CAR_Public/191015.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, October 15, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 206

                            Headlines

4745 SECOND AVE: Fails to Properly Pay Exotic Dancers, Embry Says
ABBVIE INC: Court Dismisses First Amended Walleye Securities Suit
ALLSTATE FIRE: N.J. Dist. Ct. Transfers Banks Case to M.D. Pa.
AM-PM EMPLOYMENT: Faces Glosser Suit in Northern District of Ohio
AMERICOLLECT INC: Strulovic Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

AMYRIS INC: Continues to Defend Securities Class Suit in N.D. Cal.
APPLE INC: Class of AppleCare Buyers in Maldonado Suit Certified
ASTRAZENECA PHARMA: Baltimore Sues Over Seroquel Price-Fixing
ASTRAZENECA PHARMA: Faces NECA-IBEW Suit Over Seroquel Price-fixing
BALANCED HEALTHCARE: Zevon Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida

BANCO SANTANDER: Antitrust Suit Over Mexican Gov't. Bonds Dismissed
BLU PRODUCTS: Court Grants Class Certification in Martinez Case
BRASKEM SA: Boilermaker-Blacksmith Class Suit Concluded
CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: Certification of Settlement Class Sought
CALIFORNIA: Settlement of Minors' Suit v. DHCS Gets Final Court OK

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Kanehl's Bid for Class Certification Stayed
CARDINAL HEALTH: Nguyen Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
CARMAX INC: Wage & Hour Class Suits Continue in Calif.
CDA, INC: McKenzie Seeks to Certify Class in WARN Act Suit
CENTENE MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay Overtime Wage, Del Toro Claims

CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Medgebow Suit Settlement Gets Final Ct. Approval
COMCAST CORPORATION: Baker Sues over Unilateral Price Increase
COOK COUNTY, IL: Court Denies Class Cert. Bid in McFields Suit
CVS HEALTH: Removes Opioid Case to District of Delaware
DAKOTA OF ROCKY HILL: Ct. Denies Class Cert. Bid in McDougle Case

DAKOTA PLAINS: Court Certifies Class in Gruber Securities Suit
DAKOTA PLAINS: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Gruber Securities Suit
DOMINION DENTAL: Bradley Sues over Massive Data Breach
DXC TECHNOLOGY: Constanzo Sues over 45% Drop in Share Price
EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION: Russell Moves for Class Certification

EDWARD R. MARSZAL: Mack Suit Underway in California Superior Court
EL ANGEL MARKET: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Arias Suit Alleges
ENCORE BOSTON: Schuster Case Stays in Massachusetts
ENSIGN UNITED: $815K Prim Class Settlement Gets Initial Court Nod
EXPEDIA GROUP: Can Compel Arbitration in Krause FLSA Suit

FEDEX CORPORATE: Court Narrows Claims in Abdallah TCPA Suit
FEDEX GROUND: Johnson Moves to Notify Class of Delivery Drivers
FRED BEANS: Brogan Seeks to Certify Four Classes of Consumers
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Caldwell Sues over Debt Collection Practices
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Decision in Gress Suit

GABRIEL GALLARDO: Court OKs $300K Tenorio Settlement Deal
GREEN BAY PACKAGING: Harter Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective
HAMILTON-RYKER IT: Sued by Gentry for Not Paying Overtime Wages
HEARST MAGAZINE: Arnold Suit Removed to S.D. California
HOME DEPOT U.S.A.: Removes Barragan et al. Suit to S.D. Cal.

HOMEADVISOR INC: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Airquip Suit Denied
I.C. SYSTEM: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
INT'L SPEEDWAY: MOU Entered in Firemen's Retirement Sys. Suit
INTELENET AMERICA: Employees Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
JOHN L LOEB: Martins De Melo Seeks to Recover Unpaid Min., OT Wages

JONES SEPTIC: Joint Bid to Certify Class in Rumph Suit Granted
JUUL LABS: Faces JW Suit Over Nicotine Addiction From JUULpods
KINDEST CARE: Smith Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
KOHN LAW FIRM: Certification of Class Sought in Luna Suit
KOZENY & McCUBBIN: Sevela Seeks Certification of FDCPA Class

L'OREAL USA: Ct. Narrows Claims in Defective Hair Relaxer Kit Case
LAZY DOG: Faces Van Meter Suit in California Superior Court
LIBERTY POWER: Lindenbaum TCPA Suit Seeks to Stop Illegal Calls
LOUISIANA: AJ's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Moot Ff. Stipulation
LTD FINANCIAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed

MARZEN MEDIA: Fischler Files ADA Class Action
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Court Dismisses Second Amended Miller Suit
MILE DEVELOPMENT: Faces Duncan Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
MONARCH RECOVERY: Strouse Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
NEUROBRANDS, LLC: Young, et al. Seek to Certify Class & Subclass

NEW BEAUTY MEDIA: Tatum-Rios Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
NORTH CAROLINA: Class of Sex Offenders Certified in Grabarczyk Suit
OPHTHOTECH CORP: Bid to Dismiss Micholle Securities Suit Denied
OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Class of Wisconsin Residents Certified in Nagan
OS RESTAURANT: No Conditional Class Certification in Chavira Suit

PAREX USA: Ticali Seeks Overtime Pay
PC SHIELD: Wendell H. Stone Co. Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
PIER 1: 5th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Town of Davie Police Suit
PRIMERO MINING: 9th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Royal Wulff Suit
QES PRESSURE: Newsome Seeks to Notify Field Supervisors of Suit

QUANTCAST CORP: Underpays Sales Representatives, Brown Alleges
RESEARCH AMERICA: Status Hearing in Byer Suit Re−Set to Dec. 17
RESURGENT CAPITAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
RITE AID: Class Certification Bid in Stafford Due Dec. 11
SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA: Trial Ct. Judgment in Woodruff Suit Affirmed

SAN JOSE, CA: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Hernandez Suit
SANMEDICA INTERNATIONAL: Ct. Narrows Claims Pizana's False Ad Case
SECURITY CREDIT: Batista Files FDCPA Suit in New York
SETERUS INC: Court Narrows Claims in Peebles FDCPA Suit
SHANE SMITH: Oden Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages

SHARP ELECTRONICS: Sells Defective Microwave Drawers, Hamm Says
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Court Dismisses Hughes Suit with Prejudice
STATE AUTOMOBILE: Murphy Sues Over Improper Loss Valuations
STATE COLLECTION: Certification of Class Sought in Thorson Suit
STATE FARM: MAO-MSO Ordered to Reply to Summary Judgment Bid

STYLOGIC LTD: Tatum-Rios Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SUBARU OF AMERICA: Nunez Sues Over Recall Work on Faulty Engines
TMC RESTAURANT: Stay Bid to Compel Arbitration Denied as to Davis
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Schwartz Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
UNITED FEDERAL: Capital Sues over Collection of Overdraft Fees

UNITED STATES AUTMOBILE: Wash. App. Ct. Affirms CPA Suit Dismissal
UNITED STATES: Downey Seeks Disability Accommodation, to Seal Bid
USA TECHNOLOGIES: Puerto Rico Retirement Fund Suit Consolidated
USA TECHNOLOGIES: Securities Suit Goes to E.D. Pennsylvania
USA TECHNOLOGIES: Warren Police & Fire Retirement Sys. Suit Stayed

USAA CASUALTY: Koehler's Summary Judgment Bid Denied w/o Prejudice
VENATOR MATERIALS: Cambria County Sues over Drop in Share Price
VITAL RECOVERY: Certification of Class Sought in Makurat Suit
VORTENS INC: Bid to Strike Casper Declaration in Cone Suit Denied
WESTROCK CP: Bid for Summary Judgment in Bell Suit Granted in Part

WISCONSIN: Ct. Tosses Bender Suit Asserting Civil Rights Breach
YALE UNIVERSITY: Class of Plan Participants Certified in ERISA Case

                            *********

4745 SECOND AVE: Fails to Properly Pay Exotic Dancers, Embry Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARY EMBRY on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. 4745 SECOND AVE. LTD., D/B/A BIG EARL'S
GOLDMINE, VAUNETTA WASHINGTON, Case No. 4:19-cv-00305-CRW-CFB (S.D.
Iowa, Sept. 25, 2019), alleges that the Plaintiff and others worked
as exotic dancers at Big Earl's Goldmine but the Defendants refused
to compensate them at the applicable minimum and overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

4745 Second Ave. Ltd., doing business as Big Earl's Goldmine, is a
domestic for-profit corporation.  Vaunetta Washington is an
individual, who owns and manages the Club.

The Defendants operate an adult entertainment club in Iowa, under
the name of "Big Earl's Goldmine."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Paige Fiedler, Esq.
          Madison Fiedler-Carlson, Esq.
          FIEDLER LAW FIRM, P.L.C
          8831 Windsor Parkway
          Johnston, IA 50131
          Telephone: (515) 254-1999
          Facsimile: (515) 254-9923
          E-mail: paige@employmentlawiowa.com
                  madison@employmentlawiowa.com

               - and -

          Ved Chitale, Esq.
          KENNEDY HODGES, L.L.P.
          4409 Montrose Blvd., Suite 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          E-mail: vchitale@kennedyhodges.com


ABBVIE INC: Court Dismisses First Amended Walleye Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WALLEYE TRADING LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. ABBVIE, INC. and WILLIAM J.
CHASE, Defendants, Case No. 18 C 05114 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Charles
P. Kocoras of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Walleye's First Amended Class Action Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

AbbVie conducted a modified Dutch Auction to repurchase $7.5
billion of its common stock.  It set a tender range between $99 to
$114 per share (in $1 increments).  AbbVie engaged Computershare as
the depositary to facilitate the Auction.  Computershare and AbbVie
communicated daily regarding the tender process.

The Auction began on May 1, 2018 and continued until midnight on
May 29, 2018.  At 8:00 a.m. (EST) on May 30, 2018, AbbVie issued a
Schedule to (Amendment No. 7) Tender Offer Statement announcing the
Auction's preliminary results.  Once AbbVie announced that its
purchase price would be $105, its stock rose 3.5% from its May 29,
2018 closing price of $99.47, closing at $103.01 on May 30, 2018,
with a trading volume of more than 31 million shares.

Forty-six minutes after the market closed on May 30, AbbVie filed a
Corrected Schedule to Tender Offer Statement.  The accompanying
press release showed that AbbVie's initial statement failed to
account for approximately 5,495,581 shares, of which 3,785,725 were
tendered by guaranteed delivery, which led AbbVie to lower its
purchase price from $105 to $103.  The next trading day, AbbVie
stock traded down sharply and closed at $98.94.

Walleye brings the action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of all those who bought, or otherwise
transacted in AbbVie securities between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
(EST) on May 30, 2018 and were damaged thereby.  Walleye alleges
three claims under the Exchange Act: Count I alleges Defendants
violated Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act; Count II alleges that
the Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act; and
Count III alleges that Defendant William Chase (AbbVie's CFO)
violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim.  They urge the Court to dismiss Count
I because Section 14(e) does not apply to statements made after a
tender offer expires.  They further urge the Court to dismiss Count
II because Walleye does not allege sufficient facts to support
Section 10(b)'s falsity and scienter elements.  Finally, the
Defendants urge the Court to dismiss Count III because Walleye has
not adequately alleged the direct liability of any Defendant.

Judge Kocoras finds that the factual allegations in this complaint
do not sufficiently show that AbbVie's morning press-release
statements were false when made.  Walleye alleges that
Computershare notified AbbVie of the error after the Initial Tender
Offer Statement was issued.  This allegation contradicts any
reasonable inference that AbbVie knew its statements were false
when made.  And the mere fact that AbbVie updated its first
statement to reflect omitted shares does not show falsity-when-made
but rather that AbbVie's statement was incorrect in retrospect.
The Judge, therefore, finds that Walleye fails to sufficiently
allege a false statement.

The Judge also finds that the allegations concern the "typical"
practice by depositaries to advise issuers of the number of shares
duly tendered on each day, their delivery methods, the number of
shares withdrawn, and the cumulative totals for each day.  Such
general allegations do not satisfy the PSLRA's heightened pleading
standard, which requires Walleye to state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the Defendants acted with
the required state of mind.  Absent factual allegations particular
to AbbVie, the scienter element is not sufficiently plead.  The
Judge, therefore, finds the complaint fails sufficiently to allege
scienter.

The Judge further finds that Walleye failed to state a claim under
Section 14(e).  Section 14(e) is intended to protect shareholders
from making a tender offer decision on inaccurate or inadequate
information.  Accordingly, whether the tender offer was effective
or withdrawn is irrelevant where the end result is the same, i.e.,
shareholders had no opportunity to base a tender offer decision on
a misstatement.

Finally, in order to allege a Section 20(a) claim, the Plaintiff
must allege: (1) a primary securities violation; (2) that the
individual Defendant exercised general control over the individual
or organization that committed the violation; and (3) that the
individual Defendant possessed the power or ability to control the
specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation
was predicated, whether or not that power was exercised.  Having
found that Walleye fails to allege a primary securities violation
by Chase or AbbVie, the Judge finds that Walleye fails to state a
claim under Section 20(a).

For the reasons mentioned, Judge Kocoras granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/V8csYh from Leagle.com.

Walleye Trading LLC, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley C. Keller --
ack@kellerlenker.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC, Seth Adam Meyer --
sam@kellerlenker.com -- Keller Lenkner Llc, Uri Seth Ottensoser --
so@kellerlenker.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC & Tom Kayes --
tk@kellerlenker.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC.

AbbVie Inc & William J. Chase, Defendants, represented by Joshua Z.
Rabinovitz -- joshua.rabinovitz@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, Robert J. Kopecky -- robert.kopecky@kirkland.com -- Kirkland &
Ellis LLP, Sarah Joy Donnell -- sarah.donnell@kirkland.com --
Kirkland & Ellis LLP & Theresa N. Horan --
theresa.cederoth@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis, Llp.


ALLSTATE FIRE: N.J. Dist. Ct. Transfers Banks Case to M.D. Pa.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stanley R. Chesler of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey transferred the case captioned JANINE BANKS,
individually and as class representative on behalf of others
similarly situated, and SPINE SURGERY ASSOCIATES, et al.,
individually and as class representatives on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-17117
(SRC) (D. N.J.), to the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

Plaintiff Banks is a Pennsylvania resident.  She sustained injuries
in a motor vehicle accident which occurred in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.  Although the Complaint does not specify the date of
the accident, it alleges that Banks was at the relevant time
insured by Allstate under a motor vehicle insurance policy
providing "Personal Injury Protection" ("PIP") benefits for medical
treatment of accident-related injuries.

According to the Defendants' submission, Banks maintained an
insurance policy with Allstate Fire covering two motor vehicles for
the policy period Sept. 6, 2011 to March 6, 2012.  Banks alleges
that following her motor vehicle accident, she obtained treatment
for her injuries at two health care providers, Spine Surgery
Associates and Ambulatory Surgical Center of Somerset ("Provider
Plaintiffs").  The Provider Plaintiffs are both located in the
State of New Jersey.

The crux of the putative class action is that Allstate underpaid
PIP benefits under the Policy by applying New Jersey's auto medical
fee schedules.  The Complaint alleges that Allstate improperly used
the schedule to determine benefits and/or pay providers because
Provider Plaintiffs were not subject to those fee schedules.  As a
result, the Complaint avers, Allstate deprived Banks of the full
benefit she is owed under the Policy and paid Provider Plaintiffs
an unlawfully reduced amount.

Banks purports to represent a class of Pennsylvania insureds who
maintained motor vehicle insurance policies with Allstate, were
injured in automobile accidents in Pennsylvania, sought treatment
outside of Pennsylvania and were allegedly deprived of PIP benefits
under their Allstate policies.  The Provider Plaintiffs purport to
represent a class of health care providers that provided care to
the aforementioned class of Allstate insureds and were allegedly
underpaid by Allstate due to the improper application of a fee
schedule.

Banks and the Provider Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in the Superior
Court of New Jersey on Nov. 6, 2018.  The Defendants removed the
action to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on
Dec. 12, 2018, asserting that the Court has diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.

The Complaint asserts the following state law claims: breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, violation of Pennsylvania's Insurance Bad Faith
Act, claims by the Provider Plaintiffs for payment of medical
billing, and unjust enrichment.

Defendants Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. and Allstate
Insurance Co. have filed the instant motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint on two grounds: failure to state a claim,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and improper
venue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).  As an
alternative to dismissal, they ask that the Court transfer venue to
the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The Plaintiffs have opposed
the motion.

Judge Chesler finds that the problem with the Defendants' argument
is that it was squarely repudiated by the Supreme Court in Atlantic
Marine Construction Co. v. United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas.  The Atlantic Marine Court rejected the
defendant's effort to dismiss the action for improper venue based
on the parties' contractual selection of another forum.  Simply
put, under Atlantic Marine, a forum selection clause does not
provide grounds for dismissal of an action under either Rule
12(b)(3), for "improper" venue, or 28 U.S.C. Section 1406, which
allows a federal court to dismiss when a case has been filed in the
"wrong" venue.

The claims pled in the Complaint arise primarily from the motor
vehicle accident in which Banks was injured, which occurred in
Pennsylvania, as well as from the Policy, which was issued to Banks
in Milford, Pennsylvania.  Even so, a substantial part of the
claims for the alleged underpayment of benefits relate to medical
treatment rendered to Banks for her injuries, and that treatment
was provided in New Jersey.  The Plaintiffs do not challenge the
validity of the forum selection cause.  They do not contest that
Banks purchased and had coverage under the Policy, nor do they
contest that she agreed to the policy's terms, including the forum
selection clause.

Instead, the Plaintiffs argue that the action should not be
transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania for two reasons:
(1) Banks received covered medical treatment in New Jersey and thus
may, under the Policy, sue in the district where this "other
covered occurrence happened; and (2) the Provider Plaintiffs are
not parties to the Policy and thus are not bound its forum
selection clause.  
Neither argument has any merit, the Judge holds.

First, the policy allows for lawsuits to be filed in a forum
outside Pennsylvania only when the occurrence for which the
coverage applies under the policy happens outside Pennsylvania.
Banks' motor vehicle accident and her resulting injuries, both
occurred in Pennsylvania.  Second, the Provider Plaintiffs'
entitlement to relief from Allstate exists, if at all, solely by
virtue of the Policy.  In short, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1404(a) and Atlantic Marine, the Judge finds that the forum
selection clause requires transfer of the action to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chesler granted the Defendants'
motion insofar as it seeks a transfer of venue. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1404(a), the action will be transferred to the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  An appropriate Order will be
filed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/99RVVD from Leagle.com.

JANINE BANKS, individually and as Class representative on behalf of
others similarly situated, SPINE SURGERY ASSOCIATES, individually
and as Class representative on behalf of others similarly situated
& AMBULATORY SURGICAL CENTER OF SOMERSET, individually and as Class
representative on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by CHARLES THOMAS KANNEBECKER --
kannebecker@wskllawfirm.com -- & CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL PLACITELLA --
cplacitella@cprlaw.com -- COHEN, PLACITELLA & ROTH, PC.

ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY & ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendants, represented by ANUPAMA PRASAD --
aprasad@cozen.com -- COZEN O'CONOR, LAURA BEA DOWGIN --
ldowgin@cozen.com -- COZEN O'CONNOR & MELISSA BRILL --
mbrill@cozen.com -- COZEN O'CONNOR PC.

AM-PM EMPLOYMENT: Faces Glosser Suit in Northern District of Ohio
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against J.A.B. Investigative
Services, LLC. The case is captioned as Heidi Glosser on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. AM-PM
Employment, LLC and J.A.B. Investigative Services, LLC, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02146-JRA (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 17, 2019).
The suit alleges violation of Fair Credit Reporting Act. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge John R. Adams.

J.A.B. provides a wide variety of professional and confidential
investigative services to attorneys, corporations and private
sector.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew A. Dooley, Esq.
          Stephen M. Bosak, Esq.
          O'TOOLE MCLAUGHLIN DOOLEY & PECORA
          5455 Detroit Road
          Sheffield Village, OH 44054
          Telephone: (440) 930-4001
          Facsimile: (440) 934-7208
          E-mail: mdooley@omdplaw.com
                  sbosak@omdplaw.com

AMERICOLLECT INC: Strulovic Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Americollect, Inc.
The case is styled as Idy Strulovic individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Americollect, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05730 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Americollect, Inc. provides debt collection services to the
healthcare industry. The company offers hospital collection,
radiology collection, and medical collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


AMYRIS INC: Continues to Defend Securities Class Suit in N.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Amyris, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2019, for the quarterly
period ended June 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a
securities class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.

On April 3, 2019, a securities class action complaint was filed
against Amyris and its CEO, John G. Melo, and former CFO (and
current Chief Business Officer), Kathleen Valiasek, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages on behalf of a purported
class that would comprise all persons and entities that purchased
or otherwise acquired the company's securities between March 15,
2018 and March 19, 2019. The complaint alleges securities law
violations based on statements and omissions made by the Company
during such period.

Subsequent to the filing of the securities class action complaint
described above, on June 21, 2019 and October 1, 2019,
respectively, two separate purported shareholder derivative
complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (Bonner v. Doerr, et al., Case No.
4:19-cv-03621 and Carlson v. Doerr, et al., Case No. 4:19-cv-06230)
based on similar allegations to those made in the securities class
action complaint described above.

The derivative complaints name Amyris, Inc. as a nominal defendant
and name a number of the Company's current and former officers and
directors as additional defendants. The lawsuits seek to recover,
on the Company's behalf, unspecified damages purportedly sustained
by the Company in connection with allegedly misleading statements
and omissions made in connection with the Company's securities
filings. The derivative complaints also seek a series of changes to
the Company's corporate governance policies, restitution to the
Company from the individual defendants, and an award of attorneys'
fees.

Amyris said, "These cases are in the initial pleadings stage. We
believe the complaints lack merit, and intend to defend ourselves
vigorously. Given the early stage of these proceedings, it is not
yet possible to reliably determine any potential liability that
could result from these matters."

Amyris, Inc. provides various alternatives to a range of
petroleum-sourced products worldwide. The company uses its
industrial bioscience technology to design microbes primarily
yeast, as well as to convert plant-sourced sugars into renewable
ingredients. The company is based in Emeryville, California.


APPLE INC: Class of AppleCare Buyers in Maldonado Suit Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned VICKY MALDONADO, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
APPLE, INC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-04067-WHO (N.D.
Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (i) denied Apple's motion for
summary judgment, and (ii) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

Plaintiffs Vicky Maldonado and Justin Carter allege that Defendants
Apple, Inc., AppleCare Service Co., Inc., and Apple CSC, Inc.
breach the AppleCare and AppleCare+ ("AC/AC+") agreements every
time a consumer receives a remanufactured replacement device
because those devices are not equivalent to new in performance and
reliability as promised under the contract.  Instead, the presence
of non-new parts means remanufactured devices can never be as
reliable as new ones.

AC/AC+ plans provide extended warranty and technical support for
Apple consumers who wish for more than the standard one-year
hardware warranty and 90 days of free technical support.  Purchase
of a plan entitles consumers to a second year of hardware coverage
for non-accidental damage, two years of accidental damage coverage,
and two years of free technical support.  The contract provides
that when a consumer submits a claim for hardware issues, Apple
will either repair the device or replace it with a device that is
new or equivalent to new in performance and reliability and is
functionally equivalent to the original product.

Replacement devices provided under the AC/AC+ plans can be either
new or remanufactured.  New devices are made with only parts coming
straight from vendors, while remanufactured devices use a small
quantity of components or parts recovered from the field-returned
units.  When a customer returns a device, Apple disassembles it and
performs tests to determine which parts, if any, can be recovered.
Accordingly, each remanufactured device could have a different mix
of recovered parts.  The testing process and criteria are the same
for both new and remanufactured devices.

From an engineering perspective, Apple considers a device
"equivalent to new" if it meets the same engineering specifications
as a new device.  Apple has the same quality standards for new and
remanufactured devices, and it goes through the same process to
qualify the remanufactured products for distribution to consumers.
How long an iPhone lasts is "highly dependent on how the phones
will be used."

The Plaintiffs filed the case on July 20, 2016 and on Aug. 12,
2016, Judge Orrick granted Apple's request for an order relating it
to the earlier filed case before him.  On March 2, 2017, he granted
in part and denied in part Apple's motion to dismiss.  After a few
continuations of the case schedule, the Plaintiffs filed a motion
for class certification on Feb. 28, 2019.  On March 29, 2019,
pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Judge consolidated the
hearings for the class certification motion and Apple's forthcoming
motion for summary judgment.  On April 8, Apple moved for summary
judgment.  The Judge heard argument on all the motions on Aug. 7,
2019.

Apple moves for summary judgment on Maldonado's and Carter's breach
of contract claims and asserts that the remaining claims fall for
the same reasons.  According to Apple, the Plaintiffs lack evidence
to prove their essential elements of their breach of contract
claims, and Carter's conduct should prevent him from pursuing his
claims.

Judge Orrick agrees with Apple that given the language of the
contract, equivalent-to-new devices cannot be the same as new
devices.  But the Plaintiffs' theory does not amount to a
contention that they were entitled to new devices.  Their case
rests on their ability to prove that remanufactured devices are not
"equivalent to new."  If they can prove this theory, consumers who
received such devices did not receive the benefit of their
bargain.

In addition, the Plaintiffs' success does not depend on the
functioning or malfunctioning of individual devices.  Apple
promised plaintiffs equivalent-to-new devices under the AC+
contract.  The Plaintiffs assert that when they submitted claims
under the contract, instead of receiving the benefit of their
bargain they received inferior devices that were more likely to
fail and have shorter lifespans.  If a fact finder credits this
theory, then Apple breached -- and caused the Plaintiffs' damages
-- at the time of that exchange.  Apple can challenge the
Plaintiffs' evidence at trial, but material disputes of fact
preclude summary judgment.

The Judge disagrees with Apple that Carter's conduct constitutes
spoliation or that it will prejudice Apple.  As articulated, the
Plaintiffs' theory is not tied to any specific remanufactured
device, and detailed inspections are not necessary to defend
against Carter's claims.  Accordingly, Apple's inability to test
all of the replacement devices Carter received will not cause it
prejudice.  Carter's conduct does not merit summary judgment in
favor of Apple.

Apple's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims fails
for the same reasons as the breach of contract claim.  For all of
these reasons, the Judge will deny Apple's motion for summary
judgment.  He denies as moot the Plaintiffs' conditional motion for
additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)
and the motions to seal related to the parties' briefing on that
motion.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class: All
individuals who purchased AppleCare or AppleCare+, either directly
or through the iPhone Upgrade Program, on or after Jan. 1, 2009,
and received a remanufactured replacement Device.  Apple challenges
the Plaintiffs' Rule 23 showing on several grounds: (i) the class
is overbroad in terms of members and time period; (ii) the
Plaintiffs can establish neither commonality nor predominance;
(iii) the named Plaintiffs' experiences are not typical; and (iv)
the named Plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs have made sufficient showing of
numerosity, adequacy, commonality, typicality, and adequacy under
Rule 23(a).  The Plaintiffs have also met their Rule 23(b)(3)
burden to show that class certification is appropriate.  The Judge
will certify the following class: All individuals who purchased
AppleCare or AppleCare+, either directly or through the iPhone
Upgrade Program, on or after July 20, 2012, and received a
remanufactured replacement Device.

Both parties filed motions to seal the briefing and exhibits
associated with the pending motions.  The Plaintiffs made their
requests based on Apple's designation of the information as
confidential; they take no position on whether these documents
qualify for protection.

First, Apple seeks to seal information related to its
remanufacturing and testing process, including the specific parts
that it uses in remanufactured devices and how those devices are
assembled and tested.  Second, Apple seeks to seal references to
the information it tracks and how it maintains that data.  Third,
it seeks to seal the serial numbers associated with Maldonado's and
Carter's devices on the ground that third parties could misuse them
to plaintiffs' detriment.  Fourth, Apple seeks to seal information
about its sales and service numbers for AC/AC+ on the grounds that
their disclosure would allow its competitors to unfairly compete by
using Apple's numbers in their own forecasting, planning, and
marketing efforts.

Because the Judge recognizes the potential sensitivity of the
categories of information, and because in another context he
allowed Apple to seal more general information than he is
contemplating allowing now, in the redacted Order he has
temporarily redacted information that does not appear sensitive and
does appear central to the Plaintiffs' theory that will be tried in
open court.  But he intends to file an unredacted version of the
Order in 10 days unless Apple submits a declaration meeting the
compelling reasons standard on any of that information.

With respect to the rest of the sealed information, the sheer
number of lines for some documents reveals the overbreadth; in some
cases Apple seeks to seal entire pages of deposition testimony.  
Redactions to the Pecht, Bardwell, and Kaufman reports must be
narrowed.  Information about the manufacturing process of
remanufactured devices is certainly key to Apple's defense; for
this reason, redactions to depositions and declarations of Lanigan,
Fu, and Sen should be narrowly tailored.

With this guidance in mind, the Judge directs Apple to file amended
sealing requests within 30 days of the date of the Order for all
requests other than the information that is currently redacted in
the Order.  Apple need not submit new versions of any documents,
but it should clearly reference the docket numbers as it has done
in its prior filings.  After he has reviewed the narrower requests,
the Judge will order the parties to submit public versions of
documents with approved redactions as necessary.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Orrick grants the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification for the following class: All individuals
who purchased AppleCare or AppleCare+, either directly or through
the iPhone Upgrade Program, on or after July 20, 2012, and received
a remanufactured replacement Device.  Maldonado and Carter are
appointed as the class representatives, and Hagens Berman is
appointed as class counsel.  The Judge denied Apple's motion for
summary judgment and terminated as moot the Plaintiffs' Conditional
Motion under Rule 56(d) and the accompanying motions to seal.  The
remaining motions to seal are resolved in accordance with the
discussion.

A further Case Management Conference is set for Dec. 3, 2019 at
2:00 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/FfOBxF from Leagle.com.

Vicky Maldonado, JoAnne McRight, individually and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated & Justin Carter,
individually and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Renee F. Kennedy --
kennedyrk22@gmail.com -- Attorney at Law, Shana E. Scarlett --
shanas@hbsslaw.com -- Michella A. Kras -- michellak@hbsslaw.com --
Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com -- Steve W. Berman --
steve@hbsslaw.com -- at Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice.

Apple, Inc, A California Corporation, Apple CSC Inc, A DBA for
Applecare Service Company & Applecare Service Company Inc, A
California Corporation, Defendants, represented by Penelope Athene
Preovolos -- ppreovolos@mofo.com -- Ashley K. Nakamura --
anakamura@mofo.com -- Margaret Elizabeth Mayo -- mmayo@mofo.com --
Purvi Govindlal Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- at Morrison & Foerster
LLP.


ASTRAZENECA PHARMA: Baltimore Sues Over Seroquel Price-Fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP;
ASTRAZENECA LP; ASTRAZENECA UK LIMITED; HANDA PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC;
and PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-08856 (S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 24, 2019), arises from the Defendants' illegal scheme to
delay competition in the United States and its territories for
Seroquel XR, and seeking to recover damages under state antitrust
and consumer protection laws.

The Plaintiff, a municipality located in Baltimore, Maryland,
brings the action as an end-payor purchaser of Seroquel XR, on its
own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated end-payor
purchasers. Defendants' unlawful conduct has prevented generic
extended-release quetiapine fumarate manufacturers from entering
the market with competing generic products and has cost Plaintiff
and end-payor purchasers hundreds of millions of dollars in
overcharge damages.

Seroquel XR is a prescription medication approved by the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration for the treatment of: (1) schizophrenia;
(2) acute depressive episodes of bipolar disorder; (3) acute manic
or mixed episodes of bipolar disorder in conjunction with other
medications; (4) long-term bipolar disorder in conjunction with
other medications; and (5) major depressive disorder in conjunction
with other medications for those patients, who have not had an
adequate response to antidepressant medications.  Seroquel XR is a
dopamine, serotonin, and adrenergic antagonist.  As of 2016,
Seroquel XR was the 86th most prescribed medication in the United
States, with more than 8 million prescriptions and annual sales
exceeding $1 billion.

AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP is a Delaware limited partnership
having its principal place of business in Wilmington, Delaware.
AstraZeneca LP is a Delaware limited partnership having its
principal place of business in Wilmington.  AstraZeneca UK Limited
is an English corporation having its principal place of business in
London, United Kingdom.

Handa Pharmaceuticals, LLC is a California corporation having its
principal place of business in San Jose, California.  Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc. is a Delaware corporation having its principal
place of business in Chestnut Ridge, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sharon K. Robertson, Esq.
          Donna M. Evans, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          88 Pine Street, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 838-7797
          Facsimile: (212) 838-7745
          E-mail: srobertson@cohenmilstein.com
                  devans@cohenmulstein.com

               - and -

          Archana Tamoshunas, Esq.
          TAUS, CEBULASH & LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 931-0704
          E-mail: atamoshunas@tcllaw.com

               - and -

          Andre M. Davis, Esq.
          Suzanne Sangree, Esq.
          CITY OF BALTIMORE DEPARTMENT OF LAW
          City Hall, Room 109
          100 N. Holiday Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (443) 388-2190
          E-mail: Andre.Davis@baltimorecity.gov
                  Suzanne.Sangree2@baltimorecity.gov


ASTRAZENECA PHARMA: Faces NECA-IBEW Suit Over Seroquel Price-fixing
-------------------------------------------------------------------
NECA-IBEW WELFARE TRUST FUND, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated Plaintiff, v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P.;
AstraZeneca L.P.; AstraZeneca UK Limited; Handa Pharmaceuticals,
LLC; and Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-09083 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 3, 2019) is an End-Payor Class
Action Complaint brought against Defendants for Defendants'
violations of the state antitrust and consumer protection laws
concerning the pharmaceutical drug Seroquel XR (quetiapine fumarate
extended-release tablets).

The U.S. sales for branded Seroquel XR exceeded $1 billion annually
for AstraZeneca prior to the introduction of generic competition.
Handa/Par and Accord recognized the huge market potential for
competing generic versions of Seroquel XR and each filed an
abbreviated new drug application with the FDA seeking approval to
market different strengths of generic Seroquel XR. In response to
the threat of generic competition, AstraZeneca filed separate
patent litigation against Handa/Par and Accord alleging that their
purported generic versions of Seroquel XR infringed upon
AstraZeneca's patents over the drug.

Rather than risk losing the patent litigations and allowing generic
versions of Seroquel XR to reach the market, AstraZeneca induced
Handa/Par and Accord to each settle their respective patent
litigation by entering into anticompetitive agreements whereby (1)
Handa/Par and Accord agreed not to compete in the market for
Seroquel XR from approximately September 29, 2011 until November 1,
2016, thereby allocating the entire Seroquel XR market to
AstraZeneca during this roughly 5 year period; (2) AstraZeneca
agreed not to compete in the generic Seroquel XR market from
roughly November 1, 2016 until May 1, 2017 thereby allocating the
entire market for generic versions of Seroquel XR to Handa/Par and
Accord for this six month period; and (3) AstraZeneca made a large
unjustified reverse payment--i.e., payments from the patent holder,
AstraZeneca, to the alleged infringers, Handa/Par and Accord, and
Defendants had no precompetitive justification or other legitimate
explanation for the payments.

The complaint asserts that Defendants violated state antitrust and
consumer protection laws, by entering into the anticompetitive
agreements that allocated markets, restricted output, and
improperly maintained AstraZeneca's market and monopoly power by
(1) delaying competition from lower priced generic Seroquel XR that
would have entered the market earlier; (2) delaying competition
from authorized generic Seroquel XR that would have entered the
market earlier; and (3) fixing, raising, and maintaining the prices
of Seroquel XR and its generic equivalents at supra-competitive
levels, says the complaint.

Plaintiff NECA-IBEW is an employee health and welfare benefit plan.
Plaintiff purchased or provided reimbursement for some or all of
the purchase price of branded and generic Seroquel XR, other than
for resale, during the Class Period.

AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP is a limited partnership organized
under the laws of Delaware, with a principal place of business at
1800 Concord Pike, Wilmington, Delaware 19803.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Thomas H. Burt, Esq.
     WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
     270 Madison Avenue
     New York, NY 10016
     Phone: (212) 545-4600
     Facsimile: (212) 545-4653
     Email: burt@whafh.com

          - and -

     Tyler W. Hudson, Esq.
     WAGSTAFF & CARTMELL LLP
     4740 Grand Avenue, Suite 300
     Kansas City, MO 64112
     Phone: (816) 701-1100
     Fax: (816) 531-2372
     Email: thudson@wcllp.com

          - and –

     Kenneth A. Wexler, Esq.
     Justin N. Boley, Esq.
     WEXLER WALLACE LLP
     55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3300
     Chicago, IL 60603
     Phone: 312-346-2222
     Email: kaw@wexlerwallace.com
            jnb@wexlerwallace.com


BALANCED HEALTHCARE: Zevon Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Balanced Healthcare
Receivables, LLC. The case is styled as Randi Zevon individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Balanced Healthcare Receivables, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
6:19-cv-01937-ACC-DCI (M.D. Fla., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Balanced Healthcare Receivables LLC or BHR is a third-party
collection agency based in New Hampshire that specializes in
collecting delinquent healthcare receivables.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


BANCO SANTANDER: Antitrust Suit Over Mexican Gov't. Bonds Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
case captioned IN RE: MEXICAN GOVERNMENT BONDS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, Case No. 18-CV-2830.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim, and a subset of Defendants also moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), respectively.

In this consolidated putative class action, Plaintiffs, eight U.S.
pension funds  allege that Defendants--ten banks and related
entities conspired to manipulate the market for certain debt
securities issued by the Mexican government. Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants rigged the auction process by
which the Mexican government issues the bonds and conspired to
manipulate the pricing of the bonds on the secondary market, in
violation of Sections 1 and 3 the Sherman Act and the common law of
unjust enrichment.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to manipulate the
Mexican Government Bond (MGB) markets in three main respects.
First, they allege that the market makers shared bids in advance of
auctions in order to artificially depress auction prices. Second,
they allege that the market makers conspired to artificially
inflate the prices at which they resold newly issued MGBs purchased
at the auctions. Finally, they allege that market makers conspired
to fix the MGB bid-ask spreads artificially wide.

Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted,  a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter that, if taken to be true, would allow
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Thus, in the antitrust context,
a plaintiff's job at the pleading stage, in order to overcome a
motion to dismiss, is to allege enough facts to support the
inference that a conspiracy actually existed.

Sherman Act Claims

Defendants argue that the allegations impermissibly treat the
defendants as a single, undifferentiated bloc and fail to put forth
specific allegations of specific conduct by specific entities or
individuals.  

An antitrust complaint that fails to connect each or any individual
entity to the overarching conspiracy, or, alternatively, satisfies
the requirements for imputing another affiliated entity's liability
cannot ordinarily survive a motion to dismiss. To be sure, a
plaintiff need not adduce direct evidence such as a chatroom
transcript for each and every defendant named.  

Plaintiffs argue that, at the motion to dismiss stage, they need
not allege specific conduct by each defendant, but rather need only
plausibly allege each defendant's involvement in a conspiracy.  

Here, even if Plaintiffs have alleged the plausible existence of an
antitrust conspiracy a question the Court does not reach they have
not alleged anything that would plausibly suggest that the
particular defendants named in this suit were part of that
conspiracy.  Indeed, the complaint contains almost no
individualized allegations at all.

Consider first the only allegation Plaintiffs characterize as
direct evidence of a conspiracy: that an unnamed entity is
participating in a government leniency program in connection with
the COFECE investigation into the MGB market. The unnamed entity's
cooperation with government investigators, Plaintiffs argue, is
direct evidence of the conspiracy because a precondition of
acceptance into the Mexican government's program is the
cooperator's membership in a cartel. But even if the Court were to
indulge the inferential leap from cooperation to culpability,
Plaintiffs fail to allege which, if any, of the Defendants is the
beneficiary of the leniency program. And even if one Defendant's
participation in the program suggested that Defendant's
culpability, that allegation would not, without more, be direct
evidence of a conspiracy implicating the fifty-one other
institutional defendants, or the unnamed individual defendants.

In the absence of direct evidence, Plaintiffs are left to rely on
allegations of circumstantial evidence. But here, again, Plaintiffs
have failed to articulate a link between their allegations and the
specific defendants named in the complaint. Plaintiffs characterize
their statistical analyses as evidence of parallel conduct in
bidding and bid-ask quoting. As Defendants rightfully emphasize,
though, the statistical analyses proffered by Plaintiffs are simply
group pleading in another form. Some of Plantiffs' statistical
analyses do not distinguish between Defendants and non-defendant
auction participants at all. Those that do distinguish rely on
averages and medians among the market makers that obscure any given
Defendant's contribution to an observed trend.

It is far from clear that an ongoing government investigation
involving Defendants would, in the absence of more substantial
allegations, weigh in favor of the complaint's plausibility.  But
the Court need not decide whether the allegations of ongoing
government investigations carry any water in alleging a plausible
antitrust conspiracy, because the reports cited by Plaintiffs state
nothing about wrongdoing on behalf of Defendants here. And, even if
the Court were to credit the investigations as a plus factor
supporting the involvement of certain Defendants in an antitrust
conspiracy, plus factors in the absence of parallel conduct or
direct evidence are insufficient to state an antitrust claim.

For the same reason, the allegations that the Defendants shared a
common motive to conspire, which would, at best, constitute a plus
factor, fail to move the needle. Similarly unavailing is
Plaintiffs' allegation that the horizontal mobility of employees
among Defendants constitutes a plus factor because it fostered a
professional and social network that afforded Defendants the
opportunity to conspire.

Because Plaintiffs' group pleading is fatal to their Sherman Act
claims, the Court declines to reach the myriad other issues raised
by Defendants.

Unjust Enrichment Claims

Finally, Defendants argue that to the extent the antitrust claims
have been found lacking, so too must the unjust enrichment claims.
Plaintiffs do not seriously contest this principle's application
here. Though they assert that the elements of an unjust enrichment
claim and an antitrust claim are not coextensive, the difference
they identify (that Plaintiffs need not be efficient enforcers to
prevail on their unjust enrichment claim) is not the basis of this
dismissal and is therefore inapposite. Dismissal of the Sherman Act
claims compels dismissal of the unjust enrichment claims as well.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim is GRANTED.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Ruling
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxsqrsl3 from
Leagle.com.

Oklahoma Firefighters Pension & Retirement System, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated & Electrical Workers
Pension Fund Local 103, I.B.E.W., on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Carl
Hammarskjold  - chammarskjold@bermantabacco.com  - Berman Tabacco,
Christian Levis - clevis@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Colleen
Cleary - ccleary@bermantabacco.com - Berman Tabacco, Geoffrey
Milbank Horn - ghorn@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg P.C., Patrick
Thomas Egan - pegan@bermantabacco.com - Berman DeValerio, Raymond
Peter Girnys - rgirnys@lowey.com Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., Roland
Raymond St. Louis, III - rstlouis@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg
P.C., Todd Seaver - tseaver@bermantabacco.com - Berman Tabacco &
Vincent Briganti - vbriganti@lowey.com - Lowey Dannenberg P.C.

Banco Santander S.A., Santander Investment Securities, Inc.,
Santander Holdings USA, Inc., Banco Santander (Mexico) S.A.
Institucion de Banca Multiple, Grupo Financiero Santander Mexico &
Santander Investment Bolsa, Sociedad De Valores, S.A.U.,
Defendants, represented by Alan Schoenfeld
-ALAN.SCHOENFELD@WILMERHALE.COM - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &
Dorr LLP & Steven Franklin Cherry  - STEVEN.CHERRY@WILMERHALE.COM -
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, L.L.P.

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., BBVA Securities, Inc., BBVA
Compass Bancshares, Inc., BBVA Bancomer S.A., Institucion de Banca
Multiple, Grupo Financiero BBVA Bancomer & Grupo Financiero BBVA
Bancomer, S.A. de C.V., Defendants, represented by Adam Gabor Mehes
- adam.mehes@davispolk.com - Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Arthur J.
Burke  - arthur.burke@davispolk.com - Davis Polk & Wardwell & Paul
Steel Mishkin -
paul.mishkin@davispolk.com - Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.


BLU PRODUCTS: Court Grants Class Certification in Martinez Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Darren Martinez, et al., the
Plaintiffs, v. Blu Products, Inc., et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-02507-GW-AGR (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge George H. Wu
entered an order on Oct. 3, 2019, granting Plaintiff's motion for
class certification.

According to the Civil Minutes – General, the Court set a status
conference for November 14, 2019 at 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff's proposed
order is to be filed by November 7.

Having concluded that Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated the
requirements for certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rules 23(a) and
23(b)(3), the Court will grant the motion at this time, unless
Plaintiffs wish to engage in further effort to convince the Court
that certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) in addition to,
or instead of, certification under Rule 23(b)(3).

As reported by Class Action Reporter, Darren Martinez and Joe
Mocnik asked the Court to certify a nationwide class, and a
California subclass, of consumers who purchased one or more
cellular phones branded by Blu Products, Inc. and containing
firmware and applications developed and distributed by Defendant
Shanghai Adups Technology Co., Ltd.

The Plaintiffs also asked the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and appoint The Hinton Law Firm and The Rosen Law
Firm, P.A. as class counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2450
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 785-2610
          Facsimile: (213) 226-4684
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

               - and -

          Christopher S. Hinton, Esq.
          THE HINTON LAW FIRM
          275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (646) 723-3377
          Facsimile: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: chinton@hintonlegal.com


BRASKEM SA: Boilermaker-Blacksmith Class Suit Concluded
-------------------------------------------------------
Braskem S.A. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 8, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, that the the case, In re
Braskem, S.A. Securities Litigation, No. 15-cv-5132, led by
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust has been concluded.

In July 2015, two putative class action lawsuits were filed against
the company and certain of its then-current and former officers and
directors, or the Defendants, in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, or the U.S. Court.  

In those lawsuits that were subsequently consolidated under the
caption In re Braskem, S.A. Securities Litigation, No. 15-cv-5132,
the Lead Plaintiff, Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust,
alleged that the Defendants made misrepresentations or omissions
that inflated the price of the Company's stock in violation of U.S.
securities laws.

After the decision on the motion to dismiss filed by the Company,
partially granting its arguments, the Company and the Lead
Plaintiff signed the proposed settlement agreement ("Proposed
Settlement"), which was ratified by the applicable Court, which
issued a final decision ending all claims from all members of the
class of Investors.

The company made no admission of any wrongdoing or liability as
part of the settlement.

Under the terms of the Proposed Settlement, Braskem paid US$10
million (approximately R$31.7 million) to resolve all claims
arising out of or relating to the subject matter of the class
action of a settlement class consisting of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired a legal or beneficial ownership
interest in Braskem American Depositary Receipts between July 15,
2010 and March 11, 2015, inclusive. The amount of the agreement was
deposited by Braskem in the account designated by the judge
("Escrow Account") on October 2, 2017.

On February 21, 2018, a hearing was held in which a decision was
handed down for the final approval of the agreement regarding the
entire class of investors and the dismissal of the case. Said
decision became final and unappealable.

Braskem said, "The individual distribution of the amount of the
agreement is the responsibility of the manager of the Escrow
Account, as determined by the Court and in accordance with the
ratified allocation plan. The Proposed Settlement was signed solely
to avoid the risk, uncertainty, and expense of further litigation
and does represent the admission of any wrongdoing or liability by
Braskem."

Braskem S.A. is a Brazilian petrochemical company headquartered in
Sao Paulo. The company is the largest petrochemical company in
Latin America and has become a major player in the international
petrochemical market, 8th largest resin producer worldwide.


CABLEVISION SYSTEMS: Certification of Settlement Class Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JURTREAU VILLEGAS, PATRICK
SCHIANO and WILLIAM GILBERT GARVIN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.  CABLEVISION
SYSTEMS NEW YORK CITY CORPORATION, CABLEVISION SYSTEMS CORPORATION,
CSC HOLDINGS, LLC, ALTICE USA, INC., and ALTICE TECHNICAL SERVICES
US CORP., the Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-05824-DLI-VMS (E.D.N.Y.),
the Plaintiffs move the Court for an order:

   1. granting final approval of the settlement reached by the
      parties in the action as embodied in their submitted
      Settlement Agreement;

   2. certifying settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil
      Procedure in connection with the settlement process:

      "all persons employed by any of the Defendants as an Outside
      Plant Technician and assigned to a depot in either Brooklyn
      or the Bronx between October 4, 2011 and December 10, 2018";

      and

   3. certifying settlement class under the Fair Labor Standards
      Act, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) in connection with the
      settlement process:

      "all persons employed by any of the Defendants as an Outside

      Plant Technician and assigned to a depot in either Brooklyn
      or the Bronx between October 4, 2014 and December 10, 2018".
      [CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Classes are:

          Christopher Q. Davis, Esq.
          Rachel M. Haskell, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF CHRISTOPHER Q. DAVIS, PLLC
          80 Broadway, Suite 703
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (646) 430-7930

CALIFORNIA: Settlement of Minors' Suit v. DHCS Gets Final Court OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Parties' Motion for Final
Approval of Proposed Class Settlement in the case captioned I.N., a
minor, by and through her mother and Guardian ad Litem, Zarinah F.,
and J.B., a minor, by and through his mother and Guardian ad Litem,
Alisa B., Plaintiffs, v. JENNIFER KENT, Director of the Department
of Health Care Services, and State of California DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH CARE SERVICES, Defendants, No. 18-03099 WHA. (N.D. Cal.)

In this putative class action under the Medicaid Act and other
federal statutes, the parties moved for final approval of a
proposed class settlement. Plaintiffs also moved for attorney's
fees and expenses. Defendants did not oppose.  

Suing through their parents, plaintiffs had significant physical
disabilities and received Medi-Cal benefits. Defendants DHCS and
DHCS Director Jennifer Kent authorized plaintiffs' receipt of
in-home nursing services as part of their Medi-Cal benefits.
Although plaintiffs required total assistance for all activities of
daily living, both plaintiffs received fewer hours of services than
defendants authorized. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants
placed the burden on them to navigate a complex system with little
to no support to obtain needed in-home nursing care.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that the claims,
issues, or defenses of a certified class  may be settled only with
the court's approval. When a proposed settlement agreement is
presented, the district court must perform two tasks: (1) direct
notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be
bound by the proposal, and (2) approve the settlement only after a
hearing and on finding that the terms of the agreement are fair,
reasonable, and adequate. The parties' proposed settlement
agreement satisfies these requirements, as follows.

Adequacy of Notice

The notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.
It must also describe the terms of the settlement in sufficient
detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to
come forward and be heard. The undersigned judge previously
approved the form, content, and planned distribution of the class
notice. As described above, the notice plan has been fulfilled.
This order accordingly finds that notice to class members was
adequate.

Scope of Release

The proposed settlement agreement releases only the claims actually
asserted in this action. Individual named plaintiffs waive damages
claims. Furthermore, pursuant to the parties' September 13
stipulated request regarding the release of claims by unnamed class
members, the language in the settlement agreement stating class
members, forever and fully release any and all claims, either in
law or equity, set forth in the Complaint and First Amended
Complaint, does not preclude unnamed class members from seeking
monetary damages for the claims set forth in the complaint and
first amended complaint.

The stipulated request is GRANTED and echoing the findings of the
order granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement,
this order finds the scope of release is appropriately tailored and
is approved.

Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy of Proposed Settlement

A district court may approve a proposed class settlement only upon
finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate, taking into
account (1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case (2) the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation (3)
the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial
(4) the amount offered in settlement (5) the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and
view of counsel (7) the presence of a governmental participant  and
(8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.


First, the settlement terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate. The
class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented
the class. The parties reached the proposed settlement agreement
after extensive mediation efforts supervised by Magistrate Judge
Corley, including four in-person settlement conferences and
subsequent deliberations. Continuing forward in litigation would
not only impose risks and costs on plaintiffs and the class, but
would also delay the implementation of the parties' agreed-upon
remedies.

Second, plaintiffs have only sought injunctive relief. The proposed
settlement agreement provides, among other things, that defendants
will designate case management service providers for class members,
that class members will be able to contact defendants directly with
concerns regarding the nursing or services they receive, and that
class counsel will monitor defendants' implementation of the
agreement, which all address the issues plaintiffs sought to
resolve in the initial complaint. No class member has objected to
the settlement agreement.

Based on the foregoing the reasons and those mentioned in the order
granting preliminary approval of the proposed agreement, the final
approval of the proposed class settlement is GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that:

-- The notice of settlement, as well as the manner in which it was
sent to class members, fairly and adequately described the proposed
class settlement; was the best notice practicable under the
circumstances; was valid, due, and sufficient notice to class
members; and complied fully with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, due process, and all other applicable laws. A full and
fair opportunity has been afforded to class members to participate
in the proceedings convened to determine whether the proposed class
settlement should be given final approval.

-- The proposed class settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate
as to the class, plaintiffs, and defendants; that it is the product
of good faith, arms-length negotiations between the parties; and
that the settlement is consistent with public policy and complies
with all applicable provisions of law. The settlement is
accordingly APPROVED.

-- Having considered class counsel's motion for attorney's fees,
the Court awards class counsel attorney's fees of $420,954. Half of
this amount shall be paid now and the other half shall be paid when
all relief to the class hereunder has been implemented.

-- Class counsel shall also receive $14,046 as reimbursement for
their litigation expenses. Half of this amount shall be paid now
and the other half shall be paid when all relief to the class
hereunder has been implemented.

Judgment will be entered separately.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y36c6bs3 from Leagle.com.

I. N., a minor, by and through her mother and Guardian ad Litem,
Zarinah F. & J. B., a minor, by and through his mother and Guardian
ad Litem, Alisa B., Plaintiffs, represented by William Jordan
Leiner - william.leiner@disabilityrightsca.org - Disability Rights
California, Allen L. Lanstra - allen.lanstra@skadden.com - Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher and Flom LLP, Elissa Staci Gershon -
elissa.gershon@disabilityrightsca.org - Disability Rights
California, Maria Fernanda Iriarte
-maria.iriarte@disabilityrightsca.org - Disability Rights
California, Maria del Pilar Gonzalez Morales -
pilar.gonzalez@disabilityrightsca.org - Disability Rights
California, Martha Jane Perkins -perkins@healthlaw.org - National
Health Law Program, Rachael Tara Schiffman -
rachael.schiffman@skadden.com - SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER, FLOM
LLP, Rau Mona Tawatao - mtawatao@wclp.org - Western Center On Law
And Poverty, Richard Adam Schwartz - schwartz@bgrfirm.com - Browne
George Ross LLP, Robert Dexter Newman, Jr. - rnewman@wclp.org -
Western Center on Law & Poverty, Salma E. Enan
-salma.enan@disabilityrightsca.org - Disability Rights California &
Sarah Jane Somers -somers@healthlaw.org - National Health Law
Program, Inc.

Jennifer Kent, Director of the Department of Health Care Services &
State of California Department of Health Care Services, Defendants,
represented by Carolyn Ortler Tsai, Attorney General of State of
California, Hamsa M. Murthy, Office of the Attorney General of
California, Jennifer C. Addams, State Attorney General's Office,
Maryam Toossi Berona, California Department of Justice, Office of
the Attorney General, Samona Leigh Anne Taylor, Department of
Justice, Office of the Attorney General & Susan M. Carson, Office
of the Attorney General.

CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: Kanehl's Bid for Class Certification Stayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin grants the Plaintiff's
motion to stay further proceedings on the motion for class
certification in the lawsuit styled MARLENE KANEHL v. CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LP, Case No. 2:19-cv-01381-WED (E.D. Wisc.).

On September 20, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a class action
complaint.  At the same time, the Plaintiff filed what the court
commonly refers to as a "protective" motion for class
certification.  In this motion, the Plaintiff moved to certify the
class described in the complaint but also moved the Court to stay
further proceedings on that motion.

In Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011),
the court suggested that class-action plaintiffs "move to certify
the class at the same time that they file their complaint."  "The
pendency of that motion protects a putative class from attempts to
buy off the named plaintiffs."  However, because parties are
generally unprepared to proceed with a motion for class
certification at the beginning of a case, the Damasco court
suggested that the parties "ask the district court to delay its
ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation."

Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiff's motion to stay
further proceedings on the motion for class certification.  The
parties are relieved from the automatic briefing schedule set forth
in Civil Local Rule 7(b) and (c).

Moreover, Judge Duffin notes, for administrative purposes, it is
necessary that the Clerk terminate the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  However, this motion will be regarded as pending to
serve its protective purpose under Damasco.[CC]


CARDINAL HEALTH: Nguyen Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Cardinal Health, Inc. and Cardinal Health Pharmacy
Services, LLC, removed on Sept. 24, 2019, the action captioned
NANCY NGUYEN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; CARDINAL HEALTH, INC., an Ohio
Corporation; 504 CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY SERVICES, an unknown
association; 504 CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY SERVICES d.b.a. CARDINAL
HEALTH, an unknown association; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Case
No. 34-2019-00263185-CU-OE-GDS, from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Sacramento to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-01939-KJM-EFB to
the proceeding.

On August 21, 2019, the Plaintiff commenced the action in the
Superior Court.  The Complaint asserts six causes of action against
the Defendants: (1) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (2) Meal Period
Violations; (3) Rest Period Violations; (4) Wage Statement
Violations; (5) Waiting Time Penalties; and (6) Unfair
Competition.[BN]

Defendants CARDINAL HEALTH, INC. and CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY
SERVICES, LLC, are represented by:

          Lois M. Kosch, Esq.
          Theresa M. Wynne, Esq.
          WILSON TURNER KOSMO LLP
          402 West Broadway, Suite 1600
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 236-9600
          Facsimile: (619) 236-9669
          E-mail: lkosch@wilsonturnerkosmo.com
                  twynne@wilsonturnerkosmo.com


CARMAX INC: Wage & Hour Class Suits Continue in Calif.
------------------------------------------------------
CarMax, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 4, 2019, for the quarterly
period ended August 31, 2019, that the company continues to defend
wage-and-hour class action lawsuits in California.

CarMax entities are defendants in four proceedings asserting wage
and hour claims with respect to CarMax sales consultants and
non-exempt employees in California.

The asserted claims include failure to pay minimum wage, provide
meal periods and rest breaks, pay statutory/contractual wages,
reimburse for work-related expenses and provide accurate itemized
wage statements; unfair competition; and Private Attorney General
Act claims.

On September 4, 2015, Craig Weiss et al., v. CarMax Auto
Superstores California, LLC, and CarMax Auto Superstores West
Coast, Inc., a putative class action, was filed in the Superior
Court of California, County of Placer. The Weiss lawsuit seeks
civil penalties, fines, cost of suit, and the recovery of
attorneys' fees.

On June 29, 2016, Ryan Gomez et al. v. CarMax Auto Superstores
California, LLC, and CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., a
putative class action, was filed in the Superior Court of the State
of California, Los Angeles. The Gomez lawsuit seeks declaratory
relief, unspecified damages, restitution, statutory penalties,
interest, cost and attorneys' fees.

On October 31, 2017, Joshua Sabanovich v. CarMax Superstores
California, LLC et. al., a putative class action, was filed in the
Superior Court of California, County of Stanislaus. The Sabanovich
lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, restitution, statutory
penalties, interest, cost and attorneys' fees.  

On November 21, 2018, Derek Mcelhannon et al v. CarMax Auto
Superstores California, LLC and CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast,
Inc., a putative class action, was filed in Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda.

On February 1, 2019, the Mcelhannon lawsuit was removed to the U.S.
District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco
Division. The lawsuit was remanded back to the Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda on June 4, 2019. The Mcelhannon
lawsuit seeks unspecified damages, restitution, statutory and/or
civil penalties, interest, cost and attorneys' fees.  

CarMax said, "Based upon our evaluation of information currently
available, we believe that the ultimate resolution of the foregoing
proceedings will not have a material adverse effect, either
individually or in the aggregate, on our financial condition,
results of operations or cash flows."

CarMax, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a retailer of
used vehicles in the United States. The company operates in two
segments, CarMax Sales Operations and CarMax Auto Finance. CarMax,
Inc. was founded in 1993 and is based in Richmond, Virginia.


CDA, INC: McKenzie Seeks to Certify Class in WARN Act Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DAVID MCKENZIE, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. CDA,
INC., the Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00213 (W.D.N.C.), the
Plaintiff moves the Court for an order granting Plaintiff's motion
for class certification.

As reported by Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit seeks to collect
unpaid wages and benefits for 60 calendar days pursuant to the
United States Worker Adjustment and Retaining Notification Act
("WARN Act") and to recover Plaintiff's unpaid commissions under
the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act ("PWA").

On April 10, 2019, Plaintiff and other employees employed by CDS
were notified of their termination which was to be effective less
than 60 days from the notice. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant laid
off approximately one hundred employees within a 30-day period,
which represents nearly all of Defendant's workforce, except for
some managers, a small packaging force that will be laid off on
April 30, 2019, and some inventory and shipping employees.

The Defendant CDA, Inc. is liable under the WARN Act for the
failure to provide Plaintiff and other similarly situated former
employees at least 60 days advance notice of their employment
losses, as required by the WARN Act, says the complaint.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Shawn J. Wanta, Esq.
          BAILLON THOME JOZWIAK & WANTA LLP
          100 South Fifth Street, Suite 1200
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 252-3570
          Facsimile: (612) 252-3571

               - and -

          Ann Groninger, Esq.
          COPELEY JOHNSON GRONINGER PLLC
          225 East Worthington Avenue
          Charlotte, NC 28203
          Telephone: 704-200-2009
          Facsimile: (888) 412-0421

CENTENE MANAGEMENT: Fails to Pay Overtime Wage, Del Toro Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
AMANDA DEL TORO, DANIEL WERNER, JENNIFER MCGREGOR-HALSTEAD, JOSHUA
CHROMICK AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. CENTENE MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 4:19-cv-02635 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 25, 2019),
alleges that due to the Defendant's misclassification scheme, the
Plaintiffs and other employees were not paid all earned overtime
pay for time they worked in excess of 40 hours in individual
workweeks in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Centene Management is a wholly owned subsidiary of Centene
Corporation.  Centene Corporation, through its various managed care
organization subsidiaries, has contracted to provide managed care
services to a nationwide group of over 14 million
government-sponsored health plan enrollees across the country.
Centene Corporation primarily conducts business through its various
Subsidiaries, which contract with federal and state agencies to
provide managed care services for Medicaid and Medicare plans in
their respective states ("MC Agreements").

The Subsidiaries, including the Defendant, contract with Defendant
to provide the managed care services to government sponsored health
plan enrollees required under the applicable MC Agreement.  The
Defendant employed the Plaintiffs and other individuals to perform
utilization review and case management functions under various "job
titles" in its "Clinical & Nursing" job family (collectively, "Care
Management Employees").[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Russell C. Riggan, Esq.
          Samuel W. Moore, Esq.
          RIGGAN LAW FIRM LLC
          130 West Monroe Avenue
          Kirkwood, MO 63122
          Telephone: (314) 835-9100
          Facsimile: (314) 735-1054
          E-mail: russ@rigganlawfirm.com
                  smoore@rigganlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Maureen A. Salas, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 419-1008
          E-mail: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                  msalas@flsalaw.com

               - and -

          Travis M. Hedgpeth, Esq.
          THE HEDGPETH LAW FIRM, PC
          3050 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 510
          Houston, TX 77056
          Telephone: (281) 572-0727
          Facsimile: (281) 572-0728
          E-mail: travis@hedgpethlaw.com

               - and -

          Jack Siegel, Esq.
          SIEGEL LAW GROUP PLLC
          2820 McKinnon, Suite 5009
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 790-4454
          E-mail: jack@siegellawgroup.biz


CHECKERS DRIVE-IN: Medgebow Suit Settlement Gets Final Ct. Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOEL MEDGEBOW, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CHECKERS DRIVE-IN
RESTAURANCTS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-80090-BLOOM/Reinhart
(S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida granted the Plaintiff's (i)
Application for Service Award, Attorneys' Fees, and Costs, and (ii)
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Settlement.

On May 28, 2019, the Court granted preliminary approval to the
proposed class action settlement set forth in the Stipulation and
Settlement Agreement between the Parties.  It also provisionally
certified the Settlement Class for settlement purposes, approved
the procedure for giving Class Notice to the Settlement Class
Members, and set a Final Approval Hearing to take place on Sept.
17, 2019.

On Sept. 17, 2019, the Court held a duly noticed Final Approval
Hearing. Judge Bloom finds that the prerequisites for a class
action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been satisfied for settlement purposes for each Settlement Class
Member.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she
finally certified the Settlement Class, as identified in the
Settlement Agreement: All persons in the United States (i)
identified in the Settlement Class List (ii) who between Jan. 28,
2018 and May 28, 2019, attempted to unsubscribe from receiving text
messages from Checkers' short code 88001, by texting "stop,"
"cancel," "unsubscribe," "end," "quit," "optout," "opt out,"
"remove," "cancelar," "arret," or "arrette" (or any variation
thereof) and were subsequently sent text message advertisements or
promotions from Checkers to their cellular telephone and did not
re-subscribe to receive text messages.

She also finally (i) appointed attorneys Seth Lehrman of Edwards
Pottinger, LLC and Joshua Eggnatz and Michael Pascucci of Eggnatz
Pascucci, P.A. as the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; and
(ii) designated Plaintiff Medgebow as the Class Representative.

The Settlement Agreement is finally approved in all respects as
fair, reasonable and adequate.  The Parties are directed to
implement it according to its terms and provisions.  The Settlement
Administrator is directed to provide Claim Settlement Payments to
those Settlement Class Members who submit valid, timely, and
complete Claims.

The Judge approved the Class Counsel's request for attorney fees in
the amount of $1,038,555.55, plus costs in the amount of $3,708.97.
The Settlement Administrator will pay Class Counsel the total
amount of $1,042,264.52 as reasonable attorneys' fees, inclusive of
the award of reasonable costs incurred in this Action.  The award
of attorneys' fees and costs to the Class Counsel will be paid out
of the Settlement Fund within the time period and manner set forth
in the Settlement Agreement.

The Judge awarded a Service Award in the amount of $5,000 to
Plaintiff Medgebow payable pursuant to the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

Finally, she dismissed the Litigation, including all individual
claims and class claims presented therein, on the merits and with
prejudice against the Plaintiff and all the other Settlement Class
Members, without fees or costs to any party except as otherwise
provided in the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/nmhrER from Leagle.com.

Joel Medgebow, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michael James Pascucci --
MPascucci@JusticeEarned.com -- Eggnatz Pascucci, P.A., Seth
Michael
Lehrman -- seth@epllc.com -- Edwards Pottinger, LLC & Joshua
Harris
Eggnatz -- JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com -- Eggnatz Pascucci, P.A.

Checkers Drive-In Restaurants Inc, Defendant, represented by
Anthony Peter Strasius -- anthony.strasius@wilsonelser.com --
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker & David S. Almeida --
dalmeida@beneschlaw.com -- Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff,
LLP, pro hac vice.


COMCAST CORPORATION: Baker Sues over Unilateral Price Increase
--------------------------------------------------------------
BRIAN BAKER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COMCAST CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-00652-HCN (Utah Dist., 3rd Judicial, Salt Lake Cty., Sept.
13, 2019) is an action against the Defendant for unilaterally
increasing monthly charges or fees in violation of their
agreement.

According to the complaint, the Defendant offered a lifetime plan
to the Plaintiff promising no increase of fees. The Plaintiff
accepted an offer of a lifetime contract for a lifetime price.
However, the Defendant began to renege on the lifetime contract and
unilaterally increase prices. Upon seeing the substantial increase
in monthly billing, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant and was
told that the Defendant's lifetime plan does not exist in spite of
the previous representations by its sales staff and in spite of the
numerous written contracts with the lifetime language prominently
displayed.

Comcast Corporation provides media and television broadcasting
services. The Company offers video streaming, television
programming, high-speed Internet, cable television, and
communication services. Comcast serves customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Gonnelli, Esq.
          THE SULTZER LAW GROUP P.C.
          280 Highway 35, Suite 304
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Telephone: (845) 483-7100
          Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
          E-mail: gonnellia@thesultzerlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Brent R. Baker, Esq.
          Christopher B. Snow, Esq.
          CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
          201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216
          Telephone: (801) 322-2516
          Facsimile: (801) 521-6280
          E-mail: brb@clydesnow.com
                  cbs@clydesnow.com


COOK COUNTY, IL: Court Denies Class Cert. Bid in McFields Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable John Robert Blakey denies the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification in the lawsuit captioned Courtney McFields, et
al. v. Sheriff of Cook County, et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-07424 (N.D.
Ill.).

According to the Court's Docket Entry, for the reasons explained in
the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court denies the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.[CC]


CVS HEALTH: Removes Opioid Case to District of Delaware
-------------------------------------------------------
CVS Health Corporation removed a class action lawsuit filed against
Purdue Pharma L.P. et al., (Filed Oct. 3, 2018), from the Superior
Court of the State of Delaware to the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware on Sept. 17, 2019. The District of
Delaware Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-01749-UNA to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiffs bring claims for violations of the Delaware Consumer
Fraud Act for deceptive acts or practices, fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation relating to prescription opioid medications.

The case is captioned as CITY OF DOVER, a municipal corporation of
the State of Delaware, CITY OF SEAFORD, a municipal corporation of
the State of Delaware, and KENT COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Delaware, the Plaintiffs, vs. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.;
PURDUE PHARMA INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC. ; RHODES
PHARMACEUTICALS, L.P.; ABBOTT LABORATORIES; ABBOTT LABORATORIES,
INC. ; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON &
JOHNSON; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. ; ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICA, INC. N/K/A JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ENDO
HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC.; ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; ALLERGAN PLC
F/K/A ACTAVIS PLC; ACTAVIS, INC. F/K/A WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC.; WATSON LABORATORIES, INC.; ACTAVIS LLC; ACTAVIS PHARMA, INC.
F/K/A WATSON PHARMA, INC.; MALLINCKRODT PLC; MALLINCKRODT LLC;
INSYS THERAPEUTICS, INC.; MYLAN PI-IARMACEUTICALS, INC. ; ASSERTIO
THERAPEUTICS, INC., F/K/A DEPOMED, INC.; MCKESSON CORPORATION;
CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.; AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION; ANDA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; H.D SMITH, LLC; CVS HEALTH CORPORATION; RITE
AID CORPORATION; WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE, INC.; RICHARD SACKLER;
THERESA SACKLER; KATHE SACKLER; JONATHAN SACKLER; MORTIMER D.A.
SACKLER; BEVERLY SACKLER; DAVID SACKLER; ILENE SACKLER LEFCOURT,
the Defendants.

Purdue Pharma L.P. is a privately held pharmaceutical company owned
principally by descendants of Mortimer and Raymond Sackler. In
2007, it paid out one of the largest fines ever levied against a
pharmaceutical firm for mislabeling its product OxyContin, and
three executives were found guilty of criminal charges. CVS Health
Corporation is an American healthcare company that owns CVS
Pharmacy, a retail pharmacy chain, CVS Caremark, a pharmacy
benefits manager, and Aetna, a health insurance provider, among
other brands, headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island.[BN]

Attorneys for CVS Health are:

          Richard S. Cobb, Esq.
          James S. Green Jr., Esq.
          LANDIS RATH & COBB LLP
          919 N. Market St., Suite 1800
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 467 4400
          E-mail: cobb@lrclaw.com
                  green@lrclaw.com

               - and -

          Conor B. O'Croinin, Esq.
          J. Michael Pardoe, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
          100 East Pratt Street, Suite 2440
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 332 0444

DAKOTA OF ROCKY HILL: Ct. Denies Class Cert. Bid in McDougle Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
issued a Ruling denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
in the case captioned THOMAS McDOUGLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
DAKOTA OF ROCKY HILL, LLC, Defendant. No. 3:17-cv-00245 (SRU). (D.
Conn.)

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification pursuant to
29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

McDougle and Taylor claim that Dakota violated Connecticut and
federal law by failing to satisfy the Fair Labor Standards Act's
(FLSA) Tip Credit notice requirement. Specifically, the Plaintiffs
allege that Dakota violated Section 203(m) of the FLSA by taking a
tip credit against its servers' wages from February 2014 to the
present without providing sufficient notice.

Standard of Review

Under the FLSA, a collective action for unpaid wages may be
maintained by any one or more employees for and on behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.
Conditional certification is appropriate if a plaintiff makes a
factual showing that they and potential opt-in plaintiffs together
were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.

District courts in this circuit have undertaken a two-stage inquiry
in deciding whether notice should be issued. First, the court must
determine whether the proposed class members are similarly
situated. For the first step in the inquiry, before discovery is
conducted, a class representative has only a minimal burden to show
that he is similarly situated to the potential class, which
requires a modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that
they and the potential class members together were victims of a
common policy or plan that violated the law.

During the second step, which follows the discovery phase, a court
examines all the evidence then in the record to determine whether
there is a sufficient basis to conclude that the proposed class
members are similarly situated. At step two, with the benefit of
additional factual development, the district court determines
whether the collective action may go forward by determining whether
the opt-in plaintiffs are in fact similarly situated to the named
plaintiffs.

Tip Notice Requirement

The crux of the Plaintiffs' complaint is that servers at Dakota
were not notified of the tip credit provisions of Section 203(m).
Dakota admitted through sworn testimony that it failed to notify
any Server of the tip credit provisions in any way during their
orientation prior to February 2017 when the Plaintiffs filed this
lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs assert that all Dakota servers employed from
February 2014 through February 2017 received the same orientation,
which included distribution of Dakota's Tip Reporting Policy and
New Hire Authorization forms. Those forms, the Plaintiffs contend,
failed to notify servers that Dakota would take a tip credit
against their wages by paying them the Connecticut sever wage
instead of the full federal minimum wage.

In addition, the Plaintiffs argue that the posters displayed inside
the restaurant are inadequate. Dakota's federal wage poster only
states that an employer may accept the tip credit when certain
other conditions are met' and does not describe what those
conditions are. The poster does not notify Dakota Servers of the
amount claimed by the employer as a tip credit.

In response, Dakota argues that the Plaintiffs have no viable FLSA
claims because all servers at Dakota received multiple forms of
written and oral notice of its tip credit policy. Dakota notes that
the FLSA statute and DOL regulation only requires employers to
inform its employees of the tip notice requirements, as opposed to
explaining them. Under the plain language of the regulation, Dakota
asserts that employers do not have to engage in an exhaustive
effort or any effort at all to explain any of these concepts and
employees do not even have to understand any of the requirements.

In this case, Dakota contends that it has adequately informed its
servers of the tip notice requirement through its internal polices
and labor posters.

First, Dakota states that restaurant general manager Joy Benzing
(Benzing) told servers about their compensation during orientation.
Specifically, she indicated that servers would be paid the
Connecticut server minimum plus tips. Dakota asserts that Benzing's
approach is an explanation in understandable plain English of what
the tip credit is and how it applies to the servers. It is far
easier for a layperson, who never went to law school, to understand
[Benzing's] explanation of the tip credit than the actual wording
of Section 3(m).

Secondly, Dakota notes that its orientation documents clearly
describe how its servers are paid. For example, Dakota cites
Taylor's deposition, where she admits filling out a New Hire
Authorization Form during her orientation and writing down her
hourly wage of $5.78 an hour.

After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that Dakota
adequately informed its servers of the five provisions of the tip
notice requirement provided in 29 C.F.R. Section 531.59(b). The
FLSA was implemented to ensure that restaurant servers like
McDougle and Taylor would receive fair compensation for their
labor. In this case, it is undisputed that both named Plaintiffs
made well above the federal minimum wage of $7.25. For example, the
lowest hourly wage that Taylor earned in one week was $17.90 an
hour. Similarly, McDougle's lowest hourly wage rate was $17.48 an
hour.

The Court concludes that Dakota informed its servers of the tip
notice provisions outlined in 29 C.F.R. Section 531.59(b).

Because Dakota has satisfied the tip notice requirement, the
Plaintiffs' claims fail on the merits. Therefore, the question
whether Dakota servers are similarly situated for purposes of class
certification is moot.

The Court denies the Plaintiffs' motion for conditional class
certification because the plaintiffs' claims do not succeed on the
merits.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Ruling
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y3q7xp26 from Leagle.com.

Thomas T. McDougle & Rosemarie Taylor, for themselves and other
similarly situated employees, Plaintiffs, represented by Raymond
Dinsmore, Dinsmore Stark, pro hac vice, Richard Eugene Hayber,
Hayber, McKenna & Dinsemore, LLC, Lori Ann Knuth, The Hayber Law
Firm LLC, Michael T. Petela, Jr., Hayber, McKenna & Dinsmore, LLC &
Thomas J. Durkin, The Hayber Law Firm, LLC

Dakota of Rocky Hill, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alexa M.
Farmer -
Alexa.Farmer@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis - P.C., Allison P.
Dearington -
Allison.Dearington@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis - P.C. & David
R. Golder -
David.Golder@jacksonlewis.com - Jackson Lewis - P.C.
Siegel, O'Connor, O'Donnell & Beck, P.C., Movant, represented by
Michael John Spagnola  - mspagnola@siegeloconnor.com - Siegel,
O'Connor, O'Donnell & Beck, P.C.


DAKOTA PLAINS: Court Certifies Class in Gruber Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JON D. GRUBER, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RYAN R. GILBERTSON, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 16cv9727 (S.D. N.Y.), Judge William H.
Pauley, III of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted Gruber's motion to certify a class and subclass,
appoint himself as the Lead Plaintiff, and appoint Cera LLP as the
class counsel.

The crux of the putative securities fraud class action relates to
the alleged securities fraud committed by various stakeholders of
Dakota Plains.  Gilbertson and Michael Reger -- with the help of
various insiders -- allegedly executed a multi-faceted scheme to
manipulate the stock of Dakota Plains, all while concealing that
they had amassed large equity stakes in the Company.  To execute
the scheme, they embedded a provision in the Company's promissory
notes that triggered an "additional payment" to noteholders if the
Company's average stock price exceeded a nominal figure during the
first 20 days its stock was publicly traded.  

To trigger that provision, they allegedly worked to inflate the
value of the Company's publicly traded stock. One way in which they
sought to inflate the stock price was by convincing the Company's
management to approve a reverse merger between the Company and a
defunct shell company.  Ultimately, the stock price jumped
significantly within the first 20 days of trading, activating the
additional payment provision and giving Reger and Gilbertson
millions more Dakota Plains shares.  They then unloaded their stock
at inflated prices.

Now, Gruber, who purchased stock between February 2013 and December
2014, seeks to certify (1) a class of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Dakota Plains common stock during the period
March 23, 2012 through Aug. 16, 2016  and were damaged thereby, and
(2) a subclass of investors who purchased Dakota Plains stock
contemporaneously with certain Defendants and were damaged
thereby.

Rule 23(a) imposes four requirements for class certification: (1)
numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) that the
representative party can "fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class."  Judge Pauley finds that Gruber has met
these requirements.  First, Gruber sufficiently demonstrated
numerosity.  Second, commonality is satisfied because the class
proceeding will generate common answers to several key questions,
including whether the Defendants engaged in deceptive conduct and
omitted the disclosure of material facts, whether there was
scienter, and whether insider trading occurred.  Third, typicality
is satisfied because Gruber and any class members who purchased
during the first 20 days will make similar legal arguments to prove
the Defendant's liability, irrespective of minor variations in the
fact patterns underlying the individual claims.  Finally, with
respect to class counsel's qualifications, it is clear Cera LLP is
qualified.

Gruber must also satisfy the requirements set forth under Rule
23(b).  Gruber argues that, in satisfaction of Rule 23(b)(3),
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only class members, making the class action
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

The Judge finds that because materiality is judged according to an
objective standard, the materiality of the Defendant's alleged
misrepresentations and omissions is a question common to all
members of the class.  And because one or more of the central
issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to
predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule
23(b)(3) even though other important matters may have to be tried
separately, such as damages.  But in any event, common issues
predominate with respect to damages.  As for superiority, the
Defendants do not address the superiority requirement in their
briefs and therefore concede it.  In any event, a class action is
the best method for litigating the case.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Pauley granted Gruber's motion.
He certified (1) a class of investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired Dakota Plains Holdings, Inc.'s common stock during the
period March 23, 2012 through Aug. 16, 2016, and (2) a subclass of
investors who purchased Company stock contemporaneously with the
Defendants.   In addition, he appointed (i) Gruber as the Lead
Plaintiff, and (ii) Cera LLP as class the counsel.

The parties are directed to appear for a status teleconference on
Oct. 18, 2019 at 11:00 a.m.  The counsel for the Plaintiffs is
directed to circulate dial-in information before the call.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/2eqsp7 from Leagle.com.

Jon D. Gruber, Plaintiff, represented by Louis Andrew Kessler --
lkessler@cerallp.com -- Cera LLP.

Jon D. Gruber, Plaintiff, represented by Solomon B. Cera --
scera@cerallp.com -- Gold Bennett Cera & Sidener, LLP & Jeffrey
Simon Abraham -- jabraham@aftlaw.com -- Abraham Fruchter & Twersky
LLP.

Steven Deardeuff, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A..

Jon D. & Linda W. Gruber Trust, Plaintiff, represented by Louis
Andrew Kessler, Cera LLP, Solomon B. Cera, Gold Bennett Cera &
Sidener, LLP & Jeffrey Simon Abraham, Abraham Fruchter & Twersky
LLP.

Nibahoo Malhotra, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim, The Rosen
Law Firm P.A..

Craig M McKenzie, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel --
gershelb@ballardspahr.com -- Ballard Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth
Proczko -- cproczko@lindquist.com -- Lindquist & Vennum LLP, Karl
Jon Breyer -- jbreyer@lindquist.com -- Lindquist & Vennum LLP &
Marjorie Joan Peerce -- peercem@ballardspahr.com -- Ballard Spahr
LLP.

Timothy R. Brady, Defendant, represented by Carrie Baker Anderson,
Allen & Overy, LLP, Ranelle A. Leier -- rleier@foxrothschild.com -
- Fox Rothschild LLP & Oksana Gaussy Wright --
owright@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild, LLP.

Gabriel G Claypool, Defendant, represented by Victoria Peng --
victoria.peng@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Jane
E. Dudzinski -- jane.dudzinski@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP & Kenneth Michael Kliebard --
kenneth.kliebard@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

Michael L. Reger, Defendant, represented by David Anthony Scheffel
-- scheffel.david@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, James K.
Langdon -- langdon.jim@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP &
Michael E. Rowe, III -- rowe.michael@dorsey.com -- Dorsey &
Whitney LLP.

Terry H. Rust, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel, Ballard
Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,
Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan Peerce,
Ballard Spahr LLP.

Paul M. Cownie, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel, Ballard
Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,
Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan Peerce,
Ballard Spahr LLP.

David J. Fellon, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel,
Ballard Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum
LLP, Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan
Peerce, Ballard Spahr LLP.

Gary L. Alvord, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel, Ballard
Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,
Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan Peerce,
Ballard Spahr LLP.

James L. Thornton, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel,
Ballard Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum
LLP, Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan
Peerce, Ballard Spahr LLP.

Ryan R. Gilbertson, Defendant, represented by Troy J. Hutchinson -
- thutchinson@hutchinson-legal.com -- Rock Hutchinson, PLLP.


DAKOTA PLAINS: Court Denies Bids to Dismiss Gruber Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JON D. GRUBER, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. RYAN R. GILBERTSON,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 16cv9727 (S.D. N.Y.), Judge William H.
Pauley, III of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York:

    (i) granted the Nominee Defendants' motions to dismiss;

   (ii) granted in part and denied in part Defendant Ryan
        Gilbertson's motion to dismiss;

  (iii) denied Defendant Michael Reger's motion to dismiss; and

   (iv) granted in part and denied in part Reger's motion to
        strike certain portions of the Complaint.

In a previous Opinion & Order dated March 20, 2018, the New York
District Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  Specifically, the
Court dismissed the Section 20A claim against Ryan Gilbertson for
failure to properly allege contemporaneousness between Gilbertson
and Gruber's trades, but it denied the motion with respect to
Gruber's Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 20(a) claims.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery, culminating in a
Third Amended Class Action Complaint ("Complaint"), which asserts
several new claims.  First, it asserts new Section 20A claims
against Reger, as well as family members of Gilbertson and Reger --
namely, Nominee Defendants Jessica Gilbertson, Weldon Gilbertson,
James Randall Reger, Joseph Reger, and Kellie Tasto.  Second, it
reasserts a Section 20A claim and adds a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") claim against Gilbertson.
Third, it asserts a Section 20A claim against Reger.

Plaintiff Gruber alleges that in an attempt to hide their
beneficial ownership of Dakota Plains, Gilbertson and Reger set up
"nominee accounts" in the Nominee Defendants' names.  Gilbertson
and Reger purportedly directed transactions from and made insider
sales to the Plaintiffs through these nominee accounts.

The Nominee Defendants, Gilbertson, and Reger move to dismiss these
new claims.  In addition, Reger moves to strike certain portions of
the Complaint.  

The Nominee Defendants advance two arguments they claim warrant
dismissal.  First, they argue that Gruber's failure to assert a
Section 10(b) claim against them is per se fatal to his Section 20A
claim.  Second, they argue that Gruber fails to properly allege a
predicate violation under the misappropriation theory.

Reger argues that because he disgorged $6.5 million of his Dakota
Plains gains to the SEC with respect to his role in the scheme
underlying the action, Gruber's Section 20A claim against him must
fail.  

Gilbertson argues that the RICO claim should be dismissed because
(1) a civil RICO claim is impermissible where the underlying
racketeering activity sounds in securities fraud, and (2) Gruber
fails to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity or
the existence of an enterprise.

Judge Pauley finds that although Gruber argues on the motion that
the Nominee Defendants knowingly allowed Reger and Gilbertson to
hide their beneficial ownership from investors through the nominee
accounts, the Complaint is replete with allegations that Gilbertson
and Reger had complete control over the nominee accounts and that
the Nominee Defendants were not involved with any account activity
or trading.  For instance, Gruber alleges that Gilbertson or Reger
traded from each nominee account, and no allegations indicate that
a Nominee Defendant made a trade or received any proceeds from
trades.  Indeed, Gruber alleges that, by virtue of their control
over Dakota Plains, Gilbertson, Reger, and by extension the
Gilbertson Nominees and the Reger Nominees, were in possession of
material, non-public information about Dakota Plains at the time of
their selling Dakota Plains stock, and profited by $30 million
liquidating Dakota Plains stock during the class period.  But
Gruber fails to allege why or how this "extension" should be
assumed.

With respect to the RICO claim, Gruber avers that Gilbertson helmed
an enterprise created to enrich the members of the enterprise
and/or their immediate families using Dakota Plains cash and/or its
common stock.  While Gruber claims the enterprise operated from
2008 through 2015, his RICO allegations are hazy and lacking in
specificity.  In particular, Gruber does little to detail the
purported racketeering activity.  Rather, Gruber makes broad legal
conclusions, leaving it to the Court to scour his sprawling
158-page Complaint in search of a RICO claim.  However, the Judge
finds that Gruber adequately pled that there were contemporaneous
trades between Gilbertson and Gruber.   

Accordingly, the Section 20A claims against the Nominee Defendants
are dismissed, Gilbertson's motion to dismiss the Section 20A claim
against him is denied, and Reger's motion to dismiss the Section
20A claim is denied.

Reger moves under Rule 12(f) to strike portions of four paragraphs
in the Complaint which accuse him of fraudulent conduct at other
companies as "immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous."  Many of
these allegations, according to Reger, come from letters to the SEC
which accused Reger of wrongdoing at Dakota Plains similar to
perceived wrongdoing at the companies Voyager and Northern Oil &
Gas Inc. ("NOG").  Notably, Reger is currently an officer at NOG.

Gruber argues that Reger's conduct at other companies would have
been material for investors and, had Reger and Gilbertson disclosed
their ownership in Dakota Plains, investors would have been alerted
to the negative press they received regarding related-party
transactions made at Voyager and NOG.

Paragraph 10 of the Complaint alleges that Thomas Howells set up a
shell company to merge with Dakota Plains, like he purportedly did
with Voyager and NOG.  Paragraph 32 states that, had Reger
disclosed his beneficial ownership of Dakota Plains, investors
would have seen negative press related to Voyager and NOG.  It
further avers that these companies exhibited patterns of fraud
similar to what Reger and Gilbertson did at Dakota Plains.
Paragraph 49 summarizes a Dakota Plains letter to the SEC and a
shareholder's letter to the SEC.  Paragraph 178 summarizes a 2015
letter from two Dakota Plains shareholders to the SEC.

The Judge finds that because Paragraphs 49 and 178 stem from SEC
letters, they should be stricken.  However, Paragraphs 10 and 32
relate to news articles about Reger, Voyager, and NOG.
Accordingly, they are in the public domain and are not based on
confidential preliminary steps in litigations and administrative
proceedings.  Thus, the application to strike them is denied, the
Court holds.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Pauley (i) denied the Nominee
Defendants' motions to dismiss, (ii) denied Gilbertson's motion to
dismiss, (iii) denied Reger's motion to dismiss, and (iv) granted
in part Reger's motion to strike.  The Clerk of Court is directed
to terminate the Nominee Defendants from the docket, and to place
ECF No. 175 under seal.  Gruber is directed to file a redacted
version of the Complaint forthwith which strikes Paragraphs 49 and
178 but maintains the same paragraph enumeration as the unredacted
Complaint.  The Clerk of Court is further directed to terminate the
motions pending at ECF Nos. 189, 191, 194, and 206.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/2kShpm from Leagle.com.

Jon D. Gruber, Plaintiff, represented by Louis Andrew Kessler --
lkessler@cerallp.com -- Cera LLP.

Jon D. Gruber, Plaintiff, represented by Solomon B. Cera --
scera@cerallp.com -- Gold Bennett Cera & Sidener, LLP & Jeffrey
Simon Abraham -- jabraham@aftlaw.com -- Abraham Fruchter & Twersky
LLP.

Steven Deardeuff, Plaintiff, represented by Phillip C. Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm P.A..

Jon D. & Linda W. Gruber Trust, Plaintiff, represented by Louis
Andrew Kessler, Cera LLP, Solomon B. Cera, Gold Bennett Cera &
Sidener, LLP & Jeffrey Simon Abraham, Abraham Fruchter & Twersky
LLP.

Nibahoo Malhotra, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim, The Rosen
Law Firm P.A..

Craig M McKenzie, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel --
gershelb@ballardspahr.com -- Ballard Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth
Proczko -- cproczko@lindquist.com -- Lindquist & Vennum LLP, Karl
Jon Breyer -- jbreyer@lindquist.com -- Lindquist & Vennum LLP &
Marjorie Joan Peerce -- peercem@ballardspahr.com -- Ballard Spahr
LLP.

Timothy R. Brady, Defendant, represented by Carrie Baker Anderson,
Allen & Overy, LLP, Ranelle A. Leier -- rleier@foxrothschild.com -
- Fox Rothschild LLP & Oksana Gaussy Wright --
owright@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild, LLP.

Gabriel G Claypool, Defendant, represented by Victoria Peng --
victoria.peng@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Jane
E. Dudzinski -- jane.dudzinski@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP & Kenneth Michael Kliebard --
kenneth.kliebard@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

Michael L. Reger, Defendant, represented by David Anthony Scheffel
-- scheffel.david@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP, James K.
Langdon -- langdon.jim@dorsey.com -- Dorsey & Whitney LLP &
Michael E. Rowe, III -- rowe.michael@dorsey.com -- Dorsey &
Whitney LLP.

Terry H. Rust, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel, Ballard
Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,
Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan Peerce,
Ballard Spahr LLP.

Paul M. Cownie, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel, Ballard
Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,
Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan Peerce,
Ballard Spahr LLP.

David J. Fellon, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel,
Ballard Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum
LLP, Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan
Peerce, Ballard Spahr LLP.

Gary L. Alvord, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel, Ballard
Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum LLP,
Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan Peerce,
Ballard Spahr LLP.

James L. Thornton, Defendant, represented by Bradley Gershel,
Ballard Spahr LLP, Christopher Mcbeth Proczko, Lindquist & Vennum
LLP, Karl Jon Breyer, Lindquist & Vennum LLP & Marjorie Joan
Peerce, Ballard Spahr LLP.

Ryan R. Gilbertson, Defendant, represented by Troy J. Hutchinson -
- thutchinson@hutchinson-legal.com -- Rock Hutchinson, PLLP.


DOMINION DENTAL: Bradley Sues over Massive Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------
MARK BRADLEY, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly
situated, the Plaintiff, vs. DOMINION DENTAL SERVICES USA, INC.,
DOMINION DENTAL SERVICES, INC., CAPITAL ADVANTAGE INSURANCE
COMPANY, CAPITAL BLUECROSS, and PROVIDENCE HEALTH PLAN, the
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01199-LMB-TCB (E.D. Va., Sept. 17,
2019), alleges that Defendants failed to adequately investigate
security practices and measures in place at Dominion National
before entering into a contract for dental plan administration
services and providing protected information to Dominion National
would result in injury to Plaintiff and the Providence Health Plan
Subclass.

Dominion National provides insurance and administrates dental and
vision benefits offered by other insurers. Customers of Dominion
National and the insurers for whom Dominion National provides
benefits administration must provide sensitive personal, financial,
and medical information to obtain services, which Dominion National
retains in its databases.

According to the complaint, customers believe -- and expect -- that
Dominion National will take all necessary precautions to keep their
information safe from unauthorized third parties and malicious
actors.

In fact, Dominion National is legally and contractually obligated
to and promised its customers that it would implement and maintain
reasonable and adequate safeguards and comply with industry
standards in data security practices.

According to the complaint, Dominion National breached its
obligations to and contracts with the consumers it served. On June
21, 2019, Dominion National announced that it had suffered a
massive data breach: for nearly nine years, hackers accessed the
confidential personal information of nearly three million
individuals.

From August 2010 until April 2019, hackers exploited
vulnerabilities in Dominion National's security systems
specifically to access databases containing not only the sensitive
and confidential personal, financial and medical information of its
own current and former plan members, but also the members of plans
like Providence Health Plan, for which Dominion National provides
administrative services for dental and vision benefits, the lawsuit
says.

The Plaintiff and the Providence Health Plan Subclass members have
suffered actual damages and are entitled to monetary relief.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Class are:

          Bernard J. DiMuro, Esq.
          DIMUROGINSBERG, P.C.
          1101 King Street, Suite 610
          Alexandria, VA 23314
          Telephone: (703) 684-4333
          Facsimile: (703) 548-3181
          E-mail: bdimuro@dimuro.com

               - and -

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Rebecca Solomon, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: kstephens@touslev.com
                  jdennett@touslev.com
                  rsolomon@tousley.com

               - and -

          Walter D. Kelley, Jr., Esq.
          James Pizzirusso, Esq.
          HAUSFELD LLP
          1700 K Street NW, Suite 650
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 540-7200
          Facsimile: (202) 540-7201
          E-mail: wkelley@hausfeld.com
                  jpizzirusso@hausfeld.com

               - and -

          Andrew Friedman, Esq.
          Douglas J. McNamara, Esq.
          Karina Puttieva, Esq.
          Paul Whalen, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: afriedman@cohenmilstein.com
                  dmcnamara@cohenmilstein.com
                  kputtieva@cohenmilstein.com
                  pwhalen@cohenmilstein.com

DXC TECHNOLOGY: Constanzo Sues over 45% Drop in Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------
NEIL CONSTANZO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DXC TECHNOLOGY COMPANY; HEWLETT PACKARD
ENTERPRISE COMPANY; RISHI VARNA; TIMOTHY C. STONESIFER; JEREMY K.
COX; MUKESH AGHI; AMY E. ALVING; DAVID HERZOG; SACHIN LAWANDE; J.
MICHAEL LAWRIE; JULIO A. PORTALATIN; PETER RUTLAND; MANOJ P. SINGH;
MARGARET C. WHITMAN; and ROBERT F. WOODS, Defendants, Case No.
5:19-cv-05794-BLF (N.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2019) is a class action on
behalf of persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
DXC common stock pursuant and traceable to the registration
statement and prospectus, and additional materials incorporated by
reference, issued in connection with the April 2017 transaction by
which Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company ("HPE") enterprise
services segment was spun off and merged with Computer Sciences
Corporation, Inc. ("CSC") to form DXC (the "Merger"). Plaintiff
pursues claims against the Defendants under the Securities Act of
1933.

According to the complaint, on April 2017, HPE conducted the Merger
by spinning off its Enterprise Services segment, merging it with
CSC, and forming the company now known as DXC.

In connection with the Merger, DXC issued over 140 million shares
of DXC common stock to former CSC shareholders. Each share of CSC
common stock held immediately prior to the Merger was exchanged for
one share of DXC common stock. Through this exchange, former CSC
shareholders received 141,298,797 shares of DXC common stock,
representing 49.9% of outstanding DXC common shares. These DXC
shares were registered, issued, and solicited pursuant to the
Offering Materials.

The Registration Statement was false and misleading and omitted to
state material adverse facts. Specifically, the Defendants failed
to disclose to investors: (1) that the planned "workforce
optimization" plan involved implementing arbitrary quotas; (2) that
the plan would cut thousands of jobs at the Company; (3) that jobs
that were particularly at risk of being cut were held by
longer-tenured, knowledgeable, and highly compensated senior
personnel; (4) that these job terminations were selectively timed
to artificially inflate reported earnings and other financial
metrics; (5) that, at the time of the Merger, defendant Lawrie had
forecast plans for a $2.7 billion workforce reduction in the first
year; (6) that, as a result of these workforce terminations, the
Company was unlikely to deliver on client contracts; (7) that, as a
result of the foregoing, the Company's clients would be
dissatisfied and the relationships would be impaired; and (8) that,
as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about
the Company's business, operations, and prospects, were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

By the commencement of this action, DXC stock was trading as low as
$32.70 per share, a nearly 45% decline from the $59 price per share
at the time of the Merger.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

DXC Technology Company provides information technology services.
The Company offers analytics, applications, business process, cloud
and workload, consulting, and security services and solutions. DXC
Technology serves customers worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160


EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION: Russell Moves for Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled MONIQUE RUSSELL, JASMINE
RIGGINS, ELSA M. POWELL AND DESIRE EVANS v. EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES, Case No. 2:18-cv-05629-JDW (E.D.
Pa.), file with the Court their Motion for Class
Certification.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nicholas M. Centrella, Esq.
          Howard M. Klein, Esq.
          Benjamin O. Present, Esq.
          CONRAD O'BRIEN PC
          1500 Market Street, Suite 3900
          Philadelphia, PA 19102-2100
          Telephone: (215) 864-9600
          E-mail: ncentrella@conradobrien.com
                  hklein@conradobrien.com
                  bpresent@conradobrien.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Schochor, Esq.
          Lauren Schochor, Esq.
          Brent Ceryes, Esq.
          Phil Federico, Esq.
          SCHOCHOR, FEDERICO AND STATON PA
          The Paulton
          1211 St. Paul Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 234-1000
          Facsimile: (410) 234-1010
          E-mail: jschoehor@sfspa.com
                  lsehochor@sfspa.com
                  bceryes@sfspa.com
                  pfederico@sfspa.com

               - and -

          Danielle S. Dinsmore, Esq.
          Paul M. Vettori, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF PETER G. ANGELOS, P.C.
          One Charles Center
          100 N. Charles Street, 20th Floor
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 649-2000
          Facsimile: (410) 649-2150
          E-mail: ddinsmore@lawpga.com
                  pvettori@lawpga.eom

               - and -

          Karen E. Evans, Esq.
          THE COCHRAN FIRM
          1100 New York Ave., N.W.
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 682-5800
          E-mail: kevans@cochranfirm.com

               - and -

          Patrick A. Thronson, Esq.
          JANET, JANET & SUGGS, LLC
          Executive Centre at Hooks Lane
          4 Reservoir Circle, Suite 200
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Telephone: (410) 653-3200
          Facsimile: (410) 653-9030
          E-mail: pthronson@JJSjustice.com


EDWARD R. MARSZAL: Mack Suit Underway in California Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit is pending against Edward R. Marszal
Enterprises, Inc. The case is captioned as Jimmy R. Mack On behalf
of all persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Edward R.
Marszal Enterprises, Inc., a California Corporation and Does 1-50,
the Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00262259-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super.,
Aug. 5, 2019). The suit alleges employment-related issues.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Shani O. Zakay, Esq.
          ZAKAY LAW GROUP, APLC
          5850 Oberlin Dr, Ste 230A
          San Diego, CA 92121-4711
          Telephone: (619) 892-7095
          Facsimile: (858) 404-9203
          E-mail: shani@zakaylaw.com

EL ANGEL MARKET: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Arias Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
MILZA ARIAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v.  EL ANGEL MARKET, LLC; RODOLFO GUZMAN; and
GLORIA ECHEVARRIA, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02628 (D. Colo.,
Sept. 16, 2019) is an action against the Defendants' failure to pay
the Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Arias was employed by the Defendants as hourly paid,
non exempt employee.

El Angel Market, LLC owns and operates a Mexican restaurant and
market in Aurora, Colorado. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandt Milstein, Esq.
          MILSTEIN LAW OFFICE
          1123 Spruce Street, Suite 200
          Boulder, CO 80302
          Telephone: (303) 440-8780
          E-mail: brandt@milsteinlawoffice.com

               - and -

          Sarah Parady
          Lowrey Parady
          1725 High Street, Suite 1
          Denver, CO 80218
          Telephone: (303) 593-2595
          E-mail: sarah@lowrey-parady.com


ENCORE BOSTON: Schuster Case Stays in Massachusetts
---------------------------------------------------
Encore Boston Harbor, et al removed the case captioned as A.
RICHARD SCHUSTER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. ENCORE BOSTON HARBOR; WYNN
MA, LLC; and WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED, the Defendants, (Filed July 15,
2019), from the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Middlesex County, to the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts on Aug. 5, 2019. The
District of Massachusetts Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-11679-ADB to the proceeding.

In a Sept. 23 order, Judge Allison D. Burroughs denied a Motion to
Remand.  "Although the removed complaint may not have met the
statutory damages threshold at the time of removal because the
common law claims alleged did not allow for a damages multiplier,
there are no longer grounds for remand because the Court has
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(d)(2)
over the Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint," the
ruling said.

The judge explained that a  district court has original
jurisdiction over a proposed class action containing 100 or more
members where there is minimal diversity among the parties and the
aggregated claims of individual class members exceed $5 million,
exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(d)(2),
(5), (6).  Judge Burroughs noted that there is minimal diversity
among the parties in the case, the Amended Complaint seeks class
relief on behalf of a class of 100 or more members, and the
aggregated claims of the individual class members exceed $5
million.

"Specifically, the Amended Complaint pleads that damages stemming
from Defendants alleged failure to follow Massachusetts Gaming
Commission rules amount to $85,440.00... each day.  When this
figure, which is conservative in that it only accounts for one
aspect of damages, is multiplied by the number of days elapsed
between the casino opening and the filing of the Amended Complaint,
damages are estimated at $5,639,040 before a damages multiplier is
applied," the judge said.  "Even if the Court were to estimate
damages as those alleged at the time of removal, or $3,673,920,
that figure would be trebled pursuant to the Chapter 93A claim,
thereby exceeding the $5 million threshold."

In an Oct. 10 order, Judge Burroughs granted a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Response/Reply to the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint.  The Responses are due by Oct. 18.

The complaint asserts claims against Wynn for breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and conversion/theft.[BN]

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Wayne F. Dennison, Esq.
          Joshua P. Dunn, Esq.
          BROWN RUDNICK LLP
          One Financial Center
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: (617) 856-8200
          E-mail: wdennison@brownrudnick.com
                  jdunn@brownrudnick.com

ENSIGN UNITED: $815K Prim Class Settlement Gets Initial Court Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Conditional Certification of Proposed Settlement Class
and Preliminary Approval of the Parties' Proposed Settlement and
Notice to Putative Class Members in the case captioned MATTHEW
PRIM, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ENSIGN UNITED STATES DRILLING, INC., Defendant, Civil
Action No. 15-cv-02156-PAB-KMT, (D. Colo.).

Plaintiff filed his complaint, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, alleging that defendants violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff was employed by defendant and
worked in an oilfield as an hourly employee. Plaintiff and other
employees received bonuses as a component of their compensation
including Safety Bonuses and/or Performance Bonuses. Defendant
excluded these bonuses from calculations of plaintiff's and other
employees' regular rate of pay, and therefore failed to pay
plaintiff and the putative class members overtime at the rate
required by the FLSA.

Class Certification

The FLSA provides that an employee or employees may bring an action
on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated. Courts determine whether plaintiffs are similarly
situated for purposes of FLSA collective action certification in
two stages. A court's initial certification comes at the notice
stage, where courts use a fairly lenient standard to determine
whether plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of sending
notice to putative class members.

Plaintiff seeks final certification of a class of hourly oilfield
employees who worked for Defendant during the Class Period who
received Operator Safety Bonuses and Mud Bonuses.

Plaintiff alleges that all putative class members are hourly
employees of defendant's and all regularly worked more than 40
hours per workweek during the Class Period. He states that the
putative class members received the Contested Bonuses, but that
defendant excluded the Bonuses from its calculation of the class
members' regular rate of pay and, as a result, the class members
were not paid their proper overtime rates.

The Court finds that plaintiff has provided substantial allegations
that the putative class members are similarly situated. He alleges
that the putative class members were all subject to defendant's
policy of excluding the Contested Bonuses from their overtime rate
calculations. This is sufficient for conditional class
certification. For this reason, the Court will conditionally
certify a collective action consisting of all hourly oilfield
employees who worked for defendant from January 18, 2014 until
January 18, 2017 and who received Operator Safety Bonuses and Mud
Bonuses during that time frame.

The Settlement

In a suit by employees against their employer to recover back wages
under the FLSA, the parties must present any proposed settlement to
the district court for review and a determination of whether the
settlement agreement is fair and reasonable.  Requiring court
approval of FLSA settlements effectuates the purpose of the
statute, which is to protect certain groups of the population from
substandard wages and excessive hours  due to the unequal
bargaining power as between employer and employee.

To approve the settlement agreement, the Court must find that (1)
the litigation involves a bona fide dispute (2) the proposed
settlement is fair and equitable to all parties concerned and (3)
the proposed settlement contains a reasonable award of attorney's
fees.  

Bona Fide Dispute

Parties requesting approval of an FLSA settlement must provide the
Court with sufficient information to determine whether a bona fide
dispute exists.

To meet this obligation, the parties must present: (1) a
description of the nature of the dispute (2) a description of the
employer's business and the type of work performed by the employees
(3) the employer's reasons for disputing the employees' right to a
minimum wage or overtime (4) the employees' justification for the
disputed wages and (5) if the parties dispute the computation of
wages owed, each party's estimate of the number of hours worked and
the applicable wage. The mere existence of an adversarial lawsuit
is not enough to satisfy the bona fide dispute requirement.
  
The parties' dispute in this case revolves primarily around the
discretionary nature of certain bonuses paid to hourly oilfield
employees, which defendant did not take into account in calculating
the employees' overtime compensation. In his motion, plaintiff
first describes the parties' dispute over the discretionary nature
of the Contested Bonuses: plaintiff claims that the Contested
Bonuses were non-discretionary and should have been included in the
Putative Class Members' overtime calculations.   

In contrast, defendant argues that the Contested Bonuses were
discretionary and excludable from the Putative Class Members'
overtime rates. Regarding the willfulness of defendant's conduct,
plaintiff asserts that defendant either knew that the Contested
Bonuses were non-discretionary or acted in reckless disregard of
that fact given the countless other lawsuits against oilfield
companies involving regular rate violations for excluding similar
bonuses in employees' overtime calculations and defendant's
decision to alter its practices regarding the payment of the
bonuses.

Defendant, however, argues that it acted in good faith, properly
accounts for non-discretionary bonuses in calculating the regular
rates of pay and did not willfully deprive Prim or any employee of
any wages.

Given the respective positions of the parties, the Court finds that
a bona fide dispute exists.

Fair and Reasonable

To be fair and reasonable, an FLSA settlement must provide adequate
compensation to the employees and must not frustrate the FLSA
policy rationales. Courts considering both individual and
collective settlements under the FLSA turn to the factors for
evaluating the fairness of a class action settlement.  

The Tenth Circuit considers the following factors when deciding
whether to approve a class-action settlement under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e): (1) whether the parties fairly and honestly negotiated the
settlement (2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist
which place the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt (3)
whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere
possibility of future relief after protracted litigation and (4)
the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and
reasonable.  

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, defendant agrees to
pay a gross settlement amount of $815,000.00. Of that amount, an
estimated $285,250.00 will go toward attorney's fees, $3,500.00
will pay for out-of-pocket costs incurred by class counsel,
$15,000.00 will be disbursed to the Settlement Administrator, and
$7,500.00 will be paid to plaintiff in the form of a service award.
The remaining sum approximately $503,750.00, the net settlement
amount will be divided among the estimated 340 class members on a
pro rata basis.  

The Court finds the parties' settlement to be fair and reasonable.
Plaintiff represents that the parties' settlement is the result of
arm's-length negotiations by attorneys experienced in litigating
federal and state wage and hour disputes and plaintiff states that
he approves the Agreement because he and the Putative Class Members
are receiving a substantial benefit. And, given the parties'
dispute over the facts and law, the Court finds that the value of
this immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future
relief after protracted litigation. The net settlement amount
reflects an adequate compromise in light of the disputed questions
of law and fact in this case and the risks inherent in continued
litigation.  

The Court also finds the $7,500 incentive award given to plaintiff
is reasonable. When evaluating the reasonableness of an incentive
award, courts can consider factors such as (1) the actions the
plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class (2) the
degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions (3) the
amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the
litigation and (4) reasonable fears of workplace retaliation.

The motion states that plaintiff took a substantial risk in
bringing this lawsuit when no other employee was willing to do so,
facing potential retaliation and blackballing from prospective
employers. Plaintiff also represents that he expended significant
effort and time in this litigation, participating in all stages of
the litigation to help ensure the Putative Class Members recover
their unpaid wages. And the putative class members stand to benefit
from plaintiff's contributions, receiving 75% of the maximum
recovery amount. The Court finds that this enhanced award is
reasonable.  

Because the Court finds the settlement fair and reasonable, it must
next determine whether the settlement agreement undermines the
purpose of the FLSA, which is to protect employees' rights from
employers who generally wield superior bargaining power.

To determine whether a settlement agreement complies with the FLSA,
courts look at the following factors: (1) presence of other
similarly situated employees (2) a likelihood that plaintiffs'
circumstances will recur and (3) whether defendants had a history
of non-compliance with the FLSA.  The record shows that there are
approximately 340 similarly situated employees who were subject to
the overtime calculation policy employed by defendant. If such
policy is not remedied, these circumstances could recur. Further,
defendants have no known history of non-compliance with the FLSA.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the settlement does not undermine
the purposes of the FLSA.

The Court further ruled that within twenty-one days, defendant
shall provide to plaintiff's counsel a list of all potential class
members. The list shall include all available contact information
including U.S. Mail addresses and electronic mail addresses.

Within fifteen days after receiving this list from defendant,
plaintiff shall send the Notice by First Class U.S. Mail and email
the Notice to the last known address of each of the individuals
identified on the above-referenced list.

Any individuals to whom notice is sent shall "opt-in" by returning
the necessary documents to plaintiff's counsel within sixty days
from the postmark date of the Notice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5q6wtgj from Leagle.com.

Matthew Prim, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Andrew W. Dunlap  -
adunlap@mybackwages.com - Josephson Dunlap LLP,  Lindsay R. Itkin -
litkin@mybackwages.com - Josephson Dunlap LLP,  Richard Jennings
Burch, Bruckner Burch PLLC, & Michael Andrew Josephson
-mjosephson@mybackwages.com  - Josephson Dunlap LLP.

Ensign United States Drilling, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Brooke A. Colaizzi - bcolaizzi@shermanhoward.com - Sherman &
Howard, L.L.C. & Emily Fontelle Keimig - ekeimig@shermanhoward.com
- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C..

EXPEDIA GROUP: Can Compel Arbitration in Krause FLSA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAURIE KRAUSE, on Behalf of Herself And on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC.
and EGENCIA, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00123-BJR (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, Seattle, granted the
Defendants' Motion to Compel the Plaintiff to Participate in
Arbitration.

Plaintiff Krause initiated the action against Defendants Expedia
and Egencia, claiming a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").  In her complaint, the Plaintiff claims that the
Defendants intentionally misclassified her, and others in her
position, as independent contractors in order to deny them overtime
pay.

The Plaintiff is a travel consultant, providing customer
communications services for the Defendants who operate an online
travel management company.  The parties, however, have never
entered into an employment or independent contractor agreement
directly.  Instead, Defendant Egencia, contracts with WSOL, LLC,
which provides telephone, email, and other contact center and
business processing support.  WSOL, in turn, contracts with the
Plaintiff to provide customer service assistance to travelers in
the form of chat, email, and phone.  WSOL and Plaintiff have
entered into several contracts for this work since 2014.  The
latest of these agreements is entitled "Independent Contractor
Agreement" ("2019 Agreement") and is accompanied by Schedule A,
entitled "Egencia Program: Duties, Terms, and Compensation," both
of which were signed on Feb. 26, 2019.

The foundation of the Plaintiff's lawsuit is her claim that the
Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay travel consultants
overtime wages for work done in excess of 40 hours per week.  She
alleges that travel consultants are entitled to overtime wages
because they are the Defendants' employees.  Further, the Plaintiff
claims that the Defendants intentionally misclassified her and
other travel consultants as independent contractors in order to
avoid paying them overtime wages.

Currently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
and/or to Compel Plaintiff to Participate in Arbitration pursuant
to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").  The Plaintiff proffers two
arguments in opposition to the Defendants' motion: (1) The 2019
Agreement, including the agreement to arbitrate, is unenforceable
as unconscionable because the Indemnification Provision is an
illegal fee-shifting provision that deprives her of substantive and
overtime rights under the FLSA; and (2) Even if a valid arbitration
clause exists, the Defendants may not enforce it as non-signatories
to the 2019 Agreement.  To the Plaintiff's attack on the Mutual
Arbitration Provision, the Defendants reply that the parties have
agreed to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator to
decide, not the Court, through the Delegation Clause.

Judge Rothstein finds that the Plaintiff's objection addresses the
contract as a whole and is not specific to either of the Mutual
Arbitration Provision or the Delegation Clause, meaning that the
question of arbitrability is for the arbitrator, not the Court, to
address.  The Delegation Clause expressly cites the AAA rules.
Thus, the parties have delegated the question of arbitrability to
the arbitrator, so long as the Delegation Clause itself is not
invalid on other grounds, such as the Plaintiff's argument based on
the Indemnity Provision.  However, the Plaintiff has proven by her
continual resurrection of her Indemnity Provision complaint that it
is not specific to either the Delegation Clause or the Mutual
Arbitration Provision.  That she is addressing the contract as a
whole is solidified by her arguments that given the lack of a
severability clause, the entire agreement, including the
arbitration provision, is unenforceable.

Having determined that the question of the validity of the Mutual
Arbitration Provision is for the arbitrator, the Judge next
considers whether the Defendants may compel arbitration even though
they are not signatories to the 2019 Agreement.  Both parties agree
that, under Texas law, third-party beneficiaries may enforce
arbitration clauses in contracts to which they are not a party, but
differ on whether the Defendants are third-party beneficiaries.

The Plaintiff raises two questions: (1) Is the 2019 Schedule A
incorporated into the 2019 Agreement so that the Defendants may
rely upon the 2019 Schedule A to show intent to benefit them and
(2) With the benefit of the 2019 Schedule A, does the 2019
Agreement show a sufficient intent to benefit Defendants to make
them third-party beneficiaries.

The Judge finds that the fact that the documents were signed
simultaneously, establishes that the parties' intended to
incorporate the 2019 Schedule A into the 2019 Agreement.  The fact
that the documents arrived in separate emails does not change this
determination.  It is not required that two documents be attached
in the same email for one of the documents to be incorporated by
reference into the other.  Because the 2019 Agreement refers in
plain terms to Schedule A, it is clear that Schedule A was intended
to be part of the agreement.  Therefore, the Judge finds that the
2019 Schedule A is incorporated by reference into the 2019
Agreement and both documents should be read and understood
together.

Upon construing the 2019 Agreement and the 2019 Schedule A
together, it is clear that the Defendants were granted contractual
benefits from the 2019 Agreement between the Plaintiff and WSOL,
the Court notes. The 2019 Agreement states, the Contractor
understands and agrees that the parameters of each contract project
are established by the client, not WSOL and that the specific
Contracted Services of each contract project will be defined in
Schedule A.  Thus, it is clear that what is being contracted for
are services to be delivered to WSOL's clients to the client's
specifications and satisfaction.  The 2019 Schedule A, in turn,
fills in the blank of which client the travel consultant will be
serving.  Hence, the Defendants are third-party beneficiaries to
the 2019 Agreement and, as such, entitled to compel arbitration,
the Court finds.

Finally, having decided that an arbitrator, not the Court, must
address the Plaintiff's challenges to the contract and that the
Defendants as third-party beneficiaries may enforce the agreement
to arbitrate, the Court turns to the question of where the
arbitration should take place.  The Court finds that it would be
unjust to allow the Plaintiff to subvert the agreed upon venue for
arbitration by filing her case in a district other than the one in
which she agreed arbitration would take place.  Therefore, the
Court will order the parties to conduct arbitration in Dallas
County, Texas.  Such a result prevents a party from sidestepping a
forum selection clause by filing in a district other than that
specified in the agreement, the Judge says. This result has the
additional benefit of preventing forum shopping and advancing the
strong public policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rothstein denies the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss; grants the Defendants' motion to Compel the
Plaintiff to Participate in Arbitration; stays the current
proceedings; and orders the parties to conduct arbitration in
Dallas County, Texas, according to the terms of the 2019
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Uhwn0i from Leagle.com.

Laurie Krause, on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Don J. Foty --
dfoty@kennedyhodges.com -- KENNEDY HODGES, LLP, pro hac vice,
Gabriel A. Assaad, KENNEDY HODGES, LLP, pro hac vice & Paul S.
Woods -- Paul@PaulWoodsLawFirm.com -- THE PAUL WOODS LAW FIRM
PLLC.

Expedia Group Inc & Egencia LLC, Defendants, represented by Patrick
M. Madden -- patrick.madden@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP & Todd L.
Nunn -- todd.nunn@klgates.com -- K&L GATES LLP.


FEDEX CORPORATE: Court Narrows Claims in Abdallah TCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NAJEH ABDALLAH, individually and on behalf of classes
of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. FEDEX CORPORATE
SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, HARTE HANKS, INC., a
Delaware corporation, C3/CUSTOMERCONTACTCHANNELS, INC., a Florida
corporation, Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-3967 (N.D. Ill.), Judge
Joan B. Gottschall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) denied the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, and (ii)
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.

If something is preventing a package shipped internationally from
being delivered, Defendant FedEx, or, as in the case, a contractor
providing call center services, makes a "trace call" to the
shipper.  FedEx contracts with Defendants Harte Hanks, Inc. and
C3/Customercontactchannels, Inc. to place trace calls to FedEx
customers.  As a result of a "glitch" in a FedEx database, agents
of Harte Hanks and C3 placed over 200 trace calls to Plaintiff
Abdallah's cell number between August 2015 and June 2016.

C3 and Harte Hanks' trace agents use a software system called "One
Source" operated by FedEx.  FedEx customers provide the phone
numbers in the "One Source" database when they use the company's
services.  The trace call process begins when a C3 or Harte Hanks
supervisor assigns a trace agent a package's tracking number.  The
agent enters the tracking number into "One Source," and the system
gives the agent a phone number to call.

Abdallah registered his cell number with the national do-not-call
database in 2006.  The trace agents who called Abdallah were trying
to reach other FedEx customers.  An error in the "One Source"
system (the exact origin of which is unclear) caused Abdallah's
cell number to be auto-populated into a phone number field for
other FedEx customers whose packages were delayed in customs.

Abdallah filed a two-count class action complaint against C3,
FedEx, and Harte Hanks under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA").  The Defendants answered the first amended complaint in
June 2016.  One day before the deadline to amend pleadings,
Abdallah sought leave to amend his complaint, which the court
granted seven days later.

The Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") added C3 and Harte Hanks as
Defendants based on discovery showing that their representatives
placed the calls at issue.  Like the prior complaints, the SAC's
two counts allege distinct TCPA violations.  Abdallah asserts in
Count I that the Defendants called his cell phone without his prior
express consent using an automated telephone dialing system.  In
Count II, Abdallah alleges that his cell phone number was on the
national do not call registry, and the Defendants therefore
violated 47 U.S.C. Section 227(c)(5) by calling him to solicit the
purchase of various package disposition services from FedEx.

The parties completed limited discovery.  The Defendants then filed
their pending motion for summary judgment, and Abdallah responded
by seeking leave to drop Count I, the auto dialer count, from his
complaint.  He invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2),
which tells courts to freely give leave to amend a pleading when
justice so requires.  The rule takes a liberal approach to allowing
amendments.

Because the Dec. 1, 2017 deadline to amend pleadings has not been
extended, Abdallah must demonstrate good cause to enlarge that
deadline under the more demanding standard of Rule 16(b)(4).
Because Abdallah has not demonstrated good cause to extend the
deadline to amend pleadings, Judge Gottschall denies his motion for
leave to file a third amended complaint and will dismiss Count I at
summary judgment as abandoned.  

She finds that Abdallah falls short of the good cause standard
because he does not explain why he did not act sooner during
limited discovery.   Abdallah does not explain why he pressed Count
I after the June 2018 interrogatory responses or why he did not
drop Count I after taking depositions of Harte Hanks' corporate
representatives in October and November 2018.  The Judge cannot
assume that Abdallah acted with reasonable diligence.  The
Defendants specifically complain that they could have avoided the
cost of preparing a motion for summary judgment on Count I had
Abdallah dropped it earlier.  Abdallah has given the Judge no
reason to think the Defendants are wrong or that he could not have
with reasonable diligence spared them this expense.

The Defendants move for a summary judgment on the do-not-call list
claim in Count II.  It is undisputed that a database "glitch"
resulted in the placing of hundreds calls to Abdallah.  The calls
were intended for other FedEx customers, and nothing in the record
suggests that the trace agents knew that they were calling the
wrong number.  The precise question now is whether the calls placed
to Abdallah's cell number meet the definition of a telephone
solicitation call.

The Judge finds that despite the Defendants' formal incentive
structures, a reasonable jury could find that FedEx's system of
evaluating trace agents indirectly places a premium on return
shipments.  The jury could conclude that a customer who chooses
return shipping chooses an attractive option for a trace call agent
who must meet a quota of call returns each day; the other options
potentially involve more complex, and therefore time-consuming,
processes.  It would therefore be reasonable to infer that FedEx's
evaluation system coupled with its training incentivizes agents to
push FedEx customers to choose the return shipping option.

Finally, taken together, the foregoing evidence permits a
reasonable jury to find that the trace calls were "dual purpose"
calls advertising or soliciting return shipping services.  Although
only two voicemails have been transcribed, the jury may reasonably
infer that the other calls were similar.  The Judge acknowledges
the Defendants' arguments that the trace program focuses on getting
a package to its destination, but there is evidence here that trace
agents actively encouraged called parties to purchase return
shipping services and that FedEx's evaluation system incentivized
their behavior.  The fact that the trace call agents provided the
Defendants with other options does not necessarily shield them from
the TCPA.

For the reasons she stated, Judge Gottschall (i) denied the
Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, and
(ii) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment.  Count I of the second amended complaint is
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Memorandum Opiniono
and Order is available at https://is.gd/YY8BzZ from Leagle.com.

Najeh Abdallah, individually and on behalf of classes of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff, represented by Eugene Y. Turin,
Mcguire Law, P.C.

FedEx Corporate Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by John W. Campbell, Federal Express Legal Dept. &
Aaron Thomas Cassat, Fedex Corporation.

Harte Hanks, Inc., Defendant, represented by Rosa Maria
Tumialan-Landy -- rtumialan@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett PLLc,
Jennifer Ann Warner -- jwarner@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett Pllc &
Matthew T. Hays -- mhays@dykema.com -- Dykema Gossett Pllc.

C3/CustomerContactChannels, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Mitchell Edward Widom -- mwidom@bilzin.com -- Bilzin Sumberg, pro
hac vice & Eric Stephen Mattson -- EMATTSON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley
Austin LLP.


FEDEX GROUND: Johnson Moves to Notify Class of Delivery Drivers
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ADRIAN JOHNSON and RAY BELARDINO, on behalf
of themselves and those similarly situated v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE
SYSTEM, INC., Case No. 5:19-cv-00196-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiffs file their expedited pre-discovery motion for issuance
of notice to similarly situated individuals pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b).

The Plaintiffs ask that the Court order that notice be issued, in
their proposed form to all individuals who, at any time in the last
three years, have delivered FedEx's packages but have been employed
through a FedEx ISP in Florida and who worked more than 40 hours in
at least one workweek but were not paid time overtime compensation
for such overtime hours worked.

Adrian Johnson and Ray Belardino have brought this action against
the Defendant on behalf of themselves and all other individuals,
who have delivered packages for FedEx through intermediary
"independent service providers" ("ISPs") (sometimes also called
"contracted service providers" or "CSPs") and who have been
eligible to receive overtime pay but have not been paid
time-and-a-half compensation for their hours worked in excess of 40
hours per workweek, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 N. Orange Ave., 16th Floor
          P.O. Box 4979
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Telephone: (407) 418-2069
          Facsimile: (407) 245-3401
          E-mail: RMorgan@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) WORKERS
          Facsimile: (954) 327-3013
          E-mail: AFrisch@forthepeople.com

               - and -

          Brian D. Gonzales, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN D. GONZALES, PLLC
          2580 East Harmony Road, Suite 201
          Fort Collins, CO 80528
          Telephone: (970) 214-0562
          E-mail: BGonzales@ColoradoWageLaw.com

               - and -

          Dustin T. Lujan, Esq.
          LUJAN LAW OFFICE
          1603 Capitol Ave, Suite 310 A559
          Cheyenne, WY 82001
          Telephone: (970) 999-4225
          E-mail: wyoadvocate@gmail.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jessica G. Scott, Esq.
          WHEELER TRIGG O'DONNELL LLP
          370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 4500
          Denver, CO 80202-5647
          Telephone: (303) 244-1800
          Facsimile: (303) 244-1879
          E-mail: scott@wtotrial.com

               - and -

          Lisa A. McGlynn, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
          101 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 2350
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 769-7500
          Facsimile: (813) 769-7501
          E-mail: lmcglynn@fisherphillips.com


FRED BEANS: Brogan Seeks to Certify Four Classes of Consumers
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled Christopher Brogan, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Fred Beans Chevrolet, Inc., Case
No. 5:17-cv-05628-CFK (E.D. Pa.), the Plaintiff seeks certification
of four classes:

   1. False Finance Charge Class:

      All consumers who purchased vehicles from Fred Beans in the
      United States where the retail installment sales contract
      falsely stated the finance charge; (2) were Pennsylvania
      residents at the time the contract to purchase the vehicle
      was executed; (3) within the five years prior to the filing
      of the Complaint until the date of final judgment in the
      action;

   2. Multiple RISC Class:

      All consumers who purchased vehicles from Fred Beans in the
      United States that: (1) entered into a retail sales
      installment contract with Fred Beans; (2) who were
      presented with more than one retail sales installment
      contract without a written cancellation of the prior retail
      installment sales contract; (3) were Pennsylvania residents
      at the time of the purchase; (4) within the five years
      prior to the filing of the Complaint until the date of
      final judgment in the action;

   3. Document Fee/Dealer Fee Class:

      All consumers who entered into retail sales installment
      contracts with Fred Beans: (1) that included within the
      retail installment sales contract a Document Fee/Dealer
      Fee; (2) were Pennsylvania residents at the time of the
      purchase; (3) within five years prior to the filing of the
      Complaint until the date of final judgment in the action;
      and

   4. Unauthorized Inquiry Class:

      All consumers who entered into retail sales installment
      contracts with Fred Beans in the United States: (1) where
      Fred Beans continued to conduct hard credit inquiries
      following the execution of the retail sales installment
      contract; (2) within five years prior to the filing of the
      Complaint until the date of final judgment in the action.

Mr. Brogan also asks the Court to designate him as the class
representative.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard Kim, Esq.
          THE KIM LAW FIRM, LLC
          1635 Market St., Suite 1600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (855) 996-6342
          Facsimile: (855) 235-5855
          E-mail: rkim@thekimlawfirmllc.com

               - and -

          Kevin J. Kotch, Esq.
          FERRARA LAW GROUP, P.C.
          One State Street Square
          50 W State St., Suite 1100
          Trenton, NJ 08608
          Telephone: (609) 571-3742
          Facsimile: (609) 498-7440
          E-mail: kevin@Ferraralawgp.com

               - and -

          David Promisloff, Esq.
          PROMISLOFF LAW, P.C.
          5 Great Valley Parkway, Suite 210
          Malvern, PA 19355
          Telephone: (215) 259-5156
          Facsimile: (215) 600-2642
          E-mail: david@prolawpa.com


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Caldwell Sues over Debt Collection Practices
--------------------------------------------------------------
HELENE BREEDLOVE CALDWELL, and JAMES EARL STERNS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FREEDOM
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-02193-N (N.D.
Tex., Sept. 13, 2019) seeks to stop the Defendant's unfair and
unconscionable means to collect a debt.

Freedom Mortgage Corporation operates as a mortgage lender. The
Company provides purchase, re-financing, and lending services for
buying real estate. Freedom Mortgage serves customers in the United
States. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Randall K. Pulliam, Esq.
          Hank Bates, Esq.
          E. Lee Lowther III, Esq.
          CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
          519 W. 7 th St.
          Little Rock, AR 72201
          Telephone: (501) 312-8500
          Facsimile: (501) 312-8505
          E-mail: rpulliam@cbplaw.com
                  hbates@cbplaw.com
                  llowther@cbplaw.com


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Decision in Gress Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corp. filed an appeal from a Court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Michael Gress, et al. v. Freedom
Mortgage Corp., Case No. 19-cv-00375, in the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks injunctive relief and damages for unreasonable and
inappropriate property inspection fees in breach of contract,
unjust enrichment and for violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law and various state consumer
protection statutes and Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension
Uniformity Act.

Freedom Mortgage is a mortgage lender in the United States.  The
Company services the Plaintiffs' home in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania.
Gress claims that the mortgage agreements preclude the assessment
of fees for post-default services that are not "reasonable or
appropriate" after defaulting on their payment on several
occasions.

The appellate case is captioned as Michael Gress, et al. v. Freedom
Mortgage Corp., Case No. 19-8035, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents MICHAEL J. GRESS and BRANDY L. GRESS, and on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Douglas G. Blankinship, Esq.
          Todd S. Garber, Esq.
          Bradley Silverman, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN BLANKINSHIP FREI-PEARSON & GARBER
          445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 605
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3290
          E-mail: gblankinship@fbfglaw.com
                  tgarber@fbfglaw.com
                  bsilverman@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          William F. Cash, III, Esq.
          Matthew D. Schultz, Esq.
          LEVIN PAPANTONIO THOMAS MITCHELL RAFFERTY & PROCTOR
          316 South Baylen Street, Suite 600
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 435-7140
          E-mail: bcash@levinlaw.com
                  mschultz@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH SWEET KILPELA & CARPENTER, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com

Defendant-Petitioner FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORP. is represented by:

          Jason W. McElroy, Esq.
          Brian M. Serafin, Esq.
          WEINER BRODSKY KIDER PC
          1300 19th Street NW, Suite 500
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 628-2000
          E-mail: mcelroy@thewbkfirm.com
                  serafin@thewbkfirm.com

               - and -

          Timothy P. Ofak, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          1717 Arch Street
          Three Logan Square, Suite 3100
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 851-8229
          E-mail: tofak@reedsmith.com


GABRIEL GALLARDO: Court OKs $300K Tenorio Settlement Deal
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' unopposed motion
for approval of the settlement agreement in LUCARIA TENORIO, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. GABRIEL GALLARDO, et al., Defendants, No.
1:16-cv-00283-DAD-JLT. (E.D. Cal.).

This multi-party lawsuit alleges that defendants employed
plaintiffs and other farm workers to perform seasonal agricultural
work in and around Kern County in 2014 and 2015. Plaintiffs allege
that this employment violated various federal and state labor laws,
including failure to pay all wages due, failure to provide timely
meal periods, failure to provide complete wage statements, and
operating as an unlicensed farm labor contractor.

According to the Agreement, submitted as an attachment to the
declaration of attorney Cynthia Rice, the Kooner defendants will
pay a total sum of $300,000.00.  Of that amount, $104,000.00 will
be paid directly to the named plaintiffs, $84,000.00 will be paid
to other aggrieved employees, $12,000.00 will be paid to the
California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and
$100,000.00 will be paid for attorneys' fees, costs, and claims
administration.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court will approve a settlement of PAGA claims upon a showing
that the settlement terms (1) meet the statutory requirements set
forth by PAGA and (2) are fundamentally fair, reasonable, and
adequate in view of PAGA's public policy goals.

Two points bear mentioning at the outset. First, as already
discussed, this is not a class action, nor is it the type of
collective action to which the normal logic of class action
settlements might apply.  

The second point follows from the first: because this is not a
collective action, the court's role in approving any settlement
agreement is quite limited.  

Normally, how the parties elect to dispose of claims via settlement
is not the concern of this court. Unless a statute imposes an
affirmative obligation upon the court to review and approve the
terms of a settlement agreement, the typical approach is for the
parties to reach a private agreement and then stipulate to
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41.

Here, by contrast, the parties have asked the court to approve the
Agreement as a whole, even though only the PAGA claims require
court approval. The court declines to do so because the court is
required only to approve settlement of the PAGA claims, the court
will confine its analysis accordingly.

The court is sensitive to the circumstances faced by the parties.
Plaintiffs' counsel is responsible for ensuring that their clients
receive the maximum possible award on their claims, and has
creatively crafted an Agreement that does precisely that. For their
part, the Kooner defendants have indicated that this litigation has
imposed substantial financial burdens on them, possibly
necessitating declaring bankruptcy. With this understanding, the
court will approve the Agreement as it pertains to the award of
PAGA penalties.

Separately, plaintiffs ask the court to approve the proposed
attorneys' fee award in the amount of $100,000.00. The relevant
provision of PAGA provides that Any employee who prevails in any
action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs.

In their motion, plaintiffs indicate that their request for
attorneys' fees here overlaps substantially with their prior motion
for attorneys' fees. By written order, the court has already
granted that motion for in part. That order concluded that, under
the lodestar method, plaintiffs were entitled to an award of
$249,630.25 in attorneys' fees.

Here, by contrast, plaintiffs seek an award of only $100,000.00,
far below the lodestar amount. The analysis set forth in the
court's prior order applies here as well, and the court will
approve the $100,000.00 in attorney's fees as requested.

In sum, the court finds that the settlement of the PAGA claims is
fair and reasonable and will approve that portion of the settlement
agreement as well as plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees.

The motion for approval of the settlement agreement is granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6rzebg9  from Leagle.com.

Carlos Pedro, Lucia Torres, Francisco Viera, Abel Miranda, Teresa
Miranda, Lucaria Tenorio, Antonio Torres, Maria Teresa, Cristino
Santiago, Artemio Santiago & Pascuala Saucedo, Plaintiffs,
represented by Cynthia Louise Rice -  crice@crla.org - California
Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Hector Rodriguez Martinez  -
hectorm@themmlawfirm.com -  Mallison & Martinez, Liliana Garcia
-lgarcia@themmlawfirm.com - Mallison & Martinez, Michael Meuter -
mmeuter@crla.org - California Rural Legal Assistance, Sahar Durali
- SAHAR@WITTLF.COM - California Rural Legal Assistance & Stanley
Mallison - stanm@themmlawfirm.com - Mallison & Martinez.

Ezequiel Aguilar, Irma Castaneda & Maria De Jesus, Plaintiffs,
represented by Cynthia Louise Rice , California Rural Legal
Assistance, Inc., Hector Rodriguez Martinez , Mallison & Martinez,
Michael Meuter , California Rural Legal Assistance, Sahar Durali ,
California Rural Legal Assistance & Stanley Mallison , Mallison &
Martinez.

Nazar Kooner, Pawan S. Kooner & Hardeep Kaur, Defendants,
represented by Randall Martin Rumph -rmrlaw10@sbcglobal.net - Law
Office of Randy Rumph.

Nazar Kooner, Pawan S. Kooner & Hardeep Kaur, Cross Claimants,
represented by Randall Martin Rumph , Law Office of Randy Rumph.

Gabriel Gallardo, Cross Claimant, pro se.

Manuel Gallardo, Cross Claimant, pro se.

Silvia Esther Gallardo, Cross Claimant, pro se.

Nazar Kooner, Hardeep Kaur & Pawan S. Kooner, Cross Defendants,
represented by Randall Martin Rumph, Law Office of Randy Rumph.


GREEN BAY PACKAGING: Harter Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DOUG HARTER, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. GREEN
BAY PACKAGING, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00745-PLM-RSK
(W.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to  enter an order
pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act:

   1. conditionally certifying a FLSA Collective defined as:

      "all production employees employed by Defendant in
      Kalamazoo, Michigan who were eligible for incentive pay at
      any time in the past three years";

   2. approving Plaintiff's proposed notice and consent form for
      dissemination to members of the proposed FLSA Collective via

      U.S. Mail, e-mail, and social media;

   3. requiring Defendant to identify all putative members of the
      proposed FLSA Collective by providing their full names,
      dates and location(s) of employment, employee identification

      numbers, and last known address, telephone number, and e-
      mails in computer-readable and searchable format (e.g., a
      Microsoft Excel spreadsheet) within 14 days of the entry of
      the order;

   4. giving putative members of the proposed FLSA Collective 60
      days from the date the Court-authorized notice and consent
      form is mailed to join this case if they so choose; and

   5. requiring that throughout the 60-day notice period
      requested, the Defendant must post Plaintiff's proposed
      notice in its Kalamazoo facility in a place(s) likely to be

      viewed by all members of the proposed FLSA Collective and  
      make consent forms available to them upon request.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark S. Wilkinson, Esq.
          PALADIN EMPLOYMENT LAW PLLC
          251 North Rose Street, Suite 200, PMB No 288
          Kalamazoo, MI 49007-3860
          Telephone: 269 978 2474
          E-mail: mark@paladinemploymentlaw.com

               - and -

          Jesse L. Young, Esq.
          KREIS ENDERLE HUDGINS & BORSOS PC
          One Moorsbridge
          P.O. Box 4010
          Kalamazoo, MI 49003-4010
          Telephone: 269 321 2311
          E-mail: jyoung@kehb.com


HAMILTON-RYKER IT: Sued by Gentry for Not Paying Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
Terry Gentry, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions, LLC, Case No.
3:19-cv-00320 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 25, 2019), is brought under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act arising
from the Defendant's failure to pay all due and owing overtime
wages to its non-exempt, hourly-paid employees, including the
Plaintiff.

Based in Franklin, Tennessee, Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions, LLC is a
limited liability company formed in Tennessee doing business in the
state of Texas.

The Defendant is, in part, a staffing company that provides
employees to its clients in the banking/finance, healthcare,
insurance, technology, legal, manufacturing, oil and gas
production, pipeline management, and POS services industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ricardo J. Prieto, Esq.
          Mark Lazarz, Esq.
          M. Todd Slobin, Esq.
          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: rprieto@eeoc.net
                  mlazarz@eeoc.net
                  tslobin@eeoc.net
                  marbuckle@eeoc.net


HEARST MAGAZINE: Arnold Suit Removed to S.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------
The case is styled as Fenella Arnold, Kelly Nakai, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hearst
Magazine Media, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, CDS Gloabl, Inc. an
Iowa corporation, DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
37-02019-00047733-CU-BT-CTL was removed from the Superior Court of
California County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California on Oct. 10, 2019, and assigned Case
No. 3:19-cv-01969-BEN-MDD.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

Hearst Magazines is one of the world's largest publishers of
magazine media across all platforms, with more than 300 editions
and 240 websites around the world, including more than 25 titles in
the U.S.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Zachariah Paul Dostart, Esq.
     Dostart Hannink Coveney LLP
     4180 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 530
     La Jolla, CA 92037
     Phone: (858) 623-4200
     Fax: (858) 623-4299
     Email: zdostart@sdlaw.com

The Defendants are represented by:

     Robert J Herrington, Esq.
     Greenberg Traurig, LLP
     1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
     Los Angeles, CA 90067-2121
     Phone: (310) 586-7700
     Fax: (310) 586-7800
     Email: herringtonr@gtlaw.com


HOME DEPOT U.S.A.: Removes Barragan et al. Suit to S.D. Cal.
------------------------------------------------------------
The Defendant in the case of DONNIE SANCHEZ BARRAGAN, and ARACELI
BARRAGAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.; and DOES 1 to 100,
inclusive, Defendants, filed a notice to remove the lawsuit from
the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego
(Case No. 37-2019-00042161-CU-OE-CTL) to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California on September 13, 2019. The
clerk of court for the Southern District of California assigned
Case No. 37-2019-00042161-CU-OE-CTL. The case is assigned to
Anthony J. Battaglia and referred to Magistrate Andrew G.
Schopler.

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. operates home improvement retail stores.
The Company offers building materials, home improvement, lawn,
garden, kitchen, lighting, storage, and flooring design products.
Home Depot U.S.A. serves customers in the United States. [BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Donna M. Mezias, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          580 California Street, Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 94104-1036
          Telephone: (415) 765-9500
          Facsimile: (415) 765-9501


HOMEADVISOR INC: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Airquip Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re HOMEADVISOR, INC. LITIGATION, Civil Case No.
16-cv-01849-PAB-KLM, Consolidated with Civil Action No.
18-cv-01802-PAB-KLM (D. Colo.), Judge Philip A. Brimmer of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado (i) denied
HomeAdvisor's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Claims; and
(ii) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
Sur-Reply.

HomeAdvisor is an online business that connects consumers with home
service professionals ("HSPs"). An HSP is generally an independent
contractor in the business of doing home repairs, remodeling, or
inspections. HomeAdvisor's business model is that HSPs become
members of its network.  HomeAdvisor charges the HSP for each
potential customer referral, or a "lead," that it provides.

The Plaintiffs are all former members of HomeAdvisor's network.
They allege that HomeAdvisor misrepresented the quality of its
leads as "project-ready homeowners."  In reality, they claim, the
leads were materially defective in that they contained incorrect
contact information, included individuals who had no home service
needs and had not contacted HomeAdvisor, and included contacts for
vacant or non-existent residences, among other things.

Each Plaintiff became a HomeAdvisor member through a telephone
sign-up process.  After speaking with a HomeAdvisor representative,
agreeing to become a HomeAdvisor member, and providing payment
information, an interested HSP is transferred to a "voice log"
while the HomeAdvisor representative stays on the line.  Upon
completion of the voice log process, the HSP is subject to a
background check by HomeAdvisor, which usually is completed within
24 hours.  HomeAdvisor then automatically bills the initial fee to
the credit card the HSP provided over the telephone.  Afterwards,
the HSP receives a "welcome email" and a "confirmation email."

The welcome email directs the HSP to click a hyperlink to access
his or her HomeAdvisor account on the HomeAdvisor "Pro Site."
Underneath that hyperlink, the email states, "By using this site,
you are agreeing to our Terms & Conditions."  There is a
corresponding hyperlink to the terms and conditions.  The
confirmation email also references the company's terms and
conditions, stating, "See Terms & Conditions," which also contains
a hyperlink.  By clicking on the terms and conditions hyperlink,
the recipient is provided with the full terms and conditions,
including an arbitration agreement.  The confirmation email states,
"Membership fees are non-refundable and are charged automatically
on each renewal date until canceled."  Neither the confirmation or
welcome email, however, provides the terms and conditions in the
body or in an attachment.

The matter is before the Court on HomeAdvisor, Inc.'s Motion to
Compel Arbitration and to Stay Claims.  It argues the Plaintiffs
assented to the terms and conditions during the voice log process.
The Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that, because they were
never informed about the terms and conditions before the voice log
process, and had no opportunity to read or access the terms and
conditions before being prompted to accept them, they could not
have assented to them before they became members.

Judge Brimmer finds that the Plaintiffs were told that terms and
conditions existed, but were not provided with the terms and
conditions until after the transaction was complete.  Because the
terms of the arbitration agreement were not reasonably available to
them, the Plaintiffs did not assent to the arbitration agreement
during the voice log enrollment when they entered into their
subscription agreements with HomeAdvisor.

The HSPs were able to enroll with HomeAdvisor with no knowledge
that an arbitration clause existed and with no meaningful
opportunity to review any of HomeAdvisor's terms and conditions.
Moreover, the welcome and confirmation emails sent to the
Plaintiffs after their enrollment make no reference to an
arbitration clause and contain no description of the contents of
the terms and conditions, which makes an HSP less likely to review
them.

Further, the Judge finds that it does not appear that the
Plaintiffs were given the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration
agreement.  The welcome and confirmation emails provided no express
opt-out provision.  There was no opt-out provision provided to the
Plaintiffs.  Even if the 72-hour refund provision could be
construed as an opt-out provision, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs' continued use of the service cannot constitute assent
by a failure to opt out.  Due to the lack of an express opt-out
provision, the brief permitted time for a refund, and the
contradictory email precluding refunds sent to the Plaintiffs,
their continued use of the product did not constitute assent to the
terms and conditions.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Brimmer concludes that the Defendant
has failed to meet its burden to present evidence sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement.  Therefore,
the Judge the HomeAdvisor's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to
Stay Claims and denied as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
File Sur-Reply.  Within 14 days of the Order, the Defendant will
file an answer to the Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/JRhHEM from Leagle.com.

Airquip, Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated, Kelly DaSilva & Nicole Gray, Plaintiffs, represented by
Kimberly M. Donaldson Smith -- KimDonaldsonSmith@chimicles.com --
Chimicles & Tikellis, L.L.P., Mark Wilson Williams --
dwilson@shermanhoward.com -- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Nicholas E.
Chimicles -- Nick@chimicles.com -- Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP, Scott
M. Tucker -- ScottTucker@chimicles.com -- Chimicles & Tikellis,
LLP, Stephanie Elena Saunders -- SES@chimicles.com -- Chimicles &
Tikellis, L.L.P. & Gordon W. Netzorg -- gnetzorg@shermanhoward.com
-- Sherman & Howard, L.L.C..

Charles Costello, Bruce Filipiak, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Anthony Baumann, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Kourtney Ervine, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Hans Hass, on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated, Iva Haukenes, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Brad
McHenry, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
& Linda McHenry, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiffs, represented by Gordon W. Netzorg,
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Kimberly M. Donaldson Smith, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Mark Wilson Williams,
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Nicholas E. Chimicles, Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Scott M. Tucker, Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & Stephanie Elena Saunders, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP.

Josh Seldner, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Gordon W. Netzorg,
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Kimberly M. Donaldson Smith, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Mark Wilson Williams,
Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Nicholas E. Chimicles, Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Scott M. Tucker, Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & Stephanie Elena Saunders, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP.

HomeAdvisor, Inc & IAC/Interactivecorp, and Does 1 through 10,
Defendants, represented by Alexander Christian Clayden --
aclayden@lathropgage.com -- Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Jennifer
Jackson Barrett -- jenniferbarrett@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Michelle L. Dama, Michael Best &
Friedrich LLP, Neil T. Phillips -- neilphillips@quinnemanuel.com --
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Nicholas Hoy, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Robert L. Raskopf --
robertraskopf@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
LLP, Shon Morgan, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Stephen J.
Horace -- shorace@lathropgage.com -- Michael Best & Friedrich LLP &
Stephen R. Neuwirth -- stephenneuwirth@quinnemanuel.com -- Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.

Angi Homeservices, Inc., Does 1 through 11, Consol Defendant,
represented by Alexander Christian Clayden, Michael Best &
Friedrich LLP, Ben Roxborough, Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, Evan
S. Strassberg, Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, Michelle L. Dama,
Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Stephen J. Horace, Michael Best &
Friedrich LLP, Jennifer Jackson Barrett, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan LLP, Neil T. Phillips, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
LLP, Nicholas Hoy, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Robert L.
Raskopf, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Shon Morgan, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP & Stephen R. Neuwirth, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.


I.C. SYSTEM: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JENNY RYDER, as successor
in interest to ANGELINE KOSTMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-1458 (E.D. Wisc.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court for an order certifying a class, appointing the Plaintiff as
class representative, and appointing Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class
Counsel, and for such other and further relief as the Court may
deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).

I. C. System, Inc. was founded in 1941. The company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on claims and
other insurance related issues.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

INT'L SPEEDWAY: MOU Entered in Firemen's Retirement Sys. Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
International Speedway Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October 3,
2019, for the quarterly period ended August 31, 2019, that the
parties in the class action suit initiated by the Firemen's
Retirement System of St. Louis, have executed a memorandum of
understanding related to a settlement in principle of the
litigation, subject to applicable court approval.

On December 14, 2018 a putative class-action shareholder lawsuit
was filed in the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Volusia County,
Florida the Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis.

The complaint names as defendants: the Company, its directors, its
CFO, NASCAR Holdings and certain of the Family Stockholders, and it
alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the
Merger Agreement and for aiding and abetting those alleged
breaches.

The parties to the litigation have executed a memorandum of
understanding related to a settlement in principle of the
litigation, subject to applicable court approval.

The Company currently maintains Directors & Officers Insurance.

International Speedway said, "Applicable insurance policies contain
certain customary limitations, conditions and exclusions and are
subject to a self-insured retention amount."

International Speedway Corporation is an owner of motorsports
entertainment facilities and promoter of motorsports themed
entertainment activities in the United States. The Company's
motorsports themed event operations consist of racing events at its
motorsports entertainment facilities. The company is based in
Daytona Beach, Florida.


INTELENET AMERICA: Employees Seek Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------
ANJELICA PICKETT, TAYLOR FETT and MINDY CHURCH, individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v.
INTELENET AMERICA LLC (d/b/a Intelenet Global Services), Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-04574 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 3, 2019) is a collective and
class action brought by Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of
all similarly situated persons employed by Defendant arising from
Defendant's willful violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
among other laws.

Defendant operates at least two brick-and-mortar call centers from
campus locations in Campbellsville, Kentucky and Fort Wayne,
Indiana. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as non-exempt hourly
call center employees (referred to as "customer service
representatives" or "CSRs").

The Defendant requires its hourly CSRs to work a full-time
schedule, plus overtime. However, Defendant does not compensate
CSRs for all work performed; instead, Defendant only pays the CSRs
after they have loaded several essential software programs on their
computers and are available to accept calls. This policy results in
CSRs not being paid for all time worked, including overtime.

The Defendant knew or could have easily determined how long it
takes the CSRs to complete their off-the-clock work, and Defendant
could have properly compensated Plaintiffs and the putative
Collective and Class for this work, but did not. In addition,
Plaintiffs and other CSRs were victims of Defendant's common policy
of failing to incorporate their "Incentive" and shift differential
pay into their regular rates of pay, for purposes of calculating
their hourly overtime rates. As a result, there were many weeks
throughout the statutory period in which Plaintiff and other CSRs
received an hourly rate for overtime hours of less than "one and
one-half times their regular rate," in violation of the FLSA, says
the complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jason T. Brown, Esq.
     Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
     BROWN, LLC
     111 Town Square Place, Suite 400
     Jersey City, NJ 07310
     Phone: (877) 561-0000
     Fax: (855) 582-5297
     Email: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
            nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com

          - and -

     Jason J. Thompson, Esq.
     Rod M. Johnston, Esq.
     SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
     One Towne Square, 17th Floor
     Southfield, MI 48076
     Phone: (248) 355-0300
     Email: jthompson@sommerspc.com


JOHN L LOEB: Martins De Melo Seeks to Recover Unpaid Min., OT Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------------
DOMINGOS S. MARTINS DE MELO and NUVIANA LEBOWITZ, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated v. JOHN L. LOEB, JR.
ASSOCIATES, INC. (D/B/A JOHN L. LOEB JR.), JOHN LANGELOTH LOEB JR.,
and SHARON HANDLER LOEB, Case No. 1:19-cv-08872 (S.D.N.Y., Sept.
24, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York
Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Defendants.  The
Plaintiffs were employed as chefs or cooks, and live-in houseman at
the Defendants' private residence.

The Defendants own, operate, or control their residence, previously
located at 237 East 61st Street, in New York City, and at 480 Park
Avenue Apt. 21H, in New York City, New York, and currently located
at 194 Anderson Hill Road, in Purchase, New York. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


JONES SEPTIC: Joint Bid to Certify Class in Rumph Suit Granted
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Hugh Lawson grants the parties' motion to conditionally
certify the lawsuit titled KENNETH RUMPH v. JONES SEPTIC TANK,
INC., RODERICK B. JONES, and RODERICK H. JONES, Case No.
7:19-cv-00085-HL (M.D. Ga.) as a collective action; require
production of contact information and distribution of the class
member opt-in notice; and stay certain deadlines pending a
mediation settlement conference in the case.

Judge Lawson ruled that this class of potential opt-in plaintiffs
in this action is conditionally certified under the Fair Labor
Standards Act to the extent such individuals allege that the
Defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation for all time
worked in excess of 40 hours in one or more workweeks during the
appropriate limitations period:

     Each person who worked as an hourly employee of Jones Septic
     Tank, Inc., at any time during the previous three years.

The Defendants shall provide to the Plaintiff's counsel the name
and last-known home address found in the Defendants' records for
each member of the Class as soon as practically possible.  The
Plaintiff's counsel shall mail the Notice attached to Parties'
Consent Motion to each member of the Class.

Eligible class members will have 45 days to join this lawsuit.  The
45-day opt-in period will begin September 28, 2019, and end
November 12, 2019.  The Parties shall begin their mediated
settlement conference immediately following the expiration of the
class opt-in period, and Parties must complete mediation within 45
days.

The Court will not consider the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
pending Parties' mediated settlement conference.  The discovery
period in this case is stayed pending the Parties' mediated
settlement conference, as are any subsequent deadlines.  The Court
directed the Parties to file a status report regarding the results
of their efforts to settle this dispute within seven days
immediately following the conclusion of their mediated settlement
conference.[CC]

JUUL LABS: Faces JW Suit Over Nicotine Addiction From JUULpods
--------------------------------------------------------------
J.W., a minor, individually by his mother and natural guardian
Natasha Welch, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
JUUL LABS, INC., Case No. 4:19-cv-00665-BSM (E.D. Ark., Sept. 25,
2019), is brought on behalf of those who used a JUUL e-cigarette or
related JUUL product in the state of Arkansas alleging violations
of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

J.W. understood from JUUL Labs' marketing and promotional efforts
that the JUULpods he was using would not be harmful to his health
and were not addictive, according to the complaint.  However, the
Plaintiff alleges, he became addicted to nicotine and has been
exposed to toxic chemicals like formaldehyde and propylene glycol,
among others.

Plaintiff J.W. is a minor and Natasha Welch is his mother and
natural guardian.  Beginning at the age of 14, J.W. began
"JUULing."  JUULing refers to the use of specific electronic vaping
devices that JUUL Labs makes.

JUUL Labs is a Delaware corporation having its principal place of
business in California.  JUUL designs, manufactures, markets,
promotes, distributes, and sells JUUL branded vaping devices and
JUULpods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nelson G. Wolff, Esq.
          Jerome J. Schlichter, Esq.
          Kristine K. Kraft, Esq.
          Scott H. Morgan, Esq.
          SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP
          100 South 4th Street, Suite 1200
          St. Louis, MO 63012
          Telephone: (314) 621-6115
          Facsimile: (314) 621-6151
          E-mail: nwolff@uselaws.com
                  jschlichter@uselaws.com
                  kkraft@uselaws.com
                  smorgan@uselaws.com


KINDEST CARE: Smith Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------
Annette Smith, individually, on behalf of all others similarly
situated and as class representatives, Plaintiff, v. KINDEST CARE
HEALTHCARE, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-04568-MMB (E.D. Pa.,
Oct. 3, 2019) is a complaint on behalf of herself and other current
and former employees of Defendant who elect to opt into this action
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, seeking back wages from
Defendant for overtime work for which Plaintiff did not receive
overtime premium pay pursuant to the FLSA. Plaintiff also complains
that she is owed wages, overtime premium pay and/or sales
commission under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

Plaintiff and her similarly situated co-workers regularly work
and/or worked in excess of 40 hours in the workweek. However,
Plaintiff and her co-workers were and/or are not paid overtime
premium pay for all work hours in excess of 40 hours in the
workweek, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant from approximately October 28, 2018
until approximately June 14, 2019.

Kindest Care Healthcare, LLC provides home care services, including
nurses and home health aides, to persons whom because of age or
infirmity, are unable to care for themselves in Philadelphia and
its suburbs.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Jonathan A. Bernstein, Esq.
     MEENAN & ASSOCIATES, LLC
     299 Broadway, Suite 1310
     New York, NY 10007
     Phone: (212) 226-7334
     Email: jb@meenanesqs.com

          - and -

     Christopher Q. Davis, Esq.
     LAW OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER Q. DAVIS
     80 Broad Street, Suite 703
     New York, NY 10004
     Phone: (646) 430-7930


KOHN LAW FIRM: Certification of Class Sought in Luna Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
Modesta Luna moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled MODESTA LUNA, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S.C.,
Case No. 2:19-cv-01464-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the
Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the
Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


KOZENY & McCUBBIN: Sevela Seeks Certification of FDCPA Class
------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit captioned JAMES SEVELA, Personal
Representative of the Estate of BRYCE J. BOLEN, deceased, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated v. KOZENY & McCUBBIN,
L.C., and JOHN DOES, Case No. 8:18-cv-00390-LSC-SMB (D. Neb.), asks
the Court to enter an order certifying this case to proceed as a
class action for a class defined as:

     (i) all persons with addresses in Nebraska (ii) to whom
     Defendant Kozeny & McCubbin, L.C. ("K&M") sent a letter in
     the form of Exhibit A (iii) which were not returned as
     undeliverable; (iv) in an attempt to collect a debt incurred
     for personal, family, or household purposes as shown by
     Defendant's or the creditors' records (v) allegedly due for
     a home mortgage (vi) during the one year prior to the filing
     of this litigation, i.e.--August 16, 2017 through August 16,
     2018.

Mr. Sevela contends that he filed this purported class action for
the Defendant's purported violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.  He asserts that the factual issue common to each
class member is that the Defendant sent them a letter in an attempt
to collect an alleged unpaid home mortgage, which letter failed to
inform the consumer that the alleged debt would be assumed valid
only "by the debt collector" and, therefore, violated the
FDCPA.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Pamela A. Car, Esq.
          William L. Reinbrecht, Esq.
          CAR & REINBRECHT, P.C., LLO
          8720 Frederick Street, Suite 105
          Omaha, NE 68124
          Telephone: (402) 391-8484
          Facsimile: (402) 391-1103
          E-mail: pacar@cox.net
                  billr205@gmail.com

               - and -

          O. Randolph Bragg, Esq.
          HORWITZ, HORWITZ & ASSOC.
          25 East Washington St., Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 372-8822
          Facsimile: (312) 372-1673
          E-mail: rand@horwitzlaw.com

Defendant Kozeny & McCubbin, L.C., is represented by:

          Joshua C. Dickinson, Esq.
          Shilee T. Mullin, Esq.
          SPENCER FANE LLP
          13520 California Street, Suite 290
          Omaha, NE 68154
          Telephone: (402) 547-5519
          E-mail: jdickinson@spencerfane.com
                  smullin@spencerfane.com


L'OREAL USA: Ct. Narrows Claims in Defective Hair Relaxer Kit Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, Northern Division issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motions for
Summary Judgment in the case captioned ANGELA CARTER, ELLA VALRIE,
and DORA BLACKMON, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. L'OREAL USA, INC., and SOFT SHEEN-CARSON,
LLC, Defendants, Civil Act. No. 2:16-cv-508-TFM-B.

The motions are GRANTED as to Count II, Violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; Count III, breach of express warranty;
Count IV, breach of implied warranty; and Count V, violation of the
Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, rules the Court.  

Plaintiff Angela Carter filed this action, on behalf of herself and
similarly situated individuals, raising various claims against the
defendants, L'Oreal USA, Inc. and Soft Sheen-Carson, LLC. Cases
brought by other plaintiffs eventually were consolidated with
Carter's. In a second amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert various
claims against Defendants in relation to the Amla Legend
Rejuvenating Ritual Relaxer Kit (relaxer kit), a hair-relaxer kit
marketed primarily to African American women and sold nationally
through various retailers under the Soft Sheen-Carson Optimum Salon
Haircare brand. The product is promoted as an "easy no-mix, no-lye
relaxer kit that ensures an easier relaxing process for unified
results and superior respect for hair fiber integrity," and a
"secret ritual for hair rejuvenation" with "intense moisture [that]
will rejuvenate every strand, leaving you with thicker-looking,
healthier hair," and with "unique properties [that] prevent
breakage, restore shine, manageability and smoothness." However,
Plaintiffs allege that, contrary to those assertions, the relaxer
kit causes significant hair loss and skin and scalp irritation,
including burns and blistering, due to an inherent design or
manufacturing defect.

In their operative complaint, Plaintiffs assert six claims against
Defendants: (1) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15
U.S.C. Sections 2301-2312 (Count II); (2) breach of express
warranty (Count III); (3) breach of implied warranty (Count IV);
(4) violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("ADTPA"), ALA. CODE Sections 8-19-1 through -15 (Count V); (5)
fraud (Count VI); and (6) negligent design and failure to warn
(Count VII). Paintiffs seek damages and equitable remedies on
behalf of themselves and the putative class of consumers who bought
the relaxer kit.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and a motion to
appoint class counsel on December 7, 2018. That same day,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal or
partial dismissal of all the claims asserted by Plaintiffs as well
as all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and punitive
damages.
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed their amended motion for class
certification and amended motion to appoint class counsel, which
superseded the prior motions and remain pending on the docket. On
September 3, 2019, Defendants filed an amended motion for summary
judgment that incorporates by reference the prior motion.

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to contest the following
arguments: (1) Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss and Alabama warranty
claims fail because Plaintiffs failed to give notice and an
opportunity to cure (2) Plaintiffs' implied-warranty claim is
subsumed by their theory of a safety defect and (3) Plaintiffs'
ADTPA claim is barred by either Plaintiffs' pursuit of common-law
remedies or the statute of limitation.  

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs fail to properly counter
Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs cannot show reasonable
reliance on any alleged deception by Defendants, an essential
element for fraud.  

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs failed to counter Defendants'
argument that Plaintiffs could not establish negligence because:
(1) they failed to demonstrate a duty to consumers because the
dangers of the product were known (2) Plaintiffs cannot establish
breach because they cannot show, inter alia, that the product is
defective or unreasonably dangerous, or that there is a defect in
the warnings or instructions and (3) Plaintiffs failed to dispute
that individual plaintiffs neglected the product's safety
instructions in various ways, resulting in misuse.

In their response to Defendants' amended motion, Plaintiffs concede
that their individual fraud claims are not appropriate for class
consideration, but assert that their negligence and/or wantonness
claims should be certified. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, as amended, fails to establish there
are no undisputed issues of material fact that entitle Defendants
to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' fraud and negligence
claims.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court's exclusion of some opinions
proffered by Plaintiffs' expert Randall Tackett is not dispositive,
and that expert testimony is not required to demonstrate that the
relaxer kit's packaging is misbranded, false, and misleading to a
lay observer.  

Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that a jury may use common sense to
determine whether Defendants breached their duties under the FDCA
and FPLA and whether Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct
constitutes negligence and/or wantonness.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A factual dispute alone
is not enough to defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment
only the existence of a genuine issue of material fact will
preclude a grant of summary judgment.

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails
to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required
by Rule 56(c), the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly
support or address the fact (2) consider the fact undisputed for
purposes of the motion (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials including the facts considered undisputed show
that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other
appropriate order.

First, however, the Court shall address the issue of abandonment
raised by Defendants in their reply to Plaintiffs' response to the
initial summary judgment motion, and again in their amended summary
judgment motion, specifically, their assertion that Plaintiffs have
abandoned four of their six remaining causes of action: (1)
violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count II) (2) breach
of express warranty (Count III) (3) breach of implied warranty
(Count IV)  and (4) violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (Count V). Each cause of action will be addressed in
turn.

Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Count II)

In their motion, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims under
Magnuson-Moss fail because Plaintiffs do not allege that they
provided Defendants a reasonable opportunity to cure any alleged
warranty breaches prior to bringing suit. Magnuson-Moss provides
that no action may be brought for failure to comply with any
obligation under any written or implied warranty or service
contract  unless the person obligated under the warranty or service
contract is afforded a reasonable opportunity to cure such failure
to comply.

In the case of a class action, notice must be provided by the named
members of the class.  
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs never directly notified Defendants
of the defects prior to filing this suit, and as such, they did not
afford Defendants a reasonable opportunity to repair the defects.


In the operative complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew
or were placed on reasonable notice of the defects in the Product
and their breach of the warranty but have failed to cure the
defects for the Plaintiff and putative Class Members despite having
several years to do so.

Although Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew or were placed on
notice of the alleged defect in the relaxer kit, this assertion
merely imputes to Defendants a general knowledge of the defect from
some indirect source. Plaintiffs do not allege that they,
specifically and directly, gave such notice, as required.

As Defendants note, Plaintiffs raise no objection to or argument
against Defendants' assertion, either in their response to the
original motion for summary judgment or in their response to
Defendants' amended summary judgment motion, nor do they point to
any record evidence to dispute it. As such, the claim has been
abandoned.  

Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted as to Count II.

Violation of express and implied warranties (Counts III-IV)

As with the Magnuson-Moss claim, Defendants assert that they are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims that they
violated express and implied warranties because Plaintiffs did not
provide notice of the alleged violation. Under Alabama law, a buyer
must within a reasonable time after she discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from
any remedy.  

Here again, Plaintiffs do not assert that they provided notice
prior to bringing suit, nor do Plaintiffs raise any argument to
counter Defendants assertions or point to any evidence in the
record creating a factual dispute. Additionally, Plaintiffs meet
the definition of buyer under the statute, as they allege in the
complaint that Plaintiff Carter and the putative Class Members
purchased the Product either directly from the Defendants or
through authorized retailers such as Amazon, Wal-Mart, Walgreens,
and/or beauty supply and cosmetics stores, among others. Plaintiffs
also aver that Plaintiff purchased the Product from
softsheen-carson.com in or around May 2014.

Plaintiffs allege in the complaint that Defendants were further
provided reasonable notice of the aforementioned Product defects
and their breach of the above-described warranties via direct
communications and complaints from consumers who reported Injuries
sustained as a result of using the Product as directed by
Defendants and Defendants were provided further notice of the
Product defects and the breach of warranties via the hundreds of
consumer complaints, including complaints from putative Class
Members, posted on various websites, including, but not limited to,
Amazon.com.

However, Plaintiffs allege only that Defendants had notice of the
alleged breach, not that they directly provided notice in
compliance with the statute prior to bringing suit.

Moreover, Plaintiffs raise no argument against Defendants'
assertions in their responses to the motion for summary judgment or
the amended motion for summary judgment, nor do Plaintiffs identify
any record evidence to refute them.

Accordingly, the claims have been abandoned and summary judgment is
due to be granted as to Counts III and IV.

Violation of the ADTPA (Count V)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims under the ADTPA are
cumulative of their fraud claims and must therefore be dismissed.
Under the ADTPA's savings clause, the civil remedies provided
herein and the civil remedies available at common law, by statute
or otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression of
material facts or fraudulent concealment are mutually exclusive.
The statute goes on to state that an election to pursue the civil
remedies prescribed under the ADTPA shall exclude and be a
surrender of all other rights and remedies available at common law,
by statute or otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit,
suppression of material facts or fraudulent concealment. Although
the ADTPA does `not displace remedies for fraud, misrepresentation,
deceit, or suppression that are available under the common law,
statute, or otherwise the remedies under the ADTPA and those
otherwise available are mutually exclusive.

Here, Plaintiffs again raise no argument in their responses to the
summary judgment motions in defense of their ADTPA claim. Moreover,
permitting Plaintiffs to plead ADTPA in addition to their fraud
claim would run contrary to the plain language of the statute and
enlarge a substantive right that is limited by state law.

Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted as to Count V.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum Opinion and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y6lrj9ul from Leagle.com

Angela Carter & Dora Blackmon, Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph L.
Tucker , Jackson & Tucker, P.C., Black Diamond Building, 2229 First
Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 35203, W. Lewis Garrison, Jr.
-wlgarrison@hgdlawfirm.com - Heninger Garrison Davis LLC, Brandy
Lee Robertson -brandy@hgdlawfirm.com - Heninger Garrison Davis LLC,
Honza Jan Ferdin Prchal  - hprchal@hgdlawfirm.com - Heninger
Garrison Davis LLC, K. Stephen Jackson , Jackson & Tucker, P.C. ,
Black Diamond Building, 2229 First Avenue North, Birmingham, AL
35203 & William L. Bross, IV , Heninger Garrison Davis LLC. 2224
First Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 35203

Ella B Valrie, Plaintiff, represented by Brandy Lee Robertson ,
Heninger Garrison Davis LLC, Joseph L. Tucker , Jackson & Tucker,
P.C., Honza Jan Ferdin Prchal , Heninger Garrison Davis LLC &
William L. Bross, IV , Heninger Garrison Davis LLC.

L'Oreal USA, Inc. & Soft Sheen-Carson, LLC, Defendants, represented
by M.D. Scully – mscully@grsm.com -Gordon & Rees LLP, pro hac
vice, Leslie K. Eason - leason@grsm.com Gordon & Rees & Peter G.
Siachos - psiachos@grsm.com- Gordon & Rees, pro hac vice.

Thomas Spires, Mediator, pro se.

LAZY DOG: Faces Van Meter Suit in California Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit is ongoing against Lazy Dog Restaurants. The
case is captioned as Alexander Van Meter On behalf of all others
similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Lazy Dog Restaurants, LLC a
California limited liability company, and Does 1-50, the
Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00262207-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Aug.
5, 2019). The suit alleges employment-related issues.

Lazy Dog Restaurant & Bar is a casual dining, multi-unit restaurant
concept headquartered in Southern California.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Isandra Fernandez, Esq.
          10045 SW 111th St.
          Miami, FL 33176-3462
          Telephone: (305) 439-7872
          Facsimile: (305) 270-3203

LIBERTY POWER: Lindenbaum TCPA Suit Seeks to Stop Illegal Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERTA LINDENBAUM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, and JOHN DOE CORPORATION, Case No.
1:19-cv-02211 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 24, 2019), is brought to:

   (1) stop the Defendants' practice of placing calls using "an
       artificial or prerecorded voice" to the telephones of
       consumers nationwide, including the Plaintiff,  without
       their prior express written consent; and

   (2) obtain redress for all persons injured by their conduct,
       which violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Liberty Power is a limited liability company organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware.  Liberty Power
systemically and continuously conducts business throughout this
District, the State of Ohio, and the United States. John Doe
Corporation is a vendor of Liberty Power that did not identify
itself.  The true identity of John Doe Corporation will be revealed
during discovery and the Plaintiff will amend, or seek leave to
amend, the Complaint at that time.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam T. Savett, Esq.
          SAVETT LAW OFFICES LLC
          2764 Carole Lane
          Allentown PA 18104
          Telephone: (610) 621-4550
          Facsimile: (610) 978-2970
          E-mail: adam@savettlaw.com


LOUISIANA: AJ's Bid to Certify Class Denied as Moot Ff. Stipulation
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Brian A. Jackson denied as moot the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification in the lawsuit entitled A.J., a minor child by
and through his mother, DONNELL CREPPEL, ET AL. v. REBEKAH GEE, in
her official capacity as secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Health, ET AL., Case No. 3:19-cv-00324-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La.).

Considering the Court's Order granting the Parties' Stipulation
Regarding Class Certification, Judge Jackson denied as moot the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.[CC]


LTD FINANCIAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JENNY RYDER, as successor
in interest to ANGELINE KOSTMAN, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. LTD FINANCIAL
SERVICES, LP, the Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-1456 (E.D. Wisc.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying a class,
appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).

LTD Financial Services, L.P. provides collection and custom call
center solutions. The company offers customer care accounts, pre
charge-off collection, pre charge-off system, and commercial
collection services. LTD Financial Services operates in the United
Ststes.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

MARZEN MEDIA: Fischler Files ADA Class Action
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Marzen Media LLC. The
case is styled as Brian Fischler Individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Marzen Media LLC
doing business as: Fantasy Pros, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05724-AMD-ST (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Marzen Media LLC is in the On-line Data Base Information Retrieval
business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
     New York, NY 10017
     Phone: (212) 392-4772
     Fax: (212) 444-1030
     Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


METROPOLITAN LIFE: Court Dismisses Second Amended Miller Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DALE MILLER and JOHN F. BARTON, JR., on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a New York Corporation; and
DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 17 Civ. 7284 (AT) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Analisa Torres of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").

Plaintiffs Miller and Barton are commercial airline pilots.  At all
relevant times, Miller resided in California and Barton resided in
Colorado.  Miller has been a commercial airline pilot with United
Airlines since 1990.  As part of his employee benefits package,
Miller enrolled in a life insurance program with MetLife.  Around
March 2000, Miller was notified that his life insurance policy was
changing to a Group Variable Universal Life ("GVUL") policy.

As part of enrolling in the GVUL policy, Miller completed a GVUL
Special Enrollment Change Form.  Section 1 of this enrollment form
was labeled "Smoker/Non-Smoker Status Change."  Miller left both of
these options blank because he did not smoke and had not smoked
during the relevant period, so there was no change to report.
Shortly thereafter, MetLife began charging Miller a smoker rate for
his life insurance policy.

In October 2016, Miller decided to change the coverage on his GVUL
policy through the United Airlines employee benefits website.  He
was required to complete an online form that included a question
regarding his tobacco use for the previous five years.  He answered
that he was not a smoker.  After noting that the new price of
insurance was lower than what he had been previously paying, he
contacted MetLife customer service.

The customer service agent told Miller that he had been designated
a smoker since his GVUL policy went into effect.  Miller contacted
his union and MetLife to request a refund. Miller estimates that
MetLife's decision to designate him as a smoker resulted in a 19.7%
overcharge in premium payments.

Miller informed Barton about this experience.  After his own
investigation, Barton too realized that he had been charged smoker
rates for his life insurance.  Unlike with Miller, MetLife declined
to provide Barton with his enrollment form for the GVUL policy.
Barton, like Miller, was a non-smoker during the relevant five-year
lookback period under the policy.

The Plaintiffs initiated the action on Sept. 25, 2017.  They filed
their first amended complaint on Feb. 20, 2018, bringing claims for
breach of contract and fraud.  MetLife moved to dismiss the first
amended complaint, arguing that the claims were precluded by the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), that the
Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, and that the Plaintiffs'
claims were time-barred.

The Court referred the motion to the Hon. Sarah Netburn.  In the
report and recommendation, the Court found that the Plaintiffs'
fraud claim was precluded by SLUSA and that the Plaintiffs had
failed to state a claim for breach of contract.  The Court gave the
Plaintiffs an opportunity to file an amended complaint in order to
identify which specific contractual provision was allegedly
breached and/or to assert a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.

The Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on Jan. 4,
2019.  The SAC asserts claims for breach of contract, contractual
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
negligence.  

The Plaintiffs bring these claims on behalf of themselves as well
as putative California, Colorado, and nationwide classes,
consisting of all persons who resided in California, Colorado, or
the United States, and who entered into a contract with MetLife in
response to a Group Variable Universal Life insurance offer in
replacement of their Optional Term Life or Group Universal Life
policy, wherein the enrollment form provided for a change in smoker
status section which was left blank, and where [MetLife] charged
smoker rates despite the class members never having enrolled as
smokers.

The Plaintiffs claim that these proposed classes may be maintained
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).
MetLife moves to dismiss the SAC for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Judge Torres finds that although the Plaintiffs have amended their
complaint to avoid any ostensible allegations of fraudulent
conduct, she must acknowledge the realities underlying the claims,
and dismiss them as precluded by SLUSA.  The Plaintiffs acknowledge
that MetLife used a formula for calculating premiums that was
disclosed in the policy.  Instead, their claim hinges on the
additional allegation that MetLife's undisclosed policy of
defaulting them to smoker status induced them to enroll and pay
higher premiums than they deem appropriate.  That deception,
therefore, is a "necessary component" of their claims, which are
accordingly precluded by SLUSA.  The Plaintiffs' claims, therefore,
are dismissed because they are precluded by SLUSA.

Even if she were to find that SLUSA did not preclude the
Plaintiffs' claims, the Judge holds that the SAC should be
dismissed on alternative grounds.  MetLife argues that the
Plaintiffs have failed to state prima facie claims for breach of
contract, contractual breach of the implied covenant, tortious
breach of the implied covenant, and negligence under California and
Colorado law.  MetLife's arguments are partially convincing.  They
are correct that the SAC does not state a claim for negligence or
tortious breach of the implied covenant.  They are also correct
that the Plaintiffs' claim for contractual breach of the implied
covenant is duplicative of their claim for breach of contract.  The
Plaintiffs have, however, stated a prima facie claim for breach of
contract.

The Plaintiffs request leave to amend their SAC.  However, they
have twice amended their complaint.  The Plaintiffs amended their
original complaint after the Defendants moved to dismiss the
original complaint.  They were then granted leave to file the SAC
after their first amended complaint was dismissed.  Their claims
are, however, still barred by SLUSA and the applicable statutes of
limitations—two independent grounds.  Amending, therefore, would
likely be futile.  Because the Plaintiffs have had opportunities to
cure the defects in their complaints and because amending would
likely be futile, the Judge denied their request for leave to
amend.

For the reasons stated, Judge Torres grants MetLife's motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims.  The Clerk of Court is directed to
terminate the motion at ECF No. 104 and close the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/rkUexi from Leagle.com.

Dale Miller, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & John F. Barton, Jr., on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew John
Dressel -- andrew@dresselmalikschmitt.com -- Napoli Shkolnik PLLC,
Behram Viraf Parekh -- bparekh@yaplaw.com -- Kirtland & Packard
LLP, Joshua Fields, Kirtland & Packard LLP, pro hac vice, Michael
Louis Kelly , Kirtland & Packard LLP, Salvatore Charles Badala --
SBadala@napolilaw.com -- Napoli Shkolnik PLLC & Hunter Jay Shkolnik
-- hunter@napolilaw.com -- Napoli Shkolnik PLLC.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Edward Morris Holt --
tholt@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale, P.C., John
Michael Hintz -- jhintz@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard Cooper & Gale,
P.C. & Lee E. Bains, Jr. -- lbains@maynardcooper.com -- Maynard
Cooper & Gale, P.C..


MILE DEVELOPMENT: Faces Duncan Suit in Southern Dist. of New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mile Development
Corp. The case is captioned as Eugene Duncan And on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. Mile
Development Corp., the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-07289-VSB
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 5, 2019). The suit alleges violation of Americans
with Disabilities Act. The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge
Vernon S. Broderick.

According to a stipulation between the parties, the Defendant's
time to answer, move against, or otherwise respond to the Complaint
is extended to October 28, 2019.

Miles Development is a full service residential and commercial
construction and development company.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Telephone: (646) 770-3775
          Facsimile: (646) 867-2639
          E-mail: bmarkslaw@gmail.com

Counsel to the Defendant:

         Jennifer E. Sherven, Esq.
         Erika Hannah Rosenblum, Esq.
         Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck LLP
         Telephone: 516-681-1100
                    516-283-8764
         E-mail: jsherven@kdvlaw.com
                 erosenblum@kdvlaw.com


MONARCH RECOVERY: Strouse Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Monarch Recovery
Management, Inc. The case is styled as James W. Strouse
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05721 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc. operates as a collection agency.
The Company provides debt recovery services such as new placement
review, advanced skip tracing, and arranging promises to pay, as
well as offers speech analytics, online payment portal, full call
recording, and flexible collection systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com


NEUROBRANDS, LLC: Young, et al. Seek to Certify Class & Subclass
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as RENEE YOUNG and JOYCETTE
GOODWIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, the Plaintiffs, vs. NEUROBRANDS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, the Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-05907-JSW (N.D.
Cal.), the Plaintiffs will move the Court on Dec. 13, 2019, for an
order:

   1. certifying these class and subclass:

      Nationwide Injunctive Relief Class:

      "all U.S. citizens who made retail purchases of one of the
      following Products labeled as containing 'natural flavors'
      and 'no artificial colors or flavors' in their respective
      state of citizenship on or after January 1, 2012 and until
      the Class is certified, for personal use and not for resale,

      excluding Defendant and Defendant's officers, directors,
      employees, agents and affiliates, and the Court and its
      staff:

       -- NeuroSONIC Superfruit Infusion;
       -- NeuroSONIC Orange Passion;
       -- NeuroBLISS White Raspberry;
       -- NeuroBLISS Citrus Berry;
       -- NeuroBLISS Tropical Lychee;
       -- NeuroPROTEIN Watermelon Mint;
       -- NeuroPROTEIN Cherry Vanilla;
       -- NeuroDAILY Tangerine Citrus; and
       -- NeuroGASM Passion Fruit"; and

      California Injunctive Relief SubClass:

      "all California citizens who made retail purchases of one of
      the following Products labeled as containing 'natural
      flavors' and 'no artificial colors or flavors' in California

      on or after January 1, 2012 and until the Class is
      certified, for personal use and not for resale, excluding
      Defendant and Defendant's officers, directors, employees,
      agents and affiliates, and the Court and its staff:

       -- NeuroSONIC Superfruit Infusion;
       -- NeuroSONIC Orange Passion;
       -- NeuroBLISS White Raspberry;
       -- NeuroBLISS Citrus Berry;
       -- NeuroBLISS Tropical Lychee;
       -- NeuroPROTEIN Watermelon Mint;
       -- NeuroPROTEIN Cherry Vanilla;
       -- NeuroDAILY Tangerine Citrus; and
       -- NeuroGASM Passion Fruit;" and

   2. appointing the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron as Class
      Counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g).

The case is a simple consumer fraud action in which a Nationwide
Class and California subclass allege that Defendant Neurobrands,
LLC deceptively markets, advertises, and sells Neuro beverage
Products (Neuro Products) labeled as containing "natural flavors"
and "no artificial colors or flavors."[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Classes are:

          Ronald A. Marron, Esq.
          Michael T. Houchin, Esq.
          Lilach Halperin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON
          651 Arroyo Drive
          San Diego, CA 92103
          Telephone: (619) 696-9006
          Facsimile: (619) 564-6665
          E-mail: ron@consumersadvocates.com
                  mike@consumersadvocates.com
                  lilach@consumersadvocates.com

NEW BEAUTY MEDIA: Tatum-Rios Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against New Beauty Media
Group, LLLP. The case is styled as Lynette Tatum-Rios Individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
New Beauty Media Group, LLLP, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09383
(S.D. N.Y., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Newbeauty Media Group, LLLP was founded in 2004. The company's line
of business includes commercial or job printing such as bags,
business forms, calendars, cards, and other printed material.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
     New York, NY 10170
     Phone: (212) 764-7171
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


NORTH CAROLINA: Class of Sex Offenders Certified in Grabarczyk Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Terrence W. Boyle of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, Western Division, granted the
Plaintiff's motions pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for class certification and to appoint class
counsel in the case captioned KENNETH S. GRABARCZYK, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. JOSHUA STEIN,
Attorney General of the State of North Carolina, in his official
capacity; BOB SCHURMEIER, Director of the North Carolina State
Bureau of Investigation, in his official capacity; SEAN BOONE,
District Attorney of Alamance County, North Carolina, in his
official capacity; Defendants, Case No. 5:19-CV-48-BO (E.D. N.C.).

The Plaintiff's proposed class is comprised of all persons placed
on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry solely on the basis of
an offense committed in a state other than North Carolina and who
both committed the predicate offense prior to Dec. 1, 2006, and
moved into the state of North Carolina prior to Dec. 1, 2006.

Judge Boyle finds that the class is readily identifiable and
ascertainable.  The Plaintiff has identified 1,314 class members by
using objective criteria and publicly available registry records.

He also finds that the Rule 23(a) requirements have been satisfied.
The proposed class, comprised of 1,314 individuals, plainly
satisfies the numerosity requirement.  Also, the dispositive
question for each class member is whether, as it relates to the
putative class of persons, the State of North Carolina's process
for making a determination of substantial similarity resulting in a
person's placement on the sex offender registry comports with due
process.  This common question, and answer, satisfies the
commonality requirement.  Plaintiff Grabarczyk is typical of the
class in that his interests are aligned with the class; indeed, his
claim is identical to the claim of the class members. And, the
Plaintiff will adequately represent the class and the Plaintiff's
counsel is adequate to serve as the class counsel.

Finally, the Judge finds that class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) is appropriate.  The Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and
injunctive relief.  The alleged common act of the Defendants is the
failure to afford due process prior to depriving the class members
of liberties.  Because the relief sought by the Plaintiff is about
uniform injunctive or declaratory remedies, certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Boyle granted the Plaintiff's
motions for class certification and to appoint the class counsel.
The class is defined as all persons placed on the North Carolina
Sex Offender Registry solely on the basis of an offense committed
in a state other than North Carolina and who both committed the
predicate offense prior to Dec. 1, 2006, and moved into the state
of North Carolina prior to Dec. 1, 2006.  The counsel for the
Plaintiff is appointed as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/UufteA from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Grabarczyk, Plaintiff, represented by Paul M. Dubbeling --
paul.dubbeling@pmdubbeling.com -- P.M. Dubbeling, PLLC.

Mr. Joshua Stein, Attorney General of the State of North Carolina
in his official capacity & Bob Schurmeier, Director of the North
Carolina State Bureau of Investigation in his official capacity,
Defendants, represented by Jason Paul Caccamo -- jcaccamo@ncdoj.gov
-- NC Department of Justice, Tamika L. Henderson, North Carolina
Deptartment of Justice & Tammera Sudderth Hill -- thill@ncdoj.gov
-- North Carolina Deptartment of Justice.

Sean Boone, District Attorney of Alamance County, North Carolina in
his official capacity, Defendant, represented by Anna M. Davis --
amdavis@ncdoj.gov -- NC Department of Justice & Tamika L.
Henderson, North Carolina Department of Justice.

OPHTHOTECH CORP: Bid to Dismiss Micholle Securities Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANK MICHOLLE, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. OPHTHOTECH CORPORATION,
DAVID R. GUYER, and SAMIR PATEL, Defendants, Case No. 17-CV-210
(VSB) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vernon S. Broderick of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York (i) denied the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim, and (ii) granted in part and denied
in part the Plaintiff's motion to strike certain documents the
Defendants submitted in connection with their motion to dismiss.

In the putative class action, Lead Plaintiff Sheet Metal Workers'
Pension Plan of Southern California, Arizona and Nevada claims that
Defendants Ophthotech and Ophthotech co-founders David R. Guyer and
Samir Patel violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by making materially false and misleading
statements regarding the parameters and results of clinical studies
for Fovista, a new drug developed by Ophthotech to treat macular
degeneration.

Defendant Ophthotech is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company
which, during the proposed class period from March 2, 2015 through
Dec. 12, 2016, was focused on developing the drug Fovista for the
treatment of wet age-related macular degeneration ("Wet AMD").
During the Class Period, Defendant Guyer served as Ophthotech's CEO
and Chairman of the Board of Directors, and Defendant Patel served
as Ophthotech's President and Vice Chairman.  Ophthotech designed
Fovista to be used in combination with anti-vascular endothelial
growth factor ("anti-VEGF") drugs, which are commonly used to treat
wet AMD.  

In order to secure approval from the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, a new drug must typically undergo three phases of
clinical trials.  In June 2012, Ophthotech completed a Phase 2b
clinical trial of Fovista, which evaluated the efficacy of Fovista
administered in combination with Lucentis, as compared to Lucentis
alone.  

On June 13, 2012, Ophthotech announced the results of the Phase 2b
Trial, which measured improvement in participants' visual acuity by
counting the number of additional letters trial participants gained
on an "Early Treatment Diabetic Retinopathy Study ("ETDRS") eye
chart, a standardized chart used for vision testing," at the
conclusion of the 24-week trial period.  The June 13, 2012 press
release did not specify that at the start of the trial, those
patients in the Lucentis monotherapy control group had lesions
which, on average, were approximately 17% larger than the lesions
of those patients in the Fovista combination therapy group.

Following the apparent success of the Phase 2b Trial, Ophthotech
completed its initial public offering on Sept. 30, 2013, raising
hundreds of millions of dollars to finance the third phase of the
Fovista clinical trials.  Ophthotech launched the Phase 3 Trial in
August 2013.  Like the Phase 2b Trial, the Phase 3 Trial enrolled a
group of patients who received Fovista combination therapy, as well
as a control group of patients who received Lucentis monotherapy.

On Dec. 12, 2016, Ophthotech announced the results of the Phase 3
Trial, and informed investors that no benefit was observed upon the
addition of Fovista(R) to monthly Lucentis(R) regimen for the
treatment of wet AMD.  The price of Ophthotech common stock
subsequently plummeted approximately 86%, from a closing price of
$38.77 per share on Dec. 9, 2016 to a closing price of $5.29 per
share on Dec. 12, 2016.  During the Class Period, both Defendants
Guyer and Patel sold a majority (66.3% and 82.2%, respectively) of
their personally-held Ophthotech common stock, "for proceeds of"
approximately $22.6 million and $22.9 million, respectively.

After announcing the results of the Phase 3 Trial, Ophthotech
terminated its Fovista clinical program, and Defendants Guyer and
Patel both stepped down from their positions at the company,
although Guyer transitioned to a newly created Executive Chairman
position.  As of the date of the filing of the CAC, Ophthotech
common stock was trading below $3 per share.

On Jan. 11, 2017, Plaintiff Frank Micholle filed a class action
complaint, alleging that Ophthotech and its officers and directors
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Plaintiff Mark Wasson filed a similar complaint on March 9, 2017.
Subsequently, eight Plaintiff groups filed motions requesting
consolidation of the Micholle and Wasson actions, appointment of
the Lead Plaintiff, and approval of the lead counsel.

On March 13, 2018, Judge Broderick issued an Opinion & Order
consolidating the Micholle and Wasson actions and appointing Sheet
Metal Workers' Pension Plan of Southern California, Arizona, and
Nevada as the Lead Plaintiff.  On June 4, 2018, the Plaintiff filed
a Consolidated Amended Complaint, naming Ophthotech, Guyer, and
Patel as Defendants.

On July 27, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the CAC
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted.  The Plaintiff filed
its opposition to the motion to dismiss on Oct. 12, 2018.  On the
same date, the Plaintiff moved to strike several of the exhibits
attached to the Adler Declaration.  On Nov. 19, 2018, the
Defendants filed a reply in further support of their motion to
dismiss the CAC, as well as an opposition to the Plaintiff's motion
to strike.

The Defendants argue that the CAC fails to sufficiently allege
several of the elements required to establish a violation of Rule
10b-5.  Specifically, they argue that the Plaintiff failed to plead
(A) a false or misleading statement, (B) scienter, or (C) loss
causation.

Judge Broderick finds that the Defendants' statements related to
the Phase 2(b) Trial are not actionable, but that their statements
related to the Phase 3 Trial are sufficient to support a securities
fraud claim.  He holds that the CAC fails to satisfactorily allege
that Defendants' statements regarding the success of the Phase 2b
Trial were materially misleading.  However, unlike the Plaintiff's
claims regarding the Phase 2b Trial -- which lacked any
well-pleaded allegations suggesting that the Defendants'
description of the trial's success was inaccurate -- documents
undisputedly incorporated into the CAC by reference tend to
contradict the Defendants' repeated assertions that they made no
significant changes to the inclusion and exclusion criteria between
Phase 2b and Phase 3 of the Fovista clinical trials.

Ultimately, although the Defendants disclosed a change in the
"methodology" used to determine a patient's eligibility to
participate in the Phase 3 Trial, they described this change in
complex and opaque terms and then repeatedly insisted that,
practically speaking, the modification had no material effect on
the trial's enrollment criteria.  This emphasis on the lack of a
material effect diminishes the impact of the Defendants'
disclosure.  Moreover, the Plaintiff has identified evidence which
calls the Defendants' characterization into question and which
suggests that the change in methodology may well have led to a
corresponding change in the pool of individuals eligible to
participate in Phase 3 of the Fovista clinical trials.  The Judge
therefore finds that the CAC satisfactorily alleges that the
Defendants' comparisons between the Phase 2b and Phase 3 enrollment
criteria amount to actionable misrepresentations under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

Having found that the CAC sufficiently alleges that Defendants made
materially false or misleading statements with respect to the
enrollment criteria for Phase 3 of the Fovista clinical trials, the
Judge next turns to the question of whether the facts alleged give
rise to a "strong inference" of scienter.  While he agree with the
Defendants that the Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to
plausibly suggest that Defendants had the motive and opportunity to
commit fraud, he finds that the Plaintiff does identify sufficient
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness to plead
scienter.  The Plaintiff has not established a strong inference of
scienter under the "motive and opportunity" prong, and the factual
allegations set forth in the CAC are sufficient to draw the
requisite "strong inference" of scienter.

Finally, the Defendants contend that the CAC fails to adequately
allege loss causation.  To the contrary, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff satisfactorily alleges that the risk concealed by the
Defendants' misleading statements regarding the enrollment criteria
for the Phase 3 Trial materialized, thereby causing the Plaintiff's
loss.  He finds that the Plaintiff's allegations that the
Defendants' misrepresentations concealed an increased risk that the
Phase 3 Trial would fail, followed by the actual failure of that
trial, are sufficient to plead loss causation at the motion to
dismiss stage.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Broderick granted in part the
Plaintiff's motion to strike, and denied the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the CAC.  The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to
terminate the motions pending at Docket Entries 69 and 75.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/criZhA from Leagle.com.

Sheet Metal Workers' Pension Plan of Southern California, Arizona
and Nevada, Lead Plaintiff, represented by David Avi Rosenfeld --
DRosenfeld@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Erin
Whitney Boardman -- eboardman@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP & Lindsay La Marca -- LLaMarca@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Frank Micholle, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Shannon Lee Hopkins --
shopkins@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

Ophthotech Corporation, David R. Guyer & Samir Patel, Defendants,
represented by Fraser Lee Hunter, Jr. --
FRASER.HUNTER@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr
LLP, Jeremy Todd Adler -- JEREMY.ADLER@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP & Michael G. Bongiorno --
MICHAEL.BONGIORNO@WILMERHALE.COM -- Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP.


OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Class of Wisconsin Residents Certified in Nagan
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William C. Griesbach issued a decision and order in the
lawsuit entitled STACY NAGAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. OPTIO SOLUTIONS LLC, d/b/a Qualia
Collection Services, Case No. 1:19-cv-00170-WCG (E.D. Wisc.),
granting the Plaintiff's motion for class certification.

The certified class is defined as:

    "All persons with a Wisconsin address to whom Optio
     Solutions, LLC mailed an initial written communication, in
     the form of Exhibit A to the Complaint, between February 1,
     2018 and February 22, 2019, which was not returned as
     undeliverable."

The counsel of record for the Plaintiff is appointed as class
counsel.  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the class
counsel shall provide the court with a proposed notice to be
provided to potential class members consistent with Rule
23(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Class
counsel shall consult with counsel for the Defendant before
submitting the proposed notice.

Plaintiff Stacy Nagan filed this action alleging Defendant Optio
Solutions LLC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) by sending her a debt collection letter that was deceptive
and misleading to an unsophisticated consumer.[CC]


OS RESTAURANT: No Conditional Class Certification in Chavira Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
issued a Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Notice
and Conditional Certification in the case captioned CARLOS CHAVIRA,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. OS RESTAURANT SERVICES, LLC and BLOOMIN' BRANDS,
INC., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-cv-10029-ADB.

Named plaintiff Carlos Chavira filed this putative collective
action against OS Restaurant Services, LLC and Bloomin' Brands,
Inc., together doing business as Outback Steakhouse, asserting
violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and the payment frequency provision of the Massachusetts
Wage Act (Wage Act). The opt-in plaintiffs in this case assert that
they worked as Front of House (FOH) Managers at Outback Steakhouse
restaurants in various states and allege that Defendants
misclassified them as exempt from the overtime requirements of the
FLSA.
  
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Notice and Conditional Certification
Under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) which seeks an order authorizing
notice and conditionally certifying a collective action consisting
of all current and former Front of House Managers employed by
Defendants in the United States of America in Defendants' Outback
Restaurants at any time from January 16, 2013 to the present.

Legal Standard

The FLSA permits employees to sue their employers on behalf of
themselves and other employees similarly situated. The FLSA,
however, instructs that no employee shall be a party plaintiff to
any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become
such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.

To qualify for conditional certification for purpose of notice
under the FLSA, the putative class members must be similarly
situated' with the named plaintiffs.

The two-tier or two-stage approach requires a court to make both a
preliminary, stage one and final stage two, determination of
whether potential plaintiffs are similarly situated. A court
typically makes the preliminary determination, which is often
referred to as the notice stage, before discovery when plaintiffs
move for conditional certification. At stage one, the Court needs
only to make a preliminary finding as to whether the named
plaintiff is similarly situated to other potential plaintiffs.  

In addition, before granting conditional certification, many courts
require the identification of other similarly situated employees
who are interested in joining the putative class. This additional
burden moves the inquiry beyond the theoretical to the practical
and requires a named plaintiff to demonstrate that other potential
class members are actually interested in joining the lawsuit.
District courts in the First Circuit are split as to whether named
plaintiffs must make this additional showing before conditional
certification may be granted.  

This case is at the first step in the collective action
certification inquiry.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have had a policy and practice of
refusing to pay premium overtime compensation to their FOH Managers
and similarly situated employees in comparable positions but
holding different titles, for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per workweek. He supports his allegations with his own affidavit,
the affidavits of FOH Managers who worked at Outback Steakhouse
locations outside of Massachusetts, whose notices of consent the
Court has struck, and copies of job postings for the Managing
Partner and FOH Manager positions from different states. These
documents include a job posting for a Manager Partner position in
Massachusetts but do not contain a job posting for a FOH Managing
position in Massachusetts.

Even if the Court were to consider the affidavits submitted by
individuals who cannot opt-in to the putative collective action,
only Plaintiff's affidavit speaks to practices at Outback
Steakhouse locations in Massachusetts.  In his affidavit, Plaintiff
identifies five FOH Managers who worked at Massachusetts Outback
Steakhouse locations who he observed working more than 40 hours a
week and asserts that the Seekonk restaurant where he trained to be
an FOH Manager operated in the same way as the Framingham and
Bellingham restaurants where he also worked.

While it is true that none of the FOH Managers identified by
Plaintiff have chosen to opt-in at this time, it has not been this
Court's practice to require named plaintiffs to provide it with
names of potential class members who are actually interested in
joining the collective action, and it will not do so here.

Armed solely with Plaintiff's affidavit, the Court is faced with
making a preliminary finding at stage one as to whether he is
similarly situated to other potential plaintiffs in Massachusetts.
While recognizing that the burden at stage one requires only a
modest factual showing that the putative class members were
together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan that
violated the law,  the Court cannot make the necessary finding on
Plaintiff's representations alone. To allow a putative collective
action to proceed to the notice stage on the basis of one named
plaintiff's affidavit, without supporting documentation relevant to
Massachusetts locations, pushes an already low burden significantly
lower.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not met his burden of
demonstrating that there are similarly-situated employees in
Massachusetts and declines to grant conditional certification to
the proposed collective action at this time.

Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification is DENIED with
leave to renew if Plaintiff is later able to submit information
showing other similarly situated employees whose claims against
Defendants would not be barred on jurisdictional grounds.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2bqmvnz
from Leagle.com.

Carlos Chavira, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher M. Timmel
- Christopher.Timmel@klafterolsen.com - Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP,
pro hac vice, Deirdre A. Aaron - daaron@outtengolden.com - Outten &
Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Fran L. Rudich - frudich@klafterolsen.com
- Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, Gregg I. Shavitz -
gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com - Shavitz Law Group PA, pro hac vice, Jared
W. Goldman - jgoldman@outtengolden.com - Outten & Golden LLP, pro
hac vice, Justin M. Swartz - jms@outtengolden.com - Outten & Golden
LLP, pro hac vice, Logan A. Pardell - lpardell@shavitzlaw.com -
Shavitz Law Group, P.A., pro hac vice, Michael J. Palitz , Shavitz
Law Group, P.A., 830 3rd Ave Fl 5, New York, NY 10022-6567, pro hac
vice, Michael J. Scimone -mscimone@outtengolden.com - Outten&
Golden LLP, Seth R. Lesser - SLesser@klafterolsen.com - Klafter
Olsen & Lesser LLP, pro hac vice, Brant Casavant -
brant@fairworklaw.com - Fair Work P.C. & Hillary A. Schwab -
hillary@fairworklaw.com - Fair Work, P.C.  

OS Restaurant Services, LLC, doing business as Outback Steakhouse &
Bloomin' Brands, Inc., doing business as Outback Steakhouse,
Defendants, represented by Christopher M. Pardo
-cpardo@HuntonAK.com - Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Ellen C. Kearns -
ekearns@constangy.com - Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP &
Jonathan D. Persky - jpersky@constangy.com - Constangy, Brooks,
Smith & Prophete LLP.

PAREX USA: Ticali Seeks Overtime Pay
------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit against William Ticali has been removed to
the federal district court for the Eastern District of New York.

The case was originally filed in the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
and captioned as WILLIAM TICALI, on behalf of himself and others
situated similarly, the Plaintiff, vs. PAREX USA, INC., SUPER-TEK
INC., GARUTI JOHN and any other related individuals or entities,
the Defendants, Case 609539/2019 (N.Y. Sup.).  The lawsuit alleges
that the Defendants have willfully withheld wages from the
Plaintiff and others similarly situated by failing to pay for all
hours worked, including overtime in excess of 40 hours in any given
week pursuant to the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.  The notice of removal was filed Aug. 5 and the case
is now proceeding under No. 2:19-cv-04497-DLI-PK.

Ticali was employed at Super-Trek from approximately November 1993
through approximately November, 2017. Ticali worked his way from
Nigh Shift Manager to Director of Plant Operations, a position that
he held for more than 10 years.

Ticali regularly worked in excess 40 hours per week without
receiving overtime compensation, the lawsuit says.

Parex USA, Inc. is the U.S. subsidiary of Materis, a 1.6 billion
euro worldwide company with four core businesses servicing the
construction industry. ParexLahabra Inc. is made up of six branded
product lines; Parex, LaHabra Stucco, El Rey Stucco, Teifs,
Mer-Krete, and Mer-Ko.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          LABONTE LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1461 Franklin Ave., Ste. LLS
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 280-8580
          Facsimile: (631) 794 2434

Counsel to the Defendant:

          Jeffrey Spiegel, Esq.
          Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP
          Telephone: 212-232-1300
          E-mail: jeffrey.spiegel@lewisbrisbois.com

PC SHIELD: Wendell H. Stone Co. Seeks to Certify TCPA Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as WENDELL H. STONE COMPANY,
INC. d/b/a STONE & COMPANY, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs. PC SHIELD INC., an
Oklahoma corporation, and BRANDIE M. JORDAN, an individual, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01135-AJS (W.D. Pa., Aug. 27, 2018),
the Plaintiff ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a Class of:

      "all persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
      filing of this action, (2) were sent, by Defendants or on
      Defendants’ behalf an unsolicited telephone facsimile
      message, (3) from whom Defendants claims they obtained prior

      express permission or invitation to send those faxes in the
      same manner as Defendants claim they obtained prior express
      consent to fax Plaintiff";

   2. appointing Patrick Peluso as class counsel and Plaintiff
      Stone as the class representative.

The Plaintiff brought this class action lawsuit pursuant to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005, challenging Defendants' practice of sending
unsolicited fax advertisements.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class are:

            Stuart C. Gaul, Jr., Esq.
            GAUL LEGAL LLC
            100 Ross Street, Suite 510
            Pittsburgh, PA 15219
            Telephone: 412-261-5100
            Facsimile: 412-261-5101
            E-mail: stuart.gaul@gaul-legal.com

                 - and -

            Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
            WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
            3900 East Mexico Ave., Suite 300
            Denver, CO 80210
            Telephone: (720) 213-0675
            Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
            E-mail: ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com

PIER 1: 5th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Town of Davie Police Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on October 9, 2019, for the quarterly period ended
August 31, 2019, that the dismissal of the class action suit
entitled, Town of Davie Police Pension Plan, Plaintiff, v. Pier 1
Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H. Turner,
Defendants, has been affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.

Putative class action complaints were filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas – Dallas
Division against Pier 1 Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and
Charles H. Turner in August and October 2015 alleging violations
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

The lawsuits, which were consolidated into a single action
captioned Town of Davie Police Pension Plan, Plaintiff, v. Pier 1
Imports, Inc., Alexander W. Smith and Charles H. Turner,
Defendants, were filed on behalf of a purported putative class of
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired stock of Pier 1
Imports, Inc. between April 10, 2014 and December 17, 2015.

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages purportedly caused by the
Defendants' alleged violations of the federal securities laws and
to pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

On June 25, 2018, the District Court granted the Company's motion
to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice. The plaintiffs
subsequently appealed and on August 19, 2019 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of the amended complaint.

Pier 1 Imports, Inc. engages in the retail sale of decorative
accessories, furniture, candles, housewares, gifts, and seasonal
products. The company was founded in 1962 and is headquartered in
Fort Worth, Texas.

PRIMERO MINING: 9th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Royal Wulff Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROYAL WULFF VENTURES LLC, Lead Plaintiff; ROBERT E.
COOK, as Trustee for the Robert E. Cook and Paula J. Brooks Living
Trust Under Agreement Dated 12/30/1998, Lead Plaintiff,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PRIMERO MINING CORP.; JOSEPH F. CONWAY;
DAVID BLAIKLOCK; WENDY KAUFMAN; WADE NESMITH; DAVID DEMERS; GRANT
EDEY; BRAD MARCHANT; ROBERT QUARTERMAIN; MICHAEL RILEY; ROHAN
HAZELTON; TIMO JAURISTO; EDUARDO LUNA, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 17-56367 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
putative class action complaint.

Plaintiffs Royal and Cook, as trustee of the Robert E. Cook and
Paula J. Brooks Living Trust Under An Agreement Dated 12/30/1988,
filed a putative class action in the Central District of
California, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 against Primero and 12 other named Defendants.

According to the operative complaint, Primero is a Canadian mining
company whose principal asset at the beginning of the class period
(Oct. 5, 2012 to Feb. 3, 2016) was the San Dimas gold-silver mine
in Tayoltita, Durango, Mexico.  After Primero purchased the San
Dimas mine from Goldcorp Inc. in August 2010 for $510 million,
Primero's Mexican subsidiary, Primero Empresa Minera, S.A. de C.V.
("PEM") owned and operated the San Dimas mine. Primero also
acquired a separate subsidiary from Goldcorp Inc., which it renamed
Silver Trading Barbados.

In connection with the August 2010 purchase of the San Dimas mine,
Primero also assumed the obligations of two separate amended
contracts: the Internal Silver Purchase Agreement 2004 and External
Silver Purchase Agreement 2004.  During this period, PEM computed
income taxes in Mexico based on selling all silver produced at the
San Dimas mine to Silver Trading Barbados at Spot Prices as
provided in the Internal SPA.  

During the existence of these contracts the Spot Price per ounce of
silver began to rise.  The Internal SPA and External SPA agreements
thus led to a significant tax burden for Primero.  The Plaintiffs
allege that Primero devised a tax evasion scheme to reduce this
significant tax liability.  This alleged scheme involved two steps.
First, Primero restructured its company and amended the Internal
SPA so that the transfer price (i.e., the sale price) from PEM to
its sister subsidiary, Silver Trading Barbados was no longer the
significantly higher Spot Price of silver, but rather the
approximately $4 per ounce unaffiliated Silver Wheaton Purchase
Price.  And second, on Oct. 17, 2011, a few days after amending the
Internal SPA, Primero submitted an "advance pricing agreement"
("APA") application to Mexico's tax authority, the Servicio de
Administración Tributaria ("SAT"), seeking approval of its new
transfer pricing methodology resulting from its amendment to the
Internal SPA.

According to the operative complaint, an APA is a "prospective
agreement regarding the taxpayer's transfer prices" through which
taxpayers in Mexico can avoid future disputes over transfer
pricing.  It also alleges that APAs are handled exclusively by the
SAT's Transfer Pricing Audit Administration, and that under Mexican
law, the head of the Transfer Pricing Audit Administration, known
as the Central Administrator for Transfer Pricing Audits, is one of
a few people in the Transfer Pricing Administration who may decide
APAs and in any event is in charge of the remaining few people who
can decide APAs.

As part of Primero's APA application, the company hired an attorney
named Christian Natera, whose firm, Natera Consultores, S.C.,
specialized in transfer pricing.  At the time, Christian Natera's
brother, Luis Natera, served as the Central Administrator for
Transfer Pricing Audits.  In this position, Christian Natera's
brother was one of a few people in the Transfer Pricing
Administration.

On Oct. 5, 2012, Primero issued a press release announcing that PEM
had received a positive ruling from the Mexican tax authorities.
It allowed PEM to pay taxes based on the Silver Wheaton Purchase
Price, rather than the Spot Price.  According to the Plaintiffs,
this announcement "shocked the markets," and resulted in Primero's
stock increasing by 36%, closing at $7.37 per share that same day.

Following this positive ruling by the SAT, Primero made a number of
public statements that the Plaintiffs allege were misleading in
violation of U.S. securities laws.  The first set of statements the
Plaintiffs identify concerns the effect that the SAT's 2012 APA
Ruling would have on Primero's cash flow and tax position.  They
also allege that Primero made various false and misleading public
statements representing that its quarterly and annual financial
statements were prepared in accordance with International Financial
Reporting Standards as issued by the International Accounting
Standards Board, and reflect management's best estimates and
judgment based on information currently available.  In addition to
making these statements, Primero allegedly used its newly generated
wealth to acquire two companies, Cerro Resources NL and Brigus Gold
Corp., selling 41,340,664 of its own shares in the process.

But, according to the Plaintiffs, several legal deficiencies in the
SAT's 2012 APA Ruling were confirmed after a new government
administration came to power in Mexico and began to crack down on
suspected tax avoidance schemes.  The Plaintiffs allege that by
November 2013, Luis Natera had been found administratively liable
for failing to recuse himself from Primero's APA application, and
was temporarily suspended from working in the public sector.  They
also allege that in August 2015, the SAT filed a juicio de
lesividad against PEM seeking to retroactively nullify the 2012 APA
Ruling.  

When Primero issued a press release in February 2016 announcing
that the SAT had served it with a juicio de lesividad challenging
the 2012 APA Ruling, Primero's shares fell $0.74 per share, or over
28%, to close at $1.89 per share on Feb. 4, 2016.  However,
although a juicio de lesividad was filed, its contents, and the
reasons for which it was filed, are not public.  Moreover, the
Plaintiffs do not contest that the 2012 APA Ruling remains valid
under Mexican law.

The Plaintiffs allege that in failing to disclose these alleged
legal deficiencies in the 2012 APA Ruling, and in selling Primero
shares knowing these legal deficiencies existed, Primero violated
Rule 10b-5 and sections 10(b), 20A of the Exchange Act.  They also
allege violations of Rule 10b-5 and sections 10(b), 20(a) of the
Exchange Act against various "Officer Defendants," as well as
violations of section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against various
"Director Defendants" and Defendant Joseph Conway.

Primero moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint based on the act
of state doctrine and failure to state a claim.  The district court
dismissed the action as barred by the act of state doctrine, and
ruled in the alternative that the Plaintiffs had failed to
adequately plead any materially false or misleading statements.

The Plaintiffs timely filed an appeal.

On review, the Ninth Circuit opines that the district court
correctly held that all of the Plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims are
barred by the act of state doctrine because they would require a
United States court to determine whether the Mexican tax
authority's 2012 APA Ruling was properly issued under Mexican law.
The Plaintiffs do not challenge the conclusion that the 2012 APA
Ruling issued by Mexico's tax authority constitutes a public and
governmental act of a sovereign state, taken within its own
territory, but instead argue that the act of state doctrine applies
only where United States courts would be required to declare the
foreign government's action "null and void," not unlawful in any
other way.  But the precedent dictates otherwise.  The Court has
long recognized that the act of state doctrine applies where
resolution of a plaintiff's claims would require a court to
evaluate a foreign sovereign's compliance with its own laws.

As the Plaintiffs also acknowledge, the 2012 APA Ruling that they
contend is so legally flawed as to render Primero's statements
about it misleading, remains lawful and valid under Mexican law.
And although the Plaintiffs allege that the Mexican government has
filed a juicio de lesividad to nullify the 2012 APA Ruling,
according to the complaint those proceedings are ongoing, and there
are no allegations that the Mexican government has ruled on its
juicio de lesividad.

Under these circumstances, allowing the Plaintiffs' Exchange Act
claims to proceed would require the evaluation by one sovereign of
foreign officers' compliance with their own laws in the absence of
the foreign sovereign's consent.  This sort of review of a foreign
government's decision is precisely what the act of state doctrine
precludes.  Because the Plaintiffs' Exchange Act claims would
require a court to evaluate Mexico's tax authority's compliance
with Mexican law, their claims would require a court in the United
States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign
performed within its own territory.

In addition, because it is a case in which the policies underlying
the act of state doctrine justify its application, the district
court did not err in declining to specifically address each
Sabbatino factor, the Appellate Court notes.  And even if the
district court had gone on to address those factors, they would not
have weighed against applying the act of state doctrine.  The
Plaintiffs' assertion that the 2012 APA Ruling failed to comply
with the arm's length principle is simply a rephrasing of their
assertion that the 2012 APA Ruling failed to comply with Mexico's
Income Tax Law.  Because of this, the degree of international
consensus as to the arm's length principle does not affect the
conclusion that the act of state doctrine applies, the Appellate
court further notes

In sum, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the Court has long
recognized that the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
of the acts of a foreign sovereign committed within its own
territory.  The act of state doctrine limits judicial interference
in foreign relations by precluding adjudication of the sovereign
acts of other nations in United States courts.  Because the
Plaintiffs' claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would
require a United States court to pass judgment on the validity of a
2012 ruling by the United Mexican States' tax authority, the
Servicio de Administracion Tributaria, they are barred by the act
of state doctrine.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal under the act of state doctrine, and
declined to reconsider whether a tax ruling by the Mexican
government, that remains valid in Mexico, complied with Mexico's
tax laws.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Sept. 17, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/uwyzGR from Leagle.com.

Richard W. Gonnello (argued) --  rgonnello@faruqilaw.com --
Katherine M. Lenahan -- klenahan@faruqilaw.com -- and Megan M.
Sullivan -- msullivan@faruqilaw.com -- Faruqi & Farugi LLP, New
York, New York, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Daniel M. Perry (argued) -- dperry@milbank.com -- and James D.
Whooley -- jwhooley@milbank.com -- Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy
LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.


QES PRESSURE: Newsome Seeks to Notify Field Supervisors of Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled JOHN NEWSOME, JR., Individually and on behalf
of All Others Similarly Situated v. QES PRESSURE CONTROL, LLC, Case
No. 7:19-cv-00150-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff files his
Motion for Approval and Distribution of Notice and for Disclosure
of Contact Information.

The Plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of all salaried Field
Supervisors of QES Pressure Control, LLC, to recover unpaid
overtime wages and other damages pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Newsome also asks a period of 90 days to distribute the Notice
and file Consent forms with the Court and asks the Court to enter
an Order directing the Defendant to provide the names, including
any aliases they may have gone by or go by now, last known home and
work addresses, and any and all cell phone numbers of potential
opt-in Plaintiffs (or alternatively, any and all e-mail addresses
of which Defendant is aware of) no later than one week after the
date of the entry of the Order granting this Motion.

Mr. Newsome further seeks approval of sending notice through U.S.
Mail, e-mail, and text message, and to grant counsel a period of 90
days from the date the Defendant fully and completely releases the
class members' contact information during which to distribute the
Notice and to file Consent forms.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Merideth Q. McEntire, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: merideth@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Michael J. Muskat, Esq.
          R. John Grubb II, Esq.
          MUSKAT, MAHONY & DEVINE, LLP
          1201 Louisiana Street, Suite 850
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 987-7850
          Facsimile: (713) 987-7854
          E-mail: MMuskat@m2dlaw.com
                  JGrubb@m2dlaw.com


QUANTCAST CORP: Underpays Sales Representatives, Brown Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
TAG BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. QUANTCAST CORP., Defendant, Case No.
4:19-cv-05773-KAW (N.D. Cal., Sept. 13, 2019) is an action against
the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as sales
representative.

Quantcast Corporation provides audience measurement and media
targeting solutions. The Company offers tools that allows marketers
and publishers to measure traffic and audience characteristics.
Quantcast serves customers worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew C. Helland, Esq.
          Daniel S. Brome, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, LLP
          235 Montgomery Street, Suite 810
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 277-7235
          Facsimile: (415) 277-7238
          E-mail: helland@nka.com
                  dbrome@nka.com

               - and -

          Austin Kaplan, Esq.
          KAPLAN LAW FIRM, PLLC
          406 Sterzing St.
          Austin, TX 78704
          Telephone: (512) 553-9390
          Facsimile: (512) 692-2788
          E-mail: akaplan@kaplanlawatx.com


RESEARCH AMERICA: Status Hearing in Byer Suit Re−Set to Dec. 17
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer rules in the case styled Byer
Clinic of Chiropractic, Ltd. v. Research America, Inc., Case No.
1:19-cv-05080 (N.D. Ill.), that the status hearing previously set
for October 8, 2019, is stricken and re−set to December 17, 2019,
at 9:00 a.m.

The Court adopts the parties' proposed discovery schedule as
follows:

   -- Plaintiff's Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures and reports shall be
      served by April 24, 2020;

   -- Depositions of Plaintiff's experts shall be completed by
      May 29, 2020;

   -- Defendant's Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures and reports shall be
      served by May 29, 2020;

   -- Depositions of Defendant's experts shall be completed by
      June 29, 2020;

   -- Plaintiff's rebuttal expert disclosures and reports shall
      be completed by July 17, 2020;

   -- Depositions of Plaintiff's rebuttal expert shall be
      completed by July 31, 2020;

   -- All discovery shall be noticed in time to be completed by
      August 7, 2020;

   -- Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda shall be
      filed by August 14, 2020;

   -- Plaintiff's Rule 23 motion for class certification shall be
      filed by September 4, 2020;

   -- Defendant's response shall be filed by October 9, 2020;

   -- Plaintiff's reply in support shall be filed by October 30,
      2020; and

   -- Plaintiff's motion to certify class and request for status
      conference is terminated.[CC]


RESURGENT CAPITAL: Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Filed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WILLIAM LINDALA,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the
Plaintiff, v. RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, LP, and LVNV FUNDING,
LLC, the Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-1410, (E.D. Wisc.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order certifying a class,
appointing the Plaintiff as class representative, and appointing
Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP as Class Counsel, and for such other and
further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court stay this class
certification motion until an amended motion for class
certification is filed, and that the Court grant the parties relief
from the local rules' automatic briefing schedule and requirement
that Plaintiffs file a brief and supporting documents in support of
this motion.

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896
(7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs."). While the Seventh
Circuit has held that the specific procedure described in
Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement of a class
representative's claims, the same decision cautions that other
methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class. Fulton
Dental, LLC v. Bisco, Inc., 860 F.3d 541, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2017).

Resurgent Capital is a manager and servicer of domestic and
international consumer debt portfolios for credit grantors and debt
buyers.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

RITE AID: Class Certification Bid in Stafford Due Dec. 11
---------------------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 3, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2019, that Byron Stafford's
deadline to file his class certification motion is December 11,
2019.

The Company is involved in two putative consumer class action
lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California, alleging that it overcharged customers'
insurance companies for prescription drug purchases, resulting in
overpayment of co-pays.

The first lawsuit, Byron Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp., Case No.
17-CV-01340-AJB-JLB, was filed on June 30, 2017, and the second
case, Robert Josten v. Rite Aid Corp., Case No.
18-CV-00152-AJB-JLB, was filed on January 23, 2018.

Each lawsuit alleges that (i) the Company was obligated to charge
the plaintiffs' insurance companies a "usual and customary" price
for their prescription drugs; and (ii) the Company failed to do so
properly because the prices it reported were not equal to or
adjusted to account for the prices that Rite Aid offers to
uninsured and underinsured customers through its Rx Savings
Program.

On December 19, 2017, the court granted the Company's motion to
dismiss Stafford's complaint with leave to amend for failure to
plead compliance with the applicable statutes of limitations. After
Stafford amended the complaint on January 9, 2018, the Company
filed another motion to dismiss on January 23, 2018.  

The Court denied that motion and opened discovery.  

Stafford's deadline to file his class certification motion is
December 11, 2019.  

On June 17, 2019, Rite Aid filed a motion to compel all Stafford's
claims to an individual arbitration and an accompanying motion to
stay the entire action pending the court’s decision on its motion
to compel arbitration. The court took the motion to compel
arbitration under consideration for decision without a hearing, but
denied the motion to stay the case pending a decision on that
motion.

Rite Aid moved to dismiss Josten's complaint on March 16, 2018. The
court granted the motion to dismiss most of Josten's claims for
failure to plead compliance with the applicable statute of
limitations but with leave to amend.  

The Company moved to dismiss Josten's amended complaint on the
grounds that the statute of limitations expired and that he failed
to exhaust Medicare administrative remedies. The court denied that
motion on August 7, 2019.  

A case management conference is scheduled for September 24, 2019,
where the court will likely set a pretrial schedule, including with
respect to discovery and class certification.   

Rite Aid said, "At this stage of the proceedings, the Company is
not able to either predict the outcome of the Stafford or Josten
lawsuits or estimate a potential range of loss with respect to the
lawsuits and is vigorously defending these lawsuits."

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. The company operates
through two segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite
Aid Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp
Hill, Pennsylvania.


SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA: Trial Ct. Judgment in Woodruff Suit Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEBIE WOODRUFF et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO IN-HOME SUPPORT SERVICES PUBLIC AUTHORITY,
Defendant and Appellant, Case No. D072937 (Cal. App.), Judge
Cynthia Aaron of the Court of Appeals of California for the Fourth
District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's (i) judgment for
the class and the individual Plaintiffs consistent with the jury's
verdict, and (ii) award to the Plaintiffs of costs and attorney
fees.

The Legislature enacted the In-Home Supportive Services ("IHSS")
program to provide supportive services to qualified aged, blind or
disabled persons to allow them to remain in their homes and avoid
institutionalization.  The California Department of Social Services
("DSS") promulgates regulations that implement the program, and
county welfare departments administer the program under the
supervision of DSS.  A county may administer its IHSS program in
various ways, including by establishing a public authority.

In San Diego County, the IHSS program is administered through
Defendant County of San Diego In-Home Supportive Services Public
Authority.  Plaintiffs Woodruff, Ollie Katrina Baptiste, Miriam St.
Germaine, and Cynthia Byrd provided in-home supportive services to
IHSS recipients through Public Authority.

In 2008, the Plaintiffs filed the action against Public Authority
alleging various wage and hour violations on behalf of themselves
and a class of similarly situated IHSS providers.  In 2014, after
the trial court issued numerous rulings in the matter and held a
jury trial, the Court issued an opinion in a prior appeal resolving
several issues pertaining to the action.

As relevant to the present appeal, the Woodruff I court concluded
that Public Authority was the Plaintiffs' employer for purposes of
the Plaintiffs' claims for wages, overtime, and expense
reimbursements.  It also concluded that the Plaintiffs might be
entitled to compensation for time that they spent submitting
certain enrollment forms mandated by the Legislature's 2009
enactment of section 12301.24 even though they were not entitled to
compensation for time spent acting in compliance with a government
directive.  It reasoned that although the Legislature mandated that
"prospective providers" attend an in-person enrollment orientation,
the Legislature did not require "current providers," such as the
Plaintiffs, to complete the enrollment process in person.  Thus,
the Woodruff I court concluded that the Plaintiffs might be
entitled to compensation if they could establish that their
employer, Public Authority, directed current providers to travel to
an enrollment center to attend an orientation or to submit their
enrollment forms in person, given the lack of any in-person
requirement for current providers in 12301.24, subdivision (c).

On remand from Woodruff I, the Plaintiffs filed a second amended
complaint bringing claims including: failure to pay minimum wage
for current providers who were required to attend a provider
orientation and complete the section 12301.24 enrollment process in
person, nonpayment of overtime, and failure to reimburse for
business expenses.  The trial court partially granted their motion
for class certification and certified a class solely with respect
to the Plaintiffs' minimum wage section 12301.24 claim.

The trial court held a jury trial and the jury rendered a special
verdict in favor of both the Plaintiff class and the individual
Plaintiffs.  The jury found that the Plaintiff class was entitled
to a total of $111,000 for hours worked while traveling to
enrollment centers to submit their section 12301.24 enrollment
forms in person, and an additional $74,925 in prejudgment interest.
With respect to the individual claims, the jury found that each of
the four Plaintiffs was entitled to overtime compensation and
reimbursement for employment expenses in varying amounts, together
with corresponding prejudgment interest on the overtime claims.
With respect to each plaintiff, the jury found that Public
Authority had not proven that the personal attendant exemption
applied to plaintiffs.

The trial court entered a judgment consistent with the jury's
verdict against the Public Authority and in favor of the Plaintiff
class in the amount of $185,925, and in favor of the individual
Plaintiffs in the following amounts: Woodruff, $20,638.94;
Baptiste, $95,230; St. Germain, $17,789.60; and Byrd, $15,513.73.

On appeal, Public Authority contends that the class claim fails as
a matter of law and that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury with respect to that claim.  As to the individual claims,
Public Authority contends that the Plaintiffs' claims for overtime
compensation and expense reimbursements should be reversed because
the trial court erred in determining that Public Authority is the
the Plaintiffs' employer as a matter of law.  It also claims that
the judgment for the individual Plaintiffs' on their claims for
overtime compensation should be reversed because the trial court
committed two errors related to the "personal attendant" exemption
to overtime pay, one relating to the court's jury instructions with
respect to this issue and the other pertaining to the court's
exclusion of evidence that Public Authority sought to offer to
prove the exemption.  Finally, the Public Authority maintains that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to the
Plaintiffs' claims for expense reimbursements.

Judge Arron affirmed the judgment in its entirety.  First, she
finds that the class claim does not fail as a matter of law and the
Public Authority has not established that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury with respect to that claim.  Public Authority
claims that the class claim for minimum wages for time that the
Plaintiffs spent submitting section 12301.24 forms in person to
Public Authority fail as a matter of law.  In the alternative, it
contends that the class claim must be reversed due to instructional
error.

She concludes that the Public Authority is not entitled to reversal
of the judgment on the ground that the class claim for wages for
the time that the Plaintiffs spent travelling to an enrollment
center to submit SOC 846 forms and in submitting SOC 846 forms fail
as a matter of law.  The Public Authority has not established that
the trial court erred in denying its requested No Compensation
Instruction.  Since its No Compensation Instruction was misleading
and legally incorrect, the trial court did not err in refusing to
instruct the jury pursuant to that instruction.   The Public
Authority also forfeited the instructional claim that it raises for
the first time on reply.

Second, the Judge finds that the trial court did not err in
determining that the Public Authority was the individual
Plaintiffs' employer for purposes of their claims for overtime and
expense reimbursements.  The Public Authority claims that the
portion of the judgment premised on the jury's awarding the
individual Plaintiffs overtime pay and expense reimbursements
should be reversed because the trial court erred in determining
that the Public Authority was the Plaintiffs' employer as a matter
of law.

The Judge concludes that the Public Authority's opening brief on
appeal fails to provide any argument with respect to whether the
trial court erred in concluding that Woodruff I conclusively
established Public Authority as the Plaintiffs' employer
responsible for payment of overtime and expense reimbursements.
Nor does its opening brief provide any discussion of the law of the
case doctrine with respect to this issue or why that doctrine does
not apply to preclude it from relitigating the question of whether
it was the Plaintiffs' employer for purposes of their claims for
overtime and expense reimbursements.

Third, the Judge finds that the Public Authority has not
established that the trial court committed any prejudicial error
with respect to the personal attendant exemption to the payment of
overtime wages.   Public Authority claims that the judgment on the
individual plaintiffs' claims for overtime should be reversed
because the trial court committed two errors related to the
personal attendant exemption to overtime pay.  The Judge need not
determine whether the trial court erred in either respect because
she finds that the Public Authority failed to establish prejudice
with respect to either asserted error, as is required.

Fourth and last, the Judge finds that the trial court did not err
in instructing the jury with respect to the individual Plaintiffs'
claims for expense reimbursements under Labor Code section 2802.
The Public Authority raises several claims related to the trial
court's jury instructions with respect to the individual
Plaintiffs' claims for expense reimbursements under Labor Code
section 2802, including that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that Public Authority was the Plaintiffs' employer for
purposes of their claim for expense reimbursements under Labor Code
section 2802.

The Judge holds that the claim is without merit because, as she
concluded, the Public Authority fails to demonstrate that the trial
court erred in concluding that Woodruff I established as a matter
of law of the case that Public Authority was the Plaintiffs'
employer for purposes of their claim for expense reimbursements.
Even assuming that the Public Authority is correct that evidence
that the Plaintiffs "voluntarily offered the use of their cars,"
was relevant to the jury's determination of the Plaintiffs' Labor
Code section 2802 claim, the Judge finds no evidence in the record
that the Public Authority objected to the trial court's expense
reimbursement instructions on this ground in the trial court or
that Public Authority requested an instruction on the effect of the
Plaintiffs' purported "voluntary use of their cars."

The Public Authority is to bear costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/xkurt2 from Leagle.com.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, William H. Songer and Darin
L. Wessel, Deputies County Counsel, for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of David J. Gallo and David J. Gallo for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.


SAN JOSE, CA: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Hernandez Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned JUAN HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY
OF SAN JOSE, et al., Defendants, Case No. 16-CV-03957-LHK (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, San Jose Division, denied the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The case arises out of the June 2, 2016 rally for then-presidential
candidate Donald J. Trump that took place at the McEnery Convention
Center in downtown San Jose, California.  The 20 named Plaintiffs
bring the putative class action on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated against The City of San Jose and various
individual officers of the San Jose Police Department ("SJPD").
Their claims for money damages, declaratory judgment, and
injunctive relief stem from the Defendants' handling of the protest
that occurred in response to the Rally.

The Plaintiffs are individuals who attended the Rally in June 2016.
The Defendants are the City of San Jose and SJPD officers Loyd
Kinsworthy, Lisa Gannon, Kevin Abruzzini, Paul Messier, Paul
Spagnoli, Johnson Fong, Jason Ta, and Does 1-15.  The SJPD was
responsible for securing the area around the Rally site in order to
ensure the safety of the presidential candidate, the Rally
participants, and the general public.

On the night of the Rally, a violent anti-Trump protest allegedly
broke out in response to the Rally.  The gravamen of the
Plaintiffs' suit is that the Defendants' crowd control tactics
following the Rally subjected the Rally participants to physical
harm and/or property damage by the protestors.  Specifically, the
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference, reckless and/or conscious disregard of a known and
obvious danger by directing the Plaintiffs into the mob, preventing
them from leaving the event through other, safer paths, and by
failing to intervene in the many attacks perpetrated on the
Plaintiffs and the Class members.

After the Rally, Chief Garcia allegedly praised officers for their
"discipline and restraint" because additional force can incite more
violence in the crowd.  The Plaintiffs claim that the City thus
ratified the actions of the SJPD officers and are liable for the
officers' actions.

The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on July 14, 2016.  In
the Original Complaint, 14 Plaintiffs asserted 28 claims for relief
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.  Those
claims fell into two categories: (1) state law and federal law
claims against the City, Mayor Sam Liccardo, Chief of Police
Garcia, and 15 Doe Defendants, as the individual SJPD officers were
not yet named; and (2) state law claims against various private
citizens who had allegedly committed acts of aggression and
violence against the Plaintiffs.

On Aug. 4, 2016, the City, Liccardo, Garcia, and the Doe officers
filed a motion to dismiss the four claims against them pursuant to
Federal of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Court granted in part and
denied in part the motion to dismiss on Oct. 16, 2016.  The Court
granted leave to amend for all the claims that it dismissed and
noted that failure to cure the deficiencies identified in its order
would result in dismissal with prejudice.

On Nov. 14, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint
(FAC), which is now the operative complaint in the case.  Although
the FAC is the operative complaint in the case, the FAC has been
significantly narrowed by the Court's previous orders.  The Named
Plaintiffs are Juan Hernandez, Nathan Velasquez, Frank Velasquez,
Rachel Casey, Mark Doering, Mary Doering, Barbara Arigoni, Dustin
Haines-Scrodin, Andrew Zambetti, Christina Wong, Craig Parsons, the
minor I.P., Greg Hyver, Todd Broome, Martin Mercado, Christopher
Holland, Theodore Jones, Donovan Rost, Michele Wilson, and Cole
Cassady -- all of whom attended the Rally in June 2016.  The
current Defendants are the City and SJPD officers Kinsworthy,
Gannon, Abruzzini, Messier, Spagnoli, Fong, Ta, and Does 1-15.

Three claims for relief remain: Counts 1, 2, and 4. Count 1 is the
Section 1983 claim against the individual SJPD officers, and Count
2 is the Section 1983 claim against the City.  As to these two
claims, the Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees and/or costs,
compensatory damages, and injunctive relief.  Count 4 is the
negligence claim against the City for compensatory damages.  All
three claims are predicated on the alleged actions of the SJPD
officers on the night of the Rally and not on the devising of the
Incident Action Plan in advance of the Rally.

On May 30, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class
Certification.  Specifically, they move to certify the following
Class as an injunctive relief class pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2): All persons who attended the June 2, 2016
Donald J. Trump campaign Rally (the Rally) at the South Hall of the
McEnery Convention Center in San Jose, California, and who, upon
exiting the Rally, were either (1) directed, or otherwise required,
by agents of the City of San Jose to leave in the direction of, or
along a route toward, anti-Trump protestors, and/or (2) were
prevented by agents of the City of San Jose from leaving by any
alternate route. Excluded from the Class are the City of San Jose's
officers, directors, agents, legal representatives, heirs,
successors, and assigns that attended the Rally in his, her, or
their capacity as such. Also excluded from the Class are the
counsel for the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs move to certify the following Subclass as a damages
class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3): All members of the Class who
sustained injury to their persons or damage to their property upon
leaving the Rally.  They also move to (1) certify the Plaintiffs as
the named representatives of the Class; (2) certify the Plaintiffs
as the named representatives of the Subclass; (3) appoint Dhillon
Law Group as the class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g); and (4)
authorize notice of the pending action and of the Subclass members'
right to opt out.

The Defendants opposed the motion.

Judge Koh denies the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the damages
Subclass because the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)'s
commonality requirement and Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not shown
that common questions of law or fact predominate over individual
questions.  In fact, due to the lack of a class-wide theory of
injury, she is not even persuaded that the Plaintiffs' have met
Rule 23(a)'s less demanding commonality requirement.  

The Judge is also skeptical that typicality and numerosity have
been satisfied, though she does not rest her decision on those
grounds.  She finds that it is far from clear that any Rally
participants other than the 20 Named Plaintiffs sustained such
personal injury or property damage.  Even if she accepted the
Plaintiffs' assertion as to the size of the injunctive relief
Class, the Plaintiffs have offered no method for systematically
identifying the Plaintiffs who sustained injury to their persons or
damage to their property for inclusion in the damages Subclass.
The Judge is doubtful that the Plaintiffs have met their burden to
show numerosity.

The Judge also denies Plaintiffs' motion to certify the Class as an
injunctive relief class under Rule 23(b)(2).  She is mindful that
the individualized issues that defeated predominance as to the
Subclass also impede certification of the injunctive relief class.
Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize class certification when each
class member would be entitled to an individualized award of
monetary damages.  That is because class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) is appropriate only where the primary relief sought is
declaratory or injunctive rather than monetary.  As established,
the Named Plaintiffs allege unique injuries and thus may be
entitled to individualized monetary damages.  

However, the Judge need not reach these issues, because the
Plaintiffs cannot advance past the threshold requirement of
standing.  She agrees with the Defendants that the Plaintiffs have
failed to establish standing for prospective equitable relief.  The
Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show an immediate threat of
harm.  They therefore lack standing for injunctive relief.  The
Judge's finding that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek
injunctive relief is fatal to certification of the proposed Class.


Based on the foregoing, Judge Koh denies with prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/fTnegF from Leagle.com.

Juan Hernandez, an individual, Nathan Velasquez, an individual,
Frank Velasquez, an individual, Rachel Casey, an individual, Mark
Doering, an individual, Mary Doering, an individual, Barbara
Arigoni, an individual, Dustin Haines-Scrodin, an individual,
Andrew Zambetti, an individual, Christina Wong, an individual,
Craig Parsons, an individual, I. P., a minor individual, Greg
Hyver, an individual & Todd Broome, an individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Harmeet K. Dhillon -- harmeet@dhillonlaw.com --
Dhillon Law Group Inc., Krista L. Baughman --
kbaughman@dhillonlaw.com -- Dhillon Law Group Inc. & Gregory
Richard Michael -- gmichael@dhillonlaw.com -- Dhillon Law Group
Inc.

Donovan Rost, Michele Wilson, Cole Cassady, Theodore Jones, Martin
Mercado & Christopher Holland, Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory
Richard Michael, Dhillon Law Group Inc. & Harmeet K. Dhillon,
Dhillon Law Group Inc.

City of San Jose, a municipal corporation, Loyd Kinsworthy, Lisa
Gannon, Kevin Abruzzini, Paul Messier, Paul Spagnoli, Johnson Fong
& Jason Ta, Defendants, represented by Ardell Johnson, San Jose
City Attorney's Office & Matthew W. Pritchard, Office of the City
Attorney.


SANMEDICA INTERNATIONAL: Ct. Narrows Claims Pizana's False Ad Case
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting in part and denying in part
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned RAUL PIZANA,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SANMEDICA INTERNATIONAL LLC; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-00644, (E.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff filed this putative class action, challenging the
advertising and efficacy of SeroVital-hgh, a purported Human Growth
Hormone (HGH) supplement produced by defendant. The crux of
plaintiff's suit is that defendant's Product, despite being
marketed as an HGH supplement that can make users look and feel
decades not years, but DECADES younger, is no more effective for
its advertised purposes than a placebo and is therefore worthless
to California consumers.

The FAC asserts four causes of action: (1) a violation of
California Civil Code Section 1750, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA) (2) a violation of California Business & Professions Code
Section 17500, the False Advertising Law (FAL) (3) a violation of
California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL) and (4) breach of express warranty.

Defendant SanMedica International LLC filed motions to change venue
and to dismiss plaintiff Raul Pizana's First Amended Complaint.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to
test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Dismissal can be based
on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. A
plaintiff is required to allege enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.

Defendant contends that plaintiff's suit should be dismissed
because: (1) the FAC rests on an impermissible lack of
substantiation claim; (2) the FAC fails to show falsity; (3) the
FAC fails to plead fraud with particularity as required by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b); (4) plaintiff failed to provide defendant with notice
as required by the CLRA before filing suit; (5) plaintiff does not
state a claim for breach of express warranty; and (6) plaintiff
lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Defendant also argues
that plaintiff's expert reports cannot be considered on a motion to
dismiss.

The Inclusion of Expert Reports in the FAC

The court will first consider defendant's argument that the expert
reports included by plaintiff in his FAC cannot properly be
incorporated into a pleading and thus cannot be considered in the
court's ruling on its Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court disagrees.
Although defendant cites to several cases in support of its
argument, none of them stand for the proposition that expert
reports included as part of a complaint, and which form the basis
of its claims, cannot be considered by the court in addressing a
motion to dismiss.

Here, however, plaintiff's complaint cites extensively to expert
reports in alleging that the Product "cannot deliver [its]
advertised benefits. Including expert reports to help allege
falsity in a complaint is not prohibited; rather, it goes above and
beyond what is required in a pleading.

Because there is no reason for the court to disregard plaintiff's
expert reports, either as exhibits to the complaint or pled
directly into the complaint, the court will consider them in ruling
on defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

The Lack of Substantiation Theory

Plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in false and deceptive
advertising in violation of California's CLRA, FAL, and UCL.
  
Defendant argues that plaintiff's FAC mirrors the complaint
considered by the court in Kwan, where the plaintiff only asserted
that the claims that growth hormone levels are associated with
certain health benefits falsely imply that defendant's product
claims were based on credible scientific proof.  

But the FAC in this case does not simply allege that defendant's
advertising about its Product is unsubstantiated and lacks
scientific support it pleads specific facts and bases allegations
on evidence, including from experts, to buttress its claims that
defendant's advertising is false and misleading because its Product
does not and cannot perform as marketed.  

Although defendant attacks the FAC as only discussing the six
ingredients in the Product individually rather than as a formula
and as conflating the Product's advertised ability to increase HGH
levels with the health benefits associated with HGH, defendant
fails to address the allegations of plaintiff's entire FAC in
context. Construing the factual allegations in the FAC in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the court can conclude that low doses
of orally administered amino acids a category that includes
defendant's Product categorically cannot increase HGH levels by
682%, and, even if the Product could, such elevated levels cannot
be sustained a period long enough to yield any of the purported
benefits associated with HGH. Because defendant marketed its
Product as being able to significantly increase HGH and prominently
trumpeted that HGH is associated with a myriad of health benefits,
a consumer could put two and two together to reasonably assume that
defendant's Product would yield the benefits associated with HGH.

Hence, Plaintiff has sufficiently plead falsity, not lack of
substantiation. Defendant's motion to dismiss based on a lack of
substantiation theory will therefore be denied.

Rule 9(b) Requires Pleading with Particularity

Citing the particularity standard required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) for pleading fraud, defendant argues that plaintiff
has failed to plead facts with sufficient particularity to show
plaintiff: (1) relied on defendant's advertising to buy the Product
and (2) did not experience an increase in HGH after taking the
Product.

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that he purchased the Product from a
Kohl's store in Hanford, California in early 2017 after reading
Defendants' advertisements on the Product's packaging labels.

Although it is true that plaintiff does not specifically allege in
his FAC that he failed to personally experience an increase in HGH
levels after taking the Product, the FAC does allege that plaintiff
did not experience any of the benefits defendant advertised as
associated with HGH and that the Product cannot increase HGH levels
by 682% nor can the Product lead to the anti-aging benefits claimed
by Defendants.
  
The FAC adequately puts defendant on notice that plaintiff is
proceeding in this action under a theory that defendant's Product
categorically cannot increase HGH levels as advertised and thus
cannot yield any of the benefits that defendant advertises as
associated with HGH. These allegations, taken as a whole, meet the
pleading standards of Rule 9(b). The FAC's allegations identify the
who SanMedica and plaintiff, what the SeroVital product, when early
2017, where a Kohl's store in Hanford, CA, and how the Product is
advertised as able to increase HGH levels and markets the benefits
of HGH but yields neither.  

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss on this ground will also
be denied.

Rule 8 and 12(b)(6) Pleading Standards

Defendant dedicates one paragraph of its motion to dismiss to
attack the FAC under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6). Defendant recites the
requisite pleading standards and then summarily concludes that
"Plaintiff's claims fail to meet this standard, and should be
dismissed. As noted above, however, plaintiff adequately has
alleged the who, what, when, where, and how of defendant's alleged
misconduct and incorporates two expert reports into the FAC thereby
providing analysis about the Product and its marketed effects.
Accepting the FAC's factual allegations as true and in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds that plaintiff's FAC
meets the pleading standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8 and 12(b)(6).

Thus, defendant's motion to dismiss under Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) will
also be denied.

Notice Required by the CLRA

California Civil Code Section 1782 requires plaintiff to notify
defendant of any alleged violations of the CLRA thirty days before
filing suit. Because plaintiff did not comply with this notice
requirement, defendant argues that his CLRA claim should be
dismissed with prejudice.  

The present case involves a nearly identical situation. After
filing the original complaint including an admittedly non-compliant
CLRA claim, plaintiff sent defendant a CLRA notice on May 31, 2018,
waited thirty days, and then filed his amended complaint in this
action on June 30, 2018.  

Despite attempting to comply with the notice requirement, the court
acknowledges that plaintiff sent the CLRA notice to defendant's
counsel's office instead of one of the locations required by the
statute.  

Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's CLRA claim due
to the lack of notice required by Section 1782 will be granted.
However, plaintiff will be granted leave to amend in order to fully
comply with the CLRA notice requirement.

Breach of Express Warranty Claim

Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for breach of express warranty because the Product packaging
expressly declares, Individual results will vary. Because plaintiff
failed to respond to this argument in his opposition, his breach of
express warranty claim will be deemed abandoned. Defendant's motion
to dismiss will, therefore, be granted with prejudice as to the
breach of express warranty claim.

Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to
plaintiff's Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim and denied as to all
other claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5pctd7a from Leagle.com.

Raul Pizana, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Shireen M. Clarkson -
sclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com - Clarkson Law Firm, P.C., Annick
Marie Persinger -apersinger@tzlegal.com - Tycko & Zavareei, Matthew
Theriault - mtheriault@clarksonlawfirm.com - Clarkson Law Firm,
P.C. & Ryan Jack Clarkson - rclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com -
Clarkson Law Firm, P.C.

Sanmedica International LLC, Defendant, represented by Christopher
B. Sullivan , Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC, pro hac vice, David R.
Parkinson , Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC, pro hac vice, Jason Kerr
, Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC, pro hac vice, John Joseph
Fitzgerald, IV , Law Office of John Fitzgerald, PC, Ronald F. Price
, Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC, pro hac vice & Steven W. Garff ,
Price Parkinson & Kerr, PLLC, 5742 West Harold Gatty Drive Salt
Lake City, Utah 84116


SECURITY CREDIT: Batista Files FDCPA Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Security Credit
Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Jerson Batista individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Security
Credit Systems, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05718 (E.D. N.Y.,
Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Security Credit Systems Inc. was founded in 1983. The company's
line of business includes collection and adjustment services on
claims and other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     David M. Barshay, Esq.
     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com
            csanders@barshaysanders.com



SETERUS INC: Court Narrows Claims in Peebles FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted in part and denied in part Seterus'
Motion to Dismiss in the case DARRELL PEEBLES, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SETERUS, INC. and DOES
1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00242-JAM-KJN
(E.D. Cal.).

In February 2019, Peebles filed a class action lawsuit against
Seterus, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA") and the Rosenthal Act— California's fair debt
collection statute.  Peebles also brought unfair competition and
negligent misrepresentation claims under California state law.

Peebles lives in Rancho Cordova, California.  His home is secured
by a mortgage that is owned by Fannie Mae and serviced by Seterus.
While Seterus was servicing the loan, Peebles, at times, defaulted
on his payments.  When a loan Seterus services becomes more than 45
days delinquent, Seterus sends a form letter referred to as a
"California Final Letter."  Seterus "occasionally alleged" that
Peebles's loan had become more than 45 days delinquent, at which
point Seterus sent Peebles a California Final Letter.

Peebles alleges that Seterus does not, in fact, accelerate loans in
the manner threatened by its California Final Letters.  Although
the California Final Letter requires recipients to make a "full
payment of the default amount" by the Expiration Date to avoid
acceleration, Seterus purportedly maintains a practice of not
accelerating loans so long as the loan is fewer than 45 days
delinquent.  Put simply, the collection letters instruct borrowers
that, to avoid acceleration, they must pay a larger share of the
amount owed than Seterus actually requires.

Two months after the action was filed, Seterus filed a motion to
dismiss all of Peebles' claims.  Following a page-limits dispute,
Peebles filed an opposition that better complied with the Court's
filing requirements.

Judge Mendez grants in part and denied in part Seterus's motion to
dismiss.  He dismisses Peebles' 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f, UCL, and
negligent misrepresentation claims without prejudice.

Among other things, the Judge finds that Peebles has not adequately
explained how the false threat of acceleration is comparable to any
of the categories listed in Section 1692f.  Nor does he see a
resemblance.  Section 1692f of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector
from using "unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
collect any debt."  This provision also lists eight non-exhaustive
examples of "unfair or unconscionable" conduct.

He also finds that Peebles does not allege that Seterus has
initiated foreclosure proceedings against his property or that
foreclosure proceedings are imminent.  Although the California
Final Notice threatened "immediate" acceleration of the maturity
date of Peebles' loan if he did not pay the full default amount by
the Expiration Date, it did not threaten foreclosure with the same
degree of certainty.  Rather, the notice only says continued
default "may" result in foreclosure proceedings. Nothing in the
complaint or the briefings suggest foreclosure is imminent.
Peebles therefore lacks UCL standing on that basis.

The Judge further finds that to plead a claim of negligent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a defendant
misrepresented a past or existing material fact, (2) without
reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) with intent to
induce another's reliance on the fact misrepresented; (4)
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (5) resulting
damage.  As Seterus argues, the complaint does not allege a
"resulting damage."  Nor does the Plaintiff's opposition explain
how he was harmed.

If Peebles elects to amend his complaint with respect to these
claims, he should file an Amended Complaint within 20 days of the
Order.  Seterus' responsive pleading is due 20 days thereafter.

The Court's Order re Filing Requirements limits memoranda in
support of and opposition to motions to dismiss to 15 pages.  A
violation of the Order requires the offending counsel (not the
client) to pay $50 per page over the page limit to the Clerk of
Court.  The Court does not consider arguments made past the page
limit.

The Plaintiff's counsel initially filed a 36-page opposition.  The
Court, in exercising its discretion, allowed the counsel to file an
amended opposition.  Notwithstanding this allowance, the
Plaintiff's counsel filed another opposition that exceeded the
Court's page limits.  The Plaintiff's counsel must therefore send a
check payable to the Clerk for the Eastern District of California
for $50 no later than seven days from the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/uxjyYv from Leagle.com.

Darrell Peebles, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander Robertson,
Robertson & Associates, LLP, Edward H. Maginnis --
emaginnis@maginnislaw.com -- Maginnis Law, PLLC, pro hac vice &
Scott C. Harris -- scott@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Bryson & Mason
LLP, pro hac vice.

Seterus, Inc., Defendant, represented by Alicia Anne Baiardo --
abaiardo@mcguirewoods.com -- McguireWoods LLP, Anthony Q. Le --
ale@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods, LLP, Brian A. Kahn --
bkahn@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac vice & R. Locke
Beatty -- lbeatty@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, pro hac
vice.


SHANE SMITH: Oden Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------
KIMBERLY ODEN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. SHANE SMITH ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendants,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00693-BRW (E.D. Ark., Oct. 3, 2019) is a
collective action brought by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, against Defendant for violations
of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff frequently worked more
hours than she was scheduled, which went unrecorded and
uncompensated. The Defendant had a timekeeping system by which
employees clocked in and out, but Defendant discouraged its
employees from recording more than 40 hours per week. The Defendant
directed Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to not
clock in while performing price checks. The Defendant knew or
should have known that Plaintiff was working additional hours
off-the-clock for which she was not compensated. Plaintiff was
discharged from Defendant's employment in September of 2019.
Plaintiff's final paycheck did not include wages for all the hours
she worked during her final pay period, says the complaint.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a store manager from
approximately July of 2019 to September of 2019.

Defendant owns and operates several Tobacco Outlet stores
throughout Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Josh Sanford, Esq.
     SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
     One Financial Center
     650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
     Little Rock, AR 72211
     Phone: (501) 221-0088
     Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
     Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


SHARP ELECTRONICS: Sells Defective Microwave Drawers, Hamm Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL HAMM, individually and on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, Case No.
5:19-cv-00488 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 25, 2019), arises from certain
defective microwave drawers sold by Sharp.

Mr. Hamm alleges that the Microwaves all contain a defect that
makes them unreasonably dangerous, as they are susceptible to
catching fire, and unsuitable for their intended use.  More
specifically, the Microwaves are defectively designed and/or
manufactured such that, under normal and intended use, the
electromagnetic waves generated by the magnetron tube are unable to
properly move through the waveguide into the cooking cavity,
resulting in buzzing, smoking, overheating, and eventual
destruction of the magnetron, leading to scorching of the
waveguide, according to the complaint.

Sharp Electronics Corporation is a New York corporation with its
principal place of business located in Montvale, New Jersey.  Sharp
distributes and markets, and directs the marketing of the
Microwaves in Florida, and throughout the United States.

Sharp is one of the largest technology companies in the world.  The
Company designs, manufactures and sells a variety of technological
products, including kitchen appliances, such as microwave ovens.
Sharp's kitchen appliance portfolio includes multiple different
types of microwaves, including the defective microwave drawers (the
"Microwaves" or the "Products"), which are the subject of this
action.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Rachel Soffin, Esq.
          Gregory F. Coleman, Esq.
          Lisa A. White, Esq.
          Adam A. Edwards, Esq.
          GREG COLEMAN LAW PC
          800 S. Gay Street, Suite 1100
          Knoxville, TN 37929
          Telephone: (865) 247-0080
          Facsimile: (865) 522-0049
          E-mail: rachel@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  greg@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  lisa@gregcolemanlaw.com
                  adam@gregcolemanlaw.com

               - and -

          Harper T. Segui, Esq.
          Daniel K. Bryson, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Telephone: (919) 600-5000
          E-mail: harper@wbmllp.com
                  dan@wbmllp.com

               - and -

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          Andrea Gold, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L. Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  agold@tzlegal.com


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Court Dismisses Hughes Suit with Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sara L. Ellis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, dismissed with prejuice the
amended complaint in BRIAN HUGHES, individually and on behalf, of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
CO., Defendant, Case No. 18 C 5315 (N.D. Ill.).

On Feb. 11, 2018, Defendant Southwest canceled Plaintiff Hughes'
flight from Phoenix, Arizona, to Chicago, Illinois, because it ran
out of de-icer fluid.  Hughes ended up flying to Omaha, Nebraska,
and incurred additional costs for lodging, food, and parking,
before flying to Chicago the next day.

Hughes subsequently brought the putative class action lawsuit
alleging breach of contract and negligence and seeking
consequential damages on behalf of all Southwest customers whose
flights were similarly canceled on that date, as well as on Dec. 8,
24, and 28, 2017, and Jan. 12 and 15, 2018.

The District Court previously dismissed Hughes' negligence claim
with prejudice in a March 26, 2019 Opinion and Order, on the basis
of preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA").  It
dismissed Hughes' breach of contract claim without prejudice for
failure to state a claim after finding that Hughes had not
identified the specific contractual duty that Southwest breached.

Hughes then filed an amended complaint re-alleging breach of
contract, and Southwest now moves to dismiss.  Southwest argues
that Hughes' amended complaint must be dismissed for two reasons.
First, Southwest argues that Hughes has failed to plead the
elements of his breach of contract claim.  Specifically, Southwest
contends that Hughes has failed to identify a contractual duty that
Southwest breached, and that Hughes has not pleaded damages because
the Contract of Carriage explicitly precludes consequential
damages.  Second, Southwest argues that both the ADA and the
Federal Aviation Act ("FAA") preempt his claim.

Judge Ellis finds that there is not a basis in the Contract to
imply that Southwest would always maintain enough de-icer to
operate its flights.  Implying additional terms that Southwest
would always stock sufficient de-icer to fly in cold weather events
is hardly necessary to effectuate the parties' intentions.  Nor
does the interplay between Section 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(4) require that
the Court adopt Hughes' argument.  Therefore, the term "aviation
safety" within Section 9(a)(4) includes flight cancelations due to
a lack of de-icer, regardless of whether it was because of
Southwest's own doing.

But even if the Judge agreed with Hughes that canceling a flight
due to running out of de-icer is conceptually distinct from
canceling a flight for aviation safety concerns, that argument runs
into another problem.  Section 10 of the Contract explicitly
disclaims additional implied terms.  Hughes does not explain how
the Court can imply additional terms consistent with this clause.
Nor does he seek to vary it, for Hughes asserts that the Contract
is unambiguous and asks the Court to enforce its plain terms.

The Contract is also unambiguous with respect to additional implied
terms.  There is not a sufficient basis in the Contract to imply
that Southwest had a duty to carry sufficient de-icer for all its
flights.  Additionally, implying such a duty would directly
contradict the express terms of the Contract.  Therefore, there is
no implied duty that Southwest need stock enough de-icer to operate
all of its flights.

Southwest also argues that the Contract as a whole disclaims
damages for flight cancellations, and it specifically prohibits any
consequential damages for the same.  Hughes responds that the
explicit disclaimer of liability for events beyond Southwest's
control does nothing to limit liability for damages that were the
foreseeable result of Southwest's own actions.

The Judge opines that although Section 6 does not explicitly refer
to flight cancellations, the context indicates that the disclaimer
applies without limitation whenever Southwest refuses to transport
a customer, including whenever such action is necessary for reasons
of aviation safety.  Hughes does not address Section 6, so the
Judge finds no reason to assume his claim could survive this
additional disclaimer of liability.

For these reasons, Hughes' claim also fails because he has not
shown that he has an actionable claim for damages, the District
Court finds.  Because the Court previously dismissed Hughes'
complaint, Hughes has again failed to sufficiently allege the
elements of a breach of contract claim, and the Contract expressly
precludes Hughes' claim, an additional opportunity to amend would
be futile, and so the Judge dismisses the claim with prejudice.

Finally, Southwest argues that the ADA and FAA also preempt Hughes'
claim.  Hughes does not seek to enlarge or enhance the parties'
agreement based on state laws or policies, for he argues that
Southwest's duty to carry de-icer was implicit in the agreement
itself.  Because the Judge has already found that Hughes has failed
to state a claim in this regard, there is no preemption analysis to
apply.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Ellis grants Southwest's motion to
dismiss and dismissed Hughes' amended complaint with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/uyv0rq from Leagle.com.

Brian Hughes, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas F. Burke --
tburke104@att.net -- Attorney at Law, Kent A. Heitzinger, Kent A.
Heitzinger & Associates & Terrence Buehler -- info@touhylaw.com --
The Law Office of Terrence Buehler.

Southwest Airlines Co., Defendant, represented by Leonard A. Gail
-- lgail@masseygail.com -- Massey & Gail & Eli Johnson
Kay-Oliphant
-- ekay-oliphant@masseygail.com -- Massey & Gail LLP.


STATE AUTOMOBILE: Murphy Sues Over Improper Loss Valuations
-----------------------------------------------------------
McKENZIE MURPHY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
and MERIDIAN SECURITY INSURANCE CO., Defendants, Case No.
4:19-cv-00694-BRW (Circuit Ct., Pulaski Cty., Ark., Oct. 3, 2019)
is a class action whereby Plaintiff seeks, for herself and all
other similarly situated insured customers or former customers of
State Auto, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory damages and other appropriate remedies, resulting from
State Auto's common policy and general business practice of using
unmeasurable, indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and
unexplained "condition adjustments" to improperly reduce insureds'
total loss valuations and claims payments in violation of Arkansas
law and its contractual obligations.

When valuing total loss claims for vehicles, it is improper for an
automobile insurance company, such as State Auto, to undervalue and
underpay the claims by manipulating the data used to value the
vehicles. Specifically, as proscribed by Arkansas Insurance
Regulation 43, State Auto may not use or rely on unmeasurable,
indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and/or unexplained
deductions when adjusting first-party automobile total loss claims,
notes the complaint.

Notwithstanding, State Auto uses a valuation process that employs
unmeasurable, indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and
unexplained "condition adjustments" to reduce the value of
comparable vehicles specified in the valuation reports, which in
turn reduces the vehicle valuation of the total loss vehicle, as
well as the claim payment to the insured, asserts the complaint.
This pattern and practice of undervaluing comparable and total loss
vehicles when paying first-party automobile total loss claims,
which benefits the insurer at the expense of the insured, is not
permitted under Arkansas law nor the terms of State Auto's policies
with its insureds, adds the complaint.

Plaintiff was contracted with State Auto for automobile insurance.
On September 21, 2018, Plaintiff's insured vehicle was deemed a
total loss.

State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company is a property and
casualty insurance company that owns numerous companies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     HANK BATES, ESQ.
     TIFFANY WYATT OLDHAM, ESQ.
     LEE LOWTHER, ESQ.
     CARNEY BATES & PULLIAM, PLLC
     519 W. 7th St.
     Little Rock, AR 72201
     Phone: (501) 312-8500
     Fax: (501) 312-8505


STATE COLLECTION: Certification of Class Sought in Thorson Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Thorson and Cynthia Johnson move the Court to certify the
class described in the complaint of their lawsuit styled MICHAEL
THORSON and CYNTHIA JOHNSON, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. STATE COLLECTION SERVICE, INC., Case
No. 2:19-cv-01463-WED (E.D. Wisc.), and further ask that the Court
both stay the motion for class certification and to grant them (and
the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting automatic
briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting material to
be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiffs assert, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiffs tell the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiffs assert that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiffs contend they are obligated to move for class
certification to protect the interests of the putative class.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiffs argue.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as class
representatives, and to appoint Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


STATE FARM: MAO-MSO Ordered to Reply to Summary Judgment Bid
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, MSP RECOVERY LLC, MSP
RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, & MSPA CLAIMS 1, LLC, Plaintiffs, v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
1:17-cv-1537 (C.D. Ill.), Judge Joe Billy McDade of the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria
Division, denied the Plaintiffs' (i) Motion for Leave to File a
Reply in Support of the Motion under Rule 56(d), and (ii) Motion to
Stay or Deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Medicare Secondary Payer ("MSP") provisions of the Medicare Act
make Medicare insurance secondary to any 'primary plan' obligated
to pay a Medicare recipient's medical expenses, including a
third-party tortfeasor's automobile insurance.  Part C of the
Medicare Act allows Medicare enrollees to obtain Medicare benefits
through private insurers, Medicare Advantage Organizations
("MAOs"), rather than the government.  An MAO may sue a primary
plan that fails to reimburse it for conditional payments made under
the private right of action provided in Section 1395y(b)(3)(A).

The Plaintiffs are corporate entities which have been assigned
rights of recovery under the MSP by numerous MAOs, among others.
The basic theory of their case is members of the assignor-MAOs who
were also insured under no-fault automobile insurance policies
issued by the Defendant were involved in car accidents requiring
medical services; the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant failed
to pay for the medical services or reimburse the assignor-MAOs for
conditional payments issued.

The action was commenced on Feb. 23, 2017 in the Southern District
of Illinois.  Following a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction on Article III standing grounds and for failure
to plead sufficient facts under Rule 8, the Plaintiffs filed a
First Amended Complaint.

The Defendant moved to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. Section
1404(a) and the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of Illinois.  In the interim, the Defendant
filed a second motion to dismiss asserting the amendments did not
cure the issues identified in the original motion to dismiss.  The
Court denied as moot the Defendant's original motion to dismiss but
granted the Defendant's second motion to dismiss, holding that the
Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege an injury in fact, as
necessary for Article III standing.

The Plaintiffs timely filed a Second Amended Complaint on Jan. 30,
2018.  In the Second Amended Complaint, they provided additional
details about an accident resulting in medical fees for two
Medicare beneficiaries, which they allege the Defendant failed to
pay or reimburse.  The two beneficiaries were identified as O.D.
and C.S.  

The Defendant again moved to dismiss on standing grounds, inter
alia.  The Court held the O.D. allegations were sufficient to
survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of
standing, but the C.S. allegations were not; the assignment of the
claim related to C.S. occurred after the lawsuit was filed.

The parties differed on the discovery schedule.  The Defendant
requested discovery be bifurcated between discovery on the merits
and discovery on class certification as well as a deadline for
amendment of the pleadings and joinder of additional parties, which
the Plaintiff opposed; the Defendant also noted in its potential
plan to file a motion for summary judgment on the named Plaintiffs'
individual claims.  Magistrate Judge Jonathan E. Hawley accepted
the Defendant's plan.  The Plaintiffs did not file an objection.

Judge McDade referred the case to Magistrate Judge Tom
Schanzle-Haskins for a report and recommendation concerning class
certification.  Shortly before the briefing on class certification
was completed, the Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing the O.D. allegations did not provide the Plaintiffs with
standing.  A previously set hearing, the report and recommendation,
and a decision on class certification were put on hold pending
resolution of the motion for summary judgment.  The Plaintiffs then
filed the instant motion, requesting the Defendant's summary
judgment motion be stayed or denied under Rule 56(d)(1).  Further
briefing on the summary judgment motion was postponed pending
resolution of the Rule 56(d)(1) motion.

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay or
Deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Plaintiffs have
requested to file a reply.

As an initial matter, Judge McDade holds that the Court does not
typically permit the moving party to file a reply in order to
introduce new arguments or evidence that could have been included
in the motion itself, or to rehash the arguments made in the
motion.  Rather, replies are allowed if the party opposing a motion
has introduced new and unexpected issues in response to the motion.
He finds that the Plaintiffs have not met this standard.  The
Defendant's response did not raise any new or unexpected issues.
Moreover, much of the Plaintiffs' tendered reply either rehashes
the arguments from their initial motion or attacks the Defendant's
request for summary judgment itself; neither is a proper function
for a reply in this context, the Court cites.  Therefore, leave to
file is denied, the Court holds.

Turning to the Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) Motion, what the Plaintiffs
seek before consideration of the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment is both simple and vast: for the Defendant to produce
demographic evidence of everyone in its claims database who is
Medicare eligible and to then provide that information to a
third-party data vendor (selected by the parties) who will create a
report of names that exist in that list and in the Plaintiffs' list
of MAO members.  Then, both parties would produce additional data
on the matched beneficiaries to determine whether any made a claim
to the Defendant, whether the MAO-assignors made payments on behalf
of any matched beneficiary, and whether the Defendant made any
reimbursements.  Only after this final step, the Plaintiffs assert,
the Defendant and the Court will know with certainty the extent of
the Plaintiffs' individual claims against the Defendant.

The Defendant opposes the Plaintiffs' request.  It argues the
Plaintiffs, who it says have what they need with regard to the
exemplar beneficiary, are seeking in effect to amend their
pleadings to use new examplars to establish standing.  Moreover,
the Defendant argues the Plaintiffs failed to engage in due
diligence to uncover such other exemplars.

The Judge agrees the Plaintiffs' request to probe all possible
claims cannot support its Rule 56(d) motion.  Just as they were in
MAO-MSO I, the Plaintiffs were on notice from the outset that the
issue of standing would be front and center.  If they were going to
hang their hat on a single 'exemplar' after two unsuccessful
attempts, it was important to get it right on the third try.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs' request is incongruous
with the purpose of Rule 56(d).  A Rule 56(d) motion that is based
on nothing more than mere speculation and would amount to a fishing
expedition, the Court may deny it.  Due to their repeated attempts
to adequately allege standing, the Judge is concerned that the
Plaintiffs' belief that further discovery would unearth a new,
viable exemplar is based on mere speculation.  Nothing in the
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(d) motion convinces the Judge that further
discovery would successfully uncover a new exemplar which could be
used to defend against summary judgment, even if he were inclined
to allow de facto amendment to the complaint.

The Judge recognizes the result may require a recalibration of
strategy for the Plaintiffs.  In light of that, the Court allowed
the Plaintiffs 14 days from the date of the Order to file their
response to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge McDade (i) denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Leave to File a Reply in Support of the Motion under
Rule 56(d), and (ii) their Motion to Stay or Deny Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Order and Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/Pg8Nmp from Leagle.com.

MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC, MSP Recovery, LLC, a Florida entity &
MSPA Claims 1, LLC, a Florida entity, Plaintiffs, represented by
Christopher L. Coffin -- ccoffin@pbclawfirm.com -- PENDLEY BAUDIN &
COFFIN LLP, Robert Brent Wisner -- RBWisner@BaumHedlundLaw.com --
BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN, Adam M. Foster --
AFoster@BaumHedlundLaw.com -- BAUM HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN,
Courtney L. Stidham -- cstidman@pbclawfirm.com -- PENDLEY BAUDIN &
COFFIN LLP & David M. Hundley, HUNDLEY LAW GROUP, P.C.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, Plaintiff, represented by
Christopher L. Coffin, PENDLEY BAUDIN & COFFIN LLP,  David M.
Hundley, HUNDLEY LAW GROUP, P.C. & Robert Brent Wisner, BAUM
HEDLUND ARISTEI & GOLDMAN.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant,
represented by David Matthew Allen -- mallen@carltonfields.com --
CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN BURT P.A., Joseph Anthony Cancila, Jr. --
jcancila@rshc-law.com -- RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP, Patrick
D. Cloud -- pcloud@heylroyster.com -- HEYL ROYSTER VOELKER & ALLEN,
Benjamine Reid -- breid@carltonfields.com -- CARLTON FIELDS JORDEN
BURT P.A. & James P. Gaughan -- jgaughan@rshc-law.com -- RILEY
SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP.


STYLOGIC LTD: Tatum-Rios Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stylogic Ltd. The
case is styled as Lynette Tatum-Rios Individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Stylogic Ltd.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09382 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Stylogic is a personal styling service that delivers hand-picked
apparel and accessories for women sizes 12-36.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
     Lipsky Lowe LLP
     420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
     New York, NY 10170
     Phone: (212) 764-7171
     Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


SUBARU OF AMERICA: Nunez Sues Over Recall Work on Faulty Engines
----------------------------------------------------------------
CRISTIAN NUNEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC., TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A.,
INC. and TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING & MANUFACTURING NORTH AMERICA,
INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-18303-RBK-AMD (D.N.J., Sept. 24, 2019),
asserts claims for breach of express warranties, breach of implied
warranties, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and detrimental
reliance in connection with the recall work done on certain
vehicles with defective valve springs in the engines.

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of all persons or entities in the
United States and/or Texas, who own(ed) or lease(d) a 2013 Subaru
BRZ or 2013 Toyota Scion FR-S, 2013 Subaru XV Crosstrek or 2012-14
Subaru Impreza, subject to NHTSA Recall No. 18V-772 (the "Class
Vehicles").  Plaintiff demands that Defendants accept
responsibility for the engine failures resulting from the recall
work and make the consumers whole.

The Defendants have admitted that the valve springs in the engines
of the Class Vehicles are defective and may fracture, causing the
engine to malfunction, and "result in the engine stalling during
driving and the inability to restart the vehicle."  On November 1,
2018, Subaru filed a "Safety Recall Report" with the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration concerning the valve spring
defect in the Class Vehicles.

The Plaintiff and putative class members have brought their Class
Vehicles to Defendants' authorized agents for Recall Work in
reasonable reliance upon the Defendants' promises to repair their
vehicles and eliminate the safety hazard.  Unfortunately, the
Plaintiff alleges, the Recall Work is not remedying the hazard, but
instead, is increasing the risk of valve spring and/or other engine
malfunction; is causing catastrophic engine damage to the Class
Vehicles ;and is increasing the risk of vehicle crashes caused by
vehicles suddenly stalling while being driven.  The Plaintiff adds
that in addition to having their safety and that of the public put
at risk, the owners of Class Vehicles are incurring substantial
monetary losses because Defendants are refusing to acknowledge full
liability for the faulty Recall Work or to reimburse vehicle owners
for the engine damages and other losses resulting from the Recall
Work.

Subaru is a New Jersey corporation with headquarters in Camden, New
Jersey.  Subaru is the automobile manufacturing division of the
Japanese conglomerate Subaru Corporation.  Subaru has a nationwide
dealership network and operates offices and facilities throughout
the United States.  Subaru designed the engine in the Plaintiff's
Class Vehicle and manufactured the vehicle in a Subaru facility in
Japan.

TMS is a California corporation with its corporate headquarters
located in Plano, Texas.  TMS manages and supports a Dealer network
located throughout the state of New Jersey and the United States.
TMS is the authorized importer and distributor of Toyota motor
vehicles in the United States.  TMS is responsible for advertising,
marketing, and selling the Class Vehicles.

TEMA is a Kentucky corporation with its corporate headquarters
located in Plano, Texas.  TEMA is the automobile engineering,
manufacturing, research, and design concern in North America for
Toyota motor vehicles.  TEMA designs, develops, tests,
manufactures, assembles, and evaluates Toyota motor vehicles in the
United States.  TEMA also develops parts for North American Toyota
vehicles.  TEMA operates factories which manufacture Toyota
vehicles and operates research and development facilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 750-1265
          E-mail: kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr., Esq.
          James P. McGraw, III, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0246
          E-mail: ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com
                  jmcgraw@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          LEVAN LAW GROUP LLC
          One Logan Square, 27th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-693
          Telephone: (215) 561-1500
          Facsimile: (215) 827-5390
          E-mail: pmuhic@levanlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
          Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          923 Fayette Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Telephone: (610) 234-6487
          Facsimile: (224) 632-4521
          E-mail: jjagher@fklmlaw.com
                  kjustice@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          William H. London, Esq.
          Douglas A. Millen, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN, LLC
          2201 Waukegan Road, #130
          Bannockburn, IL 60015
          Telephone: (224) 632-4500
          Facsimile: (224) 632-4521
          E-mail: blondon@fklmlaw.com
                  dmillen@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          David P. McLafferty, Esq.
          MCLAFFERTY LAW FIRM, P.C.
          923 Fayette Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Telephone: (610) 940-4000
          Facsimile: (610) 940-4007
          E-mail: dmclafferty@mclaffertylaw.com

               - and -

          Richard R. Gordon, Esq.
          GORDON LAW OFFICES, LTD.
          111 West Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 332-5200
          Facsimile: (312) 242-4966
          E-mail: rrg@gordonlawchicago.com


TMC RESTAURANT: Stay Bid to Compel Arbitration Denied as to Davis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEILONNI DAVIS, ASHLEY SAFRIT, and LAUREN WILSON, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. TMC RESTAURANT OF CHARLOTTE, LLC d/b/a THE MEN'S CLUB,
Defendant, Case No. 3:18-CV-00313-RJC-DCK (W.D. N.C.), Judge Robert
J. Conrad of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina, Charlotte Division, granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Stay in Favor of
Arbitration.

Plaintiffs Davis, Safrit, and Wilson are former servers or
bartenders at the Defendant.  They filed the putative class action
against the Defendant alleging violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, and 26 U.S.C.
Section 7434.

The Defendant answered by filing the instant Motion to Dismiss or
Stay in Favor of Arbitration contending that the Plaintiffs entered
into an Arbitration Agreement and Waiver of Class/Collective
Actions with the Defendant that requires the Plaintiffs' claims to
be resolved through arbitration.

The Plaintiffs conceded that Safrit and Wilson entered into the
Arbitration Agreement with the Defendant and, accordingly, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that their claims be stayed pending
arbitration.  However, the Magistrate Judge found that Davis did
not enter into the Arbitration Agreement with the Defendant and
recommended that the Defendant's motion be denied as to Davis'
claims.

The Defendant objects to the M&R on three grounds.  First, it
contends that the arbitrator must decide whether an arbitration
agreement between Davis and the Defendant exists because they
validly delegated the issue to the arbitrator.  Second, the
Defendant contends that it established that Davis agreed to
arbitrate her claims against it.  Third and last, it contends that
if the Court finds that the Defendant has not proven that Davis
agreed to arbitrate her claims, it is entitled to a jury trial on
the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.

Judge Conrad holds that the Defendant is correct that when the
parties' agreement delegates arbitrability issues to the
arbitrator, the Court is without power to decide arbitrability
issues -- the arbitrator must determine issues regarding the
validity, enforceability, or scope of the arbitration agreement,
including its delegation provision.  It is exactly the dispute in
the case: Davis does not challenge the validity or enforceability
of the Arbitration Agreement; rather, Davis contends that she never
entered into -- or formed -- the Arbitration Agreement with the
Defendant.  Therefore, notwithstanding the delegation provision in
the Arbitration Agreement, the Judge must decide whether Davis
entered into the Arbitration Agreement with the Defendant.

In determining whether the parties entered into an agreement to
arbitrate, the record evidence establishes that on Aug. 26, 2012,
the Defendant held an employee meeting at which managers
distributed copies of the Arbitration Agreement to all employees at
the meeting.  At this meeting, its General Manager and Office
Manager explained to all employees that entering into the
Arbitration Agreement with the Defendant was a condition of
continued employment with the Defendant.  

The Defendant informed Davis that she was required to sign and
return the Arbitration Agreement to the Defendant in order to
continue her employment, and it is undisputed that she did not do
so.  In addition, Davis did not manifest assent to the Arbitration
Agreement prior to, or after, continuing her employment.  Davis'
failure to enter into the Arbitration Agreement would have been a
valid basis for the Defendant to end Davis' employment, but Davis
did not assent to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement merely by
continuing her employment.  The fact that the Defendant informed
all employees that they were required to sign and return the
Arbitration Agreement -- and the Defendant did in fact receive and
countersign 41 separate Arbitration Agreements -- is further
evidence that the parties contemplated an executed Arbitration
Agreement for each employee, including Davis.  Therefore, the Judge
concludes that Davis did not assent to the terms of the Arbitration
Agreement.

In the alternative, the Defendant argues that the evidence that
Davis attended the August 2012 meeting at which employees were
given copies of the Arbitration Agreement and informed that
entering into the Arbitration Agreement was a condition of
continued employment is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Davis assented to the Arbitration
Agreement.

The Judge finds that the Defendant's only evidence that Davis
assented to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement is that she
attended the August 2012 meeting and thereafter continued her
employment.  The Defendant informed all employees that they were
required to sign and return the Arbitration Agreement to the
Defendant in order to continue their employment. Forty-one of the
46 employees who attended the meeting signed and returned the
Arbitration Agreement to the Defendant, and the Defendant
countersigned all 41 agreements.  Four of the five employees who
did not sign and return the Arbitration Agreement to the Defendant
left their employment within nine months after the August 2012
meeting.  Davis did not sign the Arbitration Agreement.

In light of the foregoing, Davis' attendance at the August 2012
meeting and continued employment with the Defendant is insufficient
to create a genuine dispute as to whether Davis agreed to the terms
of the Arbitration Agreement.  Therefore, the Judge holds that the
Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Conrad granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Stay in Favor of
Arbitration.  Specifically, he granted the motion as to the claims
of Plaintiffs Ashley Safrit and Lauren Wilson, and these claims are
stayed pending arbitration.  He denied the motion as to the claims
of Plaintiff Leilonni Davis.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/2nkeKh from Leagle.com.

Leilonni Davis, Ashley Safrit & Lauren Wilson, Plaintiffs,
represented by Philip J. Gibbons, Jr. -- phil@gibbonsleis.com --
Gibbons Leis, PLLC & Craig Lorne Leis, Gibbons Leis, PLLC.

TMC Restaurant of Charlotte LLC, doing business as The Men's Club,
Defendant, represented by Joseph L. Ledford --
josephlledford@yahoo.com -- Joseph L. Ledford, Attorney at Law &
Matthew J. Hoffer -- Matt@BradShaferLaw.com -- Shafer & Associates,
P.C., pro hac vice.


TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS: Schwartz Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Transworld Systems,
Inc. The case is styled as Gary Schwartz individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Transworld Systems,
Inc., MSW Capital, LLC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-05720 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 10, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Transworld Systems Inc. provides accounts receivable, debt
recovery, and past due accounts services for businesses, medical
companies, dental companies, education facilities, Fortune 500
companies, and small businesses in the United States and
internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
     Barshay Sanders, PLLC
     100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
     Garden City, NY 11530
     Phone: (516) 203-7600
     Fax: (516) 281-7601
     Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


UNITED FEDERAL: Capital Sues over Collection of Overdraft Fees
--------------------------------------------------------------
CAPITAL FIELD SERVICE & CONSTRUCTION INC., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v. UNITED
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-00765-JTN-ESC
(W.D. Mich., Sept. 17, 2019), seeks monetary damages, restitution
and declaratory relief from Defendant, arising from unfair and
unconscionable assessment and collection of "overdraft fees" on
accounts that were never actually overdrawn.

According to the complaint, this practice breaches contract
promises made in UFCU's adhesion contracts. In plain, clear, and
simple language, the checking account contract documents discussing
OD Fees promise that UFCU will only charge OD Fees or NSF Fees on
transactions where there are insufficient funds to "cover" them.

As what happened to Plaintiff, however, UFCU charges OD Fees even
when there are sufficient funds to "cover" a debit card
transaction.

UFCU's customers have been injured by UFCU's improper practices to
the tune of millions of dollars bilked from their accounts in
violation of their agreements with UFCU, the lawsuit says.

UFCU is a federally chartered credit union with approximately $3
billion in assets. UFCU is headquartered in St. Joseph, Michigan
and maintains 30 branches in Arkansas, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada,
North Carolina and Ohio.[BN]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Jeffrey Kaliel, Esq.
          Sophia Gold, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Ave. NW 10th Floor
          Washington, D.C. 20009
          Telephone: (202) 350-4783
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com
                  sgold@kalielpllc.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
          Daniel Tropin, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW
          FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One West Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: 954-525-4100
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com
                  streisfeld@kolawyers.com
                  tropin@kolawyers.com

UNITED STATES AUTMOBILE: Wash. App. Ct. Affirms CPA Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One issued an Opinion
affirming the District Court's judgment granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the case captioned EASTSIDE PHYSICAL THERAPY, INC.,
P.S., a Washington corporation, and SUMMIT PHYSICAL THERAPY, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company, Appellants, v. UNITED
SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION and USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Respondents, No. 78134-1-I.

Eastside Physical Therapy, Inc. and Summit Physical Therapy, LLC
appealed the dismissal of their Consumer Protection Act (CPA)
claims against United States Automobile Association and USAA
Casualty Insurance Company (USAA), insurers who provided PIP
coverage to Eastside and Summit patients.

Eastside brought this class action against USAA in King County
Superior Court, alleging that its reimbursement practices violated
the CPA. Summit joined as a co-plaintiff. Eastside and Summit
alleged that over a period from May 30, 2015 to October 13, 2017,
USAA violated RCW 48.22.005(7) by failing to pay all reasonable
medical expenses and violated WAC 284-30-330 by failing to
implement a reasonable procedure for investigating PIP insurance
claims before it refused to pay them in full.

USAA filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that the final settlement order in MySpine P.S. v. USAA Casualty
Insurance Company, no. 12-2-32635-5 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 11,
2015), explicitly allowed USAA to continue using the RF Methodology
to determine reimbursement to providers. USAA further argued that
Eastside's and Summit's claimed damages were not compensable
injuries under the CPA.

The trial court dismissed Summit's claim based on the MySpine
settlement, and dismissed Eastside's claim, concluding that the PIP
policy exhaustion barred the claim and, alternatively, that
Eastside had not sustained a cognizable CPA injury. Eastside and
Summit appeal the orders dismissing their claims and denying
transfer of the case to Judge Doyle.

Eastside's CPA Claim

Eastside's appeal raises three issues: first, whether the
exhaustion of LJ's PIP benefits bar Eastside's CPA claim; second,
whether Eastside presented evidence of cognizable CPA injuries to
business or property; and third, whether Eastside has standing to
challenge USAA's use of the RF Methodology as either a per se
violation of the CPA or an unfair practice under Folweiler.

The Court reviews an order of summary judgment de novo, performing
the same inquiry as the trial court and considering the facts and
inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and
depositions establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.  

Washington's CPA makes unlawful unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce.

To establish a CPA violation, a challenger must establish: (1) an
unfair or deceptive act or practice (2) in trade or commerce (3) a
sufficient showing of public interest (4) injury to business or
property and (5) a causal link between the unfair acts and injury.


PIP Policy Exhaustion

The trial court held that Eastside could not recover from USAA
because LJ's PIP coverage limits were exhausted before Eastside
filed the lawsuit. USAA argues that because coverage limits were
exhausted, an insured cannot recover any additional funds from
USAA. It argues that if LJ cannot recover CPA damages, Eastside
cannot do so either.

Because Eastside's request for payment predated the exhaustion of
LJ's policy limits by several months, and the conduct that arguably
violated the CPA similarly predated exhaustion, the Court concludes
that policy limit's exhaustion does not bar Eastside's CPA claim
under Van Noy.

USAA argues that Eastside's admission in the complaint that it was
excluding reductions made to bills submitted on PIP claims with
exhausted policy limits is a judicial admission that the Court
should deem conclusively binding on Eastside. Eastside, however,
explained that this statement was meant to exclude bills submitted
to USAA after a policy limit had been reached. A judicial admission
is a formal admission in a pleading which has the effect of
withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need
for proof of the fact. Eastside's statement in its complaint is not
a statement of fact, but a description of its claim, and an
ambiguous one at that.

The Court thus rejects USAA's argument that the judicial admission
doctrine applies here.

Because Eastside's CPA claim accrued before LJ's policy limits were
exhausted, the subsequent payout of the full $10,000 in PIP
benefits does not bar the claim as a matter of law. The trial court
erred in concluding otherwise.

Cognizable CPA Injury

The trial court also concluded that, as an alternative basis for
dismissing Eastside's CPA claim, Eastside failed to establish a
cognizable CPA injury. RCW 19.86.090 provides any person who is
injured in his or her business or property by a violation of the
CPA may bring an action to enjoin further violations or to recover
actual damages sustained by him or her.  

Eastside identified two injuries the four or five-month delay in
being paid in full on the second and third invoices and the
underpayment on the first invoice.  

USAA argues that an alleged underpayment of a medical bill is not
recoverable under the CPA under Ambach v. French, 167 Wn.2d 167,
216 P.3d 405 (2009). This reading of Ambach is not warranted by the
facts of that case. In Ambach, the plaintiff contracted a staph
infection following shoulder surgery and brought a professional
malpractice and CPA claim against the surgeon. The trial court
dismissed the CPA claim because Ambach alleged a personal injury,
not an injury to her business or property. Our Supreme Court
agreed, reasoning that where a plaintiff is both physically and
economically injured by one act, the economic damages flowing from
the physical injury are not an injury to business or property" as
that term is used in our consumer protection laws.  

It concluded that the expense for the surgery from which the
personal injury arose was not a harm to Ambach's property within
the meaning of the CPA.  

As in Williams, the Court have two separate acts here: the
tortfeasor's initial act of causing a car accident and injuring LJ,
and USAA's separate and independent act of denying full
reimbursement to Eastside, LJ's provider. Eastside's claim is based
on the second act, not the first. The Appeals Court agrees with
Eastside that under Williams, the holding of Ambach does not apply.
Thus, Eastside's claimed injury is sufficient to proceed under the
CPA.

The trial court erred in concluding that Eastside failed to
establish a cognizable CPA injury to property.

Standing to Challenge RF Methodology under Folweiler

USAA urges this court to affirm the summary judgment on alternative
grounds raised below. First, it argues Eastside failed to allege an
unfair practice within the meaning of the CPA. Second, USAA
contends Eastside lacks standing to pursue this claim.

Folweiler, which issued after the summary judgment in this case,
disposes of both arguments. In Folweiler, a chiropractic clinic
contended that American Family violated the CPA by relying on a
computer database to determine the rate it would pay for medical
expenses submitted by Washington providers. This court reversed the
trial court's dismissal of that claim on CR 12(b)(6):

On their face, RCW 48.22.095(1)(a) and RCW 48.22.005(7) require
payment of all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by or on
behalf of the insured. The statutes necessarily impose a duty to
look at each claim individually in order to determine the
reasonable and necessary expenses for the insured. The law requires
an individualized assessment rather than substituting a formulaic
approach that pays only 80 percent of the average charge for a
large geographic area.

This court held that failing to undertake an individualized
assessment and using a geographic based formula regardless of the
individual circumstances constitutes an unfair act in violation of
the CPA.  Given that Eastlake's claim is identical to that raised
by Folweiler, Eastlake has alleged an unfair practice under the
CPA.

Eastside's allegations here are identical to those raised in
Folweiler. Eastside challenges USAA's use of its RF Methodology,
alleging that it systematically denies full payment of medical
expenses because it fails to assess an insureds' individual needs.
But USAA denies this. USAA presented evidence that it permitted
Eastside to demonstrate the reasonableness of its charges, and it
adjusted the reimbursement when it was able to do so. This evidence
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether USAA is
using the RF Methodology without performing an individualized
assessment of the reasonableness of its charges in light of its
insureds' needs.

The Court concludes the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to USAA on Eastside's claim.

Summit's CPA Claims

Although Summit's claim is identical to Eastside's claim, they are
not similarly situated plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed
Summit's claim, concluding that the final settlement order in
MySpine barred its claims. We hold that under paragraph 27 of the
MySpine settlement, Summit is precluded from initiating a lawsuit
against USAA for its use of the RF Methodology for five years from
the effective date of that settlement. The trial court correctly
dismissed Summit's claims against USAA because the requisite
five-year period has not passed.

The Court reviews CR 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo.  Dismissal is
warranted only if the court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt,
the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts which would justify
recovery.

Summit argues the order approving the MySpine settlement permits it
to challenge USAA's use of the RF Methodology after the effective
date of the agreement.

Settlement agreements are interpreted the same way as contracts. An
interpretation of a contract which gives effect to all of its
provisions is favored over one which renders some of the language
meaningless or ineffective.  

Moreover, Summit and Eastside are now relying on Folweiler for the
proposition that USAA's use of the RF Methodology is, in and of
itself, an unfair practice under the CPA. These allegations are
inconsistent with Summit's agreement, as set out in the MySpine
settlement order, not to challenge this practice for a period of
five years. If Summit did not wish to participate in the MySpine
settlement, it could have opted out. It chose not to do so. It is
thus bound by the five-year litigation bar.

Because the final settlement order in MySpine unambiguously
precludes Summit from bringing suit against USAA based on its use
of the RF Methodology for a period of five years, the trial court
properly dismissed Summit's claim.

The Court concludes that the trial court correctly dismissed
Summit's CPA claim against USAA because the MySpine final
settlement order bars Summit from challenging the RF Methodology
for five years.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' September 30, 2019
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y25oe3f6 from
Leagle.com.

David Elliot Breskin, Esq., at Breskin Johnson & Townsend PLLC,
Brendan Wesley Donckers, Esq., at Breskin Johnson & Townsend, PLLC,
Counsel for Appellant(s).

Michael A Moore, Esq., at Corr Cronin LLP, Jay Williams, Esq., at
Schiff Hardin LLP, David C. Scott, Esq., at Schiff Hardin LLP, John
Taylor Bender, Esq., at Corr Cronin LLP, Counsel for
Respondent(s).


UNITED STATES: Downey Seeks Disability Accommodation, to Seal Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Downey, Plaintiff in the lawsuit styled Downey, et al. v.
Department of Justice, et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-04140-BCW (W.D.
Mo.), file with the Court his Motion to Accommodate the Disabled,
Motion to Expedite & Seal and Motion to Designate the Primary
Defendant for the Defendant Class Action Claim.

Mr. Downey asserts that he has established that he is disabled, and
that he requests to proceed in forma pauperis.  He moves the Court
that the Motions and the entire case be determined and ruled by
correspondence, with no appearances.

"Expedite is necessary due to the Plaintiff being disabled to
curtail expenses for the Court and all parties," according to the
single filing containing the three Motions.  Mr. Downey also
contends that the Motion to Seal is necessary to curtail Government
retaliation and to accommodate under the Whistleblower Protection
Act and for National Security.

Plaintiff Mark Downey, of McLean, Virginia, appears pro se.[CC]


USA TECHNOLOGIES: Puerto Rico Retirement Fund Suit Consolidated
---------------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 9, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the class action complaint
initiated by the University of Puerto Rico Retirement System (UPR)
has been consolidated with the consolidated class action suit which
has been transferred to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On August 12, 2019, the University of Puerto Rico Retirement System
("UPR") filed a putative class action complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the
Company, Herbert, Singh, the Company's Directors at the relevant
time (Steven D. Barnhart, Joel Books, Robert L. Metzger, Albin F.
Moschner, William J. Reilly and William J. Schoch) ("the
Independent Directors"), and the investment banking firms who acted
as underwriters for the May 2018 follow-on public offering of the
Company (the "Public Offering"): William Blair & Company; LLC;
Craig-Hallum Capital Group, LLC; Northland Securities, Inc.; and
Barrington Research Associates, Inc. ("the Underwriter
Defendants").

The class is defined as purchasers of the Company's shares pursuant
to the registration statement and prospectus issued in connection
with the Public Offering. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages caused
by Defendants' alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933
(the "1933 Act"), and specifically Sections 11, 12 and 15 thereof.


The complaint generally seeks compensatory damages, rescissory
damages and attorneys' fees and costs. The UPR complaint was
consolidated into the Consolidated Action and the UPR docket was
closed.

Pursuant to the February 28, 2019 Stipulation, plaintiffs' counsel
in the Consolidated Action will file one amended complaint
(covering the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act claims) after the 2018 Form
10-K has been filed, and no response to the complaint is required
at this time.

The Company plans to vigorously defend against the claims asserted
in the Consolidated Action.

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.


USA TECHNOLOGIES: Securities Suit Goes to E.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 9, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the Court granted the motion
to transfer a consolidated class action action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On September 11, 2018, Stephane Gouet filed a putative class action
complaint against the Company, Stephen P. Herbert, the Chief
Executive Officer, and Priyanka Singh, the former Chief Financial
Officer, in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. The class is defined as purchasers of the Company's
securities from November 9, 2017 through September 11, 2018.

The complaint alleges that the Company disclosed on September 11,
2018 that it was unable to timely file its Annual Report on Form
10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2018 (the "2018 Form
10-K"), and that the Audit Committee of the Company's Board of
Directors was in the process of conducting an internal
investigation of current and prior period matters relating to
certain of the Company's contractual arrangements, including the
accounting treatment, financial reporting and internal controls
related to such arrangements.

The complaint alleges that the defendants disseminated false
statements and failed to disclose material facts and engaged in
practices that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Gouet and others
similarly situated in connection with their purchases of the
Company’s securities during the proposed class period. The
complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

Two additional class action complaints, containing substantially
the same factual allegations and legal claims, were filed against
the Company, Herbert and Singh in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.

On September 13, 2018, David Gray filed a putative class action
complaint, and on October 3, 2018, Anthony E. Phillips filed a
putative class action complaint. Subsequently, multiple
shareholders moved to be appointed lead plaintiff, and on December
19, 2018, the Court consolidated the three actions, appointed a
lead plaintiff (the "Lead Plaintiff"), and appointed lead counsel
for the consolidated actions (the "Consolidated Action").

On February 28, 2019, the Court approved a Stipulation agreed to by
the parties in the Consolidated Action for the filing of an amended
complaint within fourteen days after the Company files the 2018
Form 10-K.

On January 22, 2019, the Company and Herbert filed a motion to
transfer the Consolidated Action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On February 5, 2019, the Lead Plaintiff filed its opposition to the
Motion to Transfer.

On September 30, 2019, the Court granted the motion to transfer.

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.


USA TECHNOLOGIES: Warren Police & Fire Retirement Sys. Suit Stayed
------------------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 9, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended June 30, 2019, that the class action suit
initiated by the City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System
has been stayed.

On May 17, 2019, the City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement
System filed a putative class action complaint in the Court of
Common Pleas, Chester County, Pennsylvania. The class is defined as
purchasers of the Company's shares pursuant to the registration
statement and prospectus issued in connection with the Public
Offering.

The defendants are the Company, Herbert, Singh, the Independent
Directors, and the Underwriter Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that
the registration statement contained untrue statements of material
facts or omitted to state facts necessary to make the statements
not misleading, and was not prepared in accordance with the rules
and regulations governing its preparation.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages caused by defendants' alleged
violations of the 1933 Act, and specifically Sections 11, 12 and 15
thereof. The complaint generally seeks compensatory damages,
rescissory damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants filed a Petition for Stay due to the previously filed
Consolidated Action, and on September 20, 2019, and following a
hearing, the Court granted the Petition and stayed the action
pending the final disposition of the Consolidated Action.

USA Technologies said, "The Company plans to vigorously defend
against these claims."

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.


USAA CASUALTY: Koehler's Summary Judgment Bid Denied w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUSAN J. KOEHLER, EXECUTRIX OF THE, ESTATE OF PHILIP
J. KOEHLER, JR., DECEASED, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF
SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Civil Action. No.19-715 (E.D. Pa.), Judge
Mitchell S. Goldberg of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied the Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment without prejudice pending class certification.

The Plaintiff's general allegation in the putative class action is
that the Defendant has improperly denied uninsured and underinsured
motorist benefits to its insureds based on a type of policy
exclusion recently declared invalid by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.  The named Plaintiff in the action, Koehler, is the
executrix of the estate of her late husband, Philip Koehler, who
died from injuries he suffered in a 2015 automobile accident.
Following the accident, the Plaintiff made a claim to the negligent
driver's insurer, Encompass, which settled for the policy's limit.


The Plaintiff then sought underinsured motorist coverage from Mr.
Koehler's own insurers.  First, the Plaintiff sought coverage from
Progressive, which had issued Mr. Koehler a policy providing
coverage for the motorcycle he was driving at the time of the
accident.  Like the negligent driver's insurer, Progressive settled
the claim for the policy's limit.

The Plaintiff then turned to the Defendant, which had issued Mr.
Koehler a policy providing him with "stacked" underinsured motorist
coverage for three vehicles -- none of which was the motorcycle he
was driving at the time of the accident.  However, under the
Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, when an
insured obtains "stacked" underinsured motorist coverage, the
insured can recover up to the "sum of the limits for each motor
vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured," regardless
of whether those vehicles are insured under the policy.

While the policy that Defendant issued to Mr. Koehler provides for
stacked coverage, it also includes a "household exclusion," which
excludes injuries sustained while occupying a motor vehicle owned
by the insured or a family member of the insured which is not
insured for underinsured motorist coverage under the policy.
Citing this household exclusion, the Defendant denied the
Plaintiff's claim in December 2015.

But in January 2019 -- four years after the Defendant denied the
Plaintiff's claim -- the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a
decision declaring invalid a household exclusion in a policy issued
by another insurer, GEICO, which is similar to the household
exclusion at issue in the case.  The court in GEICO reasoned that
the household exclusion acts as a de facto waiver of stacked
underinsured motorist coverages, without requiring an insured to
sign the waiver form prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Law.

One month after the Gallagher decision, the Plaintiff brought the
putative class action for breach of contract in the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas.  Her Class Action Complaint seeks a
declaration of coverage and monetary damages, both individually and
on behalf of other insureds who have, since 1990, been denied
stacked uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits on the basis of
the household exclusion in the Defendant's policy.

The Defendant removed the action to the Pennsylvania District Court
and filed an answer, after which scheduled a Rule 16 Scheduling
Conference. In preparation for that conference, the parties
submitted a discovery plan, which proposed that the parties would
agree to bifurcate discovery, with discovery relating to class
certification and the Plaintiff's individual claim to be completed
first, and any remaining discovery to be considered after the Court
rules on class certification.

After the parties submitted their proposed discovery plan, but
before the Rule 16 Conference was held, the Plaintiff moved for
partial summary judgment, solely on her individual claim for
declaratory relief.  Rather than respond to the substance of that
motion, the Defendant has moved to strike or stay consideration of
it, pending a decision on class certification.

The Defendant argues that deciding the Plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment before she has obtained (or even moved
for) class certification violates the well-established rule against
one-way intervention.  That rule was the impetus for Rule 23's
requirement that a court determines whether to certify a class
action at an early practicable time after a person sues.

The Plaintiff responds that this language in Rule 23 is flexible
and permits a district court to consider a summary judgment motion
on the merits before class certification, just as a court may
consider a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) at the outset of the litigation.

Judge Goldberg agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiff's
partial summary judgment motion should not be decided before class
certification.  The Judge opines that the rationale for Rule 23's
requirement that certification be determined early in the case was
to avoid the potential for one-way intervention, and to assure that
members of the class are identified before trial on the merits and
are bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.  Importantly, the
Third Circuit also recognized that Rule 23's requirement of early
certification is for the protection of the defendant, because the
defendant is bound by any pre-certification merits ruling, while
the absent plaintiff class members are not.

Notwithstanding the Third Circuit's recognition in Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp. that a defendant can waive his protection against
one-way intervention and agree to a pre-certification merits
ruling, until 2003 the text of Rule 23 was quite strict, mandating
that a district court decide whether to certify a class action as
soon as practicable after the commencement of the action.  In 2003,
this language in Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was amended to its current form,
providing -- more flexibly -- that certification be determined "at
an early practicable time."  

As the Advisory Committee's Note on the 2003 Amendments explains,
the change was made to reflect the "many valid reasons that may
justify deferring the initial certification decision."  One of
those valid reasons, the Note provides, is that the party opposing
the class [i.e., the defendant] may prefer to win dismissal or
summary judgment as to the individual plaintiffs without
certification and without binding the class that might have been
certified.

And while the Note does not address that question directly, it
makes clear that the purpose of the 2003 Amendments was not to
restore the practice of one-way intervention that was rejected by
the 1966 revision.  Thus, as one district court has observed, Rule
23 still disfavor[s] one-way intervention and counsels against a
court ruling on motions that encroach on the merits of a final
decision before class certification.

In light of the above history of Rule 23(c)(1)(A), and the rule
against one-way intervention it embodies, the Judge holds that it
would be inappropriate to decide the Plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment -- over the Defendant's objection -- before
deciding whether to certify a class.

Finally, even if the general interests in judicial economy and
efficiency were enough to overcome the Defendant's protection
against one-way intervention, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff
does not explain how those interests would be best served by a
pre-certification merits ruling.  If he makes a pre-certification
merits ruling favorable to the Plaintiff, she will undoubtedly
proceed to seek class certification.  On the other hand, if his
ruling were to be unfavorable to the Plaintiff, she may decide not
to seek class certification -- obviating the need for a
certification decision.  But that would still not preclude another
member of the putative class from initiating his or her own lawsuit
against the Defendant to seek a better result.  That process would
not serve the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, and is,
more importantly, the unfair circumstance that the rule against
one-way intervention seeks to prevent.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Goldberg denies the Plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment without prejudice, pending a
decision on class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/l40ZG1 from Leagle.com.

SUSAN J. KOEHLER, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF PHILIP J. KOEHLER,
JR., DECEASED, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF SIMILARLY
SITUATED PERSONS, Plaintiff, represented by JAMES C. HAGGERTY --
jhaggerty@hgsklawyers.com -- HAGGERTY GOLDBERG SCHLEIFER &
KUPERSMITH PC, JONATHAN SHUB -- jshub@kohnswift.com -- KOHN SWIFT &
GRAF PC & SCOTT B. COOPER, SCHMIDT, RONCA & KRAMER P.C.

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, represented by JAY
WILLIAMS -- jwilliams@schiffhardin.com -- SCHIFF HARDIN LLP,
LINDSAY ANDREUZZI -- lindsay.andreuzzi@kutakrock.com -- KUTAK ROCK
LLP, MICHAEL T. MCDONNELL, III -- michael.mcdonnell@kutakrock.com
-- KUTAK ROCK LLP & PAULA M. KETCHAM -- pketcham@schiffhardin.com
-- SCHIFF HARDIN LLP.


VENATOR MATERIALS: Cambria County Sues over Drop in Share Price
---------------------------------------------------------------
CAMBRIA COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VENATOR
MATERIALS PLC; SIMON TURNER; KURT D. OGDEN; STEPHEN IBBOTSON; RUSS
R. STOLLE; PETER R. HUNTSMAN; SIR ROBERT J. MARGETTS; DOUGLAS D.
ANDERSON; DANIELE FERRARI; KATHY D. PATRICK; HUNTSMAN (HOLDINGS)
NETHERLANDS B.V.; HUNTSMAN INTERNATIONAL LLC; HUNTSMAN CORPORATION;
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.; MERRILL LYNCH; PIERCE; FENNER &
SMITH INCORPORATED; GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC; and J.P. MORGAN
SECURITIES LLC, Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-03464 (S.D. Tex.,
Sept. 13, 2019) is a class action on behalf of a class of all
persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Venator
ordinary shares between August 2, 2017, and October 29, 2018, both
dates inclusive (the "Class Period"), including those who purchased
or otherwise acquired Venator ordinary shares pursuant and/or
traceable to the registration statements and prospectuses issued in
connection with Company's August 3, 2017 initial public offering
(the "IPO") and December 4, 2017 secondary public offering (the
"SPO") (collectively, the "Offerings"), asserting violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the Defendants'
representations, including the Offering Documents, were materially
false and misleading because they failed to disclose that: (1) the
Fire on January 30, 2017 was far more damaging to the Facility than
had been represented to investors, resulting in over $1 billion in
damage and rendering the Facility beyond repair; (2) the damage to
the Facility exceeded the Company's insurance policy limits by
hundreds of millions of dollars; (3) the Company had lost, with
essentially no hope of restoration, approximately 80% of the TiO2
manufacturing facility in Pori, Finland's production capacity; (4)
the Company incurred tens of millions of dollars in costs in
connection with attempts to repair the Facility; (5) the Company's
reported annual TiO2 production capacity was inflated by
approximately 15%; and (6) as a result, the Company would incur
over $600 million in restructuring expenses and other charges
associated with the closure and replacement of the Facility.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, the
Plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered damages in
the form of the precipitous and sustained decline in the price of
Venator ordinary shares since the Company's IPO.

Venator Materials PLC operates as a manufacturer and marketer of
chemical products. The Company produces a broad range of pigments
and additives. Venator Materials offers titanium dioxide, color
pigments, functional additives, and timer and water treatment
products worldwide. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas R. Ajamie, Esq.
          John S. "Jack" Edwards, Jr., Esq.
          AJAMIE LLP
          Pennzoil Place – South Tower
          711 Louisiana, Suite 2150
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 860-1600
          Facsimile: (713) 860-1699
          E-mail: tajamie@ajamie.com
                  jedwards@ajamie.com

               - and -

          Naumon A. Amjed, Esq.
          Darren J. Check, Esq.
          Jonathan R. Davidson, Esq.
          Ryan T. Degnan, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ
          MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: namjed@ktmc.com
                  dcheck@ktmc.com
                  jrdavidson@ktmc.com
                  rdegnan@ktmc.com


VITAL RECOVERY: Certification of Class Sought in Makurat Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kari Makurat moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned KARI MAKURAT, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. VITAL RECOVERY
SERVICES LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01465-NJ (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


VORTENS INC: Bid to Strike Casper Declaration in Cone Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN AND JOANNA CONE, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
VORTENS, INC., SANITARIOS LAMOSA S.A. DE C.V., and PORCELANA CORONA
DE MEXICO, SA. DE C.V., Defendant, Case No. 4:17-CV-00001-ALM-KPJ
(E.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge Kimberly C. Priest Johnson of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman
Division, denied the Defendant's Supplement to its Objections and
Motion to Strike Declaration of Shawn Capser, Ph.D.

The action arises from alleged manufacturing and/or marketing
defects in certain ceramic Vortens toilet tanks.  The Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint and Class Action is the operative
complaint.  

Shawn Capser, Ph. D., the Plaintiffs' designated statistics expert,
has provided preliminary reports and the Declaration at issue.  The
Plaintiffs designated Dr. Capser on Jan. 16, 2018; Dr. Capser was
deposed on March 5, 2018.  After the Plaintiffs submitted the
Declaration, Dr. Capser was deposed again on Jan. 10, 2019.

In its Motion, the Defendant challenged the Declaration of Shawn
Capser and sought to exclude the Declaration in its entirety due to
"inconsistencies and errors."  

The Plaintiffs responded that the issues identified by the
Defendant go to the weight, not the admissibility of modeling
examples.  They further argued Dr. Capser's opinions meet the
Daubert standard for class certification consideration and that
none of the objections warrant striking of the Declaration.

Magistrate Judge Johnson finds that Dr. Capser is qualified in the
field of statistical and reliability methods, and he is a certified
Master Black Belt in Six Sigma.  His substantial knowledge, skill,
experience, training, and education in these areas will assist the
trier of fact.  In addition, Dr. Capser's methodology includes
generally-accepted methods and principles within the field of
statistics, including the application of Six Sigma metrics and
statistics.  Therefore, the Magistrate finds the testimony is
admissible at this stage of the litigation.  Like other of the
Defendant's challenges to Dr. Capser's opinions, the four
identified issues go primarily to the weight of his opinions.  The
Defendant must resort to "vigorous cross-examination" and
"presentation of contrary evidence" as the means to attack
admissible evidence it considers to be "shaky."

The Defendant also challenged Paragraph 15 of the Declaration
regarding claim rate examples and which tank model was reviewed.
The Plaintiffs argued the issue is moot as they agreed
clarification was warranted, and the information was explained
through a second deposition of Dr. Capser.  The Magistrate finds
the challenged material is admissible.

The Defendant complains that Dr. Capser's presumption that
1,360,779 units were sold is incorrect.  This is, again, a
challenge directed not at methodology or a principle employed in
the Declaration, but to a factual presumption for demonstration of
a calculation.  The Plaintiffs agree that Dr. Capser's claim rate
example "needs more data prior to becoming a final opinion.  The
Magistrate finds the challenged material is admissible.  If the
Plaintiffs do not update the data, the Defendant's objection may be
relevant at a later stage of the litigation, as it goes to the
weight of the opinion.

The Defendant further challenged the basis of the data relied upon
for calculations, noting specifically that Dr. Capser did not
filter out claims involved in a "goodwill gesture" where no problem
had manifested with the tank.  The issue goes to the weight rather
than the admissibility of the opinion.  The Magistrate finds that
the Defendant's challenge merely focuses on the specific data
rather than a failure in the principles offered by Dr. Capser.  She
finds the challenged material is admissible.

Finally, the Defendant argued that Dr. Capser performed process
control work that was not described in the Declaration, failed to
properly identify the data he relied upon, and did not adequately
explain socalled "minor assumptions" he made.  The Plaintiffs
contend that Dr. Capser's use of "minor assumptions" was a general
statement regarding statistics or probability theory -- not as to
numbers or variable ranges -- and would be understood as such in
this context.  The Magistrate highlights that the Plaintiffs
recognize the Declaration is focused on examples of how statistical
process control is utilized rather than a final statement of the
facts, which may be used at trial.  She finds the challenged
material is admissible.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Johnson finds that the
Declaration of the Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Capser, survives the
Defendant's challenge.  Accordingly, she denies the Defendant's
Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 17, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
and Order is available at https://is.gd/yrtVK4 from Leagle.com.

Mark Fessler, on Behalf of Themselves and Those Similarly Situated,
Amber Fessler, on Behalf of Themselves and Those Similarly
Situated, Andrew Hocker, on Behalf of Themselves and Those
Similarly Situated, Kevin Reuss, on Behalf of Themselves and Those
Similarly Situated, Matthew Carreras, on Behalf of Themselves and
Those Similarly Situated, Aaron Stone, Stacey Stone, Charles
Handly, Michelle Handly, Daniel Sousa & Sharon Sousa, Plaintiffs,
represented by Nathan Scott Carpenter -- scarpenter@cstriallaw.com
-- Carpenter & Schumacher PC & Rebecca Elizabeth Bell Stanton --
rstanton@cstriallaw.com -- Carpenter & Schumacher PC.

Porcelana Corona De Mexico, S.A. DE C.V., formerly known as
Vortens, Defendant, represented by Melissa Dorman Matthews --
mmatthews@hartlinebarger.com -- Hartline Barger LLP, Angela Skaggs
Gordon -- agordon@hartlinebarger.com -- Hartline Barger LLP,
Darrell Lee Barger -- agordon@hartlinebarger.com -- Hartline Dacus
Barger Dreyer LLP & Lauren Abigail Foreman --
aforeman@hartlinebarger.com -- Hartline Dacus Barger Dreyer, LLP.

D.R. Horton, Inc., Movant, represented by David Mason Kleiman --
dkleiman@vinlaw.com -- Kleiman Lawrence Baskind & Fitzgerald.

Chapparal Plumbing, L.P., Movant, represented by Richard L.
Merrill, Fabio & Merrill.


WESTROCK CP: Bid for Summary Judgment in Bell Suit Granted in Part
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ASHTON BELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WESTROCK CP, LLC,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-829 (E.D. Va.), Judge
John A. Gibney, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Richmond Division, granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

WestRock has been operating a paper mill in West Point for 100
years.  The litigation concerns the wood chip storage yards at the
paper mill.  WestRock's supply of wood chips begins with tree
deliveries to a chip mill run by West Point Chips, Inc., which is
located next to the paper mill.  West Point Chips debarks and chips
the trees, and then sends the stripped bark and solid wood chips to
WestRock's paper mill by a conveyance system.  WestRock temporarily
stores the solid wood chips in a wood yard.  WestRock has stored
wood chips in the wood yard for 40 years.  The paper mill and chip
mill shut down annually for maintenance, typically for nine to 14
days.

The Plaintiffs, Ashton Bell, Delilah Bell, Lucy Edwards, Clarence
Burrell, Sheila Burrell, and Linda White, have sued WestRock and
West Point Chips, alleging that the wood dust that escapes from
WestRock's wood yard and West Point Chips' wood piles rains down on
their homes and properties in West Point, preventing them from
enjoying the outdoors and requiring constant cleaning.

According to the Plaintiffs, the wood dust is pervasive,
inescapable, regular, and intense, and affects their property every
day.  Notwithstanding the perpetual issues with the wood dust, they
say that the problem has worsened since 2012 or 2013.

In their amended complaint, the Plaintiffs contend that the
escaping wood dust amounts to nuisance and trespass under Virginia
law, entitling them to compensatory damages in an amount no less
than $25,000 per property.  They characterize the wood dust as a
temporary nuisance and trespass.  In addition to compensatory
damages, the Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting any future
migration of dust from the wood piles or the wood chip piles onto
their properties.

On April 26, 2019, the Court certified the case as a class action
with respect to the Defendants' liability for nuisance and
trespass.

The Defendants have now moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Virginia's five-year statute of limitations bars the Plaintiffs'
damages claims.  They argue that the Plaintiffs assert claims for
permanent nuisance and trespass, so the limitations period began to
run when they first noticed problems with the wood dust in the
2000s.  The Plaintiffs insist that their claims are for temporary
nuisance and trespass, so the statute of limitations begins running
anew with each alleged harm.

Judge Gibney agrees that the statute of limitations bars the
Plaintiffs' damages claims.  Under Virginia law, a five-year
limitations period applies to nuisance and trespass claims.  The
limitations period, however, does not apply when a series of
'repeated actions' causing temporary injuries to property would run
the limitation period anew with each such action.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision in
Robinson v. Nordquist, the Plaintiffs contend that they are
entitled to a jury trial on the temporary or permanent character of
the wood dust.  According to them, Robinson's "clear holding"
entitles them to a jury trial on the issue of whether the statute
of limitations applies to their claims.  They, however, cannot
survive summary judgment based solely on the allegations in their
complaint.  The Plaintiffs acknowledge that they first noticed the
effects of the wood dust over a decade ago, and they have failed to
demonstrate that the wood dust amounts to a temporary harm.  The
Plaintiffs waited too long to recover damages for nuisance and
trespass.  Accordingly, the Judge will grant in part the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The Judge, however, will deny in part the motion because the
limitations period is not a barrier to the Plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief.  Virginia's five-year limitations period does
not apply to equitable relief.  Instead, the doctrine of laches
governs claims for equitable relief.  He finds that the Plaintiffs
made an explicit request for injunctive relief in their complaint.
Neither the statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches
prevents them from seeking that relief.

In sum, because the five-year limitations period bars the
Plaintiffs' nuisance and trespass claims for damages, Judge Gibney
granted in part the Defendants' motions for summary judgment.  He,
however, denied in part the motions because the Plaintiffs may seek
injunctive relief.  The Court will issue an appropriate Order.  The
Clerk is directed to send a copy of the Opinion to all the counsel
of record.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/0FB8Uu from Leagle.com.

Ashton Bell, Delilah Bell & Lucy R. Edwards, Plaintiffs,
represented by David Hilton Wise, Wise & Donahue PLC, Charles
Schneider, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, pro hac vice, Danielle
Lynn Perry -- dperry@wbmllp.com -- Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP,
pro hac vice, Evan Patrick Fontenot, Pendley Baudin & Coffin LLP,
pro hac vice, Gary Edward Mason, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP, pro
hac vice, Martha Schneider, Whitfield Bryson & Mason LLP & Patrick
W. Pendley -- pwpendley@pbclawfirm.com -- NA, pro hac vice.

Clarence Burrell, Sheila Burrell, Linda White, Dale Saunders,
Nancy
Saunders & Olen Sikes, Plaintiffs, represented by David Hilton
Wise, Wise & Donahue PLC, Danielle Lynn Perry, Whitfield Bryson &
Mason LLP, pro hac vice, Gary Edward Mason, Whitfield Bryson &
Mason LLP, pro hac vice & Patrick W. Pendley, NA, pro hac vice.

Westrock CP, LLC, Defendant, represented by Frank Talbott, V --
ftalbott@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, David Mark
Bienvenu,
Jr. -- David.Bienvenu@bblawla.com -- Bienvenu Bonnecaze Foco
Viator
& Holinga APLLC, pro hac vice, Diane Pulley Flannery --
dflannery@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Joy Cummings Fuhr
-- jfuhr@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Lexi Trahan
Holinga,
Bienvenu Bonnecaze Foco Viator & Holinga APLLC, pro hac vice &
Richard Trent Taylor -- rtaylor@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods
LLP.

West Point Chips, Inc., Defendant, represented by David D. Hudgins
-- dhudgins@hudginslawfirm.com -- The Hudgins Law Firm, PC &
Robert
Emery Draim -- rdraim@hudginslawfirm.com -- Hudgins Law Firm,
P.C..


WISCONSIN: Ct. Tosses Bender Suit Asserting Civil Rights Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William M. Conley of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
case, JOSEPH W. BENDER, ET AL., On behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF WISCONSIN, ET
AL., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-29-wmc (W.D. Wis.).

In the lawsuit, the named Plaintiffs allege that the State of
Wisconsin, Gov. Anthony Evers, and Wisconsin State Public Defender
Kelli Thompson are failing to provide constitutionally required,
effective legal representation to indigent people accused of crimes
for which there is a possibility of incarceration in violation of
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Sections 7 and 8 of the Wisconsin
Constitution.  The Plaintiffs also seek to represent a class of
similarly-situated indigent persons.

The complaint identifies a dozen named Plaintiffs, each of whom
reside in Wisconsin and have been state-court criminal defendants.
While eligible for representation from the Wisconsin State Public
Defender's Office ("SPD"), each also waited for months before
receiving counsel, delaying the progress of their cases and forcing
them to appear in court without counsel, as well as otherwise
disrupting their lives.

The Plaintiffs further seek to represent a class of all indigent
persons who are now or who will be under formal charge before a
state court in Wisconsin of having committed any offense, the
penalty for which includes the possibility of confinement,
incarceration, imprisonment, or detention in a correctional
facility (regardless of whether actually imposed), and who are
unable to provide for the full payment of an attorney and all other
necessary expenses of representation in defending against the
charge.

The SPD is responsible for providing effective legal representation
to indigent people accused of committing crimes for which there is
a possibility of incarceration.  Unsurprisingly, the SPD has then
experienced difficulty in recruiting local attorneys to accept
these appointments, especially in small, rural communities.  Where
the SPD cannot successfully recruit counsel, state circuit courts
may appoint counsel at the expense of the county.  As a result of
the challenges the SPD faces in recruiting counsel, many criminal
court proceedings must be repeatedly adjourned because indigent
defendants do not yet have legal representation.  Even indigent
criminal defendants who do receive appointed counsel do not
necessarily end up with adequate representation.

The Plaintiffs ultimately lay the blame for these problems with the
State: The State of Wisconsin is the source of all these
constitutional violations.  The State issues the criminal charges.
The accused who are detained before trial are imprisoned by the
State.  The State funds the SPD and sets the rate of compensation
for appointed attorneys.  The State is aware that among the rights
of the accused are the Right to Counsel, the right to Due Process,
and the Right to a Speedy Trial.  However, the State's failure to
sufficiently fund the SPD or adequately compensate private
attorneys for their time has deprived the Plaintiffs, and all those
similarly situated, of these constitutionally-mandated rights.

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' failure to provide
effective legal representation to them and other similarly situated
indigent criminal defendants violates the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Sections 7 and 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  To remedy these
alleged violations, they seek broad declaratory, injunctive and
monetary relief.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on
three grounds: (1) Younger v. Harris, and its progeny require the
Court to abstain; (2) the Court otherwise lacks jurisdiction; and
(3) the Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for damages.

Judge Conley holds that while the Court may be anxious to protect
the Plaintiffs' and others' constitutional rights and to find a
solution to the problems faced by Wisconsin's public defender
system, the Plaintiffs' requested relief is neither sufficiently
constrained nor timely, as it would improperly entangle the Court
in state criminal proceedings and violate principles of comity,
especially given ongoing reform efforts within the state.
According, he will abstain from granting the Plaintiffs' claims for
equitable relief.

In addition to requesting equitable relief, the Plaintiffs also
purport to seek monetary damages under both federal and state law.
Although the Supreme Court has left open the question of Younger
abstention's application to damages actions, the Seventh Circuit
has held that Younger principles apply where adjudication of
damages claims would disrupt ongoing state proceedings.  In Simpson
v. Rowan, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Younger required the
court to abstain from adjudicating plaintiff's damages claim, even
though plaintiff had already been convicted.  Similarly, in Gakuba
v. O'Brien, the Seventh Circuit held that Younger principles
applied to plaintiff's Section 1983 damages claim alleging
violations of his Fourth Amendment rights as the federal claim
involved constitutional issues that may be litigated during the
course of his criminal case.

The Plaintiffs purport to seek damages suffered as a result of the
deprivation of their constitutionally-mandated rights. As with
Simpson and Gakuba, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs' damages
request would require federal adjudication of issues that may be
litigated during the course of their criminal proceedings. Younger
principles, therefore, require the Court to abstain from those
claims as well.

Finally, the Judge will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
Plaintiffs' remaining damages claims under the Wisconsin
Constitution.  Under 28 U.S. Code Section 1367, district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law
claim if the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.  The Seventh Circuit has recognized a
sensible presumption that if the federal claims drop out before
trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over the
state-law claims.  Because the Court has dismissed all federal
claims and because nothing in the case counters the presumption
against retention, the Judge dismisses the Plaintiffs' state law
damages claims.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Conley granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.  He denied as moot Michael O'Grady's motion to
intervene.  The clerk of court is directed to close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 18, 2019 Opinion and Order is
available at https://is.gd/xnWoMy from Leagle.com.

Joseph W. Bender, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Jeremy W. Stroebel, On behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Thomas G. White, Jr., On behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Tyler S. Holman, On behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Chelsea N. Cadotte, On
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Aric A.
Elmore, On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Stanchelle L. Hankins, On behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Cody L. Hansen, On behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Lindsy Mason, Jr., On behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Peng N. Lor, On behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Bryant J. Swiggum, On
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated & Homer D.
Taylor, Jr., On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by H. Craig Haukaas --
craig@haukaaslaw.com -- Haukaas Law Office, S.C., Thomas Blake
Gross -- blake@haukaaslaw.com -- Haukaas Law Office, S.C. & Kenneth
William Ryder, III -- info@haukaaslaw.com -- Haukaas Law Office,
S.C.

State of Wisconsin, Anthony S. Evers, In his official capacity as
Governor of Wisconsin & Kelli S. Thompson, In her official capacity
as Wisconsin State Public Defender, Defendants, represented by
Colin Thomas Roth, State of Wisconsin Department of Justice.

Michael O'Grady, Intervenor, pro se.


YALE UNIVERSITY: Class of Plan Participants Certified in ERISA Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Alvin W. Thompson grants the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit entitled JOSEPH VELLALI, NANCY S.
LOWERS, JAN M. TASCHNER, and JAMES MANCINI, individually and as
representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries on
behalf of the Yale University Retirement Account Plan v. YALE
UNIVERSITY, MICHAEL A. PEEL, and THE RETIREMENT PLAN FIDUCIARY
COMMITTEE, Case No. 3:16-cv-01345-AWT (D. Conn.).

The certified class is defined as:

     All participants and beneficiaries of the Yale University
     Retirement Account Plan from August 9, 2010, through the
     date of judgment, excluding the Defendants.

Judge Thompson appoints (i) Joseph Vellali, Nancy S. Lowers, Jan M.
Taschner, and James Mancini as representatives of the Class, and
(ii) Schlichter, Bogard & Denton LLP as class counsel under Rule
23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Yale University offers to eligible employees the opportunity to
participate in an individual account, 403(b) defined-contribution
plan (the "Plan") governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").  Under the Plan, employees put a
portion of their income into personal retirement savings accounts
and invest those savings in an array of investment options.  Yale
makes matching contributions under certain conditions.  The
Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants violated the ERISA in three
ways: (1) by breaching their fiduciary duties of prudence under
ERISA (Counts I, III and V), (2) by carrying out transactions
prohibited by ERISA (Counts II, IV and VI), and (3) with respect to
Yale and Peel, by failing to monitor Committee members to ensure
compliance with ERISA's standards (Count VII).[CC]



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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