/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200204.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, February 4, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 25

                            Headlines

ADTALEM GLOBAL: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Rangel Suit Endorsed
AKORN INC: March 5 Status Hearing Set in Joshi Living Trust Suit
ALL WEB LEADS: Abbaszadeh Files TCPA Suit in N.D. California
ALLIED REVENUE: Reid Files FDCPA Suit in Michigan
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Steinmetz Files FDCPA Suit in New York

ALTISOURCE RESIDENTIAL: Martin Suit Deal Got Initial Approval
AMERICAN HONDA: Court Grants Prelim OK to Settlement in Fath Suit
B&L DELIVERY: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Harris Says
BA SPORTS: Falsely Markets BodyArmor SuperDrinks, Silver Alleges
BAOZUN INC.: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Class Action

BARBEQUE INTEGRATED: Elliott Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective
BAUMGART RESTAURANT: Ding's Bid to Certify FLSA Collective Denied
BDK GROUP LLC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in New York
BHANG CORP: Hit With Proposed Class Action Over False THC & CBD
BNSF RAILWAY: Face Armitage Suit in Tex. Over Medication Protocol

BRG SPORTS: Ct. Overturns Nakamura Suit Dismissal, Remands Case
BRG SPORTS: Dismissal of Case v. Helmet makers Affirmed
CENTRA TECH: Default Judgment Entered in Rensel Securities Suit
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Kyle Suit Seeks to Stop Illegal Calls
CHARTER FOODS: Gallagher Seeks Overtime Pay for Asst. Managers

CHICAGO, IL: May File Reply on Bid to Strike Ali's Cert. Motion
CHRYSALIS CENTER: Fails to Give Meal & Rest Periods, Gaitan Says
COMPASS GROUP: Kessler Sues Over Unlawful Use of Biometric Data
COOK COUNTY, IL: Bennett's Renewed Bid to Certify Class Denied
COOK COUNTY, IL: Wins Bid for Determination of Merits in Alicea

CRISP MARKETING: Rechul Sues Over Automated Telemarketing Calls
ELITE DINERS: Faces Mojaddidi Employment Suit in California
ENDOCA LLC: Olsen Files ADA Class Action
FEDEX FREIGHT: Faces Sabine Suit Over Claims Under FLSA and FMLA
FIRST STUDENT: Court Gives Prelim. OK to Settlement in Humes Suit

FLEX-N-GATE: Haywood Seeks to Stop Illegal Use of Biometric Data
FORESCOUT TECHNOLOGIES: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action
FRASER FINANCIAL: Loyhayem Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls
GEICO CASUALTY: District Court Denies Dismissal of Davis Suit
HOME DEPOT: Campanotto Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California

HOWARD COUNTY: Teachers Union Pushes Class Action Grievance
HUDAPACK METAL: Kelly Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA and WWPCL
K&J CONSTRUCTION: Faces Bustillo Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
KANSAS CITY LIFE: Sheldon Insurance Suit Removed to W.D. Missouri
KIEWIT CORP: 9th Cir. Flipped Remand of Avila Suit to State Court

KOZENY & MCCUBBIN: Sevela's Bid for Judgment Denied; Case Tossed
LADENBURG THALMANN: Rosenberg Challenges Advisor Group Merger
LOS ANGELES CA,: App. Ct. Flips Ruling in L.A. Sheriffs' Case
LYONS MAGNUS: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Aceves Says
MANAGEMENT & TRAINING: $3.5MM Deal in Lopez Suit Gets Prelim. OK

MENASHA: Oliver Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Biometric Data
MERCK SHARP: Ct. Vacates Arbitration Bid Denial in Antitrust Suit
MONARCH RECOVERY: Brown Files FDCPA Suit in New York
NOYAH TRANSPORTATION: Fails to Pay Proper OT Wages, Iglesias Says
ONE PLANET: Faces Schley Suit in California Over TCPA Violation

ONTARIO, CA: Landlords Threatening Class Action Absent Reforms
OTTO BREMER TRUST: Faces Hansen Employment Suit in Minnesota
PERMANENT WORKERS: 5th Cir. Sets Attorney’s Fees in Portillo at
$1K
PLAINS ALL: Grey Fox's Bid to Certify Class Under Submission
PLEXOS GROUP: Wagner Moves for Conditional Class Certification

PNC FINANCIAL: Collects Improper Overdraft Fees, Komorski Alleges
PORTOLA PHARMACEUTICALS: Rosen Law Files Class Action
POTOMAC FAMILY: Class Claims in Williams Suit Dismissed
PRAIRIE FARMS: Jackson Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
PROFESSIONAL AUTO: Sales Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.

PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS: Lowenbien Files FDCPA Suit in New York
PRUDENTIAL OVERALL: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Garcia Says
R.T.R. FINANCIAL: Lowenbien Files FDCPA Class Action
REALTYSHARES INC: Shapiro Haber Files Class Action
REMAX INC: Sloatman Sues Over Unsolicited Calls Violating TCPA

RMLS HOP: Court Dismisses Romulus From Slaughter FLSA Suit
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: DeFrank Suit Moved to NJ District Court
SHALIMAR SWEETS: Faces Quiroz Suit Alleging Violations of FLSA
SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKETS: Misrepresents Soymilk Drinks, Twohig Says
SOLID WOOD: Fails to Pay Contractually Owed Wages, Weisel Claims

STARBUCKS CORP: Court Denies Troester's Class Certification Bid
SYKES BOURDON: Fulp Files FDCPA Suit in Virginia
SYSCO CORPORATION: $800K Frieri Suit Deal Gets Initial Court Nod
TANDY LEATHER: Faces Haghebaert Securities Suit in California
TARGET CORP: $8.2MM Walter Suit Settlement Gets Initial Court OK

TEAM PIZZA: Bradford Moves to Certify Class of Delivery Drivers
TEXAS PRIDE: Scheve Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
TIVITY HEALTH: Class of Stockholders Certified in Weiner Suit
TIVITY HEALTH: Scoma Chiropractic Sues Over Unsolicited Fax Ads
UKW HOLDING: Columbo May File Amended Complaint by Feb. 5

UNITED BUSINESS: Fabricant Sues Over Privacy Invasion Under TCPA
US LAND PROFESSIONALS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Caron Claims
VERISHOP INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
WELLS FARGO: Hernandez's Bid to Certify Class Granted in Part
WELLS FARGO: Narayan's Bid for Class Certification Stricken

WIRELESS PLUS: Topete Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
WREG LLC: Hanna Seeks Minimum Wages for Interpreters Under FLSA
XALER: Court Denies Derval's Motion for TCPA Class Certification
ZENDESK INC: Faces Ho Securities Suit Over Stock Price Drop

                            *********

ADTALEM GLOBAL: Denial of Bid to Dismiss Rangel Suit Endorsed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MR. LUIS RANGEL, SETH ADOMAKO, CHRISTINA CABELLO,
ELISABETH NGUYEN, JOSE SANCHEZ, CHRISTAL TURNER, MELISSA WILSON,
MARTIN OLOYEDE, NATHALIE YEKA, TRISTEN WILSON, TERRELL WHITE, DAVID
W. JESSOP, DENAIRIUS ROBINSONII, EMRAN ALHYASAT, TERESA ANAYA,
TIFFANY BROWN, MED CULLINS, KEVIN D. EARLS, TYHESSIA ELLIS, CRYSTAL
HAYDEN, RHONDA JAMES, EMMANUEL MAKARI, CHRISTOPHER MARTIN,
CATHERINE McCARTY, ROSHAWN SAMPSON, VICTOR SEKGANTSO, MARK DAVIS,
CANDACE D. SMITH, LATASHA SOLOMON, ALAN TA, GEORGE VAN-LARE, SAUL
VEGA, ROSALINDA A VELA ESCOBAR, JUSTIN WIGGINS, PATRICK ACHEAMPONG,
JOANNA AGUILERA, SHAWN J. AUSTIN, KINNEY BARCUCH, YOUNGHEE
BERMINGHAM, NINA BURNS, CHRISTIAN BURROW, MIKE DEAN, FRANKIE
EARLYJR., SHARONDA FORD, JAYSON FOX, COURTNEY FRAZIER, JENNIFER
GAILLEY, RYAN GRIZZLE, JEREMY HENGY, LISA HOWARD, NATHANIEL JONES,
DERRICK KEITH, PROSPER KISWAGA, NORMA MARTINEZ-CANTU, KASANDRA
McGHEE, GODFREY MOMANYI, MICHELLE ORR, LAWRENCE OWONIKOKO, ANDRES
SALAZAR, KIMBERLY SEARCY, LACHANNA SNEED, SCOTT SULLIVAN, JULIO
VALENCIA, MIRANDA VAN COLEN, EDWARD WATTS, WAYNE CARL WILLIAMS,
SEAN WILLIAMS, GLADYS BERISTAIN, WILLIE GARRET, RICHARD SHAW,
TREVOR REED, HEATHER MICHELLE EMMONS, Plaintiffs, v. ADTALEM GLOBAL
EDUCATION, INC., FORMERLY KNOWN AS DEVRY EDUCATION GROUP, INC.; AND
DEVRY UNIVERSITY, INC., Defendants, Case No. SA-18-CV-00082-JKP
(W.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge Elizabeth S. Chestney of the District
Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division,
recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Class Action Complaint be denied.

The case was originally filed by over 70 Texas graduates of DeVry
University who allege that Defendants Adtalem and DeVry
misrepresented the benefits of graduating from DeVry by advertising
false employment and income rates of graduates with the purpose of
inducing potential students to purchase educational products and
services.  Adtalem is the parent company of DeVry, its subsidiary.


The Plaintiffs' Original Complaint asserts claims of fraud and
negligent misrepresentation and violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") and seeks restitution for the unjust
enrichment of the Defendants.  The Defendants moved to dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and the Plaintiffs responded
with an Amended Complaint.  The Court denied the Defendants' motion
to dismiss as moot but without prejudice to filing a new motion
with respect to the Plaintiffs' amended pleading, and the
Defendants filed a second motion asking the Court for dismissal.

While the motion was pending, the District Court consolidated
another cause of action into the case, Lindberg v. Adtalem Global
Education, Inc., et al., 5:18-CV-649-DAE, and ordered the Lindberg
Defendants to refile their motion to dismiss.  After consolidation,
a group of additional Plaintiffs moved for and were granted the
right to intervene in the action and filed their Complaint in
Intervention.  There are now over 100 Plaintiffs in the action.
The Defendants thereafter stipulated that their pending motions to
dismiss applied to the Intervenors' Complaint as well.

The Defendants' earlier motion to dismiss argued that the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint did not meet the particularity
requirements of Rule 9(b) governing allegations of fraud and failed
to sufficiently allege the misconduct of Adtalem, among other bases
for dismissal.  The District Court agreed with the Defendants.  It,
however, gave the Plaintiffs another opportunity to plead their
causes of action and ordered them to file an amended pleading
addressing the identified deficiencies within 45 days of its
Order.

Plaintiffs timely filed their Second Amended Complaint, which is
now the live pleading before the Court. Plaintiffs' 181-page The
Second Amended Complaint adds over 100 pages of additional factual
allegations but does not add any new causes of action.  In response
to the new Complaint, the Defendants filed the motion to dismiss.
After the Defendants filed their motion, the case was reassigned to
the docket of the Hon. Jason K. Pulliam, who referred the motion to
Magistrate Judge Chestney for a report and recommendation.

The Magistrate Judge holds that the District Court should deny the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  The Defendants' motion argues that
the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint still fails to satisfy the
heightened pleading standard governing fraud claims; fails to
allege viable theories of causation and damages; fails to allege
consumer status under the DTPA; fails to allege a plausible claim
for unjust enrichment; and fails to allege sufficient allegations
against Adtalem.  None of these contentions has merit in light of
the additional factual allegations contained in the Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint.

First, the Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' factual
allegations, taken as true, state plausible claims that the
Defendants made material misrepresentations regarding DeVry's
post-graduation employment and income rates with the intent that
prospective students and current students would rely on the given
statistics, purchase their educational services, and continue with
their studies through graduation.  The Second Amended Complaint
also sufficiently identifies which advertisements Plaintiffs
encountered and in which medium.  And, the fact that the
representations at issue may have differed slightly in form or
terminology is not fatal to the Plaintiffs' claims.

Second, the Plaintiffs have also adequately pleaded falsity.
Viewing the allegations in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
as a whole, the Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim that
Defendants made false representations in their marketing of their
educational products.  The Plaintiffs do not base the claims of
falsity on mere conjecture or conclusory allegations.  Rather, they
have cited to numerous complaints and investigations brought by
governmental entities at the state and federal level, as well as a
Senate Report on For Profit Higher Education, which also implicated
Defendants.  And, again, the Pension Trust Fund complaint directly
quotes some of the DOE documents, which give rise to an inference
of falsity.  It is not the Plaintiffs' burden at this stage of the
proceedings to prove their fraud claims.  They must merely allege
facts, which taken as true, make relief plausible.  They have done
so. The Plaintiffs have made the most diligent pre-complaint
inquiry within their power and have stated enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal additional
evidence of falsity.  The Court should deny the Defendants' motion
to dismiss on this ground, the Magistrate Judge recommends.

Third, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint sufficiently
alleges causation and damages.  The Magistrate Judge finds that the
issues related to causation and damages are best resolved at
summary judgment or trial.  These are not pleading issues; they are
evidentiary ones.  The Plaintiffs' damages, as alleged, are
measurable and non-speculative.

Fourth, the Magistrate Judge finds that Defendants have not proved
that the Plaintiffs are not consumers under the DTPA as a matter of
law.  The Judge is not persuaded that either of the opinions
addressed the question -- on whether the Texas Supreme Court would
recognize a course of instruction or training (rather than a seat
at an examination) -- to be a service under the DTPA.  At least one
Texas appellate court has held that former students of a defunct
law school had presented some evidence of consumer status within
the meaning of the DTPA in a lawsuit against a father of a late
lawschool manager who received tuition payments at his place of
business.  At issue in that case was whether the students were in
contractual privity with the father in order to be consumers, not
whether educational services were services under the DTPA.
Nonetheless, the court held that the students "clearly" were
consumers because their status under the DTPA was defined by their
relationship to the goods or services, here their law school
education, not their opponent.  The Defendants have not established
as a matter of law that Plaintiffs are not consumers under the
DTPA.

Fifth, the Plaintiffs may plead a theory of unjust enrichment.  The
Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiffs have not asserted a
claim of breach of contract in the case based on their enrollment
agreements or any other contract, and it is not clear from their
pleadings whether a contract in fact governs the dispute and would
provide the basis for their recovery.  Moreover, even where a
breach of contract claim is expressly pleaded, courts permit a
party to advance alternative theories of recovery at the pleading
stage of litigation.  The Defendants have not established that they
are entitled to dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claim or theory of
unjust enrichment.

Finally, the Magistrate Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint contains sufficient allegations against Adtalem.
The Second Amended Complaint, contains extensive allegations
against Adtalem, including allegations regarding how it controlled
and benefited from DeVry's advertising practice.

Having considered the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint in light
of the arguments made in the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss,
Magistrate Judge Chestney recommended that the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Class Action Complaint be
denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/9wBdgR from
Leagle.com.

Mr. Luis Rangel, Seth Adomako, Christina Cabello, Elisabeth Nguyen,
Jose Sanchez, Christal Turner, Melissa Wilson, Martin Oloyede,
Nathalie Yeka, Tristen Wilson, Terrell White, David W. Jessop,
Denairius Robinson, II, Emran Alhyasat, Teresa Anaya, Tiffany
Brown, Med Cullins, Kevin D. Earls, Tyhessia Ellis, Crystal Hayden,
Rhonda James, Emmanuel Makari, Christopher Martin, Catherine
McCarty, Roshawn Sampson, Victor Sekgantso, Mark Davis, Candace D.
Smith, Latasha Solomon, Alan Ta, George Van-Lare, Saul Vega,
Rosalinda A Vela Escobar, Justin Wiggins, Patrick Acheampong,
Joanna Aguilera, Shawn J. Austin, Kinney Barcuch, Younghee
Bermingham, Nina Burns, Christian Burrow, Mike Dean, Frankie Early,
Jr., Sharonda Ford, Jayson Fox, Courtney Frazier, Jennifer Gailley,
Ryan Grizzle, Jeremy Hengy, Lisa Howard, Nathaniel Jones, Derrick
Keith, Prosper Kiswaga, Norma Martinez-Cantu, Kasandra McGhee,
Godfrey Momanyi, Michelle Orr, Lawrence Owonikoko, Andres Salazar,
Kimberly Searcy, Lachanna Sneed, Scott Sullivan, Julio Valencia,
Miranda Van Colen, Edward Watts, Wayne Carl Williams, Sean
Williams, Gladys Beristain, Willie Garret, Richard Shaw, Trevor
Reed & Heather Michelle Emmons, Plaintiffs, represented by Jose
Luis Munoz , The Carlson Law Firm, P.C. & John R. Fabry , The
Carlson Law Firm, P.C.

Troy Lindberg, Ruben Espinoza, Luis A. Lozano, Claudia Acosta,
Barrie Bergans, Dwayne Bolden, David Corvin, Bobby Garza, David
Gabriel Hardin, Jose Jovel, Kevin Sr. Lewis, Shariq Mohammad, Tarig
Owens, Omer Qureshi, Diego Sanchez DeJarmy, Joshua Thompson, Brad
Booth, Yumeka Gibson, Kevin Guest, Brandon Jordan, Jeffery
LaFayette, Khang Nguyen, Teneka Latasha Tillis, April Wilson,
Arkeiska Jefferson, Corey Kincaid, Lee Nicholson, Stephanie Yell,
Tamar Rockmore, Whitney Burton & Michelle Donahue, Consol
Plaintiffs, represented by Jose Luis Munoz , The Carlson Law Firm,
P.C. & John R. Fabry , The Carlson Law Firm, P.C.

Adtalem Global Education, Inc., formerly known as Devry Education
Group, Inc., Defendant, represented by Patricia B. Palacios --
ppalacios@steptoe.com -- Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice,
Terance A. Gonsalves -- terance.gonsalves@alston.com -- Alston &
Bird LLP, William R. Andrichik -- wandrichik@steptoe.com -- Steptoe
& Johnson LLP & Stephen K. Lecholop, II -- slecholop@rpsalaw.com --
Rosenthal Paurestein Sandoloski Agather LLP.

DeVry University, Inc., Defendant, represented by Patricia B.
Palacios , Steptoe & Johnson LLP, pro hac vice, Terance A.
Gonsalves , Alston & Bird LLP & William R. Andrichik , Steptoe &
Johnson LLP.

Billy Morris, Brianda Aguilar, Michelle Garrett, Mitchell Garrett,
Kendric Murray, Eddie Silas, Tuwandra Harris, Linda Hair, Corey
Carroll, Joshua Palczynsky, Marquita Holloman-Herod & Rebecca
Miller, Intervenor Plaintiffs, represented by Jose Luis Munoz , The
Carlson Law Firm, P.C. & John R. Fabry , The Carlson Law Firm,
P.C.

Ebony Ijeh, Counter Plaintiff, represented by Jose Luis Munoz , The
Carlson Law Firm, P.C. & John R. Fabry , The Carlson Law Firm,
P.C..


AKORN INC: March 5 Status Hearing Set in Joshi Living Trust Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Steven C. Seeger has set a status hearing for March 5,
2020, at 9:00 a.m., in the lawsuit titled Joshi Living Trust, et
al. v. Akorn, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:18−cv−01713 (N.D.
Ill.).

According to the Court's Notification of Docket Entry, a status
hearing was held on January 28, 2020.  Counsel reported on the
status of the related cases assigned to Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly,
which may impact the proposed settlement in this case.

The Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement remains
pending in the meantime.  The Court has not yet reset a final
approval hearing.  The Court and counsel discussed that the Lead
Plaintiffs will voluntarily withdraw their Motion for Class
Certification without prejudice in light of the pending Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The Plaintiffs also will file a motion to extend the claims filing
deadline, which the Court will take under advisement as discussed
at the hearing.[CC]


ALL WEB LEADS: Abbaszadeh Files TCPA Suit in N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against All Web Leads, Inc.
The case is styled as Michelle Abbaszadeh, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. All Web
Leads, Inc. a Texas corporation, Defendant, Case No. 5:20-cv-00684
(N.D. Cal., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.

All Web Leads, Inc. provides web marketing firm services. The
Company generates insurance leads and connects insurance agents,
brokers, and carriers with consumers looking for automobile,
health, life, home, and senior health insurance products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William Litvak, Esq.
          Dapeer Rosenblit et al LLP
          11500 W Olympic Blvd, Suite 550
          Los Angeles, CA 90064-1524
          Phone: (310) 477-5575
          Fax: (310) 477-7090
          Email: wlitvak@drllaw.com


ALLIED REVENUE: Reid Files FDCPA Suit in Michigan
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Allied Revenue
Services, LLC. The case is styled as Jerome Reid, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Allied Revenue
Services, LLC, doing business as: Allied Business Services,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00081-JTN-PJG (W.D. Mich., Jan. 30,
2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Allied Revenue Services, LLC is one of the largest licensed
collection agencies in Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Lewis Greenwald, Esq.
          Greenwald Davidson Radbil PLLC
          7601 N. Federal Highway, Suite A-230
          Boca Raton, FL 33487
          Phone: (561) 826-5477
          Email: mgreenwald@gdrlawfirm.com



ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Steinmetz Files FDCPA Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Alltran Financial LP.
The case is styled as Yaakov Steinmetz, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Alltran Financial
LP, LVNV Funding LLC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-00541 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Alltran Financial, LP specializes in revenue cycle, accounts
receivable, and contact center solutions within healthcare,
financial services, higher education, and government industries in
the Unites States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic st
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (347) 668-9326
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


ALTISOURCE RESIDENTIAL: Martin Suit Deal Got Initial Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Virgin
Islands, Division of St. Croix issued an Order granting Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case captioned ERIC
MARTIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ALTISOURCE RESIDENTIAL CORPORATION, WILLIAM
C. ERBERY, ASHISH PANDEY, KENNETH D. NAJOUR, ROBIN N. LOWE, and
RACHEL M. RIDLEY, Defendants, Civ. No. 15-24. (D.V.I.).

The Court has reviewed the Stipulation and preliminarily approves
the Settlement set forth therein as fair, reasonable, and adequate
to the Settlement Class, subject to further consideration at the
Settlement Hearing described below.

Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court preliminarily certifies, for the purposes of
the Settlement only, the Settlement Class of: all persons and
entities that purchased or otherwise acquired shares of the
publicly traded common stock of RESI between December 24, 2012 and
December 22, 2014, inclusive (Class Period) and were allegedly
damaged by those purchases or acquisitions and any corrective
disclosures.

Excluded from the Settlement Class are: (i) Defendants  (ii) the
officers and directors of RESI (iii) members of their immediate
families  and (iv) their legal representatives, heirs, successors,
or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a
controlling interest. Also excluded from the Settlement Class are
any Person(s) that timely and validly seek exclusion from the
Settlement Class in accordance with the requirements set forth
below and in the Notice.

The Court finds and preliminarily concludes that the prerequisites
of class action certification under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures have been satisfied for the
Settlement Class defined herein and for the purposes of the
Settlement only, in that:

(a) the Settlement Class Members are so numerous that joinder of
all Settlement Class Members is impracticable.
(b) there are questions of law and fact common to the Settlement
Class Members.
(c) the claims Plaintiffs make are typical of the Settlement
Class's claims.
(d) Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel have fairly and adequately
represented and protected the interests of the Settlement Class.
(e) the questions of law and fact common to Settlement Class
Members predominate over any individual questions and
(f) a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, considering
that the claims of Settlement Class Members in the Action are
substantially similar and would, if tried, involve substantially
identical proofs and may therefore be efficiently litigated and
resolved on an aggregate basis as a class action, the amounts of
the claims of many of the Settlement Class Members are too small to
justify the expense of individual actions; and it does not appear
that there is significant interest among Settlement Class Members
in individually controlling the litigation of their claims.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
for the purposes of the Settlement only, Lead Plaintiff Lei Shi and
Plaintiff Ashley Saunders are preliminarily certified as class
representatives for the Settlement Class. The law firm of Levi &
Korsinsky, LLP is preliminarily appointed as class counsel for the
Settlement Class.

The Court approves the form, substance, and requirements of the
Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, and Motion
for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Notice) and the Proof of Claim
and Release form (Proof of Claim), respectively.

The Court approves the form of the Summary Notice of Pendency of
Class Action, Proposed Settlement, and Motion for Attorneys' Fees
and Expenses (Summary Notice), and directs that Lead Counsel shall
cause the Summary Notice to be published in Investor's Business
Daily and be transmitted over PR Newswire within fourteen (14)
calendar days of the Notice Date. Lead Counsel shall, at or before
the Settlement Hearing, file with the Court proof of publication of
the Summary Notice.

The Court stays all proceedings in the Action other than
proceedings necessary to carry out or enforce the terms and
conditions of the Stipulation. Pending final determination of
whether the Settlement should be approved, the Court bars and
enjoins Plaintiffs, all other Settlement Class Members, and anyone
who acts or purports to act on their behalf, from instituting,
commencing or prosecuting any action which asserts Released Claims
against Defendants' Releases.

A final hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was scheduled to be held before the Court at the
Clarkson S. Fisher Building & U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom 4W, 408
East State Street, Trenton, NJ 08608, on January 30, 2020, at 10:00
A.M.  to determine whether the proposed Settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and should be finally approved by the
Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yyrx38ht from Leagle.com

Eric Martin, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin A. Rames -
kevin.rames@rameslaw.com - Law Office of Kevin A. Rames, P.C.

Altisource Residential Corporation, Ashish Pandey, Kenneth D.
Najour, Robin N Lowe & Rachel M. Ridley, Defendants, represented by
Richard H. Hunter , Hunter, Cole & Bennett, 1138 King Street Ste. 3
Christiansted, VI 00820

William C. Erbey, Defendant, represented by Chad C. Messier ,
Dudley Topper & Feuerzeig,
P.O. Box 756, St. Thomas, St. Thomas, 804  Virgin Islands, .John L.
Hardiman - hardimanj@sullcrom.com - Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Julia
A. Malkina - malkinaj@sullcrom.com - Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Lisa
Michelle Komives , Dudley Topper & Feuerzeig Dudley Topper &
Feuerzeig, P.O. Box 756, St. Thomas, St. Thomas, 804  Virgin
Islands & Richard H. Hunter , Hunter, Cole & Bennett.

AMERICAN HONDA: Court Grants Prelim OK to Settlement in Fath Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TROY FATH, HIGINIO BAUTISTA, AND CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON,
Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., Defendant, Case No.
18-CV-1549 (NEB/LIB) (D. Minn.), Judge Nancy E. Brasel of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota granted preliminary
approval to the proposed class action settlement.

In November 2018, the Court ordered the consolidation of two
putative class actions alleging a latent fuel dilution defect in
the engines of certain Honda vehicles.  It also appointed the
interim class counsel.

The parties have since negotiated a proposed class action
settlement.  On Aug. 15, 2019, the Named Plaintiffs filed their
first amended consolidated class action complaint and moved for
preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement that, among other
things, provides for the release of claims relating to or arising
out of the alleged latent oil dilution defect.

According to the First Amended Complaint (FAC), Honda failed to
disclose to the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class
that the Class Vehicles are predisposed to an engine defect that
causes dilution of engine oil.  Once the defect manifests, the
internal engine components that rely on lubrication experience
rapid wear.  Honda has long been aware of the latent defect but has
been unable to adequately repair the Class Vehicles when the defect
manifests.  It has not issued a recall, offered suitable repairs,
or offered to reimburse customers for out-of-pocket repair
expenses.  The Named Plaintiffs and members of their putative class
would not have purchased any of the Class Vehicles had they known
about the defect and have incurred costs paying for related
repairs.  The FAC asserts causes of action under certain state
consumer protection statutes and various common law theories.

The Settlement Agreement provides that Honda agrees to put certain
measures in place in exchange for the Named Plaintiffs' promise to
seek dismissal of the case.  Among other things, Honda agrees to:
(1) extend the existing Powertrain Limited Warranty an additional
year; (2) reimburse certain towing expenses incurred before the
date by which Honda completes serving notice on the putative
settlement class members; (3) reimburse certain oil change costs
incurred before the Notice Date; (4) reimburse up to $250 of
certain diagnostic costs incurred before the Notice Date; (5)
provide a Product Update to Class Vehicles registered in certain
cold-weather states so that they receive software updates that will
reduce the likelihood that the defect manifests.

Upon review of files, files, records, and proceedings on the
matter, Judge Brasel granted the Motion for Preliminary Approval of
the Class Action Settlement.  

Judge Brasel preliminarily certified, for settlement purposes only,
the following Settlement Class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:  All current and former owners or lessees
of MY 2017-18 Honda CR-Vs with the 1.5 liter turbocharged engine or
MY 2016-18 Honda Civics equipped with the 1.5 liter turbocharged
engine, who reside in, and who purchased or leased their vehicles
(other than for purposes of resale or distribution) in the United
States, Puerto Rico, and all United States territories.

The Settlement Class also includes all United States military
personnel who purchased a Settlement Class Vehicle during military
duty.  

For settlement purposes only, Troy Fath, Higinio Bautista, and
Christopher Hamilton are appointed as Settlement Class
Representatives and their counsel, Matthew D. Schelkopf of Sauder
Schelkopf as Lead Counsel; Matthew Mendelsohn of Mazie Slater Katz
& Freeman, LLC as  Chair of the Executive Committee; Nicholas
Migliaccio and Jason Rathod of Migliaccio & Rathod LLP to the
Executive Committee; and Daniel Hedlund of Gustafson Gluek PLLC as
Liaison Counsel.

The Judge preliminarily approved the settlement and Settlement
Agreement as sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate to warrant
dissemination of Notice of the proposed settlement to the
Settlement Class, the posting of the Notice on the Website, and the
scheduling of a formal Final Approval Hearing.

Solely for the purpose of implementing this Settlement Agreement
and effectuating the settlement, the Parties stipulate that Honda
will be appointed as Settlement Administrator.  The Settlement
Administrator will administer the settlement in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement and the notice plan, and the Order, and Honda
will bear all costs and expenses related to the administration of
the settlement.

The Court approved the form of the Notice, without material
alteration from Exhibit B annexed to the Settlement Agreement, and
the procedure for disseminating Notice to the proposed Settlement
Class as set forth in the notice plan described in the Settlement
Agreement.  Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and Rule 23(e), the Court
ordered that the Settlement Administrator mail the Notice to the
persons on the Class List, and that such mailing be completed no
later than March 13, 2020.  The Notice will be accompanied by a
Claim Form that does not materially differ from the form annexed as
Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement.

The Defendants will be permitted to now obtain from R.L. Polk & Co.
(now known as IHS Markit), or a similar entity, the most currently
available names and addresses of all current and former owners and
lessees of Settlement Class Vehicles in order to begin developing
the Class List so as to provide prompt Notice to the Class Members
after Preliminary Approval of the Settlement.

Each Settlement Class Member who has not submitted a timely request
for exclusion from the Settlement Class and who wishes to object to
the fairness, reasonableness or adequacy of the Settlement
Agreement or the proposed settlement or to the Class Counsel Fees
and Expenses Award to file any objection, postmarked no later than
45 days after the Notice Date.

In addition, any Settlement Class Member objecting to the
settlement will provide a list of all other objections submitted by
the objector and/or by the objector's counsel, to any class action
settlements submitted in any state or federal court in the United
States in the previous five years.  If the Settlement Class Member
or his, her or its counsel has not objected to any other class
action settlement in the previous five years, he, she or it will
affirmatively so state in the objection.

The Settlement Class Members may exclude themselves from the
settlement (i.e., "Opt-Out"), relinquishing their rights to any
benefits under the Settlement Agreement.  A Settlement Class Member
wishing to exclude himself, herself or itself must send the
Settlement Administrator a letter postmarked no later than 45 days
after the Notice Date.

The Class Counsel may apply to the Court for the Class Counsel Fees
and Expenses Award at the same time that it files its motion in
support of the Final Approval Order and Judgment.  The Class
Counsel agree not to seek from the Court or to accept a Class
Counsel Fees and Expenses Award in excess of $850,000, and Honda
agrees not to contest an award of that sum.  The Class Counsel may
also petition the Court for incentive awards of up to $3,000 per
Named Plaintiff.

The Final Approval Hearing will be held before the Court on July
31, 2020, at 10:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/wMuusq from Leagle.com.

Troy Fath, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated
& Higinio Bautista, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Catherine Sung-Yun K. Smith --
csmith@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Daniel E.
Gustafson -- dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek PLLC,
Daniel C. Hedlund -- dhedlund@gustafsongluek.com -- Gustafson Gluek
PLLC, Jason S. Rathod, Migliaccio and Rathod LLP, pro hac vice,
Joshua J. Rissman, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Kaitlyn Leeann Dennis,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Matthew R. Mendelsohn, Mazie Slater Katz &
Freeman, LLC, pro hac vice, Matthew D. Schelkopf, Sauder Schelkopf,
LLC, pro hac vice & Nicholas Migliaccio, Migliaccio & Rathod LLP,
pro hac vice.

Christopher Hamilton, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel C. Hedlund,
Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Jason S. Rathod, Migliaccio and Rathod LLP,
pro hac vice, Kaitlyn Leeann Dennis, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Matthew
D. Schelkopf, Sauder Schelkopf, LLC & Nicholas Migliaccio,
Migliaccio & Rathod LLP, pro hac vice.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Defendant, represented by Eric S.
Mattson -- EMATTSON@SIDLEY.COM -- Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice,
Isaac W. Messmore -- ike.messmore@bowmanandbrooke.com -- Bowman &
Brooke LLP, Mengjie Zou, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice, Michael
Andolina, Sidley Austin LLP, pro hac vice & Michael L. Mallow,
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L. L. P., pro hac vice.


B&L DELIVERY: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Harris Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tyler Harris and Pablo Mata, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated v. B&L DELIVERY LLC, and BOB MAYNARD, Case No.
5:20-cv-00029-KKC (E.D. Ky., Jan. 28, 2020), is brought against the
Defendants to redress violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the Kentucky Wages and Hours Act, including failure to pay
overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs allege that they were forced or otherwise required
to work "off the clock" during work weeks without receiving
compensation for all time they spent working. For instance,
pursuant to a common plan and practice, the Defendants manipulated
the Plaintiffs' time cards to reflect meal breaks that were not or
could not be taken, depriving them of wages for time spent working.
The Defendants also failed to compensate the Plaintiffs for all
overtime hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any work week, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Defendants.

B&L Delivery operates a carrier and logistics business.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew T. Lockaby, Esq.
          Tamara J. Patterson, Esq.
          LOCKBABY PLLC
          1795 Alysheba Way, Suite 4207
          Lexington, KY 40509
          Phone: 859.263.7884
          Fax: 844.270.3044
          Email: mlockaby@lockabylaw.com
                 tpatterson@lockabylaw.com


BA SPORTS: Falsely Markets BodyArmor SuperDrinks, Silver Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
Marc Silver, Heather Peffer, Donovan Marshall, and Alexander Hill,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. BA
SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-00633-LB (N.D. Cal., Jan.
28, 2020) is brought under the consumer protection laws of
California, New York, and Pennsylvania against BA for unjust
enrichment and false, deceptive, and unlawful marketing and sales
of BA's BodyArmor SuperDrink sports drinks.

According to the complaint, BA markets that Americans need to
attend to their hydration and that BodyArmor provides "SUPERIOR
HYDRATION." BA also markets that BodyArmor hydration is "More
Natural Better" hydration. BA markets BodyArmor as having these
"superior" and "better" hydration attributes in the context of
other marketing--whether in-store displays, social media, or
television--comparing it to water and/or competing sports drinks.

The Plaintiffs argue that BodyArmor does not provide "superior" or
"better" hydration to then and other consumers than other
beverages, nor are the Plaintiffs or the general public hydration
deficient and/or in need of its characteristics to replenish them
from dehydration. They contend that BodyArmor is not comprised of
"natural" ingredients and/or more natural ingredients BodyArmor on
balance is not nutrient beneficial for the general public BA
targets with its marketing, but is instead an unlawfully fortified
junk food. Instead of providing the marketed qualities and
characteristics, BodyArmor is a sugar-sweetened-beverage ("SSB")
that scientifically links to serious medical conditions, including
obesity, type 2 diabetes, and cardiovascular disease, when
regularly consumed, the Plaintiffs aver.

The Plaintiffs allege that they would not have purchased BodyArmor,
purchased as much of it, or paid as much for it, had they
understood that consumption does not provide them with superior or
better hydration, including as compared to water and/or other
sports drinks. The Plaintiffs assert that they relied on BA's
marketing when they purchased BodyArmor and were harmed thereby
because they would not have made the purchases, or would have paid
less for their purchases, or purchased fewer of them, had they
known the truth about BodyArmor. The Plaintiffs would consider
purchasing BodyArmor again if they knew that they could rely on the
label and marketing as truthful when making purchases, including
that the product they purchased matched the marketing claims and
inferences made by BA, and/or was a lawfully marketed and sold
product.

The Plaintiffs purchased BodyArmor from Walmart and other locations
in Santa Rosa and Plumas Lake, California.

BA produces and sells BodyArmor, with flavors such Banana
Strawberry, Orange Mango, and Pineapple Coconut among others,
online and through a network of retail stores.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laurence D. King, Esq.
          Mario M. Choi, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          1999 Harrison Street, Suite 1560
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Phone: (415) 772-4700
          Facsimile: (415) 772- 4707
          Email: lking@kaplanfox.com
                 mchoi@kaplanfox.com

               - and -

          Maia C. Kats, Esq.
          KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
          850 Third Ave., 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (212) 687-1980
          Email: mkats@kaplanfox.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

                 - and -

          George V. Granade, Esq.
          REESE LLP
          8484 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 515
          Los Angeles, CA 90211
          Phone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          Email: ggranade@reesellp.com


BAOZUN INC.: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, announces that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of publicly-traded Baozun Inc.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadline listed to petition the court. Further details about the
cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

Baozun Inc. (BZUN)

BZUN Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased Baozun American
Depository Receipts between March 6, 2019 and November 20, 2019
Lead Plaintiff Deadline : February 10, 2020
TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/baozun-inc-loss-form?prid=5292&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, (a) Baozun was heavily reliant
upon a single brand partner, Huawei, for the exponential service
fee growth it had been reporting historically, which was in turn
fueling its historical revenue growth; (b) compared to other brands
Baozun had as brand partners, the Huawei work had historically
included a lot of additional add-on service fees, increasing the
revenue reported from Huawei vis-a-via its other brand partners;
(c) Huawei, like other large brands, was actively preparing to
bring its online merchandising in-house, meaning Baozun knew that
it was losing a significant brand partner; and (d) as a result of
the foregoing, the Company was not on track to achieve the
financial results and performance Defendants claimed the Company
was on track to achieve during the class period.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a national firm with offices in New York,
California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's attorneys
have extensive expertise and experience representing investors in
securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of millions of
dollars for aggrieved shareholders.

Contact:

         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         Tel: (212) 363-7500
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Website: www.zlk.com
         E-mail: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
[GN]

BARBEQUE INTEGRATED: Elliott Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as BRIGIDA ELLIOTT, individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, the
Plaintiff, v. BARBEQUE INTEGRATED, INC., the Defendant, Case No.
0:19-cv-62426-AHS (S.D. Fla.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for an
order conditionally certifying her lawsuit as a collective action
and to authorize notice to potential collective action members
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Barbeque Integrated Inc. is an American casual dining restaurant
chain.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jay N. Michelman, Esq.
          MICHELMAN LAW OFFICES
          1333 E. Columbus Ave., PO Box 2992
          Springfield, MA 01101
          Telephone: (413) 737-1166
          Facsimile: (413) 736-0429
          E-mail: Michelmanlaw@hotmail.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Alex Meier, Esq.
          Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.
          Jennifer A. Riley
          Andrew D. Welker
          SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
          1075 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 2500
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3958
          Telephone: (404) 885-1500
          Facsimile: (404) 892-7056
          E-mail: ameier@seyfarth.com
                  awelker@seyfarth.com
                  gmaatman@seyfarth.com
                  jriley@seyfarth.com

BAUMGART RESTAURANT: Ding's Bid to Certify FLSA Collective Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as GUI HUA DING, the Plaintiff
v. BAUMGART RESTAURANT, INC., BAUMGART'S NEXT DOOR, INC., GOU-FU
WANG, STEVEWU, MARSHA WU, THEAN CHOO CHONG, the Defendants, Case
No. 2:18-cv-10358-JMV-SCM (D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge John Michael
Vazguez entered an order on Jan. 30, 2020, denying without
prejudice Plaintiffs' motion for conditional collective
certification under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Baumgart Defendants are all members of a Chinese-American chain
store founded in the mid 80's by Steve and Marsha Wu along with
their partner Sam Wang.[CC]

BDK GROUP LLC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BDK Group, LLC. The
case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. BDK Group, LLC,
doing business as: The Good Patch, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-00518 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

The Good Patch is a transdermal patch designed to deliver
sustained, discrete relief for life's common ailments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          Lipsky Lowe LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


BHANG CORP: Hit With Proposed Class Action Over False THC & CBD
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action filed in January in California alleges that Bhang
Corporation, a Florida-based medicinal chocolate maker, violated
several state and federal laws by claiming that its chocolate
products contained much greater amounts of tetrahydrocannabinol
("THC") and cannabidiol ("CBD") than they actually did, in order to
charge consumers premium prices.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff Charles Ballard purchased
Bhang Medicinal Chocolates from 2016 to 2018, which contained
allegedly false, deceptive, and/or misleading product labels as to
the amounts and/or levels of THC and/or CBD in the products.
Independent lab testing commissioned by the plaintiff revealed that
the amounts and/or levels of THC and CBD in the chocolate products
were substantially less than as stated on the packaging and
marketing materials.

The plaintiff alleged that the amounts and/or levels of THC and/or
CBD are not only material, but the primary reason consumers
purchase THC and/or CBD products such as these. Moreover, he
alleged that the defendants knowingly misrepresented the amounts in
the products to induce consumers to purchase them. The plaintiff
further alleged that but for the false statements, representations,
and warranties contained on the Bhang Medicinal Chocolates labels,
packaging, and marketing materials, he and the class members would
not have bought the chocolates or paid the premium price for the
products.

The class action allegations include fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and violation of California's unfair competition
and false advertising laws. The plaintiff and the proposed
nationwide and California classes are seeking compensatory and
punitive damages, prejudgment interest, attorney fees and court
orders "to correct, destroy, and change all false and misleading
labeling terms relating to defendants' statements and
representations."

Takeaway: This proposed class action is the latest example in a
plethora of recent false advertising class action lawsuits against
CBD companies in federal courts in California and across the United
States. The action underscores, as we have previously written
about, the critical importance for marketers selling CBD products
to accurately label, market, and advertise their products. Given
that plaintiffs are sending products out to be tested, and because
various state laws and the USDA interim final rule now
affirmatively require that CBD products be tested, product makers
should send their products to a reputable laboratory before
marketing the products to consumers. [GN]


BNSF RAILWAY: Face Armitage Suit in Tex. Over Medication Protocol
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GARY ARMITAGE, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Case No. 4:20-cv-00030-P (N.D.
Tex., Jan. 11, 2020), accuses the Defendant of violating the
Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
relating to medication protocol and policy.

The action is brought on behalf of similarly situated individuals,
who have been subjected to BNSF's medication protocol and written
policy, effective January 15, 2018.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant maintains a policy,
practice and custom of disqualifying employees and applicants based
upon a per se list of medications resulting in improper medical
inquiries and misinterpretation of medications and assumption of
side-effects without an individualized assessment.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and putative class were
denied employment because of their disabilities or were regarded as
disabled based on a perception that they were substantially limited
in one or more major life activities, including concentration,
thinking, and working and/or were regarded as disabled or record of
disability by BNSF that these disabilities prevented them from
performing the jobs applied for and/or worked for the Defendant.

The Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief
for denial of employment on the basis of disability.

Mr. Armitage was employed as a train dispatcher for BNSF Railway
beginning in 1996 through the medical disqualification on January
13, 2018.

BNSF Railway is primarily engaged in railroad transportation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory G. Paul, Esq.
          MORGAN & PAUL, PLLC
          100 First Avenue, Suite 1010
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Telephone: (412) 259-8375
          Facsimile: (888) 822-9421
          E-mail: gregpaul@morgan-paul.com


BRG SPORTS: Ct. Overturns Nakamura Suit Dismissal, Remands Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division
issued an Opinion reversing the District Court's judgment granting
Defendants Motion to Dismiss the case captioned HARUKI NAKAMURA,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRG SPORTS, LLC f/k/a EASTON-BELL SPORTS,
LLC, EB SPORTS CORP., BRG SPORTS HOLDINGS CORP., BRG SPORTS, INC.,
RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP, INC., RIDDELL, INC., and ALL AMERICAN SPORTS
CORPORATION, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 1-18-0397.

The former player, plaintiff Haruki Nakamura, is suing the
defendant-helmet manufacturers for the significant medical
conditions he has developed as a result of the head trauma he
endured while playing football. Plaintiff filed a disability
insurance claim with an insurance company in 2013 when he suffered
one particularly severe concussion that ultimately ended his
career.

When plaintiff filed this suit, defendants responded that the case
was barred by the two-year statute of limitations that governs
personal injury actions in Illinois. Defendants argue that
plaintiff knew about his injuries when he filed the insurance claim
in 2013 and became involved in litigation in connection with that
claim.

Thus, defendants argue, the statute of limitations began to run
more than two years before this case was filed in 2017, so this
case is untimely.

The District court agreed with defendants' argument and dismissed
the case.  

Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's dismissal of their case.

Discovery Rule

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his
claims as barred by the statute of limitations.  

In this suit, plaintiff is suing to recover for the long-term,
latent brain damage he suffered. He argues that there is no
evidence that he knew about his long-term, latent injury more than
two years before this case was filed. The basic premise of
plaintiff's position is that he did not discover the injury for
which he now seeks recovery, a latent neurodegenerative brain
diseasewhen he suffered an acute concussion or when he was pursuing
his disability claim. Instead, plaintiff maintains that he filed
this case within two years of discovering his long-term injury.

As opposed to a sudden traumatic event which causes the statutory
limitations period to begin running immediately, when a plaintiff's
injury does not manifest itself until sometime after the
defendant's wrongful act occurred, the plaintiff's cause of action
is said to accrue when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should
know that he has been injured by the wrongful conduct of another.


When a plaintiff's injuries are the result of several ostensibly
innocuous circumstances, the plaintiff's cause of action accrues
when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been
injured by the wrongful conduct of another.  

In Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill.2d 161 (1981), the
plaintiff knew that he had lung problems as early as 1957. He was
diagnosed with asbestosis in 1973. The plaintiff sued in 1975. The
supreme court held that the plaintiff's claim was not subject to
dismissal as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations
because there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff
had sufficient knowledge that the lung problems he was experiencing
20 years earlier were caused by his exposure to asbestos.  

Plaintiff argues that the concussion he suffered on August 29, 2013
cannot be said to be the point of accrual for latent
neurodegenerative disorders like CTE, Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, or
dementia. Plaintiff contends that his conduct in filing an
insurance claim and a lawsuit attendant to his insurance claim do
not evidence knowledge of any latent neurodegenerative disorder and
do not bar this suit which is based upon conditions that manifest
over many years as a result of repetitive head trauma.

Defendants argue that the admissions made by plaintiff in filings
to the NFL disability claims committee, Lloyd's of London, and to
the court during his suit against Lloyd's of London evidence his
knowledge of his injury such that his claims are barred by the
statute of limitations. Defendants point out that plaintiff alleged
in those matters that he was diagnosed as being totally and
permanently disabled as a result of suffering concussions and that
he had a long-term brain injury. Defendants contend that plaintiff
is trying to prosecute a new lawsuit for only a new symptom or
condition, but that his suit is, nonetheless, a new lawsuit for the
same injury.

The Appellate Court of Illinois finds that plaintiff's knowledge of
his acute concussion in 2013 and his conduct associated with his
disability claim is insufficient to per se establish that the
claims he presents here are barred by the statute of limitations.
In pursuing his disability claim, plaintiff was seeking recourse
for the consequences of a single severe concussion.

Here, plaintiff is seeking recourse for repetitive concussive and
subconcussive trauma experienced while playing football. In
addition, plaintiff was seeking redress for injury under a
disability insurance policy that covered the risk that he might
suffer a career-ending injury. The disability benefits were
designed to serve as a replacement for income for plaintiff's
inability to perform occupational duties and to cover medical
expenses. Here, plaintiff is seeking redress for lifelong cognitive
degeneration.

In ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court
observed that with regard to Mr. Nakamura, he had the one
particularly bad concussion so he certainly knew that he was
injured. But this case is based on the repeated and cumulative
effect of concussions, not a single one. Latent neurodegenerative
diseases manifest over several years as a result of repetitive head
trauma. There is nothing in the record that demonstrates that
Nakamura knew of these injuries and their wrongful cause more than
two years before this case was filed.

The knowledge of having suffered one severe concussion does not
mean that the person has knowledge of all brain related injuries,
including those that generally require multiple traumas to
actualize. CTE and other head-trauma-induced neurodegenerative
diseases generally do not result from a single concussion. The
allegations in this case leave open the possibility that there is a
question of fact about when Nakamura knew or should have known
about his injury and its wrongful cause.

Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, we cannot say defendants have met their burden of
demonstrating that the claims are, in fact, time barred.

While plaintiff might have been aware of his acute concussion or
even his post-concussion syndrome when he filed an insurance claim,
there is no evidence he was aware of a latent brain injury that
would later manifest in the form of CTE or another severe
neurodegenerative disorder. Plaintiff is not seeking to divide his
injury among multiple lawsuits as defendants claim. A single
concussion, even a severe, debilitating one is a different injury
than a latent brain injury caused by repetitive head trauma.
Plaintiff's conduct in the proceedings related to his disability
claim does not preclude him from seeking recompense for a latent
brain injury, at least insofar as the statute of limitations is
concerned.
  
Fraudulent Concealment

Because the Appellate Court of Illinois finds that defendants have
not demonstrated that plaintiff's claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, the Court do not address
plaintiff's claims that defendants fraudulently concealed his
causes of action.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court of Illinois reverses and remands
for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' October 21, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yx8p3x3e from Leagle.com

BRG SPORTS: Dismissal of Case v. Helmet makers Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division
issued an Opinion affirming the circuit court's judgment granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the case captioned MICHAEL BUTLER,
MELVIN CARTER, CRAIG CURRY, JAMES HARRELL, ROBERT HARRIS, CARLTON
BAILEY JONES, BRAD QUEST, JOHN MICHAEL REICHENBACH, ADAM SCHREIBER,
ERIC WRIGHT, GARY ANDERSON, MICHAEL CLARK, CHRIS DIETERICH, GERALD
FEEHERY, WILLIAM GAY, JEFF HERROD, JAMES JONES, ERNEST MILLS, BRUCE
TAYLOR, THOMAS VAUGHN, LAWRENCE WATKINS, FELIX WRIGHT, RAHIM
ABDULLAH, DOUGLAS BEAUDOIN, ROD DAVIS, MAJOR EVERETT, DAVID
GALLOWAY, KENNETH GREEN, RICKY NATTIEL, MARK NICHOLS, BERNARD
WHITTINGTON, JOHN L. WILLIAMS, MICHAEL WILLIAMS, GLEN YOUNG,
ANTOINE CASH, GLEN EARL, JOE ODOM, CHARTIC DARBY, CENTRAL
MCCLELLION, MAURICE MORRIS, GERALD WUNSCH, JEFFREY BRYANT, DAN
FIKE, DAVID HADLEY, WALTER LEE (TODD) HOWARD, SEAN LOVE, CLEOPHUS
MILLER, GREGORY BROWN, ALPHONSO CARREKER, WENDELL PATRICK CARTER,
AL DAVIS, ERIC HIPPLE, LEMAR PARRISH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BRG
SPORTS, LLC f/k/a EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC, EB SPORTS CORP., BRG
SPORTS HOLDINGS CORP., BRG SPORTS, INC., RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP,
INC., RIDDELL INC., AND ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees. CHARLES ALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRG
SPORTS, LLC f/k/a EASTON-BELL SPORTS, LLC, EB SPORTS CORP., BRG
SPORTS HOLDINGS CORP., BRG SPORTS, INC., RIDDELL SPORTS GROUP,
INC., RIDDELL, INC., and ALL AMERICAN SPORTS CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees, Case Nos. 1-18-0362 and 1-18-0394 (cons.).

These appeals stem from an important issue facing professional
athletics and contemporary culture as a whole: former professional
football players developing significant neurological disorders
after sustaining repeated concussions from playing the game.
Evolving scientific and medical research has uncovered a link
between a person suffering repeated blows to the head and that
person developing Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy and a host of
other neurological impairments.

The plaintiffs in these cases are former professional football
players who have sustained numerous concussions and are suffering
the attendant neurological impairments. The plaintiffs have already
sued the NFL in a federal class action case and have entered into a
settlement with the NFL to address their grievances. The former
players, however, now seek redress from defendants, the
manufacturers and designers of the helmets they wore while playing
football.

The plaintiffs allege that the helmet manufacturers have long known
about the dangers and the harmful effects of repeated concussive
and subconcussive traumas, but never warned the users of their
helmets about the dangers, instead representing that their helmets
were protecting the players.

The defendant-helmet manufacturers moved to dismiss these cases on
the ground that the cases are barred by the two-year statute of
limitations governing personal injury actions in Illinois.  In
response, plaintiffs argued that the cases are not time barred
because the suits were filed within two years of the players
learning about the injuries for which they seek redress.

The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims finding them to
be barred by the statute of limitations. The circuit court found
that, because the players had already sued the NFL more than two
years before filing these cases, the players knew about their
injuries and, therefore, could have sued the helmet manufacturers
at the same time more than two years before filing these cases.

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims.

The Appellate Court of Illinois rules that the plaintiffs' claims
are indeed untimely and, accordingly, affirms dismissal.


The Discovery Rule

Standard to apply—point of accrual

These appeals require us to examine and apply the discovery rule.
The purpose of the discovery rule is to postpone the starting of a
suit-limitations period until the injured party knows or should
know of his injury.  

Plaintiffs argue that their personal injury claims for the latent
brain injuries for which they now seek redress should survive a
statute of limitations challenge because the plaintiffs are just
now discovering the harm. They contend that the statute of
limitations cannot run until they discover their latent brain
injury.

Thus, plaintiffs urge us to apply the discovery rule and hold that
their causes of action accrued at the time they were diagnosed with
a particular neurodegenerative disorder.

In VaSalle v. Celotex Corp., 161 Ill.App.3d 808, 812-814 (1987),
the plaintiff developed asbestosis in 1972. He filed a disability
claim for his asbestosis in 1976 signifying his knowledge of the
harmful exposure to asbestos. In 1979, he was diagnosed with lung
cancer. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 1980 seeking to recover
for his development of lung cancer, claiming that his exposure to
asbestos was the cause.

A majority of this court held that the plaintiff's development of
asbestosis in 1972 was a legal injury separate and distinct from
his development of lung cancer in 1979 so that the statute of
limitations for filing a claim for lung cancer began to run when
the plaintiff was diagnosed with lung cancer, not when he learned
he was suffering from asbestosis.
  
According to plaintiffs, even though they alleged the existence of
head problems when they sued the NFL, there was no formal diagnoses
of neurodegenerative disease pled at that time. They argue that
even if they acknowledged that they exhibited symptoms of
neurodegenerative diseases prior to their diagnoses of latent brain
injuries, it is the diagnosis of a particular disorder that causes
the statute of limitations to begin to run for a claim to recover
for that disorder.

Pegging the date of diagnosis as the date of discovery for statute
of limitations purposes, plaintiffs argue that their filings in the
federal multidistrict litigation cannot be said to evidence
knowledge sufficient for the statute of limitations to begin to run
for their current claims. Plaintiffs maintain that the statute of
limitations for the injuries for which they now seek redress began
to run when they were made aware of a diagnosis of a particular
latent neurodegenerative brain injury a point in time after their
participation in the federal class actions ceased and within two
years of when they filed these cases.

On the other side of the issue, our supreme court has held that a
plaintiff who knows he is injured need not know the exact nature or
extent of his injuries in order for the statute of limitations to
begin running. In Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill.2d 353,
367 (1995), a plaintiff knew that she suffered injuries at the time
of a car accident. The plaintiff tacitly admitted that she could
have filed suit for some of her injuries when the accident
happened, but she waited four years to file suit until after she
was diagnosed with a more serious condition, reflex sympathetic
dystrophy. Our supreme court explained that when the plaintiff
filed suit upon learning of her more serious injury, her claim was
filed too late. The court observed that the case involved not a
plaintiff who failed to discover any injury, but a plaintiff who
failed to discover the full extent of her injuries before the
statute of limitations expired.

In this case, the allegations and the conduct of the plaintiffs in
the federal class action case establish that the plaintiffs had
sufficient knowledge to interpose the claims that they now pursue
against Riddell as early as the point in which they pursued their
claims against the NFL a point more than two years before
plaintiffs filed these cases, notes the Appellate Court of
Illinois.

Evidence of plaintiffs knowing about their injuries

As stated previously, plaintiffs' appeal is based on their supposed
lack of knowledge about their injury. They do not raise any issue
relating to their knowledge of the wrongful cause element for the
accrual of a statute of limitations under the discovery rule. It is
apparent that the injury for which plaintiffs seek redress in this
case is the same injury for which they sought redress in the
federal class action case. It is similarly apparent that plaintiffs
knew about those injuries when they sued the NFL so that, as a
matter of law, the statute of limitations accrued at least as early
as the plaintiffs' class action filings. Because plaintiffs' class
action filings occurred more than two years before these cases were
filed, the claims at issue in these cases are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.

The federal class action case, plaintiffs sought redress for both
current and future diagnoses of disorders resulting from the head
trauma they suffered while playing in the NFL. In this case
plaintiffs seek redress for "the long-term, latent brain damage
inflicted upon them. In both the master class action complaint and
in each plaintiff's short form complaint3 the plaintiffs sought
redress not for the symptoms of a latent brain injury, but for the
long-term brain injuries themselves and their attendant
manifestations, the same injuries for which they seek redress
here.

In the federal class action master complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that they have suffered and continue to suffer brain
injuries. The plaintiffs went on to allege that those brain
injuries result in early onset Alzheimer's disease, dementia,
depression, deficits in cognitive functioning, reduced processing
speed, attention and reasoning, loss of memory, sleeplessness, mood
swings, personality changes, and the debilitating and latent
disease known as Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE).

Here, in the very first paragraph of the master complaint, for
example, the plaintiffs stated that this case seeks a declaration
of liability, injunctive relief, medical monitoring, and financial
compensation for the long-term chronic injuries, financial losses,
expenses, and intangible losses suffered by the Plaintiffs and
Plaintiffs' Spouses as a result of the Defendants' intentional
tortious misconduct, including fraud, intentional
misrepresentation, and negligence. The plaintiffs alleged that the
NFL's negligence has resulted in them sustaining brain injuries
that are progressive and latent. The plaintiffs sought damages for
both present and future manifesting conditions from the brain
injuries from which they all already had allegedly suffered.
Here, the plaintiffs themselves asserted the sufficiency of their
knowledge in their suit against the NFL.

Plaintiffs had the opportunity to pursue claims against Riddell and
chose not to do so

During the course of the federal class action case, plaintiffs were
all given a short-form complaint in which to submit basic
information about their claims to the court. The short-form
complaints gave each plaintiff the option to state whether he had a
claim against Riddell it was listed as one of the potential
defendants and to detail what those claims were. While some of the
plaintiffs in the class action case chose to lodge claims against
Riddell, none of the plaintiffs in the cases now before us made a
claim against Riddell. None of these 53 plaintiffs even just simply
checked a box on the short-form complaint to indicate that they
were aggrieved by Riddell.

In addition, the master complaint contained allegations against
Riddell, but none of the plaintiffs that are interposing claims in
this case chose to pursue those allegations against Riddell at that
time, despite adopting all of the allegations from the master
complaint into their individualized short-form complaints. The
plaintiffs each made a conscious decision to voluntarily and
intentionally not pursue Riddell for the brain injuries from which
the plaintiffs are suffering.

Plaintiffs chose to enforce their claims against the NFL only and,
despite being presented with the opportunity, made a conscious
decision to not pursue any claims against Riddell.

Plaintiffs are not without a remedy. They already settled for these
injuries with the NFL

To be clear, plaintiffs are not without a remedy here. They have
already secured a remedy for the harm alleged in these cases in
their settlement with the NFL. And they had the requisite knowledge
and the opportunity to seek the same remedy against Riddell back
then, but did not pursue it. The discovery rule cannot be used to
save plaintiffs' untimely claims, says the ruling.

When the plaintiffs here sued the NFL, they sued for present and
latent injuries. In the federal class action case the plaintiffs
alleged that they have sustained brain injuries that are
progressive and latent. They alleged that their latent brain
injuries have developed and continue to develop over time.

The federal district court approved the settlement between
plaintiffs and the NFL.  The settlement provides a remedy for
future claims, claims like those the plaintiffs are now pursuing.
The main portion of the settlement is an uncapped monetary award
fund that provides compensation to players who submit proof of
certain diagnoses. The monetary award fund is uncapped and will
remain in place for 65 years. Any player that shows that he has
been diagnosed with a qualifying disorder during that time period
is entitled to an award. That award applies to diagnoses that are
made after the settlement was reached. If, after receiving an
initial award, a retired player receives a more serious diagnosis,
he will receive a supplemental award.  

Plaintiffs could not sue the NFL for the injuries asserted here,
the federal class action case encompassed future diagnoses.
Plaintiffs provide no reasoned basis on which we could permit them
to pursue the claims against Riddell for the exact same injuries
that they claimed to have knowledge about more than two years
before filing these cases. Plaintiffs have had a recovery for these
injuries, but they opted not to seek a recovery against Riddell
when they had the opportunity.

Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiffs advocate for the application of a five-year statute of
limitations for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs alternatively
refer to their invocation of fraudulent concealment as a
freestanding cause of action and then at other times refer to
fraudulent concealment being asserted as a means for tolling the
statute of limitations.  

Plaintiffs argue that Riddell's conduct prevented them from
discovering that they had a claim against the helmet manufacturer.
Thus, plaintiffs argue, they had five years from the time they
filed their complaints in the federal class action case to file
their complaints in this case. The Code of Civil Procedure provides
that if a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the
cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled
thereto, the action may be commenced at any time within 5 years
after the person entitled to bring the same discovers that he or
she has such cause of action, and not afterwards.

Our supreme court has made clear that an allegation of fraudulent
concealment does not give a plaintiff an automatic five-year
extension for bringing a claim once the plaintiff has knowledge of
the claim. If at the time the plaintiff discovers the fraudulent
concealment a reasonable time remains within the applicable statute
of limitations, section 13-215 does not toll the running of the
limitation period. Once a party discovers the fraud, it is no
longer concealed, and if time remains within which to file the
action, the Code of Civil Procedure does not operate to toll the
limitations period.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants concealed their cause of action
during the decades leading up to the discovery of their injuries.
Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants did anything to conceal
the causes of action from the time plaintiffs had sufficient
knowledge to file claims against the NFL. In the federal class
action case, plaintiffs alleged that the NFL and Riddell made
material misrepresentations about the harms the players faced.
Those same alleged misrepresentations, that pre-date the federal
class action case, are the basis for plaintiffs fraudulent
concealment assertion here.

According to the Appellate Court of Illinois, to be entitled to
fraudulent concealment tolling, it is necessary to show affirmative
acts by the defendant which were designed to prevent, and in fact
did prevent, the discovery of the claim. Even if Riddell promoted
the safety of its products in the past, it did nothing to lull the
plaintiffs into not filing suit or discovering their harm or its
wrongful cause.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' October 22, 2019 Opinion
is available at  https://tinyurl.com/y5xgvd2z from Leagle.com

CENTRA TECH: Default Judgment Entered in Rensel Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Jacob Zowie Thomas Rensel and others, Plaintiff, v.
Centra Tech, Inc. and others, Defendants, Civil Action No.
17-24500-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.), Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant
Centra Tech.

In December 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
against Defendant Centra Tech and a number of related individuals.
Defendant Centra Tech, a company founded in May 2016, purported to
sell cryptocurrency, "Centra Tech Tokens" or "CTR Tokens," in an
initial coin offering ("ICO").  The ICO allegedly raised funds for,
among other things, a debit card backed by Visa and Mastercard that
would allow users to instantly use cryptocurrencies to make
purchases.

Between July 23, 2017 and April 20, 2018, Centra Tech's ICO raised
more than $32 million from thousands of investors.  The founders of
Centra Tech, Defendants Sharma, Farkas, and Trapani are currently
the subjects of a SEC enforcement action for securities fraud
(S.E.C. v. Sharma et al., No. 18-cv-2909-DLC (S.D.N.Y.) and are
being criminally prosecuted in the Southern District of New York
for the fraudulent Centra Tech scheme. United States v. Sharma et
al., No. 18-cr-340-LGS (S.D.N.Y.).

The case was originally filed against nine Defendants; some are
co-conspirators in the criminal case, while others were only
peripherally involved with the alleged sale of false securities.
The Court granted motions to dismiss as to a handful of the
Defendants and the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining
individual Defendants.  The only remaining Defendant is Centra
Tech.

A Clerk's default was entered against Centra Tech on Jan. 30, 2019.
Centra Tech moved to set aside the Clerk's default on June 15,
2019, but the Court denied Centra Tech's motion on Sept. 12, 2019.
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant
Centra Tech is now properly before the Court.

As for the violation of Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act,
Judge Scola finds that the Plaintiffs have established a sufficient
basis for relief under Section 12(a)(1) and thus, the Court may
proceed to determine the appropriate damages.

In order to establish liability under Section 12(a)(1), a Plaintiff
must prove (1) the defendants sold or offered to sell securities;
(2) no registration statement was in effect as to the securities;
and (3) interstate transportation or communication and the mails
were used in connection with the sale or offer of sale.

First, Judge Scola finds that the Plaintiffs invested Bitcoin,
Ethereum, and other digital currencies to purchase CTR Tokens.
Second, by purchasing CTR Tokens, the Plaintiffs invested in a
"common enterprise" with Defendant Centra Tech and its founders.
Third, the "reasonable expectation of profit" prong is satisfied
when the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.
Additionally, no registration statement was ever filed with the SEC
in connection with the Centra Tech ICO or CTR Tokens, nor has
Centra Tech ever claimed that any such a registration was filed or
in effect.

As for the violation of Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, Judge
Scola finds that the Plaintiffs have established a sufficient basis
for relief under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Centra Tech made
numerous material misrepresentations.  Centra Tech made these
material misrepresentations with the requisite scienter because the
misrepresentations were either intentional or made with reckless
disregard for accuracy for the purposes of (a) personal financial
gain; (b) inflating market demand for CTR Tokens during the Centra
ICO; and (c) securing additional financing to continue as a growing
concern.  

Accordingly, Judge Scola granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Default
Judgment against Centra Tech.  The Judge granted these relief:  

  1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Jacob Zowie Thomas
     Rensel and against Centra Tech in the amount of $350.10 plus
     prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in Fla. Stat.
     Section 55.03 beginning on July 23, 2017 and post-judgment
     interest at the statutory rate set forth in 28 U.S.C.
     Section 1961 until the judgment is satisfied.

  2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Wang Yun He
     and against Centra Tech in the amount of $2,672,864.54 plus
     prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in Fla. Stat.
     Section  55.03 beginning on July 23, 2017 and post-judgment
     interest at the statutory rate set forth in 28 U.S.C.
     Section 1961 until the judgment is satisfied.

  3. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Chi Hao
     Poon and against Centra Tech in the amount of $111,331.20
     plus prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in Fla.
     Stat. Section 55.03 beginning on July 23, 2017 and
     post-judgment interest at the statutory rate set forth
     in 28 U.S.C. Section 1961 until the judgment is satisfied.

  4. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff King
     Fung Poon and against Centra Tech in the amount of $69,582
     plus prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in Fla.
     Stat. Section 55.03 beginning on July 23, 2017 and
     post-judgment interest at the statutory rate set forth
     in 28 U.S.C. Section 1961 until the judgment is satisfied.

  5. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Jae J. Lee
     and against Centra Tech in the amount of $20,874.60 plus
     prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in Fla. Stat.
     Section 55.03 beginning on July 23, 2017 and post-judgment
     interest at the statutory rate set forth in 28 U.S.C.
     Section 1961 until the judgment is satisfied.

  6. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Mateusz
     Ganczarek and against Centra Tech in the amount of
     $28,265.30 plus prejudgment interest at the rate set
     forth in Fla. Stat. Section 55.03 beginning on July 23,
     2017 and post-judgment interest at the statutory rate
     set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1961 until the judgment
     is satisfied.

  7. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Rodney
     Warren and against Centra Tech in the amount of
     $33,648.90 plus prejudgment interest at the rate set
     forth in Fla. Stat. Section 55.03 beginning on July 23,
     2017 and post-judgment interest at the statutory rate
     set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 1961 until the judgment
     is satisfied.

The Judge denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motions to strike, Centra
Tech's motion to quash, Defendant Sharma's motion to quash, and the
Plaintiffs' motion to strike.

The case will remain open as the Plaintiffs motions for sanctions
are still under consideration by Magistrate Judge Becerra.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/v8LWIh from Leagle.com.

Jacob Zowie Thomas Rensel, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Donald J. Enright --
denright@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice, John A.
Carriel -- jcarriel@zlk.com -- Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, pro hac vice
& Emily Cornelia Komlossy -- eck@komlossylaw.com -- Komlossy Law
P.A.

Chi Hao Poon, King Fung Poon, Jae J. Lee, Mateusz Ganczarek &
Rodney Warren, Plaintiffs, represented by Emily Cornelia Komlossy,
Komlossy Law P.A.

Centra Tech, Inc., Defendant, represented by Frank Eduardo Gil --
frankgillaw@gmail.com -- The Law Office of Frank E. Gil, P.A..


CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Kyle Suit Seeks to Stop Illegal Calls
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Kyle, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. d/b/a SPECTRUM, Case No.
4:20-cv-00062-SRB (W.D. Mo., Jan. 28, 2020), seeks to secure
redress for the Defendant's violations of the do-not-call rules of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the no-call rules of the
Missouri Telemarketing No-Call List Law.

The Defendant caused multiple telemarketing calls to be made to the
phones of the Plaintiff and others without their consent, despite
such person's registration with the National Do Not Call Registry
or Missouri No-Call List, and in many instances without their prior
express invitation or permission, or after the consumer explicitly
asked not to be called, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Robert Kyle is a natural person, who resides in Cass
County, Missouri. He files this class action complaint on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated seeking relief from the
Defendant's illegal calling practices.

Charter is an internet, cable television, and phone service
provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John F. Edgar, Esq.
          Brendan M. McNeal, Esq.
          EDGAR LAW FIRM, LLC
          2600 Grand Blvd., Suite 440
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Phone: (816) 531-0033
          Facsimile: (816) 531-3322
          Email: jfe@edgarlawfirm.com
                 bmm@edgarlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
          Daniel J. Marovitch, Esq.
          BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
          155 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 9020
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: (312) 729-5288
          Email: aburke@burkelawllc.com
                 dmarovitch@burkelawllc.com


CHARTER FOODS: Gallagher Seeks Overtime Pay for Asst. Managers
--------------------------------------------------------------
CARRIE GALLAGHER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CHARTER FOODS, INC., Case No.
2:20-cv-00049-MRH (W.D. Pa., Jan 10, 2020), seeks to recover
overtime compensation for Assistant Managers under the Fair Labor
Standards Act for the hours they worked over 40 in one or more
workweeks for which Charter Foods failed to pay them because it
classifies them as exempt from overtime.

Although Charter Foods considers its AMs to be "managers," AMs are
not responsible for true management functions, the Plaintiff
alleges. To the contrary, AMs spend the vast majority of their time
performing the same duties as non-exempt employees, including
serving customers, preparing food, working the drive-thru, counting
inventory, unloading trucks, and cleaning the restaurant, the
Plaintiff contends.

Between December 2018 and June 2019, Gallagher was employed by
Charter Foods as an AM at a "Taco Bell" restaurant located in
Washington, Pennsylvania.

Charter Foods is a Yum! Brands franchisee with over 200 Taco Bell,
Long John Silver's, and KFC locations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jason Conway, Esq.
          CONWAY LEGAL, LLC
          1700 Market Street, Suite 1005
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 278-4782
          Facsimile: (215) 278-4807
          E-mail: jconway@conwaylegalpa.com

               - and -

          Daniel C. Levin, Esq.
          LEVIN, SEDRAN & BERMAN LLP
          510 Walnut Street, Ste. 500
          Philadelphia, PA 19106
          Telephone: (215) 592-1000
          Facsimile: (215) 592-4663
          E-mail: dlevin@lfsblaw.com


CHICAGO, IL: May File Reply on Bid to Strike Ali's Cert. Motion
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Edmond E. Chang grants the City's unopposed motion to
file reply on the motion to strike certification motion in the
lawsuit styled Khalid Ali v. City of Chicago, et al., Case No.
1:19−cv−00022 (N.D. Ill.).

According to the Court's Notification of Docket Entry, the City
shall file the reply on the docket as a separate entry to complete
the record.  On consideration of the motion to strike, the motion
is granted, and the motion for class certification is stricken.

On December 5, 2019, the Court set a briefing schedule on the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification, which had been filed
the previous day, December 4, 2019.  The Court says it did not
understand that **no class allegation** had been advanced in the
case before the motion itself was filed; the Court mistakenly
assumed that the Plaintiff had done so before the filing of the
certification motion.  So the certification motion amounted to a
request, at the end of fact discovery, to add a class−action
claim to the case, Judge Chang states.

The Plaintiff cites Chapman v. First Index, Inc. 796 F.3d 783, 785
(7th Cir. 2015), for the proposition that class allegations need
not be in a complaint in order to pursue a class action, Judge
Chang notes.  But Chapman addressed a completely different issue:
whether a particular class *definition* needs to appear in the
complaint, Judge Chang opines.  "Of course the answer to that
question is no; frequently, the proposed class definition is
narrowed (and even sometimes expanded) as the parties engage in
discovery over the propriety of certifying a class.  But notice of
*some* kind must be given to the defense that Plaintiff is pursuing
a class action.  How else is the defense supposed to consider what
discovery to take over the propriety of certification?  Whether it
is in a complaint or given some other way, notice is required.
Otherwise, an entry of a certification order under Rule 23(c)
cannot possibly be entered, because the rule permits entry of the
order only 'after a person sues. . . . as a class representative,'"
Judge Chang explains.

According to the Order, the Plaintiff had not, as of December 4,
2019, sued as a class representative.  So the certification motion
is stricken and the briefing schedule on it is vacated.  If the
Plaintiff wishes to propose amending the Monell claim to add a
class claim, then he must promptly file the motion and explain why
leave should be granted.

If leave is granted, then inevitably there will be a discovery
period on the propriety of certification, Judge Chang says.
Meanwhile the summary judgment briefing on the individual
Defendants shall proceed as previously ordered.

The status hearing of January 31, 2020, is vacated, and the status
hearing of April 22, 2020, remains in place.[CC]


CHRYSALIS CENTER: Fails to Give Meal & Rest Periods, Gaitan Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID GAITAN, LINDA DELGADILLO and Other Aggrieved Employees and On
Behalf of the General Public as Private Attorneys General v. THE
CHRYSALIS CENTER, a California business organization, and DOES 1
through 250, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV00945 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Jan. 8, 2020), alleges that the Defendants violated
the California Labor Code by failing to provide meal and rest
periods and to pay overtime wages.

According to the complaint, the Defendant would require the
Plaintiffs and similarly aggrieved employees to report to work in
or about 30 minutes before clocking in to perform certain
work-related tasks, including paperwork, vehicle inspections,
meetings, and other duties. In addition, at the end of the day, the
Defendant would also require the Plaintiffs and other supervisors
to stay approximately 30 minutes after clocking out to do
additional work.

The Plaintiffs became employed by the Defendants as
Supervisor/Drivers in March 2019 for Mr. Gaintan and in January
2018 for Ms. Delgadillo. They also contend that during the entirety
of their employment with the Defendants, they and similarly
aggrieved employees were required to remain on site for their lunch
breaks and were not allowed to take rest breaks.

Chrysalis Center is a private, non-profit, socially innovative
multiservice organization.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Neama Rahmani, Esq.
          Ronald L. Zambrano, Esq.
          Rosie Zilifyan, Esq.
          WEST COAST EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS, APLC
          350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3325
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 927-3700
          Facsimile: (213) 927-3701
          E-mail: efilings@westcoasttriallawyers.com
                  rosie@westcoasttriallawyers.com


COMPASS GROUP: Kessler Sues Over Unlawful Use of Biometric Data
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer Kessler, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. COMPASS GROUP USA, INC., Case No. 2020CH01089
(Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Jan. 28, 2020), is brought to stop the
Defendant's unlawful collection, use, storage, and disclosure of
the Plaintiff's and the proposed class members' sensitive, private,
and personal biometric data.

Recognizing the very serious need for protection for the citizens
of Illinois when it came to their biometric information, Illinois
enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act. The BIPA is an
informed consent statute which achieves its goal by making it
unlawful for a company to, among other things, "collect, capture,
purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or
a customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless
it first: Informs the subject in writing that a biometric
identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored;
Informs the subject in writing of the specific purpose and length
of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information
is being collected, stored, and used; and Receives a written
release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or
biometric information.."

The Defendant subsequently stored the Plaintiff's biometric data in
its database(s). The Plaintiff asserts that she has never been
informed of the specific limited purposes or length of time for
which the Defendant collected, stored, or used her biometrics. The
Plaintiff has never been informed of any biometric data retention
policy developed by the Defendant, nor has she ever been informed
of whether Defendant will ever permanently delete her biometrics.
The Plaintiff has never been provided with nor ever signed a
written release allowing the Defendant to collect, capture, store,
or otherwise obtain her fingerprint(s), handprint, hand geometry,
or other biometrics. The Plaintiff contends that she has
continuously and repeatedly been exposed to the risks and harmful
conditions created by the Defendant's violations of BIPA.

The Plaintiff purchased items sold through the Defendant's vending
machine, which collected the Plaintiffs biometrics.

Compass Group USA, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with places of
business in Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Phone: 314-833-4825
          Email: bwise@pwcklegal.com
                 plesko@pwcklegal.com


COOK COUNTY, IL: Bennett's Renewed Bid to Certify Class Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
Honorable John Robert Blakey denies with prejudice the Plaintiff's
renewed motion for class certification in the lawsuit captioned
Preston Bennett v. Thomas Dart, et al., Case No. 1:18−cv−04268
(N.D. Ill.).

Thomas J. Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois.

Plaintiff Preston Bennett renewed his motion for class
certification.  In this new motion, the Plaintiff changed his
proposed class definition by removing the previous reference to
denial of an accommodation from the class definition.  He proposed
this class definition:

    "All inmates assigned to Division 10 at the Cook County
     Department of Corrections from June 27, 2016 to the date of
     entry of judgment, prescribed a cane, crutch, or walker by a
     jail medical provider."

The Plaintiff's renewed motion, however, fails to remedy the flaws
of his first motion, Judge Blakey opines.  In his reply, the
Plaintiff argues on the merits that the Americans with Disabilities
Act's and Rehabilitation Act's Structural Standards control; and
thus, the Plaintiff contends, the class overcomes its previous
commonality problems.

"But as this Court already explained, it cannot make merits
determinations prior to ruling on class certification.  Plaintiff
arguments to the contrary remain unavailing," Judge Blakey states,
citing Messner v. NorthShore University HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802,
811 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that although the district court
cannot simply assume the truth of the matters asserted by the
plaintiff in moving for class certification, a motion for class
certification is also not a "dress rehearsal for the trial on the
merits").

Judge Blakey notes that the Plaintiff argues that on a motion for
class certification the district court must sometimes consider the
merits of the claim.  While that proposition may be true in some
cases as to certain factual determinations, the Plaintiff fails to
provide any legal authority to support his request for this Court
to rule upon a potentially dispositive question of law in order to
certify his proposed class, Judge Blakey opines.  Instead, Judge
Blakey says, the Plaintiff merely argues that the rule against
one-way intervention, which prohibits courts from resolving the
merits of a case prior to ruling on class certification is
inapplicable here, because this Court has not ruled on a motion for
summary judgment and, thus, there is no danger of running afoul of
the rule.

The Plaintiff also disputes the commonality flaws in his class by
relying upon Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois, 897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir.
2018), according to the Court's Notification of Docket Entry.

But this Court already explained why this case remains
distinguishable from Lacy. ("Although differences likely existed as
to the nature and severity of the Lacy class member's individual
disabilities, the class was sufficiently homogenous, particularly
as it related to the class members' ability to ambulate, so as not
create the factual issues present here."), Judge Blakey explains.

For these reasons, the Court finds the Plaintiff's renewed motion
for class certification suffers from the same defects as his
previous motion.  As such, the Court denies with prejudice
Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification.[CC]


COOK COUNTY, IL: Wins Bid for Determination of Merits in Alicea
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. Judge Ronald A. Guzman grants the Defendants' motion to
proceed to a determination of the merits in the lawsuit entitled
Elizabeth Alicea, Michelle Urrutia, Katina Ramos, and Jack
Artinian, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated
v. County of Cook, and Thomas J. Dart, individually and in his
official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, Case No. 1:18-cv-05381
(N.D. Ill.).

The Defendants shall file their motion for summary judgment no
later than March 2, 2020.

Citing Faber v. Ciox Health, LLC, 944 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2019), the
Plaintiffs contend that "it would be most practicable for the Court
to certify the Class, and then decide merits issues prior to
sending notice to class members."  In Faber, the district court
certified a class, but prior to notice being sent to putative class
members, it granted summary judgment to the defendant, according to
the Court's order.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the merits ruling, but concluded that
"because the district court granted summary judgment to [the
defendant] after certifying a class action without sending notice
to the absentee class members, we hold that its decision binds only
the named [p]laintiffs."  The Faber court stated that because
"class certification remains functionally incomplete until class
members receive notice[,]" the class certification in that case was
a "nullity."  The merits determination, therefore, only applied to
the named plaintiffs, Judge Guzman opines.

Judge Guzman notes that the Plaintiffs here contend that if the
Court first certifies the class and the Plaintiffs prevail on
summary judgment, then notice can be sent and putative class
members can "join or opt out of the judgment."  The Plaintiffs go
on to state that "[i]f Defendants prevail, there is no detriment to
Class members because they would not be barred from bringing claims
individually."

"As to the latter statement, this is true; by moving for summary
judgment prior to class certification, Defendants acknowledge that
any ruling in their favor will apply only to the named Plaintiffs.
The Court's certification of a class would be deemed a nullity and,
essentially, an advisory opinion.  Putative class members in this
case could then seek relief elsewhere, either as a class or
individually," Judge Guzman wrote in the Order.

"On the other hand, if the Plaintiffs successfully forestall
summary judgment, it could be that the Court does not decide the
merits issues (i.e., whether the videotaping of pre-hearing
detainees violates the Fourth Amendment or is an intrusion upon
seclusion), and instead concludes that fact issues require a trial.
Or, the Plaintiffs could be successful outright on summary
judgment as to the merits issues.  The Court could then revisit the
class certification issue," Judge Guzman says, citing Wilkes v.
CareSource Ind. Inc., No. 4:16-CV-38-JVB-PRC, 2018 WL 703957, at *2
(N.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2018).

In light of the ongoing flux in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
the need to provide an opportunity for the Defendants to offer some
sort of security rationale for the policy at issue, the Court finds
the most reasonable and efficient path is to at least attempt to
reach a dispositive merits determination prior to engaging in a
months- or years-long notice process, about which the Court has
significant concerns.

For these reasons, Judge Guzman rules, the Defendants' motion to
proceed to a determination of the merits is granted.  The
Defendants shall file their motion for summary judgment no later
than March 2, 2020.  The Plaintiffs shall respond 30 days
thereafter and the Defendants will have 21 days to reply.  The
Plaintiffs' second motion for class certification is stricken
without prejudice.[CC]


CRISP MARKETING: Rechul Sues Over Automated Telemarketing Calls
---------------------------------------------------------------
Weronika Rechul, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated
v. CRISP MARKETING, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-10171 (D. Mass., Jan. 28,
2020), arises from a campaign by the Defendant to market its
services through the use of automated and pre-recorded
telemarketing calls and automated text messages, in plain violation
of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

By using an automated telephone dialing system to send thousands of
automated telemarketing text messages without first obtaining the
prior express written consent of recipients, Crisp Marketing
violated the TCPA, the Plaintiff contends. Regardless of the type
of equipment used, the use of pre-recorded messages to call a
cellular telephone is also a violation of the TCPA. Moreover, Crisp
Marketing sent messages to cellular telephone numbers that are
registered on the National Do Not Call List, which is a separate
and additional violation of the TCPA, says the complaint.

Plaintiff Weronika Rechul is an individual citizen of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. She asserts that the recipients of
Crisp Marketing's illegal calls, which include her and the proposed
classes, are entitled to damages under the TCPA,

Crisp Marketing is a Florida limited liability company that makes
telemarketing calls and solicits sales in this District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: (508) 221-1510
          Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com

               - and -

          Alex M. Washkowitz, Esq.
          Jeremy Cohen, Esq.
          CW LAW GROUP, P.C.
          188 Oaks Road
          Framingham, MA 01701
          Email: alex@cwlawgrouppc.com


ELITE DINERS: Faces Mojaddidi Employment Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Elite Diners, LLC.
The case is captioned as Naomi Mojaddidi, on behalf of herself, all
others similarly situated, and the general public v. Elite Diners,
LLC and Does 1-50, Case No. 34-2020-00273090-CU-OE-GDS (Cal.
Super., Sacramento Cty., Jan. 8, 2020).

The suit alleges violation of employment-related laws.

Elite Diners is in the eating places industry in Rancho Cucamonga,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Maralle Messrelian, Esq.
          THE SPIVAK LAW FIRM, 16530
          Ventura Blvd., Suite 203
          Encino, CA 91436-4535
          Telephone: (818) 208-9236


ENDOCA LLC: Olsen Files ADA Class Action
----------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Endoca, LLC. The case
is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Endoca, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00539 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Endoca develops different high quality Hemp extracts with broad
profile of cannabinoids and other natural molecules found in Hemp
and to identify their distinct properties.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          Lipsky Lowe LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


FEDEX FREIGHT: Faces Sabine Suit Over Claims Under FLSA and FMLA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Sabine, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated individuals v. FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., A foreign corporation,
Case No. 1:20-cv-20379-XXXX (Fla. Cir., Miami Dade Cty., Jan. 28,
2020), is brought for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and for claims under the Family Medical Leave Act of
1993.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff requested leave to care
for his serious health conditions. Specifically, the Plaintiff
requested to see a Dentist, and also requested leave to seek
counseling because of stress, anxiety, and issues with falling
asleep at the wheel. The Defendant denied the Plaintiff's request.

The Plaintiff says he worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The
Defendants were on notice of and/or had full knowledge of all hours
worked by the Plaintiff, including those worked in excess of 40.
However, the Plaintiff was not paid at the proper overtime rate for
hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, as proscribed by the
laws of the United States and the State of Florida, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff performed work for the Defendants as a non-exempt
Operation Supervisor from 2014 to August 21, 2018.

FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., has a place of business in Miami-Dade County,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter M. Hoogerwoerd, Esq.
          Nathaly Saavedra, Esq.
          Daniel J. Bujan, Esq.
          REMER & GEORGES-PIERRE, PLLC
          44 West Flagler Street, Suite 2200
          Miami, FL 33130
          Phone: (305) 416-5000
          Fax: (305) 416-5005
          Email: pmh@rgpattorneys.com
                 ns@rgpattorneys.com
                 dbujan@rgpattorneys.com


FIRST STUDENT: Court Gives Prelim. OK to Settlement in Humes Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELORES HUMES, an individual, DIANE ABELLA, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. FIRST STUDENT, INC., an entity; and Does 1 through
100, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 1:15-CV-01861-BAM (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement with
Defendant First Student.

Judge McAuliffe has granted preliminary approval to the settlement
between the Plaintiffs and Defendant.

Any Class Member who does not submit a valid request for exclusion
will receive a Settlement Share based upon the allocation formula
in the Agreement.  Any Class Member who wishes to comment on or
object to the Settlement, the attorneys' fees and costs, and/or the
proposed Class Representative Service Payment, or who elects not to
participate in the Settlement has until 45 days after the mailing
of the Class Notice to postmark his or her comment, objection, or
request for exclusion in Settlement pursuant to the procedures set
forth in the Class Notice.  The Class Counsel must file their
application for the attorneys' fees and costs no later than 14 days
prior to the end of the objection period, and the application will
be heard at the Final Approval Hearing

Simpluris is appointed as Settlement Administrator, pursuant to the
terms set forth in the Settlement.

Plaintiffs Delores Humes and Diane Abella are appointed to serve as
the Class Representatives; and Carol Gillam of The Gillam Law Firm,
Armand Kizirian and Michael Boyamian of Boyamian Law, Inc. and
Thomas W. Falvey of the Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey as the
Class Counsel.

The Class Notice will be disseminated according to the notice plan
described in the Agreement and substantially in the form submitted
by the Parties.  Proof of distribution of Class Notice will be
filed by the Parties prior to the final approval hearing.

The Defendant is directed to provide the Settlement Administrator
the Class Data as specified by the Agreement without delay.

The Settlement Administrator is directed to mail the approved the
Class Notice by first-class mail to the Class Members without
delay.

A final hearing will be held on April 2, 2020, at 9:00 a.m., in
Courtroom 8 (BAM).  Comments or objections to the Settlement or to
the attorneys' fees and costs must be submitted to the Settlement
Administrator not later than 45 days after mailing of the Class
Notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/lXutUK from Leagle.com.

Delores Humes, Plaintiff, represented by Armand Raffi Kizirian --
armand.falveylaw@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey.

Delores Humes, Plaintiff, represented by Carol Gillam --
Carol@gillamlaw.com -- The Gillam Law Firm, Michael Hagop Boyamian
-- mike.falveylaw@gmail.com -- Law Offices of Thomas W. Falvey &
Thomas Walker Falvey, Law Office of Thomas W. Falvey.

Diane Abella, Plaintiff, represented by Armand Raffi Kizirian, Law
Offices of Thomas W. Falvey, Michael Hagop Boyamian, Law Offices
of Thomas W. Falvey & Thomas Walker Falvey, Law Office of Thomas
W. Falvey.

First Student Inc., Defendant, represented by Ofelia Mishell
Parreno-Taylor -- mtaylor@littler.com -- Littler and Mendelson,
David J. Dow -- ddow@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, Pc &
Heather L. Shook -- hshook@littler.com -- Littler Mendelson, PC.


FLEX-N-GATE: Haywood Seeks to Stop Illegal Use of Biometric Data
----------------------------------------------------------------
SEYON R. HAYWOOD, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. FLEX-N-GATE LLC and FLEX-N-GATE PLASTICS,
LLC, Case No. 2019CH12933 (Ill. Cir., Cook County, Nov. 7, 2019),
seeks to put a stop to the Defendants' unlawful collection, use,
and storage of the Plaintiff's and the putative class members'
sensitive biometric data, in violation of the Illinois' Biometric
Information Privacy Act.

When employees, including the Plaintiff, first begin their jobs at
Flex-N-Gate, they are required to scan their fingerprint in its
biometric time tracking system as a means of authentication,
instead of using only key fobs or other identification cards.
Unlike key fobs or identification cards, which can be changed or
replaced if stolen or compromised, fingerprints are unique,
permanent biometric identifiers associated with the employee.  The
Plaintiff contends this exposes employees to serious and
irreversible privacy risks.

Flex-N-Gate LLC is an Illinois limited liability company with its
principal place of business in Urbana, Illinois.  Flex-N-Gate
Plastics LLC is an Illinois limited liability company with its
principal place of business in Urbana, Illinois, and operates a
facility in Danville, Illinois, that employed the Plaintiff.
Flex-N-Gate LLC is the parent company of Flex-N-Gate Plastics LLC.

Flex-N-Gate is an auto parts manufacturer and supplier of
components for the automotive industry with locations across the
county, including in Chicago and Danville, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Fish, Esq.
          John Kunze, Esq.
          Mara Baltabols, Esq.
          THE FISH LAW FIRM, P.C.
          200 East Fifth Avenue, Suite 123
          Naperville, IL 60563
          Telephone: (630) 355-7590
          Facsimile: (630) 778-0400
          E-mail: dfish@fishlawfirm.com
                  kunze@fishlawfirm.com
                  mara@fishlawfirm.com


FORESCOUT TECHNOLOGIES: Rigrodsky & Long Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., announces that a complaint has been filed
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased the
common stock of Forescout Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQGM:FSCT)
between February 7, 2019 and October 9, 2019, inclusive (the "Class
Period"), alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 against the Company and certain of its officers (the
"Complaint").

If you purchased shares of Forescout during the Class Period, or
purchased shares prior to the Class Period and still hold
Forescout, and wish to discuss this action or have any questions
concerning this notice or your rights or interests, please contact
Seth D. Rigrodsky or Timothy J. MacFall at Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.,
300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220, Wilmington, DE 19801, by telephone
at (888) 969-4242, by e-mail at info@rl-legal.com, or at
http://rigrodskylong.com/contact-us/.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made materially false and misleading statements, and omitted
materially adverse facts, about the Company's business, operations
and prospects. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the
defendants concealed from the investing public that: (i) Forescout
was experiencing significant volatility with respect to large deals
and issues related to the timing and execution of deals in the
Company's pipeline, especially in Europe, the Middle East, and
Africa ("EMEA"); (ii) the foregoing was reasonably likely to have a
material negative impact on the Company's financial results; and
(iii) as a result, the Company's public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times. As a result of
defendants' alleged false and misleading statements, the Company's
stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class
Period.

According to the Complaint, on October 10, 2019, during pre-market
hours, Forescout issued a press release announcing preliminary
third quarter 2019 ("3Q19") financial results. That press release
lowered 3Q19 revenue guidance to $90.6 million to $91.6 million,
compared to prior revenue guidance of $98.8 million to $101.8
million, and market consensus of $100.52 million. In explaining
these results, Defendants cited "extended approval cycles which
pushed several deals out of the third quarter," which "was most
pronounced in EMEA."

On this news, shares of Forescout fell over 37%, closing at $24.57
per share on October 10, 2019, on heavy trading volume.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than March 2, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Any member of the proposed class may move the court to
serve as lead plaintiff through counsel of their choice, or may
choose to do nothing and remain an absent class member.

Rigrodsky & Long, P.A., with offices in Delaware, New York, and
California, has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf
of investors and achieved substantial corporate governance reforms
in numerous cases nationwide, including federal securities fraud
actions, shareholder class actions, and shareholder derivative
actions.

Contact:

       Seth D. Rigrodsky, Esq.
       Timothy J. Macfall, Esq.
       Rigrodsky & Long, P.A.
       Phone: (888) 969-4242
                  (302) 295-5310
       Fax: (302) 654-7530
       Website: www.rigrodskylong.com
       E-mail: info@rl-legal.com
               sdr@rl-legal.com
               tjm@rl-legal.com
[GN]




FRASER FINANCIAL: Loyhayem Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Loyhayem, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. FRASER FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE SERVICES,
INC.; MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 2:20-cv-00894 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 28,
2020), arises from the Defendants' illegal actions in negligently
contacting the Plaintiff's cellular telephone in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, specifically the National
Do-Not-Call provisions, thereby, invading his privacy.

The Defendant used an "automatic telephone dialing system" to place
its call to the Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services,
according to the complaint. The Defendant's calls constituted calls
that were not for emergency purposes. The Plaintiff says he is not
a customer of the Defendants' services and has never provided any
personal information, including his telephone number, to the
Defendants for any purpose whatsoever. The Defendant did not
possess his "prior express consent" to receive calls using an
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice on its cellular telephone.

Fraser Financial And Insurance Services, Inc., is a business loan
provider.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Phone: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                 abacon@toddflaw.com


GEICO CASUALTY: District Court Denies Dismissal of Davis Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JANET DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GEICO CASUALTY
COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-2477 (S.D. Ohio),
Judge George C. Smith of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' Motion
to Compel Appraisal and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Plaintiffs Davis, Angel Randall, and Melissa Schaller all had motor
vehicle insurance policies with one of the Defendants.  They allege
that they were each involved in an automobile accident that
resulted in a claim for physical damage to their respective
vehicles under the Policies.  Following submission of the claims,
GEICO ultimately determined that the Plaintiffs' vehicles were
total losses.  Under these circumstances, the GEICO Policy at issue
provides that GEICO must determine Actual Cash Value of the vehicle
at the time of the loss, which is defined as "the replacement costs
of the auto or property less depreciation or betterment."  

The Plaintiffs allege that GEICO breached the Policies with them by
failing to pay the Actual Cash Value sales tax, title-transfer
fees, and registration fees at the time of the loss.  They assert
that nothing in the GEICO Policy pertains to the sales tax and
other fees, nor does it provide that the Plaintiffs were to pay new
sales tax on the new vehicle before receiving sales tax coverage.

The Plaintiffs initiated the case on June 13, 2019.  They each
assert a breach of contract claim against the Defendants.  On Aug.
15, 2019, in response to the Plaintiffs initiating the case, GEICO
invoked its right to appraisal under their insurance policies by
letter to the Plaintiffs through their counsel of record in the
case.  The Defendants now move for the Court to compel the
requested appraisal and/or dismiss the case.

Judge Smith holds that Appraisers are limited to making factual
determinations regarding the amount of damages vehicle has
incurred.  It is not their responsibility to interpret policy
language.  The case is therefore distinguishable from McGowen v.
First Acceptance Ins. Co., Inc.  Although the Plaintiffs seek to
recover money that GEICO did not pay them, they do not dispute the
value attributed to any aspect of the loss.  In fact, they
acknowledge that GEICO properly calculated the base value of the
total loss vehicles at issue.  The Plaintiffs are merely asking the
Court to decide whether sales tax, title fees, and registration
fees are covered under the policy and Ohio law.  This is a proper
question for the Court and the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Appraisal is denied, the Court holds.

As an alternative to seeking the Court to compel an appraisal, the
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' sales tax breach
of contract claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  

Judge Smith recognizes that GEICO's practice is arguably based on
the aforementioned Ohio Administrative Code section, however, there
is some question as to whether the actual cash value at the time of
the loss, which is the specific language included in the GEICO
policy, actually includes sales tax, title-transfer fees, and
registration fees.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
pled a claim for breach of contract as it pertains to sales tax,
title-transfer fees, and registration fees at this stage in the
proceedings.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Smith denied the Defendants'
Motion to Compel Appraisal and Dismiss.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 7, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/I3vjCY from Leagle.com.

Janet Davis, Angel Randall & Melissa Schaller, Plaintiffs,
represented by Daniel Richard Karon -- dkaron@karonllc.com -- Karon
LLC, Andrew Shamis, Shamis & Gentile, P.A., pro hac vice, Beau D.
Hollowell -- bhollowell@karonllc.com -- Edmund A. Normand, Normand
Law, PLLC, pro hac vice & Jacob Lawrence Phillips --
jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com -- Normand Law, PLLC, pro hac vice.

GEICO Casualty Company, Geico Advantage Insurance Company & Geico
Choice Insurance Company, Defendants, represented by Michael
Richard Nelson -- mikenelson@eversheds-sutherland.com -- Eversheds
Sutherland (US) LLP & Kymberly Kochis --
kymberlykochis@eversheds-sutherland.com.


HOME DEPOT: Campanotto Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Gino Campanotto, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware
corporation; and, DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV44229, was
removed from the Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on Jan. 28, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-00882 to the
proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges that Home Depot failed to pay minimum and
overtime wages, to provide timely meal periods, to provide accurate
wage statements, and to pay all wages due at termination. The
Plaintiff also asserts a derivative claim for unfair
competition.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Donna M. Mezias, Esq.
          Dorothy F. Kaslow, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          580 California Street, Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Phone: 415-765-9500
          Facsimile: 415-765-9501
          Email: dmezias@akingump.com
                 dkaslow@akingump.com


HOWARD COUNTY: Teachers Union Pushes Class Action Grievance
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jess Nocera, writing for Baltimore Sun Media, reports that the
Howard County Education Association alerted its members Jan. 2 that
the union had filed a class action grievance "to sound the alarm
about the staffing crisis" within the school system.

"The Grievants, who are mostly special educators, have missed their
contractually required planning and lunch due to the extreme and
emergent daily demands at their schools," the grievance states.

"Educators across our school system do not receive their required
planning and lunch time several days per week, the impact of which
is consequently felt by the most vulnerable children in our school
system."

The grievance, signed by more than 70 educators, is the "largest
class grievance we have ever filed," Joshua Guy Lenes, a union
representative, said in an interview Jan. 2.

"It impacts not only the 70 people who signed, but likely hundreds
more who are missing their lunch and planning time every day," said
Lenes, who filed the grievance on behalf of the union.

During any given school day, special educators respond to student
crises, attend and lead Individualized Education Program meetings,
and manage other responsibilities, according to the grievance.
General educators also serve special education students and are
"experiencing the downstream impacts of the school system's crisis
in special education."

Filed Dec. 20 to Howard County schools Superintendent Michael
Martirano, the grievants, both general education and special
education educators, represent 33 of the district's 77 schools.

"It's significant because it's affecting all of our educators and
students," said Colleen Morris, union president.

"I think that screams for the crisis because it reaches across all
grade levels [and it's] reaching across the whole county, north,
south, east, west. I think that's the most significant."

The grievance comes after four special education staff members
testified during a Nov. 7 school board meeting. The four warned
that special educators in the school system are reaching a breaking
point because of underfunding and understaffing by the county.

The school system's office of staff relations has received the
grievance, a schools spokesman confirmed.

The grievance states, "We want to be clear that this crisis extends
beyond school administrators, and that we believe they are doing
everything in their power to support our staff and students. But
even they cannot be in two places at once, and they cannot keep up
with the extreme demands faced by our school system."

A grievance hearing, including all grievants and Martirano, is
expected to take place later this month. During the hearing, the
school system will hear the grievance and make a ruling. Lenes
doesn't expect the school system to rule against the grievance.

All union members are being encouraged to participate in a letter
campaign to the County Council and the Howard County Board of
Education to urge them to work together and fix the staffing
problem, Lenes said.

"We are very, very worried this problem can get worse," Lenes said.
"I hope we can highlight the gravity of this issue." [GN]


HUDAPACK METAL: Kelly Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA and WWPCL
---------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Kelly, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. HUDAPACK METAL TREATING, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-00130-JPS (E.D.
Wis., Jan. 28, 2020), seeks to obtain relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and the Wisconsin's Wage Payment and
Collection Laws for unpaid overtime compensation.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant operated an unlawful
compensation system that deprived current and former hourly-paid,
non-exempt employees of their wages earned for all compensable work
performed each workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay for
each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

The Defendant's deliberate failure to compensate its hourly-paid,
non-exempt employees, including the Plaintiff, for hours worked and
work performed at the proper and legal rate(s) of pay violated
federal law, as set forth in the FLSA and state law as set forth in
the WWPCL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as an Office Manager.

The Defendant is a commercial heat treater.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          15850 W. Bluemound Rd., Suite 304
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Phone: (262) 780-1953
          Fax: (262) 565-6469
          Email: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                 sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                 dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com


K&J CONSTRUCTION: Faces Bustillo Suit Over Unpaid Overtime Wages
----------------------------------------------------------------
Juan Ramos Bustillo, Victor Manuel Ramos Acosta, Santos Ramos
Acosta, Josue Edgardo Isaula, Ostilio Ramos Bustillo, Yeison
Lizandro Velasquez, Ronal Marel Pdailla Alonzo, Kevin Josue
Sevilla, Bonerge Pacheco, and Raul Mendoza, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. K&J CONSTRUCTION
CONSULTANT SERVICE INC., D Z IMAGE, INC., and JENNY CHIANG and WEN
FENG ZHANG, as individuals, Case No. 2:20-cv-00478 (E.D.N.Y., Jan.
28, 2020), is brought against the Defendants to recover damages for
their egregious violations of state and federal wage and hour laws
arising out of the Plaintiffs' employment.

Although the Plaintiffs worked for 45-72 or more hours per week
during their employment by the Defendants, the Defendants did not
pay the Plaintiffs time and a half for hours worked over 40, a
blatant violation of the overtime provisions contained in the Fair
Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants.

VIGLIOTTI ENTERPRISES, LLC, is a corporation organized under the
laws of New York with a principal executive office in Greenlawn,
New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Phone: 718-263-9591
          Fax: 718-263-9598


KANSAS CITY LIFE: Sheldon Insurance Suit Removed to W.D. Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The lawsuit titled J. GREGORY SHELDON, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Case No. 1916-CV26689, was removed Nov. 7, 2019, from the Circuit
Court of Jackson County, Missouri, to the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Missouri.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:19-cv-00899-SRB to the
proceeding.

On October 1, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a purported class action
lawsuit against KCL in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri ("the State Court Putative Class Action").  The proposed
class in the State Court Putative Class Action is national in
scope.  The Plaintiff asserts a nationwide class action against KCL
alleging purported "breaches" of certain variable life insurance
policies issued by KCL.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patrick J. Stueve, Esq.
          Ethan M. Lange, Esq.
          STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP
          460 Nichols Rd., Suite 200
          Kansas City, MO 64112
          Telephone: (816) 714-7100
          E-mail: stueve@stuevesiegel.com
                  lange@sstuevesiegel.com

               - and -

          John J. Schirger, Esq.
          Matthew W. Lytle, Esq.
          Miller Schirger LLC
          4520 Main Street, Suite 1570
          Kansas City, MO 64111
          Telephone: (816) 561-7007
          E-mail: jschirger@millerschirger.com
                  mlytle@millerschirger.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          John W. Shaw, Esq.
          BERKOWITZ OLIVER LLP
          2600 Grand Boulevard, Suite 1200
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 561-7007
          Facsimile: (816) 561-1888
          E-mail: jshaw@berkowitzoliver.com


KIEWIT CORP: 9th Cir. Flipped Remand of Avila Suit to State Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELVIN AVILA, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KIEWIT
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and DOES,
1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant, Case No. 19-56300 (9th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district
court order remanding the case to state court.

Plaintiff Avila's Complaint does not state the amount in
controversy.  Kiewit sought removal, estimating that just four of
the seven causes of action (exclusive of attorney's fees) were
potentially worth upwards of $37 million -- far more than the $5
million threshold.  Because Avila contests the amount in
controversy, removal is proper only if the district court finds, by
the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
exceeds the $5 million jurisdictional threshold.  Kiewit bears the
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that its estimate
"is a reasonable one" and meets the amount in controversy
jurisdictional threshold.

In its four-page Order remanding the case, the district court
determined that Kiewit "had not met its burden" in establishing the
amount in controversy.  The district court concluded that the
language of the Complaint runs contrary to the Defendant's
assumption that all the class members suffered at least one
violation and is enough to defeat removal under CAFA.  

However, the Ninth Circuit finds that the qualifying language in
the Complaint that the district court quoted in support of the
conclusion -- "frequently" and "regularly, but not always" --
refers to the frequency of the alleged violations, not whether each
member of the class was at one time or another subjected to the
alleged violations.  Based on the language of the Complaint, Kiewit
reasonably could have assumed that each of the class members
suffered the violations alleged.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit concludes that Kiewit has carried its
burden to show that its assumptions in calculating the amount in
controversy are "reasonable," because they are sufficiently
grounded in the allegations of the Complaint and the evidence
provided.  For example, Kiewit's conservative estimate (related
only to the overtime compensation claim) is grounded in the
declaration it provided, tied directly to Avila's broad allegations
in the Complaint, and easily surpasses the $5 million
jurisdictional threshold.  Therefore, the Appellate Court reversed
the district court's Order of removal, and held that the district
court has jurisdiction over the case.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's Dec. 23, 2019 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/nrdXTs from Leagle.com.


KOZENY & MCCUBBIN: Sevela's Bid for Judgment Denied; Case Tossed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JAMES SEVELA, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Bryce J. Bolen, deceased, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. KOZENY & MCCUBBIN, L.C., and JOHN
DOES, Case No. 8:18-cv-00390-LSC-SMB (D. Neb.), the Hon. Laurie
Smith Camp denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and his remaining claims under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Bryce J. Bolen died on December 6, 2017.  On January 25, 2018, Mr.
Sevela was appointed as special administrator for Bolen's estate.

On May 4, 2018, K&M sent a letter addressed to Bolen referencing a
mortgage allegedly due Wells Fargo Bank.  The letter contained,
among other things, a statement that "Unless within 30 days after
you receive this notice you dispute the validity of the debt or a
portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid."  On July
19, 2018, Mr. Sevela was appointed as Personal Representative of
Bolen's estate. Mr. Sevela's Amended Complaint alleges that the
letter violated various provisions of the FDCPA and Nebraska
Consumer Protection Act.

Judge Camp opines that Mr. Sevela has not alleged that he suffered
a particular harm or suffers from a risk of future harm,
establishing a concrete injury sufficient for standing.  Thus, to
the extent Mr. Sevela alleges a cause of action in his individual
capacity as Personal Representative of Bolen's estate, his claim
fails for lack of standing.

Because Mr. Sevela lacks standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction
over his Amended Complaint and it must be dismissed, Judge Camp
rules.  Accordingly, the action is dismissed without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction.[CC]


LADENBURG THALMANN: Rosenberg Challenges Advisor Group Merger
-------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN ROSENBERG, a class representative on his own behalf and all
similarly situated shareholders of LADENBURG THALMANN FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC. v. LADENBURG THALMANN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
(LTS), a Florida Corporation, RICHARD J. LAMPEN, an Individual,
MARK ZEITCHICK, an Individual, ADAM MALAMED, an Individual, HOW ARD
M. LORBER, an Individual, RICHARD M. KRASNO, an Individual, HENRY
C. BEINSTEIN, an Individual, GLENN C. DA VIS, an Individual, BRIAN
S. GENSON, an Individual, MICHAEL S. LIEBOWITZ, an Individual, and
JACQUELINE M. SIMKIN, an Individual, Case No. 101429328 (Fla. Cir.,
Miami-Dade Cty., Jan. 9, 2020), alleges that the Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties as officers, directors and
collectively controlling shareholders of LTS in connection with a
proposed cash out merger of LTS and Advisor Group Holdings, Inc.

The action arises out of the proposed cash out merger of LTS
announced on November 11, 2019, pursuant to which the Plaintiff and
the other public shareholders of LTS will receive only $3.50 per
share of their LTS common stock, while LTS's board of directors
will receive $3.50 per share plus tens of millions of dollars of
extra compensation in the form of accelerated vesting of restricted
stock and severance payments and continued employment with the
post-merger entity.

The Director Defendants, who are large shareholders of LTS are also
getting an opportunity for liquidity of their shares, which they
would not otherwise have, given the small-cap status of LTS and its
relatively thin trading volume, says the complaint.

The merger price of $3.50 per share is grossly unfair and fails to
include any merger premium over LTS's recent trading price at
approximately $3.50 per share, the Plaintiff contends. In 2018, LTS
repurchased its shares at an average price of $3.41 per share. In
July 2019, LTS repurchased its shares in the open market at an
average price per share of $3.38 per share. In each month of April,
May and June of 2019, LTS repurchased millions of its shares in the
open market at an average price of $3.46 per share.

The Plaintiff contends that the overwhelming majority of these
stock repurchases occurred before LTS reporting of its second
quarter and third quarter 2019 quarterly results, which beat
analysts' forecasts and which were landed by LTS' executive
officers as the fruits of previous strategic initiatives and
investments were better than expected and exceeded forecasts.

LTS has issued a December 26, 2019 Definitive Proxy Statement to
solicit the vote of LTS common shareholders in favor of approval of
the merger. However, the Proxy Statement misrepresents or omits
material information that is necessary for the Company's
shareholders to make an informed decision whether to vote to
approve or reject the Merger being recommended by the Director
Defendants, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff owns 5,000 shares of LTS commons stock and has owned
such shares continuously at all times relevant to the case.

LTS is a diversified financial services company with two primary
business lines: one is independent brokerage and advisory, and the
other is investment banking and capital markets.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Emily C. Komlossy, Esq.
          KOMLOSSY LAW P.A.
          4700 Sheridan St., Suite J
          Hollywood, FL 33021
          Telephone: (954) 842-2021
          Facsimile: (954) 416-6223
          E-mail: eck@komlossylaw.com

               - and -

          Lee Squitieri, Esq.
          SQUITIERI & FEARON, LLP
          32 East 57th Street, 12th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 421-6492

               - and -

          James S. Notis, Esq.
          GARDY & NOTIS, LLP
          Tower 56
          126 East 56th Street, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10024
          Telephone: (212) 905-0509


LOS ANGELES CA,: App. Ct. Flips Ruling in L.A. Sheriffs' Case
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Two
issued an Opinion reversing the Trial Court's judgment sustaining
Defendant's Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint in the case captioned
ASSOCIATION FOR LOS ANGELES DEPUTY SHERIFFS, Plaintiff and
Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent, Case
No. B289597.

ALADS sued respondent County of Los Angeles (County) concerning the
County's alleged breach of a labor agreement. The complaint alleges
11 causes of action, which include: (1) claims for breach of
contract and for declaratory relief concerning the County's alleged
violation of the ATB and EE clauses in the MOU (2) a request for a
writ of mandate requiring the County to comply with those clause
(3) requests for declaratory relief concerning the County's alleged
obligation to permit representative grievances and (4) claims
alleging that the County violated the MMBA by failing to notify
ALADS of the pay increases to employees represented by PPOA and by
refusing to meet and confer with ALADS concerning the effect of
those pay increases on the ATB and EE clauses in the MOU.

The County filed a demurrer raising a number of grounds, including
the claim that ALADS had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies under the MOU.

The trial court sustained the demurrer on that ground without leave
to amend. The court rejected ALADS's argument that the
administrative procedure available under the MOU is inadequate
because it does not permit class grievances. The court concluded
that the argument was not relevant because ALADS's complaint did
not allege class claims.

ALADS appeals from the judgment.

The Court of Appeals of California, Second District reverse that
ruling. ALADS's complaint alleges that the County failed to comply
with compensation provisions described in a November 2015
memorandum of understanding between ALADS and the County (the MOU).
Those provisions required the County to match compensation
increases given to other County safety employee unions. Thus, the
issues that ALADS raises in this action and the relief that it
seeks apply to all its members.

On the other hand, the grievance procedures under the MOU are only
available to individual employees and are not binding on any other
parties. Because those procedures would require each of the
thousands of individual ALADS members to pursue a grievance through
arbitration to obtain the relief that ALADS seeks in this lawsuit,
they are not adequate. The inadequacy of available administrative
procedures is a well-established exception to the rule that a party
must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial
relief.

The trial court ruled only on the exhaustion issue. The County
raised a number of other grounds in support of its demurrer and
argues those grounds again on appeal as alternative grounds to
affirm the trial court's ruling. One of those grounds is that ALADS
should have first pursued the claims in its fourth, fifth, and
eighth causes of action alleging violations of the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA; Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.), in
proceedings before the Los Angeles County Employee Relations
Commission (ERCOM).1 We agree. ERCOM has exclusive initial
jurisdiction over such claims, and ALADS's argument that ERCOM
could not provide binding relief is insufficient to excuse its
obligation to first pursue those claims administratively.

With respect to the County's other alternative arguments, Calif.
Appeals Court holds that: (1) ALADS's seventh, ninth, and tenth
causes of action for declaratory relief no longer address any
actual controversy in light of our ruling on the inadequacy of
administrative remedies under the MOU, and the trial court's ruling
should therefore be affirmed for those causes of action; (2) ALADS
should be given leave to amend its third cause of action to add as
defendants those County officials necessary to seek writ relief;
and (3) ALADS's second cause of action for breach of contract and
its eleventh cause of action for alleged breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing adequately state claims for relief.

Accordingly, the Calif. Appeals Court will reverse the trial
court's ruling in part, affirm in part on alternative grounds, and
remand for further proceedings on ALADS's complaint. ALADS's first,
second, sixth, and eleventh causes of action may proceed; ALADS
will be given leave to amend its third cause of action; ALADS's
fourth, fifth, and eighth causes of action will be struck without
prejudice pending ALADS's exhaustion of administrative remedies
concerning those claims with ERCOM; and ALADS's seventh, ninth, and
tenth causes of action will be struck because they do not address a
current controversy in light of its holdings.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' December 2, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/uh4ebph from Leagle.com

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski -
jkalinski@rlslawyers.com -  and Brian P. Ross -
bross@rlslawyers.com - for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall  - mhashmall@millerbarondess.com -
and Emily A. Sanchirico  -esanchirico@millerbarondess.com -  for
Defendant and Respondent.

LYONS MAGNUS: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Aceves Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
YOLANDA CRUZ ACEVES, individually, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LYONS MAGNUS, LLC, a limited liability
company; corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
20CECG00095 (Cal. Super., Fresno Cty., Jan. 8, 2020), alleges that
the Defendants violated the California Labor Code by failing to pay
minimum and straight time wages, to pay overtime compensation, and
to provide meal periods and rest breaks.

According to the complaint, the Defendants classified the Plaintiff
as non-exempt and typically scheduled the Plaintiff to work 5 to 7
days per workweek, and 12 hours each workday but failed to pay the
Plaintiff for all hours worked.

The Plaintiff is a California resident that worked for the
Defendants as a quality control employee from January 2019 to
November 2019.

Lyons Magnus is doing business in food service industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          Allen Feghali, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W. Seventh St., Suite 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 232-3128
          Facsimile: (213) 232-3125
          E-mail: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com
                  allen.feghali@moonyanglaw.com


MANAGEMENT & TRAINING: $3.5MM Deal in Lopez Suit Gets Prelim. OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jeffrey T. Miller of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California has granted preliminary approval to the
class action settlement in CARLOS LOPEZ and ANGEL ALEJO,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 17cv1624 JM (RBM) (S.D. Cal.).

Defendant MTC maintains contracts with various state governments
and the federal government for the purpose of managing prisons
throughout the United States.  At the time of the filing of the
complaint, Plaintiffs were employed by MTC at Imperial Regional
Detention facilities in California.  The lawsuit arises out of
MTC's alleged failure to not properly compensate all Sergeants,
Detention Officers, and Correction Officers for all work
performed.

On June 21, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed suit in Imperial County
Superior Court asserting three claims: failure to pay straight time
and overtime wages; violation California's Unfair Competition Law;
and failure to provide accurate wage statements.

On June 22, 2017, the Plaintiffs provided notice to the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency ("LWDA") of similar allegations
against the Defendant.  MTC removed the case to federal court on
Aug. 11, 2017.

On April 10, 2018, the complaint was amended to include a Private
Attorney General Act ("PAGA") violation.  On May 17, 2019, the
Plaintiffs provided an Amended Notice to the LWDA.

Since the initiation of the lawsuit, the parties have participated
in two private mediations, one before Mr. Joel M. Grossman, Esq. on
Dec. 11, 2018, and the second before Mr. Steven W. Paul, Esq. on
Aug. 27, 2019.  The second led to the proposed settlement currently
before the court.

On Oct. 25, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement.  The motion
contained a proposed notice to the potential class members.

At the hearing, the Court voiced its concerns regarding the
guidance provided to individuals wishing to opt-out of the class in
the initial notice.  The class counsel has subsequently revised the
notice and submitted it to the Court.  The Notice has allayed the
court's earlier concerns.

The Settlement Agreement requires MTC to pay a gross settlement
amount of $3.5 million, allocated as follows: $2,123,3342 to the
settlement members for their claims; $10,000 as an incentive award
for Lopez; $10,000 as an incentive award for Alejo; $1,166,666 to
Plaintiffs' counsel; $25,000 in costs; $100,000 to settlement of
the PAGA claim, $75,000 of which is to be paid to the LWDA; and
$15,000 to the CPT Group, Inc., the Class Administrator for
administration costs.

The Agreement estimates 570 class members, and the Plaintiffs'
counsel attests that the average amount of gross settlement
benefits each class member will recover is a $3,856.  In addition,
the Agreement calls for the payment of $750 to each eligible member
of Section 203 Sub-class for penalties allegedly owed under
California Labor Code Section 203, which will be deducted from the
Class Settlement Amount prior to determining the Net Settlement
Amount.  The parties anticipate approximately 100 Section 203
Sub-class members.

Judge Miller finds on a preliminary basis that the provisions of
the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, filed with the
Court, are fair, just, reasonable, and adequate and therefore, meet
the requirements for preliminary approval.  For purposes of the
Order, the Judge adopted all the defined terms as set forth in the
Agreement.

Judge Miller further conditionally certified, for settlement
purposes only, the following Settlement Class described in the
Agreement as:

   all of the Defendant's hourly, non-exempt Sergeants, Detention
   Officers and other similarly titled officers, if any, who were
   employed in the State of California at any time between
   June 21, 2013 through the date of Preliminary Approval, but
   in no event later than Nov. 30, 2019.

The Court appointed, for settlement purposes only, Plaintiffs
Carlos Lopez and Angel Alejo as the representatives for the
Settlement Class.

The Court also preliminarily appointed Alexander I. Dychter of
Dychter Law Offices, APC, Michael D. Singer of Cohelan Khoury &
Singer, and Walter L. Haines, of United Employees Law Group, PC as
the Class Counsel for purposes of settlement.

CPT Group, Inc. has been appointed as Settlement Administrator.

In compliance with the terms of the Agreement, the Class Counsel
will provide the LWDA with a copy of the proposed settlement in
accordance with California Labor Code.

In compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act, and as set forth
in the Agreement, the Defendant, themselves or through their
designee, are ordered to serve written notice of the proposed
settlement on the U.S. Attorney General and the appropriate
California state official, along with the appropriate state
official in every state where a Class Member resides, unless such
notice has already been served.

The Class Notice, filed with the Court, is also approved.

The Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing on April 2, 2020 at
10:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Order is available at
https://is.gd/M5DDTk from Leagle.com.

Carlos Lopez, Individuals, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated & Angel Alejo, Individuals, and on behalf of all other
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Alexander Isaac
Dychter -- alex@dychterlaw.com -- Dychter Law Offices, APC,
Kristina A. De La Rosa,Cohelan Khoury & Singer, Walter L.
Haines,United Employees Law Group, PC, Diana M. Khoury,Cohelan
Khoury & Singer, James Jason Hill,Cohelan Khoury & Singer, Michael
D. Singer,Cohelan, Khoury & Singer & Seth Adam Spiewak .

Management & Training Corporation, a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Brian Patrick Long, Seyfarth Shawll LLP,
Kerry McCoy Friedrichs, Seyfarth Shaw LLP & Shireen Yvette Wetmore
-- swetmore@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP.


MENASHA: Oliver Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Biometric Data
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lloyd Oliver, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. MENASHA PACKAGING COMP ANY, LLC, Case No. 2020CH01092
(Ill. Cir., Cook Cty., Jan. 28, 2020), seeks to stop the
Defendant's unlawful collection, use, storage, and disclosure of
the Plaintiff's and the proposed class members' sensitive, private,
and personal biometric data.

Unlike ID badges or time cards, which can be changed or replaced if
stolen or compromised, biometrics are unique, permanent biometric
identifiers associated with each employee. This exposes the
Defendant's employees, including the Plaintiff, to serious and
irreversible privacy risks. Recognizing the need to protect its
citizens from situations like these, Illinois enacted the Biometric
Information Privacy Act, specifically to regulate companies that
collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics. Notwithstanding
the clear and unequivocal requirements of the law, the Defendant
disregards employees' statutorily protected privacy rights and
unlawfully collects, stores, and uses employees' biometric data in
violation of BIPA, the Plaintiff alleges.

Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts, the Defendant has violated and
continues to violate BIPA because it did not and, upon information
and belief, continues not to: properly inform the Plaintiff and
others similarly situated in writing of the specific purpose and
length of time for which their fingerprint(s) were being collected,
stored, disseminated and used, as required by BIPA; provide a
publicly available retention schedule and guidelines for
permanently destroying the Plaintiff's and other similarly-situated
individuals' fingerprint(s), as required by BIPA; receive a written
release from Plaintiff and others similarly situated to collect,
store, disseminate or otherwise use their fingerprint(s), as
required by BIPA; and obtain consent from the Plaintiff and others
similarly situated to disclose, redisclose, or otherwise
disseminate their biometric identifiers and/or biometric
information to a third party as required by BIPA.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendant in Illinois.

Menasha Packaging Company, LLC is a Wisconsin corporation with
places of business in Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon M. Wise, Esq.
          Paul A. Lesko, Esq.
          PEIFFER WOLFCARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Phone: 314-833-4825
          Email: bwise@pwcklegal.com
                 plesko@pwcklegal.com


MERCK SHARP: Ct. Vacates Arbitration Bid Denial in Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit issued an Opinion
vacating the District Court's Order denying Defendants' Motion to
Compel Individual Arbitration and stay proceedings of a putative
antitrust class action lawsuit captioned IN RE: ROTAVIRUS VACCINES
ANTITRUST LITIGATION. SUGARTOWN PEDIATRICS, L.L.C.; SCHWARTZ
PEDIATRICS S.C.; MARGIOTTI & KROLL PEDIATRICS, P.C., individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. MERCK SHARP &
DOHME CORP., Appellant. No. 19-1405. (3rd Cir.)

Unhappy with Merck's pricing, Plaintiffs filed a putative class
action suit against Merck under the Sherman Act alleging that Merck
leverages its monopoly power in multiple pediatric vaccine markets
to maintain its monopoly power in the Rotavirus Vaccine Market and,
consequently, to charge supracompetitive prices to purchasers of
its rotavirus vaccines. Plaintiffs further allege that Merck
coopted the PBGs to impose and enforce its anticompetitive and
exclusionary conduct.

Merck moved to compel individual arbitration and stay proceedings
pursuant to the arbitration provisions in the PBG Contracts.

Merck argued that, although Plaintiffs did not sign the PBG
Contracts, they are nonetheless required to arbitrate their claims
under principles of agency law and equitable estoppel. Without the
benefit of discovery or notice to the parties, the District Court
applied the summary judgment standard and denied the motion.

The District Court considered the PBG Contracts and membership
agreements, and concluded that without more it could not find that
Merck met its burden of establishing an agency relationship as a
matter of law.  The District Court also concluded that Plaintiffs
were not equitably estopped from litigating their claims against
Merck because Merck failed to make the requisite showing of
relatedness or congruence.

This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

In considering arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), the Court have recognized that arbitration is strictly a
matter of contract. If a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the
courts have no authority to mandate that he do so. Where there is
no express arbitration agreement between the parties, the Court
have repeatedly held that a party, despite being a non-signatory to
an arbitration agreement, may be equitably bound to arbitrate under
traditional principles of contract and agency law.

Merck argues that the District Court should have decided its motion
to compel arbitration under the motion to dismiss standard or, at
the least, allowed the parties to engage in limited discovery on
the issue of arbitrability. Merck relies upon the relationship
between Plaintiffs and the PBGs to assert that the PBGs acted as
Plaintiffs' agents in their negotiations with Merck and thus
Plaintiffs should be required to arbitrate their claims. While the
District Court properly declined to apply the motion to dismiss
standard, it should have allowed limited discovery on the issue of
arbitrability.

The District Court properly declined to apply the motion to dismiss
standard because it is not apparent from the Complaint that
Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the PBG Contracts' arbitration
provisions. The Complaint reveals that the PBGs entered into
contracts with Merck that provided for the purchase of Merck
vaccines at discounted pricing.

Therefore, the District Court properly declined to employ the
motion to dismiss standard.
However, the District Court should have allowed the parties to
engage in limited discovery before applying the summary judgment
standard.

Under Pennsylvania law, an agency relationship exists where there
is (1) manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for
him (2) the acceptance of the undertaking by the agent and (3) the
control of the endeavor in the hands of the principal. The
Complaint sheds little light on the precise relationship between
Plaintiffs and the PBGs. Even taking the membership agreements and
PBG Contracts into consideration, it is unclear whether an agency
relationship exists as a matter of law. While the membership
agreements explicitly delegate authority for the PBGs to negotiate
pricing with Merck, they do not shed light on the level of control
Plaintiffs exercised over the PBGs in performance of their
delegated authority. The PBG Contracts similarly do not define the
scope of control Plaintiffs exercised over the PBGs.

Because arbitrability is not apparent on the face of the Complaint,
limited discovery on the issue of arbitrability is appropriate,
after which Merck may file a renewed motion to compel arbitration.


Thus, the Third Circuit will vacate the District Court's Order
denying Merck's motion to compel arbitration and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' October 28, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6hu4pr8 from Leagle.com

Ashley E. Bass [Argued], Mark W. Mosier , Andrew D. Lazerow ,
Covington & Burling, One City Center, 850 10th Street, N.W., One
City Center, Washington, DC 20001, Lisa C. Dykstra , Morgan Lewis &
Bockius, 1701 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for
Appellants.

Daniel J. Walker [Argued], Berger Montague, 2001 Pennsylvania
Avenue, N.W., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20006, Eric L. Cramer ,
Zachary D. Caplan , Marc Edelson , Berger Montague, 1818 Market
Street Suite 3600, Philadelphia, PA 19103. Daniel A. Small , Daniel
H. Silverman , Jessica B. Weiner , Cohen Milstein, 1100 New York
Avenue, N.W. West Tower, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20005, Gary L.
Azorsky , Cohen Milstein, 1717 Arch Street 3 Logan Square, Suite
3610, Philadelphia, PA 19103. Gary Smith , Hausfeld, 325 Chestnut
Street, Suite 900, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Counsel for Appellees.


MONARCH RECOVERY: Brown Files FDCPA Suit in New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Monarch Recovery
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Tobi Brown, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Monarch
Recovery Management, Inc., John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
7:20-cv-00827 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc. operates as a collection agency.
The Company provides debt recovery services such as new placement
review, advanced skip tracing, and arranging promises to pay, as
well as offers speech analytics, online payment portal, full call
recording, and flexible collection systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Raphael Deutsch, Esq.
          Stein Saks PLLC
          285 Passaic st
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (347) 668-9326
          Email: rdeutsch@steinsakslegal.com


NOYAH TRANSPORTATION: Fails to Pay Proper OT Wages, Iglesias Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL IGLESIAS, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated Who consent to Their Inclusion in a Collective
Action v. NOYAH TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., a Florida
Corporation, and DIONIS PEREZ, individually, Case No.
1:19-cv-24622-UU (S.D. Fla., Nov. 7, 2019), arises from an ongoing
wrongful scheme by the Defendants to willfully fail to pay its
employees the applicable overtime compensation for all hours worked
in excess of 40 in a workweek in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Iglesias, who presently resides in Miami-Dade County, Florida,
was employed as a driver by the Defendants from May 22, 2017, until
September 14, 2018.  He alleges that he and other similarly
situated drivers were required to drive and transport medical
patients to medical facilities 12 hours a day, six days a week, but
they were not paid proper overtime wages.

Noyah is a Florida Corporation with its principal address located
in Miami, Florida.  Dionis Perez is the President of Noyah.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Elvis J. Adan, Esq.
          GALLARDO LAW OFFICE, P.A.
          8492 SW 8th Street
          Miami, FL 33144
          Telephone: (305) 261-7000
          Facsimile: (305) 261-0088


ONE PLANET: Faces Schley Suit in California Over TCPA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against One Planet Ops Inc.,
et al. The case is captioned as Reeve Schley, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. One Planet Ops Inc., a
Delaware Corporation and Buyerlink LLC, doing business as:
Contractors.com, Case No.3:20-cv-00203-EMC (N.D. Cal., Jan. 9,
2020).

The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Edward M. Chen.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act seeking $5 million in damages.

One Planet is a hybrid firm combining operating technology
companies, socially-responsible angel fund and startup business
incubator, all designed to run, build and invest in disruptive
technology businesses. Buyerlink makes internet marketing
accessible to businesses of all sizes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Peter Kristensen, Esq.
          KRISTENSEN WEISBERG, LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90066
          Telephone: (310) 507-7924
          Facsimile: (310) 507-7906
          E-mail: john@kristensenlaw.com


ONTARIO, CA: Landlords Threatening Class Action Absent Reforms
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Turl, writing for BayToday, reports that landlords in Ontario
are losing patience with lengthy delays at the governing board
which oversees the industry, and is ready to go to court to get
changes.

John Wilson is on the steering committee for the Affordable Housing
Providers of Ontario, which is an umbrella organization
representing landlord associations across Ontario. He says his
group submitted suggestions in June to the government to reform the
Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB).

"It's ridiculous now. It's crazy, It's totally broken down," Wilson
told BayToday. "We recommended to our members across the province
that if you have a problem, call the Ombudsman."

Ontario's Ombudsman Paul Dube said January 9 that in the wake of a
recent surge in complaints, he is investigating serious delays at
the LTB, the administrative tribunal that resolves residential
tenancy disputes.

Wilson says if nothing is resolved, his group is considering a
class-action lawsuit against the government.

"It's now taking six to eight months to get a hearing for a simple
non-payment of rent. When you wait eight months for a hearing, then
they (tenants) get another 30 days to pay up, you can see how much
money you're losing. You never get that money back. If we don't get
satisfactory reform through this process, then class action will be
the next process."

Wilson says a lot of landlords are facing bankruptcy.

"They are losing their homes," he said, adding its a big problem in
North Bay, where he lives.

"Unfortunately, the people it affects the most are lower-income
people...those on supplemented rents are having a very difficult
time finding accommodation because there is no guarantee the rent
will be paid. They have to change that law."

Right now, if someone is on OSDP (Ontario Disability Support
Program) the recipient of that disability payment can call their
caseworkers and say "stop paying my landlord."

"Then they get the money but don't pass it on to the landlord,"
explains Wilson.  

Near North Landlord's Association spokesperson Tricia Marshall
agrees with Wilson.

"The good tenants that have an issue with a bad landlord have to
wait far too long. Then the flip side is the majority of the
landlords that are good but not getting their rent. How do they
survive? It's a business. These are monies that have been saved to
help with retirement. Thes are 'mom and pops' small landlords. Some
might have one door and some may have 20 or 40 doors. They are all
small, not big corporations that have thousands and thousands of
buildings. These guys hurt when they don't get just one rent. It
could be the difference between losing and just getting by."

Marshall says landlords are frustrated and a lawsuit against the
government is "very possible" if there is no resolution.

"I get a phone call about once every two months from someone who is
on the verge of losing their property. So yes, I do see it
happening, especially if something doesn't happen during this
spring legislature to approve and make the changes that need to be
done."

Of the more than 200 complaints the Ombudsman received about the
LTB last year, about 80 were specifically about delays. The
Ombudsman has already received more than 110 complaints about
delays in the first nine months of the current fiscal year,
including 43 last month alone.

"What we're seeing in some of these complaints is that delays have
a very real human impact,"  Ombudsman Dube said. "For example, when
a landlord whose family relies on the rental income of a property
has to go without that money for months before the LTB even
schedules a hearing. Or when a tenant who has asked for repairs or
is threatened with eviction has to live in limbo, waiting for the
board's decision."

The investigation will focus on whether the government is taking
adequate steps to address the delays and backlogged cases. [GN]

OTTO BREMER TRUST: Faces Hansen Employment Suit in Minnesota
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Brian Lipschultz, et
al. The case is captioned as Ronald E. Hansen, Julie A. Berglund,
Teresa J. Biss, Joseph G. Chow, Sherri M. Matuke, Kewvin E. Beito,
Jana L. Berndt, Dawn C. Bremer, Carol O. Downhour. Kimberly L.
Ellingson, Judd F. Graham, Elwin Loomis, Leilani C. Moll, Tamara L.
Peterson, Cynthia L. Smith, and Michael P. Turenne, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. S. Brian
Lipschultz, Daniel C. Reardon, Charlotte S. Johnson, individually
and in their capacity as Trustees of the Otto Bremer Trust, Case
No. 62-CV-20-159 (Minn. Dist., Ramsey Cty., Jan. 8, 2020).

The suit alleges violation of employment-related laws.

Otto Bremer Trust is a private charitable trust located in St.
Paul, Minnesota. It was founded by Otto Bremer in 1944 and owns 92
percent of Bremer Bank. In 2016, the Trust made a record $47
million in grants and program-related investments.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Richard B. Allyn, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          800 Lasalle Ave., No. 2800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612-349-8571

The Defendants are represented by:

          Todd A. Noteboom, Esq.
          STINSON
          50 South Sixth Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612 335 1894
          E-mail: todd.noteboom@stinson.com


PERMANENT WORKERS: 5th Cir. Sets Attorney’s Fees in Portillo at
$1K
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit issued Opinion
reversing the District Court's judgment denying Plaintiffs'
Separate Motion for Attorney's Fees in the case captioned JAVIER
PORTILLO, on behalf of himself or other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PERMANENT WORKERS, L.L.C.; CONRAD
INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; DANNY CEPERO, Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 18-31238.

Javier Portillo sued for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). The district court approved a settlement but,
on the basis of estoppel, Portillo appeals that denial. The parties
settled and jointly moved to approve their settlement. That
agreement awarded Portillo $2,610 $1,305 in unpaid wages and $1,305
in liquidated damages but did not address attorney's fees and
costs. The district court approved the agreement.

Portillo separately moved for attorney's fees and costs.

Defendants opposed that motion, contending that Portillo should be
estopped from recovering fees. Defendants relied on three alleged
facts: (1) Portillo misrepresented his identity to obtain
employment; (2) he did not disclose, until defendants had moved for
summary judgment, that he had worked under an alias; and (3)
litigation was not necessary because defendants previously had
issued an unclaimed check for $1,305, payable to Portillo's assumed
name, the same amount of back wages defendants had paid to Portillo
to settle the lawsuit.

The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge (MJ).
The MJ initially recommended that the motion for fees and costs be
granted in part because defendants had not provided sufficient
authority that the defense of estoppel can be applied to an award
of attorneys' fees and costs after a settlement has been reached.
The district court adopted the recommendation as its own.

Because estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the Appellate Court
reviews for abuse of discretion the lower court's decision to
invoke it. An abuse of discretion standard does not mean a mistake
of law is beyond appellate correction, because a district court by
definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.  

Because the court abused its discretion, the Appellate Court
reverses the order denying fees and costs and render a judgment
setting fees at $1,000.

"Although we normally would remand this question to the district
court, in this case a remand to set fees would only run up expenses
and unduly prolong an already overbilled case. It is time to put
this matter to rest. We set attorney's fees at $1,000. That may
seem generous to defendants and stingy to Portillo. But the fact
that no one goes home happy may indicate that the result is fair.
In any event, it's our job to declare that result and put this
litigation to bed. We remand for the district court to determine
and assess costs in an expeditious and summary manner. IT IS SO
ORDERED," rules the Fifth Circuit.

A full-text copy of the Court of Appeals' November 11, 2019 Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/vndp5sp from Leagle.com

Murphy J. Foster, III  - murphy.foster@bswllp.com - for
Defendant-Appellee.
Greg Guidry  - greg.guidry@ogletree.com -  for Defendant-Appellee.
Melissa Morse Shirley - melissa.shirley@bswllp.com - for
Defendant-Appellee.
Hal David Ungar  - dungar2@thezenith.com - for Defendant-Appellee.
Roberto Luis Costales  - rlc@beaumontcostales.com - for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sunny West , Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Llp, 301 Main St Fl 23,
Baton Bouge,  LA, 70801-1916, for Defendant-Appellee.

Jonathan Kirkland - jonathan.davis@kirkland.com - for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

PLAINS ALL: Grey Fox's Bid to Certify Class Under Submission
------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez takes under submission the motion
for class certification pending in the lawsuit captioned Grey Fox,
LLC, et al. v. Plains All American Pipeline, L.P., et al., Case No.
2:16-cv-03157-PSG-JEM (C.D. Cal.).

According to the Court's Civil Minutes, the Court and counsel has
to confer about the Motion and the need to set pretrial and trial
dates in this matter. The Court takes the class certification
motion under submission and sets a status conference for March 2,
2020, at 1:30 p.m., with a joint status report to be filed by
February 24, 2020.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          A. Barry Cappello, Esq.
          CAPPELLO & NOEL LLP
          831 State Street
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101-3227
          Telephone: (805) 564-2444
          Facsimile: (805) 965-5950
          E-mail: abc@cappellonoel.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          Juli Farris, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          Facsimile: (805) 456-1497
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com
                  jfarris@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Robert J. Nelson, Esq.
          Wilson M. Dunlavey, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: rnelson@lchb.com
                  wdunlavey@lchb.com

               - and -

The Defendants are represented by:

          Grant A. David-Deny, Esq.
          Daniel B. Levin, Esq.
          Jessica Reich Baril, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          50 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-3426
          Telephone: (213) 683-9100
          E-mail: Grant.Davis-Denny@mto.com
                  Daniel.Levin@mto.com
                  Jessica.Baril@mto.com


PLEXOS GROUP: Wagner Moves for Conditional Class Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled JAMES PATRICK WAGNER, individually and on
behalf of other similarly situated employees v. PLEXOS GROUP, LLC,
Case No. 3:19-cv-00822-SDD-EWD (M.D. La.), the Plaintiff moves for
conditional certification, judicial notice, and for disclosure of
the names and addresses of potential "opt-in" plaintiffs.

The action arises from a "generally applicable rule, policy, or
practice" pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip Bohrer, Esq.
          Scott E. Brady, Esq.
          BOHRER BRADY, LLC
          8712 Jefferson Highway, Suite B
          Baton Rouge, LA 70809
          Telephone: (225) 925-5297
          Facsimile: (225) 231-7000
          E-mail: phil@bohrerbrady.com
                  scott@bohrerbrady.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP LAW FIRM
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 325-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 325-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  cfitz@mybackwages.com


PNC FINANCIAL: Collects Improper Overdraft Fees, Komorski Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Komorski, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation, Case No. 2020CH01060 (Ill. Cir., Cook
Cty., Jan. 28, 2020), seeks to stop the Defendant's practice of
assessing and collecting improper and excessive overdraft fees
arising from a practice that breaches the Bank's contracts and/or
is deceptive and designed to unfairly increase the Bank's fee
revenue.

PNC is a national bank and conducts business throughout Illinois
and operates around 181 retail banking centers in Illinois.

PNC charges account holders a $36 overdraft ("OD") fee when there
are insufficient funds to pay a requested transaction and PNC
chooses to accept the charge. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff asserts,
PNC undertakes to maximize OD Fees through a deceptive, unfair, and
unconscionable assessment practice, which also violates PNC's
accountholder contracts--specifically, the promise to charge OD
Fees only on transactions, which actually overdraw an account.

As happened to him on numerous occasions, PNC charges OD Fees even
when the transaction has not overdrawn an account, the Plaintiff
says. For example, the Plaintiff was charged two OD Fees on
December 10, 2019. But, according to the monthly account statement
prepared by PNC, the Plaintiff's account balance was never negative
for those transactions. By definition, there were always funds to
"pay" that transaction--yet PNC assessed an OD Fee on it anyway.
The Plaintiff argues that PNC is not authorized by contract to
charge OD Fees on transactions that have not overdrawn an account,
but it has done so and continues do so.

The Plaintiff has been a resident and citizen of the state of
Illinois and has had a checking account with PNC at a branch in
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eugene Turin, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Drive, 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Phone: (312) 893-7002
          Email: eturin@mcgpc.com


PORTOLA PHARMACEUTICALS: Rosen Law Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Portola Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: PTLA) between
November 5, 2019 and January 9, 2020, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Portola
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Portola class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1758.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Portola's internal control over financial reporting
regarding reserve for product returns was not effective; (2)
Portola was shipping longer-dated product with 36-month shelf life;
(3) Portola had not established adequate reserve for returns of
prior shipments of short-dated product; (4) as a result, Portola
was reasonably likely to need to "catch up" on accounting for
return reserves; and (5) as a result of the foregoing, defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than March 16,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1758.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors. [GN]

POTOMAC FAMILY: Class Claims in Williams Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division issued a Memorandum Opinion granting in part and
denying in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
and Motion to Strike Class Claims in the case captioned TY
WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. POTOMAC FAMILY DINING GROUP OPERATING
COMPANY, LLC, Defendant. Case No. GJH-19-1780. (D. Md.)

Plaintiff Ty Williams  brings this action under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) against Defendant Potomac Family Dining
Group Operating Company, LLC (Defendant), which owns and operates a
number of Applebee's Grill & Bar restaurants. Plaintiff alleges
that the parking facilities at several of Defendant's restaurants
do not comply with the ADA and accordingly seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief personally and as the representative of a class.

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his
individual claims and that his class claims should be stricken
because his proposed class cannot meet the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint and to strike
Plaintiff's class allegations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's individual claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), asserting that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks standing. A district
court should grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) only if the material
jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is
entitled to prevail as a matter of law.  

Defendant has also moved to strike Plaintiff's class claims on the
grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing to serve as a class
representative and that the class as proposed cannot meet the
requirements of Rule 23.
  
Individual Standing

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks an injury in fact sufficient
for standing to pursue claims as an individual because he suffered
no injury and is at no risk of any future injury.

To establish a case or controversy necessary to invoke federal
jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the
three irreducible minimum requirements' of Article III standing:
(1) an injury-in-fact, i.e., a concrete and particularized invasion
of a legally protected interest) (2) causation, i.e., a fairly
traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the
alleged conduct of the defendant  and (3) redressability, i.e., it
is likely and not merely speculative that the plaintiff's injury
will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit.

Class Standing and the Disjuncture Problem

This case presents at least some degree of disjuncture. Plaintiff
alleges that he suffered an injury due to an excessively sloped
curb ramp at one of Defendant's restaurants, but seeks relief for
the injuries of other proposed class members who have encountered
excessively sloped curb ramps, parking spaces, or access aisles at
different locations that Plaintiff has no intention of visiting.
The Court therefore must apply one of the competing approaches to
the disjuncture problem. For multiple reasons, the Court will
follow the class certification approach. First, while the Fourth
Circuit does not appear to have weighed in on the disjuncture
problem, at least two district courts in this circuit have embraced
this approach.  

Rule 23 Requirements

Defendant contends that regardless of Plaintiff's standing to serve
as a class representative, Plaintiff's class claims should be
stricken because Plaintiff fails to plead a certifiable class.  
Plaintiff responds that Defendant's motion is premature and that
the Court should defer consideration of Rule 23 until the class
certification stage.  

In general, to state a claim that survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. The
mere recital of elements of a cause of action, supported only by
conclusory statements, is not sufficient to survive a motion made
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

With this standard in mind, the Court turns to the requirements of
Rule 23 that Plaintiff ultimately must meet. Rule 23(a) requires
that a prospective class comply with four prerequisites: (1)
numerosity (2) commonality (3) typicality and (4) adequacy of
representation.

Plaintiff's proposed Rule 23(b)(2) nationwide class is defined as
follows: All persons with qualified mobility disabilities who were
denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any Potomac
Family Dining Group Operating Company, LLC location in the United
States on the basis of disability because such persons encountered
accessibility barriers due to Defendant's failure to comply with
the ADA's accessible parking and path of travel requirements.

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot meet the commonality,
typicality, and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a), nor the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Because the Court agrees that the
proposed class lacks sufficient commonality to satisfy Rule
23(a)(2), it need not reach Defendant's other arguments.

The Court notes that to establish commonality, the party seeking
certification must demonstrate that the class members have suffered
the same injury and that their claims depend upon a common
contention. The chief issue with the class definition that
Plaintiff proposes here is the overly broad range of potential ADA
violations that it purports to reach. By extending the definition
to persons who suffered injury due to Defendant's failure to comply
with the ADA's accessible parking and path of travel requirements,
Plaintiff proposes a class with members who have suffered different
injuries from those Plaintiff alleges, namely those involving path
of travel requirements that the Complaint does not specifically
allege were violated.  

In fact, the Complaint does not offer a definition of path of
travel, nor an explanation of what it means in using the term.
Though one paragraph cites 28 C.F.R. Section 36.211 for the
assertion that the accessible features of Defendant's facilities,
which include the parking lots and paths of travel, are required to
be maintained so that they are readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with mobility disabilities, that regulation does not
discuss paths of travel.  

Review of other provisions of the ADA's implementing regulations,
however, reveals that path of travel is a term of art with a
specific definition.  

Path of travel is specifically defined as a continuous,
unobstructed way of pedestrian passage by means of which the
altered area may be approached, entered, and exited, and which
connects the altered area with an exterior approach including
sidewalks, streets, and parking areas, an entrance to the facility,
and other parts of the facility.

Two conclusions are apparent from these provisions, says the Court.
First, accessible path of travel obligations arise for facility
owners when they make qualifying alterations to their facilities,
they do not generally apply to all owners of public accommodations.
Second, and importantly, physical aspects of altered facilities
that may fall under the broad definition of the term range beyond
parking lot and sidewalk features to lobbies, corridors, and rooms,
as well as elevators and lifts.  

The Complaint asserts no such injuries, either to Plaintiff at the
Germantown facility or at the other facilities Plaintiff's
investigators examined. That creates a substantial disjuncture,
producing a proposed class with members who have not all suffered
the same injury. Stated differently, many class members would have
injuries that the Complaint does not allege, except perhaps in
asserting general violations of Title III. But commonality requires
more than that the proposed class members suffered a violation of
the same provision of law.

Reinserting the alteration component of the path of travel
definition only strengthens the conclusion that Plaintiff's
proposed class fails to satisfy the commonality requirement. The
Complaint makes no specific allegations about alterations of
Defendant's facilities, instead stating merely that Defendant's
facilities were altered, designed, or constructed after the
effective date of the ADA. There is therefore no way to identify
from the Complaint which of Defendant's facilities would be subject
to path of travel requirements, nor can the Complaint fairly be
read to suggest that investigating the dates of any alterations
would be a topic for discovery.

That raises not only a commonality problem, but also a potential
issue of ascertainability, the implicit threshold requirement that
the members of a proposed class be readily identifiable.  In any
event, it is plain from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff
has failed to properly allege facts sufficient to make out a
class.

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
and Motion to Strike Class Claims, will be granted only with
respect to the class claims, and without prejudice to Plaintiff's
right to amend the Complaint, rules the Court. Defendant's Motion
will be denied in all other respects.

A full-text copy of the District Court's October 22, 2019
Memorandum Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/y6g2hrhw
from Leagle.com.

Ty Williams, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jordan Tyler Porter  -
jordan@nshmlaw.com - Nye Stirling Hale and Miller LLP, pro hac vice
& Thomas Joseph Minton - tminton@charmcitylegal.com - Goldman and
Minton PC.

Potomac Family Dining Group Operating Company, LLC, Defendant,
represented by Kara Mather Maciel  - kmaciel@connmaciel.com - Conn
Maciel Carey LLP.


PRAIRIE FARMS: Jackson Seeks to Recover Overtime Pay Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
CLAIBORNE JACKSON, Individually, and on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated v. PRAIRIE FARMS DAIRY, INC., an Illinois
Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-02018-TLP-jay (W.D. Tenn., Jan. 9,
2020), seeks to recover damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
for alleged unpaid overtime compensation on behalf of those who
have worked for the Defendant as hourly-paid production employees.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant has had a common plan,
policy and practice of automatically "editing-out" a 30-minute meal
period each work shift during which the Plaintiff and those
similarly situated were not compensated for such "edited-out" time.
He also asserts that they were required, forced, expected and/or,
suffered and permitted, to perform work and, performed such work,
during 30-minute meal periods, without being compensated for such
work time at the applicable FLSA overtime rates of pay.

The Defendant is a milk processing company with some 44 processing
facilities in 14 different states, including one facility in
Memphis, Tennessee, where the Plaintiff and similarly situated
hourly-paid production employees work.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gordon E. Jackson, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Nathan A. Bishop, Esq.
          Robert E. Morelli, III, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER & HOLT, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 754-8524
          E-mail: gjackson@jsyc.com
                  rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com
                  rmorelli@jsyc.com


PROFESSIONAL AUTO: Sales Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional Auto
Transport Inc. The case is styled as Denson M. Sales, on behalf of
all others similarly situated and on behalf of the general public,
Plaintiff v. Professional Auto Transport Inc., Does 1-100,
Defendants, Case No. 34-2020-00274521-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Sacramento Cty., Jan. 30, 2020).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Professional Auto Transport, Inc. provides transportation services.
The Company offers car haul carrier services for original equipment
manufacturers, auctions, rental fleets, dealers, and remarketing
sectors.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by David Mara, Esq.

PROFESSIONAL CLAIMS: Lowenbien Files FDCPA Suit in New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Professional Claims
Bureau, Inc. The case is styled as Boruch Lowenbien, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
Professional Claims Bureau, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00543
(E.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Professional Claims Bureau, Inc. provides receivable collection and
management services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


PRUDENTIAL OVERALL: Fails to Pay Minimum & OT Wages, Garcia Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERTO REYES GARCIA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. PRUDENTIAL OVERALL SUPPLY, a California corporation;
and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, Case No. 20CV361513 (Cal. Super.,
Santa clara Cty., Jan. 9, 2020), alleges that the Defendant
violated the California Labor Code by failing to pay minimum,
regular, and overtime wages.

The Defendants had a consistent policy of failing to pay the
Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class all wages due,
including overtime premium wages for hours worked in excess of 8
hours per day and/or 40 hours per week, according to the
complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a Laundry Worker and
Maintenance Mechanic/Helper, both non-exempt hourly-paid positions,
in the Defendants' Milpitas location within Santa Clara County.

Prudential was founded in 1923 as a uniform and textile laundry
service, serving municipal, industrial, and service industry
complaint in California and throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

           Michael D. Singer, Esq.
           Marta Manus, Esq.
           COHELAN KHOURY & SINGER
           605 C Street, Suite 200
           San Diego, CA 92101
           Telephone: (619) 595-3001
           Facsimile: (619) 595-3000
           E-mail: msinger@ckslaw.com
                   mmanus@ckslaw.com

                - and -

           Sahag Majarian, Esq.
           LAW OFFICES OF SAHAG MAJARIAN II
           18250 Ventura Blvd.
           Tarzana, CA 91356
           Telephone: (818) 609-0807
           Facsimile: (818) 609-0892
           E-mail: sahagii@aol.com


R.T.R. FINANCIAL: Lowenbien Files FDCPA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against R.T.R. Financial
Services Inc. The case is styled as Boruch Lowenbien, on behalf of
herself and all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff v.
R.T.R. Financial Services Inc., Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00534
(E.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

RTR Financial Services, Inc. (RTR) is a provider of accounts
receivable management services to health care providers throughout
New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam Jon Fishbein, Esq.
          Adam J. Fishbein, P.C.
          735 Central Avenue
          Woodmere, NY 11598
          Phone: (516) 668-6945
          Email: fishbeinadamj@gmail.com


REALTYSHARES INC: Shapiro Haber Files Class Action
--------------------------------------------------
Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP has filed a class action against
RealtyShares, Inc., RS Lending, Inc. and others ("Defendants"), for
violations of federal and state securities laws, in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, entitled
Raudonis v. RealtyShares, Inc. et al., C.A. No. 20-cv-10107

The Complaint arises out of Defendants' solicitation of investors
in 2016 to purchase debt securities relating to a loan to Ingersoll
Financial, LLC (the "Nationwide SFR Package") and in or around 2018
to purchase debt securities relating to loans involving Franchise
Growth, LLC, including a loan involving a Church's Chicken in
Owensboro, Kentucky. In soliciting these investments, Defendants
knowingly or recklessly misrepresented material facts and/or
omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, in violation of federal and state law.
Defendants also offered the securities by means of written
communications that included untrue statements of material fact
and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading in violation of state law.

The action is brought on behalf of the following classes and
subclass, defined as follows:

All persons or entities who purchased debt securities offered or
sold by RealtyShares or RS Lending relating to loans to Franchise
Growth and/or associated entities for property acquisition and
construction;

All persons or entities who purchased debt securities related to a
loan to Franchise Growth and/or associated entities for property
acquisition and construction of a Church's Chicken restaurant to be
located at 2735 Calumet Trace, Owensboro, Kentucky; and

All persons or entities who purchased debt securities related to a
loan to Ingersoll Financial for property acquisition and repair of
125 properties across the United States, known as the Nationwide
SFR Package.

If you purchased debt securities relating to loans involving
Franchise Growth, including the loan regarding the Church's Chicken
in Owensboro, or relating to the Nationwide SFR Package, you may
move the court to appoint you as lead plaintiff no later than 60
days from today.

The factual and legal bases for the Plaintiff's claims are set
forth in greater detail in the Complaint.  A copy of the Complaint
can be obtained from the office of the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 1 Courthouse Way,
Boston, Massachusetts 02210.  A copy of the Complaint is also
available on the firm's web site, www.shulaw.com.  More information
about the law firm of Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP and its
qualifications is also available on the firm's website.  If you
would like more information about this case, please contact Ian
McLoughlin at the firm's telephone numbers below or by email at
cases@shulaw.com.

Contact:

         Shapiro Haber & Urmy LLP
         2 Seaport Lane
         Boston, MA 02210
         Tel:  (800) 287-8119 or (617) 439-3939
[GN]



REMAX INC: Sloatman Sues Over Unsolicited Calls Violating TCPA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lala Sloatman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. REMAX, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each
of them, Case No. 2:20-cv-00845 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 28, 2020), seeks
damages and other remedies resulting from the illegal actions of
the Defendants in negligently contacting the Plaintiff's cellular
telephone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
specifically the National Do-Not-Call provisions, thereby, invading
the Plaintiff's privacy.

The Defendant used an "automatic telephone dialing system" to place
its call to the Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services,
according to the complaint. The Defendant's calls constituted calls
that were not for emergency purposes. The Defendant did not possess
the Plaintiff's "prior express consent" to receive calls using an
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice on its cellular telephone.

Based on the Plaintiff's experiences of being called by the
Defendant after being on the National Do-Not-Call list for several
years prior to the Defendant's initial call, the Defendant failed
to establish and implement reasonable practices and procedures to
effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the
regulations prescribed under the TCPA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a natural person and residing in Huntington Beach,
California.

The Defendant is a real estate corporation doing business in
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Meghan E. George, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Phone: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                 mgeorge@toddflaw.com
                 abacon@toddflaw.com


RMLS HOP: Court Dismisses Romulus From Slaughter FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAKURA SLAUGHTER, Plaintiff, v. RMLS HOP OHIO,
L.L.C., et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-3812 (S.D. Ohio),
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted in part and
denied in part Defendant Romulus Holdings LLC's Motion to Dismiss,
and dismissed the Complaint as against Defendant Romulus.

Slaughter was employed as a server at IHOP in Hillard, Ohio, from
December of 2018 to July of 2018.  She was also employed as a
server at IHOP in Reynoldsburg, Ohio from December 2018 to March
2019.  On Sept. 3, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against
Defendant Romulus and Defendant RMLS alleging violations of Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and the Ohio Constitution on behalf
of herself, on behalf of those similar situated as an FLSA
collective action, and on behalf of other members of a class of
persons who assert claims under the laws of Ohio, as a class
action.

On Sept. 22, 2019, the counsel for Defendant Romulus sent the
counsel for the Plaintiff a letter stating that Defendant Romulus
is not a property party to the litigation.  It does not own or
operate any restaurants, and does not employ servers, nor does it
have any subsidiaries who do so, either directly or by any
subsidiary entities. Consequently, the claims against Romulus
Holdings, LLC should be dismissed voluntarily.  The letter also
contained information regarding Defendant RMLS, which is relevant
to the Plaintiff's minimum wage claims.

Subsequent to the Sept. 22 letter, the parties' counsel exchanged
several emails.  The Plaintiff's counsel asked Defendant Romulus'
counsel for the Plaintiff's pay records as well as further
information on her time spent working non-tipped duties.  Defendant
Romulus' counsel provided the requested documents and information.
The Defendant Romulus' counsel also asked the Plaintiff's counsel
to stipulate to an extension of time to answer in order to give her
more time to review the information and consider dismissing the
case.  She never responded to the request.

On Oct. 28, 2019, Defendant Romulus filed a Motion to Dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The motion also included
a request for attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. Section 1927.  On
Nov. 12, 2019, the Plaintiff simultaneously filed a response
agreeing to dismiss her claims against Defendant Romulus and an
amended complaint no longer including Defendant Romulus and instead
including Defendant Jane Doe Company No. 1.  She, however, opposed
the request for attorney's fees.

Judge Sargus agrees with the Plaintiff that the conduct does not
rise to the level of multiplying the proceedings "unreasonably and
vexatiously."  The Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the claim against
Defendant Romulus as soon as Defendant Romulus filed the
declaration as evidence it was not the correct party.  This quick
dismissal is contrary to the facts of the cases where courts in the
circuit have awarded attorneys' fees under the statute.

While the Plaintiff may have acted with simple negligence in
failing to follow up with the Defendant for further inquiry into
whether it was a correct party to name as a defendant, simple
negligence is not enough to warrant sanctions.  The Defendant's
Rule 11 argument is not persuasive because they have not filed a
Rule 11 motion and have not satisfied the procedural requirements
of such motion by giving Plaintiff the safe harbor time period.
Its argument that the Plaintiff should have sued a fictitious
defendant again shows only simple negligence, not the conduct
required under the statue.

Finally, the Judge finds that the Defendant's argument that the
Plaintiff should be held accountable in order to encourage more
mindful litigating in the future is well taken, but not enough to
award sanctions.  The Plaintiff should be mindful of the costs of
litigation on other parties and the care that should be taken to
ensure unnecessary litigation is not pursued.  The statute,
however, does not allow the Court to award the Defendant attorney's
fees solely for this purpose.  As the case law shows, the Court is
only to award fees when a party unreasonably and vexatiously
multiplies the proceedings, a standard which has not been met in
the case.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Sargus granted in part and denied
in part Defendant Romulus' Motion to Dismiss.  The Plaintiff's
claims against Defendant Romulus are dismissed.  The request for
attorney's fees is denied.  

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/AM34TR from Leagle.com.

Shakura Slaughter, Plaintiff, represented by Kevin M. McDermott, II
-- kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com -- Scott & Winters Law Firm, LLC,
Joseph Francis Scott -- jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com -- & Ryan A.
Winters -- rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com.

RMLS Hop Ohio, L.L.C., Defendant, represented by D. Patrick Kasson
, Reminger Co., LPA.


SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS: DeFrank Suit Moved to NJ District Court
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Michael R. Barrett of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted Samsung's
Motion to Transfer Venue in the case captioned LISA DEFRANK, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:18-cv-00296 (S.D. Ohio).

The Amended Complaint alleges that Samsung is responsible for
designing, manufacturing, marketing, and selling consumer clothes
drying machines with a faulty design or manufacturing process,
resulting in a defect that rendered the dryers unusable for their
stated purpose.  The Plaintiffs purchased the dryers in question
through various retailers between December 2011 and May 2017, and
allege that Samsung's use of "thin-gauge steel and/or defective fly
wheels," eventually caused large cracks in the drum and subsequent
exposure of the heating element.

The Plaintiffs seek class certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and accordingly propose a single
nationwide class in addition to six subclasses composed of
individuals who purchased one or more of 164 models of Samsung
dryers in the states of California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Illinois, and Florida.  

The Amended Complaint contains 11 counts against Samsung, including
two under federal law on behalf of the nationwide class (or,
alternatively, on behalf of each of the state subclasses), three
under California law, two under Ohio law, and one each under the
state laws of New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, and Florida.

The Plaintiffs filed their Initial Complaint and, in response to
Samsung's Motion to Dismiss, filed an Amended Complaint.  Samsung
responded by filing the currently pending Motion to Transfer Venue,
arguing that the balance of the relevant factors strongly supports
transfer of the action to the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey.

Of the named Plaintiffs (and proposed class representatives) in the
Amended Complaint, two reside in Ohio, and one each reside in the
states of California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and New
Mexico.  Samsung is a New York corporation with its principal place
of business in New Jersey.

After weighing the relevant public and private factors, Judge
Barrett concludes that Samsung has sufficiently met its burden
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) and the balance of convenience
weighs in favor of transfer.  Transfer of the case to the District
of New Jersey is proper and in the overall interest of justice.

Accordingly, Judge Barrett granted Samsung's Motion to Transfer
Venue and ordered for the transfer of the case to the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

A full-text copy of the Court's Dec. 13, 2019 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/rOdJsY from Leagle.com.

Lisa DeFrank, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Chris Garcia, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Mark DiTroia, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Carl Gersh, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Wendy Dowds, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Maria Keene, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated & Ashley Nuibe,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, represented by Beau D. Hollowell --
bhollowell@karonllc.com -- Joseph G. Sauder --
jds@sstriallawyers.com -- SAUDER SCHELKOPF, pro hac vice & Daniel
Richard Karon -- dkaron@karonllc.com -- Karon LLC.

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jesse
L. Jenike-Godshalk -- Jesse.Jenike-Godshalk@ThompsonHine.com -- Kip
T. Bollin -- Kip.Bollin@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson Hine LLP &
Melanie Lazor -- Melanie.Lazor@ThompsonHine.com -- Thompson Hine,
LLP.


SHALIMAR SWEETS: Faces Quiroz Suit Alleging Violations of FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rogelio Quiroz, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. Shalimar Sweets & Restaurant, King of Sweets Corp.,
Mohammad Latif, Abid Latif, and Zahid Latif, Case No. 2:20-cv-00902
(D.N.J., Jan. 28, 2020), accuses the Defendants of violating the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Defendants operate a storefront eatery that features Pakistani
and Indian cuisine, plus a large display of sweets. Shalimar
Restaurant is located in Iselin, New Jersey.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Louis Pechman, Esq.
          Catalina Cadavid, Esq.
          PECHMAN LAW GROUP
          488 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: 212-583-9500
          E-mail: pechman@pechmanlaw.com
                  cadavid@pechmanlaw.com


SHOP-RITE SUPERMARKETS: Misrepresents Soymilk Drinks, Twohig Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sean Twohig, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc., Case No. 7:20-cv-00763
(S.D.N.Y., Jan. 28, 2020), seeks damages under consumer protection
laws from the Defendant's misleading representations on their
soymilk beverages purporting to be flavored only with vanilla.

The relevant front label statements include "Organic," "Soymilk,"
"Enriched with Vitamins A, D, and Calcium" and "Vanilla." The
Plaintiff alleges that the representations are misleading because
the Product's taste and flavor, recognized by consumers as vanilla,
is not provided exclusively by vanilla beans despite the front
label representation to the contrary. The Defendant's branding and
packaging of the Products are designed to--and did--deceive,
mislead, and defraud consumers, the Plaintiff asserts.

According to the complaint, the Defendant's false, deceptive, and
misleading branding and packaging of the Product has enabled the
Defendant to sell more of the Product and at higher prices per
unit, than it would have in the absence of this misconduct,
resulting in additional profits at the expense of consumers. Had
the Plaintiff and class members known the truth, they would not
have bought the Products or would have paid less for it. As a
result of the false and misleading labeling, the Product is sold at
a premium price, approximately no less than $1.00 per unit,
excluding tax, compared to other similar products represented in a
non-misleading way, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased the Products for personal consumption
within this district.

Shop-Rite Supermarkets, Inc. manufactures, distributes, markets,
labels and sells soymilk beverages purporting to be flavored only
with vanilla under the Wholesome Pantry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          Facsimile: (516) 234-7800
          Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com


SOLID WOOD: Fails to Pay Contractually Owed Wages, Weisel Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Taylor Weisel, Corey Harris, Scott Warren, Darin Chomenko, Judy
Hein and Alexis Carroll, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. THE SOLID WOOD CABINET COMPANY, LLC, STEVE
NEWTON, DOUG W. AARDENBURG, STEVE OAKLEY, KEVIN ETHERIDGE, Case No.
200103232 (Pa. Com. Pleas, Philadelphia Cty., Jan. 28, 2020),
accuses the Defendants of failing to pay the Plaintiffs
contractually owed wages, in violation of the Pennsylvania Wage
Payment and Collection Law and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law.

The Plaintiffs and the Class Members regular payday was the Friday
of every second week in a pay period ("Regular Payday"). On January
17, 2020, on behalf of SWC, Defendant Newton unexpectedly e-mailed
the Plaintiffs and the Class Members to inform them that SWC was
ceasing all business operations and all employees were terminated
effective immediately. In that same e-mail, Newton further stated
that SWC will not be paying them the wages that are owed to them.

The Defendants knew or should have known that by failing and/or
refusing to pay their employees constituted a violation of the WPCL
and the WPL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs worked as a Sales Coordinator, Sales Consultant,
Kitchen Design Consultant, Kitchen Designer, Sales Representative,
Marketing Manager, at SWC in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

SWC is a limited liability company registered in the state of
Delaware.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Casey Green, Esq.
          Shawn McBrearty, Esq.
          SIDKOFF, PINCUS & GREEN, P.C.
          1101 Market Street, Suite 2700
          Philadelphia, PA 119107
          Phone: (215) 574-0600


STARBUCKS CORP: Court Denies Troester's Class Certification Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DOUGLAS TROESTER, on behalf
of himself, and all others similarly situated, the Plaintiff, v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, and Does 1-50, the Defendants, Case No.
2:12-cv-07677-CJC-PJW (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Cormac J. Carney
entered an order on: Jan. 27, 2020:

   1. granting Starbucks' motion for partial summary judgment;
      and

   2. denying Plaintiff's motion for class certification of:

      "all Starbucks employees in California from August 6, 2008
      through December 31, 2012 who worked a closing shift in a
      Starbucks store and performed work after clocking out."

Indeed, Plaintiff points to no records or other evidence that would
create common proof on whether employees performed these functions
on or off the clock, or that would 8 otherwise allow these claims
to be proven for all class members collectively one way or another,
the Court says.

In sum, individualized issues regarding whether employees worked
off the clock and why they did so predominate over common questions
regarding whether such work is compensable. Accordingly, class
certification is not appropriate, the Court adds.

The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Starbucks on
Plaintiff's claim for liquidated damages on his unpaid wages claim
because the claim is barred by the statute of limitations or, in
the alternative, because Starbucks acted in good faith and had
reasonable grounds for believing that the alleged act or omission
was not a violation of law.

The Plaintiff brought this putative class action against Defendant,
alleging claims for failure to pay minimum and overtime wages,
failure to provide accurate written wage statements, failure to
timely pay all final wages, and unfair competition in violation of
the California Labor Code. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that
Starbucks failed to provide accurate written wage statements by
giving him pay statements that did not reflect his actual hours
worked -- that is, statements that did not include the time
Plaintiff spent working after he clocked out.

Starbucks is an American coffee company and coffeehouse chain.[CC]

SYKES BOURDON: Fulp Files FDCPA Suit in Virginia
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sykes, Bourdon, Ahern
& Levy, PC. The case is styled as Keko Fulp, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Sykes,
Bourdon, Ahern & Levy, PC, John Does 1-25, Defendants, Case No.
3:20-cv-00053-HEH (E.D. Va., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Sykes, Bourdon, Ahern & Levy, P.C. is a full service law firm
established in 1990.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aryeh Eliezer Stein, Esq.
          Meridian Law, LLC
          600 Reisterstown Road, Suite 700
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Phone: (443) 326-6011
          Fax: (410) 653-1061
          Email: astein@meridianlawfirm.com


SYSCO CORPORATION: $800K Frieri Suit Deal Gets Initial Court Nod
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned RICK FRIERI, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
v. SYSCO CORPORATION; SYSCO SAN DIEGO, INC.; and DOES 1-100,
Defendants, Case No. 16-CV-1432 JLS (NLS) (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit alleging violations of
California's Labor and Business and Professions Codes on behalf of
non-exempt truck drivers working for Defendants Sysco Corporation
and Sysco San Diego, Inc. Plaintiff alleges four claims for relief
under various provisions of California law:

1. Failure to pay for all hours worked, violating California Labor
Code Section 218.
2. Failure to authorize and permit rest periods every four hours,
violating California Labor Code.
3. Failure to pay all wages due at the time of termination from
employment, violating California Labor Code Sections 201-203 and
4. Unfair competition violations of California Business &
Professions Code Sections 17200 et seq.
Settlement Terms

Defendant agrees to pay a maximum Gross Settlement Amount of
$800,000. From this amount will be deducted: (1) payments to
Participating Class Members (2) settlement administration costs (3)
awards of attorneys' fees and costs (4) the class representative
enhanced payment and (5) employee and employer payroll taxes on the
portion of the settlement payments to Participating Class Members
deemed as wages.

Rule 23 Settlement Class Certification

Before granting preliminary approval of a class action settlement
agreement, the Court must first determine whether the proposed
Settlement Class can be certified. Rule 23(a) allows class
certification only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class and(4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that a class must
be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Here,
the proposed Settlement Class consists of approximately 232
members.   Accordingly, joinder of all members would be
impracticable for purposes of Rule 23(a)(1), and the numerosity
requirement is satisfied.

Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) requires that there be
questions of law or fact common to the class.

Here, Plaintiff has defined the Settlement Class to encompass the
employees impacted by the allegedly illegal policies of Defendants.
Critically, Plaintiff's allegations center on the common questions
of whether Defendant Sysco San Diego's uniform policies deprived
the Class of compliant rest periods and whether Defendant Sysco San
Diego's uniform policies resulted in a failure to pay all wages
owed to Settlement Class Members, which courts have held to be
sufficient to establish commonality. All common questions revolve
around whether Defendants' policies potentially harmed every member
of the Settlement Class.

Accordingly, it is appropriate for these issues to be adjudicated
on a class-wide basis and Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied.

Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality

To satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3), the named
representative's claims must be typical of the claims of the
Class.

Here, Plaintiff Rick Frieri is a former non-exempt driver of
Defendant Sysco San Diego, Inc, whose claims allegedly arise out of
the same policies and practices as those pertaining to the proposed
Settlement Class. Plaintiff and Settlement Class Members allegedly
suffered the same injuries related to Defendants' policies and
practices. The Court finds Plaintiff's claims are typical of the
claims of the Settlement Class Members and thus satisfies Rule
23(a)(3).

Rule23(a)(4): Adequacy

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires that the named
representative fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.

Here, there is no reason to believe that Plaintiff and Class
Counsel have any conflict of interest with Settlement Class
Members. Plaintiff's claims are consistent with those of the
remainder of the nonexempt employee drivers he seeks to represent.
Further, there is no evidence in the record to indicate a conflict
and all members of the proposed Settlement Class including
Plaintiff and Counsel share a common interest in challenging the
legality of the alleged policies and procedures on which the claims
are based.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff and Class Counsel
adequately represent Settlement Class Members and Rule 23(a)(4)'s
adequacy requirement is met.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) permits certification if
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual class members and a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

Predominance

The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether the proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.

Here, the major issues of whether Defendant Sysco San Diego
provided timely and duty-free meal and rest periods to Plaintiff
and the Class and paid the correct overtime compensation stem from
what Plaintiff claims are uniform policies. Further, for purposes
of settlement, class members are not required to prove any
evidentiary or factual issues that could arise in litigation.

Accordingly, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is
satisfied.

Superiority

The final requirement for certification pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is that a class action be superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The superiority inquiry requires the Court to consider
the four factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3):

(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum and(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Here, all the Settlement Class Members' claims involve the same
issues arising from the same factual bases. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that any Settlement Class Member expressed an
interest in controlling the prosecution by filing an independent
action. Further, no other litigation has been initiated.The
interests of the Settlement Class Members in individually
controlling the litigation are minimal, especially given the same
broad-based policies and practices would be at issue. In light of
the above, the Court finds class treatment is the superior method
of adjudicating this controversy.

The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) therefore is met.

Settlement Class Certification

The Court finds certification of the Settlement Class proper under
Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).

Accordingly, the Court CERTIFIES the Settlement Class for
settlement purposes only.

Rule 23 Preliminary Fairness Determination

Having certified the Settlement Class, the Court must next make a
preliminary determination as to whether the proposed settlement is
fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e). Relevant factors to this determination include:

The strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.

Rule 23(e) Factors

Strength of Plaintiff's Case

To succeed on the merits, Plaintiff would have to prove that
Defendants actually engaged in the practices and policies alleged
in the FAC and that those practices and policies violated the law.


Defendants deny all allegations of wrongdoing. Plaintiff estimates
Defendants' maximum potential liability exposure on the underlying
Labor Code claims to be approximately $4,468,218. Although the
proposed settlement amount of $800,000 represents less than twenty
percent of Defendants' maximum liability exposure, there is no
guarantee that even if Plaintiff were to prevail on the merits he
would be awarded the entirety of what he seeks. Considering the
Parties staunch disagreement regarding liability and that a neutral
third-party proposed the terms of the Agreement, the Court finds
that this factor weighs in favor of the $800,000 settlement being
fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further
Litigation

Plaintiff points to numerous obstacles to recovery, including
certification of both proposed classes, surviving motions for
summary judgment, and the challenge of winning on the merits at
trial. Defendant continues to dispute all aspects of Plaintiff's
claims, including class certification absent the Agreement,
suggesting vigorous and costly litigation if the action continues.
In light of these realities, the Court finds this factor weighs in
favor of the settlement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Through Trial

The Parties dispute whether the classes can be validly certified in
the absence of the Agreement. Implicit in this disagreement is the
likelihood of initial challenges to class certification and the
potential for decertification motions even if class status is
granted. Weighed against the fact that Defendant does not oppose a
finding that the class elements are met for purposes of this
settlement, this factor also weighs in favor of the settlement
being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Amount Offered in Settlement

Defendants have offered to pay $800,000 to settle this lawsuit. As
noted above, this represents less than twenty percent of
Defendants' maximum exposure at trial. However, Plaintiff
recognizes that he is unlikely to be awarded the maximum exposure
amount. Furthermore, relying on the Court's tentative ruling
disfavoring certification of one of the classes, Plaintiff
expresses doubts that he could prevail in class certification for
both proposed classes. Plaintiff, accordingly, discounted his
exposure analysis to arrive at the agreed-upon settlement terms.
Considering these facts, the Court finds this factor also weighs in
favor of the settlement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings

Prior to the agreed-upon settlement, the Parties engaged in
substantial discovery, including written discovery that resulted in
thousands of pages of documents and two depositions. The Parties
also engaged in substantial motion practice throughout the
litigation. Finally, the Parties engaged the neutral third-party
mediator who, after a full-day mediation attended by both Parties,
proposed the settlement agreement currently before the Court.
Accordingly, it appears the Parties have entered into the Agreement
with a strong working knowledge of the relevant facts, law, and
strengths and weaknesses of their claims and defenses.

This factor weighs in favor of the proposed settlement being fair,
reasonable, and adequate.

Experience and Views of Counsel

In considering the adequacy of the terms of a settlement, the trial
court is entitled to, and should, rely upon the judgment of
experienced counsel for the parties.

Here, Class Counsel believes the Agreement is fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the best interest of the Settlement Class.
Furthermore, the presumption of reasonableness is warranted in this
case based on Class Counsel's expertise in complex litigation,
familiarity with the relevant facts and law, and significant
experience negotiating other class and collective action
settlements. Given the foregoing, and according the appropriate
weight to the judgment of experienced counsel, this factor weighs
in favor of the proposed settlement being fair, reasonable, and
adequate.

Payment Provisions

Settlement Attorneys' Fees Provision

In the Ninth Circuit, a district court has discretion to apply
either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method in
calculating a fee award.

Here, the Agreement specifies that Defendants will not oppose Class
Counsel's request to the Court for approval of attorneys' fees in
the amount equal to thirty percent of the Gross Settlement Amount
($240,000 of $800,000) and litigation costs not to exceed $75,000.
Although this request does exceed the benchmark of twenty-five
percent, at this stage, the Court preliminarily concludes that this
amount is reasonable.  

Class Representative General Release Payment

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that named plaintiffs in class action
litigation are eligible for reasonable incentive payments.  

In this case, the Agreement provides for a $10,000 General Release
Payment to Plaintiff Rick Frieri to be paid from the gross
settlement amount in addition to his individual settlement share.

This additional compensation is sought because Plaintiff Frieri's
release is broader than the claims released by Participating Class
Members, although he does not relinquish his claims in another
lawsuit against Defendants. A general release by a class
representative is often coupled with an incentive payment in class
action settlements. Plaintiff claims that the payment is further
justified because he may have suffered financial consequences had
the case been lost and because he may suffer the loss of future
employment opportunities due to his participation in this lawsuit.
At this stage, the Court preliminarily approves the proposed
$10,000 General Release Payment to Plaintiff.

Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Settlement regarding the Settlement Agreement.
The action is preliminarily certified, for settlement purposes
only, as a class action on behalf of the following Settlement Class
Members with respect to the claims asserted in this Action:

Class: All persons within the State of California who are or were
employed by Sysco San Diego, Inc. in the State of California at any
time as a truck driver from April 11, 2012, through the date the
Court enters an order granting Preliminary Approval or February 17,
2019, whichever occurs first.

The Court preliminarily certifies, for settlement purposes only,
Plaintiff Rick Frieri as Class Representative, and David Mara, Jill
Vecchi, and Matthew Crawford of Mara Law Firm, PC as Class Counsel.
Additionally, the Court approves and appoints ILYM Group, Inc. as
Settlement Administrator.

The Court approves the form and substance of the proposed notice
set forth in the Settlement Agreement

Within ten (10) business days of the date of this Preliminary
Approval Order, Defendant SHALL provide the Settlement
Administrator with the Class Database and within seventeen (17)
days of this Order, the Parties SHALL DISSEMINATE the Notice in the
form attached as Exhibit A and in the manner and form provided in
the Settlement Agreement.

The Court shall conduct a Final Approval Hearing on March 26, 2020
at 1:30 p.m. at 221 W. Broadway, Courtroom 4D, 4th Floor, San
Diego, CA 92101, to consider, among other things, the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement.

No later than twenty-one (21) days before the Final Approval
Hearing, the Parties shall file a Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement. The Motion shall include and address any
objections received as of the filing date. In addition to the class
certification and settlement fairness factors, the motion shall
address the number of putative Settlement Class Members who have
opted out and the corresponding number of claims.

No later than twenty-one (21) days before the Final Approval
Hearing, Class Counsel shall file an application for attorneys'
fees, costs, and the class representative service award.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 2, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/w2l239h  from Leagle.com

Rick Frieri, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiff,
represented by Jill M. Vecchi - jvecchi@maralawfirm.com - Mara Law
Firm, PC, William D. Turley , The Turley Law Firm, APLC, 6440 N.
Central Expressway, Suite 1000, Dallas, Texas 75206, -
ntrenner@maralawfirm.com - Mara Law Firm, PC & Matthew Evan
Crawford-  mcrawford@maralawfirm.com - Mara Law Firm, PC.

Sysco Corporation & Sysco San Diego, Inc., Defendants, represented
by Julie Kwun , Baker & Hosteler, LLP, Margaret Rosenthal  -
mrosenthal@bakerlaw.com - Baker & Hostetler LLP, Sabrina Layne -
sshadi@bakerlaw.com -  Shadi , Baker & Hostetler LLP & Vartan S.
Madoyan - vmadoyan@bakerlaw.com - Baker and Hostetler LLP.

TANDY LEATHER: Faces Haghebaert Securities Suit in California
-------------------------------------------------------------
FREDERIC HAGHEBAERT, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. TANDY LEATHER FACTORY, INC., JANET CARR, TINA
L. CASTILLO, and SHANNON L. GREENE, Case No. 2:19-cv-09601 (C.D.
Cal., Nov. 7, 2019), is brought on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired Tandy securities between March
7, 2018, and August 15, 2019, inclusive, seeking to pursue claims
against the Defendants under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On August 13, 2019, after the market closed, the Company disclosed
that its Audit Committee was investigating "certain aspects of the
Company's methods of valuation and expensing of costs of inventory
and related issues regarding the Company's business and
operations."  On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.55
per share, or over 10%, over two consecutive trading sessions to
close at $4.90 per share on August 15, 2019, on unusually high
trading volume.

On August 15, 2019, after the market closed, the Company filed a
Form 12b-25 Notification of Late Filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, stating that it was unable to timely file the
Company's quarterly report for the period ended June 30, 2019, due
to the Audit Committee's investigation.   On this news, the
Company's share price fell $0.40 per share, or over 8%, to close at
$4.50 per share on August 16, 2019, on unusually high trading
volume.

On October 18, 2019, the Company revealed that certain financial
statements should no longer be relied upon, citing "misstatements
primarily relating to the Company's methods of valuation and
expensing of costs of inventory and related issues."  It also
disclosed that its Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, Tina
Castillo, had resigned from her positions.

On October 21, 2019, the Company disclosed that the errors
included: (i) inventory was stated using a methodology that
attempted to approximate FIFO; (ii) warehousing and handling
expenditures were not capitalized in the first and third quarters
but were subsequently corrected on a semi-annual basis; and (iii)
warehousing and handling expenditures were classified as operating
expenses, resulting in overstatement of operating expenses.

Throughout the Class Period, the Plaintiff contends, the Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects.  Specifically, the Defendants
failed to disclose to investors: (1) that certain costs of
inventory had been improperly valued and expensed; (2) that, as a
result, the Company's financial results for certain periods were
misstated; (3) that the Company lacked effective internal control
over financial reporting; (4) that there was a material weakness in
the Company's internal control over reporting; and (5) that, as a
result, the Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, according to the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Tandy securities during the Class Period,
and suffered damages as a result of the federal securities law
violations and false and/or misleading statements and/or material
omissions alleged in the complaint.

Tandy is incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal
executive offices located in Fort Worth, Texas.  The Individual
Defendants are directors and officers of the Company.

Tandy is a specialty retailer that sells leather and leathercraft
related items, such as quality tools, hardware, accessories,
liquids, lace, kits and teaching materials.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          Charles Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160
          E-mail: lglancy@glancylaw.com


TARGET CORP: $8.2MM Walter Suit Settlement Gets Initial Court OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement in the case
captioned JAMES WALTERS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORP., Defendant. Case No.
3:16-cv-1678-L-MDD (S.D. Cal.).

Plaintiff Walters filed the California action against Target
seeking monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief for
Target's alleged breach of the Target Debit Card (TDC) Agreement
(TDC Agreement") and California law.  

Plaintiff Walters filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) asserting
the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, including
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (2) unjust
enrichment (3) unconscionability (4) conversion (5) violation of
the unfair prong of California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (6)
violation of the fraudulent prong of the UCL  (7) violation of the
unlawful prong of the UCL and (8) violation of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA).

Settlement

Plaintiff proposes the Settlement class be an opt-out class under
Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
the following definition:

All TDC holders in the United States who, within the Class Period,
incurred at least one Returned Payment Fee (RPF) RPF in connection
with theirTDC, that was not refunded or waived.

The Settlement has a total cash value of $8,222,330.00, consisting
of the Cash Settlement Amount of $5,000,000 payable by Target to
establish the Settlement Fund and the Debt Reduction Cash Amount of
$3,222,330.00

Legal Standard

A court must balance the following factors in evaluating a proposed
settlement:

The strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount
offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the
stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the
class members to the proposed settlement.  

Class Certification

Numerosity

If the class is so large that joinder of all members is
impracticable, the numerosity requirement is satisfied. Here, the
numerosity requirement is satisfied as the proposed Settlement
Class consists of thousands of TDC holders and joinder of all class
members is impracticable.

Commonality

The crux of commonality is the rule requiring a plaintiff to show
that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. The
common contention must be of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of
each one of the claims in one stroke.

Plaintiffs point out the following questions of law and fact common
to the class: (1) whether Target's TDC processing practices violate
the TDC Agreement; and (2) whether the TDC Agreement and allegedly
deceptive TDC marketing injured all Settlement Class members
through imposition of RPFs.   The Court finds that determination of
the truth or falsity of Target's TDC processing or marketing
mechanisms would necessarily determine the validity of these
questions for each class member.

Accordingly, the commonality requirement is satisfied.

Typicality

Typicality requires the claims or defenses of the representative
parties to be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. The
Ninth Circuit has found the typicality requirement satisfied when
the named plaintiffs do not set forth different claims or subject a
defendant to setting forth unique defenses from those brought by
any other class member. Plaintiffs contend the typicality
requirement is satisfied because The named Plaintiffs' claims are
reasonably coextensive with those of the absent class members. The
Court agrees, and, moreover, the named plaintiffs here suffered the
same injuries due to the same practices as the absent class
members.
As such, the typicality requirement is satisfied.

Adequacy

Adequacy evaluates whether the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class. A named
plaintiff adequately represents a class if the plaintiff does not
have conflicts of interest with the proposed class and is
represented by qualified and competent counsel.  

Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs' contention that their
interests coexist with the absent class members in that both have
the same interest in the Settlement's relief, relief from TDC fees.
The Court also finds that class counsel is competent due to class
counsel's purported experience in litigation, certification, trial
and settlement of nationwide class action cases.  

Accordingly, the adequacy requirement is satisfied.

Therefore, Plaintiffs satisfied each Rule 23(a) class certification
prerequisite.

Settlement Terms

The Ninth Circuit maintains a strong judicial policy that favors
the settlement of class actions. The court's responsibility at the
preliminary approval stage is to determine whether the settlement
falls within the range of possible approval. If the proposed
settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed,
non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not
improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or
segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible
approval, then preliminary approval the settlements should granted.


Product of Non-collusive Negotiations

Settlements reached with the help of a mediator are likely
non-collusive. The Parties here engaged in formal mediation before
an experienced mediator for a full day, after completing discovery.
The Parties thereafter continued their settlement discussions for
several weeks, following mediation, with the mediator's assistance.
As such, the Court finds that this settlement was the product of
arm's-length negotiation.

Accordingly, the Court finds this factor weighs in favor of
approval.

No Obvious Deficiencies

The Court concludes that no obvious deficiencies to the settlement
exists here. The Settlement includes monetary relief of a
$5,000,000 cash fund and $3,222,230 in debt reduction funds and
non-monetary relief consisting of modification of TDC disclosures,
an increase in minimum transaction amount before assessing an RPF,
and a commitment that RPFs will not exceed the transaction mount
that incurred the fee.

Depending on the damages model referenced, Plaintiffs contend the
$5,000,000 cash settlement alone provides the Settlement Class
approximately 20%-40% of their probable damages, without the
attendant risk of further litigation. The Parties agree that
settlement prevails over the risk of continued litigation.
Continued litigation could prove to be difficult, expensive, time
consuming, and possibly fruitless as motions for class
certification and summary judgment were contested and pending prior
to settlement.

Thus, this factor tilts in favor of approval.

No Preferential Treatment

Although the Ninth Circuit has approved incentive awards for class
representatives in some cases, [it has instructed] district courts
to scrutinize carefully the awards so that they do not undermine
the adequacy of the class representatives.

Here, the class representative service awards amounts are
reasonable in light of the time, effort, and risk each class
representative assumed. Plaintiff Walters will apply for an award
not exceeding $10,000 and Plaintiffs Dixon, Powell, and Polcare
will apply for an award not exceeding $3,000. These awards merely
compensate the class representatives for the risk they assumed and
the successful assistance they provided in this case. The Court
finds the class representatives adequately represent the class in
light of their levels of participation in a complicated case in
which the absent class members will receive favorable monetary and
non-monetary relief without any effort.

Accordingly, this factor favors approval.

Effectiveness of Distribution of Class Relief

The Court finds the method of processing and distributing
class-member claims is adequate. Here, the Settlement Class members
do not have to submit claims to receive relief benefits because the
settlement administrator will automatically distribute the
Settlement Class Member Cash Payments and the Debt Relief Payments.


The Settlement Agreement provides the Settlement Administrator fair
and clear instructions on how to process each Settlement Class
members' claim. For each class member who has paid all or part of
their first RPF incurred during the Class Period, a Cash Payment
will be distributed equal to that class member's pro rata share of
the Net Settlement Fund based on the dollar amount of the first RPF
that class member paid.  

The Court finds the effectiveness of the proposed method for
processing and distributing the class relief adequate because of
its clear processing guidelines and automatic distribution to
absent class members. Therefore, this consideration also favors
approval.

Attorneys' Fee Award and Timing of Payment

In order to determine the fairness and adequacy of a settlement, a
district court must carefully assess the reasonableness of a fee
amount spelled out in a class action settlement agreement.

In a common fund case, district courts may use either the
percentage-of-the-fund method or the lodestar method to calculate
an appropriate attorneys' fee award. The following factors have
been used as grounds to adjust the percentage upward or downward
(1) the results achieved (2) the risks of litigation (3) the skill
required and the quality of the work (4) the contingent nature of
the fee (5) the burdens carried by the class counsel; and (6) the
awards in similar cases.

Under the Settlement Agreement, the Parties have agreed that Class
Counsel can apply for an award from the Settlement not to exceed
30% ($2,466,699) of the Settlement Value. Class Counsel is also
entitled to apply for reimbursement for costs and expenses incurred
in the Actions.

Class Counsel offers no contentions about the fees it will seek at
this point. Notwithstanding, the Court advises that circumstances
necessitating an attorneys' fee award that exceeds the 25%
benchmark are not obvious here. For that reason, the Court suggests
Class Counsel file a thorough fee award motion prior to the Final
Approval Hearing that details the hours reasonably spent
representing Plaintiffs in this action. Class Counsel must also
address each of the 25% benchmark adjustment factors identified
above.

The Court finds the settlement is preliminarily fair, reasonable,
and adequate to the proposed class.

This settlement class is preliminarily certified for settlement
purposes under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2): All TDC holders in the
United States who, between June 29, 2012 and the date below,
incurred at least one RPF (Returned Payment Fee) in connection with
their TDC, that was not refunded or waived.

Plaintiff James Walters is appointed as Class Representative in the
California Action, and Plaintiffs Michelle Dixon, Charles Powell,
and Deana Polcare are appointed as Class Representatives in the
Minnesota Action.

The Notice Program is as set forth in the Settlement Agreement and
modified by this order is approved, the form and content of such
notices should be modified accordingly. The Court cautions the
Parties to review both the Settlement Agreement and the three
notices for typographical, grammatical, and punctuation errors
before the Notice Program commences as the Court identified errors
in review of this motion. Notwithstanding, this schedule will
govern the filing deadlines for this settlement:

a. Notice shall be completed no later than February 14, 2020;

b. The Motion for Class Representative Service Awards and Fee and
Expense Application shall be filed no later than February 14,
2020;

c. Absent Settlement Class Members shall opt out or object to any
part of the Settlement, the Settlement as a whole, Class Counsel's
requests for fees and expenses, and/or Class Counsel's Request for
Service Awards for the Class Representatives, as instructed in the
Settlement and Class Notices, no later than April 17, 2020;

d. The Parties' deadline to file a Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement and to file a response to Absent Settlement
Class Members' objections is May 22, 2020;

e. Absent Class Members shall file any objection to Class
Counsel's fee motion no later than June 8, 2020; and

f. The Court shall hold a Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement hearing on June 22, 2020 at 10:30 a.m.

The opt-out and objection procedures as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement and modified by this order are approved.

The California Action is stayed pending final approval of the
settlement; and

Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, Kaliel PLLC, and
Tycko & Zavareei LLP are appointed as Class
Counsel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's December 2, 2019 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/rd8tb2s from Leagle.com

James Walters, on Behalf of Himself and Those Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff, represented by Andrea Gold - agold@tzlegal.com - Tycko &
Zavareei LLP, pro hac vice, Hassan Ali Zavareei
hzavareei@tzlegal.com, Tycko & Zavareei LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel
-jdkaliel@gmail.com - Kaliel PLLC, Jeffrey M. Ostrow -
ostrow@kolawyers.com - Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg
Gilbert, pro hac vice, Joshua Robert Levine - levine@kolawyers.com
- Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice,
Scott Edelsberg - edelsberg@kolawyers.com - Kopelowitz Ostrow P.A.,
pro hac vice, Sophia Goren Gold -sgold@kalielpllc.com - Kaliel
PLLC, Chiharu Sekino - csekino@sfmslaw.com - Shepherd, Finkelman,
Miller & Shah, LLP & James C. Shah - jshah@sfmslaw.com - Shepherd,
Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP.

Target Corp., Defendant, represented by James R. McGuire -
jmcguire@mofo.com - Morrison and Foerster, Mark Poe -
mpoe@gawpoe.com - Gaw & Poe LLP, Morgan Donoian MacBride  -
mmacbride@mofo.com - Morrison & Foerster & Sylvia Rivera -
srivera@mofo.com - Morrison and Foerster LLP.

TEAM PIZZA: Bradford Moves to Certify Class of Delivery Drivers
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Plaintiff in the lawsuit entitled Michael Bradford, On behalf
of himself and those similarly situated v. Team Pizza, Inc., et
al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00060-MRB-KLL (S.D. Ohio), moves the Court
for an order conditionally certifying the action as a collective
action under the Fair Labor Standards and designating him as the
representative of a class consisting of:

     All current and former Domino's Pizza delivery drivers who
     worked at any location nationwide owned/operated by
     Defendants Team Pizza, Inc. and/or Chris Short within the
     three years prior to the filing of this Class Action
     Complaint and the date of final judgment in this matter.

Mr. Bradford also asks the Court to (1) approve the his proposed
notices and methods of disseminating notice, (2) order the
Defendants to provide name and contact information for all
potential opt-in plaintiffs within 14 days of the court's order,
and (3) authorize a 90-day opt-in period.

In his complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' pizza
delivery drivers are all employed according to the same terms: they
receive minimum wage minus a tip credit for all hours worked while
completing deliveries, they drive their own cars to deliver the
Defendants' pizzas, and, until January 1, 2020, they were not
reimbursed for their actual expenses (with associated
recordkeeping) or at the IRS standard business mileage rate.  He
contends that this reimbursement policy drops the delivery drivers'
wages below minimum wage.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 200
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 604-8759
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: abiller@billerkimble.com

               - and -

          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Louise M. Roselle, Esq.
          Philip J. Krzeski, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          3825 Edwards Road, Suite 650
          Cincinnati, OH 45209
          Telephone: (513) 715-8711
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: akimble@billerkimble.com
                  lroselle@billerkimble.com
                  pkrzeski@billerkimble.com


TEXAS PRIDE: Scheve Seeks to Certify FLSA Class
-----------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DANIEL SCHEVE, Individually
and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, the Plaintiff, v.
TEXAS PRIDE FUELS, LTD., the Defendant, Case No.
7:19-cv-00248-DC-RCG (W.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a class of:

      "all hourly paid fuel technicians and automated fuel
      system operators employed by Defendant in the last three
      years";

   2. equitably tolling the statute of limitations;

   3. authorizing counsel for the Plaintiff to send the
      Notice and Consent forms to the proposed class.

The Plaintiff and Class Members worked as fuel technicians or
automated fuel systems operators for Defendant in Texas, New
Mexico, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. They were not exempt from the
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Defendant paid
them on an hourly basis, knew they were working in excess of 40
hours per week, and knew that that they were working off the clock
during overtime hours. Yet Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff and
Class Members for off-the-clock time, says the complaint.

Texas Pride is a fuel supplier in Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and
New Mexico.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edmond S. Moreland, Jr., Esq.
          Daniel A. Verrett, Esq.
          MORELAND VERRETT, P.C.
          700 West Summit Drive
          Wimberley, TX 78676
          Telephone: (512) 782-0567
          Facsimile: (512) 782-0605
          E-mail: edmond@morelandlaw.com
                  daniel@morelandlaw.com

TIVITY HEALTH: Class of Stockholders Certified in Weiner Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., grants the Motion to Certify
Class filed by the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement
System in the lawsuit styled ERIC WEINER, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. TIVITY HEALTH, INC.,
DONATO TRAMUTO, GLENN HARGREAVES and ADAM HOLLAND, Case No.
3:17-cv-01469 (M.D. Tenn.).

The Court certifies a Class consisting of:

     all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Tivity common
     stock between March 6, 2017 and November 6, 2017, inclusive.

Excluded from the Class are Defendants Tivity Health, Inc., Donato
Tramuto, Glenn Hargreaves, Adam Holland, the officers and directors
of Tivity during the relevant period, as well as member of their
immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs,
successors or assigns.

The Court appoints the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement
System as Class Representative, and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll
PLLC as Class Counsel.[CC]


TIVITY HEALTH: Scoma Chiropractic Sues Over Unsolicited Fax Ads
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scoma Chiropractic, P.A., a Florida corporation, individually and
as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons v.
TIVITY HEALTH, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case No.
2:20-cv-00063-TPB-MRM (M.D. Fla., Jan. 28, 2020), is brought to
challenge the Defendant's practice of sending unsolicited
facsimiles, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has sent a fax message and
other facsimile transmissions of unsolicited advertisements to the
Plaintiff and the Class, in violation of the TCPA. The Fax
describes the commercial availability or quality of the Defendant's
property, goods or services, namely, the Defendant's new healthy
lifestyle program--Mutually Well by Mutual of Omaha.

The Plaintiff seeks to certify a class, which were sent the Fax and
other unsolicited fax advertisements that were sent without prior
express invitation or permission and without compliant opt-out
language. The Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages for each
violation of the TCPA and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff Scoma Chiropractic, P.A. is Florida corporation.

TIVITY HEALTH, INC., is a Delaware corporation with a principal
place of business in Franklin, Tennessee.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan M. Kelly, Esq.
          ANDERSON + WANCA
          3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 500
          Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
          Phone: 847-368-1500
          Fax: 847-368-1501


UKW HOLDING: Columbo May File Amended Complaint by Feb. 5
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHELSEA COLUMBO, Plaintiff, v. UKW HOLDING COMPANY, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-11015 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge
Jesse M. Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York ordered the Plaintiff to file any amended
complaint by Feb. 5, 2020.

On January 14, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Rule 15(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff has 21 days after the service
of a motion under Rule 12(b) to amend the complaint once as a
matter of course.

Accordingly, Judge Furman ordered the Plaintiff to file any amended
complaint by Feb. 5, 2020.  The Plaintiff will not be given any
further opportunity to amend the complaint to address issues raised
by the motion to dismiss.

If the Plaintiff does amend, by three weeks after the amended
complaint is filed, the Defendants shall: (1) file an answer; (2)
file a new motion to dismiss; or (3) file a letter on ECF stating
that it relies on the previously filed motion to dismiss.  If they
file an answer or a new motion to dismiss, the Court will deny the
previously filed motion to dismiss as moot.  If they file a new
motion to dismiss, any opposition shall be filed within 14 days,
and any reply shall be filed within seven days of any opposition.

If no amended complaint is filed, the Plaintiff shall file any
opposition to the motion to dismiss by Feb. 5, 2020.  The
Defendants' reply, if any, shall be filed by Feb. 12, 2020.  At the
time any reply is served, the moving party shall supply the Court
with one, double-sided courtesy hard copy of all motion papers by
mailing or delivering them to the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Centre Street, New York, New York.

Finally, the Judge ordered that the initial pretrial conference
previously scheduled for March 11, 2020 is adjourned sine die.

A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 15, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/4bzCfJ from Leagle.com.

Chelsea Columbo, on behalf of herself and the Class, Plaintiff,
represented by Anne Melissa  will , Lee Litigation Group, PLLC &
William Michael Brown, Lee Litigation Group, PLLC.

UKW Holding Company, UKW Franchising Company, LLC, UKW Distribution
Center, LLC, Wax Manufacturing LLC, NYC Waxing, LLC, Upper Westside
Waxing Inc., Upper Eastside Waxing LLC, Bowery Waxing LLC, Ozzie
Grupenmager & Noemi Grupenmager, Defendants, represented by Phillip
Coursey Bauknight -- pbauknight@fisherphillips.com -- Porzio
Bromberg & Newman P.C.


UNITED BUSINESS: Fabricant Sues Over Privacy Invasion Under TCPA
----------------------------------------------------------------
Terry Fabricant, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. UNITED BUSINESS FUNDING, LLC, and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive, and each of them, Case No. 2:20-cv-00844 (C.D. Cal.,
Jan. 28, 2020), arises from the Defendants' illegal actions in
negligently contacting the Plaintiff's cellular telephone in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, specifically
the National Do-Not-Call provisions, thereby, invading his
privacy.

The Defendants used an "automatic telephone dialing system" to
place its call to the Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services,
according to the complaint. The Defendants' calls constituted calls
that were not for emergency purposes. The Plaintiff asserts that
the Defendants did not possess his "prior express consent" to
receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an
artificial or prerecorded voice on its cellular telephone.

The Plaintiff says he requested through counsel that the Defendant
stop calling him, thus, revoking any prior express consent that had
existed and terminating any established business relationship that
had existed. Despite this, the Defendant continued to call the
Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit its services and in violation of
the National Do-Not-Call provisions of the TCPA, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff Terry Fabricant is a natural person residing in Los
Angeles County, California.

UNITED BUSINESS FUNDING, LLC is a business financing company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          Adrian R. Bacon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21550 Oxnard Street, Suite 780
          Woodland Hills, CA 91367
          Phone: (323) 306-4234
          Fax: (866) 633-0228
          Email: tfriedman@toddflaw.com
                 abacon@toddflaw.com


US LAND PROFESSIONALS: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages, Caron Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Astrid Caron, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. U.S. LAND PROFESSIONALS, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-00231
(D. Colo., Jan. 28, 2020), challenges the Defendant's policies and
practices of not paying proper overtime pay, in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant routinely required the
Plaintiff and similarly situated co-workers to work in excess of 40
hours per week. However, the Defendant failed to pay them at the
proper overtime rate for time worked over 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant as a Right-of-Way Agent to
provide right of way acquisition services to the Defendant's
customer in connection with a project taking place in North
Dakota.

The Defendant is a full-service right-of way acquisition and
permitting company serving the energy industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher J. Lalak, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          614 W. Superior Ave., Suite 1148
          Cleveland, OH 44113-2300
          Phone: (216) 230-2955
          Email: clalak@ohlaborlaw.com

               - and -

          Hans A. Nilges, Esq.
          Shannon M. Draher, Esq.
          NILGES DRAHER LLC
          7266 Portage Street, N.W., Suite D
          Massillon, OH 44646
          Phone: (330) 470-4428
          Facsimile: (330) 754-1430
          Email: hans@ohlaborlaw.com
                 sdraher@ohlaborlaw.com


VERISHOP INC: Olsen Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Verishop Inc. The
case is styled as Thomas J. Olsen, individually and on behalf of
all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Verishop Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00515 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.

Verishop is a new e-commerce site that sells a curated selection of
women's and men's fashion, home goods, and beauty products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Brian Lipsky, Esq.
          Lipsky Lowe LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017-6705
          Phone: (212) 392-4772
          Fax: (212) 444-1030
          Email: doug@lipskylowe.com


WELLS FARGO: Hernandez's Bid to Certify Class Granted in Part
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. William Alsup grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the lawsuit entitled
ALICIA HERNANDEZ, EMMA WHITE, KEITH LINDNER, TROY FRYE, COSZETTA
TEAGUE, IESHA BROWN, RUSSELL and BRENDA SIMONEAUX, JOHN and YVONNE
DEMARTINO, ROSE WILSON, TIFFANIE HOOD, GEORGE and CYNDI FLOYD,
DEBORA GRANJA, and DIANA TREVINO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Case No.
3:18-cv-07354-WHA (N.D. Cal.).

This class is certified:

     All persons in the United States who between 2010 and 2018
     (i) qualified for a home loan modification or repayment plan
     pursuant to the requirements of government-sponsored
     enterprises (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), the
     Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the U.S. Department of
     Treasury's Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP);
     (ii) were not offered a home loan modification or repayment
     plan by Wells Fargo due to excessive attorney's fees being
     included in the loan modification decisioning process; and
     (iii) whose home Wells Fargo sold in foreclosure.

Judge Alsup notes that the Class is certified only with respect to
the breach of contract claim.  "This class definition shall apply
for all purposes, including settlement.  If further discovery is
needed as to plaintiff Campos or any other issue, the Court is
amenable to reopen discovery for a limited period," Judge Alsup
adds.

Plaintiffs Granja and Campos are appointed as class
representatives.  Michael Schrag, Esq., of Gibbs Law Group LLP and
Richard Paul, Esq., of Paul LLP are appointed as class counsel.

Judge Alsup also grants the motion for leave to file a third
amended complaint.  The Plaintiffs shall file a third amended
complaint in comport with the order by February 6, 2020, at noon.

By February 20, 2020, the parties shall jointly submit a proposal
for class notification with a plan to distribute notice by
first-class mail.

In this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs all had their mortgage loans
serviced by Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.  Although they met the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) requirements, the
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant failed to offer them mortgage
modifications.  Later, the Defendant discovered a calculation error
that had caused certain fees to be misstated and had resulted in
incorrect mortgage modification denials.

The operative complaint makes these claims: breach of contract,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful foreclosure,
violation of California's Homeowners Bill of Rights, violation of
California's unfair competition law, and violations of state
consumer protection laws.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a nationwide class for their
breach of contract claim, as well as resolution of the issue of
whether the Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous for
their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.  The
Plaintiffs also seek certification of a California subclass for
their Homeowner Bill of Rights and Section 17200 claim, and a
further California subclass for their wrongful foreclosure claim.

The Plaintiffs seek certification of an issue class that the
Defendant's conduct was "outrageous" for purposes of their
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Rule
23(c)(4).  Judge Alsup notes that the Defendant's conduct could be
considered outrageous in one situation and not the other.

"Such individualized inquiries greatly undermine commonality and
defeat class certification.  The motion for certification of a
nationwide class as to the issue of whether defendant's conduct was
"outrageous" is thus DENIED," Judge Alsup opines.  Judge Alsup
adds, among other things, that common issues would not predominate
and, accordingly, certification of the state subclasses is
denied.[CC]


WELLS FARGO: Narayan's Bid for Class Certification Stricken
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer strikes without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification in the lawsuit styled
Sat Narayan, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., Case No.
1:16−cv−11223 (N.D. Ill.).

According to the Court's Notification of Docket Entry, the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is stricken without
prejudice to renewal following ruling on certain motions, several
of them dispositive on at least one claim, that are currently being
briefed.

The Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings are taken
under advisement.  The Plaintiffs' response shall be filed by
February 20, 2020.  The Defendants' reply in support shall be filed
by February 27, 2020.[CC]


WIRELESS PLUS: Topete Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Wireless Plus Inc.
The case is styled as Candelario Topete, individually and on behalf
of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v. Wireless Plus
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 56-2020-00539487-CU-OE-VTA (Cal. Super.
Ct., Ventura Cty., Jan. 30, 2020).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment - Civil Unlimited".

Wireless Plus, Inc. was founded in 1991. The company's line of
business includes the retail sale of specialized lines of
merchandise.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by LOUIS H. KREUZER, II, ESQ.


WREG LLC: Hanna Seeks Minimum Wages for Interpreters Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
MINERVA MACIAS HANNA, Individually and on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated v. WREG, LLC, d/b/a WREG-TV NEWS CHANNEL,
a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and NEXSTAR BROADCASTING,
INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-02017-SHM-jay (W.D.
Tenn., Jan. 8, 2020), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
seeking to recover unpaid minimum wages owed to the Plaintiff and
other interpreters/translators employed by the Defendants.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants have failed to pay her
and the Class starting back from December 27, 2019. She adds that
the Defendants have also misclassified her and the Class as
independent contractors when they are actually employees.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants for 14 years as an
interpreter.

The Defendants own and operate a television station WREG, the CBS
affiliate for the Memphis, Tennessee market. The Defendants
employed interpreters and translators that translated the nightly
news from English to Spanish and performed voice-overs, among other
things.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER, HOLT, OWEN & BRYANT
          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 759-1745
          E-mail: rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com


XALER: Court Denies Derval's Motion for TCPA Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ALEX DERVAL et al., the
Plaintiffs, v. XALER et al., the Defendants, Case No.
2:19-cv-01881-ODW-JEM (C.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Otis D. Wright,
II entered an order on Jan. 28, 2020, denying Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification of:

   "all persons within the United States who had or have a number
   assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least

   one text message using an [automatic telephone dialing system]
   from [Xaler] between the date of filing this action and the
   four years preceding, where such text messages were sent and
   placed for the purpose of marketing where the recipient did not

   give their express consent to be contacted by [Xaler]."

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the numerosity
requirement.  The Court declines to address the remaining
requirements for class certification.

The Plaintiffs allege that Xaler caused automated text messages to
be sent to their cellular phones without their express consent in
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Xaler is a cannabis delivery company operating in Los Angeles
County, in Santa Monica, Venice, West Los Angeles, Beverly Hills,
Culver City, and Marina Del Rey.[CC]

ZENDESK INC: Faces Ho Securities Suit Over Stock Price Drop
-----------------------------------------------------------
MANDY HO, Individually and On Behalf All Others Similarly Situated
v. ZENDESK, INC., MIKKEL SVANE, ELENA GOMEZ, ADRIAN MCDERMOTT, JOHN
GESCHKE, JEFFREY TITTERTON, and NORMAN GENNARO, Case No.
3:19-cv-07361 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 7, 2019), is brought on behalf of
all purchasers of Zendesk securities between February 6, 2019, and
October 1, 2019, both dates inclusive, seeking to pursue remedies
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

According to the complaint, throughout the Class Period, the
Defendants disseminated materially false and misleading statements
to the investing public and failed to disclose adverse facts
pertaining to the Company's business, operations, and financial
results.  Specifically, the Company concealed material information
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Zendesk's clients had been
subject to data breaches dating back to 2016; (ii) Zendesk was
experiencing slowing demand for its SaaS offerings, particularly in
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia, due in large part to
political uncertainty and China trade issues there; and (iii) as a
result of the foregoing, Zendesk's business metrics and financial
prospects were not as strong as the Defendants had led the market
to believe during the Class Period.

On July 30, 2019, Zendesk issued a press release and conducted a
conference call to announce its second quarter 2019 ("2Q19")
financial results for the period ended June 30, 2019.  Zendesk
reported net losses that had grown to $54.5 million, or $0.50 per
share, which was significantly larger than the $34.4 million, or
$0.33 per share, reported in second quarter 2018 ("2Q18"), despite
the fact that 2Q19 revenues had increased from $141.9 million in
2Q18 to $194.6 million in 2Q19.  The Company also reported revenue
growth of 37%, which was below the 38%-41% range the Company had
reported over the prior eight quarters.

In addition to the disappointing financial results, Zendesk
disclosed that its sales growth in the Europe, Middle East, and
Africa ("EMEA") and Asia-Pacific ("APAC") regions "didn't quite
live up to [Defendants'] own expectations, and lagg[ed] other
regions."  Growth in the APAC region fell to 31% in 2Q19, down
considerably from the 39% growth reported in first quarter 2019
("1Q19").  Zendesk blamed a mix of macro and operational issues
that had been driving the weakness.

Following these disclosures, the price of Zendesk common stock
declined precipitously, falling nearly $10.00 per share from its
close of $93.12 per share on July 30, 2019, to close at $83.56 per
share on July 31, 2019, on unusually high volume of more than 8.6
million shares traded, or more than twice the average daily volume
over the preceding ten trading days.

Prior to September 24, 2019, a third party alerted Zendesk to the
fact that the personally identifiable data ("PID") of its chat and
support accounts had been breached.  By September 24, 2019, Zendesk
had internally confirmed the size and scope of the breach.  The
Company's internal investigation revealed that some 10,000 accounts
opened before November 2016 had been breached, including agent
names and contact information, along with user names and hashed and
salted agent and end user passwords.  Adversely impacted PID also
included Transport Layer Security encryption keys that customers
gave to Zendesk and the configuration settings of apps installed
from the Zendesk app market or private apps.

On October 2, 2019, Zendesk for the first time publicly disclosed
the data breach, stating then that the data breach only affected
customers, who had signed up prior to November 1, 2016.  On news of
the data breach, the price of Zendesk common stock fell another
$2.90 per share to close at $69.81 per share on October 2, 2019,
again on unusually high volume of more than 3.3 million shares
traded.

Meanwhile, with Zendesk securities trading at fraud-inflated prices
throughout the Class Period, the Company's senior executive
officers named as Defendants cashed in, collectively selling
approximately 409,000 of their personally held Zendesk shares,
reaping more than $32.7 million in proceeds.

The Plaintiff, who purchased Zendesk securities during the Class
Period, seeks claims for damages relating to the precipitous
decline of Zendesk common stock price.

Zendesk is a customer service software company founded in
Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2007 and now headquartered in San
Francisco, California.  The Company has been reporting to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and listed on the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") since conducting its initial public stock
offering in 2014.  The Individual Defendants are directors and
officers of the Company.

Zendesk is a Software as a Service ("SaaS") provider that purports
to help clients better communicate with their customers through
online customer chats and data analysis.  The Company provides
single customer service interface to organizations to manage all
their one-on-one customer interactions, track and predict common
questions, and provide a seamless path to answers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jennifer Pafiti, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 405-7190
          E-mail: jpafiti@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ, LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          Ten South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          E-mail: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Peretz Bronstein, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          Facsimile: (212) 697-7296
          E-mail: peretz@bgandg.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***