CAR_Public/191007.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, October 7, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 200

                            Headlines

3001 CASTOR: $4.5MM Award to Club Dancers in Verman Suit Upheld
AGRO LABOR SERVICES: Fombona Files Class Suit in California
ALLERGAN, INC: Tauben Sues over BIOCELL Textured Breast Implants
ALLIED INTERSTATE: Garcia-LVNV Deal Gets Initial Court Approval
AMEDISYS HOLDING: Court Certifies Class in Advanced Rehab TCPA Suit

ANDREW'S TRANS: Bobbitt Seeks Overtime Compensation for Drivers
APPLE INC: First Amended Brodsky Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
ARS NATIONAL: Ortiz Files FDCPA Class Suit in New York
ASSET RECOVERY: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
BACK OF THE HOUSE: Fails to Pay All Wages, Lopez Suit Alleges

BERRY BROS: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Murillo
BERRY BROS: Non-Exempt Laborers Class Certified in Murillo Suit
BREO BOX: Fischler Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
BROOKLYN EVENTS: Settlement in Kelly FCRA Suit Gets Final Approval
CACHET: To be Blamed for Payroll Firm's Collapse, Stevens Says

CEMENTOS ARGOS: Court Strikes Bid to Certify Class in McGaffin Suit
CENTENE CORP: Court Narrows Claims in Sanchez Securities Lawsuit
CH ROBINSON: Dietrich Renews Bid to Certify Class Under IMWL
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL: Court Dismisses Shore ERISA Suit
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Court Denies Motion to Certify Class

CHICAGO, IL: Tax Collection Suit Dismissal Affirmed
CONTINENTAL INTERMODAL: Garza Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
COOK COUNTY, IL: Bennett's Bid for Class Certification Denied
DOERING LANDSCAPE: Hernandez Seeks  Class Certification Under IWPCA
DOW CHEMICAL: Boothe Farms Files Class Action Over Pesticide

EAST WISCONSIN: Settlement in Doberstein Has Preliminary Approval
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Class Certification Sought in Zurakov Suit
ENSIGN UNITED STATES: Newell Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Calif.
ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS: Evans Class Suit Removed to S.D. Texas
FEDLOAN SERVICING: Silver Moves for Certification of TCPA Class

FORSTER GARBUS: Nitta Files FDCPA Class Suit in New Jersey
FREEDOM FINANCIAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Berman TCPA Suit Denied
GEICO GENERAL: Del. Super. OKs Interlocutory Appeal in Green
GENDER BIAS: Fails to Pay Minimum/Overtime Wages, Lazo Lazo Says
GENUINE PARTS: Removes Yoakum Suit to W.D. of Missouri

GLOBAL TRANZ: Protective Order Bid in True Freight Partly Granted
GREENLAND ACQUISITION: Wheby Sues over Share Exchange Deal
GURU KRUPA: Romualdo, et al Seek Minimum & Overtime Wages
HARTE-HANKS DIRECT: Valdez Settlement Has Final Court Approval
HIDDEN VILLA RANCH: Marshall Suit Removed to C.D. California

HYUNDAI MOTOR: NJ Court Dismisses in Part First Amended Brown Suit
ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Bennett
INKSTER CITY, MI: Seeks Initial Approval of $130K Garner Suit Deal
ISRAMCO, INC: Rosenblatt Balks at Naphtha Israel Transaction
JB HUNT: Freeney Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.

JUUL LABS: D'Amico Says E-cigarettes Addictive & Unsafe
JUUL LABS: Faces Hochhauser Product Liability Suit in NY
KAISER FOUNDATION: Settlement in Banks FLSA Suit Gets Final OK
LEGEND MINING: Approval of Kaesemeyer Suit Settlement Recommended
LICMM CORP: Murphy Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act

LJ ROSS ASSOCIATES: Rosen Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
MARJAN INT'L: Polanco, et al Seek OT Wages for Restaurant Staff
MAXWELL TRAILERS: Cond'l Certification of Two FLSA Classes Sought
MCDERMOTT CENTER: Gladney Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
MDL 2286: Discovery Deadlines & Limitations in TCPA Suit Issued

MDL 2672: Court Tosses Volkswagen's Summary Judgment Bid
MDL 2804: Bryant Sues over Sale of Opioid Drugs
MICROSOFT CORP: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Khalid Anti-Trust Suit
MID-AMERICA APARTMENTS: Rowland Seeks Certification of Two Classes
MORENO: Wonderful Pistachios Files Petition for Coordination

NASSAU, NY: Bid to Certify NY Labor Law Claims Denied
NATIONAL CREDIT: Swanson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Third Circuit Appeal Initiated in Leo Suit
NATIONWIDE LIFE: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Brown Suit
NBCUNIVERSAL MEDIA: Williams Suit Moved to C.D. California

NBTY INC: Court Refuses to Disgorge Settlement Payments in Pearson
NEW YORK, NY: Class in Suit over Police Record Access Certified
NISSAN MOTOR: Face Ellis Suit in Missouri Western District
NMS MANAGEMENT: Yip Seeks to Certify Class of Mobile Examiners
NOBULL LLC: Conner Files Class Suit under ADA in New York

NOPALERA GRILL: Sorto Seeks Regular & OT Wages for Servers
NORTH CAROLINA: Sex Offenders Class Certified in Grabarczyk Suit
NOTRE DAME DE NAMUR: Moore Labor Suit Removed to N.D. California
NOVATIME TECHNOLOGY: Thome Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
NPAS SOLUTIONS: Court Enters Protective Order in Whittum TCPA Suit

NRT WEST: Bid to Certify Three Classes in Chinitz TCPA Suit Denied
OAKLEY TRANSPORTATION: Smith Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Drivers
PATTERSON COS: Bid to Dismiss Plymouth County Suit Partly Granted
PENN CREDIT: Williams Sues over Debt Collection Practices
PETROBRAS: 2nd Cir. Upholds Securities Case Settlement Approval

PILOT MOUNTAIN: Spain Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
PRINCE GEORGE'S, MD: Strange Seeks Overtime Wages
PROPETRO HOLDING: Faces Logan Suit Over Share Price Drop
PURDUE PHARMA: Stock Files RICO Class Action in Oklahoma
QUAD/GRAPHICS: Court OKs Bid to Amend Complaint in Clark

RAIL DELIVERY: Canava Files Class Cert. Bid; Hearing on Nov. 25
RED ROBIN: Seeks to Decertify Vigueras Class & Subclasses
REYES SINGLE: Faces Port Properties Suit in California State Court
RMS PROPERTIES: Vladovich Seeks OT Premium for Landscapers
SAFE HAVEN SECURITY: FLSA Class Certified in Martin Suit

SLIDE FIRE: Court Narrows Claims in Prescott NDTPA Suit
SMITH-PALLUCK ASSOCIATES: Court Grants Protective Order in Renteri
SONY CORP: 9th Circuit Upholds Settlement Approval in Young Lawsuit
SPIRIT AIRLINES: 2nd Circuit Vacates in Part Dismissal of Cox Suit
STANLEY STEEMER: Runnels Seeks Overtime Compensation

STEIN MART INC: Castaneda Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
SWAROVSKI NORTH: Calif. Court Denies Dismissal of Lerman Suit
TAPESTRY, INC: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification
TARGET CORPORATION: Ornelas et al. Suit Moved to C.D. California
TILE SHOP: 7th Cir. Affirms IWPCA Suit Dismissal

TOKYO HIBACHI: Jones Seeks to Certify Class of Restaurant Servers
TRAVEL NURSE: Court Dismisses Individual Claims in K. Call's Suit
TRIAD SENIOR: Webster Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
TRIANTOS ENTERPRISES: Fontanez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
TRUEACCORD CORP: Certification of Class Sought in Lindala Suit

TRUEACCORD CORP: Court Stays Lindala Bid for Class Certification
UNITED AIRLINES: Vallarta Sues over Misleading Travel Insurance
UNITED COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
VERO BEACH, FL: Doe Can't Proceed Anonymously in Parlor Video Suit
VISA INC: Certification of ATM Operators Class Sought

WALGREEN CO: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
WALGREEN CO: Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Atwood Suit
WALT DISNEY: Website not Accessible to Deaf People, Wineguard Says
WE CARE HOMES: Migues Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective
WELTMAN WEINBERG: Ct. Narrows Claims in Bitzko Case

WEST VIRGINIA: Minors File Civil Rights Class Action
WHIRLPOOL CORP: NJ Court Narrows Claims in DeFillippo Suit
WILLIS TOWERS: Fourth Circuit Vacates Dismissal of Proxy Suit
WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Placeholder Bid for Class Cert. Filed
YOUNIQUE, LLC: Court Grants Bid to Certify Settlement Class


                            *********

3001 CASTOR: $4.5MM Award to Club Dancers in Verman Suit Upheld
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PRIYA VERMA, On behalf of herself and All others
similarly situated, v. 3001 CASTOR, INC., d/b/a The Penthouse Club
and/or The Penthouse Club@Philly; ABCDE PENNSYLVANIA MANAGEMENT,
LLC; DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10 3001 Castor, Inc., Appellant, Case No.
18-2462 (3d. Cir.), Judge Thomas L. Ambro of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's final
judgment entering the $4.5 million jury verdict.

Priya Verma was a dancer at the Penthouse Club, a nightclub in
Philadelphia operated by Castor.  The Club provides topless female
dancers who entertain Castor's customers by performing seductive
dances.  As the Club's owner and operator, Castor controlled its
atmosphere, policies, operations, and marketing.  Dancers at the
Club were classified into two categories: "Entertainers" and
"Freelancers."  The Dancers at the Club worked in shifts.

The Club did not pay dancers a wage; their compensation consisted
entirely of (1) "tips" they received when dancing on stage or (2)
fixed "dance fees" at rates established by the Club, which they
received from giving "private dances" in the private dance rooms.
The Club also took a fee, called a "room-rental fee," for each
private dance.  Castor also required the dancers to "tip out"
certain individuals who worked at the Club.

In 2013, Verma filed the action against Castor on behalf of herself
and similarly situated current and former dancers at the Club.  She
alleged claims for minimum wages and overtime under the FLSA,
analogous claims for minimum wages and overtime under the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA"), a claim for non-payment of
wages under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, and a
claim for unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania common law.

After some discovery, the District Court entered an order
conditionally certifying a collective action under the FLSA
comprising current and former dancers of the Club during the
covered time period.  After further discovery, the Court entered an
order granting final certification of the FLSA collective action
(covering both the minimum-wage and overtime claims) and granting
in part Verma's motion for class certification under Rule 23.

The Court certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class with respect to the
following claims under Pennsylvania law: (i) a claim for minimum
wages under the PMWA, (ii) a claim for overtime under the PMWA, and
(iii) a claim for unjust enrichment based on deductions for
mandatory tip-outs.  It denied class certification to the extent
the Plaintiffs sought to recover deductions for stage-rental fees,
fines, and room-rental fees.

A couple weeks before trial, the Plaintiffs and Castor purportedly
reached an agreement in principle to settle an aspect of the
Plaintiffs' FLSA claims.  The terms of that alleged settlement are
not in the record, and there appears to be disagreement between
counsel concerning what those terms are and whether an agreement
was actually reached.  What the Court knows is that the Plaintiffs
were to receive $109,000 in exchange for not presenting at trial
some portion of their FLSA claims.

Shortly after the alleged settlement, Castor filed a motion to
dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  It
argued that a settlement concerning the FLSA claims -- the only
federal claims involved -- deprived the District Court of
jurisdiction over the case.  The Court denied that motion because,
in its view, it retained supplemental jurisdiction over the state
claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a).

The remaining claims -- class claims for minimum wages under the
PMWA, overtime under the PMWA, and unjust enrichment -- went to
trial.  The jury returned a verdict awarding the class more than
$4.5 million: $2,610,322.61 for the minimum wage claims and
$1,948,400.12 for the unjust enrichment claims.  Castor filed
post-trial motions asking the Court to dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, to reconsider its summary-judgment rulings, and to
enter judgment for Castor as a matter of law.  The Court denied
those motions and entered final judgment on the verdict.

Castor appeals.  It contends the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to try the case.  It claims the Court should have
granted its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction after the
parties reached an agreement in principle to settle an aspect of
the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims.

Judge Ambro concludes that the District Court had CAFA jurisdiction
to try the class' claims under the PMWA and Pennsylvania common
law.  It also correctly ruled before trial that, as a matter of
law, the Plaintiffs were Castor's employees.  The Judge is not
persuaded the class' claims for unjust enrichment are preempted by
the FLSA, nor is Castor entitled to a credit or an offset of
damages for the dance fees the class members earned and received.
Hence, Judge Ambro affirmed in full the challenged rulings of the
District Court and sustained the jury's verdict.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/t4LyNO from Leagle.com.

John F. Innelli (Argued) -- jinnelli@innellilaw.com -- Two Penn
Center, Suite 1300, Philadelphia, PA 19102, Counsel for Appellant.

Jamisen A. Etzel (Argued) -- jetzel@carlsonlynch.com -- Gary F.
Lynch -- glynch@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch Kilpela &
Carpenter, 1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15222.

Gerald D. Wells, III -- gwells@cwg-law.com -- Connolly Wells &
Gray, 2200 Renaissance Boulevard, Suite 275, King of Prussia, PA
19406, Counsel for Appellee.


AGRO LABOR SERVICES: Fombona Files Class Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Agro Labor Services,
Inc. The case is styled as Esteban Fombona, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Agro Labor
Services, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant, Case No.
BCV-19-102788 (Cal. Super., Kern County, Oct. 1, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

AGRO LABOR SERVICES, INC. operates in the state of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
   9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100
   Irvine, CA 92618
   Tel: 949-379-6250
   


ALLERGAN, INC: Tauben Sues over BIOCELL Textured Breast Implants
----------------------------------------------------------------
LANA TAUBEN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, v. ALLERGAN, INC. f/k/a INAMED
CORPORATION, ALLERGAN USA, INC., and ALLERGAN plc., the Defendants,
Case No. 2:19-cv-02257-CSB-EIL (Ill. Cir., Sept. 20, 2019), alleges
Allergan's BICOELL textured breast implants have increased
Plainitff's risk of developing breast implant-associated anaplastic
large cell lymphoma ("BIA-ALCL").

On July 24, 2019, Allergan announced a worldwide recall of BIOCELL
after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration called for the action
following new information that Allergan's BIOCELL implants were
tied to cases of BIA-ALCL.

The Plaintiff has received two sets of implants from Allergan. She
received her first set of implants in November 2016. However, these
implants were removed in July 2017, because she had significant
problems with pain and swelling around the implants.

During the second surgery to remove her implants, the Plaintiff
received a second set of implants. These implants were manufactured
by Defendants and were the Naturelle 410 Highly Cohesive
Anatomically Shaped Silicone-Filled Breast Implants FX.

These implants were later recalled by the FDA on July 24, 2019. At
the time of the procedure in July 2017, the Plaintiff lived in
Illinois. the Plaintiff would not have had the recalled BIOCELL
product implanted had she known prior to her surgery that the
BIOCELL textured implants increased her risk of contracting
BIA-ALCL, in addition to the costs associated with surgical removal
of the implants.

Plaintiff seeks removal of the BIOCELL textured implants at
Defendants' full expense, the lawsuit says.

Allergan manufactures and sells BIOCELL saline-filled and
silicone-filled breast implants and tissue expanders ("BIOCELL" or
"BIOCELL textured implants").[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are:

          Luke A. Baumstark, Esq.
          THE BAUMSTARK FIRM LLC
          815 Geyer Avenue
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone: (314) 492-6290
          Facsimile: (314) 492-6348
          E-mail: luke@baumstarkfirm.com

               - and -

          Matthew L. Dameron, Esq.
          Courtney M. Stout, Esq.
          WILLIAMS DIRKS DAMERON LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 945-7110
          Facsimile: (816) 945-7118
          E-mail: matt@williamsdirks.com
                  cstout@williamsdirks.com

               - and -

          Mandy M. Shell, Esq.
          SHELL LAW & TAX
          1656 Washington, Suite 140
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 399-5030
          Facsimile: (816) 205-8420
          E-mail: mshell@shell-law.com

ALLIED INTERSTATE: Garcia-LVNV Deal Gets Initial Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ESMERALDA GARCIA, an individual; on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. ALLIED INTERSTATE,
LLC, a Minnesota Corporation; IQOR US, INC., a Delaware
Corporation; LVNV FUNDING, a Delaware Limited Liability Company;
RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, L.P., a Delaware Limited Partnership;
and ALEGIS GROUP, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company; and
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 NUMBERS THROUGH 25, Case No. 5:15-cv-00294-RCL
(W.D. Tex.), the Hon. Royce C. Lamberth preliminarily approves the
Class Action Settlement Agreement and the Notice of Class Action
Settlement reflecting a proposed settlement between:

   (a) Plaintiff Esmeralda Garcia, individually, and on behalf of
       a Settlement Class of similarly situated persons; and

   (b) LVNV Funding, LLC, Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., and
       Alegis Group, L.L.C ("the Settling Defendants").

A Fairness Hearing will be held before the Court on January 10,
2020, at 9:00 a.m., to determine all necessary matters concerning
the Settlement.

The Court approves, as to form and content, the proposed "Notice of
Class Action" attached as Exhibit I to the Agreement.

For purposes of effectuating this settlement, the Court
preliminarily certifies a Settlement Class consisting of:

     (a) all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas;
     (b) to whom a collection letter was sent on behalf of LVNV
     Funding, LLC; (c) offering a settlement of a debt; (d) which
     debt was a credit card debt on which the last payment or
     activity had occurred more than four years prior to the date
     of the letter; (e) which letter was sent during the period
     from April 16, 2014, through the date of preliminary
     approval; and (f) who either made a payment, a payment
     promise, or a dispute subsequent to the sending of the
     letter.  Excluded from the Class are:

     a. any person who is already subject to an existing
        settlement agreement with LVNV Funding, LLC, Resurgent
        Capital Services, L.P., or Alegis Group, L.L.C.;

     b. any person who 1s deceased as of the date of this Order
        and for whom an administrator or executor has not been
        appointed;

     c. any person who has filed for bankruptcy protection under
        Title 11 of the United States Code as of the date of this
        Order; and

     d. any Class Member who timely mails a valid request for
        exclusion.

For purposes of effectuating this settlement, the Court appoints
Plaintiff Esmeralda Garcia as the Class Representative and her
attorneys, Stern Thomasson LLP, as Class Counsel.

The Parties are authorized to retain the services of a reputable
third-party class settlement administrator.  On or before October
19, 2019, the Administrator will print and mail the Class Notice to
the Class Members.

Any Class Member who desires to enter an appearance through counsel
pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must do so by December 19, 2019.[CC]

The Settling Defendants are represented by:

          Manuel H. Newburger, Esq.
          BARRON & NEWBURGER, P.C.
          7320 N. Mopac Expy., Suite 400
          Austin, TX 78731
          Telephone: (512) 476-9103
          Facsimile: (512) 279-0310
          E-mail: mnewburger@bn-lawyers.com


AMEDISYS HOLDING: Court Certifies Class in Advanced Rehab TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADVANCED REHAB AND MEDICAL, P.C., Plaintiff, v.
AMEDISYS HOLDING, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01149-JDB-jay
(W.D. Tenn.), Judge J Daniel Breen of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee, Eastern Division, granted
Advanced Rehab's motion for class certification.

Advanced Rehab initiated the action on Aug. 4, 2017, against
Defendant Amedisys, and other parties, alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), as amended by the Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005 ("JFPA"), stemming from faxes Amedisys
transmitted to the Plaintiff.  In the putative class action,
Advanced Rehab seeks to join all similarly situated Plaintiffs via
the motion for class certification.

Advanced Rehab alleges that between Nov. 23, 2015, and July 13,
2017, Amedisys, a Louisiana limited liability company that provides
in-home health care services, sent it unsolicited faxes in an
effort to facilitate referrals.  The Plaintiff avers that a total
of 216,897 similar faxes were sent to the proposed class of
Plaintiffs.

On April 27, 2018, the Defendant filed a motion for partial summary
judgment.  In its supporting memorandum, Amedisys explained that
only persons who had provided at least two referrals within a
12-month period received faxes, and, furthermore, each of those
documents contained an opt-out notice that complied with the TCPA's
requirements.  The Defendant sought summary judgment on the issues
of (1) whether the opt-out notice was clear and conspicuous; (2)
whether the notice set forth the requirements for a proper opt-out
request as set forth in 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(2)(D)(iii) & (E);
and (3) whether the notice complied with the requirements of
section 227(d).

On Aug. 15, 2018, the Court granted the Defendant's motion, in
part, holding that the opt-out notice (1) was clear and conspicuous
as a matter of law; and (2) complied with the statutory
requirements of Section 227(b)(2)(D)(iii), (E)(i) & (ii)2.

Because of a lack of argument from the Defendant, the Court denied
summary judgment as to (1) the compliance of the opt-out notice
with respect to Secttion 227(b)(2)(E)(iii); and (2) whether the
timestamp at the top of the faxed document satisfied the statute's
directive under Section 227(d)(1)(B).  Amedisys's Oct. 22, 2018
response to Advanced's motion for class certification revisits
these issues at length.

In response to the Plaintiff's subsequent motion for class
certification, the Defendant filed a 33-page brief.  Much of the
document, however, does not directly address the issue of class
certification, but is, rather, devoted to arguments that are
collateral to that question.  First, Amedisys contends that
Advanced lacks standing because of an absence of damages that are
traceable to the receipt of the facsimiles in controversy.  Next,
the brief implores the Court to consider matters that should be
addressed prior to class certification, which the Defendant insists
were raised in its motion for summary judgment.  Finally, Amedisys
proceeds to challenge the merits of the Plaintiff's motion.

Because the Plaintiff satisfied the threshold questions, the Rule
23(a) prerequisites, and the requirements for one of the
certification avenues under Rule 23(b), Judge Breen granted
Advanced's motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/u16JDu from Leagle.com.

Advanced Rehab and Medical, PC, A Tennessee corporation,
individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by represented
by Brian John Wanca -- bwanca@andersonwanca.com -- ANDERSON &
WANCA, pro hac vice, Ryan Michael Kelly -- rkelly@andersonwanca.com
-- ANDERSON & WANCA, pro hac vice & Benjamin Cole Aaron, NEAL &
HARWELL PLC.

Amedisys Holding, LLC, Defendant, represented by Kevin C. Baltz --
kevin.baltz@butlersnow.com -- BUTLER SNOW LLP.


ANDREW'S TRANS: Bobbitt Seeks Overtime Compensation for Drivers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Donald Bobbitt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Andrew's Transportation, LLC and Jose
M. Avelar, the Defendants, Case No. 19-1187 (Mass Super., Sept. 16,
2019), seeks to recover damages arising from the Defendants'
failure to pay overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a
workweek in violation of the Massachusetts Overtime Act.

Mr. Bobbin is a resident of Brockton, Massachusetts, and was
employed by the Defendants out of Stoughton, Massachusetts.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a driver to perform
non-emergency medical transportation services from at least three
years preceding the filing of the Complaint in this matter through
approximately November 2018, the lawsuit says.

Andrew's Transportation provides non-emergency medical
transportation services to individuals.[BN]

Attorney for Plaintiff is:

          Adam J. Shafran, Esq.
          RUDOLPH FRIEDMANN LLP
          92 State Street
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: 617 723-7700
          Facsimile: 617-227-0313

APPLE INC: First Amended Brodsky Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAY BRODSKY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-00712-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern Distric of California,
San Jose Division, granted Apple's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint ("FAC") without prejudice.

Plaintiffs Brodsky, Brian Tracey, Alex Bishop, and Brendan Schwartz
brought a putative class action against Apple for alleged privacy
and property violations based on Apple's two-factor authentication
login tool.  Once a consumer buys an Apple product, the Apple
product is associated with the consumer's Apple ID, which is the
individual's email address.  An Apple ID is required to use Apple
services, such as FaceTime and iMessage.

The Plaintiffs allege that Apple's provision of two-factor
authentication ("2FA") as an Apple ID login process violates the
Plaintiffs' right to privacy.  2FA is enabled in three instances:
(i) a software update occurs on one of the Apple devices; (ii) on
creation of a new Apple ID; or (iii) owner of the Apple device
turns on two-factor authentication in the Settings.  When enabled,
2FA requires a multi-step login process before a user can access
Apple services.  After 2FA is enabled, Apple will sometimes send an
email to the user that explains that the user can disable 2FA.

Plaintiff Brodsky alleges that in September 2015, a software update
enabled 2FA for his Apple ID.  Plaintiff Tracey alleges that he was
forced to enable 2FA for a software update on his Apple devices.
Plaintiff Bishop alleges that based on an unforeseen consequence
outside of his control, he lost access to his second trusted Apple
device, which he used for 2FA.  Plaintiff Bishop could not access
Apple services using Apple ID "for days."  Plaintiff Schwartz
alleges that he lost his second trusted Apple device based on
events outside of his control.  Then, Apple placed Plaintiff
Schwartz in its account recovery process and Plaintiff Schwartz
could not use his Apple ID for months.

Plaintiff Brodsky filed the lawsuit against Apple on Feb. 8, 2019.
On March 29, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the Amended Complaint, with
Tracey, Bishop, and Schwartz added as named Plaintiffs.  The FAC
alleges five causes of action: (1) trespass to chattels; (2)
violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"); (3)
violation of the California Computer Crime Law ("CCCL"); (4)
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"); and (5)
unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiffs brought the suit on behalf of the following putative
class:  All persons or entities in the United States who own or
owned an Apple Watch, iPhone, iPad, MacBook, or iMac or use Apple
Services that have enabled two-factor authentication (2FA),
subsequently want to disable 2FA, and are not allowed to disable
2FA.  The class period began when Apple introduced 2FA in 2015.

On May 1, 2019, Apple filed the instant motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' FAC.  Apple moves to dismiss each of the Plaintiffs'
claims for failure to state a claim.  It also contends that certain
claims are barred by the statute of limitations or must be
dismissed because the Plaintiffs fail to allege their states of
residence.

Judge Koh finds that the Plaintiffs do not allege facts to indicate
that they failed to authorize the enablement of 2FA.  Rather, their
FAC alleges that 2FA is enabled when an Apple ID user voluntarily
turns on 2FA, installs a software update, or creates a new Apple
ID.  None of those means to enable 2FA permits Apple to enable 2FA
unilaterally and without the Plaintiffs' authorization.   In fact,
neither Plaintiff Bishop nor Plaintiff Schwartz even specifies how
they enabled 2FA on their Apple devices, or alleges that enablement
was involuntary.  The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs have
also failed to allege that Apple harmed them through 2FA.  The
Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that Apple interfered with
their possession of their devices, the Judge states.

Accordingly, the Judge grants Apple's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' trespass to chattels claim.  Because granting the
Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend the complaint would
not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Apple, and
the Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith, the Judge grants leave
to amend.

Next, the Judge discusses the  Plaintiffs' CIPA claim.  Plaintiffs
allege that Apple violated the CIPA because via 2FA, Apple, by
injecting itself in the process by requiring extra logging steps,
has acquired without authorization confidential electronic
communication owned by the Plaintiffs and the Class Members.  The
Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that via 2FA,
Apple was a third party that intercepted their communications with
another entity, and have also failed to identify the contents of
any communication that Apple allegedly intercepted, as required to
state a claim under the CIPA.

Accordingly, the Judge grants Apple's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' CIPA claim.  Because granting the Plaintiffs an
additional opportunity to amend the complaint would not be futile,
cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Apple, and the Plaintiffs
have not acted in bad faith, the Judge also grants leave to amend.


As to the Plaintiffs' claims under the federal CFAA, the Plaintiffs
allege that Apple intentionally accessed through the 2FA feature
their and the Class Members' computers and that Apple knowingly
caused the transmission of information, i.e. sending and receiving
of six-digit verification code [sic] on another device.  The
Plaintiffs brought claims under two provisions of the CFAA, 18
U.S.C. Section 1030(a)(2) and Section 18 U.S.C. Section
1030(a)(5).

First, the Judge notes that the Plaintiffs' FAC alleges a claim
that 2FA slows down the login process, not a hacking claim.  To the
extent they attempt to allege that Apple exceeded their
authorization, the Plaintiffs do not allege that they revoked any
consent for Apple's servers to receive their login activities.
Second, the Plaintiffs have failed to plead damages under the CFAA.
Although they make the conclusory allegation that they suffered
economic loss with an aggregated value of at least $5,000 during a
one-year period, the Plaintiffs allege no facts to support that
conclusion.  Accordingly, the Judge grants Apple's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' CFAA claim.  Because granting the
Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend the complaint would
not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Apple, and
they have not acted in bad faith, the Judge grants leave to amend.

Next, the Judge discusses the Plaintiffs' claims under the CCCL,
also sometimes referred to as the California Comprehensive Computer
Data Access and Fraud Act.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs
offer no allegations about how they attempted to prevent 2FA's
access to their information, or how 2FA offers Apple access to
their information that is somehow different from Apple's access
through other Apple ID login methods.  Accordingly, the Judge
grants Apple's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CCCL claim.
Because granting the Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend
the complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly
prejudice Apple, and they have not acted in bad faith, she grants
leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs' fifth claim is for unjust enrichment.  The Judge
finds that the Plaintiffs' FAC includes no allegation that Apple is
liable in quasi-contract or that 2FA was somehow mislabeled.   The
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim thus appears pled as a
stand-alone cause of action, and dismissal is warranted.
Accordingly, the Judge grants Apple's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.  Because granting the
Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to amend the complaint would
not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Apple, and
they have not acted in bad faith, she grants leave to amend.

Finally, the Judge addresses Apple's two other arguments about
deficiencies in the Plaintiffs' FAC.  First, Apple contended that
Plaintiff Brodsky's and the putative class's claims under the CIPA,
CCCL, and CFAA are all time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged
any right to periodic payments, or challenged Apple's assessment of
a periodic obligations.  Accordingly, the continuous accrual
doctrine does not apply.

Second, the Plaintiffs contended that the FAC alleges a pattern of
frequent and similar acts because after 2FA is enabled, they must
use 2FA for each login and are thus injured on an ongoing basis.
For similar reasons, the Plaintiffs also cannot rely on the delayed
discovery rule.  Any user allegedly injured by 2FA would be aware
of that injury on the user's first attempt to log in via 2FA.
Therefore, the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff Brodsky's and
the putative class' claims under the CIPA, CCCL, and CFAA, and the
Judge grants Apple's motion to dismiss Plaintiff Brodsky and the
putative class's CIPA, CCCL, and CFAA claims on that ground.
Because granting Plaintiff Brodsky and the putative class an
additional opportunity to amend the complaint would not be futile,
cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Apple, and Plaintiff Brodsky
and the putative class have not acted in bad faith, the Judge
grants leave to amend.

Finally, Apple also contended that the Plaintiffs lack standing to
bring their common law claims for trespass to chattels and unjust
enrichment because the Plaintiffs fail to allege their states of
residence.  The Judge holds that without any notice as to the
Plaintiffs' states of residence or which state's law applies to
each of their common law claims, Apple cannot adequately defend
itself, nor can the Court assess the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs'
claims.

In the Order, the Judge has dismissed the Plaintiffs' common law
claims with leave to amend.  If they file an amended complaint to
cure the deficiencies in the Order as well as in Apple's motion to
dismiss, the Plaintiffs should also amend their pleading to specify
their states of residence and clarify under which state's common
law they bring their trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment
claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh granted Apple's motion to
dismiss without prejudice.  Should the Plaintiffs elect to file an
amended complaint, they are required to do so without delay. The
Plaintiffs may not add new causes of action or parties without
leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/APhIbn from Leagle.com.

Jay Brodsky, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Brian Tracey, Alex Bishop & Brendan Schwartz, Plaintiffs,
represented by Deepali Apurva Brahmbhatt -- dbrahmbhatt@onellp.com
-- One LLP, John E. Lord , One LLP & Peter Reza Afrasiabi --
pafrasiabi@onellp.com -- One LLP.

Apple Inc., a California corporation, Defendant, represented by
David Michael Walsh, Esq. -- dwalsh@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster, Erin Patricia Lupfer -- elupfer@mofo.com -- Morrison and
Foerster LLP, Lauren Lynn Erker -- lerker@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP & Tiffany Cheung -- tcheung@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP.


ARS NATIONAL: Ortiz Files FDCPA Class Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARS National
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Jason Ortiz and Joao
Dealmeida, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. ARS National Services, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-05560 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

ARS National Services, Inc. is a Financial institution in
Escondido, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


ASSET RECOVERY: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANN ZARCZYNSKI,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. ASSET RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC and VELOCITY
INVESTMENTS, LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01377-PP (E.D.
Wisc.), the Plaintiff ask the Court for an order certifying a
class, appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and
appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such
other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff furthers ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

BACK OF THE HOUSE: Fails to Pay All Wages, Lopez Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
MAGALY OLAYO LOPEZ v. BACK OF THE HOUSE INC.; MISSION 98 SUPER,
LLC; MBURGER, LLC; JBURGER LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Case No. CGC-19-579264 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., Sept. 16,
2019), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and a class of
similarly situated current and former aggrieved employees of the
Defendants for failure to pay all wages and failure to permit meal
and rest periods.

BACK OF THE HOUSE INC. is a California corporation doing business
as Super Duper Burgers with its principal place of business located
at 1829 Union Street, in San Francisco, California.  MISSION 98,
MBURGER and JBURGER are California limited liability companies
doing business as Super Duper Burgers with their principal place of
located at 1829 Union Street.  The Plaintiff is ignorant as to the
true names and capacities of the Doe Defendants.

The Defendants own and operate several Super Duper Burger
restaurants in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Arlo Garcia Uriarte, Esq.
          Ernesto Sanchez, Esq.
          LIBERATION LAW GROUP, P.C.
          2760 Mission Street
          San Francisco, CA 94110
          Telephone: (415) 695-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 695-1006
          E-mail: arlo@liberationlawgroup.com
                  ernesto@liberationlawgroup.com


BERRY BROS: Court OKs Conditional Certification in Murillo
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Lafayette Division, issued an Order granting Plaintiff's
Motion For Conditional Certification and Notice in the case
captioned Murillo, individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situation, v. Berry Bros General Contractors Inc. Civil
Action No. 6:18-cv-1434. (W.D. La.).

Murillo filed this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), alleging that Berry Bros. failed to pay him and other
similarly situated workers overtime compensation. Murillo alleges
he was employed by Berry Bros. as a mechanic at its Pecos, Texas
fabrication facility.

Plaintiff brings this suit on his own behalf and also on behalf of
a proposed class which he moves to conditionally certify as:

     All non-exempt hourly workers, such as mechanics, equipment
operators, drivers, pipefitters, welders, electricians, cement and
concrete workers, and other laborers, employed by Berry Bros. in
the United States over the last three years whose regular rate of
pay failed to include Additional Pay beyond their base hourly rate
(hereinafter Non-Exempt Laborers or Class Members).

Murillo moves to conditionally certify a collective action under 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b) of the FLSA and judicially-approve notice to
be sent by first class mail, e-mail and text message1 to all Berry
Bros. employees classified as Non-Exempt Laborers or Class Members
at any time during the past three years.

Legal Standard

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets a general minimum wage for
employees engaged in commerce. Section 207(a) requires covered
employers to compensate nonexempt employees at overtime rates for
time worked in excess of statutorily defined maximum hours.  

The FLSA affords workers the right to sue collectively on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated for violations of the
Act's minimum wage provisions and overtime protections.  An
employee can bring an action for violating the overtime provisions
of the FLSA either individually or as a collective action on behalf
of herself and "other employees similarly situated.

Conditional Certification

As this case is presently at the notice stage, the Court must make
a decision whether conditional certification should be granted and
whether notice of the action and right to opt-in should be given to
potential class members.

Murillo alleges he was paid a base hourly rate of $21.00 per hour
and generally worked over 40 hours per week for which he was paid
overtime. In addition to the base hourly rate and related overtime,
he also received Additional Pay on his paycheck stubs. As an
example of this Additional Pay, Murillo attaches pay stubs for the
pay period 9/4/2017 to 9/10/2017 providing Pay Code 5000 for
$240.00 and Pay Code 4600 for $600.00 which were included in his
total gross amount. Murillo contends that he understood that these
Additional Payments were based on his hours worked, namely, that in
the event he worked at least 4 hours per day, he would receive this
Additional Pay which was subject to taxes.

Berry Bros. argues that Murillo refused to specify the nature of
the Additional Pay he received from Berry Bros. It argues that
Murillo has failed to cite any case in which the Court
conditionally certified a class based on the employer's exclusion
of unspecified  Additional Pay from the regular rate. Berry Bros.
states that Murillo's discovery responses demonstrate that his
unspecified Additional Pay claims are actually based on (1) per
diem payments and (2) vehicle reimbursement.  

Berry Bros. contends that per diem payments may be excludable from
the regular rate of pay under the FLSA.  

Murillo agrees that Berry Bros. characterization of Additional Pay
as taxable per diem and truck pay is exactly what type of
Additional Pay is at issue.  He claims that Berry Bros.
categorically excludes all Additional Pay (per diem and truck pay)
other than hourly and quantity of work pay, from the regular rate
of pay to calculate employees' overtime compensation.

As to Berry Bros. merit-based argument that per diem payments may
be excluded from the regular rate of pay under Section 207(e)(2),
Murillo correctly states that the conditional certification stage
is not the proper time for such arguments as affirmative defenses
are more properly adjudicated after discovery. It is Berry Bros.
burden to show that the payments at issue made to employees should
be excluded from the employees' regular rate under 29 U.S.C.
Section 207.
  
In Minyard v. Double D Tong, Inc., 2017 WL 5640818, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. Mar. 22, 2017) the plaintiffs filed an FLSA case with opt-in
plaintiffs which included all non-exempt casing employees" employed
by defendants nationwide. Defendants argued that because their
casing employees had dissimilar job positions with additional pay,
including non-discretionary bonuses, truck allowances, and safety
bonus pay, they were not similarly situated under the FLSA.

As Murillo asserts in this case, the plaintiffs in Minyard argued
that the similarly situated analysis did not depend on the various
job duties performed by the members of the proposed class because
the case was not a misclassification case, but rather, a uniform
pay plan for non-exempt employees. The court agreed and held that a
class that encompasses a wide range of job positions may be
conditionally certified as long as the differences between class
members are not material to the allegations of the case.  

Here, the claims of the putative class members are similar in that
they are compensated under the same regimen. As the dissimilar job
responsibilities among the class have not been shown to be relevant
to Plaintiff's FLSA allegations, they are not a barrier to
conditional certification. However, because Plaintiff concedes that
the Additional Pay provision are actually per diem and truck
payments, the Court will clarify the definition of Additional Pay
and amend the definition of the conditionally-certified class as
follows:

All current and former non-exempt laborers employed by Berry Bros.
over the last three years who received Additional Pay in the form
of per diem payments and truck allowance pay, not included in the
regular rate of pay.

Form of Notice

Having concluded that a notice of collective action is appropriate
in this case, the next consideration is whether Plaintiff's
proposed notice is proper. Murillo seeks judicial approval of his
Proposed Notice as well as the disclosure of the names, contact
information, including the addresses, email addresses, telephone
numbers) and dates of employment of the Class Members.  He also
requests permission to send Spanish translations of the Notice
documents because many Berry Bros. employees, like Plaintiff,
consider Spanish as their primary language.

Berry Bros. raises a number of objections to Plaintiff's proposed
notice including: (1) potential opt-in plaintiffs should not send
their notice forms directly to Plaintiff's counsel (2) the class
period should be limited to three years prior to the date notice is
issued (3) failure to inform of the potential obligation to pay
proportional taxable court costs if the judgment is unfavorable to
them (4) stating the Court has allowed or certified the collective
action. Defendant requests that the Court require the parties to
meet and convene to submit a joint proposed notice.

Plaintiff does not oppose this request, but asks that the Court
resolve Berry Bros. objections to the proposed notice. Plaintiff
opposes only objections one through three. The Court will consider
the opposed objections below. As to the unopposed objection, the
parties are to omit the objected to language from the joint
notice.

Regarding Defendant's objection that the opt-in form be sent to
Plaintiff's counsel, Plaintiff argues that submitting the form to
Plaintiff's counsel and Plaintiff's counsel filing the form with
the Court is the most practicable under the circumstances and will
conserve judicial resources. Plaintiff states that this Court has
allowed such action in the past.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff's reasoning. Depending on the
number of opt-in forms submitted by potential plaintiffs, the
Court's limited resources will be conserved by Plaintiff's counsel
receiving the consent forms and then, if appropriate, filing them
with the Court. Not only has this Court issued such an order in a
number of collective cases, other courts also rely on this method.


Production of Contact Information

Plaintiff seeks Court approval to: (1) provide notice by U.S. Mail,
text message and e-mail (2) provide a reminder notice by U.S. Mail,
text message and e-mail and (3) post the notice at Berry Bros.'
jobsite in an open and obvious location. Berry Bros. argues that
telephone numbers should only be allowed in the event first class
mail is returned as undeliverable with no forwarding address.
Multiple courts in this District have ordered the production of
telephone numbers in similar cases.   

The Court will allow Plaintiff to provide notice by all requested
methods, U.S. Mail, email and text message.

While the Court finds the Plaintiff has failed to establish that
reminder notices are necessary, the Court concludes that the
posting of Notices at Berry Bros. jobsite trailers is an efficient,
cost effective method to notify potential opt-in distributors of
this class action and would not be burdensome on Defendant.  

The Motion For Conditional Certification And Notice filed by
Plaintiffs, Sergio Murillo, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situation is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available https://tinyurl.com/yytj7z3o from Leagle.com.

Sergio Murillo, Plaintiff, represented by Kenneth W. DeJean , Law
Offices of Kenneth W DeJean, Adam Russell Credeur , Law Offices of
Kenneth W DeJean, 417 West University Avenue, Lafayette, LA
70506-3649, Armando A. Ortiz , Fitapelli & Schaffer, pro hac vice &
Joseph A. Fitapelli , Fitapelli & Schaffer, 28 Liberty Street, New
York, NY 10005, pro hac vice.

Berry Bros General Contractors Inc, Defendant, represented by
Thomas J. McGoey, II -
tjmcgoey@liskow.com - Liskow & Lewis, A'Dair Ragan Flynt -
aflynt@liskow.com - Liskow & Lewis & Kindall Chauffe James -
kjames@liskow.com - Liskow & Lewis.


BERRY BROS: Non-Exempt Laborers Class Certified in Murillo Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Carol B. Whitehurst granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification and Notice filed
by Sergio Murillo in the lawsuit entitled Murillo, individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situation v. Berry Bros General
Contractors Inc., Case No. 6:18-cv-01434-MJJ-CBW (W.D. La.).

The Court conditionally certifies this matter as a collective
action, including all current and former non-exempt laborers
employed by Berry Bros. during the time period of November 2, 2015,
to the present who received Additional Pay in the form of per diem
payments and truck allowance pay not included in the regular rate
of pay.

Judge Whitehurst directs the parties to file with the Court a Joint
Proposed Notice that complies with this Order within 10 days.  In
the event the parties cannot agree as to any specific issue, they
must identify and brief the issue(s) separately at which time the
Court will make a determination.

The Defendant is also directed to provide the Plaintiffs' counsel
with the names, last known addresses, e-mail addresses, and
telephone numbers of the potential opt-in plaintiffs
("Court-Ordered Information"), in a usable electronic format within
21 days of this Order.

Judge Whitehurst also rules that the Plaintiff's counsel shall,
upon obtaining the Court-Ordered Information, be permitted to send
notices of this action in the form set forth in the approved Joint
Proposed Notice, by mail, e-mail and text message for a period of
90 days from the date the Defendant provides the Plaintiff with the
Court-Ordered Information.  The notice shall inform all potential
opt-in plaintiffs that they shall have until ninety (90) days from
the date the Defendant provides the Plaintiffs with the
Court-Ordered Information to deposit in the mail, e-mail or text
their Notices of Consent to Join to counsel for Plaintiffs.[CC]


BREO BOX: Fischler Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------
Breo Box Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Brian
Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Breo Box Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05535 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019).

Breo Box is a seasonal subscription service for both men & women,
delivering cool and unique high-end products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com




BROOKLYN EVENTS: Settlement in Kelly FCRA Suit Gets Final Approval
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FELIPE KELLY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BROOKLYN EVENTS CENTER, LLC d/b/a
BARCLAYS CENTER, LEVY PREMIUM FOODSERVICE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS CATERING LLC, Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-4600
(RLM) (E.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the
Plaintiff's Unopposed Motions for Certification of the Settlement
Class and Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Approval of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs, and Approval of Service Award.

Based upon her review of the motions, memorandum, and other papers
submitted in connection with the Motions for Final Approval, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that the Settlement is the result of
extensive, arm's-length negotiations and is in all respects, fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and binding on all members of the Class
who have not opted out.  She granted final approval of the
settlement memorialized in the Settlement Agreement.

Pursuant to Rule 23, the Magistrate Court certified the Settlement
Class defined as applicants who applied for a position with Levy at
the Barclays Center during the Class Period [Aug. 4, 2014 through
Aug. 15, 2018], and: (i) were otherwise eligible for employment;
(ii) were identified by Levy as having a background report showing
a criminal history through background reports procured from a
consumer reporting agency retained by Levy; and (iii) who were not
hired by Levy either because of unintentional administrative error
or on the basis of their criminal history.

She granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs
and awarded the Class Counsel $165,000 in attorneys' fees and
expenses reasonably expended litigating and resolving the lawsuit.
The award will be paid by the Defendant.

She also found reasonable the service award for Plaintiff Felipe
Kelly in the amount of $5,000 in recognition of the services he
rendered on behalf of the class.  The service award will be paid by
the Defendant.

The Effective Date is the date the Judgment has become Final.  In
turn, "Final" means the date the Judgment becomes final for all
purposes, because either (i) no appeal has been filed and 30 days
have lapsed since entry of the Judgment, or (ii) if there is an
appeal of the Court's decision granting final approval, the day
after all appeals are finally resolved in favor of final approval.

Within 14 days of the Effective Date of the Settlement, the
Defendant will transfer to the Settlement Administrator the
following amounts: $250 for each Tier One Class Member, and for
individuals who submit Claim Forms, $1,950 for each Tier Two Class
Member, and $2,350 for each Tier Three Class Member, $165,000 in
attorneys' fees and costs, and $5,000 for the Plaintiff's service
award

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/lcIJDq from Leagle.com.

Felipe Kelly, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher McNerney --
cmcnerney@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, Lewis M. Steel
-- ls@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, Nina T. Martinez --
nmartinez@outtengolden.com -- New York Legal Assistance Group &
Ossai Miazad -- om@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP.

Levy Premium Foodservice Limited Partnership, Defendant,
represented by Gina Renee Merrill -- gmerrill@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Stacey Blecher -- sblecher@seyfarth.com --
Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Frederick Thomas Smith -- fsmith@seyfarth.com
-- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, pro hac vice.


CACHET: To be Blamed for Payroll Firm's Collapse, Stevens Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
VELETA STEVENS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. CACHET FINANCIAL SERVICES, a
California Corporation; and FINANCIAL BUSINESS GROUP HOLDINGS, a
Corporation, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-08120 (C.D. Cal.,
Sept. 19, 2019), arises from the collapse of a New York-based
"payroll processing" provider, MyPayrollHR (MPHR). MPHR was a
service provided by Cloud Payroll, LLC and Valuewise Corporation
(who share common ownership), but, upon information and belief, was
never organized as a separate legal entity.

When MPHR collapsed, it had the potential to send economic ripple
effects across the ecosystem of employers and employees for whom it
provided payroll services. Cachet amplified and exponentially
worsened those ripple effects in its reckless, ham-fisted attempts
to insulate itself from the fallout.

Cachet enabled but failed to recognize acts of fraud and/or
embezzlement on the part of MPHR. Once Cachet finally recognized
that something was amiss, it sought to protect itself at the
expense of employees nationwide.

Cachet wrongfully caused many millions of dollars to be with drawn
from the bank accounts of approximately 250,000 employees
nationwide. In many cases, the amounts withdrawn by Cachet vastly
exceeded the wages which were owed, often resulting in the complete
draining of employee's bank accounts and the imposition of
penalties and fees. Thus, while MPHR initiated the financial crises
for employees across the country, Cachet elevated that crises into
the stratosphere, financially crippling employees, the lawsuit
says.

Cachet is not a bank or banking institution. Instead, Cachet is a
third-party processor for electronic fund transfers in the form of
Automated Clearing House payments servicing financial institutions,
merchants, mid-market to large corporations and other users of ACH
transactions.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mike Arias, Esq.
          Alfredo Torrijos, Esq.
          mike@aswtlawyers.com
          alfredo@aswtlawyers.com
          ARIAS SANGUINETTI WANG & TORRIJOS, LLP
          6701 Center Drive West, 14th Floor
          Los Angeles, California 90045
          Telephone: (310) 844-9696
          Facsimile: (310) 861-0168

               - and -

          Steven D. Liddle, Esq.
          Nicholas A. Coulson, Esq.
          LIDDLE & DUBIN, P.C.
          975 E. Jefferson Avenue
          Detroit, MH 48207
          Telephone: (313) 392-0015
          Facsimile: (313) 392-0025
          E-mail: sliddle@ldclassaction.com
                  ncoulson@ldclassaction.com

CEMENTOS ARGOS: Court Strikes Bid to Certify Class in McGaffin Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BECKY McGAFFIN; JIM McGAFFIN; NATHAN LAVOIE; DANIEL
NUNN; STEFANIE NUNN; and RACHALE LAVOIE, Plaintiffs, v. CEMENTOS
ARGOS, S.A.; ARGOS USA CORP.; ARGOS CEMENT, LLC; and ARGOS READY
MIX LLC, Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:16-cv-104 (S.D. Ga.), Judge
R. Stan Baker of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia, Savannah Division, granted the Defendants' Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs claim that the concrete that the Defendants supplied
to their residential properties contains a common defect inherent
to the mixture of the concrete.  They contend that this common
defect has caused a tremendous amount of concrete dust to
infiltrate their homes.

The Plaintiffs, all individuals who own homes within Georgia, filed
the lawsuit on May 6, 2016.  They directly asserted numerous claims
and proposed to assert the same claims on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals defined as follows: All persons who
own a home in the State of Georgia, purchased during the period May
6, 2013 to and including May 6, 2016, where and when Argos designed
and manufactured concrete not properly proportioned in that it
contained insufficient cement and/or excessive fly ash and/or the
wrong type of fly ash and when said concrete was used in
foundations, footings, driveways, walkways, garages, patios, slabs
and other areas of the person's house and property.

The Plaintiffs amended their Complaint on July 21, 2016.  That
amendment contained a slightly revised definition of the proposed
class: All persons who own a lot and a dwelling in the State of
Georgia, purchased during the period May 6, 2013 to and including
May 6, 2016, for which Argos supplied defective concrete not
properly proportioned in that it contained insufficient cement
and/or excessive fly ash and/or the wrong type of fly ash and when
said concrete was used in slab applications for the person's
dwelling and property.

The Defendants then moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim.  On Jan. 13, 2017, the
Court granted the Motion to Dismiss in part and denied the motion
in part.  The parties' briefs on the Motion to Dismiss only relied
on Georgia law, and the Court analyzed the sufficiency of the
Plaintiffs' claims only under Georgia law.

On Jan. 29, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Certify
Class.  That motion contained the following definition of the
proposed class: All current owners of residential properties where
Argos 30RAF868 concrete was used in flatwork applications, i.e.,
poured as slabs on grade, including the slab on which the home is
built, driveways, walkways, patios, and/or garage floors, between
April 10, 2013 and Oct. 21, 2013.

On Feb. 28, 2018, the Defendants filed the instant Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify.  They argued that the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification and supporting materials made clear
for the first time that the Plaintiffs intend to broaden their
class to include homeowners in South Carolina.  They maintained
that the Plaintiffs should not be allowed to amend their Complaint
through their Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Defendants'
Motion to Strike.  They argued that the pleadings and
correspondence between the parties gave the Defendants fair notice
that the case would include claims regarding South Carolina
properties.

The Court held a hearing on the Defendants' Motion for Class
Certification and related motions on Nov. 8, 2018.  Following that
hearing, the matter was stayed for the parties to pursue settlement
discussions.  After the parties did not reach resolution, the Court
then held another hearing on May 22, 2019.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated that it was
inclined to grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification as
to liability because common issues of fact and law predominate.
However, it explicitly reserved ruling as to whether the class
would include any South Carolina properties and allowed for
additional briefing from the parties.  The parties have now filed
their post-hearing briefs through which they maintain their
respective support of and opposition to the Motion to Strike.

Judge Baker finds that much of the parties' briefing and oral
argument on the motion has focused on when the Plaintiffs knew of
the prospective South Carolinian Plaintiffs and whether the
Plaintiffs provided timely notice to Defendants of their intent to
include claims arising under South Carolina law.  He need not
resolve the parties' arguments on those issues to resolve the
Defendants' motion.  Even if the Plaintiffs did not learn of the
putative South Carolinian Plaintiffs until well into discovery and
shortly before they filed their Motion for Class Certification, the
Court would not allow the Plaintiffs to insert claims arising under
South Carolina law into this action.  Expanding the class to
include such claims would frustrate the very purposes of judicial
efficiency and economy that class litigation under Rule 23 is
designed to promote.

The Plaintiffs have also not demonstrated that the variation
between the laws of Georgia and South Carolina "is manageable," the
Georgia District Court held.  The differences between the law
applicable to South Carolina homes and Georgia homes would be
particularly difficult to manage given the unique procedural
posture of the case.  If the Court were to allow the Plaintiffs to
now expand the class to include South Carolina claims, the
Defendants would at least be given the opportunity to similarly
test the sufficiency of those claims under Rule 12(b)(6).  That
motion would require the parties and the Court to delve deeply into
the law of an entirely different jurisdiction.  That motion
practice, not to mention additional class-based discovery, would
unduly delay and complicate the litigation of the claims of the
Georgia class members.

Finally, at the May 22, 2019 Motions hearing, the Plaintiffs'
counsel conceded that the addition of South Carolina class members
may result in a "slight delay" but argued that the delay could be
mitigated by creating a subclass for the South Carolina claims.
However, even the Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that if the Georgia
claims proceeded on their current track, the South Carolina
subclass may not "catch up."  Thus, the inclusion of South Carolina
claims would cause difficulties in managing the class action that
outweigh the benefits of including these claims in the class.

For these reasons as well as those stated by the Defendants in
their pleadings and oral argument, Judge Baker granted the
Defendants' Motion to Strike.  The Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification remains before the Court, but the Plaintiffs will not
be allowed to assert claims regarding homes located outside the
state of Georgia.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/cwZ5Wx from Leagle.com.

Becky Mcgaffin, Jim Mcgaffin, Nathan Lavoie, Daniel Nunn & Rachale
Lavoie, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael J. Moore --
michaelmoore@popemcglamry.com -- Pope McGlamry Kilpatrick Morrison
& Norwood PC, Raymond L. Moss -- rlmoss@mossgilmorelaw.com -- Moss
& Gilmore, LLP, Courtney Lynn Engelke, Pope McGlamry, Jay Forbes
Hirsch, Pope McGlamry, Kimberly J. Johnson, Pope McGlamry, P.C. &
Wade Tomlinson -- triptomlinson@popemcglamry.com -- Pope, McGlamry,
Kilpatrick, Morrison & Norwood, P.C.

Stefanie Nunn, Plaintiff, represented by Michael J. Moore, Pope
McGlamry Kilpatrick Morrison & Norwood PC, Raymond L. Moss, Moss &
Gilmore, LLP, Courtney Lynn Engelke, Pope McGlamry, Jay Forbes
Hirsch, Pope McGlamry & Wade Tomlinson, Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick,
Morrison & Norwood, P.C.

Christopher Young, Movant, represented by William J. Hunter, Oliver
Maner, LLP.

Cementos Argos S.A., Argos USA Corp., Argos Cement, LLC & Argos
Ready Mix LLC, Defendants, represented by Angela M. Spivey --
angela.spivey@alston.com -- McGuireWoods, LLP, pro hac vice,
Christian Edmund Henneke -- chenneke@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire
Woods, LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer R. Burbine, McGuireWoods, LLP,
R. Trent Taylor -- rtaylor@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP,
pro hac vice & Travis C. Gunn -- tgunn@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice.


CENTENE CORP: Court Narrows Claims in Sanchez Securities Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ISRAEL SANCHEZ, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. CENTENE CORP.,
MICHAEL NEIDORFF, and JEFFREY SCHWANEKE, Defendants. SUNIL CHAND,
et al., Movants, Case No. 4:17CV00806 AGF (E.D. Mo.), Judge Audrey
G. Fleissig of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' amended consolidated
class action complaint for failure to state a claim.

The putative class action was filed under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA)," in federal district court in California and
transferred to the Missouri District Court.  The Plaintiffs bring
the action on behalf of all persons and entities that purchased or
acquired Centene stock between April 26, 2016, and July 25, 2016.

The Defendants are Centene and two of its top officers: Michael
Neidorff and Jeffrey Schwaneke.  Centene sells health insurance.
On July 2, 2015, Centene announced its intention to acquire Health
Net, Inc., a company that sold health insurance primarily in
California and Arizona, for about $6.8 billion.  Under the terms of
the agreement, upon completion of the merger, Centene shareholders
would own approximately 71% of the combined entity, with Health Net
shareholders owning approximately 29%.  The merger closed on March
24, 2016.

During the nine months leading up to the merger, Centene conducted
due diligence of Health Net's business.  In 2014 and throughout
2015, Health Net incurred rising liabilities related to claims for
substance-abuse treatment.  Health Net began denying such claims
and asked California regulators for permission to redesign its
policies.  In filings with the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC") dated Sept. 17, 2015, Sept. 21, 2015, and Jan. 26, 2016,
made in anticipation of the merger, Centene added it does not have
sufficient information as to the amount, timing and risk of cash
flows of all of Health Net's identifiable intangible assets to
determine their fair value.

On April 26, 2016, (one month after the merger and the start of the
Class Period) Centene published a required purchase price
accounting (SEC Form 10-Q) listing Health Net's assets and
liabilities that Centene acquired.  The April 2016 accounting did
not include the language that Centene did not have sufficient
information regarding Health Net's fair value; but was labeled,
"preliminary" and "subject to change."  According to the
Plaintiffs, the April 2016 statement, using "purchase accounting,"
violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") and SEC
regulations, and this resulted in about $300 million of Health
Net's liabilities not being reported as of that date.

The Plaintiffs contend that on July 26, 2016, "the truth was
revealed" when the Defendants disclosed that Health Net's
liabilities were $390 million higher than Defendants had
represented in April 2016.  On that day, in response to this
disclosure, Centene's stock price declined by about 8.5%, erasing
over $1 billion in shareholder value.  The gravamen of the amended
complaint is that the Defendants knew during the Class Period about
this level of Health Net's liabilities, but concealed it, and
"Defendants' materially false and misleading statements and
omissions artificially inflated the price of Centene common stock
and maintained inflation in the stock price. The disclosures on
July 26, 2016 revealed the relevant truth and removed the
artificial inflation from the stock price.

The Plaintiffs emphasized that Health Net's liabilities reported by
Centene on July 26, 2016, were not due to new information obtained
since the April 26, 2016 financial statements.  Rather, according
to the Plaintiffs, Centene knew as of April 26, 2016, about the
level of Health Net's liabilities that were due to claims from
California substance-abuse treatment centers.

The amended complaint also includes a section entitled, "Additional
Allegations of Defendants' Scienter," that points to evidence of
Defendants' admissions that they had knowledge during the due
diligence period of Health Net's rising substance-abuse treatment
liabilities and its efforts to control these costs.  It has two
counts: Count I against all the Defendants claims violations of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 by making
false statements Defendants knew were misleading; and Count II
against Centene officers Neidorff and Schwaneke for violations of
Section 20(a) of the Act (control-person liability).  The
Plaintiffs seek all damages and other remedies available under the
Exchange Act.

The Defendants urged the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended
consolidated class action complaint, and oral argument was held on
Feb. 22, 2018.

In support of their motion to dismiss, the Defendants argued that
the Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing that the
"Preliminary Estimates" of April 26, 2016, were false at the time
they were made, by not alleging any facts that would show
Defendants knew -- or even could have known -- the precise value of
the liabilities created by Health Net's insurance products until
Centene had completed a full valuation of those liabilities
postclosing [of the merger.

In response, the Plaintiffs argued that the complaint adequately
alleges false and misleading statements and omissions.
Specifically, they cite the Defendants' oral statements on April
26, May 24, and June 17, 2016; as well as the accounting
statements.  The Plaintiffs also argue that the complaint
adequately alleges scienter.

As for Count I, the Plaintiffs allege that three sets of statements
made by the Defendants in April, May, and June 2016 were false and
misleading.  They also allege that the Defendants' April 26, 2016,
SEC Form 10-Q filing violated GAAP and SEC regulations, and was
false and misleading.

Judge Fleissig agrees with the Defendants that the allegations as
to their April statements and SEC 10-Q filing are not adequate to
meet the PSLRA heightened pleading standard.  However, the
Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to meet the PSLRA standard
with respect to the Defendants' May and June statements.  The
Plaintiffs sufficiently support their claim that, by the time the
May 2016 statements were made, the Defendants had in their
possession facts concerning Health Net reserves that they omitted
from their May 2016 statements, which rendered those statements
materially false or misleading.  And although statements made by
the Defendants in April 2016 are not sufficient to meet the
heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA, statements made in
May and June of 2016 are pled with sufficient particularity.  The
Plaintiffs' May and June 2016 allegations are not catch-all or
blanket assertions but instead point to specific statements made by
the Defendants that could be found to be misleading.

The Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that Count II fails
due to the failure of the primary violation count.  However,
because the Judge finds that the Count I primary violation survives
dismissal under Rule 12 as to the Defendants' May and June 2016
statements, Count II also withstands dismissal as to those
statements.

Based on her findings as outlined, Judge Fleissig denied in part
and granted in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  Because the
Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to state a PSLRA claim
with particularity as to the Defendants' statements and financials
released in April 2016, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted as to these allegations.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs'
definition of the term "Class Period" must be appropriately
adjusted.  The "Class Period" will now be limited to the time
period of May 24, 2016 to July 25, 2016.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/xpWBIX from Leagle.com.

Israel Sanchez, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert V. Prongay --
rprongay@glancylaw.com -- GLANCY AND BINKOW, LLP, Charles Henry
Linehan -- CLINEHAN@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP,
Lesley F. Portnoy -- LPORTNOY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP & Lionel Zevi Glancy -- LGLANCY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy
Prongay and Murray LLP.

Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension & Relief Fund, Plaintiff, represented
by David R. Stickney -- davids@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN AND
LITOWITZ, pro hac vice & Jonathan Daniel Uslaner --
jonathanu@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN AND LITOWITZ, pro hac vice.

Centene Corp., Michael F. Neidorff & Jeffrey A. Schwaneke,
Defendants, represented by Christopher A. Smith , HUSCH BLACKWELL,
LLP, Joseph P. Conran , HUSCH BLACKWELL, LLP, Peter Bradley
Morrison -- peter.morrison@skadden.com -- Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher and Flom LLP, Jay B. Kasner -- jay.kasner@skadden.com --
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP, pro hac vice & Scott D.
Musoff -- scott.musoff@skadden.com -- SKADDEN ARPS, LLP, pro hac
vice.

Sunil Chand & Amir Softic, Movants, represented by Jennifer Pafiti
-- jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

Richard P. Wolsfeld, Jr., Movant, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy,
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi Glancy, Glancy Prongay
and Murray LLP & Robert V. Prongay, GLANCY AND BINKOW, LLP.

UA Local 13 Pension Fund, Movant, represented by Danielle S. Myers,
Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP.

Louisiana Sheriffs' Pension & Relief Fund, Movant, represented by
Brandon C. Marsh, SAXENA WHITE, P.A., David R. Stickney, BERNSTEIN
AND LITOWITZ, pro hac vice, Blair A. Nicholas, Bernstein Litowitz
Berger and Grossmann LLP & Michael J. Flannery, CUNEO AND GILBERT,
LLP.


CH ROBINSON: Dietrich Renews Bid to Certify Class Under IMWL
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned TARYN DIETRICH, on behalf of
herself and a class of all those similarly situated v. C.H.
ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INC., Case No. 1:18-cv-04871 (N.D. Ill.), filed
with the Court a renewed motion for class certification.

Ms. Dietrich, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, asks the Court to
certify a class defined as:

    "All persons who have been employed in the state of Illinois
     at C.H. Robinson as Assistant Carrier Account Managers,
     Buyers, Carrier Representatives, Carrier Account Managers,
     Senior Carrier Account Managers, Capacity Account Managers,
     and/or other similar positions, and who did not sign a C.H.
     Robinson arbitration agreement, at any time from three years
     before the filing of this action through and including the
     present and until final resolution of the case."[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robin Potter, Esq.
          M. Nieves Bolanos, Esq.
          Patrick Cowlin, Esq.
          POTTER BOLANOS LLC
          111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 861-1800
          E-mail: robin@potterlaw.org
                  nieves@potterlaw.org
                  patrick@potterlaw.org

               - and -

          Jamie S. Franklin, Esq.
          THE FRANKLIN LAW FIRM, LLC
          53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 803
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 662-1008
          E-mail: jsf@thefranklinlawfirm.com


CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL: Court Dismisses Shore ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELLA SHORE, LISA ENGEL, MARK RACZ, MICHAEL SCHWOB,
AND LYDIA WALKER, on behalf of themselves, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the
Atrium Plans, Plaintiffs, v. THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL
AUTHORITY, ATRIUM HEALTH RETIREMENT COMMITTEE, JOHN AND JANE DOES
1-20, MEMBERS OF THE ATRIUM HEALTH RETIREMENT COMMITTEE, EACH AN
INDIVIDUAL, MEDCOST, LLC AND MEDCOST BENEFIT SERVICES, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 1:18-CV-00961 (M.D. N.C.), Judge Thomas D.
Schroeder of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina granted the motions of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hospital Authority and MedCost to dismiss the Shore, et al.,
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority is a non-profit
healthcare conglomerate headquartered in Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina.  It established and maintains three employee benefit
plans: the Pension Plan of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital
Authority, the Carolinas HealthCare System 401(k) Matched Savings
Plan, and the Carolinas HealthCare System LiveWELL Health Plan.  

The City of Charlotte created the Authority in 1943 pursuant to the
Hospital Authority Act ("HAA"), which authorizes cities and
counties to create hospital authorities whenever a city council or
a county board of commissioners finds and adopts a resolution
finding that it is in the interest of the public health and welfare
to create a hospital authority.  The Authority is registered as a
"municipal" body.  The Authority is governed by the Board of Atrium
Commissioners.

The putative class action alleges that the Defendants did not
comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").  The action is brought by former Authority employees who
allege that they participated in the Authority's employee benefit
plans which should have complied with ERISA requirements.  The
Plaintiffs allege several claims flowing from a contention that the
plans are subject to ERISA and seek a declaration they are covered
plans and an order that they be brought into compliance with the
law.

Before the Court are the motions of the Authority and MedCost to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.  They move in the alternative to dismiss the
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  MedCost's brief adopts and
incorporates by reference the facts, authorities, and arguments set
forth in the Authority's brief in support of its motion to dismiss.
The Plaintiffs filed a consolidated response.

Because the claims against both the Authority and MedCost fail as a
matter of law if the Authority's plans are governmental plans,
resolution of the Authority's motion will resolve all the
Defendants' motions.

The parties agree that if the Authority's plans are governmental
plans, then the plans are not subject to ERISA coverage and the
Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law.  While the Fourth
Circuit has not established a test for determining whether an
entity is a governmental plan, other circuits have developed tests
for determining whether an entity is a "political subdivision" or
an "agency or instrumentality" under ERISA.

Both parties agree that the Hawkins test should be used to
determine whether the Authority constitutes a "political
subdivision."  This test provides that "political subdivisions" are
"entities that are either (1) created directly by the state, so as
to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government,
or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public
officials or to the general electorate."  The test is disjunctive,
so if either prong is satisfied, then the entity in question is a
political subdivision.

Judge Schroeder finds that the Authority satisfies the first prong
of the Hawkins test because it was created by the state of North
Carolina through a delegation of its authority pursuant to the HAA.
Because the Defendants have provided ample persuasive case law
holding that creation by a local entity pursuant to a state
enabling statute is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
Hawkins test, and the Plaintiffs have neither distinguished these
cases from the present case nor provided persuasive contrary
authority, the Judge finds that the first prong of the test is
satisfied.

And because the Hawkins test is disjunctive, satisfying either
prong is sufficient for an entity to attain "political subdivision"
status and thereby categorize its retirement benefits plans as
"governmental plans" exempt from ERISA coverage.  Nevertheless, the
Judge is also persuaded that the Authority meets the second prong
of the test.

Courts have held that the second Hawkins prong -- that the entity
is administered by individuals who are responsible to public
officials or to the general electorate -- is met when public
officials appoint and may remove the entity's governing members.
The Authority's board of commissioners is appointed by the county
chairman (a county-level public official) from a list of nominees
provided by the board.  The Authority's commissioners may be
removed by the county chairman for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or misconduct following notice and a hearing.

By statute, the Authority is administered by a board of
commissioners appointed by the Chairman of County Commissioners,
who is a public official.  The chairman has the statutory power to
remove a commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
misconduct.  The Authority therefore satisfies the second prong of
the Hawkins "political subdivision" test because it is administered
by officials who are responsible to public officials.

Because he finds that the Authority satisfies both prongs of the
Hawkins test and constitutes a "political subdivision," the Judge
need not reach the Defendants' separate contention that the
Authority is exempt from ERISA coverage because it constitutes an
"agency or instrumentality."

For the reasons stated, Judge Schroeder concludes that the
Authority is a "political subdivision" and that its plans are
therefore "governmental plans" exempt from ERISA coverage.
Accordingly, he granted the Authority's motion to dismiss and
MedCost's motion to dismiss, and dismissed the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/xpWBIX from Leagle.com.

DELLA SHORE, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND ON BEHALF OF THE ATRIUM
PLANS, LISA ENGEL, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND ON BEHALF OF THE
ATRIUM PLANS, MARK RACZ, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND ON BEHALF OF THE
ATRIUM PLANS, MICHAEL SCHWOB, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, AND
ON BEHALF OF THE ATRIUM PLANS & LYDIA WALKER, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, AND ON BEHALF OF THE ATRIUM PLANS, Plaintiffs,
represented by JAMIE L. BOWERS -- jbowers@cohenmilstein.com --
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC, JULIE SELESNICK --
jselesnick@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN HAUSFELD & TOLL,
P.L.L.C., KAREN L. HANDORF -- khandorf@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN
MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC & MARTHA A. GEER --
mgeer@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL, PLLC.

THE CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, A NORTH CAROLINA
NON-PROFIT CORPORATION & ATRIUM HEALTH RETIREMENT COMMITTEE,
Defendants, represented by CHARLES E. JOHNSON --
cejohnson@robinsonbradshaw.com -- ROBINSON BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A.,
DAVID C. WRIGHT, III -- dwright@robinsonbradshaw.com -- ROBINSON
BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER KRISKO, ROBINSON
BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., MARK A. HILLER, ROBINSON BRADSHAW &
HINSON, P.A., TRAVIS S. HINMAN, ROBINSON BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A.,
CAROLINE A. WONG -- CAROLINE.WONG@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP,
CHRIS K. MEYER -- CMEYER@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP & MARK B.
BLOCKER -- MBLOCKER@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP.

MEDCOST LLC & MEDCOST BENEFIT SERVICES, LLC, Defendants,
represented by RICHARD A. COUGHLIN -- rcoughlin@foxrothschild.com
-- FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, MAUREEN DEMAREST MURRAY --
mmurray@foxrothschild.com -- FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP & WHITNEY D. PIERCE
-- wpierce@foxrothschild.com -- FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP.


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Court Denies Motion to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JENNIFER M. SANSONE, and
BALDEMAR ORDUNO, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of Other Members
of the Public Similarly Situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; TWC ADMINISTRATION LLC; CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, LLC; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, the Defendants, Case
No. 3:17-cv-01880-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge William Q.
Hayes entered an order:

   1. granting a motion for summary judgment filed by the
Defendants;

   2. denying as moot the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class; and

   3. denying the Defendants' motion to file documents under seal.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs fail to identify specific
facts and explain the legal significance of the facts sought. The
information sought would not illuminate the determinative inquiries
in this case. The Court denies any requests related to discovery
that the Plaintiffs have not "set forth in affidavit form."

The Plaintiffs brought claims for violation of California Labor
Code section 227.3 (failure to pay at termination and valuation);
failure to timely pay wages; breach of contract; and unfair
competition.[CC]

CHICAGO, IL: Tax Collection Suit Dismissal Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division,
issued an Opinion affirming the District Court's judgment granting
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned Nina
Trilisky, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 1-18-2189. (Ill. App.).

Plaintiff Nina Trilisky appeals from an order of the circuit court
of Cook County granting defendant, city of Chicago's (City), motion
to dismiss her amended class action complaint pursuant to section
2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff's amended class action complaint alleged that sales to
and from the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation are exempt from the Chicago Real
Property Transfer Tax because the transfers involve real property
acquired by or from any governmental body. Plaintiff further
claimed the City has been improperly collecting the transfer tax on
such sales.

The City moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that (1)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not governmental bodies, and (2)
plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The
circuit court agreed with the City that the enterprises were not
governmental bodies and dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the circuit court erred in dismissing
her amended complaint because the court improperly concluded that
the enterprises are not governmental bodies exempt from the
transfer tax.

Plaintiff further asserts that the enterprises are federal
instrumentalities, and as such, they can be considered governmental
bodies. In addition, plaintiff argues entities created by the
government to carry out a public function are governmental bodies
under the transfer tax ordinance and relies on Hubble v. Bi-State
Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District,
238 Ill.2d 262 (2010), as well as the definition of governmental
body found in the Illinois Administrative Code (86 Ill. Adm. Code
120.20(e)(4) (2004)), as authorities for this assertion.  

The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018). A section
2-615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of a
complaint by alleging defects on the face of the complaint. When
ruling on a section 2-615 motion, the relevant question is whether
the allegations in the complaint, construed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss should
not be granted with prejudice unless it is clear that no set of
facts can be proved under the pleading which would entitle the
plaintiff to relief.

Plaintiff's arguments revolve around the interpretation of the
phrase governmental body as it is used in Chicago's transfer tax
ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code Section 3-33-060(B) (amended May
8, 2013)). Specifically, the Court must determine whether the
enterprises are governmental bodies, as transfers of real property
from governmental bodies are exempt from the tax.  

Municipal ordinances are interpreted using the same rules of
statutory interpretation.The most fundamental rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's
intent. The statute's language is the best indicator of such
intent. The statutory language must be given its plain, ordinary,
and popularly understood meaning.  

The transfer tax ordinance does not define the term governmental
body, nor is the term defined elsewhere in the Municipal Code.
Despite plaintiff's contention, however, even if the enterprises
can be considered federal instrumentalities, a federal
instrumentality is not the same as a governmental body. As
discussed further below, the term governmental body is unambiguous
and necessarily excludes entities such as governmental agencies and
instrumentalities.  

A main tenet of statutory construction is that the use of certain
language by the city council in one instance and different language
in another instance indicates the city council intended different
results. Thus, the express mention of one thing in a statute or
ordinance excludes all other things not mentioned.  

A review of title 3 of the Municipal Code, which contains all of
Chicago's tax ordinances, reveals the use of terms such as
governmental bodies, governmental agencies, departments of the
State of Illinois, political subdivisions, public or municipal
corporations, the federal government and the United States
Government or any agency thereof.

The transfer tax at issue here solely exempts governmental bodies,
i.e., exempt from the tax are transfers involving real property
acquired by or from any governmental body. In utilizing this
specific language, the city council excluded from the transfer tax
exemption other entities such as governmental agencies and
political subdivisions, which are afforded exemptions elsewhere in
the Municipal Code. The plain language of the transfer tax
therefore indicates the city council's intent was to exempt from
the transfer tax property acquired by or from governmental bodies,
and not property acquired by or from governmental agencies or
instrumentalities. Accordingly, even if the enterprises could be
considered governmental instrumentalities as a result of the
Agency's conservatorship, as plaintiff contends, it does not follow
that the city council intended them to be under the umbrella of a
governmental body where the city council was clearly able to define
the term to be so inclusive.
  
The Court interpretation of the term governmental body is
additionally supported, in part, by the framework set forth in
Lombard. Lombard, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 935.

In that case, this court was tasked with determining whether the
Lombard Public Facilities Corporation (LPFC) was a governmental
body pursuant to the Retailer's Tax Act. The Village of Lombard
incorporated LPFC, a not-for-profit corporation, to assist in the
financing and construction of a convention hall and hotel facility
in the Village. LPFC was granted authority to issue, sell, and
deliver bonds, encumber any real property or equipment acquired by
it for the purpose of the project; and enter into contracts for the
construction and acquisition of the convention hall and hotel
facility. The articles of incorporation for LPFC stated that its
purpose was to assist the Village of Lombard in its essential
governmental purposes.

The Village and LPFC entered into an agreement whereby LPFC was to
obtain a surety bond and submit construction plans to the Village
for approval. The Village agreed to provide funds to make debt
service payments on LPFC's surety bonds only if income from the
project was insufficient. The Village's taxing power and full faith
and credit were not pledged as security for any of the bonds and
Village did not otherwise funnel any of its own funds to LPFC. LPFC
had no authority to sell the property used for the project without
the consent of the Village. Further, LPFC was staffed by Village
employees and meetings were held at the Village in accordance with
the Open Meetings Act.

LPFC did not have the ability to impose taxes, maintain a police
force, or provide water or sewer treatment, and it did not receive
any charter from Illinois recognizing it as a governmental body.

LPFC filed an application for exemption from the Retailer's Tax Act
on the basis that its purchases made for the construction of the
hotel and convention center were those of a governmental body. The
Illinois department of revenue denied the application, and that
decision was affirmed by an administrative law judge.  

On appeal, the reviewing court agreed that LPFC was not a
governmental body. In so holding, it found that LPFC's status had
to be considered separate and apart from the Village, and
determined that that LPFC: (1) had little or no control over the
Village and its decisions (2) was not organized as an agency or
branch of the Village itself and (3) did not perform a function
necessary to maintain the Village's existence.  Overall, the
Village was not dependent upon LPFC for its governmental
activities, and LPFC was also not dependent on the Village for its
day-to-day project management activities.

Applying the framework set forth in Lombard to the case at bar,
like LPFC in Lombard, the enterprises do not have the ability to
impose taxes, maintain a police force, or provide water or sewer
treatment, and their charters do not recognize them as governmental
bodies. Furthermore, the federal government does not fund the
enterprises. The enterprises, like LPFC in Lombard, (1) have little
or no control over the federal government or its decisions, (2) are
not organized as branches of the government itself, and (3) do not
perform a function necessary to maintain the government's
existence. The federal government is not dependent on the
enterprises for its governmental activities, and the enterprises
are also not dependent on the government for its day-to-day
activities.  

Although plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that the
enterprises are government-sponsored enterprises under federal law,
the federal statute reveals that they are privately owned, the
money they borrow is not backed by the full faith and credit of the
federal government, they do not exercise powers reserved to the
government, they do not have the power to commit the government
financially, and their employees are not federal employees.
Moreover, each enterprise was created as a body corporate and the
Agency, which succeeded to the enterprises' rights and powers, is
independent of the federal government.  

Accordingly, the Court finds the enterprises are not governmental
bodies so as to be exempt the transfer tax.  

Plaintiff further argues the enterprises are governmental bodies
because they provide a public function. In support of this
contention, plaintiff points to section 31-45(b) of the Illinois
Real Estate Transfer Tax Law (Illinois Transfer Tax), a similar
transfer tax which exempts property acquired by or from
governmental bodies. Plaintiff observes that the Illinois
Administrative Code (Administrative Code) defines the term
governmental body as it appears in section 31-45(b) of the Illinois
Transfer Tax as an entity created to carry out a public function by
a federal, state, or local unit of government.

The record, however, reveals plaintiff never advanced this public
function theory before the circuit court. It is axiomatic that an
unsuccessful party may not advance a new theory of recovery on
appeal and doing so results in forfeiture of that issue on appeal.
Moreover, plaintiff's new theory is inconsistent with her argument
advanced before the circuit court and in her opening brief that the
enterprises transformed into governmental bodies solely as a result
of the Agency's 2008 conservatorship.  

The Court finds plaintiff's reliance on the Administrative Code to
be misguided. Plaintiff provides no authority, and we have found
none, indicating the city council intended to rely on the
Administrative Code. In fact, it would have been impossible for the
city council to rely on the definition found in the Administrative
Code when the transfer tax was initially enacted. While the
transfer tax, including the exemption at issue here, was enacted in
1992, the definition plaintiff relies on was not added to the
Administrative Code until 2004.  

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the amended complaint
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted
where the enterprises do not fall within the scope of the
governmental body exemption of the transfer tax.  

For these reasons, the Court affirms the judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County dismissing Trilisky's amended complaint.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's September 26, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y6b726jz from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth A. Fegan - beth@hbsslaw.com - and Daniel J. Kurowski -
dank@hbsslaw.com - of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, of Chicago,
for appellant.

David Freydin , of Freydin Law Firm LLP, 8707 Skokie Blvd., Ste
305, Skokie, Illinois 60077, for appellant.

Mark A. Flessner , Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, 233 East
Wacker Drive,
Chicago, IL, 60601, Benna Ruth Solomon , 1250 Larkin Avenue, Suite
100, Elgin, IL 60123, Myriam Zreczny Kasper and Suzanne M. Loose ,
30 N La Salle St Ste 800, Chicago, IL, 60602-3542, for appellee.


CONTINENTAL INTERMODAL: Garza Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CONTINENTAL
INTERMODAL GROUP LP. The case is styled as JOSEPH GARZA,
INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OFOTHER MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. CONTINENTAL INTERMODAL GROUP LP,
Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-102776 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty.,
Sept. 30, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Continental Intermodal Group - Navasota LLC provides logistics
services. The Company offers transloading and storage services for
oil and gas market.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by DOUGLAS HAN, ESQ.



COOK COUNTY, IL: Bennett's Bid for Class Certification Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable John Robert Blakey denied the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification in the lawsuit titled Preston Bennett v. Thomas
Dart, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-04268 (N.D. Ill.).

Thomas Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois.

For the reasons explained in the accompanying memorandum opinion
and order, the Plaintiff's motion for class certification is denied
without prejudice, according to the Court's docket entry.  All
dates and deadlines stand.[CC]


DOERING LANDSCAPE: Hernandez Seeks  Class Certification Under IWPCA
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ALEJANDRO OROZCO HERNANDEZ, on behalf of
himself, and all other similarly situated persons, known and
unknown v. DOERING LANDSCAPE COMPANY, and RICK H. DOERING
individually, Case No. 1:18-cv-03313 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff
moves the Court for order certifying a proposed class for claims
arising under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have had a policy or
practice of deducting the cost of uniforms from his and similarly
situated employees' wages without their written consent given
freely at the time of the deduction.  He seeks to certify this
class:

     Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees of
     Doering Landscape Co. and Rick H. Doering who had deductions
     made from their wages for the cost of uniforms from May 9,
     2008 up to and including the date of judgment.

Mr. Hernandez also asks the Court to appoint him as class
representative, to appoint his counsel to serve as counsel for the
class, and to authorize notice to the class of the action and their
right to opt out.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher J. Williams, Esq.
          NATIONAL LEGAL ADVOCACY NETWORK
          53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 1224
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 795-9121


DOW CHEMICAL: Boothe Farms Files Class Action Over Pesticide
------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reports that Boothe Farms claims in a
federal class action that Dow Chemical, Corteva and DuPont's Loyant
pesticide does not control grasses and weeds as advertised, and
damaged their rice crops.  A copy of the lawsuit is available at:
https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Pesticides.pdf



EAST WISCONSIN: Settlement in Doberstein Has Preliminary Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin, Green Bay Division, issued an Order granting Parties'
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the
case captioned TIFFANY DOBERSTEIN on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EAST WISCONSIN SAVINGS
BANK, Defendant. Case No. 18-C-1931. (E.D. Wis.).

The Court preliminarily approves the Agreement and the terms set
forth therein as being fair, reasonable, and adequate. The
Agreement is the result of arms' length negotiations between
experienced attorneys who are familiar with class action litigation
in general and with the legal and factual issues of this case in
particular. The Court finds that the settlement terms negotiated by
the Parties and described in the Agreement are a fair and
reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute between the Defendant,
the Named Plaintiff, and the Class Members.

The Court has considered the pleadings and arguments made by the
parties in this litigation and in support of the Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement and Collective Action
Settlement and for Class Certification for the Purposes of
Settlement and finds the proposed Settlement Class is proper and
that the Court had jurisdiction over the claims and parties alleged
in Plaintiff's Complaint.

Solely for the purposes of the proposed settlement, the following
settlement class is hereby certified pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All hourly-paid, non-exempt employees who are or have been
employed by Defendant within three (3) years immediately prior to
the filing of the Complaint and who received non-discretionary
forms of compensation in addition to regular wages that were not
included in their regular rates of pay for overtime calculation
purposes and whose names appear on Exhibit A (the Rule 23 Class) to
the confidential Settlement Agreement and Release.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available  https://tinyurl.com/y2pkxces from Leagle.com.

Tiffany Doberstein, Plaintiff, represented by David M. Potteiger -
dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC, James A.
Walcheske - jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC &
Scott S. Luzi - sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com - Walcheske & Luzi LLC.

East Wisconsin Savings Bank, Defendant, represented by Gregory B.
Gill, Sr. , Gill & Gill Law Firm, 501 S. Nicolet Road, Appleton, WI
54914


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Class Certification Sought in Zurakov Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs move the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of their lawsuit captioned CINDY ZURAKOV and CARLOS
GOMEZ, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01389 (E.D.
Wisc.), and further ask that the Court both stay the motion for
class certification and to grant them (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiffs assert, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiffs tell the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiffs assert that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiffs are obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiffs
contend.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiffs argue.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ENSIGN UNITED STATES: Newell Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit entitled LOUIS NEWELL, an individual, for
himself and those similarly situated v. ENSIGN UNITED STATES
DRILLING (CALIFORNIA) INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Case No. BCV-15-100367, was removed on
Sept. 19, 2019, from the Superior Court of the State of California
for the County of Kern to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California, Fresno Division.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-at-00676 to the
proceeding.

On June 22, 2015, Plaintiff Louis Newell filed this Class Action
Complaint against Ensign in the Superior Court, alleging six causes
of action under California law: (1) minimum wage violations; (2)
unfair competition; (3) failure to timely pay final wages; (4)
failure to provide lawful meal periods; (5) failure to pay overtime
and double-time premium wages for all hours worked; and (6) wage
statement violations.

The Plaintiff subsequently filed amended complaints.  On August 22,
2019, the Plaintiff filed and served his Second Amended Complaint,
alleging the same seven causes of action as the First Amended
Complaint and introducing, for the first time, a cause of action
under federal law for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
along with another state cause of action for failure to provide
lawful rest periods.[BN]

Defendant ENSIGN UNITED STATES DRILLING (CALIFORNIA) INC. is
represented by:

          David J. Cooper, Esq.
          Vanessa Franco Chavez, Esq.
          Mayra Estrada, Esq.
          KLEIN, DENATALE, GOLDNER, COOPER, ROSENLIEB
          & KIMBALL, LLP
          4550 California Ave., Second Floor
          Bakersfield, CA 93309
          Telephone: (661) 395-1000
          Facsimile: (661) 326-0418
          E-mail: dcooper@kleinlaw.com
                  vchavez@kleinlaw.com
                  mestrada@kleinlaw.com


ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS: Evans Class Suit Removed to S.D. Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------
The purported class action lawsuit styled MARY EVANS and DON WESTON
DORRELL, individually and as representatives of a class v.
ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS PARTNERS, LP, OILTANKING PARTNERS, LP, and
CENTERPOINT ENERGY, Case No. 2019-57694 was removed on Sept. 20,
2019, from the 165th Judicial District Court of Harris County,
Texas, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-03555 to the
proceeding.

On August 19, 2019, Mary Evans and Don Weston Dorrell commenced a
civil action against the Defendants in the Harris County District
Court.  The Plaintiffs claim that the installation of a pipeline in
2015 along a CenterPoint easement in Channelview, Texas, has caused
property damages and the diminution in property value of the
Plaintiffs' and Proposed Class Members' properties.  The Plaintiffs
assert negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, negligent
hiring/supervision/training/retraining, private nuisance, and fraud
by nondisclosure claims against Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Tej R. Paranjpe, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Ruemke, Esq.
          Andrew Bivona, Esq.
          PARANJPE, MAHADASS, RUEMKE LLP
          3701 Kirby Dr, Suite 530
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: (832) 667-7700
          E-mail: TParanjpe@pandmllp.com
                  DBivona@pandmllp.com
                  BRuemke@pandmllp.com

Defendant Enterprise Products Partners, LP is represented by:

          D. Ferguson McNiel, Esq.
          Patrick W. Mizell, Esq.
          Matthew Hoffman, Esq.
          Stephanie L. Noble, Esq.
          Brooke Noble, Esq.
          VINSON & ELKINS L.L.P.
          1001 Fannin Street, Suite 2500
          Houston, TX 77002-6760
          Telephone: (713) 758-3882
          Facsimile: (713) 615-5493
          E-mail: fmcniel@velaw.com
                  pmizell@velaw.com
                  mhoffman@velaw.com
                  snoble@velaw.com
                  bnoble@velaw.com

               - and -

          John Kim, Esq.
          THE KIM LAW FIRM
          4309 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 2000
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 522-1177
          Facsimile: (888) 809-6793
          E-mail: jhk@thekimlawfirm.com

FEDLOAN SERVICING: Silver Moves for Certification of TCPA Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned NEIL SILVER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION
ASSISTANCE AGENCY, DBA FEDLOAN SERVICING, Case No. 14-cv-00652 PJH
(N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff moves the Court for an order granting
his Motion for Class Certification against PHEAA pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and, Rule
23(b)(3) concerning PHEAA's violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The class consists of:

     All persons within the United States who received a
     telephone call from PHEAA between February 2010 and February
     2014 on their cellular telephone made through the use of any
     automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
     prerecorded voice after having requested PHEAA to refrain
     from further telephonic communications.

Mr. Silver also asks the Court for his appointment as Class
Representative, and for appointment of his attorneys as Class
Counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          Matthew M. Loker, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
                  ml@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (877) 206-4741
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


FORSTER GARBUS: Nitta Files FDCPA Class Suit in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Forster, Ggarbus &
Garbus. The case is styled as Takahito Nitta, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Forster,
Garbus & Garbus, Ronald Foster, Mark Garbus and Glenn Garbus,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-18588 (D. N.J., Oct. 1, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Forster, Garbus & Garbus offers legal services in Hackensack, New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   CRAIG B. SANDERS, Esq.
   BARSHAY SANDERS PLLC
   100 GARDEN CITY PLAZA, SUITE 500
   GARDEN CITY, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


FREEDOM FINANCIAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Berman TCPA Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL BERMAN, Plaintiff, v. FREEDOM FINANCIAL
NETWORK, LLC, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-01060-YGR (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California (i) denied the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment; (ii) granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to limit the admissibility of portions
of a supplemental expert report by Benjamin H. Beecher; and (iii)
denied without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

In the instant action, Plaintiff Berman, on behalf of himself and a
putative class, alleges violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA") by means of autodialed text messages and
prerecorded voice calls as part of a telemarketing campaign by Lead
Science, LLC, also known as "Drips," and Fluent, Inc. promoting the
services of Freedom Financial Network and Freedom Debt Relief, LLC.


Berman alleges a total of four claims: one for violation of section
227(b)(1) for "robocalling," i.e. placing non-emergency calls or
text messages to a cell phone number using and automatic dialing
system and/or an artificial or pre-recorded voice without his prior
express written consent; a second for violation of section 227(c)
for unsolicited telemarketing calls and texts to a residential
telephone number listed on the National Do Not Call Registry; and
two additional claims for willful violations of sections 227(b)(1)
and 227(c).

Pending before the Court were: (i) the Defendants' (1) motion for
summary judgment and (2) motion to limit the admissibility of
portions of a supplemental expert report by Benjamin H. Beecher;
and (ii) the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

As a preliminary matter, Judge Rogers considers the admissibility
of certain opinion evidence offered by the Plaintiff in the form of
an expert report by Beecher.  The Defendants move to strike
portions of portions of paragraphs 10(a), 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 29,
and 31 of the expert report of Beecher pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence 104, 401, 402, 403, 702 and 704.  The Defendants contend
the opinions offered by Beecher are not reliable or relevant and
should not be considered in connection with the pending motions.
More specifically, they contend: (1) Beecher offers opinions on
matters as to which he has not demonstrated that he has expertise;
(2) his opinions are speculative to the extent they are based upon
defendants' undisclosed intent; (3) he offers improper legal
conclusions and legal analysis.

To the extent that those statements suggest that Beecher is
offering an opinion as to a particular user or users, such opinions
will not be permitted at trial or in further proceedings.  The
Judge granted the motion to strike as to the portion of Beecher's
report opining on the intentions of the Defendants or legal
conclusions, both of which are outside his expertise and not
properly within the province of expert testimony.

Thus, the Judge sustained the objections to the following and
struck these portions of the supplemental report; (i) portion of
paragraph 10 stating unfair and not clear and conspicuous; (ii)
portion of paragraph 20 stating with every intention of coercing
and manipulating its visitors; (iii) portion of paragraph 24
stating this confusion is intentional; (iv) portion of paragraph 27
stating unfair; and (v) portions of paragraph 31 stating "This
scheme used by Fluent to obtain purported consent from consumers
was unfair and not clear and conspicuous."

The Defendants seek summary judgment on five grounds.  They contend
that the TCPA is not a strict liability statute and that their
reasonable, good faith belief that they had valid consent when they
contacted Berman should preclude liability.  In the alternative,
they seek summary judgment on four additional grounds: (1) Berman
lacks standing because his TCPA injury was caused by a third party
not before the Court; (2) he lacks standing to challenge
defendants' alleged failure to comply with the E-SIGN Act because
he never visited Fluent's website; (3) his claim for injunctive
relief is moot; and (4) he cannot establish his entitlement to
treble damages for willful violations of the TCPA.

Judge Rogers denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on
all issues raised therein.  She finds that (i) the Defendants'
contention that it maintained a good faith belief that it had
consent to call Berman is not dispositive on the TCPA claims; (ii)
the Defendants caused the TCPA injury by contacting Berman by means
of an ATDS; (iii) since the Plaintiff alleges no claim (and
therefore no direct injury) under the E-SIGN Act, lack of standing
to bring such a claim is irrelevant in the case; (iv) the record
does not show that it is "absolutely clear" Berman would never be
contacted by defendants without his express consent in the future,
at this or some other phone number; and (v) Berman has offered
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue on whether the
Defendants were willfully blind to the evidence of erroneous leads
and the complaints they received, as well as intentionally
misleading and confusing users with their web registration design
such that informed, express consent could not be obtained.

The Plaintiff moves for certification of the following class under
Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3): All persons in the United States to whom:
(a) Drips made one or more calls and/or sent one or more text
messages reflected in the documents produced in the litigation
under Bates stamp LEADSCIENCE_677.csv and/or LEADSCIENCE_677.txt
between Feb. 14, 2018, and April 17, 2018, inclusive.

The Judge denied without prejudice the motion for class
certification.  She concludes that Berman has not sufficiently
demonstrated his typicality and adequacy with respect to the class
as currently defined.  Berman offers a plan for litigating the
express consent issue on a class-wide basis, arguing lack of
contract formation based upon the uniform failure of Fluent's
websites to comply with the "signature" and "clear and conspicuous
disclosure" requirements under the TCPA.  However, he has not
offered authority showing that he can properly litigate those
issues if he himself never visited the Fluent websites.  Similarly,
it is not clear that Berman would be able to litigate adequately
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement on the Fluent
website if he is not subject to it.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UWIZei from Leagle.com.

Daniel Berman, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony I. Paronich --
anthony@broderick-law.com -- Broderick & Paronich, P.C., pro hac
vice, Matthew Passi McCue -- mmccue@massattorneys.net -- The Law
Office of Matthew P. McCue, pro hac vice, Edward A. Broderick --
ted@broderick-law.com -- Broderick and Paronich, P.C. & Jon
Bernhard Fougner -- Jon@FougnerLaw.com.

Freedom Financial Network, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian P.
Astrup -- bastrup@kleinmoynihan.com -- Klein Moynihan Turco LLP,
pro hac vice, Jay Thomas Ramsey -- jramsey@sheppardmullin.com --
Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Jonah Sampson Van Zandt --
jvz@severson.com -- Severson and Werson & Robert James Guite --
rguite@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP.

Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, Defendant, represented by Brian P.
Astrup, Klein Moynihan Turco LLP, pro hac vice, Jay Thomas Ramsey,
Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP & Jonah Sampson Van Zandt,
Severson and Werson.

Fluent, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jay Thomas Ramsey, Sheppard
Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Brian P. Astrup, Klein Moynihan
Turco LLP, pro hac vice & Joseph Thomas Johnson, III, Klein
Moynihan Turco LLP, pro hac vice.

Lead Science, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jay Thomas Ramsey,
Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP & Brian P. Astrup, Klein
Moynihan Turco LLP, pro hac vice.

Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, 3rd party plaintiff, represented by Jay
Thomas Ramsey, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Jonah
Sampson Van Zandt, Severson and Werson & Joseph Thomas Johnson,
III, Klein Moynihan Turco LLP, pro hac vice.

Freedom Financial Network, LLC, 3rd party plaintiff, represented by
Jay Thomas Ramsey, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Jonah
Sampson Van Zandt, Severson and Werson, Joseph Thomas Johnson, III
Klein Moynihan Turco LLP, pro hac vice & Robert James Guite,
Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP.


GEICO GENERAL: Del. Super. OKs Interlocutory Appeal in Green
------------------------------------------------------------
The Superior Court of Delaware issued an Opinion granting Defendant
GEICO General Insurance Company's Application for Certification of
Interlocutory Appeal of the Court's Opinion Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification in the case captioned YVONNE GREEN,
WILMINGTON PAIN & REHABILITATION CENTER, and REHABILITATION
ASSOCIATES, P.A., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant. C.A. No. N17C-03-242 EMD CCLD. (Del. Super.).

Upon consideration of Defendant GEICO General Insurance Company's
Application for Certification of Interlocutory Appeal of This
Court's Opinion Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification.  

The Plaintiffs filed suit against GEICO. As alleged, GEICO uses two
computerized models to evaluate personal injury protection (PIP)
claims of its insureds. The Plaintiffs argue that GEICO uses the
Rules to deny valid claims without evaluating the facts underlying
the claims. The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class action
under Superior Court Civil Rule 23.

As part of the Civil Rule 23 process, the Plaintiffs filed their
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class.

After extensive briefing and a one-day hearing where the parties
presented evidence and arguments, the Court issued the Opinion. The
Opinion grants the relief sought in the Class Motion. GEICO noted
an interlocutory appeal of the Opinion.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

Rule 42(b) dictates the standard for certifying an interlocutory
appeal. No interlocutory appeal will be certified by the trial
court or accepted by this Court unless the order of the trial court
decides a substantial issue of material importance that merits
appellate review before a final judgment.

In deciding whether to certify an interlocutory appeal, the trial
court must consider: (1) the eight factors listed in Rule
42(b)(iii) (2) the most efficient and just schedule to resolve the
case and (3) whether and why the likely benefits of interlocutory
review outweigh the probable costs, such that interlocutory review
is in the interests of justice. If the balance of these
considerations is uncertain, the trial court should refuse to
certify the interlocutory appeal.

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE

The substantial issue of material importance prong of Rule 42
requires that the matter decided goes to the merits of the case.
The focus, here, is not on the merits of legal arguments, but
rather on whether the trial court's decision determined a
substantial issue. This case involves the application of 21 Del. C.
Section 2118 to GEICO's Rules through a Civil Rule 23 class action.


The Opinion is not addressing a minor issue like a discovery
dispute, but rather the viability of class certification. The Court
concludes, therefore, that the substantial issue criterion is met
in GEICO's request for certification.

LEGAL RIGHT

A legal right is established when a court determines an issue
essential to the positions of the parties regarding the merits of
the case, i.e., where one of the parties' rights has been enhanced
or diminished as a result of the order. Arguably, the Opinion does
not determine an essential issue regarding the merits of the case.
The Court notes that the Opinion addresses the Plaintiffs' request
to certify classes and not the validity of the claims asserted in
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

RULE 42(b)(iii)

Even if the Court finds that GEICO satisfied the substantial issue
of material importance requirement, GEICO must also meet at least
one of the requirements of Rule 42(b)(iii). Here, the Court finds
that the Motion meets at least one of the Rule 42(b)(iii)(A)-(H)
criterion.

The Court cannot find that the Opinion involves a question of law
resolved for the first time in Delaware under Rule 42(b)(iii)(A)
and (B). Despite GEICO's contentions, the Opinion merely allows the
Plaintiffs to proceed under Civil Rule 23. This is hardly novel in
Delaware.

The Court has already addressed the validity of the claims pled by
the Plaintiffs and GEICO's purported split in trial court opinions
on those claims.  

The Court does find that the Motion meets the criterion of Rule
42(b)(iii)(G) and (H). The Opinion follows similar decisions of the
Federal District Courts. However, such a class has never been
certified in Delaware. Wilmington Pain & Rehab. Ctr., P.A.
discussed its availability but did not rule upon it. A decision by
the Supreme Court on the viability of the type of classes certified
in the Opinion could serve to terminate the class portion of this
litigation.

The Court believes this because if GEICO is right on appeal and the
Plaintiffs cannot proceed as a class, then both forms of class
certification the one advanced in Wilmington Pain & Rehab. Ctr.,
P.A. and the one advanced in the Amended Complaint with respect to
the Rules will not be available in Delaware. This does not mean
that the entire litigation will terminate as the Plaintiffs would
still be able to proceed on the Amended Complaint, just not under
Civil Rule 23.

The Court finds that Rule 42(b)(iii)(H) is necessarily implicated
because of the analysis relating to Rule 42(b)(iii)(G). In other
words, determining whether the type of class certified in the
Opinion is available in Delaware, will serve the considerations of
justice.

The Court is concerned that without the Proposed Order (or a
modified Proposed Order) the Supreme Court may be addressing an
interlocutory appeal not fully formed or defined. However, the
Court feels that addressing the Proposed Order is jurisdictionally
problematic since GEICO noted the interlocutory appeal prior to any
action on the Proposed Order.

The Court ordered that certification to the Supreme Court of the
State of Delaware for disposition in accordance with Rule 42 sought
under the Motion is granted.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available https://tinyurl.com/yyxwhpk6 from Leagle.com.


GENDER BIAS: Fails to Pay Minimum/Overtime Wages, Lazo Lazo Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maria Juana Lazo Lazo, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Gender Bias, Inc. d/b/a Lola & Sophie and
Does 1–50, inclusive, Case No. 1:19-cv-08572 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 16,
2019), alleges that the Defendants violated the minimum wage and
overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards and the New York
Labor Law.

Gender Bias, Inc., doing business as Lola & Sophie, is a business
operating in the State of New York, with its principal place of
business located at 307 W 38th Street, in New York City.  The true
identities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown.

The Defendants sell women's clothes.  The Plaintiff and class
members are current or former non-exempt employees, including
sewists.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Benjamin D. Weisenberg, Esq.
          WEISENBERG FIRM, PLLC,
          450 Lexington Ave.-4th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (917) 747-5303
          Facsimile: (212) 365-5619
          E-mail: ben@weisenbergfirm.com


GENUINE PARTS: Removes Yoakum Suit to W.D. of Missouri
------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of JESSE YOAKUM, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GENUINE
PARTS COMPANY; AUTHORIZED MOTOR PARTS CORPORATION d/b/a NAPA AUTO
PARTS; and WARREN OIL COMPANY, LLC, Defendants, filed a notice to
remove the lawsuit from the Circuit Court of the State of Missouri,
County of Cass (Case No. 19CA-CC00183) to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Missouri on September 9, 2019. The
clerk of court for the Western District of Missouri assigned Case
No. 4:19-cv-00718-BP.

Genuine Parts Company distributes automotive replacement parts,
industrial replacement parts, office products, and electrical and
electronic materials. The Company conducts business throughout most
of the United States, in Canada, and in Mexico. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James C. Morris, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP
          100 S. 4th Street, Suite 550
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 961-6686
          Facsimile: (314) 338-3076
          E-mail: jmorris@grsm.com


GLOBAL TRANZ: Protective Order Bid in True Freight Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, True Freight Logistics LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Global Tranz Enterprises Incorporated, et al., Defendants. Global
Tranz Enterprises Incorporated, Counterclaimant, v. True Freight
Logistics LLC, Counter-Defendant, Case No. CV-18-01472-PHX-JGZ (D.
Ariz.), Judge Jennifer G. Zipps of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona granted in part and denied in part GTZ's motion
for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) regarding
True Freight's requests for production of electronically stored
information ("ESI").

Through requests for production, True Freight sought "all
communications," with no subject matter limitation, between 49
different GTZ email accounts for the time period of May 2017 to
Feb. 28, 2018.  After GTZ objected, True Freight narrowed its
request to 33 email accounts, provided search terms, and expanded
the date range to include June 12, 2012 to Feb. 8, 2018.  GTZ
agreed to collect ESI from 14 of the 33 custodians and indicated
its "preference" to limit True Freight's requested search terms.
With respect to the remaining custodians, GTZ requested additional
information about why each custodian was likely to be in custody of
relevant information.

In response, True Freight provided the title and/or a "generalized"
description of the type of work performed by each custodian; True
Freight did not explain why each individual would likely be in
custody of the requested information.  Freight stating that the
description is not inclusive and not detailed.  GTZ is aware of the
responsibilities and interactions of the above individuals because
they are/were GTZ's employees.

GTZ ultimately agreed to collect data from one additional
custodian, bringing the total to 15.  GTZ's search retrieved 4.5
GB, comprised of approximately 13,000 documents and more than a
million pages for GTZ's counsel to review for relevance and
privilege.  GTZ's counsel has spent approximately 80 hours
reviewing those documents, is only a little more than half way
through, and GTZ has produced 27,000 pages to True Freight.

GTZ now seeks a protective order limiting production to the 15
custodians whose accounts GTZ has already searched.  GTZ asserts
that requiring it to collect and review documents from additional
custodians is not proportionate to the needs of the case.  GTZ
estimates that searching for documents from the additional
custodians will result in at least the same amount of data gathered
from the first 15 custodians and will cost GTZ at least another
$100,000 in attorneys' fees.

With the exception of one custodian, Judge Zipps agrees with GTZ.
She concludes that TFL's demand for GTZ to produce documents from
all of the additional custodians is not proportional to the needs
of the case.  Requiring GTZ to provide the additional
communications would result in a substantial burden and expense,
including $100,000 in attorneys' fees in addition to the 80-plus
hours of attorney time expended on the record review of the 15
custodians.  With the exception of John Hohman, GTZ's Manager of
Agent Earnings Reporting, True Freight fails to sufficiently
establish that the remaining custodian accounts likely possesses
important information bearing on the issues so as to justify that
burden and expense.  In light of the marginal relevance of the
other custodian accounts, the anticipated cost is disproportionate,
particularly in relation to the $900,000 in controversy.

GTZ alone may have access to internal communications of its
employees, but GTZ has provided or will provide the internal
communications of 16 custodians.  TFL does not dispute that records
from the first 15 custodians include internal communications that
would be retrieved from the additional custodians.  Moreover,
again, it is notable that TFL characterizes the disclosed
communications as having little value.

Considering the factors set forth in Rule 26(b)(1), Judge Zipps
concludes that, with the exception of custodian Hohman, the burden
and expense of producing the additional custodian accounts is not
proportional to the needs of the case.  Therefore, she denied GTZ's
Motion for Protective Order with respect to the custodian account
of Hohman, and granted with respect to the remaining custodians.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/LrVk3O from Leagle.com.

True Freight Logistics LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff, represented by Lorraine Morey -- Lorraine@morey-law.com
-- Morey Law PLLC.

Global Tranz Enterprises Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Benjamin Christian Nielsen --
benjamin.nielsen@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Christopher
Bradley Vynalek -- brad.vynalek@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP,
Eric Bowen Johnson -- eric.johnson@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady
LLP & Michael Shawn Catlett -- michael.catlett@quarles.com --
Quarles & Brady LLP.

Global Tranz Enterprises Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation,
Counter Claimant, represented by Benjamin Christian Nielsen,
Quarles & Brady LLP, Christopher Bradley Vynalek, Quarles & Brady
LLP, Eric Bowen Johnson, Quarles & Brady LLP & Michael Shawn
Catlett, Quarles & Brady LLP.

True Freight Logistics LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company &
Joshua Goldstein, Counter Defendants, represented by Lorraine
Morey, Morey Law PLLC.


GREENLAND ACQUISITION: Wheby Sues over Share Exchange Deal
----------------------------------------------------------
EARL M. WHEBY, JR., Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs, GREENLAND ACQUISITION
CORPORATION, YANMING LIU, SHAN CUI, JIANG PU, and YU CHEN, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01758-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 19, 2019),
alleges that Defendants violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with a share exchange
agreement.

On July 12, 2019, Greenland Acquisition Corporation's Board of
Directors caused Greenland to enter into a share exchange agreement
with Zhongchai Holding (Hong Kong) Limited, Cenntro Holding
Limited, and Greenland Asset Management Corporation.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Greenland will acquire 100%
of the issued and outstanding capital stock of Zhongchai Holding in
exchange for the issuance of 7,500,000 Greenland shares to the
Zhongchai Equity Holder.

As a result of the Proposed Transaction, Greenland's current public
stockholders will own only approximately 33.6% of Greenland's
outstanding shares.

On September 11, 2019, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, which
recommends that Greenland's stockholders vote to approve the
Proposed Transaction at a special meeting of stockholders scheduled
for October 17, 2019.

The Proxy Statement omits material information with respect to the
Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy Statement false and
misleading, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

               - and -

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                  bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

GURU KRUPA: Romualdo, et al Seek Minimum & Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
ALVAREZ QUIZAR ROMUALDO and BORIS ASARAEL HERNANDEZ LOPEZ,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. GURU KRUPA 104 CORPORATION (D/B/A 104 DELI), M&Z
CORPORATION (D/B/A FAMILY GROCERY & DELI), JATIN PATEL, NAJMA
MOHAMED RAZA (A.K.A MOHAMED), ABBASALI RAZA, and HABIB H. ALI, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05188 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 11, 2019),
seeks unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs worked for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per
week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of
hours compensation for the hours that they worked. Rather, the
Defendants failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours
worked, failed to pay Plaintiffs appropriately for any hours
worked, either at the straight rate of pay or for any additional
overtime premium, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Defendants.

The Defendants own, operate, or control two American deli's,
located at 104-10 Atlantic Ave, Ozone Park, New York 11416 under
the name "104 Deli" and at 10727 Atlantic Ave, Jamaica, New York
11418 under the name "Family Grocery & Deli".[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

HARTE-HANKS DIRECT: Valdez Settlement Has Final Court Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Southern Division, issued an Order and Judgment
granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement in the case captioned SILVIA VALDEZ, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HARTE-HANKS
DIRECT MARKETING/FULLERTON, INC., a California Corporation;
HARTE-HANKS DIRECT, INC., a New York Corporation, and DOES 1-10,
inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 8:17-cv-00525-DOC-KES(x). (C.D.
Cal.).

For the reasons set forth in the Preliminary Approval Order, which
are adopted and incorporated herein by reference, this Court finds
that the applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 23 have been satisfied with respect to the Class
and the proposed Settlement. The Court hereby makes final its
earlier provisional certification of the Class, as set forth in the
Preliminary Approval Order.

This Order and Judgment Granting Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the terms
and conditions of the parties' Stipulation, together with the
definitions of terms used and contained therein.

The (Class Notice) given to the Class Members fully and accurately
informed the Class Members of all material elements of the proposed
Settlement and of their opportunity to object to or comment
thereon; was the best notice practicable under the circumstances;
was valid, due, and sufficient notice to all Class Members; and
complied fully with the laws of the State of California, the United
States Constitution, due process, and other applicable law. The
Class Notice fairly and adequately described the Settlement and
provided Class Members adequate instructions and a variety of means
to obtain additional information. A full opportunity has been
afforded to the Class Members to participate in the Final Approval
hearing, and all Class Members and other persons wishing to be
heard have been heard. Accordingly, the Court determines that all
Class Members who did not timely and properly execute a Request for
Exclusion are bound by this Order and Judgment.

The Court has considered all relevant factors for determining the
fairness of the Settlement and has concluded that all such factors
weigh in favor of granting Final Approval. In particular, the Court
finds that the Settlement was reached following meaningful
discovery and investigation conducted by Class Counsel; that the
Settlement is the result of serious, informed, adversarial, and
arm's-length negotiations between the Parties; and that the terms
of the Settlement are in all respects fair, adequate, and
reasonable.  

The Court hereby approves attorney's fees to Class Counsel in the
amount of $180,000.00 and costs in the amount of $7,318.24 as
compensation for all attorney time spent on this matter from
inception through and including the Final Approval Hearing and all
other work related to this case and all costs, as these requests
are fair and reasonable. Costs to the Settlement Administrator in
the amount of $15,000 are hereby approved as fair and reasonable.
No other costs or fees relief shall be awarded, either against
Defendant or any other of the Released Parties, as defined in the
Stipulation.

The Court hereby approves a Service Award to Plaintiff Silvia
Valdez (Plaintiff) in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000).
Plaintiff's Service Award is approved as a service award to the
class representative and in consideration and exchange for
Plaintiff's Complete and General Release of all claims as explained
in the Stipulation. Based on his contribution to the Class, risks
incurred, stigma, change of policies, execution of a general
release and all other factors presented to the Court, the Court
finds this request fair and reasonable.

The Court approves a PAGA Award of $5,000, with $3,750 payable to
the Labor Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), as this request is
fair and reasonable.

If the Settlement does not become final and effective in accord
with the terms of the Stipulation, then this Final Order and
Judgment shall be rendered null and void and shall be vacated and,
in such event, all orders entered, including but not limited to all
releases delivered in connection herewith, shall be null and void.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
and Judgment is available https://tinyurl.com/y3dkyjjq from
Leagle.com.

Silvia Valdez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James R. Hawkins -
James@jameshawkinsaplc.com - James Hawkins APLC, Michael J.S. Calvo
- Michael@jameshawkinsaplc.com - James Hawkins APLC & Gregory E.
Mauro - Greg@jameshawkinsaplc.com - James Hawkins APLC.  

Harte-Hanks Direct Marketing Fullerton Inc, a California
Corporation & Harte Hanks Direct Inc, a New York Corporation,
Defendants, represented by Holger G. Besch - hbesch@seyfarth.com -
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Brian P. Long - bplong@seyfarth.com - Seyfarth
Shaw LLP & Duwayne Andre Carr , Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


HIDDEN VILLA RANCH: Marshall Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned REJENNA MARSHALL, individually, on a
representative basis, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; Plaintiff, v. HIDDEN VILLA RANCH PRODUCE, INC.; LUBERSKI,
INC.; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
RIC1903757 was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Riverside to the United States
District Court for the Central District of California on Sept. 30,
2019, and assigned Case No. 5:19-cv-01876.

The operative First Amended Complaint, filed by Plaintiff on August
26, 2019, asserts the following cause of action: (1) Failure to Pay
Minimum Wages; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to
Provide Mea Periods; (4) Failure to Provide Rest Breaks; (5)
Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses; (6) Failure to Timely Pay
Final Wages; (7) Failure to Provide Accurate itemized Wage
Statement; and (8) Unfair and Unlawful Competition.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

     KATHERINE C. DEN BLEYKER, ESQ.
     LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
     633 West 5th Street, Suite 4000
     Los Angeles, CA 90071
     Phone: 213.250.1800
     Facsimile: 213.250.790
     Email: Katherine.DenBleyker@lewisbrisbois.com


HYUNDAI MOTOR: NJ Court Dismisses in Part First Amended Brown Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ELIZABETH BROWN, THOMAS PEARSON, JANESHIA MARTIN, and
NICHOLAS MOORE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiffs, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, and HYUNDAI MOTOR
COMPANY, LTD., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-11249 (SDW) (JAD)
(D. N.J.), Judge Susan D. Wigenton of the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey granted in part Hyundai's motion to
dismiss the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The putative class action arises out of an alleged defect found in
certain model year 2011 through 2016 Hyundai Elantras with "Nu" 1.8
liter engines.  The defect resides in the the Class Vehicle's
engine, specifically in the pistons, which are a component of the
engine that creates the necessary force to power the car.  The
defect manifests with a knocking noise in the engine, either while
the car is warming up or while driving.  The defect allegedly
causes "total and irreparable engine failure," resulting in a loss
of engine power, power steering, and brake assistance.

The Named Plaintiffs are residents of various states who purchased
and currently own allegedly defective Class Vehicles.  Plaintiff
Brown is a citizen of New Jersey who purchased a new 2013 Hyundai
Elantra with a 1.8 liter "Nu" engine from an authorized Hyundai
dealer located in Avenel, New Jersey.  Plaintiff Pearson is a
citizen of Washington state who purchased a 2015 Hyundai Elantra
from Korum Hyundai in Puyallup, Washington.  Plaintiff Martin is a
citizen of Georgia who purchased a used 2015 Hyundai Elantra with a
1.8 liter "Nu" engine from Superior Chevrolet in Decatur, Georgia.
Finally, Plaintiff Moore is a citizen of Illinois who purchased a
used 2013 Hyundai Elantra from Green Chevrolet in Peoria, Illinois.


The Plaintiffs now bring the action on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated as a nationwide class, or, in the
alternative as New Jersey, Washington, Georgia, and Illinois
subclasses, alleging that HMA knew about the piston defect, failed
to inform consumers of the defect, and that the Plaintiffs relied
on those omissions in purchasing their Class Vehicles.  

The Plaintiffs set forth eleven counts against HMA: (1) breach of
express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; (3) breach of the
written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (4)
violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (5) violations of
the Washington Consumer Protection Act; (6) Violations of the
Georgia Fair Business Practices Act; (7) violations of the Georgia
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (8) violations of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act; (9) violations
of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (10) common
law fraud; and (11) unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiffs have since expressly waived Plaintiffs Martin and
Moore's implied warranty claims, Plaintiff Brown's common law fraud
claim, and Counts VII and VIII, and as such, those claims are
dismissed with prejudice.

Before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint.  The Plaintiffs have opposed the motion, (ECF No. 24),
and the Defendant has replied to same.

HMA argues that Plaintiff Pearson lacks Article III standing
because his claims for economic harm are either too speculative or
inadequately pleaded.  Judge Wigenton agrees. The engine in
Pearson's Elantra failed in July 2018, with approximately 76,000
miles on the car.  The Amended Complaint has not shown that
Pearson's out-of-pocket rental car costs are "certainly impending,"
and thus Pearson has failed to establish Article III standing.
Pearson's claims of future repairs and diminished value of his
vehicle are similarly flawed.  Pearson's claim of future repairs is
based on the conclusory allegation that the replacement engines
provided under the warranty are just as likely to fail as the
original engine due to it containing the same latent defect.

As for breach of express warranty under New Jersey law, the Judge
finds that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of
express warranty under New Jersey law.  First, Brown improperly
asserts that future discovery will show that she did comply with
the terms of the warranty.  Second, the Plaintiffs have provided no
factual predicate to support the conclusory statements regarding a
lack of meaningful choice and lack of bargaining power mentioned.
Finally, Moore has not pled any additional coercion or overreaching
beyond conclusory claims of unequal bargaining power and a lack of
choice.

The only remaining implied warranty claim belongs to Brown, as the
Plaintiffs conceded Martin and Moore's implied warranty claims, and
Plaintiff Pearson's claims were dismissed for lack of standing.
The Judge holds that Brown was also able to drive her car after the
repair.  Furthermore, the New Vehicle Limited Warranty period had
expired.  Additionally, Brown purportedly failed to properly
maintain her car, which Hyundai determined resulted in the engine
failure. These facts taken together lead the Judge to believe that
dismissal of Brown's implied warranty claim is appropriate at this
stage.

Because the Plaintiffs have failed to state any of their state law
warranty claims, their Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims must also
be dismissed.

As for fraud, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs make no
allegations that HMA monitored the NHTSA website. And, even if the
Court assumes that HMA did monitor NHTSA complaints, every NHTSA
complaint listed in the Amended Complaint, save two, post-dates
August 2013, when Brown purchased her vehicle.

Martin has also failed to state a Georgia common law fraud claim
and her claim is dismissed.  Moore, on the other hand, has not
alleged a sufficient likelihood of future harm.  Moore has already
had his engine replaced, and has alleged no additional facts
supporting his conclusion that the replacement engine will
inevitably fail for the same reasons his original engine failed.

Finally, the Defendants requested that the Court deny the
Plaintiffs leave to amend the Amended Complaint because they
believe amendment would be futile and prejudicial.  While the
Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once, it is the
first time the Court has addressed it dispositively.  Given that
there is a general presumption in favor of allowing a plaintiff to
amend its pleadings under Rule 15(a)(2), the Judge will allow the
Plaintiffs to amend their complaint except where explicitly stated.
She will not allow Plaintiffs leave to amend Brown's implied
warranty claim, Martin's common law fraud claim, and Moore's IUDTPA
and common law claims, as amendment would be futile in those cases
and they are thus dismissed with prejudice.

For the reasons stated, Judge Wigenton granted HMA's motion to
dismiss, except as it pertains to the Plaintiffs' leave to amend
certain aspects of the Amended Complaint.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/q4hvP4 from Leagle.com.

ELIZABETH BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by MICHAEL M. WEINKOWITZ --
mweinkowitz@lfsblaw.com -- LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN, ESQS.,
JASON S. RATHOD -- jrathod@classlawdc.com -- MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD
LLP, NICHOLAS A. MIGLIACCIO -- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com --
MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP & MATTHEW D. SCHELKOPF, McCune Wright
Arevalo LLP.

THOMAS PEARSON, JANESHIA MARTIN & NICHOLAS MOORE, Plaintiffs,
represented by JASON S. RATHOD, MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP, NICHOLAS
A. MIGLIACCIO, MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP & MATTHEW D. SCHELKOPF,
McCune Wright Arevalo LLP.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, Defendant, represented by MICHELLE M. BUFANO
-- mmbufano@pbwt.com -- Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP & PETER
C. HARVEY -- pcharvey@pbwt.com -- PATTERSON, BELKNAP, WEBB & TYLER,
LLP.


ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Bennett
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification in the case
captioned PRESTON BENNETT, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS DART, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-04268. (N.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff an amputee who relies upon crutches to ambulate is a
former detainee at CCDOC who seeks, individually and on behalf of
the proposed class, injunctive relief as well as monetary damages.


Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure to provide grab bars in
Division 10's shower and toilet facilities, as well as a fixed
bench in Division 10's shower facilities, deprived him, and other
detainees prescribed a crutch, cane, or walker, of rights
guaranteed under Section 202 of the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehab Act.   

He alleges that Defendants violated Section 202 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act (Rehab Act),  in connection with their shower and toilet
facilities in Division 10 of the Cook County Department of
Corrections (CCDOC).

Plaintiff moves to certify the following class under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3):

     All inmates housed in Division 10 at the Cook County
Department of Corrections from June 27, 2016 to the date of entry
of judgment, who were prescribed either a walker, crutch, or cane
by the medical staff and were denied an accommodation for toileting
and showering.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class action suits.
Courts must complete a two-step analysis when determining whether
to grant a motion for class certification. First, plaintiffs must
satisfy Rule 23(a)'s four requirements:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (numerosity) (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class (commonality) (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class (typicality) and(4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy of
representation).

Second, plaintiffs must also satisfy one of Rule 23(b)'s
conditions. Here, Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires both that common questions predominate and
that proceeding as a class remains superior to other ways of
adjudicating the case.  

Plaintiff advances two alternative legal theories. One theory
assumes that the ADA and Rehab Act's Structural Standards do not
apply, in which case the lawfulness of Defendants' actions turns
upon whether Defendants afforded the class reasonable
accommodations. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that Division 10
must comply with the ADA and Rehab Act's Structural Standards,
which require that Division 10 provide a grab bar for each
accessible shower and toilet. This Court cannot, at least on the
current record before it, find commonality.

Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation theory frustrates the
commonality requirement. He currently defines the class to include
individuals prescribed any of three different types of aid: a cane,
crutch, or walker. Because he broadly defines the class, the nature
and severity of the class members' disability and ability to
ambulate varies. Class dissimilarities frequently impede the
Court's ability to generate common answers.  

Indeed, in this case, given the dissimilarities among the class
members, Defendants' accommodation may or may not have been
reasonable for any individual class member depending upon the
nature and severity of that class member's disability. Thus, in
order to determine the legality of Defendants' conduct, this Court
would need to engage in a fact-specific inquiry for each
individual. In doing so, this case would devolve into an
amalgamation of various individual ADA claims, any of which may or
may have merit.  

For this reason, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the class'
reasonable accommodation theory satisfies the commonality
requirement.  

Plaintiff's alternative theory similarly cannot serve as the basis
for finding commonality. This theory posits that Division 10 must
comply with the ADA and Rehab Act's Structural Standards, which
require a shower and accessible toilet to have at least one grab
bar nearby. If viable, this theory might ostensibly satisfy Rule
23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement because the class claims do not
require this Court to engage in any individualized determinations
as to what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.   

But for this Court to determine whether the ADA and Rehab Act's
Structural Standards control thereby mooting the reasonable
accommodation inquiry it would need to rule on the merits of
Plaintiff's case. Yet doing so prior to ruling on class
certification runs afoul of the rule against one-way intervention.
Thus, this Court cannot find commonality on the record before it.

Accordingly, this Court must deny Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.

Plaintiff's motion for class certification is denied without
prejudice.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available
https://tinyurl.com/yxqsybkf from Leagle.com.

Preston Bennett, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick William
Morrissey , Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd. & Thomas Gerard Morrissey ,
Thomas G. Morrissey, 10150 S Western Ave Ste Rear
Chicago, IL, 60643-1928

Thomas Dart, Sheriff of Cook County & Cook County, Illinois,
Defendants, represented by Brian Patrick Gainer - gainerb@jbltd.com
- Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Jack E. Bentley- bentleyj@jbltd.com -
Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Ahmed A. Kosoko - kosokoa@jbltd.com - Johnson
& Bell, Ltd., Lisa Marie Mcelroy - mcelroyl@jbltd.com - Johnson &
Bell, Ltd., Michael Richard Sherer - shererm@jbltd.com - Johnson &
Bell, Ltd., Monica Burkoth - burkothm@jbltd.com - Johnson & Bell,
Ltd. & Zachary Adam Pestine  - pestinez@jbltd.com - JOHNSON & BELL


INKSTER CITY, MI: Seeks Initial Approval of $130K Garner Suit Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit styled GARNER PROPERTIES & MANAGEMENT,
LLC, CHRISTOPHER L. GARNER, and OLIVIA HEMARATANATORN v. CITY OF
INKSTER, GINA TRIPLETT, MCKENNA ASSOCIATES, INC. & JIM WRIGHT, Case
No. 2:17-cv-13960-PDB-RSW (E.D. Mich.), filed their joint motion
for certification of settlement class and preliminary approval of
settlement and class notice.

Representative Plaintiff Garner Properties & Management, LLC, seeks
to certify a Settlement Class comprised of:

     All persons who paid any registration or inspection fee to
     the City of Inkster under the City's Rental Dwellings or
     Rental Units section of its Building Regulations Code from
     December 7, 2014 through the date of the Order Preliminarily
     Approving the Settlement and Settlement Class.

In the event the settlement contemplated under this Agreement does
not receive final approval from the Court, the fact that the
Parties stipulated to a settlement class shall not be used by any
Party either in support or opposition of class certification in the
lawsuit, according to the Motion.

Under the Agreement, the City of Inkster, McKenna Associates, Inc.
and Jim Wright have agreed to establish a settlement fund in an
amount up to $130,000 ($100,000 contributed by Inkster and $30,000
contributed by McKenna and Wright), which will be used in
significant part to pay the claims of the Settlement Class Members
who are entitled to participate in the distribution of the
settlement proceeds pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

Class counsel shall apply to the Court for an award of attorney's
fees in the amount of $43,333, which represents one-third (1/3) of
the settlement fund, plus reasonable out-of-pocket expenses.  The
Defendants will pay the Named Plaintiff $10,000 from the settlement
fund for representing the Settlement Class as the Class
Representative.  The cost of administering the claims through a
third-party administrator will also be paid from the settlement
fund.

Class Members may make a claim for up to $100 for each registered
residential rental property of that Class Member.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Aaron D. Cox, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF AARON D. COX, PLLC
          23380 Goddard Rd.
          Taylor, MI 48180
          Telephone: (734) 287-3664
          E-mail: aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark K. Wasvary, Esq.
          MARK K. WASVARY, P.C.
          2401 W. Big Beaver Rd., Suite 100
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 649-5667
          E-mail: markwasvary@hotmail.com

Defendant City of Inkster is represented by:

          David W. Jones, Esq.
          Neil B. Pioch, Esq.
          ALLEN BROTHERS, PLLC
          400 Monroe, Suite 620
          Detroit, MI 48226
          Telephone: (313) 962-7777
          E-mail: djones@allenbrotherspllc.com
                  neilpioch@allenbrothersplls.com

Defendants McKenna Associates and Jim Wright are represented by:

          Gregory I. Thomas, Esq.
          Kevin G. Thomas, Esq.
          THOMAS, DEGROOD & WITENOFF, P.C.
          26211 Central Park Blvd., Suite 11
          Southfield, MI 48076
          Telephone: (248) 353-4450
          E-mail: gthomas@thomasdegrood.com


ISRAMCO, INC: Rosenblatt Balks at Naphtha Israel Transaction
------------------------------------------------------------
JORDAN ROSENBLATT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ISRAMCO, INC., HAIM TSUFF,
JOSEPH FROM, MAX PRIDGEON, ASAF YARKONI, FRANS SLUITER, and NIR
HASSON, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01774-UNA (D. Del., Sept.
20, 2019), stems from a proposed transaction announced on May 20,
2019, pursuant to which Isramco, Inc. will be acquired by Naphtha
Israel Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Naphtha Holding Ltd., I.O.C. -
Israel Oil Company Ltd., and Naphtha US Oil, Inc.

Haim Tsuff, Co-Chief Executive Officer, President, and Chairman of
the Board of the Company, controls Naphtha through various entities
and beneficially owns approximately 73% of the outstanding common
stock of Isramco.

On May 20, 2019, Isramco's Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Naphtha.  Pursuant
to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Isramco's stockholders will
receive $121.40 in cash for each share of Isramco common stock they
own.

On September 6, 2019, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with the Proposed Transaction, which scheduled a stockholder vote
on the Proposed Transaction for October 22, 2019.

The Proxy Statement omits material information with respect to the
Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy Statement false and
misleading.

Isramco, Inc. together with its subsidiaries, engages in the
acquisition, development, production, and exploration of oil and
natural gas properties in the United States.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                  bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com

JB HUNT: Freeney Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit titled KENNETH FREENEY, an individual, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT,
INC., an Arkansas corporation; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,
Case No. CV18002954 was removed on Sept. 20, 2019 from the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of Stanislaus to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01324-AWI-EPG to
the proceeding.

Plaintiff Kenneth Freeney filed his Class Action Complaint in the
Superior Court on September 20, 2018.  The Complaint alleges, among
other things, that the Defendant violated California law by: (1)
failing to properly pay overtime wages at the correct rate; (2)
failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (3) failing
to pay all wages upon termination; and (4) engaging in unfair or
unlawful business practices.[BN]

Defendant J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC. is represented by:

          Christopher C. McNatt, Jr., Esq.
          Megan E. Ross, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, LLP
          2 North Lake Avenue, Suite 560
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Telephone: (626) 795-4700
          Facsimile: (626) 795-4790
          E-mail: cmcnatt@scopelitis.com
                  mross@scopelitis.com

               - and -

          Alaina C. Hawley, Esq.
          James A. Eckhart, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C.
          10 West Market Street, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 637-1777
          Facsimile: (317) 687-2414
          E-mail: ahawley@scopelitis.com
                  jeckhart@scopelitis.com


JUUL LABS: D'Amico Says E-cigarettes Addictive & Unsafe
-------------------------------------------------------
FRANK DOUGLAS D'AMICO, the Plaintiff, vs. JUUL LABS, INC., PAX
LABS, INC., and ALTRIA GROUP, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-12628-SSV-JVM (E.D. La., Sept. 16, 2019), seeks to remedy
violations of law in connection with Defendants' unfair and
unlawful marketing, advertising, and sale of JUUL e-cigarettes
and/or JUUL pods products, which are highly addictive, unsafe, and
nevertheless immensely popular among adult and underage nonsmokers.


According to the complaint, the Defendants used a systematic
marketing campaign to dupe consumers into believing that JUUL
e-cigarettes were safe and fun to use, all the while failing to
disclose the addictive nature of the Products, as well the serious
health risks they pose.

The Defendants have maintained a stronghold in the e-cigarette
industry since the release of JUUL e-cigarettes in June 2015.

Even then the health problems caused by e-cigarettes were no
secret. The Food and Drug Administration had already expressed
concerns about the proliferation of e-cigarettes among youth and
nonsmokers, publicly discussing plans to regulate the industry as
far back as 2013.

Nevertheless, PAX Labs launched an aggressive marketing campaign
for the JUUL e-cigarette, targeting youth and nonsmokers with
colorful advertisements featuring men and women in their 20s and
30s, often at parties or in provocative clothing.

As its own entity, JUUL further intensified its marketing efforts,
targeting underage users and nonsmokers with glamorized social
media campaigns, which promoted a lifestyle of relaxation, freedom,
and sex appeal, the lawsuit says.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Proposed Classes are:

          James R. Dugan, II, Esq.
          David Scalia, Esq.
          DUGAN LAW FIRM, APLC
          365 Canal Street, Suite 1000
          New Orleans, LA 70130
          Telephone: (504) 648-0180
          Facsimile: (504) 648-0181
          E-mail: jdugan@dugan-lawfirm.com
                  dscalia@dugan-lawfirm.com

JUUL LABS: Faces Hochhauser Product Liability Suit in NY
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against JUUL Labs Inc. The
case is styled as Shawn Hochhauser, individually, and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JUUL Labs Inc., Altria
Group, Inc. and Philip Morris USA, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-05551 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Tort Product
Liability.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an electronic cigarette company which spun off
from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette, which
packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges. Juul Labs was co-founded by Adam Bowen and James
Monsees.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Seth R. Lesser, Esq.
   Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP
   Two International Drive, Suite 350
   Rye Brook, NY 10573
   Tel: (914) 934-9200
   Fax: (914) 934-9220
   Email: slesser@klafterolsen.com



KAISER FOUNDATION: Settlement in Banks FLSA Suit Gets Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jesus G. Bernal of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Eastern Division, has entered Final
Approval Order and Judgment of Dismissal, dismissing the case,
DIONKA BANKS, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN,
INC., a California corporation, Defendant, Case No.
5:18-cv-01653-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal.), with prejudice.

Judge Bernal has reviewed and considered the motion for final
approval of the Stipulation of Settlement submitted by the Parties.
The motion seeks final approval of the Settlement and entry of
judgment that will bind each Class Member, and will operate as a
full release and discharge of the Released Claims.  He finds that
the terms of the Settlement are fair, reasonable and adequate.  The
fact that a settlement represents a compromise of the Parties'
respective positions rather than the result of a finding of
liability at trial also supports his decision granting final
approval.

He appointed the Plaintiff as the representatives of, and the Class
Counsel as the counsel for, the Class Members for the purpose of
entering into and implementing the Settlement.  The Settlement
Administrator is to execute the distribution of proceeds pursuant
to the terms of the Settlement.

The payment to the California Labor and Workforce Development
Agency of $33,750 as its share of the settlement of claims arising
under the California Private Attorneys General Act in the case is
fair, reasonable and adequate, the Court holds.  The payment of
that amount will be paid from the Total Settlement Amount in
accordance with the Settlement Agreement, and there will be no
further recourse for the civil penalties released under the terms
of the Settlement.

The fees, expenses, and any other costs of Simpluris, Inc. in
administering the Settlement, in the amount of $18,300, are fair
and reasonable, the Court also holds. The Payment of that amount
will be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with
the Settlement, which will fully, finally and completely compensate
Simpluris for all fees, expenses and any other costs in
administering the Settlement.

Based upon application by the Class Counsel and the Plaintiff,
Judge Bernal approved the payment of the Class Representative
Service Award in the amount of $5,000 to Named Plaintiff Dionka
Banks (in addition to any recovery she may receive as a Class
Member under the Settlement).  The Judge also approved the payment
of attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel in the amount of 25% of the
Gross Settlement Amount, i.e. $412,500, and litigation costs to the
Class Counsel in an amount not to exceed $33,500, to be paid in the
manner set forth in the Settlement.  No other attorneys or law
firms will be entitled to any award of attorneys' fees or costs
from the Defendant in any way connected with the Action.

The Final Approval Order and Judgment of dismissal has been
entered, dismissing the Action with prejudice.

After settlement administration and distribution of funds have been
completed, the parties will file a report with the Court certifying
compliance with the terms of the Settlement and the Order and
Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/QO2DWM from Leagle.com.

Dionka Banks, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by David Yeremian --
david@yeremianlaw.com -- David Yeremian and Associates Inc., Jason
J. Thompson -- jjthompson@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwatz PC, pro
hac vice, Kevin J. Stoops -- kstoops@sommerspc.com -- Sommers
Schwartz PC, pro hac vice & Trenton R. Kashima --
trk@classactionlaw.com -- Finkelstein and Krinsk LLP.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., a California corporation,
Defendant, represented by Candace Sheri Bertoldi --
cbertoldi@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Christian J. Rowley --
crowley@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Kerry McCoy Friedrichs
-- kfriedrichs@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Pamela L.
Vartabedian -- pvartabedian@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP,
Parnian Vafaeenia -- pvafaeenia@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP &
Duwayne Andre Carr, Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


LEGEND MINING: Approval of Kaesemeyer Suit Settlement Recommended
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Kaesemeyer, v. Legend Mining USA Inc. et al, Civil
Action No. 6:17-cv-01520 (W.D. La.), Magistrate Judge Carol B.
Whitehurst of the U.S. District Court for the Western Dsistrict of
Louisiana, Lafayette Division, recommended that the joint motion
for approval of the parties' settlement agreement be granted.

Before the Court, on referral from the district judge, is a Joint
Motion To Accept Settlement filed by the parties.  The parties in
the Kaesemeyer/Legend Mining case reached a settlement, which was
conditionally certified as a collective action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").  The parties filed the instant joint motion
for court approval of their settlement agreement.  They also
provided the Court with a copy of an Affidavit of Charles J.
Stiegler, the counsel for the Plaintiff.

Based on a review of the motion, Stiegler's Affidavit, and the
applicable law and jurisprudence, Magistrate Judge Whitehurst finds
that the issues raised by the parties are sufficient for her to
find that genuine uncertainty as to the outcome of the litigation
existed for each side, and a bona fide dispute existed in the case.
The affidavit also confirms that the parties have agreed to a
settlement which provided each Plaintiff with 100% of the unpaid
overtime which he was allegedly owed, plus 25% of the calculated
potential liquidated damages penalties.  There is a presumption
that no fraud or collusion occurred between the counsel, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary.

With regard to the inquiries set forth in the second factor, the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation, the
Magistrate finds that the FLSA action presented multiple complex
legal issues which have been zealously litigated by experienced
counsel, at significant expense.  Had a settlement not been
consummated, the Court is of the opinion that the case would likely
have remained in litigation for a significant amount of time, in
excess of at least one or two more years, causing the parties to
incur significant additional expense.

The case has been litigated by competent and experienced lawyers
who enjoy great respect in their field from both sides of the
aisle.  Given the nature of the disputed issues underlying the
lawsuit, there is uncertainty surrounding the eventual outcome of
the litigation, as well as the potential for appeal to the Fifth
Circuit.

The Magistrate further finds that the settlement agreement
represents a settlement that curtails risk while resolving the
dispute for an amount that, both in total and on individual
assessment, is adequate, fair, reasonable, and within the range
anticipated by the Court.  There have been no objections to the
settlement, and all of the parties agree that the proposed
settlement is in the best interests of the parties involved.

Finally, the parties' agreement provided for $9,408.75 in
attorney's fees and costs.  This reflects a significant voluntary
reduction from the actual accrued attorney's fees in the case.  The
Counsel also incurred $535.50 in recoverable costs, which are to be
paid out of the same sum.  The Plaintiffs' counsel has willingly
accepted a reduction of their earned fees in the interests of good
faith compromise.  And, this was negotiated and paid separately,
meaning that there was no percentage reduction for the Plaintiffs
to pay the attorney's fees and costs.

For the reasons stated, Magistrate Judge Whitehurst recommended
that the proposed settlement be approved, and accordingly, that the
Court grants the Joint Motion To Accept Settlement on the terms and
conditions set forth in the parties' settlement agreement.  She
recommended that the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in the
lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice.  She further recommended that
the case be closed, subject to the Court retaining jurisdiction for
90 days to enforce the terms of the parties' settlement agreement,
if necessary.

Because the parties have agreed on the payment of the settlement
funds and attorneys' fees and there have been no objections to the
settlement filed in the record, the Court shortens the time period
for objections set forth in 28 U.S.C.A. Section 636(b)(1)(c).  The
parties have five days to serve and file written objections to the
proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions
reflected in the Report and Recommendation.  

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings
and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in the Report and
Recommendation within five days following the date of its service,
will bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual
findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court,
except upon grounds of plain error.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/X2ACdp from
Leagle.com.

Daniel Kaesemeyer, Robert Laudenslager, Seth Bigelow, Samson
Robertson, Thomas Kitts, William Walls, David Evans, James Evans,
John Heimer, Jacob Martinez, Jarrod Towne, Jared Anderson & Stephen
Stuelke, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Joseph Stiegler,
Stiegler Law Firm.

Legend Mining U S A Inc & Legend Mining Inc, Defendants,
represented by Lisa Brener -- lbrener@brenerlawfirm.com -- Brener
Law Firm & Douglas R. Kraus -- dkraus@brenerlawfirm.com -- Brener
Law Firm.


LICMM CORP: Murphy Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------------
LICMM, Corp. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as James
Murphy, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LICMM, Corp., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05556-SJF-SIL (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019).

LICMM, Corp. is a domestic not-for-profit corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Darryn G Solotoff, Esq.
   Law Office of Darryn G Solotoff PLLC
   100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 317-2453
   Fax: (516) 706-4692
   Email: ds@lawsolo.net



LJ ROSS ASSOCIATES: Rosen Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against LJ Ross Associates,
Inc. The case is styled as Lea Rosen individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LJ Ross Associates,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05516 (E.D. N.Y., Sept. 30,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

LJ Ross provides revenue cycle management, debt collections, and
call center services for utilities, healthcare, education and
government entities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


MARJAN INT'L: Polanco, et al Seek OT Wages for Restaurant Staff
---------------------------------------------------------------
JULIO CESAR POLANCO and MANUEL ELIAS CRUZ, on behalf of themselves,
and others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
MARJAN INTERNATIONAL CORP, and MORAD GHADAMIAN, individually, Case
No. 1:19-cv-08742 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid wages and minimum wages; unpaid overtime compensation;
liquidated damages; prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the New York Labor Law.

In March 2017, the Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a
general helper, at Defendants' wholesale rug importer doing
business as "Marjan International" located at 41 East 31st Street,
New York, New York 10016. The Plaintiff is not paid time and a half
the minimum wage, for hours in excess of 40 per week, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          10 Grand Central
          155 East 44th Street- 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile. (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: pcooper@jcpclaw.com

MAXWELL TRAILERS: Cond'l Certification of Two FLSA Classes Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROYAL HAMPTON and JAMES PIERCE, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiffs, v. MAXWELL TRAILERS
& PICK-UP ACCESSORIES, INC. and IRONSTAR BEDS LLC, the Defendants,
Case No. 2:18-cv-00110-HEA (E.D. Mo., Sept. 20, 2019), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a Fair Labor Standards Act
      Overtime Collective, comprised of:

      "all current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt workers
      (including but not limited to welders, finishers, painters,
      fabricators, laborers, and office workers) employed by
      Maxwell Trailers & Pick-Up Accessories, Inc. and/or Ironstar

      Beds LLC at any time from three years before the date of the
      Court's conditional certification order, through the date of
      judgment";

   2. conditionally certifying a FLSA Retaliation Collective
      comprised of:

      "all current and former hourly-paid, non-exempt workers
      (including but not limited to welders, finishers, painters,
      fabricators, laborers, and office workers) employed by
      Maxwell Trailers & Pick-Up Accessories, Inc. and/or Ironstar

      Beds LLC at any time from three years before the date of the

      Court's conditional certification order through the date of
      judgment who had their hours reduced to 40 or fewer in or
      around August or September 2018 after Plaintiff Hampton
      began efforts to organize his coworkers to file a lawsuit";

   3. requiring the Defendants to identify all FLSA Collective and

      FLSA Retaliation Collective members by providing a list of
      their names, last known addresses, cell phone numbers, and
      e-mail addresses, within 14 days following entry of an
      order;

   4. permitting the Plaintiffs to issue a notice of the action to

      all FLSA Collective members via U.S. Mail, e-mail, and text
      essage informing them that to opt in they must return a
      consent form;

   5. approving a 90-day opt-in period for FLSA Collective members

      to join by returning their completed Consent forms; and

   6. permitting Plaintiffs to issue a reminder notice via U.S.
      Mail, e-mail, and text message to FLSA Collective members 14

      days before the end of the opt-in period.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Laura E. Reasons, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, 11th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          Facsimile: (312) 253-1443
          E-mail: lreasons@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Anthony M. Pezzani, Esq.
          ENGELMEYER & PEZZANI, LLC
          13321 N. Outer Forty Road, Ste. 300
          Chesterfield, MO 63017
          Telephone: 636-532-9933
          Facsimile: 314-863-7793
          E-mail: tony@epfirm.com

               - and -

          Kenneth P. Abbarno, Esq.
          Mark M. Abramowitz, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          7556 Mentor Ave.
          Mentor, OH 44060
          Telephone: (440) 953-8888
          Facsimile: (440) 953-9138
          E-mail: kabbarno@dicellolevitt.com
                  mabramowitz@dicellolevitt.com

MCDERMOTT CENTER: Gladney Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------------------
TERRANCE GLADNEY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. MCDERMOTT CENTER d/b/a
HAYMARKET CENTER, the Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10945 (Ill. Cir.,
Sept. 20, 2019), seeks to stop the Defendant's unlawful collection,
use, and storage of the Plaintiffs and the putative Class members'
sensitive biometric data under the Biometric Information Privacy
Act.

When employees first begin their jobs at McDermott, they are
required to scan their fingerprint in its biometric time tracking
system as a means of authentication, instead of using only key fobs
or other identification cards. That is because McDermott uses a
biometric time tracking system that required employees to use their
fingerprints as a means of authentication, instead of key fobs or
identification cards.

While there are tremendous benefits to using biometric time clocks
in the workplace, there are also serious risks. Unlike key fobs or
identification cards -- which can be changed or replaced if stolen
or compromised -- fingerprint are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with the employee. This exposes employees to
serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a
fingerprint database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed,
employees have no means by which to prevent identity theft and
unauthorized tracking, the lawsuit says.

McDermott Center owns and operates behavioral health rehabilitation
facilities in and around Chicago, Illinois.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David Fish, Esq.
          Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: 630 355 7590
          Facsimile: 630 778 0400
          E-mail: admin@fishlawfirrn.com
                  dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  khilton@fishlawfirm.com
                  kunze@fishlawfinn.com

MDL 2286: Discovery Deadlines & Limitations in TCPA Suit Issued
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California has entered an order setting
discovery deadlines and limitations on discovery in the case, IN
RE: MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., TELEPHONIC CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT LITIGATION, Case No. 11-md-2286-MMA-MDD (S.D. Cal.).

On June 4, 2019, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer
and submit to the Court a joint status report providing the
following information: (i) whether the discovery contemplated by
the questionnaire process is complete; (ii) a joint discovery plan
regarding depositions of the Defendants under Rule 30(b)(6) and of
the individual Plaintiffs, including the class representative(s);
and, (iii) a proposed scheduling order containing a deadline for
completing this round of discovery, a deadline for filing summary
judgment motions and a deadline for filing any motion for class
certification.

Three status reports were filed on Aug. 5, 2019.  The Defendants
and the Lead Plaintiff filed a joint status report.  Individual
Plaintiff Nicholas Martin filed a status report through his
counsel.  The Counsel who represent, collectively, 14 individual
Plaintiffs, filed a joint status report on behalf of these
Plaintiffs.  The Defendants did not participate in the status
reports filed on behalf of any individual Plaintiffs.

Mr. Martin asserts that the information provided by the Defendants
is insufficient for the Plaintiffs that opted out of the initial
class action and complain of calls prior to Sept. 1, 2014.  The
Counsel for Mr. Martin suggests that the Court appoints liaison
counsel for the opt-out cases and provides suggested written
discovery requests.  The Counsel for the fourteen individual
Plaintiffs assert that they may not have received complete records.
Specifically, they report that the Defendants responded that there
are no call records for two Plaintiffs, Denise Boyd and Jane
Morley, a point disputed by those Plaintiffs.  The 14 Plaintiffs
request that the Court authorizes third-party discovery of the
Plaintiffs' cell carriers and of certain former employees of the
Defendants.

The Lead Plaintiff proposes that the Court authorizes additional
and "follow-up" non-duplicative written discovery to the Defendants
regarding the calling technology at issue in the action.  The
Defendants take the unhelpful posture that they cannot take a
position without seeing the actual requests.  They also state that
if written discovery is authorized for the Lead Plaintiff, the
Defendants also should be able to conduct written discovery.

Regarding depositions, the Lead Plaintiff and the Defendants agree
that the Defendants may take the deposition of the Lead Plaintiff
and other Plaintiffs alleging calls after Sept. 1, 2014.  The
parties agree that after these depositions are completed, the
Defendants' corporate representative should be deposed under Rule
30(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., regarding the Defendants' calling
practices and technologies during the proposed class period.  The
parties propose deadlines for written discovery, if authorized by
the Court, deadlines for the Plaintiff depositions and for the
deposition of the Defendants' representative.  The deadlines also
are offered for the Lead Plaintiff to file a motion for class
certification and for summary judgment.

Magistrate Judge Dembin authorized the following discovery, and the
following deadlines apply in the next phase of the case:

     1. The Defendants may depose the Lead Plaintiff in Wisconsin
no later than Oct. 25, 2019.

     2. The Lead Plaintiff may depose the Defendants by means of
Rule 30(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., regarding calling technologies and
calling practices beginning on Sept. 1, 2014, through the purported
class period, no later than Nov. 22, 2019.

     3. The Individual Plaintiffs are authorized to serve
third-party subpoenas, under Rule 45, Fed. R. Civ. P., to cellular
carriers who may possess relevant calling records relating to each
Plaintiff.

     4. No later than Oct. 25, 2019, the counsel for the Individual
Plaintiffs alleging calls on or after Sept. 1, 2014 must contact
the counsel for Lead Plaintiff regarding additional depositions
suitable for handling under the MDL.  The counsel for the Lead
Plaintiff must confer with counsel representing the 14 Plaintiffs
and, if the proposed witnesses are prepared to give relevant
testimony regarding calling practices during the purported new
class period, meet and confer with the Defendants and file a joint
motion for permission to take these depositions reflecting the view
of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.  The motion must be filed no
later than Dec. 2, 2019.

     5. No later than Sept. 30, 2019, the Defendants must file a
report:

          a. Including a list of the member cases and counsel
alleging calls prior to Sept. 1, 2014;

          b. Designating attorneys responsible for responding to
the Individual Plaintiffs, if unrepresented, or their counsel, to
discuss discovery issues unique to the pre-Sept. 1, 2014 cases, and
to discuss settlement.  To the extent a Plaintiff wishes to depose
the Defendants, under Rule 30(b)(6), regarding calling technologies
and practices during relevant time periods preceding Sept. 1, 2014,
the Court expects the involved parties to confer and propose a
suitable procedure protecting the interests of the pre-Sept. 1,
2014 Plaintiffs.  A joint motion regarding a deposition of
Defendants for this purpose must be filed no later than Dec. 2,
2019.

          c. The designating attorneys responsible for responding
to the Individual Plaintiffs, if unrepresented, or their counsel,
regarding issues with the Plaintiff-specific discovery provided by
Defendants during the questionnaire process.  The Plaintiffs who
remain dissatisfied with the Defendants production, after
conferring with Defendants, may initiate a joint motion for
determination of discovery dispute as provided in the Court's Civil
Chambers Rules.  The 30-day clock for bringing such a motion to the
Court will commence on Dec. 2, 2019.

     6. Any motion for class certification and any motion for
summary judgment must be filed no later than Jan. 24, 2020.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/hYCcFx from Leagle.com.

Christopher Robinson, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Douglas J. Campion
--
doug@djcampion.com -- Law Offices of Douglas J Campion, Abbas
Kazerounian, Kazerounian Law Group, APC & Joshua B. Swigart --
josh@westcoastlitigation.com -- Hyde & Swigart.

Eduardo Tovar, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Brian J. Trenz, Law Offices of
David Schafer PLLC, pro hac vice & David P. Schafer, Law Offices
of
David Schafer PLLC, pro hac vice.

Nicholas Martin, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander H. Burk , Burke Law
Offices, LLC, pro hac vice.

Dave Scardina, individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiff,
represented by Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman Combs Latturner &
Goodwin
LLC, pro hac vice, James O. Latturner, Edelman, Combs, Latturner &
Goodwin, LLC, pro hac vice, Cassandra P. Miller, Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin, LLC, Curtis Charles Warner, Warner Law Firm,
LLC & Francis Richard Greene, Edelman Combs Latturner & Goodwin
LLC.

Chad R. Goetz, Plaintiff, pro se.

Midland Funding LLC, Defendant, represented by Aaron L. Vorce,
Dykema Gossett, Amy M. Gallegos , Jenner & Block LLP, Andrew
Michael Schwartz , Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin,
P.C., Benjamin Michael Katz , Burr and Forman, Brett J Natarelli ,
Dykema Gossett PLLC, Bryan James Anderson, Dykema Gossett, PLLC,
Daniel Andrew Brown, WILLIAMS KASTNER & GIBBS, Danielle M.
Vugrinovich , Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, David
J. Elkanich , Holland & Knight, LLP, David M. Schultz , Hinshaw &
Culbertson, LLP, pro hac vice, Ethan A. Glickstein , Jenner &
Block
LLP, Heather L. Kramer -- hkramer@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett
PLLc, James Michael Golden, Dykema Gossett PLLC, John Anthony
Love,
King and Spalding, pro hac vice, Joshua C. Dickinson, SPENCER
FANE,
LLP, LATI WELLS SPENCE, MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN
PC, Lauren M. Burnette, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin,
Matthew B. Ames, Balch & Bingham LLP, Matthew Brady Johnson,
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Matthew W. McDade,
BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP, Michael Ronald Ayers, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP,
Palak Naimesh Shah, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Patrick Michael
DeLong, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Patrick T.
McLaughlin, SPENCER FANE LLP, Paul F. Labaki, Peltan Law, PLLC,
Paul A. Wilhelm, Dykema Gossett, Renee Lynn Zipprich, Dykema
Gossett PLLC, Stephen Michael Mahieu, Dykema Gossett, PLLC,
Theodore W. Seitz -- tseitz@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro
hac vice, Todd A Gale -- tgale@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLC,
Todd Philip Stelter, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Amanda Catherine
Fitzsimmons, DLA Piper LLP & Edward D Totino , DLA Piper LLP.

Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron
L.
Vorce, Dykema Gossett, Aimee Guidry Szygenda, McGlinchey Stafford,
Amanda E Wilson, Amy M. Gallegos, Jenner & Block LLP, Amy R.
Jonker, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, Andrew Michael Schwartz, Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C., Anthony J. Palermo,
Holland & Knight, LLP, Benjamin Michael Katz, Burr and Forman,
Brandon Stein, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Brandon M. Wrazen, Peltan
Law, PLLC, Brett J Natarelli, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Bryan James
Anderson, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Christopher David Johnsen, Holland
& Knight, Christopher Spain, Simmonds & Narita LLP, Cory W.
Eichhorn, Holland & Knight, LLP, pro hac vice, Daniel Andrew
Brown,
WILLIAMS KASTNER & GIBBS, Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Marshall,
Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, David J. Elkanich, Holland &
Knight, LLP, David George Peltan, Peltan Law, PLLC, David M.
Schultz, Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP, pro hac vice, Erica Gooden
Bartimmo, Holland & Knight, LLP, Ethan A. Glickstein, Jenner &
Block LLP, Gennifer Lynn Bridges, Burr & Forman, LLP, Gregg D
Stevens, McGlinchey Stafford, Heather L. Kramer, Dykema Gossett
PLLc, James A. Byram, Jr., BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP, James Michael
Golden, Dykema Gossett PLLC, James S. Kreamer, Baker, Sterchi,
Cowden & Rice, LLC, James Lanter, James Lanter, P.C., Jared D.
Kemper, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Jason Brent Tompkins, Balch &
Bingham
LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey M. Sankey, Sankey Law Offices, Jennifer
L. Braster, Naylor & Braster Attorneys at Law, PLLC, John Anthony
Love , King and Spalding, pro hac vice, John M. Naylor , Naylor &
Braster Attorneys at Law, John Christopher Suedekum , Burr and
Forman, LLP, Jonathan Clayton Brown, Burr Forman LLP, Joseph L.
Francoeur, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Joseph W
Letzer , Burr and Forman, Joshua C. Dickinson, SPENCER FANE, LLP,
Keasha Ann Broussard , King & Spalding, LLP, pro hac vice, LATI
WELLS SPENCER, MARSHALL DENNEHEY WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN PC, Laura
Irene Hillerich, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin,
Laura Westerman Tanner , Burr & Forman, LLP, Lauren M. Burnette ,
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Lauren Lynn Millcarek ,
Holland & Knight, LLP, Lawrence J. Bartel, III, MARSHALL DENNEHEY
WARNER COLEMAN & GOGGIN, Leah Suzanne Strickland , Solomon Ward
Seidenwurm & Smith LLP, M. Cory Nelson  Lewis, Rice & Fingersh,
pro
hac vice, Matthew B. Ames, Balch & Bingham LLP, Matthew J. Devine
,
Burr & Forman, LLP, Matthew Brady Johnson, Marshall Dennehey
Warner
Coleman & Goggin, Mei-Ying M. Imanaka, Solomon Ward Seidenwurm &
Smith, LLP, Melissa S. Gutierrez, McGlinchey Stafford, Michael
Ronald Ayers, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Nicole Strickler, Messer,
Stilp & Strickler, Ltd., pro hac vice, Palak Naimesh Shah, Hinshaw
& Culbertson LLP, Patrick Michael DeLong, Marshall, Dennehey,
Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Patrick T. McLaughlin , SPENCER FANE
LLP,
Paul F. Labaki, Peltan Law, PLLC, Paul A. Wilhelm, Dykema Gossett,
Peter J. Caltagirone, Solomon, Ward, Seidenwurm and Smith, Rachel
R. Friedman, Burr & Forman LLP, Randy Jiro Aoyama, Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP, Reid Stephens Manley, Burr Forman LLP, Renee Lynn
Zipprich, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Richard David Lane ,, Marshall
Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Robert Franklin Springfield,
Burr
& Forman, LLP, Ronald Michael Metcho, II , Marshall, Dennehey,
Warner, Coleman & Goggin, P.C., pro hac vice, Russell S. Ponessa,
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Stephen Michael Mahieu Dykema Gossett,
PLLC, Theodore J. Greeley, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Theodore W.
Seitz,
Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro hac vice, Thomas Butler Alleman , Dykema
Cox Smith, Thomas F. Landers, Solomon Ward Seidenwurm & Smith,
LLP,
Thomas A. Leghorn, Wilson, Elser Law Firm, Thomas M. Martin ,
Lewis
Rice LLC, Todd A Gale, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Todd Philip Stelter,
Hinshaw & Culbertson, Tomio B. Narita, Simmonds & Narita LLP,
Amanda Catherine Fitzsimmons, DLA Piper LLP, Edward D Totino, DLA
Piper LLP, Jacqueline A. Simms-Petredis ,, Burr & Forman, LLP,
Tatiana Alexander Waits , McGlinchey Stafford LLP & Thomas Richard
DeBray, Jr. ,, Balch & Bingham, LLP.

Encore Capital Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Amy M.
Gallegos, Jenner & Block LLP, Brett J Natarelli, Dykema Gossett
PLLC, Bryan James Anderson, Dykema Gossett, PLLC, Cory W.
Eichhorn,
Holland & Knight, LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle M. Vugrinovich,
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Ethan A. Glickstein,
Jenner & Block LLP, James Michael Golden, Dykema Gossett PLLC,
Lauren Lynn Millcarek, Holland & Knight, LLP, Matthew B. Ames,
Balch & Bingham LLP, Rachel R. Friedman, Burr & Forman LLP, Renee
Lynn Zipprich, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Robert Franklin Springfield,
Burr & Forman, LLP, Theodore W. Seitz, Dykema Gossett PLLC, pro
hac
vice, Amanda Catherine Fitzsimmons, DLA Piper LLP & Edward D
Totino, DLA Piper LLP.

Laura E. Hartman, an individual, Defendant, represented by Robert
W. Murphy, Law Office of Robert W. Murphy.

X, Y, Z Corporations, Defendant, represented by Lauren M.
Burnette,
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin.

Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P. C., Defendant, represented by
Scot W. Groghan, Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C.


MDL 2672: Court Tosses Volkswagen's Summary Judgment Bid
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order denying Volkswagen's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL"
MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This
Order Relates To: Dkt. No. 6423, BONDHOLDER ACTION. No. 2672 CRB
(JSC). (N.D. Cal.)

Plaintiff, a public pension fund, purchased Volkswagen bonds. One
month after Volkswagen's diesel scandal became front-page news,
Plaintiff sold those bonds for a loss. Plaintiff then filed a
proposed class action against Volkswagen for violations of the
federal securities laws. In that action, Plaintiff maintains that
Volkswagen was required but failed to disclose in its 2014 bond
offering memorandum that the company was using defeat devices in
millions of diesel cars worldwide to cheat on emissions tests and
was at risk of losing billions of dollars as a result. Without that
information, Plaintiff asserts that the offering memorandum was
misleading and led investors to purchase the company's bonds at
artificially inflated prices.

The company argues that summary judgment is warranted because
Plaintiff lacks the evidence needed to prove reliance, which is one
of the elements of its claims.

Specifically, Volkswagen urges that the evidence is insufficient to
support that Plaintiff's investment manager, who bought the bonds
on Plaintiff's behalf and had complete discretion to do so, read
the offering memorandum before executing the trade. And without
such proof, Volkswagen insists that Plaintiff cannot prove that its
investment manager would have acted differently and foregone
purchasing the bonds if additional disclosures had been made in the
offering memorandum.

Having reviewed the record and once more the relevant caselaw,
District Judge Charles R. Breyer concludes that this case is best
characterized as primarily a nondisclosure case, as opposed to a
positive misrepresentation case.   

As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of reliance
under Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972) and need not prove that it or its investment manager
actually relied on the statements made in the bond offering
memorandum, says the Court.  

According to the Court, Volkswagen failed to disclose that, for
years, it had been secretly installing defeat devices in its clean
diesel line of cars to mask unlawfully high emissions, and that it
was at risk of losing billions of dollars in fines and penalties if
it was caught. Volkswagen's failure to disclose this information is
ultimately what drives Plaintiff's claims.

To be sure, Plaintiff does also base its claims on certain
affirmative statements in the bond offering memorandum. Even these
affirmative statements, in other words, are tethered to the
omission that is at the heart of the case.

Having determined that a presumption of reliance applies, the Court
turns to whether Volkswagen has sufficiently rebutted that
presumption. To do so on summary judgment, Volkswagen must offer
evidence that establishes beyond controversy that Plaintiff's
investment manager would not have attached significance to the
omitted facts, and therefore would have acted as he did if he had
known the truth.  

Pointing to the deposition of Plaintiff's investment manager,
Volkswagen contends that the evidence in the record would not
permit a jury to reasonably conclude that the investment manager
read the bond offering memorandum before purchasing the bonds.
Based on that interpretation of the record, Volkswagen insists that
it has rebutted the presumption of reliance; for if Plaintiff's
investment manager did not read the offering memorandum, then, the
theory goes, Plaintiff cannot prove that its investment manager
would have attached significance to the emissions fraud and
foregone the investment in Volkswagen bonds if Volkswagen had
disclosed the fraud in the offering memorandum.

In the run-of-the-mill omissions case, an investor's failure to
read the relevant disclosure documents could indeed be fatal.
Having not read those documents, any additional disclosures in them
would have been unlikely to come to the investor's attention. As a
result, it would be difficult for the investor to prove that he
would have acted differently and avoided the investment if
additional disclosures were made in those documents.

This is not a run-of-the-mill omissions case, however, rules Judge
Breyer. The omitted facts detailed Volkswagen's large-scale and
long-running defeat-device scheme. When that scheme was disclosed
to the public, in September 2015, it was front-page news and
prompted congressional hearings, video apologies by Volkswagen
executives, and hundreds of lawsuits. The disclosure also prompted
Plaintiff's investment manager to reevaluate Plaintiff's investment
in Volkswagen bonds and to sell those bonds for a loss within a
month's time.

If Volkswagen had disclosed its defeat-device scheme in its 2014
bond offering memorandum, instead of waiting until September 2015,
the same publicity, and the same response by Plaintiff's investment
manager, would likely have followed. The scheme was so substantial
and blatant that it is hard to fathom that its disclosure would
have gone unnoticed by the investing public, and that Plaintiff's
investment manager would not have been made aware of it.

Assuming, then, that Volkswagen's evidence demonstrates that
Plaintiff's investment manager did not read the offering memorandum
prior to purchasing the bonds, that evidence alone is insufficient
to establish beyond controversy that Plaintiff's investment manager
would not have attached significance to the omitted facts about
Volkswagen's emissions fraud if those facts had been disclosed in
the offering memorandum. As a result, Volkswagen has not rebutted
Affiliated Ute's presumption of reliance.

Volkswagen moved for summary judgment exclusively on the element of
reliance. Because it has failed to rebut Affiliated Ute's
presumption of reliance, summary judgment is not warranted and the
Court DENIES Volkswagen's motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court’s  September 26, 2019
Order  is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxfqrn9y from
Leagle.com

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rcarey@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G. Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro ,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Nicholas Allen, Daniel Carroll, Giancarlo Ceci, Dominic Troffer,
Paul Linnee, Sarah Hayden, Dario Medina, Shanice Boyette, Isaac
Hoover, John Mazur & Forrest Tinsler, Plaintiffs, represented by
Caleb Marker --  caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP,
pro hac vice & Charles S. Zimmerman -- csz@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague, Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com
-- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang, Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer ,
Conrad and Scherer, LLP633 South Federal Highway, Eighth Floor,
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301.

MDL 2804: Bryant Sues over Sale of Opioid Drugs
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Purdue Pharma, et
al., seeking recompense for compensatory damages, emotional
distress; loss of enjoyment of life; lost earning capacity and loss
of income; loss of filial consortium; loss of spousal consortium;
anguish; sorrow; solace, including companionship, comfort,
guidance, kindly offices, advise, services, protection, care, and
assistance; services for medical care, including any necessary
rehabilitation; and/or funeral and burial expenses. The case is
consolidated in MDL 2804 RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE
LITIGATION.

Prescription opioids have devastated communities across the country
and in the State of West Virginia. In addition to the tragic loss
of life and the heartbreaking impact on children and loved ones,
some estimates state that the opioid crisis is costing governmental
entities and private companies as much as $500 billion per year.

The Defendants manufacture, market, sell, and distribute
prescription opioids, which are highly addictive narcotic
painkillers. The Defendants have engaged in a cunning and deceptive
marketing scheme to encourage doctors and patients to use opioids
to treat chronic pain. In doing so, the Defendants falsely
minimized the risks of opioids, overstated their benefits, and
generated far more opioid prescriptions than there should have
been.

The opioid epidemic is the direct result of the Defendants'
deliberately crafted, well-funded campaign of deception. For years,
they misrepresented the risks posed by the opioids they manufacture
and sell, misleading susceptible prescribers and vulnerable patient
populations. As families and communities suffered from the scourge
of opioid abuse, the Defendants earned billions in profits as a
direct result of the harms they inflicted.

The Defendants' false and misleading statements deceived doctors
and patients about the risks and benefits of opioids and convinced
them that opioids were not only appropriate, but necessary to treat
chronic pain. The Defendants targeted susceptible prescribers, like
family doctors, and vulnerable patient populations, like the
elderly and veterans. And they tainted the sources that doctors and
patients relied upon for guidance, including treatment guidelines,
medical education programs, medical conferences and seminars, and
scientific articles. As a result, they successfully transformed the
way doctors treat chronic pain, opening the floodgates of opioid
prescriptions and dependence. Opioids are now the most prescribed
class of drugs, generating billions of dollars in revenue for the
Defendants every year.

The direct and proximate consequence of the Defendants' misconduct
is that every West Virginia purchaser of private health insurance
paid higher premiums, co-payments, and deductibles. Insurance
companies have considerable market power and pass onto their
insureds the expected cost of future care -- including
opioid-related coverage. Accordingly, insurance companies factored
in the unwarranted and exorbitant healthcare costs of
opioid-related coverage caused by Defendants and charged that back
to insureds in the form of higher premiums, deductibles, and
co-payments, the lawsuit says.

The case is captioned as BOBBI DAWN TRENT BRYANT, on behalf of
herself individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals, and JENNIFER LOWE, on behalf of herself as widow and
Administratrix of the Estate of Robert Lowe, deceased, and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, the Plaintiff,
vs. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA, INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK
COMPANY, INC.; MCKESSON CORPORATION; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.;
AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES,
LTD.; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON &
JOHNSON; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICA INC. n/k/a JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO HEALTH
SOLUTIONS INC.; ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ALLERGAN PLC f/k/a
ACTAVIS PLC; WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a ACTAVIS, INC.;
WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.; ACTAVIS LLC; and ACTAVIS PHARMA, INC.
f/k/a WATSON PHARMA, INC., DEPOMED, INC.; MALLINCKRODT LLC;
MALLINCKRODT PLC; SPECGX LLC; PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.; PAR
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES, INC.; NORAMCO, INC.; INDIVIOR, INC.; CVS
HEALTH CORPORATION; RITE AID OF MARYLAND, INC.; RITE AID CORP.;
WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC.; WALGREEN EASTERN CO.; WALGREEN CO.;
WAL-MART INC. f/k/a WALMART STORES, INC.; MIAMI-LUKEN, INC.; COSTCO
WHOLESALE CORPORATION; THE KROGER CO.; H.D. SMITH, LLC;
H.D. SMITH HOLDINGS, LLC; H.D. SMITH HOLDING COMPANY; ANDA, INC.;
RICHARD S. SACKLER; JONATHON D. SACKLER; MORTIMER D.A. SACKLER;
KATHE A. SACKLER; ILENE SACKLER LEFCOURT; BEVERLY SACKLER; THERESA
SACKLER; DAVID A. SACKLER; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES; RHODES TECHNOLOGIES
INC.; RHODES PHARACEUTICALS L.P.; RHODES PHARMACEUTICALS INC.;
TRUST FOR THE BENEFIT OF MEMBERS OF THE RAYMOND SACKLER FAMILY; THE
P.F. LABORATORIES, INC., the Defendants, Case: 1:19-op-45805-DAP
(N.D. Ohio, Sept. 20, 2019).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Stephen P. New, Esq.
          Amanda J. Taylor, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF STEPHEN P. NEW
          P.O. Box 5516
          114 Main Street
          Beckley, WV 25801
          Telephone: 304-250-6017
          Facsimile: 304-250-6012
          E-mail: steve@newlawoffice.com

MICROSOFT CORP: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Khalid Anti-Trust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ATM SHAFIQUL KHALID, an individual and on behalf of
similarly situated, XENCARE SOFTWARE, INC., Plaintiff, v. MICROSOFT
CORP., a Washington Corporation, and JOHN DOE n, Defendants, Case
No. C19-130-RSM (W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle,
granted Defendant Microsoft's Motion to Dismiss Khalid's amended
complaint with leave to amend certain claims.

On Dec. 16, 2011, the Plaintiff received a job offer from Microsoft
as a Senior Program Manager in its Bing division.  Upon accepting
the position, the Plaintiff was required by Microsoft recruiter
Shannon Carlsen to sign a Microsoft Employee Agreement which
included a provision under Section 5 regarding assignment of
certain intellectual property rights.

On Dec. 19, 2011, the Plaintiff accepted Microsoft's employment
offer and signed the Employment Agreement.  He claims that because
there was no way to attach a list of inventions to the online
agreement pursuant to Section 6, he sent a separate email to Ms.
Carlsen attaching an invention exclusion list denoting nine
patentable items.  This Exclusion List included inventions for a
mini-cloud subscription service and a framework to protect computer
systems from viruses and spyware that he had filed prior to
starting work at Microsoft.  At his Microsoft employee orientation
program in January 2012, the Plaintiff claims he signed a hard copy
of the Employee Agreement, submitted his Exclusion List for the
second time and noted by hand in the hard copy Employee Agreement
that he submitted additional pages.

The Plaintiff worked at Microsoft from Jan. 9, 2012 until February
2015.  He claims that during his employment, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office issued patents for the Mini Cloud
(patent number 8,782,637) and the Safe and Secure (patent number
8,286,219) on July 15, 2014 and Oct. 9, 2012, respectively.  He
further claims that during his employment, he met with various
Microsoft executives who declined his proposals for business models
based on his invention ideas.  In early February 2015, Microsoft
terminated the Plaintiff's employment.

On Feb. 19, 2015, Microsoft's in-house counsel notified the
Plaintiff that he had not listed any inventions under Section 6 of
the Employment Agreement.  For that reason, the in-house counsel
stated, Microsoft retained an assignment right in the patents for
the Mini Cloud and the Safe and Secure.  The Plaintiff claims that
Microsoft continued to deny receipt of his Exclusion List, despite
his requests to various employees for hard copies of his signed
Employee Agreement.

On July 9, 2015, in response to the Plaintiff's correspondence
regarding his Mini Cloud and Safe and Secure patents, the in-house
counsel for Microsoft allegedly offered to put together an
agreement if the Plaintiff agreed to give Microsoft royalty free
access to all present and future patents related to the Mini-cloud
systems in exchange for resolving all disputes.  The Plaintiff
claims he declined the offer.

On May 27, 2016, the Plaintiff received a letter from Microsoft's
outside counsel re-stating its position that he had granted
Microsoft a "royalty-free license, irrevocable, worldwide license"
to those inventions.  Outside counsel offered to transfer to the
Plaintiff all of Microsoft's ownership interest in the Safe and
Secure and Mini Cloud patent families in exchange for his granting
Microsoft a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to the disputed
patent families and fully releasing Microsoft from all claims and
liability.

On Jan. 28, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the action against Microsoft.
In addition to alleging fraud in his particular case, the
Plaintiff seeks to challenge the general legality of Microsoft's
Employee Agreement on behalf of all Microsoft employees who signed
similar agreements with Microsoft.

Under the Plaintiff's theory, Microsoft obtains an employee's
patent rights through an overly-broad patent rights assignment
provision under Section 5.  When the employee leaves Microsoft, the
Plaintiff claims that Microsoft then disregards or destroys their
exclusion list submitted under Section 6, thereby "contaminating"
the employee's patent and requiring the employee to invest
tremendous financial resources to clear their patent right through
court.  As a result, Microsoft employees--who cannot afford to
litigate Microsoft, nor want to abandon their patent work--hand
over their patent rights from the time they sign their employment
agreements yet continue working to develop their patents.  The
Plaintiff claims that Microsoft's scheme specifically violates laws
under antitrust, forced labor, racketeering, civil rights, and
fraud.

The matter comes before the Court on Defendant Microsoft's Motion
to Dismiss Khalid's amended complaint for failure to state a claim.


As an initial matter, the Plaintiff seeks to certify as a class of
all Microsoft employees who signed an employment contract with
Microsoft similar to the Employee Agreement signed by the Plaintiff
(presented as "Count 7").  A pro se litigant may not serve as the
representative of a class in a class action lawsuit under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23.  Accordingly, Judge Martinez does not consider the
question of class certification at this time.

Having reviewed the Defendant's Motion, the Plaintiff's Response,
the Defendant's Reply, and the remainder of the record, Judge
Martinez granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.  He (i)
dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend Counts 1 and 2
(Sherman Act claims) and Count 3 (RICO claim for extortion); (ii)
dismissed with prejudice Count 4 (forced labor), Count 5 (RICO
claim for forced labor), Counts 6 and 12 (civil rights claims),
Count 8 (fraud), and the Plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief
on Fourteenth Amendment violation (Count 10); and dismissed without
prejudice and with leave to amend the Plaintiff's remaining claims
for declaratory relief (Counts 9 and 11).  

Among other things, with respect to the Plaintiffs' Anti-Trust
Claims (Counts 1-2), the Judge found that (ii) the Plaintiff has
not alleged a contract or conspiracy among multiple entities --
instead, his complaint only names Microsoft and employees of
Microsoft as the bad actors.  The Plaintiff has likewise failed to
state a claim under 15 U.S.C. Section 2 as he has provided no
market analysis such as barriers to entry or hyper-competitive
pricing that inhibits competitors from expanding their output in
the cloud application market or the other identified markets.
Finally, the injuries alleged by the Plaintiff are not within the
scope of "antitrust injury" contemplated by Section 2, said the
Court.

As for Count 3, the Plaintiff's RICO claims predicated on
extortion, the Judge found that the Plaintiff has not alleged
sufficient facts to plausibly lead to his asserted RICO claim.  The
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege conduct by Microsoft that
constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act or Washington state law.
Furthermore, he has failed to adequately allege an "enterprise"
under RICO.  Instead, the Plaintiff alleges that these various
entities enjoy mutual benefits through their partnerships and
explains how money flows between the various entities.  These
allegations do not set forth a viable RICO claim.

The Judge also found that the broad and vague declaratory relief
sought by the Plaintiff does not admit of specific relief through a
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts.
Even if the Court narrows the broad language of the Plaintiff's
request to apply to Microsoft's use and enforcement of its
Employment Agreement, the Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently
allege an actual dispute suitable for declaratory relief.  On
amendment, Plaintiff's complaint must request specific relief from
the Court based on his own dispute with Microsoft -- not broad
relief based on hypothetical injuries to other Microsoft
employees.

The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint so that he
may be afforded an additional opportunity to plead a viable claim
under the Sherman Act (Counts 1, 2), RICO (Count 3) and/or
declaratory relief under Counts 9 and 11.  The claims will be made
on his own behalf and not on behalf of a putative class of
Plaintiffs.  The amended complaint will contain a concise statement
of his claims setting forth the specific facts giving rise to a
plausible inference that Microsoft is liable for the alleged
violations.  The Plaintiff was ordered to file a Second Amended
Complaint within 30 days of the Order for Counts 1-3, 9 and 11.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/dG0L9c from Leagle.com.

Atm Shafiqul Khalid, an individual and on behalf of similarly
situated, Plaintiff, pro se.

Microsoft Corporation, a Washington corporation, Defendant,
represented by Tiffany Scott Connors -- connorst@lanepowell.com --
LANE POWELL PC & Heidi Brooks Bradley -- bradleyh@lanepowell.com --
LANE POWELL PC.


MID-AMERICA APARTMENTS: Rowland Seeks Certification of Two Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned RICARDO ROWLAND and KENNETH
SPURLOCK v. MID-AMERICA APARTMENTS, LP d/b/a COLONIAL GRAND AT
RESEARCH PARK and THE PRESERVE AT BRIER CREEK, Case No.
1:18-cv-00043-NCT-LPA (M.D.N.C.), move the Court for an order
certifying these Classes:

   * The Collection Letter Class:

     For the Relevant Time Period, all natural persons who,
     (a) resided in any of the properties in North Carolina owned
     and operated by MAALP, and (b) were sent a Collection Letter
     either threatening to Eviction Fees or noting that such Fees
     were now owed; and

   * The Fee Class:

     For the Relevant Time Period, all natural persons who,
     (a) resided in any of the properties in North Carolina owned
     and operated by MAALP, (b) were charged, and (c) paid
     Eviction Fees.

Excluded from the Classes are: (a) any Judge or Magistrate
presiding over this action and members of their families; (b) MAALP
and any entity which MAALP has a controlling interest or which has
a controlling interest in MAALP and all legal representatives; and
(c) all persons who properly execute and file a timely request for
exclusion from the classes.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint their counsel as Class
Counsel, and to appoint them as Class Representatives.  The
Plaintiffs also request oral argument to fully address the complex
legal and factual issues discussed within their Class Certification
Memorandum.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Scott C. Harris, Esq.
          Patrick M. Wallace, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          Facsimile: (919) 600-5035
          E-mail: scott@wbmllp.com
                  pat@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Edward H. Maginnis, Esq.
          Karl S. Gwaltney, Esq.
          MAGINNIS LAW, PLLC
          4801 Glenwood Avenue, Suite 310
          Raleigh, NC 27612
          Telephone: (919) 526-0450
          Facsimile: (919) 882-8763
          E-mail: emaginnis@maginnislaw.com
                  kgwaltney@maginnislaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Mark P. Henriques, Esq.
          Michael A. Ingersoll, Esq.
          Matthew F. Tilley, Esq.
          Debbie W. Harden, Esq.
          WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US), LLP
          One Wells Fargo Ctr., Suite 3500
          301 S. College St.
          Charlotte, NC 28202-6037
          Telephone: (704) 331-4912
          Facsimile: (704) 338-7830
          E-mail: mark.henriques@wbd-us.com
                  Mike.ingersoll@wbd-us.com
                  Matthew.Tilley@wbd-us.com
                  Debbie.Harden@wbd-us.com


MORENO: Wonderful Pistachios Files Petition for Coordination
------------------------------------------------------------
A Petition for coordination and motion for a stay was filed by the
Plaintiff in the class action styled as WONDERFUL PISTACHIOS AND
ALMONDS, LLC, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, Petitioner v. ANTONIO MORENO,
LIDIA VILLANUEVA, TORRES DAWSON, ALEJANDRA VILLEGAS, ULISES TORRES,
VICTOR ZEPEDA INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Respondents, Case No. JCCP5057 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern
Cty., Sept. 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Employment - Civil
Unlimited.

Wonderful Pistachios & Almonds is the world's largest vertically
integrated pistachio and almond grower and processor, cultivating
and harvesting more than 65,000 acres of pistachio and almond
orchards and delivering more than 450 million pounds of nuts
globally each year.[BN]

Petitioner WONDERFUL PISTACHIOS AND ALMONDS, LLC is represented by
BROOKE S. HAMMOND, ESQ.

Respondents ANTONIO MORENO, LIDIA VILLANUEVA, TORRES DAWSON,
ALEJANDRA VILLEGAS, ULISES TORRES, VICTOR ZEPEDA are represented by
PETER R. DION-KINDEM, ESQ.


NASSAU, NY: Bid to Certify NY Labor Law Claims Denied
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ROBERT J. ARCIELLO, FRANCIS
J. GOREY, JR., DIANE MASTROPAOLO, GLEN F. TUIFEL, DANIEL E.
SPEICHER, LAWRENCE J. LOISELLE, JOSEPH T. WHITTAKER, JAMES SHARKEY,
KIRK FOWLKES, JOHN CLOUDMAN, NICHOLAS PALMESE, JOHN OCHWAT, and all
others similarly situated; and SHAWN BURNS, KEVIN BIEN, BRIAN M.
WISE, and all other similarly situated Correction Officers, the
Plaintiffs, vs. COUNTY OF NASSAU, and EDWARD MANGANO, in his
individual and official capacity, the Defendants, Case no.
2:16-cv-3974 (ADS) (SIL) (E.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Arthur D. Spatt
entered an order:

   1. denying Plaintiffs' motion to strike the Defendants'
      consolidated answer;

   2. sustaining all of the Defendants' objections to a report
      and recommendation;

   3. granting the Defendants' Rule 12(c) cross-motion for
      judgment on the pleadings as to the NYLL claims and denying
      the Plaintiffs' motion to certify their New York Labor Law
      claims;

   4. denying Defendants' motion to set aside Judge Steven I.
      Locke's ruling on the Defendants' motion to strike the
      consent-to-sue forms.[CC]

Attorneys for Robert J. Arciello, Francis J. Gorey, Jr., Diane
Mastropaolo, Glen F. Tuifel, Daniel E. Speicher, Lawrence J.
Loiselle, Joseph T. Whittaker, James Sharkey, Kirk Fowles, John
Cloudman, Nicholas Palmese, John Ochwat, and all others similarly
situated, are:

          Louis D. Stober, Jr., Esq.
          Albina Kataeva, Esq.,
          Jason Paul Mansmann, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF LOUIS D. STOBER, JR., LLC
          350 Old Country Road, Suite 205
          Garden City, NY 11530

Attorneys for Shawn Burns, Kevin Bien, Brian M. Wise, and all other
similarly situated Correction Officers, are

          Alanna Rose Sakovits, Esq.,
          James Emmet Murphy, Esq.,
          LaDonna Marie Lusher, Esq.,
          Lloyd Robert Ambinder, Esq., Of Counsel.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004

               - and -

          Steven Isaacs, Esq.
          KOEHLER & ISAACS LLP
          61 Broadway, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10006

Attorneys for the Defendants

          Deanna Darlene Panico, Esq.,
          Michael Paul Siravo, Esq.,
          Philip A. Butler, Esq.,
          Rhoda Yohai Andors, Esq.,
          Stephen Louis Martir, Esq.
          BEE READY FISHBEIN HATTER & DONOVAN, LLP
          170 Old Country Road, Suite 200
          Mineola, NY 11501

NATIONAL CREDIT: Swanson Sues over Debt Collection Practices
------------------------------------------------------------
ROSALYNE SWANSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NATIONAL CREDIT SERVICES,
INC., a Washington corporation, the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-01504 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 19, 2019), alleges that NCS's debt
collection practices violated the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Plaintiff brings this suit on behalf of herself and the Class
of similarly situated individuals to challenge NCS harassing debt
collection calling practices and to obtain damages and other
redress for all persons injured by such unlawful conduct.

NCS is a debt collection company that claims to be a
nationally-licensed debt collection agency. NCS claims to
specialize in debt recovery for the U.S. Department of Education
and higher education. NCS also conducts debt collection for other
industries as well.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Michael P. Matesky, II
          MATESKY LAW PLLC
          1001 4 th Ave., Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98154
          Telephone: 206.701.0331
          Facsimile: 206.701.0332
          E-mail: mike@mateskylaw.com
                  litigation@mateskylaw.com

               - and -

          Seven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Ave., Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          E-mail: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com
                  ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Third Circuit Appeal Initiated in Leo Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Edward Leo, Clifford J. Marchion and Donna Marchion
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in their lawsuit entitled
Edward Leo, et al. v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC of Delaware, et al.,
Case No. 3-17-cv-05839, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
was reassigned from Judge Renee Marie Bumb, Magistrate Judge Karen
M. Williams, to Judge Brian R. Martinotti and Magistrate Judge
Douglas E. Arpert.

Nationstar provides mortgage services.

The appellate case is captioned as Edward Leo, et al. v. Nationstar
Mortgage LLC of Delaware, et al., Case No. 19-3111, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants EDWARD LEO, as executor of the Estate of Dawn
L. Leo, CLIFFORD J. MARCHION and DONNA MARCHION, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Lawrence E. Bathgate, II, Esq.
          Kyle R. Tognan, Esq.
          BATHGATE WEGENER & WOLF PC
          Bathgate Wegener & Wolf
          One Airport Road
          P.O. Box 2043
          Lakewood, NJ 08701
          Telephone: (908) 363-0666
          E-mail: lbathgate@bathweg.com
                  ktognan@bathweg.com

               - and -

          Howard M. Bushman, Esq.
          Joseph M. Kaye, Esq.
          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM
          2 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 740-1423

               - and -

          Adam M. Moskowitz, Esq.
          KOZYAK TROPIN & THROCKMORTON LLP
          2525 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, 9th Floor
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (302) 377-0652
          E-mail: amm@kttlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph G. Sauder, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO LLP
          555 Lancaster Avenue
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (610) 200-0580
          E-mail: jgs@mccunewright.com

Defendant-Appellee NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC OF DELAWARE, DBA
Champion Mortgage Co Inc., is represented by:

          Matthew T. Eyet, Esq.
          SANDELANDS EYET LLP
          1545 U.S. Highway 206, Suite 304
          Bedminster, NJ 07921
          Telephone: (908) 470-1200
          E-mail: meyet@se-llp.com

Defendant-Appellee GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE CO is represented by:

          Kevin M. Haas, Esq.
          COZEN O'CONNOR
          One Newark Center, Suite 1900
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 286-1200
          E-mail: khaas@cozen.com

Defendant-Appellee WILLIS OF OHIO INC, DBA Loan Protector Insurance
Services, is represented by:

          Edward J. Fanning, Jr., Esq.
          Gregory J. Hindy, Esq.
          Robert A. Mintz, Esq.
          Scott M. Weingart, Esq.
          MCCARTER & ENGLISH LLP
          100 Mulberry Street
          Four Gateway Center, 14th Floor
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 622-4444
          E-mail: efanning@mccarter.com
                  ghindy@mccarter.com
                  rmintz@mccarter.com
                  sweingart@mccarter.com


NATIONWIDE LIFE: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in Brown Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., issued an Opinion & Order denying
the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification in the lawsuit
entitled THERESA BROWN, Individually, and as a representative of a
class of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the Andrus
Wagstaff, PC 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan and ail other similarly
Situated individual Retirement plans v. NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al., AND ANDRUS WAGSTAFF, PC, Individually and on
behalf of a class of others similarly situated, Case No.
2:17-cv-00558-EAS-CMV (S.D. Ohio).

Judge Sargus also denied as moot each of the Defendants' Motion to
Strike the Class Allegations from the Second Amended Complaint.

On June 27, 2017, former Named Plaintiff Alana Schmitt commenced
this action on behalf of herself, other participants and
beneficiaries of AW's 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan ("the Plan"), and
the participants and beneficiaries of similarly-situated individual
account plans.  AW is the administrator and fiduciary of Plan,
which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA").  On September 28, 2018, Theresa Brown moved to
intervene and assume the role of Named Plaintiff.  That same day
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff seeks: (1) certification of a Plaintiff Class; (2)
certification of a Defendant Class; (3) declaratory judgment; (4)
disgorgement by Nationwide of the excessive fees charged; (5)
attorney's fees and costs; and (6) pre and post-judgment interest.

The Plaintiff seeks certification of:

   * a Plaintiff Class represent by Theresa Brown:

     All participant-directed individual 401(k) account plans
     that, at any time from October 1, 2014 through the date of
     judgment (the "Class Period"), that (1) have total Plan
     assets of less than $10 million; (2) paid Nationwide for
     recordkeeping and other administrative services through the
     Nationwide Retirement Flexible Advantage Retirement Plans
     Program; and (3) paid recordkeeping and administrative
     service fees to Nationwide in excess of $64 per participant.
     Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are employees of
     Plaintiff's law firms; and

   * a Defendant Class represented by Defendant Andrus Wagstaff,
     P.C.:

     All sponsors of participant-directed individual 401(k)
     account plans that, at any time from October 1, 2014 through
     the date of judgment (the "Class Period"), (1) have total
     Plan assets of less than $10 million; (2) entered into
     Program Agreements with Nationwide through the Nationwide
     Retirement Flexible Advantage Retirement Plans Program to
     provide recordkeeping and administrative services for their
     companies' defined contribution retirement plans; and (3)
     paid recordkeeping and administrative service fees to
     Nationwide in excess of $64 per participant.

In his Opinion & Order, Judge Sargus finds that the putative
Defendant Class members do not share a juridical link, and as a
result, the Plaintiff lacks standing to sue each Defendant, and
Rule 23 certification of the putative Defendant Class would be
improper.  The Court also opines that the Plaintiff can only assert
a cause of action against Nationwide and her plan sponsor, AW.
Likewise, each of the 250,000 putative Plaintiff Class members can
only assert causes of action against Nationwide and their
individual plan sponsors.  Hence, Judge Sargus says, the Plaintiff
Class lacks standing to sue AW and all similarly-situated plan
sponsors.[CC]


NBCUNIVERSAL MEDIA: Williams Suit Moved to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as JAMES BO WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated. the Plaintiff, vs. NBCUNIVERSAL
MEDIA, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and DOE 1 through
and including DOE 10, Case No. 19STCV28243 (Filed Aug. 14, 2019),
was removed from the Los Angeles County Superior Court to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
on Sept. 18, 2018.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide compliant
pay stubs, and failed to pay minimum wage and/or overtime wages
under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff Williams worked as a Grip for one day on or about
December 10, 2018, on a production entitled "NBC Sports Molorcross
Media Day". He was not paid until on or about February 8, 2019, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Alan Harris, Esq.
          MinJi Gal, Esq.
          HARRIS & RUBLE
          655 North Central Avenue 17th Floor
          Glendale CA 91203
          Telephone: 323.962.3777
          Facsimile: 323.962.3004
          E-mail: harrisa@harrisandruble.com
                  mgal@narrisandruble.com

NBTY INC: Court Refuses to Disgorge Settlement Payments in Pearson
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
denying Objector Theodore Frank, Motion Seeking Disgorgement of
Side Payments in the case captioned NICK PEARSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. NBTY, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No. 11-cv-7972.
(N.D. Ill.).

This case is before the Court on Objector Theodore Frank's motion
seeking disgorgement of side payments Defendants made to other
objectors to settle their appeals.

This case began as a putative class action on behalf of consumers
who purchased glucosamine, a dietary supplement touted to improve
joint health. The named Plaintiff, Nick Pearson, alleged, on behalf
of the class, that Defendants, Target Corporation, NBTY, Inc., and
Rexall Sundown, Inc., violated consumer protection laws by making
false claims about the efficacy of the supplement.

Pearson, along with Plaintiffs in five other cases, executed a
global, nationwide settlement agreement. That initial settlement
established a constructive common fund of $14.2 million, only $2
million of which was guaranteed to go to class members.  

As approved, the settlement required Defendants to pay, in addition
to money paid on the class members' claims: $1.5 million in notice
and administration costs; $30,000 in incentive awards to the six
named Plaintiffs; $1.13 million to the Orthopedic Research and
Education Foundation; and $1.93 million in attorneys' fees and
expenses a significant reduction from what counsel had requested.


The objectors, including Frank, appealed, and the Seventh Circuit
reversed, determining that, although Judge Zagel had improved the
settlement with his modifications, he had not gone far enough.

On remand, the parties reached a new settlement, this time with the
assistance of a neutral third-party mediator. The new settlement,
in direct response to concerns raised by the Seventh Circuit,
established a $7.5 million settlement fund to pay class member
claims, attorneys' fees and expenses, and incentive awards. On top
of that, the settlement required Defendants to pay an additional
$1.5 million for notice and administration costs.

Despite these improvements, several class members, including Frank,
Steven Buckley, Randy Nunez, and Patrick Sweeney, filed objections.
None of the objectors challenged the reasonableness of the
settlement. Rather Nunez objected because his attorney, who had
been named interim class counsel in another case pending in
California, was not involved in the negotiations that led to the
new settlement. Buckley similarly raised no challenge to the terms
of the settlement but objected to class counsel's fee petition,
arguing that counsel should get no more than $1.5 million.  

Judge Zagel approved the settlement, over these objections, awarded
$25,000 in incentive awards to five class representatives ($5,000
to each), and awarded class counsel 33% of the net settlement fund.
Additionally, Judge Zagel awarded Frank's counsel attorney's fees
in the amount of $180,000, to be paid from the gross settlement
fund.  

Frank appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Seventh
Circuit determined that the circumstances three objectors
voluntarily dismissed their appeals before appellate briefing began
were such that this Court should have allowed Frank formally to
raise his suspicion that the settling objectors acted in bad
faith.

On remand, consistent with the Seventh Circuit's directives, this
Court provided Frank with the opportunity to pursue his theory. The
parties conducted discovery, filed motions, and argued the matter,
but the record failed to confirm suspicions of blackmail or other
wrongdoing.  

For the Court to order disgorgement, Frank would have to
demonstrate that the objector/appellants violated some rule or
statute or did something unlawful, that the settlement payments
amounted to ill-gotten gains. Without more, the dismissal of an
appeal does not necessarily indicate objector blackmail. Litigants
routinely dismiss matters for reasons other than blackmail as Frank
knows, having himself dismissed his appeal. And litigants settle
disputes every day for reasons having nothing to do with the merits
of their claims or defenses. The dismissals raised red flags on
appeal because the Seventh Circuit thought that they came possibly
at the expense of the class.  

But after considering the evidence and arguments on that question,
this Court cannot say that is the case.

The settlement agreements executed by Defendants and the three
objector/appellants show that Defendants NBTY and Rexall paid
$10,000 to Patrick Sweeney, $60,000 to Steven Buckley, and $60,000
to Randy Nunez in exchange for each objector/appellant's agreement
to remain part of the Pearson class, to dismiss his appeal, and to
release all claims, including any claim for fees. Initially, each
of these settlements was far less than the $180,000 Frank
received.

Frank suggests that the appeals were meritless, designed to
leverage payments that should have gone to the class. But at the
initial status hearing following the Seventh Circuit's remand,
Frank conceded that he had no evidence to support his claim of
objector blackmail. Moreover, his assertion remains demonstrably
false with respect to at least two of the objectors.

In response to Frank's motion, Buckley explained that he filed his
objection and his notice of appeal challenging only counsel's fee
petition-a challenge similar to that asserted by Frank.  

Frank's assertions notwithstanding, this Court does not read the
Seventh Circuit's decision to preclude all payments beyond those
contemplated in a settlement agreement. Nor has the Seventh Circuit
held that all side settlements necessarily remain problematic or
improper. Indeed, Safeco Insurance Company of America v. American
International Group, 710 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2013), instructs
that side settlements can, in fact, be acceptable. In Safeco, after
describing the side settlement, the Seventh Circuit observed that
the terms of the settlement do not matter to the other members of
the class, who still split $351 million among them.

Likewise, the side settlements here had no effect on the settlement
fund or the class distributions. The money Defendants paid to the
objectors remained separate and apart from the settlement fund; the
settlement fund was firmly defined before the objectors filed their
appeals; and there simply is no mechanism by which those funds
would have gone to the class. As such, the settlements did not
deprive any class member of his or her reasonable expectations—on
the contrary, class members got exactly what they bargained for.
Absent some indication that such settlements harm the class or
somehow diminish the relief available to the class, this Court
finds no basis to inject itself into these arms' length
transactions with an unfounded order of disgorgement.

The Court finds no evidence to show that the side settlements
reached between Defendants and objector/appellants Nunez, Buckley,
and Sweeney harmed the class or came at the expense of the class.
As a result, equitable relief such as disgorgement is neither
available nor appropriate. Accordingly, Frank's motion seeking to
disgorge side payments is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available
https://tinyurl.com/yyz27pgw from Leagle.com.

Nick Pearson, Plaintiff, represented by Stewart M. Weltman -
sweltman@siprut.com - Siprut PC, Charles C. Sweedler , Levin
Fishbein Sedran & Berman, 510 Walnut Street, Suite 500Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19106-3697, pro hac vice, Elaine Ryan  -
eryan@bffb.com - Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint, PC & Howard
J. Sedran , Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 510 Walnut Street,
Suite 500Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-3697

Richard Jennings, Plaintiff, represented by Carol V. Gilden -
cgilden@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
Jeffrey Ian Carton - jcarton@denleacarton.com - Denlea & Carton
Llp, pro hac vice & Peter Newton Freiberg -
pfreiberg@denleacarton.com - Denlea & Carton Llp.

Target Corporation, Defendant, represented by Bradley Joseph
Andreozzi - bradley.andreozzi dbr.com - Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP,
David B. Sudzus - david.sudzus dbr.com - Drinker Biddle & Reath
LLP, Justin O'Neill Kay -justin.kay dbr.com - Drinker Biddle &
Reath LLP, Kara L. McCall - KMCCALL@SIDLEY.COM - Sidley Austin LLP,
Michael W. Davis - mdavis@sidley.com - Sidley Austin LLP & Theodore
R. Scarborough, Jr. , Sidley Austin LLP.

NBTY, Inc., a Delaware Corporation & Rexall Sundown, Inc., a
Florida corporation, Defendants, represented by Kara L. McCall ,
Sidley Austin LLP, Michael W. Davis , Sidley Austin LLP & Theodore
R. Scarborough, Jr. , Sidley Austin LLP.

Randy Nunez, Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Todd David
Carpenter  -tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com - Carpenter Law Group &
James Richard Patterson - jim@pattersonlawgroup.com - Patterson Law
Group, Apc, pro hac vice.


NEW YORK, NY: Class in Suit over Police Record Access Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, R. C., A. G., J. J. Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, JAMES O'NEILL, Defendants, Docket No. 153739/2018, Motion
Seq. No. 004 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Lyle E. Frank of the New York
County Supreme Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

The action arises out of the Plaintiffs' allegation that the New
York City Police Department ("NYPD") has policies regarding access
to sealed records that are in violation of Criminal Procedure Law
Section 160.50(1) and Section 160.55(1)(c).  The three named
Plaintiffs allege to have been aggrieved by these policies and are
suing for both injunctive relief and for some monetary damages.

The Plaintiffs now move for class certification for all those who
have sealed records and have either been aggrieved or may be
aggrieved by these alleged unlawful practices of the NYPD.
According to them, between 2014 and 2016, there were 400,000
arrests that were required to be sealed that the NYPD maintains
access to.

The Defendant, City of New York, opposes such certification,
arguing mainly that the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the
requirements for class certification and that the class
certification is premature, as there has been limited discovery
with no depositions thus far in the case.  Additionally, the City
argues that due to the doctrine of stare decisis and the likelihood
that an order in this case will be precedent as to all other
similar claims, such class certification is unnecessary.

Plaintiff avers, and Judge Frank  agrees, that there are likely
tens of thousands of members of the class that would be impacted by
this case.  This appears to be a conservative estimate, based on
the number provided of 400,000 arrests over a three-year period
that ended almost three years ago.  He also agrees with the
arguments set forth by the Plaintiffs as to why class certification
is appropriate.  All the factors required for class certification
pursuant to CPLR Section 901(a) are met.

Finally, the City argues that the governmental operations doctrine
makes class certification unnecessary, in short that the doctrine
of stare decisis would sufficiently resolve the matter without the
need for class certification.  However, it is simply speculative at
this point to say that any order issued by the Court in the case
would be binding on all potential class members.  Moreover, if the
allegations levied by the Plaintiffs are true, the doctrine of
stare decisis has not dissuaded the NYPD from continuing their
alleged unlawful policies in violation of the laws regarding sealed
records, rules the Court.

Accordingly, Judge Frank granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.  He appointed the Bronx Defender Services and Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP as the counsel for the class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 5, 2019 Decision and Order is
available at https://is.gd/WjFTY7 from Leagle.com.


NISSAN MOTOR: Face Ellis Suit in Missouri Western District
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nissan Motor Company,
Ltd. et al. The case is captioned as Scott Ellis, individually and
on behalf of similarly situated persons, the Plaintiff, vs. Nissan
North America, Inc. and Nissan Motor Company, Ltd., the Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00750-FJG (W.D. Mo., Sept 16, 2019). The case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., is a Japanese multinational automobile
manufacturer headquartered in Nishi-ku, Yokohama. The company sells
its cars under the Nissan, Infiniti, and Datsun brands with
in-house performance tuning products labelled Nismo.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Pamela Nagel Jorgensen, Esq.
          MCINNES LAW, LLC
          1900 West 75th Street, Suite 120
          Prairie Village, KS 66208
          Telephone: (913) 417-2728
          Facsimile: (913) 273-1671
          E-mail: pam@mcinnes-law.com

NMS MANAGEMENT: Yip Seeks to Certify Class of Mobile Examiners
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRANDI YIP, On behalf of herself and all others similarly-situated,
and OVETA TRUBOW, the Plaintiffs, vs. NMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC., EXAMONE WORLD WIDE, INC., and ELAINE TAULE, the Defendants,
Case No. 9:19-cv-80538-RKA (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs ask the
Court for an order:

   1. granting conditional certification of a Collective Action
      under section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for the

      proposed Putative Class defined as:

      "all persons who are currently and/or who were formerly
      employed by or engaged by for NMS Management Services, Inc.,

      ExamOne World Wide, Inc., and/or Elaine Taule and who worked

      out of or through NMS Management Services, Inc.'s Palm
      vSprings, Florida, office in the position of "Mobile
      Examiner," "Mobile Phlebotomist," "Paramedical Examiner"
      and/or any other similarly titled position";

   2. appointing Ms. Yip as the representative of the Putative
      Class with authority to appear at any mediation/settlement
      conference on behalf of and to bind the Putative Class;

   3. expediting production by Defendants, within 10 days from the

      entry of an Order from the Court, of a complete list of each

      person -- including his/her last known home address,
      cellular telephone number, fax number, and email address --
      who worked as a "Mobile Examiner" or other similarly titled
      positions for Defendants at any time between April 18, 2016
      and the present;

   4. requiring Defendants to format and produce, on an expedited
      basis, a list both in hard copy and electronically in an
      Excel spreadsheet, of each such person listed
      alphabetically, and with each person's last known home
      address, telephone number, fax number, and email addresses
      in a separate field corresponding with each name to
      facilitate the preparation and sending of notice;

   5. permitting Ms. Yip's counsel to send a Court-Approved Notice

      by email and by U.S. Mail to all members of the Putative
      Class about their rights to opt into this collective action
      by filing a Consent to Join Lawsuit and to call/text each to

      ensure that they received the forms;

   6. permitting Ms. Yip's counsel to send a Court-Approved
      Reminder Notice by email and by U.S. Mail to all Putative
      Class members and to call/text each to ensure that they
      received the Reminder Notice; and

   7. requiring Defendants to provide a copy of the Court-Approved

      Notice to all Putative Class members currently employed by
      Defendants in their next paychecks /pay stubs by mail at
      their last known addresses, and by email.[CC]

Ms. Yip worked for Defendants as a "Mobile Examiner" from January
3, 2013 to October 9, 2017. She claims that (1) while Defendants
classified and paid her as an independent contractor, she should
have been classified and paid as an employee; (2) that she was paid
on a per appointment basis, that she did not regularly receive at
least a minimum wage when her pay was divided by the
hours she worked each week, that she regularly worked more than 40
hours per week but was not paid for this time, reducing her regular
rate of pay below the minimum wage, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs are:

          Chris P. Wido, Esq.
          THE SPITZ LAW FIRM, LLC
          25200 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 200
          Beachwood, OH 44122
          Telephone: (216) 291-4744
          E-mail: chris.wido@spitzlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Brian H. Pollock, Esq.
          FAIRLAW FIRM
          7300 N. Kendall Drive, Suite 450
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: 305 230-4884
          E-mail: brian@fairlawattorney.com


NOBULL LLC: Conner Files Class Suit under ADA in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
Nobull, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Mary Conner,
individually and as the representative of a class of similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff v. Nobull, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-09104 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019).

NOBULL is a footwear, apparel and accessory brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


NOPALERA GRILL: Sorto Seeks Regular & OT Wages for Servers
----------------------------------------------------------
ROCIO SORTO, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NOPALERA GRILL GALVESTON, LLC;
NOPALERA ENTERPRISES, LLC; and EVELIA MENDEZ, the Defendants, Case
No. 4:19-cv-03541 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid regular and overtime wages from Defendants under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.

In connection with their business operations, Defendants
collectively employ numerous waiters, waitresses, servers,
bartenders, busboys, food runners, cooks, kitchen help, etc. The
Defendants employed Sorto from approximately January 2014 through
January. She was employed as a server/waitress.

The Defendants do not pay server/waitresses, including Sorto, at
the minimum wage for all hours worked, nor do they pay
servers/waitresses, including Sorto, overtime wages for hours
worked in excess of 40 per each seven day workweek at a rate of
time and one-half as required by the FLSA.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Melissa Moore, Esq.
          Curt Hesse, Esq.
          Bridget Davidson, Esq.
          MOORE & ASSOCIATES
          Lyric Center
          440 Louisiana Street, Suite 675
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 222-6775
          Facsimile: (713) 222-6739

NORTH CAROLINA: Sex Offenders Class Certified in Grabarczyk Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Terrence W. Boyle grants the Plaintiff's motions for class
certification and to appoint class counsel in the lawsuit titled
KENNETH S. GRABARCZYK, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. JOSHUA STEIN, Attorney General of the State of North
Carolina, in his official capacity; BOB SCHURMEIER, Director of the
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, in his official
capacity; SEAN BOONE, District Attorney of Alamance County, North
Carolina, in his official capacity, Case No. 5:19-cv-00048-BO
(E.D.N.C.).

The class is defined as:

     All persons placed on the North Carolina Sex Offender
     Registry solely on the basis of an offense committed in a
     state other than North Carolina and who both committed the
     predicate offense prior to December 1, 2006, and moved into
     the state of North Carolina prior to December 1, 2006.

Counsel for the Plaintiff is appointed as class counsel.[CC]


NOTRE DAME DE NAMUR: Moore Labor Suit Removed to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit titled JOHN S. MOORE, III, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. NOTRE DAME DE NAMUR UNIVERSITY,
a California Non-Profit Public Benefit Corporation, Case No.
19-CIV-04765, was removed on Sept. 23, 2019, from the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of San Mateo to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (San
Francisco).

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-05936-JST to the
proceeding.

On August 15, 2019, the action was commenced in the Superior Court.
On September 4, 2019, the First Amended Class Action Complaint was
filed in the Superior Court.  The FACAC alleges the existence of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the University and Service
Employees International Union, Local 1021, from July 1, 2017, to
June 30, 2020.

The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of violating the California
Labor Code by failing to pay wages for all hours and failing to
authorize and permit paid rest breaks, among other failures.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Julian Hammond, Esq.
          Polina Brandler, Esq.
          Ari Cherniak, Esq.
          HAMMONDLAW, P.C.
          1829 Reisterstown Rd., Suite 410
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Telephone: (310) 601-6766
          Facsimile: (310) 295-2385
          E-mail: jhammond@hammondlawpc.com
                  pbrandler@hammondlawpc.com
                  acherniak@hammondlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Michael J. Vartain, Esq.
          Kathryn J. Burke, Esq.
          VARTAIN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          601 Montgomery Street, Suite 780
          San Francisco, CA 94111-2664
          Telephone: (415) 391-1155
          Facsimile: (415) 391-1177
          E-mail: mike@vartainlaw.com


NOVATIME TECHNOLOGY: Thome Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TIMOTHY THOME, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. NOVATIME TECHNOLOGY, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06256 (Ill. Cir., Sept. 19, 2019),
seeks to redress and curtail Defendant's unlawful collection, use,
storage, and disclosure of Plaintiff's sensitive and proprietary
biometric data.

NOVAtime is a provider of automated time and attendance solutions
which provides software and data collection timeclocks to companies
across an array of industries. The company designs and manufactures
the subject timeclocks. The company designs and administers the
software that operate the time clocks.

Chief among the products NOVAtime manufactures are biometric time
keeping devices including fingerprint readers and other similar
devices (Biometric Data Readers) which require scans of users'
biometric data in order for those users to clock in and out of
work.

NOVAtime requires users to scan their biometric identifiers, namely
their fingerprints or hand geometry, when using Biometric Data
Readers as an authorization method to track their time at work by
using a scan of that biometric information to clock in and out of
work shifts and/or meal breaks.

Once a user has registered his or her fingerprint or hand geometry
with a Biometric Data Reader, that information is retained in
NOVAtime's database(s). According to its website, NOVAtime
"provides complete Time and Attendance / Workforce Management
solutions that are fully equipped with badge time clocks, biometric
time clocks, proximity time clocks, and web-based kiosk devices, as
well as integration capabilities with virtually any human resource
or payroll application."

Unlike ID badges or key fobs -- which can be changed or replaced if
stolen or compromised -- fingerprints and hand geometry are unique,
permanent biometric identifiers associated with each individual.
This exposes individuals who use NOVAtime's Biometric Data Readers
to serious and irreversible privacy risks. For example, if a
database containing fingerprints, hand geometry, or other
sensitive, proprietary biometric data is hacked, breached, or
otherwise exposed -- like in the recent Google+, Equifax, Uber,
FacebooldCambridge Analytica, and Marriott data breaches or misuses
-- individuals have no means by which to prevent identity theft,
unauthorized tracking or other unlawful or improper use of this
highly personal and private information, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Andrew C. Ficzko, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: 312 233 1550
          Facsimile: 312 233 1560
          E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  aticzko@stephanzouras.com

               - and -

          Brandon M Wise, Esq.
          Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone: 314-833-4825
          E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com
                  plesko@pwcklegal.com

NPAS SOLUTIONS: Court Enters Protective Order in Whittum TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Elayna J. Youchah of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada has entered the parties' Stipulated
Protective Order in the case, LEISA WHITTUM, and all similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. NPAS SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-00877-JAD-EJY (D. Nev.).

The action is likely to involve confidential personal health
information protected by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") and state privacy laws, trade
secrets, commercial and/or proprietary or personal information for
which special protection from public disclosure and from use for
any purpose other than prosecution of the action is warranted.
Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the
prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery
materials, to adequately protect information the parties are
entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are
permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation
for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the
end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective
order for such information is justified in the matter.  

It is the intent of the parties that information will not be
designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be
so designated without a good faith belief that it has been
maintained in a confidential, nonpublic manner, and there is good
cause why it should not be part of the public record of the case.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs.  Final disposition will be deemed to be the
later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in this action,
with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment after the
completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands,
trials, or reviews of the action.

Any Party or Non-Party may challenge a designation of
confidentiality, including without limitation a redaction of
Confidential Health Information or Confidential Patient
Information, at any time.  A Party that seeks to file under seal
any Protected Material must comply with District of Nevada Local
Rule IA 10-5.

Any violation of the Order may be punished by any and all
appropriate measures including, without limitation, contempt
proceedings and/or monetary sanctions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Protective Order is
available at https://is.gd/fsZiEi from Leagle.com.

Leisa Whittum, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew I. Knepper --
matthew.knepper@knepperclark.com -- Knepper & Clark LLC, Miles N.
Clark -- miles.clark@knepperclark.com -- Knepper & Clark LLC &
David H. Krieger -- info@hainesandkrieger.com -- Haines & Krieger,
LLC.

NPAS Solutions, LLC, Defendant, represented by John H. Mowbray --
jmowbray@spencerfane.com -- Spencer Fane LLP & Mary E. Bacon --
mbacon@spencerfane.com -- Spencer Fane LLP.


NRT WEST: Bid to Certify Three Classes in Chinitz TCPA Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD CHINITZ, Plaintiff, v. NRT WEST, INC., d/b/a
Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company, Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-06100-NC (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Nathaniel M. Cousins
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
denied Chinitz's motion to certify three nationwide classes.

In the class action, Chinitz accuses Defendant NRT of making
unlawful robocalls.
NRT, more commonly known as Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage,
is a residential brokerage company.  It operates regional offices,
where it contracts with local realtors or "sales associates."   In
NRT's Palo Alto office, NRT has hired over 100 current or former
sales associates since 2014.  Similar Coldwell Banker entities
operate throughout the United States.

In 2003 and 2018, Chinitz placed his landline and VOIP numbers on
the national do-not-call registry, respectively.  In 2017, after
Chinitz placed his home in Santa Cruz, California on an online real
estate listing portal for sale, he received unwanted calls on
behalf of NRT sales associates.  After receiving those calls,
Chinitz asked the caller to not call him back, but he continued to
receive unwanted calls.  One of those associates was Matt
Christensen.  On more than one occasion, Chinitz received calls
using a prerecorded message.

According to Matt Christensen, it was common practice in the
industry to use third-party services or online listings to gather
lists of prospective real estate clients and to use those lists to
call prospective clients.  Although NRT provided various onboarding
documents regarding cold calling practices, Christensen did not
receive any specific training regarding the requirements of the
National Do-Not-Call Registry.  Likewise, Christensen had access to
NRT's internal do-not-contact lists, but did not use those lists to
screen his calls.  Christensen also used third-party services to
call homeowners on his behalf.

On Oct. 4, 2018, Chinitz initiated the putative class action
alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA").  He amended his complaint on Dec. 14, 2018, alleging
putative class claims for (1) calling individuals on the national
do-not-call registry; (2) calling individuals on its internal
do-not-call registry; (3) using a non-exempt artificial or
prerecorded message; and (4) violating the UCL.  On Feb. 20, 2019,
the Court dismissed Chinitz's UCL claim.

Chinitz moved to certify three classes:

     a. National Do-Not-Call Registry Class (NDNC Class): All
persons in the United States who: (a) received more than one call
made by one of NRT's real estate agents on NRT's behalf or by
another agent of NRT on NRT's behalf; (b) promoting NRT's goods or
services; (c) in a 12-month period; (d) on their residential
telephone line; (e) whose residential telephone number(s) appear on
the DNC; (f) at any time since Oct. 4, 2014.

     b. National Internal Do-Not-Call Class (IDNC Class): All
persons in the United States who: (a) received more than one call
made by one of NRT's real estate agents on NRT's behalf or by
another agent of NRT on NRT's behalf; (b) promoting NRT's goods or
services; (c) in a 12-month period; (d) on their residential
telephone line; (e) who made a request not to receive calls from or
on behalf of NRT; (f) at any time since Oct. 4, 2014.

     c. National Prerecorded Message Residential Class (Prerecorded
Message Class): All persons in the United States to whom: (a) one
of NRT's real estate agents on NRT's behalf, or another agent of
NRT on NRT's behalf, initiated one of more non-emergency telephone
calls; (b) promoting NRT's goods or services; (c) to a recipient's
residential telephone line; (d) through the use of an artificial or
prerecorded voice; (e) at any time since Oct. 4, 2014.

Chinitz sought both monetary relief and injunctive relief.  All
parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge.

Magistrate Judge Cousins found that Chinitz has failed to meet his
burden of proof and thus denied Chinitz's motion for class
certification.  Among other things, the judge found that (i)
Chinitz has satisfied the numerosity requirement as to the NDNC
class, but not the IDNC and Prerecorded Message classes; (ii)
Chinitz is typical; (iii) Chinitz and his counsel are adequate
representatives; and (iv) Chinitz has identified common questions,
but has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that common
answers exist to those questions.  Because Chinitz failed to
demonstrate all four requirements of Rule 23(a), the Judge did not
address the requirements of Rule 23(b).

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gqs54n from Leagle.com.

Ronald Chinitz, individually, and on behalf of a class of
similarly
situated persons, Plaintiff, represented by Hassan Ali Zavareei --
hzavareei@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Sabita J. Soneji --
ssoneji@tzlegal.com -- Tycko & Zavareei LLP, George Volney
Granade,
Reese LLP, Michael Robert Reese -- mreese@reesellp.com -- Reese
LLP
& Tanya Susan Koshy -- tkoshy@tzlegal.com -- Tycko and Zavareei
LLP.

NRT West, Inc., doing business as, Defendant, represented by Aaron
Paul Rudin -- arudin@grsm.com -- Gordon & Rees LLP.


OAKLEY TRANSPORTATION: Smith Seeks Minimum & OT Wages for Drivers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
James Smith, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, the Plaintiff, vs.
Oakley Transport, Inc., Oakley Transportation Group, Inc. (dba
Oakley Transport), the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-05854 (N.D.
Cal., Sept. 19, 2019), alleges that Defendants failed to pay
minimum wage, failed to provide off-duty meal periods, failed to
provide off-duty paid rest periods, failed to timely provide
code-compliant wage statements, and failed to pay earned wages upon
discharge under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff worked as a truck driver from December 9, 2017,
through April 9, 2019, for Defendants and seeks relief for
violations of the California law.

Oakley Transport employs and has employed truck drivers, such as
Plaintiff, who was responsible for transporting time-sensitive
freight, such as food, to and from Defendants' designated pick-up
and drop-off locations.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are:

          Matthew C. Helland, Esq.
          Daniel S. Brome, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, LLP
          235 Montgomery Street, Suite 810
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 277-7235
          Facsimile: (415) 277-7238
          E-mail: Helland@nka.com
                  dbrome@nka.com

               - and -

          Jason T. Brown, Esq.
          Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
          Lotus Cannon, Esq.
          BROWN, LLC
          111 Town Square Place, Suite 400
          Jersey City, NJ 07310
          Telephone: (877) 561-0000
          Facsimile: (855) 582-5297
          E-mail: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
                  nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com
                  lotus.cannon@jtblawgroup.com

PATTERSON COS: Bid to Dismiss Plymouth County Suit Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PLYMOUTH COUNTY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. PATTERSON
COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Civil File No. 18-871
(MJD/SER) (D. Minn.), Judge Michael J. Davis of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class Action
Complaint.

The matter comes before the Court upon the Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") of U.S. Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau,
dated July 25, 2019, granting in part and denying in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The Defendants filed objections to
the R&R.

Pursuant to statute, Judge Davis has conducted a de novo review
upon the record of those portions of the R&R to which objections
were made.  Based on that review, he adopted the R&R, with the
modification that, on page 23 of the R&R, the amount "$39.92" is
amended to read "$32.92."

Accordingly, the Judge granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as set forth in the R&R with the
modification set forth.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/e4ji8S from Leagle.com.

Plymouth County Retirement System, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexi
Pfeffer-Gillett -- agillett@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Anne M. Lockner --
ALockner@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, Brant D. Penney --
b.penney@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt Wendorf & Blanchfield, Dianne
M. Anderson, Saxena White P.A., pro hac vice, Garrett D.
Blanchfield, Jr. -- g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com -- Reinhardt
Wendorf & Blanchfield, Heather Schlesier -- hschlesier@rgrdlaw.com
-- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Joseph E. White,
III --  jwhite@saxenawhite.com -- Saxena White P.A., pro hac vice,
Kyla Janine Grant, Saxena White P.A., pro hac vice, Lester R.
Hooker, Saxena White P.A., pro hac vice, Lucas F. Olts, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Maya Susan Saxena --
msaxena@saxenawhite.com -- Saxena White P.A., pro hac vice & Steven
Bennett Singer -- ssinger@saxenawhite.com -- Saxena White P.A., pro
hac vice.

Patterson Companies, Inc., Scott P. Anderson & Ann B. Gugino,
Defendants, represented by Aaron G. Thomas -- athomas@briggs.com --
Briggs & Morgan, PA, Jordan Weber -- jweber@briggs.com -- Briggs &
Morgan, PA & Patrick S. Williams -- pwilliams@briggs.com -- Briggs
& Morgan, PA.

R. Stephen Armstrong & James W Wiltz, Defendants, represented by
Aaron G. Thomas, Briggs & Morgan, PA.

Pembroke Pines Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers,
Movant, represented by Anne M. Lockner, Robins Kaplan LLP, Lucas F.
Olts, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Robert David Klausner,
Klausner Kaufman, P.A., pro hac vice, Stephen H. Cypen, Cypen &
Cypen, pro hac vice & Steven Bennett Singer, Saxena White P.A.

Central Laborers Pension Plan, Movant, represented by Anne M.
Lockner, Robins Kaplan LLP, Lucas F. Olts, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP & Steven Bennett Singer, Saxena White P.A.

Gwinnett County Public Employees Retirement System, Movant,
represented by David A. Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, pro hac vice, Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr., Reinhardt Wendorf &
Blanchfield, Lucas F. Olts, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
Steven Bennett Singer, Saxena White P.A. & Tricia L. McCormick,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice.

University of Puerto Rico Retirement System, Movant, represented by
Carolyn G. Anderson -- carolyn.anderson@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman
Reed, PLLP & June Pineda Hoidal -- june.hoidal@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed LLP.

Employees Retirement System of the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority, Movant, represented by June Pineda Hoidal, Zimmerman
Reed LLP.


PENN CREDIT: Williams Sues over Debt Collection Practices
---------------------------------------------------------
Laquanna Williams individually and on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. Penn Credit Corporation, and
John Does 1-25, the Defendants, Case No. 5:19-cv-04320-JDW (E.D.
Pa., Sept. 19, 2019), seeks to recover damages under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

The Defendant attempted to collect the Debt from the Plaintiff, the
Debt was in default, or Defendant treated the Debt as if it was in
default from the time that Defendant acquired it for collection,
the lawsuit says.

Penn Credit is a nationwide accounts receivables management
firm.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          Antranig Garibian, Esq.
          GARIBIAN LAW
          1800 JFK Blvd., Suite 300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 326 9179
          E-mail: aggaribianlaw.com

PETROBRAS: 2nd Cir. Upholds Securities Case Settlement Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's approval of the proposed settlement in the
Petrobras Securities Litigation.

The case concerns objections to a roughly $3 billion-settlement
agreement in a securities class action against Petrobras.  Two
purchasers of Petrobras shares, Richard and Emelina Gielata,
objected to the proposed settlement, arguing that the settlement
class should have excluded claims based on foreign purchases of
securities (which were likely meritless under U.S. securities law).
The district court approved the proposed settlement and determined
that the Gielatas's objections were without merit, reasoning that
the defendants are permitted to settle meritless claims.

On appeal, the Gielatas assigned a portion of their claim to their
son, Joseph Gielata, a retired attorney who had drafted his
parents' original objection in the district court.  All three
Gielatas, proceeding pro se under a single brief written by Joseph
Gielata, now argue that there is a conflict between shareholder
claims and claims based on purchases of debt securities because the
noteholder claims included the foreign-purchaser group, which were
"weaker," and the district court should have created subclasses
with independent representation for each group.

The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review in the case.
The appellees urge the application of an abuse of discretion
standard in Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig.,
whereas the Gielatas insist that a de novo standard is more
appropriate because the adequacy of class representation is a due
process issue and less deference is given to the district court's
decision when a class is certified simultaneously with the approval
of a class settlement.  However, even in cases where the Court
addressed the adequacy of class representation, it has still
applied an abuse of discretion standard.  Accordingly, it applies
an abuse of discretion standard.

The appellees insist that the Gielatas' subclass arguments are
waived on appeal because the Gielatas failed to raise them in the
district court.  The Gielatas reply that they asserted a conflict
between subgroups in the settlement class, albeit not this exact
conflict, and that another objector raised the subclasses issue,
which the district court then fully addressed.

The Court agrees with the appellees.  The Gielatas did not assert
their appellate arguments in the district court.  Although their
objection referenced the relevant case law related to subclasses in
class action settlements, they asserted a conflict between
shareholders and noteholders who could meet the domesticity
requirement, on the one hand, and noteholders who could not meet
the domesticity requirement, on the other; they did not make
arguments about conflict between shareholders and all noteholders,
as they do on appeal.

The thrust of their arguments was to exclude foreign claims from
the settlement class and appoint independent counsel to assist the
settlement administrator to sort and remove the foreign claims.
They did not argue for the creation of subclasses based on
shareholders and noteholders or for appointment of class
representatives for those subclasses, nor did they adopt the
objections filed by others.  Barring manifest injustice or an
extraordinary need, then, the Court will not consider those
arguments because the Gielatas waived (or at least forfeited) the
arguments they now raise on appeal.

The Gielatas have waived their arguments on appeal by failing to
raise them in the district court despite ample opportunity.  They
elected not to argue in the district court for any subclasses, and
they identified the chief conflict as being between domestic
purchasers, which included both shareholders and noteholders, and
foreign purchasers. The Gielatas have thereby waived their
challenge to the district court's class certification and approval
of the settlement, and the Court sees no manifest injustice or
extraordinary need to exercise its discretion to nonetheless
entertain the challenge.

The Court has reviewed the remainder of the Gielatas's arguments
and finds them to be without merit.  For the foregoing reasons, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The case is captioned In Re: Petrobras Securities Litigation.
Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited Employees Retirement
System of the State of Hawaii, North Carolina Department of State
Treasurer, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Aura Capital Ltd., Dimensional
Emerging Markets Value Fund, DFA Investment Dimensions Group Inc.,
on behalf of its series Emerging Markets Core Equity Portfolio,
Emerging Markets Social Core Equity Portfolio and T.A. World ex
U.S. Core Equity Portfolio, DFA Investment Trust Company, on behalf
of its series The Emerging Markets Series, DFA Austria Limited,
solely in its capacity as responsible entity for the Dimensional
Emerging Markets Trust, DFA International Core Equity Fund, and DFA
International Vector Equity Fund by Dimensional Fund Advisors
Canada ULC solely in its capacity as Trustee, Dimensional Funds
plc, on behalf of its sub-fund Emerging Markets Value Fund,
Dimensional Funds ICVC, on behalf of its sub-fund Emerging Markets
Core Equity Fund, SKAGEN AS, Danske Invest Management A/S, Danske
Invest Management Company, New York City Employees' Retirement
System, New York City Police Pension Fund, Board of Education
Retirement System of the City of New York, Teachers' Retirement
System of the City of New York, New York City Fire Department
Pension Fund, New York City Deferred Compensation Plan, Forsta
AP-fonden, Transamerica Income Shares, Inc., Transamerica Funds,
Transamerica Series Trust, Transamerica Partners Portfolios, John
Hancock Variable Insurance Trust, John Hancock Funds II, John
Hancock Sovereign Bond Fund, John Hancock Bond Trust, John Hancock
Strategic Series, John Hancock Investment Trust, JHF Income
Securities Trust, JHF Investors Trust, JHF Hedged Equity & Income
Fund, Aberdeen Emerging Markets Equity Fund, Aberdeen Global Equity
& Income Fund, Aberdeen Global Natural Resources Fund, Aberdeen
International Equity Fund, each a series of Aberdeen Funds;
Aberdeen Canada Emerging Markets Fund, Aberdeen Canada Socially
Responsible Global Fund, Aberdeen Canada Socially Responsible
International Fund, Aberdeen Canada Funds EAFE Plus Equity Fund and
Aberdeen Canada Funds Global Equity Fund, each a series of Aberdeen
Canada Funds, Aberdeen EAFE Plus Ethical Fund, Aberdeen EAFE Plus
Fund, Aberdeeen EAFF Plus SRI Fund, Aberdeeen Emerging Markets
Equity Fund, and Aberdeen Global Equity Fund, each a series of
Aberdeen Intitutional C, Aberdeen Fully Hedged International
Equities Fund, Aberdeen International Equity Fund, Aberdeen Global
Ethical World Equity Fund, Aberdeen Global Responsible World Equity
Fund, Aberdeen Global World Equity Dividend Fund, Aberdeen Global
World Equity Fund, Aberdeen Global World Resources Equity Fund,
Aberdeen Emerging Markets Equity Fund, Aberdeen Ethical World
Equity Fund, Aberdeen Multi-Asset Fund, Aberdeen World Equity Fund,
Aberdeen World Equity In, Aberdeen Latin America Equity Fund, Inc.,
Aberdeen Latin America Equity Fund, Inc., AAAID Equity Portfolio,
Alberta Teachers Retirement Fund, Aon Hewitt Investment Consulting,
Inc., Aurion International Daily Equity Fund, Bell Aliant Regional
Communications Inc., BMO Global Equity Class, City of Albany
Pension Plan, Desjardins Dividend Income Fund, Desjardins Emerging
Markets Fund, Desjardins Emerging Markets Fund, Desjardins Global
All Capital Equity Fund, Desjardins Overseas Equity Value Fund,
Devon County Council Global Emerging Market Fund, Devon County
Council Global Equity Fund, DGIA Emerging Markets Equity Fund L.P.,
Erie Insurance Exchange, First Trust/Aberdeen Emerging Opportunity
Fund, GE UK Pension Common Investment Fund, Hampshire County
Council Global Equity Portfolio, London Borough of Hounslow
Supperannuation Fund, MacKenzie Universal Sustainable Opportunities
Class, Marshfield Clinic, Mother Theresa Care and Mission Trust,
MTR Corporation Limited Retirement Scheme, Myria Asset Managment
Emergence, M, National Pension Service, and NPS Trust Active 14,
Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, Washington State
Investment Board, Aberdeen Latin American Income Fund Limited,
Aberdeen Global ex Japan Pension Fund ppit, FS International Equity
Mother Fund, NN Investment Partners B.V., acting in the capacity of
management, NN Investment Partners B.V., acting in the capacity of
management company of the mutual fund NN Global Equity Fund, NN
Investment Partners B.V., acting in the capacity of management
company of the muitual fund NN Hoog Dividend Aandelen Fonds, NN
Investment Partners B.V., acting in the capacity of management
copmany of the mutual fund NN Institutioneel Dividend Aandelen, NN
Investment Partners Luxembourg S.A., acting in the capacity of
management company SICAV and its Sub-Funds, and NN (L) SICA, for
and on behalf of NN (L) Emerging Markets High Dividend, NN (L)
First, Aura Capital Ltd., WGI Emerging Markets Fund, LLC, Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation Trust, Board of Regents of the University
of Texas System, Trustees of the Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop,
DBA Kamehameha Schools, Louis Kennedy, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Ken Ngo, individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated, City of Providence,
individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
Handelsbanken Fonder AB, Public Employee Retirement System of
Idaho, Peter Kaltman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Union Asset Management Holding AG, Jonathan
Messing, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Spencer Bueno, Mathis B. Bishop, Catherine
O. Bishop, Joseph Gielata, Richard Gielata, Emelina Gielata,
Objectors-Appellants, v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. Petrobras,
PricewaterhouseCoopers Auditores Independentes, BB Securities Ltd.,
Theodore Marshall Helms, Petrobras Global Finance B.V., Petrobras
America Inc., Mitsubishi UFJ Securities (USA), Inc., HSBC
Securities (USA) Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Incorporated, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of China (Hong Kong)
Limited, Banco Bradesco BBI S.A., Banca IMI, S.p.A., Scotia Capital
(USA) Inc., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Itau BBA USA Securities,
Inc., JP Morgan Securities LLC, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC,
Defendants-Appellees, Mariangela Mointeiro Tizatto, Josue
Christiano Gome Da Silva, Daniel Lima De Oliveira, Santander
Investment Securities Inc., Banco Votorantin Nassau Branch, Gustavo
Tardin Barbosa, Jose Sergio Gabrielli, Silvio Sinedino Pinheiro,
Paulo Roberto Costa, Jose Carlos Cosenza, Renato de Souza Duque,
Guillherme de Oliveira Estrella, Jose Miranda Formigl Filho, Maria
Das Gracas Silva Foster, Almir Guilherme Barbassa, Jose Raimundo
Branda Pereira, Servio Tulio Da Rosa Tinoco, Paulo Jose Alves,
Alexandre Quintao Fernandes, Marcos Antonio Zacarias, Cornelis
Franciscus Joze Looman, Defendants, Case Nos. 18-2120 (L), 18-2270
(Con), 18-2276 (Con), 18-2324 (XAP) (2d Cir.),

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Summary Order is
available at https://is.gd/4viQyN from Leagle.com.

Joseph Gielata, pro se, La Jolla, CA; Richard Gielata, Emelina
Gielata, pro se, Coraopolis, PA., for Objectors-Appellants.

Jeremy Lieberman -- jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Emma Gilmore --
egilmore@pomlaw.com -- Brenda F. Szydlo -- bszydlo@pomlaw.com --
Jennifer B. Sobers -- jbsobers@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, New
York, NY., for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Lewis J. Liman -- lliman@cgsh.com -- Jared Gerber --
jgerber@cgsh.com -- Joon H. Kim, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton,
New York, NY., for Defendants-Appellees.


PILOT MOUNTAIN: Spain Sues over Unsolicited Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------------
MALINDA SPAIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PILOT MOUNTAIN FORD, INC., a North
Carolina Corporation, the Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-416
(E.D.N.C., Sept. 18, 2019), contends that the Defendant promotes
and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited text
messages to wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

As a result, the Defendant caused thousands of text messages to be
sent to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members who
either never provided Defendant with consent to contact them or who
had revoked any prior express consent, the lawsuit says.

The Defendant is an automotive dealership that sells vehicles for
individuals and businesses.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          David M. Wilkerson, Esq.
          THE VAN WINKLE LAW FIRM
          11 N. Market Street
          Asheville, NC 28801
          Telephone: 828-258-2991
          E-mail: dwilkerson@vwlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: 305 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

PRINCE GEORGE'S, MD: Strange Seeks Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------
LYNN STRANGE, the Plaintiff, vs. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND
14741 Governor Oden Bowie Dr. Suite 3151 Upper Marlboro, MD 20772,
the Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-02761-TDC (D. Md., Sept. 18, 2019),
alleges that Defendant unlawfully failed or refused to compensate
Plaintiff in full and on time for her work as required by the Fair
Labor Standards Act; the Maryland Wage and Hour Law; and Maryland
Wage Payment and Collection Law.

The Plaintiff brings this civil action for damages, individually
and on behalf of all other similarly-situated present and past
employees of the Defendant.

Ms. Strange is a resident of Prince George's County, Maryland. She
has been employed by Defendant from 2004 through the present at
Defendant's State Attorney's Office, Juvenile Division, as an
Administrative Aide.

The Plaintiff frequently works for Defendant in excess of 40 hours
per week but is not compensated at the legally-required overtime
rate for those hours, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff is:

          Steven K. Hoffman, Esq.
          JAMES & HOFFMAN, P.C.
          1130 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 950
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: (202) 496-0500
          Facsimile: (202) 496-0555
          E-mail: skhoffman@jamhoff.com

PROPETRO HOLDING: Faces Logan Suit Over Share Price Drop
--------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD LOGAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. PROPETRO HOLDING CORP., DALE REDMAN, JEFFREY SMITH, IAN
DENHOLM, SPENCER D. ARMOUR, III, SCHUYLER E. COPPEDGE, STEPHEN
HERMAN, MATTHEW H. HIMLER, PETER LABBAT, GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO.,
BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, J.P.
MORGAN SECURITIES LLC, EVERCORE GROUP L.L.C., RBC CAPITAL MARKETS,
LLC, PIPER JAFFRAY & CO., RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC., JOHNSON RICE & COMPANY L.L.C., and
TUDOR, PICKERING, HOLT & CO. SECURITIES, INC., Case No.
7:19-cv-00217 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 16, 2019), is brought on behalf of
those who acquired ProPetro securities pursuant and/or traceable to
the Company's registration statement and prospectus issued in
connection with its March 2017 initial public offering.  The
complaint alleges violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

In the IPO, the Company sold 25 million shares of common stock at a
price of $14 per share.  The Company received proceeds of
approximately $175 million from the Offering, net of underwriting
discounts and commissions.

On August 8, 2019, after the market closed, the Company issued a
press release delaying its second quarter earnings conference call
and quarterly report, citing an ongoing review by its audit
committee.  In a Form 8-K filed with the SEC on the same day, the
Company stated that the review concerned, among other things,
expense reimbursements and certain transactions involving related
parties or potential conflicts of interest.  The Form 8-K also
stated that approximately $370,000 had been improperly reimbursed
to members of senior management.  Moreover, the Company expected to
report a material weakness in its internal control over
disclosure.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $4.59 per share, or
over 26%, to close at $12.75 per share on August 9, 2019, on
unusually high trading volume.  As a result, purchasers of
ProPetro's securities during the Class Period, including the
Plaintiff and the class, suffered injury through their purchase of
ProPetro's securities at artificially inflated prices.

ProPetro is incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its
principal executive offices located in Midland, Texas.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of ProPetro.
Goldman Sachs, Barclays, Credit Suisse, J.P. Morgan, Evercore, RBC
Capital, Piper Jaffray, Raymond James, Deutsche, Johnson, and Tudor
served as underwriters for the Company's IPO.

ProPetro is an oilfield services company that provides hydraulic
fracturing and complementary services to leading upstream oil and
gas companies engaged in the exploration and production of North
American unconventional oil and natural gas resources.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joe Kendall, Esq.
          KENDALL LAW GROUP, PLLC
          3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: (214) 744-3000
          Facsimile: (214) 744-3015
          E-mail: jkendall@kendalllawgroup.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160


PURDUE PHARMA: Stock Files RICO Class Action in Oklahoma
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Purdue Pharma L.P.
The case is styled as William Stock, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
Purdue Pharma Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company, Insys
Therapeutics, Inc., Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., TEVA
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson,
Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC, Actavis, Inc., Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Watson Laboratories, Inc., McKesson
Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc. and AmerisourceBergen
Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00526-GKF-FHM (N.D.
Okla., Oct. 1, 2019).

The docket says the case was filed pursuant to the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Purdue Pharma L.P. is a privately held pharmaceutical company owned
principally by descendants of Mortimer and Raymond Sackler. In
2007, it paid out one of the largest fines ever levied against a
pharmaceutical firm for mislabeling its product OxyContin, and
three executives were found guilty of criminal charges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Bradford D Barron, Esq.
   Barron Law Firm PLLC
   PO BOX 369
   CLAREMORE, OK 74018
   Tel: (918) 341-8402
   Fax: (918) 515-4691
   Email: bbarron@barronlawfirmok.com

     - and -

   Zachary T Barron, Esq.
   Barron Law Firm PLLC
   PO BOX 369
   CLAREMORE, OK 74018
   Tel: (918) 341-8402
   Fax: (918) 515-4691
   Email: zbarron@barronlawfirmok.com


QUAD/GRAPHICS: Court OKs Bid to Amend Complaint in Clark
--------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issue an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the
Complaint in the case captioned PAUL CLARK and CHARLES WILLAMS,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the public
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Q.G. PRINTING II, LLC, a
Connecticut limited liability company; QUAD/GRAPHICS INC., a
Wisconsin corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants. Case No. 1:18-cv-00899-AWI-EPG. (E.D. Cal.).

This is a proposed class action suit in which the named Plaintiff,
Paul Clark, (Plaintiff) alleges various causes of action against
Defendants under the Private Attorneys General Act.

The Court will grant the motion to the extent Plaintiff seeks leave
to amend the Complaint.

Generally, a party seeking to amend a pleading after the deadline
specified in a scheduling order must show good cause for amendment
under Rule 16(b), then, if good cause be shown, the party must
demonstrate that amendment was proper under Rule 15. And under Rule
15(a), leave to amend should be granted unless amendment would
cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad faith, is
futile, or creates undue delay.

Here, Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend seeks only to add one
factual allegation that Defendants have failed to identify any meal
and rest premiums they have made to class members on the members'
wage statements, in the event such payments were in fact made.

Additionally, the Court finds any prejudice to Defendants in
allowing the amendment is minimal or non-existent. For those
reasons, and for the reasons stated on the record, Plaintiff's
motion is granted to the extent it seeks leave of Court to amend
the Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available https://tinyurl.com/yyfwoce3 from Leagle.com.

Paul Clark, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ari
Yale Basser , Capstone Law, APC, Bevin Elaine Allen Pike -
Bevin.Pike@capstonelawyers.com - Capstone Law APC, Joseph Hakakian
- Joseph.Hakakian@capstonelawyers.com - Capstone Law APC & Orlando
Villalba -Orlando.Villalba@capstonelawyers.com - Capstone Law APC.

QG Printing II, LLC, a Conneciticut limited liability company &
Quad/Graphics, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Defendants,
represented by Gregory G. Iskander - giskander@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson, P.C., James Phuc Van - jpvan@littler.com -
Littler Mendelson & Andrew Hoon Woo  - awoo@littler.com - Littler
Mendelson PC.


RAIL DELIVERY: Canava Files Class Cert. Bid; Hearing on Nov. 25
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled SALVADOR CANAVA, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated v. RAIL DELIVERY SERVICES,
INCORPORATED AND GREG P. STEFFLRE, JUDI GIRARD STEFFLRE, Case No.
5:19-cv-00401-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff moves the Court
to:

   (1) conditionally certify Count 1 in the complaint as an FLSA
       collective action in accordance with 29 U.S.C. Section
       216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act and authorize
       notice to the FLSA collective action class members of
       their right to opt-in to the collective action claims; and

   (2) certify Counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 as Rule 23(b)(3)
       class actions and authorize notice to the class members
       pursuant to Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
       Procedure.

The Court will commence a hearing on November 25, 2019, at 9:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Getman, Esq.
          GETMAN, SWEENEY & DUNN, PLLC
          260 Fair St.
          Kingston, NY 12401
          Telephone: (845) 255-9370
          Facsimile: (845) 255-8649
          E-mail: dgetman@getmansweeney.com

               - and -

          Susan Martin, Esq.
          Jennifer Kroll, Esq.
          MARTIN & BONNETT, P.L.L.C.
          4647 N. 32nd St., Suite 185
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Telephone: (602) 240-6900
          Facsimile: (602) 240-2345
          E-mail: smartin@martinbonnett.com
                  jkroll@martinbonnett.com

               - and -

          Edward Tuddenham, Esq.
          23 Rue Du Laos
          Paris, France
          Telephone: 33 684 79 89 30
          E-mail: etudden@prismnet.com

               - and -

          Howard Z. Rosen, Esq.
          ROSEN MARSILI RAPP LLP
          3600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1800
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 389-6050
          Facsimile: (213) 389-0663
          E-mail: hzrosen@rmrllp.com


RED ROBIN: Seeks to Decertify Vigueras Class & Subclasses
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as MANUEL VIGUERAS, the
Plaintiff, v. RED ROBIN INTERNATIONAL, INC. WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS
IN CALIFORNIA AS RED ROBIN BURGER SPIRITS EMPORIUMS, a Nevada
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, the Defendants,
Case No. 8:17-cv-01422-JVS-DFM (C.D. Cal.), the Defendants will
move the Court on October 21, 2019, for an order decertifying the
Certified Class and all Subclasses as certified in the Court's
October 23, 2018 Order.[CC]

Attorneys for the Defendant are:

          Lonnie D. Giamela, Esq.
          Sean F. Daley, esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
          444 South Flower Street, Suite 1500
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 330-4500
          Facsimile: (213) 330-4501
          E-mail: lgiamela@fisherphillips.com
                  sdaley@fisherphillips.com

REYES SINGLE: Faces Port Properties Suit in California State Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Reyes Single PLY
Roofing Masters Corp. et al. The case is captioned as PORT
PROPERTIES, LLC and SHAWN K DUKE, and ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, vs. REYES SINGLE PLY ROOFING MASTERS CORP.
and CESAR REYES, the Defendant, Case No. CIVDS1927591 (Cal. Super.,
Sept. 16, 2019).

Reyes Single was founded by four brothers in 2007. The company
provides professional roofing installation services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are Represented by:

          SKAPIK LAW GROUP
          5861 Pine Avenue Suite A-1
          Chino Hills, CA 91709
          Telephone: (909) 398-4404

RMS PROPERTIES: Vladovich Seeks OT Premium for Landscapers
----------------------------------------------------------
EDUARD VLADOVICH, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. RMS PROPERTIES, INC., the Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-06312 (N.D. Ill.,  Sept. 22, 2019), seeks to
recover unpaid overtime premium pay pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Defendant employs a staff of employees who work for the company
as construction workers and landscapers, who work to improve
properties for Defendant’s clients.

The Plaintiff was employed as a construction worker with
Defendant's company.  He was misclassified as an independent
contractor by Defendant and was paid straight-time for all hours
worked, despite working in excess of 40 hours per week throughout
his employment.

The exact number of employees who have suffered the same unpaid
overtime wage injury as Plaintiff, and have yet to receive redress
is unknown at this time, but believed to be at least 40 employees,
the lawsuit says.

The Defendant operates a commercial property management company
named RMS Properties, LLC, which is located at 1111 N. Plaza Drive,
Suite 200, Schaumburg, IL 60713.  The Defendant leases commercial
properties as well as makes improvements to various commercial
properties for its clients.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Brandon A. Thomas, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRANDON A. THOMAS, PC
          1 Glenlake Parkway, N.E., Suite 650
          Atlanta, GA 30328
          Telephone: (678) 330-2909
          Facsimile: (678) 638-6201
          E-mail: brandon@overtimeclaimslawyer.com

SAFE HAVEN SECURITY: FLSA Class Certified in Martin Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Ortrie D. Smith grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Collective Action Certification in the lawsuit styled
ISAIAH MARTIN, et al., o/b/o themselves and all others similarly
situated v. SAFE HAVEN SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Case No.
4:19-cv-00063-ODS (W.D. Mo.).

The Court conditionally certifies an FLSA collective action
consisting of:

     all current and former sales representatives who worked for
     Defendant at any time from September 19, 2016, to the
     present, at Defendant's place of business in Kansas City,
     Missouri, who were not properly compensated for all time
     worked above forty hours in a workweek.

Judge Smith directs the parties to jointly (or if necessary,
individually) file a proposed notice plan within fourteen days of
this Order.

Plaintiffs Isaiah Martin, Kirk Kincaid, and Erik Fouts allege
Defendant Safe Haven Security Services, Inc., which sells and
installs residential security systems, violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act.  The Plaintiffs, who were employed as sales
representatives in Kansas City, Missouri, contend the Defendant
refused to pay them (and others similarly situated to them) for
more than five hours per week of overtime, despite working more
than forty-five hours per week.[CC]


SLIDE FIRE: Court Narrows Claims in Prescott NDTPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned DEVAN PRESCOTT,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. SLIDE FIRE SOLUTIONS, LP, Defendant. Case No.
2:18-cv-00296-GMN-BNW. (D. Nev.).

This case arises from the tragic mass shooting that occurred during
the Route 91 Harvest Music Festival, in Las Vegas, Nevada. That
day, an individual opened fire on concertgoers from the
thirty-second floor of his hotel room at the Mandalay Bay Resort
and Casino. In approximately eleven minutes, the shooter killed
fifty-eight people, and injured hundreds more. Plaintiffs and their
loved ones attended that Route 91 Festival.

Plaintiffs allege that Slide Fire obtained a favorable evaluation
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
by representing bump stocks as intended to assist persons with
limited mobility in their hands. Based upon this misrepresentation,
according to Plaintiffs, the ATF concluded that bump stocks are not
subject to regulation as firearm devices under the Gun Control Act
or the National Firearms Act.

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, bringing the following
claims against Slide Fire: (1) negligenc; (2) negligence per se (3)
negligent infliction of emotional distress under a theory of
bystander liability (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress
under a theory of direct liability (5) negligent entrustment  (6)
negligent products liability (7) strict products liability (8)
public nuisance (9) private nuisance (10) false advertising in
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and (11) deceptive
trade practices under Nevada Revised Statute (NRS).

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A pleading must
give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on
which it rests, and although a court must take all factual
allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as a factual
allegations are insufficient.  Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
This standard asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.

Slide Fire moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the
following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs' common-law claims are barred by
the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act  (PLCAA) (2) the
amended allegations fail to plausibly demonstrate how an exception
to the PLCAA applies, warranting dismissal of all claims and (3)
even if the PLCAA is not a bar to this action, Plaintiffs' claims
are not cognizable under Nevada law.  

Scope of Amendment

As a preliminary matter, Slide Fire contends that the Court granted
Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint for the limited purpose
of pleading additional facts to support an exception to the PLCAA.
By incorporating five unrelated new causes of action and not
pleading additional facts to support an exception to the PLCAA,
Slide Fire claims that Plaintiffs have exceeded the scope of the
Court's Order.

The Court disagrees.

First, Slide Fire's argument is factually misplaced. Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint does include new facts to establish an exception
to the PLCAA. Also, the new claims are not unrelated as Slide Fire
argues; they are premised upon the same acts and omissions alleged
in the initial complaint.  

Secondly, the Court's prior Order permitted Plaintiffs to plead
facts in support of an exception to the PLCAA.  The Court did not
limit Plaintiffs' amendment to the predicate exception, as Slide
Fire asserts.  

Finally, even if Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint exceeded the scope
of this Court's Order, this would not, in and of itself, warrant
striking portions of the pleading. Slide Fire has not made any
argument to establish prejudice, and the Court cannot discern any
conceivable harm. Given this case's procedural posture,
particularly the Court's imposition of a stay pending resolution of
the present Motion to Dismiss, any prejudice resulting from
Plaintiffs' addition of new claims is significantly mitigated.

PLCAA

Congress enacted the PLCAA upon finding that manufacturers and
sellers of firearms are not, and should not, be liable for the harm
caused by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm
products that function as designed and intended. To that end, the
PLCAA provides that federal courts must immediately dismiss any
case meeting the definition of a qualified civil liability action.


Consequently, the PLCAA bars Plaintiffs from asserting their
general tort claims3 unless an exception to the PLCAA applies here.


Exceptions to the PLCAA

In enacting the PLCAA, Congress codified six exceptions to the
definition of qualified civil liability action, pursuant to which a
seller or manufacturer of qualified products may be liable for a
third party's unlawful misuse of its products.  

Of those six exceptions, Plaintiffs point to two that may apply
here, thus permitting the case to proceed: (a) an action brought
against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per se and
(b) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified
product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to
the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a
proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought.

The Court addresses each exception in turn.

Negligent Entrustment and Negligence Per Se

The PLCAA does not bar actions against sellers of qualified
products for negligent entrustment or negligence per se. The PLCAA
defines negligent entrustment as the supplying of a qualified
product by a seller for use by another person when the seller
knows, or reasonably should know, the person to whom the product is
supplied is likely to, and does, use the product in a manner
involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or
others.

Because the PLCAA does not create a public or private cause of
action or remedy, courts look to state law.

Negligent Entrustment

Under Nevada law, the key elements are whether an entrustment
actually occurred, and whether the entrustment was negligent.
Negligent entrustment applies where one who has the right to
control [an instrumentality] permits another to use it in
circumstances where he knows or should know that such use may
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.

Slide Fire argues that this claim fails because there is no
allegation that Slide Fire sold, or otherwise entrusted the shooter
with, a bump stock. Plaintiffs respond that the negligent
entrustment theory is cognizable under a theory of indirect
entrustment and, therefore, they need not plead a direct sale to
demonstrate this claim's plausibility.  

The Court agrees with Slide Fire that the entrustment element is
lacking from this claim. Even under Plaintiffs' indirect
entrustment theory, the allegations tying Slide Fire to the shooter
are too attenuated to constitute entrustment.

Negligence Per Se

To prevail under a negligence per se claim, a plaintiff must prove
that (1) he or she belongs to a class of persons that a statute is
intended to protect (2) the plaintiff's injuries are the type the
statute is intended to prevent (3) the defendant violated the
statute (4) the violation was the legal cause of the plaintiff's
injury, and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages.  

Plaintiffs assert that Slide Fire violated NRS 104.2314, which
codifies the implied warranty of merchantability in Nevada, and NRS
598.0915(5), which counts knowingly false representations as to the
characteristics of goods and services as a deceptive trade practice
under Nevada law.  

Slide Fire argues that these statutes do not support a claim for
negligence per se under Nevada law, and that Plaintiffs otherwise
fail to satisfy the remaining elements of negligence per se.  

The Nevada Supreme Court has endorsed negligence per se actions
arising from violations of Nevada statutes in limited situations
including, inter alia, building code violations, municipal code
violations, and traffic statute violations. These decisions
underscore the requirement that the statute in question must have
been intended to protect against the type of injury asserted and
the class of persons who suffer the injury.

Here, the Court concludes that the statutes at issue, governing
breach of implied warranty of merchantability and deceptive trade
practices, are not intended to protect against the injuries
Plaintiffs assert. These statutes do not have the requisite
specificity to meet the requirements of negligence per se.  

The PLCAA's Predicate Exception

Plaintiffs' next proffered exception to the PLCAA arises under 15
U.S.C. Section 7903(5)(A)(iii), which provides that the PLCAA does
not bar actions in which a manufacturer or seller of qualified
products knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable
to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a
proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought.

The PLCAA provides examples where this exception applies, such as
when a manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or
failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept
under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product.

Here, Plaintiffs argue in favor of three avenues to establish a
predicate statutory violation: (1) Slide Fire's alleged false entry
on its application for a federal firearms license (FFL) (2) Slide
Fire's alleged misrepresentations to the ATF about bump stocks
being intended for persons with limited mobility and (3) Slide
Fire's alleged misrepresentations to the public at large concerning
the safety and lawful status of bump stocks.  

The Court finds that only the third avenue, misrepresentations to
the public concerning the safety and lawful status of bump stocks,
plausibly alleges an applicable predicate statutory violation.

False Entry on FFL Application

With its first avenue to establish a predicate statutory violation,
Plaintiffs claim that Slide Fire violated 18 U.S.C. Section
923(d)(1)(D) by knowingly and falsely representing itself to the
ATF as a manufacturer of firearms in order to obtain a Type 7 FFL.

Slide Fire argues that, as a matter of law, it correctly
represented itself as a manufacturer. Citing relevant ATF opinions,
Slide Fire explains that attaching bump stocks to existing firearms
and offering them for sale qualifies as manufacturing within the
meaning of the relevant statutes and regulations. Therefore, Slide
Fire contends, it is pure speculation that it made any
misrepresentations or false entries on its FFL application.

The Court agrees with Slide Fire: applicable ATF rulings and
regulations confirm a firearms manufacturer can encompass entities,
such as Slide Fire, who obtain firearms from third-party
manufacturers, reassemble or alter them to change their function or
utility, and offer them for further distribution.  

In light of these ATF Rulings, Plaintiffs' allegations do not
plausibly reveal that Slide Fire knowingly made a false statement
by applying as a Manufacturer of Firearms Other than Destructive
Devices. Plaintiffs' claims depend on alleging that bump stocks
significantly alter the function of semi-automatic weapons. Because
the allegations show how a bump stock alters a rifle's function and
rate in which it fires bullets and given the broad interpretation
of manufacturer under federal firearms laws, Slide Fire would not
have violated the law by applying for a Type 7 FFL as a
manufacturer of firearms as alleged in the Amended Complaint.  

Misrepresentations to the ATF

Plaintiffs' second avenue to escape the PLCAA's restrictions arises
from allegations that Slide Fire provided false information to the
ATF in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2). Section
1001(a)(2) criminalizes the making of any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation" in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government.

According to Plaintiffs, in 2010 Slide Fire sent a letter to the
ATF explaining that bump stocks are intended to assist persons
whose hands have limited mobility. ATF then reviewed the bump stock
device in view of Slide Fire's letter and concluded that this
device did not need to be regulated as a firearm under the National
Firearms Act or Gun Control Act. Plaintiffs allege that, had Slide
Fire represented the true purpose behind bump stocks to convert a
semi-automatic weapon into one with the capability of a fully
automatic weapon the ATF would have subjected bump stocks to
greater regulatory restrictions.

Slide Fire, in response, argues that its marketing of bump stocks
was not a consideration in ATF's 2010 letter approving its sale and
manufacture. Slide Fire contends that Plaintiffs have not come
forward with any statute or regulation that would make it illegal
to sell the bump stock device unless it was useful or beneficial to
persons with disabilities.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged how
Slide Fire could have violated 18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2) by
making materially false statements or representations to the ATF in
its 2010 Letter.   Slide Fire recently produced the 2010 letter it
sent to the ATF. That Letter states that the bump stock device has
the added benefit of allowing someone with limited mobility in
their fingers the ability to use their off-hand to assist them in
firing the rifle.

The Amended Complaint does not, however, allege that this language
about the device's added benefit was false. Rather, it imputes the
ATF's statement that the device was intended to assist persons
whose hands have limited mobility as Slide Fire's purpose for the
device.  

Because the Amended Complaint does not allege or reveal falsity of
Slide Fire's statement that its bump stocks had the "added benefit"
of assisting those with limited mobility in their fingers,
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Slide Fire violated 18
U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2) by making this statement to the ATF.
  
Misrepresentations to the Public

The third avenue that Plaintiffs pursue to establish a predicate
exception arises through allegations that Slide Fire knowingly
violated Nevada's Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA),
specifically, NRS 598.0915(5), through the manner in which it
conducted its sale and marketing of bump stocks.

Plaintiffs allege that Slide Fire violated the NDTPA, by making
several false or misleading statements in connection with the sale
of its bump stocks. First, Slide Fire apparently made the false
representation that the ATF approved the legality of its bump
stocks by displaying ATF Approved" on the legend of its website's
homepage.    

Slide Fire argues that any alleged violation of the NDTPA cannot
serve as a predicate statute because Plaintiffs cannot establish
any alleged violation proximately caused the harm for which
Plaintiffs seek relief.

Because the Court finds that the NDTPA may serve as predicate
statute, the Court now turns to the allegations in Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint. To survive Slide Fire's Motion to Dismiss, the
Amended Complaint must plausibly allege that Slide Fire knowingly
violated this statute and that the violation proximately caused
Plaintiffs' alleged harm. 15 U.S.C. Section 7903(5)(A)(iii).

The Court finds that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges how
Slide Fire violated the NDTPA for purposes of the predicate
exception. Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Slide Fire
knowingly made the false statement that the bump stock was approved
by the ATF in violation of the NDTPA.

Claims for Relief

Negligence

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must plead: (1) the
existence of a duty of care (2) breach of that duty (3) legal
causation and (4) damages.  

Duty

In determining whether a duty exists, courts rather than juries
possess the ultimate responsibility to define the scope of duty in
relation to particular circumstances and to define the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.

Slide Fire argues there is no legal basis to establish it had a
duty to market a bump stock solely as a device to help individuals
with limited mobility. Slide Fire further contends that because
Plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the intentional criminal
actions of a third party, Plaintiffs' cannot establish
foreseeability without demonstrating that the parties enjoyed a
special relationship.  

While Slide Fire is correct that it is under no duty to control the
dangerous conduct of another,  Plaintiffs' allegations center upon
Slide Fire's duty to reasonably and safely sell and market bump
stocks given its alleged knowledge that customers would purchase
them seeking an inexpensive alternative to a fully automatic
machine gun.

Plaintiffs argue that Slide Fire was best situated to control who
had access to bump stocks and therefore could have taken reasonable
precautions to limit their sale and distribution. According to the
Amended Complaint, while Slide Fire manufactures bump stocks
purportedly for use by disabled gun owners, Slide Fire took no
action to limit its sales or marketing efforts to such persons. On
the contrary, Slide Fire promoted bump stocks as inexpensive
alternatives to machine guns, thus permitting others and the
shooter in this case to circumvent federal law in obtaining fully
automatic weapons.

Assuming Plaintiffs' allegations are true, as the Court must at
this stage, then Slide Fire's purposeful campaign to promote bump
stocks as akin to machine guns establishes a foreseeable risk that
third-party criminals may use bump stocks in furtherance of a
military-style assault. Because of the potential for harm attendant
to the sale of machine guns and given Plaintiffs' allegations that
Slide Fire marketed bump stocks to circumvent the federal
prohibition on machine guns, the Court cannot say as a matter of
law that Slide Fire owed no duty to Plaintiffs.  

Breach

Slide Fire argues that even if it owed Plaintiffs a duty of care,
there is no evidence that Slide Fire breached any such duty. Slide
Fire explains that the ATF expressly found that its product did not
circumvent the law, leaving no basis for a finding of a breach.  

The problem with Slide Fire's argument here is that the breaches
identified in the Amended Complaint concern Slide Fire's acts and
omissions after the ATF's evaluation, when Slide Fire is alleged to
have negligently marketed and promoted the bump stock.  Whether or
not the ATF concluded that the bump stock is legal under federal
law, Nevada common law imposes stand-alone duties upon manufactures
in the context of marketing and selling their products.

Causation

Next, Slide Fire argues that the shooter's intentional conduct
constitutes a superseding and intervening ac, such that Plaintiffs
cannot establish proximate cause. Plaintiffs respond that because
the shooter's actions were foreseeable, his unlawful acts do not
supersede causation.  

While unlawful conduct can interrupt and supersede the causation
between a negligent act and injury, an unlawful act will not
supersede causation if it was foreseeable. Plaintiffs point the
Court to other cases in which courts have held a firearm
manufacturer or seller may be liable in negligence for allegedly
enabling criminal acts of third parties.  

Because Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that the shooter's
actions were a foreseeable consequence of Slide Fire's negligent
marketing, distribution, and sales, the Court is satisfied, at this
stage, that he did not break the chain of causation.  

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Slide Fire moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under theories of direct
liability and bystander liability.  According to Slide Fire, the
bystander claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to
allege a close relationship to any victim of the shooting.  With
respect to direct liability, Slide Fire contends that Nevada does
not recognize such a theory.

The Court agrees on both points.

Bystander Liability

A bystander who witnesses an accident may recover for emotional
distress provided the bystander-plaintiff can prove that he or she
(1) was located near the scene (2) was emotionally injured by the
contemporaneous sensory observance of the accident and (3) was
closely related to the victim.

Under Nevada law, the closeness of the relationship between victim
and bystander member is determined upon family membership, either
by blood or marriage.

Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged the relation between the victims
and themselves. Because Nevada law imposes strict limitations on
the relationships that may give rise to a claim of NIED bystander
liability, this claim, as presently pleaded, will be dismissed with
leave to amend.
  
Direct Liability

Nevada law does not provide a cause of action for plaintiffs to
allege direct infliction of emotional distress from conduct that
was merely negligent.

In Schoen, Schoen, 896 P.2d at 477, which Plaintiffs cite in
support of their direct NIED theory, the Nevada Supreme Court noted
that if a bystander can recover for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress, it is only logical that the direct victim be
permitted the same recovery. However, the Court made this
observation in service of its conclusion that the direct victim
should be able to assert a negligence claim that includes emotional
distress as part of the damage suffered as well as an intentional
tort cause of action.

Rather than recognizing a new cause of action for direct NIED, the
Schoen Court merely held that emotional distress is a category of
damages recoverable under existing tort theories of liability.
Other courts in this District are in accord with this reading of
Schoen.

In light of this authority establishing that Nevada does not
recognize an NIED claim based upon a theory of direct liability,
the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice, though this does not
foreclose recovery of emotional damages with Plaintiffs' negligence
claim.

Strict Products Liability

According to Slide Fire, Plaintiffs' strict products liability
claim is premised upon bump stocks being unreasonably dangerous
solely because of the potential for third-party misuse, which Slide
Fire argues is a theory unsupported by any legal authority.   

In response, Plaintiffs make clear that they are not proceeding
under a no defect form of strict products liability. Consequently,
for Plaintiffs to adequately support a claim for strict products
liability under Nevada law, they must allege an injury caused by a
defect in the product, and that such defect existed when the
product left the hands of the defendant.

Here, Plaintiffs provide only a conclusory allegation that Slide
Fire's product is defective. Plaintiffs do not explain how Slide
Fire's bump stock device failed to perform in the manner reasonably
expected or malfunctioned under normal handling conditions. Nor do
Plaintiffs identify applicable legal authority that removes this
pleading requirement and permits their theory of strict products
liability to proceed under Nevada law as currently pleaded. The
Court thus dismisses this claim, but does so without prejudice
because it is not certain that Plaintiffs are entirely unable to
provide factual allegations that can support a claim for strict
products liability.  

Public Nuisance

With respect to Plaintiffs' public nuisance cause of action,
Plaintiffs' have not stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted. In Nevada, there is no private right of action for a
public nuisance. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim with
prejudice.

Private Nuisance

Slide Fire argues that dismissal is warranted on the private
nuisance claim because NRS 40.140 limits such claims to those
implicating an interference with the use and enjoyment of real
property. Because firearm use is neither a nuisance per se nor an
activity that concerns use and enjoyment of real property, Slide
Fire contends that Nevada law does not recognize a private nuisance
claim in this context. Plaintiffs have not responded to Slide
Fire's Motion as to private nuisance. The Court construes the lack
of response as Plaintiffs consenting to dismissal of this claim.  

False Advertising in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act

A cause of action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends to
a plaintiff that alleges an injury to a commercial interest in
reputation or sale. Moreover, a plaintiff suing under Section 43(a)
must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the
deception wrought by the defendant's advertising which occurs when
deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the
plaintiff.

Here, Plaintiffs' alleged injuries do not support a claim under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as currently pleaded because they
are not to a commercial interest in reputation and sale.  Rather,
the alleged injuries are to Plaintiffs' ability to carry on their
commercial business. The Court thus dismisses this claim without
prejudice.

Deceptive Trade Practices Pursuant to NRS 598.0915(5)

Pursuant to NRS 598.0915(5), a defendant engages is a deceptive
trade practice if, in the course of his or her business or
occupation, the defendant knowingly makes a false representation as
to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations or
quantities of goods or services for sale or lease or a false
representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation
or connection of a person therewith.  

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Slide Fire violated NRS 598.0915(5)
and caused them commercial injury by: (1) creating the false and
misleading impression that the bump stock device could be used by
members of the public for a lawful, safe purpose and (2) displaying
the ATF approved' legend on its homepage thereby knowingly creating
the false and misleading impression that the ATF letter was an
official approval of the legality of the bump stock.

These allegations do not, however, reveal a direct harm of
commercial injury by Slide Fire's actions. According to the Amended
Complaint, it was not the false statement about the lawfulness of a
bump stock device or ATF's approval that deprived Plaintiffs of
their commercial business, it was the emotional trauma they
experienced as a result of defendants' sale of the bump stock
device and its subsequent use by the shooter. Thus, while NRS
598.0915(5) is not limited to only consumers or competitors of a
defendant, Plaintiffs' alleged commercial injuries here are too
attenuated to establish standing for this claim.

Nevertheless, the Court is not certain that Plaintiffs would be
unable to cure this deficiency; and thus, dismissal is without
prejudice.  

Slide Fire's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in part and GRANTED in
part. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a claim for negligence
against Slide Fire. By contrast, Plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged the following claims, and they are dismissed without
prejudice with leave to amend, negligent infliction of emotional
distress under a theory of bystander liability, negligent products
liability, strict products liability, false advertising in
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, deceptive trade
practices pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 598.0915, and private
nuisance. Last, the following claims alleged by Plaintiffs are
dismissed with prejudice: public nuisance, negligent infliction of
emotional distress (direct); negligence per se pursuant to NRS
104.2314 and NRS 598.0915 and negligent entrustment of a dangerous
instrument.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 26, 2019
Memorandum Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y526ramt from
Leagle.com.

Devon Prescott & Brooke Freeman, Plaintiffs, represented by Erica
D. Entsminger , Eglet Prince, Jonathan Lowy , pro hac vice, Robert
M. Adams , Eglet Prince, Robert T. Eglet , Eglet Prince, 400 S. 7th
St., Suite 400, Las Vegas, NV 8910, Aaron D. Ford , Nevada Attorney
General, Cassandra Cummings , Eglet Adams & Richard Hy, 400 S. 7th
St., Suite 400, Las Vegas, NV 8910,

Slide Fire Solutions, LP, Defendant, represented by Danny C. Lallis
- dlallis@pmlegalfirm.com - Pisciotti Malsch, F. Thomas Edwards ,
Holley Driggs Walch Fine Wray Puzey & Thompson, James D. Boyle ,
Holley Driggs Walch Fine Wray Puzey & Thompson 800 S. Meadows
Parkway, Suite 800, Reno, NV 89521 & Jeffrey Martin Malsch -
jmalsch@pmlegalfirm.com - Pisciotti Malsch PC, pro hac vice.
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Interested Party,
represented by Matthew Joseph Christian , c/o Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police DepartmentRisk Management.

Larry Bertsch, Special Administrator for the Estate of Stephen
Paddock, Interested Party, represented by Lisa A. Rasmussen , Law
Office of Lisa Rasmussen, 601 South 10th Street, Suite 100, Las
Vegas, NV 89101


SMITH-PALLUCK ASSOCIATES: Court Grants Protective Order in Renteri
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
a Protective Order in the case captioned JOSE RENTERIA, and all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. SMITH-PALLUCK
ASSOCIATES CORP., doing business as LAS VEGAS ATHLETIC CLUBS,
Defendant. Case No. 2:19-cv-01261-JAD-NJK. (D. Nev.).

This Order will govern the use, handling and disclosure of all
documents, testimony or information produced or given in this
action which are designated to be subject to this Order in
accordance with the terms hereof.

Any party or non-party producing or filing documents or other
materials in this action may designate such materials and the
information contained therein subject to this Order by typing or
stamping on the front of the document, or on the portion(s) of the
document for which confidential treatment is designated,
Confidential.

All documents, transcripts, or other materials subject to this
Order, and all information derived therefrom including, but not
limited to, all testimony, deposition, or otherwise, that refers,
reflects or otherwise discusses any information designated
Confidential hereunder, shall not be used, directly or indirectly,
by any person, including Plaintiff and LVAC for any business,
commercial or competitive purposes or for any purpose whatsoever
other than solely for the preparation and trial of this action in
accordance with the provisions of this Order.

All depositions or portions of depositions taken in this action
that contain confidential information may be designated as
Confidential and thereby obtain the protections accorded other
confidential information. The parties shall have twenty-one (21)
days from the date a deposition is taken, or fourteen (14) days
from the date a deposition transcript is received, whichever date
is greater, to serve a notice to all parties designating portions
as Confidential. Until such time, all deposition testimony shall be
treated as confidential information. To the extent any designations
are made on the record during the deposition, the designating party
need not serve a notice redesignating those portions of the
transcript as confidential information. Any party may challenge any
such designation in accordance with Paragraph 13 of this Order.

Documents produced pursuant to this Order shall not be made
available to any person designated in Subparagraph 6(f) unless he
or she shall have first read this Order, agreed to be bound by its
terms, and signed the attached Declaration of Compliance.

Third parties who are the subject of discovery requests, subpoenas
or depositions in this case may take advantage of the provisions of
this Protective Order by providing the parties with written notice
that they intend to comply with and be bound by the terms of this
Protective Order.

All persons receiving any or all documents produced pursuant to
this Order shall be advised of their confidential nature. All
persons to whom confidential information and/or documents are
disclosed are hereby enjoined from disclosing same to any person
except as provided herein, and are further enjoined from using same
except in the preparation for and trial of the above-captioned
action between the named parties thereto. No person receiving or
reviewing such confidential documents, information or transcript
shall disseminate or disclose them to any person other than those
described above in Paragraph 6 and for the purposes specified, and
in no event shall such person make any other use of such document
or  

Inadvertent failure to designate any document, transcript, or other
materials Confidential will not constitute a waiver of an otherwise
valid claim of confidentiality pursuant to this Order, so long as a
claim of confidentiality is promptly asserted after discovery of
the inadvertent failure. If a party designates a document as
Confidential after it was initially produced, the receiving party,
on notification of the designation, must make a reasonable effort
to assure that the document is treated in accordance with the
provisions of this Order, and upon request from the producing party
certify that the designated documents have been maintained as
confidential information.

Disclosure including production) of information after the parties'
entry of this Protective Order that a party or nonparty later
claims was inadvertent and should not have been disclosed because
of a privilege, including, but not limited to, the attorney-client
privilege or work product doctrine Privileged Information, shall
not constitute a waiver of, or estoppel as to, any claim of
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, or other ground
for withholding production as to which the disclosing or producing
party would be entitled in this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available  https://tinyurl.com/y3fsn9qt from Leagle.com.

Jose Renteria, Plaintiff, represented by George Haines , Haines and
Krieger, LLC, Matthew I. Knepper , Knepper & Clark LLC, Miles N.
Clark , Knepper & Clark LLC, Shawn Wayne Miller , Haines & Krieger,
LLC & David H. Krieger , Haines & Krieger, LLC, 8985 S. Eastern
Ave., Ste. 130, Henderson, Nevada

Smith-Palluck Associates Corp, doing business as Las Vegas Athletic
Clubs, Defendant, represented by Joel Edward Tasca - TASCA
BALLARDSPAHR.COM - Ballard Spahr LLP & Stacy H. Rubin - RUBINS
BALLARDSPAHR.COM - Ballard Spahr LLP.


SONY CORP: 9th Circuit Upholds Settlement Approval in Young Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN YOUNG; BRADLEY SELDIN; BRUCE STERMAN; CHARLES
CARTE; BRIAN HANLON; NICHOLE M. GRAY; WOODROW CLARK II; REBECCA
CERVENAK; JOHN RUSSO; MATTHEW J. MILLER; RACHEL L. MILLER; BRADLEY
VAN PATTEN; BENJAMIN KRAMER; JAMES A. SMITH; ANGELA TURNER;
KATHERINE A. WIRKUS; MICHAEL BARBAT; DAVID BROWNLEE; ROBERT ALAN
DISHMAN; JOAN GOODMAN; DAVID MCAFEE; DAWN THOMPSON; THE STEREO
SHOP; MICHELE CRIDEN; BRIAN CALEB BATEY; A-1 COMPUTERS, INC.;
YEVGENIYA LISITSA, Esquire, Attorney; DANIEL MEIR; KIMBERLY
RAIMONDO; DRAKE DAILEY-CHAWLIBOG; MEGHAN DOWLING; MICHAEL HULL;
DAVID SHAWN; DEWEESE SMITH; REGINA SHANNON; RENEE MEIER; FIRST
CHOICE MARKETING, INC.; MICHAEL JAMES DOYLE; REBECCA COHEN; ELLIS
GREENSPAN; LOUIS MESSINA; PATRICE NEALON; ELIZABETH PORTER; DAWN
POTOVIN; DAWN POTOVIN; MARYLIN SHARP; GRACE SHIRE; DAN WEHKING;
STEVEN WILEY; NANCY RUAN; CHAD CONOVER; SUSANNE HILLER; ROBERT
HYAMS; MATTHEW WEINER; GERASIMOS MOLFETAS; THOMAS R. TUOHY;
BEVERLEE SCLAR; DAVID PETREE; MIKE KATZ-LACABE; JAMES O'NEIL; LLOYD
RANOLA; ALFRED H. SIEGEL; TOM PHAM; KATHLEEN TAWNEY; CALVIN
CALKINS; AUTOMATION ENGINEERING, LLC; EDWARD KLUGMAN; GENE POWERS;
RICHARD S.E. JOHNS; BRANDON MARTINEZ; ANGELO MICHAEL D'ORAZIO; RON
NELSON, Jr.; UNIVISION-CRIMSON HOLDING, INC.; PIYA ROBERT
ROJANASATHIT; MICHAEL S. WILSON; RITZ CAMERA & IMAGE, LLC; STEVEN
BUGGE; A. KEITH THROWER; KRISTINA YEE; JOSEPHY G. O'DANIEL; JASON
AMES; WILBUR FRANKLIN; BEATRIZ HERNANDEZ; LINDA LINCOLN; KRISTIN
STARR BARNES; MARK BERGERON; MICHAEL JANUSA; ADAM RONQUILLO; TERRI
WALNER; ANNA JAWOR; KRISTA LEPORE; THE NATIONWIDE GROUP; MATT
BRYANT; LAURA GALLARDO; SPENCER HATHAWAY; ALEXANDRA LE; ROBERT
MCGRANAHAN; PATRICK MCGUINNESS; ERINN TOZER; DAVID GIBBONS;
VALENTINA JUNCAJ; VIOLET SELCA; CORIE LEVY; SCOTT BEALL; THEODORE
WOLFENDALE; CHRISTOPHER BESSETTE; ALEXANDER C. EIDE; POLLY COHEN;
SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT; INDIRECT PURCHASER
PLAINTIFFS; DIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS; ERIC MCGUIRE; KCN
SERVICES, LLC; BRAD MARCUS; BASIL BOURQUE; KEVIN LITWIN; MELINDA
LAWSON; DAVID TOLCHIN; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; KAREN STROMBERG;
CITY OF PALO ALTO; CITY OF RICHMOND; MATTHEW SABA; SHAWN SELLERS;
TRACFONE WIRELESS, INC.; ACER, INC.; ACER AMERICA CORPORATION;
GATEWAY, INC.; GATEWAY U.S. RETAIL, INC.; MICROSOFT MOBILE INC.;
MICROSOFT MOBILE OY; DELL, INC.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, CHRISTOPHER ANDREWS, Objector-Appellant, v.
LG CHEM LTD.; LG CHEM AMERICA, INC.; SONY CORPORATION; SONY
ELECTRONICS, INC.; SAMSUNG SDI AMERICA; HITACHI LTD.; HITACHI
MAXELL, LTD; MAXELL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; SONY ENERGY DEVICES
CORPORATION; SAMSUNG SDI CO, LTD.; HITACHI AMERICA LTD.; HITACHI
MAXELL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; TOSHIBA AMERICA, INC; TOSHIBA
CORPORATION; LG CHEM AMERICA; LG CORPORATION; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
AMERICA, INC.; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS COMPANY, LTD.; SAMSUNG SDI
CHUSIK HOESA; SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA; SANYO ELECTRIC CO., INC;
NEC TOKIN CORPORATION; NEC CORPORATION; LG CHEMICAL LTD.; LG
CHEMICAL AMERICA, INC.; HITACHI MAXELL, LTD.; PCM,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 17-15795 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
approval of the class-action settlement agreement between the
Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs ("IPPs") and Defendants Sony Corp.,
Sony Energy Devices Corp., and Sony Electronics Inc.

The district court approved the class-action settlement agreement
between the IPPs and Sony.  Andrews, a class member objecting to
the settlement, appealed the lower court's ruling.  He argued that
the notice of settlement was deficient, errors in the settlement
agreement and the district court's approval order rendered the
settlement unfair, and the class members were denied access to
crucial documents because they were improperly sealed.

The Ninth Circuit finds that district court properly found that the
notice of settlement was sufficient.  The Appellate Court states
that Andrews' contention that a settlement notice cannot precede
the formulation of a claims process is unsupported, and the rest of
Andrews's attacks on the notice are inconsistent with the record or
irrelevant.  The district court did not err in finding the notice
satisfied due process and Rule 23, the Appellate Court opines.

Next, the Apellate Court reviews the district court's approval of a
class action settlement for clear abuse of discretion.  Andrews
raises a host of objections to the settlement agreement and
district court's approval order, including that the $19.5 million
settlement amount was unjustifiably low compared to the $177
million in total alleged damages attributable to Sony.  The
Appellate Court finds those arguments to be unpersuasive.  The
district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the
settlement agreement.

Finally, Andrews argued that many documents were improperly sealed,
preventing the class members from accurately assessing the
settlement's fairness.  But several documents Andrews identifies
are not sealed.  Rather, they are publicly available with limited
redactions. For the documents that are sealed, Andrews offers
nothing persuasive to counter the district court's finding that the
documents pertinent to the Plaintiffs' settlement with the Sony
defendants, motion for approval, and motion for reimbursement of
costs were all readily available.  Thus, objectors were able to
access all the information relevant to the settlement.  The
district court did not abuse its discretion, the Appellate Court
holds.

In light of the foregoing, the Court accordingly affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 4, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/UeyYmc from Leagle.com.


SPIRIT AIRLINES: 2nd Circuit Vacates in Part Dismissal of Cox Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS COX, JOHN COX, CHRISTIE NEPTUNE, CYNTHIA COE,
HAYFAA BAROUD, TERRY MURRAY, ALBERT EYZAGIRRE, YULIUS MUSTAFA,
DODZI AMEMADO, DIANA CARRILLO, JULIE FEINER, VICTORIA EYZAGIRRE,
DAVID LANGTON, GRETA SCHOENEMAN, SUSAN HOTT, SHIRIN BEGUM, SILVA
IAHDJIAN, MICHAEL WYANT, SUSY KOSHKAKARYAN, HEATHER MCGLASHAN, JILL
BRUA, MARYAM AFKARIAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SPIRIT AIRLINES,
INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-3484-cv (2d Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated in part the Nov.
26, 2018, judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, dismissing the Cox, et al.'s putative class
action in which Plaintiffs alleged claims for breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and fraud against Spirit.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs pursued only their breach-of-contract
claims.  At the outset, Spirit argued that its Contract of Carriage
precludes the Plaintiffs' claims because that document specifically
provides, one carry-on bag is permitted in the aircraft cabin for a
charge.

The 2nd Circuit holds that Spirit's argument fails at the pleading
stage.  Under U.S. law and regulation, "an air carrier may
incorporate by reference in a ticket or written instrument any term
of the contract for providing interstate air transportation,
provided that certain notice requirements are satisfied.  Spirit
acknowledges that the present record is devoid of any allegations
that it complied with these notice requirements. Thus, it cannot
now rely on the Contract of Carriage as a basis for affirming the
district court's dismissal.

The district court held that the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA")
preempts the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims.  The Appellate
Court disagrees.  It finds that if carriage of the Plaintiffs'
carry-on items was within the scope of Spirit's contractual
obligations, then the ADA does not preempt the Plaintiffs'
breach-of-contract claims.  If carriage of the Plaintiffs' carry-on
items was not within the scope of Spirit's contractual obligations,
then the Plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claims fail because Spirit
did not breach any alleged contractual obligation that forbade it
from charging a separate fee for that service.  If the latter, then
the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' complaint was proper because it
failed to state a claim, not because the Plaintiffs' claims are
preempted.

Whether, in light of state-law principles of contract
interpretation, the carriage of the Plaintiffs' carry-on items was
in fact within the scope of Spirit's obligations, is a question for
the district court to consider in the first instance.  The Court
concludes only that, in light of what appear to be ambiguities in
the contract that the Plaintiffs allege Spirit to have breached,
and its conclusion that ADA preemption does not apply, the
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim was not dismissible on the
pleadings.

Nevertheless, the Appellate Court agrees with the district court
that the Plaintiffs have effectively conceded that there was only
an agreement as to the price term, destination and dates of travel,
and no other terms were either disclosed or made part of the
contract.  That concession is not fatal at the pleading stage,
however, because the Appellate Court holds that "price" is an
ambiguous term.

Finally, it observes that, if any such ambiguity resolves in the
Plaintiffs' favor, then any obligation as to carriage of carry-on
items would still be one Spirit has voluntarily undertaken,
notwithstanding its own professed contrary intent.  It is the
reasonable meaning of the parties' words or conduct that govern.
On that score, the ADA's preemption of state law does not preclude
application of state-law contract interpretation principles to the
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.

The Appellate Court has considered the remainder of the parties'
arguments and finds them to be without merit.  Accordingly, it
vacated in part the judgment of the district court, and remanded
the case.

A full-text copy of the 2nd Circuit's Sept. 10, 2019 Summary Order
is available at https://is.gd/XDAKnu from Leagle.com.

John Hermina, Hermina Law Group, Laurel, MD. Gregory Allen,
Milford, CT (on the brief), Appearing for Appellants.

Stephanie Drotar -- sdrotar@omm.com -- Mark W. Robertson --
mrobertson@omm.com -- (on the brief), O'Melveny & Myers LLP, New
York, NY, Appearing for Appellee.

Andrew Appelbaum, Flyers Rights Education Fund, Washington, DC,
amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Cox et al.

Kim Richman -- krichman@richmanlawgroup.com -- Richman Law Group,
Brooklyn, NY, for National Consumers League, amicus curiae in
support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Cox et al.

Seth P. Waxman -- SETH.WAXMAN@WILMERHALE.COM -- Catherine M.A.
Carroll -- CATHERINE.CARROLL@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hall and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Airlines for
America, amicus curiae in support of Defendant-Appellee Spirit
Airlines, Inc. Appearing for Amici.


STANLEY STEEMER: Runnels Seeks Overtime Compensation
----------------------------------------------------
LATEEF RUNNELS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. STANLEY STEEMER INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,the Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00767-BP (W.D. Mo., Sept. 20,
2019), seeks unpaid wages and overtime compensation, and related
penalties and damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked as a nonexempt employee. He regularly worked
in excess of 40 hours in a work week. Over the course of his
employment Plaintiff was on a commission basis, with a minimum
hourly guarantee of at least $9.75 per hour.

Additionally, for the weeks in which Plaintiff's regular rate fell
below the minimum hourly guarantee, Stanley Steemer failed to
properly pay overtime compensation pursuant to 29 C.F.R. section
785.111(b). Instead, Defendant solely based overtime compensation
on Plaintiff's pay and not accounting for the minimum hourly rate,
the lawsuit says.

Stanley Steemer is a US-based company that provides carpet
cleaning, tile and grout cleaning, upholstery cleaning, hardwood
floor cleaning and air duct cleaning. The company also does water
damage restoration and sells a line of cleaning products for home
and office use. It was founded in 1947 in Dublin, Ohio.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Eric L. Dirks, Esq.
          WILLIAMS DIRKS DAMERON, LLC
          1100 Main Street, Suite 2600
          Kansas City, MO 64105
          Telephone: (816) 945-7110
          Facsimile: (816) 945-7118
          E-mail: dirks@williamsdirks.com

               - and -

          Michael Hodgson, Esq.
          THE HODGSON LAW FIRM
          3609 SW Pryor Road
          Lee's Summit, MO 64082
          Telephone: (913) 890-3529
          11mike@thehodgsonlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Heather J. Hardinger, Esq.
          THE MEYERS LAW FIRM, LC
          503 One Main Plaza
          4435 Main Street
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: 816 444-8500
          Facsimile: 816 444-8508
          E-mail: hhardinger@meyerslaw.com

STEIN MART INC: Castaneda Labor Suit Removed to C.D. Cal.
---------------------------------------------------------
Sylvia Garza-Castaneda, on behalf of herself, all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Stein Mart, Inc. and Does 1 through 50,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CIV-DS-1921230 (Cal. Super., July
29, 2019), was removed to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California on March 6, 2019 under Case No.
19-cv-01644.

Castaneda seeks unpaid overtime wages and interest, redress for
failure to authorize or permit required meal periods, statutory
penalties for failure to provide accurate wage statements, waiting
time penalties in the form of continuation wages for failure to
timely pay employees all wages due upon separation of employment,
reimbursement of business-related expenses, injunctive relief and
other equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
interest under California Labor Code, Unfair Competition Law, the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act and
the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.

Stein Mart operates 26 stores in California where Castaneda worked
in one of their locations.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Matthew Roland Bainer, Esq.
      BAINER LAW FIRM
      1901 Harrison Street Suite 1100
      Oakland, CA 94612
      Tel: (510) 922-1802
      Fax: (510) 844-7701
      Email: mbainer@bainerlawfirm.com

Stein Mart is represented by:

      Krista M. Cabrera, Esq.
      FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
      3579 Valley Centre Drive, Suite 300
      San Diego, CA 92130
      Telephone: (858) 847-6700
      Facsimile: (858) 792-6773
      Email: kcabrera@foley.com

             - and -

      Archana A. Manwani, Esq.
      FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
      555 South Flower Street, Suite 3300
      Los Angeles, CA 90071-2411
      Telephone: (213) 972-4500
      Facsimile: (213) 486-0065
      Email: amanwani@foley.com


SWAROVSKI NORTH: Calif. Court Denies Dismissal of Lerman Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANNA LERMAN, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. SWAROVSKI NORTH AMERICA LIMITED, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 19cv638-LAB (BLM) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Larry
Alan Burns of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California denied Swarovski Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

In January 2019, Plaintiff Lerman placed two telephone calls to
Swarovski's customer-service line to obtain information about her
online merchandise purchase and to change an expected delivery
date.  Although the company representative provided no disclaimer
that the calls might be recorded, Lerman alleges that the company
nonetheless recorded her calls without consent, in violation of
California Penal Code Section 632.7.  In fact, according to the
complaint, Swarovski has company-wide policy of recording all
inbound consumer telephone calls without providing notice, which is
why Lerman has brought the suit as a putative class action.

Swarovski moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Lerman cannot
state a claim under section 632.7.  It argues that section 632.7
prohibits recording "without consent" only where a party
"intercepts or receives and intentionally records" that
communication.  In Swarovski's view, the phrase "without consent"
modifies both "intercepts or receives" and "intentionally records."
So, even if Lerman didn't consent to Swarovski recording the call,
she necessarily consented to the company receiving the call by
virtue of her placing the call, and thus Swarovski cannot be
liable.

Judge Burns finds Swarovski's interpretation of section 632.7
creative but unpersuasive.  The reality, as Lerman correctly points
out, is that a person cannot record a call without access to that
call -- that is, without either intercepting or receiving the call.
To read the statute as requiring consent to both the reception of
the call and the recording of the call would be to twist the plain
language of the statute past its breaking point.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that the language was
ambiguous, the Judge couldn't adopt Swarovski's reading because it
would frustrate the statute's purpose.  Under Swarovski's reading,
any customer-service call made to a business -- or any call to
anyone, for that matter -- could be recorded by the recipient
because the dialer necessarily consented to the other party
"receiving" the call.

As pled, Lerman's complaint states a valid claim for violation of
section 632.7, the judge finds. The Judge therefore denies
Swarovski's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/eBCR03 from Leagle.com.

Anna Lerman, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Zev Benjamin Zysman --
zev@zysmanlawca.com -- Law Offices of Zev B. Zysman, APC.

Swarovski North America Limited, Swarovski Retail Ventures Limited
& Swarovski Digital Business USA Inc., Defendants, represented by
Stephanie A. Sheridan -- ssheridan@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson
LLP.


TAPESTRY, INC: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as NORMA GARCIA and KARINA
ANDRADE, individually, on a representative basis, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. TAPESTRY, INC.,
a Maryland Corporation which will do business in California as
Coach Leatherware California, Inc. DBA Coach; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-01537-DMG-SHK (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dolly M. Gee entered an order denying
Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The Court, having considered the Joint Notice of Settlement and
Stipulation to Vacate Dates, and for good cause shown, orders that
all remaining dates and deadlines in the action are vacated. The
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is denied as moot and
the September 20, 2019 hearing was vacated. The motion for
preliminary approval of class settlement shall be filed within 60
days.[CC]

TARGET CORPORATION: Ornelas et al. Suit Moved to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as JOSEPH D. ORNELAS and RODNEY
ALAN ROBINSON, JR., on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. TARGET CORPORATION, a
Minnesota Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. CIVDS-1924533 (Aug. 19, 2019), was removed
from the Superior Court of California County of San Bernardino to
the U.S. District for the Central District of California on Sept.
20, 2019. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned
Case No. 5:19-cv-01814 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defenants failed to pay overtime
compensation, failed to provide adequate itemized wage statements,
failed to pay waiting time penalties in violation of the California
Labor Code.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Joseph R. Becerra, Esq.
          BECERRA LAW FIRM
          4014 Long Beach Blvd., Suite 300
          Long Beadi, CA 90807
          Telephone: (213) 542-8501
          Facsimile: (213) 542-5556
          E-mail: jbeccera@jbecceralaw.com

               - and -

          Torey J. Favarote, Esq.
          GLEASON & FAVAROTE LLP
          4014 Long Beach Blvd., Suite 300
          Long Beach, CA 90807
          Telephone: (213) 452-0510
          Facsimile: (213) 452-0514
          E-mail: tfavaiDte@gleasonfavarote.com

TILE SHOP: 7th Cir. Affirms IWPCA Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, issued an
Opinion affirming the District Court’s judgment granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned
ADRIEL OSORIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE TILE SHOP, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-2609. (7th Cir.).

Adriel Osorio filed this class action alleging that The Tile Shop's
recoverable draw system violates the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act (IWPCA) and its implementing regulations. As
relevant here, the regulatory scheme prohibits employers from
deducting more than 15% from an employee's wages per paycheck as
repayment for previous cash advances.

Osorio's suit claimed that The Tile Shop's compensation system
functions as a series of cash advances and his former employer
deducted more than 15% of his wages at various points to recoup
previous draw payments.

The district judge granted The Tile Shop's motion for partial
judgment on the pleadings with respect to Osorio's IWPCA claim. His
original complaint alleged that the company did not have his
written authorization to recoup the draw payments. The judge ruled
that he had authorized the recoupment by signing the pay plan
attached to his offer of employment.

The Court reviews a summary judgment de novo, construing evidence
and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  

The IWPCA prohibits deductions by employers from wages or final
compensation unless certain conditions are met.  As the Court
explained, the Act's implementing regulations establish
requirements for deductions from wages pursuant to a cash advance
repayment agreement, one of which is the 15%-per-paycheck
limitation.  

In the district court, The Tile Shop made two arguments in
opposition to Osorio's reformulated IWPCA claim. The first was that
the draw reconciliations are not deductions from wages or
compensation" within the meaning of the Act. The second was that
the draw system does not involve cash advances within the meaning
of the regulations. The judge agreed with The Tile Shop's second
argument, holding that the draws are not cash advances.

On appeal The Tile Shop reiterates both arguments.

The Court finds the first inquiry dispositive. The IWPCA is
triggered only if the draw reconciliations constitute deductions
from wages or final compensation. The Act broadly defines wages as
any compensation owed an employee by an employer pursuant to an
employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties. But neither
the statute nor the implementing regulations define the term
deductions, nor has any court defined the term as used in the Act.

Considered in context, the term deductions as used in the Act
refers to withholdings from an employee's gross wages, not the
formula used to calculate an employee's gross wages. This poses an
insurmountable obstacle for Osorio. The draw-reconciliation system
is part of The Tile Shop's formula for calculating a sales
associate's semimonthly commission earnings. It is not a deduction
from the sales associate's wages or final compensation. Osorio's
paystub confirms this understanding: the draw payments and
reconciliations appear as line items under Earnings, not under
Deductions. To borrow an accounting phrase, the draw reconciliation
is made above the line to calculate the employee's gross wages
before withholding for taxes and other applicable deductions are
made.

Because the draw reconciliations are not deductions from wages or
final compensation within the meaning of section 115/9, The Tile
Shop's compensation system does not violate the IWPCA.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's September 23, 2019
Opinion is available  https://tinyurl.com/y3r9y8g5 from
Leagle.com.

Michael D. Karpeles - karpelesm@gtlaw.com - for
Defendant-Appellee.

Mark Anthony Bulgarelli , Progressive Law Group LLC, 1570 Oak Ave
Ste 103, Evanston, IL, 60201-4231, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan H. Claydon - claydonj@gtlaw.com - for Defendant-Appellee.

Bryan J. Morben - bmorben@fredlaw.com - for Defendant-Appellee.
Joseph M. Sokolowski  - jsokolowski@fredlaw.com - for
Defendant-Appellee.


TOKYO HIBACHI: Jones Seeks to Certify Class of Restaurant Servers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DEVAN JONES and All Others
Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. H&J RESTAURANTS, LLC d/b/a
TOKYO HIBACHI, the Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00105-TBR (W.D.
Ky.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the case as a collective action
      pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
      on behalf of:

      "all current and former servers employed by Defendant at its

      Tokyo Hibachi restaurant in Paducah, Kentucky at any time
      since July 22, 2016"; and

   2. authorizing notice of the action via U.S. Mail and email to
      those members of the conditionally certified collective
      action.

The Plaintiff challenges Defendant's common pay policies and
practices for servers. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant has violated the minimum wage and overtime requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David W. Garrison, Esq.
          Joshua A. Frank, Esq.
          BARRETT JOHNSTON MARTIN & GARRISON, LLC
          Philips Plaza
          414 Union Street, Suite 900
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-2202
          Facsimile: (615) 252-3798
          E-mail: dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com
                  jfrank@barrettjohnston.com

TRAVEL NURSE: Court Dismisses Individual Claims in K. Call's Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order dismissing the All Individual Claims in
the case captioned KAREN CALL, Plaintiff, v. TRAVEL NURSE ACROSS
AMERICA, LLC, Defendant. Case No. 2:18-cv-03027-KJM-AC. (E.D.
Cal.).

The parties jointly stipulate to dismiss all individual claims
brought by plaintiff Karen Call, agreeing this putative class
action should be resolved on an individual basis because counsel
for Plaintiff do not believe proceeding with the class action is
feasible, while all putative class claims and causes of action
should be dismissed without prejudice.  

In response to the parties' stipulation, the court directed the
parties to meet and confer and submit a supplemental filing
addressing the factors identified in Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac.
Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1407-09 (9th Cir. 1989). As explained
below, the court now APPROVES the stipulation.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs the litigation of class
actions in federal court.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires courts to approve
the proposed voluntary dismissal of class claims even before the
class is formally certified. Where parties seek to voluntarily
dismiss class claims, the court must inquire into possible
prejudice from the following circumstances: (1) class members'
possible reliance on the filing of the action if they are likely to
know of it either because of publicity or other circumstances (2)
lack of adequate time for class members to file other actions,
because of a rapidly approaching statute of limitations  (3) any
settlement or concession of class interests made by the class
representative or counsel in order to further their own interests.

Here, the court is satisfied that dismissal of this action will
result in no prejudice to the putative class members. It is the
court's understanding that the statute of limitations on certain
class claims may have expired on or about March 20, 2019, and
therefore some potential class members would be barred from
bringing their claims once this case was dismissed.  

The court is also satisfied the settlement and dismissal are not
tainted by collusion, based on the parties' representation that the
settlement was a result of the parties discovering plaintiff was
owed wages for training time due to a clerical error when
calculating her wages and no other individuals appear to have
suffered from the same error. Further, plaintiff and plaintiff's
counsel have received no monetary consideration for dismissal of
the class claims, rather, plaintiff's counsel only recovered costs
for filing and service and a portion of the attorney's fees
attributed to investigating and prosecuting the individual claims.


The court approves the parties' stipulation. All of the individual
claims and allegations brought by Karen Call are dismissed with
prejudice and all of the claims and allegations of the putative
class members are dismissed without prejudice.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019 Order
is available https://tinyurl.com/y45lzpza from Leagle.com.

Karen Call, Plaintiff, represented by Jeff Geraci -
jgeraci@ckslaw.com - Cohelan Khoury and Singer & Michael D. Singer
- msinger@ckslaw.com - Cohelan Khoury & Singer.

Travel Nurse Across America, LLC, An Arkansas Limited Liability
Company, Defendant, represented by Kenneth Dawson Sulzer -
ksulzer@constangy.com - Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete LLP,
Kimberly T. Bernstein , Constangy, Brooks, Smith, & Prophete LLP,
Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum , Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete & Sayaka
Karitani , Constangy Brooks Smith & Prophete, LLP, Plaza Tower600
Anton Boulevard11th FloorCosta Mesa, CA 92626


TRIAD SENIOR: Webster Sues over Collection of Biometric Data
------------------------------------------------------------
ANGELA WEBSTER, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. TRIAD SENIOR LIVING, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 2019CH10787 (Ill. Cir., Sept. 18, 2019), seeks
to redress and curtail the Defendant's unlawful collection, use,
storage, and disclosure of Plaintiffs sensitive biometric data
pursuant to the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

When the Defendant or one of its affiliated facilities hires an
employee, including Plaintiff, he or she is enrolled in an employee
database shared and maintained by and between the Defendant and the
affiliate facilities to monitor the time worked by hourly
employees.

While many employers use conventional methods for tracking time
worked (such as ID badge swipes or punch clocks), the Defendant's
employees are required to have their fingerprints scanned by a
biometric timekeeping device.

Unlike ID badges or time cards -- which can be changed or replaced
if stolen or compromised -- fingerprints are unique, permanent
biometric identifiers associated with each employee. This exposes
Loews employees to serious and irreversible privacy risks, the
lawsuit says.

Triad is a senior living community management corporation that
manages independent living, assisted living, memory care, and
nursing facilities in eight states, including Illinois.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: 312 233 1550
          Facsimile: 312 233 1560
          E-mail: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                  jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                  hjenkins@stephanzouras.com

TRIANTOS ENTERPRISES: Fontanez Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
JERRY FONTANEZ v. TRIANTOS ENTERPRISES, INC. dba GALAXY HAMBURGERS;
and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV32961 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Sept. 16, 2019), alleges that the Defendants violated
the California Labor Code by, among other things, failing to pay
the Plaintiff and other similarly situated aggrieved employees
minimum and overtime wages.

TRIANTOS ENTERPRISES, INC. is a California corporation, doing
business in Los Angeles County, California, as Galaxy Hamburgers
located at 13400 Alondra Ave., in Cerritos, California.  The
Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Doe
Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harout Messrelian, Esq.
          MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
          500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
          Glendale, California 91203
          Telephone: (818) 484-6531
          Facsimile: (818) 956-1983
          E-mail: hm@messrelianlaw.com


TRUEACCORD CORP: Certification of Class Sought in Lindala Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
William Lindala moves the Court to certify the class described in
the complaint of the lawsuit titled WILLIAM LINDALA, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. TRUEACCORD CORP.,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01370-WED (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the
Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the
Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


TRUEACCORD CORP: Court Stays Lindala Bid for Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as WILLIAM LINDALA, the
Plaintiff, v. TRUEACCORD CORP., the Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-1370
(E.D Wisc.), the Hon. Judge William E. Duffin entered an order
granting Plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the
motion for class certification.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint." "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs." However, because parties are
generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."


The plaintiff's motion to stay further proceedings on the motion
for class certification is granted. The parties are relieved from
the automatic briefing schedule set forth in Civil Local Rule 7(b)
and (c). Moreover, for administrative purposes, it is necessary
that the Clerk terminate the plaintiff's motion for class
certification. However, this motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco.

On September 20, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action
complaint. At the same time, the plaintiff filed what the court
commonly refers to as a "protective" motion for class
certification. (ECF No. 3.) In this motion the plaintiff moved to
certify the class described in the complaint but also moved the
court to stay further proceedings on that motion.[CC]

UNITED AIRLINES: Vallarta Sues over Misleading Travel Insurance
---------------------------------------------------------------
DIANA VALLARTA and LISA SALMONS, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. UNITED AIRLINES,
INC., the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-05895-DMR (N.D. Cal., Sept.
20, 2019), relates that the Defendant's website encourages ticket
purchasers to protect their trip with travel insurance provided by
Allianz or the Travel Guard Group (depending on when the insurance
was purchased) -- third-party insurers that have partnered with
United to offer travel insurance exclusively through United's
website. United does not disclose, however, that it has a financial
interest in the travel insurance and, in fact, receives illegal
kickback from the insurer in exchange for brokering
the insurance sale.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's website misled them into
paying for the cost of that illegal kickback, and that the
Defendant is therefore liable for these damages, among other
things. The Plaintiffs bring claims for unjust enrichment,
violations of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code, and for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act.

Had United disclosed that the price of the travel-insurance product
on United's website incorporates an illegal commission paid to
United (as opposed to being based solely on underwriting risk and
insurer profit), the Plaintiffs would have not purchased the travel
insurance and/or would have paid less for travel insurance, the
lawsuit says.

United Airlines, Inc. is a major American airline headquartered at
Willis Tower in Chicago, Illinois. United operates a large domestic
and international route network, with an extensive presence in the
Asia-Pacific region.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Marc L. Godino, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 9160
          E-mail: mgodino@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Rosemary M. Rivas, Esq.
          Kevin Landau, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          44 Montgomery Street, Suite 650
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 373-1671
          E-mail: rrivas@zlk.com
                  klandau@tcllaw.com

               - and -

          Kevin Landau, Esq.
          Brett Cebulash, Esq.
          TAUS, CEBULASH & LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 931-0704

               - and -

          Dennis Stewart, Esq.
          Daniel C. Hedlund, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          120 South 6th St.
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          Facsimile: (612) 339-6622

UNITED COLLECTION: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL THORSON and
MARILYN MUELLER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiffs, v. UNITED COLLECTION BUREAU, INC., the
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-01364 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiffs ask
the Court for an order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff
as class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as
Class Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court
may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiffs further ask that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

VERO BEACH, FL: Doe Can't Proceed Anonymously in Parlor Video Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF VERO BEACH, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-14212-ROSENBERG/MAYNARD (S.D. Fla.), Judge Robin L.
Rosenberg of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Anonymously.

In his class action complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the
Defendant City violated his Fourth Amendment rights by installing
video equipment in a massage parlor and recording the activities
within that massage parlor "on a 24/7 basis" for a period of 60
days.  Defendant, City of Vero Beach, through its police
department, violated John Doe's constitutional rights by
surreptitiously videotaping him while in a state of undress in a
licensed massage parlor.  As a result of the video recordings, the
Plaintiff was actually charged with crimes of solicitation of
prostitution and subjected to public humiliation.  Through his
Motion, the Plaintiff sought the Court's leave to proceed
anonymously, under the pseudonym John Doe.

It is the Plaintiff's second attempt to seek the Court's leave to
proceed anonymously.  He previously sought anonymity by
incorporating a motion to proceed anonymously in his Response to
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.  In the Court's Order Granting
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court also denied the
Plaintiff's request to proceed anonymously.  However, he was
granted leave to amend his complaint and to file a renewed motion
to proceed anonymously provided that he contemporaneously files a
motion for leave to proceed anonymously, setting forth specific
details about the risks the case poses to him and relevant legal
support for his request.

Quoting Doe v. Frank, Judge Rosenberg explains that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that "every pleading" in federal
court "must name all the parties."  However, the rule is not
absolute, and a party may proceed anonymously, by showing that he
has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and
constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings.

The Eleventh Circuit has elucidated several factors to be
considered in this evaluation: (1) whether the plaintiffs seeking
anonymity are challenging governmental activity; (2) whether they
will be required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy;
(3) whether the plaintiffs will be compelled to admit their
intention to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal
prosecution; (4) whether the plaintiffs were minors; (5) whether
they were threatened with violence or physical harm by proceeding
in their own names and; (6) whether their anonymity posed a unique
threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant.

Based on her review of the Frank factors, Judge Rosenberg finds
that none of these factors weigh in the Plaintiff's favor. As a
result, she finds that the case does not present an "exceptional
circumstance" justifying the Plaintiff's anonymity in the case.
Accordingly, she denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously.  She ordered the Plaintiff to file his Amended
Complaint with his full name within two business days of the
rendition of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 10, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/hs5mwn from Leagle.com.

John Doe, Plaintiff, represented by Bradford L. Jefferson, Bradford
L Jefferson PA.

City of Vero Beach, a Florida Municipality, Defendant, represented
by William Edward Lawton -- wlawton@drml-law.com -- Dean Ringers
Morgan & Lawton & Gail C. Bradford -- gbradford@drml-law.com --
Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, PA.


VISA INC: Certification of ATM Operators Class Sought
-----------------------------------------------------
NATIONAL ATM COUNCIL, INC., et al., the Plaintiffs, v. VISA INC.,
et al., the Defendants, Case No. 1:11-cv-01803-RJL (D.C.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all ATM Operators that originated an Authorized Surcharged
       ATM Cash Disbursement at a Qualified ATM at any time
       between October 1, 2007 and the present";

   2. appointing class representatives; and

   3. appointing class counsel.[CC]

Class Counsel for Plaintiffs are:

          Jonathan L. Rubin, Esq.
          Daniel J. Mogin, Esq.
          Jennifer M. Oliver, Esq.
          MOGINRUBIN LLP
          1615 M Street, NW, Third Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: (202) 630-0616
          Facsimile: (877) 247-8586
          E-mail: jrubin@moginrubin.com
                  dmogin@moginrubin.com
                  joliver@moginrubin.com

WALGREEN CO: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
first amended class action complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) in the case captioned WASHTENAW COUNTY
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. WALGREEN CO., GREGORY D.
WASSON, and WADE MIQUELON, Defendants. Case No. 15-cv-3187. (N.D.
Ill.).

Industriens Pensionforsikring, A/S, as lead plaintiff, brings this
shareholder class action lawsuit against defendants Walgreen Co.
(Walgreens), former Walgreens Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Gregory
D. Wasson, and former Walgreens Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Wade
Miquelon for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits.
When considering dismissal of a complaint, the Court accepts all
well pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. To survive a motion to
dismiss, plaintiff must state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face.

Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud. Particularity in pleading fraud,
including securities fraud, means describing the who, what, when,
where, and how of the fraud.  

To adequately plead defendants made material misrepresentations or
omissions in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 34
Act, plaintiff must allege (1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant (2) scienter (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission (5)
economic loss and (6) loss causation.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) requires that
the complaint specify each statement alleged to be misleading and
the reason or reasons why it is misleading. The PSLRA also requires
that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind. To establish a strong inference of scienter, the
allegations must be more than merely plausible, they must be as
compelling as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent.  

Forward-Looking Statements

March 25, 2014, Second Quarter Report

In the first amended complaint, plaintiff has re-alleged certain
FY16 EBIT goal-related statements and added new ones. To start,
plaintiff re-alleges that on March 25, 2014, Walgreens issued its
second quarter report and press release. That same day, Wasson and
Miquelon held a conference call with investors to present the
report and answer questions. With respect to the FY16 EBIT goal,
Miquelon stated that Walgreens was currently tracking below the
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) needed to achieve the goal, yet
Walgreens' presentation slides for the March 25 conference call
unequivocally stated the FY16 EBIT goal remained at $9.0 to $9.5
billion.

Also, Miquelon stated: "We continue to recognize that there are
risks to achieving this goal; however, we remain focused on
delivering it." Plaintiff asserts that these statements, in tandem
with the slides, were false and misleading because by March 25
defendants knew that the FY16 EBIT goal was tracking at least $1
billion below target.

In the September 2016 motion to dismiss ruling, the Court concluded
that these statements were not actionable because plaintiff did not
sufficiently allege that the $9.0 to $9.5 billion goal was not
attainable. To clarify, statements about earnings forecasts or
goals may be actionable if they are made with the knowledge that
they are incorrect or are otherwise without a reasonable basis.

Plaintiff has cured its earlier pleading deficiencies by providing
additional allegations raising a strong inference that by March
2014 defendants knew that the $9.0 to $9.5 billion earnings goal
was not attainable. For example, in a December 17, 2013, email to
Miquelon, the Vice President of Global Finance stated in reference
to the earnings shortfall: I can see that we're trying to have
adequate upside to offset the risk shown on the slide, but based on
what I see, we don't have support to imply this range of value is
reasonable.

Plaintiff provides other communications and allegations from early
2014 through the beginning of the class period starting in March
2014 that underscore Miquelon's and Wasson's knowledge that by
early March 2014, the FY16 EBIT goal of $9.0 to $9.5 billion did
not have a reasonable basis and was not attainable.  Such
allegations include that Walgreens prepared a long-range plan
refresh in January and February 2014, which provided management
with the forecast of FY16 EBIT at $8.4 billion.

Under these allegations, plaintiff has adequately alleged
particular facts to show that defendants should not be protected by
the safe harbor provision for these March 25 forward-looking
statements.

May 15, 2014, Goldman Sachs Analyst Report

Next, plaintiff adds new goal-related allegations focusing on
defendants' statements and omissions made in May 2014. On May 15,
Miquelon made statements during investor meetings hosted by Goldman
Sachs. That same day, Goldman Sachs issued a report Takeaways from
Day 1 of meetings with management, which stated, of the five
targets all are tacking on/ahead of plan with the exception being
the adj. EBIT goal of at least $9.0bn as core growth has lagged.
That said, Walgreens did not back away from this target. Plaintiff
also highlights a May 23 Goldman Sachs report that provided
additional information discussed with Miquelon at the May 15
meeting. The report stated in pertinent part:

During our meetings, Wade Miquelon, CFO, highlighted that Walgreens
is tracking on or ahead of plan for each of its five FY16 financial
targets with the lone exception of adj. EBIT. That said, management
believes this target remains achievable and sees further upside
beyond FY16 by leveraging a global footprint, expanding in growth
markets, and bringing Alliance's best practices to the US.

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that by March 2014 defendants
knew the $9.0 to $9.5 billion earnings goal did not have a
reasonable basis and was not attainable. Defendants nevertheless
argue that they cannot be held liable for the May 2014 statements
written by third-party analysts because defendants did not have the
ultimate authority over the content of the analysts' reports.  

The context in which Goldman Sachs analysts reported Miquelon's
statements was the May 15 investor meeting hosted by Goldman Sachs.
The May 15 report stated that at the meeting with Miquelon,
Miquelon highlighted the FY16 targets, including the EBIT goal. The
May 15 report was entitled Takeaways from Day 1 of meetings with
management and stated that Walgreens did not back away from this
target. Without any attribution to Miquelon, these statements are
the author's takeaways or conclusions from the meeting. And, the
statement that Walgreens did not back away from the FY16 EBIT
target is too broad to create any inference that this statement
should be attributed to Miquelon.

On the other hand, the May 23 report specifically identified
Miquelon as the speaker by stating Wade Miquelon, CFO, highlighted
and then immediately stated that management believed the FY16 EBIT
target remains achievable.

Because the Goldman Sachs report specifically attributed this
statement to Miquelon, this May 2014 statement is actionable.

Generic drug inflation/reimbursement pressures

Plaintiff also brings additional claims related to defendants'
allegedly false and misleading statements that concealed or failed
to fully disclose the impact of generic drug price inflation and
reimbursement pressures. Because these statements are not
forward-looking, but instead discuss historical and present facts
that are not contingent on any future event, they are not protected
by the PSLRA's safe harbor provision.  

April 17, 2014, J.P Morgan Conference Call

On April 17, 2014, J.P. Morgan hosted a conference call with
Wasson. At the conference call, the J.P Morgan analyst asked Wasson
about the impact of generic price inflation. Wasson replied, we
think that it was really kind of a one-time phenomenon and that it
was probably an anomaly. He further stated that Walgreens had a
better opportunity than anyone to offset that generic inflation.
Plaintiff argues that Wasson knew that these statements were false
or misleading because the generic inflation and reimbursement
problems were structural and systemic not an anomaly or one time
phenomenon.

Defendants contend that these statements are not actionable because
plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that Wasson knew
generic inflation and reimbursement problems were more than an
anomaly. On the contrary, plaintiff has adequately alleged that
Wasson was aware of the systemic generic drug price inflation and
reimbursement pressures at the time he made these statements.
Allegations in the first amended complaint, taken as true for
purposes of this motion to dismiss, reveal that during the relevant
time period, Wasson and Miquelon, as Walgreens' most senior
officers, were regularly informed of generic inflation and pricing
trends in the generic drug market, along with third-party
reimbursement trends, both of which had a substantial impact of
Walgreens' profits.  

Wasson's April 17, 2014 statements survive defendants' motion to
dismiss.

April 30, 2014, Barclay's Conference

Plaintiff next re-alleges its claim in relation to statements made
by Walgreens' Head of Investor Relations, Rick Hans, who appeared
at the Barclay's Retail and Consumer Discretionary Conference on
April 30, 2014. Plaintiff highlights the following question posed
to Hans: When we think about maybe this fiscal year, how has the
gross margin advantage from generics helped you? I'm not talking
about the supply chain changes.

In response, Hans stated, we've had a kind of a dearth of new
generics. So that caused a big mismatch, it's kind of that peak to
trough that we've talked about relative to the introduction of new
generics and that had an impact on the margin. Plaintiff asserts
that this statement misled investors by explaining that the drop in
pharmacy margin was due to the lack of new generic drugs, rather
than the generic drug price inflation combined with Walgreen's
unfavorable contracts with PBMs.

The questioned posed, however, unequivocally states that the
inquiry did not involve supply chain changes, such as generic
pricing or generic drug price inflation. Rather, the question asked
about the gross margin advantages generics have over branded drugs.
As previously discussed, generic drugs generate a higher profit
margin than branded drugs due to their lower production costs, and,
as alleged in the first amended complaint, the profit margins on
generic drugs are typically 50% higher than branded competitors.
Therefore, Hans' answer concerning the lack of new generics
directly responds to the question about the gross margin advantage
on generics and not generic drug price inflation.

Accordingly, Hans' answer is not misleading nor actionable.

May 16, 2014, Morgan Stanley Conference Call

Last, plaintiff seeks to revive its claim concerning a May 16, 2014
analyst report issued by Morgan Stanley after a conference call
with Wasson and Miquelon. In the report, Morgan Stanley stated
Walgreens has not seen any unusual activity in relation to generic
price inflation and that its joint venture with Alliance leaves
Walgreens in better shape than peers to cope with generic price
increases. In the September 2016 ruling, the Court concluded it was
unclear who made these statements, therefore, the allegations were
insufficient to state a claim.

Plaintiff contends that it has cured this deficiency by alleging
new surrounding facts in the first amended complaint. The Court
agrees. It is undisputed that Wasson and Miquelon were the only
Walgreens' executives in attendance on the conference call.
Moreover, Wasson's statement that Walgreens has not seen any
unusual activity is similar to his earlier statement at the J.P.
Morgan investor conference raising an inference that he made the
later statement. Plaintiff further relies on Wasson's September 17,
2017 testimony in the SEC proceedings where he stated it was most
likely it could've been both of us who addressed the generic price
inflation at the May 2014 call. Viewing the well pleaded
allegations in plaintiff's favor, its additional allegations
sufficiently connect Wasson to the statements made in the May 16
Morgan Stanley report.

The May 2014 Morgan Stanley statements thus survive defendant's
motion to dismiss.

Loss Causation

Walgreens further argues that the Court should dismiss all of
plaintiff's Section 10(b) claims because plaintiff fails to
adequately allege loss causation under the fraud-on-the-market
theory of damages. The fraud-on-the market theory is based on the
presumption that the market price of shares traded on
well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information,
and, hence, any material misrepresentations.

Walgreens contends that because it withdrew its FY16 earnings
target at the June 24, 2014 conference call, the relevant
misrepresentations were publicly known on that date. Yet, Walgreens
points out, the stock price did not drop until after the August 6,
2014, disclosure. Walgreens therefore argues that because it
disclosed the actionable misrepresentations to the public on June
24, over a month before the August 6 stock drop, there was no
causal connection to establish loss causation.

To prove loss causation, the plaintiff has the burden to establish
that the price of the securities they purchased was inflated that
is, it was higher than it would have been without the false
statements and that it declined once the truth was revealed. The
loss causation element of a Section 10(b) claim attempts to
distinguish cases where the misrepresentation was responsible for
the drop in the share's value from those in which market forces are
to blame. At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff who has
suffered an economic loss must provide a defendant with some
indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff
has in mind.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, it has
adequately alleged a direct casual connection between defendants'
various misstatements and omissions and the stock drop on August 6
by asserting that the artificial inflation in Walgreens common
stock prices was removed through the corrective disclosure on
August 6, which revealed the true magnitude of the FY16 EBIT target
shortfall, along with generic price inflation and unfavorable
reimbursement contracts.   

Under the detailed allegations in the first amended complaint,
defendants' loss causation argument fails at this procedural
posture.

Section 20(a) Claims

Plaintiff also brings claims based on controlling person liability
against Wasson and Miquelon in violation of Section 20(a) of the 34
Act. A violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is necessary
predicate to support a violation of Section 20(a). Defendants argue
that plaintiff cannot bring a § 20(a) claim because there is no
predicate violation of Section 10(b), an argument that is
unavailing at this juncture.

The Court thus denies this aspect of defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The Court grants in part and denies in part defendants' Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 23, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3x7s3o4 from Leagle.com.

Washtenaw County Employees' Retirement System, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Frank Anthony Richter - frichter@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd, James E. Barz - jbarz@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP & Nicole Temkin Schwartzberg , Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, 280 King of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19087,
pro hac vice.

Walgreen Co., Defendant, represented by Amy Curtner Andrews -
AANDREWS@SIDLEY.COM- Sidley Austin LLP, Heather Benzmiller
Sultanian , Sidley Austin LLP, James Wallace Ducayet -
JDUCAYET@SIDLEY.COM - Sidley Austin LLP, John M. Skakun III -
JSKAKUN@SIDLEY.COM - Sidley Austin Llp & Kristen R. Seeger
-KSEEGER@SIDLEY.COM- Sidley Austin LLP.

Gregory D. Wasson, Defendant, represented by Thomas B. Quinn -
tquinn@rshc-law.com - Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP & Eli Joseph
Litoff - elitoff@rshc-law.com - Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP.


WALGREEN CO: Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Atwood Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Douglas E. Atwood, Individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen J.
Peterson; Michelle Brooks; Walgreen Co. Defendants-Appellees.
Arkansas Grocers & Retail Merchants Association Amicus on Behalf of
Appellee(s), Case No. 16-1152 (8th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders denying
Atwood's motion to remand and granting the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

Arkansas citizen Atwood filed a class action complaint in state
court against Walgreen Co., an Illinois corporation, and Stephen J.
Peterson and Michelle Brooks, who are Arkansas citizens and who
serve as the district managers responsible for the 43 Walgreens
stores located in Arkansas.  Atwood claimed that the Walgreens
Balance Rewards program violated Arkansas's statutory prohibition
on price discrimination in the sale of manufactured products.

Atwood alleged that the program was implemented in all Arkansas
Walgreens stores in September 2012.  Membership is free and does
not require an initial purchase, but customers must provide
identifying information, including their names, addresses,
telephone numbers, and email addresses.  After signing up,
customers may use their rewards cards to receive discounts on
certain products.

In April 2015, Atwood and another customer went to three different
Arkansas Walgreens stores and purchased the same products.  Atwood
paid more for the products than the unidentified customer because
he did not present a rewards card at checkout and the unidentified
customer did.  Based on those transactions, Atwood alleged that the
program violated Arkansas Code Section 4-75-501.  Although the
complaint alleged damages and diversity of parties sufficient to
establish federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005 ("CAFA"), Atwood asserted that the local controversy
exception to CAFA jurisdiction applied.

The Defendants removed the case to federal district court, alleging
jurisdiction under the CAFA.  Atwood moved to remand based on the
local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction.  The district
court denied Atwood's motion to remand and later granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Atwood appeals, arguing that the court erred in considering
extrinsic evidence to decide whether it had jurisdiction, in
denying his motion to remand, and in dismissing his complaint on
the merits.

The Court finds that the affidavits make clear that "the real
target in the action" is Walgreens and that the district managers'
conduct does not form a significant basis for Atwood's claim.  In
concluding that CAFA removal is not foreclosed by the complaint's
conclusory allegations that the local Defendants engaged in the
same conduct as the diverse Defendant, the Court respectfully
disagrees with the rulings to the contrary in Coleman v. Estes
Express Lines, Inc.  In light of its determination that the
district managers' conduct did not form a significant basis for
Atwood's claim, the Court concludes that Atwood has not met his
burden of establishing that the local controversy exception to CAFA
jurisdiction applies.

The Court has also considered and find to be lacking merit Atwood's
argument that the district court was without jurisdiction to decide
the merits of his case because he did not have Article III
standing.  Although the Defendants had argued that any injury was
caused by Atwood's choice not to participate in the program -- and
not by the alleged illegality of the program -- standing in no way
depends on the merits of the Plaintiff's contention that particular
conduct is illegal.

Finally, Atwood argued that the district court erred in dismissing
his complaint with prejudice.  The Court held the appeal in
abeyance pending the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes v.
Kroger Co., which held that the defendant grocery chain's rewards
program did not violate Arkansas Code Section 4-75-501, because it
was only the named plaintiffs' willful refusal to take part in the
Kroger Plus program that created the situation that is the primary
focus of the class-action complaint.  The Arkansas Supreme Court
thus concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state a viable
cause of action as a matter of law and affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint with prejudice.   The Eighth Circuit concludes that
Rhodes applies with equal force in the instant case and thus
forecloses Atwood's claim.

Accordingly, the Eighth Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal
of the Atwood case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/bA4CNG from Leagle.com.

Gene Andrew Ludwig -- gene@ludwiglawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rodney Paul Moore, I, for Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s).

Chad W. Pekron -- cpekron@qgtlaw.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Michael Alan Thompson -- ThompsonLaw@sssnet.com -- for Amicus on
Behalf of Appellee(s).

Robert Ryan Younger -- ryounger@qgtlaw.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Ryan Kent Culpepper -- ryan@ludwiglawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kale L. Ludwig -- kale@ludwiglawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


WALT DISNEY: Website not Accessible to Deaf People, Wineguard Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
JAY WINEGARD, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY and AMERICAN
BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC. d/b/a EYEWITNESS NEWS ABC 7, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05392 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 22, 2019),
alleges that Defendants denied the Plaintiff, who is deaf, and deaf
and hard-of-hearing individuals' access to goods and services
provided to non-disabled individuals through its Website
www.abc7ny.com, in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the
American with Disabilities Act; the New York State Human Rights
Law; the New York State Civil Rights Law; and the New York City
Human Rights Law.

Deaf or hard of hearing individuals require closed captioning to
understand audio components of video content. Closed captioning
displays text on videos, television programming, or DVD video
programming in addition to online websites allowing deaf and
hard-of-hearing individuals the same and equally accessible
experience as non-deaf or hard of hearing individuals to watch
videos by reading the captioned text.

Without closed captioning deaf and hard-of-hearing people cannot
enjoy video content on the Website while the general public can.

The Defendants have videos on its Website without closed
captioning, or with limited closed captioning, which are
inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. Without
closed captioning, deaf and hard-of-hearing people cannot
understand the audio portion of the videos on the Website, the
lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Mitchell Segal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL SEGAL, P.C.
          1010 Northern Boulevard, Suite 208
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 415-0100
          Facsimile: (516) 706-6631


WE CARE HOMES: Migues Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective
------------------------------------------------------
NELLIE MIGUES, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. WE CARE HOMES, INCORPORATED, And KYLE
JONES, Case No. 6:19-cv-00976-MJJ-PJH (W.D. La.), the Plaintiff
moves the Court for an order conditionally certifying the case as a
Fair Labor Standards Act collective action and approving notice on
an expedited basis.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Collective

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          E-mail: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                  scott@bohrerbrady.com

WELTMAN WEINBERG: Ct. Narrows Claims in Bitzko Case
---------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brenda K. Sannes issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order in
the lawsuit titled CHRISTY BITZKO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. WELTMAN, WEINBERG & REIS CO., LPA,
Case No. 1:17-cv-00458-BKS-DJS (N.D.N.Y.), ruling that:

   -- Defendant's motion is denied in part and granted in part;

   -- Plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion is denied in
      part and granted in part; and

   -- Plaintiff's motion for class certification is granted in
      part.

Plaintiff Christy Bitzko brings this action against the Defendant
alleging that it engaged in unlawful debt collection practices in
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by sending her
a debt collection letter on law firm letterhead even though WWR
attorneys were not meaningfully involved in its creation, among
other violations.

Judge Sannes ruled that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted as to the Plaintiff's 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(1)
"amount of debt" claim but is otherwise denied.  The Plaintiff's 15
U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(1) "amount of debt" claim is dismissed with
prejudice.  The Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted as to her 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e "debt increase" claim but
is otherwise denied.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is granted as to her
claim that the failure to disclose that the consumer's balance was
subject to future interest and/or late fees violated 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692e for the following Rule 23(b)(3) class:

     All consumers to whom Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA
     (WWR) mailed letters seeking to collect debts: (i) which
     were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;
     and (ii) which debts were subject to increase based on
     interest and/or late fees; and (iii) to whom WWR sent
     letters failing to disclose that the amount of the debt was
     subject to increase; (iv) during the period from on or after
     a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or
     before a date 21 days after the filing of this action.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is otherwise denied.
The Plaintiff is appointed as class representative, and the
Interim Class Counsel Barshay Sanders, PLLC, is appointed as class
counsel.

Judge Sannes further directed the parties to meet and confer
regarding a proposed class notice and submit a proposed notice to
the Court today, October 7, 2019.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone:  (516) 203-7600
          E-mail: dbarshay@sanderslawpllc.com.

The Defendant is represented by:

          Glenn M. Fjermedal, Esq.
          DAVIDSON FINK, LLP
          28 East Main Street, Suite 1700
          Rochester, NY 14614
          Telephone: (585) 756-5950
          E-mail: gfjermedal@davidsonfink.com


WEST VIRGINIA: Minors File Civil Rights Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against the governor of West
Virginia and other officials. The case is styled as Jonathan R.
minor, by Next Friend, Sarah Dixon, Anastasia M. minor, by Next
Friend, Cheryl Ord, Serena S. minor, by Next Friend, Theo S. minor,
by Next Friend, L. Scott Briscoe, Garrett M. minor, by Next Friend,
Gretchen C. minor, by Next Friend, April Flowers, Dennis R. minor,
by Next Friend, Debbie Stone, Chris K., Calvin K., Carolina K.
minors, by Next Friend, Katherine Huffman, Karter W. minor, by Next
Friend, Ace L. minor, by Next Friend, Isabelle Santillion and
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Jim Justice in his official capacity as the Governor
of West Virginia, Bill Crouch in his official capacity as the
Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources, Jeremiah Samples in his official capacity as the
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Resources,
Linda Watts in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the
Bureau for Children and Families; and West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00710 (S.D.
W.Va., Sept. 30, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

James Conley Justice II is an American coal mining and agriculture
businessman and politician serving as the 36th Governor of West
Virginia since 2017.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Brian L. Ooten, Esq.
     James A. Meade, Esq.
     Richard W. Walters, Esq.
     SHAFFER & SHAFFER
     P. O. Box 3973
     Charleston, WV 25339-3973
     Phone: (304) 369-0511
     Fax: (304) 369-5431
     Email: booten@shafferlaw.net
            ameade@shafferlaw.net
            rwalters@shafferlaw.net

          - and -

     Erin Snyder, Esq.
     Jeremiah Underhill, Esq.
     DISABILITY RIGHTS OF WEST VIRGINIA
     1207 Quarrier Street, Suite 400
     Charleston, WV 25301
     Phone: (304) 346-0847
     Fax: (304) 346-0867
     Email: esnyder@drofwv.org
            junderhill@drofwv.org


WHIRLPOOL CORP: NJ Court Narrows Claims in DeFillippo Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUSTIN DEFILLIPPO, DEREK SCACHETTI, and TIMOTHY
BABBITT, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
1:18-cv-12523-NLH-AMD (D. N.J.), Judge Noel L. Hillman of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint.

The putative class action concerns claims by the Plaintiffs and all
similarly situated individuals arising out of allegedly defective
refrigerators manufactured by the Defendant.  Plaintiffs
DeFillippo, Scachetti, and Babbitt, on behalf of themselves and
others who are similarly situated, claim that the Defendant has
violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"), the New
Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act
("TCCWNA"), New York's General Business Law Sections 349 and 350,
and the Magnuson-Moss Act.  The Plaintiffs also assert claims
against Whirlpool for common law fraud, breach of implied and
express warranties, and unjust enrichment.  All these claims arise
out of Whirlpool's sale of French Door Bottom Mount refrigerators.

Whirlpool has moved to dismiss all the claims of each of the
Plaintiffs on various bases depending on the particular claim and
the plaintiff who asserts it.  The Plaintiffs have opposed
Whirlpool's motion.

Judge Hillman finds that the internal technical service pointers
("TSPs") provided by the Plaintiffs show that Whirlpool had
knowledge of cooling issues with certain FDBM refrigerator models,
and this provides a factual predicate to the Plaintiffs' consumer
fraud claims regarding Whirlpool's knowledge of the defect as
alleged by the Plaintiffs.  The TSPs, as well as Plaintiffs' other
averments, are more than sufficient to survive Whirlpools' motion
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' NJCFA and GBL claims, the Judge states.

With regard to Whirlpool's argument that because Scachetti's
alleged defect manifested outside of the warranty period, his NJCFA
claim fails, the Judge does not agree.  He agrees with the
reasoning of Maniscalo, which presented claims similar to the ones
in the instant case.  He does not find that the law precludes NJCFA
claims in all situations when a defect manifests after the
expiration of a warranty.  Accordingly, under the allegations
lodged in the case, where Scachetti has paid for repairs due to the
alleged defect which existed at the time it was sold to the
original buyer, still existed when Scachetti took possession of the
refrigerator, and which was allegedly known to Whirlpool,
Scachetti's NJCFA claim is not barred simply because the defect
manifested itself after the expiration of the one-year warranty
period.

Turning to the Plaintiffs' warranty claims, the Judge holds that a
close review of the Plaintiffs' warranty claims demonstrates that
their express and implied warranty claims are viable for each
Plaintiff at this stage in the case, but not their
unconscionability claim.  The Court has already determined that the
Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded fraud claims based on their
allegations that Whirlpool knew of the defect and failed to
disclose it to the public, and that Whirlpool lulled owners of the
FDBM refrigerators with temporary fixes until the warranty period
expired.  Those fraud claims, and not a claim for an unconscionable
warranty, is the proper path for prosecuting those allegations.

Because DeFillippo and Babbitt have pleaded viable claims for
Whirlpool's express and implied warranty claims, their MMWA claims
may proceed as well.  Scachetti's MMWA claim must be dismissed.

The Plaintiffs claim that Whirlpool has been unjustly enriched and
received an economic benefit from the sale of the FDBM
refrigerators to the Plaintiffs.  Whirlpool has moved to dismiss
this claim advanced by Scachetti and Babbitt because they did not
directly purchase their refrigerators from Whirlpool and to in
order to sustain an unjust enrichment claim, the Plaintiffs must
have conferred a direct benefit on Whirlpool, and not a third
party.  Beacause Scachetti and Babbitt did not purchase their
refrigerators directly from Whirlpool, the Judge holds that their
claims against Whirlpool for unjust enrichment must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Hillman granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  

The following claims may proceed against Whirlpool: (i) Count One -
Breach of Express Warranty (DeFillippo and Babbitt); (ii) Count Two
- Breach of Implied Warranty (DeFillippo and Babbitt); (iii) Count
Three - Magnuson-Moss Act (DeFillippo and Babbitt); (iv) Count Four
- Unjust Enrichment (DeFillippo); (v) Count Five - Common Law
Fraud; (vi) Count Six - New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (vii) Count
Seven - New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice
Act; and (viii) Count Eight - New York General Business Law Sec.
349 and 350.

The following claims are dismissed: (i) Count One - Breach of
Express Warranty (Scachetti); (ii) Count Two - Breach of Implied
Warranty (Scachetti); (iii) Count Three - Breach of Magnuson-Moss
Act (Scachetti); and (iv) Count Four - Unjust Enrichment (Scachetti
and Babbitt).

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/8h8lxO from Leagle.com.

JUSTIN DEFILLIPPO, DEREK SCACHETTI & TIMOTHY BABBITT, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by BRUCE HELLER NAGEL -- bnagel@nagelrice.com -- NAGEL
RICE, LLP, JOSEPH LOPICCOLO -- lopiccolo@pllawfirm.com -- POULOS
LOPICCOLO PC & RANDEE M. MATLOFF -- rmatloff@nagelrice.com -- NAGEL
RICE, LLP.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by LATHROP BARRERE
NELSON, III -- lnelson@mmwr.com -- MONTGOMERY MCCRACKEN WALKER &
RHOADS & MEGAN B. TRESEDER -- treseder@wtotrial.com -- LOWENSTEIN
SANDLER LLP.


WILLIS TOWERS: Fourth Circuit Vacates Dismissal of Proxy Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: WILLIS TOWERS WATSON PLC PROXY LITIGATION.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIS
TOWERS WATSON PLC; TOWERS WATSON & CO.; WILLIS GROUP HOLDING PLC;
VALUEACT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT; JOHN J. HALEY; DOMINIC CASSERLEY;
JEFFREY W. UBBEN, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-1874 (4th
Cir.), Judge Albert Diaz of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the
complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The appeal concerns a securities class action by a putative class
of former shareholders in Towers.  The Plaintiffs allege that
several Defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act by omitting
material facts in proxy documents, rendering statements in those
documents false or misleading.

The case arises from the merger of Towers and Willis into Willis
Towers Watson plc ("WTW").  John Haley and Dominic Casserley, the
CEOs of Towers and Willis respectively, began discussions in
January 2015 about a merger.  Negotiations continued for several
months.  A major investor in Willis, ValueAct Capital Management,
and its CEO Jeffrey Ubben were closely involved in the
negotiations.  ValueAct -- which normally invests in companies for
three to five years -- had held shares in Willis for five years,
and it sought to increase the value of its stake before it sold.

The two companies announced the merger in June 2015.  Following the
announcement, Towers' stock price dropped by 8.8% while shares in
Willis rose by 3.3%.  Several banks, analysts, and financial
publications criticized the deal as unfair to Towers.  But despite
the criticism, Haley did not attempt to renegotiate the terms.

In October 2015, Towers filed a proxy statement with the US
Securities and Exchange Commission in anticipation of a shareholder
vote on the merger.  The proxy stated that the Towers board had
considered all conflicts of interest, even though the board wasn't
aware of Haley and Ubben's discussions about compensation.  Towers
and ValueAct pressed for approval of the merger, but shareholders
seemed poised to vote against it.  So, Haley approached ValueAct
and Willis about renegotiating the merger terms.

In November 2015, Towers issued a press release and an update to
the proxy statement detailing the revised merger terms.  The proxy
update said nothing about Haley's compensation deal or Haley's
alleged choice not to negotiate the best deal for Towers
shareholders.  The following month, Towers shareholders approved
the merger.  WTW's board subsequently initiated share buybacks and
crafted a compensation plan for Haley that was substantially
similar to what Ubben had proposed before the merger.  WTW
shareholders approved the compensation plan.  Soon after, ValueAct
sold its shares in WTW and Ubben resigned from WTW's board.

Following the merger, a group of Towers shareholders sued Towers in
state court to vindicate their statutory appraisal rights.  The
state court suit proceeded to discovery.  Between February and
August of 2017, numerous documents and depositions became public.
In the Plaintiffs' telling, those documents revealed (for the first
time) the material facts of the class action.  Armed with the
documents from the state court suit, the Plaintiffs filed suit in a
Virginia federal district court in November 2017.

The amended class action complaint alleges two counts under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Count I alleges that WTW, Towers,
Willis, Haley, and Casserley omitted facts from the proxy documents
so as to render statements therein materially false or misleading,
in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule
14a-9.  Count II alleges that Haley, Ubben, ValueAct, and Casserley
are liable under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as control
persons of the organizations that violated Section 14(a).

The district court dismissed the Section 14(a) claim on two
alternative grounds.  First, the court held that the class
complaint was barred by the Exchange Act's statute of limitations
because a reasonable Plaintiff would have been on notice of the
material facts more than one year before the complaint was filed.
Second, it held that the complaint failed to allege that the facts
omitted from proxy documents were material.  The district court
also dismissed the Section 20(a) claim because, without the Section
14(a) claim, the plaintiffs could not prove a required predicate
securities violation.

The appeal followed.

Judge Diaz holds that (at the pleading stage) the district court
erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs' suit as time barred.  There is
no dispute that the November 2017 class action complaint was filed
within three years of the violation, which took place in 2015.
With respect to the separate one-year "discovery" limitations
period, the district court appeared to hold that it began running
when the plaintiffs had inquiry notice.  Under that standard, the
statute of limitations begins running when the Plaintiffs have such
knowledge as would put a reasonably prudent purchaser on notice to
inquire, so long as that inquiry would reveal the facts on which
the claim is ultimately based.  The Judge expresses no opinion on
whether the Defendants can prove, after discovery, that the suit is
time barred.

As a separate ground for dismissing the Section 14(a) claim, the
district court held that the alleged omissions described were
immaterial as a matter of law because shareholders knew that Haley
would be CEO of WTW, and he was therefore operating under a
potential conflict of interest.  Again, Judge Diaz disagrees with
the district court.

The Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that the omitted facts were material.  The district court
erred in concluding otherwise, Judge Diaz finds.  The Plaintiffs'
complaint repeatedly alleges that Haley and Ubben (who the
Plaintiffs say was slated to serve on WTW's compensation committee)
secretly negotiated Haley's future compensation package.  And these
are not bare allegations.  Rather, the Plaintiffs allege that Haley
and Ubben had a meeting on Sept. 10, 2015 that was undisclosed to
the Towers board or shareholders, that Ubben presented Haley at
that meeting with a written compensation plan, and that Haley's
final compensation after the merger was substantially similar to
that plan.

In their brief, the Defendants presented three alternative grounds
for affirming the district court's dismissal order.  They first
contended that the complaint fails to plead that the alleged
omissions rendered any affirmative statements in the proxy
materials false or misleading.  Next, they contended that the
Plaintiffs fail to allege the requisite scienter for their claims
because they sound in fraud.  Their last argument for affirming
concerns the one-year statute of limitations.

Judge Diaz finds that none support dismissal of the complaint.
First, the Plaintiffs adequately allege that Haley had a conflict
of interest that gave him an incentive to close the merger deal
even if it was bad for Towers shareholders.  And while the proxy
statement did include a general disclosure that Towers officers
might have different interests than Towers shareholders, that
doesn't immunize Towers from liability for making a misleading
statement that it had considered all conflicts.  Second, because
these are issues of first impression in the circuit, and they have
not been fully developed in the briefing, the Judge will direct the
district court to consider them in the first instance.  Lastly,
even if he adopted the Defendants' view of the facts, it's not
clear that the right course would be imputing that knowledge to the
Plaintiff class.  Accordingly, Judge Diaz rejects the alternative
basis for affirming the district court's decision.

Finally, because the district court erred in dismissing the Section
14(a) claim, Judge Diaz vacates the dismissal of the Section 20(a)
claim as well.  He expressed no opinion on any defenses to
liability that the Defendants didn't press on appeal.

For the reasons given, Judge Diaz vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 30, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/a9ixkX from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Salvatore J. Graziano -- sgraziano@blbglaw.com --
BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ, BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, New York, New York,
for Appellant.

John A. Neuwirth -- john.neuwirth@weil.com -- WEIL, GOTSHAL &
MANGES LLP, New York, New York; Richard S. Horvath, Jr., ALLEN
MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: John Rizio-Hamilton -- johnr@blbglaw.com -- Rebecca E.
Boon -- Rebecca.Boon@blbglaw.com -- Julia K. Tebor --
julia.tebor@blbglaw.com -- BERNSTEIN, LITOWITZ, BERGER & GROSSMANN
LLP, New York, New York; Susan R. Podolsky, LAW OFFICES OF SUSAN R.
PODOLSKY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.

Edward J. Fuhr -- efuhr@HuntonAK.com -- Eric H. Feiler --
efeiler@HuntonAK.com -- Johnathon E. Schronce --
jschronce@HuntonAK.com -- HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP, Richmond,
Virginia; Joshua S. Amsel, Amanda K. Pooler, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES
LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees Willis Towers Watson PLC,
Towers Watson & Co., Willis Group Holding PLC, John J. Haley, and
Dominic Casserley.


WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS: Placeholder Bid for Class Cert. Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELIZABETH WOOD,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. WINDHAM PROFESSIONALS, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-01329 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an order
certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as class
representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir.
2017).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

YOUNIQUE, LLC: Court Grants Bid to Certify Settlement Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Meghan Schmitt, et al., the
Plaintiff v. Younique, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
8:17-cv-01397-JVS-JDE (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. James V. Selna entered
an order:

   1. granting Plaintiffs' motion certifying proposed Settlement
Class;

   2. granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement;

   3. directing dissemination of notice to the Class pursuant to
the proposed notice plan; and

   4. appointing Heffler Claims Group as the Settlement
Administrator for the dissemination of notice.

The Court finds that (1) common factual and legal issues
predominate over individual questions, and (2) a class action is a
superior method to resolve the class claims.

Class counsel shall file a motion for final settlement approval
within 45 days of the Response Deadline, the Court says.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Adam Gonnelli, Esq.
          Jason Sultzer, Esq.
          SULTZER LAW GROUP
          270 Madison Avenue, Suite 1800
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: 212 969-7811
          Facsimile: 888 749-7747
          E-mail: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com
                  gonnellia@thesultzerlawgroup.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Sascha Henry, Esq.
          Abby Meyer, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN
          333 S Hope St
          Los Angeles, CA 90071


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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