/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200115.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, January 15, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 11

                            Headlines

AAK INC: Saad Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum Wages for Dancers
AEDES DE VENUSTAS: Dominguez Alleges Violation under ADA
ALIGN TECH: Court Dismisses Lu Securities Suit with Leave to Amend
ALLERGAN INC: Doe PI Suit Transferred to New Jersey
ALSCO INC: Salas Wage and Hour Suit Removed to E.D. California

ANTHEM HEALTH: Settlement in Wilson ERISA Suit Gets Prelim Approval
ARCIMOTO INC: Awaits Court OK on Class Action Settlement
ASCENA RETAIL: Continues to Defend Consolidated Securities Suit
ASUS COMPUTER: Court Grants Prelim OK of Carlotti Class Settlement
BIOMETRIC IMPRESSIONS: Faces Sayas Suit Alleging BIPA Violation

BP EXPLORATION: Wins Summ. Judgment Bid in Turner BELO Suit
CALIFORNIA: Ct. OKs Bid to File Under Seal Declaration in Ashker
CARBONITE INC: Thomas Seeks More Information on Sale to Open Text
CARDINAL CAMERA: Mahoney Asserts Breach of ADA
CHI-ST. VINCENT: Watts PI Suit Transferred to New Jersey

CHURCHILL DOWNS: Bids for TRO in Kater & Thimmegowda Suits Granted
DELL TECH: Bid to Dismiss Class V Consolidated Suit Pending
DELL TECH: Settlement in Retirement Sys. Suit Wins Final Approval
DEUTSCHE BANK: Feb. 5 Claims Deadline in GSE Bonds Litigation Set
EDDIE BAUER: Can Compel Arbitration in Harbers Fraud Suit

ELECTROCORE INC: Turnofsky and Priewe Class Action Suits Underway
ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
FIG LLC: Ga. App. Upholds Dismissal of B.C. Grand Suits
FLORENCE BEAUTY: Slade Alleges Violation under ADA
FOAMIX PHARMACEUTICALS: Sabatini Sues Over Acquisition by Menlo

FOX NEWS: Deaf People Cannot Access Web Site, Suris Suit Says
FRANCHISE GROUP: Asbestos Workers' Pension Fund Suit Ongoing
FRANCHISE GROUP: Bid to Nix Liberty Tax Securities Suit Pending
FRANCHISE GROUP: Hearing on Class Cert. Bid Set for March 3
GALWAY BAY: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Galway Affirmed

GENERAL REVENUE: Mosley Sues Over Intrusive Marketing Practices
GREAT AMERICAN: Savett Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
GROUPON INC: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Dancel Affirmed
HARMAN-MANAGEMENT CORP: $4MM Larson TCPA Suit Deal Has Prelim. Okay
HD SUPPLY: Agreement in Principle Reached in Georgia Class Suit

HOOPER'S CRAB: Bid for Attorneys Fees in Knox Partly Granted
HOPE AND HENRY: Cooks Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
IBERIABANK CORPORATION: Parshall Sues Over Sale to First Horizon
ICS GROUP: Violates FLSA's Minimum and OT Wage Rules, Escala Says
IDT CORP: Arbitration in Samara Suit Ongoing

IDT CORP: Cross Complaint Filed Against Rosales
IDT CORP: Discovery Ongoing JDS1 LLC Class Action
IDT CORP: Parties Agree to Drop Dennis Suit
IDT CORP: Stipulation of Dismissal Entered in Sanchez Suit
IF BOUTIQUE LTD: Dominguez Alleges Violation under ADA

IFA GROUP: Parties Ordered to Modify Release in Martinez Settlement
IFINEX INC: Sued by Young for Controlling Trading of Bitcoins
ILLUMINA INC: Securities Suit Settlement Gets Initial Court OK
IMMUNOCELLULAR THERAPEUTICS: $287K Okayed for Counsel in Kaye Suit
INTEGRATED ENERGY: Court Grants Prelim OK on $20K Deal in Hozi Suit

JOSH'S ORIGINAL PIZZA: Rabanales Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
KPMG LLP: Wins Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Jones-Lowe Suit
LEPRINO FOODS: Can Partially Recover Deposition Expenses in Vasquez
MANNA PRO: Protective Order on Confidential Docs in Hale Issued
MCKESSON CORP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Evanston Securities Suit

MDL 2433: Bid to Exclude Margulis Testimony in C-8 PI Suit Nixed
MICHIGAN: 6th Cir. Flips Summary Judgment Ruling in Inmates Suit
MOMENTA PHARMA: Settlement Agreement Entered in Tennessee Suit
MRS BPO: N.J. Dist. Ct. Certifies Class in Ridley FDCPA Suit
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Manning PI Suit Transferred to Illinois

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Washington PI Suit Transferred to Illinois
NECA/IBEW FAMILY: Summary Judgment Bids in DT ERISA Suit Denied
NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Flips Denial of Inmate Irvin's Rule 60(b) Bid
NITEHAWK BROOKLYN: Dominguez Asserts Breach of ADA
OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Ct. Denies Partial Bid to Dismiss Knaak FDCPA Suit

PANERA LLC: Court Dismisses Tabler Suit with Leave to Amend
PENNY & COOPER: Faces Laser Suit Over Discrimination Under ADA
PF PAYROLL: Rivera Sues Over Failure to Pay Uniform Maintenance
PHILADELPHIA, PA: Summ. Judgment Bid in Andrews Suit Partly Granted
POINT BLANK: Discovery in Ohio State Troopers Suit Party Compelled

RAG & BONE: Gift Cards Not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Claims
RAY KLEIN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss UTPA Claim in Russell Suit
REBECCA MINKOFF: Gift Cards Not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Says
RED SLATE BRANDS: Rodriguez Asserts Breach of ADA in New York
ROBERT SILLERMAN: Guevoura Securities Suit Deal Gets Final Court OK

RUSHMORE LOAN: 11th Cir. Vacates Certification Denial in Sellers
S & J CRAZY LIZARDS: Pitts Seeks to Recover Tips and Overtime Pay
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Court Dismisses Barrera Fraud Class Suit
SANTA MONICA, CA: Prelim Injunction Bid in Columbia Suit Denied
SELECTION MANAGEMENT: Wingard Files Suit Under FCRA

SGE MANAGEMENT: $10M-Atty's Fee Allocation Order in Torres Vacated
SOLARA MEDICAL: Keally Suit Moved to S.D. California
STARLINE TOURS: $200K Deal in Harp Labor Suit Gets Final Court OK
STITCH FIX: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Set for Jan. 23
SYNERGIES3 TEC: Class in Jackson FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified

TAKEDA PHARMA: DPPs May File 4th Amended Complaint in Actos Case
TILLY'S INC: Discovery Ongoing in Ward Class Suit
TILLY'S INC: Mediation in Gonzales PAGA Claim Set for March 2020
TRADER JOE'S: District Court Dismisses Webb Consumer Class Suit
TROPICAL FINANCIAL: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Lopez Upheld

U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL: Edwards Files Suit in New York
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $346K Dulberg Class Settlement Gets Final OK
UNILEVER NV: Pederson Sues Over High Levels of Mercury in Pond's
UNITED NATURAL: Awaits 8th Cir. Decision on Plaintiff's Appeal
UNITED STATES: Court Provisionally Certifies Class in Al Otro Suit

UNITED STATES: Settlement in JL Suit Gets Final Court Approval
VERB TECHNOLOGY: Still Faces Hartmann Class Action in California
VISA INC: Bid for Class Status Still Pending in EMV Liability Suit
WAL-MART INC: Calif. District Court Dismisses Krauss Labor Suit
WARBY PARKER: Gift Cards Not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Claims

WAWA INC: Peck Files Fraud Class Suit in Pennsylvania
WAWA INC: Sodora Files Suit in Pennsylvania Over Fraud
WELLS FARGO: Simon Wage and Hour Suit Removed to C.D. California
WEST TOWN BANK: Court Narrows Claims in Somerville Kickbacks Suit
WINGS ON THA RUN: Scott Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages Under FLSA

YOUNG AMERICA: Court Narrows Claims in Apodaca Insurance Suit
ZUMIEZ INC: Appeal in Herrera Class Action Ongoing
ZURICH AMERICAN: MSP Recovery Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice

                            *********

AAK INC: Saad Seeks to Recover Unpaid Minimum Wages for Dancers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Leah Saad, individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons
v. AAK, INC. D/B/A RHODE ISLAND DOLLS, Case No. 1:20-cv-00013
(D.R.I., Jan. 8, 2020), accuses the Defendant of violating the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Rhode Island Minimum Wage Act, and the
Rhode Island Payment Minimum Wages Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant misclassified the
Plaintiff and others as "independent contractors." As a result, the
Defendant unlawfully deducted and assigned wages, tips, and
gratuities belonging to the Plaintiff and other members of the
class and collective, and failed to pay them minimum wage, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as an exotic dancer.

The Defendant is operating as Rhode Island Dolls, a gentleman's
club in Woonsocket Rhode Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          V. Edward Formisano, Esq.
          Michael D. Pushee, Esq.
          FORMISANO & CO., P.C.
          100 Midway Place, Suite 1
          Cranston, RI 02920-5707
          Phone: (401) 944-9691
          Email: edf@formisanoandcompany.com
                 mpushee@formisanoandcompany.com

               - and -

          Gregg C. Greenberg, Esq.
          ZIPIN, AMSTER & GREENBERG, LLC
          8757 Georgia Avenue, Suite 400
          Silver Spring, MD 20910
          Phone: 301-587-9373
          Email: ggreenberg@zagfirm.com


AEDES DE VENUSTAS: Dominguez Alleges Violation under ADA
--------------------------------------------------------
Aedes De Venustas, Inc. is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Yovanny Dominguez for himself and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Aedes De Venustas, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00168 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 8, 2020).

Aedes De Venustas, Inc. is a bijou fragrance boutique.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
   The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
   277 Broadway, Suite 408
   New York, NY 10007
   Tel: (212) 229-2249
   Fax: (212) 229-2246
   Email: Jazeller@zellerlegal.com


ALIGN TECH: Court Dismisses Lu Securities Suit with Leave to Amend
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, XIAOJIAO LU, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALIGN TECHNOLOGY,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-06720-LHK (N.D. Cal.),
Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Jose Division, granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss wth leave to amend.

The case is a putative securities class action against Align
Technology; its President and CEO, Joseph M. Hogan; its CFO, John
F. Morici; its former Chief Marketing, Portfolio and Business
Development Officer, Raphael S. Pascaud; and its Senior VP of
Global Operations, Emory M. Wright.  Lead Plaintiff SEB Investment
Management AB brings the suit individually and on behalf of all
other persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the
common stock of Align Technology, Inc. between April 25, 2018 and
Oct. 24, 2018, both dates inclusive.

Defendant Align designs, manufactures, and sells clear aligners for
the treatment of malocclusion, or the misalignment of teeth, under
the trademark Invisalign.  Owing to a number of patents held by
Align, the Company held a virtual monopoly over the clear aligner
market, at least until those patents began to expire in 2017.
However, as Align began to lose its patent protections, analysts
began to acknowledge that new market entrants could pressure
average sale prices.

The Plaintiff's claims center around those competitive pressures
and the representations that the Defendants made to investors
regarding how competition would impact Align's business.  The
Plaintiff alleges that, on six separate occasions between April 25,
2018 and Sept. 5, 2018, the Defendants made false and misleading
statements and/or omissions to investors that downplayed the
competition, hid the Company's price cuts to combat competition,
and failed to acknowledge that their strategies were insufficient
to mitigate competitive pressures.  For example, the Plaintiff
points to Hogan's response to a question on the April 25, 2018
quarterly conference call asking whether the company was "seeing
any changes, perhaps in promotional activity or pricing from
competitors."

On Nov. 5, 2018, an Align shareholder filed the instant case
captioned Lu v. Align Technology, Inc., et al., N.D. Cal. Case No.
5:18-CV-06720-LHK.  Another shareholder filed suit on Dec. 12,
2018, in a case captioned Infuso v. Align Technology, Inc., et al.,
N.D. Cal. Case No. 5:18-CV-07469.  On Jan. 2, 2019, the Court
granted an administrative motion to relate the two cases.  On March
22, 2019, the Court consolidated the two cases.  In the same Order,
it appointed Plaintiff SEB Investment Management AB as the Lead
Plaintiff and appointed Kessler Topaz as the lead counsel.

On May 10, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint, which the Plaintiff later corrected ("CCAC").  On
June 24, 2019, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint.  On Aug. 13, 2019, the
Plaintiff filed an opposition.

In support of their motion to dismiss, the Defendants filed a
request for judicial notice and notice of incorporation by
reference.  The Plaintiff does not object to incorporation by
reference or judicial notice, but instead contests what facts or
inferences the Court may draw from those documents.  The Court only
takes judicial notice of the fact of the filings; the Court does
not accept as true any of the disputed facts in the filings. The
Court granted the Defendants' request for judicial notice and
incorporation by reference.

The Plaintiff alleges three causes of action: (1) violation of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 against all
defendants, (2) violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act
against the individual Defendants, and (3) violation of Section
10(b) and 20(A) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for insider
trading against Hogan and Morici.

To plead a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Plaintiff
must allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2)
scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.  The Defendants argue that
the Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the complaint
fails to allege a false or misleading statement; and the complaint
fails to adequately allege scienter.

Judge Koh finds that dismissal of the claim is warranted because
the Plaintiff fails to identify which statements are allegedly
false or misleading and because the Plaintiff fails to adequately
allege falsity.  Additionally, in anticipation of an amended
complaint, the finds deficiencies in the Complaint with regard to
scienter.  The Judge finds dismissal warranted because the
Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8's requirement of a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief."  The Judge also finds that the Plaintiff fails to
allege falsity with particularity.

Viewed in their totality, Judge Koh holds that the Plaintiff's
allegations fall short of raising a strong inference of scienter.
Without curing the aforementioned defects, the Plaintiff's claim
cannot meet the PSLRA's requirement that scienter be pleaded with
particularity.

Because the Plaintiff has failed to plead a primary securities law
violation, the Plaintiff has also failed to plead a violation of
section 20(a).  Accordingly, Judge Koh also granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's section 20(a) claim.

As for the Plaintiff's third claim, violation of Sections 10(b) and
20A of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, first, Judge Koh finds that
the Plaintiff has not adequately pled a predicate violation.  The
Judge holds that the Plaintiff does not adequately allege that
Hogan or Morici traded on material, nonpublic information.  Thus,
because the Complaint does not allege a predicate violation, the
Judge dismisses the Plaintiff's section 20A claim.

Furthermore, Judge Koh finds that the Plaintiff has also failed to
allege contemporaneity, at least with respect to Hogan's June 1,
2018 trades.  Although eschewing any exact delineation as to how
close in time trading must be to be "contemporaneous," the Ninth
Circuit has explained that the rule ensures that only private
parties who have traded with someone who had an unfair advantage
will be able to maintain insider trading claims.  The Plaintiff
acknowledges that the Plaintiff's May 30 and May 31, 2018 purchases
predated Hogan's June 1, 2018 sale. It is therefore impossible that
the Plaintiff traded with Hogan for those sales, which is fatal to
the Plaintiff's Section 20A claim against Hogan.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.  Because
granting the Plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend the
complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly
prejudice the Defendants, and the Plaintiff has not acted in bad
faith, the Judge granted leave to amend.

Should the Plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, it must
do so without delay.  The Plaintiff may not add new claims or
parties without a stipulation or leave of Court.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/zbKw0N from Leagle.com.

Xiaojiao Lu, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Henry Linehan --
CLINEHAN@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Lesley F.
Portnoy -- LPORTNOY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP,
Lionel Z. Glancy -- LGLANCY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP & Robert Vincent Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com --
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP.

SEB Investment Management AB, LEAD PLAINTIFF - Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Eli Greenstein -- egreenstein@ktmc.co -- Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Jenny L. Paquette -- jpaquette@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, Nicole Temkin Schwartzberg, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer and Check LLP, Stacey Marie Kaplan, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Jennifer Lauren Joost, Kessler Topaz Meltzer and Check
LLP, Margaret Elin Mazzeo, Kessler Topaz Meltzer and Check, LLP,
pro hac vice & Sharan Nirmul -- snirmul@ktmc.co -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer Check, LLP, pro hac vice.

David Infuso, Plaintiff, represented by Reed R. Kathrein --
reed@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Align Technology, Inc., Joseph M. Hogan, John F. Morici & Raphael
S. Pascaud, Defendants, represented by Benjamin Jon Tolman --
btolman@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati, Caz Hashemi --
chashemi@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Ignacio
Evaristo Salceda, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Nicholas R.
Miller -- nmiller@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and Rosati &
Ziwei Xiao -- zxiao@wsgr.com -- Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati.

Emory M. Wright, Defendant, represented by Caz Hashemi, Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.

Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California,
Movant, represented by James Matthew Wagstaffe, Wagstaffe, von
Loewenfeldt, Busch & Radwick LLP.

John Del Gaiso, Michael King, Muhammad M. Abbas & Daniel Autry,
Movants, represented by Adam Christopher McCall, Levi Korsinsky,
LLP.

Lauren A. Windhorst, Movant, represented by Lesley F. Portnoy,
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Teamsters Local 710 Pension Fund, Movant, represented by Danielle
Suzanne Myers, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Michael Albert,
Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP & Shawn A. Williams, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Ramarao Jupalli, Movant, represented by Dillon Joseph Hagius,
Faruqi and Faruqi LLP.

Remy Vallee, Movant, represented by Danielle Smith --
danielles@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Reed R.
Kathrein, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Mark Koening & Christy Koening, Movants, represented by Jennifer
Pafiti, Pomerantz LLP.


ALLERGAN INC: Doe PI Suit Transferred to New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Allergan Inc formerly known as:
Inamed Corporation, Allergan USA Inc., Allergan PLC, MCghan Medical
Corporation and INAMED Corporation, Defendants, was transferred
from Pennsylvania Eastern with the assigned Case No. 60CV-19-08592
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
(Central Division) on January 8, 2020, and assigned Case No.
4:20-cv-00030-KGB.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Personal
Injury: Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product
Liability.

Inamed Corporation develops a range of medical devices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Donovan, Esq.
   Watts, Donovan & Tilley, P.A.
   200 River Market Avenue, Suite 200
   Little Rock, AR 72201-1769
   Tel: (501) 372-1406
   Email: david.donovan@wdt-law.com



ALSCO INC: Salas Wage and Hour Suit Removed to E.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled Fernando Rodarte Salas, individually and on half of
others similarly situated v. ALSCO INC., a Nevada corporation;
doing business in California as Steiner Corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, Case No. 34-2019-00266950, was removed from the
Superior Court of California, Sacramento County, to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California on Jan. 8,
2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-at-00032 to the
proceeding.

In the complaint, the Plaintiff asserts these causes of action:
Unpaid Overtime Class; Unpaid Minimum Wage Class; Unpaid Meal
Period Class; Unpaid Rest Period Class; Non-Compliant Wage
Statements; and Wages Not Timely Paid Upon Termination.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Philip D. Dracht, Esq.
          FABIAN VANCOTT
          15 W. Carrillo
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Phone: 801-865-0245
          Fax: 801-596-2814
          Email: pdracht@fabianvancott.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey B. Setness, Esq.
          FABIAN VANCOTT
          411 East Bonneville Ave. #400
          Las Vegas, NV 89101
          Phone: 702-233-4444
          Fax: 877-898-1168
          Email: jsetness@fabianvancott.com


ANTHEM HEALTH: Settlement in Wilson ERISA Suit Gets Prelim Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARGARET WILSON, Plaintiffs, individually and on
behalf of a Class of persons similarly situated, v. ANTHEM HEALTH
PLANS OF KENTUCKY, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-743
(W.D. Ky.), Judge Rebecca Grady Jennings of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky, Louisville Division, granted
Wilson's unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Settlement, Approval of Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Final
Fairness Hearing.

Wilson sues Defendant Anthem seeking relief for alleged violations
of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and
the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008
("MHPAEA"). She is the mother and legal guardian of M.W., a minor
child with Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD").  According to Wilson's
complaint, autism cannot be cured, but it can be treated and
Applied Behavior Analysis ("ABA") is the most common and recognized
method of treatment.  Wilson and her son are insured by Anthem.

M.W. enrolled in the Highlands Center for Autism to receive ABA
treatment.  Wilson submitted claims to Anthem seeking coverage for
the cost of M.W.'s treatment.  Anthem paid small amounts of some
claims but, because of coverage limitations, did not reimburse most
of the treatment costs.  Wilson has continued to seek treatment for
M.W.'s ASD but claims that Anthem has continued to impose coverage
limitations on it.  She has spent tens of thousands of dollars in
unreimbursed expenses for the medically necessary care of M.W. Id.

Wilson filed a Class Action Complaint, arguing that Anthem violated
ERISA and MHPAEA by routinely imposing caps and limits on benefits
under its health insurance policies for insureds seeking treatment
for Autism Spectrum Disorders.  Because of Anthem's allegedly
unlawful practices, Wilson sought relief for herself and on behalf
of a class of similarly situated individuals.

The Court certified the class requested by Wilson and named Robert
R. Sparks and Strauss Troy Co., L.P.A., as the class counsel.  The
parties then negotiated a Class Action Settlement Agreement with
help from Magistrate Judge King.  The Settlement was hotly
contested by the parties with each party required to evaluate
complex legal, factual, and procedural issues in evaluating their
settlement position.  During negotiations, the parties considered:
Wilson's ability to prove the size of the class; the amount of
damages the Court could award; the time, expense, and difficulty of
continued litigation and trial; and the likelihood of success on
the merits and on appeal.

The compensatory terms of the Settlement are:

     a. On behalf of the class members involved in this action,
Anthem has agreed to create a fund totaling $300,000.  No part of
the fund reverts to Anthem.  The settlement fund is to be used to
provide settlement to Class Members and pay attorney fees, costs,
and incentive awards approved by the Court.

     b. The Net Settlement Fund will be distributed to Class
Members.  That fund is expected to total $175,000.  The Class
Members who had claims denied by Anthem using the denial reason
description Benefit Maximum Met or Units exceed a utilization
management authorization will receive a pro rata share of the Net
Settlement Fund or a minimum payment of $250, whichever is greater.
All other Class Members will receive $250.

     c. Margaret Wilson, the Class Representative, will seek an
award of $10,000.  The Class Counsel has agreed to apply to the
Court for approval of attorneys fees and costs, which will not
exceed $115,000.  Anthem has agreed not to oppose a fee application
which is in accord with the above referenced procedure.

     d. Any funds remaining from uncashed settlement checks after
120 days following payments to the Class Members will be disbursed
as a cy pres award to Families for the Effective Treatment of
Autism (FEAT) of Louisville.

Wilson then filed her Motion, attaching a Settlement Agreement, a
Notice of Class Action Settlement, and an Order Preliminarily
Approving the Class Action Settlement Agreement, Scheduling Final
Approval Hearing, and Directing Notice to Class.  After review, the
Court entered an Order granting Wilson leave to supplement the
Motion to address two questions: 1) does the $175,000 in the net
settlement fund wholly or partially compensate the class? and 2)
why do some class members receive a pro rata share or a minimum
payment of $250 and others receive only $250?  Wilson sufficiently
responded to the Court's questions in her Supplemental Memorandum
in Support of the Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Class Settlement, Approval of Notice to Class, and Scheduling a
Final Fairness Hearing.

Judge Jennings granted the Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Settlement, Approval of Notice to the Class, and Scheduling Final
Fairness Hearing.

On Jan. 4, 2017, the Court certified, under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), the following Class: All persons who are or
have been insureds, participants in, or beneficiaries of a health
insurance policy issued or administered by Anthem Health Plans of
Kentucky, Inc., which contains dollar limits on the provision of
treatment for Autism Spectrum Disorders and who have made a claim
for, and have been denied coverage or reimbursement for Applied
Behavior Analysis treatment for Autism Spectrum Disorders on the
grounds that the policy's dollar limits had been exceeded.

On Jan. 4, 2017, it appointed Plaintiff Margaret Wilson as the
Class Representative and the law firm of Strauss Troy Co. L.P.A. as
the Class Counsel.

The settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement between the
Parties is preliminarily approved as fair, reasonable, adequate,
within the range of possible approval, and in the best interests of
the Class, subject to a hearing for final approval.  The proposed
Settlement Agreement is sufficient to justify the issuance of
notice of the settlement to the Class.

The Judge approved the form and substance of the Notice of Class
Action Settlement.  In accordance with the Settlement Agreement,
the Class Counsel will cause the Notice to be delivered to the
Class Members within 10 of the entry of the Order by disseminating
the Class Notice through the methods specified in section 5.03 and
5.04 of the Settlement Agreement.

Any Class Member who elects to opt out of the Settlement Agreement
and be excluded from the case, the Class, and the terms of the
Settlement Agreement must submit an exclusion request to the Class
Counsel by letter postmarked on or before March 13, 2020.  The
Class Counsel will file with the Court and serve a copy upon
Anthem's Counsel of all timely and valid requests for exclusion or
a list identifying those who submitted timely and valid requests
for exclusion no later than 35 days before the Fairness Hearing.

Any member of the Class who intends to object to this settlement
must submit a written Objection to the Class Counsel at the address
noted on the Class Notice with a postmarked date on or before April
7, 2020.

The Court will conduct a Final Fairness Hearing regarding the
proposed settlement (the Final Fairness Hearing) on April 27, 2020
at 1:30 p.m. (EST) at the U.S. Courthouse, 601 W. Broadway,
Louisville, KY, 40202.

The submissions of the Parties in support of the settlement,
including the Plaintiff's Counsels' application for Attorneys' Fees
and Expenses and incentive awards, will be filed with the Court no
later than 35 days prior to the Fairness Hearing and may be
supplemented up to seven days prior to the Fairness Hearing.

The dates for performance are as follows:

     a. Class Notice Mailing Initiated By: Dec. 27, 2019 10 days
from entry of the Court's preliminary approval order.

     b. Class Notice Mailing Completed By: Jan. 28, 2020 Not later
than 90 days before the Fairness Hearing.

     c. Deadline for Filing and Serving March 13, 2020 Requests for
Exclusion: Not later than 45 days before the Fairness Hearing.

     d. Deadline for the filing of Motion for March 23, 2020 Final
Approval and other papers in support of Settlement: Not later than
35 days before the Fairness Hearing.

     e. Deadline for Filing and Serving Objections: April 7, 2020
Not later than 20 days before the Fairness Hearing.

     f. The Fairness Hearing will Be Held on: April 27, 2020

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Memorandum Order &
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/acte8r from Leagle.com.

Margaret Wilson, individually and on behalf of a Class of persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert R. Sparks -
rrsparks@strausstroy.com - Strauss Troy Co., LPA.

Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Darryl William Durham, Weber & Rose, PSC, 471 W Main St. 3400,
Louisville, KY 40202, Martin J. Bishop, Reed Smith LLP, Rebecca R.
Hanson - rhanson@reedsmith.com - Reed Smith LLP & Timothy R.
Carwinski - tcarwinski@reedsmith.com - Reed Smith LLP.


ARCIMOTO INC: Awaits Court OK on Class Action Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------
Arcimoto, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2019, that the court's approval of the settlement
agreement reached by the parties in the consolidated Switzer and
Mendelson suits is still pending.

On March 11, 2018, the Company was served with a lawsuit entitled
John R Switzer vs W.R. Hambrecht & Co. LLC et al., Case Number:
CGC-18-564904, filed in San Francisco County Superior Court in the
State of California.

In this action, the Company was named as a defendant along with
five individuals who were directors and/or executive officers at
the time of the completion of the Company's Regulation A offering
on September 21, 2017.  The action was styled as a putative class
action, alleged on behalf of all those who purchased the Company's
common stock in its Regulation A offering.  The plaintiff alleged
violations of Section 12(a)(2) and Section 15 of the Securities
Act, and is seeking damages in an unspecified amount to be proven
at trial.

In addition, on March 28, 2018, the Company was served with another
lawsuit entitled Jay Mendelson v. Arcimoto, Inc. et al., Case
Number CGC-18-565324, filed in San Francisco County Superior Court
in the State of California.  In that action, which was styled as a
putative class action, the Company was also named as a defendant
along with the same individuals who were directors and/or executive
officers at the time of the completion of our Regulation A offering
on September 21, 2017.

The allegations and claims made in the Mendelson action were
substantially similar to those of the Switzer action and the
plaintiff was also seeking damages in an unspecified amount to be
proven at trial.  The two actions were consolidated into a single
lawsuit on May 28, 2018.  The Company believes that the
consolidated lawsuit was without merit and vigorously defended
itself against these claims in court.

On July 30, 2018, counsel for the Company filed a demurrer to the
consolidated complaint, seeking its dismissal.  By Order dated
September 19, 2018, the San Francisco Court sustained in part and
denied in part the demurrer.

On September 28, 2018, plaintiffs in that case filed a First
Amended Consolidated Complaint.  The Company denied the substantive
claims and allegations made in that amended pleading and continued
to assert a vigorous defense.  

On January 25, 2019, the parties reached a settlement agreement in
the consolidated cases, subject to court approval.  The parties to
the lawsuit have filed a motion with the court seeking approval of
the settlement agreement, which motion is currently pending.  By
its terms, the settlement agreement resolves this litigation in its
entirety.

Arcimoto, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and sells
three-wheeled electric vehicles. The company was formerly known as
WTP Inc and changed its name to Arcimoto, Inc. in December 2011.
Arcimoto, Inc. was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in Eugene,
Oregon.


ASCENA RETAIL: Continues to Defend Consolidated Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ascena Retail Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended November 2, 2019, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, In re Ascena
Retail Group, Inc. Sec. Litig.

On June 7, 2019, plaintiff James Newman commenced a federal
securities class action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, naming Ascena Retail Group, Inc. and
certain of ascena's current and former officers and directors as
defendants.

The Newman complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 related to
the Company's goodwill impairment accounting and statements
regarding the success of the 2015 purchase of ANN INC. (ANN) and
the overall performance and expected growth of the ANN brands.
Plaintiff seeks damages on behalf of a proposed class of purchasers
of ascena securities between September 16, 2015 and June 8, 2017
(the proposed "Class Period").

On July 2, 2019, a second lawsuit was filed by Michaella
Corporation. The Michaella complaint is substantially similar to
the Newman complaint.

Both the Michaella complaint and the Newman complaint name the same
defendants, allege the same proposed class period, and challenge
the same categories of public statements under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.

On August 6, 2019, two potential lead plaintiffs (Joel Patterson
and Michaella Corporation) filed motions for appointment as lead
plaintiff in the Newman and Michaella actions, and to consolidate
both actions. James Newman did not move for appointment as lead
plaintiff.

On August 23, 2019, the Court consolidated the two actions as In re
Ascena Retail Group, Inc. Sec. Litig. and appointed Patterson and
Michaella Corporation as joint lead-plaintiffs. The Lead
Plaintiffs' filed an amended complaint on November 21, 2019.

Ascena said, "Defendants believe they have strong defenses to these
claims and will respond accordingly. The range of loss, if any, is
not reasonably estimable at this time."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Ascena Retail Group, Inc. is a holding company for a national chain
of women's apparel specialty stores. The Company's stores operate
nationwide and in the District of Columbia. The company is based in
Mahwah, New Jersey.


ASUS COMPUTER: Court Grants Prelim OK of Carlotti Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH CARLOTTI, Plaintiff, v. ASUS COMPUTER
INTERNATIONAL, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-03369-DMR (N.D.
Cal.), Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the parties' motion for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement.

On May 4, 2018, Plaintiff Carlotti filed a class action complaint
in Alameda County Superior Court against Defendants ASUS Computer
International ("ACI") and ASUSTek Computer Inc.  Carlotti alleges
that the Defendants manufactured and sold two laptop models that
contain defects: the ASUS GL502VS ("VS") and the ASUS GL502VKS
("VKS").  These models were allegedly advertised as portable
laptops with a powerful graphical processor suited for gaming and
video editing.  However, according to Carlotti, the laptop models
contain two main defects that render them inadequate for these
processes.

First, the laptops allegedly have several issues relating to their
power supply units, including: (1) the battery drains during use,
even when connected to a power outlet; (2) there are significant
reductions in computational performance" when the battery power is
low; and (3) there is accelerated degradation of the batteries.
Second, Carlotti claims that the laptops' cooling system is
insufficient to prevent overheating, leading to reduced durability
and performance.

The operative complaint proposes a class of all persons in the
United States who purchased one or more ASUS GL502VS or GL502VSK
laptops.  The California Subclass includes all members of the Class
who made their purchase in California.  

On behalf of the putative class and subclass, Carlotti brings
numerous claims for relief, including: (1) breach of express
warranty; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability;
(3) violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (4) deceit and
fraudulent concealment; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) violations of
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act,; (7) violations of the False
Advertising Law; (8) violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act; and (9) violations of the Unfair Competition Law.

On March 19, 2019, the parties held a mediation before Martin
Quinn, Esq. at JAMS.  The case settled as a result of the
mediation, and there has been no briefing nor hearing for summary
judgment or class certification.  The Court held a hearing on Aug.
22, 2019.  Following the hearing, court ordered the parties to
submit additional information about the proposed settlement.  The
parties submitted supplemental briefing on Sept. 12, 2019 and Oct.
7, 2019.

Under the terms of the Agreement, the Defendants will provide an
extended warranty on all VS laptops to cover certain repairs, which
include repairs to or replacement of a motherboard and/or a new AC
power adapter.  The Extended Warranty will last until the latest of
(1) three years from the date of purchase; (2) 90 days after final
approval of the class action settlement; or (3) 180 days after the
date Defendants previously replaced the internal power supply
and/or AC power adaptor.  The value of the Extended Warranty is
estimated at $16,110,225.

Additionally, all the class members are entitled to submit a claim
for monetary relief, including those who are eligible for
Qualifying Repairs under the Extended Warranty.  The amount of the
settlement benefits is not limited by the number of claims
submitted or any fees or costs in the case, all of which are
covered by the Defendants.  

The amount of benefits to which each class member is entitled
depends on (1) whether the class member previously complained about
one of the defects addressed in the case and (2) the proof of
purchase:

     a. Group A includes class members who registered their
        laptop with the Defendants, bought the laptop from the
        ASUS website, or can submit a proof of purchase.  Members
        of the group who submit a claim have the option to select
        either a $110 cash payment or a $210 credit certificate,
        which is freely transferable, stackable, and is valid for
        at least two years.

     b. Group B includes class members who previously complained
        to the Defendants about the defects.  Members of the
        group will automatically receive a $210 credit
        certificate without filing a claim.  They can elect to
        file a claim instead and receive a $110 cash payment.
        The parties represent that fewer than 500 people
        qualify for Group B.

     c. Group C includes any other member of the class (i.e.,
        those that do not have the proof required to be in
        Group A or did not file a prior complaint to qualify for
        Group B).  Although the group does not have to submit the
        proof that is required to be part of Group A, they still
        must provide the serial number of their laptops.  Members
        of the group have the option to submit a claim for either
        a $55 cash payment or a $105 credit certificate.  

The highest potential monetary value of the settlement is
$5,208,000.  For Group A claims only, the Defendants retain the
right to demand an inspection of a laptop to verify that it suffers
from either defect.  Members of any Group must certify under
penalty of perjury that their laptop suffered from the Power Defect
and/or Overheating Issue.

The parties propose that Angeion Group act as the settlement
administrator.  The class members will be notified by email if the
Defendants have an email address for them; by postcard via First
Class U.S. Mail if the Defendants have their physical address but
not an email address; and by both email and postcard if the
Defendants have an email address and a physical mailing address.

If a physical mailing is returned as undelivered, then the claims
administrator will use a skip trace search to identify updated
mailing addresses.  The Notice will also be published in People
magazine and USA Today, and will be distributed via press release.
There will also be an online notice published across internet
websites and social media platforms, and an online notice on the
Defendants' websites and social media platforms.  The media notice
procedure is expected to reach 76.75% of the target audience with
an average frequency of 3.03 times each.  The claims administrator
will launch a settlement website.

Carlotti's counsel will seek approval of an award of costs and fees
in the amount of $787,500 after the class members are notified and
have the opportunity to opt out of the settlement or object.
Carlotti will seek an incentive award of $5,000.

Magistrate Judge Ryu granted the parties' motion for preliminary
approval.  The Agreement is preliminarily approved as fair,
adequate, and reasonable pursuant to Rule 23(e).

The Magistrate Judge conditionally certified, pursuant to Rule
23(a) and (b)(3) for the purposes of settlement, the proposed
Settlement Class.

Plaintiff Carlotti is appointed as Class Representative for the
Class; the law firms of Gutride Safier LLP and Miglaccio & Rathod
LLP as Class Counsel; and Angeion Group as tClaim Administrator.

The proposed claim forms and forms of notice are approved as to
form and content.  The parties will have discretion to jointly make
non-material minor revisions to the claim forms or the class
notices.  Responsibility regarding settlement administration,
including, but not limited to, notice and related procedures, will
be performed by the Claim Administrator, subject to the oversight
of the parties and this court as described in the Agreement.  The
costs of providing notice to the Class members and for
administering the settlement will be borne by ASUS, as provided in
the Agreement.  All Class Members who wish to submit a claim must
do so in the manner specified in the Agreement by April 3, 2020.

The Magistrate Judge approved the procedures for the Class Members
to exclude themselves from or object to the Agreement.  Any request
for exclusion by a Class Member must be postmarked or submitted
electronically on the settlement website by April 3, 2020, and in
compliance with the terms of the Agreement.  Any objection by a
Class Member must be filed with the court by April 3, 2020, and in
compliance with the terms of the Agreement.

The Class Counsel will file a list of the Class Members who have
requested exclusion from the Settlement in a valid and timely
manner by April 17, 2020.

The Claim Administrator will provide a declaration attesting to its
compliance with the Notice obligations set forth and the Agreement
by April 17, 2020. The declaration will include: the total number
of Class Members; a sample copy of the Class Notice; the process by
which ASUS provided a list of Class Member information to the Claim
Administrator for sending Email Notice and Postcard Notice; the
number of Email Notices emailed and Postcard Notices mailed and the
range of dates within which such Notices were sent; and the number
of Postcard Notices returned to the Claim Administrator by the
United States Postal Service.

The parties will file any memoranda or other materials in support
of final approval of the Agreement, including in response to any
timely and valid objection to the Agreement, no later than April
17, 2020.  Such materials will be served on the Class Counsel, the
Defendants' counsel, and on any member of the Class (or their
counsel, if represented by counsel) to whose objection to the
Agreement the memoranda or other materials respond.

The Magistrate Judge stayed the Plaintiff's claims against the
Defendants.

The Court also set these deadlines:

     a. Deadline for Defendants to provide class list to Class
        Counsel - Dec. 6, 2019

     b. Initial date for commencing Notice program - Jan. 10, 2020


     c. Deadline for Class Members to submit objections/requests
        for exclusion - April 3, 2020

     d. Deadline for Class Members to submit claim forms -
        April 3, 2020

     e. Deadline for Class Counsel to file a list of exclusions
        - April 17, 2020

     f. Deadline for Claim Administrator to file declaration
        with the court - April 17, 2020

     g. Deadline for Class Counsel to reply to objections -
        April 17, 2020

     h. Deadline for Class Counsel to file motion for final
        approval - April 17, 2020

     i. Final approval hearing - April 30, 2020 at 1:00 p.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/VX3Z4E from Leagle.com.

Joseph Carlotti, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Adam Gutride --
adam@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP, Anthony J. Patek --
anthony@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP, Esfand Yar Nafisi
-- enafisi@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, Joseph S.
Rathod -- jrathod@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod, Marie Ann
McCrary -- marie@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride Safier LLP, Nicholas
A. Migliaccio -- nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- Migliaccio & Rathod,
pro hac vice, Seth A. Safier -- seth@gutridesafier.com -- Gutride
Safier LLP & Stephen Michael Raab -- stephen@gutridesafier.com --
Gutride Safier LLP.

ASUS Computer International & ASUSTeK Computer Inc, Defendants,
represented by Luanne Sacks -- lsacks@srclaw.com -- Sacks, Ricketts
& Case, LLP, Michele D. Floyd -- mfloyd@srclaw.com -- Sacks,
Ricketts & Case LLP & Robert Brett Bader -- rbader@srclaw.com --
Sacks, Ricketts & Case LLP.


BIOMETRIC IMPRESSIONS: Faces Sayas Suit Alleging BIPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Sayas, on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals
v. BIOMETRIC IMPRESSIONS CORP., Case No. 2020CH00201 (Ill. Cir.,
Cook Cty., Jan. 8, 2020), arises under the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act for the Defendant's practice of storing and
collecting the fingerprints of the Plaintiff and similarly situated
individuals, without proper notification and authorization.

In order to conduct the background checks, the Defendant collects
fingerprints from individuals through its "live scan" fingerprint
technology. On May 3, 2019, the Defendant collected and stored the
Plaintiff's fingerprints.

Mr. Sayas contends that when the Defendant collected and stored the
Plaintiff's fingerprints it did not provide written notification to
him that: (a) his biometric identifiers or biometric information
was being collected or stored; nor (b) the specific purpose and
length of term for which his biometric identifiers or biometric
information was being collected, stored and used. He adds that the
Defendant never received a written release from him for the
collection and storage of his biometric identifiers or biometric
information.

The Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Cook County.

The Defendant is a licensed fingerprint vendor and a criminal
background check service provider for a wide variety of clients a
number in governmental and private industries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradley S. Levison, Esq.
          HERSCHMAN LEVISON HOBFOLL PLLC
          401 S. LaSalle St., Suite 1302G
          Chicago, IL 60605
          Phone: (312) 870-5800
          Fax: (312) 786-5921
          Email: brad@hlhlawyers.com


BP EXPLORATION: Wins Summ. Judgment Bid in Turner BELO Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WINFRED JAVON TURNER, v. BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC. ET AL., SECTION "L" (2), Civil Action No. 18-9897 (E.D. La.),
Judge Eldon E. Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The case arises from Plaintiff Turner's alleged exposure to harmful
substances and chemicals after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  He
alleges that while employed to perform response activities after
the spill, he was exposed to oil, other hydrocarbons, and other
substances released from the MC252 Well, Corexit EC9500, Corexit
EC9527, and other dispersants and decontaminants.  The Plaintiff
contends that exposure to these chemicals legally and proximately
caused him to develop numerous medical conditions, including
chronic rhinosinusitis, chronic damage to conjunctiva, and chronic
contact dermatitis.

On Oct. 23, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against
Defendants BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America
Production Co. pursuant to the Medical Benefits Class Action
Settlement reached in In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater
Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179.
The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for medical expenses, pain
and suffering, mental anguish, scarring and disfigurement,
permanent disability, physical impairment, loss of enjoyment of
life, other economic losses, increased risk of injury or death,
medical expenses, and court costs.

The Defendants timely answered the complaint, admitting the
Plaintiff was a cleanup worker but generally denying the other
allegations contained therein.  They raise a number of affirmative
defenses, including failure to state a claim, superseding and
intervening causes, preexisting medical conditions, comparative
negligence, failure to mitigate damages, and release of claims.

The Defendants seek summary judgment of the Plaintiff's claims.
They argue that summary judgment is appropriate because a Back-End
Litigation Option claim, such as this one, requires the Plaintiff
to demonstrate that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to
oil and other spill-related chemicals and substances.  Causation,
the Defendants argue, must be proven with expert testimony.
Because the Plaintiff failed to identify any expert witnesses or
disclose any expert reports by November 20th, the Court's
Scheduling Order's deadline for written expert reports, the
Defendants contend that the Plaintiff is unable to prove causation,
an essential element of his claim, as a matter of law.

Judge Fallon finds that the Plaintiff has not disclosed any expert
reports to the Defendants by the Court's deadline of Nov. 20, 2019,
nor has he indicated that an expert witness has been retained to
testify on his behalf.  In fact, the only document that conceivably
demonstrates a link between his physical condition and his alleged
exposure is a 2014 "diagnostic report" prepared by Dr. Charlie Le
of East Jefferson Family Practice.  The Court notes that Dr. Le has
not been offered as an expert and accordingly finds that the
Plaintiff's failure to identify an expert witness is fatal to his
case.  Further, the Plaintiff has not opposed the motion or
otherwise attempted to demonstrate causation.  Because the
Plaintiff cannot succeed on an essential element of his BELO claim,
it must be dismissed.

Considering the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.  He dismissed with prejudice the
Plaintiff's claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order & Reasons is
available at https://is.gd/dYzwF9 from Leagle.com.

Winfred Javon Turner, Plaintiff, represented by Howard L. Nations
--info@howardnations. com -- Nations Law Firm, Frank Jacob D'Amico,
Jr., Frank J. D'Amico, Jr., APLC & Louis A. DiRosa, Jr., Frank J.
D'Amico, Jr. PLC.

BP Exploration & Production, Inc. & BP America Production Company,
Defendants, represented by Catherine Pyune McEldowney --
CPM@maronmarvel.com -- Maron Marvel Bradley and Anderson LLC,
Devin
C. Reid -- dcreid@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis, Georgia Lee Lucier
-- georgialucier@HuntonAK.com -- Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, Kevin
Michael Hodges -- khodges@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly, LLP &
Scott C. Seiler -- scseiler@liskow.com -- Liskow & Lewis.


CALIFORNIA: Ct. OKs Bid to File Under Seal Declaration in Ashker
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TODD ASHKER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW
(RMI) (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, Eureka
Division, granted the Plaintiffs' Administrative Motion to File
Under Seal, and the Declaration of Carmen Bremer in support of the
same.

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5(a), the Plaintiffs have shown
that the portions of the documents to be sealed are entitled to
protection under the law because they contain confidential
information that the Defendants claim could harm CDCR institutional
safety and security if disclosed.  

The Magistrate finds that the Plaintiffs have met the "good cause"
standard for sealing Exhibit A and portions of Exhibit B to the
Declaration of Carmen Bremer in Support of Plaintiffs' Enforcement
Motion Regarding Unauthorized SHU-Eligible Offense of
"Participation in a Rout with an STG Nexus," as well as portions of
the Bremer Decl. ISO Plaintiffs' Enforcement Motion, because
they've shown that they contain confidential information that
Defendants claim would harm institutional safety and security, and
would further compromise ongoing investigations of alleged prison
gang activity if disclosed.

Having considered Plaintiffs' Motion, and good cause appearing
therefor, the Magistrate granted the Plaintiffs' Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ppa0bY from Leagle.com.

Todd Ashker, Plaintiff, represented by Alexandra Azure Wheeler,
Center for Constitutional Rights, Anne Marie Cappella --
anne.cappella@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Anne Butterfield
Weills, Siegel & Yee, Bambo Obaro -- bambo.obaro@weil.com -- Weil,
Gotshal and Manges, Carmen E. Bremer --
carmen.bremer@bremerlawgroup.com -- Bremer Law Group PLLC, pro hac
vice, Carol Strickman -- carol@prisonerswithchildren.org -- Legal
Services for Prisoner With Children, Charles Francis-Antonio
Carbone -- charles@charlescarbone.com -- Law Office of Charles
Carbone, Daniel Mark Siegel , Siegel Yee & Brunner, Evan Charles
Greenberg -- EGreenberg@co.tulare.ca.us -- Coleman & Balogh LLP,
Jules Lobel -- jll4@pitt.edu -- pro hac vice, Marilyn S. McMahon
--
marilyn.mcmahon@gmail.com -- Rachel Anne Meeropol, Center for
Constitutional Rights, pro hac vice & Samuel Rand Miller --
amrmiller@yahoo.com -- United Sta.

Danny Troxell, George Ruiz, George Franco, Gabriel Reyes, Richard
Johnson, Paul Redd, Luis Esquivel & Ronnie Dewberry, Plaintiffs,
represented by Alexandra Azure Wheeler, Center for Constitutional
Rights, Anne Marie Cappella, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Anne
Butterfield Weills, Siegel & Yee, Bambo Obaro, Weil, Gotshal and
Manges, Carmen E. Bremer, Bremer Law Group PLLC, pro hac vice,
Carol Strickman, Legal Services for Prisoner With Children,
Charles
Francis-Antonio Carbone, Law Office of Charles Carbone, Evan
Charles Greenberg, Coleman & Balogh LLP, Jules Lobel, pro hac
vice,
Marilyn S. McMahon, Rachel Anne Meeropol, Center for
Constitutional
Rights, pro hac vice & Samuel Rand Miller, United Sta.

Jeffrey Franklin, Plaintiff, represented by Anne Marie Cappella,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Anne Butterfield Weills, Siegel & Yee,
Bambo Obaro, Weil, Gotshal and Manges, Carmen E. Bremer, Bremer
Law
Group PLLC, pro hac vice, Carol Strickman, Legal Services for
Prisoner With Children, Charles Francis-Antonio Carbone, Law
Office
of Charles Carbone, Evan Charles Greenberg, Coleman & Balogh LLP,
Jules Lobel, pro hac vice, Marilyn S. McMahon, Rachel Anne
Meeropol, Center for Constitutional Rights, pro hac vice & Samuel
Rand Miller, United Sta.

Mathew Cate, Secretary, CDCR, Greg Lewis, Warden, Pelican Bay
State
Prison, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California
&
Anthony Chaus, Chief, Office of Correctional Safety, CDCR,
Defendants, represented by Adriano Hrvatin --
adriano.hrvatin@doj.ca.gov -- California Department of Justice,
Christine Marie Ciccotti -- christine.ciccotti@doj.ca.gov --
California Attorney General's Office, Jay Craig Russell --
jay.russell@doj.ca.gov -- Office of the Attorney General, Jillian
Renee O'Brien, California State Attorney General's Office, Loran
Michael Simon, California State Department of Justice & Martine
Noel D'Agostino, CA State Attorney
General's Office.

California Correctional Peace Officers Association, Intervenor,
represented by Phillip A. Murray -- phil@kernlaw.com -- Phillip
Murray.


CARBONITE INC: Thomas Seeks More Information on Sale to Open Text
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MARK THOMAS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CARBONITE, INC., LINDA CONNLY, SCOTT DANIELS, DAVID
FRIEND, CHARLES KANE, TODD KRASNOW, MARINA LEVINSON, STEPHEN
MUNFORD, CORAL MERGER SUB INC., and OPEN TEXT CORPORATION, Case No.
1:19-cv-02254-UNA (D. Del., Dec. 11, 2019), arises out of the Board
of Directors' attempt to sell the Company to Open Text Corporation
through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Coral Merger Sub Inc.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by causing a materially incomplete
and misleading recommendation statement (the "14D-9") to be filed
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 25, 2019. The 14D-9 recommends that Carbonite shareholders
tender their shares in favor of a proposed transaction whereby
Carbonite is acquired by Open Text.

Pursuant to the definitive agreement and plan of merger entered
into by Carbonite and Open Text, Merger Sub commenced a tender
offer to acquire all of the outstanding shares of common stock of
Carbonite for $23.00 per share. The Tender Offer was to expire on
December 23, 2019. The deal is valued at $1.42 billion.

The Plaintiff contends that the 14D-9 is materially incomplete and
contains misleading representations and information in violation of
the Exchange Act. Specifically, the 14D-9 contains materially
incomplete and misleading information concerning the sales process,
financial projections prepared by Carbonite's management, and the
financial analyses conducted by J.P. Morgan Securities LLC,
Carbonite's financial advisor. He adds that the Individual
Defendants must disclose all material information regarding the
Proposed Transaction to Carbonite's stockholders so that they can
make a fully informed decision whether to tender their shares in
favor of the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from taking any steps
to consummate the Proposed Transaction, including filing any
amendment to the 14D-9, unless and until the material information
discussed below is included in any such amendment or otherwise
disseminated to Carbonite's shareholders. In the event the Proposed
Transaction is consummated without the material omissions being
remedied, the Plaintiff seeks to recover damages resulting from the
Defendants' violations.

The Plaintiff owns shares of Carbonite common stock.

Carbonite was incorporated in 2005. The Company offers a data
protection platform that provides backup, disaster recovery and
workload migration technology, among other solutions. Carbonite
primarily offers its platform via subscription, with most customers
utilizing annual subscription plans. The Individual Defendants are
officers and directors of the Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

                - and -

          Shane T. Rowley, Esq.
          Danielle Rowland Lindahl, Esq.
          ROWLEY LAW PLLC
          50 Main Street, Suite 1000
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 400-1920
          Facsimile: (914) 301-3514


CARDINAL CAMERA: Mahoney Asserts Breach of ADA
----------------------------------------------
Cardinal Camera, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as John Mahoney, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Cardinal Camera, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00116-BMS (E.D. Penn., Jan. 7, 2020).

Cardinal Camera, LLC is a family owned & operated camera store
located in Lansdale, PA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David S. Glanzberg
   Glanzberg Tobia & Associates PC
   123 S. Broad Street Suite 1640
   Philadelphia, PA 19109
   Tel: (215) 981-5400
   Email: dglanzberg@aol.com


CHI-ST. VINCENT: Watts PI Suit Transferred to New Jersey
--------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Alice Watts, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated plaintiffs, Plaintiff v. CHI-St.
Vincent Infirmary Medical Center and Avectus Healthcare Solutions
LLC, Defendants, was transferred from Pulaski County Circuit Court
with the assigned Case No. 2:19-cv-05138 to the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey on January 8, 2020, and assigned
Case No. 2:20-cv-00282-BRM-JAD.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Personal
Injury: Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product
Liability filed pursuant to the Diversity-Product Liability.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   David M. Donovan, Esq.
   Watts, Donovan & Tilley, P.A.
   200 River Market Avenue, Suite 200
   Little Rock, AR 72201-1769
   Tel: (501) 372-1406
   Email: david.donovan@wdt-law.com

The Defendant CHI-St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center is
represented by:

   Gary D. Marts , Jr., Esq.
   Wright, Lindsey & Jennings
   200 West Capitol Avenue, Suite 2300
   Little Rock, AR 72201-3699
   Tel: (501) 212-1234
   Fax: (501) 376-9442
   Email: gmarts@wlj.com

The Defendant Avectus Healthcare Solutions LLC is represented by:

   Jeffrey W. Puryear, Esq.
   Womack Phelps Puryear Mayfield & McNeil, P.A.
   Post Office Box 3077
   Jonesboro, AR 72403-3077
   Tel: (870) 932-0900
   Fax: (870) 932-2553
   Email: jpuryear@wpmfirm.com




CHURCHILL DOWNS: Bids for TRO in Kater & Thimmegowda Suits Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, CHERYL KATER and SUZIE KELLY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CHURCHILL
DOWNS INCORPORATED, a Kentucky corporation, and BIG FISH GAMES,
INC., a Washington corporation, Defendants; MANASA THIMMEGOWDA,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. BIG FISH GAMES, INC., a Washington corporation,
ARISTOCRAT TECHNOLOGIES INC., a Nevada corporation, ARISTOCRAT
LEISURE LIMITED, an Australian corporation, and CHURCHILL DOWNS
INCORPORATED, a Kentucky corporation, Defendants, Case Nos.
C15-0612-RBL, C19-0199-RBL (W.D. Wash.), Judge Ronald B. Leighton
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Tacoma, granted the Plaintiffs' Motions for Temporary Restraining
Order and Limited Relief from Litigation Stay.

Big Fish Casino is a game platform that functions as a virtual
casino, within which users can play various electronic casino
games, such as blackjack, poker, and slots.  Users can download the
Big Fish Casino app free of charge, and first-time users receive a
set of free chips.  They then can play the games for free using the
chips that come with the app, and may purchase additional chips to
extend gameplay.  Users also earn more chips as a reward for
winning the games. If a user runs out of chips, he or she must
purchase more chips to continue playing.  A user can purchase more
virtual chips for prices ranging from $1.99 to nearly $250.

The only material differences between the cases are the addition of
Big Fish's new owner as a defendant in Thimmegowda, and class
definitions that cover different time periods.  The proposed Kater
class covers persons who lost purchased chips at the Defendants'
games before March 23, 2015, and the proposed Thimmegowda class
covers persons who lost chips after that date.  

On Aug. 28, 2019, Big Fish changed the Terms of Use on its Big Fish
Casino website.  Before then, the game's Terms contained a generic
arbitration agreement, which is the subject of pending motions in
both cases.  The Terms do not provide information about the current
status of these cases, the type of relief being sought, the Court's
previous decisions about arbitration in Kater, or how to contact
the Plaintiffs' counsel.  They do not advise players to seek their
own counsel if they have questions about the Terms.  The Terms
include an opt-out provision, which purports to permit players to
opt out of the arbitration agreement within 30 days of clicking the
"I Agree" button.

More than 30 days after changing the Terms (about Oct. 14, 2019),
Big Fish's games began displaying a new pop-up window.  The pop-up
expressly references the litigation and tells players that clicking
the "I Agree" button means that they will not be permitted to
participate in these lawsuits.  Players cannot continue to play the
game unless they click the "I Agree" button, even if they have
already purchased chips.

The Defendants did not tell the Plaintiffs, their counsel, or the
Court about the changes to the Terms of Use or the addition of the
pop-up window.  Nor has the Court authorized any form of class
notice.  In fact, both cases have been stayed, with limited
exceptions, pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the appeal in
Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc.

Before the Court are the Plaintiffs' Motions for Temporary
Restraining Order and Limited Relief from Litigation Stay.  The
pending motions are identical.

Judge Leighton holds that the Court's task is to fashion a narrow
remedy to these problems, without infringing on Big Fish's right to
communicate with its players.  As an initial matter, Judge Leighton
denied the request to appoint the interim class counsel.  He can
address the problems with the pop-up without jumping the gun on the
class status.

Second, Judge Leighton lifted the stay for the limited purpose of
implementing the corrective actions outlined.  The existing pop-up
is coercive and misleading as to those players who are putative
class members in either lawsuit.  Big Fish claims that some 90% of
its players never buy chips.  If it is feasible to do so, Big Fish
may show a revised pop-up only to those players who have purchased
chips during the relevant time periods and are therefore members of
the putative class(es).  The Judge will not interfere with Big
Fish's communications with new players or old players who did not
purchase chips in the relevant time frames.  However, if it cannot
find a way to separate its communications with putative class
members from those with its general customers, Big Fish will have
to abide by the following limitations in all pop-ups or whatever
other method of communication regarding Terms that first reaches
the putative class members.

Any pop-up or other initial communication directed to putative
class members must do the following.  First, it must reference the
ability to (and provide instruction on how to) OPT-OUT of
arbitration and out of the agreement to waive a player's status as
putative class member in either litigation.  Second, it must
briefly explain the rights at issue in these lawsuits such that an
average user would understand what they are giving up by agreeing
to the Terms.  Finally, it must advise players to contact an
attorney for advice on any of the legal terms and provide contact
information for the Plaintiff's attorneys with respect to the class
action lawsuits.

Judge Leighton is not inclined to draft the pop-up itself, nor to
include the Court's seal on the revised version that is ultimately
used. The Parties would be well-advised to cooperate and together
attempt to draft language for a notice with these features and
which addresses the Court's concerns in the analysis above.  If
they cannot agree, each will propose language and the Court will
choose (and perhaps modify) a proposal that meets these
requirements.

If competing proposals are necessary, they should be submitted
within 10 days.  Each party may provide three additional pages of
briefing defending its proposed language.  Obviously, Big Fish's
cooperation in drafting language consistent with the Order does not
waive its right to appeal or otherwise object to any Court-ordered
"edits" to its communications with its players.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is, to this
extent, granted, Judge Leighton ruled.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/X2HZd5 from Leagle.com.

Cheryl Kater, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander G. Tievsky --
atievsky@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, Amir C.
Missaghi,
EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, Benjamin H. Richman --
brichman@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, Eve-Lynn Rapp --
erapp@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, Rafey S. Balabanian
-- rbalabanian@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, Todd Logan
-- tlogan@edelson.com -- EDELSON PC, pro hac vice, Cecily C. Shiel
-- cshiel@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS, Janissa Ann
Strabuk -- jstrabuk@tousley.com -- TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS &
Clifford A. Cantor.

Churchill Downs Incorporated, a Kentucky corporation, Defendant,
represented by Robert Rivera -- RRIVERA@SusmanGodfrey.com --
SUSMAN
GODFREY, pro hac vice, Matthew R. Berry --
mberry@SusmanGodfrey.com
--  SUSMAN GODFREY & Steven M. Seigel -- sseigel@gmail.com --
SUSMAN GODFREY.


DELL TECH: Bid to Dismiss Class V Consolidated Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
Dell Technologies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 1, 2019, that the defendants'
motion to dismiss the class action suit entitled, In Re Dell Class
V Litigation (Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL), is pending.

Four purported stockholders brought putative class action
complaints arising out of the Class V transaction.

The actions were captioned Hallandale Beach Police and Fire
Retirement Plan v. Michael Dell et al. (Civil Action No.
2018-0816-JTL), Howard Karp v. Michael Dell et al. (Civil Action
No. 2019-0032-JTL), Miramar Police Officers' Retirement Plan v.
Michael Dell et al. (Civil Action No. 2019-0049-JTL), and
Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan v. Michael Dell et al. (Civil
Action No. 2019-0115-JTL). The four actions were consolidated into
In Re Dell Class V Litigation (Consol. C.A. No. 2018-0816-JTL),
which names as defendants the Company's board of directors and
certain stockholders of the Company, including Michael S. Dell.

The plaintiffs generally allege that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties to the former holders of Class V Common Stock in
connection with the Class V transaction by allegedly causing the
Company to enter into a transaction that favored the interests of
the controlling stockholders at the expense of such former
stockholders.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2019 making
substantially similar allegations to those described.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action on September
30, 2019. The plaintiffs replied to the motion to dismiss on
November 15, 2019, and the defendant's reply was due December 13,
2019.

A ruling on the pending motion is expected in early 2020.

Dell Technologies Inc. provides computer products. The Company
offers laptops, desktops, tablets, workstations, servers, monitors,
printers, gateways, software, storage, and net working products.
Dell Technologies serves customers worldwide. Dell Technologies
Inc. was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Round Rock,
Texas.


DELL TECH: Settlement in Retirement Sys. Suit Wins Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lee Yeakel of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas approved on Jan. 10, 2020 the settlement in the
case, City of Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. Dell
Inc. et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00374 (W.D. Tex.)

The Court entered an Order and Final Judgment, an Order awarding
attorney's fees and expenses, and an Order approving a plan of
allocation.

Dell Technologies Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 9, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 1, 2019, that on May 21, 2014, a
securities class action seeking compensatory damages was filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, captioned City of Pontiac General Employees' Retirement
System v. Dell Inc., et. al. (Case No. 1:14-cv-03644).

The action names as defendants Dell Inc. and certain current and
former executive officers, and alleges that Dell made false and
misleading statements about Dell's financial results and future
prospects between February 21, 2012 and May 22, 2012, which
resulted in artificially inflated stock prices.

The case was transferred in 2015 to the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas under the same caption
(Case No. 1:15-cv-00374), where the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss.

On September 16, 2016, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. On
March 29, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, and certified a class consisting of all purchasers
of Dell common stock between February 22, 2012 and May 22, 2012.

Fact and expert discovery is now closed. The parties have agreed to
an immaterial settlement amount, and the Court has preliminarily
approved the settlement. Notice of the settlement was mailed to
shareholders in October 2019.

Shareholders had until December 20, 2019 to opt out or object to
the settlement.

A hearing for the final approval of the settlement was set for
January 10, 2020.

Dell Technologies Inc. provides computer products. The Company
offers laptops, desktops, tablets, workstations, servers, monitors,
printers, gateways, software, storage, and net working products.
Dell Technologies serves customers worldwide. Dell Technologies
Inc. was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in Round Rock,
Texas.


DEUTSCHE BANK: Feb. 5 Claims Deadline in GSE Bonds Litigation Set
-----------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE GSE BONDS ANTITRUST
LITIGATION

Case No. 1:19-cv-01704 (JSR)

SUMMARY NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION, HEARING ON PROPOSED
SETTLEMENTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES PETITION, AND RIGHT TO SHARE IN NET
SETTLEMENT FUND

If you entered into a GSE Bond Transaction with one or more
Defendants from January 1, 2009 through and including January 1,
2019 ("Settlement Class Period"), you may be affected by pending
class action settlements.

This Summary Notice is to alert you to a proposed Settlement
reached with Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. ("Deutsche Bank") and
its predecessors, successors, assigns, subsidiaries, and
affiliates, including Deutsche Bank AG and a separate proposed
Settlement reached with First Tennessee Bank, N.A. and with FTN
Financial Securities Corp. ("FTN") and its predecessors,
successors, assigns, subsidiaries, and affiliates, including First
Horizon National Corp.  Deutsche Bank and FTN deny that the
material allegations made against them in this Action have merit.
In total, Deutsche Bank and FTN have agreed to pay a total of $29.5
million into a settlement fund.  The litigation is continuing
against Barclays Capital Inc.; BNP Paribas Securities Corp.;
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.; Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC;
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC; J. P. Morgan Securities LLC; Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.; TD Securities (USA) LLC; Nomura
Securities International, Inc.; HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.; Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co.; SG Americas Securities LLC; Morgan Stanley & Co.,
LLC; and UBS Securities LLC ("Non-Settling Defendants," and
collectively with Deutsche Bank and FTN, "Defendants").
Non-Settling Defendants deny all allegations of wrongdoing.  

The Court has appointed these lawyers to represent the Settlement
Class in the Action:

         Christopher M. Burke
         Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP
         600 West Broadway, Suite 3300
         San Diego, CA 92101
         Telephone: 619-233-4565
         cburke@scott-scott.com

         Vincent Briganti
         Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.
         44 South Broadway, Suite 1100
         White Plains, NY 10601
         Telephone: 914 733-7221
         vbriganti@lowey.com

Who Is a Member of the Settlement Class?

Subject to certain exceptions, the proposed Settlement Class
consists of all persons and entities who or which entered into a
GSE Bond Transaction with a Defendant or a direct or indirect
parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or division of a Defendant during
the Settlement Class Period.

"GSE Bond Transaction" means any purchase, sale, or other
transaction in the secondary market with respect to any GSE Bond.
"GSE Bond" means any and each unsecured bond or debt instrument
(i.e., senior debt, subordinated debt, and junior subordinated
debt) regardless of currency or credit quality, issued by Federal
National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, Federal Farm Credit Banks, and Federal Home Loan
Banks.

The other capitalized terms used in this Publication Notice are
defined in the detailed Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Hearing
on Proposed Settlements and Attorneys' Fees Petition, and Right to
Share in Net Settlement Fund ("Notice") and the Stipulations, which
are available at www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com

If you are not sure if you are included in the Settlement Class,
you can get more information, including the detailed Notice, at
www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com or by calling toll-free
1-877-317-7944 (if calling from outside the United States or
Canada, call 1-414-961-6546).

Will I Get a Payment?

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and do not opt out, you
will be eligible for a payment under the Settlements if you file a
proof of claim form ("Claim Form").  The Settlements and Plan of
Distribution have been preliminarily but not finally approved by
the Court.  You also may obtain more information at
www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com or by calling toll-free
1-877-317-7944 (if calling from outside the United States or
Canada, call 1-414-961-6546).

Claim Forms must be submitted online at
www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com on or before 11:59 p.m. Eastern
time on February 5, 2020.

What Are My Rights?

If you are a member of the Settlement Class and do not opt out, you
will release certain legal rights against Deutsche Bank, FTN, and
the other Settling Defendants, as explained in the detailed Notice
and Stipulations, which are available at
www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com

If you do not want to take part in the proposed Settlements, you
must opt out by January 16, 2020.  You may object to the proposed
Settlements, Plan of Distribution, and/or application for an award
of attorneys' fees, Litigation Expenses, and any service awards for
Plaintiffs.  If you want to object, you must do so by January 16,
2020.  Information on how to opt out or object is contained in the
detailed Notice, which is available at
www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com

When Is the Settlement Hearing?

The Court will hold a hearing at the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl St., Courtroom 14B, New York,
NY 10007, on February 28, 2020 at 2:00 p.m. to consider whether to
approve the proposed Settlements, Plan of Distribution, and
application for an award of attorneys' fees, Litigation Expenses,
and any service awards for Plaintiffs. You or your lawyer may ask
to appear and speak at the hearing at your own expense, but you do
not have to.

For more information, call toll-free 1-877-317-7944 (if calling
from outside the United  States or Canada, call 1-414-961-6546) or
visit www.GSEBondAntitrustSettlement.com


EDDIE BAUER: Can Compel Arbitration in Harbers Fraud Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER HARBERS, Plaintiff, v. EDDIE BAUER, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. C19-1012JLR (W.D. Wash.), Judge James L.
Lobart of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington, Seattle, (i) granted Bauer's motion to compel
arbitration, and (ii) declined to rule on Eddie Bauer's motion to
dismiss.

The putative class action revolves around Jennifer Harbers'
allegations that Eddie Bauer engaged in "false discount
advertising" by advertising "perpetual or near perpetual discounts"
but rarely if ever offering its products at the advertised list
prices.  Ms. Harbers filed her complaint in King County Superior
Court on May 28, 2019, on behalf of herself and the putative class.
Eddie Bauer removed the case to federal court on June 28, 2019.
Ms. Harbers alleges violations of the Washington Consumer
Protection Act and seeks both money damages and injunctive relief.

Ms. Harbers alleges that she made numerous purchases from Eddie
Bauer over the years, primarily through the Eddie Bauer website
(www.eddiebauer.com).  Her complaint provides one example: a pair
of "Women's Myriad Crop Pants" that she purchased through
eddiebauer.com on June 20, 2016.  She does not specify the dates of
other purchases or allege they took place during the putative class
period.  Eddie Bauer's records show that Ms. Harbers made two
online purchases during the class period: the pair of crop pants
discussed above on June 19, 2016, and a second purchase on Sept.
12, 2017.

Eddie Bauer contends that it would have been impossible for Ms.
Harbers to make either of her two online purchases without
proceeding through a "Begin Secure Checkout" page that states: "By
ordering you agree to eddiebauer.com's Privacy Policy and Terms of
Use."  It provides an image of that page, as well as an image of an
additional "Review" page that Eddie Bauer began using in 2017,
which states "By ordering you agree to eddiebauer.com's Privacy
Policy and Terms of Use."  The Review Page makes the foregoing
statement twice -- once on the top left of the page, and again just
above the "Submit Order" button at the bottom of the page.

Eddie Bauer asks the Court to take judicial notice of an archived
copy of the Terms of Use as they existed on eddiebauer.com as of
May 12, 2016, procured through the Internet Archive.  According to
James McMurdo, Senior Developer for Eddie Bauer, the page
accurately reflects how the Terms of Use on eddiebauer.com appeared
at the time of the Plaintiff's June 12, 2016, and Sept. 12, 2017,
purchases.  The Terms of Use do not expressly delegate to an
arbitrator the determinations of whether an arbitration agreement
exists or whether it covers a particular dispute.

Ms. Harbers contends that she made no agreement to arbitrate with
Eddie Bauer.  She opposes Eddie Bauer's request for judicial notice
of the Terms of Use on the grounds that the Internet Archive is not
a source whose reliability cannot reasonably be questioned, and
because the Terms of Use image is not authenticated by a person
with knowledge who works for the Internet Archive.  She further
contends that a customer can bypass the Checkout Page if (1) the
customer is using PayPal; (2) the customer is paying using Visa
Checkout; or (3) the customer or the computer is already logged in
as an Eddie Bauer registered user.

Ms. Harbers asserts that she definitely used PayPal to pay for her
Eddie Bauer purchase of 2017 and provides a screenshot of what she
claims is her PayPal receipt for that purchase.  She does not
dispute that she would have had to move through the Review Page and
click "Submit Order" to make her 2017 purchase.

The matter comes before the court on Eddie Bauer's motion to compel
arbitration, or in the alternative, dismiss Ms. Harbers' complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).   Ms. Harbers filed
a response.   

Eddie Bauer contends that Ms. Harbers formed an agreement to
arbitrate three times: twice when making her purchases after
viewing the Checkout Page, which states, "By ordering you agree to
eddiebauer.com's Privacy Policy and Terms of Use," and once when
she made her 2017 purchase by clicking the "Submit Order" button on
the Review Page, which includes the same disclosure language and a
hyperlink to the Terms of Use.

Before turning to whether Ms. Harbers is bound by the Terms of Use,
Judge Lobart addresses Ms. Harbers' contention that Eddie Bauer has
not presented sufficient evidence of the existence of the Terms of
Use in the first place.  He finds that Ms. Harbers presents no
substantive argument or evidence that the Terms of Use were not in
effect as of the date she made her purchases.  Accordingly, the
Judge concludes that Eddie Bauer has met its burden for the
purposes of its motion to compel arbitration to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the Terms of Use that were in effect
when Ms. Harbers made her purchases.

Judge Lobart next evaluates whether Ms. Harbers manifested assent
to the Terms of Use and concludes that she did.  The Judge
concludes that Eddie Bauer has met its burden to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Harbers assented to the
Terms of Use, including the arbitration agreement contained
therein, when Ms. Harbers made her Sept. 12, 2017, purchase, and
that the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable.

Having concluded that Ms. Harbers is bound by the Terms of Use, the
Judge turns to the scope of the arbitration agreement in the Terms
of Use as applied to Ms. Harbers' claims.  The Judge finds that all
of Ms. Harbers' claims in the litigation are "disputes" between
herself and Eddie Bauer and are subject to the arbitration
agreement.  Accordingly, Judge Lobart grants Eddie Bauer's motion
to compel arbitration of all of Ms. Harbers' claims.

The final question is whether to dismiss or stay the case pending
arbitration.  Eddie Bauer requests dismissal.  Judge Lobart holds
that because he finds that arbitration is the proper forum for all
of Ms. Harbers' claims, he dismisses Ms. Harbers' claims in favor
of arbitration and without prejudice.

For the reasons stated, Judge Lobart granted Eddie Bauer's motion
to compel arbitration; declined to rule on Eddie Bauer's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6);
denied Ms. Harbers' motions to strike contained in her surreply;
and dismissed Ms. Harbers' claims in favor of arbitration and
without prejudice.  Ms. Harbers is compelled to proceed to
arbitration of her claims in accordance with the terms of the
arbitration agreement contained in the Terms of Use.

A full-text copy of Judge Lobart's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available
at https://is.gd/u4Mg3j from Leagle.com.

Jennifer Harbers, for Herself, as a Private Attorney General,
and/or On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
represented by Che Z. Corrington -- che@hattislaw.com -- HATTIS &
LUKACS PLLC, Daniel M. Hattis -- an@hattislaw.com -- HATTIS &
LUKACS PLLC & Paul Karl Lukacs, HATTIS & LUKACS, pro hac vice.

Eddie Bauer LLC, Defendant, represented by Anthony Anscombe ,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, pro hac vice, Marc C. Levy --
marcl@seedip.com -- SEED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP PLLC,
Meegan Brooks -- mbrooks@steptoe.com -- STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, pro
hac vice, Stephanie Sheridan -- ssheridan@steptoe.com -- STEPTOE &
JOHNSON LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Shewmake --
tomshewmake@seedip.com -- SEED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP
PLLC.


ELECTROCORE INC: Turnofsky and Priewe Class Action Suits Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
electroCore, Inc. is still facing two putative class actions
related to the registration statement and related prospectus for
the Company's initial public offering in 2018, according to the
Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2019.

On September 26, 2019 and October 31, 2019, purported stockholders
of the Company served putative class action lawsuits in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey captioned Allyn
Turnofsky vs. electroCore, Inc., et al., Case 3:19-cv-18400, and
Priewe vs. electroCore, Inc., et al., Case 1:19-cv-19653,
respectively.  In addition to the Company, the defendants include
present and past directors and officers and the underwriters for
the Company's IPO.

The plaintiffs each seek to represent a class of stockholders who
(i) purchased common stock of the Company in its IPO or whose
purchases are traceable to the IPO, or (ii) who purchased common
stock of the Company between the IPO and September 25, 2019.  The
complaints each allege that the defendants violated Sections 11 and
15 of the Securities Act and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act, with respect to (i) the registration statement and
related prospectus for the IPO, and (ii) certain later public
disclosures.  The complaints seek unspecified compensatory damages,
interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

electroCore, Inc., a bioelectronic medicine company, engages in
developing a range of patient administered non-invasive vagus nerve
(VNS) stimulation therapies for the treatment of various conditions
in neurology, rheumatology, and other fields. The company was
founded in 2005 and is headquartered in Basking Ridge, New Jersey.


ENVISION HEALTHCARE: Court Narrows Claims in Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned In re ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORPORATION
SECURITIES LITIGATION This Document Relates To: ALL ACTIONS, Case
No. 3:17-cv-01112, Consolidated with Case Nos. 3:17-cv-01323 and
3:17-cv-01397 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville
Division:

    (i) granted in part and denied in part Defendant Envision
        Healthcare and the Individual Defendants' Motion to
        Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint; and

   (ii) granted the motion to dismiss filed by Clayton, Dublier &
        Rice, LLC, CD&R Associations VIII Ltd., Clayton Dubilier
        & Rice Fund VIII, L.P., CD&R EMS Co-Investor, L.P.,
        CD&R Advisor Fund VIII Co-Investor, L.P., and CD&R
        Friends and Family Fund VIII, L.P. ("CD&R Defendants").

On Aug. 4, 2017, Plaintiff Terry W. Bettis filed an initial
complaint against Envision Healthcare and four individual
Defendants, William A. Sanger, Randel G. Owen, Christopher A.
Holden, and Claire M. Gulmi.  The initial complaint alleged
violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.  

The case brought by Bettis was consolidated with two related cases:
Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois v. Envision Healthcare
Corporation, Case No. 3:17-cv-01323 (M.D. Tenn., Sept. 29, 2017);
and Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Envision Healthcare
Corporation, Case No. 3:17-cv-01397 (M.D. Tenn., October 23, 2017).
The Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint on Jan.
26, 2018, alleging violations of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
against Envision, the CD&R Defendants, and 23 Individual
Defendants.

The Plaintiffs commenced the action on behalf of all entities or
individuals who purchased or acquired Envision's common stock
between Feb. 3, 2014 and Oct. 31, 2017.  The Complaint identifies
four institutional investors as lead/named Plaintiffs: Laborers'
Pension Trust Fund for Northern California (lead Plaintiff);
Laborers' International Union of North America National Industrial
Fund (lead Plaintiff); Central Laborers' Pension Fund (named
Plaintiff); and United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 655
Food Employers Joint Pension Fund (named Plaintiff).

The overarching allegations of the Complaint are that Envision
artificially inflated its earnings through out-of-network billing,
illegal upcoding, and inflated facility spending, and failed to
disclose to investors that these business practices were
substantially responsible for EmCare's revenue growth.  Between
2013 and 2016, EmCare almost doubled its annual revenue from $2.3
billion to $4.2 billion.

The Plaintiffs allege EmCare intentionally staffed its emergency
rooms with out-of-network physicians, which allowed it to bill
health insurers and patients at "vastly higher rates" and reap the
associated profits.  They also allege EmCare engaged in illegal
upcoding -- billing for services using a billing code that is more
expensive than the code associated with services the patient
actually received or required.  In a similar vein, the Plaintiffs
allege EmCare increased facility spending for its hospital partners
by increasing hospital admission and imaging rates without regard
to medical necessity.  Increased facility spending had the dual
benefit of increasing EmCare's revenue and increasing revenues for
the hospitals with which it contracted.  As a result, the
Plaintiffs allege, EmCare was able to parlay the increase in
hospital revenue into more contracts and thereby increase its own
revenue.

The Consolidated Complaint alleges eight counts under the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act:

     a. Count I - claims alleging securities fraud in violation of
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") Rule 10b-5 brought by all the Plaintiffs against
Envision, the Envision Officer Defendants (Sanger, Owen, Wilson,
and Zimmerman), and the AmSurg Officer defendants (Holden, Gulmi,
and Eastridge);

     b. Count II - claims for control person liability under
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act brought by all the Plaintiffs against
the Envision Individual Defendants and the AmSurg Defendants
(except Ciggaran, Herr, and Popp) alleging these Defendants
controlled the dissemination of the alleged false and misleading
statements at issue in Claim I;

     c. Count III - insider trading in violation of Section 20A of
the 1934 Act brought by the UFCW Pension Fund against Williams,
Sanger, Owen, and Zimmerman, and the CD&R Defendants;

     d. Counts IV and V - strict liability and negligence claims
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act brought by all the
Plaintiffs against Envision and the Envision Individual Defendants,
alleging these Defendants were responsible for false and misleading
statements in the Joint Proxy Registration Statement;

     e. Count VII - negligence based claims under §14(a) of the
1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 brought by all the Plaintiffs against
Envision, the Envision Individual Defendants, and the AmSurg
Defendants for false and misleading statements in the Joint Proxy
Registration Statement;

     f. Counts VI and VIII - claims for control person liability
under Section 15 of the 1933 Act and Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.
The Claims for violation of Section 15 of the 1933 Act are brought
against the Envision Individual Defendants.  The Claims under
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act are brought against CD&R and four
associated CD&R companies, the Envision Individual Defendants, and
the AmSurg Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Envision and the Individual
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the CD&R Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  

Judge Campbell granted the the Motion of the CD&R Defendants to
Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint.  He granted in part and
denied in part Defendant Envision and the Individual Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  

Count I alleging violations of Section 10(b) Rule 10b-5 will
proceed as to Envision, Sanger, and Owen only with regard to the
allegations involving out-of-network billing as a basis of revenue
and growth and the performance of certain 2014-15 contracts.  Count
I claims against Holden and Gulmi will proceed only with regard to
the allegations involving out-of-network billing as a basis of
revenue and growth in the 2016 Annual Report.  The Claims alleged
in Count I are dismissed as to Williams, Zimmerman, and Eastridge
and with regard to allegations of upcoding and improperly
increasing hospital admissions and tests and the transition to
in-network status.

Count II alleging control person liability by the Envision
Individual Defendants and the AmSurg Defendants (except Cigarran,
Herr, and Popp) will proceed.

Count III alleging insider trading in violation of Section 20A of
the 1934 Act is dismissed against the CD&R Defendants, and will
proceed against Williams, Sanger, Owen, and Zimmerman.

Counts IV and V alleging violations of Sections 11 and 12 of the
1933 Act against Envision and the Envision Individual Defendants
will proceed.

Counts VI alleging control person liability under Section 15 of the
1933 Act for the Joint Proxy Registration Statement against the
Envision Individual Defendants will proceed.

Count VII alleging violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act
against Envision, the Envision Individual Defendants, and the
AmSurg Individual Defendants will proceed.

Count VIII alleging control person liability under Section 20(a) of
the 1934 Act for the Joint Proxy Registration Statement against the
CD&R Defendants, the Envision Individual Defendants, and the AmSurg
Defendants will proceed as to the Envision Individual Defendants
and the AmSurg Individual Defendants.  Count VIII against the CD&R
Defendants is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://bit.ly/2tiYyS6 from Leagle.com.

Terry W. Bettis, Individually, and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II
-- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Patrick V. Dahlstrom --
pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, Paul Kent Bramlett --
PKNASHLAW@aol.com -- Bramlett Law Offices & Robert P. Bramlett --
Robert@BramlettLawOffices.com -- Bramlett Law Offices.

Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois, Consol Plaintiff, represented
by Kenneth S. Byrd, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP &
Mark P. Chalos, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP.

Central Laborers' Pension Fund, Consol Plaintiff, represented by
John T. Long, Cavanagh & O'Hara & Jonathan L. Bobbitt, Gilbert
McWherter Scott & Bobbitt PLC.

Envision Healthcare Corporation, formerly known as Envision
Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Christopher A. Holden, William A.
Sanger, Claire M. Gulmi, Randel G. Owen & Mark V. Mactas,
Defendants, represented by Britt K. Latham -- blatham@bassberry.com
-- Bass, Berry & Sims, Joseph B. Crace, Jr. -- jcrace@bassberry.com
-- Bass, Berry & Sims & W. Brantley Phillips, Jr. --
bphillips@bassberry.com -- Bass, Berry & Sims.

Craig A. Wilson, Todd G. Zimmerman, Kevin D. Eastridge, Thomas G.
Cigarran, James A. Deal, John T. Gawaluck, Steven I. Geringer,
Henry D. Herr, Joey A. Jacobs, Kevin P. Lavender, Cynthia S. Miller
& John W. Popp, Jr., Defendants, represented by Britt K. Latham,
Bass, Berry & Sims.

Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, LLC & Clayton, Dubilier & Rice Fund VIII,
L.P., Defendants, represented by John S. Hicks, Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC & Shannon Rose Selden, Debevoise
& Plimpton.

CD&R Associates VIII Ltd., CD&R EMS Co-Investor, L.P., CD&R Advisor
Fund VIII Co-Investor, L.P. & CD&R Friends and Family Fund VIII,
L.P., Defendants, represented by Elliot Greenfield, Debevoise &
Plimpton, John S. Hicks, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, PC & Shannon Rose Selden, Debevoise & Plimpton.

Michael L. Smith, Ronald A. Williams, Richard J. Schnall, Carol J.
Burt & James D. Shelton, Consol Defendants, represented by Britt K.
Latham, Bass, Berry & Sims, Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Bass, Berry &
Sims & W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., Bass, Berry & Sims.


FIG LLC: Ga. App. Upholds Dismissal of B.C. Grand Suits
-------------------------------------------------------
Judge Sara L. Doyle of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fourth
Division, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the cases, B.C.
GRAND, LLC, v. FIG, LLC et al.; FIG, LLC, v. B.C. GRAND, LLC; and
INVESTA SERVICES OF GA, LLC, v. B.C. GRAND, LLC, Case No. A19A1297,
A19A1467, A19A1509 (Ga. App.).

B.C. Grand filed a class-action complaint against the Defendants,
asserting that the Defendants purchased tax executions for
delinquent ad valorem taxes on property to collect higher interest
amounts and penalties than were due because the executions were
based on initial tax assessments that were later reduced.  B.C.
Grand alleged that the Defendants wrongly collected and then failed
to repay those sums; asserted claims of negligence, unjust
enrichment, conversion, and conspiracy; and requested punitive
damages and attorney fees.  After finding that the complaint failed
to state claims for conversion, negligence, or unjust enrichment,
the trial court dismissed the complaint.

In Case No. A19A1297, B.C. Grand appealed, arguing in a number of
enumerations that the trial court erred by dismissing its
complaint.  In Case No. A19A1467, FIG cross-appealed, arguing that
the trial court's dismissal could be upheld on the bases that (1)
it was an improper party, (2) various statutes of limitation had
expired, and (3) the voluntary payment doctrine precluded the
claims.  In Case No. A19A1509, Investa also cross-appealed,
reiterating many of FIG's arguments and adding that the trial court
also should have dismissed the complaint based on equitable
estoppel.

The record shows that in January 2012, B.C. Grand purchased from
Trinity Properties Grant LTDLP property located on Broad Street in
Atlanta, Georgia.  In September 2012, after Trinity challenged the
initial property value assessment, the Fulton County Tax
Commissioner issued a temporary tax bill to Trinity/B.C. Grand for
a total of $128,110.46 based on a fair market value of $7.4
million.  The bill stated that after Feb. 23, 2018, additional
interest of 1% per month may continue to accrue until fully paid.
Taxes are due as billed and must be paid by the due date regardless
of appeal status.  In its complaint, B.C. does not assert that
either it or Trinity paid the 2012 taxes at the time of initial
assessment, and in December 2012, the Commissioner issued tax
executions on the property -- one for city taxes due and one for
county taxes due.

Investa purchased the tax executions, paying the full face value
(the equivalent of the underlying tax due plus some fees) in
December 2012.  In January 2013, Trinity challenged the assessment
with the Board of Equalization, which affirmed the assessment.  In
February 2013, Investa sent Trinity a required 60-day post-transfer
notice,9 which included interest and fees that had accrued during
that time.  Later that month, Trinity appealed the Board's
determination to Fulton Superior Court10; and in September 2013,
the Commissioner and Trinity entered into a consent agreement
reducing the assessed value of the property for 2012 from $7.4
million to $3.8 million.

Based on the consent agreement, the Commissioner issued a refund on
the tax overpayment ($39,681.04 and $11,029.24), which was paid to
B.C. Grand (the property owner at that point) based on the language
of the pertinent refund statute at that time.  B.C. Grand does not
allege in its complaint that it paid any portion of the 2012 taxes
at this time.  In November 2013, Investa sent B.C. Grand an annual
notice stating that the 2012 tax executions were due.

Eventually, in October 2014, Investa requested that the Fulton
County Sheriff levy on the 2012 tax executions, and the sale was
scheduled for December 2014.  In November 2014, B.C. Grand filed a
complaint, arguing that the 2012 tax executions were invalid
because they were issued during appeal proceedings and based on the
later-reduced assessment, and it requested a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") until the validity of the executions was determined
by the court.  At the hearing on the TRO, the trial court denied
the motion for a TRO, finding that B.C. Grand failed to cite
authority to support its contention that the executions were void
based on the change in the underlying assessment, and B.C. Grand
paid the 2012 tax executions in order to prevent the sale;
apparently, B.C. Grand later dismissed that case without proceeding
further.

In June 2018, B.C. Grand filed the instant class action complaint
seeking a refund of any interest and penalties it argues it
overpaid to Investa and FIG as a result of the tax assessment
reduction.  The Defendants filed motions to dismiss or for judgment
on the pleadings, attaching various documents thereto.  Thereafter,
the trial court granted the motions, and these appeals followed.

In Case No. A19A1297, B.C. Grand contends that the language in OCGA
Section 48-3-19(b)(1) (2012) prohibited the Defendants from
demanding payment of the amount of interest it charged because the
Commissioner eventually lowered the assessment and issued a refund
on the amount of taxes paid.  The trial court disagreed and
dismissed the case based on B.C. Grand's failure to state a claim
for negligence, conversion, or unjust enrichment based on the law
of those substantive claims.

Pretermitting whether B.C. Grand's complaint stated facts to
support claims under those causes of action, Judge Doyle finds that
it has failed to allege that the Commissioner cancelled the tax
executions or that they are void as a matter of law based on the
post-issuance reduction in the tax assessment.  This prohibits
their substantive claims as a matter of law.  B.C. Grand attempts
to rely on statutes from Title 9, which discusses judgment liens,
to argue that the Commissioner violated the law by issuing the
executions during the tax appeal, but tax executions are governed
instead by Title 48.

While nothing in Title 48 requires the Commissioner to issue
executions immediately after 30-days post tax delinquency, because
B.C. Grand failed to pay the taxes at issue while pursuing its
appeal of the assessment and awaiting a refund as contemplated by
the Code, the tax executions were validly issued by the
Commissioner.  And because B.C. Grand has failed to plead that the
executions are void as a matter of law under Title 48 or were
cancelled by the Commissioner in the consent judgment, the
Defendants were authorized to levy the executions and demand
payment as prescribed by Title 48.  Accordingly, the Appellate
Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action.

In Case Nos. A19A1467 and A19A1509, the Appelllate Court holds that
based on the holding of Division 1, it need not address the
cross-appeals.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Oct. 29, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/p235ji from Leagle.com.

Mario Bernard Williams -- mwilliams@ndh-law.com -- for Appellant.

Julie Johanna Oinonen -- julie@goodgeorgialawyer.com -- for
Appellant.

David Edward Betts, for Appellant.

Jason Michel Beach -- jbeach@HuntonAK.com -- for Appellee.

Lawrence Joseph Bracken, II, for Appellee.

DANIEL BYRUM MILLMAN, for Appellee.

Alice Stafford McQuade, for Appellee.

John E. Ramsey, III -- Ramsey@investaservices.com -- for Appellee.

Gala Villhoz, for Appellee.


FLORENCE BEAUTY: Slade Alleges Violation under ADA
--------------------------------------------------
Florence Beauty, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Linda Slade, individually and as the representative of a class
of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Florence Beauty, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00125 (S.D. N. Y., Jan. 7, 2020).

FLORENCE BEAUTY is a trademark and brand of Florence Beauty,
LLC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com

FOAMIX PHARMACEUTICALS: Sabatini Sues Over Acquisition by Menlo
---------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC SABATINI, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. FOAMIX PHARMACEUTICALS LTD., STANLEY HIRSCH, STANLEY
STERN, REX BRIGHT, ANNA KAZANCHYAN, TONY BRUNO, DAVID DOMZALSKI,
AARON SCHWARTZ, SHARON BARBARI, MENLO THERAPEUTICS INC., and GIANTS
MERGER SUBSIDIARY LTD., Case No. 1:19-cv-02257-UNA (D. Del., Dec.
11, 2019), arises from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
Foamix will be acquired by Menlo Therapeutics Inc. and Giants
Merger Subsidiary Ltd.

On November 10, 2019, Foamix's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Menlo.
Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, Foamix's
stockholders will receive 0.5924 shares of Parent common stock and
one contingent stock right for each share of Foamix common stock
they own.

On December 4, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction.

The Plaintiff contends that the Registration Statement omits
material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction,
which renders the Registration Statement false and misleading.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated
Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with the Registration Statement.

According to the compliant, the Registration Statement omits
material information regarding the Company's and Menlo's financial
projection; the analyses performed by the Company's financial
advisor in connection with the Proposed Transaction, Barclays Bank
PLC; and potential conflicts of interest of Barclays.

The Plaintiff, who owns Foamix common stock, avers that the
omissions and false and misleading statements in the Registration
Statement are material in that a reasonable stockholder will
consider them important in deciding how to vote on the Proposed
Transaction. In addition, a reasonable investor will view a full
and accurate disclosure as significantly altering the total mix of
information made available in the Registration Statement and in
other information reasonably available to stockholders.

The Plaintiff adds that the Registration Statement is an essential
link in causing the Plaintiff and the Company's stockholders to
approve the Proposed Transaction, and that because of the false and
misleading statements in the Registration Statement, the Plaintiff
and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm.

Foamix is a specialty pharmaceutical company that focuses on
therapeutic challenges in dermatology. The Individual Defendants
are officers and directors of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: sdr@rl-legal.com
                  bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

                - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Telephone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com


FOX NEWS: Deaf People Cannot Access Web Site, Suris Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
YAROSLAV SURIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC d/b/a FOX NEWS, Case No.
1:19-cv-06957 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 2019), seeks retribution for the
Defendant's actions against deaf and hard of hearing individuals
residing in New York and within the United States.

According to the complaint, the Defendant has denied the Plaintiff,
who is deaf, and deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals' access to
goods and services provided to non-disabled individuals through its
Web site, http://www.foxnews.com/.The denial is a violation of his
rights under the American with Disabilities Act, the Plaintiff
contends.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has videos on its Web site
without closed captioning, or with limited closed captioning, which
are inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. He adds
that without closed captioning, deaf and hard-of-hearing people
cannot understand the audio portion of the videos on the Web site.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the
Defendant to correct the barriers, which prevent access for deaf
and hard of hearing individuals so that they can enjoy the
Defendant's Web site as non-deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals
are able to do.

Fox News is an American conservative cable television news channel.
Fox News is owned by the Fox News Group, which itself was owned by
News Corporation from 1996–2013.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell Segal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL SEGAL, P.C.
          1010 Northern Boulevard, Suite 208
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 415-0100
          Facsimile: (516) 706-6631


FRANCHISE GROUP: Asbestos Workers' Pension Fund Suit Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------
Franchise Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that the Asbestos Workers'
Philadelphia Pension Fund has dropped its motion for preliminary
injunction.

On August 12, 2019, Asbestos Workers' Philadelphia Pension Fund,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated and
derivatively on behalf of the Company filed a class action and
derivative complaint in the Court of Chancery of the State of
Delaware, against Matthew Avril, Patrick A. Cozza, Thomas
Herskovits, Brian R. Kahn, Andrew M. Laurence, Lawrence Miller, G.
William Minner Jr., Bryant R. Riley, Kenneth M. Young, and against
Vintage Capital Management, LLC, B. Riley Financial, Inc., and the
Company as a Nominal Defendant.

The Derivative Complaint alleges breach of fiduciary duty against
the Derivative Complaint Individual Defendants based on the
following allegations: (a) causing the Company to completely
transform its business model and to acquire Buddy's at an inflated
price, (b) transfer the control of the Company to Vintage and B.
Riley for no premium and without a stockholder vote, (c) allowing
Vintage and B. Riley's other former stockholders to unfairly
extract additional value from the Company by virtue of a TRA, (d)
the offering to the Company's non-Vintage and non-B. Riley
stockholders of an inadequate price for their shares of Company
stock ($12.00 per share), (e) disseminating materially misleading
and/or omissive Tender Offer documents, and (f) issuing additional
Company shares to Vintage at less than fair value to fund the
Tender Offer and Vitamin Shoppe Acquisition. The Derivative
Complaint also includes a count of unjust enrichment against
Vintage and B. Riley.

The Derivative Complaint seeks: (a) declaration that the action is
properly maintainable as a class action; (b) a finding the
Individual Defendants are liable for breaching their fiduciary
duties owed to the class and the Company; (c) a finding that demand
on the Company's Board is excused as futile; (d) enjoining the
consummation of the Tender Offer unless and until all material
information necessary for the Company's stockholders to make a
fully informed tender decision has been disclosed; (e) a finding
Vintage and B. Riley are liable for unjust enrichment; (f) an award
to Plaintiff and the other members of the class damages in an
amount which may be proven at trial; (g) an award to Plaintiff and
the other members of the class pre-judgment and post-judgment
interest, as well as their reasonable attorneys' and expert witness
fees and other costs; (h) an award to the Company in the amount of
damages it sustained as a result of Individual Defendants' breaches
of fiduciary duties to the Company; and (i) awarding such other and
further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Simultaneously with the filing of the Derivative Complaint, the
Plaintiff filed a motion seeking expedited proceedings. The motion
was withdrawn as the Derivative Complaint Individual Defendants
agreed to produce certain documents.

On October 23, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Verified Amended
Stockholder Class Action and Derivative Complaint, following the
Company's filing of the amended and restated offer to purchase on
October 16, 2019. The Amended Complaint contained substantially
similar allegations but revised certain allegations based on
disclosures contained in, or purportedly omitted, from the Offer to
Purchase.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on October 25,
2019, seeking to prevent the consummation of the pending Offer to
Purchase unless additional information was disclosed. On November
5, 2019, the Company filed Amendment No. 5 to the Offer to Purchase
making certain additional disclosures, and Plaintiff withdrew its
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Franchise Group, Inc. is a franchisor operator and acquirer of
franchised and franchisable businesses that can be scaled using our
operating expertise. The company currently operates three
reportable segments: Liberty Tax, Buddy's and Sears Outlet. The
company is based in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


FRANCHISE GROUP: Bid to Nix Liberty Tax Securities Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Franchise Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that the defendants' joint
motion to dismiss the class action suit entitled, In Re Liberty
Tax, Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No. 27 CV 07327, is still
pending.

This case consolidated two previously filed cases on July 12, 2018.
The case, among other things, asserts that the Company's Securities
and Exchange Commission filings over a multi-year period failed to
disclose the alleged misconduct of the individual defendants and
that disclosure of the alleged misconduct caused the Company's
stock price to drop and, thereby harm the purported class of
stockholders.

The class period is alleged to be October 1, 2013 through February
23, 2018. The defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint on September 17, 2018.


The Lead Plaintiff served their opposition on November 1, 2018 and
the defendants filed their reply brief on November 27, 2018. A
mediation took place on November 12, 2018 but did not result in a
resolution.

The motion to dismiss is still pending before the Court.

Franchise Group, Inc. is a franchisor operator and acquirer of
franchised and franchisable businesses that can be scaled using the
company's operating expertise. The company currently operates three
reportable segments: Liberty Tax, Buddy's and Sears Outlet. The
company is based in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


FRANCHISE GROUP: Hearing on Class Cert. Bid Set for March 3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Franchise Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that the Class
Certification Motion in Rene Labrado v. JTH Tax, Inc. (Case BC
715076), is set to be heard on March 3, 2020.

On July 3, 2018, a class action complaint was filed in the Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles by a former employee for
herself and on behalf of all other "similarly situated" persons.

The Complaint alleges, among other things, that the Company
allegedly violated various provisions of the California Labor Code,
including: unpaid overtime, unpaid meal period premiums, unpaid
rest premiums, unpaid minimum wages, final wages not timely paid,
wages not timely paid, non-compliant wage statements, failure to
keep pay records, unreimbursed business expenses and violation of
California Business and Profession Code Section 17200.

The Complaint seeks actual, consequential and incidental losses and
damages, injunctive relief and other damages.

The Company highly disputes the allegations set forth in the
Complaint and filed a motion to dismiss. On May 29, 2019, the Court
denied the Company's motion to dismiss, but granted the Company
leave to file a motion to strike.

The Company filed a motion to strike and by Order dated August 20,
2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Company's
motion. The Court provided the Company with twenty days to file its
answer to the Complaint.  

The Court also lifted the discovery stay and set a hearing date on
the Plaintiff's Class Certification Motion for March 3, 2020.  

The Court did not set any briefing schedule for the Motion but
ordered the parties to stipulate to a briefing schedule.  

Franchise Group, Inc. is a franchisor operator and acquirer of
franchised and franchisable businesses that can be scaled using our
operating expertise. The company currently operates three
reportable segments: Liberty Tax, Buddy's and Sears Outlet. The
company is based in Virginia Beach, Virginia.


GALWAY BAY: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Galway Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Biza, Corporation, d/b/a Galway Bay Mobile Home Park,
Appellant, v. Galway Bay Mobile Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Appellee, Case No. 3D18-0631 (Fla. App.), Judge Norma S. Lindsey of
the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third District (i)
dismissed the appeal from the trial court's order denying Biza's
motion for summary judgment and (2) affirmed the trial court's
order denying Biza's motion to certify class.

The underlying dispute stems from Biza's attempt to raise the lot
rent for mobile homeowners by 18%.  The dispute is governed by the
Florida Mobile Home Act, Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (2019).
Pursuant to section 723.037, which sets forth a mandatory pre-suit
dispute resolution process, a majority of the mobile homeowners
designated a five-member negotiating committee to meet with and
discuss the dispute with Biza.  A majority of homeowners also
signed a Statement of Dispute, contesting the reasonableness of the
rental amount increase.  After the negotiating committee failed to
resolve the dispute, a majority of the homeowners signed a petition
to initiate mediation through the Department of Business and
Professional Regulation.

While the parties worked to resolve the dispute, 50 out of the 68
mobile homeowners agreed, in writing, to form the Galway Bay Mobile
Homeowners Association.  These homeowners agreed to be bound by the
provisions of the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the
Association.  Both the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws
explicitly state that the Association was organized to represent
the mobile homeowners in all matters relating to Chapter 723 of the
Florida Statutes.

On July 13, 2017, the Association filed a three-count complaint on
the homeowners' behalf, alleging unreasonable rental amount
increase, failure to maintain common areas, and violation of the
obligation of good faith.  The complaint was brought pursuant to
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222, which allows a mobile
homeowners' association to institute, maintain, settle, or appeal
actions or hearings in its name on behalf of all homeowners
concerning matters of common interest.

In its answer and affirmative defense, Biza asserted the
Association lacked standing for failing to strictly comply with
section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes.  It also filed a motion to
certify class and a motion for summary judgment based on the
Association's alleged lack of standing.

In response to Biza's motion for summary judgment, the Association
filed affidavits signed by a majority of homeowners, each stating,
in part, that the individual affiant had not withdrawn
authorization of the Association's representation of his/her
interest in challenging the Rent Increase and that the Association
was authorized to represent such interest, whether in the lawsuit,
or otherwise.  The Association also filed several exhibits,
including the Statement of Dispute; the individually-signed
Agreements to Form the Association; the Association's Bylaws; the
Association's Articles of Incorporation; a notice to the
Association's members on May 20, 2017, addressing the potential
need for filing a lawsuit if mediation proved unsuccessful; and a
notice to the members on Aug. 16, 2017, informing them that a
complaint had been filed.

Following a hearing, the trial court found that the Association
satisfied section 723.037(1)'s written authorization requirement.
In so doing, it highlighted the documents in the Association's
response to the motion for summary judgment, which conferred
standing on the Association.

The trial court also denied Biza's motion to certify class,
concluding that an evidentiary hearing was not required because the
order on summary judgment found as a matter of law that the
requirements of section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes had been
satisfied and the Association was authorized to represent the
homeowners.  It further held that an action initiated by a mobile
homeowners' association pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.222 is not
subject to the class certification requirements of Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.220.  It is from these two non-final orders that Biza now
appeals.

The issues before the Appeals Court are (1) whether the trial court
erred in finding that the Association had standing to bring the
action and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Biza's
motion to certify class without conducting an evidentiary hearing.


Judge Lindsey finds that it is undisputed that a negotiating
committee was designated to represent the homeowners' interests in
meetings with Biza pursuant to the Mobile Home Act.  It is also
undisputed that a majority of the homeowners authorized the
committee to mediate the dispute.  Moreover, a majority also signed
a Statement of Dispute, contesting the reasonableness of the rental
amount increase.  But not only is there evidence that a majority of
the homeowners agreed, in writing, to have their interests
represented in meetings with Biza and in mediation, the evidence
demonstrates that a majority also agreed to allow the Association
to represent their interests in a lawsuit.  Based on these
documents, the Judge has no trouble concluding that the trial
court's determination that the Association satisfied section
723.037(1)'s standing requirement was supported by competent
substantial evidence.

The only two issues raised in the trial court were the parties'
standing and common interest in the case.  Standing was already
addressed at the summary judgment hearing when the trial court
reviewed the undisputed facts and found that the Association had
standing.  As such, the only issue left to be addressed was the
common interest element in Rule 1.222.  

The Judge holds that there is no dispute that the first two counts,
unreasonable rental amount increase and failure to maintain common
areas, concern matters of common interest.  With respect to count
three, violation of obligation of good faith under Section 723.021,
Biza argues that the allegations in the complaint address
individual claims specific to unnamed persons and are therefore not
matters of common interest.  However, because a violation of the
Mobile Home Act's obligation of good faith and fair dealings
concerns a matter of common interest to the entire class, the Judge
is unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Lindsey (i) dismissed the appeal
of the order denying Biza's motion for summary judgment for lack of
jurisdiction, and (ii) affirmed the order denying Biza's motion for
certification.  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion
for rehearing.

A full-text copy of the Appeals Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/lUnUvI from Leagle.com.

Lutz, Bobo & Telfair, P.A., and David D. Eastman, and Carol S.
Grondzik -- csgrondzik@floridahousinglaw.com -- (Tallahassee), for
appellant.

Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson, Weiselberg Gilbert --
weiselberg@kolawyers.com -- and Alexis Fields --
fields@kolawyers.com -- (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellee.


GENERAL REVENUE: Mosley Sues Over Intrusive Marketing Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bonnie Mosley, on behalf of the classes of persons or entities
similarly situated v. GENERAL REVENUE CORP., a foreign limited
liability company, Case No. 1:20-cv-01012-JES-JEH (C.D. Ill., Jan.
8, 2020), is brought under the consumer-privacy provisions of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a federal statute enacted in
1991 in response to widespread public outrage about the
proliferation of intrusive, nuisance telemarketing practices.

The Defendant, on its own, or through one of its vendors, sought to
collect debts from putative class members, such as the Plaintiff,
by bombarding their cellular phones with automated and prerecorded
robocalls without prior express consent. In fact, the Defendant
continued to do so even after being instructed to stop.

A class action is the best means of obtaining relief for GRC's
systematic violations of the TCPA, and is consistent with both the
private right of action provided by the TCPA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person, who resides in Springfield,
Illinois.

GRC is a debt collection agency with its principal place of
business at Mason, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Keith J. Keogh, Esq.
          KEOGH LAW, LTD.
          55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3390
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: 312.726.1092
          Facsimile: 312.726.1093
          Email: keith@keoghlaw.com


GREAT AMERICAN: Savett Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Savett, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. GREAT AMERICAN POWER, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited
liability company, Case No. 1:20-cv-00042 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 8,
2020), is brought against the Defendant for its violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff files this action complaint against the Defendant to:
(1) stop its practice of placing calls using "an artificial or
prerecorded voice" to the telephones of consumers nationwide
without their prior express written consent; and (2) obtain redress
for all persons injured by its conduct. The Defendant has violated,
and continues to violate, the TCPA and its implementing regulations
by placing, or having placed on its behalf, prerecorded calls to
residential telephone subscribers (a) who have not expressly
consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who have expressly
requested not to receive such calls, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Adam Savett is a natural person and resident of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio.

Great American Power is a certified supplier in the Ohio Energy
Choice Program, offering electricity and natural gas to consumers
in Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          Kyle Shamberg, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 750-1265
          Email: kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com
                 kshamberg@carlsonlynch.com

               - and –

          Daniel R. Karon, Esq.
          KARON LLC
          700 W. St. Clair Ave., St. 200
          Cleveland, OH 44113
          Phone: (216) 622-1851
          Email: dkaron@karonllc.com


GROUPON INC: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Dancel Affirmed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINE DANCEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GROUPON,
INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 19-1831 (7th Cir.), Judge Amy J.
St. Eve of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's order denying Dancel's motion for
class certification.

Groupon is an online marketplace that sells vouchers for other
businesses.  Its website gives each business its own page with
information about the business and the discounts available.
Between April 2015 and February 2016, some visitors to the site
could scroll down each page to see a "Photos" section that
displayed up to nine pictures. If the visitor clicked a button, the
page would reveal up to eighteen more.  Groupon collected and
displayed these pictures automatically using what it calls the
"Instagram Widget."  As its name suggests, this Widget pulled
publicly available pictures from the social networking service
Instagram.  It selected which pictures to assign to each page based
on data linking the photos to the advertised business's location.
When a Groupon visitor hovered her cursor over a displayed photo,
the Widget would show the unique, user-selected username of the
Instagram account whose photo was being displayed and a caption, if
the user had attached one to the photo.

Dancel is an Instagram user, and like all Instagram users, her
account had a username -- namely, "meowchristine."  In 2015, Dancel
uploaded to her account a picture of herself and her boyfriend
visiting Philly G's, a restaurant in Vernon Hills, Illinois.  This
picture was one of several Groupon displayed on Philly G's page
while the Widget was active.

Dancel alleges that Groupon's inclusion of her photo and username
on Philly G's page violated the IRPA, which prohibits the use of a
person's identity -- meaning an attribute of an individual that
serves to identify that individual to an ordinary, reasonable
viewer or listener -- for commercial purposes without consent.  She
filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County and sought to
maintain the action on behalf of a class of "Illinois residents"
whose photographs Groupon had similarly shown on its pages.

The parties litigated in that posture for two years until Dancel
moved to certify a different class, defined as all persons who
maintained an Instagram Account and whose photograph (or
photographs) from such account was (or were) acquired and used on a
groupon.com webpage for an Illinois business.  The class also had a
sub-class: All members of the Instagram Class whose likeness
appeared in any photograph acquired and used by Groupon.

In response to these new class definitions, Groupon removed the
case to federal court.  Dancel tried to argue this removal came too
late, but the district court disagreed, denied her motion to remand
to state court, and proceeded to decide whether to certify her
proposed class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
Dancel identified the common question that united the class as
whether Instagram usernames categorically fall within the statutory
definition of 'identity.'  She distinguished this inquiry from the
individualized question "whether any particular username identifies
an individual."

The district court found Dancel's categorical theory
"unpersuasive."  Because it determined that the IRPA, as applied to
the facts of this case, required a "username-by-username
(photoby-photo)" inquiry, the court found that common questions
would not predominate over individual ones and denied
certification.  Dancel petitioned for review of that decision, and
the Court granted the petition.

Dancel argues that the district court improperly addressed the
merits of her IRPA claim at the class-certification stage, and
that, to the extent those merits are not off limits, the court
resolved them incorrectly.

Judge St. Eve of the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's
order denying class certification.  She finds that the district
court was right to identify the starting point as "the substantive
elements of the Plaintiffs' cause of action and the proof necessary
for the various elements.  If the proposed common proof could be
enough to carry a prima facie case on an element for an individual
plaintiff, in an individual case, then that element presents a
common question that can predominate for a class action.  The
present dispute is precisely what evidence is needed to make a
prima facie case for the identity element under the IRPA.  Would
facts common to all Instagram usernames (i.e., their innate
uniqueness) suffice, or would a plaintiff need to show something
more, something about her username, to meet her initial burden?
Though the question overlaps with the merits, it is also vital to
any sensible decision about class certification, and the district
court was right to decide it before certifying a class.

Moreover, the Judge emphasizes that neither she nor the district
court have decided the merits of any putative class member's claim.
Some Instagram usernames -- maybe a great many of them -- might
qualify as identities under the broad definition in the IRPA.  An
ordinary, reasonable viewer might recognize that meowchristine
serves to identify Christine Dancel, or that isa.tdg, artistbarbie,
and loparse serve to identify their respective users.  She cannot
say.  What she can say is, under the IRPA, that ordinary,
reasonable viewer would need to have evidence of which username,
which account, and which person it was linking before it could make
that decision.  This individualized evidentiary burden prevents
identity from being a predominating common question under Rule
23(b)(3).

A full-text copy of the 7th Circuit's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/vZvCyF from Leagle.com.

Eric N. Macey -- emacey@novackmacey.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Scott P. Glauberman, for Defendant-Appellee.

Linda T. Coberly, for Defendant-Appellee.

Ryan D. Andrews, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian Eliot Cohen -- BCohen@novackmacey.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

John Lawson, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Elizabeth Deshaies, for Defendant-Appellee.

Christopher Sean Moore -- cmoore@novackmacey.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Benjamin Thomassen -- bthomassen@edelson.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.


HARMAN-MANAGEMENT CORP: $4MM Larson TCPA Suit Deal Has Prelim. Okay
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CORY LARSON, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HARMAN-MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 1:16-cv-00219-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale
A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval
of class action settlement.

Harman is a nationwide franchisee of several fast-food restaurant
chains, including KFC, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut and A&W Restaurants.
On Feb. 17, 2016, Plaintiff Larson filed the class action on behalf
of himself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging that
Defendants Harman and 3Seventy, Inc. sent unauthorized, automated
text messages to putative class members' cellular phones in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Plaintiff's first amended complaint ("FAC") alleged that, in
2012, Harman and 3Seventy set out on a telemarketing campaign to
send consumers coupons for Harman restaurant food items via
automated text messages and that, by the beginning of 2014, the
Defendants were text messaging more than 150,000 consumers.  He
alleged that the Defendants sent him and other consumers its
automated telemarketing text messages without obtaining clear and
conspicuous prior express written consent as required by the TCPA.
The Plaintiff also claimed that these messages were sent "as part
of a marketing program called the A&W Text Club."

The FAC sought injunctive relief prohibiting similar violations of
the TCPA by defendants in the future; statutory damages of $500 for
each and every call/text in violation of the TCPA; and treble
damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call/text in violation
of the TCPA.

In December 2018, the parties agreed to engage in settlement
negotiations by way of mediation before the Honorable Morton Denlow
(Ret.).  On Feb. 19, 2019, after the parties provided Judge Denlow
with detailed mediation briefs, he presided over a full day of
negotiations between the parties which did not result in a
settlement being reached.  Following that mediation session,
however, the parties continued their discussions and eventually
reached the proposed settlement agreement that is now before the
Court.

Pursuant to the proposed settlement agreement, Harman has agreed to
deposit $4 million into a settlement fund. While the agreement does
not provide for any specific incentive or fee award, the class
counsel will apply for an Incentive Award of up to $10,000 for the
Class Representative and of up to 1/3 of the Settlement Fund
($1,333,333.33) in the Class Counsel Fees.  The parties agree that
the Court and only the Court will determine the amount of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs and any Incentive Award in the action.

On June 12, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the pending motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.  He seeks an
order: (1) preliminarily approving the terms of the Proposed
Settlement Agreement; (2) appointing him as the class
representative; (3) appointing attorneys Sergei Lemberg and Stephen
Taylor of Lemberg Law, LLC as the class counsel; (4) conditionally
certifying the putative settlement class; (5) approving and
directing distribution of the class notice packet to class members;
and (6) scheduling a final fairness hearing with respect to the
proposed settlement agreement.

At the hearing on the motion for preliminary approval, the Court
requested supplemental briefing regarding the appropriateness of
requiring the class members to submit claim forms to recover from
the settlement fund, as well as the overall reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the estimated maximum value of the
class's claims.  On July 23, 2019, the Plaintiff filed supplemental
briefing as requested by the Court.

Judge Drozd granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for
preliminary approval of class action settlement.  He approved the
preliminary class certification under Rule 23.  The following
settlement class is conditionally certified for settlement
purposes: All individuals and entities who were sent text messages
from, or related to, the A&W Text Club between Feb. 17, 2012 and
the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order.

Named plaintiff Cory Larson is appointed as the class
representative, the Plaintiff's counsel, Sergei Lemberg and Stephen
Taylor of Lemberg Law, LLC as the class counsel; and KCC Class
Action Services as the settlement administrator.

The proposed notices and claim form are found to conform with Rule
23 and are approved.  The proposed settlement detailed is approved
on a preliminary basis as fair and adequate.

The hearing for final approval of the proposed settlement is set
for June 15, 2020 at 4:00 p.m., with the motion for final approval
of class action settlement to be filed 28 days in advance of the
final approval hearing, in accordance with Local Rule 230.  The
Plaintiffs' proposed settlement implementation schedule is
adopted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/brgduX from Leagle.com.

Cory Larson, Plaintiff, represented by Sergei Lemberg, Lemberg &
Associates, pro hac vice.

Cory Larson, Plaintiff, represented by Stephen F. Taylor, Lemberg
Law, pro hac vice & Trinette Gragirena Kent -- tkent@kentlawpc.com
-- Kent Law Offices.

Harman-Management Corporation, Defendant, represented by Bruce J.
Boehm, McKay Burton & Thurman, David L. Bird, McKay Burton &
Thurman, PC, pro hac vice, Martin W. Jaszczuk, Locke Lord LLP, pro
hac vice & Cameron Cutler, Mckay Burton & Thurman.

3Seventy, Inc, Defendant, represented by Adam D. Bowser --
adam.bowser@arentfox.com -- Arent Fox LLP, pro hac vice, Rex Mann
-- mann@fr.com -- Fish & Richardson P.C., pro hac vice, Garrett
Kameichi Sakimae, Fish & Richardson, P.C. & Matthew R. McCullough,
Fish & Richardson P.C.


HD SUPPLY: Agreement in Principle Reached in Georgia Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
HD Supply, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 3, 2019, that the parties in the
consolidated class action suit in Georgia, have reached an
agreement in principle to settle the litigation for a payment of
$50 million.

On July 10, 2017 and August 8, 2017, shareholders filed putative
class action complaints in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, alleging that HD Supply and certain senior
members of its management made certain false or misleading public
statements in violation of the federal securities laws between
November 9, 2016 and June 5, 2017, inclusive.

Subsequently, the two securities cases were consolidated, and, on
November 16, 2017, the lead plaintiffs appointed by the Court filed
a Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint against the
securities litigation defendants on behalf of all persons other
than the securities litigation defendants who purchased or
otherwise acquired the Company's common stock between November 9,
2016 and June 5, 2017, inclusive.  

The Amended Complaint alleges that the securities litigation
defendants made certain false or misleading public statements,
primarily relating to the Company's progress in addressing certain
supply chain disruption issues encountered in the Company's
Facilities Maintenance business unit.  

The Amended Complaint asserts claims against the securities
litigation defendants under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, and seeks class certification
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as unspecified
monetary damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees and other costs.

On September 19, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part
the securities litigation defendants' motion to dismiss.

The parties have reached an agreement in principle to settle the
litigation for a payment of $50 million, subject to negotiation of
definitive settlement documentation and court approval.  

The full settlement amount is covered under the Company's insurance
policies.  

HD Supply said, "The Company and individual defendants continue to
dispute the allegations in the complaints, and the settlement is
without any admission of the allegations in the complaints."

HD Supply, Inc. operates as an industrial distribution company in
North America. The company operates in two segments, Facilities
Maintenance and Construction & Industrial. The company was formerly
known as The Home Depot Supply, Inc. and changed its name to HD
Supply, Inc. in December 2006. HD Supply, Inc. is headquartered in
Atlanta, Georgia. HD Supply, Inc. is a subsidiary of HD Supply
Holdings, Inc.


HOOPER'S CRAB: Bid for Attorneys Fees in Knox Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Casey Knox, On behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Hooper's Crab House, Inc., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-01853-JMC (D. Md.), Magistrate Judge
J. Mark Coulson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland (i) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs; and (ii) denied the
Plaintiffs' request for post-judgment relief.

Knox brought the suit against Defendants Hooper's Crab House, Inc.,
Pete Shepard, Royette Shepard, Patrick Brady, and Ryan Intrieri, on
behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
related state laws in a so-called "hybrid" class/collective action.
The pending dispute arises from the resolution of a two-year long
hybrid class/collective action, involving 50 workers, and recovery
amounting to more than $400,000.

On Aug. 22, 2019, after conducting a fairness hearing, the Court
entered a final judgment approving the settlement of the matter and
certifying the settlement class.  Pursuant to the terms of their
settlement agreement, the parties consented to be bound by the
Court's determination as to the appropriate amount of attorneys'
fees and costs to be awarded to the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs request an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of
$440,049, as well as costs and expenses in the amount of
$21,478.16, for a total of $461,527.15, plus post-judgment interest
at the rate of 10% from Aug. 22, 2019, through the date of payment.
The Defendants do not challenge the $21,478.16 in costs.

Magistrate Judge Coulson finds that there is specific evidence of
the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, which are
consistent with the Plaintiffs' rates.  Additionally, these rates
are well within the Court's guidelines for attorneys with similar
experience, as set forth in the Court's Local Rules.  Although the
Defendants reference previous decisions affording a lower rate, the
Court does not have the specifics of those matters before it and,
in any event, finds sufficient justification in the materials
discussed to justify the rates for these senior lawyers.
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that the rate of $400/hour
is appropriate for attorneys Howard Benjamin Hoffman, Bradford W.
Warbasse, and James Edward Rubin.

Nonetheless, in light of their lack of experience, and the
involvement of senior lawyers in most aspects of the case, the
Magistrate Judge believes some downward adjustment is appropriate
and that a reasonable rate under the circumstances is $185/hour.
He will order a rate of $95/hour for all time designated as
"paralegal" time, both by the Plaintiffs in their submission and
for any time entries so reclassified as "paralegal time" by the
Court as set forth.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs should re-submit
their fee bill reducing the rates for Hoffman Law associates,
Jordan Song En Liew and Herbers to $185/hour, Hoffman's law clerk
McGarry to $95/hour, and any paralegal time to $95/hour.

The Defendants contend that entries by the Counsel for
pre-engagement occurrences, such as Messrs. Rubin and Hoffman's
entries for communicating and interviewing potential clients and
opt-ins, must be deducted.  Given their status as potential
witnesses and the fact that the case is a collective/class action
where the Plaintiffs' counsel is, in part, tasked with notifying
appropriate potential class members for inclusion, the Magistrate
Judge agrees with the Plaintiffs, and will not order a further
reduction.

Next, the Defendants argue that the hours claimed by the attorneys
for drafting expert reports, when such could have been drafted by
the experts and only reviewed and lightly edited by the attorneys,
should be deducted.  The Magistrate Judge disagrees.  Attorneys are
often intimately involved with experts in drafting and editing
expert reports, as attorneys (rather than experts) are more
familiar with the legal requirements and may also have insight into
the most effective way to present the information in support of the
case.  Furthermore, attorneys are often the liaison between the
client and the expert, conveying and refining the factual
underpinning of the report.  Given the number of the Plaintiffs
involved, the detail required, and the legal overlay, there is
nothing apparent to the Court in these entries that should not be
recoverable.

The Defendants also articulate that an overall reduction of hours
is appropriate because of the improper format of the Plaintiffs'
billing records.  However, clearly, the records provide detailed
information that permits the Magistrate to evaluate the tasks
completed and charged to the parties.

Finally, the Defendants argue the Court should deny fees for all
time spent relating to preparing the Fee Petition.  The Magistrate
Judge will not deduct all fees so designated, as the Defendants
urge.  Nonetheless, attorneys typically do not bill clients for
time they spend revising, reorganizing, reformatting, or editing
bills, and there are multiple time entries reflecting such
activities over and above what review might be necessary to support
a particular argument.  Accordingly, those entries are disallowed,
as set forth in the Court's order.

Until the Order, the appropriate decision regarding fees remained
hotly contested, unresolved, and clearly unascertainable.  In the
circumstances presented (an action pursuant to Section 216(b) of
the FLSA wherein attorneys' fees and such are to be assessed
separately), the determination of attorneys' fees was clearly a
separate matter.  Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge will award
post-judgment interest, if any, from a date 15 days after of the
Plaintiffs submit their revised petition consistent with his
Memorandum and Order.

In light of the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Coulson granted in part
the Plaintiffs' Motion.  The Plaintiffs are to submit a revised
bill reflecting the Court's comments and incorporating the specific
reductions without delay.  The Magistrate Judge denied the
Plaintiffs' request for post-judgment relief at this time, but
post-judgment interest will begin to run 15 days after the
Plaintiffs submit their revised petition if the amount remains
unpaid.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://is.gd/IKtTuS from Leagle.com.

Casey Knox, On behalf of herself and Others similarly situated,
Mark Joseph Miller, Krista Perrino, Abigail Brooke Grim, Kelli
Hinman, Micheal Kirn, Madison Hubbard, Dallas Carite, Tierney
Lookingbill, Karie Mathias, Angel Hudson, Levi Renninger, Jenny
Rudin, Brooke Parker, Rose K O'Neil, Shane Bowers, Malina Denton,
Casey Froelich, Joseph Girgis, Tessa Jarvis, Martina Adams,
Maddison Poloney, Sam T Mullinix, Kristen Myers, Stephanie Jarmon,
Amanda Witt, Alex Moore, Jordan LaRocco, Logan Ortt, Taylor Pusey,
Acacia Bobotas, Peyton Stant, Kaylee Shorter, Rebecca Betz,
Kaitlynn Malone, Tiffany Raeuber, Rosemarie Leonard, Jacob Rinaldi,
Rachel Shaver, Timothy Brandon Shaver, Troy Teutsch, Patrick
Krisko, Joseph Hart, Sidney Linton, Kylee Gabler, Hannah Lippy,
Ashley Andercyk, Brandy Evans & Alison Peard, Plaintiffs,
represented by Howard Benjamin Hoffman , Howard B Hoffman Attorney
at Law, James Edward Rubin, The Rubin Employment Law Firm PC,
Bradford W. Warbasse, Bradford Warbasse Attorney at Law, Jordan
Song En Liew, Howard B. Hoffman, Attorney at Law & Scott Kraff,
Hoffman Employment Law, LLC.

Hooper's Crab House, Inc., Royette Shepard, Patrick Brady & Ryan
Intrieri, Defendants, represented by T. Christine Pham --
cpham@rosenbergmartin.com -- Rosenberg Martin Greenberg LLP.


HOPE AND HENRY: Cooks Asserts Breach of Disabilities Act
--------------------------------------------------------
Hope and Henry, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as
Richard Cooks, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Hope and Henry, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00188-SVW-RAO (C.D. Cal., Jan. 7, 2020).

Hope and Henry, LLC offers clothing products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Amanda F Benedict, Esq.
   Law Office of Amanda Benedict
   7710 Hazard Center Drive Suite E104
   San Diego, CA 92108
   Tel: (760) 822-1911
   Fax: (760) 452-7562
   Email: amanda@amandabenedict.com


IBERIABANK CORPORATION: Parshall Sues Over Sale to First Horizon
----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Parshall, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. IBERIABANK CORPORATION, WILLIAM H. FENSTERMAKER, E.
STEWART SHEA III, HARRY V. BARTON, JR., ERNEST P. BREAUX, JR.,
DARYL G. BYRD, JOHN N. CASBON, J. MICHAEL KEMP, SR., JOHN E.
KOERNER III, RICK E. MAPLES, ROSA SUGRANES, and FIRST HORIZON
NATIONAL CORPORATION, Case No. 1:20-cv-00027-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 8,
2020), stems from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
IBERIABANK will be acquired by First Horizon National Corporation.

On November 3, 2019, IBERIABANK's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with First
Horizon. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement,
IBERIABANK's stockholders will receive 4.584 shares of First
Horizon common stock for each share of IBERIABANK common stock they
own.

On December 31, 2019, the Defendants filed a Form S-4 Registration
Statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
in connection with the Proposed Transaction. The Plaintiff contends
that the Registration Statement omits material information with
respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration
Statement false and misleading. Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with the Registration Statement.

The Plaintiff contends that the Registration Statement omits
material information regarding IBERIABANK's and First Horizon's
financial projections, and the analyses performed by the Company's
financial advisors in connection with the Proposed Transaction,
Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc. and Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. The
Registration Statement also omits material information regarding
potential conflicts of interest of KBW and Goldman.

The Registration Statement fails to disclose the amount of
compensation KBW received for the past services it provided to the
Company and its affiliates. The Registration Statement false and
misleading, including, inter alia, the following sections of the
Registration Statement: (i) Background of the Merger; (ii) IBKC's
Reasons for the Merger; Recommendation of IBKC's Board of
Directors; (iii) Opinions of IBKC's Financial Advisors; and (iv)
Unaudited Financial Forecasts, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff, who owns IBERIABANK common stock, contends that the
omissions and false and misleading statements in the Registration
Statement are material in that a reasonable stockholder will
consider them important in deciding how to vote on the Proposed
Transaction. The Plaintiff adds that a reasonable investor will
view a full and accurate disclosure as significantly altering the
total mix of information made available in the Registration
Statement and in other information reasonably available to
stockholders.

IBERIABANK is a financial holding company offering commercial,
private banking, consumer, small business, wealth and trust
management, retail brokerage, mortgage, and title insurance
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Phone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
                 gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Phone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          Email: rm@maniskas.com


ICS GROUP: Violates FLSA's Minimum and OT Wage Rules, Escala Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrea V. Uzcategui Escala and Annakarina Uzcategui and all others
similarly situated v. ICS GROUP, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability
Company, and DENISSE BETANCOURT GIRALDO, individually, Case No.
0:20-cv-60039-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Jan. 8, 2020), seeks to recover
monetary damages, liquidated damages, interests, costs and
attorney's fees for the Defendants' violations of the minimum and
overtime wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs were not paid any wages
during the last three weeks of their employment. During one of
those weeks, the Plaintiffs received a dishonored check as the
account it was drawn from had insufficient funds. The Plaintiffs
say they worked approximately 40 hours per week in each of the
three weeks.

The Defendants were required to pay the Plaintiffs their overtime
wages at a rate of time and one half when they worked more than 40
hours per week, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as non-exempt
employees.

Defendant ICS performs carpentry and demolition services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel T. Feld, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL T. FELD, P.A.
          2847 Hollywood Blvd.
          Hollywood, FL 33020
          Phone: (954) 361-8383
          Email: DanielFeld.Esq@gmail.com

          - and -

          Isaac Mamane, Esq.
          MAMANE LAW LLC
          10800 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 350A
          Miami, FL 33161
          Phone (305) 773-6661
          Email: mamane@gmail.com


IDT CORP: Arbitration in Samara Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that the arbitration in
the class action suit initiated by Scarleth Samara is ongoing.

On April 12, 2019, Scarleth Samara filed a putative class action
against IDT Telecom in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana alleging certain violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

Plaintiff alleges that in October of 2017, IDT Telecom sent
unauthorized marketing messages to her cellphone.

IDT Telecom filed a motion to compel arbitration.

On or about August 19, 2019, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the
pending court action and the parties intend to proceed with
arbitration.

IDT said, "At this stage, the Company is unable to estimate its
potential liability, if any. The Company intends to vigorously
defend the claim."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Cross Complaint Filed Against Rosales
-----------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that the company has
initiated a cross complaint against Jose Rosales alleging trade
secret and other violations.

On January 22, 2019, Jose Rosales filed a putative class action
against IDT America, IDT Domestic Telecom and IDT International in
California state court alleging certain violations of employment
law.

Plaintiff alleges that these companies failed to compensate members
of the putative class in accordance with California law.

The Company is evaluating the claims, and at this stage, is unable
to estimate its potential liability, if any.

The Company intends to vigorously defend the claims.

In August 2019, the Company filed a cross complaint against Rosales
alleging trade secret and other violations.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Discovery Ongoing JDS1 LLC Class Action
-------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that discovery is ongoing
in the class action suit initiated by JDS1, LLC.

On July 5, 2017, plaintiff JDS1, LLC, on behalf of itself and all
other similarly situated stockholders of Straight Path, and
derivatively on behalf of Straight Path as nominal defendant, filed
a putative class action and derivative complaint in the Court of
Chancery of the State of Delaware against the Company, The Patrick
Henry Trust (a trust formed by Howard S. Jonas that held record and
beneficial ownership of certain shares of Straight Path he formerly
held), Howard S. Jonas, and each of Straight Path's directors.

The complaint alleges that the Company aided and abetted Straight
Path Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Davidi
Jonas, and Howard S. Jonas in his capacity as controlling
stockholder of Straight Path, in breaching their fiduciary duties
to Straight Path in connection with the settlement of claims
between Straight Path and the Company related to potential
indemnification claims concerning Straight Path's obligations under
the Consent Decree it entered into with the Federal Communications
Commission , as well as the sale of Straight Path's subsidiary
Straight Path IP Group, Inc. to the Company in connection with that
settlement.

That action was consolidated with a similar action that was
initiated by The Arbitrage Fund.

The Plaintiffs are seeking, among other things, (i) a declaration
that the action may be maintained as a class action or in the
alternative, that demand on the Straight Path Board is excused;
(ii) that the term sheet is invalid; (iii) awarding damages for the
unfair price stockholders received in the merger between Straight
Path and Verizon Communications Inc. for their shares of Straight
Path's Class B common stock; and (iv) ordering Howard S. Jonas,
Davidi Jonas, and the Company to disgorge any profits for the
benefit of the class Plaintiffs.

On August 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On
September 24, 2017, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. Following closing of the transaction, the
Delaware Chancery Court denied the motion to dismiss. On February
22, 2019, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the
motion to dismiss. The parties are engaged in discovery.

IDT said, "The Company intends to vigorously defend this matter. At
this stage, the Company is unable to estimate its potential
liability, if any."

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Parties Agree to Drop Dennis Suit
-------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that the parties in the
class action suit initiated by Erik Dennis have settled the matter
and filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.

On May 21, 2018, Erik Dennis filed a putative class action against
IDT Telecom and the Company in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia alleging violations of Do Not Call
Regulations promulgated by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

On October 31, 2019, the parties settled the matter and filed a
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IDT CORP: Stipulation of Dismissal Entered in Sanchez Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended October 31, 2019, that IDT Telecom and Jean
Carlos Sanchez have entered into a stipulation of dismissal of the
putative class action lawsuit initiated by Jean Carlos Sanchez.

On May 2, 2018, Jean Carlos Sanchez filed a putative class action
against IDT Telecom in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois alleging that the Company sent unauthorized
marketing messages to cellphones in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

On July 26, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal.

IDT said, "The Company is evaluating the claim, and at this stage,
is unable to estimate its potential liability, if any. The Company
intends to vigorously defend this matter."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


IF BOUTIQUE LTD: Dominguez Alleges Violation under ADA
------------------------------------------------------
If Boutique Ltd. is facing a class action lawsuit filed pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled as Yovanny
Dominguez for himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. If Boutique Ltd., Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-00166 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 8, 2020).

If Boutique Ltd. is a Clothing store in New York City, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
   The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
   277 Broadway, Suite 408
   New York, NY 10007
   Tel: (212) 229-2249
   Fax: (212) 229-2246
   Email: Jazeller@zellerlegal.com


IFA GROUP: Parties Ordered to Modify Release in Martinez Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE IFA GROUP, INC.,
and JOSEPH McOWEN, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-02247-JDW (E.D.
Pa.), Judge Joshua D. Wolson of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has ordered parties to modify
release provisions in the proposed settlement.

Martinez alleges in his Complaint that he worked as a repossessor
for The IFA Group from September 2016 through June 2018.  IFA paid
Martinez a piece-rate for each item of property he repossessed.
When he was not repossessing vehicles, Martinez worked at IFA's lot
in Pottstown, Pennsylvania between the hours of noon and 3 p.m.
Martinez alleges that IFA's owner and President, Joseph McOwen,
agreed to pay him $15/hour for every hour he worked at the lot.

Martinez claims in his Complaint that he regularly worked 75-80
hours per week, though he now concedes that he worked 65-70 hours
per week.  He also claims that IFA failed to pay him his
agreed-upon wages for the hours he was at the lot.  Martinez
alleges that based on a 65- to 70-hour workweek, he was entitled to
unpaid overtime wages between $40,000 and $45,000.

After Martinez filed his Complaint, the Defendants took the
position that the motor carrier exemption in the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") bars Martinez's claims.  The Plaintiff's
counsel concluded that the motor carrier exception might preclude
Martinez's claims.  Given that risk, the parties agreed to settle
the case.

Under the terms of the settlement, the Defendants will pay a total
of $35,000: Martinez receives $21,000 and the Plaintiff's counsel
receives $14,000.  In the settlement, Martinez agrees to release
IFA from any and all charges, complaints, claims, and liabilities
of any kind whatsoever, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected
which he at any time has, had or claimed to have against IFA
regarding events that have occurred as of the date Martinez
executes the Agreement.  The settlement also includes a
non-disparagement provision and choice of law and forum provisions,
among other things.

The Plaintiff's counsel asserts in the Motion that Scott Pollins
spent 30 hours of time on the case, with a suggested rate of
$495/hour, and Tashell Jenkins spent 35 hours on the case, with a
suggested rate of $350/hour.  Thus, in total, the Plaintiff's
counsel has $27,700 in fees, as well as approximately $600 in
expenses.  The Plaintiff's counsel then suggests that they will
lower their fees in order to effectuate the settlement.  The
parties have not submitted any time records or other information
that the Court can use to assess the claimed fees.

Judge Wolson finds that the case presents a bona fide dispute.
Martinez has submitted a claim for back wages under the FLSA.  The
FLSA exempts from its overtime rules any employee with respect to
whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish
qualifications and maximum hours of service.  The Defendants take
the position that Martinez falls within this exemption and that his
FLSA claim will necessarily fail.  The parties have not yet
resolved that issue, which appears to present a mixed question of
law and fact.  Moreover, there appear to be factual disputes about
exactly what type of work Martinez performed when he was at the
lot, how many hours he worked there, and what agreement existed for
his compensation there.

In addition, Judge Wolson concludes that the settlement is fair and
reasonable for Martinez.  The settlement reasonably accounts for
the risk that Martinez would receive nothing if the Defendants were
to prevail on their claim regarding the motor vehicle carrier
exemption.  Indeed, from an actuarial standpoint, Martinez's
chances of success appear to stand at or slightly below 50/50,
given the present state of the record.

Judge Wolson also finds no information concerning what claims
Martinez might be releasing.  Yet in evaluating the fairness and
reasonableness of the settlement, the Court must know what claims
are being released so that it can determine how much value Martinez
is receiving for his FLSA claim.  As things stand, the Judge has no
way to conduct that analysis.  He will approve the settlement only
to the extent that it releases claims that a judgment in the case
would bar under the doctrine of res judicata.  Other claims not
within that scope will not be released.  The Judge recognizes that
such an approval alters the Parties' deal, and he will give the
Parties seven days to opt out of their settlement in light of the
change.

Finally, as the Parties explain in the Motion, the Plaintiff's
counsel's total lodestar is approximately $27,700.  The fee award
to the Plaintiff's Counsel will be $14,000, meaning that the
lodestar multiplier will be .505.  Given the low multiplier, and
the low total recovery in the case, Judge Wolson concludes that the
$14,000 fee award is reasonable.

For reasons stated, Judge Wolson said he will approve the
settlement, with the release modified as described.  He will also
approve the attorneys' fee award provided in the settlement.  The
Judge gave the parties seven days from the date of the decision to
inform the Court that they have opted out of the settlement in
light of the changes that the Court has made to the scope of the
release.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/5g53cs from Leagle.com.

CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Plaintiff, represented by SCOTT M. POLLINS --
scott@pollinslaw.com -- POLLINS LAW FIRM.

THE IFA GROUP, INC. & JOSEPH MCOWEN, Defendants, represented by
COLIN DAVID DOUGHERTY -- cdougherty@foxrothschild.com -- FOX
ROTHSCHILD LLP.


IFINEX INC: Sued by Young for Controlling Trading of Bitcoins
-------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Young, Adam Kurtz, and David Crystal, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated v. IFINEX INC.; BFXNA INC.; BFXWW
INC.; TETHER HOLDINGS LIMITED; TETHER LIMITED; DIGFINEX INC.;
TETHER OPERATIONS LIMITED; TETHER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED; AND JOHN
DOES 1-50, Case No. 1:20-cv-00169 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 8, 2020), accuses
the Defendants of violating the Commodity Exchange Act, the Sherman
Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
relating to its alleged control of Bitcoin.

During the period from October 1, 2014, through and including the
present, the Tether Defendants issued and maintained a stablecoin
known as Tether ("USDT"), which is a digital token whose value is
anchored to the U.S. dollar. The Defendants claimed to have
maintained a one-to-one reserve ratio between USDT and the U.S.
dollar. Tether Defendants maintained the exclusive ability to issue
and remove USDT, including the timing of USDT issuances and
removals. During the Class Period, USDT remained the most used
stablecoin in the world and the overwhelming majority of Bitcoin
trading volume involved USDT. While Tether Defendants' initial USDT
issuance occurred in October 2014, Tether began issuing USDT more
regularly and in greater volume in 2017 and 2018.

According to the complaint, the Defendants, through their unique
control and access to printing USDT, manipulated prices of Bitcoin
by issuing USDT unbacked by a 1:1 U.S. dollar reserve and using the
newly created USDT to purchase Bitcoin through U.S.-based
cryptocurrency exchanges Bittrex and Poloniex. The Defendants'
unbacked printing of USDT artificially inflated the price of
Bitcoin, which enabled the Defendants to extract supra-competitive
profits from Bitcoin traders.

Specifically, Plaintiffs say their analysis demonstrated that
Bitcoin returns generally declined just before the USDT issuance
dates and improved afterwards. Moreover, Defendants' inside
information about USDT issuances enabled them to sell Bitcoin once
Bitcoin prices were artificially inflated, thus, permitting the
Defendants to replenish Tether Defendants' U.S. dollar reserves,
the Plaintiffs allege.

The Plaintiffs, who are Bitcoin traders, contend they are best
situated to bring claims on behalf of other traders of Bitcoin and
Bitcoin futures. They argue that they have been injured by paying
artificial and anticompetitive prices for Bitcoin as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendants' unlawful conduct. They add that
they and other members of the Class were deprived of trading in a
lawful competitive market for Bitcoin and Bitcoin futures during
the Class Period and have been injured in their businesses and
property.

iFinex Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David E. Kovel, Esq.
          Karen M. Lerner, Esq.
          Anthony E. Maneiro, Esq.
          KIRBY McINERNEY LLP
          250 Park Avenue, Suite 820
          New York, NY 10177
          Phone: (212) 371-6600
          Facsimile: (212) 699-1194
          Email: dkovel@kmllp.com
                 klerner@kmllp.com
                 amaneiro@kmllp.com

               - and -

          John Radice, Esq.
          RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
          475 Wall Street
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Phone: (646) 245-8502
          Fax: (609) 385-0745
          Email: jradice@radicelawfirm.com


ILLUMINA INC: Securities Suit Settlement Gets Initial Court OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE ILLUMINA, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No.
3:16-cv-3044-L-MSB (S.D. Cal.), Judge M. James Lorenz of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class
action settlement and directed dissemination of notice.

The case is a securities class action brought on behalf of all
persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Illumina common stock
during the period between July 26, 2016 and Oct. 10, 2016.  The
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint claimed that Illumina and Defendants
Francis A. deSouza and Marc A. Stapley ("Individual Defendants")
violated federal securities laws by providing investors misleading
material information concerning Illumina's revenue and sales for
the third quarter of the 2016 fiscal year.  Specifically, it is
alleged the Defendants failed to disclose that Illumina lacked
adequate internal controls over financial reporting; and, on Oct.
10, 2016, Illumina revealed, in a press release, that its third
quarter revenue ($607 million) was significantly lower than their
previous forecast of $625 million to $630 million.  After the press
release, Illumina's stock price fell from $184.85 per share on Oct.
10, 2016 to $138.99 per share on Oct. 11, 2016.

On Dec. 16, 2016, Plaintiffs Yi Fan Chen and Frontline Global
Trading Pte. filed a class action complaint in the Court against
the Defendants, alleging violations of the Security Exchange Act of
1943 ("SEA").  On Jan. 10, 2017, Plaintiff James McLeod filed a
second, substantially similar class action complaint against the
Defendants in the Court for the same violations.  Subsequently, the
district court consolidated both class actions and appointed
Natissisa as the Lead Plaintiff and Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, as the
lead counsel pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.  On May 30, 2017, Natissisa filed the Amended
Complaint alleging Defendants committed fraud under Section 10(b)
of the SEA and SEC Rule 10b-5 as: (1) Illumina failed to truthfully
disclose that the demand for one of its premier products was
decreasing, (2) Illumina's earning projections were misleading, and
(3) control liability had attached.

The Defendant moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and the Court
granted in part and denied in part the motion on certain
allegations.  The parties began discovery after the Hon. Karen S.
Crawford, United States Magistrate Judge, held a case management
conference and issued a scheduled order.  On Sept. 12, 2018,
Natissisa moved to amend the Amended Complaint to include Anton
Agoshkov as an additional named Plaintiff.  On Sept. 14, 2018,
Natissisa and Anton Agoshkov moved for class certification.  On
Oct. 4, 2018, Plaintiffs Braden Van Der Wall and Steven Romanoff
filed a Complaint against the Defendants.  Upon joint motion of the
parties, the Court granted a stay in the Van Der Wall action
pending the resolution of the class certification motion.

On Dec. 14, 2018, the parties filed a joint request to extend
scheduling order deadlines in order to provide the parties more
time to complete discovery and participate in private mediation.
The Court granted the joint motion on Dec. 18, 2018.  On Jan. 8,
2019, the Court denied Natissisa's motion to amend without
prejudice.  Around Jan. 30, 2019, the parties scheduled a mediation
for April 18, 2019.  The parties participated in mediation on April
18, 2019 and tentatively agreed to a settlement after a full day of
negotiations.  On April 25, 2019, the Court granted the parties'
joint motion to stay resolution of the class certification motion
due to the settlement.  On May 29, 2019, the Court granted the
joint motion to hold the Court's ruling on class certification in
abeyance in order to (1) allow the parties to finalize necessary
settlement paperwork and (2) the Plaintiff to file a motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement. On June 11, 2019, filed the
instant motion.

The parties define the Settlement Class as all persons or entities
who purchased or otherwise acquired a legal or beneficial ownership
interest in Illumina's common stock between July 26, 2016 through
Oct. 10, 2016, inclusive.

The parties' Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement requires
Illumina to cause the Defendants' insurers to pay the Settlement
Amount $13.85 million into the Escrow Account.  The Settlement
Amount includes all the Lead Counsel's attorneys' fees and
Litigation Expenses that may be awarded by the Court, and all
Notice and Administration Costs and Taxes, and is the total, full
and final amount of all payments to be paid by, or on behalf of,
the Defendants for the benefit of the Settlement Class in the
Consolidated Action.

The Lead Counsel intends to apply for an attorneys' fees award in
an amount not to exceed 25% of the total Settlement Fund amount
(approximately $3,462,500), incentive awards payable to the
Plaintiffs, and for reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses
incurred during the case (not to exceed $180,000).

Within 10 days of the filing of the order, Illumina must provide
the Claims Administrator, JND Legal Administration, lists of record
holders of Illumina common stock during the Class Period.  The
Defendants must serve notice of the Settlement as required under
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), within the time period
statutorily set forth and certify that CAFA Notice has been served
with Lead Counsel within 3 business days after service.

Judge Lorenz finds that the settlement is preliminarily fair,
reasonable, and adequate to the proposed class.  He preliminarily
certified the settlement class, for settlement purposes under Rule
23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3), of all persons or entities who purchased
or otherwise acquired a legal or beneficial ownership interest in
Illumina's common stock between July 26, 2016 through October 10,
2016, inclusive.

The Judge appointed (i) Plaintiff Anton Asgoshkov, as assignee of
the claims of Lead Plaintiff Natissisa, Braden Van Der Wall, and
Steven Romanoff as the Class Representatives; (ii) Signature Bank
as the Escrow Agent to manage the Settlement Fund for the benefit
of the Class; (iii) JND Legal Administration to provide all notices
to potential Settlement Class members and to administer Claims as
Claims Administrator; and (iv) Levi & Korinsky, LLP as the Lead
Counsel.

The Settling Parties must identify an appropriate cy pres award
recipient prior to the commencement of the Notice Program.  The cy
pres award recipient must be approved by the Court before Notice
begins.

The Defendants must serve 28 U.S.C. Section 1715(b) notice upon the
appropriate state official of each state in which a class member
resides and the appropriate federal official within 10 days of the
Order's filing.

The Notice Program is as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and
modified by the Order is approved, the form and content of such
notices should be modified accordingly to align with the Order's
instruction.

The following schedule will govern the filing deadlines for the
settlement:

     a. Notice will be completed no later than Feb. 14, 2020;

     b. The Motion for Class Representative Service Awards and Fee
and Expense Application will be filed no later than March 2, 2020;

     c. The Parties' deadline to file a Motion for Final Approval
of Class Action Settlement is March 2, 2020;

     d. Absent Settlement Class Members will opt out or object to
any part of the Settlement, the Settlement as a whole, Class
Counsel's requests for fees and expenses, and/or Class Counsel's
Request for Service Awards for the Class Representatives, as
instructed in the Settlement and Class Notices, no later than March
23, 2020;

     e. Responses to objections to the Motion for Class
Representative Service Awards and Fee and Expense Application and
the Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement will be
filed no later than April 6, 2020; and

     f. The Court will hold a Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement hearing on April 20, 2020 at 10:30 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/TzpYcI from Leagle.com.

Yi Fan Chen & Frontline Global Trading Pte. Ltd., Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,
representedLoren
by Robert Vincent Prongay -- rprongay@glancylaw.com -- Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP.

Natissisa Enterprise Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Adam C.
McCall
-- amccall@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP., Nicholas Porritt --
nporritt@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky LLP, pro hac vice & Adam C.
McCall, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.

James McLeod, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, Plaintiff, represented by J. Alexander Hood, II --
ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice, Jennifer Pafiti
--
jpafiti@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP & Jeremy A. Lieberman --
jalieberman@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice.

Illumina, Inc., Defendant, represented by Clarence William
Phillips, Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Jordan Scott
Joachim, Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice, Mark Chen --
mychen@cov.com -- Covington & Burling LLP & Mark Putnam
Gimbel -- mgimbel@cov.com -- Covington and Burling LLP, pro hac
vice  & Russell Squire, Covington & Burling LLP, pro hac vice.

Francis A. Desouza & Marc A. Stapley, Defendants, represented by
Mark Chen, Covington & Burling LLP & Mark Putnam Gimbel, Covington
and Burling LLP, pro hac vice.

Batali and Greenwald, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Anton Agoshkov, Movant, represented by Adam Marc Apton --
aapton@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP.


IMMUNOCELLULAR THERAPEUTICS: $287K Okayed for Counsel in Kaye Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned ARTHUR KAYE, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
IMMUNOCELLULAR THERAPEUTICS, LTD., et al., Defendants, Case No. SA
CV 17-3250 FMO (SKx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Fernando M. Olguin of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered
a judgment on Nov. 19, 2019 in connection with the final approval
of the class action settlement in the case.

Judge Olguin ordered that (i) Plaintiffs Kaye and Hayden Leason
will each be paid a service payment of $2,500; (ii) the class
counsel will be paid $287,500 in attorney's fees, and $62,200.92 in
costs; and (iii) the Claims Administrator, A.B. Data Ltd., will be
paid for its fees and expenses, all in accordance with the terms of
the Settlement Agreement.

Except as to any class members who have validly and timely
requested exclusion, the action is dismissed with prejudice, with
all parties to bear their own fees and costs except as set forth in
the Judgment and in the prior orders of the Court.

A full-text copy of Judge Olquin's Nov. 19, 2019 Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/lXXYRJ from Leagle.com.

Arthur Kaye IRA FCC as Custodian DTD 6-8-00, Indvidually and On
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by
Lionel Zevi Glancy -- LGLANCY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and
Murray LLP, Charles Henry Linehan -- CLINEHAN@GLANCYLAW.COM --
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, James Grohsgal, Levi and Korsinsky
LLP, Joshua W. Ruthizer, Wolf Popper LLP, pro hac vice, Lesley F.
Portnoy -- LPORTNOY@GLANCYLAW.COM -- Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP,
Robert C. Finkel -- rfinkel@wolfpopper.com -- Wolf Popper LLP, pro
hac vice, Robert Vincent Prongay -- RPRONGAY@GLANCYLAW.COM --
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP, Rosanne Leigh Mah -- rmah@zlk.com --
Levi annd Korsinsky LLP & Rosemary M. Rivas -- rrivas@zlk.com --
Levi and Korsinsky LLP.

Hayden Leason, Plaintiff, represented by Rosanne Leigh Mah , Levi
annd Korsinsky LLP, Lesley F. Portnoy , Glancy Prongay and Murray
LLP, Robert Vincent Prongay , Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP,
Rosemary M. Rivas , Levi and Korsinsky LLP & Lionel Zevi Glancy ,
Glancy Prongay and Murray LLP.

Nathaniel Parker, Movant, represented by Laurence M. Rosen --
lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- Rosen Law Firm PA.

ImmunoCellular Therapeutics, Ltd., Defendant, represented by Angela
L. Dunning -- adunning@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Jessie A.R.
Simpson Lagoy -- jsimpsonlagoy@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, John C.
Dwyer -- dwyerjc@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Tijana Martinovic Brien
-- tmartinovic@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.

David Fractor, Defendant, represented by Angela L. Dunning , Cooley
LLP, Jessie A.R. Simpson Lagoy , Cooley LLP & Tijana Martinovic
Brien , Cooley LLP.

Manish Singh & Lavos, LLC, Defendants, represented by Charles P.
Hyun , Reed Smith LLP, Francisca M. Mok , Reed Smith LLP & James L.
Sanders , Reed Smith LLP.

Lidingo Holdings, LLC, Kamilla Bjorlin & Hodge Andrew, Defendants,
represented by Edward Gartenberg , Gartenberg Gelfand Hayton LLP.

Brian Nichols, Defendant, pro se.


INTEGRATED ENERGY: Court Grants Prelim OK on $20K Deal in Hozi Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned GEORGE HOZI, individually, and on behalf of
other members of the general public similarly situated; MANUEL
CHAVIRA, individually, and on behalf of other members of the
general public similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. INTEGRATED ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES INC., an unknown business entity; DONCASTERS GCE, an
unknown business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2:18-CV-02006-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge John
A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted Plaintiffs George Hozi and Manuel Chavira's
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Having considered the Motion, points and authorities and
declarations submitted in support of the Motion, including the
Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement of Class Action and PAGA
Claims entered into by and between the parties, and the Notice of
Class Action Settlement, and good cause appearing, the Judge
granted the Plaintiffs leave to file the Proposed Second Amended
Complaint for Damages and Enforcement Under the Private Attorneys
General Act, California Labor Code Section 2698, Et Seq.

The Second Amended Complaint will be deemed filed as of the latter
of the date of the Order or Dec. 13, 2019 (i.e., the date on which
the expiration of the 65-day notice period under PAGA will
conclude), and will be the operative complaint in the action for
purposes of the Settlement, including the release of claims.  In
the event that the Settlement does not become final, the Second
Amended Complaint will be deemed stricken, null and void ab initio,
with the previously-filed First Amended Class Action Complaint for
Damages being deemed the operative complaint.

Judge Mendez preliminarily finds that the Settlement appears to be
within the range of reasonableness of a settlement that could
ultimately be given final approval.  He preliminarily approved the
Settlement Agreement.

For settlement purposes only, the Judge conditionally certified the
following Class: All current and former non-exempt, hourly
employees employed by the Defendant in California at any time from
May 4, 2014 to the date of the Order.

Judge Mendez also preliminarily appointed (i) Edwin Aiwazian, Arby
Aiwazian, and Joanna Ghosh of Lawyers for Justice, PC as the
counsel for the Class; and (ii) Simpluris, Inc. as the
Administrator.

Pursuant to California Labor Code section 2699(1), the Judge has
reviewed and preliminarily approved the sum of $20,000 of the
Maximum Settlement Amount to be paid as penalties pursuant to the
California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA
Payment").  He preliminarily approved payment of 75% of the PAGA
Payment (i.e., $15,000) to the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency ("LWDA Payment") and inclusion of 25% of the PAGA Payment,
or $5,000, in the Net Settlement Amount to be paid to the
Settlement Class Members.

The Judge approved, as to form and content, the Notice, for
distribution to the Class Members.  Within 15 calendar days from
the latter of the date of entry of the Order or Dec. 13, 2019
(i.e., the date on which the expiration of the 65-day notice period
under PAGA will conclude), the Defendant will provide the
Administrator with the Class List, as outlined in the Settlement
Agreement.  Within 10 calendar days of receipt of the Class List
from Defendant, the Administrator will send a Notice to each Class
Member via First-Class U.S. Mail to his or her most current mailing
address.

Prior to the initial mailing, Simpluris will perform a search using
the National Change of Address Database and update the Class List
with any newly known or identifiable address changes.

The Judge preliminarily approved the proposed procedure for
requesting exclusion from the Settlement.  A Class Member may
request exclusion from or opt out of the Settlement by submitting a
written request to the Administrator on or before the date that is
60 calendar days from the initial mailing of the Notice, or in the
case of a re-mailed Notice, the latter of the date that is 60
calendar days from the initial mailing of the Notice or seven
calendar days from the remailing of the Notice.

The Judge preliminarily approved the proposed procedure for
objecting to the Settlement.

A Final Approval Hearing is set for April 21, 2020, at 1:30 p.m.
The Class Counsel will file a motion for final approval of the
requests for Incentive Payments and attorneys' fees and litigation
costs and expenses, and approval of the Settlement Administration
Costs, along with the appropriate declarations and supporting
evidence, including the Administrator's declaration by March 24,
2020, to be heard at the Final Approval Hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gY8kTg from Leagle.com.

George Hozi & Manuel Chavira, Plaintiffs, represented by Edwin
Aiwazian -- edwin@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers for Justice, PC, Margaux V.
Roussel -- mvroussel@law.gwu.edu -- Lawyers For Justice, PC, Arby
Aiwazian -- arby@lfjpc.com -- The Aiwazian Law Firm & Joanna Ghosh
-- joanna@lfjpc.com -- Lawyers For Justice, PC.

Integrated Energy Technologies, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Barbara Allyn Blackburn -- bblackburn@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson & Simerdip Khangura -- skhangura@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson PC.


JOSH'S ORIGINAL PIZZA: Rabanales Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Isabel Rabanales, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. JOSH'S ORIGINAL PIZZA CORP. D/B/A JOSH'S
BROOKLYN BRICK OVEN, and JOSHUA A. SKURNIK, as an individual, Case
No. 2:20-cv-00166 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 8, 2020), seeks to recover
damages for the Defendants' violations of state and federal wage
and hour laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
York Labor Law.

Although the Plaintiff worked for 70 or more hours per week during
the Plaintiff's employment by the Defendants, they did not pay the
Plaintiff time and a half for hours worked over 40, a blatant
violation of the overtime provisions contained in the FLSA and
NYLL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from June 2015 until
October 2019.

JOSH'S ORIGINAL PIZZA CORP., doing business as JOSH'S BROOKLYN
BRICK OVEN is a corporation organized under the laws of New York
with a principal executive office in Cedarhurst, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Phone: 718-263-9591
          Fax: 718-263-9598


KPMG LLP: Wins Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Jones-Lowe Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS JONES, JOSEPH CHARLES LOHFINK, SUE BEAVERS,
RODOLFOA REL, and HAZEL REED THOMAS, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, and MARTHA EZELL LOWE,
individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
employees, Consolidated Plaintiff v. KPMG LLP and TRANSAMERICA
RETIREMENT SOLUTIONS CORPORATION, Defendants, Cause No.
1:17CV319-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss.), Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern
Division, granted the KMPG's Motion to Dismiss.

The claims presented were originally filed in two separate putative
class action lawsuits seeking relief as a result of the
underfunding of the Singing River Health System Employees'
Retirement Plan and Trust -- Jones, et al. v. Singing River Health
System, et al., 1:14cv447-LG-RHW, and Lowe v. Singing River Health
System, et al., 1:15cv44-LG-RHW.  In the interest of judicial
economy, the Court entered an Order severing the claims presented
by the Jones plaintiffs against Transamerica Retirement Solutions
Corporation and Lowe's claims against KPMG and Transamerica from
claims against Singing River Health System and the Plan's trustees.
It consolidated the Jones and Lowe plaintiffs' claims against KPMG
and Transamerica under a new cause number, 1:17cv319-LG-RHW.

Lowe alleges that KPMG, the company that audited the annual
financial statements of Singing River Health System ("SRHS") and
the Plan, either knew or should have known that SRHS had defaulted
on its contributions to the Plan since 2009.  She asserts that KPMG
allowed or did not correct statements that attributed the Trust's
underfunding to returns on investments and changed actuarial
assumptions.  She attempts to assert a breach of fiduciary duty
and/or aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim against
KPMG.  KPMG filed the present Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, alleging, inter alia, that Lowe lacks standing
to pursue the lawsuit against KPMG because a special fiduciary now
has exclusive authority to file claims on behalf of the Plan.

The parties appear to agree that the question of standing or
mootness in the case is governed by trust law.  Since Lowe is a
beneficiary to the trust at issue and KPMG is a third party, Lowe
may only maintain a lawsuit against KPMG if (a) she is in
possession, or entitled to immediate distribution, of the trust
property involved; or (b) the trustee is unable, unavailable,
unsuitable, or improperly failing to protect the beneficiary's
interest.

Lowe argues that she has standing to pursue the lawsuit because she
alleged in her Complaint that the Plan's trustees breached their
fiduciary duties.  However, as KPMG correctly notes, Lowe's claims
against those former trustees have been settled, and a special
fiduciary was appointed to oversee the Plan.  The special fiduciary
has apparently not abandoned her duty to file lawsuits on behalf of
the Plan as she has filed a lawsuit against KPMG in state court.
The appointment of a special fiduciary has mooted Lowe's claims
against KPMG, because only the special fiduciary has authority to
maintain lawsuits on behalf of the Plan and Lowe is not entitled to
immediate distribution of the trust property.  As a result, KPMG's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction must be granted.

For these reasons, Judge Guirola granted KMPG's Motion to Dismiss.
The claims filed against KPMG by Martha Ezell Lowe, individually
and on behalf of a class of similarly situated employees, are
dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/5KwcXS from Leagle.com.

Thomas Jones, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Joseph Charles Lohfink, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Sue Beavers, on behalf of themselves
and
others similarly situated, Rodolfoa Rel, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated & Hazel Reed Thomas, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented
by David G. Wirtes, Jr. -- DGW@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM -- CUNNINGHAM
BOUNDS, LLC, George W. Finkbohner, III -- GWF@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM
-- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice, James R. Reeves, Jr.,
REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Lucy Elizabeth Tufts --
LET@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice,
Matthew G. Mestayer, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC, Steven L. Nicholas
--
SLN@CUNNINGHAMBOUNDS.COM -- CUNNINGHAM BOUNDS, LLC, pro hac vice &
Leilani Leith Tynes, REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

Martha Ezell Lowe, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated employees, Consol Plaintiff, represented by
Angelique M. Cooper, A. COOPER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LLC, pro hac
vice,
Joe R. Whatley, Jr. -- jwhatley@whatleykallas.com -- WHATLEY
KALLAS, LLP, Richard P. Rouco , QUINN, CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES &
ROUCO, LLP, pro hac vice, Roger K. Doolittle , ROGER K. DOOLITTLE,
ATTORNEY & James R. Reeves, Jr., REEVES & MESTAYER, PLLC.

KPMG, LLP, Defendant, represented by Amelia Toy Rudolph --
amyrudolph@eversheds-sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND (US)
LLP, pro hac vice, Patricia Anne Gorham --
patriciagorham@eversheds-sutherland.com -- EVERSHEDS SOUTHERLAND
(US) LLP, pro hac vice, R. David Kaufman -- dkaufman@brunini.com
--
BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC & Taylor B. McNeel --
tmcneel@brunini.com -- BRUNINI, GRANTHAM, GROWER & HEWES, PLLC.

Transamerica Retirement Solutions Corporation, Defendant,
represented by Armin J. Moeller, Jr. -- amoeller@balch.com --
BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP, Ashley Eley Cannady -- acannady@balch.com -- BALCH
& BINGHAM, LLP, Marianne Hogan, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, pro
hac vice & William J. Delany, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, LLP, pro
hac
vice.


LEPRINO FOODS: Can Partially Recover Deposition Expenses in Vasquez
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ISAIAS VASQUEZ and LINDA HEFKE on behalf of all other
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, v. LEPRINO FOODS
COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; LEPRINO FOODS DAIRY PRODUCTS
COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 1:17-cv-00796-AWI-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted in part Defendants Leprino
Foods Co. and Leprino Foods Dairy Products Co.'s Motion to Recover
Reasonable Expenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(g).

The wage-and-hour class action stems from the Defendants' alleged
custom and policy to "de crew," i.e., sending workers home prior to
the start of their scheduled shift without pay because Defendants
reportedly misjudged its production or labor needs and from
Defendants' alleged policy of requiring the Plaintiffs and workers
to remain on call and subject to return to discuss business matters
and/or return to their work stations during their rest and meal
breaks if called upon to do so by supervisory personnel.

On June 6, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification.  The Defendants opposed the motion on Aug. 30, 2019.
On Sept. 9, 2019, in anticipation of filing their reply, the
Plaintiffs sought the Court's leave to exceed Rule 30's
10-deposition limit to depose the putative class members who
submitted declarations in support of the Defendants' opposition to
the motion for class certification.  On Sept. 25, 2019, the Court
partially granted their request, permitting them to conduct seven
depositions of the putative class members who submitted
declarations in support of the Defendants' opposition to the motion
for class certification.  The parties were directed to meet and
confer to work out a schedule for the depositions, all of which
were to be completed no later than Nov. 8, 2019.

Following the Court's order permitting additional depositions, the
counsel for the parties began communicating to set a schedule for
the depositions.  Once the Plaintiffs identified the persons to be
deposed, the Defendants inquired about the deponents' availability
for deposition.  The defense counsel communicated with the
Plaintiffs' counsel about each deponent's availability and whether
defense counsel had been authorized to accept service of a
deposition subpoena for each deponent.

With regard to Deponent Ronaldo Salvo, on Oct. 14, 2019, the
Plaintiffs sought confirmation of Mr. Salvo's deposition for Oct.
28, 2019, upon his return to work on Oct. 25, 2019.  In response,
the Defendants indicated that given Mr. Salvo's October 25 return
to work, he would not have reasonable notice for a deposition.  The
Defendants advised that, upon his return, they would check on his
availability and let the Plaintiffs' counsel know his availability
for other dates.

On Oct. 16, 2019, the Plaintiffs' counsel asked if Mr. Salvo's
deposition could be scheduled for Oct. 31, 2019.  On Oct. 21, 2019,
the defense counsel indicated that October 31 would not work for
Mr. Salvo, but they would check on his availability.  The
Plaintiff's counsel then sent another email asking that they check
on October 30 as an alternative to October 31.

On Oct. 25, 2019, the defense counsel learned that Mr. Salvo was
not available for deposition on October 30 or 31, but he could be
available on Nov. 5, 2019.  Although an offer was made to Mr. Salvo
to have the defense counsel accept service of a deposition subpoena
on his behalf, Mr. Salvo did not authorize the defense counsel to
accept service on his behalf.  The Defense counsel notified the
Plaintiffs' counsel that Mr. Salvo was available on Nov. 5, 2019.
The Plaintiffs' counsel confirmed the November 5 date and inquired
if the defense counsel would accept service on behalf of Mr. Salvo.
The Defense counsel responded that they had not been authorized to
accept service on his behalf.

On Oct. 28, 2019, the defense counsel received the Plaintiffs'
Amended Notice of Deposition of Ronaldo Salvo, which noticed his
deposition for Nov. 5, 2019 at 9:00 a.m., at Esquire Deposition
Solutions in Fresno, California.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the parties attended the deposition of Alejandro
Osuna, taken by the Plaintiffs' Counsel, Kitty K. Szeto.  The
Defense counsel, Lisa M. Pooley, was present at the deposition. (
During the deposition, Ms. Szeto inquired as to whether Mr. Osuna
knew of any facts as to why Mr. Salvo would have been evading
service and whether he knew of any facts to help the Plaintiffs
better serve him. Mr. Osuna did not provide any information in that
regard.

On Nov. 4, 2019, Ms. Pooley traveled from San Francisco to Fresno,
which took four hours, and stayed overnight in a Fresno hotel.  On
the morning of Nov. 5, 2019, Ms. Pooley went to Esquire Deposition
Solutions, the location for Mr. Salvo's noticed deposition.  Upon
her arrival, Ms. Pooley was informed by the receptionist that the
deposition was not on the calendar and that the Plaintiffs had
cancelled the deposition on Nov. 1, 2019, four days earlier.  Ms.
Pooley then sent an email to the Plaintiffs' counsel inquiring as
to why the Defendants had not been advised that Mr. Salvo's
deposition had been cancelled.  Ms. Pooley then drove back to San
Francisco, which took four hours.

The Defendants now seek recovery of their reasonable expenses
incurred on Nov. 4 and 5, 2019, for the defense counsel attending
Mr. Salvo's deposition in the total amount of $5,987.30 (costs and
attorney's fees).  They also seek recovery for preparing the
instant motion and joint statement in the amount of $2,540.  The
Plaintiffs oppose the request, arguing that the defense counsel was
on notice that the deposition was not going forward as scheduled.

Magistrate Judge McAuliffe finds that the Plaintiffs noticed the
deposition of Mr. Salvo for Nov. 5, 2019, but they did not serve
him with a deposition subpoena and did not appear for his
deposition.  They formally notified the Court reporter that the
deposition had been cancelled, but there is no indication that they
notified the defense counsel that the deposition would not proceed.
That the defense counsel may have been aware of the Plaintiffs'
difficulties in serving Mr. Salvo or that Ms. Szeto reportedly
overheard the defense counsel state that she guessed the deposition
was not going forward are not sufficient notice.  There is nothing
before the Court indicating that the Plaintiffs took any
affirmative steps to notify, or confirm with, the defense counsel
that the deposition would not proceed as scheduled.  Accordingly,
the Magistrate finds an award of reasonable expenses for attending
the deposition, including attorney's fees, is appropriate pursuant
to Rule 30(g).

The Magistrate takes judicial notice of the State Bar of California
website, which shows that Ms. Pooley was admitted to practice in
1993 and has more than 25 years of experience.  Given this
information, the Magistrate finds that a rate of $400 is reasonable
for the services of Ms. Pooley.  With this hourly rate, the
attorney fees incurred by the Defendants for Ms. Pooley's
attendance at the deposition total $3,480 (8.7 hours ×
$400/hour).

The Defendants also request an award of attorney's fees incurred in
bringing the instant motion.  However, the Magistrate declines to
award fees beyond those expenses permitted by Rule 30(g).

Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge McAuliffe partially
granted the Defendants' motion to recover reasonable expenses
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(g).  The Plaintiffs'
counsel are directed to pay the Defendants their reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, in the amount of $3,942.88
($462.88 in costs and $3,480.00 in attorney's fees) for attending
the noticed deposition of Rolando Salvo on Nov. 5, 2019 in Fresno,
California.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/2TwkJ4 from Leagle.com.

Isaias Vasquez, on behalf of all other similarly situated
individuals & Linda Hefke, on behalf of all other similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by Cory Lee, The
Downey Law Firm, LLC, Philip A. Downey, The Downey Law Firm, LLC,
pro hac vice, Robert Gibson, Law Offices of Robert W. Sink, pro
hac
vice, Eric Daniel Rouen -- rouenlaw@att.net -- Law Office of Eric
D. Rouen & Randall Martin Rumph -- rmrlaw10@sbcglobal.net -- Law
Office of Randy Rumph.

Leprino Foods Company, a Colorado corporation & Leprino Foods
Dairy
Products Company, a Colorado corporation, Defendants, represented
by Lisa M. Pooley -- lpooley@hansonbridgett.com -- Hanson Bridgett
LLP, Sandra L. Rappaport -- srappaport@hansonbridgett.com --
Hanson
Bridgett LLP & Kyle Aaron Mabe -- kyle.a.mabe@gmail.com -- Hanson
Bridgett LLP.


MANNA PRO: Protective Order on Confidential Docs in Hale Issued
---------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California has entered a stipulated protective
order on confidential documents in the case, ASHLEY HALE
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MANNA PRO PRODUCTS, LLC; DOES
1-10, INCLUSIVE, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-00209-KJM-DB (E.D.
Cal.).

The parties' stipulated procedures will govern the inspection, use
and/or disclosure of confidential, proprietary and/or trade secret
information belonging to Animal Health International, its vendors,
and/or customers, that is produced by Animal Health International
in connection with the action or already in the Plaintiff's
possession.

The Confidential Documents will be stamped with a legend stating:
"Confidential Document Subject to Protective Order."  The
Confidential Documents will be treated as confidential by the
Parties and will be used solely to obtain approval of the class
action settlement, and to notify identified members of the proposed
class of the settlement in the action.  

The Confidential Documents, or any references thereto in any
memorandum, brief, transcript, or other filing, which reveal the
content of the Confidential Documents, will not be filed with any
Court or public agency unless filed under seal, as permitted by the
Court.

No copies, extracts or summaries of the Confidential Documents will
be made except by or on behalf of counsel for the Parties for the
purposes set forth.  All such copies, extracts or summaries derived
from the Confidential Documents will be designated and treated as
confidential material, and none will be delivered, exhibited or
disclosed to any person except as necessary in accordance with the
terms of and for the purposes set forth.

Within 90 days after the final disposition of the above-captioned
action, all copies of the Confidential Documents, and any copies,
extracts, summaries or notes made thereof which reveal the contents
of the Confidential Documents, will be delivered to counsel for the
Parties or destroyed.  Within that same time period, counsel for
the Parties will affirm in writing to counsel that all such
documents (including, without limitation, any copies, extracts or
summaries thereof) have been returned or destroyed as provided.

The Court will be requested to enter a Protective Order requiring
the Parties to abide by the Stipulation.  Even if the Court
declines to enter a Protective Order as requested, the parties,
their counsel and their experts will remain contractually bound by
the Stipulation and will abide by its terms and conditions.

Requests to seal documents will be made by motion before the same
judge who will decide the matter related to that request to seal.

The designation of documents (including transcripts of testimony)
as confidential pursuant to the Order does not automatically
entitle the parties to file such a document with the court under
seal.  The parties are advised that any request to seal documents
in the district is governed by Local Rule 141.

A request to seal material must normally meet the high threshold of
showing that "compelling reasons" support secrecy; however, where
the material is, at most, "tangentially related" to the merits of a
case, the request to seal may be granted on a showing of "good
cause."

Nothing in the order will limit the testimony of parties or
non-parties, or the use of certain documents, at any court hearing
or trial -- such determinations will only be made by the court at
the hearing or trial, or upon an appropriate motion.

With respect to motions regarding any disputes concerning the
Protective Order which the parties cannot informally resolve, the
parties will follow the procedures outlined in Local Rule 251.
Absent a showing of good cause, the Court will not hear discovery
disputes on an ex parte basis or on shortened time.

The parties may not modify the terms of the Protective Order
without the Court's approval.  If they agree to a potential
modification, they will submit a stipulation and proposed order for
the Court's consideration.

Pursuant to Local Rule 141.1(f), the Court will not retain
jurisdiction over enforcement of the terms of the Protective Order
after the action is terminated.

Any provision in the parties' stipulation that is in conflict with
anything in the order is disapproved.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Protective Order is
available at https://is.gd/wbePC3 from Leagle.com.

Ashley Hale, Plaintiff, represented by Adrian R. Bacon --
abacon@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.,
Kelsey L. Kuberka, Law Offices Of Todd Friedman, Meghan George --
mgeorge@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, PC & Todd
M. Friedman -- tfriedman@toddflaw.com -- Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C.

Manna Pro Products, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jennifer E.
Hoekel -- jhoekel@armstrongteasdale.com -- Armstrong Teasdale,
LLP,
pro hac vice, Jennifer C. Martin Wang -- jwang@troygould.com --
TroyGould PC, Laura A. Bentele -- lbentele@armstrongteasdale.com
--
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, pro hac vice & Russell I. Glazer --
rglazer@troygould.com -- TroyGould PC.


MCKESSON CORP: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Evanston Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EVANSTON POLICE PENSION FUND, Plaintiff, v. MCKESSON
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-06525-CRB (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Charler R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied McKesson's motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The case arises out of government investigations of anticompetitive
agreements in the generic pharmaceutical industry.  The resulting
complaint, brought by 49 states' Attorneys General ("AG
complaint"), alleges that the generic drug industry is rife with
price-fixing and market-allocation agreements.  The scandal has
already resulted in congressional attention, multiple guilty pleas,
and a plethora of antitrust and Securities Act lawsuits against
generic drug manufacturers.

McKesson is (mostly) not a generic drug manufacturer, but a generic
drug wholesaler.  Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs in the putative class
action ("Evanston") allege that McKesson must have participated in
illegal anticompetitive conduct.  At the very least, Evanston
alleges, McKesson was aware of and profited from the illegal
agreements.  Evanston claims that by failing to disclose the
conspiracy McKesson and its executives violated the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The Consolidated Amended Complaint ("CAC") alleges that McKesson
was a party to unlawful price-fixing agreements.  McKesson has
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

McKesson has requested judicial notice of 25 documents (Exhibits
1-25) cited in its motion to dismiss.  It also argues that the
Court may consider most of these materials under the doctrine of
incorporation by reference.  Evanston does not oppose McKesson's
request, but maintains that the documents cannot be noticed for the
truth of the matters asserted therein.

Exhibits 1-13 and 15-17 are transcripts of earnings calls and
corporate presentations that the CAC alleges contained materially
false statements or corrective disclosures.  Because these
documents form the basis of Evanston's complaint, they are subject
to incorporation by reference.  Similarly, Exhibits 18 and 19 are
news articles the CAC identifies as corrective disclosures.  They
are also subject to incorporation by reference.

Exhibits 20-23 are excerpts from McKesson's FY 2013, 2014, 2015 and
2016 Proxy Statements.   The proxy statements are extensively
referenced in the CAC and subject to incorporation.  Similarly,
Exhibit 25, the AG complaint, is cited throughout the CAC.
Additionally, an 18-page excerpt is attached to the CAC as Exhibit
A.  The AG complaint is also subject to incorporation by
reference.

In contrast, Exhibits 14 (McKesson's July 27, 2017 earnings call
for Q1 2017) and 24 (Hammergren's SEC Forms 4 filed with the SEC
between Oct. 24, 2013 and Jan. 25, 2017), are not cited in the CAC.
These documents not subject to incorporation by reference.
Nonetheless, both the transcript of the earnings call and the SEC
filings are publicly-filed documents whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned and are therefore subject to judicial
notice.

The parties dispute whether the CAC may rely on allegations in the
AG Complaint.  McKesson cites a line of cases holding that
paragraphs in a complaint that are either based on, or rely on,
complaints in other actions that have been dismissed, settled, or
otherwise not resolved are, as a matter of law, immaterial within
the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

Evanston responds that several other courts have considered
allegations from the AG Complaint when ruling on motions to
dismiss.  Because the Ninth Circuit has relied on comparable
documents when deciding motions to dismiss Section 10(b) and
antitrust claims, the Court holds it is appropriate to do so in the
case.

Judge Breyer finds that Evanston has adequately plead that the
first and third categories of challenged statements were materially
false and misleading, but not the second, fourth, or sixth
categories.  The fifth category of challenged statements,
McKesson's financial results, were materially false or misleading
only insofar as they referenced generic drug price increases.

Next, Judge Breyer finds that the CAC pleads a sufficiently strong
correlation between McKesson's financial performance and Hammergren
and Beer's stock and cash awards to support a finding of scienter.
The CAC alleges specific stock and cash award multipliers that tied
Hammergren and Beer's compensation to McKesson's financial
performance in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017.  It also provides tables
alleging precise amounts each executive received in base salary,
stock award, and cash awards for each year.  The numbers Evanston
pleads demonstrate that the executives' compensation from stock and
cash awards far outstripped their base salaries.  These allegations
are comparable to those in America West.  Considered as a whole,
the core operations theory and Hammergren and Beers' compensation
arrangements adequately allege scienter.

As for loss causation, the Judge holds that it is true, as McKesson
argues, that on their own neither the disappointing financial
results nor the mere announcement of an investigation would be
sufficient to demonstrate loss causation.  However, taken together,
these allegations adequately plead loss causation.

Section 20(a) provides a right of action against any person "who,
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder."
McKesson's only argument that Evanston's control person claims
should be dismissed is that Evanston has failed to plead an
underlying Section 10(b) violation.  Because Evanston has
adequately pled an underlying Section 10(b) violation, the motion
to dismiss the Section 20(a) claims is denied.

Finally, the Judge finds that Evanston has successfully pled a
"predicate insider trading violation" for the same reasons it has
adequately alleged its Section 10(b) claim.  The allegations giving
rise to a strong inference of scienter also support an inference
that Hammergren's sales of McKesson stock during the class period
were made "while in possession of material, nonpublic information."
Specifically, Hammergren was in possession of the "material,
nonpublic information" that the price increases driving McKesson's
profits were driven by collusive behavior, not legitimate supply
disruptions, when he sold McKesson's stock.

McKesson also argues that two of the three challenged trades were
not made "contemporaneously" with Evanston's trades, as required to
establish Section 20A claims.  At this stage of the litigation, the
Judge holds that Evanston has adequately pled contemporaneousness
as to all three challenged sales.  The motion to dismiss the
Section 20A claims is denied.

Because Judge Breyer finds that Evanston has adequately plead the
required elements of its Rule 10(b) claim, including falsity,
scienter, and loss causation, he denied the motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/aAVQMo from Leagle.com.

Evanston Police Pension Fund, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lesley
Elizabeth Weaver -- lweaver@bfalaw.com -- Bleichmar Fonti & Auld
LLP, Angel Puimei Lau, Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP, Luke O.
Brooks, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Spencer A. Burkholz --
spenceb@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

McKesson Corporation, John H. Hammergren & James Beer, Defendants,
represented by Sara B. Brody -- SBRODY@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin
LLP, Jaime Allyson Bartlett -- JBARTLETT@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley
Austin LLP & Robin Eve Wechkin -- RWECHKIN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley
Austin LLP, pro hac vice.

Therese Halscheid, Movant, represented by Laurence Matthew Rosen,
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.

Pension Trust Fund For Operating Engineers, Movant, represented by
Angel Puimei Lau, Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP, Erika Limpin
Oliver, Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP, Jeffrey James Stein,
Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd LLP, Luke O. Brooks , Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Michael Albert, Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd
LLP, Ryan Anthony Llorens, Robbins Geller Rudman Dowd LLP, Shawn A.
Williams, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, Spencer A. Burkholz,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP & Tricia Lynn McCormick, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.


MDL 2433: Bid to Exclude Margulis Testimony in C-8 PI Suit Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edmund A. Sargus of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denied the Defendant's Motion
to Exclude the Opinion and Testimony of Plaintiff Angela Swartz's
Specific Causation Expert Dr. Vitaly Margulis in IN RE: E. I. DU
PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY C-8 PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION. This
document relates to: Angela Swartz and Teddy Swartz v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours and Company, Case No. 2:18-cv-00136, Civil Action
2:13-md-2433 (S.D. Ohio).

The litigation between the parties in this multidistrict litigation
("MDL") began in 2001 in a class action in West Virginia state
court captioned Leach v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No.
01-C-698 (Wood County W. Va. Cir. Ct.).  The Leach Case ended in
November 2004 when the parties entered into a class-wide
settlement.

In the Leach Settlement Agreement, the parties fashioned a unique
procedure to determine whether the approximately 80,000 members of
the class would be permitted to file actions against Defendant E.
I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. based on any of the human diseases
they believed had been caused by their exposure to ammonium
perfluorooctanoate ("C-8" or "PFOA") discharged from DuPont's
Washington Works plant.  The procedure required DuPont and the
plaintiffs to jointly select three completely independent,
mutually-agreeable, appropriately credentialed epidemiologists
("Science Panel") to study human disease among the Leach Class.

The Science Panel engaged in what ultimately became one of the
largest epidemiological studies ever convened, utilizing nearly
70,000 blood samples and medical histories of the Leach Class
members, and lasting seven years.  In 2012, the Science Panel
delivered Probable Link Findings for six human diseases ("Linked
Diseases"): kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid disease,
ulcerative colitis, diagnosed high cholesterol
(hypercholesterolemia), and pregnancy-induced hypertension and
preeclampsia.  The Probable Link Finding means that for the Leach
Class members it is more likely than not that there is a link
between their exposure to C-8 (i.e., drinking water containing at
least .05 ppb of C-8 for at least one year) and their Linked
Disease.  Ultimately, over 3,500 individuals filed cases in the
MDL, all of whom alleged that they are Leach Class members, are
subject to the Leach Settlement Agreement, have Linked Diseases,
and that C-8 specifically caused their Linked Diseases.

The Science Panel also delivered No Probable Link Findings for
approximately 50 diseases it studied.  Any Leach Class member who
received a No Probable Link Finding was prohibited from filing a
personal injury action against DuPont as a result of being subject
to the Leach Settlement Agreement, regardless of whether any other
study or expert disagreed with the Science Panel' No Probable Link
Finding.

Beginning in February 2015, the Court held four trials in the MDL:
Carla Marie Bartlett v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Case
No. 2:13-cv-170; David Freeman v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.,
2:13-cv-1103; Kenneth Vigneron, Sr. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
Company, Case No. 13-cv-136, and; Larry Ogle Moody v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours Company, Case No. 15-cv-803.  Each trial lasted at least
four weeks.  The parties reached a global settlement of the 3,500
cases in February 2017.

Since the global settlement, over 50 cases have been filed
("Post-Settlement Cases").  As did the plaintiffs in the
pre-settlement cases, the Plaintiffs in these Post-Settlement Cases
allege that they are Leach Class members, are subject to the Leach
Settlement Agreement, have a Linked Diseases, and that C-8
specifically caused their Linked Disease.  Pursuant to the Court's
trial schedule, the parties have filed their motions directed at
experts.

The matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Exclude
the Opinion and Testimony of Plaintiff Angela Swartz's Specific
Causation Expert Dr. Vitaly Margulis, the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition, and the Defendant's Reply Brief.

Plaintiff Angela Swartz offers Vitaly Margulis, M.D., F.A.C.S. as
her specific causation expert.  Dr. Margulis was presented as a
specific causation expert in the case of Carla Marie Bartlett, the
first trial in the MDL, which was held in September 2015.  In
Evidentiary Motions Order No. ("EMO"), the Court granted in part
and denied in part DuPont's Motion to Exclude the Opinions of Dr.
Margulis.

Du Pont contends that the portions of Dr. Margulis' Expert Opinion
that the Court did not exclude in EMO 1 should now be excluded
because Dr. Margulis (1) begins with an assumption or presumption
of specific causation, (2) bases his opinion on a fiction that the
Science Panel made a scientific determination and unreliably
employs two different methodologies, (3) adopts the "no safe dose"
theory, and (4) uses a made-for-litigation approach that differs
from the approach he uses in his regular professional practice
outside the courtroom.

Judge Sargus holds that DuPont's arguments provide no support for
the Court to exclude the specific causation report and testimony of
Dr. Margulis.

As for DuPont's first argument, the Judge finds that Dr. Margulis
does not simply rely on a finding of general causation, or merely
conclude that all risk factors for kidney cancer are substantial
contributing factors in its development.  Indeed, he did the
opposite. Dr. Margulis' Expert Report reflects his review of
numerous scientific studies and other documents, Mrs. Swartz's
medical records, his own physical examination of Mrs. Swartz, which
included taking a medical and familial history, and his knowledge,
training, and experience as a urologic surgical oncologist.  Dr.
Margulis utilized differential diagnosis, appropriately
"eliminating the likely causes until the most probable one wass
isolated," resulting in his conclusion.

As for the second argument, the Judge finds that specific
causation, the issue to which Dr. Margulis' analysis is directed,
is a necessary legal element in a toxic substance case.  The
Science Panel was directed to determine the whether it was more
likely than not (magnitude of risk) that there was a relationship
between C-8 (an agent) and a disease, which resulted in the
Probable Link Findings.  The study produced by the Science Panel,
and funded by DuPont, was one of the largest epidemiological study
ever conducted.  The physicians were selected by the class counsel
and DuPont.  Without question, Dr. Margulis did not err in relying
on the study, the only of its sort, in ruling in C-8 as a potential
causal factor in a differential diagnosis.  Such an approach did
not conflate general and specific causation.

DuPont's third argument as to why Dr. Margulis' Expert Report and
his testimony should be excluded, too does not provide a reason for
the Judge to exclude the specific causation report and testimony of
Dr. Margulis.  Dr. Margulis had far more that the "mere fact" that
C-8 is a carcinogen and that Mrs. Swartz "may have been exposed to"
it.  Moreover, a "no safe dose" level of C-8 exposure is not the
"only analysis that would support" Dr. Margulis' opinions.  There
is no dispute that the C-8 to which Mrs. Swartz was exposed was
released into her drinking water by DuPont or that kidney cancer is
a Probable Link disease.

Finally, DuPont's last argument too provides no support for its
request to exclude the specific causation report and testimony of
Dr. Margulis.  The Judge holds that rhere is no suggestion here
that Dr. Margulis failed to employ the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field.  Again, DuPont makes no argument that Dr. Margulis is
unqualified to engage in the causation analysis he was asked to
complete.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Sargus denied DuPont's Motion to
Exclude the Opinion and Testimony of Plaintiff Angela Swartz's
Specific Causation Expert Dr. Vitaly Margulis.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/6O09y2 from Leagle.com.

Thomas Yakubik, Ronald Bachtel, Cheryl Durst, Robert Durst, Larry
Turley, Linda Turley, Sharon Arnott, Kathy Willis & Troy Willis,
Plaintiffs, represented by David G. Utley, Collins, Roche, Utley &
Garner, LLC, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, Ohio
44145, Jon C. Conlin, Cory Watson Crowder & DeGaris, Michael A.
London, Douglas & London, PC, 59 Maiden Ln, 6th Floor, New York,
NY
10038, pro hac vice, Ethan T. Vessels, Fields, Dehmlow & Vessels
LLC, 309 2nd St., Marietta, OH 45750-2921 & Gregory Harold
Collins,
Collins, Roche, Utley & Garner, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500,
Cleveland, Ohio 44145

Betty Bragg, Lotie Cline, Linda Davis, Crystal Forshey, Vicky
Lightfritz, Willard Lightfritz, Kathy Lowe, Kit McPeek-Stalnaker,
Thomas Eugene Molden, Jack Offenberger, Kay Sheridan, Herbert
Short, John Wright & Amber Wriston, Plaintiffs, represented by
Debra Anne Nelson dnelson@debranelsonlaw.com -- The Nelson Law
Firm, LLC, Jon C. Conlin, Cory Watson Crowder & DeGaris, 875
Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, Ohio 44145, Michael A.
London, Douglas & London, PC, pro hac vice, Nina M. Towle, Cory
Watson Attorneys, pro hac vice & Richard A. Wright, Cory Watson
Attorneys, 875 Westpoint Parkway, Suite 500, Cleveland, Ohio
44145,
pro hac vice.

E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Defendant, represented by
Damond R. Mace -- damond.mace@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs
(US) LLP, Aaron Todd Brogdon -- aaron.brogdon@squirepb.com --
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Aneca E. Lasley --
aneca.lasley@squirepb.com -- Squire Sanders (US) LLP, C. Craig
Woods -- craig.woods@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US)LLP,
Clifford F. Kinney, Jr. -- ckinney@spilman.com -- Spilman Thomas &
Battle, PLLC, pro hac vice, D. Patrick Long --
patrick.long@squirepb.com -- Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP,David J.
Millstone, pro hac vice, John K. Sherk -- jsherk@shb.com -- SHOOK,
HARDY & BACON LLP, pro hac vice, Kevin T. Van Wart --
kevin.vanwart@kirkland.com -- Kirkland & Ellis, pro hac vice.

MICHIGAN: 6th Cir. Flips Summary Judgment Ruling in Inmates Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DOES 8-10, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICK SNYDER;
HEIDI E. WASHINGTON; DANIEL H. HEYNS; THOMAS FINCO; DENNIS STRAUB;
RANDY TREACHER; MARY BERGHUIS; DAVID BERGH; JEFFREY WOODS; CARMEN
DENISE PALMER; THOMAS WINN; DUNCAN MACLAREN; MITCH PERRY; KENNETH
T. McKEE, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-1352 (6th Cir.), Judge
Karen Nelson Moore of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with her Opinion.

The Plaintiffs, John Does 8-10, are inmates in various Michigan
prison facilities.  At one time, the Does were juveniles housed
with adult inmates, a policy that Michigan has since abandoned. The
Plaintiffs bring Section 1983 claims that stem from alleged sexual
abuse by adult inmates, which occurred when the policy of housing
juveniles with adults was in place.  The case is a putative class
action, and the class seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory
relief.  The Defendants are former-Governor Rick Snyder and a host
of other state officials and prison wardens.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires inmates to
exhaust available administrative remedies.  The Supreme Court has
explained that "the PLRA contains its own, textual exception to
mandatory exhaustion.  Under Section 1997e(a), the exhaustion
requirement hinges on the availability of administrative remedies:
An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not
exhaust unavailable ones.  The question in the caseis whether the
administrative remedies provided to inmates by the State of
Michigan are "available."  In the case before the Court, they are
not.  As the experiences of John Doe 8 and John Doe 10 show, the
Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") administrative process
is, in practice, filled with contradictions -- so much so that it
holds that it is unavailable.

John Doe 9's situation is slightly different.  Doe 9 did not file a
grievance, but he claims that he should be excused from doing so
because he experienced retaliation after a prior attempt to submit
a grievance.  Doe 9's allegations, if true, would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing with the grievance process.  The
district court failed to address this issue on the merits, but it
should have.

The district court entered summary judgment for the Defendants
because the district court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.  It
determined, in part, that the general grievance process, rather
than the PREA process, applied.  Finally, the district court failed
to address the merits of Doe 9's claim that he should be excused
from exhaustion based on the alleged retaliation that he
experienced.  Instead, the district court again relied on its
determination that the two-step PREA process did not apply.

The parties dispute which administrative process the Plaintiffs
were required to exhaust.  The Defendants contend that the only
administrative process available was MDOC's regular three-step
grievance process.  Under that general process, grievances need to
be submitted within seven days of an incident, and therefore, the
Plaintiffs' grievances would be untimely.

Judge Moore finds that the Defendants' treatment of the grievances
contradicts their argument.  The Defendants unquestionably treated
the Plaintiffs' complaints as PREA grievances.  Thus, even if the
Defendants were correct that the three-step general process should
have applied, when prison officials decline to enforce their own
procedural requirements and opt to consider otherwise-defaulted
claims on the merits, so as a general rule will the Court.

The Defendants appear to be trying to recast an argument from the
prior litigation, supra Section I.A., that PREA applied to only
federal prisons and not the States.  The DOJ refuted that argument
in its Statement of Interest in that case, probably because it is
completely atextual.  Now, the Defendants argue that PREA does not
apply to Michigan, at least not at the time of these grievances and
in this particular context.  For these reasons, these arguments are
meritless.

Having determined that the PREA grievance process is the relevant
MDOC administrative remedy, the Judge turns to the question of
whether that remedy is "available" under the PLRA.  He finds that
the administrative remedy was not available to Doe 8 or Doe 10, and
therefore, the PLRA does not require them to exhaust.  The prison
officials effectively prevented the use of the PREA grievance
process, even if that process could be an otherwise proper
procedure.

Finally, the Defendants appear to contest Doe 9's allegations that
prison officials retaliated against him.  At the very least, the
Defendants fail to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.  As stated, if Doe 9's allegations prove to be true,
then the adverse actions that Doe 9 describes would "deter a person
of ordinary firmness" from proceeding through the grievance
process.

For these reasons, Judge Moore reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the Defendants, and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with her Opinion.  John Doe 9 has
presented enough evidence to withstand summary judgment.  Moreover,
as John Doe 8's and John Doe 10's experiences with the
administrative process provided by MDOC show, the administrative
remedy is unavailable, and therefore, exhaustion is not required.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/aYePDo from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Deborah A. LaBelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants.

Heather S. Meingast -- meingasth@michigan.gov -- OFFICE OF THE
MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Deborah A. LaBelle, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michael L. Pitt
-- mpitt@pittlawpc.com -- Cary S. McGehee -- cmcgehee@pittlawpc.com
-- PITT McGEHEE PALMER RIVERS & GOLDEN PC, Royal Oak, Michigan, for
Appellants.

Heather S. Meingast, Mark E. Donnelly, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.


MOMENTA PHARMA: Settlement Agreement Entered in Tennessee Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed on December 10, 2019,
that a settlement agreement has been entered in the class action
suit entitled, The Hospital Authority of Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, et al. v. Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:15-cv-01100.

On December 10, 2019, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. entered into a
settlement agreement with the plaintiffs in the antitrust class
action lawsuit pending in the United States District Court, Middle
District of Tennessee under the caption The Hospital Authority of
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,
Tennessee, et al. v. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., Case
No. 3:15-cv-01100.

Under the Settlement Agreement, in consideration for a full release
of Momenta from all alleged claims, Momenta has agreed to pay to
plaintiffs an aggregate of $35.0 million, of which $200,000 is to
be paid within five business days of the entry of the Court's order
directing notice of the settlement agreement to the class, $14.8
million is to be paid within five business days of final approval
of the Settlement Agreement by the Court, and $20.0 million is to
be paid on the later of 270 calendar days of the execution date of
the Settlement Agreement or five business days after the final
approval of the Settlement Agreement by the Court.

The Settlement Agreement is subject to class notice periods and
Court approval pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

Momenta denies all claims and allegations of wrongdoing made in the
Class Action Suit.

Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a biotechnology company, focuses on
the discovery and development of novel biologic therapies for the
treatment of rare immune-mediated diseases in the United States.
The company was formerly known as Mimeon, Inc. and changed its name
to Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in September 2002. Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2001 and is headquartered in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.


MRS BPO: N.J. Dist. Ct. Certifies Class in Ridley FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FATIMA RIDLEY, individually, and on behalf of all
other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, v. MRS BPO, LLC,
Defendant, Civil No. 18-12696 (NLH/JS) (D. N.J.), Judge Noel L.
Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class.

On Aug. 13, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a one-count putative class
action complaint against the Defendant for allegedly violating the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") when it incorrectly
identified the original creditor on "trade lines" placed on her
credit report.

At some unspecified time, the Plaintiff incurred a private student
loan debt.  In furtherance of its debt collection efforts,
Defendant, a debt collector, placed a trade line on the Plaintiff's
credit report in October 2017, incorrectly listing Transworld
Systems Inc. as the purported original creditor.  The parties
appear to agree that Transworld is not, in fact, the original
creditor for the Plaintiff's debt, and that the Defendant
improperly reported TSI in some cases instead of the name that
should have been reported.  In light of the Defendant's error, the
Plaintiff alleges that she was unsure whether payment was required
and that the proverbial least sophisticated debtor would be equally
confused.

The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant made similar errors
affecting other debtors and asks the Court to certify the following
class of all consumers with a Pennsylvania address for whom
Defendant reported an incorrect original creditor to the credit
reporting agencies for personal, household, or family debts
originating within one year prior to the filing of the complaint.

The Defendant offered the following discovery response relevant to
determining whether class certification would be appropriate:

     a.  INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the number of persons, their
full names and full addresses of all persons within the State of
Pennsylvania for whom Defendant reported an incorrect original
creditor to the credit reporting agencies for personal, household,
or family debts originating within the period of time beginning one
year prior to the filing of this initial action and end 21 days
after the service of the initial complaint.

     b. ANSWER: The Defendant objects.  Notwithstanding and without
waiving these objections, the Defendant estimates that there are 73
individuals for whom it furnished information to a consumer
reporting agency suggesting that Transworld Systems Inc. was the
creditor of an account within the described time period.

Also before the Court is a portion of Michael Meyer's deposition.
The parties elected to submit only narrow portions of Meyer's
deposition transcript for the Court's review, and the portions
submitted fail to fully clarify Meyer's role in the action.  The
Plaintiff represents in her briefing that Meyer testified as the
Defendant's corporate representative, which does not appear to be
disputed.

Judge Hillman finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the Rule 23(a)
factors by a preponderance of the evidence.  After Rule 23(a) is
satisfied, a plaintiff must establish that the proposed class also
satisfies Rule 23(b).  For class certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
the Court must find that (1) "questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members," and (2) that a "class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy."  In the case, both considerations favor class
certification, the Judge holds.

For these reasons, he granted the Plaintiff's Motion.  While the
Plaintiff submitted a proposed order for the Court's consideration,
the form of the proposed order is not entirely consistent with the
Opinion.  As such, he will Order her to draft and submit a revised
proposed order consistent with his Opinion.  In that revised order,
among other things, the Plaintiff will refine the proposed class
definition in a manner consistent the Court's analysis.  Once
submitted, the Defendant will have an opportunity to object to the
proposed form.  Any objections will be made within seven days of
the proposed order being filed.  An appropriate Order will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Opinion is available
at https://is.gd/CdnNNp from Leagle.com.

FATIMA RIDLEY, individually, and on behalf of all other similarly
situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by DANIEL ZEMEL --
dz@zemellawllc.com -- Zemel Law LLC.

MRS BPO, LLC, Defendant, represented by ALEKSANDER P. POWIETRZYNSKI
-- ww@winstonandwinston.com -- WINSTON & WINSTON PC.


NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Manning PI Suit Transferred to Illinois
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Nathaniel Manning, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Defendant, was transferred from Indiana
Southern with the assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-04461 to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on
January 8, 2020, and assigned Case No. 1:20-cv-00030.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as
Diversity-Personal Injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a nonprofit
organization that regulates student athletes from 1,268 North
American institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Lewis Raizner, Esq.
   Raizner Slania, Llp
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NATIONAL COLLEGIATE: Washington PI Suit Transferred to Illinois
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Craig Washington, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, Defendant, was transferred from Indiana
Southern with the assigned Case No. 1:19-cv-04460 to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on
January 8, 2020, and assigned Case No. 1:20-cv-00021.

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as
Diversity-Personal Injury.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a nonprofit
organization that regulates student athletes from 1,268 North
American institutions and conferences.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Lewis Raizner, Esq.
   Raizner Slania, Llp
   2402 Dunlavy Street
   Houston, TX 77006
   Tel: (713) 554-9099
   Email: jraizner@raiznerlaw.com



NECA/IBEW FAMILY: Summary Judgment Bids in DT ERISA Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, D.T., by and through his parents and guardians, K.T.
and W.T., individually, on behalf of similarly situated
individuals, and on behalf of the NECA/IBEW Family Medical Care
Plan, Plaintiff, v. NECA/IBEW FAMILY MEDICAL CARE PLAN, THE BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE NECA/IBEW FAMILY MEDICAL CARE PLAN, SALVATORE J.
CHILIA, ROBERT P. KLEIN, DARRELL L. McCUBBINS, GEARY HIGGINS,
LAWRENCE J. MOTER, JR., KEVIN TIGHE, JERRY SIMS, AND ANY OTHER
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF NECA/IBEW FAMILY
MEDICAL CARE PLAN, Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-00004-RAJ (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Richard A. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, denied both (i) the
Plaintiff's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, and (ii) the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The case involves benefits coverage for children with developmental
mental health conditions such as Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD").
Plaintiff D.T. is a three-year old boy who has been diagnosed with
ASD.  He is covered as a dependent-beneficiary under the Defendant
NECA/IBEW Family Medical Care Plan.

The Plan is a multiemployer health and welfare plan within the
meaning of Section 3(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), that has been established pursuant to an
agreement entered into between the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers ("IBEW") and the National Electrical Contractors
Association ("NECA") for the purpose of providing major medical
benefits to covered employees.  The Plan is administered by a Board
of Trustees, also named as Defendants in the action.

The Plaintiff was prescribed Applied Behavior Analysis ("ABA") and
neurodevelopmental therapy to treat his ASD.  However, he was
denied coverage for these treatments, both initially and on appeal.
After the Board of Trustees denied the appeals, the Plan's legal
counsel sent the Plaintiff's parents a letter outlining the basis
for the denial of coverage.  The Plan also denied coverage of ABA
and neurodevelopmental therapies for other Plan beneficiaries.

On Jan. 4, 2017, the Plaintiff brought the class action lawsuit
alleging that the Defendants' denial of ABA and neurodevelopmental
therapies on the basis of its Developmental Delay Exclusion
violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") and
the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and
Addiction Equity Act.  The Plaintiff asserted three ERISA claims
against the Defendants: (1) recovery of benefits; (2) breach of
fiduciary duty; and (3) equitable relief.

On June 8, 2018, the Plaintiff moved to certify the class.  The
Court granted class certification and defined the class to include:
All individuals who: (2) have been, are or will be participants or
beneficiaries under the NECA-IBEW Family Medical Care Plan at any
time on or after January 4, 2011; and (2) require
neurodevelopmental therapy (speech, occupational or physical
therapy) or applied behavior analysis therapy to treat a qualified
mental health condition.

The term qualified mental health condition will mean a condition
listed in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric
Association to which defendants applied and/or currently apply the
Plan's Developmental Delay Exclusion.

On Sept. 12, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as to the Class' eligibility to benefits under the plain
language of the Plan's terms.  He later filed a second Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment regarding the Federal Mental Health Parity
Act.  The Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
regarding the Federal Mental Health Parity Act.

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Defendants,
Judge Jones cannot conclude as a matter of law that the plain
language of the Plan mandates coverage of ABA therapy for ASD.  He
finds that the Plaintiff's interpretation is plausible based on the
plain language of the Plan.  The Plan language clearly defines
mental health treatment as a "covered medical expense."  Because
ASD is widely understood to be a mental health condition, it is
reasonable to assume that ASD would be covered.  However,
Defendants offer an equally plausible interpretation.  Although the
Plan includes coverage for mental health services, it also details
limitations and exclusions, including the Developmental Delay
Exclusion.  Thus, a reasonable person could interpret that Plan to
cover treatment for mental health condition but exclude ABA therapy
for ASD.  He denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and a Permanent Injunction.  

In a second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff
argues that the Developmental Delay Exclusion is unlawful under the
Federal Parity Act.  The Defendants also move for summary judgment
as to the issue.  The Judge explains that a person claiming a
violation of the Federal Parity Act may allege an impermissible
mental-health exclusion or limitation based on the express terms of
the plan (a "facial" challenge) or based on the plan
administrator's application of the plan (an "as-applied"
challenge).  In the case, the Plaintiff asserts both a facial and
as-applied challenge to the Developmental Delay Exclusion.

Judge Jones cannot conclude as a matter of law that the DDE
expressly excludes all coverage for ASD and developmental mental
health conditions, sufficient to warrant a grant of summary
judgment.  He says it is hardly clear from the record that the DDE
was a blanket exclusion of coverage.  In addition, the Plan does
not define what constitutes a "developmental delay" under the DDE.
The Defendants point to a list of diagnosis codes from the Plan's
claim system but the Plaintiff argues this list was prepared during
the course of discovery and is not a formal interpretation of the
Plan language.

Finally, Judge Jones finds that there is competing evidence as to
whether the Developmental Delay Exclusion was consistently applied
to exclude coverage for all benefits related to ASD and other
developmental mental health conditions.  On the record, he cannot
conclude as a matter of law that the DDE was consistently applied
to exclude all coverage for ASD or developmental mental health
conditions or alternatively that the DDE was a treatment limitation
that was only applied to deny coverage for ABA and
neurodevelopmental therapies.  Because there remains a genuine
dispute of material fact as to the definition of a "developmental
delay" under the DDE and the application of the DDE by the Plan,
the Judge finds the issue is inappropriate for summary judgment.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Jones denied the Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding the Plan Language and
Permanent Injunction.  He also denied the Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Regarding the Federal Mental Health Parity
Act and Permanent Injunction, and the Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/xJZf9L from Leagle.com.

D. T., by and through his parents and guardians, K.T. and W.T.,
individually, on behalf of similarly situated individuals, and on
behalf of the NECA/IBEW Family Medical Care Plan, Plaintiff,
represented by Richard E. Spoonemore -- rspoonemore@sylaw.com --
SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER & Eleanor Hamburger --
ehamburger@sylaw.com -- SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE HAMBURGER.

NECA/IBEW Family Medical Care Plan, The Board of Trustees of the
NECA/IBEW Family Medical Care Plan, Salvatore J. Chilia, Robert P.
Klein, Darrell L. McCubbins, Geary Higgins, Lawrence J. Moter,
Jr.,
Kevin Tighe & Jerry Simms, Defendants, represented by Katie M.
Burch -- kburch@phk-law.com -- POTTS-DUPRE, HAWKINS & KRAMER CHTD,
pro hac vice, Tiffany D. Downs -- tdowns@fordharrison.com -- FORD
HARRISON LLP, pro hac vice & Kristina Detwiler, ROBBLEE DETWILER &
BLACK.

Any other individual member of the Board of Trustees of NECA/IBEW
Family Medical Care Plan, Defendant, pro se.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Healthcare of Georgia, Movant, represented
by Robert C. Deegan, REED SMITH, pro hac vice & Mary Rebecca Knack,

WILLIAMS KASTNER.

NEW YORK: 2nd Cir. Flips Denial of Inmate Irvin's Rule 60(b) Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAMUEL IRVIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, DANIEL MILLER,
DEMETRIO LIFREIRI, EUGENE MAZZIO, Intervenors, LOUIS MILBURN, A.
BROWN, FOR CLASS OF LOUIS MILBURN, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID R. HARRIS,
SUPERINTENDENT, GREEN HAVEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; THOMAS A.
COUGHLIN, III, Defendants-Appellees, HENRY S. DOGIN, ADMINISTRATOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE; PATRICIA HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, Defendants, Docket No. 17-1062-pr (2d Cir.), Judge
Rosemary S. Pooler of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed a trial court denial of Irvin's motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reconsider termination of
the Milburn consent decree.

The case stems from a termination of a consent decree in 2015 that
was first entered by the district court in 1982.  The consent
decree's objective was to ensure that inmates at Green Haven
Correctional Facility had access to adequate medical care.  In
September 1979, Louis Milburn, then an incarcerated inmate at Green
Haven, filed a pro se complaint alleging deficiencies in its
provision of health care services.  In April 1980, Milburn, at this
time represented, filed an amended complaint with 13 other
co-plaintiff class representatives, alleging that Green Haven's
health care services were so inadequate that they violated their
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.  The district court subsequently certified a
class of all persons who are or will be confined at the Green Haven
Correctional Facility in December 1980.

Eventually the parties stipulated to an entry of final judgment
whereby the plaintiffs agreed to discontinue the action in exchange
for certain reforms.  In August 1982, the district court entered a
consent decree providing injunctive relief to the class members.

About seven years later, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the
Green Haven Defendants in contempt for violating the 1982 consent
decree and to modify the consent judgment to achieve its original
purpose.  In response, the district court appointed a medical
auditor, Dr. Robert Cohen, who determined that Green Haven was not
in compliance with the consent judgment and recommended additional
modifications to improve health care at the facility.  In 1991, the
parties entered a proposed stipulation for entry of a modified
judgment, and plaintiffs withdrew their motion when the Defendants
agreed to amend the 1982 consent decree.  As with the 1982 consent
decree, the court entered the 1991 consent decree after concluding
that the settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable to all
members of the plaintiff class.

Meanwhile, Dr. Cohen continued to audit Green Haven's health care
system for the next 23 years.  His three-year term was repeatedly
extended because Green Haven was not in full compliance with the
1991 consent decree.  In his most recent report in 2014, Dr. Cohen
finally found that Green Haven was in compliance with the terms of
the modified final judgment.

In July 2014, the Defendants moved to terminate the consent decree
under Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on
the basis that the consent judgment was no longer necessary "to
correct a current and ongoing" violation of any constitutional
right and that, even if some unconstitutional conditions persisted,
the judgment was not the least intrusive means necessary to correct
the violation.

Initially, the class counsel opposed and filed a cross-motion to
modify the 1991 consent decree to address ongoing deficiencies.
But on Aug. 15, 2014, the class counsel wrote a letter to certain
inmates -- specifically, all the class members with whom the
counsel had any contact in the preceding two years -- including
Irvin and intervenor Demetrio Lifreiri, explaining why the counsel
believed that the risk of an adverse decision should be avoided.
The class counsel also explained that they had not yet made a
"final decision" on how to proceed but they would nonetheless
continue with discovery.

Without further notice to any class members, the class counsel next
informed the district court by letter dated March 2, 2015, that
they would no longer oppose termination.  On March 4, 2015, again,
without any notice to the class members, the district court noted
the withdrawal, so-ordered the class counsel's letter, and
terminated the consent decree.  It is undisputed that at the time
of termination, neither Louis Milburn, nor any of the other class
representatives, were still incarcerated at Green Haven.  The class
counsel then informed certain class members by letter dated March
11, 2015 that the consent decree had been terminated.

In June 2016, Irvin, a Green Haven inmate who was a member of the
Milburn class, filed the pro se Rule 60(b) motion at issue in the
appeal, seeking to set aside the district court's termination
order.  Irvin purported to move on behalf of himself and the entire
"class of prisoners at the Green Haven."  Specifically, his motion
called attention to Green Haven's cutting back on all the supplies,
its elimination of one of the day nurses and all the emergency call
buttons in prisoners' cells, and its elimination of the overnight
nurse all together.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied Irvin's Rule 60(b) motion on two grounds.  First, it
concluded that Irvin lacked standing to bring a Rule 60(b) motion
because he was merely a class member rather than a named class
representative.  Second, it construed Irvin's filing as a motion
for relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and
60(b)(3), so it denied it as untimely under Rule 60(c), which
requires that motions under subsections, and be made no more than a
year after the entry of the judgment.  Even construing the motion
under the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6), the district court
found that Irvin had not shown the "extraordinary circumstances"
required for relief.

Irvin then timely appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.
The Second Circuit  appointed a pro bono counsel to represent
Irvin, instructing counsel to brief, among any other issues,
whether: (1) Appellant had standing to move for relief from the
order terminating the consent decree (including whether he could
have objected to the class counsel's decision to withdraw its
opposition to the Defendants' motion to terminate that decree); (2)
Appellant's motion for relief was timely under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b); and (3) Appellant demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances for such relief (including whether the existence of
extraordinary circumstances could have been determined on the
motion papers alone).

In January 2018, Green Haven inmates Demetrio Lifreiri, Eugene
Mazzio, and Daniel Miller moved to intervene in the appeal.  The
Second Circuit granted the motion.  The intervenors also sought to
reverse the district court's order denying Irvin's pro se Rule
60(b) motion.

Irvin argues on appeal that the district court's judgment is void
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) because it
violated due process.  In particular, Irvin argues (1) that the
class was not adequately represented, and (2) that the district
court was required to provide notice to the class or conduct a
fairness hearing.

The Second Circuit holds the named representatives of a Green Haven
inmate class certified 35 years before the relevant proceedings do
not adequately represent the class when they are no longer Green
Haven inmates and have not continued to pursue the litigation.  The
termination of the 1991 consent decree violated Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because the class was inadequately represented.
Accordingly, the termination judgment is void, and the district
court's denial of Irvin's Rule 60(b) motion to set it aside must be
reversed, the Second Circuit opines.  After substituting new class
representatives or otherwise addressing the deficiency in
representation, the district court should once again provide the
class an opportunity to show current and ongoing violations of
their federal rights before terminating the litigation, the Second
Circuit says.

The Second Circuit concludes that the case, in which the class
members seek an opportunity to obtain adequate medical care while
incarcerated by the state, demonstrates the importance of adequate
representation as required by Rule 23 and the Due Process Clause.
The Second Circuit reminds the district courts that even for
longstanding consent decrees such as the one in the case, the named
representatives must adequately represent the class members'
interests at all times.

For these foregoing reasons, the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's denial of Irvin's Rule 60(b) motion, and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/sGgrZ7 from Leagle.com.

BRIAN MARC FELDMAN -- bfeldman@hselaw.com -- Harter Secrest &
Emerly LLP, Rochester, NY (Gregory M. Dickinson, on the brief), for
Plaintiff-Appellant Samuel Irvin and Intervenors Daniel Miller,
Demetrio Lifreiri, and Eugene Mazzio.

MARC S. GRUBE, Assistant Solicitor General (Steven C. Wu, Deputy
Solicitor General, on the brief), for Barbara D. Underwood,
Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY, for
Defendants-Appellees David R. Harris and Thomas A. Coughlin, III.


NITEHAWK BROOKLYN: Dominguez Asserts Breach of ADA
--------------------------------------------------
Nitehawk Brooklyn LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Yovanny Dominguez for himself and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Nitehawk Brooklyn LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 1:20-cv-00161 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 8, 2020).

Nitehawk Brooklyn LLC is a dine-in independent movie theater in
Brooklyn, New York City. It operates two locations, in the
neighborhoods of Williamsburg and Park Slope.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Justin Alexander Zeller, Esq.
   The Law Office of Justin A. Zeller, P.C.
   277 Broadway, Suite 408
   New York, NY 10007
   Tel: (212) 229-2249
   Fax: (212) 229-2246
   Email: Jazeller@zellerlegal.com


OPTIO SOLUTIONS: Ct. Denies Partial Bid to Dismiss Knaak FDCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICHARD KNAAK, Plaintiff, v. OPTIO SOLUTIONS LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-1036-JPS (E.D. Wis.), Judge J.P.
Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin denied the Defendant's partial motion to dismiss certain
of the Plaintiff's claims.

The Plaintiff filed the class action on July 18, 2019.  He sues the
Defendant for sending him, and the members of the putative class,
allegedly misleading debt collection letters.  He brings claims
under various provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), and the Wisconsin Consumer Act ("WCA").

The Plaintiff allegedly owed a debt through a Kohl's store-branded
credit card.  The Defendant was hired to collect the balance due on
the account.  The Defendant sent the Plaintiff a letter seeking
payment on Sept. 7, 2018.

The Plaintiff's claims in the case relate to the "Fees" and
"Interest" portions of the account summary.  To that end, he also
attached to his complaint a billing statement he received from
Kohl's in late 2016, which states that he had accrued $210 in fees
and $381.15 in interest in the year 2016.

The Plaintiff presents three claims for relief.  First, he contends
that the Letter falsely implies that the debt would accrue interest
or fees, when the Defendant was not assessing such charges or even
entitled to collect them.  It allegedly violates 15 U.S.C. Section
1692e, which prohibits the use of false or misleading
representations in the collection of a debt.  Second, the Plaintiff
asserts that the same conduct violates the WCA, Section 427.104.
Third, he states that by offering an "interest" balance which was
less than that described in the Kohl's billing statement, the
Letter again violated Section 1692e by mispresenting the amount of
the debt.

The Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss certain of the
Plaintiff's claims on Oct. 16, 2019.  The Defendant attacks only
the first and second claims, making three arguments for their
dismissal.  First, it asserts that the Letter does not necessarily
imply that fees and interest are accruing merely because the Letter
itemizes the debt.  It is true that the Letter does not
affirmatively state anywhere that fees and interest are accruing.
But an unsophisticated consumer could infer that the itemization of
those charges means that the amounts may change over time.

Admittedly, the Plaintiff's view is just one reasonable way to
interpret the Letter.  One could also agree with the Defendant's
assessment.  It means that a jury must be called upon to determine
which is the correct interpretation, and ultimately whether the
Letter is misleading.  In other words, the Defendant has not
convinced the Court that the Letter is so "plainly and clearly not
misleading" that it should take the matter out of the jury's
hands.

The Defendant's second argument is that the Plaintiff's reading of
the Letter is bizarre and idiosyncratic, meaning that it does not
warrant the imposition of FDCPA liability.  Judge Stadtmueller
disagrees.  He has already determined that the Plaintiff's
interpretation is one of a number of reasonable assessments of the
Letter's text.  An unsophisticated consumer reading the Letter
would have no idea who had applied the fees and interest stated
therein; the Letter does not offer an explanation on that point.
Further, any reference to the billing statement would only increase
the debtor's confusion.

The Defendant's final argument for dismissal is that it included
some "safe-harbor" language, approved by the Second Circuit in
Avila v. Riexinger & Assoc., LLC, which immunizes the Letter from
confusion-based claims such as those presented by the Plaintiff.
However, the Judge holds that Avila is distinguishable for the same
reason as Fields v. Wilber Law Firm, P.C.: the debt is static.  The
the confusion is whether a static debt was not accruing fees or
interest, where the Letter at least implies that this may be true.
The Avila-inspired paragraph in the Letter, which begins with "we
are willing to settle your account," does nothing to address the
deception complained-of by the Plaintiff.  The paragraph says
nothing about fees or interest at all.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Stadtmueller denied the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/rgEiUO from Leagle.com.

Richard Knaak, Plaintiff, represented by Ben J. Slatky --
bslatky@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, Jesse Fruchter --
jfruchter@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP, John D. Blythin --
jblythin@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP & Mark A. Eldridge --
meldridge@ademilaw.com -- Ademi & O'Reilly LLP.

Optio Solutions LLC, doing business as Qualia Collection Services,
Defendant, represented by Patrick A. Watts -- pwatts@mamlaw.com --
& Robbie L. Malone -- rmalone@mamlaw.com -- Malone Frost Martin
PLLC.


PANERA LLC: Court Dismisses Tabler Suit with Leave to Amend
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIANNA TABLER, Plaintiff, v. PANERA LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 19-CV-01646-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, (i) granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave
to amend, (ii) denied the Defendant's request to stay the instant
case, and (iii) denied as moot the Defendant's request to strike
portions of the Plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff Tabler is a citizen of Santa Clara County, California.
Defendant Panera is a limited liability company that was formed
under the laws of England and that maintains a domestic
headquarters in New York City.  The Defendant manufactures,
markets, and distributes "bread products," such as Defendant's
Whole Grain Bagel, in retail outlets in California.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant falsely and deceptively
labels and markets the Products as "clean" or "100% clean."
According to her, the claim that the Products are "clean" features
prominently in the Defendant's advertising and marketing materials.
The Plaintiff asserts that the claim is ubiquitous at the point of
sale of the Products -- on bags, signs, and labels throughout
Panera's physical locations.  For example, the Plaintiff indicates
that signs and placards at the Defendant's retail outlets display
statements such as, "Food should be clean. No artificial colors,
preservatives, sweeteners, flavors, or anything else you wouldn't
want to serve your family."

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is aware that the Products
contain glyphosate residue and that it is also aware of the source
of the glyphosate residue in the production process.  She asserts
that the Defendant purposefully fails to disclose the information
in order to charge a premium from consumers, and in order to ensure
that consumers do not cease purchasing the Products and switch to
one of the Defendant's competitors.

The Plaintiff purchased the Defendant's Whole Grain Bagel, as well
as other unspecified Products, at unspecified times from three
different retail outlets located in California.  She alleges that
in deciding to make these purchases, she saw, relied upon, and
reasonably believed the Defendant's representations that the
Products were '100% clean' or 'clean.'

On March 29, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the instant putative class
action complaint against the Defendant and two related entities.
The complaint alleges causes of action under: (1) California's
Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) California's False
Advertisement Law ("FAL"); and (3) California's Unfair Competition
Law ("UCL").  On May 15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a notice of
voluntary dismissal of the two related entities.  Thus, the
Defendant is the only remaining defendant in the instant case.

On July 10, 2019, the Defendant filed the instant motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay the instant case or strike
portions of the Plaintiff's complaint.  On Aug. 12, 2019, the
Plaintiff filed an opposition.

On July 10, 2019, the Defendant filed a request for judicial notice
in support of its motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay
the Plaintiff's complaint or strike portions thereof.  On Sept. 9,
2019, the Defendant filed a second request for judicial notice in
support of the Defendant's reply.  On Sept. 17, 2019, the Plaintiff
opposed the Defendant's two requests for judicial notice.  Finally,
on Oct. 18, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a statement of recent
decision.

In the Defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to
stay the instant case or strike portions of the Plaintiff's
complaint, the Defendant asserts that dismissal of the Plaintiff's
complaint is appropriate for four independent reasons: (1) no
reasonable consumer would understand the Defendant's alleged
statements to mean that the Products are free of glyphosate
residue; (2) the complaint does not plead reliance with sufficient
specificity to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); (3) the Plaintiff's claims are
preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") as
amended by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act ("NLEA"); and
(4) the Plaintiff's claims interfere with the primary jurisdiction
of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), the two federal agencies tasked with
determining the safety of glyphosate for human consumption.

The Defendant also argues that, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the Court should stay the instant case pending an
upcoming decision by the EPA concerning the safety of glyphosate
for human consumption.  Finally, "in the alternative" to dismissal,
the Defendant requests that the Court strikes the Plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief, the Plaintiff's individual and class
allegations to the extent the allegations concern Products that the
Plaintiff did not purchase, and her class allegations to the extent
the allegations concern representations upon which she did not
rely.

Judge Koh concludes that the Plaintiff's claims are not preempted
by the FDCA or the NLEA.  She further concludes that exercise of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine to either dismiss or stay the
instant case is inappropriate.  However, she concludes that
dismissal of the complaint is nevertheless warranted.  She
concludes that the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief should
be dismissed for lack of Article III standing, while her claims
based on unpurchased products should be dismissed for lack of
standing.  The Judge further concludes that the complaint as a
whole fails to allege reliance with sufficient specificity to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b).

Accordingly, the Judge need not reach the Defendant's other
arguments that no reasonable consumer would understand its
statements to mean that the Products are free of glyphosate residue
or that the Plaintiff is not an adequate class representative.
Furthermore, because she concludes that dismissal of the complaint
is warranted, the Defendant's "alternative" request for an order
striking portions of the complaint is moot.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss with leave to amend.  She denied the Defendant's request
to stay the instant case, and denied as moot the Defendant's
request to strike portions of the Plaintiff's complaint.

The Plaintiff may file an amended complaint without delay.  In the
amended complaint, to the extent that the Plaintiff does not plead
the existence of an advertising campaign of the necessary "extent
and pervasiveness" to satisfy the In re Tobacco II exception, the
Plaintiff will set forth in chart form the misstatements that she
challenges on a numbered, statement-by-statement basis: (1) the
challenged statement; (2) the location and timing of the statement;
(3) the Product(s) covered by the statement; (4) the date on which
the Plaintiff witnessed the statement; and (5) the Product(s) she
purchased on the basis of the statement.

The Plaintiff may not add new causes of action or new parties in an
amended complaint without a stipulation or leave of the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Oct. 29, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FXr9hv from Leagle.com.

Brianna Tabler, Plaintiff, represented by Nathan Caine Stein,
Richman Law Group & Jaimie Mak, Richman Law Group.

Panera LLC, Defendant, represented by Valerie Meiling Goo --
vgoo@crowell.com -- Crowell Moring LLP & Raija Horstman --
rhorstman@crowell.com -- Orrick, Herrrington and Sutcliffe.


PENNY & COOPER: Faces Laser Suit Over Discrimination Under ADA
--------------------------------------------------------------
LINDA LASER and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. PENNY
& COOPER, LLC d/b/a PENNY & COOPER and 154-156 MAIN ST LLC, Case
No. 2:19-cv-06939-BMC (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 2019), arises from the
Defendants' unlawful disability discrimination against the
Plaintiff, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
New York State Executive Law, the New York State Civil Rights Law,
and the Suffolk County Code.

On August 4, 2019, the Plaintiff attempted to access the
Defendants' business, and discovered that the premises contained
architectural barriers that prevents and/or restricts access to the
Plaintiff, a person with a disability.

The Plaintiff alleges that the services, features, elements and
spaces of the Defendants' place of public accommodation are not
readily accessible to, or usable by her as required by the ADA
Accessibility Guidelines. Because of the Defendants' failure to
comply with ADA, including the Accessibility Standards and the
Administrative Code, the Plaintiff was and has been unable to enjoy
equal and complete access to Defendants' place of public
accommodation.

The Plaintiff is an adult female confined to a wheelchair. She is
required to use a wheelchair as a result of being diagnosed with
Multiple Sclerosis.

The Defendants are public accommodations as they own, lease, lease
to, control or operate a place of public accommodation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Darryn G. Solotoff, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICE OF DARRYN SOLOTOFF PLLC
          100 Quentin Roosevelt Blvd., No. 208
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: 516.695.0052
          Facsimile: 212.706.4692
          E-mail: ds@belllg.com


PF PAYROLL: Rivera Sues Over Failure to Pay Uniform Maintenance
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Rivera, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. PF PAYROLL LLC, and PFNY, LLC, Case No. 500474/2020
(N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., Jan. 8, 2020), is brought against the
Defendants for violations of the New York State Labor Law, the New
York Code of Rules and Regulations and the New York Wage Theft
Prevention Act relating to uniform maintenance.

The Plaintiff says he was required by Defendants to wear a uniform
every shift, and he did, in fact, wear the uniform every shift. The
uniform required daily washing but the Defendants never paid any
uniform maintenance pay or reimbursement for the cost of
maintaining the uniform, the Plaintiff asserts. He adds that he
spent time off-the-clock and money to clean and maintain his
uniform consistent with the uniform appearance standards the
Defendants required.

The Plaintiff asserts he was entitled to reimbursement or
additional pay for time spent off the clock and money spent in
laundering and maintaining the Defendants' uniform. In the event
that an article of the uniform became unwearable, he adds that he
would have had to purchase a replacement from the Defendants at his
own expense.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from July 2, 2019,
through November 11, 2019.

The Defendants own and operate Planet Fitness locations throughout
New York State.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Gaylord, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          445 Broadhollow Road, Suite 110
          Melville, NY 11747
          Phone: (516) 742-4949
          Fax: (516)742-1977
          Email: mark@bglawny.com


PHILADELPHIA, PA: Summ. Judgment Bid in Andrews Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HAKIEM ANDREWS, Plaintiff, Pro Se, v. GERALD MAY,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 16-1872 (E.D. Pa.), Judge E.K. Pratter
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted Warden May's motion for summary judgment on the Section
1983 claim but denied it on the civil contempt claim.

Mr. Andrews claims that May, Warden of the Curran-Fromhold
Correctional Facility ("CFCF"), violated his constitutional rights
by subjecting him to unsanitary, unsafe, and inadequate prison
conditions—namely, housing three inmates in a cell built for two,
a practice also known as "triple-celling."  In addition to the
Section 1983 prison conditions claim, Mr. Andrews asserts a claim
of civil contempt against Warden May, alleging violations of a
settlement agreement between a former class of prisoners
challenging the constitutionality of triple-celling and the City of
Philadelphia.

Mr. Andrews was an inmate at CFCF from August 2015 until May 2017,
when he was released into state custody.  He alleges that
throughout his time at CFCF, he spent at least 264 days in a triple
cell.  While subject to the triple-celling, Mr. Andrews slept on a
"boat" -- a type of plastic bed -- next to the cell's toilet, where
he was allegedly exposed to urine and fecal matter.

CFCF maintains a grievance procedure through which inmates can seek
administrative resolution of complaints arising from its
administration or operation.  The CFCF grievance procedure entitles
inmates to file grievances and appeal any responses thereto.

Mr. Andrews claims that he filed his first grievance complaining of
triple-celling on March 27, 2016.  In response to that grievance,
Mr. Andrews allegedly had an oral hearing with two prison
officials, Lieutenant Lynn and Sergeant Roney, during which they
basically just told him to go back to his block and deal with it.

Mr. Andrews then turned to the judicial system for relief.  After
applying to proceed in forma pauperis in April 2016, Mr. Andrews
filed his complaint on June 8, 2016.  Therein he asserted claims
for violations of his constitutional rights against the
Philadelphia Mayor James Kenney, former Mayor Michael Nutter,
Prison Commissioner Blanche Carney, former Prison Commissioner
Michael Resnick, and CFCF Warden Gerald May.

On Jan. 12, 2017, the Court granted the Defendants' first motion to
dismiss without prejudice, finding Mr. Andrews had failed to allege
the Defendants were personally involved in the deprivations of his
constitutional rights.  Mr. Andrews filed an amended complaint in
February 2017, which was met with a subsequent motion to dismiss.
The Court dismissed all claims asserted against Defendants James
Kenney, Michael Nutter, Blanche Carney, and Michael Resnick.  As to
Warden May, however, the Court found that Mr. Andrews had
sufficiently set forth allegations that could plausibly support a
finding of personal involvement, and Mr. Andrews' Section 1983
claim against Warden May survived.

Mr. Andrews later requested leave to amend his complaint again to
add a claim against all five original defendants for civil
contempt, which the Court granted.  With his civil contempt claim,
Mr. Andrews alleged that the defendants had violated a class action
settlement agreement regarding prison conditions.  Following
another motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed with prejudice the
claims against Defendants James Kenney, Michael Nutter, Blanche
Carney, and Michael Resnick.  Finding that Warden May had not moved
to dismiss the civil contempt claim, the Court permitted the claim
to proceed against him, expressing no view on its viability.

Warden May now moves for summary judgment on both the Section 1983
claim and the claim for civil contempt.  Mr. Andrews opposes.

In his motion for summary judgment, Warden May argues that he is
entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Andrews' Section 1983 claim
because Mr. Andrews (1) did not exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing the lawsuit and (2) failed to demonstrate Warden
May's personal involvement in any alleged wrongdoing.  As to the
civil contempt claim, Warden May asserts that he is entitled to
summary judgment because there is no supporting evidence in the
record.

Judge Pratter will grant Warden May's motion for summary judgment
on the Section 1983 claim because Mr. Andrews failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, but he will deny the motion on the civil
contempt claim because Mr. Andrews has set forth sufficient
evidence to support a finding that Warden May disobeyed a valid
court order.  He finds that being able to determine that Warden May
was aware of the conditions, could also then determine that his
failure to remedy these conditions -- which were severe enough to
inspire inmate hunger strikes, prompt pod-wide grievance filings,
and give Mr. Andrews anxiety attacks -- constituted a violation of
the 2016 settlement agreement's terms to make reasonable efforts to
reduce the use of lockdowns.  This is so even under the "clear and
convincing" standard accompanying a claim for civil contempt.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Pratter granted in part and denied
in part Warden May's motion for summary judgment.  An appropriate
Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/F3tqMI from Leagle.com.

HAKIEM ANDREWS, Plaintiff, pro se.

JERALD MAY, WARDEN OF CURRAN-FROMHOLD CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Defendant, represented by SHANNON G. ZABEL, CITY OF PHILA LAW DEPT.

POINT BLANK: Discovery in Ohio State Troopers Suit Party Compelled
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OHIO STATE TROOPERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. POINT BLANK ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant. MIGUEL
PORRAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. POINT BLANK ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 18-63130-CIV-RUIZ/SELTZER (S.D. Fla.), Magistrate Judge
Barry S. Seltzer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' ore tenus Motion to Compel Discovery.

These consolidated actions involve the sale of allegedly defective
bulletproof vests.  The discovery dispute spans three separate
class action complaints.  The parties initially took discovery in
Ohio State Troopers Association, Inc., et al. v. Point Blank
Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 17-62051-CIV-UU ("First Class Action").
That case, however, was dismissed without prejudice in October
2018 when the Court denied class action certification.

The present action, Ohio State Troopers Association, Inc., et al.
v. Point Blank Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 18-63130-CIV-RAR
("OSTA"), was filed in December 2018.  Discovery in the OSTA case
is stayed.

The third litigation, Porras v. Point Blank Enterprises, Inc., Case
No. 19-61881-CIV-RAR, was transferred from the district court in
California and consolidated with the present case.  On Nov. 8,
2019, District Judge Rodolfo A. Ruiz entered an order lifting the
discovery stay only as to the California-specific claims in the
Porras action.  The stay was lifted until Dec. 16, 2019.  Judge
Ruiz later extended the deadline to Jan. 20, 2020.

After the Court lifted the discovery stay for the
California-specific claims in the Porras action, the counsel for
Porras contacted the Defendant's counsel to address claims of
privilege tje Defendant had previously raised in the OSTA
litigation.  The parties could not resolve the privilege issues and
Porras sought relief from the Court.  The Court held a discovery
hearing on Dec. 4, 2019.

Prior to the hearing, the parties filed their respective Discovery
Status Reports, which outlined the matters in dispute.  Following
the hearing, the Court entered an Order directing Defendant to
submit the disputed documents for in camera inspection.  Both
parties have briefed the privilege issues and the matter is now
ripe for review.

The Defendant asserts work-product privilege to documents
PBE_007643, PBE_007644-645, PBE_007646-647, PBE_007648-650,
PBE_007651-653, and PBE_007654-656 ("Tab A-1 Documents").  These
documents are a string of emails dated April 25, 2018, between the
Defendant's employees that refer to the testing and evaluation of
SSBS vests.  The Defendant asserts that the tests were performed at
the direction of litigation counsel in advance of and for the
parties' April 30, 2018 mediation in the First Class Action.  

Tab A-2 contains documents labeled PRIVID_00102 to 00109, which
consist of email strings from July 14 to 17, 2017 ("Tab A-2
Documents").  The Declaration of Tom Steffen explains that these
emails were generated in response to outside the counsel's requests
for information about sales data and contracts in Ohio.   
Tab A-3 includes documents labeled PRIVID_00067 to PRIVID_00079
("Tab A-3 Documents").  According to the Declaration of Tom
Steffen, adter receiving the Proposed Complaint, Point Blank and
its counsel (Morgan Lewis and Berger Singerman) had numerous
conversations regarding defenses to the Proposed Complaint, the
Plaintiffs' settlement-related demands, and potential resolution of
the dispute.

Tab A-4 includes documents labeled PRIVID_00047 to PRIVID_00055 and
PRIVID_00059 to PRIVID_00064 ("Tab A-4 Documents").  The Tab A-4
Documents are emails between the Defendant's employees and
employees of the consulting firm Exponent.  The emails were sent
between June 14, 2017, and July 6, 2017, and reportedly reflect
communications regarding expert consulting work, including testing,
for purposes of the pre-settlement discussions with Plaintiff's
counsel and the defense of threatened, anticipated litigation.

Magistrate Judge Seltzer granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's ore tenus Motion to Compel Production of Documents.  He
overruled the Defendant's assertion of work-product privilege to
documents PRIVID_00047 to PRIVID_00055 and PRIVID_00059 to
PRIVID_00064 ("Tab A-4 Documents").  The Defendant will produce the
Tab A-4 Documents within 15 days of the date of the Order.  

The Magistrate finds that Tab A-4 Documents are purely factual and
contain no "core opinion work-product" of attorneys.  Although
several attorneys from Morgan Lewis are copied on some of the
emails, none of the emails were written or sent by the attorneys.
The Defendant raises no argument that the Tab A-4 Documents are
unrelated to Page's expert opinions.  Absent any proffer or proof
that Page did not consider the Tab A-4 Documents in rendering his
opinions, the work-product privilege does not shield those
documents from disclosure.  For this reason, the Magistrate
concludes that the Tab 4-A Documents must be produced.

The Plaintiff's Motion is denied in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8fo73y from Leagle.com.

Ohio State Troopers Association, Inc., International Union of
Police Associations, Trevor Koontz, Ryan Purpura, Steven Rohner,
Alexander Pater & Lance Deshuk, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael
Wayne Moskowitz --  mmoskowitz@mmsslaw.com -- Moskowitz Mandell
Salim & Simowitz, Allan Kanner -- a.kanner@kanner-law.com -- Kanner
& Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice, Cynthia St. Amant --
c.stamant@kanner-law.com -- Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro hac vice,
David M. Cohen -- dcohen@complexlaw.com -- Complex Law Group, LLC,
pro hac vice, Herschel M. Sigall, Ohio State Troopers Association,
Inc., pro hac vice & Ari Jonathan Glazer, Moskowitz Mandell Salim &
Simowitz.

Miguel Porras, Consol Plaintiff, represented by Conrad B. Stephens,
Stephens and Stephens LLP, Frank J. Johnson, Johnson & Weaver, LLP,
Phong L. Tran, Johnson Fistel LLP, Allan Kanner, Kanner & Whiteley,
LLC, pro hac vice, Cynthia St. Amant, Kanner & Whiteley, LLC, pro
hac vice, David M. Cohen, Complex Law Group, LLC, pro hac vice &
Ari Jonathan Glazer, Moskowitz Mandell Salim & Simowitz.

Point Blank Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian
Michael Ercole, Morgan Lewis, Bockius, Clay Matthew Carlton,
Morgan, Lewis, Bockius LLP, Elisa P. McEnroe, Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, LLP, pro hac vice, Leonard Keith Samuels --
lsamuels@bergersingerman.com -- Berger Singerman LLP & Troy S.
Brown -- troy.brown@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP,
pro hac vice.


RAG & BONE: Gift Cards Not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN MATZURA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED v. RAG & BONE HOLDINGS LLC, Case No.
1:19-cv-11348-ALC (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's failure to sell store gift cards to consumers that
contain writing in Braille and to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its store gift
cards, and, therefore, denial of its products and services offered
thereby and in conjunction with its physical locations, is a
violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the Plaintiff contends. He adds that because the
Defendant's store gift cards are not equally accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, it violates the ADA.

Store Gift Card is an electronic promise, plastic card, or other
device that is redeemable at a single merchant or an affiliated
group of merchants that share the same name, mark or logo.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
requires Braille, which is a tactile writing system, to read
written material, including books, signs, store gift cards, credit
cards, etc. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its store gift cards will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Defendant operates Rag & Bone Stores across the United States.
Several of these retail stores are located in the Southern District
of New York. These retail stores constitute places of public
accommodation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: 212 228 9795
          Facsimile: 212 982 6284

               - and -

          Zare Khorozian, Esq.
          ZARE KHOROZIAN LAW LLC
          1047 Anderson Avenue
          Fort Lee, NJ 07024
          Telephone: 201.957.7269
          Facsimile: 201.224.9841
          E-mail: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com


RAY KLEIN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss UTPA Claim in Russell Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NICHOLAS RUSSELL, Plaintiff, v. RAY KLEIN, INC. and
CHRISTOPHER BEVANS, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-CV-00001-MC (D. Or.),
Judge Michael J. McShane of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Oregon Uniform Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") claim pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Nicholas Russell commenced the putative class action against Ray
Klein and Bevans for alleged violations of the UTPA, Oregon
Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act ("UDCA"), and Federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  With respect to the UTPA,
Mr. Russell alleges that the Defendants are misrepresenting to
debtors that they are authorized by state law to charge a $45
attorney's fee upon garnishment.

More than 18 years ago, Mr. Russell obtained a loan or extension of
credit from non-party Washington Mutual Bank.  The loan was
obtained for "personal, family, or household purposes."  When Mr.
Russell defaulted on that obligation, Washington Mutual initiated a
lawsuit in Jackson County Circuit Court and obtained a judgment
against Mr. Russell. Several years later, on Feb. 21, 2003,
Washington Mutual assigned that judgment to Ray Klein.

In an effort to enforce its judgment, Ray Klein, acting through its
in-house attorney Christopher Bevans, issued a writ of garnishment
to Mr. Russell's employer in October 2018.  A copy of the writ and
a debt calculation form were also sent to Mr. Russell.  On both
documents, Ray Klein represented that it was authorized to charge
an attorney's fee of $45 for issuing the writ of garnishment.  It
further represented that Mr. Russell was responsible for the fee
and that the fee had been added to Mr. Russell's outstanding debt.
To that end, when Ray Klein received the garnished wages from Mr.
Russell's employer, it deducted the $45 attorney's fee and then
credited the remainder of the funds toward satisfaction of Mr.
Russell's debt.

Mr. Russell filed the putative class action on Jan. 1, 2019.  The
Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in April, but their
motion was denied as moot when Mr. Russell submitted his FAC on May
1.  In the FAC, Mr. Russell asserts claims for violations of the
UTPA, UDCA, and FDCPA.  With respect to the UTPA claim, Mr. Russell
alleges that the Defendants caused a likelihood of confusion and
misunderstanding as to source, approval, and/or certification of
the $45 attorney's fee by wrongly suggesting that the fee was
authorized under Oregon law.

The Defendants now move to dismiss Mr. Russell's UTPA claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  They raise three arguments
as to why Mr. Russell's UTPA claim fails.  First, the Defendants
argue that the UTPA's substantive protections are not broad enough
to govern the business practices of a debt collector whose conduct
is unrelated to the original service rendered to the targeted
debtor.  Second, they argue that, even if their business practices
are subject to the UTPA, they never engaged in any conduct which
would violate a consumer's rights under the UTPA.  Finally, the
Defendants argue that, even if their businesses practices are
subject to and violated the UTPA, those alleged violations are not
actionable because the debtor here never suffered an ascertainable
loss of money or property as a result of the alleged violations.

Judge McShane finds that Mr. Russell does not frame his FAC in
precisely the manner that identifies collection fees as the
service, but it contains facts showing that he obtained a loan from
Washington Mutual Bank and that he is suing for misrepresentations
made in the effort to collect on that original obligation.  In the
interest of clarifying the precise nature of the claim, Mr. Russell
is granted leave to file a second amended complaint identifying the
loan as the underlying service obtained by Mr. Russell and
clarifying that he is alleging a misrepresentation by the
Defendants as to that service (i.e., the debt), rather than a
misrepresentation as to the Defendants' separate debt collection
services.

Next, it appears unlikely that in-house attorneys are charging fees
to their employer for the issuance of garnishment since most
in-house attorneys are compensated via salary.  The Defendants
attempted to frame the question as whether a 'fee' is 'paid' to an
in-house attorney when the garnishor pays the in-house attorney's
compensation and benefits [, i.e. salary], as opposed to an hourly
or flat fee the garnishor would pay an outside attorney  But this
misconstrues the purpose of the statute.  Or. Rev. Stat. 18.999
allows recovery of certain moneys a plaintiff has expended to
recover a debt.  When an in-house attorney tries to collect on
garnishment fees, what they are really doing is adding a $45 charge
to the garnishment without any indication that they expended
resources to recover the debt.  This directly contradicts the
statute's purpose in allowing for the recovery of money spent.

Finally, Judge McShane finds that Mr. Russell's loss is the
improper collection of the $45 fee.  Mr. Russell can establish that
the fee is a loss of money because it modifies his underlying debt
and increases his obligation.

Accordingly, Judge McShane denied the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/UAtslb from Leagle.com.

Nicholas Russell, Plaintiff, represented by Michael R. Fuller --
michael@underdoglawyer.com -- OlsenDaines, Kelly D. Jones, Kelly D.
Jones, Attorney at Law & Matthew Sutton, Attorney at Law.

Ray Klein, Inc. & Christopher Bevans, Defendants, represented by
Julie Annette Smith -- jsmith@cosgravelaw.com -- Cosgrave Vergeer
Kester, LLP, Timothy J. Fransen -- tfransen@cosgravelaw.com --
Cosgrave Vergeer Kester, LLP & Robert E. Sabido --
rsabido@cosgravelaw.com -- Cosgrave Vergeer Kester, LLP.


REBECCA MINKOFF: Gift Cards Not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN MATZURA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED v. REBECCA MINKOFF, LLC, Case No.
1:19-cv-11349-AJN (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's failure to sell store gift cards to consumers that
contain writing in Braille and to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its store gift
cards, and, therefore, denial of its products and services offered
thereby and in conjunction with its physical locations, is a
violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the Plaintiff contends. He adds that because the
Defendant's store gift cards are not equally accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, it violates the ADA.

Store Gift Card is an electronic promise, plastic card, or other
device that is redeemable at a single merchant or an affiliated
group of merchants that share the same name, mark or logo.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
requires Braille, which is a tactile writing system, to read
written material, including books, signs, store gift cards, credit
cards, etc. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that its store gift cards will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Defendant operates, manages, and markets its retail stores,
sells store gift cards to the public, and uses them as a form of
communication.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: 212 228 9795
          Facsimile: 212 982 6284

               - and -

          Zare Khorozian, Esq.
          ZARE KHOROZIAN LAW LLC
          1047 Anderson Avenue
          Fort Lee, NJ 07024
          Telephone: 201.957.7269
          Facsimile: 201.224.9841
          E-mail: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com


RED SLATE BRANDS: Rodriguez Asserts Breach of ADA in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
Red Slate Brands LLC is facing a class action lawsuit filed
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is styled
as Angel Rodriguez, individually and as the representative of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff v. Red Slate Brands
LLC doing business as: Treetopia, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00117
(E.D. N. Y., Jan. 7, 2020).

Treetopia offers the largest selection of colorful and unique
Christmas trees available.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Dan Shaked, Esq.
   Shaked Law Group, P.C.
   14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
   Scarsdale, NY 10583
   Tel: (917) 373-9128
   Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


ROBERT SILLERMAN: Guevoura Securities Suit Deal Gets Final Court OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GUEVOURA FUND LTD., On Behalf of Itself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT F.X. SILLERMAN, D.
GEOFFREY ARMSTRONG, JOHN MILLER and MICHAEL JOHN MEYER, Defendants,
Case Nos. 1:15-cv-07192-CM, 1:18-cv-09784-CM (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Colleen McMahon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted (i) the Lead Plaintiff's motion for
final approval of the settlement agreement, and (ii) the Lead
Counsel's motion for fees and reimbursement of expenses, as well as
for the Lead Plaintiff's expenses.

The first complaint in the consolidated securities fraud class
action was filed on Sept. 11, 2015, in the Southern District of New
York, styled Gutman v. SFX Entertainment, Inc., et al.
(15-cv-7192-CM).  Original plaintiff Edward S. Gutman brought the
action against SFX Entertainments, Inc. ("SFX") and certain of its
directors for their allegedly false and misleading statements in
connection with the proposed acquisition of SFX by Sillennan, SFX's
CEO and largest shareholder.  The Gutman Action alleged violations
of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, as well as SEC
Rule 10b-5.

By an order dated Dec. 8, 2015, the Court consolidated Gutman with
another action based on the same facts brought by Wilfrid Global
Opportunity Fund LP, then appointed Guevoura as the Lead Plaintiff
and Brower Piven as the Lead Counsel.

On Dec. 23, 2015, the Lead Plaintiff filed the Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint, which remains the operative pleading in the
case.

Lead Plaintiff Guevoura, on behalf of itself and the certified
Class, seeks final approval of the settlement agreement between the
Class and Defendants D. Geoffrey Armstrong, Michael John Myer, and
John Miller ("Director Defendants"), as well as Defendant Robert
F.X. Sillerman.  The Settlement comprises two contributions: the
Director Defendants' Contribution in the amount of $6.75 million;
and the Sillerman Contribution, in the amount of $750,000, to be
designated as a general unsecured dischargeable claim in
Sillerman's pending bankruptcy proceeding.  The Court granted
preliminary approval of the settlement on July 30, 2019.  

Class Counsel Brower Piven, A Professional Corp. seeks attorneys'
fees of one third (33 1/3%) of the Director Defendants'
Contribution, as well as one-third (33 1/3%) of the Sillerman
Contribution, or portions of it, if it is ever paid, as well as
reimbursement of $248,214.01 in litigation and interim
administration expenses incurred in the prosecution of the Action.
The Class Counsel also seeks $10,000 as reimbursement on behalf of
the Lead Plaintiff for the time certain of its directors and
employees devoted to the prosecution of the Action, as authorized
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").  

Judge McMahon finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.  Accordingly, she granted the Lead Plaintiff's motion for
final approval of the settlement, the class notice, and the plan of
allocation.  She also granted the Lead Counsel's motion for fees
and reimbursement of expenses, as well as for the Lead Plaintiff's
expenses.

The Order constitutes the written opinion and order of the Court.
The Clerk of Court should close the motions at Docket Number
192.3833136210621806149321052151722472905.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Decision & Order is
available at https://is.gd/BupSqf from Leagle.com.

In Re Robert Francis Xavier Sillerman, Plaintiff, represented by
Sanford Philip Rosen -- srosen@rosenpc.com -- Sanford P. Rosen &
Associates, P.C.

Edward S. Gutman, Plaintiff, represented by Nancy Kaboolian , Abbey
Spanier Rodd Abrams & Paradis, LLP.

Guevoura Fund Ltd., Plaintiff, represented by Charles J. Piven,
Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation, Daniel Kuznicki --
kuznicki@browerpiven.com -- Kuznicki Law, PLLC, Yelena Trepetin,
Brower Piven, A Professional Corporation & David A.P. Brower --
brower@browerpiven.com -- Brower Piven.

Wilfrid Global Opportunity Fund LP, Consolidated Plaintiff,
represented by Lynne M. Fischman Uniman, Andrews Kurth LLP.

Wilfrid Aubrey LLC, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Nancy
Kaboolian, Abbey Spanier Rodd Abrams & Paradis, LLP.

David Chan, Movant, represented by Phillip C. Kim, The Rosen Law
Firm.

Phillip Alfeld, Movant, represented by Adam M. Apton, Levi &
Korsinsky LLP.

Rong Liu, Movant, represented by Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Robert F.X. Sillerman, Defendant, pro se.

D. Geoffrey Armstrong, John Miller & Michael John Meyer,
Defendants, represented by Aaron Frank Miner --
aaron.miner@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP,
Catherine Barry Schumacher -- catherine.schumacher@arnoldporter.com
-- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Stephanna Francesca Szotkowski
-- stephanna.szotkowski@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP & Vincent Anthony Sama -- vincent.sama@arnoldporter.com
-- Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.


RUSHMORE LOAN: 11th Cir. Vacates Certification Denial in Sellers
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RANDOLPH SELLERS, individually and on behalf of a
class of persons similarly situated, TABETHA SELLERS, individually
and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-11420 (11th Cir.), Judge Jill Pryor
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
district court's order denying class certification, and remanded so
that it may reconsider whether common questions of law or fact
predominate.

After Randolph and Tabetha Sellers filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
the bankruptcy court issued a discharge order, which relieved them
from personal liability on their discharged debts and generally
barred creditors from taking actions to collect those debts.
Despite the discharge order, Rushmore the servicer for the Sellers'
home mortgage, sent them monthly statements for their mortgage.

Because Rushmore sent statements after the discharge order was
entered, the Sellerses sued Rushmore seeking class certification on
claims arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
("FCCPA").  The Sellerses alleged that Rushmore made false,
deceptive, and misleading representations when it sent mortgage
statements and attempted to collect on their mortgage debt after
they received a Chapter 7 discharge.

The district court denied class certification, concluding that for
each claim individualized inquiries predominated over issues common
to the proposed class.  In reaching the conclusion, the district
court relied, at least in part, on its determination that the
question of "whether the Bankruptcy Code precluded and/or preempted
the FDCPA and FCCPA" presented an individualized rather than a
common issue.

The Sellerses appeal the district court's denial of class
certification.  They argue that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied class certification on the basis that
individual issues predominated.  At the first step of the
predominance analysis, the district court classified various issues
as raising common or individualized questions.  At the second step,
the district court concluded that given the individualized issues
in the case, common issues did not predominate.

Judge Pryor concludes that the district court abused its discretion
because at the first step of the predominance analysis it
erroneously classified the question of whether the Bankruptcy Code
precluded or preempted the FDCPA and FCCPA claims as raising an
individual, rather than common, issue.

The Eleventh Circuit finds that the district court overlooked the
Sellerses' allegations that Rushmore violated discharge injunctions
even when it sent form Mortgage Statements I and II to class
members who vacated their homes because Section 524(a) provides
that a bankruptcy court's discharge order operates as an injunction
that bars any act to collect a discharged debt as a personal
liability of the debtor.  Accordingly, Rushmore's argument -- that
it is not liable under the FDCPA because the only remedy for
violation of a discharge injunction is under the Bankruptcy Code --
applies to all the class members.  

The Eleventh Circuit will remand so that the district court may
decide in the first instance whether, in light of her holding that
the preemption/preemption defense raises a common question, common
issues predominate.

Just as with the FDCPA claim, the Eleventh Circuit finds that each
class member's FCCPA claim is premised on the allegation that the
mortgage debt was not legitimate because the bankruptcy court had
discharged the debtor's personal liability.  Rushmore raised the
same defense that each class member's FCCPA claim was preempted or
precluded by the Bankruptcy Code.  For the same reasons discussed,
the Eleventh Circuit concludes that the district court abused its
discretion in categorizing the defense as raising an
individualized, as opposed to common, issue.  The Appellate Court
likewise vacates the district court's order denying class
certification on the FCCPA claim.

On remand, the district court may consider whether any other
elements or defenses related to the FCCPA claim raise
individualized questions, including whether Rushmore had actual
knowledge that the debts were not legitimate.  In contrast to the
FDCPA, Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the debt collector defendant possessed actual
knowledge that the threatened means of enforcing the debt was
unavailable. If the district court concludes that the question of
actual knowledge requires an individualized inquiry, the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion may factor into the analysis of whether common
questions predominate.

Based on the foregoing, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district
court's order denying class certification so that the district
court may reconsider whether common questions of law or fact
predominate given that the question of whether the "Bankruptcy Code
precluded and/or preempted the FDCPA and FCCPA" raises a common,
rather than an individualized, legal issue.

A full-text copy of 11th Circuit's Oct. 29, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/1st4g0 from Leagle.com.

Janet R. Varnell -- jvarnell@varnellandwarwick.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian W. Warwick -- bwarwick@varnellandwarwick.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Amy Lea Drushal -- adrushal@trenam.com -- for Defendant-Appellee.

Justin Tinshung Wong -- justin.wong@troutmansanders.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

John C. Lynch -- john.lynch@troutmansanders.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.

Max H. Story -- max@maxstorylaw.com -- for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan Stuart Hubbard -- jon.hubbard@troutmansanders.com -- for
Defendant-Appellee.


S & J CRAZY LIZARDS: Pitts Seeks to Recover Tips and Overtime Pay
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremiah Pitts and Joseph Lenz, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated v. S & J CRAZY LIZARDS ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, d/b/a
Monroe's of Palm Beach, a Florida limited liability company, Case
No. 9:20-cv-80023-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Jan. 8, 2020), seeks for the
return of tips wrongfully taken, unpaid overtime wages,
reimbursement for uniform maintenance, liquidated damages, and
other relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

The Plaintiffs, along with those similarly situated, were required
to share their tips with the director of operations and the owner,
in violation of the FLSA, says the complaint. The Plaintiffs also
allege they were required to pay for impermissible business
expenses, such as uniform maintenance, and that they regularly
worked in excess of 40 hours per seven-day week but were not paid
overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs worked as tipped employees for the Defendant.

The Defendant owned and operated the Monroe's adult entertainment
nightclub, located in Palm Beach County, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert W. Brock II, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF LOWELL J. KUVIN
          17 East Flagler Street, Suite 223
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: 305.358.6800
          Fax: 305.358.6808
          Email: robert@kuvinlaw.com
                 legal@kuvinlaw.com


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: Court Dismisses Barrera Fraud Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IRMA BARRERA, MIKO LEDESMA, LATASHA PRENTICE, MARY
MCRAE, YASIR LALLA, TIFFANY WARREN, [Assigned to Hon. Cormac J.
Carney, Dept. REGINALD BELL, and WENDY HAM on 9B] behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA INC.; SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD and
DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
8:18-cv-00481-CJC (PJW) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Cormac J. Carney of the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
dismissed the action in its entirety, with prejudice as to the
Plaintiffs and without prejudice as to the claims of any putative
class members.

The Judge has considered the Stipulated Dismissal, filed by the
Named Plaintiffs and Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
The Parties are to bear their own fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/k2oJcg from Leagle.com.

Irma Barrera, Plaintiff, represented by Marcus J. Bradley --
info@bradleygrombacher.com -- Bradley Grombacher LLP, Jesse Monroe
Bablove -- jbablove@dkblawyers.com -- Dickson Kohan and Bablove
LLP, Kiley Lynn Grombacher --kgrombacher@bradleygrombacher.com --
Bradley Grombacher LLP & Matthew Paul Dickson --
mdickson@dkblawyers.com -- Dickson Kohan and Bablove LLP.

Mike Ledesma, Latasha Prentice, Mary McRae, Yasir Lalla, Tiffany
Warren, Reginald Bell & Wendy Ham, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Kiley Lynn
Grombacher, Bradley Grombacher LLP.

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Brian
Takahashi -- brian.takahashi@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and
Brooke LLP, Lawrence R. Ramsey -- larry.ramsey@bowmanandbrooke.com
-- Bowman and Brooke LLP, Nathan J. Marcusen --
nathan.marcusen@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and Brooke LLP, pro
hac vice & Siyun Yao, Bowman and Brooke LLP.


SANTA MONICA, CA: Prelim Injunction Bid in Columbia Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COLUMBIA SUSSEX MANAGEMENT, LLC, and CW HOTEL LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, individually and on behalf of all other hotel owners
and managers operating hotels in Santa Monica, California,
Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Defendant, Case No.
2:19-CV-09991-ODW (SKx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II of
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
denied the Plaintiffs motion with expedited briefing for a
preliminary injunction to prevent the City's Santa Monica Municipal
Code ("SMMC") Chapter 4.67.030(a) Ordinance from taking effect.

On Sept. 10, 2019, the Santa Monica City Council adopted Chapter
4.67, including the Ordinance, with the stated purpose to Enhance
Protection of Hotel Workers in the Local Hospitality Industry.
Entitled "Measures to Provide Fair Compensation for Workload," the
Ordinance limits hotel employees who clean guest rooms from
cleaning more than a specified square footage of floor space during
their scheduled shift.  

At hotels with fewer than 40 rooms, Room Attendants may not be
required to clean more than 4,000 square feet in an eight-hour
workday.  At hotels with 40 or more rooms, Room Attendants may not
be required to clean more than 3500 square feet in an eight-hour
workday.  If a Room Attendant is required to exceed these limits,
the hotel employer must compensate the Room Attendant at twice the
regular rate of pay for all hours worked in that workday.  The
Ordinance may be waived pursuant to a bona fide collective
bargaining agreement.  As relevant in the case, Chapter 4.67 will
take effect on Jan. 1, 2020.

On Nov. 21, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the class action lawsuit on
behalf of all of the other 40 hotels located within Santa Monica.
Tey seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including findings that
the Ordinance is unconstitutional, invalid, and preempted.

On Nov. 27, 2019, the parties stipulated to an expedited briefing
schedule for the Plaintiffs' Motion.  Accordingly, on Dec.r 2,
2019, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent
the Ordinance from going into effect as scheduled.  The City
opposed and the Plaintiffs replied.

The Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction to prevent the
challenged portions of the Ordinance from taking effect on Jan. 1,
2020.  They challenge only section 4.67.030(a) ("Ordinance" or
"Workload Limitation") and its corresponding collective bargaining
waiver provision, section 4.67.110 ("Waiver");  the Plaintiffs
challenge no other part of the Chapter.

The Plaintiffs contend the putative class of Santa Monica hotel
owners and operators will be irreparably harmed if these provisions
are permitted to take effect on Jan. 1, 2020.  They argue the
Ordinance is (1) preempted by the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") under Machinists preemption; (2) invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause ("DCC"); and (3) preempted by the California
Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1973 ("CalOSHA").

Judge Wright finds that the Plaintiffs have not established that
there is a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of a
preliminary injunction, or that they are likely to succeed on the
merits.  Nor have they raised serious questions going to the
merits.  Accordingly, he need not reach the balance of hardships or
the public interest.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs have not satisfied the difficult task to establish that
they are entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary
injunction.  For these reasons, he denied the Plaintiffs' Motion
for a preliminary injunction.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/UVwdMo from Leagle.com.

Columbia Sussex Management, LLC, individually and on behalf of all
other hotel owners and managers operating hotels in Santa Monica,
California & CW Hotel Limited Partnership, individually and on
behalf of all other hotel owners and managers operating hotels in
Santa Monica, California, Plaintiffs, represented by Diana L.
Dowell -- dlerma@stokeswagner.com -- Stokes Wagner ALC, Jamie Lee
Santos -- jsantos@stokeswagner.com -- Stokes Wagner, George M.
Vinci, Jr. -- gvinci@sgrvlaw.com -- Spector Gadon Rosen Vinci PC,
pro hac vice & Peter B. Maretz -- pmaretz@stokeswagner.com --
Stokes Wagner ALC.

City of Santa Monica, Defendant, represented by Kirsten R. Galler,
Santa Monica City Attorneys Office & George S. Cardona, Santa
Monica City Attorneys Office.


SELECTION MANAGEMENT: Wingard Files Suit Under FCRA
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Selection Management
Systems, Inc. The case is styled as Jean Wingard, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Selection
Management Systems, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-00030-CRE
(W.D., Pa., Jan. 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Selection Management Systems, Inc. is a company that offers pre
employment screening services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   James M. Pietz, Esq.
   Feinstein, Doyle, Payne & Kravec, LLC
   429 Fourth Avenue
   Law & Finance Building, Suite 1300
   Pittsburgh, PA 15219
   Tel: (412) 281-8400
   Fax: (412) 281-1007
   Email: jpietz@fdpklaw.com


SGE MANAGEMENT: $10M-Atty's Fee Allocation Order in Torres Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN RAMON TORRES as Representative of the Estate of
Eugene Robison; CHRISTOPHER ROBISON, as Representative of the
Estate of Eugene Robison; LUCAS ("LUKE") THOMAS, individually and
on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants, v. SGE MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., Defendant.
SCOTT M. CLEARMAN, individually and on behalf of The Clearman Law
Firm, P.L.L.C., Appellant-Cross Appellee, v. ANDREW JACK
KOCHANOWSKI, individually and on behalf of Sommers Schwartz, P.C.;
ERIC FRANKLIN CITRON, individually and on behalf of Goldstein;
Russell, P.C.; JEFFREY WEST BURNETT, individually and on behalf of
Jeffery W. Burnett, PLLC; MATTHEW J. M. PREBEG, individually and on
behalf of Prebeg, Faucett; Abbott, Appellees-Cross Appellants,
THOMAS GOLDSTEIN, individually and on behalf of Goldstein; Russell,
P.C., Cross Appellant, Case No. 18-20801 (5th Cir.), Judge Patrick
E. Higginbotham of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(i) vacated the district court's allocation order on the
approximately $10 million in fees to the Plaintiffs' attorneys, and
(ii) remanded for elaboration of the trial court's reasoning under
the Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express framework.

Appellant Scott Clearman, who sought half of the total award but
received roughly $1.5 million, advances several challenges to the
fee allocation.  All the other class counsel ("Appellees") argue
that the allocation is sound, but they conditionally cross-appeal
on the basis that if there is any defect, it is that Clearman
received too much.

The underlying litigation began when two distributors for Stream
Energy, LLC, retained attorney Jeffrey Burnett because they
suspected that Stream's multi-level marketing program was a
fraudulent pyramid scheme.  Burnett hired Scott Clearman to bring a
RICO class action, any fee to be shared 25% to Burnett and 75% to
Clearman.  Stream filed successful motions to dismiss in the cases
filed in Georgia (dismissal sustained by the Eleventh Circuit) and
in Texas (dismissal reversed by the Court).  Clearman partnered
with Matthew Prebeg to form Clearman Prebeg LLP ("CP"), assigning
the prior fee interest of The Clearman Law Firm LLP to CP.  With
the case revived and class-certification discovery underway,
Burnett and CP were joined in the litigation by Andrew Kochanowski
and Sommers Schwartz, P.C. A new fee agreement was signed: 60% to
CP (split among its four partners), 20% to Sommers, 20% to
Burnett.

After the joinder of Kochanowski and Sommers, the parties dispute
Clearman's involvement.  The Appellees claim that by the time
thecase became active again in 2011, Mr. Clearman, who was the
designated attorney-in-charge, was severely struggling with
substance abuse issues.  As time progressed, the periods of his
ability to accomplish tasks diminished, so petitioners were
required to monitor his work product to protect the interests of
the clients, and reduce the potential for liability.

Clearman claims he took half the depositions relied on in the
class-certification motion, but concedes he did not participate in
the class-certification hearing and entered inpatient treatment for
alcoholism shortly thereafter. Prebeg was substituted as
attorney-in-charge in October 2013.  In January 2014, the remaining
CP partners formed Prebeg, Faucett & Abbott, PLLC ("PFA") and began
winding up CP.  Also in January 2014, the district court certified
the class and named Clearman, Kochanowski, and Prebeg as the
co-class counsel.

Kochanowski and Prebeg engaged Goldstein & Russell ("G&R") to
defend the class certification against Stream's appeal.  Another
fee arrangement was reached under which G&R would receive between
16% and 18%, depending on the size of the fee award. (The actual
award exceeded $8 million, so under these terms G&R would get 16%).
Burnett would receive another 17% of the total.  After the shares
of Burnett and G&R were paid, the remainder would be distributed to
Sommers (30.67%), Clearman (17.34%) and PFA (51.99%).  All
attorneys signed the agreement save Clearman.  On June 25, 2014,
the terms of the new fee agreement were memorialized without
Clearman's participation.

Next, although a panel had reversed the district court's class
certification, the en banc court reinstated the certification on
Sept. 30, 2016.  This led to a settlement, which included $10.275
million in expenses and fees for the class counsel.  As directed,
the counsel filed applications for fees.  The non-Clearman
attorneys sought a total of $9,056,071.80 in fees and $378,062.01
in expenses, which was $840,866.19 short of the total award.

Clearman's fee petition sought 50% of the fees remaining after
expenses, or roughly $5 million.  In response, the class
representatives moved to strike Clearman's fee petition. The court
approved the settlement and entered final judgment, retaining
jurisdiction over the fee-allocation issue.

Clearman filed a new petition with "reconstructed" time records.
Clearman again sought half the fees, and Appellees note several
concerns with the revised petition, now claiming a $950 hourly rate
to arrive at his roughly $5 million request. Further,

On Nov. 7, 2018, the district court issued its Order on Allocation
of Attorney's Fees and Costs.  That order, which is the subject of
the instant appeal, noted that no party contested the previously
determined award of fees and costs.  Since there was no dispute as
to the size of the award, the district court found it"unnecessary
to engage in determining the reasonableness of the fee and costs
under the Johnson fee calculation factors.  

Turning to proper allocation, the district court described the
several iterations of the counsels' fee agreements: Initially, the
Clearman firm was to receive 75% of any fee recovered and the
Burnette firm would receive 25%.  Later, the Sommers firm was
engaged as additional counsel and the fee arrangement changed.  The
Clearman firm would receive 60%, the Burnett firm 20% and the
Sommers firm 20%. Later, the Clearman firm split and Scott Clearman
left the firm.  However, the Prebeg group of the Clearman firm PFA
continued with the litigation along with the Sommers and Burnett
firms, and added the Goldstein firm as appellate counsel.  Scott
Clearman did not join the fee split agreement that resulted.
Nevertheless, under the agreement, the Prebeg firm would receive
46%, the Burnett firm 20%, more or less.  It was estimated that
Clerman would receive, more or less, one third of Prebeg's 46%.

The district court, having examined the various agreements, and the
spirit behind the documents determined that the last arrangement,
even though Scott Clearman did not join it, is fair and equitable.
Its two-page order elaborated no further on its reasons.  The court
split the $458,367 in expenses -- $975 to Burnett, $5,183 to
Goldstein, $187,557 to PFA, $184,347 to Sommers, and $80,305 to
Clearman.  It then split the remaining $9,816,633 in fees --
$1,963,327 to Burnett (roughly 20%), $1,570,661 to G&F (roughly
16%), $3,010,428 to PFA (roughly 30%), $1,766,994 to Sommers
(roughly 18%), and $1,505,223 to Clearman (roughly 15%).

Clearman filed a motion for entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law and for amendment of the allocation order, which
the court denied.  He now appeals the allocation of fees.  The
remaining attorneys who shared the award conditionally cross-appeal
-- if the allocation has any defect, they argue, it is the
over-generous award to Clearman.

Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit's resolution of the appeal
turns on the district court's statement that it was "unnecessary to
engage in determining the reasonableness of the fee and costs under
the Johnson fee calculation factors."  He finds the statement at
odds with the Court's decision in In re High Sulfur Content
Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig. and prevents the Court from concluding
that the district court properly utilized the Johnson framework.

The Fifth Circuit finds that the record does not clearly reflect
that the district judge utilized the Johnson framework is error.
And taking another cue from High Sulfur, which opted not to address
whether the individual awards to the Appellants were fair and
reasonable, the Judge declines to address the parties' remaining
arguments.  The Court has previously remanded in cases where the
district court gave no indication it considered Johnson.  The
approach in no way implies that the attorney's fee award, if
justified by a proper explanation, would be an abuse of discretion
but simply indicates that, without any factual findings, it is
impossible to determine whether the district court sufficiently
considered the appropriate criteria.

Although sympathetic to the difficult task the lawyers gave to the
district court, Judge Higginbotham must vacate the award allocating
attorney's fees and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion and with due consideration of the Johnson factors.  While
nothing forecloses an agreement among all, its absence leaves no
choice but to "do it by the book."  The result will be "equitable"
but not necessarily the extant result.

A full-text copy of the Fifth Circuit's Dec. 18, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/QPZRku from Leagle.com.

Danielle J. Healey -- healey@fr.com -- for Appellant
Cross-Appellee.

Scott M. Clearman -- scott@clearmanlaw.com -- for Appellant
Cross-Appellee.

Brent Taylor Caldwell -- bcaldwell@pfalawfirm.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Brent Taylor Caldwell, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Cody Wayne Stafford, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Andrew Jack Kochanowski -- akochanowski@sommerspc.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Andrew Jack Kochanowski, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Matthew J.M. Prebeg -- mprebeg@gfpiplaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Matthew J.M. Prebeg, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Eric Franklin Citron -- ecitron@goldsteinrussell.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Eric Franklin Citron, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Jeff Burnett, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Jeffrey West Burnett -- jburnett@burnetthoustonlaw.com -- for
Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant.

Jeffrey West Burnett, for Appellee Cross-Appellant.

SOLARA MEDICAL: Keally Suit Moved to S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Kristi Keally as legal Guardian of M.K.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. Solara Medical Supplies, LLC, Defendant, was removed
from the Superior Court of CA, County of San Diego with the
assigned Case No. 37-02019-00064243-CU-BT-CTL to the U.S. District
Court
for the Southern District of California (San Diego) on January 7,
2020, and assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-00049-H-AGS.

The case type of the lawsuit is stated as Personal Property:
Other.

Solara Medical Supplies offers home delivery of medical devices and
disposable medical products, serving individuals with
diabetes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Eric D. Zard Esq.
   Carlson Lynch Sweet Kilpela& Carpenter LLP
   1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603
   San Diego, CA 92101
   Tel: (619) 762-1900
   Fax: (619) 756-6991
   Email: ezard@carlsonlynch.com


STARLINE TOURS: $200K Deal in Harp Labor Suit Gets Final Court OK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Christina A. Snyder of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California has granted final approval of the
class settlement in the case captioned JOAN HARP, an individual
[Former] Class Representative On Behalf of Herself and All Others
Similarly Situated Non-Exempt Former and Current Employees; et al.,
Plaintiff, v. STARLINE TOURS OF HOLLYWOOD, INC., a California
corporation; EHM PRODUCTIONS, INC.; et al., Defendant, Case No.
2:14-cv-07704-CAS(Ex)(C.D. Cal.).

The Judge certified the Settlement Class under Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
23 and 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), as defined in the Settlement
Agreement, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Settlement
Agreement and solely for the purposes of settlement.  The Court's
prior grant of conditional certification of a subclass consisting
of all current and former hourly drivers who, within three years
preceding the date of their decision to opt in to the action, were
employed by both the Starline Defendants and EHM in the State of
California is moot.

The Defendants will pay a maximum of $200,000 pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement.

The following amounts will be paid from the Gross Settlement
Amount:

     a. Settlement Administration Costs, at $7,000;

     b. Class Counsel's Fees and Costs, in the amount of $70,000
        in fees and $17,000 in costs (including reimbursements
        to Plaintiff Deponents for travel costs and parking);

     c. Premiums in the amount of $10,000 to Plaintiff Brockman
        and $10,000 to Plaintiff Reyes for a total of $20,000;

     d. Payment to the California Labor and Workforce
        Development Agency ("LWDA") of $5,000 to be allocated
        as follows: $3,750 to the LWDA; and $1,250 to the
        Participating Settlement Class Members in satisfaction
        of any civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code Section
        2699(i); and

     e. Defendants' portion of state and federal employment
        taxes, including FICA, FUTA, Medicare, and California
        SDI.

     f. After above items are deducted from the Gross
        Settlement Amount, the remaining funds will be
        distributed pro rata to the Settlement Class
        Members pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

As of the Effective Date of the Settlement Agreement (or upon the
date their check is cashed, deposited, or negotiated, whichever is
later), Settlement Class Representative and Participating
Settlement Class Members who cash, deposit or otherwise negotiate
their checks within 180 days of issuance, or who have previously
opted into the Action, will be deemed to have, and by operation of
the Final Judgment, opted into the Settlement for purposes of the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and will be deemed to have fully
and irrevocably released and forever discharged Defendant and the
other Released Parties from all FLSA Settled Claims, as more fully
set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

The Settlement Class Representative and the Participating
Settlement Class Members who cash, deposit or otherwise negotiate
their checks within 180 days of issuance, or who have previously
opted into the Action, are permanently barred from prosecuting
against Defendant and the other Released Parties any of the FLSA
Settled Claims pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

The parties are ordered to comply with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Judgement is
available at https://is.gd/PSHeih from Leagle.com.

Joan Harp, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Patrick Wilson --
WILSONTRIALGROUP@ATT.NET -- at Law Offices of Dennis P Wilson.

William Brockman, Plaintiff, represented by Dennis Patrick Wilson
-- WILSONTRIALGROUP@ATT.NET -- at Law Offices of Dennis P Wilson,
Anthony Ngula Luti -- tony@lutilaw.com -- at The Luti Law Firm;
Julia Alicia Aparicio-Mercado, Aparicio-Mercado Law LC.

Maynard Jackson, III, Andres Reyes Plaintiffs, represented by
Dennis Patrick Wilson -- WILSONTRIALGROUP@ATT.NET -- at Law
Offices of Dennis P Wilson; and Julia Alicia Aparicio-Mercado --
at Aparicio-Mercado Law LC.

Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc., Starline Sightseeing Tours,
Inc., Starline Tours USA, Inc., Fred Sapir, and Vahid Sapir,
Defendants, represented by Mohammed K Ghods -- mghods@ghodslaw.com
-- Sandra J Vivonia -- Jeremy A Rhyne -- jrhyne@ghodslaw.com -- at
Ghods Law Firm.

EHM Productions, Inc., Defendant, represented by Robyn Michele
Coltin -- rmc@msk.com -- Seth E Pierce -- sep@msk.com -- Mitchell
Silberberg & Knupp LLP.


STITCH FIX: Hearing on Bid to Dismiss Set for Jan. 23
-----------------------------------------------------
Stitch Fix, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 2, 2019, that the hearing on the
motion to dismiss the consolidated class action suit is currently
set for January 23, 2020.

On October 11, 2018, October 26, 2018, November 16, 2018, and
December 10, 2018, four putative class action lawsuits alleging
violations of the federal securities laws were filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, naming as
defendants us and certain of our officers.

The four lawsuits each make the same allegations of violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, by the company and
its officers for allegedly making materially false and misleading
statements regarding the company's active client growth and
strategy with respect to television advertising between June 2018
and October 2018.

The plaintiffs seek unspecified monetary damages and other relief.
The four lawsuits have been consolidated and a lead plaintiff has
been appointed.

On September 18, 2019, the lead plaintiff in the consolidated class
action lawsuits filed a consolidated complaint for violation of the
federal securities laws.

On October 28, 2019, the company and other defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint. The lead plaintiff's
opposition to the motion to dismiss is due on December 9, 2019, and
defendants' reply in support of our motion to dismiss is due on
December 30, 2019.

A hearing on the motion to dismiss is currently set for January 23,
2020.

Stitch Fix, Inc. operates as an online subscription and personal
shopping platform. The Company offers shirts, jackets, sweaters,
blazers, leggings, vests, scarfs, jeans, loafers, and boots for men
and women. Stitch Fix serves customers in the United States. Stitch
Fix, Inc. was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in San
Francisco, California.


SYNERGIES3 TEC: Class in Jackson FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CLINTON JACKSON and JAMES, THOMAS, individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. SYNERGIES3
TEC SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 4:19-cv-00178-SRC (E.D.
Mo.), Judge Stephen R. Clark of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, (i) granted the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification, and (ii) granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Court-Authorized Notice.

On Feb. 4, 2019, Plaintiffs Jackson and Thomas, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a Complaint in the
Court under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), against
Defendant Synergies3 to recover unpaid overtime compensation.
According to the operative Complaint, Synergies3 is a satellite
installation provider for AT&T (DirecTV), registered to conduct
business in Missouri, Illinois, and other states across the
country.  The Plaintiffs allege that Synergies3 contracts with
installation technicians to provide satellite installation and
maintenance services for DirecTV and DirecTV's customers. Jackson
and Thomas both allege that they worked for Synergies3 as
installation technicians.

The Plaintiffs allege that although Synergies3 classified them and
the other similarly-situated installation technicians as
independent contractors, Synergies3's installation technicians were
and are, in fact, employees under federal and state law.  The
Plaintiffs contend that Synergies3 deliberately misclassified
installation technicians as independent contractors to avoid paying
overtime wages.  They further allege that Synergies3 unlawfully
denied them overtime pay, even when they worked more than 40 hours
per week, through Synergies3's practice of paying installation
technicians on a per-job, "piece-rate," basis.

On April 23, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a motion, pursuant to
Section 216(b) of the FLSA, to conditionally certify a collective
class action of all installation technicians who worked for
Synergies3 and whom Synergies3 classified as "independent
contractors" at any time within three years before the Plaintiffs
filed their Complaint.  In addition, they seek approval of a form
of notice to send to Syngergies3's past and present employees to
provide them the opportunity to opt in as the Plaintiffs in the
litigation.

In support of their motion for conditional certification, the
Plaintiffs offer seven similar declarations from individuals who
attest they worked for Synergies3 as installation technicians and
were classified as independent contractors.  The declarants worked
for Synergies3 in different states and varied in the number of
hours they typically worked each week, but otherwise the seven
declarations contain essentially identical assertions.

The matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Conditional Certification and Court-Authorized Notice.

Judge Clark finds that the Plaintiffs provided substantial
allegations that the putative class members were together victims
of a common policy or plan.  The Plaintiffs have adequately alleged
that, despite their classification by Synergies3 as "independent
contractors," the Plaintiffs and the other installation technicians
they seek to represent were in fact employees for purposes of the
FLSA.

The Plaintiffs allege that Synergies3 misclassified installation
technicians as independent contractors to avoid paying overtime
wages, even though they and the other members of the putative class
were, in fact, Synergies3's employees.  The Plaintiffs allege that
the putative class worked exclusively for Synergies3 on a full-time
and continuing basis.  They further allege that the putative class
was subject to Synergies3's direction and control as to the manner
in which they performed their work.  Finally, the Plaintiffs allege
that Synergies3 set putative class members' schedules.  These
averments adequately allege that the Plaintiffs and the other
similarly-situated installation technicians are, in fact,
Synergies3's employees.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs have presented
sufficient evidence to establish a "colorable basis" for
conditional certification.  The declarations from seven
installation technicians who worked for Synergies3 in four
different states -- each stating that they Synergies3 paid them by
piece-rate, classified them as independent contractors, and did not
pay them for overtime hours worked -- meet the required standard.
The declarants describe essentially identical treatment in terms of
how Synergies3 managed their work and structured their pay.
Additionally, the declarants identify other installation
technicians whom Synergies3 treated similarly.

Based on this evidence, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have
established a colorable basis for their claim that Synergies3 has a
company-wide policy or practice of misclassifying installation
technicians as independent contractors.

In addition to requesting conditional certification, the
Plaintiffs' Motion also seeks court approval for the means and
substance of their proposed notice to putative members of the
conditionally-certified class.  They ask the Court to authorize
notice by mail, and submit, as exhibits to their Motion, proposed
notice and reminder mailings to the putative class members.

Synergies3 does not oppose notice by mail.  Subject to a few points
of disagreement, Synergies3 also consents to the substance of the
notice and reminder mailings proposed by the Plaintiffs.  The
parties dispute who should receive the notice, how long the notice
period should last, and whether additional means of notice are
necessary.

First, to include those putative class members who have already
filed their written consents, Judge Clark defines the class as all
installation technicians who worked for Synergies3 and whom
Synergies3 classified as independent contractors at any time since
Feb. 4, 2016, three years before the date the Plaintiffs filed
their original Complaint.  However, the Judge authorizes notice
only to those installation technicians who worked for Synergies3
and who Synergies3 classified as independent contractors at any
time since Oct. 29, 2016, three years before the date of the Order.
The Judge finds that the statute of limitations bars the claim of
any individual who last worked for Synergies3 before Oct. 29, 2016,
unless they have already filed written consent to join.

Second, Judge Clark directed Synergies tot, within 10 days of the
date of the Order, provide the Plaintiffs' counsel with the names
and mailing addresses of all individuals who worked for Synergies3
as installation technicians and whom Synergies3 classified as
independent contractors at any time within three years before the
date of the Order.

Third, Judge Clark holds that a 45-day notice period is
sufficient.

Finally, the Judge holds that Notice by first-class mail is
adequate.  The Plaintiffs provide no evidence, or even any
allegations, that installation technicians who presently work for
Synergies3 (and therefore are most likely to see any posted notice)
are difficult to locate or reach by way of first-class mail.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Clark granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for an order conditionally certifying a collective action under the
FLSA.  The Judge conditionally certified a class of all individuals
who worked as installation technicians for Synergies3, and whom
Synergies3 classified as independent contractors, at any at any
time between Feb. 4, 2016 and the date final judgment is entered in
the case.  The conditionally certified class will not include
individuals who worked as installation technicians for Synergies3
but were classified as employees.

Judge Clark granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
motion to facilitate class notice and approved the form of the
Plaintiffs' proposed notice as follows:

     a) the Court amends the Plaintiffs' Notice of Collective
        Action Lawsuit,to provide for an opt-in period of 45 days
        rather than 60 days.  The opt-in period will commence on
        the date that Plaintiffs' counsel mails the notice to
        putative class members;

     b) the Court amends the notice to reflect that the notice may

        to be sent to any individual who works or worked for
        Synergies3 as an installation technician, and whom
        Synergies3 classified as an independent contractor, at
        any time on or after Oct. 29, 2016;

     c) the Court authorizes the Plaintiffs' counsel, no more
        than 21 days after their counsel receives from Synergies3
        the names and mailing addresses of the individuals
        identified, to mail the notice to the individuals
        identified;

     d) the Court approves the Plaintiffs' proposed reminder
        postcard in a format consistent with Exhibit 4 to
        their memorandum, except that the Court amends the
        reminder postcard to provide for an opt-in period of
        45 days rather than 60 days.  The Court authorizes the
        Plaintiffs' counsel to mail the reminder postcard to
        the individuals identified above at least 10, and
        no more than 21 days, before the notice deadline.

Judge Clark finally ordered that Synergies3 must provide to the
Plaintiffs' counsel, and in readable electronic format, the names
and mailing addresses of all individuals who worked for Synergies3
as installation technicians, and whom Synergies3 classified as
independent contractors, at any time within three years before the
date of the Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 29, 2019 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://is.gd/NJ4mBD from Leagle.com.

Clinton Jackson & James Thomas, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Jay E.
Eidsness -- jeidness@nka.com -- NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP, Rachhana T.
Srey -- srey@nka.com -- NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP & Mark A. Potashnick
-- markp@wp-attorneys.com -- WEINHAUS AND POTASHNICK.

Synergies3 TEC Services, LLC, Defendant, represented by Ida S.
Shafaie -- ishafaie@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE
LLP, Jay R. Aldis -- jay.aldis@bracewell.com -- BRACEWELL LLP,
Jeremy Michael Brenner -- jbrenner@atllp.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE
LLP & Robert A. Kaiser -- rkaiser@armstrongteasdale.com --
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP.


TAKEDA PHARMA: DPPs May File 4th Amended Complaint in Actos Case
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York has authorized the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs
("DPPs") to file their Fourth Consolidated Class Action Complaint
in IN RE: ACTOS DIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS
DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, Case No. 1:15-cv-03278-RA (S.D.
N.Y.).

On Nov. 16, 2017, the DPPs filed a Third Consolidated Class Action
Complaint.  On Oct. 8, 2019, the Court entered an Opinion and Order
resolving motions to dismiss filed with respect to the Consolidated
Complaint and dismissing Counts II through VIII of the Consolidated
Complaint, which included all claims against Mylan, Inc., Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis plc, Watson Laboratories, Inc.,
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, Ranbaxy Inc., Ranbaxy
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited
("Generic Defendants").

On Oct. 22, 2019, the DPPs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint or, in the Alternative Add a Party, and attached to their
motion a proposed fourth consolidated class action complaint and
jury demand.  On Oct. 24, 2019, the Court entered an order on
consent providing that the Defendants would have a period of 10
days after the Motion to Amend was resolved and the operative
complaint set within which to answer the complaint.

On Nov. 11, 2019, the Court entered an order directing the parties
to confer on a revised form of order on the Motion to Amend and
resubmit a proposed order to the Court.

Subsequently, Judge Abrams permitted the DPPs to file the Fourth
Consolidated Class Action Complaint and jury demand in the form
attached as Exhibit A to their Motion to Amend.  Takeda
Pharmaceutical Company Limited, Takeda America Holdings, Inc.,
Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc., and Takeda Development Center
Americas, Inc. may file an answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint.


The Court's opinion and order of Oct. 8, 2019 will apply to all
claims and parties in the Fourth Consolidated Class Action
Complaint, and pursuant to that opinion and order and for the
reasons set forth therein, Counts II through VIII of the fourth
consolidated class action complaint are dismissed.

Takeda will have no obligation to respond to the Dismissed Counts.
The Generic Defendants will have no obligation to respond to the
fourth consolidated class action complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/GPQ1cO from Leagle.com.

American Sales Company, LLC, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David S. Nalven --
davidn@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Linda P.
Nussbaum, Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., Thomas Matthew Sobol --
tom@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice,
Gregory Thomas Arnold, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP & Kristen
Anne Johnson -- kristenj@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens, Berman, Sobol,
Shapiro, LLP.

Meijer, Inc. & Meijer Distribution, Inc., Plaintiffs, represented
by Thomas Matthew Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.

Cesar Castillo, Inc., Individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, Consolidated Plaintiff, represented by Bradley
J. Demuth, Nussbaum Law Group, P.C., Linda P. Nussbaum, Nussbaum
Law Group, P.C. & Thomas Matthew Sobol, Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro
LLP.

Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., Takeda America Holdings, Inc.,
Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. & Takeda Development Center
Americas, Inc., Defendants, represented by Adam R. Lawton --
karen.lent@skadden.com -- Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, pro hac
vice.


TILLY'S INC: Discovery Ongoing in Ward Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 2, 2019, that discovery is ongoing
in the class action suit entitled, Skylar Ward, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. Tilly's, Inc.,
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No.
BC595405.  

In September 2015, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
lawsuit against the company alleging, among other things, various
violations of California's wage and hour laws.  

The complaint sought class certification, unspecified damages,
unpaid wages, penalties, restitution, and attorneys' fees.  

In June 2016, the court granted the company's demurrer to the
plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action against Tilly's and dismissed the
complaint.  Specifically, the court agreed with the company that
the plaintiff's cause of action for reporting-time pay fails as a
matter of law as the plaintiff and other putative class members did
not "report for work" with respect to certain shifts on which the
plaintiff's claims are based.  

In November 2016, the court entered a written order sustaining the
company's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint and dismissing all
of plaintiff's causes of action with prejudice.

In January 2017, the plaintiff filed an appeal of the order to the
California Court of Appeal. In October 2017, the plaintiff filed
her opening appellate brief, and the company's responding appellate
brief was filed in December 2017.  

In May 2018, the plaintiff filed her reply appellate brief.  

Later in May 2018, an amicus brief was filed by Abercrombie & Fitch
Stores, Inc., in support of Tilly's position in this appeal. Oral
argument was heard by the California Court of Appeal in November
2018.

On February 4, 2019, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion
overturning the trial court's decision, holding that the
plaintiff's allegations stated a claim. In March 2019, the company
filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court
seeking its discretionary review of the Court of Appeal's decision.


In May 2019, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for
review and remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.  

In July 2019, the company filed an answer to the first amended
complaint, denying all claims and asserting various defenses. The
parties are currently engaged in discovery.  

Tilly's said, "We have defended this case vigorously, and will
continue to do so."

Tilly's, Inc. retails casual apparel, footwear, and accessories for
young men and women, and boys and girls in the United States. Its
apparel merchandise includes tops, outerwear, bottoms, and dresses;
and accessories merchandise comprises backpacks, hats, sunglasses,
headphones, handbags, watches, jewelry, and others. Tilly's, Inc.
was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


TILLY'S INC: Mediation in Gonzales PAGA Claim Set for March 2020
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tilly's, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 10, 2019, for the
quarterly period ended November 2, 2019, that the parties in Juan
Carlos Gonzales, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, v. Tilly's Inc. et al, Superior Court of California,
County of Orange, Case No. 30-2017-00948710-CU-OE-CXC, have agreed
to participate in a mediation with respect to the PAGA claim in
March 2020.

In October 2017, the plaintiff filed a putative class action
against the company, alleging various violations of California's
wage and hour laws.  The complaint seeks class certification,
unspecified damages, unpaid wages, penalties, restitution,
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.  

In December 2017, the company filed an answer to the complaint,
denying all of the claims and asserting various defenses. In April
2018, the plaintiff filed a separate action under the Private
Attorneys General Act ("PAGA") against the company seeking
penalties on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
employees for the same alleged violations of California's wage and
hour laws.  

The company requested the plaintiff to dismiss the class action
claims based on an existing class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement which plaintiff signed with the company's co-defendant,
BaronHR, the staffing company that employed plaintiff to work at
the Company.  

In June 2018, the plaintiff's class action complaint was dismissed.


The parties have agreed to participate in a mediation with respect
to the PAGA claim in March 2020. The court has not yet issued a
trial date.

Tilly's said, "We have defended this case vigorously, and will
continue to do so."

Tilly's, Inc. retails casual apparel, footwear, and accessories for
young men and women, and boys and girls in the United States. Its
apparel merchandise includes tops, outerwear, bottoms, and dresses;
and accessories merchandise comprises backpacks, hats, sunglasses,
headphones, handbags, watches, jewelry, and others.  Tilly's, Inc.
was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in Irvine, California.


TRADER JOE'S: District Court Dismisses Webb Consumer Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California has dismissed with prejudice the
case captioned CHRISTINA WEBB, on behalf of herself, all others
similarly situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, v. TRADER
JOE'S COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-1587-CAB-WVG (S.D. Cal.).

Christina Webb filed the putative consumer class action complaint
against Defendant Trader Joe's in the Superior Court of California,
County of San Diego, on July 10, 2019 and the Defendant removed the
action to the California District Court on Aug. 23, 2019.  The
complaint asserts claims for violation of California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law (the "UCL"); violation of California's False
Advertising Law ("FAL"); Breach of Express and Implied Warranties;
Theft by False Pretenses; and Unjust Enrichment/Money Had and
Received.

The Defendant markets, sells, and distributes a variety of Trader
Joe's branded raw poultry products, including the "All Natural
Boneless Chicken Breasts," "All Natural Chicken Thighs," and "All
Natural Chicken Wings."  According to the complaint, the Products
are false and misleading because the Products claim to contain up
to 5% retained water when they actually contain far greater amounts
of retained water (as much as 16%) for which California consumers
are unlawfully charged.  

The Plaintiff alleges she purchased the Products from several
Trader Joe's locations in San Diego County, California, which
contained excess retained water above the amount the Products
declared and therefore Plaintiff paid more for the products than
they were worth.  After sampling and analyzing Products offered for
sale at supermarkets in Northern California, she found that the
Products were routinely economically adulterated with excess
retained water far greater than that declared on the Product
labels.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a Nationwide class and California
sub-class of consumers who purchased the Products during the class
period.  The complaint's prayer for relief requests, among other
things, an order enjoining the Defendant to cease packaging,
advertising, and selling the Products; re-label or recall all
existing Products; conduct a corrective advertising campaign; and
an award of restitution and damages for the Plaintiff and the
class.

The matter comes before the District Court on the Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The Defendant contends that
all of the Plaintiff's claims are expressly preempted under the
Poultry Products Inspection Act ("PPIA"), because it has complied
with federal requirements and the Products' label has been
pre-approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA").

The Defendant requests the District Court takes judicial notice of
a copy of the label of its "All Natural Chicken" Product.  The
Plaintiff requests the District Court takes judicial notice of a
public document from the United States Department of Agriculture
Food Safety and Inspection Service titled "Chicken from Farm to
Table" available online, an Order Sustaining Demurrer entered on
Jan. 29, 2018, and an Order after hearing on the Defendant's
Demurrer entered on Oct. 9, 2018, in Wong v. Vons, et. al., Case
No. RG17865531 (Superior Court of California, County of Alameda).
Neither party has opposed the others' requests or challenged the
documents' authenticity.  Accordingly, Judge Bencivengo takes
judicial notice of both the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's
exhibits.

Turning to the Defendant's motion, Judge Bencivengo finds that
PPIA's preemption provision preempts the Plaintiff's state law
claims.  The Plaintiff's claims are all centered around the theory
that the Defendant's Products are misleading and mislabeled due to
the Products containing retained water greater than that which is
claimed on the Products' labels according to the Plaintiff's own
testing of the Products.  The Defendant has fully complied with the
federal requirements to make the "Up to 5% Retained Water" claim on
its labels by demonstrating to the FSIS with data collected in
accordance with the above-mentioned protocol, that the Products
contain up to 5% of retained water as an unavoidable consequence.
The Defendant must have included, among several other requirements,
a report of such data and an evaluation of its results.  

In turn, the FSIS must have reviewed this data and approved the
Products' label in order to permit the Defendant to place its
retained water claim upon its Products for sale in interstate
commerce.  After review, the FSIS could have objected to the
Defendant's protocol, or required it to make changes, but the fact
that the Products are placed for sale lends to the conclusion that
no such objection or request was made.

Judge Bencivengo also finds that the Plaintiff's state law claims
would necessarily require additional requirements that are not
equivalent to the PPIA.  As the Defendant has fully complied with
the federal requirements under the PPIA and the FSIS has approved
the Products' label, the label claims cannot be construed, as a
matter of law, as false or misleading.  Receiving pre-approval of
labels must be given preemptive effect.  Furthermore, the FSIS
states it reviews labels for approval in their entirety and does
not pre-approve the data provided by establishments or the
water-retention limits the provided data purport to justify because
to do so would contradict its regulatory policy which is opposed to
command-and-control regulation.

Finally, Judge Bencivengo holds that permitting the Plaintiff to
assert her state law claims would effectively impose a labeling
requirement—and undermine federal agency authority -- because the
Defendant would have to satisfy additional requirements under state
law after already having fully complied with applicable federal
law.  Any liability the Plaintiff seeks to attach based on her
state law claims would unavoidably impose marking, labeling, or
packaging requirements upon the Defendant in addition to, or
different than the federal regulations that the Defendant has
already followed under the PPIA.  The Defendant would be required
to either provide additional corroborated data to the FSIS,
complete further testing on its Products, or satisfy some other
requirement that is not mandated under the PPIA because the
Plaintiff conducted her own testing of the Products in which she
found that the retained water was greater than what the Products
claim.  

The Plaintiff's own testing, if anything, could indicate that the
FSIS may not have properly substantiated the Defendant's
data-collection protocol or that the data-collection protocol it
provided to the FSIS was somehow faulty.  The Plaintiff's state law
claims are not predicated on such grounds.  Furthermore, even if
the Plaintiff's own testing is accurate, only the federal
government is vested with the authority to enforce the PPIA.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's state law claims are expressly
preempted under the PPIA.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Bencivengo granted the Defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and dismissed the Plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Oct. 29, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/MHJdun from Leagle.com.

Christina Webb, on behalf of herself, all others similarly
situated, and the general public, Plaintiff, represented by David
Elliot, The Elliott Law Firm, Lilach Halperin --
lilach@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron,
PLC, Michael Houchin -- mike@consumersadvocates.com -- Law Offices
of Ronald A. Marron & Ronald Marron -- ron@consumersadvocates.com
-- Law Office of Ronald Marron.

Trader Joe's Company, Defendant, represented by Angel A. Garganta
-- agarganta@venable.com -- Venable LLP, Amit Rana --
arana@venable.com -- Venable LLP & Yuhan Chi, Venable LLP.


TROPICAL FINANCIAL: Denial of Bid to Certify Class in Lopez Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERTO LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Appellant, v. TROPICAL FINANCIAL CREDIT
UNION; CMFG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; and CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY,
INC., Appellees, Case No. 4D19-884 (Fla. App.), the District Court
of Appeal of Florida for the Fourth District affirmed the circuit
court's order denying Lopez's motion for class action
certification.

The Appeals Court believes the Appellant has failed to demonstrate
that the circuit court abused its discretion in the case by denying
his motion for class action certification.  The trial court
conducted the required rigorous analysis and the Appeals Court
finds that the trial court's factual determinations are supported
by competent substantial evidence and the legal rulings are not
erroneous.

A full-text copy of the Appeals Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/zEfztE from Leagle.com.

Philip M. Burlington -- pmb@flappellatelaw.com -- and Jeffrey V.
Mansell -- jvm@flappellatelaw.com -- of Burlington & Rockenbach,
P.A., West Palm Beach, and Jeffrey M. Liggio --
jliggio@liggiolaw.com -- of Liggio Law, West Palm Beach, for
appellant.

Michael Jay Rune II -- mrune@carltonfields.com -- and Dana Chaaban
-- dchaaban@carltonfields.com -- of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami,
for appellee Tropical Financial Credit Union; and Roland C. Goss --
roland.goss@dbr.com -- of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Washington,
DC, for appellees CMFG Life Insurance Company and CUMIS Insurance
Society, Inc.

U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL: Edwards Files Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against U-Haul International,
Inc. The case is styled as Marissa Edwards and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. U-Haul International, Inc. and William Wolf,
Defendants, Case No. 600044/2019 (N.Y., Sup., Jan. 8, 2020).

The case type of the suit is stated as Other.

U-Haul is an American moving equipment and storage rental company,
based in Phoenix, Arizona, that has been in operation since 1945.
The company was founded by Leonard Shoen in Ridgefield, Washington,
who began it in the garage owned by his wife's family, and expanded
it through franchising with gas stations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
   ONE OLD COUNTRY ROAD, STE.347
   CARLE PLACE, NY 11514
   Tel: (516) 873-9550

The Defendants are represented by:

   Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLC
   1290 6th Ave, New York
   NY 10104, United States
   Tel: (212) 541-2000



UBER TECHNOLOGIES: $346K Dulberg Class Settlement Gets Final OK
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge William A. Alsup of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted final approval of the proposed
settlement in the case MARTIN DULBERG, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., and RASIER, LLC, Defendants, Case No. 17-00850 WHA (N.D.
Cal.).  The Court also granted in part the class counsel's
requested attorney's fees and expenses.

Martin Dulberg brought the class action on behalf of Uber drivers
against Defendants Uber Technologies and Rasier, LLC, asserting
Uber breached its contract with Uber drivers.  Uber's policy
changed in late 2016.  The Plaintiff alleged the new policy
violated his contract with Uber because Uber calculated costs to
passengers by estimating time and distance amounts before the ride
and then compensated drivers based on actual time and distance
amounts -- keeping the difference for itself.  

In February 2018, an order certified the following class:  All
natural persons nationwide who (1) drove for UberX or UberSELECT;
(2) opted out of arbitration; (3) transported a passenger who was
charged an upfront Fare before May 22, 2017, when Uber issued its
updated fee addendum; and (4) made less money overall on rides
where they transported passengers who were charged an upfront Fare
because they were paid on a Fare calculated based on actual time
and distance values instead of the upfront Fare calculated based on
estimated time and distance values.

In August 2018, the Plaintiff originally moved for preliminary
approval of a proposed class settlement in the amount of $345,622.
The Defendants did not oppose.  The settlement amount represented
46% of the maximum recovery the Plaintiff's expert opined the class
could recover and the maximum Uber's expert opined the class could
recover.

After some court-ordered changes to the settlement agreement,
including direction to alter the "released claims" section, an
order preliminarily approved the settlement agreement. Thereafter,
an order approved, as to form and content, the notice of class
action settlement and a schedule governing the remaining
proceedings in the action.

In February 2019, the Plaintiff moved for final approval of the
proposed class settlement of $345,622 and requested attorney's fees
and reimbursement for expenses.  Specifically, the class counsel
sought $40,430.01 in expenses (including settlement administrator
expenses), $103,687 in attorney's fees (comprising 30% of the gross
settlement fund and 33.97% of the net settlement fund), and an
incentive award for the Lead Plaintiff in the amount of up to
$5,000.

Judge Alsup finds that the proposed class settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate as to the class, the Plaintiff, and the
Defendants.  He therefore approved the settlement.  As set forth in
the settlement agreement, within 60 days after judgment is issued,
the settlement administrator will mail a check to each class
members' last known address.  Funds from uncashed checks must be
reallocated to the class and may not revert to defendants.  Within
120 days of issuing the initial checks to the class, the parties
are ordered to file a joint status report indicating how many class
members cashed their checks and how many class members did not cash
their checks.

Having considered the class counsel's motion for attorney's fees,
reimbursement of expenses, and an incentive award, Judge Alsup
awarded the class counsel attorney's fees of $65,569.50.  Half of
the amount will be paid immediately.  The other half will be paid
when the class counsel certifies that all funds have been properly
distributed and the file can be completely closed.  It is possible
that the fee award may have to be adjusted downward to account for
glitches in the distribution process that sometimes arises.  The
counsel will please continue their work to ensure distribution goes
smoothly.

The class counsel will also receive $40,430 as reimbursement for
their litigation expenses, to be paid from the settlement fund.
Half of the amount will be paid immediately.  The other half will
be paid when the class counsel certify that all funds have been
properly distributed and the file can be completely closed.

Lead Plaintiff, Martin Dulberg, will also receive $100 as an award
for his efforts in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/RdZO81 from Leagle.com.

Martin Dulberg, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly-situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jennifer R. Liakos
--
jliakos@napolilaw.com -- Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, Danielle Jan
Marlow,
Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, 360 Lexington Avenue, 11th Floor, New York,
NY 10017, pro hac vice, Salvatore C. Badala, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC,
360 Lexington Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10017, pro hac vice
& Samuel Joseph Moorhead, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC, 360 Lexington
Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10017

Uber Technologies, Inc. & Rasier, LLC, Defendants, represented by
Randall W. Edwards -- redwards@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Adam Manes Kaplan -- akaplan@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP,
Damali A. Taylor -- dtaylor@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers & Matthew
David Powers -- mpowers@omm.com -- O'Melveny & Myers LLP.


UNILEVER NV: Pederson Sues Over High Levels of Mercury in Pond's
----------------------------------------------------------------
Janneth Pederson, individually and as representative of all others
similarly situated v. UNILEVER N.V., UNILEVER PLC, and UNILEVER
UNITED STATES INC., Case No. 5:20-cv-00020 (W.D. Tex., Jan. 8,
2020), alleges that the Defendants' Rejuveness product contains
toxic and illegal levels of mercury.

The Defendants' product known as "Pond's Rejuveness" is a
moisturizer marketed for daily use.

Mercury is considered highly toxic and readily turns to a vaporous
state at room temperature. Vapor inhalation, in even the most
miniscule amounts, is the most dangerous type of mercury exposure.
Despite its well-documented dangers to human health, international
cosmetic manufacturers intentionally infuse products with mercury.
The use of mercury in cosmetics, such as facial creams like the
Product, is strictly illegal in the European Union and illegal in
the United States except for an amount of one part per million
(microgram per liter) if and only if it is impossible to
manufacture the product without any mercury.

Unilever, through its brand Pond's, is a large international
cosmetic manufacturer. One of its products in particular has
garnered special fame and reputation in Mexico for effectiveness in
counteracting the effects of aging skin (such as age spots). That
product is known as "Pond's Rejuveness" and is a moisturizer
marketed for daily use.

Ms. Pederson's container of Pond's Rejuveness indicated it was
produced at a facility in Mexico, which would be free from the
FDA's anti-mercury regulations. The Pond's Rejuveness container did
not disclose it contained mercury, nor did it provide any warnings
against using it without an intact protective seal. Unilever failed
to adequately label its product.

Unilever is actually aware of multiple cases where its products
manufactured in Mexico have been formally found to contain mercury
by U.S. authorities, according to the complaint. Unilever, like
many cosmetics manufacturers, knows of mercury's dubious use as a
skin-bleaching agent. Unilever could actively use this knowledge to
intentionally exploit lax regulations in countries outside the
United States through the use of mercury in products manufactured
outside the United States. Alternatively, Unilever's knowledge
evinces additional reasons it should label and package its products
to protect and warn against adulteration by third parties, says the
complaint.

Ms. Pederson has used the Rejuveness for its intended purpose over
a period of seven years. As a result, she asserts, she and other
putative class members were injured by, have suffered, or continue
to suffer from mercury toxicity, the hallmark of which devastates
the central nervous system.

Unilever manufactured, sold, and advertised its anti-aging beauty
products in Mexico, including Rejuveness.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Arnold Shokouhi, Esq.
          Justin N. Bryan, Esq.
          Kristin M. Hecker, Esq.
          MCCATHERN, PLLC
          3710 Rawlins Street, Suite 1600
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Phone: (214) 741-2662
          Fax: (214) 741-4717
          Email: arnolds@mccathernlaw.com
                 jbryan@mccathernlaw.com
                 khecker@mccathernlaw.com

               - and -

          Evan Selik, Esq.
          MCCATHERN, PLLC
          523 West Sixth Street, Suite 830
          Los Angeles, CA 90014
          Phone: (213) 225-6150
          Facsimile: (213) 225-6151
          Email: eselik@mccathernlaw.com


UNITED NATURAL: Awaits 8th Cir. Decision on Plaintiff's Appeal
--------------------------------------------------------------
United Natural Foods, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 11, 2019, for
the quarterly period ended November 2, 2019, that the company is
awaiting the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit on the New England plaintiff's appeal on the grant of
summary judgment and Daubert motion.

In December 2008, a class action complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against
Supervalu alleging that a 2003 transaction between Supervalu and
C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. was a conspiracy to restrain trade and
allocate markets.

In the 2003 transaction, Supervalu purchased certain assets of the
Fleming Corporation as part of Fleming Corporation's bankruptcy
proceedings and sold certain of Supervalu's assets to C&S that were
located in New England.

Three other retailers filed similar complaints in other
jurisdictions and the cases were consolidated in the United States
District Court in Minnesota.

The complaints alleged that the conspiracy was concealed and
continued through the use of non-compete and non-solicitation
agreements and the closing down of the distribution facilities that
Supervalu and C&S purchased from each other.

Plaintiffs were divided into Midwest plaintiffs and a New England
plaintiff and are seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief and
attorney's fees. As previously disclosed, the Company settled with
the Midwest plaintiffs in November 2017.

The New England plaintiff was not a party to the settlement and is
pursuing its individual claims and potential class action claims
against Supervalu, which at this time are determined as remote.

On February 15, 2018, Supervalu filed a summary judgment and
Daubert motion and the New England plaintiff filed a motion for
class certification and on July 27, 2018, the District Court
granted Supervalu's motions. The New England plaintiff appealed to
the 8th Circuit on August 15, 2018.

Briefing on the appeal is complete and the hearing occurred on
October 15, 2019. The Company is awaiting the 8th Circuit's
decision.

United Natural Foods, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
distributes natural, organic, and specialty foods and non-food
products in the United States and Canada. The company operates
through three divisions: Wholesale, Retail, and Manufacturing and
Branded Products. United Natural Foods, Inc. was founded in 1976
and is headquartered in Providence, Rhode Island.


UNITED STATES: Court Provisionally Certifies Class in Al Otro Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned Al Otro Lado, Inc., et al., Plaintiffs, v.
Kevin K. McAleenan, et al., Defendants, Case No.
17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal.), Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted both
the (i) Plaintiffs' Motion for Provisional Class Certification, and
(ii) the Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in the underlying
action on July 12, 2017 in the Central District of California.  It
was subsequently transferred to the Southern District of
California.  The Plaintiffs' putative class action complaint
alleges that Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") uses various
unlawful tactics, including misrepresentation, threats and
intimidation, verbal abuse and physical force, and coercion to
systematically deny asylum seekers access to the asylum process.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on Dec. 14, 2017.  In
its order on the motion, the Court found that organizational
Plaintiff Al Otro Lado had standing to bring the case and that the
case was not moot, even though some named Plaintiffs had received
an asylum hearing.  It further denied requests to dismiss the
lawsuit based on sovereign immunity and held that the Plaintiffs
had adequately alleged a claim under the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA") to compel agency action unlawfully withheld.

However, the Court dismissed the Section 706(1) claims brought by
Plaintiffs Abigail Doe, Beatrice Doe and Carolina Doe to the extent
they sought to compel relief under 8 C.F.R. Section 235.4 for
allegedly being coerced into withdrawing their applications for
admission.  It also dismissed the Plaintiffs' Section 706(2) claims
based on an alleged "pattern or practice."  It granted the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their Section 706(2) claims.

The Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on Oct.
12, 2018, followed by a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on Nov.
13, 2018.  The amended complaints added allegations regarding the
Government's purported "Turnback Policy," which included a
"metering" or "waitlist" system in which asylum seekers were
instructed "to wait on the bridge, in the pre-inspection area, or
at a shelter" -- or were simply told that they could not be
processed because the POE is 'full' or 'at capacity.'"  The
Plaintiffs contend that CBP officials routinely tell asylum seekers
approaching POEs that in order to apply for asylum, they must get
on a list or get a number" and that CBP prevents asylum-seekers
from coming to the POE until their number is called which can take
days, weeks or longer.  Some individuals are prevented from
registering on the lists due to discrimination based on race,
sexual orientation, or gender identity by the Mexican officials or
third parties managing the lists.  The Plaintiffs allege that CBP's
rationale for this system is a pretext to serve the Trump
administration's broader, public proclaimed goal of deterring
individuals from seeking access to the asylum process.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC on Nov. 29, 2018.
Following briefing, including six amicus briefs filed in support of
the Plaintiffs' arguments, and oral argument, the Court largely
denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the SAC.  The Defendants
then answered the Complaint on Aug. 16, 2019.

On July 16, 2019, the Government issued a joint interim final rule
entitled "Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications," widely
known as the "Asylum Ban."  The Plaintiffs argue the Asylum Ban
would, if applied to non-Mexican asylum-seekers who were metered at
the border before July 16, 2019, preclude these individuals from
accessing any asylum process altogether due to circumstances
entirely of the Government's making.

Thus, the Plaintiffs seek to provisionally certify a subclass of
the original class consisting of all non-Mexican non-citizens who
were denied access to the U.S. asylum process before July 16, 2019
as a result of the Government's metering policy and continue to
seek access to the U.S. asylum process.  They further request that
the Court preliminarily enjoins the Defendants from applying the
Asylum Ban to the provisional class members who were metered prior
to July 16, 2019.

The Defendants argue that the Court has no jurisdiction to issue
the requested relief in either Motion under a variety of provisions
in the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and because the
subject of the Plaintiffs' injunction is not of the same character
as the underlying lawsuit.  As to the merits of the Plaintiffs'
Motions, they contend that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to an
injunction because the Government's metering policies are lawful,
the balance of equities tips sharply in favor of the Government,
and they have failed to satisfy any of the prerequisites to class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Judge Bashant rejects the Defendants' arguments.  She finds that
the Defendants have not alleged that any final removal orders have
been issued as to any Plaintiff, or that the Plaintiffs' requests
challenge any such orders per subsection (a)(2)(A), implicate the
discrete actions outlined in subsection (g), or arise from actions
taken to remove these aliens under subsections (a)(5) and (b)(9).
Thus, the Judge finds that these provisions do not preclude its
jurisdiction over the claims raised in the Plaintiffs' Motions.

Next, she finds that the Defendants have not demonstrated how
determinations about asylum eligibility constitute an
"implementation" of Section 1225(b), the statute governing
expedited removal. See East Bay Sanctuary Covenant.  Hence, the
Judge does not find that Section 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) or Section
1252(e)(3)(A)(ii) divests it of jurisdiction to hear challenges to
the Asylum Ban's applicability in the case.

The Judge then finds that the Defendants offer no support for the
proposition that any relevant subsection of Section 1252 seeks to
prevent review of any issue because the Attorney General will
invoke expedited removal as to Plaintiffs in the future.  Further,
as stated, the Plaintiffs do not seek review of any decision to
place them in expedited removal proceedings.  The Judge's
determination at the injunction stage, therefore, is not a "review"
of decisions related to expedited removal, and these sections do
not apply to divest the Court of jurisdiction regarding the
Plaintiffs' Motions.

The Judge also finds that the jurisdictional bar under 8 U.S.C.
Section 1252(e)(3) does not apply to the Plaintiffs' claims.  None
of the cited subsections of 8 U.S.C. Section  1252 divest the Court
of jurisdiction to decide the issues raised by the Plaintiffs'
Motions.

In the instant Motions, the Plaintiffs request that the Court
requires the Defendants to comply with the limited scope of the
Asylum Ban to preserve their access to the asylum process.  This
relates to the allegations in the SAC regarding the Defendants'
denial of the Plaintiffs' right to asylum access.  Indeed, the
Plaintiffs' claims regarding the Asylum Ban and their underlying
claims in their SAC are so intertwined that denying their Motion
for Preliminary Injunction could effectively eviscerate the asylum
claims they seek to preserve in their underlying suit. Thus, the
Plaintiffs are not seeking relief that is of a different character
than that sought in the SAC, and a preliminary injunction can be
appropriately granted.

Alternatively, the Judge finds that the All Writs Act ("AWA"),
authorizes the Court to issue injunctive relief to preserve its
jurisdiction in the underlying action.  To preserve its
jurisdiction over the underlying claims in the SAC, the Juduge
finds that the Court possesses the authority under the AWA to issue
an injunction preserving the status quo in the case and allow the
Court to resolve the underlying questions of law before it.  

Because the Plaintiffs have met the requirements of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2), the Judge finds
certification of a subclass is appropriate.  Accordingly, she
grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Provisional Class Certification
consisting of all non-Mexican non-citizens who sought
unsuccessfully to make a direct asylum claim at a U.S. POE before
July 16, 2019, were instead required to wait in Mexico due to the
U.S. Government's metering policy, and who continue to seek access
to the U.S. asylum process.

Finally, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs have clearly shown
a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, and
that the balance of equities and public interest fall in their
favor.  Hence, the Judge grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction.  The injunctive relief in the case would
apply only to the class certified in the case, defined in Section
III, supra.  The preliminary injunction therefore does not restrain
nationwide effect of the Asylum Ban; it restrains only the effect
of the Ban on those members of the provisionally certified class
who fall outside the Ban's stated parameters.

For the reasons stated, Judge Bashant granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Provisional Class Certification.  The Judge
provisionally certified a class consisting of all non-Mexican
asylum-seekers who were unable to make a direct asylum claim at a
U.S. POE before July 16, 2019 because of the U.S. Government's
metering policy, and who continue to seek access to the U.S. asylum
process.

Furthermore, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction, and ordered the following: The Defendants
are enjoined from applying the Asylum Ban to the members of the
aforementioned provisionally certified class, and ordered to return
to the pre-Asylum Ban practices for processing the asylum
applications of the members of the certified class.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/sugGwS from Leagle.com.

Al Otro Lado, Inc., a California corporation, Abigail Doe,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Beatrice Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Carolina Doe, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Dinora Doe, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & Ingrid Doe, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by
Matthew Ellis Fenn, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew H.
Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Ori Lev, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice,
Rebecca Cassler, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice, Sarah
Marion Rich, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice, Stephen
Medlock, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Angelo R. Guisado, Center
for Constitution Rights, pro hac vice, Baher Azmy, The Center for
Constitution Rights, pro hac vice, Ghita R. Schwarz, Center for
Constitution Rights, pro hac vice, Karolina J. Walters, American
Immigration Council, pro hac vice & Melissa E. Crow, Southern
Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice.

Jose Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew Ellis Fenn, Mayer Brown
LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Ori Lev,
Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Sarah Marion Rich, Southern Poverty
Law Center, pro hac vice, Stephen Medlock, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac
vice, Angelo R. Guisado, Center for Constitution Rights, pro hac
vice, Baher Azmy, The Center for Constitution Rights, pro hac vice,
Ghita R. Schwarz, Center for Constitution Rights, pro hac vice,
Karolina J. Walters, American Immigration Council, pro hac vice &
Melissa E. Crow, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice.

Ursula Doe, Victoria Doe, Bianca Doe, Juan Doe, Roberto Doe, Cesar
Doe, Maria Doe & Emiliana Doe, Plaintiffs, represented by Matthew
Ellis Fenn, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew H. Marmolejo,
Mayer Brown LLP, Ori Lev, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice, Rebecca
Cassler, Southern Poverty Law Center, pro hac vice & Stephen
Medlock, Mayer Brown LLP, pro hac vice.

Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Defendant, represented by Alexander James Halaska, U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Gisela Ann
Westwater, US Department of Justice, Scott Grant Stewart, U. S.
Department of Justice, Ari Nazarov, U.S. Department of Justice,
Brian Ward, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration
Litigation, Danielle K. Schuessler, Civil Division - Office of
Immigration Litigation, Genevieve Kelly, Katherine J. Shinners,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Sairah G.
Saeed, USDOJ Civil Division - Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil, OIL, DCS & Yamileth G. Davila, United States Department of
Justice.

Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, United States Customs and Border Protection, in his
official capacity, Defendant, represented by Alexander James
Halaska, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration
Litigation, Gisela Ann Westwater, US Department of Justice, Scott
Grant Stewart, U. S. Department of Justice, Brian Ward, U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Danielle K.
Schuessler, Civil Division - Office of Immigration Litigation,
Genevieve Kelly, Katherine J. Shinners, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Office of Immigration Litigation & Sairah G. Saeed, USDOJ Civil
Division - Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil, OIL, DCS.

State of California, Amicus, represented by James Fred Zahradka,
II, California Department of Justice.

Amnesty International, Amicus, represented by Susan Kay Leader,
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.

Members of Congress, Amicus, represented by Alexandra Hiatt, Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, pro hac vice, Jamie Stephen
Dycus, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, pro hac vice &
Matthew Donald Benedetto, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr.

Amici Curiae, Amicus, represented by Michael D. Kibler, Simpson
Thacher and Bartlett & Susan Baker Manning, Morgan Lewis & Bockius
LLP.

Kids in Need of Defense, the Unaccompanied Minors Program of
Catholic Charities Community Services, Archdiocese of New York,
Legal Services for Children, Public Counsel & the Young Center for
Immigrant Children's Rights at the University of Chicago Law
School, Amicuss, represented by Meryl Holt, Debevoise and Plimpton
LLP.


UNITED STATES: Settlement in JL Suit Gets Final Court Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.L., et al., Plaintiffs, v. KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-04914-NC (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Nathanael M. Cousins of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
final approval of a class action settlement between a class of
immigrant juveniles seeking immigration relief and the United
States Department of Homeland Security, the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and associated officers.

In August 2018, Individual Plaintiffs J.L., M.D.G.B., and J.B.A.
filed this lawsuit alleging that USCIS implemented a blanket policy
denying petitions for Special Immigrant Juvenile ("SIJ") status
under 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(a)(27)(J).  Under that statute,
unmarried immigrants under the age of 21 may apply for SIJ status
if they were declared dependent on a state juvenile court, could
not be reunited with one or both of their parents, and it would not
be in their best interest to be returned to their previous country
of residence.  If granted, SIJ status provided a pathway to
permanent residency and citizenship.

According to the Plaintiffs, USCIS believed that California courts
did not have jurisdiction to make the required findings to
establish SIJ eligibility because California courts could not
reunite individuals over the age of 18 with their parents.  USCIS
thus began denying SIJ applications based on California court
dependency orders.  The Plaintiffs argued that the practice was
contrary to law because California explicitly granted its courts
the power to make the necessary findings for SIJ status.

On Oct. 24, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and enjoined Defendants from denying SIJ
status on the grounds that a California Probate Court does not have
jurisdiction or authority to "reunify" an 18- to 20-year-old with
his or her parents.  Following that order, the Plaintiffs amended
their complaint and moved for class certification.

On Feb. 1, 2019, the Court certified a class of children who have
received or will receive guardianship orders pursuant to California
Probate Code Section 1510.1(a) and who have received or will
receive denials of their SIJS petitions on the grounds that the
state court that issued the SIJ Findings lacked jurisdiction
because the court did not have the authority to reunify the
children with their parents.

After further motion practice and discovery disputes, the parties
participated in several settlement discussions with Magistrate
Judge Donna M. Ryu.  On Oct. 25, 2019, the parties settled and
moved for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement.  The
Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement on
Oct. 30, 2019.

The parties' Settlement Agreement provides that:

      1. USCIS will no longer require state courts to have the
authority to place into custody or order reunification of a SIJ
applicant with his or her parents in order to determine whether the
reunification with one or both of their parents is not viable for
the purposes of SIJ eligibility;

      2. Pursuant to Cal. Prob. Code Section 1510.1 and Cal. Code
Civ. Proc. Section 155, the Probate Division of the California
Superior Court is a juvenile court for the purpose of making
findings and issuing orders for SIJ purposes;

      3. An individual is not disqualified from SIJ status if (a)
state law confers upon a state court the jurisdiction to declare
her dependent, legally commit her to an individual or entity, or
place her under the custody of another individual or entity
regardless of her age; and (b) she is unmarried and under the age
of 21 when she petitions for SIJ status;

      4. A child as defined by Cal. Prob. Code Section 1510.1 is
not disqualified from SIJ status, despite having reached
California's age of majority before obtaining a custodial placement
or legal commitment as required for SIJ eligibility because
California Probate Courts have jurisdiction over such child as a
juvenile for purposes of SIJ status under Section 1510.1.

Under the Settlement Agreement, both parties were required to
provide notice of the settlement to potential class members no
later than November 1, 2019.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs' counsel
were required to notify the class members through their websites,
reach out to identified class members, and distribute the class
notice through relevant mailing lists.  USCIS was required to post
the notice on their website and email the notice to its Office of
Public Affairs' subscribed users.

The Settlement Agreement requires USCIS to adjudicate SIJ petitions
in accordance with an agreed-upon timeline and procedures.  It also
requires USCIS to preserve records and provide the Court and the
Plaintiffs' counsel with compliance reports.  The Settlement
Agreement provides that the Court would retain jurisdiction over
this lawsuit for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

Next, the Settlement Agreement releases the Defendants from the
claims asserted in the Plaintiffs' complaint.  Specifically, the
Class Members agree to release all the claims for declaratory or
injunctive relief based on allegations that USCIS imposed a new
requirement that state courts must have the authority to place into
custody or order reunification of a SIJ applicant with his or her
parents in order to determine whether the reunification with one or
both of their parents is not viable for the purposes of SIJ
eligibility.  The Class Members also release the Defendants from
all claims arising from the facts and circumstances giving rise to
the lawsuit. They also waive the provisions, rights, and benefits
of Cal. Civ. Code Section 1542, or other similar laws.  However,
the Class Members reserve the right to challenge the adjudication
of their individual immigration petitions or removal orders.  The
Defendants do not admit wrongdoing under the Settlement Agreement.


Finally, the Settlement Agreement does not award attorneys' fees
and costs, but leaves open a process for the Plaintiffs' counsel to
seek fees and costs.

The Court has considered all matters submitted to the Court at the
hearing on the motion and otherwise, including the complete record
of the action.  It previously certified a Class under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) consisting of children who have
received or will receive guardianship orders pursuant to California
Probate Code Section 1510.1(a) and who have received or will
receive denials of their SIJS petitions on the grounds that the
state court that issued the SIJ Findings lacked jurisdiction
because the court did not have the authority to reunify the
children with their parents.

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, individuals who
file their SIJ petition with USCIS on or before Dec. 15, 2019, may
benefit from the agreement.

On Dec. 18, 2019, Judge Cousins held a final approval hearing to
consider the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the
Settlement Agreement.  He finds that the Settlement Agreement is
fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Class.
He also finds that the Class Notice described in the Settlement
Agreement was distributed to the Class Members in the manner
approved by the Court's Oct. 30, 2019, order granting preliminary
approval.  There were no objections to the Settlement Agreement.

Accordingly, the Judge granted final approval of the Settlement
Agreement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2).  The
terms of the Settlement Agreement, including all exhibits to the
Settlement Agreement, the Order, and the Judgment, will forever be
binding on the class.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, all parties must provide an
Updated Notice to all individuals on the Class List.

The Court's Oct. 24, 2018, preliminary injunction order  will
terminate upon entry of judgment.  The Court retains jurisdiction
to address any violations of that order before judgment and to
adjudicate the Court's Dec. 16, 2019, order to show cause for: (1)
one year following entry of judgment or (2) until such time that
the removed Class Members have confirmed that they do not wish to
be returned to the United States or are returned to the United
States if so requested, whichever is later.

The order does not award fees or costs to any party.  If the
parties are unable to reach an agreement as to fees or costs, the
Class Counsel must file a motion for fees or costs within 30 days
following entry of judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4ILcvM from Leagle.com.

J.L., M.V.B., M.D.G.B. & J.B.A., Plaintiffs, represented by Sirena
Peleka Castillo -- scastillo@Manatt.com -- Manatt Phelps, Phillips
LLP, Adrianne Elizabeth Marshack -- amarshack@Manatt.com --
Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Allison Claire Nelson, Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips, LLP, Judith Maura London -- jlondon@publiccounsel.org --
Public Counsel, Kathleen Elizabeth Ingra Wise, Manatt, Phelps,
Phillips, LLP, Keith Lee Wurster -- kwurster@lccr.com -- Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisc, Mary Tanagho Ross
-- mross@publiccounsel.org -- Public Counsel, Matthew Brent
Golper,
Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, LLP, Matthew P. Kanny --
mkanny@Manatt.com -- Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, Michael
Gregory Nordon, Manatt Phelps Phillips, LLP & Sara Lynn Van
Hofwegen -- svanhofwegen@publiccounsel.org -- Public Counsel.

M.G.S., Plaintiff, represented by Sirena Peleka Castillo, Manatt
Phelps, Phillips LLP & Matthew Brent Golper, Manatt, Phelps and
Phillips, LLP.

Director Lee Francis Cissna, Director, United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Defendant, represented by Ari Nazarov,
USDOJ/Civil Off. Immigration Litigation, Michael Thomas Pyle,
United States Attorney's Office, Nicole Joann Thomas-Dorris, U.S.
Dep't of Justice Civil Division, Catherine McGann Reno, U.S.
Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Katelyn
Masetta-Alvarez, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration
Litigation, Kenneth John Ian, US Dept of Justice Civil Divsion &
Lauren Fascett, US Dept. of Justice Civil Division, Office of
Immigration Litigation.

Secretary Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary, United States Department
of Homeland Security, Director Robert Cowan, Director, National
Benefits Center of United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services & United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Defendants, represented by Ari Nazarov, USDOJ/Civil Off.
Immigration Litigation, Michael Thomas Pyle, United States
Attorney's Office, Catherine McGann Reno, U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Katelyn Masetta-Alvarez,
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation,
Kenneth John Ian, US Dept of Justice Civil Divsion & Nicole Joann
Thomas-Dorris, U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil Division.

United States Department of Homeland Security, Defendant,
represented by Michael Thomas Pyle, United States Attorney's
Office, Catherine McGann Reno, U.S. Department of Justice Office
of
Immigration Litigation, Katelyn Masetta-Alvarez, U.S. Department
of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Kenneth John Ian, US
Dept
of Justice Civil Divsion & Nicole Joann Thomas-Dorris, U.S. Dep't
of Justice Civil Division.

Immigration, Children's Rights and Family Law Scholars, Amicus,
represented by Nicholas Frederic Daum -- ndaum@kbkfirm.com --
Kendall Brill & Klieger LLP & Ari Nazarov, USDOJ/Civil Off.
Immigration Litigation.

Non-Profit SIJS Service Providers, Amicus, represented by Linda
Susan Dakin-Grimm -- ldakin-grimm@milbank.com -- Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy LLP.

State of California, Amicus, represented by Domonique C. Alcaraz.


VERB TECHNOLOGY: Still Faces Hartmann Class Action in California
----------------------------------------------------------------
Verb Technology Company, Inc. continues to defend itself against a
purported class action styled Scott C. Hartmann, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. Verb
Technology Company, Inc., and Rory J. Cutaia, Defendant, Case
Number 2:19-CV-05896, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2019.

The purported class action complaint was filed on July 9, 2019, in
the United States District Court, Central District of California.

The Company said that the complaint purports to be brought on
behalf of a class of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise
acquired Verb Common Stock between January 3, 2018 and May 2, 2018.
The complaint purports to allege violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Exchange Act, arising out of the January 3, 2018
announcement by the Company of its agreement with Oracle America,
Inc.

The complaint seeks unspecified costs and damages.

The Company believes the complaint is without merit and intends to
vigorously defend the action.

Verb Technology Company, Inc. provides cloud-based business
software products under the Tagg brand name. The company was
formerly known as nFusz, Inc. and changed its name to Verb
Technology Company, Inc. in February 2019. Verb Technology Company,
Inc. was founded in 2014 and is headquartered in Los Angeles,
California.


VISA INC: Bid for Class Status Still Pending in EMV Liability Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In a class action complaint on EMV Chip Liability Shift, the
Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification has been
reinstated and is currently pending, according to Visa Inc.'s Form
10-K filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 14, 2019, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2019.

Following their initial complaint filed on March 8, 2016, B&R
Supermarket, Inc., d/b/a Milam's Market, and Grove Liquors LLC
filed an amended class action complaint on July 15, 2016, against
Visa Inc., Visa U.S.A., Mastercard, Discover, American Express,
EMVCo and certain financial institutions in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California.  The amended complaint
asserts that defendants, through EMVCo, conspired to shift
liability for fraudulent, faulty or otherwise rejected payment card
transactions from defendants to the purported class of merchants,
defined as those merchants throughout the U.S. who have been
subjected to the "Liability Shift" since October 2015.  Plaintiffs
claim that the so-called "Liability Shift" violates Sections 1 and
3 of the Sherman Act and certain state laws, and seek treble
damages, injunctive relief and attorneys' fees.

EMVCo and the financial institution defendants were dismissed, and
the matter was subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, which has clarified that this
case is not part of MDL 1720.

Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification on July
16, 2018, following an earlier denial of the motion without
prejudice.  Plaintiffs' renewed motion was terminated without
prejudice to reinstatement on October 17, 2018, but was
subsequently reinstated and is currently pending.

Visa Inc. operates as a payments technology company worldwide. The
company facilitates commerce through the transfer of value and
information among consumers, merchants, financial institutions,
businesses, strategic partners, and government entities. Visa Inc.
was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in San Francisco,
California.


WAL-MART INC: Calif. District Court Dismisses Krauss Labor Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California has entered an order dismissing the case
captioned HOPE KRAUSS, aka DEONTE KRAUSS, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART,
INC., a Delaware corporation; WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC.; and DOES 1
through 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00838-JAM-DB
(E.D. Cal.).

Krauss commenced the putative class action against her former
employer, Defendants Walmart, Inc. and Wal-Mart Associate, Inc.,
for violating California's labor laws.  Krauss, a resident of
California, worked as a full-time associate in the produce and meat
departments at the Defendants' Walmart Supercenter in West
Sacramento, California, from Sept. 16, 2017 to Oct. 22, 2018.  

The Plaintiff contends Walmart committed a litany of California
Labor Code violations -- each one, primarily hinging upon the
allegation that Walmart did not pay her all that she was owed.  She
claims Walmart (1) required her to work off the clock and during
meal and rest breaks without compensation; (2) inaccurately
recorded the amount of time she worked; (3) refused to compensate
her for overtime hours; (4) failed to reimburse her for necessary
business-related expenses; (5) and generally withheld funds she was
entitled to upon her termination.  Moreover, she alleges Walmart
committed at least two of these violations -- failure to pay wages
due upon termination and failure to provide accurate wage
statements—knowingly and intentionally.

On Nov. 29, 2018, the Plaintiff filed her Complaint in Sacramento
County Superior Court.  Walmart removed the case to federal court
on May 10, 2019, alleging jurisdiction under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").  The Plaintiff later filed an
amended complaint, alleging eight violations of the California
Labor Code and a claim under California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL").  She asserts each claim as an "aggrieved employee" and on
behalf of other current and former Walmart employees under the
California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA").

Walmart moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, in its
entirety, for failure to state a claim.  The Plaintiff opposed the
motion.

The Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff
Krauss' wage statements for purpose of assessing her Sixth Cause of
Action.  They contend that judicial notice is appropriate because
the wage statements form the basis of Krauss' inaccurate wage
statement claim.   The Plaintiff has not opposed the request.
Rather, Krauss relies on an exhibit in her Opposition.  Because
Walmart's wage statements can be accurately and readily determined
as an official wage statement and because the Plaintiff does not
dispute the request, Judge Mendez will take judicial notice of the
existence of Walmart's wage statements.

First, Judge Mendez dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's
meal period and rest breaks.  He finds that the Plaintiff's
allegations fall short of plausibility.  At a minimum, Krauss must
demonstrate that she was even entitled to the required meal period
or rest breaks during those work days.

Second, Judge Mendez dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's
minimum and overtime wage claims.  He finds that the Plaintiff
merely states that Krauss and class members "were required to work
off the clock and through meal breaks."  Krauss has thus only
presented generalized allegations.  Notably absent from the
Plaintiff's complaint is any detail regarding a given workweek when
she worked in excess of 40 hours and was not paid overtime for that
given workweek and/or was not paid minimum wages.  For this reason
alone, the Plaintiff's minimum wage and overtime claims fail.  The
Judge thus need not address the two other reasons the Defendants
provide in support of dismissing these claims.

Third, Judge Mendez dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's
claim for failure to pay accrued wages.  The claim is premised on
the Defendants alleged failure to compensate Krauss for overtime
and minimum wages resulting from lack of meal periods and rest
breaks.  Because the Plaintiff's underlying causes of actions fail,
this derivative claim fails as well.

Fourth, the Judge dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's
itemized wage statement claim.  Pointing to the wage statements the
Court judicially noticed, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' wage
statements list the wrong employer.  The Judge finds that the
allegation is nowhere to be found in the Plaintiff's complaint.
The Judge will not accept this new theory, since facts articulated
in an opposition brief cannot cure the deficiencies of the
complaint.

Fifth, the Judge dismisses with prejudice the Plaintiff's
record-keeping claims.  The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's
record-keeping claims are inadequately pled because they, again,
"rest on conclusions, not facts."  The Plaintiff does not respond
to this argument in her opposition.  The Judge interprets the
Plaintiff's failure to oppose the argument as acquiescence of its
merit.

Sixth, Judge Mendez dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's
failure to reimburse claim.  He holds that the Plaintiff fails to
explain whether the cell-phone app required a fee to download, let
alone whether Walmart even knew that she downloaded the app or
purchased these boots.  Because the Plaintiff fails to allege even
a single instance when Walmart did not reimburse her for
reimbursement-eligible items, the claim fails.

Seventh, Judge Mendez dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's
UCL claim.  The claim is predicated on her preceding causes of
actions for violations of the California Labor Code.  Because the
Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead those underlying causes of
action, her UCL claim also fails.

Eighth, the Judge dismisses without prejudice the Plaintiff's PAGA
claims.  The claims are likewise derivative of her claims under the
California Labor Code.  Because the Plaintiff's underlying
California Labor Code claims fail, her PAGA claim fails as well.
The Judge therefore need not address whether the Plaintiff
satisfied PAGA's exhaustion requirement.

Finally, the Defendants request that the Court strike the putative
class definition.  They argue the definition is overbroad because
most of Krauss' claims have one or three-year statutes of
limitation.  The Plaintiff did not respond to the request in her
Opposition.  However, the failure to respond does not change the
fact that it was a procedurally improper request.  Accordingly, the
Judge need not decide the issue.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Mendez grants the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  Because amendment is not futile, the Judge
granted the Plaintiff leave to amend her claims, except for her
seventh cause of action for failure to maintain required records,
which is dismissed with prejudice.  If the Plaintiff elects to
amend her complaint, she must file a second amended complaint
without delay.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/3E6nd8 from Leagle.com.

Hope Krauss, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Matthew John Matern --
MMatern@maternlawgroup.com -- Matern Law Group & Mikael Hans Stahle
-- MStahle@maternlawgroup.com -- Matern Law Group, PC.

Walmart, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, represented by
Aaron Thomas Winn -- atwinn@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP &
Natalie Hrubos -- NFHrubos@duanemorris.com -- Duane Morris LLP, pro
hac vice.

Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., Defendant, represented by Aaron Thomas
Winn, Duane Morris LLP.


WARBY PARKER: Gift Cards Not Accessible to Blind, Matzura Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN MATZURA, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED v. WARBY PARKER RETAIL, INC. AND JAND, INC.,
Case No. 1:19-cv-11345 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 11, 2019), arises from the
Defendant's failure to sell store gift cards to consumers that
contain writing in Braille and to be fully accessible to and
independently usable by the Plaintiff and other blind or
visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its store gift
cards, and, therefore, denial of its products and services offered
thereby and in conjunction with its physical locations, is a
violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), the Plaintiff contends. He adds that because the
Defendant's store gift cards are not equally accessible to blind
and visually-impaired consumers, it violates the ADA.

Store Gift Card is an electronic promise, plastic card, or other
device that is redeemable at a single merchant or an affiliated
group of merchants that share the same name, mark or logo.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
requires Braille, which is a tactile writing system, to read
written material, including books, signs, store gift cards, credit
cards, etc.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in the
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
its store gift cards will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.

The Defendant operates Warby Parker Stores across the United
States. Several of these retail stores are located in the Southern
District of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Telephone: 212 228 9795
          Facsimile: 212 982 6284

               - and -

          Zare Khorozian, Esq.
          ZARE KHOROZIAN LAW LLC
          1047 Anderson Avenue
          Fort Lee, NJ 07024
          Telephone: 201.957.7269
          Facsimile: 201.224.9841
          E-mail: zare@zkhorozianlaw.com


WAWA INC: Peck Files Fraud Class Suit in Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wawa Inc. The case is
styled as Scott Peck, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Wawa Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-00152-GEKP (E.D., Pa., Jan. 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Fraud
filed over Diversity-(Citizenship).

Wawa, Inc. is an American chain of convenience stores and gas
stations located along the East Coast of the United States,
operating in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Roberta D. Liebenberg, Esq.
   Fine, Kaplan and Black
   One South Broad St. Suite 2300
   Philadelphia, PA 19107
   Tel: (215) 567-6565
   Fax: (215) 568-5872
   Email: rliebenberg@finekaplan.com



WAWA INC: Sodora Files Suit in Pennsylvania Over Fraud
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wawa Inc. The case is
styled as Carmine Sodora, individually and on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Wawa Inc., Defendant,
Case No. 2:20-cv-00152-GEKP (E.D., Pa., Jan. 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Fraud
filed over Diversity-Fraud.

Wawa, Inc. is an American chain of convenience stores and gas
stations located along the East Coast of the United States,
operating in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Aaron L. Schwartz, Esq.
   Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer
   850 Third Avenue
   New York, NY 10022
   Tel: (212) 687-1980
   Email: aschwartz@kaplanfox.com


WELLS FARGO: Simon Wage and Hour Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case titled Caudley Simon, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
National Banking Association; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusively,
Case No. 19STCV42777, was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on Jan. 8,
2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-00211 to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff purports to assert seven causes of action against the
Defendants on behalf of the putative class: (i) failure to provide
meal periods; (ii) failure to provide rest periods; (iii) failure
to pay hourly wages; (iv) failure to indemnify; (v) failure to
provide accurate written wage statements; (vi) failure to timely
pay all final wages; and (vii) unfair competition.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Glenn L. Briggs, Esq.
          Theresa A. Kading, Esq.
          KADING BRIGGS LLP
          100 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 800
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 450-8040
          Facsimile: (949) 450-8033
          Email: gbriggs@kadingbriggs.com
                 tkading@kadingbriggs.com


WEST TOWN BANK: Court Narrows Claims in Somerville Kickbacks Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH SOMERVILLE, III, et al. Plaintiffs, v. WEST
TOWN BANK & TRUST Defendant, Civil No. PJM 19-0490 (D. Md.), Judge
Peter J. Messitte of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland granted in part and denied in part West Town's Motion to
Dismiss.

The case is a putative class action concerning an alleged illegal
kickback scheme under which Defendant West Town purportedly
accepted payments, primarily in the form of U.S. postage stamps,
from All Star Title, Inc. in exchange for referring mortgagors to
All Star, a mortgage settlement services company.  The Plaintiffs
are borrowers who either currently have or recently had a
residential mortgage originated or brokered by West Town which All
Star settled.  

As a result of the scheme, the Plaintiffs assert, they were
overcharged by All Star for settlement services.  The payment of
kickbacks, they allege, are a patent violation of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), and the scheme further
violates the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), and the antitrust law pursuant to the Sherman Act.

West Town filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.  The Plaintiffs
filed a response, and West Town has replied.  

Upon review, Judge Messitte granted in part and denied in part West
Town's Motion to Dismiss.  He granted as to Count II, concerning
the Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claim, and denied as to Counts I and
III, concerning the Plaintiffs' RESPA and RICO claims.

Among other things, the Judge opined that the Plaintiffs have
satisfied the Court that they have sufficiently pled that West Town
fraudulently concealed evidence of its alleged scheme; that the
Plaintiffs plausibly allege that they did not discover the supposed
fraud during the limitations period; and that whatever
investigations the Plaintiffs did or did not conduct into West
Town's actions were not inconsistent with due diligence.  The
Congress did not intend for entities that engage in unlawful
kickbacks and conceal their schemes to reap the benefits of the
statute of limitations as a defense.  The Judge found that the
applicable statutes of limitations should be tolled, and that the
Plaintiffs' RESPA, RICO, and Sherman Act claims are not barred by
their respective statutes of limitations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/400J95 from Leagle.com.

Joseph Somerville, III, Karen Somerville, David McCranie, Jamie
McCranie, Randolph Whitley, Dale Wessell, Deborah Wessell, Gilman
Hoffman, Kathleen Hoffman, Mark Kline & Susan Kline, Plaintiffs,
represented by Megan Aileen Benevento -- mbenevento@jgllaw.com --
Joseph Greenwald and Laake, P.A., Melissa Lynn English --
menglish@sgs-law.com -- Smith Gildea & Schmidt LLC, Michael Paul
Smith -- mpsmith@sgs-law.com -- Smith Gildea and Schmidt LLC,
Timothy Francis Maloney -- tmaloney@jgllaw.com -- Joseph Greenwald
and Laake PA & Veronica Byam Nannis -- vnannis@jgllaw.com -- Joseph
Greenwald and Laake PA.

West Town Bank & Trust, a/k/a West Town Savings Bank, Defendant,
represented by Michael Benjamin Brown --
mbbrown@milesstockbridge.com -- Miles & Stockbridge, PC, Ranak
Kanti Jasani -- rjasani@milesstockbridge.com -- Miles and
Stockbridge PC & Brian L. Moffet -- bmoffet@milesstockbridge.com --
Miles & Stockbridge, P.C..


WINGS ON THA RUN: Scott Seeks Minimum & Overtime Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TELLY SCOTT, Individually and on Behalf of all Others Similarly
Situated v. WINGS ON THA RUN (WOTR), LLC, ANTHONY CRUTCHFIELD, and
KEITH WORTHEN DEPCLE, Case No. 4:19-cv-00888-KGB (E.D. Ark., Dec.
11, 2019), arises from the Defendants' failure to pay minimum and
overtime wages, as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants classified him and
similarly situated employees as non-exempt from the requirements of
the FLSA. He asserts that the Defendants willfully failed and
refused to pay a proper minimum wage and overtime premium for all
hours worked over 40 per week to him and other similarly situated
employees.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a cook at their
restaurant.

The Defendants own and operate a restaurant in Jacksonsville called
Wings on tha Run. Anthony Crutchfield manages and controls the
day-to-day operations of WOTR.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tess Bradford, Esq.
          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: 501 221 0088
          Facsimile: 888 787 2040
          E-mail: tess@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


YOUNG AMERICA: Court Narrows Claims in Apodaca Insurance Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YVONNE APODACA, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. YOUNG AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY,
LOYA INSURANCE COMPANY, and EP LOYA GROUP, LP, Defendants, Case No.
1:18-cv-00399-RB-JHR (D. N.M.), Judge Robert C. Brack of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico granted in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint and all Claims Against Defendants EP Loya Group,
LP and Loya Insurance Company, filed April 5, 2019.

Under the putative class action, Yvonne Apodaca alleges that the
Defendants misrepresented the terms of her underinsured motorist
coverage.  The Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries and damages to
her car in an automobile accident with Mr. Ben Shriver.  Mr.
Shriver was at fault for the accident.  The Plaintiff was covered
by an auto insurance policy issued by Young America.  She carried
insurance at New Mexico's minimum amounts, which provide bodily
injury coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident.
She also purchased uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) motorist
coverage in the same amounts.

The Plaintiff received the full amount ($25,000) of liability
coverage carried by Mr. Shriver.  She filed a claim with Young
America for coverage under her own UM/UIM policy, but Young America
denied her underinsured motorist claim.  Young America stated that
it was entitled to a full offset of Mr. Shriver's policy payments.
The Plaintiff alleges that Young America told her she would receive
a benefit from her underinsured motorist coverage, but in fact her
underinsured coverage was useless or illusory.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.  The Court granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims
against EP Loya and Loya, and Counts IV and V against Young
America.  However, it granted the Plaintiff leave to amend her
complaint.

The Plaintiff timely filed a Second Amended Complaint.  The
Defendants now argue that Plaintiff failed to cure the defects in
her complaint and ask the Court to dismiss Counts IV and V against
Young America and all claims against EP Loya and Loya.  They argue
that the Plaintiff does not have standing to bring suit against
either Loya Insurance Co. or EP Loya Group, LP, and that she has
otherwise failed to state a claim as to Counts IV and V.

Judge Brack finds that the Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege
that the Defendants formed a joint venture.  She has failed to
allege any facts suggesting that the three Defendants enjoyed a
mutual right of control, a right to share in profits, or a duty to
share in losses.  None of her allegations tend to show that EP Loya
or Loya were co-insurers with Young America.  There is no
allegation that EP Loya or Loya control the claim determination
process.

Next, the Plaintiff pled that a breach of contract claim arose
because Young America sold her illusory insurance.  She also
alleges that the underinsured motorist coverage was ambiguous and
failed to explain that it would provide no coverage.  Therefore,
she appears to argue that the contract should be construed against
the insurer to provide for coverage.  Moreover, she argues it would
be a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for
Defendant to charge a premium for coverage that does not exist.

Judge Brack holds that the answer to Judge Herrera's certified
question may resolve substantial issues in the case, including
these claims for breach of contract and good faith and fair
dealing.  Therefore, he will deny without prejudice Young America's
remaining grounds for dismissal pending the New Mexico Supreme
Court's answer to the certified question.

If the Judge were to proceed now, he risks ruling in a manner
contrary to the New Mexico Supreme Court.  Proceeding now would
also waste both the parties' and the Court's resources while a
potentially dispositive answer by the New Mexico Supreme Court is
pending.  Finally, the current briefing on the motions to dismiss
will be out of date once the New Mexico Supreme Court answers the
certified question, and the Court would likely benefit from the
parties' interpretation of the New Mexico Supreme Court's answer.

For these reasons, Judge Brack will also stay the case pending
resolution of the certified question.  Six out of seven of the
related putative class actions in the district have been stayed
pending the New Mexico Supreme Court's answer to the certified
question in Crutcher v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 1:18-cv-412
JCH/LF (D.N.M.).

For the reasons stated in his Opinion, Judge Brack will dismiss all
of the Plaintiff's claims against Loya and EP Loya.  The Judge
however declines to rule on Young America's Motion to Dismiss the
Breach of Contract (Count IV) and the Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing (Count V) claims until the New Mexico Supreme Court
answers the question certified in the Crutcher/Liberty Mutual case.
The Judge will also stay the case until an answer to the certified
question is provided.

Therefore, Judge Brack granted in part the Motion of the Defendants
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as he described in
the Opinion.  He dismissed all the claims against Defendants EP
Loya and Loya.  He denied without prejudice Defendant Young
America's requested relief.  The case is stayed pending the New
Mexico Supreme Court's answer to the question certified by Judge
Herrera in Crutcher/Liberty Mutual case.  The parties shall, within
14 days of the date that the New Mexico Supreme Court answers the
certified question, file a status report with the Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 19, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/uGGqu6 from Leagle.com.

Yvonne Apodaca, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Corinne Holt, Will Ferguson &
Associates & Adrian O. Vega, Will Ferguson & Associates.

Young America Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Andrew
B
Curtis -- andrew@bigbeecurtislaw.com -- Bigbee & Curtis, LLP,
Ernest E. Vargo -- evargo@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler LLP,
Kinzie Reed Johnson -- kjohnson@cthglawfirm.com -- Craig, Terrill,
Hale & Grantham, LLP, Leonard Raymond Grossman --
budg@cthglawfirm.com -- Craig, Terrill, Hale & Grantham, LLP,
Michael Mumford -- mmumford@bakerlaw.com -- Baker Hostetler LLP &
Gary Michael Bellair -- garyb@cthglawfirm.com -- Craig, Terrill,
Hale & Grantham, LLP.


ZUMIEZ INC: Appeal in Herrera Class Action Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------
Zumiez Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on December 9, 2019, for the quarterly
period ended November 2, 2019, that the appeal in the class action
suit initiated by Alexia Herrera is ongoing.

A putative class action, Alexia Herrera, on behalf of herself and
all other similarly situated, v. Zumiez Inc., was filed against the
company in the Eastern District Count of California, Sacramento
Division under case number 2:16-cv-01802-SB in August 2016.
Alexandra Bernal filed the initial complaint and then in October
2016 added Alexia Herrera as a named plaintiff and Alexandra Bernal
left the case.  

The putative class action lawsuit against the company alleges,
among other things, various violations of California's wage and
hour laws, including alleged violations of failure to pay reporting
time.  

In May 2017 the company moved for judgment on the pleadings in that
plaintiff's cause of action for reporting-time pay should fail as a
matter of law as the plaintiff and the other putative class members
did not "report for work" with respect to certain shifts on which
the plaintiff's claims are based. In August 2017, the court denied
the motion.  

However, in October 2017 the district court certified the order
denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings for immediate
interlocutory review by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.  

The company then filed a petition for permission to appeal the
order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
petition was then granted in January 2018.  The company's opening
appellate brief was filed on June 6, 2018 and the plaintiff's
answering appellate brief was filed August 6, 2018. The company's
reply brief to the Plaintiff's answering appellate brief was filed
on September 26, 2018 and oral arguments were completed on February
4, 2019.  

On May 20, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit granted the company's motion for leave to file a
supplemental brief addressing new authority. On June 10, 2019, the
plaintiff's supplemental answering brief was filed with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The company then
filed its supplemental reply brief to the plaintiff's supplemental
answering brief with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on June 24, 2019.

Zumiez said, "Given the current status of this case, we are unable
to express a view regarding the ultimate outcome or, if the outcome
is adverse, to estimate an amount, or range, of reasonably possible
loss. We have defended this case vigorously and will continue to do
so."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Zumiez Inc., founded in 1978, is a mall-based specialty retailer
providing sports-related apparel, footwear, equipment, and
accessories. It also sells miscellaneous novelties and dvds aimed
at young men and women between the ages of 12 and 24 and
private-label apparel. In addition, it sells merchandise on its Web
site, zumiez.com. The company is based in Everett, Washington.


ZURICH AMERICAN: MSP Recovery Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES, LLC; and SERIES
16-08-483, a series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC Series
15-09-335, LLC, a series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC,
Plaintiffs, v. ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case
No. 18 C 7849 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Robert W. Gettleman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, granted the Defendant's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing, and under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC and Series 16-08-483
have brought a second amended putative class action complaint
against Defendant Zurich, claiming to be the assignees of legal
claims held by various largely unidentified Medicare Advantage
Organizations ("MAOs").  The Plaintiffs seek double recovery under
the Medicare Secondary Payor provisions of the Medicare Act
("MSPA"), for reimbursement of medical expenses that the various
MAOs paid on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries despite the
Defendant's alleged obligation to pay under the MSPA.

The Plaintiffs in the instant case are not MAOs, but rather assert
that they are assignees of claims that belonged to MAOs.  In
particular, they allege that they have assignments to pursue seven
"exemplar" claims from Medicare enrollees that they identify by
their initials: J.Z.; P.D.; L.R.; C.F.; E.D.; A.C. and J.M.  The
Plaintiffs allege that each of these enrollees were injured in an
accident, an MAO made conditional payments for medical services,
and that the MAO "assigned" its reimbursement claim to them.  As to
J.Z., the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant was the primary
payer responsible because it provided no-fault insurance to an
unnamed individual or entity that covered J.Z.'s medical expenses.
As to the other six "exemplar" individuals, they allege that the
Defendant is the primary payer as a result of funding a lawsuit
settlement on behalf of the insured tortfeasor.

The Defendant has moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss
the complaint for lack of standing, and under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.  It first challenges the
Plaintiffs' standing to bring the exemplar claims.  It raises both
a facial and factual challenge to the Plaintiffs' standing.  With
respect to the T.D., L.R., C.F., E.D., A.C., and J.M. exemplars,
the Plaintiffs allege that they received an assignment to pursue
these claims from Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York
("HIP").

Judge Gettleman finds that the complaint fails even to acknowledge
the exclusion by alleging that the six exemplar claims were
assigned to the Plaintiffs and not to the Rawlings Group or any
other recovery vendor.  Absent such an allegation, the complaint
fails to survive a facial challenge.  The Plaintiffs have offered
no evidence to refute these letters or the Defendant's claims, nor
have they asked for an evidentiary hearing to present evidence to
defeat defendant's claims.  Consequently, the Judge concludes that
the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the P.D., L.R., C.F., E.D.,
A.C. and J.M. claims.

That leaves the J.Z. claim.  According to the complaint, J.Z. was
enrolled in a Medicare Advantage Plan issued by Network Health
Insurance Corporation ("NHIC"), which is an MAO.  The complaint
alleges that J.Z. was injured in an accident and that J.Z.'s
accident-related medical costs and expenses were covered under a
"no-fault policy issued by defendant."  NHIC allegedly paid the
medical bills, entitling it to reimbursement from the Defendant.
The complaint further alleges that NHIC assigned its right to
reimbursement to the Plaintiffs.

The Judge finds that the complaint contains no more information
about that policy, but in the briefing the Defendant has submitted
evidence, and the Plaintiffs appear to admit, that the policy in
fact was issued by Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, not
the Defendant.  Thus, the Plaintiffs have named the wrong
defeDdant.  The Plaintiffs' only response to the evidence is to ask
for leave to amend the complaint a fourth time.

As the Defendant points out, the instant complaint is not the
Plaintiffs' third attempt to establish standing and a claim, but
actually their ninth.  They filed two separate suits against the
Defendant in the Southern District of Florida raising the same
claims.  In each of those suits, in the face of motions to dismiss,
they elected to replead.  After their third attempt in each case
was challenged by motion, they voluntarily dismissed the cases and
then filed the instant case in the district.  Nine attempts to
establish standing and plead a cause of action is enough.  The
Judge will deny denies leave to amend.

For these reasons, Judge Gettleman granted the Defendant's motion
to dismiss.  He dismissed the case without prejudice.  Leave to
amend is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 18, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/7T93yr from Leagle.com.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, a Delaware entity & Series
16-08-483, a series of MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, Plaintiffs,
represented by Eduardo Enrique Bertran -- ebertran@armaslaw.com --
Armas Bertran Pieri, Francesco Antonio Zincone, III --
fzincone@armaslaw.com -- Armas Bertran Pieri & David M. Hundley --
dhundley@pbclawfirm.com -- Pendley, Baudin & Coffin, LLP.

Zurich American Insurance Company, a New York corporation,
Defendant, represented by Mr. Michael Menapace --
mmenapace@wiggin.com -- Wiggin and Dana LLP, pro hac vice & Jeffrey
R. Tone, Katten & Temple LLP.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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