CAR_Public/191014.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, October 14, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 205

                            Headlines

5TH AVENUE LANDSCAPING: Underpays Workers, Contreras Suit Alleges
AARGON AGENCY: Genay Files Class Suit under FDCPA
ADVANCED CALL CENTER: Weinberg Files FDCPA Class Action in New York
ALAMEDA SUPERIOR COURT: Laine Suit Dismissed Without Leave to Amend
ALLERGAN PLC: Raul Seeks to Enjoin Vote on AbbVie Merger Deal

ALLIED UNIVERSAL: Court Certifies Settlement Class in Douglas Suit
ALLSTATE CORPORATION: Gebka Seeks to Certify TCPA Classes
ALPHA RECOVERY: Miles Sues Over Misleading Collection Letter
AMYRIS INC: Continues to Defend Calif. Securities Class Suit
APOGEE ENTERPRISES: EFCO Acquisition-Related Suit Ongoing

ATLANTIC CREDIT: Lindala Moves for Certification of Classes
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD: Borkowski Suit Tossed; Parties May Amend Suit
BATTLBOX LLC: Fischler Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
BIG ORANGE PRODUCTIONS: Trevethan Files Class Suit in California
BILL HAMILTON: Court Denies Class Cert. Bid in Lizarraga Suit

BLUE CROSS: Shane Suit Settlement Gets Final Court Approval
BON APPETIT: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Luttrell Says
BOXY CHARM: Tatum-Rios Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
BROWN UNIVERSITY: Seeks Initial Approval of Kozlov Suit Settlement
BUCCANEERS LTD: Cin-Q Wins Ruling Decertifying Class in TTA Case

C. TECH COLLECTIONS: Engeman Files FDCPA Class Action in New York
CAMBREX CORPORATION: Thompson Challenges Sale to Catalog
CANNTRUST HOLDINGS: Owens Suit over Share Price Drop Underway
CAPSTONE RESTAURANT: Keefover Files Class Suit under ADA
CENTRA TECH: Rensel Renews Bid to Certify CTR Token Buyers Class

CERTIFIED CREDIT: Hughes Asserts Breach of FDCPA in New Jersey
CONAGRA BRANDS: Negrete Class Action Still Ongoing
CONAGRA BRANDS: Settlement in Briseno Wins Preliminary Approval
CONAGRA BRANDS: West Palm Beach Firefighters' Suit Ongoing
CONOPCO INC: Crepps Fraud Class Action Transferred to E. D. Mo.

CONOPCO INC: Richards Fraud Class Suit Transferred to E. D. Mo.
CONTINENTAL GENERAL: Wins Final OK of $1.25-M Deal in Fastrich Case
CORELLE BRANDS: Ct Narrows Claims in Consolidated Pyrex Defect Case
COTTON HOLDINGS: Underpays Laborers, Cabre et al. Suit Claim
CREDITECH INC: Certification of Class Sought in Neldner Suit

DENTAQUEST LLC: Jenkins Seeks Certification of Employees Class
DOBBERSTEIN LAW: Certification of Class Sought in Fote Suit
DYNAMEX OPERATIONS: Court Narrows Claims in Ouadani FLSA Suit
ECO SHIELD: Service Technicians Class Certified in Fanslau Suit
ELECTROCORE INC: Faces Turnofsky Class Action Suit in New Jersey

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Class of Consumers Certified in Reyes Suit
FAIRLIFE, LLC: Maltreated Dairy Cow, Olivo Claims
FINANCIAL ASSET: Molinari Seeks to Certify Class
FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Certification of Class Sought in Voeks Suit
FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Valerio Files FDCPA Suit in New York

FOCUS SERVICES: Bid for Conditional Certification Continued
FORD MOTOR: 9th Cir. Vacates Lower Court's OK of Vargas Class Deal
FOURPOINT ENERGY: Rounds Files Class Action in Colorado
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MA: Donelan Appeals Decision in Reid Class Suit
GEICO GENERAL: Interlocutory Appeal Application in Green Suit OK'd

GID ORTHODONTICS: Simon et al Seek to Certify Settlement Class
GOLDEN TRUST INSURANCE: Perez Files Consumer Class Suit in Florida
HARTFORD AUTO: Faces Willingham Suit in Connecticut Superior Court
HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Ingber Antitrust Suit in N.D. Calif.
HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL: Court Compels Arbitration in Marron Labor Suit

ILLINOIS: Court Narrows Claims in "Gun Violence" Exposure Suit
JUUL LABS: Corkery et al. Sue over Mislabeled Cigarette Products
JUUL LABS: Parents File Class Action Over E-Cigarettes in Calif.
KENDALL IMPORTS: Gomez Sues Over Blind Inaccessible Website
KIDPIK CORP: Nisbett Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act

LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Settlement Agreement Reached in Gold Suit
MAMMOTH ENERGY: Furia is Lead Plaintiff in Consolidated Secs. Suit
MASSAGE ENVY: 8th Circuit Flips Remand Order in Pirozzi Suit
MDL 2672: Protective Order Bid in Clean Diesel Suit Partly Granted
MDL 2819: End-Payors Move for Class Certification in Restasis MDL

MEDICAL MOBILITY: Court Denies Vilanova Class Certification Bid
MEDICAL NECESSITIES: Jenkins-Queen's Bid to Certify Class Granted
MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces Hague Suit in District of New Jersey
MIDLAND FUNDING: Arbitration Compelled in Huser FDCPA Lawsuit
MIDLAND FUNDING: Faces Valentine et al. Suit in New Jersey

MONEY SOURCE: Martinez's Bid to Certify Class Shelved
NATIONS RECOVERY: MJ Sues Over Illegal and Unconsented Calls
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Settlement in Pemberton Suit Has Initial OK
NAVIGANT CONSULTING: Merger-Related Suits to be Withdrawn
NEW YORK: Settlement in Brooks Civil Rights Suit Has Final Approval

OTIS ELEVATOR: Obtains Summary Judgment Dismissing Gorss' TCPA Case
OXNARD, CA: Removes Alvarez et al. Suit to C.D. California
PATENAUDE & FELIX: Moyer Moves for Rule 23 Class Certification
PEP BOYS MANNY: Luis Files Labor Class Suit in California
PHEAA: Winebarger Appeals C.D. California Ruling to Ninth Circuit

PILLARS FUNDING: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Katsnelson Suit Says
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Horowitz Asserts Breach of FDCA
PPL CORP: Talen Securities Suit Remanded to State Court
PURDUE PHARMA: Taylor Files RICO Class Action in Kansas
QUINTI INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Ngo Says

RIVERSTONE RESIDENTIAL: Casafranca Appeal on Antoine Deal Nixed
SAFECO INSURANCE: Martin Suit over Housing Insurance Underway
SALTILLO, MI: Whaley Files Civil Rights Class Action
SANCHEZ OIL: Flynn Seeks to Certify Class of Operators
SHAW INDUSTRIES: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Decision in Fitch Suit

SOUTHLAND ROYALTY: Atencio Files Class Suit in New Mexico
SPECTRA ENERGY: Morris Has No Standing to Pursue Claims, Says Court
STITCH FIX: Consolidated Amended Complaint Filed in Cal. Class Suit
SUNWEST BANK: Appeals Ct. Affirms Wood Suit Ruling, $83K Award
SWITCH ENERGY: Mickalovski Files TCPA Suit in Illinois

SYMMETRY MANAGEMENT: Dunbar Seeks to Certify FDCPA & FCCPA Classes
SYNCHRONY BANK: Court Certifies Class in McMullen Suit
TAMKO BUILDING: Snyder Dismissed From Product Liability Suit
TEXAS: Court Denies Robles' Bid to Certify Class and for New Trial
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $20MM O'Connor Suit Settlement Gets Final OK

UNDER ARMOUR: Aberdeen Council Appeals Ruling in Securities Suit
UNITED FINANCIAL: Gordon Seeks to Enjoin People's United Merger
UNITED NATURAL: Dismissal of Data Breach Suit v. Supervalu Upheld
UNITED NATURAL: Hearing Tomorrow on New England Plaintiff's Appeal
UNITED NATURAL: Mediation Underway in North County Store Suit

US CITIZENSHIP: Court Certifies Class in W.A.O. APA Suit
VENATOR MATERIALS: Bishop Sues over Drop in Share Prices
VEREIT INC: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for January 21
VERMONT: Russell Seeks to Certify Suit over Muslim Inmates' Diet
VISA INC: ATM Operator Plaintiffs Move for Class Certification

VITAL RECOVERY: Ingraham Seeks OT Pay for Collections Specialists
VITALE'S ITALIAN: Torres Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
VOLUME SERVICES: Seeks Prelim. Approval of $750K Raquedan Suit Deal
WARNER MUSIC: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Williams Suit Ruling
WM BOLTHOUSE: Felix Ordered to File Settlement Motion by Nov. 8

WONDERFUL COMPANY: Failed to Pay Wages, Zeferino, et al Say

                            *********

5TH AVENUE LANDSCAPING: Underpays Workers, Contreras Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARVIN CONTRERAS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. 5TH AVENUE LANDSCAPING, INC.; 5TH
AVENUE LANDSCAPING EXPERTS, INC.; SAMIR SLIM and SAMI SLIM,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-23872-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 17, 2019)
is an action against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff
and the class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of
40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Contreras was employed by the Defendant as
landscaper.

5th Avenue Landscaping, Inc. provides full service landscaping for
luxury homes and commercial property. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: msaenz@saenzanderson.com


AARGON AGENCY: Genay Files Class Suit under FDCPA
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aargon Agency, Inc.
The case is styled as Joy Genay, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v. Aargon Agency, Inc.
doing business as: Aargon Collection Agency, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-04672-GJP (E.D. Pen., Oct. 8, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Aargon Agency, Inc. is a Debt collection agency in Nevada.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Nicholas J. Linker, Esq.
   Zemel Law LLC
   1373 broad st.
   Suite 203-c
   Clifton, NJ 07013
   Tel: (862) 227-3106
   Email: nl@zemellawllc.com



ADVANCED CALL CENTER: Weinberg Files FDCPA Class Action in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Advanced Call Center
Technologies, LLC. The case is styled as Alexander J. Weinberg,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05699 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC (ACT) provides contact
center and back office support services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




ALAMEDA SUPERIOR COURT: Laine Suit Dismissed Without Leave to Amend
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge James Donato of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed the case captioned JOSHUA LAINE,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY HAYWARD
HALL OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-04390-JD
(N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against a number of
California state courts, state court judges, state court personnel,
counties, attorneys and others for claims arising out of state
court family law proceedings.  After a prior dismissal with leave
to amend, Laine has not established federal subject matter
jurisdiction, and so the case is dismissed, the District Court
rules.

Judge Donato holds that Laine has the burden of establishing
jurisdiction.  The Court's prior order of dismissal concluded that
the case is fundamentally a child custody dispute, which means
there is no obvious federal subject matter jurisdiction.  Laine was
given an opportunity to amend the complaint to demonstrate federal
jurisdiction, but the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") offers only
the conclusory statement that the Plaintiffs are not submitting
their family law matters to the Northern District of California but
rather require federal intervention from state, et al., abuse.
That does not state a basis for jurisdiction, and the body of the
SAC again makes clear that the case is about, in Laine's own words,
four family law cases where each case correlates one another
between the same judges, the system, third parties and lawyers.

The SAC also does not respond to the separate and independent issue
of the Younger and Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrines, which the
Court found to bar further federal proceedings.  These SAC again
alleges facts that make the application of these bars apparent on
the face of the complaint.

It is also worth noting that dismissal under FRCP 41(b) is
appropriate.  The Judge finds that Laine did not oppose any of the
numerous motions to dismiss of the SAC that were filed in the case,
nor did he request any extensions of deadlines to respond to those
motions, so dismissal of the SAC is warranted under Rule 41(b) for
failure to prosecute and to meet the Court's deadlines and order.

His discretion to dismiss without leave to amend is "particularly
broad" after prior leave to amend has been granted.  The Court
already gave Laine an opportunity to amend the complaint, despite
noting that a good argument can be made for dismissal with
prejudice in these circumstances.  In light of that prior
opportunity, the complaint's continuing jurisdictional
deficiencies, and the abstention doctrines, the SAC is dismissed
without further leave to amend.

For the sake of clarity, the dismissal is under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) in light of Laine's pro se status, although Rule 41(b) is
an independent basis as well.  For the same reason, the Judge
declines to award sanctions, and all Rule 11 and sanction requests
are denied.

The clerk of the Court will close the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/J7pkJM from Leagle.com.

Joshua Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Debbie Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jeremy Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jared Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Poppy Laine, Plaintiff, pro se.

Superior Court of Alameda County Hayward Hall of Justice, Superior
Court of Contra Costa County Spinetta Family Law Center, Judicial
Council, Martin Hoshino, Chad Finke, Stephen Nash, Gregory Syren,
Commissioner Jason Clay, John Laettner, Boydine Hall & Nancy Young,
Defendants, represented by Sharon Margaret Nagle --
snagle@bpmnj.com -- Bold, Polisner, Maddow, Nelson & Judson.

County of Alameda, Defendant, represented by Rebecca S. Widen --
rwiden@htalaw.com -- Haapala, Thompson & Abern LLP & Sharon
Margaret Nagle, Bold, Polisner, Maddow, Nelson & Judson.

County of Contra Costa, Defendant, represented by Jason William
Mauck, Contra Costa County Counsel, Torts and Civil Rights
Litigation & Sharon Margaret Nagle, Bold, Polisner, Maddow, Nelson
& Judson.

Commission on Judicial Performance, Defendant, represented by
Robert Stephen James Rogoyski, California Department of Justice,
Office of the Attorney General.

Alameda County Department of Child Support Services & Anne Howell,
Defendants, represented by Rebecca S. Widen, Haapala, Thompson &
Abern LLP.


ALLERGAN PLC: Raul Seeks to Enjoin Vote on AbbVie Merger Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN RAUL, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. ALLERGAN PLC, BRENTON L. SAUNDERS, NESLI
BASGOZ, JOSEPH H. BOCCUZI, CHRISTOPHER W. BODINE, ADRIANE M. BROWN,
CHRISTOPHER J. COUGHLIN, CAROL ANTHONY DAVIDSON, THOMAS C. FREYMAN,
MICHAEL E. GREENBERG, ROBERT J. HUGIN, and PETER J. MCDONNELL,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08873 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2019),
alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with the proposed sale of the Company to AbbVie Inc.
through AbbVie's wholly owned subsidiary Venice Subsidiary LLC.

On June 25, 2019, Allergan entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger with AbbVie, whereby AbbVie will purchase the Company.
Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, each of the Company's
shareholders will be entitled to receive $120.30 in cash and 0.8660
of a newly issued share of AbbVie common stock. On September 16,
2019, in order to convince the Company's shareholders to vote in
favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the filing
of a materially incomplete and misleading definitive proxy
statement with the SEC, in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act.

According to the complaint, the Proxy Statement contains the
financial analyses and opinion of J.P. Morgan concerning the
Proposed Transaction, but fails to provide material information
concerning such.  With respect to J.P. Morgan's Discounted Cash
Flow Analysis, for the two companies, the Proxy Statement fails to
disclose: (i) terminal period unlevered free cash flows for both
companies; (ii) implied terminal value multiples for the companies;
and (iii) the inputs and assumptions with respect to the selected
discount rate range of 8.5% to 9.5%. The Proxy Statement contains
information concerning the background of the Proposed Transaction,
but fails to disclose material information concerning such.
Specifically, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose critical
information concerning potential conflicts of interest related to
the Company's insiders. For instance, while the Proxy Statement
notes that Defendant Saunders and another member of the Company’s
Board will joining the Board of AbbVie following the completion to
the Proposed Transaction, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose
whether any members of the Company's management will be continuing
in their respective positions following the close of the Proposed
Transaction. Further, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose any
details of employment related discussions and negotiations, says
the complaint.

For these reasons, Plaintiff asserts claims against Allergan and
the Board for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants
from taking any steps to consummate the Proposed Transaction unless
and until the omitted material information is disclosed to Allergan
shareholders before the vote on the Proposed Transaction or, in the
event the Proposed Transaction is consummated, recover damages
resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act.

Plaintiff is the owner of Allergan shares.

Allergan is a publicly traded master limited Company which owns and
operates a diversified global network of integrated assets
providing midstream logistic solutions, primarily consisting of the
transportation, storage, processing and marketing of liquid
petroleum products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua M. Lifshitz, Esq.
          LIFSHITZ & MILLER LLP
          821 Franklin Avenue, Suite 209
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 493-9780
          Facsimile: (516) 280-7376
          E-mail: jml@jlclasslaw.com


ALLIED UNIVERSAL: Court Certifies Settlement Class in Douglas Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as KIRK DOUGLAS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
ALLIED UNIVERSAL SECURITY SERVICES, ALLIED BARTON SECURITY SERVICES
LLC, AND ALLIED SECURITY HOLDINGS LLC, the Defendants, Case No.
17-CV-6093-SJB (E.D.N.Y., Filed Oct. 18, 2017), the Hon. Judge
Sanket J. Bulsara entered an order on Oct. 10, 2019:

   1. granting motion for preliminary approval of class and
      collective settlement;

   2. appointing Christopher Q. Davis, Esq. and Rachel M. Haskell,
      Esq. of the Law Office of Christopher Q. Davis, PLLC, as
      Class Counsel; and

   3. certifying this NYLL Settlement Class for settlement
purposes:

      "all present and former individuals employed as Airport
      Security Agents, Operation Assistants, or Tour Supervisors
      at JFK by Defendants at any time between Sept. 1, 2013 and
      May 28, 2019".

The Court adopts this timeline to govern the settlement process in
the case:

Preliminary Approval Granted          October 10, 2019

Defendants Provide Settlement
Administrator Class Contract List     October 25, 2019

Notice Mailing and Emailing
Deadline                              November 10, 2019

Opt-Out Period (last day to submit
Opt-Out Statement or an objection)    60 days after mailing of
                                      notice; if notices returned
                                      undeliverable 60 calendar
                                      days from second mailing,
                                      but no more than 90
                                      calendar days from first
                                      mailing.

Deadline to Submit Consent to Join
Form                                  Any time before Fairness
                                      Hearing.

Settlement Administrator will
stamp the postmark date on the
original of each Opt-out Statement,
Objection and/or Consent to Join
Form that it receives and shall
send copies to Counsel               The first Friday after
                                     receipt


Settlement Administrator will
email a final report detailing
the results of the class mailings
and participation                   business day following the
                                    expiration of the Opt-Out
                                    Period, again 1 business day
                                    before the fairness hearing,
                                    and anytime upon request.

Final Approval Motion and Fee
Motion Date                         March 6, 2020
Final Approval Hearing Date         March 23, 2020 at 10 AM

Final Effective Date                As provided in the Amended
                                    Settlement Agreement, Section
                                    2.14

Funding of QSF required from
Defendants                          15 days after the Final
                                    Effective Date

Settlement Administrator to mail
checks to Claimants and Opt-in
Claimants, class counsel, class
representative’s enhancement
award                               30 days after the Final
                                    Effective Date

Acceptance Period (i.e. checks
voided if not negotiated)           90 days after the date of the
                                    mailing of the checks.

The Plaintiff filed the action alleging that he was not fully paid
for overtime work in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
New York Labor Law. The action was filed as a putative collective
and class action.[CC]

ALLSTATE CORPORATION: Gebka Seeks to Certify TCPA Classes
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as THOMAS GEBKA, an individual,
on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. THE ALLSTATE CORPORATION, a Delaware limited
liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06662 (N.D.
Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying these classes:

      Cell Phone Class:

      "(1) all persons within the United States: (a) Defendant
      and/or a third party acting on their behalf, made one or
      more non-emergency telephone calls; (b) promoting
      Defendant's products or services; (c) to the person's
      cellular telephone number; (d) using an automatic telephone
      dialing system; (e) without prior express consent; and (f)
      at any time in the period that begins four years before the
      date of the filing of this Complaint to trial"; and

      Do Not Call Class:

      "(1) all persons in the United States (2) who Defendant or
      some person on Defendant's behalf (3) initiated more than
      one telephone solicitations (4) to a telephone number
      registered with the National Do Not Call Registry (5) where
      the subject telephone number had been registered more than
      thirty-one days prior to the initiation of the telephone
      solicitations (6) within any twelve month period within four

      years prior to the filing of this action";

   2. appointing Plaintiff as class representatives;

   3. appoint his lawyers as counsel for the classes; and

   4. allowing Plaintiff to file a memorandum in support of his
      motion after taking class discovery.

The Defendant placed numerous automatically dialed telemarketing
calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone between August and
September, despite Plaintiff's phone number being on the National
Do Not Call Registry.  The Plaintiff brings this class action
against The Allstate Corporation for violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.[CC]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
          Timothy J. Sostrin, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW, LTD.
          55 West Monroe Street, Suite 3390
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 726-1092
          Facsimile: (312) 726-1093
          E-mail: Keith@KeoghLaw.com

ALPHA RECOVERY: Miles Sues Over Misleading Collection Letter
------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Miles, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Alpha Recovery Corp, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-18639-KSH-CLW (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 2, 2019) is an action
seeking to recover for violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

In its efforts to collect an alleged Debt, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff by letter dated October 4, 2018. The Letter was the
initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant
concerning the alleged Debt. A statement of "the amount of the
debt," when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, violates
the FDCPA, asserts the complaint. The FDCPA prohibits the false
representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any
debt. The Letter claims that Plaintiff owed $884.65 when the
Plaintiff, in fact, did not owe any money at all to the entity on
whose behalf Defendant was seeking to collect, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Michelle Miles is an individual who is a citizen of the
State of New York residing in Kings County, New York and is a
natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt.

Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of
debts allegedly owed by consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 706-5055
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


AMYRIS INC: Continues to Defend Calif. Securities Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Amyris, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2018, that the company continues to
defend a securities class action suit currently pending before the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

On April 3, 2019, a securities class action complaint was filed
against Amyris and its CEO, John G. Melo, and former CFO (and
current Chief Business Officer), Kathleen Valiasek, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages on behalf of a purported
class that would comprise all persons and entities that purchased
or otherwise acquired the company's securities between March 15,
2018 and March 19, 2019.

The complaint alleges securities law violations based on statements
and omissions made by the Company during such period. Subsequent to
the filing of the securities class action complaint, on June 21,
2019, a purported shareholder derivative complaint was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Bonner
v. Doerr, et al., Case No. 4:19-cv-03621) based on similar
allegations to those made in the securities class action complaint
described above.

The derivative complaint names Amyris, Inc. as a nominal defendant
and names a number of the Company's current and former officers and
directors as additional defendants.

The lawsuit seeks to recover, on the Company's behalf, unspecified
damages purportedly sustained by the Company in connection with
allegedly misleading statements and/or omissions made in connection
with the Company's securities filings. The derivative complaint
also seeks a series of changes to the Company's corporate
governance policies, restitution to the Company from the individual
defendants, and an award of attorneys' fees.

Amyris said, "These cases are in the initial pleadings stage. We
believe the complaints lack merit, and intend to defend ourselves
vigorously. Given the early stage of these proceedings, it is not
yet possible to reliably determine any potential liability that
could result from these matters."

Amyris, Inc. provides various alternatives to a range of
petroleum-sourced products worldwide. The company uses its
industrial bioscience technology to design microbes primarily
yeast, as well as to convert plant-sourced sugars into renewable
ingredients. The company is based in Emeryville, California.


APOGEE ENTERPRISES: EFCO Acquisition-Related Suit Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------
Apogee Enterprises, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 3, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a purported securities class action suit related to the
company's acquisition of EFCO Corporation.

On November 5, 2018, a shareholder filed a purported securities
class action against the Company and certain named executive
officers.

On April 26, 2019, the new lead plaintiff filed an amended
complaint, alleging that, during the purported class period of May
1, 2017 to April 10, 2019, the Company and the named executive
officers made materially false or misleading statements or
omissions about the Company's acquisition of EFCO Corporation on
June 12, 2017, and about the Company's Architectural Glass business
segment, in violation of the federal securities laws.

Apogee Enterprises said, "We intend to vigorously defend this
matter."

Apogee Enterprises, Inc. designs and develops glass and metal
products and services in the United States, Canada, and Brazil. The
company operates in four segments: Architectural Framing Systems,
Architectural Glass, Architectural Services, and Large-Scale
Optical Technologies (LSO). The company was founded in 1949 and is
headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota.


ATLANTIC CREDIT: Lindala Moves for Certification of Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
William Lindala moves the Court to certify the classes described in
the complaint of the lawsuit entitled WILLIAM LINDALA, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ATLANTIC CREDIT
AND FINANCE INC. and MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01450-LA
(E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both stay the motion
for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the
Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing
schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed
with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD: Borkowski Suit Tossed; Parties May Amend Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Deborah K. Chasanow of the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland issued a Memorandum Opinion
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned ANNA
BORKOWSKI, et al. v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. Civil
Action No. DKC 18-2809. (D. Md.).

In this civil rights class action, Defendants filed motions to
dismiss a second amended complaint and motions to seal.

Plaintiffs Anna Borkowski, Katelyn Frank, Marcella Fegler,
Annemarie Hendler, and Kaila Noland, on their own behalf and on
behalf of those similarly situated, bring suit against twenty-two
Defendants alleging twenty counts related to Defendants' handling
of Plaintiffs' sexual assault or rape investigations.

Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants adopted "discriminatory
policies and/or [exhibited] deliberate indifference [] to
artificially lower the number of recorded reports of rape and
sexual assault in Baltimore County and on the UMBC campus."
Plaintiffs further state that "Defendants followed written and/or
unwritten policies, and . . . afforded less protection to female
victims of sexual assault than to victims of other crimes."

Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants, or combinations thereof,
infringed upon their rights in violation of (1) 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, civil action for deprivation of equal protection and first
amendment rights (2) 42 U.S.C. Section 1985, conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights (3) 42 U.S.C. Section 1986, action for
neglect to prevent conspiracy to interfere with civil rights (4) 20
U.S.C. Section 1681, sex discrimination, failure to prevent sexual
harassment, deprivation of educational rights, and erroneous
outcome and (5) the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, unreasonable search and seizure.

The Defendants filed motions to dismiss in four groups:

(1) Defendants University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC), the
Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland (Board of
Regents), the UMBC Police Department (UMBCPD) (Institutional
Defendants), Dr. Freeman Hrabowski, Mark Sparks, and Paul Dillon
(University Defendants);

(2) Defendant Bernadette Hunton;

(3) Defendants Nicholas Tomas, Kristin Burrows, Kimberly
Montgomery, Morrow Lane, Rosemary Brady, Paul Dorfler, and Timothy
Lee (Officer Defendants), James Johnson and Terrence Sheridan
(Supervisory Officer Defendants), Baltimore County, and the
Baltimore County Police Department (BCPD) (County Defendants); and

(4) Defendants Scott Shellenberger, Lisa Dever, Bonnie Fox, and
Krystin Richardson (State's Attorney Defendants).

University Defendants attached thirty-three exhibits, Defendant
Hunton attached four exhibits, and County Defendants attached nine
exhibits, to their respective motions or papers.

According to the Court, Plaintiffs' verbose complaint, Defendants'
multiple motions to dismiss, and the parties' papers, excluding
exhibits, total over five hundred pages. In this wealth of words,
the parties argue past each other and fail directly to address some
of the central issues in this case. The sheer volume of factual
allegations and legal issues likely contributes to this confusion.
As will be seen, Plaintiffs, at best, have masked meritorious
allegations by the overambitious pleading, and, at worst, have
simply failed to state any viable claim. The complaint will be
dismissed, albeit without prejudice, and Plaintiffs will have 21
days to file a more focused, perhaps modest, third amended
complaint.

Group Pleadings

Plaintiffs bring three claims on behalf of all Plaintiffs against
all twenty-two Defendants. These claims are Count I, equal
protection violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Count XVIII,
conspiracy to obstruct justice under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985 and
Count XIX, action for neglect to prevent conspiracy to obstruct
justice under 42 U.S.C. Section 1986.

Defendants argue that these Counts constitute improper group
pleading or shotgun pleading' that do not meet federal pleading
requirements. Plaintiffs argue that Counts I, XVIII, and XIX were
pleaded as all Plaintiffs against all Defendants because these
claims are the only way to state claims for a conspiracy, in which
all Defendants participated, which harmed all Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs do not address the fact that Count I is not a conspiracy
claim.

Even if Plaintiffs were able to assign specific names responsible
for these allegations, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded a
claim for conspiracy under these counts. In Count I, all Plaintiffs
allege that all Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 because
Defendants followed written and/or unwritten policies, and thus
afforded less protection to female victims of sexual assault than
to victims of other crimes.

In Count XVIII, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants were part of
a broader scheme, as alleged herein, to deny female victims of
sexual assault their civil rights. When alleging a Section 1985
conspiracy, the plaintiff must plead facts amounting to more than
`parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy. Without more,
parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory
allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply
facts adequate to show illegality.

Lastly, in Count XIX, Plaintiffs state that any Defendant or
Defendants could have stopped or lessened the broader scheme, as
alleged herein. The remainder of each count lodges accusatory and
bald accusations that do not squarely support a conspiracy amongst
the twenty-two Defendants. Such an approach falls short of that
which is required to overcome a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, Counts I, XVIII, and XIX will be dismissed, and those
counts will not further be discussed.

The Baltimore County Police Department

Defendants argue that the Baltimore County Police department should
be dismissed as a Defendant.  Plaintiffs do not contest this point.
The Baltimore County Police Department is not sui juris. The Police
Department is simply an agency of Baltimore County. Accordingly,
Defendant Baltimore County Police Department will be dismissed as a
Defendant.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court for monetary
damages against a state or state officials acting in their official
capacity. Three exceptions exist to a state's sovereign immunity.
First, a state may waive its immunity and consent to suit in
federal court.

Although the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity
for certain types of actions brought in state court pursuant to the
Maryland Tort Claims Act, it has not waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity for actions brought in federal court. Second, immunity
does not bar a suit against a state official when a plaintiff is
seeking prospective relief to end a continuing violation.  Finally,
Congress may validly abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, but it has not done so here.  

University Defendants

The University Defendants state that Defendants UMBC, Board of
Regents, and UMBCPD are immune from claims made pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 and that the individual
Defendants, Hrabowski, Sparks, and Dillon, are immune from suit in
their official capacities. Plaintiffs argue that the State of
Maryland has waived any claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to
any University Defendant that is not the University System of
Maryland.

Similarly, individuals sued in their official capacity as state
agents are entitled to the same immunity. As a general matter, the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for damages against state
officers, so long as those officers are sued in their individual
capacities.

The University Defendants assert that Defendants UMBC, Board of
Regents, and UMBCPD are immune from suit because Congress has not
abrogated States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in connection with
U.S.C. Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 and that Maryland has not
waived Eleventh Amendment Immunity for claims against its public
universities. As for the individual Defendants, the University
Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiffs are alleging that
the Individual Defendants are liable in their official capacities,
the claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Defendants argue that immunity is proper because State employees
share in the State's immunity from being sued in federal court
because a suit against the state officials acting in their official
capacities is a suit against the State. Defendants also state that
they are not persons under Section 1983. Plaintiffs counter,
arguing that these Defendants have consented to be sued and
Defendant UMBCPD is not a state agency for Eleventh Amendment
purposes. Plaintiffs do not directly counter Defendants' arguments
as to the individual Defendants, and only state that even if they
were entitled to immunity for acts undertaken in their official
capacities, they are being sued in their individual capacities as
well. Plaintiffs argue that suit is proper because Defendants were
not acting within the scope of their employment.

The Board of Regents and UMBC, as a constituent institution of the
University System of Maryland, are considered instrumentalities of
the State for immunity purposes. Defendants UMBC, BOR, UMBCPD and
the individual University Defendants in their official capacities
will be dismissed.

State's Attorney Defendants

As discussed above, individuals sued in their official capacity as
state agents are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary that State's Attorneys only
act locally, Maryland has not obligated itself to reimburse State's
Attorneys for lawsuits against them, or that Maryland does not
expressly consider State's Attorneys and their employees arms of
the State lack proper support and do not overcome this definitional
hurdle.  

Accordingly, the State's Attorney Defendants in their official
capacities will be dismissed.
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

The State's Attorney Defendants argue that they are entitled to
absolute immunity from suit for the plaintiffs' claims that they
engaged in unlawful behavior, because the decision regarding whom
to prosecute is a core function of their roles as advocates for the
State. Plaintiffs insist that the State's Attorney Defendants'
actions were ultra vires, outside of the law, and they are not
entitled to protection. Plaintiffs specifically allege the
following conduct as outside the realm of prosecutorial immunity:
destroying evidence, threatening victims, and extra-territorial
intimidation. The State's Attorney Defendants do not respond to
Plaintiffs' argument against absolute immunity.

The State's Attorney Defendants fall short of showing that their
actions were prosecutorial in nature. These Defendants merely argue
that all of their actions relate to the exercise of a prosecutor's
judgment about which cases to prosecute and against which
individuals and make no effort to differentiate the nature of the
functions performed.

Thus, they have not established that they are entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity.

Qualified Immunity

The County Defendants and the State's Attorney Defendants argue
that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is
an affirmative defense to Section 1983 claims that protects
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Assessing qualified immunity requires a multi-step analysis
with shifting burdens of proof.  If the plaintiff meets this
burden, the defendant then bears the burden of proof on the
question of whether the right in question was clearly established
at the time of the alleged misconduct.  

As will be discussed, Plaintiffs have not met their burden.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983

As succinctly stated by Judge Hollander: To state a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2)
that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under
the color of state law. The phrase under color of state law is an
element that is synonymous with the more familiar state-action
requirement and the analysis for each is identical.  

Equal Protection

Plaintiffs allege in Counts V, VI, and XX that Defendants' acts
prevented Plaintiffs from enjoying equal protection under the law.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' equal protection claims must fail
because there is no class similarly situated to these Plaintiffs
and a discriminatory purpose is absent in this case.  

To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that she has been treated differently from others with
whom she is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was
the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.

Here, Plaintiffs fail to provide any sufficient, nonconclusory,
allegations that they were treated differently than similarly
situated individuals. Notably, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts
to support an inference that the investigative processes were the
result of gender discrimination. Further, Plaintiffs fail to
identify a discriminatory intent on behalf of any Defendant.

Plaintiffs are not required as a matter of law to point to a
similarly situated comparator to succeed on a discrimination claim.


For example, the second amended complaint states that between 2009
and 2014, 34% of reports of rape and sexual assault were classified
as unfounded. Plaintiffs go on to state how this data is a
statistical impossibility and shows that Defendants were engaged in
improper practices. Plaintiffs further allege that female victims
of sexual assault are less likely to have their cases investigated
than victims of other crimes. Plaintiffs do not, however, provide
how many of those reports were made by female victims opposed to
male victims, the gender percentages as to victims of other crimes,
or any other useful comparison. Plaintiffs do not directly address
their deficiencies of discriminatory evidence but rather state that
91% of sexual assault victims are women and that Defendants'
outdated, hostile attitudes towards women, women's roles, and
women's sexuality were the underlying causes of Defendants'
unconstitutional behavior.

Thus, Plaintiffs have failed sufficiently to plead an equal
protection claim. Accordingly, Counts V, VI, and XX will be
dismissed.

First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff Borkowski and class Plaintiffs allege that the State's
Attorney Defendants and Defendants Baltimore County, Montgomery,
Tomas, Burrows, Dorfler, Johnson, and Sheridan deprived them of
their first amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that
those Defendants interfered with Ms. Borkowski's right to present
sworn testimony to a Maryland District Court Commissioner, that she
has the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for
the exercise of her rights and that Defendants' retaliatory actions
adversely affected Ms. Borkowski and other class members'
constitutionally protected speech in that they were intimidated
from testifying.

The complaint does not outline, in count II, precisely what Ms.
Borkowski contends were the retaliatory actions, or by which
Defendant. As outlined above, the second amended complaint,
beginning at paragraph 459, recited the allegations beginning when
Ms. Borkowski filed an application for a statement of charges with
a District Court Commissioner on March 14, 2018. She includes only
some of the Defendants by name: Defendants Montgomery, Dever,
Burrows, Tomas, Shellenberger, and Fox.

The State's Attorney Defendants argue that Ms. Borkowski cannot
assert a federal claim against the State's Attorney Defendants for
failing to investigate or prosecute her case or for dismissing the
charges that she successfully filed on March 21, 2018 and that Ms.
Borkowski's conduct in filing successive applications for charges
is not `protected speech' under the First Amendment and may rise to
the level of harassment. The County Defendants similarly argue that
Plaintiff Borkowski cannot assert a claim to compel a criminal
investigation or prosecution and that filing successive
applications for charges is not protected speech but is
harassment.

The parties, again, fail to address each other's arguments or
provide a proper legal framework to analyze this first amendment
issue. Defendants argue that no federal appellate court has
recognized that there is a federally enforceable right for the
victim to have criminal charges investigated at all, let alone with
vigor or competence. They claim to have plausibly stated a claim
that female sexual assault victims of reasonable firmness will be
unwilling to speak out against these Defendants and their tactics.

A cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim requires a plaintiff
to show: (1) that [plaintiff's speech was protected' (2)
defendant's alleged retaliatory action adversely affected the
plaintiff's constitutionally protected speech and (3) a causal
relationship exists between plaintiff's speech and the defendant's
retaliatory action.

The second amended complaint lacks sufficient precision in Count II
to allow it to proceed in its present form. For example, some of
the Defendants who are sued in this count are not even mentioned in
the fact section related to the filing of applications for
statement of charges. Furthermore, to the extent that a prosecutor
has discretion to decide how to handle charges, actions relating to
those decisions would not adversely affect the protected speech.

Here, however, the allegations concerning some of the Defendants'
conduct appear to go beyond simply declining to investigate or
pursue charges, such as visiting Ms. Borkowski's home and
threatening criminal action against her if she did not desist.
Whether Plaintiff Borkowski's successive filing of charges
constitutes harassment cannot be determined based on the
allegations in the complaint.  

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants Baltimore County, Johnson,
and Sheridan failed to train and/or supervise. Defendants in the
proper conduct of an investigation and were deliberately
indifferent to their subordinates' violations of womens' rights.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient facts to
support supervisory liability under Section 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability on every person who subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any person to the deprivation of any
rights. The statute requires a showing of personal fault, whether
based upon the defendant's own conduct or another's conduct, in
executing the defendant's policies or customs.  

Claims premised on supervisory liability must be supported with
evidence that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintiff (2) the supervisor's response to that
knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to
or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices and (3)
there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's
inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.

To state a Section 1983 claim against a county, a plaintiff must
allege that the action at issue was one that executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by that body's officers or that represents informal
governmental custom. Counties and other local governments cannot be
held liable under Section 1983 for injuries inflicted by their
employees or agents based on the theory of respondeat superior
that is, for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents.

Plaintiffs' claims of supervisory liability do not withstand
Defendants' motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs make no specific
allegations that Defendants Johnson and Sheridan had knowledge of
the BCPD officers' conduct. Plaintiffs do not argue that Defendants
Johnson and Sheridan had any specific response to the BCPD
officers' conduct. Plaintiffs do not show how Defendants Johnson
and Sheridan's failure to respond resulted in Plaintiffs' injuries.
Finally, Plaintiffs do not plead or prove that the field manual
proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim in Count II
for failure to train and/or supervise as to Defendants Johnson,
Sheridan, and Baltimore County. Count II will be dismissed.

Plaintiff Borkowski also brings Count IV against Defendant
Baltimore County and the State's Attorney Defendants for
deprivation of equal protection retaliation against Ms. Borkowski's
family resulting in a deprivation of familial relations. Plaintiff
Borkowski argues that Emily Borkowski's firing from the State's
Attorney's Office] was a retaliatory, unjustified act, undertaken
intentionally and maliciously to punish and further intimidate
Plaintiff Borkowski for attempting to assert her right to free
speech.

The State's Attorney Defendants argue that Plaintiff Borkowski
lacks standing to sue for any alleged damages that her sister may
have suffered. The County Defendants similarly argue that Plaintiff
Borkowski lacks standing to sue on behalf of her sister's firing.
Defendants are correct that Plaintiff Borkowski lacks standing to
collect damages on behalf of her sister's firing. The Fourth
Circuit analyzed an analogous case in Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263
(4th Cir. 2007).

In Smith, the plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim alleging that
his mother was fired in retaliation for the plaintiff's running for
county clerk. The Fourth Circuit held that allowing a relative to
collect for emotional damages and humiliation resulting from [a
family member's] discharge from her employment casts the net of
possible Section 1983 liability too broadly.

Here too, Plaintiff Borkowski lacks a sufficient injury in fact to
bring suit predicated on her sister's firing. Accordingly, Count IV
will be dismissed.

42 U.S.C. Section 1985

Plaintiffs bring Counts III, VII, and XV under 42 U.S.C. Section
1985. Although not specified by subsection, these counts appear to
allege violations of subsection two. Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs' conspiracy-based counts each fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

Plaintiffs alleging unlawful intent in conspiracy claims under
Section 1985 must plead specific facts in a non-conclusory fashion
to survive a motion to dismiss. Section 1985(2) is divided into two
separate clauses. The first clause applies if two or more persons:


conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or
witness in any court of the United States from attending such
court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely,
fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property on account of his having so attended or
testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment
of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such
juror in his person or property on account of any verdict,
presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his
being or having been such juror.

The second clause of Section 1985(2) applies when two or more
persons:

conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or
defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or
Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection
of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or
class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.

A claim under the second clause of Section 1985(2) will not survive
a motion to dismiss without a sufficient allegation of class-based
animus. As discussed above, Plaintiffs fail to state an equal
protection claim. Accordingly, Counts III, VII, and XV will be
dismissed.

Count VIII will similarly be dismissed. Viability of a Section 1986
claim is based on the antecedent Section 1985 claim. If the Section
1985 claim is dismissed, the Section 1986 claim also fails.  

Fourth Amendment

Plaintiffs bring Count XIV against Defendants Baltimore County,
Sheridan, Johnson, Shellenberger, Dever, Fox, and Richardson for
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. This claim is
predicated upon the allegedly unlawful SAFE exams conducted by
GBMC. The County Defendants argue that this claim should be
dismissed because "the searches' at issue were both consented to
and reasonable. The State's Attorney Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs cannot prove a violation of informed consent. Plaintiffs
do not respond to the State's Attorney Defendants' arguments.

The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, the right of the
people to be secure in their persons and houses against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.  

Plaintiffs allege that (1) Defendant BCPD deceived the subjects of
the searches, nullifying consent (2) consent' obtained without
informing victims that the SAEKs would be destroyed without being
used to solve any crimes, including the victims assaults, is no
consent at all and (3) the consent forms were inadequate to allow
the female victims of sexual assault to give informed consent to
the procedure. Plaintiffs do not provide the contents of the GBMC
consent forms. Plaintiffs do not bring suit against any GBMC
individual or entity, but allege that performing intrusive searches
without informed consent constitutes medical battery.

Plaintiffs do not allege that they understood the SAFE exams were
conducted by medical personnel for medical purposes, rather than
for crime detection. The fact that some SAEK evidence was destroyed
after the examinations occurred does not obviate the consent given
when they were conducted. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that
any individual Defendant played any role in the creation of GBMC's
consent forms. All further allegations in the second amended
complaint as to Defendants vitiating Plaintiffs' consent are
conclusory and fail to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Accordingly, Count XIV will be dismissed.

20 U.S.C. Section 1681

Sex discrimination

Plaintiffs Fegler, Frank, and Noland

In Counts IX, XVI, and XVII, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
Board of Regents, UMBC, and UMBCPD were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiffs Fegler's, Frank's, and Noland's sexual assault
complaints in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 (Title IX).

In Count IX, Plaintiffs allege that the Institutional Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Frank's rape because they
hired a biased investigator to pantomime an investigation into Ms.
Frank's complaint of sexual assault. The second amended complaint
further states that after Plaintiff Frank filed her complaint of
sexual assault, UMBC hired Defendant Hunton to investigate the
complaint, provided Plaintiff Frank an opportunity to participate
in the investigation, provided her with the final report held a
hearing and provided her an opportunity to appeal the Board's
decision.

In Count XVI, Plaintiffs allege that the Institutional Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Fegler's rape because they
conducted a sham investigation of Ms. Fegler's complaint of sexual
assault.  Defendants state, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that as
evidenced by the facts alleged, and the documents from the
investigatory file of the complaint at issue, it is undisputed that
UMBC conducted an investigation, held a hearing, and heard Ms.
Fegler's appeal.

In Count XVII, Plaintiffs allege that the Institutional Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Noland's rape because they
hired a biased investigator to pantomime an investigation of
Plaintiff Noland's complaint of sexual assault. After Plaintiff
Noland filed her complaint of sexual assault, UMBC hired Defendant
Hunton to investigate the complaint, provided Plaintiff Noland an
opportunity to participate in the investigation, provided her with
the investigator's final report and provided her notice of the
resolution of her complaint.

Although the process and results were not perfect, Plaintiffs have
not met the bar for deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs' argument
that withholding punishment from two out of the four alleged
assailants identified by Plaintiff Fegler was deliberately
indifferent is not actionable under Title IX.  

Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant Hunton's investigative
choices to credit evidence or testimony from anyone but Plaintiff
Frank was retaliation. These allegations are accusatory and lack
support. Thus, any retaliation claim under Title IX fails to state
a claim for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Accordingly, Counts IX, XVI, and XVII will be dismissed.

Plaintiffs Borkowski and Hendler

In Count XIII, Plaintiffs allege that the Institutional Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Borkowski and Ms. Hendler's
rapes because the Defendants conducted only a sham investigation
into" Ms. Borkowski's complaint of sexual misconduct. Defendants
argue that, because Ms. Borkowski and Ms. Hendler are both students
of Towson University and not UMBC, they have no standing to make a
Title IX gender discrimination claim against the Institutional
Defendants.

Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.  

The second amended complaint states that Ms. Borkowski was a former
student and planned to apply to a UMBC program for a master's in
social work. This future intent, however, is not sufficient to
support a current deprivation of an education program or activity.
Thus, Plaintiffs Borkowski and Hendler cannot properly bring a
claim for gender discrimination under Title IX against an
institution which did not deprive them of any educational program
or activity.

Accordingly, Count XIII will be dismissed.

Plaintiff Borkowski cannot state a claim for denial of educational
opportunities under Title IX. Accordingly, Count XII will be
dismissed as to Plaintiff Borkowski.

Erroneous Outcome

In Count X, Plaintiffs assert an erroneous outcome claim based on
gender discrimination under Title IX due to the allegedly biased
investigation of Defendant Hunton into Plaintiff Frank's complaint
of sexual assault against Defendants Board of Regents and UMBC.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege the
elements of an erroneous outcome claim because Plaintiffs cite no
procedural violations that caused a procedurally or otherwise
flawed proceeding' to reach an erroneous outcome. Plaintiffs fail
to respond to Defendants' erroneous outcome argument.

Although erroneous outcome claims typically involve a plaintiff
claiming innocence who was wrongly found to have committed an
offense, an analysis will still be undertaken here.

Plaintiff Frank falls far short of pleading an erroneous outcome
claim. Plaintiff Frank's only allegations of a flawed proceeding
stems from Defendant Hunton's credibility determinations. Plaintiff
Frank does not identify any procedural irregularities regarding the
Institutional Defendants named under Count X. Further, Plaintiff
Frank does not allege any statements by members of the disciplinary
tribunal or patterns of decision-making that may lend to a proper
inference of gender discrimination.

Accordingly, Count X will be dismissed.

Denial of Educational Opportunities

Count XII alleges a denial of educational opportunity by Plaintiff
Frank against Defendants Board of Regents, UMBC, and UMBCPD.
Plaintiff Frank states that, after the alleged assault, she lost
one year of educational time and now attends a community college.
Defendants argue that this claim is duplicative of Plaintiffs'
claims of Title IX discrimination based on Ms. Frank's allegations
of studenton-student harassment. Plaintiffs argue that these claims
are not duplicative, and state factual differences listed under
each Count, but fail to provide any relevant legal citation or
standard to analyze a deprivation of educational opportunities
under Title IX. It is unfortunate that Ms. Frank suffered severe
educational setbacks, but without a sufficient claim of
discrimination under Title IX, this ancillary count fails to state
a claim as well.

Accordingly, Count XII will be dismissed.

Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment

In Count XI, Plaintiffs allege that UMBC knew that Ms. Frank's
alleged assailant had previously sexually assaulted others.
Defendants correctly point out, however, that Plaintiffs do not
allege any details as to when the alleged assaults occurred, whom
the assailant assaulted, the nature of the assaults, or who at UMBC
knew about such alleged assaults. Plaintiffs do not contest these
pleading deficiencies. These allegations fall far short of proper
pleading.

Thus, Count XI fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by
Defendant Hunton, the University Defendants, the County Defendants,
and the State's Attorney Defendants will be granted, rules the
Court. Some of the defects in Plaintiffs' second amended complaint
cannot be remedied, and Plaintiffs have already amended twice, but
it is not entirely clear that a more modest, focused, complaint
would be futile. Accordingly, they will be granted time to file a
further amendment.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy9yaarb
from Leagle.com.

Anna Borkowski & Katelyn Frank, Plaintiffs, represented by Rignal
Woodward Baldwin, V --RBaldwinV@baldwinlawllc.com -- BaldwinLaw LLC
& Stephen Craig Rigg -- SRigg@baldwinlawllc.com -- BaldwinLaw,
LLC.

Marcella Fegler, Annemarie Hendler & Kaila Noland, Plaintiffs,
represented by Rignal Woodward Baldwin, V , BaldwinLaw LLC.

Baltimore County, Maryland, Baltimore County Police Department,
Nicholas Tomas, Kristin Burrows, Kimberly Montgomery, Paul Dorfler,
James Johnson, Terrence Sheridan, Morrow Lane, Rosemarie Brady &
Timothy Lee, Defendants, represented by Christopher C. Dahl --
cdahl@bakerdonelson.com -- BAKER DONELSON & Neil E. Duke --
uduke@bakedonelson.com -- BAKER DONELSON.

The Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland,
University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Freeman Hrabowski, III,
University of Maryland Baltimore County Police Department & Mark
Sparks, Defendants, represented by Erik James Delfosse , Office of
the Attorney General.

Lisa Dever, Scott Shellenberger, Bonnie Fox & Krystin Richardson,
Defendants, represented by Wendy L. Shiff , Office of the Attorney
General.

Paul Dillon, Defendant, represented by Christopher Bowie Lord ,
Office of the Attorney General & Erik James Delfosse , Office of
the Attorney General.

Bernadette Hunton, Defendant, represented by Clifford Bernard
Geiger -- cgeiger@kollmanlaw .com -- Kollman and Saucier PA &
Alexander P. Berg -- aberg@kollmanlaw.com -- Kollman & Saucier PA.

BATTLBOX LLC: Fischler Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
BattlBox LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Brian
Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BattlBox LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05596 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 2, 2019).

BattlBox LLC is a sports store.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com



BIG ORANGE PRODUCTIONS: Trevethan Files Class Suit in California
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Big Orange
Productions, Inc. The case is styled as Donna Trevethan, on behalf
of herself, all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Big Orange
Productions, Inc., a Rhode Island Corporation, Does 1 to 50
inclusive and Target Corporation, Minnesota Corporation,
Defendants, Case No. CGC19579858 (Cal. Super., Oct. 8, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Non Exempt Complaints.

Big Orange Productions is an event staffing agency specializing in
wine tastings, liquor promotions, street teams, in store sampling
events, and trade shows.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



BILL HAMILTON: Court Denies Class Cert. Bid in Lizarraga Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Susan Van Keulen denies the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit titled ERIBERTO LIZARRAGA, et al. v.
BILL HAMILTON ROOFING, INC., et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-03845-SVK
(N.D. Cal.).

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed Off the Clock Class
fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as to commonality, typicality, and
adequacy.  The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed Piece
Worker Class fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a) as to
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy.

Plaintiffs Juan Padilla and Eriberto Lizarraga bring this
wage-and-hour suit against Defendants Bill Hamilton ("Hamilton")
and Bill Hamilton Roofing, Inc. ("BHR").  The Court held a hearing
on August 20, 2019.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of all current and former
employees who were employed by Defendants at any time between June
27, 2014 and August 20, 2019.  The Plaintiffs moved for the Court
to certify two classes under Rule 23: the "off the clock" class and
the "piece worker" class.  The Plaintiffs define the classes as:

   1. Off the Clock Class:

      All hourly non-exempt roofing laborers who work off the
      clock hours and [are] not paid regular or overtime wages[,]
      including but not limited to those [who are] required to
      report to the Hamilton yard at 7am and [are] not
      compensated [for] any travel time from the Hamilton yard to
      the job site and/or back to the Hamilton yard from June 27,
      2014 through August 20th, 2019; and

   2. Piece Worker Class:

      All non-exempt roofing laborers who were paid by the piece
      and not compensated for their nonproductive time, including
      but not limited to: travel time, 20 minutes per day for
      rest breaks, [and] waiting time in either regular or
      overtime wages from June 27, 2014 through August 20th,
      2019.[CC]


BLUE CROSS: Shane Suit Settlement Gets Final Court Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division issued an Order granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement in the case captioned THE
SHANE GROUP, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF
MICHIGAN, Defendant, Case No. 10-CV-14360. (E.D. Mich.).

A Consolidated Class Action Amended Complaint was filed against
Defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross) alleging:
Unlawful Agreement in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
under the Rule of Reason (Count I), Unlawful Agreements in
Violation of Section 2 of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (Count
II). The class action seeks to recover overcharges paid by
purchasers of Hospital Healthcare Services directly to hospitals in
Michigan.

Rule 23

Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs the Court's
determination of whether the settlement is fair. The factors to be
determined at the fairness hearing are: (1) the risk of fraud or
collusion (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties
(4) the likelihood of success on the merits (5) the opinions of
class counsel and class representatives (6) the reaction of absent
class members and (7) the public interest.

Factors

Substantial Risk of Fraud or Collusion

Applying the first factor, the Court finds there is no indication
of fraud or collusion in this case. The Varnum Group did not raise
this issue on remand. It is presumed that the class representatives
and counsel handled their responsibilities with the independent
vigor that the adversarial process demands absent evidence of
improper incentives. Each party vigorously advanced and defended
their arguments and positions before the Court. There were
initially three cases filed relating to the instant Settlement
which were later consolidated by the Court after the parties'
agreed to do so.  

Various motions were filed by the parties, including a Motion to
Dismiss filed by Blue Cross, which was denied by the Court.  The
parties engaged in extensive motion practice and discovery relating
to the class certification issue and expert-related issues. It was
only after these motions were filed that the Court was informed
that the parties resolved the matter after extensive negotiations.
Each time a status conference or a hearing was held before the
Court, there were numerous attorneys in attendance representing
each party.

On remand, more motions were filed regarding the document sealing
issue and hearings were held on the matter. The Court did not
observe any signs that the parties were engaged in pretense and
posturing during the years in litigation before the Court to mask
collusion in reaching a Settlement Agreement with Blue Cross. Blue
Cross has defended these type of anti-trust cases before the Court
most vigorously, and continues to do so in another case before this
Court. Class Counsel in these consolidated cases also vigorously
argued each of their positions before the Court.

This factor weighs in favor of the class settlement.

Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of Litigation

The Court finds that the antitrust MFN issues raised by the
Plaintiffs are complex, very expensive to litigate and the
litigation has been ongoing for years, including appeals. The MFN
issue is not a common issue involving antitrust cases in the
healthcare arena. The complexity, expense and duration factor
weighs in favor of class settlement.

Amount of Discovery

All parties agree that they have engaged in discovery of millions
of pages of documents, multiple terabyte of data, 169 depositions
and preparation of competing expert reports. They argue that based
on all of this discovery taken, Plaintiffs and Blue Cross are
well-aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case. They argue
that based on the significant discovery taken, this factor weighs
heavily in favor of approval of the settlement.

There is no dispute that extensive discovery has been taken in this
case. On remand, further discovery was provided to Class Members
and the Objectors. In light of this extensive discovery, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs and Blue Cross have been able to evaluate the
propriety and fair value of the settlement. The amount of discovery
taken and considered by the parties in this case weighs in favor of
approving the settlement.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Varnum Group argues that because the Department of Justice
brought a federal complaint against Blue Cross, in itself, is
significant evidence that Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits. In addition, the Michigan legislature
banned the MFN Agreements by legislation passed in March 2013.

They also claim that the Court has not granted a dispositive motion
in favor of Blue Cross in this suit or the related Aetna lawsuit or
the original Department of Justice lawsuit. The Objectors argue
that it is obvious that the proposed settlement is grossly
unreasonable, which means class members have nothing to lose, and
everything to gain, by going forward with trial.

Plaintiffs claim they face significant risk that class members
would receive nothing without a settlement, therefore the recovery
of nearly $30 million reflects a substantial victory for Settlement
Class members.

The main question in approving a class settlement is whether the
settlement is fair in light of plaintiff's likelihood of success on
the merits. As noted above, extensive discovery has been held in
this case. The Court has denied Blue Cross' initial Motion to
Dismiss, finding at that point in the litigation that Plaintiffs
had stated a claim against Blue Cross. However, in light of
Plaintiffs' expert's analysis as to damages, the Court finds that
the settlement amount reached by the parties is fair in light of
any success the Plaintiffs may obtain on the merits of the case.

Dr. Leitzinger and Plaintiffs determined that damages could be
reliably and manageably measured only for purchasers covered by 23
provider agreements at 13 MFN hospitals. This resulted in damages
of $118 million, with one direct purchaser, HAP, incurring $58
million in damages. HAP's exclusion from the Class, the settlement
recovers approximately 50% of the damages incurred by the class.
Plaintiffs face significant risk that the class members could
receive nothing or some negligible amount in damages at trial or on
appeal.

The Court finds that the likelihood of success on the merits weighs
in favor of approving the settlement. The number of opt-outs on
remand have decreased and thousands of Class Members have filed
claims under the settlement.

Opinions of Class Counsel and Class Representatives

The Varnum Group argues that in circumstances where class counsel
and class representatives receive preferential treatment under the
terms of the settlement, the Court should not give any weight to
their opinions. They claim Class Counsel and the Class
Representatives have a conflict of interest due to their heavy
financial incentive to push for the proposed settlement.

Plaintiffs and their counsel argue that as noted previously,
counsel include leaders in complex class action litigation,
particularly in the field of antitrust. They have considered
voluminous discovery, expert analysis and engaged in motion
practice before reaching the settlement. Plaintiffs claim they have
participated in the case for years and they include all segments of
the Settlement Class, including individual purchasers,
institutional payors, purchasers in each of the Categories 1, 2 and
3.

The judgment of the parties' counsel that the settlement is in the
best interest of the settling parties is entitled to significant
weight. Courts should defer to the judgment of experienced counsel
who have evaluated the strength of the proofs.  

Class Counsel and Plaintiffs in this action all support the
settlement in this case. Deference is given to their opinions
because they have had the opportunity to review discovery and an
opinion by an expert in the evaluation of the case. Although the
Objectors argue that Class Counsel and the Class Representatives
have a conflict of interest due to their heavy financial incentive
to push for the proposed settlement, the Court must weigh this
factor significantly in their favor.

The Objectors have not overcome this burden in light of the
discovery taken in this case and the expert analysis reviewed by
Class Counsel and Named-Plaintiffs.

Reaction of Absent Class Members

The Varnum Group argues that Aetna's parallel lawsuit against Blue
Cross provides significant evidence of the inadequacy of the
proposed settlement. Aetna alleges it suffered over $600 million in
damages, and with the trebled damages, Aetna claims damages of over
$2 billion. The Varnum Group argues that the aggregate damages in
this class action exceed the individual damages sought by Aetna.

Plaintiffs assert that as to Aetna's estimate of damages, such
estimate is based on lost profits for Aetna's sales in the market
for commercial group health insurance and diminution of business
value, not overcharges for purchases of hospital services
attributable to Blue Cross' conduct. In this case, Plaintiffs only
sought overcharges in the sale of hospital services, not total
payments for hospital services paid by class members.

On remand, the number of opt outs decreased by 80%, in light of the
Class members' access to the unsealed record. The opt-outs only
constitute about 0.005% of the Class and 0.01% of those Class
members directly notified. Tens of thousands of injured Class
members have filed claims, 84,094 Class Members, which includes
many of the largest purchasers of hospital services in Michigan.
The reaction of the absent class members weighs in favor of
approval.  

Based on the opt out rate at about 0.005% of the Class and 0.01% of
those Class members directly notified, and the few objections filed
against the settlement, the low opt-out rate shows that the
reaction of absent class members factor weighs in favor of
settlement.

The Public Interest

Plaintiffs argue that the public interest in this case is to settle
a complex litigation and class action and to conserve judicial
resources. They claim that in this case, 169 depositions have been
taken, including depositions of over 100 third parties (employees
from dozens of hospitals), and that having a trial in this case
would burden the court and place a burden on Michigan healthcare
providers.

There is a strong public interest in encouraging settlement of
complex litigation and class action suits because such suits are
"notoriously difficult and unpredictable and settlement conserves
judicial resources. The public interest the Objectors raise is
essentially a numerosity issue, which weighs in favor of a class
action settlement. The public interest is strong to settle complex
class action cases, such as this case. If the matter was to move
forward to class action litigation, dispositive motion practice and
trial, given the number of members in the class, the time to
resolve this matter would be lengthy. The number of witnesses,
including those in the Michigan healthcare system involved, would
burden those systems. There is no guarantee at trial that the
matter would be resolved in favor of class members.

The public interest in settling complex class action litigation
weighs in favor of settlement.

Preferential Treatment/Absent Class Members

The Objectors argue that based on the Sixth Circuit decision in
Greenberg, incentive payments to Plaintiffs and Class Counsel are a
disincentive for the class members to care about the adequacy of
relief afforded by unnamed class members and instead encourages the
class representatives to compromise the interest of the class for
their personal gain. They claim this constitutes a bounty. Such
inequities in treatment, they argue, make a settlement unfair.

Plaintiffs assert that the incentive payments to Plaintiffs are
allowed and encouraged to reward their efforts in litigating the
case on behalf of the class. The incentives are proportional to the
time and resources each Plaintiff devoted to the case. They argue
that the attorneys' fees are not dependent on any award, but are
subject to the Court's approval. As to absent class members,
Plaintiffs argue that the settlement on their behalf is not
perfunctory. The settlement calls for a recovery of over 25 percent
of the $118 million they claimed are the estimated damages in this
case, which, they argue is not perfunctory in light of the risks,
burdens and delay of continued litigation. They claim that there is
no preferential treatment in favor of the Plaintiffs and Class
Counsel.

The Court finds that the settlement before the Court does not give
preferential treatment to the Plaintiffs, other than the incentives
which are reasonable in light of their involvement in the case. The
Court also finds that the relief to unnamed class members is not
illusory or perfunctory. Because the settlement does not give
preferential treatment to Plaintiffs or perfunctory relief to
unnamed class members, the Court approves the settlement in this
case.

Plan of Allocation

In addition to the above-stated factors, the Court must also
determine whether the method of distributing the settlement fund is
fair and reasonable.

Plaintiffs in this case have shown that an expert has analyzed the
damages in this case and the effect of the MFNs on the damages. The
Plan of Allocation categorizes different claims by placing them in
three categories, 23 provider agreements for which damages were
able to be measured (Category 1), purchases at hospitals with an
MFN agreement, but for which the plaintiff has no reliable evidence
of harm or evidence of only de minimus damages (Category 2) and
purchases were made when no MFN agreement was in effect (Category
3). Category 1 is allocated to receive 78 percent of the Net
Settlement Fund, Category 2 will receive 20 percent of the Net
Settlement Fund, and Category 3 will receive 2 percent of the Net
Settlement Fund. The Plan of Allocation is structured where the
stronger claims receive more than the other claims where damages
are less.

Any payments in Category 3 which are too small to distribute will
instead be made to the non-profit organization Free Clinics of
Michigan, a charity providing free health services throughout
Michigan. This non-profit was agreed to by the parties.

The Court has reviewed the various parties' submissions, objections
and arguments. Having weighed the factors set forth above, the
Court finds that the Settlement submitted to the Court is fair,
reasonable and adequate and that the Plan of Allocation is also
fair, reasonable and adequate. The Court approves the Settlement
and the Plan of Allocation.  The Objections filed, specifically
filed by Christopher Andrews and the Entities/Objectors represented
by the Varnum Firm, are OVERRULED and DENIED.

Class Counsel's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement
of Expenses and Payment of Incentive Awards to Class
Representatives is GRANTED.

The Varnum Group's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. The Varnum Group must resubmit the time
sheets by October 21, 2019, highlighting the time spent on the
sealed documents issue only. Any response/objections to the
resubmitted time sheets must be filed by November 4, 2019. Any
reply to the response/objections must be filed by November 12,
2019. The matter will be decided by the Court without any further
hearings.

The Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and Plan of Allocation
is GRANTED.

The Motion to File Response to Defendant BCBSM's Memorandum is
GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3asfd8o from Leagle.com.

The Shane Group, Inc. & Bradley A. Veneberg, Plaintiffs,
represented by Brent W. Johnson -
bjohnson@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC,
Daniel E. Gustafson , Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel Hedlund ,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel J. Nordin , GustafsonGluek PLLC, 120
SOUTH 6TH St., Ste. 2600, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Daniel Small -
dsmall@cohenmilstein.com - Cohen, Milstein, Darryl Bressack , Fink
Bressack,  38500 Woodward Ave., Suite 350 Bloomfield Hills, MI
48304, E. Powell Miller - epm@miller.law - The Miller Law Firm,
John E. Tangren - jtangren@dlcfirm.com - DiCello Levitt & Casey
LLC, Mary Jane Fait , Theodore Bell & David H. Fink , Fink +
Associates Law, 38500 Woodward Ave., Suite 350 Bloomfield Hills, MI
48304

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, Defendant, represented by
Michelle L. Alamo , Dickinson Wright, 2125 Butterfield, Suite 100N,
Troy, MI 48084, Michelle R. Heikka , Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Michigan, Patrick B. Green , Dickinson Wright, 2125 Butterfield,
Suite 100N, Troy, MI 48084, Michelle R. Heikka,  Robert A.
Phillips, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Thomas G. McNeill , Dickinson
Wright, 2125 Butterfield, Suite 100N, Troy, MI 48084, Thomas J.
Rheaume, Jr. - trheaume@bodmanlaw.com - Bodman PLC, Todd M.
Stenerson , Shearman & Sterling LLP & Farayha J. Arrine , Dickinson
Wright PLLC, 2125 Butterfield, Suite 100N, Troy, MI 48084, Michelle
R. Heikka
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan Mutual Insurance Company,
Defendant, represented by Rachel E. Mossman -
rachel.mossman@shearman.com - Shearman & Sterling LLP, Thomas J.
Rheaume, Jr. , Bodman PLC & Todd M. Stenerson-
todd.stenerson@shearman.com - Shearman & Sterling LLP.

BON APPETIT: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Luttrell Says
-------------------------------------------------------
EILEEN LUTTRELL, as an individual and on behalf 0f all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. BON APPETIT MANAGEMENT CO.,
a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 19CV355098 (Cal. Super., Sept. 16, 2019) seeks
to recover penalties and/or damages for Defendants' failure to pay
overtime wages and failure to provide accurate itemized wage
statements in violation of the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff began employment with Defendant in about September
2018, as a food services professional. The Plaintiff was hired as a
non-exempt employee.

Bon Appetit is a Palo Alto, California-based on-site restaurant
company, that provides café and catering services to corporations,
colleges, and universities. The company, a subsidiary of the
British multinational corporation Compass Group since 2002,
operates over 1,000 cafes in 34 states.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class are:

          W. Lee, Esq.
          Max W. Gavron, Esq.
          DIVERSITY LAW GROUP, P.C.
          5 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1250
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 488-6555
          Facsimile: (213) 488-6554

               - and -

          William L. Marder, Esq.
          POLARIS LAW GROUP LLP
          501 San Benito Street, Suite
          Hollister, CA 95023
          Telephone: (831) 531-4214
          Facsimile: (831) 634-0333

BOXY CHARM: Tatum-Rios Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------
Boxy Charm, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Lynette
Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Boxy Charm, Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-09150 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 2, 2019).

Boxy Charm, Inc. is a provider of monthly beauty-box subscription
service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


BROWN UNIVERSITY: Seeks Initial Approval of Kozlov Suit Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------------
The parties in the lawsuit titled MAXWELL D. KOZLOV and BENJAMIN D.
BOSIS, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated
individuals v. BROWN UNIVERSITY IN PROVIDENCE IN THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, alias, Case No.
1:19-cv-00028-JJM-LDA (D.R.I.), jointly ask the Court for an
order:

   1. granting conditional certification of a Fair Labor
      Standards Act collective class for settlement purposes
      only;

   2. granting preliminary approval of their proposed Settlement
      Agreement;

   3. authorizing the sending of Notice and the Consent to Join
      forms to Potential Collective Action Members substantially
      in the form as proposed and attached hereto; and

   4. reserving jurisdiction over the construction,
      interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the
      Settlement.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard A. Sinapi, Esq.
          Chloe A. Davis, Esq.
          SINAPI LAW ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          2374 Post Road, Suite 201
          Warwick, RI 02886
          Telephone: (401) 739-9690
          E-mail: ras@sinapilaw.com
                  cad@sinapilaw.com

Defendant Brown University is represented by:

          Michael E. Jusczyk, Esq.
          Barry J. Miller, Esq.
          Hillary Massey, Esq.
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          Two Seaport Lane, Suite 300
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 946-4800
          E-mail: mjusczyk@seyfarth.com
                  bmiller@seyfarth.com
                  hmassey@seyfarth.com


BUCCANEERS LTD: Cin-Q Wins Ruling Decertifying Class in TTA Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Anthony E. Porcelli of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida issued an Order granting
Cin-Q Automobiles, Inc.'s Renewed Motion to Decertify Settlement
Class, Vacate Preliminary Approval Order, and Strike Class
Allegations in the case captioned TECHNOLOGY TRAINING ASSOCIATES,
INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. BUCCANEERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant. Case No. 8:16-cv-1622-T-AEP. (M.D. Fla.).

The Court confronts the issue of the propriety of the preliminary
approval of the settlement of the class claims in this matter.
Following reversal and remand of the Court's prior Order denying a
Motion to Intervene, the Intervenors, or Cin-Q Plaintiffs, sought a
ruling by the Court decertifying the settlement class, vacating the
preliminary approval order, and striking the class allegations in
the above-mentioned case. Both Plaintiffs Technology Training
Associates, Inc. and Larry E. Schwanke, D.C. d/b/a Back to Basiccs
Family Chiropractic (TTA Plaintiffs) and Defendant Buccaneers
Limited Partnership (BLP) responded in opposition.

Cin-Q Action

In June 2013, Cin-Q Automobiles, Inc. (Cin-Q) initiated an action
against Buccaneers Limited Partnership (BLP), alleging that BLP
sent unsolicited advertisements via facsimile to Cin-Q in violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and its implementing
regulations. The faxed advertisements pertained to Tampa Bay
Buccaneers tickets and were allegedly sent by or on behalf of BLP
in 2009 and 2010. In January 2014, the Court allowed Cin-Q to file
a Second Amended Class Action Complaint adding Medical &
Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. (M&C) as another named plaintiff and
putative class representative.

During the proceedings in the Cin-Q Action, the parties engaged in
extensive discovery, motion practice, and mediation conferences,
with no resolution, over the course of three years. On March 25,
2016, after surviving BLP's motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, Cin-Q Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class
Certification.  BLP received extensions to file its response to the
Motion for Class Certification, during which the parties continued
to leave settlement discussions open. BLP then moved, on April 18,
2016, for a settlement conference before the Court or a designee as
the parties had reached an impasse in their other settlement
efforts, which Cin-Q Plaintiffs opposed.

BLP never filed a response to Cin-Q Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification. Instead, BLP filed a Notice of Pendency of Related
Action indicating that a related action was filed in the Circuit
Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County,
Florida, captioned Technology Training Associates, Inc. v.
Buccaneers Limited Partnership, et al., Case No. 16-CA-004333 (Fla.
Cir. Ct.) filed May 6, 2016.

Technology Training I Action

After the settlement discussions in the Cin-Q Action reached an
impasse, and while the motion for class certification was still
pending in the Cin-Q Action, TTA Plaintiffs contacted BLP regarding
pursuit of the same class claims on behalf of the same purported
class at issue in the Cin-Q Action. Subsequently, on May 6, 2016,
TTA Plaintiffs initiated the aforementioned action against BLP in
the Circuit Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit in and for
Hillsborough County, Florida, alleging violations of the TCPA on
behalf of the same class as the Cin-Q Action and regarding the same
facsimile advertisements.

Upon becoming aware of the pending Technology Training I Action,
Cin-Q Plaintiffs sought to enjoin BLP from proceeding in the
Technology Training I Action and moved for an order immediately
certifying the class in the Cin-Q Action rather than in any other
action. Cin-Q Plaintiffs also moved the state court on May 13,
2016, to allow them to intervene in, to dismiss, or to stay the
Technology Training I Action. The state court set the motion for a
hearing to occur on May 19, 2016, but, prior to the state court's
consideration of Cin-Q Plaintiffs' motion, TTA Plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed the Technology Training I Action on May 18,
2016.

Shortly thereafter, and given the existence of the claims by TTA
Plaintiffs, Magistrate Judge Porcelli conducted a status conference
in the Cin-Q Action on May 25, 2016 to address multiple motions
filed by the parties in that action, including BLP's motion for
settlement conference, Cin-Q Plaintiffs' motion to enjoin BLP from
participating in a competing case, and BLP's motion for a
determination that the mediation privilege had been waived. After
hearing oral argument regarding the motions and the status of the
Technology Training I Action, the Magistrate Judge denied all three
motions and directed Cin-Q Plaintiffs and BLP to conduct another
mediation conference prior to BLP's deadline for filing a response
to the motion for class certification in the Cin-Q Action on June
20, 2016. During the hearing, the Magistrate Judge further directed
that, if BLP entered into a settlement affecting class
certification in the Cin-Q Action, BLP must notify Cin-Q Plaintiffs
of the potential settlement in any separate action three days prior
to the filing of any settlement or pleading relating to a
settlement.

Technology Training II Action

Following dismissal of the Technology Training I Action, TTA
Plaintiffs and BLP conducted two full days of mediation, which
resulted in an agreement on a class settlement (the "Settlement")
on June 16, 2016. Upon reaching the Settlement with TTA Plaintiffs,
BLP provided written notice to Cin-Q Plaintiffs of the Settlement
in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's directive at the May 25,
2016 hearing. Subsequently, TTA Plaintiffs initiated the instant
action ("Technology Training II Action" or "this action") on June
20, 2016 .

On the same day, Cin-Q Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Transfer
Related Case under Local Rule 1.04(b), to Consolidate Cases, and
Appoint Interim Class Counsel seeking to (1) transfer the
Technology Training II Action to  Magistrate Judge Porcelli
pursuant to Local Rule 1.04(b); (2) to consolidate the Cin-Q Action
with the Technology Training II Action following transfer; and (3)
appoint the law firms of Addison & Howard, P.A., and Anderson +
Wanca as interim co-lead counsel for the class. Additionally, on
that day, Cin-Q Plaintiffs filed an identical Motion to Transfer
Related Case under Local Rule 1.04(b), to Consolidate Cases, and
Appoint Interim Class Counsel in the Cin-Q Action seeking the same
relief, while BLP filed a Motion for a Stay or, in the Alternative,
an Extension of Time in the Cin-Q Action seeking a stay of the
Cin-Q Action or, alternatively, an extension of time to respond to
the Cin-Q Action motion for class certification. Subsequently, on
June 22, 2016, TTA Plaintiffs filed their Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Notice to the
Class. Pursuant to Rule 23(e), Plaintiffs requested, on behalf of
themselves and a proposed settlement class of similarly situated
persons (the "Settlement Class"), that the Court enter an order (1)
preliminarily approving the parties' proposed class action
settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") that appoints
Plaintiffs as class representatives and their attorneys as class
counsel; (2) approving the form of Class Notice attached to the
Settlement Agreement and its dissemination to the Settlement Class
by U.S. mail, website, and publication; and (3) set dates for
opt-outs, objections, and a fairness hearing.

The Court granted BLP's request to stay the Cin-Q Action, stayed
the Cin-Q Action pending further order of the Court, and permitted
the parties in both the Cin-Q Action and the Technology Training II
Action to file a supplemental memorandum regarding the
appropriateness of conducting an inquiry into the allegations by
Cin-Q Plaintiffs regarding the occurrence of a "reverse auction" in
the Technology Training II Action. In accordance with the Court's
directive, the parties briefed the issue of a "reverse auction" and
the appropriateness of considering the issue prior to or after
preliminary approval of class certification and the Settlement.

On July 8, 2016, the deadline for the briefs, Cin-Q Plaintiffs
additionally submitted their Motion to Intervene. By the motion,
Cin-Q Plaintiffs sought intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)
and by permission under Rule 24(b). Though Cin-Q Plaintiffs
received permission from the Court to submit a brief as to the
issue of a reverse auction, Cin-Q Plaintiffs wanted to intervene to
move to strike the class allegations, arguing that the TTA
Plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations and, if
necessary, to oppose the motion for preliminary or final approval.
In support of intervention, Cin-Q Plaintiffs argued that their
motion was timely, they possessed an interest related to the
subject matter of the Technology Training II Action, the
disposition of the Technology Training II Action might impede or
impair their ability to protect their interests, and their
interests were not adequately represented by the parties in the
Technology Training II Action. Both TTA Plaintiffs and BLP opposed
Cin-Q Plaintiffs' request to intervene.

After conducting further hearings on the matter, the Court issued
its Order denying Cin-Q Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer Related Case
under Local Rule 1.04(b), to Consolidate Cases, and Appoint Interim
Class Counsel, denying Cin-Q Plaintiffs' Motion to Intervene; and
granting TTA Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement and Notice to the Class. The Court concluded that
Cin-Q Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the lack of standing by TTA
Plaintiffs due to the running of the statute of limitations and the
inapplicability of equitable tolling was misplaced because BLP
explicitly and unequivocally waived the statute of limitations
affirmative defense, with such waiver surviving in the event of
termination of the Settlement Agreement.

After concluding that TTA Plaintiffs established standing, the
Court then determined that TTA Plaintiffs established the
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a); that the
common issues outweighed and predominated over any individualized
issues involved in the litigation and that proceeding as a class
action provided the superior method to other methods available to
fairly and efficiently adjudicate the controversy; and that the
Settlement Agreement, which provided, among other things, a
Settlement Fund up to $19.5 million and payments of up to $350 for
the first facsimile and up to $565 total for up to five facsimiles
to Settlement Class members who submitted claims, appeared fair,
adequate, and reasonable solely for purposes of preliminary
approval.

Accordingly, the Court granted TTA Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Notice to the
Class and set forth the terms of the preliminary certification of
the Settlement Class, including the time for disseminating notice
to Settlement Class members and the date and time for the fairness
hearing.

The Court denied Cin-Q Plaintiffs' Motion to Transfer Related Case
under Local Rule 1.04(b), to Consolidate Cases, and Appoint Interim
Class Counsel and denied Cin-Q Plaintiffs' Motion to Intervene. The
Court did not need to transfer the action because Magistrate Judge
Porcelli received the case through random assignment and then by
consent to his jurisdiction by TTA Plaintiffs and BLP. Further,
given the preliminary approval of the Settlement and appointment of
TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel as Class Counsel, the considerations did
not favor consolidation of the Technology Training II Action and
the Cin-Q Action and obviated the need for appointment of Addison
and Anderson + Wanca.

Finally, in considering Cin-Q Plaintiffs' Motion to Intervene, the
Court denied Cin-Q Plaintiffs' request both for intervention as of
right, pursuant to Rule 24(a), and by permission, pursuant to Rule
24(b). The Court concluded that Cin-Q Plaintiffs could assert their
objections in the normal course of the proceedings, as anticipated
by Rule 23, and that a potential incentive award to Cin-Q
Plaintiffs and attorneys' fees for their counsel were not
foreclosed, thereby negating their contention regarding the
necessity for intervention as of right. Likewise, the Court
concluded that permissive intervention was not appropriate since
Cin-Q Plaintiffs could still assert their claims and defenses in
this action at the appropriate time or could opt out of the class
and continue to pursue their claims on an individual basis in the
Cin-Q Action.

Given the rulings in the Technology Training II Action, the Court
denied all pending motions in the Cin-Q Action, including Cin-Q
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. The Court also stayed
the Cin-Q Action pending further order of the Court. Currently, the
Cin-Q Action remains stayed pending the Magistrate Judge's ruling
on the instant motion in this action.

M&C Action

Meanwhile, based on the initiation of the Technology Training II
Action, M&C filed an action against Oppenheim and Bock Hatch, in
the Circuit Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit in and for
Hillsborough County, Florida, which Oppenheim and Bock Hatch then
removed to federal court a week later.  M&C asserted claims for (1)
breach of fiduciary duty against Oppenheim and Bock Hatch and (2)
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against Bock Hatch.
M&C claimed that it had an interest in being named as class
representative and obtaining class certification for the proposed
class after vigorously litigating the Cin-Q Action for the past
three years through fact discovery, class discovery, depositions,
expert discovery, dispositive motions, and mediation conferences.
M&C further alleged that during the course of the proceedings in
the Cin-Q Action through his resignation from Anderson + Wanca on
April 8, 2016, Oppenheim represented M&C as its attorney in the
Cin-Q Action.

In April 2016, shortly after the filing of the Motion for Class
Certification Motion in the Cin-Q Action, Oppenheim resigned from
Anderson + Wanca and joined Bock Hatch. Shortly thereafter, in May
2016, Bock Hatch filed the Technology Training I Action and then,
in June 2016, filed the Technology Training II Action asserting
claims on behalf of the same putative class members identified in
the Cin-Q Action. Based on the foregoing, M&C alleged a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty against Oppenheim, which it alleged was
imputed to Bock Hatch, and a claim for aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty against Bock Hatch. M&C alleged that Oppenheim
owed M&C an undivided duty of loyalty to represent M&C's interests
and a duty not to represent a client with interests materially
adverse to M&C, with such duties continuing after his resignation
from Anderson + Wanca, which were then imputed to Bock Hatch.
Further, M&C alleged that Bock Hatch aided and abetted the breach
of fiduciary duty because Bock Hatch knew about Oppenheim's
representation of M&C in the Cin-Q Action, and the attendant duties
attached to such representation, and substantially assisted
Oppenheim's breach of those duties.

Following the filing of the Complaint and removal in the M&C
Action, M&C filed its Amended Motion for Entry of Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
Oppenheim and Bock Hatch from (1) representing any entity in a case
alleging class-wide allegations substantially related to the Cin-Q
Action; (2) representing TTA Plaintiffs in any actions
substantially related to the Cin-Q Action; (3) engaging in
settlement negotiations with BLP, or reaching a settlement, in any
matter substantially related to the Cin-Q Action; and (4) using,
disclosing, or relying upon confidential information Oppenheim
gained while representing M&C, including information protected by
the attorney-client privilege or mediation privilege.

United States District Judge Charlene E. Honeywell denied M&C's
motion for preliminary injunction in October 2016. Judge Honeywell
determined that M&C could not establish a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of either its breach of fiduciary duty claim
or its aiding and abetting claim, could not establish a threat of
irreparable harm, could not establish that any threatened injury to
M&C outweighed the harm an injunction would cause Oppenheim or Bock
Hatch, and could not establish that an injunction would serve the
public interest. She concluded that Oppenheim had a fiduciary duty
to the entire class, including M&C, but it was questionable whether
M&C could demonstrate the existence of a special fiduciary duty to
M&C different from the fiduciary duty owed to all class members.
Since neither Oppenheim nor Bock Hatch were pursuing relief for the
class that was "materially adverse" to the interests of the other
class members, including M&C, M&C was unlikely to establish a
breach of any duty owed by Oppenheim, she added. Judge Honeywell
determined that M&C failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because,
among other things, any issue related to an alleged "reverse
auction" could be remedied through the normal course of litigation,
namely, the approval process of the Settlement. Judge Honeywell
determined that the balance of harm weighed against entry of an
injunction, since M&C demonstrated no irreparable harm it would
suffer, and that entry of an injunction would not serve the public
interest as no materially adverse interest existed among the
parties in the M&C Action, the Cin-Q Action, and the Technology
Training II Action.

Subsequently, in the M&C Action, M&C sought partial summary
judgment on its claims solely as to the issue of liability, and
Oppenheim and Bock Hatch sought summary judgment on M&C's claims in
full.  Upon consideration, Judge Honeywell denied M&C's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and granted Oppenheim and Bock Hatch's
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that M&C could not establish
the existence of a fiduciary duty owed to it individually, could
not establish that Oppenheim or Bock Hatch breached any fiduciary
duty owed to M&C to the extent that one existed, and could not
establish any damages suffered as a result of the purported breach,
and, further, given the lack of a breach of fiduciary duty on the
part of Oppenheim, M&C could not establish a claim for aiding and
abetting such breach by Bock Hatch.  

M&C appealed Judge Honeywell's Order, which appeal currently
remains pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Given the pending appeal relating to whether
Oppenheim or Bock Hatch breached any fiduciary duties or aided and
abetted such breach, the Court conducted a hearing in the
Technology Training II Action to address whether the matters
pending in this action should be stayed pending a resolution by the
Eleventh Circuit of the appeal in the M&C Action.

Though the Court maintains reservations regarding the lack of any
overlap between the outcome of the appeal in the M&C Action and the
issues presented in this action, TTA Plaintiffs, BLP, and Cin-Q
Plaintiffs all indicated that the resolution of the appeal in the
M&C Action would have no bearing on the outcome in this matter,
even given the findings made by the Eleventh Circuit in this
action.

The Eleventh Circuit Appeal in Technology Training II Action

During the pendency of the M&C Action, Cin-Q Plaintiffs submitted
an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit regarding the denial of their
request to intervene in the Technology Training II Action.

The Eleventh Circuit indicated that parties seeking to intervene
under Rule 24(a)(2) must demonstrate that (1) their request to
intervene is timely; (2) they have an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3)
they are so situated that disposition of the action, as a practical
matter, may impede or impair their ability to protect that
interest; and (4) their interest is represented inadequately by the
existing parties to the suit.

As to the first two prongs, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Cin-Q Plaintiffs satisfied those prongs since the request to
intervene was timely and since, as class members, they would be
bound by the terms of the Settlement if approved and judgment was
then entered. In considering the third prong, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Cin-Q Plaintiffs satisfied that prong by
demonstrating a risk that they would be bound by an unsatisfactory
class action settlement.  In making that determination, the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with this Court's finding that Rule 23's
procedural protections provided a basis for concluding that the
disposition of the Technology Training II Action would not impede
or impair Cin-Q Plaintiffs' ability to protect their interests
under Rule 24(a)(2)'s third prong. As part of that determination,
the Eleventh Circuit considered BLP's reliance upon the decision in
Grilli v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 78 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir.
1996), and, in a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that the
Grilli holding did not extend to cases like this one where the
facts of the case demonstrated that the existing parties do not
adequately represent the movants' interest. With respect to the
fourth prong, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis started with the
presumption that the TTA Plaintiffs' representation was adequate in
pursuing the same general objective -- vindicating the class'
rights under the TCPA. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
presumption is weak and merely requires the proposed intervenors to
present some evidence to the contrary. Based on the record before
it, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Cin-Q Plaintiffs rebutted
the weak presumption that TTA Plaintiffs adequately represented
Cin-Q Plaintiffs' interests by presenting evidence that TTA
Plaintiffs' Counsel engaged in a "Machiavellian" plan to undercut
Cin-Q Plaintiffs' negotiating position.

Based on its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case
back to the District Court with instructions to grant Cin-Q
Plaintiffs' motion to intervene as of right. The Eleventh Circuit
provided no other instructions for the District Court upon remand.

Cin-Q Plaintiffs now move the Court to dismiss the Technology
Training II Action or, alternatively, to decertify the Settlement
Class, vacate preliminary approval of the Settlement, and strike
TTA Plaintiffs' class allegations.

In doing so, Cin-Q Plaintiffs set forth several arguments.
Initially, they contend that China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138
S.Ct. 1800 (2019) requires dismissal or decertifying of the
Settlement Class, vacating of the preliminary approval of the
Settlement, and striking of the class allegations in this action as
China Agritech does not permit the maintenance of a class action
after the expiration of the statute of limitations, regardless of
whether BLP waives a statute of limitations defense. Alternatively,
Cin-Q Plaintiffs argue that the Court should decertify the
Settlement Class, vacate preliminary approval, and strike the class
allegations based upon the findings in the Eleventh Circuit Appeal.
Mainly, Cin-Q Plaintiffs assert that the findings in the Eleventh
Circuit Appeal dictate that TTA Plaintiffs are inadequate class
representatives and that TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel are inadequate
class counsel.

BLP and TTA Plaintiffs each responded in opposition. BLP argues
that China Agritech does not require the dismissal of this case or
the striking of the class allegations. BLP further contends that
its waiver of the statute of limitations for all purposes, which
survives termination of the Settlement, demonstrates that no basis
exists for striking the class allegations, especially since the
waiver did not form an integral term of the Settlement but rather a
procedural mechanism for presentation of the Settlement to the
Court rather than intervention in the Cin-Q Action, which it
contends still remains a viable option. In addition, BLP asserts
that the Eleventh Circuit Appeal does not provide a basis for the
relief sought by Cin-Q Plaintiffs since the law-of-the-case
doctrine applies only to issues within the scope of the appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit did not consider the adequacy of TTA Plaintiffs
and TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel under Rule 23, and the record before
the Eleventh Circuit was limited in scope.  

TTA Plaintiffs set forth similar arguments. Essentially, TTA
Plaintiffs argue that China Agritech does not prevent TTA
Plaintiffs from maintaining the concurrent class action and that
the decision in the Eleventh Circuit Appeal does not support or
require decertification.  

In reply, Cin-Q Plaintiffs contend that the attempts to distinguish
China Agritech from the facts of this case fail such that the
Technology Training II Action cannot be maintained as a class
action. Cin-Q Plaintiffs further contend that the attempts to
minimize the findings by the Eleventh Circuit fail, meaning TTA
Plaintiffs and TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel cannot be permitted to
represent a class.

China Agritech

According to Magistrate Judge Porcelli, the Court recognizes that
some courts considering China Agritech rejected the notions that
China Agritech can be distinguished based on whether class
certification was decided in an earlier-filed action or on whether
the earlier action remained pending at the time of filing the
subsequent action, while other courts accepted such notions.

In this instance, the Court does not deem it necessary to determine
whether either factor distinguishes this case from China Agritech
because the main distinguishing and determinative factor in this
case rests upon BLP's waiver of its statute of limitations
defense.

As with the China Agritech plaintiffs, TTA Plaintiffs would not
have a substantive right to bring their claims outside of the
statute of limitations; instead, they could only bring such claims
due to the judicially crafted tolling rule. Had TTA Plaintiffs
sought to establish class claims based on a theory of equitable
tolling, this Court might swiftly dismiss those class claims under
China Agritech. Yet, that is not the case, he said.

Here, BLP unequivocally waived the statute of limitations defense
as to TTA Plaintiffs and all other class members, which, according
to BLP and TTA Plaintiffs, opened the door for TTA Plaintiffs to
assert class claims that would otherwise be precluded. The Court,
therefore, confronts an issue neither before the Court in China
Agritech nor addressed by any courts subsequently considering China
Agritech. Instead, the question presented before this Court
involves whether BLP's unequivocal waiver of any assertion of a
statute of limitations defense provides an avenue for TTA
Plaintiffs to bring class claims in this action. The Court finds
that, as a general proposition, it does.

To reiterate what the Court previously articulated, in the
Settlement Agreement, BLP explicitly waived its affirmative defense
regarding the statute of limitations, with such waiver surviving in
the event of termination of the Settlement Agreement. Such a waiver
removes the issue of the statute of limitations from the
controversy.  Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well
as numerous courts, indicate that the statute of limitations
constitutes an affirmative defense that a party may waive.  

Importantly, the statute of limitations governing TCPA claims is
not found within the text of the TCPA. Instead, courts apply the
four-year catchall statute of limitations provided under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1658(a), which states: Except as otherwise provided by law,
a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the
date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later
than 4 years after the cause of action accrues. Neither the text
nor the context of such time prescription, located in a separate,
catchall statute, indicates that the statute of limitations
operates as jurisdictional bar to suit.  Accordingly, the four-year
statute of limitations related to TCPA claims acts only as a
procedural limit or an affirmative defense subject to waiver.

As noted, BLP presents no opposition to TTA Plaintiffs bringing
their claims outside of the statute of limitations and, again,
explicitly waived such defense as to all class members, regardless
of the approval of the Settlement Agreement. China Agritech remains
silent as to waiver by a defendant. Indeed, while China Agritech
expresses a preference for early assertion of competing class
claims and diligence by a plaintiff in pursuing class claims, the
Court finds nothing in China Agritech or any case interpreting
China Agritech that would prohibit a defendant from waiving the
statute of limitations defense or allowing time-barred claims to
proceed based on such waiver, especially where the plaintiff does
not seek to rely on equitable tolling as a basis for asserting any
claims.

Although the Court appreciates Cin-Q Plaintiffs' arguments to the
contrary, the Court does not read China Agritech to prohibit a
defendant from waiving its statute of limitations defense or
allowing a plaintiff to bring class claims on that basis,
Magistrate Judge Porcelli concluded.

The Eleventh Circuit Appeal

Notwithstanding the foregoing, just because a defendant may waive
its statute of limitations defense, allowing a plaintiff to bring
class claims on that basis under China Agritech, does not mean that
TTA Plaintiffs could bring the class claims in this action. In
fact, quite the opposite. Given the findings set forth in the
Eleventh Circuit Appeal, the waiver of the statute of limitations
defense provides the downfall of the class claims in this instance,
the Court held.

Though the Eleventh Circuit addressed only the issue of adequacy
for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2), the findings the Eleventh Circuit
set forth in rendering its decision provide this Court with
guidance in considering Rule 23(a), even given the differing
standards and the expanded record in this action, wrote Magistrate
Judge Porcelli in his ruling.

The adequacy-of-representation requirement under Rule 23 requires
the representative party in a class action to fairly and adequately
protect the interests of those he or she purports to represent.
Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy inquiry serves to uncover conflicts of
interest between named parties and the class they seek to
represent.

The Court finds that the record reveals that the interests of TTA
Plaintiffs were in substantial conflict with those of Cin-Q
Plaintiffs and, thus, the rest of the putative class. Basically,
unlike TTA Plaintiffs, Cin-Q Plaintiffs and the other putative
class members in the Cin-Q Action "have no statute of limitations
issue." Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed the
issue in its decision, stating: "Although the parties fiercely
contest whether the plaintiffs' claims are actually time barred,
the risk that they could be gives the plaintiffs a greater
incentive to settle as compared to the movants." The Court finds
the Eleventh Circuit's observation instructive since TTA Plaintiffs
in fact admit that they were aware of the statute of limitations
issue from the outset of the settlement negotiations with BLP. The
fact that BLP and TTA Plaintiffs did not address the issue of the
waiver of the statute of limitations until late in their settlement
negotiations does not change the analysis. Namely, the timing of
the actual waiver by BLP does not bear on the issue, since the
issue was present from the outset. Put simply, but for the timely
initiation of the Cin-Q Action, BLP would have no reason to waive
the statute of limitations defense to settle potential class claims
with plaintiffs whose claims expired. By the same token, but for
obtaining a statute of limitations waiver, TTA Plaintiffs would not
maintain the ability to bring class claims outside of the Cin-Q
Action.

Given the unavailability of the separate class action option
without a waiver of the statute of limitations, the interests of
TTA Plaintiffs and BLP were aligned. Even on the limited record on
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that "[i]t is plain from the
record that during the negotiations the interests of the named
plaintiffs and of Bock Hatch were aligned with those of Buccaneers
and adverse to the movants' interests." As the record in this
action and in the Cin-Q Action indicate, TTA Plaintiffs and BLP
endeavored to settle the class claims against the backdrop of the
breakdown of the settlement negotiations in the Cin-Q Action and
the impending deadline for BLP to respond to Cin-Q Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification. BLP expressed frustration with the
settlement process with Cin-Q Plaintiffs and thus sought the
Court's assistance in conducting a settlement conference given
concerns BLP held with the position taken by Cin-Q Plaintiffs in
the prior settlement negotiations. At the same time, as the
Eleventh Circuit noted, e-mails indicated that TTA Plaintiffs'
Counsel engaged in a "Machiavellian" plan to undercut Cin-Q
Plaintiffs negotiating position.  Indeed, TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel
did not approach BLP about the filing of a new case regarding the
same class claims until after the parties reached an impasse in the
Cin-Q Action, a fact that TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel was aware of at
the time they approached BLP. Given that backdrop, both TTA
Plaintiffs and BLP possessed aligning incentives to settle outside
the purview of the Cin-Q Action or, at the very least, Cin-Q
Plaintiffs. As a result, the interests of TTA Plaintiffs remained
antagonistic to and in substantial conflict with Cin-Q Plaintiffs
and the rest of the putative class in the Cin-Q Action, meaning TTA
Plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the class under Rule
23(a)(4).

Contrary to BLP's argument, this finding does not prioritize form
over substance. Understandably, from BLP's perspective, the issues
relating to the class claims have been resolved and no need exists
to disturb such resolution. To that end, TTA Plaintiffs and BLP
argue that TTA Plaintiffs could have intervened in the Cin-Q
Action, but chose not to do so, and requiring them to do so now
would prove an exercise in futility. Had TTA Plaintiffs and BLP
determined that intervention in the Cin-Q Action provided the
proper means for getting the Settlement before the Court, the
issues might have been resolved or at least addressed much
differently. As it stands, however, the parties did not. Instead,
they proceeded in a separate action, and the Eleventh Circuit
subsequently provided its interpretation of the facts, which now
guides this Court in its decision.

"Given the change in the procedural landscape after the Eleventh
Circuit issued its decision, therefore, this Court finds no basis
to allow the class claims to proceed in this action. Furthermore,
the Court need not address the adequacy of Cin-Q Plaintiffs or
their Counsel nor the viability of a class action in the Cin-Q
Action, as neither issue affects the outcome here," rules
Magistrate Judge Porcelli.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Porcelli concluded that:

-- The Preliminary Approval Order is VACATED.

-- The Settlement Class is DECERTIFIED.

-- TTA Plaintiffs' class claims in this action are STRICKEN.

This matter is STAYED pending a status conference. The Court
directed the parties to meet and confer to determine dates and
times when all parties can attend an in-person status conference.
TTA Plaintiffs' Counsel shall then contact the Court at (813)
301-5541 to provide the proposed dates and times, after which the
status conference will be scheduled by separate notice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y43k2hda from Leagle.com.

Technology Training Associates, Inc. & Larry E. Schwanke, D.C.,
individually and as the representative of a class of
similarly-situated persons, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel J.
Cohen , Bock Hatch Lewis & Oppenheim LLC, pro hac vice, Jonathan B.
Piper , Bock Law Firm, LLC, pro hac vice & Phillip A. Bock , Bock
Hatch Lewis & Oppenheim LLC, 134 North La Salle Street Suite 1000
Chicago, IL 60602

Buccaneers Limited Partnership, Defendant, represented by Joseph H.
Varner, III - joe.varner@hklaw.com - Holland & Knight, LLP,
Kathleen P. Lally - kathleen.lally@lw.com - Latham & Watkins, LLP,
pro hac vice & Mark S. Mester - mark.mester@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins, LLP, pro hac vice.

Cin-Q Automobiles, Inc. & Medical & Chiropractic Clinic, Inc.,
Intervenors, represented by Glenn L. Hara - ghara@andersonwanca.com
- Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice, Michael C. Addison - m@mcalaw.net
- Addison Law Office, P.A., Ross Michael Good  -
rgood@andersonwanca.com - Anderson & Wanca & Ryan M. Kelly -
rkelly@andersonwanca.com - Anderson & Wanca.

C. TECH COLLECTIONS: Engeman Files FDCPA Class Action in New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against C. Tech Collections,
Inc. The case is styled as Robert G. Engeman, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. C. Tech
Collections, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05710 (E.D. N.Y.,
Oct. 9, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

C. Tech Collections, Inc. is debt collection agency in Mount Sinai,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com





CAMBREX CORPORATION: Thompson Challenges Sale to Catalog
---------------------------------------------------------
JOHN THOMPSON, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. CAMBREX CORPORATION, GREGORY B. BROWN, CLAES
GLASSELL, LOUIS J. GRABOWSKY, BERNARD HAMPL, KATHRYN RUDIE
HARRIGAN, ILAN KAUFTHAL, STEVEN M. KLOSK, and SHLOMO YANAI,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01793-UNA (D. Del., Sept. 24, 2019)
stems from a proposed transaction pursuant to which Cambrex will be
acquired by Catalog Intermediate Inc. and Catalog Merger Sub Inc.,
which are controlled by investment funds advised by Permira
Advisers LLC.

On August 7, 2019, Cambrex's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Permira.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Cambrex's
stockholders will receive $60.00 in cash for each share of Cambrex
common stock they own. On September 23, 2019, the Defendants filed
a proxy statement with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction, which
scheduled a stockholder vote on the Proposed Transaction for
October 23, 2019.

The complaint notes that, first, the Proxy Statement omits material
information regarding the Company's financial projections. The
Proxy Statement fails to disclose, for each set of projections: (i)
all line items used to calculate Adjusted EBITDA; (ii) all line
items used to calculate unlevered free cash flow; and (iii) a
reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics. Second, the Proxy
Statement omits material information regarding the analyses
performed by the Company's financial advisor in connection with the
Proposed Transaction, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC. With respect to
Morgan Stanley's Precedent Premiums Paid Analysis, the Proxy
Statement fails to disclose: (i) the transactions observed by
Morgan Stanley in the analysis; and (ii) the premiums paid in the
transactions. Third, the Proxy Statement omits material information
regarding potential conflicts of interest of Morgan Stanley. The
Proxy Statement fails to disclose the timing and nature of the past
services Morgan Stanley provided to Permira and its affiliates.
Fourth, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose whether the Company
entered into any confidentiality agreements that contained
standstill and/or "don't ask, don't waive" provisions that are or
were preventing the counterparties from submitting superior offers
to acquire the Company. Without this information, stockholders may
have the mistaken belief that, if these potentially interested
parties wished to come forward with a superior offer, they are or
were permitted to do so, when in fact they are or were
contractually prohibited from doing so, says the complaint.

Accordingly, the Proxy Statement omits material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy
Statement false and misleading, the Plaintiff alleges.  The
Plaintiff contends that the Defendants violated Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the
Proxy Statement.

The Plaintiff is the owner of Cambrex common stock.

Cambrex is a small molecule company that provides drug substance,
drug product, and analytical services across the entire drug
lifecycle.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


CANNTRUST HOLDINGS: Owens Suit over Share Price Drop Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
RYAN OWENS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. CANNTRUST HOLDINGS INC., PETER ACETO,
GREG GUY ATT, ERIC PAUL, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH
INC., CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC., CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA)
LLC, RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC., JEFFERIES LLC, and CANACCORD
GENUITY LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 19CV352374 (Cal. Super., Aug.
5, 2019), alleges that Defendants violated the Securities Act of
1933. The Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and on
behalf of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Cann Trust
common stock pursuant or traceable to the offering materials issued
in connection with the company's 2019 offering (the "offering"),
including the registration statement, the prospectus, and various
prospectus supplements.

CannTrust is a producer and distributor of medical and recreational
cannabis. Cann Trust's common stock was traded over the counter
until February 25, 2019, when it became listed on the NYSE under
the ticker symbol "CTST."

After its listing on the NYSE, the Company conducted a share
offering in which it registered new shares of common stock that it
issued to investors, including Plaintiff and members of the class.


The Company registered approximately $531 million in new shares,
warrants, and debt securities under a registration statement that
was issued March 1 (and included a short form prospectus), amended
March 18, and became effective on March 19, 2019. On April 22,
2019, the Company issued a preliminary prospectus supplement. On
May 3, 2019, CannTrust amended and finalized the prospectus
supplement to qualify the distribution of 36,363,636 common shares
at a price of $5.50 per common share. Together, these materials are
referred to as the "offering materials."

The cannabis industry is regulated, both in Canada and in the
United States. One requirement under Canadian law is that cannabis
growing facilities be licensed by Health Canada-the Canadian
regulator responsible for oversight of the cannabis industry.

Unbeknownst to investors like Plaintiff, Cann Trust lacked the
required licenses for some of its main growing facilities in
Canada, and was producing cannabis in these unlicensed facilities,
a fact that the Company misrepresented and failed to disclose to
investors in its offering materials.

On July 8, 2019, CannTrust disclosed that Health Canada had found
that Cann Trust's operation of its greenhouse facility in Pelham,
Ontario, violated governing regulations. Specifically, Health
Canada issued a report on July 3 concluding that the Company had
been growing cannabis in five unlicensed rooms at its Niagara
campus in Pelham, Ontario, between October 2018 and March 2019.

As a result, Health Canada placed an inventory hold on
approximately 5,200 kilograms of dried cannabis harvested from the
unlicensed facility, and CannTrust agreed to place a voluntary
inventory hold on an additional 7,500 kilograms of cannabis.

CannTrust was unable to sell the held inventory and is subject to
significant inventory holding costs. On July 8, 2019, following
news of Cann Trust's licensing violations, the company's stock
price fell $1.11, more than 22%, to close at $3.83 per share, the
lawsuit says.

                           *     *     *

A case management conference is scheduled in the case for Nov. 15,
2019, at 10 a.m.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Dena C. Sharp, Esq.
          Adame Polk, Esq.
          GIRARD SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, Suite 1400
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dsharp@girardsharp.com
                  apolk@girardsharp.com

               - and -

          Eric H. Gibbs, Esq.
          David Stein, Esq.
          GIBBS LAW GROUP LLP
          11505 14th Street, Suite 110
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 350-9700
          Facsimile: (510) 350-9701
          E-mail: ehg@classlawgroup.com
                  ds@classlawgroup.com

CAPSTONE RESTAURANT: Keefover Files Class Suit under ADA
--------------------------------------------------------
Capstone Restaurant Group, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Alexander Keefover, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Capstone Restaurant
Group, LLC and Lund Brown Enterprises, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00188-TSK (N.D. W.V., Oct. 2, 2019).

Capstone Restaurant Group is a collection of affiliated companies
that operates and franchises almost 300 restaurants in 16 states
through a variety of brands.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James A. Kirby , III, Esq.
   Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP
   300 Summers Street, Ste. 1500
   PO Box 2107
   Charleston, WV 25328-2107
   Tel: (304) 346-7000
   Fax: (304) 344-9692
   Email: jak@goodwingoodwin.com

      - and -

   Benjamin J. Sweet Esq.
   The Sweet Law Firm, PC
   186 Mohawk Drive
   Pittsburgh, PA 15228
   Tel: (412) 742-0631
   Email: ben@sweetlawpc.com

      - and -

   Holly Blackwell, Esq.
   Nye Stirling Hale & Miller LLP
   33 West Misson Ste., #201
   Santa Barbara, CA 93101
   Tel: (805) 963-2345

      - and -

   Jonathan D. Miller, Esq.
   Nye Stirling Hale & Miller LLP
   33 West Misson Ste., #201
   Santa Barbara, CA 93101
   Tel: (805) 963-2345
   Email: Jonathan@nshmlaw.com

      - and -

   Timothy C. Hale, Esq.
   Nye Stirling Hale & Miller LLP
   33 West Misson Ste., #201
   Santa Barbara, CA 93101
   Tel: (805) 963-2345



CENTRA TECH: Rensel Renews Bid to Certify CTR Token Buyers Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled JACOB ZOWIE THOMAS RENSEL, WANG YUN HE, CHI
HAO POON, KING FUNG POON, JAE J. LEE, MATEUSZ GANCZAREK, and RODNEY
WARREN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. CENTRA TECH, INC., SOHRAB SHARMA, ROBERT FARKAS, RAYMOND
TRAPANI, STEVEN STANLEY, STEVEN SYKES, ALLAN SHUTT, CHASE
ZIMMERMAN, FLOYD MAYWEATHER JR., AND KHALED MOHAMED KHALED A/K/A DJ
KHALED, Case No. 1:17-cv-24500-RNS (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs
filed their renewed motion for class certification.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as Class
Representatives and to appoint Levi & Korsinsky, LLP and
Taylor-Copeland Law as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiffs previously moved to certify this securities class
action against Defendant Centra Tech, Inc. on June 13, 2019 (the
"First Motion").  On September 17, 2019, the Court issued its Order
denying Plaintiffs' First Motion (the "Denial Order").

The Denial Order denied Plaintiffs' Motion on two grounds.  First,
the Court determined that denial of the Motion was warranted
because "Plaintiffs' motion for class certification [wa]s untimely"
and "offer[ed] no excuse or justification for this delay . . .."
Second, the Court denied certification upon a finding that the
Plaintiffs had "failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that
the proposed classes are ascertainable."

In this Renewed Motion, the Plaintiffs provide such justification,
and explain the timing of events as they have occurred.  The
Plaintiffs contend that they have been limited in their ability to
pursue discovery or other relief in this Action because of the
automatic stay of discovery and other proceedings provided for
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  The
Plaintiffs add that because the Court did not otherwise set a
deadline for filing a motion for class certification, there were no
deadlines under which a class certification motion could be
untimely.

The Plaintiffs now seek certification of this revised proposed
definition of the "Class":

     All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
     Centra Tech Tokens ("CTR Tokens") directly from Defendant
     Centra Tech in connection with its "official" initial coin
     offering from July 23, 2017 through October 5, 2017 ("Class
     Period").

Excluded from the Class are: (i) defendant Centra Tech; (ii) any
person who was an officer, director or employee of Centra Tech,
Inc.; (iii) any immediate family member of any excluded person;
(iv) any firm, trust, corporation or other entity in which any
excluded person or entity has or had a controlling interest; and
(v) the legal representatives, affiliates, heirs, successors
in-interest, or assigns of any such excluded person or entity.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Emily Komlossy, Esq.
          KOMLOSSY LAW P.A.
          4700 Sheridan St., Suite J
          Hollywood, FL 33021
          Telephone: (954) 842-2021
          Facsimile: (954) 416-6223
          E-mail: eck@komlossylaw.com

               - and -

          Eduard Korsinsky, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          30 Broad Street, 24th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 363-7500
          Facsimile: (212) 636-7171
          E-mail: ek@zlk.com

               - and -

          Donald J. Enright, Esq.
          Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Esq.
          John A. Carriel, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP
          1101 30th Street, N.W., Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524-4290
          Facsimile: (202) 333-2121
          E-mail: denright@zlk.com
                  etripodi@zlk.com
                  jcarriel@zlk.com

               - and -

          James Taylor-Copeland, Esq.
          TAYLOR-COPELAND LAW
          501 W. Broadway, Suite 800
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 400-4944
          E-mail: james@taylorcopelandlaw.com


CERTIFIED CREDIT: Hughes Asserts Breach of FDCPA in New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Certified Credit &
Collection Bureau. The case is styled as Milena M. Hughes, on
behalf of herself and those similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Certified Credit & Collection Bureau, Joanne M. Possumato, Diana M.
Schobel and John Does 1 to 10, Defendants, Case No.
3:19-cv-18819-MAS-TJB (D. N.J., Oct. 8, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Certified Credit & Collection Bureau is a Debt collection agency in
Branchburg Township, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
   Kim Law Firm LLC
   411 Hackensack Ave Ste 701
   Hackensack, NJ 07601
   Tel: (201) 273-7117
   Fax: (201) 273-7117
   Email: ykim@kimlf.com


CONAGRA BRANDS: Negrete Class Action Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 25, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a consolidated class action suit entitled, Negrete v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., et al.

The company is a party to matters challenging the Company's wage
and hour practices.

These matters include a number of class actions consolidated under
the caption Negrete v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., et al, pending in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, in
which the plaintiffs allege a pattern of violations of California
and/or federal law at several current and former Company
manufacturing facilities across the State of California.

Conagra Brands said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the
results of this or any other legal proceeding, we do not expect
this matter to have a material adverse effect on our financial
condition, results of operations, or business."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra
Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: Settlement in Briseno Wins Preliminary Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 25, 2019, that the trial court in
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., granted preliminary approval of the
parties' settlement.

The company is a party to a number of putative class action
lawsuits challenging various product claims made in the Company's
product labeling.

These matters include Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. in which it is
alleged that the labeling for Wesson(R) oils as 100% natural is
false and misleading because the oils contain genetically modified
plants and organisms. In February 2015, the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California granted class certification to
permit plaintiffs to pursue state law claims.

The Company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which affirmed class certification in January 2017.
The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the
decision and the case has been remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

On April 4, 2019, the trial court granted preliminary approval of a
settlement in this matter.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra
Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: West Palm Beach Firefighters' Suit Ongoing
----------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 25, 2019, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit entitled, est Palm Beach
Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Conagra Brands, Inc., et al.

The Company, its directors, and several of its executive officers
are defendants in several class actions alleging violations of
federal securities laws. The lawsuits assert that the Company's
officers made material misstatements and omissions that caused the
market to have an unrealistically positive assessment of the
Company's financial prospects in light of the acquisition of
Pinnacle Foods Inc. (Pinnacle), thus causing the Company's
securities to be overvalued prior to the release of the Company's
consolidated financial results on December 20, 2018 for the second
quarter of fiscal year 2019.

The first of these lawsuits, captioned West Palm Beach
Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Conagra Brands, Inc., et al., with
which subsequent lawsuits alleging similar facts have been
consolidated, was filed February 22, 2019 in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

In addition, on May 9, 2019, a shareholder filed a derivative
action on behalf of the Company against the Company's directors
captioned Klein v. Arora, et al. in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois asserting harm to the Company due to
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and mismanagement in connection
with the Pinnacle acquisition.

On July 9, 2019 and September 20, 2019, the Company received two
separate demands from stockholders under Delaware law to inspect
the Company's books and records related to the Board of Directors'
review of the Pinnacle business, acquisition, and the Company's
public statements related to them.

On July 22, 2019 and August 6, 2019, respectively, two additional
shareholder derivative lawsuits captioned Opperman v. Connolly, et
al. and Dahl v. Connolly, et al. were filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois asserting similar facts
and claims as the Klein v. Arora, et al. matter.

Conagra Brands said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the
results of these or any other legal proceedings, we do not expect
these matters to have a material adverse effect on our financial
condition, results of operations, or business."

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra
Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.


CONOPCO INC: Crepps Fraud Class Action Transferred to E. D. Mo.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Dan Crepps, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Conopco, Inc. doing
business as: Unilever and Does 1 through 10, Defendants, Case No.
19JE-CC0489, was transferred from the 23rd Judicial Circuit -
Jefferson County to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri (St. Louis) on October 8, 2019, and assigned
Case No. 4:19-cv-02726.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Fraud.

Conopco Inc. Conopco, Inc., doing business as Unilever, provides
personal care products. The Company offers perfumes, soaps, and
shampoos, as well as food products.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.

The Defendant is represented by:

   James Muehlberger, Esq.
   SHOOK AND HARDY, LLP
   2555 Grand Blvd.
   Kansas City, MO 64108
   Tel: (816) 474-6550
   Fax: (816) 421-5547
   Email: jmuehlberger@shb.com


CONOPCO INC: Richards Fraud Class Suit Transferred to E. D. Mo.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Jamie Richards, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Conopco, Inc. doing
business as: Unilever and Does 1 through 10, Defendants, Case No.
1922-CC10814, was transferred from the Circuit Court of St. Louis
City to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri (St. Louis) on October 8, 2019, and assigned Case No.
4:19-cv-02726.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Fraud.

Conopco Inc. Conopco, Inc., doing business as Unilever, provides
personal care products. The Company offers perfumes, soaps, and
shampoos, as well as food products.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.

The Defendant is represented by:

   James Muehlberger, Esq.
   SHOOK AND HARDY, LLP
   2555 Grand Blvd.
   Kansas City, MO 64108
   Tel: (816) 474-6550
   Fax: (816) 421-5547
   Email: jmuehlberger@shb.com


CONTINENTAL GENERAL: Wins Final OK of $1.25-M Deal in Fastrich Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Michael R. Barrett enters an order granting final approval
to the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement between Plaintiffs
and Defendants in the lawsuit entitled JOHN FASTRICH and UNIVERSAL
INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC. and REGINALD J. GOOD D/B/A REGINALD J.
GOOD AGENCY v. CONTINENTAL GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, GREAT
AMERICAN FINANCIAL RESOURCE, INC., AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,
LOYAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and AMERICAN RETIREMENT LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 1:17-cv-00615-MRB (S.D. Ohio).

The Settlement Agreement provides that, in exchange for the release
described in the Settlement Agreement and this Settlement Order,
the Defendants will pay $1,250,000 by wire transfer the Settlement
Amount into an escrow account, which will be established at a bank
by Class Counsel.  The Settlement Amount will be allocated as set
forth in the Allocation Plan.

For settlement purposes only, the Court certifies the Settlement
Class defined as:

     all persons or entities that, from October 25, 2011 through
     the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement, lost or
     otherwise were not paid commissions that were or would have
     been payable on, or attributable to, insurance policies or
     products issued or sold by the Defendants or Releasees as a
     result of Defendants or their affiliates': (1) failing to
     pay Commissions on premiums paid by policyholders due to
     premium rate increases on long-term care insurance policies;
     (2) failing to properly calculate and/or pay Commissions in
     accordance with the vesting provisions of any agreement(s)
     with any Defendants; or (3) replacing any person or entity
     as the agent of record in connection with a sale of any
     insurance policy; provided, however, that Settlement Class
     or Class Members shall not include: (i) persons or entities
     that previously released any of the Claims raised in the
     Nebraska Action or the Producer Class Action; (ii)
     Defendants; or (iii) Releasees. Also excluded from the
     Settlement Class are the persons and/or entities who request
     exclusion from the Settlement Class within the time period
     set by this Order.

The Court confirms the appointment of Plaintiffs John Fastrich,
Universal Investment Services, Inc., and Reginald J. Good D/B/A
Reginald J. Good Agency as the Settlement Class Representatives.
The Notice and the Claim Form are finally approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate.

The Allocation Plan is approved as fair and reasonable, and in the
best interests of the Class, and Class Counsel and Strategic Claims
Services are directed to administer the Settlement Agreement in
accordance with its terms and provisions.  Strategic Claims
Services shall discharge all aspects of notice and other settlement
administration in accordance with the Settlement Agreement.

The Parties are authorized without further approval from the Court
to agree upon such amendments or modifications of the Settlement
Agreement and all exhibits thereto as shall be consistent in all
respects with this Settlement Order and do not limit the rights of
the Class Members.

The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice against the Defendants,
their past or present subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, and
others.  The action is dismissed with prejudice.

An appeal of the Order, which awards attorneys' fees, expenses,
and/or service awards, shall have no effect whatsoever on the
finality of any other portion of this Order, the Final Judgment or
the Effective Date of the Settlement as provided in the Settlement
Agreement.  Class Members appealing this Order or any portion
thereof, must first timely intervene pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.  Without further order of the court, the
parties may agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry out any
of the provisions of the Settlement Agreement.[CC]


CORELLE BRANDS: Ct Narrows Claims in Consolidated Pyrex Defect Case
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned TRICIA FULLERTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
CORELLE BRANDS, LLC (previously d/b/a World Kitchen, LLC), et al.,
Defendants, and MARCIA SCHUTTE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORELLE
BRANDS, LLC (previously d/b/a World Kitchen, LLC), et al.,
Defendants, Case Nos. 18-cv-4152, 18-cv-4198 (N.D. Ill.).

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
This consolidated class action involves seven plaintiffs from six
different states suing Defendants Corelle Brands LLC, f/k/a World
Kitchen, LLC, and Corelle Brands Holdings Inc., f/k/a WKI Holding
Company, Inc. (Corelle) for various claims arising from the
allegedly defective manufacturing of Pyrex glassware.

Plaintiffs allege that the tempering process: (1) increases the
risk of breakage when consumers use the Product over time (2)
causes the glass to shatter rather than dicing into safer, small
pieces when it breaks and (3) increases the risk that broken glass
will fly through the air due to the process' creation of internal
tension in the glass.

Legal Standard

Motion to Dismiss—Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants seeks to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  To survive Defendants' motion under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Complaint must state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. For a claim to have facial plausibility, a
plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The amount of factual allegations required to
state a plausible claim for relief depends on the complexity of the
case, but threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.  

Standing

Standing requires, among other things, that the plaintiff suffered
an injury in fact. With this background in mind, this Court turns
to whether Plaintiffs Simon and Fullerton possess standing to
assert their claims. Both individuals base their claims upon the
failure to receive the benefit of the bargain. In other words,
Plaintiffs seek damages meant to give them the benefit they
expected to receive from the contract they made with Defendants.
  
Consequently, this Court dismisses all of Plaintiffs Simon's and
Fullerton's claims without prejudice. Additionally, because
Plaintiff Simon is the only class representative asserting claims
based upon Michigan law, Plaintiffs' claims asserting violations of
Michigan law are dismissed because the putative class claims cannot
proceed without a class representative, this claim cannot proceed.

Express Warranty Claims

Plaintiffs allege Defendants sold the Products with several express
warranties attached. Defendants contest the existence of some
express warranties, challenge that they did not breach others, and
argue that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for some of their
express warranty allegations.

Under New York, Illinois, Florida, Ohio, and Massachusetts law, an
express warranty includes any affirmation of fact or promise made
by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain or any description of the goods
which is made part of the basis of the bargain.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Defendants'
representations that the Products as currently manufactured are
high-quality, versatile, and safe to use in a variety of settings
including high temperatures and sudden heat changes could
constitute an affirmation of fact or promise and/or a description
of the goods that is part of the basis of bargain. Therefore,
Plaintiffs sufficiently allege breach of express warranty beyond
the Limited Warranty.  

Timeliness of Plaintiffs' New York and Massachusetts Express
Warranty Claims (Counts 2 and 7)
Under New York and Massachusetts law, warranty claims must be
asserted within four years after the cause of action accrued.  

Plaintiffs Slepian and Klein purchased the relevant Pyrex products
more than four years ago. For that reason, Plaintiffs fail to
allege that they timely asserted their claims. Instead they argue
Defendants' actions tolled the statute of limitations,  because
Defendants allegedly concealed the "true character, nature, and
quality of soda lime Pyrex. Yet Defendants expressly disclosed on
the Limited Warranty and safety instructions that accompany all
Pyrex products that Defendants' Pyrex may shatter when exposed to a
sudden change in temperature.  And, as Plaintiffs also note in
their Complaint, public documents, which Plaintiffs could have
discovered with reasonable diligence, detail that Pyrex made from
soda lime glass remained more susceptible to shattering when
exposed to sudden temperature changes.   

Accordingly, this Court dismisses Plaintiffs Slepian's and Klein's
breach of express warranty claims under New York and Massachusetts
law as untimely.

Florida Express Warranty Claims (Count 3)

Defendants' argue that Plaintiff Grau's Florida express warranty
claim fails to allege a specific representation that she relied
upon when purchasing the Products as required to state a claim
under Florida law. Although the Florida Uniform Sales Act casts
doubt on whether reliance remains an element of a claim for breach
of express warranty,  Florida courts continue to treat reliance as
an essential element of a breach of express warranty claim.
Therefore, this Court treats reliance as an element of the claim
under Florida law.

Plaintiff Grau, however, has not alleged what representations
Defendants made that she relied upon when purchasing her Pyrex.
Without alleging reliance, Plaintiff Grau fails to sufficiently
allege a claim for breach of express warranty under Florida law.  


As such, this Court grants without prejudice Defendants' motion to
dismiss her claim.

Ohio Express Warranty Claim (Count 6)

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff Schutte's express warranty
claims are deficient because she failed to allege how she gave
Defendants notice prior to filing suit. Under Ohio law, the buyer
must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from
any remedy. Plaintiff Schutte concedes she did not provide
Defendants pre-suit notice.  

Rather, she argues that no notice obligation exists because
Defendants already knew of the defect and, thus, they already knew
they were in breach. But, even if Defendants have independent
knowledge of their breach, a plaintiff must still provide
pre-litigation notice.Ohio law imposes this requirement not only to
inform the defendant of the breach, but also to provide the parties
an opportunity to resolve their claims and avoid litigation
altogether by curing the defect.  

Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Schutte's express warranty
claims is granted with prejudice.

Breach of the Limited Warranty for Plaintiffs' Illinois Claim
(Count 5)

As to Plaintiff Cashmore's breach of the Limited Warranty claim,
Defendants argue her claim should be dismissed for her failure to
fulfill her obligations under the Limited Warranty, which required
her to request a replacement. Plaintiff Cashmore, however, counters
that the Limited Warranty's sole remedy to replace the Products
with new Pyrex also made from soda lime glass fails its essential
purpose and/or is unconscionable because the new Product will
suffer from the same latent defect.

Under Illinois law, a warranty term may be unenforceable when the
warranty is unconscionable.  If the warranty term is unenforceable,
then compliance with that term is unnecessary. In this case,
Plaintiff Cashmore alleged that the Products contain a latent
defect that Defendants knew of when they sold the Products.  

As such, Plaintiff Cashmore has sufficiently stated a claim for
procedural unconscionability thus making the Limited Warranty's
terms unenforceable. Therefore, Plaintiff Cashmore's allegations
remain sufficient to sustain a breach of contract claim under the
Limited Warranty, even though she did not request a replacement.

Implied Warranty Claims

Plaintiffs also allege violations of various implied warranty laws.
They allege that the Products are not fit for use as versatile
bakeware. Defendants present multiple arguments as to why
Plaintiffs' implied warranty claims should be dismissed.  

First, they argue that all of Plaintiffs' claims should be
summarily dismissed because they fail to allege the Products do not
perform as reasonably expected.  

In this case, though, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged facts that a
consumer might reasonably expect the Products to withstand sudden
temperature changes better than they currently do. Plaintiffs
allege that borosilicate Pyrex has a long history with consumers.
Plaintiffs also note Defendants, and Corning before them,
advertised Pyrex as uniquely versatile and able to withstand sudden
and extreme changes in temperature.   

Based upon Plaintiffs' allegations including the nature of Pyrex's
extensive consumer history, the fact that the Products continue to
be sold under the Pyrex name, are still marketed as versatile and
safe and that Defendants fail to note on the Products or in
advertisements that the Products are now made with a less thermal
resistant glass, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts
plausibly showing that the Products do not perform as reasonably
expected.

This Court next turns to Defendants' specific arguments regarding
the various state implied warranty claims.

Timeliness of New York and Massachusetts Implied Warranty Claim
(Counts 8 and 13)

Defendants argue that the New York and Massachusetts claims for
breach of implied warranty are untimely. As this Court explained
earlier, under New York and Massachusetts law, warranty claims must
be asserted within four years after the cause of action accrued.
Plaintiff Slepian's and Plaintiff Klein's implied warranty claims
accrued more than four years ago and are thus time-barred.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 8 and 13 is
granted.

Failure to Plead Privity for Plaintiffs Florida, Illinois, and Ohio
(Counts 9, 11, and 12)

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff Grau's, Plaintiff Cashmore's,
and Plaintiff Schutte's respective Florida, Illinois, and Ohio
implied warranty claims should be dismissed for lack privity.  
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege
privity because they purchased the Products from various retailers
rather than directly from Defendants. Id. Plaintiff Grau, Plaintiff
Cashmore, and Plaintiff Schutte concede they lack privity with
Defendants but counter that their claims should be exempted from
this requirement because they were the intended third-party
beneficiaries and because Defendants dealt directly with consumers.


Under Illinois law, privity constitutes an essential prerequisite
to state a claim for economic damages based upon a breach of
implied contract. An exception to this general rule exists,
however, when the manufacturer and the consumer had a direct
relationship, or when the manufacturer knew the identity, purpose,
and requirements of the seller's customer and delivered the goods
to meet those requirements.  

Here, Plaintiff Cashmore has not sufficiently alleged facts showing
a direct relationship under Illinois law. While Plaintiffs
generally alleges Defendants made representations and
advertisements that were directed at consumers. Plaintiff Cashmore
has not alleged any information establishing a direct relationship.
For example, she has not alleged: any direct communications with
Defendants or their agents prior to purchasing the Products, facts
showing that Defendants took unique steps to create the Product for
her needs or remedy the defect for her needs, or that Defendants
were aware that Plaintiff Cashmore was Walmart's ultimate customer.
Without more, her implied warranty claim cannot proceed.

For these reasons, Plaintiff Cashmore's Illinois implied warranty
claim is dismissed with prejudice.

This Court now turns to Plaintiff Grau's breach of implied warranty
claim. Florida law also strictly requires privity to sustain a
claim of breach of implied warranty. The privity requirement
extends to consumer claims even when the manufacturer directly
markets its products to consumers. Here, Plaintiff Grau alleged
that she purchased the Product from Target rather than Defendants.
Therefore, she fails to allege privity and, by extension, fails to
state a claim for breach of implied warranty. Her claim is, thus,
dismissed with prejudice.

Finally, Ohio law also requires privity of contract to state a
claim for breach of implied warranty. Ohio courts have also
declined to recognize an exception to this requirement for intended
beneficiaries of a manufacturer's agreement with a retailer given
the Ohio Supreme Court's unequivocal language that privity is
required to maintain an implied warranty claim. Despite the privity
requirement, Plaintiff Schutte pled that she purchased the Products
from Kroger.This Court, thus, grants with prejudice Defendants'
motion to dismiss Plaintiff Schutte's claim for breach of implied
warranty.

Because this Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs' Implied
Warranty claims, this Court need not evaluate Defendants' further
arguments that Plaintiffs Slepian's and Klein's claims are
defective because they misused their Products, and that Plaintiff
Slepain's and Plaintiff Schutte's claims failed to plead notice.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims (Count 1)

Defendants argue that where Plaintiffs' state warranty claims fail,
so too do their Magnuson-Mass Warranty Act (MMWA) claims. This
Court agrees. The Act provides federal jurisdiction for plaintiffs
to assert warranty claims but does not provide substantive rights.
Therefore, if a plaintiff's state law warranty claim is
insufficient, her MMWA claim must also be dismissed. Thus,
Plaintiffs MMWA claims rise and fall with their state law warranty
claims.

Plaintiffs' Common Law Contract Claims (Count 15)

Plaintiffs assert a generalized common law contract claim should
this Court dismiss their UCC-based warranty claims. This claim
fails as a matter of law. Whenever a provision of the UCC applies
to the parties' claims, then the UCC displaces common law claims.
Plaintiffs fail to provide any authority as to why the UCC does not
apply to their claims. For this reason, this Court dismisses
Plaintiffs' common law contract claim without prejudice.

Plaintiffs' Consumer Protection Claims

Unlike Plaintiffs' contract claims, which are based upon
Defendants' representations, Plaintiffs assert claims for
violations of various consumer protection statutes based upon
Defendants' alleged omission on the Products and in advertising
that the Products are now made from a less heat resistant glass.
Defendants advance two arguments arguing that this Court should
summarily dismiss Plaintiffs' consumer protection claims.  

Defendants' Express Disclosure of the Defect

Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs' consumer protection
claims must be summarily dismissed because Defendants expressly
disclosed that the Products may experience thermal breakage in the
Products' Limited Warranty and user instructions. Even so,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants gave conflicting instructions and
representations that were likely to confuse a reasonable consumer.

  
This Court finds Plaintiffs' allegations sufficient to state a
claim for consumer deception.

Plaintiffs allege that: Defendants continue to market their
Products under the longstanding Pyrex name; that they fail to
expressly state the Products are now made with a less thermal
resistant form of glass; that when they do address the material
change on an FAQ, Defendants fail to explain the defect and
represent generally that soda lime glass provides the same
high-quality performance as borosilicate and that the Products are
versatile and dishwasher, refrigerator, microwave, preheated oven
safe.  

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim that a reasonable
consumer may be misled into believing the Products are safer, more
versatile, and more resistant to thermal breakage than they are,
even in spite of Defendants' warning.

Plaintiffs' Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity

Defendants also argue that all of Plaintiffs' state consumer fraud
claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b). This Court disagrees for several reasons. First, contrary to
Defendants' assertion, the various state consumer protection laws
implicated here do not require Plaintiffs to meet the Rule 9(b)
heightened pleading standard. For example, in Florida, the
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act was enacted to provide
remedies outside the reach of common law torts such as fraud, and
therefore, the plaintiff need not prove the elements of fraud to
sustain an action under the statute.

Besides, Plaintiffs base their consumer protection claims upon a
fraudulent omission theory. The standard to state a fraudulent
omission claim under Rule 9(b) is more relaxed than the typical
fraud claim. To plead fraudulent omission, Plaintiffs must allege
details regarding the who, what, when, where, and how. Here,
Plaintiffs allege those details by asserting that Defendants, since
switching to soda lime glass, failed to disclose to consumers,
either on the Products or in marketing campaigns, that the Products
were made from an allegedly lower quality glass. These allegations
remain sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent omission.

Defendants also allege various pleading defects as to particular
consumer protection statutes. This Court will now address these
arguments in turn.

Timeliness of Plaintiffs' New York Claims (Counts 16 and 17)

Corelle argues that Plaintiff Slepian's consumer fraud claims are
untimely. Claims brought under New York General Business Law
Section 349 and 350 are subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. The cause of action begins to accrue at the time
Plaintiffs purchased the inherently defective Products. Plaintiff
Slepian purchased the Products in 2013. Her claims, then, are
time-barred as she purchased her Pyrex product more than three
years ago.

Thus, this Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 16 and
17.

Failure to Plead the Elements of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act (Count 22)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff Schutte's claim under the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA) fails to allege facts showing
that Defendants had prior notice that their specific actions were
deceptive or unconscionable.  

Ohio courts articulated:

To adequately plead prior notice under O.R.C. Section 1345.09(B),
plaintiff must allege either that a specific rule or regulation has
been promulgated by the Ohio Attorney General under R.C. 1345.05
that specifically characterizes the challenged practice as unfair
or deceptive, or that an Ohio state court has found the specific
practice either unconscionable or deceptive in a decision open to
public inspection.

To fulfill the notice requirement, Plaintiff Schutte cites a
section of Ohio's Administrative Code that generally prohibits
misleading representations. But generic provisions are not enough
because Plaintiff Schutte must identify a substantially similar act
or practice which the Ohio Attorney General or an Ohio court
previously declared deceptive. The generic provision Plaintiff
Schutte cites does not refer to any particular act or practice such
as a substantially similar conduct taken within the same industry.
Because Plaintiff Schutte failed to allege Defendant had prior
notice that its actions were deceptive as required under the OCSPA,
this Court dismisses her OCSPA claim.

Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Count 23)

Plaintiff Schutte's claim under the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (ODTPA) also fails. While the Ohio Supreme Court has not
addressed the question of whether consumers have standing to assert
claims under the ODTPA, the vast majority of federal courts and all
lower Ohio state courts to address the issue have concluded that
relief under the DTPA is not available to consumers.

Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiff Schutte, as a consumer, does
not have standing to assert this claim and dismisses Count 23.

Failure to Plead Reliance or Causation for Plaintiffs' New York,
Florida, Illinois, and Ohio Consumer Fraud Claims (Counts 16-23)

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' New York, Florida,
Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio consumer protection claims because
Plaintiffs failed to identify any specific representation they
relied upon when purchasing the Products, thereby leading to their
injury. Because this Court already dismissed Plaintiffs' New York,
Michigan, and Ohio consumer fraud claims on other grounds, this
Court will only consider Plaintiffs' Florida and Illinois claims.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims fail to identify a
specific representation they relied upon to their detriment in
purchasing the Products. Typically, to state this type of claim, a
plaintiff must allege the specific representation the defendant
made upon which he or she relied.  

Yet Defendants misunderstand Plaintiffs' allegations. For their
consumer protection claims, Plaintiffs state they were harmed by
Defendants' omission rather than any representation. Plaintiffs
further pled that had they been aware of the Defect, i.e. that the
Product was made from soda lime glass which is more susceptible to
shattering, they would not have purchased or used Pyrex. These
allegations suffice to state a claim of consumer deception based
upon fraudulent concealment.  

In sum, this Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
Florida and Illinois consumer fraud claims based upon a theory of
fraudulent concealment.

Failure to Allege Future Harm under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (Count 21)

Plaintiff Cashmore seeks injunctive relief against Defendants under
the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA). The
UDTPA is designed to enjoin trade practices that are deceptive or
confusing to consumers.  A claim is proper under the UDTPA when the
plaintiff alleges facts showing a likelihood of future damage.
Defendants contend that given that Plaintiff Cashmore is now aware
the Products are manufactured with soda lime glass, she is unlikely
to succumb to future harm by purchasing the Products again.  

In fact, she even alleges that had she known of the defect when she
purchased the Products, she would have taken a different course of
action. Therefore, Defendants argue that she is at no risk of
continuing to be fooled by Defendants' allegedly deceptive
conduct.

This Court finds Defendants' argument persuasive. Indeed, the
UDTPA's future harm requirement frequently proves problematic for
plaintiffs asserting consumer claims. This Court concludes that
Plaintiff Cashmore has failed to adequately plead a likelihood of
future injury. For that reason, this Court dismisses Count 21.

Failure to Allege a Violation of Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Law (Count 24)

Plaintiffs allege violations of Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A based upon
the allegations of Plaintiff Klein. To state a claim sounding in
fraud under Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A, a Plaintiff must meet the
heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b). As discussed previously, however, Plaintiff Klein met this
standard as to her theory of fraudulently omission.

For this reason, this Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Klein's claim under Mass Gen. Laws ch. 93A.

Unjust Enrichment (Count 14)

Plaintiffs assert a generalized unjust enrichment claim. Plaintiffs
state they bring this claim in the alternative should their other
claims not be governed by contract law. To support this claim,
Plaintiffs assert Defendants unjustly received a benefit when
Plaintiffs purchased the defective Products. Id. Pars. 348-50. For
their part, Defendants argue that some of these claims are
time-barred and that many of these claims are improper for other
reasons.

In order to analyze this claim, this Court looks to Illinois
choice-of-law principles to determine the applicable substantive
law to Plaintiffs' claims. Illinois uses the most significant
relationship test. Under this test, the location of the injury
controls unless Illinois has a more significant relationship. In
this case, the state where the consumer lives, purchased the
products, and was injured has the more significant relationship to
the claims and govern Plaintiffs' claims. Thus, this Court will
evaluate each Plaintiff's claims based upon where she suffered an
injury.

Plaintiffs' Claims are Duplicative of Other Claims at Law

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Slepian's, Grau's, Cashmore's, and
Klein's unjust enrichment claims should be dismissed as improperly
duplicative of their contract and consumer protection claims.This
Court evaluates Plaintiffs claims in turn.

As to Plaintiff Slepian, under New York law, claims for unjust
enrichment may not proceed as a catchall cause of action. Instead
the claim is available only in unusual situations when, though the
defendant has not breached a contract nor committed a recognized
tort, circumstances create an equitable obligation running from the
defendant to the plaintiff. Although Plaintiff Slepian asserts that
her claims are not duplicative, this argument rings hollow. She
asserts not only contract claims but also tort consumer protection
claims, both of which rely upon the same underlying facts as her
unjust enrichment claim.  

Accordingly, this Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Slepian's unjust enrichment claim with prejudice.

Relatedly, under Florida law, unjust enrichment, as an equitable
remedy, is available only when the plaintiff does not have a remedy
at law available. And although unjust enrichment may be pled in the
alternative, where the unjust enrichment claim relies upon the same
factual predicates as plaintiff's legal causes of action, it is not
a true alternative theory of relief and must be dismissed.  

Here, Plaintiff Grau's unjust enrichment claims rest upon the same
factual allegations as her contract and consumer deception claims,
namely that Defendants fraudulently marketed the Products as
versatile and safe without disclosing the Products were made from
inferior soda lime glass and that she paid more than she otherwise
would have if Defendants had not concealed that the Products are
now made from soda lime glass. Because her unjust enrichment claim
relies upon the same factual predicate as her legal causes of
action, her claim must be dismissed.  

Therefore, this Court grants with prejudice Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Grau's unjust enrichment claim.

Turning to Plaintiff Klein's claims, Massachusetts law likewise
does not permit claims for unjust enrichment when Plaintiffs have
an adequate remedy at law. Indeed, under Massachusetts law, unjust
enrichment serves only as an equitable stopgap for occasional
inadequacies in contractual remedies at law.

As relevant here, Massachusetts courts consider claims for
violations of Massachusetts consumer protection law an adequate
remedy at law. Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiffs may not
prevail on their contract claims does not mean that they do not
have an adequate remedy at law. For these reasons, this Court
grants with prejudice Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff
Klein's unjust enrichment claim.

Finally, this Court examines Plaintiff Cashmore's unjust enrichment
claim under Illinois law. Unlike claims under New York, Florida,
and Massachusetts law, under Illinois law, a claim for unjust
enrichment may be asserted alongside other claims in tort,
contract, or statute.  

In this case, this Court declined to dismiss Plaintiff Cashmore's
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim. Accordingly, just as her
consumer fraud claim survived dismissal, so does Plaintiff
Cashmore's unjust enrichment claim.

Failure to Establish a Direct Relationship with Defendants under
Ohio Law

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff Schutte's Ohio unjust
enrichment claim because she has not pled facts showing that she
directly purchased Pyrex from Corelle. Under Ohio law, unjust
enrichment is not intended to compensate the plaintiff for damages
lost, but rather to restore the benefit she conferred on the
defendant.  

In this case, Plaintiff Schutte alleges she purchased several new
Pyrex bowls from a Kroger store in Ohio. By contrast, she does not
allege that she ever purchased Pyrex directly from Defendants. But
the Ohio Supreme Court has held that in order for a plaintiff to
confer a benefit on a defendant, an economic transaction must exist
between the parties. Ohio courts, therefore, dismiss unjust
enrichment claims when the plaintiff did not directly purchase the
goods or services from the defendant.  

Here, Plaintiff Schutte has failed to allege any facts suggesting
that her purchase conferred a benefit on Defendants. For that
reason, this Court grants Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff
Schutte's unjust enrichment claim without prejudice. Plaintiff
Schutte may reassert this claim if she can allege facts showing
that Defendants financially profited from this transaction.

In conclusion, this Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss
Count 14 with prejudice except as it relates to Plaintiff
Cashmore's claim.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach
of express warranty claims except for Plaintiff Cashmore's Illinois
claim.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach
of implied warranty claims.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim
for breach of warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
except for Plaintiff Cashmore's claim for breach of express
warranty.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach
of contract, or, alternatively, breach of common law warranty
claim. This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
claims for violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Section 349 and 350.

This Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Grau's
claim for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Simon's
claim for violation of Michigan's Consumer Protection Act.

This Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff
Cashmore's claim for violation of Illinois's Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff
Cashmore's claim for violation of Illinois's Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.

This Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Schutte's
claims under Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices Act and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.

This Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Klein's
claim for violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.

A full-text copy of the District Court’s September 30, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yxv2o96t from Leagle.com

Tricia Fullerton, Plaintiff, represented by Edward A. Wallace --
eaw@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace LLP, Gregory F. Coleman ,
Greg Coleman Law PC, 800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100, Knoxville, TN
37929, Lauren C. Kaplan -- LCK@wexlerwallace.com -- Wexler Wallace,
Adam Arthur Edwards , Greg Coleman Law PC, 800 S. Gay Street, Suite
1100, Knoxville, TN 37929, Daniel K. Bryson -- dan@wbmllp.com --
Whitfield Bryson & Mason Llp, pro hac vice, Harper T. Segui  --
harper@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, pro hac vice,
Mark E. Silvey , Greg Coleman Law PC, 800 S. Gay Street, Suite
1100, Knoxville, TN 37929, pro hac vice, Matthew E. Lee --
matt@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Byrson & Mason Llp, pro hac vice &
Rachel Lynn Soffin , Greg Coleman Law, 800 S. Gay Street, Suite
1100, Knoxville, TN 37929

Karyn Slepian, Claribel Grau & Jan Simon, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Edward A. Wallace , Wexler Wallace LLP, Gregory F. Coleman , Greg
Coleman Law PC, Lauren C. Kaplan , Wexler Wallace, Adam Arthur
Edwards , Greg Coleman Law PC, Harper T. Segui , Whitfield Bryson &
Mason LLP, pro hac vice, Mark E. Silvey , Greg Coleman Law PC, pro
hac vice, Matthew E. Lee , Whitfield Byrson & Mason Llp, pro hac
vice & Rachel Lynn Soffin , Greg Coleman Law.

Kelly Cashmore, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew E. Lee, Whitfield
Byrson & Mason Llp, pro hac vice, Rachel Lynn Soffin, Greg Coleman
Law & Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law PC.

Corelle Brands, LLC, doing business as World Kitchen, LLC & Corelle
Brands Holdings, Inc., doing business as World Kitchen Holdings,
Inc., Defendants, represented by Alexa Blaine Lutchen --
alexa.lutchen@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk & Wardwell Llp, Andrew
Scott Gehring -- andrew.ditchfield@davispolk.com -- Davis Polk &
Wardwell Llp, Frances E. Bivens -- frances.bivens@davispolk.com --
Davis Polk & Wardwell Llp, Leonard A. Gail --
lgail@masseygail.com -- Massey & Gail & Suyash Agrawal --
sagrawal@masseygail.com -- Massey & Gail LLP.


COTTON HOLDINGS: Underpays Laborers, Cabre et al. Suit Claim
------------------------------------------------------------
PEDRO J. CABRE; KASSANDRA V. CRUZ; YORMAR E. FARFAN; BELLALIZ E.
GONZALEZ; NOIRALITH B. GONZALEZ; GUSTAVO HERNANDEZ; REINALDO J.
QUINTERO; and ERICK VILLASANA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. COTTON HOLDINGS, INC.
d/b/a COTTON COMMERCIAL USA; SUPERIOR STAFFING & PAYROLL SERVICES;
VCDP COMPANIES INC., and DANIEL PAZ, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-23866-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Sept. 17, 2019) seeks to recover
from the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation,
interest, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as laborers to
perform hurricane clean-up duties at the Hyatt Residence Club Key
West, Windward Pointe following Hurricane Irma in 2017.

Cotton Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Cotton Commercial USA provides general
contracting services such as constructing heavy construction
projects. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Erin F. Medeiros, Esq.
          Matthew J. Mierzwa, Jr., Esq.
          MIERZWA & FLOYD, P.A.
          3900 Woodlake Blvd., Suite 212
          Lake Worth, FL 33463
          Telephone: (561) 966-1200
          Facsimile: (561) 966-1231
          E-mail: mmierzwa@mierzwalaw.com
                  emedeiros@mierzwalaw.com

               - and -

          Gregory K. McGillivary, Esq.
          Sara L. Faulman, Esq.
          Sarah M. Block, Esq.
          McGILLIVARY STEELE ELKIN LLP
          1101 Vermont Ave. NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 833-8855
          Facsimile: (202) 452-1090
          E-mail: gkm@mselaborlaw.com
                  slf@mselaborlaw.com
                  smb@mselaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Kerry O'Brien, Esq.
          RESILIENCE FORCE JUSTICE PROJECT
          53 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 1224
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (202) 316-8049
          Facsimile: (773) 214-0670
          E-mail: kobrien@resilienceforce.org


CREDITECH INC: Certification of Class Sought in Neldner Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Neldner moves the Court to certify the class described
in the complaint of the lawsuit captioned CHRISTOPHER NELDNER,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
CREDITECH, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-01437-PP (E.D. Wisc.), and
further asks that the Court both stay the motion for class
certification and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief
from the Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and
requiring briefs and supporting material to be filed with the
Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
contends.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          Denise L. Morris, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com
                  dmorris@ademilaw.com


DENTAQUEST LLC: Jenkins Seeks Certification of Employees Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled SHAQUAN JENKINS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. DENTAQUEST, LLC,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01432-LA (E.D. Wisc.), seeks certification of a
class defined as:

     All persons who worked for Defendant as telephone-dedicated
     employees, however titled, who were compensated, in part or
     in full, on an hourly basis in Wisconsin at any time between
     September 30, 2017 and the present who did not receive the
     full amount of wages earned and owed to them (the "Wisconsin
     Class").

Ms. Jenkins also asks the Court to appoint her counsel as counsel
for the class.

The Plaintiff's claims are brought on a class basis against the
Defendant, which provides dental plans to its members across the
country.  The Plaintiff alleges that she and those employees
similarly situated are individuals who were, or are, employed by
the Defendant in customer service and similar positions at its call
centers, who were not paid for some or all of their work activities
prior to the beginning of their shifts, or after the end of their
shifts, or both.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick J. Schott, Esq.
          SCHOTT, BUBLITZ & ENGEL S.C.
          640 W. Moreland Boulevard
          Waukesha, WI 53188
          Telephone: (262) 827-1700
          E-mail: pschott@sbe-law.com

               - and -

          James X. Bormes, Esq.
          Catherine P. Sons, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.
          8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 201-0575
          E-mail: jxbormes@bormeslaw.com
                  cpsons@bormeslaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas M. Ryan, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS M. RYAN, P.C.
          35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 650
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 726-3400
          E-mail: tom@tomryanlaw.com


DOBBERSTEIN LAW: Certification of Class Sought in Fote Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Fote moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit styled JOSEPH FOTE, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. DOBBERSTEIN LAW FIRM
LLC, COLLECTION ASSOCIATES LTD, and DUKE CAPITAL LLC, Case No.
2:19-cv-01435-LA (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court both
stay the motion for class certification and to grant the Plaintiff
(and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic
briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to
be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com


DYNAMEX OPERATIONS: Court Narrows Claims in Ouadani FLSA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DJAMEL OUADANI, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DYNAMEX OPERATIONS EAST,
LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-12036-PBS (D. Mass.), Judge
Patti B. Saris of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts (i) allowed in part and denied in part Ouadani's
motion for class certification, and (ii) denied Oudani's motion for
partial summary judgment.

Ouadani brings the lawsuit against Defendant Dynamex, alleging
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the
Massachusetts misclassification and wage laws.  He asserts
individual, class, and collective claims arising from Dynamex's
practice of classifying drivers who perform Google Shopping Express
deliveries as independent contractors.

Ouadani performed Google Express deliveries from March to August
2016.  He contracted directly with Selwyn & Bertha LLC ("S&B"),
which was one of companies Dynamex used to supply drivers for
Google Express deliveries.  S&B classified and paid Ouadani as an
independent contractor, not an employee.

Dynamex, which is now doing business as TForce Final Mile, LLC, is
headquartered in Dallas, Texas and operates a branch office in
Wilmington, Massachusetts.  It is a provider of transportation
logistics services, which include providing same-day delivery
services for its clients.  From June 1, 2014 to Oct. 14, 2016,
Dynamex contracted with Google Inc. to provide drivers to make
Google Express deliveries across several major U.S. cities,
including Boston, Massachusetts.  Dynamex's Wilmington office was
responsible for Google Express deliveries in the Greater Boston
area.

Ouadani filed the proposed class action on Oct. 11, 2016.  His
complaint asserts class claims for misclassification under Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 149 Section 148B, the Massachusetts Independent
Contractor Statute (Count I), improper deductions under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 149 Section 148 ("Massachusetts Wage Act") (Count II),
minimum wage violations under Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151, Section 1A
("Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law") (Count III), and unjust
enrichment (Count IV).  It also asserts an individual claim for
retaliation (Count V) and a collective action claim for minimum
wage violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Count VI).

Dynamex moved to dismiss and/or compel arbitration of all claims on
Feb. 9, 2017, which the Court denied on May 10, 2017.  Dynamex then
appealed the Court's decision, and the case was stayed while the
appeal was pending.  On Nov. 21, 2017, the U.S. Circuit Court for
the First Circuit denied Dynamex's appeal.  The First Circuit
subsequently lifted the stay and discovery on liability proceeded
between the parties.

On Oct. 14, 2018, Ouadani filed a motion for class certification as
to Counts I and II.  He seeks a class with the following
definition: All individuals categorized by Dynamex as indirect
drivers who performed Google Express deliveries between July 16,
2014 and Oct. 14, 2016.  On the same day, Ouadani also filed a
motion for summary judgment as to Count I only.  The Defendants
opposed both motions.  The Court held a hearing on Ouadani's class
certification and summary judgment motions on Jan. 29, 2019.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) imposes four "threshold
requirements" applicable to all class actions: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy.  Judge Saris finds that the
proposed class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a).  

And while Dynamex has not offered any evidence of how exactly the
Masters compensated their W-2 employees (i.e., an hourly rate vs.
salary), the Judge agrees that calculating their damages will
likely require individualized proof.  Moreover, it is not clear
that Dynamex can even be held liable for misclassifying Indirect
Drivers as independent contractors if they were in fact classified
by their Masters as employees.  But these issues can be avoided by
excluding all W-2 employees from the class.  For the remaining
Indirect Drivers, however, Dynamex merely speculates that their
Masters and Agents may have used different compensation schemes.  

This is not enough to overcome the inference suggested by Ouadani
and supported by the evidence that is actually in the record, the
District Court points out.  Therefore, the Judge concludes that
subject to the modifications described -- the exclusion of the
Indirect Drivers who (1) worked for Agents and (2) were W-2
employees of Masters -- the proposed class satisfies Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement.

Under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court also must be satisfied that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  The superiority inquiry
is closely related to the predominance inquiry, and Dynamex's
arguments concerning superiority mostly re-hash those it made
regarding predominance. For largely the same reasons, the Judge
does not find these arguments persuasive.  Rather, she agrees with
Ouadani that that efficiency and the policy considerations unique
to the employment context make class adjudication superior.  The
Judge is satisfied that Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement is
satisfied.

In addition to the textual requirements of Rule 23, the First
Circuit adds an ascertainability requirement to the class
certification analysis.  The parties do not contest this issue and
the Judge sees no reason why the class members are not
ascertainable.  Indeed, the parties agree which Google Express
drivers fall within the class as proposed by Ouadani.  And the
Court's modifications to the proposed class do not impact
ascertainability.  Whether the Indirect Drivers worked for Masters
or Agents and whether they were employed as W-2 employees or
independent contractors are both objective criteria.  Thus, the
Judge finds that the class satisfies the First Circuit's
ascertainability requirement.

In his motion for summary judgment, Ouadani contended that Dynamex
cannot bear its burden on either part of the Prong A inquiry and,
therefore, he is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of his
complaint for misclassification of the Indirect Drivers.  Dynamex
concedes it ran background checks and drug tests on the Indirect
Drivers. It also admits it issued the drivers uniforms and badges
(although it disputes that these uniforms and badges were always
Dynamex-branded). But these concessions are not enough to establish
that Dynamex controlled the "means and methods" by which the
Indirect Drivers performed Google Express deliveries.   Ouadani
contended that Dynamex has manufactured many of these factual
disputes by submitting an affidavit that directly contradicts the
documentary evidence and the deposition testimony of its corporate
representative.

Judge Saris is not persuaded.  For the most part, the Judge finds
that the affidavit contradicts Ouadani's characterization of the
facts.  These contradictions will have to be resolved at trial.
She does not find as a matter of law that Dynamex exercised actual
control over the indirect drivers.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Saris (i) allowed in part and
denied in part Ouadani's motion for class certification as to
Counts I and II of the complaint.  The Judge certified the
following class:  All individuals who performed Google Express
deliveries between July 16, 2014 and Oct. 14, 2016 who (1) were
categorized by Dynamex as indirect drivers, (2) were associated
with a master independent contractor, and (3) were not W-2
employees of their master independent contractor.  The Judge denied
Ouadani's motion for summary judgment as to Count I of the
complaint.  

A status conference on the matter was to be held on Oct. 1, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Memorandum and Order
is available at https://is.gd/llQke6 from Leagle.com.

Djamel Ouadani, On Behalf of himself and all others similary
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen S. Churchill, Esq. --
steve@fairworklaw.com -- and -- Rachel J. Smit, Esq. --
rachel@fairworklaw.com -- FAIR WORK, P.C.

Dynamex Operations East, LLC, Defendant, represented by Diane M.
Saunders -- daine@saunders@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart.

Dynamex Operations East, LLC, ThirdParty Plaintiff, represented by
Diane M. Saunders, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart.

Sylwin and Bertha Shipping, ThirdParty Defendant, represented by
Shehzad S. Rajwani -- srajwani@harborlaw.com -- The Harbor Law
Group.

Sylwin and Bertha Shipping, Counter Claimant, represented by
Shehzad S. Rajwani, The Harbor Law Group.

Dynamex Operations East, LLC, Counter Defendant, represented by
Diane M. Saunders, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart.


ECO SHIELD: Service Technicians Class Certified in Fanslau Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Manish S. Shah grants the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for
conditional certification and to facilitate notice pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act in the lawsuit entitled MATTHEW FANSLAU,
et al. v. ECO SHIELD PEST CONTROL CHICAGO, LLC, et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-07181 (N.D. Ill.).

Judge Shah conditionally certifies a collective action for all
service technicians that were employed on a non-exempt,
hourly-compensated basis in the State of Illinois by Eco Shield
Chicago LLC at any point during the three years preceding the date
of notice.  This potential class shall include any employees that
had a title or duties similar to "service technician," including
but not limited to start technicians and pest technicians.

The amended proposed notice, as modified by this order, may issue,
Judge Shah says.  He directs the Defendants to produce to the
Plaintiff by October 28, 2019, a computer-readable data file
containing the names, last-known addresses, e-mail addresses, phone
numbers, and dates of employment of the conditionally certified
FLSA collective.

"At the present time, I see no need for the disclosure of social
security numbers or dates of birth.  Disclosure of email addresses,
phone numbers, and last known addresses is warranted because the
putative class members appear to be spread throughout the state and
because such methods of communication appear reasonably calculated
to inform them of this collective action," Judge Shah notes.

All opt-in consent forms must be returned and executed within 60
days of the date the first notice is sent.  This will allow members
of the putative collective to receive "accurate and timely notice
concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can
make informed decisions about whether to participate," Judge Shah
opines, citing Hoffman-LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 170.  He adds that
disclosure of the dates of employment will facilitate the
Plaintiffs' counsel's communication with the potential opt-in
plaintiffs and allow counsel to accurately advise the opt-ins about
the nature of this action as it may apply to them.[CC]


ELECTROCORE INC: Faces Turnofsky Class Action Suit in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------
electroCore, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 2, 2019, that
the company has been named as a defendant in a putative class
action suit entitled, Allyn Turnofsky vs. electroCore, Inc., et
al., Case 3:19-cv-18400.

On September 26, 2019, a purported stockholder of the Company
served a putative class action lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey captioned Allyn
Turnofsky vs. electroCore, Inc., et al., Case 3:19-cv-18400.

In addition to the Company, the defendants include present and past
directors and officers and the underwriters for the Company's
initial public offering.

The plaintiff seeks to represent a class of stockholders who (i)
purchased common stock of the Company in its initial public
offering (the "IPO") or whose purchases are traceable to the IPO,
or (ii) who purchased common stock of the Company between the IPO
and September 25, 2019.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Exchange Act of 1934, with respect to (i) the registration
statement and related prospectus for the IPO, and (ii) certain
later public disclosures. The complaint seeks unspecified
compensatory damages, interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

The Company intends to vigorously defend itself; however, in light
of, among other things, the preliminary stage of the litigation,
the Company is unable to provide any assurances as to the ultimate
outcome of the lawsuit and is unable to make a meaningful estimate
of the amount or range of loss, if any, that could result from an
unfavorable outcome.

electroCore, Inc., a bioelectronic medicine company, engages in
developing a range of patient administered non-invasive vagus nerve
(VNS) stimulation therapies for the treatment of various conditions
in neurology, rheumatology, and other fields. The company was
founded in 2005 and is headquartered in Basking Ridge, New Jersey.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Class of Consumers Certified in Reyes Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Andrew J. Guilford grants the Plaintiff's motion for
class certification in the lawsuit styled DEMETA REYES V. EXPERIAN
INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Case No. 8:16-cv-00563-AG-AFM (C.D.
Cal.).

The class is defined as:

    "All persons whose Experian consumer report contained an
     account from Delbert Services Corp. reflecting delinquency
     on a loan originated by Western Sky Financial, LLC after
     January 21, 2015 . . . ."

The Plaintiff defines "delinquency" as "accounts that have been
charged off, sent to collection, and/or reflect past due or late
payments[.]"  Excluded from the Class are certain persons
affiliated with Experian, as well as "any judge, justice or
judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of
their immediate families and judicial staff."

The Court also appoints Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP as class counsel
in this case.

"Any arguments not addressed in this lengthy order either weren't
convincing or didn't need to be addressed at this time," according
to the Court's Civil Minutes.

In February 2016, Plaintiff Demeta Reyes, a Georgia resident, filed
this putative class action against Defendant Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., a nationwide credit-reporting agency headquartered
in Costa Mesa, California.  The Plaintiff purports to assert one
claim for relief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.[CC]


FAIRLIFE, LLC: Maltreated Dairy Cow, Olivo Claims
-------------------------------------------------
MARLENY OLIVO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, and FAIRLIFE,
LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-08302 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 25,
2019), seeks to hold Defendants liable for engaging in a massive
consumer fraud involving the sale of milk products.

The Defendants advertised, promoted, and sold a variety of milk
products at premium prices justified solely by the representation
that the milk was obtained from dairy cows that receive
"extraordinary" care. That was false. Fair Oaks Farms, run by
defendants Mike and Sue McCloskey, abused and tortured the dairy
cows and young calves on the farm. Undercover video exposed the
sickening treatment of these animals -- treatment that one hopes is
far worse than the treatment of dairy cows and calves on any other
dairy farm that produces and sells milk at a non-premium price. The
Plaintiffs were deceived into purchasing Defendants' products.

Therefore, the Products are not merchantable under California law
and Defendants have breached their implied warranty of
merchantability in regard to the Products.

If Plaintiff and members of both the California Subclass and
California Consumer Subclass had known that the Products were not
made with milk from humanely raised cows, they would not have
purchased them or would not have been willing to pay the premium
price associated with the milk. Therefore, as a direct and/or
indirect result of Defendants' breach, Plaintiff and members of
both the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass have
suffered injury and deserve to recover all damages afforded under
the law, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Benjamin Heikali, Esq.
          Joshua Nassir, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          10866 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1470
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (424) 256-2884
          Facsimile: (424) 256-2885
          E-mail: bheikali@faruqilaw.com
                  jnassir@faruqilaw.com

FINANCIAL ASSET: Molinari Seeks to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as RICHARD MOLINARI, the
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated
individuals, the Plaintiff, vs. FINANCIAL ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01526 (N.D. Ill.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   a. certifying a class of:

      "all persons who were called with pre-recorded voice
      messages without their consent";

   b. appointing the Plaintiff as Class Representative; and

   c. appointing James C. Vlahakis as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.[CC]

Attorney for the Plaintiff and the proposed class members are:

          James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
          2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: 630 581-5456
          Facsimile: 630 575-8188
          E-mail: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com

FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Certification of Class Sought in Voeks Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Megan Voeks moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned MEGAN VOEKS, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. FINANCIAL RECOVERY
SERVICES INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-01438-WED (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Valerio Files FDCPA Suit in New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Recovery
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Maria Valerio, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Financial Recovery Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05700 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 9, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Financial Recovery Services, Inc. provides debt collection
services. The Company offers comprehensive coverage, auditing,
monitoring, electronic file transfer, legal collections,
skiptracing, bilingual capability, and comprehensive data security
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


FOCUS SERVICES: Bid for Conditional Certification Continued
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Mikayla Pretzsch, the
Plaintiff, v. Focus Services, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-03599 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Charles P. Kocoras
entered an order continuing Plaintiff's motion for Conditional
Certification and Court-Authorized Notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
section 216(b), according to the docket entry made by the Clerk on
October 8, 2019.

As previously reported by Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
filed the lawsuit on behalf of herself and all similarly situated
current and/or former Customer Service Representative employees of
Defendants to recover for Defendants' willful violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law
("IMWL"), Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), alleged
contractual obligations (or unjust enrichment if no contract is
found), and other appropriate rules, regulations, statutes, and
ordinances.

Focus Services LLC is a privately owned call center service
provider, specializing in multi-product telesales and customer
relationship management founded in 1995. It has locations in the
United States, El Salvador, England, Nicaragua, India, China,
Brazil and the Philippines.[CC]

FORD MOTOR: 9th Cir. Vacates Lower Court's OK of Vargas Class Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, OMAR VARGAS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BRENDA
LOTT, et al., Objectors-Appellants, v. JASON DEBOLT,
Objector-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Case
Nos. 17-56745, 17-56746 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's approval of the
pre-certification class settlement between Defendant Ford and a
nationwide class of consumers.

The appeal concerns a putative nationwide class action alleging
defects in the transmission of the 2011-2016 Ford Fiesta and the
2012-2016 Ford Focus.  The district court approved a
pre-certification class settlement between Defendant Ford and a
nationwide class of consumers.  In exchange for release of all
claims, the settlement provided that any class member who brought
in their vehicle for transmission repairs would be entitled to cash
payments for the third and every subsequent repair.  The settlement
also allowed class members to seek, through arbitration, repurchase
when authorized by the consumer's state's lemon law.  Finally, the
Defendant agreed not to object to an award of $8,856,000 in fees to
the class counsel.

Objectors Brenda Lott, Suzanne Lutz, Carlie Olivant, Gail Slomine,
and Philip Woloszyn ("Lott Objectors") appealed the lower court's
decision, arguing that the district court failed to justify its
conclusion that the settlement provided meaningful value to the
class members.  Objector Jason DeBolt separately appealed, arguing
that the district court erred in refusing to consider his
objections.

The Appellate Court finds that the district court did not undertake
the comprehensive review required by the Court's precedent.  For
example, the court adopted the estimate of the class counsel's
expert that the cash payments were worth around $35 million.  As
the Lott Objectors noted, however, that calculation was based on
the total payments available to every eligible vehicle.  Because
the actual claims rate is likely to be very much less than 100%,
the actual value of the settlement is almost certainly much lower.


From the record, the Appellate Court cannot determine whether the
district court made an effort to estimate the likely claims rate.
Additionally, while the Plaintiffs represented that the class was
likely to include nearly 2 million members, the Plaintiffs' own
expert found that there were only 92,891 eligible vehicles, with
another 143,178 close to eligibility.  Thus, only a very small
fraction of the class likely stands to gain any monetary benefit.
The district court's analysis failed to analyze the settlement's
fairness in light of this information.

The lower court's analysis of the arbitration provision was
similarly truncated, resting largely on the conclusion that the
arbitration procedure appears more favorable to claimants than the
typical lemon law suit, the Appellate Court notes.  The Ninth
Circuit  holds that this analysis was not the sufficiently reasoned
response required by the precedent.  For even if that were true, it
does not determine whether releasing all claims against Ford,
including those governed by less stringent standards than lemon
laws, is fair or reasonable.

Finally, with respect to the fee award, the Appellate Court has
warned district courts to be alert for certain subtle signs that
the class counsel has allowed pursuit of their own self-interests
and that of certain class members to infect the negotiations.  At
least two of those signs are present in the settlement, which
includes a fee award disproportionate to the class recovery and a
"clear sailing" provision whereby the Defendant agreed not to
object to the award sought by the class counsel.  The district
court did not examine the settlement and develop record to support
its final approval decision, the Appellate Court held.

The district court's failure to give a reasoned response to all
non-frivolous objections precludes affirmance on this record, the
Appellate Court further held. Because the district court did not
satisfy the procedural standard required by the caselaw, the
Appellate Court vacated the final settlement approval and remanded
so that the district court may conduct a more searching inquiry.
In light of this disposition, the Appellate Court has no occasion
to consider Objector DeBolt's separate arguments for vacatur.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/1wtd0K from Leagle.com.


FOURPOINT ENERGY: Rounds Files Class Action in Colorado
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FourPoint Energy,
LLC. The case is styled as Kenny Wayne Rounds and Randy Carl Smith,
on behalf of themselves and on all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. FourPoint Energy, LLC, a Colorado limited liability
company, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-02878 (D. Colo., Oct. 8,
2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Contract: Other
filed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.

FourPoint Energy, LLC is a private oil and gas exploration and
production company founded by the leadership team of Cordillera
Energy Partners following the sale to Apache Corporation in
2012.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Reagan Edward Bradford, Esq.
   Lanier Law Firm, P.C.
   431 West Main Street, Suite D
   Oklahoma City, OK 73102
   Tel: (405) 698-2770
   Fax: (405) 234-5506
   Email: Reagan.Bradford@LanierLawFirm.com


FRANKLIN COUNTY, MA: Donelan Appeals Decision in Reid Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Matthew T. Albence, William P. Barr, Christopher
Brackett, Christopher J. Donelan, David Dubois, Executive Office
for Immigration Review, Thomas M. Hodgson, Kevin K. McAleenan,
Joseph D. McDonald, Jr., James McHenry, Denis C. Riordan, Lori
Streeter and Steven W. Tompkins filed an appeal from a Court ruling
issued in their lawsuit entitled Reid, et al. v. Donelan, et al.,
Case No. 3:13-cv-30125-PBS, in the U.S. District Court for the
District Court of Massachusetts, Springfield.

The appellate case is captioned as Reid, et al. v. Donelan, et al.,
Case No. 19-1900, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 2, 2019,
Plaintiffs Leo Felix Charles, Mark Anthony Reid and Robert Williams
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate
case is styled Reid, et al. v. Donelan, et al., Case No. 19-1787,
in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

In the class action, the Plaintiffs challenge the mandatory
detention of certain criminal aliens for more than six months
without the opportunity for a bond hearing during removal
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1226(c) under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment Excessive
Bail Clause.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that Docketing
Statement, Transcript Report/Order form, and Appearance form were
due October 7, 2019.[BN]

Petitioner-Appellee MARK ANTHONY REID is represented by:

          Muneer I. Ahmad, Esq.
          Erin Drake, Esq.
          Clare Kane, Esq.
          Zachary-John Manfredi, Esq.
          Aseem Mehta, Esq.
          My Khanh Ngo, Esq.
          Amber Qureshi, Esq.
          YALE LAW SCHOOL
          PO Box 209090
          New Haven, CT 06511
          Telephone: (203) 432-4800
          E-mail: muneer.ahmad@yale.edu
                  zachary.manfredi@gmail.com
                  aseem.mehta@aya.yale.edu
                  mk.ngo@yale.edu

               - and -

          Lunar Mai, Esq.
          Marisol Orihuela, Esq.
          YALE LAW SCHOOL
          127 Wall St.
          New Haven, CT 06511
          Telephone: (203) 432-4992
          E-mail: marisol.orihuela@yale.edu

               - and -

          Ahilan Arulanantham, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
          1313 West 8th St
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 977-5211
          E-mail: aarulanantham@aclu-sc.org

               - and -

          Matthew R. Segal, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASSACHUSETTS
          211 Congress St., 3rd Floor
          Boston, MA 02110-2485
          Telephone: (617) 482-3170
          E-mail: msegal@aclum.org

               - and -

          Michael King Thomas Tan, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
          125 Broad St., 18th Floor
          New York, NY 10004-0000
          Telephone: (212) 519-7848
          E-mail: mtan@aclu.org

               - and -

          Lauren J. Carasik, Esq.
          WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY
          1215 Wilbraham Rd.
          Springfield, MA 01119-2684
          Telephone: (413) 782-1504
          E-mail: Carasik@law.wne.edu

               - and -

          Michelle Nyein, Esq.
          Anant Kumar Saraswat, Esq.
          WOLF GREENFIELD & SACKS PC
          600 Atlantic Ave.
          Boston, MA 02210-0000
          Telephone: (617) 646-8457
          E-mail: Michelle.Nyein@WolfGreenfield.com
                  Anant.Saraswat@WolfGreenfield.com

Petitioner-Appellee MARK ANTHONY REID, and Petitioners ROBERT
WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, and
LEO FELIX CHARLES, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Michael J. Wishnie, Esq.
          YALE LAW SCHOOL
          127 Wall St.
          New Haven, CT 06511
          Telephone: (203) 432-4800
          E-mail: michael.wishnie@yale.edu

Respondents-Appellants CHRISTOPHER J. DONELAN, Sheriff, Franklin
County, Massachusetts; LORI STREETER, Superintendent, Franklin
County Jail & House of Correction; THOMAS M. HODGSON, Sheriff,
Bristol County, Massachusetts; JOSEPH D. MCDONALD, JR., Sheriff,
Plymouth County, Massachusetts; STEVEN W. TOMPKINS, Sheriff,
Suffolk County, Massachusetts; KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security; DENIS C. RIORDAN, Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Boston Field Office; MATTHEW T.
ALBENCE, Acting Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General; JAMES MCHENRY, Director of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW; DAVID DUBOIS; and CHRISTOPHER BRACKETT are
represented by:

          Janette L. Allen, Esq.
          Yamileth G. Davila, Esq.
          Lauren E. Fascett, Esq.
          Colin A. Kisor, Esq.
          Huy Le, Esq.
          Elianis N. Perez, Esq.
          Catherine M. Reno, Esq.
          J. Max Weintraub, Esq.
          U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 878
          Ben Franklin Station
          Washington, DC 20044-0878
          Telephone: (202) 532-4095
          E-mail: janette.allen@usdoj.gov
                  yamileth.g.davila@usdoj.gov
                  Lauren.Fascett@usdoj.gov
                  colin.kisor@usdoj.gov
                  elianis.perez@usdoj.gov
                  catherine.m.reno@usdoj.gov
                  jacob.weintraub@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Huy Le, Esq.
          U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 868
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 353-4028
          E-mail: M.Le2@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Karen L. Goodwin, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          300 State St., Suite 230
          Springfield, MA 01105-2926
          Telephone: (413) 785-0269
          E-mail: karen.goodwin@usdoj.gov

               - and -

          Cynthia A. Young, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          1 Courthouse Way, Suite 9200
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 748-3100


GEICO GENERAL: Interlocutory Appeal Application in Green Suit OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned YVONNE GREEN, WILMINGTON PAIN &
REHABILITATION CENTER, and REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, P.A., on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, C.A. No. N17C-03-242
EMD CCLD (Del. Super.), Judge Eric M. Davis of the Superior Court
of Delaware granted the Defendant's Application for Certification
of Interlocutory Appeal of This Court's Opinion Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

The Plaintiffs filed suit against GEICO.  As alleged, GEICO uses
two computerized models to evaluate personal injury protection
("PIP") claims of its insureds.  The Plaintiffs argued that GEICO
uses the Rules to deny valid claims without evaluating the facts
underlying the claims.  They seek certification of a class action
under Superior Court Civil Rule 23.

As part of the Civil Rule 23 process, the Plaintiffs filed their
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.  After extensive
briefing and a one-day hearing where the parties presented evidence
and arguments on May 10, 2019, the Court issued the Opinion
granting the relief sought in the Class Motion.  GEICO noted an
interlocutory appeal of the Opinion on Sept. 6, 2019.

Previously, on Sept. 5, 2019, the Plaintiffs submitted a proposed
implementing order.  GEICO has opposed entry of the Proposed Order,
arguing that the Proposed Order is merely a disguised motion to
reconsider the Opinion.  The Plaintiffs have countered and
contended that under Superior Court Civil Rule 23(d), the Court has
broad authority to manage the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument and to deal with similar
procedural matters. The orders may be altered or amended as may be
desirable from time to time.

Given that GEICO noted an appeal, Judge Davis does not feel it is
appropriate to address the Proposed Order.  The Judge is concerned
with jurisdictional issues based on the appeal and Rule 42.  The
Judge is apprehensive, though, that GEICO's appeal is premature
given that the Court has not addressed issues like "claimant
classes," "class representatives" and "class counsel" ("Open
Issues") -- all of which the Court anticipated dealing with
subsequent to issuing the Opinion.  As such, the Supreme Court may
not have an entire record to review on appeal and any decision may
warrant remand to address the Open Issues.

Judge Davis does not agree with many the contentions in the Motion.
The Judge says GEICO continually attempts to "recharacterize" the
pleadings in the civil action to fit a situation previously
addressed by the Court and the U.S. District Court for the District
of Delaware.  The Plaintiffs, however, have crafted a complaint and
asserted claims recognized as potentially valid by the Court and
adopted by, among others, the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey.  The Court previously addressed those legal issues
in GEICO's motion to dismiss ("MTD") the Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint.  The Court denied the MTD in an opinion issued on April
24, 2018.  GEICO noted an interlocutory appeal of the MTD Opinion,
however, the Supreme Court denied GEICO's request for an
interlocutory appeal.  Accordingly, the Judge does not believe that
Rule 42(b)(iii)(A)-(F) criterion apply.

Instead, the Judge grants the Motion and enters the Order
certifying an interlocutory appeal because the Opinion: (i) decides
a substantial issue of material importance that merits appellate
review before a final judgment; and (ii) implicates Rule 42(b)(iii)
(G) and (H).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/U7tnVb from Leagle.com.


GID ORTHODONTICS: Simon et al Seek to Certify Settlement Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as BRANDON SIMON and LAINEY
HOLLINGSWORTH, individually and on behalf of those similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. KEVIN J. ISON DMD PSC, d/b/a
ORTHODONTIC SPECIALISTS; GID ORTHODONTICS LLC, d/b/a ORTHODONTICS
SPECIALISTS; and DR. KEVIN J. ISON, DMD, MS, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:18-cv-00458-SJD-KLL (S.D. Ohio),the Plaintiffs ask the Court
on Oct. 10, 2019 for an order:

   1. preliminarily certifying a Settlement Class;

      "all persons who worked as hourly and non-exempt employees
      for Defendants, and who worked in excess of 40 hours in any
      workweek, and who were not paid one and one-half times their

      regular rate of pay for the hours worked in excess of 40 in
      any such workweek";

   2. approving the Parties' proposed Settlement Agreement;

   3. allowing Plaintiffs to send notice to the Settlement Class
      members;

   4. scheduling a Fairness Hearing at the earliest possible
      date, at which time the parties will request final approval
      of the settlement; and

   5. establishing a schedule to complete the tasks necessary to
      effectuate the proposed settlement, and for such other and
      further relief as the Court may deem equitable and just.

The proposed Settlement Agreement requires Defendants to pay
$110,000 into a settlement fund. The settlement amount will cover
all of Defendants' settlement obligations to Plaintiffs and the
class members. From the settlement fund, Plaintiffs' counsel shall
pay a proposed service payment to the class representatives in the
amount of $3,500 per individual and attorneys' fees and costs in
the amount of $55,000. The settlement administration costs will be
borne by Plaintiffs' counsel and deducted from the attorneys' fees
and costs awarded to them.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to properly calculate
and pay overtime wages to certain non-exempt, hourly employees who
worked more than 40 hours per week. The Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants' acts and omissions violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, and the Commonwealth
of Kentucky's wage and hour laws.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stephen E. Imm, Esq.
          FINNEY LAW FIRM
          4270 Ivy Pointe Blvd., Suite 225
          Cincinnati, OH 45245
          Telephone: (513) 943-5678

               - and -

          Bruce H. Meizlish, Esq.
          Deborah R. Grayson, Esq.
          MEIZLISH & GRAYSON
          830 Main Street, Suite 999
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 345-4700

Counsel for the Defendants are:

          Katherine B. Capito, Esq.
          HISSAM FORMAN DONOVAN RITCHIE PLLC
          707 Virginia Street East, Suite 260
          Charleston, WV 25301
          Telephone: (681) 265-3802

GOLDEN TRUST INSURANCE: Perez Files Consumer Class Suit in Florida
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Golden Trust
Insurance, Inc. The case is styled as Manuel Perez, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Golden
Trust Insurance, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-24157-MGC (S.D. Fla., Oct. 9, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Consumer Credit.

GoldenTrust Insurance is located in Miami, Florida, with offices in
Coral Gables, Hialeah, Doral and Kendall.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
   Shamis, Gentile, P.A.
   7241 SW 118 St
   Pinecrest, FL 33156
   Tel: (305) 298-2253
   Email: gberg@shamisgentile.com

      - and -

   Scott Adam Edelsberg, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law PA
   20900 NE 30th Ave 417
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (305) 975-3320
   Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com

      - and -

   Andrew John Shamis, Esq.
   14 NE 1st Ave STE 1205
   Miami, FL 33131
   Tel: (404) 797-9696
   Email: ashamis@sflinjuryattorneys.com



HARTFORD AUTO: Faces Willingham Suit in Connecticut Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hartford Auto Group,
Inc. The case is captioned as RALPH WILLINGHAM AND OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, the Plaintiff, vs. HARTFORD AUTO GROUP, INC. D/B/A: MAC
MITSUBISHI; SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.; and JOHN DOE, the
Defendants, Case No. HHD-CV-19-6117177-S (Conn. Super., Sept. 16,
2019).[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          CONSUMER LAW GROUP LLC
          35 Cold Spring Road, Suite 512
          Rocky Hill, CT 06067
          Telephone: (860) 571-0408

HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Faces Ingber Antitrust Suit in N.D. Calif.
----------------------------------------------------------------
TED INGBER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY INC.,
MAGNECOMP PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC CO. LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL
(DONG GUAN) CO., LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (H.K.) CO. LTD., NHK SPRING
CO. LTD., NHK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, NHK SPRING (THAILAND) CO.,
LTD., SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD., AND TDK CORPORATION, Case No.
3:19-cv-05938 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 23, 2019), is brought for damages
and injunctive relief pursuant to federal antitrust laws, state
antitrust laws, unfair competition, and consumer protection laws.

The Plaintiff's claims arise from the Defendants' unlawful
agreement to eliminate competition, fix prices, and allocate
markets for hard disk drive suspension assemblies ("HDD Suspension
Assemblies") sold in the United States.  The Plaintiff brings this
antitrust class action on behalf of individuals and entities that
indirectly purchased HDD Suspension Assemblies in the United States
from the Defendants, their predecessors, any subsidiaries or
affiliates thereof, or any of their named and unnamed
coconspirators.

HDD Suspension Assemblies are a critical component of hard disk
drives, which are used to store electronic information.  The
Plaintiff and members of the Class paid artificially inflated
prices for HDD Suspension Assemblies and have been injured in their
business and property, according to the complaint.

The Defendants manufactured and/or supplied HDD Suspension
Assemblies, either directly or indirectly through its subsidiaries
or affiliates, to customers in the United States.

Headway Technologies, Inc. is a Delaware corporation wholly owned
by TDK, with its principal place of business located in Milpitas,
California.  Headway provides recording head products to the HDD
industry and employs approximately 800 people in engineering,
manufacturing and administration roles in Milpitas.  TDK is a
Japanese corporation with its principal place of business located
in Tokyo, Japan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrice L. Bishop, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          9430 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 400
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 209-2468
          Facsimile: (310) 209-2087
          E-mail: pbishop@ssbla.com

               - and -

          Melissa R. Emert, Esq.
          STULL, STULL & BRODY
          6 East 45th Street
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 687-7230
          Facsimile: (212) 490-2022
          E-mail: memert@ssbny.com


HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL: Court Compels Arbitration in Marron Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID H. MARRON, Plaintiff, v. HEALTHSOURCE GLOBAL
STAFFING, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01534-KAW (N.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California (i) denied the Plaintiff's
motion to remand, and (ii) granted the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.

On Oct. 18, 2018, Marron filed the instant putative class action
against the Defendant, asserting violations of various credit
reporting laws and California labor laws.  On Dec. 18, 2018, he
filed an amended complaint, adding a California's Private Attorneys
General Act claim.  

The Defendant recruits and hires registered healthcare
professionals from all over the United States to staff hospitals
during labor disputes between the hospital and its employees'
unions.  The Plaintiff is a former employee of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff alleges that when he applied for employment with the
Defendant, he was required to fill out a disclosure and
authorization form to perform a background investigation.  The
disclosures, however, contained extraneous and superfluous language
that does not consist solely of the disclosure as required by
federal and state laws.

The Plaintiff further alleges that he and the putative class
performed off-the-clock work.  Thus, he alleges the Defendants
failed to pay workers for extensive time spent traveling and under
the direction and control of the Defendants.  While working, the
Plaintiff alleges that workers were not provided with the necessary
meal breaks or rest periods.  The Plaintiff also alleges that the
Defendants agreed to pay its workers a daily per diem for food, but
that they did not receive the agreed upon per diem from them.

Because of these practices, the Plaintiff asserts that workers did
not receive accurate wage statements, as their statements failed to
accurately reflect all hours worked and premium wages for missed
meal and/or rest periods.  Additionally, he alleges that the
Defendant failed to timely pay wages earned to employees who were
terminated or resigned.

To be eligible for employment, an applicant creates an account
through the Defendant's website using a unique e-mail address and
password.  The Plaintiff created his account on June 18, 2012.  On
Dec. 1, 2017, he nominated himself for consideration for an
anticipated May 2018 strike.  On April 28, 2018, the Plaintiff
electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement.

On behalf of a FCRA Class, ICRAA Class, and CCRAA Class, the
Plaintiff alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the
Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, and Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act, respectively.

The Plaintiff also sought to represent an Hourly Employees Class,
made up of all persons employed by Defendants and/or any staffing
agencies and/or any other third parties in hourly or non-exempt
positions in California.  On behalf of the Hourly Employees Class,
the Plaintiff alleged violations for failure to pay hourly and
overtime wages.  

The Hourly Employees Class includes four subclasses: (1) the meal
period sub-class, made up of Hourly Employees Class members who
worked in a shift in excess of five hours; (2) the rest period
sub-class, made up of Hourly Employees Class members who worked a
shift of at least 3.5 hours; (3) the wage statement penalties
sub-class, made up of Hourly Employee Class members who were
employed by Defendant during the period beginning one year before
the filing of the action through the entry of final judgment; and
(4) the waiting time penalties sub-class, made up of Hourly
Employee Class members who separated from their employment during
the period beginning three years before the filing of the action
through entry of final judgment.  

The Plaintiff also seeks to represent an Unfair Competition Law
(UCL) Class, made up of all Hourly Employee Class members, and an
Expense Reimbursement Class, made up of all persons employed by
Defendant who incurred business expenses.

On March 25, 2019, the Defendant removed the case to federal court,
asserting federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act.
It estimated that: (1) the FCRA claim was worth $105,000; (2) the
meal period claim was worth $797,500; (3) the rest period claim was
worth $1,993,750; (4) the hourly and overtime claim was worth
$1,143,760; (5) the unreimbursed business expenses claim was worth
$181,250; (6) the wage statement penalties claim was worth 120,000;
(7) the waiting time penalties claim was worth $9,108,000; and (8)
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees claim was worth $3,362,315, or 25%
of the estimated damages.

On June 27, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to compel
arbitration.  On July 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his motion to
remand, and his opposition to the Defendant's motion to compel.
The parties dispute whether the Defendant has established the $5
million amount in controversy.

Judge Westmore holds that the Defendant's estimate of the
wage-related claims is adequate to satisfy CAFA's $5 million
requirement.  She finds that the Defendant has demonstrated by a
preponderance of evidence that (i) the unpaid hourly and overtime
wages is $1,143,760; (ii) the wage statement penalty is $9,108,000,
assuming a 10% violation rate ($440 average daily pay x 30 days x
6,900 total assignments x 10%); and (iii) the wage statement
penalties claim is worth $120,000, or $50 x 2,400 wage statements
during a one-year period.

The Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds there is CAFA
jurisdiction, it should sever the FCRA claim and remand it to state
court because there is no basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
The Plaintiff contends that because he has not adequately alleged
Article III standing, there is no federal question jurisdiction,
and thus the Court has no jurisdiction over the FCRA claim.

The Judge disagrees.  She holds that the Court does not require
federal question jurisdiction over the FCRA claim because there is
CAFA jurisdiction over the entire case.  Accordingly, the Judge
denies the Plaintiff's request to sever ands remand the FCRA
claim.

Finally, the Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the Elbahou
declaration, arguing that he did not affirmatively state that he
reviewed time records or pay records.  While he expresses doubt as
to the veracity of Mr. Elbahou, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff
cites no authority that jurisdictional discovery is warranted in
the case, nor any basis for his concerns.  The record was
sufficient for the Court to determine that it has jurisdiction, and
therefore jurisdictional discovery is not necessary.

In opposing the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, the
Plaintiff argues only that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable.  The Judge holds that the concern is not that
personally notifying the Defendant is burdensome, but that there is
no practical way for a worker to satisfy this condition.  If a
worker cannot satisfy the first condition at all, a worker can
never opt out, and therefore the opt-out provision is illusory.
Without an opt-out provision, the contract is effectively one of
adhesion, and therefore there is procedural unconscionability.

The Court must also look for terms that are unreasonably favorable
to the more powerful party and provisions that seek to negate the
reasonable expectations of the non-drafting party.  In the instant
case, the Judge finds there is no substantive unconscionability in
the Arbitration Agreement.  While the PAGA waiver is unenforceable
as a matter of public policy, that does not make it
unconscionable.

As the Plaintiff has failed to establish any substantively
unconscionable provision in the Arbitration Agreement, the Judge
finds that the Arbitration Agreement is not unconscionable.
Therefore, the Defendant's motion to compel must be granted.

For the reasons stated, Judge Westmore (i) denies the Plaintiff's
motion to remand, and (ii) grants the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.  The Court will stay the proceedings in the instant
case pending resolution of the arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/hU9Epn from Leagle.com.

David H. Marron, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, William Matthew Pao --
william@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Alexandra Rochelle
McIntosh, Setareh Law Group.

Healthsource Global Staffing, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Amanda E. Beckwith -- abeckwith@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Paul Scott Cowie --
pcowie@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton
LLP & Brian Samuel Fong -- bfong@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard
Mullin Richter Hampton.


ILLINOIS: Court Narrows Claims in "Gun Violence" Exposure Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
in the case captioned DEMETRIA POWELL, as guardian ad litem and on
behalf of her son D.P.; TANYA REESE, as guardian ad litem and on
behalf of her son M.R.; and TYWANNA PATRICK, as guardian ad litem
and on behalf of her granddaughter J.C., as well as on behalf of a
class of similarly situated children, Plaintiffs, v. THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS; THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE; BRUCE RAUNER,
Governor of the State of Illinois; and LEO P. SCHMITZ, Director of
the Illinois Department of State Police, Defendants, Case No.
18-CV-6675. (N.D. Ill.).

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

It is common knowledge that, as the plaintiffs in this proposed
class action allege, gun violence has ravaged the City of Chicago
for decades and that the violence is concentrated in predominately
African-American neighborhoods.  The three named plaintiffs bring
claims against the State of Illinois, the Illinois State Police
(State Police), Illinois' governor, and the head of the State
Police on behalf of three children who grew up in a high-crime,
predominately African-American neighborhood on Chicago's west side.


Plaintiffs' claims arise under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as amended and the Illinois Civil
Rights Act (ICRA). The complaint attributes each child's
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) diagnosis, as well as other
disabilities affecting the child's ability to succeed at home and
at school, primarily to daily exposure to gun violence and its
effects.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs do not have standing under Article
III of the Constitution. They also argue that the complaint fails
to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

Standing

To meet the minimum standing requirements of Article III, a
plaintiff must establish three things: (1) he or she suffered or
will suffer a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or
imminent (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's
action and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.

Threat of Actual or Imminent Injury in Fact

Defendants concede that the complaint adequately alleges an injury
in fact: there is no question the complaint adequately alleges the
psychological trauma to children who hear and are frightened by the
sounds of gunshots, who personally see victims of violence dead or
dying at crime scenes, and who have to cope on a frequent basis
with the news of friends or loved ones killed or injured from gun
violence.  

The precise nature of the ongoing threatened injury alleged in the
complaint bears emphasis here. If plaintiffs sought money damages,
the psychological harm and trauma alleged in the complaint
certainly would meet the injury in fact requirement. But standing
to seek damages for past wrongs does not necessarily give a
plaintiff standing to seek a prospective injunction.  

Though not couched in injury in fact terms, the gist of many of
defendants' arguments against standing is that gun violence in
Chicago is a problem that affects everyone in the city of Chicago
and State of Illinois to some measure. The complaint contains ample
statistical evidence that gun violence in Chicago is concentrated
in Austin and other predominately African-American neighborhoods.


It is reasonable to infer that the concentrated violence begets
trauma and the psychological and behavioral injuries described in
the complaint, creating discrete pockets of predominately
African-American individuals disproportionately likely to be harmed
by ongoing exposure.

The complaint here shares its theory of discrete and particularized
harm with a recent Supreme Court case, Bank of America Corp. v.
City of Miami, 137 S.Ct. 1296 (2017). Considering the Fair Housing
Act, the Supreme Court held that a city had standing to sue a
lender based on allegations that two lenders intentionally gave
African-American and Latino individuals risky mortgages.  

The Court held that the plaintiff's complaint established the
standing of the City of Miami to sue under the Fair Housing Act
based on allegations that the lender's unlawful conduct led to a
concentration of foreclosures and vacancies in certain
neighborhoods. Those concentrated foreclosures and vacancies caused
stagnation and decline in African-American and Latino
neighborhoods, impairing the plaintiff's efforts to create
integrated neighborhoods. Similarly here, the plaintiffs allege a
chain of causation from defendants' unlawful conduct leading to
concentrations of preventable gun violence in predominately
African-American neighborhoods.
  
Applying this standard here, only D.P. faces an actual or imminent
threat of exposure to further gun violence in Chicago. D.P.
continues to live in Chicago's Austin neighborhood where the
complaint alleges gun violence continues on a daily basis. But T.C.
and M.R. moved out of Chicago before the complaint was filed, T.C.
to Bellwood and M.R. to Oak Park. The complaint says nothing about
how the regulations plaintiffs propose would affect either child's
exposure to gun violence, if any, in Oak Park or Bellwood. To the
contrary, plaintiffs specifically plead that the regulations will
stem the flow of guns into Chicago. Probably due to the scope of
the reports and scholarly materials on which plaintiffs rely, they
confine their allegations of the prevalence and concentration of
gun violence to the City of Chicago and its neighborhoods.  

The complaint does not indicate that either T.C. or M.R. intends to
return to the Austin neighborhood or that either child is likely to
move to another Chicago neighborhood in which gun violence is
concentrated. Accordingly, the court is forced to conclude that
neither T.C. nor M.R. faces a reasonably likely ongoing threat of
experiencing the harm alleged in the complaint exposure to gun
violence in Chicago.

The court therefore dismisses them, or rather their
representatives, for lack of standing.

In sum, the complaint adequately alleges the three essential
ingredients of standing as to D.P. an ongoing threatened injury
that is concrete and particularized, that is fairly traceable to
defendants' failure to regulate, and that is redressable through
injunctive and declaratory relief.

Defendants' causation arguments raise, at least at the complaint
stage, merits issues on the proper reach of an ADA claim and
proximate causation. Plaintiffs' burden to establish the elements
of standing generally increases throughout the litigation, but that
is not the issue at the moment.  

The complaint adequately alleges standing. Having determined that
plaintiffs' complaint adequately establishes standing for D.P.'s
claims, the court turns to the related merits issues raised by
defendants.

Defendants argue on the merits that the complaint fails to state a
claim under Title II of the ADA or the Illinois Civil Rights Act.
They also contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs' ADA
claims. The court first analyzes the ADA claims and then turns to
the ICRA claim in Count III.

Failure to State a Claim Standard

Defendants' merits challenges arise under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the
complaint, not the merits of the case , A complaint need only set
forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. That is, the complaint must state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim satisfies
this standard when its factual allegations raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.
Merits of ADA Claims

When it enacted the ADA, Congress sought to enforce a prohibition
on irrational disability discrimination in Title II and to enforce
a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees. Congress
enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment
of persons with disabilities in the administration of state
services and programs, including systematic deprivations of
fundamental rights.

To state a claim, each plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) he
or she is a qualified person (2) with a disability and (3) the
defendant] denied him or her access to a program or activity
because of his or her disability.   

Defendants seek to frame plaintiffs' ADA claims as challenging
everything they are doing at an exceedingly high level of
generality.  Thus, defendants cite a case considering whether, at a
high level, an arrest can be considered a program or service under
Title II.  They opine that it is difficult to conceptualize how the
plaintiffs or any other discrete group of people meet the essential
eligibility requirements' of criminal law enforcement activities.

Defendants' framing conflicts irreconcilably with the allegations
of the complaint, however. The complaint defines the program or
service not as statewide law enforcement but as the FOID firearms
identification program. Defendants offer no argument as to why this
is not a program or activity of theirs, and the complaint's
well-pleaded allegations, as well as Illinois statutory law,
confirms that it is.

The same fundamental mischaracterization of the program or service
plaintiffs allege undergirds defendants' other merits arguments.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not adequately alleged
discrimination under the ADA and that plaintiffs do not meet the
program, service, or activity's essential eligibility requirements.
In the Seventh Circuit a plaintiff need not allege either disparate
treatment or disparate impact in order to state a reasonable
accommodation claim under Title II of the ADA.

Liability under Title II can be established by showing that (1) the
defendant intentionally acted on the basis of the disability (2)
the defendant refused to provide a reasonable modification or (3)
the defendant's rule disproportionally impacts disabled people. The
complaint here specifically alleges that defendants' FOID rules, or
rather the lack of them, disproportionately impacts them and other
persons with disabilities, citing statistical and anecdotal
evidence which must be accepted as true for present purposes.  

Rather than engage with these allegations about the FOID program,
defendants argue as though the relevant program or service is
Illinois statewide law enforcement writ large or, as in one passage
of the reply, public education.  

In particular, the court will not attempt to identify the essential
eligibility criteria for the FOID program as it relates to
plaintiffs an inquiry that is intertwined with defendants' argument
that no discrimination occurred. Of course, the children plaintiffs
represent do not want a FOID card, a gun, or ammunition. However,
defendants argue for the first time in their reply that plaintiffs
should have petitioned for a rulemaking under Illinois'
Administrative Procedure Act before filing this lawsuit. It would
seem to be a necessary predicate of defendants' argument that
plaintiffs would be eligible to petition for a rulemaking enacting
their proposed changes. But because defendants have waived this
argument by waiting until their reply to make it, the court has no
occasion to explore its significance.  

The court intimates no view on what discovery may reveal about
these claims or on legal theories not adequately developed in the
briefing. The court finds only that dismissal is unwarranted on the
theories adequately developed in the motion to dismiss.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity for ADA Claims

Defendants next argue that if the court does not dismiss the
complaint's ADA claims, then the Eleventh Amendment bars them. The
Eleventh Amendment grants states immunity from private suits in
federal court without their consent.

Defendants want the court to answer a question left open in
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). In Lane, the Court
concluded that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,
constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' Section 5 authority to
enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" and abrogates
the state sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.
Defendants invite the court to apply the abrogation framework
applied in Lane, an analysis based on the test of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997).
  
The court must decline defendants' invitation to conduct a Flores
analysis because the Ex parte Young doctrine applies. The complaint
seeks only prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.  . In
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-74, the Supreme Court held that Congress
did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in the employment
provision of the ADA, Title I, for claims for money damages.  

As this language makes clear, Title II suits for prospective
equitable relief remain available without regard to the Boerne
abrogation analysis, which is concerned with claims for money
damages.  

Plaintiffs raise the Ex parte Young issue in their response, but
defendants suggest no reason to think Ex parte Young is inapposite
in their reply. Hence defendants' Eleventh Amendment argument must
be rejected.

Illinois Civil Rights Act Claim

The Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003 forbids a unit of state,
county, or local government to, among other things, utilize
criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, national origin, or gender. Several courts have recognized
that the ICRA was expressly intended to provide a state law remedy
that was identical to the federal disparate impact canon under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs' ICRA claims for many of
the same reasons they contend the ADA claims should be dismissed.
Defendants here say the causal link between their conduct and the
failure to regulate is too attenuated: they cite the intervention
of third parties in gun violence and their connection to the
resulting harm. The court has already explained that the complaint
pleads statistical evidence that adequately establishes a causal
relationship between defendants and gun violence.  

Defendants rely on one case in support of their argument, an
Illinois trial court decision dismissing ICRA and other claims
against gun shops and municipalities in which they were located.
The court there analyzed the plaintiff's complaint and concluded
that, despite the statistical evidence and reports pleaded in the
complaint showing the village's connection to gun violence,
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to sufficiently allege a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination under section 5(a)(2) of
ICRA, and that Plaintiffs' cannot sufficiently allege a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination.

For the reasons discussed throughout this opinion, the complaint
does each of those things. The court will not rehash that
discussion here except to make a point underscored by the federal
cases applying the ICRA. How a state actor utilizes methods or
criteria as defined in the ICRA can often be a matter of semantics.
Utilization can often be recharacterized as a failure to act. The
complaint here points to the defendants' administration of the FOID
program and alleges a double negative: defendants have no
reasonable basis for not adopting reasonable gun trafficking
regulations. Stated affirmatively, defendants administered the FOID
program by not adopting certain practices and that administration
has visited harms disproportionately on residents of predominately
African-American neighborhoods in Chicago.  

Federal cases support the proposition that ICRA liability does not
turn on whether the challenged state action is stated in the
negative or the positive, liability can arise from the failure to
take some step provided that the failure has a disparate impact.  

Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint is granted in
part and denied in part. The claims of plaintiffs Reese and Patrick
are dismissed for lack of standing.

A full-text copy of the District Court’s September 30, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5lrtp6k from Leagle.com.

Demetria Powell, as guardian ad litem and on behalf of her son
D.P., Plaintiff, represented by Thomas Howard Geoghegan --
tgeoghegan@dsgchicago.com -- Despres Schwartz & Geoghegan, Thomas
Edward Johnson -- tjohnson@jjsgd.com -- Johnson, Jones, Snelling &
Gilbert & Michael Paul Persoon -- mpersoon@dsgchicago.com --
Despres Schwartz & Geoghegan.

The State of Illinois, Bruce Rauner, Governor of the State of
Illinois, Illinois Department of State Police, The & Leo P Schmitz,
Director of the Illinois Department of State Police, Defendants,
represented by Thomas A. Ioppolo , Illinois Attorney General's
Office.



JUUL LABS: Corkery et al. Sue over Mislabeled Cigarette Products
----------------------------------------------------------------
CONOR CORKERY; TOM HADDAD; THOMAS JOSEPH; and WILLIAM KIRK,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. JUUL LABS, INC.; and PAX LABS, INC., Defendants, Case
No. 3:19-cv-05813(N.D. Cal., Sept. 17, 2019) alleges that the
Defendants misrepresented the nicotine content of JUULpods on its
label, including the potency and addictiveness of JUULpods'
nicotine salt formulation, and the use of JUULpods as a cool, fun,
healthy activity.

The Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that the Defendant knew, or
was negligent or reckless in not knowing, that the JUUL
e-cigarettes were likely to cause nicotine addiction in smokers and
posed great risks of addiction to children. The Defendants further
made misrepresentations about these risks, effects, operation,
content, and other attributes of JUUL e-cigarettes. These
misrepresentations include both omissions of nicotine warning,
omission of facts regarding the increased potency and addictiveness
of nicotine salts, misrepresentations about the amount of nicotine
in JUULpods and the user's absorption thereof through use of JUUL.
The Defendants also misrepresented JUUL as a fun, healthy activity
for young people, without disclosing the long-term health effects
and the actual feeling of being addicted to nicotine.

Also, the Defendant actively concealed the nicotine content and
nicotine potency of JUUL e-cigarettes from the Plaintiffs and Class
Members while simultaneously providing false or misleading evidence
concerning nicotine content. The Defendant actively concealed the
benzoic acid content of the JUUL e-cigarettes, despite knowing that
benzoic acid played a central role in determining the physiological
effects of JUUL e-cigarettes. The Defendant manipulated the
formulations of JUUL devices and JUULpods to augment their potency
and addictiveness, and did so without notifying the Plaintiffs.

JUUL Labs, Inc. manufactures electronic cigarettes. The Company
offers products such as device kits, JUULpods, and accessories in
different flavors. JUUL Labs serves customers in the United States.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark P. Robinson, Jr., Esq.
          Kevin Calcagnie, Esq.
          ROBINSON CALCAGNIE, INC.
          19 Corporate Plaza Drive
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 720-1288
          Facsimile: (949) 720-1292
          E-mail: mrobinson@robinsonfirm.com
                  kcalcagnie@robinsonfirm.com


JUUL LABS: Parents File Class Action Over E-Cigarettes in Calif.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Juul Labs, Inc. The
case is styled as Bradley Colgate, Kaytlin McKnight, Anthony Smith,
David Langan, Corey Smith, Jennifer Hellman, Tommy Benham, Jill
Nelson, Lisa Commitante, M.H., a minor, by her Mother and Natural
Guardian, Jennifer Hellman appointed guardian ad litem, L.B., a
minor, by her Mother and Natural Guardian, Jill Nelson appointed
guardian ad litem, Kacie Ann Lagun, on behalf of themselves, the
general public and those similarly situated, A.U., a minor, by her
Mother and Natural Guardian, Lisa Commitante appointed guardian ad
litem, Michael Viscomi, Barbara Yannucci, David Masessa, Hasnat
Ahmad, Liliana Andrade, Virginia Jose Angullo, B.C., a minor,
through his Parent and Natural Guardian Mary Baker, Adam Banner,
Q.C. through his parent and natural guardian Anjie Comer, D.C. and
his mother and Natural Guardian Renee Deeter, D.D., Minor through
their Parent and Natural Guardian Joseph DiGiancinto, C.D., minor,
through their Parent and Natural Guardian Joseph DiGiacinto, K.S.
through his parent and Natural Guardian Rachelle Dollinger, J.D.
through his parent and natural guardian Nicole Dramis, Jillian
Furey, Edgar Kalenkevich, David Kugler, Tracie Kugler, Kacie Ann
Lagun, M.C. through his Parent and Natural Guardian Jeanine
Manning, Ron Minas, S.G. through her Parent and Natural Guardian
Ashley Noble, D.O. through her mother and natural guardian Atoyia
Orders, Jack Roberts, W.T. both minors, through their parent and
Natural Guardian Tonya Rowan, A.R.T. both minors, through their
parent and Natural Guardian Tonya Rowan, Amber Royce, D.S., a
minor, through his Parent and Natural Guardian Amber Selfridge,
Laura Staller, T.B.T., a minor, through his parent and natural
Guardian MarlendThomseth-Belcher, O.V., a minor, through her parent
and natural guardian Tanya Viti, S.W., a minor, through his parent
and natural guardian Joe Weibel, Jonathan Mardis, J.Y.
a minor, by and with his mother and Natural Guardian Barbara
Yannucci individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
Sabrina Zampa and John Thomas Via Peavy, Plaintiffs v. Juul Labs,
Inc. and Altria Group, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-md-02913-WHO
(N.D. Cal., Oct. 2, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Product
Liability asserting Personal Injury.

Juul Labs, Inc. is an American electronic cigarette company which
spun off from Pax Labs in 2017. It makes the Juul e-cigarette,
which packages nicotine salts from leaf tobacco into one-time use
cartridges. Juul Labs was co-founded by Adam Bowen and James
Monsees. Its headquarters is in San Francisco.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

   Adam Gutride, Esq.
   GutrideSafier LLP
   100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 789-6390
   Fax: (415) 449-6469
   Email: adam@gutridesafier.com

      - and -

   Anthony J Patek, Esq.
   Gutride Safier LLP
   835 Douglass Street
   San Francisco, CA 94114
   Tel: (415) 529-4995
   Fax: (415) 449-6469
   Email: apatek@pateklaw.com

      - and -

   Esfand Nafisi, Esq.
   Migliaccio & Rathod LLP
   388 Market Street, Suite 1300
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 489-7004
   Fax: (202) 800-2730
   Email: enafisi@classlawdc.com

       - and -

   Marie Ann McCrary, Esq.
   Gutride Safier LLP
   100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 789-6390
   Fax: (415) 449-6469
   Email: marie@gutridesafier.com

      - and -

   Matthew Thomas McCrary, Esq.
   Gutride Safier LLP
   100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (214) 502-2171
   Email: matt@gutridesafier.com

      - and -

   Seth A. Safier, Esq.
   Gutride Safier LLP
   100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 271-6469
   Fax: (415) 449-6469
   Email: seth@gutridesafier.com

      - and -

   Todd Michael Kennedy, Esq.
   Gutride Safier LLP
   835 Douglass Street
   San Francisco, CA 94114
   Tel: (415) 789-6390
   Email: todd@gutridesafier.com




KENDALL IMPORTS: Gomez Sues Over Blind Inaccessible Website
------------------------------------------------------------
Andres Gomez, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated mobility-impaired individuals, Plaintiff, v. Kendall
Imports, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-23640 (S.D. Fla., August
29, 2019), seeks preliminary and permanent injunction,
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment
and post-judgment interest, costs and expenses of this action
together with reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other
and further relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New
York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.

Defendant is a vehicle dealer that owns and operates the website,
www.kendalltoyota.com. Plaintiff is legally blind and claims that
Defendant's website cannot be accessed by the visually-impaired.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Anthony J. Perez, Esq.
      GARCIA-MENOCAL, & PEREZ, P.L.
      4937 SW 74th Court, No. 3
      Miami, FL 33155
      Telephone: (305) 553-3464
      Facsimile: (305) 553-3031
      E-Mail: ajperezlaw@gmail.com
              agmlaw@bellsouth.net
              mpomares@lawgmp.com


KIDPIK CORP: Nisbett Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kidpik Corp. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kareem
Nisbett, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Kidpik Corp., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-09289 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2019).

Kidpik Corp is an eCommerce clothing retailer that mixes and
matches clothing for their customers and sends it to them.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com



LUMBER LIQUIDATORS: Settlement Agreement Reached in Gold Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 2,
2019, that the company has entered into a definitive settlement
agreement in the class action suit entitled, Dana Gold, Tammy
Emery, Mary Louise Ference, Laura Norris, Donald Fursman, and John
Triana, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated v.
Lumber Liquidators, Inc.

On March 2019, Lumber Liquidators, Inc. (the "Company"), who is a
defendant in a putative class action litigation captioned Dana
Gold, Tammy Emery, Mary Louise Ference, Laura Norris, Donald
Fursman, and John Triana, on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., a Delaware
corporation; and Does 1 through 200, inclusive (the "Gold
Litigation"), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ("Gold
MOU") with the lead plaintiff in the Gold Litigation, Dana Gold, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (collectively,
the "Gold Plaintiffs") to memorialize an agreement in principle to
settle the Gold Litigation on a nationwide basis.

On September 30, 2019, the Company entered into a definitive
settlement agreement with the Gold Plaintiffs consistent with the
terms of the Gold MOU (the "Settlement Agreement"). The Settlement
Agreement is subject to approval by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California (the "Court") and
other contingencies.

The Settlement Fund will be used to pay notice and administrative
fees relating to the Gold Litigation and to compensate those
individuals that were Putative Class Members during the Class
Period. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Company
will contribute $14 million in cash and provide $14 million in
store-credit vouchers, with a potential additional $2 million in
store-credit vouchers possible based on obtaining a claim’s
percentage of more than 7% (collectively, the "Vouchers"), for an
aggregate settlement of up to $30 million (the "Settlement Fund")
to settle all claims asserted in the Gold Litigation (or which
could have been asserted in the Gold Litigation) on behalf of all
persons in the United States who purchased for personal, family or
household use, Morning Star Strand Bamboo flooring (the "Putative
Class Members") at any time between January 1, 2012 through March
15, 2019 (the "Class Period").

Holdings believes that its cash flow from operations, together with
existing liquidity sources, is sufficient to fund the Settlement
Fund, of which $1,000,000 of the cash portion will be paid to the
fund within five days of the Court's preliminary approval of the
settlement and will be used to pay the notice and settlement
administrator's fees and the remaining $13,000,000 cash amount will
be paid within 30 days of the Court's final approval order of the
Settlement Agreement and the dismissal of the Gold Litigation.

The Company will work together with counsel for the Gold Plaintiffs
and the settlement administrator to prepare the Vouchers for
distribution to approved claimants as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement. The Gold Plaintiffs' legal fees and costs, not to exceed
33.33% of the Settlement Fund, are included as part of the
Settlement Fund.

Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
operates as a multi-channel specialty retailer of hard-surface
flooring, and hard-surface flooring enhancements and accessories.
The company also offers its products through its Website, catalogs,
and call center. Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc. was founded in
1994 and is headquartered in Toano, Virginia.


MAMMOTH ENERGY: Furia is Lead Plaintiff in Consolidated Secs. Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, THOMAS SCUDERI, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. MAMMOTH ENERGY SERVICES,
INC., ARTY STRAEHLA, and MARK LAYTON, Defendants; JUSTIN NORMANTAS,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. MAMMOTH ENERGY SERVICES, INC., ARTY STRAEHLA, and
MARK LAYTON, Defendants; THE CITY OF SARASOTA GENERAL EMPLOYEE
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. MAMMOTH ENERGY SERVICES,
INC. ARTY STRAEHLA, and MARK LAYTON, Defendants, Case Nos.
CIV-19-522-SLP, CIV-19-560-SLP, CIV-19-720-SLP (W.D. Okla.), Judge
Scott L. Palk of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma has issued an order (i) consolidating the three related
securities actions, and (ii) appointing the Lead Plaintiffs and the
Lead Counsel.

The three related matters involve a proposed securities fraud class
action on behalf of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired publicly traded Mammoth securities from Oct. 19, 2017
through June 5, 2019.  The matters are before the Court on pending
motions to consolidate, appoint the Lead Plaintiff(s) and appoint
the Lead Counsel pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act.

On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff Scuderi filed a proposed class action
complaint for violation of the federal securities laws. On the same
day the suit was filed, Scuderi's counsel's law firm published
notice of the pendency of the action announcing that the Lead
Plaintiff motions were due no later than Aug. 6, 2019.  Thereafter,
on Aug. 6, 2019, Scuderi, together with Stephen Terry, Justas
Normantas, Andrew Micklin, and Dion Larot ("Mammoth Investor
Group") filed a motion to consolidate, appoint the Lead Counsel and
approve the Lead Plaintiff's selection of counsel.  They
subsequently filed a Notice of Withdrawal acknowledging that the
Mammoth Investor Group does not appear to have the largest
financial interest.  The Mammoth Investor Group continues to move
for consolidation of the actions but withdraws its request to be
appointed the Lead Plaintiff or to have its counsel be approved to
serve as the Lead Counsel.

On June 19, 2019, Plaintiff Normantas filed a second lawsuit that
arises from substantially the same factual allegations and legal
issues as the Scuderi lawsuit.

On Aug. 6, 2019, Plaintiff Sarasota filed a third lawsuit.  This
lawsuit is also substantially the same as the Scuderi and Normantas
lawsuits.

The motions before the Court have been filed by the Mammoth
Investor Group, the Furia Family and Sarasota.  The Scuderi,
Normantas and Sarasota actions involve claims on behalf of
purchasers of Mammoth securities for alleged violations of
securities laws.  The actions each name as Defendants Mammoth
Energy Services, Inc., Arty Straehla and Mark Layton.  All three
actions arise from the same factual and legal issues: whether the
Plaintiffs purchased or otherwise acquired Mammoth securities at
artificially inflated prices during the relevant time period as a
result of the Defendants' allegedly false and misleading
statements, and whether their conduct violated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10(b)-5.  Moreover, no party opposes consolidation of the related
actions.  Accordingly, Judge Palk finds consolidation is proper and
directs that the cases be consolidated for all pretrial proceedings
and for trial.

Applying the statutory presumption, the Judge finds that the Furia
Family is the most adequate Plaintiff.  The Furia Family has
suffered $989,215.54 in losses as a result of the Defendants'
alleged wrongful conduct.  In comparison, Sarasota identifies
$133,595.84 as its approximate losses.  The Judge also finds the
Furia Family satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements of
Rule 23.

The Furia Family has selected as the Lead Counsel the law firm
Block & Leviton LLP.  The record establishes Block & Leviton has
extensive experience litigating federal securities fraud class
actions.  As such, the Furia Family's selection of lead counsel is
approved.

The Furia Family also selects Jones, Gotcher & Bogan, P.C. as the
Local Counsel.  However, the Judge finds that no firm resume or
other information is currently before the Court concerning the
qualifications of local counsel.  He, therefore, defers its ruling
on appointment of local counsel and directs the Furia Family to
submit appropriate information to demonstrate the qualifications of
local counsel within five days of the date of the Order.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Palk consolidated the three actions
for all pretrial proceedings and for trial.  The consolidated
action will be designated as In re Mammoth Energy Services, Inc.
Securities Litigation and all pleadings and other submissions filed
subsequent to the date of the Order will bear the following caption
and be filed only in Case No. CIV-19-522-SLP: IN RE MAMMOTH ENERGY
SERVICES, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. CIV-19-522-SLP.

All pleadings and other submissions previously served and filed in
the Normantas and Sarasota actions will be deemed a part of the
record in the consolidated action.  The Furia Family is appointed
as the Lead Plaintiff and the law firm of Block & Leviton LLP as
the Lead Counsel.

The Judge denied as moot the Motion of the Mammoth Investor Group
to: (1) Consolidate the Related Actions; (2) be Appointed Lead
Plaintiff; and (3) Approve Proposed Lead Plaintiff's Selection of
Counsel based on the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal.

He granted the Motion of the Furia Family for (1) Consolidation of
Cases; (2) Appointment as Lead Plaintiffs; and (3) Appointment of
Lead and Local Counsel and Brief in Support except that he defered
ruling on appointment of local counsel and directed the Furia
Family to submit appropriate information to demonstrate the
qualifications of local counsel within five days of the date of the
Order.

He granted the Motion of the City of Sarasota General Employees
Defined Benefit Pension Plan for (1) Consolidation, (2) Appointment
as Lead Plaintiff, and (3) Approval of Selection of Counsel to the
extent the Motion requests consolidation of these matters and
denied it as to all other requested relief.

The following scheduling deadlines in the matter are established:

     a) within 60 days of the date of the Order, Block & Leviton
        LLP on behalf of the Furia Family as the Lead Plaintiff,
        will file a consolidated amended complaint;

     b) The Defendants will have 45 days to answer or otherwise
        respond to the allegations of the consolidated amended
        complaint;

     c) The Furia Family, as the Lead Plaintiff, will file a
        response to any motion to dismiss, if such motion is
        filed by the Defendants, within 45 days after the motion
        is filed; and

     d) The Defendants will file their reply, if any, to the
        Furia Family's response within 30 days after such
        response, if any, is filed.

The Clerk of Court is directed to file the Order in Scuderi, Case
No. CIV-19-522-SLP, Normantas, Case No. CIV-19-560-SLP and
Sarasota, Case No. CIV-19-720-SLP.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/trUjIT from Leagle.com.

Thomas Scuderi, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by William B. Federman --
wbf@federmanlaw.com -- Federman & Sherwood & Phillip Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm PA.

Justas Normantas, Stephen Terry, Andrew Micklin & Dion Larot,
Plaintiffs, represented by William B. Federman, Federman &
Sherwood.

Daniel Furia, Sharon Furia & Vincent Furia, Plaintiffs, represented
by C. Michael Copeland, Jones Gotcher & Bogan PC, Jacob A. Walker,
Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Sarasota Gen. Pension Fund, Plaintiff, represented by Atara Hirsch
, Abraham Fruchter & Twersky LLP, Darren M. Tawwater, The Tawwater
Law Firm PLLC, Ian D. Berg, Abraham Fruchter & Twersky LLP &
Mitchell M.Z. Twersky, Abraham Fruchter & Twersky LLP.

Mammoth Energy Services Inc, Arty Straehla & Mark Layton,
Defendants, represented by Erin M. Brewer --
erin.brewer@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, M.
Scott Barnard -- sbarnard@akingump.com -- Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld, Michael F. Lauderdale -- michael.lauderdale@mcafeetaft.com --
McAfee & Taft, Michelle A. Reed -- mreed@akingump.com -- Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld & Spencer F. Smith --
spencer.smith@mcafeetaft.com -- McAfee & Taft.


MASSAGE ENVY: 8th Circuit Flips Remand Order in Pirozzi Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the appellate case Mark Pirozzi; Keila Green, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated, Respondents, v. Massage
Envy Franchising, LLC, Petitioner, Case No. 19-8014 (8th Cir.), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (i) granted
the Petition for Permission To Appeal, (ii) reversed the Order of
Remand dated July 15, 2019, and (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Remand.

Plaintiffs Pirozzi and Green filed a class action lawsuit in
Missouri state court, alleging that Massage Envy violated the
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act ("MMPA") when advertisements
for its one hour massage session failed to disclose that the
session included 10 minutes to undress, dress, and consult with the
therapist.  A second amended petition filed in March 2019 expanded
the class claims to include Massage Envy's one and one-half and two
hour sessions.  The petitions sought compensatory, statutory, and
punitive damages and an award of attorneys' fees in unspecified
amounts.

Massage Envy filed a notice of removal on April 1, 2019, invoking
federal diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA").  It alleged that, if liable to the class, it would
potentially owe an aggregate of $2.885 million in compensatory
damages, based on the value of 10 minutes of massage, $720,000 in
attorneys' fees, assuming a 25% fee award, and $3.6 million in
punitive fees, assuming an award of punitive damages equal to the
compensatory damages and attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiffs moved to remand the class action to state court,
arguing the notice of removal was untimely.  Without addressing
that question, the district court remanded the case to state court,
concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Massage
Envy offers nothing but speculation that potential awards of
attorneys' fees and punitive damages push the amount in controversy
over $5 million, the minimum aggregate amount in controversy
required to remove a class action under CAFA.

Massage Envy petitions for permission to appeal the remand order.

Reviewing de novo, the 8th Circuit concludes that the district
court misapplied controlling Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit CAFA
precedents.  Accordingly, the Appellate Court (i) granted the
Petition for Permission To Appeal, (ii) reversed the Order of
Remand dated July 15, 2019, (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Remand, and (iv) remanded to the district court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with his Opinion.

The Plaintiffs did not challenge Massage Envy's allegation that
more than $5 million is in controversy; indeed, their motion to
remand affirmatively alleged aggregate claims that "conservatively"
put more than $12 million in controversy.  The district court,
exercising its "independent obligation to determine whether federal
subject-matter jurisdiction exists, nonetheless reviewed the class
action petition and the notice of removal.  In remanding, the court
stated that Massage Envy overstates the actual damages that the
Plaintiffs could recover, and offers nothing but speculation as to
the potential awards of attorneys fees and punitive damages.  Given
the nature of the plaintiffs' allegations, the Court concluded, it
is more likely that a reasonable fact finder would not award
several million dollars in punitive damages.

The Appellate Court opines that the district court erred when it
evaluated the MMPA violations alleged in the Plaintiffs' second
amended petition and remanded the class action to state court
because it is more likely that a reasonable fact finder would not
award several million dollars in punitive damages.  Even if that
assessment of the Plaintiffs' class action claims was sound,
considerations such as this go to the merits of the Plaintiffs'
claims; they should not be smuggled into the jurisdictional
inquiry.  The Appellate Court notes that when the Plaintiffs have
not challenged the removing Defendant's amount-in-controversy
allegations, it is a pleading requirement, not a demand for proof.
So long as Massage Envy has plausibly alleged that more than $5
million is in controversy, the case belongs in federal court unless
it is legally impossible for the Plaintiff to recover that much.

The Plaintiffs' class action petition explicitly sought to recover
punitive damages.  Massage Envy's notice of removal alleged that
the Plaintiffs' second amended petition put $3.6 million in
aggregated compensatory damages and attorneys' fees in controversy.
The petition also alleged the class is entitled to punitive
damages in an unstated aggregate amount.

It is undisputed that punitive damages may be awarded for egregious
violations of the MMPA.  Given the awards of punitive damages
upheld in prior MMPA cases, Plaintiffs' allegation that they are
entitled to punitive damages in an unstated amount raised the
amount in controversy to more than $5 million, whether or not they
ultimately prove they are entitled to the punitive damages they
claim, the Appellate Court cites.  In determining the amount in
controversy for CAFA removal purposes, the Appellate Court must
accept the class' characterization.

The remaining issue is the Plaintiffs' motion to remand, which the
district court denied as moot.  The Plaintiffs argued that Massage
Envy's notice of removal was untimely because the class action
allegations in their original petition, as well as in their second
amended petition, put more than $5 million in controversy.

The Appellate Court concludes that this contention is without
merit.  The 30-day removal period in Section 1446(b)(3) begins
running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the
complaint explicitly discloses the Plaintiff is seeking damages in
excess of the federal jurisdictional amount.  If the complaint
contains no such disclosure, the time limit begins to run when the
removing Defendant receives from the Plaintiff an amended pleading,
motion, order, or other paper from which the Defendant can
unambiguously ascertain that the CAFA jurisdictional requirements
have been satisfied.

Neither the initial nor the second amended petition disclosed an
aggregate amount in controversy or permitted Massage Envy to
unambiguously ascertain that more than $5 million was in
controversy.  When Massage Envy investigated and filed a notice of
removal based on the results of its own amount-in-controversy
investigation, the notice was not untimely, the Appellate Court
holds.

A full-text copy of the 8th Circuit's Sept. 17, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/9VLpKA from Leagle.com.

Thomas Blumeyer Weaver -- tweaver@armstrongteasdale.com -- for
Petitioner.

Anthony S. Bruning -- tony@bruninglegal.com -- for Respondent.

Edward Morris Roth -- eroth@bruninglegal.com -- for Respondent.

Michael B. Kass -- mkass@armstrongteasdale.comc -- for Petitioner.

Michael J. Flannery -- mflannery@cuneolaw.com -- for Respondent.

Richard Steven Cornfeld -- rcornfeld@cornfeldlegal.com -- for
Respondent.

Cynthia Juedemann -- cjuedemann@armstrongteasdale.com -- for
Petitioner.

Daniel S. Levy -- dlevy@cornfeldlegal.com -- for Respondent.

Anthony S. Bruning, Jr. -- aj@bruninglegal.com -- for Respondent.

Cynthia Ricketts -- cricketts@srclaw.com -- for Petitioner.

Luanne Sacks -- lsacks@srclaw.com -- for Petitioner.

Nathan J. Kunz -- nkunz@srclaw.com -- for Petitioner.


MDL 2672: Protective Order Bid in Clean Diesel Suit Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MDL MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order Relates To:
Napleton, No. 3:16-cv-2086-CRB, Case No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jacqueline S. Corley of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and
denied in part Bosch's request for a protective order.

The Plaintiffs are preparing to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
Bosch.  Bosch, while agreeing to make witnesses available for that
deposition, has requested a protective order to prevent the
Plaintiffs from seeking testimony on six topics.

Topic No. 1 covers Bosch's role in the creation, development,
modification, or refinement of the acoustic function (whether known
by that name or any other in German or another language) in Audi
vehicles to correct or compensate for a noise problem in the
vehicles upon ignition as described in paragraph 78 of the Third
Amended Complaint.

Bosch argues that this first topic is unwieldy and unduly
burdensome because it effectively requests a corporate witness to
testify about all steps that Bosch took to create, develop, modify,
and refine the "acoustic function" in Audi vehicles over a 14-year
period.  The Plaintiffs counter that the topic is relevant because
the Audi acoustic function formed the blueprint for the development
of the defeat device software at issue in the case.

Magistrate Judge Corley agrees with the Plaintiffs that Bosch's
role in creating and developing the Audi acoustic function is
relevant, given that the software at issue in this case may trace
its origins to that function.  The topic is overbroad however.  No
relevant modifications to the Audi function are alleged.  Thus,
testimony on Bosch's role in modifying and refining the function
over the course of years (whether that be 14 years or five) is not
relevant and would impose an unwarranted burden on Bosch.  In light
of the foregoing, the Judge instructs Bosch to provide a Rule
30(b)(6) witness to testify about the company's role in creating
and developing the Audi acoustic function.  But Bosch need not
provide a witness to testify about its role in modifying and
refining that function.

Topic Nos. 16 and 17 generally cover the terms of engagement
between Bosch and other automobile manufacturers.  As framed by the
Plaintiffs, the relevant question is whether Bosch retained tight
control over the software it provided to Volkswagen.  The answer to
that question should be evident from Bosch's agreements with
Volkswagen and from evidence of how those agreements were
implemented. (Whether the agreements allowed Volkswagen to modify
the software or not.)  The terms of engagement between Bosch and
other car manufacturers would at most provide a much less direct
answer to the relevant question.

Given Bosch's statement that it has entered into agreements with
potentially 50 or more car manufacturers, this would be a
significant undertaking.  The burden on Bosch of providing the
requested testimony outweighs the testimony's limited probative
value.  As a result, Bosch need not provide a witness to address
Topic Nos. 16 and 17.

Topic Nos. 46, 47, and 48, the last three disputed topics relate to
a letter that Bosch sent to Volkswagen in 2008.  Bosch explained in
the letter that certain software Volkswagen had requested could
qualify as a defeat device if used improperly.  Bosch then
requested that Volkswagen indemnify Bosch for any liability arising
from the software's misuse.  The Plaintiffs maintain that
Volkswagen refused to sign the indemnity letter, but that Bosch
still provided Volkswagen with the requested software.  Bosch
argues that the indemnity letter is not relevant because it
concerned emissions software for gasoline powered cars, not the
diesel powered cars at issue in the case.

While that fact may lessen the letter's evidentiary value, the
Magistrate holds that the letter -- and testimony about it -- is
still relevant. The letter demonstrates that Bosch knew that its
software could be used as a defeat device and that Bosch shared
this knowledge with Volkswagen.  From these facts, it becomes more
plausible that Bosch also knew that its software for diesel powered
cars could be used as a defeat device.  Topic Nos. 46, 47, and 48
are relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims, and Bosch has not proven
that the burden of providing a corporate witness to address these
topics would outweigh the likely benefit of the testimony.  As a
result, Bosch must provide a corporate witness to testify on these
topics.

Bosch has asked for permission (i) to redact certain information
from the parties' joint letter brief and from Exhibit 3 to the
Plaintiffs' counsel's supporting declaration, and (ii) to file
under seal in their entirety Exhibits 1 and 2 to the counsel's
supporting declaration.  Exhibit 1 is an internal Bosch document,
from 2005, about the "system requirements" of certain Bosch
software.  Exhibit 2 is an internal Bosch email from 2009.

For Exhibits 1 and 2 to counsel's declaration, the Judge finds that
Bosch has not met the good cause standard to support sealing these
exhibits in their entirety.  As for Bosch's request to redact
portions of the parties' letter brief and Exhibit 3 to the
counsel's declaration, only some of the redactions are warranted.
Consistent with prior Orders, she will permit Bosch to redact the
names and job titles of employees who are nonparties in the action.
Those redactions will help protect nonparty privacy rights, which
is a good cause that supports the request.  The other requested
redactions will not be permitted.  They are mostly of quotes,
paraphrases, and citations to Exhibits 1 and 2 to the counsel's
declaration.

For the reasons she stated, Magistrate Judge Corley (i) Bosch's
request to seal Exhibits 1 and 2 to the declaration of the
Plaintiffs' counsel; (ii)) granted Bosch's request to redact the
names and job titles of employees who are nonparties in the action;
and (iii) denied Bosch's request to redact references in the
parties' letter brief to Exhibits 1 and 2 to the counsel's
declaration and to the 2008 indemnification letter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/EJMIub from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice,
Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com --
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

James Babiak, Jonathon Horacek & Alfred Howe, Plaintiffs,
represented by Robert B. Carey, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice & Steve W. Berman, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.
Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague --
avague@lightfootlaw.com -- Lightfoot Franklin & White, Casey Erin
Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J.
Baker, III -- cbaker@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice,
Colin Hampton Tucker, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, 100
W. Fifth Street, Suite 400, Tulsa, Oklahoma 74121-1100, Dana
Woodrum Lang -- dlang@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and
Rice, David M. Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker,
Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. --
hsmythe@wcsr.com -- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard
Feller -- hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R.
Scherer, Conrad and Scherer, LLP, 633 South Federal Highway Fort
Lauderdale, FL 33301, J. Randolph Bibb, Jr. --
rbibb@lewisthomason.com -- Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop,
P.C., James K. Toohey -- tooheyj@jbltd.com -- Johns & Bell LTD,
Jeffrey Lance Chase, Chase Kurshan Herzfeld & Rufin LLC, 354
Eisenhower ParkwaySuite 1100Livingston, NJ 07039.


MDL 2819: End-Payors Move for Class Certification in Restasis MDL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The End-Payor Plaintiffs in the multidistrict litigation captioned
IN RE RESTASIS (CYCLOSPORINE OPHTHALMIC EMULSION) ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, MDL No. 18-MD-2819 (NG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y.), move the Court
for an order certifying a class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

     All persons or entities who indirectly purchased, paid
     and/or provided reimbursement for some or all of the
     purchase price for Restasis, other than for resale, in
     Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of
     Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine*,
     Massachusetts*, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri*,
     Montana*, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
     York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
     South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont*, West Virginia, and
     Wisconsin from May 17, 2014, through the present (in the
     case of Arkansas only, July 31, 2017), for consumption by
     themselves, their families, or their members, employees,
     insureds, participants, or beneficiaries.

     Excluded from the Class are: Allergan, its officers,
     directors, employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; all
     federal and state government entities except for cities,
     towns, municipalities, or counties with self-funded
     prescription drug plans; all persons or entities who
     purchased Restasis for purposes of resale or directly from
     Allergan or its affiliates; fully insured health plans,
     i.e., plans that purchased insurance covering 100% of their
     reimbursement obligation to members; any "flat co-pay"
     consumers who purchased Restasis only via a fixed dollar
     co-payment that does not vary on the basis of the drug's
     status as branded or generic; pharmacy benefit managers; and
     all judges assigned to this case and any members of their
     immediate families.

For states marked with an asterisk, the End-Payor Plaintiffs assert
claims only on behalf of natural persons.

The End-Payor Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint Plaintiffs
1199SEIU National Benefit Fund, 1199SEIU Greater New York Benefit
Fund, 1199SEIU National Benefit Fund for Home Care Workers,
1199SEIU Licensed Practical Nurses Welfare Fund, American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees District
Council 37 Health & Security Plan, Fraternal Order of Police, Miami
Lodge 20, Insurance Trust Fund, Ironworkers Local 383 Health Care
Plan, Self-Insured Schools of California, Sergeants Benevolent
Association Health & Welfare Fund, and St. Paul Electrical Workers'
Health Plan as Class Representatives.  The End-Payor Plaintiffs
further ask the Court to appoint Girard Sharp LLP, Lieff Cabraser
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, and Joseph Saveri Law Firm, Inc. as
Co-Lead Counsel for the Class and to appoint Zwerling, Schachter &
Zwerling, LLP as Liaison Counsel for the Class.[CC]

The End-Payor Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Dena C. Sharp, Esq.
          Scott Grzenczyk, Esq.
          Tom L. Watts, Esq.
          GIRARD SHARP LLP
          601 California Street, 14th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 981-4800
          Facsimile: (415) 981-4846
          E-mail: dsharp@girardsharp.com
                  scottg@girardsharp.com
                  tomw@girardsharp.com

               - and -

          Eric B. Fastiff, Esq.
          David T. Rudolph, Esq.
          Adam Gitlin, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: efastiff@lchb.com
                  drudolph@lchb.com
                  agitlin@lchb.com

               - and -

          Kathleen M. Konopka, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 355-9500
          Facsimile: (212) 355-9592
          E-mail: kkonopka@lchb.com

               - and -

          Joseph R. Saveri, Esq.
          Ryan J. McEwan, Esq.
          Kyla J. Gibboney, Esq.
          V Chai Oliver Prentice, Esq.
          JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
          601 California Street, Suite 1000
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 500-6800
          Facsimile: (415) 395-9940
          E-mail: jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com
                  rmcewan@saverilawfirm.com
                  kgibboney@saverilawfirm.com
                  vprentice@saverilawfirm.com

               - and -

          Dan Drachler, Esq.
          Robert S. Schachter, Esq.
          Sona R. Shah, Esq.
          ZWERLING, SCHACHTER & ZWERLING, LLP
          41 Madison Avenue, 32nd Floor
          New York, NY 10010
          Telephone: (212) 223-3900
          Facsimile: (212) 371-5969
          E-mail: ddrachler@zsz.com
                  rschachter@zsz.com
                  sshah@zsz.com


MEDICAL MOBILITY: Court Denies Vilanova Class Certification Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Michel Vilanova, the
Plaintiff, v. Mobility Medical Transport, Inc., and others,
Defendants, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-22391-RNS (S.D. Fla.),
the Hon. Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. entered an order on Oct. 7,
2019, denying a motion for class certification and dismissing the
case.

The Court said conditional FLSA class certification is not the same
as class certification under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] Rule 23(b), which is
what Plaintiff's motion seeks.  The Court pointed out that in La
Chapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the former Fifth Circuit
considered whether a plaintiff could bring a class action under
Rule 23 for a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). Section 7(b) of the ADEA incorporates by reference specific
provisions of the FLSA statute and directs that the ADEA "shall be
enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures
provided in [the FLSA statute]." The Court found that there is a
"fundamental, irreconcilable difference between the class action
described in Rule 23 and that provided for by FLSA Sec. 16(b)." A
Rule 23 class is an "opt out" class, whereas an FLSA class is an
"opt in" class. Because Congress created a unique procedure,
distinct from Rule 23, for a collective action under the FLSA,
these two forms of class actions are "mutually exclusive and
irreconcilable." The holding in La Chapelle related to ADEA
claims.

The Court finds that the Fifth Circuit's holding in La Chapelle has
even greater applicability in the Vilanova case where the Plaintiff
is seeking to certify a Rule class in an FLSA action. Accordingly,
the Court denies the Plaintiff's motion for class certification as
improper in an FLSA action.

On September 4, 2019, the Court directed the Plaintiff to file a
motion for default judgment or a notice of joint liability by
September 18. The Court warned the Plaintiff that failure to file
the required motion or notice within the specified time would
result in dismissal without prejudice. To date, the Plaintiff has
not filed the required motion or notice. Therefore, the Court
dismisses this case without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to
close the case. All pending motions, if any, are denied as
moot.[CC]

MEDICAL NECESSITIES: Jenkins-Queen's Bid to Certify Class Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled CHARLES JENKINS-QUEEN, Individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated current and former employees
v. MEDICAL NECESSITIES AND SERVICES, LLC, a Tennessee Corporation,
Case No. 3:18-cv-01294 (M.D. Tenn.), the Hon. Eli Richardson grants
conditional certification of a class, pursuant to Section 216(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act:

     all current and former hourly-paid delivery technicians of
     Defendant who worked on-call hours between July 2017 and
     August 2018.

Judge Richardson also rules that:

   1. Plaintiff's counsel is authorized to serve the Notice form
      and the Consent to Join form attached to the Order to the
      Class members;

   2. within 30 days of this Order, the Defendant shall provide
      the names, last known addresses, and telephone numbers for
      the individuals who meet the criteria above and who have
      not yet consented to join this action;

   3. Plaintiff's counsel shall send the Notice and Consent to
      Join forms to the individuals on the list provided by
      Defendants, by first class mail, within 30 days of
      receiving the list from the Defendant;

   4. All Consent to Join forms will be filed with the Court on
      the date they are received by the Plaintiff's counsel or,
      if received on a non-business day, on the first business
      day after they are received by the Plaintiff's counsel;

   5. the opt-in period shall be for 45 days, which shall start
      on the date the Plaintiff receives the contact information
      from the Defendant.  During the notice period, it is the
      responsibility of counsel for the Plaintiff to contact such
      current and former employees of the Defendant and provide
      to them the Notice and Consent to Join forms;

   6. within two (2) business days of mailing the Notice and
      Consent to Join forms, the Plaintiff's counsel shall file a
      Notice with the Court indicating the date that the Notice
      and Consent to Join forms were mailed; and

   7. Defendant retains all defenses, including all objections to
      a three (3) year statute of limitations period and the
      right to seek decertification or to object to and oppose
      final certification.[CC]


MIDLAND CREDIT: Faces Hague Suit in District of New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. The case is captioned as LORI HAGUE, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-18054-FLW-ZNQ (D.N.J., Sept 17, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Freda L. Wolfson.

Midland Credit was founded in 1953. The company's line of business
includes extending credit to business enterprises for relatively
short periods.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          Ari Hillel Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (347) 526-4093
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: yzelman@marcuszelman.com
                  ari@marcuszelman.com

MIDLAND FUNDING: Arbitration Compelled in Huser FDCPA Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JONATHAN HUSER, and STEPHEN WELCH on behalf of
themselves and the class members, Plaintiffs, v. MIDLAND FUNDING,
LLC; MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. and ENCORE CAPITAL GROUP,
INC., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-04490 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Joan B.
Gottschall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration of Huser's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA") claims.

Huser opened the consumer credit card account at issue with Juniper
Bank Delaware on Feb. 7, 2006.  Juniper renamed itself Barclay's on
May 25, 2006.  Barclay's sold Huser's account to defendants as one
of a group of allegedly delinquent accounts on Dec. 14, 2012.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants sent them misleading form
dunning letters seeking to collect credit card debts.  Huser's
claims stem from a collection letter dated March 8, 2017.  The
original complaint filed June 14, 2017, named Mary T. Janetos as
the sole Plaintiff.  The Defendants did not answer the original
complaint before it was amended on July 20, 2017.  The First
Amended Complaint (FAC) added Huser as Plaintiff.

The Defendants answered the FAC on Aug. 30, 2017, asserting as an
affirmative defense that the Plaintiffs' claims "may be" subject to
a binding arbitration clause.  Janetos voluntarily dismissed her
claims that same day, Aug. 30, 2017, leaving Huser as the sole
Plaintiff.

The Defendants have been negotiating with Huser about the
arbitration of his claims since at least April 2018.  The
Plaintiffs' lawyer expressed confusion about the fact that the
agreement involved Juniper rather than Barclay's, responding that
the Defendants would need to provide an affidavit before Huser
would agree to arbitrate his claims.  One was immediately
provided.

Instead the parties attempted to settle this and three other cases
pending in the Court from July to September 2018.  The Plaintiffs
filed a motion in Pierre v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., to
reassign the case and three other cases for the purpose of holding
a settlement conference before a magistrate judge.  Conferences
were held in July and September 2018, but they did not produce a
settlement.  The Plaintiffs withdrew their motion to reassign the
case on Oct. 3, 2018.

The record shows that two things happened while settlement efforts
were ongoing.  First, the Defendants sent Huser an offer of
judgment.  Second, Huser sought and obtained leave to filed his
second amended complaint (SAC) on July 12, 2018.  The SAC added
Stephen Welch as a named Plaintiff.  The Defendants answered the
SAC on Aug. 23, 2018.  For the first time in the case, the answer
demanded a jury trial.

The Plaintiffs moved to strike the Defendants' jury demand on Sept.
5, 2018.  The Court granted the motion on Nov. 2, 2018.

The Defendants then filed the pending motion to compel arbitration
in December 2018.  They sought to enforce an arbitration clause in
a credit card member agreement between Huser and Juniper.  Huser
and Welch respond that the Defendants have waived their right to
compel arbitration by participating in the case and that his claims
are outside the scope of the applicable arbitration clause.

Judge Gottschall finds that in opposing the Defendants' motion,
Huser effectively concedes that the three requirements of
compelling arbitration are present.  Huser of course refuses to
arbitrate, satisfying the third element, and he does not suggest
that the credit agreement is unenforceable.  Neither does he deny
that the Defendants, as successors by assignment, can enforce the
agreement.  That leaves the question whether the dispute falls
within the arbitration clause's scope.

An evaluation of the evidence the Court now has before it leads to
the finding that Huser experienced minimal, if any, prejudice from
the Defendants' initial five-month delay in moving to compel
arbitration.  Considering the facts in their totality, Huser has
not carried his burden to establish that the Defendants forfeited
their contractual right to arbitrate this dispute.  The Judge
therefore will grant the Defendant's motion.

The Defendants ask the Court to compel Huser to arbitrate his
claims on an individual basis and dismiss his class action claims.
The agreement contains specific language supporting their request,
and Huser does not discuss this aspect of the motion in his
response.  The agreement declares that claims made and remedies
sought as part of a class action are subject to arbitration on an
individual basis, not on a class action or representative basis.
Because there is no doubt that the arbitration clause covers
Huser's class claims, the Judge compels individual arbitration.

For the reasons stated, Judge Gottschall concludes that the
Defendants have not waived or forfeited their contractual right to
arbitrate this dispute.  The Judge granted the motion to compel and
ordered Huser to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis.  His
claims in the Court are stayed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/2UBHci from Leagle.com.

Jonathan Huser & Stephen Welch, on behalf of themselves and the
class members described below, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel A.
Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cassandra P.
Miller, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Cathleen M. Combs,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, James O. Latturner,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC & Paul Michael Waldera,
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin Llc.

Midland Funding, LLC, Midland Credit Management, Inc. & Encore
Capital Group, Inc., Defendants, represented by David M. Schultz --
dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Todd Philip
Stelter -- tstelter@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, &
Brandon S. Stein -- bstein@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP.


MIDLAND FUNDING: Faces Valentine et al. Suit in New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Funding, LLC,
et al. The case is captioned as CASSANDRA A. VALENTINE and ERLINDA
G. FALDAS, Individually and on behalf of those similarly situated,
the Plaintiff, vs. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT,
INC., and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-18034-ES-MAH (D.N.J., Sept. 16, 2019). The suit alleges
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act. The case is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Esther Salas.

Midland Funding is a large debt buyer of unpaid debt.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          Kim Law Firm LLC
          411 Hackensack Ave Ste 701
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          Facsimile: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com

MONEY SOURCE: Martinez's Bid to Certify Class Shelved
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Roberta Martinez, the
Plaintiff, v. The Money Source, Inc., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00060-SVW-E (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Stephen V. Wilson
entered an order on Oct. 7, 2019, taking a motion to certify class
filed by Plaintiff under submission.[CC]

As reported by Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff seeks to
recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
California Labor Code.  According to the complaint, the Defendant
provides banking services, and specifically mortgage services, to
their customers in California and throughout the United States. TMS
offers eligible employees, such as Plaintiff, the ability to work
remotely in certain situations. The Defendant employed the
Plaintiff as non-exempt, hourly mortgage underwriter. Underwriters,
such as Plaintiff, primarily worked from their home offices and
connected to Defendant's computer systems via a remote virtual
private network.

The Defendant requires its hourly Underwriters to work a full-time
schedule, including overtime. However, Defendant does not
compensate the Underwriters for all work performed; instead,
Defendant required Underwriters, such as Plaintiff, to only record
40 hours per week, regardless of how many hours they actually
worked, unless permission was granted by management. Consequently,
the Plaintiff and Defendant's other Underwriters were routinely
under compensated and deprived of overtime pay, in violation of
state and federal labor laws.

The Defendant's Underwriters were also deprived of meal and rest
breaks as required by federal and state labor laws due to the
Defendant's common unlawful policies and practices. The Defendant
knew or could have easily determined the actual number of overtime
hours worked by the Underwriters, and Defendant could have properly
compensated Plaintiffs and the putative Collective and Class for
this work, but the Defendant did not, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs are:

          Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ LAW OFFICES
          Telephone: (248) 784-6613
          Facsimile: (248) 936-2143
          E-mail: kstoops@sommerspc.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Erica P. Gruver, Esq.
          POLSINELLI LLP
          2049 Century Park E, Ste 2900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3221
          Telephone : (310) 203-5329
          Facsimile: (310) 387-5426

NATIONS RECOVERY: MJ Sues Over Illegal and Unconsented Calls
------------------------------------------------------------
M.J., a minor, by and through his legal guardian VALBONA LAHU, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. NATIONS
RECOVERY CENTER, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-18260 (D.N.J., Sept. 23,
2019), alleges that the Defendant has violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by contacting the Plaintiff and Class
Members on their cellular telephones via an automatic telephone
dialing system and/or by using an artificial or prerecorded voice,
without these individuals' prior express consent.

Nations Recovery Center, Inc. is a 'Domestic Profit Corporation'
registered in and with its principal place of business in the State
of Georgia, also registered as a 'Foreign For-Profit Corporation'
in the State of New Jersey.

NRC is a debt collection agency located in Atlanta, Georgia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yongmoon Kim, Esq.
          Catherine Rhy, Esq.
          KIM LAW FIRM LLC
          411 Hackensack Avenue, Suite 701
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 273-7117
          E-mail: ykim@kimlf.com
                  crhy@kimlf.com


NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Settlement in Pemberton Suit Has Initial OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as MICHAEL PEMBERTON and SANDRA
COLLINS PEMBERTON, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a Federal
Savings Bank, the Defendant, Case No. 3:14-cv-01024-BAS-MSB (S.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Cynthia Bashant entered an order on Oct. 9,
2019:

   1. granting the Parties' joint motion for preliminary approval
      of a class action settlement;

   2. conditionally certifying a class for settlement purposes
      only:

      "all persons who, according to Nationstar's reasonably
      available computerized computer records, had or have Option
      ARM loans serviced by Nationstar and made payments to
      Nationstar in any tax year from 2010 - 2018";

   3. appointing Michael Pemberton and Sandra Collins Pemberton as

      Class Representatives;

   4. appointing the Law Office of David J. Vendler and Michael R.

      Brown, APC, as Class Counsel to represent the Class.

   5. preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement and the
      terms and conditions of Settlement, subject to further
      consideration at a Final Approval Hearing; and

   6. holding a Final Settlement Approval Hearing on January 13,
      2020, at 11:00 a.m., in the Courtroom of the Hon. Cynthia
      Bashant, United States District Court for the Southern
      District of California, Courtroom 11 4B (4th Floor – Edward

      J. Schwartz United States Courthouse), 221 West Broadway,
      San Diego, CA 92101, for the following purposes:

      a. Finally determining whether the Class meets all
         applicable requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
         of  Civil Procedure and whether the Class should be
         certified for the purposes of effectuating the
         Settlement;

      b. Finally determining whether the proposed Settlement of
         the case on the terms and conditions provided for in the
         Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate
         and should be approved and ordered by the Court; and

      c. Ruling upon such other matters as the Court may deem just
         and appropriate.[CC]

Class Members must provide a copy of the written objections to the
Class Counsel and to counsel for Defendant Nationstar at:

Class Counsel:

          LAW OFFICE OF DAVID J. VENDLER
          2700 South Oak Knoll Avenue
          San Marino, CA 91108

                - and -

          Michael R. Brown, APC
          2030 Main Street, Suite 550
          Irvine, CA 92614

Counsel for Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC:

          Erik Wayne Kemp, Esq.
          John B. Sullivan, Esq.
          Adam Vukovic, Esq.
          Mary Kate Kamka, Esq.
          SEVERSON & WERSON, APC
          One Embarcadero Center, Suite 2600
          San Francisco, CA 94111

NAVIGANT CONSULTING: Merger-Related Suits to be Withdrawn
---------------------------------------------------------
Navigant Consulting, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 3, 2019, that
the plaintiffs in the Guidehouse LLP merger related lawsuits have
agreed to withdraw their complaints.

On August 2, 2019, Navigant Consulting, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger, by and among Guidehouse LLP, a Delaware limited liability
partnership ("Parent"), Isaac Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware
corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Parent ("Sub"), and the
Company (as amended from time to time, the "Merger Agreement").

The Merger Agreement provides for, among other things, Sub to merge
with and into the Company, causing the Company to become a wholly
owned subsidiary of Parent (the "Merger").

Lawsuits challenging the merger were filed on September 4, 2019,
September 9, 2019, and September 10, 2019, in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware.

The lawsuits, filed by purported stockholders of the Company, are
captioned Rosenblatt v. Navigant Consulting, Inc., et al., No.
1:19-cv-01680, filed as a putative class action on behalf of
stockholders of the Company, and Stein v. Navigant Consulting,
Inc., et al., No. 1:19-cv-01652, and Gottlieb v. Navigant
Consulting, Inc., et al., No. 1:19-cv-1693, both filed as
individual actions.

The lawsuits allege that the preliminary proxy statement filed on
August 30, 2019, relating to the transactions contemplated by the
merger agreement, omitted material information in violation of
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and certain rules
promulgated thereunder, rendering the preliminary proxy statement
false and misleading. The lawsuits name as defendants the Company
and its directors and seek, among other relief, an order enjoining
completion of the merger.

In addition, by letter dated September 19, 2019, another putative
stockholder of the Company, Steven Makowsky, alleged that the
definitive proxy statement filed on September 12, 2019 (the "Proxy
Statement"), made misrepresentations and omitted material
information in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

The Company believes that the claims asserted by the plaintiffs and
Mr. Makowsky are without merit. However, in order to moot the
plaintiffs' and Mr. Makowsky's unmeritorious disclosure claims,
alleviate the costs, risks and uncertainties inherent in litigation
and provide additional information to its stockholders, the Company
has determined to voluntarily supplement the Proxy Statement.
Plaintiffs and Mr. Makowsky agreed that the supplemental
disclosures will moot their claims and have agreed to withdraw
their complaints and demands, respectively.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://bit.ly/2AYVSJn.

Navigant Consulting, Inc. is a global professional services
company. The Company serves clients in the healthcare, energy and
financial services industries. It operates through three segments.
The Healthcare segment provides consulting services and business
process management services. The Energy segment provides advisory
solutions in business strategy and planning, distributed energy
resources and renewables, energy efficiency and demand response and
grid modernization The Financial Services Advisory and Compliance
segment provides strategic, operational, valuation, risk
management, investigative and compliance advisory services to
clients primarily in the financial services industry. The company
is based in Chicago, Illinois.


NEW YORK: Settlement in Brooks Civil Rights Suit Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DERRICK BROOKS, CLIFTON DEMECO, and BRIAN
BLOWERS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. SAMUEL D. ROBERTS, Commissioner of the New York
State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Defendant,
Case No. 1:16-CV-1025 (N.D. N.Y.), Judge David N. Hurd of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of New York granted the
parties' joint motion for final approval of the class action
settlement.

On Aug. 19, 2016, the named Plaintiffs commenced the action seeking
relief on behalf of themselves and a putative class of fellow New
York State residents receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program ("SNAP") benefits who, since Jan. 1, 2016, have had, are
now having, or will have their benefits terminated for allegedly
failing to meet a work requirement after receiving benefits for
three out of 36 months.  The putative class action named Defendant
Samuel D. Roberts, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, the
agency designated by New York State to administer the federal SNAP
program.

The Complaint sought injunctive relief ordering defendant to:
refrain from terminating SNAP benefits pursuant to the able-bodied
adults without dependents ("ABAWDs") rules without complying with
Due Process and federal laws and regulations governing SNAP;
provide adequate and timely notices of SNAP termination to those
whom defendant deems subject to the ABAWD rules; provide adequate
preliminary notices of ABAWD status and a comprehensive individual
assessment process for those SNAP recipients subject to the ABAWD
time limit; cease terminations of SNAP benefits pursuant to the
ABAWD rules until such time as adequate and timely termination
notices, adequate and timely preliminary notices, and a
comprehensive individual assessment process were in use; and
restore SNAP benefits, provide appropriate back benefits, and
resolve assessed overpayments to individuals wrongfully terminated
from SNAP pursuant to the ABAWD rules.

In a Memorandum-Decision & Order issued on May 5, 2017, the
Plaintiffs' motions for class certification and for a preliminary
injunction were denied while the Defendant's motion to dismiss was
denied in part and granted in part, granting only that portion of
the Defendant's motion as to the Plaintiffs' due process claims
regarding notice of ABAWD status.

Thereafter, the parties worked toward negotiating terms of a final
settlement that would provide significant relief to members of the
proposed class.

On June 14, 2019, the parties advised the Court they had reached a
settlement and moved for preliminary approval of a final class
action settlement agreement.  They thereafter submitted a proposed
notice to be distributed.  On July 8, 2019, the Court approved the
parties' proposed Notice to the Class of the Settlement Agreement
and directed the parties to distribute the Notice in accordance
with the parties' proposed terms.

On Sept. 17, 2019, at 1:00 p.m., a Fairness Hearing was conducted
on the record in Utica, New York.  After considering these facts,
the parties' submissions and statements on the record, and the
factors set forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Judge Hurd finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate to the class and subclass.  Accordingly,
he granted the parties' joint motion for final approval of the
class action settlement.

The certified class is defined as all current or former New York
State Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits
recipients who had their SNAP benefits reduced or terminated
between Jan. 1, 2016, and Dec. 31, 2018, for failing to meet a work
requirement applicable to able-bodied adults without dependents,
pursuant to 7 U.S.C. Section 2015(o)(2) or 7 C.F.R. Sections
273.24(a)(1) and (b).

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/P8pAyr from Leagle.com.

Derrick Brooks, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Clifton DeMeco, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated & Brian Blowers, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Marc Cohan --
info@nclej.org -- National Center for Law & Economic Justice, Inc.,
Petra T. Tasheff , National Center for Law & Economic Justice,
Inc., Saima A. Akhtar, Empire Justice Center, Susan C. Antos --
santos@empirejustice.org -- Empire Justice Center, Gregory Lee
Bass, National Center for Law & Economic Justice, Inc. & Katherine
M. Deabler-Meadows, National Center for Law & Economic Justice,
Inc.

Samuel D. Roberts, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance, Defendant, represented by Omar
J. Siddiqi, New York City Law Department & C. Harris Dague, New
York State Attorney General.


OTIS ELEVATOR: Obtains Summary Judgment Dismissing Gorss' TCPA Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
issued a Ruling and Order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the case captioned GORSS MOTELS, INC., Plaintiff, v. OTIS ELEVATOR
COMPANY, Defendant. No. 3:16-cv-1781 (VAB). (D. Conn.)

Gorss Motels, Inc., has sued the Otis Elevator Company for
allegedly sending unsolicited facsimiles in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk
Fax Prevention Act (TCPA).

The Otis Elevator Company has moved for summary judgment on all of
Gorss Motels's claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record
shows no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party bears the
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. The non-moving party may defeat the motion by
producing sufficient specific facts to establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.  

To protect consumers from unsolicited fax advertisements, Congress
passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and amended it
with the Junk Fax Prevention Act in 2005.  

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 forbids the use of
any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send,
to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement,
unless certain exceptions are met.  

An unsolicited advertisement is any material advertising the
commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or
services which is transmitted to any person without that person's
prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise. An
unsolicited fax advertisement is only permissible when (1) the
unsolicited advertisement is from a sender with an established
business relationship with the recipient (2) the sender obtained
the recipient's fax number either via voluntary communication from
the recipient or from a directory, advertisement, or site on the
internet to which the recipient agreed to make the number publicly
available and (3) the unsolicited advertisement contains an opt-out
notice meeting the requirements set forth in Section 227(b)(2)(D).


Standing

Article III Standing

The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing in federal court
requires: (1) injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to a
defendant's challenged conduct and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.

Otis Elevator Company argues that Gorss Motels lacks Article III
standing because it cannot demonstrate a causal connection between
the injury and the Fax. Otis Elevator Company asserts that because
Gorss Motels conceded that it did not matter what language was in
the fax's disclosures  as Steven Gorss allegedly never read any of
the faxes received from Wyndham, believing that they were all junk
faxes the content of the allegedly deficient disclosures in the fax
could not have caused a concrete and particularized injury.  

According to Otis Elevator Company, the allegedly inadequate
notices made no difference to Steven Gorss as he had no intention
of opting out, but instead collected the faxes with an eye towards
litigation.  

Gorss Motels argues that Otis Elevator Company's argument is a red
herring because it ignores the harms that federal courts have
recognized as giving rise to concrete injury in the TCPA fax
context in dozens of post-Spokeo cases, i.e., forcing unwitting
recipients to bear the costs of the paper and ink, monopolizing the
fax line, and preventing businesses from receiving legitimate
messages. Gorss Motels then argues that it is undisputed that the
Fax was transmitted to and printed from Gorss Motels's fax machine,
thus costing Gorss Motels toner, ink, paper and maintenance. Thus,
Gorss Motels asserts that, in line with Spokeo, it need not argue
any additional harm to satisfy Article III standing.  

Otis Elevator Company notes the Second Circuit in Strubel, 842 F.3d
181, agreed there was no Article III jurisdiction with respect to
two alleged deficiencies, including the bank's failure to include a
disclosure regarding its obligation to comply within 30 days. Otis
Elevator Company asserts that the Strubel court would similarly
find no Article III violation here with the alleged failures of the
opt-out notice on the Fax, which provided clear opt-out
instructions that would have been honored within 30 days, had Gorss
ever wanted to follow those instructions.

The Court disagrees.

Although the Second Circuit in Strubel did find that the plaintiff
lacked standing on two claims, it was because the claims failed to
demonstrate concrete injury, not because there was no causal
connection between the injury and the complained-of conduct. Absent
clear guidance from Strubel, and with the ability to resolve this
case without addressing the issue of standing, however, the Court
need not and will not address that issue here.

Even if there is Article III standing, the case will be dismissed
for other reasons discussed below.

The Court will not grant summary judgment on this basis.

Prudential Standing

Otis Elevator Company also asserts that Gorss Motels lacks
prudential standing and does not fall within the TCPA's zone of
interests, because Gorss Motels is a professional plaintiff. Gorss
Motels responds that it purchased its fax machine for legitimate
purposes, and that whether it is a professional plaintiff, because
it forwarded faxes to its attorneys, has no bearing on whether or
not Otis Elevator Company violated the TCPA.  

The Court agrees.

For the same reasons as discussed with Article III standing, the
Court will not grant summary judgment on this basis.

TCPA Liability

In addressing the issue of TCPA liability, the Court begins its
analysis with the FCC's solicited-fax rule, and after determining
that it no longer applies, turns to whether the Fax here was
solicited. Because this issue ultimately is dispositive, the Court
need not and does not separately address the issue of whether the
Otis Elevator Company was, in fact, the sender of the Fax.

The Otis Elevator Company then argues that Gorss Motels gave WSSI
permission to send the Fax. Gorss Motels provided its fax number to
Wyndham in its several documents, notably Gorss's 2014 Franchise
Agreement and the Property Improvement Plan Report. The 2014
Franchise Agreement addressed the Approved Supplier program and
provided that affiliates may offer assistance in purchasing
approved items conforming to system standards.

According to the Otis Elevator Company, WSSI was doing exactly what
Gorss contractually agreed that Wyndham entities could do: provide
assistance to franchisees with purchasing items from Approved
Suppliers that would conform to the Wyndham system/brand standards.
And Gorss Motels continued to provide its fax number to Wyndham,
despite knowing that it was receiving faxes from WSSI.  

According to the Otis Elevator Company, merely providing a fax
number by itself is sufficient for finding permission or invitation
to send marketing faxes. Because Gorss gave express permission to
Wyndham for WSSI faxes to be sent to its fax number, Otis maintains
that no opt-out language was required, and so the Fax did not
violate the TCPA.

The Otis Elevator Company also argues that, assuming it was the
sender, it had express written consent to send the Fax. According
to the Otis Elevator Company, when Steven Gorss, on behalf of Gorss
Motels, signed a Property Improvement Plan Report promising to make
certain corrections to the property in order to renew its 2014
Franchise Agreement, this agreement included Gorss Motels's contact
information for use by Wyndham's approved vendors for the purpose
of their offering Gorss Motels products and services" involved in
Wyndham-required repairs and updates to the Gorss Motels property.


The Court agrees.

The TCPA's specific disclosure and opt-out requirements then only
apply to unsolicited facsimiles.  
In answering this question, the critical issue is not whether a
franchisor-franchisee relationship itself constitutes consent or
prior express permission, at least in this case. Instead, there are
two agreements entered into by Gorss Motels that ultimately provide
the requisite "prior express invitation or permission.

First, the 2014 Franchise Agreement specifically addressed WSSI's
Approved Supplier program, which provided that Wyndham affiliates
may offer assistance in purchasing approved systems conforming to
system standards.  Second, the Property Improvement Plan Report
stated that Gorss's contact information could be used by Wyndham's
approved vendors for the purpose of their offering Gorss products
and services.

Although Gorss Motels argues that these documents do not constitute
prior express permission, but instead implied permission, in both
of these signed agreements, Gorss Motels affirmatively opted into
receiving faxes.

Indeed, Gorss Motels executed both the 2014 Franchise Agreement and
the Property Improvement Plan Report and listed its fax number and
agreed to receive information from its franchisor's affiliates and
approved vendors. Significantly, Otis Elevator Company is one of
these affiliates and approved vendors.

The Property Improvement Plan Report identified Gorss Motels's
property as in need of elevator repairs, repairs to be completed
within one year. The Gorss Motels property had an elevator from the
Otis Elevator Company. As a result, the Otis Elevator Company would
be the approved vendor for the required repairs. Because Gorss
Motels has conceded that no limitation was placed on the Property
Improvement Plan Report as to how it could be contacted,
communication by facsimile was permissible.  

A recent summary judgment decision in a TCPA case involving Gorss
Motels, from another Circuit and, although not binding on this
Court, nevertheless is instructive. In Gorss Motels, Inc. v.
Safemark Systems, 931 F.3d 1094, 1096 (11th Cir. 2019), the faxes
did not violate the prohibition on unsolicited faxes because the
hotels had provided prior express permission to receive faxes from
the Defendant in their franchise agreement. Although Gorss Motels
similarly argued that it never provided prior express permission to
receive faxes from Safemark, another Wyndham approved vendor, their
franchise agreements constitute an `official act of allowing'
Safemark the liberty to send them faxes.

Because the franchise agreements contemplated that the hotels could
receive optional assistance with purchasing items' from Wyndham and
its affiliates by providing their fax numbers in their agreements,
the hotels invited the assistance or advertisements to come by fax.
Significantly, testimony about what Steven Gorss subjectively
thought is immaterial because the hotels had already provided their
express permission in their franchise agreements.

Here, as in Safemark, Gorss Motels did not rescind the permission
provided in both the 2014 Franchise Agreement and the Property
Improvement Plan Report for Wyndham affiliates to contact it. Both
documents signed and executed by Gorss Motels authorized contact by
facsimile, making the Fax here a solicited one. Because the Fax was
solicited, no opt-out language was required.

And because the Fax was solicited, the Otis Elevator Company did
not violate the TCPA. The Court will dismiss Gorss Motels's TCPA
claim against the Otis Elevator Company.

The Otis Elevator Company's motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court’s September 30, 2019
Ruling and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y65gn3rl from
Leagle.com.

Gorss Motels Inc., a Connecticut corporation, individually and as
the representative of a class of similarlysituated persons,
Plaintiff, represented by Aytan Y. Bellin -
aytan.bellin@bellinlaw.com - Bellin & Associates LLC, Brian J.
Wanca - bwanca@andersonwanca.com -  Anderson & Wanca, pro hac vice
& Ryan Michael Kelly - rkelly@andersonwanca.com - Anderson &
Wanca.

Otis Elevator Company, a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Becca J. Wahlquist -
bwahlquist@swlaw.com - Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Jeffrey J. White -
jwhite@rc.com - Robinson & Cole, LLP & Kathleen Elizabeth Dion -
Kdion@rc.com - Robinson & Cole, LLP.


OXNARD, CA: Removes Alvarez et al. Suit to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of JOSE ALVAREZ; KAREEM DAVIS; ETHEL
HERRERA; CHAD SHOEMAKER; and LEO TAPIA individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF OXNARD; and
DOES 1 through 10, Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit
from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of
Ventura (Case No. 56-2019-00531510-CU-OE-VTA) to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on September 17, 2019.
The clerk of court for the Central District of California assigned
Case No. 2:19-cv-08044.

Oxnard is a seaside city west of Los Angeles, in California. [BN]

The defendant is represented by:

          Tomas A. Guterres, Esq.
          David C. Moore, Esq.
          Ryan J. Kohler, Esq.
          COLLINS COLLINS MUIR + STEWART LLP
          1100 El Centro Street
          South Pasadena, CA 91030
          Telephone: (626) 243-1100
          Facsimile:  (626) 243-1111
          E-mail: tguterres@ccmslaw.com
                  dmoore@ccmslaw.com
                  rkohler@ccmslaw.com


PATENAUDE & FELIX: Moyer Moves for Rule 23 Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned CANDACE MOYER, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. PATENAUDE & FELIX,
A.P.C., Case No. 5:18-cv-04711-JDW (E.D. Pa.), moves for an order
granting her Motion to Certify Class pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Ms. Moyer seeks oral argument.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: Ari@MarcusZelman.com


PEP BOYS MANNY: Luis Files Labor Class Suit in California
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Pep boys Manny
Moe & Jack of California. The case is styled as Torres Luis
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. The Pep boys Manny Moe & Jack of California, a
California Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 19STCV36167 (Cal.
Super., Oct. 9, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Employment Complaint Case.

The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California retails automotive
parts and accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



PHEAA: Winebarger Appeals C.D. California Ruling to Ninth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Peter Gannon, Jenise Overmier and Lisa Winebarger filed
an appeal from a Court ruling issued in their lawsuit entitled Lisa
Winebarger, et al. v. PHEAA, et al., Case No.
2:19-cv-01503-JFW-RAO, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Lisa Winebarger, et al. v.
PHEAA, et al., Case No. 19-56118, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to rectify a pattern and practice by Defendants of failing to
credit student loan borrowers for qualifying payments toward the
Congressionally-mandated Public Service Loan Forgiveness ("PSLF")
program.

According to the lawsuit, the practice contravenes Defendants'
duties under their servicing contracts with the federal government
and under applicable law, and financially impairs thousands, if not
millions, of student loan borrowers eligible or potentially
eligible for debt relief under the PSLF program.

Ms. Winebarger is a case in point. She has diligently made payments
which meet all the statutory and regulatory requirements to count
as "qualifying payments" toward the qualifying payments required
for loan forgiveness under the PSLF program.

However, PHEAA -- which serves as the exclusive loan servicer for
borrowers actively pursuing PSLF -- has furnished Ms. Winebarger
with vastly fluctuating payment counts that do not reflect the full
number of qualifying payments she has made. Ms. Winebarger now
seeks to remedy the situation on behalf of herself and those
similarly situated, public servants who have borrowed money to fund
their education but have found their progress toward promised loan
forgiveness stymied by Defendants' negligence and malfeasance.

In the aggregate, the claims of all class members exceed
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, based on the
allegations herein. Given the value of the loans eligible or
potentially eligible for forgiveness under the PSLF program (which
run to the hundreds of billions of dollars), it is readily apparent
that Defendants' negligence and malfeasance have caused much more
than $5,000,000 in qualifying payments for PSLF to go uncredited,
the lawsuit says.

PHEAA is a public corporation headquartered in Pennsylvania. Nelnet
is a corporation headquartered in Nebraska.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Appellants Peter Gannon, Jenise Overmier and Lisa
      Winebarger's opening brief is due on November 19, 2019;

   -- Appellees Nelnet Servicing, LLC, Nelnet, Inc. and
      Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency's answering
      brief is due on December 19, 2019; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants LISA WINEBARGER, JENISE OVERMIER and PETER
GANNON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
are represented by:

          Jonathan A. Sorkowitz, Esq.
          PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
          277 Park Avenue, 45th Floor
          New York, NY 10172
          Telephone: (212) 484-9866
          E-mail: jsorkowitz@piercebainbridge.com

               - and -

          Thomas D. Warren, Esq.
          PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
          355 S. Grand Avenue, 44th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 262-9333
          E-mail: twarren@piercebainbridge.com

Defendant-Appellee PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE AGENCY
is represented by:

          Mark S. Kokanovich, Esq.
          BALLARD SPAHR LLP
          1 East Washington Street, Suite 2300
          Phoenix, AZ 85004-2555
          Telephone: (602) 798-5532
          E-mail: kokanovichm@ballardspahr.com

Defendants-Appellees NELNET, INC. and NELNET SERVICING, LLC are
represented by:

          Jonathan C. Sandler, Esq.
          BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK LLP
          2049 Century Park East
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 500-4600
          E-mail: jsandler@bhfs.com


PILLARS FUNDING: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Katsnelson Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT KATSNELSON, Individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated persons v. PILLARS FUNDING LLC, SAUL SHERMAN,
ELI BERG, and KEVIN MILLS, Jointly and Severally, Case No.
1:19-cv-05413 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 23, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and other employees the
minimum wage under the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Pillars Funding is a New York Domestic Limited Liability Company
that is organized under New York law and authorized to do business
in the State of New York.  The Individual Defendants own, operate
or controls Pillars Funding's day-to-day operations and
management.

Pillars Funding is a financial services company that offers
merchant cash advances at high-interest rates, as well as credit
card processing services.  Pillars Funding operates two offices,
one in Brooklyn, New York, and one in Staten Island, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          Sara J. Isaacson, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10170-1830
          Telephone: (212) 392-4772
          Facsimile: (212) 444-1030
          E-mail: doug@lipskylowe.com
                  sara@lipskylowe.com


PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Horowitz Asserts Breach of FDCA
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC. The case is styled as Usher Horowitz, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05575 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 2, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC is a debt collection firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



PPL CORP: Talen Securities Suit Remanded to State Court
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Susan P. Waters of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Montana, Billings Division, granted Plaintiffs Talen Montana
Retirement Plan and Talen Energy Marketing, LLC's motion to remand
the case captioned Talen Montana Retirement Plan and Talen Energy
Marketing, LLC, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. PPL Corporation, PPL Capital Funding Inc.,
PPL Electric Utilities Corp., PPL Energy Funding Corp., Paul A.
Farr, Mark F. Wilten, Peter J. Simonich, and DOES 1-50, Defendants,
Cause No. CV-18-174-BLG-SPW (D. Mont.), back to the Sixteenth
Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, Montana.

In 1999, PPL purchased 11 hydroelectric facilities, a storage dam,
and ownership interests in coal-fired plants in Colstrip, Montana,
and Corette, Montana, from Montana Power Co. for $769 million.  PPL
created PPL Montana, a subsidiary, to acquire and manage the energy
assets.  For the next 13 years, PPL Montana generated more than
$325 million in profits for PPL.  In 2012, due to a number of
converging factors, energy prices dropped in Montana, causing PPL's
profits to fall.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
formulating new regulations related to disposal of coal ash, which
would result in higher production costs.  The Montana Department of
Environmental Quality imposed extensive closure, remediation, and
financial obligations on PPL Montana due to seepage from the coal
plants' ash ponds.  The Sierra Club sued PPL Montana under the
Clean Air Act for civil penalties and injunctive relief concerning
the Colstrip coal plant.

While issues with the coal plants were going on, PPL acquired
utilities in Kentucky and the United Kingdom for a combined cost of
$13.2 billion.  It also designed plans to modernize existing
utility operations for more than $15 billion.  The combined effect
of PPL's declining energy profits and utility acquisitions was
financial stress.  To ease the financial stress, PPL began shopping
PPL Montana's assets.  Northwestern Energy submitted two bids.  One
bid was $740 million for PPL Montana's hydroelectric assets, the
other bid was $400 million for PPL Montana's hydroelectric and
coal-fired assets.  The coal-fired assets carried such a
substantial negative valuation that PPL decided to sell PPL
Montana's hydroelectric assets, distribute the proceeds to PPL, and
leave the coal fired assets with PPL Montana.

At the time of the sale, all three of PPL Montana's board of
managers were employed by PPL.  One of these managers was Peter
Simonich.  Simonich and PPL Montana's other two managers approved
PPL Montana's sale of its hydroelectric assets to Northwestern
Energy for approximately $900 million.  As soon as the sale was
complete, Simonich and his fellow managers on the board authorized
the distribution of the $900 million from PPL Montana to PPL
despite knowing the distribution would leave PPL Montana
insolvent.

The distribution left PPL Montana insolvent -- just as Simonich,
his fellow managers, and PPL knew it would -- with only the
coal-fired plants its material assets.  Less than a year after
rendering PPL Montana insolvent, PPL completed a spin-off
transaction, wherein PPL Montana became a subsidiary of a new
company completely unaffiliated with PPL, called Talen Energy
Corp., which subsequently changed its name to Talen Montana.

Talen Montana's pension plan and Talen Energy Marketing LLC, an
affiliate of Talen Montana, filed suit against PPL in Montana state
district court, alleging actual fraudulent transfer, constructive
fraudulent transfer, recovery against subsequent transferees, civil
conspiracy, concert of action, unjust enrichment, constructive
trust, and punitive damages.  The Plaintiffs brought the suit as a
class action on behalf of all current and contingent creditors of
Talen Montana.  The first amended complaint seeks a constructive
trust, damages equal to the distribution, and punitive damages.
PPL removed the action to the Court under the Class Action Fairness
Act.  The Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case back to
state court under the local controversy exception to CAFA.

The Plaintiffs argue the Local Controversy Exception applies in the
case.  The Defendants respond the Local Controversy Exception does
not apply because Montana citizens do not make up two-thirds of the
class, no Defendant is a Montana citizen from whom significant
relief is sought and whose conduct forms a significant basis for
the claims asserted, and principal injuries were not incurred in
Montana but instead nationwide.

Because greater than two-thirds of the proposed class are Montana
citizens, Judge Waters finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied
their burden under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I).  

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently allege
Simonich's conduct forms a significant basis for their claims.
Although PPL was undoubtedly the bigger player in the alleged
scheme, Simonich remains liable for his own conduct, which the
Plaintiffs claim is civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting
tortious conduct.  The Plaintiffs further claim Simonich's conduct
was so egregious that he is liable for punitive damages.  Most
importantly, Simonich's alleged conduct -- the approval of the sale
and distribution knowing it would render PPL Montana insolvent --
played a pivotal role in the resulting harm.

Finally, the Judge finds that although some other states each have
a smattering of Talen Montana creditors, the sheer amount of damage
caused to Montana citizens, particularly the hundreds of employees
and retirees residing in Rosebud County, and to the Montana
Department of Environmental Quality makes this a controversy that
"uniquely affects" Montana unlike anywhere else.  To hold otherwise
would cause a distinctly local issue to be transformed into a
national issue, which is the opposite of CAFA's intent.

For these reasons, Judge Waters granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand the case to state court.  She remanded case to the Sixteenth
Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, Montana.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/75kMvQ from Leagle.com.

Talen Montana Retirement Plan, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated & Talen Energy Marketing, LLC,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Robert L. Sterup --
rsterup@brownfirm.com -- BROWN LAW FIRM, P.C., Adam Wolfson --
adamwolfson@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN,
LLP, pro hac vice, Karl S. Stern, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP, pro hac vice, Kate K. Shih --
kateshih@quinnemanuel.com -- QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN,
LLP, pro hac vice & Katherine Kunz, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP, pro hac vice.

PPL Corporation, PPL Capital Funding Inc., PPL Electric Utilities
Corp., PPL Energy Funding Corp., Mark F. Wilten & Peter J.
Simonich, Defendants, represented by Elizabeth L. Griffing --
bgriffing@axilonlaw.com -- AXILON LAW GROUP, PLLC & Tom Singer --
tsinger@axilonlaw.com -- Axilon Law Group, PLLC.

Paul A. Farr, Defendant, represented by Casey Heitz, PARKER, HEITZ
& COSGROVE, PLLC, Mark D. Parker, PARKER, HEITZ & COSGROVE, PLLC &
Joshua L. Seifert, pro hac vice.


PURDUE PHARMA: Taylor Files RICO Class Action in Kansas
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Purdue Pharma L.P.
The case is styled as William Taylor, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Purdue Pharma, LP,
Purdue Pharma, Inc., The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., INSYS
Therapeutics, Inc., Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., Teva
Pharmaceutical USA, Inc., Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson,
Janssen Pharmaceutical, Inc., Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC, Actavis Inc., Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Watson Laboratories, Inc., McKesson
Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc. and Amerisourcebergen
Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02596-DDC-KGG (D. Kan.,
Oct. 2, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as
Racketeer/Corrupt Organization filed pursuant to the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Purdue Pharma L.P. is a privately held pharmaceutical company owned
principally by descendants of Mortimer and Raymond Sackler. In
2007, it paid out one of the largest fines ever levied against a
pharmaceutical firm for mislabeling its product OxyContin, and
three executives were found guilty of criminal charges.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Robert L. Kinsman, Esq.
   Krause & Kinsman, LLC
   4717 Grand Avenue, Suite 250
   Kansas City, MO 64112
   Tel: (816) 760-2700
   Fax: (816) 760-2800
   Email: robert@krauseandkinsman.com


QUINTI INC: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Ngo Says
-------------------------------------------------
HOANG NGO, an individual, the Plaintiff, vs. QUINTI INC., a
California corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case No. 19STCV27433 (Cal. Super., Aug. 5, 2019),
alleges that Defendants violated the California Labor Code by
failing pay overtime, failing to pay all wages upon termination,
and failing to issue complete and accurate wage statements.

The Plaintiff and all other similarly aggrieved past and current
employees of Defendant were and are victims of Defendant's policies
and/or practices complained of, lost money and/or property as a
result of Defendant's conduct, and have been deprived of the rights
guaranteed to them by California Labor Code

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Tire Technician from
approximately February 2018 until his termination on or about May
20, 2019, at Defendant's EZ Tire Stop retail 15 store.

The Plaintiff commenced work at Defendant's Walnut location,
located at 750 Nogales Street 16 No. D, Walnut, California 91789,
and then was transferred to Defendant's Alhambra location, located
at 502 South Garfield Avenue, Alhambra, California 91801, when the
Walnut location was closed.

The Defendant classified Plaintiff and all other similarly
aggrieved employees as hourly, as non-exempt employees. The
Plaintiff and other similarly aggrieved employees held
non-management positions.

During Plaintiff's employment, Defendant regularly failed to
provide the Plaintiff and all other similarly aggrieved employees
their legally compliant meal and rest breaks due to Defendant's
understaffing.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Allen B. Felahy, Esq.
          FarbodNourian, Esq.
          FELAHY EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 2655
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (323) 645-5197
          Facsimile: (323) 645-5198
          E-mail: afelahy@Felahylaw.com
                  fnourian@felahylaw.com

RIVERSTONE RESIDENTIAL: Casafranca Appeal on Antoine Deal Nixed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVELYN ANTOINE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
RIVERSTONE RESIDENTIAL CA, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents;
NELLY CASAFRANCA, Objector and Appellant, Case No. C083946 (Cal.
App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Third District,
Sacramento, dismissed Objector Nelly D. Casafranca's appeal of the
trial court's Final Approval Order and Judgment approving a
settlement in the class action lawsuit brought by employees
(Antoine et al.) against employers (Riverstone Residential CA,
Inc., et al.) for unfair business practices and specified labor law
violations regarding wages, meal and rest periods, etc.

The class action suit includes a cause of action under the Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, which authorizes
employees to sue employers for statutory penalties for Labor Code
violations and attorney fees.  Casafranca, who is not a named party
of record, argued that the Antoine settlement was invalid as to the
PAGA claim for various reasons and would foreclose her own PAGA
claim that she filed in Orange County Superior Court, alleging
claims duplicative of those in the Antoine complaint.  Casafranca
filed the Orange County complaint as a "representative action" on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated.

The Sacramento County judge in the Antoine suit addressed and
rejected Casafranca's objections in a tentative ruling, adopted its
tentative ruling, and specified in the Final Approval Order and
Judgment that the Objection of Nelly D. Casafranca to the Proposed
Settlement is overruled and denied in its entirety.  The Court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Settlement.
Casafranca filed a notice of appeal.

After Casafranca filed her opening brief on appeal and the
Appellant's appendix, the Plaintiffs, joined by the Defendants,
moved for dismissal of Casafranca's appeal on the ground that she
lacks standing because she did not make herself a party of record
in the Sacramento County class action.

It is undisputed that Casafranca did not formally intervene nor
move to set aside nor vacate the judgment.  The Respondents ask the
Court to take judicial notice of the register of actions from the
Sacramento County Superior Court website, reflecting that
Casafranca never sought to intervene in the class action and never
filed a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment.  Casafranca
does not claim that the register is incorrect and does not claim
that she filed anything in the trial court to intervene or set
aside or vacate the judgment. And the Court can take judicial
notice that no filing for intervention or motion to set aside or
vacate the judgment appears in the trial court's register of
actions.

Judge Hull opines that a PAGA claim may be pursued as a class
action, and when it is, unnamed class members do not become parties
of record with the right to appeal under Code of Civil Procedure
section 902 unless they formally intervene in the class litigation
before the action is final, or file an appealable motion to set
aside and vacate the class judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 663.  The Antoine lawsuit that included a PAGA claim was
pursued as a class action.

Originally, Ms. Antoine filed a class action complaint that did not
include a PAGA claim, while other employees (not Casafranca)
separately filed suits that did raise PAGA claims.  All of these
suits were incorporated in an amended complaint pursuant to a
class-wide settlement, as stated in the Notice of Class Action
Settlement filed with the Sacramento County Superior Court.  The
Sacramento court approved the settlement and allowed the filing of
the amended complaint, which added the other plaintiff-employees as
named plaintiffs in Antoine's complaint.  Casafranca was not
included, because she did not initiate her own PAGA claim until
after she received notice of the proposed settlement.

Since the PAGA claim in the lawsuit at issue in the appeal was
pursued as a class action, class action rules apply, and
Casafranca's failure to make herself a party of record leaves her
without standing to appeal.  Accordingly, Casafranca lacks standing
to appeal, the Appellate Court holds.

In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Court granted the
Respondents' motion to dismiss Casafranca's appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/BCh7J2 from Leagle.com.


SAFECO INSURANCE: Martin Suit over Housing Insurance Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
ROGER MARTIN, Individually & on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF INDIANA,
the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00262-JRG (E.D. Tex., Aug. 5, 2019)
alleges that Defendant failed to comply with its insuring agreement
when it recouped the funds paid for recoverable depreciation and/or
claims adjusting expenses.

SAFECO provides replacement cost homeowners' insurance to tens of
thousands of Texans. In the event of a covered loss, SAFECO pays
the full replacement cost of property damaged or destroyed. Under
the terms of the policies, "replacement cost" includes the actual
cash value of the property plus recoverable depreciation.

Meanwhile, the lawsuit says, policyholders asserting claims against
third parties responsible for covered losses recover only the
actual cash value of damaged or destroyed property. Even though a
subrogated insurance carrier indisputably has no greater rights
than its policyholder, SAFECO nonetheless demands reimbursement of
the full amount of its outlays -- including recoverable
depreciation and claims adjusting expenses -- from policyholder
third party recoveries, the lawsuit says.

                  *     *     *

Defendant's Unopposed First Application for Extension of Time to
Answer Complaint has granted pursuant to Local Rule CV-12 for
SAFECO Insurance Company of Indiana to Sept. 27.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          James A. Holmes, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF JAMES HOLMES, P.C.
          212 South Marshall
          Henderson, TX 75654
          Telephone: (903) 657-2800
          Facsimile: (903) 657-2855
          E-mail: jh@JamesHolmesLaw.com

               - and -

          David B. Miller, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER MILLER REYNOLDS, P.C.
          300 North Coit Road, Suite 1125
          Richardson, TX 75080-5535
          Telephone: (972) 479-1112
          Facsimile: (972) 479-1113
          E-mail: david@schneidlaw.com

SAFECO Insurance Company of Indiana is represented by:

          Christopher Andrew Thompson, Esq.
          Jackson Walker LLP
          2323 Ross Ave., Suite 600
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Tel: (214) 953-6032
          Fax: (214) 953-5822
          E-mail: cthompson@jw.com

SALTILLO, MI: Whaley Files Civil Rights Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against City of Saltillo,
Mississippi. The case is styled as Jacob A. Whaley, on behalf of
himself and those similarly- situated, Plaintiff v. City of
Saltillo, Mississippi, Defendant Case No. 1:19-cv-00178-DMB-DAS
(N.D. Miss., Oct. 8, 2019).

The case type is stated as Civil Rights-Other.

Saltillo is a city in Lee County, Mississippi, located in the
northern part of the Tupelo micropolitan area.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jim D. Waide , III, Esq.
   WAIDE & ASSOCIATES, PA
   P.O. Box 1357
   Tupelo, MS 38802-1357
   Tel: (662) 842-7324
   Fax: (662) 842-8056
   Email: waide@waidelaw.com


SANCHEZ OIL: Flynn Seeks to Certify Class of Operators
------------------------------------------------------
MARK FLYNN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. SANCHEZ OIL & GAS CORPORATION, the
Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00867-JKP-ESC (W.D. Tex.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order conditionally certifying a
Fair Labor Standards Act class consisting of:

   "all Operators who worked for, or on behalf of, Sanchez, who
   were staffed through Tulsa Inspection Resources and paid a day
   rate at any time during the last three years".

Sanchez is a private company engaged in the management of oil and
natural gas properties. SOG and various related companies have
participated in and managed the drilling of over 1,000 wells,
investing a substantial amount of capital in well costs, seismic
and acreage.

In an effort to side step federal overtime requirements, Sanchez
pays these operators a day rate with no overtime compensation.
Plaintiffs' pay records and declarations are consistent that
Sanchez pays its operators a day rate without overtime.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          William R. Liles, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  wliles@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          Richard J. (Rex) Burch
          Greenway Plaza, Ste. 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com


SHAW INDUSTRIES: Seeks 9th Cir. Review of Decision in Fitch Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Shaw Industries Group, Inc. and Shaw Industries, Inc.
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit styled Randolph
Fitch v. Shaw Industries, Inc., et al., Case No.
2:19-cv-00590-RGK-MAA, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is titled as Randolph Fitch v. Shaw Industries,
Inc., et al., Case No. 19-56119, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Defendants
filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate
case is captioned as Randolph Fitch v. Shaw Industries, Inc., et
al., Case No. 19-80044.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee RANDOLPH FITCH, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated and on behalf of the general public, is
represented by:

          David Mara, Esq.
          Jill Marie Vecchi, Esq.
          MARA LAW FIRM PC
          2650 Camino Del Rio North, Suite 205
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 234-2833
          E-mail: dmara@turleylawfirm.com
                  jvecchi@turleylawfirm.com

Defendants-Appellants SHAW INDUSTRIES, INC. and SHAW INDUSTRIES
GROUP, INC., are represented by:

          Michaela Goldstein, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          1901 Avenue of the Stars
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-6001
          Telephone: (424) 288-5303
          E-mail: mgoldstein@sheppardmullin.com

               - and -

          Tyler James Johnson, Esq.
          Tracey Adano Kennedy, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1448
          Telephone: (213) 620-1780
          E-mail: tjjohnson@sheppardmullin.com
                  tkennedy@sheppardmullin.com


SOUTHLAND ROYALTY: Atencio Files Class Suit in New Mexico
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Southland Royalty
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Brenda Atencio, on behalf of
herself and a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v.
Southland Royalty Company, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-00946-JFR-LF (D. N.M., Oct. 9, 2019).

The docket of the case states that the case was filed for Breach of
Contract.

Southland Royalty Co., headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, operates
oil and gas assets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Stacy Burrows, Esq.
   Law Offices of George A. Barton, PC
   7227 Metcalf Avenue, Suite 301
   Overland Park, KS 66204
   Tel: (913) 563-6253
   Fax: (913) 563-6259
   Email: stacy@georgebartonlaw.com

      - and -

   George Barton, Esq.
   Law Offices of George Barton, P.C.
   7227 Metcalf Avenue, Suite 301
   Overland Park, KS 66204
   Tel: (913) 563-6250
   Email: gab@georgebartonlaw.com


SPECTRA ENERGY: Morris Has No Standing to Pursue Claims, Says Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Chancery of Delaware issued an Opinion granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case captioned PAUL MORRIS, on
behalf of all similarly situated former unitholders of SPECTRA
ENERGY PARTNERS, LP, Plaintiff, v. SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS (DE) GP,
LP, Defendant. C.A. No. 2019-0097-SG. (Del. Ch.).

This is the second incarnation of a challenge--by a unitholder of a
master limited partnership--to a buyback (a "reverse dropdown") of
partnership assets formerly purchased from the controller of the
partnership's general partner. The first litigation in the matter
alleged that a special committee appointed by the general partner
consented to the transaction in violation of its contractual duty
of good faith, at an inadequate price. That litigation was brought
in pertinent part derivatively, and survived a motion to dismiss.
Standing to pursue the matter was lost, however, when the
controller acquired the partnership via merger.

The Plaintiff then brought this challenge to that merger, alleging
that the general partner agreed to the merger in bad faith, in that
it failed to receive any value for the derivative litigation
asset.

The Defendant has moved to dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiff does
not pass the Primedia test, and therefore lacks standing; and that
in any event he has failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.

The Court finds that the value of the derivative claim here was not
material in light of the merger transaction. The derivative claim
asserted that in determining that the reverse dropdown was fair to
the partnership, the derivative defendants erred in netting out
from known value a reduction of future payments to the general
partner avoided due to the reverse dropdown. According to the
derivative complaint, the assets, valued at $1.5 billion, were
undersold by $554 million. That is not the value of the claim to
the partnership, however. The potential value must be reduced to
reflect the minority unitholders' interest, as well as the prospect
of ultimate recovery in light of the difficulties of proof inherent
therein. Upon consideration, the Court finds the amount at issue
not material to the partnership. Therefore, the Plaintiff lacks
standing and the Motion to Dismiss must be granted. Accordingly the
Court need not reach the Defendant's argument under Rule 12(b)(6).


Analysis

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Chancery
Court Rule 12(b)(6).

The Complaint pleads two counts. Both are pled as direct claims.

Count I asserts breach of SEP's Third Amended and Restated
Agreement of Limited Partnership (Third A&R LPA) against SEP GP.
Count II asserts breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing against SEP GP.  

The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is well settled:
(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true (ii)
even vague allegations are well-pleaded if they give the opposing
party notice of the claim (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and (iv) dismissal is
inappropriate unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover
under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible
of proof.

Standing Requirement for the Plaintiff's Claims

In certain circumstances, Delaware law permits stockholders who
lose standing under this scenario to directly challenge the
fairness of the merger that extinguished their right to pursue the
derivative litigation.

In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch.
May 10, 2013), sets out the standing requirements under Delaware
law for a plaintiff who attacks the fairness of a merger based on a
board's alleged failure to obtain value for an underlying
derivative claim. Primedia holds that a plaintiff seeking to pursue
such a direct claim must establish standing to sue via a three-part
test:

First, the plaintiff must plead an underlying derivative claim that
has survived a motion to dismiss or otherwise could state a claim
for which relief could be granted. Second, the value of the
derivative claim must be material in the context of the merger.
Third, the complaint challenging the merger must support a
pleadings-stage inference that the acquirer would not assert the
underlying derivative claim and did not provide value for it.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Roll-Up was unfair because the 2018
Committee and SEP GP failed to secure any value for the Derivative
Claim on behalf of SEP's public unitholders. The Plaintiff argues
that the Derivative Claim had value and it is incontrovertible that
the Defendant did not obtain value for the Derivative Claim and
that the Plaintiff seeks to challenge the Roll-Up on this ground.
The Plaintiff, however, must first establish standing to pursue
this challenge.

The Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing

The Derivative Claim Was Viable, and the Plaintiff's Class Received
No Value for It
The Derivative Claim here survived a motion to dismiss in this
Court. The record at that point was insufficient to determine the
nature of the alleged IDR savings from the Sand and Southern Hills
and whether it was properly understood as value of consideration to
SEP. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff in
that motion to dismiss, the Court found that he made adequate
allegations showing that under reasonably conceivable circumstances
a facially unreasonable gap in consideration exists sufficient to
infer subjective bad faith in breach of the Second A&R LPA.

The Defendant urges this Court to evaluate the viability of the
Derivative Claim as of the date the Plaintiff's standing was
extinguished. The Defendant had moved for summary judgment on the
Derivative Claim. The Defendant's summary judgment motion relied on
discovery material and the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff
cannot now contend that this Court must assess the viability of his
claim as if that summary judgment evidence did not exist.

The Defendant's argument misconstrues the purpose of the viability
inquiry, which seeks to identify only whether the underlying
derivative suit is meritorious. In discussing whether a claim is
meritorious, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that it is not
necessary that factually there be absolute assurance of ultimate
success, but only that there be some reasonable hope. Viability is
a threshold inquiry. If the complaint is devoid of actionable
claims, the inquiry is at an end.  

The answer for the Derivative Claim is in the affirmative. That is
the end of the viability inquiry. The Defendant's argument that the
facts favor a summary judgment is not pertinent to viability, but,
obviously, may be pertinent to the materiality prong of the
Primedia analysis, addressed below.

Likewise, the record reflects that the third Primedia prong was
satisfied; the public unitholders received no value for the
Derivative Claim.

The Derivative Claim Was Not Material

The remaining prong of the Primedia inquiry is whether the value of
the derivative claim was material in the context of the merger.
This first requires a calculation of the value of the claim. Then,
materiality is adjudicated by viewing that value in the context of
the merger as a whole.

The Complaint alleges that the Derivative Claim was worth more than
$660 million to SEP. The Plaintiff calculates this number as the
sum of (1) the difference the Plaintiff alleges between the value
of the Pipeline Interests ($1.5 billion) and the value the
Plaintiff alleges was received as consideration for the Pipeline
Interests from SE Corp ($946 million) and (2) prejudgment interest
using the applicable statutory rate.

Previous cases are unclear whether in determining materiality,
prejudgment interest should be included in the value of a
derivative claim. The Court presumes, without deciding, that
prejudgment interest is a part of the value attributable to the
Derivative Claim. The Court assumes that the Derivative Claim,
therefore, was for $661 million.

But $661 million is not the value of the Derivative Claim for
Primedia purposes. Instead, the value of the Derivative Litigation
must be discounted to reflect the minority stockholders' beneficial
interest in the litigation recovery. This reflects the fact that
the public unitholders of SEP would only share in that portion of
the recovery from the Derivative Claim for those units that were
not owned by Enbridge prior to the Roll-Up.

The Complaint alleges that Enbridge owned approximately 83% of
SEP's limited partner units. This left the minority unitholders
with an approximately 17% interest in SEP. $661 million multiplied
by 17% equals $112,370,000. The Court therefore find the value of
the Derivative Claim, assuming a 100% chance of recovery, to be
$112,370,000.

Yet the Plaintiff faced substantial roadblocks to a $112.37 million
judgment, as there was risk in the litigation. It remains, in my
view, a litigable question whether Reduced GP Cash Flow represented
value to the Partnership in the Reverse Dropdown, which would
vindicate the Defendant's approval of the transaction objectively.
But even if the Defendant was incorrect in its valuation, that
would not breach the Second A&R LPA.

Instead, the Plaintiff would have to show either that the work of
the Defendant's advisor, Simmons, on the Reverse Dropdown did not
fit in the parameters of Section 7.10(b) of the Second A&R LPA, or
that SEP GP did not reasonably believe that the valuation of the
transaction was within Simmons' competence, negating any safe
harbor for the Defendant.

Clearing this bar, moreover, would only remove the conclusive
presumption of good faith. The Plaintiff would still have to
demonstrate the Defendant's subjective bad faith to recover damages
on behalf of SEP; the Second A&R LPA insulated SEP GP as long as
its actions were taken in subjective good faith. To overcome that
hurdle the Plaintiff would have had to show scienter: that SEP GP's
Board of Directors and the 2015 Committee acted consciously against
the best interests of the Partnership.

The Court finds that the chance of success of the Derivative Claim
was slim, and certainly less than one-in-four. Twenty-five percent
of $112,370,000 is $28,092,500. This represents less than one
percent of the total value of the Roll-Up. One percent is not
material in the context of the Roll-Up. The Plaintiff consequently
does not have standing to pursue his claims. Therefore, both Counts
I and II must be dismissed.

The Defendant's Motion is granted.

A full-text copy of the Chancery Court's  September 30, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2zl7wrq
from Leagle.com.

Michael J. Barry -  mbarry@gelaw.com - and Michael T. Manuel -
mmanuel@gelaw.com - of GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Peter B. Andrews - pandrews@andrewsspringer.com - and
Craig J. Springer  - cspringer@andrewsspringer.com - of ANDREWS &
SPRINGER LLC, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Jeremy Friedman -
jfriedman@ljbpc.com - Spender Oster - soster@fotpllc.com -  and
David Tejtel -dtejtel@fotpllc.com -  of FRIEDMAN OSTER & TEJTEL
PLLC, New York, NY, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Robert S. Saunders - rob.saunders@skadden.com - Ronald N. Brown,
III - ron.brown@skadden.com - and   of SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; OF COUNSEL: Noelle M.
Reed - noelle.reed@skadden.com - Daniel S. Mayerfeld  -
daniel.mayerfeld@skadden.com - and Alston L. Walker , 1440 New York
Ave Nw, Washington, DC 20005-2111 of SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER
& FLOM LLP, Houston, Texas, Attorneys for Defendant.

STITCH FIX: Consolidated Amended Complaint Filed in Cal. Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Stitch Fix, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 2, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 3, 2019, that a consolidated amended
complaint has been filed in the consolidated class action suit
filed before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.

On October 11, 2018, October 26, 2018, November 16, 2018, and
December 10, 2018, four putative class action lawsuits alleging
violations of the federal securities laws were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, naming as
defendants the company and certain of its  officers.

The four lawsuits each make the same allegations of violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange
Act"), by the company and its officers for allegedly making
materially false and misleading statements regarding our active
client growth and strategy with respect to television advertising
between June 2018 and October 2018.

The plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary damages and other relief.
The four lawsuits have been consolidated and a lead plaintiff has
been appointed. The lead plaintiff filed a consolidated amended
complaint on September 18, 2019.

Stitch Fix said, "We dispute these claims and intend to defend the
matter vigorously."

Stitch Fix, Inc. operates as an online subscription and personal
shopping platform. The Company offers shirts, jackets, sweaters,
blazers, leggings, vests, scarfs, jeans, loafers, and boots for men
and women. Stitch Fix serves customers in the United States. Stitch
Fix, Inc. was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


SUNWEST BANK: Appeals Ct. Affirms Wood Suit Ruling, $83K Award
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division One
affirmed a trial court order entered in favor of Defendants in the
case captioned DENNIS WOOD et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
SUNWEST BANK et al., Defendants and Respondents, Case No. B286529.
(Cal. App.).

In a so-called "freeze-out" transaction, minority shareholders are
compelled to surrender their stock in a corporation and thereby
relinquish ownership. Plaintiffs, a class of investors holding
common stock in a community bank, allege they were unlawfully
victimized by such a freeze-out transaction. Plaintiffs assert the
Defendants--the corporation, its board of directors (Board), and
related business entities--orchestrated the freeze-out over a
multi-year period in seemingly discreet but in fact coordinated
transactions. Plaintiffs argue they received less than fair value
when forced to surrender shares they held.

Defendants take the position there was no multi-year freeze-out
plan, but rather a series of distinct transactions with different
business rationales that ultimately resulted in the corporation
becoming privately held. Defendants assert Plaintiffs received a
fair price for their shares upon surrender and are instead
attempting through litigation to extract an unjustified premium for
their shares.

After five-plus years of litigation, including a three-week bench
trial, the trial court resolved this dispute in Defendants' favor,
finding no fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or other grounds
warranting relief. The court entered judgment in favor of
Defendants, and awarded costs to Defendants totaling $82,983.97.

Plaintiff shareholders appeal. They do not dispute the trial
court's factual findings. Claiming the court applied flawed legal
standards in denying them relief, Plaintiffs argue that the Appeals
Court should reverse and enter a $25.8 million judgment in their
favor.

Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred in viewing
the transactions at issue separately, instead of being a unitary
plan to freeze out minority shareholders; the court erred in
denying their motion to amend the class definition to include a
certain "Private Placement", open market purchases of shares by
Defendants, and a "2013 Stock Buyback"; the trial court applied the
wrong legal standard to their breach of fiduciary duty claims
regarding the 2011 Reverse Stock Split, and improperly admitted
expert testimony regarding the valuation of fractional shares at
the time of the 2011 RSS; and the trial court erroneously held
Plaintiffs' complaints about the value they received for their
shares in the 2015 short form merger had to be brought in an
appraisal action. Finally, Plaintiffs argue the court awarded costs
that were statutorily unauthorized.

The Appeals Court discerns no error and affirm.

The Appeals Court rules that the trial court did not err in
evaluating the transactions at issue separately. "As we find no
grounds to combine disparate transactions over a multi-year period
into a single coordinated plan, we review each transaction
individually, in chronological order, pursuant to the legal
standard applicable to Plaintiffs' claim of error concerning that
transaction," Judge WEINGART wrote in his order.

According to the Appeals Court, the trial court did not err in
denying permission to amend the class definition to include 2009
and 2010 Private Placements.

The trial court found "if Plaintiff seeks to change the scope of
the class based on facts that neither they nor the court had at the
time of the original certification it follows that Plaintiffs must
now offer evidence which supports a finding of common questions of
fact in light of these new facts. And pursuant to California Rule
of Court 3.764, such evidence is to be submitted in the form of
declarations and judicial notice. However, Plaintiffs have not done
so, so this requirement is left unsatisfied." The trial court also
found Plaintiffs had not offered any evidence that Plaintiffs'
claims were typical of the proposed class such as "declarations of
counsel, class representatives, or any other related evidence, and
so not only is the commonality not established by evidence; the
typicality is not satisfied either."

Considering the lack of evidence that the proposed broader class
definition met the commonality or typicality requirements necessary
to certify a class, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Plaintiffs' 11th hour request to amend the class
definition, ruled Judge WEINGART.

In addition, the Appeals Court finds that the trial court correctly
applied Section 407 to the 2011 RSS.

The 2011 RSS resulted in all shareholders holding anything other
than an even multiple of ten shares receiving a fractional
interest, which Sunwest bought out at a predetermined price.
Section 407 provides that in such a circumstance, a "determination
by the board of the fair value of fractions of a share shall be
conclusive in the absence of fraud." Plaintiffs argue the trial
court erred in relying on Section 407 to conclude Plaintiffs failed
to establish any claim for damages in connection with the 2011
RSS.

There was no procedural defect in the Board's establishment of Fair
Value, wrote Judge WEINGART. The Board hired a respected investment
banking firm with extensive industry expertise to value the
fractional interests and relied on that valuation. Sunwest was
transparent with its regulators that it used liquidity and minority
discounts in deriving the valuation, and those regulators raised no
concern.

Section 407 does not relieve board members of their fiduciary
duties in valuing fractional shares, nor does it insulate their
valuation from review, but Section 407 does provide that to
overturn that valuation a shareholder must show evidence of bad
faith and duplicity amounting to fraud. Plaintiffs did not
establish fraud.

The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to
exclude expert testimony, ruled the Appeals Court. Sunwest called
two expert witnesses at trial on valuation related issues. One was
an investment banker/consultant named Craig Mancinotti, whose
testimony the trial court found credible. Mancinotti had worked in
the finance industry for over 30 years providing investment banking
and consulting services to community banks. Mancinotti did not base
his conclusions on unsupported speculation. He explained his
conclusions in a detailed report, in depositions, and at trial.

With regards the Plaintiffs assertion that Bancorp's open market
purchases following the 2011 RSS caused them damage under the
"special facts" doctrine, and further were coercive transactions by
a fiduciary because the parties holding those shares were forced to
sell them, the Appeals Court held that putting aside the lack of
record support for these claims, Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue
them.

Bancorp made no open market purchases from the two class
representatives--both of these plaintiffs instead were cashed out
as part of the 2011 RSS and/or the 2015 short-form merger. The
class definition did not include open market purchases--it
encompassed "all persons who owned shares of common stock of
Sunwest on or after December 8, 2011 and whose shares were, or are
subject to being cashed out." The transactions after December 8,
2011 in which shareholders were subject to being cashed out were
the 2011 RSS and the 2015 short form merger. As discussed above,
Plaintiffs' attempt to broaden this class definition to include any
open market purchases by Defendants or their affiliates was
properly rejected. The trial court, therefore, did not err in
declining to award Plaintiffs any relief on these claims.

"[W]e perceive no error in the trial court's holding that
Plaintiffs were required to pursue relief through an appraisal
action for any alleged damages resulting from the 2015 short form
merger," Judge WEINGART further held.

The trial court based this decision on its reading of section 1300,
et seq. as interpreted by Steinberg, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1198 and
Busse v. United PanAm Financial Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1028
(Busse). The trial court correctly relied on section 1312,
Steinberg, and Busse to hold Plaintiffs could not sue for damages
allegedly resulting from the 2015 short form merger, but instead
were required to pursue relief through an appraisal action, ruled
the Appeals Court.

Lastly, there was no error in the costs awarded to Defendants,
ruled Judge WEINGART.  The trial court did not err in awarding
exhibit related costs.

Having concluded there was no legal prohibition on the trial
court's award of exhibit related costs, we see no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's award. Defendants' request for
exhibit costs was proper on its face, and Plaintiffs' only
objection to it was that Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 did
not permit recovery. Having determined that the costs were
statutorily authorized, the trial court was within its discretion
to award costs for the exhibits at issue, Judge WEINGART
concluded.

As a protective measure in the event of a reversal, Defendants
cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their demurrer to one of
Plaintiffs' causes of action. "As we affirm the judgment, we need
not address the cross-appeal," ruled Judge WEINGART.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. and CHANEY, J., concurs.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' September 30, 2019
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy8rsgsp from
Leagle.com.

Cooch and Taylor, R. Bruce McNew  - bmcnew@coochtaylor.com - JPG
Law and J. Paul Gignac , 15 W. Carrillo St. Suite 246, Santa
Barbara, CA, 93101for, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Respondents.

Callahan & Blaine, Michael J. Sachs - michael@callahan-law.com -
and Scott D. Nelson, 3 Hutton Centre Drive, Ninth Floor, Santa Ana,
CA 92707-5781, for Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants.

SWITCH ENERGY: Mickalovski Files TCPA Suit in Illinois
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Switch Energy, LLC.
The case is styled as John B. Mickalovski, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Switch
Energy, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06681 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9,
2019).

The docket of the case states that the case was filed under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of
Telephone Equipment.

Switch Energy is an independent energy company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Joseph Scott Davidson, Esq.
   Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.
   2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
   Lombard, IL 60148
   Tel: (630) 575-8181 x116
   Email: jdavidson@sulaimanlaw.com


SYMMETRY MANAGEMENT: Dunbar Seeks to Certify FDCPA & FCCPA Classes
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ELLA DUNBAR, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
SYMMETRY MANAGEMENT CORP. d/b/a BCC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 8:19-cv-00715-CEH-TGW (M.D. Fla.),
Case No. 8:19-cv-00715-CEH-TGW (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court for an order:

   1. certifying these classes:

      Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Class:

      "(i) all persons with addresses in the state of Florida (ii)
      to whom initial communication letters were sent containing
      the phrase, "If you dispute the debt or any portion thereof
      by writing or calling this office within 30 days after
      receiving this notice this office will obtain verification
      of the debt or a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of
      such judgment or verification. If you request this office by

      writing or calling within 30 days after receiving this
      notice, this office will provide you with the name and
      address of the original creditor, if different from the
      current creditor." (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt
      incurred for personal, family, or household purposes (iv)
      which were not returned undelivered by the U.S. Post Office
      (v) during the one year period prior to the filing of the
      original complaint in this action through the date of
      certification"; and


      Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act Class:

      "(i) All persons with addresses in the state of Florida (ii)

      to whom initial communication letters were sent containing
      the phrase, "If you dispute the debt or any portion thereof
      by writing or calling this office within 30 days after
      receiving this notice this office will obtain verification
      of the debt or a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of
      such judgment or verification. If you request this office by

      writing or calling within 30 days after receiving this
      notice, this office will provide you with the name and
      address of the original creditor, if different from the
      current creditor." (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt
      incurred for personal, family, or household purposes (iv)
      which were not returned undelivered by the U.S. Post Office
      (v) during the two year period prior to the filing of the
      original complaint in this action through the date of
      certification";

   2. appointing her as class representative; and

   3. appointing her counsel as class counsel.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiff are:

          James S. Giardina, Esq.
          Kimberly H. Wochholz, Esq.
          THE CONSUMER RIGHTS LAW GROUP, PLLC
          3104 W. Waters Avenue, Suite 200
          Tampa, FL 33614-2877
          Telephone: (813) 435-5055 ext 101
          Facsimile: (866) 535-7199
          E-mail: James@ConsumerRightsLawGroup.com
                  Kim@ConsumerRightsLawGroup.com

SYNCHRONY BANK: Court Certifies Class in McMullen Suit
------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James E. Boasberg grants the Plaintiff's renewed motion
for class action certification, directing the issuance of class
notice, and appointing class counsel in the lawsuit captioned
VALERIE MCMULLEN v. SYNCHRONY BANK, et al., Case No.
1:14-cv-01983-JEB (D.D.C.).

The Class consists of all individuals for whom a line of credit was
opened by Chase and/or Synchrony Bank through one or more of the
One World Fitness Defendants (One World Fitness, Bullen Wellness,
Washington Chiropractic, Bullen, and/or Steward).  The Class
includes these sub-classes:

   a. All members of the Class who received charges against the
      line of credit opened by Chase and/or Synchrony Bank
      through the World Fitness Defendants (One World Fitness,
      Bullen Wellness, Washington Chiropractic, Bullen, and/or
      Steward); and

   b. All members of the Class who made payments to Chase and/or
      Synchrony Bank in response to receiving such charges.

Plaintiff Valerie McMullen is designated as the representative of
the Class.  The law firms of Regan Zambri Long PLLC and Klaproth
Law PLLC are designated as Class Counsel.

The Court orders the One World Fitness Defendants to produce to the
Class Counsel a complete list of every individual, who received a
line of credit that was opened by Chase and/or Synchrony Bank
through One World Fitness, Bullen Wellness, Washington
Chiropractic, Bullen and/or Steward ("Class List").  The Court
further orders that should it be necessary, the Plaintiff may serve
a subpoena on Chase to obtain a Class List pertaining to lines of
credit that were opened by Chase.

The Class Counsel shall mail and e-mail the Notice to each member
of the Class within thirty (30) days of receiving the Class List.
The Class counsel shall also establish a Web site within 60 days of
this Order that contains this Order, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint, the One World Fitness Defendants' Answers to the
Complaint, the Notice, and subsequent developments concerning the
Class.[CC]


TAMKO BUILDING: Snyder Dismissed From Product Liability Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff Snyder in the case captioned
JEFFERY SNYDER, MARTIN and BETH MELNICK, LIA LOUTHAN, and
SUMMERFIELD GARDENS CONDOMINIUM, on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TAMKO BUILDING PRODUCTS,
Inc., A Missouri Corporation, Defendant. No. 1:15-CV-01892-TLN-KJN.
(E.D. Cal.)

Plaintiff alleges that in October 2004, a builder installed
shingles on the home Plaintiff would eventually purchase in
February 2005. He further alleges that a contractor told him his
shingles were in very poor condition in 2013, and that they
worsened over the next year. Along with all other plaintiffs,
Plaintiff broadly alleges that in addition to damages to their
shingles and roofs, Plaintiffs and the Class have also suffered
damage to the underlying structures.

Plaintiff brings claims for breach of express and implied
warranties, strict liability, fraud, negligence, and unjust
enrichment, as well as claims under California state law products
liability.  

STANDARD OF LAW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Under notice pleading in federal court, the
complaint must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against Defendant:
(1) Breach of Express Warranty (First Cause of Action) (2) Breach
of the Implied Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for a
Particular Purpose (Second and Third Causes of Action) (3) Strict
Liability and Negligence (Fourth through Eighth Causes of Action)
(4) Unjust Enrichment (Ninth Cause of Action) (6) Fraudulent
Concealment and Negligent Misrepresentation (Tenth and Eleventh
Causes of Action) (7) Violation of multiple California Consumer
Protection Statutes (Twelfth through Fifteenth Causes of Action)
(8) Declaratory Judgment (Twenty-First Cause of Action) and (9)
Injunctive Relief (Twenty-Second Cause of Action). Defendant moves
to dismiss each, and the Court addresses each in turn below.

Express Warranty

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for breach of express
warranty because (1) Plaintiff does not allege facts establishing
Defendant breached an express warranty (2) Plaintiff did not
satisfy the 30-day notice terms of the warranty; (3) Plaintiff does
not identify any specific statements contained in marketing
materials, nor allege facts showing he relied on any such
statements; and (4) Plaintiff lacks privity of contract with
Defendant.

Plaintiff argues his express warranty claim should proceed because
the warranty (1) fails of its essential purpose (2) is
unconscionable and (3) does not require privity. Plaintiff also
asserts that Defendant created additional warranties through its
marketing materials.   

The Court first considers Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has
failed to sufficiently allege a breach, and finding that
Plaintiff's allegations fall short turns to Plaintiff's arguments
for unenforceability of contract.

Breach

A manufacturer's liability for breach of an express warranty
derives from the terms of the warranty itself. The warranty in this
case provides that TAMKO's obligation is limited to providing the
owner with a Material Certificate for replacement shingles,
prorated over the life of the limited warranty.

Plaintiff alleges he made a claim in June 2015, replaced the
shingles in June 2015, received from Defendant a certificate for a
prorated amount of replacement shingles on August 14, 2015, and
thereafter refused the offer. Plaintiff may not be happy with the
remedy provided, but Plaintiff's refusal to accept that remedy does
not constitute a breach by Defendant, where Defendant fulfilled its
obligations under the terms of the warranty.

The Court agrees with Defendant that the Amended Complaint fails to
sufficiently allege facts that establish a breach of the limited
warranty.

Essential Purpose

Regardless, Plaintiff contends that he was not limited to the
remedy contained in the warranty because the warranty fails of its
essential purpose and is unconscionable. A limited warranty fails
of its essential purpose only if, after multiple attempts, the
warrantor fails to repair the defects in a reasonable timeframe.  

Plaintiff argues the warranty fails of its essential purpose
because allowing Defendant to provide replacement shingles would
have been futile, since the replacement shingles would suffer from
the same latent defects as the original shingles.   

Simply put, a plaintiff cannot assert failure of essential purpose
where the defendant was not given the opportunity to repair,
replace, or adjust the problem. Here, Plaintiff alleges he replaced
the shingles the same month he filed a claim with Defendant and
before Defendant had the opportunity to respond to his warranty
claim. On these factual allegations, Plaintiff has not shown he was
excused from allowing Defendant the opportunity to repair the
shingles, and therefore the express warranty cannot be said to have
failed of its essential purpose.  

Unconscionability

Similarly, Plaintiff argues the express warranty was unconscionable
because TAMKO, and only TAMKO, knew of the shingles' latent
defects, withheld that information, and then limited the remedy to
replacement with equally defective shingles.  

In California, an allegation of unconscionability requires a
showing that the warranty is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. For a warranty to be substantively unconscionable,
the result must be so outrageous as to shock the conscience of the
court. Broad allegations of procedural unconscionability claiming a
lack of bargaining power or lack of choice are insufficient to
state a claim for unconscionability.

The Court finds the warranty here was not substantively
unconscionable because the terms of the contract and/or its result
are not so outrageously unfair as to shock the conscience. The
court there found the plaintiff's contention of substantive
unconscionability invalid because California law specifically
allows sellers to limit the warranty remedies available to buyers.
  
Here, Plaintiff's argument of substantive unconscionability
similarly fails because a warranty that limits the buyer's remedy
to replacement of a defective part does not shock the Court's
conscience.  

Privity

Plaintiff's assertion that express warranty claims do not require
privity of contract is similarly misplaced.  

Here, Plaintiff alleges a builder installed the shingles on a home
that Plaintiff purchased months later, and Plaintiff was not aware
Defendant manufactured the roofing shingles until ten years after
that. Plaintiff's allegations show he could not have relied on
Defendant's written warranty or advertising material in purchasing
the product, or in this case, in purchasing his home that contained
the shingles. Plaintiff cannot plausibly plead reliance on
Defendant's written warranty or advertising and, therefore, is
required to show privity of contract to pursue the breach of
express warranty claim. He has not done so.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim.

A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it
determines that allegations of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibility cure the deficiency, or
if the plaintiff had several opportunities to amend its complaint
and repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies.

Plaintiff has had two opportunities to allege facts sufficient to
support his breach of express warranty claim and has not done so.
Further, it does not appear Plaintiff can cure the deficiencies by
alleging additional facts because the issue is not a lack of
factual support for Plaintiff's claim, but rather that Plaintiff's
factual allegations show his claim is not viable because he cannot
allege privity. In other words, the Court finds Plaintiff cannot
allege additional facts consistent with the present allegations
that would cure the deficiencies identified above. It would
therefore be futile to allow further opportunities to amend this
claim.

Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for breach of express
warranty is without leave to amend.

Implied Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Purpose

Defendant argues Plaintiff's implied warranty claims fail because
(1) Defendant expressly disclaimed the implied warranties (2)
Plaintiff does not allege he experienced problems with the shingles
within the warranty period (the first year of purchase) and (3)
Plaintiff does not allege privity of contract with Defendant.  

For his part, Plaintiff argues that the implied warranty
disclaimers are unenforceable because (1) the warranty fails of its
essential purpose, as discussed above and (2) the implied warranty
disclaimer is unconscionable. Plaintiff also argues his claims are
timely and direct privity is not required where a plaintiff is a
third-party beneficiary.  

Failure of Essential Purpose and Unconscionability

The Court has already addressed Plaintiff's argument that the
warranty fails of its essential purpose and does not repeat that
discussion here. Because the Court found the warranty does not fail
of its essential purpose, Plaintiff's derivative argument does not
render the disclaimers unenforceable.

Plaintiff's argument regarding unconscionability is slightly
different from that asserted with respect to the express warranty
in that Plaintiff asserts that the implied warranty disclaimer
itself is unconscionable, presumably apart from the
unconscionability of the warranty. The analysis, however, is the
same. As above, Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting that the
disclaimer or its results "shock the conscience" such that the
Court might find substantive unconscionability.

Privity

With regard to privity, the parties do not dispute that the rule of
privity generally applies to implied warranty claims in California.
Plaintiff, however, argues privity is not required for implied
warranty claims brought by third-party beneficiaries under
California Commercial Code Section 2314.   

Plaintiff argues that Defendant sold its product through a network
of retailers, dealers, and distributors who were not the intended
beneficiaries of the warranties. Instead, because Plaintiff and the
class were the ultimate consumers and intended third-party
beneficiaries, they may bring implied warranty claims.

Defendant on the other hand argues that implied warranty claims
generally require privity or an exception to privity, and the
third-party beneficiary exception is not recognized by California
courts in the consumer warranty context.  

Under California Commercial Code section 2314 a plaintiff asserting
breach of warranty claims must stand in vertical contractual
privity with the defendant, meaning buyer and seller are in
adjoining links of the distribution chain.

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant sold its shingles through
retailers, dealers, installers, and distributors, a builder
installed those shingles on Plaintiffs' home months before he
purchased it and Plaintiff only discovered years later that
Defendant was the manufacturer.  

The Court, having found a lack of privity and insufficient
allegations of unconscionability and failure of purpose, need not
and does not address Defendant's additional arguments for
dismissal. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for
implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for purpose is
GRANTED.

Strict Liability, Negligence, and Negligent Failure to Warn

Defendant argues California's economic loss rule bars Plaintiff's
claims for strict liability, negligence, and negligent failure to
warn.  Plaintiff argues the economic loss rule does not apply
because he sufficiently alleges damage to other property.

In California, under the economic loss rule, a manufacturer or
distributor may be strictly liable or liable for negligence for
injury to property caused by a defective product, but is not liable
in tort for purely economic loss.  A plaintiff can recover in tort
when the product defect causes damage to other property," or in
other words, property other than the product itself.  
Defendant previously raised this issue and Plaintiff did not take
the opportunity to add sufficient allegations in the amended
complaint. The original complaint contained the same language in
paragraph 25 that Plaintiffs suffered damage to underlying
structures.

In the section of the original complaint with Plaintiff's
allegations, paragraph 53 reads, "[i]n June 2015, Snyder had his
defective TAMKO roof replaced at a cost of approximately $12,000,
an expense he should not have had to incur for another two
decades.

In its first motion to dismiss, Defendant argued these two
allegations were insufficient to show more than economic loss, but
Plaintiff's only change was to add the phrase in order to avoid
further damage to paragraph 61. On the other hand, all other named
plaintiffs were able to allege specific damage to specific
identifiable property. Given the clear allegations of the other
named plaintiffs compared to the paucity of information presented
in Plaintiff's specific allegations, and the tactful avoidance of
clarification regarding whether Plaintiff is one of the Plaintiffs
who suffered damage to underlying structures, the only reasonable
inference the Court can draw is that Plaintiff cannot properly
allege damage to other property.

As a result, the economic loss rule bars Plaintiff's claims for
strict liability, negligence, and negligent failure to warn.
Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Claims Four, Five, Six,
Seven, and Eight is GRANTED. Because Plaintiff has had two
opportunities to sufficiently allege damage to other property and
has failed to do so, dismissal is without leave to amend.

Claims Sounding in Fraud

Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for
fraudulent concealment because Plaintiff (1) has not adequately
alleged a duty to disclose on the part of TAMKO and (2) has not
pleaded the particulars of TAMKO's alleged concealment, as required
under Rule 9(b).

Relatedly, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for
negligent misrepresentation and Plaintiff's claims brought under
California's consumer protection laws (CLRA, UCL, and FAL) because
Plaintiff (1) has not plausibly alleged reliance and (2) has not
met the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).

In response, Plaintiff argues (1) he has adequately alleged
specific facts to state a claim for fraudulent concealment,
including a duty to disclose (2) reliance on Defendant's
representations can be inferred (3) the CLRA, UCL, and FAL claims
are held to a reduced pleading standard under Rule 9(b) and (4) the
UCL claim alleges an unfair act, and so reliance is not required.
Plaintiff additionally asserts that he has pleaded violations of
the UCL under the unfair and unlawful prongs as well.  

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b) - Actual Knowledge.

Plaintiff's claims of negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment, and violations of the CLRA, UCL, and FAL are each
based, generally, on allegations that Defendant made
representations or omissions concerning the quality and performance
of its shingles that it knew or should have known were false, while
concealing the truth about its product. Because Plaintiff asserts a
unified course of fraudulent conduct, each claim is grounded in
fraud or sounds in fraud and therefore must meet the heightened
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).  

Under Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be alleged with
particularity. In the case of fraudulent concealment or omission,
it is true that the heightened standard does not necessarily
require a plaintiff to allege the specific time of an omission or
the place it occurred because doing so would generally not be
possible.  

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant had actual knowledge because
Defendant was in a position of superiority to the Plaintiffs and
the Class members, knew of warranty claim submissions, and knew or
should have known of consumer complaints. These allegations are the
type of conclusory allegations that that are not sufficient to
support the conclusion that Defendant obtained actual knowledge of
the specific defect, nor do they come close to establishing that
Defendant knew of the defect prior to Plaintiff's purchase.
Plaintiff also quotes passages of frustrated customer postings from
two consumer websites to support his claims. However, Plaintiff has
not alleged any connection between the consumer websites and
Defendant.
  
Plaintiff thus does not sufficiently allege Defendant had actual
knowledge of the alleged defects prior to Plaintiff's purchase, and
his claims of fraudulent concealment, as well as those brought
under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, are therefore DISMISSED.

Actual Reliance

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was exposed to
any specific marketing or warranty messages and relied on those
messages in purchasing the defective product or, in this case, in
purchasing his home.

In order to successfully allege violations under the UCL, FAL, and
CLRA, a plaintiff must set forth facts supporting that he was
exposed to and actually relied on certain misrepresentations or
omissions in purchasing the defective product. The same is true for
a claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment.
To establish actual reliance, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate
cause of the plaintiff's injury-producing conduct.

Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege reliance on any
misrepresentation or omission. Indeed, Plaintiff's allegation
concedes that he purchased his home in 2005 and became aware that
the shingles were Defendant's Heritage 30 shingles in 2015.  These
allegations do not square with the assertion that Plaintiff relied
on Defendant's misrepresentations or omissions when he purchased
his home because it reveals Plaintiff became aware of the
manufacturer of his home's shingles ten years after he purchased
the home.

The Court understands Plaintiff's argument that such an
interpretation of the reliance requirement does not account for the
realities of the roofing industry an industry that contemplates the
transferability of its representations to the subsequent owners.
But Plaintiff cites to no case law in support of its argument, and
the Court is aware of none. Indeed, it seems that absent reliance
on a statement or omission, Plaintiff's requested relief would come
in the form of a warranty claim, and not one grounded in fraud.

For this additional reason, Plaintiff's claims based in fraud must
be DISMISSED.

Additional UCL Accusations

Plaintiff also argues he has stated additional violations under the
UCL's unlawful and unfair prongs.  Plaintiff is correct that each
prong of the UCL comprises a separate and distinct theory of
liability. However, if a UCL claim is grounded in fraud, the entire
claim must meet the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b).

Here, Plaintiff's UCL claim sounds in fraud, and so Plaintiff's
entire UCL claim must be pleaded with particularity under Rule
9(b). As discussed above, Plaintiff has not met this standard.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss claims
10, 11, 13, 14, and 15. Because this is Plaintiff's second attempt
to sufficiently allege claims sounding in fraud, and because
Plaintiff is unable to allege either Defendant's actual knowledge
or Plaintiff's reliance on any misrepresentation or omission,
dismissal is without leave to amend.

Unjust Enrichment

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claim for unjust
enrichment, arguing California does not recognize unjust enrichment
as an independent cause of action. Plaintiff acknowledges this, but
urges the Court to allow the claim to proceed by construing it as a
quasi-contract claim seeking restitution. Plaintiff further argues
that it has properly pleaded unjust enrichment as an alternative to
its breach of warranty claim.

In reply, Defendant asserts that two recent cases both from the
Northern District of California have made clear that [such
alternate pleading] is not permitted.

It is true that California courts have concluded that unjust
enrichment is not an independent cause of action, but rather a
theory that permits recovery on other recognized causes of action.
Courts may, however, construe a cause of action for unjust
enrichment as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.  Even so,
claims based in quasi-contract may be dismissed where they are
rooted in the same subject matter covered by an express contract.
This is because an unjust enrichment claim does not lie where the
parties have an enforceable express contract.

Plaintiff seems to argue in opposition that because he alleges the
limitations and exclusions of the warranty are unconscionable, the
existence of an enforceable contract is disputed or denied and so
he can plead unjust enrichment as an alternative to his
contract-based claims.  

Such an alternately-pleaded claim may proceed where a party
obtained a benefit by fraud or similar conduct, or where the
contract in question is otherwise unenforceable. At this early
stage of litigation, Plaintiff may plead inconsistent causes of
action, even though he will be precluded from ultimately recovering
under both.  

Here, however, the Court has found that Plaintiff has failed to
adequately plead that the express warranty and/or the disclaimer
are unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. Additionally, the
Court has found Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action grounded
in fraud. As a result, his unjust enrichment claim pleaded in the
alternative necessarily fails.

In addition, there is no dispute that a claim for unjust enrichment
cannot stand alone without a cognizable claim under a
quasi-contractual theory or some other form of misconduct. Thus,
because Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment is premised on the
same factual allegations as his other causes of action, it must be
dismissed for this additional related reason.  

Song-Beverly Act

Defendants argue that the operative version of the Song-Beverly Act
at the time Plaintiff alleges his shingles were installed in 2004
did not include shingles as a consumer good covered by the Act, and
that the current version that includes shingles is not retroactive.


In response, Plaintiffs argue that shingles are consumer goods
within the meaning of the current version of the Act, and that
Defendants rely upon a case that interprets a prior version of the
Act, a case that has been abrogated by the more-recent amendment to
the Act.
  
The Song-Beverly Act was indeed amended in 2004 to include goods
that cannot be serviced or repaired  because of the method of
attachment or because the goods have become so affixed to real
property to become a part thereof.  

The parties agree Plaintiff's shingles at issue were installed in
2004, while the former version of the Song-Beverly Act was
operative. Plaintiff's shingles, therefore, were not consumer goods
covered by the former version of the Song-Beverly Act.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's Snyder's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claim.
Because the defect cannot be cured by amendment, the claim is
DISMISSED without leave to amend.

The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff
Snyder's claims, without leave to amend. The Court defers ruling on
Defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to the other Plaintiffs
unless and until it is determined that this Court is the proper
venue for the remainder of this action. As such, Defendants are
ordered to re-notice such a motion before the Court, if at all, not
later than 14 days following issuance of an order confirming that
venue is proper in this Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3fqcfs2
from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey Snyder, Martin Melnick & Beth Melnick, Plaintiffs,
represented by Charles E. Schaffer - cschaffer@lfsblaw.com - Levin
Sedran & Berman, pro hac vice, Jacob M. Polakoff - jpolakoff@bm.net
- Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Lawrence Deutsch –
ldeutsch@bm.net - Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice, Richard Norman
Sieving - rsieving@sievinglawfirm.com - The Sieving Law Firm
A.P.C., Shanon J. Carson - scarson@bm.net - Berger and Montague,
pro hac vice & Luke Gabriel Pears-Dickson -
lpearsdickson@sievinglawfirm.com - Sieving Law Firm, APC.

Lia Louthan & Summerfield Gardens Condominium, Plaintiffs,
represented by Charles E. Schaffer , Levin Sedran & Berman, pro hac
vice, Jacob M. Polakoff , Berger Montague PC, pro hac vice &
Richard Norman Sieving , The Sieving Law Firm A.P.C.

Tamko Building Products, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles
Stephen Painter , Ericksen Arbuthnot, 100 Howe Ave #110 S,
Sacramento, CA 95825, Jessica D. Miller -jessica.miller@skadden.com
- Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, pro hac vice, John H.
Beisner -  john.beisner@skadden.com - Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &
Flom, LLP & Richard T. Bernardo - richard.bernardo@skadden.com  -
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP, pro hac vice.

TEXAS: Court Denies Robles' Bid to Certify Class and for New Trial
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Fred Biery denied the motion seeking class certification
and seeking a motion for new trial filed by the Plaintiff in the
lawsuit titled STEVEN ROBLES v. STATE OF TEXAS, S.A.P.D. CHIEF
McMANUS, SHERIFF SALAZAR, and S.A.P.D. OFFICER J. DIEL, Case No.
5:17-cv-01017-FB (W.D. Tex.).

On October 6, 2017, Plaintiff Steven Robles filed a Civil Rights
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  The Plaintiff was
subsequently granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

On January 3, 2018, the Plaintiff's Section 1983 Complaint was
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a non-frivolous civil
rights claim and because the Plaintiff was seeking monetary relief
against immune Defendants.  On September 3, 2019, approximately 20
months after a judgment was entered dismissing the Plaintiff's
Section 1983 Complaint, the Plaintiff filed the present motion
requesting class certification and seeking a motion for new trial.

The Plaintiff's motion is denied as untimely and moot.  Further, to
the extent the Plaintiff's motion can be construed as a Rule
60(b)(6) motion, the Plaintiff fails to present any reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, Judge Biery
opines.[CC]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $20MM O'Connor Suit Settlement Gets Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DOUGLAS O'CONNOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UBER
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-03826-EMC
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' (i)
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and
Release, and (i) Motion for Attorneys' Fees.

The Plaintiffs brought two lawsuits against Defendant Uber,
alleging that Uber misclassifies its drivers as independent
contractors rather than as employees.  Five years of contentious
litigation ensued.  The parties eventually entered into an
agreement to settle both suits, and on March 29, 2019, the Court
granted preliminary approval to the parties' class action
settlement.

The Settlement Agreement covers all Drivers in California and
Massachusetts who have used the Uber App at any time since Aug. 16,
2009, up to and including Feb. 28, 2019, and who have validly opted
out of arbitration or for whom Uber has no record of acceptance of
an arbitration agreement.

In exchange for the Class Members' release of their claims, the
Settlement provides monetary and non-monetary consideration.  The
monetary component of the Settlement is a $20 million
non-reversionary fund.  From the fund, $5 million will be deducted
for attorneys' fees, approximately $311,092 will be awarded for
attorneys' out-of-pocket expenses related to the litigation,
$300,000 will be awarded for costs of claims administration, and
$40,000 will be ordered as incentive awards for the Settlement
Class representatives.

The remainder -- an estimated $14,348,900 -- will be distributed to
Class Members who timely submitted claims.  Each claimant's share
will be calculated in proportion with the number of miles he or she
drove for Uber, based on relevant records that Uber is able to
identify following a good-faith inquiry.  The Plaintiffs' counsel
estimates that the Class Members who drove 0-1,000 miles will
receive approximately $360, those who drove 10,000 miles will
receive $4,000, and those who drove 100,000 miles will receive
$36,000. The average settlement share for each claiming Class
Member, after attorneys' fees are deducted, will be approximately
$2,206.  

The Court, in granting preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement, found the Plan of Allocation -- outlining the monetary
recovery, on a pro rata basis, to all members of the Settlement
Class who file a timely claim -- to be fair and reasonable.

On April 19, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Fifth Amended Complaint,
as required by the Settlement Agreement.  The Fifth Amended
Complaint adds (1) claims pertaining to unjust enrichment,
conversion, and fraud, based upon Uber's failure to remit to
drivers the entire gratuity paid by customers or tips they might
have otherwise received; (2) claims pertaining to various
violations of the California Labor Code "stemming from drivers'
misclassification as independent contractors"; and (3) claims
pertaining to violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
Seventeen claims were added in total.

The Class Members were directed to file claims by Aug. 17, 2019,
and as of Aug. 23, 2019, the Settlement Administrator had received
5,627 timely Claim Forms accounting for 67.3% of the settlement
fund (assuming 100% participation).

Judge Chen finds that the final approval factors indicate that the
Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The
Parties have evidenced full compliance with the Court's Preliminary
Approval Order and other Orders relating to the Settlement. The
class reaction has been overwhelmingly favorable.

The Judge therefore granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release, and
their Motion for Attorneys' Fees.  He granted final approval to the
Settlement and to the Plan of Allocation.  The Settlement Agreement
is incorporated into the Court's Final Approval Order.  The Judge
finds, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), that there is no just reason
for delay in entering final judgment and directed that the Judgment
will be final and entered forthwith.

He confirmed the previous appointment of the law firm of Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C. as the Class Counsel.  On May 14, 2019, the
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees, seeking $5 million
in attorneys' fees and costs, which is consistent with the Ninth
Circuit's 'benchmark' award of 25% of the common fund.  They
contend that the Plaintiffs' fees, had they charged fees up front,
were approximately $6 million, and their expenses came to
approximately $311,000.

The Judge finds that the Class Counsel have adequately represented
the Settlement Class for purposes of entering into and implementing
the Settlement and awrded to the Class Counsel attorneys' fees in
the amount of $5 million to be paid exclusively from the Settlement
Amount, as defined in the Settlement Agreement.  He further awarded
the Class Counsel $311,091.67 in additional out-of-pocket costs.

He also confirmed previous appointment of the following people as
Representatives of the Settlement Class: Matthew Manahan, Elie
Gurfinkel, Pedro Sanchez, Mohktar Talha, Aaron Dulles, and Antonio
Oliveira.  He finds that these Class Representatives have
adequately represented the Settlement Class for purposes of
entering into and implementing the Settlement.  

The Plaintiffs request $7,500 incentive awards for Plaintiffs
Matthew Manahan, Elie Gurfinkel, Pedro Sanchez, and Mohktar Talha,
as well as $5,000 incentive awards for Plaintiffs Aaron Dulles and
Antonio Oliveira. This represents a total of $40,000 in incentive
awards.  The Judge ordered that the aforementioned Incentive Awards
be paid pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge confirmed its previous appointment of Epiq as the
Settlement Administrator and finds that it has so far fulfilled its
duties under the Settlement.  He ordered that $300,000 be paid from
the Settlement Amount to the Settlement Administrator for
unreimbursed expenses relating to notice and administration of the
Settlement with the understanding that the Settlement Administrator
will be allowed to collect any additional administration fees and
expenses over that amount from unclaimed funds, prior to any
payment being made to the designated cy pres recipients.

Pursuant to the Order and Final Judgment, with respect to the
Released Parties, the Settlement Class Members' Released Claims,
the  Named Plaintiffs' General Released Claims, and the Authorized
Claimants' Released Claims, are dismissed with prejudice and
without costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/XDkmiQ from Leagle.com.

Douglas O'Connor, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano --
apagano@llrlaw.com -- Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac
vice.

Douglas O'Connor, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew A. August,
Browne George Ross LLP, Ben Weber -- bweber@llrlaw.com -- Lichten
and Liss-Riordan, P.C., Benjamin J. Meiselas, Geragos and
Geragos, APC, Brian Stephen Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP,
Brian C. Tackenberg -- btackenberg@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac
vice, Charles Morris Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac
vice, George R. Baise, Jr. -- gbaise@crabtreelaw.com -- pro hac
vice, Jennifer R. Liakos, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, John Granville
Crabtree, pro hac vice, Mark J. Geragos, Geragos & Geragos, APC,
Matthew David Carlson -- mcarlson@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-
Riordan, P.C., Sara Smolik, Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C.,
Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Shant Arthur
Karnikian -- sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Thomas Colopy, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano, Lichten
and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August, Browne
George Ross LLP, Brian C. Tackenberg, pro hac vice, Charles
Morris Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac vice, George R.
Baise, Jr., pro hac vice, John Granville Crabtree, pro hac vice,
Matthew David Carlson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Sara Smolik,
Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C..

Matthew Manahan, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano,
Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August,
Browne George Ross LLP, Brian C. Tackenberg, pro hac vice,
Charles Morris Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac vice,
George R. Baise, Jr., pro hac vice, John Granville Crabtree, pro
hac vice, Matthew David Carlson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. &
Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Elie Gurfinkel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adelaide Pagano,
Lichten and Liss-Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August,
Browne George Ross LLP, Ben Weber, Lichten and Liss-Riordan,
P.C., Brian C. Tackenberg, pro hac vice, Charles Morris
Auslander, Crabtree and Auslander, pro hac vice, George R. Baise,
Jr., pro hac vice, John Granville Crabtree, pro hac vice, Matthew
David Carlson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C. & Shannon Liss-
Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C.

Ronald Gillette, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon Liss-Riordan,
Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Adelaide Pagano, Lichten and Liss-
Riordan, P.C., pro hac vice, Andrew A. August, Browne George Ross
LLP, Andrew Paul Lee, Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho, Brian C.
Tackenberg, pro hac vice, Charles Morris Auslander, Crabtree and
Auslander, pro hac vice, George R. Baise, Jr., pro hac vice, John
Granville Crabtree, pro hac vice, Theodore Walter Maya, Ahdoot &
Wolfson, P.C. & William Copley Jhaveri-Weeks, Goldstein, Borgen,
Dardarian & Ho.

Uber Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Michael
Spurchise -- aspurchise@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Marcellus Antonio McRae -- mmcrae@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Theane D. Evangelis -- tevangelis@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. --
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com -- Attorney at Law, Brandon J. Stoker --
bstoker@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Debra
Wong Yang -- dwongyang@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn Crutcher
LLP, Dhananjay Saikrishna Manthripragada --
dmanthripragada@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, John
C. Fish, Jr. -- jfish@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC,
Joshua Seth Lipshutz -- jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn
and Crutcher LLP, Kevin Joseph Ring-Dowell --
kringdowell@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP,
Stephen A. Swedlow -- stephenswedlow@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, pro hac vice & Theane Evangelis
Kapur, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP.

7x7 Executive Transportation LLC, Defendant, represented by James
Parton, III, Parton & Sell PC.

Rasier-CA, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew Michael
Spurchise, Littler Mendelson, P.C..

Caren Ehret, Movant, represented by Myron Milton Cherry --
mcherry@cherry-law.com -- Myron M. Cherry & Associates LLC.

Ricardo Del Rio, Movant, represented by Christopher James Hamner
-- chamner@hamnerlaw.com -- Hamner Law Offices, APC, Amy Tai
Wootton, Hamner Law Offices, APC, Benjamin J. Meiselas, Geragos
and Geragos, APC, Brian Stephen Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP, Joshua H. Haffner, Kabateck Kellner LLP, Mark J. Geragos,
Geragos & Geragos, APC & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown
Kellner LLP.

Greg Fisher, Movant, represented by Christopher James Hamner,
Hamner Law Offices, APC.

John Doe, Movant, Pro Se.

Todd Johnston, Movant, represented by Brian J. Malloy, The Brandi
Law Firm.

Steven Price, Interested Party, represented by Christopher John
Morosoff, Law Office of Christopher J. Morosoff & Douglas Caiafa,
Attorney at Law.

City of Cleveland, Ohio, Interested Party, represented by Carl E.
Meyer, City of Cleveland.

Rosario Richardson, Interested Party, represented by Carey A.
James -- caj@asmlawyers.com -- Aiman-Smith and Marcy & Shant
Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Kathy Robinson, Interested Party, Pro Se.

Leticia Alcala, Objector, represented by Hunter J. Shkolnik,
Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Paul Napoli, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, pro hac
vice, Jennifer R. Liakos, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC & Shant Arthur
Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Marc Borgen, Objector, represented by Hunter J. Shkolnik, Napoli
Shkolnik PLLC, Paul Napoli, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Jennifer R.
Liakos,

Napoli Shkolnik PLLC & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown
Kellner LLP.

Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Objector, represented by Andre Emilio
Jardini -- aej@kpclegal.com -- Knapp Petersen & Clarke.

Uladzimir Tabola, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky --
alexei@sfbizlaw.com -- Klein Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian -
sk@kbklawyers.com -- Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Alexander Kazakov, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky,
Klein Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP.

Yahor Zgurski, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky, Klein
Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.

Maksim Hancharuk, Objector, represented by Alexei Kuchinsky,
Klein Law Group.

Omar Zine, Objector, represented by Christopher John Gansen,
Gansen Law Group & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner
LLP.

Nahabet Narsis, Objector, represented by Kevin Todd Barnes, Law
Offices of Kevin T. Barnes.

Jorge Zunigas, Objector, represented by Mark Alan Morrison --
markmorrison@paulhastings.com -- Morrison and Associates.

Jason Rosenberg, Objector, represented by Mark Alan Morrison,
Morrison and Associates.

David Lanier, Amicus, represented by Christopher G. Jagard,
McCurdy Ku & John Cumming, Department of Industrial Relations.

Abdo Ghazi, Intervenor, represented by Alec Llewellyn Segarich,
Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich LLP, Conor Daniel Granahan, Law Offices
of Conor Granahan, Jason Shelton Lohr, Lohr Ripamonti & Segarich
LLP & Shant Arthur Karnikian, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP.


UNDER ARMOUR: Aberdeen Council Appeals Ruling in Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Aberdeen City Council and Bucks County Employees
Retirement Fund filed an appeal from a Court ruling entered in
their lawsuit entitled Aberdeen City Council, et al. v. Under
Armour, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00388-RDB, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
bring the putative class action against Under Armour, certain
directors, and underwriters alleging violations of federal
securities laws.

The Plaintiffs bring the federal class action under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
against Under Armour, Plank, Molloy, and Dickerson ("Exchange Act
Defendants").  Separately, Buck brings the federal class action
under the Securities Act of 1933, and the rules promulgated
thereunder, against Under Armour, Plank, Molloy, the Director
Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants ("Securities Act
Defendants").

The appellate case is captioned as Aberdeen City Council, et al. v.
Under Armour, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-2032, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ABERDEEN CITY COUNCIL, as Administrating
Authority for the North East Scotland Pension Fund, and BUCKS
COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND, Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Stephen R. Astley, Esq.
          Elizabeth A. Shonson, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAND & DOWD
          120 East Palmetto Park Road
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 750-3000
          E-mail: SAstley@rgrdlaw.com
                  eshonson@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Christopher R. Kinnon, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
          655 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101-0000
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          E-mail: ckinnon@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          William Nelson Sinclair, Esq.
          SILVERMAN, THOMPSON, SLUTKIN & WHITE LLC
          201 North Charles Street
          Baltimore, MD 21201-0000
          Telephone: (410) 385-2225
          E-mail: bsinclair@mdattorney.com

Plaintiff-Appellant ABERDEEN CITY COUNCIL, as Administrating
Authority for the North East Scotland Pension Fund, is represented
by:

          Austin P. Brane, Esq.
          Robert R. Henssler, Jr., Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD, LLP
          655 West Broadway
          San Diego, CA 92101-0000
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          E-mail: abrane@rgrdlaw.com
                  bhenssler@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark J. Dearman, Esq.
          Jack Reise, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAND & DOWD
          120 East Palmetto Park Road
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Telephone: (561) 750-3000
          E-mail: mdearman@rgrdlaw.com
                  jreise@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Pierce C. Murphy, Esq.
          Andrew Clayton White, Esq.
          SILVERMAN, THOMPSON, SLUTKIN & WHITE LLC
          201 North Charles Street
          Baltimore, MD 21201-0000
          Telephone: (443) 909-7488
          E-mail: pmurphy@mdattorney.com
                  awhite@mdattorney.com

Defendant-Appellee UNDER ARMOUR, INCORPORATED, is represented by:

          Samuel P. Groner, Esq.
          Michael P. Sternheim, Esq.
          FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON, LLP
          1 New York Plaza
          New York, NY 10004-8032
          Telephone: (212) 859-8000
          E-mail: samuel.groner@friedfrank.com
                  michael.sternheim@friedfrank.com

               - and -

          Michael Jackman Wilson, Esq.
          VENABLE, LLP
          750 East Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 244-7614
          E-mail: mjwilson@Venable.com

Defendant-Appellee UNDER ARMOUR, INCORPORATED, BYRON K. ADAMS, JR.,
GEORGE W. BODENHEIMER, DOUGLAS E. COLTHARP, ANTHONY W. DEERING,
KAREN W. KATZ, A. B. KRONGARD, WILLIAM R. MCDERMOTT, ERIC T. OLSON
and HARVEY L. SANDERS are represented by:

          James D. Wareham, Esq.
          FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON, LLP
          801 17th Street
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 639-7040
          E-mail: james.wareham@friedfrank.com

               - and -

          George Stewart Webb, Jr., Esq.
          VENABLE, LLP
          750 East Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 244-7400
          E-mail: gswebb@Venable.com

Defendant-Appellee KEVIN A. PLANK is represented by:

          Scott R. Haiber, Esq.
          HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
          Harbor East
          100 International Drive
          Baltimore, MD 21202-0000
          Telephone: (410) 659-2776
          E-mail: scott.haiber@hoganlovells.com

               - and -

          Jon M. Talotta, Esq.
          HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
          8350 Broad Street
          Tysons, VA 22102-0000
          Telephone: (703) 610-6100
          E-mail: jon.talotta@hoganlovells.com

Defendants-Appellees LAWRENCE P. MOLLOY and BRAD DICKERSON are
represented by:

          Adam Ben Abelson, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER, LLP
          100 East Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202-0000
          Telephone: (410) 949-1148
          E-mail: aabelson@zuckerman.com

               - and -

          Eric Robert Delinsky, Esq.
          Steven Mark Salky, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER, LLP
          1800 M Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 778-1831
          E-mail: edelinsky@zuckerman.com
                  ssalky@zuckerman.com

Defendants-Appellees JP MORGAN SECURITIES, LLC; MERRILL LYNCH,
PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED; WELLS FARGO SECURITIES, LLC;
HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC.; PNC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC; BB&T CAPITAL
MARKETS; SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY, INC.; CITIGROUP GLOBAL
MARKETS, INCORPORATED; GOLDMAN SACHS & COMPANY, LLC; REGIONS
SECURITIES, LLC; and SMBC NIKKO SECURITIES AMERICA, INC., are
represented by:

          Amanda F. Davidoff, Esq.
          SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP
          1700 New York Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20006-5215
          Telephone: (202) 956-7500
          E-mail: davidoffa@sullcrom.com


UNITED FINANCIAL: Gordon Seeks to Enjoin People's United Merger
---------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL GORDON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. UNITED FINANCIAL BANCORP, INC., ROBERT A. STEWART, JR.,
RAYMOND H. LEFURGE, JR., WILLIAM H. W. CRAWFORD, IV, CAROL A.
LEARY, KRISTEN A. JOHNSON, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, KEVIN E. ROSS,
MICHAEL A. BARS, and PAULA A. AIELLO, Case No. 1:19-cv-01787-UNA
(D. Del., Sept. 23, 2019), accuses the Defendants of violating the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the proposed
merger between United Financial and People's United Financial,
Inc.

On July 15, 2019, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger, pursuant to which the Company's
shareholders stand to receive 0.875 shares of People's United
common stock for each share of United Financial stock they own.
Upon completion of the merger, United Financial shareholders will
own approximately 10.1% and People's United shareholders will own
approximately 89.9% of the combined company.

Mr. Gordon, on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders
of United Financial, seeks to enjoin the Defendants from holding
the shareholder vote on the Proposed Transaction and taking any
steps to consummate the Proposed Transaction unless, and until,
certain omitted material information is disclosed to United
Financial shareholders sufficiently in advance of the vote or, in
the event the Proposed Transaction is consummated, to recover
damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the Exchange
Act.

On August 12, 2019, in order to convince United Financial
shareholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the
Board authorized the filing of a materially incomplete and
misleading Form S-4 Registration Statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, according to the complaint.  In particular,
the S-4/A contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) the summary of certain valuation analyses conducted
by the Company's financial advisor, Sandler O'Neill & Partners,
L.P. in support of its opinion that the Merger Consideration is
fair to shareholders, on which the Board relied; and (ii) the
summary of certain valuation analyses conducted by the Company's
financial advisor, RP Financial, LC. ("RP") in its analysis of
United Financial's alternative stand-alone planning scenario, on
which the Board relied.

United Financial is incorporated in Connecticut and maintains its
principal executive offices in Hartford, Connecticut.  The
Individual Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

United Financial is a publicly owned registered financial holding
company.  The Company's principal asset is the outstanding capital
stock of United Bank, which delivers financial services to
individuals, families, and businesses primarily in Connecticut and
Massachusetts including retail, commercial and consumer banking, as
well as financial advisory services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          3828 Kennett Pike, Suite 201
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Telephone: (302) 482-3182
          E-mail: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                  jwilson@faruqilaw.com


UNITED NATURAL: Dismissal of Data Breach Suit v. Supervalu Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
United Natural Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended August 3, 2019, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has denied plaintiff's appeal,
affirming the District Court's dismissal of the class action suit
entitled, In Re: SUPERVALU Inc. Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation.

On October 22, 2018, the Company acquired all of the outstanding
equity securities of SUPERVALU INC.

In August and November 2014, four class action complaints were
filed against Supervalu relating to the criminal intrusion into
Supervalu's computer network that were previously announced by
Supervalu in its fiscal 2015.

The cases were centralized in the Federal District Court for the
District of Minnesota under the caption In Re: SUPERVALU Inc.
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation. On June 26, 2015, the
plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Supervalu
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint
and the hearing took place on November 3, 2015.

On January 7, 2016, the District Court granted the Motion to
Dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to sue as they had not met their
burden of showing any compensable damages. On February 4, 2016, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the District Court's dismissal
of the complaint or in the alternative to conduct discovery and
file an amended complaint, and Supervalu filed its response in
opposition on March 4, 2016. On April 20, 2016, the District Court
denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate the District Court's dismissal
or in the alternative to amend the complaint.

On May 18, 2016, plaintiffs appealed to the 8th Circuit and on May
31, 2016, Supervalu filed a cross-appeal to preserve its additional
arguments for dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint. On August 30,
2017, the 8th Circuit affirmed the dismissal for 14 out of the 15
plaintiffs finding they had no standing.

The 8th Circuit did not consider Supervalu's cross-appeal and
remanded the case back for consideration of Supervalu's additional
arguments for dismissal against the one remaining plaintiff. On
October 30, 2017, Supervalu filed a motion to dismiss the remaining
plaintiff and on November 7, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to
amend its complaint.

The court held a hearing on the motions on December 14, 2017, and
on March 7, 2018, the District Court denied plaintiff's motion to
amend and granted Supervalu's motion to dismiss.

On March 14, 2018, plaintiff appealed to the 8th Circuit and on May
31, 2019, the 8th Circuit denied plaintiff's appeal affirming the
District Court’s dismissal of the case.

United Natural said, "We do not expect any further action on this
case. Supervalu had $50 million of cyber threat insurance above a
per incident deductible of $1 million at the time of the criminal
intrusion, which the Company believes should cover any potential
loss related to this litigation."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

United Natural Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
distributes natural, organic, and specialty foods and non-food
products in the United States and Canada. The company operates
through three divisions: Wholesale, Retail, and Manufacturing and
Branded Products. United Natural Foods, Inc. was founded in 1976
and is headquartered in Providence, Rhode Island.


UNITED NATURAL: Hearing Tomorrow on New England Plaintiff's Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------------
United Natural Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended August 3, 2019, that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has set October 15, 2019, as the
hearing date on a New England plaintiff's appeal.

On October 22, 2018, the Company acquired all of the outstanding
equity securities of SUPERVALU INC.

In December 2008, a class action complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against
Supervalu alleging that a 2003 transaction between Supervalu and
C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. ("C&S") was a conspiracy to restrain
trade and allocate markets.

In the 2003 transaction, Supervalu purchased certain assets of the
Fleming Corporation as part of Fleming Corporation's bankruptcy
proceedings and sold certain of Supervalu's assets to C&S that were
located in New England.

Three other retailers filed similar complaints in other
jurisdictions and the cases were consolidated in the United States
District Court in Minnesota. The complaints alleged that the
conspiracy was concealed and continued through the use of
non-compete and non-solicitation agreements and the closing down of
the distribution facilities that Supervalu and C&S purchased from
each other.

Plaintiffs were divided into Midwest plaintiffs and a New England
plaintiff and are seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief and
attorney's fees. The Company settled with the Midwest plaintiffs in
November 2017.

The New England plaintiff was not a party to the settlement and is
pursuing its individual claims and potential class action claims
against Supervalu, which at this time are determined as remote.

On February 15, 2018, Supervalu filed a summary judgment and
Daubert motion and the New England plaintiff filed a motion for
class certification and on July 27, 2018, the District Court
granted Supervalu's motions.

The New England plaintiff appealed to the 8th Circuit on August 15,
2018. Briefing on the appeal is complete and a hearing date has
been set for October 15, 2019.

United Natural Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
distributes natural, organic, and specialty foods and non-food
products in the United States and Canada. The company operates
through three divisions: Wholesale, Retail, and Manufacturing and
Branded Products. United Natural Foods, Inc. was founded in 1976
and is headquartered in Providence, Rhode Island.


UNITED NATURAL: Mediation Underway in North County Store Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
United Natural Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 1, 2019, for
the fiscal year ended August 3, 2019, that mediation is ongoing in
the class action suit entitled, North Country Store v. United
Natural Foods, Inc.

In November 2018, a putative nationwide class action was filed in
Rhode Island state court, and which the Company removed to U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

In North Country Store v. United Natural Foods, Inc., plaintiff
asserts that the Company made false representations about the
nature of fuel surcharges charged to customers and asserts claims
for alleged violations of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act,
breach of contract, unjust enrichment and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing arising out of the Company's fuel
surcharge practices.

On March 5, 2019, the Company answered the complaint denying the
allegations. A court-ordered mediation is scheduled for October
2019.

United Natural said, "While the Company believes that it has
meritorious defenses to the allegations and should be successful
upon ultimate resolution of this matter, it also believes the risk
of loss is now reasonably possible. Management is unable to
estimate a range of reasonably possible loss because the case is in
the very early stages, no discovery has been conducted and the
plaintiff has not asserted a damage amount."

United Natural Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
distributes natural, organic, and specialty foods and non-food
products in the United States and Canada. The company operates
through three divisions: Wholesale, Retail, and Manufacturing and
Branded Products. United Natural Foods, Inc. was founded in 1976
and is headquartered in Providence, Rhode Island.


US CITIZENSHIP: Court Certifies Class in W.A.O. APA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, W.A.O., H.H.M.C., N.L.J., and K.M.R.L., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI II, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services; KEVIN McALEENAN, Acting Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; ROBERT COWAN, Director, National
Benefits Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; and UNITED STATES
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendants, Civil Action No.
2:19-cv-11696 (MCA)(MAH)(D. N.J.), Judge Madeline Cox Arleo of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class
Counsel pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (g) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiffs are individuals who were between the ages of 18 and
21 when they obtained orders from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, making the child welfare findings
necessary for Special Immigrant Juvenile ("SIJ") classification.
Based on such Family Part orders, the Plaintiffs applied for SIJ
classification when they were between their 18th and 21st
birthdays.

They filed a Complaint alleging that the Defendants have adopted
and implemented a policy that disqualified SIJ applicants who
obtained Family Part orders when they were between 18 and 21 years
old on the grounds that: (1) the Family Part must have jurisdiction
to make the required child welfare findings; and (2) the Family
Part lacked such jurisdiction as to petitioners in this age group.
The alleged Policy resulted in the rejection of SIJ petitions filed
by juveniles in New Jersey who were between 18 and 21 years old
when the Family Part issued their orders.  The Plaintiffs' SIJ
applications were delayed, questioned, or denied because of
Defendants' alleged Policy.  The putative class members also had
their SIJ petitions delayed, questioned, or denied, or their SIJ
classifications revoked, under the alleged Policy.

The putative class consists of hundreds of juveniles who do not
have the means to bring individual federal lawsuits challenging
Defendants' alleged Policy.  Their Complaint seeks classwide relief
to permanently and preliminarily enjoin the Defendants from
delaying, questioning, denying, or revoking SIJ petitions on the
ground that the New Jersey Family Part does not have the
jurisdiction, power, or authority to make the required child
welfare findings for a juvenile between the ages of 18 and 21.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks further classwide relief to
permanently and preliminarily enjoin the Defendants to (1) rescind
alleged improper denials or revocations of the Plaintiffs' and
putative class members' SIJ petitions; (2) reopen their petitions;
and (3) readjudicate their petitions without relying on any
requirement or policy declared invalid in the case.

The Plaintiffs' counsel represents that Lowenstein Sandler LLP has
extensive experience handling class action litigation and complex
immigration cases, including those related to SIJ classification.
The Plaintiffs' counsel represents that the firm has no interests
that are in conflict with the putative class and has committed to
representing the class on a pro bono basis.

The matter having come before the Court on the motion of the
Plaintiffs, for class certification and appointment of the class
counsel pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (g) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Arleo finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) requirements.  She holds that (i) the numerosity
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) is satisfied because the
Plaintiffs have established that there are more than 100 members of
the putative class, and the Defendants have identified additional
members of the putative class; (ii) the commonality requirement of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) is satisfied because common questions of
law predominate in the action; (iii) the typicality requirement of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) is satisfied because the claims of the
named Plaintiffs and putative class members involve the same
conduct by the Defendant; and (iv) the adequacy requirement of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) is satisfied because the Plaintiffs have
demonstrated the ability and the incentive to represent the claims
of the class vigorously, that they've obtained adequate counsel,
and that there is no conflict between their individual claims and
those asserted on behalf of the class.

In addition, the Judge holds that Certification under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(2) is appropriate in the case because the Plaintiffs
allege that the Defendants' Policy defeats SIJ classification for
all members of the putative class and because an injunction
requiring Defendants to suspend that alleged Policy would provide
relief to the class as a whole.

Based on these Findings and Conclusions, Judge Arleo granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class
Counsel pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (g) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The following class is certified
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2):
Individuals who have filed or will file petitions for Special
Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) classification based on New Jersey Family
Part Orders that were entered between the petitioners' 18th and
21st birthdays, and whose SIJ petitions are, have been, or will be
delayed, questioned, denied, or revoked on the ground that the
Family Part lacks the authority, power, or jurisdiction to make the
required child welfare findings as to petitioners in this age
group.

The Judge appointed (i) the Plaintiffs as the representatives of
the class; and (ii) Lowenstein Sandler LLP as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/D36wL2 from Leagle.com.

W.A.O., Lead Plaintiff, represented by CRAIG LAURENCE DASHIELL --
cdashiell@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP, ERIC R. SUGGS
-- esuggs@lowenstein.com -- Lowenstein Sandler LLP, NATALIE JANET
KRANER -- nkraner@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC &
CATHERINE WEISS -- cweiss@lowenstein.com -- LOWENSTEIN SANDLER.

H.H.M.C., N.L.J. & K.M.R.L., Plaintiffs, represented by CRAIG
LAURENCE DASHIELL, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP, ERIC R. SUGGS,
Lowenstein Sandler LLP, NATALIE JANET KRANER, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC
& CATHERINE WEISS, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER.

LEE FRANCIS CISSNA, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, KEVIN MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, ROBERT COWAN, Director, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services - National Benefits Center, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY & U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Defendants, represented by ENES HAJDARPASIC, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.


VENATOR MATERIALS: Bishop Sues over Drop in Share Prices
--------------------------------------------------------
BONNIE YOON BISHOP, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VENATOR MATERIALS PLC; SIMON
TURNER; KURT D. OGDEN; STEPHEN IBBOTSON; RUSS R. STOLLE; PETER R.
HUNTSMAN; SIR ROBERT J. MARGETTS; DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON; DANIELE
FERRARI; and KATHY D. PATRICK, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-08625
(S.D.N.Y., Sept. 17, 2019) is a class action brought on behalf of
all persons or entities that purchased Venator securities between
August 2, 2017 and October 29, 2018, inclusive, purchased Venator
shares in or traceable to the Company's initial public offering of
ordinary shares conducted on or around August 3, 2017; purchased
Venator shares in or traceable to the Company's secondary public
offering of ordinary shares conducted on or around December 4,
2017.  The Plaintiff seeks to pursue remedies under the Securities
Act.

According to the complaint, on August 3, 2017, Venator conducted
the IPO, through which more than 26 million ordinary shares of
Venator were sold at $20 per share, with its former parent,
Huntsman Corporation, reaping over $522 million in gross proceeds.
Four months after the IPO, on or around December 4, 2017, Venator
conducted the SPO, through which an additional 23.7 million
ordinary shares of Venator were sold at $22.50 per share, resulting
in over $533 million in gross proceeds to Huntsman.

In the Offering Materials for both the IPO and the SPO, Defendants
misrepresented the true extent of the fire damage to Venator's Pori
facility, the cost to rehabilitate the facility, and the impact on
Venator's business and operations. Throughout the Class Period, the
Company repeatedly misrepresented the true extent of the damage at
the Pori facility and made reassuring statements to investors
regarding the Company's business operations, financial prospects,
and the restoration of its Titanium Dioxide production capacity.

As a result of these misrepresentations, Venator shares traded at
artificially inflated prices throughout the Class Period.

The truth began to emerge on July 31, 2018, when Venator revealed
that the fire damage at the Pori facility was far more extensive
than Defendants had previously represented to investors.
Specifically, Venator announced that the cost to repair the
facility had climbed to more than $375 million above the insurance
policy limits, more than double the amount disclosed to investors
just two months after the IPO. On this news, the price of Venator
shares declined from $15.35 per share to $14.62 per share, or
roughly 4.76%, on July 31, 2018.

On October 30, 2018, Venator announced that in addition to the over
$500 million in costs and lost business associated with the Pori
fire incurred to date -- which had been covered by Venator's
insurance policy -- the Company incurred an additional
restructuring expense of approximately $415 million and would incur
additional "charges of $220 million through the end of 2024"
related to the Pori site. As a result of these disclosures, the
Company's share price declined from $8.00 per share to $6.47 per
share, or more than 19%, on unusually high trading volume on
October 30, 2018.

Ultimately, by October 30, 2018, the price of Venator shares had
fallen nearly 68% from the price at which Venator shares were sold
to investors in the IPO and over 71% from the price at which
Venator shares were sold to investors in the SPO.

Venator Materials PLC operates as a manufacturer and marketer of
chemical products. The Company produces a broad range of pigments
and additives. Venator Materials offers titanium dioxide, color
pigments, functional additives, and timer and water treatment
products worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


VEREIT INC: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for January 21
----------------------------------------------------------------
Vereit, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission filed on October 3, 2019, that the court in
the class action suit entitled, In re American Realty Capital
Properties, Inc. Litigation, No. 1:15-mc-00040 (AKH), has scheduled
a hearing for January 21, 2020, to consider final approval of
settlement.

On September 30, 2019, VEREIT, Inc. ("VEREIT" or the "Company") and
VEREIT Operating Partnership, L.P. (the "Operating Partnership"),
in their capacity as defendants, entered into a Stipulation of
Settlement (the "Class Action Stipulation") in connection with In
re American Realty Capital Properties, Inc. Litigation, No.
1:15-mc-00040 (AKH) (the "Class Action"), consistent with the
Memorandum of Understanding providing for settlement of the Class
Action, as previously disclosed in VEREIT's and the Operating
Partnership's joint Current Report on Form 8-K, filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on September 9, 2019
(the "Prior 8-K").

The Class Action Stipulation and the settlement contemplated
therein (the "Class Action Settlement") are subject to court
approval and are conditioned on approval of the Derivative
Settlement in connection with Witchko v. Schorsch, et al., No.
1:15-cv-06043-AKH (the "Derivative Action"). Pursuant to the
proposed Class Action Settlement, and consistent with the related
disclosure in the Prior 8-K, certain defendants agreed to pay in
the aggregate $1.025 billion, comprised of contributions from the
Company's former external manager and its principals (together the
"Former Manager") totaling $225.0 million, $12.5 million from the
Company's former chief financial officer (the "Former CFO"), $49.0
million from the Company's former auditor, and the balance of
$738.5 million from the Company.

The contribution from the Company's Former Manager is expected to
be satisfied almost entirely by limited partner units of the
Operating Partnership ("OP Units") held by the Former Manager and
the remainder in cash. The contribution from the Former CFO is
expected to be satisfied by a combination of OP Units held by the
Former CFO, amounts due related to the dividends on such OP Units
previously withheld from distribution and the remainder in cash.

The Company will contribute cash for such OP Units and dividends
used by the Former Manager and Former CFO to fund their
contributions. The contributions from the Company's Former Manager
are inclusive of the value of substantially all of the OP Units and
dividends surrendered to the Company in July 2019 as a result of a
settlement by the Former Manager and certain of its principals with
the SEC, totaling approximately $32.0 million, which was recorded
in the Company's quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter
ended June 30, 2019, and for which cash will be contributed by the
Company.

In addition, the Class Action Stipulation does not contain any
admission of liability, wrongdoing or responsibility by any of the
parties and provides that upon final approval of the Class Action
Settlement, the Class Action will be dismissed with prejudice, with
mutual releases by all parties.

On September 27, 2019, VEREIT and the Operating Partnership entered
into a Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement (the "Derivative
Stipulation") in connection with Witchko v. Schorsch, et al., No.
1:15-cv-06043-AKH (the "Derivative Action"), consistent with the
Memorandum of Understanding providing for settlement of the
Derivative Action (the "Derivative Settlement"), as previously
disclosed in the Prior 8-K. The Derivative Settlement will resolve
the allegations brought by the derivative plaintiffs. The
Derivative Settlement is subject to court approval and is
conditioned on approval of the Class Action Settlement.

During a hearing on October 3, 2019, the court gave preliminary
approval to both the Class Action Settlement and the Derivative
Settlement. Both settlements remain subject to final approval by
the court.

The court scheduled a hearing on January 21, 2020, to consider
final approval of both settlements.

Vereit, Inc. is a full-service real estate operating company which
owns and manages one of the largest portfolios of single-tenant
commercial properties in the U.S. The company is based in Phoenix,
Arizona.


VERMONT: Russell Seeks to Certify Suit over Muslim Inmates' Diet
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JUSTIN RUSSELL, the
Plaintiff, v. ANDREW PALLITO, CYNTHIA MASON, RICHARD BILODEAU, LISA
MENARD, ROBERT ARNELL, and MICHAEL TOUCHETTE, the Defendants, Case
No. 5:15-cv-00126-gwc-jmc (D. Vt.), the Plaintiff asks the Court on
Oct. 6, 2019, to grant his Renewed Motion for Class Certification.

Russell seeks to certify a class consisting of:

   "Muslim prisoners now or formerly in the custody of the Vermont
   Department of Corrections who maintain that the Halal dietary
   offering provided by the Department since late 2014 violates
   their right to the free exercise of religion, and who seek a
   return to the Halal dietary offering made available to Muslim
   prisoners in the Department's custody prior to that time. In
   support of the Motion, Plaintiff submits the following
   Memorandum of Law."

The Plaintiff has reframed his request for injunctive relief,
seeking an order directing Commissioner Touchette to "reinstate the
religious dietary offering that was made available to Muslim
inmates in the Department's custody immediately prior to September,
2014."[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          David Bond, Esq.
          STROUSE & BOND, PLLC
          2 Church St., Ste 3A
          Burlington, VT 05401
          Telephone: 802 540-0434
          E-mail: david@strouse-bond.com

VISA INC: ATM Operator Plaintiffs Move for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
The ATM Operator Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled NATIONAL ATM
COUNCIL, INC., et al. v. VISA INC., et al., Case No.
1:11-cv-01803-RJL (D.D.C.), ask the Court to:

   (1) certify a class defined as:

       All ATM Operators that originated an Authorized Surcharged
       ATM Cash Disbursement at a Qualified ATM at any time
       between October 1, 2007 and the present (the "Class
       Period");

   (2) appoint them as class representatives; and

   (3) appoint Jonathan L. Rubin, Esq., and Daniel J. Mogin,
       Esq., of the firm of MoginRubin LLP as Co-Lead Class
       Counsel.

The ATM Operator Plaintiffs are Co-Lead Plaintiffs ATMs of the
South, Inc., Business Resource Group, Inc., Just ATMs USA, Inc.,
Wash Water Solutions, Inc., ATM Bankcard Services, Inc., Selman
Telecommunications Investment Group, LLC, Scot Gardner d/b/a SJI,
Turnkey ATM Solutions, LLC, Trinity Holdings Ltd., Inc., T&T
Communications, Inc. and Randal N. Bro d/b/a T & B Investments.

Specifically excluded from the Class are:

      i. all banks, credit unions, and other financial
         institutions that deploy or operate ATMs, including all
         chartered state or federal banks or credit unions,
         issuers of payment cards, or members of either the
         Mastercard Defendants or the Visa Defendants;

     ii. the Visa Defendants and Mastercard Defendants;

    iii. officers, directors or employees of any Visa Defendant
         or Mastercard Defendant;

     iv. any entity in which any Visa Defendant or Mastercard
         Defendant has a controlling interest;

      v. any affiliate, legal representative,
         successor-in-interest or assignee of any Visa Defendant
         or Mastercard Defendant;

     vi. any federal, state, or local governmental entity;

    vii. any judicial officer presiding over this action and the
         members of their immediate family and judicial staff;
         and

   viii. any juror assigned to this action.[CC]

The ATM Operator Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jonathan L. Rubin, Esq.
          MOGINRUBIN LLP
          1615 M Street, NW, Third Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: (202) 630-0616
          Facsimile: (877) 247-8586
          E-mail: jrubin@moginrubin.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Mogin, Esq.
          Jennifer M. Oliver, Esq.
          MOGINRUBIN LLP
          600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 687-6611
          Facsimile: (619) 687-6610
          E-mail: dmogin@moginrubin.com
                  joliver@moginrubin.com


VITAL RECOVERY: Ingraham Seeks OT Pay for Collections Specialists
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CAMILLE INGRAHAM individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, he Plaintiffs, vs. VITAL RECOVERY SERVICES,
LLC and VITAL SOLUTIONS, INC., the Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-04159-MLB (N.D. Ga., Sept. 16, 2019), seeks to recover
damages for Defendants' willful violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and alleged contractual obligations (or unjust
enrichment if no contract is found).

Ingraham was jointly employed by Defendants as an hourly
Collections Specialist from approximately November 2018 until
approximately April 2019. The Plaintiff, and others similarly
situated, were regularly scheduled to work 40 hours per workweek
and often worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek.

In fact, the Plaintiff was regularly scheduled to work Monday
through Friday for at least 8 hours per day, and Plaintiff would
occasionally work Saturdays. Regardless of the total number of
hours Plaintiff was scheduled to work, Defendants regularly
required Plaintiff to work a substantial amount of time
off-the-clock as part of her job as a Collection Specialist in the
call center and Plaintiff was never compensated for this time
worked off-the-clock, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, are current and former
hourly Collections Specialists or other job titles performing the
same or similar job duties who were employed by Defendants to
perform work in Defendants' call centers in Georgia.

Vital Solutions "works nationwide in all time zones, and provides
customized outsourcing solutions for various industries, with
specialized programs in the Automotive Finance, Credit Card and
Utilities industries".

Vital Recovery is a financial services company.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs are:

          Cale Conley, Esq.
          CONLEY GRIGGS PARTIN, LLP
          4200 Northside Parkway NW
          Building One, Suite 300
          Atlanta, GA 30327
          Telephone: (404) 809-2580
          Facsimile: (404) 467-1166
          E-mail: cale@conleygriggs.com

               - and -

          Molly E. Nephew, Esq.
          JOHNSONBECKER, PLLC
          444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (612) 436-1800
          Facsimile: (612) 436-1800
          E-mail: mnephew@johnsonbecker.com

VITALE'S ITALIAN: Torres Moves for Class Certification Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled EMILIO TORRES, an individual and on behalf of
all similarly situated v. VITALE'S ITALIAN RESTAURANT, INC., a
Michigan Corporation, d/b/a VITALE'S GRAND RAPIDS, SALVATORE
VITALE, an individual, and BELINDA PIERSON, an individual, Case No.
1:18-cv-00547-RSK (W.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
grant conditional class certification pursuant to Section 216(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Anthony Alvarez, Esq.
          Agustin Henriquez, Esq.
          AVANTI LAW GROUP, PLLC
          600 28th St. SW
          Wyoming, MI 49509
          Telephone: (616) 257-6807
          E-mail: ralvarez@avantilaw.com
                  ahenriquez@avantilaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Ian A. Northon, Esq.
          Hal G. Ostrow, Esq.
          G. Will Furtado, Esq.
          Patrick E. Sweeney, Esq.
          RHOADES MCKEE PC
          55 Campau Ave. N.W., Suite 300
          Grand Rapids, MI 49503
          Telephone: (616) 235-3500
          E-mail: ian@rhoadesmckee.com
                  hostrow@rhoadesmckee.com
                  gwfurtado@rhoadesmckee.com
                  psweeney@rhoadesmckee.com


VOLUME SERVICES: Seeks Prelim. Approval of $750K Raquedan Suit Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MONIQUE RAQUEDAN, et al. v. VOLUME SERVICES,
INC., et al., Case No. 5:18-cv-01139-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Plaintiffs
Monique Raquedan and Ronald Martinez and Defendants Volume
Services, Inc., and Centerplate of Delaware, Inc., jointly move the
Court to:

   (1) conditionally certify a settlement class;

   (2) preliminarily approve the parties' proposed class action
       Fourth Amended Settlement Agreement (the "Amended
       Settlement");

   (3) appoint Plaintiffs Monique Raquedan and Ronald Martinez as
       the Class Representatives, their counsel as class counsel,
       and Simpluris, Inc., as the settlement administrator;

   (4) approve the forms of notice to the class of the settlement
       and Election Not to Participate in the Amended Settlement;
       and

   (5) schedule a hearing on the final approval of the Amended
       Settlement for April 30, 2020, or as soon thereafter as
       the Court is available.

The Joint Motion seeks preliminary approval of the parties Fourth
Amended Settlement Agreement of this Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA") and related state law class action between the Plaintiffs
and an estimated 11,740 Class Members, and the Defendants.

The Settlement provides for an "all-in" non-reversionary settlement
of $750,000.  Class members will not have to make claims.  Instead,
a check will be mailed directly to them.  For any uncashed checks,
the money will be sent to the State of California's Unclaimed
Property Fund to be held for the Class Member.  No money will
revert to Centerplate.

In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that they and the Class
Members were subject to a background check, including a consumer
report, in connection with their application for a job, promotion
or job change with Centerplate that was conducted in violation of
applicable law.  Centerplate denies the Plaintiffs' allegations in
their entirety, denies any liability, and further denies that, for
any purpose other than settling, the action is appropriate for
class treatment.

The class to be conditionally certified is defined as:

     All employees and applicants in the United States who
     applied for a job, promotion or job change with Centerplate
     for which a background check, including a consumer report,
     was conducted at any time from February 22, 2011, to the
     earlier of (i) the date that the District Court grants
     preliminary approval of the Settlement, or (ii) March 31,
     2019, excluding those individuals who already have resolved
     all the claims asserted in the Action, whether by settlement
     or adjudication, including, but not limited to, the
     settlement in Phlisida Gibbs v. Centerplate, Inc., et al.,
     U.S.D.C., M.D. Fla., No. 8-17-cv-2187-EAK-JSS.

Centerplate will pay a Maximum Settlement Amount (the "MSA") of
$750,000.  The MSA covers (1) class representative payments of
$5,000 to the Plaintiffs ($2,500 each), in compensation for having
initiated and prosecuted the action and undertaken the risk of
payment of costs in the event this matter had not been successfully
concluded; (2) Settlement Shares paid to Class Members; (3) the
Class Counsel Fees and Expenses Payment of not more than $222,500
(25% of the MSA), plus costs not to exceed $35,000, to compensate
plaintiffs' counsel for all work performed thus far and all work
remaining to be performed in documenting and administrating the
Amended Settlement and securing Court approval; (4) the fees and
expenses of the settlement administrator, not to exceed $53,610;
and (6) any other fees or expenses (other than Class Counsel Fees
and Expenses Payment) incurred in implementing the terms and
conditions of the settlement agreement and securing the judgment
pursuant to that agreement.

After all court-approved deductions from the MSA, it is estimated
that a Net Settlement Amount of $468,890 will be available to pay
the Settlement Shares of all Class Members.  If the Court awards
all the requested amounts, each Class Member's Settlement Share is
estimated to be $39.86.

The Parties propose this schedule for approval of the Amended
Settlement, which assumes that preliminary approval is granted at
the hearing on the motion:

   -- December 20, 2019 -- Centerplate to provide to Settlement
      Administrator database containing Class Member information
      necessary to calculate Settlement Shares (30 days after
      Preliminary Approval);

   -- January 14, 2020 -- Settlement Administrator to mail Class
      Notice Packets to all Class Members (15 days after
      receiving Class Member information from Centerplate);

   -- February 13, 2020 -- Date by which plaintiffs and class
      counsel will submit their motion for Class Representative
      Payments and Class Counsel Fees and Expenses Payment (30
      days after Class Notice Packets are mailed to Class
      Members);

   -- February 28, 2020 -- Last day for Class Members to file
      with the Court and serve upon counsel for the parties
      objections to Settlement (45 days after Settlement
      Administrator mails Class Notice Packets to all Class
      Members)

      Last day for Class Members to mail Elections Not to
      Participate in Settlement (45 days after Settlement
      Administrator mails Class Notice Packets to all Class
      Members);

   -- March 13, 2020 -- Date by which Settlement Administrator
      will provide Parties with a list of all Class Members who
      submitted timely and valid Elections Not to Participate
      Forms;

   -- March 26, 2020 -- Date by which parties will submit their
      joint motion for final approval of settlement; and

   -- April 30, 2020 -- Hearing on joint motion for final
      approval of settlement.

The Court will commence a hearing on November 21, 2019, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Segal, Esq.
          Farrah Grant, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          315 S. Beverly Drive, Suite 315
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  thomas@setarehlaw.com
                  farrah@setarehlaw.com

Defendants Volume Services, Inc., and Centerplate of Delaware, Inc.
are represented by:

          Jeffrey D. Wohl, Esq.
          Zina Deldar, Esq.
          Jana B. Fitzgerald, Esq.
          PAUL HASTINGS LLP
          101 California Street, 48th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 856-7000
          Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
          E-mail: jeffwohl@paulhastings.com
                  zinadeldar@paulhastings.com
                  janafitzgerald@paulhastings.com


WARNER MUSIC: Seeks 9th Circuit Review of Williams Suit Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and Warner Music Group
Corporation filed an appeal from a Court ruling in the lawsuit
styled Leonard Williams, et al. v. Warner Music Group Corporation,
et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-09691-RGK-PJW, in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

The appellate case is captioned as Leonard Williams, et al. v.
Warner Music Group Corporation, et al., Case No. 19-56121, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Defendants
filed an appeal from a ruling in the lawsuit.  That appellate case
is titled as Leonard Williams, et al. v. Warner Music Group
Corporation, et al., Case No. 19-80052.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees LEONARD WILLIAMS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, and THE LENNY WILLIAMS PRODUCTION
COMPANY, a California corporation, are represented by:

          Douglas L. Johnson, Esq.
          Neville Johnson, Esq.
          JOHNSON & JOHNSON LLP
          439 N. Canon Drive
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 975-1080
          Facsimile: (310) 975-1095
          E-mail: djohnson@jjllplaw.com
                  njohnson@jjllplaw.com

               - and -

          Paul R. Kiesel, Esq.
          Jeffrey Alan Koncius, Esq.
          Nicole Ramirez, Esq.
          KIESEL LAW LLP
          8648 Wilshire Boulevard
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 854-4444
          Facsimile: (310) 854-0812
          E-mail: kiesel@kiesel.law
                  koncius@kiesel.law
                  ramirez@kiesel.law

               - and -

          Clifford Harris Pearson, Esq.
          Bobby Pouya, Esq.
          Daniel Leon Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON SIMON WARSHAW & PENNEY, LLP
          15165 Ventura Boulevard
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 788-8104
          E-mail: cpearson@pswlaw.com
                  bpouya@pswlaw.com
                  dwarshaw@pswlaw.com

Defendants-Appellants WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORPORATION, a Delaware
Corporation, and WARNER BROS. RECORDS, INC., a Delaware
Corporation, are represented by:

          Sean Ashley Commons, Esq.
          Rollin Ransom, Esq.
          SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
          555 West 5th Street
          Los Angeles, CA 90013
          Telephone: (213) 896-6010
          Facsimile: (213) 896-6600
          E-mail: scommons@sidley.com
                  rransom@sidley.com


WM BOLTHOUSE: Felix Ordered to File Settlement Motion by Nov. 8
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC FELIX, an individual, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WM. BOLTHOUSE FARMS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-312-AWI JLT (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California has (i) ordered the Plaintiff to
file a motion for preliminary approval of class settlement no later
than Nov. 8, 2019; and (ii) vacated all other pending deadlines,
conferences, hearings, and trial date.

On Sept. 10, 2019, the parties filed a "Joint Notice of
Settlement," informing the Court that they were in the process of
negotiating a long-form settlement agreement, and that the
Plaintiff anticipates filing a motion for preliminary approval of
class action settlement within 30 to 60 days.

Based upon the filing of the Joint Notice of Settlement, Magistrate
Judge Thurston ordered that the Plaintiff to file a motion for
preliminary approval of class settlement that substantively
complies with the following guidelines no later than Nov. 8, 2019:

     a. Litigation and Settlement Class Definitions: The parties
seeking preliminary approval should address whether the Court
certified a litigation class.  If a litigation class was certified,
the parties should address identify any differences between the
class defined by the Court and the proposed settlement class.  If a
class was not certified, they must address whether the proposed
settlement class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must demonstrate the proposed
class is maintainable under one or more of the three alternatives
set forth in Rule 23(b).

     b. Settlement Administration: The parties should identify the
proposed settlement administrator and the anticipated duties of the
settlement administrator.  They should also identify the
anticipated administration cost, the reasonableness of these costs,
and who will be responsible if the claims administration costs
exceed the amount preliminarily approved.  Prior to the hearing for
final approval, the settlement administrator will file a
declaration of due diligence, setting forth its compliance with its
obligations under the settlement agreement, and addressing the
costs incurred.

     c. Proposed Class Notice: The parties should ensure the
proposed class notice is easily understandable, considering any
concerns about the education level or language needs of the class
members.  If the parties intend to issue any language translation
of the Notice, they are reminded that the Court requires a
declaration that the Notice was translated by a certified court
interpreter, asserting the translation is an accurate translation
of the Court-approved English version of the Notice.

     d. Attorney Fees and Costs: Although the Court will not
approve a request for attorneys' fees until the final approval
hearing, the class counsel should include information about the
fees they intend to request -- and the lodestar calculation --
through preparation of the motion for preliminary approval.  In
addition, the counsel should state whether they seek payment of
costs and expenses, including expert fees, and the total amount.

     e. Class Representative Incentive Awards: The parties seeking
incentive awards should include evidence supporting the requested
awards in the motion for preliminary approval.  The class counsel
should also compare the requested award to the average anticipated
by the class members.

     g. Final Approval: The motion for final approval should
include information about the class members' responses, the
requests for approval of attorneys' fees, and at least one
comparable class action settlement.

The Magistrate vacated all other pending deadlines, conferences,
hearings, and trial dates.  The Plaintiff is advised that failure
to comply with the Order may result in the Court imposing
sanctions, including the dismissal of the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/kbdpet from Leagle.com.

Eric Felix, an individual, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Emil Davtyan --
emil@davtyanlaw.com -- Davtyan Professional Law Corporation, Eric
Bryce Kingsley -- eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley & Kingsley
APC & Kelsey Szamet -- kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com -- Kingsley &
Kingsley, APC.

WM. Bolthouse Farms, Inc., Defendant, represented by Ashley
Adrianne Baltazar -- ashley.baltazar@morganlewis.com -- Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP.


WONDERFUL COMPANY: Failed to Pay Wages, Zeferino, et al Say
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit against The Wonderful Company remains
pending in state court.  The case is captioned, PERFECTO ZEFERINO;
LIBRADO MARTINEZ RAMIREZ; ELISEO GASPAR; OLEGARIO HERNANDEZ; GENARO
REYES, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. THE WONDERFUL COMPANY, LLC; WONDERFUL CITRUS PACKING
LLC and DOES 1-25, the Defendants, Case No. 19STCV27582 (Cal.
Super., Aug. 5, 2019), and alleges that Defendants failed to pay
wages, failed to provide/compensate for mandated rest periods and
meal periods, and failed to reimburse expenses for tools and
equipment in violation of the California Labor Code.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have required workers to
perform unpaid, off-the-clock work in violation of state wage and
hour laws.

The Plaintiffs and Members of the Proposed Class are seasonal
agricultural workers who have worked in Defendants' fields.

The Defendants are engaged in the business of cultivating,
harvesting and packing fruit and tree nuts, including mandarins and
other citrus, and marketing the mandarins under the "Halos"
brand.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and all aggrieved employees are:

          Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
          Liane Katzensteinly, Esq.
          Lyubov Lerner, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 990-8300
          Facsimile: (818) 990-2903
          E-mail: eric@kingsleykingsley.com
                  liane@kingsleykingsley. com
                  luba@kingsleykingsley.com

               - and -

          Mario Martinez, Esq.
          Edgar L. Aguilasocho, Esq.
          MARTINEZ AGUILASOCHO & LYNCH, APLC
          P.O. BOX 1998
          Bakersfield, CA 93303
          Telephone: (661) 859-1174
          Facsimile: (661) 840-6154
          E-mail: mmartinez@farmworkerlaw.com
                  eaguilasocho@farmworkerlaw.com


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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