/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200120.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, January 20, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 14

                            Headlines

ABM INDUSTRIES: Appeal in Castro and Marmolejo Suit Dismissed
ABM INDUSTRIES: Trial in Bucio Class Suit Set for May 2020
ACACIA RESEARCH: Proxy on Starboard Deal Incomplete, Franchi Says
ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Schall Law Files Class Action
ADTRAN INC: Burbridge Suit Moved From S.D.N.Y. to N.D. Alabama

ALJ REGIONAL: Mediation in Marshall Suit Set for May 2020
ALLERGAN INC: Olinger Sues Over Defective BIOCELL Implants
ALTA DEVICES: Faces Patterson Suit Alleging Violation of WARN Act
APPLE INC: Bid to Deny Class Certification in Davidson Suit Nixed
APPLE INC: Bid to Dismiss 1st Amended MacBook Keyboard Suit Denied

ASCOT RIDGE: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage Under NYLL, Haughwout Says
BAOZUN INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds Investors of Feb. 10 Deadline
BAOZUN INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of Class Action
BAXTER INT'L: Schall Law Reminds of Jan. 24 Deadline
BIG MIKE'S RESTAURANT: Court Partly Grants Deal in Fitzwater Suit

BOOT BARN: Mendez Sues Over Unwanted Telemarketing Messages
BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE INC: Taylor FACTA Suit Moved to C.D. California
CANOPY GROWTH: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline
CATERPILLAR INC: Faces Texas Hill Suit Over Defective Liners
CENLAR AGENCY: Gemborys Suit Removed to District of Massachusetts

COMCAST CABLE: Court Denies Arbitration on Hearn's FCRA Suit
COOPER COMPANIES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Feb. 25
CVS HEALTH: Arizona & New York Classes Certified in Corcoran Suit
DANNY & JIMMY'S: Herrera Seeks Minimum and OT Wages for Dancers
DART TRANSIT: Court Orders Arbitration in Byars Case

DELTA DENTAL: Faces Bemus Suit Over Antitrust Law Violation
DIVISION III: Peralta Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida
EATALY CHICAGO: Illegally Collects Biometric Data, Sykes Claims
ENERGY TRANSFER: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline
EXELON CORP: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline

EXELON CORP: Lieff Cabraser Reminds Investors of Feb. 14 Deadline
EXELON CORP: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
EXELON CORP: Vincent Wong Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline
FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Tan Securities Suit Over Drop in Share Price
FIRST AMERICAN: Antao Sues Over Improperly Charged Fees to Buyers

FITBIT INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
FRONTIER AIRLINES: Women Sue Over Sex Assaults by Passengers
GEO GROUP: Court Partly Grants Class Cert. in Ramirez Labor Suit
GOLDEN STATE: Transfer Trevino Suit to Cal. Central Dist. Denied
GPB CAPITAL: Barasch Sues Over $1.8BB Fraud on Investors

HCP INC: District Dismisses Boynton Firefighters Securities Suit
HOME OWNERS MGMT: Supreme Ct. Upholds Arbitration Order in Robinson
IC SYSTEM: Makurat Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco
ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification in Inmates' Suit
INNOPHOS HOLDINGS: Faces Kappelman Suit Over Merger With One Rock

INSTRUCTURE INC: Faces Post Securities Suit Over Thoma Bravo Sale
INSTRUCTURE RESOURCES: Zhang Balks at Planned Sale to Thoma Bravo
JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Awards $731M Attorneys' Fees in Merryman Suit
JPMORGAN CHASE: Settlement in Merryman Suit Gets Final Approval
KEMET CORPORATION: Faces Silverberg Suit Over Sale to Yageo

KOHN LAW FIRM: Certification of Class Sought in Rozani Suit
LEEDS MORELLI: Can't Compel Arbitration in Dowe Suit
LIBERTY PROPERTY: Rigrodsky & Long Files Suit Over Prologis Deal
LOANCARE LLC: Charges Illegal Pay-to-Pay Fees, Tanner Suit Claims
MARYLAND: Retirees Seek Class Action Status in Drug Benefits Case

MDL 1203: Denial of Panoussi Claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits Upheld
MDL 2804: Taylor v. Purdue Pharma Over Opioid Drugs Consolidated
MERIT MEDICAL: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Feb. 3 Deadline
MERIVALE: Says Employees Unlikely to Benefit From Class Action
MICROSOFT CORP: No Class Status of Gender Bias Claims Upheld

MIH SALES: Violates Overtime Provisions of FLSA, Turner Alleges
MPSK INC: Faces Acevedo Suit Over Improper Pay Under FLSA & IMWL
NOW HOME: Rogers Sues Over Unwanted Robo-Calls and Robo-Texts
ONLINE INFORMATION: Certification of Class Sought in Morgan Suit
PALM BEACH, FL: Denial of Class Status in Utilities Case Appealed

PATHWAY SENIOR: Dukes Sues Over Illegal Collection of Biometrics
PIONEER HOME: State Attorneys Seek Dismissal of Class Action Suit
PRECISION PIPELINE: Severe Labor Suit Removed to S.D. New York
RIDGEWOOD INDUSTRIES: Winters Sues Over Dressers' Tip-Over Issues
SAFEGUARD DOCUMENT: McKenna Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA

SCOFFOLDING SOLUTIONS: Mag. Judge Recommends OK of $200K Epps Deal
SEATTLE, WA: 9th Cir. Upholds Class Certification Denial in Willis
SGS NORTH AMERICA: Gomez Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
SPRINT CORP: Turina Sues Over Illegal Deductions on Commissions
SPSG PARTNERS: Whiteside Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages

SSK DONUTS: Joell Sues Over Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked
TRIPLE CROWN: Myers Labor Class Suit Removed to S.D. California
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Aleksanian Seeks to Recover Illegal Deductions
UMG RECORDINGS: Court Enters Protective Order in Soundgarden Suit
UNITI GROUP: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action

WAWA INC: Customers File Class Suit Over Data Breach
WAWA INC: Faces High Suit in Eastern District of Pennsylvania
WELLIVER & ASSOCIATES: Martinez Sues Over Use of Consumer Reports
WILCO LIFE: 11th Cir. Flips Remand of Anderson Suit to State Court
WINDSOR HEIGHTS, IA: Class Action Suit Filed Over Traffic Cams

WOODLAND CLINIC: Martinez FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. California

                            *********

ABM INDUSTRIES: Appeal in Castro and Marmolejo Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
ABM Industries Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 20, 2019,
for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2019, that the company has
dismissed its appeal in the class action suit entitled, Castro and
Marmolejo v. ABM Industries, Inc., et al., before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff Marley Castro filed a class action
lawsuit alleging that ABM did not reimburse janitorial employees in
California for using their personal cell phones for work-related
purposes, in violation of California Labor Code section 2802. On
January 23, 2015, Plaintiff Lucia Marmolejo was added to the case
as a named plaintiff.

On October 27, 2017, plaintiffs moved for class certification
seeking to represent a class of all employees who were, are, or
will be employed by ABM in the State of California with the
Employee Master Job Description Code "Cleaner" (hereafter referred
to as "Cleaner Employees") beginning from October 24, 2010. ABM
filed its opposition to class certification on November 27, 2017.

On January 26, 2018, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion
for class certification.

The court rejected plaintiffs' proposed class, instead certifying
three classes that the court formulated on its own: (1) all
employees who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in the State of
California as Cleaner Employees who used a personal cell phone to
punch in and out of the EPAY system and who (a) worked at an ABM
facility that did not provide a biometric clock and (b) were not
offered an ABM-provided cell phone during the period beginning on
January 1, 2012, through the date of notice to the Class Members
that a class has been certified in this action; (2) all employees
who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in the State of
California as Cleaner Employees who used a personal cell phone to
report unusual or suspicious circumstances to supervisors and were
not offered (a) an ABM-provided cell phone or (b) a two-way radio
during the period beginning four years prior to the filing of the
original complaint, October 24, 2014, through the date of notice to
the Class Members that a class has been certified in this action;
and (3) all employees who were, are, or will be employed by ABM in
the State of California as Cleaner Employees who used a personal
cell phone to respond to communications from supervisors and were
not offered (a) an ABM-provided cell phone or (b) a two-way radio
during the period beginning four years prior to the filing of the
original complaint, October 24, 2014, through the date of notice to
the Class Members that a class has been certified in this action.

On February 9, 2018, ABM filed a petition for permission to appeal
the district court's order granting class certification with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was
denied on April 30, 2018.

On March 20, 2018, ABM moved to compel arbitration of the claims of
certain class members pursuant to the terms of three collective
bargaining agreements. In response to that motion, on May 14, 2018,
the district court modified the class definition to exclude all
claims arising after the operative date(s) of the applicable
collective bargaining agreements (which is June 1, 2016 for one
agreement and May 1, 2016 for the other two agreements).

However, the district court denied the motion to compel arbitration
as to claims that arose prior to the operative date(s) of the
applicable collective bargaining agreements. ABM appealed to the
Ninth Circuit the district court's order denying the motion to
compel arbitration with respect to the periods preceding the
operative dates of the collective bargaining agreements.

After a court-ordered mediation held on October 15, 2018, the
parties agreed to a class action settlement of $5.4 million,
subject to court approval. The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
approval of the settlement was filed on January 4, 2019, and the
court held a hearing on the motion on February 12, 2019. On
February 14, 2019, the court granted preliminary approval of the
settlement. The court granted final approval of the settlement on
September 3, 2019, and the settlement was funded on September 23,
2019.

In connection with the settlement, the modified its existing
written policies for California to expressly confirm that ABM
service workers are not required to use personal cell phones for
work purposes and began centralizing the process and implementing
technology for such employees to request reimbursement for personal
cell phone use due to work. Because the settlement was finally
approved, on October 31, 2019, ABM dismissed its Ninth Circuit
appeal regarding the district court's order denying the motion to
compel arbitration.

ABM Industries Incorporated provides integrated facility solutions
in the United States and internationally. It operates through
Business & Industry, Aviation, Technology & Manufacturing,
Education, Technical Solutions, and Healthcare segments. The
company was founded in 1909 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


ABM INDUSTRIES: Trial in Bucio Class Suit Set for May 2020
----------------------------------------------------------
ABM Industries Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 20, 2019,
for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2019, that the trial in the
consolidated cases of Bucio and Martinez v. ABM Janitorial Services
has been set for May 26, 2020.

The Bucio case is a class action pending in San Francisco Superior
Court that alleges that the company failed to provide legally
required meal periods and make additional premium payments for such
meal periods, pay split shift premiums when owed, and reimburse
janitors for travel expenses.

There is also a claim for penalties under the California Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA").

On April 19, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs'
motion to certify the class. At the conclusion of that hearing, the
trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify the class.

On May 11, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which
was denied. The plaintiffs appealed the class certification issues.
The trial court stayed the underlying lawsuit pending the decision
in the appeal.

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate
District, heard oral arguments on November 7, 2017. On December 11,
2017, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying
class certification and remanded the matter for certification of a
meal period, travel expense reimbursement, and split shift class.
The case was remitted to the trial court for further proceedings on
class certification, discovery, dispositive motions, and trial.

On September 20, 2018, the trial court entered an order defining
four certified subclasses of janitors who were employed by the
legacy ABM janitorial companies in California at any time between
April 7, 2002 and April 30, 2013, on claims based on alleged
previous automatic deduction practices for meal breaks, unpaid meal
premiums, unpaid split shift premiums, and unreimbursed business
expenses, such as mileage reimbursement for use of personal
vehicles to travel between worksites.

On February 1, 2019, the trial court held that the discovery
related to PAGA claims allegedly arising after April 30, 2013 would
be stayed until after the class and PAGA claims accruing prior to
April 30, 2013 had been tried.

The parties engaged in mediation in July 2019, which did not result
in settlement of the case.

On October 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial
court to certify additional classes based on an alleged failure to
maintain time records, an alleged failure to provide accurate wage
statements, and an alleged practice of combining meal and rest
breaks.

The company's response to this motion was filed on November 4,
2019, and the trial court heard the matter on December 10, 2019.
This matter is currently set for trial on May 26, 2020.

ABM Industries said, "Prior to trial, we will have the opportunity
to move for summary judgment, seek decertification of the classes,
or engage in further mediation, if we deem such actions
appropriate. We expect to engage in one or more such activities in
upcoming quarters."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

ABM Industries Incorporated provides integrated facility solutions
in the United States and internationally. It operates through
Business & Industry, Aviation, Technology & Manufacturing,
Education, Technical Solutions, and Healthcare segments. The
company was founded in 1909 and is headquartered in New York, New
York.


ACACIA RESEARCH: Proxy on Starboard Deal Incomplete, Franchi Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Franchi, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. ACACIA RESEARCH CORPORATION, MAUREEN O'CONNELL, ALFRED
V. TOBIA, JR., CLIFFORD PRESS, ISAAC T. KOHLBERG, KATHARINE
WOLANYK, JONATHAN SAGAL, and LUIS RINALDINI, Case No.
1:20-cv-00045-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13, 2020), stems from the
Defendants' dissemination of a materially incomplete proxy
statement relating to a securities purchase agreement with
Starboard Value LP.

On November 18, 2019, Acacia Research Corporation's Board of
Directors caused Acacia to enter into a securities purchase
agreement with Starboard Value LP and certain of its affiliates.
Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase Agreement, Acacia issued to
the Buyers: (i) an aggregate of 350,000 shares of Series A
Convertible Preferred Stock; and (ii) warrants to purchase up to
5,000,000 shares of the Company's common stock, in exchange for a
cash payment of $35 million.

If the Company's stockholders approve the Proposals, the Company
will issue to Starboard warrants to purchase up to 100,000,000
shares of common stock, and may issue up to $365 million in senior
secured notes.

On December 10, 2019, the Defendants filed with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission a proxy statement relating to
the Agreement. The Plaintiff asserts that the Proxy Statement omits
material information, which renders it false and misleading.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated
Sections the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the
Proxy Statement.

The Plaintiff, who owns common stock of Acacia, contends that the
Proxy Statement fails to disclose whether the Individual Defendants
engaged a financial advisor in connection with the Purchase
Agreement. If the Individual Defendants engaged a financial
advisor, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose the terms of the
financial advisor's engagement, including: (i) the amount of
compensation the financial advisor has received or will receive in
connection with its engagement; (ii) whether the financial advisor
has performed past services for any parties to the Purchase
Agreement or their affiliates; (iii) the timing and nature of such
services; and (iv) the amount of compensation received by the
financial advisor for providing such services.

Because of the false and misleading statements in the Proxy
Statement, the Plaintiff and the Class are threatened with
irreparable harm, says the complaint.

Acacia invests in intellectual property and related absolute return
assets, and engages in the licensing and enforcement of patented
technologies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Phone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
                 gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Phone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          Email: rm@maniskas.com


ADAMAS PHARMACEUTICALS: Schall Law Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
has filed a class action lawsuit against Adamas Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (NASDAQ:ADMS) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between August 8,
2017 and September 30, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before February 10, 2020.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Adamas suffered from insurers excluding
GOCOVRI from their coverage or requiring patients to try other
therapies first. The rapid increase in doctors prescribing GOCOVRI
to patients was not based on the drug's effectiveness. Based on
these facts, the Company's public statements were false and
materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market
learned the truth about Adamas, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         E-mail: info@schallfirm.com
                 brian@schallfirm.com
[GN]


ADTRAN INC: Burbridge Suit Moved From S.D.N.Y. to N.D. Alabama
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as MICHAEL BURBRIDGE, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. ADTRAN, INC.,
THOMAS R. STANTON, MICHAEL FOLIANO, ROGER D. SHANNON, Case No.
1:19-cv-09619 (Filed Oct. 17, 2019), was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Northeastern)
on Jan. 13, 2020.

The Northern District of Alabama Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:20-cv-00050-HNJ to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Herman N Johnson, Jr.

The case is a class action brought on behalf of persons and
entities that purchased or otherwise acquired ADTRAN securities
between February 28, 2019, and October 9, 2019, inclusive, pursuing
claims against the Defendants under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, the Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that there were material weaknesses in the Company's
internal control over financial reporting; as a result, certain E&O
reserves had been improperly reported; as a result, the Company's
financial results for certain periods were misstated; there would
be a pause in shipments to the Company's Latin American customer;
and as a result of the foregoing, the Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Mr. Burbridge purchased ADTRAN securities during the Class Period,
and suffered damages as a result of the federal securities law
violations and alleged false and/or misleading statements and/or
material omissions.

ADTRAN is a networking and communications company that provides
services which enable voice, data, video, and internet
communications across a variety of network infrastructures. ADTRAN
also offers a broad portfolio of flexible software and hardware
network solutions to service providers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Garth Avery Spencer, Esq.
          Gregory Bradley Linkh, Esq.
          Lesley Frank Portnoy, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jessica P Corley, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING LLP
          1180 Peachtree St. NE
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3521
          Telephone: (404) 572-4717
          E-mail: jpcorley@kslaw.com


ALJ REGIONAL: Mediation in Marshall Suit Set for May 2020
---------------------------------------------------------
ALJ Regional Holdings, Insaid in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 2019,
for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2019, that the court has
ordered the parties in the case, Marshall v. Faneuil, Inc., to
mediation scheduled for May 2020.

On July 31, 2017, plaintiff Donna Marshall filed a proposed class
action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Sacramento against Faneuil and ALJ.

Marshall, a previously terminated Faneuil employee, alleges various
California state law employment-related claims against Faneuil.  

Faneuil has answered the complaint and removed the matter to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California; however, Marshall filed a motion to remand the case
back to state court, which has been granted.  

In connection with the above, an amended complaint was filed by
certain plaintiffs to add a claim for penalties under the
California Private Attorneys General Act.  Faneuil demurred to the
PAGA Claim and it was eventually dismissed by the trial court.

The parties are currently engaged in limited discovery.

A court-ordered mediation is scheduled between the parties for May
2020. Faneuil believes this action is without merit and intends to
defend this case vigorously.  

The Company has not accrued any amounts related to the Marshall
claim as of September 30, 2019.

ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. provides call center, back-office,
staffing, and toll collection services to government and commercial
clients in the healthcare, utility, consumer goods, toll, and
transportation industries in the United States. It operates through
three segments: Faneuil, Carpets, and Phoenix. The company was
formerly known as YouthStream Media Networks, Inc. and changed its
name to ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. in October 2006. ALJ Regional
Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is based in New York, New
York.


ALLERGAN INC: Olinger Sues Over Defective BIOCELL Implants
----------------------------------------------------------
ERIKA OLINGER v. ALLERGAN, INC. f/k/a INAMED CORPORATION, ALLERGAN
USA, INC., and ALLERGAN plc, Case No. 2:20-cv-00103 (E.D. La., Jan.
10, 2020), is a class action complaint brought against the
Defendants alleging that their BIOCELL textured implants are
defective.

The lawsuit arises from Allergan's July 24, 2019 announcement of a
worldwide recall of BIOCELL after the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) called for the action following new
information that Allergan's BIOCELL implants were tied to cases of
breast implant-associated anaplastic large cell lymphoma
("BIA-ALCL") not seen with other textured implants.

On July 30, 2019, Allergan announced it has created a BIOCELL
Replacement Warranty for all customers that currently have BIOCELL
textured implants ("the Warranty"). The Warranty provides that
Allergan will provide Allergan smooth implants to replace the
BIOCELL textured implants, the lawsuit says. However, Allergan will
not provide any surgical fee assistance or reimbursement for the
surgery to remove the BIOCELL textured implants and replace them
with Allergan smooth implants. The Warranty will run for 24 months,
until July 24, 2021, and will apply only to revision surgeries on
or after the date of the FDA's recall, July 24, 2019.

As a result of Allergan's conduct, including refusal to pay for the
removal of the recalled BIOCELL implants and the increased risk of
developing BIA-ALCL, the Plaintiff contends she will be forced to
expend substantial amounts of money for surgery, medical
monitoring, diagnostic testing, and other medical expenses. The
Plaintiff also alleges that she is entitled to have Allergan pay
all possible incurred expenses.

Breast implants are medical devices that are implanted under the
breast tissue to increase breast size or replace breast tissue that
has been removed. Tissue expanders are a type of inflatable breast
implant which stretches skin and muscle to make room for a
permanent implant in the future. Tissue expanders are often used in
breast reconstruction surgeries. BIA-ALCL is a serious cancer and
can be fatal, especially if not diagnosed early or promptly
treated.

The FDA determined the risk of developing BIA-ALCL was six times
higher with Allergan's BIOCELL textured implants when compared with
textured implants from other manufacturers, the lawsuit adds.

In Allergan's recall statement, the FDA stated there are 573 cases
of BIA- ALCL worldwide. Of those 573 cases, 33 people have died as
a result of BIA-ALCL. The products affected by the FDA's recall are
as follows: Style Allergan Natrelle Saline-Filled Breast Implants;
Allergan Natrelle Silicone-Filled Textured Breast Implants;
Natrelle 410 Highly Cohesive Anatomically Shaped Silicone Filled
Breast Implants; and Allergan tissue expanders that have BIOCELL
texturing originally cleared as: o Natrelle 133 Plus Tissue
Expander (K143354) and Natrelle 133 Tissue Expander with Suture
Tabs (K102806).

Allergan manufactures and sells BIOCELL saline-filled and
silicone-filled breast implants and tissue expanders "BIOCELL" or
"BIOCELL textured implants").[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Claire E. Berg, Esq.
          Irving J. Warshauer, Esq.
          Michael J. Ecuyer, Esq.
          M. Palmer Lambert, Esq.
          Claire E. Berg, Esq.
          GAINSBURGH, BENJAMIN, DAVID, MEUNIER & WARSHAUER L.L.C.
          2800 Entergy Centre
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 521-7643
          Facsimile: (504) 528-9973
          E-mail: iwarshauer@gainsben.com
                  mecuyer@gainsben.com
                  cberg@gainsben.com
                  plambert@gainsben.com

               - and -

          Dawn M. Barrios, Esq.
          Zachary L. Wool, Esq.
          BARRIOS, KINGSDORF & CASTEIX, LLP
          701 Poydras Street, Suite 3650
          New Orleans, LA 70139
          Telephone: (504) 524-3300
          Facsimile: (504) 524-3313
          E-mail: barrios@bkc-law.com
                  wool@bkc-law.com


ALTA DEVICES: Faces Patterson Suit Alleging Violation of WARN Act
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Patterson, Ben Lenail, Brendan Kayes, James Bustamante,
Octavi Semonin, Annett Suess, and Glenn Garcia, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated v. ALTA DEVICES, INC.;
HANERGY HOLDING GROUP, LTD., Case No. 5:20-cv-00296 (N.D. Cal.,
Jan. 13, 2020), arises from the Defendants' unlawful labor
practices resulting to breach of contract and violation of the
Worker Adjustment Retraining Notification Act and the California
Labor Code.

On October 15, 2019, the Defendants abruptly shut the doors to
their Sunnyvale, California factory, leaving almost 300 employees
without a job--and without their final paychecks--just before the
holiday season.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants abandoned employees
without any pay and left them in the lurch--providing no official
notice of termination, and repeatedly promising that the plant
would be back up and running any day. In the meantime, employees
are having trouble paying bills and are left with uncertainty
relating to healthcare coverage after being given false hope that
Defendant Hanergy would reopen the Alta plant and resume operations
as usual.

In abruptly closing the Alta plant, the Defendants violated the
federal and California WARN Acts, which require at least 60 days
written notice of termination where a plant is shut down and/or
mass layoffs occur, the Plaintiffs contend. They add that the
Defendants also failed to pay employees wages and vacation time
already earned in violation of the California Labor Code, and have
breached agreements with the Plaintiffs and other similarly
situated employees by failing to provide severance pay as clearly
outlined in some employees' agreements.

The Plaintiffs are all former or current employees of the
Defendants, who did not receive warning.

Alta is a thin film solar company, which was founded in 2008.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Justin T. Berger, Esq.
          Sarvenaz "Nazy" J. Fahimi, Esq.
          COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
          840 Malcolm Road
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Phone: (650) 697-6000
          Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
          Email: jberger@cpmlegal.com
                 sfahimi@cpmlegal.com


APPLE INC: Bid to Deny Class Certification in Davidson Suit Nixed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned THOMAS DAVIDSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
APPLE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-CV-04942-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Lucy H. Koh of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, San Jose Division, denied the Defendant's motion to
deny class certification.

The Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action against Apple
based on the Defendant's alleged failure to disclose an alleged
defect in the iPhone 6 and the iPhone 6 Plus.  The Defendant
released the iPhone 6 and iPhone 6 Plus on Sept. 19, 2014.  The
iPhone 6 and 6 Plus both have a larger touchscreen than the
Defendant's prior iPhone models.  The Purchasers of the iPhone 6
and 6 Plus had 14 days after purchase to return their iPhones for a
full refund.

According to the Plaintiffs, the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus suffer from a
material manufacturing defect that causes the touchscreen to become
unresponsive to users' touch inputs.  They allege that the
touchscreen defect is caused by a defect in the iPhone's external
casing.  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant knew about the
touchscreen defect before releasing the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus.  They
allege that within days of the iPhones' release, there were
widespread consumer complaints about the iPhones bending.

On Nov. 18, 2016, the Defendant announced a customer service
program related to the touchscreen defect called the "Multi-Touch
Repair Program."  Prior to the Multi-Touch Repair Program, the
Defendant charged approximately $349 for a refurbished iPhone when
a consumer complained of the touchscreen defect outside of its
warranty.  Through the Repair Program, the Defendant has offered to
repair consumers' devices for $149 if the iPhone is otherwise
working, and the screen is not broken.  It also offers to reimburse
consumers for amounts previously paid over $149.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant did not disclose the
existence of the touchscreen defect despite having exposed
consumers to materials in which it could have disclosed the
defect.

On Aug. 27, 2016, Plaintiffs Davidson, Jun Bai, and Todd Cleary
filed a putative class action complaint against the Defendant that
alleged claims under (1) California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act;
(2) Unfair Competition Law; (3) False Advertisement Law; (4) common
law fraud; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) unjust enrichment;
(7) breach of implied warranty; (8) violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act; and (9) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act.

On Oct. 7, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action
Complaint that added several Plaintiffs and added claims under the
consumer fraud statutes of Illinois, New Jersey, Florida,
Connecticut, Texas, Colorado, Michigan, New York, and Washington.
On Dec. 2, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action
Complaint ("SACC"), which added a Utah Plaintiff and a claim under
Utah's consumer fraud statute.  The Plaintiffs therefore alleged 22
claims against the Defendant in total.  Their references in their
opposition to only 21 claims are therefore incorrect.  

The Plaintiffs sought to represent a Nationwide Class of all
persons or entities in the United States that purchased an Apple
iPhone 6 or 6 Plus.  Alternatively, they sought to represent state
sub-classes.

Given the breadth of the Plaintiffs' action, the Court ordered the
parties at the Nov. 30, 2016 initial case management conference to
each select five claims to litigate through trial.  The Court
initially scheduled trial on Oct. 12, 2018.  On Dec. 5, 2016, the
parties selected (1) New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (2) Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; (3) Washington Consumer
Protection Act; (4) Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act; (5) Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (6)
Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (7) common law fraud; (8) breach
of express warranty; (9) breach of implied warranty; and (10)
Magnuson-Moss Act.

On Jan. 5, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their first motion for class
certification as to the Selected Claims.  On May 8, 2018, the Court
denied the motion.

On Nov. 8, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed their second motion for class
certification as to the Selected Claims.  On Feb. 12, 2019, the
Court denied without prejudice the second motion for class
certification as to the Selected Claims because analysis of whether
Boedeker's new survey satisfies Comcast is essential to a class
certification determination; because the Plaintiffs did not
complete this survey before filing their renewed motion for class
certification despite having 6 months to do so; and because
briefing on class certification should address Boedeker's new
survey.   The Court gave Plaintiffs yet another opportunity to file
a motion for class certification.

On March 5, 2019, Plaintiffs John Borzymowski of Florida, William
Bon of Washington, and Matt Muilenburg of Washington ("Former
Plaintiffs") filed a third motion for class certification as to the
Selected Claims.  The Former Plaintiffs sought to certify the
following class of any person residing in Florida or Washington who
purchased an Apple iPhone 6 or iPhone 6 Plus from Apple or an Apple
Authorized Service Provider (listed on https://locate.apple.com/)
that was manufactured without underfill under the U2402 (Meson)
integrated circuit chip.  On March 29, 2019, Defendant filed its
opposition.

On June 20, 2019, the Court denied the Former Plaintiffs' third
motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims.  The
Court explained that the varying manifestation rates lead to vast
differences in economic loss calculations.

Fact discovery closed on Nov. 2, 2018, and expert discovery closed
on March 8, 2019.  On July 2, 2019, the Former Plaintiffs and
Plaintiff Justin Bauer of Colorado dismissed all of their claims
without prejudice.  These Plaintiffs were the only individuals who
alleged the three Selected Claims that survived summary judgment:
(1) Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (2) Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act; and (3) Washington Consumer Protection
Act.  On Aug. 30, 2019, the Former Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Justin
Bauer dismissed all of their claims with prejudice.

Only the following Plaintiffs now remain in the instant case: Todd
Cleary of California; Thomas Davidson of Pennsylvania; Eric Siegal
of Illinois; Michael Pajaro of New Jersey; Brooke Corbett of
Connecticut; Taylor Brown of Texas; Heirloom Estate Services, Inc.
of Michigan; Kathleen Baker of New York; and Jason Petty of Utah.

The Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint ("FACC")'s claim for
Violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act was
not one of the Selected Claims.  However, the parties indicated in
their July 17, 2019 joint case management statement that the
Court's decision on summary judgment rendered moot the claim for
Violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Thus, on July 25, 2019, the Court dismissed this claim with
prejudice pursuant to the parties' agreement in the July 17, 2019
joint case management statement.

Accordingly, the following 10 Parked Claims remain pending in the
instant case, on behalf of representative Plaintiffs for
sub-classes located in California, Connecticut, Michigan, New York,
and Utah: (Count 1) Violation of the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act; (Count 2) Violation of California Unfair Competition
Laws; (Count 3) Violation of California False Advertising Law;
(Count 8) Violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act;
(Count 11) Violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act;
(Count 12) Violation of New York General Business Law Section 349;
(Count 13) Violation of New York General Business Law Section 350
16 Negligent Misrepresentation; (Count 17) Unjust Enrichment;
(Count 22) Violation of Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act.

On Aug. 21, 2019, the Defendant filed the instant motion to deny
class certification.  Defendant argues that the Court's order
denying Plaintiffs' third motion for class certification as to the
Selected Claims requires the Court to also denies class
certification as to the Parked Claims.  It claims that class
certification as to the Parked Claims is barred on the basis of
three different doctrines: (1) issue preclusion; (2) law of the
case; and (3) comity.  The Plaintiffs filed an opposition.  

Judge Koh will deny the Defendant's motion to deny class
certification to the extent that it argues that issue preclusion
applies in the instant case.  Against the great weight of this
authority, the Defendant cites no case law to demonstrate that
issue preclusion may indeed apply in the context of a single,
continuing case.  There is no "subsequent suit" before the Court.
Issue preclusion therefore has no application in the instant case.

The Judge proceeds to consider the Defendant's argument that law of
the case bars class certification of the Parked Claims.  She
concludes that the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable to the
Plaintiffs because they were not party to the Former Plaintiffs'
third motion for class certification as to the Selected Claims.
For the sake of completeness, Judge Koh further proceeds to analyze
the question of whether the issue of the Plaintiffs' class
certification as to the Parked Claims has already been "decided
explicitly or by necessary implication" in the instant case.

In light of the Plaintiffs' new representation, the Judge cannot
determine as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs will necessarily
be unable to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), as
would be required for the law of the case doctrine to bar class
certification as to the Parked Claims.  She finds that because the
Plaintiffs were not party to the third motion for class
certification as to the Selected Claims, and because the Court did
not decide the question of class certification as to the Parked
Claims by "necessary implication" in the instant case, she will
deny the Defendant's motion to deny class certification to the
extent that the Defendant argues that the law of the case doctrine
bars class certification in the instant case.

Judge Koh will also deny the Defendant's motion to deny class
certification to the extent that it argues that principles of
comity bar class certification as to the Selected Claims.  In sum,
because she has concluded that class certification as to the Parked
Claims cannot be denied based on issue preclusion, law of the case,
or principles of comity, she will deny the Defendant's motion to
deny class certification.

Finally, to the extent that the Plaintiffs now intend to rely on
Boedeker 3 as to the Parked Claims, the Plaintiffs will not be
permitted to do so.  Nor will they be permitted to file any other
untimely expert report bearing any other name.  Fact discovery has
been closed since Nov. 2, 2018, and expert discovery has been
closed since March 8, 2019.  The sole exception that the Court
contemplated was for transactional discovery, such as sales
information and customer names, in states that correspond to the
Parked Claims.  Even if the doctrines of issue preclusion, law of
the case, or comity do not bar class certification as to the Parked
Claims, the Defendant is indeed correct that Boedeker 3 remains
untimely and that allowing the Plaintiffs to rely on Boedeker 3 or
any other untimely expert discovery would still "result in severe
prejudice" to the Defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Koh denied the Defendant's motion
to deny class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/mMmXgk from Leagle.com.

Thomas Davidson, Todd Cleary, Jun Bai, William Bon, Adam
Benelhachemi, Brooke Corbett, Matt Muilenburg, Kathleen Baker,
Taylor Brown, Michael Pajaro, Heirloom Estate Services, Inc., John
Borzymowski & Justin Bauer, Plaintiffs, represented by David
Christopher Wright -- dcw@mccunewright.com -- McCune Wright
Arevalo, LLP, Gregory F. Coleman -- greg@gregcolemanlaw.com --
Greg
Coleman Law PC, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac
vice, Bruce Daniel Greenberg -- bgreenberg@litedepalma.com -- Lite
Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder --
jgs@mccunewright.com -- McWright, LLP, pro hac vice, Matthew David
Schelkopf -- mds@mccunewright.com -- McCuneWright LLP, pro hac
vice, Mitchell M. Breit -- mbreit@simmonsfirm.com -- SIMMONS HANLY
CONROY, LLC, pro hac vice, Paul J. Hanly, Jr., Simmons Hanly Conry
LLC, pro hac vice, Richard Christian Harlan --
rcharlan@larsonobrienlaw.com -- Larson O'Brien LLP, Stephen Gerard
Larson -- slarson@larsonobrienlaw.com -- Larson O'Brien LLP,
Susana
Cruz Hodge -- scruzhodge@litedepalma.com -- Lite DePalma
Greenberg,
LLC, pro hac vice & Richard D. McCune, Jr. -- rdm@mccunewright.com
-- McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP.

Jason Petty, Plaintiff, represented by David Christopher Wright,
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Gregory F. Coleman, Greg Coleman Law
PC, Mitchell M. Breit, SIMMONS HANLY CONROY, LLC, Adam A. Edwards,
Greg Coleman Law PC, pro hac vice, Bruce Daniel Greenberg, Lite
Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, Joseph G. Sauder,
McCuneWright, LLP, Matthew David Schelkopf, McCuneWright LLP, pro
hac vice, Richard Christian Harlan, Larso O'Brien LLP, Stephen
Gerard Larson, Larson O'Brien LLP, Susana Cruz Hodge, Lite DePalma
Greenberg, LLC, pro hac vice & Richard D. McCune, Jr., McCune
Wright Arevalo, LLP.

Eric Siegal, Plaintiff, represented by Joseph G. Sauder,
McCuneWright, LLP, Richard D. McCune, Jr., McCune Wright Arevalo,
LLP, Adam A. Edwards, Greg Coleman Law PC, Bruce Daniel Greenberg,
Lite Depalma Greenberg LLC, pro hac vice, David Christopher
Wright,
McCune Wright Arevalo, LLP, Richard Christian Harlan, Larson
O'Brien LLP, Stephen Gerard Larson, Larson O'Brien LLP & Susana
Cruz Hodge, Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC, pro hac vice.

Apple, Inc., Defendant, represented by Arturo J. Gonzalez, Esq. --
agonzalez@mofo.com -- Alexandria Armida Amezcua, Esq. --
aamezcua@mofo.com -- Christopher Leonard Robinson, Esq. --
christopherrobinson@mofo.com -- Penelope Athene Preovolos, Esq. --
ppreovolos@mofo.com -- and -- Tiffany Cheung, Esq. --
tcheung@mofo.com -- MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP -- David Ramraj Singh,
Esq. -- david.singh@weil.com -- and -- Diane P. Sullivan, Esq. --
diane.sullivan@weil.com -- Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, pro hac
vice.


APPLE INC: Bid to Dismiss 1st Amended MacBook Keyboard Suit Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied Apple's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint in IN RE: MacBOOK KEYBOARD
LITIGATION, Case No. 5:18-cv-02813-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs claim the Apple MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook
Pro with Touch Bar laptops they purchased in 2016, 2017, and 2018
contain a defective "butterfly" keyboard design that causes their
keyboards to fail -- resulting in sticky keys, unresponsive keys,
and keys that do not register strokes properly.  The Plaintiffs
bring a putative class action against Defendant Apple for allegedly
selling MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Air laptops with
defective keyboards in violation of state consumer protection and
warranty laws.  The Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, equitable
relief, attorneys' fees, and costs.

In October 2018, 10 plaintiffs, citizens and residents of
California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, and Washington, filed a putative class action against
Apple on behalf of individuals who purchased model year 2015 or
later Apple MacBook laptops and model year 2016 or later MacBook
Pro laptops -- the Consolidated Class Action Complaint or CACC.

The Plaintiffs claimed the MacBook and MacBook Pro laptops have
defective "butterfly" keyboards that place consumers at a constant
threat of non-responsive keys and keyboard failure.  Accordingly,
they brought ten claims against Apple for alleged violations of:
(1) the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (2) Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (3) fraudulent concealment; (4) breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (common law); (5)
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("Song-Beverly Act"); (6)
Washington Consumer Protection Act; (7) Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act; (8) Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act; (9) New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act; (10) New York General Business Law Section 349; and (11)
Michigan Consumer Protection Act.  In December 2018, Apple filed a
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' CCAC and Request for Judicial Notice.
Soon after, the Plaintiffs filed their Opposition and Apple filed
a Reply.

In April 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part Apple's
Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's CCAC under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b).  The Court denied Apple's Motion to
Dismiss the non-California Plaintiffs' claims under California law,
deciding to defer the choice of law analysis.  The Court also
denied the motion as to the Plaintiffs' claims based on fraud by
omission and the Plaintiffs' claim under the unfair prong of
California's UCL.

The Court, however, granted Apple's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs'claims under the CLRA, Song-Beverly Act, and implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  In their Opposition, the
Plaintiffs claimed Apple's Keyboard Service Program did not moot
their CLRA and Song-Beverly Act claims because Apple could not
"provide an effective fix to the defect" and the Program does not
provide all of the relief that they seek.  But, the Plaintiffs did
not allege any facts about the Program in the CCAC.  Thus, they did
not allege any facts showing that the Keyboard Service Program does
not moot their claims under the CLRA and the Song-Beverly Act.

Regarding the Program, Apple had requested the Court to take
judicial notice of an apple.com webpage that described the Program.
The webpage represented that Apple will provide free service to
model years 2015-2017 MacBooks and model years 2016-2017 MacBook
Pros with keyboards that malfunction in ways similar to the alleged
failures that the Plaintiffs have experienced.  The webpage stated
that the service may involve the replacement of one or more keys or
the whole keyboard.  The Court took judicial notice of the
following facts under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b): (1) Exhibit
A is an accurate depiction of an apple.com webpage, (2) Apple has
made the above representations about the Key Board Service Program
to the public through that website, and (3) Apple is providing free
services to the models of MacBook and MacBook Pro listed on the
website.

The order granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend.  In May 2019,
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC).  In June
2019, Apple filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' FAC.  The
Plaintiffs and Apple respectively filed an Opposition and Reply.
The court heard oral arguments on Apple's Motion to Dismiss.

In its Motion to Dismiss the FAC, Apple moves the court: (1) to
dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims on grounds that they have not
demonstrated an injury, Article III standing, or prudential
standing; (2) to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CLRA claim for mootness;
and (3) to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Song-Beverly Act claim for
mootness.

Because the Plaintiffs establish standing, Judge Davila will deny
Apple's Motion to Dismiss all of the Plaintiffs' claims under Rule
12(b)(1).  Because the Plaintiffs adequately plead claims under the
CLRA and Song-Beverly Act that the Program does not moot their
claims, Judge Davila will deny the Apple's Motion to Dismiss these
claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

Judge Davila first addressed Apple's Request for Judicial Notice
("RJN").  Next, the Judge addressed the issue of standing.  Third,
the Judge evaluates the Plaintiffs' claims under the CLRA and
Song-Beverly Act.

Judge Davila takes judicial notice of the following facts: (1)
Exhibit A is an accurate depiction of the apple.com webpage for the
Program for MacBook and MacBook Pro laptops as it existed on Dec.
3, 2018, (2) Exhibit B is an accurate depiction of the apple.com
webpage for the Program for MacBook, MacBook Pro, and MacBook Air
laptops as it existed on June 4, 2019, (3) the fact that Apple made
the statements in Exhibits A and B to the public through the
apple.com website, and (4) that Apple is offering free service
under the Program for eligible models of MacBook, MacBook Pro, and
MacBook Air laptops as listed on the website.  The Judge, however,
does not take judicial notice of whether the Program effectively
remedies the behavior associated with the allegedly defective
keyboards -- a question the parties vigorously dispute.  In sum,
the Judge takes judicial notice of the apple.com webpages
describing the Program (Exhibits A-B) and Apple's representations
to the public on those webpages.

Next, Judge Davila finds that the Apple does not meet its "heavy"
burden of showing that the Program moots the Plaintiffs' claims and
deprives them of standing.  First, Apple cites cases involving
refund programs that offered the Plaintiffs full relief, such as
full refunds.  But the program does not moot the Plaintiffs' claims
because the Plaintiffs seek relief beyond what the Program offers,
including monetary damages and injunctive relief.  Second, Apple
cites distinguishable cases where the effectiveness of recall
programs was not at issue.  The Plaintiffs, however, rely on
Apple's internal documents allegedly acknowledging a design defect
and Apple's multiple failed attempts to repair their allegedly
defective keyboards in the past.

Judge Davila will deny Apple's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims
under the CLRA and Song-Beverly Act.  The Plaintiffs have
adequately pled that the Program is ineffective.  They sufficiently
plead that their laptops are unfit for the ordinary purposes for
which a laptop computer is used, and the Plaintiffs are not
required to participate in the Program.  Hence, the Plaintiffs
sufficiently plead a claim under the Song-Beverly Act.

For the reasons stated, Judge Davila denied Apple's Motion to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/a9IOV1 from Leagle.com.

Zixuan Rao, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Kyle Barbaro, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew William
Ferich, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Angelica
Maria Ornelas, Girard Sharp LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F.
Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Jordan S.
Elias, Girard Sharp LLP, Simon Seiver Grille, Girard Sharp LLP,
Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith
LLP, Trevor Taige Tan -- ttan@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP,
Adam E. Polk -- apolk@girardsharp.com -- Girard Sharp LLP & Daniel
C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP.

Remy Turner & Christopher Martin, Plaintiffs, represented by Esther
Shinjung Kim, Attorney at Law, Noah M. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer
& Kolbe LLP, Robert C. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP,
Willem F. Jonckheer, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Beena M.
McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac
vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner &
Donaldson-Smith LLP, Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP & Steven
Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP.

Joey Baruch, Plaintiff, represented by Esther Shinjung Kim,
Attorney at Law, Noah M. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP,
Robert C. Schubert, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Willem F.
Jonckheer, Schubert Jonckheer & Kolbe LLP, Angelica Maria Ornelas,
Girard Sharp LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner &
Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F. Johns, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Daniel C. Girard, Girard
Sharp LLP, Jordan S. Elias, Girard Sharp LLP, Steven Alan Schwartz,
Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP & Trevor Taige Tan,
Girard Sharp LLP.

Kevin Kou, Plaintiff, represented by Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F.
Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Daniel C.
Girard, Girard Sharp LLP, Esfand Nafisi, Migliaccio & Rathod LLP &
Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith
LLP.

Steve Eakin, Kevin Melkowski, Lorenzo Ferguson, Michael Hopkins,
Benjamin Gulker & Adam Lee, Plaintiffs, represented by Angelica
Maria Ornelas, Girard Sharp LLP, Beena M. McDonald, Chimicles
Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, pro hac vice, Benjamin F.
Johns, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Jordan S.
Elias, Girard Sharp LLP, Steven Alan Schwartz, Chimicles Schwartz
Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Trevor Taige Tan, Girard Sharp LLP &
Daniel C. Girard, Girard Sharp LLP.

Apple Inc., California Corporation, Defendant, represented by
Margaret Elizabeth Mayo -- mmayo@mofo.com -- Morrison & Foerster
LLP, Penelope Athene Preovolos -- ppreovolos@mofo.com -- Morrison &
Foerster LLP & Purvi Govindlal Patel -- ppatel@mofo.com -- Morrison
& Foerster LLP.


ASCOT RIDGE: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage Under NYLL, Haughwout Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
VINCENT HAUGHWOUT and DONNA HAUGHWOUT, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated v. ASCOT RIDGE CORP, SCOTT DECKER,
JEFFREY GOLOWNER, DESPINA BONKOWSKI (a/k/a DESPINA RAFTOPOULOS),
ELIZABETH TOBIO, INGER NIELSON, JAMES POPPE (a/k/a "JIM POPPE"),
VINCENT BONKOWSKI, HARVEY FRIEDMAN, ANDREW VOllBECK, GIANCARLO
SCACCIA, and MAUREEN MOONEY, Case No. 610749/2019 (N.Y. Sup., Jan.
13, 2020), alleges violations of the New York Labor Law arising
from the Defendants' decision not to pay minimum wages, wages for
all hours worked, keep records, provide wage statements or pay
stubs, provide wage notices, pay wages timely, and pay for the
costs of tools of the trade.

The action also alleges breach of the implied warranty of
habitability.

As a result of the alleged violations, the Plaintiffs assert that
they are entitled to recover from the Defendants: unpaid minimum
and overtime wages, premiums, the maximum statutory penalty amounts
allowed for failure to provide wage notices and wage statements
under New York Labor Law, liquidated damages, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest, monetary damage for breach of the warranty
of implied habitability, attorneys' fees and costs.

Vincent Haughwout was employed by the Defendants from 1999 until
August 1, 2019, while Donna Haughwout was employed by the
Defendants from 1999 until May 2019. They were employed to perform
cleaning, maintenance work for the lot and building located at 1
Ascot Ridge, in Great Neck, New York.

Ascot Ridge operates luxury apartments and townhomes. The
Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES
          One Grand Central Place
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: 212 317-1200
          Facsimile: 212-317-1620
          E-mail: michacl@faillacelaw.com
                  ctucker@faillacelaw.com


BAOZUN INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds Investors of Feb. 10 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming February 10, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of Baozun Inc. (NASDAQ: BZUN)
investors who purchased American Depository Receipts ("ADRs")
between March 6, 2019 and November 20, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Charles Linehan,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com

On November 21, 2019, Baozun announced third quarter 2019 financial
results that were below market expectations, and provided dismal
fourth quarter 2019 financial guidance. The Company attributed the
negative results and outlook to adverse impacts from terminating
its service agreement with one electronics brand. Baozun did not
disclose who that large electronics brand was, but some in the
financial media have suggested that it was Huawei.

On this news, Baozun's share price fell $7.60 per share, or more
than 17%, to close at $35.90 per share on November 21, 2019.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that Baozun was heavily reliant upon a single brand
partner, Huawei, for the exponential service fee growth it had been
reporting historically, which was in turn fueling its historical
revenue growth; (2) that, compared to other brands Baozun had as
brand partners, the Huawei work had historically included a lot of
additional add-on service fees, increasing the revenue reported
from Huawei vis-à-vis its other brand partners; (3) that Huawei,
like other large brands, was actively preparing to bring its online
merchandising in-house, meaning Baozun knew that it was losing a
significant brand partner; and (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, the Company was not on track to achieve the financial
results and performance Defendants claimed the Company was on track
to achieve during the class period.

Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP

If you purchased Baozun ADRs during the Class Period, you may move
the Court no later than February 10, 2020 to request appointment as
lead plaintiff in this putative class action lawsuit. To be a
member of the class action you need not take any action at this
time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no action and
remain an absent member of the class action. If you wish to learn
more about this class action, or if you have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to the pending class action lawsuit, please contact Charles
Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los
Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our
website at www.glancylaw.com.  If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased.

Contact:
         Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
         Charles Linehan, Esq.
         310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
         Email: shareholders@glancylaw.com, clinehan@glancylaw.com
         Website: www.glancylaw.com
[GN]


BAOZUN INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that class action lawsuits have
commenced on behalf of shareholders of publicly-traded Baozun Inc.
(BZUN).  Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have
until the deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details
about the cases can be found at the links provided. There is no
cost or obligation to you.

BZUN Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/baozun-inc-loss-form?prid=5051&wire=1

Baozun Inc. (BZUN)

BZUN Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased Baozun American
Depository Receipts between March 6, 2019 and November 20, 2019

Lead Plaintiff Deadline : February 10, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/baozun-inc-loss-form?prid=5051&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, (a) Baozun was heavily reliant
upon a single brand partner, Huawei, for the exponential service
fee growth it had been reporting historically, which was in turn
fueling its historical revenue growth; (b) compared to other brands
Baozun had as brand partners, the Huawei work had historically
included a lot of additional add-on service fees, increasing the
revenue reported from Huawei vis-a-via its other brand partners;
(c) Huawei, like other large brands, was actively preparing to
bring its online merchandising in-house, meaning Baozun knew that
it was losing a significant brand partner; and (d) as a result of
the foregoing, the Company was not on track to achieve the
financial results and performance Defendants claimed the Company
was on track to achieve during the class period.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a national firm with offices in New York,
California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's attorneys
have extensive expertise and experience representing investors in
securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of millions of
dollars for aggrieved shareholders.

Contact:

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Phone: (212) 363-7500
         Toll Free: (877) 363-5972
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         Email: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
[GN]


BAXTER INT'L: Schall Law Reminds of Jan. 24 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces it has filed a class action lawsuit against Baxter
International Inc. (NYSE:BAX) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between February
21, 2019 and October 23, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before January 24, 2020.

If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to
participate.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Baxter engaged in intra-Company
transactions designed to generate gains from foreign exchanges that
did not follow GAAP principles and were undertaken when the foreign
exchange rates were already known. The Company failed to maintain
effective controls on financial reporting. Based on the Company's
internal investigation of these matters, it was not capable of
filing a Form 10-Q quarterly report for the period ending September
30, 2019. Based on these facts, the Company's public statements
were false and materially misleading throughout the class period.
When the market learned the truth about Baxter, investors suffered
damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         E-mail: info@schallfirm.com
                 brian@schallfirm.com
[GN]


BIG MIKE'S RESTAURANT: Court Partly Grants Deal in Fitzwater Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned WENDY FITZWATER, Plaintiff, v. MIKE COLE, SR,
et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 18-00137-N (S.D. Ala.),
Magistrate Judge Katherine P. Nelson of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, granted in
part and denied in part the parties' joint motion to approve the
settlement of the Plaintiffs' Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
claims.

The named Defendants are Mike Cole, Sr., Scott Powell, Caine
Conway, Casey Taylor, Big Mike's Restaurant LLC, Big Mike's
Steakhouse OB, LLC, Big Mike's Restaurant II, LLC and Big Mike's
Restaurant Andalusia, LLC.

In the conditionally certified collective action alleging
violations of the FLSA, the parties have filed a joint motion for
the Court's approval of their proposed settlement of the FLSA
claims of the named Plaintiff Fitzwater, and the 6 opt-in
Plaintiffs: Carlissa Phillips, Jeanie Odom, Lisa Smith, Cynthia
Woodard, Veronica McLaughlin, and Alexandria Glass.  A telephonic
hearing was held with the counsel for the parties on Oct. 4, 2019,
to discuss some concerns the undersigned had with aspects of the
proposed settlement, and the Plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief
addressing those concerns.  The Plaintiffs have also since filed a
supplemental motion for approval of the settlement agreement, which
also requests modification of a deadline in the stipulated
judgment.

Fitzwater filed the action on March 21, 2018.  In April 2018,
before the Defendants were served with the complaint in late May
and early June, the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department
of Labor initiated an audit of the Defendants' payroll practices.
The DOL issued its determinations to the Defendants on Aug. 22,
2018, including a settlement demand requiring payment of back wages
and other elements of compensation, including properly calculated
overtime and other elements of compensation, to all current and
former employees, with the sole exception of Plaintiff Fitzwater.


The Agency's determination and settlement demand included loss of
the Defendants' 'tip credit' due to a tip pooling arrangement that
was deemed not compliant with the FSLA.  The DOL did not assess
liquidated damages after determining no willful conduct on the part
of the Defendants.  Fitzwater was excluded from the DOL's payment
compensation roster due to the DOL's policy of not representing
employees who are represented by counsel and have claims pending in
court.  The roster did include former employee Carlissa Phillips,
to date the only opt-in plaintiff.

As confirmed by the parties at the hearing, the DOL Settlement
Plaintiffs have all accepted their settlement checks from the
mentioned DOL investigation.

The record also otherwise indicates that there are bona fide
disputes over FLSA wage-and-hour provisions for all the Plaintiffs.
While the Defendants concede that they required the Plaintiffs to
engage in an invalid "tip pool" arrangement, the measure of damages
is contested, as evidenced by, inter alia, the Defendants' motion
for judgment on the pleadings seeking a ruling that certain
withheld tips are not recoverable under the FLSA.  The Defendants
also dispute that the Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages
in the action, claiming a defense of good faith.

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Plaintiffs will receive
the following amounts to settle their claims for back wages and
liquidated damages: (i) Fitzwater - $16,266.35; (ii) Phillips -
$38,903.60; (iii) Odom - $3,046.30; (iv) Smith - $3,778.32; (v)
Woodard - $7,745.97; (vi) McLaughlin - $644.41; and (vii) Glass -
$5,602.10.  The parties agree that each of the Plaintiffs stands to
receive significantly more under the settlement than they would (or
did) under the DOL settlement formula, and that these amounts were
negotiated prior to discussions regarding attorneys' fees and
costs.  Judge Nelson finds those amounts to be fair and reasonable
settlements of the aforementioned bona fide FLSA disputes.

In addition to settling the Plaintiffs' claims for back wages and
liquidated damages under the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime
provisions, the parties also report that they have separately
settled Fitzwater's potential claim for unlawful retaliation in
violation of 29 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(3) in exchange for a payment
of $15,000.  They also propose to pay Fitzwater an additional
$5,000, which the Plaintiffs characterize as a service/incentive
award for bringing the action on behalf of the class.

Judge Nelson holds that though not addressed in their joint motion,
the parties' proposed stipulated judgment appears to request that
the Court makes findings about how the various proceeds from the
settlement agreement will be treated for tax purposes.  The parties
have not presented any authority to suggest that such findings are
either permitted or appropriate, and the undersigned declines to
make any such findings here or include them in the resulting
judgment.  

Judge Nelson also declines to include specific instructions about
how disbursement of the settlement is to be carried out, to retain
jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, or to delay
dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims until the issue of attorneys'
fees and costs is resolved.  However, the Judge will permit a
generous period to allow for reinstatement of the action should the
settlement agreement not be carried out in full.

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, Judge Nelson granted in
part and denied in part the parties' joint motion to approve the
settlement of the Plaintiffs' FLSA claims.  The Judge approved the
proposed settlement as a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona
fide dispute over FLSA provisions; and denied that certain
requested relief as set forth.  

A modified version of the parties' stipulated final judgment will
separately issue in accordance with the settlement agreement,
Lynn's Food, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, at which time
all of the Plaintiff's claims in the action will be dismissed with
prejudice, subject to the right of any party to move to reinstate
the action within 90 days from the date of entry of the
accompanying judgment, should the settlement agreement not be fully
carried out.  As such, the Plaintiffs' pending motion to compel and
motion to extend the discovery deadline, and the Defendants'
pending motion for partial judgment on the pleadings are moot, and
all remaining deadlines and settings in the scheduling order are
cancelled.

Judge Nelson set Jan. 31, 2020, as the deadline for the Plaintiffs
to file and serve any motion for attorneys' fees and costs under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) in connection with the
accompanying final judgment.  An appropriate briefing schedule will
be entered if any such motion is timely filed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/tEbQLc from Leagle.com.

Wendy Fitzwater, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak,
III -- yezbak@yezbaklaw.com -- Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice,
Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas -- Daniel@attorneydaniel.com --
Arciniegas Law PLLC & Nicholas Chase Teeples, Yezbak Law Offices,
pro hac vice.

Lisa Smith, Cynthia Woodard, Jeanie Odom, Veronica McLaughlin &
Alexandria Glass, Plaintiffs, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak,
III, Yezbak Law Offices, Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas, Arciniegas Law
PLLC & Nicholas Chase Teeples, Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice.

Carlissa Phillips, Plaintiff, represented by Charles Peter Yezbak,
III, Yezbak Law Offices, pro hac vice, Daniel Eduardo Arciniegas,
Arciniegas Law PLLC, pro hac vice & Nicholas Chase Teeples, Yezbak
Law Offices, pro hac vice.

Mike Cole, Sr., Scott Powell, Caine Conway, Casey Taylor, Big
Mike's Restaurant LLC, Big Mike's Steakhouse OB, LLC, Big Mike's
Restaurant II, LLC & Big Mike's Restaurant Andalusia, LLC,
Defendants, represented by Emily C. Killion -- ekillion@burr.com --
BURR & FORMAN LLP & H. William Wasden -- bwasden@burr.com -- Burr
Forman.


BOOT BARN: Mendez Sues Over Unwanted Telemarketing Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------
CARRINA MENDEZ, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. BOOT BARN, INC., Case No. 8:20-cv-00054 (C.D. Cal.,
Jan. 10, 2020), alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited automated text
messages to wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that she did not give the Defendant prior
express written consent to send text messages to her cellular
telephone number by using an automatic telephone dialing system.
She adds that the text message Boot Barn sent to the Plaintiff
consisted of pre-written templates of impersonal text, and was
identical to text messages the Defendant sent to other consumers.

Boot Barn's telemarketing campaign, which caused harm to the
Plaintiff and purported class members across the country, emanated
from Irvine, California, according to the complaint.

Boot Barn is a retailer of western and work related footwear,
apparel, and accessories for men, women, and children, consisting
of over 200 stores in 33 states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          Yana A. Hart, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Suite D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: 800 400 6808
          Facsimile: 800 520 5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com
                  yana@kazlg.com


BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE INC: Taylor FACTA Suit Moved to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc. removed the case captioned as MONIKA TAYLOR,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v.
BUTH-NA-BODHAIGE, INC. (d/b/a The Body Shop), Case No.
30-2019-01105338-CU-BT-CXC (Filed Oct. 17, 2019), from the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Orange, to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on Jan. 10,
2020.

The Plaintiff alleges that after April 22, 2014, The Body Shop
provided her with one or more electronically-printed receipts that
displayed more than the last five digits of her credit or debit
card number, in violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act.

Buth-Na-Bodhaige manufactures and retails cosmetics products. The
company offers bath, body care, skin care, make-up, hair care, and
fragrance products.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Sarah M. Indrawes, Esq.
          McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200
          Los Angeles, CA 90067-3026
          Telephone: 310 277 4110
          Facsimile: 310 722 1555
          E-mail: sindrawes@mwe.com


CANOPY GROWTH: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has
commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Canopy Growth
Corporation (CGC). If you suffered a loss you have until the lead
plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead
plaintiff. There will be no obligation or cost to you.

Canopy Growth Corporation (CGC)

If you suffered a loss, contact us at:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/canopy-growth-corporation-loss-submission-form?prid=5062&wire=1

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 21, 2020

Class Period: June 21, 2019 to November 13, 2019

Allegations against CGC include that: (1) the Company was
experiencing weak demand for its softgel and oil products; (2) as a
result, the Company would be forced to take a CA$32.7 million
restructuring charge due to poor sales, excessive returns, and
excess inventory; and (3) as a result, Defendants' statements about
its business, operations, and prospects, were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights.

Contact:

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Phone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         Email: vw@wongesq.com
[GN]


CATERPILLAR INC: Faces Texas Hill Suit Over Defective Liners
------------------------------------------------------------
Texas Hill Country Landscaping Inc. d/b/a Organic Quality Products,
Easterling Wood Products Inc., Morning Star Farms, and Northwest
Recycling, LLC, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. Caterpillar Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-00227 (N.D. Ill.,
Jan. 13, 2020), is brought on behalf of those who purchased or
leased a Caterpillar product containing the C-18 or C-32 engine
with particular cylinder liners.

According to the complaint, the Liners have an inherent defect
(Defect) that leads to repeated failures. In particular, as
confirmed by metallurgical analysis, the Liners crack because of
residual stress. This allows oil and coolant to mix, ultimately
leading to engine failure.

The Plaintiffs tell the Court that they paid hundreds of thousands
of dollars for these defective products. They contend that the
failure requires expensive, time-consuming repairs in existing
engines and prevented them and other proposed class members from
using their products. They note that properly designed and
manufactured liners do not allow oil and coolant to mix, yet
Caterpillar sold and leased two different commercial propulsion
engines (the C-18 and C-32) with the Liners.

The Plaintiffs assert that Caterpillar was no less than negligent
when it sold the Liners because a reasonably careful manufacturer
would have uncovered the Defect. They add that Caterpillar did know
about the Defect, but simply chose to conceal it from its
customers.

Quality Organic Products provides agricultural services in Texas,
including mulching, soil and compost, gravel and sand, fertilizer,
trees, and palletized products. Morning Star Farms is a general
partnership located and headquartered in Greensburg, Kansas.
Morning Star Farms operates a rotochopper as part of its farming.

Caterpillar manufactures constructing and mining equipment, diesel
and natural gas engines, industrial gas turbines and
diesel-electric locomotives.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert A. Clifford, Esq.
          Shannon M. McNulty, Esq.
          CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          120 N. LaSalle Street, 31st Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: 312-899-9090
          E-mail: rclifford@cliffordlaw.com
                  smm@cliffordlaw.com

               - and -

          Kenneth S. Byrd, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          222 2nd Ave. S, Suite 1640
          Nashville, TN 37201
          Telephone: 615-313-9000
          E-mail: kbyrd@lchb.com

               - and -

          Jason L. Lichtman, Esq.
          Sean A. Petterson, Esq.
          250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: 212-355-9500
          E-mail: jlichtman@lchb.com
                  spetterson@lchb.com

               - and -

          Enrique G. Serna, Esq.
          Daniel E. Serna, Esq.
          SERNA & ASSOCIATES PLLC
          City View Office Building
          10999 IH 10 West, Suite 305
          San Antonio, TX 78230
          Telephone: 210-472-2222
          E-mail: enrique@serna-associates.com
                  daniel@serna-associates.com

               - and -

          Jon Powell, Esq.
          Mickey Johnson, Esq.
          THE POWELL LAW FIRM
          1148 East Commerce Street
          San Antonio, TX 78205
          Telephone: 210-225-9300
          E-mail: jon@jpowell-law.com
                  mickey@jpowell-law.com


CENLAR AGENCY: Gemborys Suit Removed to District of Massachusetts
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as Ely Gemborys, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Cenlar Agency, Inc.,
Case No. 1985CV1725C, was removed from the Worcester Superior Court
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
(Worcester) on Jan. 10, 2020.

The District of Massachusetts Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:20-cv-40006 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Krystle S. Guillory Tadesse, Esq.
          LOCKE LORD LLP
          2800 Financial Plaza
          Providence, RI 02903
          Telephone: (401) 274-9200
          E-mail: krystle.tadesse@lockelord.com


COMCAST CABLE: Court Denies Arbitration on Hearn's FCRA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, Atlanta Division issued an Opinion and Order denying
Defendants' Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay
Litigation in the case captioned MICHAEL HEARN individually and on
behalf of all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, v.
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Defendant, Civil Action No.
1:19-CV-1198-TWT (N.D. Ga.).

This is a class action under Fair Credit Report Act. The Plaintiff
Michael Hearn alleges that he called Defendant Comcast Cable
Communications to inquire about its services. During the call, a
representative for the Defendant made a hard pull of the
Plaintiff's consumer report, damaging his credit score. The
Plaintiff alleges that he did not consent to a credit check, was
not a customer of the Defendant at the time, and did not request
any services before or after the Defendant pulled his consumer
report.

The Defendant argues that the Court should therefore stay these
proceedings pending arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim. The
Federal Arbitration Act covers any arbitration provision that is
(1) in writing and (2) is part of a contract evidencing a
transaction involving interstate commerce.

The Plaintiff does not dispute that the arbitration provision is in
writing and that, by contracting for telecommunications services,
the parties engaged in a transaction involving interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Court will consider and apply precedent construing
the Federal Arbitration Act in adjudicating the Defendant's
motion.

Legal Standard

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides in relevant part
that a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transactionshall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract. When considering a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court must first
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.

The Defendant argues that the arbitration provision is valid and
compels arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim.

The Plaintiff makes three arguments in response. First, the
Plaintiff argues that he ceased to be bound by the arbitration
provision of the 2016 Service Agreement when he terminated the
Defendant's services in August of 2017.

Second, the Plaintiff argues that his FCRA claim is beyond the
scope of the arbitration provision because they do not relate to
the 2016 Service Agreement.

Third, the Plaintiff argues that if the arbitration provision
requires arbitration of claims unrelated to the 2016 Service
Agreement, then the provision is unenforceable because it is
unconscionable.

Whether the Arbitration Provision Continues to Bind the Parties

The Plaintiff does not dispute that he entered into the 2016
Service Agreement when he purchased services from the Defendant in
December of 2016.

The Plaintiff argues, however, that he is no longer bound by the
arbitration provision because he terminated the 2016 Service
Agreement two years before the events giving rise to this lawsuit.
Section 9(b) of the Agreement permits customers to terminate the
Agreement for any reason at any time by, among other options,
calling the Defendant's customer service line during normal
business hours. The Plaintiff called the Defendant and cancelled
his services in August of 2017. At that time, he also confirmed
that no outstanding balance remained due on his account.The
Plaintiff argues that any agreement to arbitrate was necessarily
extinguished when he cancelled the 2016 Service Agreement.

The Court is not persuaded. The Plaintiff's argument contravenes
the express language of the arbitration provision's survival
clause, which states that this Arbitration Provision shall survive
the termination of your Services with Comcast.The survival clause
unambiguously reflects the parties' intent that their agreement to
arbitrate would survive termination of the 2016 Service Agreement.


The Plaintiff argues that the survival clause somehow renders the
termination provision ambiguous, and that this ambiguity must be
resolved against the Defendant as the drafter of the Agreement. But
the termination provision and the arbitration provision are not in
conflict. The termination provision explains how the parties can
terminate the 2016 Service Agreement, and the arbitration
provision's survival clause explains that the parties' agreement to
arbitrate survives termination of the 2016 Service Agreement.
Because the plain language of the contract makes the parties'
intentions clear, the Court need not apply rules of contract
construction to manufacture ambiguity where none exists.

Based on the plain language of the contract, the Court concludes
that the parties intended for the arbitration provision to survive
termination of the 2016 Service Agreement. The Court will therefore
compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim unless, as the
Plaintiff argues in the alternative, they fall outside the scope of
the arbitration provision or the arbitration provision is
unenforceable on unconscionability grounds.

Whether the Plaintiff's FCRA Claim is Within the Scope of the
Arbitration Provision

The Plaintiff argues that his FCRA claim is wholly unrelated to the
2016 Service Agreement and that it is therefore beyond the scope of
the Agreement's arbitration provision. The Defendant responds that
the plain language of the arbitration provision states that it
reaches any claim related to Comcast, such that claims unrelated to
the 2016 Service Agreement fall under the provision's broad scope.


The Defendant argues in the alternative that the Plaintiff's FCRA
claim is, in fact, related to the 2016 Service Agreement and that
the arbitration provision therefore covers the Plaintiff's FCRA
claim even if the Court subjects it to a limiting construction.

Whether the Arbitration Provision Covers Unrelated, Post-Expiration
Claims

The Defendant has not identified a single case in which a court has
compelled arbitration of a claim that was (1) unrelated to the
agreement containing the arbitration provision and (2) arose after
the arbitration provision had expired. Indeed, the case law
interpreting arbitration provisions like the one at issue in this
case is sparse and largely unfriendly to the Defendant's position.
In the Seventh Circuit case Smith v. Steinkamp, 318 F.3d 775 (7th
Cir. 2003), the court highlighted the problems that could arise if
courts began enforcing arbitration agreements untethered to an
underlying commercial contract or transaction.

In Steinkamp, the plaintiffs brought federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act claims against a payday loan company
for making usurious loans. The loan company moved to compel
arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that the plaintiffs
signed when taking out prior loans from the payday lending company.
Crucially, however, the plaintiffs had not signed any arbitration
agreements when taking out the loans that gave rise to their RICO
claims.

The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that the arbitration
provision did not on its face extend to future claims, and upheld
the lower court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration on
that basis. But the court aptly described the absurd results that
could ensue if the court were to construe the arbitration provision
to cover future, unrelated claims:

If the arbitration provisions are read as standing free from any
loan agreement, absurd results ensue, for example that if Instant
Cash murdered Smith in order to discourage defaults and her
survivors brought a wrongful death suit against Instant Cash (a
common law suit, thus encompassed by [the arbitration provisions]),
Instant Cash could insist that the wrongful death claim be
submitted to arbitration. For that matter, if an employee of
Instant Cash picked Smith§s pocket when she came in to pay back
the loan, and Smith sued the employee for conversion, he would be
entitled to arbitration of her claim. It would make no difference
that the conversion had occurred in Smith§s home 20 years after
her last transaction with Instant Cash.

The arbitration provision at issue in this case is an attempt to do
just that. The Court will not embrace the Defendant's attempt to
extend the scope of arbitrable claims past the point that any
reasonable customer would expect it to go. The Court will therefore
decline to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's FCRA claim unless
the Defendant can show that it relates to or arises out of the 2016
Service Agreement.

Whether the Plaintiff's FCRA Claim is Related to the 2016 Service
Agreement

The Defendant argues that it was only able to pull the Plaintiff's
consumer report during the March 2019 call because it already had
the Plaintiff's personal information, including the Plaintiff's
social security number, on file. But for the parties' prior
contractual relationship, the Defendant argues, the alleged FCRA
violation would have been impossible. Thus, the Plaintiff's FCRA
claim necessarily relates to the 2016 Service Agreement.  

The Court is not persuaded. A dispute does not arise out of a
contract just because the dispute would not have arisen if the
contract had never existed. Rather, the test for determining
whether a dispute relates to" or arises out of a contract is
whether the dispute was an immediate, foreseeable result of the
performance of contractual duties. The Plaintiff bases his claim on
his rights under the FCRA, not the 2016 Service Agreement.  

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff's FCRA claim does not relate
to the 2016 Service Agreement and therefore does not fall within
the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The Defendant's
motion to compel arbitration should therefore be denied. Because
the Court has determined that the parties did not agree to
arbitrate the Plaintiff's FCRA claim, it does not reach the
question of whether enforcement of the arbitration provision would
be unconscionable.

Defendant Comcast Cable's Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration
and Stay Litigation is DENIED, rules the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 21, 2019 Opinion
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2z34tuv from
Leagle.com.

Michael Hearn, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated consumers, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Zemel , Zemel
Law,  70 Clinton Ave Suite 3 , Newark NJ 07114, pro hac vice &
Jonathan Braxton Mason , Mason Law Group, LLC. 1100 Peachtree
Street NE, Suite 200, Atlanta, GA, 30309

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, Defendant, represented by
Meredith C. Slawe -
mslawe@akingump.com -  Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Michael
W. McTigue, Jr.-
mmctigue@akingump.com - Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, pro hac
vice & Samuel S. Woodhouse, III , The Woodhouse Law Firm, LLC,
Suite 1402, 260 Peachtree Street, NW, Atlanta, GA 30303-1237



COOPER COMPANIES: Final Settlement Approval Hearing on Feb. 25
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Cooper Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on December 20, 2019,
for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2019, that the final hearing
to consider approval of the settlement in the class action suit
involving contact lens-related suit has been set for February 25,
2020.

Since March 2015, over 50 putative class action complaints were
filed by contact lens consumers alleging that contact lens
manufacturers, in conjunction with their respective Unilateral
Pricing Policy (UPP), conspired to reach agreements between each
other and certain distributors and retailers regarding the prices
at which certain contact lenses could be sold to consumers.

The plaintiffs are seeking damages against CooperVision, Inc.,
other contact lens manufacturers, distributors and retailers, in
various courts around the United States.

In June 2015, all of the class action cases were consolidated and
transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

In August 2017, CooperVision entered into a settlement agreement
with the plaintiffs, without any admission of liability, to settle
all claims against CooperVision.

In July 2018, the Court approved the plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement, and the Company paid the
$3.0 million settlement amount into an escrow account.

The settlement remains subject to final Court approval at a future
hearing currently scheduled for February 25, 2020.

The Cooper Companies, Inc. operates as a medical device company
worldwide. It operates through CooperVision and CooperSurgical
business units. The Cooper Companies, Inc. was founded in 1980 and
is headquartered in Pleasanton, California.


CVS HEALTH: Arizona & New York Classes Certified in Corcoran Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned CHRISTOPHER CORCORAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v.
CVS HEALTH, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 15-cv-03504-YGR (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California (i) granted the Plaintiffs'
amended motion to substitute class representatives and for
certification of New York and Arizona classes based on two
substituted class representatives; and (ii) granted in part and
denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for approval of the notice
provider, Angeion Group LLC, and for approval of the class notice
program.

The Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action alleging that
the Defendants knowingly overcharged millions of insured patients
by submitting falsely inflated drug prices to pharmacy benefit
managers ("PBMs") and third-party payor insurance providers
("TPPs"), which resulted in higher copayment obligations for the
Plaintiffs.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs raise claims under the
laws of eleven states: (i) each state's statutory laws proscribing
unfair and deceptive acts and practices; and common law claims for
(ii) fraud, (iii) negligent misrepresentation, and (iv) unjust
enrichment.

On Sept. 5, 2017, the District Court granted in part the
Plaintiffs' prior motion for class certification; granted in part
the Defendants' motion to exclude certain opinions by an expert
witness; and granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The District Court denied in part the motion for class
certification based on the representatives of the proposed New York
and Arizona classes failing to meet the requirements of Rule
23(a)— -- specifically, typicality and adequacy.  It concluded
that the proposed class representatives did not have any qualifying
transactions, and thus, denied without prejudice plaintiffs' motion
to certify a New York and Arizona class.

On June 12, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued a memorandum decision reversing and remanding the September
2017 Order.  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District
Court's holdings that certain materials and issues failed to create
a triable issue, with respect to narrowing the classes on
typicality grounds, and in striking the Plaintiffs' expert witness'
testimony.

On Aug. 23, 2019, the District Court issued an order complying with
the Ninth Circuit's mandate by denying the motion to strike the
Plaintiffs' expert witness, and denying the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and by certifying the following class without
limitation: All CVS customers in California, Florida, Illinois, and
Massachusetts, who, between November 2008 and July 31, 2015, (1)
purchased one or more generic prescription drugs that were offered
through CVS's Health Savings Pass (HSP) program at the time of the
purchase; (2) were insured for the purchase(s) through a
third-party payor plan administered by one of the following
pharmacy benefit managers: Caremark/PCS, Express Scripts, Medco,
MedImpact, or Optum/Prescription Solutions (prior to Jan. 29,
2015); and (3) paid CVS an out-of-pocket payment for the purchase
greater than the HSP price for the prescription.

Recognizing that the September 2017 Order had denied the
Plaintiffs' motion to certify a New York and Arizona class without
prejudice, the District Court permitted the Plaintiffs a limited
period to identify an appropriate representative for each class and
permitted the parties to engage in appropriate discovery and motion
practice on the proposed class representatives.  

The Plaintiffs so moved to certify New York and Arizona classes,
identifying Joseph Luzier and Aaron Allen as class representatives
for the New York class, and Darlene McAfee as the class
representative for the Arizona class.  They further moved for
approval of the notice provider, class notice program, and forms of
notice.  For the good cause shown in the Plaintiffs' administrative
motion, the District Court permitted them to substitute Allen and
Luzier, the initially proposed New York class substitutes, with
Stephen Sullivan.

Having identified McAfee for the Arizona class and Sullivan for the
New York class, the Plaintiffs now seek to certify two additional
state classes composed of individuals from New York and Arizona who
have filled prescriptions for generic drugs at CVS pharmacies using
coverage provided by their TPP plans.

Judge Rogers finds that the addition of one or two more classes
does not impact the District Court's prior superiority analysis.
Accordingly, in light of her holdings that both McAfee and Sullivan
satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a), and
that the class action continues to satisfy the superiority analysis
of Rule 23(b), Judge Rogers will grant the Plaintiffs' motion to
substitute class representatives and certify New York and Arizona
classes.

Having reviewed the parties' briefings, the Plaintiffs'
declarations regarding the selection process for a notice provider
in the matter and regarding Angeion's experience and
qualifications, and in light of the Defendants' non-opposition,
Judge Rogers will approve Angeion as the notice provider.  Thus,
the Judge will grant the motion for approval of class notice
provider and class notice program on this basis.

Having considered the parties' revised proposed notice program,
Judge Rogers agrees that the parties' proposed notice program is
the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances." The
District Court is satisfied with the representations made regarding
Angeion's methods for ascertaining email addresses from existing
information in the possession of the Defendants.  Rule 23 further
contemplates and permits electronic notice to class members in
certain situations.  

Judge Rogers finds, in light of the representations made by the
parties, that this is a situation that permits electronic
notification via email, in addition to notice via United States
Postal Service.  Thus, Judge Rogers will approve the parties'
revised proposed class notice program, and will grant the motion
for approval of class notice provider and class notice program as
to notification via email and United States Postal Service mail.
Because the Plaintiffs have withdrawn their request for notice via
text messaging, the Judge will deny the motion as moot.

Finally, the parties' joint status report notes that the parties
are revising the proposed short-form and long-form notices to
incorporate the District Court's comments at the Nov. 12, 2019
hearing.  The parties agree to submit the revised forms following
the issuance of this Order.  Judge Rogers will therefore deny the
motion as to the proposed form notices.  The parties may seek
approval on an expedited basis of the revised form notices on Dec.
2, 2019.

Judge Rogers granted the Plaintiffs' motion to substitute the class
representatives and certified Arizona and New York classes.  The
Judge amended the class definition to state as follows: All CVS
customers in California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
York, and Arizona, who, between November 2008 and July 31, 2015
(the Class Period), (1) purchased one or more generic prescription
drugs that were offered through CVS' Health Savings Pass (HSP)
program at the time of the purchase; (2) were insured for the
purchase(s) through a third-party payor plan administered by one of
the following pharmacy benefit managers: Caremark/PCS, Express
Scripts, Medco, MedImpact, or Optum/Prescription Solutions (prior
to Jan. 29, 2015); and (3) paid CVS an out-of-pocket payment for
the purchase greater than the HSP price for the prescription.

Judge Rogers further granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for approval of the notice provider and for
approval of the class notice program.  She ordered, with respect to
the motion for approval of the notice provider and for approval of
the class notice program, as follows:

1. For the purpose of providing notice to class members, the
    Defendants are authorized to disclose, and is ordered to
    disclose, to Angeion Group, LLC: (a) the name; (b) the last
    known mailing address; and (c) email address for the
    Defendants' customers associated with the purchases at the
    pharmacies identified by the Plaintiffs' expert report
    attached to their amended motion for class certification
    (June 6, 2017).  The disclosure to Angeion will occur:

    a. Within two business days of the entry of the Order, for
       individuals associated with the purchases occurring at
       CVS pharmacies in California, Florida, Illinois, and
       Massachusetts identified by the Plaintiffs' expert
       report; or

    b. Within two business days of the entry of any order
       certifying a class or classes for Arizona and New York,
       for individuals associated with the purchases occurring
       at the Defendants' pharmacies in Arizona or New York
       identified by the Plaintiffs' expert report.

2. The Defendants are authorized to disclose the information
    identified in the Order pursuant to the regulations of the
    Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.

3. The parties to the action and Angeion are expressly prohibited
    from using or disclosing the contact information obtained
    pursuant to the Order for any purpose other than providing
    notice to proposed class members in the action.

4. Angeion is further ordered to destroy contact information
    received in connection with the Order within 10 business
    days following the conclusion of the action.

5. The parties will file revised proposed short-form and
long-form
    notices incorporating the Court's comments at the November 12,
    2019 hearing on or before Dec. 2, 2019.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/lheIKM from Leagle.com.

Christopher Corcoran, Plaintiff, represented by Elizabeth Cheryl
Pritzker -- ecp@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine LLP, Jonathan
Krasne Levine -- jkl@pritzkerlevine.com -- Pritzker Levine, LLP,
Bonny E. Sweeney -- bsweeney@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, Edward
H. Meyers -- emeyers@steinmitchell.com -- Stein Mitchell Cipollone
Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr. -- gsmith@hausfeld.com
-- Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Ward Broz -- kbroz@constantinecannon.com
-- Haufeld, pro hac vice, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Michael
Paul Lehmann -- mlehmann@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, Michaela
Spero -- mspero@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld, Pasquale A. Cipollone --
pcipollone@steinmitchell.com -- Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone Beato
LLP, pro hac vice, Rebecca Ruby Anzidei, Stein Mitchell Muse
Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice, Richard S. Lewis --
rlewis@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Robert B.
Gilmore -- rgilmore@steinmitchell.com -- Stein Mitchell Muse
Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin --
sgosselin@hausfeld.com -- Hausfeld LLP & Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker
Levine LLP.

Robert Garber, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher L. Lebsock,
Hausfeld LLP, Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP,
Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Bethany Caracuzzo,
Pritzker Levine LLP, Bonny E. Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP, Edward H.
Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan
Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Ward Broz, Haufeld, pro hac vice,
Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Michael Paul Lehmann, Hausfeld
LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Robert B.
Gilmore, Stein Mitchell Muse Cipollone Beato LLP, pro hac vice,
Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld LLP & Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine
LLP.

Vincent Gargiulo, Zulema Avis, Carolyn Caine & Zachary Hagert,
Plaintiffs, represented by Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker
Levine LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Edward H.
Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan
Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Richard
S. Lewis, Hausfeld LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld
LLP, Shiho Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine LLP & Bonny E. Sweeney,
Hausfeld LLP.

Robert Jenks, Tyler Clark, Carl Washington & Debbie Barrett,
Plaintiffs, represented by Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker
Levine LLP, Jonathan Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Bethany
Caracuzzo, Pritzker Levine LLP, Edward H. Meyers, Stein Mitchell
Cipollone Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr., Hausfeld
LLP, Kristen Marie Ward, Hausfeld LLP, Richard S. Lewis, Hausfeld
LLP, pro hac vice, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld LLP, Shiho
Yamamoto, Pritzker Levine LLP & Bonny E. Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP.

Amanda Gilbert & Gilbert Brown, Plaintiffs, represented by Bonny E.
Sweeney, Hausfeld LLP, Edward H. Meyers, Stein Mitchell Cipollone
Beato and Missner LLP, Gary Ivan Smith, Jr., Hausfeld LLP, Jonathan
Krasne Levine, Pritzker Levine, LLP, Sathya S. Gosselin, Hausfeld
LLP & Elizabeth Cheryl Pritzker, Pritzker Levine LLP.

CVS Health, Defendant, represented by August P. Gugelmann --
august@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP, David Michael Horniak
-- dhorniak@wc.com -- Williams & Connolly, LLP, Edward W. Swanson
-- ed@smllp.law -- Swanson & McNamara LLP, Enu A. Mainigi --
emainigi@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Frank
Lane Heard, III -- lheard@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP &
Grant A. Geyerman -- ggeyerman@wc.com -- Williams Connolly, LLP,
pro hac vice.

CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew Watts --
awatts@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly, Ashley Wall Hardin --
ahardin@wc.com -- Williams and Connolly LLP, August P. Gugelmann,
Swanson & McNamara LLP, Colleen Marie McNamara, Williams and
Connolly LLP, Daniel M. Dockery, Williams and Connolly LLP, Edward
W. Swanson, Swanson & McNamara LLP, Enu A. Mainigi, Williams and
Connolly LLP, pro hac vice, Frank Lane Heard, III, Williams and
Connolly LLP, Grant A. Geyerman, Williams Connolly, LLP & Sarah
Lochner O'Connor -- soconnor@wc.com -- Wiliams & Connolly LLP.


DANNY & JIMMY'S: Herrera Seeks Minimum and OT Wages for Dancers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Herrera, aka Veronica, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. DANNY & JIMMY'S ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,
A/K/A PANDORA'S MENS CLUB, and BRANDON CROSBY an individual, Case
No. 3:20-cv-00076-K (N.D. Tex., Jan. 13, 2020), is brought against
the Defendants for damages resulting from their evading the
mandatory minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and for illegally absconding with the Plaintiff's
and other dancers' tips.

The Plaintiff alleges that she has been denied minimum wage
payments and denied overtime as part of the Defendants' scheme to
classify her and other dancers/entertainers as "independent
contractors." She contends that the Defendants failed to pay her
minimum wages and overtime wages for all hours worked in violation
of the FLSA.

The Defendants' conduct violates the FLSA, which requires
non-exempt employees to be compensated for their overtime work at a
rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay, Ms.
Herrera contends. As a result of the Defendants' violations, the
Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members seek to recover double damages
for failure to pay minimum wage, overtime liquidated damages,
interest, and attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a dancer from July
2019 through the present.

The Defendants own and operate a strip club named Pandora's Mens
Club.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
          W. Craft Hughes, Esq.
          Leigh Montgomery, Esq.
          HUGHES ELLZEY, LLP
          1105 Milford Street
          Houston, TX 77066
          Phone: (713) 554-2377
          Fax: (888) 995-3335
          Email: jarrett@hughesellzey.comd

               - and -

          Jacob J. Ventura, Esq.
          KRISTENSEN, LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90066
          Phone: (310) 507-7924
          Fax: (310) 507-7906
          Email: jacob@kristensenlaw.com


DART TRANSIT: Court Orders Arbitration in Byars Case
----------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division issued a Memorandum Opinion granting
in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue,
or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration in
the case captioned KIMBERLY BYARS, an individual appearing on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.
DART TRANSIT COMPANY, et al., Defendants. No. 3:19-cv-00541. (M.D.
Tenn.)

This putative class action arises out of an employment dispute
concerning alleged unpaid wages. Defendant Dart Transit Company
(Dart), a Minnesota-based interstate trucking company, hired
Plaintiff Kimberly Byars as a truck driver to transport trailers
and freight for its shipping customers. As part of her
pre-employment on-boarding process in Texas, Plaintiff signed
various employment related documents, including a Business
Operating Agreement (Dart BOA) that contained the following
provision regarding its scope.

When a trial court is presented concurrently with a motion to
transfer venue and a motion to compel arbitration, it is more
efficient to consider the motion to compel arbitration first.

Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings

Defendants move to stay this action in favor of arbitration based
on the BOAs. In response, Plaintiff does not dispute that she
signed separate BOAs with Dart and Mainstream, both of which
include arbitration provisions. She instead argues against the
BOAs' enforceability generally, claiming that the Court cannot
compel arbitration under any applicable law in this case, and even
if it could, the arbitration provisions in the BOAs are invalid and
unconscionable.

The Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Apply to the BOAs

Generally, where a litigant establishes the existence of a valid
agreement to arbitrate the dispute at issue, the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) requires the district court to grant the
litigant's motion to compel arbitration and stay or dismiss
proceedings until the completion of arbitration. Earlier this year,
however, the Supreme Court held that section 1 of the FAA excludes
from the Act's coverage contracts between an interstate trucking
company and its driver, regardless of the driver's status as an
employee or independent contractor. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139
S.Ct. 532, 543-44 (2019).

Thus, New Prime makes clear that the Court has no authority under
the FAA to compel arbitration in this case.

Choice of Law

In New Prime, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a
truck driver working for an interstate trucking company suing under
the FLSA who had signed an arbitration agreement could still be
compelled to arbitration, just not under the FAA.  That's true even
when the contract says that the FAA applies and mentions no other
law if the federal act doesn't apply, the agreement to arbitrate
remains viable, and the only question becomes what state's law
applies to the contract to arbitrate.

Plaintiff argues that the BOAs' arbitration provisions cannot be
enforced under state law because the parties intended that the FAA
was the only law that applied to those agreements. Specifically,
she contends that because the Advantage® Fuel Network and Advances
Contract addenda to the Dart BOA states that the FAA applies to the
arbitration provision in that addendum, the parties have no valid
agreement to arbitrate under any other law.

The BOAs, however, explicitly state that the entire Agreement and
any properly adopted Addenda shall be interpreted under the laws of
the State of Minnesota and any disputes arising under this
Agreement or in its interpretation, or that are related in any way
to this Agreement shall be submitted to final and binding
arbitration. Thus, the inapplicability of the FAA does not nullify
the parties' agreement to arbitrate.

Given this background, the Court must determine which state's law
applies to the enforceability of the arbitration provisions in this
case. In federal question cases, a District Court entertaining
pendent state claims should follow the choice of law rules of the
forum state. Because Tennessee is the forum state, the Court will
apply Tennessee choice-of-law rules.

Tennessee's conflict of law doctrine applicable to contractual
claims provides that when the dispute involves questions concerning
rights and obligations under a contract, the court applies the law
of the state where the contract was made, absent a contrary
intent.

The BOAs' choice-of-law clause is valid and enforceable under these
criteria. The BOAs and accompanying addenda, including the
Advantage® Fuel Network and Advances Contract, explicitly state
that they shall be interpreted under the laws of the State of
Minnesota.

Accordingly, the Court will apply Minnesota law. Under Minnesota
law, agreements to arbitrate entered into on or after August 1,
2011 are governed by the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA).

Validity of Arbitration Agreement

When a party moves to compel arbitration, Minn. Stat. Section
572B.06(b) requires a court to determine two gateway issues: (1)
whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and (2) whether the
particular dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration
agreement.  

There is no dispute that Plaintiff signed contracts with both
Defendants, and those contracts refer to arbitration Plaintiff
acknowledged by her signature that she was subject to a binding
arbitration provision, and this clause distinct from the
arbitration clause itself suggests that disputes would be subject
to arbitration. The overall agreements are also supported by
adequate consideration, as Plaintiff would receive payment for her
services. Accordingly, the BOAs' arbitration provisions are
presumed to be valid.  

Notwithstanding this objective evidence of her assent to
arbitration, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreements she
signed are invalid and unenforceable because (1) the potential
arbitrator pool and arbitration rules are biased in favor of
Defendants and (2) the arbitration agreements are unconscionable.

The Court finds that these arguments are mainly aimed at the
enforceability of the arbitration provisions, rather than the BOAs
as a whole. Thus, the court, and not the arbitrator, must decide
whether the parties have an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.  

Alleged Bias of Arbitration Procedures

Plaintiff argues that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable
because they require disputes to be submitted to final and binding
arbitration under the commercial rules of the Transportation ADR
Council, Inc (TAC), which are biased in favor of Defendants.
Although Plaintiff's bias argument is not a contract-based defense
to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, a party may
avoid the agreed-upon arbitration process when the
arbitrator-selection process itself is fundamentally unfair.

Plaintiff argues that the TAC's arbitrator-selection process is
unfairly biased in Defendants' favor because all potential TAC
arbitrators are required to be members of the Transportation
Lawyers Association (TLA), an independent bar organization whose
members must actively represent companies in the transportation
industry and cannot affiliate with a firm that represents
plaintiffs against the transportation industry. She further notes
that some of Defendants' own lawyers are either current or former
TLA members. As a result, Plaintiff claims the entire TAC
arbitrator pool lacks the minimum level of impartiality required
for arbitration, and thus there is no valid agreement to
arbitrate.

The TAC's arbitration rules5 provide satisfactory protections
against biased arbitrators. For example, the rules require that no
person shall serve as an Arbitrator who has a financial or personal
interest in the outcome of the arbitration or who has acquired
prior detailed knowledge of the matter in dispute. Each potential
TAC arbitrator is also required to disclose to the parties any
information that might cause the person's impartiality or
independence to be questioned and Plaintiff is then free to
challenge the appointment of any arbitrator who exhibits undue
bias.

Even assuming arguendo that all of the TAC arbitrators have a
lengthy background in transportation employer defense work, a party
cannot avoid the arbitration process simply by alleging that the
arbitration panel will be biased. The Court declines to indulge the
presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a
proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,
conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.

Accordingly, the Court does not find the TAC arbitrator-selection
process to be so fundamentally unfair to warrant invalidating the
parties' arbitration agreements.

Unconscionability

Plaintiff also presents numerous arguments about why the
arbitration agreements are unconscionable. A contract is
unconscionable if it is `such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other.

First, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration agreements are
unconscionable contracts of adhesion presented on a take it or
leave it basis. By definition, a contract of adhesion is one
drafted unilaterally by the business enterprise and forced upon an
unwilling and often unknowing public for services that cannot
readily be obtained elsewhere.

Accordingly, the two factors for determining whether a contract is
one of adhesion are: (1) was the contract the result of the
superior bargaining power of one of the parties? and (2) was the
service involved a public necessity?

The record before the Court fails to support a finding that the
arbitration agreements are unenforceable contracts of adhesion.
Plaintiff contends she was in desperate financial need of a job and
feared not having enough money to return home from her on-boarding
orientation, but the degree of economic compulsion that Plaintiff
asserts is no different from that of any unemployed individual who
is looking for a job and cannot possibly suffice to support the
revocation of an otherwise legal and valid contract.

Most importantly, Plaintiff has neither shown that Defendants
provide services of public necessity, nor that she was unable to
obtain employment with another company providing similar services.
Thus, the arbitration provisions in this case were not contracts of
adhesion.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is not persuaded by
Plaintiff's unconscionability arguments and concludes that the
parties entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to
arbitrate.

Compelling Arbitration and Staying Proceedings

The parties' agreement to arbitrate in Minnesota is enforceable
under the MUAA. Unlike the FAA, the MUAA provides that if a
proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an
alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a motion under
this section must be filed in that court. Not only were Defendants
required to file their motion to compel arbitration in this Court,
this is the only court in which they could have done so.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to the extent
it seeks to compel arbitration under the MUAA.

Motion to Transfer Venue

When a matter is stayed pending arbitration, it is appropriate for
the court to deny other pending motions, without prejudice. Thus,
given the stay ordered herein, Defendants' motion to transfer venue
is denied without prejudice to it being re-filed if the stay is
lifted and the case is administratively re-opened.

Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue or, Alternatively, to Stay
Proceedings and Compel Arbitration will be GRANTED IN PART.
Plaintiff will be ORDERED to submit to arbitration, and this case
will be STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration. Defendants'
motion to transfer venue will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

The case will be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED and may be reopened for
cause on the motion of either party, rules the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 21, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y2q7gful
from Leagle.com.

Kimberly Byars, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Bass -
daniel@kicklawfirm.com - The Kick Law Firm, APC, David W. Garrison
- dgarrison@barrettjohnston.com - Barrett Johnston Martin &
Garrison, LLC, Joshua A. Frank - jfrank@barrettjohnston.com -
Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC, Scott P. Tift -
stift@barrettjohnston.com - Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison, LLC
& Taras Kick - taras@kicklawfirm.com - The Kick Law Firm, APC.

Dart Transit Company & Mainstream Transportation, Inc., Defendants,
represented by Daniel W. Olivas - dolivas@lewisthomason.com -
Lewis, Thomason, King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C., David M. Krueger -
dkrueger@beneschlaw.com - Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP,
Eric Larson Zalud -
ezalud@beneschlaw.com - Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP &
John Roy Tarpley - jtarpley@lewisthomason.com - Lewis, Thomason,
King, Krieg & Waldrop, P.C..

DELTA DENTAL: Faces Bemus Suit Over Antitrust Law Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bemus Point Dental, LLC, on behalf of itself and all others
similarly situated v. Delta Dental Insurance Company, et al., Case
No. 1:19-cv-07362 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 6, 2019), arises from the
Defendants' anticompetitive conduct, including market allocation
for dental insurance, that violates federal antitrust laws, the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.

The Defendants are Delta Dental Insurance Company; DeltaCare USA;
Delta USA Inc.; Delta Dental Plans Association; Delta Dental
Insurance Company Alabama; Delta Dental of Alaska; Delta Dental of
Arizona; Delta Dental of Arkansas; Delta Dental of California;
Delta Dental of Colorado; Delta Dental of Connecticut; Delta Dental
of Delaware; Delta Dental of the District of Columbia; Delta Dental
of Florida; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Georgia; Hawaii Dental
Service; Delta Dental of Idaho; Delta Dental of Illinois; Delta
Dental of Indiana; Delta Dental of Iowa; Delta Dental of Kansas;
Delta Dental of Kentucky; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Louisiana;
Delta Dental of Maryland, Inc.; Delta Dental of Massachusetts;
Delta Dental of Michigan; Delta Dental of Minnesota; Delta Dental
Insurance Company-Mississippi; Delta Dental of Missouri; Delta
Dental Insurance Company-Montana; Delta Dental of Nebraska; Delta
Dental Insurance Company-Nevada; Delta Dental of New Jersey; Delta
Dental of New Mexico; Delta Dental of New York; Delta Dental of
North Carolina; Delta Dental of North Dakota; Northeast Delta
Dental (of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont); Delta Dental of Ohio;
Delta Dental of Oklahoma; Delta Dental of Oregon; Delta Dental of
Pennsylvania; Delta Dental of Puerto Rico; Delta Dental of Rhode
Island; Delta Dental of South Carolina; Delta Dental of South
Dakota; Delta Dental of Tennessee; Delta Dental Insurance
Company-Texas; Delta Dental Insurance Company-Utah; Delta Dental of
Virginia; Delta Dental of Washington; Delta Dental of West
Virginia; Delta Dental of Wisconsin; and Delta Dental of Wyoming.

Bemus Point Dental, LLC, is a dental services provider and a New
York State professional corporation.  During the relevant time
period, the Plaintiff provided dental goods and services to
patients insured by Delta Dental of New York and was reimbursed by
Delta Dental of New York for said goods and services.

The Plaintiff contends that as a result of the Defendants'
anticompetitive conduct, it was deprived of the choice of accepting
dental patients under a greater number of insurance plans than it
would have been in a competitive market and was reimbursed less for
providing dental goods and services than it would have been but for
such conduct.

The Delta Dental State Insurers are 50 predominantly not-for-profit
dental services corporations that operate in 39 state territories,
multi-state territories, or territories (the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico) across the United States.  They contract with
dentists and dental practices--like the named Plaintiff--that
accept Delta Dental insurance (collectively, the
"Delta Dental Providers") to reimburse the providers for dental
services provided to Delta Dental insureds under Delta Dental
insurance contracts.  The Delta Dental State Insurers are supported
in turn by the Delta Dental Plans Association, a nationwide entity
that acts as an administrator and watchdog for the Delta Dental
insurance plans offered to the Delta Dental Providers and their
patients via the Delta Dental State Insurers.

Each Delta Dental State Insurer operates independently ("Delta
Dental Plans Association is comprised of a network of . . .
independent Delta Dental companies.").  Delta Dental Plans
Association is funded and controlled by the Delta Dental State
Insurers, and acts as a vehicle for their concerted activity,
including via a contract entered into by each Delta Dental State
Insurer with the Delta Dental Plans Association (the "Delta Dental
Plan Agreement").

The Plaintiff alleges that the Delta State Insurers engaged in a
Market Allocation Conspiracy by dividing the U.S. dental insurance
market into 39 territories and setting forth that within each Delta
State Insurer's territory, which is usually one state but in some
cases encompasses multiple states, other Delta State Insurers will
not compete (the "Market Allocation Conspiracy").  This has greatly
reduced or effectively eliminated competition in state-level
markets for dental insurance, the Plaintiff argues.

The Plaintiff also alleges, among other things, that the Delta
State Insurers also conspired to fix and reduce the reimbursement
rates that they pay to Delta Dental Providers for services
performed for Delta Patients (the "Price Fixing Conspiracy"). Given
that the Market Allocation Conspiracy has resulted in greatly
reduced competition within each territory, the Delta State Insurers
are able to abuse their market power in order to force Delta Dental
Providers to accept these lower reimbursement rates, because such a
large fraction of actual and potential patients have Delta
insurance, so that a practice cannot practically refuse to accept
Delta Patients.

Delta Dental Plans Association is located in Oak Brook, Illinois.
Delta Dental Plans Association was comprised of and managed by a
network of the Delta Dental State Insurers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Leonid Feller, Esq.
          Athena Dalton, Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
          191 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 2700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone (312) 705-7400
          E-mail: leonidfeller@quinnemanuel.com
                  athenadalton@quinnemanuel.com

               - and -

          Stephen Neuwirth, Esq.
          Toby E. Futter, Esq.
          Joseph N. Kiefer, Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
          51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
          New York, NY 10010
          Telephone: (212) 849-7000
          E-mail: stephenneuwirth@quinnemanuel.com
                  tobyfutter@quinnemanuel.com
                  josephkiefer@quinnemanuel.com

               - and -

          Robert N. Kaplan, Esq.
          Gregory K. Arenson, Esq.
          Elana Katcher, Esq.
          Matthew P. McCahill, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          850 Third Ave., 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 687-1980
          E-mail: rkaplan@kaplanfox.com
                  garenson@kaplanfox.com
                  ekatcher@kaplanfox.com
                  mmccahill@kaplanfox.com

               - and -

          Gary Specks, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          681 Prestwick Lane
          Wheeling, IL 60090
          Telephone: (847) 831-1585
          Facsimile: (847) 831-1580
          E-mail: gspecks@kaplanfox.com


DIVISION III: Peralta Suit Moved to Southern District of Florida
----------------------------------------------------------------
Division III Group Corp., et al., removed the case captioned as
ULISES GAMALIEL MAYORGA PERALTA, and all others similarly situated
under 29 U.S.C. 216(b) v. DIVISION III GROUP CORP., MATRIX
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPERS CORP., MICHAEL MEJIA and VICTOR QUINTERO,
Case No. 2019-034834-CA-01 (Filed Nov. 26, 2019), from the Florida
Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, 11th Judicial Circuit,
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on
Jan. 10, 2020.

The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-20110-XXXX to the proceeding.

Division III Group Corp is in the commercial and office building
contractors business. Matrix provides trained employees in
construction industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J.H. Zidell, Esq.
          J.H. ZIDELL, P.A.
          300 71st Street, Suite 605
          Miami Beach, FL 33141
          Telephone: (305) 865-6766
          Facsimile: (305) 865-7167
          E-mail: zabogado@aol.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Pedro Forment, Esq.
          Edwin Cruz, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500
          Two South Biscayne Boulevard
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 577-7600
          Facsimile: (305) 373-4466
          E-mail: pedro.forment@jacksonlewis.com
                  edwin.cruz@jacksonlewis.com


EATALY CHICAGO: Illegally Collects Biometric Data, Sykes Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Melissa Sykes and Latasha Fox, on behalf of themselves and all
other persons similarly situated, known and unknown v. EATALY
CHICAGO, LLC, Case No. 2020CH00418 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Jan. 13,
2020), is brought against the Defendant  for violations of the
Biometric Information Privacy Act.

In enacting the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the Illinois
legislature recognized that biologically unique identifiers, like
fingerprints, can never be changed when compromised, and thus
subject a victim of identity theft to heightened risk of loss. As a
result, Illinois restricted private entities, like the Defendant,
from collecting, storing, or using a person's biometric identifiers
and information without adhering to strict informed-consent
procedures established by the BIPA.

The Defendant collected, stored, and used unique biometric
identifying information based on the fingerprints of the Plaintiffs
and others similarly situated without following the detailed
requirements of the BIPA, according to the complaint. As a result,
the Defendant violated the BIPA and compromised the privacy and
security of the biometric identifiers and information of the
Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees.

Plaintiff Sykes was employed by the Defendant as a retail
associate. Plaintiff Fox was employed by the Defendant as a
housekeeper.

The Defendant operates an Italian marketplace in Chicago,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Douglas M. Werman, Esq.
          Sarah J. Arendt, Esq.
          Zachary C. Flowerree, Esq.
          WERMAN SALAS P.C.
          77 West Washington, Suite 1402
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 419-1008
          Email: dwerman@flsalaw.com
                 sarendt@flsalaw.com
                 zflowerree@flsalaw.com


ENERGY TRANSFER: Vincent Wong Reminds of Jan. 21 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that a class action has
commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Energy Transfer LP
(ET). If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff
deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.
There will be no obligation or cost to you.

Energy Transfer LP (ET)

If you suffered a loss, contact us at:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/energy-transfer-lp-loss-submission-form?prid=5062&wire=1

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: January 21, 2020

Class Period: February 25, 2017 to November 11, 2019

Allegations against ET include that: (i) Energy Transfer's permits
to conduct the Mariner East pipeline project in Pennsylvania were
secured via bribery and/or other improper conduct; (ii) the
foregoing misconduct increased the risk that the Partnership and/or
certain of its employees would be subject to government and/or
regulatory action, thereby depreciating the Partnership's unit
value; and (iii) as a result, the Partnership's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights.

Contact:

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Phone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         Email: vw@wongesq.com
[GN]


EXELON CORP: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a motion for lead
plaintiff in a securities class action that has been filed on
behalf of investors that purchased or acquired the securities of
Exelon Corporation ("Exelon" or the "Company") (EXC) between
February 9, 2019, and November 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois alleges violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Exelon securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Exelon Shareholder Class
Action or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414
or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Exelon and/or its employees
were engaged in unlawful lobbying activities; (ii) the foregoing
increased the risk of a criminal investigation into Exelon; (iii)
ComEd's revenues were in part the product of unlawful conduct and
thus unsustainable; and (iv) that, as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On October 15, 2019, shortly before the market closed, Exelon
issued a press release announcing the abrupt departure of Anne
Pramaggiore (Pramaggiore), Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Exelon
Utilities, and former President/CEO of ComEd. On this news,
Exelon's stock price fell $2.15 per share, or 4.57%, to close at
$44.91 per share on October 16, 2019.

Then, on October 31, 2019, during intraday trading, Exelon filed a
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the SEC, disclosing that [o]n
October 22, 2019, the SEC notified Exelon and ComEd that it has
also opened an investigation into their lobbying activities. On
this news, Exelon's stock price fell $1.17 per share, or 2.51%, to
close at $45.49 per share on October 31, 2019.

Finally, on November 1, 2019, after the market opened, the Chicago
Tribune reported that [a] source with knowledge of the case in
Chicago confirmed that Pramaggiore is one focus of the ongoing
federal investigation. On this news, Exelon's stock price fell an
additional $0.15 per share to close at $45.34 per share on November
1, 2019, total decline of 2.83% since the initial announcement of
the SEC investigation.

If you purchased Exelon securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/exeloncorporation-exc-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-stock-fraud-232/apply/
contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than February 14, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:

         Matthew E. Guarnero, Esq.
         Bernstein Liebhard LLP
         Website: https://www.bernlieb.com
         Tel: (877) 779-1414
         E-mail: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com
[GN]


EXELON CORP: Lieff Cabraser Reminds Investors of Feb. 14 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP announces
that class action litigation has been filed on behalf of investors
who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Exelon
Corporation (Nasdaq: EXC) between February 9, 2019 and November 1,
2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Exelon
during the Class Period, you may move the Court for appointment as
lead plaintiff by no later than February 14, 2020. A lead plaintiff
is a representative party who acts on behalf of other class members
in directing the litigation. Your share of any recovery in the
actions will not be affected by your decision of whether to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff. You may retain Lieff Cabraser, or
other attorneys, as your counsel in the action.

Exelon investors who wish to learn more about the litigation and
how to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should click here or
contact Sharon M. Lee of Lieff Cabraser toll-free at
1-800-541-7358.

Exelon, incorporated in Pennsylvania and headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois, is a utility services holding company that serves as the
parent company of the Commonwealth Edison Company ("ComEd"), the
largest electric utility in Illinois, and the sole electric
provider in Chicago.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Exelon and/or its employees were engaged in
unlawful lobbying activities; (2) this conduct increased the risk
of a criminal investigation into Exelon; (3) ComEd's revenues were
partly the product of unlawful conduct and therefore unsustainable;
and (4) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On July 15, 2019, Exelon disclosed that it had received a grand
jury document subpoena from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Northern District of Illinois ("USAO") concerning Exelon's
"lobbying activities in the State of Illinois." On this news, the
price of Exelon stock price fell $0.18 per share, or 0.37% from a
previous closing price of $49.06 on July 12, 2019, to close at
$48.88 per share on July 15, 2019.

On October 9, 2019, Exelon disclosed that the USAO sought records
of communications with Illinois State Senator Martin Sandoval,
chairman of the Illinois Senate Transportation Committee. Exelon
also revealed that it had formed a Special Overnight Committee in
June 2019 to oversee compliance with the subpoenas.

On October 15, 2019, shortly before market close, Exelon announced
the departure of Chief Executive Officer Anne Pramaggiore,
"effective immediately." On this news, Exelon's stock price dropped
$2.15 per share, or 4.57% from a closing price of $47.06 on October
15, 2019, to close at $44.91 per share on October 16, 2019, on
elevated trading volume.

On October 31, 2019, Exelon revealed that on October 22, 2019, the
Securities and Exchange Commission had notified the Company that it
had opened an investigation into Exelon's lobbying activities. On
this news, the price of Exelon dropped $1.17 per share, or 2.51%
from a previous closing price of $46.66 on October 30, 2019, to
close at $45.49 per share on October 31, 2019.

The next day, on November 1, 2019, the Chicago Tribune reported
that "a source with knowledge of the case in Chicago" confirmed
that "Pramaggiore is one focus of the ongoing federal
investigation." According to the same article, "the ComEd lobbying
investigation dates to at least mid-May, when the FBI executed
search warrants at the homes of former lobbyist Mike McClain of
Quincy, a longtime confidant of House Speaker Michael Madigan, and
of former 23rd Ward Ald. Michael Zalewski." Additionally, "the
information sought by the FBI included records of communications
among Madigan, McClain and Zalewski about attempts to obtain ComEd
lobbying work for Zalewski." On this news, the price of Exelon
stock declined an additional $0.15, or 0.33% from the previous
day's close, to close at $45.34 per share on November 1, 2019.

                     About Lieff Cabraser

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, with offices in San
Francisco, New York, and Nashville, is a nationally recognized law
firm committed to advancing the rights of investors and promoting
corporate responsibility.

The National Law Journal has recognized Lieff Cabraser as one of
the nation's top plaintiffs' law firms for fourteen years. In
compiling the list, the National Law Journal examines recent
verdicts and settlements and looked for firms "representing the
best qualities of the plaintiffs' bar and that demonstrated unusual
dedication and creativity." Law360 has selected Lieff Cabraser as
one of the Top 50 law firms nationwide for litigation, highlighting
our firm's "laser focus" and noting that our firm routinely finds
itself "facing off against some of the largest and strongest
defense law firms in the world." Benchmark Litigation has named
Lieff Cabraser one of the "Top 10 Plaintiffs' Firms in America."

For more information about Lieff Cabraser and the firm's
representation of investors, please visit
https://www.lieffcabraser.com/.

Contact:

         Sharon M. Lee, Esq.
         Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
         Telephone: 1-800-541-7358
[GN]


EXELON CORP: Schall Law Files Class Action Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Exelon
Corporation ("Exelon" or "the Company") (NASDAQ:EXC) for violations
of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between February
9, 2019 and November 1, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before February 14, 2020.

If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to
participate.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Exelon and its employees engaged in
improper lobbying of government officials. These actions increased
the likelihood of a criminal investigation of the Company. Exelon
subsidiary Commonwealth Edison gained revenues as a result of the
improper conduct which would be unsustainable in the future. Based
on these facts, the Company's public statements were false and
materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market
learned the truth about Exelon, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         Email: info@schallfirm.com, brian@schallfirm.com
[GN]


EXELON CORP: Vincent Wong Reminds of Feb. 14 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announces that a class action has
commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Exelon Corporation
(EXC).  If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff
deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.
There will be no obligation or cost to you.

Exelon Corporation (EXC)

If you suffered a loss, contact us at:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/exelon-corporation-loss-submission-form?prid=5062&wire=1


Lead Plaintiff Deadline: February 14, 2020
Class Period: February 9, 2019 to November 1, 2019

Allegations against EXC include that: (i) Exelon and/or its
employees were engaged in unlawful lobbying activities; (ii) the
foregoing increased the risk of a criminal investigation into
Exelon; (iii) Exelon subsidiary Commonwealth Edison's revenues were
in part the product of unlawful conduct and thus unsustainable; and
(iv) that, as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights.

Contact:

         Vincent Wong, Esq.
         39 East Broadway
         Suite 304
         New York, NY 10002
         Phone: 212.425.1140
         Fax: 866.699.3880
         Email: vw@wongesq.com
[GN]


FIAT CHRYSLER: Faces Tan Securities Suit Over Drop in Share Price
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JENNIFER H. TAN, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES N.V., ROLAND ISELI AND
ALESSANDRO BALDI AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE FOR SERGIO
MARCHIONNE, MICHAEL MANLEY, and RICHARD K. PALMER, Case No.
1:20-cv-00202 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 10, 20200), is brought on behalf of
persons or entities, who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly
traded Fiat securities from February 26, 2016, through November 20,
2019, inclusive, seeking to recover compensable damages caused by
the Defendants' violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On February 22, 2019, Fiat filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for
the year ended December 31, 2018 with the SEC (the "2018 20-F").
The 2018 20-F was signed by Defendant Palmer. The 2018 20-F
contained signed SOX certifications by Defendants Manley and Palmer
attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of
any material changes to the Company's internal controls over
financial reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud.

The Plaintiff alleges that the statements in the reports were
materially false and/or misleading because the Defendants
misrepresented and failed to disclose certain adverse facts
pertaining to the Company's business, operations and prospects,
which were known to the Defendants or recklessly disregarded by
them. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts, the Defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
the Company employed a bribery scheme to obtain favorable terms in
its collective bargaining agreement with The International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW); high-ranking Fiat official were aware of and
authorized the scheme; and as a result, the Defendants' statements
about Fiat's business, operations, and prospects were materially
false and/or misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all
relevant times.

On November 20, 2019, while the market was open, General Motors
("GM") filed a racketeering lawsuit against Fiat in the Eastern
District of Michigan styled as General Motors LLC, et al. v. FCA US
LLC et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-13429-PDB-DRG, for damages caused by a
bribery scheme perpetuated by UAW and the Company. According to the
lawsuit, the illegal activity was authorized by the high-level
officers of the Company, including Marchionne, and helped the
Company win union acceptance of cost concessions in 2011 and 2015.
The lawsuit also contended that Fiat executives bribed UAW leaders
to pressure GM into a merger with Fiat.

On this news, shares of Fiat fell $0.58 per share, or 3.72%, to
close at $15.00 per share on November 20, 2019, damaging
investors.

The Plaintiff purchased Fiat securities during the Class Period. As
a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, the lawsuit says.

Fiat, together with its subsidiaries, designs, engineers,
manufactures, distributes, and sells vehicles, components, and
production systems. Fiat is incorporated in the Netherlands, with
principal executive offices located at 25 St. James's Street,
London, SW1A 1HA, United Kingdom. The company's stock trades on the
New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol "FCAU." The
Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com
                  pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com


FIRST AMERICAN: Antao Sues Over Improperly Charged Fees to Buyers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ANTAO PROPERTIES LLC, a Florida limited liability company,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 19-007377-CI (Fla.
Cir., Pinellas Cty., Nov. 6, 2019), arises from closing fees
improperly charged and collected by the Defendant from buyers of
real estate transactions throughout the state of Florida.

Antao is a single member Florida limited liability company.  The
Plaintiff's single individual member, Edward Antao, is a resident
of Florida.

The Defendant, a licensed title agency, is a foreign company
licensed and registered to do business in Florida, having offices
located throughout the state of Florida, including in Clearwater,
Florida.

On November 14, 2017, the Plaintiff entered into a real estate
purchase and sale contract ("Contract") with the owner ("Seller")
of certain real estate located in Pinellas, Florida ("Property").
Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, the Plaintiff agreed to pay
cash for the Seller's Property.  Accordingly, the Contract was
between Plaintiff, as the "Buyer," and the owners, as the
"Seller."

Pursuant to Paragraph 9(c)(1) of the Contract, charges and fees are
only to be paid by the Buyer in the event the transaction is being
financed by a lender.  Since the Contract here was an all-cash
transaction with no lender, the Plaintiff says it was not
responsible for any title agent fees, title policy premiums or
lender endorsements.

Antao contends that the Contract provided that the Closing Services
Fee would only be charged to, and collected from, the Seller.
Antao adds that because the sale was a cash transaction, there was
no lender's policy, endorsement or related loan closing services
required to be paid by the Plaintiff, the Buyer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          EGGNATZ PASCUCCI
          7450 Griffin Road, Suite 230
          Davie, FL 33328
          Telephone: (954) 889-3359
          Facsimile: (954) 889-5913
          E-mail: JEggnatz@JusticeEarned.com

               - and -

          Seth M. Lehrman, Esq.
          EDWARDS POTTINGER LLC.
          425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 524-2820
          Facsimile: (954) 524-2822
          E-mail: seth@epllc.com

               - and -

          Richard B. Feinberg, Esq.
          FLORIDA LEGACY LAW, LLC
          600 Cleveland Street, Suite 313
          Clearwater, FL 33755
          Telephone: (727) 231-6400
          E-mail: ricfeinberg@hotmail.com


FITBIT INC: Faruqi & Faruqi Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP has filed a class action lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, Case
No. 4:19-cv-08046-HSG, on behalf of shareholders of Fitbit, Inc.
(NYSE:FIT) who have been harmed by Fitbit's and its board of
directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
in connection with the proposed merger of the Company with Alphabet
Inc. (the "Proposed Transaction").

On November 1, 2019, the Board caused the Company to enter into an
agreement and plan of merger under which Fitbit shareholders stand
to receive $7.35 in cash for each share of Fitbit stock they own.

The complaint alleges that the Proxy filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction
violates Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act because it
provides materially incomplete and misleading information about the
Company and the Proposed Transaction, including information
concerning the Company's financial projections and certain
valuation analyses conducted by the Company's financial advisor, on
which the Board relied to recommend the Proposed Transaction as
fair to Fitbit shareholders.

If you wish to obtain information concerning this action, you can
do so by clicking here: www.faruqilaw.com/FITBIT.

Take Action

Plaintiff is represented by Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, a law firm with
extensive experience in prosecuting class actions, and significant
expertise in actions involving corporate fraud.  Faruqi & Faruqi,
LLP, was founded in 1995 and the firm maintains its principal
office in New York City, with offices in Delaware, California,
Georgia, and Pennsylvania.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than 60 days from the date of this notice.  Any member of the
putative class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff
through counsel of their choice, or may choose to do nothing and
remain an absent class member.  If you wish to discuss this action,
or have any questions concerning this notice or your rights or
interests, please contact:

         Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
         James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
         FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
         685 3rd Avenue, 26th Floor
         New York, NY 10017
         Telephone: (877) 247-4292 or (212) 983-9330
         E-mail: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
         Email: jwilson@faruqilaw.com
[GN]


FRONTIER AIRLINES: Women Sue Over Sex Assaults by Passengers
------------------------------------------------------------
CBS Denver reports that two women who say they were sexually
assaulted by passengers on Frontier Airlines flights are suing the
Denver-based budget carrier for allegedly refusing to help them and
either not having or failing to follow policies to respond to
assaults.  The class action lawsuit was filed Dec. 16, 2019, by two
Denver residents.

The women say they reported the assaults to flight attendants, who
did not report them to anyone else and did not request that law
enforcement meet the planes.

A Frontier spokeswoman said she can't comment on litigation but
added that the safety of the airline's passengers and employees is
its top priority.

A statement released by attorney Annika K. Martin, Esq. for
plaintiffs Lena Ramsay and "Jane Doe" - "on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated" - stated:

This is a class action against Frontier for failure to have and/or
follow policies and procedures to prevent, report, and respond to
sexual assault of its passengers on its flights.

The prevalence of passenger-on-passenger in-flight sexual assault
is a wellknown, and growing, problem. In fact, in 2018, the FBI
issued a warning – to airlines and the public at large – that
the number of sexual assaults reported during commercial airline
flights has been increasing "at an alarming rate."

Frontier, like all airlines, has an affirmative duty to aid and
protect its passengers. This duty includes protecting passengers
from sexual assaults by fellow passengers, and responding properly
to in-flight sexual assaults that do occur.

Frontier violated this duty by failing to implement and enforce
appropriate policies and procedures to prevent, or properly respond
to, sexual assaults that occur on its flights; failing to report
in-flight sexual assaults to the proper authorities, or to any
authorities; and failing to cooperate with authorities in the
reporting and investigation process into in-flight sexual
assaults.

As a result of these violations by Frontier, Plaintiffs were
sexually assaulted by their fellow passengers while they were on
Frontier flights, and are at an ongoing risk for future sexual
assaults.

Frontier's failure to implement and enforce polices to prevent and
properly respond to in-flight sexual assault led Frontier employees
and representatives to fail to properly respond to those assaults;
fail to report the assaults to the any authorities; and fail to
cooperate with authorities investigating those assaults.

7. Frontier's actions and inactions were – and are – part of a
pattern of behavior and a common course of conduct towards all its
passengers, including Plaintiffs and Class members.

Plaintiffs seek appropriate relief, including but not limited to
compensatory damages and injunctive relief, on behalf of all others
similarly situated who were unnecessarily put at risk and harmed by
Frontier's common course of misconduct. [GN]


GEO GROUP: Court Partly Grants Class Cert. in Ramirez Labor Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAYMOND RAMIREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE GEO GROUP,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 18cv2136-LAB (MSB) (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Larry Alan Burns of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted in part and denied in part Ramirez's
Motion for Class Certification.

Defendant GEO Group and its subsidiaries own and operate private
prisons throughout the United States.  From 2000 until 2017,
Plaintiff Ramirez served as a corrections officer at the Western
Region Detention Facility in San Diego.  The Facility is owned by
GEO Group subsidiary GEO Corrections and Detentions, LLC and houses
between 700 and 770 federal detainees awaiting trial, sentencing,
or a hearing.  At issue in the case are Ramirez's allegations that
GEO violated various provisions of California labor law by, among
other things, failing to provide adequate meal and rest breaks,
failing to reimburse employees for job-related expenses, and
improperly rounding employee time.

Based on these and other alleged violations of California law,
Ramirez brought the suit in San Diego County Superior Court in
August 2018.  GEO timely removed the case to the Court, and Ramirez
now seeks class certification.  Ramirez originally purported to
represent all correctional officers employed by GEO in California,
but now limits the putative class to only those correctional
officers employed by GEO at the San Diego Facility from Aug. 9,
2014 to present.  GEO opposes Ramirez's motion, arguing that its
policies do not violate California law and that Ramirez cannot meet
the requirements for class certification.

Ramirez seeks to certify one class and two subclasses:

     a. Class: All current and former employees who worked as a
Correctional Officer or Assistant Shift Supervisor at GEO's Western
Region Detention Facility from Aug. 9, 2014 to present.

     b. Ten Hour Shift Subclass: All Class Members who worked a
shift of ten hours or more without receiving a second 30-minute
duty-free meal break.

     c. Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: All Class Members who
separated from their employment with GEO between Aug. 9, 2014 to
the present.

GEO's opposition focuses primarily on what it sees as Ramirez's
inability to show commonality (and the related requirement of
predominance).  But GEO also argues that even if there are common
questions, Ramirez's claims are not typical and that he is an
inadequate representative.  The Court will address each requirement
of Rule 23 in turn, with a focus on commonality.

Judge Burns finds that these two narrow questions -- whether GEO's
rounding policy was permissible and whether GEO's wage statements
violated California law -- are common to the class.  These common
questions predominate over individual questions and are therefore
appropriate for class treatment.

Next, the Judge finds that even setting aside the question of
whether GEO's reimbursement policy was sufficient, the fact that
only some of the class members were required to purchase duty belts
means that the question is not common to the class and cannot form
the basis for class certification.  Further, there is no evidence
that Ramirez himself fell within the category of employees required
to purchase a duty belt, so he couldn't serve as an adequate
representative for those employees even if the Court were inclined
to form a sub-class.

But the Court is not certifying the issue of whether GEO's meal and
rest break policies were lawful.  The issues for class-wide
adjudication -- whether GEO improperly rounded its employees' time
and whether its pay statements complied with California law -- are
common to both Corrections Officers and their Supervisors.  The
Judge therefore finds the typicality and adequacy requirements
met.

As part of their briefing, the parties jointly move to have certain
documents related to GEO's policies, procedures, and schedules file
under seal.  According to the parties, because GEO operates a
detention facility, its policies and procedures are significantly
more sensitive than those of a typical corporation, because such
documents directly impact the safety and privacy of detainees and
officers.  

The Judge finds that the parties have demonstrated "good cause."
If made public, the documents at issue could jeopardize the safety
of employees and detainees at the Facility.  The documents reveal
when detention officers go on break, what equipment and weapons
particular officers carry, when and how detainee counts are
conducted, the location of keys, and how officers are expected to
respond to certain emergency situations.  Limiting the spread of
this information is important to protect both employees and
detainees from harm.  

The Judge therefore finds the "good cause" standard met and granted
the parties' Motions to File Documents under Seal.  The documents
conditionally lodged under seal in Docket Entries 49 and 85 are
ordered sealed pending further order of the Court.

For these reasons, Judge Burns granted in part and denied in part
Ramirez's motion for class certification.

He certified one class and one sub-class as follows:

     a. Class: All current and former employees who worked as a
Correctional Officer or Assistant Shift Supervisor at GEO's Western
Region Detention Facility from Aug. 9, 2014 to present.

     b. Waiting Time Penalty Subclass: All Class Members who
separated from their employment with GEO between Aug. 9, 2014 to
present.

But the class claims are limited only to those common questions
found above—namely, whether GEO improperly rounded employee time
and whether GEO's pay statements complied with California law.
Related claims, such as whether GEO violated California's Unfair
Competition Law and whether GEO failed to pay all wages due upon
termination of employment, may be litigated on behalf of the class
only insofar as those claims are predicated on these two narrow
issues.  All other claims must be litigated on an individual basis.
Plaintiff Ramirez will serve as the class representative, and his
attorneys at the Patterson Law Group, APC will serve as the class
counsel.

The Judge granted the parties' Motions to Seal, as is GEO's Request
for Judicial Notice. The parties' various evidentiary objections
are overruled.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 11, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/uFsfjh from Leagle.com.

Raymond Ramirez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by James Richard Patterson --
jim@pattersonlawgroup.com -- Patterson Law Group, APC & Jennifer M.
French, Patterson Law Group, APC.

The Geo Group, Inc., a Florida Corporation, Defendant, represented
by Anthony Gerald Ly -- aly@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson PC,
Lena Kae Sims -- lsims@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson & Peiyi
Chen -- pchen@littler.com -- Littler & Mendelson PC.

GEO Corrections and Detention, LLC ("GEO Corrections"), a
subsidiary of GEO Group, Inc., a Florida limited liability
corporation, Defendant, represented by Peiyi Chen, Littler &
Mendelson PC & Anthony Gerald Ly, Littler Mendelson PC.


GOLDEN STATE: Transfer Trevino Suit to Cal. Central Dist. Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JUAN TREVINO, ROMEO PALMA, JUAN C. AVALOS, ALBERTO
GIANINI, CHRISTOPHER WARD, and LINDA QUINTEROS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GOLDEN
STATE FC, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, AMAZON.COM
INC., a Delaware Corporation, and AMAZON FULFILLMENT SERVICES,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Lead Case No.
1:18-cv-00120-DAD-BAM (Trevino) (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale E. Drozd of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
denied Amazon's motion to transfer the consolidated action to the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

The consolidated action consists of five separately filed class
actions which were initially filed in state courts located within
the boundaries of the U.S. District Court for either the Eastern or
Central Districts of California and thereafter removed to those
federal courts.  Three of the five cases (Trevino, Ward, and Palma)
were filed within the Eastern District of California, and the
remaining two (Avalos and Hagman) were originally filed within the
Central District of California.  Each of these actions was filed as
a class action and each asserted similar wage and hour violations
against Amazon.

On Jan. 8, 2018, Plaintiff Trevino filed a notice of related cases,
seeking to relate Trevino, Ward, and Palma.  On Jan. 24, 2018,
Judge Drozd issued an order relating the Trevino, Ward, and Palma
cases.

On April 23, 2018, the parties in Avalos filed a stipulation
seeking to transfer that case to the district and, on Aug. 29,
2018, the parties in Hagman filed a stipulation seeking to transfer
that case to the district.  Both stipulations were adopted by court
order and the Avalos and Hagman actions were thereafter assigned to
the Court.

On Feb. 25, 2019, the parties in each of the five aforementioned
actions stipulated to consolidating those actions.  That
stipulation was adopted by court order and Trevino was designated
as the lead case.  On March 28, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a first
amended consolidated class action complaint.  Therein, they allege
the following wage and hour violations: (1) failure to pay wages
for all hours worked, including overtime; (2) meal period
violations; (3) rest period violations; (4) wage statement
violations; (5) failure to pay waiting time wages; and (6)
violations of California Business and Professions Code.

On April 23, 2019, the parties participated in a joint scheduling
conference before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe.  During
the scheduling conference, Magistrate Judge McAuliffe informed the
parties that the Chief Judge of the Eastern District would be
retiring at the end of 2019, leaving Judge Drozd as the only
remaining district court judge in the Fresno Courthouse.

On June 6, 2019, 27 named Plaintiffs filed a separate wage and hour
class action in Orange County Superior Court against Amazon.com
Services, Inc. and, on July 5, 2019, that action was removed to the
Central District of California.

On July 5, 2019, Amazon filed the pending motion to transfer.
Therein, it seeks to transfer the consolidated action back to the
Central District of California.  First, Amazon argues that the
original purpose of transferring the Avalos and Hagman actions to
the district has been frustrated by the impending retirement of the
Chief Judge, which was unknown and unforeseen at the time the
parties stipulated to transferring and consolidating all related
cases in the Eastern District.  Second, it contends that transfer
is warranted because the Sherman class action asserts claims that
overlap with those asserted in the consolidated class action.
Finally, Amazon argues that the action meets all the requirements
for transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) and that the parties
will not be prejudiced by the transfer.  On Aug. 6, 2019, the
Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the pending motion and, on
Aug. 13, 2019, Amazon filed its reply thereto.

The parties do not dispute that the action may have been brought in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.
Rather, they focus on the balance of the relevant factors.  Amazon
primarily argues that the original purpose of transferring the
Avalos and Hagman action to the district has been frustrated by
Chief Judge O'Neill's impending move to inactive senior status.  It
also contends that transfer back to the Central District is
warranted because the Sherman action overlaps with this action.  

Judge Drozd addresses Amazon's arguments with respect to the
Sherman action first, and then addresses whether the original
purpose of the Avalos and Hagman transfers has been frustrated by
Chief Judge O'Neill's taking of inactive senior status in early
2020.

He finds that Amazon offers no analysis for why this consolidated
class action overlaps with the Sherman class action beyond simply
asserting so in conclusory fashion.  It is not, however, the
Court's task to compare the allegations in the respective actions
to determine whether the actions are overlapping, and transfer is
warranted.  Accordingly, Amazon's intention to seek consolidation
of Sherman with Trevino in the Central District, pending the
outcome of this motion, in light of the overlapping claims and
class period does not weigh in favor of transfer, as Judge Selna
has already ruled that there is no substantial overlap between the
two actions, thus clearly indicating that he is unlikely to
consolidate the action with Sherman.

Next, the Judge addresses Amazon's contention that the purpose of
transferring Avalos and Hagman to the Eastern District has been
frustrated by Chief Judge O'Neill's impending move to inactive
senior status.  Amazon argues that it will leave only one presiding
judge in the Fresno division of the already-congested Eastern
District, and thwart the original purpose of the transfer and
consolidation: preserving time and resources, and ensuring faster
and more efficient outcomes in the case.  

The Judge is not persuaded.  First, it appears that Amazon was (or
at least should have been) aware that the Eastern District was
"already-congested" prior to stipulating to transferring the Avalos
and Hagman actions to the district.  Second, further undercutting
Amazon's position are the stipulations themselves.  Third, while
Amazon states that courts regularly consider docket congestion when
deciding a motion to transfer venue, it offers no authority for the
proposition that court congestion alone provides an adequate reason
to transfer an action to another district.

Finally, the Judge briefly addresses the Section 1404(a) factors.
Amazon argues that the Central District is more convenient for the
parties and witnesses for various reasons, but its arguments in
this regard rely on a finding that the Sherman action overlaps with
the action.  Because there is no overlap, Amazon's arguments with
respect to the Section 1404(a) factors are unpersuasive.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Drozd denied the motion to
transfer.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 11, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/ShhVCX from Leagle.com.

Juan Trevino, Plaintiff, represented by Lonnie C. Blanchard, III
--
lonnieblanchard@gmail.com -- The Blanchard Law Group, APC, Peter
R.
Dion-Kindem -- peter@dion-kindemlaw.com -- Peter R. Dion-Kindem,
P.C. & James Ross Hawkins -- James@jameshawkinsaplc.com -- James
Hawkins APLC.

Romeo Palma, Plaintiff, represented by Graham Lambert --
GL@Haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law PC, Joshua H. Haffner --
jhh@Haffnerlawyers.com -- Haffner Law, PC & James Ross Hawkins,
James Hawkins APLC.

Golden State FC LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company,
Amazon.com Inc., a Delaware Corporation & Amazon Fulfillment
Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by
Helen Ofelia Avunjian -- havunjian@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn
and Crutcher LLP, Jason C. Schwartz -jschwartz@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, pro hac vice, Katherine V.A. Smith
-ksmith@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Michele
Leigh
Maryott -- mmaryott@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
&
Ashley Louise Allyn -- aallyn@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher, LLP.

Amazon, Defendant, pro se.


GPB CAPITAL: Barasch Sues Over $1.8BB Fraud on Investors
--------------------------------------------------------
MILLICENT R. BARASCH, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated v. GPB CAPITAL HOLDINGS, LLC; DAVID GENTILE;
WILLIAM JACOBY; MINCHUNG KGIL; MANUEL FREDERICO VIANNA; DOTTY J.
BOLLINGER; MICHAEL FROST; EVAN MYRIANTHOPOULOS; ABHAYA SHRESTHA;
MICHAEL COHN; STEVEN FRANGIONI; SCOTT NAUGLE; GPB HOLDINGS, LP; GPB
HOLDINGS II, LP; GPB AUTOMOTIVE PORTFOLIO, LP; GPB COLD STORAGE,
LP; GPB WASTE MANAGEMENT FUND, LP; GPB HOLDINGS III, LP; GPB
HOLDINGS QUALIFIED, LP; GPB NYC DEVELOPMENT, LP; ASCENDANT CAPITAL,
LLC; ASCENDANT ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, LLC; AXIOM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, INC.; JEFFRY SCHNEIDER; MARK D. MARTINO; DJ PARTNERS
LLC; MR RANGER, LLC; RSM US LLP (f/k/a McGLADREY LLP); EISNERAMPER
LLP; GENTILE PISMENY & BRENGEL, LLP; CROWE, LLP; CROWE GLOBAL; DOE
AUDITORS 1 through 10; PHOENIX AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.;
CKFG HOLDING LLC; McANNA, LP; ROBERT KESSLER; GERALD FRANCESE; RINA
CHERNAYA; and DIANA CHERNAYA, Case No. 1:19-cv-01079-LY (W.D. Tex.,
Nov. 6, 2019), seeks recoverable compensatory and other damages
sustained by Plaintiff and the proposed class members, and for the
rescission of all investments they made to the GPB Funds, as well
as all transactions made by the GPB Funds to other entities in
furtherance of the Defendants' fraudulent activities, which
included selling unregistered securities, in violation of the Texas
Securities Act.

According to the complaint, GPB Capital Holdings, LLC ("GPB
Capital"), led by its CEO David Gentile ("Gentile"), CFO William
Jacoby ("Jacoby"), former CFO Minchung Kgil, and its directors and
partners, ran a Ponzi scheme, by and through a series of limited
partnerships--GPB Holdings, LP, GPB Holdings Qualified, LP, GPB
Holdings II, LP, GPB Automotive Portfolio, LP, GPB Cold Storage,
LP, GPB NYC Development, GPB Waste Management, LP, and GPB Holdings
III, LP (collectively, "the GPB Funds").

Plaintiff Millicent R. Barasch through her sons, Jeffrey Barasch
and Phillip Barasch in their capacities as powers of attorney
and/or trustee of the Millicent Barasch Trust ("Plaintiff"),
asserts that on the surface, the GPB Capital Ponzi scheme was a
garden variety Ponzi scheme.  Investors were promised 8% returns
guaranteed, and those purported returns were generated not by
actual investment returns, but by tapping the capital investments
of the next round of investors (or, in some cases, from the capital
accounts of the investor itself, cannibalizing a particular
investor's own principal).  GPB Capital was able to keep this
enterprise afloat for several years, long enough to generate $1.8
billion in investment capital, a significant percentage of which
was siphoned into the pockets of GPB Capital's principals.

The Plaintiff was one of those individuals, who invested in the GPB
Capital Ponzi scheme.  The Plaintiff alleges that behind the
public-facing facade of GPB Capital and the GPB Funds, however,
lurked a complex web of entities and individuals, who propped up,
facilitated, and financially benefitted, from the GPB Capital Ponzi
scheme.

Like an onion, the Plaintiff explains, every time you peel a layer
off of the outer surface, you find another layer underneath, each
layer ultimately profiting off of the investors, who put their
money into the illegal machine of GPB Capital.  Thus, GPB Capital
(controlled by Gentile) bought the assets of the conglomerate
controlled by Gentile and his associates, funneling money from the
Plaintiff and investors into the pockets of Gentile and his
associate.  None of these improper and self-dealing transactions
were disclosed.

Through this action, the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
investors seek to encompass the entirety of the onion that is GPB.
In doing so, Plaintiff and the class seek to hold all responsible
parties accountable for what at the end of the day is a $1.8
billion fraud on investors.

GPB Capital Holdings, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability company
with a principal place of business in New York City.  GPB is the
general partner of the GPB Funds and was at all relevant times the
control person, manager, and majority owner of the GPB Funds.  GPB,
therefore, effected the GPB Funds' securities offerings.  GPB is an
investment advisor registered under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 ("IAA").

Each of the Defendants was involved in the operation, selling, or
distribution of the GPB Funds.  The GPB Funds were underwritten by,
and thus originated from, Defendant Ascendant, which is located in
Austin, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Todd Kelly, Esq.
          THE CARLSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
          11606 North Interstate Highway 35
          Austin, TX 78753
          Telephone: (512) 346-5688
          Facsimile: (512) 719-4362
          E-mail: tkellyefile@carlsonattorneys.com

               - and -

          David Meyer, Esq.
          Matthew R. Wilson, Esq.
          Michael J. Boyle, Jr., Esq.
          Courtney M. Werning, Esq.
          MEYER WILSON CO., LPA
          1320 Dublin Road, Ste. 100
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 224-6000
          Facsimile: (614) 224-6066
          E-mail: dmeyer@meyerwilson.com
                  mwilson@meyerwilson.com
                  mboyle@meyerwilson.com
                  cwerning@meyerwilson.com

               - and -

          Joseph Peiffer, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR AND KANE, APLC
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 4314
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 523-2434
          Facsimile: (504) 523-2464
          E-mail: jpeiffer@pwcklegal.com


HCP INC: District Dismisses Boynton Firefighters Securities Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Boynton Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund, On Behalf of
Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. HCP, Inc.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-1106 (N.D. Ohio), Judge
Jeffrey J. Helmick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Western Division, granted Defendants HCP,
Lauralee E. Martin, Timothy Schoen, and Darren A. Kowalske's (the
"HCP Defendants") motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class
Action Complaint, pursuant to Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

HCP is a real estate investment trust ("REIT") that primarily
leases the real property it owns to companies involved in the
healthcare industry.  Martin previously served as HCP's Chief
Executive Officer and President, while Schoen was HCP's Executive
VP and CFO.  Kowalske served first as the Senior VP of Hospital and
Post-Acute and the Executive VP of Asset Management, Senior Housing
and Care.

On April 7, 2011, HCP entered into an agreement with HCR ManorCare
in which HCP purchased substantially all of HCR ManorCare, Inc.'s
real estate assets and then leased those assets back to ManorCare.
In connection with this transaction, HCP also acquired a 9.9%
equity ownership interest in ManorCare.  The Lead Plaintiffs allege
ManorCare accounted for approximately 30% of HCP's revenue stream
following these transactions.

Lead Plaintiffs Societe Generale Securities Services GmbH and the
City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System allege ManorCare
was heavily dependent upon revenue generated by unlawful and
unsustainable billing practices, including alleged Medicare fraud.
ManorCare, they allege, engaged in a variety of practices designed
to increase revenues by increasing the percentage of services for
which it could bill at Medicare's higher or highest reimbursement
level, grouping patients together to permit physical and
occupational therapists to bill for multiple therapy sessions at
one time, and maximizing the length of a patient's stay in a
ManorCare facility.

The Lead Plaintiffs assert that, between 2009 and 2011, three
individuals who previously worked as therapists for ManorCare each
filed qui tam complaints to assert False Claims Act claims against
ManorCare as a result of these billing practices.  They further
allege HCP had access to information concerning ManorCare's billing
practices before completing the 2011 Transactions.

In early 2013, the Department of Justice served a Civil
Investigative Demand at ManorCare's corporate headquarters.  That
investigation led to the United States intervening in the qui tam
actions in December 2014.

The Lead Plaintiffs allege all the Defendants violated Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, and that the individual
Defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  They assert
their securities fraud claims on behalf of a class of all
individuals or entities who purchased or acquired HCP's common
stock between March 30, 2015, and Feb. 8, 2016, inclusive.

The HCP Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint.  Pursuant to the parties' request,
the Court held oral argument on Oct. 23, 2018.

Defendants HCR ManorCare, Inc., Paul A Ormond, and Steven M.
Cavanaugh ("ManorCare Defendants") also filed a motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's Complaint.  After briefing on that motion was
completed and oral argument was held, the Defendants and the
Plaintiff stipulated to the voluntary dismissal without prejudice
of the claims against the ManorCare Defendants.

The Lead Plaintiffs allege the HCP Defendants offered or failed to
correct their false or misleading statements with the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud the market so that HCP could sell
approximately $1.35 billion of newly-issued securities to
investors.  

A court seeking to determine whether the plaintiff has adequately
pled scienter reviews all of the plaintiff's allegations
collectively and considers a non-exhaustive list of nine factors:
(1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual amount;
(2) divergence between internal reports and external statements on
the same subject; (3) closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent
statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent
information; (4) evidence of bribery by a top company official; (5)
existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company and
the company's quick settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the
most current factual information before making statements; (7)
disclosure of accounting information in such a way that its
negative implications could only be understood by someone with a
high degree of sophistication; (8) the personal interest of certain
directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending
sale of stock; and (9) the self-interested motivation of defendants
in the form of saving their salaries or jobs.

The Lead Plaintiffs assert the Complaint alleges facts implicating
the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth Helwig
v. Vencor, Inc. factors.  They implicitly concede the Complaint
does not include allegations which would implicate the fourth or
eighth Helwig factors.

Judge Helmick finds that (i) the Complaint does not contain
allegations of insider trading; (ii) the allegations in the
Complaint show the HCP Defendants acknowledged the DOJ was
investigating ManorCare and offered reasons why HCP believed that
investigation would not adversely impact HCP's ability to collect
lease payments; (iii) the Lead Plaintiffs fail to plead allegations
which could prove that HCP made adverse disclosures approximately
two and three months after offering positive evaluations of
ManorCare's business and the likelihood ManorCare would continue to
pay its lease payments on time; (iv) while the Lead Plaintiffs
argue they have alleged facts implicating this factor, they do not
identify any in their brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss;
(v) the Lead Plaintiffs do not allege HCP failed to accurately
report either the initial revenue number or the corrected revenue
number; and (vi) the Lead Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the
individual Defendants acted to save their salaries or jobs.

The Judge further finds that Lead Plaintiffs' allegations fail to
establish a strong inference of scienter.  The Lead Plaintiffs have
not offered any facts which support their argument that the HCP
Defendants must have known ManorCare's revenues were irreversibly
declining and it was on its way to bankruptcy. They fail to show a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter to be at
least as strong as the countervailing inference that the HCP
Defendants had no knowledge of or reason to suspect the allegedly
fraudulent billing scheme ManorCare used from 2006 to 2012 had
improperly inflated ManorCare's past revenues and had undermined
the reliability of those past revenues as a data point for
ManorCare's future viability.  HCP's heavy reliance on income from
ManorCare, while perhaps a poor business strategy, is not evidence
of scienter which could support Lead Plaintiffs' securities fraud
claims.

Because he has concluded the Lead Plaintiffs fail to allege
sufficient facts to create a strong inference of scienter, Judge
Helmick finds it unnecessary to consider the parties' arguments
concerning the remaining elements of the Lead Plaintiffs' Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.

The Lead Plaintiffs also claim Martin, Schoen, and Kowalske
violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  When a plaintiff's
Section 10(b) claims have been dismissed, the plaintiff's related
Section 20(a) claims also are subject to dismissal.  Therefore, the
Judge also grants the HCP Defendants' motion as to these claims.

For the reasons he stated, Judge Helmick granted the HCP
Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/lhaK42 from Leagle.com.

Boynton Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund, on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Scott D.
Simpkins, Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli, Avi
Josefson, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, Gerald H. Silk,
Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, Jack Landskroner,
Landskroner Law Firm, John R. Climaco -- jrclim@climacolaw.com --
Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli & Rebecca E. Boon --
Rebecca.Boon@blbglaw.com -- Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger &
Grossman.

Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi, Plaintiff,
represented by Ross M. Shikowitz, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger &
Grossman, Jack Landskroner, Landskroner Law Firm & Scott D.
Simpkins, Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli.

HCP, Inc., Lauralee E. Martin, originally named as & Timothy
Schoen, Defendants, represented by Audra J. Soloway --
asoloway@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison,
Daniel J. Kramer -- dkramer@paulweiss.com -- Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, James A. King -- jking@porterwright.com --
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur & Kirsten R. Fraser --
kfraser@porterwright.com -- Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur.

Darren A. Kowalske, Defendant, represented by James A. King,
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur & Kirsten R. Fraser, Porter,
Wright, Morris & Arthur.

Albert J Belle, Movant, represented by Katherine C. Ferguson,
Kooperman Gillespie Mentel.

Societe Generale Securities Services GmbH, Movant, represented by
Christopher F. Moriarty, Motley Rice, Darren J. Robbins, Robbins
Geller Rudman & Dowd, Gregg S. Levin, Motley Rice, Jack Reise, Law
Office of Robert J. Hunt, pro hac vice, Joseph F. Rice, Motley
Rice, Nathan R. Lindell, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Sara B.
Polychron, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Tricia L. McCormick,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, William H. Narwold, Motley Rice, Jack
Landskroner, Landskroner Law Firm & Richard M. Kerger, Kerger Law
Firm.

City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System, Movant,
represented by Darren J. Robbins, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd,
Gregg S. Levin, Motley Rice, Jack Reise, Law Office of Robert J.
Hunt, pro hac vice, Nathan R. Lindell, Robbins Geller Rudman &
Dowd, Sara B. Polychron, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Tricia L.
McCormick, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, Jack Landskroner,
Landskroner Law Firm & Richard M. Kerger, Kerger Law Firm.


HOME OWNERS MGMT: Supreme Ct. Upholds Arbitration Order in Robinson
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned NATHAN ROBINSON AND MISTI ROBINSON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, Petitioners, v. HOME OWNERS MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES, INC.
D/B/A HOME OF TEXAS AND WARRANTY UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents, Case No. 18-0504 (Tex.), Judge Eva M. Guzman of the
Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeal's denial of
motion to compel arbitration of class claims under the parties'
arbitration agreement.

The arbitration dispute between homeowners and their home-warranty
company began as an individual action for construction-defect
damages and evolved into a putative class action complaining about
"deliberately overbroad" releases the warranty company allegedly
"demanded" before making covered repairs.  Only the class claims
are at issue in the appeal.

The homeowners, Nathan and Misti Robinson, purchased a newly
constructed residential home that was enrolled in a limited
warranty program operated by Home Owners Management Enterprises,
Inc. and Warranty Underwriters Insurance ("HOME").  When
construction-related defects were discovered, the Robinsons sued
HOME and other Defendants alleging the defects were not promptly or
properly resolved.  Over the Robinsons' vigorous opposition, the
trial court abated the case and compelled arbitration in accordance
with the terms of the limited warranty and its addendum.

Yet, with less than a month before the scheduled arbitration, the
Robinsons filed an amended statement of claims seeking to add
class-action claims against HOME to the arbitration proceeding.
The new -- and entirely independent -- claims alleged that HOME
routinely demanded overbroad releases as a precondition to
fulfilling its warranty obligations.

HOME promptly filed written objections to the amended statement and
moved to strike the class claims from the arbitration proceeding.
The following week, mere days before the arbitration began, the
arbitrator denied HOME's objections and motion to strike "in its
entirety," but bifurcated the class claims from the Robinsons'
construction-defect claims.

After arbitration on the Robinsons' individual claims had
concluded, but before the arbitrator had issued a decision, HOME
asked the trial court to clarify the "scope of the issues" referred
to the arbitrator and, in the alternative, to strike the Robinsons'
class claims.  While HOME's motion was pending in the trial court,
the arbitrator ruled against HOME on the warranty claims and
awarded the Robinsons substantial damages, costs, and fees.
Furthermore, and in accordance with the arbitration agreement's
terms, the arbitrator awarded HOME the costs and fees it had
incurred compelling arbitration over the Robinsons' resistance.

With the arbitrator's award in hand, the Robinsons returned to the
trial court to file a "Statement of Claims, Individually and as the
Representatives of All Persons Similarly Situated."  Once again,
the Robinsons' putative class action alleged HOME refused to pay
for home repairs unless the homeowners executed overbroad releases.
But this time, the Robinsons did not resist arbitration; they
demanded it, asserting HOME was required to arbitrate the class
claims under the broad arbitration provisions in the limited
warranty and addendum.

HOME responded with a motion to dismiss, disputing that the
arbitration agreement authorized class arbitration and arguing that
only the court, not the arbitrator, could make that determination.
The trial court ruled in HOME's favor.

Affirming the trial court's conclusion that availability of class
arbitration is a gateway issue for the court, the appeals court
declined to follow the Court's In re Wood decision, which held that
an arbitrator should rule on class certification issues when an
arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA and the parties have
agreed to submit all disputes arising out of the agreement to the
arbitrator.  After surveying federal authority issued after Wood,
the appeals court concluded that Wood was based entirely on
presumably binding Supreme Court authority that has since proved to
be a chimera and thus was not binding authority because it did not
really 'squarely decide' the issue.

Having concluded the trial court properly assumed the role of
decider, the appeals court then examined the arbitration
agreement's text to determine whether the agreement evinced the
parties' plain intent that class-based claims would be arbitrated.
Adhering to the Supreme Court's mandate that a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there
is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so, the appeals court found no agreement to arbitrate class claims
because the agreement contained not one word about class
arbitration.

The Robinsons' petition for review presents three issues: (1) who
decides whether parties have agreed to class arbitration; (2)
whether the Robinsons and HOME agreed to class arbitration; and (3)
whether HOME otherwise consented or acquiesced to arbitration of
the class claims.  Though an order denying an arbitration demand is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, the issues on appeal present only
questions of law, which are subject to de novo review.

Considering the fundamental differences between bilateral and class
arbitration, and the bedrock principle that a party cannot be
forced to arbitrate any dispute absent a binding agreement to do
so, Judge Guzman holds that a court must determine, as a gateway
matter, whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration
unless the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed otherwise.
The class arbitration implicates what must be arbitrated and who
must arbitrate, matters that are presumptively for the court's
determination.  Because the arbitration agreements at issue are
silent as to arbitrability and do not mention class claims at all,
the lower courts correctly determined HOME was not bound to
arbitrate the Robinsons' putative class claims. Judge Guzman
affirmed the court of appeals' judgment.

A full-text copy of the Texas Supreme Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://is.gd/kQljfn from Leagle.com.

Evan 'Van' L. Shaw -- info@shawlawoffice.com -- Jennifer W.
Johnson, Mark A. Ticer, for Misti Robinson and Nathan Robinson,
Petitioners.

Edward J. Baines -- ted.baines@saul.com -- Curt M. Covington --
curt@lrclegal.com -- for Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc.,
Respondent.


IC SYSTEM: Makurat Moves for Class Certification Under Damasco
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kari Makurat moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled KARI MAKURAT, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., Case
No. 2:20-cv-00027 (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the Court
both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the
Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff avers.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


ILLINOIS: Court Denies Class Certification in Inmates' Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing in part
Plaintiff's Claims in the case captioned TRAVIS WESTON, (also known
as Nafiabdul Basir), on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated, #M07414, Plaintiff, v. JOHN BALDWIN, JACQUELINE
LASHBROOK, FRANK LAWRENCE, LLOYD HANNA, HOWARD HARNER, and JAMES
CLAYCOMB, Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-01020-NJR (S.D. Ill.).

The case came before the Court for preliminary review of the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A, which requires the
Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious
claims.

Plaintiff Travis Weston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center (Menard), brings this action for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Weston
asserts claims under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  

Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from
an immune defendant must be dismissed. At this juncture, the
factual allegations of the pro se complaint are liberally
construed.  

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial
officer of this Court. The designations do not constitute an
opinion regarding their merit. Any other claim that is mentioned in
the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly
pleading standard.

Counts 1-3

It is well-established that a prisoner is entitled to practice his
religion insofar as doing so does not unduly burden the
administration of the prison. To state a claim under the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege
facts to plausibly suggest that his right to practice his chosen
religion was burdened in a significant way. A religious diet is
substantially burdened when officials force an inmate to choose
between his religious practice and adequate nutrition.  

Weston's allegations are sufficient to proceed on his claims in
Counts 1-3 against Claycomb, Harner, Lawrence, and Hanna.

Count 4

Inmates are afforded broader religious protections under RLUIPA,
which prohibits prisons receiving federal funds from imposing a
substantial burden on an inmate's religious exercise unless prison
officials can demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.  

Although Weston has generally stated a colorable RLUIPA claim,
RLUIPA does not authorize a suit for money damages against
defendants in their individual capacities. Therefore, the RLUIPA
claim in Count 4 against Defendants in their individual capacities
shall be dismissed with prejudice.

But a court may order injunctive relief to correct a violation of
RLUIPA. As the Warden of Menard, Frank Lawrence is a proper
defendant for injunctive relief. Lawrence will be added in his
official capacity, and the RLUIPA claim shall proceed only against
him.

Count 5

To state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in constitutionally
protected speech (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter
protected speech and (3) his protected speech was a motivating
factor in the defendants' actions.
  
A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth a
chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be
inferred. Weston's allegations are sufficient for the retaliation
claim in Count 5 to proceed against Claycomb.

Count 6

Weston's allegations are sufficient for the claim in Count 6 to
proceed against Baldwin, Lashbrook and Lawrence. To the extent a
RLUIPA claim is raised in Count 6, it will proceed only against
Lawrence in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard.

Counts 7 and 8

An Illinois negligence claim for personal injuries requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a duty of care owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an
injury proximately caused by that breach.  

To state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress
under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendant
owed plaintiff a duty; (2) that defendant breached that duty; and
(3) that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by that breach.
Weston bases his state law claims on the facts that serve as the
basis for Counts 1-3. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
the claims because they involve the same facts as the federal
claims.

At the screening stage, Weston's allegations are sufficient to
proceed on the claims in Counts 7 and 8 against Claycomb, Harner,
Hanna, and Lawrence.

Class action

Weston purports to bring a class action on behalf of unknown
plaintiffs who are similarly situated. Weston is the only
individual who signed the Complaint, and the Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis. Because Weston is proceeding pro se, he
cannot represent a class of plaintiffs.  

Therefore, to the extent that Weston seeks class certification, the
request is denied, rules the Court.

Count 1 will proceed against Claycomb. Count 2 will proceed against
Harner and Lawrence. Count 3 will proceed against Hanna and
Claycomb. Count 4 will proceed against Lawrence in his official
capacity as the Warden of Menard Correctional Center and is
dismissed as to the remaining Defendants. Count 5 will proceed
against Claycomb. Count 6 will proceed against Baldwin, Lashbrook
and Lawrence but the RLUIPA claim will proceed only against
Lawrence in his official capacity as the Warden of Menard
Correctional Center. Counts 7 and 8 will proceed against Claycomb,
Harner, Hanna, and Lawrence.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 2, 2019
Memorandum and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/qpfle2f
from Leagle.com.

Travis Weston also known as Nafiabdul Basir, on behalf of himself
and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, pro se.


INNOPHOS HOLDINGS: Faces Kappelman Suit Over Merger With One Rock
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gary Kappelman, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. INNOPHOS HOLDINGS, INC., KIM ANN MINK, GARY CAPPELINE,
JANE HILK, LINDA MYRICK, KAREN OSAR, JOHN M. STEITZ, PETER T.
THOMAS, and ROBERT J. ZATTA, Case No. 1:20-cv-00039-UNA (D. Del.,
Jan. 13, 2020), is brought against Innophos Holdings, Inc. and the
members of the Company's board of directors for their violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in connection with the
proposed merger between Innophos and an affiliate of One Rock
Capital Partners, LLC.

On October 20, 2019, Innophos entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger, pursuant to which the Company's shareholders will receive
$32.00 in cash for each share of Innophos common stock they own.

On December 6, 2019, in order to convince Innophos' shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Merger, the Defendants authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading definitive proxy
statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in violation
of the Exchange Act, the Plaintiff alleges. In particular, the
Plaintiff says, the Proxy contains materially incomplete and
misleading information concerning: (i) financial projections for
Innophos; and (ii) the valuation analyses performed by Innophos'
financial advisor Lazard Freres & Co. LLC, in support of their
fairness opinion.

The special meeting of Innophos shareholders to vote on the
Proposed Merger was scheduled on January 15, 2020. The record date
to participate in the Shareholder Vote is for Innophos holders as
of November 25, 2019.

As a direct and proximate result of the dissemination of the
misleading Proxy the Defendants used to obtain stockholder approval
of the Proposed Merger, the Plaintiff and the Class will suffer
damages and actual economic losses (i.e. the difference between the
value they received as a result of the Proposed Merger and the true
value of their shares prior to the Proposed Merger) in an amount to
be determined at trial, according to the complaint.

For these reasons, the Plaintiff asserts claims against the
Defendants for violations of the Exchange Act. The Plaintiff seeks
to recover damages resulting from the Defendants' violations of the
Exchange Act, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a holder of Innophos common stock.

Innophos is an international producer of specialty ingredient
solutions for the food, health, nutrition, and industrial
markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          Miles D. Schreiner, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          Phone: 212-971-1341
          Fax: 212-202-7880
          Email: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
                 mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com

               - and -

          Guri Ademi, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Phone: (414) 482-8000
          Fax: (414) 482-8001
          Email: gademi@ademilaw.com
                 jfruchter@ademilaw.com

               - and -

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          The Nemours Building
          1007 N. Orange St., Suite 1120
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Phone: (302) 984-3800


INSTRUCTURE INC: Faces Post Securities Suit Over Thoma Bravo Sale
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Post, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. INSTRUCTURE, INC., JOSH COATES, DAN GOLDSMITH, STEVEN
A. COLLINS, WILLIAM M. CONROY, ELLEN LEVY, KEVIN THOMPSON, and
LLOYD G. WATERHOUSE, Case No. 1:20-cv-00034-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13,
2020), stems from a proposed transaction, pursuant to which
Instructure will be acquired by affiliates of a fund managed by
Thoma Bravo, LLC.

On December 4, 2019, Instructure's Board of Directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with PIV
Purchaser, LLC and PIV Merger Sub, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of
the Merger Agreement, Instructure's stockholders will receive
$47.60 in cash for each share of Instructure common stock they
own.

On January 2, 2020, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with
the Proposed Transaction, which scheduled a stockholder vote on the
Proposed Transaction for February 13, 2020.

The Plaintiff contends that the Proxy Statement omits material
information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders
the Proxy Statement false and misleading. The Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
connection with the Proxy Statement because it omits material
information regarding the Company's financial projections.

The Proxy Statement also omits material information regarding the
analyses performed by the Company's financial advisor in connection
with the Proposed Transaction, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, the
Plaintiff asserts. The Plaintiff adds that the Proxy Statement
fails to disclose the timing and nature of all communications
regarding "Instructure's recent modifications of its stock-based
compensation policies," including who participated in all such
discussions, which resulted in "an increase in operating expenses
starting in January 2020."

The omissions and false and misleading statements in the Proxy
Statement are material in that a reasonable stockholder will
consider them important in deciding how to vote on the Proposed
Transaction, the Plaintiff argues. Because of the false and
misleading statements in the Proxy Statement, the Plaintiff and the
Class are threatened with irreparable harm, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is the owner of Instructure common stock.

Instructure is a leading software-as-a-service technology company
that provides learning management system software to the global
education market and employee development and engagement solutions
for people focused companies via its Bridge platform.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Phone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          Email: bdl@rl-legal.com
                 gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Richard A. Maniskas, Esq.
          RM LAW, P.C.
          1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Phone: (484) 324-6800
          Facsimile: (484) 631-1305
          Email: rm@maniskas.com


INSTRUCTURE RESOURCES: Zhang Balks at Planned Sale to Thoma Bravo
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ZIYANG ZHANG, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. INSTRUCTURE RESOURCES, INC., JOSEPH A. MILLS, MATTHEW
BONANNO, EVAN LEDERMAN, JOHN V. LOVOI, PAUL B. LOYD, JR., MICHAEL
RALEIGH, ANDREW TAYLOR, and ANTHONY TRIPODO, the Defendants, Case
No. 1:20-cv-00042-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 13, 2020), accuses the
Defendants of violating securities laws in connection with their
proposed sale of the Company to Thoma Bravo.

The lawsuit is a stockholder class action brought against the
Defendants for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and for breaches of fiduciary
duty as a result of their efforts to sell the Company to PIV
Purchaser, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("Parent"),
and PIV Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a direct
wholly owned subsidiary of Parent ("Merger Sub," and with Parent,
"Thoma Bravo"), as a result of an unfair process for an unfair
price.

The Plaintiff challenges and seeks to enjoin an upcoming
stockholder vote on a proposed transaction by which Thoma Bravo
will acquire each issued and outstanding share of Instructure for
an inadequate and insufficient price. Both companies' boards of
directors have approved the deal.

Pursuant to the terms of the definitive Agreement and Plan of
Merger entered into by and among Instructure and Thoma Bravo on
December 4, 2019, Thoma Bravo will acquire all of the outstanding
shares of Instructure common stock, in compensation for which,
Instructure stockholders will be entitled to receive only $47.60 in
cash for every Instructure share they own.

On December 23, 2019, Instructure filed a Preliminary Proxy
Statement on Schedule 14A (the "Preliminary Proxy") with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission in support of the
Proposed Transaction, followed by the January 2, 2020 filing of the
Definitive Proxy Statement and January 7, 2020 filing of the
Revised Definitive Proxy Statement on Schedule 14A.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Proxy is wholly insufficient and
provides either materially misleading and or insufficient
information for Instructure stockholders to properly analyze
whether to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, and is
therefore, a continuation of the Board's breaches of fiduciary
duty.

The Plaintiff contends that the Proposed Transaction is unfair and
undervalued for a number of reasons. The Plaintiff notes that the
Proxy describes an insufficient sales process in which the Board
only paid lip service to its fiduciary duties. In fact, only 20
days passed (over the Thanksgiving holiday) between the Company
announcing a strategic review and reaching a deal with Thoma Bravo.
In addition to Thoma Bravo's interest in the Proposed Transaction,
the deal may also be tainted by conflicts of interest of the
directors and Company executives. Certain of the Company's
directors and senior executive officers may have been motivated to
enter into the Proposed Transaction in order to receive benefits
not shared equally with the Plaintiff and members of the Class, the
Plaintiff says. Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, all
illiquid Company options and other incentive awards will vest no
later than seven days before the effective date of the Proposed
Transaction, the Plaintiff adds.

If the Proposed Transaction is approved, the Plaintiff asserts, the
Individual Defendants will have breached their fiduciary duties of
loyalty and due care by, inter alia, agreeing to sell Instructure
without first taking steps to ensure that Plaintiff and Class
members who are the minority stockholders of the Company, would
obtain adequate and fair consideration under the circumstances. The
Plaintiff adds that the Proxy is materially deficient and deprives
Instructure stockholders of the information they need to make an
intelligent, informed and rational decision of whether to vote
their shares in favor of the Proposed Transaction.

According to the complaint, the Proxy omits and/or misrepresents
material information concerning, among other things: (a) the sales
process leading up to the Proposed Transaction; (b) the Company's
financial projections; (c) Citizen's financial projections; and (d)
the data and inputs underlying the financial valuation analyses
that purport to support the fairness opinions provided by the
"Financial Advisor" to the Board, J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC
("J.P. Morgan"). Absent judicial intervention, the Merger will be
consummated, resulting in irreparable injury to Plaintiff and the
Class. Accordingly, the action seeks to enjoin the Proposed
Transaction and compel the Individual Defendants to properly
exercise their fiduciary duties to Instructure's stockholders, and
to recover damages resulting from violations of federal securities
laws by Defendants, the lawsuit adds.

The Plaintiff alleges that he, along with all other public
stockholders of Instructure common stock, are entitled to enjoin
the Proposed Transaction or, alternatively, to recover damages in
the event that the Proposed Transaction is consummated.

The Plaintiff is and has been a stockholder of Instructure.

Instructure provides applications for learning, assessment, and
performance management through a software-as-a-service business
model worldwide. It develops Canvas, a learning management platform
for higher education; and Bridge, an employee development and
engagement platform.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blake A. Bennett, Esq.
          COOCH AND TAYLOR, P.A.
          1007 N. Orange Street, Suite 1120
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 984-3800

               - and -

          Marc L. Ackerman, Esq.
          Ryan P. Cardona, Esq.
          BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
          Two Bala Plaza, Suite 510
          Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
          Telephone: (610) 667-6200
          Facsimile: (610) 667-9029
          E-mail: mackerman@brodskysmith.com
                  rcardona@brodskysmith.com


JPMORGAN CHASE: Court Awards $731M Attorneys' Fees in Merryman Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BENJAMIN MICHAEL MERRYMAN, AMY WHITAKER MERRYMAN
TRUST, B MERRYMAN AND A MERRYMAN 4TH GENERATION REMAINDER TRUST AND
CHESTER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-09188-VEC
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement
of Litigation Expenses.

The Plaintiffs are owners of American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs")
held on deposit by J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM").  ADRs are
negotiable United States securities that enable holders to obtain
ownership of publicly traded shares in foreign corporations.
Pursuant to Deposit Agreements between JPM, the foreign issuer, and
the registered owners of the ADRs, JPM converted dividends or cash
distributions received from the foreign companies into U.S. dollars
before distributing them to the owners of the ADRs.  The Plaintiffs
claim that during the conversion into U.S. dollars, JPM added a
spread over and above the foreign exchange rates it obtained.  In
adding this spread, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendant breached
the Deposit Agreements.

On May 1, 2015, the Merryman Plaintiffs, represented by Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, filed a complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Arkansas.  The complaint asserted
claims against Defendant for breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion.
The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds,
including lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim.

On Nov. 19, 2015, the Plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed, without
prejudice, for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Two days later, on
Nov. 21, 2015, the Merryman Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
Court, again alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion.

On Dec. 8, 2015, the Defendant wrote to the Court regarding
Merryman v. Citigroup, Inc. et al., No. 15-CV-9185 (CM) ("Citi"), a
parallel case pending in the New York District.   The Plaintiffs
acknowledged the similarity between the two cases but requested
that they remain separate because they concerned different
defendants and a different set of agreements.  The Court did not
combine or coordinate the two cases.

On Jan. 22, 2016, JPM moved to dismiss the Complaint.  The motion
argued, among other things, that: (1) the Plaintiffs' claims were
barred by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
("SLUSA"); (2) the Plaintiffs lacked contractual standing under the
Deposit Agreements; (3) the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
claims on behalf of all JPM-sponsored ADRs; (4) the Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim for breach of contract; and (5) the
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing and conversion were duplicative of the breach of
contract claim.  On Sept. 29, 2016, the Defendant's motion to
dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.

On Nov. 21, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Class Action
Complaint, adding Chester County Employees Retirement Fund as a
plaintiff and adding claims for ADRs owned by Chester County; the
Amended Complaint did not otherwise change the causes of action or
theories of liability.  The Defendant again moved to dismiss and
the motion to dismiss was again granted in part and denied in
part.

After months of written discovery, depositions, expert discovery,
and additional negotiations, the Parties reached an agreement in
principle on April 12, 2018.   The Settlement Agreement provides
for $9.5 million, less any attorneys' fees and litigation expenses,
notice and administration costs, and taxes, to be distributed to
the eligible Class Members according to the court-approved plan of
allocation.  By Order dated Nov. 22, 2019, the Court certified a
settlement class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and approved the parties' Settlement Agreement as fair
and adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  The
Court also approved the parties' Plan of Allocation.

The Class Counsel requests (i) one third of the settlement amount,
or $3,166,666.67 as attorneys' fee, (ii) reimbursement of
$264,680.05 in litigation expenses, and (iii) Class Counsel
requests Service Awards of $2,500 each to the Merryman Plaintiffs
and Chester County.  The Merryman Plaintiffs received $20,000 from
the Citi Settlement Agreement.

Judge Caproni finds that the although the Kessler Firm suggests
that it is, therefore, taking a slight haircut, its fee request is
shockingly high given the circumstances of the case.  In
particular, "scrutiny of the unique circumstances" surrounding the
case, namely the case's procedural history and its marked
similarity to the Citi case, necessitates a significant reduction
of the lodestar.  After consideration of the Goldberger factors and
significantly recalculating Class Counsel's lodestar, Judge Caproni
finds an award of $731,063.99 to be reasonable.

As for the expert expenses, the Class counsel retained two experts
in the case; 8Rivers Capital to prepare a damages methodology and
calculate class-wide damages and HF Media, LLC to design the
modified class notice program.  The Class Counsel requests $167,400
for 8Rivers's fee and $7,560.60 for HF Media, LLC's fee, totaling
$174,960.60.  Because the Class Counsel did not even attempt to
show that there was not substantial duplication of the expert's
work between these two cases, Judge Caproni reduces the requested
amount by 75%.  Accordingly, Judge Caproni will award $41,850 as
reimbursement for work performed by 8Rivers and $7,560.60 for work
done by HF Media, LLC, totaling $49,410.60 in reimbursement for
expert expenses.

The Class Counsel seeks reimbursement of $16,536.21 in travel
expenses.  The amount is unreasonably high, Judge Caproni opines.
Specifically, the Judge finds the Class Counsel's caps,
particularly $500 per night for lodging, $20 per person for
breakfast, and $50 per person for dinner, to be too generous.  The
Class Counsel also fails to indicate whether it has a policy
prohibiting its attorneys from charging alcohol to the client.
Lastly, the Class Counsel provides inadequate detail regarding the
expenses incurred during the six depositions taken in New York.
For these reasons, the Judge reduces the requested travel expenses
by 20%.  Accordingly, Judge Caproni awards $13,228.97 in travel
expenses.

The Class Counsel requests $16,129.78 for the cost of online legal
and factual research.  Because despite the Court putting the
Counsel on notice that it might not allow reimbursement for
computerized legal research services, the Counsel failed to do so,
all of the costs for these expenses will be disallowed.  The Class
Counsel's request for $1,133 in court fees is reasonable; those
costs will be allowed.  In sum, the Court awards $63,772.57 as
reimbursement for expert expenses, travel expenses, and court
fees.

Finally, the Class Counsel requests Service Awards of $2,500 each
to the Merryman Plaintiffs and Chester County.  The Merryman
Plaintiffs received $20,000 from the Citi Settlement Agreement.  It
is difficult to believe that any incremental work done by them in
this case warrants an additional $2,500.  As a result, Judge
Caproni awards nothing to the Merryman Plaintiffs.  Judge Caproni
awards the requested $2,500 to Chester County, which also received
a service award of $2,500 in the Citi case.

For reasons stated, Judge Caproni granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation
Expenses.  The Class Counsel is awarded attorneys' fees of
$731,063.99 and reimbursement of expenses in the sum of $63,772.57.
The Judge awarded a service fee of $2,500 to Chester County.  

A full-text copy of Judge Caproni's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion & Order
is available at https://is.gd/S61Db6 from Leagle.com.

Benjamin Michael Merryman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Christopher
Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J. Barlieb,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul -- snirmul@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Amy Whitaker Merryman Trust, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & B Merryman and A Merryman 4th
Generation Remainder Trust, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
Christopher Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J.
Barlieb, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP &
Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Chester County Retirement Board, Plaintiff, represented by Sharan
Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Chester County Employees Retirement Fund, Plaintiff, represented by
Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer
L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer
Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Susan Leslie
Saltzstein, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Franklin B.
Velie, Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP, Jeffrey S. Geier,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Jonathan G. Kortmansky --
jkortmansky@piercebainbridge.com -- Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price &
Hecht, LLP & Marco Enrique Schnabl -- marco.schnabl@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.


JPMORGAN CHASE: Settlement in Merryman Suit Gets Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BENJAMIN MICHAEL MERRYMAN, AMY WHITAKER MERRYMAN
TRUST, B MERRYMAN AND A MERRYMAN 4TH GENERATION REMAINDER TRUST AND
CHESTER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-09188-VEC
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Valerie Caproni of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York fully and finally approved the
parties' Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated June 12,
2018.

Having reviewed and considered the Stipulation, all papers filed
and proceedings held in connection with the Settlement, all oral
and written comments received regarding the Settlement, and the
record in the Litigation, and good cause appearing therefor, Judge
Caproni finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair,
reasonable and adequate to the Settlement Class.  

The Judge finally certified, solely for purposes of effectuating
the Settlement, the Litigation as a class action on behalf of a
Settlement Class defined as all Persons or entities who are or were
holders (directly or indirectly, registered or beneficially) of or
otherwise claim any entitlement to any payment (whether a dividend,
rights offering, interest on capital, sale of shares or other
distribution) in connection with (1) the securities listed in
Appendix 1 to the Stipulation (including any predecessor or
successor securities) from Nov. 21, 2010 to July 18, 2018,
inclusive; or (2) the securities listed in Appendix 2 to the
Stipulation (including any predecessor or successor securities)
from Nov. 21, 2012 to July 18, 2018, inclusive.

The Plaintiffs are appointed, for purposes of effectuating the
Settlement only, as the representatives for the Settlement Class.


Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, which was appointed by the
Court to serve as the Lead Counsel, is appointed, for settlement
purposes only, as the counsel for the Settlement Class.

A full-text copy of Judge Caproni's Nov. 22, 2019 Order & Final
Judgment is available at https://is.gd/7bOzis from Leagle.com.

Benjamin Michael Merryman, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Christopher
Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J. Barlieb,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer
& Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer -- jmeltzer@ktmc.com -- Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul -- snirmul@ktmc.com -- Kessler
Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Amy Whitaker Merryman Trust, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated & B Merryman and A Merryman 4th
Generation Remainder Trust, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel
Christopher Mulveny, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Ethan J.
Barlieb, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer L. Enck, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer Neumann, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP &
Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Chester County Retirement Board, Plaintiff, represented by Sharan
Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP.

Chester County Employees Retirement Fund, Plaintiff, represented by
Geoffrey Coyle Jarvis, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jennifer
L. Enck, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Jonathan Flexer
Neumann, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Joseph H. Meltzer,
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP, Zachary Arbitman, Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP & Sharan Nirmul, Kessler Topaz Meltzer &
Check, LLP.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Defendant, represented by Susan Leslie
Saltzstein, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Franklin B.
Velie, Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP, Jeffrey S. Geier,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Jonathan G. Kortmansky --
jkortmansky@piercebainbridge.com -- Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price &
Hecht, LLP & Marco Enrique Schnabl -- marco.schnabl@skadden.com --
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.


KEMET CORPORATION: Faces Silverberg Suit Over Sale to Yageo
-----------------------------------------------------------
HERBERT SILVERBERG, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. KEMET CORPORATION; FRANK G. BRANDENBERG;
WILFRIED BACKES; GURMINDER S. BEDI; JACOB KOTZUBEI; WILLIAM M.
LOWE, JR.; E. ERWIN MADDREY, II; YASUKO MATSUMOTO; ROBERT G. PAUL;
and KAREN M. ROGGE, Case No. 1:20-cv-00036-UNA (D. Del., Jan 10,
2020), accuses the Defendants of violating the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9, 17
C.F.R. 240.14a-9, in connection with the proposed sale of KEMET to
Yageo Corporation and Sky Merger Sub Inc.

On November 11, 2019, the Company's board of directors caused the
Company to enter into an agreement and plan of merger with Yageo
Corporation and Sky Merger Sub Inc. Under the terms of the Merger
Agreement, KEMET stockholders will receive $27.20 in cash, without
interest, for each share of KEMET common stock they hold. The
consummation of the Proposed Merger is subject to certain closing
conditions, including the approval of the stockholders of KEMET.
The Company expects the Proposed Merger to close in the second half
of 2020.

On December 26, 2019, in order to convince KEMET's stockholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Merger, the Board authorized the
filing of a preliminary proxy statement, which was filed with the
SEC on Schedule 14A (the "Proxy Statement"). The Proxy Statement is
materially incomplete and misleading, and in violation of Sections
14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, the Plaintiff alleges. The
Plaintiff contends that while the Defendants, in the Proxy
Statement, tout the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the
Company's stockholders, they have failed to disclose material
information that is necessary for KEMET's stockholders to properly
assess the fairness of the Proposed Merger, thereby, rendering
certain statements in the Proxy Statement incomplete and
misleading.

The Plaintiff contends that it is imperative that the material
information that has been omitted from the Proxy Statement is
disclosed to the Company's stockholders prior to the forthcoming
stockholder vote so that they can properly exercise their corporate
suffrage rights.

The Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Defendants from holding the
stockholder vote on the Proposed Merger and taking any steps to
consummate the Proposed Merger unless and until the material
information is disclosed to KEMET's stockholders sufficiently in
advance of the vote on the Proposed Merger or, in the event the
Proposed Merger is consummated, to recover damages resulting from
the Defendants' violations of the Exchange Act.

The Plaintiff is and has been a KEMET stockholder.

KEMET manufactures and sells passive electronic components under
the KEMET brand worldwide. The company operates in three segments:
Solid Capacitors; Film and Electrolytic; and Electro-Magnetic,
Sensors, and Actuators. The individual Defendants are officers and
directors of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian D. Long, Esq.
          Gina M. Serra, Esq.
          RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A.
          300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 295-5310
          Facsimile: (302) 654-7530
          E-mail: bdl@rl-legal.com
                  gms@rl-legal.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Abraham, Esq.
          Michael J. Klein, Esq.
          ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
          One Penn Plaza, Suite 2805
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: (212) 279-5050
          Facsimile: (212) 279-3655
          E-mail: jabraham@aflaw.com
                  mklein@aflaw.com


KOHN LAW FIRM: Certification of Class Sought in Rozani Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Julian Rozani moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit captioned JULIAN ROZANI, Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S.C.,
Case No. 2:20-cv-00029 (E.D. Wisc.), and further asks that the
Court both stay the motion for class certification and to grant the
Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the Local Rules setting
automatic briefing schedules and requiring briefs and supporting
material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff contends.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


LEEDS MORELLI: Can't Compel Arbitration in Dowe Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned MAUREEN DOWE; ELVIE MOORE; and ESTHER
BUCKRAM, individually and on behalf of those Class Members
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.; LEEDS
MORELLI & BROWN, P.C.; LEEDS MORELLI & BROWN, LLP; LEEDS & MORELLI,
P.C.; LENARD LEEDS; STEVEN A MORELLI; JEFFREY K. BROWN; PRUDENTIAL
FINANCIAL INC., parent and successor in interest to PRUDENTIAL
SECURITIES, INC.; ERIC SCHWIMMER; and JOHN DOES 1-25, fictitious
persons and entities, Defendants, Case No. 18cv11633 (DLC) (S.D.
N.Y.), Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (i) granted Prudential's motion to
compel arbitration; (ii) denied LMB's motion to compel arbitration;
and (iii) granted LMB's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Dowe, Moore, and Buckram are former employees of
Prudential and former clients of the law firm Leeds & Morelli, P.C.
or its successors ("LMB").  In the putative class action, the
Plaintiffs allege that LMB conspired with Prudential to settle
discrimination claims against Prudential for less than their true
value, in exchange for side payments from Prudential to LMB.

Beginning in 1997, LMB solicited Prudential employees to become
clients of the firm and bring employment-discrimination claims
against Prudential.  Dowe was one such client, and in January 1998,
she signed a retainer agreement providing that LMB would represent
her in "negotiating a settlement against" Prudential and that LMB
would receive one third of the settlement as attorneys' fees.

On Feb. 13, 1998, LMB entered into a five-page Dispute Resolution
Agreement ("DRA") with Prudential.  The DRA provided that
Prudential and the employees represented by LMB had agreed to
utilize confidential and informal dispute resolution procedures for
the resolution of" the employment-discrimination claims.  

Despite these representations, the Plaintiffs allege that LMB had
not shown the DRA to its clients and never did so.  Instead, LMB
later presented its clients with a signature page for the DRA and
instructed them to sign.  The Defendants have submitted a signature
page executed by Dowe on March 8, 1998.  It is entitled Execution
and Acknowledgement and contains a declaration under penalty of
perjury.

Unbeknownst to Dowe or the other employees, LMB and Prudential had
also executed a side agreement on Feb. 13, 1998 -- the same day
they entered into the DRA.  In a letter to LMB, Prudential agreed
that it would pay LMB $1.5 million within one week of LMB's
execution of the DRA.  Between 1998 and 2000, Prudential paid LMB
an additional $6 million in fees.

In February 1999, LMB informed Dowe that Prudential had offered
$150,000 to settle her claim.  LMB recommended that Dowe accept the
settlement, and she did so.  Dowe signed a settlement agreement on
Feb. 6, 1999.  That agreement was made between Dowe and Prudential.
Prudential therein agreed to pay Dowe $150,000 in exchange for
release of her claims.  Dowe agreed not to disclose "any
information regarding the amount of, terms of, or facts or
circumstances underlying" the settlement.  The settlement agreement
also included an arbitration clause.

In the agreement, Dowe also acknowledged that she had carefully
read and understood its terms, had not relied on any extrinsic
representations or statements, and had been encouraged to have the
document reviewed by her attorney.  The document was executed by
Prudential and Dowe.  It was not signed by LMB, nor was LMB
mentioned anywhere in the settlement agreement.

Dowe filed the lawsuit on Dec. 12, 2018.  On April 5, 2019, Dowe
filed an amended complaint.  On May 20, LMB and Prudential filed
separate motions to compel arbitration, or in the alternative to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On June 10, Dowe
filed a second amended complaint, which added Moore and Buckram as
the named Plaintiffs and added four new claims.  The Defendants'
motions became fully submitted on Aug. 9, 2019.

There is no dispute that the claims against Prudential fall within
the broad arbitration clause contained in the settlement agreement
between the Plaintiffs and Prudential.  The Plaintiffs contend,
however, that Prudential may not compel arbitration based upon the
arbitration clause contained in their settlement agreements because
the settlement agreements were fraudulently induced.  Judge Cote
holds it is not the law.  A court may consider a claim of fraud in
the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, but claims of
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally are for
arbitrators to decide.  The Plaintiffs make no allegations targeted
at the arbitration clause itself; rather, they allege a conflict of
interest that tainted the agreement as a whole.  Under the Supreme
Court's cases, the issue is for the arbitrator to decide.

In contrast, LMB's motion to compel arbitration must be denied,
Judge Cote opines.  The Plaintiffs, by agreeing to arbitrate
disputes arising out of their settlement agreements with
Prudential, did not agree to arbitrate claims they might have
against LMB.  Nor are they estopped from seeking court adjudication
of their claims against LMB.   LMB cannot compel arbitration of the
claims.

Turning to the Motions to Dismiss on statute of limitations
grounds, Judge Cote holds that none of the Plaintiffs' claims
against LMB is timely.  The only possible avenues for the
Plaintiffs to plead timely claims are the two-year discovery rule
under N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 213(8) or equitable estoppel due to
fraudulent concealment.  Neither path is open to the Plaintiffs.

For reasons stated, Judge Cote (i) granted Prudential's May 20,
2019 motion to compel arbitration; and (ii) granted LMB's May 20,
2019 motion to dismiss.  The action against Prudential is stayed
pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/hhUTd0 from Leagle.com.

Maureen Dowe, individually and on behalf of those Class Members
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Arthur D. Middlemiss
-- arthur.middlemiss@lbkmlaw.com -- Lewis Baach Kaufmann
Middlemiss, John W. Moscow -- john.moscow@lbkmlaw.com -- Lewis
Baach Kaufmann Middlemiss PLLC & Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Andrew
Lavoott Bluestone, Esq.

Elvie Moore & Esther Buckram, Plaintiffs, represented by Andrew
Lavoott Bluestone, Andrew Lavoott Bluestone, Esq & John W.
Moscow,Lewis Baach Kaufmann Middlemiss PLLC.

Leeds, Morelli & Brown PC, Leeds, Morelli & Brown LLP, Lenard
Leeds, Steven A. Morelli & Jeffrey K. Brown, Defendants,
represented by Carol A. Lastorino, Rivkin Radler LLP, Janice J.
DiGennaro -- janice.digennaro@rivkin.com -- Rivkin Radler, LLP &
Shari Claire Lewis -- shari.lewis@rivkin.com -- Rivkin Radler,
LLP.

Eric Schwimmer, Defendant, represented by Catherine Barry
Schumacher, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Liza May Velazquez,
Paul Weiss & Vincent Anthony Sama, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP.

Leeds Brown Law P.C. & Leeds & Morelli, PC, Defendants, represented
by Janice J. DiGennaro, Rivkin Radler, LLP.

Prudential Financial Inc., parent and successor in interest to
Prudential Securities Incorporated, Defendant, represented by
Vincent Anthony Sama, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.


LIBERTY PROPERTY: Rigrodsky & Long Files Suit Over Prologis Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., announces that it has filed a class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware on behalf of holders of Liberty Property Trust ("LPT")
(NYSE: LPT) common stock in connection with the proposed
acquisition of LPT by Prologis, Inc. and its affiliates
("Prologis") announced on October 27, 2019 (the "Complaint").  The
Complaint, which alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against LPT, its Board of Directors (the "Board"), and
Prologis, is captioned Thompson v. Liberty Property Trust, Case No.
1:19-cv-02230 (D. Del.).

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions concerning
this notice or your rights or interests, please contact plaintiff's
counsel, Seth D. Rigrodsky or Gina M. Serra at Rigrodsky & Long,
P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by
telephone at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

On October 27, 2019, LPT entered into an agreement and plan of
merger (the "Merger Agreement") with Prologis.  Pursuant to the
terms of the Merger Agreement, shareholders of LPT will receive
0.675 shares of Prologis common stock per share (the "Proposed
Transaction").

Among other things, the Complaint alleges that, in an attempt to
secure shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction, defendants
issued materially incomplete disclosures in a Form S-4 Registration
Statement (the "Registration Statement") filed with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The Complaint alleges
that the Registration Statement omits material information with
respect to, among other things, the Company's and Prologis's
financial projections and the analyses performed by LPT's financial
advisors. The Complaint seeks injunctive and equitable relief and
damages on behalf of holders of LPT common stock.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than February 24, 2020.  A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.  Any member of the proposed class may move the Court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Delaware, New York, and
California, has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf
of investors and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms
in numerous cases nationwide, including federal securities fraud
actions, shareholder class actions, and shareholder derivative
actions.

Contact:

       Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
       Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
       Gina M. Serra, Esq.
       Phone: (888) 969-4242
                  (302) 295-5310
       Fax: (302) 654-7530
       Website: www.rigrodskylong.com
       Email: info@rl-legal.com
              gms@rl-legal.com   
              sdr@rl-legal.com
[GN]


LOANCARE LLC: Charges Illegal Pay-to-Pay Fees, Tanner Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TRISTAN TANNER, STEPHANIE AUGUSTIN, SHIRLEY MCNEELY, and TIERA
HOLMES, On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated
v. LoanCare, LLC, Case No. 8:20-cv-00074-WFJ-AAS (M.D. Fla., Jan.
10, 2020), accuses the Defendant of breaches of contract and
violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act and Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act by charging and collecting illegal
processing fees, the Pay-to-Pay Fees, when borrowers pay their
monthly mortgage by phone or online.

The Plaintiffs contend that LoanCare illegally charges homeowners
fees between $5.00 and $15.00 for each online and telephone
payment.

LoanCare services mortgages throughout the United States and is
supposed to be compensated out of the interest paid on each
borrower's monthly payment. Here, LoanCare charged borrowers more
for online and telephone Pay-to-Pay Fees than it spends to process
those payments, pocketing the difference, the Plaintiffs allege.

Despite its uniform contractual obligations to charge only fees
explicitly allowed under the Uniform Mortgages and applicable law,
and only those amounts actually disbursed, LoanCare leverages its
position of power over homeowners and demands exorbitant Pay-to-Pay
Fees, according to the complaint. Even if some fee were allowed,
the mortgage uniform covenants and applicable law only allow
LoanCare to pass along the actual costs of fees incurred to it by
the borrowers--here, only a few cents per transaction.

The Plaintiffs all paid Pay-to-Pay Fees. The Plaintiffs assert they
and the Class Members were harmed by these Defendant's breaches.

LoanCare provides loan servicing solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James L. Kauffman, Esq.
          BAILEY GLASSER LLP
          1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite 540
          Washington, DC 20007
          Telephone: (202) 463-2101
          Facsimile: (202) 463-2103
          E-mail: jkauffman@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          Katherine M. Aizpuru, Esq.
          Chai Oliver Prentice, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  kaizpuru@tzlegal.com
                  vprentice@tzlegal.com


MARYLAND: Retirees Seek Class Action Status in Drug Benefits Case
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Danielle E. Gaines, writing for Maryland Matters, reports that more
than 1,000 state retirees are seeking to be recognized as a class
in a lawsuit against the state of Maryland over lost prescription
drug benefits -- and another 1,000 filings are on their way.

Certifying a class-action case would bring all retiree claims about
the drug benefits into one courtroom, while "separate actions by
individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent
adjudications," plaintiffs wrote in a memorandum filed with the
U.S. District Court on December 27.

It is the latest development in Fitch, et al. v. State of Maryland,
which was filed in 2018 and yielded an injunction that stopped a
state reform from taking place this year. It would have removed
Medicare-eligible retirees from a state plan and shifted them to
the federal program.

Lead plaintiff Kenneth Fitch and his attorney, Deborah A. Holloway
Hill, Esq., have held meetings across the state to inform retirees
about the change. They've collected thousands of forms from
retirees who say they want to be part of a class-action case. The
first 1,000 forms were delivered as part of a motion to certify
retirees as a class, and another 1,000 forms are being processed
now, Hill said December 25.

The state has so far not responded to the motion to certify a
class-action claim and officials from the Office of the Attorney
General and Department of Budget and Management declined to comment
Wednesday, December 25.

The number of retirees or vested state employees who could be part
of the case is estimated to be between 35,000 and 90,000 people,
according to the plaintiffs' filing.

The shift in retiree health benefits was in the works for several
years, but only became widely known last spring, when thousands of
retirees were mailed notices that they would need to enroll in
Medicare. That stemmed from pension reform passed by the General
Assembly in 2011, which lowered the state's post-employment
benefits liability by roughly $8 billion.

The plaintiffs' lawsuit claims that pension benefits are a form of
deferred compensation and constitute a property right, and that
reducing the availability of a previously promised health benefit
is unconstitutional.

"The promise and provision of certain guaranteed health benefits,
which include prescription drug coverage, for the duration of their
retirement, induced the Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated
persons to continue working as a State of Maryland employee and
forgo additional options and opportunities for employment and
benefits from other employers," Hill reiterated in December 27's
filing.

In response to outcry from retirees, the legislature passed a bill
this year to update the retiree prescription drug program. That
bill creates three plans to try to keep retirees "as whole as
possible," lawmakers said.

Under the bill, which passed into law last month without Republican
Gov. Lawrence J. Hogan Jr.'s signature, those who retire before
Dec. 31, 2019, would have access to a plan with an out-of-pocket
expense cap at $1,500. Retirees after that date would have a cap of
$2,500.

All retirees would have access to a life-sustaining prescription
drug plan in which the state would pick up the costs for critical
medications that are covered by the state's current plan but not
Medicare Part D. Lawmakers have tasked state government with
creating a program that would provide instant or near-instant
reimbursements to retirees after they pass the annual out-of-pocket
cap. The bill will not take effect until the lawsuit is settled.

Hill and Fitch said the lawsuit to reinstate the previous benefit
is necessary because a reimbursement-based program is not
sufficient for retirees on a fixed income who might need expensive
drugs to survive.

"Who has that kind of money to lay out?" Fitch asked about pricey
prescriptions.

"They've eliminated that drug coverage – in a different way,"
Hill said.

Fitch, who is diabetic, said he paid $930 in co-pays each year
under the state prescription drug plan, a figure that would shoot
up to an estimated $11,683.10 under a Medicare plan. The
class-action forms that he's collected include other tales of
sticker shock, Fitch and Hill said. [GN]


MDL 1203: Denial of Panoussi Claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Harvey Bartle III of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania affirmed the AHP Settlement Trust's denial
of Julie Panoussi's claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits in IN RE: DIET
DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATE TO: SHEILA BROWN, et al., v.
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, MDL No. 1203, Civil Action No.
99-20593, No. 2:16 MD 1203 (E.D. Pa.).

Claimant Julie Panoussi, a class member under the Diet Drug
Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with Wyeth, seeks
benefits from the AHP Settlement Trust.  To seek Matrix Benefits, a
claimant must first submit a completed Green Form to the Trust.
The Green Form consists of three parts.  The claimant or the
claimant's representative completes Part I of the Green Form.  Part
II is completed by the claimant's attesting physician, who must
answer a series of questions concerning the claimant's medical
condition that correlate to the Matrix criteria set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.  Finally, claimant's attorney must complete
Part III if claimant is represented.

In August 2016, the Claimant submitted a completed Green Form to
the Trust signed by her attesting physician, Duncan Salmon, M.D.
Based on an echocardiogram dated April 24, 2015, Dr. Salmon
attested in Part II of Ms. Panoussi's Green Form that claimant
suffered from severe mitral regurgitation and had surgery to repair
or replace the aortic and/or mitral valve(s) following the use of
Pondimin(R) and/or Redux(TM).  Based on such findings, the Claimant
would be entitled to Matrix A-1, Level III benefits in the amount
of $297,859.

Dr. Salmon also attested that Ms. Panoussi did not suffer from
mitral annular calcification.  Under the Settlement Agreement, the
presence of mitral annular calcification requires the payment of
reduced Matrix Benefits for a claim based on damage to the mitral
valve.  As the Trust does not contest claimant's entitlement to
Level III benefits, the only issue before the Court is whether
claimant is entitled to payment on Matrix A-1 or Matrix B-1.

In October 2016, the Trust forwarded the claim for review by Zuyue
Wang, M.D., one of its auditing cardiologists.  In audit, Dr. Wang
concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis for finding
that claimant did not have mitral annular calcification.  Pursuant
to Court Approved Procedure No. 11, the Consensus Expert Panel
subsequently reviewed Ms. Panoussi's claim.  The Consensus Expert
Panel did not recommend re-audit of Ms. Panoussi's claim.

Based on the auditing cardiologist's findings, the Trust issued a
post-audit determination that Ms. Panoussi was entitled only to
Matrix B-1, Level III benefits.  Pursuant to the Rules for the
Audit of Matrix Compensation Claims, the Claimant contested this
adverse determination.  In contest, Ms. Panoussi argued that there
was a reasonable basis for finding that mitral annular
calcification was not present on the April 24, 2015 echocardiogram.


Although not required to do so, the Trust forwarded the claim to
the auditing cardiologist for a second review.  Dr. Wang submitted
a declaration in which she again concluded that there was no
reasonable medical basis for finding that Ms. Panoussi did not have
mitral annular calcification.

The Trust then issued a final post-audit determination again
determining that Ms. Panoussi was entitled only to Matrix B-1,
Level III benefits.  The Claimant disputed this final determination
and requested that the claim proceed to the show cause process
established in the Settlement Agreement.  The Trust then applied to
the Court for issuance of an Order to show cause why Ms. Panoussi's
claim should be paid.  On April 12, 2018, the Court issued an Order
to show cause and referred the matter to the Special Master for
further proceedings.

Once the matter was referred to the Special Master, the Trust
submitted its statement of the case and supporting documentation.
The Claimant then served a response upon the Special Master.  The
Special Master assigned a Technical Advisor, Gary J. Vigilante,
M.D., F.A.C.C., to review the documents submitted by the Trust and
claimant and to prepare a report for the court.  The Show Cause
Record and Technical Advisor Report are now before the court for
final determination.

The issue presented for resolution of the claim is whether the
Claimant has met her burden of proving that there is a reasonable
medical basis for finding that she did not have mitral annular
calcification.  Ultimately, if the Court determines that there is
no reasonable medical basis for this finding, it must affirm the
Trust's final determination and may grant such other relief as
deemed appropriate.  If, on the other hand, it determines that
there is a reasonable medical basis for this finding, it must enter
an Order directing the Trust to pay the claim in accordance with
the Settlement Agreement.

After reviewing the entire show cause record, Judge Bartle finds
that Ms. Panoussi's arguments are without merit.  As the Court
noted previously, the Settlement Agreement provides that the
presence of mitral annular calcification requires the payment of
reduced Matrix Benefits.  The Judge disagrees with Ms. Pannousi
that there is a reasonable medical basis for finding that her April
24, 2015 echocardiogram does not demonstrate mitral annular
calcification.

Dr. Wang and Dr. Vigilante each reviewed claimant's April 24, 2015
echocardiogram and concluded that it demonstrated mitral annular
calcification.  Notably, the cardiologist who initially interpreted
claimant's echocardiogram noted there is mild mitral annular
calcification.  Neither Dr. Wang nor Dr. Vigilante simply deferred
to the findings of claimant's surgeon in light of these specific
findings, which claimant does not adequately dispute.  The
Settlement Agreement provides that the presence of mitral annular
calcification, regardless of level, requires the payment of reduced
Matrix Benefits.  Unlike some of the other factors that reduce a
claim to Matrix B-1, any presence of mitral annular calcification,
regardless of the amount, places the claim on Matrix B-1.

The Claimant further argues the fact that she had mitral valve
repair, rather than replacement, surgery is evidence that she did
not have mitral annular calcification.  Dr. Salmon's own statement
undermines this argument.  Dr. Salmon opined that calcification of
the mitral annulus renders mitral valve repair difficult and
replacement surgery is typically performed in cases involving
mitral annular calcification.  Dr. Wang confirmed that patients
with mitral annular calcification undergo repair surgery routinely
and that she has even consulted on such procedures.  Thus, it is
not reasonable to infer that simply because Ms. Panoussi underwent
mitral valve repair surgery she did not have mitral annular
calcification.

For the stated reasons, Judge Bartles concludes that Ms. Panoussi
has not met her burden of proving that there is a reasonable
medical basis for finding that she did not have mitral annular
calcification.  Accordingly, Judge Bartles affirmed the Trust's
denial of Ms. Panoussi's claim for Matrix A-1 Benefits.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/rsOAhb from Leagle.com.

WILLIAMS DAILEY, Special Master, represented by MICHAEL L.
WILLIAMS, WILLIAMS O'LEARY LLC.

VIVIAN NAUGLE, QUINTIN LAYER, Plaintiffs, represented by ARNOLD
LEVIN -- alevin@lfsblaw.com -- LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN, CHRISTOPHER
MICHAEL PLACITELLA -- cplacitella@cprlaw.com -- COHEN PLACITELLA &
ROTH PC, DIANNE M. NAST -- dnast@nastlaw.com -- NASTLAW LLC, GENE
LOCKS -- glocks@lockslaw.com -- LOCKS LAW FIRM PLLC, JOHN J.
CUMMINGS, III, CUMMINGS CUMMINGS & DUDENHEFER, MARK W. TANNER --
mtanner@feldmanshepherd.com -- FELDMAN, SHEPHERD, WOHLGELERNTER,
TANNER & WEINSTOCK, MICHAEL D. FISHBEIN, LEVIN, FISHBEIN, SEDRAN &
BERMAN, RICHARD S. LEWIS -- rlewis@hausfeld.com -- HAUSFELD LLP,
RICHARD S. WAYNE -- rswayne@strausstroy.com -- STRAUSS & TROY,
ROBERT ERIC KENNEDY, WEISMAN, KENNEDY & BERRIS, SOL H. WEISS --
sweiss@anapolweiss.com -- ANAPOL WEISS & STANLEY M. CHESLEY, WAITE,
SCHNEIDER, BAYLESS & CHESLEY CO., L.P.A..

JOAN S. LAYER, Plaintiff, represented by SOL H. WEISS, ANAPOL
WEISS.

BRENDA CHAMBERS, ISABEL CONNOR, RANDY G. ALLEN, Appellants,
represented by ARNOLD LEVIN, LEVIN SEDRAN & BERMAN.

CHARLENE ALLSPAUGH, Appellant, pro se.

DORIS ATANMO, Appellant, pro se.

EVELYN AMEND, Appellant, pro se.

JOAN BAKANOWSKY, Appellant, pro se.

STEVEN BERKOWITZ, Appellant, pro se.

KATHY BURROW, Appellant, pro se.

LINDA BUSBY, Appellant, pro se.

JO BUTTERFIELD, Appellant, pro se.

LINDA CASTON, Appellant, pro se.

AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant, represented by
Andrew A. Chirls, Esq. -- achirls@finemanlawfirm.com -- FINEMAN
KREKSTEIN & HARRIS PC; Kevin A. Cline, Esq. --
kevin.cline@aporter.com -- ARNOLD & PORTER LLP; Leslie Anne
Benitez, Esq. --
lbenitez@gordonrees.com -- GORDON & REES LLP; Edward F. Hanover,
III, Esq. -- ehanover@reedsmith.com --  Louis W. Schack, Esq. --
lschack@reedsmith.com -- and Milind M. Shah, Esq. --
mshah@reedsmith.com -- REED SMITH LLP.

AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant, pro se.


MDL 2804: Taylor v. Purdue Pharma Over Opioid Drugs Consolidated
----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as William Taylor individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. PURDUE PHARMA L.P.; PURDUE PHARMA,
INC.; THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY, INC.; MCKESSON CORPORATION;
CARDINAL HEALTH, INC.; AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION; TEVA
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, LTD.; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.;
CEPHALON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.;
ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. n/k/a JANSSEN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.; JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, Case 2:19-cv-02596
(Filed Oct. 2, 2019), was transferred from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Kansas to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio (Cleveland) on Jan. 10, 2020.

The Northern District of Ohio Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-op-45017-DAP to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Dan Aaron Polster. The lead case is Case No.
1:17-md-02804-DAP.

The lawsuit seeks to recompense for compensatory damages, emotional
distress; loss of enjoyment of life; lost earning capacity and loss
of income; loss of filial consortium; loss of spousal consortium;
anguish; sorrow; solace, including companionship, comfort,
guidance, kindly offices, advise, services, protection, care, and
assistance; services for medical care, including any necessary
rehabilitation; and/or funeral and burial expenses.

Prescription opioids have devastated communities across the country
and in the State of West Virginia. In addition to the tragic loss
of life and the heartbreaking impact on children and loved ones,
some estimates state that the opioid crisis is costing governmental
entities and private companies as much as $500 billion per year.

The Defendants manufacture, market, sell, and distribute
prescription opioids, which are highly addictive narcotic
painkillers. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants have
engaged in a cunning and deceptive marketing scheme to encourage
doctors and patients to use opioids to treat chronic pain. In doing
so, the Plaintiff says, the Defendants falsely minimized the risks
of opioids, overstated their benefits, and generated far more
opioid prescriptions than there should have been.

The opioid epidemic is the direct result of the Defendants'
deliberately crafted, well-funded campaign of deception. For years,
they misrepresented the risks posed by the opioids they manufacture
and sell, misleading susceptible prescribers and vulnerable patient
populations. As families and communities suffered from the scourge
of opioid abuse, the Defendants earned billions in profits as a
direct result of the harms they inflicted, the Plaintiff asserts.

The direct and proximate consequence of the Defendants' misconduct
is that every West Virginia purchaser of private health insurance
paid higher premiums, co-payments, and deductibles. Insurance
companies have considerable market power and pass onto their
insureds the expected cost of future care--including opioid-related
coverage. Accordingly, insurance companies factored in the
unwarranted and exorbitant healthcare costs of opioid-related
coverage caused by the Defendants and charged that back to insureds
in the form of higher premiums, deductibles, and co-payments, the
lawsuit says.

The Taylor Case is being consolidated in MDL 2804 RE: NATIONAL
PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION. The MDL was created by Order of the
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Dec. 5,
2017.

The Plaintiffs in the actions allege that: (1) manufacturers of
prescription opioid medications overstated the benefits and
downplayed the risks of the use of their opioids and
aggressivelymarketed (directly and through key opinion leaders)
these drugs to physicians, and/or (2) distributors failed to
monitor, detect, investigate, refuse and report suspicious orders
of prescription opiates. All actions involve common factual
questions about, inter alia, the manufacturing and distributor
defendants' knowledge of and conduct regarding the alleged
diversion of these prescription opiates, as well as the
manufacturers' alleged improper marketing of such drugs.

In its Dec. 5, 2017 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in
this MDL involve common questions of fact, and that centralization
in the Northern District of Ohio will serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of
the litigation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert L. Kinsman, Esq.
          KRAUSE & KINSMAN
          4717 Grand Avenue, Ste. 250
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 760-2700
          Facsimile: (816) 760-2800


MERIT MEDICAL: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Feb. 3 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming February 3, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of Merit Medical Systems, Inc.
("Merit" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: MMSI) investors who purchased
common stock between February 26, 2019 and October 30, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Charles Linehan,
Esquire, at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or by email to
shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
www.glancylaw.com.

On July 25, 2019, post-market, the Company announced disappointing
financial results for second quarter 2019, reporting net income of
$6.9 million, or $0.12 per share, compared to $10.9 million, or
$0.21 per share for the same period in the prior year. Merit's
Chief Executive Officer cited "a number of factors affecting
revenues and gross margins during the second quarter," including
"foreign exchange [and] slower than anticipated conversion and
uptake of acquired products."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $13.84, or over 25%,
to close at $41.00 on July 26, 2019, thereby injuring investors.

On October 30, 2019, the Company announced its third quarter 2019
financial results, lowered revenue guidance for fiscal 2019, and
eliminated previously issued guidance for fiscal 2020.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $8.45, or 29%, to
close at $20.66 per share on October 31, 2019, thereby injuring
investors further.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the integrations of Cianna and Vascular
Insights, including their products, sales people, and R&D
facilities, had caused operational disruptions and reduced sales
and were months behind schedule; (2) that sales of acquired company
products had slowed substantially due to pre-acquisition pipeline
fill, in particular for Vascular Insights products which, as late
as July 2019, had zero orders during fiscal 2019; and (3) that in
light of the foregoing, the Company's reported financial guidance
for fiscal 2019 and 2020 was made without a reasonable basis.

Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/GPM_LLP.

If you purchased Merit common stock during the Class Period, you
may move the Court no later than February 3, 2020 to request
appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative class action
lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need not take any
action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take
no action and remain an absent member of the class action. If you
wish to learn more about this class action, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to the pending class action lawsuit, please contact
Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite
2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our
website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased.

Contact:

         Charles Linehan, Esq.
         Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
         Tel: 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
         E-mail: shareholders@glancylaw.com
                 clinehan@glancylaw.com
         Website: www.glancylaw.com
[GN]


MERIVALE: Says Employees Unlikely to Benefit From Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Anna Patty, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports that
Justin Hemmes' hospitality giant Merivale has denied employees will
get any benefit from a class action for alleged underpayments of up
to $129 million, saying the company will vigorously defend the
case.

"Merivale has always acted with the interests of its workforce
squarely in mind and does not anticipate that its employees will in
any way benefit from these proceedings," said Sue Cato, a Merivale
spokeswoman.

Adero, a Canberra-based law firm that specialises in class actions,
said it has filed Federal Court action against Merivale alleging a
WorkChoices agreement which resulted in the underpayment of penalty
rates and other benefits was not validly approved 10 years ago. The
claim alleges that staff should have been paid industry award rates
because the agreement was invalid.

The statement of claim alleges that a pastry chef at Merivale's
French bistro Felix, in Sydney, was paid a base salary of $48,000
for a 38-hour week but was required to work an average of 55 hours
or more each week.

Adero has estimated more than 8000 Merivale restaurant and bar
staff could be eligible to claim backpay of up to $129 million
under the class action.

The Merivale spokeswoman said Adero's class actions were typically
bankrolled by litigation funders "whose interests in the
proceedings concern receiving very large commissions from proceeds
which the Courts award to class action members".

"The scale of those commissions have previously been the subject of
adverse criticisms from a range of courts," she said.

If the class action goes ahead, Merivale, which has more than 70
restaurant, pub and hotel venues, would "vigorously defend" any
legal claim lodged.

A letter written in June 2009 by Penny Weir, acting director of the
Australian government's Workplace Authority, to Merivale's lawyers
says that a 2007 wages agreement for Merivale staff had not passed
the fairness test.

Despite this failure, the Workplace Authority then decided to
rescind its previous decision to reject the agreement because of
unexplained administrative issues.

"The undertaking submitted on 29 December 2008 was not sufficient
for the Agreement to pass the fairness test," Ms Weir's letter
says. "However, you outline significant administrative issues
experienced by your client and this provides grounds to rescind the
original notice advising you that the Agreement does not pass the
fairness test."

In the statement of claim, Adero says the 2010 hospitality industry
award covered Merivale staff for the past six years, the maximum
period claimable under the Fair Work Act.

The Merivale spokeswoman said it had not yet received any class
action proceedings via the courts or Adero.

"Responding without service of any class action documents is
difficult, however Merivale firmly believes there is no basis for
any action," the spokeswoman said.

"From the scant information at hand, the only basis for this claim
seems to be that the Federal Government regulator is alleged to
have got it wrong when it approved the enterprise agreement some
ten years ago which cannot be Merivale's fault.

"Merivale regularly reviews its compliance regarding employee
entitlements and has had them independently assessed by external
parties." [GN]


MICROSOFT CORP: No Class Status of Gender Bias Claims Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------
Nate Robson, writing for The Recorder, reports that a federal
appeals court has upheld a ruling undercutting a prospective class
action against Microsoft for allegedly underpaying and not
promoting nearly 8,600 female employees.

A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sided
with a team from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe in affirming a 2018
decision not to certify the class accusing Microsoft of
systematically discriminating against women in both pay and
promotions. U.S. District Judge James Robart of the Western
District of Washington found there were no uniform policies or job
descriptions that tied the proposed class together.

"The allegedly discriminatory pay and promotion decisions in the
instant case do not present common questions because the proposed
class consists of more than 8,600 women, who held more than 8,000
different positions in facilities throughout the United States,"
the panel wrote in the unpublished ruling December 24. "Further,
appellants failed to identify a common mode of discretion
throughout Microsoft because the individual managers had broad
discretion over how to conduct the Calibration Meetings/People
Discussions, as well as over the decisions that they made at those
meetings."

More than 30 civil rights and labor groups filed an amicus brief
urging the panel to reverse Robart's ruling. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the Washington Legal Foundation were among the groups
that filed amicus briefs siding with Microsoft.

The panel was composed of Ninth Circuit Judges Richard Paez and
Johnnie Rawlinson, and U.S. District Judge Leslie Kobayashi of
Hawaii sitting by designation.

Attorneys from Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein represented the
plaintiffs, and appeared to face an uphill fight during oral
arguments in November.

The panelists peppered Lieff Cabraser partner Anne Shaver with
questions during the hearing about how Microsoft evaluated its
employees, and pushed her to identify the policy at issue.

"I don't feel there is a policy that's been pointed out," Rawlinson
said at one point during the hearing.

Orrick partner Lynne Hermle handled arguments for Microsoft.

The case is one of several gender bias lawsuits that have targeted
the technology industry. Other companies that have faced scrutiny
include Google, Oracle, Twitter and Uber Technologies.

A California appellate court earlier in December refused to
overturn a ruling denying class certification in a case against
Twitter brought on behalf of 135 female software engineers who
claimed they were disproportionately passed over for promotions.
Orrick represents Twitter in that case. [GN]


MIH SALES: Violates Overtime Provisions of FLSA, Turner Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
JESSIE TURNER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, and MELODEE THOMPSON v. M.I.H. SALES & MARKETING, INC.,
AND JOHN HILGER, Case No. 4:20-cv-00044-LPR (E.D. Ark., Jan 10,
2020), accuses the Defendants of violating the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act.

According to the compliant, the Defendants willfully failed to pay
overtime wages to the Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees,
who worked more than 40 hours in a week during the time period
relevant to the complaint. The Plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment
interest, and a reasonable attorney's fee and costs as a result of
the violations of the FLSA and AMWA.

Plaintiff Turner worked for the Defendants as a cashier and
delivery driver from August 2019 to November 2019. Plaintiff
Thompson worked for the Defendants as cashier from August 2019 to
November 2019. As cashiers, the Plaintiffs performed duties, such
as servicing customers and keeping the store in order.

The Defendants own and operate several Chicken City stores
throughout Arkansas, including stores in North Little Rock, Conway,
White Hall, Jonesboro and Marion. Hilger manages and controls the
day-to-day operations of MIH.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          Lydia Hamlet, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford Road, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Telephone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          E-mail: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com
                  lydia@sanfordlawfirm.com


MPSK INC: Faces Acevedo Suit Over Improper Pay Under FLSA & IMWL
----------------------------------------------------------------
EDWARD ACEVEDO, on behalf of himself, and all other plaintiffs
similarly situated, known and unknown v. M.P.S.K., INC. D/B/A THE
SYBER TECHNOLOGY GROUP, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION AND MICHAEL POWELL,
INDIVIDUALLY, Case No. 1:19-cv-07332 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 6, 2019), is
brought over improper compensation under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law and the Chicago Minimum Wage
Ordinance, Section 1-241-10 of the Municipal Code of Chicago.

Mr. Acevedo, a former employee of the Defendants, alleges that the
Defendants compensated him and members of the proposed class on a
"piece-rate" basis but failed to pay one- and one-half times the
employees' effective rate established by the piece-rate
compensation.  He asserts that the Defendants' failure to properly
calculate the overtime rate and compensate him and others at the
statutory overtime rate for work in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek is in violation of local, state and federal laws.

M.P.S.K., Inc., doing business as The Syber Technology Group, is an
Illinois corporation that provides IT support services to corporate
clients in the private and public sectors.  STG is located in
Chicago, Illinois.  Michael Powell is the owner and President of
STG.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John William Billhorn, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450
          E-mail: jbillhorn@billhornlaw.com


NOW HOME: Rogers Sues Over Unwanted Robo-Calls and Robo-Texts
-------------------------------------------------------------
NICK ROGERS, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. NOW HOME BUYERS LLC dba WHOLESALE FLORIDA HOMES, INC.,
a Florida Corporation, Case No. 9:20-cv-80037-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Jan
10, 2020), alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its
merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited telemarketing calls
and spam texts to wireless phone users, in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff contends that Defendant knew and/or should have known
that it was using "robo-calling" and "robo-texting" to generate
leads. Additionally, the Defendant failed to have adequate and
proper policies and procedures in place to ensure that its agents
and/or vendors were not using the illegal telephone solicitation
method of "robo-calling" and robo-texting." Therefore, the
Plaintiff asserts, the Defendant is directly liable for the
"robo-calls" and "robo-texts' made to its prospective customers.

The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages, injunctive relief, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies to secure redress from
the illegal actions of the Defendant in negligently or willfully
contacting his cellular telephone multiple times, thereby invading
his privacy.

The Defendant is a real estate broker in the business of selling
real estate, including the solicitation of potential investors for
Defendant's business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          Michael J. Pascucci, Esq.
          Joshua H. Eggnatz, Esq.
          Steven N. Saul, Esq.
          EGGNATZ PASCUCCI
          5400 S. University Drive, Ste. 417
          Davie, FL 33328
          Telephone: (954) 889-3359
          Facsimile: (954) 889-5913


ONLINE INFORMATION: Certification of Class Sought in Morgan Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Regina Morgan moves the Court to certify the class described in the
complaint of the lawsuit titled REGINA MORGAN, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. ONLINE INFORMATION
SERVICES, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-00028 (E.D. Wisc.), and further
asks that the Court both stay the motion for class certification
and to grant the Plaintiff (and the Defendant) relief from the
Local Rules setting automatic briefing schedules and requiring
briefs and supporting material to be filed with the Motion.

Dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v.
Gomez, left open the possibility that a defendant facing a class
action complaint could moot a class representative's case by
depositing funds equal to or in excess of the maximum value of the
plaintiff's individual claim with the court and having the court
enter judgment in the plaintiff's favor prior to the filing of a
class certification motion, the Plaintiff asserts, citing
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).

To avoid the risk of a defendant mooting a putative class
representative's individual stake in the litigation, the Seventh
Circuit instructed plaintiffs to file a certification motion with
the complaint, along with a motion to stay briefing on the
certification motion.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds, Chapman v. First
Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The pendency of
that motion [for class certification] protects a putative class
from attempts to buy off the named plaintiffs.").

While the Seventh Circuit has held that the specific procedure
described in Campbell-Ewald cannot force the individual settlement
of a class representative's claims, the same decision cautions that
other methods may prevent a plaintiff from representing a class,
the Plaintiff tells the Court, citing Fulton Dental, LLC v. Bisco,
Inc., No. 16-3574, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10839 *9-10 (7th Cir. June
20, 2017).  The Plaintiff asserts that one defendant has attempted
a similar tactic by sending a certified check to the proposed class
representative. Bonin v. CBS Radio, Inc., No. 16-cv-674-CNC (E.D.
Wis.); see also Severns v. Eastern Account Systems of Connecticut,
Inc., Case No. 15-cv-1168, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 24, 2016).

The Plaintiff is obligated to move for class certification to
protect the interests of the putative class, the Plaintiff
asserts.

As the Motion to certify a class is a placeholder motion as
described in Damasco, the parties and the Court should not be
burdened with unnecessary paperwork and the resulting expense when
short motion to certify and stay should suffice until an amended
motion is filed, the Plaintiff avers.

The Plaintiff also asks to be appointed as class representative,
and for the appointment of Ademi & O'Reilly, LLP, as class
counsel.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          ADEMI & O'REILLY, LLP
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com


PALM BEACH, FL: Denial of Class Status in Utilities Case Appealed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
William Kelly, writing for Palm Beach Daily News, reports that two
residents are appealing a judge's denial of class certification of
their lawsuit challenging the town assessments of property owners
to pay for the burial of all overhead utilities on the island.

Michael Scharf and Carol Kosberg have appealed Palm Beach County
Circuit Judge James Nutt's decision to Florida's Fourth District
Court of Appeal.

The town was notified of the action on December 26, the last day in
a 30-day window to appeal Nutt's Nov. 26 ruling.

Boca Raton attorney William Berger, Esq., who is representing
Kosberg and Scharf, could not be reached for comment.

The town is represented by West Palm Beach attorneys Joanne
O'Connor, Esq. and Robert Wilkins, Esq.

"It's not unexpected," Wilkins said. "They had an absolute right to
file the notice of appeal."

Kosberg and Scharf have 35 days to file an initial brief with the
appellate court, followed by a response from the town. It typically
takes six to nine months before the three appellate judges issue a
ruling, Wilkins said.

If the appeal is denied, the plaintiffs' remaining recourse would
be to petition the Florida Supreme Court to hear the request.

A class-action certification would enable Kosberg and Scharf to
collect reimbursement from the town for their attorneys' fees
should they prevail in the case. But failure to win the
certification would not prevent them from going forward with their
lawsuit as individuals if they so choose.

In his ruling, Nutt said Scharf and Kosberg failed to demonstrate
that their complaint would adequately and fairly represent the
divergent interests of all other property owners who would have
been certified as class members.

The town is assessing property owners to repay bonds issued to
finance most of the cost of burying all overhead utilities on the
island. The assessments are being collected annually over a period
of 30 years.

Construction began in 2017 and is expected to take nine years to
complete. The cost of the work was recently revised upward from
$103 million to $120 million.

Scharf, a former zoning commissioner who owns a house in the North
End, and Kosberg, who owns a condominium in the South End, sued the
town in 2017, alleging the assessments are invalid because the town
relied on a consultant's "arbitrary" assessment methods. They are
asking a judge to halt the assessments and force the town to refund
the money it has so far collected.

More than 7,000 parcels are being assessed. Individual assessments
range from a few hundred dollars to thousands of dollars based on a
number of factors.

Each property is rated based on the improved safety, reliability
and aesthetic value it would receive from a town-wide underground
system. Also considered is the size and type of each property,
including whether it is single-family, condominium, vacant,
non-residential or multi-family.

Kosberg and Scharf contend in the suit that there are no special
benefits from buried utilities because there's no objective
evidence of an increase in the affected parcels' market values.

Voters in a 2016 referendum narrowly approved up to $90 million in
bonds to finance the project.

"There is plainly conflict between those who voted for and against
the referendum," Nutt wrote in his opinion. "There is plainly not a
uniform class-wide view of either the benefits or the [assessment]
apportionment."

If the assessments are invalidated, the town would have to repay
the bonds through a property tax increase, Nutt wrote. Property
taxes are based on each property's taxable value — a different
approach than the special assessment formula.

"In the end, some class members would financially benefit from the
relief while others would be financially disadvantaged," Nutt
wrote.

As of last month, the town had spent $516,238 defending against the
suit, according to the Finance Department.

The Kosberg-Scharf suit is one of three filed against the town
challenging the referendum language or assessments.

The other two, brought by South End resident Arthur Goldmacher and
PBT Real Estate, were dismissed without going to trial.

The town spent $183,701 defending against the Goldmacher suit. To
date, it has spent $159,182 in the case against PBT Real Estate,
which has appealed U.S. District Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks'
ruling to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.

PBT Real Estate's agent is John D. O'Neill, an attorney and West
Palm Beach resident. PBT Real Estate is a property owner in the
Palm Beach Towers, whose board of directors has said it is not
involved with the case.  [GN]


PATHWAY SENIOR: Dukes Sues Over Illegal Collection of Biometrics
----------------------------------------------------------------
TAKITA DUKES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PATHWAY SENIOR LIVING, LLC, Case No. 2020CH00330 (Ill.
Cir., Jan. 10, 2020), seeks to stop the Defendant's capture,
collection, use and storage of individuals' biometric identifiers
and/or biometric information, which violate the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act.

The Plaintiff contends that she was required to "clock-in" and
"clock-out" using a timeclock that operated, at least in part, by
scanning her fingerprint. As an employee, she was required to scan
at least one finger, multiple times, so Defendant could create,
collect, capture, construct, store, use, and/ or obtain a biometric
template for her.

The Defendant then used the Plaintiff's biometrics as an
identification and authentication method to track her time,
potentially with the help of a third-party vendor. The Defendant
subsequently stored her biometric data in its database(s). Each
time she began and ended her workday, in addition to clocking in
and out for lunches, she was required to scan her fingerprint using
the biometric timeclock device.

Ms. Dukes worked for the Defendant at Victory Centre in Galewood,
Illinois.

The Plaintiff alleges that she has never been informed of the
specific limited purposes or length of time for which Defendant
collected, stored, or used her biometrics. She further alleges that
she has never been informed of any biometric data retention policy
developed by Defendant, nor has she ever been informed of whether
Defendant will ever permanently delete her biometrics.

The Plaintiff brings the action for damages and other legal and
equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of the
Defendant.

Pathway provides senior care services. The Company operates,
manages, owns, and develops assisted as well as independent living
facilities for senior citizens.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Telephone: 314 833-4825
          E-mail: bwise@pwcklegal.com
                  plesko@pwcklegal.com


PIONEER HOME: State Attorneys Seek Dismissal of Class Action Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Stone, writing for KRBD.com, reports that state attorneys are
asking a Ketchikan judge to dismiss a class-action lawsuit brought
by three Pioneer Home residents after monthly rates more than
doubled: with top tier residents liable to owe $15,000 a month for
state-run assisted living.

Attorneys filed a suit in Ketchikan Superior Court on behalf of
Pioneer Home residents in Juneau and Ketchikan claiming that
dramatic rates increases threaten to bankrupt elderly Alaskans who
live in the state-run assisted living homes.

The lawsuit asks a judge to issue an injunction against the rate
increases and prevent any residents from being evicted for not
paying.

One of the plaintiffs, Ketchikan resident Eileen Casey, is now
nearly $100,000 in debt to the facility and administrators have
threatened to kick her out of the home, according to court
filings.

The state Attorney General's office's 12-page answer filed on Dec.
23 doesn't dispute these facts. Rather, it asks the court to toss
it on technical grounds by calling into question the plaintiffs'
standing and other factors.

State attorneys also argue that the plaintiff facing eviction
hadn't paid her rent prior to the hike or applied for assistance.
It also denies the claim that previous incremental rate increases
make a large jump - of around 138 percent in some cases - unfair.

The state's filing lays out some general avenues for a defense. It
could argue that Pioneer Home residents haven't been harmed by rate
increases; it could argue that residents had other options for
relief besides suing and it could argue that the plaintiffs are
acting in bad faith by challenging their bills in court.

A timeline for the lawsuit remains unclear. In the meantime, the
octo- and nonagenarians continue to live in Pioneer Homes in
Ketchikan and Juneau. They are among the 497 residents in six
Pioneer Homes affected by the increases. [GN]


PRECISION PIPELINE: Severe Labor Suit Removed to S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
Precision Pipeline Solutions, LLC removed the case captioned as
RONALD SEVERE and EDUARDO NEGRON, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated who were employed by PRECISION
PIPELINE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. PRECISION PIPELINE SOLUTIONS, LLC, Case
No. 162286/2019 (Filed Dec. 19, 2019), from the Supreme Court of
New York, New York County, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York on Jan. 13, 2020.

The action seeks to recover damages for alleged breach of utility
contracts purportedly requiring payment of prevailing wage. The
Plaintiffs seek damages for prevailing rates of wages and
supplemental benefits for themselves and the putative class plus
interest, costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to the New York Labor
Law.

Precision Pipeline is a natural gas and electric utility contractor
headquartered in New Windsor, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          James Emmet Murphy, Esq.
          Lloyd Ambinder, Esq.
          VIRGINIA & AMBINDER, LLP
          40 Broad Street, 7th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 943-9080
          E-mail: JMurphy@vandallp.com


RIDGEWOOD INDUSTRIES: Winters Sues Over Dressers' Tip-Over Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------------
WINDI WINTERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. RIDGEWOOD INDUSTRIES LTD. and DOREL HOME FURNISHINGS,
INC., Case No. 2:20-at-00045 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 13, 2020), alleges
that the Defendants violated California's Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, California's Unfair Competition Law, the Song-Beverly Act and
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in connection with their sale of
defective Belmont Four-4 Drawer Dresser products.

According to the complaint, the Defendants manufacture, market, and
sell the Belmont Four-4 Drawer Dresser products, all of which
suffer from an identical defect in design. Specifically, the
Products' defective design renders them unstable, posing severe
tip-over and entrapment hazards that can result in death or
injuries to children. This defect renders the Products unsafe for
their principal purpose, the Plaintiff asserts.

In the fall of 2017, Ms. Winters purchased multiple Belmont
Four-Drawer Dressers from a K-Mart store located in Stockton,
California, for approximately $40 each. Ms. Winters is a mother of
young children and purchased the Products because she believed they
were safe and suitable for use as dressers. However, the Products
Ms. Winters purchased were not fit for use as dressers due to the
Products' defective nature. In fact, the Products indeed tipped
over posing a severe safety hazard to her children. Ms. Winters
would not have purchased the Products had she known that the
Products were unsafe and unfit to perform their intended purpose,
the lawsuit says.

Furniture tip-over accidents are becoming increasingly common.
Every year, approximately 40,000 people visit emergency rooms due
to such accidents, 25,000 of whom are children, according to the
complaint. For instance, in 2010, furniture tip-overs accounted for
the deaths of 49 children in the United States. In 2011, according
to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, furniture tip-overs
killed 49 children in the United States. The CPSC estimates that
between 2000 and 2018, there have been 459 deaths involving
children due to furniture tip-overs.

Ridgewood manufactures furniture products throughout the United
States. Dorel Home markets, distributes, and sells furniture
products throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          Joel D. Smith, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Boulevard, Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
                  jsmith@bursor.com


SAFEGUARD DOCUMENT: McKenna Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kenny McKenna, and others similarly situated v. SAFEGUARD DOCUMENT
DESTRUCTION, INC., and FRANK VITARELLI, JR., Case No.
CACE-20-000706 (Fla. Cir., Broward Cty., Jan. 13, 2020), seeks to
recover from the Defendants unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages, and attorney's fees and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked about 56 hours
every week in that year (52 weeks) which yields about 16 hours of
overtime every week. The Plaintiff alleges he was only paid his
regular rate of pay for all of his overtime hours.

The Defendants knew and/or showed reckless disregard for properly
paying overtime because the Defendants paid the overtime at the
regular rate in cash or by a separate check, because the Defendants
knew they weren't paying overtime properly, and because the booked
labor costs didn't match the hours worked by the employees, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by Safeguard as a FLSA-covered employee
from January 2017 until December 2019.

Safeguard Document Destruction, Inc., was engaged in interstate
commerce in the document shredding industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ben Murphey, Esq.
          LAWLOR WHITE & MURPHEY, LLP
          2211 Davie Blvd.
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33312
          Phone: 954-525-2345
          Fax: 954-730-8908
          Email: bmurphey@lwmlegal.com
                 beller@lwmlegal.com
                 pleadings@lwmlegal.com


SCOFFOLDING SOLUTIONS: Mag. Judge Recommends OK of $200K Epps Deal
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TONY EPPS and MATTHEW SULLIVAN, For themselves and on
behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiff, v. SCOFFOLDING
SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-562 (E.D. Va.),
Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division, recommended
that the parties' Joint Motion for Settlement Approval be granted.

Before the Court is the parties' Joint Motion for Settlement
Approval, which was filed in accordance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA").  The matter was referred to the Magistrate
Judge for a report and recommendation.

The Defendant, is engaged in the business of erecting and
dismantling scaffolding, with six locations in North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia, including in the City of Chesapeake.
The named Plaintiffs and the opt-in Plaintiffs were employees of
the Defendant -- either as Erectors, Foremen or Helpers -- who
worked out of the Chesapeake location between October 2014 and
April 2018.  The Plaintiffs erected and dismantled scaffolding at
various job sites throughout Hampton Roads, as well as out of the
area in Richmond, Fredericksburg, Charlottesville, Lynchburg,
Northern Virginia, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Pennsylvania.  As hourly employees of a business
engaged in interstate commerce with annual gross receipts in excess
of $500,000, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant are subject to the
FLSA.

The Court previously ruled that the Plaintiffs as a class were
subject to a compensation policy for out-of-town travel which
violated the FLSA and for which some Plaintiffs were entitled to
recover.  The Plaintiffs alleged further that they were entitled to
compensation which they were not paid for the time from when they
were required to report to the Chesapeake Yard in the morning at
6:00 a.m. until they arrived at the first job site of the day, and
that they were not compensated for the return journey from the last
job site of the day or for subsequent work at the Chesapeake Yard
at the end of the work day.  The Defendant disputed that the
Plaintiffs were entitled to such compensation, contending that they
were not performing work-related duties until they arrived at the
various jobsites.

The Plaintiffs filed their cause of action on Oct. 26, 2017, which
the Defendant answered on Jan. 16, 2018.  The Plaintiffs moved to
conditionally certify their class on Feb. 16, 2018,  and the Court
granted the motion on Feb. 21, 2018.  Over the Defendant's
objection, the Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
Amend their complaint, and the Amended Complaint was filed on Jan.
3, 2019.  The parties subsequently litigated motions for
decertification, for partial summary judgment, and to dismiss Count
II and claim for willfulness (Defendant), for bifurcation (joint),
and to strike Defendant's expert, and for partial summary judgment
(Plaintiffs).  After trial was bifurcated and the liability portion
of trial rescheduled for Nov. 19, 2019, the parties engaged in a
settlement conference with United States Magistrate Judge Miller,
at which the proposed Settlement Agreement was reached.

According to the proposed Settlement Agreement, the Defendant
agreed to pay a total amount of $200,000 to settle the action.  In
exchange, the named Plaintiffs and all participating members agree
to release their claims against Scaffolding Solutions.  Under the
Settlement Agreement, no more than $100,000 will be allocated to
the Plaintiffs' damages and the balance of the settlement amount
will be allocated to attorneys' fees and costs.  Pursuant to the
Joint Motion for Settlement Approval, the 20 opt-in Plaintiffs
actually will share $85,000 in damages, with $5,000 allocated to
costs and $110,000 allocated to attorneys' fees.  The $85,000 in
damages is alleged to represent the about 90% of the claimed unpaid
overtime pay within two years of the respective opt-in dates as
calculated by the Plaintiffs' counsel.  Neither Tony Epps nor
Matthew Sullivan, the named Plaintiffs, are earmarked to receive
any additional recovery for their efforts in bringing and
prosecuting the matter.

The Court held a hearing on the Joint Motion for Settlement
Approval on Dec. 10, 2019.

Magistrate Judge Leonard finds that the amount of settlement in
relation to the potential recovery weighs in favor of approving the
settlement.  The compromise proposed therefore is reasonable under
these circumstances as the desired settlement fairly reflects the
parties' wish to finalize all potential collective litigation, put
an end to the expenditure of attorneys' fees and costs, and end the
uncertainty that accompanies litigation.

As to the attorneys' fees and costs, the Magistrate Judge concludes
that the requested $110,000 allocation for attorneys' fees and
$5,000 in costs are fair and reasonable.  

Consequently, given the strength of the Plaintiffs' claims, the
defenses advocated by Defendant, the uncertainty of damages,
consideration of appropriate attorneys' fees and costs, and the
general uncertainty and expense that accompanies all litigation,
the Magistrate finds that that the proposed $200,000 settlement is
fair and reasonable and in accordance with the purposes of the
FLSA.  

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Leonard recommended that the Joint
Motion for Settlement Approval be accepted by the District Judge.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 11, 2019 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/RMSU7M from
Leagle.com.

Tony Epps, MATTHEW SULLIVAN, For themselves and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Mike Wall, Shakai Cowell, Christopher
Jackson, Eternal Kamal Allah, Justin Switzer, Joseph Johnson,
Brandon Hecker, Ras Jelani A. Simba, Marlon Stallings, Antoine
Davis, Brandon L. Dunbar, Otis Fulbright, Brandon Neusome, David A.
Riggins, Chad D. Schlny, Malik Williams, Quandarius Dowell & Malik
Davis, Plaintiffs, represented by Christopher Colt North, The
Consumer & Employee Rights Law Firm PC, Samuel Young Lee, David
Kamp & Frank LLC & Joshua Michael David --
jdavid@davidkampfrank.com -- David Kamp & Frank LLC.

Scaffolding Solutions, LLC, Defendant, represented by Jaime Brett
Wisegarver -- jwisegarver@hirschlerlaw.com -- Hirschler Fleischer
PC & Courtney Moates Paulk -- cpaulk@hirschlerlaw.com -- Hirschler
Fleischer PC.


SEATTLE, WA: 9th Cir. Upholds Class Certification Denial in Willis
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case captioned KAYLA WILLIS; REAVY WASHINGTON; LISA HOOPER;
BRANDIE OSBORNE, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
individuals; THE EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF OLYMPIA; TRINITY PARISH OF
SEATTLE; REAL CHANGE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF SEATTLE;
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; ROGAR MILLAR,
Secretary of Transportation for WSDOT, in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-35053 (9th Cir.), Judge Jennifer
Choe-Groves of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's refusal to grant the Appellants'
motion for class certification.

Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 08-01, enacted by the City
of Seattle in 2008, establish, in part, standard procedures for the
removal of unauthorized encampments, camping equipment, and
personal property left on city-owned property.  The City of Seattle
amended its encampment rules in 2017 by promulgating
Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 17-01.  The Washington
State Department of Transportation ("WSDOT") has adopted guidelines
instituting similar removal procedures for unauthorized encampments
on state property, titled "WSDOT's Guidelines to Address Illegal
Encampments within State Right of Way."

Appellants Willis, Hooper, Osborne, and Washington are four
individuals who live outside on public property and seek to
represent a class of approximately 2,000 other people similarly
situated.  They appeal the district court's order denying a motion
for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Referencing the MDARs and the WSDOT Guidelines, the Appellants
asserted in their motion for class certification that the City of
Seattle and WSDOT engaged in an alleged policy and practice of
"sweeps" that destroyed property, violating the unreasonable
seizure and due process clauses under both the U.S. Constitution
and the Washington State Constitution.  By bringing the action on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the
"sweeps."

The district court found that the Appellants satisfied the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23, but concluded that they failed
to establish sufficiently the existence of a practice that applied
uniformly to all proposed class members and was subject to
resolution in a single action.  The district court denied the
motion for class certification for failure to satisfy all the
requirements of Rule 23(a).

The Ninth Circuit finds that the Appellants failed to proffer
sufficient evidence and articulate a practice that was common to
the claims of the proposed class in their motion for class
certification.  The Appellants presented five bases for commonality
before the district court in their motion, and each basis relates
to whether the Defendants' course of conduct, such as failing to
provide adequate notice and removing or destroying personal
property, raises a common question.  Although the record contains
voluminous declarations, photographs, and videos in support of a
broad description of "sweeps," the Appellants notably do not point
to a specific practice that applies uniformly to all proposed class
members. Despite the broad allegations in their complaint, there is
no evidence that every Appellant has experienced the same
challenged practice or suffered the same injury due to the
implementation of the MDARs or the WSDOT Guidelines.  In fact, the
Appellants themselves acknowledged that "each sweep is different."
The Ninth Circuit concludes that it was not an abuse of discretion
for the district court to hold that an alleged practice affecting
each of the Appellants was not discernable from the record and to
deny the Appellants' class action certification accordingly.

The Ninth Circuit cannot agree with her dissenting colleague that
that the Appellants' motion for class certification raises a facial
challenge to the MDARs or the WSDOT Guidelines as a basis for
establishing commonality for purposes of Rule 23(a).  The
Appellants themselves have dismissed the relevance of a facial
challenge as a basis for commonality, stating that the City's
argument that they have not facially challenged the Defendants'
policies or practices is irrelevant to class certification because
they've shown that the Defendants' conduct places all unhoused
persons in Seattle at risk.

Because the Appellants' commonality argument before the district
court rested upon extra-regulatory conduct, the Ninth Circuit
declines to read their argument as premised upon a facial
challenge.  The Ninth Circuit also declines to rewrite the
Appellants' commonality argument for them to include a facial
challenge.

Based upon the Appellants' failure to proffer sufficient evidence
of a practice that was common to the claims of the proposed class
members or lodge a facial challenge in satisfaction of the Rule
23(a) commonality requirement, the Ninth Circuit readily concludes
that the district court's refusal to grant class certification was
not an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, the Appellate Court
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Nov. 29, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/NwoFXp from Leagle.com.

Toby J. Marshall -- tmarshall@terrellmarshall.com -- (argued),
Terrell Marshall Law Group PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Emily Chiang,
Nancy Talner , and Breanne Schuster, ACLU of Washington Foundation,
Seattle, Washington; Eric A. Lindberg -- elindberg@corrcronin.com
-- Kristina Markosova, and Todd T. Williams --
twilliams@corrcronin.com -- Corr Cronin Michelson Baumgardner Fogg
& Moore, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Matthew J. Segal -- matthew.segal@pacificalawgroup.com -- (argued),
Taki V. Flevaris -- taki.flevaris@pacificalawgroup.com -- and
Athanasios P. Papailiou -- athan.papailiou@pacificalawgroup.com --
Pacific Law Group LLP, Seattle, Washington; Patrick Downs, Gregory
Narver, Carlton Seu, and Gary Smith, Seattle City Attorney's
Office, Seattle, Washington; for Defendant-Appellee City of
Seattle.

Alicia O. Young (argued) and Matthew D. Huot, Assistant Attorneys
General; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General; Office of the
Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; for Defendants-Appellees
Washington State Department of Transportation and Rogar Millar.

J. Dino Vasquez and Joshua Howard, Karr Tuttle Campbell, Seattle,
Washington; Eric Tars, National Law Center on Homelessness &
Poverty, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Disability Rights of
Washington, et al.

Shenoa Payne and Zachariah Allen, Richardson Wright LLP, Portland,
Oregon, for Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors.


SGS NORTH AMERICA: Gomez Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Israel Gomez, individually and for others similarly situated v. SGS
NORTH AMERICA INC., Case No. 4:20-cv-00125 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 13,
2020), seeks to recover unpaid overtime wages and other damages
from the Defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendant has failed to pay the Plaintiff overtime as required
by the FLSA, says the complaint. Instead, the Defendant paid the
Plaintiff and other workers like him, the same hourly rate for all
hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a work week.

Plaintiff Gomez performed work for the Defendant as a Plant
Insulation Inspector from April 2019 through July 31, 2019.

SGS is a member of SGS Group, and is the world's largest
certification and inspection company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          Email: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                 adunlap@mybackwages.com
                 cfitz@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Phone: (713) 877-8788
          Telecopier: (713) 877-8065
          Email: rburch@brucknerburch.com


SPRINT CORP: Turina Sues Over Illegal Deductions on Commissions
---------------------------------------------------------------
KRISTINA TURINA, individually and on behalf of a class of others
similarly situated v. SPRINT CORPORATION, a Kansas Corporation &
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY, a Kansas Corporation, Case No.
2:20-cv-02018 (D. Kan., Jan. 10, 2020), is brought against the
Defendants for unpaid wages and related penalties based on
contracts for commissions they had with the Defendants.

According to the complaint, specifically at issue is the
Defendants' policy and practice of making illegal deductions from
the Plaintiff and the Putative Class' commissions/wages related to
commissions earned based on sales of the Defendants' "Sprint Mobile
AI" product. The Plaintiff contends that the conduct is in
violation of Sprint's 2019 Sales Incentive Compensation Plan, and
the Kansas Wage Payment Act.

The Plaintiff brings a nationwide class action on her own behalf
and on behalf of those similarly situated, including all Account
Managers working in the Defendants' Business Inside Sales
Organization (BISO), who have had illegal deductions made from
their pay in connection with the sale of the Defendant's "Sprint
Mobile AI" product.

The Plaintiff and the Putative Class are employees of the
Defendants' BISO Department.

Sprint Corporation is an American telecommunications company that
provides wireless services and is an internet service provider,
based in Overland Park, Kansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ruben J. Krisztal, Esq.
          SMITH MOHLMAN INJURY LAW, LLC
          701 E. 63rd Street, 3rd Floor
          Kansas City, MO 64110
          Telephone: (816) 866-7711
          Facsimile: (816) 866-7715
          E-mail: rkrisztal@accidentlawkc.com

               - and -

          Jolie N. Pavlos, Esq.
          C. Ryan Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          20 N. Orange Ave., 15th Floor
          Orlando, FL 32802-4979
          Telephone: (407) 420-1414
          Facsimile: (407) 245-3401
          E-mail: JPavlos@forthepeople.com
                  RMorgan@forthepeople.com


SPSG PARTNERS: Whiteside Seeks to Recover Minimum and OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHON WHITESIDE, as individual and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. SPSG PARTNERS, an Unincorporated Joint
California Venture; SPSG PARTNERS, LLC, a Limited Liability
Company; SUKUT CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; SUKUT
CONSTRUCTION, LLC., a California Limited Liability Company;
GOODFELLOWS BROS. CALIFORNIA, LLC., a California Limited Liability
Company; PACIFIC STATES ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTORS, INC., a
California Corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Case No.
20CV000901 (Cal. Super., Jan. 13, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid
overtime and minimum wages, unpaid meal and rest period premiums,
unpaid reimbursement expenses, and derivative penalties for
inaccurate wage statements and for failure to keep accurate time
records under the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff and similarly situated employees worked for the
Defendants as hourly, non-exempt employees. The Plaintiff contends
that the Defendants had a uniform rounding policy that negatively
affected the employees. The Plaintiff also alleges that the
Defendants failed to the employees minimum wages and overtime
wages, did not provide all meal and rest periods, and failed to pay
all applicable meal and rest period premiums.

The Plaintiff worked as laborer for the Defendants from April 2019
to July 2019.

The Defendants are doing business in the construction
industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Galen T. Shimoda, Esq.
          Justin P. Rodriguez, Esq.
          Brittany V. Berzin, Esq.
          Ronald Konini, Esq.
          SHIMODA LAW CORP.
          9401 East Stockton Blvd., Suite 200
          Elk Grove, CA 95624
          Telephone: (916) 525-0716
          Facsimile: (916) 760-3733


SSK DONUTS: Joell Sues Over Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked
---------------------------------------------------------------
KOVAN JOELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
v. SSK DONUTS LLC and SSK DONUTS 2 LLC, Case No. 615609/2019 (N.Y.
Sup., Jan. 13, 2020), alleges that pursuant to the New York Labor
Law, the New York Code of Rules and Regulations and the New York
Wage Theft Prevention Act, the Plaintiff is entitled to be paid in
full for all hours that he worked.

The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Arthur M. Diamond.

The Plaintiff alleges that he spent time off-the-clock and money to
clean and maintain his uniform consistent with the uniform
appearance standards Defendants required. He adds that he was
entitled to reimbursement or additional pay for time spent off the
clock and money spent in laundering and maintaining the Defendants'
uniform. The Plaintiff contends that throughout his entire
employment with Defendants, he was a covered, non-exempt employee
within the meaning of the NYLL. As such, he was, and is, entitled
to be paid in full for all hours worked.

In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to
pay him for all hours worked. He would regularly work through
breaks without compensation. He adds that the Defendants further
failed to compensate him for all hours worked, routinely deducting
one or more hours per week from him pay.

Because of Defendants' improper compensation policies, the
Plaintiff argues he was deprived of pay, in direct violation of the
NYLL.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from July 2017 through
October 6, 2019.

The Defendants own and operate Dunkin' Donuts restaurants.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Gaylord, Esq.
          BOUKLAS GAYLORD LLP
          445 Broadhollow Road, Suite 110
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (516) 742-4949
          E-mail: mark@bglawny.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          KAUFMAN DOLOWICH SCHNEIDER
          135 Crossways Park Dr., Suite No. 201
          Woodbury, NY 11797
          Telephone: (516) 681-1100


TRIPLE CROWN: Myers Labor Class Suit Removed to S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as JENNIFER MYERS v. TRIPLE CROWN
NUTRITION, INC., LISA WEIGMAN, AND DOES 1 TO 30, Case No.
37-2019-00061046-CU-WT-NC (Filed Nov. 15, 2019), was removed from
the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California on Jan. 10,
2020.

The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:20-cv-00080-H-BGS to the proceeding.

Ms. Myers, on behalf of all similarly situated employees, seeks to
pursue all available penalties resulting from Defendants'
violations of the California Labor Code. She also asserts claims
for damages for discrimination, harassment, failure to engage in
good faith interactive process, and failure to accommodate.

The Plaintiff was an employee of Triple Crown serving under the
direction of Lisa Weigman and Robert Daugherty.

Triple Crown specializes in developing horse feed. The Company
offers products, such as feeds, supplements, forages, and racing
formulations. Weigman and Daugherty are officers of the
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Charles P. Boylston, Esq.
          Amber S. Jones, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES P. BOYLSTON, APC
          28991 Old Town Front Street, Suite 103
          Temecula, CA 92590
          Telephone (909) 825-9276
          Facsimile (909) 825-9369
          E-mail: cboylston@boylstonlaw.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Aleksanian Seeks to Recover Illegal Deductions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LEVON ALEKSANIAN, SONAM, LAMA, HARJIT KHATRA, and, Individually, on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, and as Class
Representatives v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., UBER LOGISTIK, LLC,
UBER USA LLC, jointly and severally, Case No. 1:19-cv-10308
(S.D.N.Y., Nov. 6, 2019), arises from the Defendants' alleged
systematic breaches of contract.

Specifically, the lawsuit seeks to recover amounts that were
systematically deducted from drivers' earnings, in violation of
Uber's driver contracts (known as Uber "Software License and
Services Agreement," hereafter "contracts") as a result of Uber's
payment practices in New York from at least November 6, 2013,
through May 22, 2017.

The Plaintiffs are present and former drivers, who contracted with
Uber to drive Black Cars as part of Uber's New York City fleet and
who did not opt out of arbitration.

Uber is a Delaware corporation headquartered in San Francisco,
California. Uber operates twenty-eight (28) wholly owned
subsidiaries in New York, each of which has held or currently holds
a TLC license to operate a For-Hire Vehicle (FHV) Base. Uber
operates its Black Car operations in New York City as a group of
Black Car bases and one luxury limousine base, each of which is
licensed by the New York City Taxi Limousine Commission (TLC).

According to the complaint, the claims raised on behalf of those
similarly situated seek to provide redress to more than 96,000 New
York City Uber drivers for breaches of contract affecting every
member of the largest private sector workforce in New York City
over the relevant period.  From the time Uber entered the New York
City market in 2011, until May 22, 2017, Uber illegally deducted
from drivers' earnings monies, which Uber represented were sales
taxes and the surcharge for the Black Car Fund (BCP) surcharge,
which provides Workers' Compensation for Black Car drivers.

The Plaintiffs contend that Uber's own contract did not allow for
such deductions from driver earnings.  Rather, Uber's contracts
promised drivers a set percentage of each fare paid by the
passenger, with only Uber's commission, or "Service Fee" deducted
from each fare.  They note that during the relevant time period,
Uber deducted its Service Fee, which ranged from 20-28% of the
fare.  In the relevant period, the New York City sales tax rate was
8.875% and the BCF surcharge rate was 2.5%.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeanne E. Mirer, Esq.
          Ria Julien, Esq.
          MIRER, MAZZOCCHI, & JULIEN & PLLC
          1 Whitehall Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10031
          Telephone: (212) 231-2235
          E-mail: Jmirer@mmsjlaw.com
                  rjulien@mmsjlaw.com

               - and -

          Zubin Soleimany, Esq.
          NEW YORK TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE
          31-10 37th Avenue, Suite 300
          Long Island City, NY 11101
          Telephone: (718) 706-9892
          E-mail: zsoleimany@nytwa.org


UMG RECORDINGS: Court Enters Protective Order in Soundgarden Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth of the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, Western Division, has entered
the parties' Stipulated Protective Order in the case captioned
SOUNDGARDEN, a Partnership; TOM WHALLEY, as Trustee of the Afeni
Shakur Trust; JANE PETTY; STEVE EARLE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. UMG RECORDINGS,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-05449 JAK
(JPRx) (C.D. Cal.).

The Action is likely to involve privacy interests of the putative
class members and third parties, trade secrets and other valuable
research, development, commercial, financial, technical and/or
proprietary information for which the parties believe special
protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose
other than prosecution of the Action is warranted.  

Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to facilitate the
prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of discovery
materials, to adequately protect information the parties are
entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are
permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation
for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the
end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective
order for such information is justified in the matter.

It is the intent of the parties that information will not be
designated as "Confidential" or "Highly Confidential" for tactical
reasons and that nothing be so designated without a good faith
belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public
manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the
public record of the case.

The protections conferred by the Order cover not only Protected
Material, but also (1) any information copied or extracted from
Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or
compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony,
conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that
might reveal Protected Material.

Even after final disposition of the litigation, the confidentiality
obligations imposed by the Order will remain in effect until a
Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order
otherwise directs.  Final disposition will be deemed to be the
later of (1) dismissal of all claims and defenses in the Action,
with or without prejudice; and (2) final judgment after the
completion and exhaustion of all appeals, rehearings, remands,
trials, or reviews of the Action, including the time limits for
filing any motions or applications for extension of time pursuant
to applicable law.

All challenges to confidentiality designations will proceed under
Local Rule 37-1 through Local Rule 37-4.  Unless the Designating
Party has waived or withdrawn the confidentiality designation, all
Parties will continue to afford the material in question the level
of protection to which it is entitled under the Producing Party's
designation until the Court rules on the challenge.

Within 60 days after the final disposition of the Action, each
Party will return all Protected Material to the Designating Party
or destroy such material, including all copies, abstracts,
compilations, summaries and any other format reproducing or
capturing any Protected Material.  The Receiving Party must submit
a written certification to the Designating Party by the 60-day
deadline.

A full-text copy of the Court's Nov. 22, 2019 Stipulated Protective
Order is available at https://is.gd/g96x10 from Leagle.com.

Soundgarden, a Partnership, Tom Whalley, as Trustee of the Afeni
Shakur Trust, Jane Petty & Steve Earle, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Steven
G. Sklaver -- ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP,
Andres Monserrate -- amonserrate@khpslaw.com -- King Homes Paterno
and Soriano LLP, Edwin F. McPherson -- emcpherson@mcpherson-llp.com
-- McPherson LLP, Henry D. Gradstein -- hgradstein@khpslaw.com --
King Holmes Paterno and Soriano LLP, Howard E. King --
hking@khpslaw.com -- King Holmes Paterno and Soriano LLP, Kalpana
Srinivasan -- ksrinivasan@susmangodfrey.com -- Susman Godfrey LLP,
Mark H. Hatch-Miller, Susman Godfrey LLP, pro hac vice, Meng Xi,
Susman Godfrey LLP, Pierre B. Pine -- ppine@mcpherson-llp.com --
McPherson LLP & Stephen E. Morrissey, Susman Godfrey LLP.

UMG Recordings, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Deborah L. Stein -- dstein@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson
Dunn and Crutcher LLP, Nathaniel L. Bach -- nbach@gibsondunn.com --
Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP & Scott A. Edelman --
sedelman@gibsondunn.com -- Gibson Dunn and Crutcher LLP.


UNITI GROUP: Schall Law Files Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class action lawsuit against Uniti Group
Inc. (NASDAQ: UNIT) for violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between April 20,
2015 and June 24, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before December 30, 2019.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
424-303-1964, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Uniti's customer, Windstream, defaulted
on unsecured notes, rendering the Company's financial results
unsustainable. Based on this fact, the Company's public statements
were false and materially misleading throughout the class period.
When the market learned the truth about Uniti, investors suffered
damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

View source version on businesswire.com:
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191226005109/en/

Contact:

         Brian Schall, Esq.
         The Schall Law Firm
         Website: www.schallfirm.com
         Office: 310-301-3335
         Cell: 424-303-1964
         E-mail: info@schallfirm.com
                 brian@schallfirm.com
[GN]


WAWA INC: Customers File Class Suit Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------
Rudy Chinchilla, writing for NBC Philadelphia, reports that a group
of Wawa customers has filed a class-action lawsuit against the
company a week after the chain revealed that a data breach
potentially exposed people's credit and debit card information at
hundreds of its locations.

The plaintiffs allege that Wawa failed to take adequate security
measures, which exposed customers to fraud and identity theft and
left them vulnerable to criminals for potentially years to come.

"The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Wawa's inadequate
data security measures and cavalier approach to data security," the
plaintiffs allege in the suit filed December 26 in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Wawa announced the data breach in a Dec. 19 open letter, saying
that malware began running at its stores around March 4 and wasn't
discovered until Dec. 10. The company said the malware was finally
contained Dec. 12.

Sensitive information exposed during the data breach included card
numbers, expiration dates and cardholder names at more than 860
locations throughout the East Coast, the company said.

The plaintiffs allege the company failed to notify individual
customers about the breach, relying only on the open letter posted
to its website.

Tabitha Hans-Arroyo, of Woodbury Heights, New Jersey, who is named
in the suit, said she found out her card had been compromised only
after receiving a Christmas Eve email from her bank telling her
that someone had tried to make an online purchase of around
$2,535.

Wawa CEO Chris Gheysens apologized "deeply to all of you, our
friends and neighbors, for this incident," and the company has
offered customers one year of free credit monitoring and identity
theft protection.

However, the plaintiffs say the offer "is too little too late,"
since they have already had their data exposed and "will suffer
increased vulnerability to fraudulent transactions and identity
theft for many years into the future."

The plaintiffs are seeking unspecified damages through a jury
trial.

Wawa declined to comment for this story, citing pending litigation.
[GN]


WAWA INC: Faces High Suit in Eastern District of Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wawa, Inc. The case
is captioned as SUZANNE HIGH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. WAWA, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-00001-JHS
(E.D. Pa., Jan. 1, 2020).

The case is assigned to the Hon. Joel H. Slomsky. The suit alleges
violation fraud related laws.

Wawa is an American chain of convenience stores and gas stations
located along the East Coast of the United States, operating in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Washington,
D.C., and Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin Clancy Boylan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          1800 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1401
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 446-9795
          Facsimile: (215) 446-9799
          E-mail: cboylan@forthepeople.com


WELLIVER & ASSOCIATES: Martinez Sues Over Use of Consumer Reports
-----------------------------------------------------------------
PABLO MARTINEZ, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. WELLIVER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
30-2020-01123128-CU-BT-CXC (Cal. Super., Jan. 10, 2020), arises
from the Defendants' violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
relating to their preparation and furnishing of consumer reports
for employment purposes without first obtaining compliant
certifications from users.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, the
Plaintiff and other putative class members have been injured,
including having their privacy and statutory rights invaded in
violation of the FCRA, their employment prospects diminished, and
resulting losses including lost income and emotional harm, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff seeks statutory, actual, or compensatory damages,
punitive damages, costs and expenses of litigation including
attorney's fees, declarative and equitable relief, including
injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to comply with their
legal obligations, as well as additional and further relief that
may be appropriate.

Welliver is a consumer reporting agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony J. Orshansky, Esq.
          Alexandria R. Kachadoorian, Esq.
          Justin Kachadoorian, Esq.
          COUNSELONE, PC.
          9301 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310)277-9945
          Facsimile: (424)277-3727
          E-mail: anthony@counselonegroup.com
                  alexandria@counselonegroup.com
                  justin@counselonegroup.com


WILCO LIFE: 11th Cir. Flips Remand of Anderson Suit to State Court
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VANESSA ANDERSON, individually and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILCO
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 19-14127,
Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir.), Judge Frank Mays Hull of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court's order granting Plaintiff Anderson's motion to
remand the putative class action back to a Georgia state court.

Vanessa Anderson, on behalf of herself and all those similarly
situated, sued her former insurer, Wilco.  Anderson alleges that
Wilco improperly raised the cost of insurance premiums for her life
insurance policy, which caused her policy to lapse.  As relief,
Anderson seeks both money damages and declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring Wilco (1) to reinstate all life insurance policies
that were surrendered or lapsed as a result of the improper premium
increases and (2) to lower premiums.

Anderson filed her lawsuit in the Superior Court of Columbia
County, Georgia.  Wilco timely removed the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia under the Class
Action Fairness Act.  The federal district court remanded the case
to state court, concluding that Wilco had not met its burden of
showing that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, as
required by CAFA.  The District Court granted Wilco permission to
appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1453(c).

Wilco thus appealed.  On appeal, Wilco argued that the district
court incorrectly found that the case did not meet the $5 million
amount-in-controversy standard under CAFA.  According to Wilco,
because the putative class seeks reinstatement of their lapsed life
insurance policies, the face value of the policies is at issue.

In response, Anderson countered that the putative class is not
challenging the validity or face value of the insurance policies,
rather her claim is that she and others were overcharged for the
policies.  Anderson submitted that because her allegations
challenge the premium costs, only the wrongfully charged premiums
are in the controversy, not the policies' face values. She also
contended that, because it is difficult to predict when the class
members will die, or whether their policies will remain in effect
until their deaths, and, if so, in what amounts, the value of her
request to reinstate the lapsed policies is too speculative to be
treated as the amount in controversy in any event.

Because Anderson seeks equitable relief to reinstate a lapsed or
surrendered life insurance policy, Judge Hull concludes that (1)
the face value of the policy can be used to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement, and (2) the aggregate face value
of the life insurance policies is over $75 million.  Wilco thus has
met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy exceeds the $5 million CAFA threshold,
the Eleventh Circuit opines.

For the reasons stated, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated
the district court's order remanding the Anderson case to state
court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with her
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Eleventh Circuit's Nov. 22, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/JdZfFE from Leagle.com.

Lee W. Brigham, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles A. McCallum, III, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elizabeth Joy Campbell -- ecampbell@lockelord.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.

Robert Brent Irby, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Carl C. Scherz -- cscherz@lockelord.com -- for
Defendant-Appellant.


WINDSOR HEIGHTS, IA: Class Action Suit Filed Over Traffic Cams
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sue Danielson, writing for whoradio.iheart.com, reports that
there's a new chapter in a long legal battle, over traffic cameras
in two cities in Iowa. A new class-action lawsuit has been filed
against Windsor Heights, Iowa.  The suit is similar to one filed
against the city of Cedar Rapids which may be close to being
resolved.

A proposed settlement was recently announced in the Cedar Rapids
case. Under the proposed settlement, more than 200-thousand people
who received citations because of traffic cameras over the past
several years, will be able to get a refund. Those who had fees
subtracted from the Iowa Income Tax refund would also be
reimbursed. Those eligible for a refund will be contacted.

The class-action lawsuit against the city, was led by WHO Radio
talk show host, Simon Conway.[GN]



WOODLAND CLINIC: Martinez FCRA Suit Removed to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit styled as JOSE MARTINEZ, as an individual
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. WOODLAND CLINIC
MEDICAL GROUP, a medical corporation, DIGNITY HEALTH, a California
Corporation; DIGNITY COMMUNITY CARE, a Colorado Corporation: and
DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Case No. CGC-19-580640 (Filed Nov. 8, 2019),
was removed from the California Superior Court to the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California on Jan. 10, 2020.

The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:20-cv-00225-DMR to the proceeding. The case is assigned to Hon.
Judge Donna M Ryu.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The
action arises from the Defendants' acquisition and use of consumer
and/or investigative consumer reports (background reports) to
conduct background checks on the Plaintiff and current and former
employees.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants routinely obtain and use
information from background reports in connection with its hiring
processes without complying with state and federal mandates.

Woodland Clinic offers family medicine, pediatrics, and primary
care. Dignity Health is a California-based not-for-profit
public-benefit corporation that operates hospitals and ancillary
care facilities in three states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zachary Crosner, Esq.
          Michael Crosner, Esq.
          David Watson, Esq.
          CROSNER LEGAL, P.C.
          433 N. Camden Dr., Suite 40
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 496-5818
          Facsimile: (818) 700-9973



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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