CAR_Public/191212.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, December 12, 2019, Vol. 21, No. 248

                            Headlines

ADVANCED MICRO: Notice Protocol in Dickey Suit Approved
AHOLA CORPORATION: Jones Challenges Improper Account Withdrawals
ALAMEDA, CA: Babu et al. Seek to Certify Class & Subclass
ALLIED UNIVERSAL: Calixto Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Insurance Policy Conflicts With MVFRL, Says Ct.

AMERICAN EXPRESS: Settlement in Singer Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
AMERICARE CERTIFIED: Denial of Bids to Dismiss & Stay Badzio Upheld
AMI LIVONIA: Nolan Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Employees
ARSTRAT LLC: Marchese Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
ATLANTA NETWORK: Faces Guglielmo ADA Class Action in NY

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE: Lammert et al. Seek to Certify Class Action
AXIOM DEBT: Canfield May Serve Complaint via Ca. Secretary of State
BAYER HEALTHCARE: Grider Sues Over Mislabeling of Sunscreens
BBVA COMPASS: Certification of Non-US Citizens Class Sought
BEAUTY PLACE: Violates ADA, Guglielmo Suit Asserts

BG RETAIL: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BOARD OF SELECTMEN: Court Denies Class Certification
BOWLING SUPERMARKET: Mijares Seeks OT Wages for Cleaning Employees
CADENCE BANCORPORATION: Faces Anthony Securities Suit in Texas
CANADA GOOSE: Calcano Files Suit Under Disabilities Act

CANADA: Victoria Withdraws Motion Calling for Class Action
CAPITAL ONE BANK: Faces Childers Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
CARNIVAL CORP: Wolfe Appeals S.D. Florida Ruling to 11th Circuit
CAVALRY PORTOFOLIO: Kendrick Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Kentucky
CENTRIC BRANDS: Guglielmo Suit Asserts ADA Breach

CHICAGO, IL: Must Reply to Ali's Bid to Certify Class by Feb. 26
CISION LTD: Faces Kent Suit Over Proposed Sale to Platinum Equity
CLAUDIA RODAS: Withheld Workers' Earned & OT Wages, Ferreira Says
COINBASE, INC: Leidel Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
COMENITY BANK: Court Denies Bid to Remand Identity Theft Suit

COOK COUNTY, IL: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Alicea Suit
COOK COUNTY, IL: Elizarri Seeks to Certify Class of Detainees
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL: 11th Circuit Affirms Class Action Dismissal
DIGNITY HEALTH: Judge Refuses to Approve $100MM Settlement
DON VITO OZUNA: Court OKs $375,000 Settlement in Camilo Case

EATON CORP: 2nd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of SC Retirement Suit
EAZE SOLUTIONS: Court Orders Arbitration in Williams TCPA Suit
ELIE TAHARI: Dominguez Files ADA Class Action in NY
EMPOWER HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses King FLSA Suit with Prejudice
ENAGIC USA: Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Sought

FAIRWAY GOLF: Class Certification in Medina Suit Affirmed
FAMILY RANCH: Alvino Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages and Penalties
FAT BRAIN TOYS: Guglielmo Files Class Suit Under ADA
FEDCHEX RECOVERY: Castle Seeks to Certify Illinois Residents Class
FH CANN: Violates FDCPA When Collecting Debt, Fredrick Claims

FILOBLU USA: Faces Mahoney ADA Class Action in Pa.
FIRST ADVANTAGE: Dossett FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. Georgia
FIRST COUNTY BANK: Moskowitz Sues Over Charging of NSF & OD Fees
FIRST NATIONAL: Bid to Compel Doc Production in Lundquist Denied
FLAGSTAR BANK: Court Certifies Class in Kivett Suit

FLORIDA: Unconstitutionality of Sections 11.066(3) & (4) Affirmed
GC SERVICES: Jawaid Files Suit Asserting FDCPA Violation
GENERAL NUTRITION: Ruling on OT Compensation Multiplier Affirmed
GOOD SAMARITAN: Court Denies Class Certification Bid as Moot
HALLMARK RETAIL: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

HANDY TECHNOLOGIES: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Fixes Prices of HDD Suspension, Burke Says
HEALTHY HALO: Gordon Suit Moved to Eastern District of Washington
HEALTHY HALO: Martin Sues Over Unsolicited Ads That Violate TCPA
HERR FOODS: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in Pennsylvania

HOT TOPIC: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HR PARKING: Summary Judgment Bid in Fernandez FLSA Suit Denied
INDOCHINO APPAREL: Calcano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JAGGED PEAK: Sabatini Challenges Proposed Sale to Parsley Energy
JETSMARTER, INC: Court Sends Worthington Suit to Arbitration

JPMORGAN CHASE: Final Approval of $5M Rotondo Suit Deal Recommended
JUST BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over JustCBD Gummy Candy
JUUL LABS: Jefferson PSD Sues Over Sale of E-Cigarettes to Minors
KNEIPP CORPORATION: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
LA PECORA: Reeves Suit Settlement Gets Initial Court Approval

LACOSTE USA: Violates ADA, Dominguez Suit Asserts
LAS SIRENAS: Cisneros Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
LIBRE TECHNOLOGY: Court Certifies Class in Hudson Case
LOAD TRAIL: Lopez Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Overtime Pay for Welders
LSG GROUP LLC: Frisby Sues in N.D. Ill. for Violating BIPA & FLSA

LYFT INC: ILRCSF Moves to Certify Class of PWDs, Who Need WAVs
MADEWELL INC: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MCKESSON CORP: Opioid Case Settlement Reached Prior to Trial
MDL 1720: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Antitrust Suit
MDL 2492: Rangel Suit v. NCAA Over Health Issues Consolidated

MDL 2804: National Opioid Settlement Moving in Federal Dist. Court
MDL 2909: Sabeehullah Class Suit Over Fairlife Milk Consolidated
MDL 2909: Salzhauer Class Suit Over Fairlife Milk Consolidated
MILLER MAYER: Must Face Class Action Over Investment Scam
MONAT GLOBAL: Judge Refuses to Dismiss Hair Product Class Action

MONSANTO CANADA: Faces B.C. Roundup Suit Amid U.S. Class Actions
MYER: Class Action Decision No Game-Changer
NCAA: Manning Sues Over Student-Athletes' Health & Safety
NEBRASKA FURNITURE: Faces Guglielmo Suit Over ADA Breach
NEW YORK, NY: Astacio Files Civil Rights Suit in E.D. New York

OFFICE DEPOT: Nasco Sues Over Unsolicited Texts That Violate TCPA
OLDCASTLE APG: Jackson Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Georgia
OM JOLIET: Faces Johnson Suit Over Unlawful Use of Biometric Data
ONCOSEC MEDICAL: Alpha Holdings Files Class Action in Nevada
OREGON: Awaits Decision on Breach of Contract Lawsuit

PANASONIC CORP: Seeks Decertification of Cartel Class Action
PC SHIELD: Court Grants Renewed Motion for Class Certification
PEARL DINER: Sued by Baten Rojas for Violating FLSA and NYLL
PIZZA HUT: Franchisees to Pay $6MM to End TCPA Class Action
PLAYMOBIL USA: Guglielmo Files ADA Suit in NY

RAMCO ENTERPRISES: Pantoja Suit Remanded to Monterey Superior Court
RENOVATE AMERICA: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Nemore Suit Affirmed
RESIDEO TECHNOLOGIES: Faces St. Clair Securities Suit in Minn.
RYDER INTEGRATED: Ct. OKs Amended Settlement Agreement in Eure Suit
SALEM COUNTY, NJ: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Strip Searches

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Summary Judgment in Antitrust Suit Upheld
SRA ASSOCIATES: Genovese Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
STARBUCKS CORP: Certification of Starbucks Employees Class Sought
SUBARU OF AMERICA: Faces Class Action Over Defective Windshields
TACO MADRE: Maldonado Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages

TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS: St. Petersburg ERS Suit Moved to D. Conn.
TEXAS DE BRAZIL: Non-PAGA Claims in Chavez Dismissed w/o Prejudice
TIDY SERVICES: Fischler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
TWITTER INC: Kaplan Fox Files Securities Class Action in Calif.
UNIFIN INC: Berkowitz Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

UZBEK LOGISTICS: Class of Drivers Certified in Kopaleishvili Suit
VOYA FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Goetz Class Action
VOYA FINANCIAL: Still Defends Barnes COI Litigation
VOYA FINANCIAL: Zhou Class Suit Underway in Colorado
WATTS HAY COMPANY: Garcia Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

WATTS REGULATOR: Accounting of Settlement Funds in Klug Ordered
WELLS FARGO: Loughrans Suit Stayed Pending Grundy Case
WFS EXPRESS: Temporary Stay of Bautista Suit Extended for 120 Days
WILLIAMS COMPANIES: Fairchild Seeks Overtime Wages for Inspectors
WORLD BANK: D.C. Court Dismisses Zhan Suit Without Prejudice

XPO LOGISTICS: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in "Alvarez"
YOUNG LIVING: Penhall Files Fraud Class Suit in S.D. Ca.
[*] Cybersecurity Class Actions in Canada on the Rise
[*] ERGs May Raise Workplace Discrimination Concerns
[*] Firm Sees Dramatic Rise in N.Y. Website Accessibility Suits


                            *********

ADVANCED MICRO: Notice Protocol in Dickey Suit Approved
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TONY DICKEY AND PAUL PARMER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ADVANCED
MICRO DEVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No.
4:15-cv-04922-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
Oakland Division, has issued an order regarding the class members
who purchased from Amazon.com.

As discussed in colloquy with the Court during the Oct. 3, 2019
hearing, Amazon, citing customer privacy concerns, has refused to
provide relevant customer contact information to the Court-approved
settlement administrator in the case, Angeion Group.

Rather than burden the Class and the judiciary with a subpoena
enforcement fight in another District Court, the Parties and Amazon
have jointly agreed, subject to Court approval, to an alternative
notice protocol for the Class members who purchased the at-issue
AMD product via Amazon.com.  The parties note that the protocol is
intended to be substantively identical to the protocol approved by
the Court, and successfully implemented, in In Re: Lenovo Adware
Litigation, No. 4:15-md-02624-HSG, Dkt. 248-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14,
2019).

The Parties propose -- and represent to the Court that Amazon has
agreed to implement -- a protocol wherein Amazon will send an email
on Notice Regarding Class Action Settlement to its
previously-identified list of customers that are potential Class
members.

The Parties believe that the protocol is both in the best interest
of the Class and also preserves the resources of the federal
judiciary.  Consequently, the Parties respectfully requested, and
Judge Gilliam approved, that the Parties will request that Amazon
comply with the protocol described in the Parties' stipulation, and
will advise the Court if Amazon does not implement the protocol
described in the Parties' stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/swjZzP from Leagle.com.

Tony Dickey & Paul Parmer, Plaintiffs, represented by Lily E.
Hough -- lhough@edelson.com -- Edelson PC, Benjamin Scott Thomassen
--
bthomassen@edelson.com -- Edelson P.C., Brandt Silver-Korn --
bsilverkorn@edelson.com -- Gregory Scott Dovel -- greg@dovel.com
--
Dovel and Luner, Rafey Sarkis Balabanian --
rbalabanian@edelson.com
-- Edelson PC, Simon Carlo Franzini -- simon@dovel.com -- Dovel
and
Luner & Todd M. Logan -- tlogan@edelson.com -- Edelson PC.

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., Defendant, represented by Matthew
David Powers -- mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Edmundo
Clay Marquez -- cmarquez@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP & Kelsey
M. Larson -- klarson@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP.


AHOLA CORPORATION: Jones Challenges Improper Account Withdrawals
----------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGITTE JONES, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, and DENNIS SEAMAN CO. L.P.A. d/b/a SEAMAN & ASSOCIATES,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. THE
AHOLA CORPORATION and CACHET FINANCIAL SERVICES, Case No. CV 19
924236 (Ohio Com. Pleas, Cuyahoga Cty., Oct. 30, 2019), challenges
the unlawful practices and actions of the Defendants, which caused
improper withdrawals to be taken on employees' bank accounts
causing the Plaintiffs to suffer a loss of funds.

Plaintiff Brigitte Jones brings the lawsuit, individually and as
representative of all others similarly situated employees
("Employee Class") and Plaintiff Dennis Seaman Co. L.P.A. d/b/a
Seaman & Associates, individually, and as representative of all
others similarly situated employers ("Employer Class").

Ahola is a payroll and H.R. processing company that markets itself
as being efficient, accurate, and easy with seamless integration
with time/attendance, with a total workforce management package.
Ahola provides payroll processing services to small to mid-size
corporate and institutional clients like Plaintiff Seaman. Ahola
offers full-service direct deposits that allow Employers to get
their funds directly to employee bank accounts.  Plaintiff Seaman
contracted with Ahola to process and issue payment of their
employee payroll, which included directly depositing funds into
employee's individual bank accounts.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants failed to properly
process payroll payments, wrongfully withheld payroll funds, and
fraudulently or negligently misrepresented the events that took
place surrounding their failure to deposit payroll payments.  The
Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants had a responsibility to
Plaintiff Jones and each member of the Employee Class of similarly
situated employees as third-party beneficiaries to the contract
between the Defendants and Plaintiff Seaman & Associates, to
properly process, distribute, and deposit payroll checks.

Ahola is a corporation organized and existing according to the laws
of the State of Ohio and is duly licensed to conduct business in
the State of Ohio.  Cachet is a California corporation with its
principal offices in Pasadena, California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David L. Meyerson, Esq.
          SEAMAN & ASSOCIATES
          1400 Rockefeller Building
          614 West Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-1080
          Facsimile: (216) 696-3177
          E-mail: dmeyerson@seamanatty.com

               - and -

          Shaun H. Kedir, Esq.
          KEDIR LAW OFFICES LLC
          1400 Rockefeller Building
          614 West Superior Avenue
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Telephone: (216) 696-2852
          Facsimile: (216) 696-3177
          E-mail: shaunkedir@kedirlaw.com


ALAMEDA, CA: Babu et al. Seek to Certify Class & Subclass
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ASHOK BABU, ROBERT BELL,
IBRAHIM KEEGAN-HORNSBY, DEMAREA JOHNSON, BRANDON JONES, STEPHANIE
NAVARRO, ROBERTO SERRANO, and ALEXANDER WASHINGTON on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA; GREGORY J. AHERN in his official capacity as
Sheriff of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office; KARYN TRIBBLE in
her official capacity as Director of the Alameda County Behavioral
Health Care Services Agency; and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, the
Defendants, Case 5:18-cv-07677-NC (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiffs will
moved the Court on January 22, 2020, for an order:

   1. certifying that this action is maintainable as a class
      action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and
      23(b)(2) as to each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action;

   2. certifying a class of:

      "all adults who are now, or in the future will be,
      incarcerated in the Alameda County Jail" (Inmate Class);

   3. certifying a subclass of:

      "all qualified individuals with a psychiatric disability, as

      that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. section 12102, 29 U.S.C.
      section 705(9)(B), and California Government Code section
      12926(j) and (m), and who are now, or will be in the future,

      incarcerated in the Alameda County Jail" (Disability
      Subclass); and

   4. certifying Plaintiffs as representatives of the Inmate Class

      and named Plaintiffs Babu, Bell, Keegan-Hornesby, Johnson,
      Jones, Navarro, and Washington as representatives of the
      Disability Subclass and their counsel of record as class
      counsel for the Inmate Class and Disability Subclass.

The Plaintiffs have alleged that the Alameda County Jail system is
broken, especially when it comes to the way it treats people with
psychiatric disabilities. The Plaintiffs' complaint for injunctive
and declaratory relief.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

          Jeffrey L. Bornstein, Esq.
          Ernest Galvan, Esq.
          Kara J. Janssen, Esq.
          ROSEN BIEN GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP
          101 Mission Street, Sixth Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105-1738
          Telephone: (415) 433-6830
          Facsimile: (415) 433-7104
          E-mail: jbornstein@rbgg.com
                  egalvan@rbgg.com
                  kjanssen@rbgg.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          Gregory B. Thomas, Esq.
          Temitayo O. Peters, Esq.
          BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
          1901 Harrison Street, Suite 900
          Oakland, CA 94612-3501
          Telephone: (510) 273-8780
          Facsimile: (510) 839.9104
          E-mail: gthomas@bwslaw.com
                  tpeters@bwslaw.com

               - and -

          Paul B. Mello, Esq.
          Samantha D. Wolff, Esq.
          HANSON BRIDGETT LLP
          425 Market Street, 26th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 777-3200
          Facsimile: (415) 541-9366
          E-mail: pmello@hansonbridgett.com
                  swolff@hansonbridgett.com

ALLIED UNIVERSAL: Calixto Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
LEXLY CALIXTO, an individual, Plaintiff v. ALLIED UNIVERSAL, a
business entity of unknown organization; UNIVERSAL PROTECTION
SERVICE, LP, a California Limited Partnership; BRIAN RABOIN, an
individual; and DOES 1 through inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
19STCV40354 (Cal. Super., Nov. 8, 2019), seeks recovery of unpaid
overtime wages, statutory penalties, interest, costs, and
attorney's fees, and injunctive relief pursuant to the California
Labor Code.

Allied Universal employed the Plaintiff from June 13, 2014, to
August 20, 2019.

Universal Protection is a private security company in the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thomas M. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LAW OFFICES, APLC
          1435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2400
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: 213 251 5533
          Facsimile: 213 251 5534
          E-mail: thomas@thomasmlee.com

               - and -

          Barry G. Florence, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BARRY G. FLORENCE
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2000
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 252 4969
          Facsimile: (213) 232 4890
          E-mail: bgf@bgflawoffices.com


ALLSTATE INSURANCE: Insurance Policy Conflicts With MVFRL, Says Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, SAMANTHA SAYLES, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellee, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellant. WILLIAM H. SCOTT, Appellee, v. TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, Case Nos. 58 MAP 2018, 59 MAP 2018
(Pa.), Judge Debra Todd of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for
the Middle District concluded that automobile insurance policy
provision conflicts with 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1796(a) of the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL"),
and is void as against public policy.

The matter arises out of two separate lawsuits commenced in the
courts of common pleas which were subsequently removed to federal
district courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and
thereafter consolidated for disposition by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.

In 2009, Appellee Scott was covered by an automobile insurance
policy issued by Appellant Travelers, which contained a clause
requiring Scott, if he filed a claim for first-party medical
benefits, to submit, as often as Travelers reasonably requires to
physical exams by physicians Travelers] selects.  Scott was injured
in an automobile accident on April 8, 2009.  He sought
reimbursement from Travelers under his automobile policy for his
medical expenses, as they were first-party benefits, and Travelers
responded to his request by sending a letter stating that he was to
be scheduled to undergo an independent medical exam ("IME"),
pursuant to the right Travelers claimed it possessed to require
such an examination under the above-referenced clause in its
insurance policy.  Scott did not attend the scheduled IME, and
Travelers discontinued paying Scott's outstanding medical bills.

Scott then sued Travelers in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County alleging, inter alia, that Travelers had breached its
contract with him by imposing its IME requirement, which he
contended conflicted with Section 1796(a) of the MVFRL, which
requires a court order, based upon a showing of good cause by an
insurer paying first-party benefits, to compel an insured to submit
to an IME.  ravelers responded by removing the action to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where the
matter was assigned to Magistrate Judge Susan E. Schwab.
Subsequently, both Scott and Travelers filed cross motions for
summary judgment.

Judge Schwab ultimately determined, based on her prediction that
the Court would find that the Travelers policy provision requiring
the IME conflicted with Section 1796(a), that it was void as
against public policy.  Thus, she concluded that Scott was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.  Travelers sought, and was granted,
the right to take an interlocutory appeal of the decision to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Sayles alleges that an auto insurance policy issued by Allstate
under which she was insured contains an "examination requirement"
that violates Section 1796 of the MVFRL.  In 2015, Sayles was
covered by an automobile policy issued by Appellant.  In December
2015, Sayles was injured in an automobile accident, necessitating
her medical treatment.  She sought reimbursement of the amount of
her medical bills under her policy's provision for the payment of
first-party medical benefits, which obligated Allstate to pay her
up to $5,000 per person.  

In response, Allstate sent a letter to Sayles' attorney requesting
that she submit to an IME, which would be performed by a doctor of
Allstate's choosing.  Sayles never submitted to an IME, and
Allstate refused to pay her claim for medical benefits.  She
subsequently sued Allstate in the Court of Common Pleas of Pike
County, alleging, inter alia, that Allstate's conditioning her
first-party medical benefits on the IME violated Section 1796(a).

In response, Allstate successfully removed the action to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Allstate then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which was adjudicated by the Honorable
Richard A. Caputo of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  After
reviewing the terms of Section 1796(a), as Judge Schwab had
previously determined, Judge Caputo found the language of Section
1796(a) to prohibit the IME which Allstate requested.  Judge Caputo
denied Allstate's motion to dismiss.

The Third Circuit consolidated Travelers' and Allstate's appeals.
In these consolidated matters, the Court answers a certified
question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
Whether an automobile insurance policy provision, which requires an
insured seeking first-party medical benefits under the policy to
submit to an independent medical exam whenever the insurer requires
and with a doctor selected by the insurer, conflicts with Section
1796(a) of the MVFRL, such that the requirement is void as against
public policy.

Judge Todd rejects the Appellants' argument that Section 1796(a)
imposes no mandatory duty on them as insurers with respect to how
they may compel a policyholder who has filed a claim for
first-party benefits to submit to an IME after the policyholder has
refused the insurer's request to voluntarily do so, merely because
it does not utilize the terms "insurer," or "shall."  Having
concluded that Section 1796(a) imposes mandatory obligations on
insurers, the Judge turns to a comparison of the IME provisions
contained in the Appellants' policies and the requirements of
Section 1796(a); a plain reading of both indicates that they are in
irreconcilable conflict.

First, Section 1796(a) requires an insurer who wishes to compel a
claimant for first-party medical benefits to undergo an IME to file
a petition with a court of competent jurisdiction, and, also, to
show good cause for the IME.  In addition, any court order for an
IME must give the insured "adequate notice of the time and date of
the examination," as well as "state the manner, conditions and
scope of the examination."

Second, Section 1796(a) requires a judge to adjudicate the
petition; however, the IME policy provisions contain no such
requirement, and it is the insurer alone which decides when such a
request is justified, and if the insured has adequately complied.

Third, under Section 1796(a), if the judge does grant an insurer's
request for the IME, the judge selects the physician who will
perform the IME, and, importantly, sets the manner, conditions, and
scope of the examination.  However, the IME policy provisions allow
the insurer to unilaterally select the physicians who will perform
the IME, and, of great significance, set no limits on the scope or
conduct of the IME, a process, as we have emphasized above, which
impacts insureds' significant privacy interests.

Fourth, the IME policy provisions allow the insurer to determine
whether, as a result of the insured's alleged noncompliance with
the conditions the insurer places on the conduct of the IME, the
insured's benefits should be terminated, as they were in the cases
before us. By contrast, Section 1796(a) vests this authority solely
with the judge who orders the IME.

Finally, the Judge must reject Allstate's contention that, because
the Insurance Department has, by regulation, promulgated sample
language for insurance policies governing medical claims for
injuries caused by uninsured motorists which mirrors the language
of the clauses at issue, it constitutes approval of the use of such
policy language.

In sum, then, these IME policy provisions manifestly conflict with,
and are repugnant to, the statutory protections for individuals
insured under automobile insurance policies regarding the conduct
of IMEs as established by the General Assembly in Section 1796(a);
consequently, they are void as against the public policy of the
Commonwealth, rules Judge Todd.  She, therefore, answers the
certified question from the Third Circuit in the affirmative.

The matter is returned to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/vpglsq from Leagle.com.

David J. D'Aloia -- ddaloia@saiber.com -- SAIBER LLC, for Allstate
Insurance Company, Appellant.

Michael J. Grohs -- mgrohs@saiber.com -- SAIBER LLC, for Allstate
Insurance Company, Appellant.

Marc Wolin -- mwolin@saiber.com -- Saiber LLC, for Allstate
Insurance Company, Appellant.

Charles Kannebecker -- kannebecker@wskllawfirm.com -- Law Office of
Charles Kannebecker, for Samantha Sayles, Appellee.

James C. Haggerty, Haggerty, Goldberg, Schleifer & Kupersmith,
P.C., for PA Association for Justice, Amicus Curiae.

John J. McGrath, Palmer & Barr, P.C., for PA Defense Institute, et
al, Amicus Curiae.

Scott B. Cooper, SCHMIDT KRAMER P.C., for PA Association for
Justice, Amicus Curiae.

Patricia S. Dodszuweit, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, for U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Participants.

Cheryl Ann Krause, US Court Of Appeals Third Circuit, for U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Participants.


AMERICAN EXPRESS: Settlement in Singer Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TARYN SINGER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION BANK,
Defendant, Case No. 7:17-cv-02507-VB ((S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vincent L.
Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted the Plaintiff's unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement.

Based on preliminary examination, the Judge concludes that the
Settlement Agreement appears to be fair, reasonable and adequate
and within the range of possible approval, that the Settlement
Class should be certified for settlement purposes and that a
hearing should be held after notice to the Settlement Class to
determine whether the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and
adequate, and whether a settlement approval order and final
judgment should be entered in this action, based upon that
Settlement Agreement.

Based upon the foregoing, the Judge preliminarily approved the
Settlement Agreement.  He conditionally certified, for settlement
purposes only, the following Settlement Class under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3): All holders of an American
Express credit card issued by American Express Centurion Bank who:
(a) between April 6, 2016 and July 28, 2016, received a billing
statement from American Express that did not disclose that a late
payment could trigger a penalty annual percentage rate on features
or balances other than the purchase feature of their account; and
(b) timely and properly rejected the arbitration provision in the
Cardmember Agreement governing their account.

The Judge appointed Bromberg Law Office, P.C., and the Law Office
of Harley J. Schnall, as the counsel for the Settlement Class.

The Fairness Hearing is set for April 24, 2020 at 11:00 a.m.

The Notice shall be provided in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement within 30 days following entry of the Order.  The
Settlement Administrator shall provide notice to the Settlement
Class Members.  

The Internet Notice shall be posted and made available for download
in .pdf format on a website, the domain name and content of which
shall be subject to review and approval by American Express.  The
website shall be maintained by a third-party settlement
administrator and shall be active and accessible until 120 days
after the Effective Date.

Comments or objections must be filed and mailed to the Class
Counsel and American Express's Counsel not later than Feb. 20,
2020.

The Settlement Class Members or their counsel intending to appear
at the Settlement Hearing must file with the Court and serve on the
Class Counsel and American Express's Counsel, no later than April
3, 2020.  

Any responses to objections to the Settlement Agreement and any
papers in support of the Settlement and Fee Application shall be
filed with the Court on or before April 17, 2020.

All proceedings in the action are stayed until further order of the
Court, except as may be necessary to implement the terms of the
Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Ej2CPs from Leagle.com.

Taryn Singer, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Harley Jay Schnall, Law Office
of Harley J. Schnall & Brian Lewis Bromberg --
brian@bromberglawoffice.com -- Bromberg Law Office, P.C.

American Express Centurion Bank, Defendant, represented by Raymond
Alexander Garcia -- rgarcia@stroock.com -- Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan LLP.


AMERICARE CERTIFIED: Denial of Bids to Dismiss & Stay Badzio Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAMARA BADZIO, ETC., ET AL., Respondents, v. AMERICARE
CERTIFIED SPECIAL SERVICES, INC., ET AL., Appellants, 2017-06984,
2017-06985, Index No. 506155/16 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department,
affirmed (i) the order dated June 15, 2017 that denied the
Defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss; and (ii)
the order dated June 22, 2017, of the same court, that denied the
Defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay all proceedings.

The Plaintiffs, home health aides who were employed by the
Defendants Americare Certified Special Services, Inc., and
Americare, Inc., and who often worked 24-hour "live in" shifts,
seek to recover damages for underpayment of minimum, overtime, and
"spread of hours" wages in violation of the Labor Law and New York
State Department of Labor wage orders and regulations.  Plaintiff
Badzio, a current Americare home health aide, commenced the action
on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated employees on
April 18, 2016.  An amended complaint adding Larysa Salo, a former
Americare home health aide, as a named Plaintiff was served on Jan.
30, 2017.

Prior to serving their answer, the Defendants moved pursuant to
CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss so much of the amended complaint
asserted by Badzio as it seeks damages for underpayment of wages
prior to April 18, 2010, and so much of the amended complaint
asserted by Salo as it seeks damages for underpayment of wages
prior to Jan. 30, 2011, as time-barred by the six-year statute of
limitations set forth in Labor Law Section 198(3).  

In opposition, the Plaintiffs contended that a prior putative class
action commenced on behalf of Americare home health aides entitled
Melamed v. Americare Certified Special Servs., Inc., in the Supreme
Court, Kings County, under Index No. 503171/12, in which the class
action allegations had been dismissed, tolled the limitations
period.  

In an order dated June 15, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the
Defendants' motion.  It concluded that American Pipe tolling
applied to successive class actions and, therefore, the Plaintiffs'
claims were timely.

Thereafter, the Defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay all
proceedings in the action pending the determinations of appeals in
actions entitled Andryeyeva v. New York Health Care, Inc.,
commenced in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Index No.
14309/11, and Moreno v. Future Care Health Servs., Inc., commenced
in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Index No. 500569/13, or,
alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order.  In an
order dated June 22, 2017, the Supreme Court granted a 30-day stay
of discovery of class-wide payroll records and, in effect, denied,
as academic, the alternative relief sought in the Defendants'
motion.

In a putative class action, inter alia, to recover damages for
violations of Labor Law articles 6 and 19, the Defendants appeal
from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin M.
Solomon, J.), dated June 15, 2017, and (2) an order of the same
court dated June 22, 2017.  

The Court finds that the Defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that
so much of the amended complaint asserted by Badzio as seeks
damages for underpayment of wages prior to April 18, 2010, and so
much of the amended complaint asserted by Salo as seeks damages for
underpayment of wages prior to Jan. 30, 2011, was time-barred.  It
also finds that no court has previously dismissed a class action
involving the claims in the case based on the determination that
the class action status was inappropriate.

The Defendants' contention that all proceedings in the action
should have been stayed pending the determinations of appeals in
the actions entitled Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc.,
commenced in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Index No.
14309/11, and Moreno v Future Care Health Servs., Inc., commenced
in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Index No. 500569/13, has
been rendered academic in light of the determination of those
appeals.  

The Defendants' remaining contention is without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirmed.  The one bill of
costs is awarded to the Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Decision & Order is
available at https://is.gd/Sc5HBT from Leagle.com.

Peckar & Abramson, P.C., New York, NY (Kevin J. O'Connor --
KOConnor@pecklaw.com -- of counsel), for appellants.

Beranbaum Menken LLP, New York, NY (Jason J. Rozger of counsel),
for respondents.


AMI LIVONIA: Nolan Seeks to Certify Class of Terminated Employees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DALE NOLAN, the Plaintiff,
vs. AMI LIVONIA, LLC, et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-10773-BAF-APP ECF (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiff moves the
Court for an order on Nov. 27 2019:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all former employees who worked at or reported to the
      facility located at 36930 Industrial Road Livonia, Michigan
      48150 (the Facility) until they were terminated, without
      cause on their part, on or about March 4, 2019 and
      thereafter, who do not file a timely request to opt-out of
      the class;

   2. appointing Dale Nolan as Class Representative;

   3. appointing Lankenau & Miller, LLP, The Gardner Firm, P.C.,
      and The Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice as
      Class Counsel;

   4. approving the form and manner of Notice to the Class; and

   5. granting other and further relief as the Court may deem
      proper.

AMI Livonia is a metal parts stamping company.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are:

          Mary E. Olsen, Esq.
          M. Vance McCrary, Esq.
          THE GARDNER FIRM, P.C.
          182 St. Francis Street, Suite 103
          Mobile, AL 36602
          Telephone: (251) 433-8100
          E-mail: molsen@thegardnerfirm.com
                  vmccrary@thegardnerfirm.com

               - and -

          Stuart J. Miller, Esq.
          LANKENAU & MILLER, LLP
          132 Nassau Street, Suite1100
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 581-5005
          Facsimile: (212) 581-2122

              - and -

          John C. Philo, Esq.
          Anthony D. Paris, Esq.
          Sugar Law Center for
          Economic & Social Justice
          4605 Cass Ave., 2nd Floor
          Detroit, MI 48201
          Telephone: (313) 993-4505
          E-mail: jphilo@sugarlaw.org
                  tparis@sugarlaw.org

ARSTRAT LLC: Marchese Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ARStrat, LLC. The
case is styled as Collette P. Marchese, Roman Gonzalez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. ARStrat, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-06858-KAM-LB (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

ARstrat is a collection and bad debt resolution provider for the
healthcare industry.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          Sanders Law, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 203-7600
          Fax: (516) 706-5055
          Email: csanders@sanderslawpllc.com
                 dbarshay@barshaysanders.com


ATLANTA NETWORK: Faces Guglielmo ADA Class Action in NY
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Atlanta Network
Technologies, Inc. The case is styled as Joseph Guglielmo, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Atlanta Network Technologies, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-11191 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Atlanta Network Technologies, Inc. offers online shopping services.
The Company sells computer products, electronics, cameras, and
office and home products, as well as provides marine products such
as rafts, skiing, and boats.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic St., Suite 5
          Hakensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE: Lammert et al. Seek to Certify Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
GREGORY J. LAMMERT, JAMIE LAMMERT, LARRY REASONS, and SUSAN
REASONS, Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. the Plaintiffs, vs. AUTO-OWNERS
(MUTUAL) INSURANCE COMPANY, the Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00819
(M.D. Tenn.), the Plaintiffs move the Court for an order on Dec. 6,
2019, for an order:

   1. certifying the case as a class action:

      "all Auto-Owners' property insurance policyholders who made:
      (1) a structural damage claim for property located in the
      State of Tennessee; and (2) which resulted in an actual cash

      value payment during the class period from which "non-
      material depreciation" was withheld from the policyholder;
      or which should have resulted in an actual cash value
      payment but for the withholding of "non-material
      depreciation" causing the loss to drop below the applicable
      deductible";

   2. appointing Plaintiffs as class representatives;

   3. appointing Plaintiffs' counsel for the class;

   4. requiring the parties to meet and confer on the form and
      process for disseminating class notice and submit any
      disputes to the Court within 10 days of the certification
      order; and

   5. providing all other relief requested that is just and to
      which Plaintiffs or the class may be entitled.

The class period will vary by the type of coverage form in place
for each policyholder, as follows:

   a. All policyholders with applicable claims having a date of
      oss on or after March 10, 2016 for property policies with a
      one-year "suit limitations" clause;

   b. All policyholders with applicable claims having a date of
      loss on or after April 9, 2015 for property policies with a
      two-year "suit limitations" clause.

The proposed class excludes:

   a. Claims arising under the following Auto-Owners Policy Forms:
      "Labor Permissive" forms, including Forms 15542 (7-19),
      57911 (7-19), and 57912 (7-19); "Builders Risk" coverage
      forms, including Forms CP 00 20 10 90; 16690 (7-14), 16691
      (7-14), and 16695 (7-13);

   b. Any claims for which the applicable limits of insurance were
      exhausted by the initial actual cash value payment.

   c. The Court, its staff, and Plaintiffs' counsel.[CC]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Putative Class Representatives are:

          T. Joseph Snodgrass
          LARSON KING, LLP
          30 East Seventh St., Suite 2800
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (651) 312-6500
          E-mail: jsnodgrass@larsonking.com

               - and -

          Gilbert McWherter, Esq.
          SCOTT & BOBBITT, PLC
          341 Cool Springs Blvd, Suite 230
          Franklin, TN 37067
          Telephone: (615) 354-1144
          E-mail: bmcwherter@gilbertfirm.com

Attorneys for the Defendants are:

          John S. Hicks
          Charles C. McLaurin
          B AKER , D ONELSON , B EARMAN , C ALDWELL &
          B ERKOWITZ , PC
          211 Commerce Street, Suite 800
          Nashville, TN 37201
          E-mail: jhicks@bakerdonelson.com
                  cmclaurin@bakerdonelson.com

               - and -

          Todd A. Noteboom
          Peter J. Schwingler
          Jeffrey G. Mason
          Zane A. Gilmer
          S TINSON L EONARD S TREET LLP
          50 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          E-mail: todd.noteboom@stinson.com
                  jeffrey.mason@stinson.com
                  zane.gilmer@stinson.com
                  peter.schwingler@stinson.com

AXIOM DEBT: Canfield May Serve Complaint via Ca. Secretary of State
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL CANFIELD and REGAN SMITH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AXIOM DEBT
LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant, Case No.
19cv2015-MMA (JLB) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael M. Anello of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to permit alternate service on the Defendant via
the California Secretary of State.

On Oct. 20, 2019, Plaintiffs Canfield and Smith filed the putative
class action against the Defendant, alleging violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  To date, the Defendant
has not appeared in the action.  On Oct. 31, 2019, the Plaintiffs
filed a motion to permit alternate service on the Defendant via the
California Secretary of State.

The Plaintiffs contend that they have not been able to locate and
serve the Defendant's designated agent at the address registered
for personal service.  They claim that on Oct. 23, 2019, their
process server attempted to serve the Defendant's registered agent
at the address listed on the California Secretary of State's
website, 440 S. Melrose Dr., Suite 208, Vista, CA 92081.  The
process server informed the Plaintiffs' counsel that the address
was invalid.

They then attempted to serve the address listed on the Defendant's
website (axiomdebt.com), which is the same for the registered
agent, except for the suite number.  The website indicates that the
company's suite number is Suite 207, as opposed to 208.  The
process server attempted to serve Suite 207, but that address was
also invalid.  The process server returned the proof of
non-service.

The Plaintiffs assert that it appears that Axiom is intentionally
using fake addresses to conceal its business activity.  As a
result, they seek leave to serve Defendant via the California
Secretary of State.

Pursuant to Section 17701.16(c) of the California Corporations
Code, before service can be made via the Secretary of State, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the designated agent cannot
with reasonable diligence be found at the address designated for
personal delivery of the process;" and (2) the plaintiff shows by
affidavit that the LLC "cannot be served with reasonable diligence
upon the designated agent by hand in the manner provided in Section
415.10, subdivision (a) of Section 415.20, or subdivision (a) of
Section 415.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Judge Anello finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the first
requirement and have demonstrated that the designated agent cannot
be found at the address designated for personal delivery of the
process.  In fact, the process server indicated that the address is
invalid.  With respect to the second requirement, although the
Plaintiffs do not mention attempting service by hand or mail, the
Judge is satisfied based upon the counsel's declaration that the
Defendant cannot be served with reasonable diligence in the manner
prescribed in Sections 415.10, 415.20(a), or 415.30(a) of
California's Code of Civil Procedure.  Because both addresses
listed on the California Secretary of State's website and the
Defendant's website are invalid, the Plaintiffs cannot serve the
registered agent by hand or by mail.

After learning that the address listed on the California Secretary
of State's website was invalid, the Plaintiffs took additional
steps to find an alternate address for service.  After finding a
different address on the Defendant's website, they learned that the
new address was also invalid.  The Plaintiffs have not been able to
identify any other address for the designated agent for service of
process.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have
adequately demonstrated that process cannot be served on the
Defendant with reasonable diligence.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Anello granted the Plaintiffs'
motion.  The Plaintiffs may serve the Defendant by hand-delivering
the summons and Complaint, as well as a copy of the Order, to the
California Secretary of State.  Service in this manner is deemed
complete on the 10th day after delivery of the process to the
Secretary of State.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/yUH9fJ from Leagle.com.

Daniel Canfield, an individual & Regan Smith, an individual,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Mark Louis Javitch --
mark@javitchlawoffice.com.


BAYER HEALTHCARE: Grider Sues Over Mislabeling of Sunscreens
------------------------------------------------------------
Ethan Grider and Kevin Terry individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. BAYER HEALTHCARE PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,
a Delaware corporation; BAYER HEALTHCARE LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; BAYER AG, a public limited company; BEIERSDORF,
INC., a Delaware corporation; BEIERSDORF NORTH AMERICA, INC., a
Delaware corporation; and BEIERSDORF AG, a public limited company,
Case No. 2:19-cv-10342 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 5, 2019), seeks to stop the
Defendants' unlawful conduct in the false, deceptive, and
misleading labeling and marketing of their mineral-based sunscreen
products.

To obtain an unfair competitive advantage in the billion-dollar
sunscreen market, the Defendants are exposing babies and children
to harmful chemical-based ingredients hidden in their sunscreens by
fraudulently passing them off as safe mineral-based ingredients,
according to the complaint. The Defendants have reaped many
millions of dollars through this fraudulent scheme based on a
calculated business decision to put profits over people. The
purported "Mineral-Based" products at issue are Coppertone Water
Babies Mineral-Based Sunscreen Stick; Coppertone Water Babies
Mineral-Based Sunscreen Lotion; Coppertone Kids Mineral Based
Sunscreen Lotion; and Coppertone Sport Face Mineral-Based Sunscreen
Lotion.

Contrary to their labeling, the purported mineral-based sunscreen
products contain chemical active ingredients, the Plaintiffs
allege. In fact, the Products often contain a larger percentage of
chemical active ingredients than mineral active ingredients.
Through falsely, misleadingly, and deceptively labeling the
Products, the Defendants sought to take advantage of consumers'
desire for mineral-based sunscreens, while reaping the financial
benefits of using less desirable chemical active ingredients in the
Products. Defendants have done so at the expense of unwitting
consumers, as well as Defendants' lawfully acting competitors, over
whom the Defendants maintain an unfair competitive advantage, says
the complaint.

Plaintiff Connor Hauer purchased the Nutriar Immune Product in
California within the last four years of the filing of this
Complaint.

The Defendants manufacture, market, advertise, label, and sell the
Products throughout California and the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan J. Clarkson, Esq.
          Matthew T. Theriault, Esq.
          Bahar Sodaify, Esq.
          CLARKSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
          9255 Sunset Blvd., Suite 804
          Los Angeles, CA 90069
          Phone: (213) 788-4050
          Fax: (213) 788-4070
          Email: rclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com
                 sclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com
                 bsodaify@clarksonlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Christopher D. Moon, Esq.
          Kevin O. Moon, Esq.
          MOON LAW APC
          600 West Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone:  (619) 915-9432
          Fax: (650) 618-0478
          Email: chris@moonlawapc.com
                 kevin@moonlawapc.com


BBVA COMPASS: Certification of Non-US Citizens Class Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Amitabho Chattopadhyay, et.
al., the Plaintiffs, vs. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc. et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-01541-JST (N.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff
will move the Court on January 22, 2020, for an order:

   1. certifying these classes:

      "all non-United States citizens who applied or attempted to
      apply for a bank account with Simple Bank and were denied,
      or were deterred from applying for an account with Simple
      Bank, or who had an account with Simple Bank that was
      terminated, and who had a valid Social 4 Security Number
      (Covered Non-Citizens) from March 25, 2016 through the date
      of final judgment in this action" (Covered Period):

      (a) all Covered Non-Citizens who resided in California at
          any point during the Covered Period (the "California  
          Class");

      (b) all Covered Non-Citizens during the Covered Period (the

          "Out-of-State Class").

   2. appointing the Plaintiff as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiff, a person with a valid Social Security Number,
attempted to sign up for a checking account with Defendants and was
denied solely because she was not a citizen of the United States.
Defendants' denial of Plaintiff's attempt to register for an
account was due to their policy which prohibits all non-citizens
from registering an account with them, without any individualized
inquiry, the lawsuit claims.[CC]

Attorney for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class

          Erin L. Brinkman, Esq.
          UNITE THE PEOPLE
          555 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 205
          Long Beach, CA 90802
          Telephone: (888) 245-9393
          E-mail: erin@unitethepeople.org

BEAUTY PLACE: Violates ADA, Guglielmo Suit Asserts
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Beauty Place Inc. The
case is styled as Joseph Guglielmo, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Beauty Place Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11201 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

TheBeautyPlace.com is an online retailer of professional beauty
products for cosmetics, hair and skin care needs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic St., Suite 5
          Hakensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


BG RETAIL: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BG Retail, LLC D/B/A
Famous Footwear. The case is styled as Himelda Mendez and on behalf
of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BG Retail, LLC
D/B/A Famous Footwear, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11166 (S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Bg Retail, LLC operates 1,055 value-priced family footwear stores
under the Famous Footwear banner in the US and Guam.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


BOARD OF SELECTMEN: Court Denies Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as NICHOLAS G. BELEZOS, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff,
v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN of Hingham, Massachusetts, in their official
capacity, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, the Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-12570-MBB (D. Mass.),
the Hon. Judge Marianne B. Bowler entered an order denying a motion
seeking to certify a class consisting of:

"any person who received motor vehicle traffic citations for
violation of a special speed regulation lawfully made under the
authority of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 90, section 18, i.e., operating a
vehicle at a rate of speed in excess of a Speed Limit sign (R2-1),
where (in fact) there is no such approved special speed regulation,
and who, by reason thereof, suffered or experienced an adverse
legal consequence, including payment of an assessment, surcharge,
cost or fee in disposition of the citation, or whose admission or
finding of responsibility have been or may be counted against them
in the future for the purposes of adversely affecting their driving
record or automobile insurance premium, or all these things, from
September 28, 2011, to the date of the judgment in this action."

The Court said, "In the motion for class certification, the
plaintiff repeats the option that: the Court may choose to separate
claims or issues within the complaint, and thereby specify and
certify a damages subclass under Rule 23(b)(3). If the Court
declines to certify a damages subclass under Rule 23(b)(3), then it
may instead certify a liability-only subclass under Rule 23(b)(3).
The Plaintiff provides no developed argument to support these three
subclasses or any analysis regarding why such subclass
certification is appropriate and satisfies Rule 23."

The Plaintiff fails in his burden to "'affirmatively demonstrate
his compliance' with Rule 23" regarding these proposed
subclasses.[CC]

BOWLING SUPERMARKET: Mijares Seeks OT Wages for Cleaning Employees
------------------------------------------------------------------
CARMEN J. MIJARES and other similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiff, vs. BOWLING SUPERMARKET INC. and NORBERTO
BENITEZ-CALDERON, individually, the Defendants, Case No.
9:19-cv-81523-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Nov. 7, 2019), seeks to recover
money damages for retaliation and unpaid overtime wages, pursuant
to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants employed Plaintiff as a cleaning employee from
approximately November 1, 2018, to October 19, 2019, or 50 weeks.

The Plaintiff and all other current and former employees similarly
situated to Plaintiff worked in excess of 40 hours during one or
more weeks on or after July 2016, without being properly
compensated. The Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff
overtime hours at the rate of time and one-half her regular rate
for every hour that he worked in excess of 40, the lawsuit says.

Bowling Supermarket is a Hispanic/specialty supermarket and Mexican
restaurant located at 1425 S. Main Street, Belle Glade,
Florida.[BN]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

CADENCE BANCORPORATION: Faces Anthony Securities Suit in Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT H. ANTHONY, JR., Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. CADENCE BANCORPORATION, PAUL B. MURPHY, and
VALERIE C. TOALSON, Case No. 4:19-cv-04269 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 30,
2019), is brought on behalf of persons and entities that purchased
or otherwise acquired Cadence securities between July 23, 2018, and
July 22, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Cadence is a financial holding company that focuses on
middle-market commercial lending, complemented by retail banking
and wealth management services, and purportedly provides banking
services to businesses, high net worth individuals, and business
owners.

On July 22, 2019, the Company disclosed that "higher credit costs
including net charge-offs of $18.6 million and loan provisions of
$28.9 million" negatively impacted its second quarter 2019
financial results.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $3.75 per share, or
over 19%, to close at $15.86 per share on July 22, 2019, thereby,
injuring investors, including the Plaintiff.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects, the Plaintiff alleges.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, the Defendants failed to
disclose to investors that: (i) the Company lacked adequate
internal controls to assess credit risk; (ii) as a result, certain
of the Company's loans posed an increased risk of loss; (iii) as a
result, the Company was reasonably likely to incur significant
losses for certain loans; (iv) the Company's financial results
would suffer a material adverse impact; and (v) as a result, the
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood, II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South LaSalle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


CANADA GOOSE: Calcano Files Suit Under Disabilities Act
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Canada Goose US, Inc.
The case is styled as Marcos Calcano on behalf of himself and all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Canada Goose US,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11227 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 7, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Canada Goose markets a wide range of jackets, parkas, vests, hats,
gloves, shells and other apparel through various avenues, both
wholesale and direct to customer with their own retail stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com



CANADA: Victoria Withdraws Motion Calling for Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Stewart Muir, writing for Times Colonist, reports that elected
officials have a duty to consider every reasonable idea that comes
their way. However, when one of those ideas doesn't stand up to
consideration and everyone else is dropping it in favour of another
tack, those politicians have an equal duty to let it go.

At September's Union of B.C. Municipalities meeting, the annual
convention of municipal mayors and councillors, these leaders
delivered a three-part win for the cause of common sense: First,
the idea of suing fuel companies was soundly rejected. Secondly, a
motion from Port Moody calling on the B.C. government to enact
legislation expediting climate lawsuits was defeated. Thirdly,
Victoria withdrew a motion calling for a class-action lawsuit by
B.C. municipalities.

Instead, by a two-to-one margin, B.C. elected municipal officials
approved a motion from Interior towns and cities stating climate
lawsuits are "an inappropriate direction for B.C. communities" and
calling for a collaborative approach to the very real challenges of
climate change.

Practicality and good sense won the day.

And yet, Victoria Coun. Ben Isitt isn't letting it go.

Afterward, in media, Isitt blamed the decision on the "division
between major cities in southeastern B.C. and smaller
municipalities in the interior of the province."

Such words only sow dissent and create division where we need
unity, while conveniently ignoring the fact many urban politicians
voted against the climate litigation motions and the defeat was
decisive.

He then announced law firm Arvay Finlay is working to prepare yet
another legal opinion to support local governments considering such
lawsuits in an effort to "[recover] a portion of costs incurred in
relation to climate change."

This ignores his own city staff's legal and cost analysis of the
option. We have undertaken several freedom-of-information requests
of municipal governments considering these lawsuits, and in one
found a letter from Victoria Mayor Lisa Helps to Toronto city Coun.
Mike Layton, stating: "We've received some legal advice and cost
estimates in camera and safe to say it is a big battle!"

Mayor Helps was once a proponent of trying to sue energy firms, but
dropped the idea after receiving legal opinions and hearing from
local businesses. When the facts came in, she changed course.

We asked for the Victoria staff reports referenced in the email,
but were turned down. However, we did receive staff reports from
cities such as Richmond and Burnaby, which reveal municipal staff
are telling councils lawsuits are uncertain, will take many years
to come to a conclusion, and will be expensive (for taxpayers).

Importantly, such lawsuits are also divisive, preventing the
parties involved from working together for years at a time as legal
actions drag out. At the very time when collaborating on a response
to climate change has never been more critical, Isitt wants to
launch legal action that makes collaboration impossible.

Launching lawsuits against oil and gas companies will do nothing to
take on climate change. It is a feel-good PR exercise about winning
points with voters that will stall climate-change action for years.
It also ignores that they rely on oil and gas to operate their
cities.

Victoria has fleets of vehicles and countless services that rely on
the very fuels Isett wants to sue over. The capital region's
$800-million wastewater-treatment project is only possible because
its power system will be backed up by natural gas -- a
cleaner-burning, reliable fuel that will allow the system to make
our waters cleaner for the next 100 years or more.

Our oil and gas companies remain vital to Canada's economy and
social fabric -- they literally fuel our lives. And, Canada's
energy companies are among the world's most innovative when it
comes to green technologies. By way of example, oil sands companies
have cut emissions from their extraction processes by 30 per cent
in the last 10 years alone, and are aiming to get even lower.

Instead of lawsuits, we need our leaders from both the public and
private sectors to gather together and inspire creative solutions.
The challenge of our times will require solving environmental,
social and governance problems at every level of government and in
collaboration with industry. Lawsuits that drag on for decades, at
unknown cost to local ratepayers, are not a viable path. Only the
lawyers come out ahead.

It's encouraging to see British Columbia's civic leaders
recognizing this by embracing a more positive pathway to change.
Most of them, at least. [GN]


CAPITAL ONE BANK: Faces Childers Suit Alleging Violation of TCPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Childers, individually and on behalf of others v. CAPITAL ONE
BANK (USA), N.A., Case No. 3:19-cv-02318-H-JLB (S.D. Cal., Dec. 5,
2019), is brought for damages, injunctive relief, and any other
available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal
actions of the Defendant in negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully contacting the Plaintiff and class members for alleged
debt on their cellular telephones, in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, thereby, invading their privacy.

The Defendant called the Plaintiff's cellphone attempting to
collect a debt. The Plaintiff experienced a long delay before the
Plaintiff was connected with a live person. Such a delay indicates
use of an Automatic Telephone Dialing System. The Plaintiff
unequivocally and explicitly informed the Defendant's
representative, agent, or employee that the Plaintiff was
represented by Attorney Shay regarding the debt. As such, the
Plaintiff demanded Defendant cease all contact and communication
with him.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff asserts he revoked any implied consent
previously given to receive the calls when he demanded that the
Defendant stop calling him. Despite the Plaintiff's revocation of
any implied consent, the Defendant called him again. Through the
Defendant's conduct, the Plaintiff suffered an invasion of a
legally protected interest in privacy, which is specifically
addressed and protected by the TCPA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of
California.

The Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in
the County of San Diego.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua B. Swigart, Esq.
          SWIGART LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 308
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: 866-219-3343
          Fax: 866-219-8344
          Email: josh@swigartlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Daniel G. Shay, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. SHAY
          409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101B
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: (619) 222-7429
          Fax: (866) 431-3292
          Email: danielshay@tcpafdcpa.com


CARNIVAL CORP: Wolfe Appeals S.D. Florida Ruling to 11th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Erika Bruce, Shivon Harris, Miguel Hernandez, Sonia
Hernandez, Samad Rainey and James Wolfe filed an appeal from a
court ruling entered in their lawsuit entitled James Wolfe, et al.
v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Case No. 1:18-cv-23463-KMW, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, on Aug. 24, 2018, this
proposed class-action lawsuit was filed by James Wolfe and others
against Carnival Corporation in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida relating to the marketing and
sales of Carnival Vacation Protection product.  The Plaintiffs
purport to represent an alleged class of passengers, who purchased
the Carnival Vacation Protection product.

The "Wolfe" complaint alleges that Carnival Cruise Line concealed
that it received "kickbacks" on the sale of the travel insurance
portion of the product from an underwriter.

The appellate case is captioned as James Wolfe, et al. v. CARNIVAL
CORPORATION, Case No. 19-14326, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants JAMES WOLFE, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, et al., are represented by:

          Kimberly Lambert Adams, Esq.
          LEVIN PAPANTONIO THOMAS MITCHELL RAFFERTY & PROCTOR, PA
          316 South Baylen St.
          Pensacola, FL 32502
          Telephone: (850) 435-7000
          E-mail: kadams@levinlaw.com

               - and -

          Francis J. Balint, Jr., Esq.
          Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2901 N Central Ave., Suite 1000
          Phoenix, AZ 85012-3311
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: afriedman@bffb.com
                  fbalint@bffb.com

               - and -

          Howard M. Bushman, Esq.
          Joseph M. Kaye, Esq.
          Adam Moskowitz, Esq.
          Adam A. Schwartzbaum, Esq.
          THE MOSKOWITZ LAW FIRM, PLLC
          2 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 601
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 536-8220
          E-mail: howard@moskowitz-law.com
                  joseph@moskowitz-law.com
                  adam@moskowitz-law.com
                  adams@moskowitz-law.com

               - and -

          William F. Merlin, Jr., Esq.
          MERLIN LAW GROUP PA
          777 S. Harbour Island Blvd., Suite 950
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 229-1000
          E-mail: cmerlin@MerlinLawGroup.com

Defendant-Appellee CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a foreign corporation,
d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, is represented by:

          Stuart H. Singer, Esq.
          BOIES SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP
          401 E Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 356-0011
          E-mail: ssinger@bsfllp.com


CAVALRY PORTOFOLIO: Kendrick Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Kentucky
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cavalry Portfolio
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Tracey Kendrick, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v.
Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
5:19-cv-00475-CHB (E.D. Ky., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Cavalry Portfolio Services, LLC provides financial resolution
services. Its services cover various areas, such as collection
account and debt control.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          1500 Allaire Ave, Suite 101
          Ocean, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


CENTRIC BRANDS: Guglielmo Suit Asserts ADA Breach
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Centric Brands Inc.
The case is styled as Joseph Guglielmo, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Centric Brands Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11193 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Centric Brands Inc. is a lifestyle brand collective, bringing
together creative minds from the worlds of fashion and commerce,
sourcing, technology, marketing and digital.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic St., Suite 5
          Hakensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com

CHICAGO, IL: Must Reply to Ali's Bid to Certify Class by Feb. 26
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois made a docket entry on December 5, 2019, in the case
entitled Khalid Ali v. City of Chicago, et al., Case No.
1:19-cv-00022 (N.D. Ill.), relating to a hearing held before the
Honorable Edmond E. Chang.

The minute entry states that:

   -- Status hearing held.  Both sides reports that fact
      discovery is closed and neither side is likely to retain
      experts, though the City will make a final decision per the
      schedule set in this entry;

   -- For now, on the Plaintiff's motion for class certification,
      the City's response is due by February 5, 2020;

   -- Plaintiff's reply is due by February 26, 2020;

   -- If the City believes it needs an expert to respond, then
      the City shall file a motion to vacate the briefing
      schedule by December 23, 2019;

   -- By December 12, 2019, both sides (and if needed, the City
      and the individual Defendant may file separate statements,
      if their interests diverge) shall file position papers on
      the proper sequence of litigation: the certification
      motion, the individual-defendant summary judgment motion
      (and perhaps cross−motion), the Monell summary judgment
      motion (and perhaps cross−motion), or some combination;

   -- It is possible for the defense to waive preclusive effect
      and to waive protection against one−way intervention.
      Collins v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 875 F.3d 839, 846
      (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d
      1045, 1057 n.3 (7th Cir. 2016)); Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki,
      513 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2008);

   -- A tracking status hearing is set for December 16, 2019, at
      8:30 a.m. (no appearance required for that hearing);

   -- Noticed motion date of December 10, 2019, is stricken; and

   -- Status hearing is set for March 3, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.[CC]


CISION LTD: Faces Kent Suit Over Proposed Sale to Platinum Equity
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Kent, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CISION LTD., MARK M. ANDERSON, PHILIP A. CANFIELD, MARK
D. EIN, L. DYSON DRYDEN, KEVIN AKEROYD, STEPHEN P. MASTER, SUSAN
VOBEJDA, STUART YARBROUGH, DAVID KRANTZ, PLATINUM EQUITY ADVISORS,
LLC, MJ23 UK ACQUISITION LIMITED, and CASTLE MERGER LIMITED, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02229-UNA (D. Del., Dec. 5, 2019), stems from a
proposed transaction, pursuant to which Cision will be acquired by
affiliates of Platinum Equity Advisors, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company: MJ23 UK Acquisition Limited and Castle Merger
Limited.

On October 22, 2019, Cision's Board of Directors caused the Company
to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Platinum.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Cision's
stockholders will receive $10 in cash for each share of Cision
common stock they own.

On December 3, 2019, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with the Proposed Transaction, which scheduled a stockholder vote
on the Proposed Transaction for December 19, 2019.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the Proxy Statement.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends, the Proxy Statement omits
material information regarding the Company's financial projections.
The Proxy Statement fails to disclose, for each set of projections:
(i) all line items used to calculate Adjusted EBITDA; and (ii) a
reconciliation of all non-GAAP to GAAP metrics. The Proxy Statement
also omits material information regarding the analyses performed by
the Company's financial advisors, Rothschild & Co. and Centerview
Partners LLC, in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The
Proxy Statement also omits material information regarding the
Company's additional financial advisor, Deutsche Bank Securities
Inc. The Proxy Statement fails to disclose the timing and nature of
the past services Deutsche Bank provided to the parties to the
Merger Agreement and their affiliates, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is the owner of Cision common stock.

Cision is a leading global provider of earned media software and
services to public relations and marketing communications
professionals.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Phone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
                 gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Phone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          Email: rm@maniskas.com


CLAUDIA RODAS: Withheld Workers' Earned & OT Wages, Ferreira Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Wellington Ferreira, individually and on behalf of all other
employees similarly situated v. CLAUDIA RODAS, MARVIN MARTINEZ and
DUO-GASTROPUB CORP. (AKA DUO GASTRO PUB) jointly and severally,
Case No. 1:19-cv-06868 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019), is brought under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law, as well as
the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, in
order to remedy the Defendants' wrongful withholding of the
Plaintiff's earned wages and overtime compensation.

The Plaintiff was not paid at an overtime rate of one-and-one-half
his regular rate of pay for the overtime hours that he worked, says
the complaint. The Defendants required the Plaintiff to work and
never compensated them at all for his work. The Plaintiff was never
provided with any wage statements, time sheets, or other documents
showing the amount of hours they each worked every week and the
amounts they were owed.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a kitchen worker
from July 2019 until end of October 2019.

The Defendants own and operate a restaurant located in Elmhurst,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lina Stillman, Esq.
          STILLMAN LEGAL PC
          42 Broadway, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Phone: (212) 203-2417
          Web site: http://www.FightForUrRights.com/


COINBASE, INC: Leidel Seeks to Certify Settlement Class
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as BRANDON LEIDEL, individually,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
COINBASE, INC., a Delaware corporation d/b/a, Global Digital Asset
Exchange (GDAX), the Defendant, Case No. 9:16-cv-81992-KAM (S.D.
Fla.), the Class Representative asks the Court for an order:

   1. preliminarily approving a settlement agreement among the
      Parties;

   2. approving for the settlement agreement (a) the class
      notice for mailing and publication and (b) Proof of
      Claim Form;

   3. scheduling a final approval hearing; and

   4. certifying settlement class:

      "all Cryptsy account owners who held bitcoin, other digital
      currencies or cryptocurrencies, or any other asset on the
      Cryptsy platform as of November 1, 2015 to the present."

      Excluded from the Class are: (1) employees of Cryptsy,
      including its shareholders, officers and directors and
      members of their immediate families; (2) employees of
      COINBASE, including its shareholders, officers and directors

      and members of their immediate families; any judge to whom
      this action is assigned and the judge's immediate family;
      (3) persons who timely and validly opt to exclude themselves

      from the Class; and (4) any person or entity that opened an
      account at Cryptsy after October 4, 2015, which is the last
      date on which any of the Cryptsy used any of the accounts
      maintained on the Coinbase platform to exchange Bitcoin for
      U.S. dollars."

The Settlement adds $962,500 to the Settlement Fund established and
distributed to the Class in the Cryptsy Case.

As it relates to attorney's fees, Class Counsel have committed that
their fee application will not exceed 33.33% of the Common Fund,
which is the same percentage approved by the Court in the Cryptsy
Case.

Therefore, the Settlement, when viewed in the context of these
risks and the uncertainties involved with any litigation, makes the
Settlement a strong result for the Class. The Settlement was
negotiated at arm's length, by counsels who are well-informed of
the issues in the Litigation, and are experienced in complex
securities litigation.

The class definition mirrors the class certified by the Court in
the Cryptsy Case, with the exception that it excludes persons who
opened an account at Cryptsy after the time that Coinbase closed
Cryptsy's accounts at Coinbase. Plaintiff's Counsel believes that
few, if any, persons, who were part of the Cryptsy Class will be
excluded from the instant Class as a result of this limitation
because Cryptsy effectively shut down on, or shortly after,
November 1, 2015.

The Class Representative has reached an agreement to settle this
Class Action against Defendant. The Court previously certified a
virtually identical class that asserted claims based on the same
underlying conduct at issue here in the matter styled Leidel, et
al. v. Project Investors, Inc. d/b/a CRYPTSY, Paul Vernon, and
Lorie Ann Nettles, Case No. 9:16-cv-80060-MARRA (the Cryptsy
Case).

The Cryptsy Case concerned the conduct of Paul Vernon and Cryptsy,
a cryptocurrency exchange, in unlawfully converting for their own
use the cryptocurrency of the Cryptsy Class.

On January 13, 2016, Plaintiff Leidel (and others) filed the
Cryptsy Case. The Court appointed James D. Sallah as Receiver.
Although unopposed, the Court certified the Class.

Coinbase is a digital currency exchange headquartered in San
Francisco, California. They broker exchanges of Bitcoin, Bitcoin
Cash, Ethereum, Ethereum Classic, and Litecoin with fiat currencies
in approximately 32 countries, and bitcoin transactions and storage
in 190 countries worldwide.[CC]

Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Class are:

          Marc A. Wites, Esq.
          WITES LAW FIRM
          4400 North Federal Highway
          Lighthouse Point, FL 33064
          Telephone: 954-933-4400
          Facsimile: 954-354-0205
          E-mail: mwites@witeslaw.com

             - and -

          David C. Silver, Esq.
          Jason S. Miller, Esq.
          SILVER MILLER
          11780 W. Sample Road
          Coral Springs, FL 33065
          Telephone: (954) 755-4799
          Facsimile: (954) 755-4684
          E-mail: DSilver@SilverMillerLaw.com
                  JMiller@SilverMillerLaw.com

COMENITY BANK: Court Denies Bid to Remand Identity Theft Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court of the Eastern District of
California issued an Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand in
the case captioned as, LORI ANN GONZALEZ, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, a Plaintiff, v. COMENITY BANK,
DOES 1-30, Defendant. Case No. 1:19-CV-00348-AWI-EPG. (E.D. Cal.)

The Court held that the amount in controversy in this action
properly includes the maximum statutory penalties for Gonzalez's
claims under the Rosenthal Act and the CITA, as well as a
reasonable estimate of future penalties under Section 530.8 of the
California Penal Code. The Court further held that these penalties,
combined with a reasonable estimate of future attorneys' fees
attributable solely to Gonzalez's CITA claim, exceed the $75,000
jurisdictional minimum under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(b), even
without factoring in the other types of relief Gonzalez is seeking.
Therefore, the Court concluded it properly has jurisdiction over
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a) and remand is not
warranted.

Plaintiff Lori Ann Gonzalez filed a putative class action in Fresno
County Superior Court alleging that Defendant Comenity Bank
routinely violates California statutes relating to identity theft
in connection with credit cards branded for a clothing retailer
called The Limited.

Comenity removed the case to this forum based on diversity of
citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a)-(b). The notice
of removal asserts that Gonzalez and Comenity are citizens of
different states and that the total amount of individual relief to
which Gonzalez claims she is entitled if she prevails in this
action exceeds $75,000, including actual and statutory damages for
the Rosenthal Act claim, damages and penalties for claim under
Section 530.8 of the California Penal Code, actual damages,
injunctive relief and a civil penalty for the CITA claim and
attorneys' fees.  

In moving for remand, Gonzalez does not dispute that she and
Comenity are citizens of different states but contends that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and that
remand is required under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c), because
Comenity has not met its burden to show that the amount in
controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold set forth
in 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)(1).  

Specifically, Gonzalez argues that using the maximum penalty for
the Rosenthal Act claim and the maximum penalty for the CITA claim
to calculate the amount in controversy, as Comenity proposes, is
improper because the award amounts are discretionary and the
Complaint does not expressly seek or allege facts to support the
maximum award as to either claim.  

Further, she argues that Comenity improperly assumes that the
penalty under Section 530.8 of the Penal Code will continue to
accrue through trial.  

Finally, Gonzalez contends that Comenity's estimate of attorneys'
fees cannot be credited because it overstates the incremental costs
associated with litigating Gonzalez's individual CITA claim and the
underlying methodology is unsound.  

Comenity argues that using the maximum penalty for the Rosenthal
Act claim and the maximum penalty for the CITA claim to calculate
the amount in controversy in this action is proper because recent
Ninth Circuit decisions make it clear that the amount in
controversy in a case encompasses all relief a court may grant on a
complaint if the plaintiff prevails on all claims and because
Gonzalez has not alleged or otherwise indicated that she is seeking
less than the maximum penalty under either statute.   

Further, Comenity contends that it is proper to assume the penalty
under Section 530.8 of the California Penal Code will continue to
accrue through completion of the trial at the statutorily
prescribed rate of $100 per day because the amount in controversy
is to be estimated at the time of removal, without regard to future
events such as settlement or discovery productions  that might
reduce the amount in controversy after removal.  

Finally, Comenity argues that at a rate of $300 per hour, Gonzalez
could recover attorneys' fees in the amount of at least $28,725 on
her individual CITA claim alone.  

Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, a defendant generally may remove an
action filed in state court if a federal district court would have
had original jurisdiction over the action.

There are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction: (1)
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, which
gives federal courts original jurisdiction over all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States and (2) diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332,
which gives federal courts original jurisdiction where the amount
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs and there is complete diversity among the
parties.  

Neither party disputes that the diversity requirement is satisfied
in this case, so the only issue for the Court to resolve on this
motion is whether it is more likely than not that the amount in
controversy in connection with Gonzalez's individual claims exceeds
the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.  

Statutory Penalties Under the Rosenthal Act and the CITA

Two of the statutes at issue in this action the Rosenthal Act and
the CITA contain provisions that specify maximum penalties. The
Rosenthal Act provides for a penalty ranging from a minimum of $100
to a maximum of $1,000  (b) while the CITA provides for a penalty
of up to $30,000.  

Gonzalez contends that the statutory maximum penalties should not
be included in the amount-in-controversy calculation because the
Complaint does not expressly seek or allege facts justifying
maximum penalties, and because Comenity has failed to meet its
burden to show that maximum penalties will be awarded if Gonzalez
prevails on her claims.  

Comenity, for its part, contends that it is proper to include
maximum penalties in the amount-in-controversy calculation because,
whether or not they are ultimately imposed, they are within the
scope of relief that could be awarded and are, thus, at stake in
the litigation.  

Further, Comenity argues that Gonzalez has not disclaimed maximum
penalties in this case and that the facts alleged in the Complaint
could justify maximum penalties under both of the statutes in
question.

The use of maximum statutory penalties in jurisdictional
amount-in-controversy calculations was addressed by this district
in Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F.Supp.2d 1199 (E.D. Cal.
2008). Korn was a putative class action involving alleged
violations of Section 1747.08 of the California Civil Code, which
provides for a civil penalty not to exceed $250 for the first
violation and $1,000 for each subsequent violation.

Defendant removed the action to federal court under the CAFA and,
in seeking remand, plaintiff took the position that the $1,000
maximum penalty set forth in the statute should not be included in
the amount in controversy because the class plaintiffs could be
awarded less than the maximum statutory penalty per violation.

The court rejected that argument on the ground that it overlooked
the critical distinction between the likely recovery per plaintiff
and the actual issue before the court, the amount in controversy in
the litigation. Further, the court found that the maximum penalty
was properly included in the amount in controversy because
plaintiff alleged that he and every other class member were
entitled to civil penalties in amounts up to $1,000 per violation
and had not stipulated that he would demand less than the maximum
civil penalty.

The Court therefore finds that the maximum penalty specified in a
statute is properly included in a jurisdictional
amount-in-controversy calculation where a plaintiff could
reasonably recover that penalty. The amounts in controversy as to
Gonzalez's claims under the Rosenthal Act and the CITA are
evaluated accordingly below.

Rosenthal Act Claim

Gonzalez alleges that Comenity violated the Rosenthal Act through a
persistent, frequent, willful and knowing failure to notify debtors
including herself that claims of identity theft must be submitted
in writing.

Gonzalez also alleges that she received multiple telephone calls
from Comenity seeking to collect on the credit card account at
issue here, that Comenity maintains a pattern and practice of
failing to inform debtors who make oral claims of identity theft
that the claims must be in writing and that Comenity's practices
present a continuing threat to Gonzalez and others unless enjoined
and restrained.

While awards vary, the allegations in the Complaint, including, for
example, the allegation that Comenity called Gonzalez on more than
one occasion, appear sufficient, in light of relevant case law, to
show that Comenity's conduct was willful and knowing and that
Gonzalez could reasonably recover the maximum penalty under the
Rosenthal Act in this action.  

Therefore, the Court held that the Complaint puts the maximum
penalty under the Rosenthal Act at stake in this action and assigns
a value of $1,000 to Gonzalez's individual claim for a penalty
under the Rosenthal Act for purposes of the amount-in-controversy
calculation.  

CITA Claim

The CITA provides for a civil penalty, in addition to any other
damages, of up to $30,000 if the victim establishes by clear and
convincing evidence all of the following:

     (A) That at least 30 days prior to filing an action or within
the cross-complaint pursuant to this section, he or she provided
written notice to the claimant at the address designated by the
claimant for complaints related to credit reporting issues that a
situation of identity theft might exist and explaining the basis
for that belief.

     (B) That the claimant failed to diligently investigate the
victim's notification of a possible identity theft.

     (C) That the claimant continued to pursue its claim against
the victim after the claimant was presented with facts that were
later held to entitle the victim to a judgment pursuant to this
section.

Gonzalez alleges that she twice provided timely written notice to
Comenity that a situation of identity theft might exist, but that
Comenity failed to diligently investigate her notification of
identity theft and continued to pursue the claim against her after
being presented with the facts underlying her claim of identity
theft.

Comenity cites a couple of cases in which the $30,000 statutory
maximum was awarded to the prevailing plaintiff under the CITA. In
Washington, 2018 WL 4005447, *3-*4, *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018),
the district court awarded the $30,000 statutory maximum penalty on
default judgment based on a mere finding that the FAC has
sufficiently alleged a claim under the CITA.

Here again, Gonzalez has prayed without caveat for a penalty under
a statute that specifies a maximum penalty, while also alleging
facts that appear, in light of relevant case law, to be sufficient
to justify the maximum award. The Court therefore held that
Gonzalez could reasonably recover the maximum penalty if she
prevails on her individual CITA claim in this action and assigned
$30,000 to Gonzalez's claim for a penalty under CITA for purposes
of the amount-in-controversy calculation.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y2cezkor from Leagle.com

Lori Ann Gonzalez, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Weiss --
jonathan.weiss@squirepb.com -- Law Office Of Jonathan Weiss & Tavy
Alice Dumont  -- tavy.dumont@dumontlaw.com -- Law Office of Tavy A.
Dumont.

Comenity Bank, Defendant, represented by Tomio B. Narita --
tnarita@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita, LLP, Margaret T. Cardasis
-- mcardasis@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita LLP & Robert Travis
Campbell --  tcampbell@snllp.com -- Simmonds & Narita LLP.


COOK COUNTY, IL: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Alicea Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Elizabeth Alicea, Michelle Urrutia, Katina Ramos, and
Jack Artinian, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. County of Cook, and Thomas J. Dart,
individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook
County, Defendants, Case No. 18 C 5381 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Ronald A.
Guzman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

The proposed class is defined as all persons who used a toilet in a
holding cell in a courthouse in Cook County, Illinois since Aug. 8,
2016, wherein any part of the toilet is visible in the camera feed
monitoring the cell.

The Judge reviewed the parties' recent submissions, their briefs on
class certification, and additional case law addressing the Fourth
Amendment as it relates to searches of pretrial detainees and
concludes that, as currently defined, the Plaintiff's class is
unable to be certified.  Upon further reflection, the Judge finds
that, as currently defined, the proposed class is too broad to
satisfy the commonality requirement.

The Plaintiffs may renew their motion for class certification with
a revised proposed class definition no later than Dec. 13, 2019.
They are directed to provide citations to Seventh Circuit case law
in support of their proposed definition in order to assist the
Court in determining whether a summary judgment motion should be
briefed before the renewed class certification motion.

Given the amount of money and effort that will be expended in
providing class notice as the Plaintiffs have outlined in their
supplemental filing, the Plaintiffs are directed to address in
their motion for class certification how their renewed proposed
class definition incorporates the anticipated evidence in the
case.

The Defendants may either respond to the renewed motion for class
certification or file a motion seeking to proceed first with a
determination on the merits.  Either way, the Defendants have until
Jan. 8, 2019 to submit their filing.  At that time, the Court will
review the parties' filings and issue an order as to how it will
proceed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/4HrB2G from Leagle.com.

Elizabeth Alicea, Michelle Urrutia, Katina Ramos & Jack Artinian,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Thomas A. Zimmerman, Jr. --
tom@attorneyzim.com -- Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., Matthew C. De
Re -- matt@attorneyzim.com -- Zimmerman Law Offices, P.c.,
Nickolas
J. Hagman -- nick@attorneyzim.com -- Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C. &
Sharon Harris -- sharon@attorneyzim.com -- Zimmerman Law Offices,
P.C.

County Of Cook & Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, individually, and in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, Defendants,
represented by Elizabeth A. Ekl -- eekl@reiterburns.com -- Reiter
Burns LLP, Terrence Michael Burns -- tburns@reiterburns.com --
Reiter Burns LLP, Daniel Jerome Burns -- kate@reiterburns.com --
Reiter Burns Llp, Daniel Matthew Noland -- dnoland@reiterburns.com
-- Reiter Burns LLP, Katherine Carole Morrison --
kmorrison@reiterburns.com -- Reiter Burns LLP & Paul A. Michalik
--
pmichalik@reiterburns.com -- Reiter Burns LLP.


COOK COUNTY, IL: Elizarri Seeks to Certify Class of Detainees
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiffs move the Court to order that their case titled
Leoncio Elizarri and Gregory L. Jordan, individually and for others
similarly situated v. Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County,
Illinois, Case No. 1:17-cv-08120 (N.D. Ill.), may proceed as a
class action for:

     All persons transferred to the Illinois Department of
     Corrections from the Cook County Jail whose property remains
     in the custody of the Sheriff of Cook County.

The Sheriff of Cook County, pursuant to an official policy set out
in the "Cook County Department of Corrections Inmate Information
Handbook," seizes many items of personal property from detainees as
they enter the Jail.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Sheriff's actions have caused them
and others similarly situated to be deprived of their property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The Plaintiffs
seek equitable relief for members of the putative class,
specifically that the Court order the Sheriff to establish and
implement a procedure to return the detainee property that it is
presently holding.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kenneth N. Flaxman, Esq.
          Joel A. Flaxman, Esq.
          KENNETH N. FLAXMAN, P.C.
          200 South Michigan Ave., Suite 201
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: 312) 427-3200
          E-mail: knf@kenlaw.com
                  jaf@kenlaw.com


DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL: 11th Circuit Affirms Class Action Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Courthouse News Service reported that the 11th Circuit affirmed
dismissal of a class action that claimed the Democratic National
Committee was biased in favor of Hillary Clinton during the 2016
presidential primaries. [GN]


DIGNITY HEALTH: Judge Refuses to Approve $100MM Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
Ayla Ellison, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that a
California federal judge has refused to approve a deal requiring
Dignity Health to pay more than $100 million to settle a
class-action lawsuit accusing the San Francisco-based health system
of using a religious Employee Income Retirement Security Act
exemption it wasn't entitled to, according to Bloomberg Law.

Dignity Health allegedly used the religious exemption to underfund
its pension plan by $1.5 billion. Under the proposed settlement,
Dignity would add $50 million in retirement plan funding in 2020
and 2021.The settlement also requires Dignity to fund the pension
plan until 2024 and prohibits the health system from reducing
accrued benefits because of a plan merger or amendment for 10
years.

On Oct. 29, a federal judge in the Northern District of California
refused to sign off on the deal because it contains a "kicker"
clause. The clause would allow Dignity to keep the difference
between the amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the court and the
nearly $6.2 million in fees authorized by the settlement.

"Although the fact is not explicitly stated in the Settlement, if
the Court awards less than $6.15 million in fees, Defendants keep
the amount of the difference and those funds are not distributed to
the class," Judge Jon S. Tigar said, according to Bloomberg Law.
"The Court concludes that this arrangement, which potentially
denies the class money that Defendants were willing to pay in
settlement -- with no apparent countervailing benefit to the class
-- renders the Settlement unreasonable."

Though the judge refused to sign off on the deal, he gave the
parties an opportunity to revise the agreement and resubmit it for
approval. [GN]


DON VITO OZUNA: Court OKs $375,000 Settlement in Camilo Case
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, granted Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement in the case captioned
RODRIGO CAMILO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SEVERO C. OZUNA, et al.,
Defendants. Case No. 18-cv-02842-VKD. (N.D. Cal.).

The Parties agree to settle this Class Action for a maximum and
all-inclusive amount of $375,000 to be paid by Defendants. The
Settlement Sum includes attorney's fees, costs and expenses
directly related to the Class Action, including Settlement
Administration costs estimated to be between $10,000 and $15,000.

Plaintiffs Rodrigo Camilo, Alvaro Camilo, Ricardo Sanchez, and Jose
Lopez filed this hybrid class action and collective action for
alleged wage and hour violations under various provisions of the
California Labor Code and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).

Plaintiffs estimate that their potential recovery for all claims
could be about $2 million. However, certain downward adjustments
were made to account for the weakness of plaintiffs' claims for
meal and rest break violations.  Based on Mr. Ozuna's scribbled
handwritten notes and payment method, plaintiffs' counsel estimates
that defendants might be able to prove that class members are owed
only $500,000.

For settlement purposes, the Court conditionally certifies this
matter as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Seciton
216(b), for FLSA Class Members consisting of all individuals who
are employed or who have been employed by defendants as non-exempt
hourly employees involved in the tortilla and chip manufacturing
process from May 14, 2015 through March 19, 2019 who allege
violations under the FLSA as described in claim one of the
Complaint.

For settlement purposes, and pursuant to Rule 23, the Court
preliminarily certifies a class of Rule 23 Class Members,
consisting of all individuals who are employed or have been
employed by defendants as non-exempt hourly employees involved in
the tortilla and chip manufacturing process between May 14, 2014
and March 19, 2019 and who allege violations under California law
as described in claims two through seven of the Complaint.

Subject to plaintiffs with defendants' agreement making certain
corrections noted below, the form and content of the proposed
Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and the notice
methodology described in the Amended Agreement, are approved. The
Court finds the notice procedures set forth in the Amended
Agreement to be the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, and constitute due and sufficient notice, in full
compliance with the requirements of Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Constitution of the United States, and any
other applicable law.

Any Rule 23 Class Member who wishes to be excluded from the
settlement must send to the Claims Administrator a personally
signed letter including (a) his or her full name; (b) his or her
current address and telephone number; (c) a clear statement
communicating that he or she chooses to be excluded from the
settlement, does not wish to be a Rule 23 Class Member, and chooses
to be excluded from any judgment entered pursuant to the Amended
Agreement; (d) his or her signature; and (e) the case name and case
number of this action. Any such Request for Exclusion must be sent
to the Claims Administrator, in accordance with the Amended
Agreement, no later than 45 calendar days from the date the Claims
Administrator mails the Notice Packet.

All persons or entities who properly exclude themselves from the
settlement shall not be Class Members and shall relinquish their
rights or benefits under the Amended Agreement, should it be
finally approved, and may not file an objection to the settlement
or be entitled to any settlement benefits.

If the Court gives final approval for the proposed settlement, any
Rule 23 Class Member or FLSA Class Member for whom the Claims
Administrator is not able to determine an accurate address and who,
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Amended
Agreement, has neither submitted a timely Request for Exclusion,
nor submitted a valid and timely Claim Form, shall be bound by all
terms of the Amended Agreement and the Court's final order and
final judgment, regardless of whether they objected to the
settlement, even if the Rule 23 Class Member or FLSA Class Member
previously initiated or subsequently initiates any litigation
against any or all of the Released Parties relating to Released
Claims.

In the event the Court does not grant final approval of the
settlement, or for any reason the parties fail to obtain a final
order and final judgment pursuant to the Amended Agreement, or the
Amended Agreement is terminated pursuant to its terms for any
reason, then the conditional certification of the class action and
collective action shall be automatically vacated, and this
litigation shall proceed as though the class and collective action
had never been certified and such findings had never been made.

The Court appointed CPT Group as the Claims Administrator to help
implement the terms of the Amended Agreement.

A Final Approval Fairness Hearing will be held before this Court on
Tuesday, March 3, 2020, 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 2, 5th Floor at 280
South First Street, San Jose, California to determine the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement and whether
it should be finally approved, including its provision for payment
of service awards to each of the named plaintiffs, as well as Class
Counsel's request for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses. The
Final Approval Fairness Hearing may be postponed, adjourned, or
continued by order of the Court without further notice to the Class
Members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3kohpry from Leagle.com

Rodrigo Camilo, an individual, Alvaro Camilo, an individual,
Ricardo Sanchez, an individual & Jose Manuel Lopez, an individual,
Plaintiffs, represented by James Dal Bon -- jdb@wagedefenders.com -
Law Offices of James Dal Bon, 2625 Middlefield Road #600 Palo Alto,
CA 94306 & Victoria L.H. Booke , Law Offices of Booke & Ajlouny,
LLP, 606 N. First Street, San Jose, CA 95122

Severo C Ozuna, an individual & Don Vito Ozuna Food Corporation, a
California Corporation, Defendants, represented by Julian Pardo De
Zela -- julian.pardo.de.zela@svelf.com -- SV Employment Law Firm PC
& Stacey Ann Zartler -- szartler@svelf.com -- Berliner Cohen.


EATON CORP: 2nd Circuit Affirms Dismissal of SC Retirement Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SOUTH CAROLINA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS GROUP TRUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant, STEAMFITTERS LOCAL 449 PENSION PLAN,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, HELENE
GABRIELE, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. EATON CORPORATION PLC, ALEXANDER CUTLER,
RICHARD FEARON, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-2450-cv (2d
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the District Court dismissing the Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff-Appellant South Carolina Retirement Systems Group Trust,
the Lead Plaintiff in a putative securities class action,
challenges the District Court's dismissal of its Complaint against
Eaton and two of its executives, Alexander M. Cutler and Richard H.
Fearon.  The Plaintiff argues that its complaint adequately states
a claim for relief under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

The Plaintiff argues that its complaint plausibly alleged that the
Defendants intentionally misrepresented and omitted material
information about Eaton's vehicle business.  Specifically, it
argues that the Defendants misled investors about the possibility
that Eaton could divest its vehicle business after its merger with
Cooper Industries plc.  The District Court disagreed and dismissed
the complaint.

The Appellate Court now concludes that the District Court was
correct to dismiss, reaching only the issue of whether there were
any material misrepresentations or omissions.  It finds there were
none, and affirms the dismissal of the complaint on that ground
alone.

The Plaintiff alleges 10 misrepresentations or omissions in its
complaint.  

     a. May 21, 2012 Conference Call Statement 1: The Plaintiff
argues that Cutler misleadingly answered a question about Eaton's
"portfolio evolution over time" in failing to state that Eaton
would be subject to a tax burden if it divested from its vehicle
business within five years of the merger.

     b. May 21, 2012 Conference Call Statement 2: The Plaintiff
argues that Cutler misleadingly answered a question about whether
Eaton was precluded by any element of the tax structure of the deal
from spinning off the vehicle business, because he failed to
mention that no tax-free spin-off would be possible.  It maintains
that the omission was an attempt by Cutler to avoid admitting
Eaton's potential tax liability from any spin-off.

     c. June 22, 2012 Preliminary Proxy Statement: The Plaintiff
faults Eaton for stating in an SEC filing that it did not omit
anything likely to affect the import of information provided.  It
argues that the filing, in fact, omitted information regarding
Eaton's ability to conduct a tax-free spin-off.

     d. Sept. 14, 2012 Proxy Statement: The Plaintiff argues that,
in a second SEC filing, Eaton misleadingly stated that its merger
with Cooper increased global liquidity and free global cash flow
among the various entities of the combined enterprise without
negative tax effects.

     e. Oct. 31, 2012 Earnings Call: The Plaintiff argues that
Cutler, in responding to a question about whether Eaton faced
anything from a regulatory basis that would prevent one from doing
additional divestures, misleadingly answered in the negative.

     f. Nov. 13, 2012 Goldman Sachs Conference: The Plaintiff
argues that Cutler misleadingly stated that there is nothing
structural in their deal structure or any of their covenants that
prevents them from making changes in their portfolio.

     g. Feb. 5, 2013 Earnings Call: The Plaintiff argues that
Cutler's statement that they like the portfolio they're with, was
misleading because it suggested that Eaton chose not to divest when
in fact Eaton was prevented from divesting by tax consequences.

     h. May 21, 2013 EPG Conference: In response to a question
about whether Eaton was constrained in things it might do
strategically, whether that were a larger-scale divestiture or
anything else" because of its "tax structure," Cutler said on the
tax issue, no, further noting, they've got great flexibility in
terms of how they are able to move cash around the world.  The
Plaintiff argues that this was misleading and that Eaton's "tax
structure" constrained its ability to undertake a "larger-scale
divestiture.

     i. June 12, 2013 Press Release: The Plaintiff argues that
Eaton's press release -- straight-forwardly entitled "Eaton Not in
Discussions to Sell its Automotive Business" -- was misleading in
omitting any reference to the potential tax effects of such a
sale.

     j. Nov. 13, 2013 Goldman Sachs Conference: The Plaintiff
argues that when Fearon was asked whether Eaton viewed its vehicle
business as a "sacred cow" or whether it would consider divesting
from it, it was misleading.  It argues that, by failing to disclose
the tax consequences of divestiture, Fearon misleadingly suggested
that Eaton's commitment to the vehicle business was a choice.

The Appellate Court has considered each in turn and concluded that
no material misrepresentation or omission occurred.  Because it
identified no material misrepresentation or omission among the 10
statements highlighted by Plaintiff, it concluded that Plaintiff
failed to state a plausible claim for securities fraud.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Summary Order is
available at https://is.gd/OoKwcP from Leagle.com.

THOMAS A. DUBBS -- tdubbs@labaton.com -- Louis Gottlieb, Jeffrey A.
Dubbin, Labaton Sucharow LLP, New York, NY, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

JAMES E. BRANDT -- james.brandt@lw.com -- Jeff G. Hammel, Latham &
Watkins LLP, New York, NY; Roman Martinez, Benjamin W. Snyder,
Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.


EAZE SOLUTIONS: Court Orders Arbitration in Williams TCPA Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California issued an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the case captioned FARRAH WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v.
EAZE SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-02598-JD (N.D.
Cal.).

In this putative class action, plaintiff Farrah Williams alleges
that defendant Eaze Solutions violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA), by sending her unsolicited, autodialed text
messages. The parties do not dispute the salient facts. Eaze
operates a marijuana mobile application (app) and online
marketplace. The app facilitates the delivery of cannabis products
from dispensaries to consumers. Williams signed up for Eaze's
service. Before creating her Eaze account, Williams checked a box
consenting to Eaze's terms of service.

Eaze seeks to compel arbitration of her claims pursuant to its
terms of service.

LEGAL STANDARD

The parties disagree about the governing legal standards. Eaze says
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies for two reasons: (1)
the terms of service state that the Federal Arbitration Act will
govern the interpretation and enforcement of its dispute resolution
provisions and (2) the contract involves interstate commerce as
contemplated by the FAA.  

Williams contends that California law controls because: (1) the
terms of service state the parties' agreement will be governed by
the laws of the State of California and (2) the contract does not
involve interstate commerce.

The TCPA allegations in the complaint also depend on the presence
of interstate commerce. The TCPA was passed under Congress's
Commerce Clause power.

Williams alleges Eaze has violated the TCPA by harassing her with
text messages, and she seeks to represent a nationwide class. The
federal and nationwide claims in this case again require that Eaze
be engaged in interstate commerce.

Consequently, the FAA controls. The parties could have agreed
otherwise, but they did not do so. The terms of service expressly
state that the Federal Arbitration Act will govern the
interpretation and enforcement of the dispute resolution section.
While the contract contains a more general choice-of-law provision
that opts for California law, it is the specific provision
designating the FAA that governs arbitration.   

CONTRACT FORMATION

The parties dispute yet again what law should be used to resolve
the contract formation question. Eaze says that, under the FAA, the
issue should be delegated to an arbitrator.   
Williams says that California law controls, and that the
agreement's unlawful object to facilitate marijuana distribution
and use means a contract was never formed.  

Starting with Williams's position, it is important to understand
that, under California law, a contract that has an unlawful object
is deemed void and unenforceable, not that it was never formed.
Williams argues California Civil Code Section 1550, which states
that it is essential to the existence of a contract that there
should be: (1) Parties capable of contracting (2) Their consent (3)
A lawful object and(4) A sufficient cause or consideration, means
no contract was ever formed. She also cites an unpublished
California Court of Appeal decision equating these factors with
contract formation principles.  

But the California Code and decisions by the state Supreme Court
critically undermine Williams's argument. These sources, some of
which Williams herself cites, definitively establish that the
consequence under California law of an unlawful object is not that
a contract was not formed, but that the contract cannot be
enforced. Williams mentions some arguably different opinions by
California appellate courts and federal courts, but they are not
controlling authorities.

Eaze's argument takes a step further to suggest that the Supreme
Court has applied substantive federal law to determine whether an
issue is nondelegable. On this view, questions going to whether a
contract has been concluded are limited to whether a contract was
signed, whether the signor had authority, and whether the signor
possessed the mental capacity to assent and do not include issues
related to legality.  

But the Court need not decide whether California or federal law
determines the effect of a contract's illegality because the answer
is the same under both regimes. No other formation challenges are
presented here.

THE DELEGATION CLAUSE

The parties agreed to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the
arbitration agreement. Under the Supreme Court's decision in
Rent-A-Center, Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72. Williams must
challenge the delegation provision itself since any challenge to
the validity of the Agreement as a whole is for the arbitrator.  

Here, the arbitration clause provides that any dispute, claim or
controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity
thereof or the use of the Service or Application (Disputes) will be
settled by binding arbitration. There is no challenge to the
delegation provision here and, so the Court will treat it as valid
under Section 2, and must enforce it under Sections 3 and 4,
leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole
for the arbitrator.

The Court declines to consider whether the arbitration clause
itself is unconscionable because that question was delegated under
the terms of service, and Williams did not challenge the
delegation.  

Eaze's motion to compel arbitration of Williams's claims is
granted.  Williams's motion for a sur-reply is denied. The case is
dismissed, rules the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/y5h3erns  from Leagle.com

Farrah Williams, Plaintiff, represented by David William Hall -
dhall@hedinhall.com - Hedin Hall LLP & Frank S. Hedin -
fhedin@hedinhall.com - Hedin Hall LLP.

Eaze Solutions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Albert Quoc Giang ,
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP & Michael Dietz Roth , Boies Schiller
Flexner LLP, 725 S Figueroa Street, 31st Floor Los Angeles, CA
90017.

ELIE TAHARI: Dominguez Files ADA Class Action in NY
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Elie Tahari, Ltd. The
case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez and on behalf of all others
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Elie Tahari, Ltd.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11183 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Elie Tahari Limited retails luxury clothes for both men and women.
The Company offers its products both online and through its retail
stores worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


EMPOWER HEALTHCARE: Court Dismisses King FLSA Suit with Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kristine G. Baker of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, Western Division, dismissed the case, QUIANA
KING, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, v. EMPOWER HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, LLC, and BEACON HEALTH
OPTIONS, INC., Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-00456 KGB (E.D. Ark.),
with prejudice.

The parties' filed the Court their joint stipulation of dismissal
with prejudice.  For good cause shown, the Judge adopted the
stipulation of dismissal.  The Court has not certified a collective
or class action in the case, nor does the settlement agreement
purport to resolve any claims on behalf of any collective or class,
according to all the counsel.   

Each party will bear its own costs and fees to the extent not
otherwise provided for in the settlement agreement between the
parties.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/Mdyr0c from Leagle.com.

Quiana King, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Sanford --
josh@sanfordlawfirm.com -- Sanford Law Firm & Sean Short --
sean@sanfordlawfirm.com -- Sanford Law Firm.

Empower Healthcare Solutions LLC & Beacon Health Options Inc,
Defendants, represented by Louisa J. Johnson --
lojohnson@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


ENAGIC USA: Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Sought
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as EDWARD MAKARON, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, vs.
ENAGIC USA, INC., the Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-05145-DDP-E (C.D.
Cal., Nov. 29, 2019), the Plaintiff will move the Court on January
13, 2019, for an order granting final approval of class action
settlement.

Enagic USA manufactures water purification equipment. The company
offers water filtration machine and other related products.[BN]

Attorneys for Plaintiff and all others similarly situated are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          Thomas E. Wheeler, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          324 S Beverly Blvd, Suite 725
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (888) 595-9111
          Facsimile: (866) 633-0228
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                  abacon@toddflaw.com
                  twheeler@toddflaw.com

FAIRWAY GOLF: Class Certification in Medina Suit Affirmed
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELVIN MEDINA, ETC., Respondent, v. FAIRWAY GOLF
MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL., Defendants, MILL POND COUNTRY CLUB
CATERERS, INC., ET AL., Appellants, Case No. 2017-11586, Index No.
607829/15 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, Second Department, affirmed the order of the
Supreme Court, Nassau County (Stephen A. Bucaria, J.), entered Aug.
8, 2017, granting the Plaintiff's motion for class certification
pursuant to CPLR article 9.

The Plaintiff, a catering service employee, commenced the action to
recover damages for violations of Labor Law Section 196-d.  He
alleged that the Defendants, owners and operators of a golf course
and its food and beverage catering operation, improperly retained
mandatory service charges that were imposed upon customers for
catered events, which customers would reasonably believe were
gratuities for the catering employees.  The Plaintiff moved for
class certification pursuant to CPLR article 9.  The Supreme Court
granted the motion.  Defendants Mill Pond Country Club Caterers,
Inc., John Rossi, Anthony Gillespie, and Michael Danon appeal.

The Appellate Court agrees with the Supreme Court's determination
that the Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of CPLR 901(a).
Contrary to the Appellants' contention, the Plaintiff demonstrated
that his claim arose out of the same course of conduct and is based
on the same theories as the other class members.  It is not
necessary that the claims of the named Plaintiff be identical to
those of the class or that the named Plaintiff be able to assert
all the claims made on behalf of the class.  In addition, the
evidence established that the Plaintiff, and his counsel, would
adequately represent the class.  Contrary to the Appellants'
further contention, the Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to
satisfy the minimal threshold of establishing that his claim was
not a sham.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court agreed with the Supreme Court's
determination to grant the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification and affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 13, 2019 Decision & Order is
available at https://is.gd/sPTau7 from Leagle.com.

Silverman Acampora, LLP, Jericho, NY (Brian J. Shenker --
TheFirm@SilvermanAcampora.com -- and Alan B. Pearl of counsel), for
appellants.

Leeds Brown Law, P.C., Carle Place, NY (Suzanne B. Klein, Brett R.
Cohen, Jeffrey K. Brown, and Michael A. Tompkins of counsel), for
respondent.


FAMILY RANCH: Alvino Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages and Penalties
----------------------------------------------------------------
Manuel Alberto Alvino, as an individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. FAMILY RANCH, INC., a California corporation;
FAMILY TREE FARMS, INC., a California corporation; BALOIAN PACING
CO., INC., a California corporation; LANDBOUW RANCHES, LLC, a
California limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 100, Case
No. 19CECG04356 (Cal. Super. Ct., Fresno Cty., Dec. 5, 2019), is
brought for recovery of unpaid wages and penalties under the
California Business & Professions Code.

The Plaintiff says he was in most workweeks paid on a piece-rate
basis, whereby he was paid a set rate per bag filled with onions.
The Defendants' foreperson allegedly recorded the hours the
Plaintiff worked, however, the Plaintiff was only paid an hourly
minimum wages if his earned piece-rate compensation did not exceed
his minimum wages earned in a pay period. The Plaintiff and other
non-exempt employees also were not authorized to take all legally
required rest periods regardless of whether they were working on a
piece-rate or hourly basis, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a non-exempt farm
labor employee in the position of "Topper".

The Defendants are in the agricultural business and employee
seasonal farm labor employees to harvest agricultural goods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Daniel J. Brown, Esq.
          STANSBURY BROWN LAW
          2610 1/2 Abbot Kinney Blvd.
          Venice, CA  90291
          Phone: 323-207-5925
          Fax: (310) 410-0800
          Email: dbrown@stansburybrownlaw.com


FAT BRAIN TOYS: Guglielmo Files Class Suit Under ADA
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Fat Brain Toys, LLC.
The case is styled as Joseph Guglielmo, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Fat Brain Toys, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11196 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Fat Brain Toys is a United States manufacturer and retailer of
educational toys and games.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic St., Suite 5
          Hakensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com



FEDCHEX RECOVERY: Castle Seeks to Certify Illinois Residents Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as BONNIE J. CASTLE,
individually and on behalf of a nationwide class of similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiff, vs. FEDCHEX RECOVERY, LLC
d/b/a FCR COLLECTION SERVICES, the Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-06441 (N.D. Ill.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all residents of the state of Illinois who were sent
      collection letters from Defendant, where Defendant's name
      was visible on the face of the envelope that contained the
      collection letters within the last year";

   2. appointing the Plaintiff as Class Representative; and

   3. appointing James C. Vlahakis as Class Counsel.

On or about September 6, 2019, the Defendant sent Plaintiff a
collection letter in an attempt to collect a purported medical debt
that was incurred for personal use.

The gist of the Class Action Complaint is that the envelope used by
Defendant to mail the collection letter violates Section 1692f(8)
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.[CC]

Attorney for the Plaintiff are:

          James C. Vlahakis, Esq.
          2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Telephone: 630 581-5456
          Facsimile: 630 575-8188
          E-mail: jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com

FH CANN: Violates FDCPA When Collecting Debt, Fredrick Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Keith Fredrick, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. F.H. CANN & ASSOCIATES, INC., Case No.
2:19-cv-01784-JPS (E.D. Wisc., Dec. 5, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's practices, which violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, when attempting to collect consumer debts.

The Defendant mailed or caused to be mailed a letter dated December
5, 2018, to the Plaintiff. The Letter contends that the Plaintiff
owes a debt. The Letter stated the Plaintiff's loans could be
removed from default by completing the Federal Student Loan
Rehabilitation Program.

The Letter stated in relevant part: Completion of the
Rehabilitation Program will remove you from the Treasury Offset
Program and Administrative Wage Garnishment, which will prevent
your taxes from being offset, prevent SSI/SSDI benefits from being
garnished at up to 15%, and prevent involuntary payments of up to
15% of your wages.

The Plaintiff contends that the statement is false, deceptive, and
misleading as the law only permits wage garnishment of up to 15% of
the Plaintiff's disposable pay. By failing to state that the cap on
garnishment was 15% of disposable pay, the Defendant falsely
represented that a larger amount of the Plaintiff's pay was subject
to garnishment than is actually permitted by law, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, who was a citizen of and resided
in the Village of Elkhart Lake, Sheboygan County, Wisconsin.

F.H. CANN regularly engages in the collection of defaulted consumer
debts or allegedly defaulted consumer debts owed to others.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Francis R. Greene, Esq.
          Philip D. Stern, Esq.
          Andrew T. Thomasson, Esq.
          STERN THOMASSON LLP
          3010 South Appleton Road
          Menasha, WI 54952
          Phone (973) 379-7500
          Email: Philip@SternThomasson.com
                 Andrew@SternThomasson.com
                 Francis@SternThomasson.com


FILOBLU USA: Faces Mahoney ADA Class Action in Pa.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FILOBLU USA, CORP.
The case is styled as JOHN MAHONEY ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. FILOBLU USA, CORP.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05761-TJS (E.D. Pa., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

FiloBlu is a business accelerator for brands and retailers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
          GLANZBERG TOBIA & ASSOCIATES PC
          123 S. BROAD STREET SUITE 1640
          PHILADELPHIA, PA 19109
          Phone: (215) 981-5400
          Email: dglanzberg@aol.com



FIRST ADVANTAGE: Dossett FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. Georgia
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as James Dossett on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. First Advantage Background
Services Corp., Defendant, Case No. 2019CV328090 was removed from
Fulton Superior Court, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia on Dec. 5, 2019, and assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-05497-SDG-CMS.

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

First Advantage Background Services Corp. was founded in 2003. The
Company's line of business includes providing detective, guard, and
armored car services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          E. Michelle Drake, Esq.
          John G. Albanese, Esq.
          Berger & Montague, P.C. -MN
          43 SE Main Street, Suite 505
          Minneapolis, MN 55414
          Phone: (612) 594-5999
          Fax: (612) 584-4470
          Email: emdrake@bm.net
                 jalbanese@bm.net

               - and -

          Gary B. Andrews, Jr. , Esq.
          Blake Andrews Law Firm, LLC
          1831 Timothy Dr.
          Atlanta, GA 30329
          Phone: (770) 828-6225
          Email: blake@blakeandrewslaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Connor McGinnis Bateman, Esq.
          Esther Slater McDonald, Esq.
          Frederick Thomas Smith, Esq.
          Seyfarth Shaw, LLP-Atl
          1075 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2500
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Phone: (404) 885-1500
          Fax: (404) 892-7056
          Email: cbateman@seyfarth.com
                 emcdonald@seyfarth.com
                 fsmith@seyfarth.com


FIRST COUNTY BANK: Moskowitz Sues Over Charging of NSF & OD Fees
----------------------------------------------------------------
Craig Moskowitz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. FIRST COUNTY BANK, Case No. 3:19-cv-01920-AVC (D.
Conn., Dec. 5, 2019), arises from the Bank's routine practice of:

   (a) assessing more than one insufficient funds fee ("NSF Fee")
       on the same item; and

   (b) charging both NSF Fees and overdraft fees ("OD Fees") on
       the same item.

These practices breach contractual promises, violate the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and/or result in the Bank being
unjustly enriched, the Plaintiff alleges. The Defendant's customers
have been injured by its improper practices to the tune of millions
of dollars bilked from their accounts in violation of their
agreements with the Defendant.

The Defendant's Account Documents allow it to charge a single NSF
Fee or a single OD Fee when an item, including an electronic
payment item, is returned for insufficient funds or paid into
insufficient funds. The Defendant breaches its contract when it
charges more than one NSF Fee on the same item, since the contract
explicitly states--and reasonable consumers understand--that the
same item can only incur a single NSF or OD Fee, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Stamford, Connecticut, and holds a
First County checking account.

The Defendant is engaged in the business of providing retail
banking services to consumers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James E. Miller, Esq.
          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLP
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Phone: 860-526-1100
          Facsimile: 866-300-7367
          Email: jmiller@sfmslaw.com
                 lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

               –and–

          Jeffrey Kaliel, Esq.
          KALIEL PLLC
          1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, 10th Floor
          Washington, DC 20009
          Phone: (202) 350-4783
          Facsimile: (202) 871-8180
          Email: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com

               - and -

          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan Streisfeld, Esq.
          Daniel E. Tropin, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One West Las Olas, Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          Email: ostrow@kolawyers.com
                 streisfeld@kolawyers.com
                 tropin@kolawyers.com


FIRST NATIONAL: Bid to Compel Doc Production in Lundquist Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAMERON LUNDQUIST, an individual, and LEEANA LARA, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA, a New Hampshire Corporation, and LM GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, and CCC INFORMATION SERVICES
INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18-5301
RJB (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, denied the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents Relating to
Regulatory Action, Customer Complaints, and other Lawsuits.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendants' practice of using unexplained and unjustified condition
adjustments to comparable vehicles when valuing a total loss claim
for a vehicle, violates the Washington Administrative Code ("WAC"),
specifically WAC 284-30-391 (4)(b) and (5)(d), and so constitutes:
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, (3) violation of Washington's Consumer
Protection Act ("CPA") and (4) civil conspiracy.  The Plaintiffs
seek damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees
and costs.

The class has not been certified.  The Second Amended Complaint
proposes to define the class as all individuals insured by First
National and LMGIC under a private passenger vehicle policy who,
from the earliest allowable time to the date of judgment, received
a first-party total loss settlement or settlement offer based in
whole or in part on the price of comparable vehicles reduced by a
condition adjustment.

The parties have exchanged written discovery and produced thousands
of pages of documents.  As part of that written discovery, the
Plaintiffs propounded requests for production and the interrogatory
that is at issue.

They are as follows:

     (1) Please provide all documents and electronically stored
information ("ESI") relating to any previous dispute or discussion
about First National's application of condition adjustments to the
values of comparable vehicles use to value total loss claims.

     (2) Produce all documents and ESI relating to investigations,
complaints, citations, fines, rebukes or penalties from or by
municipal, state or federal agencies, including but not limited to
any state government agencies overseeing auto coverage insurance,
regarding the application of condition adjustments to the values of
comparable vehicles used to value total loss claim payments to
insureds in first-party motor vehicle total loss claims and
business practices related thereto.

     (3) Produce all documents and ESI concerning prior lawsuits,
in the relevant time period filed against the Defendants concerning
their application of condition adjustments to the values of
comparable vehicles used to value total loss claim payments to
insureds in first-party motor vehicle total loss claims.

     (4) Produce all documents and ESI relating to complaints made
by customers (or their attorneys) concerning the application of
condition adjustments to the values of comparable vehicles used to
value total loss claim payments to insureds in first-party motor
vehicle total loss claims.

     (5) Please produce any and all documents relating to
applicable state methodologies used for requesting, obtaining,
and/or generating total loss valuation reports as that term is used
in the CCC Valuescope claim services product schedule.

     (6) Please list all states where, as a general practice, First
National and/or LM General value total loss claims based upon
valuation reports from CCC Information Services that do not contain
condition adjustments applied to the values of comparable
vehicles.

On Oct. 5, 2018, the Insurer Defendants objected to those discovery
requests to the extent they seek information for activities outside
of Washington and agreed to provide the discovery that related to
Washington.  They began collecting their ESI in mid-February 2019
based on over 50 agreed search terms from 50 custodians.  They
finished the ESI collection process in April of 2019.  They began
producing documents on a rolling basis and their final production
to the Plaintiffs was on Sept. 9, 2019.  The Insurer Defendants did
not produce documents or information relating to complaints,
lawsuits, and activities, etc. outside of Washington.

The parties conferred several times over the last year and
attempted to resolve the issue of whether the out-of-state
information would be provided.  They were unable to come to a
resolution.  The instant motion followed.

The deadline for the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is
Jan. 31, 2020, the fact discovery deadline is July 31, 2020, the
dispositive motions deadline is Aug. 13, 2020, and the trial is set
to begin on Nov. 16, 2020.

Judge Bryan holds that the Plaintiffs' motion to compel should be
denied.  Even broadly construing the term "relevant," the
information sought is not relevant to any parties' claims or
defenses.  The claims asserted are for a proposed Washington class
and are made under Washington law.  The Insurer Defendants properly
point out that information from out-of-state related activities for
different policy holders under different standards and applicable
state laws are not relevant to the issues presented.

Further, the Insurer Defendants have shown that the discovery
sought is not proportional to the needs of case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information,
the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.  Moreover, the
Insurer Defendants point out that the Plaintiffs' request for
production regarding lawsuits are materials that are publicly
available.

Finally, to the extent the Insurer Defendants move for an award of
expenses, the motion should be denied.  The motion to compel was
substantially justified.  An award of expenses would be unjust.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bryan denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Compel Production of Documents Relating to Regulatory Action,
Customer Complaints, and other Lawsuits.  To the extent the Insurer
Defendants move for an award of expenses, that motion is denied.
No award of expenses shall be made.  The Clerk is directed to send
uncertified copies of the Order to all the counsel of record and to
any party appearing pro se at said party's last known address.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ANgOfC from Leagle.com.

Cameron Lundquist, an individual, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated & Leeana Lara, Plaintiffs, represented
by
Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL
SHAPIRO
LLP, David L. Woloshin, ASTOR WEISS KAPLAN & MANDEL, LLP, pro hac
vice, Dina S. Ronsayro, ASTOR WEISS KAPLAN & MANDEL, LLP, The
Bellevue Suite 600, 200 South Broad Street, Philadelphia, PA
19102,
pro hac vice, John M. DeStefano -- johnd@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS
BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, pro hac vice, Marc A. Goldich, AXLER
GOLDICH LLC, 1520 Locust Street, Suite 301 Philadelphia, PA 19102,
pro hac vice & Robert B. Carey -- rob@hbsslaw.com -- HAGENS BERMAN
SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP, pro hac vice.

First National Insurance Company of America, a New Hampshire
Corporation & LM General Insurance Company, Defendants,
represented
by Casey Grabenstein -- casey.grabenstein@saul.com -- SAUL EWING
ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP, pro hac vice, James A. Morsch --
jim.morsch@saul.com -- SAUL EWING ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP, pro hac
vice, John Michael Silk- silk@wscd.com -- WILSON SMITH COCHRAN &
DICKERSON & Kellie Y. Chen -- kellie.chen@saul.com -- SAUL EWING
ARNSTEIN & LEHR LLP, pro hac vice.

CCC Information Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Kathleen
M. O'Sullivan -KOSullivan@perkinscoie.com -- PERKINS COIE, Jason
R.
Burt -- jason.burt@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS, pro hac vice,
Kathleen P. Lally -- kathleen.lally@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS,
pro
hac vice, Marguerite M. Sullivan -- marguerite.sullivan@lw.com --
LATHAM & WATKINS, pro hac vice & Steven J. Pacini --
steven.pacini@lw.com -- LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, pro hac vice.


FLAGSTAR BANK: Court Certifies Class in Kivett Suit
---------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM KIVETT, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, a federal
savings bank, and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. C
18-05131 WHA (N.D. Cal.), Judge William Alsup of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' (i) motion for class certification and (ii) motion for
new Plaintiffs to intervene with leave to amend the complaint.

In 2010, the enshrinement of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act changed the federal preemption scheme for
banks and federal savings associations.  In 2018, the states' Court
of Appeals relied on the change to hold that the National Bank Act
-- which governs national banks -- did not preempt Section
2954.8(a).  Judge Edward Chen has since certified for interlocutory
appeal the question of whether the Home Owners' Loan Act preempts
state law claims.

The civil action began in April 2018, filed by Lowell and Gina
Smith.  The Smiths alleged that in October 2004, they had obtained
a mortgage loan to finance their purchase of real property located
in California.  The Smiths had executed a deed of trust as security
for the loan.  The deed of trust called for the establishment of an
escrow impound account and required that interest be paid on funds
in the escrow account if doing so was required by applicable law.
Flagstar then took over the servicing of the Smiths' mortgage
account and remained the loan servicer until August 2015.  No
interest accrued on the funds.

The Smiths' complaint alleged two claims against Flagstar: (i)
breach of contract, and (ii) violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law.  In August 2018, a Rule 12 order dismissed that
complaint without prejudice due to the Smiths' failure to comply
with a threshold notice-and-cure requirement provided by the deed
of trust.  Judgment then entered in favor of Flagstar and against
the Smiths.

The Smiths quickly provided Flagstar written notice and an
opportunity to cure, which Flagstar refused.  Having fixed the cure
issue, the Smiths filed the instant suit, alleging the same claims
on the same facts as before.

In October 2018, Kivett came in as another Plaintiff.  He only
alleged a violation of Section 17200.  He alleged that he had
obtained a mortgage loan from Flagstar in September 2012.  Flagstar
serviced his loan from the loan's inception in 2012 until he
refinanced with another institution in April 2015.  Flagstar held
his money in an escrow account during that time.  No interest
accrued on the account. In September 2018, Plaintiff Kivett gave
written notice and demand for cure, which Flagstar denied.

In December 2018, a case management schedule set a deadline of Jan.
30, 2019, for leave to add any new parties or to amend the
pleadings.  Rule 12 practice followed as to the Smiths but not to
Plaintiff Kivett.  In February 2019, an order converted Flagstar's
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d).

At bottom, Flagstar's motion presented a threshold issue as to
whether or not the Home Owners' Loan Act preempted the Smiths'
claims.  To be clear, the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010
had generally ended HOLA preemption.  The Smiths had obtained their
mortgage in October 2004.

The preemption argument veered outside the complaint.  Flagstar
sought judicial notice of the Smiths' promissory note to establish
that Flagstar participated in the origination of the Smiths' loan
and became its original servicer immediately after origination.
The Smiths, however, countered that the deed of trust clearly
identified Wholesale America Mortgage as the lender, not Flagstar.
Owing to the importance of the factual question and because matters
outside the pleading were presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion to dismiss became one for summary judgment.

Following discovery and further briefing, summary judgment issued
in favor of Flagstar.  In brief, the order hewed to a practical
construction of the Dodd-Frank Act's phrase "entered into,"
determining that even though Flagstar had not directly entered into
the contract with the Smiths, it sufficed that Flagstar had
participated in the origination of the Smiths' loan in 2004.  Put
simply, the Smiths' claims were still preempted by the Home Owners'
Loan Act.  With the Smiths out of the picture, the sole surviving
plaintiff and claim in this action became plaintiff Kivett and his
claim under Section 17200.  This brings the Court to the two
instant motions.

First, Plaintiff Kivett seeks to certify a single class of 125,189
Flagstar customers who, from April 18, 2014, onward, have not
received two percent interest on the amounts Flagstar held in their
mortgage escrow accounts.  More specifically, he seeks to certify
the following class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3): All persons who on
or after April 18, 2014 had mortgage loans serviced by Flagstar
Bank FSB (Flagstar) on 1-4 unit residential properties in
California and paid Flagstar money in advance to hold in escrow for
the payment of taxes and assessments on the property, for
insurance, or for other purposes relating to the property, but did
not receive interest on the amounts held by Flagstar in their
escrow accounts (excluding, however, any such persons whose
mortgage loans originated on or before July 21, 2010).  Kivett
seeks to represent will be within the four-year statute of
limitations counting from the filing of the complaint in the first
action.  

Flagstar opposes Kivett's motion for class certification, training
all its fire on one Rule 23 element: predominance.

Second, Kivett also moves for Bernard and Lisa Bravo to intervene
in this action and to amend the complaint.  The primary purpose for
the motion is to add a class member currently serviced by Flagstar
to ensure standing for an injunction and a class under Rule
23(b)(2), as plaintiff Kivett has not been a Flagstar customer
since 2015.  Kivett moved for the Bravos to intervene on August 20.
The deadline to add any new parties was January 30.

Kivett's instant motion for class certification only seeks
certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3).  It differs from the
operative complaint, which sought certification of a class under
both Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).  Kivett never moved to
certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2).  As such, Judge Alsup only
assessed certification under Rule 23(b)(3), and whether or not it
is too late for new Plaintiffs to intervene.

The Judge holds that the prior Smith order erred when it dismissed
the statutory claim under the deed of trust's notice-and-cure
provision.  That requirement did not apply to the statutory claim
at issue.  The tolling of class claims therefore began from April
18, 2014.  Furthermore, the notice-and-cure provision is not an
individualized inquiry, because it is not an inquiry in the instnat
case at all.  The Judge now proceeds to the instant motions.

Flagstar does not contest that any of the Rule 23(a) requirements
have been met here.  Indeed, Kivett has sufficiently established
each element.  The class would comprise 125,189 California
borrowers, the sole claim at issue stems from Flagstar's purported
obligation to pay interest on every class member's mortgage loan,
and the named Plaintiff suffers the identical injury as the rest of
the class, namely that his escrow account never received an
interest payment.  Furthermore, the class definition is tailored so
that no class member would be subject to HOLA field preemption or
Section 17200's statute of limitations.  It sufficiently satisfies
the elements of numerosity, commonality, and typicality, as
required by Rule 23(a)(1)-(3).  The Judge also finds Kivett and his
counsel to be adequate representatives as required by Rule
23(a)(4).

Flagstar does not contest that it is both manageable and superior
to allow the case to proceed as a class action.  Indeed, Flagstar's
mortgage records provide current or former home addresses, phone
numbers, and social security numbers for all class members, and the
low individual restitution amounts are readily calculable based on
Flagstar's data.  What Flagstar does contest, however, is whether
common issues predominate.

The Judge holds that it is a classic and textbook issue of the
class action device.  The law required interest to be paid but the
savings association did not do so to its borrowers, all allegedly
cheated by the savings association.  These borrowers now join
together to vindicate their right to interest under the law.  The
miscellaneous differences thrown out by the savings association are
just that -- miscellaneous -- and cannot obfuscate the main point
that the savings association allegedly cheated thousands of
borrowers out of the interest due to them and pocketed the money
for itself.  It is hard to imagine a case worthier of class
treatment.

Finally, the Judge holds that the prejudice Flagstar props up does
not suffice to turn the Bravos away.  Moreover, the Bravos have
already provided Flagstar all their mortgage related documents, and
have offered to appear for deposition upon request.  Further,
Flagstar's argument that amendment would be futile because the
proposed class can never seek prospective injunctive relief fails.
Under Flagstar's theory, not every class member is a current
Flagstar customer and so because the entire class cannot be
entitled to injunctive relief, no class can be entitled to
injunctive relief.  Even assuming Flagstar's argument to be true, a
separate sub-class under Rule 23(b)(2) can be certified for all
class members who are currently serviced by Flagstar.  For these
reasons, Kivett's motion to intervene and for leave to amend the
complaint will be granted.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Alsup granted the Plaintiff's motion
for class certification.  He certified the following class: All
persons who on or after April 18, 2014 had mortgage loans serviced
by Flagstar Bank FSB (Flagstar) on 1-4 unit residential properties
in California and paid Flagstar money in advance to hold in escrow
for the payment of taxes and assessments on the property, for
insurance, or for other purposes relating to the property, but did
not receive interest on the amounts held by Flagstar in their
escrow accounts (excluding, however, any such persons whose
mortgage loans originated on or before July 21, 2010).

The class definition will apply for all purposes, including
settlement.  The class is certified as to Kivett's Section 17200
claim, except for prospective injunctive relief.

Kivett is appointed as the class representative.  His counsel from
Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and the Law Office of Peter Fredman
PC are appointed as the class counsel.

The Judge provisionally granted the Plaintiff's motion for new
Plaintiffs to intervene and for leave to amend to add new class
representatives.  The Defendant will have until Jan. 20, 2010 to
show cause why the Bravos should not be authorized to co-represent
the class.  The Plaintiff's counsel will promptly make the Bravos
available for depositions on or before Dec. 6, 2019, and will
produce their records by that date.  By Jan. 2, 2020, both sides
will submit a proposed form of notice to the class with a plan of
distribution by first-class mail.

The Plaintiff also moved for an extension on the deadline to bring
dispositive motions.  To the extent stated, the Judge granted in
part that motion.  The deadline on dispositive motions was set for
Dec. 5, 2019.  All other deadlines remain in place.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ycvtNY from Leagle.com.

Lowell Smith & Gina Smith, Plaintiffs, represented by Fredman B.
Peter -- peter@peterfredmanlaw.com -- Law Office of Peter Fredman
PC & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

William Kivett, Plaintiff, represented by Fredman B. Peter, Law
Office of Peter Fredman PC & Thomas Eric Loeser, Hagens Berman
Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Flagstar Bank, FSB, Defendant, represented by Carolee Anne Hoover
-- choover@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, David Carlyle
Powell -- dpowell@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, Aaron
Robert Marienthal -- amarienthal@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods,
LLP, Alexander Jacob Gershen -- agershen@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP & Alicia Anne Baiardo -- abaiardo@mcguirewoods.com
-- McGuireWoods LLP.


FLORIDA: Unconstitutionality of Sections 11.066(3) & (4) Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER
SERVICES and FLORIDA COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE, Appellants, v.
JOSEPH DOLLIVER; NANCY DOLLIVER; JOHN KLOCKOW and DEANNA KLOCKOW,
Trustees of the Klockow Living Trust; CHARLES STROH; LOIS STROH;
THE CERTIFIED CLASS OF LEE COUNTY HOMEOWNERS; RAYMOND DELLASELVA;
MARY E. DELLASELVA; and MARIANNE J. SANSON, Trustee of the Marianne
J. Sanson Revocable Trust, Appellees, Case No. 2D18-1393 (Fla.
Dist. App.), Judge Morris Silberman of the District Court of Appeal
of Florida, Second District, affirmed the trial court's decision
declaring sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied to
the Lee Homeowners' takings judgments and in issuing a writ of
mandamus compelling payment.

The Florida Constitution provides in what is commonly referred to
as the "Takings Clause" that no private property will be taken
except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor
paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry of the
court and available to the owner.  The Appellants, a class of
homeowners in Lee Count, have spent 16 years fighting for their
constitutional rights to payment of compensation for the taking of
their property by the Florida Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services and the Florida Commissioner of Agriculture.

In this stage of these unnecessarily protracted proceedings, the
Lee Homeowners are pursuing enforcement of a 2014 final judgment
for $13,625,249.09 that was entered following a jury trial,
together with final judgments for attorney's fees and costs entered
in their favor in 2015 and 2016.  In 2016, the Court affirmed the
2014 final judgment, and the Department did not seek further review
in the Florida Supreme Court.  The Department also did not seek
appellate review of the judgments for fees and costs.

As a result of the Department's ongoing failure to pay the
outstanding final judgments, the Lee Homeowners returned to Court
to enforce the judgments.  Although the judgments have long been
final and the Department claimed that it would be happy to pay the
three judgments, the Department asserted that it is unable to make
payment until the legislature appropriates the funds as required by
sections 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (2015).  The Lee
Homeowners responded that the Department has refused to take
affirmative action to obtain an appropriation and has taken a
position that has resulted in the governor vetoing a legislative
appropriation that the Lee Homeowners had requested.  Further, the
Lee Homeowners argued that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are
unconstitutional as applied.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a thorough
order that addressed at length the Takings Clause, the pertinent
statutes, and the applicable case law, together with the evidence
that the parties presented. The court determined that sections
11.066(3) and (4) are unconstitutional as applied and issued a writ
of mandamus directing the Department to pay the judgments.  As the
court explained, to essentially argue that the Lee Homeowners
should just hope that someday, some year, the Legislature
eventually will pass an appropriation to cover the judgments, and
further that the governor finally will assent, while at the same
time doing absolutely nothing to secure such an appropriation, is a
specious argument.

Judge Silberman agreed with the trial court's well-reasoned
decision and affirmed.  After considering all arguments made by the
Department, he concluded that the trial court did not err in
declaring sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied to
the Lee Homeowners' takings judgments and in issuing a writ of
mandamus compelling payment.  Applying sections 11.066(3) and (4)
to prevent the trial court from issuing a writ of mandamus would
preclude the Lee Homeowners from securing their constitutional
rights to payment of full compensation under article X, section
6(a), of the Florida Constitution.  It would also allow the
legislature to control the amount of compensation, if any, that the
Lee Homeowners will actually receive in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine under article II, section 3; and the
power of the judiciary under article V, section 1.  The Judge
echoed the sentiment of the trial court that it cannot and will not
countenance further delays in securing payment to the Lee
Homeowners of the constitutionally-guaranteed full compensation
that was adjudicated to finality in the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 13, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/FdcJw9 from Leagle.com.

Wesley R. Parsons -- wparsons@cspalaw.com -- and Karen H. Curtis --
kcurtis@cspalaw.com -- of Clarke Silverglate, P.A., Miami, for
Appellants.

Robert C. Gilbert -- gilbert@kolawyers.com -- of Grossman Roth
Yaffa Cohen, P.A., Coral Gables; and Bruce S. Rogow and Tara
Campion of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellees.


GC SERVICES: Jawaid Files Suit Asserting FDCPA Violation
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GC Services Limited
Partnership. The case is styled as Muhammad Jawaid, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GC
Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06884
(E.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

GC Services Limited Partnership provides accounts receivable and
customer care solutions to public and private sector
organizations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          Sanders Law, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 203-7600
          Fax: (516) 706-5055
          Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com


GENERAL NUTRITION: Ruling on OT Compensation Multiplier Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, TAWNY L. CHEVALIER AND ANDREW HILLER, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellees, v. GENERAL
NUTRITION CENTERS, INC. AND GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION,
Appellants, TAWNY L. CHEVALIER AND ANDREW HILLER, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellees, v. GENERAL
NUTRITION CENTERS, INC., AND GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION,
Appellants, Case Nos. 22 WAP 2018, 23 WAP 2018 (Pa.), Judge Max
Baer of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for the Western District
affirmed the Superior Court's decision rejecting GNC's use of the
Fluctuating Work Week method ("FWW Method") for calculating the
Plaintiffs' overtime compensation to the extent it utilizes a 0.5
Multiplier.

In the case, Court considers the calculation of overtime
compensation for non-exempt salaried workers under the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act of 1968 ("PMWA"), and the related regulations
adopted by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry.
Specifically, it addresses whether these statutory and regulatory
provisions allow for the usage of the FWW Method for calculating
overtime compensation for salaried employees working fluctuating
hours.

In September 2013, Chevalier filed a class action complaint against
General Nutrition Centers, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and
General Nutrition Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation ("GNC").
Chevalier had previously been employed by GNC as a store manager
and senior store manager, earning a set weekly salary plus
commissions, regardless of the number of hours she worked in a
given week.  GNC additionally paid her overtime for any hours
worked in excess of 40 hours in a week by utilizing the FWW Method.
Essentially, Chevalier argued that the FWW Method did not satisfy
the PMWA's requirement that employees will be paid for overtime not
less than one and one-half times the employee's regular rate.

She later amended her complaint to add Andrew Hiller, also a former
GNC store manager, as a named Plaintiff and class representative.
The Plaintiffs asserted that they were bringing the class action on
behalf of all former or current managers, assistant managers and
senior store managers and other 'non-exempt' GNC employees that are
paid overtime based upon the 'Fluctuating Work Week Method' of
overtime compensation.  The Plaintiffs worked at GNC between 2009
and 2011.

The trial court subsequently granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.  On Sept. 6, 2016, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, in the amount of
$1,378.494.77, representing the unpaid overtime, in addition to
$362,286.08 in interest to date, with costs and attorneys' fees to
be calculated later.  The trial court also granted an award of
attorney fees in the amount of $360,000 and $8,000 in costs on Dec.
29, 2016.

GNC appealed to the Superior Court from the trial court's order of
Sept. 6, 2016, entering final judgment, and the order of Dec. 29,
2016, granting attorney fees and costs.  After oral argument, the
Superior Court sought the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and
Industry's views on "whether the PMWA authorizes an employer to use
the [FWW] method to calculate overtime compensation for salaried
employees."  The Department declined the invitation, asserting that
the question implicated not merely an interpretation of law but
policy choices among competing positions as to how best to
effectuate the intent of the legislature.

Ultimately, the Superior Court concluded that GNC's use of a 0.5
Multiplier violated the PMWA and the Pennsylvania Regulations.
Given that the court reversed the trial court in part, it vacated
the order granting attorney fees and costs and remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.

GNC appealed the Superior Court's decision to the extent it
rejected the application of the FWW Method to salaried employees
working fluctuating hours.  Before the Court, GNC reiterates its
contention that the PMWA should be interpreted consistently with
the Federal Regulations, which explicitly adopt the FWW Method.  It
argues that Pennsylvania's silence on the issue should be
interpreted as acceptance of the FWW Method, rather than a
repudiation of it.

Judge Baer holds that the language of the regulation provides that
each employee will be paid for overtime not less than 1-1/2 times
the employee's regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40
hours in a workweek.  This language, when mechanically applied,
comports with the Plaintiffs' analysis as it requires "all hours in
excess of 40" to be paid at 1.5 times the regular rate, regardless
of whether the regular rate was calculated based upon the actual
hours worked.  Considering this application in light of the
unmistakable intent of the General Assembly to use the
Commonwealth's police power to increase wages to combat the "evils
of unreasonable and unfair wages, the Judge concludes that the
rules of statutory construction favor the Plaintiffs'
interpretation requiring application of the 1.5 Multiplier.

This interpretation is further supported by the Secretary's overt
application of the 0.5 Multiplier for day and job rate compensation
arrangements by adopting Section 778.112 of the Federal Regulations
verbatim but not adopting Section 778.114, which applies the FWW
Method's 0.5 Multiplier to salaried employees working fluctuating
hours.  They are similarly guided by the regulatory decision to
allow the use of Belo contracts in 34 Pa. Code. Section 231.43(c),
which approves of a different overtime compensation method for
salaried employees working fluctuating hours, but not adopting the
FWW Method approved in Overnight Motor Transportation Company, Inc.
v. Missel.   The incorporation of these provisions gives additional
credence to the conclusion that the Secretary intentionally adopted
some but not all of the calculation methods elaborated in the
Federal Regulations.  Thus, the Judge views the Secretary's silence
as an intent to reject the 0.5 Multiplier of the FWW Method in
favor of the 1.5 Multiplier.

Accordingly, Judge Baer affirmed the Superior Court's decision
rejecting GNC's use of the FWW Method under the PMWA and the
Pennsylvania Regulations, which he finds distinguishable from the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and related regulations, which
overtly adopt the FWW Method for salaried employees working
fluctuating hours.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/mZ3mFW from Leagle.com.

Robert William Pritchard -- rpritchard@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson, P.C., for General Nutrition Centers, Inc. and General
Nutrition Corporation, Appellants.

Adrian Nathaniel Roe -- aroe@roeandsimonllc.com -- Roe & Simon LLC,
for Tawny L. Chevalier and Andrew Hiller, Appellees.

Michael D. Simon, Roe & Simon LLC, for Tawny L. Chevalier and
Andrew Hiller, Appellees.

George A. Bibikos -- gbibikos@gabibikos.com -- GA BIBIKOS LLC, for
National Federation of Independent Business, Pennsylvania Chamber
of Business and Industry, Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association,
Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association and Pennsylvania
Retailers' Association, Amicus Curiae.

Christine Teresa Elzer, Elzer Law Firm, LLC, for NELA Eastern
Pennsylvania and Western Pennsylvania Employment Lawyers
Association, Amicus Curiae.

Peter David Winebrake -- pwinebrake@winebrakelaw.com -- Winebrake &
Santillo, LLC, for Community Legal Services Inc., PathWays PA, The
Keystone Research Center, The National Employment Law Project, The
Pennsylvania AFL-CIO and The Women's Law Project, Amicus Curiae.


GOOD SAMARITAN: Court Denies Class Certification Bid as Moot
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Jahmir Christopher Frank, the
Plaintiff, vs. The Good Samaritan Hospital of Cincinnati, Ohio, the
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-00618-MRB (S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge
Michael R. Barrett entered an order on Dec. 4, 2019, denying as
moot the motion for class certification by proposed class
representative Jahmir Frank, pending since September 18, 2018.

As reported by the Class Action Reporter, the Plaintiff moved the
Court for
entry of an order:

     (i) certifying that this action may be maintained and
         proceed as a class action against defendants;

    (ii) for his appointment as class representative; and

   (iii) for appointment of Percy Squire, Esq., as Counsel for
         the Class and as Liaison Counsel for the Class.

Mr. Frank brought this action as a Class Action under Rules 23(a),
(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on behalf of: "all persons who delivered or were delivered at Good
Samaritan Hospital between the period January 1, 1997 through
December 31, 1999."

Good Samaritan Hospital, the oldest and largest private teaching
and specialty health care facility in Cincinnati, Ohio, United
States.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Percy Squire, Esq.
          PERCY SQUIRE CO., LLC
          341 S. Third Street, Suite 10
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 224-6528
          E-mail: psquire@sp-lawfirm.com

HALLMARK RETAIL: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hallmark Retail, LLC.
The case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez and on behalf of all others
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hallmark Retail, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11165 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Hallmark Marketing Corporation retails gift and card products. The
Company offers holidays and occasions gifts, greeting cards, party
plates, invitation cards, books, ornaments, games, and toys.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


HANDY TECHNOLOGIES: Fischler Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
------------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Fischler, Individually and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. HANDY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Case No.
1:19-cv-11141 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019), is brought against the
Defendant for its failure to design, construct, maintain, and
operate its Web site, http://www.handy.com/,to be fully accessible
to and independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant denies full and equal access to its Web site; hence,
the Plaintiff asserts claims against the Defendant under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, New York State Human Rights Law,
and New York City Human Rights Law. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent
injunction to cause the Defendant to change its corporate policies,
practices, and procedures so that its Website will become and
remain accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.

Plaintiff Fischler is blind, visually-impaired handicapped person.

The Defendant offers online booking services for household
contractors, such as house cleaning, furniture assembly, tv
mounting, remodeling, painting, lawn mowing and similar
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas B. Lipsky, Esq.
          Christopher H. Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: 212.392.4772
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com
                 chris@lipskylowe.com


HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES: Fixes Prices of HDD Suspension, Burke Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ALLISON BURKE v. HEADWAY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HUTCHINSON TECHNOLOGY
INC., MAGNECOMP PRECISION TECHNOLOGY PUBLIC CO., LTD., NAT
PERIPHERAL (DONG GUAN) CO., LTD., NAT PERIPHERAL (H.K.) CO., LTD.,
NHK SPRING CO., LTD., NHK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, NHK SPRING
(THAILAND) CO., LTD., NHK SPRING PRECISION (GUANGZHOU) CO., LTD.,
SAE MAGNETICS (H.K.) LTD., AND TDK CORPORATION, Case No.
3:19-cv-07177 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 30, 2019), is brought for damages,
injunctive relief and other relief pursuant to federal antitrust
laws, state antitrust, unfair competition, consumer protection
laws, and the laws of unjust enrichment.

The lawsuit arises out of a global conspiracy among the Defendants
and their co-conspirators to fix prices of and allocate market
shares for hard disk drive ("HDD") suspension assemblies.

HDD suspension assemblies are a component of hard disk drives,
which use magnetism to store information electronically.  HDDs use
recording heads, attached to sliders, to read from and write onto
rapidly spinning disks.  HDD suspension assemblies hold the
recording heads close to the disks and provide the electrical
connection from the recording heads to the hard disk drives'
circuitry.  HDDs containing HDD suspension assemblies are sold both
as stand-alone devices and incorporated into a variety of
ubiquitous electronics, such as desktop computers, laptop
computers, gaming systems, printers, and copy machines.

The Defendants manufactured and sold HDD suspension assemblies
throughout and into the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennie Lee Anderson, Esq.
          ANDRUS ANDERSON LLP
          155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 986-1400
          Facsimile: (415) 986-1474
          E-mail: jennie@andrusanderson.com

               - and -

          Kevin Landau, Esq.
          Miles Greaves, Esq.
          TAUS, CEBULASH & LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (646) 873-7654
          Facsimile: (212) 931-0703
          E-mail: klandau@tcllaw.com
                  mgreaves@tcllaw.com

               - and -

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
          613 Williamson Street, #201
          Madison, WI 53703
          Telephone: (608) 237-1775
          Facsimile: (608) 509-4423
          E-mail: sam@turkestrauss.com


HEALTHY HALO: Gordon Suit Moved to Eastern District of Washington
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Issac Gordon individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Healthy Halo
Insurance Services, Inc., a California Corporation, and CallFire,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, was removed from the
Spokane County Superior Court to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington (Spokane) on  Nov. 12, 2019.

The Eastern District of Washington Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:19-cv-00387 to the proceeding. The suit demands $5 million worth
of damages.

Healthy Halo is a full-service health insurance agency providing
consumers with extensive coverage at affordable prices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian Cameron, Esq.
          CAMERON SUTHERLAND PLLC
          421 W Riverside Avenue, Suite 660
          Spokane, WA 99201
          Telephone: (509) 315-4507
          Facsimile: (509) 315-4584
          E-mail: bcameron@cameronsutherland.com

               - and -

          Kirk D Miller, Esq.
          KIRK D MILLER PS
          421 West Riverside Avenue, Suite 660
          Spokane, WA 99201
          Telephone: (509) 413-1494
          Facsimile: (509) 413-1724
          E-mail: kmiller@millerlawspokane.com

               - and -

          Shayne Sutherland, Esq.
          CAMERON SUTHERLAND PLLC
          421 W Riverside Avenue, Suite 660
          Spokane, WA 99201
          Telephone: (509) 315-4507
          Facsimile: (509) 315-4585
          E-mail: ssutherland@cameronsutherland.com

CallFire, Inc. is represented by:

          Duncan C. Turner, Esq.
          BADGLEY-MULLINS LAW GROUP
          701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4750
          Seattle, WA 98104
          Telephone: (206) 621-6566
          Facsimile: (206) 621-9686
          E-mail: duncanturner@badgleymullins.com


HEALTHY HALO: Martin Sues Over Unsolicited Ads That Violate TCPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
William Martin individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HEALTHY HALO INSURANCE SERVICES INC., Case No.
8:19-cv-02347 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 5, 2019), is brought for damages
resulting from the unlawful actions of the Defendant in
negligently, knowingly, and/or willfully placed unsolicited
automated text messages to the Plaintiff's cellular phone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Defendant has violated the TCPA by using an automatic telephone
dialing system to bombard consumers' mobile phones with
non-emergency advertising and marketing text messages without prior
express written consent, says the complaint. The case is brought to
enforce the consumer privacy provisions afforded by the TCPA, a
federal law that was designed to curtail abusive telemarketing
practices.

The Plaintiff is an individual who resided in Garden Grove,
California.

Healthy Halo is a full-service health insurance agency which sells
consumers health insurance for both individuals and employers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
          Bradley K. King, Esq.
          AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          10728 Lindbrook Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Phone: (310) 474-9111
          Fax: (310) 474-8585
          Email: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
                 bking@ahdootwolfson.com


HERR FOODS: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in Pennsylvania
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HERR FOODS
INCORPORATED. The case is styled as JOHN MAHONEY ON BEHALF OF
HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. HERR FOODS
INCORPORATED, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05759-MMB (E.D. Pa., Dec.
6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Herr Foods Inc. provides food products. The company offers potato
chips, pretzels, chocolate covered pretzels, kettle cooked potato,
tortilla chips, cheese curls, corn chips, and salsas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
          GLANZBERG TOBIA & ASSOCIATES PC
          123 S. BROAD STREET SUITE 1640
          PHILADELPHIA, PA 19109
          Phone: (215) 981-5400
          Email: dglanzberg@aol.com


HOT TOPIC: Dominguez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hot Topic, Inc. The
case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez and on behalf of all others
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Hot Topic, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11163 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Hot Topic is an American retail chain specializing in
counterculture-related clothing and accessories, as well as
licensed music.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


HR PARKING: Summary Judgment Bid in Fernandez FLSA Suit Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRYAN FERNANDEZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. HR PARKING INC
et al., Defendants, Case No. 16 Civ. 2762 (GWG) (S.D. N.Y.),
Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York denied Open Road Defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the issue of their status as
employers, whether the Plaintiffs are similarly situated, and
whether the Plaintiffs can proceed as a class.

The Plaintiffs in the case are current and former employees of HR
Parking, who have sued HR Parking and its owner, Nelson Rodriguez,
along with three other Defendants: Open Road Audi of Manhattan,
Michael Morais, and Rodman Ryan ("Open Road Defendants").  Under
both the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the New York Labor
Law Sections 190 et seq. ("NYLL"), any employee who works more than
40 hours per week must be paid at a rate not less than 150% of the
employee's regular hourly rate for all hours worked beyond 40.  The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated this requirement
when the Plaintiffs worked for them as valets at Audi Manhattan.

Fernandez filed the complaint in the action on April 13, 2016,
claiming HR Parking and the Open Road Defendants failed to pay him
the proper overtime rate when he worked more than 40 hours per
week.  Both HR Parking and the Open Road Defendants answered and
the Open Road Defendants asserted cross-claims against HR Parking.


On July 1, 2016, Fernandez moved for approval of the case as a
collective action under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).  Carlos Arzeno,
Naiim Flowers, Hernando Daza, Julio Diaz, and Candiany Rodriguez
filed forms consenting to become party Plaintiffs.  The consent
forms included a box allowing claimants to indicate that they
worked at "Audi Manhattan" and thus that they were joining the
lawsuit as against the Open Road Defendants.  Diaz and Flowers did
not check the box.  Daza checked the box but conceded at his
deposition that he never worked at Audi Manhattan.

The Open Road Defendants filed the instant motion for summary
judgment on June 21, 2019.

Magistrate Judge Gorenstein finds that some of the four "formal
control" factors under Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., favor a
finding that the Open Road Defendants were employers and at least
one does not.  Satisfying the four Carter factors may be sufficient
to establish joint employment under the FLSA but it is not
necessary to establish joint employment.  Rather than determine,
however, whether the Plaintiffs have supplied enough evidence to
allow a jury to find formal control under Carter, the Magistrate
Judge will instead turn to the Zheng "functional control" test,
which allows a more expansive determination of employer status.  

In assessing "functional control," he will also consider any
non-duplicative Carter factors in addition to the six Zheng
factors: (i) use of premises and equipment; (ii) shift as a unit;
(iii) discrete line-job that was integral to the business; (iv)
whether HR Parking's contract Ccould pass to another subcontractor;
(v) degree of control and supervision; and (vi) "exclusively or
predominantly" for the putative joint employer.

After considering all the Zheng factors, the non-duplicative Carter
factors, and the possibility that a jury could find that the
defendants knew of the failure to pay overtime, the Magistrate
Judge concludes that a reasonable jury could find that the Open
Road Defendants were a joint employer of the Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be
denied.

Finally, in their motion for summary judgment, the Open Road
Defendants include an argument that the Plaintiffs who opted in as
part of the collective action should be "decertified" or that Open
Road Defendants should be dismissed, because the Plaintiffs are not
"similarly situated."  

The Magistrate Judge holds that the three of the Plaintiffs --
Diaz, Flowers and Daza -- have claims only against HR Parking and
not against the Open Road Defendants because these Plaintiffs never
worked at Audi Manhattan.  The three remaining Plaintiffs, however
-- that is, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Arzeno -- all worked for the
Open Road Defendants on the seven-to-seven, Monday through Friday,
schedule for months at a time.  The Open Road Defendants have
raised a common defense against them -- that is, that they are not
the Plaintiffs' employers.  Thus, the Plaintiffs are "similarly
situated" to each other.  As for Defendants' arguments regarding
Rule 23 class certification, these arguments are moot given that
the Plaintiffs have not made a motion under that rule.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Gorenstein denied the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and other requests for
relief.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/iJJCRw from Leagle.com.

Bryan Fernandez, individually & Bryan Fernandez, in behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Brandon David Sherr, Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C., Justin
Alexander Zeller, The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C. & John
Gurrieri, Law Office of Justin A. Zeller.

Carlos Arzeno, Naiim Flowers, Hernando Daza, Julio Diaz & Candiany
Rodriguez, Plaintiffs, represented by Brandon David Sherr, Law
Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C. & John Gurrieri, Law Office of
Justin A. Zeller.

HR Parking Inc, jointly and severally doing business as Tristate
Valet & Nelson Rodriguez, jointly and severally, Defendants,
represented by Michael K. Chong, Law Offices of Michael K. Chong,
LLC.

Open Road of Manhattan, LLC, jointly and severally doing business
as Audi Manhattan, Michael Morais, jointly and severally & Rodman
Ryan, jointly and severally, Defendants, represented by Alicia
Langone, I, Methfessel & Werbel & Frank Joseph Keenan --
Keenan@methwerb.com -- Methfessel & Werbel, PC.

Michael Morais, jointly and severally, Rodman Ryan, jointly and
severally & Open Road of Manhattan, LLC, jointly and severally,
Cross Claimants, represented by Frank Joseph Keenan, Methfessel &
Werbel, PC.

HR Parking Inc, jointly and severally & Nelson Rodriguez, jointly
and severally, Cross Defendants, represented by Michael K. Chong,
Law Offices of Michael K. Chong, LLC.

INDOCHINO APPAREL: Calcano Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Indochino Apparel
(US) Inc. The case is styled as Marcos Calcano on behalf of himself
and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Indochino
Apparel (US) Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11145 (S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Indochino Apparel Inc. produces custom tailored suits for men. The
Company offers shirts, coats, blazers, vests, pants, cufflinks, and
neckties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com



JAGGED PEAK: Sabatini Challenges Proposed Sale to Parsley Energy
----------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC SABATINI, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff v. JAGGED PEAK ENERGY INC., CHARLES D.
DAVIDSON, ROGER L. JARVIS, JANEEN S. JUDAH, MICHAEL C. LINN,
ADRIANNA C. MA, JOHN R. SULT, S. WIL VANLOH, JR., DHEERAJ VERMA,
BLAKE A. WEBSTER, JAMES J. KLECKNER, PARSLEY ENERGY, INC., and
JACKAL MERGER SUB, INC., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02114-UNA (D.
Del., Nov. 8, 2019), alleges that the Defendants violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the registration
statement filed for a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
Jagged Peak will be acquired by Parsley Energy, Inc. and Jackal
Merger Sub, Inc.

On October 14, 2019, Jagged Peak's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger. Pursuant to
the terms of the Merger Agreement, Jagged Peak's stockholders will
receive 0.447 shares of Parent common stock for each share of
Jagged Peak common stock they own.

On November 5, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Plaintiff alleges
that the Registration Statement omits material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration
Statement false and misleading.

The Plaintiff contends that the Registration Statement omits
material information with respect to, among other things, the
Company's and Parsley's financial projections and the analyses
performed by Jagged Peak's financial advisors.

The Plaintiff is the owner of Jagged Peak common stock. The
Plaintiff seeks injunctive and equitable relief and damages on
behalf of holders of Jagged Peak common stock.

Jagged Peak operates as an oil and natural gas company. The Company
focuses on the acquisition and development of unconventional oil
and associated natural gas reserves.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                  bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


JETSMARTER, INC: Court Sends Worthington Suit to Arbitration
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case
captioned JENNIFER WORTHINGTON, ALEXANDRA WORTHINGTON, and MASSIMO
TASSAN-SOLET, Plaintiffs, v. JETSMARTER, INC., DAVID SHERIDAN, and
JOHN DOES 1-4, Defendants. No. 18 Civ. 12113 (KPF). (S.D.N.Y.)

Plaintiffs J. Worthington and Tassan-Solet renewed their
memberships in JetSmarter, a travel services company, and found
themselves unable to access many of the services that JetSmarter
had previously provided to them. Plaintiffs communicated with
Sheridan regarding the changes in their service, but soon realized
that, contrary to Sheridan's representations, JetSmarter had in
fact changed its business model and would no longer offer free
flights. The Complaint alleges claims for breach of contract,
violations of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
unfair trade practices, respondeat superior, and fraud.

JetSmarter moves to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration
provision in its Membership Agreement.  Defendants contend that
because the JetSmarter Membership Agreement contains a Florida
choice-of-law provision, Florida law applies to the question of
contract formation.  

In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the Court should apply New
York law because Plaintiffs have no connections to Florida and are
asserting causes of action under New York law.

In diversity of citizenship cases, a federal court deciding
questions of conflict of laws must follow the rules prevailing in
the state in which the court sits. Under New York law, courts
should not engage in any conflicts analysis where the parties
included a choice-of-law provision in their contract.

District Judge Katherine Polk Failla said the Court need not decide
which state's law applies, because the law of New York and Florida
is substantially similar on the question of whether the parties
have formed an agreement to arbitrate. Under both New York and
Florida law, an arbitration agreement requires a manifestation of
mutual assent to sufficiently definite contract terms.  

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants cannot prove that Plaintiffs
manifested assent to the Membership Agreements.

They are wrong, according to Judge Failla, saying that the
Defendants have provided the Court with evidence sufficient to show
that Plaintiffs indeed manifested assent to JetSmarter's Membership
Agreements and, by extension, to arbitrate their disputes under
those Agreements.

A declaration submitted by Mikhail Kirsanov, the Chief Technology
Officer of JetSmarter, explains that during the process of
obtaining JetSmarter memberships, Plaintiffs indicated their assent
to JetSmarter's Membership Agreement at least twice. First, when
Plaintiffs registered on the JetSmarter app, they indicated assent
to JetSmarter's terms of use by swiping a button next to the phrase
"I agree to Terms of Use and Privacy Policy."

Second, when Plaintiffs submitted payment information for their
memberships, they each clicked on a box next to the phrase "I
ACCEPT TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT" that was
hyperlinked to the Membership Agreement.

Undeterred by this evidence, Plaintiffs contend that the making of
the arbitration agreement is in issue, and therefore the Court must
hold a trial to determine whether Plaintiffs agreed to arbitration.
To support this argument, Plaintiffs cast aspersions on the
documentary evidence provided by Defendants. Plaintiffs argue, for
instance, that the Membership Agreements attached to the Kirsanov
Declaration have not been properly authenticated because they are
not date-stamped and do not contain the JetSmarter logo.  

According to Judge Failla, Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the type
and format of Defendants' evidence do not create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the parties entered into an arbitration
agreement. When presented with arbitration agreements in contracts
formed online between companies and their customers, courts
routinely rely on affidavits and declarations similar to the
Kirsanov Declaration and screenshots describing and depicting how
the customer manifested assent to the company's arbitration
provision.  

Judge Failla noted that, in Cordas v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 228
F.Supp.3d 985, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2017), the court relied on the
declaration of an Uber engineer that described the rider sign-up
and registration process and on screenshots of the Uber app in
determining whether the plaintiff had agreed to Uber's terms and
conditions.  The court in Cordas rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the declaration was insufficient to support Uber's motion to
compel arbitration because it was hearsay, speculation, and lacked
authentication. The court explained that Cordas offered no
testimony or evidence regarding what he did see on his screen, and
offered] no evidence to rebut the Uber engineer's reasoned
declaration other than his own conclusory allegations that he never
received notice of the terms and conditions and that the Uber
engineer's declaration is false and inadequate.  Instead, the court
held that the Uber engineer's declaration was based on personal
knowledge and on records kept by Uber in the ordinary course of
business, and was therefore sufficient to find, as a matter of law,
that Cordas had entered into an arbitration agreement with Uber.

Plaintiffs further argue that even if they did agree to the terms
of the Membership Agreements, they should not be compelled to
arbitrate because those agreements are unenforceable as
unconscionable and illusory.  Plaintiffs argue that the Membership
Agreements were unconscionable because: (i) they were offered to
Plaintiffs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (ii) JetSmarter did not
return Plaintiffs' funds when Plaintiffs sought to cancel their
memberships and (iii) JetSmarter unilaterally changed the
membership program, stripping Plaintiffs of the benefits of their
bargain.  Plaintiffs also argue that the provisions in the
Membership Agreements allowing JetSmarter to modify the terms of
such agreements unilaterally rendered these agreements illusory.

According to Judge Failla, all of these arguments are challenges to
the enforceability of the Membership Agreements in toto. Plaintiffs
do not make any discrete challenges to the validity of the
arbitration provisions specifically.

Neither party has requested a stay, and Defendants have explicitly
asked for this action to be dismissed. The Court therefore denied
Defendants' motion to dismiss and stayed the matter pending the
completion of arbitration. However, Defendants' only argument in
support of the Court dismissing, rather than staying, the matter
consists of a single footnote providing in its entirety.
Defendants' bare assertion fails to persuade the Court that it
should dismiss, instead of stay, the matter, particularly where
courts in other JetSmarter cases have recognized that a stay
promotes the expeditious resolution of the dispute.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Opinion and Order is
available at
https://tinyurl.com/yxnd45au from Leagle.com

Jennifer Worthington, Alexandra Worthington & Massimo Tassan-Solet,
Plaintiffs, represented by:

     Bruce E. Baldinger, Esq.
     The Law Offices of Bruce E. Baldinger, LLC
     365 South Street, 1st Floor
     Morristown,  NJ 07960-7323

Jetsmarter, Inc. and David Sheridan, Defendants, represented by:

     Ronald Andrew Giller, Esq.
     Catherine Bentivegna, Esq.
     Daniel Jason Dimuro , Esq.
     Gordon & Rees LLP
     E-mail: rgiller@grsm.com
             cbentivegna@grsm.com
             ddimuro@grsm.com


JPMORGAN CHASE: Final Approval of $5M Rotondo Suit Deal Recommended
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEREK ROTONDO, Plaintiff, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
N.A., Defendant, Civil Action 2:19-cv-2328 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate
Judge Chelsey M. Vascura of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, recommended that the
Court grant (i) the Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlement, and (ii) the Plaintiff's Unopposed
Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses,
and Service Payment.

The action arises out of the Defendant's parental leave policy.
Under its policy effective in 2016, Chase employees who were
primary caregivers could receive up to 16 weeks of paid parental
leave upon the birth of a child, while employees who were not
primary caregivers (non-primary caregivers) could receive only up
to two weeks of paid parental leave.  

Named Plaintiff Rotondo was told by Chase human resources personnel
that, under the 2016 Policy, birth mothers were presumptively
treated as primary caregivers, while birth fathers were
presumptively treated as non-primary caregivers.  To qualify as
primary caregivers, birth fathers would have to show that: (1) the
father's spouse had returned to work; or (2) the spouse was
medically incapable of caring for the child.  Mr. Rotondo intended
to be the primary caregiver for his son born in 2017, but could not
satisfy the 2016 Policy's primary caregiver requirements because
his wife had not yet returned to work and was capable of caring for
their child.

Mr. Rotondo timely filed a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") challenging
Chase's alleged policy and practice of denying primary caregiver
leave to fathers, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly
situated male employees.  From July 2017 through April 2019, the
parties engaged in settlement discussions and informal discovery
about Chase's policies and their impact on putative class members,
including in-person negotiations on July 25 and Oct. 3, 2017, and
two days of mediation with an independent mediator on April 16 and
May 14, 2018.

While the settlement talks were ongoing, Chase changed its parental
leave policy in December 2017 to remove gender-specific language
and clarify that fathers are eligible to be designated as primary
caregivers on the same basis as mothers.  The parties executed the
Settlement on May 28, 2019, and Mr. Rotondo filed the putative
class action on May 30, 2019.

On June 21, 2019, the Court granted preliminary approval of the
Settlement.  It certified the following class under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for settlement purposes only:
All male employees of Defendant nationwide who took the maximum
amount of non-primary caregiver leave available under the
Defendant's policy in effect at the time of the birth of one or
more child (either 1 week or 2 weeks depending on the time period)
during the Settlement Class Period, or if applicable, the State
Settlement Class Periods, and would have otherwise qualified for
paid primary caregiver leave, but did not take primary caregiver
leave.

The Settlement Class period for class members not subject to the
State Settlement Class Periods is from Aug. 19, 2016 (300 days
before the charge was filed) through Dec. 4, 2017 (when Chase
revised the 2016 policy).  The

Class members who worked in one of the following states are subject
to the following State Settlement Class Periods: (a) Alaska, Maine,
New Jersey, and West Virginia: June 15, 2015 through Dec. 4, 2017;
(b) Michigan, New York, Washington, and Vermont: June 15, 2014
through Dec. 4, 2017; (c) California: June 15, 2013 through Dec. 4,
2017; (d) Kentucky: June 15, 2012 through Dec. 4, 2017; (e) Ohio:
June 15, 2011 through Dec. 4, 2017; (f) Arkansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
District of Columbia: June 15, 2016 through Dec. 4, 2017.  Chase,
through its personnel records, identified 5,035 members of the
Settlement Class.

As part of the Settlement, Chase will continue to maintain a
gender-neutral parental leave policy and will not reduce the amount
of non-primary or primary paid caregiver leave it provides for four
years from the effective date of the Settlement.  It will also
conduct training of relevant human resources personnel and
contractors on its new parental leave policy, monitor
implementation of the policy, and provide data to the Plaintiff's
counsel on the implementation of the policy for two years after the
Settlement's approval.

The Settlement also establishes a $5 million Gross Settlement
Amount that covers all amounts to be paid to, or on behalf of,
Settlement Class Members; any Court-approved Service Payment to the
Named Plaintiff; any Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses
approved by the Court; and any Settlement Administrator's fees and
costs that exceed $50,000.  The Class Counsel may request
attorneys' fees not to exceed one-third of the Gross Settlement
Amount, as well as reimbursement of reasonable costs and expenses.
Chase will pay the Settlement Administrator's fees and costs up to
$50,000 in addition to the Gross Settlement Amount.  The fees and
costs of the Settlement Administrator above $50,000 will be paid
from the Gross Settlement Amount.

The Net Settlement Amount (which is the Gross Settlement Amount
minus attorneys' fees and costs, service payments, and the
settlement administrator's fees and costs that exceed $50,000) will
be distributed in equal shares to the Settlement Class Members
based on the total number of valid claims submitted by the
Settlement Class Members.  The Settlement Class Members who had
more than one child during the Settlement Class Period may receive
compensation for multiple claims that they filed.

To receive a Settlement Award, the Settlement Class Members must
have submitted a valid Claim Form by the Claim Form Deadline.  As
of Oct. 22, 2019, the Settlement Administrator had received 1,503
claim forms, of which at least 1,440 have been determined to be
valid.  The Settlement Administrator has calculated the pro rata
share of the Net Settlement Amount for each valid claim to be
$2,301.  The Settlement Class Members will have 180 days to cash
the checks that they receive from the Settlement Administrator.
Any amount remaining 20 days after the expiration of the 180-day
Acceptance Period will be redistributed to the Settlement Class
Members who have timely cashed their checks or, if the amount
remaining is small enough that a redistribution is not appropriate,
unclaimed funds will be donated to a nonprofit organization that
the parties propose and the Court approves pursuant to the cy pres
doctrine.

Plaintiff retained RG/2 as the Settlement Administrator.  As of
Oct. 22, 2019, RG/2 had received 1,503 claim forms.  No class
members objected to the Settlement, and 3 class members opted out
of the Settlement.

Magistrate Judge Vascura presided over a Fairness Hearing on Nov.
6, 2019.  She recommended that:

      a. The Motion for Final Settlement Approval and the Motion
for Award of Attorneys' Fees be granted;

      b. Based upon her review of the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law
in Support of Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement and all
other papers submitted in connection with the Plaintiff's Final
Approval Motions, that the Court grants final approval of the $5
million settlement memorialized in the Settlement Agreement and
Release;

      c. For settlement purposes only, the Court certifies the
Settlement Class defined in the Settlement Agreement pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e);

      d. The Settlement Class Period for the Settlement Class
Members who worked in any state outside of those included in
separately-defined State Settlement Class Periods is from Aug. 19,
2016 (300 days before the charge was filed) through Dec. 4, 2017
(when Chase revised the 2016 policy).  The Settlement Class
Member's non-primary caregiver leave or request for non-primary or
primary caregiver leave must have occurred during the Settlement
Class Period or within 16 weeks before the Settlement Class Period
(as the person still would have been eligible for paid parental
leave benefits during the Settlement Class Period);

      e. If a Settlement Class Member worked in a state included in
the State Settlement Class Periods, the Settlement Class Member's
non-primary caregiver leave or request for non-primary or primary
caregiver leave must have occurred during the applicable State
Settlement Class Period or within 12 weeks before the State
Settlement Class Period (as the person still would have been
eligible for paid parental leave benefits during the State
Settlement Class Period), except that for Arkansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee and
District of Columbia the Settlement Class Member's non-primary
caregiver leave or request for non-primary or primary caregiver
leave must have occurred during the applicable State Settlement
Class Period or within sixteen (16) weeks before the State
Settlement Class Period. The following State Settlement Class
Periods apply for the following states: (i) Alaska, Maine, New
Jersey, and West Virginia: June 15, 2015 through Dec. 4, 2017; (ii)
Michigan, New York, Washington, and Vermont: June 15, 2014 through
Dec. 4, 2017; (iii) California: June 15, 2013 through Dec. 4, 2017;
(iv) Kentucky: June 15, 2012 through Dec. 4, 2017; (v) Ohio: June
15, 2011 through Dec. 4, 2017; and (vi) Arkansas, Louisiana,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
District of Columbia: June 15, 2016 through Dec. 4, 2017;

      f. Outten & Golden LLP and the American Civil Liberties Union
Women's Rights Project ("ACLU"), which the Court previously
appointed as Class Counsel in its Preliminary Approval Order,
satisfy the adequacy requirements of Rule 23(g);

      g. The Court approves the settlement and all terms set forth
in the Settlement Agreement;

      h. The attorneys at Outten & Golden LLP and the ACLU who
prosecuted the case are experienced civil rights and employment
lawyers with good reputations among the employment law bar.  The
Court grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and awards
the Class Counsel $1,666,666.67 in attorneys' fees, which is 33
1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount, plus $29,726.43 in costs and
expenses reasonably expended litigating and resolving the lawsuit.
These amounts will be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount;

      i. The Court finds reasonable the service payment for
Plaintiff Derek Rotondo in the amount of $20,000 in recognition of
the services he rendered on behalf of the Settlement Class Members.
This amount will be paid from the Gross Settlement Amount;

      j. The Court approves the Settlement Administrator's fees and
costs of no more than $55,698.  Of the amount, $50,000 will be paid
by the Defendant and the excess will be paid out of the Gross
Settlement Amount;

      k. Any amount remaining 20 days after the expiration of the
Acceptance Period for Settlement Checks will be redistributed among
the Settlement Class Members who have timely cashed their checks
or, if the amount remaining is small enough that a redistribution
is not sensible in the discretion of the Class Counsel, the
unclaimed will be donated under the cy pres doctrine.  The Parties
will identify an organization or organizations to serve as the cy
pres recipient if there are unclaimed settlement funds, which will
be subject to this Court's approval;

      l. If no individual or party appeals this Order, the
Settlement Effective Date will be 31 days after the Order is
entered;

      m. The Settlement Administrator will disburse Settlement
Checks to the Settlement Class Members, the Named Plaintiff's
Service Award, and the Class Counsel's attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses within 30 days of the Effective Date;

      n. The Litigation is dismissed with prejudice, with each side
to assume their respective costs and attorneys' fees (other than
such costs and attorneys' fees approved by the Court as set forth);
and

      o. The Parties will abide by all terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

If any party objects to the Report and Recommendation, that party
may, within 14 days of the date of the Report, file and serve on
all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made.

A full-text copy of the Magistrate Judge's Nov. 20, 2019 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/HI6R91 from
Leagle.com.

Derek Rotondo, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Freda J. Levenson --
flevenson@acluohio.org -- ACLU of OHIO, Deirdre Aaron --
daaron@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice, Galen
Sherwin -- gsherwin@aclu.org -- American Civil Liberties Union, pro
hac vice, Peter Romer-Friedman -- prf@outtengolden.com -- Outten &
Golden LLP, pro hac vice & Pooja Shethji --
pshethji@outtengolden.com -- Outten & Golden LLP, pro hac vice.

JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Defendant, represented by Alyson A.
Terrell -- aterrell@ulmer.com -- Ulmer & Berne LLP, Emily M. Loeb
-- eloeb@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice, Jeffrey S.
Dunlap -- jdunlap@ulmer.com -- Ulmer & Berne LLP, Precious S.
Jacobs -- pjacobs@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP, pro hac vice,
Samuel C. Birnbaum -- sbirnbaum@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP,
pro hac vice & Thomas J. Perrelli -- tperrelli@jenner.com -- Jenner
& Block LLP, pro hac vice.


JUST BRANDS: Faces Class Action Over JustCBD Gummy Candy
--------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that an Illinois man sued CBD company Just Brands
USA in federal court on Oct. 28, claiming he tested positive for
THC after eating some of the company's JustCBD gummy candy. Trevor
Darrow bought JustCBD watermelon rings in July, thinking they would
help him sleep, according to the suit. [GN]


JUUL LABS: Jefferson PSD Sues Over Sale of E-Cigarettes to Minors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jefferson County Public School District, individually and on behalf
of all similar situated school districts v. JUUL LABS, INC.; ALTRIA
GROUP, INC.; ALTRIA CLIENT SERVICES; ALTRIA GROUP DISTRIBUTION
COMPANY; NU MARK LLC; PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.; AND JOHN DOES 1-100,
INCLUSIVE, Case No. 5:19-cv-00136-DCB-MTP (S.D. Miss., Dec. 5,
2019), arises out of the injuries to the Plaintiff's property,
students, and employees caused by the Defendants' wrongful conduct
in marketing of e-cigarettes to minors.

The Defendants' marketing strategy, advertising, and product design
target minors, especially teenagers, and has dramatically increased
the use of e-cigarettes amongst minors, like the student body in
Jefferson County Public School District, according to the
complaint. The Defendants' conduct has caused many students to
become addicted to the Defendants' e-cigarette products.

The Plaintiff, and similarly situated school districts in
Mississippi, redirected resources to combat the deceptive marketing
scheme of the Defendants and to educate the school children of the
true dangers of e-cigarettes, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a school district located in Jefferson County,
Mississippi.

JUUL manufactures, designs, sells, markets, promotes and
distributes JUUL e-cigarettes, JUULpods and accessories throughout
the state of Mississippi and the nation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          T. Roe Frazer II, Esq.
          Patrick McMurtray, Esq.
          Thomas Roe Frazer III, Esq.
          W. Matthew Pettit, Esq.
          FRAZER PLC
          30 Burton Hills Blvd., Suite 450
          Nashville, TN 37215
          Phone: (615) 647-6464
          Fax: (866) 314-2466
          Email: roe@frazer.law
                 patrick@frazer.law
                 trey@frazer.law
                 mpettit@frazer.law


KNEIPP CORPORATION: Mahoney Files ADA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KNEIPP CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, INC. The case is styled as JOHN MAHONEY ON BEHALF OF
HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. KNEIPP
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:19-cv-05757-GEKP (E.D. Pa., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Kneipp has created natural bath and body products designed to
improve well-being.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David S. Glanzberg, Esq.
          GLANZBERG TOBIA & ASSOCIATES PC
          123 S. BROAD STREET SUITE 1640
          PHILADELPHIA, PA 19109
          Phone: (215) 981-5400
          Email: dglanzberg@aol.com



LA PECORA: Reeves Suit Settlement Gets Initial Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN REEVES and KRISTEN BOOTH, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LA PECORA
BIANCA, INC., LA PECORA BIANCA HOLDINGS, LLC, LPB1 LLC and MARK
BARAK, in his individual and professional capacities, Defendants,
Docket No. 151153/2018, Motion Seq. No. 002 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge
Robert D. Kalish of the New York County Supreme Court granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Approval of Proposed Notice of Settlement.

On Nov. 6, 2019, the matter came before the Court on the Motion for
Preliminary Approval.  The Defendants did not oppose the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval.

Judge Kalish has considered the Plaintiffs' request for approval of
a class pursuant to CPLR 901 and 902 for settlement purposes and
the Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release, filed in its
final form on June 28, 2019, and the Declaration of Innessa M. Huot
filed on the same day.  He finds on a preliminary basis that the
Settlement memorialized in the Settlement Agreement, filed with the
Court, is fair, reasonable and adequate, and therefore, meets the
requirements for Preliminary Approval such that notice to the class
is appropriate.  Therefore, he granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Approval.

Pursuant to CPLR 901 and 902, the Judge conditionally certified,
for settlement purposes only, a Settlement Class consisting of all
individuals who have been employed by Defendants in any position at
any time from Aug. 1, 2015 to Jan. 23, 2019.

He appointed (i) Plaintiffs Steven Reeves and Kristen Booth to
represent the Settlement Class; (ii) Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP as the
Class Counsel; and (iii) Rust Consulting, Inc. as the Settlement
Administrator.

Consistent with the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the
Defendants are authorized to send personal and confidential
information concerning the Class Members to the Settlement
Administrator, including, without limitation, the Social Security
Numbers of the Class Members.

The Judge approved the proposed Notice of Settlement of Class
Action Lawsuit, as well as the Claim Form attached thereto, filed
on Nov. 19, 2019.  Any written objection to the Settlement made by
a Settlement Class Member must be sent to the Settlement
Administrator by March 13, 2020.

The Judge adopted the settlement approval process as set forth in
the Settlement Agreement.  He ordered the Parties to carry out the
Settlement according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Fairness Hearing is set for April 7, 2020, at 2:15 p.m.  The
Plaintiffs shall file their motion for Final Approval of the
Settlement, and the Class Counsel shall file their motion for
attorneys' fees, litigation costs and expenses, and service awards
on or before April 3, 2020.

The following dates shall govern the schedule in the action:

     a. November 22, 2019 - La Pecora Bianca shall provide the
Class Counsel and the Settlement Administrator with the names, last
known addresses, email addresses, and telephone numbers of the
Settlement Class Members.  La Pecora Bianca shall also provide the
Settlement Administrator with the social security numbers of the
Settlement Class Members.

     b. Dec. 13, 2019 - Mailing of Notice and Claim Form

     c. Feb. 7, 2020 - Follow up mailing of Postcards

     d. March 13, 2020 - Last day for the Settlement Class Members
to Opt-In or Opt-Out of the Settlement or to mail written
objections to the Settlement to the Settlement Administrator

     e. April 3, 2020 - Last day for filing and serving of papers
in support of Final Approval of the Settlement with the Court

     f. April 7, 2020 at 2:15 p.m. -  Fairness Hearing

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Decision + Order is
available at https://is.gd/c6DjgD from Leagle.com.


LACOSTE USA: Violates ADA, Dominguez Suit Asserts
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lacoste USA, Inc. The
case is styled as Yovanny Dominguez and on behalf of all others
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Lacoste USA, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11182 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Lacoste Usa, Inc. retails clothings. The Company offers jackets,
sweaters, shirts, bottoms, tops and dresses, shoes, watches, bags,
fragrance, and other related accessories for mens, womens, and
kids.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


LAS SIRENAS: Cisneros Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Noe Soriano Cisneros on behalf of himself, and other similarly
situated employees v. LAS SIRENAS RESTAURANT INC., doing business
as LAS SIRENAS MEXICAN RESTAURANT, Case No. 1:19-cv-11152
(S.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019), is brought against the Defendants
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law
seeking to recover unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid "spread of
hours" premiums for each day he worked more than 10 hours,
liquidated and statutory damages, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff worked over 40 hours per week, and often in excess of
10 hours per shift. The Plaintiff was paid hourly, but work
performed above 40 hours per week was not paid at time and one-half
the Plaintiff's regular rate of pay, as required by state and
federal law. The Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay
the Plaintiff lawfully earned overtime compensation, in
contravention of the FLSA and New York Labor Law, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants in Bronx County, New
York, as a cook food/preparer and cleaner, at the Defendant's
restaurant business.

The Defendant owns and operates a Japanese restaurant known as
"Tampopo Ramen," located in the City of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          10 Grand Central
          155 East 44th Street - 6th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Phone: (212) 209-3933
          Fax: (212) 209-7102
          Email: info@jcpclaw.com


LIBRE TECHNOLOGY: Court Certifies Class in Hudson Case
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EBONY HUDSON, an individual and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LIBRE TECHNOLOGY INC.,
doing business as Student Loan Service, Docupop, and Student Loan
Service, US; ANTONY MURIGU; JASON BLACKBURN; and BRIAN BLACKBURN,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-1371-GPC-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part and denied in part Hudson's
unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class/Collective
Action Settlement.

On June 21, 2018, Plaintiff Hudson brought the putative Rule 23
class action/FLSA collective action against Defendants Libre,
Murigu (its owner), Jason Blackburn (its COO), and Brian Blackburn
(Director of Operations) for violations of California laws and the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

On April 12, 2019, the Court granted a joint request to allow the
Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint ("FAC").   According to
the FAC, the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a "Member
Success Coordinator," or "Agent," responsible for making calls to
prospective customers and assisting individuals in applying for
student loan consolidations and repayment programs.  She alleges
that the Defendants failed to pay coordinators for the time
required to startup, login, and sign out of their computer systems
before starting and ending their day.  As a result, the Plaintiff
and other coordinators were required to work off the clock when
booting up and shutting down their computer systems.  In addition,
she alleges that the Defendants failed to pay its coordinators the
entire amount due under its commission-based compensation system,
failed to include bonus pay when calculating the regular rate of
pay, failed to pay for all overtime hours, and failed to provide
the Plaintiff and other coordinators with uninterrupted, work-free
30-minute meal periods and paid 10-minute rest breaks.

On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff's FAC raises the
following claims: (1) agents were not paid for all wages and
overtime due during their employment pursuanthe t to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.; (2) agents were not
paid minimum wage and regular wages for all hours worked pursuant
to California Labor Codes Sections 223, 1194, 1197, 1197.1 and IWC
Wage Order 4; (3) agents were not paid overtime pursuant to
California Labor Codes Sections 510, 1194, 1198 and IWC Wage Order
4; (4) agents were subject to unlawful deductions in violation of
California Labor Codes Sections 221 and 223; (5) agents were not
provided rest and meal periods pursuant to California Labor Codes
Sections 226.7 and 512; (6) agents were not timely paid wages owed
in accordance with California Labor Codes Sections 202, 203, and
203; (7) the Defendants failed to provide accurate wage statements
in accordance with California Labor Code Section 226; (8) the
Defendants engaged in unfair competition in violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq.; (9) the Defendants breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; and (10) that by engaging in these
alleged practices, the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated
were entitled to recover penalties pursuant to the Private Attorney
General Act ("PAGA") pursuant to California Labor Code Section
2698.

On Jan. 24, 2018, the parties attended a full-day mediation session
with Steven Rottman, a mediator who the Plaintiff alleges has
extensive experience with wage and hour cases.  At the conclusion
of the mediation, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding
detailing the material terms of the Settlement.  Thereafter, the
parties jointly moved to allow the Plaintiff to amend her complaint
to add additional claims as to lunch break violations uncovered
during the course of the parties' settlement discussions.  The
filing resulted in the FAC, i.e., the operative complaint.

On June 6, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the instant unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement and
Certification of Settlement Class.  She seeks, inter alia, Rule 23
preliminary class certification for a Settlement Class comprised of
all persons who, during the Class Period, have previously been or
currently are employed in California by Libre Technology, Inc. dba
Student Loan Service, Docupop, and Student Loan Service, US, as an
hourly-paid 'non-exempt' employee from June 21, 2014, to the date
of Preliminary Approval.

She also seeks preliminary approval for the terms of a settlement
agreement reached with Defendants and executed on May 23, 2019.
The Settlement provides for a gross settlement amount of $425,000,
to be distributed as follows: up to $127,500 in attorneys' fees,
$15,000 for litigation costs, $6,000 to the Plaintiff as an
incentive award, $5,500 to the proposed claims administrator,
$21,250 in Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA") penalties, and the
rest to be allocated on a pro rata basis to the participating Class
Members based on the hours worked during the class period.  The
Plaintiff predicts that the Settlement would result in a $2,361
check (before tax) for the average employee.

Prior to the hearing, the Court issued a tentative order denying in
part and granting in part preliminary approval of proposed class
settlement for litigant use only outlining potential areas of
deficiencies in the proposed settlement.  A hearing was held on
Aug. 23, 2019.  

After a review of the briefs, supporting documentation, the
applicable law, and hearing oral argument, Judge Curiel granted in
part and denied in part the Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class/Collective Action Settlement.  Specifically, the Judge
granted the Plaintiff's request to (1) preliminarily certify the
Rule 23 class, (2) be named the Class Representative, (3) and
appoint Trenton R. Kashima and Kevin J. Stroops as the class
counsel.  He also sua sponte conditionally certified the FLSA
collective.  The Judge denied her request for preliminary approval
of the Settlement.

The Judge concluded that there still remains an issue concerning
the FLSA notice and opt-in procedures that will require
modification.  He found that preliminary approval does not include
an opt-in procedure or a separate allocation of payments for FLSA
claims.  For purposes of the parties' interest in streamlining the
process, other courts have noted that the parties may direct
putative FLSA Group members to send opt-in forms to the Settlement
Administrator and then having the Plaintiff file those opt-in forms
with the court.  However, the Judge left it up to the parties to
present an opt-in procedure and allocation of separate funds that
comply with Section 216(b).  Finally, the proposed notice does not
explain the hybrid nature of the case and instead refers to a
"class action settlement" and does not mention Rule 23 or the
FLSA.

The Judge permited the parties an additional 60 days from the
issuance of the Order to file a renewed motion for preliminary
approval of class action settlement that cures the deficiencies
identified by the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WkxlJq from Leagle.com.

Ebony Hudson, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin J. Stoops --
kstoops@sommerspc.com -- Sommers Schwartz, P.C., pro hac vice &
Trenton R. Kashima -- TKashima@sommerspc.com -- Finkelstein &
Krinsk, LLP.

Libre Technology Inc., doing business as Student Loan Service doing
business as Student Loan Service, US, Anthony Murigu, Jason
Blackburn & Brian Blackburn, Defendants, represented by Andrea
Leigh Rosenkranz -- arosenkranz@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan Meyer
LLC, Gouya A. Ranekouhi -- granekouhi@ohaganmeyer.com -- O'Hagan
Meyer & Matthew Craig Sgnilek -- msgnilek@ohaganmeyer.com --
O'Hagan Meyer LLP.


LOAD TRAIL: Lopez Seeks to Recoup Unpaid Overtime Pay for Welders
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JUAN LOPEZ BARRIOS, AND JOSE FRAIRE HERNANDEZ, Individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LOAD TRAIL,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00811 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 7, 2019),
seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages for the Plaintiffs and other
welders.

Plaintiffs Lopez and Fraire are former employees of Defendant Load
Trail, LLC. They worked as welders for Defendant from 2007 and
2013, respectively, until August 28, 2018.

The Defendant maintained a practice with Lopez, Fraire, and others,
where it paid them on a piece rate basis. The Plaintiffs, if not
universally, worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek and were not
paid all overtime premium compensation for such overtime hours, the
lawsuit says.

The Defendant maintains a business in Sumner, Texas, where it
manufacturers trailers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew R. Scott, Esq.
          Javier Perez, Esq.
          SCOTT PEREZ LLP
          Founders Square
          900 Jackson Street, Suite 550
          Dallas, TX 75202
          Telephone: 214-965-9675
          Facsimile: 214-965-9680
          E-mail: matt.scott@scottperezlaw.com
                  javier.perez@scottperezlaw.com

               - and -

          Nicanor (Nick) Pesina, Jr.
          ROBERTS & ROBERTS, P.C.
          118 West Fourth Street
          Tyler, TX 75701-4000
          Telephone: 903 597-6655
          Facsimile: 903 597-1600
          E-mail: nick@robertslawfirm.com


LSG GROUP LLC: Frisby Sues in N.D. Ill. for Violating BIPA & FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Frisby, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. LSG GROUP, LLC, and SKY CHEFS, INC., Case No.
1:19-cv-07989 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 5, 2019), accuses the Defendants of
violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law,
and the City of Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance.

The Plaintiff says he has never been informed of the specific
limited purposes or length of time for which the Defendants
collected, stored, used and/or disseminated his biometric data. The
Plaintiff has never been informed of any biometric data retention
policy developed by the Defendants, nor has he ever been informed
whether the Defendants will ever permanently delete his biometric
data. The Plaintiff also says he has never been provided with nor
ever signed a written release allowing the Defendants to collect,
store, use, or disseminate his biometric data.

Mr. Frisby also alleges that no time clocked in by him or other
similarly situated employees of either of the Defendants prior to
the start time of the scheduled shift was in fact compensated by
the Defendants. The Defendants, instead, rounded the pre-shift and
post-shift time worked by the Plaintiff and others to their
regularly scheduled shift times; and such rounding was typically to
the detriment of the employee, and to the benefit of the
Defendants, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants from November 2015 through
March 2019 as a driver's helper, a driver and in other related
positions in customer service.

The Defendants operate in-flight catering and related food services
for the airline industry, world-wide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Grant Brown, Esq.
          JEFFREY GRANT BROWN, P.C.
          221 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: 312.789.9700
          Email: jeff@JGBrownlaw.com

               - and -

          Glen J. Dunn, Jr., Esq.
          GLEN J. DUNN & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
          221 North LaSalle Street, Suite 1414
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: 312.880.1010
          Email: GDunn@GJDlaw.com


LYFT INC: ILRCSF Moves to Certify Class of PWDs, Who Need WAVs
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled INDEPENDENT LIVING RESOURCE CENTER SAN
FRANCISCO, a California non-profit corporation, JUDITH SMITH, an
individual, JULIE FULLER, an individual, TARA AYRES, an individual,
SASCHA BITTNER, an individual, and COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR
INDEPENDENT LIVING, a California non-profit corporation v. LYFT,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, Case No. 3:19-cv-01438-WHA (N.D.
Cal.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify their claims as a
class action.

The proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class is defined as:

     All individuals in San Francisco County, Alameda County, and
     Contra Costa County who are disabled because of a mobility
     impairment, use wheelchairs or other mobility devices and
     therefore need Wheelchair Accessible Vehicles ("WAVs") for
     transportation, and who have been and continue to be
     deterred from using Lyft's transportation service due to
     Lyft's failure to provide equivalent transportation services
     for WAV users in those counties.  Excluded from the Class is
     any individual who has downloaded the Lyft application.

To the extent the Court disagrees with their definition for the
Plaintiff Class, the Plaintiffs move for the Court to redefine or
modify that definition, as such determinations are within the
Court's discretion.

The Plaintiffs also ask the Court to appoint them as Class
Representatives, and to appoint their counsel as Class Counsel
pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court will commence a hearing on January 30, 2020, at 8:00
a.m., to consider the Motion.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stuart Seaborn, Esq.
          Melissa Riess, Esq.
          Rebecca Serbin, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES
          2001 Center Street, Fourth Floor
          Berkeley, CA 94704-1204
          Telephone: (510) 665-8644
          Facsimile: (510) 665-8511
          E-mail: sseaborn@dralegal.org
                  mriess@dralegal.org
                  rserbin@dralegal.org


MADEWELL INC: Mendez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Madewell Inc. The
case is styled as Himelda Mendez and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Madewell Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-11159 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Madewell Inc provides women's apparel and accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          The Marks Law Firm PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: bmarkslaw@gmail.com


MCKESSON CORP: Opioid Case Settlement Reached Prior to Trial
------------------------------------------------------------
Aaron Cooper, Kristina Sgueglia and Holly Yan, writing for CNN,
report that four defendants accused in thousands of lawsuits over
the opioid epidemic reached a settlement, averting a high-profile
trial that was just hours away from starting.

Hours before the first federal trial in the opioid epidemic was set
to begin, four pharmaceutical companies reached a settlement
totaling $260 million.

The four companies -- McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health Inc.,
AmerisourceBergen Corp. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. --
reached a settlement with the two plaintiffs, Summit and Cuyahoga
counties in Ohio.

McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health Inc. and AmerisourceBergen Corp.
will pay out a combined $215 million immediately, and Teva
Pharmaceutical will pay $20 million, officials said at a press
conference.

Teva will also be donating $25 million worth of Suboxone, according
a source familiar with the settlement.

The settlement was struck between midnight and 1 a.m. on Oct. 21,
and the case was dismissed with prejudice, US District Court Judge
Dan Polster said.

The defendants were supposed to appear in a Cleveland court on Oct.
21 in the first federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) trial
involving the opioid epidemic. Thousands more plaintiffs' cases are
awaiting trial.

MDL is similar to class-action lawsuits in the sense that both
consolidate plaintiffs' pretrial proceedings for the sake of
efficiency. But unlike with class-action lawsuits, each plaintiff
in an MDL case can get a different verdict or award.

The plaintiffs in this MDL case -- Summit and Cuyahoga counties --
were the first among more than 2,700 plaintiff communities to head
to trial.

Three of the defendants -- AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and
McKesson -- issued a joint statement saying the settlement does not
mean they are at fault.

"While the companies strongly dispute the allegations made by the
two counties, they believe settling the bellwether trial is an
important stepping stone to achieving a global resolution and
delivering meaningful relief," the joint statement said.

"The companies expect settlement funds to be used in support of
initiatives to combat the opioid epidemic, including treatment,
rehabilitation, mental health and other important efforts. The
distributors remain deeply concerned about the impact the opioid
epidemic is having on families and communities across the nation --
and are committed to being part of the solution."

The money will go towards treatment

Attorneys general from four states -- North Carolina, Tennessee,
Pennsylvania and Texas -- lauded the settlement as "an important
step" in combating the opioid epidemic.

"People in every corner of the country have been hurt by this
crisis, and it is critical that settlement funds be distributed
fairly across states, cities, and counties and used wisely to
combat the crisis," the attorneys general said in a joint
statement.

"The global resolution we are working to finalize will accomplish
those goals while also ensuring that these companies change their
business practices to prevent a public health crisis like this from
ever happening again."

Both Summit County and Cuyahoga County have announced plans for how
settlement awards would be allocated.

"This is a national emergency right now, and all counties, all
municipalities, all villagers need help right now to combat this
crisis," Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Michael O'Malley said.

"We are looking at using this money for treatment, and getting
people into programs and helping first responders as they deal with
this crisis."

Two other defendants were also involved in this case -- a smaller
pharmaceutical company, Henry Schein Medical, and the pharmacy
chain Walgreens.

Walgreens was not part of the settlement. Judge Polster said claims
against the company have been cut off and moved to a different
track, with a schedule to follow.

Walgreens released a statement saying it is "completely unlike the
wholesalers involved in the national opioid litigation."

"Before 2014, Walgreens delivered opioid medications -- among many
other types of medications -- only to our own pharmacies, staffed
by our own pharmacy professionals,' company spokesman Phil Caruso
said.

Henry Schein Medical will be making a donation of $1 million to
establish an educational foundation with Summit County and will pay
$250,000 of the county's expenses, the company said in a written
statement.

Henry Schein said the plaintiffs have "agreed to dismiss the
Company."

More work needs to be done, attorneys say

The sudden settlement followed marathon negotiations that went
nowhere.

The talks lasted more than 10 hours and involved the CEOs of the
four major companies; attorneys general from Tennessee, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania and Texas' and lawyers representing over
2,000 state, local and Native American tribal governments.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs welcomed the settlement, but said more
work needs to be done in fighting the opioid epidemic.

"The proposed settlement will make significant progress to abate
the epidemic by providing resources for and applying funds directly
to necessary opioid-recovery programs," said a joint statement from
Paul J. Hanly Jr., Paul T. Farrell Jr. and Joe Rice.

"Throughout this process, Summit and Cuyahoga Counties have
tirelessly investigated, litigated, and prepared for the bellwether
trial that would have begun if not for this agreement. In doing so,
the communities revealed facts about the roles of the opioid
industry that created and fueled the opioid epidemic."

Summit County Executive Ilene Shapiro said the settlement is just
one step in a long road ahead.

"The long-term impacts on our children that have been byproducts of
this health crisis won't end just because a settlement has been
done," the county official said. But for now, she added, "we will
at least be able . . . to move on with something to help our folks
in the shorter term."

CNN's Evan Simko-Benarski, Brian Vitagliano, Ben Tinker, Amir Vera
and Kate Trafecante contributed to this report. [GN]


MDL 1720: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Antitrust Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, BARRY'S CUT RATE STORES INC.; DDMB, INC. d/b/a
EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR; DDMB 2, LLC d/b/a EMPORIUM LOGAN SQUARE; BOSS
DENTAL CARE; RUNCENTRAL, LLC; CMP CONSULTING SERV., INC.; TOWN
KITCHEN, LLC d/b/a TOWN KITCHEN BAR; GENERIC DEPOT 3, INC. d/b/a
PRESCRIPTION DEPOT; and PUREONE, LLC d/b/a SALON PURE, Plaintiffs,
v. VISA, INC.; MASTERCARD INCORPORATED; MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED; BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; BA MERCHANT SERVICES LLC
(f/k/a DEFENDANT NATIONAL PROCESSING, INC.); BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION; BARCLAYS BANK PLC; BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE; BARCLAYS
FINANCIAL CORP.; CAPITAL ONE BANK, (USA), N.A.; CAPITAL ONE F.S.B.;
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORPORATION; CHASE BANK USA, N.A.; CHASE
MANHATTAN BANK USA, N.A.; CHASE PAYMENTECH SOLUTIONS, LLC; JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A.; JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.; CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA),
N.A.; CITIBANK N.A.; CITIGROUP, INC.; CITICORP; and WELLS FARGO &
COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 05-MD-1720 (MKB) (JO) (E.D. N.Y.),
Judge Margo K. Brodie of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York denied the Bank Defendants' joint motion to
dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
standing and for failure to state a claim.

A putative Rule 23(b)(2) class of millions of merchants commenced
the antitrust action under the Clayton Act to prevent and restrain
violations of the Sherman Act, and the California Cartwright Act,
seeking injunctive relief against Defendants Visa and Mastercard
networks, as well as various issuing and acquiring banks ("Bank
Defendants").  The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of
merchants that accept Visa- and Mastercard-branded cards as forms
of payment, and allege that the Defendants engage in
anticompetitive conduct that harms competition and imposes
supracompetitive and collectively-fixed fees on the merchants.

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against all
the Defendants.  They request a declaratory judgment, pursuant to
Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C.
Section 2201(a), declaring that the Defendants' conduct is unlawful
as alleged in the Complaint, and further request that the Court
enjoins and restrains the wrongful conduct alleged in the
Complaint, pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act.

As to all the Defendants, including tge Bank Defendants, the
Plaintiffs request, among other things, that the Court declares,
adjudges, and decrees that the Defendants have committed the
violations of the federal and state antitrust laws alleged in the
Complaint; orders that the Defendants, their directors, officers,
employees, agents, successors, members, and all persons in active
concert and participation with them be enjoined and restrained
from, in any manner, directly or indirectly, committing the
violations of the Cartwright and Sherman Acts; and grants further
relief as is necessary to correct for the anticompetitive market
effects caused by the Defendants' unlawful conduct.

Currently before the Court is the Bank Defendants' joint motion to
dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.  They argue that the Plaintiffs lack Article III standing
to pursue the claims against them because they have not plausibly
alleged that the Bank Defendants are capable of redressing the
alleged harm, i.e., the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that
any of the Bank Defendants, individually or collectively, has any
authority to change the networks' rules.

Because the Plaintiffs have standing and have plausibly alleged
that the Bank Defendants are part of a conspiracy to unlawfully
benefit from supracompetitive interchange fees, Judge Brodie denied
the Bank Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims against them.

Among other things, she finds that (i) there is a substantial
likelihood that a favorable decision on the merits and a grant of
the requested relief would provide partial redress; (ii) the
Plaintiffs have alleged an ongoing antitrust conspiracy; (iii) the
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the Bank Defendants' failure
to withdraw from an ongoing conspiracy; (iv) the Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged a hub-and-spoke conspiracy and unlawful
agreement; (v) the Plaintiffs have alleged agreement between the
"spokes," i.e., the Bank Defendants, and more than simple
membership in a trade association; (vi) the Plaintiffs have alleged
more than parallel conduct; and (vii) Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
does not compel a contrary result.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/jJhTfZ from Leagle.com.

Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Litigation, In Re, represented by Linda P. Nussbaum --
lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com -- Nussbaum Law Group, PC, Alexandra S.
Bernay -- xanb@rgrdlaw.com -- Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman &
Robbins LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin R. Nagin -- BNAGIN@SIDLEY.COM
-- Sidley Austin LLP, Carmen A. Medici -- cmedici@rgrdlaw.com --
Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, pro hac vice, D.
Cameron Baker, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, David
W.
Mitchell, Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, pro hac
vice,
Dennis Stewart -- dstewart@hulettharper.com -- Hulett Harper
Stewart LLP, Eric P. Barstad -- EBarstad@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins
Kaplan LLP, Eric H. Grush, Sidley Austin LLP, Gary R. Carney, Jr.
-- gcarney@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garison, LLP, H. Laddie Montague -- hlmontague@bm.net -- Berger &
Montague, P.C., Jonah H. Goldstein -- jonahg@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, pro hac vice, K. Craig Wildfang --
KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Merrill G.
Davidoff -- mdavidoff@bm.net -- Beger & Montague, P.C., Patrick
Joseph Coughlin -- patc@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller, Ryan W.
Marth -- RMarth@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan LLP, pro hac
vice, Stacey Slaughter -- SSlaughter@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins,
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P. & Thomas J. Undlin --
TUndlin@RobinsKaplan.com -- Robins Kaplan, L.L.P.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al & Plaintiffs in civil action American
Booksellers Association v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al, Plaintiffs,
represented by K. Craig Wildfang -- KCWildfang@RobinsKaplan.com --
Robins Kaplan L.L.P., Richard J. Kilsheimer --
rkilsheimer@kaplanfox.com -- Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP, Thomas
M.
Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman --
wblechman@knpa.com -- Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Plaintiffs in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., Plaintiff, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder --
jshinder@constantinecannon.com -- Constantine Cannon LLP.

Plaintiffs in civil action National Association of Convenience
Stores et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et al & Plaintiffs in civil
action National Grocers Association et al v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. et
al, Plaintiffs, represented by Jeffrey Isaac Shinder, Constantine
Cannon LLP, Richard J. Kilsheimer, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP,
Thomas M. Campbell, Smith Campbell, LLP & William Jay Blechman,
Kenny Nachwalter, P.A., pro hac vice.

Defendants in civil action Jetro Holding, Inc. et al v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc. et al, Defendant, represented by Mark E. Tully --
mtully@goodwinlaw.com -- Goodwin Procter, LLP, Peter Edward
Greene,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, William Harry Rooney --
wrooney@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Andrew J.
McDonald, Pullman & Comley, LLC, Brian A. Herman --
brian.herman@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockuis, LLP,
David
Sapir Lesser, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, Douglas
Melamed, Eric H. Grush, Sidley Austin LLP, Erica Fenby --
erica.ghali@alston.com -- Alston & Bird LLP, pro hac vice, Gary R.
Carney, Jr. -- gcarney@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garison, LLP, James T. Shearin -- jtshearin@pullcom.com
-- Pullman & Comley, LLC, James M. Sulentic --
James.Sulentic@KutakRock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP, John P. Passarelli
-- John.Passarelli@KutakRock.com -- Kutak Rock LLP.


MDL 2492: Rangel Suit v. NCAA Over Health Issues Consolidated
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled JONATHAN RANGEL, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, and  LONE STAR CONFERENCE, Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-02813 (Filed July 9, 2019), was transferred from the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago)
on Nov. 8, 2019.

The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-07342 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff brings this class action complaint against the
Defendants to obtain redress for injuries sustained as result of
their reckless disregard for the health and safety of generations
of student-athletes.

The Rangel case is being consolidated with MDL No. 2492, In Re:
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION STUDENT-ATHLETE CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 18, 2013.
These actions seek medical monitoring for putative classes of
former student athletes at NCAA-member schools, who allege they
suffered concussions. The Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA concealed
information about the risks of the long-term effects of concussion
injuries. Opponents to centralization argue, inter alia, that (1)
the putative classes and claims alleged in these actions do not
sufficiently overlap; and (2) given the small number of actions
pending, alternatives to centralization are preferable. Opponents'
arguments, while persuasive when the Section 1407 motion was first
filed, are less compelling now given the current state of the
litigation, the Panel said.

Since the motion for centralization was filed, an additional eight
related actions have been filed, most alleging overlapping putative
classes of former football players at NCAA-member schools. The
Northern District of Illinois Arrington action involves
student-athletes, who participated in additional sports, and the
putative class alleged in that action is more limited in scope.
Most of the actions now pending, however, involve nearly completely
overlapping putative classes and claims. Moreover, the Panel is
persuaded that the overlap between Arrington and the remaining
actions is sufficient to warrant centralization. Regardless of the
scope of the putative classes alleged, all actions share common
factual questions concerning the NCAA's knowledge of the risks of
concussions in football players and its policies governing the
protection of players from such injuries. The Plaintiffs in all
actions seek medical monitoring for putative class members.

In its Dec. 18, 2013 Order, the MDL Panel found that the these
actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions
relating to allegations against the NCAA stemming from injuries
sustained while playing sports at NCAA-member institutions,
including damages resulting from the permanent long-term effects of
concussions. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery;
prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to
class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties,
their counsel, and the judiciary. Presiding Judge in the MDL is
Hon. Judge John Z. Lee Paul. The lead case is 1:16-cv-08727.

NCAA is a non-profit organization, which regulates athletes of
1,268 North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Vincent P. Circelli, Esq.
          CIRCELLI WALTER & YOUNG PLLC
          500 East 4th St., Suite 250
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (682) 703-2019
          E-mail: vinny@cwylaw.com

NCAA is represented by:

          Mark Steven Mester, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          330 N. Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 876-7700
          E-mail: mark.mester@lw.com

MDL 2804: National Opioid Settlement Moving in Federal Dist. Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
Stateline.org reports that as talks continue on a national opioid
settlement, a class-action lawsuit is still moving in federal
district court.

"The (Multi District Litigation) still exists and they're gearing
up for another bellweather case," said Andy Davis, a lead attorney
on the suit filed by Rome, Floyd County and several other Northwest
Georgia governments.

Bellweather cases are the ones U.S. District Judge Dan Polster is
using to decide questions of law that will apply to the more than
2,000 suits against opioid manufacturers and distributors gathered
under the MDL umbrella.

The two Ohio counties slated to be heard first reached a $260
million settlement last week. A group of state attorneys general
brokered a deal to expand the settlement to all pending cases, but
Davis said it hasn't been accepted by the MDL negotiation class.

"Right now there's a hang-up," Davis said. "There are some AGs that
don't want to let the cities and counties control the money.
There's still that stress that has to be resolved at some point."

The Rome City and Floyd County commissions declared the opioid
crisis a public nuisance that has harmed the community's residents
and led to ongoing costs to taxpayers. They're seeking damages and
funding for local services to address the epidemic.

However, a large share of the proposed national settlement would be
a supply of the addiction medication known as Suboxone: an
estimated $26 billion worth over 10 years, out of a $48 billion
overall settlement.

Addiction experts say states could make a greater impact by
spending the money on other measures.

"The primary barrier to getting more people into treatment is not
the cost of the drug," said Andrew Kolodny, senior scientist at the
Institute for Behavioral Health at Brandeis University and
co-director of the Opioid Policy Research Collaborative.

Kolodny said the real barrier to people with opioid addictions
getting help is the lack of willing prescribers and the shortage of
treatment programs.

Focusing on just one medication as a one-size-fits-all solution
across the country misses the mark, said Yngvild Olsen, an
addiction specialist in Baltimore who serves on the board of the
American Society of Addiction Medicine.

"Different states may have different needs and obtaining the
medication may not be top-most among them," she said. "Without a
robust, trained workforce and funding for comprehensive services, a
simplistic settlement may not get us very far."

More than 48,000 people in the United States died from overdoses of
prescription painkillers, heroin and fentanyl in 2017, according to
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Research shows that people who receive addiction medications,
including buprenorphine -- the primary ingredient in Suboxone --
methadone and naltrexone, which is sold as Vivitrol, are at least
twice as likely to stay in treatment and recovery as those
receiving addiction treatment without medication. The drugs, which
block the effects of other opioids, also protect patients from
accidental overdose.

But only about 10% of the more than 2 million Americans -- about
200,000 people -- with an opioid addiction are receiving treatment,
and most treatment does not include these medications, according to
data from the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration.

Also, in much of the country, few doctors are qualified to write
prescriptions for the controlled substance, and even fewer accept
Medicaid payments. Cash payment is very common, said Brendan
Saloner, a researcher at Johns Hopkins University who studies the
availability of opioid treatment.

Kenneth Stoller, who runs a treatment center in Baltimore, said
medications represent only a small portion of the total cost of
treatment and recovery services.

And when all the other costs of abating the opioid crisis are
accounted for, including child protective services, law
enforcement, drug courts, employment training, housing and other
medical expenses, the relative share of the costs represented by
the medication recedes even more, he said.

In addition to the cash and medication, the companies in the
settlement would agree to participate in a data-tracking program to
ensure that opioid painkillers are not over-supplied and to change
their marketing and distribution policies. [GN]


MDL 2909: Sabeehullah Class Suit Over Fairlife Milk Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as MOHAMMAD SABEEHULLAH and NABIL
KHAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. FAIRLIFE, LLC, MIKE McCLOSKEY, and SUE McCLOSKEY,
Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00222 (Filed June 17, 2019), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (Chicago) on Nov. 12, 2019.

The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-07171 to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. The lead case is Case No. 1:19-cv-07141.

The Sabeehullah case is being consolidated with MDL 2909, In re:
FAIRLIFE MILK PRODUCTS MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION.
The MDL was created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on Oct. 2, 2019.

These actions share factual questions arising from allegations of
animal cruelty at a farm in northern Indiana that provides milk
used in fairlife's milk products. The Plaintiffs in each action
allege that they purchased fairlife milk products based on the
Defendants' marketing and labeling, which emphasized Fairlife's
humane treatment of its dairy cows. The Plaintiffs in each action
assert similar claims for fraud, unjust enrichment, and violation
of state consumer protection laws, and they seek to represent
overlapping national and state classes of purchasers of Fairlife
milk.

In its Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL
involve common questions of fact, and that centralization in the
Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of
this litigation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Syed Ali Saeed, Esq.
          SAEED & LITTLE, LLP
          18 W Vermont Street
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Telephone: (317) 721-9214
          E-mail: ali@sllawfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Allison A. Ray, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS
          300 N Lasalle
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 862-2518
          E-mail: allison.ray@kirkland.com

               - and -

          Mark Steven Mester, Esq.
          LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
          330 N. Wabash Avenue, Suite 2800
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Telephone: (312) 876-7700
          E-mail: mark.mester@lw.com


MDL 2909: Salzhauer Class Suit Over Fairlife Milk Consolidated
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Eliana Salzhauer, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. The
Coca-Cola Company, Fairlife, LLC, Mike McCloskey, Sue McCloskey,
and Select Milk Producers, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02709
(Filed June 13, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) on Nov. 12, 2019.

The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:19-cv-07170 to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. The lead case is Case No. 1:19-cv-07141.

The Salzhauer case is being consolidated with MDL 2909, In re:
FAIRLIFE MILK PRODUCTS MARKETING AND SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION.
The MDL was created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on Oct. 2, 2019.

These actions share factual questions arising from allegations of
animal cruelty at a farm in northern Indiana that provides milk
used in fairlife's milk products. The Plaintiffs in each action
allege that they purchased fairlife milk products based on the
Defendants' marketing and labeling, which emphasized Fairlife's
humane treatment of its dairy cows. The Plaintiffs in each action
assert similar claims for fraud, unjust enrichment, and violation
of state consumer protection laws, and they seek to represent
overlapping national and state classes of purchasers of Fairlife
milk.

In its Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL
involve common questions of fact, and that centralization in the
Northern District of Illinois will serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of
this litigation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Amy Elisabeth Keller, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC
          Ten North Dearborn Street, 11th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 214-7900
          E-mail: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                  akeller@dicellolevitt.com

               - and -

          Daniel Warshaw, Esq.
          PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW LLP
          15165 Ventura Blvd., Suite 400
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Telephone: (818) 788-8300
          E-mail: dwarshaw@pswlaw.com

               - and -

          Kenneth Steven Canfield, Esq.
          DOFFERMYRE SHIELDS CANFIELD & KNOWLES, LLC
          1355 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 1725
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 881-8900
          E-mail: kcanfield@dsckd.com

               - and -

          Sue J. Nam, Esq.
          REESE LLP -NY
          100 West 93rd Street
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jeffrey S. Cashdan, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING
          1180 Peachtree Street, N.E.
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 572-4600
          E-mail: jcashdan@kslaw.com

               - and -

          Ronald Thomas Coleman, Jr.
          PARKER, HUDSON, RAINER & DOBBS, LLP
          303 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 3600
          Atlanta, GA 30308
          Telephone: (404) 523-5300
          E-mail: rcoleman@phrd.com


MILLER MAYER: Must Face Class Action Over Investment Scam
---------------------------------------------------------
Laura D. Francis, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that one of
two law firms involved with an investment scam must continue to
defend a lawsuit brought by a class of 54 immigrant investors who
say they were cheated out of their money and a chance at U.S.
citizenship, the California Court of Appeal ruled.

Ithaca, N.Y.-based Miller Mayer and Wolfsdorf Rosenthal, which has
a main office in Santa Monica, Calif., tried to get the case thrown
out under a California law that bars lawsuits based on their
exercise of free speech. Both firms prevailed in trial court with
the argument that the state's Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation, or Anti-SLAPP law shielded them from litigation over
their submission of immigration petitions to the government.

But while the investors' allegations against Wolfsdorf directly
involved protected activity -- the firm's filing of their
immigration paperwork -- that wasn't the case with the allegations
against Miller, the Second Appellate District said Oct. 29 in an
unpublished decision.

Rather, the investors say Miller prepared the misleading private
offering memorandum on which they relied in deciding whether to
invest, the court said. The firm's protected activity --
petitioning the government for an EB-5 regional center designation
-- was "merely incidental," it said.

"We're pleased with the decision of the Court of Appeals as another
step in confirming that plaintiffs' claims are meritless and
lacking in any evidence as to the allegations against Wolfsdorf
Rosenthal, LLP," the firm's attorney, Valerie A. Moore of Haight
Brown & Bonesteel in Los Angeles, said Oct. 30.

The decision also is a boon to immigration attorneys because it
protects their constitutional right to petition the government on
behalf of their clients and "affirms that immigration attorneys are
not guarantors of an EB-5 investment or the success of an
underlying EB-5 project," she said in a statement.

But Manhattan Beach, Calif., attorney Steven P. Scandura called the
decision disappointing because it "said law firms can rip off their
own clients."

"The whole EB-5 program was basically destroyed by fraud," said
Scandura, who represents the investors. "I'm sure there are
legitimate ones out there. There must be. I've yet to find one," he
said.

A representative for Miller Mayer didn't respond to a request for
comment.

EB-5 Fraud

The case is one of several dealing with the fallout of various EB-5
immigrant investor program scams, many of which came to light after
a push by the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate and
prosecute EB-5 fraud. The visa program provides green cards to
immigrants who invest at least $500,000 in a commercial enterprise
that creates at least 10 U.S. jobs.

Homeland Security Department regulations set to go into effect Nov.
21 will raise that minimum investment to $900,000 and channel more
money into projects in rural areas.

But the regulations don't contain provisions to immunize the
program from the fraud that has cost investors millions of dollars,
something Sens. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
are trying to fix via legislation.

The lawsuit brought by a class of 54 investors involved the Pacific
Proton EB-5 Fund, which was supposed to build and operate Beverly
Proton, a cancer treatment center in southern California. But
founder Charles Liu and his partner, radiation oncologist Dr. John
Thropay, misappropriated some $21.1 million of the total $26.9
million invested and never built the center.

As a result of the SEC's civil enforcement action, Liu and his wife
were ordered to pay back all the investors' money and to fork over
$8.2 million in civil penalties, and were permanently barred from
the EB-5 program. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
later affirmed.

The investors, each of whom lost more than $500,000, sued Miller
and Wolfsdorf for their alleged roles. Both firms knew or should
have known that Beverly Proton was a scam, the investors said.

Although finding that the case could go forward against Miller, the
court said it wasn't ruling on whether the firm actually is liable
to the investors.

Kaufman Dolowich Voluck represented Miller Mayer.

The case is Shi v. Wolfsdorf Rosenthal, LLP, 2019 BL 414783, Cal.
Ct. App., 2d Dist., No. B290792, unpublished 10/29/19. [GN]


MONAT GLOBAL: Judge Refuses to Dismiss Hair Product Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
HarrisMartin reports that a Florida federal judge has refused to
dismiss a consolidated class action complaint accusing the makers
of Monat hair care products of misrepresenting their safety and
efficacy, ruling that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged design
and manufacturing defects, and causation.

In an Oct. 23 order, Judge Darrin Gayles of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, noted the complaint lists
ingredients in the products that are known to cause allergic
reactions and dermatitis, and points to unsanitary conditions at
defendants' facilities.

Monat Global Corp., Alcora Corp. and B&R Products comprise a
family-controlled beauty conglomerate. [GN]


MONSANTO CANADA: Faces B.C. Roundup Suit Amid U.S. Class Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------
Vancouver Courier reports that a lawsuit filed in British Columbia
against Monsanto Canada ULC is just one of a growing number of
lawsuits targeting the U.S.-based agrochemical corporation for its
herbicide Roundup.

Alongside Monsanto, the notice of civil claim in B.C. Supreme Court
names the multinational pharmaceutical company Bayer as a defendant
as well as retailers where Roundup is sold, including Canadian Tire
and Home Hardware among others. This suit is in addition to
multiple class action lawsuits being filed against Monsanto in the
United States.

In his suit, Clifford Frank Sissons claims that he used Roundup
heavily at various rental properties from 1987 to 2018. In June of
the last year, Sissons was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma,
which the suit alleges was caused, or materially contributed to, by
his use of Roundup.

The lawsuit points to the chemical compound glyphosate contained in
Roundup as the cause of the cancer and says that glyphosate-based
herbicides are the most commonly and intensely used herbicides in
the word.

"The defendants knew of or should have known that glyphosate-based
herbicides such as Roundup, and specifically Roundup, had been
associated with the cause of several types of cancers," read the
court filings.

The lawsuit alleges that the defendants misled Sissons and other
customers by not providing any health warnings in their sales
brochures or advertisements, and not issuing a warning when selling
the product. According to the claim, the retailers knew that
Sissons would be mixing and using the herbicide himself, and they
had an obligation to ensure such a practice would be safe to
perform.

Sissons claims that, in addition to suffering from cancer, he has
other personal ailments including headaches, chronic muscular pain
and physiological injuries. Sissons is seeking general and special
damages, as well as damages for lost earning capacity. He is also
suing for costs and future medical care. For his case, Sissons is
relying on the legal arguments of negligence, breach of duty of
care and breach of the Consumer Protection Act.

The claims have not been tested in court, and the respondents had
not responded to the petition by press time. [GN]


MYER: Class Action Decision No Game-Changer
-------------------------------------------
Justin McDonnell, writing Australian Financial Review, reports that
the Myer class action decision will be a confidence boost for
plaintiff lawyers and funders, but it's no game-changer.

The decision in the Myer class action has attracted much attention.
However, perhaps its importance has been overstated. Let me explain
why.

The Myer judgment establishes that a plaintiff only has to
demonstrate what a company's market price would have been if the
unlawful conduct had not occurred, rather than show individual
reliance on a misleading document or statement.

The market-based causation issue has been part of securities class
action litigation for more than a decade. Yet there has been
limited judicial guidance because most cases have been settled.

However, in the space of a week, we had two conflicting decisions.

The theory was supported in Myer (October 24) but not in Babcock &
Brown, another case run in the Federal Court -- and decided on
October 18.

Babcock & Brown was not a class action. About 1200 claims by
separate plaintiffs across three proceedings were heard together.
However, the case was very similar to Myer. Net profit figures were
announced to the market from April 2008 but these were shown up by
its eventual demise in January 2009.

The court found the relevant information was either covered by ASX
listing rules or not material. The market-based causation theory
was not accepted because Justice Lindsay Foster said there was "a
serious problem" with the theory in that it "allows compensation to
people who actually suffered no loss".

The Myer decision will not lead to more class actions. Plaintiff
lawyers and funders look for a sudden drop in a listed company's
share price as the catalyst for a claim. Causal loss theories do
not drive that decision.

Practically, the Myer case will mean that plaintiff lawyers will be
tougher in pushing the market causation theory in settlement
negotiations.

However, Myer and Babcock & Brown have demonstrated that these
cases are very much subject to their own facts.

Concern for boards

The length of the Myer decision (386 pages) has meant there are
many twists and turns in proving the market causation theory: what
else could have caused the share price to drop, how strong is the
institutional share base, is there a well-defined event as opposed
to the impact being spread out over a couple of days, what is the
period in which it is alleged the market was misled, what index
should be used, what share price inflation model to consider, and
so on.

So, while there will be a confidence boost for plaintiff lawyers
and funders, defendants will find solace in the Myer roadmap that
has many different pathways.

Will boards be more concerned? Definitely. However, boards for some
time have been wary of internal forecasting and other management
views that may not support a position expressed externally.

Boards nowadays are very attuned to continuous disclosure
requirements. And the Myer case shows that market analysts are
sufficiently savvy and sophisticated to query the exuberant tone of
chief executive officers.

Judge's ruling in Myer case provides a clear path for class
actions
While the judgment is an important decision and required reading in
the class action space, it is unlikely to be the game-changer that
some predict.

Remember that in Myer and Babcock & Brown, the plaintiffs lost.
[GN]


NCAA: Manning Sues Over Student-Athletes' Health & Safety
---------------------------------------------------------
NATHANIEL MANNING, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04461-JPH-MJD (S.D. Ind.,
Nov. 6, 2019), seeks redress for injuries sustained as a result of
the Defendants' reckless disregard for the health and safety of
generations of Kent State University student-athletes.

According to the complaint, nearly 100,000 student-athletes sign up
to compete in college football each year, and it's no surprise why.
Football is America's sport and Plaintiff and a Class of football
players were raised to live and breathe the game. During football
season, there are entire days of the week that millions of
Americans dedicate to watching the game. On game days, hundreds of
thousands of fans fill stadium seats and even more watch around the
world. Before each game, these players--often mere teenagers--are
riled up and told to do whatever it takes to win and, when playing,
are motivated to do whatever it takes to keep going.

But up until 2010, NCAA kept players and the public in the dark
about an epidemic that was slowly killing college athletes. During
the course of a college football season, athletes absorb more than
1,000 impacts greater than 10 Gs (gravitational force) and, worse
yet, the majority of football-related hits to the head exceed 20
Gs, with some approaching 100 Gs. To put this in perspective, if
you drove your car into a wall at 25 miles per hour and weren't
wearing a seatbelt, the force of you hitting the windshield would
be around 100 Gs. Thus, each season these 18, 19, 20, and
21-year-old student-athletes are subjected to repeated car
accidents.

Over time, the repetitive and violent impacts to players' heads led
to repeated concussions that severely increased their risks of
long-term brain injuries, including memory loss, dementia,
depression, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy ("CTE"), Parkinson's
disease, and other related symptoms. Meaning, long after they
played their last game, they are left with a series of neurological
events that could slowly strangle their brains. For decades, NCAA
knew about the debilitating long-term dangers of concussions,
concussion-related injuries, and sub-concussive injuries (referred
to as "traumatic brain injuries" or "TBIs") that resulted from
playing college football, but recklessly disregarded this
information to protect the very profitable business of "amateur"
college football.

Football players were under the Defendant's care. Unfortunately,
the Defendant did not care about the off-field consequences that
would haunt students for the rest of their lives. Despite knowing
for decades of a vast body of scientific research describing the
danger of traumatic brain injuries ("TBIs") like those the
Plaintiff experienced, the Defendant failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect the Plaintiff and other football players from
the long-term dangers associated with them. They did so knowingly
and for profit, the Plaintiff avers.

As a direct result of the Defendant's acts and omissions, the
Plaintiff and countless football players suffered brain and other
neurocognitive injuries from playing NCAA football, the lawsuit
says. As such, the Plaintiff brings this Class Action Complaint in
order to vindicate those players' rights and hold the NCAA
accountable.

NCAA is a non-profit organization which regulates athletes of 1,268
North American institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: 713.554.9099
          Facsimile: 713.554.9098
          E-mail: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: 312 589 6370
          Facsimile: 312 589 6378
          E-mail: jedelson@edelson.com
                  brichman@edelson.com
                  rbalabanian@edelson.com

NEBRASKA FURNITURE: Faces Guglielmo Suit Over ADA Breach
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nebraska Furniture
Mart, Inc. The case is styled as Joseph Guglielmo, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nebraska
Furniture Mart, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11197 (S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Nebraska Furniture Mart is the largest home furnishing store in
North America selling furniture, flooring, appliances and
electronics.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic St., Suite 5
          Hakensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


NEW YORK, NY: Astacio Files Civil Rights Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The City of New York,
et al. The case is styled as Dolores Astacio, Kinetta Berry, Adrian
Salas, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs v. The City of New York, New York City Department of
Housing Preservation and Development, and Louise Carroll,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06862 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Accommodations Civil Rights.

New York City comprises 5 boroughs sitting where the Hudson River
meets the Atlantic Ocean. At its core is Manhattan, a densely
populated borough that's among the world's major commercial,
financial and cultural centers.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
          The Sultzer Law Group
          85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 200
          Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
          Phone: (845) 483-7100
          Email: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com


OFFICE DEPOT: Nasco Sues Over Unsolicited Texts That Violate TCPA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur Nasco on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v.
OFFICE DEPOT, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-02317-L-KSC (S.D. Cal., Dec.
5, 2019), is brought for damages resulting from the unlawful
actions of the Defendant in negligently, knowingly, and/or
willfully placed unsolicited automated text messages to the
Plaintiff's cellular phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection.

According to the complaint, the Defendant placed these unlawful
texts after the Plaintiff revoked consent by following the
Defendant's own opt-out mechanism and replying "Stop" to the texts.
The Defendant has violated the TCPA by using an automatic telephone
dialing system to bombard consumers' mobile phones with
non-emergency advertising and marketing text messages without prior
express written consent, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, who resided in the County of San
Diego, California.

Office Depot is an American office supply retailing company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yana A. Hart, Esq.
          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Phone: (619) 233-7770
          Fax: (619) 297-1022
          Email: yana@kazlg.com
                 ak@kazlg.com


OLDCASTLE APG: Jackson Files FDCPA Suit in N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Oldcastle APG, Inc.
The case is styled as Joseph Devon Jackson, on behalf of himself
and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. Oldcastle APG, Inc.
also known as: Oldcastle Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
1:19-cv-05490-ELR-WEJ (N.D. Ga., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Oldcastle Services, Inc. supplies building products. The Company
offers concrete masonry, hardscapes, lawn, and garden products.
Oldcastle Services serves customers in the North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory Joseph Gorski, Esq.
          Francis & Mailman, P.C.
          1600 Market St., Suite 2510
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 735-8600
          Email: ggorski@consumerlawfirm.com

               - and -

          James Marvin Feagle, Esq.
          Skaar and Feagle
          2374 Main Street, Suite B
          Tucker, GA 30084
          Phone: (404) 373-1970
          Fax: (404) 601-1855
          Email: jfeagle@skaarandfeagle.com

               - and -

          Justin Tharpe Holcombe, Esq.
          Kris Kelly Skaar, Esq.
          Skaar & Feagle, LLP -Woodstock
          133 Mirramont Lake Drive
          Woodstock, GA 30189
          Phone: (770) 427-5600
          Fax: (404) 601-1855
          Email: jholcombe@skaarandfeagle.com
                 krisskaar@aol.com

               - and -

          Matthew Anderson Dooley, Esq.
          O'Toole McLaughlin Dooley & Pecora Co. LPA
          5455 Detroit Road
          Sheffield Village, OH 44054
          Phone: (440) 930-4001
          Email: mdooley@omdplaw.com

OM JOLIET: Faces Johnson Suit Over Unlawful Use of Biometric Data
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michele Johnson individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. OM JOLIET WINGS, INC. and KALPESH PATEL, Case No.
2019CH14014 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Dec. 5, 2019), is brought
against the Defendants to redress and curtail their unlawful
collection, use, storage, and disclosure of the Plaintiff's
sensitive and proprietary biometric data.

The Defendants' and their affiliated facilities' employees are
required to have their fingerprints scanned by a biometric
timekeeping device. Unlike ID badges or time cards--which can be
changed or replaced if stolen or compromised--fingerprints are
unique, permanent biometric identifiers associated with each
employee. This exposes the Defendants' employees to serious and
irreversible privacy risks. Recognizing the need to protect its
citizens from such situation, Illinois enacted the Biometric
Information Privacy Act, specifically to regulate companies that
collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics, such as
fingerprints.

Notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal requirements of the law,
the Defendants disregards employees' statutorily protected privacy
rights and unlawfully collects, stores, disseminates, and uses its
employees' biometric data in violation of BIPA, the Plaintiff
contends. Specifically, the Defendants have violated and continues
to violate BIPA because it did not and continues not to: properly
inform the Plaintiff in writing of the specific purpose and length
of time for which their fingerprints were being collected, stored,
and used, as required by BIPA; receive a written release from the
Plaintiff to collect, store, or otherwise use their fingerprints,
as required by BIPA; provide a publicly available retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying Plaintiff's
fingerprints, as required by BIPA; and obtain consent from
Plaintiff to disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate their
fingerprints to a third party as required by BIPA, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Michele Johnson is a natural person and a citizen of the
State of Illinois.

OM Joliet Wings, Inc. is a franchisee of Wingstop. The Defendant
owns and operates a Wingstop located in Joliet, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan F. Stephan, Esq.
          Megan E. Shannon, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 2150
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 233-1550
          Fax: (312) 233-1560
          Email: rstephan@stephanzouras.com
                 mshannon@stephanzouras.com


ONCOSEC MEDICAL: Alpha Holdings Files Class Action in Nevada
------------------------------------------------------------
Alpha Holdings, Inc., the largest stockholder of OncoSec Medical
Incorporated (NASDAQ: ONCS), with an approximate 15.15% ownership
stake, on Oct. 30 disclosed that it has filed two lawsuits in the
District Court of Clark County, Nevada, against OncoSec and its
Board of Directors.

The first is a class action lawsuit filed by Alpha Holdings on
behalf of all OncoSec stockholders, alleging that the OncoSec board
members have breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to a
takeover proposal (the "Takeover Proposal") with a wholly-owned
subsidiary of China Grand Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Holdings
("CGP") and Sirtex Medical US Holdings, Inc. ("Sirtex"), an
affiliate of CGP, and breached their duty of candor by failing to
fully and fairly disclose all material information regarding the
Takeover Proposal. The lawsuit seeks to enjoin the as-yet
unscheduled meeting at which stockholders will vote on the Takeover
Proposal, void the license agreement with China Grand that was
agreed as part of the Takeover Proposal and order OncoSec to run a
true and thorough sale process to maximize value for all
stockholders. The second lawsuit asks the Court to enforce Alpha
Holdings' demand to inspect OncoSec's books and records, which
OncoSec has refused to honor even though it is legally required to
do so.

Commenting on the lawsuits, Alpha Holdings stated: "The OncoSec
board has agreed to a change of control transaction that we believe
undervalues the Company and its future prospects, as evidenced by
OncoSec's own statements and the analysis of its financial advisor.
The OncoSec Board has limited the Company's ability to realize
future upside and even agreed to a "no-talk" provision preventing
OncoSec from engaging with alternative bidders prior to the closing
of the transaction with CGP. We firmly believe that the China Grand
takeover should be prevented and OncoSec should consider other
financing arrangements that will preserve value for OncoSec's
current stockholders."

As detailed in the Class Action Complaint, Alpha Holdings opposes
the proposed transaction because it:

   -- Gives CGP and its affiliate, Sirtex, 53% share ownership of
OncoSec at a significantly depressed stock price;

   -- Allows CGP and Sirtex to appoint 3 of 9 directors plus up to
2 additional directors if any OncoSec's current directors cease to
serve, potentially giving CGP and Sirtex a majority of board
seats;

   -- Limits OncoSec's ability to consider acquisition proposals
for OncoSec from third parties, thereby lowering the potential
upside for current stockholders;

   -- Creates preemption rights on future equity sales by OncoSec
that may further dilute OncoSec's current stockholders and hinder
the ability to attract new capital in the future;

   -- Fails to require that CGP actually develop or sell the
products it seeks to license, thereby reducing their potential
value to current OncoSec stockholders;

   -- Establishes a 70% board approval requirement for certain
business decisions that would significantly restrict the board's
ability to run OncoSec's business for the benefit of all
stockholders; and

   -- Is supported by a so-called "fairness" opinion from a bank
that will receive the majority of its fee, $1.2 million, only if
the deal goes through.

The Books and Records Complaint alleges, among other things, that
OncoSec has refused to provide Alpha Holdings with books and
records that it is entitled to inspect, including a copy of the
Company's stock ledger and a list of OncoSec stockholders. In the
complaint, Alpha Holdings states its belief that OncoSec refused
its request in order to obtain an unfair advantage in the upcoming
proxy contest over the China Grand Takeover Proposal by hiding from
Alpha Holdings the identities of its fellow stockholders and other
valuable information. Alpha Holdings is seeking an order mandating
that OncoSec immediately provide the books and records that Alpha
Holdings has requested and an order enjoining the Special Meeting
until Alpha Holdings has had an opportunity to inspect the records
and communicate with its fellow stockholders about the China Grand
Takeover Proposal.

Alpha Holdings also announced that it has filed a preliminary proxy
statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which
details its reasons for opposing the transaction. Stockholders need
take no action at this time.

                    About Alpha Holdings, Inc.

Alpha Holdings, Inc. is a top-ranked Korean company engaged in the
design-development service and manufacturing of system
semiconductors, biotechnologies and thermal compound materials. The
company, formerly known as Alpha Chips Corp., is headquartered in
Seongnam, South Korea and was founded in 2002. Alpha is listed on
the KOSDAQ Market. [GN]


OREGON: Awaits Decision on Breach of Contract Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------
Ted Sickinger, writing for The Oregonian, reports that twelve
people in Linn County are about to decide, for all Oregonians, how
we value state forests.

It's not about selling them, but how the state balances the need
for logging revenues against other social and environmental
benefits the forests produce.

In a trial that started on Oct. 25, jurors are considering whether
the state breached a contract it made with 15 rural counties in
1941, and if so, how much it owes them.

Eighty years ago, counties began deeding 600,000 acres of burned,
logged and unproductive forests to the state. In return, the state
agreed to rehabilitate them, protect them from wildfire and share
logging revenues. Today, the 15 "trust land counties" receive
two-thirds of all state timber sale revenues -- money they depend
on to fund public services.

But 14 of those counties now claim the state has shortchanged them
for two decades, since the Oregon Department of Forestry adopted
new forest management rules. Counties claim they're owed $1 billion
because Oregon failed to maximize logging on the land.

Depending on who you listen to, the lawsuit is either a landgrab
financed by the timber industry, or an effort by rural counties to
get what they were promised before radical environmentalists took
over the state.

For the troubled forestry department, it's a major management
distraction and a financial drain that's already cost $2 million.

Legally, the lawsuit turns on one question: What did legislators
mean eight decades ago when they enshrined in statute that the
forest lands should be managed "to secure the greatest permanent
value of such lands to the state of Oregon."

Practically, it's about whether 729,000 acres of state forests
should be operated more like tree farms or managed to provide a
broader set of benefits, including habitat for fish and wildlife,
clean air and water, scenery and recreation.

If Oregon loses -- and the litigation and appeals could go on for
years -- it could be hugely consequential, both in terms of the
physical impact on forests that belong to all Oregonians, as well
as the wealth transfer to a few counties by taxpayers around the
state.

A settlement is possible. But last-ditch mediation this summer
produced no agreement, and the state has shown no signs of caving
to date.

Both the governor's office and the forestry department declined to
comment on the suit. But the agency is developing a new forest
management plan, one designed to deliver a broad set of
environmental and social benefits. Officials say that plan isn't
likely to increase logging levels.

The 14 counties can live with that, as long as taxpayers elsewhere
pay up.

"We're not telling them they have to manage (the state forests)
differently," said John DiLorenzo, the counties' lawyer, whose
Portland firm stands to earn 15 percent of any monetary award. "But
we're telling them that if they manage in a way that violates the
contract, they owe us money."

Mills rely on state timber

It's well into the first shift at Hampton Lumber's mill in
Tillamook and inside, the cacophony of bouncing logs, clattering
boards and whining saws is deafening.

Each log is laser-scanned as it enters the building. Within
seconds, a computer considers all possible combinations of
rectangles that can be cut from the circle, what boards would fetch
the highest price, and how to position the log through the saw to
maximize recovery of saleable lumber. Then the precision cutting
begins.

It's an odd mix of 21st-century high-technology and hard-hatted,
ear-plugged manual labor.

Well-paid labor.

"If you walk in the door and you're sweeping the floor, you're
making $18.54 an hour," said Mark Elston, the plant manager.

That entry level wage translates to $39,000 a year. The scale tops
out at about $60,000, with full medical and dental and a 401(k)
match. Skilled trades like electricians and mechanics earn more.

"With those kinds of wages," he said, "they contribute a lot to the
local economy."

Hampton sources most of the logs for the Tillamook Mill within a
100-mile radius. Up to 35% comes off the Astoria, Tillamook and
Forest Grove state forest districts, which together comprise about
600,000 acres.

That's less than 3% of all forest land in the state. But for mills
in Northwest Oregon, they are a critical and steady source of
supply. By state law, the logs can't be exported. And because the
forestry department relies on timber sales for its budget, it puts
a steady supply up for sale, regardless of market conditions.

Today, Hampton's Tillamook mill operates at about 75% of capacity,
with 165 employees on two shifts. The company insists those numbers
could be bigger -- if Oregon harvested more.

Dave Kunert, Hampton's log procurement manager, says that when the
agency adopted its current management plan in 2001, leaders
promised a sustainable annual harvest of 279 million board feet
from the three districts. As it is, he said, they've only produced
about 180 million board feet on average.

That "shortfall" has been bitterly debated for 20 years. Agency
leaders say the high harvest projections were due to modeling
errors in 2001. Yet the timber companies insist their own analysis
shows the forests could deliver another 100 million more board feet
annually.

"That's another sawmill," Kunert said.

Crucial jobs, local revenues

Hampton's mills are part of the skeletal remains of Oregon's
once-thriving wood products sector, where employment has shriveled
by almost two-thirds since the late 1970s, according to the state's
Office of Economic Analysis.

In Tillamook County, wood products accounted for more than one in
four private sector jobs in the 1970s. Now it's less than one in
10. That continuous contraction has bred resentment all over rural
Oregon, and increasingly polarized politics.

Timber wars aren't new, but they're gathering momentum again.

Take the walkout by Republican senators last summer over Oregon's
proposed climate change legislation, and the rise of Timber Unity,
a movement with an amorphous agenda, but whose members are
channeling rural anger on Salem.

It's about logging revenues. It's about jobs. It's about the
dignity that come with good paychecks, and the despair and social
problems that multiply without them.

That's what Board of Forestry members regularly hear from the
Forest Trust Lands Advisory Committee, a group of county
commissioners who advise them on forestry issues.

The 15 counties receive 64% of the logging revenues off state
forests, and don't pay anything to manage the land. Last year,
their cut was $87 million, with the lion's share going to Clatsop,
Tillamook and Washington counties.

Tillamook was projected to take home about $21 million. About $6
million went to its general fund, which was about a quarter of its
operating revenue for the year. The rest was parceled out to taxing
districts that included three school districts, the community
college, the major fire districts, the education service district,
the soil and water district and three ports.

"The other side is the fully benefitted family wage jobs we have
here in Tillamook County," said County Vice Chairman Dave Yamamoto,
who also chairs the advisory committee.

Yamamoto reels off the figures: The average private sector wage in
his county is about $37,737 a year, well shy of the state's $50,843
average. But forestry and logging jobs pay $50,680. Mill jobs
average $52,918. And trucking logs -- to the mill and to market --
averages almost $44,000.

"People tell me all the time that Tillamook County just needs to be
brought into the 21st century, that you're doing really well with
tourism and you need to concentrate on that," he said. "The average
tourism job pays $20,000 a year."

Yamamoto says Oregon currently grows 400 million board feet of
timber annually in state forests, yet the agency only puts about
230 million board feet up for sale each year. There's potential, he
said, to almost double the cut.

In short, the counties argue, the state is letting trees get too
old. Instead of cutting them on a 45- to 50-year rotation, as
private landowners do, they let them grow to 80 years and older.
Once the trees develop old growth characteristics, they can attract
endangered species like the Northern Spotted Owl and Marbled
Murrelet, they're off limits.

"That's what's happening on our state forest right now," Yamamoto
said.

Former Tillamook County Commissioner Tim Josi put it more starkly
in testimony to the Legislature on a 2015 bill that would have
required steep logging increases.

"Old growth trees bring in murrelets," he said, "and when that
happens, it is just like a cancer."

A stalking horse?

There's a narrative that the counties' lawsuit was a grassroots
effort that grew out of decades of frustration.

The frustration is real, but that's not how it happened.

Court documents show the lawsuit was instigated -- and initially
funded -- by the Oregon Forest & Industries Council trade group and
the two companies that buy the most timber off the north coast
forests, Hampton Tree Farms and Stimson Lumber.

Emails from August of 2015 show the council's president, Kristina
McNitt, arranging meetings with Linn County's three commissioners
to discuss "harvest activity" and the agency's management plans.
She specifically noted she wanted to meet individually to avoid the
county's two-person quorum rules, which also triggers a public
meeting obligation.

By January of 2016, Linn County had entered a contract with Davis
Wright Tremaine to pursue the lawsuit. McNitt's group had promised
to pay up to $125,000 for the first phase of it.

Why Linn County, which gets less than 5% of the harvest revenues?

"Kristina grew up in rural Linn County," said Sara Duncan, the
group's spokeswoman. "She witnessed, first-hand, mill jobs lost,
school enrollment down, communities left behind."

The lawsuit's critics say they were "venue shopping," choosing a
locale where they'd have a sympathetic judge and jury.

A meeting was arranged in early February 2016 for commissioners
from other counties to hear more about the lawsuit. Some were
anxious about being drawn into a legal case against the state.

Craig Pope, a Polk County commissioner, expressed concerns in an
email to other commissioners. "I feel like OFIC is in control now,"
he wrote. "I believe DiLorenzo and company will be chomping at the
bit to dive into their strategy to convince the rest of the
counties as quickly as they can…

"I wish I could feel like (the council) had a voice in the outcomes
of the near future, but I think we have been served up by the OFIC
and will now have to live with the actions they have chosen."

Whatever reservations they had, 14 of the 15 counties -- and
another 150 underlying taxing districts -- ultimately joined. It
was certified as a class action in October 2016.

And now they can't back out. If they do, the counties would owe
Davis Wright Tremaine's legal bills since 2016 -- and with five
lawyers billing between $410 and $625 an hour, the bill could be in
the millions.

McNitt said the industry council only provided seed money and has
no control.

"We believe in and supported advancing this lawsuit because we care
about the sustainable management of state forests for the benefit
of Oregon schools, our workers and local communities," she said.

The lawsuit's lynchpin is a phrase included in legislation more
than 80 years ago, when counties began deeding the land to the
state. The state's formal mandate, codified in 1941, was to manage
the forests "to secure the greatest permanent value of such lands
to the state."

It's an ambiguous phrase, and in reaction to growing controversy
around logging in the 1990s, lawmakers updated the rule in 1998.
The new rule spelled out that the agency was to manage forests for
sustainable harvests and to protect habitat for salmon and native
wildlife, generate productive soil, clean air and clean water,
prevent floods and erosion and promote recreation.

But counties say that rule change breached their contract.

"In the 1940s, timber was king," DiLorenzo said, "and the purpose
of the act was to produce revenues for the counties and produce a
constant source of timber for the wood products industry."

Counties are seeking $1 billion -- $35 million annually since 2001
-- to compensate for lost revenues, plus an additional amount
sufficient to yield $35 million annually going forward. That's on
top of their cut of future harvest revenues.

But the state argues the lands were acquired for multiple uses.
According to its pretrial memo, it contends the laws governing the
forest acquisitions changed over time, but explicitly mentioned
other uses beyond timber production, including water supplies and
recreation.

The state maintains the lands it acquired were virtually worthless
and required a substantial investment to restore. And, it says,
there was never a legislative mandate to maximize revenues. The
state argues its environmental protection efforts don't breach any
contract, but simply comply with the federal clean water and
endangered species acts.

"It's just absurd," said Scott Lee, a former Clatsop County
commissioner who was on the county advisory council when the
lawsuit was being considered. "It's Oregonians suing Oregonians.
This is not the Oregon way."

If the counties win, Lee said, they'll lose anyway. "If we don't
manage the forests in a balanced way, it will invite lawsuits that
can tie up the state forests just like it did with the federal
forests back in the eighties."

Clatsop County, the biggest recipient of state timber sales, did
not join the lawsuit.

A current Clatsop Commissioner, Kathleen Sullivan, calls it a
destructive action that "forces conflict rather than
collaboration." Instead of working together, time, talent and money
are being in a way that is damaging critical working relationships
between state and local governments, she said.

"Where will the state come up with $1 billion? Will ODF be forced
to cash out the entirety of the state forest lands? Then what?"
[GN]


PANASONIC CORP: Seeks Decertification of Cartel Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Leonard, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a group of
overseas electronics makers say a San Francisco federal judge
should decertify an auto capacitor price-fixing class action based
on new data showing the plaintiffs badly underestimated the number
of uninjured class members.

The multidistrict lawsuit targets dozens of mostly Japanese,
Korean, and Taiwanese companies, including industry giants like
Panasonic Corp. and Samsung Electro-Mechanics Co. Ltd. It accuses
them of violating antitrust laws through a global conspiracy to
jack up the prices of auto capacitors, components that store and
regulate electric currents in cars. [GN]


PC SHIELD: Court Grants Renewed Motion for Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as WENDELL H. STONE COMPANY,
INC., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
doing business as STONE & COMPANY, the Plaintiff, vs. PC SHIELD
INC. an Oklahoma corporation, and BRANDIE M. Jordan, an individual,
the Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-01135-AJS (W.D. Pa.), the Hon.
Judge Arthur J. Schwab entered an order on Dec. 4, 2019:

   1. granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification;

   2. certifying a class of:

      "all persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the
      filing of this action, (2) were sent, by Defendants or on
      Defendants' behalf an unsolicited telephone facsimile
      message, (3) from whom Defendants claim they obtained prior
      express permission or invitation to send those faxes in the
      same manner as Defendants claim they obtained prior express
      consent to fax Plaintiff";

   3. appointing Patrick H. Peluso as class counsel; and

   4. appointing Stone as class representative.

The Court finds that in light of the negligible damages available
under the TCPA for a violation, that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Stone has established that the
prerequisites of Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(b)(3) are met.

Stone asserts a claim on its own behalf, as well as on behalf of a
class of individuals, pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005.[CC]

PEARL DINER: Sued by Baten Rojas for Violating FLSA and NYLL
------------------------------------------------------------
EDWIN RAMIRO BATEN ROJAS (A.K.A. EDWIN), individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated v. PEARL DINER, INC. (D/B/A PEARL
DINER), JAMES COULIANIDIS, EMANUEL COULIANIDIS, ALEXANDER ALMONTE,
and RUBEN DOE, Case No. 1:19-cv-10051 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 30, 2019),
accuses the Defendants of violating the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of the Defendants and was
employed as a delivery worker and a dishwasher at the Diner.  He
alleges that he worked for the Defendants in excess of 40 hours per
week, without appropriate minimum wage and overtime compensation
for the hours that he worked.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a diner located at 212
Pearl Street, in New York City, under the name "Pearl Diner."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Michael@Faillacelaw.com


PIZZA HUT: Franchisees to Pay $6MM to End TCPA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that several Pizza Hut franchisees have agreed to
pay $6 million to clear up allegations in Florida federal court
that they breached the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by texting
cellphone subscribers unsolicited advertisements after their
friends passed on their numbers during a promotion. The franchisees
-- ADF MidAtlantic LLC, ADF Pizza I LLC, ADF PA LLC and American
Huts Inc. -- have agreed to fund the multimillion dollar settlement
amount. [GN]



PLAYMOBIL USA: Guglielmo Files ADA Suit in NY
---------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Playmobil USA, Inc.
The case is styled as Joseph Guglielmo, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Playmobil USA, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-11198 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

PLAYMOBIL USA, Inc. manufactures and retails toys and games. The
Company offers toys, dolls, cars, board games, playing cards,
instruments, and puzzles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Russel Craig Weinrib, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic St., Suite 5
          Hakensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: rweinrib@steinsakslegal.com


RAMCO ENTERPRISES: Pantoja Suit Remanded to Monterey Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BEATRIZ CISNEROS PANTOJA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAMCO
ENTERPRISES, L.P., Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-03336-LHK (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, (i) granted the
Plaintiff Carmela Maribel Arroyo's motion to remand, and (ii)
denied her request for attorney's fees.

On Feb. 25, 2014, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant, a California
limited partnership, in the Superior Court of California for the
County of Monterey.  The Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of a
putative class of all current and former employees of the Defendant
who were non-exempt under the Wage Order and who performed any work
for Defendants in California during the Class Period and were paid
any portion of their wages on a piece rate basis.  

The Plaintiff generally alleged that the Defendant unlawfully
underpaid the putative class members for hours worked, minimum
wages, overtime wages, rest periods, and other reimbursement costs
for work-related expenses.  She alleged various violations of the
California Labor Code and the California Business and Professions
Code.  She amended the class action complaint on June 9, 2014 and
again on Aug. 31, 2016.  The Second Amended Complaint filed on Aug.
31, 2016 replaced class representative Beatriz Pantoja with current
Plaintiff Arroyo.

On July 29, 2015, the Plaintiff served a settlement conference
statement on the Defendant.  In the settlement conference
statement, the Plaintiff demanded $11.5 million to resolve all
claims at issue, inclusive of costs and attorneys' fees.

On May 7, 2019, the Plaintiff filed and served the Defendant with a
motion for class certification.  The motion for class certification
included a spreadsheet that the Defendant produced on March 5, 2019
in response to written discovery.  The spreadsheet identified
thousands of putative class members and included the residences of
some putative class members.  Some putative class members were
listed as residing outside of California.

On June 10, 2019, the state court granted the Plaintiff's class
certification motion in its entirety.  On June 12, 2019, more than
five years after the Plaintiff initiated the action, on June 12,
2019, Defendant RAMCO removed the action from the Superior Court of
California for the County of Monterey, to the Court.  Trial in the
state court action was scheduled for Sept. 16, 2019.

On July 12, 2019, the Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to
state court on the basis that the Defendant's notice of removal was
untimely.  The Defendant opposed.

In the present case, the only issue is whether the Defendant's
notice of removal was timely.  The Plaintiff contends that the
Defendant's notice of removal was untimely because all three
elements necessary for CAFA jurisdiction were ascertainable more
than 30 days before the Defendant filed the notice of removal.
Again, under CAFA, a federal court may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a class action where (1) the parties are
minimally diverse; (2) the proposed class has at least 100 members;
and (3) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.

The Defendant concedes that it was on notice more than 30 days
before removal that the Plaintiff's proposed class had at least 100
members.  It, however, challenges the Plaintiff's claim that the
diversity and amount in controversy requirements were ascertainable
from the pleadings or other papers more than thirty days before
removal.  Because the Plaintiff claims that the amount in
controversy was ascertainable at an earlier date than minimal
diversity, the Court first addresses the amount in controversy and
then turns to minimal diversity.

Judge Koh concludes that the amount in controversy in the case was
ascertainable from the Plaintiff's July 29, 2015 settlement
conference statement, almost four years before Defendant removed
the case to federal court on June 12, 2019.  As a result, whether
the Defendant's removal was timely depends on whether and when the
Plaintiff put the Defendant on notice that the final element of
CAFA jurisdiction -- minimal diversity -- was satisfied.

Turning to the minimal diversity issue, the Judge concludes that
the Defendant had a sufficient basis to ascertain minimal diversity
on May 7, 2019, when the Plaintiff served it with a spreadsheet
indicating that multiple class plaintiffs currently resided outside
of California.  The Defendant did not remove the case until June
12, 2019, more than 30 days after ascertaining that all elements of
CAFA jurisdiction were satisfied and that federal jurisdiction was
proper.  As a result, the Defendant's removal was untimely under 28
U.S.C. Section 1446(b)(3), and the Judge grants the Plaintiff's
motion to remand.

Finally, along with the motion to remand, the Plaintiff requests an
award of attorneys' fees.  The Judge in her discretion denies the
Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh granted the Plaintiff's motion
to remand the instant case to the Superior Court of California for
the County of Monterey.  She also denied the Plaintiff's request
for attorney's fees.  The Clerk will close the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mhtAcI from Leagle.com.

Beatriz Cisneros Pantoja, on behalf of herself and other similarly
situated employees, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston Attorneys at Law, Kristen Michelle
Agnew -- kagnew@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, APC, Larry
W. Lee -- lwlee@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group, P.C., Max
William Gavron -- mgavron@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law Group &
Nicholas Rosenthal -- nrosenthal@diversitylaw.com -- Diversity Law
Group.

Carmela M Arroyo, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Swanston,
Fitzpatrick Spini & Swanston Attorneys at Law.

RAMCO Enterprises, L.P., Defendant, represented by Anthony P.
Raimondo -- mcg@raimondoassociates.com -- Raimondo & Associates,
Gerardo V. Hernandez, Raimondo Associates, James Daniel Miller,
Raimondo & Associates, Jan Leslie Kahn -- kahn@kschanford.com --
Kahn Soares & Conway, LLP, Rissa Ann Stuart --
rstuart@kschanford.com -- Kahn, Soares & Conway, LLP, Robert Brian
Zumwalt -- rzumwalt@kschanford.com -- Kahn, Soares and Conway &
Steven Richard Wainess, Raimondo and Associates, a law
corporation.


RENOVATE AMERICA: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Nemore Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, REGINALD NEMORE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
RENOVATE AMERICA, INC., Defendant and Appellant, Case No. B294459
(Cal. App.), Judge Victoria M. Chavez of the U.S. Court of Appeals
of California for the Second District, Division Two, affirmed the
trial court's order denying Renovate's petition to compel
arbitration.

Plaintiffs Nemore, Violeta Senac, and Allen Bowen are homeowners
who obtained financing from the County of Los Angeles through its
Property Assessed Clean Energy ("PACE") program for energy
efficiency or water saving improvements to their homes.  Plaintiffs
Senac and Bowen are ages 87, and 69, respectively.  Renovate is one
of two private companies retained by the County to administer the
PACE program.  Renovate markets its PACE financing under the brand
name "HERO."

The Plaintiffs entered into home improvement contracts with
contractors who installed PACE improvements in their homes.  The
home improvement contracts specify the PACE improvements to be
installed; the scope of work, price, and timing of the improvements
and installation; and the parties' responsibilities regarding
insurance and standards of materials and workmanship.  The home
improvement contracts also contain arbitration provisions requiring
binding arbitration in the event of any dispute, or a claim arising
out of or relating to the agreement, or the enforcement or
interpretation thereof or of any controversy or claim arising out
of or related to this contract, or breach thereof.

The Plaintiffs filed the action against Renovate and the County on
behalf of themselves and other homeowners who entered into a HERO
assessment contract with the County between March 1, 2015 and March
31, 2018.  They asserted causes of action against Renovate for
financial elder abuse, breach of the Administration Contract under
a third party beneficiary theory, violation of the Unfair
Competition Law, and declaratory relief.

In the general allegations of their complaint, plaintiffs allege
that Renovate did not use licensed mortgage brokers to market or
originate PACE loans, but instead used registered contractors to
sell PACE financing and to sell and install PACE improvements.
Typically, contractors introduced homeowners to the PACE program,
controlled the financing application process, and obtained
homeowners' signatures on PACE contracts. Plaintiffs allege that
Renovate instructed its registered contractors to base the amount
of improvements sold to a homeowner on the homeowner's available
equity rather than the homeowner's ability to repay. As a result,
PACE loans are typically larger than traditional home improvement
loans. Because the PACE liens run with the land and are accorded
priority status ahead of any other mortgage or lien, homeowners
with PACE liens have difficulty selling or refinancing their
homes.

Each of the named Plaintiffs allege that they entered into PACE
assessment contracts with the County to finance the cost of various
energy efficient or water saving improvements and that liens
securing the financing were recorded against their properties.  The
Plaintiffs further allege that they receive fixed incomes,
primarily monthly Social Security payments; that entering into PACE
assessment contracts caused their respective DTI ratios to increase
substantially; and that repaying the PACE financing will consume
most of their annual incomes.

In the cause of action for elder abuse, Plaintiffs Senac and Bowen
allege, based on the general allegations of the complaint, that
Renovate "has taken, secreted, appropriated, obtained and/or
retained the property of the Elder Subclass Members."

In their breach of contract cause of action, the Plaintiffs allege
that Renovate breached its obligations under the Administration
Contract to "ensure best in class protections for property owners"
against predatory lending and poor assessment servicing and to
provide "special" or heightened protections for senior citizens.
They further allege Renovate's breaches have caused them damage,
including loss of funds they have paid in connection with the PACE
loans, increased risk of foreclosure, barriers to obtain
refinancing or other debt secured by their homes, reduced value of
their homes, and encumbrances that reduce the equity in their
homes.

In their cause of action for violation of the Unfair Competition
Law, the Plaintiffs allege that Renovate engaged in unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent business practices by (a) breaching its
duties to plaintiffs under the Administration Contract, (b) failing
to screen and monitor its registered contractors in accordance with
its own policies, (c) charging an above-market rate of interest on
PACE loans and a rate of interest in excess of the risks of return
of principal, (d) encouraging predatory lending by determining PACE
financing eligibility without considering homeowners' ability to
repay, and (e) encouraging predatory lending by informing
registered contractors how much funding plaintiffs qualified for
based on the equity in their homes. Plaintiffs allege that because
of Renovate's unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent practices, they have
incurred actual financial losses and injuries including first
priority PACE liens that require payment and may trigger
foreclosure by the County or by pre-existing conventional mortgage
lenders.

In their declaratory relief cause of action, the Plaintiffs allege
an actual controversy exists between them and Renovate regarding
their legal rights and remedies toward one another in connection
with the PACE program and PACE liens, and that they are entitled to
a judicial declaration extinguishing the PACE liens on the
properties, cancelling their obligations under the Assessment
Contracts, and recovering payments made in connection with the PACE
program and PACE liens.

Renovate filed a petition to compel arbitration and a request to
stay judicial proceedings pending arbitration, invoking the
arbitration provisions in the home improvement contracts between
the Plaintiffs and contractors who installed PACE improvements.  It
argued that even though it was not a signatory to the home
improvement contracts, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied
to compel the Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against Renovate
pursuant to the arbitration provisions in those contracts.  The
Plaintiffs opposed the petition, arguing that the arbitration
provisions in the home improvement contracts were unenforceable,
and that even if the arbitration provisions were enforceable,
equitable estoppel did not apply.

After a Dec. 5, 2018 hearing, the trial court denied Renovate's
petition, concluding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did
not apply to compel the Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims
against Renovate.  The appeal followed.

Judge Chavez finds that the Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a
breach of any obligation under the home improvement contracts, and
does not rely on any provision in those contracts to support any of
the asserted causes of action.  There is no similar intertwining of
the Plaintiffs' claims against Renovate with the provisions of the
home improvement contracts.  The Plaintiffs do not refer to, rely
on, or support their claims with any term or provision in the home
improvement contracts, nor do they allege any breach of those
provisions.

In addition, the Judge finds that the factual basis for the
Plaintiffs' claims is not the existence of the home improvement
contracts or any alleged breach thereunder.  Rather, their claims
are based squarely on Renovate's obligations under the
Administration Contract to "ensure best in class protections"
against predatory lending and to provide special protection for
seniors over 65 years of age to confirm they clearly understand the
terms of the financing.

Similarly, the Plaintiffs do not seek to enforce any of the terms
or obligations in their respective home improvement contracts.  The
only operative agreement is the Administration Contract and
Renovate's alleged breach of its duties under that agreement.

The Judge concludes that the claims asserted against Renovate are
not founded in or inextricably entwined with the terms or
obligations of the home improvement contracts that contain
arbitration provisions.  The trial court did not err in denying the
motion to compel arbitration.

For these reasons, Judge Chavez affirmed the order denying the
petition to compel arbitration.  The Plaintiffs shall recover their
costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/4SuVjq from Leagle.com.

Reed Smith, Jesse L. Miller -- jessemiller@reedsmith.com -- James
M. Neudecker -- jneudecker@reedsmith.com -- Matthew T. Peters, and
Dennis Peter Maio -- dmaio@reedsmith.com -- for Defendant and
Appellant.

Hogan Lovells, Michael M. Maddigan --
michael.maddigan@hoganlovells.com -- and Vassi Iliadis --
vassi.iliadis@hoganlovells.com; Public Counsel, Cindy Panuco,
Stephanie Carroll, and Nisha Kashyap -- nkashyap@publiccounsel.org;
Bet Tzedek Legal Services, Jenna Miara and Jennifer Sperling for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.


RESIDEO TECHNOLOGIES: Faces St. Clair Securities Suit in Minn.
--------------------------------------------------------------
ST. CLAIR COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. RESIDEO
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., MICHAEL G. NEFKENS and JOSEPH D. RAGAN III,
Defendants, Case No. 0:19-cv-02863 (D. Minn., Nov. 8, 2019), is
brought against the Defendants for their violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The case is a securities class action on behalf of all persons, who
purchased the common stock of Resideo between October 29, 2018, and
October 22, 2019, inclusive, against Resideo and its President and
Chief Executive Officer, Michael G. Nefkens, and Executive Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer, Joseph D. Ragan III.

On October 30, 2018, the Company announced that it was now trading
independently from Honeywell International Inc., with the
expectation of new product launches to expand its offerings in the
modern home technology market.

During the Class Period, Resideo continued to assure investors that
the Company was poised to meet its 2018 guidance at the high end of
its forecasted range, and more importantly, for 2019 the Company
would achieve 4%+ organic growth and -13% adjusted EBITDA margin.
Further, while the Company acknowledged it had experienced
operational disruptions (primarily administrative) in connection
with the spin-off, the Defendants repeatedly assured investors that
any negative effects of the spin-off were largely "behind them or
minimizing and reiterated their fiscal year ("FY") 2019 guidance
for the Company, stating as late as August 8, 2019 that the
Company's performance to date put it on track to make its FY19
revenue guidance.

The Plaintiff alleges that these representations was materially
false and misleading when made because the Defendants failed to
disclose the following true facts, which were known to them or
recklessly disregarded by them: (a) The negative operational
effects of the spin-off were more substantial and persistent than
disclosed and had negatively affected the Company's product sales,
supply chain, and gross margins, putting Resideo's FY 19 financial
forecasts at risk; and as a result of the foregoing, the Company's
financial guidance lacked a reasonable basis and the Company was
not on track to make its FY19 guidance as claimed.

As a result of the Defendants' material misrepresentations and
omissions, Resideo stock traded at artificially inflated prices of
more than $26 per share during the Class Period, the Plaintiff
asserts.

Then, on October 22, 2019, Resideo shocked investors when it issued
its preliminary financial results for the third quarter of 2019,
announcing that it had missed revenue and earnings targets and was
lowering its recently reaffirmed revenue outlook for FY19 by $80
million. Also on October 22, 2019, the Company announced that
Defendant Ragan, the Company's CFO, would be leaving as of November
6, 2019.

Following these alarming disclosures and a significant reduction in
the Company's outlook for free cash flow, Resideo's stock price
declined more than 40%, from a close of $15.23 per share on October
22, 2019, to a close of $9.50 per share on October 23,
2019, on massive volume of more than 16 million shares traded.

Plaintiff St. Clair County Employees' Retirement System purchased
Resideo common stock during the Class Period and was damaged by the
Defendants' misrepresentations and violations of securities laws.

Resideo Technologies is a global provider of residential comfort
and security solutions, and distributor of low-voltage and security
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carolyn G. Anderson, Esq.
          June P. Hoidal, Esq.
          ZIMMERMAN REED LLP
          37-1100 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612 341 0400
          Facsimile: 612 341 0844
          E-mail: Carolyn.Anderson@zimmreed.com
                  June.Hoidal@zimmreed.com

               - and -

          Daniel J. Pfefferbaum, Esq.
          Shawn A. Williams, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          Post Montgomery Center
          One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: 415 288-4545
          Facsimile: 415 288-4534
          E-mail: shawnw@rerdlaw.com
                  dpfefferbaum@regrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas C. Michaud, Esq.
          VANOVERBEKE, MICHAUD & TIMMONY, P.C.
          79 Alfred Street
          Detroit, MI 48201
          Telephone: 313 578-1200
          Facsimile: 313 578-1201
          E-mail: tmichaud@vmtlaw.com


RYDER INTEGRATED: Ct. OKs Amended Settlement Agreement in Eure Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIM EURE, on behalf of himself, all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff, v. RYDER
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC., a Corporation; RYDER DEDICATED
LOGISTICS, INC., a Corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 16-cv-00324-MCE-AC (E.D. Cal.), Judge Morrison
C. England, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of California granted the Parties' Stipulation to Amend the Class
Action Settlement Agreement.

Without affecting the finality of the Order granting the
Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion For Final Approval Of Class Action
Settlement, the Judge finds that the amendment to the Settlement
Agreement falls within the range of reasonableness and is fair,
just, and adequate and no further notice to the Class shall be
required.

The United Way of California shall be designated as the Cy Pres
Beneficiary for the 2018 Credit Reduction tax payment in the amount
of $1,975.44.

Paragraph 63 of the Class Action Settlement Agreement shall be
amended and modified as follows:

     The Settlement Administrator shall determine the amount of any
tax withholding to be deducted from each Participating Class
Member's Settlement Payments.  All such tax withholdings shall be
remitted by the Settlement Administrator to the proper governmental
taxing authorities.  

     (i) The State of California was able to pay off its Credit
Reduction Account with the IRS towards the end of 2018 and issued a
refund in the amount of $1,975.44, representing the 2018 Credit
Reduction tax payment.  The Parties agree that the 2018 Credit
Reduction tax payment in the amount of $1,975.44 (Cy Pres Amount)
shall be disbursed to a cy pres and have designated The United Way
of California (Cy Pres Beneficiary).  The Settlement Administrator
shall disburse the Cy Pres Amount to the Cy Pres Beneficiary.

     (ii) The United Way of California is an umbrella organization,
supporting multiple local United Ways throughout the state that all
serve the public by working towards financial stability of the
citizens they support.  Many of these local United Ways have
specific programs aimed at promoting steady, gainful employment of
Californians, something that meets the objectives of a lawsuit
brought with the aim of enforcing employee rights, and supports
silent class members through the variety of programs offered.
Beyond program that support job seekers and employees, the United
Way also advocates at the policy level for an increase in the State
minimum wage, and is thus in the interest of the settlement class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/otmX6C from Leagle.com.

Tim Eure, Plaintiff, represented by Jill Marie Vecchi --
jvecchi@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara Law Firm, APLC, William
Turley -- bturley@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara Law Firm,
APLC
& Jamie Kathryn Serb -- jserb@turleylawfirm.com -- Turley & Mara
Law Firm, APLC.

Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. & Ryder Dedicated Logistics,
Inc.,
Defendants, represented by Mara D. Curtis -- mcurtis@reedsmith.com
-- Reed Smith LLP.


SALEM COUNTY, NJ: Faces Class Action Over Illegal Strip Searches
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Gray, writing for NJ.com, reports that four people who were
held at Salem County Correctional Facility claim they were
improperly classified as suicide risks, required to wear garments
that exposed their genitals and were strip searched several times a
day in view of other prisoners and officers.

Attorneys representing them hope to make their lawsuit alleging
illegal strip searches at the facility a class-action case.

A motion for class-action status will be heard in December.

The plaintiffs -- Dana Clark-Stevenson, of Salem County, Mark
Hendricks, of Gloucester County, and Cumberland County residents
Kenneth Fuqua and Darius Snead -- allege they were subjected to
humiliating conditions and that their civil rights were violated
during their unrelated stays at the facility.

The suit, originally filed in 2017, names Salem County and jail
Warden John S. Cuzzupe.

The county is following state regulations for handling prisoners,
Cuzzupe said on Oct. 29, adding that the jail is inspected annually
by the state and is in compliance.

"The county has taken the position that we're doing things
appropriately with regard to their claims of strip searching and
classifying inmates at risk," Cuzzupe said on Oct. 29. "It's not
like we're doing something different than anybody else. It's all
approved by the state."

Clark-Stevenson was jailed for two six-day stints in 2016 and 2017,
first for missing a municipal court date in a non-indictable matter
and the second time for failing to pay a municipal fine, according
to the suit.

She claims she was strip searched prior to admission to general
population, classified as suicidal "for no apparent reason," made
to wear garments that exposed her private parts, was routinely
strip searched up to three times a day "absent any penological
purpose" and subjected to these searches in a public setting.

Searches were conducted in her cell, where a glass window meant
other prisoners and male officers could see what was happening,
according to the lawsuit, and a camera in the cell allowed male
officers in other locations at the jail to see her.

Those classified as suicidal are issued "turtle suits," an
anti-suicide smock that fastens with Velcro. The garments at Salem
jail were worn out "because of the sheer volume of individuals
misclassified" and didn't close properly, the suit alleges, leaving
the plaintiffs' genitals exposed.

Fuqua was arrested in 2016 for an outstanding warrant and spent 10
days at the jail. Snead was jailed in 2017 for failing to pay a
$250 municipal fine. Both make similar claims about being
classified as suicidal for no valid reason, having to wear the
turtle suits and being subjected to the repeated searches.

Hendricks worked in the jail kitchen during his 2015 stay and was
subjected to a strip search after each shift, even though the jail
had procedures in place to ensure that all kitchen utensils were
accounted for when prisoners completed their duties. Those searches
occurred in view of his fellow workers, according to the suit. He
was also strip searched each time he was taken to court, again in
the presence of other detainees.

The plaintiffs say the jail's system for determining if a prisoner
is suicidal is illegal.

"Salem County's classification system failed to follow New Jersey
law in determining whether someone was a threat to himself or
others," they claim, adding that strip-searching detainees charged
with non-indictable offenses, conducting daily strip searches for
no valid reason and failing to provide adequate garments in the
"suicide unit" violates the state constitution.

If approved as a class action, the class would include anyone
subjected to a non-private strip search at the jail, those charged
with a non-indictable offense who were strip searched, those
classified as suicidal and female prisoners who were strip searched
in the presence of male corrections officers or searched while in a
cell where a camera feed could be viewed by male officers elsewhere
in the facility.

The suit alleges there are hundreds "if not thousands" of people
improperly classified as suicidal and improperly subjected to strip
searches in view of other prisoners, staff and cameras. The
class-action period described in the suit begins in April 2015.

In a brief arguing against class status, attorneys for the county
argued that the claims should be severed since each case is
different.

"Each were incarcerated at different points in time, for different
offenses, and subject to searches based on their individual
characteristics," attorney Brian H. Leinhauser wrote. "Allowing the
four plaintiffs to proceed in a single lawsuit will only serve to
prejudice the defendants should this case go to trial by permitting
the jury to hear testimony on unproven allegations regarding the
necessity to conduct a strip search based on individualized
assessments of plaintiffs."

The plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages, along with
an injunction barring jail officials from continuing the practices
alleged in the suit.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs -- Carl Poplar, Kevin P. McCann,
Shanna McCann and William Riback -- either didn't return calls for
comment or declined to comment on the case.

The county previously asked the state Attorney General to defend it
against the lawsuit, but the office declined. The county appealed
that ruling and lost earlier in October. The appellate court found
that the administration of the county jail, including development
and implementation of search procedures "are the exclusive
responsibility of the county."

The allegations in this suit are similar to those described in
another claim against the jail that was filed earlier this year in
state Superior Court. In that case, a Mullica Hill woman was
arrested for leaving the scene of a traffic stop and jailed for two
days in 2017.

During that time, she alleged she was placed on suicide watch
status without proper evaluation by a licensed mental health
professional, required to wear an anti-suicide smock and subjected
to three strip searches during her stay.

While Cuzzupe wouldn't comment on specific allegations in that
suit, he said in August that detainees charged with indictable
offenses are strip searched upon entry to the facility, as are
those classified as at-risk of self-harm and drug addicts going
through withdrawal while incarcerated. [GN]


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Summary Judgment in Antitrust Suit Upheld
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: OPTICAL DISK DRIVE PRODUCTS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION. INDIRECT PURCHASER CLASS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS COMPANY, LTD.; et al., Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 18-15058 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants.

In the class action, Plaintiff Indirect Purchaser Class ("IPC")
alleges violations of the Sherman Act, California's Cartwright Act,
and California's Unfair Competition Law.  IPC contends that the
class members, indirect purchasers of optical disk drives ("ODDs"),
were injured by an unlawful conspiracy to slow the declining prices
of ODDs.

The district court granted summary judgment on the issues of
causation, injury, and damages based on IPC's failure to create a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the overcharge was
passed on to the class members ("pass-through" issue).  IPC argues
that the opinion of its economics expert, as well as certain
documentary evidence, suffices to create a genuine dispute of
material fact on pass-through.  The expert's opinion is that nearly
all of the Defendants' alleged overcharges were passed on to the
class members in the form of either (i) higher price, or (ii)
reduced computer quality.  In support of his opinion, IPC's expert
principally relies on certain regression analyses.  IPC also
identifies a variety of documentary evidence.

Viewed in the light most favorable to IPC, the Court holds that the
evidence establishes that the ODD market was competitive.  However,
whether viewed in isolation or in combination with the other record
evidence, it does not suffice to create a genuine dispute that
pass-through actually occurred.  In order for a reasonable jury to
decide in favor of IPC, it would have to engage in speculation.

In light of the foregoing, the Court affirmed the district court's
order granting summary judgment.  It need not address the
additional arguments concerning damages raised by IPC, nor the
alternative arguments raised by the Defendants in their answering
brief.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lQuGFD from Leagle.com.


SRA ASSOCIATES: Genovese Files Class Suit Under FDCPA
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against SRA Associates, Inc.
The case is styled as Sara Genovese, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. SRA Associates, Inc.
doing business as: SRA Associates of New Jersey, Defendant, Case
No. 2:19-cv-06882 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Sra Associates Inc was founded in 1995. The company's line of
business includes collection and adjustment services on claims and
other insurance related issues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David M. Barshay, Esq.
          Sanders Law, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 203-7600
          Fax: (516) 706-5055
          Email: dbarshay@barshaysanders.com



STARBUCKS CORP: Certification of Starbucks Employees Class Sought
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DOUGLAS TROESTER, on behalf
of himself, and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiffs, vs.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a Washington corporation; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive, the Defendants, Case No. 2:12-cv-07677-CJC-PJW (C.D.
Cal.), the Plaintiff will move the Court on January 27, 2020, for
an order:

   1. certifying Plaintiff class:

      "all Starbucks employees in California from August 6, 2008
      through December 31, 2012 who worked a closing shift in a
      Starbucks store and performed work after clocking out";

   2. appointing Plaintiff as class representative for the class
      proposed or later proposed and approved by the Court and any

      other sub-class the Court may devise; and

   3. appointing Shaun Setareh and Thomas Segal of Setareh Law
      Group, Stanley Saltzman of Marlin & Saltzman LLP, David
      Spivak of Spivak Law Firm and Louis Benowitz of Law Offices
      of Louis Benowitz as Class Counsel pursuant to Fed. 15 R.
      Civ. P. 23(g).

Starbucks' practice during the time period of the case was to
require employees on closing shifts to perform duties after
clocking out for their shift, including uploading store data to
Starbucks' computer system, programming the alarm, and walking
coworkers to their cars.

The issue of the compensability of that time is an overarching
common issue -- if it is compensable the class will win. If it is
not compensable, Starbucks will win.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff are:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Segal, Esq.
          William Pao, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          315 S. Beverly Drove, Suite 315
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  thomas@setarehlaw.com
                  william@setarehlaw.com

               - and -

          Stanley Saltzman, Esq.
          MARLIN & SALTZMAN LLP
          29800 Agoura Road, Suite 310
          Agoura Hills, CA 91301
          Telephone: (818) 991-8080
          Facsimile: (818) 991-8081

               - and -

          David Spivak, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM
          16530 Ventura Bl., Suite 203
          Encino, CA 91436
          Telephone: (818) 582-3086
          Facsimile: (818) 582-2561
          E-mail: david@spivaklaw.com

               - and -

          Louis Benowitz, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF LOUIS BENOWITZ
          9454 Wilshire Boulevard, Penthouse
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310)844-5141
          Facsimile: (310)492-4056

SUBARU OF AMERICA: Faces Class Action Over Defective Windshields
----------------------------------------------------------------
Denis Flierl, writing for Torque News, reports that Subaru has more
bad news than good news in October. See what is happening to some
new 2017-2019 Subaru Forester, Outback, and Crosstrek windshields.

Subaru of America (SOA) can't seem to catch a break and is now hit
with its second class-action lawsuit. Torque News reported on
October 16, Subaru and Toyota have a new lawsuit over recall
repairs on the BRZ and Toyota 86 causing engine fires. A new
class-action lawsuit seeks damages against Subaru for the drivers
of 2017-2019 Subaru Forester, Outback, and Crosstrek models alleged
to have defective windshields.

The lawsuit, filed on behalf of Christine Powell by attorney Peter
Muhic of Philadelphia and attorneys for a Pittsburgh-based firm,
Carlson Lynch LLC, contends 2017-19 Forester and Outback models
have "dangerous" windshields that are prone to "cracking, chipping
and otherwise breaking."

2017-2019 Subaru Outback windshields

A similar windshield lawsuit was filed against SOA in 2017 claiming
the 2015-2016 Subaru Outback and Legacy model's windshield were
spontaneously breaking. A judge ruled the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged claims on behalf of a proposed class of
California drivers under a mix of state and federal consumer
protection, unfair competition and warranty laws. The California
judge ruled Subaru knew of the defects and the plaintiffs received
compensation in that lawsuit.

The recent lawsuit says replacement windshields for 2017-2019
Forester, Outback, and Crosstrek models are not fixing the problem
and contends the defect prevents "the safe and proper operation" of
technology intended to prevent collisions. Subaru uses a driver
assist safety system attached to the inside of the upper windshield
and the lawsuit contends cracks in the windshield hamper the
EyeSight safety system from working properly.

2019 Subaru Forester

Powell, a Wisconsin woman, says the windshield on her 2018 Subaru
Forester cracked twice in an 18-month period. The suit says Subaru
will not cover the cost of a new windshield or pay for
recalibrating the vehicles' EyeSight driver-assist system which can
cost from $1,000 to $2,000.

Torque News checked the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) website and found numerous complaints about
Outback and Forester windshields cracking, and some while the car
is parked.

What should Forester, Outback, and Crosstrek owners do?

If you own a 2017-2019 Subaru Outback, Forester, or Crosstrek and
have experienced a cracked windshield for no apparent reason, you
can file a complaint with the NHTSA by going to this website link,
or call 1-888-327-4236. Or you can submit your contact information
here and an attorney from Carlson Lynch will be in touch to review
your case further. [GN]


TACO MADRE: Maldonado Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
------------------------------------------------------------
Noe Maldonado, on behalf of himself and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated v. Taco Madre Geneva, Inc., Taco Madre, Inc.,
Taco Madre Naperville, Inc., and Israel Garcia, Case No.
1:19-cv-07965 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 5, 2019), is brought as a collective
action to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act.

The Defendants did not pay the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees proper overtime wages of one and one-half time
his regular rate of pay for all hours worked above 40 hours in a
workweek, says the complaint. The Plaintiff asserts he was working
a substantial amount of overtime but was not getting paid for it.

The Plaintiff worked as a chef for Taco Madre.

The Defendant is an Illinois corporation owning and operating
various restaurants in the Chicago suburbs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kimberly Hilton, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          Thalia Pacheco, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Phone: 630.355.7590
          Fax: 630.778.0400
          Email: admin@fishlawfirm.com
                 khilton@fishlawfirm.com
                 jkunze@fishlawfirm.com
                 tpacheco@fishlawfirm.com


TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS: St. Petersburg ERS Suit Moved to D. Conn.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Employees' Retirement System of
the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, Plaintiff v. Kare Schultz and
Michael Mcclellan, Defendants; Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan
Board, Respondent; and Paul Huang, Ramon Geraldino, David Magana,
Ezra Erani, and HMG Global Initiative Inc., Movants, Case No.
2:19-cv-02711 (Filed June 21, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut (New Haven) on Nov.
8, 2019.

The District of Connecticut Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:19-cv-01768-RNC to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Robert N. Chatigny.

The case is a federal securities class action against Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. and certain of its executive
officers for violations of the federal securities laws.

The Plaintiff brings the action on behalf of all persons or
entities, who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Teva
American Depositary Shares (ADS) between August 4, 2017, and May
10, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies under Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Exchange Act claims allege that the Defendants engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate the Company's share
price. As a result of the fraud, the Company has lost a substantial
portion of its value and its investors have incurred substantial
losses.

Teva Pharmaceutical manufactures and markets generic pharmaceutical
products. The Company provides high-quality health-care by
developing, producing and marketing affordable generic, innovative
and specialty products, as well as active pharmaceutical
ingredients.[BN]


TEXAS DE BRAZIL: Non-PAGA Claims in Chavez Dismissed w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WENDY CHAVEZ, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated, and as an "aggrieved employee" on behalf of
other "aggrieved employees" under the Labor Code Private Attorneys
General Act of 2004, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS DE BRAZIL (FRESNO), et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-CV-0502 AWI BAM (E.D. Cal.), Judge
Anthony W. Ishii of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiff's
individual and class action claims (non-PAGA claims).

On Oct. 28, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal of
the Plaintiff's individual and class claims and for the filing of
Second Amended Complaint that pursued a state law Private Attorneys
General Act ("PAGA") claim.  The dismissal of the individual and
class claims is based on an arbitration agreement that the
Plaintiff signed in connection with her employment with the
Defendants.

On Oct. 30, 2019, the Court requested additional information from
the Plaintiff's counsel regarding the three Diaz v. Trust Territory
of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989) factors that a court
is to consider before permitting the voluntary dismissal of a
putative class action.  On Nov. 5, 2019, the Plaintiff's counsel
submitted the additional information.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires courts to approve
the proposed voluntary dismiss of a class claim even before the
class has been certified.  Therefore, when parties seek to
voluntarily dismiss class claims, the Court must be aware of
prejudice to a class and consider three factors before authorizing
a dismissal: (1) class members' possible reliance on the filing of
the action if they are likely to know of it either because of
publicity or other circumstances, (2) lack of adequate time for
class members to file other actions, because of a rapidly
approaching statute of limitations, (3) any settlement or
concession of class interests made by the class representative or
counsel in order to further their own interests.

In the case, with respect to the first Diaz factor, the initial
stipulation and the supplemental materials demonstrate that the
Plaintiff's counsel is unaware of any publicity surrounding the
filing of the case, no potential class members have contacted the
counsel, the counsel unsuccessfully attempted to contact three
putative class members, the counsel is unaware of any foregone
opportunities by the class members to participate in individuals
suits or other class actions, and no class member received written
notice of the suit.  From the counsel's submissions, Judge Ishii
concludes that there is either no or insubstantial detrimental
reliance by the member of the putative class action.

With respect to the second Diaz factor, the counsel points out
that, per American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974),
the statutes of limitations were all tolled as to the class when
the complaint was filed.  Further, the counsel is unaware of any
imminently approaching limitations periods that would leave the
putative class members with inadequate time to file other actions.
From this submission, the Judge does not detect a significant
statute of limitations problem.

Finally, with respect to the third Diaz factor, the stipulation
indicates that the dismissal of the class claims is to be without
prejudice.  Because the dismissal is without prejudice, the other
class members will be able to pursue claims against the Defendants.
Additionally, no class has been certified and no motion to certify
class has been filed.  The Judge concludes that the interests of
the class are not adversely affected.

Because the submissions of the counsel and the Diaz factors do not
show that the putative class will be prejudiced by the proposed
voluntary dismissal, the Judge will generally give effect to the
stipulation.  Per the stipulation, the Plaintiff's individual and
class action claims will be dismissed without prejudice.  The
Plaintiff will file and serve her proposed second amended
complaint, but the second amended complaint will add jurisdictional
allegations.  Because the Judge will not permit the proposed second
amended complaint to be filed without jurisdictional allegations,
the second amended complaint will not be deemed to have been filed
on Oct. 28, 2019 (the date it was lodged as part of the parties'
stipulation).

Accordingly, Judge Ishii, per the parties' stipulation, dismissed
without prejudice the Plaintiff's individual and class action
claims (non-PAGA claims).  The Plaintiff will file the proposed
Second Amended Complaint, but will add jurisdictional allegations
to the proposed Second Amended Complaint, within seven days of
service of the order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/SeJ2RH from Leagle.com.

Wendy Chavez, Plaintiff, represented by David Glenn Spivak --
david@spivaklaw.com -- The Spivak Law Firm, Stephanie Brenna
Greenberg -- stephanie@spivaklaw.com -- The Spivak Law Firm &
Walter L. Haines -- whaines@uelglaw.com -- United Employees Law
Group, PC.

Texas De Brazil (Concord), a California corporation, Texas De
Brazil (Fresno) Corporation, a California corporation, Texas De
Brazil (Carlsbad) Corporation, a California corporation, Texas De
Brazil (Irvine), a California corporation & Texas De Brazil
(Oxnard), a California corporation, Defendants, represented by Adam
J. Fiss -- afiss@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Marlene S.
Muraco -- mmuraco@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Uliana A.
Kozeychuk -- ukozeychuk@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, P.C..


TIDY SERVICES: Fischler Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Tidy Services, Inc.
The case is styled as Brian Fischler Individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Tidy Services,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-06843 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Tidy Services is a family-owned company that specializes in solid
and liquid waste disposal and recycling.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          Lipsky Lowe LLP
          630 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


TWITTER INC: Kaplan Fox Files Securities Class Action in Calif.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP (www.kaplanfox.com) has filed a class
action suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California against Twitter, Inc. (NYSE: TWTR), Jack
Dorsey, Twitter's Chief Executive Officer, and Ned Segal, Twitter's
Chief Financial Officer (collectively, the "Defendants").

The complaint alleges that Defendants violated Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the SEC, and is brought by plaintiff on
behalf of all persons and entities who purchased the publicly
traded common stock of Twitter from August 6, 2019 through October
23, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

The complaint further alleges that on August 6, 2019, Twitter
publicly disclosed through a tweet that it recently found issues
where certain user settings choices designed to target advertising
were not working as intended.  Twitter represented that "We
recently discovered and fixed issues related to your settings
choices for the way we deliver personalized ads, and when we share
certain data with trusted measurement and advertising partners."
(Emphasis added).  However, unknown to investors, while Twitter
represented that it "fixed" certain issues relating to user choice
settings, Defendants failed to disclose that the changes
implemented to fix these issues adversely affected Twitter's
ability to target advertising, including the targeting of
advertising through its Mobile App Promotion ("MAP") product, which
caused a material decline in advertising revenue.

On October 24, 2019, before the market opened, the Company
disclosed its financial results for the quarter ended September 30,
2019 and conducted a conference call with investors. During the
conference call, Defendant Dorsey, disclosed that Twitter "had some
missteps and bugs in our map ads . . .  We discovered and took
steps to remediate bugs that largely affected our legacy map
product. These bugs affected our ability to target ads and share
data with measurement and partners.  We also discovered that
certain personalization and data sightings were not operating as
expected."

On this news, Twitter's shares declined from a closing price of
$38.83 per share on October 23, 2019, to close at $30.73 per share,
a decline of $8.10 per share, or over 20%, on heavier than average
trading volume.

If you are a member of the proposed Class, you may move the court
no later than 60 days from October 30, 2019. to serve as a lead
plaintiff for the proposed Class.  You need not seek to become a
lead plaintiff in order to share in any possible recovery.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of the proposed Class
and is represented by Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP
(www.kaplanfox.com).  Our firm, with offices in New York, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and New Jersey, has decades of
experience in prosecuting investor class actions and actions
involving violations of the Federal securities laws.

If you have any questions about this Notice, the action, your
rights, or your interests, or would like a copy of the complaint,
please e-mail attorneys Jeff Campisi (jcampisi@kaplanfox.com), or
Larry King (lking@kaplanfox.com), or contact them by phone, regular
mail, or fax:

Jeffrey P. Campisi
KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
850 Third Avenue, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Toll-Free Telephone: (800) 290-1952
Telephone: (212) 687-1980
Fax: (212) 687-7714
E-mail address: jcampisi@kaplanfox.com

Laurence D. King
KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
350 Sansome Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 772-4700
Fax: (415) 772-4707
E-mail address: lking@kaplanfox.com
[GN]


UNIFIN INC: Berkowitz Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Unifin Inc. and Cach,
LLC. The case is styled as David Berkowitz, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Unifin Inc.,
Cach, LLC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-06852
(E.D.N.Y., Dec. 5, 2019).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Unifin, Inc. is a full service BPO and Accounts Receivable
Management firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic st
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (347) 668-9326
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


UZBEK LOGISTICS: Class of Drivers Certified in Kopaleishvili Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Timothy S. Black grants the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification in the lawsuit captioned RAUL KOPALEISHVILI, on
behalf of himself and others similarly-situated v. UZBEK LOGISTICS,
INC., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-00702-TSB (S.D. Ohio).

The Court certifies this class:

     All drivers who entered into written contracts with Uzbek
     Logistics, Inc. and/or Uzbek Transport Express, LLC since
     April 2009 requiring payment on a "per mile" basis.

     The class does not include those drivers whose contracts
     expressly state compensation will be paid "based on
     practical miles."

Judge Black appoints Raul Kopaleishvili as class representative and
his counsel from the law firms of Croskery Law Offices and Virginia
& Ambinder LLP as class counsel.

The Plaintiff shall file an amended proposed notice within 10 days
of entry of this Order reflecting the revised class certified by
this Order, Judge Black also rules.

Mr. Kopaleishvili brings this action on behalf of himself and those
similarly situated setting forth a single breach of contract claim
against his former employers, Defendants Uzbek Logistics, Inc. and
Uzbek Transport Express, LLC.  He alleges that the Defendants
breached their employment contracts by paying truck drivers a
per-mile rate based on "practical miles," calculated using an
atlas, MapQuest, or Google Maps, rather than based on the "actual
miles" they drove. He also alleges that as a result of being paid
based on practical miles, his "compensation was regularly short by
at least 100 miles in every payment."[CC]


VOYA FINANCIAL: Continues to Defend Goetz Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Voya Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Goetz v. Voya
Financial and Voya Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company (USDC
District of Delaware, No. 1:17-cv-1289).

A putative class action in which plaintiff, a participant in a
401(k) plan, seeks to represent other participants in the plan as
well as a class of similarly situated plans that "contract with
[Voya] for recordkeeping and other services."

Plaintiff alleges that "Voya" breached its fiduciary duty to the
plan and other plan participants by charging unreasonable and
excessive recordkeeping fees, and that "Voya" distributed
materially false and misleading 404a-5 administrative and fund fee
disclosures to conceal its excessive fees.

The Company denies the allegations, which it believes are without
merit, and intends to defend the case vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
employee benefits company in the United States. It operates through
four segments: Retirement, Investment Management, Employee
Benefits, and Individual Life. The company was formerly known as
ING U.S., Inc. and changed its name to Voya Financial, Inc. in
April 2014. Voya Financial, Inc. was incorporated in 1999 and is
based in New York, New York.


VOYA FINANCIAL: Still Defends Barnes COI Litigation
---------------------------------------------------
Voya Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company
continues to defend against a cost of insurance litigation,
entitled, Barnes v. Security Life of Denver (USDC District of
Colorado, No. 1:18-cv-00718) (filed March 27, 2018).

A putative class action in which the plaintiff alleges that his
insurance policy only permitted the Company to rely upon his
expected future mortality experience to establish and increase his
cost of insurance, but the Company instead relied upon other,
non-disclosed factors to do so.

Plaintiff alleges breach of contract and conversion claims against
the Company and also seeks declaratory relief.

The Company denies the allegations in the complaint, believes the
complaint to be without merit, and intends to defend the matter
vigorously.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
employee benefits company in the United States. It operates through
four segments: Retirement, Investment Management, Employee
Benefits, and Individual Life. The company was formerly known as
ING U.S., Inc. and changed its name to Voya Financial, Inc. in
April 2014. Voya Financial, Inc. was incorporated in 1999 and is
based in New York, New York.


VOYA FINANCIAL: Zhou Class Suit Underway in Colorado
----------------------------------------------------
Voya Financial, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 6, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended September 30, 2019, that the company is
defending against a putative class action suit entitled, Zhou v.
Voya Financial, Inc. and Security Life of Denver (USDC District of
Colorado, No. 1:19-cv-02781)(filed September 27, 2019).

A putative class action in which the plaintiff alleges that the
Company did not properly administer certain universal life
insurance policies. The plaintiff claims that the Company did not
timely credit interest earned on the payment of her premiums and
incorrectly calculated the amount of interest that the Company
credited to her account.

In addition to the class allegations, the lawsuit alleges breach of
contract and conversion and seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief.

The Company denies the allegations, which it believes are without
merit, and intends to defend the case vigorously.

Voya Financial, Inc. operates as a retirement, investment, and
employee benefits company in the United States. It operates through
four segments: Retirement, Investment Management, Employee
Benefits, and Individual Life. The company was formerly known as
ING U.S., Inc. and changed its name to Voya Financial, Inc. in
April 2014. Voya Financial, Inc. was incorporated in 1999 and is
based in New York, New York.


WATTS HAY COMPANY: Garcia Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against WATTS HAY COMPANY.
The case is styled as Jose Garcia, Luis Cazarez, on behalf all of
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WATTS HAY COMPANY, A
CALIFORNIA COMPANY, JARED ALLEN WATTS, Defendants, Case No.
BCV-19-103402 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty., Dec. 5, 2019).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

WATTS HAY CO operates in the Transportation of Freight and Cargo
industry in Bakersfield, CA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by JONATHAN MELMED, ESQ.
          

WATTS REGULATOR: Accounting of Settlement Funds in Klug Ordered
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, CURTIS KLUG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; LAWRENCE NOVER, and NELS ROE, Plaintiffs, v.
WATTS REGULATOR COMPANY, Defendant. DURWIN SHARP, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated; JOSEPH PONZO, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated; KATHRYN MEYERS, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; and JOSHUA
WHIPP, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated;
Plaintiffs, v. WATTS REGULATOR CO., Defendant, Case Nos. 8:15CV61,
16CV200 (D. Neb.), Judge Joseph F. Bataillon of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska has entered an order regarding
the accounting of the money distributed by Berger & Montague Law
Firm as part of the class action.

The matter is before the Court on a letter dated Nov. 5, 2019, from
Counsel Glen Abrahamson of the Berger & Montague Law Firm.  It
appears from the letter that certain settlement funds may have been
appropriated by Craig Cohen, a subrogation attorney.  Criminal
charges are currently pending against Mr. Cohen regarding these
actions.  Accordingly, Judge Bataillon ordered a phone conference
to discuss the same with the counsel.  Likewise, the Judge will
require and order the Berger & Montague Law Firm to perform an
accounting of the money distributed by the firm as part of the
class action.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Bataillon ordered that the counsel be
provided with phone conference information via email.  The law firm
of Berger & Montague will perform an accounting of the money
distributed by the firm as part of the class action.  Such
accounting will be provided to the Court within 30 days of the date
of the Order.  The counsel for the law firm of Berger & Montague is
ordered to provide a copy of the Order to the counsel for the
Defendant Craig Cohen.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4Uj83y from Leagle.com.

Curtis Klug, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam A. Edwards, GREG COLEMAN
LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Bryan L. Clobes, CAFFERTY, CLOBES LAW FIRM,
pro hac vice, Daniel O. Herrera, CAFFERTY, CLOBES LAW FIRM, pro hac
vice, Edward A. Wallace, WEXLER, WALLACE LAW FIRM, pro hac vice,
Glen L. Abramson, BERGER, MONTAGUE LAW FIRM, Gregory F. Coleman,
GREG COLEMAN LAW FIRM, Jeffrey L. Osterwise, BERGER, MONTAGUE LAW
FIRM, Joseph G. Sauder, MCCUNE, WRIGHT LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Lisa
A. White, GREG COLEMAN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice, Mark E. Silvey, GREG
COLEMAN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice & Shanon J. Carson, BERGER, MONTAGUE
LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.

Lawrence Nover, et al. are represented by Bryan L. Clobes, Esq. --
bclobes@caffertyclobes.com -- and -- Daniel O. Herrera, Esq. --
dherrera@caffertyclobes.com -- CAFFERTY, CLOBES LAW FIRM -- Edward
A. Wallace, Esq. -- eaw@wexlerwallace.com -- WEXLER, WALLACE LAW
FIRM -- Glen L. Abramson, Esq. -- gabramson@bm.net -- Jeffrey L.
Osterwise, Esq. -- josterwise@bm.net -- and -- Shanon J. Carson,
Esq. -- scarson@bm.net -- BERGER, MONTAGUE LAW FIRM.

Watts Regulator Company is represented by David S. MacCuish, Esq.
-- david.maccuish@alston.com -- and -- Evan W. Sippel-Feldman, Esq.
-- evan.sippel-feldman@alston.com -- ALSTON, BIRD LAW FIRM -- Jodi
D. Oley, Esq. -- joley@eckertseamans.com -- and -- Keith E. Smith,
Esq. -- ksmith@eckertseamans.com -- ECKERT, SEAMANS LAW FIRM.

Farmers Insurance Exchange, Interested Party, represented by David
Williams, WILLIAMS & ASSOCIATES, pro hac vice & Patrick S. Cooper,
FRASER, STRYKER LAW FIRM.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Interested Party, represented by
Joel M. Carney, GOOSMANN LAW FIRM & William J. Hoffmann, GROTEFELD,
HOFFMANN LAW FIRM, pro hac vice.


WELLS FARGO: Loughrans Suit Stayed Pending Grundy Case
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Daniel and Margaret Loughran
on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, the
Plaintiffs, vs. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., d/b/a WELLS FARGO HOME
MORTGAGE, et al., the Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-04023 (N.D.
Ill.), the Hon. Judge Virginia M. Kendall entered an order:

   1. granting Law Firm Defendants' motion to stay pending
      resolution of Grundy County case (joined by the other
      Defendants) pursuant to Colorado River;

   2. dismissing Defendants' motions to dismiss without
      prejudice;

   3. directing Defendants to may refile motions to dismiss
      upon resolution of the state-court foreclosure action;
      and

   4. striking the Loughrans' motion for class certification
      with leave to refile pending resolution of the state-court
      foreclosure action.

On December 28, 2011, the Loughrans were named as Defendants in a
foreclosure action filed in Grundy County Circuit Court. The named
plaintiff in the foreclosure action was U.S. Bank.

The Court said, "Defendants argue that a stay pursuant to the
Colorado River abstention doctrine is appropriate here. Motions
seeking abstention under the Colorado River doctrine are typically
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the
Court will construe the Defendants' motion as one filed pursuant to
that rule."

When evaluating such a motion, the Court must accept all
well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff when determining whether it should decline to
exercise jurisdiction and stay the proceeding.

In its consideration, the Court "may properly look beyond the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever
evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in
fact subject matter jurisdiction exists."

The Colorado River doctrine, however, creates a narrow exception to
that rule, allowing federal courts in some exceptional cases to
defer to a concurrent state-court case as a matter of 'wise
judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'[CC]

WFS EXPRESS: Temporary Stay of Bautista Suit Extended for 120 Days
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JIRIKI BAUTISTA, an individual, ARI SILVA, an
individual, Plaintiff, v. WFS EXPRESS, a Delaware corporation,
CONSOLIDATED AVIATION SERVICES, a New York Corporation, Defendants,
Case No. C18-0757 RSM (W.D. Wash.), Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, extended the temporary stay of the case for 120 days.

On April 25, 2018, the Plaintiffs commenced the action by filing a
complaint in King County Superior Court against the Defendants.  On
May 25, 2018, the Defendants removed the action to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act.  In the subsequent 17 months, the
Parties have participated in substantial documentary discovery,
including the production of voluminous timekeeping and payroll data
for the Defendants' employees, who comprise the putative class.

The counsel for the Parties have conferred regarding the relevant
factual and legal issues in the case, and whether it would be
preferable to participate in early mediation before undertaking
signification litigation and motions practice relating to the
validity of the Plaintiffs' claims and theories.  The Parties have
also considered the Court's practice of encouraging litigants to
explore early settlement initiatives that might shorten the
duration and cost of litigation.

As result of these discussions, the Parties have agreed to mediate
with Judge Steven Scott.  A mediation with Judge Scott was
originally set for Oct. 23, 2019.

Prior to that mediation date, it became clear that the Parties'
needed to exchange additional information and discovery before
concerted settlement discussions could occur.  Based on the need
for a further exchange of information and discovery, the Parties
struck the Oct. 23, 2019 mediation date.  A new mediation date of
Jan. 29, 2020 has been set.

The Parties believe that in the next 120 days, they can: (1)
exchange the necessary discovery and information necessary to
constructively participate in mediation, (2) conduct the mediation,
and (3) negotiate the specific terms and details of a settlement,
However, the Parties also agree that if they are simultaneously
attempting to comply with Court deadlines and participate in
motions practice, it would reduce their ability to constructively
participate in mediation.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Parties requested the Court, and
Judge Martinez entered an Order staying the action for all purposes
for a period of at least 120 days so that the Parties may conduct
early settlement efforts.  Within 120 days, the Parties will file a
status report with the Court describing the status of the Parties'
efforts to resolve the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/WZO1yH from Leagle.com.

Jikiri Bautista, an individual & Ari Silva, an individual,
Plaintiffs, represented by Abel M. Tsegga --
abel@northshorelawgroup.com -- TG LAW GROUP, PLLC, Duncan Calvert
Turner -- dturner@badgleymullins.com -- BADGLEY MULLINS TURNER PLLC
& Mark A. Trivett -- mtrivett@badgleymullins.com -- BADGLEY MULLINS
TURNER PLLC.

WFS Express, a Delaware corporation & Consolidated Aviation
Services, a New York corporation, Defendants, represented by
Kathryn S. Rosen -- katierosen@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE,
Paula L. Lehmann -- paulalehmann@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE &
N. Joseph Wonderly -- joewonderly@dwt.com -- DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE.


WILLIAMS COMPANIES: Fairchild Seeks Overtime Wages for Inspectors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
CHARLES FAIRCHILD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. THE WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC. AND
WILLIAMS ENERGY RESOURCES, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-01465-JFC (W.D. Pa., Nov. 12, 2019), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.

Williams is an energy delivery company. Williams employs energy and
inspector personnel to carry out its work.

Mr. Fairchild worked for Williams from January 2019 until September
2019 as a utility inspector. He asserts that he and the other
workers like him regularly worked for Williams in excess of 40
hours each week but they never received overtime for hours worked
in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek.

Instead of paying overtime as required by the FLSA and PMWA,
Williams improperly classified Mr. Fairchild and those similarly
situated workers as exempt employees and paid them a daily rate
with no overtime compensation, the lawsuit says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, P.L.L.C.
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-877-8788
          Facsimile: 713-877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Joshua P. Geist, Esq.
          GOODRICH & GEIST, P.C.
          3634 California Ave.
          Pittsburgh, PA 15212
          Telephone: (412) 766-1455
          Facsimile: (412)766-0300
          E-mail: josh@goodrichandgeist.com


WORLD BANK: D.C. Court Dismisses Zhan Suit Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RENJIE ZHAN, Plaintiff, v. WORLD BANK, Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-1973 (DLF) (D. D.C.), Judge Dabney L. Friedrich of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted World
Bank's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim.

In the early 1990s, the World Bank helped the Chinese government
fund construction of the Shuikou Hydroelectric Power Station.  The
project forced nearby villagers to resettle, and the Chinese
government allegedly broke its promise to compensate those
villagers.  With the putative class action, Zhan sues the World
Bank for its role in the project.

The World Bank, which comprises two separate institutions, the
International Development Association and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, is an international financial
institution charged with assisting the development of its member
nation's territories, promoting and supplementing private foreign
investment, and promoting long range balanced growth in
international trade.

As for the World Bank's role, Zhan alleges that the Bank was
supposed to keep a "close watch" on the resettlement process but
instead turned a blind eye to the behavior of government officials
and to the difficulty of the migrants on the ground in the
Submersion District.  And because of the Bank's "protection,"
government corruption continues to stymie the resettled villagers
from receiving compensation for their lost property.

Zhan, proceeding pro se, purports to represent 252 Xiadun villagers
who did not receive any compensation for their lost land or houses.
Zhan filed the Complaint on July 2, 2019, seeking $12,332,500 to
compensate for the villagers' lost homes, another $2,520,00 to
cover damages and other costs incurred by the Plaintiffs as a
result of the incident, and all costs related to the lawsuit.

The World Bank moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim.

Judge Friedrich holds that because of two Executive Orders, the
World Bank's two constituent intuitions are public international
organizations entitled to the privileges, exemptions, and
immunities conferred by the International Organizations Immunities
Act ("IOIA").  The IOIA provides that such organizations shall
enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.  

The immunity has two main exceptions.  First, the IOIA limits the
immunity to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive
their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms
of any contract.  And second, the Supreme Court held recently that
the IOIA's reference to "same immunity" means the same immunity
that foreign governments enjoy at any given time, not the immunity
they enjoyed when Congress passed the IOIA.  Today, that means that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") -- which did not
exist when Congress enacted the IOIA -- governs the immunity of
international organizations.  The World Bank is thus immune from
suit unless an FSIA exception applies or the Bank expressly waived
its immunity under the IOIA.

The Judge finds that neither is present in the case.  First, no
FSIA exception applies.  It is the Plaintiff's burden to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction, yet Zhan does not identify a relevant
FSIA exception.  Second, the World Bank has not expressly waived
its immunity.  Once again, Zhan does not argue as much.  And that
argument would fail regardless.  The World Bank has indeed waived
certain immunity through its Articles of Agreements.

A suit like the instant one would hinder the Bank, not help it.  As
the Bank correctly warns, exposure to liability for decades-old
loans where the Plaintiffs have been allegedly injured by the
borrower -- and not the actions of the World Bank -- would severely
interfere with and hamper the Bank's operations.  Such exposure
would also make certain loans riskier than they would otherwise be,
reducing the Bank's financial capacity and willingness to lend.
And even if the Bank could conceivably benefit from waiving
immunity here, any limited benefit would be substantially
outweighed by the burdens caused by judicial scrutiny of the Bank's
discretion to select and administer programs.  This clear lack of
benefit -- indeed, disadvantage -- of a waiver of immunity compels
the conclusion that Section 3 of the agreement should not be
construed to waive the Bank's immunity in the case.

For these reasons, Judge Friedrich granted the World Bank's motion
to dismiss, and dismissed the case without prejudice.  A separate
order accompanied the Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 20, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/RHoWXQ from Leagle.com.

RENJIE ZHAN, Representative of 252 Villagers at Xiadun Village,
Xibin Township, Plaintiff, pro se.

WORLD BANK, Defendant, represented by Jeffrey T. Green --
JGREEN@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP & Matthew J. Letten --
MLETTEN@SIDLEY.COM -- SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP.


XPO LOGISTICS: Court Denies Class Certification Bid in "Alvarez"
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as Angel Omar Alvarez et al.,
the Plaintiffs, v. XPO Logistics Cartage, LLC et al., the
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-03736-SJO-E (C.D. Cal.) the Hon. Judge
James Otero entered an order denying without prejudice the request
of Angel Omar Alvarez, Alberto Rivera, Fernando Ramirez, Juan
Romero, and Juan Paz to certify class.

The Court said, "In addition to fulfilling the four prongs of
[Fed.R.Civ.P.] Rule 23(a), the proposed class must also meet at
least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). Alvarez
Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires the Court to find 'that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.'"

A court evaluating predominance and superiority must consider:

     (1) 'the class members' interests in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;'

     (2) 'the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;'

     (3) 'the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum;' and

     (4) 'the likely difficulties in managing a class action.'"

Because the Court finds the Alvarez Plaintiffs have not satisfied
the requirements of Rule 23(a), the Court declines to analyze Rule
23(b) at this time.

The putative class action centers on allegations that Defendants
deliberately misclassified their truck drivers as independent
contractors, denying them protections under California law to which
they were entitled.

Alvarez Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid wages owed by Defendants,
all expenses unlawfully deducted by Defendants, and to collect all
applicable statutory penalties. Alvarez Plaintiffs also seek to
collect civil penalties for Labor Code violations.

XPO Logistics is a global logistics provider of cutting-edge supply
chain solutions to the most successful companies in the world.[CC]

YOUNG LIVING: Penhall Files Fraud Class Suit in S.D. Ca.
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Young Living
Essential Oils, LC. The case is styled as Lindsay Penhall, on
behalf of herself and a class of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC, Defendant, Case No.
3:19-cv-02340-JLS-RBB (S.D. Cal., Dec. 6, 2019).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Young Living is a multi-level marketing company based in Lehi, Utah
that sells essential oils and other related products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Decker Moon, Esq.
          Moon Law APC
          600 West Broadway, Suite 700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 915-9432
          Email: chris@moonlawapc.com


[*] Cybersecurity Class Actions in Canada on the Rise
-----------------------------------------------------
Nicole Henderson, Esq. -- nicole.henderson@blakes.com -- and Darren
Reed, Esq. -- darren.reed@blakes.com -- of Blake, Cassels & Graydon
LLP, in an article for JDSupra, report that cybersecurity
litigation in Canada is on the rise. Given that the number of data
breaches in Canada has been rising exponentially in recent years,
the increase in cybersecurity litigation is unsurprising. However,
the increase in the volume of breaches, coupled with privacy
legislation changes, has resulted in more reporting to the privacy
commissioners, attempted class proceedings, and settlements of
actions.

PRIVACY COMMISSIONER INVESTIGATIONS AND CIVIL LITIGATION

An organization that has experienced a privacy breach or
cybersecurity incident may be subject to mandatory reporting and
resulting investigations by the federal or provincial privacy
commissioner. Procedural protection for the organization in the
course of such an investigation is often limited. Further, in some
cases, there is no (or only very limited) legal recourse to
challenge unfair or erroneous findings made in a privacy
commissioner report.

Plaintiffs in privacy class actions often seek to rely on privacy
commissioner reports to the extent they are critical of the
security safeguards an organization had in effect at the time of a
breach. In two recent decisions in Ontario, however, certification
judges affirmed that such reports are not determinative of civil
liability or even whether a proposed class action should be
certified.

In Broutzas v. Rouge Valley Health System, the plaintiffs sought a
ruling that the hospital defendant was barred from challenging the
findings of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC)
following its investigation of the privacy breaches at issue in the
action, and that these findings were conclusive of the hospital's
liability. The court declined to make such a ruling, finding that
it would be "egregiously unfair" to determine a class action based
on the decision of an informal proceeding before an administrative
tribunal.

Similarly, in Kaplan v. Casino Rama Services Inc., the
certification judge confirmed that an IPC investigation report
regarding the cyberattack on Casino Rama was "not determinative of
legal liability." The judge went on to conduct his own analysis
based on the evidence before him on the motion.

RECENT DENIALS OF CERTIFICATION IN PRIVACY CLASS ACTIONS

There have been an increasing number of privacy class actions in
Canada since 2012, when the Ontario Court of Appeal first
recognized the new privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion. While
many privacy class actions have been certified, the last year has
seen several denials of certification:

Broutzas v. Rouge Valley Health System: The Ontario Superior Court
of Justice refused to certify a privacy class action in which rogue
hospital employees allegedly accessed patient records to sell new
mothers' contact information as RESP sales leads. Among other
things, the court found that a person's contact information is not
"inherently private" and that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion
requires some deliberate intrusion by the defendants and could not
be made out by some form of "guilt by association."

Kaplan v. Casino Rama Services Inc.: The Ontario Superior Court of
Justice refused to certify this class action brought following a
criminal cyberattack on Casino Rama's networks. The certification
judge found that while some of the plaintiffs' claims could survive
a motion to strike, the proposed class "collapse[d] in its
entirety" because there were no common issues among the class. The
court also noted the defendants' prompt and comprehensive response
following the discovery of the cyberattack. For further
information, please see our May 2019 Blakes Bulletin: Proposed
Privacy Class Action "Collapses in its Entirety" on Commonality.

Bourbonniere c. Yahoo! Inc.: The Quebec Superior Court refused
authorization of this case, which arose out of cyberattacks against
Yahoo and theft of user account data. The court found that the
authorization criteria were not met because there was no evidence
that anyone, including the proposed representative plaintiffs, had
suffered any compensable loss as a result of the cyberattacks. As
such, there was no "arguable case" with respect to the plaintiffs'
claims.

Li c. Equifax Inc.: The Quebec Superior Court refused authorization
of this case, arising out of the Equifax data breach announced in
September 2017. Similar to the reasoning in Bourbonniere, the court
concluded that the proposed representative plaintiff did not have
an arguable case because he did not show that he had experienced
any compensable damages as a result of the breach.

While we expect privacy class actions to remain commonplace in
Canada for the foreseeable future, these cases suggest that courts
are increasingly willing to scrutinize plaintiffs' claims to assess
whether they are viable and whether a class action is the
appropriate vehicle for their resolution.

SETTLEMENT TRENDS IN PRIVACY CLASS ACTIONS

To date, no privacy class action in Canada has proceeded to a
determination on the merits. In the meantime, there have been
several settlements, although it will remain to be seen what impact
the cases referred to in this bulletin have on that trend.

While most settlements in privacy class actions to date have
represented fairly low values per class member, there have been a
few settlements involving more significant payments in cases where
the information involved was highly sensitive and the defendant's
intrusion was deliberate.

Settlement structures reflect the bespoke nature of civil privacy
suits and the difficulty in assessing the losses (if any) of
potential class members. Common characteristics of privacy class
action settlements include:

   -- Compensation for losses in the case of fraud or
      identity theft resulting from the breach
   -- Cash payments for other proven out-of-pocket losses
      (e.g., steps taken to remediate the risk of fraud,
      lost time)
   -- Amounts for continuing credit monitoring
   -- Notice and administration costs
   -- Honoraria for representative plaintiffs
   -- Counsel fees.

CONCLUSION

Cybersecurity incidents are an ever-increasing threat for
organizations of all sizes, and with it comes the threat of privacy
litigation. The class actions landscape in this area is still
evolving. Encouragingly, Canadian courts are turning a careful eye
to these claims and scrutinizing their viability. [GN]


[*] ERGs May Raise Workplace Discrimination Concerns
----------------------------------------------------
Mishell Parreno Taylor, Esq. -- mtaylor@littler.com -- of Littler
Mendelson, in an article for Mondaq, reports that affinity groups,
also known as employee resource groups (ERGs), bring together
employees with similar backgrounds or interests and can have a
powerful influence in the workplace.

Employers that have, or are exploring establishing, affinity
groups, though, must consider several legal and practical issues.

ERGs are employer-recognized groups that can promote a company's
diversity and inclusion efforts and allow for networking,
mentorships, and other opportunities for professional and personal
development. Historically, affinity groups were centered on race or
gender, but these groups are increasingly being created for those
sharing other characteristics, such as age, veteran status or
sexual identity.

From a legal standpoint, ERGs raise two common issues: the use of
social media and discrimination concerns.

Use of Social Media
The first issue may arise when employers offer communication
options such as messaging services, social media spaces or intranet
platforms where employees can engage in ERG discussions. These
forums provide accessible communication for members, which is
especially beneficial for staff spread across locations or working
remotely. Yet these forms of communication can cause problems if
employees act inappropriately, perhaps by posting negative comments
or sharing others' posts without permission.

It can be difficult to assess what is inappropriate conduct and
what behavior an employer may regulate. Employers that host these
types of forums must bear in mind that Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, which applies to unionized and nonunionized
nonsupervisory employees in the private sector, entitles workers to
engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid or protection.
The National Labor Relations Board has held that employees
communicating via company e-mail or on social media may be covered
by Section 7's protections.

Employers should be mindful about restricting or removing employee
communications or disciplining employees based on their posts. If
an employee posts a disparaging comment about the employer and the
employer deletes the post, employees may claim that the company
censored their protected Section 7 communications.

Employers may maintain a policy to remove posts or limit
communications that are obscene, violent, defamatory or harassing
of a protected category of worker.

Discrimination Concerns
ERGs can, at times, create friction in the workplace. Employees who
do not feel welcome to join an affinity group or to attend its
events may feel excluded -- or even threatened -- by this
employer-backed organization. Communication is key. Employers with
ERGs should be sensitive and responsive to these concerns to ensure
that all employees feel heard and that anti-discrimination laws are
followed. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion and
national origin.

Some employers have faced class-action civil rights lawsuits filed
by white male employees alleging that they were fired -- or
suffered some other adverse action -- because of their gender and
race. Some plaintiffs in such lawsuits have pointed to corporate
diversity initiatives, like ERGs, as evidence of the discrimination
they purportedly faced at the office. Although reverse
discrimination claims are relatively rare and largely unsuccessful,
employers should exercise forethought when implementing diversity
initiatives.

Recommended Steps
Employers can take several steps to support diversity initiatives
and limit risk. At the outset, affinity groups should be carefully
structured to encourage sharing and mentorship without devolving
into platforms for negativity. Some employers have found that an
application process and charter requirement for ERGs clarifies the
purpose of the group and helps participants focus on clear goals.

Employers may also want to provide tasks for affinity groups to
tackle, like identifying ways to improve the workplace. Keep in
mind that any limits on ERG creation must be applied to all groups
in a category. For example, a ban on religious groups must apply to
all groups with religious leanings.

In addition, management should hold some sort of leadership
position on affinity groups. A management representative, for
example, may serve as a sponsor or liaison between group members
and company leaders. The liaison can help steer discussions toward
stated goals and business initiatives rather than allowing the
group to focus on complaints.

Management can also build a healthy foundation for ERGs by
providing anti-discrimination training, including implicit bias
training, for all staff. This training can educate employees about
the benefits of diversity and about everyone's role in
counteracting their own biases.

Benefits of Affinity Groups
While ERGs require planning and ongoing participation, employers
find that the benefits are well worth the effort. Affinity groups
can help employers attract more diverse candidates, reduce turnover
and increase employee morale.

Moreover, multiple studies have found that companies are likely to
have above-average financial returns if they fall among the top
quartile of their peers for diversity by race, ethnicity and
gender.

In short, affinity groups, managed wisely, can serve to attract and
retain top talent, increase the bottom line, and build a healthy
and thriving workplace culture. [GN]


[*] Firm Sees Dramatic Rise in N.Y. Website Accessibility Suits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Siobhan Neela-Stock, writing for Mashable, reports that it may seem
that people with disabilities have made a lot of progress accessing
the same resources as people without disabilities. But there's
always more ground to cover. Right now there's an important battle
playing out online and in the courts IRL, where many businesses are
questioning whether they have to make their websites and mobile
apps accessible -- and disabilities rights advocates are vehemently
insisting they do.  

Recently, the Supreme Court passed on reviewing a case from
Domino's, in which the pizza chain argued that the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which protects individuals with disabilities
against discrimination, doesn't apply to online spaces. This all
started back in 2016 when a blind man, Guillermo Robles, sued
Domino's when he couldn't order food on their website and mobile
app using a screen reader, an assistive device that helps people
who are blind read text online. Domino's site, Robles alleged, was
incompatible with the device.

The ADA's Title III is a federal civil rights law; it says that
public accommodations (businesses in most cases) are required to
provide effective communication with the people it serves.
Effective communication isn't happening, some disabilities rights
advocates argue, when someone who is blind is blocked from a
business' services because they can't use its website and mobile
app. The problem -- or the loophole for the businesses trying to
fight it -- is one about the law's vagueness.

"There's no direct mandate in the ADA or its regulations that says,
'you must make your website accessible and here is what an
accessible website is,'" Minh Vu, a partner with Seyfarth Shaw who
defends businesses against ADA Title III lawsuits, says. In fact,
Domino's referenced Title III when they approached the Supreme
Court with their case, questioning whether it requires businesses'
websites and mobile apps to comply with the ADA's accessibility
requirements for people with disabilities.  

But Christina Brandt-Young, managing attorney with the nonprofit
Disability Rights Advocates (DRA), which represents people with
disabilities both in class-action lawsuits and systemic litigation,
thinks otherwise. "Companies are fighting this [ADA's Title III],
not because they think the law isn't clear but just because they
don't want to comply with it," she says, adding that the ADA was
crafted to be open enough to include websites and apps.

"The point of a law is to draft it flexibly so that it can apply to
every situation you need it to, and there's no question that the
drafters intended the ADA to apply to communication," says
Brandt-Young.

Currently, there aren't any explicit federal regulations mandating
businesses to make their websites and mobile apps accessible. But
the fact that the Supreme Court declined to hear the case means the
lower court's decision -- which stated that customers should be
able to access Domino's website and app -- remains in place.

While disability rights advocates applauded this decision, saying
the ADA was written to be interpreted in this manner, Domino's
wasn't so happy. "Creating a nation-wide standard will eliminate
the tsunami of website accessibility litigation that has been filed
by plaintiffs' lawyers exploiting the absence of a standard for
their own benefit, and chart a common path for both businesses and
non-profit institutions to follow in meeting the accessibility
needs of the disabled community," Domino's said in an online
statement.  

A barrage of lawsuits

Domino's isn't the only company grappling with these questions. The
number of federal website accessibility lawsuits went from 814 in
2017 to at least 2,258 in 2018, according to the law firm Seyfarth
Shaw, which has a team dedicated to defending businesses against
ADA Title III lawsuits.

The firm witnessed a dramatic increase in New York federal website
accessibility lawsuits after New York federal judges allowed
website accessibility cases to be presented during pre-trial
fact-finding and presenting process, known as discovery, in
lawsuits against the businesses Five Guys and Blick Art, Seyfarth
Shaw's website says.    

Like the Domino's case, people who are blind accused Five Guys' and
Blick's of having inaccessible websites.

"It's really quite, in my view, unfair for businesses to be hit
with all these lawsuits when nobody told them, 'Yes, your website
has to be accessible and here are the standards for what an
accessible website is,' " says Vu.

Why is this so confusing?

Some people, like Vu, think the confusion with the ADA lies in the
fact that the law was passed in 1990, when the World Wide Web was
only about a year old. That means there's no specific language in
the ADA about website and app accessibility.

However, Brandt-Young isn't confused.

"The text of the ADA Title III is broad and flexible . . . if you
offer a service like a website to your customers, you have to offer
it to all your customers," Brandt-Young wrote in an email.

But Sharron Rush, executive director of the nonprofit Knowbility,
which works to improve technology access for people with
disabilities globally, thinks the question about whether businesses
have to make their technology accessible is moot. "We have to
create accessible technology because of the way our entire society
is now centered around [technology and the web]," Rush says.

Brandt-Young says businesses can look to the first web content
accessibility guidelines (WCAG) issued in 1999 and updated in 2018.
These state that accessible websites should have
assistive-technology friendly text alternatives -- which substitute
graphics such as pictures and charts with text so people who are
blind can understand the information -- video captions, and sign
language for prerecorded audio. These standards were published by
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the organization that sets the
international standards for the internet. The 2018 WCAG guidelines
include a long list of accessible features businesses can
incorporate into their online technologies so people with
disabilities can access them.

These are widely accepted international standards for what a
website has to do to be accessible, says Kenneth Shiotani, senior
staff attorney at the National Disability Rights Network, a
disability legal advocacy organization set up by Congress.

While Vu also advises her clients to use the WCAG if they want to
make their websites and apps accessible, she does explain that
businesses aren't legally obligated to follow these guidelines. She
also feels it's not an easy standard to meet because it's filled
with technical language.

How businesses can help

Both Rush and Vu have suggestions for how businesses can make their
websites and apps accessible.

All websites and apps should have keyboard access so people do not
have to rely on mouses to navigate, Rush says.

Businesses need to pay attention to color contrast, too. For
example, pale gray letters on a white background are hard to read,
Rush says.

Vu says videos should have both closed captioning and audio
descriptions.

For websites, Vu recommends that companies prioritize the most
visited parts of their websites by making them accessible to screen
reader users.

The need for standards

The Department of Justice has never included the WCAG in its Title
III regulations. But they are tasked with writing regulations for
implementing Title III, which businesses have to follow to make
sure they aren't discriminating against people with disabilities.
The DOJ can file "lawsuits in federal court to enforce the ADA." In
2010, the DOJ considered creating website accessibility rules but
reneged in 2017.

"It would have been simpler if DOJ had said, 'OK, look WCAG is the
standard," Vu says. Vu worked for the DOJ from 2001 to 2003,
overseeing enforcement of the ADA.

As to why the DOJ has never adopted any ADA Title III web
accessibility standards, Vu says she doesn't know. But she's heard
a rumor.

During the Obama presidency, Vu says she heard talk that there was
pressure on the DOJ from Silicon Valley not to adopt web
accessibility standards. If true, Vu thinks this is because this
would limit the software tech companies could release.

True or not, businesses don't have to wait for the DOJ to do
something.

"What the courts have essentially said is there's no need to wait
for DOJ standards in terms of the full and equal access to
technology, including websites . . . [however], it would be great
if the DOJ would issue standards," Seaborn says.

Fixes could be costly, but inaction costs more
For businesses that want to make their websites accessible for
people with disabilities, it can cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars to potentially millions of dollars, Vu says.

If that range seems high to you, you're not the only one.

It can cost thousands of dollars for businesses to make their
websites accessible, Dmitri Belser, executive director of the
Center for Accessible Technology (CforAT), a nonprofit that
consults with businesses on accessible web design, wrote in an
email.

But Belser says, of the businesses CforAT has worked with --
including nonprofits, small businesses, and larger companies like
Macy's and JCPenney -- no one has ever spent a million doing this.
It's usually about $5,000 to $15,000. At the end of the day,
businesses will save money if they include accessibility in the
website on day one, Belser wrote in an email.

Putting aside disputes about the specific price tag, businesses
need to update their websites constantly, so the cost is ongoing,
Vu says.     

"I'm not saying this is why we shouldn't be doing it, I understand
that accessibility means there is going to be an additional cost
for every business on a permanent basis," Vu says. "Until the
language of accessibility becomes the standard for every website
developer out there, it's going to cost a lot more money."  

Rush, for her part, disagrees, pointing to the W3C's "Business Case
for Accessible Design" report, which she edited. It looks at the
benefits, both financial and otherwise, Fortune 100 companies have
enjoyed when including accessible design in their technologies. The
report found that inaction can actually cost more. Target learned
this lesson when it shelled out millions of dollars in a settlement
over claims that its website was inaccessible. After all that,
Target still had to make its website accessible. Coincidentally,
the DRA represented the plaintiffs.

Despite the business consideration, "inclusion is where the future
is going and so we need to incorporate those costs . . . to quibble
about costs seems so anti-future," Rush says.

The DRA, for its part, believes that improving website and app
accessibility both increases revenue for businesses while also
encouraging independence for people with disabilities.

Nonetheless, DRA predicts the issue over website accessibility
isn't going away and businesses will likely continue to be hit with
website accessibility lawsuits. While the storm of litigation
brews, businesses will either have to embrace the future of
accessibility or fight it -- leaving out customers with
disabilities in the process. [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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