/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200131.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, January 31, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 23

                            Headlines

500.COM LTD: Klafter Olsen Probes Alleged Bribery, Fund Transfers
AETNA LIFE: Bid to Dismiss Section 1132(a)(3) Claim in Kazda Denied
ANGELS IN YOUR HOME: Appeals Decision in Hardgers-Powell Suit
BACARDI USA: Remand of Marrache to Miami-Dade Circuit Court Denied
BANK OF AMERICA: Court Certifies Narrowed Classes in Frausto Suit

BARRETT MAINTENANCE: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Gardner Claims
C&C TIRES: Mauldin Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Young Prisoners Suit Without Prejudice
CENTERFOLD CLUB: Class in De Angelis Suit Conditionally Certified
CENTRAL MAINE: Customers Dismayed Over Report, Joins Class Action

COMMONWEALTH EDISON: Summary Judgment in Rivera Suit Upheld
CURO GROUP: Bid to Dismiss Yellowdog Securities Suit Denied
DIANE KOERNER: Summary Judgment Bid in Verde Minerals Suit Denied
DICK'S SPORTING: Weisen Sues Over Violations of Disabilities Act
DIRECTV LLC: Faces Farrell Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls

DSC LOGISTICS: Linares Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
EAGLE NATIONAL: Court Grants Edmondson Leave to Amend RESPA Suit
EQT CORP: Superior Court Upholds Dismissal of Amended Garfield Suit
EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE: $350K Deal in Acosta Suit Gets Final OK
FALKIRK MANAGEMENT: Lomeli May Amend Complaint

FILTRATION GROUP: Johnson Hits Biometrics Data Sharing
FIRST STREET: Court Seeks Affidavit on Settlement in Mendez Suit
FUSION INDUSTRIES: Garza Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
GC SERVICES: Settlement in Macy FDCPA Suit Gets Prelim. OK
GOOGLE LLC: Production of Class List in Roley Suit Partly Approved

HAAAGEN-DAZS: Bid to Certify Class in San Pedro-Salcedo Suit Denied
HASAKI RESTAURANT: 2nd Cir. Vacates Order on Yu Suit Settlement
HEALTHEX CORP: Manu Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
HIGHLAND CARE: Williams Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
HWASHIN AMERICA: Lee Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA

IFINEX INC: Market Manipulation Class-Action Lawsuit Refiled
JB HUNT: Issaian Suit Removed From Super. Ct. to C.D. California
KATERRA INC: Hamlin Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
LOGMEIN INC: Faces Carter Securities Suit Over Merger With Elliot
MBF INSPECTION: $2.3MM Deal in Ganci Suit Gets Final Court Approval

MDL 2291: Final Judgment Entered in Conagra Breach of Contract Suit
MDL 2357: Class Supplemental Notice in Zappos Breach Suit Okayed
MDL 2672: Horn Not Compelled to Show Docs in Clean Diesel Suit
MICROSOFT CORP: $4MM From Settlement to Benefit Iowa Schools
MIDLAND CREDIT: Granted Summary Judgment  in Tillman FDCPA Suit

MINNESOTA: Bid for Relief on Murphy's Third-Party Docs Partly OK'd
MONARCH RECOVERY: Faces Ferrando FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
NATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT: De Angelis Class Conditionally Certified
NATIONAL LABOR: Oquil Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
NBG LOGISTICS: Silva Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties

NEW HAMPSHIRE: Dozens Allege Abuse at Youth Detention Center
NEW ORLEANS, LA: Lafaye Sues Over Illegally Collected Fines
NEXTEP FUNDING: Forster Expert Testimony Allowed in Prayitno Suit
NORFOLK SOUTHERN: Sued by Wills in Illinois for Violating BIPA
OASIS LEGAL FINANCE: Kaplan Sues Over Usurious Loan Rates

OLIVER WYMAN: Maxwell Suit Asserts Retaliation
OMNICARE INC: Class in Davis FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Dismiss Costas Securities Suit Denied
PITTSBURGH CATHOLIC: 20+ Abuse Cases Pending in Court
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Faces Ferrando Suit Over Violation of FDCPA

PORTOLA PHARMACEUTICALS: Gibbs Probes Securities Law Violations
PROLOGIS INC: Garfield Securities Suit Removed to M.D. Pa.
RAPID DISPLAYS: Ortega Sues Over Biometrics Data Retention
RC WILLEY: Williams Sues in California Over Employment Disputes
SACRAMENTO, CA: Court Grants Final Approval of Mays Suit Settlement

SACRAMENTO, CA: Ct. Awards $2.1MM Attys' Fees in Mays Suit
SHARKS OF ROOSEVELT: Mitchell Sues Over Cashiers' Unpaid OT Wages
SHELL OIL: Faces Harmon Suit in Texas Alleging Violation of ERISA
SKINNY LABS: Insley Seeks Reimbursement of Work-Related Expenses
SOUTHFIELD, MI: Court Dismisses Oron 2015 Suit Without Prejudice

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Final Approval of Deal in Acevedo Suit Endorsed
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Seventh Cir. Appeal Filed in Saxon FLSA Suit
TAKEDA PHARMA: RICO Claims Ruling in Painters Fund Suit Reversed
TEAM DRIVE-AWAY: Haynie Labor Suit Removed to N.D. California
TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE: MSP Recovery Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice

TEXAS ROADHOUSE: Managers File Class Action Over Unpaid OT Work
TLC DENTAL-HOLLYWOOD: Hill Sues Over Illegal SMS Ad Blasts
UNILEVER: Pre-Trial Proceedings in 8 Deodorant Suits Consolidated
WAWA INC: Faces Emery Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania Over Data Breach
WAWA INC: Faces Mullen Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania Over Data Breach

WEISER SECURITY: Holcomb Suit Remanded to LA Superior Court
WHITE GLOVE: Arbitration Bid Denial in Arboleda Labor Suit Upheld
WILMINGTON TRUST: Court Certifies Class in Choate ERISA Suit
WINNER FORD: Arbitration Bid Denial in Trout Suit Affirmed
[^] CLASS ACTION Money & Ethics Conference on May 4


                        Asbestos Litigation



                            *********

500.COM LTD: Klafter Olsen Probes Alleged Bribery, Fund Transfers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, which has extensive experience in
securities class action, group, and individual litigation,
announces its investigation into online sports lottery service
provider 500.com Limited ("500.com") (WBAI) regarding allegations
of bribery and illegal money transfers.

On December 31, 2019, 500.com announced that it had formed a
"Special Investigation Committee" to investigate allegations of
bribery and illegal money transfers within the company that have
already led to the arrest of one consultant (also a former director
of the Company's subsidiary in Japan) and two former consultants by
the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office. 500.com further
disclosed the resignation of Xudong Chen as Chairman of the
Company's Board, effective December 30, 2019, and that "the Board
has accepted the request from Mr. Zhengming Pan, Director and Chief
Executive Officer, to temporarily step aside from his positions,
effective December 30, 2019, until the conclusion of the SIC's
investigation in order to ensure a thorough and fair
investigation."

The announcement caused 500.com's American depositary receipt price
to fall $0.94 per share, or 10.93%, to close at $7.66 per share the
following trading day.

If you purchased 500.com securities and suffered significant
losses, please contact Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP for more
information about the case.

Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP has offices in New York and Washington
D.C. The founding partners have over fifty years combined
experience representing plaintiffs in individual and class action
litigation and have a track record of recovering significant
percentages of investor losses.

Client praise for our work: "This was one of the finest pieces of
legal work I've been a part of (and I have worked with literally
dozens of lawyers on a wide range of matters over the years). More
than anyone involved with Superior, I really believe you created
the most value for shareholders." Chair of the Post Confirmation
Committee in In re Superior Offshore International, Inc.

Contact:

         Kurt B. Olsen, Esq.
         KLAFTER OLSEN & LESSER LLP
         1250 Connecticut Ave., NW, Ste. 200
         Washington DC 20036
         Tel: (202) 261-3553
         Email: ko@klafterolsen.com
[GN]

AETNA LIFE: Bid to Dismiss Section 1132(a)(3) Claim in Kazda Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHALA KAZDA, Plaintiff, v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-02512-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge
William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied Aetna's motion to dismiss Kazda's
Section 1132(a)(3) claim.

Aetna denied Kazda insurance coverage for liposuction to treat her
advanced lipedema because it found the procedure was "cosmetic" and
not medically necessary.  Kazda was diagnosed with Stage 3
lipedema, a condition caused by abnormal buildup of adipose (fat)
tissue in the lower body and sometimes in the arms.  She sought
coverage for tumescent liposuction to treat her advanced lipedema,
a procedure that removes excess fat tissue to allow patients to
gain mobility, reduce or eliminate pain, and lead a productive
life.  Her medical provider submitted this information to Aetna,
setting forth her diagnosis and proposed treatment.  

On April 25, 2018, Aetna sent her a letter denying coverage for the
proposed surgery.  It denied coverage by referring to its Clinical
Policy Bulletins ("CPBs"), internal written directives guiding
Aetna's coverage positions with respect to certain medical
treatments.

On May 9, 2019, Kazda filed suit under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), seeking recovery on behalf of
herself and others who have had their claims erroneously denied.
She alleges that Aetna violated ERISA because it (i) erroneously
denied coverage for surgical treatment for lipedema under 29 U.S.C.
Section 1132(a)(1)(B); and (ii) breached its fiduciary duty under
29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3).

On Sept. 11, 2019, Judge Orrick granted Aetna's motion to dismiss
both claims for failure to state a claim.  Kazda did not
sufficiently plead a claim under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(1)(B)
for denial of benefits and under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3) for
breach of fiduciary duty.  The Judge gave Kazda leave to amend her
complaint.  On Sept. 26, 2019, she filed her First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"), bringing the same claims.  

Aetna now moves to dismiss Kazda's second claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under Section 1132(a)(3) for failure to state a
claim.  It moves to dismiss Kazda's Section 1132(a)(3) claim on
three grounds: (i) Kazda has not pleaded sufficient facts to state
a claim; (ii) her claim is duplicative of her Section 1132(a)(1)(B)
claim; and (iii) her claim undermines the essential purpose of the
ERISA civil enforcement scheme.  

Judge Orrick holds that contrary to Aetna's position, tumescent
liposuction to treat the symptoms of lipedema is not cosmetic, but
rather is the only effective treatment for the pain and immobility
caused by lipedema.  Kazda's allegations are sufficient to show, at
least at the pleading stage, that Aetna was acting as a fiduciary
when it adopted the CPBs and therefore may be liable for a breach
of fiduciary duty on the basis of its conduct.

Next, Judge Orrick holds that CPB 0031 explicitly excludes coverage
for suction-assisted lipectomy in the upper and lower extremity.
That the "Background" section acknowledges the severity of lipedema
and effectiveness of tumescent liposuction treatment shows that
Aetna refuses to provide coverage despite knowledge that such
procedure is the only effective treatment for lipedema, according
to Kazda.  In addition, CPBs do not need to explicitly bar
tumescent liposuction for lipedema in order for Kazda's Section
1132(a)(3) to go forward. Kazda's allegation that the language in
the CPBs is interpreted by Aetna to "systematically deny claims"
like hers is enough at the pleading stage.  The CPB documents do
not warrant dismissal of her Section 1132(a)(3) claim.

Judge Orrick then finds that Kazda has sufficiently pleaded a
distinct declaratory remedy under Section 1132(a)(3).  The
plaintiff in Wit v. United Behavioral Health, similarly sought
"declaration that United Behavioral Health's denials of residential
treatment coverage were improper."  The court relied on another
case, Hill v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, where the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a claim
under Section 1132(a)(3) in a class action in which the plaintiffs
alleged both that they had been improperly denied benefits and that
the plan administrator was using an improper methodology in
adjudicating claims.  The Judge agrees with those decisions.

Finally, as for injunctive relief, like the plaintiffs in Wit v.
United Behavioral Health, Kazda has sufficiently pleaded a distinct
remedy for injunctive relief.  Kazda seeks an injunction "requiring
Aetna to retract its internal coverage guidelines," just as the Wit
plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering UBH to stop utilizing the
guidelines.  She seeks an injunction requiring Aetna to reform its
claims adjudication process, just as the Wit plaintiffs sought an
injunction requiring UBH to adopt or develop guidelines that are
consistent with those that are generally accepted and with the
requirements of applicable state law.  Kazda seeks an injunction
"requiring Aetna to provide notice of the reformation," and
"reevaluate and reprocess prior denials," just as the Wit
plaintiffs sought injunction requiring UBH to "reprocess claims"
for residential treatment that it previously denied.  The relief
Kazda seeks under Section 1132(a)(3) has been recognized as not
being duplicative, at least at the pleading stage.

Judge Orrick concludes that Aetna's third argument has no basis
because courts have repeatedly held that allowing plaintiffs to
seek relief under both Section 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3) is
consistent with ERISA's intended purpose of protecting
participants' and beneficiaries' interests.  Aetna's first and
second argument do not warrant dismissal either.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Orrick denied Aetna's motion to
dismiss the Section 1132(a)(3) claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/vM4jIi from Leagle.com.

Michala Kazda, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Joshua Seth Davis --
joshua.davis@gmlawyers.com -- Gianelli and Morris, Robert Steven
Gianelli -- rob.gianelli@gmlawyers.com -- Gianelli and Morris &
Adrian Jorge Barrio -- adrian.barrio@gmlawyers.com -- Gianelli and
Morris.

Aetna Life Insurance Company, Defendant, represented by Jonathan
Acker Shapiro -- jonathan.shapiro@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts
L.L.P., Earl B. Austin, III -- earl.austin@bakerbotts.com -- Baker
Botts L.L.P., pro hac vice & Tania L. Rice --
tania.rice@bakerbotts.com -- Baker Botts L.L.P..


ANGELS IN YOUR HOME: Appeals Decision in Hardgers-Powell Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Angels In Your Home LLC, Angels In Your Home and David
Wegman filed an appeal from the District Court's decision and order
issued on October 7, 2019, in the lawsuit entitled Hardgers-Powell,
et al. v. Angels In Your Home LLC, et al., Case No. 16-cv-6612, in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York
(Rochester).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Hardgers-Powell and Yolanda Clay bring a putative class action
against the Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") and New York Labor Law ("NYLL").  The Plaintiffs are
home health care workers, who allege that the Defendants failed to
pay overtime at the correct rate under state and federal law and
failed to comply with a state wage-notice requirement.

The appellate case is captioned as Hardgers-Powell, et al. v.
Angels In Your Home LLC, et al., Case No. 19-3715, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Rose Hardgers-Powell and Yolanda Clay, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Robert Mullin, Jr., Esq.
          FERR & MULLIN
          7635 Main Street
          P.O. Box 440
          Fishers, NY 14453
          Telephone: (585) 869-0210
          E-mail: rlmullin@FerrMullinLaw.com

Defendants-Appellants Angels In Your Home LLC, Angels in your home
and David Wegman, individually and in his role as owner of ANGELS
IN YOUR HOME and/or ANGELS IN YOUR HOME LLC, are represented by:

          Scott M. Mooney, Esq.
          BOYLAN CODE LLP
          Culver Road Armory
          145 Culver Road
          Rochester, NY 14620
          Telephone: (585) 232-5300
          E-mail: smooney@boylancode.com


BACARDI USA: Remand of Marrache to Miami-Dade Circuit Court Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Uri Marrache, Plaintiff, v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc. and
Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., Defendants, Civil Action No.
19-23856-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.), Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied
Marrache's motion to remand the case to Miami-Dade Circuit Court.

Marrache commenced the class action under the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUPTA) against Bacardi U.S.A., Inc.
and Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., alleging that one of the
products made by Bacardi and sold by Winn-Dixie, the Bombay
Sapphire gin, contains a botanical whose use is prohibited under
Florida law.

Marrache originally filed the action on behalf of a putative class
of people who purchased Bombay Sapphire gin in Florida in
Miami-Dade Circuit Court.  The class included all buyers regardless
of whether they are Florida citizens, citizens of other states, or
citizens of foreign nations.  On Sept. 16, 2019, the Defendants
removed the action to federal court pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act ("CAFA"), and Marrache subsequently filed an amended
complaint, which amended the class definition to Florida citizens
who purchased Bombay Sapphire gin in Florida.  Marrache filed his
motion to remand the case to Miami-Dade Circuit Court pursuant
various exceptions under CAFA on Oct. 23, 2019.

Judge Scola holds that Marrache's motion to remand is untimely
because it was filed more than 30 days after removal.  Motions for
remand that are not predicated on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be filed within 30 days after the case is
removed.  The notice of removal in the case was filed on Sept. 16,
2019, and 37 days later, Marrache filed the motion to remand.
Thus, the Court must deny Marrache's untimely motion.

In sum, Judge Scola denied Marrache's motion for remand as
untimely.  He also denied as moot Marrache's motion for judicial
notice of census data.  Marrache asked the Court to take judicial
notice of census data that he used to bolster the substantive
arguments in his motion to remand.  Because the Judge did not reach
these arguments and instead denied the motion as untimely,
Marrache's motion is moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/tDt4P4 from Leagle.com.

Uri Marrache, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Maury Lorne Udell --
mudell@bmulaw.com -- Beighley, Myrick, Udell & Lynne, P.A. & Roniel
Rodriguez, IV -- ron@rjrfirm.com -- Roniel Rodriguez IV PA.

Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., a Delaware corporation & Winn-Dixie
Supermarkets, Inc., doing business as Winn Dixie Liquors,
Defendants, represented by David B. Massey --
david.massey@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP, Melissa Linn
Levitt -- melissa.levitt@hoganlovells.com -- Hogan Lovells US LLP &
Martin Leonard Steinberg -- melissa.levitt@hoganlovells.com --
Hogan Lovells US, LLP.


BANK OF AMERICA: Court Certifies Narrowed Classes in Frausto Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, IRMA FRAUSTO, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, Defendant; and ARIANNA SUAREZ, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case Nos. 18-cv-01983-LB, 18-cv-01202-LB
(N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Laura Beeler of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco
Division, granted in part the Plaintiffs' motion to certify classes
for all claims.

The Plaintiffs both worked for Bank of America as non-exempt
employees and -- on behalf of themselves and the putative class --
sued for alleged wage-and-hour violations under the California
Labor Code for off-the-clock work and missed meal-and-rest breaks.
They also made derivative claims predicated on the off-the-clock
work and missed-breaks claims: failure to pay final wages on time,
failure to provide accurate wage-and-hour statements, and unfair
business practices under California's Unfair Competition Law
("UCL").

Ms. Frausto worked in a call center as a Treasury Services Advisor
from 1999 to 2017 and spent her day fielding calls from commercial
clients, financial centers, and other business partners, and
(generally) verifying wires, the amount of cash in vaults, and
information about accounts.  Ms. Suarez worked from 2003 to 2016,
first as a teller, then as a Teller Operations Specialist and a
Client Services Specialist, and starting in 2015, as an assistant
manager.

Following the Court's summary-judgment orders, the Frausto
complaint has two stand-alone class claims: (1) claim two charging
a failure to provide meal breaks, in violation of the California
Labor Code, and (2) claim three charging a failure to provide rest
breaks, in violation of the Labor Code. It has three class claims
predicated on claims two and three: (3) claim four charging a
failure to pay final wages on time, in violation of the Labor Code,
(4) claim five charging a failure to provide accurate wage-and-hour
statements, in violation of the Labor Code, and (5) claim six
charging unfair business practices, in violation of the UCL.

The complaint's class definition is as follows: All persons who
worked for any Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee at
any time during the period beginning four years before the filing
of the initial complaint in this action and ending when notice to
the Class is sent.

The Frausto complaint has the following subclasses:

     a. Meal Period Premium Sub-Class: All persons who worked for
any Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee at any time
during the period beginning four years before the filing of the
initial complaint in the action and ending when notice to the Class
is sent and received from any Defendant payment for a bonus and a
missed meal period.

     b. Late Pay Sub-Class: All persons who worked for any
Defendant in California as a non-exempt employee at any time during
the period beginning three years before the filing of the initial
complaint in the action and ending when notice to the Class is sent
and terminated their employment with any Defendant.

     c. The Suarez complaint has three stand-alone class claims:
(1) claim one for overtime wages, (based on work "off the clock"),
in violation of the Labor Code; (2) claim two, charging a failure
to pay minimum wage (based on the overtime violations),6 in
violation of the Labor Code; and (3) claim three, charging a
failure to provide meal-and-rest breaks, in violation of the Labor
Code.7 It has four class claims predicated on claims one through
three: (4) claim five, charging a failure to pay vacation time at
termination, in violation of the Labor Code (a claim that is not at
issue in the class-certification motion); (5) claim six, charging a
failure to pay final wages on time, in violation of the Labor Code;
(6) claim eight, charging a failure to provide accurate
wage-and-hour statements, in violation of the Labor Code; and (7)
claim twenty, charging unfair business practices, in violation of
the UCL.

The Suarez complaint has the following class definitions:  

      a. All non-exempt employees who worked for Bank of America as
Assistant Manager or similar job titles, in the State of California
at any time on or after the date that is four years prior to when
the Complaint was filed.

      b. Terminated Subclass: All persons who are eligible for
membership in the Class but who are no longer employed by the
Defendant.

In their joint class-certification motion, the Plaintiffs ask to
certify the following class: All persons who worked for Defendant
Bank of America, National Association in California as a non-exempt
employee at any time during the period beginning on Feb. 22, 2014
and ending when the Court grants class certification, but expressly
excluding therefrom any individuals who, as of the date the Court
grants class certification, (a) have filed their own separate
action as a named Plaintiff alleging any of the same claims alleged
by the Plaintiffs, (b) have opted into a collective action or are
class members in a certified class action against Defendant
alleging any of the same claims alleged by the Plaintiffs, and/or
(c) have previously released all claims against Defendant being
alleged by Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs do not contend that Bank of America had
non-compliant overtime and meal-and-rest break policies and instead
assert that it did not follow its policies.  Their submissions in
support of their class-certification motion include the following:
(1) declarations and testimony from witnesses; (2) a plan to
conduct a survey and use statistical sampling to establish whether
Bank of America's policies and practices resulted in Labor Code
violations; and (3) expert analysis of timekeeping, payroll, phone,
and work-schedule records to identify any violations and calculate
damages.

Bank of America's submissions in support of its opposition to the
class-certification motion include the following: (1) the
organization of its operations; (2) its policies and training about
recording shifts and breaks; (3) witness declarations about their
jobs; and (4) expert analysis.

The Plaintiffs' main claims are for off-the-clock work and missed
meal-and-rest-breaks, and they also raise claims predicated on
these claims: failure to pay final wages on time, failure to
provide accurate wage-and-hour statements, and unfair business
practices under the UCL.  They move to certify classes for all
claims.

Magistrate Judge Beeler granted the motion in part and certified
the following narrowed classes: (1) for the off-the-clock claim,
(a) all Treasury Services Advisors and persons with similar job
duties (in call centers) and (b) all Assistant Managers and persons
with similar job duties (in financial centers); and (2) for the
meal-and-rest-breaks claims, all Treasury Services Advisors and
persons with similar job duties (in call centers).  The Magistrate
Judge certified the same classes for the derivative claims for the
reasons that it certifies classes for the predicate claims.

Among other things, the Magistrate Judge found (i) that the
Plaintiffs' submissions at this stage are sufficient to show that a
means exist for proving injury and damages on a class-wide basis;
(ii) the named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the classes'
claims; (iii) the Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)(4)'s
adequacy requirement and the Class counsel is adequate in all
relevant respects.

The Magistrate Judge further found that (i) commonality and
predominance requirements of Rule 23 are meet by the the underlying
claims, and (ii) the Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)'s
superiority requirement.

The Magistrate Judge directed the parties to confer and to submit a
joint revised class definition that complies with the order without
delay.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/p85epW from Leagle.com.

Irma Frausto, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Justin F. Marquez --
justin.marquez@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon & Yang, APC, Allen Victor
Feghali -- allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang, APC &
Kane Moon -- kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com -- Moon and Yang, APC.

Bank of America, National Association, a business entity, form
unknown, Defendant, represented by Sylvia Jihae Kim --
skim@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuire Woods LLP & Michael David Mandel
-- mmandel@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP.


BARRETT MAINTENANCE: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Gardner Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Gardner, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. BARRETT MAINTENANCE, INC., Case No. 5:20-cv-00015-TBR
(W.D. Ky., Jan. 26, 2020), alleges that the Defendant violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay its employees for all
hours worked and overtime compensation.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed and refused to pay
him, straight-time pay for all hours worked and failed and refused
to pay him overtime pay for overtime worked. The Plaintiff also
asserts claims in this action for retaliation and defamation he
suffered as a result of his opposition to the Defendant's illegal
pay practices.

The Defendant's practice and policy is, and for the past three
years has been to willfully fail to compensate the Plaintiff for
all hours worked while employed by the Defendant and to willfully
fail and refuse to pay overtime compensation due and owing to the
Plaintiff in violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Gardner was employed by the Defendant as a Service
Technician from May 2019 until his termination in December 2019.

The Defendant is a Kentucky corporation with its principal place of
business located in Benton, Kentucky.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          D. Wes Sullenger, Esq.
          SULLENGER LAW OFFICE, PLLC
          629 Washington Street
          Paducah, KY 42003
          Voice: (270) 443-9401
          Email: wes@sullengerfirm.com


C&C TIRES: Mauldin Suit to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------
Archie Mauldin, individually and others, similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. C&C Tires LLC and Brian Carter, Defendants, Case No.
20-cv-00019 (M.D. Fla., January 6, 2020) seeks to recover money
damages for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

Mauldin worked as a mechanic for Defendants' auto repair shop. He
claims to have regularly clocked well in excess of forty hours per
work week but without being paid overtime pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Constantine W. Papas, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF CONSTANTINE W. PAPAS, P.A.
      1277 N. Semoran Blvd. Ste. 106
      Orlando, FL 32807
      Tel: (407) 347-6502
      Fax: (407) 206-3655
      E-mail: cwp@deanpapaslaw.com


CALIFORNIA: Court Dismisses Young Prisoners Suit Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John A. Mendez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California dismissed without prejudice (i) all class
claims, and (ii) Young's individual claims in the case captioned
ZURI S. YOUNG and GEORGE LOVIN JACKSON, Plaintiffs, v. RALPH M.
DIAZ, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-983-JAM-EFB P (E.D.
Cal.).

The Plaintiffs, state prisoners proceeding pro se, have filed the
civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
The matter was referred to a U.S. Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On Oct. 17, 2019, the Magistrate Judge filed findings and
recommendations which were served on the Plaintiffs and which
contained notice to them that any objections to the findings and
recommendations were to be filed within 14 days.  Plaintiff Young
has filed objections to the findings and recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C)
and Local Rule 304, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the
case.  Having carefully reviewed the entire file, Judge Mendez
finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the
record and by proper analysis.

Accordingly, Judge Mendez adopted in full the findings and
recommendations.  Judge Mendez denied the motions for class
certification.  All class action claims are dismissed without
prejudice.  Young's individual claims are dismissed without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/ZMTyoQ from Leagle.com.

Zuri S. Young, Plaintiff, pro se.

George Lovin Jackson, Plaintiff, pro se.


CENTERFOLD CLUB: Class in De Angelis Suit Conditionally Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE DE ANGELIS, Plaintiff, v. NOLAN ENTERPRISES,
INC., d/b/a, CENTERFOLD CLUB, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-926 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted De Angelis'
Motion for Conditional Class Certification, Expedited Discovery,
and Issuance of Notice.

National Entertainment Group, LLC, doing business as Centerfold, is
an adult entertainment club in Columbus, Ohio.  The Plaintiff, Ms.
De Angelis, alleges that she worked at Centerfold as a dancer from
April 2016 to February 2017.  Ms. De Angelis alleges that
Centerfold did not pay its dancers any wages.  Instead, she avers
that Centerfold misclassified all of its dancers as independent
contractors, rather than employees, and that the dancers are only
compensated through tips from customers.  She further alleges that
at the end of each night, Centerfold took a cut from all tips made
by the dancers, and the dancers were required to divide their tips
with other employees.

Ms. De Angelis filed the lawsuit as a collective and class action
against Centerfold on Oct. 23, 2017, alleging violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1983 ("FLSA"), the Ohio Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act ("OMFSWA"), and the Ohio Semi-Monthly Payment
Act, as well as common law unjust enrichment by failing to pay
dancers minimum wage for all hours worked, including failure to pay
overtime.

On Jan. 15, 2018, Centerfold answered the Complaint and shortly
thereafter filed a motion to compel arbitration based on a
provision in an agreement Ms. De Angelis was required by Centerfold
to sign that purportedly required her to arbitrate any issues
arising between the club and herself.

On Sept. 24, 2018, the Court issued an order denying Centerfold's
motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement void and
unenforceable for lack of consideration.  

On May 21, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a motion for conditional class
certification also requesting expedited discovery and issuance of
notices to the prospective class members.  She seeks to certify a
class of "all of the Defendant's current and former dancers who
have worked at the Defendant's club during the three years before
the Complaint was filed up to the present."

Centerfold opposes the Plaintiff's motion arguing that she has
presented no legal or factual basis to support her motion to
conditionally certify a class.

Judge Marbley finds that good cause exists to grant the limited
expedited discovery.  The Plaintiffs have only requested targeted
expedited discovery so that they may ensure that the potential
Plaintiffs receive notice and an opportunity to opt-in before their
claims expire.

Next, Judge Marbley finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately
alleged a willful violation and he finds it appropriate to define
the class according to the three-year limitations period.  The
Plaintiffs specifically alleged that the Defendant's scheme to
label the Plaintiff and the putative Collective Action Members as
independent contractors was designed to deny them their fundamental
rights as employees to receive minimum wages, overtime, to demand
and retain portions of tips given to putative Collective Action
Members by the Defendant's customers, and to enhance their
profits.

Finally, Judge Marbley holds that disclosure of all but the
potential Plaintiff's telephone numbers is permitted.  The
disclosure of addresses is routinely granted by courts that have
conditionally certified FLSA classes and the nationwide trend has
been to also order notice through email.  

Judge Marbly orders the parties to confer as to the proper form of
the notice and submit a proposed notice form and opt-in consent
form within 14 days of the date of the Order.  If they disagree as
to any specific language in the notice and opt-in consent form, the
parties may note the disputed language, with accompanying briefing
as necessary, and the Court will promptly determine which language
to use.

At the same time, the parties will also submit a proposed plan for
the distribution of the notice to all the potential opt-in
Plaintiffs employed by the Defendant at any time from three years
prior to the granting of this motion to the present.  In the event
of a disagreement on the distribution procedure, the parties will
submit simultaneous briefing on the matter.  No responsive briefing
will be permitted.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Marbley granted Ms. De Angelis'
Motion for Conditional Certification and Expedite Discovery.  He
conditionally certified a class of all of the Defendant's current
and former dancers who have worked at the Defendant's club during
the three years before the Order was granted to the present.

The parties are ordered to confer and submit to the Court within 14
days a proposed notice and plan for distribution of notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/R2SEMA from Leagle.com.

Stephanie De Angelis, Plaintiff, represented by Steven Charles
Babin, Jr. -- steven.babin@chapinlegal.com -- Chapin Legal Group
LLC, Courtney Werning -- cwerning@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson
Co, LPA, Lance Chapin -- lance.chapin@chapinlegal.com -- Chapin
Legal Group, LLC, Matthew R. Wilson -- mwilson@meyerwilson.com --
Meyer Wilson Co., LPA & Michael J. Boyle, Jr. --
mboyle@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson, LPA.

Nolan Enterprises, Inc., Defendant, represented by Charles William
Klausman, IV, Klausman Law Ltd., Ilya L. Polyakov --
ilp@olrblaw.com -- Onda LaBuhn Rankin & Boggs Co., LPA & Timothy
S.
Rankin -- tsr@olrblaw.


CENTRAL MAINE: Customers Dismayed Over Report, Joins Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Keithley, writing for WMTW News 8, reports that Central Maine
Power customers who said they saw their bills spike two years ago
are angry after a Maine Public Utilities Commission recently
released report found no systematic problems with the company's
billing and metering system.

The report put most of the blame on a cold snap for the large
increase in bills.

Some of the customers have joined a class action lawsuit against
CMP.

Goat farmer Lisa McLeod of Greenwood said she owes CMP $10,000 and
is worried the company is going to pull the power lines from her
home.

"I've spent my life here. I've broken my body on this farm," McLeod
said, saying her monthly bills doubled from $250 to $500.

"I worry about losing everything I've worked for here," McLeod
said.

McLeod said she has received a disconnection notice from CMP.

"They shut my freezers down? There's thousands and thousand and
thousands of dollars in product in the freezers and these
refrigerators, as well as my family's year of food. I'm out of
business. I'm dead in the water. My house will freeze and then
what?" McLeod said.

McLeod is one of the customers who are part of the class action
lawsuit against CMP. The lawyer representing McLeod and the other
customers has told them to hold on a little longer.

The report released Jan. 9 is a recommendation that commissioners
will review and then issue a final decision at the end of the
month.

"Maybe I 'm going to tell CMP to go fly a kite and I'm going to buy
45 solar panels and a bunch of battery banks and they can take me
to court until I die," McLeod said. "You can't get blood out of a
stone. What are they going to do, put a lien on my property? Good
luck. I'm going to live here until I'm dead."

A CMP spokeswoman said the company will review the findings of the
Maine PUC report and will file a response a week ahead of the
commissioners' meeting. [GN]

COMMONWEALTH EDISON: Summary Judgment in Rivera Suit Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MONICA RIVERA, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH
EDISON COMPANY and EXELON CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 1-18-2676 (Ill. App.), Judge Fitzgerald Smith of the Appellate
Court of Illinois for the First District, Second Division, affirmed
the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants on the Plaintiff's claim.

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the
Defendants, Commonwealth Edison Co. ("ComEd") and Exelon, alleging
that they violated her rights under the Employee Credit Privacy Act
by investigating her credit history in connection with a
conditional offer of employment as a customer service
representative ("CSR") and ultimately refusing to hire her because
of the results of that investigation.

ComEd is a public utility company that provides electrical services
to approximately 3.8 million customers in Illinois.  It is a
subsidiary of Exelon, which is an electric utility holding company.
On May 9, 2017, the Defendants extended to the Plaintiff a
conditional offer of employment for a temporary part-time position
as a CSR with ComEd, with a starting wage of $31.42 per hour.  This
was an entry-level position that required a high school diploma or
equivalent.

The offer of employment was contingent upon the completion of a
successful background check, credit check, and drug screen. As part
of this, the Defendants obtained a consumer report on the Plaintiff
that included certain information about her credit history.  On May
23, 2017, a representative of the Defendants sent an e-mail to the
Plaintiff, rescinding the conditional offer of employment.  That
e-mail stated that due, in part, to information received from the
consumer report previously provided to her, they're not able to
offer her employment at this time.

The Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that, by
inquiring into her credit history and obtaining her credit report
in connection with her application for the CSR position and by
ultimately refusing to hire her for that position because of
information contained in the report, the Defendants violated her
rights under the Employee Credit Privacy Act.  She alleged that she
was bringing the case on behalf of herself and other similarly
situated individuals who had applied for the same position or other
similarly titled positions with the Defendants and had been
subjected to a credit inquiry or check as a condition of
employment.

The Defendants answered the complaint and later filed a motion for
summary judgment.  In general, they argued in the motion for
summary judgment that the prohibition on an employer's
investigation into an applicant's credit history or use of that
credit history in connection with hiring decisions did not apply to
the customer service representative position for which the
plaintiff had been a candidate.  They argued that the possession of
a satisfactory credit history was a bona fide occupational
requirement of that position because it involves access to personal
or confidential information of the Defendants' customers.  After
conducting discovery pertaining to the issues raised in the
Defendants' motion and supporting affidavits, the Plaintiff filed a
response supported by depositions and other evidence.

The trial court granted the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment.  It concluded that the undisputed facts established that
a satisfactory credit history was a bona fide occupational
requirement of the CSR position that the Plaintiff sought because
the position involves access to personal or confidential
information.  As such, the trial court determined that the
prohibition on an employer's investigating and considering a job
applicant's credit history in making hiring decisions did not apply
in the case.

The Plaintiff then filed a timely notice of appeal.

Plaintiff raised several principal arguments on appeal that the CSR
position at issue does not qualify for the exemption under section
10(b)(5).  She argues that genuine issues of material fact exist
about whether the information handled by ComEd's CSRs satisfied the
statutory definition of "personal or confidential information."
She also argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists about
whether CSRs have "access" to such information, as opposed to
merely serving as "conduits" who receive the information initially
and then distribute it to other employees within ComEd.  The
Plaintiff correctly notes that the Defendants bear the burden of
proving that an exemption applies to the position at issue.

Judge Smith holds that no genuine issue of material fact exists
about whether the information at issue satisfies the statutory
definition of "personal or confidential information" because it is
sensitive information that is stored in secure repositories not
accessible by the public or low-level employees.  As the
satisfaction of any one aspect of the definition is sufficient, the
Judge does not need to consider the Plaintiff's alternative
arguments that the number of ComEd employees who can access the
information indicates that it is not entrusted only to managers and
a select few employees, or that there is no evidence that customers
gave "explicit authorization" for ComEd to "obtain, process, and
keep" the information at issue.  To the extent that the Plaintiff's
argument suggests that all three aspects of the statutory
definition must be satisfied, the Judge rejects the argument.  The
use of the word "or" in the statute indicates that these are three
different alternatives and establishing any one of the three
alternatives is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of
personal or confidential information.

The Judge further holds that the uncontested evidence shows that
ComEd's CSRs have the ongoing ability to view in CIMS customers'
partial Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, bank
account numbers, and credit card numbers, in conjunction with
customers' names, address histories, dates of birth, and other
identifying information.  With the ongoing ability to view this
information and use it as part of their jobs, their position is
closer to that of the employees in the loss prevention, customer
service, and credit departments of the defendant in Ohle than that
of the sales associate.  The fact that these numbers are only
partially visible to CSR does not mean that the position does not
involve "access to personal or confidential information" of the
customers of ComEd.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Smith affirmed the trial court's
entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and against
the Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/iCgNJC from Leagle.com.

Ryan F. Stephan -- rstephan@stephanzouras.com -- James B. Zouras,
Andrew C. Ficzko -- aficzko@stephanzouras.com -- and Anna M.
Ceragioli, of Stephan Zouras, LLP, of Chicago, Attorneys for
Appellant.

Neil H. Dishman -- Neil.Dishman@jacksonlewis.com -- Julia P.
Argentieri -- Julia.Argentieri@jacksonlewis.com -- and Nicholas A.
Simpson -- Nicholas.Simpson@jacksonlewis.com -- of Jackson Lewis
P.C., of Chicago, Attorneys for appellees.


CURO GROUP: Bid to Dismiss Yellowdog Securities Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge John W. Lungstrum of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the consolidated
complaint, YELLOWDOG PARTNERS, LP and CARPENTERS PENSION FUND OF
ILLINOIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. CURO GROUP HOLDINGS CORP., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 18-2662-JWL (D. Kan.).

The Plaintiffs initiated the putative class action under the
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against Curo and its
various executives and owners.  During the relevant time period,
Curo provided lending products to nonprime, underbanked consumers
in need of cash in the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom.  Essentially, Curo operated as a payday lender, and its
most profitable single line of business was its Canadian
"single-pay" loans.  In 2016 and 2017, various new laws and
regulations in Canada imposed restrictions on such loans, which
served to decrease Curo's yield on the single-pay loans in Canada.
As a result, it developed a strategy to transition its Canadian
business from single-pay loans to installment and "open-end" loan
products.  Pursuant to that strategy, Curo began to convert
single-pay customers to installment and open-end loans in Alberta,
and it then opened test stores in one market in Ontario, before
effecting the transition in the broader Ontario market.

Open-end loans were expected to be less profitable for Curo
initially because revenue on such loans takes longer to build and
because Curo was required to account for increased loan losses
"upfront" (at the time of origination).  The Defendants assured
investors that the transition away from Curo's most profitable line
of business would not be immediate; that single-pay loans would
remain viable; and that the negative impact would be minimal, would
be confined to the second quarter of 2018, and had been factored
into Curo's publicly-reported 2018 financial guidance.  Curo
reaffirmed that guidance in late April 2018 and at the end of July
2018.  In fact, the Defendants had already decided to accelerate
the transition in Ontario, and the transition was significantly
ramped up beginning in May 2018.  The majority of the losses from
the transition had already occurred by July 2018.  In October 2018,
Curo announced dismal third quarter financial results, and it
significantly reduced its 2018 guidance for income and earnings.

The Plaintiffs bring the action on behalf of a putative class of
those who acquired shares of Curo between April 27, 2018, and Oct.
24, 2018.  They assert claims against Curo and three officer
defendants for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and
SEC Rule 10b-5.  They also assert claims against the non-Curo
Defendants as control persons pursuant to Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

The gist of the Plaintiffs' complaint is that the Defendants failed
to disclose to the public that the transition to open-end loans in
Canada would be accelerated and that Curo's short-term performance
would therefore be negatively impacted; and that the Defendants
therefore made false and misleading statements concerning the
transition and Curo's expected 2018 financial performance.  The
Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims.

The Defendants seek dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims on the
basis that the statements by them that the Plaintiffs have
challenged in the complaint are not actionable as a matter of law,
for various reasons.  Specifically, they assert that particular
statements are not actionable or are not material because they are
opinions and thus not statements of fact; they are forward-looking
statements protected by the statutory safe harbor or the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine; they are merely statements of corporate optimism
or puffery; or they are accurate descriptions of historical
performance.

Judge Lungstrum declines to conclude as a matter of law that
particular statements challenged by the Plaintiffs in their
complaint cannot have been materially misleading and thus cannot be
actionable.  He rejects these arguments for dismissal at this
stage.  Considering the totality of the allegations in the
complaint, these claims, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, are not
merely based on predictions or projections of financial performance
that proved inaccurate.  Rather, at their heart, these claims are
based on allegations that the Defendants failed to disclose
specific facts, particularly concerning the strategy and timing of
the transition in Canada, which transition was bound to have a
substantial undisclosed impact on financial performance.  Under the
Plaintiffs' theory of the case, those omissions made the challenged
statements materially false or misleading, and thus actionable.

The Defendants also seek dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims based
on a failure to disclose facts concerning the transition to
open-end loans in Canada.  They concede they had a duty to disclose
any facts necessary to make their statements not materially
misleading, but they argue, in fairly summary fashion, that the
challenged statements are too vague to trigger such a duty and that
plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts that should have been
disclosed.

The Judge rejects this argument.  He finds that the Plaintiffs'
complaint is detailed and contains specific allegations.  The
Plaintiffs have identified various statements by the Defendants
concerning the transition and Curo's financial performance, they
have alleged specific facts that should have been disclosed, and
they have explained in the complaint how the statements were
misleading in light of the omissions.  He also rejects the
Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs' claims based on omissions
should be dismissed because the Defendants fully disclosed all
risks associated with the transition as a matter of law.  The
question whether the Defendants' statements were misleading in
light of omitted facts cannot be decided as a matter of law at this
stage.

The Defendants also challenge the Plaintiffs' claims that they
violated a duty to disclose arising under an SEC regulation known
as Item 303 of Regulation S-K.  The Judge rejects these arguments.
He holds that the Defendants focus on the allegations that the
transition was essentially complete and most losses were incurred
by or in July 2018, and they argue that negative performance during
part of the third quarter cannot constitute a "trend" that had to
be revealed in the report issued at the end of that month.  The
Judge cannot conclude as a matter of law that there was no "trend"
or "uncertainty."  He also rejects their argument that the
Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to show that the Defendants
knew of events reasonably likely to have a material financial
impact.  The Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants decided to
accelerate the transition to such a degree that a substantial
impact was likely if not inevitable.

The Defendants argue that with respect to any misrepresentations
alleged in the complaint, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege the
falsity of those statements with particularity as required.  The
Judge holds that the Defendants repeat many of their arguments
concerning whether the alleged false statements are actionable, but
as concluded, whether the statements were false or misleading
remains a question for the trier of fact.  The Plaintiffs have
alleged specific facts to show why the challenged statements were
false, and thus he rejects this argument for dismissal.

The Defendants next seek dismissal based on the Plaintiffs' failure
to allege scienter adequately.  The Judge holds that the Defendants
have not shown that any of the Plaintiffs' facts cannot be
considered or have no relevance whatsoever; thus, this is not a
case involving a bunch of zeros on plaintiffs' side of the scienter
ledger.  He concludes that the Plaintiffs' detailed and varied
factual allegations create a cogent and compelling inference of
scienter in the case.

The Judge rejects the Defendants' argument that the inference of
scienter is not as compelling as the opposing, non-culpable
explanation for their conduct.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs
have alleged that defendants adopted a particular strategy (which
allegation must be accepted as true) that had obvious negative
consequences in contradiction to their public statements, and
innocent explanations for the failure to disclose that strategy and
those consequences are not as readily apparent.  Thus, he concludes
that the inference of scienter is at least as compelling as
opposing inferences.  Accordingly, he denies the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint on this basis.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged that
these defendants actually exerted some measure of control, as
supported by the company's own admission.  In light of the Tenth
Circuit's instructions that the statute should be interpreted
liberally and that this issue normally presents a question of fact
for trial, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs' allegations of
control person liability are sufficient with respect to the Founder
Defendants and the FFL Defendants.  He thus denies the motion to
dismiss this claim as asserted against certain Defendants.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Lungstrum denied the Defendants'
motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/TJHR47 from Leagle.com.

Yellowdog Partners, LP, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ashley Keller --
ack@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice, Larkin
E. Walsh -- lwalsh@midwest-law.com -- Rex A. Sharp, PA, Seth Meyer
-- sam@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice,
Travis Lenkner -- tdl@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller Lenkner LLC, pro
hac vice & U. Seth Ottensoser -- so@kellerlenkner.com -- Keller
Lenkner LLC, pro hac vice.

Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois, LEAD PLAINTIFF, Plaintiff,
represented by Jack Reise, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro
hac vice, Kathleen B. Douglas, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP,
pro hac vice, Norman Eli Siegel, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, Rachel
E. Schwartz, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP & Tricia L. McCormick,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP, pro hac vice.

CURO Group Holdings Corp., Defendant, represented by Anthony J.
Durone -- ADURONE@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- Berkowitz Oliver LLPMO,
John W. Shaw -- JSHAW@BERKOWITZOLIVER.COM -- Berkowitz Oliver
LLPMO, Tariq Mundiya -- tmundiya@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr &
Gallagher, LLP, pro hac vice & Todd G. Cosenza --
tcosenza@willkie.com -- Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, pro hac
vice.

Donald F. Gayhardt, William Baker, Roger W. Dean, Doug Rippel, Chad
Faulkner, Mike McKnight, Friedman Fleischer & Lowe Capital Partners
II, L.P., FFL Executive Partners II, L.P. & FFL Parallel Fund II,
L.P., Defendants, represented by Anthony J. Durone, Berkowitz
Oliver LLPMO, Tariq Mundiya, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, pro hac
vice & Todd G. Cosenza, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, pro hac
vice.

Dev Bohn, Movant, represented by Brent LaPointe, The Rosen Law
Firm, PA.


DIANE KOERNER: Summary Judgment Bid in Verde Minerals Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VERDE MINERALS, LLC, et al, Plaintiffs, v. DIANE
DUNCAN KOERNER, et al, Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:16-CV-199
(S.D. Tex.), Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division, denied
  the Defendants' (Diane Duncan Koerner, Kimberly K. Sheridan,
Stacey E. Koerner, and Charles D. Duncan -- "Koerner Defendants")
motion for summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' third amended class
action complaint.

The Plaintiffs originally sued the Defendants for breach of
covenant, breach of fiduciary duties, and conversion, and sought a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.  In their second
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs brought claims against Burlington
and later dismissed Burlington without prejudice.  Subsequently,
the Defendants filed a 12(b)(6) partial motion to dismiss.  The
Court dismissed the claims for conversion, injunctive relief, and
punitive damages for failure to state a claim and dismissed the
request for declaratory relief as duplicative of the breach of
covenant claim.

In the third amended complaint, the Plaintiffs dropped the claim
for breach of fiduciary duties, restated a claim for declaratory
judgment, and added Burlington to the lawsuit for violation of the
Texas Natural Resources Code ("TNRC").  Soon after, Burlington
filed a motion to dismiss.  Because the Plaintiffs failed to show
that Burlington was liable under the TNRC, the Court granted the
motion to dismiss.  Thus, Burlington is no longer a party to the
action.

The Plaintiffs' remaining claims are for declaratory judgment and
breach of covenant.  They allege that the Defendants are bound by
the covenants contained in the Hawley Deeds to deliver and pay to
the Plaintiffs a portion of the proceeds for oil and gas found and
sold from the Hawley-Ayers Survey.  The Court held that the Deeds
conveyed a floating royalty interest.

Now, the Koerner Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that
they cannot be liable for a breach of covenant claim as the lessors
of the Property.  Their argument is solely an issue of law.
Defendants also argue that the Deeds conveyed a personal payment
covenant that does not run with the land and the Deeds are invalid
under the statute of frauds - arguments previously rejected by the
Court.

The Defendants argue that in a typical oil and gas dispute, the
Plaintiff alleging failure to pay royalties sues the
operator-lessee, not the lessor, for breach of contract or
violations of the TNRC.  Thus, the Plaintiffs are asserting the
breach of covenant claim against the wrong party because it is
Burlington who is liable for any royalties owed under the terms of
Burlington's lease with Defendant Diane Crawford (the Lease).

Judge Ramos declines to revisit these arguments and addresses only
the breach of covenant claim.  Because the Deeds included a
covenant that the grantors would pay the grantees the royalties,
the Judge rejects the Defendants' argument that a claim under the
TNRC or for unjust enrichment is the appropriate cause of action.
By the plain language of the clause, the Defendants' predecessors
agreed to pay the grantees a percentage of the royalties.  And the
Supreme Court of Texas has stated that the TNRC does not abrogate a
breach of contract claim in the context of a lease.

Next, because the Defendants have not established that a breach of
covenant claim fails as a matter of law here, the Judge rejects the
Defendants' argument that a royalty interest owner may not sue a
lessor for breach of contract.  Contrary to the Defendants'
suggestion, a grantor of a royalty interest can be liable to the
grantee under certain situations.  The grantor of a royalty
interest is not immune from liability to the royalty interest owner
once the grantor enters into an oil and gas lease.

Even accepting the Defendants' argument that Burlington expressly
assumed all obligations owed to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants do
not point to any language that Burlington expressly released
Defendant Diane Crawford or the remaining Defendants from the
obligation to pay and deliver the royalties.  Nor do the Defendants
state how Burlington impliedly released Defendants from the
specially created obligation.  Thus, the Defendants' argument that
they are not liable for breach of covenant because they assigned
any obligation to Burlington is rejected.

Finally, arguing that the term "lease" in the oil and gas context
is a misnomer, the Defendants claim that the Lease conveyed their
mineral estate in the Property to Burlington.  According to the
Defendants, they do not owe any obligation to the Plaintiffs
because they only retained a 1/4 royalty interest in the Property.
As the Judge has already held, the Deeds granted a floating royalty
interest, a fraction of half of whatever proceeds the Defendants'
predecessors received from the Property.  A floating royalty
interest entitles its owner to a share of the landowner's royalty
obtained under a lease.  The Defendants still possess a royalty
interest in the Property, which is subject to any floating royalty
interest created by the Deeds.  Thus, the Judge rejects this
argument.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Ramos denied the Koerner
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Additionally, Judge Ramos
denied the Koerner Defendants' motion requesting oral argument.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/nEn98F from Leagle.com.

Verde Minerals, LLC, on behalf of itself and a class of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Walter James Scott,
Jr., Scott Law Group LLP, Douglas E. Chaves, Chaves Resendez et al,
George Theodore Scott, Scott Law Group LLP & Joshua Richard Stein
.

Mark Larson & Scott Saufferer, Plaintiffs, represented by Douglas
E. Chaves, Chaves Resendez et al, George Theodore Scott, Scott Law
Group LLP & Joshua Richard Stein .

Diane Duncan Koerner, Kimberly K. Sheridan, Stacey E. Koerner &
Charles D. Duncan, Defendants, represented by William Louis Sciba,
III, Cole, Cole, Easley & Sciba, P.C., Andrew Richmond Knop, K&L
Gates LLP, Elizabeth Gilman, K&L Gates LLP, Michael Terrell Murphy,
K&LGates & Mitchell Maddox Murphy, K&L Gates LLP.

Jo Ann Crawford Floyd, Virginia K. Pittman Rothermel, Charles T.
Rothermel, III, Elizabeth Pittman Clark, Ansel P. Clark & Trustee
Barbara Braun Wolin as Trustee of the Robyn Louise Wolin Trust,
Barbara Braun Wolin as Trustee of the Robyn Louise Wolin Trust,
Defendants, represented by Michael Terrell Murphy, K&LGates, Andrew
Richmond Knop, K&L Gates LLP, Elizabeth Gilman, K&L Gates LLP,
Elizabeth Linan Tiblets, KL Gates LLP & Mitchell Maddox Murphy, K&L
Gates LLP.

Robyn L. Wolin Trust, Defendant, represented by Michael Terrell
Murphy, K&LGates, Andrew Richmond Knop, K&L Gates LLP, Elizabeth
Gilman, K&L Gates LLP & Mitchell Maddox Murphy, K&L Gates LLP.

Trustee Barbara Braun Wolin, Barbara Braun Wolin as Trustee of the
Robyn Louise Wolin Trust, Defendant, represented by Michael Terrell
Murphy, K&LGates & Elizabeth Linan Tiblets, KL Gates LLP.

Burlington Resources Oil and Gas Company, LP, Defendant,
represented by William Scott Hastings, Locke Lord LLC, Alexandra
Ann LoCasto, Locke Lord LLP & Susan E. Adams, Locke Lord LLP.


DICK'S SPORTING: Weisen Sues Over Violations of Disabilities Act
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dick's Sporting
Goods, Inc. The case is captioned as Jeffrey Weisen, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Dick's Sporting
Goods, Inc., Case No. 0:19-cv-03151-SRN-ECW (D. Minn., Dec. 23,
2019).

The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Susan Richard Nelson. The
suit demands $75 thousand in damages alleging violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.

Dick's Sporting is an American sporting goods retail company, based
in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Chad Throndset, Esq.
          Patrick W. Michenfelder, Esq.
          THRONDSET MICHENFELDER, LLC
          One Central Avenue West, Suite 203
          St. Michael, MN 55376
          Telephone: (763) 515-6110
          E-mail: chad@throndsetlaw.com
                  pat@throndsetlaw.com


DIRECTV LLC: Faces Farrell Suit Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Farrell, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. DIRECTV, LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-05061 (W.D. Wash., Jan.
24, 2020), is brought for damages and other equitable and legal
remedies resulting from the Defendant's violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and the Federal Communication Commission
rules promulgated thereunder.

In 2017 and 2018, the Plaintiff received at least 30 marketing
calls from or on behalf of the Defendant on his cellular phone,
according to the complaint. The Defendant or its agents repeatedly
called the Plaintiff to solicit his purchase of the Defendant
service. The calls had all the signs of being placed using an
automated telephone dialing system. When the Plaintiff answered his
phone and said hello, no one would immediately answer.

The Plaintiff contends that he has never been a customer of the
Defendant and did not consent to receive calls from or on behalf of
the Defendant. Although the Plaintiff repeatedly asked the
Defendant to stop the calls, the Defendant continued to call him
without his consent, says the complaint.

Plaintiff John Farrell resides in Tacoma, Washington.

DIRECTV, LLC is a California Limited Liability Company with
headquarters at El Segundo, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          Jennifer Rust Murray, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Phone: (206) 816-6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319-5450
          Email: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com
                 jmurray@terrellmarshall.com


DSC LOGISTICS: Linares Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit styled Juan Linares, individually and on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. DSC LOGISTICS, INC., a
limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Case
No. CIVDS2000631, was removed from the Superior Court of the State
of California for the County of San Bernardino County to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on Jan. 24,
2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:20-cv-00176 to the
proceeding.

The Complaint seeks, on behalf of all class members dating back to
January 7, 2016, payment of allegedly unpaid overtime wages,
minimum wage, meal break premium wages, rest break premium wages,
and unreimbursed business expenses. The Complaint also seeks
damages for allegedly inaccurate wage statements in the amounts
required by California Labor Code, which sets forth maximum damages
of $4,000 per employee, waiting time penalties equal to one day's
pay for 30 days for each terminated employee, as well as other
penalties and attorneys' fees.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Thomas H. Petrides, Esq.
          Babak Termechi, Esq.
          VEDDER PRICE (CA), LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: +1 424 204 7700
          Fax: +1 424 204 7702
          Email: tpetrides@vedderprice.com
                 btermechi@vedderprice.com


EAGLE NATIONAL: Court Grants Edmondson Leave to Amend RESPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stephanie A. Gallagher of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland has granted plaintiff leave to amend complaint
in MARY E. EDMONDSON, Plaintiff, v. EAGLE NATIONAL BANK, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Case No. 16-3938-SAG (D. Md.).

On Dec. 8, 2016, Edmondson filed a one-count class action Complaint
against Defendants Eagle National, Eagle Nationwide Mortgage
Company, Eagle National Bancorp, Inc., ESSA Bancorp, Inc., and ESSA
Bank & Trust, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA").  

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on March 27,
2017.  Once the motion was fully briefed, Judge Richard D. Bennett
held a motions hearing on Jan. 16, 2018 (over one year after the
Complaint had been filed), and issued an order granting the Motion
to Dismiss on Jan. 29, 2018.  An appeal ensued.

On April 26, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
entered judgment reversing the district court's decision and
remanding the case for further proceedings.  Judge Bennett issued a
Scheduling Order on June 27, 2019.  The parties jointly requested
modifications to the Scheduling Order on July 10, 2019, and Judge
Bennett approved the parties' requested schedule on July 12, 2019.
According to the schedule the parties jointly requested, the
deadline for Moving for Joinder of Additional Parties and Amendment
of Pleadings was Nov. 1, 2019.

Edmondson now seeks leave to amend her complaint to modify the
putative class definition and to add additional Plaintiffs and
class representatives.

The Defendants assert that two of the three grounds for denying a
motion for leave to amend are present in the case.  First, they
assert that they will be prejudiced if the Court grants Edmondson
leave to amend.  Second, they claim that Edmondson brings her
proposed amendments in bad faith.

Judge Gallagher finds the Defendants' first argument as
unpersuasive.  First, given the nature of the litigation, and the
fact that Edmondson seeks to add only one couple as Plaintiffs and
class representatives, it is unclear that any material alterations
to the Scheduling Order will be required by the change.  Second,
the Defendants' repeated contention that Edmondson seeks the
amendment almost three years after the action was filed,
inaccurately portrays the suit's procedural posture.  In light of
these facts, the Defendants' unsupported assertion of "prejudice"
is unpersuasive.

As for the Defendants' second argument,  Judge Gallagher finds it
also unpersuasive.  She opines that courts typically find that a
party acts in bad faith in bringing a motion for leave to amend,
for example, when their amendment fails to advance a colorable
legal argument.  Furthermore, the earlier in the case the motion
for leave to amend is brought, the less likely it is that the
motion is brought in bad faith.  No bad faith indicators are
present in the case, particularly given that leave to amend was
sought before the deadline agreed by the parties.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Gallagher granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Leave to Amend.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/WPPrHO from Leagle.com.

Mary E Edmondson, Plaintiff, represented by Michael Paul Smith --
mpsmith@sgs-law.com -- Smith Gildea and Schmidt LLC, Timothy L.
Creed -- tcreed@hccw.com -- Harman Claytor Corrigan & Wellman,
Timothy Francis Maloney, Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA, Veronica
Byam Nannis, Joseph Greenwald and Laake PA, Megan Aileen
Benevento, Joseph Greenwald and Laake, P.A., & Sarah A. Zadrozny,
Smith, Gildea & Schmidt, LLC.

Eagle National Bank, Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company, Eagle
National Bancorp., Inc., ESSA Bancorp, Inc. & ESSA Bank & Trust,
Defendants, represented by Brian L. Moffet --
bmoffet@milesstockbridge.com -- Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., George
J. Krueger -- gkrueger@foxrothschild.com -- Fox Rothschild LLP,
pro hac vice & Ryan T. Becker -- rbecker@foxrothschild.com -- Fox
Rothschild LLP, pro hac vice.


EQT CORP: Superior Court Upholds Dismissal of Amended Garfield Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT GARFIELD, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Appellant, v. EQT CORP., Appellee, Case No. 254
WDA 2019 (Pa. Super.), Judge John T. Bender of the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's Jan. 29, 2019 order,
sustaining the Appellee's preliminary objections and dismissing the
Appellant's second amended complaint ("SAC") with prejudice.

The case is a shareholder class action brought under Pennsylvania
law by the Appellant, a shareholder of EQT, against the members of
EQT's Board of Directors and EQT.  The action arises out of EQT's
acquisition of Rice Energy for stock and cash, pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger entered into on June 19, 2017.  On
that date, EQT and Rice announced that they had entered into a
definitive Agreement and Plan of Merger under which EQT would
acquire all of the outstanding shares of Rice common stock for
total consideration of approximately $6.7 billion -- consisting of
.37 shares of EQT common stock and $5.30 in cash per share of Rice
common stock.

The Appellant contends that the Merger and the related issuance of
additional EQT shares to pay for the Merger was fundamentally
unfair to EQT shareholders.  He also contends that the Board and
EQT persuaded EQT shareholders to support an unfair acquisition by
misrepresenting the value of the transaction and by misrepresenting
and concealing other conflicts of interest.

The Appellant filed his Amended Shareholder Class Action Complaint
on Dec. 19, 2017, asserting claims for Fundamental Unfairness
pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S. Section 1105 (Count I), Intentional
Interference with Voting Rights (Count II), and Unjust Enrichment
(Count III).  Preliminary objections were then filed, and by order
dated Aug. 21, 2018, the Court sustained all of the objections and
dismissed the Amended Complaint without prejudice.

Thereafter, the Appellant filed his Second Amended Complaint (SAC),
reasserting Counts I to III of his Amended Complaint and asserting
two new causes of action: negligence against EQT (Count IV) and
Breach of Contract between EQT and its shareholders (Count V).
Preliminary objections were filed to these new counts and by order
dated Jan. 29, 2019, the Court sustained the objections with
prejudice to Counts IV and V, and the within appeal followed.

On Dec. 19, 2017, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal
(without prejudice) as to all derivative claims, in which the
Appellant withdrew his demand upon EQT's Board, dismissed without
prejudice any and all derivative claims (whether so denominated or
not) set forth in the Verified Shareholder Class Action and
Derivative Complaint, and agreed not to assert any further
derivative claims (whether so denominated or not).

As stated in the Appellant's response to EQT's preliminary
objections, Counts I, II, and III have merely been restated,
without change, to preserve the Appellant's appellate rights in
light of the Court's previous order dismissing those claims without
prejudice, as is explained in the SAC at paragraph 129 entitled
"Reservation."  Instead of amending those previously asserted
counts, the Appellant's SAC amends by adding two new causes of
action at Counts IV (negligence, gross negligence, recklessness)
and V (breach of contract).

As referenced by the trial court, the Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal from its order sustaining EQT's preliminary
objections and dismissing his SAC with prejudice. The trial court
subsequently ordered the Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and he timely
complied.  Thereafter, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
opinion.

The Appellant raises two issues for the Superior Court's review:

      I. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Count IV of
the Appellant's SAC, which asserts a claim for negligence, gross
negligence, and recklessness against EQT only, based upon its
determination that: (a) Count IV is a derivative claim improperly
recast as a direct claim, and (b) EQT does not owe any direct duty
to Appellant and other EQT shareholders.

      II. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Count V of
the Appellant's SAC, which asserts a breach of contract claim
against EQT only, based upon its determination that EQT's Articles
of Incorporation did not create a contractual obligation between
EQT and EQT shareholders including Appellant to act lawfully when
conducting its business.

Judge Bender holds that the Appellant has not demonstrated that the
trial court erred in determining that Count IV is a derivative
claim.  The Judge finds that it is the directors who manage and
oversee the conduct of the corporation's business; the corporation
does not manage or oversee the Board.  Nor could it.  Moreover, the
injuries upon which the Appellant's claims are based are not unique
to him.  The Judge articulates the harm as the dilution of EQT
shares and a decline in EQT's share price resulting from poor
management decisions.  These are harms to all EQT shareholders.
For these reasons, the Judge concludes that the trial court did not
err in dismissing Count IV of the SAC, as it is a derivative claim
masked as a direct claim.  Therefore, no relief is due.

As for the Appellant's second issue, Judge Bender finds that
problematically, the Appellant does not analyze the Relational or
Healy cases he cites to, nor provide the Court with their context,
even in the face of EQT's stating that they are distinguishable and
inapposite to the matter at hand.  Judge Bender also does not
address the trial court's observation that the statement of
corporate purpose does not create a contract as it does not set any
definite terms, nor does it provide for an exchange of
consideration or a mutuality of obligations.  As EQT discerns, the
Appellant fails to identify any actual duties and instead points to
a description of the business purposes for which EQT was
incorporated.  Finally, EQT compellingly recognizes that the breach
of contract claim is just another improper attempt to bring a
derivative claim directly.  Judge Bender concurs.  Accordingly, no
relief is due, and the trial court properly dismissed Count V.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Bender affirmed and judgment is
entered.

A full-text copy of the Superior Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Decision is
available at https://is.gd/a3Y4L7 from Leagle.com.

Joseph N. Kravec, Jr. -- JKRAVEC@FDPKLAW.COM -- Feinstein Doyle
Payne & Kravec, LLC, Kevin Ryan Green -- KRGREEN@FDPKLAW.COM --
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, for Appellant, Robert
Garfield.

Thomas Lee Allen, Reed Smith LLP, Kim M. Watterson --
kwatterson@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, James Louis Rockney,
Jr. -- jrockney@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Brian Joseph
Willett -- bwillett@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, for Appellee,
EQT Corporation.

Thomas Lee Allen, Reed Smith LLP, Kim M. Watterson, Reed Smith LLP,
James Louis Rockney, Jr., Reed Smith LLP, Brian Joseph Willett,
Reed Smith LLP, for Participants, Christine J. Toretti, Lee T.
Todd, Jr., Stephen A. Thorington. Steven T. Schlotterbeck, James E.
Rohr, David L. Porges, Margaret K. Dorman, A. Bray Cary, Jr.,
Kenneth M. Burke, Philip G. Berhrman and Vicky A. Bailey.


EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE: $350K Deal in Acosta Suit Gets Final OK
--------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Final
Approval of the Class Action Settlement in the case captioned JARED
ACOSTA, Plaintiff, v. EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE MORTGAGE COMPANY, a
Washington Corporation; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive, Defendant.
No. 2:17-cv-00466-KJM-DB. (E.D. Cal.)

Plaintiff commenced the wage and hour class action and
representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act
(PAGA). Plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in unfair
competition; failed to provide paid rest periods and sick leave,
pay contract wages, timely pay wages, timely pay final wages, and
provide legally compliant paystubs and required class members to
enter into unlawful agreements.

Defendant agrees that the scope of the settlement class will
include all employees who have, or continue to work for defendant
within California, except for those classified as outside sales
employees, who were paid by commissions only or commissions in
conjunction with a draw against commissions from January 24, 2013
to the court's entry of an order preliminarily approving the class
settlement.

Defendant agrees to pay $350,000 in addition to any monies
necessary to satisfy defendant's tax obligations (e.g., employer
FICA, FUTA and SDI contributions on wage payments) on any monies
distributed to class members that are allocated as wages under the
agreement.  

Numerosity

In its order granting preliminary approval, the Court found the
putative class met the numerosity requirement because the 59-member
class, although small, fell within the acceptable range. As the
class size has since grown to approximately 75 members, there is no
reason for the Court to depart from its prior finding. The
numerosity requirement is satisfied here.

Commonality
  
As plaintiff argues, each of his theories of recovery are based on
alleged common practices of Defendants or their alleged uniformly
applied policies or lack thereof. The Court's preliminary approval
order describes these common practices as: (1) unpaid rest periods
(2) unpaid wages owed at termination, which triggered waiting time
penalties (3) inaccurate wage statements that included neither the
employer's full name nor the itemized rest period premiums owed (4)
no paid sick leave and (5) delayed termination wages.  

The commonality element is satisfied, the Court finds.

Typicality

The typicality requirement also is satisfied, the Court adds. A
court resolves the typicality inquiry by considering whether other
members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is
based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and
whether other class members have been injured by the same course of
conduct. As explained in the preliminary approval order,
plaintiff's claims typify the class's claims because plaintiff and
each class member allegedly held the same position at roughly the
same time, and allegedly were subject to the same policies
regarding wages, commissions, hours, rest periods, sick leave and
vacation accruals. Because of this, the basis for plaintiff's
claims and the types of remedies sought are similar amongst all
class members.

On these grounds the typicality requirement is satisfied, the Court
holds.
  
Predominance

The legality of defendant's standardized policies is central to the
claims of all class members, and the only individual questions
involve the degree to which each class member was harmed by those
policies. Because the amount of damages is invariably an individual
question and does not defeat class action treatment, there is no
reason for the court to depart from its preliminary finding. Were
class members to assert their claims individually, rather than
together as here, the same allegations unpaid rest periods, unpaid
wages owed at termination, inaccurate wage statements, no paid sick
leave and delayed termination wages would remain consistent across
all class members. The existence of slight factual distinctions,
such as precise hours worked, does not diminish the predominance of
the common legal claims amongst them.  

Therefore, the predominance requirement is met, the Court finds.

Adequacy

The preliminary approval order found that nothing before the court
suggests a conflict of interest between class members and plaintiff
or plaintiff's counsel.  Plaintiff has taken no actions to pursue
these matters and no actions have been taken that negatively affect
the class or settlement. Because it appears the potential conflict
with plaintiff never materialized, the Court is satisfied that the
adequacy requirement is met.

The parties have undergone substantial litigation in order to reach
a settlement agreement, and the terms of the agreement demonstrate
it is the result of hard fought and vigorous representation by
Plaintiff and his counsel.  Plaintiff has been involved in all
stages of the litigation, including investigation of claims,
preparation of complaints, production of evidentiary documents,
inclusion in the discovery and pleading process and involvement in
negotiations.  

Taken together, the Court is satisfied that plaintiff's role as
class representative adequately represents the interests of the
class.

Superiority

In the preliminary approval order the court found the superiority
element to be satisfied. The reasons for the court's preliminary
approval are unchanged; thus, there is no reason for the court to
depart from them here. Class certification is superior to
alternative forums for the following reasons: (1) there is no
evidence of existing lawsuits filed by class members against
defendant raising the same or similar issues (2) there is a risk of
obtaining smaller awards if members pursued claims individually (3)
the Eastern District of California is an appropriate forum to
litigate this action because the class is comprised of California
residents, asserting California law, and defendant has offices in
California, including in the Eastern District.

The Court affirms its preliminary order and finds the superiority
requirement is met.

Notice to Class Members

Here, claims administrator, Simpluris, Inc., received a Class List
from defense counsel containing names, most recent mailing
addresses, social security numbers and pertinent employment
information for all 75 class members. Mailing addresses were
updated using the U.S. Postal Service's National Change of Address
Database (NCOA).  Notice packets were mailed to all 75 class
members using addresses from the class list using First Class mail
or addresses updated via NCOA search.  

A class member who is unable to share in the award due to lack of
actual notice will still benefit indirectly through cy pres
distribution.  

Based on plaintiff's efforts and in light of the authority
governing notice requirements, the Court's concerns regarding
notice are satisfied.  

Fairness of Settlement

The proposed settlement amount for all 75 class members is
$350,000, which is approximately 14.4 percent to 21.3 percent of
the maximum recovery if the class were successful in maintaining
certification and at trial.  

Having reviewed the settlement agreement in aggregate and the cases
cited by plaintiff, the Court is satisfied that the settlement
value, even if relatively small compared to the maximum possible
recovery, is fair to the putative class members.

Class counsel seek an award of attorneys' fees of $87,500, which
represents 25% percent of the $350,000 gross settlement amount.
The Court is satisfied that the proposed distribution to counsel is
not disproportionate, and is within a percentage range the Ninth
Circuit deems acceptable.  

In sum, the Court grants final approval of the settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's November 14, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/rfcblr5 from Leagle.com

Jared Acosta, Plaintiff, represented by Galen T. Shimoda-
attorney@shimodalaw.com - Shimoda Law Corp. & Justin Paul Rodriguez
- jrodriguez@shimodalaw.com - Shimoda Law Corp.

Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage Company, Defendant, represented by
Kerry M. Friedrichs , Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Tiffany Tran -
ttran@seyfarth.com - Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Alexander A. Baehr ,
Summit Law Group, PLLC, pro hac vice.


FALKIRK MANAGEMENT: Lomeli May Amend Complaint
----------------------------------------------
In the case, JODI LOMELI, ETC., Appellant, v. FALKIRK MANAGEMENT
CORP., ETC., ET AL., Respondents, 2017-05746, 2017-05748, Index No.
1580/16 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, Second Department, (i) affirmed in part the
order of the Supreme Court, Orange County, dated Dec. 20, 2016, and
(2) reversed the order of the same court dated Dec. 27, 2016.

In a putative class action, inter alia, to recover unpaid wages,
the Plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of Judge Maria S.
Vazquez-Doles of the Supreme Court, Orange County, dated December
20, 2016, and (2) an order of the same court dated Dec. 27, 2016.
The order dated Dec. 20, 2016, insofar as appealed from, denied the
Plaintiff's motion to compel the Defendants to respond to discovery
demands and for an extension of time to move for class
certification, and granted that branch of the Defendants' cross
motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first
cause of action insofar as asserted against the defendants Wayne
Corts and Carla Corts.  The order dated Dec. 27, 2016, denied the
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint.

The Plaintiff was formerly employed as a banquet server by Falkirk
Management to perform waitstaff services at a catering facility
known as Falkirk Estate and Country Club.  The Plaintiff commenced
the putative class action against Falkirk Management, doing
business as the Country Club, and Wayne Corts and Carla Corts, the
alleged owners and managers of that entity, seeking, inter alia, to
recover unpaid wages.  The complaint alleged, in sum, that the
defendants violated Labor Law Section 196-d by failing to properly
remit to banquet servers and other waitstaff, including the
Plaintiff, the service charges and gratuities collected by the
Defendants on contracts for catered events held at the Country
Club.

The Plaintiff moved to compel the defendants to respond to
discovery demands and for an extension of time to move for class
certification.  The Defendants opposed the Plaintiff's motion and
cross-moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.  While the motion
and cross motion were pending, the Plaintiff moved for leave to
amend the complaint, inter alia, to correct the name of Falkirk
Management in the caption and to add the Country Club corporation
as a Defendant.

In an order dated Dec. 20, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the
Defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action and denied the Plaintiff's motion to compel
discovery and for an extension of time to move for class
certification.  Thereafter, in an order dated Dec. 27, 2016, the
court denied the Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the
complaint.

The Court disagrees with the Supreme Court's determination granting
that branch of the Defendants' cross motion which was to dismiss
the first cause of action, alleging a violation of Labor Law
Section 196-d, insofar as asserted against the Cortses.  On a
motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, the complaint is to be
afforded a liberal construction.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
the Court finds that the materials submitted by the Defendants did
not conclusively establish that the Plaintiff has no cause of
action against the Cortses to recover damages for unpaid wages
pursuant to Labor Law Section 196-d.  As is relevant to these
appeals, the first cause of action alleged that the Cortses were
the employers of the Plaintiff and other waitstaff within the
meaning of the Labor Law, and that they violated Labor Law Section
196-d by imposing a mandatory service charge on contracts for
catered events without "disclaiming" that the charge was a
gratuity, thereby leading a reasonable customer to believe that the
service charge was a gratuity, and by failing to distribute the
service charge to the Plaintiff and other waitstaff.  Accordingly,
the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the Defendants'
cross motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action,
alleging a violation of Labor Law Section 196-d, insofar as
asserted against the Cortses.

However, the Court agrees with the Supreme Court's determination
denying that branch of the Plaintiff's motion which was to compel
the Defendants to respond to discovery demands.  The information
sought by the Plaintiff in her first set of interrogatories and
first request for the production of documents was largely
burdensome or immaterial, and consequently, palpably improper.

Nonetheless, it disagrees with the Supreme Court's determination
denying that branch of the Plaintiff's motion which was for an
extension of time to move for class certification.  A plaintiff's
need to conduct pre-class certification discovery to determine
whether the prerequisites of a class action set forth in CPLR
901(a) can be satisfied constitutes good cause for the extension of
the 60-day time period fixed by CPLR 902.  Since the Plaintiff made
the requisite showing of good cause, that branch of the Plaintiff's
motion which was for an extension of time in which to seek class
certification should have been granted.

The Supreme Court also should have granted the Plaintiff's
subsequent motion for leave to amend the complaint.  The defendants
alleged no surprise or prejudice.  Moreover, the proposed
amendments are not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of
merit.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the
complaint should have been granted.

The parties' remaining contentions are either not properly before
the Court, as they were improperly raised for the first time on
appeal, or without merit.

Based on the foregoing, the Court modified the order dated Dec. 20,
2016, on the law and the facts, (1) by deleting the provision
thereof granting that branch of the Defendants' cross motion which
was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the first cause of
action insofar as asserted against the Defendants Wayne Corts and
Carla Corts, and substituting therefor a provision denying that
branch of the cross motion; and (2) by deleting the provision
thereof denying that branch of the Plaintiff's motion which was for
an extension of time to move for class certification, and
substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the
motion; as so modified, the order dated Dec. 20, 2016, is affirmed
insofar as appealed from.

The Court reversed the order dated Dec. 27, 2016, on the law, and
granted the Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint.

One bill of costs is awarded to the Plaintiff.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 8, 2020 Decision & Order is
available at https://is.gd/jrQs3A from Leagle.com.

Joseph & Kirschenbaum LLP, New York, NY (D. Maimon Kirschenbaum --
maimon@jhllp.com -- Denise A. Schulman -- denise@jhllp.com -- and
Pechman Law Group PLLC [Louis Pechman -- pechman@pechmanlaw.com --
and Vivianna Morales -- morales@pechmanlaw.com] of counsel), for
appellant.

Dwight D. Joyce -- office@dwightjoycelaw.com -- Stony Point, NY
(Stephen J. Cole-Hatchard of counsel), for respondents.


FILTRATION GROUP: Johnson Hits Biometrics Data Sharing
------------------------------------------------------
Lanette Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Filtration Group LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2020CH00138 (Ill. Cir., January 6, 2020), seeks an injunction
requiring Defendants to cease all unlawful activity related to the
capture, collection, storage and use of biometrics; statutory
damages together with costs and reasonable attorneys' fees for
violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Plaintiff was required to "clock-in" and "clock-out" using a
timeclock that scanned fingerprints. The complaint asserts that
Filtration Group improperly disclosed employees' fingerprint data
without informed consent. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
      KOZONIS & KLINGER, LTD.
      4849 N. Milwaukee Ave., Ste. 300
      Chicago, IL 60630
      Phone: (312) 283-3814
      Fax: (773) 496-8617
      Email: gklinger@kozonislaw.com

             - and -

      Daniel R. Johnson, Esq.
      Adam Waskowski, Esq.
      WASKOWSKI JOHNSON YOHALEMLLP
      954 W. Washington Blvd., Suite 322
      Chicago, IL 60607
      Tel: (312) 278-3153
      Email: djohnson@wjylegal.com
             awaskowski@wjylegal.com


FIRST STREET: Court Seeks Affidavit on Settlement in Mendez Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Himelda Mendez, Plaintiff, v. First Street Gallery,
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 19 Civ. 8464 (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Deborah
A. Batts of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York has issued an order regarding the Parties' proposed class
action settlement agreement.

The case was originally filed as a class action.  The parties
notified the Court in November 2019 that they have a resolution in
the action.  

Judge Batts accordingly ordered the Parties to inform the Court, by
Affidavit, whether the proposed settlement agreement alters the
legal rights of purported, unnamed class members.  The Parties are
also ordered to file a Stipulation of Dismissal.  If they fail to
do so, the Defendant will answer or otherwise respond to the
Complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/FryVf2 from Leagle.com.

Himelda Mendez, and on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Bradly Gurion Marks --
bmarkslaw@gmail.com -- The Marks Law Firm PC.


FUSION INDUSTRIES: Garza Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Pay Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Javier Garza, on Behalf of Himself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. FUSION INDUSTRIES, LLC, Case No.
1:20-cv-00072 (D.N.M., Jan. 24, 2020), is brought against the
Defendant for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New Mexico Minimum Wage Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant required the Plaintiff to
work more than forty hours in a workweek without overtime
compensation. The Defendant misclassified the Plaintiff and other
similarly situated workers as independent contractors instead of as
employees. By misclassifying them as independent contractors, the
Defendant illegally denied the Plaintiff and the proposed Class
Members compensation at time and one half their regular rates of
pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff performed work for the Defendant as a welder from
January 2018 to August 2018.

The Defendant is a company that provides services to the oil and
gas industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Don J. Foty, Esq.
          HODGES & FOTY, L.L.P.
          4409 Montrose Blvd., Ste. 200
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: (713) 523-0001
          Facsimile: (713) 523-1116
          Email: Dfoty@hftrialfirm.com

               - and -

          Daniel M. Faber, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL M. FABER
          4620C Jefferson Lane NE
          Albuquerque, NM 87109
          Phone: (505) 830-0405
          Email: dan@danielfaber.com


GC SERVICES: Settlement in Macy FDCPA Suit Gets Prelim. OK
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILBUR MACY and PAMELA J. STOWE, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. GC
SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendants, Civil Action No.
3:15-cv-819-DJH-CHL (W.D. Ky.), Judge David J. Hale of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Louisville
Division, granted the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of class settlement.

Plaintiffs Macy and Stowe, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, allege that Defendant GC Services violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by sending them debt-collection
letters that did not accurately convey their rights under the Act.
The parties have reached a settlement to resolve the class action,
and the Plaintiffs seek preliminary approval of that settlement.

The Court previously certified the following class: "(1) All
persons with a Kentucky or Nevada address, (2) to whom GC Services
Limited Partnership mailed an initial communication that stated:
(a) if you do dispute all or any portion of this debt within 30
days of receiving this letter, we will obtain verification of the
debt from our client and send it to you, and/or (b) if within 30
days of receiving this letter you request the name and address of
the original creditor, we will provide it to you in the event it
differs from our client, (3) between Nov. 5, 2014 and Nov. 5, 2015,
(4) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt, (5) that
was not returned as undeliverable to GC Services Limited
Partnership."

GC Services has identified 8,902 class members, including Macy and
Stowe.  Under the proposed settlement, the class members who do not
opt out would automatically receive $10 each, while the named
Plaintiffs would each receive $2,500 ($1,000 in statutory damages
and $1,500 as an "incentive award"), plus fees and costs.  In
addition, GC Services would cease using the form of debt collection
letter at issue in the case.  The agreement contemplates an award
of $220,000 in fees to the class counsel, and GC Services has
agreed not to oppose the motion for attorney fees.  The recent
changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 require careful
scrutiny of these provisions before the settlement is preliminarily
approved.

After careful consideration, Judge Hale finds that the proposed
settlement appears to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The
Plaintiffs have shown that the Court will likely be able to approve
the settlement at the final-approval stage.  Accordingly, the Judge
granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Action Settlement.  

In compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act, the Defendant,
through the Settlement Administrator, will cause written notice of
the proposed class settlement to be served on the United States
Attorney General and the Attorney General of each state in which
any Class Member resides.

A third-party settlement administrator acceptable to the parties
will administer the settlement and notification to the Class
Members.  The Settlement Administrator will be responsible for
mailing the approved class-action notice and settlement checks to
the Class Members.  All reasonable costs of notice and
administration will be paid by Defendant separate and apart from
the Settlement Fund.  Upon the recommendation of the parties, the
Judge appointed First Class, Inc. as Settlement Administrator.

With the exception of the errors noted and at the hearing, the
Judge approved the form and substance of the written notices of the
class action settlement.  In accordance with the Agreement, the
Settlement Administrator will mail the notice to the Class Members
as expeditiously as possible.  The Settlement Administrator will
confirm and if necessary, update the addresses for the Class
Members through standard methodology that the Settlement
Administrator currently uses to update addresses.

Any Class Member who wishes to be excluded from the Class must send
a written request for exclusion to the Settlement Administrator
with a postmark date no later than 75 days after entry of the
Order, or Feb. 19, 2020.  Any Class Member who intends to object to
the fairness of the Settlement must file a written objection with
the Court within 75 days of entry of the Order, or no later than
Feb. 19, 2020.  Furthermore, any such Class Member must, within the
same time period, provide a copy of the written objection to the
Class Counsel, attention: James L. Davidson, Greenwald Davidson
Radbil PLLC, 5550 Glades Road, Suite 500, Boca Raton, FL 33431; and
the counsel for Defendant, Elizabeth M. Shaffer, Dinsmore & Shohl
LLP, 255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900, Cincinnati, OH 45202.

If the Court grants final approval of the settlement, the
Settlement Administrator will mail a settlement check to each
Settlement Class Member who has not timely requested exclusion.
Each Settlement Class Member who has not timely requested exclusion
will receive $10 from the Settlement Fund.

The Final Approval Hearing is set for April 10, 2020, at 2:00 p.m.

The Court has set the following schedule:

     a. Dec. 6, 2019 - Preliminary Approval

     b. Dec. 27, 2019 - Notice to Class

     c. Jan. 29, 2020 - Attorney-Fee Petition

     d. Feb. 19, 2020 - Exclusion/Objection

     e. March 11, 2020 - Motion for Final Approval

     f. March 27, 2020 - Opposition to Final Approval

     g. April 3, 2020 - Reply in Support of Final Approval

     h. April 10, 2020 - Final Approval Hearing

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/2efDVt from Leagle.com.

Wilbur Macy, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated &
Pamela J. Stowe, on behlf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by James L. Davidson --
jdavidson@gdrlawfirm.com -- Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC &
Shireen Hormozdi -- shireen@norcrosslawfirm.com -- Hormozdi Law
Firm, LLC.

GC Services Limited Partnership, Defendant, represented by
Elizabeth M. Shaffer -- elizabeth.shaffer@dinsmore.com -- Dinsmore
& Shohl LLP & Hilary J.L. Palazzolo -- hilary@rudnickifirm.com --
The Rudnicki Firm.


GOOGLE LLC: Production of Class List in Roley Suit Partly Approved
------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California has entered an order regarding
the discovery dispute in the case, ANDREW ROLEY, Plaintiff, v.
GOOGLE LLC, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-07537-BLF (SVK) (N.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Roley brings the putative class action against Google.
On Sept. 24, 2019, the Court ordered the Defendant to provide the
Plaintiff with the email addresses of a sample of the putative
class members and ordered the Parties to meet and confer on the
sample size.  If there were remaining issues with regards to the
Court's order, the Parties were to provide a joint status report to
the Court by Oct. 22, 2019 in preparation for a hearing on Oct. 24,
2019.

On Oct. 11, 2019, the Parties submitted a joint stipulation
extending the Court's deadlines to Dec. 3, 2019 and Dec. 5, 2019,
respectively.  The Court granted the stipulation on Oct. 15, 2019
and set a hearing for Dec. 10, 2019.

Now before the Court is the Parties' Joint Status Report Regarding
Production of Class List and Data submitted on Dec. 3, 2019 in
response to the Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order.  The Parties have yet
to agree on an adequate sample size and have been unsuccessful in
their meet and confer efforts.

Having considered the Parties' submissions and the relevant case
law, Magistrate Judge van Kuelen granted in part the Plaintiff's
motion to compel the production of the class list.  The Parties now
agree that the putative class consists of approximately 12,000
individuals.  The Plaintiff requests a sample of 6,000 individuals,
based on the recommendation of a survey expert.

The Plaintiff also reiterates its prior request for production of
the entire class list.  The Plaintiff's argument regarding the
statistical significance of the 6,000 figure is not persuasive.
The analysis presented results in only 48 respondents, thereby
undermining the use of such an analysis in determining an adequate
sample size.  Similarly, the Magistrate Judge finds the Defendant's
arguments unpersuasive, as the Plaintiff has demonstrated his need
for the email addresses of the putative class members.  Further,
the relative extreme positions of both Parties, little changed from
the arguments presented in the September briefing, casts doubt on
whether the Parties fulfilled their obligation to meet, confer, and
attempt to compromise in good faith.

The Magistrate Judge finds that a sample of 1,800 individuals (15%
of 12,000) is appropriate.  The Parties are ordered to meet and
confer on the particulars of how this sample will be selected,
taking into account the class members that may be been
"grandfathered" in.  

In accordance with the Court's Sept. 24, 2019 Order, the Plaintiff
is to provide a draft of its communication with putative class
members to the Defendant and the Court prior to issuing it to the
sample.  The Defendant may respond to the draft communication, and
the Parties should meet and confer over any issues that arise.  If
the Parties are unable to resolve the issues, they may submit the
Plaintiff's proposed communication and the Defendant's red-line
version to the Court for determination.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1GDWPf from Leagle.com.

Andrew Roley, Plaintiff, represented by Christian Schreiber --
christian@osclegal.com -- Olivier Schreiber & Chao LLP, Monique
Olivier -- monique@osclegal.com -- Olivier Schreiber & Chao LLP,
Marisa Carolyn Katz -- katz@tkkrlaw.com -- Teske, Katz, Kitzer and
Rochel, PLLP, pro hac vice, Rebecca Anne Peterson --
rapeterson@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Robert
K. Shelquist -- rkshelquist@locklaw.com -- Lockridge Grindal Nauen
P.L.L.P., pro hac vice, Seth J. Leventhal --
seth@leventhalpllc.com
-- LEVENTHAL pllc, pro hac vice, Stephanie Alicia Chen, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., pro hac vice & Vildan Teske --
teske@tkkrlaw.com -- Teske, Katz, Kitzer and Rochel, PLLP, pro hac
vice.

Google LLC, Defendant, represented by Michael Graham Rhodes --
rhodesmg@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP, Maxwell Evan Alderman --
malderman@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP & Whitty Somvichian --
wsomvichian@cooley.com -- Cooley LLP.


HAAAGEN-DAZS: Bid to Certify Class in San Pedro-Salcedo Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELANIE G. SAN PEDRO-SALCEDO, Plaintiff, v. THE
HAAGEN-DAZS SHOPPE COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Case No.
5:17-cv-03504-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, (i) denied the Plaintiff's motion for class
certification, and (ii) Haagen-Dazs's motion to strike San
Pedro-Salcedo's expert reports and the portions of her reply that
rely on those expert reports.

While patronizing one of Defendant Haagen-Daz's locations, the
cashier asked Plaintiff San Pedro-Salcedo if she would like to join
its Reward Program, and then asked for her phone number.  San
Pedro-Salcedo provided her phone number, and Haagen-Dazs, through a
third-party, then sent her a text message that provided a link to
down load its mobile application.  The cashier apparently violated
Haagen-Dazs's policy and deviated from its official script by not
advising San Pedro-Salcedo that she would receive the text message
with the link to the App.  San Pedro-Salcedo does not allege that
Haagen-Dazs has used her phone number for any other communications.


San Pedro-Salcedo filed this lawsuit against Haagen-Dazs and two
other Defendants in the Superior Court for Santa Clara County on
May 18, 2017.  Haagen-Dazs timely removed the case to the Northern
California District Court.

San Pedro-Salcedo now moves to certify a class of over half a
million customers who received this text message (or a nearly
identical one) on the grounds that the text message violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").  She is the only person
to have complained of the text message.  

The class San Pedro-Salcedo seeks to certify is all persons in the
United States who, since Oct. 16, 2013 (or such date when the
texting aspect of the customer Reward Program commenced), received
at least one text message from Defendants, or persons working on
their behalf, on their cellular telephones.

Haagen-Dazs has moved to strike San Pedro-Salcedo's expert reports
and the portions of her reply that rely on those expert reports.

As for San Pedro-Salcedo's Motion for Class Certification, Judge
Davila finds that San Pedro-Salcedo cannot satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23(a)(3).  Sending customers a one-time, warned-of text
message is consistent with not using their phones numbers "for
telemarketing purchases."  San Pedro-Salcedo bears the burden on
the motion, and she has not shown that her experience and claim is
typical of that of the class.

Judge Davila also finds that San Pedro-Salcedo is not an adequate
representative of the absent class members.  The Plaintiff's
erroneous testimony as to the basic factual allegations of her
claim and her belief that Haagen-Dazs's conduct did not meet an
essential element of her claim show that she cannot adequately
supervise the litigation or represent the class's interests.  Her
lack of knowledge of her factual allegations and legal claims
disqualifies San Pedro-Salcedo from serving as class
representative.  The personal friendship between her attorney,
Jaurigue, and San Pedro-Salcedo and her husband further complicates
her service as class representative.

As for Haagen-Dazs' Motion to Strike, Judge Davila holds that
because those expert reports were in no way material to the Court's
decision on the Motion for Class Certification, he denies the
Motion to Strike as moot.

For the reasons stated, Judge Davila denied both motions.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/HnAWE3 from Leagle.com.

Melanie G. San Pedro-Salcedo, Plaintiff, represented by Abigail
Ameri Zelenski -- abigail@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group.

Melanie G. San Pedro-Salcedo, Plaintiff, represented by David
Zelenski -- david@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group, Michael
Joe Jaurigue -- michael@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group, Ryan
A. Stubbe -- ryan@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group & Sehreen
Ladak -- sehreen@jlglawyers.com -- Jaurigue Law Group.

The Haagen-Dazs Shoppe Company, Inc., Defendant, represented by
Geoffrey W. Castello -- gcastello@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye
and Warren LLP, pro hac vice, Lauri Anne Mazzuchetti --
lmazzuchetti@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye Warren LLP, pro hac
vice & Miles Cooley -- mcooley@kelleydrye.com -- Kelley Drye
Warren LLP.

Nestle Dreyer's Ice Cream Company, Defendant, represented by
Geoffrey W. Castello, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, pro hac vice &
Miles Cooley, Kelley Drye Warren LLP.

Nestle USA, Inc., Defendant, represented by Geoffrey W. Castello,
Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, pro hac vice & Miles Cooley, Kelley
Drye Warren LLP.


HASAKI RESTAURANT: 2nd Cir. Vacates Order on Yu Suit Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEI XING YU, individual, on behalf of all other
employees similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HASAKI
RESTAURANT, INC., SHUJI YAGI, KUNITSUGA NAKATA, HASHIMOTO GEN,
Defendants-Appellants, JANE DOE AND JOHN DOE #1-10, Defendants,
Case No. 17-3388-cv (2d Cir.), Judge John M. Walker, Jr. of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and vacated
the district court's order directing the parties to submit their
settlement agreement to the district court.

Plaintiff-Appellee Mei Xing Yu worked as a sushi chef at a
restaurant owned and operated by Appellant Hasaki Restaurant.  On
Aug. 1, 2016, Mei Xing Yu filed a complaint against Hasaki
Restaurant and various individual owners and managers of Hasaki
Restaurant in the Southern District of New York on behalf of
himself and all other employees similarly situated, alleging
violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and New York labor laws.

On Nov. 23, 2016, Hasaki mailed Mei Xing Yu a Rule 68 offer of
judgment for $20,000 plus reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and
expenses through the date of the offer.  Mei Xing Yu timely
accepted the offer of judgment, and on Dec. 8, 2016, Mei Xing Yu
filed a letter with the district court notifying the court of his
acceptance.

On Dec. 9, 2016, Judge Furman ordered the parties to submit their
settlement agreement to the district court along with a joint
letter explaining why the settlement should be approved as fair and
reasonable.  He explained that he believed their decision in Cheeks
v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc. required him to scrutinize the
parties' settlement to ensure it was fair and reasonable.  Cheeks
held that stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims with prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) require
the approval of either the district court or the Department of
Labor ("DOL").  Alternatively, the district court offered the
parties the opportunity to argue why they did not believe that
judicial approval of the Rule 68(a) offer of judgment was
required.

The parties then submitted a joint letter on Dec. 22, 2016, arguing
that they did not need judicial approval of their Rule 68(a) offer
of judgment to settle Mei Xing Yu's FLSA claims.  On Jan. 13, 2017,
the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief in a separate case in
the Southern District of New York, Sanchez v. Burgers & Cupcakes
LLC, arguing that judicial approval is required when a Rule 68(a)
offer of judgment is accepted by a plaintiff raising FLSA claims.
Pursuant to a district court order, the parties filed supplemental
briefs in response to the Secretary's amicus brief in Sanchez, in
which the parties maintained their position that judicial approval
was not required.

On March 20, 2017, the district court issued a brief order
concluding that judicial approval of the parties' settlement is
required, notwithstanding the fact that it was reached pursuant to
Rule 68(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Shortly
thereafter, the district court issued a follow-up opinion.  It
reasoned that although Rule 68(a) is phrased in mandatory terms,
there are exceptions to the Rule's mandatory terms, such as class
action and bankruptcy settlements, which require judicial
approval.

Accepting the fact that there are exceptions to Rule 68(a)'s
mandatory language, the district court concluded that FLSA claims
fall within the narrow class of claims that cannot be settled under
Rule 68 without approval by the court (or the DOL).  Relying on
their opinion in Cheeks, the district court concluded that while
Cheeks may not apply a fortiori to a Rule 68 FLSA settlement given
its reliance on the language of Rule 41, its reasoning compels the
conclusion that parties may not evade the requirement for judicial
(or DOL) approval by way of Rule 68.

Noting the existence of substantial ground for difference of
opinion on the issue, and that the lower courts were divided on the
question, the district court certified its order for interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b).  The parties filed a timely
notice of appeal in the district court, but did not file a timely
Section 1292(b) petition for permission to take an interlocutory
appeal in the Second Circuit.

Nonetheless, on Oct. 23, 2017, a panel of the Second Circuit
granted the parties' motion to file a late Section 1292(b) petition
and then granted the petition.  In addition, because both Mei Xing
Yu and Hasaki took the same position before the district court, the
Second Circuit granted the Public Citizen Litigation Group's
("PCLG") motion to be appointed amicus curiae in order to defend
the district court's ruling.  The Second Circuit also invited and
received an amicus brief from the Secretary of Labor.

The question before the Second Circuit is straightforward: whether
acceptance of a Rule 68(a) offer of judgment that disposes of an
FLSA claim in litigation needs to be reviewed by a district court
or the DOL for fairness before the clerk of the court can enter the
judgment.  The question is one of statutory interpretation.
Therefore, the Second Circuit begins with a careful examination of
the statutory text of both Rule 68(a) and the FLSA.

Upon review of the text of the Act and judicial precedents
interpreting the Act, the Second Circuit holds that judicial
approval is not required of Rule 68(a) offers of judgment settling
FLSA claims.  The Second Circuit does not dwell on policy
considerations given that it is not possible on the record to
perform a cost-benefit analysis as to the requirement of fairness
hearings in Rule 68 settlements of the thousands of FLSA cases
filed in the Circuit each year.  And even if such an analysis were
possible, that is not the job of the Appellate Court.

The Second Circuit has considered amici's other arguments and found
them to be without merit.  Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed
and vacated the district court's order and remanded with
instructions to direct the Clerk of the Court to enter the judgment
as stipulated in the accepted Rule 68(a) offer.  

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's Dec. 6, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ZTmpmp from Leagle.com.

KELI LUI -- kliu@hanglaw.com -- WILLIAM M. BROWN --
wbrown@hanglaw.com -- Hang and Associates, PLLC, Flushing, NY, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

LILLIAN M. MARQUEZ -- marquez@pechmanlaw.com -- (Louis Pechman --
pechman@pechmanlaw.com -- Laura Rodriguez --
rodriguez@pechmanlaw.com -- on the brief), Pechman Law Group PLLC,
New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellants.

ADINA H. ROSENBAUM (Sean M. Sherman, Adam R. Pulver, on the brief),
Public Citizen Litigation Group, for Court-Appointed Amicus
Curiae.


HEALTHEX CORP: Manu Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kwadwo Manu, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. HEALTHEX CORP., and HEALTHEX COURIER LLC, Case No.
2:20-cv-00408 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 2020), seeks overtime
compensation for hours worked over 40 in a workweek pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wages Standards
Act.

The Defendants misclassified the Plaintiff, and others similarly
situated, as independent contractors and failed to pay them one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over
40, says the complaint. Instead, the Defendants paid them on a per
mile and/or per delivery basis with no overtime premium.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a delivery driver in
Ohio.

The Defendants are a medical courier company providing healthcare
deliveries to customers, which include residential and nursing
homes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Palitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A
          800 Third Avenue, Suite 2800
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (800) 616-4000
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          Email: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33432
          Phone: (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          Email: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Michele R. Fisher, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4600 IDS Center, 80 S 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Phone: 612-256-3200
          Facsimile: 612-338-4878
          Email: fisher@nka.com


HIGHLAND CARE: Williams Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Keisha Williams, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Highland Care Center, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-00391-ARR-PK (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 2020), seeks to recover
unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New
York Labor Law and the New York Minimum Wage Act.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant to provide medical
services to their clients/patients.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff worked about 45-54 hours
or more each week for the Defendant, 5-6 days a week. The Defendant
failed to pay the Plaintiff and the putative class members at a
rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all
overtime hours (hours over 40 in a week) worked in each week during
their employment with the Defendant, says the complaint.

The Defendant was engaged in the business of providing nursing home
service.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abdul K. Hassan, Esq.
          ABDUL HASSAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          215-28 Hillside Avenue
          Queens Village, NY 11427
          Phone: 718-740-1000
          Fax: 718-740-2000
          Email: abdul@abdulhassan.com


HWASHIN AMERICA: Lee Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
YECHAN LEE, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated v.
HWASHIN AMERICA CORPORATION and HYUN PARK, Case No.
2:19-cv-01073-MHT-SMD (M.D. Ala., Dec. 23, 2019), challenges the
Defendants' misclassification of the Plaintiff and similarly
situated employees as exempt from the overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff contends that he regularly worked more than 40 hours
in a work week, but Hwashin failed to provide him with one and
one-half times his regular rate of pay for his work in excess of 40
hours in a work week.

From October 23, 2018, to June 22, 2019, the Plaintiff was employed
by Hwashin as a factory worker. The Plaintiff's primary duties
included work involving repetitive operations with his hands,
physical skill and energy.

Hwashin is an automobile chassis and body components
manufacturer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian G. Kim, Esq.
          BRIAN KIM, PC
          1815 Satellite Blvd. No. 403
          Duluth, GA 30097
          Telephone: 678 878 4200
          Facsimile: 404 878 4208
          E-Mail: brian@briankimpc.com


IFINEX INC: Market Manipulation Class-Action Lawsuit Refiled
------------------------------------------------------------
Andrey Shevchenko, writing for Coin Telegraph, reports that an Oct.
10, 2019 class-action lawsuit filed against iFinex Inc., the parent
company of Bitfinex and Tether, was refiled on Jan. 8, 2020, in New
York's Southern District. The lawsuit by Young et al. was followed
on the next day by a similar class-action filing by Bryan Faubus.

The original lawsuit alleges that iFinex manipulated the
cryptocurrency market in 2017 by issuing unbacked Tether (USDT)
that was then sold for Bitcoin to increase its price. Plaintiffs
argue that the common belief that each USDT represented one real
dollar led traders to eagerly participate in the market, boosting
it by an excessive amount that later led to the 2018 bear market.

Representatives from Bitfinex had earlier refused the allegations
in their entirety, attempting to dismiss the class-action suit
outright.

The original lawsuit by Eric Young and Adam Kurtz was filed in
Washington State's Western District and was terminated on Jan. 7
according to court documents obtained by Cointelegraph.

The new, refiled lawsuit was submitted on Jan. 8 to New York's
Southern District with the addition of a third plaintiff, David
Crystal.

Second plaintiff starts similar class action

Court documents show that just one day later on Jan. 9, a lawsuit
was filed by Bryan Faubus, a self-identified Bitcoin trader. The
case files were submitted to the same Southern District and
directly cite the Jan. 8 class action filed by Young.

Text comparison tools show that the two filings are virtually
identical, though some parts in Faubus's are different in that they
refer to Young's class action.

It is unclear what relationship, if any, the two plaintiffs have to
each other. Cointelegraph reached out to the attorneys listed in
both filings for clarification, but had not received a response as
of press time. This article will be updated with more information
as it comes in.

It is also unclear why the original class action was refiled in New
York, though it would make sense given iFinex's New York
incorporation. Possible motivations may have to do with the
Southern District courts' previous indictment of Crypto Capital
Corp., a former business partner of iFinex, as well as the
district's general reputation for strictness in financial
litigation.

In addition, the New York Attorney General is currently
investigating the company for alleged mismanagement of Tether
reserve funds. [GN]



JB HUNT: Issaian Suit Removed From Super. Ct. to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit entitled Girik Issaian, individually and on behalf of
himself, all others similarly situated, and the general public v.
J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC., an Arkansas corporation, J.B.
HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., a Georgia corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Case No. 19STCV44422, was removed from the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles to
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on
Jan. 24, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-00732 to the
proceeding.

The Complaint alleges that the Defendants violated California law
by: (1) failing to indemnify expenses; (2) improperly deducting
amounts from wages due; (3) failing to provide meal periods; (4)
failing to provide rest periods; (5) failing to provide accurate
itemized wage statements; (6) failing to pay all wages at time of
separation; (7) owing waiting time penalties under Cal. Lab. Code;
and (8) engaging in unfair or unlawful business practices in
violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Christopher C. McNatt, Jr., Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C.
          2 North Lake Avenue, Suite 560
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Phone: (626) 795-4700
          Fax: (626) 795-4790
          Email: cmcnatt@scopelitis.com

               - and -

          James A. Eckhart, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C.
          10 West Market Street, Suite 1400
          Indianapolis, IN 46204
          Phone: (317) 637-1777
          Fax: (317) 687-2414
          Email: jeckhart@scopelitis.com


KATERRA INC: Hamlin Seeks to Recover Overtime Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Susan Hamlin, filing individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated; and Paul Hanks, filing individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Katerra, Inc., a foreign
corporation, Case No. 2:19-cv-05886-GMS (D. Ariz., Dec. 23, 2019),
arises from the illegal employment actions of Katerra under the
statutes of the United States involving violations of the overtime
wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs and those similarly situated were employees of
Katerra covered by the provisions and protections contained in the
FLSA. Susan Hamlin worked for Katerra as a Supplier Quality Manager
working out of the Scottsdale office from October 24, 2016, through
September 23, 2019. Paul Hanks worked for Katerra as a Supplier
Quality Manager working out of the Scottsdale office from December
2016 through October 11, 2019, says the complaint.

The lawsuit solely involves Supplier Quality Managers and Supplier
Quality Engineers, including the Plaintiffs, working in the Phoenix
Arizona metropolitan area out of the Scottsdale office.

The Plaintiffs contend that the duties of Supplier Quality Managers
and Supplier Quality Engineers, were such that they should not have
been classified as exempt under the FLSA and should have legally
collected overtime pay when they worked over 40 hours in any one
workweek.

Katerra is a technology-driven offsite construction company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael R. Pruitt, Esq.
          Nathaniel Hill, Esq.
          JACKSON WHITE
          40 North Center Street, Suite 200
          Mesa, AZ 85201
          Telephone: (480) 464-1111
          Facsimile: (480) 464-5692
          E-mail: centraldocket@jacksonwhitelaw.com
                  mpruitt@jacksonwhitelaw.com
                  nhill@jacksonwhitelaw.com


LOGMEIN INC: Faces Carter Securities Suit Over Merger With Elliot
-----------------------------------------------------------------
William Carter, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. LOGMEIN, INC., ROBERT M. CALDERONI, WILLIAM R. WAGNER,
EDWIN J. GILLIS, STEVEN J. BENSON, DAVID JAMES HENSHALL, PETER JOHN
SACRIPANTI, MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSON, ITA M. BRENNAN, and SARA C.
ANDREWS, Case No. 1:20-cv-00124-UNA (D. Del., Jan. 24, 2020),
accuses the Defendants of violating the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in connection with the proposed merger between LogMeIn,
Francisco Partners and Evergreen Coast Capital Corporation, the
private equity affiliate of Elliot Management Corporation.

On December 17, 2019, the Board of Directors caused the Company to
enter into an agreement and plan of merger, pursuant to which the
Company's shareholders stand to receive $86.05 in cash for each
share of LogMeIn stock they own.

On January 17, 2020, in order to convince LogMeIn shareholders to
vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction, the Board authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Form PREM14A
Preliminary Proxy Statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in violation of the Exchange Act, the Plaintiff
contends. He adds that the materially incomplete and misleading
preliminary proxy violates both Regulation G and SEC Rule 14a-9,
each of which constitutes a violation of the Exchange Act.

While touting the fairness of the Merger Consideration to the
Company's shareholders in the Proxy, the Defendants have failed to
disclose certain material information that is necessary for
shareholders to properly assess the fairness of the Proposed
Transaction, thereby, violating SEC rules and regulations and
rendering certain statements in the Proxy materially incomplete and
misleading, the Plaintiff asserts. In particular, the Proxy
contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) the financial projections for the Company that were
prepared by the Company and relied on by Defendants in recommending
that LogMeIn shareholders vote in favor of the Proposed
Transaction; and (ii) the summary of certain valuation analyses
conducted by LogMeIn's financial advisors, Qatalyst Partners LP and
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC in support of their opinion that the
Merger Consideration is fair to shareholders, on which the Board
relied.

The Plaintiff, a holder of LogMeIn common stock, argues that it is
imperative that the material information that has been omitted from
the Proxy is disclosed prior to the forthcoming vote to allow the
Company's shareholders to make an informed decision regarding the
Proposed Transaction. For these reasons, the Plaintiff asserts
claims against the Defendants for violations the Exchange Act.

LogMeIn provides its customers with unified communications and
collaboration, identity and access management, and customer
engagement and support solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Van Gorder, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          3828 Kennett Pike, Suite 201
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Phone: (302) 482-3182
          Email: mvangorder@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Nadeem Faruqi, Esq.
          James M. Wilson, Jr., Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Phone: (212) 983-9330
          Fax: (212) 983-9331
          Email: nfaruqi@faruqilaw.com
                 jwilson@faruqilaw.com


MBF INSPECTION: $2.3MM Deal in Ganci Suit Gets Final Court Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS GANCI, Plaintiff, v. MBF INSPECTION SERVICES,
INC., Defendant, Civil Action 2:15-cv-2959 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate
Judge Chelsey M. Vascura of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted (i) the
parties' Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class and Collective
Action Settlement, and (ii) the Plaintiff's unopposed Motion for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service
Awards.

The action arises out of Defendant MBF's classification of
inspectors as exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and Ohio state wage and hour laws.  The Plaintiff alleged that
MBF incorrectly classified him and other similarly-situated
inspectors as exempt, improperly paid them on a day-rate basis
rather than an hourly basis, and denied them overtime premiums to
which they were entitled.

The Plaintiff commenced the action on Oct. 30, 2015.  The Defendant
contested class treatment both under the FLSA and Rule 23; however,
the Court conditionally certified the case as a collective action
under the FLSA on Sept. 20, 2016, and granted class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 of the Ohio wage and hour
claims on Oct. 27, 2017.  

Both parties engaged in written discovery, took over a dozen
depositions, and exchanged approximately 18,000 pages of documents.
They then filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the
Defendant moved to decertify the FLSA collective.  The parties
further engaged in multiple mediation sessions with two different
third-party mediators in April 2018 and May 2019.  The latter of
these mediations resulted in a signed memorandum of understanding,
followed by a fully executed Settlement Agreement in July 2019.

Although MBF filed for bankruptcy in June 2018 in the District of
New Mexico, the parties sought and obtained a modification of the
automatic stay for the limited purpose of allowing settlement
approval to proceed in the Court.

On Sept. 6, 2019, the Court approved the Settlement under the FLSA
and granted preliminary approval of the Settlement under Rule 23.
it had previously certified the following class under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3), and the Court adopted the
same class definition for settlement purposes: All inspection
personnel, other than chief inspectors and lead inspectors, who
were paid a day rate and who worked for Defendant in Ohio under a
Spectra contract at any time since two years prior to filing of the
Complaint.  The Settlement encompasses 120 individuals: 53 FLSA
opt-in Plaintiffs, and 72 Rule 23 class members; 5 individuals are
both opt-in Plaintiffs and class members.

The Defendant has agreed to pay a total settlement amount of
$2,225,000.  This includes payments to all accepting the
Plaintiffs, enhancements awards, attorneys' fees, litigation costs,
and expenses of the Class Counsel, but excludes the employer's
share of payroll taxes.  The settlement agreement distributes pro
rata shares of the Settlement amongst Opt-In Plaintiffs who return
release forms and all Rule 23 Class Members, determined based on
the individual's work history within the applicable statute of
limitations, the individual's pay rate, and a uniform assumption of
daily overtime worked. Each individual entitled to compensation
will receive a minimum of $200.

The settlement amount is non-reversionary.  The amounts allocated
to the Plaintiffs who did not accept the settlement payments will
be reallocated to Accepting Plaintiffs and will not revert to the
Defendant.  If checks remain uncashed after 90 days, those amounts
will be donated to a cy pres recipient.  The Settlement will be
paid according to a bankruptcy plan in the bankruptcy case.

Notice was given to the members of the Settlement Class, and a
Fairness Hearing was held before on Dec. 2, 2019.  Also before the
Court is the Plaintiff's unopposed Motion for an Award of
Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative Service Awards.
Having considered the Settlement and the arguments in support of
final approval, Judge Vascura concludes that the Settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable.

Accordingly, judge Vascura granted the Joint Motion for Final
Approval of Class and Collective Action Settlement and the Motion
for an Award of Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Class Representative
Service Awards.  

The Class Counsel will receive (i) attorney's fees in the amount of
one third of the gross settlement amount, $741,666.67, and (ii)
teimbursement of costs of $63,328.12.

The service payments to the Named Plaintiff, and to each Plaintiff
that was deposed in the matter or the Defendant's pending
bankruptcy proceeding, are approved as requested and will be
distributed as requested in the Settlement.  If settlement checks
remain uncashed for 90 days after issuance, those amounts will be
donated to Shriners Hospital for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio as a
cy pres recipient.

Judge Vascura dismissed the Litigation with prejudice, with each
side to assume their respective costs and attorneys' fees (other
than such costs and attorneys' fees approved by the Court as set
forth), subject to the Court's ongoing jurisdiction over the
settlement process and any disputes that may arise over the
administration of the settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/QoOaxC from Leagle.com.

Thomas Ganci, Plaintiff, represented by Robert E. DeRose, II --
bderose@barkanmeizlish.com -- Barkan Meizlish Handelman Goodin
DeRose Wentz, LLP.

Thomas Ganci, Plaintiff, represented by Alexander M. Baggio --
abaggio@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice, Brittany B.
Skemp -- bbachmanskemp@nka.com -- pro hac vice, Matthew C. Helland
-- helland@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, LLP, pro hac vice & Paul J.
Lukas -- lukas@nka.com -- Nichols Kaster, PLLP, pro hac vice.

MBF Inspection Services, Inc., Defendant, represented by Joseph
Anthony Gerling -- jgerling@lanealton.com -- Lane Alton & Horst,
Christopher R. Pettit -- cpettit@lanealton.com -- Lane Alton &
Horst, Christopher Wesierski -- cwesierski@wzllp.com -- One
Corporate Park, pro hac vice & Eric S. Bravo --
ebravo@lanealton.com -- Baird Law Offices LLC.


MDL 2291: Final Judgment Entered in Conagra Breach of Contract Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cormac J. Carney of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California has dismissed with prejudice the case IN RE
CONAGRA FOODS, INC. ROBERT BRISEÑO, et al., individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CONAGRA
FOODS, INC, Defendants, Case No. CV 11-05379-CJC (AGRx), MDL No.
2291 (C.D. Cal.).

The matter came before the Court to determine whether to finally
approve the Settlement with Defendant Conagra Brands, Inc.
(formerly Conagra Foods, Inc.) as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement dated March 12, 2019 relating to the Action.

The Court has granted final approval and confirmed that the
Settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement is, in all
respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate to the Classes pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  After careful consideration of all papers
filed in the proceeding, including evidence from the counsel
regarding attorneys' fees, $978,671 in unreimbursed expenses, and
over 20,320 hours of time and effort by the Class Counsel
benefitting the Classes and resulting in the Settlement Agreement,
the Court is fully informed and determined that the Settlement
Agreement should be and was approved in the Order Granting Final
Approval.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), David E. Azar of Milberg
Phillips Grossman LLP; Ariana J. Tadler and A. J. de Bartolomeo of
Tadler Law LLP; and Adam J. Levitt and Amy E. Keller of DiCello
Levitt Gutzler LLC have been appointed as counsel for the Class.
The Class Counsel and their respective firms have fairly and
competently represented the interests of the Classes.

Willis A. Johnson timely submitted a letter dated May 22, 2019,
stating he wanted to opt out and be excluded from the Settlement
Agreement.  He, therefore, is excluded from the Final Judgment.  No
other opt-outs were timely received and therefore all other Class
Members are subject to the Final Judgment and dismissal with
prejudice, regardless of whether a Class Member submitted a Claim
Form.

Judge Carney dismissed the Action with prejudice, with each party
to bear its own costs and attorneys' fees except as otherwise
described in the Settlement Agreement and the Order Granting Final
Approval.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Final Judgment is
available at https://is.gd/0l2Oow from Leagle.com.

Robert Briseno, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Ariana J. Tadler --
atadler@tadlerlaw.com -- Tadler Law LLP, pro hac vice, David E.
Azar, Milberg Phillips Grossman LLP, Henry J. Kelston, Tadler Law
LLP, pro hac vice, A.J. De Bartolomeo -- ajd@tadlerlaw.com --
Tadler Law LLP, Adam J. Levitt -- alevitt@dlcfirm.com -- DiCello
Levitt Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice, Amy E. Keller --
akeller@dlcfirm.com -- DiCello Levitt and Gutzler LLC, pro hac
vice, Andrei V. Rado, Milberg LLP, pro hac vice & Jessica J.
Sleater -- jessica@andersensleater.com -- Andersen Sleater Sianni
LLC, pro hac vice.

Christi Toomer, Plaintiff, represented by Adam J. Levitt, DiCello
Levitt Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice, Betsy C. Manifold, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz LLP, Rachele R. Byrd, Wolf
Haldenstein Adler Freeman and Herz LLP, A.J. De Bartolomeo, Tadler
Law LLP, Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt and Gutzler LLC, pro hac
vice, Ariana J. Tadler, Tadler Law LLP, pro hac vice & David E.
Azar, Milberg Phillips Grossman LLP.

Kelly McFadden, Plaintiff, represented by A.J. De Bartolomeo,
Tadler Law LLP, Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt Gutzler LLC, pro hac
vice, Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt and Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice,
Ariana J. Tadler, Tadler Law LLP, pro hac vice, David E. Azar,
Milberg Phillips Grossman LLP, Kim E. Richman, Richman Law Group,
pro hac vice & Michael R. Reese, Reese LLP.

Janeth Ruiz, Plaintiff, represented by A.J. De Bartolomeo, Tadler
Law LLP, Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice,
Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt and Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice, Ariana
J. Tadler, Tadler Law LLP, pro hac vice, David E. Azar, Milberg
Phillips Grossman LLP & William Charles Wright, Wright Law Office.

Brenda Krein, Plaintiff, represented by A.J. De Bartolomeo, Tadler
Law LLP, Adam J. Levitt, DiCello Levitt Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice,
Amy E. Keller, DiCello Levitt and Gutzler LLC, pro hac vice, Ariana
J. Tadler, Tadler Law LLP, pro hac vice, Christopher A. Seeger,
Seeger Weiss LLP, pro hac vice, David E. Azar, Milberg Phillips
Grossman LLP, Jonathan Shub, Kohn Swift and Graf PC & Scott Alan
George, Seeger Weiss LLP, pro hac vice.

Conagra Foods, Inc., Defendant, represented by Andrew G. Phillips
-- andrew.phillips@alston.com -- Alston and Bird LLP, pro hac vice,
Angela M. Spivey -- angela.spivey@alston.com -- Alston and Bird
LLP, pro hac vice & Rachel E.K. Lowe -- rachel.lowe@alston.com --
Alston and Bird LLP.

M. Todd Henderson, Objector, represented by Theodore H. Frank --
ted.frank@hlli.org -- Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute.


MDL 2357: Class Supplemental Notice in Zappos Breach Suit Okayed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert C. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada granted the parties' stipulation on supplemental notice
in the Zappos Security Breach Litigation.

Two rounds of notices have been sent to the Settlement Class
Members in the action.  The deadline for the Settlement Class
Members to opt-out or object has expired.  To date, more than
259,000 Settlement Class Members have redeemed the discount codes
described in the settlement agreement in the matter, with the total
value of redeemed discounts exceeding $4.35 million.

The parties propose a further supplemental notice to remind the
Settlement Class Members who have not yet used their discount codes
(and who have not opted out, objected or otherwise requested no
further communications) of the availability of the settlement
benefit.

They stipulated and agreed, and Judge Jones granted, that during
the period Dec. 10 to 18, 2019, Zappos will email (or will cause
the Settlement Administrator to email) supplemental notice to the
Settlement Class Members who have not yet used their discount codes
(and who have not opted out, objected or otherwise requested no
further communications).  Zappos will bear the costs of the
supplemental notice described.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/8i82KC from Leagle.com.

The case is IN RE ZAPPOS SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION, document
relates to: ALL ACTIONS, MDL No. 2357, Case No.
3:12-cv-00325-RCJ-VPC (D. Nev.).

In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,
represented by Brian C. Frontino -- bfrontino@stroock.com -- Julia
B Strickland -- jstrickland@stroock.com -- Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan LLP, pro hac vice, Robert R. McCoy -- mccoy@kcnvlaw.com --
Kaempfer Crowell & Stephen J. Newman -- snewman@stroock.com --
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.

Robert Ree, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow --
b.barnow@barnowlaw.com -- Barnow and Associates, P.C., D. Greg
Blankinship -- gblankinship@fbfglaw.com -- Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, David C OMara --
david@omaralaw.net -- The OMara Law Firm, P.C., Jeremiah Frei-
Pearson -- jfrei-pearson@fbfglaw.co -- Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Jon A Tostrud --
jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com -- Tostrud Law Group, P.C., pro hac vice,
Kara M Wolke -- kwolke@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay & Murray
LLP, Marc L. Godino -- mgodino@glancylaw.com -- Glancy Prongay &
Murray LLP, pro hac vice & Shin Young Hahn, Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP.

Stephanie Priera, Shari Simon, Plaintiffs, represented by Ben
Barnow, Barnow and Associates, P.C., D. Greg Blankinship,
Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Jeremiah
Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber,
LLP, Marc L. Godino, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice,
Robert A Winner, Winner & Carson, P.C., Shin Young Hahn,
Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP & David C
OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C..

Kathryn Vorhoff, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., D. Greg Blankinship, Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Marc L. Godino, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Robert A Winner, Winner &
Carson, P.C. & David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C..

Ms. Dahlia Habashy, Plaintiff, represented by Jeremiah Frei-
Pearson, Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Ben
Barnow, Barnow and Associates, P.C., D. Greg Blankinship,
Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Marc L.
Godino, Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Shin Young
Hahn, Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP & David
C OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C..

Theresa D. Stevens, Plaintiff, represented by Edward K Wood, Wood
Law Firm, LLC, Lance A Harke, Harke Clasby & Bushman LLP, Timothy
Gordon Blood, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon LLP, Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., pro hac vice, David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm,
P.C., Erich Schork, Barnow and Associates, P.C., Mark Gray, Gray &
White, pro hac vice &Richard L. Coffman, The Coffman Law Firm.

Stacy Penson, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., Charles T. Lester, Jr., pro hac vice, David C
OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C., Howard M Bushman, Harke Clasby &
Bushman LLP, Lance A Harke, Harke Clasby & Bushman LLP & Richard
L. Coffman, The Coffman Law Firm.

Tara J. Elliott, Brooke C. Brown, Plaintiff, represented by Ben
Barnow, Barnow and Associates, P.C., David C OMara, The OMara Law
Firm, P.C., Edward K Wood, Wood Law Firm, LLC, Lawrence Lee Jones,
II, Jones Ward PLC & Richard L. Coffman, The Coffman Law Firm.

Christa Seal, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C. & Edward
K Wood, Wood Law Firm, LLC.

Christa Seal, Kentucky Western, 3:12-cv-00037, Plaintiff,
represented by Lawrence Lee Jones, II, Jones Ward PLC.
Christa Seal, Plaintiff, represented by Richard L. Coffman, The
Coffman Law Firm.

Zetha Nobles, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., D. Greg Blankinship, Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Marc L. Godino, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice,Reginald V. Terrell, The
Terrell Law Group, Shin Young Hahn, Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP & David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm,
P.C..

Patti Hasner, Plaintiff, represented by Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C., D. Greg Blankinship, Finkelstein, Blankinship,
Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Jeremiah Frei-Pearson, Finkelstein,
Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP, Marc L. Godino, Glancy
Prongay & Murray LLP, pro hac vice, Robert A Winner, Winner &
Carson, P.C., Shin Young Hahn, Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-
Pearson & Garber, LLP & David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C..

Denise Relethford, Emily E. Braxton, Plaintiffs, represented by
David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C. & Ben Barnow, Barnow and
Associates, P.C..

Amazon.com, Inc., dba Zappos.com, Defendant, represented by Brian
C. Frontino, Christine R Fitzgerald, Belcher, Starr & Fitzgerald,
LLP, David C OMara, The OMara Law Firm, P.C., Jeffrey B Bell,
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Julia B Strickland, Stroock &
Stroock & Lavan LLP, pro hac vice, Robert R. McCoy, Kaempfer
Crowell & Stephen J. Newman, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.


MDL 2672: Horn Not Compelled to Show Docs in Clean Diesel Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Litigation, Magistrate Judge
Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied the Volkswagen bondholder's motion to
compel Michael Horn, the former CEO of Volkswagen Group of America,
Inc., to produce 118 documents in connection with Mr. Horn's sworn
testimony before Congress while he was still Volkswagen's CEO.

A Volkswagen bondholder, in a proposed class action, has sued
Volkswagen and two of the company's former officers, alleging
securities fraud arising out of the 2015 disclosure of the
company's diesel emissions fraud.  Mr. Horn is one of the officer
Defendants.

Pending before the Court are several discovery letter briefs
regarding the bondholder's demand to Mr. Horn to produce 118
documents that Volkswagen's attorneys selected and shared with Mr.
Horn's attorneys in October 2015, in connection with Mr. Horn's
sworn testimony before Congress while he was still Volkswagen's
CEO.

Having reviewed the parties' submissions and the relevant caselaw,
Magistrate Judge Corley finds that Volkswagen's compilation of
these 118 documents is privileged opinion work product.  While the
documents themselves are not privileged, their compilation clearly
is.

The absolute work product privilege protects from discovery an
attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories.  Requiring Mr. Horn or Volkswagen to identify the 118
specific documents that Volkswagen's attorneys shared with Mr.
Horn's attorneys would reveal Volkswagen's attorneys' mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories; namely,
their mental processes about what documents were most important for
Mr. Horn's personal attorneys to review in connection with his
congressional testimony.  The absolute work product privilege
protects against this disclosure.

The bondholder's reliance on Waymo v. Uber, is misplaced, the
District Court holds.  First, there was no attorney compilation of
documents at issue in that decision.  Second, to the extent that
the work product doctrine applied in Waymo, its protections were
waived by disclosure of the relevant documents to an adversary.
Third, the Defendants in Waymo were seeking to prevent disclosure
of all the sought-after documents.

In contrast, the Magistrate Judge finds that Volkswagen does not
contend that the documents themselves are privileged, and the
company intends to produce them (if it has not already done so) as
responsive to the bondholder's document requests.   Volkswagen
merely objects to disclosing these documents in a form that would
reveal that they were the specific documents that Volkswagen's
attorneys compiled and gave to Mr. Horn's personal attorneys before
Mr. Horn's congressional testimony in his capacity as Volkswagen's
CEO. Waymo is not analogous, and as the compilation in question is
protected opinion work product, the bondholder's motion to compel
its production is denied.

The bondholder's letter brief alludes to a dispute as to how
Volkswagen is producing documents responsive to document requests,
and also asks for further briefing on the application of the common
interest privilege.  If the bondholder wishes to have an informal
telephone discovery conference, at which the Court would attempt to
give guidance without a formal written submission, it should
contact the Court's Courtroom Deputy by email, copying counsel for
all of the parties in the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/fWe9sT from Leagle.com.

The case is IN RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES
PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. This Order Relates
To: MDL Dkt. Nos. 6867, 6888, 6892 BONDHOLDER ACTION, MDL No. 2672
CRB (JSC) (N.D. Cal.).


Nicholas Benipayo, Plaintiff, represented by Robert B. Carey --
rcarey@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac
vice, Steve W. Berman -- steve@hbsslaw.com -- Hagens Berman Sobol
Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice & Thomas Eric Loeser -- toml@hbsslaw.com
-- Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, pro hac vice.

Nadine Bonda, Plaintiff, represented by Adam M. Stewart --
astewart@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP & Thomas G.
Shapiro -- tshapiro@shulaw.com -- Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Brian Connelly, Plaintiff, represented by Thomas G. Shapiro,
Shapiro Haber and Urmy, LLP.

Nicholas Allen, Daniel Carroll, Giancarlo Ceci, Dominic Troffer,
Paul Linnee, Sarah Hayden, Dario Medina, Shanice Boyette, Isaac
Hoover, John Mazur & Forrest Tinsler, Plaintiffs, represented by
Caleb Marker -- caleb.marker@zimmreed.com -- Zimmerman Reed LLP,
pro hac vice & Charles S. Zimmerman -- csz@zimmreed.com --
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, pro hac vice.

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc., a New Jersey Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Amie Adelia Vague, Lightfoot Franklin &
White, Casey Erin Lucier -- clucier@mcguirewoods.com --
McGuireWoods LLP, Charles J. Baker, III -- chuck.baker@wbd-us.com
-- Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Colin Hampton Tucker --
chtucker@rhodesokla.com -- Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable,
Dana Woodrum Lang, Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, David M.
Eisenberg -- eisenberg@bscr-law.com -- Baker, Sterchi, Cowden &
Rice, LLC, Henry Buist Smythe, Jr. -- henry.smythe@wbd-us.com --
Womble Carlyle Sandridge and Rice, Howard Feller --
hfeller@mcguirewoods.com -- McGuireWoods LLP, William R. Scherer,
Conrad and Scherer, LLP633 South Federal Highway, Eighth Floor,
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301.


MICROSOFT CORP: $4MM From Settlement to Benefit Iowa Schools
------------------------------------------------------------
Business Record reports that more than $4 million from the
settlement of a Microsoft class-action lawsuit will go toward
computer science education in Iowa schools, according to the office
of Des Moines attorney Roxanne Conlin, who represented Iowa
consumers and businesses in the lawsuit. The funding will come from
a 2007 court-approved settlement of a class-action antitrust
lawsuit filed against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the company
overcharged Iowa consumers and businesses for certain products. The
nearly $180 million settlement agreement included setting aside a
portion of unclaimed money to buy computers and software for Iowa
schools. The $4 million announced will be administered over three
years through the Iowa Department of Education. Specific projects
are in the planning phase, and implementation is expected to begin
within the next six months, according to Conlin's office. [GN]



MIDLAND CREDIT: Granted Summary Judgment  in Tillman FDCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DEVONNA TILLMAN, aka DEVONNA FRICKS, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MIDLAND
CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.; MIDLAND FUNDING LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 4:19-cv-4030 (W.D. Ark.), Judge Susan O.
Hickey of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, Texarkana Division, granted the Defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.

On March 20, 2019, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").   She
alleges that, sometime prior to June 20, 2018, she incurred a
financial obligation to GE Capital Retail Bank.  GE Capital Retail
Bank then contracted with the Defendants to collect the debt.  The
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants violated the FDCPA by sending
her a dunning letter on June 20, 2018, that contained false,
deceptive, and misleading statements.

In relevant part, the dunning letter indicated that the Plaintiff
owed an outstanding balance and listed various options to pay off
the debt.  The dunning letter also stated that "the law limits how
long you can be sued on the debt.  Because of the age of the debt,
we will not sue you for it. If you do not pay the debt, we may
report it to the credit reporting agencies as unpaid."   The
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants' dunning letter was
misleading, unfair, and in violation of various provisions of the
FDCPA.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants' dunning letter violated
15 U.S.C. Section 1692e and 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f by failing to
disclose that her debt's statute of limitations could be reset if
she made partial payments and, thus, they failed to inform her of
the true ramifications of making a payment.  She also asserts that
the dunning letter is misleading because it states, "we will not
sue you for the debt," which implies that the Defendants merely
have chosen not to sue, rather than stating that they are
time-barred from doing so.

On July 5, 2019, the Defendants filed the instant motion for
judgment on the pleadings.  They contend that they are entitled to
judgment on the pleadings on numerous grounds and ask for dismissal
of the case.  Specifically, they contend that: (1) their attempt to
collect a time-barred debt is not actionable under the FDCPA absent
a threat of litigation or the commencement of litigation, neither
of which is alleged to have occurred in the case; (2) the Plaintiff
did not allege that she made a partial payment in response to the
dunning letter and the Defendants' own policies and procedures
preclude the revival of an expired statute of limitations based on
partial payment and also prohibit the re-sale of time-barred
accounts; (3) the Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted with respect to the allegations that "we will
not sue you" language is misleading; (4) the Plaintiff's claims are
time-barred because they accrued, if at all, on Sept. 27, 2017,
when the Defendants first sent a collection letter to the
Plaintiff; and (5) the Defendants are entitled to immunity from
liability under the FDCPA's safe-harbor provision.

The Plaintiff opposed the motion.  She argued that none of these
arguments warrant judgment on the pleadings and the instant motion
should be denied.

Judge Hickey finds that the Plaintiff has not alleged that the
Defendants threatened litigation or commenced litigation in
association with their efforts to collect a potentially time-barred
debt.  Thus, the Defendant's dunning letter does not make any false
mepresentations about the character, amount, or legal status of the
debt, resulting in a violation of the FDCPA.  Consequently, taking
the Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true, and giving her
the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the Judge finds that
judgment on the pleadings is proper and that the Plaintiff's claims
should be dismissed.

In addition, after taking the Plaintiff's well pleaded allegations
as true and giving her the benefit of all reasonable inferences,
the Judge also finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
plausible claim that the Defendants' use of the phrase "we will not
sue you" violated the FDCPA, and that claim should be dismissed.
Viewed in a vacuum, the phrase "we will not sue you" could arguably
be interpreted to mean that the Defendants merely chose not to sue
on the debt and that they could change their mind and file suit.
However, the phrase must be read in the proper context.  When read
in the context of the entire paragraph, the phrase "will not sue
you" is not false or deceptive, even from the perspective of the
least sophisticated consumer.

For the stated reasons, Judge Hickey granted the Defendants' motion
for judgment on the pleadings.  The Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/azbnj3 from Leagle.com.

Devonna Tillman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Yaakov Saks --
ysaks@steinsakslegal.com -- Stein Saks, PLLC.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. & Midland Funding LLC, Defendants,
represented by Jason B. Tompkins -- jtompkins@balch.com -- Balch
Bingham LLP & Michael N. Shannon -- mshannon@qgtlaw.com --
Quattlebaum, Grooms, Tull & Burrow PLLC.


MINNESOTA: Bid for Relief on Murphy's Third-Party Docs Partly OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Tenner Murphy, by his Guardian Kay Murphy; Marrie
Bottelson; Dionne Swanson; and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Jodi Harpstead, in her Capacity as
Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services,
Defendant, Civ. No. 16-2623 (DWF/BRT) (D. Minn.), Magistrate Judge
Becky R. Thorson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
request for relief relating to the Plaintiffs' June 2019 and August
2019 productions totaling over 10,600 pages of additional
third-party documents.

The case was filed on Aug. 3, 2016.  The first Pretrial Scheduling
Order was issued on Nov. 9, 2016.  In the parties' joint Rule 26(f)
Report, the Plaintiffs proposed that fact discovery be completed by
May 2017; however, the Court provided more time and set the fact
discovery deadline for Aug. 15, 2017.  An Amended Pretrial
Scheduling order was issued on July 17, 2017, and the discovery
deadline was extended to Nov. 15, 2017, as proposed jointly by the
parties.  In October 2017, the parties jointly submitted another
extension request, taking the position that there was good cause
for the amendment because significant discovery remains to be
completed and likely cannot be completed in advance of the current
discovery deadline.  Based on the parties' representations, the
Court issued a Second Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order extending
the fact discovery deadline to Feb. 15, 2018.

During the discovery period, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to
compel documents responsive to their Request Nos. 18, 19, 20, 22,
24, and 25 that were kept by third-party agencies, but under the
control of the Defendant.  On Nov. 20, 2017, the Court denied the
Plaintiffs' motion as to these requests and concluded that the
requests were overly broad and unduly burdensome as applied to
every county and tribe.  In its order, the Court observed that the
Plaintiffs would be in a better position to frame proper document
requests -- or to establish the Defendant's control of responsive
documents -- if they conducted a 30(b)(6) deposition to obtain
knowledge about the documents kept by DHS or lead agencies.

The Court set a Dec. 29, 2017 deadline for the 30(b)(6) document
deposition and a Jan. 30, 2018 deadline for serving new written
discovery in a Third Amended Scheduling Order issued on Nov. 20,
2017.  The deadline for responses was March 5, 2018.  The Third
Amended Scheduling Order also required the parties to supplement
their Initial Disclosures by Jan. 30, 2018.  In addition, because
of the parties' dispute over the control of third-party documents,
third-party discovery was anticipated; therefore, the Third Amended
Scheduling Order required the parties to serve any third-party
subpoenas seeking fact discovery by April 13, 2018.  The Court also
set several status conferences to keep the case on track.

On April 6, 2018, at a discovery motion hearing, the Plaintiffs
made an oral motion to extend the April 13, 2018 date for serving
third-party subpoenas, which had been set back in November 2017.
The Court denied the Plaintiffs' request from the bench for lack of
good cause.

Almost two months later, on May 29, 2018, the parties proposed
amending the Third Amended Scheduling Order.  On June 4, 2018, the
Court adopted the parties' proposed schedule to extend the expert
deadlines so that the remaining fact discovery being collected
could be considered by the experts.  According to the new schedule,
the Plaintiffs' opening reports were due on July 20, 2018, and the
Defendant's opening reports were due on July 27, 2018.  Rebuttal
experts were to be disclosed by Aug. 10, 2018, and rebuttal reports
were to be served by Sept. 12, 2018.  All expert discovery,
including expert depositions, was to be completed by Sept. 27,
2018.

On June 7, 2018, the Plaintiffs informed the Defendant that they
believed their production of documents was substantially complete.
On June 8, 2018, based on the parties' stipulation, the Court
amended the deadline for non-dispositive motions relating to
written fact discovery to allow the Plaintiffs to file a motion
relating to theDefendant's document productions that occurred after
April 6, 2018 by June 8, 2018.  That same day, in addition to a
motion for sanctions for the Defendant's noncompliance with the
Court's discovery orders, the Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to
compel certain counties that had been served with Rule 45 subpoenas
to produce case files responsive to certain requests made in the
subpoenas.

On June 15, 2018, the Counties filed a letter indicating that they
had reached an agreement with the Plaintiffs on what would be
produced pursuant to the subpoena but stating that the Counties
took the position that they could not produce confidential
information subject to the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
("MGDPA"), Minnesota Health Records Act ("MHRA"), and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPPA") without a
court order.  The Court then granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel, ordering the Counties to produce individual client files
pursuant to te Plaintiffs' agreement with each of the Counties, and
separately issued a Second Amended Protective Order to facilitate
the third parties' production of individual client files sought
through the Rule 45 subpoenas. This Second Amended Protective Order
was filed on July 6, 2018.

In the fall of 2018, the Pretrial Scheduling Order was amended two
more times, based on the parties' stipulations, but only for
limited purposes.  On Sept. 12, 2018, the Court amended the Sept.
27, 2018 deadline for completion of expert discovery to allow the
Defendant to depose the Plaintiffs' expert on Oct. 4, 2018.  And on
Nov. 11, 2018, the Court amended the Scheduling Order to permit
Defendant to bring a non-dispositive motion relating to a fact
deposition by Nov. 12, 2018 (the previously set non-dispositive
motion deadline was June 22, 2018).  After the close of fact and
expert discovery, dispositive motions were filed.  The District
Court held a hearing on the dispositive motions on Jan. 25, 2019.
At that point, the Plaintiffs had produced a total of approximately
14,198 pages of documents.

Unbeknownst to the Defendant or the Court, after dispositive
motions were heard, the Plaintiffs' counsel obtained releases from
class members and began the process of requesting additional
documents pursuant to these releases from third-party lead agencies
between March and June 2019.  On June 19, 2019, the Plaintiffs then
produced over 3,000 pages of new documents to the Defendant.  And
on Aug. 9, 2019, the Plaintiffs produced an additional 7,600 pages
of new documents.  The Plaintiffs also informed the Defendant that
they expected to produce more documents and that they might request
additional documents from the counties.

The Defendant objected to the late productions, but the Plaintiffs
took the position that they were simply fulfilling their duty to
supplement under Rule 26(e).  They formally resisted the
Defendant's efforts to bring the dispute to the Court, claiming
that the deadline for filing non-dispositive motions had passed and
that the review of their actions would not be proper before the
undersigned magistrate judge.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs argued
that the decision of whether more than 10,000 pages of late
produced documents (and perhaps more) could be used at trial should
be conducted by the District Court in a motion in limine before
trial.  On Aug. 28, 2019, the Defendant's counsel wrote the
Plaintiffs' counsel stating, the Defendant has no choice but to
seek judicial intervention.

The Defendant filed a motion with the Court on Sept. 20, 2019.  A
hearing was held on Oct. 10, 2019, and Magistrate Judge Thorston
granted the Defendant's motion to amend the scheduling order so
that she could bring her motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.  The
Court deferred ruling on the Defendant's request for Rule 37 relief
and granted the Plaintiffs' request for supplemental briefing.  The
Plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief on Oct. 15, 2019, and
Defendant filed a reply on Oct. 22, 2019.

The Magistrate Judge holds that the Plaintiffs have made no showing
that any of the documents were created after the fact discovery
period closed or are correcting or completing information
previously provided.  And there is no dispute that the documents
could have been gathered and produced prior to the discovery
deadline had any necessary preliminary work been accomplished
earlier.  Therefore, the production of the more than 10,000
documents at issue does not qualify as supplementation pursuant to
Rule 26(e).  

Further, even if this huge production fell under the category of
proper Rule 26(e) supplementation, which the Court finds that it
did not, the Plaintiffs' disclosure is simply too late considering
the third-party discovery deadline set forth in the Scheduling
Orders.  Knowing that the Defendant took the position that it would
not be collecting documents from the third parties, the Plaintiffs
should have initiated the process for their direct requests to
third parties earlier or served third-party subpoenas by the
deadline for third-party discovery.

The Magistrate Judge assumes that the Plaintiffs have provided
copies of all the documents collected thus far to the Defendant.
If not, they must do so within 21 days, unless they are privileged
or otherwise subject to the work-product doctrine.  If privilege or
work-product protection is claimed, a log must be provided within
21 days.  The Plaintiffs must also withdraw any pending request to
any third party submitted through this process, as it is deemed
untimely.  Any additional documents received must be shared with
the Defendant, subject to the same conditions described.  The
Magistrate Judge will not issue any additional sanctions.  The
exclusion of the materials is a sufficient sanction in light of the
circumstances of the case.

For the reasons stated, Magistrate Judge Thorston, and consistent
with the requirements set forth, granted in part and denied in part
the Defendant's request for relief.  The documents at issue are
excluded.  Neither party may use the documents that were collected
by the Plaintiffs following the discovery cut off at trial, unless
the District Judge permits such use for impeachment.  The
Plaintiffs must provide copies of all the documents collected thus
far to Defendant within 21 days, unless they are privileged or
otherwise subject to the work-product doctrine.  If privilege or
work-product protection is claimed, a log must be provided within
21 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/y46sPp from Leagle.com.

Tenner Murphy, by his guardians Kay and Richard Murphy and on
behalf of others similarly situated, Marrie Bottelson, and on
behalf of others similarly situated & Dionne Swanson, and on
behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Eren
Ernest Sutherland, Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid Minnesota Disability
Law
Center, Joseph W. Anthony -- janthony@anthonyostlund.com --
Anthony
Ostlund Baer & Louwagie PA, Justin M. Page, Mid-Minnesota Legal
Aid/Disability Law Center, Justin H. Perl -- jperl@mylegalaid.org
--, Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid, Peter McElligott --
pmcelligott@anthonyostland.com -- Anthony Ostlund Baer & Louwagie
PA, Steven M. Pincus -- spincus@anthonyostlund.com -- Anthony
Ostlund Baer & Louwagie PA, Steven C. Schmidt, Mid-Minnesota Legal
Aid Minnesota Disability Law Center & Steven Andrew Smith, Nichols
Kaster, PLLP.

Emily Johnson Piper, in her Capacity as Commissioner of the The
Minnesota Department of Human Services, Defendant, represented by
Aaron Winter -- aaron.winter@ag.state.mn.us -- Minnesota Attorney
General's Office, Brandon L. Boese, Office of the Minnesota
Attorney General, Janine Wetzel Kimble --
janine.kimble@ag.state.mn.us -- Minnesota Office of Attorney
General & Scott H. Ikeda -- scott.ikeda@ag.state.mn.us --
Minnesota
Attorney General's Office.

ARRM, Amicus, represented by Pari McGarraugh --
pmcgarraugh@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron & Samuel D. Orbovich
-- sorbovich@fredlaw.com -- Fredrikson & Byron, PA.


MONARCH RECOVERY: Faces Ferrando FDCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Ferrando, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc. and John Does 1-25,
Case No. e 2:19-cv-06074-CMR (E.D. Pa., Dec. 23, 2019), seeks to
redress the Defendants' conduct, which violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, that caused the Plaintiff to suffer
intangible harms.

According to the complaint, in connection with the collection of a
debt, the Defendants mailed the Plaintiff a letter dated October
16, 2019. The Plaintiff alleges that portion of the Letter is
misleading because it fails to advise the Plaintiff of the proper
method for exercising the dispute and validation rights under the
FDCPA. He sustained an informational injury as he was not fully
apprised of the rights and responsibilities necessary to properly
exercise his options, he adds.

Prior to October 16, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred by
the Plaintiff to Synchrony Bank. The alleged bank obligation arose
out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or
services which were the subject of the transactions were used
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Synchrony
Bank sole the debt to Monarch Recovery who is attempting to collect
the alleged debt.

Monarch Recovery is a "debt collector."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Antranig Garibian, Esq.
          GARIBIAN LAW OFFICES P.C.
          1800 JFK Blvd., Suite 300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 326-9179
          E-mail: ag@garibianlaw.com


NATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT: De Angelis Class Conditionally Certified
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEPHANIE DE ANGELIS, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL
ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2:17-cv-924 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted Ms. De
Angelis' Motion for Conditional Class Certification, Expedited
Discovery, and Issuance of Notice.

National Entertainment Group, LLC ("Vanity") is an adult
entertainment club in Columbus, Ohio.  Ms. De Angelis worked at
Vanity as a dancer from April 2016 to February 2017.  She alleges
that Vanity did not pay its dancers any wages by misclassifying all
of its dancers as independent contractors, rather than employees.
She further alleges that at the end of each night, Vanity took a
cut from all tips made by the dancers, and the dancers were
required to split their tips with other employees.

Ms. De Angelis filed the lawsuit as a collective and class action
against Vanity on Oct. 23, 2017, alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1983, the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards
Act, and the Ohio Semi-Monthly Payment Act, as well as common law
unjust enrichment by failing to pay dancers minimum wage for all
hours worked, including failure to pay overtime.

On Jan. 2, 2018, Vanity answered the Complaint and brought
counterclaims against Ms. De Angelis for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment.  The same day, it filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction, arguing that Ms. De Angelis never danced at
Vanity, and therefore does not have standing to bring the instant
lawsuit.

On Aug. 10, 2018, the Court held an evidentiary hearing to
determine for purposes of standing whether Ms. De Angelis danced at
Vanity.  On Sept. 11, 2018, the Court issued an order denying
Vanity's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and determining
that Ms. De Angelis did work at Vanity.

The Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for conditional class
certification also requesting expedited discovery and issuance of
notices to prospective class members.  She seeks to certify a class
of all of the Defendant's current and former dancers who have
worked at the Defendant's club during the three years before the
Complaint was filed up to the present.

Vanity opposes the Plaintiff's motion arguing: (1) that Plaintiff
has failed to submit adequate evidence in support of her motion and
that the affidavit she has submitted is conclusory boilerplate; (2)
that the Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing contradicts her
affidavit; and (3) the Plaintiff is not similarly situated to
members of the proposed class because she did not sign any
agreements with Vanity and "actual Vanity dancers" are required to
sign agreements that contain an arbitration clause.

Judge Marbley finds that the Plaintiff has brought forward
sufficient evidence that she is similarly situated to other dancers
at Vanity and that she and other dancers were subjected to a
single, FLSA-violating policy.  Accordingly, he granted the
Plaintiff's motion and conditionally certifies a class of all of
the Defendant's current and former dancers who have worked at the
Defendant's club during the three years before this order was
granted to the present.  The parties are ordered to proceed with
expedited discovery.

The Defendant takes issue with the Plaintiff's opt-in form and the
process for providing notification.  Although the Plaintiff asks
the Court to certify the class from the time of the three years
preceding the filing of the complaint, collective-action
certification is appropriately limited to the three years prior to
the date of approval of the notice, not the filing of the lawsuit.

The Judge ordered the parties to confer as to the proper form of
the notice and submit a proposed notice form and opt-in consent
form within 14 days of the date of the Order.  If they disagree as
to any specific language in the notice and opt-in consent form, the
parties may note the disputed language, with accompanying briefing
as necessary, and the Court will promptly determine which language
to use.

At the same time, the parties will also submit a proposed plan for
the distribution of the notice to all potential opt-in plaintiffs
employed by Defendant at any time from three years prior to the
granting of the motion to the present.  In the event of a
disagreement on the distribution procedure, the parties will submit
simultaneous briefing on the matter.  No responsive briefing will
be permitted.

For the reasons set he forth, Judge Marbley granted Ms. De Angelis'
Motion for Conditional Certification and Expedite Discovery.  The
parties are ordered to confer and submit to the Court within 14
days a proposed notice and plan for distribution of notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/Q9tee2 from Leagle.com.

Stephanie De Angelis, Plaintiff, represented by Courtney Werning
--
cwerning@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson Co, LPA, Lance Chapin --
lchapin@chapinlegal.com -- Chapin Legal Group, LLC, Matthew R.
Wilson -- mwilson@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson Co., LPA,
Michael
J. Boyle, Jr. -- mboyle@meyerwilson.com -- Meyer Wilson, LPA &
Steven Charles Babin, Jr. -- sbabin@chapinlegal.com -- Chapin
Legal
Group LLC.

National Entertainment Group LLC, Defendant, represented by Robert
G. Cohen -- rcohen@keglerbrown.com -- Kegler Brown Hill & Ritter &
John Paul Brody -- jbrody@keglerbrown.com -- Kegler Brown Hill &
Ritter.


NATIONAL LABOR: Oquil Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Pablo Alejandro Carlo Oquil, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. NATIONAL LABOR STRATEGIES, L.L.C. and HANUL
CORPORATION, Case No. 1:20-cv-00695 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 2020),
seeks to recover from the Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the New York Labor Law: unpaid wages, including unpaid
overtime, due to an impermissible rounding policy; unpaid spread of
hours premium; statutory penalties; liquidated damages; and
attorneys' fees and costs.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff was scheduled to work
from 9:30 A.M. until 6:30 P.M. five days per week, for a total of
45 hours per week. The Plaintiff was not paid for all of his hours
worked. The Plaintiff asserts he suffered from the Defendants'
policy of rounding to the nearest 15-minute interval, which reduced
the number of hours worked as reported on his wage statements.

The Plaintiff alleges that he was time-shaved at least one (1) hour
per workweek. Depending on the number of hours he worked in any
given week, the off-the-clock hours would be overtime hours, which
should be paid at an overtime premium rate, the Plaintiff avers.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants work as a stocker in a
warehouse owned and operated by the Defendants.

National Labor Strategies, L.L.C. is a New Jersey Corporation which
has registered in the state of New Jersey as a domestic business
corporation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Phone: 212-465-1188
          Fax: 212-465-1181


NBG LOGISTICS: Silva Labor Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages, Penalties
-------------------------------------------------------------
Giovana Silva, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. NBG Logistics Alliance, Inc. and Does 1
through 20, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 37-2020-00000754 (Cal.
Super., January 6, 2020), seeks unpaid wages and interest thereon
for failure to pay for all hours worked and minimum wage rate,
failure to authorize or permit required meal periods, failure to
authorize or permit required rest periods.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff further seeks statutory
penalties for Defendants' failure to provide accurate wage
statements, waiting time penalties in the form of continuation
wages for failure to timely pay employees all wages due upon
separation of employment, unfair competition, injunctive relief and
other equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
interest pursuant to California Labor Code and applicable
Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jessica L Campbell, Esq.
      Kashif Haque, Esq.
      Samuel A. Wong, Esq.
      AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC
      9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100
      Irvine, CA 2618
      Telephone: (949) 379-6250
      Facsimile: (949) 379-6251
      Email: jcampbell@aegislawfirm.com


NEW HAMPSHIRE: Dozens Allege Abuse at Youth Detention Center
------------------------------------------------------------
Holly Ramer, writing for ABC News, reports that more than two dozen
men and women say they were physically, sexually and emotionally
abused as children at New Hampshire's state-run youth detention
center over the course of three decades, according to attorneys who
have filed a class action lawsuit on their behalf.

The lawsuit filed Jan. 11, 2020, in Merrimack County Superior Court
comes six months after two former counselors were charged with
repeatedly raping a teenage boy at the Youth Development Center in
Manchester, New Hampshire, in the late 1990s. The victim in that
case is now the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit filed by attorneys
representing 35 others who say they were abused between 1982 and
2014.

"This lawsuit seeks to hold the state of New Hampshire and others
responsible for the lives they forever destroyed and to bring about
system change so that this can never happen again to another child
in New Hampshire," the lawsuit states.

The victims who have come forward were between 11 and 17 at the
time, and the perpetrators were both men and women, attorney Rus
Rilee told The Associated Press. Of the 36 victims, approximately
30 allege they suffered sexual, physical and emotional abuse, were
deprived of an education and kept in solitary confinement, while
the rest fall into one or more of those categories, Rilee said.
They were terrorized into keeping quiet, and even those who sought
help while sporting black eyes, swollen faces and bleeding genitals
were told that the abuse had not occurred, the lawsuit alleges.

"These are boys and girls that were taken into state custody and
then beaten, raped and tortured by state employees whose sole duty
was to protect them," Rilee said. "The people that were in charge
knew what was going on, and they covered it up."

The Associated Press doesn't generally identify victims of sexual
assault, but David Meehan, who is now 38, said he wanted to come
forward publicly after realizing that he and others were harmed not
just by individual staffers but by a system.

"They didn't do anything they were supposed to do to protect me as
a person or any of my rights as a human being," said Meehan, the
lead plantiff in the lawsuit. "The juvenile justice system needs
some type of oversight. I understand the need for privacy to
protect the children, but they have put such a canopy over
everything that we don't know if the kids are safe."

The lawsuit names a dozen defendants, including the state, the
detention center and the agencies overseeing it. It also names the
two former counselors facing criminal charges — Jeffrey Buskey
and Stephen Murphy -- and four other men who worked at the center,
which houses children who have been ordered to a secure institution
by the juvenile justice system.

The Department of Health and Human Services does not comment on
pending litigation, and referred questions to the attorney
general's office, which in July announced a broad criminal
investigation into the youth center, including whether additional
children were subject to physical or sexual violence. The
spokeswoman for that office said January 11 that officials will
review the lawsuit as that investigation continues. Attorneys for
Buskey and Murphy did not respond to requests for comment.

Meehan, who was at the detention center from December 1995 to
January 1999, declined to discuss his time there because of the
ongoing criminal case. But the lawsuit describes years of alleged
abuse, starting about a year after his arrival. Buskey, 53, is
accused of gaining Meehan's trust by giving him snacks and coveted
work assignments, and arranging for him to play basketball with a
local high school team. But by early 1998, he and Murphy were
allegedly raping and beating him almost daily.

The lawsuit also alleges that a third staffer raped Meehan once
while another employee stood guard. Another staffer is accused of
holding Meehan down during assaults, and a supervisor is accused of
denying him help. According to the lawsuit, the supervisor saw
Meehan crying with a black eye and split lip, but when Meehan said
he had been beaten and raped, cut him off and said, "Look little
fella, that just doesn't happen." Around the same time, a nurse who
observed Meehan crying, with his face bruised and nose broken, told
him his injuries appeared to be self-inflicted, according to the
lawsuit.

In a post on a fundraising website he appears to have written in
August, Buskey said he is innocent and described himself as "a
doting grandfather, a loving father, and a kind person."

Murphy, a 50-year-old Massachusetts resident, worked until July as
a clubhouse attendant for the Boston Red Sox, which has suspended
him without pay. His attorney has said Murphy doesn't know the
victim and denies all the charges.

Meehan said he landed in the detention center after running away
from a physically abusive home and joining what he described as a
biker gang of thieves. After one arrest, he said he was being
transported back to a pre-trial holding facility when another teen
already at the center told him about being raped and beaten. Meehan
said they persuaded the sheriff's deputy to stop for a bathroom
break and then fled, still wearing their handcuffs. They were on
the run for two weeks before being caught.

"This was an older brother, looking out for me," he said. "He was
telling me that he wasn't going to allow me to walk into that."

Since his release, Meehan has married and raised three children,
and for years owned a roofing and residential construction company.
But he's also been arrested for drunken driving and for burglaries,
which he says he committed to pay for what at times was a
$500-per-day heroin habit. The drinking and drugs allowed him to
avoid thinking about his past, he said. His wife, Erin Meehan, whom
he began dating as a teenager, said she knew nothing of the abuse
until 2017, when he told her, "They raped me."

In a lengthy interview that included some tears, Meehan said he is
determined to stand up for other victims.

"It's about holding people accountable for their own actions," he
said. "I personally have to face judgment for things I've done
wrong, which seem petty compared to what these guys did. Why should
any of us survivors carry the burden of their dirty secret
anymore?" [GN]

NEW ORLEANS, LA: Lafaye Sues Over Illegally Collected Fines
-----------------------------------------------------------
Susan Lafaye, Lisa Picone and Inez Victorian, on behalf of
themselves and other similarly-situated persons, Plaintiff, v. The
City of New Orleans, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-00041 (E.D. La.,
January 6, 2020), seeks damages, general, special and punitive,
together with legal interest, and for all costs of these
proceedings and all general and equitable relief.

The City collected $25,612,690.32 in fees and fines over the
Automated Traffic Enforcement System in connection with its traffic
ordinance. Plaintiffs seeks a refund under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenging the ordinance under local, state and federal
law. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Joseph R. McMahon, III, Esq.
      2332 Severn Avenue
      Metairie, LA 70001
      Telephone: (504) 828-6225
      Facsimile: (504) 828-6201
      Email: Joe@josephmcmahonlaw.com


NEXTEP FUNDING: Forster Expert Testimony Allowed in Prayitno Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHAN-LI PRAYITNO, Plaintiff, v. NEXTEP FUNDING LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 17 C 4310 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Jorge Alonso of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiff's motion to bar Eric Forster
from testifying as an expert witness.

In the putative class action, Prayitno claims that, in offering him
a loan to defray car repair expenses, Nextep failed to disclose the
loan's true credit terms at an exorbitant rate of interest,
violating the Truth in Lending Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Illinois Consumer Installment
Loan Act, and the Illinois Interest Act.

In February 2017, the Plaintiff's auto transmission failed.  He had
his vehicle towed to Atomic Transmission, where he learned that he
could have his transmission either rebuilt, at a cost of $2,105, or
replaced with a used transmission, at a cost of $995.  The
Plaintiff could not afford the rebuilt transmission, but he
believed he could raise enough to pay for a used transmission.
According to the owner of Atomic Transmission, however, a rebuilt
transmission is more reliable than a used transmission, and the
Plaintiff learned that Atomic Transmission could arrange an
extension of credit to finance the repair.

Atomic Transmission presented the Plaintiff with a document,
captioned as a "Merchandise/Service/Repair Contract" under the
Nextep logo.  The MSR contract required the Plaintiff to pay a
total of $4,715.92, $2,610.92 more than the repair cost of $2,105.
Although it disclosed this sequence of installment payments, the
MSR contract did not disclose the annual percentage rate ("APR"),
which, according to the Plaintiff, the Defendant was required to
disclose under TILA.

The Plaintiff alleges that he entered into the MSR contract without
understanding how much he would pay in interest.  According to him,
the MSR contract documents were misleading as presented to him,
and, if he had known that the contract required him to pay an APR
in excess of 140%, he would have either purchased the cheaper used
transmission or tried to arrange for a cheaper loan elsewhere, as
he would not have knowingly paid an APR at or above 140%.  

He alleges that he attempted to pay off the loan early, but Nextep
quoted him a higher payoff amount than he expected, and he could
not determine from the documents whether the quoted amount was
correct.  Additionally, he claims that the cost of the credit was
in excess of the limits imposed by the Illinois Interest Act.

The Defendant has retained Eric Forster to provide expert opinion
testimony on the range of financing options that would have been
available to the Plaintiff.  Mr. Forster has worked for over 30
years in the real estate finance industry as a mortgage originator
and underwiter.  

According to his expert report, Mr. Forster proposes to testify
that, under general principles of loan underwriting, lenders
typically consider three factors in making credit decisions: the
applicant's credit rating; his income; and the value of any
collateral. Mr. Forster opines that prospective lenders would have
viewed plaintiff as a significant credit risk based on his weak
credit rating and relatively low provable income, particularly to
the extent he might have sought credit without pledging any
collateral or by pledging only his car.  

As a result, Mr. Forster opines, the Plaintiff likely would not
have been able to obtain the credit necessary to repair his car
from any other lender, and even if he could have, the APR would
have been higher than 140%.  Mr. Forster concluded that, given the
Plaintiff's low income and credit rating, the other lenders were
also unlikely to offer him credit, in the absence of any valuable
collateral.

The Plaintiff has moved to exclude the expert's testimony as
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the standards
set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.  He argues that
Mr. Forster is not qualified to give the opinions he has disclosed
because they are purportedly based on his professional experience,
which is in mortgage lending, not the smaller consumer loans that
are the subject of his proposed testimony.  

Further, Mr. Forster's professional experience has been in
California, not Illinois, and according to the Plaintiff, he showed
in his deposition testimony that he lacks knowledge of the Illinois
consumer lending landscape.  The Defendant responds that Mr.
Forster has decades of experience in lending and loan underwriting,
and the Plaintiff's objections concerning the soundness of his
conclusions based on the nature of his experience go to the weight
of his proposed testimony, rather than its admissibility.

Judge Alonso holds that Mr. Forster is qualified to opine on the
Plaintiff's likelihood of obtaining better credit terms by his long
experience in lending and underwriting.  He described a reliable
methodology that lenders would have used to assess the Plaintiff's
creditworthiness, and he reliably applied it to the case to form
his opinion.  Because that opinion will assist the trier of fact's
determination of whether and how the Plaintiff was injured by the
Defendant's credit terms, it is admissible under Daubert and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.

For these reasons, the Judge denied the Plaintiff's motion to bar
Mr. Forster from testifying as an expert witness.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/ayOtLo from Leagle.com.

Chan-Li Prayitno, on behalf of plaintiff and the class members
defined below, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel A. Edelman --
dedelman@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC,
Cathleen M. Combs -- ccombs@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs,
Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Dulijaza Clark -- jclark@edcombs.com --
Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin, LLC & James O. Latturner --
jlatturner@edcombs.com -- Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC.

Nextep Funding, LLC, Defendant, represented by Bruce N. Menkes --
bmenkes@mandellmenkes.com -- Mandell, Menkes LLC, George V. Desh --
gdesh@mandellmenkes.com -- Mandell Menkes LLC & Steven L. Baron,
Baron Harris Healey.


NORFOLK SOUTHERN: Sued by Wills in Illinois for Violating BIPA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Wills, individually and on behalf of similarly situated
individuals v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, a Virginia
corporation, Case No. 2020CH00990 (Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Jan. 24,
2020), is brought against the Defendant for its violations of the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act and to obtain redress
for persons injured by its conduct.

The BIPA provides, inter alia, that private entities, such as the
Defendant, may not store an individual's biometric information,
such as fingerprints and hand scans, or any biometric information,
including any data regardless of the manner from which it was
converted unless they first: inform that person in writing that
biometric identifiers or biometric information will be stored;
inform that person in writing of the specific purpose of the length
of term for which such biometric identifier or biometric
information is being collected, stored and used; and receives a
written release from the person for the collection of their
biometric identifiers or biometric information.

The Plaintiff has been a resident and citizen of the state of
Illinois. The Plaintiff brings this action for statutory damages
and other remedies as a result of the Defendant's collective and
respective conduct in violating his biometric privacy rights under
BIPA.

The Defendant is classified as a Class I Railroad and part one of
the largest freight railroad networks and railroad operators in
North America.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Myles McGuire, Esq.
          David L. Gerbie, Esq.
          Andrew T. Heldut, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: (312) 893-7002
          Email: mmcguire@mcgpc.com
                 dgerbie@mcgpc.com
                 aheldut@mcgpc.com


OASIS LEGAL FINANCE: Kaplan Sues Over Usurious Loan Rates
---------------------------------------------------------
Jami Kaplan, an individual, individually, and on behalf of all
other members of the class similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Oasis
Legal Finance, LLC, Defendant, Case No. 2020CH00093, (W.D. Pa.,
January 6, 2020), seeks injunctive relief, statutory damages,
attorneys' fees, costs together with other relief for violation of
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Oasis Financial is engaged in the business of providing litigation
funding to individuals. Kaplan claims that Oasis charges unlawful
interest rates on borrowed funds. Kaplan borrowed $1,000 in the
form of litigation funding from Oasis Financial at an interest rate
of thirty-six percent per annum. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Daniel J. Voelker, Esq.
     Voelker Litigation Group
     33 N. Dearborn Street Suite 1000
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Tel: (312) 870-5430
     Tel: (312) 254-7666
     Email: dvoelker@voelkerlitigationgroup.com


OLIVER WYMAN: Maxwell Suit Asserts Retaliation
----------------------------------------------
Douglas Maxwell, on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Oliver Wyman, Inc. Marsh & McLennan
Companies, Inc. and Rick Wise, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00102,
(S.D. N.Y., January 6, 2020), seeks compensation for retaliation,
liquidated damages, statutory penalties and attorneys' fees and
costs pursuant to the New York Labor Law, Fair Labor Standards Act
and New York City Human Rights Law.

Maxwell worked for Defendants as Director of the IT Department from
September 2006 until August 15, 2019. He was terminated for his
participation in an internal sexual harassment investigation
against some the company's senior employees, says the complaint.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      C.K. Lee, Esq.
      Anne Seelig, Esq.
      LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
      30 East 39th Street, Second Floor
      New York, NY 10016
      Tel: (212) 465-1188
      Fax: (212) 465-1181


OMNICARE INC: Class in Davis FLSA Suit Conditionally Certified
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL DAVIS, individually and on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. OMNICARE, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 5:18-CV-142-REW (E.D. Ky.), Judge Robert
E. Wier of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington, granted in part the
Plaintiff's motion conditional certification of an FLSA
collective.

The Plaintiff initiated the putative collective action against
Defendant Omnicare and three of its subsidiary pharmacies on behalf
of himself and other Act Fast Delivery workers.  The Plaintiff
claims violations of state and federal wage laws as well as unjust
enrichment.  Davis alleges that the Defendants -- despite
contracting with a third-party (Act Fast) for delivery services and
nominally classifying Plaintiffs (or Act Fast) as independent
contractors -- jointly employed the Plaintiffs as delivery drivers
for their medical products.

From 2014 through 2017, the Plaintiff, nominally an Act Fast
driver, delivered Omnicare products from Omnicare facilities to
Omnicare customers on an Omnicare-set schedule via
Omnicare-mandated routes using Omnicare gear.  The Defendants also
required Davis to be on call during regularly scheduled periods to
make Defendant-directed stat runs, which are individual deliveries
on an expedited, emergency, and ad hoc basis.  

Act Fast's Courier Services provided an integral link between the
Defendants' supply of delivery-only products and demand from
nursing homes and other medical facilities.  Per the Plaintiff,
Omnicare is Act Fast's largest, indeed its sustaining customer.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, through the Courier
Agreements and in practice, maintained sufficient control over Act
Fast employees such that Defendants (along with Act Fast) jointly
employed him under state and federal wage law.

Davis claims the flat fees he received for deliveries effectively
were below minimum wage and failed to compensate him for overtime.
He alleges further impermissible wage deductions and omitted
reimbursements.  Though Davis claims Act Fast directly underpaid
him, he contends that Act Fast acted for the Defendants' benefit
and on their behalf.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants, as
his joint employers, are jointly and severally liable for all
underpayments.

Specifically, Davis seeks: unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime,
unreimbursed vehicle costs, unlawful deductions, unlawful expenses,
and unpaid payroll deductions under 29 U.S.C. Section 216 and KRS
337.385 (Count I), and, alternatively, unpaid payroll deductions
under KRS 337.060 (Count II).  Davis also seeks restitution to the
extent the  Defendants, through underpayment, were unjustly
enriched by improperly shifting costs and expenses to the Plaintiff
(Count III).

Davis pleaded that his FLSA claims are typical of the proposed
class members, and that he was subject to the same common scheme
regarding underpayment, failure to reimburse kickbacks, Unlawful
Deductions, Unlawful Expenses and lack of Required Deductions as
the members of the class.  

Davis seeks conditional certification of a collective defined as
"All current and former delivery drivers and dispatchers classified
as independent contractors who performed work for Defendants and
were based at a distribution center located in Ashland, Beattyville
or Lexington, Kentucky during the three-year period before the
filing of the Complaint up to the date the Court authorizes
notice.

In support, Davis attaches his own affidavit, as well as affidavits
of former Act Fast Dispatcher Brian Alberts, and former Act Fast
Drivers William Eckler and Edna K. Narragon.  Generally, the DE
51-affidavit suite coincides with and lends support to Davis'
pleaded allegations.

Judge Wier granted in part the Plaintiff's motion conditional
certification of an FLSA collective, and conditionally certified a
collective defined as: All current and former delivery drivers
classified as independent contractors who performed work for
Defendants and were based at a distribution center located in
Ashland, Beattyville or Lexington, Kentucky, and who received their
last paycheck on or after Dec. 3, 2016.

To ensure accurate identification of individuals within the defined
collective, the Plaintiff shall, within 7 days, provide the defense
a proposed list of notice recipients accompanied by any applicable
supporting documentation.  The Defendants will review the proposal
and, within 4 days of receipt, advise the Plaintiff of specific
objections, if any, to the identified recipients.

Within 14 days of the Order, the parties will file either: (I) a
joint status report attaching an agreed list of notice recipients,
or (II) if the parties are unable to agree, separate reports (not
to exceed 5 pages) addressing any unresolved disputes, attaching
proposed notice lists, and including any documentation relevant to
the disputed recipients.

To give the Defendants a fair opportunity to review the (as-yet
unfiled) opt-in form, Plaintiff shall, within 7 days, provide the
defense a proposed form (modified to reflect the Court's findings
and directions in this Order). Defendants will review such form
and, within 4 days of receipt, advise Plaintiff of specific
objections, if any.

Within 14 days of the Order, the parties will file either: (I) a
joint status report attaching an agreed proposed opt-in form, or
(II) if the parties are unable to agree, separate reports (not to
exceed 2 pages) addressing any unresolved disputes, attaching
proposed forms, and including any documentation relevant to a
lingering objection.

Within 7 days of the Order, the Plaintiff shall, via Notice of
Filing, tender in the record a Proposed Notice modified to reflect
the Court's findings and directions in the Order. Within 4 days of
such filing, the Defendants will file either: (I) a notice of
nonopposition to the modified proposal, or (II) objections (not to
exceed 3 pages) identifying any provision of the revised notice the
Defendants view as inconsistent with this Order or binding
precedent.  To be clear, it is not an invitation for the Defendants
to rehearse arguments the Court has, here, rejected or lodge fresh
complaints premised on non-binding contrary authority.  The
Plaintiff may respond (subject to a like 3-page limitation) within
3 days of the Defendants' objections, if any.

The Judge provisionally authorized notice to the conditionally
certified collective under the mechanics approved in the Order.
However, he withheld final approval of notice mailing pending
finalization of the recipient list, opt-in form, and notice
content.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/978r2b from Leagle.com.

Daniel Davis, individually and on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Michele D. Henry --
mhenry@craighenrylaw.com -- Craig Henry PLC, Susan C. Wittemeier --
scw@goodwingoodwin.com -- Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP, pro hac vice,
Thomas R. Goodwin -- trg@goodwingoodwin.com -- Goodwin & Goodwin,
LLP, pro hac vice, W. Jeffrey Vollmer -- wjv@goodwingoodwin.com --
Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP, pro hac vice, Zachary L. Rubin --
zrubin@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan, PC, pro hac vice &
Harold L. Lichten -- hlichten@llrlaw.com -- Lichten & Liss-Riordan,
PC, pro hac vice.

Omnicare, Inc., Home Care Pharmacy, LLC & D&R Pharmaceutical
Services, LLC, Defendants, represented by Andrew M. McKinley,
Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, J. Stanton Hill, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, James
Joseph Swartz, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Nancy E. Rafuse, Seyfarth
Shaw, LLP & Teeka K. Harrison, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, pro hac vice.

Three Forks Apothecary, LLC, Defendant, represented by Andrew M.
McKinley -- amckinley@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, J.
Stanton Hill -- shill@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, James
Joseph Swartz, Jr. -- jswartz@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP,
Michele D. Henry, Craig Henry PLC, Nancy E. Rafuse --
nrafuse@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP & Teeka K. Harrison --
tkharrison@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, pro hac vice.


ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Dismiss Costas Securities Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert C. Jones of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada denied Defendant Ormat's motion to dismiss the case, MAC
COSTAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:18-CV-00271-RCJ-CLB (D. Nev.).

The Plaintiffs file the class action suit against Defendants Ormat,
Isaac Angel, and Doron Blachar, alleging violations of Rules 10b-5
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("SEA") and of
Israeli securities law.

In 2015, Ormat released a new strategic plan indicating its desire
to expand and accelerate growth through acquisitions and other
investments, both domestically and globally.  Pursuant to the new
plan, Ormat acquired the domestic company Viridity Energy, Inc. in
2017 and finalized a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with the
Southern California Public Power Authority ("SCPPA").  As a result
of those endeavors, Ormat re-evaluated its previous position of
completely investing foreign earnings abroad, resulting in the need
to perform calculations regarding tax repatriations to the United
States.

In March 2017, Ormat filed a Form 10-K with the Securities Exchange
Commission disclosing the discovery of a material weakness in its
internal controls for financial reporting.  In May 2018, Ormat
issued a press release announcing it would have to delay the filing
of its 2018 1Q 10-Q due to errors in the previous consolidated
financial statements. Several days later, Ormat announced that the
errors discovered would require a restatement of several prior
financial reports from 2017.  Concurrent with these announcements,
Ormat's stock price fell a total of $4 per share, from $56.35 to
$52.35.  In June 2018, Ormat filed amended versions of the 2017 2Q
10-Q, 2017 3Q 10-Q, and 2017 10-K.

On May 11, 2018, Plaintiff Costas filed the original complaint
against the Defendants, alleging violations of Rules 10b-5 and
20(a).  Following the addition of several interested parties,
Plaintiff Phoenix Insurance was appointed the Lead Plaintiff for
the proposed class and the class period was designated as Aug. 8,
2017 to May 15, 2018, both dates inclusive.  The Lead Plaintiff
then filed an amended consolidated complaint on May 13, 2019,
incorporating the previous claims and adding a claim for violations
of Israeli securities laws, to which Ormat filed the present motion
to dismiss.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the
specificity standard by including the statements in controversy as
block quotes within the complaint.  In support, the Defendant cites
to several district court decisions within the Circuit.

Judge Jones finds the cases cited by the Defendant to be
distinguishable.  While the Plaintiffs did include the
certification statements in a block quote, certain portions of the
quote were bolded and italicized.  Immediately following the block
quote, Plaintiffs explained why the indicated material was alleged
to be misleading.  Thus, the instant case is not one in which the
plaintiffs highlighted passages but did not indicate exactly what
is false within the highlighted passage.  Accordingly, the Judge
finds that the Plaintiffs have specified each statement alleged to
have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why the statement
is misleading.

For a claim to be plausible under the heightened pleading standards
of Rule 9(b) and the PLSRA, a plaintiff must plead, in great
detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct.  In the case, the
portions of the amended complaint regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley
certifications do not -- on their own -- provide factual support
sufficient to discern a strong inference of deliberate recklessness
or conscious misconduct.  The paragraphs following the
certifications do not address scienter at all.  Thus, the
requirements of the PLSRA are not met and the Sarbanes-Oxley
certifications do not -- on their own -- provide sufficient
evidence of scienter.

The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs' complaint fails to
identify material misrepresentations with required particularity
and also fails to demonstrate required scienter in regard to the
2017 2Q 10-Q, 2017 3Q 10-Q, and the 2017 10-K.  As with the
Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, the Judge holds that the amended
complaint provides the statement alleged to be unlawful,
identification of the particular statement at controversy, and an
explanation as to why the indicated material is alleged to be
unlawful.  Therefore, the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiffs
have failed to meet the specificity standard by including the
statements in controversy as block quotes within the complaint is
rejected.

The amended complaint addresses scienter in three different
locations: Paragraph 12, Paragraphs 109-110, and the paragraphs
following each particularized statement.  Accordingly, the portions
of the amended complaint regarding the financial reports filed by
the Defendants do not -- on their own -- provide factual support
sufficient to discern a strong inference of deliberate recklessness
or conscious misconduct as required by the PLSRA.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have not alleged any
motive for fraud.  The Judge holds that the Defendant's disclosure
itself noted that the material weakness, if not timely remediated,
may adversely affect the accuracy and reliability of their
financial statements, and our reputation, business and the price of
our common stock, as well as lead to a loss of investor confidence
in them.  Furthermore, although tDefendants Angel and Blachar did
not sell any Ormat stock during the class period, the Plaintiffs
note that Defendant Angel's executive salary went from $1,356,435
in 2017 to $7,984,551 in 2018, despite the need for issuing
significant restatements.  Consequently, although motive and
opportunity, without more, is not enough to establish a cogent and
compelling inference of scienter, the allegations of such may be
considered in the holistic analysis.

The primary competing inferences in the case appear to be that
either (1) the Defendant improperly applied complicated GAAP
principles in a manner negligent at best and dutifully disclosed
the errors and corrections or (2) the Defendant, concerned over the
possible impact of significant new tax liability due to its
revamped business plan, issued misstatements designed to reassure
investors and prevent a drop in corporate assets during the
changeover.  Taking the complaint as a whole, Judge Jones finds
that the Plaintiffs have provided sufficient cumulative evidence to
create an inference at least as compelling as the opposing
inference.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs'
amended complaint satisfies the requirements of the PLSRA and Rule
9(b) and may therefore proceed on the Rule 10b-5 claim.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Jones denied the Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 6, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/1YziK4 from Leagle.com.

Mac Costas, Plaintiff, pro se.

Timothy Herbst, Movant, represented by Kimberly P. Stein --
KSTEIN@NEVADAFIRM.COM -- Holley Driggs Walch Fine Wray Puzey &
Thompson.

Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd, Movant, represented by Jeremy Alan
Lieberman -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, pro hac vice,
Joseph Alexander Hood, II -- ahood@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP,
pro
hac vice & Andrew R. Muehlbauer -- andrew@mlolegal.com --
Muehlbauer Law Office, Ltd.

City of Cape Coral Municipal Police Officers' Retirement Plan,
Movant, represented by Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com --
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP.

Ormat Technologies Inc., Isaac Angel & Doron Blachar, Defendants,
represented by Douglas P. Baumstein -- dbaumstein@whitecase.com --
White & Case LLP, pro hac vice, Dominique Forrest --
dominique.forrest@whitecase.com -- White & Case LLP, pro hac vice
&
Matthew C. Addison -- maddison@mcdonaldcarano.com -- McDonald
Carano Wilson LLP.


PITTSBURGH CATHOLIC: 20+ Abuse Cases Pending in Court
-----------------------------------------------------
Deb Erdley, writing for Trib Live, reports that nearly 18 months
after a Pennsylvania grand jury report unmasked decades of
allegations of clergy sexual abuse in Catholic parishes across the
state and church leaders paid $84 million to abuse survivors,
fallout from the report continues to mount in the courts.

State lawmakers began the process of amending the Pennsylvania
Constitution to give abuse survivors with old claims a day in court
even as the state Supreme Court weighs a lower court ruling that
could set the stage for such claims even sooner.

Locally, court records show there are more than 20 such suits
pending against the Pittsburgh Catholic Diocese as well as one in
Westmoreland County.

In the latest legal development, Allegheny County Common Pleas
Judge Christine Ward ruled a class-action suit seeking to force the
Pittsburgh Diocese to open its abuse archives to survivors may move
forward in court.

The ruling comes weeks after a year-end report found seven of the
state's eight dioceses had paid $84 million to 564 abuse survivors
who agreed not to sue the church.

Such offers held little pull for Ryan O'Connor, a Verona father of
two, abuse survivor and committed Roman Catholic whose children
attend Catholic schools. He still sees a church in need of greater
transparency.

A month after the August 2018 grand jury report was released,
O'Connor and Kristen Hancock, a Mt. Lebanon woman who is a reader
at Mass and whose daughter attends Catholic school, joined in the
class-action suit that seeks not money, but the church's records of
all abuse allegations as well as a process for victims to review
them for accuracy.

They contend diocesan records that were made public contain gaping
holes that suggest the church failed to meet mandatory reporting
laws and has created a public nuisance.

O'Connor went public in 2018 with his searing allegations of abuse
at the hands of a parish priest as a child growing up in the
Altoona-Johnstown diocese. He said he wants assurances that
children today are safe.

"As a parent, your number one priority always has to be children,"
O'Connor said. "Knowing what I know can, will and does happen to
children with priests, saying that you are in compliance with state
law does not make it so. The only way parents should be okay with
everything is complete transparency with the church."

Church leaders have repeatedly stressed that the church of today is
committed to protecting children. Their lawyers argued they are in
compliance with the state law by reporting allegations of child
sexual abuse to law enforcement.

The Pittsburgh diocese is aware of the order from Judge Ward but
said it is unable to comment on a matter of pending litigation,
diocesan Chancellor Ellen Mady said.

"The diocese is in full compliance with the State of Pennsylvania's
mandated reporting requirements, and reports all allegations
regarding sexual abuse of a minor to the district attorney's
office," she said. "We pray for healing for all victims."

O'Connor and Hancock say they need to go further.

Benjamin Sweet, one of the lawyers pressing the suit, pointed to
eight clergy names that were blacked out in the grand jury report,
another 10 who were identified only as "Pittsburgh priests #1-10"
and religious orders whose records were not included.

"Those names should most certainly be released. It is very clear
that the grand jury's belief was that this was only the tip of the
iceberg in terms of information the church had," Sweet said.

Timothy Hale, a California lawyer who is co-counsel with Sweet,
said there are strong parallels between the Pittsburgh suit and
successful public nuisance claims he argued in California that
forced the Boy Scouts of America and the Catholic Church to release
abuse files.

"There are strong parallels in the way these entities battled to
keep their secrets secret," Hale said.

Hale said the church relies on technical legal defenses "to avoid
having to disclose what we believe to be the truth: that there are
countless predatory priests within Pennsylvania whose identities
remain known only to the church and to their victims."

Sweet said Ward's ruling marked the first time a judge has granted
a member of the public who was not a victim standing to challenge
the church to prove it is complying with mandatory reporting laws.

While Ward's ruling affects only the Pittsburgh diocese, she left
open the possibility that the state's other seven dioceses could be
included in the case if the plaintiffs can amend the suit to
include specific allegations against them. [GN]



PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Faces Ferrando Suit Over Violation of FDCPA
---------------------------------------------------------------
David Ferrando individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC and John Does 1-25,
Case No. 2:19-cv-06073-GJP (E.D. Pa., Dec. 23, 2019), seeks to
redress the Defendants' conduct, which violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, that caused the Plaintiff to suffer
intangible harms.

According to the complaint, in connection with the collection of a
debt, the Defendants mailed the Plaintiff a letter dated July 2,
2019. The Plaintiff alleges that the Letter does not meet the
required requirements of the FDCPA because it falsely omitted the
requirement that a consumer must dispute in writing. In omitting
the writing requirement, the Defendants falsely communicated the
consumer's requirements under the FDCPA, he adds.

Prior to July 2, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred by the
Plaintiff to Capital One Bank. The alleged bank obligation arose
out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or
services which were the subject of the transactions were used
primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Capital One
Bank sole the debt to PRA who is attempting to collect the alleged
debt.

PRA is a "debt collector."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Antranig Garibian, Esq.
          GARIBIAN LAW OFFICES P.C.
          1800 JFK Blvd., Suite 300
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 326-9179
          E-mail: ag@garibianlaw.com


PORTOLA PHARMACEUTICALS: Gibbs Probes Securities Law Violations
---------------------------------------------------------------
Portola Pharmaceuticals, Inc. shares plummeted on January 10, 2020
after the company shocked investors by announcing that it expects
fourth quarter net revenue for the drug Andexxa to be approximately
$28 million, well below previous estimates and expectations. Gibbs
Law Group is investigating a potential Portola Pharmaceuticals
Class Action Lawsuit on behalf of investors who lost money in
Portola Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: PTLA) stock.

To speak with an attorney regarding this class action lawsuit
investigation, call (888) 410-2925.

On January 9, 2020, Portola Pharmaceuticals announced preliminary
unaudited Andexxa global net revenues for 2019. According to the
announcement, the company estimates Andexxa revenues to be around
$28 million for the fourth quarter. Oppenheimer's analyst, Jay
Olson, stated that this estimate is "well below our $39 million
estimate and $41 million consensus."

According to the announcement, Portola attributed the decrease in
fourth quarter Andexxa sales, in part, to "hospital pharmacies
curtailed use of Andexxa following drug utilization reviews in an
effort to manage pharmacy budgets."

Following this news, on January 10, 2020, Portola's stock price
dropped more than 40% to close at $14.76, causing harm to
investors.

What Should Portola Pharmaceuticals Investors Do?

If you invested in Portola Pharmaceuticals, visit our website or
contact our securities team directly at (888) 410-2925 to discuss
how you may be able to recover your losses. Our investigation
concerns whether Portola Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and certain of its
officers and/or directors have violated federal securities laws.

Gibbs Law Group represents individual and institutional investors
throughout the country in securities litigation to correct abusive
corporate governance practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
proxy violations. The firm has recovered over a billion dollars for
its clients against some of the world's largest corporations, and
our attorneys have received numerous honors for their work,
including "Top Boutique Law Firms in California," "Best Lawyers in
America," "Top Plaintiff Lawyers in California," "California Lawyer
Attorney of the Year," "Top Class Action Attorneys Under 40,"
"Consumer Protection MVP," and "Top Cybersecurity/ Privacy
Attorneys Under 40."

Contact:

         Eileen Epstein, Esq.
         GIBBS LAW GROUP
         PHONE: 510.350.9728
         EMAIL: EJE@CLASSLAWGROUP.COM
[GN]



PROLOGIS INC: Garfield Securities Suit Removed to M.D. Pa.
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Robert Garfield, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. William P. Hankowsky,
Thomas C. Deloach, Jr., Katherine Dietze, Antonio Fernandez, Daniel
P. Garton, Robert G. Gifford, David L. Lingerfelt, Marguerite
Nader, Lawrence D. Raiman, Fredric J. Tomczyk, Liberty Property
Trust and Prologis, Inc., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-9529 (Comm.
Pleas Pa., December 16, 2019) was removed to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on January
6, 2020, under Case No. 20-cv-00019.

Garfield seeks damages resulting from Defendants' breach of
fiduciary duties arising from the non-disclosure of material
information to solicit shareholders' vote on the acquisition of
Liberty Property Trust by Prologis Inc.[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brandon S. Harter, Esq.
      RUSSELL, KRAFFT & GRUBER, LLP
      930 Red Rose Court, Suite 300
      Lancaster, PA 19701
      Tel: (717) 293-9293
      Fax: (717) 293-5130
      Email: bsh@rkglaw.com

             - and -

      Richard B. Brualdi, Esq.
      THE BRUALDI LAW FIRM, P.C.
      29 Broadway, Suite 2400
      New York, NY 10006
      Telephone: (212) 952-0602
      Facsimile: (212) 952-0608
      rbrualdi@brualdilawfirm.com

Liberty Property Trust is represented by:

      Laura H. McNally, Esq.
      Marc J. Sonnenfeld, Esq.
      Amanda F. Lashner, Esq.
      MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
      1701 Market Street
      Philadelphia, PA 19103
      Telephone: (215) 963-5000
      Facsimile: (215) 963-5001
      Email: Laura.mcnally@morganlewis.com
             Marc.sonnenfeld@morganlewis.com
             Amanda.lashner@morganlewis.com


RAPID DISPLAYS: Ortega Sues Over Biometrics Data Retention
----------------------------------------------------------
Maurilio Ortega, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Rapid Displays, Inc., Defendant, Case No.
2020CH00140 (Ill. Cir., January 6, 2020), seeks statutory damages,
injunctive and other equitable relief, reasonable litigation
expenses and attorneys' fees, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest and such other and further relief under the Biometric
Information Privacy Act.

Rapid designs and produces in-store merchandising products. It uses
a biometric time tracking system that requires employees to use
their fingerprint as a means of authentication, instead of key fobs
or identification cards. Ortega was never informed of the specific
limited purposes or length of time for which Rapid collected,
stored or used his fingerprint. Plaintiff was never informed of any
biometric data retention policy developed by the Defendants, nor
has he ever been informed of whether Peacock will ever permanently
delete his fingerprint, notes the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alejandro Caffarelli, Esq.
      Alexis D. Martin, Esq.
      CAFFARELLI & ASSOCIATES LTD.
      224 N. Michigan Ave., Ste. 300
      Chicago, IL 60604
      Tel. (312) 763-6880
      Email: info@caffarelli.com


RC WILLEY: Williams Sues in California Over Employment Disputes
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against RC Willey Home
Furnishings, et al. The case is captioned as Jerome Williams on
behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. RC Willey Home
Furnishings, a Utah Corporation and Does 1-20, Case No.
34-2019-00272003-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., Dec. 23,
2019).

The suit alleges violation of employment-related laws.

RC Willey is an American home furnishings company with stores in
Utah, Idaho, Nevada and California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kent L. Bradbury, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF KENT BRADBURY
          3200 Douglas Blvd., Suite 300
          Roseville, CA 95661-4238
          Telephone: (916) 960-2080
          E-mail: kb@castleemploymentlaw.com


SACRAMENTO, CA: Court Grants Final Approval of Mays Suit Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORENZO MAYS, RICKY RICHARDSON, JENNIFER BOTHUN,
ARMANI LEE, LEERTESE BEIRGE, and CODY GARLAND, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY
OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02081-TLN-KJN (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Joint Motion for Final
Approval of the Class Action Settlement.

The named Plaintiffs are state prisoners, proceeding through their
counsel.  The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule
302.

On Dec. 9, 2019, the magistrate judge filed findings and
recommendations which were served on all parties and which
contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings
and recommendations were to be filed within 10 days.  On Dec. 19,
2019, the parties filed a joint statement of non-opposition to the
findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, Judge Nunley presumes that any findings of fact are
correct.  The magistrate judge's conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo.  Having reviewed the file under the applicable legal
standards, the Judge finds the Findings and Recommendations to be
supported by the record and by the magistrate judge's analysis.

Accordingly, he adopted in full the Findings and Recommendations
filed Dec.9, 2019.  He granted the Joint Motion for Final Approval
of the Class Action Settlement.  He approved the Consent Decree and
adopted as the Order of the Court.  All parties will comply with
all its terms.

The Defendant will implement the Remedial Plan and accompanying
policies pursuant to the schedule set forth therein.  The Clerk of
the Court will separately file and docket the "Final Class Notice."
The Clerk of the Court will separately file and docket the
"Consent Decree" after striking "proposed" from the title.  The
Clerk of the Court will enter judgment and terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/news41 from Leagle.com.

Sammy Davis Morgan, also known as Sammy Davis Dewitt Morgan,
Movant, pro se.

Lorenzo Mays, Ricky Lee Richardson, Jr., Jennifer Bothun, Armani
Lee & Leertese Beirge, Plaintiffs, represented by Donald Specter,
Prison Law Office, Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria -- jvs@cooley.com
-- Cooley LLP, Addison Mills Litton -- alitton@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Anne Hadreas -- anne.Hadreas@disabilityrightsca.org --
Disability Rights California, Margot Knight Mendelson --
mmendelson@prisonlaw.com -- Prison Law Office, Mark Anthony
Zambarda, Cooley LLP, Sophie Jedeikin Hart -- sophieh@prisonlaw.com
-- Prison Law Office & Aaron Joseph Fischer --
Aaron.Fischer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California.

County of Sacramento, Defendant, represented by Todd Holton Master
-- tmaster@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley LLP & Shawn
M. Ridley -- sridley@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley.


SACRAMENTO, CA: Ct. Awards $2.1MM Attys' Fees in Mays Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORENZO MAYS, RICKY RICHARDSON, JENNIFER BOTHUN,
ARMANI LEE, LEERTESE BEIRGE, and CODY GARLAND, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY
OF SACRAMENTO, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-02081-TLN-KJN (E.D.
Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses.

The named Plaintiffs are state prisoners, proceeding through their
counsel.  The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule
302.

On Dec. 9, 2019, the magistrate judge filed findings and
recommendations which were served on all parties and which
contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings
and recommendations were to be filed within 10 days.  On Dec. 19,
2019, the parties filed a joint statement of non-opposition to the
findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, Judge Nunley presumes that any findings of fact are
correct.  The magistrate judge's conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo.  Having reviewed the file under the applicable legal
standards, the Judge finds the Findings and Recommendations to be
supported by the record and by the magistrate judge's analysis.

Accordingly, he adopted in full the Findings and Recommendations
filed Dec.9, 2019.  The Defendant will pay the Plaintiffs' counsel
$2.1 million for reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs.
The payment will be made in two installments: (1) the first
installment in the amount of $1.05 million by no later than Jan.
31, 2020, and (2) the second installment in the amount of $1.05
million by no later than July 31, 2020.

The Defendant will pay the Plaintiffs' counsel reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses up to $250,000 per year for monitoring
of implementation of the Consent Decree and Remedial Plan.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/48glIc from Leagle.com.

Sammy Davis Morgan, also known as Sammy Davis Dewitt Morgan,
Movant, pro se.

Lorenzo Mays, Ricky Lee Richardson, Jr., Jennifer Bothun, Armani
Lee & Leertese Beirge, Plaintiffs, represented by Donald Specter,
Prison Law Office, Jessica Valenzuela Santamaria -- jvs@cooley.com
-- Cooley LLP, Addison Mills Litton -- alitton@cooley.com -- Cooley
LLP, Anne Hadreas -- anne.Hadreas@disabilityrightsca.org --
Disability Rights California, Margot Knight Mendelson --
mmendelson@prisonlaw.com -- Prison Law Office, Mark Anthony
Zambarda, Cooley LLP, Sophie Jedeikin Hart -- sophieh@prisonlaw.com
-- Prison Law Office & Aaron Joseph Fischer --
Aaron.Fischer@disabilityrightsca.org -- Disability Rights
California.

County of Sacramento, Defendant, represented by Todd Holton Master
-- tmaster@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley LLP & Shawn
M. Ridley -- sridley@hrmrlaw.com -- Howard Rome Martin & Ridley.


SHARKS OF ROOSEVELT: Mitchell Sues Over Cashiers' Unpaid OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jeriesha Mitchell, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. SHARKS OF ROOSEVELT & BROADWAY, INC., and
KHALID HOURANI, Case No. 4:20-cv-00088-LPR (E.D. Ark., Jan. 24,
2020), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act as a result of the Defendant's failure to
pay the Plaintiff and other hourly-paid cashiers a minimum wage for
all hours worked and proper overtime compensation for hours worked
in excess of forty 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff and other cashiers regularly worked in excess of 40
hours per week with the knowledge of and at the direction of the
Defendants. The Plaintiff alleges that it was the Defendants'
commonly applied practice to not pay the cashiers a proper overtime
rate for all of the hours worked over 40 in a given week.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a cashier from November
2019 until January 2020.

Sharks of Roosevelt & Broadway, Inc., is a for-profit corporation
operating as a restaurant in Little Rock under the name Sharks Fish
and Chicken.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Josh Sanford, Esq.
          SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC
          One Financial Center
          650 South Shackleford, Suite 411
          Little Rock, AR 72211
          Phone: (501) 221-0088
          Facsimile: (888) 787-2040
          Email: josh@sanfordlawfirm.com


SHELL OIL: Faces Harmon Suit in Texas Alleging Violation of ERISA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Harmon, Brian Coble, Asur Vallejos, and David Lawrence,
individually and as representatives of a class of participants and
beneficiaries of the Shell Provident Fund 401(k) Plan v. SHELL OIL
COMPANY, CYNTHIA A.P. DEERE, SCOTT G. BALLARD, PAUL GOODFELLOW,
RHOMAN J. HARDY, EILEEN M. PERILLO, CHRISTOPHER B. RICE, SUSAN M.
WARD, GLENN T. WRIGHT, FIDELITY INVESTMENTS INSTITUTIONAL
OPERATIONS COMPANY, INC., FMR LLC, FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC,
FIDELITY PERSONAL AND WORKPLACE ADVISORS LLC, FIDELITY INVESTMENTS
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, FIDELITY PERSONAL TRUST COMPANY FSB, AND
ALL OTHER UNKNOWN PLAN ADMINISTRATORS AND TRUSTEES OF THE SHELL
PROVIDENT FUND FROM 2014 TO THE PRESENT, Case No. 3:20-cv-00021
(S.D. Tex., Jan. 24, 2020), is brought against the Defendants as
Plan fiduciaries arising from their violations of the fiduciary
duties and prohibited transactions rules of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.

The marketplace for retirement plan services is established and
competitive. Multi-billion-dollar-defined contribution plans, like
the Plan, have tremendous bargaining power to obtain high-quality,
low-cost administrative, managed account, and investment management
services. But instead of using the Plan's bargaining power to
benefit participants and beneficiaries, the Shell Defendants
allowed unreasonable expenses to be charged to participants for
administration of the Plan and managed account services, failed to
even monitor numerous funds in the Plan at all, and retained poorly
performing investments that similarly situated fiduciaries removed
from their plans, according to the complaint.

Even worse, the Plaintiffs contend, the Shell Defendants allowed
the Fidelity Defendants to use Plan participants' highly
confidential data, including social security numbers, financial
assets, investment choices, and years of investment history, to
aggressively market lucrative non-Plan retail financial products
and services, which enriched Fidelity Defendants at the expense of
participants' retirement security.

To remedy these breaches of duty, the Plaintiffs, individually and
as representatives of a class of participants and beneficiaries of
the Plan, bring this action on behalf of the Plan to enforce the
Defendants' personal liability under the ERISA to make good to the
Plan all losses resulting from each breach of fiduciary duty and to
restore to the Plan profits made through Shell and Fidelity
Defendants' use of Plan assets.

The Plaintiffs are participants in the Plan.

Shell Oil Company is the Plan's sponsor.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert M. Tramuto, Esq.
          JONES GRANGER
          10000 Memorial Drive, Suite 888
          P.O. Box 4340
          Houston, TX 77210
          Phone: (713) 668-0230
          Facsimile: (713) 956-7139
          Email: btra@jonesgranger.com

               - and -

          Jerome J. Schlichter, Esq.
          Scott T. Apking, Esq.
          SCHLICHTER, BOGARD & DENTON, LLP
          100 South Fourth Street, Suite 1200
          St. Louis, MO 63102
          Phone: (314) 621-6115
          Facsimile: (314) 621-5934
          Email: jschlichter@uselaws.com
                 sapking@uselaws.com


SKINNY LABS: Insley Seeks Reimbursement of Work-Related Expenses
----------------------------------------------------------------
JOHN MARSHALL INSLEY, an individual v. SKINNY LABS INC., dba Spin
Scooters, a California corporation; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, Case No. 19STCV46345 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty.,
Dec. 23, 2019), alleges that Skinny Labs failed to reimburse
necessary expenses and failed to provide meal and rest periods, in
violation of the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff was employed by Skinny Lab from January 21, 2019,
through December 2, 2019, as a technician in its downtown Los
Angeles facility and was tasked with maintaining electric two-wheel
scooters, which were part of Skinny Lab's fleet of "dockless
mobility systems. Skinny Lab use an array of similarly situated
employees to carry out the same or similar functions as the
Plaintiff, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff contends that Skinny Lab failed to reimburse or to
adequately reimburse him and the Aggrieved Employees the costs of
acquisition and use of cellular telephones equipped with voice
and/or data service for work purposes. As a direct consequence of
the Defendant's failure to reimburse them for necessary expenses as
required by law, he and the Aggrieved Employees have suffered
substantial monetary damages, he adds.

Skinny Labs operates as a stationless electric scooter company. The
company offers dockless mobility systems. Spin serves customers in
the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Corbett H. Williams, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CORBETT H. WILLIAMS
          24422 Avenida de la Carlota, Suite 370
          Laguna Hills, CA 92653
          Telephone: 949 679 9909
          Facsimile: 949 535 1031
          E-mail: cwilliams@chwilliamslaw.com


SOUTHFIELD, MI: Court Dismisses Oron 2015 Suit Without Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ORON 2015, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SOUTHFIELD,
Defendant, Case No. 18-12671 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Mark A. Goldsmith
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
Southern Division, granted Plaintiff Oron 2015's motion to
voluntarily dismiss its claims without prejudice pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).

Oron 2015 initiated the present case as a putative class action on
behalf of all owners of real property in Southfield, Michigan.  The
action challenges the constitutionality of the City's adoption of
certain ordinances authorizing City officials to enter any
premises, without a warrant and upon reasonable cause, to perform
an inspection of the property.  The complaint alleges that failure
to permit inspection may result in criminal and civil infractions,
inability to lawfully rent or occupy the subject property, and
liens being placed on the property.  Pursuant to these ordinances,
Oron 2015, a property owner in Southfield, was forced to pay the
City $340 in inspection fees.  

The class action complaint sets forth the following claims against
the City: (1) violation of due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches, and (3) a state law claim
for unjust enrichment and assumpsit.

On June 17, 2019, the Court entered an opinion and order granting
in part and denying in part the City's motion to dismiss and
denying Oron 2015's motion for class certification.  In relevant
part, the Court held that because Oron 2015 did not allege that it
continued to own property in Southfield, it faced no threat of
future injury and, therefore, lacked standing to pursue declaratory
or injunctive relief.  Consequently, Oron 2015's standing is
limited to the recovery of damages for previous injury.  The Court
also denied Oron 2015's motion to certify class on the ground that
the typicality and adequacy elements under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a) were not satisfied, given Oron 2015's lack of
standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief.

Oron 2015 now seeks to voluntarily dismiss the action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) on the ground that the limited
damages recoverable render the continued cost of litigation
impractical.  The City opposes Oron 2015's motion on the ground
that it would suffer prejudice if the case were dismissed.

Judge Goldsmith agrees that litigating the matter further would be
noneconomical, as the cost of litigation would vastly outweigh any
potential recovery.  Consequently, Oron 2015 has supplied adequate
explanation justifying dismissal of the case.  

With respect to procedural history, the Judge finds that the
present case is not at an advanced stage, nor is there any
indication of excessive delay or lack of diligence by Oron 2015.
Absent substantial trial preparation or extensive motion practice,
a defendant usually will not suffer significant harm by the
dismissal of a case at the pretrial stage.  The present action was
initiated on Aug. 27, 2018 and, therefore, was pending only a year
before the Court imposed a stay of the proceedings on Aug. 21,
2019.

Finally, the City contends that it has incurred more than $50,000
in attorney fees and costs -- including expenses related to
document production and to responding to Oron 2015's motion for
class certification.  Should a different plaintiff file a similar
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the City's ordinances,
all materials produced by the City during discovery in the present
action may be reused in the subsequent action.  Fees and costs
attributable to the City's document productions, therefore, are not
recoverable.  But other fees and costs incurred by the City in
defending the present action prior to Oron 2015's filing of its
motion to dismiss may be awarded.  

While the City has not submitted the customary itemization showing
attorney hours and rates, the Judge will grant 21 days in which the
City may submit such documentation in a motion for attorney fees
and costs.  The City may include in that itemization any time spent
in preparing it.  The Plaintiff will have 14 days from the date
such a motion is filed to oppose the reasonableness of the amount
claimed.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Goldsmith granted Oron 2015's
motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.  The action is,
therefore, dismissed, and all pending motions are dismissed as
moot.  However, the City may file a motion for attorney fees and
costs as set forth in the opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 8, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/GAfCss from Leagle.com.

Oron 2015, LLC, Plaintiff, represented by Aaron D. Cox, Law
Offices
of Aaron D. Cox PLLC, 23380 Goddard Rd., Taylor, Michigan 48180
&Mark K. Wasvary -- mark@wasvarylaw.com -- Mark K. Wasvary, P.C.

City of Southfield, Defendant, represented by David D. Burress,
Seward Henderson, PLLC, Kali M.L. Henderson, Seward Peck &
Henderson PLLC, 210 E 3rd St. Suite 212, Royal Oak, MI 48067,
Marcileen C. Pruitt, City of Southfield City Attorney's Office &
T.
Joseph Seward, Seward Peck & Henderson PLLC, 210 E 3rd St. Suite
212, Royal Oak, MI 48067


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Final Approval of Deal in Acevedo Suit Endorsed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANGELA ACEVEDO, on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of
all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES
CO., Defendant, Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00024-MV-LF (D. N.M.),
Magistrate Judge Laura Fashing of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico has recommended that the class settlement in
the case be granted final approval.

In January 2016, the Plaintiff filed the action alleging that
Defendant Southwest Airlines Co.: (1) misclassified her and the
putative class members as exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") and New Mexico Minimum Wage Act ("NMMWA");
(2) failed to pay them minimum wage; and (3) failed to pay them for
all hours they worked—including alleged "off-the-clock" time
spent finding a work station and logging into their computers.  She
sought to bring the lawsuit as a collective action under the FLSA
and as a Rule 23 class action under the NMMWA.  The Plaintiff
sought damages on her behalf and on behalf of the putative class.
Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant are represented by experienced
attorneys who have litigated numerous wage and hour cases,
including class and collective actions.

On May 21, 2019, the parties participated in an all-day mediation
with mediator Courtenay Bass in Dallas, Texas.  They agreed that
Ms. Bass is an experienced mediator in the employment law arena.
The mediation culminated in Ms. Bass making a mediator's proposal
concerning a class-wide settlement of the Plaintiff's NMMWA
overtime claim, which both sides accepted.

In July 2019, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Settlement -- which the Court granted.  Afterwards,
a court-approved notice was sent to each of the hundreds of
putative class members by an agreed-upon third-party administrator.
The Court scheduled the final fairness hearing to review the
settlement after notice was issued to the class members, and to
consider any objection(s) (if applicable).  After the class notice
was issued, no objections were received.  Additionally, 13
individuals timely submitted requests to be excluded, and one
individual submitted a late request.

Having reviewed the terms of the settlement, Magistrate Judge
Fashing opined that (i) the settlement is fair, adequate, and
reasonable; (ii) the requested incentive award is reasonable and in
line with similar awards approved in other cases; (iii) the
requested attorneys' fee award of 33.33% of the gross recovery is
reasonable and in line with similar awards; and (iv) she is
satisfied that confidentiality is both permissible and appropriate
in the case.

For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that: (1) the
parties' Rule 23 class settlement be approved; (2) the incentive
award to the Named Plaintiff be approved; (3) the attorneys' fees
and other costs be approved; and (4) the parties be permitted to
maintain the confidentiality of the settlement agreement under
seal.

A full-text copy of Judge Fashing's Dec. 10, 2019 Findings is
available at https://is.gd/ZXq8bM from Leagle.com.

Angela Acevedo, on Behalf of Herself and on Behalf of all Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel M. Faber --
dan@danielfaber.com -- Law Office of Daniel Faber & Don Foty --
DFoty@kennedyhodges.com -- Kennedy Hodges, LLP, pro hac vice.

Southwest Airlines Company, Defendant, represented by Mia Kern
Lardy -- mia.kern@modrall.com -- Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris &
Sick, Patrick L. Ryan -- pryan@fordharrison.com -- Ford & Harrison,
LLP, Earl E. DeBrine, Jr. -- earl.debrine@modrall.com -- Modrall,
Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, PA & Patricia G. Griffith --
pgriffith@fordharrison.com -- Ford & Harrison, pro hac vice.


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Seventh Cir. Appeal Filed in Saxon FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Latrice Saxon filed an appeal from a court ruling issued
in her lawsuit styled Latrice Saxon v. Southwest Airlines Company,
Case No. 1:19-cv-00403, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks to recover minimum compensation, overtime wages, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.

As of the filing of the lawsuit, Ms. Saxon works for Southwest as a
non-exempt ramp supervisor. She performed work before the start of
her scheduled shift and during meal breaks, but was not paid for
her time worked. She also claims to have worked though her meal
breaks.[BN]

The appellate case is captioned as Latrice Saxon v. Southwest
Airlines Company, Case No. 19-3226, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant LATRICE SAXON, Individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Andrew C. Ficzko, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP
          100 N. Riverside Plaza
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 233-1550
          E-mail: aficzko@stephanzouras.com

Defendant-Appellee SOUTHWEST AIRLINES COMPANY is represented by:

          Melissa A. Siebert, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP
          111 S. Wacker Drive
          Chicago, IL 60606-4418
          Telephone: (312) 704-7700
          E-mail: masiebert@shb.com


TAKEDA PHARMA: RICO Claims Ruling in Painters Fund Suit Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL 82 HEALTH
CARE FUND, third-party healthcare payor fund; ANNIE M. SNYDER, a
California consumer; RICKEY D. ROSE, a Missouri consumer; JOHN
CARDARELLI, a New Jersey consumer; MARLYON K. BUCKNER, a Florida
consumer; SYLVIE BIGORD, a Massachusetts consumer, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY LIMITED, a
Japanese Corporation; TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS U.S.A., FKA Takeda
Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., an Illinois corporation; ELI
LILLY AND COMPANY, an Indiana corporation, Defendants-Appellees,
Case No. 18-55588, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs'
RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of RICO standing, and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

The appeal arises from a putative class action against the
Defendants.  Together, the Defendants developed and marketed a drug
named Actos.  Actos was intended to lower blood sugar in type 2
diabetics.  The Defendants obtained Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval for Actos in 1999.

The Plaintiffs allege that despite learning through multiple
studies over the next several years that Actos increased a
patient's risk of developing bladder cancer, the Defendants refused
to change Actos's warning label or otherwise inform the public of
such risk.  Further, they allege that the Defendants convinced the
FDA that studies revealing that Actos increased the risk of bladder
cancer were wrong.  The Defendants are alleged to have actively
misled prescribing physicians, consumers, and third-party payors
into believing that Actos did not increase a person's risk of
developing bladder cancer.  They did all of this, the Plaintiffs
allege, simply to increase their profits from the sale of Actos.

A group of patients who developed bladder cancer after ingesting
Actos and their family members then brought personal injury and
wrongful death claims against the Defendants in the Western
District of Louisiana -- In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 6:11-MD-2299.  After a 37-day trial in 2014, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, but the parties
later agreed to a global settlement program for all eligible
personal injury claimants who used Actos before Dec. 1, 2011 and
had been diagnosed with bladder cancer.

The present action was also originally filed in the Western
District of Louisiana.  But in late 2017, the parties stipulated to
transfer the case to the Central District of California.  The
Plaintiffs in the case comprise five individual patients from
different states and Painters and Allied Trades District Council 82
Health Care Fund.

Painters Fund is a third-party payor ("TPP") of health and welfare
benefits to covered members and their families.  As a TPP, Painters
Fund reimburses its members' claims for drugs, including Actos,
submitted by pharmacies and healthcare providers covered by its
plan.  The Patients are individuals with type 2 diabetes who were
prescribed Actos by their physicians and who took Actos to help
lower their blood sugar.  Each patient paid an out-of-pocket sum
for Actos.  The Patients each allege that neither they nor their
physicians knew about Actos's risk of bladder cancer when they
began taking the drug and that they immediately stopped taking
Actos once they learned that it increased their risk of developing
bladder cancer.  They also allege that they never would have
purchased Actos had they known that it increased their risk of
developing bladder cancer, and thus, that they never would have
submitted claims for reimbursement forpurchases of Actos to their
respective TPPs.

Only one patient, Annie Snyder from California, alleges that prior
to starting her prescription, she read and relied upon the Actos
label.  But the Plaintiffs generally allege that they relied on the
Defendants' misrepresentations about Actos, by act or omission, in
purchasing the drug, that physicians relied on such
misrepresentations in prescribing Actos for their patients, and
that TPPs relied on such misrepresentations in agreeing to pay for
Actos prescriptions for their members.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of similarly situated
patients and TPPs who paid or incurred costs for the drug Actos,
for purposes other than resale, between 1999, i.e., when the drug
was approved, and the present.  The Plaintiffs argue that the
Defendants conspired to commit mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C.
Sections 1341, 1343 by intentionally misleading physicians,
consumers, and TPPs to believe that Actos did not increase a
person's risk of developing bladder cancer.  They seek to recover
economic damages under RICO for the payments they made to purchase
Actos under the assumption that it was a safe drug, which they
allege they would not have purchased had they known that Actos
increases a person's risk of developing bladder cancer.  The
Plaintiffs do not, however, seek to recover economic or
non-economic damages caused by any person's actual ingestion of
Actos.

The district court dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' RICO
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in a single
paragraph, holding that they failed adequately to allege facts
sufficient to establish that the Defendants' acts and omissions
were the proximate cause of their claimed damages.  The appeal
followed.

As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit holds that any argument
that the Patients have not alleged that they relied on the
Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions lacks merit.  Each
patient alleged that had he known that Actos increased the risk of
causing bladder cancer, he would never have purchased and ingested
the drug.  Additionally, Patients alleged that they relied on the
Defendants' misrepresentations of Actos's safety in purchasing the
drug.  These statements are sufficient to allege that Patients
relied on the Defendants' misrepresentations.

In addition, all that is required of Painters Fund at this stage is
to allege that someone in the chain of causation relied on
Defendants' alleged misrepresentations and omissions, which it has
done.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit holds that the Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged the reliance necessary to satisfy RICO's
proximate cause requirement.

While it expresses no opinion on the Plaintiffs' chances of success
in the litigation as it proceeds, the Ninth Circuit holds that the
Plaintiffs have satisfactorily alleged that the Defendants
proximately caused their claimed damages at the pleadings stage.
The Appellate Court reversed the district court's judgment
dismissing the Plaintiffs' RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack
of RICO standing, and remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with his disposition.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Dec. 3, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/TNcV8f from Leagle.com.

R. Brent Wisner (argued) -- RBWisner@BaumHedlundLaw.com -- and
Michael L. Baum -- MBaum@BaumHedlundLaw.com -- Baum Hedlund Aristei
& Goldman PC, Los Angeles, California; Christopher L. Coffin and
Nicholas R. Rockforte, Pendley Baudin & Coffin LLP, New Orleans,
Louisiana; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jonathan S. Franklin (argued) --
jonathan.franklin@nortonrosefulbright.com -- Norton Rose Fulbright
US LLP, Washington, D.C.; Darryl W. Anderson and Geraldine W.
Young, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP, Houston, Texas; for
Defendants-Appellees Takeda Pharmaceuticals Company Limited and
Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A.

Randall L. Christian (argued) --
randy.christian@bowmanandbrooke.com -- and Susan E. Burnett --
susan.burnett@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman and Brooke LLP, Austin,
Texas, for Defendant-Appellee Eli Lilly and Co.


TEAM DRIVE-AWAY: Haynie Labor Suit Removed to N.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------
The case titled Howard Haynie, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. TEAM DRIVE-AWAY, INC., a Kansas
Corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Case No. 19-CGC-581868, was
removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of San Francisco to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on Jan. 24, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-00573 to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint asserts eight causes of
action: (1) Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods, (2) Failure
to Provide Required Rest Periods, (3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage,
(4) Failure to Pay All Wages Due to Discharged or Quitting
Employees, (5) Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage
Statements, (6) Failure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary
Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties, (7) Unlawful
Deduction from Wages, and (8) Unfair and Unlawful Business
Practices.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Timothy M. Fisher, Esq.
          SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C.
          2 North Lake Avenue, Suite 560
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Phone: (626) 795-4700
          Fax: (626) 795-4790
          Email: tfisher@scopelitis.com


TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE: MSP Recovery Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MSP RECOVERY CLAIMS, SERIES LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, and Series 16-08-483, a designated series of MSP
Recovery Claims, Series LLC, Plaintiffs, v. TECHNOLOGY INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation; AMTRUST FINANCIAL SERVICES,
INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18 Civ. 8036
(AT) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Analisa Torres of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1395y, otherwise known as the Medicare Secondary Payer Act
("MSPA"), to recover conditional Medicare payments against
Defendants Technology Insurance Co., Inc. ("TIC"), Amtrust
Financial Services, Inc. ("AMFSI"), and Amtrust North America,
Inc.

The Plaintiffs have designed and developed a software system ("MSP
System"), that allows them to capture, compile, synthesize, and
funnel large amounts of data to identify claims class-wide.  The
MSP System captures data from different sources to identify the
class member enrollees' medical expenses incurred as a result of an
accident and which should have been reimbursed for by the
Defendants after they entered into a settlement.  The Plaintiffs
then merge the Defendants' data with the information available on
the MSP System to discover and identify a Medicare eligible person
for whom reimbursement of secondary medical payments should have
been made, along with any information stored as to the potential
class members.  The MSP System utilizes medical diagnosis and
procedure codes to identify and obtain any information regarding an
enrollee's claim, such as the type of injury suffered, the
circumstances that caused the injury, whether the listed primary
insurance provider made payment, and whether the insurance carrier
was a liability provider.

The complaint sets forth 16 representative claims that demonstrate
the Plaintiffs' right to recover for the Defendants' failure to
meet its reimbursement obligations under the MSPA.  The Plaintiffs
describe the Defendants' failure to reimburse conditional payments
with respect to a number of individuals enrolled in a Medicare
Advantage plan issued and administered by MAO Health Insurance Plan
of Greater New York ("HIP"), and how that failure caused an injury
in fact to an MAO, which subsequently assigned its recovery rights
to the Plaintiffs.

The Defendants move to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  They contend
that although the Plaintiffs allege that they received an
assignment from HIP, the complaint does not adequately allege facts
sufficient to show that the claims asserted in the complaint fall
within the scope of that assignment.

Judge Torres agrees.  HIP's assignment does not assign all of their
Medicare recovery claims to the Plaintiffs.  Rather, the Plaintiffs
received rights only to claims that (1) were rendered and paid for
by HIP during the six-year period beginning Sept. 29, 2011 and
ending Sept. 29, 2017, and (2) were not assigned to and/or are
being pursued by other recovery vendors.

The Complaint does not specify the date on which HIP paid for any
charges.  Without this information, the Judge cannot assess whether
any of the representative claims actually fall within the scope of
the assignment, and therefore, whether the Plaintiffs have standing
to sue.  As a result, the Plaintiffs' claim is merely "conjectural
or hypothetical" and not "concrete and particularized.  Moreover, a
review of the complaint suggests that standing is likely lacking,
with respect to at least some of the representative claims.

The complaint also fails to allege that the representative claims
were never assigned to or are being pursued by other recovery
vendors.  The Judge agrees with the Defendants that this flaw is
fatal to the Plaintiffs' standing argument.  The assignment
provision explicitly excludes from assignment claims that have been
assigned to and/or are being pursued by other recovery vendors.  In
order to establish that each representative claim was assigned to
the Plaintiffs, they must allege that, as of Sept. 29, 2017, the
representative claim had not previously been assigned to another
recovery vendor or was not already being pursued by another
recovery vendor.  Because the Plaintiffs have failed to do so, they
cannot demonstrate that they have standing.

Finally, because the Judge dismisses the claim for lack of
standing, dismissal must be without prejudice.  Without
jurisdiction, the Court lacks the power to adjudicate the merits of
the case.  Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice.

For the reasons stated, Judge Torres granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Clerk of
Court is directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 46 and close
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/iH0R3P from Leagle.com.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company & Series 16-08-483, a designated series of MSP Recovery
Claims, Series LLC, Plaintiffs, represented by James L. Ferraro,
The Ferraro Law Firm & Janpaul Portal, The Ferraro Law Firm.

Technology Insurance Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation &
AmTrust Financial Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants, represented by Benjamin Robert Nagin --
BNAGIN@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, Christopher M. Assise --
CASSISE@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin, LLP & Theodore R. Scarborough,
Jr. -- TSCARBOROUGH@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood.

Amtrust North America Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant,
represented by Theodore R. Scarborough, Jr., Sidley, Austin, Brown
& Wood.


TEXAS ROADHOUSE: Managers File Class Action Over Unpaid OT Work
---------------------------------------------------------------
Madeleine O'Neill, writing for Go Erie, reports that the Texas
Roadhouse location in Summit Township is at the center of what
could become a federal class-action lawsuit over claims the chain
failed to pay overtime to assistant managers.

The lead plaintiff in the case, filed in U.S. District Court in
Erie, is Brittanee Tupitza, who worked as a service manager at the
Erie County eatery from June 2016 until May 2017, according to the
complaint.

The complaint claims that Tupitza regularly worked more than 40
hours per week, often working between 50 and 70 hours per week, but
did not receive overtime pay.

The restaurant chain applied the same policy to all assistant
managers at its restaurants across the country, the lawsuit
alleges.

"Texas Roadhouse required plaintiff and other assistant managers to
work more than 40 hours per workweek without paying them any
overtime compensation," the complaint says.

The complaint accuses Texas Roadhouse of misclassifying assistant
managers as exempt from the overtime requirements in the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Pennsylvania wage laws, and asks a judge to order
the company to pay the unpaid overtime.

The suit also asks a judge to approve two classes for the purpose
of a class-action lawsuit: one made up of individuals who have
worked as assistant managers at Texas Roadhouse locations
nationwide, and another focused solely on locations in
Pennsylvania.

Texas Roadhouse has 24 corporate-owned locations in Pennsylvania
and 464 locations nationwide, according to the complaint.

"Defendant's unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and
consistent," Tupitza's lawyer, Gary Lynch, of Pittsburgh, wrote in
the complaint. "There are many similarly situated current and
former assistant managers who have been underpaid in violation of
the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised
notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it."

The suit claims that assistant managers like Tupitza were required
to perform tasks that were similar to those performed by hourly
employees who received overtime, such as cooking, cleaning and
serving customers.

The assistant managers had no control over hiring, firing or
discipline, according to the complaint. Their job duties "were not
directly related to defendant's management or general business
operations," Lynch wrote.

Lynch did not return a phone call requesting comment. A spokesman
for Texas Roadhouse also did not return a call requesting a
response to the lawsuit. The chain will have the chance to respond
in court. [GN]

TLC DENTAL-HOLLYWOOD: Hill Sues Over Illegal SMS Ad Blasts
----------------------------------------------------------
Adriana Hill, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. TLC Dental-Hollywood, LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 20-cv-60029 (S.D. Fla., January 6, 2020), seeks injunctive
relief, statutory damages and any other available legal or
equitable remedies resulting from violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

TLC Dental-Hollywood is a dental practice that offers routine and
cosmetic dental procedures to consumers. It attempted to contact
Hill via SMS on her cellular telephone in an attempt to solicit
their products and/or services using an automatic telephone dialing
system. Hill did not give his express consent to be contact in this
manner. [BN]

American Directions is represented by:

      Thomas J. Patti, Esq
      Jibrael S. Hindi, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF JIBRAEL S. HINDI, PLLC
      110 SE 6th Street
      Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
      Telephone: (954) 907-1136
      Facsimile: (855) 529-9540
      Email: jibrael@jibraellaw.com
             tom@jibraellaw.com


UNILEVER: Pre-Trial Proceedings in 8 Deodorant Suits Consolidated
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAN CREPPS, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CONOPCO, INC., d/b/a "UNILEVER,"
DOES 1 through 10, Defendant, Case No. 4:19CV2554 RLW (E.D. Mo.),
Judge Ronnie L. White of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, Eastern Division, (i) denied as moot the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; and (ii) granted their Motion to
Transfer and Coordinate Pre-Trial Proceedings.

Plaintiff Crepps, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, filed the putative class action against the
Defendants.  He alleges the Defendants' "UltraClear Black + White"
line of antiperspirant products causes the "yellow stains" and
"white marks" on clothing that it purports to prevent.  

The Second Amended Class Action Complaint asserts the following
counts relating to the nationwide class: breach of warranty (Count
I); breach of implied contract (Count II); and unjust enrichment
(Count III).  Additionally, Plaintiff asserts Defendant violated
the Missouri Merchandizing Practices Act (MMPA) (Count IV) and
seeks injunctive relief on behalf of the Missouri subclass (Count
V).

In addition to the case, seven other putative class actions have
been filed in the district by Plaintiffs Crepps, Jamie Richards,
and Carla Been: (i) Crepps v. Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02723-AGF
(E.D. Mo.) (Crepps III); (ii) Richards v. Conopco, Inc., No.
4:19-cv-02556-HEA (E.D. Mo.) (Richards I); (iii) Richards v.
Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02558-SRC (E.D. Mo.) (Richards II); (iv)
Richards v. Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02726-AGF (E.D. Mo.)
(Richards III); (v) Richards v. Conopco, Inc., No.
4:19-cv-02728-SRC (E.D. Mo.) (Richards IV); (vi) Been v. Conopco,
Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02703-SRC (E.D. Mo.) (Been I); and (vii) Been v.
Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02704-RLW (E.D. Mo.) (Been II).

The Defendants filed the instant Motion to Transfer and Coordinate
Pre-Trial Proceedings, arguing all eight cases are substantially
similar and appropriate for coordination of pre-trial proceedings
pursuant to Local Rule 4.031 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(a).  They note that the Plaintiff's counsel consents to the
requested coordination of pre-trial proceedings.  Furthermore, the
deadline by which to file any formal objection has since passed.

Judge White finds that the eight cases have a common party as the
separate putative class actions assert claims against the same
Defendant: Unilever.  Additionally, three individuals are the named
Plaintiffs in the each of the eight cases: Crepps is the named
Plaintiff in two cases, Richards is the named Plaintiff in four
cases, and Been is the named Plaintiff in two cases.  Judge White
also finds that all eight cases present common issues of fact and
law.  While each case relates to a specific antiperspirant product,
all eight cases make similar factual allegations and assert the
same causes of actions on behalf of a nationwide class and Missouri
subclass.

Based on these factors, Judge White finds that coordination of
pre-trial proceedings in these eight cases is appropriate and
judicial economy is best served by coordinating pre-trial
proceedings before a single judge.  The cases will clearly involve
similar questions of law related to Defendants' products and
business practices.  Further, any such differences between the
specific antiperspirant products at issue can be litigated and
adjudicated in the discovery process.  Lastly, and significantly,
no party will be unfairly inconvenienced or prejudiced as all cases
are at the same stage in litigation and all the Plaintiffs are
represented by the same counsel who consents to pre-trial
coordination.

Accordingly, Judge White granted the Defendants' Motion to Transfer
and Coordinate Pre-Trial Proceedings.  The Clerk of Court will
reassign the following cases to the undersigned for pre-trial
purposes only: (i) Crepps v. Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02723-AGF
(E.D. Mo.) (Crepps III); (ii) Richards v. Conopco, Inc., No.
4:19-cv-02556-HEA (E.D. Mo.) (Richards I); (iii) Richards v.
Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02558-SRC (E.D. Mo.) (Richards II); (iv)
Richards v. Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02726-AGF (E.D. Mo.)
(Richards III); (v) Richards v. Conopco, Inc., No.
4:19-cv-02728-SRC (E.D. Mo.) (Richards IV); and (vi) Been v.
Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02703-SRC (E.D. Mo.) (Been I).

Because Been v. Conopco, Inc., No. 4:19-cv-02704-RLW (E.D. Mo.)
("Been II") is assigned to the Court, it does not need to be
reassigned.  Nonetheless, it will be included in the pre-trial
consolidation.  

The Judge denied as moot the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and
granted the Joint Motion for Extension of Time and Entry of
Briefing Schedule.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://is.gd/r5qpyg from Leagle.com.

Dan Crepps, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel F. Harvath --
dharvath@harvathlawgroup.com -- HARVATH LAW GROUP, LLC.

Conopco, Inc., doing business as Unilever, Defendant, represented
by James Muehlberger -- jmuehlberger@shb.com -- SHOOK AND HARDY,
LLP.


WAWA INC: Faces Emery Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania Over Data Breach
----------------------------------------------------------------
KELLY EMERY, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated
v. WAWA, INC. and WILD GOOSE HOLDING CO., INC., Case No.
2:19-cv-06077-CDJ (E.D. Pa., Dec. 23, 2019), seeks monetary
damages, restitution and declaratory relief pursuant to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act arising from a data breach announced to the
public on December 19, 2019.

The Plaintiff alleges that Wawa failed to secure and safeguard
personal information and payment card or other financial
information that Wawa collected and maintained. She further alleges
that Wawa failed to provide timely and adequate notice to her and
other Class members with details regarding what Private Information
had been stolen.

On November 13, 2019, the Plaintiff purchased gas at a WaWa in
Feasterville, Pennsylvania, using a debit card issued to her by her
credit union. The Plaintiff returned to this WaWa location two
weeks later, on November 27, 2019, to purchase gas. She used the
same debit card to complete this purchase.  WaWa confirmed that the
location the Plaintiff visited was potentially affected by the WaWa
Data Breach.

Wawa is an American chain of convenience stores and gas stations
located along the East Coast of the United States, operating in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Washington,
D.C., and Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          Jaminsen A. Etzel, Esq.
          Kevin W. Tucker, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburg, PA 15220
          Telephone: (412) 322-9243
          E-mail: glynch@carlsonlynch.com
                  jetzel@carlsonlynch.com
                  ktucker@carlsonlynch.com


WAWA INC: Faces Mullen Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania Over Data Breach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alexis Mullen, Laura Angelo, and Jeffrey Baumann, on Behalf of
themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. WAWA, INC., Case
No. 2:19-cv-06076-JHS (E.D. Pa., Dec. 23, 2019), seeks monetary
damages, restitution and declaratory relief pursuant to the Fair
Credit Reporting Act arising from a data breach announced to the
public on December 19, 2019.

The Plaintiffs allege that Wawa failed to secure and safeguard
personal information and payment card or other financial
information that Wawa collected and maintained. They further allege
that Wawa failed to provide timely and adequate notice to them and
other Class members with details regarding what Private Information
had been stolen.

The Plaintiffs have been customers of Wawa and whose Financial
Information were compromised in the Data Breach

Wawa is an American chain of convenience stores and gas stations
located along the East Coast of the United States, operating in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Washington,
D.C., and Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          Bart D. Cohen, Esq.
          James Perelman, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9102
          E-mail: Inussbaum@nussbaumpc.com
                  bcohen@nussbaumpc.com
                  jperelman@nussbaumpc.com

               - and -

          Michael E. Criden, Esq.
          Lindsey C. Grossman, Esq.
          CRIDEN & LOVE, P.A.
          7301 SW 57th Court, Ste. 515
          South Miami, FL 33143
          Telephone: (305) 357-9000
          E-mail: mcriden@cridenlove.com
                  lgrossman@cridenlove.com


WEISER SECURITY: Holcomb Suit Remanded to LA Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMAL F. HOLCOMB, Plaintiff, v. WEISER SECURITY
SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-02108-ODW
(ASx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright II of the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California (i) granted Holcomb's
Motion to Remand, and (ii) denied Holcomb's Motion for
Reimbursement of Fees.

On Feb. 7, 2019, Holcomb filed the putative class action in Los
Angeles Superior Court against his employer Weiser.  He brings the
class action against Weiser on behalf of himself and the class he
seeks to represent.  The putative class consists of all current and
former persons employed by Weiser in California as non-exempt
employees at any time during the period beginning four years prior
to the filing of this Complaint.

Holcomb is a citizen of California.  Weiser is incorporated and has
its principal place of business in Louisiana.

Holcomb alleges ten causes of action against Weiser: (1) Failure to
Pay Minimum Wage; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; (3) Failure to
Provide Meal Periods; (4) Failure to Provide Rest Periods; (5)
Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements; (6) Failure to Pay All
Wages Due to Discharged and Quitting Employees; (7) Failure to
Maintain Required Records; (8) Failure to Indemnify Employees for
Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties; (9) Unfair
and Unlawful Business Practices ("UCL"); and (10) Civil Penalties
Under PAGA. Holcomb does not allege a specific damages amount.

Weiser removed the action to the Central California District Court
on March 21, 2019, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA).  On July 11, 2019, Holcomb moved to remand arguing that
Weiser's removal relies on speculative violation rates to calculate
the amount in controversy.  Holcomb contends that, as a result,
Weiser has not established that the amount in controversy is met
and, thus, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  Weiser
opposes the Motion and argues that the amount in controversy is
satisfied because Weiser calculated the alleged violation rates
based on reasonable assumptions derived from the Complaint.

Weiser asserts that removal is proper because there are more than
100 putative class members, minimal diversity is satisfied, and the
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.  Holcomb does not dispute
that the class is over 100 members or that the parties are
minimally diverse, but argues Weiser has not established the amount
in controversy.

Weiser contends that the face of the Complaint clearly demonstrates
that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, and over
$6,461,288.13 when including attorney's fees, reimbursement, and
maintenance of records claims.  It reaches this calculation by
adding together Weiser's estimates for Holcomb's claims: (1)
minimum wage, (2) overtime compensation, (3) meal periods, (4) rest
periods, (5) accurate wage statements, (6) final wages due, (7) and
attorney fees.  Holcomb argues that Weiser has not provided
sufficient evidence in support of the amount in controversy and
relies on fabricated violation rates in its amount in controversy
calculation.

As for amount in controversy, Judge Wright finds that (i) Weiser
fails to support its estimated meal and rest break violation rates;
(ii) the calculations for wage statement violations are
unreasonable for amount in controversy purposes as well; and (iii)
Weiser has not satisfied its burden to establish that the amount in
controversy is greater than $5 million because it fails to support
its asserted violation rates for meal breaks, rest breaks, wage
statements, and overtime.

Although Weiser fails to show that the Court has jurisdiction over
the class action, Judge Wright finds that Weiser did not lack an
objectively reasonable basis for removing the action and opposing
Holcomb's Motion, particularly in light of courts' treatment in the
Ninth Circuit of the Defendants' estimation of labor code violation
rates.  Therefore, Judge Wright denies Holcomb's request for fees.

For the reasons stated, Judge Wright granted Holcomb's Motion and
remanded the case to the Superior Court of California for the
County of Los Angeles, Case No. 19STCV03843 located at 111 North
Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012.  The Judge denied
Holcomb's requests for fees and costs incurred from removal.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Order is
available at https://is.gd/pfU0pR from Leagle.com.

Jamal F Holcomb, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Caspar S. Jivalagian --
caspar@kjtlawgroup.com -- KJT Law Group LLP, Christopher A. Adams
-- CA@AdamsEmploymentCounsel.com -- Adams Employment Counsel,
Jonathan M. Lebe -- info@lebelaw.com -- Lebe Law APLC & Vache A.
Thomassian -- vache@kjtlawgroup.com -- KJT Law Group LLP.

Weiser Security Services, Inc, a corporation, Defendant,
represented by Bradley E. Schwan -- bschwan@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson PC & Jannine E. Kranz -- jkranz@littler.com -- Littler
Mendelson PC.


WHITE GLOVE: Arbitration Bid Denial in Arboleda Labor Suit Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JORGE ARBOLEDA, ETC., ET AL., Respondents, v. WHITE
GLOVE ENTERPRISE CORP., ET AL., Defendants, SLEEPY'S, LLC, ET AL.,
Appellants, 2018-11250, Index No. 711980/17 (N.Y. App. Div.), the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second
Department, affirmed the order of Judge Leonard Livote of the
Supreme Court, Queens County, entered July 31, 2018, denying the
motion of the Defendants Sleepy's and Mattress Firm, Inc., to
compel arbitration of the Plaintiffs' claims and stay all
proceedings in the action pending arbitration pursuant to CPLR
7503.

In 2017, the Plaintiffs commenced the putative class action, inter
alia, to recover damages for underpayment of minimum wage and
overtime in violation of Labor Law article 6, arising out of their
employment as delivery drivers and/or delivery helpers.  Defendants
Sleepy's and Mattress moved pursuant to CPLR 7503 to compel
arbitration of the Plaintiffs' claims and stay all proceedings in
the action pending arbitration.  The Defendants relied upon certain
"Independent Owner Agreements" they entered into with the
Defendants White Glove, Enalet Enterprise Corp., and ALE Enterprise
Corp., which provided that any claim, dispute or controversy
relating to or arising out of the Agreement will be subject to
arbitration.  Judge Livote denied the motion, and the appeal
ensued.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held that
contrary to the Defendants' contention, the Plaintiffs should not
be compelled to arbitrate based upon the agreements.  The record
does not establish that the Plaintiffs were even aware of the
existence of the agreements or that they knowingly exploited the
benefits of the agreements.  Accordingly, Appellate Division agreed
with Judge Livote's determination denying the Defendants' motion
pursuant to CPLR 7503 to compel arbitration of the Plaintiffs'
claims and stay all proceedings in the action pending arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 8, 2020 Decision & Order is
available at https://is.gd/A2eIe0 from Leagle.com.

Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, NY (Theo E. M. Gould --
tgould@littler.com -- and Kelly C. Spina -- kspina@littler.com --
of counsel), for appellants.

WILMINGTON TRUST: Court Certifies Class in Choate ERISA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LYLE J. GUIDRY and RODNEY CHOATE, on behalf of the
MRMC ESOP and a class of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A., as successor to Wilmington
Trust Retirement and Institutional Services Company, Defendant,
Civil Action No. 17-250-RGA (D. Del.), Judge Richard G. Andrews of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

Choate alleges that Defendant Wilmington Trust breached its
fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") by causing an employee pension plan to overpay for
company stock.  

The Martin Resource Management Corp. ("MRMC") is a privately-held
company that transports petroleum products and other bulk liquids.
In January 2012, MRMC created an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP") -- a retirement benefit for employees made up primarily of
stock in the employer company.  MMRC appointed Wilmington Trust as
the trustee of the ESOP.  Under ERISA, an ESOP trustee may not pay
more than "adequate consideration" for the employer's stock.

The Plaintiff is challenging two ESOP transactions.  In the first
transaction, on Oct. 2, 2012, the Plan purchased 3,066.5 shares of
MRMC preferred stock and 738 shares of MRMC common stock for $233
million.  After a stock split and conversion of preferred stock
into common stock, the transaction became 95,112.5 shares of common
stock.  In the second transaction, on Dec. 23, 2013, the Plan
bought an additional 89,049.5 shares of MMRC common stock for
$142.5 million.  According to the Plaintiff, the shares from both
transactions are only worth about $79 million now.  Wilmington
Trust is responsible for both transactions in its capacity as
trustee of the ESOP.

Guidry sued Wilmington Trust over the transactions in March 2017,
and Choate sued the next month.  The cases were consolidated in May
2017.  Guidry died on Aug. 26, 2018, leaving Choate to pursue the
action.

Choate was employed as a boat captain for an MRMC subsidiary from
November 2006 until about April 2013.  He became a participant in
the ESOP when it started in 2012.  Because he left the company
before his retirement account fully vested, Choate forfeited about
80% of his potential benefits.

Currently before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.  The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all
persons who were participants in the Plan and the beneficiaries of
such participants.  The Defendant challenges certification on only
three grounds: (1) ascertainability; (2) numerosity; and (3)
adequacy of the representation.  It argues the proposed definition
is too ambiguous to meet the "ascertainability" requirement.

Judge Andrews finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b), and Rule 23(b)(2).
Therefore, the Judge granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 10, 2019 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/86ukdV from Leagle.com.

Lyle J. Guidry, on behalf of the MRMC ESOP, and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by David
A. Felice -- dfelice@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey & Glasser LLP,
Gregory Y. Porter -- gporter@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey Glasser,
pro hac vice, Patrick Muench -- pmuench@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey
& Glasser, L.L.P., pro hac vice & Ryan T. Jenny --
rjenny@baileyglasser.com -- Bailey Glasser, pro hac vice.

Rodney Choate, on behalf of the MRMC ESOP and a class of all other
persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel M.
Feinberg -- dan@feinbergjackson.com -- Feinberg Jackson Worthman &
Waso, pro hac vice, Todd F. Jackson -- todd@feinbergjackson.com --
Feinberg Jackson Worthman & Waso, pro hac vice & David A. Felice,
Bailey & Glasser LLP.

Wilmington Trust, N.A., as successor to Wilmington Trust Retirement
and Institutional Services Company, Defendant, represented by
Albert H. Manwaring, IV -- amanwaring@morrisjames.com -- Morris
James LLP, Andrew Salek-Raham -- asalek@groom.com -- Groom Law
Group, pro hac vice, Lars C. Golumbic -- lgolumbic@groom.com --
Groom Law Group, pro hac vice, Michael J. Prame -- mprame@groom.com
-- Groom Law Group, pro hac vice & Ross P. McSweeney --
rmcsweeney@groom.com -- Groom Law Group, pro hac vice.


WINNER FORD: Arbitration Bid Denial in Trout Suit Affirmed
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES TROUT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WINNER FORD,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. A-3732-18T1 (N.J. Super. App. Div.),
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the
March 29, 2019 order denying a motion to compel arbitration of
claims raised in Trout's complaint.

In December 2015, the Plaintiff traded in his used car to the
Defendant.  The vehicle had an outstanding loan, which had to be
satisfied at the trade-in.  The Plaintiff executed two agreements,
namely, a trade-in agreement and a separate lease agreement for his
new vehicle.  The trade-in agreement has not been provided to the
Appellate Court as a part of the record.

The Plaintiff paid a $75 fee, which was added to the loan payoff
and not the future purchase or lease.  He claimed the fee was never
disclosed or itemized and that defendant offered various
explanations for its purpose, namely, to satisfy the per diem
interest on the outstanding loan; to allow time to receive credit
approval, process the vehicle transaction, and make the payoff; to
cover title transfer costs, the cost of a bank check for the payoff
amount, and the time and gas mileage of clerical staff to secure
the bank draft; and the cost of express mail delivery of the
pay-off amount to the bank.  The Plaintiff claimed he never
received an explanation for the fee and only learned about it after
the trade-in.

The Plaintiff filed a Law Division complaint on behalf of himself
and a purported class asserting four counts for violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act, one count of common law fraud, and one count
for violation of the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and
Notice Act.

The first motion judge granted the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration based on a provision contained in the lease agreement
between the parties.  The Appellate Court reversed the order
because the lease agreement's arbitration provision was vague and
unenforceable.  Following this decision, the Defendant filed a
second motion to compel arbitration based on a provision contained
in a motor vehicle retail order ("MVRO").

A different motion judge denied the Defendant's motion with
prejudice, finding the arbitration provisions under the lease
agreement and the MVRO contained "separate and distinct arbitration
agreements," and under Rockel v. Cherry Hill Dodge, conflicted with
one another and were therefore unenforceable.  The judge also found
that the Defendant waived its right to pursue arbitration under the
MVRO because it did not rely upon the document when filing its
first motion even though both the lease and the MVRO were executed
at the same time.

Although the Defendant did not raise the MVRO arbitration provision
until after we reversed the first motion judge, it claims it did
not waive its right to enforce the MVRO arbitration provision
because it consistently sought to compel arbitration.  It contends
waiver does not apply because proceeding to arbitration does not
prejudice the Plaintiff.  The Defendant argues Rockel is
distinguishable because the MVRO and lease agreement's respective
arbitration provisions are not in conflict.  It also argues the
Plaintiff is not an "innocent" and "unaware" consumer as was the
case in Rockel because he was a dealership employee, who drafted
his own contracts.  The Defendant asserts public policy requires
enforcement of the MVRO arbitration provision and its class action
waiver.  It claims, as a stand-alone document, the terms of the
MVRO are "undeniably enforceable" and could be raised separately
from the lease arbitration provision.

The Appellate Court holds that the Defendant's initial motion to
compel arbitration did not mention the MVRO's provision.  The
Defendant waited over a year to assert the MVRO arbitration
provision.  Therefore, the Appellate Court's reversal of the
initial order compelling arbitration was dispositive of the
Defendant's ability to later raise arbitration under the MVRO.  The
Defendant's failure to proffer all relevant documentation, despite
its awareness of the MVRO arbitration provision from the onset, is
the sort of piece meal litigation strategy prohibited under Cole.

Furthermore, an arbitration agreement is a contract, and is
subject, in general, to the legal rules governing the construction
of contracts. Therefore, the completion of factual discovery had
little import on the motion judge's ability to adjudicate the
dispute over the arbitration contract provision.

Additionally, the Appellate Court opines that the Defendant's
after-the-fact assertion of arbitration under the MVRO clearly
prejudiced the Plaintiff.  The Plaintiff has endured multiple
rounds of motion and appellate litigation for nearly two years,
which have only decided the proper forum for adjudication of his
claims.  The Cole factors preponderate in favor of the Plaintiff.
For these reasons, the Appellate Court declines to disturb the
motion judge's findings on the waiver.

The Appellate Court also agrees with the motion judge the
conflicting arbitration provisions in the lease agreement and the
MVRO rendered each unenforceable under Rockel.  Arbitration
agreements are interpreted under the objective, "average consumer"
standard.  Therefore, the Plaintiff's employment was irrelevant to
the issue of arbitration, especially considering the Defendant's
counsel did not respond to the judge's finding or explain how the
Plaintiff's employment status overcame the ambiguity of the
arbitration provisions and required arbitration.  

The remainder of the Defendant's arguments are without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.

For these reasons, the Appellate Court affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Dec. 3, 2019 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/04uXTA from Leagle.com.

John Scott Fetten argued the cause for appellant (Montgomery
Fetten, attorneys; John Scott Fetten, of counsel and on the briefs;
Courtney Ann Reed Keren, on the briefs).

Leo Bernard Dubler, III, argued the cause for respondent (Law
Offices of Leo B. Dubler, III, attorneys; Leo B. Dubler, III, and
Mark R. Natale, on the brief).


[^] CLASS ACTION Money & Ethics Conference on May 4
---------------------------------------------------
Beard Group, Inc. is hosting the 4th Annual Class Action Money &
Ethics Conference in NYC on Monday, May 4th.

Sponsorship opportunities are currently available.

Showcase your firm's expertise on a panel in front of 150+ class
action attorneys, general counsel, litigation financiers,
consultants, claims administrators, reporters and academics.  

For sponsorship options and details, contact Colin Post at
colin@beardgroup.com

Visit the conference website: http://bit.ly/2RlIHvo

Past conference attendees have included professionals from these
firms and universities:

A.B. Data, Ltd.
Aaron M. Levine & Associates
Adams and Reese LLP
Akin Gump
Angeion Group
Baker Botts LLP
Ballard Spahr LLP
Battea Class Action Services
Bentham IMF
Berger Montague
Berkeley Research Group
Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP
Blank Rome LLP
Bloomberg BNA
Brian S. King PC
Broadridge Financial Solutions
BroadRiver Asset Management, L.P.
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC
Burford Capital LLC
Castro & Co
Citi
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC
Columbia Law School
Complex Settlements, P.C.
Constantine Cannon LLP
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP
Delaware Law Weekly
Dentons
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Dundon Advisers LLC
Edelson PC
EJF Capital LLC
Epiq
Fagenson & Puglisi
Fordham Law School
FTI Consulting
Garden City Group
Garretson Resolution Group
George Washington University
Greenberg Traurig LLP
Groia & Company
Hagens Berman
Hausfeld LLP
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
Hochberg ADR
Huntington Bank
Ice Miller LLP
John D Webb PA
Johnson Fistel
JTB Law Group
Justice Catalyst
K&H Integrity Communications
Kazerouni Law Group, APC
Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP
King & Spalding
Kinsella Media
Kirkland & Ellis
KPMG
Kurtzman Carson Consultants
Labaton Sucharow LLP
Lavie Law Offices
Law Offices Of Zorik Mooradian
Leeds Brown
Levi & Korsinsky LLP
Levy Konigsberg LLP
Lewis & Clark Law School
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP
Liquid Claims
Locke Lord LLP
Lowey Dannenberg, P.C.
Marron Lawyers, APC
Maurice Blackburn
McGuireWoods LLP
Michigan Attorney General's Office
Mighty
MLex Market Insight
Murphy, Falcon & Murphy
New York Law Journal
New York University
Norton Rose Fulbright LLP
Olumide Babalola LP
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
Pace University
Pacer Monitor
Paul Weiss
Perini Capital
Pomerantz LLP
Postlethwaite & Netterville
Proskauer Rose LLP
PwC
Reisman Karron Greene
RG/2 Claims Administration
Richman Law Group
Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila
Ríos Ferrer, Guillen-Llarena, Treviño y Rivera, S.C.
Robins Kaplan LLP
Rose Law Firm
Rutgers University
Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP
Seeger Weiss LLP
Sheridan Ross P.C.
Simpluris
Sipree, Inc.
Skadden Arps
Sommers Schwartz, P.C.
Stanley Law Group
Susan J. Levy, Esq.
The Law Offices of Kenneth R. Feinberg, P.C.
Therium Inc.
Thompson Reuters
TriState Capital Bank
UBS
United States District Court-Eastern District of Pennsylvania
United States District Court-Southern District of New York
University of Connecticut
Valli Kane & Vagnini, LLP
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
Western Alliance Bank
Winston & Strawn LLP
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
Workman Law Firm, PC
Yeshiva University
Zwerling Schachter & Zwerling, LLP

                        Asbestos Litigation


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***