CAR_Public/191127.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, November 27, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 237

                            Headlines

23ANDME INC: Fischler Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
A10 NETWORKS: Appeal from Order Dismissing Shah Suit Dropped
AIRBNB: Reaches Class Action Settlement with Quebec Users
ALCARIS THERAPEUTICS: Fulcher & Rosi Securities Suits Consolidated
ALLIANCEMED LLC: Court Certifies Class in Retina Assoc. Case

ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS: Fischler Asserts Breach of ADA
ARC MANAGEMENT: Werzberger Suit Asserts Breach under FDCPA
ASHISH HOLDINGS: Reyes Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
AUTOVEST LLC: Court Dismisses Frank FDCPA Suit
B RILEY FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Freedman Class Suit

B RILEY FINANCIAL: Mediation in Suit v. MLV Fails
CBL CORP: Faces Second Shareholder Class Action
CENTURYLINK INC: Masales Sues Over Failure to Protect PII
CHARLES RIVER: Fails to Pay Overtime Wage Under FLSA, Matson Says
CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION: Wins Summary Judgment in Royalties Suit

CHRISTMAS TREE SHOPS: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in New York
CITIGROUP INC: Bid to Dismiss Mexican Govt. Bonds Suit Granted
CITIGROUP INC: Settlement in Contant Litig. Wins Initial Approval
COLLECTION BUREAU: Wilson Files FDCPA Suit in NY under FDCPA
CONDE NAST: Granillo Suit Moved to Southern District of California

CORDUA RESTAURANTS: Faegre Baker Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
CURALEAF HOLDINGS: Lead Counsel Numbers Narrowed to Two
DESTINY MATERNITY: Wu Files Suit in New York under ADA
DOLLAR TREE: Can Compel Arbitration in Snipes Discrimination Suit
DYNASTY GUNITE: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Botelho Says

FEDERAL NATIONAL: E.D. Tenn Accepts Bank. Ct. Ruling in Cawood Case
FITBIT: Dec. 22 Deadline Set to Request for Settlement Payout
FLOOR & DECOR: Securities Litigation Underway in Georgia
FMT SJ LLC: Aguayo Files Labor Class Action in Cal. Sup. Ct.
FORESTERS FINANCIAL: Connor Sues Over Nuisance Telemarketing

GOLDMAN SACHS: Faces Curtis Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
GOLDMAN SACHS: Settlement Reached in GSE Bonds Antitrust Suit
GOYENETCHE DAIRY: Tiscareno Files Suit in California
GRAND CENTRAL: Rojas-Maravilla Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
GREGORY W. GRAY: Investors Lose Class Certification Bid

HARD ROCK: Saenger Theatre Employee Files Class Action
HARMON STORES: Delacruz Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
HAYCO CORP: Violates Overtime Provisions of FLSA, Huitzil Claims
HOME POINT: $$2.2MM Deal in Noroma FLSA Suit Gets Final Approval
HSBC BANK: Ahmed Moves for Final Approval of Class Settlement

HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Rinehart Antitrust Suit in Calif.
INTERSTATE COLLECTIONS: Abusively Collect Debts, Roberts Claims
J. JILL INC: Wu Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
JABIL INC: Walker Case Removed to Northern District of California
JETSMARTER INC: Court Orders Arbitration in Galvez Case

JOHNNY ROCKETS: Wu Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
JOY ORGANICS: Olsen Suit Alleges ADA Violation
KELLY M DAVIS: Jaffer Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
LABORATORY CORP: Covance Continues to Defend Mitchell Suit
LE LABO HOLDINGS: Wu Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act

LEHMAN PROPERTY: Former Clients File Class Action
LIFTED PERFORMANCE: Olsen Files Class Suit under ADA in New York
LOUD BUDDHA: Fails to Properly Pay Cannabis Workers, Denning Says
LYFT INC: Gonzalez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
MAC COSMETICS: Wu Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act

MARK HOTEL OWNERS: Nisbett Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
MARMARA MANHATTAN: Nisbett Alleges Violation under ADA in NY
MCCARTHY, BURGESS: Lombardi Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pa.
MEDICAL MANAGEMENT: Faces Mele Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
MERITAGE HOMES: Faces Thomas Class Suit Alleging Mortgage Fraud

METAL TECHNOLOGIES: Attys' Fees & Costs Awards in Weil Suit Revised
MIDLAND CREDIT: Henderson Files FDCPA Suit in Pa.
MIDWEST PUBLISHING: Taylor Sues Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
MORAN FOODS: Sinclair Suit Challenges Illegal Time-Shaving Policy
MOVIE GRILL CONCEPTS: Burns Files Suit in Ca. Super. Ct.

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Labiak Files PI Suit in S.D. Indiana
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Williams Files PI Suit in S.D. Indiana
OASIS POWER: February 11, 2020 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
OLIN CORP: Suits Against Unit over Sale of Caustic Soda Underway
ORIGINS NATURAL: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

P.C. RICHARD & SON: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
PANDORA: Lower Court Asked to Reconsider Class Action Ruling
PAPA JOHN'S: Court Sends No-Poach Class Action to Arbitration
PARETEUM CORP: Rosen Law Reminds of Dec. 23 Lead Plaintiff Deadline
PAYMENTCLUB INC: Bid to Dismiss Amended Fabricant TCPA Suit Denied

PHH MORTGAGE: Cabral Suit Removed to Massachusetts District Court
PORTLAND GENERAL: Oregon App. Affirms Dismissal of Dreyer Suit
PROSPECT CHARTERCARE: $4.5MM Settlement Gets Final Ct. Nod
PROSPECTS DM: Faces Gunn Suit Over Autodialed Telemarketing Calls
PURDUE PHARMA: Stock Suit Moved From N.D. Okla. to N.D. Ohio

RISE CONSTRUCTION: Sanchez Seeks OT Pay for Construction Workers
ROCKWELL MEDICAL: Feb. 26 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
ROTHMAN EVANS: Gonzalez Files Suit under FDCPA in New York
S&S SPRAYERS: Hernandez Files Class Suit in California
SAFEWAY: Faces Class Action Over 1% Surcharge

SEMPRA ENERGY: Ninth Circuit Appeals Filed in Plumley Class Suit
SETERUS INC: Court Narrows Claims in Heinitz Class Action
SHIRE US: Review of Class Cert. Bid Order in Antitrust Suit Denied
SPECTRA ENERGY: Morris Appeals Dismissal of Suit to Del. Sup. Ct.
STANDARD FIRE: Court Nixes Class Allegations in Young Case

STATE FARM: Bid to Dismiss Fraud/Unjust Enrichment Charges Denied
STUDIO 34: Cardoso Seeks to Recover Minimum and Overtime Wages
TEE JAYE'S COUNTRY: Faces Cockrell Suit Alleging FLSA Violations
TOTALMED STAFFING: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Repossessed Cars

TTC LLC: Millward TCPA Suit Seeks to Stop Unsolicited Marketing
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks Dismissal of Drivers' Class Action
US BANCORP: Bruna Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Text Messages
VENATOR: Bernstein Litowitz Appointed as Class Action Lead Counsel
WAL-MART INC: Settles Pregnancy Bias Class Action for $14 Million

WALT DISNEY: Responds to Gender Discrimination Class Action
WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Herrington Class Suit
WELLS FARGO: Liguori Files Suit in S.D. New York
WORLD FINANCIAL: Transfer of Yeomans to Ga. Northern Dist. Denied
XPO LOGISTICS: Settles Wage Class Action for $16.5 Million

ZAPPOS: Nov. 29 Deadline Set to Object to Settlement Terms

                            *********

23ANDME INC: Fischler Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------
23ANDME, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Brian
Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. 23ANDME, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06544 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

23andMe is a privately held personal genomics and biotechnology
company based in Sunnyvale, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


A10 NETWORKS: Appeal from Order Dismissing Shah Suit Dropped
------------------------------------------------------------
A10 Networks, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has granted the stipulated
motion to dismiss the appeal from a ruling in the case, Shah v. A10
Networks, Inc. et al., 3:18-cv-01772-VC.

On March 22, 2018, the Company, its Chief Executive Officer, its
Chief Financial Officer, and certain former officers, were named as
defendants in a putative class action lawsuit filed in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California,
captioned Shah v. A10 Networks, Inc. et al., 3:18-cv-01772-VC.

On August 31, 2018, the court appointed a lead plaintiff. On
October 5, 2018, the lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The
amended complaint named the same defendants as the initial
complaint, in addition to one of the Company's former executive
vice presidents.

The amended complaint asserted claims under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. The Company and individual defendants filed
motions to dismiss the amended complaint.

On February 21, 2019, the court granted the motions to dismiss with
leave to amend within 21 days. The lead plaintiff did not file an
amended complaint by the Court-ordered deadline. Instead, on March
21, 2019, the lead plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On April 5, 2019,
the clerk of court suspended briefing on the appeal and ordered
that, by April 26, 2019, appellants shall either move for voluntary
dismissal or show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.

On April 25, 2019, appellants moved to voluntarily dismiss the
appeal without prejudice, and that motion was granted on May 1,
2019. The district court entered final judgment dismissing lead
plaintiff's claims on May 8, 2019. The lead plaintiff subsequently
filed a notice of appeal on June 6, 2019.

The parties filed a stipulated motion to voluntarily dismiss the
appeal on October 7, 2019, with each side to bear its own costs.
The Court of Appeals granted the stipulated motion to dismiss on
October 10, 2019.

A10 Networks, Inc. provides software and hardware solutions in the
United States, Japan, other Asia Pacific and EMEA countries, and
Latin America. A10 Networks, Inc. was incorporated in 2004 and is
headquartered in San Jose, California.


AIRBNB: Reaches Class Action Settlement with Quebec Users
---------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Raymer, writing for Canadian Lawyer, reports that Airbnb
users in Quebec have reached a settlement with the company that
will see them reap up to $45 each in Airbnb credits.

In this case, Airbnb customers complained about how the company
displayed pricing on its website and launched a class action suit
in 2017. As part of the settlement, Airbnb has now agreed to change
the way it prices its products online in Canada, so that the price
shown when a customer first views a listing is the full price
excluding taxes.

The settlement shows the strength of Quebec's consumer protection
laws, says Claude Marseille -- claude.marseille@blakes.com -- a
partner at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP in Montreal.

"The Quebec Consumer Protection Act is very progressive," says
Marseille, and "Quebec legislature is very aggressive in following
up on trends and amending the Act as required."

Article 224 of the Consumer Protection Act prohibits so-called
"drip pricing," which occurs a lot on commercial websites, he says,
and refers to businesses using a lower price that the consumer will
see first in order to encourage the consumer to click through and
make a booking, only to be surprised by a significantly higher
price at the end. That's because the initial price shown excludes
not only taxes, but service charges and other fees.

"That occurred a couple of years ago with airplane ticket prices,
and now it's in the context of Airbnb," with the plaintiffs
claiming service charges of 14 to 17 per cent of the original price
were added on as the user continued to click through the pages,
says Marseille. Article 224 of Quebec's Consumer Protection Act
dictates that more emphasis must be placed on the total price to be
paid in the advertisement than on its components, he says.

The class action against Airbnb was launched only for Quebec
residents because the plaintiff based his case entirely on Article
224, Marseille explains. Although there are deceptive marketing
provisions outlined in the Competition Act, s. 55, and civil
recourse in s. 36, Quebec legislation has a specific provision
respecting "drip pricing," and so in this class action the decision
may have made to have a smaller class of plaintiffs but a stronger
case, he says.

"Under the Quebec Consumer Protection Act, you do not have to
establish, in order to claim damages, that you relied on the
initial price in order to make your decision to book your room. The
simple fact that Airbnb breached a statutory provision under the
CPA entails a presumption of damages in Quebec. You must take for
granted, as a court, that that's why the consumer made the
purchase." That lowers the burden of proof on the plaintiff
substantially, Marseille explains.

Another significant advantage of Quebec's CPA is that an individual
can claim punitive damages if the Act was breached, even if no
compensatory damages have been suffered; "it's an aggressive
position." In the Airbnb case, punitive damages were requested at
$100 per member of the class, Marseille says.

Although Airbnb has admitted no wrongdoing in the case, the outcome
"achieved the purpose [in class actions] of what the Supreme Court
of Canada has called behaviour modification. Aside from damages,
which are not high, Airbnb modified its website . . . so that . . .
you will now get in the advertisement . . . the full price you will
pay, including service charges, excluding tax."

In Hollick v. Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68, a judgment written by
then Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, behaviour modification was
indicated as a principle goal of class action legislation, he says.
The first two goals were judicial efficiency, and access to
justice.

A settlement agreement is expected to be approved by Quebec's
Superior Court on December 3. [GN]


ALCARIS THERAPEUTICS: Fulcher & Rosi Securities Suits Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases captioned LINDA ROSI, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALCARIS THERAPEUTICS,
INC., NEAL WALKER, and FRANK RUFFO, Defendants; and ROBERT FULCHER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. ALCARIS THERAPEUTICS, INC., NEAL WALKER, and FRANK
RUFFO, Defendants, Case Nos. 19-CV-7118 (LTS) (JLC), 19-CV-8284
(LTS) (JLC) (S.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge James L. Cott of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York:

-- granted Fulcher and Rosi's motions for consolidation, Fulcher's
motion for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff, and the motion for
approval of Pomerantz LLP as the lead counsel;

-- denied Rosi's motion for appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and
for approval of Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP as the lead counsel;
and

-- consolidated Fulcher's and Rosi's actions.

Plaintiffs Rosi and Fulcher filed separate securities fraud class
actions earlier this year against Alcaris, its President and CEO
Neal Walker, and its CFO Frank Ruffo, alleging that they violated
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act as well as
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.

Rosi filed suit on July 30, 2019 (Rosi v. Alcaris Therapeutics,
Inc. et al., No. 19-CV-7118 (LTS) (JLC)), and Fulcher filed the
second action on Sept. 5,2019 (Fulcher v. Alcaris Therapeutics,
Inc. et al, No. 19-CV-8284 (LTS) (JLC)).  The Plaintiffs in both
cases allege violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  Each action is brought
on behalf of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Alcaris
stock between May 8, and June 20, 2019, inclusive, and who
purportedly incurred damages in connection with such purchases or
acquisitions.

The Plaintiffs allege that during the Class Period, the Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the company's lead product ESKATA,
which is a hydrogen peroxide topical solution used to treat raised
seborrheic keratosis, a common non-malignant tumor.  On June 20,
2019, the U.S. Food & Drug Administration stated that an
advertisement for ESKATA makes false or misleading claims"
regarding the product's risk and efficacy.  As a result of the
Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the resulting decline
in the market value of Alcaris's stock, the Plaintiffs claim that
they and the other class members have suffered significant losses
and damages.

Only Rosi and Fulcher have filed motions requesting appointment as
the Lead Plaintiff and approval of the lead counsel, in addition to
requesting consolidation of their suits.  Specifically, Fulcher
moves to be appointed as the Lead Plaintiff and for approval of
Pomerantz LLP as the lead counsel, while Rosi moves to be appointed
as the Lead Plaintiff and for approval of Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP as the lead counsel.  In response to Fulcher's motion, Rosi
filed a notice of nonopposition, acknowledging that she does not
possess the largest financial interest in the action.  The
Defendants have not taken a position on these motions.

Both Fulcher and Rosi seek consolidation of Rosi v. Alcaris
Therapeutics, Inc. et al., No. 19-CV-7118 (LTS) (JLC), with Fulcher
v. Alcaris Therapeutics, Inc. et al, No. 19-CV-8284 (LTS) (JLC).

Magistrate Judge Cott holds that consolidation is appropriate.  The
actions assert virtually identical claims based on virtually
identical factual allegations.  Both complaints allege violations
of the same federal securities laws based on the same set of facts.
Accordingly, the actions are consolidated for all purposes.  All
future filings in either case will be filed under Docket Number
19-CV-7118, as it bears the lower docket number.

Turning to the appointment of the Lead Plaintiff, the Magistrate
Judge finds that (i) Rosi and Fulcher have satisfied the timeliness
prong of the PSLRA's requirements for appointment of the Lead
Plaintiff; (ii) Fulcher satisfies the largest financial interest
requirement of the PSLRA; and (iii) Fulcher has satisfied Rule 23's
typicality and adequacy requirements for purposes of this stage of
the litigation.  And because no other Plaintiff has come forward
with rebuttal evidence establishing that Fulcher will not fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class or is subject to
unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately
representing the class, the Magistrate will appoint Fulcher as the
Lead Plaintiff.

Finally, having reviewed the Firm Resume of Pomerantz LLP, the
Magistrate finds that Fulcher's chosen counsel will adequately and
effectively represent the interests of the class.  The attorneys at
Pomerantz have extensive experience with securities class actions
and have been found to be qualified to be lead or co-lead counsel
by other courts.  Thus, he will approve Fulcher's selection of
Pomerantz as the lead counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Cott granted Fulcher
and Rosi's motions for consolidation, Fulcher's motion for
appointment as the Lead Plaintiff, and the motion for approval of
Pomerantz LLP as the lead counsel.  He denied Rosi's motion for
appointment as the Lead Plaintiff and for approval of Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP as the lead counsel. All future filings will
be made under Docket Number 19-CV-7118.

The Clerk is directed to close Docket Numbers 8 and 12 and mark
Docket No. 8 as granted, and Docket No. 12 as granted in part and
denied in part.  The Clerk is further directed to change the
caption to reflect Fulcher as the Lead Plaintiff.

Within 10 days of the Opinion and Order, the lead counsel will meet
and confer with the counsel for the Defendants for the purpose of
jointly submitting a proposed schedule for the filing of a
consolidated amended complaint by the Lead Plaintiff, the filing of
any motion to dismiss the amended complaint by the Defendants, the
Lead Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss, and the
Defendants' reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/wdUQz6 from Leagle.com.

Robert Fulcher, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.


ALLIANCEMED LLC: Court Certifies Class in Retina Assoc. Case
------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James V. Selna grants the Motion for Class Certification
in the lawsuit captioned Retina Associates Medical Group, Inc. v.
Alliancemed, LLC, et al., Case No. 8:18-cv-01670-JVS-KES (C.D.
Cal.).

The Court certifies this class only against AllianceMed:

     All persons or business entities in the United States who in
     June 2018, as identified in Defendants' fax transmission
     records produced as CSV files, were successfully sent
     through Openfax an[] unsolicited fax advertisement by or on
     behalf of Defendants.

Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their employees, agents,
and members of the federal judiciary.

The Court appoints Retina as class representative and appoints the
law firm of Edwards Pottinger LLC as class counsel.

Retina filed its complaint on September 14, 2018, asserting on
behalf of a purported class one cause of action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.  Retina alleges that it received an
unsolicited fax advertisement from the Defendants on June 26, 2018,
that lacked a proper opt-out notice.  Retina also alleges that for
the past four years the Defendants have systematically and pursuant
to a policy and procedure arranged to fax hundreds or thousands of
such unsolicited fax advertisements lacking compliant opt-out
notices to recipients, such as Retina and the purported class
members.[CC]



ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS: Fischler Asserts Breach of ADA
-------------------------------------------------------
Ancestry.com Operations Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Brian Fischler, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Ancestry.com Operations Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06545 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

Ancestry.com Operations Inc. provides online family genealogy
information and resources. The Company allows website users to
upload family history information to create genealogy networks.
Ancestry.com serves individuals internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   630 Third Avenue
   Fifth Floor
   New York, NY 10017
   Tel: (212) 392-4772
   Fax: (212) 444-1030
   Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


ARC MANAGEMENT: Werzberger Suit Asserts Breach under FDCPA
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARC Management Group,
LLC. The case is styled as Sarah Werzberger, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ARC
Management Group, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-10701 (S.D.
N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

ARC Management Group, LLC is a legitimate collection agency,
founded in 2006. ARC is listed as a collection agency with a
headquarters in Kennesaw, GA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com



ASHISH HOLDINGS: Reyes Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Anselma Reyes and Beatriz Gonzalez v. ASHISH HOLDINGS, LLC, dba
A-ONE BONDS & MORE and dba AA FRIEND AUTO INSURANCE, ASIM DIDARALI,
INDIVIDUALLY, and RUBINA DIDARALI, INDIVIDUALLY, Case No.
4:19-cv-04574 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 21, 2019), is brought as a
collective action to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages, and attorneys' fees owed to the Plaintiffs and other
similarly situated employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs, who routinely worked more than 40 hours per
workweek, were not paid one and one-half times their regular hourly
rate for hours worked over 40 hours per workweek, says the
complaint. Rather, the Plaintiffs were paid the same hourly rate
for all hours worked.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Company in various locations as
customer service clerks.

Ashish Holdings, LLC, dba A-One Bonds & More and dba AA Friend Auto
Insurance, provides automobile title bonds and various forms of
insurance.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark Siurek, Esq.
          Patricia Haylon, Esq.
          WARREN & SIUREK, L.L.P.
          3334 Richmond Ave., Suite 100
          Houston, TX 77098
          Phone: 713-522-0066
          Fax: 713-522-9977
          Email: thaylon@warrensiurek.com
                 msiurek@warrensiurek.com


AUTOVEST LLC: Court Dismisses Frank FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
issued a Memorandum Opinion granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case captioned PHYLLIS FRANK, et al., Plaintiffs,
v. AUTOVEST, LLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Case No. 17-2773 (RJL)
(D.D. C.).

Phyllis Frank brings this putative class action against Autovest,
LLC (Autovest) and Michael Andrews & Associates (MAA) for actual
and statutory damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA). Frank claims that Autovest and MAA violated the FDCPA in a
debt-collection action initiated by Autovest against her.  

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Material facts are those
that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.
A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. The court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in
her favor, and eschew making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.

To establish a claim under the FDCPA, a private plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the defendant is a debt collector (2) who took
an action in connection with the collection of a debt and (3) the
action violated the substantive proscriptions in those provisions.

Frank alleges that defendants violated the FDCPA in the underlying
Collections Action by misrepresenting that Autovest was assigned
the Contract, by using a false verification and false affidavit to
seek default judgment against Frank, and by attempting to collect
contingency-based attorneys' fees.

Defendants contend that summary judgment in their favor is
warranted as to all of Frank's claims because none of the alleged
misrepresentations were misleading.

The Court agrees.

Assignment of the Loan

Frank first claims defendants misrepresented that FIFS assigned the
Contract to Autovest because FIFS in fact assigned the contract to
FIAR.This theory fails on the evidence alone. As the record shows,
FIFS initially assigned the Contract to FIAR, and FIAR subsequently
reassigned the Contract back to FIFS in May 2016. FIFS then
assigned the Contract to Autovest. Frank does not, and could not,
seriously dispute this chain of events. Instead, she points to the
fact that FIFS securitized the loan before assigning it to
Autovest.  

But that, of course, has nothing to do with whether Autovest owned
the loan when it sought to collect Frank's outstanding debt. Nor
can Frank reasonably claim she was unaware of the assignment to
Autovest at the time of the Collections Action.

Accordingly, Autovest's representations that it was the assignee of
FIFS were not misleading, and Frank's claimed violation on that
basis cannot survive summary judgment.

Undaunted, Frank attempts to reframe this claim in her summary
judgment papers, arguing that Autovest's representations in the
underlying Collections Action were misleading because Autovest
failed to report the Contract's complete chain of title.

To say the least, the Court is similarly unpersuaded by Frank's
revamped claim. Nowhere in her Amended Complaint did Frank suggest
that Deuman's affidavit was misleading because it failed to include
the complete chain of title or otherwise describe the
securitization of Frank's loan. But even considering Frank's new
theory at summary judgment, her claim does not survive because
Deuman's affidavit is not misleading.  

The Dunn Verification and the Deuman Affidavit

Frank next asserts that defendants' statements in two pleadings in
the Collections Action give rise to FDCPA liability. Frank points
to (1) the verification attached to Autovest's collections
complaint against Frank and (2) the affidavit attached to
Autovest's motion for default judgment. She argues that the
verification and the affidavit are misleading because Dunn and
Deuman claimed to be employees of Autovest, when they were in fact
employees of MAA.  

Both of those documents, however, contain, at most, false
non-material statements that are not actionable under the FDCPA.
Whether Dunn and Deuman were employed by Autovest or MAA had no
effect on Frank's ability to respond to or dispute the debt sought
in the Collections Action. Dunn and Deuman were seeking to collect
the unpaid balance of Frank's loan on behalf of Autovest. Even
assuming representations about Dunn's and Deuman's employer were
false, they were the type of mere technical falsehoods that mislead
no one and do not give rise to FDCPA liability.

Frank's arguments to the contrary are, not surprisingly,
unconvincing. She first contends that Dunn and Deuman
misrepresented the identity of the debt collector by stating they
were employed by Autovest.  

But Frank conflates two separate issues. Defendants accurately
represented that Autovest was the debt collector, and statements
about Dunn's and Deuman's employer do not contradict or undermine
that representation. Frank next contends that she was not confused
by what debt was at issue, but to whom it was owed. That claim is
contradicted by the record. Frank answered Autovest's complaint,
objecting to any judgment against her because, in her view, she was
not properly notified of the sale of her vehicle in 2015.
  
Nowhere did she dispute the nature of the debt or its amount, let
alone express any confusion as to what Autovest was or why it was
seeking to collect on her debt.

Against this backdrop, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum Opinion  is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y2pv34nd
from Leagle.com.

PHYLLIS FRANK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Dean Gregory , LAW OFFICES OF
DEAN GREGORY, 129 N Lafayette Street, South Lyon, MI 48178

AUTOVEST, LLC & MICHAEL ANDREWS & ASSOCIATES, Defendants,
represented by Eric N. Heyer
- Eric.Heyer@ThompsonHine.com - THOMPSON HINE LLP, Jessica E.
Salisbury-Copper Jessica.Salisbury -Copper@ThompsonHine.com -
THOMPSON HINE LLP, pro hac vice & Scott A. King , THOMPSON HINE
LLP, pro hac vice.

B RILEY FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Freedman Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
B. Riley Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a putative class action suit entitled, Freedman
v. magicJack VocalTec Ltd. et al., Case 9-17-cv-80940.

On August 11, 2017, a putative class action lawsuit titled Freedman
v. magicJack VocalTec Ltd. et al., Case 9-17-cv-80940, was filed
against magicJack and its Board of Directors in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Case No:
9:17-cv-80940-RLR).

On September 30, 2019, the court determined that oral arguments
will be required for this matter.

The Company cannot estimate the amount of potential liability, if
any, that could arise from this matter.

B. Riley Financial, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides
collaborative financial services and solutions in North America,
Australia, and Europe. The company operates in four segments:
Capital Markets, Auction and Liquidation, Valuation and Appraisal,
and Principal Investments - United Online and magicJack. The
company was formerly known as Great American Group, Inc. and
changed its name to B. Riley Financial, Inc. in November 2014. B.
Riley Financial, Inc. was founded in 1973 and is headquartered in
Woodland Hills, California.


B RILEY FINANCIAL: Mediation in Suit v. MLV Fails
-------------------------------------------------
B. Riley Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the mediation in
the class action suit against MLV & Co. produced no settlement.

On January 5, 2017, complaints filed in November 2015 and May 2016
naming MLV & Co. ("MLV"), a broker-dealer subsidiary of FBR, as a
defendant in putative class action lawsuits alleging claims under
the Securities Act, in connection with the offerings of Miller
Energy Resources, Inc. have been consolidated.

The Master Consolidated Complaint, styled Gaynor v. Miller et al.,
is pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee, and, like its predecessor complaints,
continues to allege claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the
Securities Act against nine underwriters for alleged material
misrepresentations and omissions in the registration statement and
prospectuses issued in connection with six offerings (February 13,
2013; May 8, 2013; June 28, 2013; September 26, 2013; October 17,
2013 (as to MLV only) and August 21, 2014) with an alleged
aggregate offering price of approximately $151,000.

Court ordered mediation before a federal magistrate took place on
August 6, 2019, with no resolution.

B. Riley Financial, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides
collaborative financial services and solutions in North America,
Australia, and Europe. The company operates in four segments:
Capital Markets, Auction and Liquidation, Valuation and Appraisal,
and Principal Investments - United Online and magicJack. The
company was formerly known as Great American Group, Inc. and
changed its name to B. Riley Financial, Inc. in November 2014. B.
Riley Financial, Inc. was founded in 1973 and is headquartered in
Woodland Hills, California.


CBL CORP: Faces Second Shareholder Class Action
-----------------------------------------------
LawFuel reports that the litigation funders are fighting to battle
CBL Corp, with the 'first-up-best-dressed' contender being
Australian-based IMF Bentham, but now local heavyweight LPF Group
has joined the fray with even more heavyweight institutional
backing.

The second class action against CBL Corp and its directors has been
launched with the support of the company's largest, institutional
shareholder, Harbour Asset Management, along with Argo Investments
and brokers Forsyth Barr.

The first action, reported by LawFuel, was taken by Glaister Ennor,
supported by Australian-based funder IMF Bentham, although the
chances of two actions against the same 'target' is unlikely, as
LPF's Phil Newland says.

The CBL collapse is one of the largest in New Zealand, as Harbour
Asset Management Managing Director Andrew Bascand said.

It is also apparent that the directors withdrew considerable sums
of money from the company prior to the collapse.

CBL, which had a market value of $747 million when its shares were
suspended from trading on NZX and ASX in February 2018, listed in
2015 after raising $125.3 million from a float with 80.9 million
shares sold at $1.55 each. The shares were valued at $3.17 when
trading on NZX was suspended.

"Shareholders have lost everything. The directors of CBL need to be
held to account and the out-of-pocket shareholders must be
compensated," Bascand says.

"Legal action is the only way shareholders can get any money
back."

"We want to know what the facts were and we probably have heard
less than half the story."

Asked how much his action is seeking, Newland says that will depend
on how many CBL shareholders sign up and how much money each has
lost.

"Our focus is on the losses that the shareholders have
occasioned."

Of the shares sold in the IPO, 22.8 million worth about $35.3
million were existing shares. In April 2017, directors Peter Harris
and Alistair Hutchison and other senior managers sold 20 million
shares for $3.26 each, or $65.2 million.

While the IMP Bentham-backed suit has engaged Philip Skelton, QC,
as their barrister, the LPF-backed suit has engaged Justin Smith,
QC Mike Colson and Jonathan Orpin-Dowell and law firm Meredith
Connell as their solicitors.

Skelton has been arguing the class action against Southern Response
on behalf of Brendan and Colleen Ross, who are represented by
solicitor Grant Cameron of GCA Lawyers.

Both the CBL cases are expected to proceed on an opt-in basis. The
LPF-backed group say those who have already signed up to the IMF
Bentham-backed case can opt out within 21 days if they wish to join
their action.

Meredith Connell partner Fionnghuala Cuncannon says the suit
against the CBL directors will claim there were false or misleading
statements in the IPO documents and then ongoing breaches of the
continuous disclosure obligations.

In February 2018, CBL revealed the Reserve Bank had been
questioning its solvency for some time, certainly since July 2017,
but that it had been bound by the central bank's confidentiality
order from telling the market any earlier. [GN]


CENTURYLINK INC: Masales Sues Over Failure to Protect PII
---------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Masales and Patricia Masales, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. CENTURYLINK, INC. and
MONGODB, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-02750-JZ (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 21,
2019), is brought against the Defendants for their failure to
protect the Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information.

CenturyLink maintains personally identifiable information ("PII")
of its customers, including customers' names, e-mail addresses,
phone numbers, physical addresses, the contents of their e-mail
correspondence, and other account-specific information. As of at
least November 17, 2018, CenturyLink stored some or all of the PII
it maintained in a database created, operated, and controlled by
MongoDB.

On September 15, 2019, security researcher Bob Diachenko discovered
that the Database "was made publicly available such that no
authentication was required to access it."

Although "Diachenko notified CenturyLink" of the Security Flaw that
same day, "the database had already been exposed for many
months"--approximately 10 months in total. This would have given
malicious parties more than ample time to use the data in various
schemes, the Plaintiffs contend.

The Defendants' failures to adopt, implement, maintain, and enforce
proper data security policies and procedures resulted in the
Plaintiffs' and other similarly situated individuals' PII being
improperly disclosed to unauthorized third-parties, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs are natural persons and residents and citizens of
Fulton County, Ohio.

CenturyLink is a global technology company "that provides
residential, business, and enterprise customers with a variety of
products and services, including internet, phone, cable TV, cloud
solutions, and security".[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Marc E. Dann, Esq.
          Brian D. Flick, Esq.
          DANNLAW
          P.O. Box. 6031040
          Cleveland, OH 44103
          Office: (216) 373-0539
          Facsimile: (216) 373-0536
          Email: notices@dannlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Office: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          Email: tom@attorneyzim.com
                 matt@attorneyzim.com


CHARLES RIVER: Fails to Pay Overtime Wage Under FLSA, Matson Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kathleen Matson, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
v. CHARLES RIVER LABORATORIES, INC., Case No. 1:19-cv-02747 (N.D.
Ohio, Nov. 21, 2019), challenges the Defendant's policies and
practices that violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as
the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act.

The Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee under the FLSA and the
OMFWSA, who routinely worked 40 or more hours per workweek.
However, even though the Plaintiff and those similarly situated
were required to enter all of their hours worked into the
Defendant's timekeeping system, the Defendant did not pay them for
all hours worked, the Plaintiff alleges.

The Defendant's failure to properly pay her has resulted in her
being denied overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess
of 40 hours in a workweek, Ms. Matson asserts.

The Plaintiff is an adult individual residing in Huron County,
Ohio, and was employed by the Defendant.

The Defendant is a for-profit Delaware corporation that is
registered to conduct business in Ohio as a Foreign
Corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Phone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
                 sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey J. Moyle, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          614 W. Superior Ave., Suite 1148
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Phone: 216.230.2955
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          Email: jmoyle@ohlaborlaw.com


CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION: Wins Summary Judgment in Royalties Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division issued a Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment in the case captioned DALE H.
HENCEROTH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L.L.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 4:15CV2591 (N.D. Ohio).

The named Plaintiffs, Dale H. Henceroth and Marilyn S. Wendt, along
with eight others brought suit against Defendant Chesapeake
Exploration, L.L.C. (CELLC) for breach of contract arising from
CELLC's alleged underpayment of oil and gas royalties because
Defendant paid the royalties on the wrong price.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party
is not required to file affidavits or other similar materials
negating a claim on which its opponent bears the burden of proof,
so long as the movant relies upon the absence of the essential
element in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file. The moving party must "show that the
non-moving party has failed to establish an essential element of
his case upon which he would bear the ultimate burden of proof at
trial.

Plaintiff's motion presents three issues.

First, whether the gas is marketed at the well to CEMLLC or only in
the sale to third-party buyers in downstream markets.

Second, whether CELLC realizes the wellhead price or the
third-party price.

Third, whether costs can be deducted from the price paid by the
third-party buyers. The dispute is over when the oil and gas is
marketed and what revenue is realized as those terms are used in
section 5(B) of the Class Leases.  

According to Plaintiffs, the only products marketed are the
products marketed to the third-party buyers and the only revenues
paid to CEMLLC is the real cash paid by the third-party buyers.
Plaintiffs contend that CELLC paid their royalties on the wrong
price. This claim arises from the two-step manner in which CELLC
markets and sells oil and gas that it produces in Ohio.

According to Plaintiffs, CELLC's Trial Balance confirms that CELLC
receives the gross proceeds paid by the third-party buyers.
Plaintiffs cite the deposition testimony of Megan Martin,
designated by CELLC in this case as its Rule 30(b)(6) witness on
the Trial Balance, that the gross revenue paid by the third-party
buyers is received by Defendant, distributed to Defendant, and
recorded to Defendant.

Plaintiffs argue the netback or wellhead price is never paid
because it is merely an account receivable on a general accounting
ledger showing a debt owed by CEMLLC to CELLC. According to
Plaintiffs, the royalties must be paid on revenue actually realized
on a marketed product. It cannot be a debt. In other words, it
cannot be money owed. And the only revenue realized is the real
cash paid by the third-party buyers to CEMLLC.  

Plaintiffs also argue that the downstream price must be used
because the Class Leases require that the royalties be paid on
products that are marketed and there is no marketing in the
transaction at the well.  

Finally, Plaintiffs argue costs can not be deducted from the price
paid by the third-party buyers.  

Meanwhile, Defendant's motion presents the issue of whether CELLC
paid royalties consistent with the Class Leases.

The Court concludes that it did. Defendant paid one-eighth of the
net proceeds realized. The lease language is plain and unambiguous
and the evidentiary record is clear: CELLC, the Lessee, paid
Plaintiffs 1/8th of the proceeds it received from the sale of the
oil and gas produced and marketed from the leaseholds. CELLC sells
the oil and gas at the wellhead to CEMLLC pursuant to Ohio Rev.
Code Section 1302.01(A)(11), receives a netback price from CEMLLC
for those sales, and paid Plaintiffs 1/8th of those proceeds,
without taking any deductions from the proceeds realized from
CEMLLC. That is exactly what the parties negotiated for in section
5(B) of the Class Leases.

Plaintiffs do not dispute CELLC's lease interpretation. Instead,
Plaintiffs argue that there are facts in dispute and improperly
seek to have the Court interpret the Class Leases to mean
Plaintiffs receive proceeds from the sale by CEMLLC to third-party
purchasers downstream from the leasehold, rather than the proceeds
the Lessee, CELLC, received from the sale of the oil and gas at the
leasehold. But, there are no genuine, material facts in dispute.
CELCC marketed, sold, and transferred title to the oil and gas to
CEMLLC at or near the wellhead; it received proceeds from CEMLLC
based on a netback price; and it did not take any deductions from
the proceeds it received from the sale to CEMLLC.

CELLC is paid only the netback price from CEMLLC, not the
third-party price.

Defendant correctly notes that Plaintiffs' factual and legal
arguments have been rejected at the summary judgment stage by an
Ohio trial court and by two arbitration panels, notes the Court.

In Gateway Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., No.
2017CVH28970 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Carroll Cty. July 15, 2019), the
state court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in a
case with similar facts to the case at bar. It construed Ohio
contracts under Ohio law and concluded CELLC's method of
calculating royalties, under substantially similar lease language,
was proper and Gateway Royalty's argument that material facts were
in dispute was rejected. The court found that Gateway Royalty is
paid royalties based upon the price that CELLC receives in its sale
of the gas to CEMLLC.  

For these reasons, the Court agrees with Defendant's interpretation
of how payment of oil and gas royalties are to be calculated and
then paid to Plaintiffs. Therefore, there is no breach of contract.
The Court grants Defendant's motion, and denies Plaintiffs'
motion.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Clarification of Answer at
Hearing is granted.

Final judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant and against
the Class on the Second Amended Class Action Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y4y2l432
from Leagle.com.

Dale H. Henceroth & Marilyn S. Wendt, Plaintiffs, represented by
Mark A. Hutson , 20 South Main Street Columbiana, Ohio 44408,
Robert L. Guehl -RGuehlEsq@Gmail.com - Guehl Law Office, Robert C.
Sanders & James Allison Lowe , Lowe, Eklund & Wakefield, 1660 West
Second Street, 610 Skylight Office Tower, Cleveland, Ohio44113

Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, Defendant, represented by Alexandra I.
Russell - alexandra.russell@kirkland.com - Kirkland & Ellis, Alexia
R. Brancato - alexia.brancato@kirkland.com - Kirkland & Ellis,
Andrew P. Guran - apguran@vorys.com - Vorys, Sater, Seymour &
Pease, Daniel T. Donovan - daniel.donovan@kirkland.com - Kirkland &
Ellis, Peter A. Lusenhop -  palusenhop@vorys.com - Vorys, Sater,
Seymour & Pease, Ragan Naresh - ragan.naresh@kirkland.com -
Kirkland & Ellis, Seamus C. Duffy , Drinker Biddle & Reath, Timothy
B. McGranor - tbmcgranor@vorys.com - Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease
& William M. Connolly - william.connolly dbr.com - Drinker Biddle &
Reath.

CHRISTMAS TREE SHOPS: Delacruz Files ADA Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
Christmas Tree Shops, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Emanuel Delacruz, on Behalf Of Himself And All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Christmas Tree Shops, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-10711 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

Christmas Tree Shops is an American retail chain that began in
Yarmouth Port, Massachusetts, in 1970 as a complex of three small
stores. The chain's founders were Doreen and Charles
Bilezikian.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com



CITIGROUP INC: Bid to Dismiss Mexican Govt. Bonds Suit Granted
--------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc.said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that in the consolidated
action captioned IN RE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT BONDS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, the court has granted defendants' motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint.

The Court entered its order on September 30, 2019.

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions in North America, Latin
America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The company
operates through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). Citigroup Inc. was founded in
1812 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


CITIGROUP INC: Settlement in Contant Litig. Wins Initial Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Citigroup Inc.said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that in the case,
CONTANT, ET AL. v. BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, ET AL., the court
has granted preliminary approval to the settlement between
plaintiffs and Citigroup, Citibank, Citicorp, and Citigroup Global
Markets Inc. (CGMI).

The approval order was entered on July 29, 2019.

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company,
provides various financial products and services for consumers,
corporations, governments, and institutions in North America, Latin
America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The company
operates through two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and
Institutional Clients Group (ICG). Citigroup Inc. was founded in
1812 and is headquartered in New York, New York.


COLLECTION BUREAU: Wilson Files FDCPA Suit in NY under FDCPA
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Collection Bureau of
the Hudson Valley, Inc. The case is styled as Amy H. Wilson,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Collection Bureau of the Hudson Valley, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06526 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Collection Bureau of Hudson Valley, Inc. (CBHV) is a third-party
collection agency based in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com


CONDE NAST: Granillo Suit Moved to Southern District of California
------------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Saul Granillo and Jennifer Fite
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. Conde Nast Entertainment LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, and Does 1-50, Defendants, Case No.
37-02019-00051411-CU-BT-CTL, was removed from the California
Superior Court, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California (San Diego) on Nov. 1, 2019.

The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-02104-BEN-JLB to the proceeding. The suit is assigned to
the Hon. Judge Roger T. Benitez.

Conde Nast is an American mass media company founded in 1909 by
Conde Montrose Nast, based at One World Trade Center in Manhattan
and owned by Advance Publications.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Zachariah Paul Dostart, Esq.
          DOSTART HANNINK COVENEY LLP
          4180 La Jolla Village Drive, Suite 530
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Telephone: (858) 623-4200
          Facsimile: (858) 623-4299
          E-mail: zdostart@sdlaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Peter Zlomke Stockburger, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          4655 Executive Drive, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (619) 595-8018
          Facsimile: (619) 232-8311
          E-mail: Peter.Stockburger@dentons.com


CORDUA RESTAURANTS: Faegre Baker Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gustavo Jimenez, Esq. -- gustavo.jimenez@FaegreBD.com -- of Faegre
Baker Daniels, in an article for JDSupra, report that on August 14,
2019, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a decision
in Cordua Restaurants, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 43, expanding upon the
U.S. Supreme Court's Epic Systems v. Lewis ruling last year
regarding collective actions and mandatory arbitration agreements.

Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Epic Systems held
that agreements with class action and collective action waivers do
not violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and any
disputes arising out of the employment relationship must be
resolved through individual arbitration. Thus, the Court stated
that arbitration agreements are to be enforced as written under the
Federal Arbitration Act.

Since the Epic Systems decision, the NLRB has dismissed complaints
alleging that employers unlawfully maintained or enforced
arbitration agreements requiring employees to waive their rights to
pursue employment disputes through a class or collective action as
a condition of employment.

The NLRB made two additional interpretations to the Supreme Court
decision in Cordua Restaurants. First, the NLRB determined that the
NLRA does not prohibit employers from promulgating class action
waivers in response to Section 7 activity. This is because the
Court stated in Epic Systems that Section 7 did nothing to address
the question of class and collective actions. In addition, the NLRB
reasoned that when an employee chooses to opt into a collective
action, that employee is merely taking a procedural step to
participate in a collective action. Thus, an arbitration agreement
prohibiting employees from opting into a collective action does
nothing to restrict their exercise of Section 7 rights. The NLRB
differentiated this from circumstances when an employer promulgates
an unlawful rule that does restrict its employees' protected
activities, such as implementing a rule prohibiting all
solicitation on nonworking time.

The promulgation of the revised arbitration agreement in Cordua
Restaurants required employees to agree not to opt into a
collective action and, instead, resolve their employment-related
claims through individual arbitration. Thus, the NLRB found that
the revised arbitration agreement was lawful.

Additionally, the NLRB found that the NLRA allows employers to
discipline employees who refuse to sign a mandatory arbitration
agreement. Epic Systems allows an employer to condition employment
on signing an arbitration agreement containing class or
collective-action waivers. In Cordua Restaurants, the assistant
manager distributed a revised arbitration agreement and told
employees they would be removed from the schedule if they refused
to sign it. Thus, the NLRB found that no unlawful threats were made
to the employees. Rather, the statements were lawful expressions of
the consequences imposed on employees for failing to sign the
agreement.

In the wake of the recent Supreme Court case, only time will tell
how the NLRB continues to apply this interpretation. [GN]


CURALEAF HOLDINGS: Lead Counsel Numbers Narrowed to Two
-------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that the lead counsel tussle in a proposed class
action against cannabis giant Curaleaf Holdings Inc. has been
winnowed down to two firms, with Levi & Korsinsky LLP and Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP edging out four other
competitors for the reins in a cannabidiol labeling stock drop
case. [GN]



DESTINY MATERNITY: Wu Files Suit in New York under ADA
------------------------------------------------------
Destiny Maternity Corporation is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Kathy Wu, on behalf of herself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Destiny Maternity Corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06537 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

Destination Maternity Corporation is a designer and retailer of
maternity apparel. It is based in Moorestown, New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
   100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 208
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 695-0052
   Fax: (516) 706-4692
   Email: ds@lawsolo.net



DOLLAR TREE: Can Compel Arbitration in Snipes Discrimination Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TERRY T. SNIPES, SR., an individual, Plaintiff, v.
DOLLAR TREE DISTRIBUTION, INC., a Virginia corporation, and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-00878-MCE-DB
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of California granted the
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Amend Operative Class
Definition.

Through the present class action, Snipes, on behalf of himself and
those similarly situated, challenges various wage and hour
practices utilized by his employer, Dollar Tree.

Dollar Tree initiated an arbitration program for prospective
employees approximately five years ago.  In May of 2015, the
program was expanded to include current employees.  At that time,
current employees were given an opportunity to either opt out or
enter into an arbitration agreement with the Defendant.  As to any
new individuals hired on or after Oct. 6, 2014, however, Dollar
Tree required an agreement to arbitrate as a condition of
employment.

In the meantime, on April 1, 2015, Snipes, an existing Dollar Tree
employee who had chosen to opt out of the arbitration program,
brought the first eight causes of action against the Defendant on a
class-wide basis pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
In the Ninth through Sixteenth causes of action, Snipes also sought
civil penalties against Dollar Tree pursuant to the provisions of
California's Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA").

The following month, on May 11, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an Ex
Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") seeking
to compel Dollar Tree to distribute an informational notice of the
present lawsuit to all its employees.  At the May 21, 2015, hearing
on the TRO, Defendant differentiated between those employees hired
before Oct. 6, 2014, who were given an opportunity to opt out of
the arbitration agreements, and the Arbitration Associates.  The
Plaintiffs were concerned with whether arbitration agreements would
be enforced against those employees hired before Oct. 6, 2014.  In
order to eliminate concern, the Defendant agreed not to enforce any
arbitration agreement entered into by employees hired prior to that
time.  The Plaintiffs acknowledged the Defendant's agreement and as
such, the Court denied the TRO.  According to Dollar Tree, as
discovery proceeded it believed both sides recognized that the
Arbitration Associates were not included within the class of
employees participating in the lawsuit.

The Plaintiffs eventually moved to certify the class and subclasses
to be included as litigants.  On Nov. 28, 2017, the Court granted
that Motion and certified the Plaintiffs' classes.  The Defendant
then moved to reconsider the class certification on Sept. 17, 2018,
and that motion was denied.

Dollar Tree now moves to enforce the arbitration agreements as to
the Arbitration Associates.  It further moves to amend the
operative class definitions to exclude the Arbitration Associates
from the class and subclasses to account for enforcement of those
agreements.

First, Judge England holds that the Plaintiffs' attempt to compare
the case to cases where an employer withheld notice of a lawsuit to
induce current employees to sign an arbitration agreement fails.
Those cases are distinguishable from the present matter, where
prospective employees were required to agree to arbitrate before
being hired.  The Plaintiffs' argument incorrectly presupposes that
new applicants were subject to the same rights as existing
employees who worked for Dollar Tree during the time of the alleged
damages and already subject to the wage and hour deprivations
alleged by the class action.  The Defendant's failure to provide
notice of the present action does not invalidate their agreements
because the Arbitration Associates were not employed by Dollar Tree
at the time and thus could not be party to the claims associated
with this suit.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.

Having determined that an enforceable arbitration agreement is in
place between Dollar Tree and the Arbitration Associates, the Judge
must next consider whether that agreement covers the particular
controversy at issue.  He finds that the Plaintiffs' lawsuit was
commenced on April 1, 2015, a point in time after the specified
cut-off of Feb. 23, 2015 specified in the FAQs, and consequently
the FAQs do not exempt the Arbitration Associates from being
subject to arbitration in the present matter.  As such, claims of
the Arbitration Associates are subject to individual arbitration
and the Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration is thus granted.

Given the foregoing conclusion, the class definitions must also be
modified.  Since the Arbitration Associates must arbitrate their
claims, they are not subjected to the class claims alleged.
Consequently, the proposed class definition is overbroad.  The
Plaintiffs' definition fails to limit the class and subclasses to
those employees hired after Oct. 6, 2014 whose employment was
conditioned on signing an agreement to arbitrate.  Accordingly, to
properly narrow the class and subclasses, the introductory
paragraph of the class definitions for Classes 1-6 are modified to
reflect that they pertain only to current and former nonexempt
employees of Dollar Tree Distribution Inc. who did not enter into a
Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims with Dollar Tree on or after
Oct. 6, 2014.

For the reasons he stated, Judge England granted the Defendant's
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Amend Operative Class Definitions
as follows with respect to each class member identified in Appendix
A and Appendix B of the Defendant's Notice of Motion:

     A. Pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. section 3, as to the class
members identified in Appendix A:

          a. Each is compelled to arbitrate, in the manner provided
by his or her Arbitration Agreement with Dollar Tree, the first
through eighth claims for relief asserted in the operative
complaint, which will be initiated within 90 days of the Order,
should the class member so choose; and

          b. The ninth through seventeenth claims for relief
asserted in the operative complaint are dismissed.

     B. Pursuant to the FAA, 9 U.S.C. section 3, as to the class
members identified in Appendix B:

          a. Each is compelled to arbitrate, in the manner provided
by his or her Arbitration Agreement with Dollar Tree, the first
through eighth claims for relief asserted in the operative
complaint arising on or after Oct. 6, 2014, to be initiated within
90 days of the Order granting this Motion, should the class member
so choose; and

          b. The ninth through seventeenth claims for relief for
civil penalties arising on or after Oct. 6, 2014, are dismissed.  
Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority and broad discretion to
modify class definitions and as a consequence of other portions of
the Order, the introductory paragraph of class definitions for
Classes 1 through 6 is hereby amended from: "All current and former
nonexempt employees of Dollar Tree Distribution Inc. who at any
time within four (4) years preceding the filing of this action" to
read "All current and former nonexempt employees of Dollar Tree
Distribution Inc. (who did not enter into a Mutual Agreement to
Arbitrate Claims with Dollar Tree on or after October 6, 2014) who
at any time within four (4) years preceding the filing of this
action."

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/F7UMwe from Leagle.com.

Terry T. Snipes, Plaintiff, represented by Anthony Eugene Guzman
--
anthony@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation.  Terry T.
Snipes, Plaintiff, represented by S. Brett Sutton --
brett@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC, Jared
Hague -- jared@suttonhague.com -- Sutton Hague Law Corporation, PC
& Joseph Vidal Macias -- joseph.macias@maxmintegrated.com --
Sutton
Hague Law Corporation, PC.

Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey
J. Mann -- jmann@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C., Kurt R.
Bockes -- kbockes@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
Lindbergh
Porter, Jr. -- lporter@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Elena R.
Baca -- elenabacca@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, George
W.
Abele, Paul Hastings LLP & Ryan David Derry --
ryanderry@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP.


DYNASTY GUNITE: Fails to Pay Proper Overtime Wages, Botelho Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JASON BOTELHO, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. DYNASTY GUNITE POOLS, LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-12160-IT
(D. Mass., Oct. 21, 2019), alleges that in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Defendant does not pay its construction
workers, including the Plaintiff, overtime compensation until they
hit more than 45 hours in a workweek, even though they should be
paid for overtime compensation for hours in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.

Dynasty Gunite Pools, LLC, is a limited liability company based in
Swansea, Massachusetts.  Dynasty does business in Massachusetts,
Connecticut and Rhode Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW, L.L.C.
          43 Danbury Road, 3rd Floor
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Telephone: (203) 653-2250
          Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
          E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com


FEDERAL NATIONAL: E.D. Tenn Accepts Bank. Ct. Ruling in Cawood Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION and
SETERUS, INC., Defendants/Appellants, v. JOSEPH C. CAWOOD,
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 1:17-cv-357 (E.D. Tenn.), came before
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee, Chattanooga from the Bankruptcy Court.
Defendants/Appellants, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
and Seterus, Inc. (Seterus), object to the Bankruptcy Court's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on their motions
to dismiss the adversary proceeding filed against them by
Plaintiff/Appellee, Joseph C. Cawood.

The background of the case notes that the Plaintiff bought a house
in Cleveland, Tennessee, in 2004, obtaining a loan from SunTrust
Mortgage, Inc. (SunTrust). The loan was secured by a deed of trust.
Plaintiff moved to Texas. He fell behind on his loan payments in
2008, and SunTrust instituted foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff
filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition (the Texas Case)
in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas on May
12, 2008, to stop the foreclosure. The Texas Case was completed on
May 31, 2013. The Texas Court granted the trustee's June 2013
motion deeming the mortgage current and directing Plaintiff to make
future loan payments directly to SunTrust. Plaintiff received a
discharge from the Texas Court on July 8, 2013.

Plaintiff made loan payments to SunTrust for June, July, August,
and September 2013. In October 2013, Seterus sent Plaintiff a
letter informing him that Seterus had become the servicer of the
loan on behalf of FNMA. The letter stated that there was unpaid
interest of $2,591.62 and an escrow overdraft of $745.33 on the
loan. Seterus also returned Plaintiff's September payment.
Plaintiff made his October 2013 payment to Seterus as instructed.
He also retained counsel, who wrote to Seterus in November 2013,
resubmitting Plaintiff's September 2013 payment and enclosing a
copy of the order from the Texas Case deeming the loan current.

Between October 2013 and August 2014, certain patterns repeated.
Plaintiff submitted all of his payments to Seterus, Seterus
returned certain payments, and Plaintiff resubmitted them. Seterus
sent multiple letters to Plaintiff claiming the loan was in default
and discussing new payment amounts, a possible loan modification,
and the institution of foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff's counsel
sent multiple letters telling Seterus to check the records from the
Texas Case, asserting that Plaintiff had made all of his payments
since the Texas Case on time, and asserting that foreclosure would
violate the orders of the Texas Court. Seterus responded with
letters saying the matter was under investigation.

Foreclosure was scheduled and advertised for August 14, 2014. In
order to stop the sale, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 petition on
August 12, 2014, in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Tennessee, to which Petitioner had returned. Seterus filed an
objection to confirmation on the grounds that Plaintiff's plan did
not account for arrearages to Seterus of more than $7,000.

Plaintiff filed the adversary proceeding on August 11, 2015,
against FNMA, Seterus, SunTrust, and other entities allegedly
involved in the planned foreclosure. His First Amended Complaint
seeks individual and class-action relief. He asserts causes of
action for (1) an objection to Seterus's claim; (2) breach of
contract; (3) intentional or negligent misrepresentation; (4)
negligence; (5) failure to credit payments in violation of 15
U.S.C. Section 1639f; and (6) violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Seterus and FNMA each filed a motion to dismiss on July 8, 2016.
Seterus argued the Bankruptcy Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff's claims for individual relief
because they are attempts to enforce the discharge injunction from
the Texas Case, and a contempt action for violation of a discharge
injunction can only be heard in the court that issued the
injunction. Similarly, Seterus argued for dismissal of the
class-action claims as attempts to enforce discharge injunctions of
other courts. In the alternative, it argued the Complaint fails to
state valid claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FNMA's motion sought dismissal on the
grounds that the Complaint does not contain any factual allegations
of misconduct by FNMA. In the alternative, FNMA adopted Seterus's
arguments for dismissal. The Bankruptcy Court heard oral argument
on the motions to dismiss on September 20, 2016.

The Bankruptcy Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on
September 29, 2017, which constitute the Bankruptcy Court's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for this Court's
review.

Defendants objected to the Bankruptcy Court's proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law on October 27, 2017. Defendants
objected only as to the Bankruptcy Court's proposed conclusion that
it has subject-matter jurisdiction over Counts Two through Six and
the class-action allegations. They do not object to the Bankruptcy
Court's proposed conclusions as to subject-matter jurisdiction over
the core claim in Count One or as to whether Plaintiff's various
counts state claims on which relief may be granted.


STANDARD OF REVIEW

A bankruptcy judge may hear a matter and submit proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law to the district court if the
proceeding is not a core proceeding but is otherwise related to a
case under title 11. The district court may enter a final order or
judgment after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings
and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which
any party has timely and specifically objected.

The Allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint

Defendants point first to the Complaint's allegation that one of
Seterus's letters to Plainitff said Plaintiff owed $3,000 in
arrears not paid in his prior Chapter 13 case. Defendants cite no
legal authority binding a plaintiff to a factual assertion in a
letter from a defendant, merely because the plaintiff describes
that letter in the complaint.

Defendants also point to the Complaint's multiple allegations about
letters Plaintiff's counsel sent to Seterus claiming that the
foreclosure action is in direct violation of the Bankruptcy Order.
These were statements Plaintiff's own counsel allegedly made before
the Complaint was filed, when trying to persuade Defendants that
they should not foreclose on Plaintiff's deed of trust. Similarly
to the preceding argument, Defendants cite no legal authority
binding Plaintiff to legal theories he advanced before the
litigation was filed. On the contrary, even in pleadings, a party
may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically. As Plaintiff argues, these are
seven paragraphs spread throughout the Complaint and multiple
causes of action may be brought under a single set of facts.

Defendants have not shown Plaintiff is bound to the positions his
counsel asserted in his letters to Defendants for purposes of the
causes of action he may allege, no matter how many such letters
there were.

Count Two, for breach of contract, alleges the Defendants breached
the contract created between the parties by the loan documents,
Deed of Trust, and subsequent assignments by commencing a
foreclosure proceeding. Defendants argue this must be a claim for
violation of the discharge injunction and not for breach of
contract, because Plaintiff did not attach copies of the loan
documents to the Complaint, and because Plaintiff did not identify
specific sections of the loan documents Defendants violated.  

The Court disagrees.

A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Plaintiff has done
that here. In the incorporated allegations, he has alleged that his
loan was current as of May 2013 and that he made all of his
subsequent payments, but that Defendants claimed he was in default
and instituted foreclosure proceedings anyway.

This is sufficient as a short and plain statement of facts showing
Plaintiff is entitled to relief for breach of contract.

Count Three, for intentional or negligent misrepresentation,
alleges Defendants made false representations by telling Plaintiff
his loan was in default, publishing the foreclosure sale, objecting
to confirmation of Plaintiff's plan by alleging he was in default,
and ignoring requests for an accounting. Defendants argue every
alleged misrepresentation is grounded in the default that Plaintiff
alleges resulted from the failure to reflect his loan as current as
required by the Texas bankruptcy court.

This argument fails for the same reasons the Court explained as to
Count Two.

Count Four, for negligence, alleges Defendants negligently failed
to properly correct its accounting records to reflect that the
Plaintiff was current on his mortgage upon the completion of the
Texas Case.

Defendants argue that Count Four facially ties to the orders of the
Texas Bankruptcy Court and is premised on the idea that Seterus was
obligated to correct its record based on the Texas Bankruptcy Court
proceeding.

In his response, Plaintiff argues Defendants' negligent handling of
his account is clear from Defendants' months of statements that it
was investigating Plaintiff's account and would explain the
results, which it never did.   

This does not, however, explain how the description of Defendants'
negligence in Count Four is for something other than the failure to
obey the Texas Court's orders. Plaintiff also argues it is clear
Defendants hatched a scheme to target individuals recently released
from Chapter 13 bankruptcies for foreclosure. As Defendants point
out, schemes involve intentional actions, not negligent ones. This
argument also does nothing to separate Plaintiff's allegation of
wrongdoing from the Texas Court's orders. Last, Plaintiff argues
that Defendants did not become interested parties in Plaintiff's
mortgage until after the Texas Case was complete, so their alleged
negligence could not have had anything to do with the Texas Court's
orders. Defendants are correct, however, that they may be held
liable for contempt even though they were not interested parties
while the Texas Case was going on.  Count Four could be read to
allege a violation of the discharge order.

The Court will therefore consider it further in the following
section, regarding whether Plaintiff's loan was included in the
discharge injunction.

Count Five, for failure to credit payments on receipt in violation
of 15 U.S.C. Section 1639f, alleges on information and belief that
SunTrust and Seterus failed to credit payments to Plaintiff's
account as of the date of receipt for the purpose of assessing late
charges to the account. Count Six, for violation of the FDCPA,
alleges Defendants demanded an amount from Plaintiff which is
inaccurate and inflated, and in violation of any contract between
the parties.

Count Six also lists specific actions that allegedly violated
specific provisions of the FDCPA. Defendants allege these counts
also arise out of Defendants' alleged failure to credit Plaintiff
in accordance with the Texas bankruptcy court's order.

This argument fails for the same reasons the Court explained as to
Count Two.

For these reasons, the Court will ACCEPT the Bankruptcy Court's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, DENY Seterus's
motion to dismiss, GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART FNMA's motion to
dismiss, DISMISS Count Six of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint against
FNMA, and REMAND the case to the Bankruptcy Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum is available at  https://tinyurl.com/yxj5qmvu from
Leagle.com.

Federal National Mortgage Association & Seterus, Inc, Appellants,
represented by Austin L. McMullen  -,
amcmullen@bradley.com - Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP & J.
Douglas Minor, Jr. , Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, 200 Clinton
Avenue W, Suite 900 Huntsville, AL 35801, pro hac vice.

Joseph C. Cawood, Appellee, represented by Richard Bradley Banks ,
Richard Banks & Associates, P.C. & Richard L. Banks , Richard Banks
& Associates, P.C.,393 Broad St NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37311.

FITBIT: Dec. 22 Deadline Set to Request for Settlement Payout
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dworken & Bernstein Co. L.P.A. and Bonezzi Switzer Polito & Hupp
Co. L.P.A. remind consumers that they have until December 22, 2019,
to request their $12.50 payment from the Fitbit Class Action
Settlement.

Don't Lose Your $12.50 PAYMENT From The Fitbit Class Action
Settlement.

File your Claim Form by December 22, 2019.

The United States District Court, N.D. California, ordered us to
notify you again of your right to $12.50 from a class action
settlement in Brickman, et al. v. Fitbit, Case No. 3:15-cv-2077.

Over 60,000 people have claimed their money. Don't lose yours.

Questions? Call 1-855-336-4163 or visit
www.SleepDeviceSettlement.com [GN]




FLOOR & DECOR: Securities Litigation Underway in Georgia
--------------------------------------------------------
Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended September 26, 2019, that the class
action suit entitled, Taylor v. Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc., et
al. has been re-captioned as,  In re Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc.
Securities Litigation, No. 1:19-cv-02270-SCJ (N.D. Ga.).

On May 20, 2019, an alleged stockholder of the Company filed a
putative class action lawsuit, Taylor v. Floor & Decor Holdings,
Inc., et al., No. 1:19-cv-02270-SCJ (N.D. Ga.), in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against
the Company and certain of its officers, directors and
stockholders. On August 14, 2019, the Court named a lead plaintiff,
and the case was re-captioned In re Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc.
Securities Litigation, No. 1:19-cv-02270-SCJ (N.D. Ga.).

The operative complaint alleges certain violations of federal
securities laws based on, among other things, purported materially
false and misleading statements and omissions allegedly made by the
Company between May 23, 2018 and August 1, 2018 and seeks class
certification, unspecified monetary damages, costs and attorneys'
fees and equitable relief.

The Company denies the material allegations in this lawsuit, which
is in the early stages and has not yet been certified as a class,
and intends to defend itself vigorously.

Floor & Decor said, "In addition, the Company maintains insurance
that may cover any liability arising out of this litigation up to
the policy limits and subject to meeting certain deductibles and to
other terms and conditions thereof. Estimating an amount or range
of possible losses resulting from litigation proceedings is
inherently difficult, particularly where the matters involve
indeterminate claims for monetary damages and are in the stages of
the proceedings where key factual and legal issues have not been
resolved. For these reasons, we are currently unable to predict the
ultimate timing or outcome of or reasonably estimate the possible
losses or a range of possible losses resulting from this
litigation."

Floor & Decor Holdings, Inc., formerly FDO Holdings, Inc.,
incorporated on October 15, 2010, is a retailer of hard surface
flooring and related accessories. The Company retails its products
such as tile, stone, wood, marble, glass and decoratives. The
company is based in Smyrna, Georgia.


FMT SJ LLC: Aguayo Files Labor Class Action in Cal. Sup. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------------
MARISOL AGUAYO, PERLA DE GUZMAN, SAJIDA AMIN, and STEFANI GONZALEZ,
on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated v. FMT SJ,
LLC, a limited liability corporation, dba FAIRMONT SAN JOSE; and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 19CV356971 (Cal. Super.,
Santa Clara Cty., Oct. 21, 2019), alleges that since January 2019,
the Defendant has violated the California Labor Code by failing and
refusing to provide suitable seating for the Plaintiffs and other
current and former employees of FMT.

The Plaintiffs are current employees of Fairmont San Jose, who are
currently working as Front Desk Clerks, Registration Agents or
Associates at the Defendants' hotel.

Fairmont San Jose does business in California, including in Santa
Clara County.  Fairmont San Jose operates a hotel in San Jose,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Caren P. Sencer, Esq.
          Katharine R. Mcdonagh, Esq.
          WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
          1001 Marina Village Parkway, Suite 200
          Alameda, CA 94501
          Telephone: (510) 337-1001
          Facsimile: (510) 337-1023
          E-mail: csencer@unioncounsel.net
                  kmcdonagh@unioncounsel.net


FORESTERS FINANCIAL: Connor Sues Over Nuisance Telemarketing
------------------------------------------------------------
James Van Connor, individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons and entities similarly situated v. FORESTERS FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC. and ONE LIFE AMERICA, INC., Case No.
6:19-cv-03283-BHH (D.S.C., Nov. 21, 2019), is brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a federal statute enacted in
response to widespread public outrage about the proliferation of
intrusive, nuisance telemarketing practices.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant One Life sent him a
pre-recorded telemarketing call for purposes of promoting Foresters
goods and services without prior express written consent. Because
these calls were transmitted using technology capable of generating
thousands of similar calls per day, the Plaintiff sues on behalf of
a proposed nationwide class of other persons, who received similar
calls.

A class action is the best means of obtaining redress for the
Defendants' illegal telemarketing and is consistent both with the
private right of action afforded by the TCPA, the Plaintiff
contends.

James Van Connor resides in Greenville County, South Carolina.

The Defendants offer financial service products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Maxfield, Esq.
          DAVE MAXFIELD, ATTORNEY, LLC
          P.O. Box 11865
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Phone: 803-509-6800
          Fax: 855-299-1656
          Email: dave@consumerlawsc.com


GOLDMAN SACHS: Faces Curtis Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mazie S. Curtis, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA a/k/a MARCUS BY GOLDMAN SACHS,
Case No. 8:19-cv-02876-WFJ-CPT (M.D. Fla., Nov. 21, 2019), is
brought to seek damages, as well as injunctive relief, for the
Defendant's violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant has placed several phone
calls to her cellular phone during which she experienced the
Defendant's use of prerecorded messages. The Defendant's relentless
collection campaign caused the Plaintiff to demand that the
Defendant cease contacting her. Despite the Plaintiff's efforts,
the Defendant continued to regularly call her cellular phone, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Pinellas County,
Florida.

The Defendant is engaged in the business of offering loans and
collecting or attempting to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or due using the mail and telephone from consumers across the
country.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alexander J. Taylor, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
          2500 South Highland Ave., Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Phone: (630) 575-8181
          Facsimile: (630) 575-8188
          Email: ataylor@sulaimanlaw.com


GOLDMAN SACHS: Settlement Reached in GSE Bonds Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the firm
and class plaintiffs reached a settlement in principle in the class
action suit related to GSE Bonds.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (GS&Co.) is among the dealers named as
defendants in numerous putative antitrust class actions relating to
debt securities issued by Federal National Mortgage Association,
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Federal Farm Credit Banks
Funding Corporation and Federal Home Loan Banks (collectively, the
GSEs), filed beginning in February 2019 and consolidated in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The third consolidated amended complaint, filed on September 10,
2019, asserts claims under federal antitrust law in connection with
an alleged conspiracy among the defendants to manipulate the
secondary market for debt securities issued by the GSEs.

The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
treble damages in unspecified amounts.

Beginning in September 2019, the State of Louisiana and the City of
Baton Rouge filed complaints in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana against the class defendants and a
number of dealers alleging the same claims as in the class action.


On October 2, 2019, the firm and class plaintiffs reached a
settlement in principle, subject to documentation and court
approval. The firm has reserved the full amount of its proposed
contribution to the settlement.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide. It
operates in four segments: Investment Banking, Institutional Client
Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. was founded in 1869 and is headquartered
in New York, New York.


GOYENETCHE DAIRY: Tiscareno Files Suit in California
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Goyenetche Dairy. The
case is styled as Francisco Tiscareno, an individual, on behalf of
the state of California, as a private Attorney General, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Goyenetche
Dairy, business formation unknown, Defendant, Case No.
BCV-19-103255 (Cal. Super Ct., Kern County, Nov. 19, 2019).

The case type of the lawsuit is stated as CV Other Employment -
Civil Unlimited.

Goyenetche Dairy is a Dairy farm in California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Martin E Sullivan, Esq.
   Melmed Law Group, P.C.
   1180 S Beverly Dr, Ste 610
   Los Angeles, CA 90035-1158
   Tel: (310) 824-3828
   Email: ms@melmedlaw.com



GRAND CENTRAL: Rojas-Maravilla Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
MISAEL ROJAS-MARAVILLA, individually and in behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GRAND CENTRAL STAR CAFE,
INC. and WILLIE GOMEZ; jointly and severally, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-10178 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 1, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid or
underpaid minimum wages, overtime compensation and other relief
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law
and the Wage Theft Prevention Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants employed the Plaintiff
from March 2009 until November 2017. The Defendants employed the
Plaintiff as a chef's assistant. He worked for the Defendants
approximately 37.5 to 48.5 hours per week. The Plaintiff contends
he and party plaintiffs worked more than 40 hours each workweek,
yet the Defendants willfully failed to pay them overtime
compensation of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay.

The Defendants did not launder or maintain the Plaintiff's required
uniforms and he laundered and maintained the uniforms at his
expense because the Defendants failed to pay an allowance for
uniform maintenance, the lawsuit says.

The Defendants' business is a full-service restaurant doing
business as Grand Central Star Cafe and located at 463 Lexington
Ave., in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John M. Gurrieri, Esq.
          Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
          277 Broadway, Suite 408
          New York, NY 10007-2036
          Telephone: (212) 229-2249
          Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
          E-mail: jmgurrieri@zellerlegal.com
                  jazeller@zellerlegal.com


GREGORY W. GRAY: Investors Lose Class Certification Bid
-------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that a group of investors won't get a rethink of
their rejected bid for class certification in a suit against an
imprisoned Twitter stock fraudster because they "seem to
misundertand the allocation of burdens" in arguing their securities
fraud claims, a New York federal judge said.  Lead plaintiffs
Stevens Amerio and Andrew Goldberg say they lost $300,000 in
Gregory W. Gray's scheme in which the central New York businessman
acquired fewer private Twitter Inc. shares ahead of its initial
public offering. [GN]

HARD ROCK: Saenger Theatre Employee Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Paul Murphy, writing for Eyewitness News, reports that a new
lawsuit is seeking damages on behalf of workers who continue to
suffer economic losses as a result of the collapse of the
half-finished Hard Rock Hotel in New Orleans.

The lead plaintiff in the case is Kerri Brunson, a part-time
employee at the Saenger Theatre.

"You have workers who are working in businesses in the areas that
were closed off," attorney Mark Glago said. "You have business
owners in those areas and others that suffered economic loss."

The building collapse across North Rampart Street from the Saenger
forced the historic theater to cancel shows.

On Oct. 21, the crew for Wicked was finally allowed back in the
building to remove their props and equipment.

The Oct. 20's crane implosion broke three windows at the Saenger
and the initial collapse punched an 8-foot-by-3-foot hole in the
roof.

The class-action lawsuit demands compensation for business owners
whose operations were interrupted by the collapse as well as their
employees and residents who haven't been able to get back to their
homes since the area was closed off after the collapse.

The suit hasn't received approval to proceed as a class action as
of Oct. 21.

"We are grateful for the work of the city, first responders and
everyone involved in progressing the situation at the Hard Rock
Hotel as safely as possible," Saenger Theatre General Manager Sam
Voisin said in a prepared statment. "We are working closely with
the city to determine next steps. We look forward to welcoming the
community back to the historic Saenger Theatre soon."

The blast also shattered about 10 windows at the Hotel Maison
Lafitte near Canal Street and Roosevelt Way.

Hotel manager George Friedman told WWL-TV the intensity of the
implosion surprised him.

"I was sitting on a little upside down Home Depot pail," Friedman
said. "It knocked me off the pail. At that time I didn't even
realize it, my windows shattered."

A judge's order now in place prevents the builder, engineers and
others in charge of the partially built structure from destroying
potential evidence.

"All the emails, text messages that are going on they now have to
preserve," Glago said. "There's also samples of building materials
we want preserved as well which the judge allowed."

Glago added they are not seeking to interfere with the ongoing
investigation into the cause of the building collapse.

Attorneys are seeking class action status in this most recent
lawsuit.

They were due back in court on Oct. 30 for a hearing on a
preliminary injunction. [GN]


HARMON STORES: Delacruz Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------------
Harmon Stores, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Emanuel Delacruz, on Behalf Of Himself And All Other Persons
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Harmon Stores, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-10706 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

Harmon Stores, Inc. operates as a cosmetics, and health and beauty
care discount retailer in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com


HAYCO CORP: Violates Overtime Provisions of FLSA, Huitzil Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Perfecto Huitzil, Rogelio Hutizil, Francisco Diaz, Francisco Diaz
III, Obispo Montero, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. HAYCO CORP., ALEX HAY, and FRED HAY, Case No.
1:19-cv-10819 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 21, 2019), is brought for Defendants'
systemic and continuous violations of the overtime provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs regularly worked as many as seven days a week, and
well over 40 hours each week, including the requirement that they
be on-call 24 hours a day, seven days a week to deal with any
issues in their assigned buildings, without receiving overtime
compensation as required by law, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are superintendents, who have worked for properties
owned and/or managed by the Defendants at various times between
2000 and the present.

Hayco is a real estate acquisition company with a portfolio
comprising of at least 25 residential buildings located throughout
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Chaya M. Gourarie, Esq.
          JOSEPH & NORINSBERG, LLC
          225 Broadway, Suite 2700
          New York, NY 10007
          Phone: (212) 227-5700
          Fax: (212) 406-6890
          Email: chaya@norinsberglaw.com


HOME POINT: $$2.2MM Deal in Noroma FLSA Suit Gets Final Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRANDON NOROMA, Plaintiff, v. HOME POINT FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-07205-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California (i) granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion
for final approval of the parties' proposed class action
settlement; and (2) granted in part the Plaintiffs' unopposed
motion for attorneys' fees, expenses, and incentive awards.

Although Plaintiff Norona initially filed the case as the single
named Plaintiff, Plaintiff Corbin was added to the action on April
16, 2019, following the Court's order granting preliminary approval
of the class action settlement.  Plaintiffs Norona and Corbin
brought the putative labor and employment class action against
Defendant Home Point.  

They allege, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, that the Defendant had a uniform policy and practice of
failing to (1) include commissions and bonuses as wages when
calculating overtime pay; (2) pay premiums for meal and rest
breaks; (3) provide complete wage statements; and (4) pay all wages
owed at the time of termination of its employees, in violation of
the Fair Labor Standard Act ("FLSA") and California law.  The
Plaintiffs further sought civil penalties under California's
Private Attorneys' General Act ("PAGA").

The Plaintiffs brought claims on behalf of two groups of non-exempt
Home Point employees, including "loan originators, mortgage
professionals, loan officers, and loan processors" who were not
compensated for all hours that they worked.  First, the Plaintiffs
asserted a nationwide, opt-in collective action under FLSA, 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b), on behalf of Home Point employees who worked
from three years prior to the filing date up to the date of
judgment ("FLSA Collective").  Second, they asserted claims under
the California Labor Code, California Business and Professions
Code, and PAGA as part of an opt-out class action composed of Home
Point employees who worked from four years prior to the filing date
up to the date of judgment ("California Class").

On May 17, 2018, the parties held an all-day mediation before the
Hon. William J. Cahill, during which they reached a settlement in
principle.  The parties filed a motion for settlement,  and the
Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement on April 12,
2019.

The FLSA Collective is defined as all persons currently or
previously employed by Defendant in the United States while
residing outside California, including under Defendant's previous
name, Maverick Funding Corp., as non-exempt loan originators,
mortgage professionals, loan officers, loan processors and other
non-exempt employees in positions that were eligible for
commissions and/or non-discretionary bonuses, the amounts of which
are measured by or dependent on hours worked, production, or
efficiency, from Dec. 19, 2014, through and including Sept. 30,
2018, who have not previously released their claims.  Individuals
who resided in California for part of the relevant time period and
outside of California for part of the relevant time period are
included in the California Class for the workweeks employed by the
Defendant and residing in California, and included in the FLSA
Collective for the workweeks employed by the Defendant and residing
in the United States but outside of California.

The California Class is defined as all persons currently or
previously employed by Defendant in California, including under its
prior name, Maverick Funding Corp., as non-exempt loan originators,
mortgage professionals, loan officers, loan processors and other
non-exempt employees in positions that were eligible for
commissions and/or non-discretionary bonuses, the amounts of which
are measured by or dependent on hours worked, production, or
efficiency, from Dec. 19, 2013 through and including Sept. 30,
2018, who have not previously released their claims.  Individuals
who resided in California for part of the relevant time period and
outside of California for part of the relevant time period are
included in the California Class for the workweeks employed by
Defendant and residing in California, and included in the FLSA
Collective for the workweeks employed by Defendant and residing
outside of California.

The Defendant has agreed to pay up to $500,000 to the FLSA
Collective, with the actual amount paid out based on the number of
opt-ins.  Of the estimated 1,382 FLSA Collective members who were
sent notice, 461 have opted in.  FLSA Collective members will
receive a pro-rata share of the available funds, based on the
number of weeks the member worked during the covered period as
reflected in the following formula: (FLSA Collective Member's Total
Workweeks/Total Workweeks in the Settlement Collective combined) x
FLSA Collective Fund.  However, the "Total Workweeks in the
Settlement Collective combined" will include all 1,382 putative
members of the collective, and not just the 461 who opted in.
After fees and costs, the Plaintiffs estimate that $130,681.75 will
be paid out to FLSA Collective members.  The average award is
expected to be approximately $284.09.  For tax purposes, the awards
will be allocated as 50% wages and 50% liquidated damages.

The Defendant has agreed to pay a total of $1.725 million, with no
reversion, for the California Class fund.  Of the estimated 255
California Class members, only two have opted out, for a total of
253 total participating members.  California Class members will
receive a pro-rata share of the available funds, based on the
number of weeks the member worked during the covered period.  After
fees and costs, the Plaintiff estimates that $1.1 million will be
paid out to the California Class members.  The average award is
expected to be over $4,000.  For tax purposes, the awards will be
allocated as one-third wages, one-third statutory and civil
penalties, and one-third interest.

The Defendant has agreed to pay $25,000 to settle claims under
PAGA.  Of this, three-quarters ($18,750) will be paid to the
California Labor Workforce Development Agency, and one-quarter
($6,250) will be paid to the California Class.  All California
Class members (even those who opt out) will receive their pro-rata
share of the PAGA payment.

The parties agreed that third-party settlement administrator ILYM
Group, Inc. would send notices to class members in accordance with
the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Agreement permits (i)
Plaintiffs Norona and Corbin to seek a service award of up to
$10,000 each; and (ii) the Plaintiffs' counsel to file a separate
motion for attorneys' fees, seeking up to one-third of the gross
settlement fund of $2.225 million.

Judge Gilliam (i) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlements; and (ii) granted in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees, Expenses,
and Service Awards.  He approved the settlement amount of $2.225
million, including payments of attorneys' fees in the amount of
$556,250, or 25% of the settlement amount; and an incentive fee for
the two named Plaintiffs in the amount of $10,000 for Plaintiff
Norona and $5,000 for Plaintiff Corbin, for a total of $15,000.

The parties and settlement administrator are directed to implement
this Final Order and the settlement agreement in accordance with
the terms of the settlement agreement.  The parties are further
directed to file a stipulated final judgment within 21 days from
the date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Ek1MfN from Leagle.com.

Brandon Noroma, Plaintiff, represented by Reuben D. Nathan --
rnathan@nathanlawpractice.com -- Nathan & Associates, APC &Matthew
Righetti -- matt@righettilaw.com -- Righetti Glugoski, P.C.

Home Point Financial Corporation, Defendant, represented by Rod M.
Fliegel -- rfliegel@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson P.C., Alison
S. Hightower -- ahightower@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Gal
Gressel.

HSBC BANK: Ahmed Moves for Final Approval of Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled SABER AHMED and JOHN
MONTELEONE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, and PHH MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, Case No. 5:15-cv-02057-FMO-SP (C.D. Cal.), move the
Court for an order granting final approval of the parties' class
action settlement.

The Court will commence a hearing on December 12, 2019, at 10:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: (323) 306-4234
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com

               - and -

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          Jason A. Ibey, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
                  jason@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
          Adrienne D. McEntee, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103
          Telephone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
                  jmurray@terrellmarshall.com
                  amcentee@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
          Daniel J. Marovitch, Esq.
          BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
          155 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 9020
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 729‐5288
          Facsimile: (312) 729‐5289
          E-mail: aburke@burkelawllc.com
                  dmarovitch@burkelawllc.com

               - and -

          Matthew R. Mendelsohn, Esq.
          MAZIE SLATER KATZ & FREEMAN, LLC
          103 Eisenhower Parkway
          Roseland, NJ 07076
          Telephone: (973) 228-9898
          Facsimile: (973) 228-0303
          E-mail: mmendelsohn@mskf.net


HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY: Faces Rinehart Antitrust Suit in Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Rinehart, Joseph Mattingly, and Thomas Thele,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY INC., HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., MAGNECOMP
PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC CO. LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN)
CO., LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (H.K.) CO., LTD., NHK SPRING CO. LTD.,
NHK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, NHK SPRING (THAILAND) CO., LTD., NHK
SPRING PRECISION (GUANGZHOU) CO., LTD., SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD.,
and TDK CORPORATION, Case No. 3:19-cv-07690 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 21,
2019), arises out of the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct and
global conspiracy to fix prices and allocate market shares in the
market for hard disk drive suspension assemblies, in violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Hard disk drives or HDDs containing suspension assemblies are
incorporated into many computers and other electronic devices
requiring electronic storage. During the period of May 2008 until
such time as the Defendants' unlawful conduct ceased, the
Defendants and their co-conspirators contracted, combined, and
conspired to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize the prices of
and allocate market shares for HDD suspension assemblies in the
United States.

The Defendants and their co-conspirators have participated in a
combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition in
the market for HDD suspension assemblies by agreeing to rig bids
for, and to fix, stabilize, and maintain the prices of HDD
suspension assemblies sold in the United States and elsewhere. The
combination and conspiracy that Defendants and their
co-conspirators were engaged in was an unreasonable restraint of
interstate and foreign trade and commerce in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, state antitrust and consumer protection
statutes, and the common law of unjust enrichment.

As a direct and proximate result of the anticompetitive and
unlawful conduct alleged herein, prices for HDD suspension
assemblies were maintained and stabilized at artificially inflated
levels, eliminating and excluding competition, extending or
maintaining the Defendants' market power, and fortifying barriers
to entry in the HDD suspension assemblies market, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs purchased at least one HDD suspension assembly
indirectly from at least one Defendant, and were injured in their
business or property as a result of one or more Defendant's
unlawful conduct.

The Defendants manufactured HDD suspension assemblies and sold them
in, or for delivery to, the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          John H. Weston, Esq.
          Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.
          G. Randall Garrou, Esq.
          WESTON, GARROU & MOONEY
          12121 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 525
          Los Angeles, CA 90025
          Phone: (310) 442-0072
          Fax: (310) 442-0899
          Email: johnhweston@wgdlaw.com
                 jerrym@mooneylaw.com
                 randygarrou@wgdlaw.com

               - and -

          Richard M. Hagstrom, Esq.
          Michael R. Cashman, Esq.
          Nicholas S. Kuhlmann, Esq.
          HELLMUTH & JOHNSON, PLLC
          8050 West 78th Street
          Edina, MN 55439
          Phone: (952) 941 4005
          Fax: (952) 941 2337
          Email: rhagstrom@hjlawfirm.com
                 mcashman@hjlawfirm.com
                 nkuhlmann@hjlawfirm.com


INTERSTATE COLLECTIONS: Abusively Collect Debts, Roberts Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sharon Roberts, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. INTERSTATE COLLECTIONS, INC., Case No.
1:19-cv-00137-DBP (D. Utah, Nov. 21, 2019), arises out of the
Defendant's attempts to unlawfully and abusively collect debts
allegedly owed by the Plaintiff and Class Members, in violation of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

On January 9, 2019, the Defendant mailed a letter to the Plaintiff.
Overshadowing occurs when the letter fails to explain an apparent
contradiction which in any way affects the debtor's rights. This
initial communication to the Plaintiff by the Defendant included a
written notice, the language of which overshadowed, weakened, and
failed to comply with, the notice required by the FDCPA, the
Plaintiff asserts. Specifically, the notice attempted to limit and
obfuscate the rights available to the Plaintiff in a manner that
creates a contradiction and would confuse the least sophisticated
debtor into disregarding his or her rights pursuant to the
validation notice required in the FDCPA.

The Defendant's statements in this letter were a false, deceptive,
or misleading representation or means in connection with the
collection of the alleged debt because the statements were likely
to confuse or otherwise mislead the least sophisticated debtor
regarding the means by which he or she could dispute the debt, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, who resides in the State of
Utah.

The Defendant is a Utah business entity doing business in Utah and
located in Salt Lake City, Utah.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan L. McBride, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          2633 E. Indian School Road, Suite 460
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Phone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          Email: ryan@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Theron D. Morrison, Esq.
          MORRISON LAW GROUP
          290 25th Street, Suite #102
          Ogden, UT 84401
          Phone: (801) 392-9324
          Facsimile: (801) 337-2087
          Email: theron@morlg.com


J. JILL INC: Wu Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------
J. Jill, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kathy
Wu, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. J. Jill, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06539 (E.D.
N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

J. Jill is an American retailer specializing in womenswear. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
   100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 208
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 695-0052
   Fax: (516) 706-4692
   Email: ds@lawsolo.net


JABIL INC: Walker Case Removed to Northern District of California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as KODY WALKER, individually, and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JABIL, INC., a corporation;
JABIL CIRCUIT, INC., an unknown entity; WOLFE ENGINEERING AND
DESIGN, INC.; JABIL SILVER CREEK, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, the Defendants, Case No. 19CV347835 (Filed May 21,
2019), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Santa Clara to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California on Nov. 1, 2019.

The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:19-cv-07240 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to provide
required meal periods and rest periods; failed to pay overtime
wages; failed to pay minimum wages; failed to pay all wages due to
discharged and quitting employees; and failed to maintain required
records pursuant to the California Labor Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Marlene S. Muraco, Esq.
          Michael W. M. Manoukian, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          50 W. San Fernando, 7th Floor
          San Jose, CA 95113 2303
          Telephone: 408 998 4150
          Facsimile: 408 288 5686
          E-mail: mmuraco@littler.com
                  mmanoukian@littler.com


JETSMARTER INC: Court Orders Arbitration in Galvez Case
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in
part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and to
Compel Arbitration in the case captioned LEONARDO GALVEZ,
Plaintiff, v. JETSMARTER, INC, BRENT HOLLENBACH, and JOHN DOES 1-4,
Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-10311 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiff Leonardo Galvez brings this breach of contract and fraud
action against Defendants JetSmarter, Inc. (JetSmarter), JetSmarter
Senior Membership Executive Brent Hollenbach, and John Does 1-4,
officers and managers of JetSmarter, arising out of an agreement
pursuant to which JetSmarter agreed to provide Plaintiff with
certain travel-related services.

Legal Standard

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), requires courts to compel
arbitration in accordance with the terms of an arbitration
agreement, upon the motion of either party to the agreement,
provided that there is no issue regarding its creation.  A court
must therefore first determine: (1) whether the parties entered
into a valid agreement to arbitrate and (2) whether the dispute
falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  

Defendants argue that because the JetSmarter Membership Agreement
requires Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims, the Court should issue
an order compelling Plaintiff to resolve the instant dispute
through arbitration. In deciding whether the parties' dispute is
arbitrable, the Court must answer two questions: (1) whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate, and if so (2) whether the scope of
that agreement encompasses the claims at issue.

Agreement to Arbitrate

Defendants have submitted extensive documentary evidence supporting
the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.
This evidence includes a declaration from JetSmarter's Chief
Technology Officer, Mikhail Kirsanov, who is responsible for the
development, implementation, and maintenance of the membership
registration process of JetSmarter's software application.

As Kirsanov explained, in order to sign up for JetSmarter online, a
prospective member must accept the terms and conditions of the
Membership Agreement before paying his membership fee. Plaintiff
originally signed up for JetSmarter's services and Plaintiff's
invoice, the date Plaintiff upgraded his JetSmarter membership,
which both reflect that Plaintiff clicked the box indicating his
acceptance of the terms and conditions of the JetSmarter Membership
Agreement.  

Plaintiff's challenge to Defendants' evidence is unpersuasive.

Plaintiff objects to Kirsanov's statement that because Plaintiff
successfully paid his initial membership invoice, Plaintiff must
have clicked on the toggle indicating his acceptance of the
Membership Agreement; he argues that Kirsanov had no actual
knowledge of whether Plaintiff in fact entered into the agreement.
Defendants correctly point out that, as with any clickwrap consumer
agreement the company does not sit next to the prospective member
while they click the toggle button or check box on the computer
screen"; yet, such agreements are nevertheless considered valid.  

Given Kirsanov's position as JetSmarter's Chief Technology Officer
and the personal knowledge of JetSmarter's registration process
that he developed while serving in that capacity, the Court finds
Kirsanov's step-by-step description of the process reliable.
Plaintiff has failed to meet that standard here.

Plaintiff has also challenged the Membership Agreement's
arbitration provision as both illusory and unconscionable. First,
Plaintiff argues that the provision is not mutually enforceable,
and is therefore illusory, because JetSmarter allegedly retains the
right not to be bound by its obligations under the arbitration
provision since the Membership Agreement permits JetSmarter to
amend or modify the Agreement from time to time. Second, Plaintiff
argues that the provision is unconscionable because the contract
envisioned that Defendants would provide flight services to
Plaintiff in exchange for prepayment of a significant membership
fee; however, Defendants refused to provide the promised services
yet retained Plaintiff's funds.

The Court finds that the parties entered into a valid agreement to
arbitrate.

Scope

Here, the arbitration provision expressly delegates the issue of
arbitrability to an arbitrator; namely, it provides any claim or
dispute whether related to this Agreement, any of the Terms and
Conditions, or the relationship or rights or obligations
contemplated herein, including the validity of this clause, shall
be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration. The Court finds
that this language provides clear and unmistakable evidence of the
parties' agreement to arbitrate arbitrability and the Court
therefore concludes that the issue of arbitrability is a matter for
the arbitrator's review.

Because the Court concludes that the arbitration provision is valid
and that the scope of the provision is a question for the
arbitrator, Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted.

Defendants' motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration is GRANTED and the Court refers Plaintiff's claims to
arbitration.

However, Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED and the matter is
STAYED pending the completion of arbitration, rules the Court.

The parties are directed to submit a joint status letter 120 days
from the date of this Opinion & Order, advising the Court as to the
status of arbitration proceedings.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at
Document 9.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yyclkuuj from
Leagle.com.

Leonardo Galvez, Plaintiff, represented by Bruce E. Baldinger , The
Law Offices of Bruce E. Baldinger, LLC., 365 South St, Morristown,
NJ 07960

Jetsmarter, Inc. & Brent Hollenbach, Defendants, represented by
Ronald Andrew Giller , Gordon & Rees LLP, Catherine Bentivegna ,
Gordon & Rees, LLP & Daniel Jason Dimuro , Gordon & Rees LLP, 18
Columbia Tpke Ste 220, Florham Park, NJ 07932-2266

JOHNNY ROCKETS: Wu Alleges Violation under Disabilities Act
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Johnny Rockets Group, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Kathy Wu, on behalf of herself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Johnny Rockets Group, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06533 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

The Johnny Rockets Group Inc. is an American restaurant franchise
whose themed decor was based upon 1950s diner-style
restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
   100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 208
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 695-0052
   Fax: (516) 706-4692
   Email: ds@lawsolo.net


JOY ORGANICS: Olsen Suit Alleges ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------
Joy Organics LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Thomas
J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Joy Organics LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06546 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

Joy Organics specializes in and provides premier broad spectrum CBD
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170-1830
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


KELLY M DAVIS: Jaffer Sues Over Illegal Debt Collection Practices
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shawn Jaffer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Kelly M. Davis & Associates, LLC and John Does 1-25,
Case No. 4:19-cv-00860-RWS (E.D. Tex., Nov. 21, 2019), seeks
statutory and actual damages and declaratory relief for the
Defendants' violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and the Texas Debt Collection Act.

On November 20, 2019, KMDA sent a collection letter to the
Plaintiff in the Eastern District of Texas. KMDA's Letter
threatened the Plaintiff with legal arbitration action and
demanding interests and attorney's fees. KMDA's Letter demanded
payment from the Plaintiff of $19,192.67 within 10 days from the
date of the letter, says the complaint.

The Letter claimed the KMDA is a debt collector. However, the
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant does not have a surety bond
for debt collection and has not filed a copy of such surety bond
with the Texas Secretary of State.

Plaintiff is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a debt to
the Defendant.

KMDA is a "debt collector" with an address at Lewisville,
Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shawn Jaffer, Esq.
          SHAWN JAFFER LAW FIRM PLLC
          9300 John Hickman Pkwy., Suite 1204
          Frisco, TX 75035
          Phone: (214) 210-0730
          Fax: (214) 594-6100
          Email: Shawn@jafflaw.com


LABORATORY CORP: Covance Continues to Defend Mitchell Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October
31, 2019, for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that
Covance, Inc. continues to defend a class action suit entitled,
Mitchell v. Covance, Inc. et al.

On July 30, 2019, the Company was served with a class action
lawsuit, Mitchell v. Covance, Inc. et al., filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff alleges that certain individuals employed by Covance Inc.
and Chiltern International Inc. were misclassified as exempt
employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act and were thereby not properly paid overtime
compensation.

The lawsuit seeks monetary damages, liquidated damages, and
recovery of attorneys' fees and costs.

The Company will vigorously defend the lawsuit.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings operates as an
independent clinical laboratory company worldwide. It operates
through two segments, LabCorp Diagnostics and Covance Drug
Development. The company was founded in 1971 and is headquartered
in Burlington, North Carolina.


LE LABO HOLDINGS: Wu Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------
Le Labo Holdings LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kathy Wu, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Le Labo Holdings LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-06538 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

Le Labo is a New York-based perfume house which has become iconic
for its collection of hand-made perfumes and home scents
available.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
   100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 208
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 695-0052
   Fax: (516) 706-4692
   Email: ds@lawsolo.net


LEHMAN PROPERTY: Former Clients File Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
Spotlight PA's Charlotte Keith and PennLive's Steve Marroni report
that a class-action lawsuit has been filed against a Harrisburg
property management company that abruptly closed over the summer,
leaving more than 300 landlords in the lurch and thousands of
dollars in collected rent and security deposits unaccounted for.

Filed by 40 former clients of Glenn Lehman and Lehman Property
Management, the suit also names as a defendant state Rep. Susan
Helm, who founded Century 21 at Helm and served as the broker of
record for Lehman.

Lehman and Helm could not immediately be reached for comment on
Oct. 21. Helm represents parts of Dauphin and Lebanon counties.

In the suit filed in Dauphin County Court on Oct. 16, James
Tupitza, the attorney representing Lehman's former clients, said he
doesn't know what happened to his clients' money, and hopes to
learn more about that through the legal proceedings.

Tupitza said in court documents that former employees told him
Lehman may have used the money to pay salaries for himself and
family members, and to pay for personal expenses and travel.

At the very least, he said, Lehman improperly managed his
employees, allowing the money to disappear.

"Since we haven't done discovery yet, we don't know what happened
with the money," Tupitza said.

The complaint accuses Lehman of fraud or, alternatively, negligent
failure and accuses Helm of malpractice and failing in her duty as
a broker of record to properly supervise Lehman.

While 40 clients are named as plaintiffs, Tupitza expects between
150 and 300 will sign onto the class action. Most have money tied
up with Lehman in amounts ranging from $7,500 to $10,000, but some
are missing more than $100,000 each, Tupitza said.

The money held in escrow included security deposits and rent
payments that clients entrusted to Lehman, who was also expected to
pay real estate taxes, utilities and other expenses on the
properties it managed.

The lawsuit says that in July, Lehman notified his clients that he
discovered "accounting irregularities." At around that time, Helm
resigned as the broker of record.

With no broker of record, Lehman Property Management was forced to
close.

In August, Lehman gave a statement to CBS 21 news.

"I discovered an error with the way some of our accounting is being
done," Lehman explained to CBS 21. "I did not feel comfortable
collecting any additional rent money or taking anymore money and
putting it into the mix. As such, I stopped doing business
immediately."

The suit is seeking damages in the amount of the lost funds, along
with punitive damages, interest and costs.

The lawsuit also claims that both Lehman and Helm committed
malpractice by deviating from the expected standards of care.

The suit also says Lehman was negligent by failing to engage with
his broker of record, despite being required to do so due to the
hundreds of properties and amount of expenses the company handled.

And the suit says Helm was negligent in her supervision of Lehman,
claiming she had a duty under real estate standards that she
ignored because she was busy as a state representative and in
managing her own brokerage company.

By ignoring her duty as the broker of record, she failed to prevent
the theft or conversion of the funds, the suit claims.

Tupitza recently prosecuted a case against Helm for failing to
supervise Luu Le Dang, a former agent of Century 21 at Helm who was
accused of scamming clients. That case resulted in a $1 million
settlement after three days of trial, he said.

Tupitza successfully prosecuted the case against Dang, too,
resulting in a $3.8 million verdict in the expansive scam
defrauding immigrant Vietnamese investors. [GN]


LIFTED PERFORMANCE: Olsen Files Class Suit under ADA in New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lifted Performance, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Lifted Performance, LLC doing
business as: Kanibi, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06549 (E.D. N.Y.,
Nov. 19, 2019).

Kanibi CBD products are crafted with select batches of premium hemp
and double-tested to ensure perfection.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170-1830
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com



LOUD BUDDHA: Fails to Properly Pay Cannabis Workers, Denning Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Casey Denning and Natalia Cole, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. LOUD BUDDHA, LLC, PURA CALI MANAGEMENT
CORP., and DOES 1-50, jointly and severally, Case No. 3:19-cv-07665
(N.D. Cal., Nov. 21, 2019), arises from the Defendant's willful
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, among other laws.

The Plaintiffs and other cannabis workers were required to work a
substantial amount of daily and weekly overtime, according to the
complaint. The Defendants loosely tracked the Plaintiffs' and other
cannabis workers' time by writing their hours on loose-leaf
notebooks. However, the Plaintiffs allege, the hours were typically
incorrect and rounded down to benefit the Defendants. The
Defendants also failed to provide meal and rest breaks to the
Plaintiffs and other cannabis workers as required by law, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants to cultivate and
harvest cannabis from Pura Cali's farm in Lake County, California.

The Defendants are in the business of cultivating and harvesting
cannabis for its eventual sale.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Trenton R. Kashima, Esq.
          Kevin J. Stoops, Esq.
          SOMMERS SCHWARTZ, P.C.
          402 West Broadway, Suite 1760
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 762-2125
          Facsimile: (619) 762-2127
          Email: tkashima@sommerspc.com

               - and -

          Jesse L. Young, Esq.
          KREIS ENDERLE, P.C.
          8225 Moorsbridge
          P.O. Box 4010
          Kalamazoo, MI 49003-4010
          Phone: (269) 324-3000
          Facsimile: (269) 324-3010
          Email: jyoung@kehb.com


LYFT INC: Gonzalez Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Renier Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LYFT, INC., Case No. 2:19-cv-20569 (D.N.J., Nov. 21,
2019), is seeking all available relief for unpaid minimum wages,
unpaid overtime wages and unreimbursed business expenses pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law,
and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Regulations.

The Defendant violated the FLSA and the NJWHL by misclassifying the
Plaintiff as an independent contractor and failing to pay its
employees for all the hours worked at minimum wage after
work-related expenses, by failing to pay them overtime wages and
failing to reimburse their business-related expenses pursuant to
the Defendant's company policy, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff and the class are entitled to unpaid wages from the
Defendant for all hours worked by them at minimum wage after
payment of work-related expenses, as well as unpaid overtime wages
for hours in excess of 40 hours worked per work week, the Plaintiff
contends.

The Plaintiff has worked as a driver engaged in interstate commerce
for Lyft from October 2017 to the present.

Lyft Technologies, Inc. is a transportation services company that
provides drivers, who can be hailed and dispatched through a mobile
phone application.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roosevelt N. Nesmith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF ROOSEVELT N. NESMITH LLC
          363 Bloomfield Avenue, Suite 2C
          Montclair, NJ 07042
          Phone: (973) 259-6990
          Fax: (866) 848-1368
          Email: roosevelt@nesmithlaw.com


MAC COSMETICS: Wu Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------
Make-Up Art Cosmetics Inc. facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kathy Wu, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Make-Up Art Cosmetics Inc., Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-06535 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

MAC Cosmetics, stylized as M*A*C, is a cosmetics manufacturer
founded in Toronto, Canada in 1984 by Frank Toskan and Frank
Angelo. The company is headquartered in New York City and became
part of the Estee Lauder Companies in 1996. MAC is an acronym for
Make-up Art Cosmetics.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
   100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 208
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 695-0052
   Fax: (516) 706-4692
   Email: ds@lawsolo.net





MARK HOTEL OWNERS: Nisbett Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Mark Hotel Owners Corp. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Kareem Nisbett, individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The Mark Hotel Owners Corp.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-10688 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

The Mark Hotel is a luxury hotel, situated at 25 East 77th Street,
at Madison Avenue, on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, New York
City. Originally constructed in 1927 in the Renaissance Revival
style, the building was purchased by Izak Senbahar of Alexico Group
and Simon Elias in 2006 and the building's interiors were
reimagined by French designer Jacques Grange in 2009.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170-1830
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com



MARMARA MANHATTAN: Nisbett Alleges Violation under ADA in NY
------------------------------------------------------------
Marmara Manhattan Hospitality Management Co., Inc. is facing a
class action lawsuit filed pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Kareem Nisbett,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Marmara Manhattan Hospitality Management Co., Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-10687 (S.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

The Marmara-Manhattan has 108 suites in a 32-story, luxury
residence in the culturally and historically rich neighborhood of
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
   Lipsky Lowe LLP
   420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
   New York, NY 10170-1830
   Tel: (212) 764-7171
   Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


MCCARTHY, BURGESS: Lombardi Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pa.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MCCARTHY, BURGESS &
WOLFE. The case is styled as David Lombardi, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MCCARTHY, BURGESS &
WOLFE, JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-05434-MSG (E.D.
Pa., Nov. 18, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff, Inc. is a Collection Agency. This
company provides commercial and consumer debt collection
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Ave-Ste 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (732) 695-3282
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: ari@marcuszelman.com


MEDICAL MANAGEMENT: Faces Mele Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Mele, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. Medical Management International, Inc. d/b/a/ Banfield
Pet Hospital, Case No. 3:19-cv-06114 (W.D. Wash., Nov. 21, 2019),
seeks damages resulting from the Defendant's illegal actions in
calling the Plaintiff in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant operates an aggressive
automated calling campaign. Moreover, it is the Defendant's stated
policy to not stop placing automated calls to someone's telephone
number after being told it is a 'wrong number.'

Indeed, the Plaintiff says she is not a customer of the Defendant
and never provided it with her cellular telephone number or with
consent to call her number. Nonetheless, the Defendant proceeded to
place repeated automated calls to the Plaintiff in an attempt to
reach a separate individual, who cannot be reached at her number.

The Defendant placed repeated automated calls to the Plaintiff's
cellular phone--over her request for it to stop and notwithstanding
that it was calling a wrong number--in violation of the TCPA, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff is an adult individual residing in Arlington, Texas.

Banfield operates more than 1,000 veterinarian hospital across the
United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sarah Stasch, Esq.
          STASCH LAW LLC
          33530 First Way South, Suite 102
          Federal Way, WA 98003
          Telephone: (253) 237-0539

               - and -

          Sarah Stasch, Esq.
          LEMBERG LAW LLC
          43 Danbury Road
          Wilton, CT 06897
          Phone: (253) 237-0539
          Facsimile: (253) 253-0701
          Email: sstasch@lemberglaw.com


MERITAGE HOMES: Faces Thomas Class Suit Alleging Mortgage Fraud
---------------------------------------------------------------
ELIZABETH THOMAS, individually and on behalf of other
similarly-situated persons as a class, Plaintiff v. MERITAGE HOMES
CORPORATION; MTH LENDING GROUP LP; PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
INC,; JP MORGAN CHASE AND COMPANY; JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NA; STEWART
TITLE COMPANY; MERITAGE HOMES OF TEXAS LLC; MERITAGE HOMES OF TEXAS
LP; NICOLE SMITH; Unknown KATHI LEWIS; and Unknown PATRICK
IGLINSKY, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-03186-ELH (D. Md., Nov. 1,
2019), alleges that the Defendants stole Ms. Thomas' personally
identifying information, used that information without her
knowledge to obtain residential mortgage loans in her name, and
then stole the loaned money for themselves.

According to the complaint, the Defendants literally forged closing
documents, falsified verification of Ms. Thomas' employments,
claiming she worked for a company she never worked for and claiming
she made $92,500 per year despite knowing her household income was
only $36,000. The Defendants submitted a falsified verification of
employment with forged pay stubs accompanying it.

Ms. Thomas alleges that the Defendants tricked her by holding a
closing, and at that closing, instead of closing on her so-called
extension of credit loan--a loan that is unlawful under the Texas
Constitution and a loan never actually extended to her--the
Defendants used closing date to forge closing documents on a Fannie
Mae guaranteed loan, originated by JP Morgan Chase Bank. She
contends this is a loan for which (1) she never knew anything
about, and a loan for which (2) the Defendants used all proceeds
for their own personal use.

Engaging in mortgage fraud to dupe people, who have made numerous
professional and personal sacrifices to become homeowners, is
utterly despicable, the lawsuit says.

Meritage Homes Corporation is an American real estate development
company that constructs single-family detached homes across the
United States along with active adult communities and luxury real
estate in Arizona.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John M. Shoreman, Esq.
          MCFADDEN & SHOREMAN, LLC
          1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 500
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: 202-772-3188
          Facsimile: 202-204-8610
          E-mail: jmshoreman@verizon.net


METAL TECHNOLOGIES: Attys' Fees & Costs Awards in Weil Suit Revised
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN A. WEIL and MELISSA D. FULK, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. METAL
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-00016-JMS-MPB (S.D.
Ind.), Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division, revised the
Court's June 13, 2018 determination regarding attorneys' fees and
costs.

The relevant part of the Plaintiffs' action is the claim based on
I.C. Section 22-2-6-2, which provides that an employee's wages can
be deducted and assigned if such assignment is: (1) in writing; (2)
signed by the employee; (3) by its terms, revocable by the employee
at any time; and, (4) agreed to by the employer in writing.  This
statute also provides that a wage assignment may be made for
certain purposes found in subsection (b) of the statute.  As of
July 1, 2015, one of the permissible uses for a wage deduction and
assignment was the purchase of uniforms and equipment necessary to
fulfill the duties of employment.

The Plaintiffs filed the action seeking, among other things,
damages for violation of I.C. Section 22-2-6-2.  Specifically,
Plaintiff Weil, individually, and the Plaintiff Class alleged that
their employer, Metal Technologies, impermissibly made deductions
from their wages to pay for the rental of uniforms.  From Jan. 20,
2013 through April 10, 2016, Metal Technologies used a certain form
for this wage assignment, and that form did not include the
required language indicating that the wage assignment agreement was
revocable by an employee at any time upon written notice to the
employer.  Metal Technologies conceded that this omission of the
revocation language on the wage assignment form was a violation of
I.C. Section 22-2-6-2, and the parties stipulated to the amount of
damages to which Mr. Weil and the Plaintiff Class were entitled.

The Court accepted the parties' stipulation, with a slight
modification, finding that Metal Technologies owed the Plaintiff
Class $31,039.96 for improper wage deductions.  It then trebled
those damages, by stipulation of the parties, making the total
amount of damages owed to the Plaintiff Class for wage deductions
$93,152.58.  The parties also stipulated that Metal Technologies
deducted a total of $43.10 from Mr. Weil's wages for uniform
rental, and the Court trebled that amount and found that Mr. Weil
was owed $129.30 in damages for the improper deduction of wages for
uniform rental.

After April 10, 2016, Metal Technologies amended the wage
assignment form, adding the required revocation language.  Using
this amended form, Metal Technologies continued to deduct wages for
uniform rental from employees that chose to rent their uniforms.
Although the wage assignment form had been corrected, the
Plaintiffs argued at trial that the wage deduction uniform rental
was still unlawful because uniform rental was not one of the
permissible uses listed in I.C. Section 22-2-6-2(b).

Following a bench trial, the Court concluded that although
"purchase" was listed as a permissible use in I.C. Section
22-2-6-2(b), "rental" was not listed.  It disagreed with Metal
Technologies' reading of the statute, reasoning that in ordinary
usage, the terms purchase and rental are not used synonymously.  It
concluded that the wage deductions for uniform rental were in
violation of the wage assignment statute, and it granted the
Plaintiff Class $8,102.04 in damages for the deductions made using
the revised wage assignment form, an amount that was stipulated to
by the parties.  On June 13, 2019, the Court awarded the Plaintiffs
$99,229.58 in attorneys' fees for the wage deduction claims.

The parties filed cross-appeals on several issues.  After oral
argument, on May 1, 2019, the Indiana legislature amended the
statute to explicitly allow wage deductions for the rental of
uniforms, and the legislature made this amendment retroactive.  As
of May 1, 2019, I.C. Section 22-2-6-2(b)(14) now provides: "A wage
assignment under this section may be made for the purpose of paying
for the purchase, rental, or use of uniforms, shirts, pants, or
other job-related clothing."

On May 29, 2019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals entered its
opinion affirming in part and vacating in part the Court's
decision. It remanded the matter and instructed the Court to
determine whether the May 1, 2019 amendment to Indiana Code Section
22-2-6-2(b) can be applied retroactively to the Plaintiff Class'
wage-deduction claims; and, if so, whether the Court's June 13,
2018 determination regarding attorneys' fees and costs should be
revised.

Based on the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the Court ordered the
parties to submit briefs on the issues of whether the amended law
could be applied retroactively to the Plaintiff Class's
wage-deduction claim and, if so, whether the Court's award of
attorneys' fees and costs needed to be revised.

In their opening brief on these issues, the Plaintiffs argue that
the amendment to I.C. Section 22-2-6-2 cannot be applied
retroactively because that would deprive them of their "legally
vested right in their earned wages" and would violate the United
States Constitution's and Indiana Constitution's prohibitions
against ex post facto laws.  In response, Metal Technologies argues
that the limited purpose of the Seventh Circuit's remand was to
determine if the amended statute could be applied retroactively in
the case and, if so, whether the amount of attorneys' fees should
be revised.  In reply, the Plaintiffs argue that the wage
assignment agreements were void as a matter of law because they
violated public policy and the law as it existed at that time.

Judge Magnus-Stinson finds that it is appropriate to give the
amended statute the retroactive effect the legislature intended.
The new law confirms that the amended wage assignment form signed
by the employees was proper.  Because the new law enforces -- not
impairs -- the parties' contract, there is no constitutional
takings issue.  The deductions here were wholly voluntary; even the
two named Plaintiffs demonstrate the fact: Mr. Weil rented his
uniform, Ms. Fulk did not.

Because the amendment to I.C. Section 22-2-6-2 can be applied
retroactively in the case, the Judge finds that the attorneys' fee
award should be reduced -- not increased as the Plaintiffs suggest.
Although the Plaintiffs interpret the Seventh Circuit's remand and
this Court's July 15, 2019 Order as broadly reopening the issue of
attorneys' fees, the Seventh Circuit made it clear that the award
of fees should only be revisited in the event the new law applies
retroactively to the Plaintiffs' claims.  The Judge declines to
award additional fees to the Plaintiffs' counsel for continued,
unnecessary litigation in the case.

The Judge finds that the attorneys' fee award should be reduced
based on the new law.  It is fair to reduce the fee award by 8%,
which is the percentage of the total damages that relate to
deductions made based on the corrected wage assignment form (i.e.,
the deductions that the Indiana legislature confirmed were
appropriate in its May 1, 2019 amendment to I.C. Section 22-2-6-2).
She finds that the original attorneys' fee award of $116,098.61
should be reduced to $106,810.72.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Magnus-Stinson amended the judgment
in the case as follows to reflect that Metal Technologies will pay:
(i) $93,152.58 to the Plaintiff Class, from which will be paid a
$2,500 incentive award to lead Plaintiff Melissa Fulk; (ii) $194.61
to Mr. Weil; (iii) $128.97 to Ms. Fulk; and (iv) $106,810.72 as
reasonable attorneys' fees.  She declined to award costs to either
party.  An Amended Final Judgment will issue accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Entry is available at
https://is.gd/Q6sKyP from Leagle.com.

BRIAN A. WEIL & MELISSA D. FULK, Plaintiffs, represented by Jacob
H. Miller, HUNT HASSLER LORENZ KONDRAS LLP, Robert F. Hunt, HUNT
HASSLER LORENZ & KONDRAS LLP & Robert Peter Kondras, Jr., HUNT
HASSLER KONDRAS & MILLER LLP.

METAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, represented by Melissa K.
Taft
-- Melissa.Taft@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C. & Michael
W.
Padgett -- PadgettM@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS P.C.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Henderson Files FDCPA Suit in Pa.
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Midland Credit
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Rrahqayya Henderson,
individually, and on behalf of all other similarly situated
consumers, Plaintiff v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2:19-cv-05423-CFK (E.D. Penn., Nov. 19, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. was founded in 1953. The company's
line of business includes extending credit to business enterprises
for relatively short periods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   NICHOLAS J. LINKER, Esq.
   ZEMEL LAW LLC
   1373 Broad St., SUITE 203-C
   Clifton, NJ 07013
   Tel: (862) 227-3106
   Email: nl@zemellawllc.com




MIDWEST PUBLISHING: Taylor Sues Over Unsolicited Telephone Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
RAYMOND TAYLOR, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. MIDWEST PUBLISHING INC. and MPI TELESERVICES
INC., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02107-BEN-NLS (S.D. Cal., Nov.
2, 2019), alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by placing unsolicited telephone calls to
wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants are subsidiaries of one
another and are ostensibly the same entity, under direction of the
same corporate leadership. The Defendants are contracted by
numerous nonprofit and charitable organizations (including
California Narcotic Officers Association) to raise money on their
behalf through various fundraising and telemarketing campaigns.

There are online complaints about the Defendants' calling
practices, including a complaint that the Defendants placed
unsolicited pre-recorded calls even to people, who were on the
National Do-Not-Call Registry.

The Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive relief, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alex S. Madar, Esq.
          MADAR LAW CORPORATION
          14410 Via Venezia No. 1404
          San Diego, CA 92129-1666
          Telephone: (858) 299-5879
          Facsimile: (619) 354-7281
          E-mail: alex@madarlaw.net


MORAN FOODS: Sinclair Suit Challenges Illegal Time-Shaving Policy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRITTANY SINCLAIR, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MORAN FOODS, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02569 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 1, 2019), alleges that the
Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Ohio Minimum
Fair Wage Standards Act and the Prompt Pay Act by regularly
engaging in the practice of "time shaving," by which it would erase
time worked from the Plaintiff's time records in order to pay her
for fewer hours than she actually worked.

Specifically, the Defendant would manually clock Ms. Sinclair out
for a thirty-minute break each day, even if she had not actually
taken a break, according to the complaint. The members of proposed
class were subject to the same time-shaving policies.  As a result
of the Defendant's time-shaving policy, she was not paid minimum
wage and overtime premium for all hours worked, the lawsuit says.

From June 3, 2019 to present Ms. Sinclair worked for the Defendant.
She works at the Save-a-Lot store located at 15870 Broadway Avenue,
in Maple Heights, Ohio. She was hired as a cashier on June 3, 2019,
and was promoted to shift lead on August 4, 2019.

Moran, doing business as Save-A-Lot, Ltd., owns, operates, and
licenses a chain of discount grocery stores, including the Maple
Heights store.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Claire I. Wade-Kilts, Esq.
          Sean H. Sobel, Esq.
          SOBEL, WADE & MAPLEY, LLC
          2460 Fairmount Boulevard, Suite 314
          Cleveland, OH 44106
          Telephone: (216) 223-7213
          Facsimile: (216) 223-7213
          E-mail: wade@swmlawfirm.com
                  sobel@swmlawfirm.com


MOVIE GRILL CONCEPTS: Burns Files Suit in Ca. Super. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Movie Grill Concepts
XX, LLC. The case is styled as Latoya Burns, individually and on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Movie Grill Concepts XX, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company and
Studio Movie Grill Holdings, LLC, a Texas Limited Liability
Company, Defendants, Case No. BCV-19-103253 (Cal. Super Ct., Kern
County, Nov. 19, 2019).

The case type of the lawsuit is stated as CV Other Employment -
Civil Unlimited.

Movie Grill Concepts XX, LLC is as a Domestic Limited Liability
Company (LLC) in the State of Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Christina M. Lucio
   Parker Legal Group, PC
   One American Plaza
   600 West Broadway, Suite 700
   San Diego, CA 92101- 7620
   Tel: 619-930-9820


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Labiak Files PI Suit in S.D. Indiana
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Richard Labiak,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-04595-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind., Nov. 18, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 554-9099
          Fax: (713) 554-9098
          Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Williams Files PI Suit in S.D. Indiana
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against National Collegiate
Athletic Association. The case is styled as Jonathan Williams,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-04594-JRS-MPB (S.D. Ind., Nov. 18, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other P.I.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a non-profit
organization which regulates athletes of 1,268 North American
institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey L. Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 554-9099
          Fax: (713) 554-9098
          Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


OASIS POWER: February 11, 2020 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
--------------------------------------------------------------
A Settlement has been reached in a class action lawsuit, Albrecht
v. Oasis Power, LLC d/b/a Oasis Energy, No. 18-cv-1061 (N.D. Ill.
2018), about whether Oasis Power, LLC d/b/a/ Oasis Energy incl.
Censtar, Electricity Maine, Electricity N.H., Major Energy,
Perigee, Provider Power Mass, Respond Power, Spark, and Verde
(together, the "Oasis Entities") sent prerecorded voicemail
messages to mobile telephone numbers without prior express written
consent of the recipients in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 227 ("TCPA"). Oasis denies the
allegations and any wrongdoing. The Court has not decided who is
right.

Who's Included?  Settlement Class Members include all individuals
within the United States (i) who were sent a prerecorded message,
also referred to a ringless voicemail, (ii) on his or her telephone
(iii) by or on behalf of the Oasis Entities advertising the Oasis
Entities' goods and services during the Class Period (February 12,
2014 through September 25, 2019).

Excluded from the Settlement Class are the Oasis Entities and their
affiliates, employees, officers, directors, agents, representatives
and their immediate family members; class counsel and the judge and
magistrate judge who have presided over the Action and their
immediate family members.

What does the Settlement provide?  To fully settle and release
claims of the Settlement Class Members, the Oasis Entities have
agreed to make payments to the Settlement Class Members and pay for
notice and administration costs of the Settlement, attorneys' fees
and expenses incurred by counsel for the Settlement Class, and a
service award for Plaintiff.  Defendant will make available
$7,000,000.00 (the "Settlement Fund"). Each Settlement Class Member
who submits a timely, valid, correct and verified Claim Form by the
Claim Deadline in the manner required by the Settlement Agreement
shall be sent a Cash Award.

What are the options of Settlement Class Members?  Settlement Class
Members have several options available to them as part of the
Settlement.  They can:

   * File a claim. Members of the Settlement Class must submit a
completed Claim Form to receive a payment. Class Members may obtain
a Claim Form at the Settlement Website,
www.OasisEnergyTCPAsettlement.com, or by calling the Settlement
Administrator toll-free at 1-855-939-0540. Claim Forms can be
submitted by U.S. mail or through the Settlement Website, and must
be postmarked by February 20, 2020.

   * Exclude themselves. Class Members who do not want benefits
from the Settlement, and want to keep the right to sue or continue
to sue the Oasis Entities on their own about the legal issues in
this case, must exclude themselves from the Settlement. Class
Members who exclude themselves cannot get money from this
Settlement. To be excluded from the Settlement, Class Members must
send a letter postmarked no later than December 7, 2019 to Oasis
Energy TCPA Settlement Administrator, P.O. Box 4109, Portland, OR
97208-4109.

   * Object. Settlement Class Member who do not exclude themselves
from the Settlement Class can object to any part of the Settlement.
All objections must be postmarked by December 7, 2019. The detailed
notice found at www.OasisEnergyTCPAsettlement.com further explains
how to object.

   * Do nothing. Settlement Class members who do nothing, meaning
they do not file a timely Claim, will not get benefits from the
Settlement. Further, unless Class Members exclude themselves, they
will be bound by the judgment entered by the Court.

The Court has scheduled a Final Approval Hearing on February 11,
2020 to consider whether the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. The Court will also consider the requests by Class
Counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses and for a Service Award to
the Class Representative.  Class Members do not need to attend the
hearing but they or their own attorney, if they have one, may ask
to appear and speak at the hearing at their own cost.

Getting more information? This Notice summarizes the proposed
Settlement. For a complete, definitive statement of the Settlement
terms, refer to the Settlement Agreement at
www.OasisEnergyTCPAsettlement.com.  Class Members may also contact
the Settlement Administrator by calling the toll-free number,
1-855-939-0540, or by sending questions to Oasis Energy TCPA
Settlement Administrator, P.O. Box 4109, Portland, OR 97208-4109.
[GN]


OLIN CORP: Suits Against Unit over Sale of Caustic Soda Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Olin Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that Olin, K.A. Steel
Chemicals continues to defend several class action suits related to
the sale of caustic soda.

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemicals (a wholly owned subsidiary of Olin) and
other caustic soda producers were named as defendants in six
purported class action civil lawsuits filed March 22, 25 and 26,
2019 and April 12, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York on behalf of the respective named plaintiffs
and a putative class comprised of all persons and entities who
purchased caustic soda in the U.S. directly from one or more of the
defendants, their parents, predecessors, subsidiaries or affiliates
at any time between October 1, 2015 and the present.  

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemicals and other caustic soda producers were
also named as defendants in two purported class action civil
lawsuits filed July 25 and 29, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York on behalf of the respective named
plaintiffs and a putative class comprised of all persons and
entities who purchased caustic soda in the U.S. indirectly from
distributors at any time between October 1, 2015 and the present.


The other defendants named in the lawsuits are Occidental Petroleum
Corporation, Occidental Chemical Corporation d/b/a OxyChem,
Westlake Chemical Corporation, Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd.,
Shintech Incorporated, Formosa Plastics Corporation, and Formosa
Plastics Corporation, U.S.A.

The lawsuits allege the defendants conspired to fix, raise,
maintain and stabilize the price of caustic soda, restrict domestic
(U.S.) supply of caustic soda and allocate caustic soda customers.
Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of damages and injunctive
relief.

Olin said, "We believe we have meritorious legal positions and will
continue to represent our interests vigorously in this matter. Any
losses related to this matter are not currently estimable because
of unresolved questions of fact and law, but if resolved
unfavorably to Olin, could have a material adverse effect on our
financial position, cash flows or results of operations."

Olin Corporation, incorporated on August 13, 1892, is a
manufacturer and distributor of chemical products, and ammunition.
The Company operates through three segments: Chlor Alkali Products
and Vinyls, Epoxy and Winchester. The company is based in Clayton
Missouri.


ORIGINS NATURAL: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Origins Natural
Resources Inc. The case is styled as Jason Camacho and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Origins Natural
Resources Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06505 (E.D.N.Y., Nov.
18, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Origins Natural Resources Inc. engages in the manufacture of skin
care, color, bath and body, lifestyle, and sensory therapy
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darryn G Solotoff, Esq.
          Law Office of Darryn G Solotoff PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 317-2453
          Fax: (516) 706-4692
          Email: ds@lawsolo.net


P.C. RICHARD & SON: Camacho Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against P.C. Richard & Son,
LLC. The case is styled as Jason Camacho and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-06504 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 18, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

P.C. Richard & Son, commonly known as simply P.C. Richard, is the
largest chain of private, family-owned appliance, television,
electronics, and mattress stores in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darryn G Solotoff, Esq.
          Law Office of Darryn G Solotoff PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Boulevard, Ste 280
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 317-2453
          Fax: (516) 706-4692
          Email: ds@lawsolo.net


PANDORA: Lower Court Asked to Reconsider Class Action Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Marsha Silva, writing for Digital Music News, reports that the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave Pandora hope that it could
escape a class action lawsuit filed against it relating to the
streaming of music recorded prior to 1972.

The Appeals Court did this by asking a lower court to reconsider
the request by Pandora to throw out the lawsuit.

In 2013, the Turtles' Flo & Eddie tried to get payment from both
Pandora and SiriusXM for the digital and satellite performances of
songs such as "Happy Together." However, because federal U.S.
Copyright Law at that time did not cover music recorded prior to
1972, the two had to sue the companies in state courts.

That triggered a patchwork of decisions, and a very lengthy and
expensive legal war.  And complicating the mess is that Pandora was
acquired by SiriusXM in 2018 for roughly $3.5 billion.

In 2014, a California court agreed that the recordings were
protected by state law.  In response, Pandora appealed to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California, which
rejected the company's bid to dismiss the case.

At the same time, though, other state courts, such as in Florida
and New York, ruled in favor of Pandora. This led the Ninth
Circuit, which eventually received the case, to request
clarification of California law from the state's Supreme Court.

In the meantime, U.S. Congress in 2018 passed the Music
Modernization Act (MMA), which -- while it gave federal copyright
protection to songs recorded prior to 1972 -- also protected
companies like Pandora against previous usage of songs as well as
state-based claims as long as they pay royalties going back to 3
years before the law was passed.

As Pandora has made this payment, the Ninth Circuit, which cannot
directly consider the passage of the MMA in its ruling because it
is considered new evidence, is instead asking the California
district court to reconsider its decision in light of the passage
of the MMA.

Interestingly, this is the first time the MMA has been factored
into this multi-state battle. "When faced with a determination of
applying a new legal principle, a standard practice is to remand to
the district court for a decision in the first instance," the Ninth
Circuit stated.

The ball now is in the district court's hands, and it looks like
Pandora just may avoid the costly class action suit. [GN]


PAPA JOHN'S: Court Sends No-Poach Class Action to Arbitration
-------------------------------------------------------------
David McAfee, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Papa John's
prevailed in its efforts to send to arbitration a combined proposed
class action in Kentucky federal court challenging "no-poach"
language in the pizzeria's franchise agreements.

Papa John's successfully convinced Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky that
claims by Jamiah Greer, a named plaintiff and former employee, were
covered by the parties' arbitration agreement. The ruling comes
more than six months after Papa John's sought to have the case
dismissed or sent to arbitration.

Mckinley Oct. 21 granted the pizza giant's motion to compel
arbitration in the case. [GN]


PARETEUM CORP: Rosen Law Reminds of Dec. 23 Lead Plaintiff Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, has filed a
class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the securities of
Pareteum Corporation (NASDAQ: TEUM) from March 12, 2019 and October
21, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to
recover damages for Pareteum investors under the federal securities
laws.

To join the Pareteum class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1701.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Pareteum improperly and inaccurately recognized revenue
for certain customer transactions; (2) Pareteum's financial
statements for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2018 and
quarters of ending March 31, 2019 and June 30, 2019 were false and
could not be relied on; and (3) as a result, defendants' statements
about its business, operations, and prospects, were materially
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than December
23, 2019. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1701.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

CONTACT:

Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40thFloor
New York, NY 10016

Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
[GN]


PAYMENTCLUB INC: Bid to Dismiss Amended Fabricant TCPA Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TERRY FABRICANT, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PAYMENTCLUB INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-CV-02451-ODW-(ASx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis
D. Wright of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California (i) granted the Plaintiff's motion for relief from Local
Rule 23-3, which sets the deadline for moving for class
certification; and (ii) denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") for failing to state a claim.

On April 1, 2019, Fabricant filed a complaint against Net Element
Inc. for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") and willful or knowing violation of the TCPA.  Thereafter,
on May 3, 2019, Fabricant amended his complaint to name Defendant
Paymentclub, which executed a Waiver of Service on May 9, 2019,
resulting in a responsive pleading deadline of July 8, 2019.

Fabricant alleges that Paymentclub uses automatic telephone dialing
system ("ATDS") with the ability to store or produce telephone
numbers to solicit business.  He alleges on Jan. 22, 2019, he
received a call from Paymentclub on his (818) mobile device without
his consent.  To identify the caller, Fabricant provided his email
address to the sales representative and received an email from
meesha@paymentclub.com.  He asserts that the call was not
necessitated by an emergency and his privacy was violated by the
annoying, harassing nuisance.

Fabricant seeks to represent a class of all persons to whom (a) the
Defendant and/or a third party acting on the Defendant's behalf
made one or more non-emergency telephone calls; (b) to a cellular
telephone number; (c) through the use of an automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (d) at any
time in the period that begins four years before the date of filing
the original complaint in the case and ends at the date of trial.

Fabricant filed his Motion for Relief on June 25, 2019, seeking
relief from the Central District's Local Rule 23-3, which requires
a plaintiff to move for class certification within 90 days of
service of a pleading purporting to commence a class action other
than an action subject to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.  On July 10, 2019, the  Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the FAC for failing to state a claim.   Paymentclub filed
its Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion on July 15, 2019 claiming
Fabricant provides no justification for his failure to comply with
Local Rule 23-3.

Fabricant's deadline to file a motion for class certification
elapsed on Aug. 1, 2019, which is 90 days after Fabricant served
Paymentclub with the FAC.  He filed his Motion for Relief
requesting an extension, over a month before the deadline, because
he anticipated he would not have received sufficient discovery to
file a robust motion for class certification.  Fabricant notes that
Paymentclub agreed to waiver of service on May 9, 2019 and was not
required to file a responsive pleading until July 7, 2019.
Although the Parties dispute whether Paymentclub agreed to an early
Rule 26(f) conference, Fabricant projected that the 90-day deadline
would not provide sufficient time for meaningful discovery and
moved for relief well before the deadline.  Accordingly, Judge
Wright finds that Fabricant acted with diligence and timely filed
his motion for relief, and finds good cause to grant relief from
Local Rule 23-3.

Paymentclub alleges that Fabricant failed to plead sufficient
allegations to state a claim.  Specifically, Fabricant failed to
allege that the call was placed using an ATDS, without his consent,
or for a non-emergency reason.  Yet, Fabricant did in fact allege
that recipients of these calls, including the Plaintiff, did not
consent to receive them.  Further, he alleges that Paymentclub uses
an ATDS system, for example, when he received a phone call from
Paymentclub no one answered at first but after a click he received
a human response.  Moreover, Fabricant alleges that he spoke to the
sales representative who described the company was in payment
solutions and pitched him on using their services.  Thus, the Judge
can surmise that the call was not regarding an emergency situation.
Accordingly, from these allegations the Court can infer that
Fabricant asserts a violation under the TCPA for use of an ATDS.

Lastly, Paymentclub repeatedly asserts that Fabricant fails to
state any factual support regarding any calls; however, on a motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff need not prove his claim with evidentiary
support.  The Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a claim if he provides
notice of the violation.  Fabricant indicates the date he received
the call and outlines the factual background of his claim with
sufficient detail.  Thus, Judge Wright finds Fabricant has
sufficiently plead a claim and will deny Paymentclub's motion to
dismiss.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Wright (i) granted the Plaintiff's
motion, and (ii) denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/l66D3Z from Leagle.com.

Terry Fabricant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher J. Reichman --
admin@prato-reichman.com -- Prato and Reichman APC & Anthony I.
Paronich -- anthony@paronichlaw.com -- Paronich Law PC, pro hac
vice.

PAYMENTCLUB INC., Defendant, represented by James Cannon Huber --
jhuber@attorneygl.com -- Global Legal Law Firm.

PHH MORTGAGE: Cabral Suit Removed to Massachusetts District Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Thomas Cabral on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. PHH
Mortgage Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 1973CV00379, was removed
from the Bristol Superior Court to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts (Boston) on Nov. 1, 2019.

The District of Massachusetts Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-12245-DJC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Denise J. Casper.

The suit alleges violation of consumer credit-related laws.

PHH Mortgage Corporation provides mortgage financing
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Sergei Lemberg, Esq.
         LEMBERG LAW, L.L.C.
         43 Danbury Road
         Wilton, CT 06897
         Telephone: (203) 653-2250
         Facsimile: (203) 653-3424
         E-mail: slemberg@lemberglaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

         Richard E. Briansky, Esq.
         ECKERT SEAMANS CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC
         Two International Place, 16th Flr.
         Boston, MA 02110
         Telephone: (617) 342-6824
         Facsimile: (617) 342-6899
         E-mail: rbriansky@eckertseamans.com


PORTLAND GENERAL: Oregon App. Affirms Dismissal of Dreyer Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, Phil DREYER, Plaintiff, and Frank GEARHART and
Kafoury Bros., LLC, an Oregon limited liability corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.,
Defendant-Respondent; Patricia MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., Defendant-Respondent, Case Nos.
03C10639, A161947 (Control), Nos. 03C10640, A161948 (Or. App.),
Judge Roger J. DeHoog of the Court of Appeals of Oregon affirmed
the general judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court
denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint and granted
the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The case is the final installment in an extensive series of
challenges arising out of the Public Utility Commission (PUC)'s
approval of rates for PGE in Order No. 95-322 that erroneously
included, as a component of those rates, a return on PGE's capital
investment in the unused Trojan nuclear generating facility, which
had been prematurely retired from service.  The Plaintiffs
challenged the order, and, in Citizens' Utility Board v. PUC, the
Court remanded the order to the PUC for reconsideration.  

While PUC's reconsideration of Order No. 95-322 was pending, the
Plaintiffs brought the action, alleging that the rates PGE had
charged between April 1, 1995 and Oct. 1, 2000, pursuant to that
order were unlawful and that PGE's collection of payments at those
rates had caused them recoverable damages.  The complaint alleged
that: (1) PGE had violated ORS 757.355 (1993)2 by charging and
receiving rates that included a return on PGE's investment in
Trojan, rendering PGE liable for damages under ORS 756.185;3 (2)
PGE had violated ORS 757.2254 by charging an amount for utility
services not authorized by law; and (3) the Plaintiffs were
entitled to damages, under the equitable theories of "money had and
received" and unjust enrichment, for the component of PGE's charges
that represented a return on its investment.  The Plaintiffs sought
damages in excess of $190 million, which they alleged PGE had
charged "illegally" between April 1, 1995 and Oct. 1, 2000, due to
its inclusion of a return on the Trojan investment in its rates.

In a ruling issued Jan. 9, 2005, the trial court declined PGE's
request to abate the action pending the PUC's reconsideration of
its order.  It also rejected PGE's motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgment, instead granting summary judgment to the
Plaintiffs on their claims for money had and received and violation
of ORS 757.355 (1993).

PGE petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, seeking to
compel the trial court to dismiss or abate the Plaintiffs' claims.
The court issued a peremptory writ ordering the circuit court to
abate the action, and the Plaintiffs' claims were held in abeyance.


Following the Court's remand of Order No. 95-322, the PUC held
further proceedings resulting in the issuance of PUC Order No.
08-487.  In Order No. 08-487, the PUC determined what rates it
would have approved had it correctly disallowed a return on PGE's
investment in Trojan.  The PUC determined that the resulting rates
for April 1, 1995 to Oct. 1, 2000, would have been higher than the
rates that PGE had actually charged to customers for that same
period.

Previously, PGE and the Plaintiffs had reached a settlement with
respect to customers who had paid for utility services after Oct.
1, 2000.  However, the PUC's reevaluation of the pre-October 2000
rates led it to conclude that the rates charged thereafter were too
high and had resulted in an overpayment for services by those
customers, not all of which had been accounted for through the
settlement.  After determining that it had the power to remedy that
overpayment by ordering refunds, the PUC required PGE to issue
refunds totaling $33.1 million plus interest to PGE's post-October
2000 customers.

The PUC did not, however, require PGE to issue refunds to the
Plaintiffs for the period of 1995 to 2000, due to its conclusion in
Order No. 08-487 that the rates charged during that period had been
just and reasonable and that there had therefore been no
overpayments.  The Court and the Supreme Court subsequently upheld
PUC Order No. 08-487.   With respect to the PUC's failure to issue
refunds for the period of 1995 to 2000, the Supreme Court upheld
the PUC's determination that PGE did not violate ORS 757.355 (1993)
or ORS 757.225, and that the Plaintiffs did not overpay for utility
services from 1995 to 2000 and therefore did not sustain any
damages.

In October 2015, while the summary judgment motion was under
advisement, the Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking leave to amend
their complaint to add allegations that PUC Order No. 95-322 was
void ab initio, that the previous rate order (PUC Order No.
87-1017) was the lawful order that remained in effect, and that the
Plaintiffs were entitled to damages based on the difference between
the charges imposed under PUC Order No. 95-322 and the charges that
would have been imposed under PUC Order No. 87-1017.  On Feb. 22,
2016, the trial court issued an order denying the Plaintiffs'
motion to amend the complaint.

Five of the Plaintiffs' six assignments of error on appeal relate
to the trial court's denial of leave to amend the complaint.  The
Plaintiffs advance various arguments as to how, in their view, the
trial court abused its discretion.  They do not, however, contend
that the trial court should not have considered the nonexclusive
Ramsey factors when exercising its discretion to allow an
amendment.  Nor, with the limited exceptions, do they suggest that
the court relied on an erroneous interpretation of the law in
exercising its discretion.

With that understanding, and for the reasons that follow, DeHoog
concludes that the trial court properly evaluated the Ramsey
factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs'
motion for leave to amend the complaint.

Like the trial court, he specifically notes that the Plaintiffs'
"void ab initio" argument, under which the factfinder would be
required to compare the rates charged to the rates authorized under
PUC Order No. 87-1017 was a wholly new theory that neither
Plaintiffs' earlier claims nor the years of agency and judicial
review had foreshadowed.  And, whether or not, as the Plaintiffs
suggest, the trial court's belief that they could have raised their
new arguments earlier in the case was legally incorrect, that
belief appears unlikely to have informed the trial court's ultimate
rationale -- that allowing the proposed amendments at that late
time would cause considerable prejudice to PGE.  Given that the
Plaintiffs fully litigated the Defendant's summary judgment motion
and waited over two months after the court had taken that motion
under advisement before filing their motion for leave to amend, the
trial court reasonably could have concluded that the Plaintiffs'
delay was wholly tactical and that the interests of justice weighed
against their request.

Similarly, the trial court did not, under the first Ramsey factor,
err in characterizing the Plaintiffs' proposed attorney fee claim
as "new," as they also contend.  The Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs' original complaint requested relief in the form of $190
million with prejudgment interest, and included a general request
for costs and reasonable attorney fees.  But the Plaintiffs did not
identify a specific source for attorney fees.  Additionally, in the
litigation, the Plaintiffs did not prevail on any claim that would
support an award of attorney fees.  The attorney fees they now seek
though their proposed amendments relate to benefits obtained
through litigation of PGE's obligations to its post-2000
ratepayers, which did not inure to the benefit of any of them in
the case.  As a result, the trial court reasonably could view the
Plaintiffs' attorney fee claims as both new and unrelated to the
allegations of the existing complaint.

Plaintiffs make various other arguments as to how the trial court
abused its discretion in denying them leave to amend the complaint.
Ultimately, however, whether the Judge considers them individually
or collectively, none of those additional arguments persuade him
that the court abused its discretion in ruling as it did, and, to
the extent that he has not expressly identified every argument that
the Plaintiffs make on that point, he rejects the balance of those
arguments without further discussion.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' sixth assignment of error challenges the
trial court's ruling granting PGE's motion for summary judgment.
They contend that the circuit court's ruling on Jan. 9, 2005,
granting their motion for summary judgment on the claims for money
had and received and violation of ORS 757.355, became "law of the
case," and that the trial court therefore could not revisit the
ruling.  The Plaintiffs are mistaken.  The Judge holds that the
Jan. 9, 2005, order was superseded, first by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Dreyer, abating the action pending the out-come of
Gearhart, then by the Supreme Court's opinion in Gearhart upholding
the PUC's order determining that the Plaintiffs have not been
damaged, and, finally, by the circuit court's ruling, within its
discretion, reconsidering the Jan. 9, 2005, order and instead
granting PGE's motion for summary judgment. The trial court's
decision to reconsider its prior ruling in light of subsequent case
law was within the court's discretion and was not precluded by "law
of the case."

As an alternative to their law-of-the-case argument, the Plaintiffs
argue the merits of PGE's motion for summary judgment, contending
that the trial court erred in granting that motion because
questions of fact remained as to what part of the rates that PGE
had charged between 1995 and 2000 had been attributable to the
disallowed return on its investment in Trojan.

The Judge does not agree with the Plaintiffs' reading of Dreyer.
He holds that the PUC's conclusion -- that the inclusion of the
unlawful component did not cause the rates to be unjust or
unreasonable and, therefore, has not resulted in any unrectified
damages to ratepayers -- was consonant with the remands.  The gist
of the PUC's order, and the Court's and the Supreme Court's
affirmance of that order, is that the Plaintiffs have not been
injured.  Therefore, as the trial court reasoned in its letter
opinion, the Plaintiffs have no damages to recover.  Thus, the
Judge concludes that the trial court did not err in granting PGE's
motion for summary judgment.

Having concluded that the trial court did not err in the rulings to
which the Plaintiffs have assigned error, Judge DeHoog affirmed the
trial court's judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gGisao from Leagle.com.

Linda K. Williams -- williams@kafourymcdougal.com -- Daniel W.
Meek, and Phil Goldsmith filed the briefs for appellants.

James N. Westwood -- james.westwood@stoel.com -- Stoel Rives LLP,
Paul W. Conable, Alexander M. Tinker, and Tonkon Torp LLP filed the
brief for respondent.


PROSPECT CHARTERCARE: $4.5MM Settlement Gets Final Ct. Nod
----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
granted final approval of a settlement in the case captioned
STEPHEN DEL SESTO, AS RECEIVER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ST. JOSEPH
HEALTH SERVICES OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT PLAN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, v. PROSPECT CHARTERCARE, LLC, ET AL., Defendants, C.A.
No. 18-328 WES. (D.R.I.).

This action stems from alleged underfunding of a retirement plan
for nurses and other hospital workers employed by SJHSRI. According
to the amended complaint, the Plan, which has 2,729 participants,
is insolvent. After the Plan was placed into receivership in 2017,
the Receiver and several named participants, individually and on
behalf of a purported class of plan participants, filed a
twenty-three-count complaint in this Court against several
defendants, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) for failure to meet minimum funding
requirements and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as various state
law claims.  

A number of defendants have agreed to settle with Plaintiffs,
resulting in two separate settlement agreements. Under the
settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants SJHSRI, RWH,
CCCB, and CCF ("Settlement B"), the Receiver will be transferred
$4.5 million for deposit into the Plan assets by CCF and its
insurer.  In exchange, Plaintiffs and Defendants SJHSRI, CCCB, and
RWH will release CCF and the Rhode Island Foundation from
liability. In addition, the Receiver will transfer to CCF any
rights he holds in CCF.

Non-Settling Defendants objected. On May 17, 2019, the Court
preliminarily approved the settlement and directed the settling
parties to give notice to the purported class.

Plaintiffs and Settling Defendants now seek final approval of the
settlement. One class member objects on the basis that the $4.5
million amount transferred to the Plan is insufficient. The
Non-Settling Defendants also reiterate their objections to the
settlement.

In order to approve the settlement, the Court must first determine
that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. A federal court has
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 so long as
the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint exhibits, within its four
corners, either an explicit federal cause of action or a state-law
cause of action that contains an embedded question of federal law
that is both substantial and disputed. Plaintiffs' complaint
alleges four claims which arise under ERISA a federal statute.

Final Approval Under Rule 23(e)

A Court may approve a settlement in a class action only upon a
finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Some
of the factors in this consideration include:

(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation
(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement (3) the stage of
the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed (4) the risks
of establishing liability (5) the risks of establishing damages (6)
the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial (7) the
ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment (8) the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best
possible recovery and (9) the range of reasonableness of the
settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the
attendant risks of litigation.

The Court finds that this settlement has been entered into in good
faith and that its terms are fair, adequate, and reasonable.
Without question, this case involves the determination of complex
legal questions which would be costly and time-consuming to
litigate through trial. Indeed, hundreds of pages of briefing have
already been filed at this stage of the litigation.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have provided evidence demonstrating that
hundreds of class members support the settlement. Only one member
of the purported class of more than 2,700 members has objected on
the basis that the amount of money to be transferred to the
Receiver is only half of the money which should have gone into the
Plan. However, as Plaintiffs have acknowledged, given the
complexity of this case and lack of settled law with respect to the
claims asserted against CCF, Plaintiffs are not without risk in
proving liability should the case move forward.  

In light of that risk, the settlement amount appears to be
reasonable.

The Court finds that Settlement B is the product of good faith and
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Non-Settling Defendants' Objections

The Non-Settling Defendants have objected to final approval of the
settlement on several grounds. A number of these objections turn on
an unsettled legal question regarding whether ERISA applies to the
Plan or whether the Plan is exempt from ERISA as a church plan.

The Court is satisfied that it need not address questions related
to the applicability of ERISA in order to approve this settlement.
Similarly, the Court need not determine the constitutionality or
potential preemption of the Settlement Statute, and therefore
expressly declines to rule on these issues at this time.

The Court's approval of this settlement shall be without prejudice
to the Non-Settling Defendants' right to assert these arguments
later in this litigation or in future proceedings.

Certification of Class, Class Representatives, and Class Counsel

The Settling Parties also ask the Court to grant final
certification of the class, class representatives, and class
counsel under Rule 23. In order to meet the standard for class
certification, the purported class must meet the requirements under
Rule 23(a) and one of the categories of Rule 23(b).  

A class satisfies Rule 23(a) if

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the class or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class  and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

The Court outlined its reasons for finding these factors to have
been met in the order granting preliminary approval of the
settlement. The Court is satisfied that its analysis of these
factors has not changed for purposes of final settlement approval.
Additionally, the Non-Settling Defendants' objections do not relate
to certification of the class, its representatives, or its
counsel.

Accordingly, for purposes of this settlement only, the Court
certifies the following class: All participants of the St. Joseph
Health Services of Rhode Island Retirement Plan, including all
surviving former employees of St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode
Island who are entitled to benefits under the Plan and all
representatives and beneficiaries of deceased former employees of
St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island who are entitled to
benefits under the Plan.  

The Court appoints Gail J. Major, Nancy Zompa, Ralph Bryden,
Dorothy Willner, Caroll Short, Donna Boutelle, and Eugenia Levesque
as settlement class representatives and Wistow, Sheehan & Lovely,
P.C. as class counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum of Decision is available at https://tinyurl.com/yxl36ddd
from Leagle.com.

Deming E. Sherman, Special Master, pro se.

Stephen Del Sesto, as Receiver and Administrator of the St. Joseph
Health Services of Rhode Island Retirement Plan, Gail J. Major,
Nancy Zompa, Ralph Bryden, Dorothy Willner, Caroll Short, Donna
Boutelle & Eugenia Levesque, Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin G.
Ledsham , Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley, PC, Stephen P. Sheehan ,
Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley, PC & Max Wistow , Wistow Sheehan &
Loveley, 61 Weybosset Street, Providence, RI 02903-2824

Prospect CharterCARE, LLC, Prospect CharterCare SJHSRI, LLC &
Prospect Chartercare RWMC, LLC, Defendants, represented by Joseph
V. Cavanagh, III , Blish & Cavanagh LLP, Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr. ,
Blish & Cavanagh, LLP, Commerce Center, 30 Exchange Terrace,
Providence, RI 02903-1765, William Mark Russo , Ferrucci Russo
P.C., 55 Pine Street, 4th Floor Providence, RI 02903, Christopher
Joseph Fragomeni - cfragomeni@shslawfirm.com - SHECHTMAN HALPERIN
SAVAGE, LLP & Dean J. Wagner - dwagner@shslawfirm.com - Shechtman
Halperin Savage LLP.

PROSPECTS DM: Faces Gunn Suit Over Autodialed Telemarketing Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
William Gunn, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PROSPECTS DM, LLC, ICOT HEARING SYSTEMS, LLC d/b/a
LISTENCLEAR, ICOT HOLDINGS, LLC, JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1 THROUGH
10, and OTHER JOHN DOE ENTITES 1 THROUGH 10, all whose true names
are unknown, Case No. 4:19-cv-03129 (E.D. Mo., Nov. 21, 2019), is
brought against the Defendants for their violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendants have placed autodialed telemarketing calls to the
Plaintiff and class members' phones without prior express written
consent, in violation of the TCPA, the Plaintiff alleges. These
autodialed calls placed by the Defendants caused the Plaintiff and
class members to suffer actual harm and legal injury. The Plaintiff
has suffered aggravation, invasion of privacy, nuisance due to
receiving such calls, says the complaint.

William Gunn is a resident of the State of Missouri.

PDM is a limited liability company organized in the state of
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samantha J. Orlowski, Esq.
          Joel S. Halvorsen, Esq.
          HALVORSEN KLOTE
          680 Craig Road, Suite 104
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Phone: (314) 451-1314
          Fax: (314) 787-4323
          Email: sam@hklawstl.com
                 joel@hklawstl.com


PURDUE PHARMA: Stock Suit Moved From N.D. Okla. to N.D. Ohio
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as William Stock, Individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Purdue
Pharma L.P.; Purdue Pharma Inc.; Purdue Frederick Company; Insys
Therapeutics Inc.; Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.; Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Cephalon Inc.; Johnson & Johnson;
Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Endo Health Solutions Inc.; Endo
Pharmaceuticals Inc.; Actavis plc; Actavis Inc.; Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Watson Laboratories Inc.; McKesson
Corporation; Cardinal Health Inc.; AmerisourceBergen Corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00526, was transferred on Nov 1, 2019,
from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
(Cleveland).

The Northern District of Ohio Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-op-45927-DAP to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Dan Aaron Polster.

The suit alleges violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.

The lawsuit seeks recompense for compensatory damages, emotional
distress; loss of enjoyment of life; lost earning capacity and loss
of income; loss of filial consortium; loss of spousal consortium;
anguish; sorrow; solace, including companionship, comfort,
guidance, kindly offices, advise, services, protection, care, and
assistance; services for medical care, including any necessary
rehabilitation; and/or funeral and burial expenses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradford D. Barron, Esq.
          Zachary T. Barron, Esq.
          BARRON LAW FIRM PLLC
          PO Box 369
          Claremore, OK 74018
          Telephone: (918) 341-8402
          Facsimile: (918) 515-4691
          E-mail: bbarron@barronlawfirmok.com
                  zbarron@barronlawfirmok.com


RISE CONSTRUCTION: Sanchez Seeks OT Pay for Construction Workers
----------------------------------------------------------------
JAVIER SANCHEZ, Individually and On Behalf of All Similarly
Situated Persons, Plaintiff v. RISE CONSTRUCTION LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 4:19-cv-04295 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 1, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, Rise Construction has a business plan
that includes hiring hourly construction workers and misclassifying
them as independent contractors. Rise does this in order to avoid
paying social security and medicare taxes, unemployment premiums,
workers compensation premiums, and overtime pay, and to gain an
unfair advantage over competitors who follow the law in their
employment practices.

Mr. Sanchez is one of the many workers hired by Rise as an hourly
construction worker "contractor." He worked for Rise from April
2018 until June 6, 2019, and his duties included sheet rock work
and painting. During the time he worked for the Defendant, he
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, the lawsuit
says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josef F. Buenker, Esq.
          THE BUENKER LAW FIRM
          2060 North Loop West, Suite 215
          Houston, TX 77018
          Telephone: 713 868-3388
          Facsimile: 713 683-9940
          E-mail: jbuenker@buenkerlaw.com


ROCKWELL MEDICAL: Feb. 26 Settlement Fairness Hearing Set
---------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP and Pomerantz LLP on Oct. 21 disclosed
that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York has approved the following announcement of a proposed
class action settlement that would benefit purchasers of securities
of Rockwell Medical, Inc. (RMTI):

SUMMARY NOTICE OF (I) PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION AND PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT; (II) SETTLEMENT HEARING; AND (III) MOTION FOR AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

TO:   all persons or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
Rockwell Common Stock or Rockwell Call Options, or sold Rockwell
Put Options between November 8, 2017 and June 26, 2018, inclusive
(the "Settlement Class Period") and were injured thereby (the
"Settlement Class"):

PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY, YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY
A CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT PENDING IN THIS COURT.

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and an Order of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, that the above-captioned
litigation (the "Action") has been certified as a class action on
behalf of the Settlement Class, except for certain persons and
entities who are excluded from the Settlement Class by definition
as set forth in the full Notice of (I) Pendency of Class Action and
Proposed Settlement; (II) Settlement Hearing; and (III) Motion for
an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses (the "Notice").

YOU ARE ALSO NOTIFIED that Lead Plaintiffs in the Action have
reached a proposed settlement of the Action for three million seven
hundred thousand dollars ($3,700,000.00 USD) in cash (the
"Settlement"), that, if approved, will resolve all claims in the
Action.

A hearing will be held on February 26, 2020 at 11:00 a.m., before
the Honorable Allyne R. Ross at the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, Courtroom 2E, 225 Cadman
Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY 11201, to determine (i) whether the
proposed Settlement should be approved as fair, reasonable, and
adequate; (ii) whether the Action should be dismissed with
prejudice against Defendants, and the Releases specified and
described in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated
August 6, 2019 (and in the Notice) should be granted; (iii) whether
the proposed Plan of Allocation should be approved as fair and
reasonable; and (iv) whether Co-Lead Counsel's application for an
award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of expenses should be
approved.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, your rights will be
affected by the pending Action and the Settlement, and you may be
entitled to share in the Settlement Fund.  The Notice and Proof of
Claim and Release Form (the "Claim and Release Form"), can be
downloaded from the website maintained by the Claims Administrator,
www.RockwellSecuritiesSettlement.com. You may also obtain copies of
the Notice and Claim and Release Form by contacting the Claims
Administrator at Too v. Rockwell Medical, Inc., c/o Strategic
Claims Services, 600 N. Jackson Street, Suite 205, Media, PA 19063,
866-274-4004.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class, in order to be
eligible to receive a payment under the proposed Settlement, you
must submit a Claim and Release Form to the Claims Administrator
postmarked no later than February 7, 2020.  If you are a Settlement
Class Member and do not submit a proper Claim and Release Form, you
will not be eligible to share in the distribution of the net
proceeds of the Settlement but you will nevertheless be bound by
any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the Action.

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and wish to exclude
yourself from the Settlement Class, you must submit a request for
exclusion such that it is received no later than February 5, 2020,
in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Notice.  If
you properly exclude yourself from the Settlement Class, you will
not be bound by any judgments or orders entered by the Court in the
Action and you will not be eligible to share in the proceeds of the
Settlement.

Any objections to the proposed Settlement, the proposed Plan of
Allocation, or Co-Lead Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of expenses, must be filed with the Court and
delivered to Co-Lead Counsel and Defendants' Counsel such that they
are received no later than February 5, 2020, in accordance with the
instructions set forth in the Notice.

Please do not contact the Court, the Clerk's office, Defendants, or
their counsel regarding this notice.  All questions about this
notice, the proposed Settlement, or your eligibility to participate
in the Settlement should be directed to Co-Lead Counsel or the
Claims Administrator.

Inquiries, other than requests for the Notice and Claim and Release
Form, should be made to Co-Lead Counsel:

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
Casey E. Sadler, Esq.
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 201-9150
Email: settlements@glancylaw.com

Or

POMERANTZ LLP
Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (212) 661-1100
Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com

Requests for the Notice and Claim and Release Form should be made
to:

Too v. Rockwell Medical, Inc.    
c/o Strategic Claims Services
600 N. Jackson Street, Suite 205
Media, PA 19063
Telephone: (866) 274-4004
www.RockwellSecuritiesSettlement.com

By Order of the Court
[GN]


ROTHMAN EVANS: Gonzalez Files Suit under FDCPA in New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rothman Evans, P.C.
The case is styled as Brandon Gonzalez, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Rothman Evans, P.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06525 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 19, 2019).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Rothman Evans, PC is a firm serving Syracuse, NY in Collections,
Creditors Rights and Creditor Bankruptcy cases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Barshay, Esq.
   Barshay Sanders, PLLC
   100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
   Garden City, NY 11530
   Tel: (516) 203-7600
   Fax: (516) 706-5055
   Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com


S&S SPRAYERS: Hernandez Files Class Suit in California
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against S&S Sprayers, LLC.
The case is styled as J. Santos Hernandez, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. S&S Sprayers,
LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant, Case No.
BCV-19-103259 (Cal. Super Ct., Kern County, Nov. 19, 2019).

The case type of the lawsuit is stated as CV Other Employment -
Civil Unlimited.

S&S SPRAYERS LLC is a freight Carrier that is authorized for
property in the state of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Martin E Sullivan, Esq.
   Melmed Law Group, P.C.
   1180 S Beverly Dr, Ste 610
   Los Angeles, CA 90035-1158
   Tel: (310) 824-3828
   Email: ms@melmedlaw.com



SAFEWAY: Faces Class Action Over 1% Surcharge
---------------------------------------------
Jared Cowley, writing for KGW8, reports that a class action lawsuit
was filed on Oct. 21 against Safeway, accusing the grocery store
corporation of charging customers a 1% fee to pay for a tax the
city is charging large retailers to help pay for Portland's clean
energy initiative.

The tax, which began Jan. 1, 2019, applies to large retailers with
gross income from retail sales of $1 billion or more in the U.S.
and $500,000 in the City of Portland.

This is the second class action lawsuit filed against a Portland
business for passing on the city tax to customers. The first
lawsuit was filed against AT&T over a 5-cent billing surcharge.

"The surcharge was passed along to the customer to pay Safeway's
obligation to help fund the Portland Clean Energy Initiative," said
Portland attorney Michael Fuller, who is organizing both this class
action lawsuit and the lawsuit against AT&T. [GN]





SEMPRA ENERGY: Ninth Circuit Appeals Filed in Plumley Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in their
lawsuit entitled Craig Plumley, et al. v. Sempra Energy, et al.,
Case No. 3:16-cv-00512-BEN-AGS, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California, San Diego.

The appellate case is captioned as Craig Plumley, et al. v. Sempra
Energy, et al., Case No. 19-56216, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiffs
sought Ninth Circuit review of a ruling issued in their lawsuit.
That appellate case is styled as Craig Plumley, et al. v. Sempra
Energy, et al., Case No. 19-55121.

Sempra Energy is a publicly traded energy-services holding company
whose operating units invest in, develop, and operate energy
infrastructure, and provide gas and electricity services to
customers in North and South America.  Southern California Gas
Company (SCG) is one of Sempra's operating units.  SCG is a natural
gas distribution utility and operates over 20,000 square miles
throughout Central and Southern California.  SCG's operation
includes the storage of natural gas. It owns four natural gas
storage facilities, the largest located at the Aliso Canyon, which
contains approximately 115 underground wells. One of its well, the
SS-25 had a gas leak.

Sempra/SCG discovered the Aliso Canyon gas leak at the SS-25 well
on or about October 23, 2015, when residents in the nearby Porter
Ranch neighborhood reported what they believed to be a home with a
major gas leak.  Sempra/SCG did not immediately report the gas leak
to the appropriate government agencies, but instead, SCG went
door-to-door reassuring residents that all was under control and
that no danger existed.  Three days later, on October 26, 2015,
Sempra/SCG reported the gas leak to the appropriate authorities.

The gas leak persisted for months.  On December 4, 2015, Sempra/SCG
began constructing a relief well.  On January 6, 2016, Governor
Brown declared or made a proclamation of a state of emergency
regarding the gas leak.  The proclamation directed additional
immediate actions to respond to the leak, and ordered a
comprehensive independent review of the safety of the storage wells
and the air quality of the surrounding community.  The proclamation
also charged SCG with payment of the costs related to the gas leak,
as well as the funding of a program to mitigate the emissions.
Sempra/SCG sealed the gas leak on February 18, 2016.

Sempra and SCG have been jointly or separately named as defendants
in at least 138 lawsuits related to the gas leak, including this
lawsuit.  The first amended complaint claims violations of Section
10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript is due on December 17, 2019;

   -- Appellants Richard Berkowitz, Stephen Graham and Craig M.
      Plumley's opening brief is due on January 27, 2020;

   -- Appellees Dennis V. Arriola, Debra L. Reed, Sempra Energy
      and Southern California Gas Company's answering brief is
      due on February 26, 2020; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after
      service of the answering brief.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants CRAIG M. PLUMLEY, STEPHEN GRAHAM and RICHARD
BERKOWITZ, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, are represented by:

          Adam M. Apton, Esq.
          Adam McCall, Esq.
          Nicholas I. Porritt, Esq.
          LEVI & KORSINSKY LLP
          1101 30th Street NW, Suite 115
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 524-4290
          E-mail: AApton@zlk.com
                  amccall@zlk.com
                  nporritt@zlk.com

               - and -

          Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
          Jennifer Banner Sobers , Esq.
          Matthew L. Tuccillo, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  jbsobers@pomlaw.com
                  mltuccillo@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees SEMPRA ENERGY and SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS
COMPANY are represented by:

          Robert Elliott Gooding, Jr., Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          600 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1800
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (714) 830-0600
          E-mail: robert.gooding@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          Randall M. Levine, Esq.
          David Bruce Salmons, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20004
          Telephone: (202) 739-3000
          E-mail: randall.levine@morganlewis.com
                  david.salmons@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          Thomas M. Peterson, Esq.
          MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Market Street
          Spear Street Tower
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 442-1000
          E-mail: thomas.peterson@morganlewis.com

               - and -

          John Warren Rissier, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue, 22nd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3132
          Telephone: (213) 612-2500
          E-mail: warren.rissier@morganlewis.com

Defendant-Appellee DEBRA L. REED is represented by:

          Jack P. DiCanio, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM, LLP
          525 University Avenue
          Palo Alto, CA 94301
          Telephone: (650) 470-4500
          E-mail: jack.dicanio@skadden.com

               - and -

          Allen Louis Lanstra, Jr., Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          300 South Grand Avenue
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 687-5513
          E-mail: allen.lanstra@skadden.com

Defendant-Appellee DENNIS V. ARRIOLA is represented by:

          Matthew W. Close, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 430-6000
          E-mail: mclose@omm.com


SETERUS INC: Court Narrows Claims in Heinitz Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York issued a Memorandum Decision and Order granting in part and
denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned
ROBERT J. HEINITZ, et. al., on Behalf of Themselves and Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. SETERUS, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 1:18-CV-1076(LEK/ATB) (N.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs  filed this class action complaint against Seterus, Inc.
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.
Plaintiffs assert two causes of action: violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and violation of New York General
Business Law Section 349 (GBL Section 349). Plaintiffs claim that
Defendant send letters (New York Final Letters) informing
homeowners that they are in default on their mortgages and falsely
stating that unless the homeowners make full payment, Defendants
will accelerate their loans and commence foreclosure proceedings.
In reality, Plaintiffs allege, Defendants do not take this action
if the homeowners bring their loans less than forty-five days
delinquent.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court must accept as true all material factual
allegations in the complaint, but [it is] not to draw inferences
from the complaint favorable to plaintiffs.  

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint
be dismissed if it ails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. To state a valid claim, a complaint must allege enough
facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.

Standing

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to
maintain a claim because: (1) Plaintiffs have not alleged a
particularized and concrete injury and (2) Plaintiffs have not
alleged an injury traceable to Defendant.

The Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiffs have standing.

The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing consists of
three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in
fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.  

Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs do not allege a concrete and
particularized injury because they merely allege a bare procedural
violation of the FDCPA.  

The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that FDCPA violations
protect concrete interests. There can be no dispute that Sections
1692e and g of the FDCPA protect an individual's concrete
interests. The purpose of the FDCPA is, among other things, to
protect debtors from abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors.

Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs failed to allege an injury
fairly traceable to Defendant is also misguided. Defendant argues
that Plaintiffs' alleged injury of "anxiety" about the New York
Final Letter is not traceable to Defendant's conduct because that
anxiety arises more from the fact that they are default than from
the letter. But the fact that Plaintiffs may also have anxiety
about their default does not mean Plaintiffs do not also have
anxiety about the allegedly empty threat that their loan would be
accelerated unless they made a full payment.  

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e
and Section 1692f. Plaintiffs specifically allege violations of
Section 1692e(5) and (10).

These sections state:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt , the following conduct is a violation of this section: (5)
The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that
is not intended to be taken (10) The use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.

Here, Plaintiffs allege misstatements that would mislead the least
sophisticated consumer. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that
the New York Final Letters cause the least sophisticated consumers
to believe that they will lose their homes if all arrearages to
Seterus are not paid by the stated expiration date; which is not
true.

They also allege New York Final Letters have the potential of
causing individuals to send additional money to Seterus that,
absent the false and misleading statements, they could have
utilized on other necessary expenditures, including food and
utility payments and that the misleading threats of acceleration
and foreclosure make it impossible for the least sophisticated
consumer to make a rational decision in response to the New York
Final Letter because it threatens immediate, irreversible
consequences.

Defendant argues that it is simply providing Plaintiffs a grace
period and that debt collectors do not violate the FDCPA by giving
debtors more rights. This is, to put it mildly, unconvincing.
Plaintiffs' allegation is not that Defendants are failing to
enforce all their rights. Plaintiffs' allegation is that Defendants
are threatening action they do not intend to take. Defendant's
unabashed attempt to characterize this as an act of generosity
ignores the 30(b)(6) testimony stating that it is in Defendant's
best interest not to foreclose on customers because our objective
is to collect that payment.

Thus, the allegation is not that Defendant kindly offers a grace
period. The allegation is that Defendant threatens serious action
in an attempt to induce frightened debtors into making a payment,
but does not actually intend to follow through on that action
because it is not in Defendant's business interest. This is the
sort of misstatement that falls clearly under Swection 1692e.  

Defendants have also submitted to the Court two cases in which
similar FDCPA claims against the same Defendant were dismissed by
other district courts. But Defendants fail to acknowledge that
neither of these cases were dismissed on the merits of the FDCPA
claim. It also fails to give approximate dates as to when these
letter were received, or the amount owed. Instead, it relies on and
recites snippets of a letter sent to a borrower in North Carolina
and alleges her letters were similar. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs
rely on a letter sent to the New York Plaintiffs.

Defendant's argument that Section 1692e(5) is inapplicable because
it only applies to threat of litigation is also unconvincing. It is
true that the language of the communication, taken as a whole, must
leave the least sophisticated reader with the impression that some
type of legal action has already been or is about to be initiated
and can be averted from running its course only by payment.

Thus, Plaintiffs have alleged a violation of Section 1692(e).

New York General Business Law Section 349

Under GBL Section 349 deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service
in this state are hereby declared unlawful. To state a claim for a
Section 349 violation, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has
engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially
misleading and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of
the allegedly deceptive act or practice.

Here, Plaintiffs have satisfied the first two elements. First,
Defendant does not appear to dispute that Defendant engaged in
consumer-oriented conduct, as the alleged conduct has a broad
impact on consumers at large and was not a private contract dispute
unique to the parties. Second, as discussed in the FDCPA context,
the notice was materially misleading.

But Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that they suffered an
injury. Under GBL Section 349, plaintiffs must allege harm, though
it does not need to be pecuniary.  

While Plaintiffs allege several potential injuries to the broader
class, they have alleged no specific injury to themselves. In
defending this omission in their response, Plaintiffs are only able
to muster the conclusory assertion that Plaintiffs' Complaint
stated Seterus wrongful and deceptive acts have caused injury and
damages to Plaintiffs and class members and unless enjoined, will
cause further irreparable injury.' Plaintiffs may be correct that
Defendant's threat to Plaintiffs' shelter and creation of
Plaintiffs' anxiety can most certainly be classified as an
emotional injury but Plaintiffs have not directly alleged that they
suffered such an injury. While Plaintiffs' allegations may be
sufficient to obtain standing and assert an FDCPA claim, they fail
to state a claim under GBL Section 349.

Thus, Plaintiffs' GBL Section 349 must be dismissed with leave to
replead specific allegations of injury.

Accordingly, the Court rules that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' GBL Section 349 claims. Plaintiffs' GBL
Section 349 claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff's Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act claims.

The Court ordered the Clerk serve a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order on all parties in accordance with
Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum Decision and Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y5xse5c5 from Leagle.com.

Robert J. Heinitz, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated & Sandra L. Heinitz, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Elmer R. Keach, III
, Law Offices of Elmer Robert Keach, III, P.C.,1 Pine West Plaza |
Suite 109 | Albany, NY 12205 & Scott C. Harris - scott@wbmllp.com -
Whitfield, Bryson Law Firm.

Seterus, Inc., Defendant, represented by Philip A. Goldstein -
pagoldstein@mcguirewoods.com - McGuireWoods LLP.

SHIRE US: Review of Class Cert. Bid Order in Antitrust Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In In re INTUNIV ANTITRUST LITIGATION (Indirect Purchasers), Civil
Action No. 1:16-cv-12396-ADB (D. Mass.), Judge Allison D. Burroughs
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied
the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs ("IPPs")'s motion for
reconsideration of the Court's Aug. 21, 2019, Order that denied
their motion for class certification.

The IPPs moved for certification of two classes of consumers who
they claim were overcharged for Intuniv because of an allegedly
anticompetitive settlement agreement between Defendants Shire and
Actavis.

Those proposed classes included:

     a. The Nationwide Consumer Class: For the period beginning
Nov. 15, 2012, to the present: (A) all persons who purchased brand
or generic Intuniv in the United States for personal or household
use, and who paid the purchase price themselves; and (B) all
persons covered by commercial health insurance who purchased brand
Intuniv in the United States for personal or household use, and who
paid some of the purchase price pursuant to a co-payment or
co-insurance provision.

     b. Illinois Brick Repealer Class: For the period beginning
Nov. 15, 2012, to the present, all persons in Arizona, California,
Florida, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and the District of Columbia: (A) who paid the purchase price
themselves for brand or generic Intuniv in the United States for
personal or household use; and (B) all persons covered by
commercial health insurance who purchased brand Intuniv in the
United States for personal or household use, and who paid some of
the purchase price pursuant to a co-payment or co-insurance
provision.

The Court determined that the IPPs had not provided a workable plan
to exclude a large number of uninjured class members, including
roughly 25,000 brand loyalists, several thousand coupon-using class
members, and a de minimis number of potential class members who
purchased Intuniv only after reaching their out-of-pocket maximums.
It therefore refused to certify either of the two proposed
classes.

The IPPs moved for reconsideration on Sept. 4, 2019, arguing that
the Court should have certified one subclass of the potential
Plaintiffs consisting of consumers who bought brand Intuniv or
generic Guanfacine ER with cash or co-insurance.  The Defendants
responded on Sept. 18, 2019.

On Sept. 26, 2019, the IPPs requested leave to file a reply brief,
which the Defendants opposed.  The Court granted the motion, and
the IPPs filed their reply on Oct. 21, 2019.  On Sept. 6, 2019, the
IPPs filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal with the First
Circuit.  The Defendants responded on Sept. 16, 2019, and the IPPs
replied on Sept. 24, 2019.

The IPPs allege that the Court misunderstood their proposed class.
They claim that they previously proposed three groups of consumers
for class certification: (1) consumers who purchased brand Intuniv
with a co-pay; (2) consumers who purchased brand Intuniv with
co-insurance; and (3) consumers who purchased brand or generic
Intuniv with cash.  They argue that if the Court was concerned
about including the unharmed Plaintiffs, it should only have
refused to certify the first group and narrowed the class, instead
of denying class certification.

Judge Burroughs declines to modify the Court's denial of class
certification.  First, the Court did not misunderstand the parties,
as the IPPs have not previously proposed a class of consumers who
purchased brand Intuniv with co-insurance or cash.  Second, the
IPPs have failed to demonstrate that the named plaintiffs would be
adequate representatives of the newly proposed class.  Finally, the
narrower class would still include the uninjured class members that
concerned the Court when it denied the motion for class
certification.

The Judge concludes that the IPPs previously failed to request that
the Court consider a class of consumers who purchased Intuniv
out-of-pocket or with co-insurance.  On reconsideration, the IPPs
have failed to demonstrate that the named Plaintiffs would be
included in the potential class and that the class would not
include a large number of uninjured consumers.  Accordingly, she
denied the IPPs' motion for reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/OWmeRp from Leagle.com.

Sherri Cummisford, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Allan
Kanner -- a.kanner@kanner-law.com -- Allan Kanner & Associates,
pro
hac vice, Conlee S. Whiteley -- c.whiteley@kanner-law.com --
Kanner
& Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice, Denise L. Morris, Ademi & O'Reilly
LLP, John D. Blythin, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Layne Hilton --
l.hilton@kanner-law.com -- Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice,
Mark A. Eldridge, Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Ruben Honik --
rhonik@golombhonik.com -- Golomb & Honikl, P.C., pro hac vice &
Shpetim Ademi, Ademi & O'Reilly.

Carmen Richard, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Allan
Kanner, Allan Kanner & Associates, pro hac vice, Bradley Winston,
Winston Law Firm, Conlee S. Whiteley, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro
hac vice, David J. Stanoch, Golomb & Honik, P.C., pro hac vice,
Layne Hilton, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice & Ruben Honik,
Golomb & Honikl, P.C., pro hac vice.

Tina Picone, Plaintiff, represented by Allan Kanner, Allan Kanner
&
Associates, pro hac vice, Annemieke A. Tennis, Kanner & Whiteley,
LLC, pro hac vice, Conlee S. Whiteley, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro
hac vice, David J. Stanoch, Golomb & Honik, P.C., pro hac vice,
Layne Hilton, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice, Ruben Honik,
Golomb & Honikl, P.C., pro hac vice & Stephen Herbert Galebach,
Galebach Law Office.

Shire U.S. Inc. & Shire LLC, Defendants, represented by David S.
Shotlander, Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLLP, pro hac vice, David A.
Zwally -- dzwally@haugpartners.com -- Haug Partners LLLP, pro hac
vice, Michael F. Brockmeyer , Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP, pro hac
vice, Nicholas F. Giove -- ngiove@haugpartners.com -- Haug
Partners
LLP, pro hac vice, Fred A. Kelly, Jr., Haug Partners, Joshua S.
Barlow -- jbarlow@haugpartners.com -- Haug Partners LLP & Tarae L.
Howell -- thowell@nixonpeabody.com -- Nixon & Peabody, LLP.

Actavis Elizabeth LLC & Actavis Holdco U.S., Inc., Defendants,
represented by Aviv A. Zalcenstein, Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac
vice, Alicia Rubio-Spring, Goodwin Procter LLP, Christopher T.
Holding, Goodwin Procter, LLP, Sarah K. Frederick, Goodwin Procter
LLP & Srikanth K. Reddy, Goodwin Procter, LLP.

Actavis Inc., Defendant, represented by Aviv A. Zalcenstein,
Goodwin Procter LLP, pro hac vice & Christopher T. Holding,
Goodwin
Procter, LLP.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Intervenor, represented by
Christopher T. Holding, Goodwin Procter, LLP.

SPECTRA ENERGY: Morris Appeals Dismissal of Suit to Del. Sup. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Paul Morris filed an appeal from a Memorandum Opinion
dated September 30, 2019, and Order dated October 25, 2019, entered
in the lawsuit styled PAUL MORRIS, on behalf of all similarly
situated former unitholders of SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P., v.
SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS (DE) GP, LP, Case No. 2019-0097-SG, in the
Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Oct 14,
2019, the Court of Chancery of Delaware issued an Opinion on
September 30 granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case.

This is the second incarnation of a challenge--by a unitholder of a
master limited partnership--to a buyback (a "reverse dropdown") of
partnership assets formerly purchased from the controller of the
partnership's general partner.  The first litigation in the matter
alleged that a special committee appointed by the general partner
consented to the transaction in violation of its contractual duty
of good faith, at an inadequate price.  That litigation was brought
in pertinent part derivatively, and survived a motion to dismiss.
Standing to pursue the matter was lost, however, when the
controller acquired the partnership via merger.

The Plaintiff then brought this challenge to that merger, alleging
that the general partner agreed to the merger in bad faith, in that
it failed to receive any value for the derivative litigation
asset.

The appellate case is captioned as PAUL MORRIS, on behalf of all
similarly situated former unitholders of SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS,
L.P., Plaintiff-Appellant v. SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS (DE) GP, LP,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 2019-0097-SG, in the Delaware Supreme
Court.[BN]

The Plaintiff-Appellant is represented by:

          Michael J. Barry, Esq.
          Viola Vetter, Esq.
          Rebecca A. Musarra, Esq.
          GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A.
          123 S Justison St.
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 622-7000
          Facsimile: (302) 622-7100
          E-mail: mbarry@gelaw.com
                  vvetter@gelaw.com
                  rmusarra@gelaw.com

               - and -

          Peter B. Andrews, Esq.
          Craig J. Springer, Esq.
          ANDREWS & SPRINGER LLC
          3801 Kennett Pike
          Building C, Suite 305
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          E-mail: pandrews@andrewsspringer.com
                  cspringer@andrewsspringer.com

               - and -

          Jeremy Friedman, Esq.
          Spencer Oster, Esq.
          David Tejtel, Esq.
          FRIEDMAN OSTER & TEJTEL PLLC
          493 Bedford Center Road, Suite 2D
          Bedford Hills, NY 10507
          Telephone: (888) 529-1108
          E-mail: jfriedman@ljbpc.com
                  soster@fotpllc.com
                  dtejtel@fotpllc.com

The Defendant-Appellee is represented by:

          Robert S. Saunders, Esq.
          Ronald N. Brown, III, Esq.
          Ryan M. Lindsay, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          One Rodney Square
          P.O. Box 636
          Wilmington, DE 19899-0636
          E-mail: rob.saunders@skadden.com
                  ron.brown@skadden.com
                  ryan.lindsay@skadden.com

               - and -

          Noelle M. Reed, Esq.
          Daniel S. Mayerfeld, Esq.
          Alston L. Walker, Esq.
          SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
          1000 Louisiana Street, Suite 6800
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 655-5100
          E-mail: noelle.reed@skadden.com
                  daniel.mayerfeld@skadden.com


STANDARD FIRE: Court Nixes Class Allegations in Young Case
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned DIANE YOUNG, individually Plaintiff, v. THE
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurance company,
Defendant, Case No. 2:18-CV-031-RMP (E.D. Wash.), the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington issued an
Order denying cross motions for partial summary judgment; granting
Defendant's motion to dismiss class allegations, and denying as
moot Plaintiff's motion for pre-certification discovery.

Young's claims arise out of her central contention that Standard,
as a subsidiary of Travelers Insurance, wrongfully denied personal
injury protection (PIP) for injuries that Young allegedly sustained
in a car accident. Young alleges that Standard should not have
suspended payment pending investigation of Young's claims and
completion of an independent medical examination (IME), when her
treating physicians already had determined that the treatment she
was receiving was reasonable, necessary, and related to the
accident in which she was injured.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine dispute exists
where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Factual
disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Young's primary contention is that Standard violates a Washington
insurance regulation, and acts in bad faith, when its claims
adjusters suspend payment of benefits based on their own review of
claimants' medical records, without first obtaining a medical
opinion.  Young also alleges that Standard refused to schedule the
IME until Standard obtained all of Plaintiff's prior treatment
records  and questions why Standard did not issue its suspension
earlier, since the insurer's records indicate concerns regarding
the medical bills allegedly as early as June 2017.
  
By contrast, Standard maintains that suspending payment of PIP
benefits pending the results of an IME is not a per se, actionable
violation of the Washington insurance regulations. Standard further
highlights that the IME was delayed because Young had limited the
scope of her medical release at the outset of her claim, and both
Young and the reviewing medical professionals expressed limited
availability when scheduling the IME.  

Plaintiff's class claim and individual claims regarding suspension
of the PIP benefits pending an IME take issue with the short-term
allocation of the cost of medical expenses, arguing at oral
argument that, as a matter of law, the insurer must continue to pay
the benefits pending the IME and may recover erroneously paid
benefits from the insured after an adverse final determination.

Plaintiff insists that suspension legally amounts to denial because
Defendant's own claims adjusters testified in their depositions
that they deny all bills after suspending PIP benefits until after
the IME is complete. Plaintiff repeatedly emphasizes that the
claims adjusters lacked the technical expertise to be able to
suspend benefits on the basis the medical care is not related,
reasonable, or necessary.  

These arguments are unavailing considering the dearth of authority
supporting Plaintiff's primary position. The Court finds a
meaningful distinction between deciding that a medical opinion is
needed and impermissibly rendering a lay determination of medical
reasonableness, necessity, or relatedness, and none of the relevant
caselaw erases that distinction.
  
Suspension is not necessarily denial for purposes of WAC Section
284-30-395. An insurer may rely on a medical opinion of health care
professionals to deny, limit, or terminate benefits for medical
expenses that are not reasonable, necessary, or related to the
accident.  Securing that medical opinion may take some time, and it
becomes a question of fact as to whether under a different WAC
provision referred to by the parties, WAC Section 284-3-330, the
insurer's investigation of the insured's claim was reasonable.

There is no dispute that Standard withheld payment of Young's
medical bills pending an IME and that Standard's claims handling
policies allowed the adjuster to do so. However, Plaintiff's
assertion that those undisputed facts demonstrate a violation of
WAC Section 284-30-395 or constitute bad faith is not supported by
the caselaw upon which Plaintiff relies. Simply put, there is no
basis to find that Standard violated WAC Section 284-30-395, or
demonstrated bad faith, simply by sending Young a suspension letter
and requesting an IME.

By contrast, questions of material fact persist regarding whether
Defendant's investigation of Plaintiff's claim was reasonable under
WAC Section 284-30-330 in that it is disputed as to whether
Standard unreasonably delayed requesting an IME or took other
actions amounting to bad faith or unfair conduct.

Both Motions for Partial Summary Judgment shall be denied.

Dismissal of Plaintiff's Class Allegations and Plaintiff's Efforts
to Obtain Pre-Certification Discovery

Plaintiff seeks to compel from Defendant responses and documents
relating to whether Defendant has engaged in a common policy or
practice of suspending payment of PIP to putative class members on
the basis of its bare requests for an IME instead of first
obtaining and providing notice of medical opinion from an actual
medical or health professional with whom the insurer consulted
supporting the suspension. Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's
class allegations on the basis that there is no legal foundation
upon which they may proceed.  

Complaints filed in federal court must contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.

Class allegations in a complaint are commonly tested on a motion
for class certification, not at the pleading stage.
Correspondingly, motions to dismiss or strike class allegations are
disfavored, particularly where the arguments against the class
claims would benefit from discovery or would otherwise be more
appropriate in a motion for class certification.  

Nevertheless, sometimes the issues are plain enough from the
pleadings to determine whether the interests of the absent parties
are fairly encompassed within the named plaintiff's claim. Applying
a strict standard requiring that any questions of law are clear and
not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances could the
claim or defense succeed, courts may strike class allegations from
a complaint.  

Although Plaintiff filed her motion to compel pre-certification
discovery at a relatively early stage in this litigation, since
that time the parties have engaged in a substantive exchange of
arguments, with a corresponding distillation of issues, that has
been absent in cases in which courts have declined to address
challenges to a putative class's viability at the pleading stage.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's class allegations shall be dismissed
without prejudice while Plaintiff's individual claims shall be
allowed to proceed, and Plaintiff's Motion to Compel shall be
denied as moot.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Accordingly, the Court orders that:

-- Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
-- Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.
-- Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Class Action Allegations is
GRANTED.
-- Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Class Certification Discovery is
DENIED AS MOOT.

The Courtroom Deputy shall schedule a status conference with the
parties to reestablish a trial schedule to resolve Plaintiff's
individual claims, rules the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y62xodtr from Leagle.com.

Diane Young, individually, Plaintiff, represented by J.J. Jesse
Junior Thompson , Armitage & Thompson, PLLC, 220 W. Main Avenue,
Spokane, WA 99201, Christopher Eric Love -
chris@pcvalaw.com - Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC, Darrell Lee
Cochran-
darrell@pcvalaw.com - Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala, Kevin M.
Hastings -
kevin@pcvalaw.com - Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC & Loren A.
Cochran -
loren@pcvalaw.com - Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC.

The Standard Fire Insurance Company, a foreign insurance company,
Defendant, represented by Eric J. Neal - eneal@letherlaw.com -
Lether & Associates PLLC, Thomas Lether  - tlether@letherlaw.com -
Lether & Associates PLLC & Mark Lane Hanover , Dentons US LLP, 1221
Avenue of The Americas, New York, NY 10020-1001,  pro hac vice.

STATE FARM: Bid to Dismiss Fraud/Unjust Enrichment Charges Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Anderson Phillips, et al., Plaintiffs, v. State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company, Defendant, Case No. CV-19-04605-PHX-GMS
(D. Ariz.), Judge G. Murray Snow of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts
III and IV of Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint.

The Defendant is an Illinois corporation engaged in the business of
insurance in Arizona.  It contracts with Xactware, a company that
sells a structural damage estimate program, to adjust residential
and commercial property loss claims.  Xactware's estimating tool
has two different databases: a restoration database and a new
construction database. The new construction database is used when
property damage is so extensive that a ground up rebuild is
required, while the restoration database is used when property
damage requires renovation or repairs, but not a ground up
reconstruction.  Because it includes efficiencies in labor cost
associated with ground up construction, the new construction
database produces a lower cost estimate than the restoration data
base would produce for the same scope of work.  The Defendant
selects which of the two databases to use when adjusting a claim.

On Dec. 6, 2015, a fire occurred at the home of Plaintiffs Anderson
and Jasmine Phillips ("Plaintiffs"), causing considerable damage to
the home and the Plaintiffs' personal property.  The Plaintiffs
timely submitted a claim to Defendant for their loss and performed
their obligations and responsibilities under their insurance policy
with respect to the claim.

On Dec. 14, 2015, the Defendant inspected the Plaintiffs' home and
personal property.  It subsequently estimated their repair costs at
$153,759.64.  The Plaintiffs also retained the services of a public
adjuster, Skipton & Associates, Inc. ("SAI").  SAI inspected the
Plaintiffs' home and personal property on Dec. 28, 2015 and
submitted a repair cost estimate of $203,114.69.  The Defendant
refused to pay the higher amount estimated by SAI.

The Plaintiffs filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court on
Sept. 30, 2016 alleging breach of insurance contract and tortious
bad faith.  While that complaint did not assert a class action
theory, it alleged that the Defendant had underpaid the Plaintiffs'
claim by approximately $50,000.

On June 3, 2019, after the court granted leave over the Defendant's
opposition, the Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, asserting
a class action and adding claims for unjust enrichment (Count III)
and statutory insurance fraud under A.R.S. Section 20-443 (Count
IV).  

The Plaintiffs allege the Defendant used Xactware's new
construction database on claims that did not require a ground up
rebuild, including their claim.  The Plaintiffs further allege that
as a result, the Defendant knowingly and intentionally underpaid on
replacement cost claims to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and
other insured parties.  Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
and 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(d), 1441, 1446, and 1453(a)-(b), the
Defendant removed the case to the Court on July 1, 2019.  

On July 8, 2019, the Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss.

The Plaintiffs argue that they and each member of the putative
class conferred a direct benefit on the Defendant through payments
for property insurance, and that Defendant unjustly enriched itself
by using new construction costs to calculate renovation losses.
The Defendant argues that this claim must be dismissed because the
parties' dispute is governed by contract (insurance policies) and
Counts I and II of the complaint already allege claims arising out
of the alleged breach of that contract.

Judge Snow holds that the Plaintiffs plausibly allege that they did
not receive the benefits promised in their contracts with the
Defendant.  They also plausibly allege that the Defendant made
misrepresentations in the sale or advertisement of its policies.
Finally, the Plaintiffs claim under A.R.S. Section 20-443 is not
time-barred because their original and amended complaints arise out
of a common scheme.

For these reasons, the Judge denied the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.  He directed the Defendant to file an answer to the First
Amended Class Action Complaint within 14 days of the date of the
Order.  Thus, the parties' obligations to produce the information
called for in the MIDP within 30 days of the filing of an answer,
as set forth in paragraph (A)(6) of the General Order, will be
triggered by the Defendant's filing of an answer.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/LvaQ1I from Leagle.com.

Anderson Phillips, husband and wife & Jasmine Phillips, husband and
wife, Plaintiffs, represented by Lawrence Robert Moon --
lmoon@MerlinLawGroup.com -- Merlin Law Group PA, Michael N. Poli --
mpoli@MerlinLawGroup.com -- Merlin Law Group PA & Michael John
Ponzo -- mponzo@MerlinLawGroup.com -- Merlin Law Group PA.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant, represented by Alicyn Marie Freeman -- amf@bowwlaw.com
-- Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC, Robert Thomas Aquinas Sullivan
-- rts@bowwlaw.com -- Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC & Alice Mae
Jones -- amj@bowwlaw.com -- Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC.


STUDIO 34: Cardoso Seeks to Recover Minimum and Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
MARCELA CARDOSO, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
v. STUDIO 34 HAIR SALON, INC., STUDIO 34 SALON INC., GARIK
RAKHAMIMOV, and NASIBA AZIZBEKOVA, Case No. 1:19-cv-09684
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 21, 2019), alleges that, pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from
Defendants:

   (a) unpaid minimum wages;
   (b) unpaid overtime compensation;
   (c) liquidated damages;
   (d) prejudgment and post-judgment interest; and
   (e) attorneys' fees and costs.

Studio 34 Hair is a domestic business corporation organized under
the laws of the State of New York with a principal place of
business located in New York City.  Studio 34 Hair owns and
operates a hair salon doing business as "Studio 34 Hair Salon,"
located at 1225 Third Avenue, in New York City.  In 2017, Studio 34
Hair owned and operated a hair salon doing business as "Studio 34
Hair Salon," located at 201-A East 34th Street, in New York City,
where the Plaintiff worked.  Sometime after 2017, Studio 34 Hair
ceased operations of the 34th Street Salon and opened the Third
Avenue Salon.

Studio 34 Salon is a domestic business corporation organized under
the laws of the state of New York with a principal place of
business located in New York City.  Studio 34 Salon owns and
operates a hair salon doing business as "Studio 34 Hair Salon,"
located at 250 East 40th Street, in New York City.  The Individual
Defendants are owners, officers or managers of the Corporate
Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          I0 Grand Central
          155 East 44th Street, 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 209-3933
          Facsimile: (212) 209-7102
          E-mail: jcilenti@jcpclaw.com
                  pcooper@jcpclaw.com


TEE JAYE'S COUNTRY: Faces Cockrell Suit Alleging FLSA Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
MELINDA COCKRELL, On behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. TEE JAYE'S COUNTRY PLACE, INC. d/b/a TEE JAYE'S COUNTRY
PLACE and DAYNA SOKOL, Case No. 2:19-cv-04658-JLG-EPD (S.D. Ohio,
Oct. 21, 2019), challenges the Defendants' policies and practices
that violate the minimum wage, overtime and tip provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio overtime compensation
statute.

Ms. Cockrell was employed by the Defendants from April 2019 to
October 2019 as a tipped employee at the South Hamilton, Ohio Tee
Jaye's Country Place location as a server and hourly manager.  She
alleges that though the Defendants paid her and other similarly
situated employees a subminimum wage as tipped employees, the
Defendants did not comply with 29 U.S.C. Section 203(m)'s and Ohio
law's tip credit requirements and were, thus, disqualified from
taking a tip credit against her and proposed class members' minimum
wages.

Tee Jaye's Country Place, Inc., is an Ohio for-profit corporation
with its principal place of business in Franklin County, Ohio.
Dayna Sokol is an owner and the President of Tee Jaye's.

The Defendants are owners and operators of approximately eight Tee
Jaye's Country Place restaurant locations in Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott, II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Caxton Building
          812 Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Telephone: (216) 912-2221
          Facsimile: (216) 350-6313
          E-mail: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com


TOTALMED STAFFING: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Sacramento employment law attorneys at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, filed a class action lawsuit against Totalmed
Staffing Inc., for allegedly failing to provide their workers in
California with the legally required thirty minute uninterrupted
meal periods and rest periods. The class action also alleges that
Totalmed Staffing Inc., failed to properly reimburse their
California employees for necessary business expenses they incurred
on the company's behalf. The Totalmed Staffing Inc., class action
is currently pending in the Santa Clara County Superior Court for
the State of California, Case No. 19CV354635. To view a copy of the
Complaint, click here.

The lawsuit filed against Totalmed Staffing Inc., alleges that the
company failed to provide their California employees with the legal
required thirty (30) minute uninterrupted meal break prior to their
fifth hour of work. The complaint alleges, "As a result of their
rigorous work schedules, PLAINTIFF and other CALIFORNIA CLASS
Members were also from time to time unable to take thirty (30)
minute off duty meal breaks and were not fully relieved of duty for
their meal periods."

The Class action lawsuit also alleges that the company violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act by unlawfully, unfairly and/or
deceptively having in place company policies, practices and
procedures that uniformly obtained credit reports on prospective
employees without first obtaining valid authorization consent
forms.

For more information about the class action lawsuit filed against
Totalmed Staffing Inc., please call Attorney Nicholas De Blouw at
(800) 568-8020.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, is a Northern
California employment law firm that dedicates its practice to
helping employees, fight back against unfair business practices,
including violations of the California Labor Code and Fair Labor
Standards Act. The firm has offices located in San Diego, Los
Angeles, Riverside, San Francisco, Sacramento, Orange, Santa Clara
and Chicago. [GN]


TOYOTA MOTOR: Faces Class Action Over Repossessed Cars
------------------------------------------------------
Brigette Honaker, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that a
recent Toyota class action claims that the auto company's credit
division wrongfully repossesses cars from consumers under
bankruptcy protections.

Plaintiff Robert M. Muswaya reportedly filed bankruptcy in June
2019. During this filing, his 2018 Toyota Corolla was reportedly
covered by an "automatic stay" which prevents it from being
repossessed. Because the vehicle became property of Muswaya's
bankruptcy estate, it was allegedly covered by this automatic
stay.

The stay reportedly prohibits "any act to obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the estate or to
exercise control over property of the estate" as well as "any act
to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate."

Despite this stay, Toyota Motor Credit Corp. allegedly repossessed
the vehicle in September without authorization from the bankruptcy
court.

"[Toyota's] conduct demonstrates a blatant disregard of the rights
of bankruptcy debtors and the mandates of the Bankruptcy Code," the
Toyota class action argues.

The company, who issued a loan to Muswaya for the vehicle,
allegedly refused to return the vehicle when requested. As a
result, Muswaya has allegedly been forced to spend $2,307 on
alternative transportation such as rental cars and cab fares.

"As a result of [Toyota's] willful, malicious and reckless
repossession of plaintiff's vehicle, plaintiff sustained
significant damages," the Toyota class action lawsuit claims. "As a
result of [Toyota's] unlawful repossession, plaintiff was deprived
of his primary means of transportation."

Due to the lack of transportation, Muswaya was allegedly unable to
make it to work which caused him to miss out on wages. In addition
to the financial damages sustained due to the repossession, Muswaya
reportedly suffered "significant emotional distress, mental
anguish, anxiety, loss of time, and extreme inconvenience."

Muswaya argues that Toyota willfully violated bankruptcy
regulations by repossessing the vehicle. According to the Toyota
class action, the automotive company had actual knowledge of
Muswaya's bankruptcy filing and repossessed his vehicle while
operating under internal policies which "run afoul" of bankruptcy
codes.

The Toyota class action lawsuit seeks actual damages, punitive
damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees. The complaint also seeks
a court order enjoining Toyota from committing any further
violations of U.S. bankruptcy law.

Muswaya seeks to represent a Class of consumers who had their
vehicle repossessed by Toyota within the last three years after
declaring bankruptcy. Class Members are eligible if Toyota
repossessed the vehicle without seeking relief from an automatic
stay or before the automatic stay expired.

The exact number of Class Members isn't known, but Muswaya believes
that there could be thousands of consumers in the same situation as
him.

Did you have your vehicle repossessed by Toyota despite an
automatic stay during bankruptcy proceedings? Share your
experiences in the comment section below.

Muswaya and the proposed Class are represented by Mohammed O.
Badwan and Joseph S. Davidson of Sulaiman Law Group Ltd.

The Toyota Repossession Class Action Lawsuit is Muswaya, et al. v.
Toyota Motor Credit Corp., Case No. 4:19-cv-00768, in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. [GN]


TTC LLC: Millward TCPA Suit Seeks to Stop Unsolicited Marketing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Millward, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TTC, LLC d/b/a Try The CBD, a Colorado Limited
Liability Company, Case No. 0:19-cv-62887-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Nov. 21,
2019), is brought to secure redress for the Defendant's violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant is a Colorado-based CBD oil products company.

To promote its services, the Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process, the
Plaintiff contends. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's illegal conduct, which
has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation,
and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. The
Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of himself and
members of the class, and any other available legal or equitable
remedies.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, who was a resident of Broward
County, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone (305) 479-2299
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Phone: (305) 975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks Dismissal of Drivers' Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kathleen Dailey, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that Uber asked
a California federal court to throw out a driver's proposed class
action, saying that it can't proceed because most putative class
members already agreed to individual arbitration and class-action
waivers.

Thomas Colopy filed individual and class action claims against Uber
Technologies Inc. Oct. 9 in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California. He alleged that Uber willfully
misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors,
violating California wage, overtime, business expenses,
recordkeeping, and unfair competition laws.

Uber responded Oct. 18, saying that the claims didn't satisfy
federal class action requirements. [GN]


US BANCORP: Bruna Sues Over Illegal Telemarketing Text Messages
---------------------------------------------------------------
ESTEBAN BRUNA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. U.S. BANCORP d/b/a US BANK, a Delaware corporation,
Case No. 0:19-cv-02750 (D. Minn., Oct. 21, 2019), is brought under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act seeking to halt the
Defendant's illegal conduct of sending telemarketing text messages,
which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment,
aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of
individuals, including the Plaintiff.

To promote its services, the Defendant engages in unsolicited
marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process, the
Plaintiff contends.  He asserts that at no point in time did he
provide the Defendant with his express written consent to be
contacted using an automatic telephone dialing system.

The Defendant is a Delaware corporation with a principal office
located at 800 Nicollet Mall, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  The
Defendant is an American bank holding company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Melissa S. Weiner, Esq.
          Joseph C. Bourne, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
          800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 2150
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 389-0600
          Facsimile: (612) 389-0610
          E-mail: mweiner@pswlaw.com
                  jbourne@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          Facsimile: (786) 623-0915
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com


VENATOR: Bernstein Litowitz Appointed as Class Action Lead Counsel
------------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that Bernstein Litowitz was appointed lead counsel
in a putative class action in Texas federal court against pigment
and additive company Venator, whose shareholders claim downplayed
the seriousness of a fire at one of its facilities in the months
leading up to its 2017 initial and secondary public offerings.
[GN]



WAL-MART INC: Settles Pregnancy Bias Class Action for $14 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Carsen, writing for HR Drive, reports that Walmart will
pay $14 million to settle a class action alleging it had a
discriminatory written policy that denied pregnant workers the same
benefits as other similarly situated workers (Borders v. Wal-Mart
Inc., No. 17-cv-0506 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2019)). The court filing
says this case "was one of the first, if not the first, in the
nation in which private plaintiffs brought claims of pregnancy
discrimination on behalf of a class of women who were denied
workplace accommodations because of pregnancy."

The lawsuit was triggered when a pregnant worker who had a medical
restriction against lifting more than 25 lbs. was allegedly denied
light duty even though light duty was available to workers injured
on the job who were otherwise similar in their ability to work. The
worker says Walmart told her she had to take an unpaid leave of
absence pursuant to company policy. Other workers came forward with
similar allegations.

The class consists of approximately 740 Walmart employees whose
pregnancy accommodation requests were allegedly denied. Walmart is
not, as part of the settlement, conceding the truth of the
allegations or all of the facts as presented by the plaintiffs.

Dive Insight:
Walmart has found itself in a lot of legal hot water lately. Though
it was able to defeat a terminated employee's age bias allegations
by showing a legitimate, non-biased reason for the firing, a jury
recently awarded a Walmart cart pusher more than $5 million in a
disability bias lawsuit brought by the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). A separate EEOC lawsuit, filed
earlier in October, claims the retailer failed to allow an
applicant with a disability to take a physical assessment.
Additionally, back in August, a Walmart in Washington, D.C., paid
out $100,000 to settle EEOC allegations that it had refused to
accommodate two deaf employees.

Class actions alleging pregnancy bias aren't always possible if the
claims are too fact-specific. Here, however, a broadly applied
policy allegedly affected numerous women across multiple states in
a similar way.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides that discrimination
against employees or applicants on the basis of childbirth,
pregnancy, or related medical conditions constitutes illegal sex
discrimination. Pregnancy alone is not considered a disability
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but conditions linked to
or caused by it may be.

The law is clear that pregnant employees who are able to continue
performing their jobs must be allowed to do so. If, however, a
pregnant employee is temporarily unable to perform a job, the
worker must be treated the same as any other employee with a
temporarily disability in terms of opportunities for light duty,
modified tasks, alternative assignments, unpaid leave or disability
leave. [GN]


WALT DISNEY: Responds to Gender Discrimination Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dominic Patten, writing for Deadline, reports that ten women across
the Walt Disney Company claim that the Bob Iger-run media giant
doesn't pay women fairly and are challenging the House of Mouse in
court in a proposed class action first launched this spring.
However, while fine with fighting a ton of individual actions,
Disney are now declaring that the potentially massive
discrimination suit is just too unwieldy for the Burbank based
conglomerate to handle, seriously.

"The Walt Disney Company described in Plaintiffs' Complaint is not
The Walt Disney Company that exists in fact and law," declares
Disney in a memorandum accompanying their October 18 move to
kneecap the class action. "The Disney Companies categorically deny
that they pay any female employee less than her similarly situated
male coworkers and will vigorously defend themselves against each
Plaintiff's individual claims," the L.A. Superior Court document
adds dismissively, literally and figuratively. "But that is all
this case is–an assortment of individual claims, based on highly
individualized allegations."

Or, as Felicia Davis -- feliciadavis@paulhastings.com -- of Paul
Hasting LLP and Disney's chief lawyer in the matter put it
unequivocally from her clients' POV: "The parties do not need to
litigate this case for three years to discover what is clear today
-- Plaintiffs' claims are not appropriate for class or
representative treatment."

Longtime Walt Disney Studios employees LaRonda Rasmussen and Karen
Moore instigated the suit back on April 3 in a move for back pay,
lost benefits and other compensation. They were joined by eight
other women on September 18 in an amended complaint that Disney now
wants to see shredded -- just like the attorneys for the product
development manager, the copyright administrator and the others
expected.

"We anticipated Disney's attack on the complaint, and are preparing
our opposition," Lori Andrus of San Francisco firm Andrus Anderson
LLP told Deadline on Oct. 21. "Although Disney's legal team
attempts to minimize the scope of the impact of the company's
unfair pay practices, the experiences of Ms. Rasmussen and the
other plaintiffs show that unequal pay is not limited to one
division or one job level," the attorney stated.

"Disney is essentially arguing that it is too big to be held
accountable. But no company should be permitted to evade equal pay
laws just because it is large."

Pivoting against the plaintiff's read on the Golden State's long on
the books and rarely enforced Fair Pay Act, Disney are essentially
making the argument that the potential class action initiators'
lawyer plain calls them out on. "The comparisons Plaintiffs seek to
make-across different jobs, different levels and with potentially
unspecified other differences-would demand an
individual-by-individual review of the duties, skills, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions of each woman in every job,
compared to each man in every other job, to identify the correct
comparator pool," the company pleads in the 22-page filing to get
the class struck.

"The defenses to which the Disney Companies are statutorily
entitled to assert for each individual further exposes the unique,
non-fungible nature of Plaintiffs' jobs," the paperwork continues
noting that differences in pay can come from aspects other than
gender "such as education, training or experience." Which is where
Disney really digs in: "For one putative class member, the Disney
Companies may argue that she lacks the job critical prior
experience of a male colleague.For another putative class member,
the Disney Companies may argue that she lacks important education
or training required for the job. For many others, no defense will
be necessary at all because the female employee will be the highest
paid among her peers."

Rasmussen and Moore's initial complaint followed the former going
to Disney HR about her pay being less than men at the company
performing the same or similar jobs. The situation specific audit
the still Disney employed Rasmussen requested was conducted and the
then just under a decade employee was basically told, yes you are
right, the men are paid more but its "not due to gender." Last
year, Rasmussen's pay was increased over $20,000 a year but she
says she is still paid less than men doing the work that she is.

Facing what could be hundreds of millions of dollars in pay
adjustments and past compensation if the class action is allowed to
continue and gearing up for a brave new streaming future, family
focused Disney obviously don't want to be having to do that. This
battle comes in an environment when many media companies and others
are committing themselves to California's Equal Pay Pledge -- which
Disney has not yet inked for its over 60,000 stateside employees.
As it is, women overall in American earn about 80% of what men do,
at best.

The Walt Disney Company did not respond to request for comment on
its strike filing. However, the lawyers for the company and the
plaintiffs will be showing up in LASC on December 11 to argue
whether this class action should go forward or not. [GN]


WATERSTONE FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Herrington Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Waterstone Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 1, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled,  Herrington et
al. v. Waterstone Mortgage Corporation.

Waterstone Mortgage Corporation was a defendant in a class action
lawsuit that was filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin and subsequently compelled to
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association.

The plaintiff class alleged that Waterstone Mortgage Corporation
violated certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and failed to pay loan officers consistent with their employment
agreements.

On July 5, 2017, the arbitrator issued a Final Award finding
Waterstone Mortgage Corporation liable for unpaid minimum wages,
overtime, unreimbursed business expenses, and liquidated damages
under the FLSA.

On December 8, 2017, the District Court confirmed the award in
large part, and entered a judgment against Waterstone in the amount
of $7,267,919 in damages to Claimants, $3,298,851 in attorney fees
and costs, and a $20,000 incentive fee to Plaintiff Herrington,
plus post-judgment interest.

On February 12, 2018, the District Court awarded post-arbitration
fees and costs of approximately $98,000. The judgment was appealed
by Waterstone to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, where oral
argument was held on May 29, 2018.  

On October 22, 2018, the Seventh Circuit issued a ruling vacating
the District Court's order enforcing the arbitration award.  

If the District Court determined the agreement only allows for
individual arbitration, the award would be vacated and the case
sent to individual arbitration for a new proceeding. If the
District Court determined the arbitration agreement nevertheless
allows for collective arbitration, the District Court could have
confirmed the prior award.

On December 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a post-remand brief. In it,
Plaintiff asked the District Court to reaffirm the arbitration
award entered by the arbitrator in full. Alternatively, she asked
the Court to affirm her individual damage award and the awards of
123 other opt-ins whose arbitration agreements permit joinder or
class actions.

Lastly, Plaintiff asked the District Court to have 154 opt-ins
intervene and file an amended complaint for individual relief in
court.

Waterstone opposed the motion on January 28, 2019, and asked the
District Court to vacate the prior Final Award in full because
Herrington’s arbitration agreement only allowed for individual
arbitration. Plaintiff filed its reply on February 14, 2019.

On April 25, 2019, the District Court held that Plaintiff's claims
must be resolved through single-plaintiff arbitration. As a result,
it vacated the July 5, 2017 arbitration award in its entirety, and
closed the case.

In May 2019, Herrington and approximately 90 of the prior Claimants
filed new demands in arbitration asserting similar claims.
Waterstone has answered to those demands and denies the
allegations.

Waterstone will continue to vigorously defend its interests in
these matters and does not believe a loss is probable at this
time.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Waterstone Financial, Inc. operates as a bank holding company for
WaterStone Bank SSB that provides various financial services to
customers in southeastern Wisconsin, the United States. It operates
through two segments, Community Banking and Mortgage Banking. The
company was formerly known as Wauwatosa Holdings, Inc. and changed
its name to Waterstone Financial, Inc. in August 2008. Waterstone
Financial, Inc. was founded in 1921 and is based in Wauwatosa,
Wisconsin.


WELLS FARGO: Liguori Files Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. The case is styled as William Liguori, Jr., Tricia Liguori,
Jose Aguilar, Elizabeth Manley, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Defendant, Case No. 7:19-cv-10677 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 18, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Statutory Actions.

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association operates as a bank. The Bank
offers online and mobile banking, home mortgage, loans and credit,
investment and retirement, wealth management, and insurance
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs appear pro se.

WORLD FINANCIAL: Transfer of Yeomans to Ga. Northern Dist. Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRICIA YEOMANS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WORLD FINANCIAL
GROUP INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-00792-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California denied (i)
the Defendants' motion to transfer the case to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and (ii) the
Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiffs bring a putative class action against Defendants
World Financial Group Insurance Agency (a California corporation),
World Financial Group Inc. (a Florida corporation), and Does 1 to
100, alleging violations of the California Labor Code, the
California Business and Professional Code, and California Wage
Orders (and asserting a claim of unjust enrichment) based on the
Defendants' purported misclassification of the Plaintiffs as
independent contractors, as opposed to employees.

The Defendants represent themselves as a financial- and
insurance-products marketing company; they recruit individuals as
"Associates" and purport to give people the tools to build and
operate their own financial services business.  However, the
Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants conduct their business by way
of a massive pyramid scheme, wherein recruiting new Associates is
one of the main factors involved in achieving promotions.  Once
someone is an Associate, the Defendants pressure that person to
purchase the Defendants' financial and insurance products and to
sell financial and insurance products to the new Associates.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants have unlawfully
misclassified Associates as 'independent contractors' rather than
as employees in order to further increase profits.  Specifically,
each Associate is required to sign identical, non-negotiable
Associate Membership Agreements ('AMAs'), which set forth uniform
rules and policies promulgated by the Defendants, which subject
Associates to strict control.  The Plaintiffs and the Class Members
signed the AMAs.

The Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendants completely control
the overall operation of the business and retain the exclusive
authority to hire and fire every Associate.  Furthermore, because
of this classification, Associates earn only commissions, not
minimum wage, and they bear the burden of business costs, which the
Defendants might otherwise bear.  In addition, Associates are
improperly deprived of the protection of workers' compensation, the
benefits of overtime pay, and meal and rest breaks.  The Plaintiffs
contend that, through this conduct, the Defendants have violated
various provisions of the California Labor Code, the California
Business and Professional Code, and California Wage Orders; they
also assert a claim of unjust enrichment.

The Defendants seek to have the case transferred to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia because of
forum selection clauses in the parties' various agreements.  It
also alleges that many of the Plaintiffs signed Marketing Director
Agreements ("MDAs"), which do not displace the AMAs, but contain a
similar forum-selection clause, under which those Plaintiffs
reaffirmed their commitment to conduct 'all litigation' in
Georgia.

The Plaintiffs filed the case in San Francisco Superior Court in
December 2018.  It was removed by the Defendants in February 2019.
In June 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action
Complaint.  Shortly thereafter, the Defendants filed a Motion to
Transfer Case; they move the Court for an order transferring the
case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia.

The parties dispute three issues regarding the forum selection
clauses at issue in the case.  First, the Plaintiffs assert that
the Defendants failed to properly authenticate their AMAs and
MDAs," which means that the authenticity of the documents is
disputed.  Second, and relatedly, the Plaintiffs contend that they
"never saw or were provided with a full copy of the AMA" when they
were recruited, and instead were only provided with the AMA's
signature page.  Third, the parties disagree as to whether the
forum selection clauses in the AMAs and MDAs violate California
public policy and are therefore voidable.  

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the documents are properly
authenticated and that the Plaintiffs did see all of the documents'
provisions in their entirety when signing them, the Judge Chen
finds that the third issue is the one upon which the Defendants'
Motion turns.  He focuses his analysis accordingly.

The Plaintiffs argue that enforcing the Agreements' forum-selection
clauses is against the strong public policy of California in favor
of its workers' protections as expressed by Cal. Labor Code Section
925.

The Judge finds that (i) the allegations are highly suggestive of a
relationship in which the Plaintiffs work under the control and
direction of the Defendants; (ii) the Plaintiffs have pled
sufficient facts to support a plausible claim of misclassification
at this stage; and (iii) the parties' employment agreements within
the sweep of Section 925; (iv) the modifications at issue bring the
AMAs and MDAs within the sweep of Section 925.  Having found that
the Plaintiffs plausibly allege they are properly classified as
employees, that the Agreements imposed "conditions of employment,"
and that modifications to the Agreements were made after the
effective date of Section 925, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs
may void the forum selection clauses at issue.

The Judge also finds that the Section 1404(a) factors weigh in
favor of keeping the case in California.  Having found the forum
selection clauses at issue voidable and having concluded that the
factors of Section 1404(a) weigh against transfer, the Judge denies
the Defendant's Motion to Transfer, as other Courts looking at
forum selection clauses have done when analyzing Section 925 of the
California Labor Code.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' counsel seeks attorneys' fees under
Section 925 of the California Labor Code.  The Plaintiffs' counsel
notes the numerous hours of work dedicated to the motion and Mr.
Schaad's "false statements" (among several reasons) as the basis of
their request.  The Defendants offer several responses, but the
most important among them is that they had a reasonable basis to
bring the Motion.  Because the Court is loath to award attorneys'
fees in the absence of bad faith or unreasonableness, the Judge
denies the Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chen denied (i) the Defendants'
Motion to Transfer, and (ii) the Plaintiffs' request for attorneys'
fees.  The Order disposes of Docket No. 24.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/R0AmDi from Leagle.com.

Tricia Yeomans, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Adrian Rodriguez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Adam
Tamburelli -- atamburelli@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin and
Saltzman, LLP, Christina Marie Lucio, Farnaes and Lucio, APC, Karen
I. Gold, Marlin Saltzman, LLP & Stanley Donald Saltzman --
ssaltzman@marlinsaltzman.com -- Marlin and Saltzman LLP.

Ismail Chraibi, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Robert Jenkins, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Dorothy Jenkins, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Fatemeh Abtahi, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated & Cameron Bradford,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adam Tamburelli, Marlin and Saltzman,
LLP, David Rosenberg, Rosenberg Shpall and Zeigen, APLC, Chad F.
Edwards, Rosenberg, Shpall and Zeigen, APLC, Christina Marie Lucio,
Farnaes and Lucio, APC, Karen I. Gold, Marlin Saltzman, LLP &
Stanley Donald Saltzman, Marlin and Saltzman LLP.

World Financial Group Insurance Agency, Inc., a California
corporation & World Financial Group, Inc., a Georgia corporation,
Defendants, represented by Spencer C. Skeen --
spencer.skeen@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak Stewart
PC, Jesse Carter Ferrantella, Ogletree Deakins, Marlene Moffitt --
marlene.moffitt@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, PC & Timothy Lloyd Johnson -- tim.johnson@ogletree.com --
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart, P.C..


XPO LOGISTICS: Settles Wage Class Action for $16.5 Million
----------------------------------------------------------
Kathleen Dailey, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a $16.5
million wage-related class action settlement between XPO Logistics
Inc., a delivery service company, and its drivers, obtained final
approval from a judge in the Northern District of California.

XPO provides delivery and basic installation services in California
and throughout the U.S. for retailers including Home Depot, Lowe's
Home Improvement, Macy's, Ethan Allen, Pottery Barn, and Kraftmaid.
Delivery drivers based in California brought a class action against
XPO in March 2016, alleging they were misclassified as independent
contractors in violation of California wage and
work-related-expense laws, and federal Fair Labor Standards Act
overtime requirements. [GN]


ZAPPOS: Nov. 29 Deadline Set to Object to Settlement Terms
----------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Rossow, writing for Grit Daily, reports that yeah, in this
case, users are the "bastards" to the Zappos family. Seven years
after the Zappos data breach, the long-awaited class-action lawsuit
has finally come to its closing mark. Unfortunately, for the Las
Vegas online store's users, the news isn't that great -- if
anything, it's almost laughable.

For a quick recap, Zappos first warned users by email in January
2012 that it had suffered a data breach, affecting 24 million
users. The breach exposed data including names, email addresses,
billing and shipping addresses, phone numbers, and the last four
digits of credit card numbers. It also included password hashes,
which generated using the SHA-2 algorithm.

Days following the breach notification, Zappos was hit by a lawsuit
seeking class action status over its security failure.

Under Nevada's data breach statute, codified in Title 52, Chapter
603A of the Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated, a data collector is
subject to Nevada's data breach notification statute if it owns or
licenses computerized data that includes personal information.

In this event, it shall disclose any breach in the security of the
system data to any resident of Nevada whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired
by an unauthorized person. This notice can be delivered via written
notification, electronic notice, if its consistent with the
provisions of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, and/or substitute notice, as further discussed in
Nevada's data breach notification statute.

In March, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from
Zappos, which would have addressed the issue of "standing," which
is required under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 'Standing'
refers to a justifiable harm or an articulatable harm caused by
another party. The result of the SCOTUS' refusal to hear an appeal,
meant that the victims of the breach did not have to show evidence
of illegal activity directly linked to the Zappos breach.

With the lawyers set to receive $1,620,000 in attorneys' fees and
other legal costs, Zappo users are walking away with a 10% discount
for any future purchase at the online store. You've got to be
fu***** kidding me right??

But wait, there's more.

Okay, now you can throw down. This settlement marks another case
where data breach victims walk away with almost nothing in their
pockets, and more problems with little to no remedy.

The terms of the settlement received preliminary approval from
District Judge Robert C. Jones on September 19, and victims have
until November 29 to file their objections. It currently is pending
Judge Jones' approval in a final approval hearing scheduled for
December 20.

This lawsuit represents everything that's wrong with class-action
lawsuits today and our legal justice system.

#1—History Continues to Repeat Itself
If you are thinking of countering that this is just one shitty
outcome, think again. This isn't anything new.

Yahoo's Data Breach
Let's look back to the Yahoo data breach and its accompanying
settlement, where affected users were able to walk away with a
maximum of $358.80.

Back in September, Yahoo announced that if you had an account any
time between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2016, and are a
resident of the U.S. or Israel, you are part of the settlement
class and can file a claim for part of the $117,500,000. In other
words, you may be entitled to at least $358 as part of the
settlement.

The settlement was designed to compensate users for losses
resulting from a series of data breaches that took place in 2012
and 2013. Over several years, hackers were able to gain access to
Yahoo user accounts, stealing private emails, calendars, and
contacts in at least three documented, separate attacks. The
breaches ranged in scope from two attacks in 2012, although Yahoo
claims no data was taken, to a 2013 breach where hackers were able
to gain access to information from more than 3 billion Yahoo
accounts, stealing names, email addresses, telephone numbers, birth
dates, passwords, and answers to many security questions.

Equifax Data Breach
Back in September 2017, credit reporting agency, Equifax announced
a data breach that exposed the personal information of over 147
million people, one of the largest data breaches in history. The
company settled with the FTC for $425 million in September 2019,
again, with little to no accountability. Why? Consumers still have
no choice when other agencies choose to pull credit information
from Equifax.

The Equifax settlement generously allowed consumers to walk away
with a whopping $125. However, just two days ago, it was announced
that Equifax used the word "admin" as both password and username
for a portal that contained sensitive information, according to a
class action lawsuit filed in federal court in the Northern
District of Georgia.

The ongoing lawsuit, consolidating the 373 previous lawsuits into
one, was filed after the company's data breach, went viral after
BuzzFeed reporter Jane Lytvynenko took to Twitter sharing the
details from the lawsuit:

"Equifax employed the username 'admin' and the password 'admin' to
protect a portal used to manage credit disputes, a password that
'is a surefire way to get hacked,'" the lawsuit reads.

The lawsuit also notes that Equifax admitted using unencrypted
servers to store the sensitive personal information and had it as a
public-facing website.

One of the three largest consumer credit reporting agencies left
the keys to unlocking public-facing servers up for grabs.

#2—The Settlement Is Absolutely BONKERS
While the settlement is the first where both parties have formally
agreed following a very drawn-out, seven-years-old lawsuit, I'm not
sure what the hell was going on during this seven-year period.

What made this case unusually difficult, was the lack of evidence
that consumers actually suffered from the breach beyond simply
changing their passwords. Indeed, as Zappos wasn't found to be
negligent in its security measures, holding the company responsible
and liable for the breach was an up-hill battle.

It's a slap in the face to consumers and to the justice system.
These settlements are not reflective nor punitive enough in nature
to wake these companies up. It's only fair to assume the same will
take place with whatever settlement arises from the Capital One
data breach and Door Dash data breach.

The settlement, having received preliminary approval, has its final
approval hearing in December. The settlement itself grants $2,500
to each of the nine representative plaintiffs in the case, while
the rest of the $1.6 million settlement fund goes straight into the
attorney fees. God it would be nice to be one of them right now.

As you may have guessed by now, the public is fucking furious with
the Zappos outcome. Don't believe us?

Check out your Twitter feeds.

#3—Consumers Are Left to Fend for Themselves
So, if you're one of probably 99 percent of the masses that is
extremely disjointed with the settlement, you can opt out and hire
a lawyer to help fight the case individually. However, Adam
Moskowitz, a class-action attorney in Miami believes the opt-out
rate for the settlement will be very low.

"It's better than nothing," Moskovitz said of the discount,
explaining that in a settlement, the plaintiff and defendant agree
on the relief (your compensation) together. While the coupon is a
show of goodwill, it does more harm than good. Of course, loyal
consumers to the brand will continue to buy shoes, but what about
those truly affected or upset?

But, that's just it isn't it? We are continuing to see each of
these conglomerates escape liability, with little to no
accountability, while the average consumer continues to suffer.
Sorry Moskovitz, but it's not better than nothing—why would
people continue to trust, at least wholly, the security Zappos
offers?

I don't care that there was a lack of evidence consumers suffered
from the breach—every breach creates a harm, direct or indirect,
large or small. The mere fact it happened, shows some slight
misstep in the company's security. That's a fact.

What is it going to take to wake these companies up? What is it
going to take for a court to realize that this is far from
acceptable? Maybe the court needs to see for itself what it's like
to get hit from one of these breaches.

And no, there is nothing premeditated here. Back in high school,
our curriculum required us to study Sharon Creech and her novel,
"Walk Two Moons," and if there's anything that can be taken away
from it, it's that you "don't judge a man until you've walked two
moons in his moccasins." Yes, we are talking to you Judge Jones.
[GN]



                            *********

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