CAR_Public/191021.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, October 21, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 210

                            Headlines

267 MADISON: Fails to Pay Proper Wages Under FLSA, Garcia Claims
ABB INC: Averts Employee Data Breach Class Action
AMAZON.COM: Edmonds Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
AMERICAN HERITAGE: Stuckey Files FLSA Class Suit in Arkansas
ASCELLON CORPORATION: Cummins Seeks to Recover Unpaid Back Wages

ASCENA RETAIL: Continues to Defend Consolidated Securities Suit
AUTO TRANSPORT: Rahman Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing
BALANCED HEALTHCARE: Musarra Files Class Suit in New York
BAY SEAFOOD: Isidro Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
BREMER FINANCIAL: Class Action on Overdraft Fee Ongoing

BUTTONWILLOW WAREHOUSE: Lay Files Class Suit in California
C&J ENERGY: Class Suits over Keane Group Merger Ongoing
CAPITAL MGMT: Court Stays Kanehl's Class Certification Motion
CAPITAL ONE: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
CBE GROUP: Cantave Files FDCPA Suit in New York

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Hartigan Sues Over TCPA Violation
CHINA CITY: Fails to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages, Lopez Claims
CLUB QUARTERS: Nisbett Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
COMCAST CORP: Settlement in Antitrust Suit Gets Final Approval
COWABUNGA INC: Under-reimbursed Delivery Drivers, Parks Suit Says

CVS PHARMACY: Settles Class Action Over Algal-900 DHA Supplement
CVS PHARMACY: Voluntarily Suspends Sale of Heartburn Medication
DAISY FRESH: Montoya Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages and Damages
DAKOTA PLAINS: Gilbertson, et al., Appeals Order in Gruber Suit
DEBT RECOVERY: Dymond Files Class Suit under FDCPA

DELAWARE: District Court Narrows Claims in HRYCI Inmates' Suit
DENTAQUEST LLC: Jenkins Sues Over Unpaid Regular and Overtime Pay
DKCOSMETICS: Kim Seeks to Recoup Overtime Pay, Damages Under FLSA
ENHANCED RECOVERY: Delacruz Alleges Violation under FDCPA
EUBA CORP: McConnell Named New Class Representative in FLSA Suit

EVERSOURCE ENERGY: 1st Cir. Upholds Breiding Class Suit Dismissal
FACEBOOK INC: King & Spalding Discusses BIPA Class Action Ruling
FIDELITY NATIONAL: Faces Loyhayem Suit Alleging Invasion of Privacy
FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Rafferty Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
FOREST CITY: Nagy Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA

GENERAL MOTORS: T. Leopold Named Lead Counsel in Mich. Class Action
GENOMIC HEALTH: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
GOOGLE INC: UK Class Action Over iPhone Data Tracking Can Proceed
GROSSMAN & KARASZEWSKI: Steil Files FDCPA Class Suit in New York
GUYS TIRE: Fails to Properly Pay Employees, Ramos Suit Alleges

HEARING HELP: Hoffman Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
IDT CORP: Cross Complaint Filed Against Rosales
IDT CORP: JDS1 LLC Class Action Suit Ongoing
IDT CORP: Must Defend Against Dennis Class Action
IDT CORP: Parties in Sanchez Suit Agree to Dismissal

IDT CORP: Samara Suit over Spam Texts Proceeds to Arbitration
ILLINOIS: Parents File Class Action on Vitamin K Administration
ITG INC: Mauthe Appeals Decision in TCPA Suit to Third Circuit
JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: 9th Cir. Remands Dynamex Matter to Lower Court
JEFFREY G. LERMAN PC: Tannenbaum Files FDCPA Suit in New York

JIFFY LUBE: Court Dismisses First Amended Turizo TCPA Suit
JUUL: Long Island Teen Files Class Suit Over Misleading E-Cig Ads
JZANUS LTD: Appel Files Class Suit under FDCPA
LIBERTY POWER: Court Allows TCPA Class Action to Proceed
MDL 2672: Dismissal Bids in Volkswagen Clean Diesel Suit Granted

MDL 2819: Certification of Restasis Direct Purchaser Class Sought
MDL 2879: Simon Appeals Ruling in Data Breach Suit to 4th Cir.
MEDRISK LLC: Neighborhood Neuropathy Sues Over Unsolicited Fax
MICHIGAN: DOC Seeks Review of Ruling in Inmates' Suit
MICHIGAN: Miles Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit v. DOC

MID CENTRAL EDUCATIONAL: Supreme Ct. Hears Argument in Gear Up Suit
MODEL SERVICE: Order on Agerbrink Misclassification Claims Vacated
MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS: Class in Nashville Hosp. Suit Certified
OCWEN LOAN: Dismissal Bid in Andrade Suit Denied as Moot
PEPSICO INC: District Court Dismisses DuBuske ERISA Complaint

PREMIERE CREDIT: Watson Files FDCPA Class Action in New York
PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION: Kuhn Class Settlement Gets Prelim. Approval
ROBINSON INNOVATIONS: Ocasio Seeks to Recover OT Wages Under FLSA
RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES: Defends Nanometrics Merger-Related Suits
SANOFI US: Rodriguez Files Fraud Class Action in New York

SCOTT YANCEY: Martinez Suit Asserts TCPA Breach
SHARKS SPORTS: Relief From Gen. Order 56 in Salsiccia Suit Nixed
SMILEDIRECT: FeganScott Law Firm Launches Probe on Practice
ST CLAIR NISSAN: Appeals Ct. Affirms Robinson-Combs Suit Dismissal
STERICYCLE INC: Faces Jordan Suit Asserting BIPA Violation

TERRIO PHYSICAL: Laflora Files Class Suit in California
TRANSITAMERICA SERVICES: Bid to Remand Alvarez FCRA Suit Granted
TUPELO, MS: Court Allows Edwards to File Second Amended Complaint
UTAH: ICFs Allowed in Part to Intervene in Christensen ADA Suit
WESCO AIRCRAFT: Faces Wolverine Merger-Related Class Suits

WORK OUT WORLD: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Decision in Susinno Suit
[*] Alston & Bird Publishes Class Action & MDL Roundup Summer Ed.
[*] Blank Rome Attorneys Discuss BIPA Case Defense Strategies
[*] Cleary Gottlieb Attorneys Discuss SLUSA Class Action Ruling
[*] FTC Releases Report on Class Action Settlement Notices

[*] Univ. of Windsor Launches First Non-Profit Class Action Clinic

                            *********

267 MADISON: Fails to Pay Proper Wages Under FLSA, Garcia Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
HARANATH HERNANDEZ GARCIA, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. 267 MADISON PUB INC. (D/B/A MULLIGAN'S PUB),
MACK MOORE, LESLIE MOORE, MICHAEL RYAN, and MAURICE RYAN, Case No.
1:19-cv-09069 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2019), alleges that the
Plaintiff worked for the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that he worked, in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

267 Madison Pub Inc., doing business as Mulligan's Pub, is a
domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
State of New York.  The Individual Defendants serve or served as
owners, managers, principals, or agents of the Defendant
Corporation.

The Defendants own, operate, or control an Irish pub, located at
267 Madison Avenue, in New York City, under the name "Mulligan's
Pub," where the Plaintiff worked.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


ABB INC: Averts Employee Data Breach Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Perry Cooper, writing for BloombergLaw, reports that ABB Inc. is
free from a data breach class action brought by employees of its
subsidiary Baldor Electric Co., the Eastern District of North
Carolina ruled Oct. 1.

The 2017 breach affected the personally identifiable information
nearly 18,000 employees.

But the plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete injury sufficient to
establish standing, the court said.

Their asserted injuries are too speculative to meet the Fourth
Circuit's "certainly impending" threshold for data breach standing,
the court said.

ABB's health benefits plan was compromised after an employee fell
for an email phishing scheme.

Employee Rickey Kimbriel and his wife Paula sued ABB. [GN]



AMAZON.COM: Edmonds Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------
BRADY EDMONDS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., a Foreign for Profit Corporation;
AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., a Foreign for Profit Corporation;
AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., a Foreign for Profit Corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01613 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 9, 2019) is a
lawsuit arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act, for Amazon's
failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers
overtime wages for all time worked in excess of forty hours in a
workweek in violation of the FLSA.

As a central part of its delivery and logistics business, Amazon
contracts with incorporated delivery service providers all around
the country, through its Delivery Service Provider program, and
their employees, in order to handle the influx of customer orders,
and to retain control over every aspect of the delivery process.
These DSPs, in turn, hire drivers like Plaintiff to deliver the
Amazon packages within the DSP's service areas. However, even
though Plaintiff and the other drivers were nominally employed
through DSPs, Amazon directed and controlled Plaintiff and other
drivers, dictating nearly every aspect of their delivery work. As
such, Amazon jointly employed Plaintiff and these other similarly
situated drivers and is liable for wage and hour compliance for
these drivers.

Plaintiff and the other drivers were only paid a flat rate with no
additional overtime compensation paid for their overtime hours
worked. Under the FLSA, workers paid such flat rates are entitled
to additional overtime compensation for overtime hours worked. The
flat rates paid to drivers failed to compensate each of those
drivers at a rate of one and one half times the driver's regular
hourly wage for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, in
violation of the FLSA. Amazon failed to keep accurate records of
the hours that Plaintiff and those similarly situated worked each
week, says the complaint.

Plaintiff, Brady Edmonds, worked for Amazon as a driver from June
2018 thru February 2019.

Amazon is the largest digital retailer in the United States,
recently becoming the second company in world history to reach $1
trillion in value.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
     Toby J. Marshall, Esq.
     TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
     936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
     Seattle, WA 98103-8869
     Phone: (206) 816-6603
     Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
     Email: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
            tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com

          - and -

     Andrew R. Frisch, Esq.
     Paul M. Botros, Esq.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A.
     8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
     Plantation, FL 33324
     Phone. (954) WORKERS
     Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
     Email: afrisch@forthepeople.com
            pbotros@forthepeople.com


AMERICAN HERITAGE: Stuckey Files FLSA Class Suit in Arkansas
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Heritage
Apartments, Inc. The case is styled as Milton Henderson-Stuckey,
individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff v. American Heritage Apartments, Inc., American Heritage
Enterprises-Chapel Ridge, LLC and William Weitzel, Defendants, Case
No. 4:19-cv-04133-SOH (W.D. Ark., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states that the case was filed pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standard Act.

American Heritage is aptly named for its classic architecture and
important place in Richmond's history.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Josh Sanford, Esq.
   Sanford Law Firm PLLC
   One Financial Center
   650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
   Little Rock, AR 72211
   Tel: (501) 221-0088
   Fax: (888) 787-2040
   Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com



ASCELLON CORPORATION: Cummins Seeks to Recover Unpaid Back Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Anna Cummins, for herself and on behalf of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ASCELLON CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-02953-DKC (S.D. Md., Oct. 9, 2019) is a lawsuit brought to
recover unpaid back wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs under the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant in excess of 40 hours within a
workweek. The Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff at a rate
one and one half times Plaintiff's regular rate for all hours
worked in excess of 40 in a single workweek in violation of the
FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant to work as a non-exempt "Nurse
Consiltant/Inspector".

Defendant is engaged in business throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Louis Allen DeFreitas, Jr., Esq.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A.
     198 Broadway
     Kissimmee, FL 34741
     Phone: (407) 452-6977
     Facsimile: (407) 572-0111
     Email: ldefreitas@forthepeople.com


ASCENA RETAIL: Continues to Defend Consolidated Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ascena Retail Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 10, 2019,
for the fiscal year ended August 3, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated class action suit entitled, In
re Ascena Retail Group, Inc. Sec. Litig.

On June 7, 2019, plaintiff James Newman commenced a federal
securities class action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, naming Ascena Retail Group, Inc. and
certain of Ascena's current and former officers and directors as
defendants. The Newman complaint asserts claims under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5 related to the Company's goodwill impairment accounting and
statements regarding the success of the 2015 purchase of ANN and
the overall performance and expected growth of the ANN brands.
Plaintiff seeks damages on behalf of a proposed class of purchasers
of Ascena securities between September 16, 2015 and June 8, 2017
(the proposed "Class Period").

On July 2, 2019, a second lawsuit was filed by Michaella
Corporation. The Michaella complaint is substantially similar to
the Newman complaint. Both the Michaella complaint and the Newman
complaint name the same defendants, allege the same proposed class
period, and challenge the same categories of public statements
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5.

On August 6, 2019, two potential lead plaintiffs (Joel Patterson
and Michaella Corporation) filed motions for appointment as lead
plaintiff in the Newman and Michaella actions, and to consolidate
both actions. James Newman did not move for appointment as lead
plaintiffs. On August 23, 2019, the Court consolidated the two
actions as In re Ascena Retail Group, Inc. Sec. Litig. and
appointed Patterson and Michaella Corporation as joint
lead-plaintiffs.

Ascena Retail said, "Defendants believe they have strong defenses
to these claims and will respond accordingly. The range of loss, if
any, is not reasonably estimable at this time."

Ascena Retail Group, Inc. is a holding company for a national chain
of women's apparel specialty stores. The Company's stores operate
nationwide and in the District of Columbia. The company is based in
Mahwah, New Jersey.


AUTO TRANSPORT: Rahman Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing
----------------------------------------------------------
RUMI RAHMAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. AUTO TRANSPORT GROUPE, INC D/B/A AMERICAN
AUTO TRANSPORT, Defendant, Case No. 0:19-cv-62515-KMW (S.D. Fla.,
Oct. 9, 2019) is a putative class action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, arising from Defendant's knowing and
willful violations of the TCPA.

The Defendant engages in unsolicited telemarketing directed towards
prospective customers with no regard for consumers' privacy rights,
asserts the complaint. Defendant's telemarketing consists of
sending text messages to consumers soliciting them to purchase its
goods and/or services. Defendant caused thousands of unsolicited
text messages to be sent to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff
and Class Members, causing them injuries, including invasion of
their privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion,
trespass, and conversion. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief to halt Defendant's illegal conduct. Plaintiff
also seeks statutory damages on behalf of himself and Class
Members, and any other available legal or equitable remedies
resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant, the complaint
relates.

Plaintiff is a natural person who was a resident of Broward County,
Florida.

Defendant operates as a vehicle transportation broker, offering
both "open and enclosed auto transports".[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Michael Eisenband, Esq.
     EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
     515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
     Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33301
     Phone: 954.533.4092
     Email: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com

          - and -

     Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
     HIRALDO P.A.
     401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
     Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
     Phone: 954.400.4713
     Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com


BALANCED HEALTHCARE: Musarra Files Class Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Balanced Healthcare
Receivables, LLC. The case is styled as Jennifer Musarra and Yitty
Rosenberg, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Balanced Healthcare Receivables, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05814 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Balanced Healthcare Receivables LLC or BHR is a debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




BAY SEAFOOD: Isidro Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
---------------------------------------------------------------
FELIX MALDONADO ISIDRO (A.K.A. GARY), GREGORIO ESTRADA MALDONADO,
and LUIS GUSTAVO ESTRADA BASURTO, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. THE BAY SEAFOOD CUISINE EAST 49TH LLC,
(D/B/A JASMINE RESTAURANT), LEIDIAN LI, and MICHAEL DOE, Case No.
1:19-cv-09101 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019), is brought under the Fair
Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law over unpaid minimum and
overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs were employed as food runners, delivery workers, and
dishwashers at the Jasmine Restaurant.  The Plaintiffs contend that
they worked for the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that they worked.

The Bay Seafood Cuisine East 49th LLC, doing business as Jasmine
Restaurant, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New York.  The Individual Defendants serve
or served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of the
Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Chinese restaurant,
located at 216 E 49th St., in New York City, under the name
"Jasmine Restaurant."  The Defendants operate the Chinese
restaurant located in the Midtown East section of Manhattan in New
York City.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


BREMER FINANCIAL: Class Action on Overdraft Fee Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff's law firms Johnson // Becker, PLLC, Kaliel PLLC, and
Cohen & Malad LLP currently represent Kristine Crosby in a proposed
class action lawsuit against Bremer Financial Corporation. The
lawsuit, filed on September 27, 2019, alleges that Bremer Financial
Corporation entered into an agreement with Crosby and all other
Bremer checking account customers whereby Bremer agreed to charge
its checking account customers one insufficient funds or overdraft
fee for each transaction in which its customers attempted to make a
purchase using their Bremer checking account, but were denied for
lack of funds. Despite this agreement, Crosby alleges that she, and
all other Bremer checking customers, were charged multiple
insufficient funds and overdraft fees for a single transaction.
Crosby seeks to enjoin Bremer from continuing to withdraw excess
fees, as well as disgorgement of fees collected by Bremer and
payment for actual and compensatory damages incurred in connection
with the excess fees. The lawsuit has been filed in United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Minnesota-based Bremer Financial Corporation owns and operates
Bremer Bank, with locations throughout Minnesota, North Dakota, and
Wisconsin. Bremer Bank offers personal and business banking,
financial planning, investment, and insurance products for
individuals and businesses. Bremer Financial Corporation is a is
headquartered in Saint Paul, MN.

This suit is filed by Timothy J. Becker of Johnson // Becker, PLLC,
Jeffrey Kaliel of Kaliel PLLC, and Lynn Toops of Cohen & Malad
LLP.

Timothy J. Becker is a founding partner of Johnson // Becker and is
counsel of record on the case. Timothy J. Becker manages a wide
range of class action cases across the United States.

Were you charged an insufficient funds fee or overdraft charge by
Bremer Bank that you feel was unjustified? If so, Johnson // Becker
would like to speak with you. You may be entitled to compensation
by filing a lawsuit.

For a free case review, please visit:
https://www.johnsonbecker.com/class-action/bremer-bank-overdraft-fee-lawsuit-filed-by-johnson-becker-pllc/
or call 800-279-6386.
[GN]


BUTTONWILLOW WAREHOUSE: Lay Files Class Suit in California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Buttonwillow
Warehouse Company, Inc. The case is styled as Keith Lay,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Buttonwillow Warehouse Company,
Inc., a California Corporation, Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-102922
(Cal. Super., Kern County, Oct. 15, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

Buttonwillow Warehouse Company (BWC) is a family owned and operated
business with over sixty years of experience in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
   LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
   410 Arden Ave Ste 203
   Glendale, CA 91203
   Tel: (818) 265-1020
   Fax: (818) 265-1021
   Email: edwin@lfjpc.com



C&J ENERGY: Class Suits over Keane Group Merger Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------------
C&J Energy Services, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 11, 2019, that
the company continues to defend class action suits related to its
merger with Keane Group, Inc.

On June 16, 2019, C&J Energy Services, Inc. ("C&J"), Keane Group,
Inc. ("Keane") and King Merger Sub Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary
of Keane ("Merger Sub"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger (as it may be amended from time to time, the "Merger
Agreement"), pursuant to which they agreed to combine their
respective businesses in a merger of equals. Pursuant to the Merger
Agreement, Merger Sub will merge with and into C&J, with C&J as the
surviving corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Keane (the
"Merger"), and immediately thereafter, as part of the same
transaction, C&J will merge with and into another wholly owned
subsidiary of Keane, with such subsidiary continuing as the
surviving entity.

In connection with the Merger Agreement and the transactions
contemplated thereby, one putative class action complaint has been
filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado by a purported C&J stockholder on behalf of himself and
all other C&J stockholders (excluding defendants and related or
affiliated persons) against C&J and members of the C&J board of
directors, two putative class action complaints have been filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware by a
purported C&J stockholder on behalf of himself and all other C&J
stockholders (excluding defendants and related or affiliated
persons) against C&J, members of the C&J board of directors, Keane
and Merger Sub, one putative class action complaint has been filed
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas by a purported Keane stockholder on behalf of himself and all
other Keane stockholders (excluding defendants and related or
affiliated persons) against Keane and members of the Keane board of
directors, and one putative class action has been filed in the
Delaware Chancery Court by a purported Keane stockholder on behalf
of himself and all other Keane stockholders (excluding defendants
and related or affiliated persons) against members of the Keane
board of directors.

The five complaints are captioned as follows: Palumbos v. C&J
Energy Services, Inc., et al., Case 1:19-cv-02386 (D. Colo.) (Aug.
22, 2019), Wuollet v. C&J Energy Services, Inc., et al., Case
1:19-cv-01411 (D. Del.) (Jul. 29, 2019), Plumley v. C&J Energy
Services, Inc., et al., Case 1:19-cv-01446 (D. Del.) (Aug. 1,
2019), Bushansky v. Keane Group, Inc. et al., Case 4:19-cb-02924
(S.D. Tex) and Woods v. Keane Group, Inc., et al., Case 2019-0590
(Del. Chan.) (Jul. 31, 2019), which the company refers to
collectively as the "Stockholder Actions."

In general, the Stockholder Actions allege that the defendants
violated Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"), or aided and abetted in such
alleged violations, because the Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus
allegedly omits or misstates material information. The Stockholder
Actions seek, among other things, injunctive relief preventing the
consummation of the Merger, unspecified damages and attorneys'
fees.

C&J, Keane and the other named defendants believe that no
supplemental disclosures are required under applicable laws;
however, to avoid the risk of the Stockholder Actions delaying the
Merger and to minimize the expense of defending the Stockholder
Actions, and without admitting any liability or wrongdoing, C&J and
Keane are making certain disclosures that supplement and revise
those contained in the Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus, which C&J
and Keane refer to as the "litigation-related supplemental
disclosures." The litigation-related supplemental disclosures
should be read in conjunction with the Joint Proxy
Statement/Prospectus, which is available on the Internet site
maintained by the SEC at www.sec.gov, along with periodic reports
and other information C&J and Keane file with the SEC. C&J, Keane
and the other named defendants have denied, and continue to deny,
that they have committed or assisted others in committing any
violations of law, and expressly maintain that, to the extent
applicable, they complied with their legal obligations and are
providing the litigation-related supplemental disclosures solely to
try to eliminate the burden and expense of further litigation, to
put the claims that were or could have been asserted to rest, and
to avoid any possible delay to the closing of the Merger that might
arise from further litigation.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://bit.ly/2MAWhXX.

C&J Energy Services, Inc. provides well construction, completions,
and services. The Company offers hydraulic fracturing, cased-hole
wireline, coiled tubing, cementing, rig, fluids management, and
other special well site services. C&J Energy Services serves the
oil and gas industry in the United States and Western Canada. The
company is based in Houston, Texas.


CAPITAL MGMT: Court Stays Kanehl's Class Certification Motion
-------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Plaintiff's motion to
stay further proceedings on her motion for class certification in
the class action complaint captioned MARLENE KANEHL, Plaintiff, v.
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LP, Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-1381
(E.D. Wis.).

The Plaintiff filed the class action complaint alleging violations
of the Fair Debt Collect Act on Sept. 20, 2019.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/Aa6CJw from Leagle.com.

Marlene Kanehl, Plaintiff, represented by Ben J. Slatky --
bslatky@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter --
jfruchter@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin --
jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Mark A. Eldridge --
meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP.


CAPITAL ONE: Rosen Law Firm Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, has disclosed
that it has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of
the securities of Capital One Financial Corporation (NYSE: COF)
from February 2, 2018 through June 29, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Capital One
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Capital One class action, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1635.html or call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Company did not maintain robust information security
protections, and its protection did not shield personal information
against security breaches; (2) such deficiencies heightened the
Company's exposure to a cyber-attack; and (3) as a result, Capital
One's public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than December
2, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
https://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1635.html or to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

CONTACT:
Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40thFloor
New York, NY 10016

Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com
[GN]


CBE GROUP: Cantave Files FDCPA Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The CBE Group, Inc.
The case is styled as Annemarie Cantave and Shiyah Teitelbaum,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. The CBE Group, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05796 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The CBE Group, Inc. provides debt recovery services. The Company
offers payment monitoring, default aversion, primary bad debt
collection, and secondary bad debt collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Hartigan Sues Over TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------
RAEANON HARTIGAN, individually and on behalf of others, Plaintiff,
v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. dba SPECTRUM, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-01962-H-MDD (S.D. Cal., Oct. 9, 2019) is a Class Action
Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and any other available
legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of
Defendant, in negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully contacting
Plaintiff for marketing purposes on their cellular telephones, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act thereby invading
Plaintiff's privacy.

The call from Defendant to Plaintiff was placed via an "automatic
telephone dialing system" as prohibited by the TCPA. The Defendant
called Plaintiff's cellular telephone using an automatic telephone
dialing system in an effort to convince Plaintiff to contract for
services offered by Defendant. The calls placed by Defendant were
marketing and/or solicitation calls. Plaintiff never provided
Defendant prior written express consent to receive the telephone
call to Plaintiff's cellular telephone. Through Defendant's
aforementioned conduct, Plaintiff suffered an invasion of a legally
protected interest in privacy, which is specifically addressed and
protected by the TCPA. The invasion itself caused concrete harm to
Plaintiff similar to trespass to real property which has been
illegal for hundreds of years with no actual damages required for
the harm.
Defendant's calls forced Plaintiff and other similarly situated
class members to live without the utility of their cellular phones
by occupying their cellular telephone with one or more unwanted
calls, causing a nuisance and lost time, says the complaint.

Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of California.

Defendant provides telecommunication services and products, along
with mass media and advertises those products through the use of
telephone calls.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
     SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Phone: 866-219-3343
     Fax: 866-219-8344
     Email: josh@swigartlawgroup.com


CHINA CITY: Fails to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages, Lopez Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. CHINA CITY OF EAST 188TH STREET INC. (D/B/A CHINA CITY
RESTAURANT), YOUYI HE, and XIAO YING HUANG, Case No. 1:19-cv-09115
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 1, 2019), alleges that the Plaintiff worked for the
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that he worked, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and New York Labor Law.

China City of East 188th Street Inc., doing business as China City
Restaurant, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New York.  The Individual Defendants serve
or served as owners, managers, principals, or agents of the
Defendant Corporation.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Chinese restaurant,
located at 308 East 188th Street, in Bronx, New York, under the
name "China City Restaurant."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


CLUB QUARTERS: Nisbett Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
---------------------------------------------------------------
Club Quarters Management Company, L.L.C. is facing a class action
lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
case is styled as Kareem Nisbett, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Club Quarters
Management Company, L.L.C. doing business as: Hotel Boutique Grand
Central, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09529 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 15,
2019).

Club Quarters Management Company, L.L.C. owns, manages and operates
hotels.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com



COMCAST CORP: Settlement in Antitrust Suit Gets Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Anita B. Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted final certification of settlement
class and final approval of class action settlement in IN RE:
COMCAST CORP. SET-TOP CABLE TELEVISION BOX ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
Civil Action No. 09-md-2034 (E.D. Pa.).

Judge Brody also approved an award of attorneys' fees and
reimbursement expenses in the amount of $1.1 million and an
incentive award for each named class representative in the amount
of $1,000 (an aggregate amount of $4,000).

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/UXfYWG from Leagle.com.

JAMES DEANNE, WILLIAM GONZALES & STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Appellants, represented by DIANNE M. NAST -- dnast@nastlaw.com --
NASTLAW LLC.


COWABUNGA INC: Under-reimbursed Delivery Drivers, Parks Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LASHAUN PARKS, MICHAEL MILLER and BRADLEY WOODARD, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
COWABUNGA, INC. d/b/a Domino's Pizza, a Georgia Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-00138-TCB (N.D. Ga., Oct. 9, 2019) is a
collective action seeking to recover for unpaid minimum wage
compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory relief, and other
relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Defendant operates approximately 108 Domino's franchises in
Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina.

The Defendant has employed thousands of individuals, including
Plaintiffs, as pizza delivery drivers at these Domino's locations.
These drivers were typically paid a reduced, tipped minimum wage
for the hours they worked delivering pizzas to customers. The
Defendant systematically under-reimbursed Plaintiffs and the other
delivery drivers for their vehicle expenses causing the Plaintiffs
and other drivers' pay to fall below the minimum wage, says the
complaint.

Plaintiffs worked as hourly paid delivery drivers for
Defendant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
     Morgan & Morgan, P.A.
     20 N. Orange Ave., 14th Floor
     P.O. Box 4979
     Orlando, FL 32802-4979
     Phone: (407) 420-1414
     Facsimile: (407) 245-3401
     Email: RMorgan@forthepeople.com


CVS PHARMACY: Settles Class Action Over Algal-900 DHA Supplement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Josh Long, writing for Natural Products Insider, reports that CVS
Pharmacy Inc. has agreed to pay refunds to consumers who purchased
a supplement promoted to improve memory, resolving a 2016 class
action lawsuit in New York that alleged the national retailer
lacked the scientific evidence to support its marketing claims.

Although Algal-900 DHA was promoted as "clinically shown to improve
memory," the nonprofit Center for Science in the Public Interest
(CSPI) asserted clinical studies demonstrated DHA (docosahexaenoic
acid) -- an omega-3 fatty acid -- is no more effective than a
placebo at improving cognitive function.

A federal magistrate judge approved terms of the settlement, which
covers consumers in the U.S. who purchased the products between
Nov. 15, 2008 and Sept. 30, 2016. The settlement bars CVS from
making claims for two years that Algal-900 is "clinically shown to
improve memory" or the supplement provides "clinically proven
memory improvement," according to CSPI.

"This is a great result for purchasers of CVS's Algal-900 DHA
supplement, many of whom can get all their money back," CSPI
associate litigation director Matthew Simon, who worked on the
lawsuit, said in a press release announcing the settlement. "And we
hope the resolution of this litigation sends a clear signal to the
rest of the supplement industry, where too many companies are
making promises they can't deliver."

Michael DeAngelis, a CVS spokesman, said the company is "pleased to
resolve this matter."

"Our store brands are designed to maximize quality and ensure they
are safe, work as intended, comply with regulations and satisfy
customers," he said in an email. "In 2015, we updated the label on
this product from stating 'shown to improve memory' to "pure DHA
for memory support.'"

Asked in a phone interview to comment on the case's significance
for the supplement industry, Simon said marketers likely
assume—based on "a lax legal structure and lack of
enforcement—that they're not susceptible to significant liability
and can make promises that they can't deliver on."

"And what we hope to prove in this case and similar cases that we
might pursue in the future is that there is a consumer harm here,
and there are avenues for holding these manufacturers accountable,"
the lawyer added. "And they need to take a serious look at the
science behind their claims before making them."

Citing "weak regulations and under-enforcement of the existing
regulations," Simon described the supplement market as "awash in
false and misleading dietary supplement advertising."

"Manufacturers are preying on vulnerable individuals who are really
in no position to assess these advertising claims," he said.

The 2016 class action lawsuit, filed against CVS in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleged the
retailer's statements about the benefits of Algal-900 DHA were
false and misleading.

The complaint cited a meta-analysis of 34 randomized, controlled
trials of omega-3 fatty acids involving about 13,000 subjects.
Researchers, the lawsuit said, concluded omega-3 fatty acids "do
not improve cognitive performance in children, adults or the
elderly." The suit also cited a five-year National Institutes of
Health (NIH) study that reached a similar conclusion as the
meta-analysis concerning the effect of omega-3 fatty acid
supplements on older adults.

"Comprehensive, high-quality clinical studies have shown that
omega-3 fatty acids, including DHA, work no better than a placebo
in tests of adults' cognitive performance," the lawsuit asserted.

The Global Organization for EPA and DHA Omega-3s (GOED), which
represents members around the world in segments of the omega-3
supply chain, had no comment in response to an inquiry for this
article about the settlement of the lawsuit.

CVS relied on a clinical study that purported to show DHA
supplements improve learning and memory function in people with
age-related cognitive decline, the suit said. But the plaintiffs
noted the Federal Trade Commission previously concluded the "MIDAS
study" failed to "reveal any improvement in working memory" and
"clinical proof claims [based on the study] are false and
misleading."

The principal investigator and study author was an employee of
Martek Biosciences Corp., which funded the study to promote its DHA
product, "BrainStrong Adult," the suit noted. Jennifer Himmelhoch,
a marketing communications manager for DSM Nutritional Products,
which owns Martek Biosciences, did not immediately respond to an
emailed request for comment for this article.

Martek Biosciences and i-Health Inc. reached an agreement in 2014
with the FTC to settle charges of deceptive adverting for claiming
their supplement would improve memory in adults and prevent
cognitive decline.

In a joint statement at the time, two FTC commissioners said the
MIDAS study only showed "a very small improvement" related to
"episodic memory" and failed "to reveal any improvement in working
memory."

"In light of the narrow scope of the study and its limited results,
we have reason to believe that i-Health's marketing claims that
BrainStrong improves ‘memory' broadly speaking would likely
mislead consumers, as there is no basis to conclude that it has any
impact whatsoever on other important facets of memory, such as the
ability to remember the meaning of words (semantic memory) or to
follow an exchange of dialogue (working memory)," said then-FTC
chairwoman Edith Ramirez and commissioner Julie Brill. Both women
are no longer with the agency.

The study also "failed to show meaningful, statistically
significant improvements on two of the three episodic memory tasks
measured," and it did not "demonstrate that the very small,
statistically significant improvement on one of those tasks that it
did report correlates with improvements in memory tasks outside of
the laboratory," the commissioners added.

Another commissioner at the time, Maureen Ohlhausen, partially
dissented from FTC's action, concluding "it imposes an unduly high
standard of substantiation on a safe product."

"This unduly high standard not only risks denying consumers useful
information in the present but may also, in the long term, diminish
incentives to conduct research on the health effects of foods and
dietary supplements and reduce the incentives of manufacturers to
introduce such products," she said in a statement.

About two years after FTC officials announced the settlement, CVS
was hit with the lawsuit. Simon noted a copycat suit was filed in
another federal district in Illinois where it was later transferred
to the Eastern District of New York.

In that class action, the named plaintiff reached an agreement with
CVS to settle the complaint. But the lawsuit was ultimately
dismissed after a federal magistrate judge objected in 2018 to the
settlement, recommending denial of the plaintiff's motion for its
preliminary approval.

In the most recent settlement approved, class members who provide
full proof of purchase will receive a full refund, while others
will get a credit on their loyalty card if they used one to buy the
product, Simon said. Class members without proof of purchase can
receive a voucher if they submit a claim and there is a record of
an online purchase, while certain relief also is available for
claimants without any documentation, according to the settlement
agreement.

"It's really quite robust relief for many of the consumers who
purchased this product, and we're really happy with the result,"
Simon concluded. [GN]


CVS PHARMACY: Voluntarily Suspends Sale of Heartburn Medication
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rosie McCal, writing for Newsweek, reports that Zantac and
ranitidine have made numerous headlines in recent weeks, after the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decided to investigate possible
contaminants in ranitidine products on Sept. 13 and companies (like
CVS) chose to voluntarily suspend the sale of the heartburn
medication.

The crux of the matter is a naturally-occurring compound called
N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) found in low (but "unacceptable")
levels in random samples of the drug tested.

NDMA is found in food, drink and the environment among other
things, but rarely in levels that would cause for concern.

While there are currently class actions being considered against
manufacturers of Angiotensin II receptor blockers (ARBs) after the
FDA had to issue a number of recalls on products containing
unacceptable levels of the contaminant, it is too early to predict
the same will happen to producers of drugs like Zantac. That's what
Katherine Van Tassel, a Visiting Professor of Law at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, told Newsweek.

At this point in the investigation, it does not appear there is
sufficient evidence to show that over-the-counter and prescription
ranitidine products containing the NDMA impurity could cause
cancer, she explains.

This is a view shared by Michael D. Green, Professor of Law at Wake
Forest University School of Law, who told Newsweek: "It's important
to find out what the dose is."

"The dose makes the poison," he said. This means that as the dose
goes up, so do any adverse health effects—provided there are any.
But at this point, it looks like levels of the contaminant in these
products are not much more that you'll find in cooked foods, says
Green.

"The decision of the FDA to investigate the drug—and of companies
like CVS, Walmart, Sandoz and Apotex Corp. to voluntarily recall
the drugs—is the administration being very cautious," he
continues.

It is not something people should get overwrought about, he adds.
While he recommends seeking out an alternative, he says consumers
shouldn't worry if they are currently taking the product or have
done so in the past.

On a strictly theoretical note, to have a strong case to take a
drug manufacturer to court, a consumer would have to prove by "a
preponderance" of the evidence that their malady was caused by
their use of a particular medication, says Van Tassel. That is
commonly explained as requiring a finding that at least 51 percent
of the evidence shown favors their story and outcome, she adds.

"Another way to think of the standard is to simply ask whether the
plaintiff's proposition is more likely to be true than not true."

Impurities like NDMA turn up in medications sold in the US more
often than most realize, says Van Tassel. She cites docusate
sodium, a stool softener that was frequently prescribed to hospital
patients to prevent constipation, as a good example. It was found
to contain the bacterium Burkholderia cepacia and was
recalled—but not before the contamination seriously injured some
consumers.

As things stand, the FDA has not requested that manufacturers
recall the product.

Levels of NDMA found in these products have not been confirmed, but
in its latest update (published October 2), the FDA asked
manufacturers of ranitidine to conduct their own laboratory testing
to determine levels of NDMA in their products in accordance to FDA
guidelines, which do not use elevated temperatures.

The FDA has said it will provide more information as it becomes
available. [GN]


DAISY FRESH: Montoya Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages and Damages
--------------------------------------------------------------
SARA EVELINDA MONTOYA, GLINDYS DILENIA RIVERA MONTOYA and SARA
EVELINDA RIVERA MONTOYA, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others
Similarly situated v. DAISY FRESH CLEANING COMPANY, INC. and CONNIE
MASON, Case No. 1:19-cv-01264-RDA-TCB (E.D. Va., Oct. 1, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and reasonable
attorney's fees and costs under Section 16(b) of the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.

Daisy Fresh Cleaning Company, Inc. is a residential cleaning
business.  Connie Mason is a resident of the Commonwealth of
Virginia and the owner Daisy Fresh.

The Defendants are in the business of providing residential house
cleaning services throughout the Washington Metropolitan area.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew T. Sutter, Esq.
          SUTTER & TERPAK, PLLC
          7540A Little River Turnpike
          Annandale, VA 22003
          Telephone: 703-256-1800
          Facsimile: 703-991-1661
          E-mail: matt@sutterandterpak.com


DAKOTA PLAINS: Gilbertson, et al., Appeals Order in Gruber Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Gary L. Alvord, Timothy R. Brady, Gabriel G. Claypool,
Paul M. Cownie, David J. Fellon, Ryan R. Gilbertson, Craig M.
McKenzie, Michael L. Reger, Terry H. Rust and James L. Thornton
took an appeal from the District Court's Opinion and Order entered
on September 17, 2019, in the lawsuit titled Jon D. Gruber v. Ryan
R. Gilbertson, et al., Case No. 16-cv-9727, in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs' motion to lift the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act ("PSLRA") stay on discovery for the limited purpose of
subpoenaing non-parties Dakota Plains Holdings, Inc. and BioUrja
Trading, LLC, was granted in part and denied in part.

This putative securities fraud class action arises from the alleged
manipulation of Dakota Plains stock.  Dakota Plains, originally a
Defendant in this action, was dropped as a party after it filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the District of Minnesota.
Nine months later, Dakota Plains is primed to exit bankruptcy by
way of liquidation.

In January 2017, Dakota Holdings agreed to transfer substantially
all of its assets to BioUrja, an energy commodities trading
company, pursuant to the terms of an asset purchase agreement.
Since then, Dakota Plains has been operating these assets on behalf
of BioUrja pursuant to a "Transition Services Agreement" pending
completion of the bankruptcy.  Following confirmation of Dakota
Plains' Chapter 11 plan of liquidation, Dakota Plains' assets will
be transferred to BioUrja.

The appellate case is captioned as Jon D. Gruber v. Ryan R.
Gilbertson, et al., Case No. 19-3142, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent Jon D. Gruber, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Louis Andrew Kessler, Esq.
          CERA LLP
          595 Market Street
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 977-2221
          E-mail: lkessler@cerallp.com

Defendants-Petitioners Craig M. McKenzie, Terry H. Rust, Paul M.
Cownie, David J. Fellon, Gary L. Alvord and James L. Thornton are
represented by:

          Karl Jon Breyer, Esq.
          KUTAK ROCK LLP
          60 South 6th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 334-5000
          E-mail: jon.breyer@kutakrock.com

Defendant-Petitioner Timothy R. Brady is represented by:

          Ranelle A. Leier, Esq.
          FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
          Campbell Mithun Tower
          222 South 9th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 607-7247
          E-mail: rleier@foxrothschild.com

Defendant-Petitioner Gabriel G. Claypool is represented by:

          Victoria Peng, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          101 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10178
          Telephone: (212) 309-6366
          E-mail: victoria.peng@morganlewis.com

Defendant-Petitioner Michael L. Reger is represented by:

          David Anthony Scheffel, Esq.
          DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
          51 West 52nd Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 735-0799
          E-mail: scheffel.david@dorsey.com

Defendant-Petitioner Ryan R. Gilbertson is represented by:

          Amy S. Conners, Esq.
          BEST & FLANAGAN LLP
          60 South 6th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 339-7121
          E-mail: aconners@bestlaw.com


DEBT RECOVERY: Dymond Files Class Suit under FDCPA
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Debt Recovery
Solutions, LLC. The case is styled as Heather Dymond and Jeetindra
Rajkumar, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. Debt Recovery Solutions, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05818 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Debt Recovery Solutions LLC is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



DELAWARE: District Court Narrows Claims in HRYCI Inmates' Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY A. NASH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KOLAWOLE
AKINBAYO, et al., Defendants, C.A. No. 18-677 (MN) (D. Del.), Judge
Maryellene Noreika of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware (i) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motions to dismiss; (ii) granted Nash's renewed motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis; and (iii) denied Nash's motion for class
certification.

Nash, Jose Santiago, and Reggie Folks, all former or current
inmates at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI")
in Wilmington, Delaware, commenced the action on May 3, 2018,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 19831 against State Defendants HRYCI
Warden Kolawole Akinbayo, former Delaware Department of Correction
("DOC") Commissioner Perry Phelps, and former HRYCI Warden and
former Bureau of Prisons Chief Steven Wesley, as well as medical
Defendant Connections CSP, Inc.  The Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint on May 24, 2018 and it is the operative pleading.

The Amended Complaint raises unlawful conditions of confinement and
medical needs claims at the HRYCI as well as any state law claims.
The matter was filed as a proposed class action with Nash as the
proposed class representative.  Since the filing of the action,
Nash has been released from prison and Santiago has been
transferred to the Morris Community Correctional Center in Dover,
Delaware.  According to the web-site VINE-LINK, Folks is now housed
at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("JTVCC") in Smyrna,
Delaware, but he has not advised the Court of his transfer there.

The Plaintiffs, all of whom were housed in Dorm One of the Key
North Program at HRYCI, allege they were confined with inmates who
were medically cleared, but suffered from contagious and fatal
illnesses such as tuberculosis, hepatitis and/or AIDs.  The Amended
Complaint alleges that inmates, such as Nash, were forced to sleep
within 20 feet of 12 toilets and 15 showers that were often used
throughout the night with frequent overflows on the floor described
as replete with fetid waste contaminated with HIV, hepatitis, and
other contagious diseases found in blood and fecal matter.

The Plaintiffs allege the Defendants knew of the problems
associated with the overcrowding, the inadequate ventilation
system, and painted the air ducts black in a failed attempt to mask
the toxic black mold.  They allege that they fear for their future
because of the highly carcinogenic poison producing mold, and they
have asthma attacks in the middle of the night and don't even have
asthma.   The Plaintiffs allege that they sought to make complaints
about the conditions, but there is effectively, no functioning
grievance process at the HRYCI and their cries for help have been
ignored.

Count I alleges due process violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution on behalf of all
inmates past, present, and future, who are housed in Dormitories
One and Two, for unlawful conditions of confinement, for failing to
adopt necessary policies and training programs, and failing to
properly supervise correctional officers assigned to HRYCI.  Count
II alleges unlawful conditions of confinement under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution on behalf of all
inmates past, present, and future, who are housed in Dormitories
One and Two, for failing to adopt necessary policies and training
programs, and failing to properly supervise correctional officers
assigned to HRYCI.

The Eighth Amendment governs claims brought by convicted inmates
challenging their conditions of confinement, while the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims brought by
pretrial detainees.  It is unclear if, at the time the action
commenced, Nash, Santiago, and Folks were convicted inmates or
pretrial detainees.

The Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, equitable
relief, and injunctive relief.

The State Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) the Plaintiffs have failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies as is required under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"); (2) the Amended Complaint
alleges, without documentary support, that mold or toxic mold is
present at the HRYCI and causes the medical symptoms complained of;
(3) the claims are deficiently pled; and (4) the claims against the
State Defendants in their official capacities that seek monetary
damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Connections CSP moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) the Plaintiffs have failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies as is required under the
PLRA; (2) the authority to make decisions related to housing,
conditions of confinement or grievance policies belong to the DOC,
not Connections; (3) the Plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable
constitutional claim of deliberate indifference; and (4) the
Plaintiffs failed to attach an affidavit of merit as required under
Delaware law for any potential medical negligence claims.

Nash and Santiago filed oppositions to the motions. Folks did not.
Nash and Santiago argue that the Court has already screened the
Amended Complaint and determined that it raised cognizable and
non-frivolous claims within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section
1915A(b) and Section 1915(e)(2)(B).  While this is correct, Judge
Noreika takes a second look at the Amended Complaint in light of
the arguments posed by the Defendants in their motions to dismiss.

To the extent Nash and Santiago attempt to amend the Amended
Complaint by providing new facts and relying upon exhibits in their
oppositions that were not attached to the amended Complaint, they
may not do so, the District Court relays.  The Plaintiffs may not
amend their complaint through opposition briefs, and new facts may
not be considered by the Court on the instant motions to dismiss,
the District Court says.

The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, not motions for summary
judgment.  Judge Noreika holds that resolving the issue of
administrative exhaustion in the case would require examination of
factual matters well outside of the pleadings.  Hence, the
exhaustion issue is not amenable to resolution at this stage.
Accordingly, the Judge will deny the Defendants' motions to dismiss
for the Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Defendants are free to raise the issue again in a properly
filed motion for summary judgment.

The Judge will grant the State Defendants' motion to dismiss the
official capacity claims raised against them that seek monetary
damages.  The Judge holds that any and all claims seeking money
damages against the State Defendants in their official capacities
are barred by sovereign immunity.  Also, the Plaintiffs' official
capacity claims seeking injunctive relief are not subject to
dismissal, the District Court relays.

Judge Noreika will grant the State Defendants' motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege
personal involvement of the State Defendants as is required for a
Section 1983 claim.  Because the Plaintiffs may be able to cure
their pleading defects and state a plausible claim for relief, they
will be given leave to file a second amended complaint as to the
constitutional claims.

Judge Noreika will also grant Connections CSP's motion to dismiss
the claims raised against it.  Because the Plaintiffs may be able
to cure their pleading defects and state a plausible claim for
relief, they will be given leave to file a second amended complaint
as to the constitutional claims.

Finally, to the extent the Plaintiffs allege medical negligence, at
the time they filed the complaint, they were required to submit an
affidavit of merit as to each defendant signed by an expert
witness.  The Plaintiffs did not comply with this requirement.
Therefore, the Judge will grant Connections CSP's motion to dismiss
any potential medical negligence claims.

Nash moves for class certification on his behalf and on behalf of
Santiago and Folks.  The Amended Complaint names Nash as the
proposed class representative.  Nash argues that the requisites for
class certification have been met.  Conversely, the Defendants
argue that the requirements for class certification have not been
met.

Judge Noreika holds that Nash cannot fulfill the requirements of
Rule 23(a).  Even were the Court to accept his argument that the
first three requirements (numerosity, commonality, and typicality)
are met, as a pro se Plaintiff, he cannot adequately represent the
interests of other class members.  In addition, as discussed above,
although the Plaintiffs will be given leave to amend, the Amended
Complaint will be dismissed as deficiently pled and, therefore, the
commonality factor has not been met.  Finally, even were Nash
represented by an attorney, he would not "possess the same
interests and suffer the same injury" as the class inasmuch as he
is no longer an incarcerated individual and it appears that none of
the named Plaintiffs remain housed at the HRYCI.  Thus, the
typicality factor has not been met.  Nash has not met his burden to
establish that class certification is proper.  Therefore, his
motion for class certification will be denied.

Nash, who has been released from prison, has filed a long form
application to proceed in district court without prepaying fees or
costs. The Judge will grant the motion.

Santiago requests counsel on the grounds that he is incarcerated
and, because of his incarceration, it is impossible to obtain
discovery, sensitive documents and videos from the DOC, and witness
testimony.  He also states that he cannot afford legal
representation.

Assuming, solely for the purpose of deciding the motion, that
Santiago's claims have merit in fact and law, several of the Tabron
factors militate against granting his request for counsel.  The
filings demonstrate Santiago's ability to articulate his claims and
represent himself and the case is in its early stages.  Therefore,
at this juncture, the Judge will deny Santiago's request for
counsel without prejudice to renew. Should the need for counsel
arise later, one can be sought at that time.

Because more than three months have passed since Folks has taken
any action in the case, including his failure to file oppositions
to the Defendants' motions to dismiss and his failure to advise the
Court of his new address, he will be ordered to show cause why he
should not be dismissed as a Plaintiff for failure to prosecute,
pursuant to D. Del. LR 41.1.

For the reasons stated, Judge Noreika: (1) granted in part and
denied in part the State Defendants' motion to dismiss; (2) granted
in part and denied in part Connections' motion to dismiss; (3)
dismissed the Amended Complaint and gave the Plaintiffs leave to
file a second amended complaint as to only the constitutional
claims; (4); granted Nash's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis; (5) denied Nash's motion for class certification; (6)
denied without prejudice to renew Santiago's request for counsel;
and (8) order ordered Folks to show cause why he should not be
dismissed as a Plaintiff for his failure to prosecute the case.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 13, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/x14Cdg from Leagle.com.

Anthony A. Nash, Plaintiff, pro se.

Jose Santiago, Plaintiff, pro se.

Reggie Folks, Plaintiff, pro se.

Kolawole Akinbayo, Perry Phelps & Steven Wesley, Defendants,
represented by Carla Anne Kingery Jarosz, Department of Justice.

Connections CSP, Inc., Defendant, represented by Dana Spring Monzo
-- monzod@whiteandwilliams.com -- White & Williams & Karine
Sarkisian -- sarkisiank@whiteandwilliams.com -- White & Williams.


DENTAQUEST LLC: Jenkins Sues Over Unpaid Regular and Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SHAQUAN JENKINS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. DENTAQUEST, LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-01432-LA (E.D. Wisc.,
Sept. 30, 2019), arises under the Fair Labor Standards Act for the
Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and other employees all
earned regular and overtime pay for all time worked.

DentaQuest, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company qualified
to transact business in Wisconsin.

The Defendant manages, controls and operates customer service call
centers within this judicial district and throughout the country
and employs, manages and controls the telephone-based workers, who
are the putative class and collective members in the lawsuit.  The
telephone-dedicated employees in this case handled phone calls
regarding dental insurance plans and benefits.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James X. Bormes, Esq.
          Catherine P. Sons, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JAMES X. BORMES, P.C.
          8 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 2600
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 201-0575
          E-mail: jxbormes@bormeslaw.com
                  cpsons@bormeslaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas M. Ryan, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS M. RYAN, P.C.
          35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 650
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 726-3400
          E-mail: tom@tomryanlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick J. Schott, Esq.
          SCHOTT, BUBLITZ & ENGEL S.C.
          640 W. Moreland Boulevard
          Waukesha, WI 53188
          Telephone: (262) 827-1700
          E-mail: pschott@sbe-law.com


DKCOSMETICS: Kim Seeks to Recoup Overtime Pay, Damages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GA HO KIM v. DKCOSMETICS; DKCOS CORP.; CLUB CLIO CORP.; CLUB CLIO
NYC CORP.; JONG KYUN ("JOHN") LEE and JOHN DOES 1-10 (said names
being fictitious); and JOHN ROE CORPS. 1-10 (said names being
fictitious), Case No. 1:19-cv-09079 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2019), is
brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
non-exempt employees seeking recovery of unpaid overtime premium
and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New
York Labor Law and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.

DKCOSMETICS is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New York and maintains a principal place
of business at 18 W 33rd Street, in New York City.  DKCOSMETICS
also maintains a warehouse facility in Ridgefield, New Jersey.
DKCOS Corp. maintains a principal place of business also at 18 W
33rd Street.

Club Clio Corp. maintains a principal place of business at 136-86
Roosevelt Avenue, in Flushing, New York.  Club Clio Corp. also had
a place of business at 141-47 Northern Boulevard, in Flushing,
which is now closed.

Club Clio NYC Corp. maintains a principal place of business at 11
West 14th Street, in New York City.  Jong Kyun Lee ("JK Lee") is
the chief executive officer, president, principal, shareholder,
officer, director, or otherwise authorized representative of all
Corporate Defendants.  The identities of the Doe and Roe Defendants
are unknown to the Plaintiff at the filing of this Complaint.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Seokchan Kwak, Esq.
          KIM, CHO & LIM, LLC
          460 Bergen Boulevard, Suite 305
          Palisades Park, NJ 07650
          Telephone: (201) 585-7400
          Facsimile: (201) 585-7422
          E-mail: seankwak@kcllawfirm.com


ENHANCED RECOVERY: Delacruz Alleges Violation under FDCPA
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enhanced Recovery
Company, LLC. The case is styled as Zeuxi Delacruz, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-09517
(S.D. N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Enhanced Recovery Company, LLC is an international BPO and a full
service, end-to-end provider for every aspect of the customer
lifecycle.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


EUBA CORP: McConnell Named New Class Representative in FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARY BUCKLES, On behalf of herself and those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. EUBA CORP., et al., Defendants, Case No.
3:18-cv-355 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Walter H. Rice of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, (1)
sustained in part and overruled in part Defendants, EUBA Corp.,
Steve DePugh and David Sharpe's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Class and Collective Complaint filed by Mary
Buckles; and (2) sustained the Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint filed by opt-in Plaintiff Michael Hunter
McConnell, through his representative, Kacey Leann McConnell.

Buckles filed a Complaint against her former employer, EUBA, as
well as the individual owners and operators, DePugh and Sharpe,
alleging that the Defendants failed to pay her and others minimum
wages and overtime wages as required by federal and state law.
These Defendants allegedly operate approximately 20 Domino's Pizza
franchises in Ohio.  The Complaint alleges violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); the Ohio Constitution, Article II,
Section 34a; the Ohio Minimum Wage Fairness Act ("OMFWSA"); O.R.C.
4111.01, et seq.; O.R.C. Section 4113.15 (Ohio's "Prompt Pay Act");
and O.R.C. Section 2307.60.

Buckles seeks to represent the current and former delivery drivers
employed by the Defendants at the EUBA stores.

The First and Second Counts of the Complaint allege FLSA violations
for failure to pay minimum wage and overtime.  These counts are
asserted on behalf of Buckles and all similarly situated current
and former delivery drivers employed at the EUBA restaurants owned
by the Defendants nationwide during the three years prior to the
filing of the Complaint who elect to opt-in.  These two FLSA counts
are referred to as the "FLSA Collective."

Violations of state law, under the Ohio Constitution, Article II,
Section 34a, OMFWSA, R.C. Section 4113.15 and R.C. Section 2307.60,
are alleged in Counts Three, Four, Five and Six in the Complaint.
These state law counts are brought under a typical Rule 23 class
action where, unlike the FLSA Collective, affirmatively opting-in
is not required, since each person who falls within the class
definition is considered to be a member of the Rule 23 class.

The Defendants responded to the Complaint by filing a motion to
compel arbitration seeking to dismiss the class and collective
action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civil P. 12(b)(1) and the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA").  They argue that as a former employee of
EUBA, Buckles signed an arbitration agreement which requires her to
arbitrate all claims alleged in the Complaint and to do so on an
individual basis.  As an alternative to dismissal of the lawsuit,
the Defendants request that the Complaint be stayed pending the
completion of the arbitration.

Shortly after the Defendants' motion was filed, a Consent to Join
Action was filed by McConnell, on behalf of her deceased father,
Michael Hunter McConnell.

Although the response filed by Buckles and McConnell opposes any
dismissal of the case, Buckles does consent to a stay of her
individual case in order to pursue arbitration against Defendants
for those claims.  The Counsel for Buckles and McConnell, however,
further states in the response that they are investigating whether
Michael Hunter McConnell signed any arbitration agreement.  If he
did not, then Plaintiff Michael Hunter McConnell would seek to step
in as a class representative.

The Defendants' reply argues that dismissal is appropriate since
any efforts to potentially amend the Plaintiff's Complaint to add
Mr. McConnell as a named Plaintiff in the action are not currently
before the Court and do nothing to preclude the dismissal of the
Plaintiff's Complaint.

Thereafter, McConnell filed her motion for leave to file a first
amended complaint and argued that the Complaint should not be
dismissed and that there was no evidence that her father signed an
arbitration agreement.  McConnell also asserted that an amended
complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), is appropriate since an
amended complaint will not cause undue delay, does not arise as a
result of bad faith or dilatory motive, and will not unduly
prejudice the Defendants.

The Defendants, however, argued that because Buckles conceded that
the arbitration agreement prevented her from proceeding further,
the case must be dismissed.  To do otherwise, deprives them of the
benefits of the arbitration agreement and is inconsistent with the
goals of the Federal Arbitration Act.  They Defendants contend that
the case should either be stayed or dismissed and that if McConnell
has a claim that she wishes to pursue for her deceased father and
others, the proper vehicle is an independent suit, which she may
attempt to bring on behalf of those similarly situated to her
father if she so chooses.

McConnell's reply, however, stated that as a result of her father
opting-in, there are currently two Plaintiffs in the case: Mary
Buckles and Michael Hunter McConnell (represented by his daughter
Kacey).  The Reply further states that the Defendants have obtained
the benefit they bargained for with Ms. Buckles -- she is pursuing
her claims in individual arbitration.  However, they are not
permitted to use Ms. Buckles' arbitration agreement to block valid
class claims asserted by other employees.

Judge Rice holds that there is no dispute between the parties that
Buckles, as an employee of EUBA, signed an Arbitration Agreement.
There is also no dispute that the terms of the document prevent her
both from filing a lawsuit and also acting in a representative
capacity by asserting claims on behalf of others against the
Defendants.  

Because there is agreement between the parties that the claims
asserted by Buckles are arbitrable, the only issues that remain are
(1) whether the case should be dismissed or stayed pending
completion of Buckles's arbitration, with McConnell being required
to file a new lawsuit against Defendants or (2) whether the opt-in
Plaintiff Michael Hunter McConnell can be substituted as the named
Plaintiff for Buckles with McConnell acting as representative as
well as for those similarly situated.

The Judge recognizes that in FLSA actions, opt-in plaintiffs are
parties.  Because a notice of Consent to Join has been filed and
there is an opt-in Plaintiff, a justiciable issue still exists and
the case is not moot.

And although Buckles has conceded that she signed an arbitration
agreement and is now bound by it, no such claim has been made that
the opt-in Plaintiff also signed such an agreement, the Court
notes.  Moreover, although the Defendants contend that if McConnell
has claims she should simply file a new lawsuit on behalf of her
deceased father and others similarly situated, this would neither
further the interests of judicial economy nor the preservation of
party resources.

For all the foregoing reasons, Judge Rice sustained in part and
overruled in part the Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss
the Class and Collective Action Complaint.  

Plaintiff Mary Buckles is ordered to arbitrate all claims against
the Defendants as an individual Plaintiff pursuant to the parties'
arbitration agreement.  Her individual claims against the
Defendants are stayed.

Michael Hunter McConnell is substituted as the named Plaintiff and
class
representative in place of Mary Buckles with Kacey Leann McConnell
to represent the interests of Michael Hunter McConnell, as well as
the interests of any of those similarly situated current and former
employees of the Defendants, who choose to opt-in.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Decision is
available at https://is.gd/Ha6uVq from Leagle.com.

Mary Buckles, Kacey Leann McConnell & Michael Hunter McConnell,
Opt-in-Plaintiff, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew Biller --
abiller@msdlegal.com -- Biller & Kimble, LLC, Andrew P. Kimble --
akimble@msdlegal.com -- Biller & Kimble, LLC Of Counsel Markovits,
Stock & DeMarco, LLC & Philip J. Krzeski -- pkrzeski@msdlegal.com
-- Biller & Kimble, LLC Of Counsel.

EUBA Corp., Steve DePugh & David Sharpe, Defendants, represented by
Michael Jacob Ball -- mjball@vorys.com -- Vorys Sater Seymour &
Pease LLP.


EVERSOURCE ENERGY: 1st Cir. Upholds Breiding Class Suit Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Douglas G. Green, Esq., and Shannen W. Coffin, Esq., of Steptoe &
Johnson LLP, in an article for Mondaq, report that in a notable
decision affirming the continuing vitality of the filed rate
doctrine, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld
the dismissal of a $3.66 billion-dollar consumer class action
brought against Eversource Energy and Avangrid, Inc. in Breiding v.
Eversource Energy, No. 18-1995 (Sept. 18, 2019), which alleged
manipulation of the New England energy markets. The "filed rate"
doctrine prohibits collateral attacks on tariff rates, terms, and
conditions established by federal and state regulatory agencies.

The First Circuit's decision in Breiding v. Eversource Energy
illustrates that the doctrine continues to stand as a first line of
defense against antitrust claims and similar state law claims
challenging conduct governed by regulator-approved tariffs.

Both Eversource and Avangrid operate electric utilities that sell
services to end users in New England markets, as well as local
distribution companies (LDCs) that distribute natural gas to retail
consumers. The Breiding plaintiffs are a group of electricity
consumers from New England states. Their lawsuit alleged that
Eversource and Avangrid, acting through their LDC affiliates,
strategically over-reserved transportation capacity along the
Algonquin gas pipeline, the main natural gas pipeline serving New
England, and then reduced their reservations late in the trading
day without releasing the capacity for use by others. Plaintiffs
claimed the effect of these practices was to limit the availability
of transportation capacity in New England, thereby increasing the
spot market price of natural gas.

Plaintiffs claimed the higher spot gas prices ultimately resulted
in higher costs for gas-fired generators participating in the New
England wholesale electricity markets, causing higher electricity
prices that flowed through New England electricity consumers.
Plaintiffs, representing a purported class of New England retail
customers, claimed damages of $3.66 billion, trebled. Though the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has exclusive
jurisdiction over wholesale electricity and natural gas
transportation, plaintiffs claimed that defendants' conduct was not
compelled by any FERC tariff and affected certain markets not
subject to FERC's pricing regulation.

The Court of Appeals agreed with defendants that plaintiffs federal
antitrust and state consumer protection claims were foreclosed by
the filed rate doctrine, which the court described as set of legal
rules that "revolve around the notion that. . . utility filings
with the regulatory agency prevail over . . . other claims seeking
different rates or terms than those reflected in the filings with
the agency." The fundamental problem with the Breiding plaintiffs'
claims was that "[a]ll of the conduct that the plaintiffs say
violates federal and state law occurred in the natural gas
transmission market," which is exclusively governed by FERC through
tariffs regulating conduct on the Algonquin Pipeline. "Pursuant to
FERC's exclusive authority to regulate natural gas transmission,
FERC mandates that natural gas companies file 'schedules showing
all rates and charges for any [jurisdictional] transportation or
sale of natural gas.'"

The First Circuit reasoned that, in exercising its exclusive
authority, FERC approved tariffs that not only permitted, but
required, the very practices challenged in the suit in order to
give LDCs the flexibility to serve the consumer demand for natural
gas, especially on cold winter days. "FERC, in conformity with its
broader regulatory scheme, expressly declined to require direct
purchasers [such as defendants] to release excess capacity in
recognition of the fact that direct purchasers facing variable
demand for natural gas might need to retain that capacity to ensure
reliability" during "peak periods." The lawsuit directly challenged
decisions made by FERC in the exercise of its exclusive authority
over gas transportation markets: "[M]aintaining the efficient use
of limited transmission capacity falls squarely within the bull's
eye of FERC's regulatory aims."

Thus, the court concluded that the filed rate doctrine "prohibits
[it] from questioning [FERC's] reasoned judgment in this lawsuit."
The filed rate doctrine thus protects the judgements of federal
regulators overseeing complex markets from being disturbed by
lawsuits seeking damages and injunctive relief under state and
federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. [GN]


FACEBOOK INC: King & Spalding Discusses BIPA Class Action Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
King & Spalding, in an article for JDSupra, reports that on Aug. 8,
the Ninth Circuit issued a highly anticipated decision affirming
the district court's certification of a class of Facebook users who
suffered alleged violations of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act ("BIPA").  The case -- which has been followed closely
by the business community and privacy activists -- may lead to the
proliferation of biometric privacy class actions under the BIPA and
analogous statutes in Texas, California, and Washington.

   * A group of Illinois Facebook users filed a putative class
action alleging that Facebook violated the BIPA by using facial
recognition technology to automatically tag individuals in photos
without first obtaining written consent and without complying with
the BIPA's requirements with respect to retention of biometric
data.

   * Facebook moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing,
arguing the plaintiffs alleged only a bare statutory violation, not
a concrete injury. While the motion was pending, the plaintiffs
filed a motion for class certification. The district court denied
Facebook's motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for
class certification. Facebook appealed.

   * With respect to standing, the Ninth Circuit explained that the
right to privacy has long been recognized as a concrete injury. And
"[b]ecause the privacy right protected by BIPA is the right not to
be subject to the collection and use of such biometric data,
Facebook's alleged violation of these statutory requirements would
necessarily violate the plaintiffs' substantive privacy interests."
Accordingly, the court concluded the plaintiffs had alleged a
concrete injury in fact.

   * The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's order on
class certification, rejecting Facebook's argument that the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement due to the presumption against extraterritorial
application of Illinois law. In so holding, the court explained
that Illinois law would govern the claims of individuals who use
Facebook in Illinois, even if some relevant activities occurred
outside the state.

   * Moreover, the court rejected Facebook's argument that the
potential for a large, class-wide statutory damages
award—including $1,000 for each negligent violation and $5,000
for each intentional or reckless violation across a putative class
potentially consisting of millions of users—defeated Rule
23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement, since the Illinois legislature
declined to impose any aggregate statutory damages cap in the
BIPA.

   * The decision comes as an increasing number of states weigh
proposed legislation to curb biometric privacy abuses. In the wake
of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, corporate defendants that collect
biometric data should ensure they comply with the BIPA and other
state data privacy statutes, as failure to do so may expose the
company to various risks, including consumer class actions and
state attorney-general actions/investigations. [GN]


FIDELITY NATIONAL: Faces Loyhayem Suit Alleging Invasion of Privacy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN LOYHAYEM, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. FIDELITY NATIONAL HOME WARRANTY and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Case No. 2:19-cv-08431
(C.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2019), alleges that the Defendants contacted
the Plaintiff on his cellular telephone in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, thereby, invading his privacy.

Fidelity National Home Warranty is a marketing company.  The true
names and capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown to
the Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866)633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com


FIRSTSOURCE ADVANTAGE: Rafferty Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Firstsource
Advantage, LLC. The case is styled as Jennifer Rafferty,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05822 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Firstsource Advantage, LLC is a Financial institution in Getzville,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



FOREST CITY: Nagy Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------
CASSANDRA NAGY, On behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. FOREST CITY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., TECHNIFAB, INC. and
JOHN CLOUD, Case No. 1:19-cv-02290-PAB (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 1, 2019),
accuses the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor Standards Act by
consistently failing to pay Plaintiff and other present and former
hourly employees for all hours, including overtime hours, worked.

Forest City Technologies, Inc. is an Ohio for-profit corporation
with its principal place of business in Wellington, Ohio.
Technifab, Inc. is an Ohio for-profit corporation and wholly owned
subsidiary of Forest City.  John Cloud resides in Lorain County,
Ohio.  He is the owner, President and CEO of Forest City.

The Defendants are a "diversified manufacturer, converting
specialty materials into components for customers around the world
in the fields of automotive, industrial transportation & equipment,
aerospace, electronics & lighting, and consumer goods."  The
Defendants operate out of several locations in Wellington, Ohio.
The Defendants own and operate manufacturing plant locations in
northern Ohio and surrounding areas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott, II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Caxton Building
          812 Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Telephone: (216) 912-2221
          Facsimile: (216) 350-6313
          E-mail: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com


GENERAL MOTORS: T. Leopold Named Lead Counsel in Mich. Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Zach Schlein, writing for Law.com, reports that a South Florida law
partner has been named lead counsel in a nationwide class action
against General Motors LLC.

Cohen Milstein partner Theodore J. Leopold --
tleopold@cohenmilstein.com -- was appointed to the position by U.S.
District Judge David M. Larson. The Palm Beach Gardens-based
attorney is part of the legal team representing plaintiffs from
more than 30 states in a putative consumer class action against GM
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.

An amended complaint filed on Sept. 30 consolidated previous suits
against GM and contended the automotive company knowingly concealed
a defect in its vehicles from customers. According to the suit, two
faulty models of eight-speed automatic transmissions have caused
widespread problems for GM vehicle owners in recent years. The
plaintiffs allege vehicles manufactured by the defendant between
2015 and 2019 with the GM 8L90 or 8L45 transmissions suffer from a
shared problem, which causes the vehicles to jerk and sputter.

"The class vehicles were sold with a defective 8L90 or 8L45
transmissions that, among other things, slip, buck, kick, jerk and
harshly engage, suffer abnormal internal wear, sudden acceleration,
delay in downshifts, delayed acceleration, difficulty stopping the
vehicle, and eventually require replacement of the transmission or
its components," the complaint said. "This defect, which manifests
itself within the limited warranty period or shortly after the
limited warranty period expires, can cause unsafe conditions in the
Class Vehicles, including but not limited vehicles suddenly
lurching forward, sudden loss of forward propulsion, and
significant delays in acceleration."

The suit argues because the movements described affect a driver's
ability to control their car's speed, acceleration, and
deceleration, the problems associated with the transmissions pose a
safety hazard to users.

A defense attorney for GM, Grant A. Newman with Michigan law firm
Bush Seyferth, said the company's legal counsel was not authorized
to speak on the case.

GM's manager for news relations on legal and corporate issues,
David Caldwell, declined to comment on the amended complaint,
beyond calling the filing "another step for an existing issue."

Caldwell said customers concerned about their GM vehicles should
visit their local dealerships to address any issues.

Meanwhile, the complaint filed on Sept. 30 lists 61 plaintiffs and
proposes a class that comprises U.S. residents who leased or
purchased new and used vehicles containing the alleged defect.
There are 104 individualized charges comporting to the respective
consumer protection laws for the 32 states in the suit, as well as
claims of breach of warranty, unjust enrichment and fraudulent
omission on behalf of the nationwide class.

"GM failed to disclose the transmission defect to plaintiff and
class members through its advertising," the suit said. "On
information and belief, owners have complained of dangerous driving
conditions and near-accidents because of the transmission defect.
However, GM continues to sell the dangerously defective vehicles to
consumers."

Leopold told the Daily Business Review the "panoply of different
issues" described in the complaint is supported by ample evidence,
including extensive testimonies posted online by GM customers.

"Every time the vehicles are brought in for repairs, adjustments
etc., the problems never go away," the attorney said. "None of the
fixes GM tried to do ever worked, and the problems kept
persisting."

Leopold added, "There was an accumulation of people around the
country. It took a few years but it's now sort of a snowball
effect."

The plaintiffs are seeking damages for overpaying for the
purportedly defective vehicles, as well as losses on diminished
resale value and repair costs. Leopold said he anticipates GM will
file a motion to dismiss the case, and the plaintiffs in turn
intend to respond accordingly.

Leopold is joined on the case by fellow Cohen Milstein attorney
Douglas James McNamara -- dmcnamara@cohenmilstein.com -- as well as
litigators from Philadelphia firm Berger Montague and the Miller
Law Firm in Michigan. [GN]


GENOMIC HEALTH: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP on Oct. 2 disclosed that it has filed a class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, Case No. 3:19-cv-05929-SI, on behalf of
shareholders of Genomic Health, Inc. ("Genomic" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ:GHDX) who have been harmed by Genomic's and its board of
directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
in connection with the proposed merger of the Company with Exact
Sciences Corporation ("Exact Sciences") (the "Proposed
Transaction").

On July 28, 2019, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger under which Genomic shareholders stand
to receive $27.50 in cash, without interest, plus a fraction of a
share of Exact Sciences common stock equal to the quotient obtained
by dividing $44.50 by the average of the volume-weighted average
prices per share of Exact Sciences common stock on The Nasdaq Stock
Market on each of the 15 consecutive trading days ending
immediately prior to the closing of the merger, for each share of
Genomic stock they own.  If the Exact Sciences stock price is equal
to or less than $98.79 or equal to or greater than $120.75, a
two-way collar mechanism will apply, pursuant to which (i) if the
Exact Sciences stock price is equal to or greater than $120.75, the
exchange ratio will be fixed at 0.36854 and (ii) if the Exact
Sciences stock price is equal to or less than $98.79, the exchange
ratio will be fixed at 0.45043.

The complaint alleges that the Form S-4 Registration Statement
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission violates Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act because it provides materially
incomplete and misleading information about the Company and the
Proposed Transaction, including information concerning the
Company's financial projections and certain valuation analyses
conducted by the Company's financial advisor, on which the Board
relied to recommend the Proposed Transaction as fair to Genomic
shareholders.

If you wish to obtain information concerning this action, you can
do so by clicking here: www.faruqilaw.com/GHDX  

Take Action

Plaintiff is represented by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a law firm with
extensive experience in prosecuting class actions, and significant
expertise in actions involving corporate fraud.  Faruqi & Faruqi,
LLP, was founded in 1995 and the firm maintains its principal
office in New York City, with offices in Delaware, California,
Georgia, and Pennsylvania.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from
October 2, 2019, the date of this notice.  Any member of the
putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  If you wish to discuss this action,
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests, please contact:

Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (877) 247-4292 or (212) 983-9330
E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
jwilson@faruqilaw.com
http://www.faruqilaw.com
[GN]


GOOGLE INC: UK Class Action Over iPhone Data Tracking Can Proceed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Croft, writing for Financial Times, reports that a collective
lawsuit against Google for allegedly tracking the personal data of
4 million iPhone users can proceed in the UK courts, three judges
ruled on Oct. 2.

The Court of Appeal said Richard Lloyd, a former director of the
consumer rights group Which?, could press ahead with a lawsuit
against Google under the UK 1998 Data Protection Act and serve
legal papers on Google in the US.

Mr. Lloyd claims that Google secretly tracked the online behaviour
of iPhone users in the UK between August 2011 and February 2012,
bypassing the privacy settings on the handsets and collecting data
from the Safari browser on users' internet surfing habits as well
as their ethnicity, health, sexuality, political views and
finances.

Google then is said to have aggregated the information to create
groups with labels such as "football lovers" and offered
advertisers the chance to target these groups through its
DoubleClick ad sales platform. It has already paid millions of
dollars to US states and the US Federal Trade Commission over the
Safari security bypass.

Mr. Lloyd has previously estimated that if he wins at trial,
damages could run to GBP750 per iPhone user, or a total cost of
GBP3.3bn to Google. But it will be up to the High Court to
determine any damages if he wins against Google at a future trial.

The Court of Appeal reversed an earlier decision by the High Court
that had blocked the claim. Sir Geoffrey Vos, chancellor of the
High Court, said that the lawsuit should proceed and added, "this
case, quite properly if the allegations are proved, seeks to call
Google to account for its allegedly wholesale and deliberate misuse
of personal data without consent, undertaken with a view to
commercial profit".

Google will appeal to the Supreme Court. It said: "Protecting the
privacy and security of our users has always been our number one
priority. This case relates to events that took place nearly a
decade ago and that we addressed at the time. We believe it has no
merit and should be dismissed."

Mr. Lloyd called the ruling "a big decision". "It says very clearly
to big tech companies and anyone else that they can be held to
account in this country," he said.

This is the first time such a collective action --
where one person represents a group with a shared grievance, akin
to a US-style class action -- has been brought in Britain against a
leading tech company over alleged misuse of data. [GN]


GROSSMAN & KARASZEWSKI: Steil Files FDCPA Class Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Grossman &
Karaszewski, PLLC. The case is styled as Jeannie L. Steil,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Grossman & Karaszewski, PLLC, Darleen Karaszewski and
William C. Grossman, PLLC, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05839 (E.D.
N.Y., Oct. 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Grossman & Karaszewski, PLLC is a debt collection law office
located in East Amherst, NY.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


GUYS TIRE: Fails to Properly Pay Employees, Ramos Suit Alleges
--------------------------------------------------------------
Genaro R. Ramos, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated v. Guys Tire Buys & Custom Wheel Ltd. d/b/a
Guy's Tire Buys, Guys Tire Buys Corporation d/b/a Guy's Tire Buys,
Angelo Pignataro, and Salvatore Galienao, Case No. 716695/2019
(N.Y. Sup., Queens Cty., Sept. 30, 2019), alleges violations of the
New York Labor Law and New York Codes, Rules and Regulations
arising from the Defendants' failure to pay their employees,
including the Plaintiff, compensation for all hours worked, and
overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 hours each
week.

Guys Tire Buys & Custom Wheels LTD., was a domestic corporation
organized under the laws of the New York State with a principal
business address at 373 Veterans Road West, in Staten Island, New
York.  Guy's Tire Buys, Corporation, is a domestic corporation
organized under the laws of the New York State with a principal
business address at 4099 Hylan Blvd., in Staten Island, New York.
The Individual Defendants are owners, officers or managers of the
Corporate Defendants.

The Defendants operate auto shops under the name Guy's Tire Buys
located at their business addresses, where the Plaintiff worked as
electrical mechanic specialist.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zindzi Baugh Corbett, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8522
          Facsimile: (718) 353-6288
          E-mail: zbaughcorbett@hanglaw.com


HEARING HELP: Hoffman Suit Asserts FDCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------
MARK HOFFMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. HEARING HELP EXPRESS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 3:19-cv-05960 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 9, 2019) is a class action for
damages and other equitable and legal remedies resulting from
Defendant's violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In August and September 2019, Mark Hoffman received telemarketing
calls on his cellular phone placed by or on behalf of Hearing Help
Express, Inc. seeking to sell their hearing aid products to him.
Hearing Help Express, Inc. used an automatic telephone dialing
system on at least one of these calls. Mark Hoffman has not been a
Hearing Help Express, Inc. customer at any time, and Mark Hoffman
did not consent to receive calls from Hearing Help Express, Inc. or
its agents. Mark Hoffman's telephone number is listed on the Do Not
Call registry maintained by the Federal Trade Commission and has
been continuously listed there since August 21, 2009, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Mark Hoffman resides in Kitsap County, Washington.

Hearing Help Express, Inc. is an Illinois corporation with
headquarters in Dekalb, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

     Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
     Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
     Adrienne D. McEntee, Esq.
     TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
     936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
     Seattle, WA 98103-8869
     Phone: (206) 816-6603
     Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
     Email: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
            jmurray@terrellmarshall.com
            amcentee@terrellmarshall.com

          - and -

     Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
     Paronich Law, P.C.
     350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
     Hingham, MA 02043
     Phone: (508) 221-1510
     Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com
            pbotros@forthepeople.com


IDT CORP: Cross Complaint Filed Against Rosales
-----------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2019, that the company has lodged a
cross complaint against Jose Rosales alleging trade secret and
other violations.

On January 22, 2019, Rosales filed a putative class action against
IDT America, IDT Domestic Telecom and IDT International in
California state court alleging certain violations of employment
law.

The plaintiff alleges that these companies failed to compensate
members of the putative class in accordance with California law.

IDT  said, "We are evaluating the claims, and at this stage, are
unable to estimate our potential liability, if any. We intend to
vigorously defend the claims. In August 2019, we filed a cross
complaint against Rosales alleging trade secret and other
violations."

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: JDS1 LLC Class Action Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2019, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by JDS1, LLC.

On July 5, 2017, plaintiff JDS1, LLC, on behalf of itself and all
other similarly situated stockholders of Straight Path, and
derivatively on behalf of Straight Path as nominal defendant, filed
a putative class action and derivative complaint in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware against the Company, The Patrick
Henry Trust (a trust formed by Howard S. Jonas that held record and
beneficial ownership of certain shares of Straight Path he formerly
held), Howard S. Jonas, and each of Straight Path's directors.

The complaint alleges that the Company aided and abetted Straight
Path Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Davidi
Jonas, and Howard S. Jonas in his capacity as controlling
stockholder of Straight Path, in breaching their fiduciary duties
to Straight Path in connection with the settlement of claims
between Straight Path and the Company related to potential
indemnification claims concerning Straight Path's obligations under
the Consent Decree it entered into with the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), as well as the sale of Straight Path's
subsidiary Straight Path IP Group, Inc. to the Company in
connection with that settlement. That action was consolidated with
a similar action that was initiated by The Arbitrage Fund.

The Plaintiffs are seeking, among other things, (i) a declaration
that the action may be maintained as a class action or in the
alternative, that demand on the Straight Path Board is excused;
(ii) that the term sheet is invalid; (iii) awarding damages for the
unfair price stockholders received in the merger between Straight
Path and Verizon Communications Inc. for their shares of Straight
Path's Class B common stock; and (iv) ordering Howard S. Jonas,
Davidi Jonas, and the Company to disgorge any profits for the
benefit of the class Plaintiffs.

On August 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
September 24, 2017, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. Following closing of the transaction, the
Delaware Chancery Court denied the motion to dismiss.

On February 22, 2019, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of the motion to dismiss.

The Company intends to vigorously defend this matter.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Must Defend Against Dennis Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2019, that a motion seeking dismissal of
the class action suit initiated by Erik Dennis has been denied.

On May 21, 2018, Erik Dennis filed a putative class action against
IDT Telecom and the company in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia alleging violations of Do Not Call
Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

The company is evaluating the claim, and at this stage, is unable
to estimate its potential liability, if any.

On August 13, 2018, the company and IDT Telecom filed a motion to
dismiss or in the alternative to strike class allegations. The
plaintiff opposed the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied.

IDT said, "We intend to vigorously defend this matter."

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Parties in Sanchez Suit Agree to Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2019, that IDT Telecom and Jean Carlos
Sanchez have entered into a stipulation of dismissal of the
putative class action lawsuit initiated by Jean Carlos Sanchez.

On May 2, 2018, Jean Carlos Sanchez filed a putative class action
against IDT Telecom in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois alleging that the company sent unauthorized
marketing messages to cellphones in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

On July 26, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal.

IDT said, "We are evaluating the claim, and at this stage, are
unable to estimate our potential liability, if any. We intend to
vigorously defend this matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Samara Suit over Spam Texts Proceeds to Arbitration
-------------------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 11, 2019, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2019, that plaintiff Scarleth Samara has
agreed to dismiss a pending putative class action and the parties
have agreed to proceed with arbitration.

On April 12, 2019, Scarleth Samara filed a putative class action
against IDT Telecom in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana alleging certain violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

The plaintiff alleges that in October of 2017, IDT Telecom sent
unauthorized marketing messages to her cellphone. IDT Telecom filed
a motion to compel arbitration.

On or about August 19, 2019, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the
pending court action and the parties intend to proceed with
arbitration.  "At this stage, we are unable to estimate our
potential liability, if any. We intend to vigorously defend the
claim," the Company said.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


ILLINOIS: Parents File Class Action on Vitamin K Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Breck Dumas, writing for The Blaze, reports that several parents in
Illinois have filed a lawsuit against the state's Department of
Children and Family Services, affiliated agents, doctors, nurses,
and major hospitals who they say worked in coordination to either
take their newborns or threatened to after they chose not to have
the elective Vitamin K shot administered to their babies right
after birth.

What are the details?

One situation at the heart of the suit is that of Pastor Brian
Bougher and his wife, Angela, whose fifth child, Glori, was seized
by doctors for more than 12 hours after the couple chose to legally
opt out of having their daughter being injected with Vitamin K
immediately after being born. The couple maintains that they aren't
anti-vaxxers (and the Vitamin K shot is not a vaccine), but they
have chosen for religious reasons to not have any of their kids get
the shot. Their first four children were born in Wisconsin.

As news of the Bourghers' and others' stories got out, additional
families hopped on board, infuriated over being victims of medical
professionals working in coordination with (and reportedly paid by)
DCFS to root out what the agency considered to be a potential
indicator for "medical neglect."

According to a report by PJ Media's Megan Fox -- who has been
fervent in her coverage of such abuses -- doctors are often "hired
and paid by child protective agencies, who aggressively diagnose
accidental injuries as abuse and often accuse mothers of Munchausen
syndrome by proxy or narcissistic personality disorder form afar,
sometimes without having treated the mother, in order to allow DCFS
or other CPS agencies to remove their children."

A year ago, DCFS changed its policy, acknowledging, according to
the Chicago Tribune, that "making that kind of determination falls
outside the confines of our statutory and professional mission and
judgment." An internal memo sent out by the agency's acting
director at the time pointed to the fact that out of 138 families
investigated for choosing not to have their babies get the Vitamin
K shot, there were only 7 cases where officials could find evidence
of potential medical neglect.

Even parents whose children were not seized complained of being
investigated and harassed for months by DSFS, with the threat of
having their children put into state care -- or worse, adopted
out.

In the meantime, the plaintiffs haven't forgotten the shake-down
they received from the agency's and hospitals' employees. Local
station WBBM-TV interviewed two sets of emotion parents who say
they'll never get back what should have been joyous moments taken
from them as part of the illegal policy.

Anything else?

The Vitamin K shot has been recommended by the American Academy of
Pediatrics and regularly administered to newborns since the 1960's
for the purpose of preventing a rare bleeding disorder. But parents
who choose not to have the shot given to their babies are allowed
to fill out a form acknowledging their decision, which adds further
confusion for parents who have been punished by states -- such as
Illinois -- that offer a form at-the-ready for parents who decline
the recommended procedure. [GN]


ITG INC: Mauthe Appeals Decision in TCPA Suit to Third Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Robert W. Mauthe MD PC filed an appeal from a Court
ruling issued in its lawsuit entitled Robert W. Mauthe MD PC v. ITG
Inc., et al., Case No. 5-18-cv-01968, in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court issued a Memorandum granting the Defendants' Motions for
Reconsideration of the denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Class Action Complaint in the case.

This suit arises from the Defendants' alleged sending of five
facsimiles (faxes) to Plaintiff Robert Mauthe, M.D., PC in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).  The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants sent him and other health
professionals advertisements by fax without their express consent
offering compensation in exchange for their participation in one or
more internet or telephone surveys.  During the time the faxes were
allegedly sent to the Plaintiff, Defendants were providing their
customers with market research on the healthcare market.

The appellate case is captioned as Robert W. Mauthe MD PC v. ITG
Inc., et al., Case No. 19-3222, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant ROBERT W MAUTHE MD PC, Individually and as the
representatives of a class of similarly-situated persons, is
represented by:

          Phillip A. Bock, Esq.
          Molly S. Gantman, Esq.
          David M. Oppenheim, Esq.
          BOCK, HATCH, LEWIS & OPPENHEIM, LLC
          134 N. La Salle St., Suite 1000
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 658-5500
          Facsimile: (312) 658-5555
          E-mail: phil@classlawyers.com
                  molly@classlawyers.com
                  david@classlawyers.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Cohen, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL J. COHEN
          P.O. Box 432040
          Maplewood, MO 63143
          Telephone: (314) 497-6352
          E-mail: danieljaycohen209@gmail.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Reilly, Esq.
          SWARTZ CAMPBELL LLC
          115 North Jackson Street
          Media, PA 19063
          Telephone: (610) 566-9222
          E-mail: areilly@swartzcampbell.com

               - and -

          Richard E. Shenkan, Esq.
          SHENKAN INJURY LAWYERS LLC
          6550 Lakeshore Street
          West Bloomfield, MI 48323
          Telephone: (412) 716-5800
          E-mail: rshenkan@shenkanlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee ITG INC. is represented by:

          Francis J. Earley, Esq.
          MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC
          666 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 935-3000
          E-mail: FEarley@mintz.com

               - and -

          Esteban Morales, Esq.
          MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC
          2029 Century Park East, Suite 3100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586-3200
          E-mail: Emorales@mintz.com

               - and -

          James W. Kraus, Esq.
          PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP
          301 Grant Street
          One Oxford Centre, 38th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 263-4370
          E-mail: JWK@Pietragallo.com

               - and -

          Kevin E. Raphael, Esq.
          PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3402
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 320-6200
          E-mail: KER@Pietragallo.com

Defendants-Appellees ITG INVESTMENT RESEARCH INC. and M SCIENCE LLC
are represented by:

          Patrick D. Doran, Esq.
          Craig D. Mills, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
          50 South 16th Street
          Two Liberty Place, Suite 3200
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 665-8700
          E-mail: patrick.doran@bipc.com
                  craig.mills@bipc.com


JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: 9th Cir. Remands Dynamex Matter to Lower Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case GERARDO VAZQUEZ, GLORIA ROMAN, and JUAN AGUILAR, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 17-16096 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to
resolve an open question of California state law and certify the
question on whether the Court's decision in Dynamex Operations West
Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018), applies
retroactively.

Defendant-Appellee Jan-Pro, a company headquartered in Georgia,
licenses a system for marketing cleaning services to "regional
master franchisees" in multiple countries, including the United
States.  Regional master franchisees purchase franchises for
exclusive operations in a given regional area.

Jan-Pro is not party to any contract with unit franchisees.  It
contracts with the master franchisors, who then contract with unit
franchisees.  Unit franchisees may hire their own employees and may
act in individual or corporate capacities.

The Plaintiffs-Appellants are former unit franchisees who purchased
their franchises from two different regional master franchisors.
Gerardo Vazquez purchased his franchise from master franchisor New
Venture of San Bernardino, LLC for $2,800; Gloria Roman bought hers
from Connor-Nolan, Inc. for $2,800; and Juan Aguilar, with a
business partner, acquired his from Connor-Nolan, Inc. for $9,000.


The case began in 2008 when three other former Jan-Pro unit
franchisees (not the Plaintiffs) filed a putative class action in a
Massachusetts district court. By the end of the year, there were
eight additional plaintiffs, including the Plaintiffs, who are
California residents.  Together, they alleged that Jan-Pro had
developed a sophisticated "three-tier" franchising model to
misclassify its janitors as independent contractors and avoid
paying minimum wages and overtime compensation.

Because of the variety of state laws involved, the Massachusetts
district court chose a test case and, over Jan-Pro's objection,
severed the Plaintiffs' cases and sent them to the Northern
District of California, the Plaintiffs' place of residence.

Eventually, Jan-Pro moved for summary judgment in the case,
contending that the California Supreme Court's decision in
Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC -- a case concerning the vicarious
liability of a franchisor for a sexual assault against an employee
of its franchisee -- provided the relevant standard for determining
whether the Plaintiffs should be considered employees of Jan-Pro.
The Plaintiffs, in turn, contended that the case Martinez v. Combs
provided the standard because the instant case is a wage and hour
case.  In Martinez, the California Supreme Court held that "to
employ," as used in California wage orders, means (a) to exercise
control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to
suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a
common law employment relationship.

The district court recognized that no binding decision had
addressed the standard applicable to determining whether a
franchisor is an employer of a franchisee, and in the absence of
controlling authority, it applied the Martinez standard, with the
gloss of Patterson.  Analyzing Martinez's three prongs, the
district court held that the Plaintiffs had not established a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were employees
under any of the three prongs, and the court granted summary
judgment to Jan-Pro.

The Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.  While the appeal
was pending and after briefing was completed, the California
Supreme Court entered a decision in the Dynamex case.  Dynamex
turned on the definition of "suffer or permit" -- i.e., Martinez's
second prong -- for California wage order cases.  Specifically,
Dynamex held that a "hiring entity" (a putative employer) "suffers
or permits" a putative employee to work if it cannot overcome the
"ABC test."

A hiring entity must establish three elements to disprove
employment status: (A) that the worker is free from the control and
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance
of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the
work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside
the usual course of the hiring entity's business; and (C) that the
worker is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work
performed.

Because Dynamex postdated the district court's decision, the Ninth
Circuit issued an order directing the parties to brief its effect
on the merits of the case.  Among other contentions, the parties
disputed whether the decision applies retroactively.  On May 2,
2019, the Ninth Circuit issued a published opinion holding, inter
alia, that Dynamex applies retroactively.  On petition for panel
rehearing, however, the Ninth Circuit decided to certify the
retroactivity question to the California Supreme Court.  The Ninth
Circuit therefore issued an order withdrawing its prior opinion.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that it is prudent to certify the
question of Dynamex's retroactivity to the California Supreme
Court.  It does so for two reasons.  First, in its now-withdrawn
opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected Jan-Pro's argument that the
doctrines of res judicata and law of the case bar the Plaintiffs
from contending that they are employees under the ABC test.
Second, in resolving the parties' competing contentions, the Ninth
Circuit' task, as a federal court sitting in diversity, is to
approximate state law as closely as possible in order to make sure
that the vindication of the state right is without discrimination
because of the federal forum.

In asking the California Supreme Court to resolve the question, the
Ninth Circuit respectfully directs it to its own analysis in the
withdrawn opinion to the extent that the State Supreme Court may
find it helpful.  The Appellate Court also respectfully directs it
to the voluminous briefs of the parties and amici.  To that end,
the Ninth Circuit grants the Plaintiffs' motion to take judicial
notice of a hearing transcript in Juarez v. Jani-King of Cal.,
Inc., in which Judge Yvonne Gonzalez-Rodgers reasoned that Dynamex
applies retroactively.  The Appellate Court likewise grants the
California Employment Law Council's motion to file an amicus
brief.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/9TmGo5 from Leagle.com.


JEFFREY G. LERMAN PC: Tannenbaum Files FDCPA Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jeffrey G. Lerman,
P.C. The case is styled as Rivka Tannenbaum and Chava Silberstein,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C., Defendant, Case No.
7:19-cv-09554 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Jeffrey G. Lerman, P.C., is a personal injury litigation law
firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com



JIFFY LUBE: Court Dismisses First Amended Turizo TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned BLAKE TURIZO, Plaintiff, v. JIFFY LUBE
INTERNATIONAL, INC., and ATLANTIC COAST ENTERPRISE, LLC, d/b/a Ace
Lube Centers, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-61140-BLOOM/Valle
(S.D. Fla.), Judge Beth Bloom of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (i) granted in part and denied in part
Atlantic Coast Enterprise, LLC's ("Ace") Motion to Dismiss; and
(ii) granted Jiffy Lube's Motion to Dismiss.

The case arises as a result of unwanted text messages.  Plaintiff
Turizo initiated the purported class action alleging that Ace, at
the direction of Jiffy Lube, sent at least one text message to his
cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system
("ATDS") and without his consent.  As such, Turizo asserts one
count against Ace and Jiffy Lube for violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

Defendants Ace and Jiffy Lube filed separate Motions to Dismiss.

In its Motion, Ace argues that the First Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim because there are no facts pleaded to create an
inference that Ace sent text messages using an ATDS or without
Turizo's prior express consent.

Upon review, Judge Bloom finds that the allegations in the First
Amended Complaint are insufficient to plausibly allege the use of
an ATDS.  There are no facts alleged to connect Jiffy Lube's
provision of "marketing assets and tools" with Turizo's conclusory
allegation that one of the tools was an ATDS.  In addition, the
text of the message raises an inference that it was sent as a
result of some provision of services to Turizo, as opposed to a
marketing message sent en masse, as alleged.  Therefore, the First
Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that the Defendant
used an ATDS to send the text messages at issue.

Ace next argues that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint
fail to raise a plausible inference that the text messages were
sent without Turizo's prior express consent.  The Judge disagrees.
First, Turizo explicitly alleges that he did not provide express
consent to be contacted to either Ace or Jiffy Lube.  Second,
regardless of whether the text message may ultimately qualify as
telemarketing, prior express consent is an affirmative defense for
which a defendant bears the burden of proof.  As such, it is not an
appropriate basis for dismissal.  As a result, this element of
Turizo's claim is adequately pleaded.

In its Motion, Jiffy Lube argues that the allegations in the First
Amended Complaint fail to establish that the Court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over it, as Turizo has not alleged a
sufficient basis for either general or specific jurisdiction.  In
response, Turizo contends that the Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over Jiffy Lube under the provision of Florida's
long-arm statute providing for an exercise of jurisdiction as a
result of a defendant committing a tortious act within Florida.

Jiffy Lube has provided the sworn declaration of Dennis M. Reiner,
Director of Operations for Jiffy Lube.  In the Declaration, Mr.
Reiner states in pertinent part that, contrary to Turizo's
allegations, Jiffy Lube does not have corporate offices in Florida,
nor does it own or operate automotive service centers in Florida.
Mr. Reiner states that Ace is an entity completely distinct from
Jiffy Lube, such that Jiffy Lube had no authority to cause Ace to
send text messages, and that Jiffy Lube did not provide Ace an
ATDS, nor did Jiffy Lube direct or control any marketing campaign
pursuant to which Ace may have sent the alleged text messages.

The Judge finds Jiffy Lube has provided sufficient evidence to
shift the burden back to Turizo to provide evidence for the claim
of jurisdiction.  In response, Turizo fails to present any evidence
to rebut the Declaration provided by Jiffy Lube, but simply argues
that his allegations are sufficient.  The allegations Turizo relies
upon to establish personal jurisdiction have been fully rebutted
with evidence by Jiffy Lube, to which Turizo has provided no
evidentiary response.  As a result, Turizo has failed to establish
that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Jiffy Lube
under the Florida long-arm statute.  Furthermore, because Turizo
has failed to satisfy the first part of the applicable two-part
inquiry, the Court does not consider whether an exercise of
jurisdiction would comport with due process.

Accordingly, Judge Bloom (i) granted in part and denied in part
Ace's Motion as set forth, and (ii) granted Jiffy Lube's Motion.
Turizo was permitted to file a second amended complaint no later
than on Oct. 10, 2019.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Omnibus Order is
available at https://is.gd/2PCFaL from Leagle.com.

Blake Turizo, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas John Patti, III --
tom@jibraellaw.com -- Law Offices of Jibrael S. Hindi & Jibrael
Jarallah Said Hindi -- jibrael@jibraellaw.com -- The Law Offices of
Jibrael S. Hindi.

Jiffy Lube International, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brandon
T. White -- bwhite@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith, LLP, Daniel Alvarez
Sox -- dsox@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP & Edward Maurice
Mullins -- emullins@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP.

Atlantic Coast Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Ace Lube Centers, LLC,
Defendant, represented by Todd Alan Armbruster --
tarmbruster@mmsslaw.com -- Moskowitz Mandell Salim & Simowitz.


JUUL: Long Island Teen Files Class Suit Over Misleading E-Cig Ads
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Denney, writing for New York Post, reports that a Long
Island teen has filed a class action suit against e-cigarette maker
Juul, claiming the company used strategies from the traditional
tobacco industry to "manipulate" users to keep them hooked.

In a lawsuit filed on Oct. 1 in federal court in Central Islip,
19-year-old Shawn Hochhauser of Massapequa says he started smoking
Juul e-cigs when he was 15 years old--drawn to the company's
mango-flavored variety.

But, he claims, he didn't know the product was addictive and
contained high levels of nicotine and, before he learned of the
adverse health effects, he was smoking one or two Juul pods a day.

Now, Hochhauser claims, he suffers from shortness of breath, chest
pain and increased mucus production.

Hochhauser accused Juul of employing marketing campaigns that
associated vaping with "love, attractiveness, sexuality,
popularity, parties, social events, celebrity and being cool."

The company's practices have led to an "epidemic of individuals
addicted to e-cigarettes and vaping, to their severe detriment,"
Hochhauser charges in the lawsuit.

Conventional tobacco producers Altria and Philip Morris, which own
a 35 percent stake in Juul, are also named as defendants in the
lawsuit.

Hochhauser's suit is one of several filed against the vape-maker.

In recent weeks, two Manhattan parents sued the company alleging it
got their teen hooked on nicotine.

A New Jersey man who bought e-cigarettes for his son when he was
just 14 years old also filed a class action suit against Juul in
September, the Star-Ledger reported.

The suits come amid a national crisis that has seen more than a
dozen people die and hundreds more fall sick from vaping-related
illnesses.

Juul announced that its CEO is stepping down and that it was
ceasing all of its advertising.

A spokesman for Juul said the case was without merit.

"JUUL Labs is committed to eliminating combustible cigarettes, the
number one cause of preventable death in the world," the rep said.

"Our product has always only been intended to be a viable
alternative for the one billion current adult smokers in the world.
We have never marketed to youth and do not want any non-nicotine
users to try our products." [GN]


JZANUS LTD: Appel Files Class Suit under FDCPA
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jzanus Ltd. The case
is styled as Chaya Appel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Jzanus Ltd., Defendant, Case No.
7:19-cv-09520 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Jzanus LTD is a debt collection agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com




LIBERTY POWER: Court Allows TCPA Class Action to Proceed
--------------------------------------------------------
Melanie A. Conroy, Esq. -- mconroy@pierceatwood.com --
of Pierce Atwood LLP, in an article for The National Law Review,
reports that on September 24, 2019, the District of Massachusetts
held in Katz v. Liberty Power Corp., LLC that the government debt
collection exemption to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. Secs. 227 et seq., is an unconstitutional
violation of the First Amendment. No. 18-cv-10506-ADB, 2019 WL
4645524 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 2019). Following the U.S. Circuit
Courts for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, Judge Burroughs concluded
that the exemption to the statute could not survive constitutional
scrutiny, but otherwise permitted the plaintiffs' TCPA class action
claims, which did not implicate the exemption, to go forward.

Defendants Sought Dismissal of the TCPA Class Claims by Challenging
the Constitutionality of the Government Debt Exemption

In their class action complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that
Liberty Power Corp., LLC and its holding company ("Liberty Power")
placed prohibited pre-recorded calls to cell phones in disregard of
the national Do Not Call Registry and specific do-not-call
requests. In defense of those class claims, on a motion to dismiss,
Liberty Power challenged the constitutionality of a TCPA provision
that did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims but that nonetheless,
it argued, rendered the statute unenforceable. Specifically,
Liberty Power focused on an exemption in the TCPA that permits
calls with autodialers for the purpose of collecting government
debt, calls that would otherwise violate the statute. The
government debt exemption was added to the 1991 statute by
amendment in 2015 to permit calls made solely to collect a debt
owed to or guaranteed by the United States. Liberty Power argued
that the exemption runs afoul of the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment because it unconstitutionally favors a certain type
of communication over others. Liberty Power argued that the TCPA's
exemption created content-based restrictions on speech, and
therefore should be reviewed under the standard of strict scrutiny,
which requires the government to prove that its restriction
furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest. On these constitutional arguments,
Liberty Power asked the Court to dismiss the plaintiffs' TCPA class
claims in their entirety.

The Court Agrees the Exemption is Unconstitutional, but Severs the
Statute and Declines to Dismiss the TCPA Class Claims
The District of Massachusetts agreed that the TCPA's
debt-collection exemption warranted strict scrutiny because an
exemption that turns on the "purpose(s) of the call and its subject
matter" is by definition content-based. Because the court was not
persuaded that the content-based restriction was crafted to address
a compelling government interest, and in fact "undercut" the
purpose of the TCPA, it concluded that the provision is
unconstitutional. However, in light of the TCPA's language
providing that the invalidity of any one provision shall not affect
the applicability of the remainder, the court joined the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits in holding that the debt-collection exemption of the
TCPA is severable. For that reason, the class claims in the case --
which did not relate to the exemption -- were held to be unaffected
by the court's ruling that the exemption is unconstitutional.
Therefore, Liberty Power's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' TCPA
class claims was denied. With its September 24th ruling, the
District of Massachusetts has joined a growing number of courts
that have held the government debt exemption to be unconstitutional
but have nonetheless permitted unrelated TCPA class claims to move
forward by severing the statute. [GN]


MDL 2672: Dismissal Bids in Volkswagen Clean Diesel Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted Volkswagen's Motion to Dismiss in IN
RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiffs are three car salespersons who, at various times
from 2010 to the present, have worked at Volkswagen dealerships in
California.  Their pay is almost entirely commission based: when
they sell a car, they get a percentage of the dealer's profits on
the sale.  An additional commission on each sale comes directly
from Volkswagen.  The remainder of their pay is bonus based.  If
they sell a target number of cars in a given month, for example,
the dealer pays them a bonus.  If their customer service ratings
meet a certain threshold, Volkswagen will award them a separate
bonus.

After the public learned in 2015 that Volkswagen, for the better
half of a decade, had installed defeat devices in its "clean
diesel" line of cars to mask unlawfully high emissions, there was a
measurable drop in the sale of new Volkswagen cars.  Consumers were
shocked by the blatancy and scale of the fraud and became less
interested in the brand.  The decline in demand for Volkswagen cars
in turn meant that the Plaintiffs made less money.

Seeking to recover that lost income, the Plaintiffs filed the
action.  Styled as a proposed class action, they sought to
represent Volkswagen salespersons nationwide.  They have named as
Defendants Volkswagen AG ("VWAG"), Volkswagen Group of America,
Inc. ("VWGoA"), Audi AG, Martin Winterkorn and Matthias Muller
(former CEOs of VWAG), Rupert Stadler (former CEO of Audi AG),
Bosch GmbH and Bosch LLC (electronics companies that partnered with
Volkswagen), and Volkmar Denner (Bosch GmbH's CEO).  They also
named Porsche AG as a Defendant but later agreed to dismiss all
claims against Porsche AG.

The causes of action are for breach of contract, negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage, fraud, and
violation of RICO.  Four motions to dismiss have been filed: one by
VWAG, VWGoA and Audi AG ("VW"), one by Bosch GmbH and Bosch LLC,
one by Martin Winterkorn, and one by Rupert Stadler.

VW first argued that the claims against it should be dismissed
because those claims were released as part of the class settlement
that the company reached with its authorized franchise dealers.  VW
contended that under the plain terms of that agreement, the
Plaintiffs are among the "Releasing Parties" and their claims fall
within the scope of the "Released Claims."

The District Court notes that there is a distinction between the
Plaintiffs and the dealerships at which they worked.  The
Plaintiffs' claims are based in part on the relationships that they
had with VW as VW salespersons.  Those relationships are separate
and apart from the relationships that VW had with its franchise
dealers.  The Plaintiffs are not bringing their claims "by,
through, or under" Dealer Settlement Class Members.  This means the
Plaintiffs are not Releasing Parties and that the settlement does
not foreclose their claims.

Turning to the claims themselves, the first cause of action is for
breach of contract and is against VWAG and VWGoA.  A breach of
contract claim has four elements: (1) the existence of a contract;
(2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for non-performance; (3)
defendant's breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the
breach.

Judge Breyer holds that the contract claim against VWAG does not
satisfy the first of these elements, and the contract claim against
VWGoA does not satisfy the third of these elements.  With respect
to VWAG, the complaint makes no mention of any agreements between
Plaintiffs and VWAG.  With no allegations supporting the existence
of a contract, a necessary element of the claim is missing.  The
Plaintiffs have thus failed to state a breach of contract claim
against VWAG.  

As for the contract claim against VWGoA, Judge Breyer finds that
the Plaintiffs have identified agreements that they entered into
with VWGoA, but they have not adequately alleged that VWGoA
breached those agreements.  It was in VWGoA's best interests that
the Plaintiffs would sell more Volkswagen cars; and from the
allegations, there is no reason to believe that VWGoA sought to (or
did) interfere with the Plaintiffs ability to sell those cars.  The
allegations do not support the Plaintiffs' breach of contract
claims against VWAG and VWGoA.  VW's motion to dismiss these claims
is granted and the claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs' second cause of action, which they bring against
all the Defendants, is for negligent interference with prospective
economic advantage.  The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have
not satisfied the particularity requirement, and the Judge agrees.
Because the complaint does not identify with particularity the
relationships that the Defendants interfered with, the Plaintiffs'
negligent interference claim is inadequately pled.  The Defendants'
motions to dismiss the claim are granted and the claim is dismissed
with leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs' third cause of action, which is brought against all
the Defendants, is for common law fraud.  The Defendants argue that
the Plaintiffs' fraud allegations do not satisfy Rule 9(b).  Judge
Breyer agrees.  He finds that the allegations fall short of Rule
9(b) in several ways.  First, the Plaintiffs have not identified
the time and place of Volkswagen's representations to them.
Second, the Plaintiffs have not adequately identified the parties
to the representations.  Third, the Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged that the individual Defendants knew that
Volkswagen's diesel cars were "defective, non-EPA-compliant,
unsafe, and unreliable."  Finally, the Plaintiffs'
fraud-by-omission theory also falls short of the Rule 9(b)
standard.  Hence, the Plaintiffs' fraud cause of action is not
adequately pled.  The Defendants' motions to dismiss the fraud
claim are granted and the claim is dismissed with leave to amend.

The Plaintiffs' final cause of action is for violation of RICO.
They bring the claim against each Defendant except VWGoA, referring
to the Defendants minus VWGoA as the "RICO Defendants."  In moving
to dismiss the RICO claim, the Defendants argue that the
allegations fail to satisfy Rule 9(b), do not meet RICO's proximate
cause standard, and do not support an injury to "business or
property," as needed for RICO standing.

Judge Breyer finds that the RICO cause of action does not satisfy
Rule 9(b).  To the extent that the Plaintiffs seek to base the
claim on representations that were made to them, those
representations are not described with any specificity.  At no
point in the complaint do the Plaintiffs identify any particular
representations that the RICO Defendants made to them or to other
VW salespersons.  The pleading of this theory falls far short Rule
9(b), which requires the Plaintiffs to identify "the time, place,
and specific content of the false representations as well as the
identities of the parties to the misrepresentation."

Stadler has also moved to dismiss the claims against him under Rule
12(b)(5), based on insufficient service of process.  There is no
dispute that the Plaintiffs did not serve Stadler with the
operative, consolidated complaint.  The Judge therefore grants
Stadler's motion.

Stadler and Winterkorn have also moved to dismiss the claims
against them under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Contemplating that the Court might grant the Rule 12(b)(2)
motions, the Plaintiffs have asked for leave to conduct
jurisdictional discovery.

Prior to discovery, other plaintiffs in the MDL have managed to
provide more detail about Winterkorn's involvement in the diesel
scandal.  And indeed, on more than one occasion, the Court has held
that it has personal jurisdiction over Winterkorn.  Because other
plaintiffs were able to establish personal jurisdiction over
Winterkorn without jurisdictional discovery, the Plaintiffs should
be able to do so too.  As for Stadler, the Judge holds that the
Plaintiffs' claims against him are based only on generalities.
More is needed to support jurisdictional discovery.  For these
reasons, the District Court denies the Plaintiffs' request for
jurisdictional discovery.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Breyer grants the Defendants' motions
to dismiss the complaint.  If the Plaintiffs choose to amend their
complaint, they must do so within 45 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/hb4dIl from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rcarey@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro
-- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro ,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Nicholas Allen, Daniel Carroll, Giancarlo Ceci, Dominic Troffer,
Paul Linnee, Sarah Hayden, Dario Medina, Shanice Boyette, Isaac
Hoover, John Mazur & Forrest Tinsler, Plaintiffs, represented by
Caleb Marker --  caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP,
pro hac vice & Charles S. Zimmerman -- csz@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague, Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com
-- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang, Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer ,
Conrad and Scherer, LLP633 South Federal Highway, Eighth Floor,
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301.


MDL 2819: Certification of Restasis Direct Purchaser Class Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit re: RESTASIS (CYCLOSPORINE OPHTHALMIC
EMULSION) ANTITRUST LITIGATION (MDL No. 2819), Case No. 18-MD-2819
(NG) (LB), (E.D.N.Y.), the Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs will
move the Court on a date and time to be determined by the Court for
an Order:

   1. certifying Class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the
      Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

      "all persons who, or entities which, purchased Restasis in
      the United States or its territories and possessions
      directly from Allergan at any time after May 2014 through
      and until the anticompetitive effects of Allergan's conduct
      cease". Excluded from the Direct Purchaser Class are
      Allergan and its officer, directors, management, employees,
      subsidiaries, or affiliates, and all governmental entities.;

   2. appointing FWK Holdings, LLC, Rochester Drug Co-Operative,
      Inc., KPH Healthcare Services, Inc. a/k/a Kinney Drugs,
      Inc., as Class Representatives;

   3. appointing current interim lead/liaison class counsel Hagens

      Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as lead/liaison counsel for the
      direct purchaser class and appointing the following as the
      executive committee for the direct purchaser class:
      BergerMontague PC, Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, Kaplan Fox &
      Kilsheimer, LLP, Nastlaw LLC, Nussbaum Law Group, PC, Radice

      Law Firm, P.C., Roberts Law Firm, P.A., Taus, Cebulash &
      Landau, LLP, and Vanek Vickers & Masini, P.C.;

   4. granting such other relief as the Court deems just.[CC]

Direct Purchaser Interim Co-Lead Counsel are:

          Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
          David S. Nalven, Esq.
          Kristen A. Johnson, Esq.
          Jessica MacAuley, Esq.
          Hannah W. Brennan, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301
          Cambridge, MA 02142
          Telephone: (617) 482-3700
          Facsimile: (617) 482-3003
          E-mail: tom@hbsslaw.com
                  davidn@hbsslaw.com
                  kristenj@hbsslaw.com
                  jessicam@hbsslaw.com
                  hannahb@hbsslaw.com

Counsel for FWK Holdings, LLC and the Proposed Class are:

          Calvin Capshaw, Esq.
          Elizabeth DeRieux, Esq.
          CAPSHAW DERIEUX, LLP
          114 E. Commerce Ave.
          Gladewater, TX 75647
          Telephone: (903) 845-5770
          E-mail: ccapshaw@capshawlaw.com
                  ederieux@capshawlaw.com

               - and -

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          Bart Cohen, Esq.
          Hugh Sandler, Esq.
          Peter Moran, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40 th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9102
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
                  bcohen@nussbaumpc.com
                  pmoran@nussbaumpc.com
                  hsandler@nussbaumpc.com

               - and -

          Robert N. Kaplan, Esq.
          Gregory K. Arenson, Esq.
          Elana Katcher, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER, LLP
          850 Third Avenue, 14 th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 687-1980
          E-mail: rkaplan@kaplanfox.com
                  garenson@kaplanfox.com
                  ekatcher@kaplanfox.com

               - and -

          John D. Radice, Esq.
          A. Luke Smith, Esq.
          RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
          475 Wall Street
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (646) 245-8502
          Facsimile: (609) 385-0745
          E-mail: jradice@radicelawfirm.com
                  lsmith@radicelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Paul E. Slater, Esq.
          Joseph M. Vanek, Esq
          David P. Germaine, Esq
          John P. Bjork, Esq
          SPERLING & SLATER, P.C.
          55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3200
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 641-3200
          Facsimile: (312) 641-6492
          E-mail: pes@sperling-law.com
                  jvanek@sperling-law.com
                  dgermaine@sperling-law.com
                  jbjork@sperling-law.com

               - and -

          John D. Radice, Esq.
          A. Luke Smith, Esq.
          RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
          475 Wall Street
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (646) 245-8502
          Facsimile: (609) 385-0745
          E-mail: jradice@radicelawfirm.com
                  lsmith@radicelawfirm.com

Counsel for Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. and the Proposed
Class are:

          Daniel J. Walker, Esq.
          David F. Sorensen, Esq.
          Ellen T. Noteware, Esq.
          Nicholas Urban, Esq.
          BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.
          2001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 300
          Washington, D.C. 20006
          Telephone: (202) 559-9745
          Facsimile: (215) 875-5707
          E-mail: dwalker@bm.net
                  dsorensen@bm.net
                  enoteware@bm.net
                  nurban@bm.net

               - and -

          Peter R. Kohn, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          One Penn Center, Suite 1550
          1617 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 277-5770
          Facsimile: (215) 277-5771
          E-mail: pkohn@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Bradley J. Demuth, Esq.
          Kristyn Fields, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: bdemuth@faruqilaw.com
                  kfields@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Barry Taus, Esq.
          Miles Greaves, Esq.
          TAUS, CELUBASH & LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (646) 87307654
          Facsimile: (212) 931-0703
          E-mail: btaus@tcllaw.com
                  mgreaves@tcllaw.com

Counsel for KPH Healthcare Services, Inc. a/k/a Kinney Drugs, Inc.
and the Proposed Class are:

          Michael L. Roberts, Esq.
          Debra G. Josephson, Esq.
          Karen S. Halbert, Esq.
          Stephanie E. Smith, Esq.
          ROBERTS LAW FIRM, P.A.
          20 Rahling Circle
          Little Rock, AR 72223
          Telephone: (501) 821-5575
          Facsimile: (501) 821-4474
          E-mail: mikeroberts@robertslawfirm.us
                  debrajosephson@robertslawfirm.us
                  karenhalbert@robertslawfirm.us
                  stephaniesmith@robertslawfirm.us

               - and -

          Dianne M. Nast, Esq.
          Erin Burns, Esq.
          NASTLAW LLC, Esq.
          1101 Market Street, suite 2801
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 923-9300
          Facsimile: (215) 923-9302
          E-mail: dnast@nastlaw.com
                  eburns@nastlaw.com

MDL 2879: Simon Appeals Ruling in Data Breach Suit to 4th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Aryeh Simon and Sassya Simon took an appeal from a Court
ruling issued in their lawsuit styled Aryeh Simon, et al. v.
Marriott International, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 8:19-md-02879-PWG
and 8:19-cv-01792-PWG, pending in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland at Greenbelt.

The appellate case is captioned as Aryeh Simon, et al. v. Marriott
International, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-385, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, this lawsuit
was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut under Case No. 3:19-cv-00873, and was transferred to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on June 27,
2019, and assigned Case No. 8:19-cv-01792-PWG.

The Plaintiffs allege violation of customers' privacy rights.

The Simon case was consolidated with MDL No. 2879 in re: Marriott
International, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation.  The
MDL was created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6, 2019.  These actions--which are
putative nationwide and/or statewide consumer class actions--share
factual issues concerning a recently-disclosed breach of Marriott's
Starwood guest reservation database from 2014 to 2018.  In its Feb.
6, 2019 Order, the MDL Panel found that the factual overlap among
these actions is substantial, as they all arise from the same data
breach, and they all allege that Marriott failed to put in to place
reasonable data protections.  Many also allege that Marriott did
not timely notify the public of the data breach. Centralization
will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings on class certification and other issues, and conserve the
resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.
Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge. Paul W. Grimm. The lead
case is 8:19-md-02879-PWG.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners ARYEH SIMON and SASSYA SIMON, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Tillman J. Breckenridge, Esq.
          Andrew John Pecoraro, Esq.
          PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
          601 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 759-6925
          E-mail: tjb@piercebainbridge.com
                  apecoraro@piercebainbridge.com

               - and -

          Theodore J. Folkman, Esq.
          PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
          One Liberty Square
          Boston, MA 02019
          Telephone: (617) 313-7401
          E-mail: tfolkman@piercebainbridge.com

               - and -

          William L. Geraci, Esq.
          Claiborne R. Hane, Esq.
          PIERCE BAINBRIDGE BECK PRICE & HECHT LLP
          227 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10172
          Telephone: (212) 484-9866
          E-mail: wgeraci@piercebainbridge.com
                  chane@piercebainbridge.com

Defendants-Respondents MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,
STARWOOD HOTELS & RESORTS WORLDWIDE LLC and ARNE SORENSON are
represented by:

          Lisa M. Ghannoum, Esq.
          Daniel R. Warren, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP
          Key Tower
          127 Public Square
          Cleveland, OH 44114-1214
          Telephone: (216) 861-7872
          E-mail: lghannoum@bakerlaw.com
                  dwarren@bakerlaw.com

               - and -

          Gilbert S. Keteltas, Esq.
          BAKER & HOSTETLER, LLP
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20036-0000
          Telephone: (202) 861-1530
          E-mail: gketeltas@bakerlaw.com


MEDRISK LLC: Neighborhood Neuropathy Sues Over Unsolicited Fax
--------------------------------------------------------------
NEIGHBORHOOD NEUROPATHY CENTER OF RENO LLC, individually and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v.
MEDRISK, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-01754 (D. Nev., Oct. 9, 2019) is a Class Action
Complaint against Defendant seeking to stop Defendant's practice of
sending unsolicited fax advertisements, and to obtain redress for
all similarly situated persons.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the
Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 and the regulations promulgated
under the Act, prohibit a person or entity from faxing or having an
agent fax advertisements without the recipient's prior express
consent, invitation, and permission. Between February 2019 and July
2019, Defendant transmitted by telephone facsimile machine at least
9 unsolicited faxes to Plaintiff.  Plaintiff has never invited nor
given permission to Defendant to send the faxes nor did Plaintiff
have any prior relationship with Defendant at the time the faxes
were sent or otherwise. Further, Defendant's facsimile did not
display any opt-out notice as required by the TCPA. Accordingly,
neither Plaintiff nor the class members had any means to put an end
to the receipt of future faxes, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Neighborhood Neuropathy Center of Reno LLC is a limited
liability company organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Nevada with its principal place of business located at
1475 Terminal Way, Unit C-2, Reno, Nevada 89502.

MedRisk, LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Marc P. Cook, Esq.
     COOK & KELESIS, LTD.
     517 S. 9th St.
     Las Vegas, NV 89101
     Phone: (702) 737-7702
     Fax: (702) 737-7712
     Email: law@bckltd.com


MICHIGAN: DOC Seeks Review of Ruling in Inmates' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Defendants Department of Corrections, et al., filed an appeal from
a ruling issued by the Washtenaw Circuit Court in the lawsuit
entitled JOHN DOES 11-18, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et
al., Case No. 13-001196-CZ.

The appellate case is styled JOHN DOES 11-18, et al. v. DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Case No. 350679, in the Michigan Court of
Appeals.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Department
of Corrections, et al., also appealed from a ruling in the lawsuit.
That appellate case is entitled JOHN DOES 11-18, et al. v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Case No. 349073.

The Plaintiffs, who are/were inmates, previously took an appeal to
the Michigan Supreme Court from the ruling by the Michigan Court of
Appeals in their lawsuit against the State's Department of
Corrections, et al.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees JOHN DOES 11-18 & JANE DOE 1/ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED are represented by:

          Deborah A. LaBelle, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF DEBORAH A. LABELLE
          221 North Main Street, Suite 300
          Ann Arbor, MI 48104
          Telephone: (734) 996-5620
          Facsimile: (734) 769-2196

Defendants-Appellants DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., are
represented by:

          Heather S. Meingast, Esq.
          STATE OF MICHIGAN, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          G. Mennen Williams Building, 7th Floor
          525 W. Ottawa St.
          P.O. Box 30212
          Lansing, MI 48909
          Telephone: (517) 335-7622
          E-mail: meingasth@michigan.gov


MICHIGAN: Miles Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit v. DOC
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Michigan Department
of Corrections. The case is styled as Kushawn S. Miles #237011
named as Kushawn Miles-El, on behalf of himself and other
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Michigan Department of
Corrections, Heidi Washington, Director, Robert Napel, Assistant
Deputy Director, Chippewa Correctional Facility and Connie Horton,
Warden, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00205-PLM-MV (W.D. Mich., Oct.
16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Prisoner:
Prison Condition filed pursuant to the Prisoner Civil Rights.

The Michigan Department of Corrections oversees prisons and the
parole and probation population in the state of Michigan, United
States. It has 31 prison facilities, and a Special Alternative
Incarceration program, together composing approximately 41,000
prisoners.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



MID CENTRAL EDUCATIONAL: Supreme Ct. Hears Argument in Gear Up Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Angela Kennecke, writing for KELOLAND News, reports that two
college students representing nearly 7,000 Native American students
want someone to be held accountable in the GEAR UP Scandal.

KELOLAND News investigation found that despite tens of millions of
dollars spent on the college readiness program, no data was kept to
show it resulted in a single student going to college.

Alyssa Black Bear was a student at Todd County High School where
GEAR Up was supposed to be administered.

Kelsey Walking Eagle-Espinosa attended the summer GEAR UP program
when it was held at the School of Mines.

Both young women actually did end up in college, but say it was not
due to GEAR UP.

Walking Eagle Espinosa's mother told KELOLAND Investigates in
2015:

"All the Native American children that didn't benefit anything from
it. And we're not thinking just hundreds of dollars - we're
thinking millions of dollars that probably could have put a lot of
our Native American children into colleges across the state," Starr
Walking Eagle said.

The young women's lawsuit went after the now-defunct Mid Central
Educational Cooperative, its leaders and board. The American Indian
Institute for Innovation, formerly led by Stacy Phelps and the
estates of Scott and Nicole Westerhuis, are also listed in the
lawsuit.

Circuit Court Judge Bruce Anderson however ruled that federal law
doesn't allow students to sue for breach of contract or malfeasance
because the GEAR UP grant fell under the Higher Education Act.

"We are not claiming that the students claims arise under the
higher education act," students' attorney John Hinrichs said.

Chief Justice Gilbertson: I guess theoretically you could have the
federal government seeking their money back. The state might be on
the hook and seek their money back; now your clients.  You could
potentially have three different parties seeking the dollars.

Hinrichs: That's correct.

Mid Central Attorney Ryland Deinert pointed to an audit
commissioned by the educational cooperative following the scandal.

"From 2013 to 2015 with their audit, Eide Bailly found that no GEAR
UP funds were missing," Deinert said.

But as KELOLAND Investigates first reported, that audit did not
show how the money was spent.

Justice Patricia DeVaney: Wasn't the response to that though, it
didn't take into account how the flow of dollars actually went?
That there were certain amounts advanced each month?

Deinert: There was $50,000 was the automatic fund advanced each
month.

"We have an effort by Mr. Westerhuis and Mr. Phelps to shield AIII
from an audit, from both the state and federal government so that
whatever is occurring at that level cannot be investigated or
detected," Hinrichs said.

"There are wild allegations there were hotels and things like that.
But the South Dakota Department of Education and the U.S.
Department of Education allowed that. There's no finding of that at
all. We have innuendo of this inappropriate spending," Deinert
said.

In 2016, KELOLAND Investigates reported the State Division of
Criminal investigation had evidence Phelps spent some $240,000 in
federal grant money living the high life and that he and Scott
Westerhuis worked together to hide that spending from authorities.

"The people who were responsible for reporting those expenditures
and documenting those expenditures up the chain to the South Dakota
Department of Education are the very people who are implicated in
the wrong doing," Hinrichs said.

"To this day, we have seen no evidence that any GEAR UP funds were
actually improperly utilized or stolen, or used. Admittedly,
according to Auditor General Guindon, $1.3 million was stolen from
Mid Central. But that was their own funds. It wasn't GEAR UP
funds," Deinert said.

In the criminal cases, juries acquitted both Stacy Phelps of AIII
and Stephanie Hubers of Mid Central.

Former Mid Central Director Dan Guericke pled guilty to backdating
contracts.

The South Dakota Supreme Court will make the decision on whether
the students' civil lawsuit can proceed in state court at a later
date. [GN]


MODEL SERVICE: Order on Agerbrink Misclassification Claims Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVA AGERBRINK, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant,
v. MODEL SERVICE LLC d/b/a MSA MODELS, SUSAN LEVINE, WILLIAM IVERS,
Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees, Case No. 18-1471 (2d Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the
judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the question of whether Agerbrink was misclassified as an
independent contractor, rather than an employee, for purposes of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the New York Labor Law
("NYLL").

Agerbrink is a fit model.  Fit models do not pose for advertising
campaigns or walk in runway shows -- the work one might associate
with a fashion model.  Instead, fit models are hired based on their
body proportions: clothing designers and apparel companies rely on
fit models to test the fit of their designs.  Model Service, also
known as MSA Models, is a model "management" company.  Susan Levine
is MSA Models' President and Chief Executive and William Ivers is
Chief Operating Officer.

On March 5, 2013, Agerbrink signed a three-year "management
agreement" with MSA.  MSA helped Agerbrink "book" work by acting as
a match-maker between Agerbrink and apparel companies seeking
models with her dimensions.  Generally, an apparel company would
contact MSA when it needed a model, and, if Agerbrink fit the
description, MSA would schedule her for an initial meeting with
that company.  If a company decided to engage Agerbrink for more
appointments, it would contact MSA directly.  Similarly, if a
company decided it no longer wanted to work with Agerbrink, it
would communicate that decision to MSA, rather than to Agerbrink.
The reverse was also true: if Agerbrink no longer wanted to work
with an apparel company, she would inform MSA who, in turn, would
relay that information to the company.

As part of its exclusive management of Agerbrink's career, MSA
collected payments for Agerbrink's modeling work directly from
apparel companies.  After taking its commission, usually 20%, MSA
would then pay Agerbrink.  Agerbrink's contract with MSA noted that
she was to consult with MSA regarding compensation or compensation
rates.  MSA also managed Agerbrink's schedule.  This management
included: setting her appointment schedule for the work week ahead,
emailing Agerbrink her daily schedule a day in advance, and
communicating directly with an apparel company if Agerbrink was
running late to an appointment.

Agerbrink asserts that MSA had near full control over her schedule.
She asserts that MSA controlled all aspects of her pay and that
she was not free to directly negotiate her own hourly rate.

Agerbrink and MSA ended their relationship after Agerbrink was
hired by an apparel company for an "in-house" position in June
2014.  Agerbrink applied for that job directly, without going
through MSA.  The position involved fit modeling and office
administrative work.  When MSA found out that Agerbrink had been
offered the position, it informed her that accepting the position
would be a breach of her agreement with MSA.  MSA threatened legal
action but noted it would be willing to not pursue such action if
Agerbrink, among other things, agreed to allow MSA to retain the
nearly $18,000 of her wages it was holding, and instructed her new
employer to remit twenty percent of her salary to MSA.

Agerbrink commenced the lawsuit, originally filed as a putative
class action, against MSA on Sept. 26, 2014, asserting claims under
the FLSA and the NYLL, as well as a claim for unjust enrichment.
On March 14, 2018, the district court granted MSA's motion for
summary judgment on the question of whether Agerbrink was MSA's
employee for purposes of the FLSA and the NYLL.  It also granted
Agerbrink's motion for summary judgment on defendants' tortious
interference claim and her motion for summary judgment as to
initial damages on her unjust enrichment claim for withheld
earnings (having previously granted summary judgment for Agerbrink
on her unjust enrichment claim).  The district court denied
Agerbrink's motion for partial summary judgment on the Defendants'
breach of contract counterclaim.

On April 12, 2018, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss their
remaining claims with prejudice.  Judgment was entered on April 30,
2018.  The appeal, on the misclassification issue alone, followed.

As the district court properly noted, the Second Circuit concludes
that the independence to determine Agerbrink's schedule and income
are key inquiries to determining "whether, as a matter of economic
reality" Agerbrink "depended upon" MSA's "business for the
opportunity to render service" or was "in business for" herself.
These are material facts. They are in dispute.  As such, summary
judgment was not proper on the question of whether Agerbrink was an
employee under the FLSA.  Similarly, Agerbrink was not entitled to
summary judgment on that same question.

For the foregoing reasons, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment
of the district court and remanded the case for trial on the
misclassification claims.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit Sept. 24, 2019 Summary Order
is available at https://is.gd/dGnS13 from Leagle.com.

CYRUS E. DUGGER -- cd@duggerlawfirm.com -- The Dugger Law Firm,
PLLC, New York, NY, for Appellant.

EVAN J. SPELFOGEL -- espelfogel@ebglaw.com -- Phillips Nizer LLP,
New York, NY; Matthew S. Aibel -- maibel@ebglaw.com -- Jeffrey H.
Ruzal (on the brief) -- rgreen@ebglaw.com -- Epstein Becker &
Green, P.C., New York, NY, for Appellees.


MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS: Class in Nashville Hosp. Suit Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THE HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, d/b/a NASHVILLE GENERAL
HOSPITAL and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES DISTRICT COUNCIL 37 HEALTH & SECURITY PLAN, Plaintiffs,
v. MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. and SANDOZ INC., Defendants, Case
No. 3:15-cv-01100 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
Nashville Division, (i) denied the Defendants' Motion to Exclude
the Report and Opinions of Plaintiffs Expert Dr. Russell L. Lamb,
and (ii) granted the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class
Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel.

Plaintiff Nashville General Hospital (NGH) is a metropolitan
charity hospital that purchases certain drugs it administers,
including the generic anticoagulant enoxaparin.  Plaintiff American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees District
Council 37 Health & Security Plan is a non-profit health and
welfare benefit plan covering public sector employees, retirees and
their families.  The Plaintiffs allege that they have, and will
continue to, indirectly purchase or provide reimbursement for
Lovenox(R) and enoxaparin.

The drug at issue, enoxaparin, is used in the prevention and
treatment of deep vein thrombosis and in the treatment of heart
attacks.  Sanofi-Aventis, a non-party to the lawsuit, brought
enoxaparin to market in the United States under the brand name
Lovenox(R) and held a patent on the drug, which was subsequently
held to be unenforceable in 2007.

Defendant Momenta Pharmaceuticals is the assignee of a patent ("886
Patent") for a chemical process used to test the quality of
enoxaparin ("Method").   In 2003, Momenta entered into a
collaboration agreement with Sandoz, whereby Sandoz eventually
began manufacturing and selling generic enoxaparin. The
Collaboration Agreement provided for profit-sharing between Momenta
and Sandoz regarding Sandoz's sales of its generic enoxaparin, so
long as Defendants remained the sole source of generic enoxaparin
in the United States.

In December 2009, the United States Pharmacopeial Convention
("USP") approved and adopted Method as the standardized test to
assure enoxaparin quality, and the 886 Patent was issued shortly
thereafter.  The Plaintiffs allege that had the Defendants
disclosed their own application for the 886 Patent, the USP would
have either required Momenta to abandon its patent rights, as it
did with Aventis, or chosen an alternative test that would not have
been subject to patent protection.  The Defendants became the first
entities authorized by the FDA to produce generic enoxaparin.

In its initial complaint dated Oct. 14, 2015, NGH alleged against
the Defendants four separate counts under the Sherman Antitrust
Act.  NGH sought damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief.  NGH brought its claims on behalf of itself and a
nationwide class of persons and entities, pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b).  The
alleged Sherman Act violations centered on the role that the
Defendants played in a conspiracy to monopolize the production and
distribution of enoxaparin, a generic version of the drug
Lovenox(R).

In response to the complaint, the Defendants filed a Motion to
Transfer the case to the District of Massachusetts and a Motion to
Dismiss.  Momenta additionally filed a separate Motion to Dismiss
or Transfer for Improper Venue.  On Sept. 29, 2016, Magistrate
Judge Barbara Holmes entered a Report and Recommendation
recommending that the motions be denied.  The Defendants filed
joint and separate objections to the Report and Recommendation.

On March 21, 2017, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion that
adopted in part and declined to adopt in part the Report and
Recommendation.  The Court dismissed NGH's Sherman Act claims on
the ground that NGH did not have standing to seek damages under the
"indirect purchaser rule."  However, NGH's Sherman Act claims were
permitted to proceed on declaratory and injunctive theories of
relief.

Thereafter, NGH filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint.  The amended complaint contained three primary changes:
(1) the addition of DC 37 as a new representative plaintiff; (2)
the addition of various state antitrust and consumer protection
claims; and (3) the addition of new substantive allegations
pertaining to the Defendants' alleged anticompetitive conduct.  The
Defendants filed a response in opposition.  Ultimately, Magistrate
Judge Holmes granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an
amended complaint, and the Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint
on Dec. 21, 2017.

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs asserted that the
Defendants' alleged anti-competitive activity violates numerous
states' antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment
laws.

The Defendants then filed three Motions to Dismiss under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and (12)(b)(6).  The
Court granted Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, denied the Rule
12(b)(2) motion, and granted in part and denied in part the
12(b)(6) motion.  The net result of these rulings was that the
Plaintiffs' federal Sherman Act claims were dismissed but the
majority of their state law antitrust claims were allowed to
proceed.  The Defendants filed two Motions for Reconsideration of
the Court's Rule 12(b)(2) ruling, both of which were denied.

The parties then proceeded to the class certification phase.  After
the Plaintiffs' initial Motion for Class Certification was fully
briefed, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was
necessary and set the hearing for May 13, 2019.  At the conclusion
of the first day of the evidentiary hearing, the Court inquired
into the Plaintiffs' objective criteria for identifying members of
the class.  

In response to this line of inquiry, the Plaintiffs returned the
next day with an amended class definition that contained
substantial changes.  In light of this development, the Court
continued the evidentiary hearing, denied the Plaintiffs' initial
Motion for Class Certification as moot, and allowed them leave to
file a Motion to Amend the Class Definition.  The Plaintiffs filed
their Motion to Amend the Class Definition, which the Court
granted.  The parties then briefed the new class definition, the
Court held another evidentiary hearing.  The Defendants also filed
their Motion to Exclude the Report and Opinions of Plaintiffs
Expert Dr. Russell L. Lamb.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class:
Hospitals, third-party payors, and people without insurance who
indirectly purchased, paid for, and/or reimbursed some or all of
the purchase price for, generic enoxaparin or Lovenox(R), in
Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin, from Sept. 21, 2011, through Sept. 30, 2015 (the Damages
Class Period), for the purpose of personal consumption by
themselves, their families, or their members, employees, insureds,
participants, patients, beneficiaries or anyone else. With respect
to third-party payors and people without insurance, the Damages
Class only includes those, described above, who purchased, paid
for, and/or reimbursed some or all of the purchase price for,
generic enoxaparin or Lovenox(R) from a pharmacy.

Judge Crenshaw finds that the Rule 23(a)'s requirements are
satisfied.  He now examines the Rule 23(b) predominance factor in
terms of both the non-retail/hospital chain and the retail chain.
He then turns to an analysis of class-wide damages, thePlaintiffs'
standing to pursue out of state claims, and the superiority
inquiry.

In support of their assertion that the Defendants' antitrust
conspiracy resulted in higher prices for enoxaparin and these
overcharges were passed down the supply chain, the Plaintiffs
primarily rely on Dr. Lamb's expert reports and testimony.  Dr.
Lamb uses a method known as "backcasting."  Dr. Lamb, in his
original expert report, estimated class-wide damages for indirect
purchasers to be around $298 million, but as a result of the
Plaintiffs amended class definition, he reduced the damages
estimate to approximately $234 million.

The Defendants do not take issue with Dr. Lamb's backcasting
analysis or the proposition that the alleged antitrust activity
resulted in higher generic enoxaparin prices, rather, they target
the second part of the analysis -- whether the initial overcharge
was passed through the retail and non-retail channels and whether
these overcharges can be proven through proof common to the class.

Judge Crenshaw believes that Dr. Lamb's opinion and testimony,
supported by economic literature and the IMS data, provides enough
evidence to demonstrate antitrust impact in the retail channel.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have established antitrust impact as to
both the retail and non-retail channels of their class definition,
and, therefore, the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is
satisfied, Judge Crenshaw says.

Judge Crenshaw also finds that the Plaintiffs' evidence has shown,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the vast majority of
non-retail/hospital class members were most likely injured, based
on how the generic enoxaparin supply chain is structured.
"Rigorous analysis" of the evidence does not show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the number of uninjured class
members is more than de minimis.  The Judge is well within his
discretion to find that the Plaintiffs have presented a sufficient
showing of common antitrust impact to the putative
non-retail/hosptial class. Defendants' speculation, built on the
back of an unreliable expert opinion, cannot defeat the Plaintiffs'
showing, the District Court notes.

Judge Crenshaw finds that as to the issue of class-wide damages,
the Plaintiffs, through Dr. Lamb, have presented a proper
methodology to measure class-wide damages.  Based on the above
analysis, the Judge is satisfied that an injury-in-fact impacted
the proposed class members.  As with all other issues in this case,
the parties disagree as to the quantum of damages.  However, at
this point, the Court need not provide any definitive answer to
this issue.  At bottom, Dr. Lamb has produced a viable,
methodologically sound opinion as to the calculation of damages,
and, at this stage, that is all that is required, the Court says.

Finally, the Defendants do not dispute that superiority is met.  In
the instant case, three of the four factors weigh in favor of a
certifying the case as a class action, the District Court notes.
First, the relatively small amount of individual damages and the
similarity of claims give class members little interest in
individually controlling separate actions.  Second, concentration
of these claims in the Court is desirable, as it will streamline
the resolution of the claims and conserve judicial and litigation
resources.  Finally, the Court is aware of no particular
difficulties associated with the management of this class action,
especially given the current stage of the litigation.  Thus, for
purposes of Rule 23(b)(3), a class action is superior to other
methods of adjudication in the instant case.  With that, the
Plaintiffs have carried their burden in establishing that their
proposed class should be certified under Rule 23(a)(1) and (b)(3)
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons stated, Judge Crenshaw (i) grants the Plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class
Counsel, and (ii) denies the Defendants' Motion to Exclude the
Report and Opinions of Plaintiffs Expert Dr. Russell L. Lamb.

NGH and DC 37 are appointed as the class representatives.

Lieff Cabraser is appointed as class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 20, 2019 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/ONquLz from Leagle.com.

The Hospital Authority of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County, Tennessee, doing business as Nashville General
Hospital, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gitlin -- agitlin@lchb.com
-- Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Andrew Richard
Kaufman, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Brendan P.
Glackin -- bglackin@lchb.com -- Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, Bruce W. Leppla, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann &
Bernstein, LLP, David T. Rudolph -- drudolph@lchb.com -- Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Dean M. Harvey, Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, John Tate Spragens , Spragens
Law PLC, Katherine C. Lubin, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein,
LLP, Mark P. Chalos -- mchalos@lchb.com -- Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann
& Bernstein, LLP & Michelle A. Lamy -- mlamy@lchb.com -- Lieff,
Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
District Council 37 Health & Security Plan, Plaintiff, represented
by Adam Gitlin, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Andrew
Richard Kaufman, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, David
T. Rudolph, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, John Tate
Spragens, Spragens Law PLC, Katherine C. Lubin, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Michelle A. Lamy, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP & Brendan P. Glackin, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Defendant, represented by Bradley D.
Justus -- bjustus@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP,
Brooke Jones Oppenheimer, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, Carmel
Rana Arikat -- carikat@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider,
LLP, Daniel K. Oakes, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, Jason T.
Murata -- jmurata@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP,
Jetta C. Sandin, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, Michael L. Keeley
-- mkeeley@axinn.com -- Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, Richard B.
Dagen, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, Robert Dale Grimes --
dgrimes@bassberry.com -- Bass, Berry & Sims, Thomas Rohback, Axinn,
Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP & Virginia M. Yetter --
vyetter@bassberry.com -- Bass, Berry & Sims.

Sandoz, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Hatchett, Alston &
Bird LLP, Anthony Thomas Greene, Alston & Bird LLP, Carmel Rana
Arikat, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, LLP, Jean E. Richmann, Alston &
Bird LLP, Kara F. Kennedy, Alston & Bird LLP, Liz Broadway Brown,
Alston & Bird LLP, Matthew Kent, Alston & Bird LLP, Michael P.
Kenny, Alston & Bird LLP, Nell G. Moley, Alston & Bird LLP, Teresa
T. Bonder, Alston & Bird LLP, Thomas Rohback, Axinn, Veltrop &
Harkrider, LLP & Timothy L. Warnock, Riley, Warnock & Jacobson.

Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, Interested Party, represented by Jeffrey
W. Melcher, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP.

Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interested Party, represented by
Joshua Mack, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.


OCWEN LOAN: Dismissal Bid in Andrade Suit Denied as Moot
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ARTUR and JULIA ANDRADE, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. OCWEN
LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al., Defendants, C.A. No. 18-385 WES (D.
R.I.), Judge William E. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Rhode Island (i) denied as moot the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint, and (ii) granted in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Class
Action Complaint solely as to the proposed Count II breach of
contract claim.

Before the District Court is Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond's
Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), recommending (i) the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot; and (ii) the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend solely as to breach of contract claim is granted in
part.  The Defendants objected to the R&R on several grounds.

Judge Smith evaluated the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend under the
same standard of review as a motion to dismiss.  In Count II of
their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that Ocwen was operating as
an unlicensed third-party loan servicer, in violation of the
Emergency Cease and Desist Order issued by the Rhode Island
Department of Business Regulation ("RIDBR"), at the time it
foreclosed on the Plaintiff's property.  

Judge Smith agrees with Magistrate Judge Almond that the Plaintiffs
state a plausible breach of contract claim, as it does not take a
leap of logic to conclude that a mortgagor who engages an
unlicensed loan servicer to effectuate a foreclosure is not acting
in a manner prescribed by applicable law.

In the Defendants' Objection, they continue to raise several
factual defenses, all centered on how to interpret the Emergency
Order and subsequent Consent Order issued by the RIDBR, and whether
the Defendants were in fact barred from operating as a third-party
mortgage servicer during the time period in question.  Judge Smith
says he cannot resolve these factual questions at this stage, where
the District Court must accept as true all plausible factual
allegations in the Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in
the Plaintiff's favor.

Accordingly, Judge Smith accepts the R&R and adopts its reasoning.


A full-text copy of Judge Smith's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/nKPTdW from Leagle.com.

Artur Andrade, On behalf of themselves and all other so similarly
situated & Julia Andrade, On behalf of themselves and all other so
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Todd S. Dion --
toddsdion@msn.com -- Law Office of Todd S. Dion Esq.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC & HSBC Bank USA, N.A., as Trustee for
Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-HL1, Defendants, represented
by
Samuel C. Bodurtha -- sbodurtha@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw &
Culbertson LLP & Ethan Z. Tieger -- etieger@hinshawlaw.com --
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.


PEPSICO INC: District Court Dismisses DuBuske ERISA Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint captioned WILLIAM
DuBUSKE, MICHAEL DUCHAINE, and GARY MAYNARD, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
PEPSICO, INC., THE EMPLOYEE BENEFITS BOARD, THE PEPSICO
ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, and JOHN/JANE DOES ##1-50, Defendants,
Case No. 18 CV 11618 (VB) (S.D. N.Y.).

Plaintiffs DuBuske, Duchaine, and Maynard bring the putative class
action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") against Defendants Pepsi, Pepsi's Employee Benefits
Board ("EBB"), Pepsi's Administration Committee ("PAC"), and 50
unknown individuals sued as John or Jane Does.  The case concerns
the Plaintiffs' early retirement benefits under Pepsi's Salaried
Employees Retirement Plan.  Each Plaintiff allegedly retired after
working for Pepsi, or a Pepsi subsidiary or affiliate, for at least
10 years.

According to the complaint, the plan is a defined benefit plan
subject to ERISA.  This means, plan participants receiving a
pension get a certain annual amount that the plan pays during the
employee's lifetime, beginning at the employee's retirement.  The
plan is administered by Pepsi and the PAC.  The EBB allegedly
appoints the PAC's members.

The Plaintiffs say Pepsi employees participating in the plan can
receive a monthly post-retirement pension starting at age 65, which
the plan defines as its normal retirement age.  Alternatively,
participants can receive early retirement benefits if they retire
before turning 65.  In their papers opposing the instant motion,
the Plaintiffs concede they took early retirement.

For unmarried plan participants, the normal -- i.e., the default --
form of benefit under the plan allegedly is a single life annuity
("SLA").  An SLA is a stream of monthly payments that starts when
the participant retires and ends when the participant dies.  The
amount of a participant's monthly SLA payments allegedly depends on
the participant's wages at and "years of service with Pepsi."

For married plan participants, the normal form of benefit under the
plan allegedly is a 50% qualified joint and survivor annuity
("QJSA").  A joint and survivor annuity ("JSA") is a stream of
monthly payments that starts when the participant retires and, if
the participant dies before his or her spouse, continues with
monthly payments to the spouse until the spouse's death.  A QJSA is
a JSA that satisfies certain statutory requirements.

Pursuant to the plan's terms, participants may elect to receive
another, alternate form of benefit instead of an SLA or a QJSA. The
complaint identifies these options as falling under one of two
categories: qualified optional survivor annuities ("QOSA"), and
qualified preretirement survivor annuities ("QPSA"). These
categories come in different flavors.

If a participant chooses to receive a survivor annuity calling for
potential payments to the participant's spouse -- i.e., a QJSA,
QOSA, or QPSA -- the participant gets less money each month than if
he or she chose to receive an SLA.

Plan administrators must therefore calculate how much to pay each
month to a participant who chooses to receive a QJSA, QOSA, or
QPSA.  ERISA requires that such calculations yield a QJSA, QOSA, or
QPSA that "is the actuarial equivalent of" the participant's SLA.

The Plaintiffs say the standard way of calculating a participant's
QJSA, QOSA, or QPSA benefit calls for comparing in a ratio the
present value of the participant's SLA on the one hand, and the
present value of the participant's QJSA, QOSA, or QPSA on the
other.  The ratio allegedly generates a "conversion factor," also
known as an "annuity factor."  To calculate the size of a
participant's QJSA, QOSA, or QPSA benefit, the participant's SLA
benefit is multiplied by the conversion factor.

The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants do not follow this allegedly
standard method of calculating conversion factors.  Instead, they
accuse the Defendants "baldly" set a fixed conversion factor for
each form of alternative benefit, and then apply those conversion
factors to all participants alike -- no matter the prevailing
interest rate of the day, and no matter the participant's life
expectancy.

The Plaintiffs allege these fixed conversion factors yield QJSAs,
QOSAs, and QPSAs with lower present values than the SLAs that were
"available" to them "at early retirement."  Thus, plan participants
who retire early and choose a QJSA, QOSA, or QPSA allegedly end up
worse off than if the Defendants calculated conversion factors in
the purportedly standard fashion, using reasonable market interest
rates and mortality tables.

The Plaintiffs cry foul.  They claim the conversion factors in
question deprive them of benefits to which they are entitled, in
contravention of ERISA's anti-forfeiture provision.  They plead two
counts seeking equitable relief to remedy that alleged violation.
They also plead a third count seeking equitable relief on a theory
of breach of fiduciary duty.

The Defendants sought for a dismissal of the complaint.  The
Defendants first contend that the Plaintiffs' claims fail as a
matter of law because they do not arise under ERISA, but rather
arise under federal regulations from which no private right of
action derives.

Judge Briccetti holds that the Defendants are wrong.  The complaint
plainly pleads claims under ERISA, not regulations promulgated
thereunder.  The complaint explicitly accuses the Defendants of
violating ERISA in various ways.  Thus, the Plaintiffs' claims
arise under ERISA.

The Defendants argue the Plaintiffs fail plausibly to allege a
violation of ERISA's anti-forfeiture provision, ERISA Section
203(a), 29 U.S.C. Section 1053(a), because the provision applies
only to normal retirement benefits upon the attainment of normal
retirement age.

The Judge agrees.  The complaint does not allege any Plaintiff was
deprived of his normal retirement benefit upon the attainment of
normal retirement age.  The Plaintiffs do not claim the Defendants
have deprived them of the full amount of pension payments they
would achieve at normal retirement age.  Instead, they argue ERISA
elsewhere imposes a separate and additional requirement that the
benefits the Plaintiffs receive be no less valuable than the SLA
they were offered when they actually retired.  But the Plaintiffs'
first two causes of action allege the Defendants have violated
ERISA's antiforfeiture clause, not some other ERISA provision.  The
anti-forfeiture provision imposes no such requirement.
Accordingly, Judge Briccetti dismisses Counts I and II of the
complaint.

Judge Briccetti likewise dismisses the Plaintiffs' remaining claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.  The complaint alleges the Defendants
breached their fiduciary duty by countenancing the plan's use of
"unreasonable conversion factors" that allegedly resulted in
participants and beneficiaries illegally forfeiting and losing
vested benefits.  As set forth, the Plaintiffs have inadequately
pleaded such a forfeiture.  Their breach of fiduciary duty claim
therefore fails as a matter of law, the District Court opines

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Briccetti grants the Motion to
Dismiss.  The Clerk is directed to terminate the motion, and close
the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Opinion and
Order is available at https://is.gd/yp9jVY from Leagle.com.

William DuBuske, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Michael Duchaine, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Gary Maynard, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Gregory Y.
Porter -- gporter@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP, Mark
George Boyko -- mboyko@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey and Glasser LLP,
Mark Peter Kindall -- mkindall@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe
LLP, Robert A. Izard -- rizard@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe
LLP, pro hac vice, Seth R. Klein -- sklein@ikrlaw.com -- Izard,
Kindall & Raabe, LLP, pro hac vice & Douglas Patrick Needham --
dneedham@ikrlaw.com -- Izard Kindall & Raabe LLP.

PepsiCo, Inc., the Employee Benefits Board & the PepsiCo
Administration Committee, Defendants, represented by Jeremy Paul
Blumenfeld -- jeremy.blumenfeld@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP & Stephanie Rosel Reiss --
stephanie.reiss@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.


PREMIERE CREDIT: Watson Files FDCPA Class Action in New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Premiere Credit of
North America, LLC. The case is styled as David P. Watson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Premiere Credit of North America, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-05838 (E.D. N.Y., Oct. 16, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Premiere Credit of North America, LLC is a Debt collection agency
in Indianapolis, Indiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com

     - and -

   Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 281-7601
   Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION: Kuhn Class Settlement Gets Prelim. Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned HERTA GUADALUPE KUHN, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general
public, Plaintiff, v. PRIMEFLIGHT AVIATION SERVICES, INC., et al.,
and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-CV-02340-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento
Division, granted Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Action Settlement.

Having received and fully considered the Plaintiff's Notice of
Motion and Motion, supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
Declaration of Roman Otkupman, the Settlement Agreement, the
proposed Class Notice, and the arguments of the counsel presented
to the Court at the hearing of the Motion, and for good cause
appearing, Judge Mendez finds, on a preliminary basis, that the
terms of the settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable.

Judge Mendez further granted the request for certification of the
following Rule 23 Settlement Class for the sole and limited purpose
of implementing the terms of the Settlement Agreement, subject to
the Court's final approval: All persons employed by Defendant as
non-exempt, hourly-paid employees in one or more of Defendant's
operations at (a) Oakland International Airport (OAK), (b)
Sacramento International Airport (SMF), and/or (c) San Diego
International Airport (SAN), at any time from Nov. 10, 2017 to
March 12, 2019.

Otkupman Law Firm is appointed as Class Counsel, and Plaintiff
Herta Guadalupe Kuhn is named as Class Representative.

The Judge further approved the selection of Simpluris as the Class
Administrator, and the payment of reasonable administration costs
to be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount.

The Settlement Class Members who object to the proposed Settlement
must give written notice to the Class Administrator without delay.

The Court is expected to convene a hearing on March 10, 2020 at
1:30 p.m. to consider final approval of the Class Settlement
Agreement ("Final Approval Hearing").

The Class Counsel will file a motion for approval of reasonable
attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses and a motion for
approval of the service payment for Plaintiff Kuhn prior to the
Final Approval Hearing.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/EdxT9P from Leagle.com.

Herta Guadalupe Kuhn, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by Meghan Sherry Maertz -- meghan@olfla.com -- Otkupman
Law Firm & Roman Otkupman -- roman@olfla.com -- Otkupman Law Firm,
ALC.

PrimeFlight Aviation Services, Inc., a Delaware Corporation; which
will do business in California, Defendant, represented by
Christopher M. Ahearn -- cahearn@laborlawyers.com -- Fisher &
Phillips LLP & Collin Dennis Cook -- ccook@fisherphillips.com --
Fisher & Phillips LLP.

Prime Flight Aviation Services, Inc., an Ohio Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Christopher M. Ahearn, Fisher & Phillips
LLP.


ROBINSON INNOVATIONS: Ocasio Seeks to Recover OT Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KATHERINE OCASIO, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. ROBINSON INNOVATIONS, LLC, a foreign Limited
Liability Company, Case No. 5:19-cv-00910-PRW (W.D. Okla., Oct. 1,
2019), seeks to recover compensation, including overtime wages,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Oklahoma
Protection of Labor Act.

Robinson Innovations LLC is a foreign limited liability company,
licensed to and doing business in Oklahoma.

Robinson is a supplier and solutions provider in the rubber,
plastics, engineered products and tire making industry in North
America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Clif Alexander, Esq.
          Lauren E. Braddy, Esq.
          ANDERSON ALEXANDER, PLLC
          819 N. Upper Broadway
          Corpus Christi, TX 78401
          Telephone: (361) 452-1279
          Facsimile: (361) 452-1284
          E-mail: clif@a2xlaw.com
                  lauren@a2xlaw.com

               - and -

          Noble K. McIntyre, Esq.
          MCINTYRE LAW, P.C.
          8601 S. Western Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73139
          Telephone: (405) 917-5250
          Facsimile: (405) 917-5405
          E-mail: noble@mcintyrelaw.com


RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES: Defends Nanometrics Merger-Related Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rudolph Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on October 11, 2019,
that the company continues to defend multiple class action suits
related to its merger with  Nanometrics Incorporated.

On June 23, 2019, Rudolph Technologies, Inc., a Delaware
corporation ("Rudolph"), Nanometrics Incorporated, a Delaware
corporation ("Nanometrics"), and PV Equipment Inc., a Delaware
corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Nanometrics ("Merger
Sub"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger
Agreement"). The Merger Agreement provides for, among other things
and subject to the satisfaction or waiver of specified conditions,
the merger of Merger Sub with and into Rudolph (the "Merger"), with
Rudolph surviving the Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Nanometrics.

Following the announcement of the Merger Agreement, two purported
class action complaints and three complaints have been filed on
behalf of Rudolph's stockholders against Rudolph and its directors;
of those five complaints, three were filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware, one in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and one in
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.


One of those five complaints also names Nanometrics and Merger Sub
as defendants.

A sixth complaint has been filed on behalf of a Nanometrics
stockholder against Nanometrics and its directors in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California.

The complaints are captioned as follows: Stein v. Rudolph
Technologies, Inc., et al. (D. Del.); Rosenblatt v. Rudolph
Technologies, Inc., et al.(D. Del.); Stein v. Rudolph Technologies,
Inc., et al. (D. Del.); Parikh v. Rudolph Technologies, Inc., et
al. (D.N.J.); Roy v. Rudolph Technologies, Inc., et al. (D. Mass.);
and Bryden-Moore v. Nanometrics Inc., et al. (N.D. Cal.). The
company refers to these actions collectively as the "Shareholder
Actions."

Nanometrics and Rudolph do not believe that supplemental
disclosures are required or necessary under applicable laws.
However, in order to minimize the expense of defending the
Shareholder Actions, and without admitting any liability or
wrongdoing, Nanometrics and Rudolph are supplementing the Joint
Proxy Statement/Prospectus. The Supplemental Disclosures should be
read in conjunction with the Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus,
which is available on the Internet site maintained by the SEC at
http://www.sec.gov.Nanometrics, Rudolph and the other named
defendants deny that they have violated any laws or breached any
duties to Nanometrics' stockholders or Rudolph's stockholders.

Nanometrics and Rudolph are providing the Supplemental Disclosures
solely to eliminate the burden and expense of litigation and to
avoid any possible disruption to the Merger that could result from
further litigation. Nothing in the Supplemental Disclosure should
be deemed to be an admission of the legal necessity or materiality
of any Supplemental Disclosure under applicable laws.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://bit.ly/35xuznw.

Rudolph Technologies, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and
supports defect inspection, process control metrology, and data
analysis systems and software used by semiconductor device
manufacturers worldwide. The Company provides yield management
solutions that are used in both the wafer processing and final
manufacturing of ICs, as well as in emerging markets such as LED
and Solar. The company is based in Wilmington, Massachusetts.


SANOFI US: Rodriguez Files Fraud Class Action in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sanofi U.S. LLC. The
case is styled as Glorimar Rodriguez, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sanofi U.S. LLC, Chattem,
Inc., CVS Health Co. formerly known as: CVS Caremark and Dollar
Tree Stores, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-09527-AT (S.D.,
N.Y., Oct. 15, 2019).

The nature of case stated as Other Fraud.

Sanofi U.S. LLC is a Pharmaceutical company in Bridgewater
Township, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Andrew Obergfell, Esq.
   Bursor & Fisher, P.A.
   888 Seventh Avenue
   New York, NY 10019
   Tel: (646) 837-7150
   Email: aobergfell@bursor.com


SCOTT YANCEY: Martinez Suit Asserts TCPA Breach
-----------------------------------------------
Keith Martinez, Individually and on behalf of others, Plaintiff, v.
SCOTT YANCEY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-01960-CAB-KSC (S.D. Cal.,
Oct. 9, 2019) seeks damages, injunctive relief, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal
actions of Defendant, in negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully
contacting Plaintiff for marketing purposes on their cellular
telephones, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
thereby invading Plaintiff's privacy.

Plaintiff has business dealings in the real estate world, but has
never conducted business with Yancey either directly or indirectly.
At no time did Plaintiff provide his current cellular telephone
number to Defendant through any medium. On August 29, 2019,
Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone. This call
was placed via an "automatic telephone dialing system". Yancey
called Martinez's cellular telephone using an artificial or
prerecorded voice message in an effort to convince Martinez to
register for a real estate investing class offered by Yancey. The
calls placed by Yancey were marketing and/or solicitation.
Plaintiff never provided Defendant prior written express consent to
place this telephone call to his cellular telephone, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of California.

Yancey provides various real estate courses and product, along with
providing real estate seminars and advertises those product through
the use of telephone calls.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
     SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
     2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
     San Diego, CA 92108
     Phone: 866-219-3343
     Fax: 866-219-8344
     Email: josh@swigartlawgroup.com


SHARKS SPORTS: Relief From Gen. Order 56 in Salsiccia Suit Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MARCO SALSICCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
SHARKS SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-01546-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth Labson Freeman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Administrative Relief
from General Order 56.

Plaintiffs Salsiccia and Scott Banks, two blind hockey fans, have
sued Sharks, the City of San Jose, and San Jose Arena Authority,
alleging that the Sharks + SAP mobile application is inaccessible
to blind users, in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and related California laws.  They brought the action on
their own behalf and on behalf of all individuals who are blind and
use the App or would use the App if it was accessible via the
relevant assistive technology called "screen readers."

Mr. Salsiccia first brought his concerns regarding the
inaccessibility of the App to Defendant Sharks' attention in
October 2016.  On July 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs sent correspondence
to Sharks and the City of San Jose regarding their allegations that
the App is inaccessible and proposed that all parties engage in
structured negotiations.  In October 2018, Sharks and the
Plaintiffs entered into a structured negotiations agreement with
the hope of resolving the dispute without the need for litigation.
In February 2019, the Plaintiffs provided a demonstration of the
alleged accessibility issues at an in-person meeting with Sharks.
On March 26, 2019, five months after negotiations began, the
Plaintiffs filed the class action suit.

On May 27, 2019, Sharks and the Plaintiffs stipulated to, and the
Court granted, a 90-day stay of litigation to continue
negotiations.  During the stay, on June 20, 2019, parties met again
in person and the Plaintiffs had an opportunity to access an
"alpha" version of an update to the App in order to assess the
App's accessibility.  While recognizing that "some improvement" was
made, the Plaintiffs identified some remaining accessibility issues
with the App.  On July 17, 2019, the Plaintiffs followed up with a
written proposal of terms, to which the Defendants did not respond.
The stay of litigation expired on Aug. 30, 2019 and the Defendants
filed their answer on Sept. 5, 2019.

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Motion for Administrative
Relief from General Order 56.  General Order 56 involves American
with Disabilities Act (ADA) Access Litigation.  The Plaintiffs
argue that the parties have fulfilled both of the key purposes of
General Order 56 -- an early exchange of information regarding the
ambit of the claimed violations and an early attempt at alternative
dispute resolution.  According to them, the Defendants are
well-aware of the inaccessibility allegations due to the two
in-person meetings attended by both parties, which the Plaintiffs
call the equivalent of joint inspections.  Additionally, they argue
that the Defendants have had every opportunity to respond to their
proposed remedial steps but have not and therefore the goals of
General Orders 56 have been more than satisfied.  

The Plaintiffs ask for relief from General Order 56 so discovery
can begin immediately.  They also request a case management
conference.  Alternatively, they ask the Court to adopt their
proposed expedited case schedule.

The Defendants argue that it is premature and inappropriate for the
parties to abandon the schedule of General Order 56 because (1) the
2018-2019 App was recently replaced on Sept. 11, 2019 with the
2019-2020 App and thus, the App subject to the Plaintiffs'
complaint no longer exists; and (2) mediation has not taken place.
Furthermore, they point out that they have voluntarily provided
otherwise discoverable information and materials to the Plaintiffs
as requested and have opened the App up at private meetings for
inspection and comment.

Judge Freeman holds that there is no dispute that the ADA case is
governed by General Order No. 56, which was adopted in the Northern
District of California to advance efficient and effective
litigation of ADA cases and to address the Defendants' concerns
about costs.  In cases subject to General Order No. 56, discovery
and other litigation proceedings are stayed, and the parties must
follow a detailed timeline for completing a joint inspection and
for participating in a mediation process.

Judge Freeman finds that the Plaintiffs' arguments in support of
their request for relief from General Order 56 are not persuasive.
Based on the parties' briefing, it seems to her that both sides
have engaged in good-faith efforts to resolve the App's alleged
inaccessibility issues set forth by the Plaintiffs.  The mobile
application has now undergone an update, which was released
recently on Sept. 11, 2019 after the parties' in-person meetings.

Therefore, a joint inspection of the most recent version of the App
has yet to take place.  The Judge finds that the parties would
benefit from another joint inspection, in which the current version
of the App can be inspected and evaluated for its accessibility.

Moreover, no formal mediation has taken place, the Court points
out.  Although the parties have engaged in informal settlement
discussions and negotiations, the Judge agrees with the Defendants
that the parties would benefit from structured and supervised
mediation process.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Freeman denies the Plaintiffs'
Motion.  The new deadline for the parties to complete inspection
pursuant to General Order 56 is set on Oct. 23, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/7FE9EH from Leagle.com.

Marco Salsiccia, and other similarly situated individuals & Scott
Blanks, and other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs,
represented by Meredith Jayne Weaver -- mweaver@dralegal.org --
Disability Rights Advocates & Stuart John Seaborn --
sseaborn@dralegal.org -- Disability Rights Advocates.

Sharks Sports & Entertainment, LLC, The City of San Jose & The San
Jose Arena Authority, Defendants, represented by Martin H. Orlick
-- MOrlick@jmbm.com -- Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP.


SMILEDIRECT: FeganScott Law Firm Launches Probe on Practice
-----------------------------------------------------------
FeganScott, LLC, a national class-action law firm, on Oct. 2
disclosed that it launched an investigation into SmileDirect, which
provides orthodontic treatment without the patient ever being seen
by an orthodontist.

According to the firm, SmileDirect may be ignoring proper licensing
requirements to administer orthodontic services and may have made
false and misleading claims to fraudulently entice customers to
purchase its invisible liners for treatment.

SmileDirect's business model is based on eliminating direct doctor
contact with patients, and customers complain that they find
themselves unable to reach any actual doctor to discuss complaints
and injuries from using the aligners.

According to FeganScott Managing Member Elizabeth Fegan, who has
led similar consumer class-action cases, SmileDirect has been the
focus of a growing number of consumer complaints, including one
from the American Dental Association.

"This is the story of a company who faces a barrage of litigation
and, rather than address the legitimate concerns of licensed
practitioners and customers, is choosing to stifle criticism,"
Fegan said. "At the end of the day, when a company's misleading
claims cause substantial damage to their customers, it's time to
step in and demand accountability."

Consumers who have been misled by SmileDirect can learn more about
the firm's investigation at smiledirect@feganscott.com.

FeganScott is a national class-action law firm dedicated to helping
victims of consumer fraud, sexual abuse, and discrimination. The
firm is championed by acclaimed veteran, class-action attorneys who
have successfully recovered $1 billion for victims nationwide.
FeganScott is committed to pursuing successful outcomes with
integrity and excellence while holding the responsible parties
accountable. To sign up for case updates, email
smilesdirect@feganscott.com. [GN]


ST CLAIR NISSAN: Appeals Ct. Affirms Robinson-Combs Suit Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
John Breslin, writing for Madison Record, reports that an attempt
to develop a class action over how a vehicle registration fee was
included in purchase documents has failed after an appeals court
affirmed a lower court's decision to throw out the action.

The case centered on how St. Clair Nissan dealership in O'Fallon
listed a $25 electronic registration and title (ERT) fee on the
documents.

Plaintff Phyllis Robinson-Combs, represented by Wood River attorney
Thomas Maag, claimed violations of unjustment enrichment and
consumer fraud statutes on behalf of herself and others in the same
position against St. Clair Nissan following her purchase of a 2010
Dodge in October 2016. Her initial complaint also alleged
mechanical problems.

The dispute was over whether the actions of the dealership --
its failure to list the fee so that stood out from the rest of the
purchase documents -- rose to the level of consumer fraud or unjust
enrichment

The Fifth District Appellate Court, with Justice Mark Boie
delivering the judgment and Justices David Overstreet and John
Barberis concurring, found that they did not and affirmed the
dismissal of the action by St. Clair County Circuit Judge Stephen
P. McGlynn.

In his judgment, Boie detailed the background in the action,
including that the plaintiff bought the vehicle on the
understanding that it was "operational, in good condition, and
covered by a 'full' warranty."

According to the plaintiff, the vehicle, over the next 30 days,
began to develop mechanical problems. She returned the vehicle and
asked for a refund, but this was refused.

It was then the plaintiff took a closer look at the purchase
documents, and noticed the listing for the $25 "Optional ERT Fee."
She had signed the document.

On Dec. 9, 2016, Robinson-Combs filed a four count action claiming
damages personally for beach of warranty and, in connection with
the ERT fee, on behalf of herself and others, a class action, which
at no point was certified. She claimed the dealership "crammed" the
fee notice into the document, which did not allow her to decline to
pay.

Regarding Rbinson-Combs' individual claims, Boie wrote, "Plaintiff
has failed to provide this court with any articulated legal
argument supported by citation to pertinent authority concerning
that portion of the circuit court's order finding" that the statute
governing the ERT fee "does not provide a private right of
action."

"As such, we find that plaintiff has forfeited this issue on
appeal," he added.

Under the statute, it does state that "Optional ERT Fee" shall be
"distinguished from other language with the use of bold, colored,
italic or underscored type or by using a larger font."

"Because the defendant did not disclose the ERT fee in compliance
with . . . (the code) . . . plaintiff argues that customers were
not aware that the fee could be refused," according to the appeals
court judgment.

Boie added, "Plaintiff does not allege that defendant failed to
disclose the ERT fee or that defendant failed to provide the
services for which the ERT fee was charged," Further, the court
stated, it is not alleged she was charged an excess amount.

There also was "nothing to indicate" that Robinson-Combs was not
allowed to review the document prior to signing.

The appeals court could not "determine that a fee, charged for
services that were performed, and that was disclosed as optional on
a written document signed by the plaintiff prior to the performance
of the service, is a benefit unjustly retained by defendant."

On the consumer fraud complaint, accusing the defendant of acting
deceptively, the court, affirming McGlynn, found that
Robinson-Combs was informed in writing of the fee, it was listed as
optional, and the document was signed by the plaintiff. [GN]


STERICYCLE INC: Faces Jordan Suit Asserting BIPA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------
ANITA JORDAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. STERICYCLE, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2019CH11693 (Circuit Ct., Cook Cty., Ill., Oct. 9, 2019) is a Class
Action Complaint for violations of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, brought for damages and other legal and
equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Stericycle
in collecting, storing and using Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated individuals' biometric identifiers and biometric
information without obtaining informed written consent or providing
the requisite data retention and destruction policies, in direct
violation of BIPA.

In direct violation of each of the provisions of the BIPA,
Stericycle is actively collecting, storing, and using--without
providing notice, obtaining informed written consent, or publishing
data retention policies--the fingerprints and associated personally
identifying information of hundreds of its employees (and former
employees), who are being required to "clock in and out" with their
fingerprints. If Stericycle's database of digitized fingerprints
were to fall into the wrong hands, by data breach or otherwise, the
employees to whom these sensitive biometric identifiers belong
could have their identities stolen.

Stericycle never adequately informed anyone of its biometrics
collection practices, never obtained written consent from employees
and former employees regarding its biometric practices, and never
provided any data retention or destruction policies to anyone, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff is a resident and citizen of Cook County, Illinois.

Stericycle is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters at 28161
North Keith Drive, Lake Forest, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel R. Johnson, Esq.
     Seth Yohalem, Esq.
     WASKOWSKI JOHNSON YOHALEMLLP
     954 W. Washington Blvd., Suite 322
     Chicago, IL 60607
     Phone: (312) 278-3153
     Email: djohnson@wjylegal.com
            syohalem@wjylegal.com

            - and -

     Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
     KOZONIS & KLINGER, LTD.
     4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60630
     Phone: 773.545.9607
     Fax: 773.496.8617
     Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com


TERRIO PHYSICAL: Laflora Files Class Suit in California
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Terrio Physical
Therapy-Fitness, Inc., a California Corporation. The case is styled
as Erika Laflora, individually and on behalf of other members of
the general public similarly situated and on behalf of other
aggrieved employees pursuant to the California Private Attorneys
General Act, Plaintiff v. Terrio Physical Therapy-Fitness, Inc., a
California Corporation, Defendant, Case No. BCV-19-102925 (Cal.
Super., Kern County, Oct. 15, 2019).

The case type is stated as Other Employment - Civil Unlimited.

TERRIO Physical Therapy-Fitness is a health & wellness company that
provides nutritional services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
   LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
   410 Arden Ave Ste 203
   Glendale, CA 91203
   Tel: (818) 265-1020
   Fax: (818) 265-1021
   Email: edwin@lfjpc.com



TRANSITAMERICA SERVICES: Bid to Remand Alvarez FCRA Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, remanded the case ALBERT
C. ALVAREZ, Plaintiff, v. TRANSITAMERICA SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 5:18-cv-03106-EJD (N.D. Cal.), to the Santa
Clara County Superior Court.

Alvarez initiated the putative class action in the Santa Clara
Superior Court asserting that Defendants TransitAmerica and Herzog
Transit Services violated federal and state laws.  The federal
claims alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), which occurred when Defendants obtained background checks
for the Plaintiff's employment.  The Plaintiff asserted analogous
California state law claims under Investigative Consumer Reporting
Agencies Act ("ICRAA"), Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act
("CCRAA"), and unfair competition law ("UCL").  He also included
claims that the Defendants failed to provide meal periods, rest
periods, pay hourly and overtime wages, accurate written wage
statements, and timely pay all final wages.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants routinely acquired
consumer, investigative, and credit reports (i.e., credit and
background reports) to conduct background checks on the Plaintiff
and other prospective, current, and former employees.  The
Defendants then used information from the reports in their hiring
process without providing or obtaining proper
disclosures/authorizations in compliance with federal and state
law.

The Plaintiff alleges two FCRA claims.  First, that the Defendants
willfully failed to provide proper disclosures because the
authorization did not "stand alone" as required by 15 U.S.C.
Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) and as a result of their unlawful
procurement of credit and background reports by way of their
inadequate disclosures, the Plaintiff and the class members have
been injured, including but not limited to, having their privacy
and statutory rights invaded in violation of the FCRA.  Second,
that the Defendants failed to give proper "summary of rights" as
required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1681d(a)(1) and 15 U.S.C. Section
1681g(c).  The Plaintiff incorporates the same allegations of
injury for this second cause of action.  Finally, he seeks
declaratory and restitutionary relief for the FCRA claims.

The Defendants removed the action to federal court, invoking
federal question jurisdiction over the FCRA claims and supplemental
jurisdiction over the other state-law claims.  The Plaintiff moves
to remand, arguing that because he lacks Article III standing for
his FCRA claim, removal was improper as the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.

First, Judge Davila finds that the complaint's mere recitation of
FCRA violations and "injury to statutory and procedural rights," is
neither actual nor concrete because there is no showing of how the
Plaintiff is affected.  Therefore, because the Plaintiff's only
harm is the violation of the FCRA itself, the Plaintiff lacks an
injury in fact and federal-question jurisdiction does not exist.

Second, the Judge finds that the Defendants do not assert that the
related state law claims independently support jurisdiction.  It is
unclear if the Plaintiff's claims meet the amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) or if
CAFA jurisdiction would exist under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d).  And,
without federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the Judge may
not exercise the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over the state
law claims.

Judge Davila concludes that because the Plaintiff lacks standing to
assert a claim for violation of the FCRA, the District Court must
remand the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Nothing
in the District Court Order, however, should be construed as
precluding the Plaintiff from pursuing its claim in state court.
Accordingly, Judge Davila grantes the Plaintiff's motion, and
directs the Clerk to remand the case to Santa Clara County Superior
Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/XPbnLB from Leagle.com.

Albert C. Alvarez, on behalf of himself and all others similarily
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh --
info@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Howard Scott Leviant --
scott@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & William Matthew Pao --
william@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

TransitAmerica Services, Inc., a Missouri corporation & Herzog
Transit Services, a Missouri corporation, Defendants, represented
by Brendan Timothy Sapien -- Brendan.Sapien@lewisbrisbois.com --
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard Smith LLP & Jeffrey Scott Ranen --
Jeffrey.Ranen@lewisbrisbois.com -- Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard Smith
LLP.


TUPELO, MS: Court Allows Edwards to File Second Amended Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Debra M. Brown of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi, Aberdeen Division, permits Edwards to file
a second amended complaint in the class action lawsuit VINCENT
EDWARDS, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF TUPELO, MISSISSIPPI, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-CV-131-DMB-DAS (N.D. Miss.),

Vincent Edwards sought to challenge on a class action basis the
incarceration of persons unable to pay debts owed to the City of
Tupelo and/or Lee County, Mississippi.

On Aug. 18, 2017, Edwards, individually and as the class
representative, filed a "Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights"
against the City of Tupelo, Mississippi; Lee County, Mississippi;
Ramierre Warren; and certain fictitious parties.  In addition to
the individual claims asserted by Edwards, the complaint proposed a
class action based on certain allegedly unconstitutional practices
of the City and the County.

On Oct. 12, 2018, Edwards filed a Motion to Certify a class defined
as all individuals assessed fines by the City of Tupelo's sitting
Municipal Court Judges who were incarcerated for their inability to
pay those debts/fines owed without an inquiry being done to
determine their ability to pay; all individuals who were imprisoned
for their inability to pay debts/fines without appropriate counsel
being appointed on their behalf; all indigent individuals who were
forced into Work Programs in order to pay off their debts/fines
assessed to them by the City of Tupelo Municipal Court; all
individuals who were either threatened with the possibility of
incarceration, or who were actually incarcerated to pay off
fines/debts; all individuals deprived of their right to personal
safety and security; and, all individuals deprived of their right
to liberty.

On Nov. 2, 2018, however, Edwards filed a Motion to Stay a ruling
on the motion to certify until discovery is complete and the class
has been identified or at least until discovery issues are
resolved.

One week after seeking the stay on his Motion to Certify, Edwards,
with leave of the Court, filed an amended complaint against the
same Defendants.  In addition to individual claims not pertinent,
the amended complaint asserts four proposed constitutional claims,
titled as (1) The City Violated Plaintiffs' Rights by Incarcerating
them for Non-Payment of Debts without a Constitutional Inquiry into
their Ability to Pay, (Count One); (2) The City Violated the
Plaintiffs' Rights by Imprisoning them for Inability to Pay Debts
without Appointing Adequate Counsel, (Count Two); (3) The City of
Tupelo and Lee County's Scheme of Forcing Indigent Prisoners to
Labor in Order to Work off their Debts Violates the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Federal Law, (Count
Three); and (4) The use of Incarceration and Threats of
Incarceration to Collect Debts Owed to the City Violates the Equal
Protection Clause, (Count Four).

On Feb. 28, 2019, Edwards filed a Supplemental Motion for class
certification, seeking certification of the following proposed
class: all individuals assessed fines by the City of Tupelo's
sitting Municipal Court Judges who were ultimately found to be in
contempt of court and incarcerated for their inability to pay those
debts/fines owed without a willfulness inquiry to determine their
ability to pay either the assessed fines or their payment plans for
fines; all individuals who were imprisoned because they were unable
to pay their debts to the City of Tupelo or fines, or who were
coerced into pleading guilty, or who were incarcerated without
advice of counsel; all indigent individuals who were placed into
work programs in order to pay off their debts/fines assessed to
them by the City of Tupelo Municipal Court; all individuals who
were either threatened with the possibility of incarceration or who
were actually incarcerated to pay off fines/debts; all individuals
deprived of their right to personal safety and security as a result
of these practices; and, all individuals deprived of their right to
liberty delineated herein for reasons directly or indirectly
stemming from their poverty.  Finally, the proposed class will
include persons unconstitutionally imprisoned as a result of the
City's Pay or Stay policy that was implemented through a joint
effort of the City of Tupelo and Lee County, Mississippi to collect
fines and operating revenue.

After the City filed a response opposing the Supplemental Motion
and the County joined the response, Edwards replied.  In support of
his reply, Edwards submitted a declaration from one of his
attorneys, Halbert E. Dockins, Jr.  Shortly after, the City moved
to strike the Dockins declaration.

On July 24, 2019, Magistrate Judge David A. Sanders issued a Report
& Recommendation (R&R) recommending that (1) the Motion for Class
Certification, "as supplemented by" the supplemental motion for
class certification, be denied; (2) the Motion to Stay ruling be
denied as moot; and (3) the Motion to Strike be granted in part and
denied in part.

On Aug. 13, 2019, Edwards filed objections to the R&R; a motion for
voluntary dismissal; and a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of class certification.

In his motion to stay, Edwards seeks to stay a ruling on his first
Motion to Certify until discovery is complete and the class has
been identified or at least until discovery issues are resolved.
Judge Sanders' R&R recommends finding this motion to be moot
because the Court allowed supplementation and because the discovery
deadline has passed.  Neither party has objected to the
recommendation, and Judge Brown sees no clear error in it.
Accordingly, Judge denies as moot the Motion to Stay.

Edwards requests an order from the Court allowing him to
voluntarily dismiss all claims and issues other than whether
indigency hearings were held in contempt of court cases.  The City
argues this is, in substance, an "amendment" which is "untimely and
improper."

Judge Brown finds that Edwards acted promptly after the R&R; that
there is no evidence of bad faith or dilatory motive; that there is
no likelihood of prejudice to the Defendants in allowing the
amendments; and that there is no indication the amendment would be
futile.  These factors outweigh the fact that Edwards had, on one
previous occasion, amended his complaint.  Accordingly, Judge Brown
finds the proposed amendment to be in the interest of justice.
Judge Brown thus grants in part Edwards' Motion to Dismiss, which
is in substance a motion to amend.  Within seven days of the Order,
Edwards may file a second amended complaint which only drops all
claims and issues other than whether indigency hearings were held
in contempt of court cases.

Because the District Court finds that Edwards is entitled to amend
his complaint to drop numerous claims which partially define his
class, Judge Brown as moot his previous Motions for Class
Certification.  Judge Brown adopted the R&R to the extent it
recommends treating the first motion to certify as moot but
rejected as moot to the extent it recommends addressing the second
motion to certify on the merits.  For the same reasons, Judge Brown
denied as moot the Motion to Strike the Dockins declaration.

Finally, Edwards has moved for a hearing, ostensibly on his newly
proposed class.  While Rule 23 does not require an evidentiary
hearing on the question of class certification, a district court
should ordinarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the question.
As it stands, Judge Brown holds that she is in no position to
evaluate the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on Edwards' new
proposed class (particularly since the amended complaint regarding
the new proposed class has not yet been filed).  Accordingly, Judge
Brown denies without prejudice the motion for hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/AuQdPq from Leagle.com.

Vincent Edwards, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Halbert E. Dockins,
Jr., DOCKINS TURNAGE & BANKS.

The City of Tupelo, Mississippi, Defendant, represented by John
Samuel Hill -- Jhill@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS
& Stephen Pierce Spencer -- sspencer@mitchellmcnutt.com --
MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS.

Lee County, Mississippi, Defendant, represented by Margaret Sams
Gratz -- mgratz@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS,
William C. Murphree -- Bmurphree@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL,
MCNUTT & SAMS, Gary L. Carnathan, CARNATHAN & MCAULEY & Michael D.
Chase -- Mchase@mitchellmcnutt.com -- MITCHELL, MCNUTT & SAMS.


UTAH: ICFs Allowed in Part to Intervene in Christensen ADA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STACI CHRISTENSEN, JOHN R. WEAKLY, and DISABILITY LAW
CENTER, Plaintiffs, v. JOSEPH MINER M.D., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 2:18CV37DAK (D. Utah), Judge Dale A. Kimball of the U.S.
District Court for the District Utah granted in part and denied in
part the Motion to Intervene filed by several Intermediate Care
Facilities ("ICFs") in Utah.

On Dec. 19, 2016, the Disability Law Center ("DLC") wrote a letter
to Governor Herbert, the Executive Director of the Utah Department
of Health ("UDOH"), and the Executive Director of Human Services,
alleging that the State of Utah's failure to create a working plan
to transition individuals with intellectual and/or developmental
disabilities from intermediate care facilities into the community
at a reasonable pace constitutes a violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C.  State officials met with
several parties and held a series of public meetings to seek input
from interested parties regarding the need for home and community
based services for individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities.  However, the DLC was not satisfied with the pace of
progress and filed the class action lawsuit against the various
State Defendants on Jan. 12, 2018.

The Complaint requested that the State of Utah: (1) develops and
implements a working plan for identifying and transitioning
individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities from
private ICFs into home and community-based services by providing
appropriate information and supports and conducting appropriate
assessments of all residents to determine individual preference;
(2) evaluates, improves, and expands the services that support
individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities so that
individuals who reside in private ICFs and are not opposed to
leaving may live in integrated, community-based settings; and (3)
reduces the State's reliance on segregated, institutional care in
private ICFs for individuals with intellectual or developmental
disabilities in Utah.

The Intermediate Care Facilities (ICFs) currently moving to
intervene state that they did not attempt to intervene in the
lawsuit at that time because there was no need to based on the
allegations of the Complaint.  The ICFs state that they do not
oppose additional treatment options for residents that want to
leave the facilities.

On July 27, 2018, state officials met with counsel for the Utah
Health Care Association to discuss the status of the lawsuit, the
possibility of settlement, and whether UHCA or its member ICFs were
going to intervene in the lawsuit.  Again, on Aug. 16, 2018, state
officials met with ICF representatives to discuss the ICF
transition program and issues related to the pending lawsuit. Then,
on November 19, 2018, state officials held a conference call to
discuss the ICF transition program and issues related to the
pending lawsuit.

Before the proposed Settlement Agreement for the case was approved
by the Governor and State Legislature, public committee meetings
were held to discuss funding and other issues related to the
potential settlement.  On Feb. 6, 2019, the proposed Settlement
Agreement was presented to the Social Services Appropriations
Subcommittee, along with UDOH and DHS funding requests.

On March 4, 2019, Governor Herbert approved the terms of the
Settlement Agreement and forwarded it the President of Senate and
Speaker of the House of Representatives.  On March 12, 2019, the
Legislature passed the bill approving the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.  On April 16, 2019, Utah Department of Health
representatives met with ICF representatives to discuss the
Settlement Agreement at the UHCA spring conference.

On May 14, 2019, the Court certified the Plaintiffs' proposed class
of all persons with an intellectual and/or developmental disability
who are eligible for Medicaid, reside in a private ICF in Utah on
or after Jan. 12, 2018, and prior to the termination of the lawsuit
have expressed an interest in living in the community and are
capable of living in the community.  On May 17, 2019, the Court
preliminarily approved the parties' proposed joint Settlement
Agreement and scheduled a fairness hearing for final approval to be
held on Oct. 17, 2019.

The ICF movants state that they learned of the parties' Joint
Motion for Settlement Approval in a July 2, 2019 letter the DLC
sent to administrators at various ICF/ID facilities.  The ICF
movants claim that the proposed Settlement Agreement goes far
beyond the relief requested in the Plaintiff's Complaint because it
requires Defendant to transition the approximately 300 potential
class members from private ICFs to HCBS within six years, put in
place a permanent moratorium on licensing additional beds in
private ICFs in Utah, and reduce the total number of licensed
private ICF beds.  The Settlement Agreement does not identify the
approximately 300 class members who want to transition away from
ICFs and does not appear to be congruent with the desire to provide
patient choice.

The ICF movants seek only intervention as a matter of right under
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

On review, Judge Kimball concludes that the ICFs have not
demonstrated a basis for intervention as a matter of right.
Therefore, he denies the ICF's motion to intervene.

The ICFs assert that their motion is timely because their interests
did not become impacted until the parties' filed the Joint Motion
for Approval of Settlement.  The ICFs contend that the Complaint
appears to only advocate for patient choice, but the Settlement
Agreement provides relief to the Plaintiffs that was not sought for
in the Complaint and which affects the property and interests of
the ICFs.

The Judge disagrees with the ICFs' characterization of the
Complaint.  He finds that the Complaint contains numerous
provisions that should have put the ICFs on notice that the
Plaintiffs were seeking a reduction of services at ICFs.  The
Complaint specifically stated that the State needed to reduce its
reliance on ICFs and was improperly designing services in a way to
keep ICFs fully populated.  The most obvious way to reduce the
State's reliance on ICFs is to reduce the number of beds.  

Given the allegations in the Complaint, the ICFs have known about
their interests in this case since the time it was filed.  There is
also evidence that the ICFs have been participating in the public
and legislative process involving the issues presented in the case.
Accordingly, the Judge finds the ICFs' motion to intervene as of
right to assert their own claims against the State to be untimely.

The ICFs claim that they have an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action because the
Proposed Settlement Agreement seeks to reduce the total number of
licensed ICF beds.  They argue that they should be able to
intervene to assert claims against the State, claiming that the
State cannot take those licenses away under the Health Care
Facility Licensing and Inspection Act, and without affording the
ICFs due process.

The Judge holds that the ICFs potential loss of some business is
merely caused by governmental regulations allowing patients options
-- options the Plaintiffs believe are required by the ADA.
Moreover, the Settlement Agreement does not state that any bed
licenses must be revoked.  Therefore, the ICFs' claimed property
interest is not necessarily affected.  Also significant for
purposes of intervention, the ICFs have failed to demonstrate that
the claims they wish to assert against the State are ripe.  Because
of the implementation process set forth in the proposed Settlement
Agreement, the ICFs cannot claim that any interest is currently or
imminently being impaired.  Finally, the State has not taken any
action against any existing ICF licensed bed.  The Settlement
Agreement simply sets broad obligations and provides the Defendant
with significant flexibility in meeting those obligations.

The ICFs claim that their interests are not being adequately
represented by any current party.  Because the Court has determined
that the ICFs do not have a presently-ripe protectable interest,
Judge Kimball does not believe that it needs representation in the
case.

The ICFs did not seek to intervene under Rule 24's permissive
intervention provisions.  However, at the hearing on their motion,
they agreed that they were not opposed to entering the case through
permissive intervention.

Judge Kimball believes that the case is an unusual class action and
that it raises significant public interest concerns for the
non-class members.  In his discretion, Judge Kimball will permit
the ICFs to intervene in the action in limited fashion -- not to
assert their own claims against the State, but to participate in
the Fairness Hearing scheduled on the proposed Settlement
Agreement. The Fairness Hearing was scheduled for Oct. 17 to 18,
2019.  

Based on given reasons, Judge Kimball granted in part and denieed
in part the ICFs' Motion to Intervene.  Permissive intervention
only for purposes of participating in the Fairness Hearing on the
proposed Settlement Agreement is granted.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Memorandum
Decision & Order is available at https://is.gd/t1O3zo from
Leagle.com.

Staci Christensen, an individual, John R Weakley, an individual &
Disability Law Center, a Utah nonprifit corporation, Plaintiffs,
represented by Juliette P. White -- JWhite@parsonsbehle.com --
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, Cedar Q. Cosner --
CCosner@parsonsbehle.com -- PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER, Laura K.
Henrie -- LHenrie@disabilitylawcenter.org -- DISABILITY LAW CENTER,
Mary Anne Davies -- mdavies@disabilitylawcenter.org -- DISABILITY
LAW CENTER & Nathaniel J. Crippes, DISABILITY LAW CENTER.

Joseph Miner, M.D., in his official capacity as Executive Director
of the Utah Department of Health, Nathan Checketts, in his official
capacity as Director of Utah Division of Medicaid and Health
Financing, Ann Williamson, in her official capacity as Executive
Director of the Utah Division of Services for People with
Disabilities, Angie Pinna, in her official capacity as Director of
Utah Division of Services for People with Disabilities, Utah
Department of Health, Utah Division of Medicaid and Health
Financing, Utah Department of Human Services & Utah Division of
Service for People with Disabilities, Defendants, represented by
David N. Wolf -- dnwolf@utah.gov -- UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
LITIGATION UNIT & Lance F. Sorenson, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
LITIGATION UNIT.

North Parkway Healthcare, doing business as Wide Horizons
Intermediate Care Facility, Bungalow Care Center, East Side Care
Center, Hidden Hollow Care Center, Lindon Care Center, North Side
Care Center, Provo Care Center, West Side Care Center, Medallion
Manor Provo, Medallion Manor Payson, Medallion Manor Springville,
Medallion Manor Lehi, Hillcrest Care Center, West Jordan Care
Center, Mesa Vista & Tophams Tiny Tots, Intervenors, represented by
Jaryl L. Rencher -- lawfirmra.com -- RENCHER ANJEWIERDEN.


WESCO AIRCRAFT: Faces Wolverine Merger-Related Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------------
Wesco Aircraft Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 10, 2019, that
the company has been named as a defendant in five putative class
action suits related to its announced merger with Wolverine
Intermediate Holding II Corporation, a Delaware corporation
("Parent"), and Wolverine Merger Corporation, a Delaware
corporation and a direct wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.

On August 8, 2019, Wesco Aircraft Holdings, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the "Company" or "Wesco Aircraft"), entered into an
Agreement and Plan of Merger (the "Merger Agreement") with
Wolverine Intermediate Holding II Corporation, a Delaware
corporation ("Parent"), and Wolverine Merger Corporation, a
Delaware corporation and a direct wholly owned subsidiary of Parent
("Merger Sub"), providing for the merger of Merger Sub with and
into the Company (the "Merger") with the Company surviving the
Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.

Since the announcement of the Merger, five putative class action
complaints have been filed by and purportedly on behalf of alleged
Wesco Aircraft stockholders: Gray v. Wesco Aircraft Holdings, Inc.,
et al., No. 1:19-cv-08528 filed September 13, 2019 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Stein
v. Wesco Aircraft Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 2:19-cv-08053 filed
September 17, 2019 in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, Kent v. Wesco Aircraft Holdings,
Inc., et al., No. 1:19-cv-01750 filed September 17, 2019 in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Sweeney
v. Wesco Aircraft Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 19STCV33392 filed
September 19, 2019 in the Superior Court of the State of California
County of Los Angeles, and Bushansky v. Wesco Aircraft Holdings,
Inc., et al., No. 2:19-cv-08274 filed September 24, 2019 in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
(together, the "Actions").

The Actions name as defendants Wesco Aircraft and the members of
Wesco Aircraft's Board of Directors. The Actions allege, among
other things, that the Definitive Proxy Statement omits certain
information regarding the confidentiality agreements between Wesco
Aircraft and the potentially interested parties, the Company's
updated projections, the analysis performed by the financial
advisors, and services the financial advisors previously provided
to certain parties.

The Actions seek, among other things, damages, attorneys' fees and
injunctive relief to prevent the Merger from closing. Wesco
Aircraft believes these claims are entirely without merit and that
the Definitive Proxy Statement does not omit any material
information about the Merger. However, to decrease the expense of
defending the litigation related to the Merger, Wesco Aircraft has
agreed to disclose information that was allegedly omitted from the
Definitive Proxy Statement. By making these disclosures, Wesco
Aircraft does not admit and expressly denies that this information
was required to be disclosed in the Definitive Proxy Statement.

A copy of the supplemental disclosure is available at
https://bit.ly/35vBmhK.

Wesco Aircraft Holdings, Inc. provides supply chain management
services to the global aerospace industry. The Company also
provides hardware, bearings, tools, electronic components, and
machined parts. Wesco Aircraft Holdings serves customers worldwide.
The company is based in Valencia, California.


WORK OUT WORLD: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Decision in Susinno Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Work Out World Inc. filed an appeal from a Court ruling
in the lawsuit titled Nooreen Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., Case
No. 3-15-cv-05881, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff
filed a First Amended Complaint individually and behalf of a
putative class of people who received phone calls from Defendant
Work Out World, contrary to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
According to the Complaint, in July 28, 2015, WOW used an automatic
dialing system that left a pre-recorded message in the Plaintiff's
voicemail system.

The appellate case is captioned as Nooreen Susinno v. Work Out
World Inc., Case No. 19-8037, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent NOOREEN SUSINNO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          E-mail: ari@marcuszelman.com
                  Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com

Defendant-Petitioner WORK OUT WORLD INC. is represented by:

          Michael H. Ansell, Esq.
          Joshua S. Bauchner, Esq.
          Seth M. Rosenstein, Esq.
          ANSELL GRIMM & AARON PC
          365 Rifle Camp Road
          Woodland Park, NJ 07424
          Telephone: (973) 247-9000
          E-mail: mha@ansellgrimm.com
                  jb@ansellgrimm.com
                  smr@ansellgrimm.com


[*] Alston & Bird Publishes Class Action & MDL Roundup Summer Ed.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Akerman, Esq. -- alex.akerman@alston.com --
Patrick M.W. Arnold, Esq. -- patrick.arnold@alston.com --
Christina Bortz, Esq. -- christina.bortz@alston.com --
Sam Bragg, Esq., Sarah Cansler, Esq., and David Carpenter, Esq., of
Alston & Bird, in an article for JDSupra, reported that Alston &
Bird has published the summer edition of its Class Action & MDL
Roundup.  The summer edition covers notable class actions from the
second quarter of 2019.

The Supreme Court granted cert on a pair of ERISA cases that
revived one ruling thought settled and upended another with a
circuit split. Wrong numbers were dialed in a pair of TCPA cases,
with one dismissal reversed on appeal and another finding that
wrong numbers protected the defendant from class certification.

A copy of the full publication is available at:

                      https://is.gd/lKe6OF
[GN]


[*] Blank Rome Attorneys Discuss BIPA Case Defense Strategies
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ana Tagvoryan, Esq. -- atagvoryan@blankrome.com --
Jeffrey N. Rosenthal, Esq. -- rosenthal-j@blankrome.com --
and David J. Oberly, Esq. -- doberly@blankrome.com --
of Blank Rome LLP, posted at Biometric Update the second article in
a two-part series examining Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy
Act (BIPA) and the flood of class action lawsuits alleging
violations of Illinois' biometric privacy law. The first article
explained BIPA's legal requirements and the impact of the Illinois
Supreme Court's January 2019 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment
Corp. decision, which opened the floodgates for individuals to sue
businesses utilizing biometric data for mere technical or
procedural violations of the law. This article provides tips and
strategies for corporate defendants to defend against BIPA class
action suits.

While there are a range of applicable defenses to BIPA claims, the
following are some of the more robust potential strategies to halt
BIPA claims in their tracks, or, at a minimum, limit the amount of
damages.

Lack of Article III standing in Federal Court.

One potential defense available to defendants in federal BIPA
litigation is Article III standing. To establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff must show, among other things, a cognizable
injury-in-fact. Thus, a plaintiff must show he or she suffered "an
invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and
particularized" and "actual and imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical." To be "concrete," an injury "must be 'de facto';
that is, it must actually exist." Significantly, in Spokeo v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court held
standing requires a concrete and particularized injury, even in the
context of a statutory violation.

In BIPA class action litigation, plaintiffs often allege mere
technical violations of the law without any real-world, actual
damages. When such bare procedural violations are alleged,
defendants can attack BIPA class lawsuits at the pleading stage by
arguing a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
case because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate they suffered "concrete
injuries" sufficient to satisfy Article III standing. For example,
in Rivera v. Google, Inc., No. 16-C-02714 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29,
2018), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois dismissed a BIPA lawsuit against Google pertaining to the
company's photo app technology based on an absence of any "concrete
injury" suffered by the plaintiffs sufficient to confer Article III
standing in connection with Google's alleged technical violations
of the law. Likewise, in Santana v. Take-Two Interactive, 717 Fed.
App'x 12 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that NBA 2K players lacked standing to pursue BIPA claims because
they suffered no actual injury or harm by the video game's
collection and retention of their face scans.

However, litigants must be careful to avoid using this tactic in
actions originating in state court, which are then subsequently
removed to federal court. In several recent cases, federal courts
have remanded suits back to state court where the defendant
challenged standing under Spokeo after removing the case from state
court to federal court. Here, courts are concerned with defendants
taking inconsistent positions: on the one hand arguing in favor of
federal jurisdiction, while on the other positing plaintiffs do not
have standing to pursue their claims in federal court. Thus, BIPA
defendants would be wise to exercise caution to only use a Spokeo
standing defense in suits originating in federal court. Even then,
a plaintiff may still refile a lawsuit in state court after
dismissal in federal court.

Lack of personal jurisdiction.

Second, personal jurisdiction arguments can also be raised at the
pleading stage to obtain an early dismissal.

For personal jurisdiction to exist, there must be either "general"
or "specific" jurisdiction over the defendant. With respect to
general personal jurisdiction, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct.
746 (2014), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that, absent
exceptional circumstances, a corporation is only subject to general
personal jurisdiction where its "affiliations with the state [] are
so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at
home in the forum state." To date, the Court has identified only
two places where that condition will be met: the state of the
corporation's principal place of business, and the state of its
incorporation. As such, a BIPA defendant would not be subject to
general personal jurisdiction where they are not "at home" in
Illinois -- i.e., where Illinois is not the defendant's principal
place of business or its state of incorporation.

As to specific personal jurisdiction, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S.Ct.
1773 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held "[i]n order for a state
court to exercise specific jurisdiction, 'the suit' must arise out
of or relate to the defendants' contacts with the forum." "In other
words, there must be 'an affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversy, principally, an activity or an occurrence
that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the
State's regulation.'"

Applied to BIPA litigation, defendants can establish a lack of
specific jurisdiction by demonstrating the absence of any
forum-related activities that caused plaintiffs harm for which the
defendant is responsible. Here, defendants should aim to show
plaintiffs' claims do not arise out, of, and are not related to,
the defendant's contacts with Illinois -- i.e., that all the
defendant's biometric-related activities took place beyond the
state's borders.

For example, in Gullen v. Faceboook.com, Inc., No. 15 C 7681 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 21, 2016), a BIPA action involving a suit by an Illinois
resident against Facebook was dismissed based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction where Facebook was neither incorporated nor had its
principal place of business in Illinois, and where the court
further concluded that specific jurisdiction did not exist because
Facebook did not target its biometric collection activities at
Illinois residents. Importantly, in reaching this conclusion the
court noted that the mere fact that Facebook's site was accessible
to Illinois residents did not confer specific jurisdiction over the
social media company. Moreover, the Gullen decision illustrates the
significant point that the focus of the personal jurisdiction
analysis is on the defendant, not the plaintiff(s). Thus, even in
cases involving plaintiffs who are Illinois residents, defendants
can still defeat BIPA suits where the defendant is not incorporated
nor has its principal place of business in Illinois, and the
defendant can demonstrate that it did not purposefully direct its
biometric practices specifically at Illinois residents.

Combined -- as the Gullen decision illustrates --
if defendants can establish the lack of both general and specific
personal jurisdiction, they can then seek to obtain an early
dismissal from BIPA litigation.

Extraterritoriality.

A third potential defense relates to extraterritoriality. Illinois
has a long-standing rule of construction that a statute is without
extraterritorial effect unless a clear intent appears from the
express provisions of the statute. Importantly, nothing in the BIPA
provides for such intent. Thus, to be actionable, a BIPA violation
must take place within the borders of Illinois, as the BIPA does
not apply extraterritorially.

Under Illinois law, the test for extraterritoriality is whether
"the circumstances relating to the challenged conduct [did or] did
not occur 'primarily and substantially within' Illinois." In other
words, "the majority of circumstances relating to the alleged
violation of the [statute]" must have occurred in the state.
Significantly, a lawsuit will fail this test if a "necessary
element of liability did not take place in Illinois."

In the context of BIPA litigation, many companies faced with BIPA
actions are incorporated outside of Illinois (principally,
Delaware), and are headquartered outside the state as well. In
addition, the biometric-related actions taken by a defendant -- for
example, the actual scan of a plaintiff's face geometry -- also
commonly takes place outside Illinois. Similarly, the storage of
biometric data also routinely occurs outside of Illinois. As the
district court noted in Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No.
1:16-cv-10984 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017), all these issues are
significant factors that could establish a valid
extraterritoriality argument. Thus, if users' biometric information
was collected and then stored outside Illinois, and all the
relevant activities took place outside of Illinois, a defendant may
have a potentially viable extraterritoriality defense to a BIPA
suit.

Statute of limitations.

Finally, the statute of limitations can also be raised as a
potential defense.

BIPA does not provide a specific limitations period. In the absence
of any express statute of limitations, Illinois courts look to
existing Illinois limitations periods and apply the most specific
one. Accordingly, an argument can be made in favor of imposing a
one-year limitations period set forth for privacy claims under 735
ILCS 5/13-201, which pertains to actions for "slander, libel, or
for the publication of matter violating the right of privacy."
Importantly, in Patel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-15982 (9th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2019), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a BIPA
violation is analogous to an invasion of privacy, which provides
strong support for the argument that 735 ILCS 5/13-201's tight
one-year statute of limitations period should be applied to BIPA
causes of action.

Alternatively, even if Section 13-201's one-year limitations period
was inapplicable, at most, BIPA claims should be subject to a
two-year limitations period under 735 ILCS 5/13-202, which applies
to claims for statutory penalties and personal injuries. A statute
is remedial where it imposes liability only when actual damage
results from a violation, and where liability is contingent upon
damage being proven by the plaintiff; whereas a statute is properly
characterized as penal when it imposes automatic liability and sets
forth a predetermined amount of damages regardless of actual
damages. Here, BIPA is a statutory penalty statute, as the Illinois
Supreme Court in Rosenbach plainly held that an individual need not
allege any actual injury beyond a violation of his or her rights to
seek damages. As the clear majority of plaintiffs in BIPA
litigation do not plead or seek actual damages, but rather,
liquidated damages in the form of the BIPA's $1,000 and $5,000
statutory damages figures, most -- if not all -- BIPA actions will
assert statutory penalty claims that should be subject to a
two-year statute of limitations.

By successfully arguing for a limited one (or even two) year
limitations period, BIPA defendants can reduce the size of a
proposed class as well as the potential amount of damages.

The final word.

Following Rosenbach, companies that collect and use biometric data
can expect flurry of BIPA class action lawsuits for the foreseeable
future. While Rosenbach greatly increased the scope of potential
exposure, several potentially applicable, robust BIPA defenses
exist that can be deployed in certain circumstances to defeat, or
limit, a broad assortment of BIPA actions. As such, BIPA defendants
and their legal counsel are well advised to add the above defenses
to their litigation toolbelt and should contact experienced counsel
about utilizing these potentially game-changing defenses whenever
possible.

                       About the authors

Ana Tagvoryan is a partner at Blank Rome LLP and serves as chair of
the Firm's Privacy Class Action Defense group and vice chair of the
Corporate Litigation group. Jeffrey N. Rosenthal is a partner at
Blank Rome LLP. He concentrates his complex corporate litigation
practice on consumer and privacy class action defense, and
regularly publishes and presents on class action trends, attorney
ethics and social media law. David J. Oberly is an associate at
Blank Rome LLP and is also a member of the Firm's Cybersecurity &
Data Privacy group. [GN]


[*] Cleary Gottlieb Attorneys Discuss SLUSA Class Action Ruling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Victor L. Hou, Esq. -- vhou@cgsh.com -- Roger A. Cooper, Esq. --
racooper@cgsh.com -- and Jared Gerber, Esq. -- jgerber@cgsh.com --

of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, in an article for Mondaq,
report that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
("SLUSA") generally precludes the assertion of claims under state
law in securities class actions, as well as in individual actions
that proceed together with such class actions.

In securities class actions that have generated opt-out litigation,
this provision has provided a powerful tool for defendants to seek
the dismissal of individual plaintiffs' state law claims, which may
not require allegations of intentional wrongdoing and can be
subject to longer statutes of limitations and/or repose than claims
under the federal securities laws.  However, a divided panel of the
Third Circuit held that individual actions filed after the
settlement of the related class action had not "proceed[ed] as a
single action for any purpose" with the class action, and that
therefore SLUSA did not preclude the state-law claims in those
individual actions.

The majority based its conclusion on its construction of the
statute, Congress's intent in enacting the securities laws, and
constitutional concerns about due process for plaintiffs who opt
out of a class action settlement. The decision highlights the
significance of class action settlement timing, as well as the
potentially complex and fact-intensive nature of the question of
whether multiple actions proceeded as a single action within the
meaning of SLUSA.

Background
In response to the perceived abusiveness of securities class action
lawsuits in the 1990s, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), which introduced a number
of reforms in securities litigation, including a process for
appointing lead plaintiffs in class actions, an automatic stay of
discovery until a motion to dismiss is decided, and heightened
pleading standards for securities fraud claims. In an attempt to
circumvent the PSLRA's requirements, class action plaintiffs began
bringing similar claims under state law and arguing that the
PSLRA's protections did not apply.  In an effort to prevent the
circumvention of the PSLRA, Congress enacted SLUSA in 1998, which
precludes the assertion of securities law claims under state law in
"covered class actions." SLUSA defines "covered class actions" to
include traditional class actions, as well as any group of lawsuits
"filed in or pending in the same court and involving common
questions of law or fact," "in which . . . damages are sought on
behalf of more than 50 persons" and "in which . . . the lawsuits
are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action
for any purpose." 3

District Court Proceedings
The North Sound case arose from plaintiffs' allegations that two
pharmaceutical companies concealed damaging clinical trial results,
which allegedly caused a drop in the companies' stock prices when
they were revealed. Investors filed putative class actions in the
District of New Jersey, alleging that the companies made material
misstatements regarding the drugs that were the subject of the
clinical trials. The actions survived the defendants' motions to
dismiss and the district court subsequently granted class
certification.

Following class certification, the district court approved notices
advising class members that if they opted out of the class they
would be able to "individually pursue any legal rights [they] have
against any Defendants." The class action subsequently settled, and
the district court granted final approval of the settlement in
October 2013.

Certain investors who had opted out of the class action, and
declined to opt back into the class after the settlement, filed
individual actions alleging federal securities claims and state
common law fraud claims in November 2013 and January 2014.Only
those opt-out plaintiffs' state law claim survived defendants'
initial motions to dismiss and a subsequent appeal.

On remand to the district court, defendants again moved to dismiss
the lawsuits, arguing that SLUSA barred plaintiffs' common law
fraud claim. 8Finding that SLUSA's legislative history, text and
purpose mandated an "expansive construction" of the relevant
statutory provision, 9 the district court held that "based on the
procedural history of, and degree of informal coordination between"
the individual actions and the class action, they had "proceeded as
a single action" and SLUSA barred the state law claims,
notwithstanding that the related class action had settled before
the individual actions were filed. 10Accordingly, the district
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining state law
claims.

Third Circuit
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered the question of "whether
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) prohibits
investors from bringing individual actions under state law if they
exercise their constitutionally protected right to opt out of a
class action." A divided court held that the plaintiffs' individual
actions were not "joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed[ing]
as a single action for any purpose" with the previously settled
class action, and thus their state law claims were not barred by
SLUSA.

Majority Opinion
The majority opinion held that the single-action requirement of
SLUSA requires "actual coordination" of the related
actions.Applying the canon of ejusdem generis -- which instructs
that where two or more words that "share a common attribute"
appear, successive words refer "only to persons or things of the
same general kind or class specifically mentioned" -- the majority
reasoned that the words "joined" and "consolidated" illuminated
what Congress meant by "otherwise proceed as a single action." The
court therefore held that for two actions to be a "single action"
within the meaning of SLUSA, they must be "somehow combined, in
whole or in part, for case management or for resolution of at least
one common issue."

Significantly, the court opined that actions are highly unlikely to
be so combined when one was filed after the settlement of the
other, such that they were never pending at the same time. In that
circumstance, "a court cannot combine them for management of a
common stage of the proceedings or for resolution of a common
question." On the other hand, the court clarified that cases need
not be "coextensive with one another" to meet the single-action
requirement of SLUSA, but they must be at least "partially
coordinated."

In reaching this result, the majority stated that a broader reading
would raise constitutional concerns by "burden[ing]" putative class
members' opt-out right, "or worse yet sap[ping] it of any meaning."
18The court also rejected defendants' suggestion that any benefit
the individual plaintiffs received from the existence of a class
action based on the same allegations would satisfy the
single-action requirement, remarking that "only a hermetically
sealed opt-out investor could possibly escape the all-encompassing
sweep of [this] proposed atextual rule." 19

Having thus defined the single-action requirement, the court
reversed the district court's conclusion that the actions proceeded
as a single action for the purposes of SLUSA preclusion.

Dissenting Opinion
Judge Shwartz dissented from the majority opinion, providing an
alternative textual analysis of the single-action requirement
focusing on the distinctions between the words "joined" and
"consolidated" on the one hand and the phrase "otherwise proceed as
a single action for any purpose" on the other. 20In particular,
Judge Shwartz reasoned that Congress included the latter "otherwise
proceed . . . for any purpose" language to "capture actions other
than those that have been actually associated via formal invocation
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 21Judge Shwartzfurther
concluded that the text of the statute did not impose a
simultaneity requirement. 22

As Judge Shwartz did not consider the lack of simultaneity to be an
obstacle to fulfilling the single-action requirement, she then
turned to evaluating the indicia of coordination that the district
court had considered. Based on the similarity of the class action
and individual action complaints, the filing of the individual
actions as related to the class action, and the benefits individual
plaintiffs obtained from class action discovery and pretrial
proceedings, Judge Shwartz concluded that the district court did
not err in holding that the individual suits were precluded by
SLUSA.

Implications
While the North Sound decision places a limit on SLUSA preclusion
by requiring as a condition for its application individual actions
to proceed at the same time as the related class action, the ruling
does not otherwise question the propriety of applying SLUSA to
opt-out actions that are coordinated with securities class actions,
as has been done in many prior securities litigations.

However, the decision leaves unanswered the precise degree of
coordination required to trigger SLUSA preclusion, as well as
whether state law claims should be dismissed where an opt-out
action is consolidated with a class action "over an opt-out
plaintiff's objection."25  Defendants facing securities class
actions with significant numbers of opt outs should consider these
issues in deciding whether to stay any opt-out actions during the
pendency of the class action, the degree to which to coordinate
discovery across the actions, and in considering the timing and
scope of any class action settlement. [GN]


[*] FTC Releases Report on Class Action Settlement Notices
----------------------------------------------------------
Alan S. Kaplinsky, Esq. -- kaplinsky@ballardspahr.com -- Mark J.
Levin, Esq. -- levinmj@ballardspahr.com -- and Matthew Morr, Esq.
-- morrm@ballardspahr.com -- of Ballard Spahr LLP, in an article
for JDSupra, report that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
recently released its preliminary report on two studies it
conducted to help understand the effectiveness of class action
settlement notices and to "develop information to help improve
settlement outcomes for consumers." The report shows that claims
rates, regardless of the form of notice, are very low and that some
of the more costly forms of notice, like publications in magazines
and national newspapers, do not significantly increase the claims
rate. The FTC did, however, identify certain characteristics
contained in emails (the least expensive form of notice) that
improved open rates and consumers' comprehension of notices.
Regardless, consumers' comprehension of the emails was very low -
less than half. The FTC noted that the results suggest that
consumers view class action settlement notices with healthy
skepticism.

The FTC performed the studies as part of its Class Action Fairness
Project. The initiative strives to make sure class settlements
provide appropriate benefits to consumers.

Importantly, the FTC, a consumer protection agency, made no effort
as part of these studies to determine if the underlying claims had
merit, if the settlements were fair under the circumstance of the
case, or if the people receiving notices would have been entitled
to any compensation had they brought their own lawsuit.

The first study, the Administrator Study, examined the
characteristics of 149 class action settlements. To obtain data
regarding the settlements, the FTC ordered seven claims
administrators to provide information on notification procedures
and response rates for different notice methods.  The FTC examined
149 settlements, 139 federal court. These included numerous cases
involving the consumer finance industry: six TCPA cases, seven
overdraft practices cases, 14 consumer privacy cases, 15
mortgage-related cases, 15 debt collection (including FDCPA)
cases), and 30 improper payment (charged or credited) cases.

This study found that the median calculated claims rate was 9
percent and the weighted mean (i.e., cases weighted by the number
of notice recipients) was only 4 percent. While the claims rates
varied by form of notification, the averages remained low. Notice
campaigns that used more expensive notice packets with claim forms
had claim rates of approximately 10 percent. The claims rates for
campaigns that cost less, using primarily postcards and email, was
about 6 percent and 3 percent, respectively. Importantly, the added
use of publication notice did not have a significant impact on the
claims rate. While publication notice is potentially important to
convince a court to approve the notice process, it can be very
expensive and take up a considerable percentage of the
administration fee and overall settlement amount.

The Administrator Study found that, of the consumers who submitted
claims, the overwhelming majority had their claims approved. The
median claim approval rate was 93 percent, with a weighted mean of
86 percent. Only 15 percent of the claims were incomplete or
inconsistent with the definition of the class and denied.

A piece of good news for businesses that settle class lawsuits: the
percentage of consumers who excluded themselves from the class
settlement or objected were miniscule, with weighted averages at
0.0003 percent and 0.01 percent, respectively.

In the second study, called the Notice Study, the FTC performed
internet-based consumer research to explore consumer perceptions of
emailed class action notices. While the FTC noted that its study
was not an endorsement of email notice, it recognized the reality
that class settlements are increasingly using email notifications,
especially for large, national classes, and Rule 23 was recently
amended to expressly endorse the use of email notice.

The FTC evaluated a number of factors, including the likelihood a
class action settlement email would be opened, whether the email
would be understood, and impressions about the email. While
potentially useful in crafting effective notices, the study has
limitations. By using a voluntary internet panel, percentages
cannot be projected to the national population. Further, the survey
platform did not replicate an authentic email experience. The
environment was not the same as the respondents' personal inboxes.

Interestingly, including a specific refund amount in the email
subject line, in a likely attempt to encourage the consumer to open
it, actually made it less likely that the email would be opened.
For example, 36 percent of the respondents said they would open an
email stating they were entitled to a $100 refund in the subject
line. But 40 percent of the respondents said they would open an
email that did not identify a refund amount in the subject line.
The respondents were also less likely, by 12 percent, to understand
the class action email if the refund amount appeared in the subject
line. Respondents were more likely to think emails that contained a
refund amount in the subject line were advertisements or spam.

The study also revealed a likely trade-off in crafting subject
lines. Short subject lines, like Notice of Refund, had
substantially higher open rates than longer subject lines. But
longer subject lines, without a refund amount, like Lavin v. Sonoro
Technologies Class Action Settlement and Notice of Class Action
Settlement, were more likely to be understood.

Further, the Notice Study examined how comprehension compared
between an email with a long format (a text-heavy notice
conventionally used in nationwide class action settlements) and an
experimental streamlined version. While the streamlined version was
more effective in conveying next steps to receive a settlement
payout, the long version was more effective in helping respondents
understand the nature of the email. Respondents were more
suspicious of the streamlined versions, frequently describing them
as "spam" or a "scam."

Overall, the level of comprehension of the emails was low. Only
38.2 percent correctly understood the nature of the email when
seeing it in the inbox, 49.3 percent correctly understood the
nature of the email when viewing the actual email, and only 40.5
percent understood the next steps required to receive a refund.

The FTC concluded that the results of the Notice Study suggest that
consumers may not fully understand the value of participating in
class action settlements and that there may be a need to more fully
educate consumers about the potential monetary benefits of class
action settlements.

Ballard Spahr noted it is not the least bit surprised by the FTC's
conclusions because prior studies that were conducted in
conjunction with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB)
2015 empirical study of consumer arbitration found that class
actions fare poorly when compared to other means of dispute
resolution, in particular individual consumer arbitration. For
example, in class settlements that required the putative class
members to submit a claim form, the weighted average claims rate
was only 4 percent, meaning that 96 percent of the potentially
eligible putative class members failed to obtain any benefits
because they did not submit claims. In addition, even those
minuscule claims rates fell by 90 percent if documentary proof was
required to be submitted along with the claim. Moreover, in 87
percent of the 562 class actions the CFPB studied, the putative
class members received no benefits whatsoever because they were
settled individually or withdrawn by the plaintiff or had reached
no result while the study was ongoing. In the 13 percent of the
class actions that settled, the average class member's recovery was
a mere $32.35. The lawyers for the class, by contrast, recovered a
whopping $424,495,451 in attorneys' fees. By contrast, in
arbitrations where consumers obtained relief on affirmative claims,
the consumer's average recovery was $5,389 (an average of 57 cents
for every dollar claimed and 166 times as much as the average
putative class member's recovery).  The CFPB's statistics further
showed that consumer arbitration is up to 12 times faster than
consumer class action litigation.

A 2013 empirical study of class actions by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform titled "Do Class Actions
Benefit Class Members?" analyzed 148 putative consumer and employee
class action lawsuits filed in or removed to federal court in 2009.
The Chamber's report found, inter alia, that:

   * Not one of the class actions studied ended in a final judgment
on the merits for the plaintiffs. And none of the class actions
went to trial, either before a judge or a jury.

   * The vast majority of cases produced no benefits to most
members of the putative class—even though in a number of those
cases the lawyers who sought to represent the class often enriched
themselves in the process.

   * Over one-third (35 percent) of the class actions that were
resolved were dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiff. Many of those
cases settled on an individual basis, meaning a payout to the
individual named plaintiff and the lawyers who brought the suit,
even though the class members received nothing.

   * Just under one-third (31 percent) of the class actions that
were resolved were dismissed by a court on the merits, meaning that
class members received nothing.

   * For those cases that settled, there was often little or no
benefit for class members. Moreover, few class members ever saw
those paltry benefits, particularly in consumer class actions.

On October 29, 2019, the FTC will hold a public workshop in
Washington, D.C., on improving class action settlement notices for
consumers. The event will address current practices and research
related to class action notices, redress methods, claims rates,
check-cashing rates, and similar issues. Specifically, the FTC will
include a continued examination of the issues raised in the
preliminary report. [GN]


[*] Univ. of Windsor Launches First Non-Profit Class Action Clinic
------------------------------------------------------------------
Sharon Hill, writing for Windsor Star, reports that a new legal
clinic for class-action lawsuits was set to be launched on Oct. 2
through the University of Windsor's Faculty of Law.

The Class Action Clinic at Windsor Law downtown is the first clinic
of its kind in North America, law professor and clinic director
Jasminka Kalajdzic said on Oct. 1.

"There is no other organization that's on a not-for-profit basis
that provides legal support and advice to class members . . .
anywhere as far as I can tell," she said.

Kalajdzic saw an unmet need. Over the years she has fielded many
calls and emails from people looking for basic information on how
class actions work, understanding a court notice or filling out a
claims form. People may hear about a lawsuit of a potentially
defective product they used but not know if they can be a part of
that class action or they receive a notice in the mail but don't
understand it.

The clinic isn't looking to start class action lawsuits but help
class members, people who are already part of a lawsuit or think
they may be part of one, understand their rights and navigate the
legal proceedings where thousands of people may be eligible for
compensation.

Class action members are often called absent clients, Kalajdzic
said. They don't have the traditional lawyer-client relationship
because there may be only a few representative plaintiffs in the
lawsuit. The clinic wants to provide free legal support for this
unique group of people in Windsor-Essex and across Canada.

"These cases are all about class members. At the end of the day
it's about a very large group of people sometimes who claim to have
been harmed and we're trying to get justice for them," she said.
"We see our role as helping ensure that people participate to the
fullest extent in this really important type of litigation and
expanding awareness of the useful role class actions can play."

The Class Action Clinic at Windsor Hall (167 Ferry Street) received
$100,000 in start-up funding from The Law Foundation of Ontario. It
is staffed by Kalajdzic and Windsor law students and will be able
to help class action members across Canada through its website
classactionclinic.com and by telephone and video conferencing.

The clinic will also have a central database of class actions and
their results which may be the first and only comprehensive
database of class actions in Ontario. [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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