CAR_Public/191113.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, November 13, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 227

                            Headlines

3F TECHNOLOGY: Cruz Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
AARP, INC: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification in Friedman
ABC INC: Faces Klawien Class Suit in Minnesota District Court
ADP SCREENING: Fifer Remanded to Santa Clara County Superior Court
ALIGN TECHNOLOGY: Court Endorses Dismissal of Simon Antitrust Suit

AMERICAN CARPET: Vieira Suit Seeks Overtime Pay for Installers
ANTONIO MASONRY: Violates Wage and Hour Laws, Paucar Suit Says
AT&T MOBILITY: Bid to Remand Arkins Suit to Kanawha Court Denied
AUTO CLUB: Rothstein Appeals Order and Judgment to Second Circuit
BEAR DOWN: Weigmann Seeks to Recover OT Pay for Delivery Drivers

BURBERRY LIMITED: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CALIFORNIA NATURAL: Suarez Can Amend Consumer Suit, Court Rules
CAPSTAN HEALTHCARE: Remand of Associated Management Suit Denied
CARDINAL FINANCIAL: Faces Winters Suit Alleging Invasion of Privacy
CBDMD INC: Olsen Files ADA Class Action in New York

CHICAGO, IL: Motion to Certify Class in Jackson Suit Continued
CLUB MONACO: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
COMMUNITY HEALTH: Appeals Decision in Norfolk Securities Suit
CONSOL ENERGY: Bid to Certify Class in Fitzwater ERISA Suit Denied
CROWN EQUIPMENT: Brown Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California

CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP: Court Denies Schenck Class Certification Bid
DAUPHINS LLC: Joint Bid for Certification in Boothe Suit Granted
DETROIT, MI: Court Grants Bid to Amend Frontczak Civil Rights Suit
DIPLOMAT PHARMACY: Reconsideration Bid in Mortimer Case Nixed
DSW SHOE: Morrison Suit Closed Due to Deficiencies

EMERSON COLLEGE: Court Dismisses Camacho ADA Suit
ENDO INT'L: Dec. 11 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Reyes Suit
EXXON MOBIL: Court Dismisses Wheeler Suit Without Prejudice
FEDEX GROUND: Farrell Suit Removed to New Jersey District Court

FIRST AMERICAN: Show Cause Order Issued in Contract Breach Suit
GAP INC: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Court Stays Mahar Suit Over Stock Direct Plan
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION: Nasseri Sues Over Losses From Layne Merger
HAYT HAYT: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Order in Barenbaum FDCPA Suit

HEARTLAND EXPRESS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Connell Suit Says
HENRY COUNTY, IN: Summary Judgment Bid in Baker Suit Partly Granted
HNN ASSOCIATES: Jammeh Can File 2nd Amended FDCPA Suit
HORIZON TALK: Sued by Castillo Over Unsolicited Marketing Texts
IOC-BOONVILLE, INC: Nicholson Seeks to Certify FLSA Collectives

IROBOT CORP: Campbell Sues Over Drastic Decline in Share Price
JACOBS ENGINEERING: Delozier Sues Over Dec. 2008 Coal Ash Spill
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Accruals Established in XARELTO(R) Related Suits
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend INVOKANA(R) Related Suits
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend Talc-Related Class Suits

JUUL LABS: Flores Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Biometric Data
KANSAS CITY, MO: Civil Contempt Judgment in Sophian Suit Reversed
KILCOY PASTORAL: Smithson Sues Over Collection of Biometric Data
KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: Cal. Eastern Dist. Stays Martinez Labor Suit
KOHLBERG VENTURES: Workers Class Certified in Wojciechowski Suit

KOLTER GROUP: Faces Devivo Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing Texts
LANCASTER GENERAL: 3rd Cir. Appeal Filed in St. Luke's RICO Suit
LOAD TRAIL: Class in Ramirez FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
LOS ANGELES, CA: Balber's Appeal on Eck Settlement Order Tossed
MAC GRADING: Gonzales Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA & NCWHA

MDL 2913: Emidy v. JUUL Suit Over E-Cigarettes Consolidated
MEC DEVELOPMENT: Court Okays 2nd Settlement Bid in Jefferson Suit
MEDIANT COMMUNICATIONS: Faces Braun Class Suit Over Data Breach
MEDICOPY SERVICES: Swetlic Files Initial Bid to Certify Class
MEDTERRA CBD: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

METROPOLITAN LIFE: Certification of Newman Settlement Class Sought
MIDLAND CREDIT: Gimble Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. California
MIDTOWN CENTER: Fails to Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Camacho Claims
MISSION LINEN: Faces Fleming Employee Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
MISSOURI: Wright, et al. Seek to Certify Class of Drivers

NATIVE ANGELS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Floyd Says
NCAA: Amell Sues Over Disregard for Health of Student-Athletes
NORTHERN TRUST: Certification of 3 Classes Sought in Banks Suit
PLAINS ALL: Grey Fox Moves to Certify Class of Property Owners
POLK COUNTY, FL: Case Seeks Certification of Employees Class

PRO CUSTOM: Venson Sues Over Racial Harassment & Discrimination
PURITY COSMETICS: Fails to Comply With Gift Card Law, Rubio Says
QUAD/GRAPHICS INC: Born Seeks Damages From Decline of Share Price
RFS INVESTMENTS: Solorio Seeks Owed Wages for Non-Exempt Workers
SABOR VENEZOLANO: Barboza Seeks to Recoup Overtime Pay Under FLSA

SAN GABRIEL CITY, CA: Goltermann Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
SANTA ROSA: Mendoza, et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
SEDGWICK CLAIMS: Easterwood Seeks to Certify Employees Class
SHIVA SHAKTI: Bolyard Wants to Collect Overtime Pay Under FLSA
SOUTHERN RESPONSE: Kedney Files FLSA Suit in S.D. Alabama

SUFFOLK CTY, NY: Eames Files Civil Rights Suit
TERRA OILFIELD: Barhight Seeks to Certify Class of Operators
TRANS CONTINENTAL: Stokes Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
TUCKER ALBIN: Faces Fabricant Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
UMB BANK: Court Certifies Class of Mortgage Loan Originators

UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Doe Sues Over Discriminatory IBT Exclusions
UNITED STATES: Court Denies Prelim. Injunction Bid in Rosa Suit
UNITED STATES: K. Thomas' Claims vs. ICE to Proceed in Civil Case
UNITED STATES: Vara Sues Over Refusal to Discharge Student Loans
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: 2nd Cir. Upholds Dismissal of KLI Suit

UNIVERSAL PROPERTY: Watkins Files Class Suit in W.D. North Carolina
USA: USCIS & ICE Referral Classes in Nightingale Suit Certified
WAYFAIR INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Nicholas Suit
WAYNE, MI: Mich. App. Upholds Summary Disposition in Retirees' Suit
WELLS FARGO: Court Dismisses Ehrenfeld's RESPA Suit


                            *********

3F TECHNOLOGY: Cruz Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Cruz, Individually and For Others Similarly Situated v. 3F
TECHNOLOGY, LLC D/B/A PROGRESSIVE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, FERNANDO
FERNANDEZ, RAUL RODRIGUEZ, and ROMAN CORONADO, Case No.
4:19-cv-04386 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 7, 2019), is brought under the Fair
Labor Standards Act to recover unpaid overtime compensation.

According to the complaint, the Defendants paid the Plaintiff at
the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in
excess of 40 in a workweek. Rather than receiving time and half as
required by the FLSA, the Plaintiff only received "straight time"
pay for overtime hours worked. The Defendants were aware of the
overtime requirements of the FLSA. The Defendants' failure to pay
overtime to these hourly workers was a willful violation of the
FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff David Cruz was employed by the Defendants as a lead
technician from May 2019 to September 2019.

3F is a technology company providing copper cabling, fiber optics
and coax cabling services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          Amanda E. McGowen, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Phone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          Email: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                 scott@bohrerbrady.com
                 amcgowen@bohrerbrady.com


AARP, INC: Court Denies Motion for Class Certification in Friedman
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JERALD FRIEDMAN, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
AARP, INC., AARP SERVICES, INC., AARP INSURANCE PLAN, UNITEDHEALTH
GROUP, INC., and UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, the
Defendants, Case No. 2:14-cv-00034-DDP-PLA (C.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Dean D. Pregerson entered an order on Nov. 1, 2019,
dismissing the Third Amended Complaint without leave to amend and
denying Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The court said, "Defendants challenge the sufficiency of
Plaintiffs' state law claims, money had and received, conversion,
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and financial elder abuse. The Plaintiffs do not allege
that they paid more than the DOI-approved rate or that they paid
more than they agreed to pay. Plaintiffs' theory that they paid
"more than what is required to obtain coverage under the insurance
policy," is not plausible to support the state law claims. Absent
any plausible allegations that Defendants charged Plaintiffs more
than Plaintiffs agreed to pay, that Defendants provided
unsatisfactory coverage, or that the contract prohibited Defendants
from the alleged conduct, Plaintiffs state law claims fail."

In or around 2011, the Plaintiffs purchased a type of health
insurance policy, known as a "Medigap" policy, which is designed to
offer extra coverage to Medicare beneficiaries beyond the basic
Medicare benefits, including coverage of copays and deductibles
that would otherwise be the patient's responsibility.

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action in January 2014
asserting violations of California's Unfair Competition Law, money
had and received, and conversion.[CC]

ABC INC: Faces Klawien Class Suit in Minnesota District Court
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ABC Seamless. The
case is captioned as Bree Klawien, Rory Klawien, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ABC, Inc. dba ABC
Seamless, Defendant, Case No. 27-CV-19-17744 (Minn. Dist., Oct. 22,
2019).

ABC Seamless offers superior siding, roofs and gutters services to
homeowners across the nation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anna Purna Prakash, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center
          80 South Eighth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612-256-3291
          Facsimile: 612-338-4878
          E-mail: aprakash@nka.com


ADP SCREENING: Fifer Remanded to Santa Clara County Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DESTINY FIFER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ADP SCREENING
AND SELECTION SERVICES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-03174-LHK
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (i) granted the Plaintiff's motion
to remand, and (ii) denied as moot the Defendant's motion to
transfer.

Defendant ADP Screening is a Colorado corporation that routinely
does business in California.  It creates credit and background
reports that it then provides to employers who use these reports in
connection with their hiring decisions.  The Plaintiff alleges that
the Defendant provides these reports to employers without first
obtaining a certification that the employers made the required
disclosure to, and received authorization from, prospective
employees, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(1).

On an unspecified date, Plaintiff Destiny Fifer, a California
resident, applied for employment with Smith and Noble, LLC.
Plaintiff claims that after she applied for employment, the
Defendant performed a background investigation on her. However, she
alleges that the Defendant never obtained a certification from
Smith and Noble that Smith and Noble had disclosed the existence
of, and received the Plaintiff's authorization for, the background
investigation, as required by 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(1).

On April 15, 2019, a putative class action complaint was filed in
California Superior Court for the County of Santa Clara.  The
complaint asserted only a single cause of action: failure to obtain
certification in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA").  On June 6, 2019, the Defendant removed the case to
federal court on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction.
Then, on June 13, 2019, the Defendant answered the complaint.

On June 14, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint
("FAC"). The FAC replaced the two previous putative class
representatives with the Plaintiff, and the FAC asserted the same
single cause of action for failure to obtain certification in
violation of the FCRA.  The Defendant answered the FAC on June 28,
2019.

The Plaintiff seeks to remand the present case to state court,
while the Defendant argues that the case should instead be
transferred to the District of Colorado for further proceedings.
In light of these divergent requests, the parties raise the
threshold issue of the order in which the court should resolve the
pending motions.  The Plaintiff argues that courts faced with a
competing motion to remand and motion to transfer typically resolve
the former before the latter.  On the other hand, the Defendant
argues that the Court should proceed directly to the motion to
transfer, in order to potentially permit a more appropriate venue
to analyze the propriety of remand.

With respect to the underlying motion to remand, the Plaintiff
argues that remand is necessary because Article III standing does
not exist in the present case.  According to the Plaintiff, because
the FAC solely asserts a bare procedural violation of the FCRA, the
FAC does not allege a concrete harm sufficient to confer standing
to her.  On the other hand, the Defendant claims that remand of the
present case would be premature.

Judge Koh finds that the Defendant provides no information about
why the District of Colorado is better situated than the California
District Court to resolve the standing question in the present
case.  Relatedly, it provides no reason to believe that the
jurisdictional issue appears factually or legally difficult, such
that the Court should defer deciding the motion to remand.  

Judge Koh further concludes that the Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing.  Because the Plaintiff lacks standing, the Judge does not
have subject matter jurisdiction.  However, Section 1681p of the
FCRA expressly grants concurrent federal-state jurisdiction over
FCRA claims.  Accordingly, remand to state court is proper under 28
U.S.C. Section 1447(c), Judge Koh states.

Finally, the Plaintiff argues that upon granting the motion to
remand, the Court must deny as moot the Defendant's motion to
transfer.  Judge Koh agrees.  After granting a motion to remand
while a motion to transfer is pending, the proper course is to deny
as moot the motion to transfer.  Accordingly, Judge Koh denies as
moot the Defendant's motion to transfer.

Accordingly, Judge Koh granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand,
and denied as moot the Defendant's motion to transfer.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/kdFoUb from Leagle.com.

Destiny Fifer, on behalf of themselves, all other similarly
situated & Catrina R. Rodriguez, on behalf of themselves, all other
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Chaim Shaun Setareh
-- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Ashley N. Batiste --
ashley@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group, Farrah Grant --
farrah@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group & Thomas Alistair Segal
-- william@setarehlaw.com -- Setareh Law Group.

ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc., a Colorado corporation,
Defendant, represented by Annie Lau -- alau@fisherphillips.com- --
Fisher and Phillips LLP, James M. Patrick, Fisher Phillips, pro hac
vice, Richard A. Millisor -- rmillisor@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher
Phillips, pro hac vice & Spencer W. Waldron --
swaldron@fisherphillips.com -- Fisher Phillips LLP.


ALIGN TECHNOLOGY: Court Endorses Dismissal of Simon Antitrust Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SIMON AND SIMON, PC d/b/a CITY SMILES, Plaintiff, v.
ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC., Defendant, C.A. No. 19-506 (LPS) (D. Del.),
Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Hall of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware recommends that Align's motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) be granted.

Plaintiff Simon and Simon, PC, doing business as City Smiles, filed
an antitrust class action complaint against Defendant Align on
March 14, 2019, alleging violations of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.  

Align sells the Invisalign system, an orthodontic treatment for
straightening teeth without metal braces.  It involves the use of
custom-made, plastic dental aligners.  To make the aligners, Align
requires a dental professional to obtain an impression of the
patient's teeth and transmit that impression to Align. One way to
take an impression is with a digital intraoral scanner.  In
September 2015, Align introduced a scanner called the iTero
Element, which can be used to order Invisalign from Align.  

City Smiles, a dental practice in Chicago, purchased Align's iTero
Element scanner in December 2016 and has prescribed Invisalign to
its patients.

The Complaint takes issue with two categories of conduct by Align
that, the Plaintiff contends, amount to an anticompetitive scheme
to monopolize both the scanner and the aligner markets.  The first
relates to the criteria under which Align accepts orders for
Invisalign.  The second category of challenged conduct relates to
the design of the iTero Element.  

According to City Smiles, those two categories of conduct by Align
-- (1) Align's refusal to accept scans from the Trios scanner for
Invisalign orders and (2) the design of Align's scanner -- operate
as a de facto bundle by making it impracticable for Dental
Practices to sell Invisalign without an iTero Scanner, or for
Dental Practices with an iTero Scanner to sell other Aligners.
City Smiles alleges that Align's actions have harmed competition in
the scanner and aligner markets, resulting in higher prices,
reduced competition, and reduced product choice.  According to City
Smiles, it was injured as a direct result of its purchase of an
iTero Element scanner in 2016 and the numerous Invisalign orders it
made between 2015 and 2018, all at "artificially inflated" prices.

City Smiles' Complaint sets forth the following claims:
monopolization of the clear aligner market under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act; and monopolization of the market for scanners for
orthodontic treatment under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Count 2).
City Smiles seeks treble damages and injunctive relief under
Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, respectively.

A previous antitrust lawsuit against Align was also before the
Court, 3Shape Trios A/S v. Align Technology, Inc., C.A. No.
18-1332-LPS (D. Del.).  On Aug. 15, 2019, Magistrate Judge Hall
recommended that the other case be dismissed without prejudice,
and, on Sept. 26, 2019, the Court adopted her Report and
Recommendation.  Similar facts and legal theories are at issue in
the instant case.

Pending before the Court is Align's motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to
transfer the case to the Northern District of California, filed on
April 5, 2019.  The parties completed the briefing on May 10, 2019.
Align requested oral argument.  The Court heard oral argument on
Aug. 1, 2019.

Magistrate Judge Hall concludes that City Smiles' Complaint fails
to plausibly allege anticompetitive conduct, a required element of
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  As explained,
the Complaint in the case sets forth two categories of conduct
that, City Smiles alleges, are anticompetitive: (1) Align's refusal
to accept Invisalign aligner orders sent from 3Shape's Trios
scanner and (2) Align's design of its iTero scanner (to make it
easier and cheaper to order Invisalign aligners than aligners made
by its competitors).

The Magistrate Judge finds that because the Complaint does not
plausibly allege circumstances invoking the refusal to deal
doctrine, Align's termination of the agreement with 3Shape by
itself is not anticompetitive.  Also, absent a duty to deal,
antitrust law does not require a firm to lend its competitors a
helping hand.  Align's design of its iTero Element scanner by
itself does not constitute anticompetitive conduct.  Furthermore,
she finds that the Plaintiff's two wrong refusal to deal claims do
not make a right.  The Plaintiff's characterization of Align's
otherwise non-actionable refusals to deal as a "scheme" do not save
its claims.  The Plaintiff's characterization of Align's conduct as
"bundling" does not save its claims.  Finally, as 3Shape's failure
to plead anticompetitive conduct fully supports granting Align's
motion to dismiss, the Magistrate need not decide whether the other
grounds raised by Align (lack of standing and failure to allege
relevant product markets) would also support dismissal.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Align's motion be
granted; that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice; and
that City Smiles be granted leave to amend the Complaint within 21
days.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/yGZ4he from
Leagle.com.

Simon and Simon, PC, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey S. Goddess --
jgoddess@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A., Daniel
E. Rubenstein, Mintz & Fraade P.C., pro hac vice, Daniel J. Walker,
pro hac vice, Eric L. Cramer, pro hac vice, Jessica Zeldin --
jzeldin@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A., John D.
Radice, Radice Law Firm, P.C., pro hac vice, Peter Bradford DeLeeuw
-- bdeleeuw@rmgglaw.com -- Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. &
Rishi Raithatha -- jradice@radicelawfirm.com -- Radice Law Firm,
PC, pro hac vice.

Align Technology, Inc., Defendant, represented by Abigail H. Wald,
Paul Hastings LLP, pro hac vice, Grant N. Margeson --
grantmargeson@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, pro hac vice,
John P. Phillips, Paul Hastings LLP, pro hac vice, Nathan Roger
Hoeschen, Shaw Keller LLP, Noah B. Pinegar, Paul Hastings LLP, pro
hac vice, Thomas Brown -- tombrown@paulhastings.com -- Paul
Hastings LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas A. Counts --
tomcounts@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, pro hac vice.


AMERICAN CARPET: Vieira Suit Seeks Overtime Pay for Installers
--------------------------------------------------------------
HUMBERTO VIEIRA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN CARPET SOUTH, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-12181 (D. Mass., Oct. 22, 2019), is brought on behalf
of individuals, who are current and former flooring and carpet
installers of ACS and who were classified as independent
contractors rather than employees and, as a result, were not paid
overtime wages.

The Plaintiff alleges that although ACS classified him and the
class as independent contractors, they were in fact ACS's employees
under Massachusetts law and, in the alternative, New Hampshire law.
The Plaintiff also asserts claims of quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment under Massachusetts common law and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

While the Plaintiff worked out of ACS's warehouse in Hudson, New
Hampshire, he lived in Lowell, Massachusetts, and performed the
majority of his work in Massachusetts.

Further, as a result of said misclassification, the Plaintiff
individually and a group of similarly situated employees have had
deductions taken from their pay and have not been paid for all
hours worked, and have worked far in excess of 40 hours per week
without receiving overtime, the lawsuit says.

ACS provides flooring and carpet installation services to its own
customers, as well as to customers, who purchase flooring or carpet
through Home Depot.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
          Thomas P. Fowler, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston St., Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800
          E-mail: hlichten@llrlaw.com
                  tfowler@llrlaw.com


ANTONIO MASONRY: Violates Wage and Hour Laws, Paucar Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE NATONIO ROMERO PAUCAR, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ANTONIO MASONRY CORP., and
MARIO YUNGA, as individual, Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-05942-WF-RML (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 22, 2019), seeks to recover
damages for violations of state and federal wage and hour laws
arising out of the Plaintiff's employment at Antonio Masonry Corp.


The Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and liquidated damages in
an amount exceeding $100,000. The Plaintiff also seeks interest,
attorneys' fees, costs, and all other legal and equitable remedies
the Court deems appropriate under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from 1994 until
November 2018. The Plaintiff's primary duties was a brick layer.

Although the Plaintiff worked approximately 56 or more hours per
week during his employment, the Defendants did not pay him time and
a half for hours worked over 40, a blatant violation of the
overtime provisions contained in the FLSA and NYLL, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: 718-263-9591


AT&T MOBILITY: Bid to Remand Arkins Suit to Kanawha Court Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH ATKINS, JUSTIN ROACH, and JAMES HULL,
individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated
persons, Plaintiffs, v. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES, LLC, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00599 (S.D. W. Va.), Judge John T.
Copenhaver, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, Charleston, denied the Plaintiffs'
motion to remand, filed on May 23, 2018.

Plaintiffs Atkins, Roach, and Hull initiated the putative class
action in the Circuit Court for Kanawha County, West Virginia, on
Sept. 15, 2015.  They were employed in a sales capacity by AT&T
between September 2010 and September 2015, and were compensated by
both hourly wages and sales commissions through the AT&T consumer
retail sales compensation plan.  The Commission Plan applied
"chargebacks" based on certain events that reduced the monthly
commission payment to employees.

The complaint filed in state court alleges that the "chargeback"
process implemented by AT&T constitutes an assignment of wages to
AT&T for which AT&T did not obtain a valid wage assignment from the
Plaintiffs, as required under the West Virginia Wage Payment and
Collection Act ("WPCA").  The Plaintiffs also assert that AT&T
violated the WPCA by failing to pay other former employees all of
the wages they had earned within the time periods mandated by the
WPCA.  

The Plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of the following proposed
class ("First Class Definition"): All persons formerly employed by
the Defendant in West Virginia within five years of the filing of
the filing of the Complaint who fit both of the following criteria:
(a) Whose employment wages were assigned by Defendant without an
assignment (1) having been in place for a period not exceeding one
year from the date of the assignment; (2) acknowledged by the party
making the same before a notary public or other officer authorized
to take acknowledgements; (3) specifying thereon the total amount
due and collectible by virtue of the assignment; (4) stating that
three fourths of the periodical earnings or wages of the assignor
will at all times be exempt from such assignment; and (5) the
written acceptance of the employer of the assignor to the making
thereof, is endorsed thereon, and (b) Who were not paid after the
cessation of their employment all of the wages they had earned
within the time periods mandated by West Virginia Wage Payment and
Collection Act.  The complaint did not allege any specific damage
amounts on either an individual or class basis.

The Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on May 15,
2017 and proposed the following class definition ("Second Class
Definition"): All persons formerly or currently employed by the
Defendant in West Virginia within five years of the filing of the
Complaint through the present whose employment wages were assigned
by Defendant without first obtaining a wage assignment pursuant to
West Virginia's Wage Payment and Collection Act.  AT&T opposed the
motion for class certification on several grounds, including the
scope of the proposed class.

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for class
certification on March 22, 2018.  At the hearing, the Plaintiffs
moved to amend the proposed class definition.  The judge orally
granted the amended definition and certified the class as such.

The Plaintiffs prepared a proposed order with the following class
definition ("Third Class Definition"): All commissioned employees
currently or formerly employed by Defendant in West Virginia within
five years of the filing of the complaint through the present who
were subject to AT&T Mobility's consumer related sales compensation
policy.  The class excludes any persons with an existing
arbitration clause with AT&T, as well as any persons who have
released their claims.  AT&T did not address this proposed order.

On April 23, 2018, AT&T removed the case by asserting that the
Virginia District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").  The Plaintiffs filed a
motion to remand on May 23, 2018, in which they argue that AT&T's
removal was untimely.  AT&T filed a response in opposition to the
Plaintiffs' motion to remand, to which the Plaintiffs filed a
reply.

The Plaintiffs' only objection to removal is that AT&T failed to
remove this action in a timely manner within 30 days of when the
action became removable, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b).
They contend that the action became removable under CAFA when they
filed the motion for class certification on May 15, 2017, and that
the notice of removal filed on April 23, 2018 was therefore
untimely.

AT&T disagrees, stating that neither the motion for class
certification nor any order or other document provided by the
Plaintiffs informs the Defendant as to the number of class members
or the amount in controversy, and thus, the 30-day removal period
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b) was never triggered.

Judge Copenhaver finds that the motion for class certification does
not contain any damages calculation, but merely indicates that the
Plaintiffs are entitled to the statutory damages allowed by the
WPCA.  They simply assert (repeatedly) that the damages are easily
quantifiable as they are set by the WPCA.  It is likely that AT&T
was in possession of all the information necessary to calculate the
amount in controversy at the time it received the motion; however,
this is not enough to challenge the removal as untimely.  AT&T was
under no obligation to investigate its own business to discern the
amount in controversy.

Judge Copenhaver further finds that the cases to which Plaintiffs
cite in support of their contention that the motion for class
certification contained a clue to which AT&T might apply
"reasonable intelligence" to ascertain the amount in controversy
are inapposite.  Those cases involve simple multiplication or
percentage valuations of numbers already provided to the defendant.


The Plaintiffs also fail to estimate the potential number of
members in the proposed class, a number that would be necessary to
calculate a reasonable estimate of the amount in controversy, the
Judge cites.  Calculating the amount in controversy requires
knowing the approximate number of members in the proposed class,
the value of the "chargebacks" for each class member, and any
damages multiplier, plus statutory interest and attorney's fees.
The Plaintiffs furthermore do not contend that they ever provided
these numbers to the Defendant.  Calculating these numbers requires
investigating facts outside of the "four corners of the initial
pleading or subsequent paper," which directly contradicts Fourth
Circuit precedent and the bright-line rule of other circuits.

Finally, the Judge finds that the 39-day period for removal under
28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b) was not triggered in the action because
the Plaintiffs did not provide AT&T with sufficient facts by which
the amount in controversy could be reasonably or readily scertained
from the "four corners" of an "amended pleading, motion, order or
other paper."  AT&T was permitted to remove at any time upon
discovering, by its own investigation, removability under CAFA.  As
such, the Judge need not consider AT&T's further argument regarding
the number of class members in the action.

Accordingly, Judge Copenhaver denies the Plaintiffs' motion to
remand.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/2A1tZd from
Leagle.com.

Joseph Atkins, Justin Roach & James Hull, Plaintiffs, individually,
and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated persons, Plaintiffs,
represented by D. Blake Carter, Jr. -- jrcarter@bbjlc.com -- BUCCI
BAILEY & JAVINS, Jonathan R. Marshall --
jmarshall@baileyglasser.com -- BAILEY & GLASSER, L. Lee Javins, II
-- ljavins@bjc4u.com -- BAILEY JAVINS & CARTER, Mark A. Barney --
mbarney@barneylawwv.com -- BARNEY LAW & Patricia M. Kipnis, BAILEY
& GLASSER.

AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, a foreign limited liability company,
Defendant, represented by Christopher M. Michalik, MCGUIRE WOODS,
pro hac vice, James F. Neale -- jneale@mcguirewoods.com -- MCGUIRE
WOODS & Richard David Owen, GOODWIN & GOODWIN.


AUTO CLUB: Rothstein Appeals Order and Judgment to Second Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Iris Rothstein and Stanley Rothstein filed an appeal
from the District Court's order, dated September 18, 2019, and
judgment, dated September 19, 2019, issued in their lawsuit styled
Rothstein, et al. v. Auto Club South, et al., Case No. 15-cv-9391,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
bring the putative class action against Auto Club South, American
Automobile Association (AAA) and Priceline.com claiming that the
Plaintiffs booked three hotel reservations through AAA.com, which
promoted its reservation service as having "member rates with
exclusive AAA member savings," that the website represented that no
fees would be charged with respect to such bookings, and that
plaintiffs later discovered that they had not received "exclusive
member savings" on their rooms and had been charged fees with
respect to the bookings.

The appellate case is captioned as Rothstein, et al. v. Auto Club
South, et al., Case No. 19-3340, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Iris Rothstein, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, and Stanley Rothstein, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Noah Axler, Esq.
          DONOVAN AXLER, LLC
          Donovan Searles
          1845 Walnut Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 732-6067
          E-mail: naxler@donovanaxler.com

Defendants-Appellees Auto Club South and American Automobile
Association are represented by:

          Harvey W. Gurland, Jr., Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS LLP
          200 South Biscayne Boulevard
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 960-2214
          E-mail: HWGurland@duanemorris.com

Defendant-Appellee Priceline.com is represented by:

          Paul Evans Chronis, Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS LLP
          190 South LaSalle Street
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 499-6765
          E-mail: PEChronis@duanemorris.com


BEAR DOWN: Weigmann Seeks to Recover OT Pay for Delivery Drivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER WEIGMANN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BEAR DOWN LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-1545 (E.D. Wisc., Oct. 22, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys' fees,
declaratory and/or injunctive relief pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the Wisconsin's Wage Payment and
Collection Laws.

The Plaintiff brings these FLSA and WWPCL claims and causes of
action against the Defendant on behalf of himself and all other
similarly-situated current and former non-exempt Delivery Driver
employees of the Defendant.

According to the complaint, the Defendant operated (and continues
to operate) an unlawful compensation system that deprived current
and former hourly-paid, non-exempt Delivery Driver employees of
their wages earned for all compensable work performed each
workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay for each hour worked
in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges, the Defendant's unlawful
compensation system:

   -- failed to include all forms of non-discretionary
      compensation, such as monetary bonuses, commissions,
      incentives, awards, and/or other rewards and payments, in
      all current and former non-exempt Delivery Driver
      employees' regular rates of pay for overtime calculation
      purposes;

   -- failed to compensate said employees for rest periods of
      less than twenty (20) minutes in duration and/or for lunch
      breaks during which said employees were not completely
      relieved of duty or free from work for the purpose of
      eating a regular meal, in violation of the FLSA; and

   -- failed to compensate said employees for meal periods during
      which they were not completely relieved of duty or free
      from work for at least 30 consecutive minutes, in violation
      of the WWPCL.

The Defendant is an Amazon delivery and logistics provider. The
Defendant owned, operated, and managed a variety of locations
across the Midwest region of the United States, including in the
State of Wisconsin, where all non-exempt Delivery Driver employees,
including the Plaintiff, performed work on behalf of the Defendant,
at its direction, for its benefit, and/or with its knowledge.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com


BURBERRY LIMITED: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Burberry Limited. The
case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz On Behalf Of Himself And All
Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Burberry Limited,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-10254 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Burberry Limited operates apparel stores in the United States. The
company offers clothing, bags, scarves, accessories, shoes, beauty
products, and gifts for women; clothing, scarves, accessories,
shoes, fragrances, and gifts for men; and clothing, accessories,
and gifts for boys and girls.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com


CALIFORNIA NATURAL: Suarez Can Amend Consumer Suit, Court Rules
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case PAMELA SUAREZ, individually on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA NATURAL
LIVING, INC., d/b/a CALIFORNIA BABY + KIDS, Defendant, Case No. 17
CV 9847 (VB) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the amended complaint to
substitute a new named Plaintiff in Suarez's place, and to amend
the Court's Civil Case Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order.

Suarez brings the putative class action against Defendant
California Natural Living, doing business as California Baby +
Kids, claiming the Defendant engaged in deceptive marketing and
sales of 32 cosmetics products.  The Plaintiff claims the Defendant
engaged in deceptive and misleading business practices respecting
sales and marketing of 32 cosmetics products, of which she
allegedly purchased three.  

Namely, the Plaintiff says the Defendant markets and advertises the
products as natural despite the fact that they contain synthetic
ingredients.  The amended complaint claims defendant's
misrepresentations in this regard induced the Plaintiff and the
putative class members to buy products different from what it
represented, at price premiums she and the putative class members
would not have otherwise paid.  The Plaintiff further alleges she
would not have purchased the products had the Defendant truthfully
described their ingredients.  The Plaintiff asserts an assortment
of consumer protection and related claims under federal and state
law.

On April 8, 2019, after granting in part and denying in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court held
an initial pretrial conference and issued a Civil Case Discovery
Plan and Scheduling Order.  Pursuant to that Order, Amended
pleadings may not be filed and additional parties may not be joined
except with leave of the Court.  Any motion to amend or to join
additional parties will be filed by May 8, 2019.  The Order further
stated that no extensions will be granted absent compelling
circumstances.  The Plaintiff did not request an extension of the
May 8 deadline to move to amend or join additional parties.

On Aug. 14, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the instant motion (i) for
leave to substitute putative class member Rachelyn Kramer for
Suarez as the named Plaintiff, and (ii) to amend the discovery plan
and scheduling order.  The Plaintiff states Kramer is a New York
citizen who, in 2017, purchased the same products as the Plaintiff,
with one exception.

The Plaintiff has filed a proposed second amended class action
complaint listing Kramer as the lone named Plaintiff.  That
proposed pleading appears substantively identical to Suarez's
operative amended complaint.  In support of the instant motion,
Suarez filed an affidavit stating, recent work obligations that
have arisen over the past few months, along with ongoing family
obligations, have caused her to doubt whether she can commit the
time and effort that might be required to continue to lead the
case.  The affidavit further states that she has regretfully
decided that she may not be the best person to lead the case after
evaluating the unpredictability of her schedule over the next few
months.

Judge Briccetti granted the Plaintiff's application for leave to
substitute Kramer in Suarez's place.  First, the Judge finds that
the Plaintiff has clearly shown good cause for failing to meet the
applicable deadline.  Second, the Judge will extend discovery
deadlines to afford the Defendant adequate time to conduct
discovery.  Third, the Judge finds no suggestion of bad faith or
undue delay by the Plaintiff's counsel, nor would the proposed
amendment be futile.  Last, and certainly not least, denying the
Plaintiff leave to amend would disserve the guiding purpose of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: to resolve the parties' dispute
in a just, speedy, and inexpensive manner.  Under the
circumstances, the Judge declines to invite that duplicative
procedural exercise.

For these reasons, Judge Briccetti granted the motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint, and to amend the Court's Civil
Case Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/zFJtBD from Leagle.com.

Pamela Suarez, individually on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Lipari, The
Sultzer Law Group, P.C., Melissa S. Weiner, Pearson, Simon &
Warshaw, LLP, pro hac vice, Michael Milton Liskow, The Sultzer Law
Group P.C. & Jason P. Sultzer, The Sultzer Law Group.

California Natural Living, Inc., doing business as California Baby
+ Kids, Defendant, represented by Angela L. Diesch --
angela@dieschlawgroup.com -- Diesch Forrest Apc, pro hac vice,
Joshua Dillon Anders, Chaffetz Lindsey LLP & Stephen E. Paffrath --
stephen@dieschforrestlaw.com  -- Diesch Forrest Apc.


CAPSTAN HEALTHCARE: Remand of Associated Management Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Ross of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, denied Plaintiff Associated
Management's motion to remand the case, ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CAPSTAN HEALTHCARE, LLC d/b/a CAPSTAN
RX, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:19-CV-01841-JAR (E.D. Mo.).

On Jan. 1, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the junk fax class action in
the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in St. Charles County, Missouri.  On
June 26, 2019, Defendant North G Rx, LLC, with the consent of the
other Defendants, removed the action to federal court.  On July 3,
2019, the Defendants filed their joint answer to the amended
complaint and asserted two affirmative defenses that the Plaintiff
and/or the putative class members lacked standing because they did
not suffer concrete and particularized harm.

On July 29, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the motion to remand based on
those affirmative defenses and cited St. Louis Heart Center, Inc.
v. Nomax in support of its motion.  In Nomax, the defendant removed
the lawsuit to federal court and then moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of Article III standing.  The Eighth Circuit
held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing but concluded
that the proper disposition of the matter was to remand it to state
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).

The Plaintiff asserts that that principle applies to the instant
case, arguing that the Defendants should not be able to invoke
federal subject matter jurisdiction in a particular Telephone
Consumer Protection Act case and then take the inconsistent
position that the claims against them should be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Defendants respond that the Plaintiff's motion to remand is
premature because, unlike Nomax, there is no contested factual
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction presently before the
Court.  Theys argue that no motion to dismiss has been filed, nor
has any evidence been presented regarding the question of standing
in the case.

Judge Ross concludes that the motion to remand is premature.
Although the Court may review its own subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte, Hart v. United States, there is nothing before the
Court indicating that it lacks jurisdiction over the case.
Further, the case is readily distinguishable from Nomax.  The
Defendant raises the issue of standing by way of an affirmative
defense, which it has the burden to prove and presumably must be
developed through discovery.  The case is in the early stages of
litigation, and discovery has not yet begun.  Moreover, unlike
Nomax, there is no motion to dismiss pending before the Court.
Thus, the Plaintiff's motion to remand is premature.

Based on the foregoing, the Judge denied without prejudice the
Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.  A Rule 16 Conference will be set by
separate order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/U7ZepC from Leagle.com.

Associated Management Services, Inc., Plaintiff, represented by
Ronald J. Eisenberg -- reisenberg@sl-lawyers.com -- SCHULTZ AND
ASSOCIATES, L.L.P.

Capstan Healthcare, LLC, doing business as Capstan RX, Syed Haroon
Zulfiqar, doing business as Capstan RX & North G RX, LLC, doing
business as Capstan RX, Defendants, represented by Michael B.
Hunter -- mhunter@bscr-law.com -- BAKER AND STERCHI, LLC, William
J. Akins, FISHER BROYLES LLP, pro hac vice & Andreea T. Sharkey --
asharkey@bscr-law.com -- BAKER AND STERCHI, LLC.


CARDINAL FINANCIAL: Faces Winters Suit Alleging Invasion of Privacy
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Winters Jr., individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. Cardinal Financial Company, Limited
Partnership, Case No. 2:19-cv-05406-NVW (D. Ariz., Oct. 15, 2019),
accuses the Defendant of illegally contacting the Plaintiff on his
cellular telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, thereby, invading his privacy.

Mr. Winters, a resident of Mesa, Arizona, received in October 2018
a text message from the Defendant on his cellular telephone.  He
asserts that during this time, the Defendant began to contact his
cellular telephone for the purpose of sending him spam
advertisements and/or promotional offers, via text messages.

Cardinal Financial Company, Limited Partnership, is a home mortgage
and refinancing company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. McGlothlin, Esq.
          Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          2633 E. Indian School Road, Suite 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: david@kazlg.com
                  ryan@kazlg.com


CBDMD INC: Olsen Files ADA Class Action in New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against cbdMD, Inc. The case
is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. cbdMD, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06220 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

cbdMD, Inc. operates as a pharmaceutical company. The Company
offers vape oil, oil capsules, gummies, bath bombs, and companion
box.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          Lipsky Lowe LLP
          630 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


CHICAGO, IL: Motion to Certify Class in Jackson Suit Continued
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Lureatha Jackson, the
Plaintiff, v. Board Of Education Of The City Of Chicago, et al.,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-05809 (N.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge
Sharon Johnson entered an order continuing Plaintiff's motion to
certify class.

According to the docket entry made by the Clerk on Nov. 1, 2019,
counsel for Defendants reports that they will file an answer by
Nov. 12, 2019. The Plaintiff's motion to certify class is entered
and continued. The case is referred to Magistrate Judge Kim for
discovery supervision and settlement. Status hearing is set for
Dec. 16, 2019 at 9:00 a.m.

As reported by Class Action Reporter on Sept. 27, 2019, the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all Chicago Public Schools students with disabilities whom
      it has placed in non-public schools in the past two years or

      whom it will place at such schools in the future";

   2. designating D.M. by and through her legal guardian Lureatha
      Jackson as a class representative;

   3. designating Legal Council for Health Justice and Disability
      Rights Advocates as class counsel; and

   4. directing any notice the Court deems appropriate to class
      members under Rule 23(c)(2)(A).[CC]

The case presents one core legal question: Whether CPS's policy of
excluding the students with disabilities it places at non-public
schools from its free breakfast and lunch programs (“CPS's
Policy") violates the substantive rights guaranteed by the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Caroline Goodwin Chapman, Esq.
          Julie Harcum Brennan, Esq.
          LEGAL COUNCIL FOR HEALTH JUSTICE
          17 N. State Street, Suite 900
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 605-1981
          E-mail: cchapman@legalcouncil.org
                  jbrennan@legalcouncil.org

               - and -

          Jelena Kolic, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          10 South LaSalle Street, 18th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60603
          E-mail: jkolic@dralegal.org

               - and -

          Seth Packrone, Esq.
          Michelle Caiola, Esq.
          655 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 644-8644
          E-mail: spackrone@dralegal.org
                  mcaiola@dralegal.org




CLUB MONACO: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Club Monaco U.S.,
LLC. The case is styled as Emanuel Delacruz On Behalf Of Himself
And All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Club Monaco
U.S., LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-10255 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 4,
2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Club Monaco US LLC provides apparels. The Company offers retail
sale of women's and men's ready-to-wear clothing. Club Monaco
serves customers worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com



COMMUNITY HEALTH: Appeals Decision in Norfolk Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants W. Larry Cash, Community Health Systems, Inc. and Wayne
T. Smith filed an appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit styled
NORFOLK COUNTY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., WAYNE
T. SMITH, and LARRY CASH, Case No. 3:11-cv-00433, in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 31, 2019, the
District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and
denying in part Lead Plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Class Definition
in the case.

The Lead Plaintiff sought to clarify (or, in the Defendants' view,
to expand) the definition of the class the District Court recently
certified current class definition, namely:

   All persons who and entities who purchased the publicly traded
   common stock of CHS from July 27, 2006 through April 8, 2011,
   inclusive, and who were damaged thereby. Excluded from the
   Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the
   company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate
   families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors
   or assigns and any entities in which Defendants have or had
   a controlling interest.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: Community Health Systems,
Inc., et al., Case No. 19-513, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM;
NEW YORK CITY TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM; NEW YORK CITY TEACHERS'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM VARIABLE ANNUITY PROGRAM; NEW YORK CITY FIRE
DEPARTMENT PENSION FUND; and NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
PENSION FUND are represented by:

          David C. Harrison, Esq.
          Barbara J. Hart, Esq.
          Scott Vincent Papp, Esq.
          LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C.
          44 S. Broadway, Suite 1100
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 997-0500
          E-mail: dharrison@lowey.com
                  bhart@lowey.com
                  spapp@lowey.com

Defendants-Petitioners COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., WAYNE T.
SMITH and W. LARRY CASH are represented by:

          Matthew M. Madden, Esq.
          Gary Orseck, Esq.
          David Hunter Smit, Esq.h
          ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, ORSECK, UNTEREINER
          & SAUBER LLP
          2000 K Street, N.W., Fourth Floor
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 775-4500
          E-mail: mmadden@robbinsrussell.com
                  gorseck@robbinsrussell.com
                  hsmith@robbinsrussell.com


CONSOL ENERGY: Bid to Certify Class in Fitzwater ERISA Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BENNY FITZWATER and CLARENCE BRIGHT, and TERRY PRATER,
and EMMET CASEY, JR., and CONNIE Z. GILBERT, and ALLAN H. JACK,
SR., and ROBERT H. LONG, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CONSOL ENERGY, INC., and
CONSOLIDATION COAL CO., and FOLA COAL CO., LLC, and CONSOL OF
KENTUCKY, INC., and CONSOL BUCHANAN MINING CO., LLC, and CONSOL
PENNSYLVANIA COAL CO., LLC, and KURT SALVATORI, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 2:16-cv-09849, Consolidated with Civil Action No.
1:17-cv-0386 (S.D. W. Va.), Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
Charleston, denied the Plaintiffs' supplemental motion for class
certification filed on Aug. 17, 2018.

On April 24, 2017, Plaintiffs Fitzwater, Bright, and Prater, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed their
amended complaint against CONSOL Energy, Inc., Consolidation Coal
Co., Fola Coal Co., LLC, CONSOL of Kentucky, Inc., and Kurt
Salvatori in the Court.  The case was consolidated on Dec. 22, 2017
with Casey v. CONSOL Energy, Inc. et al., brought by Casey,
Gilbert, Jack, and Long.

Plaintiffs Casey, Gilbert, Jack, and Long filed an amended
complaint on March 1, 2018.  After Fitzwater, Bright, and Prater's
original motion to certify class, filed July 13, 2017, was denied
as moot by the Court's Feb. 6, 2018 order, all seven named
Plaintiffs jointly filed a supplemental motion for class
certification against CONSOL, and Mr. Salvatori on Aug. 17, 2018.

The named Plaintiffs are retired miners who worked at CONSOL mine
sites consisting of the CONSOL of Kentucky mines, the Buchanan Mine
located in Virginia and the Enlow Fork Mine located in
Pennsylvania, or at the Fola mine sites located in West Virginia.
They seek to represent some 4,000 miners who worked at numerous
CONSOL mine sites in four different states over the course of
approximately 40 years.  The Plaintiffs allege wrongful and
discriminatory termination of retiree health benefits pursuant to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1975 ("ERISA").

The Plaintiffs refer to these benefits as the "Lifetime Plan" for
which there was no uniform formal statement and no Summary Plan
Document ("SPD").  Formal plans with SPDs did exist, consisting of
varying degrees of coverage for medical, prescription drug, short-
and long-term disability, dental, vision, and life insurance
benefits, in addition to pension payments under a separate
retirement plan.  The Defendants provided the Court with SPDs from
1992, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2011, 2014 that were distributed to
CONSOL's retired and active employees.

In January 2011, CONSOL issued a separate benefit plan for retired
employees called the CONSOL Energy Inc. Retiree Health and Welfare
Plan ("Retiree Benefits Plan"). Active employees remained
participants in what was known as the CONSOL Energy Inc. Health and
Welfare Plan ("Active Employee Benefits Plan").

CONSOL informed retired employees by letter that their retiree
benefits under the Retiree Benefits Plan would terminate on Dec.
31, 2015.  For retirees, such as named Plaintiff Prater, who had
previously elected to retire after the Fall 2014 announcement,
CONSOL provided a pro-rated portion of the previously rejected
transition payment to reflect the receipt of an additional year of
benefits under the Retiree Benefits Plan.

The Plaintiffs now contend that the defendants violated ERISA by
representing, orally and in writing, the existence of a single,
unified retiree welfare benefits plan, which they coin the
"Lifetime Plan," consisting of lifetime medical, prescription drug,
dental, vision, and life insurance coverage.  

The Plaintiffs assert that Consol created the Lifetime Plan through
its slideshows and explanations that retiree welfare benefits would
vest in retirement after working the requisite number of years.
They also allege that the Defendants withheld or inconsistently
distributed the separate SPDs for retirees, which also failed to
mention obligations under the Lifetime Plan.  They say that some
employees never received the SPD for the Retiree Benefits Plan and
others only received the SPD when they became eligible for
retirement, which was the first time they learned that there were
any differences in the welfare benefits of retirees versus active
employees.

The consolidated Plaintiffs move for class certification on all
seven counts listed in the March 1, 2018 amended complaint:

(I) Breach of fiduciary duties as to the Lifetime Plan under 29
U.S.C. Section 1104(a)(1)(a)(i);

(II) Enforcement of the Lifetime Plan as an ERISA plan under 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1-3);

(III) Discrimination against individual participants based on
health-status related factors under 29 U.S.C. Section 1182;

(IV) Failure to meet the duty of disclosure by providing the
Plaintiffs with incomplete SPDs that did not mention the Lifetime
Plan's benefits and obligations or with no SPDs at all under 29
U.S.C. Section 1021(a)(1);

(V) Failure to provide accurate and comprehensive SPDs regarding
the Lifetime Plan under 29 U.S.C. Section 1022(a);

(VI) Failure to accurately state the Lifetime Plan's requirements
with respect to eligibility under 29 U.S.C. Section 1022(b); and

(VII) Failure to provide an adequate SPD regarding the Lifetime
Plan in a timely manner under 29 U.S.C. Section 1024(b)(1).

The Plaintiffs originally proposed the following class definition
which would establish a class for retirees only:  All individuals
who in 2014 or 2015 were participants in or beneficiaries of a
welfare benefits plan (medical, prescription drug, dental, vision,
and/or life insurance) administered by CONSOL Energy (Consol),
whose receipt of such benefits was predicated on being a retiree
from Consol or the dependent of a retiree from Consol, and whose
receipt of such benefits terminated in the years of 2014 and 2015.


In response, the Defendants argued that the class definition was
too indefinite because it ranged anywhere from 12,000 to 16,000
individuals based on the allegations in the complaint.  The
definition was also overbroad in that it would include individuals
who were not impacted by CONSOL's 2014 and 2015 decisions to
terminate retiree medical benefits because their retiree medical
liabilities had already been transferred to a separate entity,
Murray Energy Corporation.  Thus, the actual size of the putative
class was only around 4,000 individuals.

For the first time in their reply, Plaintiffs now seek to certify
the following two classes of CONSOL employees from mine sites
located in West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
"neighboring states:"

Class A: All individual plan participants, and their dependents,
who had qualified to enroll in a retiree welfare benefits plan
administered by CONSOL Energy (CONSOL), but who had not yet
enrolled in such plan when CONSOL terminated their plan
participation in the years of 2014 and 2015.

Class B: All individual plan participants, and their dependents,
who had enrolled in a retiree welfare benefits plan administered by
CONSOL prior to CONSOL terminating their plan participation in the
years of 2014 and 2015.

Counts I-II and IV-VII all relate to the existence of the Lifetime
Plan, and each count suffers similar flaws for purposes of the
class certification.  Judge Copenhaver finds that the lifetime
claims lack the support of written materials demonstrating a
uniform Lifetime Plan, the oral representations are spotty and
divergent, and both will require individualized proof, including
proof of reliance.  Consequently, Counts I-II and IV-VII fail to
meet the commonality and typicality requirements under Rule 23(a).

Next, under Count III, the Defendants allegedly violated 29 U.S.C.
Section 1182(a)(1)12 of ERISA by unlawfully establishing rules for
eligibility for the transition payment based on health-status
related factors and violated Section 1182(b)13 by offering the
transition payment to active employees while requiring retired
employees to continue paying premiums after the 2014 announcement.
In other words, the Defendants purportedly discriminated against
individuals who had retired as of Sept. 30, 2014 by terminating
their welfare benefits without providing them the same cash
transition payment given to active employees.

Judge Copenhaver finds that inasmuch as the Plaintiffs fail to
provide basic evidence to support their claim, Count III fails to
conform to Rule 23(a)'s requirements.  The Plaintiffs fail to
provide any other evidence to support the claim that a substantial
portion of the retiree welfare plan participants were necessarily
in poorer health than the active workers.  The mere fact that
retirees and active employees were treated differently does not
support the assertion that they were discriminated against based on
their health status under Section 1182.  Class certification must
be denied on this count.

Because the Plaintiffs' claims fail to comply with Rule 23(a)'s
requirements, Judge Copenhaver denies the Plaintiffs' supplemental
motion for class certification.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/9UO6Rm from Leagle.com.

Benny Fitzwater, Clarence Bright & Terry Prater, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by Aubrey Sparks, MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, INC., Bren J. Pomponio --
bren@msjlaw.org -- MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, INC. & Samuel Brown
Petsonk -- sam@msjlaw.org -- PETSONK.

Emmett Casey, Jr., Connie Z. Gilbert, Allan H. Jack, Sr. & Robert
H. Long, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Consol Plaintiffs, represented by Aubrey Sparks, MOUNTAIN STATE
JUSTICE, INC., Bren J. Pomponio, MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, INC. &
Samuel Brown Petsonk, PETSONK.

CONSOL Energy, Inc., Consolidation Coal Co. & Kurt Salvatori,
Defendants, represented by Joseph J. Torres, WINSTON & STRAWN, pro
hac vice, Charles F. Johns -- charles.johns@steptoe-johnson.com --
STEPTOE & JOHNSON, Jennifer Anderson Hill, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, Paul
K. Reese, STEPTOE & JOHNSON & Michael D. Mullins --
michael.mullins@steptoe-johnson.com -- STEPTOE & JOHNSON.

Fola Coal Co., L.L.C., Defendant, represented by Joseph J. Torres,
WINSTON & STRAWN, pro hac vice, Jennifer Anderson Hill, STEPTOE &
JOHNSON, Paul K. Reese, STEPTOE & JOHNSON & Michael D. Mullins,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON.

CONSOL of Kentucky, Inc., Defendant, represented by Michael D.
Mullins, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, Joseph J. Torres, WINSTON & STRAWN &
Paul K. Reese , STEPTOE & JOHNSON.

Consol Buchanan Mining Co. LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph J.
Torres, WINSTON & STRAWN, pro hac vice & Michael D. Mullins,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON.

Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co., LLC, Defendant, represented by Joseph
J. Torres, WINSTON & STRAWN, pro hac vice, Michael D. Mullins,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON & Charles F. Johns, STEPTOE & JOHNSON.


CROWN EQUIPMENT: Brown Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Joshua Brown, Bryan Krenk, Martin Castaneda,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated; Michael Layman, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated and on
behalf of other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act v. CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, an
unknown entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
34-2019-00265878, was removed from the Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of Sacramento to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California on Nov. 7, 2019.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:19-at-01052 to the
proceeding.

The Complaint alleges six causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay
Overtime Wages; (2) Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (3) Failure to
Provide Required Rest Periods; (4) Unpaid Minimum Wages; (5)
Failure to Pay Wages Due at Termination; (6) and Non-Compliant Wage
Statements.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Evan R. Moses, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: 213-239-9800
          Facsimile: 213-239-9045
          Email: evan.moses@ogletree.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Nader, Esq.
          Rabia Z. Reed, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          500 Capitol Mall, Suite 2500
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Phone: 916.840.3150
          Facsimile: 916.840.3159
          Email: michael.nader@ogletree.com
                 rabia.reed@ogletree.com


CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP: Court Denies Schenck Class Certification Bid
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as JUSTIN SCHENCK, the
Plaintiff, v. CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, the Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-00164-MPK (W.D. Pa.), the Hon. Judge Maureen P. Kelly
entered an order on Nov. 1, 2109, denying Plaintiff's motion for
class certification of:

   "all natural persons residing in the United States (including
   territories and other political subdivisions): (1) who applied
   for employment with [Curtiss-Wright] or any of its
   subsidiaries; (2) about whom [Curtiss-Wright] obtained a
   consumer report for employment purposes from Sterling
   InfoSystems, Inc. from September 2015 to May 2018; (3) where
   the consumer report contained a score of "Complete Report-
   Consider" at the top; and (4) [Curtiss-Wright] did not send a
   notice as provided in 15 U.S.C. section 1681b(b)(3)."

The Court finds that Schenck has not his burden of establishing
each of the requisite Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 elements by a preponderance
of the evidence.

Schenck alleges that Curtiss-Wright Corporation violated the Fair
Credit Reporting Act by failing to provide candidates for
employment with copies of their background reports and a written
summary of FCRA rights.[CC]

DAUPHINS LLC: Joint Bid for Certification in Boothe Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Jeffrey U. Beaverstock grants the Parties' Agreed to
Motion and Stipulation Regarding Conditional Certification and
Notice to the Putative Class Members in the lawsuit styled TARA
BOOTHE, et al. v. DAUPHINS, LLC, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00408-JB-N (S.D. Ala.).

Based on the agreed premises and processes in the Motion, the Court
deems that conditional certification and Court-facilitated notice
is appropriate.  The Court approves the Parties' agreed Notice of
Collective Action Lawsuit, and the agreed processes set out in the
Motion as follows:

   1. Defendants will provide the names and last known addresses,
      personal e-mail addresses (if available), and dates of
      employment for the Putative Class Members no later than
      14 days following the Court's granting of the Order for
      Conditional Certification.  This information will be
      provided in a usable electronic format, such as Excel;

   2. Plaintiffs' counsel will have seven (7) days from the date
      of receipt of the information from the Defendants to
      distribute the approved Notice and Consent form to the
      Putative Class Members;

   3. Plaintiffs' counsel will send the Putative Class Members a
      Notice and Consent Form by regular First Class mail and
      e-mail.  The Plaintiffs' counsel will also send a reminder
      Notice and Consent Form by regular First Class mail and
      e-mail 30 days after the initial mailing;

   4. The Putative Class Members will have 60 days from the
      initial mailing of the Notice and Consent Form to file the
      Consent Form with this Court to opt-in to the lawsuit (the
      "opt-in period"); and

   5. Plaintiffs' counsel must maintain the Putative Class
      members' contact information as confidential records and
      shall not share the information with any third-party.

At the conclusion of the opt-in period, the Plaintiffs' counsel
must destroy/delete all copies of the information pertaining to any
Putative Class Member, who did not timely file a Consent Form.[CC]


DETROIT, MI: Court Grants Bid to Amend Frontczak Civil Rights Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case NICK FRONTCZAK and MICHAEL VALENTINO, Plaintiffs, v.
CITY OF DETROIT, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-13781 (E.D.
Mich.), Judge Robert H. Cleland of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the complaint; and (ii) denied as moot
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

Following the denial of class certification, the Plaintiffs
individually filed the instant complaint on Dec. 6, 2018.  They sue
Defendant City of Detroit and various City of Detroit police
officers for constitutional violations stemming from what they
allege was an illegal search of their lawful marijuana grow
facility and residence on March 20, 2014.

Currently pending before the court is the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the complaint in its entirety and the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend the complaint.  The Defendants' argue that the complaint
contains insufficient factual details to sustain the claims alleged
and requests legally prohibited damages.  The Plaintiffs respond
that their proposed amended complaint will remedy all of the
pleading deficiencies targeted by the Defendants' motion.

Based on the liberal pleading standard articulated in Rule 15(a)
and the facts, Judge Cleland is persuaded that amendment is
appropriate.  The Judge is not persuaded that the Plaintiffs'
decision to omit from the original complaint factual allegations
now presented in the proposed amended complaint amounts to
gamesmanship or bad faith, especially considering that the class
action complaint was sustained on similar factual allegations and
not subject to 12(b)(6) challenge by the Defendants.  The
Plaintiffs have promptly requested amendment following the
Defendants' first challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint
and, based on the Defendants' failure to present any argument to
the contrary, the Judge finds that amendment will not cause any
undue prejudice to the Defendants given the early stage of
discovery in the case.  He is satisfied that the liberal standard
announced in Rule 15 supports granting the Plaintiffs' request for
amendment.

In addition, in the proposed amended complaint, the Plaintiffs
allege that they suffered "emotional distress, humiliation,
anguish, embarrassment, and loss of their valuable property" as a
result of the violations alleged.  Such injuries can sustain a
claim for the violation of the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.


Accordingly, Judge Cleland granted the Plaintiffs' motion and
allowed them to file an amended complaint within seven days.  The
filing of the amended complaint mooted the Defendants' pending
Motion to Dismiss.  Hence, Judge Cleland denied as moot the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/rwdPpe from Leagle.com.

Nick Frontczak, as the Public Administrator for the Estate of
Michael McShane, deceased & Michael Valentino, Plaintiffs,
represented by Dennis A. Dettmer, Dettmer and Dezsi, PLLC & Michael
R. Dezsi -- mdezsi@dezsilaw.com -- Law Office of Michael R. Dezsi,
PLLC.

City of Detroit, Kenneth Ballnski, Stephen Geelhood, In their
Individual and Official Capacities, Matthew Bray, Reginald Beasley,
Larry Barnett, Amy Matelic, Marlon Wilson & Gregory Tourville,
Defendants, represented by James P. Allen, Allen Brothers, James M.
Surowiec, Allen Brothers, Attorneys and Counselors, PLLC & Lindsey
R. Johnson, Allen Brothers, Attorneys and Counselors, PLLC.


DIPLOMAT PHARMACY: Reconsideration Bid in Mortimer Case Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division denied movant Arsany Girgis's motion for
reconsideration in the case captioned CHASE MORTIMER, Plaintiff, v.
DIPLOMAT PHARMACY INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-C-1735,
(N.D. Ill.).

This is a securities class action against Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc.,
Brian T. Griffin, Jeffrey Park, Joel Saban, and Atul Kavthekar. The
complaint generally alleges that Defendants violated federal
securities laws by making false or misleading statements and
failing to disclose key facts about the integration and growth of
Diplomat's Pharmacy Benefit Management business, the National
Pharmaceutical Services ("NPS") and LDI Integrated Pharmacy
Services ("LDI") acquisitions, impending impairment charges to its
PBM business, and the nature of its preliminary 2019 full-year
outlook.

The Court previously appointed Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension
Fund (Fund) as lead plaintiff under the PSLRA and appointed the
Fund's chosen counsel, Robbins Geller, to be lead counsel. In doing
so, the Court also denied movant Arsany Girgis's motion for the
same appointment. Girgis now asks the Court to reconsider that
decision and appoint him as co-lead plaintiff and appoint his
counsel, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, as co-lead counsel.

Legal Standard

District courts have discretionary authority to reconsider
interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment is entered.
Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. They are not an appropriate vehicle to advance arguments
or legal theories that could and should have been made before the
Court entered its order.

Robbins Geller's Statements to the Court and the Limited Fund
Scenario

Girgis first argues that the Court should reconsider its decision
in light of new evidence that became available after the Court
appointed the Fund as lead plaintiff. The evidence Girgis cites is
a series of statements made by the Fund's counsel, Robbins Geller,
on behalf of different plaintiffs in a separate suit against
Diplomat pending in the Eastern District of Michigan.

In that suit, Robbins Geller represents a separate class of
plaintiffs suing Diplomat for securities fraud based on separate
conduct from a different time period than the one at issue here.
The Court previously ruled that Robbins Geller's representation of
the lead plaintiffs in the Zimmerman suit and its representation of
the Fund as lead plaintiff in this suit was not a disqualifying
conflict of interest.  

The Court based its holding in part on its finding that there did
not appear to be a limited fund scenario, i.e., a situation where
Diplomat might not have the ability to pay judgments in both
Zimmerman and this case, which would require both classes to
compete for the same limited pool of funds and which could create a
conflict of interest for Robbins Geller, who is now representing
both classes. Because courts frequently look to factors other than
cash or cash equivalents when determining a defendant's ability to
pay at the class settlement approval stage, the Court sided with
the Fund, considered Diplomat's total assets and probable
insurance, and found that this did not appear to be a limited fund
scenario.  

There are two separate issues here: first, whether this actually is
or is not a limited fund scenario; and second, whether Robbins
Geller violated its duty of candor to the Court. Setting aside
Robbins Geller's statements for a moment, there is no longer a risk
of a limited fund scenario because the Zimmerman court approved the
class settlement and closed the case. To the extent Robbins Geller
ever faced a potential conflict by representing both classes, that
conflict has resolved itself because the Zimmerman litigation is
over and the two classes are no longer competing over the same pot
of money. The size of the pot is irrelevant at this point, because
the Zimmerman plaintiffs are no longer competing for it.  

As for Robbins Geller's candor with the Court, the Court finds
that, despite making vastly different arguments in the two cases,
Robbins Geller did not misstate or misrepresent any facts or
otherwise mislead the Court. The Fund never misstated or
misrepresented any of Diplomat's specific financial figures, it
simply argued that some figures were more relevant than others for
the limited fund scenario analysis. Girgis is correct that Robbins
Geller simultaneously made a very different argument on behalf of
different clients in the Zimmerman litigation and urged that court
to consider different financial figures when analyzing Diplomat's
financial health for settlement purposes. But Robbins Geller, when
representing different parties in different litigation, is not
bound to always take the same position on a question.  

There is nothing in the record indicating that Robbins Geller
misstated, misrepresented, or concealed any facts in this
proceeding and the Court has no reason to question the firm's
fitness to serve as lead counsel in this case.

Standing and Additional Named Plaintiffs

Girgis also argues that the Court erred by holding that the Fund
could select additional plaintiffs to remedy its standing issues.
Girgis argued once already that the Fund is not an adequate or
typical plaintiff because it does not have an interest in pursuing
losses based on the second and third disclosures, having sold all
its shares after the first disclosure.

The Court explained, however, that to the extent there are concerns
about the Fund's incentives to pursue losses related to the second
and third disclosures, the Fund has represented that it will ensure
that class representatives are added to the amended consolidated
complaint to ward off loss causation challenges.

According to Girgis, allowing the Fund or its counsel to select
additional named plaintiffs to cure the Fund's standing issues
would be unprecedented and would undermine the PSLRA, which aimed
to promote a client-driven rather than lawyer-driven process.
Girgis is wrong on both accounts. Nor is it necessary that a
different lead plaintiff be appointed to bring every single
available claim, as such a requirement would contravene the main
purpose of having a lead plaintiff namely, to empower one or
several investors with a major stake in the litigation to exercise
control over the litigation as a whole.

Girgis's concerns about the Fund's lack of standing as to the
second and third disclosures should be allayed by the fact that the
Fund is well within its rights under the PSLRA to add named
plaintiffs to address those deficiencies.

Accordingly, Girgis's motion for reconsideration is denied. The
Court grants the Fund's motion for leave to provide notice of
additional information and has considered the Fund's additional
information in this decision.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 7, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6yoje7u from
Leagle.com.

Chase Mortimer, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similary
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Marvin Alan Miller -
Mmiller@millerlawllc.com - Miller Law LLC & Lori Ann Fanning ,
Miller Law LLC, 115 S. LaSalle St., Ste. 2910, Chicago, Illinois,
William Riehm & Alaxander Virgili, Plaintiffs, represented by
Matthew Todd Hurst  - mheffner@heffnerhurst.com - Heffner Hurst.

Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund, Plaintiff, represented by
James E. Barz - jbarz@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP, Danielle S. Myers - danim@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins Geller Rudman
& Dowd LLP & Frank Anthony Richter - frichter@rgrdlaw.com - Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd.

Diplomat Pharmacy, Inc., Brian T. Griffin, Jeffrey Park, Joel Saban
& Atal Kavthekar, Defendants, represented by James Wallace Ducayet
- JDUCAYET@SIDLEY.COM - Sidley Austin LLP & Nilofer Ibrahim Umar -
NUMAR@SIDLEY.COM - Sidley Austin LLP.

Feihua Xu & Frank Mazur, Movants, represented by Carl V. Malmstrom
- malmstrom@whafh.com - Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLC.

Arsany Girgis, Movant, represented by Reed R. Kathrein
-reed@hbsslaw.com - Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Daniel J.
Kurowski - dank@hbsslaw.com - Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP &
Lucas Gilmore  - lucasg@hbsslaw.com - Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro
LLP, pro hac vice.

DSW SHOE: Morrison Suit Closed Due to Deficiencies
--------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Jill Morrison, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated and on
behalf of other aggrieved employees pursuant to the California
Private Attorneys General Act, Plaintiff v. DSW Shoe Warehouse,
Inc. a Missouri Corporation, Designer Brands, Inc. a California
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendant, Case No.
19STCV26422 was removed from California Superior Court, for Los
Angeles County, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California on Nov. 4, 2019, and assigned Case No.
2:19-mc-00187.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

According to a docket entry dated Nov. 7, the Clerk issued a Notice
to Filer of Deficiencies in Attorney Case Opening. The Notice
indicated that unless counsel corrected the identified discrepancy
within two business days, the docket for this case number would be
closed and no further filings would be permitted under this case
number. Counsel has not corrected the discrepancy. Accordingly,
this case is now closed.

DSW Inc. is a footwear and accessories retailer.[BN]

EMERSON COLLEGE: Court Dismisses Camacho ADA Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Judge Edgardo Ramos of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the amended complaint in the case
JASON CAMACHO and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. EMERSON COLLEGE, Defendant, Case No. 18
Civ. 10600 (ER) (S.D. N.Y.).

Emerson College, with its main campus in Boston, Massachusetts,
participated in a college fair in Manhattan.  Later that same month
as the fair, Emerson was served with a complaint alleging that a
blind New Yorker, Camacho, had attended that fair, gone to
Emerson's website, and run into several web-design-based barriers
that prevented him from accessing information through his
screen-reader software.

Camacho avers that he spent the next several days on his computer,
researching the colleges that had attended the fair.  During this
research, he went to Emerson's website, located at www.emerson.edu.
To browse the website, he attempted to use screen-reader software
called JAWS, which reads aloud each element on a webpage, allowing
a visually impaired user to navigate the page.  He alleges that
certain aspects of the design of Emerson's website prevented him
from obtaining useful information.

Nine days after he visited the fair at the Javits Center, Camacho
filed a lawsuit under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, as well as the New York Human Rights Law, New York State Civil
Rights Law Section 40-c(2), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,.
In the complaint, which was amended in March 2019, Camacho alleged
that his difficulties in collecting information about Emerson
violated his rights under each of these laws, and he demanded
injunctive relief along with statutory damages.  He also sought to
certify a class of those who have faced similar difficulties.

Emerson filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) arguing that the
Court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it or, in the
alternative, that Camacho had not suffered injury sufficient to
establish Article III standing and thus subject-matter
jurisdiction.  It supplemented its motion with several declarations
from Emerson staff.  Camacho supplemented his opposition to the
motion with his own declaration.

Judge Ramos finds that no part of the website provides a sufficient
basis to allow the Court to exercise specific jurisdiction over
Emerson under CPLR Section 302.  The Judge finds that Camacho
having failed to show the Emerson website is fully interactive.
Even it if were, the interactive elements of the website do not
give rise to the claim at hand.  Camacho alleges in his complaint
that he generally had difficulty with the website due to the lack
of alt-text and similar features.  In his declaration, he brings a
new claim that pop-up boxes were interfering with his ability to
navigate to the net price calculator.  Neither of these claims
implicate the only parts of the website even approaching
interactivity: the calculator itself, contact forms, and the
application.

Camacho has also failed to make a prima facie case that any
transaction Emerson conducted in New York gave rise to his claims,
Judge Ramos finds.  Accordingly, the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. Section 302(a)(1).  Because it has
determined that it does not have personal jurisdiction under New
York law, the Court does not examine whether exercising
jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause.

Finally, in a final effort to develop a jurisdictional foundation
for his lawsuit, Camacho asks the Court for leave to conduct
jurisdictional discovery.  Judge Ramos denies that request.
Camacho has not made out a prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction, and he has not indicated to the Court what additional
information he could discover from Emerson that would save his
case's future in the District.

Accordingly, Judge Ramos granted Emerson's motion to dismiss the
amended Camacho complaint under 12(b)(2), although Camacho is
granted leave to refile in a court that can exercise jurisdiction
over Emerson.  Camacho's request for jurisdictional discovery is
denied.  The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate
the motion, and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/gWszH8 from Leagle.com.

Jason Camacho, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb --
NYJG@aol.com -- Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.

Emerson College, Defendant, represented by John William Egan --
jegan@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Samuel Sverdlov --
ssverdlov@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


ENDO INT'L: Dec. 11 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Civ. A. No. 2:17-CV-3711-TJS

SEB INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AB,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

            v.

ENDO INTERNATIONAL PLC, et al.,

Defendants.

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT; (II) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES; AND (III) SETTLEMENT FAIRNESS
HEARING

This notice is directed to all persons and entities who purchased
or otherwise acquired Endo International plc and/or Endo Health
Solutions Inc. (together, "Endo") common stock or ordinary
shares[1] between November 30, 2012 and June 8, 2017, inclusive,
and were damaged thereby ("Settlement Class").  Certain persons and
entities are excluded from the Settlement Class as set forth in
detail in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated August
22, 2019 ("Stipulation") and the Notice described below.

Please read this notice carefully; your rights will be affected by
a class action lawsuit pending in this court.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("Court"), that the
above-captioned action ("Action") has been provisionally certified
as a class action for the purposes of settlement only and that the
parties to the Action have reached a proposed settlement for
$82,500,000 in cash ("Settlement") that, if approved, will resolve
all claims in the Action.  A hearing will be held on December 11,
2019 at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Timothy J. Savage at the
James A. Byrne U.S. Courthouse, 601 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA
19106, Courtroom 9A, to determine: (i) whether the proposed
Settlement should be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate;
(ii) whether the Action should be dismissed with prejudice against
Defendants, and the releases specified and described in the
Stipulation (and in the Notice described below) should be entered;
(iii) whether the Settlement Class should be certified for purposes
of effectuating the Settlement; (iv) whether the proposed Plan of
Allocation should be approved as fair and reasonable; and (v)
whether Lead Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees
and reimbursement of expenses should be approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  This notice provides
only a summary of the information contained in the detailed Notice
of (I) Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement; (II)
Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of
Litigation Expenses; and (III) Settlement Fairness Hearing
("Notice"). You may obtain a copy of the Notice, along with the
Claim Form, on the website for the Settlement,
www.EndoSecuritiesLitigationSettlement.com, or on Lead Counsel's
website, www.ktmc.com. You may also obtain copies of the Notice and
Claim Form by contacting the Claims Administrator at SEB Investment
Management AB v. Endo International plc, et al. Settlement, c/o JND
Legal Administration, P.O. Box 91311, Seattle, WA 98111-9411;
1-844-961-0316; info@EndoSecuritiesLitigationSettlement.com.  

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim Form postmarked (if mailed), or online at
www.EndoSecuritiesLitigationSettlement.com, no later than February
7, 2020, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Claim
Form.  If you are a Settlement Class Member and do not submit a
proper Claim Form, you will not be eligible to share in the
distribution of the net proceeds of the Settlement but you will
nevertheless be bound by any releases, judgments or orders entered
by the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is postmarked no later than November 22,
2019, in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.
If you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you
will not be bound by any releases, judgments or orders entered by
the Court in the Action and you will not be eligible to share in
the net proceeds of the Settlement.  Excluding yourself is the only
option that may allow you to be part of any other current or future
lawsuit against Defendants or any of the other released parties
concerning the claims being resolved by the Settlement. Please
note, however, if you decide to exclude yourself from the
Settlement Class, you may be time-barred from asserting the claims
covered by the Action by a statute of repose.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, and/or Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than November 22, 2019, in accordance with
the instructions set forth in the Notice.

PLEASE DO NOT CONTACT THE COURT, THE CLERK'S OFFICE, DEFENDANTS, OR
THEIR COUNSEL REGARDING THIS NOTICE.

All questions about this notice, the Settlement, or your
eligibility to participate in the Settlement should be directed to
Lead Counsel or the Claims Administrator.

Requests for the Notice and Claim Form should be made to the Claims
Administrator:

   SEB Investment Management AB v. Endo International plc,
   et al. Settlement
   c/o JND Legal Administration
   P.O. Box 91311
   Seattle, WA  98111-9411
   1-844-961-0316
   info@EndoSecuritiesLitigationSettlement.com
   www.EndoSecuritiesLitigationSettlement.com

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim Form, may
be made to Lead Counsel:

   Sharan Nirmul, Esq.
   Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
   280 King of Prussia Road
   Radnor, PA  19087
   1-610-667-7706
   info@ktmc.com
   www.ktmc.com

DATED:  September 10, 2019   

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
United States District Court
Eastern District of Pennsylvania

1 Effective February 28, 2014, all of Endo Health Solutions Inc.'s
outstanding common stock was cancelled and converted into the right
to receive Endo International plc ordinary shares on a
one-for-one-basis.  Accordingly, persons and entities who purchased
or otherwise acquired either Endo common stock or ordinary shares
(collectively, "common stock") between November 30, 2012 and June
8, 2017, inclusive, and were damaged thereby are Settlement Class
members.


EXPERIAN INFORMATION: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Reyes Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc., filed an appeal
from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Demeta Reyes v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., Case No. 8:16-cv-00563-AG-AFM, in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Santa
Ana.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 22, 2019, Judge
Andrew Guilford certified a class of consumers whose reporting by
Experian was allegedly "misleading" after a loan servicer went out
of business.

Delbert Services Corporation ("Delbert") was a servicer for
internet loans issued by Western Sky Financial, LLC.  In January
2015, Delbert went out of business and told Experian that it wanted
to "discontinue use of any and all services provided by Experian."
Experian responded that it had deleted all Delbert loans from its
database.  In reality, however, Experian continued to report the
loans until April 2016.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff Demeta Reyes alleged a single claim for
relief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 ("FCRA"), 15
U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq.  Specifically, she asserted that Experian
willfully failed to "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy of the information" contained in her credit
report.

The appellate case is captioned as Demeta Reyes v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., Case No. 19-80139, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Respondent DEMETA REYES, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Jason Scott Hartley, Esq.
          HARTLEY LLP
          101 W Broadway, Suite 820
          San Diego, CA 92101-8206
          Telephone: (619) 400-5822
          Facsimile: (619) 400-5832
          E-mail: hartley@hartleyllp.com

               - and -

          Norman E. Siegel, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Road, Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714-7100
          E-mail: siegel@stuevesiegel.com

Defendant-Petitioner EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., is
represented by:

          Ryan Ball, Esq.
          Richard Joseph Grabowski, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          3161 Michelson Drive, Suite 800
          Irvine, CA 92612-4408
          Telephone: (949) 553-7515
          E-mail: rball@jonesday.com
                  rgrabowski@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Meir Feder, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          250 Vesey Street
          New York, NY 10281-1047
          Telephone: (212) 326-7870
          E-mail: mfeder@jonesday.com

               - and -

          Nathaniel Garrett, Esq.
          JONES DAY
          555 California Street, 26th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 875-5731
          E-mail: ngarrett@jonesday.com


EXXON MOBIL: Court Dismisses Wheeler Suit Without Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS E. WHEELER, and FITZGERALD FARMS, LLC; on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION and EXXONMOBIL OIL CORPORATION,
including affiliated predecessors and affiliated successors,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-4025-KHV (D. Kan.), Judge Kathryn
H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
sustained the Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs' Original
Complaint.

On April 2, 2019, Wheeler and Fitzgerald Farms, LLC, on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, filed suit
against the Defendants.  Wheeler owns royalty interests pursuant to
an oil and gas lease in the Perry Rowe Unit located in Latimer
County, Oklahoma, which Exxon Mobil Corporation1 operates.
Similarly, Fitzgerald Farm owns royalty interests pursuant to an
oil and gas lease in the Fitzgerald Unit located in Texas County,
Oklahoma, which Exxon Mobil Corporation also operates.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants underpaid them royalties on
natural gas production.  The Defendants did so in a variety of
ways, including taking improper deductions, not paying royalties on
all constituents found in the gas, and not paying royalties on the
full volume of gas, the Plaintiffs relate.

The Plaintiffs assert breach of lease (Count 1); breach of
fiduciary duty (Count 2); and fraud, constructive fraud and deceit
(Count 3).  They seek to recover on their own behalf and on behalf
of two putative classes.  The first putative class is a multi-state
class that seeks to recover royalties associated with gas obtained
from the leased premises.

The Plaintiffs define the Class as all last successors in interest
to royalty owners in wells where the Defendants (including their
affiliated predecessors and affiliated successors) were the
operator (or a working interest owner who marketed its share of gas
and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners), payable under
any lease that contains an express provision stating that royalty
will be paid on gas used off the lease premises (Express Fuel
Clause).  These Class claims relate to royalty payments for gas and
its constituents (such as residue gas, natural gas liquids, helium,
nitrogen, or drip condensate).

The second putative class consists of Oklahoma royalty interest
owners who seek to recover underpaid royalties prior to April 30,
2002.  The Plaintiffs define the Subclass as all last successors in
interest to royalty owners in Oklahoma wells where Defendants
(including their affiliated predecessors and affiliated successors)
were the operator (or a working interest owner who marketed its
share of gas and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners)
from inception to April 30, 2002.  The Subclass claims relate to
royalty payments for gas and its constituents (such as residue gas,
natural gas liquids, helium, nitrogen, or drip condensate).
Id.

On April 23, 2019, the Defendants sought a dismissal of all claims
in the  Plaintiffs' Original Complaint.  Specifically, the
Defendants assert that:

  -- the Court should dismiss all claims against unidentified
Defendants and all claims that seek to hold named Defendants liable
for the actions of unidentified predecessors and successors;

  -- the applicable statutes of limitation bar the Plaintiffs'
claims;

  -- the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' breach of lease
claims (Count 1) because the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
alleged the existence of specific leases between them;

  -- the Court should dismiss the breach of fiduciary claims (Count
2) because they do not owe such a duty under Oklahoma law;

  -- the Court should dismiss the Plaintiffs' fraud, constructive
fraud and deceit claims (Count 3) because the complaint fails to
satisfy the heightened pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b).

Judge Vratil dismisses all claims which seek to hold the two named
Defendants liable for the actions of unidentified entities.  The
Judge  that including the unnamed Defendants violates Rule 10(a),
therefore all claims against them must be dismissed.  

The Judge further finds that the complaint fails to plausibly
establish the existence of any lease to which the Plaintiffs and
the Defendants are parties.  The fact that the Plaintiffs happen to
share names with the lessors identified in the leases is an
amateurish effort to cure this defect.

Judge Vratil dismisses the breach of fiduciary duty claims under
Count 2.  She finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately
allege a fiduciary claim under Section 902.  The Plaintiffs
apparently concede that Section 902 bars their claims, arguing only
that it is not at issue for the Subclass because its class predates
the statute.  However, because the Plaintiffs do not have a viable
fiduciary claim, they cannot represent the Class or Subclass on
such a claim.

Finally, because the existing allegations do not satisfy Rule
9(b)'s pleading requirements, Judge Vratil dismisses the fraud,
deceit and constructive fraud claims under Count 3.  She finds that
the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded reliance under Rule
9(b).  They  assert that the Court can infer reliance because the
royalty owners cashed the checks as if they included proper payment
but their complaint does not actually include the allegation.

Accordingly, Judge Vratil sustains the Defendants' Motion To
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Original Complaint filed April 23, 2019.  The
Plaintiffs' Original Class Action Complaint filed April 2, 2019 is
dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/k1lSRT from Leagle.com.

Thomas E Wheeler & Fitzgerald Farms, LLC, Plaintiffs, represented
by Barbara C. Frankland -- bfrankland@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA, Margaret Elizabeth Robertson --
Maggie.Robertson@LanierLawFirm.com -- Lanier Law Firm, Reagan E.
Bradford -- Reagan.Bradford@LanierLawFirm.com -- The Lanier Law
Firm, PC, pro hac vice, Ryan C. Hudson , Rex A. Sharp, PA, Ryan K.
Wilson -- Ryan.Wilson@LanierLawFirm.com -- The Lanier Law Firm, pro
hac vice, Scott B. Goodger -- sgoodger@midwest-law.com -- Rex A.
Sharp, PA & Rex A. Sharp -- rsharp@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp,
PA.

Exxon Mobil Corporation & ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, Defendants,
represented by John J. Griffin, Jr. --
john.griffin@crowedunlevy.com -- Crowe & Dunlevy, pro hac vice, L.
Mark Walker, Crowe & Dunlevy, pro hac vice, LeAnne Turner Burnett,
Crowe & Dunlevy, Marla D. Broaddus, Enoch Kever PLLC, pro hac vice,
Reagan M. Brown, Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP, pro hac vice,
Richard N. Bien, Lathrop Gage, LLP, Seth Isgur --
seth.isgur@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright US,
LLP, pro hac vice & Shannon H. Ratliff -- shratliff@dgclaw.com --
Davis, Gerald & Cremer, pro hac vice.


FEDEX GROUND: Farrell Suit Removed to New Jersey District Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit captioned Sirkerra Farrell, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE
SYSTEM, INC., a Delaware Corporation; GHG CORPORATION, a Nevada
Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants, Case
No. MID-L-006789-19, was removed from the Superior Court of
Middlesex County, New Jersey, to the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey on Nov. 7, 2019.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:19-cv-19973 to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff's one-count Amended Complaint asserts that the
Defendant failed to pay overtime to the Plaintiff due to its policy
of not including time spent in secure screenings as hours worked,
in violation of the New Jersey Wages and Hour Law.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kathleen M. Caminiti, Esq.
          FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP
          430 Mountain Ave., Suite 303
          Murray Hill, NJ 07974
          Phone: (908) 516-1062
          Facsimile: (908) 516-1101
          Email: kcaminiti@fisherphillips.com

               - and -

          David J. Kiefer, Esq.
          FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.
          1000 FedEx Drive
          Moon Township, PA 15108
          Phone: (412) 859-4140
          Fax: (412) 859-5450
          Email: david.kiefer@fedex.com


FIRST AMERICAN: Show Cause Order Issued in Contract Breach Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale S. Fischer of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California ordered the Plaintiff's counsel seeking to
be named lead counsel and the other counsel who intend to play a
significant role to show cause why they would be adequate counsel
to represent a class in the case In re FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL
CORPORATION CASES. This Document Relates to ALL CASES, Case Nos.
8:19-cv-01009-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01022-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01023-DSF-E,
8:19-cv-01040-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01051-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01078-DSF-E,
8:19-cv-01102-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01105-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01112-DSF-E,
8:19-cv-01137-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01156-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01176-DSF-E,
8:19-cv-01180-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01234-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01293-DSF-E,
8:19-cv-01305-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01316-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-01533-DSF-E,
8:19-cv-05552-DSF-E, 8:19-cv-06576-DSF-E (C.D. Cal.).

The response must provide full and complete information responsive
to Rule 23(g)(1)(A) and (B), and sufficient for the Court to make
an informed decision.

Among other things, the counsel must:

     1. Identify (by court, case name, case number, etc.) all
putative class actions filed by any law firm and any individual
attorney seeking to be named as the class counsel in any court, and
state whether a motion for class certification was filed, whether a
class was certified, and, if so, whether the firm or attorney was
named as class counsel.  If a class certification motion was denied
in any such class action, specify the reasons given by the court
and provide a copy of the opinion or decision;

     2. Describe the trial experience of each individual attorney
seeking to be named as the class counsel;

     3. Describe the experience of each individual attorney seeking
to be named as the class counsel in other complex cases and in the
types of claims asserted in the action, describe the nature of the
cases/claims, identify the cases (by court, case name, case number,
etc.);

     4. Identify (by court, case name, case number, etc.) all cases
in which the court found any law firm or any individual attorney
seeking to be named here as class counsel not to be adequate to
represent a class or otherwise declined to grant counsel's request
to be appointed, specify the reasons given by the court and provide
a copy of the opinion or decision;

     5. Identify (by court, case name, case number, etc. or other
appropriate description) all cases (not limited to class actions or
putative class actions) or circumstances in which the conduct or
ethics (professional or otherwise) (including billing practices) of
any law firm or any individual attorney seeking here to be named as
the class counsel have been the subject of written inquiry by any
court, administrative agency, or bar association, and provide the
complete facts and disposition of the matter;

     6. Identify (by court, case name, case number, etc.) all cases
in which any law firm or any individual attorney seeking to be
named in the instant case as te class counsel has been admonished
or sanctioned by any court or agency and provide the complete facts
and disposition of the matter;

     7. Identify (by court, case name, case number, and charge) any
criminal conviction (other than infractions) of any counsel seeking
to be named as the class counsel;

     8. Identify (by court, case name, case number, etc.) all cases
(not limited to class actions or putative class actions) in which
any counsel or any law firm representing the Plaintiff has
previously represented, or is currently representing, the Plaintiff
and any present or previous relationship with the Plaintiff;

     9. Provide any agreement relating to the instant action with
any person or entity other than the Plaintiff;

     10. Provide the counsel's proposal for terms for attorney's
fees and nontaxable costs;

     11. Describe any liens against the assets, etc. of any law
firm or any individual attorney seeking to be named as the class
counsel;

     12. Describe how the counsel intends to staff the case and the
means by which counsel will fund the necessary costs, including
expert's fees.  

Judge Fischer required that each attorney and firm seeking to be
named as the class counsel answer separately (but not necessarily
in a separate document).  In addition, the counsel must provide all
information responsive to items 4, 5, and 6 regarding any
applicable case or circumstance involving a former law firm but
based in whole or in part on the conduct of the individual attorney
seeking here to be named as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/WfC1q5 from Leagle.com.

ROGER CAMPBELL & GILLIAN SCHAADT, Plaintiffs, represented by Bobby
Saadian --bobby@wilshirelawfirm.com -- Wilshire Law Firm, PLC,
Justin F. Marquez -- justin@wilshirelawfirm.com -- Wilshire Law
Firm, PLC, Patty W. Chen -- patty@wilshirelawfirm.com -- Wilshire
Law Firm,Robert James Dart -- rdart@wilshirelawfirm.com --
Wilshire
Law Firm & Thiago Merlini Coelho -- thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com --
Wilshire Law Firm.

FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation &
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, a California corporation,
Defendants,
represented by Joel David Siegel -- joel.siegel@dentons.com --
Dentons US LLP & Paul Maynard Kakuske --
paul.kakuske@snrdenton.com
-- SNR Denton US LLP.


GAP INC: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Gap, Inc. The
case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez and on behalf of all others
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Gap, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-10167 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 1, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Gap, Inc., commonly known as Gap Inc. or Gap, is an American
worldwide clothing and accessories retailer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Court Stays Mahar Suit Over Stock Direct Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KEVIN MAHAR, MITCHELL WEST, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL
ELECTRIC COMPANY, JEFFREY IMMELT, JEFFREY BORNSTEIN, JAN HAUSER,
JOHN FLANNERY, DOUGLAS WARNER, KPMG LLP, Defendant, Case
653648/2018 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge Andrew Borrok of the New York County
Supreme Court (i) granted GE Defendants' motion to stay, and (ii)
denied without prejudice KPMG's motion to dismiss.

The Plaintiffs assert claims under Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and (15)
of the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of themselves and a
putative class of investors who participated in the GE Direct
Purchase and Dividend Reinvestment Plan known as "GE Stock Direct,"
which allowed investors to purchase shares of GE common stock
through a plan administrator.  

In connection with the Plan, on Nov. 7, 2014, GE registered 75
million shares of common stock and designated Computershare Trust
Co., N.A. as the transfer agent through which investors actually
acquired their shares.  Computershare was authorized to purchase
shares either directly from GE as a new issue or held in its
treasury or the public markets in privately negotiated transactions
.  

In connection with the Plan, pursuant to a Prospectus Supplement
(to Prospectus dated Feb. 29, 2016), on Nov., 6, 2017, GE
registered 25 million shares of common stock and designated Wells
Fargo Shareholder Services as the Plan Administrator.

In accordance with 17 CFR Section 230.405, the 2017 Prospectus
Supplement indicates that if the Plan Administrator purchases
shares from GE, the price will be the same as otherwise available
in the market place.

As set forth in the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint,
the Plaintiffs purchased their GE common stock through the Plan
between July 20, 2015 and July 19, 2018, both dates inclusive.  GE
solicits investors for the Plan on its website by offering that the
Plan enables investors to buy shares of GE common stock directly
from GE.

The Plaintiffs purchased GE common stock during the Class Period
pursuant to GE's registration statements and prospectus directly
from GE as part of the Stock Direct Plan.  They allege that GE's
(i) 2014 S-3, 2014 Prospectus, (ii) 2016 S-3, 2016 Prospectus, and
(iii) 2017 Prospectus Supplement were materially misleading in
violation of the 1933 Act because GE improperly recorded certain
revenue, overstated its earnings and incorporated materially false
and/or misleading quarterly and annual reports that failed to
timely increase its reserves for its LTC reinsurance business as
required under state insurance regulations and GAAP, and failed to
properly account for LTSAs long term services agreements.

As such, the Plaintiffs assert strict liability and negligence
claims under Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the 1933 Act against the GE
Defendants and its accountant KPMG.  They are also proceeding in
the Federal Action captioned "Sjunde Ap-Fonden v. General Electric
Co., No. 17-cv-08457 (SD NY)," brought pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.  For the avoidance of doubt, the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to
the 1934 Act, and an action brought pursuant to the 1933 Act in
state court can not be removed to federal court.

The GE Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be
dismissed because the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their 1933
Act claims, and, in the alternative, argue that the case should be
stayed pending adjudication of the Federal Action.  KPMG argues
that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to CPLR
Section 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiffs undeniably purchased the stock pursuant to the Plan
and based on the allegedly materially misleading Registration
Documents, Judge Borrok states.  To the extent that the GE
Defendants argue that this creates an exception to the tracing
requirement, the Judge disagrees.  It is an offering of securities
on behalf of GE and the tracing requirement is ipso facto met if
the Plaintiffs purchased pursuant to the Plan.  As such, there is
Section 11 standing, the Judge holds.

Judge Borrok further holds that the Plaintiffs have standing to
assert claims under Section 12 of the 1933 Act.  In addition to the
requirement that a defendant be a "statutory seller," the remaining
requirements for Section 12 claims are that (i) the sale was
effectuated "by means of a prospectus or oral communication" and
(ii) that prospectus or oral communication included an untrue
statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.  In the
instant case, the Amended Complaint alleges both elements and the
GE Defendants do not raise any persuasive arguments to the
contrary.

Section 15 of the 1933 Act creates liability for individuals or
entities that control any person liable under section 11 or 12 of
the Act and, thus, relies in part on a plaintiff's ability to
demonstrate primary liability under sections 11 and 12.  As the
Sections 11 and 12 claims survive, the Section 15 claims survive as
well.

Finally, the Defendants also argue, in the alternative, that the
action should be stayed based on the Federal Action.  Judge Borrok
agrees.  The Judge finds that neither party will suffer undue
detriment or gain undue advantage by having the earlier-filed
action determined first, particularly since the other action may
well determine the underlying issues.  The fact that this action
involves claims under the 1933 Act and the Federal Action involves
claims under the 1934 Act is not a reason to deny a stay motion: it
is inconsequential that different legal theories or claims are set
forth in the two actions.  As noted, the hallmark for a stay under
First Department law is that both actions seek to recover for the
same alleged harm based on the same underlying events, and that is
concededly the case.

Accordingly, Judge Borrok need not address KPMG motion to dismiss
the claims against it and, indeed, it would be inappropriate to do
so.  Accordingly, Judge Borrok denied the branch of GE Defendants'
motion to dismiss seeking dismissal for lack of standing.  He
granted the branch of the motion seeking a stay to the extent of
staying further proceedings in the action, except for an
application to vacate or modify said stay.  Either party may make
an application by order to show cause to vacate or modify the stay
following final adjudication of the Federal Action.

Judge Borrok denied without prejudice and deemed held in abeyance
KPMG's motion to dismiss until after the stay in the action is
lifted.

The movant is directed to serve a copy of the Order with notice of
entry on the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street,
Room 119) within 10 days from entry and the Clerk will mark the
matter stayed as provided.  Such service upon the Clerk of the
General Clerk's Office will be made in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk
Procedures for Electronically Filed Cases.

The parties are directed to update the Court on the status of the
Federal Action on the earlier of final adjudication of the Federal
Action and April 1, 2020 at 11:30 a.m. by calling the court room
for Part 53.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UKHHag from Leagle.com.

Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, 712 Fifth Avenue, 31st Floor, New
York, NY 10019, The Rosen Law Firm, P.A., 275 Madison Avenue, 34th
Fl., New York, NY 10016, For Plaintiffs.

Latham & Watkins, LLP, 885 Third Avenue, Suite 1000, New York, NY
10022, Wilkie Farr Gallagher LLP, 787 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY
10019, For Defendants.


GRANITE CONSTRUCTION: Nasseri Sues Over Losses From Layne Merger
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ARASH NASSERI, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. GRANITE CONSTRUCTION INC., JAMES H. ROBERTS,
LAUREL KRZEMINSKI, WILLIAM H. POWELL, JAMES W. BRADFORD, JR.,
MICHAEL F. MCNALLY, PATRICIA D. GALLOWAY, DAVID C. DARNELL, CLAES
G. BJORK, DAVID H. KELSEY, GADDI H. VASQUEZ, CELESTE B. MASTIN, and
DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19CV03208 (Cal. Super.,
Oct. 23, 2019), seeks to pursue remedies under the Securities Act
of 1933 on behalf of all persons, who acquired shares of Granite
common stock issued in the Company's June 2018 merger with Layne
Christensen Company.

According to the complaint, the registration statement and
prospectus for the merger were negligently prepared, and as a
result, contained materially false and misleading statements of
fact and failed to disclose material facts as required under the
rules and regulations governing the preparation of such documents.
On the basis of these materially misleading offering documents,
Layne shareholders voted to approve the Merger on June 13, 2018.

In the stock-for-stock Merger, Layne shareholders received 0.27
Granite shares for each share of Layne common stock they owned.
Subsequent to the Merger's closing, Granite has revealed project
delays, cost overruns, and tens millions of dollars in revenue
adjustments and other charges related to four legacy projects worth
over $1 billion each that predated the Merger. By contrast, the
legacy Layne business has continued to outperform the Company's
overall operations.

At the time of the Merger, Granite stock was trading at nearly $58
per share. By the end of August 2019, the price had fallen to below
$27 per share, representing a more than 50% price decline.
Investors who exchanged their Layne shares for Granite shares in
the Merger have consequently suffered millions of dollars in
damages and financial losses. The lawsuit seeks recovery for those
losses under the 1933 Act.

Granite Construction Inc. is a member of the S&P 400 Index based in
Watsonville, California, and is the parent corporation of Granite
Construction Company, a heavy civil general contractor and
construction material producer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James I. Jaconette, Esq.
          Brian E. Cochran, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101-8498
          Telephone: (619) 231 1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231 7423
          E-mail: jjaconnette@rgdlaw.com
                  bcochran@rgdlaw.com


HAYT HAYT: Seeks 3rd Cir. Review of Order in Barenbaum FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Hayt Hayt & Landau LLC filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Daniel Barenbaum v. Hayt Hayt &
Landau LLC, et al., Case No. 2-18-cv-04120, in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct. 8, 2019, District
Court Judge Berle M. Schiller (i) denied HHL's motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) granted Barenbaum's
motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II of the
Complaint; (iii) granted HHL's motion for summary judgment with
respect to Counts I and III; and (iv) granted Barenbaum's motion
for class certification.

In 2014, Mr. Barenbaum failed to make payments on his Credit One
credit card, and after several months, Credit One charged off his
account with a balance of $1,011.39.  Credit One then sold the
charged off account to Sherman Originator III, LLC; Sherman, in
turn, sold the account to Midland Funding, LLC.  Midland retained
the law firm Hayt, Hayt, & Landau (HHL) to help collect Barenbaum's
debt.  HHL obtained a default judgment against Barenbaum on behalf
of Midland in the Court of Common Pleas in Bucks County,
Pennsylvania. Seeking to recover the judgment, HHL mailed
post-judgment interrogatories to Barenbaum in June 2016 which
included an offer to resolve the judgment through installment
payments in lieu of responding to the questions.

In June 2018, after Barenbaum failed to respond to the written
discovery request, HHL sent Barenbaum a "Notice of Deposition in
Aid of Execution."  At the top of the Notice was the name and
address of the "Law Offices of Hayt, Hayt, & Landau, LLC" and the
caption "Midland Funding LLC, Plaintiff vs. Daniel Barenbaum,
Defendant(s)."  The Notice directed Barenbaum to appear and testify
at a deposition on July 6, 2018 at the Bucks County Bar Association
and to produce documents to assist in the discovery of his income,
assets, and property that could satisfy Midland's judgment.

Judge Schiller finds that HHL's argument in its Motion to Dismiss
overlooks the fact that Barenbaum has brought a class action claim.
While the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act limits statutory
damages available in individual actions to $1,000, a plaintiff
asserting claims on behalf of a class has the opportunity for
greater financial recovery than he would otherwise obtain in an
individual action.  That is because the FDCPA specifically permits
a named class plaintiff to recover not only the statutory damages
available to him in an individual action but also, a pro-rata share
of the common fund that is generated for the benefit of the class.
Because Barenbaum still has the prospect of recovering additional
funds as a named class Plaintiff, he has not reached his maximum
recovery and thus, still has a personal stake in the outcome of the
case.  Barenbaum's claims are not moot and thus, Judge Schiller
denies HHL's Motion to Dismiss.

The appellate case is captioned as Daniel Barenbaum v. Hayt Hayt &
Landau LLC, et al., Case No. 19-3337, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee DANIEL BARENBAUM, On Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          E-mail: Ari@MarcusZelman.com
                  Yzelman@MarcusZelman.com

Defendant-Appellant HAYT HAYT & LANDAU LLC is represented by:

          Shannon P. Miller, Esq.
          MAURICE WUTSCHER LLP
          175 Strafford Avenue
          Executive Commons, Suite One
          Wayne, PA 19087
          Telephone: (215) 789-7157
          E-mail: smiller@MauriceWutscher.com

Defendant-Appellee MIDLAND FUNDING LLC is represented by:

          Andrew M. Schwartz, Esq.
          GORDON REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP
          Three Logan Square
          1717 Arch Street, Suite 610
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 717-4023
          E-mail: amschwartz@grsm.com


HEARTLAND EXPRESS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Connell Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jacqueline Connell, an individual, and on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. HEARTLAND EXPRESS, INC.; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-09584 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 7,
2019), accuses the Defendants of wage and labor violations arising
out of their failure to fully compensate their truck driver
employees according to law.

The Defendants paid the Plaintiff and Class member on an hourly
basis for driving in California; the Defendants did not pay them
for all waiting and/or on duty time in California, the Plaintiff
alleges. She contends she was only paid a small "retention" when
waiting to be loaded or unloaded. However, the Plaintiff often
waited hours, well beyond retention pay, without any compensation,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a driver.

Heartland Express is a transportation company that provides
transportation and trucking services.[BN]  

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua H. Haffner, Esq.
          Graham G. Lambert, Esq.
          HAFFNER LAW PC
          445 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2625
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 514-5681
          Fax: (213) 514-5682
          Email: jhh@haffnerlaw.com
                 gl@haffnerlaw.com


HENRY COUNTY, IN: Summary Judgment Bid in Baker Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER BAKER, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD MCCORKLE, ET
AL., Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-03026-JMS-MPB (S.D. Ind.), Judge
Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

On Nov. 4, 2016, Plaintiff Christopher Baker, along with four other
Plaintiffs, initiated the action against Defendants Henry County
Sheriff Richard McCorkle, the Henry County Commissioners, and the
Henry County Council.  They asserted their claims individually and
on behalf of a class of present and future inmates of the Henry
County Jail, to redress allegedly unconstitutional conditions at
the Jail stemming from overcrowding.

After resolving several pre-trial issues, the Court found that only
Mr. Baker had alleged viable claims and certified a class of any
and all persons currently confined or who will in the future be
confined in the Henry County Jail for purposes of declaratory and
injunctive relief only.

On June 27, 2019, the Court decertified the class based on
inadequacy of the class counsel, noted that it did not appear that
Mr. Baker asserted individual claims, and ordered him to file a
motion to dismiss the case.  Instead, Mr. Baker filed a "Response"
to the Court's Order, asserting that he is entitled to damages on
his individual claims.

The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Mr. Baker's
individual claims -- to the extent they exist.  In their Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Defendants argue that Mr. Baker cannot
recover monetary damages as a member of the class because the class
was only certified for purposes of declaratory and injunctive
relief.  They contend that Mr. Baker cannot add claims through his
Statement of Claims and Damages, and has not alleged claims related
to the lockdown of inmates due to a shortage of staff, a lack of
indoor recreation, and other issues not raised in the Complaint.
The Defendants also argue that Mr. Baker did not plead an
individual claim related to inmate fighting due to overcrowding,
such as a failure to protect claim, so he may not recover on that
theory.

In his response, Mr. Baker challenges the Court's ruling as to the
limited damages for which Mr. Baker may recover and argues that the
aggregate conditions and the reasonable effects they would have on
his physical and mental wellbeing amount to punishment in violation
of the U.S. Constitution.  He points to his testimony at the Pavey
hearing that his cell block was overcrowded with inmates sleeping
on the floor, and argues that he sets forth his individual claims
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights separate
from the class action portion of the complaint.

In his Complaint, Mr. Baker raised four individual claims: (1) he
had to sleep on the floor with nothing but a one-inch thick, moldy
mat; (2) there was mold on the walls, ceiling, and floor of his
cell; (3) he was not permitted to use the outside recreation area
for a period of time; and (4) he was forced to sleep naked in a
padded cell and to share that cell with another naked inmate.
These are the only claims Mr. Baker raised on his own behalf,
separate and apart from the class claims set forth in the
Complaint.  After the Pavey hearing, the Court found that Mr. Baker
had not exhausted his administrative remedies for the last three
allegations.  As to his allegation that he had to sleep on the
floor, the Court found that this related to overcrowding and was
beyond the control of Jail officials so, according to the grievance
procedure set forth in the Inmate Handbook, he was not required to
file a grievance related to overcrowding in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies.

Judge Magnus-Stinson does not read Mr. Baker's Statement of Claims
and Damages as abandoning his individual claim related to sleeping
on the floor.  First, Mr. Baker fairly raised his claim related to
sleeping on the floor due to overcrowding in his Statement of
Claims and Damages.  Second, his representation that there are no
special damages with regard to Mr. Baker is not clear.  It could
mean that he does not seek anything over $50 a day, it could mean
that he does not seek anything above nominal damages, or it could
mean something entirely different.

In order to recover anything more than nominal damages for sleeping
on the floor, Mr. Baker would need to show that he suffered a
physical injury.  Given Mr. Baker's concession in his response to
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that he is only
entitled to nominal damages in connection with his individual
claim, the Judge reads his Statement of Claims and Damages to mean
that he does not seek any compensatory damages over and above
nominal damages.  Moreover, Mr. Baker states in the Statement of
Claims and Damages that he seeks attorneys' fees and punitive
damages, and he is not precluded from doing so under the PLRA, even
in the absence of a showing of physical injury.

Accordingly, Judge Magnus-Stinson denied in part the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.  Mr. Baker's individual claim for
being required to sleep on the floor due to overcrowding while a
Jail inmate remains, and he may seek nominal damages, attorneys'
fees, and punitive damages.  The Judge granted in part the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to any other
claim.   Judge Magnus-Stinson asks that the Magistrate Judge meets
with the parties to discuss the resolution of the matter short of
trial.  Absent such a resolution, trial is scheduled to take place
on Jan. 27, 2020.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ufrj93 from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER BAKER, Individually and on Behalf of the Present and
Future Inmates of Henry County Jail, Plaintiff, represented by
Julie A. Newhouse, NEWHOUSE AND NEWHOUSE, Michael K. Sutherlin --
msutherlin@gmail.com -- MICHAEL K. SUTHERLIN & ASSOCIATES, PC &
Tracy J. Newhouse, NEWHOUSE & NEWHOUSE.

RICHARD MCCORKLE, Individually And In His Official Capacity As
Sheriff of Henry County, BRUCE BAKER, Henry County Commissioner,
KIM CRONK, Henry County Commissioner, ED YANOS, Henry County
Commissioner, RICHARD BOUSLOG, Henry County Council, ROBIN
RENO-FLEMING, Henry County Council, STEVEN DUGGER, Henry County
Council, NATHAN LAMAR, Henry County Council, CLAY MORGAN, Henry
County Council, MICHAEL THALLS, Henry County Council, HAROLD
GRIFFIN, Henry County Council, HENRY COUNTY, INDIANA COMMISSIONERS
& HENRY COUNTY COUNCIL, Defendants, represented by represented by
James S. Stephenson, STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER & Pamela G.
Schneeman, STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER.


HNN ASSOCIATES: Jammeh Can File 2nd Amended FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ADAMA JAMMEH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HNN ASSOCIATES,
LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. C19-0620JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge
James L. Robart of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington, Seattle, granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
file a second amended class action complaint.

The Plaintiffs are sisters who co-signed a lease on rental property
in which Ms. Jammeh lived with her children.  Gateway owned the
property, and HNN managed it.  Approximately four months into the
lease, HNN and Gateway evicted the Plaintiffs for reasons the
Plaintiffs allege are pretextual and immaterial.  HNN and Gateway
then allegedly declared the Plaintiffs' security deposit forfeited
and claimed additional fees, which they dispute.  HNN then referred
the Plaintiffs' account to Columbia for collections.  The
Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Wojdak controls Columbia.

The Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the King County Superior
Court on March 7, 2019, and filed a first amended complaint on
April 25, 2019, which added a claim under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act ("FDCPA").  On April 26, 2019, the Defendants removed
the action to federal court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331
and 1441(c).  The Plaintiffs did not oppose removal.

On June 14, 2019, the District Court issued a scheduling order
setting July 12, 2019, as the deadline for joining additional
parties, and April 16, 2020, as the deadline for amending
pleadings.  Thus, the Plaintiffs' July 12, 2019, motion seeking to
add a Defendant and amend the allegations of their first amended
complaint is timely. As of the date the Plaintiffs filed their
motion, no party has taken any depositions or engaged in formal
written discovery beyond providing the required initial disclosures
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a).

Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs assert that the documents HNN produced
in informal discovery on May 10, 2019, reveal specific ways that
HNN and Gateway engaged in practices that violatethe Residential
Landlord Tenant Act, along with the Washington Consumer Protection
Act ("CPA").  They also assert that these documents and further
investigation revealed the basis for class action allegations on
behalf of two classes of Washington residents.  The two proposed
classes are based on (1) the conduct of HNN and Gateway, and (2)
Columbia's debt collection practices.  Finally, the Plaintiffs
assert that initial disclosures and independent investigation
reveal the basis for individual allegations against Mr. Wojdak
based on his control of the conduct and practices of Columbia.

Plaintiffs Jammeh and Oumie Sallah's motion for leave to file a
second amended class action complaint, seeks to (1) add William
Wojdak, the allegedly controlling principle of Defendant Columbia
Debt Recovery, LLC, as a Defendant, (2) add a claim under the
Washington Landlord Tenant Act, and (3) bring class allegations on
behalf of two classes of Washington residents who were former
tenants of apartments managed by Defendant HNN and who paid various
move-out charges to HNN or its collection agency Columbia.
Defendants HNN, Gateway, and Columbia failed to timely file an
opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion.

Judge Robart finds that the Plaintiffs' motion is timely under the
scheduling order.  The Judge also can detect no bad faith.  The
Plaintiffs' proposed amendment will also cause no undue prejudice
to the Defendants as it is in its earliest stages.  The Judge
further perceives no basis for dismissal of the proposed class
allegations or the Residential Landlord Tenant Act, claim on
grounds of inadequate pleading.  The Defendants' failure to file a
response to the Plaintiffs' motion supports the conclusion.
Finally, the allegations the Plaintiffs propose are new allegations
based on the Defendants' initial disclosures and resulting
investigation.

Because the Court freely gives leave to amend when justice so
requires, and the relevant factors favor permitting the requested
amendments, Judge Robart grants the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to
file a second amended class action complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/VGTHtg from Leagle.com

Adama Jammeh & Oumie Sallah, Plaintiffs, represented by Paul Arons,
LAW OFFICE OF PAUL ARONS, Samuel R. Leonard, LEONARD LAW, Ari Y.
Brown, TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC, Beth E. Terrell, TERRELL
MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC, Blythe H. Chandler, TERRELL MARSHALL LAW
GROUP PLLC & Brittany J. Glass -- bglass@terrellmarshall.com --
TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC.

HNN Associates LLC & Gateway LLC, Defendants, represented by Andrew
David Shafer -- ashafer@sksp.com -- SIMBURG KETTER SHEPPARD & PURDY
LLP.

Columbia Debt Recovery LLC, doing business as Genesis, Defendant,
represented by Krista L. White, COLUMBIA DEBT RECOVERY LLC & Andrew
David Shafer, SIMBURG KETTER SHEPPARD & PURDY LLP.


HORIZON TALK: Sued by Castillo Over Unsolicited Marketing Texts
---------------------------------------------------------------
JEFF CASTILLO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. HORIZON TALK LLC, d/b/a TELECLARO, A
Delaware limited liability company, the Defendant, Case No.
CACE-19-021856 (Fla. Cir., Oct. 22, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
unsolicited text messages to wireless phone users, in violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, to solicit new paying customers, the
Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing with no regard for
privacy rights of the recipients of those messages.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's
illegal conduct. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and Class Members.

The Defendant is a telecommunication company that offers
international long-distance calls.[BN]

The Plaintiff and the Class are represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479 2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW , PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975 3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com


IOC-BOONVILLE, INC: Nicholson Seeks to Certify FLSA Collectives
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as CAROLYN M. NICHOLSON,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. IOC-BOONVILLE, INC. D/B/A ISLE OF CAPRI CASINO HOTEL
BOONVILLE, the Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-4084-NKLN (W.D. Mo.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to to enter an order:

   a. conditionally certifying these Fair Labor Standards Act
      Collectives:

      FLSA Time Clock Rounding Collective:

      "all hourly employees who clocked in and clocked out using
      the Kronos timekeeping system at IOC from three years prior
      to the filing of the Complaint to the present";

      FLSA Tip Credit Notice Collective:

      "all hourly employees who were paid a direct hourly wage
      that was less than $7.25 per hour and for whom a tip credit
      was claimed from three years prior to the filing of the
      Complaint to the present"; and

      FLSA Gaming License Deduction Collective:

      "all hourly employees who were paid a direct hourly wage
      equal to or less than $7.25 per hour and had a gaming
      license fee deducted from their wages from three years prior

      to the filing of the Complaint to the present";

   b. certifying these Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 Classes:

      MMWL Time Clock Rounding Class:

      "all hourly employees who clocked in and clocked out using
      the Kronos timekeeping system at IOC from two years prior to

      the filing of the Complaint to the present";

      MMWL Gaming License Deduction Class:

      "all hourly employees who were paid a direct hourly wage
      equal to or less than the then-applicable minimum wage in
      Missouri ($8.60 per hour during 2019, $7.85 per hour during
      2018, or $7.70 per hour during 2017) and had a gaming
      license fee deducted from their wages from two years prior
      to the filing of the Complaint to the present";

      Missouri Unjust Enrichment Class:

      "all hourly employees who clocked in and clocked out using
      the Kronos timekeeping system at IOC from five years prior
      to the filing of the Complaint to the present";

      Missouri Breach of Contract Class:

      "all hourly employees who clocked in and clocked out using
      the Kronos timekeeping system at IOC from five years prior
      to the filing of the Complaint to the present";

   c. appointing Carolyn M. Nicholson as class representative for
      the FLSA Time Clock Rounding Collective, FLSA Tip Credit
      Notice Collective, and FLSA Gaming License Deduction
      Collective;

   d. appointing Carolyn M. Nicholson as class representative for
      the MMWL Time Clock Rounding Class, MMWL Gaming License
      Deduction Class, Missouri Unjust Enrichment Class, and
      Missouri Breach of Contract Class;

   e. appointing McClelland Law Firm, P.C. as class counsel for
      each class and collective;

   f. directing Defendant to produce the following information for

      each member of each class and collective in an excel
      document within 10 days of the Court’s Order on this
motion:
      (a) full name; (b) last known address; (c) last known phone
      number; (d) last known e-mail address; (e) dates of
      employment; (f) last four digits of their social security
      number; (g) whether and when Defendant claimed a tip credit
      for the person; and (h) if Defendant claimed a tip credit
      for the person, the sub-minimum wage rate for each person
      and the date the person earned that base sub-minimum wage;

   g. setting a deadline by which the parties shall file a joint
      motion to approve a Rule 23 Class Notice to the Rule 23
      Classes and/or FLSA Collective Action Notice to the FLSA
      Collectives; and

   h. granting such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Ryan L. McClelland, Esq.
          Michael J. Rahmberg, Esq.
          The Flagship Building
          200 Westwoods Drive
          Liberty, MO 64068-1170
          Telephone: (816) 781-0002
          Facsimile: (816) 781-1984
          E-mail: ryan@mcclellandlawfirm.com
                  mrahmberg@mcclellandlawfirm.com

IROBOT CORP: Campbell Sues Over Drastic Decline in Share Price
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jerome Campbell, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated v. IROBOT CORPORATION, COLIN M. ANGLE, and ALISON DEAN,
Case No. 1:19-cv-103373 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 7, 2019), is brought on
behalf of purchasers of iRobot securities between November 21,
2016, and October 22, 2019, accusing the Defendants of violating
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Defendants have reported explosive, double-digit revenue
growth, which it attributed to increasing demand for its Roomba
products, expanded gross margin because of distributor
acquisitions, greater brand awareness, and technological
innovation. However in reality, the Defendants were engaging in
channel-stuffing in order to inflate its sales and revenues
figures, and had acquired two of its largest distributors to
facilitate and conceal this deceptive practice, the Plaintiff
alleges.

On April 23, 2019, after the closing of trading, the Defendants
surprised the market by announcing quarterly revenues that were
below analyst expectations and also revealed surging inventory
levels. In response to this news, the Defendants' stock price fell
from $130.57 per share on April 23, 2019, to $100.42 per share on
April 24, 2019, on unusually high trading volume--a decline of over
23% in one trading day. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful act
omissions, and the resulting decline in the market value of
iRobot's securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have
suffered significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased shares of iRobot securities during the
Class Period.

iRobot is a global consumer company with a portfolio of products
focused on indoor and outdoor cleaning applications.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Phone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          Email: peretz@bgandg.com


JACOBS ENGINEERING: Delozier Sues Over Dec. 2008 Coal Ash Spill
---------------------------------------------------------------
Margie Delozier, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. and THE TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY, Case No. 4:19-cv-04386 (E.D. Tenn., Nov. 7, 2019), is
brought against the Defendants as a result of the catastrophic
spill on December 22, 2008, of toxic coal ash sludge from
containment structures at a Class II landfill at the Defendant's
Kingston Fossil Plant.

The Plaintiff complains of environmental contamination and
polluting events upon their property and person caused by the
conduct and activities of the Defendants. The Defendants have
caused the dispersion of coal ash and its fugitive dust on the
Plaintiff and their properties, as well as the surrounding private
homes and business. If coal ash and its fugitive dust is ingested,
inhaled and/or deposited on private property, surface and
groundwater, it does great damage to the Plaintiff's health,
safety, and welfare. It is injurious to property and unreasonable
interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is an owner of a private property in Roane County,
Tennessee. The Plaintiff asserts claims for personal injury,
property damages, trespass, nuisance, and medical monitoring.

The Defendants operate the Kingston Fossil Plant, which is a
coal-fired power plant that produces electricity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by

          James K. Scott, Esq.
          Keith D. Stewart, Esq.
          J. Tyler Roper, Esq.
          MARKET STREET LAW PLLC
          625 Market Street, 7th Floor
          Knoxville, TN 37902
          Phone: (865) 245-0989


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Accruals Established in XARELTO(R) Related Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 28, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 29, 2019, that the company has
established accruals for the costs associated with the United
States settlement program and XARELTO(R) related product liability
litigation.

Claims for personal injury arising out of the use of XARELTO(R), an
oral anticoagulant, have been made against Janssen Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (JPI); Johnson & Johnson; and JPI's collaboration partner for
XARELTO(R) Bayer AG and certain of its affiliates.

Cases filed in federal courts in the United States have been
organized as a multi-district litigation in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

In addition, cases have been filed in state courts across the
United States.

Many of these cases have been consolidated into a state mass tort
litigation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and in a coordinated
proceeding in California. Class action lawsuits also have been
filed in Canada.

In March 2019, the Company announced an agreement in principle to
the settle the XARELTO(R) cases in the United States; such
agreement was finalized and executed in May 2019 establishing an
ongoing United States settlement program.

The Company has established accruals for the costs associated with
the United States settlement program and XARELTO(R) related product
liability litigation.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend INVOKANA(R) Related Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 28, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 29, 2019, that the company
continues to defend class action suits related to sales of
INVOKANA(R).

Claims for personal injury have been made against a number of
Johnson & Johnson companies, including Janssen Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, arising out of the use of INVOKANA(R),
a prescription medication indicated to improve glycemic control in
adults with Type 2 diabetes.

Lawsuits filed in federal courts in the United States have been
organized as a multi-district litigation in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. Cases have also been
filed in various state courts including Pennsylvania, Louisiana and
Utah.

Class action lawsuits have been filed in Canada. Product liability
lawsuits continue to be filed, and the Company continues to receive
information with respect to potential costs and the anticipated
number of cases.

The Company has settled or otherwise resolved many of the cases and
claims in the United States and the costs associated with these
settlements are reflected in the Company's accruals.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Continues to Defend Talc-Related Class Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 28, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 29, 2019, that the company
continues to defend different class action suits involving asbestos
contamination in body powders containing talc, primarily
JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder.

In February 2018, a securities class action lawsuit was filed
against Johnson & Johnson and certain named officers in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that
Johnson & Johnson violated the federal securities laws by failing
to adequately disclose the alleged asbestos contamination in body
powders containing talc, primarily JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder, and
that purchasers of Johnson & Johnson's shares suffered losses as a
result.  

Plaintiffs are seeking damages.

The Company has filed a motion to dismiss and awaits the Court's
schedule for oral argument.  

In October 2018, a shareholder derivative lawsuit was filed against
Johnson & Johnson as the nominal defendant and its current
directors as defendants in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, alleging a breach of fiduciary duties
related to the alleged asbestos contamination in body powders
containing talc, primarily JOHNSON’S(R) Baby Powder, and that
Johnson & Johnson has suffered damages as a result of those alleged
breaches.

In September 2019, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
the shareholder derivative lawsuit, and dismissed the complaint
without prejudice.  

In January 2019, two ERISA class action lawsuits were filed by
participants in the Johnson & Johnson Savings Plan against Johnson
& Johnson, its Pension and Benefits Committee, and certain named
officers in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties by offering Johnson & Johnson stock as a Johnson & Johnson
Savings Plan investment option when it was imprudent to do so
because of failures to disclose alleged asbestos contamination in
body powders containing talc, primarily JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder.
Plaintiffs are seeking damages and injunctive relief. Defendants
have filed a motion to dismiss.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JUUL LABS: Flores Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Flores, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. JUUL LABS, INC., Case No. 2019CH12935 (Ill.
Cir., Cook Cty., Nov. 7, 2019), seeks redress and to curtail the
Defendant's unlawful collection, use, storage, and disclosure of
the Plaintiff's sensitive and proprietary biometric data.

When customers uses JUUL's Web site, https://www.juul.com/, to
complete and online our chase of e-cigarettes or e-cigarette
cartridges, they must submits detail information, including name,
date of birth, permanent address, and the last four digits of their
social security number for age verification. Should a customer
opt-out of providing that information, the customer may verify
their age by uploading a real-time photograph, which JUUL uses to
match a user's face to an uploaded government-issued Identification
Card. The Plaintiff contends that JUUL's use of facial geometry
features technology exposes its customers to serious and
irreversible privacy risks.

Recognizing the need to protect its citizens from such situation,
Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act,
specifically to regulate companies that collect and store Illinois
citizens' biometrics, such as facial features.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant disregards employees'
statutorily protected privacy rights and unlawfully collects,
stores, disseminates, and uses its employees' biometric data in
violation of BIPA. Specifically, the Defendant has violated and
continues to violate BIPA because it did not and continues not to:
properly inform the Plaintiff in writing of the specific purpose
and length of time for which their facial geometry were being
collected, stored, and used, as required by BIPA; receive a written
release from the Plaintiff to collect, store, or otherwise use
their facial geometry, as required by BIPA; publish a publicly
available retention schedule and guidelines for permanently
destroying Plaintiff's facial geometry, as required by BIPA; and
obtain consent from Plaintiff to disclose, redisclose, or otherwise
disseminate their facial geometry to a third party as required by
BIPA, says the complaint.

Michelle Flores is a natural person and a citizen of the State of
Illinois.

JUUL is a Delaware company that manufactures electronic cigarettes,
which are marketed as an alternative to traditional
cigarettes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          Haley R. Jenkins, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 233-1550
          Fax: (312) 233-1560
          Email: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                 jzouras@stephanzouras.com
                 hjenkins@stephanzouras.com


KANSAS CITY, MO: Civil Contempt Judgment in Sophian Suit Reversed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SOPHIAN PLAZA ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondents, v.
CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, Appellant, Case No. SC97626 (Mo.),
Judge Zel M. Fischer of the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the
circuit court's judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.

In 1971, Kansas City enacted an ordinance, Section 16.20(a),
providing for trash collection for all residences except trailer
parks or buildings containing seven or more dwelling units.  In
1975, three lawsuits filed by owners of residences excluded from
the trash collection service were consolidated in one suit
challenging the constitutional validity of the ordinance.

In its April 1976 judgment, the circuit court held the exclusion of
trailer parks and buildings with seven or more dwelling units was
unconstitutional and entered a mandatory injunction requiring City
to provide trash collection services to Graham unless and until
City enacts a valid ordinance which establishes a reasonable and
justifiable classification for those persons who are not entitled
to refuse collection by City.  Both Graham and City filed timely
notices of appeal of the April 1976 order.

On Aug. 31, 1976, City and Graham filed a Stipulation and Agreement
with the circuit court.  The Agreement was signed by Graham's
attorney as well as by the assistant city attorney on City's
behalf.  The Agreement required City to either provide trash
services to owners of apartment buildings containing seven or more
dwelling units and owners of trailer parks within Kansas City,
Missouri, or pay each owner $1.15 per occupied unit per year in
lieu of trash services.  It provided the cash payment would be
increased or decreased each year by the same percentage as the
increase or decrease in the average cost of providing services to
those dwelling units receiving trash service under the city
ordinance.  It also provided City's obligations to provide the
trash rebate program would terminate only upon City's termination
of its entire trash collection service.  Following termination of
the trash collection service, City's obligation to provide the
trash rebate program would renew should City ever then restore its
city-wide trash collection service.

Before the record on appeal was filed in the court of appeals, and
upon the joint request of the parties through the Agreement, the
circuit court entered a modified judgment ("1976 Modified
Judgment") declaring Section 16.20(a) unconstitutional, adopting
and incorporating the Agreement into its judgment at the request of
the parties, and entering a mandatory injunction directing City to
comply with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.  In 1976,
City amended its trash collection ordinances in adherence with the
1976 Modified Judgment by formally adopting the trash rebate
program into the city code.

City continued providing the trash rebate program until the city
council approved a proposed budget eliminating the program in 2008.
In 2010, City effectively eliminated the program by repealing City
Code Sections 62-41(a3) and 62-42.

The class Plaintiffs, Sophian Plaza Association, Townsend Place
Condominium Association, Inc., and Stadium View Apartments filed a
class action petition in 2015, alleging City's elimination of the
trash rebate program was a breach of the modified judgment and a
breach of the Agreement.  

The circuit court certified a class consisting of all managers and
owners of trailer parks, condominiums, apartments and buildings
containing seven or more dwelling units located in Kansas City
Missouri during the class period May 1, 2010 to the present.

After trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the
class on its claims for breach of injunction, breach of contract,
specific performance, and civil contempt.  The circuit court
assessed $10,274,704 in compensatory damages, required City to pay
$2,846 per day until it complies with its trash collection
obligations, and ordered City to pay class counsel $1,362,562.50 in
fees and $59,035.56 in expenses.  The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment, and the Court granted transfer.

The City of Kansas City appeals the judgment in favor of the class
on claims of breach of injunction, breach of contract, specific
performance and civil contempt in connection with City's
termination of its trash rebate program.  

Judge Fischer holds that the consequence of not certifying a class
under Rule 52.08(b) and thereafter following class action
procedures -- including ordering individual notice be provided to
all class members under Rule 52.08(c) -- is that the 1976 Modified
Judgment can be enforced only by the parties to that judgment, even
though the judgment extends benefits to others.

The breach of contract claim is not viable because the underlying
contract was merged into the 1976 Modified Judgment at the request
of the parties.  Neither Sophian Plaza nor the class of similarly
situated Plaintiffs may bring a contempt action to enforce the 1976
Modified Judgment because they were not parties to the litigation
nor were the 1976 Plaintiffs certified as a class under Rule 52.08.


Accordingly, Judge Fischer reversed the circuit court's judgment
holding City in civil contempt of the 1976 Modified Judgment.

A full-text copy of Judge Fischer's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/ydiPwT from Leagle.com.

The city was represented by Tara M. Kelley, Cecilia Abbott and M.
Margaret Sheahan Moran of the city attorney's office in Kansas
City, (816) 513-3117.

The associations were represented by Edward D. Robertson Jr., Mary
D. Winter and Anthony L. DeWitt of Bartiumus Frickleton Robertson
Rader PC in Jefferson City, (573) 659-4454.

Edward D. Robertson III of Bartimus Frickleton Robertson Rader PC
in Leawood, Kansas, (913) 266-2300.

Richard F. Lombardo and Leland M. Shurin -- lshurin@sls-law.com --
of Shaffer Lombardo Shurin in Kansas City, (816) 931-0500.

Gregory A. Lehy of Gregory Leyh PC in Gladstone, (816) 283-3380.

Kenneth E. Barnes of Barnes Law Firm LLC in Kansas City, (816)
221-4321.


KILCOY PASTORAL: Smithson Sues Over Collection of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN SMITHSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. KILCOY PASTORAL COMPANY TRADING USA, LLC
d/b/a KILCOY GLOBAL FOODS, and RUPRECHT COMPANY d/b/a RUPRECHT - A
DIVISION OF KILCOY GLOBAL FOODS, Defendants, Case No. 2019CH12243
(Ill. Cir., Oct. 22, 2019), seeks to recover damages resulting from
the Defendants' violation of the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act.

The case is a class action on behalf of all persons in Illinois,
who had their handprints and/or fingerprints improperly collected,
captured, received, or otherwise obtained by the Defendants.

According to the complaint, at least 300 individuals performed work
for the Defendants in the state of Illinois. The Defendants collect
biometric identifiers and biometric information from these
individuals through its timekeeping systems.

The Plaintiff has been employed by Defendants as a Lead Maintenance
Tech beginning on April 14, 2016, through the present. Throughout
his employment, Smithson has worked at the Defendants' facility
located in Mundelein, Illinois.

From the start of Plaintiff's employment with Defendants in April
2016 through the present, the Plaintiff, and all other members of
the putative BIPA Class, has been required to have his fingerprint
and/or handprint collected and/or captured so that the Defendants
could store it and use it moving forward as an authentication
method. From the start of the Plaintiff's employment through
December 2017, the Defendants utilized a time clock that required
him to place his entire hand on a panel to be scanned to clock in
and out of work.

Until December 2017, each of the putative BIPA Class members was
each required to place his/her entire hand on a panel to be scanned
in order to 'clock in' and 'clock out' of work.

Due to the fact that the Plaintiff had to place his entire hand on
the Defendants' biometric scanner, and because the Defendants
provided no information about the device, the Plaintiff is not
certain whether Defendants took scans of only his fingerprints,
only his handprint, or of both his fingerprints and handprints.

The Defendants failed to obtain prior written consent from the
Plaintiff or any putative BIPA Class member before they collected,
stored, or used those individuals' biometric information, the
Plaintiff alleges. The Plaintiff and the putative BIPA Class
members have continuously and repeatedly been exposed to risks,
harmful conditions, and violations of privacy through the
Defendants' violations of BIPA, the lawsuit says.

In 2013, KPG was purchased by a Chinese private equity investment
fund, New Hope, which is managed by Hosen Capital. In 2014,
Ruprecht was purchased by New Hope, which is managed by Hosen
Capital. Under the combined ownership, the companies have undergone
a multi-year restructuring and rebranding in order to create a
global food manufacturing, processing, and distribution
conglomerate, now known as the brand "KPG". As a part of this
corporate and brand restructuring, KPG fully controls and manages
Ruprecht, including Ruprecht's operations and policies.

Kilcoy Pastoral Company Trading USA is a domestic limited liability
company. KPG originated in Queensland, Australia, and is a beef
production and processing company. KPG maintains its registered
office in Orland Park, Cook County, Illinois. Ruprecht Company - A
Division of Kilcoy Global Foods ("Ruprecht"), is a domestic
corporation. Ruprecht is a meat processing and food manufacturing
company originating in Illinois. Ruprecht maintains its registered
office in Orland Park, Cook County, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alejandro Caffarelli, Esq.
          Alexis D. Martin, Esq.
          CAFFARELLI & ASSOCIATES LTD.
          224 S. Michigan Ave., Ste. 300
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone (312) 763-6880


KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION: Cal. Eastern Dist. Stays Martinez Labor Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California stayed the case captioned ROBERT MARTINEZ,
an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION, INC. d/b/a ARIZONA
KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION, INC., and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 1:16-cv-01730-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.).

On Sept. 30, 2016, the Plaintiff, a truck driver, commenced the
class action on behalf of himself and other truck drivers employed
by the Defendant, asserting claims including state law claims for
failure to provide meal and rest breaks.  On Oct. 15, 2019, the
parties stipulated to staying the action, including discovery,
pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in four
matters challenging the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration's ("FMCSA") determination preempting California's
meal and rest break laws for drivers subject to the federal hours
of service regulations.  Because the viability of the Plaintiff's
meal and rest break claims depend on whether the Ninth Circuit
affirms or reverses the FMCSA's determination, the parties seek a
stay of the action in its entirety pending the Ninth Circuit's
decision.

Good cause appearing, and pursuant to the parties' stipulation,
Judge Drozd stayed the matter, including all discovery and motion
practice, in its entirety, pending the Ninth Circuit's decision
regarding the FMCSA's determination.  The parties will file a joint
status report within 30 days of the Ninth Circuit's decision
regarding the FMCSA's determination, wherein each party will state
its position on whether to lift the stay, without prejudice to the
rights of either party to move, thereafter, for a further stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/aKnfB8 from Leagle.com.

Robert Martinez, Plaintiff, represented by Craig Justin Ackermann
-- cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann & Tilajef, PC. & Julian
Ari Hammond -- jhammond@hammondlawpc.com -- HammondLaw P.C..

Knight Transportation, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Defendant,
represented by Michael J. Hui -- mhui@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C., Richard H. Rahm -- rrahm@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C. & Kai-Ching Cha -- kcha@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C..


KOHLBERG VENTURES: Workers Class Certified in Wojciechowski Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Thomas S. Hixson grants the Plaintiff's Motion for
Class Certification in the lawsuit entitled PETER WOJCIECHOWSKI, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. KOHLBERG
VENTURES, LLC, Case No. 3:16-cv-06775-TSH (N.D. Cal.).

The certified Class is comprised of: Plaintiff and all similarly
situated former employees (i) who worked at or reported to one of
ClearEdge Power's Facilities in Connecticut, (ii) who were
terminated without cause on or about April 25, 2014 and within 30
days of that date, or who were terminated without cause as the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass layoffs and/or plant
closings ordered on or about April 25, 2014, (iii) who are affected
employees, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(5) and
(iv) who have not filed a timely request to opt-out of the class.

Jack A. Raisner, Esq., and Rene S. Roupinian, Esq., of Outten &
Golden LLP are appointed as Class Counsel.  Plaintiff Peter
Wojciechowski is appointed Class Representative.

The amended proposed form of Notice of Class Action to the Class
submitted to the Court on November 1, 2019, is approved.

Judge Hixson ruled that on or before ten (10) days after entry of
this Order, Class Counsel shall provide notice of the pendency of
the class action lawsuit by mailing the Notice, First Class postage
prepaid, to all class members to their last known address as noted
in the records of ClearEdge Power that were produced to Plaintiff
in connection with the prior bankruptcy proceeding and as updated
by Class Counsel.  After such mailing, Class Counsel shall serve
and file a sworn statement affirming compliance with this Order
concerning the mailing of the Notice.  The deadline for any Class
Member to opt-out of the Class shall be 30 days from the date of
mailing of the Notice.

After the objection and opt-out deadline has expired, Class Counsel
shall serve and file a sworn statement listing the names of any
persons, who have opted out of the Class.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gail C. Lin, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          One California Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 638-8800
          Facsimile: (415) 638-8810
          E-mail: gl@outtengolden.com

               - and -

          Jack A. Raisner, Esq.
          Rene S. Roupinian, Esq.
          OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 25th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 245-1000
          E-mail: jar@outtengolden.com
                  rsr@outtengolden.com


KOLTER GROUP: Faces Devivo Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing Texts
----------------------------------------------------------------
COLLEEN DEVIVO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. THE KOLTER GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
CACE-19-021842 (Fla. Cir., Oct. 22, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending
unsolicited text messages to wireless phone users, in violation of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

According to the complaint, to solicit new paying customers, the
Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing with no regard for
privacy rights of the recipients of those messages.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's
illegal conduct. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on
behalf of himself and Class Members.

The Defendant is a real estate development and investment
firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff and the Class are represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479 2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975 3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com


LANCASTER GENERAL: 3rd Cir. Appeal Filed in St. Luke's RICO Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Blue Mountain Hospital, Carbon Schuylkill Community
Hospital, St. Luke's Health Network Inc., St. Luke's Hospital of
Bethlehem and St. Luke's Quakertown Hospital filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit entitled St. Luke's Health Network
Inc., et al. v. Lancaster General Hospital, et al., Case No.
5-18-cv-02157, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit was filed on May 22, 2018.

Lancaster General Health is a small health system in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Founded in 1893 in a small home on Queen Street, the
hospital now stands in a 590-bed facility located at 555 North Duke
Street in Lancaster.

The appellate case is captioned as St. Luke's Health Network Inc.,
et al. v. Lancaster General Hospital, et al., Case No. 19-3340, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ST. LUKE'S HEALTH NETWORK INC., DBA St.
Luke's University Health Network, et al., are represented by:

          Brian W. Barnes, Esq.
          David H. Thompson, Esq.
          COOPER & KIRK PLLC
          1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 220-9659
          E-mail: bbarnes@cooperkirk.com
                  dthompson@cooperkirk.com

               - and -

          Douglas J. McGill, Esq.
          WEBBER MCGILL LLC
          760 Route 10, Suite 104
          Whippany, NJ 07981
          Telephone: (973) 739-9559
          E-mail: dmcgill@webbermcgill.com

Defendants-Appellees LANCASTER GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., are
represented by:

          Kevin W. Fay, Esq.
          Peter J. Hoffman, Esq.
          Jeffrey P. Lewis, Esq.
          ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT LLC
          50 South 16th Street
          Two Liberty Place, 22nd Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 851-6629
          E-mail: kfay@eckertseamans.com
                  phoffman@eckertseamans.com
                  jlewis@eckertseamans.com


LOAD TRAIL: Class in Ramirez FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JACINTO RAMIREZ, LUIS MORALES, ORLANDO PIEDRA FLORES,
AND SALVADOR LEON, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiffs, v. LOAD TRAIL, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action
No. 4:18-cv-00756 (E.D. Tex.), Judge Amos L. Mazzant of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division,
granted the Plaintiffs' Opposed Motion to Conditionally Certify a
Collective Action and to Issue Notice with Brief in Support.

Plaintiffs Ramirez, Morales, Flores, and Leon are current or former
employees of Defendant Load Trail.  The Plaintiffs and the putative
collective action members they represent allege that they have
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek for the
Defendant but have not received all overtime premium compensation
owed them under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  The
Defendant is in the trailer manufacturing business, and the
Plaintiffs and putative collective action members work in various
departments of the Defendant's business—specifically, the
fabrication, welding, and finishing departments.

In particular, the Plaintiffs and putative collective action
members are or were, among other things, welders, painters, parts
distributors, robot machine operators, plasma cutters, personnel
responsible for transporting inventory, and finishing department
personnel responsible for installation services.

The Defendant required the Plaintiffs and putative collective
action members to clock in and out of each shift by inserting their
barcoded employee ID card into a computer.  The computer system
allegedly often malfunctioned, however, meaning the timekeeping was
at times handled and subject to alteration by the Defendant's
supervisors.  Thus, the Plaintiffs claim, the hours reported on
employees' paystubs were frequently inaccurate and did not capture
the full amount of time actually worked.  They maintain that these
and other similar timekeeping practices caused them and putative
collective action members not to be paid proper overtime for all
hours actually worked over 40.

The Defendant apparently paid the Plaintiffs using three different
compensation methods: (1) pay for performance; (2) non-pay for
performance; and (3) salary pay for those assisting the
supervisors.  Based on these three pay "schemes," the Plaintiffs
ask the Court to certify three subclasses as follows:

     1. Pay for Performance: All current and/or former Load Trail
(1) non-supervisor employees (2) who work(ed) in the fabrication
department, welding department, finishing department, or in the
warehouse handling inventory (3) who perform(ed) manual labor tasks
(4) that are/were in a pay for performance position (aka paid by
production or paid by piece rate), (5) who are/were employed
between July 22, 2016 and present (6) and work(ed) in excess of 40
hours in a given workweek, but were not paid time and one-half
their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in each such
workweek.

     2. Non-Pay for Performance: All current and/or former Load
Trail (1) non-supervisor employees (2) who work(ed) in the
fabrication department, welding department, finishing department,
or in the warehouse handling inventory (3) who perform(ed) manual
labor tasks (4) that are/were paid on an hourly basis (5) that
are/were not in pay for performance positions (aka paid by
production or paid by piece rate), (6) who are/were employed
between July 22, 2016 and present (7) and work(ed) in excess of 40
hours in a given workweek, but were not paid time and one-half
their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in each such
workweek.

     3. Salaried Assistants: All current and/or former Load Trail
employees (1) whose primary job duties are/were to assist the
supervisors (aka lead hands) in the fabrication department,
finishing department, welding department or in the warehouse
handling inventory, (2) that are/were paid on a salary basis (3)
who are/were employed between July 22, 2016 and present (4) and
worked in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek, but were not paid
time and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked
over 40 in each such workweek.

The Plaintiffs and putative collective action members claim that
they worked the same basic kinds of tasks so as to make them
"similarly situated" and that the Defendant's compensation schemes
were part of a central practice and policy by Defendant to underpay
overtime wages owed to its workforce.  The Defendant argues that
that the employees in question were not similarly situated because
they had varying job titles and responsibilities and were paid in
different ways.  Moreover, it maintains that no one practice,
policy, or plan existed to improperly compensate its workforce.

On July 12, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved to Conditionally Certify a
Collective Action.  On Sept. 17, 2019, Defendant filed a Response
and objected to the Plaintiffs' evidence.

Judge Mazzant granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional
Certification.  He conditionally certified the class, containing
three subclasses, described as follows:

     1. Pay for Performance: All current and/or former Load Trail
(1) non-supervisor employees (2) who work(ed) in the fabrication
department, welding department, finishing department, or in the
warehouse handling inventory (3) who perform(ed) manual labor tasks
(4) that are/were in a pay for performance position (aka paid by
production or paid by piece rate), (5) who are/were employed
between July 22, 2016 and present (6) and work(ed) in excess of 40
hours in a given workweek, but were not paid time and one-half
their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in each such
workweek.

     2. Non-Pay for Performance: All current and/or former Load
Trail (1) non-supervisor employees (2) who work(ed) in the
fabrication department, welding department, finishing department,
or in the warehouse handling inventory (3) who perform(ed) manual
labor tasks (4) that are/were paid on an hourly basis (5) that
are/were not in pay for performance positions (aka paid by
production or paid by piece rate), (6) who are/were employed
between July 22, 2016 and present (7) and work(ed) in excess of 40
hours in a given workweek, but were not paid time and one-half
their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in each such
workweek.

     3. Salaried Assistants: All current and/or former Load Trail
employees (1) whose primary job duties are/were to assist the
supervisors (aka lead hands) in the fabrication department,
finishing department, welding department or in the warehouse
handling inventory, (2) that are/were paid on a salary basis (3)
who are/were employed between July 22, 2016 and present (4) and
worked in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek, but were not paid
time and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked
over 40 in each such workweek.

The Notice and Consent to Join Form presented to the Court are
conditionally approved, subject to the Plaintiffs' insertion of the
appropriate dates and their compliance with the Court's
instructions as provided in the Order.

The Defendant must produce the names, job titles, addresses,
telephone numbers, Social Security numbers, and email addresses of
the prospective class members.  It will provide the information in
an electronic format within 14 days of the entry of the Order.  The
Plaintiffs' Counsel will send the Notice and Consent Forms to the
prospective class members within seven days after the Defendant
provides the prospective class members' information to the
Plaintiffs' counsel.

The Judge authorized the Plaintiffs to immediately issue the Notice
and Consent Forms to those individuals whose names are being
provided as required by the Order.  They will issue the Notice and
Consent Forms by U.S. mail and email.  They may provide a
self-addressed, postage paid return envelope.  The Plaintiffs will
bear the cost of issuing the Notice and Consent Forms and any
reminder notice.

The prospective class members will be provided 90 days after the
date the Notice and Consent Forms are mailed to file a Consent Form
opting-in to the litigation, unless the parties agree to permit
late filings.  Any re-mailing of the original notice and any
reminder notices will not extend the deadline.  The Plaintiffs will
inform opposing counsel as to the date on which the Notice forms
were sent to the prospective class members.  Their counsel may send
a reminder notice 30 days before the expiration of the Opt-In
Period, provided the parties agree upon the text of the reminder.

Any Notice and Consent Forms returned to the Plaintiffs' counsel by
the prospective class members will be filed within 60 days of the
date of initial mailing of the Notice.  If such list is sent
piecemeal, the 60 days will begin to run on the date that the last
address or other identifying information is sent by the Defendant
to the Plaintiffs' counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/5MXiXP from Leagle.com.

Jacinto Ramirez, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated, Luis Morales, Orlando Piedra Flores & Salvador Leon,
Plaintiffs, represented by Allen Ryan Vaught --
avaught@baronbudd.com -- Vaught Firm, LLC & Diana-Linh My Hoang Le,
Le & Le PLLC.

Load Trail, LLC, Defendant, represented by Ruth Ann Daniels --
rdaniels@grayreed.com -- Gray Reed, LLP.


LOS ANGELES, CA: Balber's Appeal on Eck Settlement Order Tossed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PATRICK ECK et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents; CARMEN
BALBER, Objector and Appellant, Case No. B289717 (Cal. App.), Judge
Dennis M. Perluss of the U.S. Court of Appeals of California for
the Second District, Division Seven, dismissed Carmen Balber's
appeal from order denying her motion to vacate the judgment
approving the settlement agreement entered on Feb. 26, 2018.

On April 1, 2015, Eck, on behalf of himself and a proposed class of
similarly situated Los Angeles County utility ratepayers, sued the
City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power ("DWP") alleging that DWP had overcharged ratepayers for
electric utility usage.  They allege DWP had charged its electric
utility customers fees and other amounts that exceeded the cost of
providing electric utility service by approximately 8%; these
overcharges were designed to fund annual transfers from DWP to the
City's reserve fund to benefit the City's general fund; and such
transfers, which had not been approved by the voters, constituted
an illegal tax in violation of the California Constitution.

On Sept. 14, 2017, the Court conditionally granted class
certification for purposes of settlement and granted preliminary
approval of a proposed settlement agreement between the class
Plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the City and DWP, on the other
hand.  The proposed settlement created a $52 million settlement
fund, along with at least $243 million in what the Eck parties have
characterized as future savings for ratepayers.  The Court
scheduled a hearing concerning final approval of the settlement and
ordered notice to be provided to all unnamed class members in
accordance with the terms of its order.

On Dec. 27, 2017, in response to the Plaintiffs' notice of motion
and motion for final approval of the class action settlement,
Balber timely objected to the proposed settlement.  In her papers
supporting her objection, Balber primarily alleged (1) notice of
the proposed settlement was inadequate and/or misleading because it
failed to apprise class members of a planned $241 million transfer
of funds from DWP to the City for fiscal year 2017-2018; and (2)
the waiver and release provisions of the settlement were overbroad
in that they expressly permitted DWP to make future transfers of
funds to the City that amounted to an unconstitutional tax.

After the Court certified the class for purpose of settlement and
preliminarily approved a settlement agreement between the parties,
subject to a fairness hearing, Balber, an unnamed class member,
timely objected to the settlement and filed an ex parte application
to intervene in the action.  The court denied her application as
untimely, overruled her objection, approved the settlement and
entered a judgment in accordance with the settlement terms.
Balber's subsequent statutory motion to vacate the judgment was
denied by operation of law.

On Feb. 14, 2018, the date of the fairness hearing, Balber filed an
ex parte application to intervene in the action.  The Court denied
the application as untimely, overruled Balber's objection (and the
objections of other unnamed class members) and, finding notice
proper and the settlement agreement fair, adequate and reasonable,
granted final approval of the settlement.  It entered judgment on
Feb. 26, 2018.

On March 6, 2018, Balber moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 663.  Balber failed to obtain a
ruling on her motion, and it was denied by operation of law on
April 30, 2018.

On April 27, 2018, while Balber's motion to vacate was pending,
Balber filed a notice of appeal identifying the denial of her ex
parte application for leave to intervene and the judgment as the
order/judgment from which she appealed.  Balber did not file a
notice of appeal from the subsequent denial of her motion to vacate
the judgment.

On appeal from the judgment, Balber contends the Court erred in
approving the settlement agreement, primarily arguing the notice
sent to class members was inadequate.  However, in her briefs in
the Court, Judge Perluss finds that Balber has not challenged the
Court's ruling denying her application to intervene; and she has
not appealed from the denial of her motion to vacate the judgment.
Because Balber is not a party of record and has not utilized the
procedures available to alter her status, she lacks standing to
appeal from the judgment. For these reasons,  Judge Perluss
dismissed Balber's appeal from the judgment.  The Eck Plaintiffs,
the City and DWP are to recover their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/SfBjLR from Leagle.com.

Consumer Watchdog, Jerry Flanagan, Benjamin Powell and Pamela
Pressley for Objector and Appellant.

Ahdoot & Wolfson, Robert R. Ahdoot -- RAhdoot@ahdootwolfson.com --
Tina Wolfson, Theodore W. Maya; Zimmerman Reed, Christopher P.
Ridout and Caleb L.H. Marker; Krause, Kalfayan, Benink & Slavens,
Eric J. Benink -- eric@beninkslavens.com -- Vincent D. Slavens;
Moskovitz Appellate Team, Myron Moskovitz and Christopher Hu for
Plaintiffs and Respondents Patrick Eck, Tyler Chapman, Brendan
Eisan and Justin Kristopher Le-Roy.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Benjamin Chapman, Assistant City
Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents City of Los Angeles and
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.


MAC GRADING: Gonzales Seeks to Recover OT Pay Under FLSA & NCWHA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Panfilo Gonzales Santos, Benjamin Gonzalez Sanjuan, and Gilberto
Gonzalez Sanjuan, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated persons v. M.A.C. GRADING CO., CHRISTOPHER HALES, and
MELISSA D. HALES, Case No. 7:19-cv-00219-D (E.D.N.C., Nov. 7,
2019), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act for unpaid overtime wages.

The Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiffs and the group of
workers, wages they were due at the overtime rate when the
Defendants employed the Plaintiffs to perform hours worked in
excess of 40 in the same workweek, the Plaintiffs assert. The
Defendants also failed to pay all promised wages when due on the
regular scheduled payday for the Plaintiffs, all in violation of
the FLSA and the NCWHA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants to perform hours
worked in the construction and repair of pallets.

Defendant MAC is engaged in the construction and repair of wooden
pallets for the use and sale of those pallets in interstate
commerce.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert J. Willis, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT J. WILLIS, P.A.
          P.O. Box 1828
          Pittsboro, NC 27312
          Phone: (919) 821-9031
          Facsimile: (919) 821-9031
          Email: rwillis@rjwillis-law.com


MDL 2913: Emidy v. JUUL Suit Over E-Cigarettes Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as JOHN SCOTT EMIDY, Individually
and on behalf of those similarly situated, PLAINTIFF v. JUUL LABS,
INC., ALTRIA GROUP, INC. and PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., DEFENDANTS,
Case No. 2:19-cv-02671-MSN-cgc (Filed Oct. 2, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
California (San Francisco) on Oct 23, 2019.

The Northern District California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-06905-WHO to the proceeding.

The suit alleges violation of the Racketeer/Corrupt Organization
Act.

The Defendants have engaged and continue to engage in unfair,
unlawful, and deceptive trade practices in Florida, the Plaintiff
alleges. In particular, the Defendants have knowingly developed,
sold, and promote a product that contained nicotine levels in
excess of cigarettes with the intention of creating and fostering
long-term addiction to JUUL products for minors to continue that
addiction into adulthood; selling a product that aggravates
nicotine addiction; creating advertising to target youth into using
JUUL e-cigarettes, and disseminating that advertising through
unregulated social media platforms commonly used by youth.

The Plaintiff and class members reasonably relied to their
detriment on the Defendants' unlawful conduct in that they
purchased JUUL not knowing the true propensity of its dangers,
according to the complaint. They have sustained damages as a direct
and proximate result of the Defendants' tortious conduct and seek
injunctive relief to prohibit Defendants from continuing to engage
in the unfair and deceptive advertising and marketing practices.

JUUL e-cigarettes and JUULpods deliver dangerous toxins and
carcinogens to users, especially teenage users. Nicotine itself is
a carcinogen, as well as a toxic chemical associated with
cardiovascular, reproductive, and immunosuppressive problems, the
lawsuit says.

The Emidy case is being consolidated with the multidistrict
litigation titled IN RE: JUUL LABS, INC., MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2913. The MDL
was created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on Oct. 2, 2019. The actions in this
litigation involve allegations that JLI has marketed its JUUL
nicotine delivery products in a manner designed to attract minors,
that JLI's marketing misrepresents or omits that JUUL products are
more potent and addictive than cigarettes, that JUUL products are
defective and unreasonably dangerous due to their attractiveness to
minors, and that JLI promotes nicotine addiction. The actions
include both putative class actions and individual personal injury
cases.

In its Oct. 2, 2019 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
share multiple factual issues concerning the development,
manufacture, labeling, and marketing of JUUL products, and the
alleged risks posed by use of those products. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery, the possibility of inconsistent
rulings on class certification, Daubert motions, and other pretrial
matters, and conserve judicial and party resources. The Panel
select the Northern District of California as the transferee
district. JLI is headquartered in that district, and it represents
that most of the key evidence and witnesses are located there.
Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge William H. Orrick III. The
lead case is Case No. 3:19-md-02913-WHO.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Keith Morgan, Esq.
          Owen P. Lalor, Esq.
          LALOR ABY & MORGAN, PLLC
          230 Trace Colony Park Drive, Suite 4
          Ridgeland, MS 39157
          Telephone: 601-898-2000
          E-mail: kmorgan@lalorbaileyaby.com
                  hbailey@lalorbaileyaby.com
                  olalor@lalorbaileyaby.com


MEC DEVELOPMENT: Court Okays 2nd Settlement Bid in Jefferson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case ANTONIO JEFFERSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. MEC
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:17-cv-01394 (E.D. Cal.),
Judge Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California granted the parties' second joint motion for
approval of a settlement agreement of the Plaintiffs' several
claims, including a FLSA overtime claim.

The lawsuit is about an employer that allegedly violated federal
and California wage and hours laws by, amongst other acts and
omissions, failing to pay overtime and failing to provide meal and
rest breaks.  The employer is Defendant MEC, and the Plaintiffs are
three former employees of MEC: namely, Antonio Jefferson, Wayne
Lewis, and Gregory Brown.

After leaving their employment at MEC, the Plaintiffs filed suit
against MEC in October 2017, alleging that MEC violated multiple
federal and California wage and hour laws affecting thems and a
class of other similarly situated logisticians.  On that basis, the
Plaintiffs pleaded seven claims for relief against MEC.

The Plaintiffs' first claim is (1) failure to pay overtime
compensation as required by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA").  Their six other claims against MEC are based on
California law: namely, (2) failure to pay overtime compensation;
(3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and
permit rest breaks; (5) failure to pay all wages due at
termination; (6) engaging in unfair competition; and (7) failure to
comply with California's wage statement laws, such as by failing to
furnish the Plaintiffs with accurate itemized written statements
showing their total hours worked.

The Plaintiffs pleaded their FLSA claim on behalf of themselves and
a class of similarly situated logisticians pursuant to Section
216(b) of the FLSA, which allows a plaintiff to bring an FLSA claim
in behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated.
Similarly, the Plaintiffs pleaded their California claims pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated logisticians.

After engaging in discovery and settlement negotiations, the
parties filed their first joint motion for approval of a settlement
agreement.  The Court denied that motion because the proposed
settlement agreement and the parties' briefing failed to
demonstrate that the proposed settlement agreement was a fair and
reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.
In the Court's order denying the motion, it identified the relevant
legal standard that the parties must meet in order to obtain the
Court's approval of a FLSA settlement, and the Court identified
several deficiencies with the parties' first proposed settlement
agreement and supportive briefing.

The parties then filed their second joint motion for approval of a
settlement agreement, which is now before the Court.  To date, the
Plaintiffs have not moved for class certification for any of their
claims, and they indicate that they have abandoned their pursuit of
class certification.

In their second joint motion for approval of a settlement
agreement, the parties assert that they have reached a settlement
agreement that, if approved by the Court, will resolve all of the
Plaintiffs' claims.  

In the settlement agreement, the Defendant agrees to make the
following four settlement payments to the Plaintiffs, respectively:


   (1) $22,000 to Jefferson, $6,763.70 of which is for his
       California overtime claim and $15,236.30 of which is for
       his California rest and meal break claim;

   (2) $24,000 to Lewis, $7,749.66 of which is for his California
       overtime claim and $16,250.34 of which is for his
       California rest and meal break claim;

   (3) $21,000 to Brown, $5,164.83 of which is for his California
       overtime claim and $15,835.17 of which is for his
       California rest and meal break claim; and
   
   (4) $61,344.45 to all the Plaintiffs.

The settlement agreement provides no payments to the Plaintiffs for
their California claims of failure to pay wages when due and
failure to provide compliant wage statements, and this is because,
according to the parties, the claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.  Similarly, the settlement agreement provides no
payments to Plaintiffs for their FLSA overtime claim because,
according to the parties, the claim is likely barred by the statute
of limitations and, additionally, double recovery for both a FLSA
overtime claim and a California overtime claim is generally not
allowed.

In consideration for the settlement payments, each Plaintiff agrees
to release the Defendant from any and all claims that he had, has,
or may have against the Defendant, arising out of or relating to
the subject matter of the claims in the lawsuit.  The parties
assert that the settlement agreement applies only to the claims of
the three Plaintiffs -- not to any putative class members --
because the Plaintiffs have abandoned their pursuit of class
certification.

Judge Ishii concludes that the parties' second proposed settlement
agreement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide
dispute over FLSA provisions.  Accordingly, the Judge grants the
parties' motion to approve the second proposed settlement
agreement, and approves the second proposed settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6xOegT from Leagle.com.

Antonio Jefferson, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher
Wayne Rowlett -- rowlett@pvflaw.com -- Perez Vaughn & Feasby,
Inc.,
John Vaughn -- vaughn@pvflaw.com -- Perez Vaughn & Feasby Inc.,
Peter R. Rosenzweig -- prosenzweig@kleinbard.com -- Kleinbard LLC,
pro hac vice & Jeffrey Feasby -- feasby@pvflaw.com -- Perez Vaughn
& Feasby Inc.

Wayne Lewis, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated & Gregory Brown, an individual, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jeffrey Feasby, Perez Vaughn & Feasby Inc. & Peter
R. Rosenzweig, Kleinbard LLC, pro hac vice.

MEC Development, LLC, Defendant, represented by Ian Blade Wieland
-- ian@sw2law.com -- Sagaser, Watkins & Wieland, PC, Matthew E.
Feinberg, PilieroMazza PLLC, pro hac vice, Nichole D. Atallah --
natallah@pilieromazza.com -- Pilieromazza PLLC, pro hac vice &
Timothy F. Valley, PilieroMazza PLLC, pro hac vice.


MEDIANT COMMUNICATIONS: Faces Braun Class Suit Over Data Breach
---------------------------------------------------------------
SHERI BRAUN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MEDIANT COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Case No.
0:19-cv-62563-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Oct. 15, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's failure to properly secure and safeguard the personally
identifiable information of investors of various public companies
for whom it provides noticing and proxy services.

On May 31, 2019, Mediant sent letters to thousands of investors,
including the Plaintiff, with whose PII it was entrusted, informing
them that on April 1, 2019, several of its e-mail accounts had been
hacked and an e-mail server compromised.  As a result, unauthorized
parties gained access to sensitive PII belonging to investors of
various companies that use Mediant's communication services ("Data
Breach").

Ms. Braun contends that without question, the Data Breach could
have been prevented by Mediant had it employed sufficiently robust
cyber security measures. Instead, she asserts, Mediant disregarded
her rights and Class Members by intentionally, willfully,
recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and reasonable
measures to ensure its data systems were protected.  As a result of
the Defendant's failure to implement and follow standard cyber
security procedures, Plaintiff and Class Members' PII is in the
hands of thieves, and they now face an increased risk of identity
theft and will have to spend significant amounts of time and money
to protect themselves, says the complaint.

Mediant Communications Inc. provides investor communication
services to a variety of banks, brokers, corporate issuers, funds,
alternative investments, and investment advisor companies.  Mediant
is a Delaware company headquartered in New York City with offices
in New Jersey, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Missouri, and
Alabama.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
          Jonathan B. Cohen, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
          201 N. Franklin St., 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 222-2434
          E-mail: jyanchunis@forthepeople.com
                  jcohen@forthepeople.com


MEDICOPY SERVICES: Swetlic Files Initial Bid to Certify Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit titled SWETLIC CHIROPRACTIC &
REHABILITATION CENTER, INC., an Ohio corporation, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons v.
MEDICOPY SERVICES, INC., a Tennessee corporation, Case No.
3:19-cv-00971 (M.D. Tenn.), files its initial motion for class
certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The proposed class is defined as:

     All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
     filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile
     messages of material advertising the commercial availability
     or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on
     behalf of Defendant, and (3) from whom Defendant did not
     obtain "prior express invitation or permission" to send fax
     advertisements, or (4) with whom Defendant did not have an
     established business relationship, or (5) where the fax
     advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant
     with 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iii) regarding any
     claimed business relationship.

Swetlic asserts that in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct.
663, 672 (2016), the Supreme Court held in a class action under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), like this case,
that "an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not
moot a plaintiff's case," and "a would-be class representative with
a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair opportunity to show
that certification is warranted."  The Supreme Court refused to
"place the defendant in the driver's seat" on the issue of class
certification by allowing it to pay a nominal sum to the named
plaintiff "to avoid a potential adverse decision, one that could
expose it to damages a thousand-fold larger than the bid [the
plaintiff] declined to accept."  The Sixth Circuit applied
Campbell-Ewald in an unreported opinion in Family Health
Chiropractic, Inc. v. MD On-Line Sols., Inc., No. 15-3508, 2016 WL
384823, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2016), affirming a denial of a
motion to dismiss a putative TCPA class action based on mootness.

The Plaintiff asks the Court to allow this "placeholder" motion for
class certification to remain pending to protect against any
alternative pick-off attempt following the Supreme Court's decision
in Campbell-Ewald.  The Plaintiff contends that the proposed class
meets the requirements of Rules 23(a), (b)(3), and (g).

Swetlic asks that, following discovery and further briefing, the
Court certify the class, appoint it as the class representative,
and appoint its attorneys as class counsel.  Swetlic says it will
file its memorandum of law in support of its motion after Rule 23
discovery has been completed.  Swetlic notes that the parties need
to meet and confer and propose a discovery schedule with the Court.
Swetlic also asks a status conference with the Court as soon as
practicable to set a discovery schedule on its motion.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles F. Barrett, Esq.
          Benjamin C. Aaron, Esq.
          NEAL & HARWELL, PLC
          1201 Demonbreun Street, Suite 1000
          Nashville, TN 37203
          Telephone: (615) 244-1713
          Facsimile: (615) 726-0573
          E-mail: cbarrett@nealharwell.com
                  baaron@nealharwell.com

               - and -

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Telephone: (847) 368-1500
          Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
          E-mail: rkelly@andersonwanca.com


MEDTERRA CBD: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Medterra CBD, LLC.
The case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf
of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Medterra CBD,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06221 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Medterra provides products that are made with 99% pure CBD
extracted from hemp grown in accordance with the strict guidelines
of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture, and are guaranteed
THC-free.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          Lipsky Lowe LLP
          630 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


METROPOLITAN LIFE: Certification of Newman Settlement Class Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as MARGERY NEWMAN, similarly
situated, and all others, the Plaintiff, vs. LINDA MORRIS, KEVIN
MORRIS, and MARSHA DONALDSON, on behalf of Hon. Thomas M. Durkin
themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs-Intervenors, vs. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
the Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-03530 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff
and Intervenors ask the Court for an order:

   1. certifying a proposed class for settlement purposes;

   2. naming Plaintiff and Intervenors as class representatives;

   3. appointing Robert R. Duncan of Duncan Law Group, LLC, Thomas
      C. Cronin of Cronin & Co., Ltd. and Frank H. Tomlinson of
      Tomlinson Law, LLC as class counsel;

   4. granting preliminary approval to the proposed settlement;

   5. approving the proposed notice plan;

   6. scheduling a final fairness hearing; and

   7. providing any other relief that is just. [CC]

Attorneys for Margery Newman, and all others similarly situated,
are:

          Robert R. Duncan, Esq.
          DUNCAN LAW GROUP, LLC
          161 North Clark Street, Suite 2550
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: 312 202 3283
          Facsimile: 312 202 3284

               - and -

          Thomas C. Cronin, Esq.
          CRONIN & CO., LTD.
          120 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312 201 7100
          Facsimile: 312 201 7101

               - and -

          Frank H. Tomlinson, Esq.
          TOMLINSON LAW, LLC
          2100 First Avenue North, Suite 600
          Birmingham, AL 35203
          Telephone: 205.328.9445
          Facsimile: 800.856.9028

Attorneys for the Intervenors are:

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, LPA
          One West Fourth Street, 18th Floor
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: 513 345.8297
          Facsimile: 513 345.8294

               - and -

          Charles E. Schaffer, Esq.
          LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN, LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Suite 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: 215 592 1500
          Facsimile: 215 592 4663

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 305
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: 202 429 2290
          Facsimile: 202 429 2294

MIDLAND CREDIT: Gimble Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Heather Gimble, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-02110
(C.D. Cal., Nov. 4, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. is a licensed debt collector
founded in 1953. The company's line of business includes extending
credit to business enterprises for relatively short period.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Aaron Stieglitz, Esq.
          Jonathan Stieglitz Law Offices
          11845 West Olympic Boulevard, Suite 800
          Los Angeles, CA 90064
          Phone: (323) 979-2063
          Fax: (323) 488-6748
          Email: jonathan.a.stieglitz@gmail.com



MIDTOWN CENTER: Fails to Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Camacho Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FRANCISCO CAMACHO v. MIDTOWN CENTER AUTO REPAIR INC. d/b/a MIDTOWN
CENTER AUTO REPAIR, A1 COLLISION, RUBA ABRAMOV and RANI ABRAMOV,
Jointly and Severally, Case No. 1:19-cv-09505 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 15,
2019), is brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated current and former employees of the Defendants alleging
that they violated the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor
Standards Act by failing to pay minimum and overtime wages.

Midtown Center is a domestic business corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York with its principal
place located in New York City.  A1 Collision is a domestic
business corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the
State of New York with its principal place of business located in
New York City.  The Individual Defendants own, operate and control
Midtown Center and A1 Collision.

The Defendants own and operate two auto repair shops, one located
at 537 West 38th Street, in New York City (the "Midtown Center
Location") and the other located at 528 West 39th Street, in New
York City (the "A1 Location").[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10170-1830
          Telephone: (212) 392-4772
          Facsimile: (212) 444-1030
          E-mail: chris@lipskylowe.com


MISSION LINEN: Faces Fleming Employee Suit in Calif. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Mission Linen Supply,
et al. The case is captioned as James Fleming, on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Does 1-25 and Mission Linen
Supply, Defendants, Case No. 34-2019-00267357-CU-OE-GDS (Cal.
Super., Oct. 22, 2019).

The suit alleges violation of employment related laws.

Mission Linen Supply is a family-owned company that has been
providing textile service solutions to every industry segment since
1930.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan M. Lebe, Esq.
          LEBE LAW
          777 S. Alameda Street, 2nd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90021


MISSOURI: Wright, et al. Seek to Certify Class of Drivers
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as NATHAN WRIGHT, CAMESE
BEDFORD, ASHLEY GILDEHAUS,and LISA MANCINI, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v. FAMILY SUPPORT
DIVISION of the Missouri Department of Social Services; MICHAEL
PARSON, in his official capacity as Governor of Missouri; JENNIFER
TIDBALL, in her official capacity as Acting Director of the
Department of Social Services; REGINALD MCELHANNON, in his Official
capacity as Interim Director of the Family Support Division;
KENNETH ZELLERS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the
Department of Revenue; and JOSEPH PLAGGENBERG, in his official
capacity as Director of the Motor Vehicle and Driver Licensing
Division, the Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-398 RLW (E.D. Mo.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order certifying a class of:

   "all individuals whose Missouri driver's licenses are, or will
   be, suspended for failure to pay child support and whose reason

   for nonpayment was, or will be, inability to pay."

The case is about the Missouri Department of Social Services'
Family Support Division and the Missouri Department of Revenue
perpetuating a cycle of poverty by unconstitutionally suspending
the driver's licenses of tens of thousands of Missouri parents who
are unable to pay child support.

Under MO Rev. Stat. section 454.1003.1(1), the Family Support
Division has the authority to issue an order suspending the
driver's license of any person who is not making child support
payments and who owes at least three months' worth of payments or
at least $2,500, whichever is less.

These suspensions are meant to coerce payment, but for those who
cannot pay, the loss of a driver's license decreases the likelihood
that a person will be able to pay child support, as it often leads
to job loss, reduced employment opportunities, eviction, and
greater difficulty carrying out the responsibilities of everyday
life, the lawsuit says.[CC]

Attorney for the Plaintiffs are:

          Phil Telfeyan, Esq.
          Rebecca Ramaswamy, Esq.
          ATTORNEYS, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW
          400 7th Street NW, Suite 602
          Washington, D.C. 20004
          Telephone: (202) 505-2058
          E-mail: rramaswamy@equaljusticeunderlaw.org
                  ptelfeyan@equaljusticeunderlaw.org

               - and -

          Stephanie Lummus, Esq.
          ATTORNEY, MCGIVNEY, KLUGER, AND COOK, P.C.
          211 N. Broadway Suite 1295
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Telephone: (314) 571-4332
          E-mail: slummus@mcgivneyandkluger.com

NATIVE ANGELS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Floyd Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Candice Floyd, individually and on behalf of other similarly
situated v. NATIVE ANGELS HOME CARE AGENCY, INC. BOBBIE
JACOBS-GHAFFAR, and LESA JACOBS, Case No. 7:19-cv-00220-D
(E.D.N.C., Nov. 7, 2019), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act to recover unpaid overtime compensation.

The Plaintiff's hours varied from week to week but she regularly
worked more than 40 hours a week. The Defendants paid straight time
for all hours worked, except all travel time, but failed to pay the
Plaintiff an overtime premium for all hours worked over 40 in a
workweek, says the complaint.

Candice Floyd was employed by the Defendants as an hourly home
healthcare worker from June 2016 to May 2019.

The Defendants operate a home healthcare agency, providing
healthcare services to clients in Robeson County, North
Carolina.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian L. Kinsley, Esq.
          CRUMLEY ROBERTS LLP
          2400 Freeman Mill Road
          Greensboro, NC 27406
          Phone: (800) 288-1529
          Fax: (336) 333-9894
          Email: blkinsley@crumleyroberts.com

               - and -

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          Amanda E. McGowen, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Phone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          Email: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                 scott@bohrerbrady.com
                 amcgowen@bohrerbrady.com


NCAA: Amell Sues Over Disregard for Health of Student-Athletes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jared Amell, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION and ST.
LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY, Case No. 1:19-cv-07351 (S.D. Ind., Oct. 11,
2019), seeks to obtain redress for injuries sustained as a result
of the Defendants' reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of SLU College student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those the Plaintiff experienced, the Defendants failed to implement
adequate procedures to protect the Plaintiff and other SLU football
players from the long-term dangers associated with them, says the
complaint. The Defendants did so knowingly and for profit. As a
direct result of the Defendants' acts and omissions, the Plaintiff
and countless former SLU football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football.  As such, the
Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate
those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable.

Plaintiff Jared Amell is a natural person and citizen of the State
of South Carolina.

The NCAA is the governing body of collegiate athletics that
oversees twenty-three college sports and over 400,000 students who
participate in intercollegiate athletics, including the football
program at Greensboro.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: 713.554.9099
          Fax: 713.554.9098
          Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Phone: 312.589.6370
          Fax: 312.589.6378
          Email: jedelson@edelson.com
                 brichman@edelson.com

               - and -

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Phone: 415.212.9300
          Fax: 415.373.9435
          Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NORTHERN TRUST: Certification of 3 Classes Sought in Banks Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit captioned LINDIE L. BANKS and ERICA
LEBLANC individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION and NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, Case No.
2:16-cv-09141-JFW-JC (C.D. Cal.), move the Court for an order
certifying three classes and respective subclasses:

   (1) Tax Preparation Fee Class:

       From January 1, 2008 to the present, all grantors,
       trustors, beneficiaries, remaindermen, co-trustees and/or
       successor trustees of Class Trusts, which are defined as
       all revocable or irrevocable personal or charitable
       trusts: (1) for which Defendants served or serve as
       trustee, and where Defendants charged a "fiduciary" or
       "tax preparation" fee for one or more of the covered
       years, and (2) the paid preparer of the fiduciary return
       was Northern Trust.

       Excluded from the Nationwide Class are Defendants and
       their employees, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, and
       co-conspirators, whether or not named in this Complaint,
       and the United States government.  Also excluded are any
       trusts where the trustee was both unpaid, and did not
       prepare fiduciary returns, but rather a return was
       performed entirely by a third-party accountant that was
       paid directly from the trust.

       Plaintiff Banks seeks a subclass on her claim for
       financial elder abuse (seventh cause of action) for
       Members of the Tax Preparation Fee Class who are 65 years
       old or older;

   (2) Fixed-Fee Overcharge Class:

       From January 1, 2008 to the present, all grantors,
       trustors, beneficiaries, remaindermen, co-trustees and/or
       successor trustees of Class Trusts, which are defined as
       all revocable or irrevocable personal or charitable
       fixed-fee trusts: (1) for which Defendants served or serve
       as trustee, (2) for which the amount of the trustee's
       compensation is specified in the governing instrument for
       the trust, and (3) for which fees were charged in excess
       of the specified compensation by Defendants.

       Excluded from the Nationwide Class are Defendants and
       their employees, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, and
       co-conspirators, whether or not named in this Complaint,
       and the United States government.

       Plaintiff Banks also seeks a subclass for members of the
       Investment Class who are 65 years old or older; and

   (3) Investment Class:

       From December 9, 2012 to the present, all grantors,
       trustors, beneficiaries, remaindermen, co-trustees and/or
       successor trustees of Class Trusts, which are defined as
       all revocable or irrevocable personal or charitable
       trusts: (1) for which Defendants served or serve as
       trustee, (2) for which Defendants had sole investment
       discretion or recommendation responsibility over principal
       and/or income, and (3) which had trust assets invested in
       index fund investments that were financially affiliated
       with Defendants, that were also invested in the Lindstrom
       Trust.

       Excluded from the Nationwide Class are Defendants and
       their employees, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, and
       co-conspirators, whether or not named in this Complaint,
       and the United States government.

       These proprietary index funds are: Northern Stock Index
       Fund; Northern Mid Cap Index Fund; Northern Small Cap
       Index Fund; Northern International Equity Fund; Northern
       Emerging Markets Equity Index Fund; Northern Bond Index
       Fund; and Northern Global Real Estate Index Fund.

       Plaintiff Banks seeks a subclass on her claim for
       financial elder abuse (seventh cause of action) for
       Members of the Investment Class who are 65 years old or
       older.

The Court will commence a hearing on December 9, 2019, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas J. Brandi, Esq.
          Brian J. Malloy, Esq.
          THE BRANDI LAW FIRM
          354 Pine Street, Third Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 989-1800
          Facsimile: (415) 989-1801
          E-mail: tjb@brandilaw.com
                  bjm@brandilaw.com

               - and -

          Derek G. Howard, Esq.
          DEREK G. HOWARD LAW FIRM, INC.
          42 Miller Avenue, Mill Valley, CA 94941
          Telephone: (415) 432-7192
          Facsimile: (415) 524-2419
          E-mail: derek@derekhowardlaw.com


PLAINS ALL: Grey Fox Moves to Certify Class of Property Owners
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the first amended complaint filed in the lawsuit
titled GREY FOX, LLC, a California limited liability company; MAZ
PROPERTIES, INC., a California corporation; BEAN BLOSSOM, LLC, a
California limited liability company; WINTER HAWK, LLC, a
California limited liability company, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated v. PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P., a
Delaware limited partnership, PLAINS PIPELINE L.P., a Texas limited
partnership, Case No. 2:16-cv-03157-PSG-JEM (C.D. Cal.), move the
Court for an order granting certification of a state class.

The Plaintiffs are Grey Fox LLC, MAZ Properties, Inc., Mark W.
Tautrim, Trustee of the Mark W. Tautrim Revocable Trust, Live Oak
Bazzi Ranch L.P., JTMT, LLC, a California Limited Partnership, and
Mike and Denise McNutt, a marital community (collectively, the
"putative Class Representatives").  The Plaintiffs also ask the
Court to designate them as class representatives, and to appoint
their counsel as class counsel.

The proposed Class is defined as:

    "All owners of real property through which Plains' Line 901
     and/or Line 903 passes pursuant to Right-of-Way Grants."

Plains owned and operated a Pipeline (Lines 901 and 903) that
transported oil produced from offshore rigs in the Santa Barbara
channel inland 123 miles to Bakersfield.  Starting just west of the
city of Santa Barbara, the Pipeline crosses through approximately
165 properties.  The owners of these properties are each members of
the putative Class. The Pipeline was installed in the 1980s
pursuant to right-of-way grants, also known as easements, provided
by the owners of these properties.

The Plaintiffs allege that contrary to the terms of the easements
and the law, Plains failed to maintain the Pipeline until,
inevitably, it ruptured, causing a massive oil spill in May 2015.
Now, Plains wants to install a second pipeline system through the
putative Class properties but it does not want to pay property
owners for the easement rights necessary to do so, the Plaintiffs
assert.

The Court will commence a hearing on January 27, 2020, at 1:30
p.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Esq.
          Robert J. Nelson, Esq.
          Nimish R. Desai, Esq.
          Wilson M. Dunlavey, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: ecabraser@lchb.com
                  rnelson@lchb.com
                  ndesai@lchb.com
                  wdunlavey@lchb.com

               - and -

          A. Barry Cappello, Esq.
          Leila J. Noel, Esq.
          Lawrence J. Conlan, Esq.
          David L. Cousineau, Esq.
          CAPPELLO & NOEL LLP
          831 State Street
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101-3227
          Telephone: (805) 564-2444
          Facsimile: (805) 965-5950
          E-mail: abc@cappellonoel.com
                  lnoel@cappellonoel.com
                  lconlan@cappellonoel.com
                  dcousineau@cappellonoel.com

               - and -

          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1201 Third Ave., Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
          E-mail: lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Juli Farris, Esq.
          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com
                  jfarris@kellerrohrback.com


POLK COUNTY, FL: Case Seeks Certification of Employees Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled CONRAD CASE, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. GRADY JUDD, in his official capacity
as Polk County Sheriff, Case No. 8:19-cv-00607-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla.),
the Plaintiff seeks certification of this class:

     Any current or former employee of the Defendant, Polk County
     Sheriff, who is/was (1) a member of the uniformed services
     as defined by USERRA; and (2) who was denied a promotion(s)
     to the position of Sergeant and/or Lieutenant due to their
     membership in the uniformed services.

Mr. Case also asks the Court to appoint him as Class
Representative, to authorize notice to all class members, and to
appoint the law firm of Florin Gray Bouzas Owens, LLC, as Class
Counsel.

On May 15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint,
which is the operative pleading in this matter.  He brought class
claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA).  Specifically, the Plaintiff sought to certify
a class and represent individuals who were: (1) denied promotions
due to their membership in the uniformed services and (2) denied
the right to receive Florida's mandated veteran preference by the
Polk County Sheriff over the past 15 years.

On October 23, 2019, the Court entered an Order finding that
Florida's mandated veteran preference in promotions was not a
"benefit of employment" as defined by USERRA.  As a result, the
issue currently before the Court is class certification specific to
the Defendant's pattern or practice of denying promotions to its
employees due to their membership in the uniformed services,
including the Defendant's failure to treat their military-related
absence as continuous employment as required by USERRA.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Owens, Esq.
          Christopher Gray, Esq.
          FLORIN GRAY BOUZAS OWENS, LLC
          16524 Pointe Village Drive, Suite 100
          Lutz, FL 33558
          Telephone: (727) 254-5255
          Facsimile: (727) 483-7942
          E-mail: greg@fgbolaw.com
                  chris@fgbolaw.com


PRO CUSTOM: Venson Sues Over Racial Harassment & Discrimination
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARK VENSON, on behalf of himself and all similarly-situated
employees, Plaintiff v. PRO CUSTOM SOLAR LLC d/b/a MOMENTUM SOLAR,
ALEX SHEIKH, ADAM GUGINO, JEFFREY ANCLIEN and BRIAN ALPER, in their
individual and professional capacities, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-19227 (D.N.J., Oct. 22, 2019), alleges that the Defendants
committed unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination.

According to the complaint, Pro Custom and its managers were
accused of engaging in systemic discrimination against Black
workers, fostering a racially hostile work environment and
retaliating against Black employees who filed discrimination
complaints. These accusations resulted in the filing of a proposed
class action lawsuit filed in Brooklyn, New York, entitled Murrell,
et al. v. Pro Custom Solar LLC d/b/a Momentum Solar, et al. Among
the allegations raised in the Brooklyn Suit were that Black
employees were repeatedly referred to as "Nigger," and were
abruptly terminated after they complained.

However, instead of taking these allegations seriously and making
necessary changes to Momentum's culture and its impact on Black
workers, Dave Wightman, a white regional service manager in
Momentum's New Jersey headquarters, took a different approach. In a
series of text messages in which he was asked about the Brooklyn
Suit, Mr. Wightman responded by referring to the serious
allegations of racism raised as "bullshit." He then mocked the
Black workers, who came forward to make racial discrimination
allegations by texting Black-skinned emojis to that white Momentum
employee.

Mr. Wightman's deplorable attitude then worsened, as he sent a GIF
image of a group of white-hooded men--an obvious reference to the
Ku Klux Klan--with the caption "We ready or what?"

Against the backdrop of such vile, racist attitudes held by members
of its upper-most management, Momentum continues to thrive as one
of the nation's most successful and fastest growing clean energy
companies, recently ranked as the "No. 2" energy company in the
nation, and a top company in New Jersey across all industries, the
Plaintiff contends.

What Momentum's investors, clients and the New Jersey taxpayers,
who help foot its operations bill do not know is that the
management at its New Jersey call center has also fostered a work
environment permeated with vile racism that has targeted its Black
employees, including Plaintiff Mark Venson, the lawsuit says. Mr.
Venson was repeatedly called "nigger" and "boy" by his white
managers at Momentum, and when he complained, he had his employment
terminated.

Other Black employees at Momentum's New Jersey call center were
also subjected to vile, race-based harassment and discrimination.
This action, which Plaintiff brings as a putative class action,
seeks justice for all such Black employees, who have been subjected
to Momentum's unlawful, racist conduct.

Mark Venson began working at Momentum in its New Jersey call center
in April 20 2018. After doing an outstanding job, in the summer of
2018, Mr. Venson realized that he had not been paid certain bonuses
he believed he was owed. As a result, he complained to Brian Alper
about not receiving the wages owed to him. Mr. Alper responded by
saying, "well nigger you're lucky you got a job," and "I don't know
why you want to work, you're an old nigger."

Not only did Mr. Alper repeatedly call Mr. Venson a heinous and
disgusting racial epithet, but he failed to address Mr. Venson's
wage-related complaint, the lawsuit says. Unfortunately, as has
been the case with countless people of color working at Momentum,
this was not an isolated incident of vile racial harassment and
discrimination.

Pro Custom is a New Jersey limited liability company with its
principal place of business located at 3096 Hamilton Boulevard, in
South Plainfield, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tanvir H. Rahman, Esq.
          Michael J. Willemin, Esq.
          WIGDOR LLP
          85 Fifth Avenue
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: (212) 257-6800
          Facsimile: (212) 257-6845
          E-mail: trahman@wigdorlaw.com
                  mwillemin@wigdorlaw.com


PURITY COSMETICS: Fails to Comply With Gift Card Law, Rubio Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN RUBIO, on behalf of herself, the General Public, and all
others similarly situated v. PURITY COSMETICS, doing business as
100% Pure, and DOES 1 through 20, Case No.
37-2019-00054748-CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Oct. 15,
2019), arises from the Defendants' noncompliance with California's
gift card law in connection with their refusal of the Plaintiff's
lawful request to redeem a gift card for cash.

Section 1749.5(b)(2) of the California Civil Code provides that
"any gift certificate with a cash value of less than ten dollars
($10) is redeemable in cash for its cash value."

The Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Defendants' ongoing
policy and/or practice of failing to provide cash to consumers
wishing to redeem a gift card with a cash value less than $10, or
alternatively, the Defendants' failure to maintain a policy and/or
practice of complying with Section 1749.5(b)(2), the Defendants
have violated consumers' statutory rights pursuant to Section
1749.5; Civil Code Section 1770; and Business and Professions Code
Sections 17200, et seq. and 17500, et seq.

Purity Cosmetics, doing business as 100% Pure, owns and operates
retail cosmetic stores in California.  In addition to the products
it offers, 100% Pure also sells gift cards, which can be used to
buy products from its California locations.  The true names and
capacities of the Doe Defendants are currently unknown to the
Plaintiff.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip R. Poliner, Esq.
          Neil B. Fineman, Esq.
          FINEMAN POLINER LLP
          155 North Riverview Drive
          Anaheim Hills, CA 92808-1225
          Telephone: (714) 620-1125
          Facsimile: (714) 701-0155
          E-mail: Phillip@FinemanPoliner.com
                  Neil@FinemanPoliner.com


QUAD/GRAPHICS INC: Born Seeks Damages From Decline of Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Born and Marilynn Born, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC., J. JOEL
QUADRACCI, and DAVID J, HONAN, Case No. 1:19-cv-10376 (S.D.N.Y.,
Nov. 7, 2019), is brought on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired Quad securities between February
21, 2018, and October 29, 2019, seeking to pursue claims under the
Securities Act of 1933.

On October 29, 2019, after the market closed, the Company slashed
its quarterly dividend by 50% to $0.15 per share, announced plans
to divest its book business, reported third quarter 2019 financial
results, and lowered its fiscal 2019 guidance. On this news, the
Company's share price fell $6.42 per share, or nearly 57%, to close
at $4.85 per share on October 30, 2019, on unusually high trading
volume.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects.  Specifically, the Defendants fail to disclose to
investor: (1) that the Company's book business in United States was
underperforming; (2) that, as a result, the Company was likely to
divest its book business; (3) that the Company was unreasonably
vulnerable to decreases in market prices; (4) that, to remain
financially flexible while market prices decreased, the Company was
likely to cut its quarterly dividend and expand its cost reduction
programs; and (5) that, as a result, the Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially misleading and/or lacked reasonable basis, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs purchased Quad securities during the Class Period.

Quad provides a data-driven, integrated marketing solutions
platform to help clients reduce complexity, increase efficiency,
and enhance marketing spend effectiveness.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Ave., Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          Email: lportnoy@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 432-1495
          Email: info@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Howard G. Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD G. SMITH
          3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
          Bensalem, PA 19020
          Phone: (215) 638-4847
          Facsimile: (215) 638-4867


RFS INVESTMENTS: Solorio Seeks Owed Wages for Non-Exempt Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as MARIA SOLORIO, JULISSA CUELLAR,
PATRICIA PORTILLO PENA and FAVIOLA  CUELLAR, Plaintiff v. RFS
INVESTMENTS INC., dba CARL'S JR, L. SCOTT TIMPLE and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 19CV357162 (Cal. Super., Oct.
10, 2019), involves at least four known Carl's Jr. restaurants
owned and operated by Defendants, in which workers were not paid
for all hours worked, did not receive paid rest breaks every
4-hours of work, and who at various times received unpaid meal
periods after five hours of work pursuant to the California Labor
Code.

The Plaintiffs have been employed as non-exempt workers by the
Defendants in California and were paid on an hourly basis in the
"fast food" or public housekeeping," the lawsuit says.

RFS owns, manages, and operates and employs workers in various fast
food restaurants, primarily Carl's Jr. franchise restaurants in
California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas E. Margain, Esq.
          JUSTICE AT WORK LAW GROUP, LLP
          1550 The Almeda, Suite 302
          San Jose, CA 95126
          Telephone: (408) 317 1100
          Facsimile: (408) 351 0105
          E-mail: tomas@jawlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Alexander S. Rusnak, Esq.
          Jennifer L. Rusnak, Esq.
          RUSNAK LAW OFFICE
          1419 7th Street
          Oregon City, OR 97045
          Telephone: (408) 780 9835
          Facsimile: (408) 351 0114
          E-mail: arusnak@rusnaklawoffice.com


SABOR VENEZOLANO: Barboza Seeks to Recoup Overtime Pay Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Marivin M. Barboza, and other similarly situated individuals v.
SABOR VENEZOLANO KENDALL, INC., KATHERINE ACOSTA, and MANUEL
VILLALOBOS, individually, Case No. 1:19-cv-24623-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
Nov. 7, 2019), is brought to recover money damages for half-time
unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, who was employed by the Defendants as a cook
assistant from September 9, 2018, to October 14, 2019, alleges the
she worked in excess of 40 hours during one or more weeks without
being properly compensated.  The Defendants willfully failed to pay
the Plaintiff overtime hours at the rate of time and one-half her
regular rate for every hours that she worked in excess of 40, in
violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

The Defendant is a Florida corporation having a place of business
in Miami-Dade County, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Phone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          Email: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


SAN GABRIEL CITY, CA: Goltermann Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kirk Goltermann, Phillip Apparis, Chris Backley, Eric Calisher,
Brad Davis, Christopher Eakman, Christopher Lee Fetner, Jacob
Gustafson, Sean Irwin, Hrag Jivalagian, Gregory Kernodle, Jim
Miller, David Milligan, Kevin Murphy, Antonio Negrete, Brent Curtis
Pattison, Shane Salazar, Takahiro Suzuki, Aaron Terry, Cuong Tran,
Dennis Barwick, Derrick Doehler, Bryan Frieders, Vanessa Murphy,
David Pacela, Arthur Stafford, Erik Walton, Jordan Miller,
individually, and on behalf of themselves and all other similarly
situated individuals v. CITY OF SAN GABRIEL, a municipal
corporation, Case No. 2:19-cv-09575 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 7, 2019), is
brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover unpaid
overtime and other compensation, as well as liquidated damages,
costs of suit, reasonable attorney fees and other relief.

The Plaintiffs, who are current or former employees of the
Defendant, contends that the Defendant's compensation formula is
improper in that it fails to compensate an employee for "time and
one-half" the regular rate of pay for overtime as required by the
FLSA. "Time and one-half" is properly calculated by dividing the
regular rate of pay by weekly hours worked, and then multiplying
the resulting figure by 1.5. The Defendant computes its overtime
compensation by multiplying the employee's hourly rate by 1.0 and
the regular rate of pay by .5, then adding the result together to
product the time and one-half rate. This method systematically
reduces the amount of overtime compensation to the Defendant's
employees, says the complaint.

The City of San Gabriel is a political subdivision of the State of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Christopher D. Nissen, Esq.
          Jacob B. Kalinski, Esq.
          Brian P. Ross, Esq.
          RAINS LUCIA STERN ST, PHALLE & SILVER PC
          16130 Ventura Blvd., Suite 600
          Encino, CA 91436
          Phone: 747-221-7100
          Fax: 747-221-7101
          Email: CNissen@RLSlawyers.com


SANTA ROSA: Mendoza, et al. Seek to Certify FLSA Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as CONSTANTINO
PAPADIMITROPOULOS, MARVIN MENDOZA, and JOYCE VALLONE, Individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, v.
SANTA ROSA CONSULTING, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-11779-AJT-SDD (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court9
for an Order:

   1. authorizing the action to proceed as an Fair Labor Standards
      Act collective action for Defendant's minimum wage and
      overtime compensation violations occurring at Defendant's
      clients' healthcare facilities at any time during the last
      three years;

   2. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "similarly situated current and former hourly-paid, non-
      exempt, W-2 employees who were employed by Defendant Santa
      Rosa Consulting, Inc. to provide activation, "go live", EHR
      and/or any other healthcare staffing resource services, and
      who were not paid for out-of-town travel that necessitated
      an overnight stay, and authorizing Court-supervised notice
      to those individuals, in accordance with Section 16(b) of
      the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b)";

   3. directing the Defendant to immediately provide Plaintiffs'
      counsel a computer-readable file containing the names (last
      names first), last known physical addresses, last known
      email addresses, social security numbers, dates of
      employment, and last known telephone numbers of all putative

      class members during the last three years;

   4. providing that Court-approved notice be enclosed with
      Defendant's currently-employed putative class members' next

      regularly-scheduled paychecks/stubs, and be mailed and
      emailed to putative class members employed in the past three

      years so they can timely assert their claims as part of the
      litigation;

   5. authorizing a reminder postcard be issued mid-way through
      the 90-day notice period;

   6. tolling the putative class' statute of limitations as of the
      date this Motion is filed; and

   7. deeming Opt-in Plaintiffs' Consent Forms "filed" on the
      dates they are postmarked (excluding those who opted in
      prior to Court-supervised Notice being sent).[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated
current and former employees, are:

          David C. Linder, Esq.
          LARSON KING, LLP
          30 E. 7th St., Suite 2800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (651) 312-6500
          Facsimile: (651) 312-6618
          E-mail: dlinder@larsonking.com

               - and -

          Jennifer Lossia McManus, Esq.
          FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C.
          25892 Woodward Avenue
          Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910
          Telephone: (248) 542-6300
          Facsimile: (248) 542-6301
          E-mail: jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com

               - and -

          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com

SEDGWICK CLAIMS: Easterwood Seeks to Certify Employees Class
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DALE EASTERWOOD, STEPHANIE
LAYNE-CAMERON, SHAMEKA PLATTE, ORLANDO RIVERA, AND SHANNON SMITH,
On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, vs. SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES INC., a Foreign
for Profit Corporation, the Defendant, Case No.:
6:19-CV-700-WWB-LRH (M.D. Fla.), the Plaintiffs move the Court for
an Order:

   1. conditionally certifying collective class of Sedgwick's
      employees processing disability claims as a national
      class;

   2. requiring Sedgwick to produce the names, addresses,
      telephone numbers and emails (both work and personal) of
      each putative class member;

   3. compelling notice of the action be sent to:

      "all of Sedgwick's employees processing disability claims
      who are and/or were classified as exempt and were employed
      by Sedgwick within the three years preceding the filing of
      the Complaint in this matter (April 12, 2019)";

   4. requiring Sedgwick to post notice of the action at its work
      sites and on its company intranet site; and

   5. tolling the statute of limitations back to the date of the
      filing of this motion.

The Plaintiffs assert that Sedgwick violated the overtime
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiffs are:

          Mary E. Lytle, Esq.
          David V. Barszcz, Esq.
          LYTLE & BARSZCZ, P.A.
          543 N. Wymore Road, Ste. 103
          Maitland, FL 32751
          Telephone: (407) 622-6544
          Facsimile: (407) 622-6545
          E-mail: mlytle@lblaw.attorney
                  dbarszcz@lblaw.attorney

Counsel for the Defendant are:

          Robin A. Wofford, Esq.
          Lois M. Kosch, Esq.
          Hang Alexandra Do, Esq.
          WILSON TURNER KOSMO LLP
          402 West Broadway, Suite 1600
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Facsimile: 619 236-9669
          E-mail: rwofford@wilsonturnerkosmo.com
          lkosch@wilsonturnerkosmo.com
          hdo@wilsonturnerkosmo.com

               - and -

          Chad K. Lang, Esq.
          SANCHEZ-MEDINA, GONZALEZ QUESADA
          LAGE, GOMEZ & MACHADO LLP,
          201 Alhambra Circle, Ste. 1205
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Facsimile: 855-327-0391
          E-mail: clang@smgqlaw.com

SHIVA SHAKTI: Bolyard Wants to Collect Overtime Pay Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER BOLYARD, PAMELA SHEPPARD, MERANDA WILDER, JELANNE
SHUKRY, MARIO PASCHALL and AUDREY HUNDLEY, Plaintiffs, for
themselves and all others similarly situated v. SHIVA SHAKTI TWO
CORPORATION, d/b/a SUPER 8 BY WYNDHAM WESTLAKE/CLEVELAND, HETAL
PATEL, and NEHAL PATEL, Case No. 1:19-cv-02402-DCN (N.D. Ohio, Oct.
15, 2019), seeks to collect unpaid compensation, including overtime
wages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs were employees of the Defendants' as that term is
defined by the FLSA and Ohio law.

Shiva Shakti Two Corporation d/b/a Super 8 by Wyndham
Westlake/Cleveland is an Ohio Corporation registered to do business
in Ohio.  The Individual Defendants are owners of the Company.

The Defendants operate a motel (Super 8 by Wyndham
Westlake/Cleveland) located at 25200 Sperry Drive, in Westlake, in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Greg R. Mansell, Esq.
          Carrie J. Dyer, Esq.
          MANSELL LAW, LLC
          1457 S. High St.
          Columbus, OH 43207
          Telephone: (614) 610-4134
          Facsimile: (614) 547-3614
          E-mail: Greg@MansellLawLLC.com
                  Carrie@MansellLawLLC.com


SOUTHERN RESPONSE: Kedney Files FLSA Suit in S.D. Alabama
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Southern Response
Services, Inc. The case is styled as John Kedney, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Southern
Response Services, Inc., a Domestic Corporation, Robert L. Duke,
II, Individually, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00913 (S.D. Ala.,
Nov. 1, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Southern Response Services provides training to industrial
emergency response teams.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick Glenn Montgomery, Esq.
          63 S. Royal Street, Suite 710
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Phone: (251) 800-6030
          Fax: (251) 800-6062
          Email: pmontgomery@forthepeople.com


SUFFOLK CTY, NY: Eames Files Civil Rights Suit
----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brown et al. The case
is styled as Jefferson Eames, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Town of East Hampton, Dennis
M. Brown, The County Of Suffolk, Jacqueline Caputi, GM Financial,
The Incorporated Village of Westhampton Beach, The Incorporated
Village of Southampton, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-06214
(E.D.N.Y., Nov. 4, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights.

The Town of East Hampton is located in southeastern Suffolk County,
New York, at the eastern end of the South Shore of Long
Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Campanelli, Esq.
          Campanelli & Associates, P.C.
          1757 Merrick Avenue, Suite 204
          Merrick, NY 11566
          Phone: (516) 746-1600
          Fax: (516) 746-2611
          Email: ajc@campanellipc.com



TERRA OILFIELD: Barhight Seeks to Certify Class of Operators
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as RONNIE BARHIGHT, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
TERRA OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC, the Defendant, Case No.
7:19-cv-00214-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order:

   1. conditionally certifying class;

   2. equitably tolling statute of limitations; and

   3. authorizing counsel for the Plaintiff to send the Notice and
      Consent forms, the Social Media Notice of Collective Action,

      and the Text Message Notice of Collective Action  to the
      following group of individuals:

      "all current and former operators or leads in Defendant’s
      Water Transfer division in the last three years who were
      paid by the hour".

The Plaintiff and Class Members worked as operators and leads for
Defendant throughout the nation. They were not exempt from the
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Defendant paid
them on an hourly basis, knew they were working in excess of 40
hours per week, and knew that that they were working off the clock
during overtime hours. Yet Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff and
Class Members for off-the-clock time, the lawsuit says.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          The Commissioners House at Heritage Square
          2901 Bee Cave Road, Box L
          Austin, TX 78746
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605

               - and -

          Daniel A. Verrett, Esq.
          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          700 West Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telecopier: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: daniel@morelandlaw.com
                  edmond@morelandlaw.com

TRANS CONTINENTAL: Stokes Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Trans Continental
Credit & Collection Corp. The case is styled as Naheim Stokes
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Trans Continental Credit & Collection Corp.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06182 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 1, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Trans Continental Credit & Collection Corp. (TCC) is a third-party
collection agency that specializes in healthcare collections.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          Barshay Sanders, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 203-7600
          Fax: (516) 706-5055
          Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com


TUCKER ALBIN: Faces Fabricant Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
-------------------------------------------------------------
Terry Fabricant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TUCKER, ALBIN AND ASSOCIATES, INC., DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:19-cv-09600 (C.D. Cal., Nov. 7, 2019), seeks
damages and other remedies resulting from the illegal actions of
the Defendants, in negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully
contacting the Plaintiff on the Plaintiff's cellular telephone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, thereby,
invading the Plaintiff's privacy.

According to the complaint, the Defendants used an "automatic
telephone dialing system" to place its call to the Plaintiff
seeking to solicit its business services. The Defendants' calls
constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes. The
Plaintiff is not a customer of the Defendants' services and has
never provided any personal information, including his cellular
telephone number. Accordingly, the Defendants never received the
Plaintiff's "prior express consent" to receive calls.

Terry Fabricant is a natural person residing in Winnetka,
California.

TUCKER, ALBIN AND ASSOCIATES, INC. is a commercial debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Phone: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                 abacon@toddflaw.com


UMB BANK: Court Certifies Class of Mortgage Loan Originators
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as STEVE L. GARRETT, et al., the
Plaintiffs, v. UMB BANK, N.A., the Defendant, Case No.
19-00369-CV-W-BP (W.D. Mo.), the Hon. Judge Beth Phillips entered
an order:

   1. certifying a collective action consisting of:

      "all current and former Mortgage Loan Originators who were
      employed by Defendant at any time between August 16, 2016
      and the present";

   2. conditionally approving Steve Garrett and M. Gwen Goins
      to serve as collective actions representatives, and Michael
      Rahmberg and Ryan McClelland to serve as counsel for the
      collective action.

   3. within 14 days of the Order, directing Defendant to produce
      the following information for all putative collective action

      members in a Microsoft Excel document: full name; last known

      address; last known phone number; last known e-mail address;

      date(s) of employment; and location(s) of employment.

   4. directing Defendant to mail Notice via first-class mail and
      electronic mail to putative collective action members within

      45 days of the Order.

   5. giving Putative collective action members of 60 days from
      the date the Notice to opt-in; and

   6. directing Defendant to post Notice in conspicuous locations
      at Defendant’s office locations where putative collective
      action members are employed (including breakroom bulletin
      boards or bulletin boards where job notices are posted)
      during the opt-in period.[CC]

UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Doe Sues Over Discriminatory IBT Exclusions
--------------------------------------------------------------
JANE DOE, as the representative of her minor son, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. UNITED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH and
UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-07316 (N.D.
Cal., Nov. 7, 2019), is seeking to enforce the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 and the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 on
behalf of her son, who has been injured as a result of the
Defendants' implementation of illegal and discriminatory Intensive
Behavioral Therapies exclusions in self-funded plans.

The Plaintiff's son, John Doe, has been diagnosed with Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD). As a result of his condition, John has
severe difficulties interacting with the world around him. John's
healthcare providers have continuously recommended that he receive
a treatment called Applied Behavior Analysis for his ASD. The
Plaintiff sought coverage under John's father's health benefits
plan for John to begin ABA treatment, but the Defendants denied
coverage, relying upon a plan term that purports to exclude
coverage for IBT for mental health conditions like ABA for autism.

The IBT Exclusion, however, violates the Federal Parity Act, the
Plaintiff contends. As a result, the exclusion is unenforceable as
a matter of federal law and by applying it to deny coverage to the
Plaintiff's son, the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties
under the ERISA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Jane Doe is the mother of John Doe, who is insured as a
beneficiary under the Wipro Limited Plan, which is a self-funded
group, non-grandfathered commercial policy sponsored by John's
father's employer, Wipro Limited.

The Defendants are the Claims Administrators for the Wipro
Plan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Meiram Bendat, Esq.
          PSYCH-APPEAL, INC.
          8560 West Sunset Boulevard, Suite 500
          West Hollywood, CA 90069
          Phone: (310) 598-3690
          Fax: (888) 975-1957
          Email: mbendat@psych-appeal.com

               - and -

          D. Brian Hufford, Esq.
          Jason S. Cowart, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
          485 Madison Avenue, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (212) 704-9600
          Fax: (212) 704-4256
          Email: dbhufford@zuckerman.com
                 jcowart@zuckerman.com

               - and -

          Caroline E. Reynolds, Esq.
          Rachel F. Cotton, Esq.
          ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP
          1800 M Street, NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Phone: (202) 778-1800
          Fax: (202) 822-8106
          Email: creynolds@zuckerman.com
                 rcotton@zuckerman.com


UNITED STATES: Court Denies Prelim. Injunction Bid in Rosa Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HECTOR SIGIFREDO RIVERA ROSA, et al., Petitioners, v.
KEVIN K. McALEENAN, et al., Respondents. JAIRO ALEXANDER
GONZALEZ-RECINOS, et al., Petitioners, v. KEVIN K. McALEENAN, et
al., Respondents. JAVIER ERNESTO GIRON MONTERROZA, et al.,
Petitioners, v. KEVIN K. McALEENAN, et al., Respondents. SANTOS
ZUNIGA, et al., Petitioners, v. KEVIN K. McALEENAN, et al.,
Respondents. BRYAN LOPEZ-LOPEZ, et al., Petitioners, v. KEVIN K.
McALEENAN, et al., Respondents, Civil Action Nos. 1:19-CV-00138.
(Lead), 1:19-CV-00095 (Member), 1:19-CV-00103 (Member),
1:19-CV-00118 (Member), 1:19-CV-00126 (Member) (S.D. Tex.), Judge
Fernando Rodriguez, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Brownsville Division, denied the Petitioners'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

The United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") detained 16
aliens for being in the United States illegally and kept them in
its custody for weeks before transferring them to the custody of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").  CBP allegedly
maintained these aliens in abhorrent conditions and without access
to, or contact with, counsel or family.

The detained aliens filed five lawsuits, which have now been
consolidated into the action, alleging a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and causes of action based on alleged violations of
the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.  The Petitioners advance their claims
in their individual capacities and as putative class
representatives of similarly situated aliens in CBP custody.

The Petitioners currently seek a preliminary injunction that would
require Respondents to, among other things, grant detained aliens
access to counsel while in CBP custody, improve the conditions at
CBP facilities, and transfer all aliens from CBP custody to ICE
custody within 72 hours, or otherwise release the aliens on bond or
with electronic monitoring.

In each of the individual lawsuits, the Court denied the request
for a temporary restraining order and scheduled a preliminary
injunction hearing.  Following consolidation, the Petitioners filed
their Second Amended Petition, and then filed their Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.  On Sept. 5 and 6, 2019, the Court held a
two-day evidentiary hearing during which 11 witnesses testified.
The record contains numerous exhibits and several briefs, including
one from amici American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas
and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

The Petitioners advance three causes of action in their Second
Amended Petition.  First, Petitioners Perez Valle, Landaverde
Lopez, Lopez Lopez and Santay Son present a petition for writ of
habeas corpus based on the allegations that Respondent Pitts
continues to hold them in custody, that they have either not
received their credible fear interviews or the results of that
interview, and that they continue to "suffer the effects of their
unlawful detention by CBP."  These four Petitioners seek their
immediate release, either on personal recognition, bond or with
electronic monitoring.

Second, the Petitioners allege causes of action under the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, basing these claims on allegations that CBP
held detained aliens in custody for longer than 72 hours and in
substandard conditions.  As to these causes of action, they assert
claims on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class.  As
relief, the Petitioners seek an order requiring that CBP transfer a
detained alien to ICE custody within 72 hours of detention, or
release the alien on bond, personal recognition or with electronic
monitoring.  They also ask the Court to order CBP to comply with
enumerated standards regarding the conditions of detention at CBP
Stations.

In their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Petitioners present
all three causes of action as grounds for the requested injunctive
relief.  To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must
establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is
not issued, (3) that the threatened injury, if the injunction is
denied, outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is
granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve
the public interest.

Judge Rodriguez finds that the Petitioners have failed to show a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits (i) as to a habeas
corpus claim based on the length of their detention in CBP custody;
(ii) of their petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the
conditions of their confinement; (iii) as to their Fifth Amendment
claim that they should be provided access to counsel when in CBP
custody; (iv) on any of their causes of action.  Their Motion
fails.

The Judge proceeds to consider the remaining elements for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction to demonstrate that even if
the Petitioners presented a claim with a likelihood of success,
they would not have satisfied the applicable standard for the
requested relief.

Judge Rodriguez finds that the Petitioners have not demonstrated an
irreparable injury that supports the granting of the requested
preliminary injunction.  The supporting factors that helped improve
the substandard conditions currently are in place, and no evidence
shows that they will be removed in the foreseeable future.  The
Petitioners cannot carry their burden simply by arguing that the
status quo is not guaranteed.

Finally, Judge Rodriguez finds that in a case involving the
detention of adults in a prison setting, the Supreme Court
expressed strong reservations about judicial relief that imposes
detailed requirements on the operations of a facility in which
individuals are detained.  Granting the requested relief int he
instant case would impose a substantial burden on CBP to meet the
proposed court-ordered requirements.

Accordingly, Judge Rodriguez denies the Petitioners' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UMDNOo from Leagle.com.

Jairo Alexander Gonzalez Recinos, On his own behalf and on behalf
of all those similarly situated, Gerardo Henrique Herrera Rivera,
On his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Kevin Eduardo Rizzo Ruano, On his own behalf and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, Jonathan Fernando Beltran Rizo, On his
own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated, William
Anthony Perez Valle, On his own behalf and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, through his next friend, his cousion, Roberto
Valle, Hugo Flandez, On his own behalf and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, through his next friend, Ernesto Giron, Bryan
Lopez-Lopez, On his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, through his next friend, Juan Ramon Lopez, William Abel
Santay-Son, On his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Hector Sigifredo Rivera Rosa, On his own behalf and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, through his next friend,
Julio Rivera, Juan Carlos Acensio Y Acensio, On his own behalf and
on behalf of all those similarly situated, through his next friend,
Ruth Isabel Acensio, Jose Neftali Arias Hernandez, On his own
behalf and on behalf of all those similarly situated, through his
next friend, Zulma Chavarria Vanegas & Javier Alexander Reyes
Vigil, On his own behalf and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, through his next friend, Zuleyma Stefany Sanchez,
Petitioners, represented by Elisabeth Lisa S. Brodyaga, Attorney at
Law, Efren Carlos Olivares, South Texas Civil Rights Project, Jaime
M. Diez, Jones Crane, John Brent Beckert --
brent.beckert@haynesboone.com -- Haynes and Boone, pro hac vice,
Karla Marisol Vargas, Texas Civil Rights Project, Luis Campos --
luis.campos@haynesboone.com -- Haynes and Boone, pro hac vice,
Manuel E. Solis, Attorney at Law, Thelma Odilia Garcia, Attorney at
Law & Wesley Darwin Lewis -- wesley.lewis@haynesboone.com -- Haynes
and Boone LLP.

Kevin K McAleenan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and Commissioner, United States Customs & Border
Protection, Carla Provost, Chief of the United States Border
Patrol, Rodolfo Karisch, Chief Patrol Agent-Rio Grande Valley
Sector & Michael J. Pitts, Field Office Director, ICE/ERO, Port
Isabel Service Processing Center, Respondents, represented by
Christopher D. Pineda , United States Attorneys Office, Nancy Lynn
Masso, Office of U S Attorney, Annalisa L. Cravens, United States
Attorney's Office, Daniel David Hu, Office of the US Attorneys
Office, Eric Joel Drootman, Dept of Homeland Security & Michael
Anthony Celone, US Dept of Justice - Civil Division, pro hac vice.

John P Sanders, Acting Comissioner of CBP, Respondent, represented
by Christopher D. Pineda, United States Attorneys Office, Nancy
Lynn Masso, Office of U S Attorney, Annalisa L. Craven, United
States Attorney's Office, Daniel David Hu, Office of the US
Attorneys Office & Eric Joel Drootman , Dept of Homeland Security.

ACLU Foundation of Texas, Amicus, represented by Thomas Paul
Buser-Clancy, ACLU of Texas.


UNITED STATES: K. Thomas' Claims vs. ICE to Proceed in Civil Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATA S. BOB; KENNETH THOMAS; YUSUF RAHEEM,
Petitioners, v. THOMAS DECKER, DHS/ICE DIRECTOR OF
DETENTION/REMOVAL; HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONS REHABILITATION (JAIL)
WARDEN; MEDICAL DEFENDANTS (JOHN DOE), Respondents, Case No.
19-CV-8226 (CM) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Colleen McMahon of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York directed the
Clerk of Court to sever the claims of Petitioners Bob and Raheem,
and open each as a separate civil action, leaving Thomas' claims to
proceed in the action.

Petitioners Bob, Thomas, and Raheem jointly filed the pro se
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241,
while all three were detained at the Hudson County Jail in the
custody of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").  The Petitioners style their
petition as a class action, in which they challenge the adequacy of
their medical treatment.

By order dated Sept. 10, 2019, the Court directed the Petitioners
to pay the filing fee or submit applications to proceed in forma
pauperis.  Petitioner Thomas paid the filing fee for the action.
And Petitioner Raheem recently filed his own Section 2241 petition
in the Court, Raheem v. Barr, ECF 1:19-CV-9134 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 30, 2019), challenging his ongoing detention.  But the
order sent to Petitioner Nata was returned to the Court as
undeliverable, and according to ICE's public records, he is
currently detained in Natchez, Mississippi.

Judge McMahon finds that the Petitioners challenge the medical care
that they received in DHS/ICE custody.  Petitioner Nata alleges
that since he was taken into custody on May 8, 2019, DHS/ICE has
not provided constitutionally adequate medical care or medication
for his nerve damage, which resulted from a 1998 injury he
sustained while doing construction work.  Petitioner Thomas alleges
that since he was taken into custody on May 7, 2019, DHS/ICE has
not provided constitutionally adequate medical care or medication
for his hypertension, diabetes, and knee and shoulder injuries.
Petitioner Raheem alleges that he received constitutionally
inadequate dental care in DHS/ICE custody.  All the three
Petitioners seek damages, and the Court liberally construes the
petition as also seeking injunctive relief in the form of adequate
medical care.

The three petitioners in the multi-party petition do not present
the same legal claim "uncluttered by subsidiary issues."  Instead,
the question of whether DHS/ICE has denied any Petitioner
constitutionally adequate medical care turns on facts unique to
each Petitioner.  The Judge therefore concludes that it is
appropriate to sever the claims of Petitioners Bob and Rahee, and
open each as a separate civil action, leaving Thomas's claims to
proceed in the action.

Accordingly, Judge McMahon ordered the Clerk of Court  to assign
the matter to her docket, mail a copy of the order to the
Petitioner, and note service on the docket.  She directed the Clerk
of Court to sever the claims of Petitioners Bob and Raheem, and
open each as a new civil action under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241.
Petitioner Thomas' claims will proceed in the action under docket
number 19-CV-8226 (CM).

Because the petition at this time makes no substantial showing of a
denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability
will not issue.  The Judge certified under 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the Order would not be taken in
good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the
purpose of an appeal.

The Clerk of Court is directed to docket the opinion as a "written
opinion" within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the
E-Government Act of 2002.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/tCkYWe from Leagle.com.

Kenneth Thomas, Petitioner, pro se.


UNITED STATES: Vara Sues Over Refusal to Discharge Student Loans
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Diana Vara and Amanda Wilson, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
v. ELISABETH DEVOS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
United States Department of Education, AND THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-12175-LTS (D.
Mass., Oct. 22, 2019), arises from the Department of Education's
enduring refusal to discharge the federal student loans for Everest
students.

According to the complaint, 7,241 students borrowed federal student
loans to pay for attendance at Everest Institute, an abusive
for-profit school. The chief law enforcement officer in
Massachusetts and a Commonwealth court agreed--nearly four years
ago--that Everest Institute violated Massachusetts law and that
these individuals were entitled to full restitution of all amounts
paid to the school, whether those fees were paid out of pocket, by
private loans, or by federal student loans or grants.

Everest Institute had locations in Chelsea and Brighton,
Massachusetts. It was operated by Corinthian Colleges, Inc., an
ignominious nationwide chain that went bankrupt and shut down in
2015.

While in operation, Everest offered career training programs
leading to certificates or associate degrees in healthcare-related
fields, such as medical insurance billing and coding, medical
administrative assisting, dental assisting, and massage therapy.
Everest marketed its programs to individuals, who were un- or
underemployed, and seeking job-specific training. Many were single
mothers, immigrants, and/or the first in their families to go to
college. As of June 30, 2010, 89.9 percent of Corinthian's revenue
came from federal student aid and grants.

The Attorney General of Massachusetts (AGO) investigated and
prosecuted Everest Massachusetts for consumer fraud. In 2015, she
asked the Department to cancel the federal student loans of each
and every student, who was impacted by the consumer fraud, as the
AGO's prosecution of Everest demonstrated that each student had a
"borrower defense" under the Department's own regulations. In 2016,
a court of the Commonwealth entered judgment in favor of the AGO,
finding that Everest had violated Massachusetts law and defrauded
students.

Without issuing a reasoned decision denying or granting this
request, the Department continues to collect on the loans of former
students of Everest Massachusetts, including by seizing the tax
refunds and garnishing the wages of individuals specifically named
by the Attorney General as qualifying for loan cancellation, the
lawsuit says.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all of their
classmates, ask the Court to rule that the Secretary is violating
the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to render a reasoned
decision on the Borrower Defense that the Attorney General
submitted on behalf of 7,241 students in 2015.

Moreover, by the Secretary's own admission before the Court, she
has determined that the AGO's submission is insufficient, in and of
itself or in combination with all other information available to
the Department, to establish a borrower defense for any and all
individuals who took out a federal student loan in connection with
Everest Massachusetts.

The Plaintiffs seek an order setting aside this decision as
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act. The only non-arbitrary action that the Defendants
may take, in light of all the evidence in front of them, is to
cancel the loans of all members of the proposed class, and return
any money already collected towards these invalid loans.

All loans at issue in this lawsuit were issued under Title IV of
the Higher Education Act of 1965, which provides the statutory
authorization for federal student loans, including the Federal
Family Education Loan and Direct Loan programs, the lawsuit says.

Diana Vara is a resident of Medford, Massachusetts. She borrowed
federal student loans to attend Everest Institute in Chelsea,
Massachusetts. Amanda Wilson is a resident of Epping, New
Hampshire. She borrowed federal student loans to attend Everest
Institute in Chelsea, Massachusetts. On November 23, 2015, the AGO
submitted an application for loan cancellation on the Plaintiffs'
behalf, specifically naming them, to the Department of Education.
The Plaintiffs allege that the Department seized their tax refunds
to offset their Everest student loans.

Elisabeth DeVos is the Secretary of Education and is charged by
statute with the supervision and management of all decisions and
actions of the United States Department of Education. The Secretary
oversees and is responsible for federal student loan programs. The
United States Department of Education is an "agency" of the United
States, responsible for overseeing and implementing rules for the
federal student aid program.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Toby R. Merrill, Esq.
          Eileen Connor, Esq.
          Kyra A. Taylor, Esq.
          LEGAL SERVICES CENTER OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
          122 Boylston Street
          Jamaica Plain, MA 02130
          Telephone: (617) 390-3003
          Facsimile: (617) 522-0715


UNITED TECHNOLOGIES: 2nd Cir. Upholds Dismissal of KLI Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case KAPITALFORENINGEN LAEGERNES INVEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant, FRANKFURT-TRUST INVESTMENT LUXEMBURG AG,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Plaintiff, v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION, GREGORY J. HAYES,
AKHIL JOHRI, ALAIN M. BELLEMARE, DAVID GITLIN, GERAUD DARNIS,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-3208 (2d Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Kapitalforeningen Laegernes Invest (KLI)'s second
amended complaint.

Kapitalforeningen Laegernes (KLI) was appointed the Lead Plaintiff
in the putative class action claiming violations of Sections 10(b)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.  The case was originally assigned to Hon.
John G. Koeltl. United Technologies Corporation (UTC) moved to
dismiss the first amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
Pursuant to Judge Koeltl's scheduling order, KLI elected to amend
its complaint rather than oppose the motion.  The case was then
reassigned to the Judge Victor Marrero.

Following the filing of the second amended complaint, the parties
jointly inquired as to whether they should continue to follow Judge
Koeltl's scheduling order or instead exchange pre-motion letters in
accordance with Judge Marrero's individual rules.  Judge Marrero
directed the parties to comply with the Court's pre-motion letters
practice in relation to the second amended complaint and refrain
from further motion practice until the Court's review of the
exchange.  The parties complied, and UTC subsequently submitted a
pre-motion letter requesting permission to renew its motion to
dismiss.  KLI in turn submitted a letter laying out its opposition
to UTC's position.

Eight months later, without a hearing or further notice to the
parties, Judge Marrero construed UTC's pre-motion letter as an
actual motion and dismissed the second amended complaint. The
appeal follows.

KLI urges vacatur primarily on the ground that it was denied the
chance to brief the relevant issues on what the district court
construed as a motion to dismiss.

Upon review, the Second Circuit concludes that the district court
properly dismissed KLI's claims for failure adequately to allege
scienter.  Specifically, KLI failed to plead motive and
opportunity; and its allegations concerning former employees, none
of whom was in direct contact with any UTC decisionmaker, if
supported by evidence would not amount to strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, much less actual
knowledge that the relevant statements were false.  For these
reasons, and substantially the reasons stated by the district court
in its thorough and well-reasoned Sept. 28, 2018 opinion, the
Second Circuit will affirm.  The Second Circuit has considered
KLI's remaining arguments and finds them to be without merit.

Accordingl, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, the
Second Circuit rules.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/n5YQDm from Leagle.com

KIMBERLY A. JUSTICE -- kjustice@fklmlaw.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Radnor, PA (Jonathan Gardner, David J.
Goldsmith, Alec T. Coquin, Labaton Sucharow LLP, New York, NY, on
the brief), Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant.

WILLIAM SAVITT  -- WDSavitt@wlrk.com -- (George T. Conway III,
Benjamin D. Klein, Adam L. Goodman, on the brief), Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY, Appearing for
Defendants-Appellees.


UNIVERSAL PROPERTY: Watkins Files Class Suit in W.D. North Carolina
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Universal Property &
Casualty Insurance Company. The case is styled as Jerry Watkins,
Pamela Hagan individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance
Company, Defendant, Case No. 5:19-cv-00146-KDB-DSC (W.D.N.C., Nov.
1, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance.

Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company operates as an
insurance firm.  The Company offers property and casualty insurance
products including automobile, motorcycle, homeowner, and mobile
home.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew Earl Lee, Esq.
          Whitfield, Bryson & Mason, LLP
          900 W. Morgan Street
          Raleigh, NC 27603
          Phone: (919) 600-5000
          Fax: (919) 600-5035
          Email: matt@wbmllp.com


USA: USCIS & ICE Referral Classes in Nightingale Suit Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ZACHARY NIGHTINGALE, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 19-cv-03512-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted
the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Plaintiffs challenge the systematic delay non-citizens face in
obtaining access to immigration case files maintained by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), and its component
agencies, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").  These files,
commonly referred to as Alien Registration Files ("A-Files"),
contain documents relating to all interactions that a non-citizen
has had with the immigration system, and therefore are critical to
defending against removal or determining eligibility for
immigration benefits.

The only way a non-citizen can obtain an A-File is by submitting a
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request from the same agency
adjudicating their case.  Congress mandated that FOIA requests must
be answered within 20 business days.  Adherence to this statutorily
prescribed time frame is especially important for A-File FOIA
requests, yet while the Defendants push to accelerate adjudication
of immigration cases they routinely fail to timely provide
noncitizens a copy of their A-Files.  For people attempting to
navigate the complex immigration system, often without counsel and
in danger of deportation, it is a serious impediment.

The Plaintiffs are three immigration attorneys who regularly file
A-File FOIA requests on behalf of their clients, and two
non-citizens who have filed A-File FOIA requests from the
Defendants.  They allege that the Defendants have a "pattern or
practice" of failing to answer these requests within the statutory
deadline set under FOIA.  All the Plaintiffs had A-File FOIA
requests that were pending with the Defendants without a
determination for more than 30 days at the time the Complaint was
filed.

The Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants have failed to comply
with the statutory time frame and that some of them have waited for
more than a year.  They allege that DHS holds ultimate
responsibility for USCIS's and ICE's pattern or practice of failing
to make timely determination in response to A-File FOIA requests.

On June 16, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the class action lawsuit,
claiming that the Defendants' pattern or practice of failing to
meet the statutory deadline with respect to A-File FOIA requests
violates FOIA.  They seek declaratory relief that the Defendants'
failure to make timely determinations on the Plaintiffs' and
proposed classes' A-File FOIA requests violates FOIA, and
nationwide injunction requiring the Defendants to make timely
determinations.  On July 31, 2019, the Defendants filed an answer,
denying each and every allegation in the Complaint.  

Subsequently, on Aug. 8, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a motion
seeking certification of the following two classes:

     a. USCIS Class: All individuals who filed, or will file,
A-File FOIA requests with USCIS which have been pending, or will be
pending, with USCIS for more than 30 business days without a
determination.

     b. ICE Referral Class: All individuals who filed, or will
file, A-File FOIA requests with USCIS that USCIS has referred, or
will refer, to ICE and which have been pending, or will be pending,
for more than 30 business days from the date of the initial filing
with USCIS without a determination.

All attorney Plaintiffs and noncitizen Plaintiff Lopa seek to
represent the USCIS Class, and all attorney Plaintiffs and
noncitizen Plaintiff Carandang seek to represent the ICE Referral
Class.  Accompanying their motion, the Plaintiffs also filed
multiple declarations collected from immigration attorneys across
the nation that attest to the importance of A-Files and the
hardships caused by delays in attaining them from the Defendants.
The Defendants opposed the motion on several grounds.  The Court
heard arguments on Oct. 1, 2019.

Judge Orrick holds that while it may be the first class action
addressing the Defendants' systematic failure of making timely
determinations on A-File FOIA requests, the Plaintiffs have shown
that class certification is appropriate in these extraordinary
circumstances.  The Plaintiffs have established that noncitizens
nationwide experience significant delays in obtaining their A-Files
and that such delays are harmful to their immigration cases.
Accordingly, Judge Orrick granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification because a single injunction or declaratory judgment
would provide relief to each member of the proposed classes -- the
timely determination of their time-sensitive A-File FOIA requests.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/GGCOYW from Leagle.com.

Zachary Nightingale, Courtney McDermed, Pao Lopa & Maribel
Carandang, Plaintiffs, represented by Claudia Valenzuela --
cvalenzuela@immcouncil.org -- American Immigration Council, pro hac
vice, Emily Jamieson Creighton -- ecreighton@immcouncil.org --
American Immigration Council, pro hac vice, Leila Kang --
leila@nwirp.org -- Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, pro hac
vice, Mary A. Kenney -- mkenney@immcouncil.org -- American
Immigration Council, pro hac vice, Matthew Hyrum Adams --
matt@nwirp.org -- Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, pro hac vice,
Stacy Eva Tolchin -- Stacy@Tolchinimmigration.com -- Law Offices of
Stacy Tolchin & Trina Ann Realmuto -- trealmuto@immcouncil.org --
American Immigration Council.

Cheryl David, Plaintiff, represented by Claudia Valenzuela,
American Immigration Council, pro hac vice, Emily Jamieson
Creighton, American Immigration Council, Leila Kang, Northwest
Immigrant Rights Project, pro hac vice, Mary A. Kenney, American
Immigration Council, pro hac vice, Matthew Hyrum Adams, Northwest
Immigrant Rights Project, pro hac vice, Stacy Eva Tolchin, Law
Offices of Stacy Tolchin & Trina Ann Realmuto, American Immigration
Council.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement & U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Defendants, represented by Cristen Cori Handley, U.S. Department of
Justice Civil Division.


WAYFAIR INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Nicholas Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEKISHA NICHOLAS, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WAYFAIR INC. and WAYFAIR
LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-1974 (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Jack B.
Weinstein of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York granted the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

Nicholas brings suit on behalf of a proposed class of individuals
alleged to have purchased from Defendants Wayfair Inc. and Wayfair
LLC products infested by bedbugs.  The Plaintiffs seek substantial
damages for having to debug entire homes through extermination as
the varmints took over households.

The Plaintiff alleges that she was bitten and her home infested
after receiving the headboard contaminated with bedbugs.  Though
she contacted the Defendants in 2016, the Plaintiff was unable to
resolve her dissatisfaction with the purchase.  She contends that
some of the Defendants' other customers have received bedbug
infested products, and that the Defendants have misrepresented the
quality of their products and concealed information about them.

She asserts claims for breach of contract, negligence, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent concealment, unjust
enrichment, and breach of various federal and state consumer laws.

The Plaintiff is a well-informed internet consumer.  She is a
college graduate who has worked in management consulting and at a
prominent bank.  Wayfair Inc. is engaged in the marketing and sale
of bedroom furniture, among other household items.  Wayfair LLC is
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wayfair Inc.  The Defendants' Director
of Storefront Engineering, Jonathan Klein, and the Plaintiff
testified at an evidentiary hearing conducted by the court.

The Defendants' regularly kept technical records captured the
Plaintiff's repeated use of the Defendants' website, Wayfair.com.
In 2016, the Plaintiff purchased a headboard from the Defendants.
When placing her order, she clicked "Submit Order," immediately
under which was the text "By placing this order, you are agreeing
to our terms and conditions."  The Plaintiff accessed the webpage
containing the terms and conditions before she purchased the
headboard; the webpage was open for 107 seconds. Later in the day,
her first order was cancelled, and the same headboard was ordered
in a different color, using a "Submit Order" button without the
terms and conditions text immediately below it.  The Plaintiff
remembers making the purchases but does not remember clicking on
the terms and conditions webpage or reading the terms and
conditions.  The terms and conditions were also available through a
link appearing on the bottom of every page of the website.

The terms and conditions Plaintiff accessed state that specified
websites, including the one accessed by the Plaintiff, are provided
"subject to compliance with these Terms of Use."  The terms and
conditions contain the following detailed, extensive arbitration
agreement in clear typeface.

The Defendants move to compel arbitration based on the Plaintiff's
acquiescence to the Defendants' website "terms and conditions."
The Plaintiff opposes.

Judge Weinstein finds that regardless of who decides scope, the
Plaintiff's claims are unmistakably within the scope of the
arbitration provision, which contains the broadly interpreted terms
"arising from or relating to."  The instant dispute arises from the
Plaintiff's purchase of a product through the Defendants' website,
emanating from the purchaser-seller relationship created by the
website.  Usage of the website is governed by the Defendants' terms
and conditions.

Judge Weinstein also finds that regardless of what forum decides
the issue of unconscionability, the agreement is not
unconscionable.  The instant agreement is not procedurally
unconscionable; its presentation to the Plaintiff and her manner of
acceptance has been approved.  Nor is the agreement substantively
unconscionable.  The Defendants have waived the complained-of forum
and statute of limitations requirements, so the Judge need not
address unconscionability of those provisions.  Use of American
Arbitration Association rules does not render an arbitration
agreement unconscionable.  And finally, the unilateral right to
modify an agreement, without more, does not render the agreement
unenforceable.

Judge Weinstein holds that Wayfair Inc. may enforce the arbitration
agreement because the Plaintiff's claims against it are identical
to those against Wayfair LLC and the two entities have a close
operating relationship.

Accordingly, Judge Weinstein grants the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration and stay the litigation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/IMd8kH from Leagle.com.

Lekisha Nicholas, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kyle A. Shamberg --
kshamberg@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch, LLP & Joshua D.
Arisohn -- jarisohn@bursor.com -- Bursor & Fisher PA.

Wayfair Inc. & Wayfair LLC, Defendants, represented by Katie Jakola
-- katie.jakola@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Robert B.
Ellis -- robert.ellis@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis LLP &
Caitlin Kovacs -- caitlin.kovacs@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis
LLP, pro hac vice.


WAYNE, MI: Mich. App. Upholds Summary Disposition in Retirees' Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CITY OF WAYNE RETIREES ASSOCIATION, CHRISTOPHER
JOHNSON, TIMOTHY REYNOLDS, ROBERT ENGLISH, EDMUND ROTHFELDER,
DANIEL HAMANN, and CHERYL FISHER, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF WAYNE,
Defendant-Appellee, Case Nos. 343522, 343916 (Mich. App.), the
Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed:

    (i) the trial court's order denying the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary disposition and granting the City's cross-motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10); and

   (ii) the trial court's order dissolving a preliminary injunction
that was in effect while the matter was pending, dismissing the
Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice, and denying as moot the
Plaintiffs' motion to certify the matter as a class action.

The Plaintiffs, retired employees of the city of Wayne, filed the
proposed class action against the City after it made changes
affecting retirees' healthcare coverage benefits.  The Plaintiffs
alleged that they have a vested right to receive healthcare
benefits according to collective-bargaining agreements ("CBAs") or
other agreements in effect when each employee retired.

For many years, the City has paid retiree healthcare benefits
pursuant to CBAs in effect when each employee retired.  The CBAs
specify the City's obligation to pay for healthcare coverage for
retirees in varying amounts, depending on the retired employee's
years of seniority. The CBAs contained language that these
obligations would continue for the life of the agreement.  The CBAs
also contained language generally referring to "the duration of the
agreement," which expressly limited all provisions of the CBAs to
the effective term of each CBA. When the City experienced economic
problems, it began to make changes to retiree healthcare benefits.

In 2017, the City proposed eliminating all healthcare benefits for
retirees.  The Plaintiffs filed the action alleging that they have
a vested right to receive lifetime healthcare benefits, and
therefore, any modification or reduction to their benefits without
their consent is a breach of contract.  The trial court entered a
preliminary injunction to prevent the City from proceeding with its
planned changes while the matter was pending.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition with
respect to whether the City could lawfully proceed with its
proposed changes.  The trial court denied the Plaintiffs' motion
for summary disposition and granted the City's cross-motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the ground that none
of the governing CBAs awarded lifetime healthcare benefits to
retirees.  The Plaintiffs appeal that order as of right in Docket
No. 343522.  

After the court entered the order granting summary disposition to
the City, it entered an order dissolving a preliminary injunction
that was in effect while the matter was pending, dismissing the
Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice, and denying as moot the
Plaintiffs' motion to certify this matter as a class action.  The
Plaintiffs appeal the latter order as of right in Docket No.
343916.

The appeals have been consolidated.  The trial court held that the
language in the CBAs was clear and unambiguous, and the Appellate
Court agrees with that conclusion.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs were
required to show that a past practice was so widely acknowledged
and mutually accepted by the parties that there was a meeting of
the minds with respect to an agreement to modify the CBAs to extend
healthcare benefits to retirees for their lifetimes, beyond the
life or duration of the applicable CBA.  The Plaintiffs did not
meet that standard, the Appellate Court finds.

The Plaintiffs offered the testimony of various retirees who
understood that they were promised healthcare benefits for life
upon retirement.  Although the City honored that practice for
years, it was never incorporated into the parties' employment
agreements.  The understandings of various individuals regarding
healthcare coverage for retirees do not show any meeting of the
minds with regard to whether retiree healthcare benefits were
vested when an employee retired and could not be changed.

Even if the City may have acknowledged over the years, through its
financial statements, the Appellate Court holds that that it had a
continuing burden of providing healthcare coverage to retirees and
may have actually had a practice of providing coverage for
retirees' lifetimes, there was no concession or mutual agreement
that retiree healthcare benefits were not subject to future
modifications.  Notwithstanding the City's past practices with
respect to retiree healthcare benefits, the CBAs unambiguously
indicate that retiree healthcare benefits were only guaranteed for
the lifetime or duration of each CBA.  The Plaintiffs have failed
to show that the parties' past practice was to treat retiree
healthcare benefits as vested obligations that could not be
modified during each retiree's lifetime, the Appellate Court
holds.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Oct. 15, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/u4IXnw from Leagle.com.

ALEC SCOTT GIBBS -- greggibbs51@sbcglobal.net -- for CITY OF WAYNE
RETIREES ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant.

MINDY BARRY -- mgb@kellerthoma.com -- for CITY OF WAYNE,
Defendant-Appellee.


WELLS FARGO: Court Dismisses Ehrenfeld's RESPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned FAIGIE EHRENFELD, on behalf
of herself and all individuals similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
WELLS FARGO, N.A., Defendant. No. 19-cv-2314 (BMC). (E.D.N.Y.)

Plaintiff brings this proposed class action against the servicer of
her mortgage loan for claims arising out of her unsuccessful loss
mitigation applications. Her claims arise under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and its implementing regulation,
Regulation X, as well as Section 349 of the New York General
Business Law.

Defendant has moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a
claim.

When resolving a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may consider the complaint as well as
any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit or
any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.
However, a district court errs when it relies on factual
allegations contained in legal briefs or memoranda, in ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Here, as explained below, the complaint fails in two distinct but
related ways. In some respects, the complaint includes insufficient
allegations that, accepted as true, would state a claim for relief.
In other respects, the complaint fails to allege conduct that would
constitute a violation of law because the facts alleged in the
complaint defeat plaintiff's claims.

RESPA and Regulation X Claims

Plaintiff claims that defendant violated various provisions of 12
C.F.R. Section 1024.41, but plaintiff fails to state a claim under
each provision.

First, plaintiff claims that defendant violated 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(b)(2)(i)(B) and 12 C.F.R. Section 1024.41(c)(3). Both of
those previsions require a loan servicer to respond to a loss
mitigation application within five days and indicate whether the
application is complete. But at no point in the complaint has
plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to respond to a loss
mitigation application within five days of defendant's receipt of
such an application.

Second, plaintiff asserts defendant violated 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(c)(1). That provision requires loan servicers who receive a
complete loss mitigation application more than 37 days before a
foreclosure sale to inform the borrower which, if any, loss
mitigation options the borrower will offer within 30 days of
receiving the application.  

Third, plaintiff asserts defendant violated 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(h). That subsection allows borrowers to appeal a servicer's
denial of a loss mitigation application and requires servicers to
respond to the appeal within 30 days of the appeal. But plaintiff
has not alleged in the complaint that she even appealed defendant's
denial of her loss mitigation applications, let alone alleged that
defendant failed to timely respond to this appeal.

Fourth, plaintiff claims defendant violated 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(d). That subsection requires servicers to provider
borrowers with the specific reason or reasons for the servicer's
determination if the borrower rejects a complete loss mitigation
application for a loan modification.  

RESPA (through Regulation X) regulates many aspects of loss
mitigation practices, but does not regulate the correctness of a
loss mitigation decision. Thus, regardless of whether plaintiff
agrees with defendant's calculation of her income, defendant
complied with 12 C.F.R. Section 1024.41(d) by providing a reason
for denying plaintiff's request for loan modification.

Fifth, plaintiff claims that defendant violated 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(g). This provision states that if a borrower submits a
complete loss mitigation application after a servicer made the
first notice for a foreclosure process but over 37 days before a
foreclosure sale, then the servicer shall not move for foreclosure
judgment or order of sale, or conduct a foreclosure sale unless,
among other things, the borrower fails to perform under an
agreement on a loss mitigation option.

Here, plaintiff failed to perform on her short sale agreement by
providing short sale offers that defendant rejected as too low.

Even if plaintiff submitted a complete loss mitigation application
on January 3, 2019 and did not fail to perform, her application was
complete less than 37 days before the foreclosure sale, which was
scheduled for January 31, 2019.

Thus, 12 C.F.R. Section 1024.41(g) did not prevent defendant from
seeking foreclosure. Further, the complaint concedes that defendant
did not conduct a foreclosure sale, and does not allege that
defendant moved for a foreclosure judgment or order of sale after
plaintiff submitted a complete loss mitigation application.

Sixth, plaintiff contends that defendant violated 12 C.F.R. Section
1024.41(c)(2)(iv). That provision requires a servicer to give a
borrower a reasonable opportunity to complete a facially complete
application5 if the servicer later realizes the application is
incomplete. Plaintiff contends that her application was facially
complete on January 3, 2019, but that defendant both rejected her
bid and sent her a notice of sale the next day before giving her a
reasonable opportunity to respond.

To recover actual damages, plaintiff must allege that the damages
were proximately caused by the defendant's violation of RESPA.

Plaintiff has alleged that she incurred various emotional damages,
including stress, embarrassment, and irritability, because of
defendant's alleged RESPA violations. Assuming that is true, she
has not alleged facts showing defendant's alleged RESPA violations
rather than the underlying failure to pay her mortgage and the
potential foreclosure sale caused these emotional damages.
Plaintiff claims additional damages beyond emotional distress  the
deficiency on her mortgage loan, damage to her credit, and costs
associated with a foreclosure action but plaintiff has again failed
to allege facts showing that these damages were the result of the
alleged RESPA violations rather than as a result of plaintiff's
apparent inability to pay her mortgage.

New York General Business Law Claim

Supplemental jurisdiction would be inappropriate here. Under 28
U.S.C. Section 1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

Thus, the strong preference in this Circuit is for district courts
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under Section
1367(c)(3) when all of the federal claims are dismissed from the
suit prior to trial.  

Having dismissed all federal claims in this case before commencing
or even scheduling trial, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim.  

Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

Plaintiff's RESPA and Regulation X claims are dismissed with
prejudice and plaintiff's New York General Business Law claim is
dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment,
dismissing this case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 7, 2019 Memorandum
Decision and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yy4k6rjo
from Leagle.com

Faigie Ehrenfeld, Plaintiff, represented by Igor Meystelman -
igor@theimlawgroup.com -  IM Law Group PC.

Wells Fargo NA, Defendant, represented by Danielle Oakley -
doakley@omm.com - O'Melveny & Myers LLP, pro hac vice.


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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