CAR_Public/191206.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, December 6, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 244

                            Headlines

6201 N KENMORE: Faces Okolo Class Suit Alleging Violation of RLTO
ACCREDITED DEBT: Jones Sues Over Autodialed Marketing Texts
ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL: Merlan Sues Over Unpaid Wages and Premiums
ALTRIA GROUP: Faces Cipolla Suit Over Decline in Share Price
APHRIA INC: Facing 7 Complaints over Acquisitions, Offering

AT&T CORP: Dist. Ct. Denies Wexler's Bid to Amend Complaint
AVON PRODUCTS: Reaches Agreement to Resolve Berger Action in N.Y.
BANK OF AMERICA: Advisors Classes Certified in Frausto and Suarez
BEMBE INC: Bennici FLSA Suit Moved From S.D. to E.D. New York
BRENDON LOCHERT: Coleman Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages

BURLINGTON COUNTY, NJ: Bid to Vacate Atty's Pro Hac Vice Adm. Nixed
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: No Judgment on Pleadings in TCPA Suit
CAPITALA FINANCE: Paskowitz Securities Suit Tossed
CBL & ASSOCIATES: Lowers Accrual by $22.7MM for Wave Lengths Accord
CBL & ASSOCIATES: Merelles Case in Tennessee Voluntarily Dismissed

CLIENT SERVICES: Wins Favorable Ruling in Campagna FDCPA Suit
COMENITY BANK: Arbitration Bid in Gonzalez Suit Denied w/out Prej.
CONTROL GROUP: Court Dismisses Walker Class Suit
CRAFT BREW: Settlement Claims Period in Broomfield Case Ends
DASUYA ENTERPRISES: Smith Moves to Certify FLSA Collective Class

DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Karp & Dearborn Securities Suits Consolidated
EDMUNDSON, MO: More Definite Statement Bid in Thomas Case Denied
ENDURANCE INT'L: Machado Class Action Dismissed
EVERI HOLDINGS: Continues to Defend Donahue Class Suit
FAT BRANDS: Wins Bid to Strike Class Cert. Motion in Vignola Suit

FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Kong Securities Suit Over CBA Bribery Issue
FLAGSTAR BANK: Court Certifies Class of Mortgage Loan Owners
FOUNDATION ENERGY: Lee Seeks OT Wages for Production Consultants
FUNKY'S BUSINESS: Pearson Seeks to Certify Banquet Workers Class
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Mass. Dist. Ct. Dismisses Count III in ERISA Suit

GEORGIA: Ga. App. Affirms Dismissal of Kelly Suit
GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL: Class Certification Sought in Frank Suit
GREEN ROADS: Sued by Davis for Selling Illegal CBD Products
GROUPON INC: 7th Cir. Remands Dancel Suit for Jurisdiction Inquiry
HAAGEN-DAZS SHOPPE: San Pedro-Salcedo's Bid for Class Cert. Tossed

HORIZONS ETFS: Ontario Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
HUNTINGTON LEARNING: Dhade Class Action Dismissed with Prejudice
INUVO INC: Settlement Fee Under Confidential Pact Paid in September
KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: Securities Suits over SOPRA Trial Ongoing
KEMET CORP: Reaches $62MM Settlement in Capacitors Antitrust Suit

KRAFT HEINZ: Court Dismisses Tarzian Fraud Class Suit
KULICKE & SOFFA: Kumar Securities Suit Dismissed w/ Leave to Amend
MATTEL INC: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Wyatt Class Suit Set for 4Q
MATTEL INC: No Schedule Yet for Appeal in Consolidated Calif. Suit
MATTEL INC: Still Defends Class Suits over Fisher-Price Sleeper

MATTERPORT INC: Falsely Sells 3D Camera, Services, Stemmelin Says
MCDERMOTT INT'L: Court Narrows Claims in Hampton FLSA Suit
MDL 1720: Jack Rabbit & 280 Can't Intervene in Antitrust Suit
MDL 2492: Zachery Suit v. NCAA Over Health Issues Consolidated
MDL 2672: Court Issues Show Cause Order in VW Clean Diesel Suit

MDL 2913: King County Suit Over JUUL E-Cigarettes Consolidated
MISSOURI: Failed to Offer Alternative Repayment Plan, Dykes Says
MOMENTA PHARMA: Dropped from M923-Related Proceedings
MUTUAL SECURITIES: Bid to Enforce Settlement in Milliner Denied
MVP WORKFORCE: Smith Wins Prelim. Approval of Class Settlement

NCAA: Lyon Sues Over Disregard for Health and Safety of Athletes
NIAGARA BOTTLING: Bid to Certify Classes in Frompovicz Suit Denied
NIZHONI HEALTH: Faces Lima Suit Over Unreimbursed Travel Expenses
NORMAL LIFE: Grotte Suit Remanded to San Luis Obispo Superior Court
OCTAPHARMA PLASMA: Crumpton Sues Over Unlawful Use of Biometrics

OMEGA FLEX: Missouri Class Action Still Ongoing
PATHWAY LEASING: Court Denies Bid to Certify Appeal in Merrill Suit
PLANNERNET INC: Court Enters Final Judgment in Champagne Suit
PROSPECT CHARTERCARE: $11M Del Sesto ERISA Suit Deal Has Final Okay
READING INTERNATIONAL: Brown vs. Reading Cinemas, et al., Underway

REWALK ROBOTICS: Has Until Dec. 20 to Oppose Appellate Brief
RUHNN HOLDING: Faces Securities Suit in E.D. New York
SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN: Ct. Allows Romaine to Intervene in Lanier
SHEIN FASHION: Dargoltz Seeks to Stop Unsolicited Telemarketing
SMITH & WESSON: Amended Primus RICO Suit Dismissed with Prejudice

SOLI-BOND INC: Sanchez Suit Remanded to Kern County Superior Court
STEWART BUILDERS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Sheffield
TANDY LEATHER: Faces Haghebaert Suit Over Decline in Share Price
TENNESSEE VALLEY: Class Suit over 2008 Kingston Ash Spill Underway
TITAN CONSTRUCTION: Dolores Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA & NYLL

TREVENA INC: Bid to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pending
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Messinger Sues Over Drop in IPO Share Price
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class in Sweet Suit
UNITED STATES: Dent County Receives PILT Class Action Payout
US CLAIMS SERVICES: DeSimone Sues for Deceiving Property Owners

USA TECHNOLOGIES: Plaintiff Appeals Stay of Chester County Suit
USA TECHNOLOGIES: Shareholder Class Suit Underway in E.D. Pa.
WORLD HARVEST: Jamari Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Phone Calls
[*] EC Proposes Directive on Representative Actions Across EU
[*] Politicians Ask for Looney's Stand on Restaurant Servers' Law


                        Asbestos Litigation



                            *********

6201 N KENMORE: Faces Okolo Class Suit Alleging Violation of RLTO
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Josephine Okolo, individually and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated persons v. 6201 N. KENMORE, LLC & BECOVIC
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., Case No. 2019CH13845 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty.,
Dec. 2, 2019), accuses the Defendants of violating the Chicago
Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance.

Defendant Becovic collected rent and fees directly from tenants and
deposited rent received into their business account. On March 6,
2019, Becovic initially offered the Plaintiff an 18-page rental
agreement for her dwelling unit.

The Defendants failed to provide her with an updated RLTO Summary
from the commissioner of the department of housing when her rental
agreement was initially offered, the Plaintiff contends. She notes
that the Defendants provided their own version of the RLTO Summary
to her, which was not the summary prepared by the Commissioner and
made available to the public for inspection and copying by the City
of Chicago at the time the rental agreement was initially offered.

The Defendants also failed to provide the Plaintiff with any
Separate Summary with interest rates from the commissioner of the
department of housing when her rental agreement was initially
offered in violation of the Chicago RLTO, says the complaint.

Josephine Okolo was a tenant at Chicago, Illinois.

Kenmore Building is a residential apartment building in Chicago
containing over 50 residential rental dwelling units owned and
managed by the Defendants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aaron A. Krolik, Esq.
          AARON KROLIK LAW OFFICE, P.A.
          225 W. Washington St., Suite 2200
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 924-0278
          Fax: (312) 650-8241
          Email: akrolik@securitydepositlaw.com

              - and -

          Mark Silverman, Esq.
          MARK SILVERMAN LAW OFFICE LTD.
          225 W. Washington St., Suite 2200
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 775-1015
          Fax: (312) 256-2055
          Email: mark@depositlaw.com


ACCREDITED DEBT: Jones Sues Over Autodialed Marketing Texts
-----------------------------------------------------------
STANLEY JONES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. ACCREDITED DEBT RELIEF, LLC, a California
limited liability company, and BEYOND FINANCE, INC., a Delaware
corporation, Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-02144-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal.,
Nov. 7, 2019), alleges that the Defendants promote and market their
merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited, autodialed text
messages to consumers, in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

The Plaintiff received autodialed text messages to his cellular
phone from Defendant Accredited, despite having his phone number
registered on the Do Not Call, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive and monetary relief for all persons
injured by the Defendants' conduct.

Accredited functions as a lead generator for Beyond, providing
Beyond with consumers that qualify for Beyond's debt relief and
consolidation programs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Amanda F. Benedict, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF AMANDA F. BENEDICT
          7710 Hazard Center Dr., Suite E-104
          San Diego, CA 92108
          E-mail: amanda@amandabenedict.com

               - and -

          Steven L. Woodrow, Esq.
          Patrick H. Peluso, Esq.
          WOODROW & PELUSO, LLC
          3900 East Mexico Ave., Suite 300
          Denver, CO 80210
          Telephone: (720) 213-0675
          Facsimile: (303) 927-0809
          E-mail: swoodrow@woodrowpeluso.com
                  ppeluso@woodrowpeluso.com


ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL: Merlan Sues Over Unpaid Wages and Premiums
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Delfin Merlan, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, INC., a California,
For-Profit Benefit Corporation, DOES 1 to 50, inclusive, Case No.
37-2019-00064053-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., Dec. 2,
2019), is brought for the Defendant's failure to pay minimum wages,
to provide paid rest breaks and/or pay missed rest break premiums,
to reimburse business expenses, and to pay all wages due to its
former employees upon termination.

The Plaintiff and Class Members were paid on a set amount per
credit hour for each course they taught or were paid a flat piece
rate for each course taught. This amount was not tied to the number
of hours the Plaintiff and Class Members worked, but rather, was a
form of piece-rate compensation based on the number of courses they
taught, or the number of credits taught. As a result, the Plaintiff
and Class Members, were paid on a piece-rate basis, and were thus,
non-exempt employees. In fact, the Plaintiff's total compensation
for the year was well below the twice the minimum wage requirement
of Cal. Labor, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant as an adjunct professor in
San Diego County.

Alliant International University, Inc., is a California for-profit
benefit corporation, operating within the State of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig J. Ackermann, Esq.
          ACKERMANN & TILAJEF, P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Phone: (310) 277-0614
          Facsimile: (310) 277-0635
          Email: cja@ackermanntilajef.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Melmed, Esq.
          MELMED LAW GROUP P.C.
          1180 South Beverly Drive, Suite 610
          Los Angeles, CA 90035
          Phone: (310) 824-3828
          Facsimile: (310) 862-6851
          Email: jm@melmedlaw.com


ALTRIA GROUP: Faces Cipolla Suit Over Decline in Share Price
------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick F. Cipolla, individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. ALTRIA GROUP, INC., HOWARD A. WILLARD III,
and WILLIAM F. GIFFORD, JR., Case No. 1:19-cv-06774 (E.D.N.Y., Dec.
2, 2019), is brought on behalf of persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired Altria securities between October
25, 2018, and September 24, 2019, inclusive, asserting claims
against the Defendants under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On December 20, 2018, during pre-market hours, Altria issued a
press release announcing that it had signed and closed a $12.8
billion investment in JUUL Labs, Inc. the purported U.S. leader in
electronic vapor products, including e-cigarettes. According to the
December 2018 Press Release, the service agreements related to the
transaction would accelerate JUUL's mission to switch adult smokers
to e-vapor products. Altria's investment represented a 35% economic
interest in JUUL, valuing the company at $38 billion, with JUUL
purportedly remaining fully independent.

Several government agencies, including the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, have recently announced their
separate investigations over e-cigarette related cases of illnesses
and incidents.  On this news, Altria's stock price fell several
times.

On September 25, 2019, Altria issued a press release announcing
that Philip Morris had called off discussions of a $200 billion
merger with Altria due to scrutiny of the vaping industry and the
Company's 35% stake in market leader JUUL, which had announced the
same day that it was the subject of another federal investigation.
JUUL also announced its CEO would step down and the firm would stop
all advertising in the U.S.

On this news, Altria's stock price fell an additional $0.17 per
share, or 0.42%, to close at $40.56 per share on September 25,
2019--a total loss of $0.32 per share, or 0.78%, since closing at
$40.88 per share two trading days earlier on September 23, 2019.

The Plaintiff, who purchased Altria securities during the Class
Period, alleges that the Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, the Defendants failed to
disclose to investors: (1) that Altria had conducted insufficient
due diligence into JUUL prior to the Company's $12.8 billion
investment, or 35% stake, in JUUL; (2) that Altria consequently
failed to inform investors, or account for, material risks
associated with JUUL's products and marketing practices, and the
true value of JUUL and its products; (3) that, as a result of the
foregoing, as well as mounting public scrutiny, negative publicity,
and governmental pressure on e-vapor products and on JUUL, Altria's
investment in JUUL was reasonably likely to have a material
negative impact on the Company's reputation and operations; and (4)
that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Altria manufactures and sells cigarettes, smokeless products, and
wine in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Ave., Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          Email: lportnoy@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 432-1495
          Email: info@glancylaw.com


APHRIA INC: Facing 7 Complaints over Acquisitions, Offering
-----------------------------------------------------------
Aphria Inc. said in its Form F-10/A filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 13, 2019, that it is aware of
seven claims in class action lawsuits in the U.S. and Canada
related to the Company's acquisitions and its June 2018 offering.

The Company was served statements of claim in class action lawsuits
against it and certain of its current and former officers.  These
claims relate to alleged misconduct in connection with the
Company's acquisitions of LATAM Holdings Inc. and Nuuvera Holdings
Limited, and the Company's June 2018 Offering (as defined in the
annual information form (the "AIF") of the Company dated July 31,
2019 for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2019).

At the present time, the Company is aware of seven such claims,
four of which were commenced in the United States (which have since
been consolidated into a single complaint) and three of which were
commenced in Canada.

The US claims include alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the
U.S. Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act and Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act.  The Canadian claims include alleged
statutory and common law misrepresentation and oppression.  The
Company intends to vigorously defend itself in each of these
actions.

With respect to the cases commenced in the United States, the
Company is self-insured for the costs associated with any award or
damages arising from such actions and has entered into indemnity
agreements with each of the Company's directors and officers and,
subject to certain exemptions, will cover any costs incurred by
them in connection with any of the class action claims.  With
respect to the cases commenced in Canada, the Company's insurance
policies may not be sufficient to cover any judgments against it.

Aphria Inc. produces and sells medical cannabis in Canada and
internationally. The company offers pharmaceutical-grade medical
cannabis; and adult-use cannabis under the Solei, RIFF, Good
Supply, and Broken Coast brands. It serves patients and consumers
through distributors and online. The company is headquartered in
Leamington, Canada.


AT&T CORP: Dist. Ct. Denies Wexler's Bid to Amend Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------
In a prior memorandum and order, in the case captioned EVE WEXLER,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. AT&T CORP., Defendant, Case No. 15-CV-0686 (FB) (PK).
(E.D.N.Y.), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York ordered the class-action allegations stricken
from the complaint on the ground that the named plaintiff, Dr. Eve
Wexler, could not be an adequate class representative because she
is married to Shimshon Wexler, the lawyer who filed the complaint.
It reasoned that Mr. Wexler's withdrawal from the case did not cure
the conflict because he still retained the right to seek fees on a
quantum meruit theory.

In response, Dr. Wexler moved to amend the complaint to resurrect
the class-action allegations. She explained in a promotion letter
that Mr. Wexler had agreed to disavow any claim to attorney fees.
The Court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Kuo, who issued a
Report and Recommendation ("R&R") on August 5, 2019. Dr. Wexler
timely objected, which requires the Court to review the R&R de
novo.

The R&R recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a
Second Amended Complaint be denied. It reasons that Plaintiff's
proposed amendments would be futile "[b]ecause Plaintiff is not an
adequate class representative" and as such "the proposed class
cannot be certified under Rule 23."

Plaintiff argues that the R&R erred in two respects:

First, as Magistrate Judge Kuo examined whether Plaintiff was an
adequate representative under Rule 23, Plaintiff argues the R&R
addressed the wrong question and should be rejected as contrary to
law.

It is true that a motion to amend a pleading is subject to the
lenient standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. But when a
motion for leave to amend arises in the context of a class action,
leave should be denied as futile if the allegations in the proposed
amended complaint demonstrate that the proposed class cannot be
certified under Rule 23.

In this case, Plaintiff's Motion seeks to reinstate class
allegations that were already stricken by this Court on the grounds
that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the 0adequacy of representation
requirement.   Whether Plaintiff's amendments are futile,
therefore, necessarily requires this Court to consider if those
amendments will enhance the likelihood of class certification under
Rule 23.  

Second, Plaintiff argues that it was error for Magistrate Judge Kuo
to find Plaintiff inadequate under Rule 23 because the R&R only
found the mere appearance of impropriety and the potential for
conflicts of interest, rather than an actual, fully-ripe conflict.


The Court overrules this objection as well.

To satisfy Rule 23's adequate representation requirement, a
plaintiff must have no interests antagonistic to the interest of
the other class members. A proposed representative may be an
inadequate if, for example, they have a close relationship with
class counsel or would otherwise permit a settlement on terms less
favorable to absent class members.  

While Plaintiff argues the mere appearance of impropriety is not
disqualifying under Rule 23, the Court cannot agree. An actual
conflict is not a prerequisite to a finding of inadequacy, even a
potential conflict of interest is sufficient to render a named
plaintiff an inadequate class representative. The Court's role is
not to discern whether the representative-counsel relationship
creates an actual conflict, but rather to assess the likelihood
that a conflict of interest may exist.

According to Plaintiff, even the appearance of a conflict of
interest was dispelled when Mr. Wexler the former lead counsel in
this case and Plaintiff's spouse renounced his claim for fees,
including for quantum meruit.

Here again, the Court does not agree.

Evidence brought out in the parties briefing and an evidentiary
hearing on the Motion confirm that potential conflicts of interest
remain even in the absence of a direct fee claim from Mr. Wexler.
For example, Mr. Wexler's testimony revealed a history of business
dealings between him and current class attorneys James Giardina and
Keith Keogh. Mr. Wexler admitted that he and Mr.

Giardina previously worked together as counsel on more than one
matter and that, in at least two additional cases, Mr. Keogh had
takenover as lead counsel for Mr. Wexler.  

Thus, even accepting as true that Mr. Wexler was not promised
specific remuneration by Giardina and Keogh in this case, the
significant potential for a conflict of interest remains: Mr.
Wexler acknowledged that he previously brought Giardina and/or
Keogh into cases with hope of financial gain, that he had attempted
to do so here, and that he may do so again in the future. The clear
possibility that Plaintiff's husband may derive financial gain from
class counsel creates the appearance that Plaintiff would have an
incentive to maximize fees for her attorneys.  

Having reviewed the R&R de novo, the Court adopts the R&R in full.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum and Order  is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2hwsgfn
from Leagle.com.

Eve Wexler, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by James S. Giardina , The Consumer Rights
Law Group, PLLC, 3104 W Waters Ave STE 200. Tampa, FL 33614-2877 &
Keith James Keogh , Keogh Law, Ltd., 55 W. Monroe, Ste. 3390,
Chicago, IL, 60603, pro hac vice.

AT&T Corp., Defendant, represented by Christopher James Houpt -
choupt@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP, Archis A. Parasharami -
aparasharami@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP, Evan M. Tager -
etager@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown, LLP, pro hac vice & Matthew D.
Ingber - mingber@mayerbrown.com - Mayer Brown LLP.

AVON PRODUCTS: Reaches Agreement to Resolve Berger Action in N.Y.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Avon Products, Inc. disclosed in its Form 8-K filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 13, 2019, that the
Company reached agreement with the plaintiff in the Berger Action
to resolve his claims.

A putative class action complaint was filed on October 16, 2019 in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York Kings County against the
Company and members of the board of directors of the Company (the
"Berger Action").  The Company believes the claims asserted in the
Berger Action are without merit.

In conjunction with the Company's November 6, 2019 filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission of supplemental disclosures to
its definitive proxy statement/prospectus filed on October 4, 2019,
the Company reached agreement with the plaintiff in the Berger
Action to resolve his claims.  The plaintiff has agreed that he
will dismiss the Berger Action in its entirety, with prejudice as
to such plaintiff only and without prejudice to all other members
of the putative class, and the parties have filed a stipulation of
discontinuance to that effect.

Avon Products, Inc. manufactures and markets beauty and related
products in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, south Latin America,
North Latin America, and the Asia Pacific. The company was founded
in 1886 and is headquartered in London, the United Kingdom.


BANK OF AMERICA: Advisors Classes Certified in Frausto and Suarez
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler grants the Plaintiffs'
joint motion for class certification in the lawsuits styled IRMA
FRAUSTO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Case No.
3:18-cv-01983-LB (N.D. Cal.), and ARIANNA SUAREZ, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION, Case No. 3:18-cv-01202-LB (N.D. Cal.).

The Court modifies the Plaintiffs' proposed class definition and
certifies narrowed classes as follows:

   (1) for the off-the-clock claim, (a) all Treasury Services
       Advisors and persons with similar job duties (in call
       centers) and (b) all Assistant Managers and persons with
       similar job duties (in financial centers); and

  (2) for the meal-and-rest breaks claims, all Treasury Services
       Advisors and persons with similar job duties (in call
       centers).

The Court certifies classes for the derivative claims for the same
reasons.  The off-the-clock claim is limited to mandatory duties
pre-and post-shift (in the form of logging on and off computers).

The Court directs the parties to confer and to submit a joint
revised class definition that complies with this order within 14
days.  The parties may stipulate to extend this deadline.

The Plaintiffs both worked for Bank of America as non-exempt
employees and--on behalf of themselves and the putative class--sued
for alleged wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor
Code for off-the-clock work and missed meal-and-rest breaks.  They
also made derivative claims predicated on the off-the-clock work
and missed-breaks claims: failure to pay final wages on time,
failure to provide accurate wage-and-hour statements, and unfair
business practices under California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL").[CC]


BEMBE INC: Bennici FLSA Suit Moved From S.D. to E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as MAMIE NKATIA-BOATEMA BENNICI, on
behalf of herself, Plaintiff v. BEMBE INC. and ANTHONY PILIASKAS,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-08917 (Filed Sept. 25, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Brooklyn) on Nov. 7, 2019.

The Eastern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-06309-BMC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Brian M. Cogan.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act by willfully failing and refusing to pay her and the
Class legally required minimum wage for all hours worked and
unlawfully deducting money from their tips.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a bartender at
Bembe from March 2018 to April 29, 2019.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel Maimon Kirschenbaum, Esq.
          JOSEPH HERZFELD HESTER & KIRSCHENBAUM LLP
          233 Broadway, 5th Floor
          New York, NY 10279
          Telephone: (212) 688-5640
          Facsimile: (212) 688-2548
                    E-mail: maimon@jhllp.com


BRENDON LOCHERT: Coleman Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Coleman, Gillian Mershon, and John Mershon, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BRENDON LOCHERT,
Case No. 1:19-cv-03380 (D. Colo., Dec. 2, 2019), accuses the
Defendant of violating the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to
pay the Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated workers the federal
minimum wage and overtime compensation for hours that they worked.

The Plaintiffs observed that other employees, who were incorrectly
classified by Lochert as being exempt from the overtime
requirements of the FLSA, regularly worked more than 40 hours per
week, as did the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs were paid on an hourly
basis and were not paid overtime compensation for hours that they
worked over 40 per week during the period, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by Lochert as an X-ray technician, and
as Physician's Assistants.

Brendon Lochert is an Arizona resident, who conducted business
within the State of Colorado, managing, running, owning and
controlling over one dozen urgent care (medical) centers operating
under the name "Metro Urgent Care."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David H. Miller, Esq.
          Adam M. Harrison, Esq.
          THE SAWAYA & MILLER LAW FIRM
          1600 Ogden Street
          Denver, CO 80218
          Phone: 303-839-1650
          E-mail: DMiller@sawayalaw.com
                  AHarrison@sawayalaw.com


BURLINGTON COUNTY, NJ: Bid to Vacate Atty's Pro Hac Vice Adm. Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMMY MARIE HAAS and CONRAD SZCZPANIAK, individually
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs, v. BURLINGTON COUNTY, et al., Defendants, Civil No.
08-1102 (NLH/JS) (D. N.J.), Judge Noel L. Hillman of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey (i) denied the the
Poplar Group's motion to vacate Attorney Lask's pro hac vice
admission; (ii) granted the Novack Group's cross-motion to withdraw
Attorney Lask's pro hac vice admission; and (iii) denied the Poplar
Group's motion for reconsideration.

On Jan. 31, 2019, the Court granted final settlement approval in
the enduring class action.  As part of the settlement, the Court
approved a counsel fee and litigation cost award of $925,000.  The
Class Counsel, however, could not agree on how to share the award
among themselves.  As such, the Court attempted to facilitate an
amicable resolution of the matter, albeit unsuccessfully.  After
the counsel could not amicably resolve the issue, on Sept. 3, 2019,
Magistrate Judge Schneider issued a Report and Recommendation
("R&R") recommending an allocation of the fee.  On Sept. 17, 2019,
the Poplar Group filed objections to the R&R, and the Court
undertook a de novo review of it.

While the Poplar Group's objections to the R&R remained pending
before the Court, the Poplar Group moved to vacate Attorney Lask's
pro hac vice admission, citing what the Court previously described
as troubling findings of Judge Loretta A. Preska of the Southern
District of New York regarding Ms. Lask and litigation ongoing in
that district.  In response, the Novack Group cross-moved to
withdraw Attorney Lask's pro hac vice admission.

On Sept. 24, 2019, the Court issued an Opinion and Order adopting
and affirming the R&R in its entirety.  On Oct. 3, 2019, the Poplar
Group moved for reconsideration of the Sept. 24, 2019 Opinion and
Order.  The Novack Group filed opposition on Oct. 18, 2019.

The pending motions are the last three remaining in the case.

The Poplar Group's Motion for Reconsideration advances four main
arguments, none of which suggest that the Court overlooked relevant
facts or controlling law, but rather rehash arguments previously
raised.  Most of the Poplar Group's arguments focus on Attorney
Lask's involvement in the case and the relevancy of such
involvement to the Court's decision to adopt the R&R's
recommendation regarding fee allocation.  The Court previously
concluded that Attorney Lask's involvement in the action and the
status of Ms. Lask's admission to practice before the Court have no
direct effect on what portion of the negotiated fee the Novak Group
is entitled to.  Judge Hillman holds that the Poplar Group fails to
identify new facts or controlling law that would require
reconsideration of the prior decision.

For the first time, and in a footnote, the Poplar Group also argues
that Magistrate Judge Schneider lacked the authority to resolve the
issue of the allocation of attorney's fees.  The position now
advanced by the Poplar Group directly contradicts the position it
took in objecting to the R&R.  Previously, the Poplar Group
acknowledged that Judge Schneider is in the best position of any
judicial officer to make an allocation recommendation because he
participated in many aspects of the case and was an eye-witness to
court activity.  In any event, the Judge holds that the Poplar
Group's abrupt change in position does not warrant
reconsideration.

In furthering its argument, the Poplar Group directs the Court to
authority from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals for the
proposition that attorney fee distribution is reviewed under a de
novo standard.  The Judge interprets the Poplar Group's argument as
suggesting that reconsideration is appropriate because a de novo
standard of review should be applied to the R&R's fee allocation
determination.  He holds that teconsideration is not warranted, as
the Court applied the very standard the Poplar Group suggests is
required.  To the extent the Poplar Group argues that
reconsideration is appropriate because the Court failed to conduct
a de novo review of the R&R, that argument lacks merit.
Accordingly, the Judge will deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

Turning to the motions relating to Attorney Lask's pro hac vice
admission, the Judge holds that the status of Ms. Lask's admission
to practice before the Court has no direct effect on what portion
of the negotiated fee the Novak Group is entitled to.  The Judge
has no reason to question the judgment, especially in light of the
benefits ultimately conferred on the class through the efforts of
the Novak Group as a whole.

Either way, the Judge need not address that issue further.  The
Novack Group has moved to voluntarily withdraw Attorney Lask's pro
hac vice admission, and he will grant that motion.

For those reasons, Judge Hillman (i) denied the Poplar Group's
motion to vacate Attorney Lask's pro hac vice admission, (ii)
grantd the Novack Group's cross-motion to withdraw Attorney Lask's
pro hac vice admission; and (iii) denied the Poplar Group's motion
for reconsideration.  An appropriate Order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/By8gCn from Leagle.com.

TAMMY MARIE HAAS, Individually and on behalf of a Class of
Similarly Situated Individuals, Plaintiff, represented by CARL D.
POPLAR -- cpoplar@poplarlaw.com -- DAVID J. NOVACK --
dnovack@budd-larner.com -- MARIN GOODMAN, JAMIE BETH GOLDMAN,
ROBERT BRUCE WOODRUFF, SCHILLER & PITTENGER, P.C., SETH RICHARD
LESSER, KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER, LLP, WILLIAM A. RIBACK, WILLIAM
RIBACK, LLC, SONYA M. LONGO, BUDD LARNER, PC & TERENCE W. CAMP,
BUDD, LARNER, P.C.

CONRAD SZCZPANIAK, Plaintiff Consolidated, represented by CARL D.
POPLAR, FRAN L. RUDICH -- frudich@klafterolsen.com -- KLAFTER
OLSEN
& LESSER LLP, SETH RICHARD LESSER, KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER, LLP &
WILLIAM A. RIBACK, WILLIAM RIBACK, LLC.

BURLINGTON COUNTY, Defendant, represented by BETSY G. RAMOS,
CAPEHART & SCATCHARD, EVAN H.C. CROOK, MALAMUT AND ASSOCIATES,
LLC,
MICHELLE L. COREA -- mcorea@capehart.com -- CAPEHART AND
SCATCHARD,
P.A. & LAURA DANKS -- ldanks@capehart.com -- CAPEHART & SCATCHARD
PA.

BURLINGTON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY & RONALD COX, both in his
individual and Representive capacity as Warden of the Burlington
County Jail, Defendant Consolidated, represented by MICHELLE L.
COREA, CAPEHART AND SCATCHARD, P.A. & LAURA DANKS, CAPEHART &
SCATCHARD PA.


CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT: No Judgment on Pleadings in TCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada issued
an Order denying Defendants' Motion to Stay and a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings in the case captioned JUAN CASTILLO, as
an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 2:18-cv-02297-GMN-NJK. (D. Nev.)

This case arises out of Defendants' alleged violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act  (TCPA) by way of its Ivy virtual
concierge. Plaintiff claims that at no time prior to receiving
Defendants' text message did Plaintiff expressly authorize
Defendants to send him text messages using an automatic telephone
dialing system for telemarketing or advertising purposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c), a court must accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when, taking all the
allegations in the nonmoving party's pleadings as true, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The allegations
of the nonmoving party must be accepted as true while any
allegations made by the moving party that have been denied or
contradicted are assumed to be false.

The TCPA prohibits any call using automatic telephone dialing
system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to a telephone without
prior express consent by the person being called, unless the call
is for emergency purposes.  

The Ninth Circuit has set forth three elements for a TCPA
violation: (1) the defendant called a cellular telephone number (2)
using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice (3) without the recipient's prior express
consent.

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim under
the TCPA because: (1) the TCPA violates the First Amendment both
facially and as applied (2) Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible
set of facts that would show Defendants' text message with sent
with an ATDS (3) Plaintiff provided the requisite prior express
consent.  

With respect to Defendants' first argument which challenges the
constitutionality of the TCPA, this argument fails.  

Defendants' second argument contends that Plaintiff does not allege
a plausible set of facts that would show Defendant's text message
with sent with an ATDS. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the text
message that forms the basis of this case was sent using equipment
capable of dialing numbers en masse from a stored database, and/or
automatically dialing numbers.

In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2018), the
Ninth Circuit held that an ATDS encompasses systems that make
automatic calls from lists of recipients. Thus, under Marks, an
ATDS means equipment which has the capacity (1) to store numbers to
be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator and to dial such numbers automatically
even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person.
Accordingly, under Marks, Plaintiff states a plausible set of facts
that would show Defendant's text message with sent with an ATDS.

Defendants' last argument is that Plaintiff provided the requisite
prior express consent. However, express consent is not an element
of a plaintiff's prima facie case but is an affirmative defense for
which the defendant bears the burden of proof. To the extent that
Defendant asserts that the message at issue does not constitute
telemarketing or advertising, and therefore, prior express consent
is not required, this assertion is contradicted by the allegations
in Plaintiff's Complaint. As such, Defendants' contrary allegations
are assumed to be false.  Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently
states a claim under the TPCA.

Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is, therefore,
DENIED. The Court  also declines to issue a stay saying the
Defendants have not carried its burden of demonstrating hardship or
that a stay would serve the orderly course of justice. To the
extent Defendants has established that a stay would result in de
minimis harm to Plaintiff, this consideration is outweighed by the
other factors.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y5za5eqn from Leagle.com.

Justin Castillo, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lionel Z. Glancy -
lglancy@glancylaw.com - Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice,
Mark S. Greenstone  - mgreenstone@greenstonelaw.com - Greenstone
Law APC, Danielle Manning - DMANNING@GLANCYLAW.COM - Glancy Prongay
& Murray LLP, pro hac vice, David C. OMara - david@omaralaw.net -
The OMara Law Firm, P.C., Marc Lawrence Godino  -
mgodino@glancylaw.com - Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice,
Mark Samuel Greenstone - mgreenstone@greenstonelaw.com - Greenstone
Law APC, pro hac vice & Michael Joe Jaurigue  -
michael@jlglawyers.com - Jaurigue Law Group, pro hac vice.

Caesars Entertainment Corporation & Desert Palace, LLC, doing
business as Caesars Palace Hotel & Casino, Defendants, represented
by Matthew T. Murchison - matthew.murchison@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Melanie Marilyn Blunschi -
melanie.blunschi@lw.com - Latham & Watkins LLP, Adam J. Tuetken -
adam.goldberg@lw.com - Latham & Watkins LLP, pro hac vice, Frank M.
Flansburg, III - fflansburg@bhfs.com - Browmstein Hyatt Farber
Schreck & Natalie Hardwick Rao  - natalie.rao@lw.com - Latham &
Watkins LLP, pro hac vice.

United States of America, Intervenor, represented by Joshua Charles
Abbuhl , Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch U.S. Department of
Justice.

CAPITALA FINANCE: Paskowitz Securities Suit Tossed
--------------------------------------------------
Capitala Finance Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 4, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that a California court
has entered an order dismissing the class action lawsuit entitled,
Paskowitz v. Capitala Finance Corp., et al.

On December 28, 2017, an alleged stockholder filed a putative class
action lawsuit complaint, Paskowitz v. Capitala Finance Corp., et
al., in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California (case number 2:17-cv-09251-MWF-AS), against the
Company and certain of its current officers on behalf of all
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common
stock between January 4, 2016 and August 7, 2017.

On January 3, 2018, another alleged stockholder filed a putative
class action complaint, Sandifer v. Capitala Finance Corp., et al.,
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California (case number 2:18-cv-00052-MWF-AS), asserting
substantially similar claims on behalf of the same putative class
and against the same defendants.

On February 2, 2018, the Sandifer Action was transferred, on
stipulation of the parties, to the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina. The Sandifer Action was
voluntarily dismissed on February 28, 2018.

On March 1, 2018, the Paskowitz Action was transferred, on
stipulation of the parties, to the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina (case number
3:18-cv-00096-RJC-DSC). On June 19, 2018, the plaintiffs in the
Paskowitz Action filed their amended complaint.  

The amended complaint alleged certain violations of the securities
laws, including, inter alia, that the defendants made certain
materially false and misleading statements and omissions regarding
the Company's business, operations, and prospects between January
4, 2016 and August 7, 2017.  

The amended complaint sought compensatory damages and attorneys'
fees and costs, among other relief, but did not specify the amount
of damages being sought.

On August 14, 2018, Defendants in the Paskowitz Action filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On August 15, 2019, the
Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed the
amended complaint without prejudice to the plaintiffs' ability to
file a motion seeking to further amend the amended complaint.  

On September 16, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice with the Court
informing the Court that plaintiffs intend not to file a second
amended complaint and requesting that the Court enter an order of
final judgment and dismissal.

On October 25, 2019, the Court entered a judgment in accordance
with the August 15, 2019 dismissal order.

While the Company intends to vigorously defend itself in this
litigation should the litigation continue, the outcome of these
legal proceedings cannot be predicted with certainty.

Capitala Finance Corp. is a Business Development Company
specializing in traditional mezzanine, senior subordinated and
unitranche debt, first-lien and second-lien loans, equity
investments in sponsored and non-sponsored lower and traditional
middle market companies. The company is base in Charlotte, North
Carolina.


CBL & ASSOCIATES: Lowers Accrual by $22.7MM for Wave Lengths Accord
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2019, that in connection with the
settlement of the class action lawsuit initiated by Wave Lengths
Hair Salons of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Salon Adrian, the Company
reduced the accrued liability by US$22,688,000 during the three
months ended September 30, 2019, a majority of which was related to
past tenants that did not submit a claim pursuant to the terms of
the settlement agreement with the remainder relating to tenants
that opted out of the lawsuit.

In April 2019, the Company entered into a settlement agreement and
release with respect to the class action lawsuit filed on March 16,
2016 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida by Wave Lengths Hair Salons of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Salon
Adrian.  The settlement agreement stated that the Company had to
set aside a common fund with a monetary and non-monetary value of
US$90,000,000 to be disbursed to class members in accordance with
an agreed-upon formula that is based upon aggregate damages of
US$60,000,000.

The Court granted final approval to the proposed settlement on
August 22, 2019.  Class members are comprised of past and current
tenants at certain of the Company's shopping centers that it owns
or formerly owned during the class period, which extended from
January 1, 2011 through the date of preliminary court approval.
Class members who are past tenants and made a claim pursuant to the
Court's order will receive payment of their claims in cash.  Class
members who are current tenants will receive monthly credits
against rents and future charges, beginning no earlier than January
1, 2020 and continuing for the following five years.

Any amounts under the settlement allocated to tenants with
outstanding amounts payable to the Company, including tenants which
have declared bankruptcy or declare bankruptcy over the relevant
period, will first be deducted from the amounts owed to the
Company.  All attorney's fees and associated costs to be paid to
class counsel (up to a maximum of US$28,000,000), any incentive
award to the class representative (up to a maximum of US$50,000),
and class administration costs (which are expected to not exceed
US$100,000), have or will be funded by the common fund, which has
been approved by the Court.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the Company did not
pay any dividends to holders of its common shares payable in the
third and fourth quarters of 2019.  The settlement agreement does
not restrict the Company's ability to declare dividends payable in
2020 or in subsequent years.  The Company recorded an accrued
liability and corresponding litigation settlement expense of
US$88,150,000 in the three months ended March 31, 2019 related to
the settlement agreement.

The Company reduced the accrued liability by US$22,688,000 during
the three months ended September 30, 2019, a majority of which was
related to past tenants that did not submit a claim pursuant to the
terms of the settlement agreement with the remainder relating to
tenants that opted out of the lawsuit.  Subsequent to September 30,
2019, the Company paid US$23,050,000 in attorney and administrative
fees related to the previously accrued litigation settlement
payable.  The Company also received document requests in the third
quarter, in the form of subpoenas, from the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Department of Justice regarding the Wave Lengths
Hair Salons of Florida, Inc. litigation and other related matters.
The Company is cooperating in these matters.

CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. is a self managed and self
administered real estate investment trust. The Company owns
regional shopping malls and community shopping centers in the
United States. The company is based in Chattanooga, Tennessee.


CBL & ASSOCIATES: Merelles Case in Tennessee Voluntarily Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Merelles complaint, one of the two remaining cases in the
consolidated proceeding captioned In re CBL & Associates
Properties, Inc. Securities Litigation, has been voluntarily
dismissed, according to CBL & Associates Properties, Inc.'s Form
10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2019.

The Company and certain of its officers and directors have been
named as defendants in three putative securities class action
lawsuits, each filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, on behalf of all persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's securities during a
specified period of time.

The first such lawsuit, captioned Paskowitz v. CBL & Associates
Properties, Inc., et al., 1:19-cv-00149-JRG-CHS, was filed on May
17, 2019, and asserts claims on behalf of persons or entities that
purchased CBL securities between November 8, 2017 and March 26,
2019, inclusive.  The second such lawsuit, captioned Williams v.
CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., et al., 1:19-cv-00181, was filed
on June 21, 2019, and asserts claims on behalf of persons or
entities that purchased CBL securities between April 29, 2016 and
March 26, 2019, inclusive.  The third such lawsuit, captioned
Merelles v. CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., et al.,
1:19-CV-00193, was filed on July 2, 2019, and asserts claims on
behalf of persons or entities that purchased CBL securities between
July 29, 2014 and March 26, 2019.

The Court consolidated these cases on July 17, 2019, under the
caption In re CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 1:19-cv-00149-JRG-CHS.  After plaintiff Laurence
Paskowitz voluntarily dismissed his case on July 25, 2019, the
Court re-consolidated the two remaining cases under the caption In
re CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. Securities Litigation,
1:19-cv-00181-JRG-CHS, on August 2, 2019.  

On September 26, 2019, the Merelles complaint was voluntarily
dismissed.

The complaints filed in the Securities Class Action Litigation
allege violations of the securities laws, including, among other
things, that the defendants made certain materially false and
misleading statements and omissions regarding the Company's
contingent liabilities, business, operations, and prospects during
the periods of time specified above.  The plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs, among other
relief, but have not specified the amount of damages sought.

The Company said that the outcome of these legal proceedings cannot
be predicted with certainty.

CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. is a self managed and self
administered real estate investment trust. The Company owns
regional shopping malls and community shopping centers in the
United States. The company is based in Chattanooga, Tennessee.


CLIENT SERVICES: Wins Favorable Ruling in Campagna FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Sandra J. Feuerstein issued a Memorandum & Order in the
lawsuit captioned TERESA CAMPAGNA, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. CLIENT SERVICES, INC., Case No.
18-CV-3039 (SJF)(ARL) (E.D.N.Y.):

   -- denying the Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion;

   -- denying as moot the Plaintiff's motion seeking class
      certification;

   -- directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in the
      Defendant's favor and then close this case; and

   -- ruling that the December 10, 2019 Status Conference is
      marked off the Court's calendar.

Judge Feuerstein opines that there was no false, deceptive, or
misleading representation in the subject Letter that would mislead
or confuse the least sophisticated consumer regarding the debt CSI
sought to collection.

Teresa Campagna commenced this action against the Defendant
alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq.  The Plaintiff obtained a
credit card issued by Chase Bank USA, N.A. and, subsequently,
became delinquent in her payments due the Bank arising from her use
of that Card.  In its efforts to collect the debt, the Defendant
contacted the Plaintiff by letter (the "Letter") dated March 7,
2018.[CC]


COMENITY BANK: Arbitration Bid in Gonzalez Suit Denied w/out Prej.
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORI ANN GONZALEZ, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. COMENITY BANK, DOES 1-30,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-CV-00348-AWI-EPG (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California denied Comenity's motion to compel
arbitration without prejudice pending a summary determination as to
the existence of an arbitration agreement.

The action involves a credit card account issued by Comenity and
branded for a clothing retailer called "The Limited."   Gonzalez
contends that she did not open the Account and filed an action
against Comenity in Fresno County Superior Court alleging various
forms of misconduct on Comenity's part in connection with her claim
of identity theft.

For example, Gonzalez alleges that Comenity pursued her for a debt
she did not owe on the Account; ignored her when she said the
account was not hers; and ignored her requests for information
about the alleged debt, violating California laws for how creditors
and debt collectors must respond to reports of identity theft.
Further, shealleges that Comenity failed to notify her that her
claim of identity theft with respect to the Account "must be in
writing"; failed to provide "information and/or documents" Gonzalez
requested with respect to the Account; and failed to diligently
investigate Gonzalez's notification of identity theft with respect
to the Account.

Based on these and other such allegations, Gonzalez brought claims
against Comenity under the California Identity Theft Act ("CITA"),
California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the
California Penal Code, and California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL").  The CITA claim is brought individually, while the claims
under the Rosenthal Act, Penal Code and UCL are brought
individually and on a class basis.

Comenity removed the action to this Court based on diversity
jurisdiction on March 14, 2019, and later filed the instant motion
to compel arbitration.  The Court denied Gonzalez's motion to
remand in an Order dated Oct. 21, 2019.

Comenity argues that the Court is required under the Federal
Arbitration Act to send the action to arbitration in its entirety
because the agreement governing the Account includes a valid and
enforceable arbitration provision that encompasses all four of
Gonzalez's claims and bars her from arbitrating any claims on a
class basis.  Comenity also seeks a stay of the action pending
arbitration of Gonzalez's claims.

According to Comenity, the "totality of the evidence" shows that
Gonzalez entered into the Credit Card Agreement -- and manifested
assent to the Arbitration Provision -- because she opened, used and
managed the Account; was provided with the Credit Card Agreement on
two occasions; and did not opt out of the Arbitration Provision.

In the alternative to an order compelling arbitration and staying
the action, Comenity seeks a summary trial on the question of
whether the Arbitration Provision applies.

Gonzalez contends that the Court cannot send the action to
arbitration -- or undertake a summary determination as to the
applicability of the Arbitration Provision -- because Comenity has
failed to make a prima facie showing that she entered into the
Credit Card Agreement.  Specifically, Gonzalez argues that the
facts set forth in support of Comenity's motion to remand "show
only" that the Account was opened, and do not show "who opened the
account."  Further, she argues that Comenity has failed to
establish that she manifested agreement to the terms of the
Arbitration Provision through conduct, which, according to
Gonzalez, requires showing that she received an arbitration
agreement and was aware of a contractual relationship with
Comenity.

Judge Ishii finds that, assuming the Arbitration Provision applies,
all of the claims in the case are within the scope of the
Arbitration Provision and can only be arbitrated on an individual
-- non-class -- basis.  He further finds, however, that Gonzalez's
sworn statement that she did not open the Account puts the
formation of the Credit Card Agreement in issue.

The Judge therefore denied Comenity's motion to compel arbitration
without prejudice and finds that a summary determination is
required on the limited question of whether Gonzalez entered into
the Credit Card Agreement.  Within 14 days of the date of service
of the Order, the parties will meet and confer as to the scope of
discovery necessary to address that question and submit a joint
proposal to Magistrate Judge Grosjean for further proceedings
consistent with the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/K1tPVu from Leagle.com.

Lori Ann Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Weiss -- jw@lojw.com
-- Law Office Of Jonathan Weiss & Tavy Alice Dumont --
tavy.dumont@dumontlaw.com -- Law Office of Tavy A. Dumont.

Comenity Bank, Defendant, represented by Tomio B. Narita --
tnarita@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita, LLP, Margaret T. Cardasis,
Simmonds & Narita LLP & Robert Travis Campbell --
tcampbell@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita LLP.


CONTROL GROUP: Court Dismisses Walker Class Suit
------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting a Joint Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned Tyanna Walker, Samantha Sanchez, Terry Hunt, Joe
Cardenas, Vladimir Tejada, Roberto Huerto, and Michelle Rice on
behalf of themselves and of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v. The Control Group Media Company, Inc.; Instant Checkmate, LLC;
TruthFinders, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-347 LAB JLB, (S.D.
Cal.).

The Joint Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice is GRANTED, rules the
Court.

According to the Court, it is ADJUDGED by consent that Plaintiffs
are bound by the mandatory arbitration and class action waiver
provisions set forth in Defendants' website terms of use and thus
their claims must be brought in the claimants' individual capacity
and not in a representative or class capacity before an arbitrator
from the American Arbitration Association.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at   https://tinyurl.com/y5acclnz from Leagle.com.

Tyanna Walker, on behalf of themselves and of others similarly
situated, Samantha Sanchez, on behalf of themselves and of others
similarly situated, Terry Hunt, on behalf of themselves and of
others similarly situated, Joe Cardenas, on behalf of themselves
and of others similarly situated, Vladimir Tejada, on behalf of
themselves and of others similarly situated, Roberto Huerta, on
behalf of themselves and of others similarly situated & Michelle
Rice, on behalf of themselves and of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Stephanie Renee Tatar -
stephanie@thetatarlawfirm.com - Tatar Law Firm, APC & Thomas J.
Lyons, Jr. , Consumer Justice Center P.A., 367 Commerce Court,
Vadnais Heights, MN 55127, pro hac vice.

The Control Group Media Company, Inc., Instant Checkmate, LLC &
TruthFinders, LLC, Defendants, represented by Christopher Scott
Crook  - cscrook@Venable.com - Venable LLP, pro hac vice, Damon
W.D. Wright , Venable LLP, 8010 Towers Crescent Drive, Suite 300,
Tysons Corner, VA 22182, pro hac vice & Daniel Scott Silverman ,
VENABLE LLP, 8010 Towers Crescent Drive, Suite 300, Tysons Corner,
VA 22182


CRAFT BREW: Settlement Claims Period in Broomfield Case Ends
------------------------------------------------------------
Craft Brew Alliance, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2019, that the settlement claims period
in the lawsuit by Theodore Broomfield closed on October 7, 2019.
The Company said that the total cost of settling the litigation is
not expected to be materially in excess of US$4.7 million.

On February 28, 2017 and March 6, 2017, respectively, two lawsuits,
Sara Cilloni and Simone Zimmer v. Craft Brew Alliance, Inc., and
Theodore Broomfield v. Kona Brewing Co.  LLC, Kona Brew
Enterprises, LLP, Kona Brewery LLC, and Craft Brew Alliance, Inc.,
were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
Division of California.

On April 7, 2017, the two lawsuits were consolidated into a single
complaint under the Broomfield case.  The lawsuit alleges that the
defendants misled customers regarding the state in which Kona
Brewing Company beers are manufactured.

On April 28, 2017, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, which was granted in part and denied in part on
September 1, 2017.

On September 26, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification, forming a class of persons within the state of
California who purchased certain Kona Brewing Company products
within the relevant statute of limitations period.  The Company's
motion for reconsideration was denied on October 16, 2018.

On May 30, 2019, the Company announced its entry into a definitive
settlement agreement, which received preliminary approval from the
Court on June 14, 2019.  The Company recorded a charge of US$4.7
million on a pre-tax basis in the quarter ended March 31, 2019,
based on the Company's estimate of the probable costs of settling
the litigation.  The settlement claims period ended October 7,
2019.  The total cost of settling the litigation is not expected to
be materially in excess of US$4.7 million.

Craft Brew Alliance, Inc. brews and sells craft beers and ciders in
the United States and internationally.  It operates through two
segments, Beer Related Operations and Brewpubs Operations.  The
Company was founded in 1981 and is headquartered in Portland,
Oregon.


DASUYA ENTERPRISES: Smith Moves to Certify FLSA Collective Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs in the lawsuit titled CRYSTAL SMITH AND TIFFANY
EARIN, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated v.
DASUYA ENTERPRISES, LLC; MINAKSHI PANDIT; AND HANU KAUSHAL, Case
No. 2:17-cv-17895-CJB-JVM (E.D. La.), submit their Motion to
Conditionally Certify FLSA Collective Action and Facilitate Notice
Under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The "FLSA Collective Class" is defined as:

     All persons employed by Defendants since December 2016 who
     were paid on an hourly basis but were required to work off
     the clock hours for which they were not paid, thereby
     depriving them of the federal minimum wage and/or were not
     paid at an overtime rate of one and one-half times their
     hourly rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 per
     week in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
     29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jody Forester Jackson, Esq.
          Mary Bubbett Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON+JACKSON
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2500
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 599-5953
          Facsimile: (888) 988-6499
          E-mail: jjackson@jackson-law.net
                  mjackson@jackson-law.net


DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Karp & Dearborn Securities Suits Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SELWYN KARP, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated Plaintiff, v. DIEBOLD NIXDORF, INCORPORATED,
ANDREAS W. MATTES, and CHRISOPHER A. CHAPMAN, Defendants; CITY OF
DEARBORN HEIGHTS ACT 345 POLICE AND FIRE RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. DIEBOLD NIXDORF, INCORPORATED, ANDREAS W. MATTES, and
CHRISOPHER A. CHAPMAN, Defendants, Case Nos. 19 Civ. 6180 (LAP), 19
Civ. 6514 (LAP) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Loretta A. Preska of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the
motions to consolidate the SDNY Actions.

The instant dispute arises out of three overlapping securities
class actions brought against Defendant Diebold -- an international
provider of commerce services, software, and technology -- by
purchasers of the Company's securities.  Two of those actions were
brought in the Court -- Karp v. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc., No.
19-cv-06180 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2019); City of Dearborn Heights Act 345
Police & Fire Retirement Sys. V. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc., No.
19-cv-06514 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2019).  A third, and closely related,
action was also brought in the Northern District of Ohio -- City of
Livonia Retiree Health & Disability Benefits Plan v. Diebold
Nixdorf, Inc., No. 19-cv-01887 (JRA) (N.D. Oh. Aug. 20, 2019).

The SDNY Actions and the Ohio Action center around substantially
similar alleged misconduct and involve the same claims.  In all
three actions, the Plaintiffs allege that Diebold and its
executives repeatedly led investors to believe that integration
efforts in the wake of the Company's November 2015 merger with
competitor Wincor Nixdorf were proceeding smoothly, all the while
concealing that the Company was suffering from significant
integration-related cost overruns. These misstatements by
Defendants, aver the Plaintiffs, artificially increased the value
of the Company's securities, caused the Plaintiffs to purchase the
securities at inflated prices, and damaged the Plaintiffs when the
truth came out and the price of the securities dipped.  A tale as
old as time.

On July 2, 2019, the same day as the commencement of his action
against Diebold, Plaintiff Karp published notice of the securities
class action via Global Newswire.  The notice provided for 60 days,
i.e., until Sept. 3, 2019, the last day permitted under the PSLRA,
for parties to submit their applications to serve as the Lead
Plaintiff.

Before the Court are the issues of: (1) consolidating the
securities class actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42; (2) appointing the Lead Plaintiff in said securities
cases pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"); and (3) approving the selection of the counsel for the
Lead Plaintiff, also pursuant to the PSLRA.  Of these issues, only
the appointment of the Lead Plaintiff is hotly contested.

Three parties have jockeyed for the status of the Lead Plaintiff in
these actions.  These include a pairing of the University of Puerto
Rico Retirement System ("UPR System") and the General Retirement
System of the City of Detroit; individual investors Manoj Arora and
Neelam Arora, a married couple; and an interested party, the
Indiana Laborers Pension and Welfare Funds.  The various movants
have pressed their respective cases through a menagerie of briefs
and letters to the Court and ably presented their positions to the
Court at a hearing on Oct. 16, 2019.

The UPR/Detroit Movants submitted that they have suffered combined
losses of $1,563,084.85 in a Sept. 5, 2019 letter to the Court.
The Aroras show $1,459,427.91 in losses on Sept. 16, 2019.
Meanwhile, the Indiana Movants claims losses of $1,050,100.

As an initial matter, Judge Preska finds that consolidation is
clearly merited in the instance.  The SDNY Actions assert virtually
identical claims based on virtually identical factual allegations.
Moreover, it appears to be undisputed amongst the Parties that
consolidation is appropriate.  Accordingly, the SDNY Actions will
be consolidated into a single action, captioned Karp, et al. v.
Diebold Nixdorf, Inc., et al., No. 19-cv-06180 (LAP).

The Judge holds that although the UPR/Detroit Movants and the
Aroras both hold larger financial interests in the litigation than
do the Indiana Movants, she finds that both suffer from unique
issues that cast doubt upon their ability adequately to serve as
the Lead Plaintiff.  Neither the UPR/Detroit Movants nor the Aroras
have rebutted the presumption that the Indiana Movants should serve
as the Lead Plaintiff.  Given that she has already elected to
consider the Indiana Movants' submissions, the Judge accordingly
names the Indiana Movants the Lead Plaintiff.

The Judge sees no reason to upset the apple cart today, as the
Indiana Movants have hired capable, experienced lead counsel in
Robins Geller and Kendall Law Group.  Accordingly, she approves
their selection as the lead counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Preska (i) granted the motions to
consolidate the SDNY Actions, (ii) appointed the Indiana Movants as
the Lead Plaintiff, and (iii) approved the Indiana Movants'
selected lead counsel.  The SDNY Actions will be consolidated into
a single action, captioned Karp, et al. v. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc.,
et al., No. 19-cv-06180 (LAP).

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/KIXeoH from Leagle.com.

Selwyn Karp, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy Alan Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP.

University of Puerto Rico Retirement System & General Retirement
System of the City of Detroit, Plaintiffs, represented by Ian Berg,
Abraham Fruchter & Twersky LLP & Mitchell M.Z. Twersky, Abraham
Fruchter & Twersky LLP.

City of Dearborn Heights ACT 345 Police and Fire Retirement System,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Lesley Frank Portnoy, Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP.

Manoj Arora & Neelam Arora, Movants, represented by Lawrence P.
Eagel, Bragar, Eagel & Squire P.C. & William Scott Holleman,
Johnson Fistel, LLP.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated, Andreas W. Mattes & Christopher A.
Chapman, Defendants, represented by Nidhi Yadava --
nyadava@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, David Maxwell Rein --
reind@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Geoffrey Ritts --
gjritts@jonesday.com -- Jones Day, Jeffrey T. Scott --
scottj@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan and Cromwell, LLP & Virginia Ruth
Hildreth -- hildrethv@sullcrom.com -- Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP.

Indiana Laborers Pension and Welfare Funds, Interested Party,
represented by Christopher Chad Johnson, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd LLP, Danielle Suzanne Myers, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
David Avi Rosenfeld, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Elton Joe
Kendall, Provost Umphrey Law Firm, LLP.


EDMUNDSON, MO: More Definite Statement Bid in Thomas Case Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division issued a Memorandum and Order denying
Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement in the case
captioned QUINTON THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF EDMUNDSON,
Defendant, Case No. 4:18CV2071 RLW (E.D. Mo.).

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section1983 against the City, claiming it has a deliberate policy
that violates their constitutional rights. Count I of Plaintiff's
Class Action Complaint alleges violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment for imprisoning Plaintiffs for inability to pay, Count II
alleges violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for
failure to provide adequate counsel, Count III alleges violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment for subjecting Plaintiffs to indefinite
and arbitrary detention, Count IV alleges violations of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments for issuances of invalid warrant and
Count V alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for the use
of threats of incarceration to collect debts.

The City moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e)
for the Court to order Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
provide a more definite statement. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and
argue their complaint satisfies federal pleading requirements.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a party may move for a
more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the
party cannot reasonably prepare a response. Rule 12(e) is not
designed to remedy an alleged lack of detail, rather, the Rule is
intended to serve as a means to remedy unintelligible pleadings.

However, when a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a
manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a
more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding.
The City argues the Court should order Plaintiffs to provide a more
definite statement regarding their alleged constitutional
violations. Specifically, the City wants Plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to include the following:

a. Each action that each Plaintiff contends to have resulted in
the violation of a constitutional right.

b. Each injury resulting therefrom and

c. The identity of each person (by title or name) who committed
each such action (i.e., whether it was the prosecutor, municipal
judge, court clerk, police officer, etc.).

A plaintiff bringing a claim for municipal liability pursuant to
Section 1983 must assert or allege fact from which reasonable
inferences can be drawn that the conduct of which he or she
complains was the result of an unconstitutional policy or custom.

The Court finds Plaintiffs' pleadings, while lengthy, are not
unintelligible to necessitate a more definite statement. Because of
liberal notice pleading and the availability of extensive
discovery, motions for a more definite statement are universally
disfavored. Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint alleges various
facets of an alleged municipal policy or custom that may subject it
to liability under Section 1983, a municipality.  

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the City's mayor directly monitored
the number of traffic tickets issued by City police officers and
admonished those officers when they do not issue as many tickets as
the Mayor would like. The City's argument that Plaintiffs'
allegations fail to sufficiently plead the specifics of each
alleged constitutional violation does not constitute a basis for
relief at this stage, rules the Court. Such details will
undoubtedly be expounded during the course of discovery, it adds.

Accordingly, the Motion for More Definite Statement filed by
Defendant, the City of Edmundson, is DENIED.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019
Memorandum and Order  is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y3qxxvjm
from Leagle.com.

Quinton M. Thomas & Bradley Jiles, Plaintiffs, represented by John
Robinson -john.robinson@arnoldporter.com - ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP,
pro hac vice, John McCann Waldron - jwaldron@archcitydefenders.org
- ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, Michael-John Voss -
mjvoss@archcitydefenders.org - ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, Samuel Zachary
Fayne , ARNOLD AND PORTER, LLP, Blake Alexander Strode  -
bstrode@archcitydefenders.org - ARCHCITY DEFENDERS & Jacqueline
Marie Kutnik-Bauder - jkutnikbauder@archcitydefenders.org -
ARCHCITY DEFENDERS.  

City of Edmundson, Defendant, represented by Blake Daniel Hill ,
HELLMICH HILL LLC & William A. Hellmich , HELLMICH HILL LLC, 2000 S
Hanley Rd., St. Louis, Missouri


ENDURANCE INT'L: Machado Class Action Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------
Endurance International Group Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 4, 2019, for the quarterly period ended September 30,
2019, that the court in Machado v. Endurance International Group
Holdings, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-11775-GAO, has
entered an order granting final approval of the settlement and
dismissed the case with prejudice.

On May 4, 2015, Christopher Machado, a purported holder of the
Company's common stock, filed a civil action in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the
Company and its former chief executive officer and former chief
financial officer, captioned Machado v. Endurance International
Group Holdings, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-11775-GAO.

The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 8, 2015, a
second amended complaint on March 18, 2016, and a third amended
complaint on June 30, 2017.

In the third amended complaint, plaintiffs Christopher Machado and
Michael Rubin alleged claims for violations of Section 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
"Exchange Act"), and Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, on behalf of a purported class
of purchasers of the Company's securities between October 25, 2013
and December 16, 2015, including persons or entities who purchased
or acquired the Company's shares pursuant or traceable to the
registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with the
Company's October 25, 2013 initial public offering.

The plaintiffs challenged as false or misleading certain of the
Company's disclosures about the total number of subscribers,
average revenue per subscriber, the number of customers paying over
$500 per year for the Company's products and services, and the
average number of products sold per subscriber.

The proceedings were stayed and the parties negotiated the terms
and conditions of a stipulation and agreement of settlement and
related papers, which, among other things, provided for the release
of all claims asserted against the Company and its former chief
executive officer and former chief financial officer.

On September 13, 2019, the court entered an order granting final
approval of the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.

The Company's contribution to the settlement pool was equal to the
$5.8 million it reserved for this matter during the year ended
December 31, 2018.

Endurance International Group Holdings, Inc., together with its
subsidiaries, provides cloud-based platform solutions for small-and
medium-sized businesses in the United States and internationally.
The company operates in three segments: Web Presence, Domain, and
Email Marketing. Endurance International Group Holdings, Inc. was
founded in 1997 and is headquartered in Burlington, Massachusetts.


EVERI HOLDINGS: Continues to Defend Donahue Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Everi Holdings Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 5, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Geraldine
Donahue, et. al. v. Everi Payments Inc., et. al.

The putative class action matter was filed on December 12, 2018, in
Cook County, Illinois.

The original defendant was dismissed and the Company was
substituted as defendant on April 22, 2019.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
alleges that Everi Payments and the Company have violated certain
provisions of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
(FACTA).

Plaintiff seeks an award of statutory damages, attorney’s fees,
and costs.  

Everi Holdings Inc., incorporated on February 4, 2004, is a holding
company. The Company operates through subsidiaries, including Everi
Games Holding Inc. (Everi Games Holding) and Everi Payments Inc.
(Everi Payments or Payments). The Company operates through two
segments: Games and FinTech. The Company provides video and
mechanical reel gaming content and technology solutions, integrated
gaming payments solutions, and compliance and efficiency software.
The company is based in Las Vegas, Nevada.


FAT BRANDS: Wins Bid to Strike Class Cert. Motion in Vignola Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez grants the Defendants' ex parte
application to strike the Lead Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification in the lawsuit captioned Adam Vignola v. FAT Brands,
Inc., et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-07469-PSG-PLA (C.D. Cal.).

The Lead Plaintiffs are Charles Jordan and David Kovacs.  The
Defendants are FAT Brands, Inc., Andrew A. Wiederhorn, Ron Roe,
James Neuhauser, Edward H. Rensi, Fog Cutter Capital Group, Inc.,
and TriPoint Global Equities, LLC.

On August 24, 2018, the Plaintiffs brought this class action
asserting claims under Sections 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933.   On June 14, 2019, the Court granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action
Complaint with leave to amend.  On August 5, 2019, the Plaintiffs
filed a Second Amended Complaint.  On September 9, 2019, the
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC, which was set for
hearing on December 16, 2019.

After meeting and conferring, on November 22, 2019, the Plaintiffs
filed a motion for class certification, setting the hearing for
January 27, 2020.  Three days later, on November 25, 2019, the
Defendants filed an ex parte application for an order striking the
motion for class certification and supporting documents, or, in the
alternative, for an order taking the current hearing date for the
class certification motion off calendar sine die, to be
re-calendared if and when the automatic stay expires and the
parties meet and confer on a schedule.

The Plaintiffs opposed the application.  

The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral
argument.

According to its Civil Minutes, the Court grants the Defendants'
Application.  The Lead Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
and supporting documents are stricken from the docket.  The Lead
Plaintiffs may re-submit their motion for class certification if
and when the Court has sustained the legal sufficiency of their
complaint.[CC]

FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Kong Securities Suit Over CBA Bribery Issue
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jung Kyoon Kong, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES N.V., ROLAND ISELI AND
ALESSANDRO BALDI AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE FOR SERGIO
MARCHIONNE, MICHAEL MANLEY, and RICHARD K. PALMER, Case No.
1:19-cv-06770 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 2, 2019), is brought on behalf of
persons or entities, who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly
traded Fiat securities from February 26, 2016, through November 20,
2019, inclusive, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by
the Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, during the Class Period,
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) the Company employed a bribery scheme to obtain favorable
terms in its collective bargaining agreement with UAW; (2)
high-ranking Fiat official were aware of and authorized the scheme;
and (3) as a result, Defendants' statements about Fiat's business,
operations, and prospects were materially false and/or misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

The Plaintiff purchased Fiat securities during the Class Period and
is damaged by the Defendants' violations of securities laws.

Fiat, together with its subsidiaries, designs, engineers,
manufactures, distributes, and sells vehicles, components, and
production systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
          275 Madison Ave., 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 686-1060
          Fax: (212) 202-3827
          Email: pkim@rosenlegal.com
                 lrosen@rosenlegal.com


FLAGSTAR BANK: Court Certifies Class of Mortgage Loan Owners
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as WILLIAM KIVETT, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, a federal savings bank, and DOES 1-100,
inclusive, the Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-05131-WHA (N.D.
Cal.),the Hon. Judge William Alsup has entered an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all persons who on or after April 18, 2014 had mortgage
      loans serviced by Flagstar Bank FSB on 1-4 unit residential
      properties in California and paid Flagstar money in advance
      to hold in escrow for the payment of taxes and assessments
      on the property, for insurance, or for other purposes
      relating to the property, but did not receive interest on
      the amounts held by Flagstar in their escrow accounts
      (excluding, however, any such persons whose mortgage loans
      originated on or before July 21, 2010)". The class
      definition shall apply for all purposes, including
      settlement.

   2. appointing Kivett as class representative;

   3. appointing Plaintiff's counsel from Hagens Berman William
      Sobol Shapiro LLP and the Law Office of Peter Fredman PC as
      class counsel;

   4. provisionally granting Plaintiff's motion for new
      plaintiffs to intervene and for leave to amend to add new
      class representatives;

   5. giving Defendant until Jan. 2, 2020 to why the Bravos
      should not be authorized to co-represent the class;

   6. directing Plaintiff's counsel to promptly make the Bravos
      available for depositions on or before Dec. 6, 2019, and to
      produce their records by that date;

   7. granting Kivett's motion to intervene and for leave to
      amend the complaint;

   8. directing both sides to submit a proposed form of notice to
      the class with a plan of distribution by first-class mail
      by Jan. 2, 2020;

   9. granting in part motion for an extension on the deadline to
      bring dispositive motions;

  10. scheduling deadline on dispositive motions on Dec. 5,
      2019, while all other deadlines remain in place.[CC]


FOUNDATION ENERGY: Lee Seeks OT Wages for Production Consultants
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Lee, Individually and for Others Similarly Situated v.
FOUNDATION ENERGY MANAGEMENT, LLC, Case No. 4:19-cv-00083-BMM-JTJ
(D. Mont., Dec. 2, 2019), is brought to recover unpaid overtime
wages and other damages from the Defendant under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff and the other Production Consultants, who worked for
Foundation in the last three years regularly worked more than 40
hours a week. But these workers never received overtime for the
hours they worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek.
Instead of receiving overtime as required by the FLSA, Foundation
classified the Plaintiff and its other Production Consultants as
independent contractors and paid these workers a flat amount for
each day worked (a day-rate) without overtime compensation, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Lee worked for Foundation as a Production Consultant from
February 2017 to July 2019.

Foundation is a manager and operator of onshore oil and gas
producing properties throughout the United States, including in
Montana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Caitlin Boland Aarab, Esq.
          BOLAND AARAB PLLP
          11 5th St. N, #207
          Great Falls, MT 59401
          Phone: 406-315-3737

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Lindsay R. Itkin, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Fax: (713) 877-8065


FUNKY'S BUSINESS: Pearson Seeks to Certify Banquet Workers Class
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled KATHYRN DICKEN PEARSON, on behalf of
herself and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown
v. FUNKY'S BUSINESS VENTURES, INC., et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00911-MRB (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiff moves the Court to
conditionally certify this collective action and allow her to
notify similarly situated employees of the existence of this
lawsuit, thereby, providing them with the opportunity to
participate or "opt-in" to the pending litigation.

Specifically, the Plaintiff asks that the Court issue an order:

   (1) conditionally certifying this collective action;

   (2) directing Defendants Funky's Business Ventures, Inc.,
       Michael W. Forgus dba Funky's Catering, Michael W. Forgus,
       FPTA Employee Group, Inc., and Sheakley HR LLC to
       immediately provide the Plaintiff's counsel with a list of
       the names and contact information of all current and
       former banquet servers, banquet bartenders, and any other
       tipped banquet employees ("Banquet Employees") who, at any
       time during the three years immediately preceding the
       filing of the Complaint, were employed at the Defendants'
       business known as Funky's Catering; and

   (3) authorizing the issuance of a Court-approved notice to the
       Similarly Situated Employees so that they may be made
       aware of and can effectively assert their claims on a
       timely basis.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kristen M. Myers, Esq.
          Caroline M. Drennen, Esq.
          BECKMAN WEIL SHEPARDSON LLC
          895 Central Avenue, Suite 300
          Cincinnati, OH 45202
          Telephone: (513) 621-2100
          Facsimile: (513) 621-0106
          E-mail: kmyers@beckman-weil.com
                  cdrennen@beckamn-weil.com

Defendants Funky's Business Ventures, Inc., Michael W. Forgus, and
Michael W. Forgus, DBA Funky's Catering, are represented by:

          Jennifer W. Colvin, Esq.
          CALFEE, HALTER & GRISWOLD LLP
          2800 First Financial Center
          255 East Fifth Street
          Cincinnati, OH 45202-4728
          Telephone: (513) 693-4870
          E-mail: jcolvin@calfee.com


GENERAL ELECTRIC: Mass. Dist. Ct. Dismisses Count III in ERISA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: G.E. ERISA LITIGATION, Civil Action No.
17-cv-12123-IT (D. Mass.), Judge Indira Talwani of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended
Complaint as to Count III, and denied as to Count IV.

The putative class action is brought by participants in a 401(k)
plan2 against institutional and individual Defendants alleging
reaches of fiduciary duties and prohibited transactions in
violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").

Eligible employees of GE and participating affiliates can
participate in GE's 401(k) Plan, also known as the GE Retirement
Savings Plan by investing up to 30% of their eligible earnings in
any of a number of investment options within the Plan.  The action
pertains to the Plaintiffs' investments in five mutual funds among
these options: the GE Institutional Strategic Investment Fund, the
GE Institutional Small Cap Equity Fund, the GE Institutional
International Equity Fund, the GE RSP Income Fund, and the GE U.S.
Equity Fund.

The GE Funds are the only actively managed funds open to eligible
employees of GE and participating affiliates.  Employees and
affiliates can also participate in the Plan by investing in the GE
Stock Fund, six collective trust index funds, Target Date Funds,
and/or a Money Market Fund.  GE required that certain proprietary
investment options, the Income Fund and the US Equity Fund, be
offered to Plan participants.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants used the Plan
participants to offset an investor exodus from the underperforming
GE Funds despite the fact that the Plan participants could have
been better served by investment options from unaffiliated
companies that were cheaper and better performing.  As of Dec. 31,
2015, the Plan owned the vast majority of assets in the GE Funds;
assets from Plan participants ranged from approximately 40% of all
fund assets to approximately 96% of all fund assets, depending on
the fund and the year.

All of the Plan's actively managed funds were managed and sponsored
by GE's wholly-owned subsidiary, GE Asset Management, until July 1,
2016, when GE sold the subsidiary to State Street for a reported
$485 million.  The Plaintiffs allege that GE retained the poorly
performing proprietary funds as a constant source of fees and to
help inflate the market value of GE Asset Management prior to its
sale to State Street.  Of the total $28 billion value of the Plan,
at the time of its sale, GE Asset Management managed $8 billion in
Plan assets.  Furthermore, from 2010 to 2016, GE earned more than
$175 million in fees from the proprietary funds.

The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Consolidated
Amended Complaint.  After a hearing, the Court denied the motion as
to Counts I, II, V, VI, VII, and VIII, and took Counts III and IV
under advisement.  It subsequently issued a Memorandum and Order
allowing the Defendants' motion as to Count III and denying the
motion as to Count IV.  On the Defendants' Motion for
Reconsideration, the Court has corrected portions of the Memorandum
and Order to address issues of law raised by the Defendants.

The Defendants argue that Counts III and IV are barred because of
the statute of limitations.  

Under Count III of the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs
allege that the offering of the GE Funds as the sole actively
managed investment options constitutes a prohibited transaction in
violation of ERISA Sections 406(a)(1)(A), (C), and (D).  They
allege that each of them were participants in the Plan and invested
in the GE Funds during the class period, which began in September
2011.  The fact that these were proprietary funds would have been
immediately known to the Plaintiffs, as the funds are labeled as GE
Funds, e.g., the GE Institutional Strategic Investment Fund, the GE
Institutional Small Cap Equity Fund, the GE Institutional
International Equity Fund, the GE RSP Income Fund, and the GE US
Equity Fund.  To the extent that the basis of the Plaintiffs' claim
is that the Defendants only offered proprietary funds as the sole
actively managed investment options of the Plan, the Plaintiffs had
actual knowledge the day the Plaintiffs elected their Plan options.
Thus, Count III is barred by the statute of limitations.

Under Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs
allege that GE, the Benefit Plan Investment Committee Defendants,
and the Asset Management Defendants offered GE Funds as the sole
actively managed investment options of the Plan despite high costs
and poor performance in order to generate management fees and
maintain GE Asset Management's performance.  Because the fees were
for the financial benefit of GE and the Asset Management
Defendants, the Plaintiffs argue that these acts constitute a
prohibited transaction in violation of ERISA Section 406(b)(1) and
(3).

Although the Plaintiffs could have easily discerned that the funds
were proprietary funds, and even that they were paying fees to GE
Asset Management, the question of whether they had actual knowledge
of high costs and poor performance is much more complex.  There are
no facts in the Second Amended Complaint to suggest that they had
actual knowledge that their funds were performing poorer and their
fees cost higher compared to other funds.  Even if they did, the
Plaintiffs would certainly not have known about the sale of GE
Asset Management to State Street prior to the sale on July 1, 2016.


The Plaintiffs not only allege that Defendants profited from the
management fees, but that they also profited from the financial
health of GE Asset Management due to the selection and presence of
the GE Funds in GE Asset Management's portfolio.  This financial
benefit materialized in the sale of GE Asset Management for a
reported $485 million.  As July 2016 is within the three-year
statute of limitations, Count IV is not barred by the statute of
limitations.

The Defendants raise two further arguments regarding prohibited
transactions: (1) that ERISA Section 406 does not apply because the
management fees are not a "plan asset," and (2) that even if
management fees are a "plan asset," the Plaintiffs' claims must be
dismissed because the Plaintiffs did not plead a non-exempt
prohibited transaction.

Judge Talwani holds that the Plaintiffs claim that as the GE Funds
failed to perform and as other outside investors left the funds,
the number of Plan participants in the funds continued to increase.
Because the Plaintiffs' claim is broader and also encompasses the
shares of the funds that financially benefitted the Defendants, the
Plaintiffs' argument would not be precluded by these cases.  Their
claim would properly fall under ERISA Section 406(b)(1).

In addition, she holds that the Plaintiffs have alleged that beyond
merely investing in in-house funds (the GE Funds), the Defendants
did so as part of a strategy to prop up the apparent value of GE
Asset Management before its sale to State Street, and that the sale
profited the Defendants' own account in violation of ERISA Section
406(b).  This allegation, if substantiated, may constitute a
prohibited transaction beyond the scope of the PTE 77-3 exemption
since the allegations concern self-dealing beyond the mere
acquisition and sale of shares of an in-house fund.  Accordingly,
and without prejudice to any subsequent argument regarding the
applicability of PTE 77-3, the Judge concludes that Count IV's
allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Talwani allowed the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint as to
Count III, and denied as to Count IV.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Amended Memoradum
Order is available at https://is.gd/ogV9Gw from Leagle.com.

Brian Sullivan, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiff, represented by Jordan D. Mamorsky --
jmamorsky@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac
vice, Lee Squitieri, Squitieri & Fearon, LLP, pro hac vice,
Theodore M. Hess-Mahan -- thess-mahan@hutchingsbarsamian.com --
Hutchings, Barsamian, Cross and Mandelcorn, LLP, Jacob A. Walker
--
jake@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP, Jason M. Leviton --
jason@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block --
jeff@blockesq.com -- Block & Leviton LLP.

Kristi Haskins, Individually and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated persons in the General Electric Retirement
Savings Plan and the General Electric Savings and Security
Program,
Plaintiff, represented by Charles H. Field --
cfield@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac
vice, David W. Sanford -- dsanford@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford
Heisler, LLP, David Hahn Tracey -- dtracey@sanfordheisler.com --
Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin Sharp --
ksharp@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac
vice, Andrew H. Miller -- amiller@sanfordheisler.com -- Sanford
Heisler Sharp, LLP, Edward D. Chapin -- echapin@sanfordheisler.com
-- Sanford Heisler SHarp, LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob A. Walker,
Block
& Leviton LLP, Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C.
Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Anthony Powell, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiff, represented by Evan J. Kaufman, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M. Leviton, Block &
Leviton LLP, Jordan D. Mamorsky, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP,
pro hac vice, Orin Kurtz -- okurtz@gardylaw.com -- Gardy & Notis,
LLP, pro hac vice, R. Joseph Barton -- jbarton@blockesq.com --
Block & Leviton LLP, Jacob A. Walker, Block & Leviton LLP &
Jeffrey
C. Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Frank Magliocca, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN, Kelvin Douglas, Individually and on behalf of a
class
of all persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE
RETIREMENT
SAVINGS PLAN & Melinda Stubblefield, Individually and on behalf of
a class of all persons simlarly situated and on behald of the GE
RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN, Plaintiffs, represented by Evan J.
Kaufman, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jason M.
Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP, Jordan D. Mamorsky, Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Orin Kurtz, Gardy & Notis, LLP,
pro hac vice, R. Joseph Barton, Block & Leviton LLP, pro hac vice,
Jacob A. Walker, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block, Block &
Leviton LLP.

Maria LaTorre, Individually and on behalf of a class of all
persons
simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN
&
Robyn Berger, Individually and on behalf of a class of all persons
simlarly situated and on behald of the GE RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN,
Plaintiffs, represented by Adam M. Stewart, Shapiro Haber & Urmy
LLP, Edward F. Haber, Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP, Jordan D.
Mamorsky,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob A. Walker,
Block & Leviton LLP, Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP &
Jeffrey C. Block, Block & Leviton LLP.

Laura Scully, Individually and as a representative of a class
similarly situated persons in the General Electric Retirement
Savings Plan and the General Electric Savings and Security Program
& Donald J. Janak, Individually and as representative of a class
of
similarly situated persons in the General Electric Retirement
Savings Plan and the General Electric Savings and Security
Program,
Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew H. Miller, Sanford Heisler
Sharp,
LLP, Charles H. Field, Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice,
David W. Sanford, Sanford Heisler, LLP, David Hahn Tracey, Sanford
Heisler Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin Sharp, Sanford Heisler
Sharp, LLP, pro hac vice, Jacob A. Walker, Block & Leviton LLP,
Jason M. Leviton, Block & Leviton LLP & Jeffrey C. Block, Block &
Leviton LLP.

General Electric Company, GE Asset Management Incorporated, Dmitri
Stockton, Ralph Richard Layman, Rochelle Lazarus, Matthew Simpson,
Francisco DSouza, Robert Lane, James Tisch, Matthew Zakrzewski,
Marjin Dekkers, Mary Schapiro, Susan Hockfield, John J. Brennan,
Benefit Plans Investment Committee, Michael Cosgrove, W. Geoffrey
Beattie, GE Pension Board, Andrea Jung, David Wiederecht, James
Mulva, Jeffrey Immelt, Don Torey, John Flannery, GEAM Committee,
George Bicher, Jessica Holscott, James Rohr, Greg Hartch, Jeanne
LaPorta, Paul Colonna, GE Board of Directors, Roger Penske, Matt
Cribbins, Keith Sherin, Sam Nunn, Alan Lafley, James Cash, John
Samuels, Carol Anderson, Douglas Warner, Kelly Lafnitzegger, Brian
Worrell, Susan Peters, Jamie Miller, Jan Hauser, Ann Fudge, Robert
Swieringa, Sharon Daley, John Lynch, Tracie Winbigler, Jeff
Bornstein, Puneet Mahajan & Trevor Schauenberg, Defendants,
represented by Alison V. Douglass -- adouglass@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter, LLP, Jaime A. Santos -- jsantos@goodwinlaw.com --
Goodwin Procter LLP & James O. Fleckner --
jfleckner@goodwinlaw.com
-- Goodwin Procter, LLP.

John Walker, Defendant, represented by James O. Fleckner, Goodwin
Procter, LLP.


GEORGIA: Ga. App. Affirms Dismissal of Kelly Suit
-------------------------------------------------
In the case, Kelly et al., v. Board of Community Health et al.,
Case No. A19A0802 (Ga. App.), Judge Ken Hodges of the Court of
Appeals of Georgia, First Division, affirmed the trial court's
order granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

The class action arose in response to reductions made in December
2011 by the Board of Community Health to the State Health Benefit
Plan ("SHBP")'s retiree health insurance subsidy.  

Before Dec. 8, 2011, the Retirees were entitled to a so-called
"Annuitant Basic Subsidy Policy" that provided a 75% subsidy for an
annuitant with at least 10 years of service.  After a study
determined that the Department of Community Health would not be
able to sustain the subsidy at this level without endangering the
financial health of the SHBP, the Board adopted a resolution on
Dec. 8, 2011, that under its new "Annuitant Years of Service
Subsidy Policy," those Retirees who did not have five years of
service on Jan. 1, 2012, would receive a subsidy of 15% for 10
years of service, increasing with each year of additional service
to a maximum of 75% for 30 years of service.  The Board noted that
its announcement of the new policy "does not constitute a promise
or contract of any kind" and that any subsidy policy adopted by the
Board may be changed at any time by Board resolution and does not
constitute a contract or promise of any amount of subsidy.  

As a result of this change, the Plaintiffs, who had the minimum 10
years of service at the time of their retirement but less than five
years of active service as of Jan. 1, 2012, receive a much lower
annuitant subsidy than other retirees with the same number of years
of service.  In December 2016 and February 2017, the Commissioner
notified SHBP members of these changes.

The Plaintiffs brought their action for breach of contract and
mandamus relief in December 2017 and later amended the complaint to
include three counts against Board members in their individual
capacities as well as constitutional claims for equal protection
and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  After the Plaintiff retirees brought
an action seeking class certification as well as monetary and
injunctive relief, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss
filed by the Defendants -- Board of Community Health and its
individual members -- on grounds including that the Plaintiffs'
claims were barred by sovereign immunity.  The appeal followed.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred because
the Board's previous resolution granting them a subsidy amounted to
a written contract which could not be revoked without causing them
financial harm and violating their equal protection rights, and for
which mandamus is a proper remedy.  

The Plaintiffs first assert that the trial court erred when it
concluded that they had not established a waiver of sovereign
immunity under the ex contractu provision of the Georgia
Constitution.  Judge Hodges disagrees.  He finds that the
Plaintiffs have cited to no part of any previous resolution,
arguably supplanted by the 2011 resolution at issue, showing any
specific waiver or written contract term.  On this ground alone,
the Plaintiffs' claims would fail.  More important is the plain
language of the applicable regulation, which shows that no adoption
or modification of any SHBP benefit could amount to a waiver of
sovereign immunity.

Because nothing in the text of the SHBP statutes supports the
proposition that a regulation, revised or not, could "constitute a
written contract," the trial court did not err when it concluded
that the Plaintiffs had no basis for asserting an ex contractu
waiver of the State's sovereign immunity arising from the December
2011 resolution of the Board, which revised the regulations at
issue.

The Plaintiffs' equal protection claim asks for injunctive relief
against the Board to prevent the Board Members from providing a
different SHBP annuitant subsidy to any retiree that began his or
her employment on or before Dec. 8, 2011, as well as declaratory
relief to the same effect.  The Plaintiffs assert that neither
sovereign nor official immunity shields the Board members from
liability in their individual capacities as to the Board's action
in changing their SHBP benefits, which violated their equal
protection right.

Again, Judge disagrees.  He finds that the Plaintiffs cannot show
that they had a right to future health insurance subsidies: the
adjustment of such subsidies by regulation does not amount to an
"enforcement of law" sufficient to activate equal protection
concerns.  It follows that the Plaintiffs' equal protection claim
fails.

Finally, the Judge notes that mandamus claims are not barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  However, he finds that the trial
court did not err when it dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim for
mandamus relief because they have not shown any clear legal right
to the relief being sought.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Hodges affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1tJg2j from Leagle.com.

Jeffrey L. Berhold, for Appellant.

Michael Travis Foust, for Appellant.

Peter Andrew Lampros -- alampros@hallandlampros.com -- for
Appellant.

Allan Leroy Parks, Jr., for Appellant.

Julie Adams Jacobs -- Julie@julieajacobspc.com -- for Appellee.

William Wright Banks, Jr., for Appellee.

Christopher Michael Carr, for Appellee.

Robin Joy Leigh, for Appellee.


GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL: Class Certification Sought in Frank Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JAHMIR CHRISTOPHER FRANK v. GOOD SAMARITAN
HOSPITAL FOUNDATION OF CINCINNATI, INC., et al., Case No.
1:18-cv-00618-MRB (S.D. Ohio), the Plaintiff moves the Court for
entry of an order:

     (i) certifying that this action may be maintained and
         proceed as a class action against defendants;

    (ii) for his appointment as class representative; and

   (iii) for appointment of Percy Squire, Esq., as Counsel for
         the Class and as Liaison Counsel for the Class.

Mr. Frank brings this action as a Class Action under Rules 23(a),
(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on behalf of: "all persons who delivered or were delivered at Good
Samaritan Hospital between the period January 1, 1997 through
December 31, 1999."[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Percy Squire, Esq.
          PERCY SQUIRE CO., LLC
          341 S. Third Street, Suite 10
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 224-6528
          E-mail: psquire@sp-lawfirm.com


GREEN ROADS: Sued by Davis for Selling Illegal CBD Products
-----------------------------------------------------------
Cynthia Davis, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GREEN ROADS OF FLORIDA, LLC, a Florida Limited
Liability Company, Case No. 2:19-cv-10194 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 2,
2019), is brought on behalf of consumers, who purchased the
Defendant's illegal CBD products for personal use and not for
resale.

The Defendant's CBD products include "CBD Oils", "CBD Daily Dose",
"CBD Capsules", "CBD Terpenes", "CBD Syrups", "CBD Froggies", "CBD
Relax Bears", "CBD Fruit Bites", and "CBD Gummies," all of which
are promoted as products containing cannabidiol (CBD), which are
illegal to sell, the Plaintiff asserts. She contends that with
knowledge of growing consumer demand for CBD Products, the
Defendant has intentionally marketed and sold illegal CBD
products.

The Defendant's multiple and prominent systematic mislabeling of
the Products form a pattern of unlawful and unfair business
practices that harms the public, the Plaintiff avers. Accordingly,
the Plaintiff and each of the Class members have suffered an injury
in fact caused by the false, fraudulent, unfair, deceptive, and
misleading practices, and seek compensatory damages and injunctive
relief. The Plaintiff brings this suit to halt the unlawful sales
and marketing of the CBD Products by the Defendant and for damages
she sustained as a result. If the Plaintiff knew the Products were
not legally sold in the United States, the Plaintiff would have not
purchased them, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of California, who purchased CBD Oil 550
mg for $84.99 and Beginner's Relief for $100 from the Defendant's
Web site.

The Defendant formulates, manufactures, advertises, and sells the
CBD Products throughout the United States, including in the State
of California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          KOHN, SWIFT & GRAF, P.C.
          1600 Market Street, Suite 2500
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 238-1700
          Email: jshub@kohnswift.com
                 klaukaitis@kohnswift.com


GROUPON INC: 7th Cir. Remands Dancel Suit for Jurisdiction Inquiry
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Amy St. Eve of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit remanded the case, CHRISTINE DANCEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. GROUPON, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 19-1831 (7th Cir.),
to the district court so that it may inquire into its
jurisdiction.

Dancel sued Groupon in the Circuit Court of Cook County in 2016.
She alleged that Groupon, an online marketplace that sells discount
vouchers to businesses, had used her photograph on one of its pages
to promote a voucher for a restaurant in Vernon Hills, Illinois.
Groupon had collected the photograph automatically from Dancel's
public Instagram account based on data linking it to the
restaurant's location.  Her complaint sought damages under the
Illinois Right of Publicity Act, on behalf of a class of all
Illinois residents (1) who maintain an Instagram account, and (2)
whose photograph(s) from such Instagram account have appeared on a
Groupon Deal offer page.

The parties litigated in state court for two years until Dancel
moved to certify a class that differed from the one in her
complaint.  Her new class (which also had a subclass) was to
consist of all persons who maintained an Instagram Account and
whose photograph (or photographs) from such account was (or were)
acquired and used on a groupon.com webpage for an Illinois
business.  Unlike the original class, this one was not defined by
its members' residency, though it was still limited to
advertisements of Illinois businesses.

In response to the modified class definition, Groupon filed a
notice of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act.  Groupon,
the sole Defendant, is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Illinois and thus is a citizen of those two
states. To meet the minimal-diversity  requirement, its notice of
removal stated that the new class undoubtedly would include at
least some undetermined number of non-Illinois and non-Delaware
citizens as the class Plaintiffs.  Groupon did not identify any one
of these class members or his or her citizenship.

Dancel initially let this omission slide.  She moved to remand on
the theory that Groupon's removal was improper not because
jurisdiction was lacking but because it had always existed, and
therefore Groupon had waived its right to remove.  Indeed, she
expressly told the district court she did not challenge the
existence of minimal diversity, which, she argued, had been
apparent from her complaint's use of residency: some Illinois
residents are citizens of another state, and it was likely at least
one such person was within the original class definition.  She
changed her tune in her reply in support of remand, though, and
argued there that Groupon was required to specifically identify
some absent class member who is not a citizen of Illinois or
Delaware to show minimal diversity.

In a sur-reply, Groupon insisted that it could easily cure the
deficiency, if pressed, but thought it unnecessary to do so.  The
district court rejected Dancel's waiver argument and denied the
motion to remand but did not address minimal diversity or direct
Groupon to cure its allegations.  Dancel did not apply for leave to
appeal the denial.

Instead, the parties litigated the class certification motion,
which eventually the court denied on predominance grounds.  Dancel
petitioned for review of that denial, and the Court granted the
petition.

Despite asking for and receiving only permission to appeal the
class-certification decision, Dancel begins the appeal by
relitigating her motion to remand.  She repeats her assertion of
waiver based on Groupon's delay in seeking removal.  She also
argues that Groupon's allegations of jurisdiction were deficient,
and therefore urges the Court to direct that the case be remanded
to state court.

Judge St. Eve refuses the invitation to expand the scope of the
appeal.  In contrast to her concededly procedural waiver argument,
Dancel frames her belated challenge to the allegations in Groupon's
notice of removal as a question of the district court's
jurisdiction.  As long as the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction is either apparent from the record, the Court can
proceed to the class-certification issue.

Judge St. Eve finds that the record does not currently reveal the
existence of jurisdiction, so Groupon must amend its allegations,
as it may do even on appeal.  Groupon, as the removing party, bears
the burden of showing the existence of federal jurisdiction.  

Groupon's allegations do not have the necessary factual content for
Dancel's waiver to permit an inference of jurisdiction.   Without
an alternative basis for jurisdiction, the Judge elects to follow
the approach the Court hinted at in Miller v. Southwest Airlines
Co., and will return the case to the district court so that it may
inquire into its jurisdiction.

She orders a limited remand for the district court to permit
discovery to whatever extent the court deems necessary for Groupon
to allege that at least one member of the putative class was a
citizen of a state other than Illinois or Delaware at the time of
removal.  The remand is limited solely to the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction and does not independently obligate the
district court to consider or reconsider any nonjurisdictional
issues, including the home-state or local-contro-versy exceptions
to the CAFA.

The Court will retain its jurisdiction over the appeal pending
resolution of the issue.  If the district court, after a reasonable
time, is not convinced that Groupon can carry its burden, then it
may enter an indicative ruling that it is inclined to remand for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section
1447(c), and the Court will take appropriate steps.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/jdH6hy from Leagle.com.

Eric N. Macey -- emacey@novackmacey.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Scott P. Glauberman, for Defendant-Appellee.

Linda T. Coberly, for Defendant-Appellee.

Ryan D. Andrews, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian Eliot Cohen -- BCohen@novackmacey.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

John Lawson, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Elizabeth Deshaies, for Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher Sean Moore -- cmoore@novackmacey.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Benjamin Thomassen -- bthomassen@edelson.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

HAAGEN-DAZS SHOPPE: San Pedro-Salcedo's Bid for Class Cert. Tossed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Edward J. Davila entered an order in the lawsuit entitled
MELANIE G. SAN PEDRO-SALCEDO v. THE HAAGEN-DAZS SHOPPE COMPANY,
INC., Case No. 5:17-cv-03504-EJD (N.D. Cal.), denying the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification, and denying as moot the
Defendant's motion to strike the Plaintiff's expert reports and the
portions of her reply that rely on those expert reports.

Judge Davila rules that in the parties' joint pretrial conference
statement, which is due on January 2, 2020, the parties shall
address whether Ms. San Pedro-Salcedo will seek to continue this
lawsuit in her individual capacity, whether any adjustments should
be made to the case schedule, and whether the Court should rule on
Haagen-Dazs's summary judgment motion that is currently under
submission.  The Court will not issue an order on that motion until
hearing from parties.

While patronizing one of the Defendant's locations, the cashier
asked the Plaintiff if she would like to join its Reward Program,
and then asked for her phone number.  She provided her phone
number, and Haagen-Dazs, through a third-party, then sent her a
text message that provided a link to down load its mobile
application (the "App").

The cashier apparently violated Haagen-Dazs's policy and deviated
from its official script by not advising Ms. San Pedro-Salcedo that
she would receive the text message with the link to the App.  The
Plaintiff does not allege that Haagen-Dazs has used her phone
number for any other communications.  She now moves to certify a
class of over half a million customers, who received this text
message (or a nearly identical one) on the grounds that the text
message violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").
She is the only person to have complained of the text message.

The class she seeks to certify is "All persons in the United States
who, since October 16, 2013 (or such date when the texting aspect
of the customer Reward Program commenced), received at least one
text message from Defendants, or persons working on their behalf,
on their cellular telephones."  Haagen-Dazs has moved to strike Ms.
San Pedro-Salcedo's expert reports and the portions of her reply
that rely on those expert reports.

In his Order, Judge Davila finds that Ms. San Pedro-Salcedo
individually cannot meet the requirements for--at
minimum--typicality and adequacy of representation.  The Court does
not consider the other requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.  Haagen-Dazs argues that Ms. San
Pedro-Salcedo's experience is not typical of the class members
because the cashier did not inform her that she would receive a
text message while asking for her phone number in violation of the
policy to verbally inform customers of the text message.  The Court
agrees with Haagen-Dazs.

Judge Davila also opines that the Court finds that the Plaintiff's
erroneous testimony as to the basic factual allegations of her
claim and her belief that Haagen-Dazs's conduct did not meet an
essential element of her claim show that she cannot adequately
supervise the litigation or represent the class's interests.  "Her
lack of knowledge of her factual allegations and legal claims
disqualifies San Pedro-Salcedo from serving as class
representative," Judge Davila adds, among other things.[CC]


HORIZONS ETFS: Ontario Court Dismisses Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Veronica Sjolin, Esq. -- VSjolin@blg.com -- of Borden Ladner
Gervais LLP, in an article for Mondaq, reports that in the case
Wright v. Horizons ETFS Management (Canada) Inc., Justice Perell of
the Superior Court of Justice explores whether a duty of care ought
to be extended to the creators of exchange traded funds ("ETFs")
for alleged pure economic loss, and whether statutory claims under
s. 130 of Ontario's Securities Act are available for
misrepresentations in a prospectus associated with the selling of
ETFs in the secondary market. An ETF is an investment vehicle where
the underlying assets (stocks, bonds, or commodities) are pooled in
an investment portfolio. The market price of an ETF is determined
by the bid and ask of buyers and sellers on the stock exchange.

The plaintiff, who had lost significant investments after a complex
derivatives-based ETF collapsed, had commenced a class action
against the defendant ETF provider. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant breached a duty of care owed to investors and alleged a
secondary cause of action under s. 130 of the Securities Act for
misrepresentation in the primary market for securities.

The decision echoes the Supreme Court of Canada's statement (in
Deloitte & Touche v. Livent Inc. (Receiver of)) that what a
defendant reasonably foresees as flowing from his or her negligence
depends upon the purpose of the defendant's undertaking. Perell J.
also confirms that strong policy reasons exist for not extending a
duty of care to the ETF investor/ ETF fund developer and manager
relationship. Further, the decision underscores the importance of
pleading all causes of action in support of a proposed class
action, particularly where the issues are novel.

Background
The defendant created and managed a complex derivatives-based ETF
that retail investors were entitled to purchase through stock
exchanges ("HIV-ETF"). This was a high risk, speculative
investment. The prospectus cautioned investors that ETFs are "not
conventional" and are "speculative investment tools". The risk of
loss was repeated throughout the prospectus and investors were
advised to monitor their investments in an ETF daily.

Overnight on February 5, 2018, investors in the HVI-ETF lost almost
their entire investment, totaling tens of millions of dollars. The
plaintiff lost approximately $210,000 when he sold his units on
February 6, 2018. He commenced a proposed class action seeking
damages based on the capital loss experienced by the ETF, on behalf
of himself and the proposed class. His primary cause of action was
a common law negligence claim grounded in an argument that the
defendant breached a duty of care owed to investors by, among other
things, selling an ETF that had an investment strategy that was too
risky to be passively managed. His ancillary cause of action was
the statutory cause of action under s. 130 of the Ontario
Securities Act for alleged misrepresentations in the primary market
for securities. The plaintiff did not advance a statutory cause of
action under the Ontario Securities Act in secondary market
securities, nor did he allege a common law negligent
misrepresentation claim.

Plain and Obvious That Wright's Causes of Action Could Not Succeed
The first criterion for certification that a plaintiff must satisfy
under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 is that the
plaintiff's pleading discloses a cause of action, in that it is not
plain and obvious that it cannot succeed. Perell J. declined to
certify the plaintiff's action on the basis that it failed to
disclose a reasonable cause of action.

Pure Economic Loss
The parties agreed that the plaintiff's negligence claim was for
pure economic loss (i.e. a financial loss arising in respect of the
value of the units themselves and not a loss resulting from
physical injury to the Class Members' person or property).

The duties pleaded by Wright were unprecedented, however, and did
not fit within the established categories in which plaintiffs can
recover damages for pure economic loss. Perell J. therefore
undertook a duty of care analysis to determine whether investment
fund developers and managers owe investors a novel duty of care in
the plaintiff's circumstances.

Perell J. was reticent to extend the scope of duty of care this
far. Perell J. found that there was no doubt that there was a
legally proximate relationship between an ETF investor and an ETF
fund developer and manager, but held that the relationship was
limited by the undertaking assumed by the fund developer and
manager. Here, the defendant did not warrant or guarantee returns,
and it did not suggest that there was anything other than high
risks associated with the ETF. It warned of the risks. Further, the
defendant did not undertake to actively manage the ETF, nor did it
undertake to step in, to stop investor losses.

Perell J. also found that there are policy reasons for not
extending the scope of the duty of care to ETF fund developers and
managers. This kind of relationship, which is essentially one
between a vendor of a product and a disappointed purchaser, is
typically dealt with as a matter of contractual obligation and not
through a tort claim for pure economic loss. Moreover,

[e]xtending a duty of care for pure economic loss to the creator of
an index tracking ETF would: (a) deter useful economic activity
where the parties are best left to allocate risks through the
autonomy of contract, insurance, and due diligence; (b) encourage a
multiplicity of inappropriate lawsuits; (c) arguably disturb the
balance between statutory and common law actions envisioned by the
legislator; and (e) introduce the courts to a significant
regulatory function when existing causes of action, the regulators,
and the marketplace already provide remedies (para. 107).

Section 130 of the Ontario Securities Act
Wright's claim was framed under Part XXIII, s. 130 (which provides
for civil liability in respect of the primary market) and not under
Part XXIII.1, s. 138.3 of the Ontario Securities Act (which
provides for civil liability in respect of secondary market
disclosure). ETFs are connected to the secondary market, which is
regulated by Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act. The only
connection between ETFs and the primary market is that before an
ETF can begin trading on a stock exchange, its manager must file a
prospectus and the regulator must issue a receipt for the
prospectus. However, for purchasers of ETFs units, for all
practical purposes, they are trading in the secondary market.
Consequently, Perell J. found that it was obvious that the
statutory claim under s. 130 of the Ontario Securities Act was not
available for misrepresentations in a prospectus associated with
the selling of ETFs in a secondary market. Wright's claim ought to
have been framed under s. 138.3 of the Ontario Securities Act, and
he ought to have pleaded both causes of action in support of his
proposed action given that this was a case of first instance about
whether ETFs should be subject to Part XXIII or Part XXIII.1 of the
Ontario Securities Act.

About BLG

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide
to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about
your specific circumstances.[GN]

HUNTINGTON LEARNING: Dhade Class Action Dismissed with Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HERMAN DHADE, as an individual and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HUNTINGTON LEARNING CENTERS, INC.
Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-1834-CFC (D. Del.), Judge Colm F.
Connolly of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) with
prejudice.

Dhade filed the putative class action on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated against Defendant Huntington.  The single
count of Dhade's complaint alleges that Huntington violates the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA").  That act creates a private
right of action for applicants for credit.

Huntington is a Delaware corporation that sells Huntington Learning
Center® franchises.  These franchises offer tutoring and test
preparation services to customers.  Dhade applied to Huntington on
April 5, 2017 for two franchises in Michigan.  Huntington provided
Dhade a package that contained a Franchise Agreement, numerous
related contracts, and a franchise disclosure document.  A copy of
the personal guarantee, titled "Guarantee Agreement," was attached
as Exhibit A to the Franchise Agreement.  On April 26, 2017,
Huntington sent Dhade a document titled "Huntington Learning Center
In-House Financing" and a Huntington Learning Corporation form for
Dhade to complete titled "Request for Huntington Financing."  

In June 2017, Dhade emailed Huntington a "Request to be Awarded a
Huntington Learning Center Franchise."  In his franchise request,
Dhade stated that the purchasers of the franchises would be two
companies he wholly owned, Fluffy Bunny, Inc. and Purple Butterfly,
Inc.  Dhade also emailed Huntington a request to remove my spouse
from the personal guarantee.

In response to these requests, Huntington sent Dhade a proposed
limited guarantee that capped the amount of his spouse's potential
monetary obligations.  Dhade's spouse refused to sign this limited
guarantee, and, "as a result," Dhade withdrew his application for a
Huntington Learning Center® franchise and did not submit the
Request for Huntington Financing.

Dhade seeks in his complaint injunctive relief and damages for
himself and a putative class for alleged violations of the ECOA.
Dhade alleges that he and all other members of the putative class
are entitled to relief under the ECOA because they are prospective
applicants within the meaning of 12 C.F.R. Sections 1002.2(3) and
1002.4(b).  He further alleges that Huntington is liable under
Section 1691e of the ECOA because Huntington's spousal guarantee
requirement (1) is prohibited by 12 C.F.R. Section 1002.7(d)(1);
and (2) discourages on a prohibited basis a reasonable person from
making or pursuing an application for credit in violation of 12
C.F.R. Section 1002.4(b).

Huntington has moved to dismiss the complaint.  In support of its
motion, it argues, among other things, that because Dhade alleges
he is a prospective applicant and not an applicant for credit, the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and Dhade lacks standing.

Judge Connolly agrees that the ECOA's private right of action only
covers applicants and not prospective applicants.  He finds that
Dhade alleges that he withdrew his application for a Huntington
Learning Center® franchise and did not submit the Request for
Huntington Financing.  Moreover, Dhade does not allege that he
submitted to Huntington Learning Corporation the Promissory Note,
Security Agreement, or Promissory Note Guarantee discussed in Item
10 of the FDD.  

Thus, although Dhade was an applicant for a Huntington franchise,
he was never an applicant for credit and does not have a private
right of action under the ECOA.  Nor do any members of the putative
class have a private right of action under the ECOA because, as
Dhade alleges in his complaint, they are only "prospective
applicants," not applicants.

The Judge concludes that because Dhade and the proposed class
members were not applicants within the meaning of the ECOA, they do
not have a private right of action under the ECOA.  Therefore,
Dhade and the proposed class members lack standing, and the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, he granted Huntington's motion to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/Yi0zdi from Leagle.com.

Herman Dhade, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert J. Cahall --
rcahall@mccormickpriore.com -- McCormick & Priore, P.C.

Huntington Learning Centers, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant, represented by Eve H. Ormerod -- EORMEROD@SKJLAW.COM --
Smith, Katzenstein, & Jenkins LLP, Robert J. Katzenstein --
RJK@SKJLAW.COM -- Smith, Katzenstein, & Jenkins LLP & Scott
McIntosh -- scott.mcintosh@quarles.com -- Quarles and Brady LLP,
pro hac vice.


INUVO INC: Settlement Fee Under Confidential Pact Paid in September
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Inuvo, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q/A filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2019, that a settlement fee has been paid pursuant to
a certain Confidential Settlement Agreement resolving outstanding
litigation (including attorneys' fees claims) against Inuvo and
ConversionPoint related to its Merger Transactions.  The Company
further stated that the cases are now dismissed with prejudice.

On November 2, 2018, Inuvo entered into the Merger Agreement with
CPT, Parent, CPT Merger Sub and CPT Cigar Merger Sub, Inc. pursuant
to which, among other things, Inuvo would merge with and into Inuvo
Merger Sub and become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent, and
ConversionPoint would merge with and into CPT Merger Sub and become
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent (collectively, the "Merger
Transactions").

On June 20, 2019, the parties to the Merger Agreement terminated
the Merger Agreement pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger
Termination Agreement.  Prior to June 20, 2019, Inuvo and
ConversionPoint were subject to litigation related to the Merger
Transactions.

On December 19, 2018 and December 20, 2018, respectively, Peter
D'Arcy and Morris Akerman, both of whom claim to be stockholders of
Inuvo, filed separate putative class action lawsuits, captioned
D'Arcy v. Inuvo, Inc. et al., No. 1:18-cv-02023-UNA, in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware; and Akerman v.
Inuvo, Inc. et al., No. 2:18-cv-02407, in the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada.  The two lawsuits each
named Inuvo and the members of Inuvo's board of directors as
defendants.  The D'Arcy action also named ConversionPoint and
various entities created to effect the Merger Transaction as
defendants.

On December 21, 2018, Domenic Spagnolo, another purported
stockholder of Inuvo, filed a substantially similar lawsuit,
captioned Spagnolo v. Inuvo, Inc. et al., No. 1:18-cv-12099, in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
This lawsuit also challenged the adequacy of disclosure under the
same sections of the Exchange Act against Inuvo and its directors.

Each of the foregoing lawsuits sought, among other relief, an
injunction preventing the parties from consummating the Merger
Transactions, damages in the event the Merger Transactions were
consummated, and an award of attorneys' fees.  In the Akerman
action, following the filing of Parent's amended S-4 Registration
Statement on March 15, 2019, Plaintiff Akerman filed a stipulation
of dismissal, dismissing the entire action, except with respect to
a fee and expense request.  In the Spagnolo action, the plaintiff
withdrew his motion for preliminary injunction following Parent's
filing of its amended S-4 Registration Statement on March 15, 2019
and the court dismissed the Spagnolo action as moot.

On January 4, 2019 and January 8, 2019, respectively, two more
purported stockholders of Inuvo, Adam Franchi and Les Thomas,
commenced substantially similar putative class action lawsuits
under Nevada state law, captioned Franchi v. Inuvo, Inc. et al.,
No. A-19-787021-C and Thomas v. Inuvo, Inc. et al., No. T19-57, in
the District Court of the State of Nevada in the County of Clark.
These complaints named Inuvo and the members of Inuvo's board of
directors as defendants.  The Franchi action also named
ConversionPoint and various entities created to effect the Merger
Transactions as defendants.  Both complaints sought an injunction
preventing the parties from consummating the Merger Transactions,
damages in the event the Merger Transactions were consummated and
an award of attorneys' fees.  Following the filing of Parent's
amended S-4 Registration Statement on March 15, 2019, Plaintiff
Thomas filed a stipulation of dismissal, dismissing the action.

On April 11, 2019, Plaintiff Franchi filed a notice of voluntary
dismissal and, as of date, has never made any claim for fees and
expenses.

On June 20, 2019, Inuvo entered into a certain Confidential
Settlement Agreement resolving the D'Arcy, Ackerman, Spagnolo, and
Thomascases (including attorneys' fees claims) against Inuvo and
ConversionPoint so long as Inuvo pays a settlement fee by September
30, 2019.  On or about September 30, 2019, the settlement fee was
paid.  These cases are now dismissed with prejudice.

Inuvo, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, a technology company,
provides data-driven platforms that automatically identify and
message online audiences across video, mobile, connected TV,
display, and social and native devices, channels, and formats in
the United States. Inuvo, Inc. was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas.


KARYOPHARM THERAPEUTICS: Securities Suits over SOPRA Trial Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------------
Karyopharm Therapeutics Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 4, 2019,
for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend class action lawsuits related to the results
from the Phase 2 SOPRA study and Part 2 of the Phase 2b STORM
study.

The company has been named as a defendant in securities class
action litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts.

A complaint was filed on July 23, 2019, by the Allegheny County
Employees' Retirement System, against the company and certain of
its current and former executive officers and directors as well as
the underwriters of our public offerings of common stock conducted
in April 2017 and May 2018.

A second complaint was filed by Heather Mehdi on September 17,
2019, against the same defendants with the exception of the
underwriters.

The two complaints are related and the company expects them to be
consolidated by the court.

Both complaints allege violations of federal securities laws based
on our disclosures related to the results from the Phase 2 SOPRA
study and Part 2 of the Phase 2b STORM study, and seek unspecified
compensatory damages, including interest; reasonable costs and
expenses, including attorneys' and expert fees; unspecified
recessionary damages; and such equitable/injunctive relief or other
relief as the court may deem just and proper.

Karyopharm said, "We have reviewed the allegations and believe they
are without merit. We intend to defend vigorously against this
litigation."

Karyopharm Therapeutics Inc., incorporated on December 22, 2008, is
an oncology-focused pharmaceutical company. The Company is focused
on the discovery, development, and commercialization of drugs
directed against nuclear export and related targets for the
treatment of cancer and other diseases. The company is based in
Newton, Massachusetts.


KEMET CORP: Reaches $62MM Settlement in Capacitors Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KEMET Corporation said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2019, that it has entered into a settlement agreement
in the antitrust class action captioned, In re: Capacitors
Antitrust Litigation, wherein the Company agreed to pay an
aggregate of US$62.0 million to the settlement class of
plaintiffs.

KEMET and KEMET Electronics Corporation (KEC), along with more than
20 other capacitor manufacturers and subsidiaries (including
TOKIN), are defendants in a purported antitrust class action
complaint, In re: Capacitors Antitrust Litigation, No.
3:14-cv-03264-JD, filed on December 4, 2014 with the United States
District Court, Northern District of California (the "U.S. Class
Action Complaint").  The complaint alleges a violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act, for which it seeks injunctive and equitable
relief and money damages.

On November 8, 2019 KEMET and KEC entered into a settlement
agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") with the plaintiffs in the
U.S. Class Action Complaint by which, in consideration for the
release of KEMET, KEC, and their affiliates from all claims
relating in any way to the conduct alleged in the U.S. Class Action
Complaint and from claims which could have been asserted in the
U.S. Class Action Complaint to the extent they relate to the sale
of capacitors in the United States, KEMET agreed to pay an
aggregate of US$62.0 million to the settlement class of plaintiffs.
The Settlement Agreement is subject to court approval.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, US$10.0 million
will be paid by KEMET into an escrow account within 30 calendar
days of the date of the Settlement Agreement and the remaining
amount will be paid by KEMET within 12 months of the date of the
Settlement Agreement.  Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,
KEMET and KEC did not admit to any violation of any statute or law
or any liability or wrongdoing.

KEMET Corporation manufactures and sells passive electronic
components under the KEMET brand worldwide. The company operates in
three segments: Solid Capacitors, Film and Electrolytic; and
Electro-Magnetic, Sensors, and Actuators. The company was founded
in 1919 and is headquartered in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.


KRAFT HEINZ: Court Dismisses Tarzian Fraud Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATRINA TARZIAN and SENIA HARDWICK, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. KRAFT
HEINZ FOODS COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 18 C 7148 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Charles P. Kocoras of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Kraft's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' class-action complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Kraft is a limited-liability company organized under the laws of
Pennsylvania with its principal places of business in Pittsburg and
Chicago. It is a large-scale food manufacturer that markets to all
states, including Illinois and New York. Kraft produces "Capri Sun"
beverages in a wide variety of flavors.  Tarzian is an Illinois
citizen and a resident of Cook County.  Hardwick is a citizen of
New York State and a resident of Queens County.

Plaintiffs Tarzian and Hardwick both purchased 10-packs of Capri
Sun beverages bearing a label stating the products contain "no
artificial preservatives."  They allege these claims are "deceptive
and misleading," as Capri Sun beverages contain citric acid, a
preservative alleged to be artificially produced on an industrial
scale.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that citric acid can be
produced in several ways.  Until the early 1900s, citric acid was
mainly produced by extraction from fresh fruits, such as lemons and
limes.  In 1917, researcher James Currie discovered that citric
acid could be produced by "cultivating Aspergillus Niger and
allowing it to metabolize sucrose or glucose to yield citric
acid."

The Plaintiffs do not specifically allege that Kraft uses citric
acid produced through Aspergillus Niger fermentation; rather, they
allege that it is more economically viable to produce citric acid
for industrial use through the fermentation process.  They further
allege that Capri Sun contains industrially produced citric acid.

As a result of Kraft's allegedly misleading labeling, the
Plaintiffs allege that they sustained an injury by being denied the
benefit of their bargain.  They assert that they would not have
purchased the Capri Sun beverages had they known that the drinks
contained citric acid.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs filed their first
amended class action complaint on March 03, 2019.  Count I asserts
violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act ("ICFA") and seeks monetary damages and injunctive
relief on behalf of a nationwide class ("nonresident Plaintiffs").
Count II asserts violations of New York's Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act and seeks injunctive relief on behalf of a New
York class under New York's General Business Law ("NY GBL") Section
349.  Count III asserts violations of New York's False Advertising
Law and seeks monetary damages on behalf of the New York class and
Plaintiff Hardwick.

On March 21, 2019, the Defendants moved to dismiss all three counts
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It urges the Court
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' class-action complaint for three
reasons.  First, Kraft argues that the ICFA does not apply to the
Plaintiffs injured outside of Illinois.  Second, it argues the
Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief for their
claims.  Third, it argues the Plaintiffs have failed to allege an
actionable misrepresentation.

The Plaintiffs argue that the deception occurred in Illinois
because the scheme allegedly originated here.  Judge Kocoras holds
that this allegation is insufficient to show that the
misrepresentation occurred in Illinois.  Moreover, Kraft correctly
points out that the complaint does not contain any allegations to
support the Plaintiffs' argument that profits or complaints that
ensued from the alleged misrepresentation flowed back to Illinois.
As such, he finds that the Plaintiffs failed to allege that the
situs of the transactions at issue occurred "primarily and
substantially" in Illinois.  Accordingly, he will dismiss Count I
on behalf of the nonresident Plaintiffs for lack of standing under
the ICFA.

Next, the Judge agrees with Kraft's second argument.  The complaint
alleges that the Plaintiffs and Class members did not know, and had
no reason to know, that the Products were misbranded and misleading
as set forth, and would not have bought the Products had they known
the truth about them.  Given this allegation, the Judge finds it
implausible that the Plaintiffs would again purchase the products
at issue.  Thus, they have not alleged a sufficient likelihood that
they will again be wronged in a similar way.  He accordingly will
dismiss Count II for lack of standing to seek injunctive relief.

Finally, he will dismiss Counts III and IV.  The Judge finds that
to satisfy the pleading standards, the Plaintiffs need to draw a
connection between the common industry practice and the actual
practice used by Kraft.  Even drawing all reasonable inferences in
the Plaintiffs' favor, the complaint fails to draw this nexus, and
the Judge cannot draw it for them.  Because their allegations do
not link the allegedly artificial citric acid to the actual citric
acid used by Kraft, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient
facts showing that Kraft's "no artificial preservatives" statement
was false.

For the reasons mentioned, Judge Kocoras granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/kZvAVf from Leagle.com.

Katrina Tarzian, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated & Senia Hardwick, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by C.K. Lee --  -- Lee
Litigation Group, PLLC.

Kraft Heinz Food Company, Defendant, represented by Kara L. McCall
-- KMCCALL@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP & Daniel Adam Spira --
DSPIRA@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP.


KULICKE & SOFFA: Kumar Securities Suit Dismissed w/ Leave to Amend
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MANDIRA KUMAR, Individually and on behalf of all other
similarly situated; DENNIS DANDELES, Co-Lead Plaintiff; and, THOMAS
WALSH, Co-Lead Plaintiff Plaintiffs, v. KULICKE AND SOFFA
INDUSTRIES, INC.; FUSEN CHEN; and, JONATHAN CHOU, Defendants, Civil
Action No. 19-0362 (E.D. Pa.), Judge C. Darnell Jones, II of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2),
9(b), and 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs Dennis Dandeles and Thomas Walsh are the Co-Lead
Plaintiffs in the class action securities fraud claim brought
against Defendants Kulicke, Chou, and Chen.  Kulicke is a publicly
traded company incorporated in Pennsylvania and headquartered in
Singapore.  The Company designs, manufactures, and sells capital
equipment and expendable tools used to assemble semi-conductor
devices.  During the relevant time period, Defendant Chou served as
Kulicke's CFO, Principal Accounting Officer, and Executive VP,
while Defendant Chen served as Kulicke's President and CEO.  The
Co-Lead Plaintiffs allege that they purchased shares of Kulicke at
an artificially inflated price between Nov. 16, 2017 and May 10,
2018.

Kulicke submitted its 2017 annual report with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") on Nov. 16, 2017 that provided the
Company's financial statements and position for the 2017 fiscal
year which had concluded on Sept. 30, 2017.  In addition to signing
the 2017 10-K, Defendants Chou and Chen signed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act certifications ("SOX certifications") contained therein.  By
signing and certifying the 2017 10-K, Defendants Chou and Chen
attested to its accuracy.  The 2017 10-K stated that Kulicke's
management concluded that the Company had maintained effective
internal controls over its financial reporting as of Sept. 30,
2017.

On Nov. 27, 2017 -- 11 days after Kulicke filed its 2017 10-K --
the Company issued a press release announcing that Defendant Chou
resigned from his positions.  However, Defendant Chou remained with
Kulicke until Feb. 28, 2018.  On March 5, 2018, Defendant Chou was
named the CFO of Nanometrics Inc.  He remained in that role until
June 25, 2018, at which point Nanometrics informed Defendant Chou
that his employment was being terminated immediately.

On May 10, 2018, over two months after Defendant Chou left Kulicke,
the Company filed an 8-K with the SEC.  In a press release
associated with the May 10th 8-K, the Company announced that it
would not be filing its second quarter 10-Q on time, and that its
2017 10-K could no longer be relied upon.  The press release stated
that following the end of the second fiscal quarter of 2018, the
Company learned of certain unauthorized transactions by a senior
finance employee.  Up until that point, an ongoing internal
investigation had uncovered that certain warranty accruals in prior
periods were accounted for incorrectly and were therefore
misstated.  On the following day, the Company's stock price dropped
$1.80 (a 7.5% decline) from the prior day's closing price.

Nearly three weeks later, Kulicke announced the results of its
internal investigation as an amendment to the May 10th 8-K.
Therein, Kulicke disclosed that its investigation had uncovered an
unauthorized payment initiated by a senior finance employee to an
unapproved vendor in the second fiscal quarter of fiscal 2018
totaling $5.8 million.

On the following day, the Company filed an amended annual report
for the 2017 fiscal year.  The 2017 10-K/A stated that Kulicke did
not maintain effective control over review of journal entries as a
result of a management override of journal entries of the accrual
for warranty.  Contrary to statements contained in the 2017 10-K,
the Company had failed to maintain effective internal control over
financial reporting as of Sept. 30, 2017.

On that same day, the Company filed an amended quarterly report for
the first fiscal quarter of 2018 ("December 2018 10-Q1/A").  The
December 2018 10-Q1/A disclosed that Kulicke's investigation
identified additional payments made to a different vendor during
the first fiscal quarter of 2018.  The payments -- made by the same
senior finance employee -- were also made through falsified
accounting records.  As a result, the Company announced that it was
in the process of assessing its plan for remediation of the
material weaknesses, through which Kulicke anticipated changes in
its finance leadership personnel.

Count I of the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that
Defendants Chou, Chen, and Kulicke violated Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and the incorporated SEC Rule 10b-5.  Their Amended
Complaint alleges that the Defendants' statements in the 2017 10-K
and the associated SOX certifications were false or misleading.

Count II of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts that Defendants
Chou and Chen violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  Their
Amended Complaint alleges that the "controlled person" was Kulicke.
They further claim that Defendants Chou and Chen were "controlling
persons" of Kulicke because of their positions with the Company.

The matter comes before the Court via transfer from the Central
District of California.  Upon transfer, the Defendants filed the
present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

Judge Jones granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint granted with respect to each Defendant.  With
specific regard to Defendant Chen, he finds that the Plaintiffs
failed to adequately plead the material misrepresentation element
required under the PSLRA and Rule 9(b).  Conversely, the Plaintiffs
adequately pled this element for both Defendants Chou and Kulicke.


However, the Judge granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with
respect to Defendant Chou and Kulicke because the Plaintiffs failed
to plead facts with particularity to plausibly show that either
Defendant Chou or Kulicke acted with the requisite degree of
scienter.

The Judge granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend because the
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is being dismissed for pleading
deficiencies under Rule 9(b) and the PSRLA.  

An appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/gts8sP from Leagle.com.

Manindra Kumar, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by EX KANO S. SAMS, II --
ESAMS@GLANCYLAW.COM -- GLANCY PRONGAY AND MURRAY LLP & LAURENCE
MATTHEW ROSEN -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM PA.

THOMAS WALSH, Co-Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by JACOB A.
GOLDBERG, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, JOSHUA E. BAKER, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM
PA, pro hac vice, LAURENCE MATTHEW ROSEN, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM PA,
PHILLIP C. KIM -- pkim@rosenlegal.com -- THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, PA &
EX KANO S. SAMS, II, GLANCY PRONGAY AND MURRAY LLP.

Dennis Dandeles, Co-Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff, represented by
Charles Henry Linehan, Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, JACOB A.
GOLDBERG, THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, Lesley F. Portnoy, Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP, Lionel Zevi Glancy, Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP,
ROBERT V. PRONGAY, GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP, EX KANO S. SAMS,
II, GLANCY PRONGAY AND MURRAY LLP & JOSHUA E. BAKER, THE ROSEN LAW
FIRM PA, pro hac vice.

Kulick and Soffa Industries, Inc. & Fusen Chen, Defendants,
represented by Erin E. McCracken, Drinker Biddle and Reath LLP,
SHELDON E. EISENBERG -- sheldon.eisenberg@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE
& REATH & MARY P. HANSEN -- mary.hansen@dbr.com -- DRINKER BIDDLE &
REATH LLP, pro hac vice.

Jonathan Chou, Defendant, represented by MARY P. HANSEN, DRINKER
BIDDLE & REATH LLP.


MATTEL INC: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Wyatt Class Suit Set for 4Q
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Mattel, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September
30, 2019, that a motion to dismiss the purported class action
styled, Wyatt v. Mattel, Inc., et al., is scheduled to be heard by
the Court in the fourth quarter of 2019.

A purported class action lawsuit is pending in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California (Wyatt v.
Mattel, Inc., et al., filed March 6, 2019) against Mattel, Ynon
Kreiz, and Joseph J. Euteneuer alleging federal securities laws
violations in connection with statements allegedly made by the
defendants during the period February 7, 2019 through February 15,
2019.

In general, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants artificially
inflated Mattel's common stock price by knowingly making materially
false and misleading statements and omissions to the investing
public about Mattel's Structural Simplification Program and
regarding prospects for Barbie and Hot Wheels in 2019.

The lawsuit alleges that the defendants' conduct caused the
plaintiff and other stockholders to purchase Mattel common stock at
artificially inflated prices.

In August 2019, Mattel and the individual defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the case, which is currently scheduled to be heard by
the Court in the fourth quarter of 2019.

The lawsuit seeks unspecified compensatory damages, attorneys'
fees, expert fees, and/or costs.

Mattel believes that the allegations in the lawsuit are without
merit and intends to vigorously defend against them.

The Company said, "A reasonable estimate of the amount of any
possible loss or range of loss cannot be made at this time."

Mattel, Inc., a children's entertainment company, designs and
produces toys and consumer products worldwide. The company operates
through North America, International, and American Girl segments.
The company was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in El Segundo,
California.


MATTEL INC: No Schedule Yet for Appeal in Consolidated Calif. Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Mattel, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended September
30, 2019, that oral argument has not yet been scheduled for the
appeal in the consolidated class action suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California.

A purported class action lawsuit is pending in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California,
(consolidating Waterford Township Police & Fire Retirement System
v. Mattel, Inc., et al., filed June 27, 2017; and Lathe v. Mattel,
Inc., et al., filed July 6, 2017) against Mattel, Christopher A.
Sinclair, Richard Dickson, Kevin M. Farr, and Joseph B. Johnson
alleging federal securities laws violations in connection with
statements allegedly made by the defendants during the period
October 20, 2016 through April 20, 2017.

In general, the lawsuit asserts allegations that the defendants
artificially inflated Mattel's common stock price by knowingly
making materially false and misleading statements and omissions to
the investing public about retail customer inventory, the alignment
between point-of-sale and shipping data, and Mattel's overall
financial condition.

The lawsuit alleges that the defendants' conduct caused the
plaintiff and other stockholders to purchase Mattel common stock at
artificially inflated prices.

On May 24, 2018, the Court granted Mattel's motion to dismiss the
class action lawsuit, and on June 25, 2018, the plaintiff filed a
motion informing the Court he would not be filing an amended
complaint.  Judgment was entered in favor of Mattel and the
individual defendants on September 19, 2018.  The plaintiff filed
his Notice of Appeal on October 16, 2018 and his opening appellate
brief on February 25, 2019.

On April 26, 2019, Mattel filed its responsive appellate brief, and
on June 17, 2019, plaintiff filed his reply brief.  Oral argument
has not yet been scheduled.

Mattel, Inc., a children's entertainment company, designs and
produces toys and consumer products worldwide. The company operates
through North America, International, and American Girl segments.
The company was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in El Segundo,
California.


MATTEL INC: Still Defends Class Suits over Fisher-Price Sleeper
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mattel, Inc. continues to face a number of putative class action
lawsuits related to the Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper,
according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2019.

A number of putative class action lawsuits are pending against
Fisher-Price, Inc. and/or Mattel, Inc. asserting claims for false
advertising, negligent product design, breach of warranty, fraud,
and other claims in connection with the marketing and sale of the
Fisher-Price Rock 'n Play Sleeper (the "Sleeper").

In general, the lawsuits allege that the Sleeper should not have
been marketed and sold as safe and fit for prolonged and overnight
sleep for infants.  The putative class action lawsuits propose
nationwide and over 15 statewide consumer classes comprised of
those who purchased the Sleeper as marketed as safe for prolonged
and overnight sleep.  The class actions have been consolidated
before a single judge for pre-trial purposes pursuant to the
federal courts' Multi-District Litigation program.

Ten additional lawsuits are pending against Fisher-Price, Inc. and
Mattel, Inc. alleging that a product defect in the Sleeper caused
the fatalities of fourteen children.  Additionally, Fisher-Price,
Inc. and/or Mattel, Inc. have also received letters from lawyers
purporting to represent additional plaintiffs who are threatening
to assert similar claims.

The lawsuits seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, statutory
damages, restitution, disgorgement, attorneys' fees, costs,
interest, declaratory relief, and/or injunctive relief.

Mattel believes that the allegations in the lawsuits are without
merit and intends to vigorously defend against them.  A reasonable
estimate of the amount of any possible loss or range of loss cannot
be made at this time.

Mattel, Inc., a children's entertainment company, designs and
produces toys and consumer products worldwide. The company operates
through North America, International, and American Girl segments.
The company was founded in 1945 and is headquartered in El Segundo,
California.


MATTERPORT INC: Falsely Sells 3D Camera, Services, Stemmelin Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
John Stemmelin, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MATTERPORT, INC., a Delaware corporation, RJ PITTMAN,
DA VE GAUSEBECK, MATT BELL, CARLOS KOKRON, PETER HEBERT, JASON
KRIKORIAN, and MIKE GUSTAFSON, Case No. 2019CH13889 (Ill. Cir.,
Cook Cty., Dec. 2, 2019), stems from Matterport falsely
representing a business opportunity, whereby individual purchasers
in Illinois would buy Matterport's 3D cameras and "tied" services,
and Matterport would purportedly provide lucrative "filtered leads"
for the purchaser's services.

To avail themselves of Matterport's "business opportunity,"
purchasers first buy Matterport's 3D cameras. Then, in order to
store the images they create using those 3D cameras, purchasers are
required to subscribe and pay a monthly fee for Matterport's Cloud
Service Plan, which includes data storage and software for cloud
processing, post-production tour creation, and syndication to
interactive online technology, such as the Multiple Listing Service
used by realtors, and Google Street View.

However, the Plaintiff asserts, the lucrative leads promised by
Matterport never materialize. In addition, because an active
subscription to Matterport's required Cloud Services is required in
order to maintain access to the images they previously scanned and
the models they already created, purchasers are left with no choice
but to make monthly payments to maintain their memberships.

In making and offering such a "business opportunity" in Illinois as
that term, Matterport was required to register its "business
opportunity" with the Illinois Secretary of State and make certain
disclosures to potential purchasers in compliance with the Illinois
Business Opportunity Sales Law of 1995. Matterport failed to comply
with the BOSL. Matterport never made the required disclosures under
the BOSL to potential purchasers, failed to have a written contract
or agreement as required by the BOSL, failed to provide the
requisite written contract or agreement to the purchasers, did not
honor any geographic limitations, saturated an ill-defined and
non-lucrative market, and did not register with the Illinois
Secretary of State, says the complaint.

As a result, all "contracts" or "agreements" entered into by all
Illinois-based residents, who were "purchasers" of Matterport's
illusory "lucrative" business opportunities have voidable
contracts/agreements and, pursuant to the BOSL, can recover all
money or other valuable consideration paid for the business
opportunity and actual damages, together with interest at 10% per
annum from the date of sale, and reasonable attorney's fees and
court costs, the Plaintiff argues.

John Stemmelin was and is a resident and citizen of Cook County,
Illinois.

The Defendants engage in soliciting contracts for its business
opportunities related to its 3D camera products and Cloud
Services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr., Esq.
          Sharon A. Harris, Esq.
          Matthew C. De Re, Esq.
          Jeffrey D. Blake, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          77 W. Washington Street, Suite 1220
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Office: (312) 440-0020
          Facsimile: (312) 440-4180
          Email: irm@attorneyzim.com


MCDERMOTT INT'L: Court Narrows Claims in Hampton FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERONICA HAMPTON, ET AL. v. McDERMOTT INTERNATIONAL,
INC., ET AL, Civil Action No. 19-0200 (W.D. La.), Judge Donald E.
Walter of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, Lake Charles Division, granted the motions to dismiss
filed Defendants McDermott and CB&I, LLC, and Defendant Brock
Services, LLC.

Hampton, Sergio Hernandez, Tristan Greene, and Ethan Champion filed
the cause of action on their own behalf and for others similarly
situated against McDermott, CB&I, Brock, and Sun Industrial Group
for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
and the Louisiana Wage Payment Act ("LWPA").  The Defendants
employed the Plaintiffs in a variety of labor-based positions at
the Cameron LNG Project, a liquefied natural gas facility that was
under construction in Hackberry, Louisiana.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated the FLSA by
failing to pay them statutorily required overtime for all hours
worked in excess of 40 hours per week.  They contend that the
violation occurred because the Defendants required them to work
"off-the-clock" while being transported to and from the worksite on
the Defendants' mandatory transportation system.  The Plaintiffs
allege that the bus rides often included work-related meetings with
their crew leaders.  They also allege that they were required to
engage in "pre-work" activities immediately upon arrival at the job
site before their scheduled shifts.  The Plaintiffs contend that
the FLSA applies to the Defendants because each engaged in
interstate commerce.

Plaintiffs Hernandez and Greene also allege that when they ended
their employment relationship with the Defendants, they were never
paid the amount due under the terms of their employment within the
time required under Louisiana's LWPA, as set forth in La. R.S.
23:631.  Hernandez and Greene also state that they are asserting
their state law claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 on their own behalf and a class of persons who also ended their
employment with Defendants and were never paid amounts owed to them
under the terms of their employment.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' state law LWPA
claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the Plaintiffs
cannot recover unpaid wages under both the FLSA and LWPA because
the state law claims are preempted by the FLSA.  The Defendants
also argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient
facts to support their LWPA claims.  Defendants McDermott and CB&I
also move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' class allegations under Rule
23.

Judge Walter finds that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently set
forth their claims under the LWPA because they have not alleged
that there was an agreement or understanding of any sort that they
would be compensated for any time spent on the transport van or any
pre-shift work that may have been performed upon their arrival at
the worksite prior to their scheduled shift.  The LWPA is directed
only at payment, upon termination, of 'agreed-upon' compensation."
Indeed, the allegations are that the Plaintiffs were not paid for
"off-the-clock" work, which indicates that there was no agreement
as to the payment for the disputed time or it would not be
"off-the-clock."  There is simply no allegation that the parties
ever agreed or had a meeting of the minds regarding compensation
for the disputed time in question.  This is insufficient to meet
the standard of facial plausibility under Ashcroft v. Iqbal.

Defendant McDermott and CB&I also move for the dismissal of the
Plaintiffs' proposed Rule 23 class, arguing that the preemption of
the Plaintiffs' LWPA claims by the FLSA also prevents the
application of Rule 23.  The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule 23
class allegations should not be dismissed because their LWPA claims
are not preempted.

The Judge has found that the Plaintiffs' LWPA claims, even if
properly alleged, are preempted.  Thus, the only remaining claims
are those for violations of the FLSA.  The FLSA requires the
Plaintiffs to "opt-in" to be a part of the class while Rule 23
provides that they will be considered a member of the class unless
they "opt-out."  As such, the two are "mutually exclusive and
irreconcilable."  Because he has dismissed all claims but those
asserted under the FLSA, the Plaintiffs may only seek class status
under the provisions provided by the FLSA.

For the reasons assigned, Judge Walter (i) granted the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Defendants McDermott and CB&I; (ii) granted the
Motion to Dismiss filed by Brock; and (ii) dismissed with prejudice
the Plaintiffs' state law claims under the LWPA.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Memorandum Ruling is
available at https://is.gd/lisR9p from Leagle.com.

Veronica Hampton, Sergio Hernandez, Trenada Agn, James Earl
Blackwell, Jr, Zachary Ryan Cox, Phillip Nation, Barbara Ann Bennet
Smith, Vankeisha Williams, Clarence Williams, Anthony Santos San
Nicolas, Louis M Toussaint, Kevin Duane Jean, Sentrel Griffin,
Freddy Allen Jenkins, Ethan Clark Champion, James P Browning, Kevin
Earl Robinson, Jr, Fernando Rangel, Jr, Juan M Aguilar Castillo,
Luis Alberto Matamoros Castillo, Darrius Robinson, Ashley Price,
Kimberly Gilliam, Rosevelt Gilliam, Samuel Thompson, Calvin
Williams, James Ester, John Myers, Eric Howell, Richard Parks, Kati
Knight, Michael Williams, Desroy Dehaney, Dwayne Gibson, Gino Sias,
Paula Cox, Aaron Blady, Christopher Evans, Donald Prudhomme, Carlos
Torres, Robert C Larson, Tristan Green, All Plaintiffs, Mickey
Myles & Michael Baker, Plaintiffs, represented by Philip Bohrer --
phil@bohrerbrady.com -- Bohrer Law Firm, Alexander M. White --
awhite@vkvlawyers.com -- Valli Kane & Vagnini, pro hac vice, Esha
Rajendran -- erajendran@equalrights.law -- Ellwanger Law, pro hac
vice & Jay D. Ellwanger -- jellwanger@equalrights.law -- Ellwanger
Law, pro hac vice.

Carl Dixon, Plaintiff, represented by Philip Bohrer, Bohrer Law
Firm, Alexander M. White, Valli Kane & Vagnini, pro hac vice & Jay
D. Ellwanger, Ellwanger Law, pro hac vice.

C B & I L L C, incorrectly named as Chicago Bridge & Iron Co &
McDermott International Inc, incorrectly identified as McDermott
Inc, Defendants, represented by Kristyn L. Lambert --
kristyn.lambert@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et al, Christopher
E. Moore -- christopher.moore@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et
al, Hal D. Ungar -- hal.ungar@ogletree.com -- Ogletree Deakins et
al & William H. Payne, IV -- william.payne@ogletree.com -- Ogletree
Deakins et al.

Chicago Bridge & Iron L L C, Defendant, represented by William H.
Payne, IV, Ogletree Deakins et al.

Brock Services L L C, Defendant, represented by Adam R. Perkins,
Littler Mendelson, pro hac vice, Edward J. Fonti, Jones Tete et al,
G. Mark Jodon, Littler Mendelson, pro hac vice & Travis J. Odom,
Littler Mendelson, pro hac vice.

Sun Industrial Group L L C, Defendant, represented by Adrienne
Clare May, Adams & Reese, Elizabeth Anderson Roussel, Adams & Reese
& Hunter Jacob Schoen, Adams & Reese.

Derrick R Ceasar, Sr, Derrick R Ceaser, Jr, Janson Ceaser & Hillary
S Weatherall, Defendants, represented by Philip Bohrer, Bohrer Law
Firm, Alexander M. White, Valli Kane & Vagnini, pro hac vice, Esha
Rajendran, Ellwanger Law, pro hac vice & Jay D. Ellwanger,
Ellwanger Law, pro hac vice.


MDL 1720: Jack Rabbit & 280 Can't Intervene in Antitrust Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE PAYMENT CARD INTERCHANGE FEE AND MERCHANT
DISCOUNT ANTITRUST LITIGATION referting to: ALL ACTIONS, Case No.
05-MD-1720 (MKB) (JO) (E.D. N.Y.), Judge Margo K. Brodie of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied
Jack Rabbit, LLC and 280 Station, LLC's (i) motion to intervene
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
(2) motion for a pre-final fairness hearing conference.

On Jan. 24, 2019, the Court granted preliminary approval of a Rule
23(b)(3) class settlement agreement in the multi-district
litigation.  On July 23, 2019, the last day to file objections to
the Rule 23(b)(3) class settlement agreement, Jack Rabbit filed
objections and a notice of intention to appear at the Nov. 7, 2019
final class settlement fairness hearing.  

Jack Rabbit states that it is a petroleum dealer engaged in the
retail sale of branded motor fuels, and has paid interchange fees
associated with credit card transactions at its locations.  It
asserts that even though those transactions were processed by an
applicable branded fuel supplier, the suppliers deducted the
interchange (base cost) fees charged by Visa or Mastercard from
Jack Rabbit's proceeds before remitting the proceeds to Jack
Rabbit, and that it is therefore Jack Rabbit, and not the branded
fuel suppliers, who is entitled to recover from the settlement.  In
its objections, Jack Rabbit argues that it and all the other class
members similarly situated are members of an unrepresented
subclass, whose interests have not been adequately protected by the
proposed settlement.

The objection echoes other nearly identical objections to final
approval of the Rule 23(b)(3) class settlement agreement that have
been filed by similarly situated merchants that sell branded fuel,
a group that the Court has collectively labeled, the "Branded
Operators."  Several Branded Operators filed similar objections at
the preliminary approval stage.

On Sept. 16, 2019, the Proposed Intervenors filed the motion to
intervene.  They state that they objected to the settlement, in
part, because the settlement creates a conflict between the
Proposed Intervenors and the other potential class members, such as
the branded fuel suppliers, for the same portion of settlement
benefits.  In support, they argue that the class is not properly
defined because it lumps all entities in the payment chain together
that have accepted any Visa-Branded Cards and/or MasterCard-Branded
Cards during the class period.

As a result, they seek to intervene to affirmatively assert their
claim to recovery, because of the sharp conflict involving the
Proposed Intervenors' claims to the settlement, and argue that they
are entitled to intervene because of the express lack of diligence
on behalf of the Class Counsel to represent their interests.  The
Class Counsel opposes the motion.

On Oct. 11, 2019, the Proposed Intervenors filed their motion for a
pre-final fairness hearing conference to address (1) a conflict
between the Branded Operators and the major integrated oil
companies and non-retail entities, (2) the Proposed Intervenors'
requested remedy, inter alia, which is to create a subclass for the
Branded Operators and require major integrated oil companies and
non-retail entities to carry the burden under contract law to
establish their entitlement to settlement proceeds, and (3) the
Branded Operators' entitlement to the settlement proceeds absent
concrete contract language.  The Proposed Intervenors argue that
they will be unfairly prejudiced if these matters are not raised
before the final fairness hearing.

Judge Brodie declines to grant the Proposed Intervenors
intervention as of right.  She finds that the Proposed Intervenors
have failed to show that their interest, which they state is "their
claim to the settlement proceeds for their acceptance of Visa and
MasterCard Branded Cards and payment of the related interchange
charges," is not protected by the named Plaintiffs, who undoubtedly
possess the same interest.  While the burden to demonstrate
inadequacy of representation is generally speaking minimal, the
Second Circuit has demanded a more rigorous showing of inadequacy
in cases where the putative intervenor and a named party have the
same ultimate objective.

While the Judge acknowledges and understands the Proposed
Intervenors' concerns regarding their ultimate right to recover as
opposed to a branded fuel supplier, the Proposed Intervenors
nevertheless admit that their interest is one that is common to all
the class members, including the named Plaintiffs, i.e., economic
recovery for interchange fees paid.

The Judge declines to grant permissive intervention under Rule
24(b)(2), (1) for the reasons set forth, (2) because the Proposed
Intervenors seek to intervene after fourteen years of litigation at
this late stage of class settlement, having submitted a fully
briefed motion less than one month before the final fairness
hearing, and over two months after Jack Rabbit submitted its
substantially similar objections, (3) because granting intervention
might unduly delay the class settlement proceedings, which includes
the right to appear for the other objectors with substantially
similar concerns, and (4) because the Court does not believe that
the Proposed Intervenors will significantly contribute to full
development of the underlying factual issues, given that one of the
Proposed Intervenors already submitted substantive objections of
almost identical substance, and approximately 140 other objectors
have raised nearly identical objections.

Finally, the Judge declines to grant the Proposed Intervenors a
pre-final fairness hearing conference.  She finds that the Proposed
Intervenors have not shown why they will not be able to
sufficiently address and protect any rights they have through
alternative processes, such as the final fairness hearing or a
separate claims process directly against the branded fuel
suppliers.  In accordance with her analysis, the Judge finds that
the Proposed Intervenors' arguments are directed to the
settlement's ultimate fairness and adequacy, and are best weighed
alongside those of other likely objectors.  Moreover, if the
Proposed Intervenors disagree with any decision by the Court,
including decisions made with respect to the final approval motion,
they can seek review of the Court's decision.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Brodie denied Jack Rabbit and 280
Station's motion to intervene and motion for a pre-final fairness
hearing conference.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/7Dm4CI from Leagle.com.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al & Plaintiffs in civil action American
Booksellers Association v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al, Plaintiffs,
represented by K. Craig Wildfang -- KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Richard J. Kilsheimer --
rkilsheimer@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Thomas
M.
Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman --
wblechman@knpa.com -- Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder --
jshinder@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine Cannon LLP.

Plaintiffs in civil action National Association of Convenience
Stores et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al & Plaintiffs in civil
action National Grocers Association et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et
al, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder, Constantine
Cannon LLP, Richard J. Kilsheimer, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
Thomas M. Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman,
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Defendants in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al, Defendant, represented by Mark E. Tully --
mtully@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP, Peter Edward
Greene,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, William Harry Rooney --
wrooney@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Andrew J.
McDonald, Pullman & Comley, LLC, Brian A. Herman --
brian.herman@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockuis, LLP,
David
Sapir Lesser, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, Douglas
Melamed, Eric H. Grush, Sidley Austin LLP, Erica Fenby --
erica.ghali@alston.com -- Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Gary R.
Carney, Jr. -- gcarney@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garison, LLP, James T. Shearin -- jtshearin@pullcom.com
-- Pullman & Comley, LLC, James M. Sulentic --
James.Sulentic@KutakRock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP, John P. Passarelli
-- John.Passarelli@KutakRock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP.


MDL 2492: Zachery Suit v. NCAA Over Health Issues Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JERRY ZACHERY, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-03272 (Filed Aug.
5, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Nov. 7, 2019.

The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-07330 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against NCAA to
obtain redress for injuries sustained as result of its reckless
disregard for the health and safety of generations of
student-athletes.

The Zachery case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, In Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools, who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation, the Panel said.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes, who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. The Plaintiffs in all
actions seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization, which regulates athletes of
1,268 North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: (713) 554-9099
          Facsimile: (713) 554-9098
          E-mail: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com


MDL 2672: Court Issues Show Cause Order in VW Clean Diesel Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Charles R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has issued a show cause order in the case,
IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order Relates To: Remaining
Consumer Actions, MDL No. 2672 CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.), for the
identified 13 Plaintiffs' noncompliance with Pretrial Order No.
24.

Pursuant to Pretrial Order No. 24, the Plaintiffs who opted out of
the 2.0-liter or 3.0-liter class action settlements and who had not
since settled with or released their claims against the Volkswagen
Defendants were required to serve upon the Volkswagen Defendants'
counsel a complete and signed Plaintiff Fact Sheet ('PFS')," along
with supporting documents, by Aug. 15, 2019.  The Volkswagen
Defendants have identified 13 Plaintiffs who did not serve a
completed PFS and supporting documents, as required.  They've asked
the Court to dismiss these Plaintiffs' cases unless good cause is
shown.  

The 13 Plaintiffs in question are: (i) Donna McQuiggan Allen et al.
v. Volkswagen Group of Kent Law Offices America Inc., 16-cv-02424;
(ii) Tony Ray Byrum, Byrum v. Volkswagen Group of APLC America,
Inc. et al., 17-cv-02685; (iii) Bev Johnson, Cantu et al. v.
Volkswagen Group of Law Office of Bobby America, Inc. et al.,
17-cv-03198; (iv) Garcia PC; Eckerson Law Firm, PLLC Jose Trevino,
Cantu et al. v. Volkswagen Group of Law Office of Bobby America,
Inc. et al., 17-cv-03198; (v) Garcia PC; Eckerson Law Firm, PLLC
Laura Torres Davila et al. v. Volkswagen Group of Law Office of
Bobby America, Inc. et al., 17-cv-02029; (vi) Garcia PC; Eckerson
Law Firm, PLLC Miriam Martinez Davila et al. v. Volkswagen Group of
Law Office of Bobby America, Inc. et al., 17-cv-02029; (vii) Garcia
PC; Eckerson Law Firm, PLLC John Michael Gullotti Jackson et al. v.
Volkswagen Group of MLG Automotive Law, America, Inc., 16-cv-00616;
(viii) APLC; Wesierski & Zurek, LLP Camille Jackson Jackson et al.
v. Volkswagen Group of MLG Automotive Law, America, Inc.,
16-cv-00616; (ix) APLC; Wesierski & Zurek, LLP Casandra Lane Lane
v. Volkswagen Group of Hossley Embry LLP America, Inc.,
16-cv-02175; (x) Mark R. Moskowitz Pease et al. v. Volkswagen Group
of Mark R. Moskowitz America, Inc., 16-cv-01820; (xi) Jay Rothman
Rothman v. Motorcars West, LLC et Law Offices of Robert B. al.,
16-cv-04728; (xii) Mobasseri, P.C. Kathryn L. Shillin Shilling v.
Volkswagen Group of Kathryn L. Shilling America, Inc., 18-cv-00423;
and (xiii) Robin L. Swanson Swanson et al. v. Volkswagen Group
Underwood & Riemer, PC of America, Inc., 16-cv-04363.

Judge Breyer ordered of them to show cause for their noncompliance
with Pretrial Order No. 24.  Absent a showing of good cause, he may
dismiss their cases.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/qWiJIw from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rcarey@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro ,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Nicholas Allen, Daniel Carroll, Giancarlo Ceci, Dominic Troffer,
Paul Linnee, Sarah Hayden, Dario Medina, Shanice Boyette, Isaac
Hoover, John Mazur & Forrest Tinsler, Plaintiffs, represented by
Caleb Marker -- caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP,
pro hac vice & Charles S. Zimmerman -- csz@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague, Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com
-- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang, Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer,
Conrad and Scherer, LLP633 South Federal Highway, Eighth Floor,
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301.


MDL 2913: King County Suit Over JUUL E-Cigarettes Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as King County, on behalf of itself
and similarly situated counties, Plaintiff v. JUUL Labs Inc.,
formerly known as: Pax Labs Inc., Pax Labs Inc., Altria Group Inc.,
Altria Group Distribution Company, Nu Mark LLC, and Nu Mark
Innovations Ltd., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-01664 (Filed Oct.
16, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District California (San Francisco) on Nov. 7, 2019.

The Northern District California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-07324-WHO to the proceeding. The suit alleges violation of
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The Defendants have engaged and continue to engage in unfair,
unlawful, and deceptive trade practices in Florida, the Plaintiff
alleges. In particular, the Defendants have knowingly developed,
sold, and promote a product that contained nicotine levels in
excess of cigarettes with the intention of creating and fostering
long-term addiction to JUUL products for minors to continue that
addiction into adulthood; selling a product that aggravates
nicotine addiction; creating advertising to target youth into using
JUUL e-cigarettes, and disseminating that advertising through
unregulated social media platforms commonly used by youth.

The Plaintiff and class members reasonably relied to their
detriment on Defendants' unlawful conduct in that they purchased
JUUL not knowing the true propensity of its dangers. They have
sustained damages as a direct and proximate result of the
Defendants' tortious conduct and seek injunctive relief to prohibit
Defendants from continuing to engage in the unfair and deceptive
advertising and marketing practices.

JUUL e-cigarettes and JUULpods deliver dangerous toxins and
carcinogens to users, especially teenage users. Nicotine itself is
a carcinogen, as well as a toxic chemical associated with
cardiovascular, reproductive, and immunosuppressive problems, the
lawsuit says.

The King County case is being consolidated with MDL 2913, IN RE:
JUUL LABS, INC., MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Oct. 2, 2019. The
actions in this litigation involve allegations that JLI has
marketed its JUUL nicotine delivery products in a manner designed
to attract minors, that JLI's marketing misrepresents or omits that
JUUL products are more potent and addictive than cigarettes, that
JUUL products are defective and unreasonably dangerous due to their
attractiveness to minors, and that JLI promotes nicotine addiction.
The actions include both putative class actions and individual
personal injury cases.

In its Oct. 2, 2019 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions
share multiple factual issues concerning the development,
manufacture, labeling, and marketing of JUUL products, and the
alleged risks posed by use of those products. Centralization will
eliminate duplicative discovery, the possibility of inconsistent
rulings on class certification, Daubert motions, and other pretrial
matters, and conserve judicial and party resources. The Panel
select the Northern District of California as the transferee
district. JLI is headquartered in that district, and it represents
that most of the key evidence and witnesses are located there.
Presiding Judge in the MDL is Hon. Judge William H. Orrick III. The
lead case is Case No. 3:19-md-02913-WHO.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alison Gaffney, Esq.
          Felicia Craick, Esq.
          Derek W. Loese, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 3rd Ave., Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101-3052
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: agaffney@kellerrohrback.com
                  fcraick@kellerrohrback.com
                  dloeser@kellerrohrback.com


MISSOURI: Failed to Offer Alternative Repayment Plan, Dykes Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JEFFREY DYKES, on behalf of himself And others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. MISSOURI HIGHER EDUCATION LOAN AUTHORITY, Defendant,
Case No. 19-007394-CI (Fla. Cir., Nov. 7, 2019), seeks to recover
damages for the Defendant's violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act.

In 2017, MOHELA demanded that the Plaintiff begin making $850
payments towards his federal student loans based on an increase in
his annual employment income. Due to prior cumulative financial
obligations, the Plaintiff could only afford roughly $150 monthly
payment, which MOHELA rejected.

MOHELA offered the Plaintiff an Income Contingent repayment (ICR)
plan, which involved $861 monthly payment unaffordable for the
Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant denied him
the less expensive alternative of a $350 monthly IBR plan. Instead,
MOHELA referred him to the Defendant's Web page indicating all
available repayment options, the lawsuit says.

The Plaintiff says he was damaged by the Defendant's actions in
failing to offer an Alternative Repayment Plan, including increased
interest during the forbearance period and an eventual default
because forbearance time is limited and the payments are
unaffordable.

The Higher Education Loan Authority of the State of Missouri, aka
the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority or MOHELA, is one of
the largest holders and servicers of student loans nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey "Jack" Gordon, Esq.
          David P. Mitchell, Esq.
          MANEY & GORDON, P.A.
          101 East Kennedy Blvd., Suite 1700
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 221-1366
          Facsimile: (813) 223-5920
          E-mail: j.gordon@maneygordon.com
                  d.mitchell@maneygordon.com
                  k.glascock@maneygordon.com


MOMENTA PHARMA: Dropped from M923-Related Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2019, that UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund
and Sheet Metal Workers' Local Union No. 28 Welfare Fund (SMW) have
lodged an updated consolidated complaint dropping the Company as a
defendant without prejudice.

On March 19, 2019, UFCW Local 1500 Welfare Fund, or UFCW, filed a
class action suit against AbbVie Inc., AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd.,
Amgen Inc., Samsung Bioepsis Co., Ltd., Mylan, Inc., Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sandoz, Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Company, in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated for alleged violations of
state and federal antitrust and consumer protection laws.

According to the complaint, UFCW is seeking injunctive and other
equitable relief and damages.

Two additional complaints, mirroring that filed by UFCW, were filed
on April 19, 2019 and April 25, 2019 in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois by the Sheet Metal
Workers' Local Union No. 28 Welfare Fund, or SMW, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated and by Locals 302 & 612 of
the International Union of Operating Engineers-Employers
Construction Industry Health and Security Trust Fund, or IUOE, on
behalf of itself and others similarly situated, which also name
AbbVie Inc., AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd., Amgen Inc., Samsung
Bioepsis Co., Ltd., Mylan, Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Sandoz, Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and
the Company as defendants.

On August 9, 2019, UFCW and SMW filed an updated consolidated
complaint dropping the Company as a defendant without prejudice.

Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biotechnology company, focuses on
the discovery and development of novel biologic therapies for the
treatment of rare immune-mediated diseases in the United States.
The company was formerly known as Mimeon, Inc. and changed its name
to Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in September 2002. Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2001 and is headquartered in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.


MUTUAL SECURITIES: Bid to Enforce Settlement in Milliner Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHARLOTTE B. MILLINER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MUTUAL
SECURITIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 15-cv-03354-DMR (N.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (a) granted in part the Plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration; and (b) denied without prejudice (i)
Proposed Intervenor Vincent Gilotti's motion to intervene; (ii) the
portion of MSI's motion to enforce the settlement agreement; and
(iii) the Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the Sept. 11, 2018 dismissal
order, pending resolution of the Plaintiffs' appeal of the July 8,
2019 order.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action against MSI on July
21, 2015 alleging claims stemming from MSI's brokerage agreement
with the Plaintiffs.  The lawsuit is related to another case filed
in the Court, Milliner v. Bock Evans Financial Counsel, Ltd., No.
15-cv-1763 JD, in which Milliner and Brem challenged the actions of
their investment advisor, Bock Evans Financial Counsel, Ltd.

The Magistrate Judge conducted a settlement conference on June 1,
2018 which resulted in a full resolution of the Plaintiffs'
individual claims in the lawsuit.  Milliner, Joann Brem, and MSI
executed a settlement agreement the same day.  On June 5, 2018,
with the parties' consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c), the
matter was reassigned to the Court.  The case was dismissed on
Sept. 11, 2018.

The Court currently has four motions before it.  Plaintiffs
Milliner and Brem move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) for relief from a portion of the court's July 8, 2019 order
on MSI motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement and
stipulated protective order.  They also move to vacate the Court's
Sept. 11, 2018 dismissal order.  Gilotti moves to intervene.
Finally, as part of MSI's motion to enforce the settlement
agreement, the parties have submitted supplemental briefing on
Monster Energy v. Schechter.

Magistrate Judge Ryu finds that the Plaintiffs' notice of appeal
does not specify which portions of the order they challenge.  She
also finds that Gilotti's motion to intervene seeks to unseal the
settlement agreement filed by MSI and is therefore directly related
to a matter currently before the Ninth Circuit.  Therefore, the
Court currently lacks jurisdiction to decide it.  She accordingly
denied without prejudice the motion to intervene.

The Magistrate also finds that the Court also lacks jurisdiction to
decide the outstanding issue regarding the effect of Monster Energy
on Sturgeon-Garcia's ability to use the settlement agreement,
because the Plaintiffs divested the Court of its ability to rule on
it when they filed their appeal of the July 8, 2019 order that held
that issue in abeyance.

As to the Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the Court's Sept. 11, 2018
order dismissing this action, she holds that it is not clear
whether such a motion is collateral to the matters being appealed.
The parties did not address this in the motion papers, and the
Court's own research did not yield any authority regarding whether
it has jurisdiction to consider the motion under these
circumstances.  In the absence of such authority and out of an
abundance of caution, the Magistrate denied the motion without
prejudice pending resolution of the Plaintiffs' appeal.

Finally, with respect to the Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration, on Aug. 20, 2019, following its receipt of the
motion for reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit stayed the
proceedings in the appeal until the district court determines
whether the Plaintiffs' July 25, 2019 filing falls within the
motions listed in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) and,
if so, whether the motion should be granted or denied.  The
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the July 8, 2019 order
seeks relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 and was filed
on July 25, 2019, less than 28 days after the issuance of the
order.  Therefore, their Rule 60 motion was filed within the 28-day
time period set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(4).  The notice of appeal is thus suspended, and the Court has
jurisdiction to dispose of the Rule 60 motion, to which the
Magistrate now turns.

She holds that it is undisputed that due to MSI's mistake, the
Court ruled on whether Sturgeon-Garcia had violated the protective
order entered in the case, even though the documents in Exhibit 2
were produced in the Bock Evans lawsuit, and are not subject to the
protective order.  Given these circumstances, the portion of the
July 8, 2019 order addressed to Exhibit 2 is vacated.

Finally, the Plaintiffs appear to ask the Court to rule that
Sturgeon-Garcia's use of Exhibit 2 did not violate the Bock Evans
protective order.  The request, according to the Magistrate, is
perplexing given the Plaintiffs' position that the Court does not
have jurisdiction to decide any issues related to Exhibit 2.  She
denied the Plaintiffs' request.  She also denied MSI's request that
the Court refers the matter of whether Sturgeon-Garcia violated the
Bock Evans protective order to Judge Donato.  Should MSI seek to
pursue the issue, it should file a motion before Judge Donato in
accordance with the Local Rules.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Ryu granted in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.  She vacated the portion of
the Court's July 8, 2019 order finding Sturgeon-Garcia in violation
of the protective order with respect to Exhibit 2 and directing the
Plaintiffs to withdraw Exhibit 2 from the Gilotti claim.  The
Magistrate denied without prejudice (i) Gilotti's motion to
intervene; (ii) the portion of MSI's motion to enforce the
settlement agreement that is addressed to whether under Monster
Energy Sturgeon-Garcia is bound by the confidentiality provision of
the settlement agreement; and (iii) Plaintiffs' motion to vacate
the Sept. 11, 2018 dismissal order, pending resolution of the
Plaintiffs' appeal of the July 8, 2019 order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sWVsUZ from Leagle.com.

Charlotte B. Milliner, as trustee of the Charlotte B. Milliner
Trust dated January 30, 1997 and as owner and holder of the
Charlotte B. Milliner SEP IRA & Joanne Brem, as Trustee of the Van
Santern-Brem Revocable Trust, for themselves and on behalf of all
others similarly situation, Plaintiffs, represented by David
Sturgeon-Garcia -- dsglaw@comcast.net -- The Law Offices of David
Sturgeon-Garcia.

Vincent Gilotti, Intervenor Pla, represented by David
Sturgeon-Garcia, The Law Offices of David Sturgeon-Garcia.

Mutual Securities, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant,
represented by Timothy W. Fredricks -- fredricks.t@wssllp.com --
Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP, Brandon S. Reif --
reif.b@wssllp.com -- Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP, Nazanin
Afshar -- afshar.n@wssllp.com -- Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg
LLP & Shelly C. Yoo, Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP.


MVP WORKFORCE: Smith Wins Prelim. Approval of Class Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Mary M. Rowland grants the Plaintiff's unopposed
motion for preliminary approval of the parties' class action
settlement in the lawsuit styled Eric Smith v. MVP Workforce, LLC,
et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-03718 (N.D. Ill.).

Final Approval hearing is set for March 10, 2020, at 8:30 a.m.[CC]


NCAA: Lyon Sues Over Disregard for Health and Safety of Athletes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Austin Lyon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Case No.
1:19-cv-04739-JPH-MJD (S.D. Ind., Dec. 2, 2019), seeks to obtain
redress for injuries sustained a result of the Defendant's reckless
disregard for the health and safety of generations of Humboldt
State University student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like
those the Plaintiff experienced, the Defendant failed to implement
adequate procedures to protect the Plaintiff and other HSU football
players from the long-term dangers associated with them, says the
complaint.

As a direct result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the
Plaintiff and countless former HSU football players suffered brain
and other neurocognitive injuries, the Plaintiff asserts. As such,
the Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in order to
vindicate those players' rights and hold the NCAA accountable.

Austin Lyon is a natural person and citizen of the State of
California.

The NCAA is the governing body of collegiate athletics that
oversees twenty-three college sports and over 400,000 students who
participate in intercollegiate athletics, including the football
program at Greensboro.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: 713.554.9099
          Fax: 713.554.9098
          Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Phone: 312.589.6370
          Fax: 312.589.6378
          Email: jedelson@edelson.com
                 brichman@edelson.com

               - and -

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Phone: 415.212.9300
          Fax: 415.373.9435
          Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NIAGARA BOTTLING: Bid to Certify Classes in Frompovicz Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ, Plaintiff, v. NIAGARA BOTTLING,
LLC, ICE RIVER SPRINGS WATER CO, INC., AND JAMES J. LAND, JR.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-54 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Wendy
Beetlestone of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied the Plaintiff's motion to certify two putative
classes: one on behalf of water extractors, and the other on behalf
of water bottlers.

The case concerns allegations that certain entities in the water
extraction and bottling industries falsely labeled and sold "well
water" as the more desirable "spring water."  The Plaintiff and the
Defendants are in the bottled water business.  Defendant Land is a
water extractor -- he owns and operates multiple water sources in
Pennsylvania, from which he collects and sells water in bulk to
bottlers.  One such extraction site is Pine Valley Farm Springs.

The thrust of the parties' dispute concerns the water Land extracts
from Pine Valley and then sells to Niagara and Ice River --
specifically, whether the water extracted and sold is the more
desirable "spring water" or the less desirable "well water."
Spring water enjoys pride of place in the bottled water industry,
commanding a premium price because consumers prefer it to other
types of water, including well water.  To be lawfully labeled as
such, spring water must meet certain minimum requirements set forth
by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). Specifically, the
water must (1) be drawn from an "approved source," and (2) meet the
Standard of Identity for spring water.  The FDA also specifies that
extractors and bottlers must comply with supplementary state and
local rules regulating water extraction and bottling.  In
Pennsylvania, the DEP regulates bulk water hauling and water
bottling systems, consistent with the state's Safe Drinking Water
Program. DEP does not, however, define "spring" or "spring water"
and does not maintain records or lists that identify water sources
as supplying spring water.

The Plaintiff claims that the water extracted from Pine Valley does
not meet the FDA's definition of spring water, and is, in fact,
well water.  He primarily bases his claims on a walk-through of the
Pine Valley site that he conducted in 1997 and a hydrologist report
for the site that he reviewed in 2008.  He further claims that Land
fraudulently markets and sells Pine Valley well water as the more
desirable spring water, thereby diminishing Plaintiff's market to
sell legitimate spring water.  As to Niagara and Ice River, the
Plaintiff claims that they ceased buying water from him to pursue a
fraudulent plan to sell Defendant Land's spuriously labeled water
to consumers, causing the Plaintiff to lose sales.

The record is replete with evidence of the Plaintiff's deep-seated
animosity towards Land.  In an email to a Niagara employee from
June 2008, the Plaintiff asserted that Pine Valley's water was not
true spring water.  In 2013, he filed a complaint with the FDA,
raising many of the same claims asserted in the case.  In 2017, the
Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DEP, claiming that the
organization turned a blind eye to Land's violation of state water
regulations.  In the course of the litigation, the Plaintiff
testified that he harbored "animus, absolutely," against Land.

The Plaintiff filed the suit in 2018.  The Defendants moved to
dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, which the Court
granted in part and denied in part.  The Plaintiff then filed an
Amended Complaint, and the Defendants again moved to dismiss.  The
Court granted the motion in part and denied in part, finding inter
alia that Plaintiff made out viable Lanham Act false advertising
claims against Land, Ice River, and Niagara.

The Plaintiff now moves to certify the following two classes: (1)
All persons or entities who, between Jan. 8, 2012 and the present
extracted spring water for sale within 400 miles of either Pine
Valley in New Ringgold, PA, Niagara's bottling plants in Allentown
or Hamburg, PA, or Ice River's bottling plan in Allentown, PA
("Extractor Class"); and, (2) All persons or entities who, between
Jan. 8, 2012 and the present bottled spring water for sale in the
United States ("Bottler Class").  The Plaintiff seeks both
injunctive relief and damages on the putative class claims.

Judge Beetlestone concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to carry
his burden of establishing the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a)
for both the Bottler and Extractor Classes.  Accordingly, he denied
the Plaintiff's motion to certify the proposed classes.  An
appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/RTbJpG from Leagle.com.

STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by DAVID J. STANOCH --
dstanoch@golombhonik.com -- GOLOMB & HONIK, P.C.

NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC, Defendant, represented by REBEKAH B.
KCEHOWSKI -- rbkcehowski@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY & LAURA A.
MEADEN -- lameaden@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY.

ICE RIVER SPRINGS WATER CO. INC. & JAMES J. LAND, JR., doing
business as PINE VALLEY FARMS SPRINGS, Defendants, represented by
AMY R. BRANDT, WEIR & PARTNERS LLP, PATRICK KRENICKY , WEIR &
PARTNERS LLP, BRETT A. DATTO -- brett.datto@weirpartners.com --
WEIR & PARTNERS LLP & REBEKAH B. KCEHOWSKI, JONES DAY.

CROSSROADS BEVERAGE GROUP, Defendant, represented by AMY R. BRANDT,
WEIR & PARTNERS LLP, PATRICK KRENICKY, WEIR & PARTNERS LLP & BRETT
A. DATTO, WEIR & PARTNERS LLP.

SIGNATURE SPRINGS, LLC, Movant, represented by DAVID J. COHEN --
dcohen@stephanzouras.com -- STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP.


NIZHONI HEALTH: Faces Lima Suit Over Unreimbursed Travel Expenses
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY LIMA, on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
NIZHONI HEALTH SYSTEMS, LLC, JOSEPH P. MCDONOUGH, and ANTHONY
LOUMIDIS, Defendants, Case No. 19-3278 (Mass. Super., Nov. 7,
2019), seeks to recover unreimbursed business travel expenses,
mandatory statutory multiplication of such damages to the extent
authorized by law, reasonable costs, and attorney fees under the
Massachusetts Wage and Hour laws.

According to the complaint, individuals performing similar
functions to the Plaintiff as RN Case Managers were treated
similarly to Lima.  The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants in
Massachusetts as an RN Case Manager from December 21, 2018, to
October 7, 2019.

Ms. Lima's rate of pay was $65,000.00 per year, and subject to
overtime. In the course of her employment as an RN Case Manager,
she would be required to travel to clients' homes in order to
provide home health care assistance, typically to disabled or aging
individuals.

Despite the fact that Ms. Lima--and the class members--used their
personal vehicles to make such "intraday travel," the Defendants
failed to reimburse her and the putative class members for mileage
incurred for use of her personal vehicle in the course of her
employment duties for the Defendants, the lawsuit says.

Nizhoni Health provides in-home care services, including skilled
nursing and home health aide services.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew A. Slater, Esq.
          Michael T. Marshall, Esq.
          TENTINDO, KENDALL, CANNIFF & KEEFE LLP
          510 Rutherford Avenue
          Boston, MA 02129
          Telephone: (617) 242-9600
          Facsimile: (617) 242-0800
          E-mail: mas@tkcklaw.com
                  mtm@tkcklaw.com


NORMAL LIFE: Grotte Suit Remanded to San Luis Obispo Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge George H. Wu of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California remanded the case captioned Michael Grotte,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Normal Life of California, Inc., a California
Corporation; Rescare Behavior Services, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation; RSCR California Inc., a Delaware Corporation, licensed
to do business in California; RSCR Inland, Inc., a California
Corporation; Res-Care California, Inc. d/b/a RCCA Services, a
Delaware Corporation licensed to do business in California as RCCA
Services; Rescare, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and DOES 1 to 100,
inclusive, Defendants, Case No. CV 18-9814-GW-KSx (C.D. Cal.), to
the San Luis Obispo Superior Court from which it was removed for
all further proceedings.

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, and good cause shown, the
Judge concluded that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
under the Class Action Fairness Act because the home-state
controversy exception set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(4)(B)
applies.  Accordingly, he vacated the pending motion for
preliminary approval of the parties' class action and/or PAGA
representative action settlement that was set for Nov. 14, 2019,
and remanded the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 23, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/x3INPR from Leagle.com.

Michael Grotte, an individual, appearing individually and on behalf
of all otheres similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Craig
J. Ackermann -- cja@ackermanntilajef.com -- Ackermann and Tilajef
PC, David S. Winston -- david@employmentlitigators.com -- Winston
Law Group PC & Jonathan Melmed -- jm@melmedlaw.com -- Melmed Law
Group PC.

Normal Life of California, Inc., a California Corporation, RSCR
California, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, licensed to do business
in California & Res-Care California, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
licensed to so business in California as RCCA Services, Defendants,
represented by Phil J. Montoya, Jr. -- pmontoya@hpylaw.com --
Hawkins Parnell Thackston and Young LLP, Matthew A. Boyd --
mboyd@hpylaw.com -- Hawkins Parnell Thackston and Young LLP, pro
hac vice & Ronald G. Polly, Jr. -- rpolly@hpylaw.com -- Hawkins
Parnell Thackston and Young LLP, pro hac vice.


OCTAPHARMA PLASMA: Crumpton Sues Over Unlawful Use of Biometrics
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Crumpton, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. OCTAPHARMA PLASMA, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case
No. 2019CH13850 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Dec. 2, 2019), is brought
against the Defendant to put a stop to its unlawful collection,
use, and storage of the Plaintiff's and the putative Class members'
sensitive biometric data.

When consumers donate plasma at Octapharma, they are required to
scan their fingerprints and enroll in Octapharma's customer
membership database. While most membership management programs use
conventional methods for verifying customers (like identification
cards), Octapharma's customers are required to have their
fingerprints scanned. Unlike identification cards-which can be
changed or replaced if stolen or compromised-fingerprints are
unique, permanent biometric identifiers associated with a consumer.
This exposes consumers to serious and irreversible privacy risks.
Recognizing the need to protect its citizens from situations like
these, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act,
specifically to regulate companies that collect and store Illinois
citizens' biometrics, such as fingerprints.

Despite this law, Octapharma disregards its customers' statutorily
protected privacy rights and unlawfully collects, stores, and uses
their biometric data in violation of the BIPA. Specifically,
Octapharma has violated the BIPA because it did not: properly
inform the Plaintiff and the Class members in writing of the
specific purpose and length of time for which their fingerprints
were being collected, stored, and used, as required by the BIPA;
provide a publicly available retention schedule and guidelines for
permanently destroying the Plaintiff and the Class' fingerprints,
as required by the BIPA; nor receive a written release from the
Plaintiff or the members of the Class to collect, capture, or
otherwise obtain fingerprints, as required by the BIPA, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and citizen of the State of
Illinois.

Octapharma operates a nationwide chain of blood plasma donation
centers with locations throughout the State of Illinois, including
in Cook County.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Phone: 312.589.6370
          Fax: 312.589.6378
          Email: jedelson@edelson.com
                 brichman@edelson.com

               - and -

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Phone: 630.355.7590
          Fax: 630.778.0400
          Email: admin@fishlawfirm.com
                 dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                 jkunze@fishlawfirm.com


OMEGA FLEX: Missouri Class Action Still Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------
Omega Flex, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2019, that the company continues to defend a re-filed
class action suit in Missouri.

In March 2017, a putative class action case was re-filed against
the Company and other parties in Missouri state court after the
predecessor case was dismissed without prejudice by the federal
court.

The Company successfully removed the case to federal court and is
currently vigorously defending the case.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Omega Flex, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, manufactures and
sells flexible metal hoses and accessories in the United States and
internationally. The company was formerly known as Tofle America,
Inc. and changed its name to Omega Flex, Inc. in 1996. Omega Flex,
Inc. was founded in 1975 and is based in Exton, Pennsylvania.


PATHWAY LEASING: Court Denies Bid to Certify Appeal in Merrill Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANKLIN MERRILL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PATHWAY
LEASING LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, MATTHEW HARRIS,
an individual, Defendants, Civil Action No. 16-cv-02242-KLM (D.
Colo.), Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado (i) granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed
Request for Written Order on Ruling Granting Pathway Defendants'
Motion to Decertify; (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify
Order Granting Decertification for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to
28 U.S.C.Section 1292(b); and (iii) denied the Plaintiffs' Second
Motion for Use of Permissive Joinder Standard for Collectivization,
or in the Alternative, Motion for Conditional Certification of
Collective Action—Liability Only.

On Feb. 21, 2019, the Court orally granted the Defendants' Motion
to Decertify 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) Collective Action in the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") case.  At that hearing, it invited
either party to request a written ruling on that motion in order to
more fully explain the Court's reasoning (and, as noted by the
Plaintiffs, to provide a more concrete basis for an appeal).  The
Plaintiffs subsequently filed the present Motion for Written
Ruling.

After considering the relevant factors, Magistrate Judge Mix finds
that decertification of the collective action is appropriate due to
individualized evidence as to both the fact of damage and as to the
amount of damages for each Plaintiff.  Accordingly, she granted the
Motion for Written Ruling, and for the reasons stated and at the
Feb. 21, 2019 hearing, she granted the Defendants' Motion to
Decertify.  The opt-in Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed without
prejudice.

The Motion to Certify Collectivization seeks two rulings, one in
the alternative of the other.  The Plaintiffs first ask the Court
to utilize the "permissive joinder" standard in collectivizing the
suit.  Alternatively, they ask the Court to certify the case as a
collective action as to liability only.  The parties dispute
whether the Plaintiffs' request is in essence a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's prior Order, which would place a
higher burden on the Plaintiffs.

The Magistrate Judge denied the Motion to Certify Collectivization
to the extent the Plaintiffs request that the Court uses Turner v.
Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.'s permissive joinder standard for
collectivization.  She rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that the
Court should instead adopt the even looser standard articulated by
Turner.  Turner appears to suggest that the only constraint on the
scope of the first stage determination is whether the workers are
bringing the same statutory claim against the same employer.
Although she agrees with several aspects of Judge Kane's analysis
in Turner, the Magistrate does not agree that the standard the
Court should apply at the first stage is so ephemeral.

Next, the Magistrate finds that the Plaintiffs offer no other
authority to support their argument that the Court may certify a
collective action as to liability only.  Even were the Court
inclined to do here what can be done under Rule 23(c)(4), the
entire rationale for proceeding as a collective action would be
negated; in other words, such a course of action here would not
promote the efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues
of law and fact arising from the same alleged activity.  Thus, in
the absence of any legal authority demonstrating that the Court may
certify a collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) as to
liability only, the Motion to Certify Collectivization is denied to
the extent the Plaintiffs ask the Court to conditionally re-certify
the case as a collective action as to liability only.

Finally, the Motion to Certify Appeal asks the Court to certify its
Feb. 21, 2019 oral ruling (and subsequent written ruling, on the
Defendants' Motion to Decertify).  The Plaintiffs argue that the
Court erred both in its initial decision to entertain the Motion to
Decertify post-trial and in decertification of the collective
action.  However, neither of these determinations implicates a
controlling question of law.  Rather, the timing of decertification
is a procedural determination about which the Plaintiffs have
failed to show that there is either a conflict of law or a lack of
legal authority.  With respect to the decertification itself, the
Magistrate finds that the Plaintiffs simply disagree with the
Court's assessment of the trial evidence based on the application
of settled law. The Court cannot find that either of these
constitutes the type of "controlling question of law" contemplated
by 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).  A different determination on either
of these questions simply would not "entitle a party to judgment
and obviate the need for further proceedings in the case.

Because the Plaintiffs fail to meet the second criterion for
certification of an immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section1292(b), the Motion to Certify Appeal is denied.

Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Mix (i) granted the Motion
for Written Ruling, and (ii) denied both the Motion to Certify
Appeal and the Motion to Certify Collectivization.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/eISiUo from Leagle.com.

Franklin Merrill, Anthony Glover, Keith Herring, Anthony Dennis,
Larry Jurcak, Sami Nasr, Ronald Dennis, Rodney Lacy, James
Newberry, Tami Potirala, Craig Williams, Zigmund Gutowski, Joseph
Horion & Eric Ard, Plaintiffs, represented by John Reily Crone --
John.Crone@andruswagstaff.com -- The Law Office of John R. Crone,
LLC.

Pathway Leasing LLC, a Colorado limited liability company & Matthew
Harris, an individual, Defendants, represented by Jeremy Ben
Merkelson -- jbmerkelson@hollandhart.com -- Holland & Hart, LLP,
Mark Brian Wiletsky -- mbwiletsky@hollandhart.com -- Holland &
Hart, LLP & Robert M. Thomas -- rmthomas@hollandhart.com -- Holland
& Hart LLP.

Rodney Lacy, Anthony Dennis, Anthony Glover, Keith Herring, Larry
Jurcak, Franklin Merrill, Sami Nasr, Eric Ard, Ronald Dennis,
Zigmund Gutowski, Tim Hollingsworth, Joseph Horion, James Newberry,
Tami Potirala & Craig Williams, Counter Defendants, represented by
John Reily Crone, The Law Office of John R. Crone, LLC.

Matthew Harris, an individual & Pathway Leasing LLC, a Colorado
limited liability company, Counter Claimants, represented by Mark
Brian Wiletsky, Holland & Hart, LLP & Robert M. Thomas, Holland &
Hart LLP.


PLANNERNET INC: Court Enters Final Judgment in Champagne Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDA CHAMPAGNE, Plaintiff, v. PLANNERNET, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 17-cv-02128-SK (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Sallie Kim of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against
the Defendants, and approved the terms of the Class Settlement
Agreement, pursuant to the preliminary approval order entered on
April 22, 2019, and the order granting final approval of the class
action settlement entered on Oct. 9, 2019.

The Agreement will be incorporated into the judgment as though all
terms therein are set forth in full.  The Judgment constitutes a
final judgment in the action, as defined in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58(a)(1).  All claims asserted in the Action are
dismissed with prejudice as to Plaintiff Champagne and all the
class members, to the maximum extent permitted by law.  The PAGA
claims asserted in the Action are also dismissed with prejudice as
to Plaintiff Champagne and all the class members.

The Plaintiffs are permanently enjoined from pursuing or seeking to
reopen any of the released claims as defined in the Agreement, to
the maximum extent permitted by law.  They are permanently enjoined
from pursuing or seeking to reopen any of the PAGA Claims, as
defined in the Agreement, to the maximum extent permitted by law.
Except as set forth in the Agreement and the Final Approval Order,
each party is to bear her/his/its own attorneys' fees and costs.

Without affecting the finality of the judgment, the Court will
retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the action and
the parties, including all the class members, for purposes of
supervising, administering, implementing, enforcing, and
interpreting the Agreement, the Final Approval Order, any releases
in connection therewith, and any other matters related or ancillary
to the foregoing.

The action is dismissed, and the Clerk is directed to close the
file.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Judgment & Dismissal
is available at https://is.gd/U5mGQ0 from Leagle.com.

Linda Champagne, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ramsey Hanafi --
ramsey@qhplaw.com -- Quintana Hanafi, LLP, Enrique Martinez --
enriquemartinez@hill-law-offices.com -- Law Offices of John E. Hill
& John E. Hill -- johnhill@hill-law-offices.com -- Law Offices of
John E. Hill.

Plannernet, Inc., a North Carolina corporation, Defendant,
represented by Travis Michael Gemoets -- txg@jmbm.com  -- Jeffer
Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP & Taylor Nicole Burras --
TBurras@jmbm.com -- Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP.


PROSPECT CHARTERCARE: $11M Del Sesto ERISA Suit Deal Has Final Okay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHEN DEL SESTO, AS RECEIVER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ST. JOSEPH HEALTH SERVICES OF RHODE ISLAND RETIREMENT PLAN, ET
AL. Plaintiffs, v. PROSPECT CHARTERCARE, LLC, ET AL., Defendants,
C.A. No. 18-328 WES (D. R.I.), Judge William E. Smith of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted final
approval of the Parties' Settlement Agreement, and certified the
class, the class representatives, and the class counsel.

The action stems from alleged underfunding of a retirement plan for
nurses and other hospital workers employed by St. Joseph Health
Services of Rhode Island ("SJHSRI").  According to the amended
complaint, the St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island
Retirement Plan, which has 2,729 participants, is insolvent.  After
the Plan was placed into receivership in 2017, the Receiver and
several named participants, individually and on behalf of a
purported class of plan participants, filed a 23-count complaint in
the Court against several Defendants, alleging violations of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") for failure to
meet minimum funding requirements and breach of fiduciary duty, as
well as various state law claims.

A number of Defendants have agreed to settle with the Plaintiffs,
resulting in two separate settlement agreements. The Court approved
the settlement reached between the Plaintiffs and SJHSRI, RWH,
CCCB, and CharterCARE Foundation ("CCF") ("Settlement B") for the
reasons stated in its Memorandum of Decision Entering Final
Approval of the Settlement, ECF No. 162.  The settlement currently
before the Court, "Settlement A," was reached between Plaintiffs
and SJHSRI, Roger Williams Hospital ("RWH"), and CharterCARE
Community Board ("CCCB").

The terms of Settlement A are set forth in the parties' settlement
agreement.  In sum, following approval, the Settling Defendants
will transfer to the Receiver an initial lump sum payment in an
amount not less than $11.15 million.  Additionally, the Settling
Defendants will assign to the Receiver all rights in an escrow
account held by the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training
with a current balance of $750,000.  CCCB will also assign its
rights in CCF to the Receiver, and the Settling Defendants will
hold CCCB's interest in non-settling defendant Prospect CharterCARE
in trust for the Receiver.  Finally, the Settling Defendants agree
to petition the Rhode Island Superior Court to initiate judicial
liquidation proceedings, pursuant to which their remaining assets
will be distributed to creditors, including the Plaintiffs.  In
exchange, the Plaintiffs will release the Settling Defendants and
their agents, officers, and directors serving after June 20, 2014
from liability as it relates to the Plan.

The Plaintiffs and Settling Defendants sought preliminary approval
of the settlement, to which the Non-Settling Defendants objected.
On June 6, 2019, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement
and directed the settling parties to give notice to the purported
class.

The Parties now seek final approval of the settlement.  The
Non-Settling Defendants object to final approval on several
grounds.  Some of the objections relate to the merits of the case
-- whether ERISA applies to the Plan and the consequences flowing
from that determination. he Non-Settling Defendants also object on
the basis that R.I. Gen. Laws Section 23-17.14-35 is
unconstitutional or preempted by ERISA.  Their central argument,
however, is that the settlement should not be approved because it
is the product of collusion between the Del Sesto, as state
appointed receiver and administrator of the Plan, and the Settling
Defendants.

Judge Smith is satisfied that this settlement is the product of an
arm's length transaction, and furthermore, that the class
representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
class.  Weighing further in favor of approval, no class member has
objected to the settlement.  In fact, the Plaintiffs' filings
demonstrate that hundreds of class members support Settlement.  For
these reasons, hefinds that the settlement is the product of good
faith and is fair, adequate, and reasonable.

The Judge is also satisfied that he need not address questions
related to the applicability of ERISA in order to approve the
settlement.  However, approval will be without prejudice to the
Non-Settling Defendants' right to assert these arguments later in
the proceedings.

Similarly, he need not determine the potential preemption or
constitutionality of the Settlement Statute, and therefore
expressly declines to rule on these issues at this time.  His
approval of the settlement will be without prejudice to the
Non-Settling Defendants' right to assert these arguments later in
the litigation or in future proceedings.  Moreover, the Settling
Defendants acknowledged at oral argument that any protection they
receive by virtue of the Settlement Statute may be lost if the
Court finds it preempted or unconstitutional; this is a risk they
accept with open eyes.

Finally, the Judge is satisfied that his analysis has not changed
for purposes of final settlement approval.  Additionally, the
Non-Settling Defendants' objections do not relate to certification
of the class, its representatives, or its counsel.

Accordingly, for purposes of the settlement only, he certified the
following class: All participants of the St. Joseph Health Services
of Rhode Island Retirement Plan, including all surviving former
employees of St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island who are
entitled to benefits under the Plan and all representatives and
beneficiaries of deceased former employees of St. Joseph Health
Services of Rhode Island who are entitled to benefits under the
Plan.

Furthermore, he appointed Gail J. Major, Nancy Zompa, Ralph Bryden,
Dorothy Willner, Caroll Short, Donna Boutelle, and Eugenia Levesque
as the settlement class representatives, and Wistow, Sheehan &
Lovely, P.C. as the class counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/Qv8kbN from Leagle.com.

Deming E. Sherman, Special Master, pro se.

Stephen Del Sesto, as Receiver and Administrator of the St. Joseph
Health Services of Rhode Island Retirement Plan, Gail J. Major,
Nancy Zompa, Ralph Bryden, Dorothy Willner, Caroll Short, Donna
Boutelle & Eugenia Levesque, Plaintiffs, represented by Benjamin
G.
Ledsham -- bledsham@wistbar.com -- Wistow, Sheehan & Loveley, PC,
Stephen P. Sheehan -- spsheehan@wistbar.com -- Wistow, Sheehan &
Loveley, PC & Max Wistow -- mwistow@wistbar.com -- Wistow Sheehan
&
Loveley.

Prospect CharterCARE, LLC, Prospect CharterCare SJHSRI, LLC &
Prospect Chartercare RWMC, LLC, Defendants, represented by Joseph
V. Cavanagh, III -- jvc3@blishcavlaw.com -- Blish & Cavanagh LLP,
Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr., Blish & Cavanagh, LLP, William Mark Russo
-- mrusso@frlawri.com -- Ferrucci Russo P.C., Christopher Joseph
Fragomeni -- cfragomeni@shslawfirm.com -- SHECHTMAN HALPERIN
SAVAGE, LLP & Dean J. Wagner -- dwagner@shslawfirm.com --
Shechtman
Halperin Savage LLP.

CharterCARE Community Board, St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode
Island & Roger Williams Hospital, Defendants, represented by
Robert
D. Fine, Chace, Ruttenberg & Freedman, LLP & Richard J. Land,
Chace
Ruttenberg & Freedman, LLP.

Prospect East Holdings, Inc. & Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Preston W. Halperin, Shechtman Halperin
Savage LLP, Christopher Joseph Fragomeni, SHECHTMAN HALPERIN
SAVAGE, LLP, Dean J. Wagner, Shechtman Halperin Savage LLP, Ekwan
E. Rhow, pro hac vice, John McGowan, Jr., Baker & Hostetler LLP,
pro hac vice & Thomas V. Reichert, Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert,
et al., pro hac vice.

CharterCARE Foundation, Defendant, represented by Andrew R.
Dennington, Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford, lLP,
Christopher K. Sweeney, Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford,
LLP
& Russell F. Conn, Conn Kavanaugh, pro hac vice.

The Rhode Island Community Foundation, Defendant, represented by
David A. Wollin, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP & Christine E.
Dieter, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder LLP.

Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, Diocesan Administration
Corporation & Diocesan Service Corporation, Defendants,
represented
by Howard A. Merten, Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP, Christopher M.
Wildenhain, Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP, Eugene G. Bernardo, II,
Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP & Paul M. Kessimian, Partridge, Snow &
Hahn LLP.

The Angell Pension Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Daniel
F.
Sullivan, Robinson & Cole LLP, David R. Godofsky, Alston & Bird
LLP, pro hac vice, Emily S. Costin, Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac
vice
& Steven J. Boyajian, ROBINSON & COLE LLP.


READING INTERNATIONAL: Brown vs. Reading Cinemas, et al., Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Reading International, Inc. continues to defend itself in a
putative class action styled Taylor Brown, individually, and on
behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated
vs. Reading Cinemas et al., according to the Company's Form 10-Q
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019.

The Company is currently involved in two California employment
matters which include substantially overlapping wage and hour
claims: Taylor Brown, individually, and on behalf of other members
of the general public similarly situated vs. Reading Cinemas et al.
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Kern,
Case No. BCV-19-1000390 ("Brown v. RC," and the "Brown Class Action
Complaint" respectively) and Peter M. Wagner, Jr., an individual,
vs. Consolidated Entertainment, Inc. et al., Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of San Diego, Case No.
37-2019-00030695-CU-WT-CTL ("Wagner v. CEI," and the "Wagner
Individual Complaint" respectively).

Brown v. RC was initially filed in December 2018, as an individual
action and refiled as a putative class action in February 2019, but
not served until June 24, 2019.

The lawsuits seek damages, and attorneys' fees, relating to alleged
violations of California labor laws relating to meal periods, rest
periods, reporting time pay, unpaid wages, timely pay upon
termination and wage statements violations.

Wagner v. CEI was filed as a discrimination and retaliation lawsuit
in June 2019.  The following month, in July 2019, a notice was
served on the Company by separate counsel for Mr. Wagner under the
California Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (Cal.  Labor Code
Section 2698, et seq) (the "Wagner PAGA Claim") purportedly
asserting in a representational capacity claims under the PAGA
statute, overlapping, in substantial part, the allegations set
forth in the Brown Class Action Complaint.  Neither plaintiff has
specified the amount of damages sought.

The Company is investigating and intends to vigorously defend the
allegations of the Brown Class Action Complaint, the Wagner
Individual Complaint and the Wagner PAGA Claim and denies that a
PAGA representative action is appropriate.  These matters are in
their early stages, and the putative class action has not been
certified.

Reading International said, "As these cases are in early stages,
the Company is unable to predict the outcome of the litigation or
the range of potential loss, if any; however, the Company believes
that its potential liability with respect to such matters is not
material to its overall financial position, results of operations
and cash flows.  Accordingly, the Company has not established a
reserve for loss in connection with these matters."

Reading International, Inc., is focused on the development,
ownership, and operation of entertainment and real estate assets in
the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Currently, RDI
operates through two segments: cinema exhibition and real estate.
The cinema exhibition segment operates multiplex cinemas.  RDI's
real estate segment includes real estate development and the rental
of retail, commercial and live theater assets.  The Company is
based in Culver City, California.


REWALK ROBOTICS: Has Until Dec. 20 to Oppose Appellate Brief
------------------------------------------------------------
ReWalk Robotics Ltd. has until December 20, 2019, to file an
opposition to the plaintiffs' appellate brief in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit in connection with the District
Court's dismissal of the complaint in a securities class action in
Massachusetts, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2019.

The action commenced in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, alleging violations of Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, was partially dismissed on August 23, 2018.  In
particular, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss the
claims under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act, finding that
the plaintiff failed to plead a false or misleading statement in
the IPO registration statement.  The District Court did not address
the claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
because, as a result of the dismissal of the claims under the
Securities Act, the lead plaintiff lacked standing to pursue those
claims.

On September 10, 2018, the lead plaintiff sought leave to amend his
complaint to add a new plaintiff that purportedly has standing to
pursue Exchange Act claims, and the Company opposed the motion to
amend on September 24, 2018.

On May 16, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend
and the complaint was dismissed.  The plaintiff timely appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  The
plaintiffs filed their appellate brief and the Company's opposition
is due on December 20, 2019.

ReWalk Robotics Ltd., a medical device company, designs, develops,
and commercializes exoskeletons for wheelchair-bound individuals
with mobility impairments or other medical conditions. The company
was formerly known as Argo Medical Technologies Ltd. ReWalk
Robotics Ltd. was founded in 2001 and is headquartered in Yokne'am
Illit, Israel.


RUHNN HOLDING: Faces Securities Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
XIAOHAI YAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, the Plaintiff, vs. RUHNN HOLDING LIMITED, MIN FENG, LEI
SUN, CHAO SHEN, ZHENBO CHI, KE CHENG, SHEK YUEN TING, FENGCHUN JIN,
SHANGZHEN LI, ZHENXING SHAO, PEN HUNG TUNG, JUNHONG QI, and XIAOCAO
XU, the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06162 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 31,
2019), seeks to pursue remedies under the Securities Act of 1933.
The case is a securities class action on behalf of all persons or
entities who purchased Ruhnn American Depositary Shares pursuant
and/or traceable to the Company's April 3, 2019 initial public
offering.

Ruhnn describes itself as China's largest key opinion leader (KOL)
facilitator and the largest KOL facilitator in China's e-commerce
market. So-called KOLs are essentially social media influencers,
i.e., individuals who create content on social media platforms such
as Facebook, YouTube, Tik Tok, and Instagram with the hope of
garnering a large public following.

As a purported KOL facilitator, Ruhnn contracts with social media
influencers who are paid to promote, market, and advertise products
and services to their fans and followers. Ruhnn claims to recruit,
train, and manage KOLs and provide them with analytical support.
The Company describes such activities as "incubating" KOLs. Ruhnn's
KOLs primarily market women's apparel, cosmetics, shoes, handbags,
and other fashion products on social media platforms popular in
China, such as Miaopai, Tik Tok, and Kuaishou.

Ruhnn's KOLs provide marketing services both to Ruhnn-owned and
-operated brands and stores and to Ruhnn's third-party customers.
The Company describes sales of products through Ruhnn's own stores
as the Company's product sales business, which Ruhnn also refers to
as its "full-service model." The majority of these online stores
are located or hosted on third-party ecommerce platforms and are
operated and marketed in the name of Ruhnn's KOLs.

As of December 31, 2018, Ruhnn purportedly owned and operated
ninety-one online stores. Ruhnn earns revenue from these product
sales by taking a percentage of the sales price at the time the
product is sold. The Company's full-service model 1s its largest
and most important operating segment, accounting for over 88% of
Ruhnn's total net revenues for the nine months ended December 31,
2018.

Ruhnn also derives revenue from its service business, which Ruhnn
refers to as its "platform model." Ruhnn launched its platform
model in 2017 to market its KOLs and KOL services to third parties,
such as brands, retailers, designers, and manufacturers. As of
December 31, 2018, Ruhnn claimed to have over 500 customers using
its platform services. Ruhnn earns fees for these services under a
variety of arrangements.

On March 6, 2019, Ruhnn filed with the SEC a registration statement
on Form F-1 for the IPO, which, after several amendments, was
declared effective on April 2, 2019.

One day later, on April 3, 2019, the Company filed a prospectus for
the [PO on Form 424B4 (the Prospectus'), which incorporated and
formed part of the Registration Statement. The Registration
Statement was used to sell to the investing public approximately 10
million Ruhnn ADSs, representing 50 million Ruhnn Class A ordinary
shares, at $12.50 per share. Defendants generated $125 million in
gross offering proceeds from their sale of Ruhnn ADSs in the IPO.

The Registration Statement was allegedly negligently prepared and,
as a result, contained untrue statements of material fact, omitted
material facts necessary to make the statements contained therein
not misleading, and failed to make adequate disclosures required
under the rules and regulations governing the preparation of such
documents. For example, the Ruhnn's fiscal year ends on March 31st
of the calendar year.

These statements were materially false and misleading because the
Registration Statement failed to disclose that, by the time of the
IPO, the Company's net revenues from its full-service model had
already declined 46% on a sequential basis to RMB186.9 million in
the fourth quarter of 2019, which also represented an anemic 1.4%
quarterly growth rate on a year-over-year basis.

In addition, the Company's full-service operating segment was not
rapidly expanding, but, in fact, was rapidly contracting as of the
date of the IPO.

The Registration Statement also claimed that Ruhnn's business
strategies involved the continued "rapid" expansion of the
Company's KOL ecosystem. These statements were materially false and
misleading because, at the time of the IPO, Ruhnn had slashed its
online stores by nearly 40% and its full-service KOLs by 44%, and
its net revenues derived from its full-service segment—the
Company's largest and most important operating segment—had
declined by 46% on a sequential basis.

The Registration Statement also purported to warn of risks that had
passed, and were already coming to pass, or omitted to disclose
known risks and adverse developments. For example, the Registration
Statement stated that "[w]e may experience a decrease in purchases
on our online stores," when in fact the Company had already closed
dozens of stores, had lost 44% of its full-service KOLs, and was in
the midst of a rapid contraction of its full-service operating
segment that predated the IPO. This purported "risk" warning in the
Registration Statement was thus itself materially misleading and
was plainly not tailored to Ruhnn's actual known risks related to
decreased purchases on its online stores., the lawsuit says.

On June 14, 2019, Ruhnn reported its fiscal year and fourth quarter
2019 financial results. These results were for the quarter prior to
the quarter in which defendants had conducted the IPO. In the
fiscal 2019 press release, Ruhnn reported that, as of March 31,
2019, the Company only had fifty-six stores in operation, which
indicated that the Company had closed nearly 40% of the ninety-one
stores defendants reported operating 1n the Registration
Statement.

Since the IPO, and as a result of the disclosure of material
adverse facts omitted from Ruhnn's Registration Statement, Ruhnn
ADSs have fallen substantially below their IPO price, damaging
Plaintiff and Class members, the lawsuit says.[BN]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood I, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN: Ct. Allows Romaine to Intervene in Lanier
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma issued an Order granting Reed Romine's Motion to Intervene
in the case captioned DUANE & VIRGINA LANIER TRUST, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SANDRIDGE MISSISSIPPIAN TRUST I, et al., Defendants, Case No.
CIV-15-634-G (W.D. Okla.).

In this putative class action, Lead Plaintiffs allege claims on
behalf of themselves and those individuals and entities that had
purchased or otherwise acquired common units of SandRidge
Mississippian Trust I (Trust I).

Romine purchased common units in Trust I and is a member of the
putative class as defined in the Consolidated Amended Complaint.
Romine moves, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(d)
and 24(b), to intervene as a named plaintiff and additional
proposed class representative in this case.

Rule 24(b) governs permissive intervention and provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:

On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who
claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question
of law or fact. In exercising its discretion, the court must
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the original parties' rights.

Upon review of the parties' submissions, the Court finds Romine
should be allowed to intervene as a named plaintiff and additional
proposed class representative in this case.

First, Romine's motion is timely. Although Romine has been aware of
this action since its commencement, some three and a half years
prior to the filing of his motion, Romine states that the filing of
his motion was prompted by the death of Lead Plaintiff Lawrence
Ross. The notice regarding the death of Mr. Ross was filed only
fourteen days prior to Romine's motion to intervene.
  
The Court also finds Romine's intervention would be beneficial to
the class. Romine states he is seeking to intervene in an effort to
address any potential concerns regarding the adequacy or typicality
of any other class representative movant, particularly any concerns
regarding the adequacy of Deborah Rath2 as a class representative
in light of her lack of knowledge regarding the reasons motivating
Mr. Ross' decisions to invest in Trust I.
  
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Romine's Motion to Intervene. Reed
Romine is permitted to intervene as a named plaintiff and proposed
class representative in this action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's September 30, 2019 Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2oesn73 from Leagle.com.

Duane and Virginia Lanier Trust, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Laurence M.
Rosen – lrosen@rosenlegal.com - The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro hac
vice, Phillip Kim – pkim@rosenlegal.com - The Rosen Law Firm PA,
pro hac vice, Darren B. Derryberry , Derryberry & Naifeh LLP, 4800
North Lincoln Boulevard, Oklahoma City, OK 73105, Jonathan Horne
– jhorne@rosenlegal.com - The Rosen Law Firm PA, Joshua E. Baker
– jbaker@rosenlegal.com - The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro hac vice,
Keith R. Lorenze – klorenze@rosenlegal.com - The Rosen Law Firm
PA & Nicholas G. Farha , Farha Law PLLC, 1900 NW Expressway
501,Oklahoma City, OK, 73118

Matthew Willenbucher, Jase Luna & Ivan Nibur, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jonathan Horne , The Rosen Law Firm PA, Joshua E.
Baker , The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro hac vice, Keith R. Lorenze , The
Rosen Law Firm PA, Laurence M. Rosen , The Rosen Law Firm PA &
Nicholas G. Farha , Farha Law PLLC.

Reed Romine & Deborah Rath, on behalf of Lawrence Ross, Plaintiffs,
represented by Jonathan Horne , The Rosen Law Firm PA, Joshua E.
Baker , The Rosen Law Firm PA, pro hac vice & Nicholas G. Farha ,
Farha Law PLLC.

Sandridge Energy Inc, Defendant, represented by Amy H. Bond -
abond@cov.com - Covington & Burling, C. Williams Phillips -
cphillips@cov.com - Covington & Burling, Christopher Yuk Lun Yeung
-
cyeung@cov.com - Covington & Burling, Herbert Beigel , Law Offices
of Herbert Beigel, 38327 S Arroyo Way Tucson, AZ, 85739-3075,
Jordan S. Joachim - jjoachim@cov.com - Covington & Burling, Kiran
A. Phansalkar , Conner & Winters, 4000 One Williams Center Tulsa,
OK 74172, Mark P. Gimbel , Covington & Burling, Mitchell D.
Blackburn , Conner & Winters, 4000 One Williams Center Tulsa, OK
74172, Robert A. Nance - rnance@riggsabney.com - Riggs Abney Neal
Turpen Orbison Lewis & Swati R. Prakash - sprakash@cov.com -
Covington & Burling.

SHEIN FASHION: Dargoltz Seeks to Stop Unsolicited Telemarketing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Simmone Dargoltz, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SHEIN FASHION GROUP, INC., Case No.
1:19-cv-24953-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Dec. 2, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's knowing and willful violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

To solicit new customers, the Defendant engages in unsolicited
telemarketing with no regard for consumers' privacy rights, says
the complaint. The Defendant's telemarketing consists of sending
automated text messages to consumers soliciting them to purchase
the Defendant's goods. The Defendant caused thousands of text
messages to be placed to the cellular telephones of the Plaintiff
and Class Members, causing them injuries.

Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt
the Defendant's illegal conduct. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory
damages on behalf of himself and Class Members, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Miami-Dade County,
Florida.

The Defendant specializes in "fast fashion" and operates an
e-commerce platform focusing on women's wear and apparel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954.400.4713
          Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone (305) 479-2299
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave, Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Phone: (305) 975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com


SMITH & WESSON: Amended Primus RICO Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PRIMUS GROUP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. SMITH & WESSON CORP.,
et al., Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-3450 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Edmund
A. Sargus, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff is a limited liability company that operates as an
entertainment venue in the central business district of Columbus,
Ohio.  On Aug. 8, 2019, the Plaintiff filed its Complaint and
Emergency Application for Injunctive Relief.  It asserts
racketeering and intentional misrepresentation claims on behalf of
a class against the Defendants.  The Defendants manufacture
firearms referred to as assault weapons.

On Sept. 3, 2019, the Defendants moved the Court to dismiss the
Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice on various grounds, including:
respect for the separation of powers, the Defendants' entitlement
to statutory immunity, the Plaintiff's failure to state a claim,
and the Plaintiff's lack of standing.

The Plaintiff then filed its Amended Complaint on Sept. 16, 2019,
adding claims of public nuisance, negligent design, and failure-to
warn.  Concomitantly, it filed a Memorandum in Opposition
requesting that the Court denies the motion to dismiss for the
reason the Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint that traverses
and supersedes all arguments within the motion to dismiss rendering
it moot.  According to the Plaintiff, it is well-settled that an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.  The Plaintiff
acknowledges an exception to the rule.  When a defect raised in a
motion to dismiss remains in an amended pleading, a court may
consider the original motion as addressing the new pleading.

In their Reply, the Defendants assert that the exception the
Plaintiff acknowledged applies because the various grounds for
dismissal found in the Plaintiff's Complaint persist in the Amended
Complaint.  They also argue that because the Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint and Memorandum in Opposition did not adequately respond
to the Motion to Dismiss, the Court should grant their Motion to
Dismiss.

Judge Sargus holds that the Defendant's arguments are well taken,
particularly in regard to the Plaintiff's lack of standing.  To
establish standing, the Plaintiff must demonstrate three elements:
an injury-in-fact, a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of, and the likely redressability of the injury
by a favorable decision.  He finds that Primus cannot satisfy any
of these elements.

First, he holds that there is no alleged factual basis on which the
Court can conclude that the Plaintiff -- in contrast with any other
business or individual -- is likely to be the victim of imminent
criminal firearms violence.  Second, the Plaintiff's eneralized
grievances related to the harm from the Defendants' knowledge and
actions regarding assault weapons do not provide the basis for an
injury in fact which would satisfy the first required element for
standing.  Likewise, an injury "must actually exist" to be
concrete.  Third, the  Plaintiff has failed to establish that it
has suffered an injury-in-fact.  Because the Plaintiff has not
established an injury-in-fact, the Judge Court need not address the
causation or redressability requirements of standing.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Sargus granted the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss in accordance with his Opinion and Order.  He
directed the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 9, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/ttPd8V from Leagle.com.

Primus Group, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas D. Lambros --
Thomas.Lambros@janiklaw.com -- Janik & Doman LLP & Percy Squire,
Percy Squire Co., LLC.

Smith & Wesson Corp., Defendant, represented by Robert Ward
Trafford -- rtrafford@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright Morris &
Arthur, Edward Scheideman -- edward.scheideman@dlapiper.com -- DLA
Piper LLP, pro hac vice & Elizabeth L. Moyo --
emoyo@porterwright.com -- Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP.

Bushmaster Firearms International & DPMS Firearms, Defendants,
represented by Robert Ward Trafford, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur
& Elizabeth L. Moyo, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP.

Sig Sauer, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert L. Joyce,
Littleton Park Joyce Ughetta & Kelly LLP, pro hac vice, Robert Ward
Trafford, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur & Elizabeth L. Moyo, Porter
Wright Morris & Arthur LLP.

Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Robert Ward
Trafford, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, Elizabeth L. Moyo, Porter
Wright Morris & Arthur LLP & James B. Vogts, Swanson, Martin & Bell
LLP, pro hac vice.

Remington Arms Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert Ward
Trafford, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, Andrew Lothson, Swanson,
Martin & Bell, LLP, pro hac vice & Elizabeth L. Moyo, Porter Wright
Morris & Arthur LLP.

Colt's Manufacturing Company, LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert
Ward Trafford, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur, Christopher Renzulli,
Renzulli Law Firm, LLP, pro hac vice, Elizabeth L. Moyo, Porter
Wright Morris & Arthur LLP & John F. Renzulli, Renzulli Law Firm,
LLP, pro hac vice.

Armalite, Defendant, represented by Robert Ward Trafford, Porter
Wright Morris & Arthur, Elizabeth L. Moyo, Porter Wright Morris &
Arthur LLP & Gayathiri Shanmuganatha, Tiffany & Bosco P.A., pro hac
vice.


SOLI-BOND INC: Sanchez Suit Remanded to Kern County Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California remanded the case, JACOB SANCHEZ, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. SOLI-BOND, INC., a California corporation, Defendant,
Case No. 1:19-cv-01247-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal.), to the Kern County
Superior Court without prejudice.

On Aug. 5, 2019, Sanchez filed a class action in the Kern County
Superior Court. His claims for damages arise under the Class Action
Fairness Act.  On Sept. 6, 2019, the Defendant timely filed a
notice of removal to the federal court.

By stipulation filed on Oct. 22, 2019, the parties have notified
the Court of their agreement that the action should be remanded to
the state court without prejudice.  Additionally, they stipulated
that the Defendant reserves the right to remove the action should a
federal question arise, a diverse party be named, or facts are
later discovered that meet federal jurisdiction requirements.  The
parties have also stipulated that each party shall bear its own
attorneys' fees and costs with respect to the removal and
subsequent remand of the action.

The parties having so stipulated, and good cause appearing, Judge
Drozd remanded the action to the Kern County Superior Court without
prejudice.  The Defendant reserved the right to remove the action
should a federal question arise, a diverse party be named, or facts
are later discovered that meet federal jurisdiction requirements.
Lastly, each party shall bear its own attorneys' fees and costs
with respect to the removal and subsequent remand of the action
pursuant to the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 23, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/JuU668 from Leagle.com.

Jacob Sanchez, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Rex Phillips --
rex@crosnerlegal.com -- Consumer sLitigation Law Center, APC,
Zachary Miles Crosner -- zach@crosnerlegal.com -- Crosner Legal,
P.C., David Watson -- david@crosnerlegal.com -- Crosner Legal, P.C.
& Michael Crosner -- mike@crosnerlegal.com -- Crosner Legal, P.C.

Soli-Bond, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant, represented
by Howard A. Sagaser -- has@sw2law.com -- Sagaser, Watkins &
Wieland, PC & Charles Paul Hamamjian -- Charles@sw2law.com --
Sagaser Watkins Wieland PC.


STEWART BUILDERS: Court Conditionally Certifies Class in Sheffield
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LOUIS SHEFFIELD, Individually and on behalf of all
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. STEWART BUILDERS, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. H-19-1030 (S.D. Tex.), Judge Gary H.
Miller of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, (a) denied Stewart's motions to strike the
consent of (i) Glenn Gryder and (ii) Jereamy Clayton; (b) granted
Sheffield's motion for conditional certification; and (c) deferred
ruling on Sheffield's motion for approval and distribution of
notice and for disclosure of contact information.

Sheffield filed the Fair Labor Standard Act ("FLSA") claim on
behalf of himself and those similarly situated on March 20, 2019.
He filed a motion for conditional certification of an FLSA class
and motion for approval and distribution of notice on May 16.  In
his motion for conditional certification, Sheffield argued that the
Court should decline to consider the third element of the
traditional test for conditional certification.  

The Court, however, as is its custom, required a showing under the
third prong and, accordingly, denied Sheffield's motion for
conditional certification and denied the motion for approval and
distribution of notice as moot.  It issued that order on July 10,
2019, and it entered a scheduling order on July 23, 2019.   The
scheduling order required that all amendments to the pleadings be
made by Aug. 23, 2019.  The scheduling order indicated that the
date to join new parties was "N/A."

Sheffield filed consents to join a collection action by Glenn
Gryder and Jereamy Clayton on Aug. 12, 2019.  Stewart moved to
strike both consents on Aug. 15, 2019.  Sheffield filed his second
motion for conditional certification and his second motion for
approval and distribution of notice on Aug. 15, 2019.

Stewart files its motions to strike pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f), arguing that the consents are "impertinent"
to the Court's previous order.  It also argues that the Court has
already denied conditional certification and entered a scheduling
order stating that new parties cannot be joined.  Additionally, it
contends that the factors courts typically apply to untimely filed
consents support exclusion of these consents.

Judge Miller finds that there is good cause to modify the
scheduling order to make room for opt in FLSA Plaintiffs.  While
the explanation is lacking, it is clearly an important modification
as there are two individuals who would like to opt into the
lawsuit.  The potential prejudice is minimal as the consents were
filed shortly after the court issued its order and before the
deadline for amendments to pleadings, and the delay in the case --
should the Court decides to allow the case to proceed collectively
at this point -- is not significant since the case was originally
filed as a collective action anyway.  The Judge denied the motion
to strike the consents.

Sheffield seeks conditional certification of a class of all
salaried pump operators from March 20, 2016.  The Judgefinds that
Sheffield has met the lenient standard for conditional
certification.  Accordingly, he granted Sheffield's motion for
conditional certification.

Sheffield moves for approval and distribution of notice and for
disclosure of contact information.  The Judge has reviewed
Sheffield's proposed notice and other documents as well as the
briefing provided by both parties.  Since there is a relatively
small group of potential opt-in Plaintiffs, he believes the parties
should be able to resolve most of their disputes regarding fair and
accurate notice without Court intervention.  Accordingly, the Judge
strongly urges the parties to work together to determine the best
way to fairly and accurately advise potential collective action
members about the lawsuit and the ability to opt in.

If, as the Judge suspects, the parties are able to reach an
agreement, Sheffield will file the agreed notice and proposed order
within two weeks of the Order.  If they are, however, unable to
reach a complete resolution, Sheffield may submit supplemental
briefing, not to exceed five pages, outlining the continued areas
of disagreement, within two weeks of the Order, and Stewart may
file a brief response, not to exceed five pages, within one week of
Sheffield's supplemental brief.  The Judge will also consider any
already existing briefing on any area or areas of continued
disagreement, should the parties not be able to fully agree.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Miller (i) granted Sheffield's
motion for conditional certification; (ii) denied Stewart's motions
to strike; (iii) deferred ruling on Sheffield's motion for approval
of notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/wckZny from Leagle.com.

Louis Sheffield, Individually and on behalf of all Others
Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Jon Sanford --
josh@sanfordlawfirm.com -- Sanford Law Firm, PLLC & Merideth Queen
McEntire, Sanford Law Firm PLLC.

Stewart Builders, Inc., Defendant, represented by Richard Daniel
Alaniz -- ralaniz@alaniz-law.com -- Alaniz Law & Associates PLLC.


TANDY LEATHER: Faces Haghebaert Suit Over Decline in Share Price
----------------------------------------------------------------
Frederic Haghebaert, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. TANDY LEATHER FACTORY, INC., JANET CARR, TINA
L. CASTILLO, and SHANNON L. GREENE, Case No. 4:19-cv-01000-A (C.D.
Cal., Dec. 2, 2019), is brought by persons and entities that
purchased or otherwise acquired Tandy securities between March 7,
2018, and August 15, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On August 13, 2019, after the market closed, the Company disclosed
that its Audit Committee was investigating "certain aspects of the
Company's methods of valuation and expensing of costs of inventory
and related issues regarding the Company's business and
operations." On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.55 per
share, or over 10%, over two consecutive trading sessions to close
at $4.90 per share on August 15, 2019, on unusually high trading
volume.

On August 15, 2019, after the market closed, the Company filed a
Form 12b-25 Notification of Late Filing with the SEC, stating that
it was unable to timely file the Company's quarterly report for the
period ended June 30, 2019 due to the Audit Committee's
investigation. On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.40
per share, or over 8%, to close at $4.50 per share on August 16,
2019, on unusually high trading volume.

The Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements,
as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects, says the complaint.
Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1)
that certain costs of inventory had been improperly valued and
expensed; (2) that, as a result, the Company's financial results
for certain periods were misstated; (3) that the Company lacked
effective internal control over financial reporting; (4) that there
was a material weakness in the Company's internal control over
financial reporting; and (5) that, as a result of the foregoing,
the Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts
and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of
the Company's securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members
have suffered significant losses and damages.

The Plaintiff purchased Tandy securities during the Class Period.

Tandy is a specialty retailer that sells leather and leathercraft
related items such as quality tools, hardware, accessories,
liquids, lace, kits and teaching materials.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 432-1495
          Email: info@glancylaw.com


TENNESSEE VALLEY: Class Suit over 2008 Kingston Ash Spill Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee Valley Authority is facing a proposed class action
lawsuit related to the 2008 ash spill at the Kingston Fossil Plant
(Kingston), according to the Company's Form 10-K/A filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the fiscal year ended
September 30, 2019.

In response to the 2008 ash spill at Kingston, TVA hired Jacobs
Engineering Group, Inc. ("Jacobs") to oversee certain aspects of
the cleanup.

On November 7, 2019, a resident of Roane County, Tennessee, filed a
proposed class action lawsuit against Jacobs and TVA in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.  The
complaint alleges that the class representative and all other
members of the proposed class were damaged as a result of the 2008
ash spill at Kingston and the resulting cleanup activities.

The complaint alleges, among other things, that 1) TVA was
negligent in its construction and operation of the Kingston CCR
facility, 2) TVA and Jacobs failed to take proper measures to
mitigate environmental and health risks during the cleanup
response, and 3) TVA and Jacobs misled the community about health
and environmental risks associated with exposure to coal fly ash.

The complaint seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief in the
form of an order requiring that the defendants establish a blood
testing program and medical monitoring protocol, and to remediate
damage to the proposed class' properties.

Tennessee Valley Authority, a government-owned corporation,
produces electricity. The Company provides power to large
industries and 155 power distributors that serve approximately 9
million consumers in seven southeastern states. Tennessee Valley's
power system is self financed.


TITAN CONSTRUCTION: Dolores Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA & NYLL
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jose Alvaro Dolores, Jose Hugo Romero Ventura, Eliberto Gil, Luis
Carcamo, Efren Valentin, and Steven Morales, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated v. TITAN CONSTRUCTION
SERVICES LLC, MUCU CONTRACTING CORP., REGALADO CONTRACTING, INC.,
EL CASTILLO CONTRACTING CORP., AMADOR GARCIA, JOSE INAKY GARCIA,
JUAN GARCIA, CESARIO MUCU, and ERIC MERCADO, Case No. 1:19-cv-11056
(S.D.N.Y., Dec. 2, 2019), seeks to recover unpaid wages and unpaid
overtime wages based upon the Defendants' violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs regularly worked between 55 and 75 hours per week,
or more. The Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiffs wages for all
hours worked and overtime wages for all overtime hours worked, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed as full-time non-exempt construction
employees of the Defendants.

The Defendants operate a construction company that purports to have
40 years of experience servicing "residential, commercial and
institutional facilities including Landmark designated buildings
and structures" in the New York City area.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Harrison, Esq.
          HARRISON, HARRISON & ASSOCIATES
          110 State Highway 35, 2nd Floor
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Phone: (718) 799-9111
          Fax: (718) 799-9171
          Email: nycotlaw@gmail.com


TREVENA INC: Bid to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pending
-----------------------------------------------------
Trevena, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 4, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company is
seeking dismissal of a consolidated amended class action complaint
on the basis that there were no false statements and no scienter as
a matter of law.

In October and November 2018, the company and certain of its
current and former officers and directors were sued in three
purported class actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, or the EDPA, alleging violations
of the federal securities laws.

In January 2019, the three lawsuits were consolidated into one
action, and on May 29, 2019, the District Court appointed a group
of five individual investors as lead plaintiffs.

A consolidated amended complaint was filed on August 2, 2019,
alleging, among other things, that the company and two of its
former officers made false and misleading statements regarding our
business, operations, and prospects, including certain statements
made relating to the company's End-of-Phase 2 meeting with the FDA,
and certain statements concerning top-line results from the
company's Phase 3 studies.

The plaintiffs seek, among other remedies, unspecified damages,
attorneys' fees and other costs, and unspecified equitable or
injunctive relief.

Trevena said, "We believe that the claims are without merit, and we
intend to vigorously defend ourselves against the allegations. On
October 2, 2019, we moved to dismiss the consolidated amended
complaint on the basis that there were no false statements and no
scienter as a matter of law."

Trevena, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses on the
development and commercialization of treatment options that target
and treat diseases affecting the central nervous system. The
company was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in Chesterbrook,
Pennsylvania.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Messinger Sues Over Drop in IPO Share Price
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Messinger, individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., DARA KHOSROWSHAHI, NELSON
CHAI, GLEN CEREMONY, RONALD SUGAR, URSULA BURNS, GARRETT CAMP, MATT
COHLER, RYAN GRAVES, ARIANNA HUFFING TON, TRAVIS KALANICK, WAN LING
MARTELLO, H.E. YASIRAL-RUMAYYAN, JOHN THAIN, DAVID TRUJILLO, MORGAN
STANLEY & CO. LLC, GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. LLC, MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE,
FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED, BARCLA YS CAPITAL INC., CITIGROUP
GLOBAL MARKETS INC., ALLEN & COMPANY LLC, RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC,
SUNTRUST ROBINSON HUMPHREY, INC., DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC.,
HSBC SECURITIES (USA) INC., SMBC NIKKO SECURITIES AMERICA, INC.,
MIZUHO SECURITIES USA LLC, NEEDHAM & COMPANY, LLC, LOOP CAPITAL
MARKETS LLC, SIEBERT CISNEROS SHANK & CO., L.L.C., ACADEMY
SECURITIES, INC., BTIG, LLC, CANACCORD GENUITY LLC, CASTLEOAK
SECURITIES, L.P., COWEN AND COMPANY, LLC, EVERCORE GROUP L.L.C.,
JMP SECURITIES LLC, MACQUARIE CAPITAL (USA) INC., MISCHLER
FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., OPPENHEIMER & CO. INC., RAYMOND JAMES &
ASSOCIATES, INC., WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., THE WILLIAMS
CAPITAL GROUP, L.P., and TPQ CAPITAL BD, LLC, Case No.
CGC-19-579544 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., Dec. 2, 2019), is
brought under the Securities Act of 1933 against Uber and certain
of the Company's senior executives and directors, who signed the
Registration Statement in connection with the Company's initial
public offering, and the underwriters of the Offering.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Registration Statement and
Prospectus (filed with the SEC on May 13, 2019) contained
materially incorrect or misleading statements and/or omitted
material information that was required by law to be disclosed. The
Defendants are each strictly liable for such misstatements and
omissions therefrom (subject only to their ability to establish a
"due diligence" affirmative defense) and are so liable in their
capacities as signers of the Registration Statement and/or as an
issuer, statutory seller, and/or offeror of the shares sold
pursuant to the Offering.

Unbeknownst to investors, however, the Offering Documents'
representations were materially inaccurate, misleading, and/or
incomplete because they failed to disclose, inter alia, that: (i)
at the time of the Offering, Uber was rapidly increasing subsidies
for customer's rides and meals in a bid a for market share, which
caused the Company's sales and marketing expenses to swell; and
(ii) at the same time, the Defendants were cutting (or planned to
cut) costs in key areas that undermined the Company's central
growth opportunities, says the complaint.

As the true facts emerged in the wake of the Offering, the
Company's shares fell sharply to trade as low as $30.67 per share,
a decline of approximately 31.8% from the Offering Price. By this
action, the Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other members of
the Class who also acquired the Company's shares pursuant or
traceable to the Offering, now seeks to obtain a recovery for the
damages suffered as a result of the Defendants' violations of the
Securities Act.

Plaintiff David Messinger purchased shares of the Company's common
stock that were issued pursuant and traceable to the Registration
Statement and Offering.

Uber, based in San Francisco, California, claims to be a technology
company that primarily facilitates access to rides and meals on
demand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John T. Jasnoch, Esq.
          Hal D. Cunningham, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 3300
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: 619/233-4565
          Fax: 619/233-0508
          Email: jjasnoch@scott-scott.com
                 hcunningham@scott-scott.com


UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Class in Sweet Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, THERESA SWEET, CHENELLE ARCHIBALD, DANIEL DEEGAN,
SAMUEL HOOD, TRESA APODACA, ALICIA DAVIS, and JESSICA JACOBSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ELISABETH DEVOS, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the United States Department of Education, and THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants, Case No. C
19-03674 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

Many for-profit colleges have left numerous students saddled with
debt.  Certain of these schools used fraudulent tactics to enroll
students, such as inflating job placement numbers.  The members of
the instant putative class -- including Plaintiffs Sweet,
Archibald, Deegan, Hood, Apodaca, Davis, and Jacobson -- sought to
cancel their federal student loans with the Defendant United States
Department of Education under the "borrower defense" rule, which
allows defrauded students to apply for loan forgiveness based on
their school's misconduct.

The Plaintiffs allege that since June 2018, the Department has
arbitrarily and capriciously stonewalled (and continues to
stonewall) the relief process with its "blanket refusal" to process
their borrower claims.  In June 2019, they brought the instant
putative class action, seeking to compel the Department to at least
begin deciding applications again.  The Plaintiffs fired the
opening salvo soon thereafter with the instant motion for class
certification.  

The Plaintiffs move to represent other borrower defense claimants
and certify the following class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2): All people who borrowed a Direct Loan
or FFEL loan to pay for a program of higher education, who have
asserted a borrower defense to repayment to the U.S. Department of
Education, whose borrower defense has not been granted or denied on
the merits, and who is not a class member in Calvillo Manriquez v.
DeVos, No. 17-7106 (N.D. Cal.).

In the alternative, they seek an order holding the instant motion
in abeyance until further discovery.

The Defendants oppose, arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to show
that their claim can be resolved with a common answer, that the
Plaintiffs' claim is typical, or that the proposed class is
amenable to a single injunctive relief.

Judge Alsup finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23(A), Rules 23(b)(2) and 65(d).  Accordingly,
he granted their motion for class certification.

He certified the class of all people who borrowed a Direct Loan or
FFEL loan to pay for a program of higher education, who have
asserted a borrower defense to repayment to the U.S. Department of
Education, whose borrower defense has not been granted or denied on
the merits, and who is not a class member in Calvillo Manriquez v.
DeVos, No. 17-7106 (N.D. Cal.).

The class definition will apply for all purposes, including
settlement.  Plaintiffs Theresa Sweet, Chenelle Archibald, Daniel
Deegan, Samuel Hood, Tresa Apodaca, Alicia Davis, and Jessica
Jacobson appointed as the class representatives.  Their counsel
from the Harvard Legal Service Center's Project on Predatory
Student Lending and the Housing and Economic Rights Advocates, are
appointed as the class counsel.  By Nov. 6, 2019 at noon, the
parties will jointly submit a proposal for class notification with
a plan to distribute notice, including by first-class mail.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 30, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8tqnE8 from Leagle.com.

Theresa Sweet, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Chenelle Archibald, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Daniel Deegan, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Samuel Hood, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Tresa Apodaca, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Alicia
Davis, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated &
Jessica Jacobson, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Joseph E. Jaramillo --
jjaramillo@heraca.org -- Housing & Economic Rights Advocates,
Joshua David Rovenger -- jrovenger@law.harvard.edu -- Legal
Services Center of Harvard Law School, pro hac vice, Kyra A. Taylor
-- ktaylor@law.harvard.edu -- Harvard Law Legal Services Center,
pro hac vice, Natalie Ann Lyons -- nlyons@heraca.org -- Housing and
Economic Rights Advocates, Toby Rachel Merrill --
tmerrill@law.harvard.edu -- Legal Services Center of Harvard Law
School, pro hac vice & Eileen Mathews Connor --
econnor@law.harvard.edu -- Legal Services Center of Harvard Law
School.

Elisabeth DeVos, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
United States Department of Education, & U.S. Department of
Education, Defendants, represented by Kathryn Celia Davis, U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Division & R. Charlie Merritt, United
States Department of Justice Civil Division.


UNITED STATES: Dent County Receives PILT Class Action Payout
------------------------------------------------------------
Craig Montgomery, writing for theSalemNewsonline.com, reports that
Dent County has received $3,653 from a class-action suit filed
against the federal government for underpayments to counties of tax
revenues, commissioners were told on Oct. 28.

Treasurer Denita Williams reported the money was received from a
suit the county joined alleging underpayment of Payments in Lieu of
Taxes in 2015-17 that was recently settled.

"That was nice to get some unanticipated general revenue,"
presiding commissioner Darrell Skiles said.[GN]


US CLAIMS SERVICES: DeSimone Sues for Deceiving Property Owners
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominick DeSimone, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. U.S. Claims Services Inc., and Paul Hashim, Case No.
191200218 (Pa. Com. Pleas, Philadelphia Cty., Dec. 2, 2019), is
brought for damages and injunctive relief alleging the Defendants
have violated the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer
Protection Law and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer
Protection Act through deception and misrepresentation causing
individual property owners to believe that their services were
required to recover unclaimed property that was escheated to the
state.

The Defendants identify Unclaimed Property by querying the various
statutorily-designated agencies that receive it, normally the state
Department of Treasury. Once the Defendants have identified
unclaimed property of sufficient value to be of interest in their
business, they then 'locate' the property owner using commonly
available tools like Intellius People Search and/or LexisNexis
Public Records. The Defendants, then, contact the property owners,
where they notice the owner of the unclaimed property and provide a
form to complete in order to recover it.

In early April 2019, Mr. DeSimone was contacted by Defendant U.S.
Claims Services, advising him that the Defendants had identified
unclaimed property belonging to him in the value of $469.10. At no
point did Mr. DeSimone know or suspect that Defendant U.S. Claims
Services' services were unnecessary or that he could recover his
unclaimed property himself. Therefore, Mr. DeSimone completed,
signed, and had-notarized, believing it to be necessary to recover
his monies.

Several months after recovering his money, Mr DeSimone began
receiving invoices from Defendant Payne for $70.36. Mr. DeSimone
did not initially recall the reason for the invoice and was
confused by its statement: "Your prompt payment is appreciated so
we may continue to search and locate any additional monies owed to
you."

Mr. DeSimone says he was upset that he had been deceived and was
being charged for something he could have--and would have--done
himself for free. He, therefore, ignored the first and second
notices, believing that was part of the Defendants' scam, that they
were merely trying to collect fraudulent debt, and if he ignored
them they would go away.

However, Mr. DeSimone received another invoice stamped 'FINAL
NOTICE' which stated: "You have a legally binding contract without
company and have failed to remit payment as agreed. If your payment
is not received within 10 days, this account will be turned over to
our collections agency for legal action which may result in
additional costs to you," says the complaint

Mr. DeSimone had unclaimed property that was escheated to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Defendants Paul Hashim and U.S. Claims Services are "finders"
engaged in the business of connecting property owners with their
unclaimed property escheated to the state.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew B. Austin, Esq.
          P.O. Box# 54628
          Philadelphia, PA 19148
          Phone: (610) 656-1956
          Email: austin@stackhousegroup.com


USA TECHNOLOGIES: Plaintiff Appeals Stay of Chester County Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2019, that the plaintiff in the Chester County,
Pennsylvania Class Action, has taken an appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court from an order granting defendants' Petition for
Stay.

The appeal was commenced on October 18, 2019.

A putative shareholder class action was filed against the Company,
its chief executive officer and chief financial officer at the
relevant time, its directors at the relevant time, and the
investment banks who served as underwriters in the May 2018
follow-on public offering of the Company (the "Underwriters"), in
the Court of Common Pleas, Chester County, Pennsylvania, Docket No.
2019-04821-MJ.  The complaint alleged violations of the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended.

On September 20, 2019 the Court granted the defendants' Petition
for Stay and stayed the action until the consolidated shareholder
class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reaches a
final disposition.

On October 18, 2019, plaintiff filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court from the Order granting defendants' Petition for
Stay, Docket No. 3100 EDA 2019.

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.


USA TECHNOLOGIES: Shareholder Class Suit Underway in E.D. Pa.
-------------------------------------------------------------
USA Technologies, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period
ended September 30, 2019, that the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has approved a stipulation among
the parties in a consolidated class action lawsuit.

The Order was entered on October 18, 2019.  The deal provided for
the filing of an amended complaint by no later than November 20,
2019, a date for the defendants to respond thereto, and a briefing
schedule, if necessary.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Various putative shareholder class actions had been filed in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against
the Company, its chief executive officer and chief financial
officer at the relevant time, its directors at the relevant time,
and the investment banks who served as underwriters in the May 2018
follow-on public offering of the Company (the "Underwriters").
These complaints alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
These various actions were consolidated by the Court into one
action (the "Consolidated Action").

On September 30, 2019, the Court granted the Motion to Transfer
filed by the Company and its former chief executive officer, and
transferred the Consolidated Action to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Docket No.
19-cv-04565.

USA Technologies, Inc. provides wireless networking, cashless
transactions, asset monitoring, and other value-added services in
the United States and internationally. USA Technologies, Inc. was
founded in 1992 and is headquartered in Malvern, Pennsylvania.


WORLD HARVEST: Jamari Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Phone Calls
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KAIL JAMARI; INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff v. WORLD HARVEST CHURCH, INC.; RODNEY L.
PARSLEY, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 10, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-02244-TLN-KJN (E.D. Cal., Nov. 7, 2019), alleges that the
Defendants promote and market their merchandise, in part, by
placing unsolicited telephone calls to wireless phone users, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the
Defendants' illegal actions.

From February 2019 to July 2019, the Defendants contacted the
Plaintiff on her cellular telephone ending in -6273 in an effort to
collect donations. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a
business relationship with the Defendant.
The Plaintiff did not provide her cellular telephone number to the
Defendant through any medium at any time. The Defendant began
contacting the Plaintiff using an automatic telephone dialing
system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, the lawsuit
says.

World Harvest Church is an international pentecostal megachurch
pastored by Rod Parsley. Originally founded in Columbus, Ohio, it
now has campuses in Canal Winchester, Ohio and Elkhart,
Indiana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 W Oxnard St., #780,
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Telephone: 323-306-4234
          Facsimile: 866-633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddlfaw.com


[*] EC Proposes Directive on Representative Actions Across EU
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Humphreys, Esq. -- jhumphreys@cooley.com -- and Tracey
Bischofberger, Esq., of Cooley LLP, in an article for Lexology,
report that the European Commission published a proposed directive
on representative actions for the protection of the collective
interests of consumers in 2018 as part of its "New Deal for
Consumers" package of measures to strengthen consumer protection in
the EU (covered previously on Productwise here). This is the EU's
model for introducing representative actions across the EU, but
with safeguards built-in to avoid abusive actions and there is a
prohibition on punitive damages to prevent excessive awards of
damages, such as those seen in US-style class actions.

Product manufacturers (among others) risk facing increased
litigation if the directive comes into force. The proposed EU-wide
rules would enable a consumer organisation to bring a
representative action seeking compensation for a defective product
or to oblige a trader to repair or replace a defective product,
where the same product has caused harm to a large group of
consumers. It will apply to domestic and cross-border infringements
in the EU.

The proposed directive lays down EU-wide rules to enable "qualified
representative entities", which represent the collective interests
of consumers, to bring representative actions for breaches of
certain EU laws. The scope of laws covered by the current draft of
the proposed directive adopted by the European Parliament is broad
and includes the areas of consumer rights, product liability and
product safety, data protection, financial services, travel and
tourism, energy, telecommunications, environment and health.

Entities entitled to bring representative actions will be
designated by Member States and must be non-profit making, have
procedures to avoid conflicts of interest and will be required to
disclose the source of funds used for its activities in general and
the source of funds it uses to support a particular action (amongst
other requirements).

The remedies that may be awarded include an injunction,
compensation, a replacement product or termination of a contract
(as available under national laws of the Member State).

The European Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and
Consumer Protection issued a draft opinion on the proposed
directive suggesting various amendments last year (discussed on
Productwise here). Following debate in March this year, the
European Parliament adopted an amended version of the proposed
directive. It has since been reported that one of the priorities
under the current Finnish presidency of the Council of the European
Union is to reach agreement on the proposed directive by the end of
autumn this year and the Working Party on Consumer Protection and
Information has been examining the proposed directive during recent
meetings. Once the proposed directive has been formally agreed by
both the European Parliament and the European Council and enters
into force, Member States will have 18 – 24 months to give effect
to these measures.[GN]

[*] Politicians Ask for Looney's Stand on Restaurant Servers' Law
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christine Stuart, writing for CTNewsJunkie.com, reports that Gov.
Ned Lamont, House Speaker Joe Aresimowicz, Senate Republican Leader
Len Fasano and House Minority Leader Themis Klarides wrote Senate
President Martin Looney to ask where he stood on draft legislation
that would limit the ability of servers and bartenders to bring
class action lawsuits against restaurants.

The draft legislation, which had a public hearing earlier in
October, would require the state Department of Labor to create new
regulations and rules regarding how restaurants segregate the hours
of service and non-service work, such as rolling silverware and
filling salt shakers.

Looney previously told the four that he would sign an emergency
certification that would allow a special session on the
legislation, which is one of three issues leftover from the session
that ended in June.

"We appreciate your willingness to sign an emergency certification
of this bill, but are concerned that you also emphasized that your
caucus has no position on the matter," Lamont, Aresimowicz, Fasano
and Klarides wrote.

They said before proceeding with a special session, "[W]e
respectfully request to know your personal position on the proposed
legislation. We stand ready to act on this legislation and believe
it would pass with a majority in both chambers."

In his response on Oct. 28, Looney indicated concern that he was
being asked his personal position on a bill.

"Asking my personal views on a proposal stating that my leadership
is 'critical' and urging me to garner support for its passage,
while at the same time stating that you have confidence it would
pass is an inherent contradiction," Looney wrote.

The bill is expected to start in the House. Looney wondered in his
response whether there's any guarantee it would pass without an
amendment. He said he agreed to the emergency certification to
enable the House to move the process forward by "replacing
speculation and hypotheticals with reality."

"I had hoped that by offering to sign an emergency certification,
we might move toward closure on at least this one special session
issue since the others continue pending as they have for months
while the General Assembly awaits additional information or plans
from the administration," Looney wrote.

In the summer, Lamont vetoed a bill that sought to retroactively
change the law so restaurant workers would not be able to sue
restaurant owners for failing to properly keep track of their
hours. It had passed both chambers unanimously.

Lamont called the bill "an illegal attempt to retroactively deprive
restaurant workers of their day in court. Restaurant workers across
our state say they went to work under rules that promised them a
higher wage than they were paid."

The House and the Senate failed to override the veto in July, but
seem to have come to a consensus with Lamont's administration on a
way forward. The draft legislation would require the labor
department to write new regulations more accurately reflecting the
guidance they've given to restaurants.

Scott Dolch, executive director of the Connecticut Restaurant
Association, has said restaurants have been operating for years
under so-called 80/20 guidelines. Those guidelines essentially say
restaurant owners don't need to keep track of all the side work
servers do when they're not waiting on customers as long as they
don't spend more than 20 percent of their time on those tasks.

The draft legislation also would make it tougher for servers to
organize class action lawsuits.

More than a dozen class action lawsuits have been filed, mostly by
one law firm, against a number of restaurants for not appropriately
keeping track of servers' hours based on DOL guidance.

The threat to the industry posed by the lawsuits prompted the
Connecticut Restaurant Association to lobby for a change to the
law.[GN]

                        Asbestos Litigation


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***