/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/200422.mbx C L A S S A C T I O N R E P O R T E R Wednesday, April 22, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 81 Headlines 24 HOUR FITNESS: Faces Diaz Labor Suit in California Super. Ct. ABLE HEALTH: Summary Judgment Bid in Cedeno Suit Partly Granted ALLEGIANCE HOSPITAL: Holland Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Arkansas ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY, GA: Clyde Armory Balks at COVID-19 Decrees BANK OF AMERICA: Schertzer Suit Over Int'l. Transaction Fees Junked BR BRAND: Gonzalez Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation CANE BAY PARTNERS: Manago Sues Over Illegal and Usurious Loans CBS BROADCASTING: Piazza Discrimination Suit Removed to C.D. Cal. CENTURYLINK: Tenth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Birse ERISA Suit CHICAGO, IL: Gets Summary Judgment in Jackson Discrimination Suit COSTCO WHOLESALE: Misrepresents Ice Cream Bars, Tinelli Alleges CREDIT BUREAU: Faces Hamilton Suit Over FDCPA and NCPA Violation CSC SERVICEWORKS: Rubio Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California DAWN FOOD: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Potter Alleges DENTSPLY SIRONA: Awaits Court's Decision in Bid to Dismiss Suit DENTSPLY SIRONA: Plaintiffs' Bid to Amend State Court Suit Denied DYCOM INDUSTRIES: Continues to Defend Securities Suit in Florida EVERGREEN PACKAGING: Johnson ACRA Suit Removed to E.D. Arkansas EXPLO SYSTEMS: App. Ct. Reverses Class Certification in Reeves Suit FCA US: Kansas Dist. Court Dismisses LaRoe Suit Without Prejudice FCA US: Myler FMLA Suit Removed to Northern District of Ohio FEDEX GROUND: Perea Labor Class Suit Removed to S.D. California FIRST TRANSIT: Diarian Discrimination Suit Removed to C.D. Calif. FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: ATRS Appeals Order in Stockholders Suit FUTUREDONTICS INC: Parties Proceed to Mediation in July 2020 GANNETT CO INC: Suris Sues in E.D. New York Over ADA Violation GENERAL NUTRITION: Faces Clausen Class Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania HERITAGE VALLEY: Ct. Orders Arbitration in SEIU Grievance Suit HERON THERAPEUTICS: Wong Complaint Voluntarily Dismissed HOME DEPOT: Fails to Give Compliant COBRA Notice, Smith Claims ICU MEDICAL: Bid to Drop Saline Solution Class Suit Remains Pending JGOO INC: Johnson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages JM DISTRIBUTING: Gutierrez Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California KOJI'S JAPAN: Attys' Fees & Costs Award in Quiles FLSA Suit Flipped LATAM AIRLINES: TM Solutions Sues Over Cancellation of Tickets LIBERTY UNIVERSITY: Student A Seeks Refund of Spring Semester Fee LINEBARGER GOGGAN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Hinojoda FDCPA Suit LTD FINANCIAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Vedernikov FDCPA Suit Okayed LYFT INC: Islam Sues in New York Alleging Breach of Contract MAGIC MOUNTAIN: Faces Ruiz Suit Over Unlawful Charging of Fees MAINTENX INT'L: Binion Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California MASSIMO ZANETTI: Sternberg TCPA Suit Removed to S.D. Florida MCKENNA & DUPONT: Phillips Suit Seeks to Certify Class MDL 2641: Ariz. Dist. Ct. Suggests Remand of Cases Over IVC Filters METROPOLITAN LIFE: McNeely Suit Dismissed Following Settlement MINDBODY INC: Seedman Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Texts MYLAN NV: Faces Kent Securities Suit Challenging Pfizer Merger NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Whitefield's Unjust Enrichment Claim Dismissed NEWELL BRANDS: Appeal in Securities Class Suit Ongoing NEWELL BRANDS: Continues to Defend Oklahoma Firefighters Suit PARTSBASE INC: Fails to Pay NEHPE Overtime Wages, Sullivan Says PARTY CITY HOLDINGS: Knox Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Texts POPULAR INC: Appeal in Camacho Class Suit Still Pending POPULAR INC: Appeal Sought in Maura Class Action POPULAR INC: Awaits Initial Approval of Torres Case Settlement POPULAR INC: BPPR Faces Soto-Melendez Class Action POPULAR INC: Continues to Defend Perez Dias Suit in Puerto Rico PROFESSIONAL STAFF: Court Dismisses Seidemann Civil Rights Suit PROVIDENCE ST. JOSEPH: Gregg Sues Over Hospital Care's High Liens RECKITT BENCKISER: Prescott Sues Over Woolite Revival Color Claim REGIONAL INDUSTRIES: Lewis Sues Over Unpaid Wages Under NJWPL RON GALLO: Faces Ermi CEPA Suit Over Unlawful Pay Practices SAVE MART SUPERMARKETS: Rooney Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Calif. SECURITAS ELECTRONIC: Fails to Pay OT Wage Under NJWPL, Khan Says SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Plaintiffs Ask Court to Reconsider Decision SJW GROUP: To Pay $325,000 Mootness Fee in Exchange for Release SMS VENTURES: Esquivel Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls SOUTH NASSAU: Class Certification Order in Krobath Suit Affirmed SSCP PROPERTY: Class Notice in Polk Labor Suit Under FLSA Approved STATE FARM: Court Dismisses Sheahan Antitrust Suit STERLING JEWELERS: Aguayo CFEHA Suit Removed to C.D. California TIME INC: Hall Appeals C.D. California Decision to Ninth Circuit TUTCO LLC: Court Dismisses Toca Suit Over Faulty Heaters UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Capriole Appeals D. Mass. Ruling to 1st Cir. UNITED STATES: Gayle Files Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus UNITED STATES: Roman Files Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus WAKE COUNTY, NC: Stafford Sues Over Refusal to Issue Gun Permits WALMART INC: Fourth Circuit Appeal Filed in Van Buren Fraud Suit ZOOM VIDEO: Hurvitz Sues Over Collection of Users' Personal Info ZOOM VIDEO: Kondrat Sues Over Deficient Privacy and Data Security ********* 24 HOUR FITNESS: Faces Diaz Labor Suit in California Super. Ct. --------------------------------------------------------------- NATALIA DIAZ, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, and the general public v. 24 HOUR FITNESS USA; INC., a California corporation; and-DOES-1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. CGC-20-583971 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., March 26, 2020), seeks civil penalties resulting from the Defendants' violation of the California Labor Code. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to provide her and all other aggrieved employees with meal periods; failed to provide them with rest periods; and failed to pay them at least minimum wage for all hours worked. The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a non-exempt, hourly employee from October 9, 2019, through the present. 24 Hour operates a worldwide chain of fitness clubs. The Company offers fitness programs, weight training, cardio equipment, and spas.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Shaun Setareh, Esq. Thomas Segal, Esq. Farrah Grant, Esq. SETAREH LAW GROUP 315 S. Beverly Dr., Suite 315 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 Telephone: (310) 888-7771 Facsimile: (310) 888-0109 E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com thomas@setarehlaw.com farrah@setarehlaw.com ABLE HEALTH: Summary Judgment Bid in Cedeno Suit Partly Granted --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ROSALIE CEDENO, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED WHO WERE EMPLOYED BY ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICE, INC., D/B/A ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICES-HEMPSTEAD, INC., ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICE, INC.-CHHA, AND ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICE, INC.-LHCSA, Plaintiff, v. ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICE, INC., ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICE, INC.-CHHA, ABLE HEALTH CARE SERVICE, INC.-LHCSA, AND/OR ANY OTHER RELATED ENTITIES Defendants, Docket No. 154435/2018, Motion Seq. No. 002 (N.Y. Sup.), Judge John J. Kelley of the New York County Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In the putative class action to recover for several employers' failure to abide by state and federal minimum wage and maximum-hour requirements, the Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Plaintiff expressly withdraws her causes of action to recover unpaid spread-of-hours compensation, unpaid reimbursement for employee expenses, and unpaid laundry expenses for home health-aide uniforms, and otherwise opposes the motion. The Plaintiff is a home health-care aide. The Defendants are several private agencies that placed home health-care aides in the households of their clients who needed such services. The Plaintiff alleges that, at some point, all the Defendants were her employer. The Plaintiff seeks to recover wages and benefits that she alleges she was statutorily and contractually entitled to receive pursuant to Labor Law Section 190 et seq., Section 663, Section 651 et seq., and Section650 et seq., 12 NYCRR 142-2.1, 142-2.2, 142-2.4, 142-2.10, 142-2.14, 142-2.5(c), Public Health Law Section3614-c, and Admin. Code of City of N.Y. (Ad. Code) Section 6-109. In her complaint, the Plaintiff specifically asserted that, beginning in April 2012 and continuing through the present, the Defendants maintained a policy and practice of requiring her regularly to work in excess of 10 hours per day, without providing the proper hourly compensation for all hours worked, including failing to pay the lawful minimum wage rate for travel time between worksites, and overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any given week, as well as unpaid "spread-of-hours" compensation for work days on which she was required to be at her job for more than 10 hours notwithstanding that she actually worked less than 10 hours on those days. The Defendants contend that the Defendant Able Health is not the Plaintiff's true employer, and that only Able Health Care Services-Hempstead, Able Health Care Services, Inc.-CHHA, and Able Health Care Services, Inc.-LHCSA were her employers. The Plaintiff counters that all the Defendants were her joint employers. There has been only limited discovery so far, and there is much information that is solely within the knowledge and possession of the Defendants that would be necessary to resolve this issue. In a Decision and Order dated Dec. 11, 2019, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/ncupcK from Leagle.com, Judge Kelley finds that the Defendants have not established, prima facie, that the Plaintiff did not work a sufficient number of hours for her to assert minimum-wage, maximum-hour claims. In any event, the documentary evidence submitted by the parties reveals a disputed issue of fact as to the number of hours that the Plaintiff actually worked for the Defendants. The Defendants have not established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Plaintiff's wage parity claims under Public Health Law Section 3614-c and Ad. Code Section 6-109, which respectively set the minimum amount of total compensation that employers must pay home health care aides in order to receive Medicaid reimbursements for reimbursable care provided in New York City and Westchester, Suffolk, and Nassau Counties, and the minimum compensation for any employee who works for an entity that contracts with the City of New York to provide services. Inasmuch as it does not appear conclusively from the complaint and affidavits that there is no basis for class certification, and because only limited document discovery has been conducted, while additional discovery is necessary with respect to numerous issues in this action, further discovery on the issue of the propriety of class certification must be part on the ongoing discovery process. In light of the foregoing, Judge Kelley granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment to the extent that the Plaintiff's causes of action to recover for unpaid spread-of-hours compensation, unpaid reimbursement for employee expenses, and unpaid laundry expenses for home health-aide uniforms are dismissed, and otherwise denied the motion, without prejudice to renewal upon completion of discovery. ALLEGIANCE HOSPITAL: Holland Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Arkansas ---------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as CRYSTAL HOLLAND, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ROCK BORDELON; ALLEGIANCE HOSPITAL OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK, LLC, d/b/a/ NorthMetro Medical Center; T. JASON REED; and FREEDOM BERA VIORAL HOSPITAL OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS, LLC, Case No. 60CV-20-350 (Filed Jan. 13, 2020), was removed from the Arkansas Circuit Court for Pulaski County to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on March 27, 2020. The Eastern District of Arkansas Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:20-cv-00344-KGB to the proceeding. The Plaintiff contends that despite of her and members of the proposed class' entitlement to payment of lawful sick and vacation time and coverage of the insurance premiums withheld, the Defendants failed to provide them what they bargained for, and instead kept the benefit in the form of the withheld premium and time works to themselves. Rock Bordelon is the Chief Executive Officer at Allegiance Health Management Inc. Allegiance Hospital is a health care provider in Jacksonville, Arkansas.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Brian A. Vandiver, Esq. Dylan J. Botteicher, Esq. COX, STERLING, McCLURE & VANDIVER, PLLC 8712 Counts Massie Rd. North Little Rock, AR 72113 Telephone: (501) 954-8073 ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY, GA: Clyde Armory Balks at COVID-19 Decrees ---------------------------------------------------------------- CLYDE ARMORY, INC., ROSS LEE LEROHL, BARRY HITCHCOCK FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC OF ATHENS, INC., and ATHENS MARINE, INC. v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY, BLAINE WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as Manager of Athens-Clarke County, Georgia, and JUDD DRAKE, in his official capacity as Attorney of Athens-Clarke County, Georgia, Case No. 3:20-cv-00042-CAR (M.D. Ga., March 28, 2020), challenges the constitutionality of ACC's Ordinance for the Second Declaration of a Local State of Emergency Related to COVID-19 and Shelter in Place Ordinance as applied to the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals and businesses across Athens-Clarke County, Georgia. The Plaintiffs contend that the Shelter in Place Ordinance violates the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Georgia, as well as Georgia statutory law. The Plaintiffs ask the Court to hold it as unlawful, to enjoin Defendant Drake and Defendant Williams and their subordinates from enforcing it, declare individual Plaintiffs' right to continue to pursue a livelihood as healthy individuals, declare corporate Plaintiffs' right to carry on their businesses as essential businesses under Georgia law, and award the Plaintiffs their costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. The Plaintiffs allege that the Shelter in Place Ordinance is in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Georgia because there is no rational basis that requires all businesses to cease their business operations and quarantine healthy individuals. The action seeks declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief on behalf of the Plaintiffs, whose business operations and ability to maintain a livelihood have been and will continue to be subject to unduly intrusive requirements under the Shelter in Place Ordinance. Clyde Armory is a Georgia corporation engaged in the business of purchasing, trading, and selling firearms, ammunition, tools, and other defensive and safety supplies to law enforcement and civilians. Family Chiropractic is a Georgia corporation engaged in the business of providing chiropractic services. Athens Marine is a Georgia corporation engaged in the business of selling and inspecting watercraft, including providing inspections and maintenance for the watercraft of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the United States Geological Survey, and the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, and the fire and rescue boats of the Athens-Clarke, Walton, Barrow, and Oconee counties' fire and rescue departments. ACC is the governing body of Athens-Clarke County with authority and control over the operation of businesses within its jurisdiction and enforcement of the Code of Ordinances.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Kevin E. Epps, Esq. J. Edward Allen, Esq. EPPS HOLLOWAY DELOACH & HOIPKEMIER, LLC 1220 Langford Drive, Building 200-101 Watkinsville, GA 30677 Telephone: (706) 508-4000 E-mail: kevin@ehdhlaw.com ed@ehdhlaw.com - and - Morris H. Wiltshire, Jr., Esq. WILTSHIRE DEFENSE 1220 Langford Drive, Building 200-100 Watkinsville, GA 30677 E-mail: mo@wiltshiredefense.com The Defendants are represented by: Gregory Sowell, Esq. Edward D. Tolley, Esq. V. Aidan Moss, Esq. COOK & TOLLEY, LLP E-mail: gregsowell@cooktolley.com etolley@cooktolley.com vaidanmoss@cooktolley.com BANK OF AMERICA: Schertzer Suit Over Int'l. Transaction Fees Junked ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, KRISTEN SCHERTZER, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A, et al., Defendants, Case No. 19cv264 JM (MSB) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Jeffrey T. Miller of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) with leave to amend. On Feb. 5, 2019, Plaintiffs Schertzer, Meagan Hicks and Brittany Covell have brought the putative class action case, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against Bank of America, Cardtronics Inc., ATM National, LLC. FCIT, Inc., and Cash Depot Ltd., essentially claiming deceptive, misleading, and unwarranted practices have been employed in the charging and collecting of bank balance inquiry and transaction fees. On May 31, 2019, a second amended complaint ("SAC") was filed alleging original jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and, specifically under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2) and setting forth a total of thirteen1 claims against the Defendants individually and collectively. Combined, the claims are for: (1) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"); (2) conversion; (3) negligence; (4) violation of the California's False Advertising Law ("FAL"); (5) violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (6) breach of contract; and (7) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The allegations in the complaint center around three distinct categories. First, the Plaintiffs allege a scheme by Bank of America ("BofA") to charge its customers unwarranted fees for using out-of-network ("OON") Automatic Teller Machines ("ATMs") for balance inquiries. Second, they assert that the independent ATM operators Cardtronics, Cash Depot and FCTI ("ATM Defendants") made deceptive and misleading representations on the screens and on signs at ATMs they operate regarding the fees that would be charged for balance inquiries. Third, Plaintiff Schertzer alleges the fees BofA charges for International Transactions are in violation of the governing account documents. Attached to the SAC are the Deposit Agreement and Disclosures and the Personal Schedule of Fees. No party disputes that these are the contract documents between BofA and the Plaintiffs. The Fee Schedule that was in effect beginning May 18, 2018. Additionally, the Fee Schedule provides the information regarding International Transaction Fees. Plaintiff Schertzer seeks to represent the "California Cardtronics Class" and the "National Cardtronics Class." Plaintiff Covell seeks to represent the "California FCTI Class" and the "National FCTI Class." Plaintiff Hicks seeks to represent the "California Cash Depot Class" and the "National Cash Depot Class." Each of these classes consists of: a. California [ATM Defendant Name] Class: All holders of a checking account in California who, within the applicable statute of limitations preceding the filing of the lawsuit, were assessed one or more fees for purportedly undertaking a balance inquiry as part of a cash withdrawal at a [ATM Defendant Name] ATM. b. National [ATM Defendant Name] Class: All holders of a checking account in California who, within the applicable statute of limitation preceding the filing of the lawsuit, were assessed one or more fees for purportedly undertaking a balance inquiry as part of a cash withdrawal at a [ATM Defendant Name] ATM. c. All three Plaintiffs seek to represent a Nationwide BofA class and a California sub-class of BofA checking account holders who were assessed one or more fees for undertaking a balance inquiry as part of a cash withdrawal at an OON ATM. Ms. Schertzer also seeks to represent BofA Foreign Exchange Fee classes consisting of: a. National Class: All BofA payment card accountholders who, within the applicable statute of limitations preceding the filing of the lawsuit, incurred an International Transaction Fee in excess of 3.00% on an International Transaction conducted with a Payment Card. b. California Class: All BofA payment card accountholders in the State of California who, within the applicable statute of limitation preceding the filing of the lawsuit, incurred an International Transaction Fee in excess of 3% on an International Transaction conducted with a Payment Card. The prayer for relief seeks, amongst others, restitution, disgorgement, damages and an order enjoining the Defendants from continuing to employ unfair methods of competition and commit unfair and deceptive acts and practices alleged in the complaint. On June 14, 2019, Defendants Cardtronics, Inc., ATM National LLC, doing business as Allpoint, FCTI, Inc., and BofA separately filed motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs filed their oppositions to the motions, and the Defendants filed replies. On June 27, 2019, Defendant Cash Depot, Ltd. also filed its motion to dismiss. An opposition to the motion was timely filed, and Cash Depot filed a reply. Judge Miller has determined that the most practical way to proceed is to group the arguments for dismissal under the Rules by which they were made. As such, he first discusses the Rule 12(b)(1) motions, then the Rule 12(b)(2) motions, and finally the Rule 12(b)(6) motions. As for the Rule 12(b)(1) motions, the Judge agrees with the persuasive authority discussed above and holds that in order to have Article III standing to bring claims for conversion and breach of contract, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the named Plaintiffs must have been charged the OON balance inquiry fee in the state under whose laws they seek to bring the claims. Further, he concurs that it is appropriate to rule on the standing issue at the dismissal stage. All the three Plaintiffs reside in California and are asserting breach of contract and conversion claims without specifying which state laws are in play; the breach of contract claim references "under the laws of the states where BofA does business, good faith is an element of every contract" and the claims for conversion is silent. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claims brought on behalf of a nationwide class is granted. Covell has alleged that FCTI's ATM's deceptive screen prompts tricked her into performing two balance inquiries. After Covell had performed the balance inquiry, she opted to continue her transaction. It is alleged that FCTI informed BofA that Covell performed a second balance inquiry by either equating her consent to receive a receipt for her cash withdrawal as a second balance inquiry or miscommunicated to BofA regarding the second inquiry. Either way, BofA, in turn, then charged Covell for both transactions. These allegations sufficiently allege how Cowell was injured and trace the injury to the conduct of FCTI. Accordingly, the Judge concludes that Plaintiff Covell has met the causation requirement. As a consequence, FCTI's motion to dismiss on this ground is denied. Presuming the truth of the Plaintiffs' allegations and construing the allegations in their favor, the Judge concludes the Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege an actual or imminent risk of future harm. Neither Hicks nor Covell have expressly alleged that they intend to use either an FCTI or Cash Depot ATM in the future to make a balance inquiry knowing the information that they now know. Simply using "have paid and/or will continue to pay" in the complaint in relation to the UCL claims does not demonstrate an "actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical threat of future harm." More specific plausible allegations are required under the standard suggested by Davidson. Neither are the allegations sufficient to state claims for violation of the FAL or CLRA. Therefore, Plaintiffs Hicks and Covell do not have standing to seek injunctive relief. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss the claims for injunctive relief under the UCL, FAL and CLRA are granted with leave to amend. As for the Rule 12(b)(2) Motions, the Judge holds that given the current state of the pleadings, it is his view that it "would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," if Allpoint were to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The court cannot ignore Plaintiffs' concession that the SAC incorrectly states that the ATM used by Schertzer was located at 817 West Washington Street. tHE Plaintiffs do not dispute that the West Washington ATM is not on the Allpoint network or that it is neither owned nor operated by Cardtronics. Accordingly, Allpoint's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is granted with leave to amend. He agrees with the persuasive reasoning of the sister courts that absent controlling authority to the contrary, the Judge, therefore, declines to extend Bristol-Myers to the class action arena. Accordingly, BofA's motion to dismiss the claims of the putative non-California class members for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied. He does not find BofA's argument for applying Bristol-Myers in the class action context persuasive as the Supreme Court's holding concerned a state court mass tort action against a corporation engaged in a nationwide course of conduct, not, as in the case, a class action filed in federal court. While the Ninth Circuit has yet to address the issue, the reasoning of a majority of cases within the Circuit counsels against Bristol-Myers applying to class actions. Finally, as for the Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Judge granted BofA's motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim related to the assessment of OON Fees, with leave to amend. Implicit in the Plaintiffs' argument is the suggestion that BofA was required to provide notice on the ATM screen of the balance inquiry fee and receive the Plaintiffs' authorization via an ATM screen prompt, yet the Court knows of no authority requiring such an obligation and the Plaintiffs have provided none. He also granted BofA's motion to dismiss the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim related to the assessment of OON Fees, with leave to amend. The Plaintiffs have not established a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. They have not pled this as a separate count and it exists only as part of their breach of contract claim. They simply allege that BofA has breached the covenant of good fair dealing in their standardized account agreements through their OON Fee policies and practices as alleged. The Judge further granted BofA's motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim related to the assessment of the International Transaction Fees, with leave to amend. In essence, Schertzer is ignoring all of the times BofA rounded down and she received the benefit of BofA's policy. Instead, she is arguing that on the basis of rounding up certain transactions she has paid an infinitesimally small amount more than was disclosed to her. But, Schertzer has provided no facts to support her theory that the use of the rounding policy should be considered a material representation. Having based their implied covenant cause of action on essentially the same allegations as the breach of contract cause of action, this claim cannot stand independently. Accordingly, the Judge granted BofA's motion to dismiss the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to the assessment of International Transaction Fees, with leave to amend. Turning to the UCL claims, the Judge (i) recognizes that Regulation E provides a safe harbor from the UCL claim; (ii) finds Hicks and Schertzer have failed to state a claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL; (iii) finds that the Plaintiffs have not alleged any law, statute, regulation, or specifically declared legal policy that the ATM Defendants have violated; (iv) finds that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim with the requisite particularity under the fraud prong of the UCL; (v) holds that the Plaintiffs' conversion claims fail; and (vi) the Plaintiffs have not established any of the elements necessary to state a negligence claim or alleged enough facts for the court to adequately access the plausibility of the claim under the special relationship exception. As for the CLRA Claims, the Judge agrees with Cash Depot that the CLRA does not apply to the type of transaction at issue. The arguments BofA presented in support of dismissal of the UCL claim apply equally to the CLRA claim and the Judge need not rehash them. Thus, he granted BofA's motion to dismiss the CLRA claim without leave to amend. For the reasons set forth, Judge Miller dismissed with leave to amend (i) claim one for violation of the UCL brought against Cardtronics and Cash Depot on behalf of the California class; (ii) claim two for violation of the UCL brought against FCTI on behalf of the nationwide class; (iii) claim three for conversion against the ATM Defendants on behalf of the nationwide class; (iv) claim four for negligence against the ATM Defendants on behalf of the nationwide class; (v) claim five for violation of FAL against Cash Depot on behalf of the California class; (vi) claim seven for breach of contract including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against BofA arising from the assessment of OON fees; (vii) claim eight for violation of the UCL brought against BofA arising from the assessment of OON Fees; (viii) claim ten for conversion against BofA on behalf of the nationwide class for the collection of OON Fees; (ix) claim eleven for breach of contract including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against BofA arising from the assessment of International Transaction Fees; and (x) claim thirteen for conversion against BofA brought on behalf of the national class and the California class for the collection of International Transaction Fees. The Judge dismissed without leave to amend (i) claim six for violation of the CLRA against Cash Depot; (ii) claim nine for violation of the CLRA brought against BofA arising from the assessment of OON Fees on behalf of the California class; and (iii) claim twelve for violation of the UCL brought against BOA arising from the assessment of International Transaction Fees. Any amended complaint must address the standing issues related to the claims being brought on behalf of the California and nationwide classes. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Order is available at https://is.gd/6qzCsQ from Leagle.com. Kristen Schertzer, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jae Kook Kim, Carlson Lynch, LLP, Jeffrey Douglas Kaliel, Kaliel PLLC, Sophia Goren Gold, Kaliel PLLC & Todd D. Carpenter -- tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com -- Carlson Lynch LLP. Yoseph Abdelsalam & Harley Seegert, Plaintiffs, represented by Todd D. Carpenter, Carlson Lynch LLP. Meagan Hicks & Brittany Covell, Plaintiffs, represented by Jae Kook Kim, Carlson Lynch, LLP & Todd D. Carpenter, Carlson Lynch LLP. Bank of America, N.A., Defendant, represented by Amanda Leigh Groves -- agroves@winston.com -- Winston & Strawn LLP & Shawn Rieko Obi -- sobi@winston.com -- Winston & Stawn LLP. Cardtronics, Inc. & Allpoint, Inc., Defendants, represented by David A. Vogel, COOLEY LLP, Douglas P. Lobel, COOLEY LLP, Leo P. Norton, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP & Michelle C. Doolin, Cooley LLP. FCTI, Inc., Defendant, represented by Jeffrey D. Cawdrey, Gordon & Rees, Kristen Sweaney McLeod, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Shelby Poteet, Gordon & Rees LLC & Yan Ren, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP. Cash Depot LTD, Defendant, represented by Eileen M. Ahern, Willenken LLP. ATM National LLC, Defendant, represented by Leo P. Norton, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP. BR BRAND: Gonzalez Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation --------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against BR Brand Holdings LLC. The case is captioned as Raymond Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. BR Brand Holdings LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-02614 (S.D.N.Y., March 27, 2020). The lawsuit alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mars Khaimov, Esq. MCCABE, WEISBERG & CONWAY, P.C 10826 64th Avenue, 2nd Floor Forest Hills, NY 11375 Telephone: (917) 915-7415 E-mail: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com CANE BAY PARTNERS: Manago Sues Over Illegal and Usurious Loans -------------------------------------------------------------- Glendora Manago, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. CANE BAY PARTNERS VI, LLLP; DAVID JOHNSON; KIRK CHEWNING, Case No. 1:20-cv-00945-ELH (D. Md. April 13, 2020), alleges that the Defendants are involved in a scheme to make online short-term loans that carry triple-digit interest rates, often exceeding 800%, and that are illegal in many states. In recent years, online lenders have concocted various schemes to make high interest loans over the internet while avoiding state usury laws, including the "off-shore" scheme and the "tribal" or "sovereign" lending scheme. In the so-called "off-shore model," the lender is purportedly located off-shore, such as in Belize, but in reality, the lender operates in the United States. The purpose of the off-shore model is to attempt to evade the usury laws and discourage regulators by purportedly operating outside the United States. In a tribal lending scheme, the lender affiliates with a Native American tribe to attempt to insulate itself from federal and state law by piggy-backing on the tribe's sovereign legal status and the tribe's general immunity from suit under federal and state laws. Tribal lending schemes are not designed to promote tribal business but instead are contrivances aimed at avoiding state usury law, with the vast majority of the revenues going to non-tribal entities, with tribes receiving one or two percent of the revenue. In a tribal lending scheme, the tribe sets up a company that purportedly makes the loans while entering into an agreement with a servicing or consulting company that controls the entire business and retains the vast majority of the revenue from the scheme, leaving the tribe with 1% or 2% of the revenue. In this case, non-tribe members David Johnson and Kirk Chewning and their company Cane Bay Partners VI, LLLP, ran the lender Makes Cents, Inc. d/b/a MaxLend, a purportedly tribal entity in North Dakota that makes usurious loans to persons located throughout the United States. Johnson and Chewning and their company Cane Bay have been running lending schemes for years. These schemes have been highly lucrative, says the complaint. The Plaintiff seeks to recover damages and penalties under state and federal law for the usurious interest and fees obtained by the Defendants. Plaintiff Glendora Manago is a natural person and resident of Glen Burnie, Maryland. Cane Bay Partners VI, LLLP, is a limited liability limited partnership based in the U.S. Virgin Islands.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Martin E. Wolf, Esq. GORDON, WOLF & CARNEY CHTD. 100 W. Pennsylvania Ave., Suite 100 Towson, MD 21204 Phone: 410-825-2300 Email: mwolf@GWCfirm.com - and - E. Michelle Drake, Esq. John G. Albanese, Esq. BERGER MONTAGUE P.C. 43 SE Main Street, Suite 505 Minneapolis, MN 55414 Phone: (612) 594-5933 Facsimile: (612) 584-4470 Email: emdrake@bm.net jalbanese@bm.net CBS BROADCASTING: Piazza Discrimination Suit Removed to C.D. Cal. ----------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as BEN PIAZZA; JOEL BINGER; KEVIN BELLOTTI; JIMMY VELARDE; WAYNE GETCHELL; NANCY PERRY; EDWARD NELSON; RON NUGENT; DAVE GOLBA; PETER MALLARD; FREDERICK SMITH; JULIAN SALAS; ROBERTO BOSIO; RICHARD LABGOLD; DENISE STONES; LESLIE NOURSE; LINDA RUSS; JERILYNNE AKUTAGAWA; BARBRA CIMO; SHARON O'DANIEL; JODY LAWRENCE-MILLER; VICKI KAUFMAN; TRACY LAWRENCE; KENNETH LATKA; and MARC BERUTI v. CBS BROADCASTING, INC.; TELEVISION CITY STUDIOS, LLC; TELEVISION CITY SERVICES, LLC; TELEVISION CITY PRODUCTIONS, LLC; MICHAEL HACKMAN & ASSOCIATES; HACKMAN CAPITAL PARTNERS, LCC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No. 19STCV42511 (Filed Nov. 27, 2019), was removed from the Superior Court in the State of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on March 27, 2020. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-02920 to the proceeding. The lawsuit arises from the Defendants' alleged intentional discrimination, disparate impact discrimination, and unfair competition that violate the California Government Code and Business & Professions Code. CBS is an American English-language commercial broadcast television and radio network that is the flagship property of the CBS Entertainment Group division of ViacomCBS. Television City, alternatively CBS Television City, is an American television studio complex located in the Fairfax District of Los Angeles.[BN] CBS Broadcasting is represented by: Blair J. Robinson, Esq. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP 425 5th Street New York, NY 10018 Telephone: +1 212 626 4100 Facsimile: +1 212 310 1632 E-mail: blair.robinson@bakermckenzie.com - and - Stephanie P. Priel, Esq. Lara A. Grines, Esq. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP 1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 950 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: +1 310 201 4728 Facsimile: +1 310 201 4721 E-mail: stephanie.priel@bakermckenzie.com lara.grines@bakermckenzie.com CENTURYLINK: Tenth Circuit Appeal Initiated in Birse ERISA Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiff Bonnie Birse filed an appeal from a court ruling issued in the lawsuit styled Birse, et al. v. CenturyLink, et al., Case No. 1:17-CV-02872-CMA-NYW, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Denver. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit arises out of the Defendants' alleged breach of duty of prudence, specifically by failing to replace or restructure the Large Cap Fund as the CenturyLink Dollars & Sense 401(k) Plan participants' investment option, for five years despite its poor design and performance. The appellate case is captioned as Birse, et al. v. CenturyLink, et al., Case No. 20-1137, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.[BN] Plaintiffs–Appellants BONNIE BIRSE and GERAD DETWILER, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated participants and beneficiaries of the CenturyLink Dollars & Sense 401(k) Plan are represented by: Devyn Rae Glass, Esq. Donald Sean Nation, Esq. Paul R. Wood, Esq. FRANKLIN D. AZAR & ASSOCIATES 14426 East Evans Avenue Aurora, CO 80014 Telephone: 303/757-3300 Email: woodp@fdzar.com Defendants–Appellees CENTURYLINK, INC. and CENTURYLINK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY are represented by: Amanda S. Amert, Esq. Matt D. Basil, Esq. Craig C. Martin, Esq. Laura Leigh Norris, Esq. Michele Lyn Slachetka, Esq. JENNER & BLOCK 353 North Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 Telephone: 312-222-9350 Email: mslachetka@jenner.com – and - Michael S. Beaver, Esq. HOLLAND & HART LLP 6380 South Fiddlers Green Circle, Suite 500 Greenwood Village, CO 80111 Telephone: 303-290-1600 Email: mbeaver@hollandhart.com – and - Melissa Lou, Esq. Matthew J. Smith, Esq. Kimberly J. Willis, Esq. HOLLAND & HART 555 17th Street, Suite 3200 Denver, CO 80202 Telephone: 303-295-8000 Email: MYLou@hollandhart.com mjsmith@hollandhart.com KJWillis@hollandhart.com CHICAGO, IL: Gets Summary Judgment in Jackson Discrimination Suit ----------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, TERRI FELLS, LILLIAN EDMONDS, and JOSEPHINE HAMILTON PERRY, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant, Case No. 12 C 10338 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Jorge Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (i) granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, (ii) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and (iii) denied as moot the parties' Daubert motions to exclude the other's expert testimony. The Plaintiffs bring the class-action suit against the Defendant, asserting claims of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Defendant is the employer of all teachers and paraprofessionals in the Chicago Public Schools ("CPS") system. Plaintiff CTU is a labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of all CPS teachers and paraprofessionals. The individual Plaintiffs, Terri Fells, Lillian Edmonds, and Josephine Hamilton Perry, are African-Americans who were working as teachers in CPS schools when they received layoff notices in the summer of 2011. The Plaintiffs bring the suit on behalf of all African-American teachers and paraprofessionals who received similar layoff notices in 2011. The Board, via CPS administrators, determines how many teachers to employ in its individual schools based essentially on enrollment projections. Each spring, a certain number of "quota positions" are allocated to each school based on the school's enrollment projections for the following school year. Additionally, a certain number of "instructional and programmatic positions," such as, for example, special education or bilingual education positions, are allocated to each school based on formulas created by the Illinois State Board of Education, which depend on the number of students in each school needing special education, bilingual education, or other such additional support. Further, each school is allocated a certain amount of discretionary funding derived from federal programs, based on the number of students receiving free or reduced lunch in the school. The school's principal can use the funding to create additional positions, or for any other purpose, at his or her discretion. Toward the end of each school year, each CPS principal receives a packet of information from the CPS budget office, including a letter providing the number of quota positions and amount of discretionary funding the school has been allocated for the coming school year. If the school is allocated fewer positions and/or less discretionary funding than in prior years, the principal may be forced to close positions. Depending on factors such as past performance and applicable seniority rules, the principal makes an initial determination as to which individuals will be retained for the upcoming year and which will be bumped from their positions. The Board's Workforce Planning Department reviews the principal's initial decisions in order to ensure that they comply with the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and CTU. In the spring of 2011, due to a range of factors, the Board was facing a budget deficit of $724 million, and the Board's senior administrators held several meetings to determine how to address it. Among the options presented was altering the formula for calculating quota positions so as to require schools to make do with fewer teachers, but chief executive officer Jean-Claude Brizard rejected the suggestion, which would have increased class sizes. In 2011, CPS followed the same process it had followed the previous year for adjusting the number of positions and amount of funding allocated to particular schools. As a result, in the summer of 2011, the Board sent 1,470 layoff notices to 1,077 teachers and 393 paraprofessionals. Between 2001 and 2011, enrollment in CPS schools had declined by 7.6%. For African-American students, who were in large part clustered on Chicago's South and West Sides, the rate of decline was more than triple, 25.2%. Of the 1,470 individuals who received layoff notices in 2011, 630 were African-American. Many of these 630 worked in predominantly African-American schools on the South and West Sides, where enrollment was declining most precipitously. Laid-off individuals received full pay and benefits through Aug. 31, 2011. Some tenured teachers were transferred to the Reassigned Teachers Pool, where they received full salary and benefits for 10 months while working as substitute teachers. Other tenured teachers were not transferred to the reassigned teachers' pool, but they were given the opportunity to continue their employment as day-to-day substitute teachers, albeit at lower pay, with no guarantee of steady work. Of the 630 laid-off individuals, 335 had found other full-time positions with the Board by Sept. 1, 2011, sometimes in the same school where they had previously worked, and therefore suffered no loss of pay or benefits. Another 34 voluntarily retired prior to Sept. 1, 2011. The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant's 2011 layoffs violated Title VII under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, as well as Daubert motions to exclude the other's expert testimony. In a Memorandum Opinion & Order dated Jan. 3, 2020, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/x0WHIb from Leagle.com, Judge Alonso opined that he is inclined to agree with the Plaintiffs that the layoff notices they received were adverse employment actions in their own right, even if many class members never actually experienced an interruption of pay or benefits. Regardless of the fact that many class members found other positions during a short grace period, the fact remains that their positions were closed and the onus was on them to secure new ones. Thus, they fully experienced the dislocation of losing employment and necessity of taking action to recoup the loss that the plaintiff in Schultz experienced -- unlike the plaintiff in Ajayi, who received only a notice of demotion that was never imposed. In the case, unlike Ajayi, there is no question that the layoff was imposed, and the fact that some class members managed to find new positions quite quickly merely mitigates their damages; it does not nullify the adverse action. Ultimately, however, the Judge need not rule definitively on the question or on the admissibility of the parties' expert testimony. Even if it assumes that the Plaintiffs are correct and that the Court should admit Dr. Walker's testimony and exclude Dr. Blanchflower's, the Plaintiffs cannot prevail because they lack sufficient evidence to rebut the Defendants' business justification for the layoff. Next, he finds that it makes no difference at this stage. Regardless of CPS' central budget deficit, the enrollment declines in certain schools provided a legitimate business justification for laying off teachers and paraprofessionals who worked in those schools. CPS' system for making those staffing adjustments was a reasonable and practical method of staffing a school with the number of teachers and paraprofessionals reasonably necessary to serve the needs of the school's students, which meets the standard for employment practices that are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." The Defendant has met its burden of producing evidence on this issue, and there are no genuine factual disputes as to that evidence. Thus, the burden shifts to the Plaintiffs to show that a less discriminatory, equally effective alternative was available. The Judge also finds that because the Defendant has justified its enrollment-based layoff practice as job related and consistent with business necessity, and because the Plaintiffs do not adduce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find in their favor on the question of whether there were less discriminatory, equally valid alternatives to that practice, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the disparate impact claim. Next, on a motion for summary judgment, where the Plaintiff asserts a Title VII claim of discriminatory discharge based on race, the sole question that matters is whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the Plaintiff would have kept his job if he had a different ethnicity, and everything else had remained the same. First, the Judge finds that given the close relationship, the Plaintiffs are not barred from asserting their disparate treatment claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He need not reach the issue of whether the Defendant has waived the affirmative defense because, regardless, it lacks merit. Second, no reasonable juror could find that the Board intentionally discriminated against the Plaintiffs in imposing the 2011 layoffs. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted on the disparate treatment claim, and the Plaintiffs' is denied. Finally, the Defendant argues that, even if any portion of the Plaintiffs' suit survives summary judgment, it is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment against CTU because CTU has no standing to assert plaintiffs' claims in the case. According to the Defendant, CTU's claim is invalid because CTU never properly authorized this suit, nor could it because, if CTU prevails, some CTU members will benefit to the detriment of others. But the Judge need not resolve the issue because he has concluded that no portion of the Plaintiffs' suit survives summary judgment, in any case. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Alonso (i) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and (ii) granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. He denied as moot the parties' Daubert motions. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, represented by Robin B. Potter -- robin@potterlaw.org -- Potter Bolanos LLC & Patrick James Cowlin -- patrick@potterlaw.org -- Potter Bolanos LLC. Terri Fells, Lillian Edmonds & Josephine Hamilton Perry, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, represented by Robin B. Potter, Potter Bolanos LLC, Patrick James Cowlin, Potter Bolanos LLC & Randall D. Schmidt, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic. Board Of Education City Of Chicago, a body politic and corporate, Defendant, represented by Cary E. Donham -- cdonham@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, John J. Hagerty, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Allison Emma Czerniak -- aczerniak@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister Llp, Daniel Reza Saeedi -- dsaeedi@taftlaw.com -- Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP & J. Ernest Mincy, III, Board of Education, City of Chicago. Board Of Education City Of Chicago, a body politic and corporate, Counter Claimant, represented by Cary E. Donham, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, John J. Hagerty, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Allison Emma Czerniak, Taft Stettinius & Hollister Llp, Daniel Reza Saeedi, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, J. Ernest Mincy, III, Board of Education, City of Chicago & John Francis Kennedy, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Counter Defendant, represented by Robin B. Potter, Potter Bolanos LLC & Patrick James Cowlin, Potter Bolanos LLC. COSTCO WHOLESALE: Misrepresents Ice Cream Bars, Tinelli Alleges --------------------------------------------------------------- Catherine Tinelli, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, Case No. 1:20-cv-02983 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 2020), seeks damages under consumer protection laws from the Defendant's misleading representations on their ice cream bars purported to be dipped in chocolate and almonds, under the Kirkland Signature brand. The relevant representations include "Kirkland Signature," "Ice Cream Bars," "Chocolate Almond Dipped Vanilla," a picture of the product and vignette of vanilla beans, the vanilla flower, pieces of chocolate and whole almonds. The Defendant identifies the Product on the front label as being coated with "Chocolate," which is not an accurate, informative, or truthful designation and deceives consumers, the Plaintiff contends. The Plaintiff adds that the Product's ingredient list reveals that it actually is made with "Milk Chocolate Flavored Coating," instead of the real chocolate consumers expect and the law requires. According to the complaint, the Defendant's identification of the coating on the ingredient list is also misleading because it fails to disclose the presence of vegetable oil components and uses the creative name "Milk Chocolate Flavored Coating With Almonds." The Product's representations are misleading because "Milk Chocolate Flavored Coating With Almonds" is not a truthful or accurate name, because it omits the presence of vegetable oils which are a part of the coating. It is false, deceptive and misleading to represent the Product as being made with chocolate without disclosing the addition of coconut oil and soybean oil, ingredients which are prohibited in chocolate. The Defendant sold more of the Product and at higher prices than it would have in the absence of this misconduct, resulting in additional profits at the expense of consumers like the Plaintiff, says the complaint. The value of the Product that the Plaintiff purchased and consumed was materially less than its value as represented by the Defendant. Had the Plaintiff and class members known the truth, they would not have bought the Product or would have paid less for them. As a result of the false and misleading labeling, the Product is sold at a premium price, approximately no less than $10.99 per box of 18 bars, excluding tax, compared to other similar products represented in a non-misleading way. The Plaintiff purchased the Products for personal consumption. Costco Wholesale Corporation manufactures, distributes, markets, labels and sells ice cream bars purported to be dipped in chocolate and almonds, under the Kirkland Signature brand.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Spencer Sheehan, Esq. SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 505 Northern Blvd., Suite 311 Great Neck, NY 11021 Phone: (516) 303-0552 Facsimile: (516) 234-7800 Email: spencer@spencersheehan.com CREDIT BUREAU: Faces Hamilton Suit Over FDCPA and NCPA Violation ---------------------------------------------------------------- Donna J. Hamilton, n/k/a Donna J. Lunsford, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. CREDIT BUREAU SERVICES, INC. and C.J. TIGHE, Case No. 8:20-cv-00141 (D. Neb., April 13, 2020), arises from the Defendants' violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act. The Defendants sent the Plaintiff collection letters respectively dated April 15, 2019 (Letter A), May 9, 2019 (Letter B) and June 20, 2019 (Letter C), which seek payment of alleged bills for medical care/services, and which fail to identify the patient, date of service and/or account number in the letters, which created confusion for the Plaintiff and class members. None of the letters state the date of service, the patient, the nature of the service or the account number. The Plaintiff suffered concrete and particularized harm because her legally-protected consumer rights under the FDCPA and the NCPA were violated by the Defendants, says the complaint. The Plaintiff is a resident of Fremont, Dodge County, Nebraska. Credit Bureau Services, Inc., is a collection agency located in Fremont, Nebraska.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: William L. Reinbrecht, Esq. Pamela A. Car, Esq. CAR & REINBRECHT, P.C., LLO 2120 South 72nd St., Suite 1125 Omaha, NE 68124 Phone: (402) 391-8484 Facsimile: (402) 391-1103 Email: billr205@gmail.com - and - O. Randolph Bragg, Esq. HORWITZ, HORWITZ & ASSOCIATES 25 East Washington Street, Suite 900 Chicago, IL 60602 Phone: (312) 372-8822 Fax: (312) 372-1673 Email: rand@horwitzlaw.com CSC SERVICEWORKS: Rubio Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California ------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as Ricardo Rubio v. CSC ServiceWorks, Inc., Case No. 20STCV05131 (Filed Feb. 7, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on March 27, 2020. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-02873 to the proceeding. The complaint asserts claim arising from the Defendant's failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide meal breaks, failure to pay minimum wages, and failure to pay overtime wages. CSC Serviceworks provides laundry equipment services.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Shiva Shirazi Davoudian, Esq. Everett C. Martin, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 2049 Century Park East, 5th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067.3107 Telephone: 310 553 0308 Facsimile: 310 553 5583 E-mail: sdavoudian@littler.com cmartin@littler.com DAWN FOOD: Fails to Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA, Potter Alleges ----------------------------------------------------------------- Lever Franklin Potter, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. DAWN FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-10926-MAG-RSW (E.D. Mich., April 13, 2020), alleges that the Defendant violated of the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying the Plaintiff and others for all hours worked, including overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. The Plaintiff was only paid for work performed between their scheduled start and stop times, and were not paid for the following work performed before and after their scheduled start and stop times: a) changing into and out of uniforms and personal protective equipment; b) getting tools and equipment that were necessary to perform manufacturing work; c) walking to their assigned area of the manufacturing floor; and/or d) performing their manufacturing work, says the complaint. The Plaintiff was employed between January 2015 and December 2018 as a pre-mix operator at the Defendant's Jackson, Michigan plant. The Defendant manufactures food products, including mixes, bases, icings, glazes, fillings, and frozen dough.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Jennifer L. McManus, Esq. FAGAN MCMANUS, P.C. 25892 Woodward Avenue Royal Oak, MI 48067-0910 Phone: 248) 542-6300 Fax: (248) 542-6301 Email: jmcmanus@faganlawpc.com - and - Anthony J. Lazzaro, Esq. Chastity L. Christy, Esq. THE LAZZARO LAW FIRM, LLC The Heritage Bldg., Suite 250 34555 Chagrin Boulevard Moreland Hills, OH 44022 Phone: 216-696-5000 Facsimile: 216-696-7005 Email: anthony@lazzarolawfirm.com chastity@lazzarolawfirm.com DENTSPLY SIRONA: Awaits Court's Decision in Bid to Dismiss Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- Dentsply Sirona Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the company is still awaiting the decision of the court on its motion to dismiss the putative class action suit before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. On December 19, 2018, a related putative class action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Company and certain individual defendants (the "Federal Class Action"). On June 7, 2018, and August 9, 2018, two putative class action suits were filed, and later consolidated, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York claiming that the Company and certain individual defendants, violated U.S. securities laws (the "State Court Class Action") by making material misrepresentations and omitting required information in the December 4, 2015 registration statement filed with the SEC in connection with the merger deal between DENTSPLY International Inc. and Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. The amended complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose, among other things, that a distributor had purchased excessive inventory of legacy Sirona products and that three distributors of the Company's products had been engaging in anticompetitive conduct. The plaintiff in the Federal Class Action makes similar allegations and asserts the same claims as those asserted in the State Court Class Action. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated U.S. securities laws by making false and misleading statements in quarterly and annual reports and other public statements between February 20, 2014, and August 7, 2018. The plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of a putative class consisting of (a) all purchasers of the Company's stock during the period February 20, 2014 through August 7, 2018 and (b) former shareholders of Sirona who exchanged their shares of Sirona stock for shares of the Company's stock in the Merger. The Company's motion to dismiss the amended complaint was served on August 15, 2019. Briefing was completed on October 21, 2019 and the Company is awaiting the decision of the Court. Dentsply Sirona Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and markets various dental and oral health products, and other consumable healthcare products primarily for the professional dental market worldwide. The company operates in two segments, Technologies & Equipment; and Consumables. The company was formerly known as DENTSPLY International Inc. and changed its name to DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. in February 2016. DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. was founded in 1899 and is headquartered in York, Pennsylvania. DENTSPLY SIRONA: Plaintiffs' Bid to Amend State Court Suit Denied ----------------------------------------------------------------- Dentsply Sirona Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that a trial court has denied the plaintiffs' motion to show cause to vacate or modify the judgment and to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. On June 7, 2018, and August 9, 2018, two putative class action suits were filed, and later consolidated, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York claiming that the Company and certain individual defendants, violated U.S. securities laws (the "State Court Class Action") by making material misrepresentations and omitting required information in the December 4, 2015 registration statement filed with the SEC in connection with the merger deal between DENTSPLY International Inc. and Sirona Dental Systems, Inc. The amended complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose, among other things, that a distributor had purchased excessive inventory of legacy Sirona products and that three distributors of the Company's products had been engaging in anticompetitive conduct. The plaintiffs seek to recover damages on behalf of a class of former Sirona shareholders who exchanged their shares for shares of the Company's stock in the Merger. The Company has filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint, to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, and to stay all proceedings pending resolution of the Federal Class Action. On August 2, 2019, the Court denied the Company's motions to stay discovery and to stay all proceedings. On August 21, 2019, the Company filed a notice of appeal of that decision. Briefing has not yet commenced on that appeal. On September 26, 2019, the Court granted the Company's motion to dismiss all claims. The associated judgment was entered on September 30, 2019. On October 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of the motion to dismiss decision and the judgment. On November 4, 2019, the Company filed a notice of cross-appeal of select rulings in the Court's motion to dismiss decision. On October 9, 2019, the plaintiffs moved by order to show cause to vacate or modify the judgment and grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. On February 4, 2020, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion. Dentsply Sirona Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and markets various dental and oral health products, and other consumable healthcare products primarily for the professional dental market worldwide. The company operates in two segments, Technologies & Equipment; and Consumables. The company was formerly known as DENTSPLY International Inc. and changed its name to DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. in February 2016. DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. was founded in 1899 and is headquartered in York, Pennsylvania. DYCOM INDUSTRIES: Continues to Defend Securities Suit in Florida ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dycom Industries, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended January 25, 2020, that the company continues to defend a consolidated class action suit in Florida. On October 25, 2018 and October 30, 2018, the Company, its Chief Executive Officer and its Chief Financial Officer were named as defendants in two substantively identical lawsuits alleging violations of the federal securities fraud laws. The lawsuits, which purport to be brought on behalf of a class of all purchasers of the Company's securities between November 20, 2017 and August 10, 2018, were filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The cases were consolidated by the Court on January 11, 2019. The lawsuit alleges that the defendants made materially false and misleading statements or failed to disclose material facts regarding the Company's financial condition and business operations, including those related to the Company's dependency on, and uncertainties related to, the permitting necessary for its large projects. The plaintiffs seek unspecified damages. The Company believes the allegations in the lawsuit are without merit and intends to vigorously defend the lawsuit. Dycom said, "Based on the early stage of this matter, it is not possible to estimate the amount or range of possible loss that may result from an adverse judgment or a settlement of this matter." No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report. Dycom Industries, Inc. provides specialty contracting services in the United States. The company offers various specialty contracting services, including program management, engineering, construction, maintenance, and installation services, such as placement andsplicing of fiber, copper, and coaxial cables to telecommunications providers. Dycom Industries, Inc. was founded in 1969 and is based in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. EVERGREEN PACKAGING: Johnson ACRA Suit Removed to E.D. Arkansas --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as KARL JOHNSON v. EVERGREEN PACKAGING, INC., Case No. 60CV-20-1445 (Filed Feb. 17, 2020), was removed from the Arkansas Circuit Court for Pulaski County to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on March 27, 2020. The Eastern District of Arkansas Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:20-cv-00342-BSM to the proceeding. The action is brought under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993 for illegal race discrimination and retaliation. As direct and proximate of the Defendant's alleged acts and omissions, the Plaintiff has suffered severe mental and emotional stress, lost wages, incurred other damages in an amount to be proven at trial, according to the complaint. Evergreen Packaging provides beverage packaging solutions.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Carolyn B. Witherspoon, Esq. Gregory J. Northen, Esq. CROSS, GUNTER, WITHERSPOON & GALCHUS, P.C. 500 President Clinton Avenue, Suite 200 Post Office Box 3178 (72203) Little Rock, AR 72201 Telephone: (501) 371-9999 Facsimile: (501) 371-0035 E-mail: cspoon@cgwg.com gnorthen@cgwg.com EXPLO SYSTEMS: App. Ct. Reverses Class Certification in Reeves Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ROGER REEVES, SUSAN FULLERTON, HENRY GREGORY, RODNEY BROADWAY, ANITA DARBONNE AND RAY POWELL Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. EXPLO SYSTEMS, INC. AND CRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 53,219-CA (La. App.), Judge Jeanette G. Garrett of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Second Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment certifying a class action arising from an explosion that occurred near Minden, Louisiana, in October 2012, and a later voluntary evacuation of Doyline, Louisiana, which was unrelated to the explosion. Explo was in the business of disassembling munitions. It stored various explosives at Camp Minden, which is located near the towns of Minden and Doyline in Webster Parish. Around midnight on Oct. 15, 2012, some of the materials ignited, causing a large explosion that was felt and heard for miles around the area. Some windows were broken in downtown Minden and some residents reported minor property damage. In the course of investigating the blast, it was discovered that Explo was improperly storing millions of pounds of explosives. Local authorities suggested a voluntary evacuation of the Doyline area from Nov. 30, 2012, to Dec. 7, 2012. On Nov. 29, 2012, Fullerton and Gregory, residents of Doyline, filed a class action petition for damages, claiming physical, mental, and emotional injuries, fear, fright, discomfort and serious inconvenience, diminished property value, other economic damages to property, and loss of enjoyment of property. The petition stated that it was a class action filed on behalf of the named Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals who fell into the following described class: All persons and entities located or residing in, owning or leasing places of business or property in, and/or operating businesses within the geographic area of the Oct. 15, 2012 explosion or within the Nov. 29, 2012 evacuation area, who claim, claimed, and/or could claim that they suffered any damages, including fear, flight, discomfort, inconvenience, physical, mental and/or emotional damages, exposure or fear of exposure, bodily and/or personal injury, loss, property damage, and/or other damage under any theory of recovery, from the explosion and unsafe storage of explosives that occurred in 2012 in Webster Parish, Louisiana, and/or the resulting release, including the presence, migration, and/or dispersion of any toxic and/or noxious substance from the explosion and unsafe storage of explosives. The petition specified that the class was located in the geographic area of Webster Parish, including all residences, business establishments, and property located within a 15-mile radius from the explosive storage facility. The petition was subsequently amended four times to include as Plaintiffs and suggested representatives of the class Broadway, Darbonne, Powell, and Reeves, in addition to Fullerton and Gregory. C&F, an insurer of Explo, was added as a Defendant. The Plaintiffs asserted that Explo and C&F were in solido obligors. In February 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for class action certification, requesting that the trial court certify the class of Plaintiffs for prosecution of claims against the Defendants. They claimed that the class would contain more than 300 people. They sought to have the class include all persons in the blast zone; all persons who suffered property damages as a result of the explosion, including diminution of the value of property; all businesses and business owners who suffered financial losses as a result of the explosion and evacuation; those who were evacuated from Nov. 30, 2012, to Dec. 7, 2012; and all persons present at the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant when the explosion occurred, or who were considered to be in the blast zone at the time of the explosion, who suffered personal injury or property damages. The Defendants asserted that the class was defined as follows: All persons, firms, businesses, or other entities whose person or property suffered harms and losses as a result of the Oct. 15, 2012 explosion or the subsequent evacuation. No determination was made at that time regarding class action certification due to extensive and prolonged proceedings in bankruptcy court and in federal court. In March 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification. C&F again opposed the motion, arguing that the Plaintiffs sought recovery for two separate events, the explosion and the evacuation. In December 2018, a hearing was held in the trial court on the motion to certify a class action. On May 7, 2019, the trial court signed an order and opinion certifying the class. It limited the geographic radius of the class for property damage to within nine miles of the explosion, rather than the 15-mile radius urged by the Plaintiffs. Pecuniary damages for the evacuation were limited to those living in the 71023 zip code, which is Doyline and the immediate vicinity, where law enforcement recommended a voluntary evacuation. The trial court issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class action and incorporated its geographic restrictions on the classes. On June 10, 2019, C&F filed a motion to appeal the May 7, 2019, opinion and order certifying the class action. An order granting the appeal was signed on June 17, 2019. On June 11, 2019, C&F filed a motion in the trial court to modify the class certification order. It urged that the order should be amended to include claimants in Webster Parish whose property was within a six-mile radius of the explosion site and was damaged by the October 2012 explosion at Camp Minden. The plaintiffs opposed the motion to modify the class certification order, arguing that no class certification judgment had been signed in the matter. On August 6, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on C&F's motion to modify the class certification. The motion to modify the order was overruled in all other respects. A judgment to this effect was signed by the trial court on Sept. 17, 2019. Susan Fullerton, James Powell, and Katheryn Ruff were appointed the class representatives. Ryan Gatti, Stephen M. Irving, and Kyle M. Robinson were appointed the counsel for the class. While those proceedings were progressing in the trial court, on Aug. 9, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed in the Court a motion to dismiss C&F's appeal for lack of an appealable judgment. It also requested a suspension of briefing delays pending the entry of the trial court's judgment modifying its order of class certification and a supplementation of the record with the pleadings, transcripts, and judgment. On Sept. 13, 2019, the Court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss the appeal and granting C&F's motion to suspend briefing delays. It ordered the clerk of the district court to supplement the appellate record with all filings, transcripts, and orders or judgments relating to the modification of the appealed judgment. Briefing was suspended and was reissued after the record was completed. On appeal, C&F argues that the trial court erred in certifying a class in this matter because the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy any of the requirements to certify a class of mass tort Plaintiffs set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 591. Judge Garrett holds that the argument has merit. She finds that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that the prerequisites for La. C.C.P. art. 591, necessary for certification of a class action, were satisfied in the case. First, the trial court specifically found that all claims in the matter arose from the explosion in October 2012, and the resulting damage and evacuation from the surrounding area. The record does not support this view, but rather shows that the voluntary evacuation was not caused by the explosion, but was a separate event. Because two separate events caused the Plaintiffs' alleged harm, the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that there were common questions of law and fact in the matter sufficient to certify a class action. Second, because the Plaintiffs allege damage arising from two separate events, they have failed to show that the requirement of typicality has been satisfied. Because the claims are not based on the same event, practice, or course of conduct, the proposed class representatives have not shown that their claims are typical of the claims or defenses of the entire class. The trial court erred in finding that this prerequisite for class certification was satisfied. Third, one of the factors considered in determining adequacy of representation is that the representative parties should not have interests seriously antagonistic to or in direct conflict with other class members. The response to interrogatories introduced at the hearing shows that the Plaintiffs aver that the insurance policy limits in this matter are $2 million per occurrence, with an aggregate limit of $4 million. The response provides that the Plaintiffs are seeking recovery based upon two separate occurrences. The interests of those Plaintiffs seeking recovery for damages arising from the explosion may have interests in conflict with those seeking damages arising from the voluntary evacuation. The trial court erred in finding that this element of La. C.C.P. art. 591(A) was satisfied. Fourth, no one class may be defined objectively because the claimed damages arose from two entirely separate events. The attempts by the trial court to define a single class in the case demonstrate the difficulty of that task. The trial court set forth different and distinct class criteria for those who allegedly suffered property damage from the explosion and those who allegedly incurred damages from the voluntary evacuation. Because the Plaintiffs have different causes for their damages, they are not a single class. Due to the lack of commonality in the causation of their damages, the Plaintiffs are not subclasses of one class. The trial court erred in finding that an objectively definable class existed in the case. Finally, in its opinion, the trial court did not discuss the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 591(B). However, because the trial court was manifestly erroneous in determining that the Plaintiffs satisfied the commonality prerequisite of La. C.C.P. art. 591(A), the Judge must logically conclude that substantial questions of law and fact common to the class will not predominate over questions affecting only individual members. As with the commonality determination, and for the same reasons, she finds that the predominance requirement has not been satisfied in the case. For these reasons, Judge Garrett concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in certifying a class action. She reversed the trial court's judgment. The costs in the matter are assessed to the Plaintiffs. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Order is available at https://is.gd/yQQnVt from Leagle.com. THOMPSON COE COUSINS & IRONS, By: Christina Anne Culver -- cculver@thompsoncoe.com -- Kevin Risley -- krisley@thompsoncoe.com -- Brian S. Martin -- bmartin@thompsoncoe.com. WEEMS SCHIMPF HAINES ET AL., By: Carey Thomas Schimpf, Counsel for Appellant, Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company. LAW OFFICE OF KYLE M. ROBINSON, By: Kyle M. Robinson, STEVE IRVING, LLC, By: Stephen Miller Irving, GATTI & MERCKLE, By: Ryan Eugene Gatti, Emily Settle Merckle, Counsel for Appellees. FCA US: Kansas Dist. Court Dismisses LaRoe Suit Without Prejudice ----------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Daniel D. Crabtree of the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the case, RONALD AND MELODY LAROE, individually, and on behalf of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US, LLC f/k/a CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 17-2487-DDC-JPO (D. Kan.), without prejudice. Plaintiffs Ronald and Melody LaRoe, individually, and on behalf of those similarly situated, have filed their Fifth Amended Complaint in the case. The filing -- like its many predecessors—alleges that defendants acted in concert to defraud owners of some 320,000 vehicles manufactured by FCA US. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that defective wire harnesses were installed in some -- but not all -- FCA US-manufactured vehicles. And, they allege, the Defendants conducted a "sham recall" to avoid the cost of replacement parts. The Fifth Amended Complaint largely resembles the Fourth Amended Complaint, except that it now pleads that the Plaintiffs overpaid for their vehicle when they purchased it in 2014. The matter comes before the Court on Defendants FCA US and ZF North America, Inc.'s Motions to Dismiss. As they argued in earlier Motions to Dismiss, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the single cause of action they plead. Judge Crabtree again concludes that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the RICO claim asserted in their Fifth Amended Complaint. He organizes the Court's Article III standing around the three requirements recognized by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife. The first requirement asks whether the Plaintiffs have alleged an "injury in fact." Concluding that the Fifth Amended Complaint has alleged such an injury, the Judge focuses on the next component of Lujan's analysis: the requirement of a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. Because he concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead a causal connection, he need not address the last of Lujan's three requirements: redressability. Among other things, the Judge finds that the Fifth Amended Complaint discharges Lujan's first requirement. It sufficiently alleges injuries in fact in the form of overpayment damages and out-of-pocket expenses. But the Fifth Amended Complaint fails Lujan's second requirement because it never pleads any facts that could support a causal connection between the injuries alleged and the conduct complained of. The absence of such allegations means the Plaintiffs have failed to establish Article III standing. Given this conclusion, the Judge need not address Lujan's third element, or any other issue raised by the parties. The Judge holds that the Fifth Amended Complaint has failed to establish Article III standing. The conclusion leaves the Court without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, he granted FCA US' Motion to Dismiss and ZF NA's Motion to Dismiss. This time, the Judge declined to permit the Plaintiffs to replead yet again. After four tries, they never have satisfied the requisite of Article III standing. Given the sophistication of the Plaintiffs' counsel, and the many opportunities the Plaintiffs have had to plead the requisite satisfactorily, the Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs, could they do so, would have pleaded facts sufficient to establish standing. They still have not done so. He thus dismissed the action without prejudice. The Judge directed the Clerk of the Court to close the case. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Memorandum & Order is available at https://is.gd/pl4wB4 from Leagle.com. RONALD LAROE & MELODY LAROE, Movants, represented by ANDREW R. WOLF -- awolf@wolflawfirm.net -- The Wolf Law Firm, LLC & MARK A. FISHER -- MFisher@wolflawfirm.net -- THE WOLF LAW FIRM, LLC. Dolores Granillo, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Albert Granillo, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals & Desiree Nava, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs, represented by HOWARD A. GUTMAN. FCA US LLC., a Delaware limited liability company, Defendant, represented by KATHLEEN N. FENNELLY -- FENNELLY@MDMC-LAW.COM -- MCELROY, DEUTSCH,MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP. Center for Auto Safety & Public Citizen, Inc., Amicuss, represented by CARY L. FLITTER -- consumers@consumerslaw.com -- FLITTER MILZ, P.C. & JODY THOMAS LOPEZ-JACOBS , FLITTER MILZ, P.C.. FCA US: Myler FMLA Suit Removed to Northern District of Ohio ------------------------------------------------------------ The class action lawsuit captioned as Kristin Myler v. FCA US LLC, et al., was removed from the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Lucas County, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on March 30, 2020. The Northern District of Ohio Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-00676 to the proceeding. The Plaintiff asserts claims that arise under federal law, specifically, the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act. FCA US is a North American automaker based in Auburn Hills, Michigan. FCA US designs, manufactures, and sells or distributes vehicles under the Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep (TM), Ram, FIAT and Alfa Romeo brands, as well as the SRT performance designation.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brian D. Spitz, Esq. Daniel S. Debow, Esq., The Spitz Law Firm LLC 25200 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 200, Beachwood, OH 44122 E-mail: brian.spitz@spitzlawfirm.com, daniel.dubow@spitzlawfirm.com The Defendants are represented by: Heidi N. Hartman, Esq. Emilie K. Vassar, Esq. EASTMAN & SMITH LTD. One SeaGate, 24th Floor P.O. Box 10032 Toledo, OH 43699-0032 Telephone: (419) 241-6000 Facsimile: (419) 247-1777 E-mail: HNHartman@eastmansmith.com EKVassar@eastmansmith.com FEDEX GROUND: Perea Labor Class Suit Removed to S.D. California --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as NORA PEREA, individually and behalf of all others similarly situated and aggrieved v. FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., a Delaware 16 Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive, Case No. 20VC0610DMSAHG (Filed Jan. 21, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California on March 30, 2020. The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-00610-DMS-AHG to the proceeding. The Plaintiff asserts claims for the Defendants' failure to pay reporting time wages and failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements under the California Labor Code. Fedex provides package delivery services.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Evan R. Moses, Esq. Alexander M. Chemers, Esq. OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: 213-239-9800 Facsimile: 213-239-9045 E-mail: evan.moses@ogletree.com alexander.chemers@ogletree.com FIRST TRANSIT: Diarian Discrimination Suit Removed to C.D. Calif. ----------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as MAURICE DIARIAN, an Individual v. FIRST TRANSIT, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV05484 (Filed Feb. 10, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on March 30, 2020. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-02957to the proceeding. The Plaintiff asserts causes of action against the Defendants for age discrimination and harassment/hostile work environment, in violation of the California Government Code. First Transit is a United States-based subsidiary of FirstGroup.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Ryan L. Eddings, Esq. Vanessa M. Cohn, Esq. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 5200 North Palm Avenue, Suite 302 Fresno, CA 93704.2225 Telephone: (559) 244-7500 Facsimile: (559) 244-7525 FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS: ATRS Appeals Order in Stockholders Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- Lead Plaintiffs Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al., filed an appeal from the District Court's Order dated March 24, 2020, entered in the lawsuit styled In re FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS, CORP. STOCKHOLDERS LITIGATION, Case No. 3:17-cv-1617 (VAB), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit focuses on Frontier's planned acquisition of Verizon's California, Texas, and Florida wireline operations ("CTF Acquisition") and related efforts to raise capital in 2015-16. The Plaintiffs have sued three groups of the Defendants: (1) the Frontier Defendants, (2) Additional Securities Act Defendants, and (3) the Underwriter Defendants. On April 30, 2018, Arkansas Teacher Retirement System ("ATRS") and Carlos Lagomarsino, filed an amended class action Complaint on behalf of shareholders who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock of Frontier between Feb. 6, 2015 and Feb. 28, 2018, inclusive; and/or (ii) purchased or otherwise acquired Frontier common stock or Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock either in or traceable to the Company's offerings of common and preferred stock conducted on or about June 2, 2015 and June 8, 2015. The Lead Plaintiffs are suing numerous Defendants for violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933; Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and Rule 10b-5 of The Securities and Exchange Commission. The appellate case is captioned as In re: Frontier Communications, Case No. 20-1161, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN] Movant–Appellants Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al., are represented by: Katherine Sinderson, Esq. BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 Telephone: 212-554-1392 Email: katiem@blbglaw.com Plaintiffs–Appellees Gene R. Wills, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., are represented by: David R. Schaefer, Esq. BRENNER, SALTZMAN & WALLMAN LLP 271 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511 Telephone: 203-772-2600 Email: dschaefer@bswlaw.com - and – Ross H. Garber, Esq. SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP 1 Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: 860-251-5901 - and – Archis Ashok Parasharami, Esq. MAYER BROWN LLP 1999 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: 202-263-3328 Email: aparasharami@mayerbrown.com - and – Mathew P. Jasinski, Esq. MOTLEY RICE LLC 20 Church Street Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: 860-218-2725 Email: mjasinski@motleyrice.com - and – Brian Murray, Esq. GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP 230 Park Avenue New York, NY 10169 Telephone: 212-682-5340 Email: bmurray@glancylaw.com - and – Shannon Hopkins, Esq. LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP 1111 Summer Street Stamford, CT 06905 Telephone: 203-992-4523 Email: shopkins@zlk.com - and – Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq. POMERANTZ LLP 600 3rd Avenue New York, NY 10016 Telephone: 212-661-1100 Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com Defendants–Appellees Frontier Communications Corporation, et al., are represented by: Patrick M. Fahey, Esq. SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP 1 Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: 860-251-5824 Email: pfahey@goodwin.com - and – Ross H. Garber, Esq. SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP 1 Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: 860-251-5901 FUTUREDONTICS INC: Parties Proceed to Mediation in July 2020 ------------------------------------------------------------ Dentsply Sirona Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that parties in the class action suit initiated by Henry Olivares against Futuredontics, Inc., intend to participate in a mediation in July 2020. On January 25, 2018, Futuredontics, Inc. received service of a purported class action lawsuit brought by Henry Olivares and other similarly situated individuals in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. In January 2019, an amended complaint was filed adding another named plaintiff, Rachael Clarke, and various claims. The plaintiff class alleges several violations of the California wage and hours laws, including, but not limited to, failure to provide rest and meal breaks and the failure to pay overtime. The parties have engaged in written and other discovery. On February 5, 2019, Plaintiff Calethia Holt (represented by the same counsel as Mr. Olivares and Ms. Clarke) filed a separate representative action in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging a single violation of the Private Attorneys' General Act that is based on the same underlying claims as the Olivares/Clarke lawsuit. On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff Kendra Cato filed a similar action in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging a single violation of the Private Attorneys' General Act that is based on the same underlying claims as the Olivares/Clarke lawsuit. The parties intend to participate in a mediation in July 2020 and the case will be stayed until that time. The Company continues to vigorously defend against these matters. Dentsply Sirona Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, and markets various dental and oral health products, and other consumable healthcare products primarily for the professional dental market worldwide. The company operates in two segments, Technologies & Equipment; and Consumables. The company was formerly known as DENTSPLY International Inc. and changed its name to DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. in February 2016. DENTSPLY SIRONA Inc. was founded in 1899 and is headquartered in York, Pennsylvania. GANNETT CO INC: Suris Sues in E.D. New York Over ADA Violation -------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gannett Co., Inc., et al. The case is styled as Yaroslav Suris, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Gannett Co., Inc., doing business as: USA Today; Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc., doing business as: USA Today, Case No. 1:20-cv-01793 (E.D.N.Y., April 13, 2020). The Plaintiff filed the case under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Gannett Co., Inc. is an American mass media holding company headquartered in McLean, Virginia, in Greater Washington DC. Gannett is the largest U.S. newspaper publisher as measured by total daily circulation.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mitchell Segal, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL SEGAL P.C. 1010 Northern Boulevard, Suite 208 Great Neck, NY 11021 Phone: (516) 415-0100 Fax: (516) 706-6631 Email: msegal@segallegal.com GENERAL NUTRITION: Faces Clausen Class Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania ---------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against General Nutrition Corporation. The case is captioned as DALE CLAUSEN and TIMOTHY DUNCAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. GENERAL NUTRITION CORPORATION, Case No. 2:20-mc-00464-MRH (W.D. Pa, March 27, 2020). The case is assigned to the Hon. Judge Mark R. Hornak. GNC distributes health and wellness products. The Company offers vitamins and minerals, herbal supplements, beauty, and weight loss products.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Anthony M. Christina, Esq. LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C Four Tower Bridge 200 Barr Harbor Drive, Suite 400 West Conshohocken, PA 19428 Telephone: (914) 733-7268 Facsimile: (914) 997-0035 E-mail: achristina@lowey.com The Defendant is represented by: Rachel Bevans, Esq. 45 Broadway, 16th Floor New York City, NY 10006 E-mail: rbevans@cozen.com HERITAGE VALLEY: Ct. Orders Arbitration in SEIU Grievance Suit -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION HEALTHCARE PENNSYLVANIA, Plaintiff, v. HERITAGE VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant, Case No. 2:19-cv-00393-NR (W.D. Pa.), Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (i) granted the Service Employees International Union ("SEIU")'s motion for summary judgment, and (ii) compelled Heritage Valley to arbitrate the grievance. SEIU is a labor union representing registered nurses employed by Heritage Valley at its hospital in Beaver, Pennsylvania. SEIU and Heritage Valley were parties to a collective bargaining agreement effective from July 1, 2016 until June 30, 2019. Under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, Heritage Valley agreed to arbitrate "any dispute or complaint" that might arise. Yet when the union demanded to arbitrate a dispute about whether Heritage Valley was improperly forcing unionized nurses to work as "patient care assistants," Heritage Valley refused. So the union filed the lawsuit. Alongside its unionized nurses, Heritage Valley also employs non-unionized "patient care assistants." Patient care assistants do not need a nursing license. Their job functions are also considerably less skilled than those performed by unionized nurses. Because the CBA applies only to unionized nurses, it does not mandate staffing levels or ratios for patient care assistants. Heritage Valley typically assigns each patient care assistant to aid between three and four nurses on a given unit. It means that care assistants can be responsible for providing care to over 20 patients, and almost always care for many more patients than each unionized nurse on a given shift. SEIU filed the grievance at issue on Oct. 28, 2018. In it, SEIU alleged that, on at least three dates during that month, Heritage Valley reassigned unionized nurses to work as patient care assistants outside their normal hospital units. According to SEIU, Heritage Valley then forced the nurses to perform low-level, unskilled tasks normally performed by care assistants, and to care for numbers of patients that exceeded mandatory staffing ratios. SEIU contends that these actions breached Article 5, Article 10.5, Article 21, and Appendix A of the CBA, and that Article 7 requires Heritage Valley to arbitrate SEIU's grievance. As required by Article 7.1, Heritage Valley responded to SEIU's grievance in writing, by email, on Dec. 11, 2018. In its email, Heritage Valley confirmed that it would refuse to arbitrate the grievance based on Article 10.5(a), which it interpreted to mean that a dispute which involves the floating/pulling of employees is not subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure in Article 7. Heritage Valley also invited SEIU to instead consider whether it wished to refer the pulling issue to the Professional Practice Committee for a recommended solution, as set forth in Article 10.5. SEIU declined. Four months later, SEIU filed the lawsuit, seeking to compel Heritage Valley to arbitrate the pending grievance. The parties have agreed to resolve the case through the pending motions for summary judgment. The parties agree that the case presents a pure question of contract interpretation, that no material facts are in dispute, and that the Court should resolve the case on summary judgment. Of course, they have opposite views on what that resolution should be. SEIU points out that the CBA broadly requires arbitration of "any dispute or complaint" arising under it and argues that its grievance here is no exception. Heritage Valley counters that Article 10.5(a) of the CBA exempts the matters raised in SEIU's grievance from arbitration. After careful consideration, Judge Ranjan agrees with SEIU. In deciding whether Heritage Valley should be compelled to arbitrate SEIU's grievance, "judicial review is limited to two threshold questions." First, whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement. And second, whether the parties' dispute falls within the language of the arbitration agreement. Judge Ranjan holds that the plain terms of the parties' CBA establish that SEIU's grievance is arbitrable. The parties' arbitration agreement is broad. And where a broad arbitration agreement exists, the federal policy favoring arbitration creates a presumption of arbitrability unless the contract is "not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." In the case, the potential "exclusion" identified by Heritage Valley does not apply to the union's grievance. Even if it did, that exclusion would at most prevent the union from compelling arbitration of just one of its several claims, while all others would remain arbitrable. Judge Ranjan therefore granted SEIU's motion for summary judgment. He also denied Heritage Valley's cross-motion for summary judgment, having found that SEIU is entitled to relief under the undisputed facts agreed to by both parties. Finally, to avoid any doubt, Judge Ranjan clarified that, because he finds that the pending grievance is arbitrable in its entirety, SEIU is free to pursue the alleged violation of Article 10.5(a) in arbitration alongside its other claims, if it so chooses, notwithstanding its offer to forgo that claim. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Opinion is available at https://is.gd/85Up7r from Leagle.com. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION HEALTHCARE PENNSYLVANIA, Plaintiff, represented by Claudia Davidson, Office of Claudia Davidson & Pamina G. Ewing -- PEWING@FDPKLAW.COM -- Feinstein Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC. HERITAGE VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant, represented by James A. Prozzi, Jackson Lewis P.C. & Douglas G. Smith -- Douglas.Smith@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis P.C.. HERON THERAPEUTICS: Wong Complaint Voluntarily Dismissed -------------------------------------------------------- Heron Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that Jimmy Wong has voluntarily dismissed his complaint, without prejudice, as to all defendants. On June 3, 2019, a purported federal securities class action complaint was filed against the Company, its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer by Jimmy Wong, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On November 21, 2019, the Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Complaint, without prejudice, as to all defendants. Heron Therapeutics, Inc., incorporated on February 5, 1987, is a biotechnology company. The Company is engaged in developing pharmaceutical products for patients suffering from cancer or pain. The company is based in San Diego, California. HOME DEPOT: Fails to Give Compliant COBRA Notice, Smith Claims -------------------------------------------------------------- Jennifer M. Smith, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., d/b/a THE HOME DEPOT, a Foreign Profit Corporation, Case No. 8:20-cv-00850 (M.D. Fla., April 13, 2020), alleges that the Defendant violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, by failing to provide the Plaintiffs with a timely COBRA notice that complies with the law. Despite having access to the Department of Labor's Model COBRA form, Home Depot chose not to use the model form--presumably to save Home Depot money by pushing terminated employees away from electing COBRA, the Plaintiff alleges. The deficient COBRA Notice at issue in this lawsuit, both confused and misled her, the Plaintiff says. She adds that it also caused her economic injuries in the form of lost health insurance and unpaid medical bills, as well as informational injuries. According to the complaint, Home Depot, the plan sponsor and plan administrator of the Home Depot Welfare Benefits Plan, has repeatedly violated ERISA by failing to timely provide participants and beneficiaries in the Plan with adequate notice, as prescribed by COBRA, of their right to continue their health coverage upon the occurrence of a "qualifying event" as defined by the statute. As a result of receiving the deficient COBRA enrollment notice, the Plaintiff says she could not make an informed decision about her health insurance and lost health coverage. She adds that she suffered a tangible injury because she did not seek medical treatment as she was uninsured due to Home Depot's late and deficient COBRA forms. And, not only did the Plaintiff lose her insurance coverage, after Plaintiff lost her insurance, she lost the ability to direct her health-care related decisions, says the complaint. Plaintiff Jennifer M. Smith is a former employee of the Defendant and participant in its health plan. The Defendant is a foreign corporation but is registered to do business in the State of Florida.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Marc R. Edelman, Esq. George G. Triantis, Esq. MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A. 201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700 Tampa, FL 33602 Phone: 813-223-5505 Fax: 813-257-0572 Email: MEdelman@forthepeople.com GTriantis@forthepeople.com ICU MEDICAL: Bid to Drop Saline Solution Class Suit Remains Pending ------------------------------------------------------------------- ICU Medical, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in the intravenous saline solutions class action suit, is pending. Beginning in November 2016, purported class actions were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Pfizer, Inc. subsidiaries, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Worldwide, Inc. and certain other defendants relating to the intravenous saline solutions part of the HIS business. Plaintiffs seek to represent classes consisting of all persons and entities in the U.S. who directly purchased intravenous saline solution sold by any of the defendants from January 1, 2013 until the time the defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct ceases. Plaintiffs allege that U.S. manufacturer defendants conspired together to restrict output and artificially fix, raise, maintain and/or stabilize the prices of intravenous saline solution sold throughout the U.S. in violation of federal antitrust laws. Plaintiffs seek treble damages (for themselves and on behalf of the putative classes) and an injunction against defendants for alleged price overcharges for intravenous saline solution in the U.S. since January 1, 2013. On July 5, 2018, the District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the operative complaint for failing to state a valid antitrust claim, but allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. On September 6, 2018, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding new allegations in support of their conspiracy claims and adding ICU as a defendant. All defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this second amended complaint. Briefing is complete and we are awaiting the Court's ruling. ICU Medical said, "On February 3, 2017, we completed the acquisition of the HIS business from Pfizer. This litigation is the subject of a claim for indemnification against us by Pfizer and a cross-claim for indemnification against Pfizer by us under the HIS stock and asset purchase agreement." No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report. ICU Medical, Inc. develops, manufactures, and sells medical devices used in vascular therapy, critical care, and oncology applications worldwide. ICU Medical, Inc. was founded in 1984 and is headquartered in San Clemente, California. JGOO INC: Johnson Sues Over Unpaid Minimum and Overtime Wages ------------------------------------------------------------- Lindsey Johnson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. JGOO, INC., and OSWALDO OSEGUERA, Case No. 6:20-cv-06042-RTD (W.D. Ark., April 13, 2020), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act, for declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, as a result of the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff minimum and overtime wages. According to the complaint, the Defendant does not distinguish between time spent by servers on tipped work and time spent by servers on non-tipped work. Non-tipped duties occupy more than twenty percent of the Plaintiff's time. The Defendant paid the Plaintiff the same rate--below the applicable minimum wages--for both tipped work and non-tipped work. As a result of the policies put in place by the Defendant, the Plaintiff was often required to perform non-tipped work for less than minimum wage. The Plaintiff regularly worked over forty hours per week. The Defendant did not pay a proper overtime rate for hours over 40 per week, says the complaint. The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant as a server at the Defendant's restaurant in Hot Springs. The Defendant owns and operates a restaurant in Hot Springs called Bleu Monkey Bar & Grill.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Sean Short, Esq. Josh Sanford, Esq. SANFORD LAW FIRM, PLLC One Financial Center 650 South Shackleford, Suite 411 Little Rock, AR 72211 Phone: (501) 221-0088 Facsimile: (888) 787-2040 Email: sean@sanfordlawfirm.com josh@sanfordlawfirm.com JM DISTRIBUTING: Gutierrez Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California ---------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as STEVEN GUTIERREZ and AMERICA GUTIERREZ, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated v. J.M. DISTRIBUTING, INC., a Florida corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 30-2020-701135734-CU-OE-CXC (Filed March 2, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Orange to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on March 27, 2020. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:20-cv-00617 to the proceeding. The Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime premiums, including interest, statutory penalties, civil penalties, attorneys' fees, and costs of suit according to the California Labor Code. J M Distributing is a consumer goods company.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Agnes M. Sullivan, Esq. ZUBER LAWLER & DEL DUCA LLP 350 S. Grand Avenue, 32nd Floor Los Angeles, CA 90071 Telephone: (213) 596-5620 Facsimile: (213) 596-5621 E-mail: asullivan@zuberlawler.com KOJI'S JAPAN: Attys' Fees & Costs Award in Quiles FLSA Suit Flipped ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, AMANDA QUILES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTHUR J. PARENT, JR., Defendant and Appellant, Case No. G056687 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the Fourth District, Division Three, (i) reversed the postjudgment order to the extent it awarded postjudgment appellate attorney fees and costs; (ii) remanded to the trial court to determine how much of the attorney fees and costs award includes fees and costs for appellate work prohibited by Conservatorship of McQueen and reduce the award accordingly; and (iii) otherwise affirmed the postjudgment order. In November 2010, Quiles, along with other individuals, filed a proposed class action against, inter alia, Koji's Japan Inc. and Arthur J. Parent, Jr., asserting several state and federal wage and hour claims and violation of California's unfair competition law. The Plaintiffs amended their complaint several times to add, among other things, Quiles' individual wrongful employment termination claim in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In early 2015, the trial court presided over a bench trial to determine joint employer and alter ego theories of liability. At the beginning of the trial, the Defendants declared bankruptcy. Parent was fined over $50,000 for making a frivolous bankruptcy filing. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found Parent qualified as a joint employer under the FLSA. In April 2016, following a jury trial, judgment was entered in the amount of $383,500 against Parent, in Plaintiff Quiles' wrongful termination action. Parent filed a motion for a new trial, which challenged as excessive the jury's punitive damages award of $350,000. The trial court conditionally granted the new trial motion, subject to Quiles consenting to a reduction of the punitive damages award to $175,000; Quiles accepted the reduction. In October 2016, an amended judgment was entered which reflected the reduced punitive damages award and added an award of $689,310.04 in attorney fees and $50,591.69 in costs in favor of Quiles. In early 2018, Quiles filed a memorandum of costs and a motion to recover attorney fees she incurred in enforcing the judgment. After several rounds of briefing and hearings, the trial court granted the motion, awarding Quiles the requested amounts of $493,017 in attorney fees and $27,879.09 in costs. The trial court finds that the hourly rates charged and the number of hours billed were reasonable and necessary. A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case. The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work. A defendant cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response. Parent's Motion to Strike or Tax Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs is denied. The Defendants have not completely satisfied the Judgment. Parent appealed from the June 29, 2018 order. Parent argues that as of the time Quiles filed her motion to recover postjudgment attorney fees and costs, he had fully satisfied the judgment. Parent's calculations are dependent on his assumption that postjudgment interest did not begin to accrue in this case until the amended judgment was filed in October 2016. Quiles's calculations, summarized in the chart set forth in the Background section ante, assume postjudgment interest began to accrue in April 2016. The Court agrees that postjudgment interest began to accrue on the original judgment beginning April 2016, there is no dispute about the accuracy of Quiles' numbers and calculations based on that assumption, and, therefore, her memorandum of costs and motion for attorney fees were not barred because Parent had not satisfied the judgment. Next, Parent contends that Quiles never served him directly (as opposed to service through his counsel) with a noticed motion for postjudgment attorney fees and costs as required by section 685.080. Quiles served only Parent's counsel on Feb. 6, 2018 with her memorandum of points and authorities and declarations in support of her motion to recover enforcement costs, including attorney fees, and later on March 2, 2018, served only Parent's counsel with the notice of motion and motion. Quiles only served the memorandum of costs on Parent's counsel on Jan. 26, 2018; on April 16, 2018, she directly served Parent, as well as his counsel, with the same memorandum of costs as required by section 685.070. The Court holds that Parent did not contend in the trial court and does not contend on appeal that he was unaware of Quiles' memorandum of costs and motion for postjudgment attorney fees when they were served on his counsel or that he required more time to oppose Quiles's motion to his satisfaction. He opposed Quiles's requests on the merits. Again, not only did Parent fail to request a continuance on the hearing in order to provide him time to oppose Quiles' requests, he opposed her request for a continuance sought by her to ensure he directly received sufficient notice. In sum, Parent did not preserve his objection that he was not directly served with Quiles's motion for attorney fees as required by section 685.080 but, even if he had, his argument fails because he has not demonstrated prejudice. Parent argues Quiles was equitably and/or judicially estopped from asserting that her motion for postjudgment attorney fees and costs was timely because her counsel, on prior occasions, had inaccurately represented a lesser outstanding balance on the principal judgment. Parent argues he justifiably relied on Quiles' counsel's representations in making payments on the judgment and therefore Parent's right to post-judgment attorney fees and costs should be forfeited. The Court holds that Parent's judicial estoppel argument gets no further than the second element. Quiles' counsel's miscalculations were never accepted by the trial court or otherwise incorporated into any order of the court. Judicial estoppel does not apply. Parent contends that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees and costs associated with Quiles's appellate work that were not recoverable as fees and costs incurred to enforce the judgment within the meaning of sections 685.070 and 685.080. The Court finds that the record shows Quiles sought attorney fees and costs for appellate work and was awarded her requested attorney fees and costs. It is unclear how much of the attorney fees and costs award was attributable to appellate work the McQueen court held to be unrecoverable as enforcement attorney fees and costs. The Court therefore remands to the trial court to determine how much the attorney fees and costs award should be reduced under McQueen. Its opinion is without prejudice to Quiles attempting to pursue attorney fees and costs for her appellate work through the procedures set forth by the California Rules of Court. Parent argues that even if the Court concluded that Quiles could recover costs beyond those permitted by section 685.070 [notwithstanding defects in service and notice], the trial court abused its discretion by awarding certain costs. Parent cites legal research fees, costs related to the filing of a status conference statement in a companion action, and travel costs. The Court has reviewed the record and find nothing to suggest the trial court's attorney fees and cost awards constituted an abuse of discretion. Finally, Parent filed a request that the Court takes judicial notice of Interest calculations performed on Jan. 17 to 19, 2019, using the judgment calculator available on the San Diego County Superior Court's website. The Court concludes that interest started accruing when judgment was entered in April 2016. Parent's calculations, which were based on interest calculations beginning in October 2016, are therefore irrelevant. It denied the request for judicial notice. Based on the foregoing, the Court reversed only the portion of the postjudgment order that awards Quiles attorney fees and costs incurred to defend against the reversal or modification of the judgment on appeal which the California Supreme Court in Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602, 605 (McQueen) held are not recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080. The Court remanded to the trial court to determine how much the attorney fees and costs award should be reduced under McQueen. The Court otherwise affirmed the postjudgment order in its entirety, rejecting Parent's contentions of error. Postjudgment interest began to accrue as of the date the original judgment was entered. P arent, therefore, had not satisfied the judgment by the time Quiles filed her memorandum of costs and motion to recover attorney fees. Although Quiles only served Parent's counsel and failed to serve Parent directly with her motion for attorney fees as required by section 685.080, Parent waived the defect in service by failing to raise that issue in his opposition and instead addressing the merits of Quiles' motion. Even if the issue of defective service had not been waived, Parent failed to show he had been prejudiced. Quiles was not estopped from seeking attorney fees and costs because her counsel mistakenly reported a lesser amount was owed on the judgment; there was no evidence Quiles had agreed to accept a lesser amount than was owed in full satisfaction of the judgment. The Court did not otherwise abuse its discretion by awarding certain costs. In the interest of justice, the parties will bear their own costs on appeal. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Order is available at https://is.gd/AElWh6 from Leagle.com. Rutan & Tucker, Brian C. Sinclair -- BSinclair@rutan.com -- and Maria Z. Stearns -- mstearns@rutan.com -- for Defendant and Appellant. Bryan Schwartz Law and Bryan J. Schwartz -- bryan@bryanschwartzlaw.com; Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill, Daniel H. Reiss -- dhr@lnbyb.com -- and Beth Ann R. Young -- bry@lnbyb.com -- for Plaintiff and Respondent. LATAM AIRLINES: TM Solutions Sues Over Cancellation of Tickets -------------------------------------------------------------- TM Solutions USA LLC, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. LATAM AIRLINES GROUP S.A. INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-21552-JAL (S.D. Fla., April 13, 2020), alleges that the Defendant intentionally cancelled tickets for flights that consumers already paid for, without their consent, in order to resell the tickets and enrich itself, all at the expense of stranded consumers. On February 13, 2020, in his capacity as manager member and owner of TM Solutions, Pedro Egusquiza had to travel to Miami, Florida, for business meetings with one of TM Solutions' main partners in the United States. Due to the nature of the meetings, Egusquiza called Andres Guerrero, a food industry professional working for a TM Solutions affiliate in Lima, Peru, to travel with him for the meetings. Egusquiza requested his assistant, Talia Peschiera, to purchase flights on the route LIM3-MIA-LIM for both of them. Ms. Peschiera was supposed to purchase flights departing from LIM on the early hours of February 19, 2020, and returning from MIA on the early hours of February 21, 2020. However, Peschiera inadvertently purchased the inbound flights for February 18, 2020, at 12:15AM rather than February 19, 2020, at a similar time. TM Solutions paid $2,280 for Egusquiza and Guerrero's roundtrip tickets. Ms. Peschiera was able to find substitute LIM-MIA flights for Egusquiza and Guerrero in American Airlines for $420 each. Importantly, Peschiera, in her call with LATAM, told the customer service agent what she was going to do, i.e., that given the difference in flight prices, she would purchase new one-way inbound flights in the open market for Egusquiza and Guerrero. At no point was Peschiera told that this would be a problem, or that it would have any impact on the existing reservation. On February 20, 2020, Peschiera attempted to complete the check-in for Egusquiza and Guerrero's outbound flight in LATAM's website. To her surprise, there was no available reservation with her original LATAM reservation code. Peschiera called BudgetAir, which in turn told her to call LATAM, which in turn told her to call BudgetAir again. Both LATAM and BudgetAir told Peschiera that it is the policy of LATAM to cancel complete reservations (the entire roundtrip) once a passenger does not board his inbound flight (this is the so called "no-show" policy). Peschiera requested to speak with LATAM supervisors but they would not speak with her. According to the complaint, at no point did LATAM ask TM Solutions, or any of its agents (Peschiera, Egusquiza, or Guerrero), for consent to cancel the already paid-for MIA-LIM return flights. At no point did TM Solutions, or any of its agents tell LATAM that it could resell the return flights that had already been paid for by TM Solutions. It would be very inexpensive and simple for LATAM to request their consumers' consent to resell or cancel flights that consumers will not use, but LATAM, as a matter of policy, does not obtain this consent because it would deprive LATAM of a rather profitable resale scheme under its current "no-show" policy whereby LATAM nets the price of a single flight twice, enlarging its already formidable bottom line, says the complaint. Plaintiff TM Solutions is a company dedicated, principally, to the wholesale of fresh produce in the United States and other international markets. LATAM is an international commercial air carrier that operates under the brand name "LATAM Airlines."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Eduardo A. Maura, Esq. Luis F. Quesada, Esq. AYALA LAW, P.A. 1390 Brickell Ave., Ste. 335 Miami, FL 33131 Phone: 305-570-2208 Email: eayala@ayalalawpa.com - and - Jorge Garcia-Menocal, Esq. GARCIA MENOCAL, PASTORI & IRIAS LLP 368 Minorca Ave. Coral Gables, FL 33134 Phone: 305-400-9652 Email: jgm@gmilaw.com LIBERTY UNIVERSITY: Student A Seeks Refund of Spring Semester Fee ----------------------------------------------------------------- Student A, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, INC. d/b/a LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, Case No. 6:20-cv-00023-NKM (W.D. Va., April 13, 2020), seeks to recover refund for fees and costs paid for the Spring 2020 academic semester at Liberty University. The lawsuit is brought on behalf of all people, who paid fees to cover the costs of services and/or activities (including parking, room and board, campus fees, activity fees, athletic fees, and other fees) for the Spring 2020 academic semester at Liberty University who, because of the University's response and policies relating to the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 ("COVID-19") pandemic, lost the benefits of the services and activities for which their fees were paid, without having those fees and costs refunded to them. In March 2020, Liberty University announced that because of the global COVID-19 pandemic, it "will transition most residential classes to a online format starting Monday, March 23." Students, who lived in on-campus housing were not expressly forced to move out their housing--indeed, the University purports to remain open while classes have moved online and the University's President has tried to downplay the significance of the pandemic, says the complaint. In a March 13, 2020 interview, the University's President, Jerry Falwell, Jr., stated that people are "overreacting," compare COVID-19 to the flu, insinuated that the overreaction was politically motivated, and even speculated the virus may have been a Christmas present from North Korea and China. According to the complaint, despite efforts to downplay the pandemic, the University has stopped providing the services and activities for which the Plaintiff paid fees. Despite ending on-campus services and activities for the rest of the semester leaving students with o safe and practical choice other than moving out of their on-campus housing and discontinuing coming to Liberty's campus, Liberty has refused to refund to students and their families the unused portions of the feed that they each paid to cover costs of certain on-campus services and activities, which are no longer available to students. The Plaintiff brings this class action for injunctive, declaratory, and equitable relief, and any other available remedies, resulting from Liberty's improper conduct, namely training the costs fees by the Plaintiff, while encouraging the Plaintiff and the other Class members to move off campus and ceasing coming to attend class. Student A. is a U.S. citizen and is a Liberty University student, who paid fees for the Spring 2020 semester. Liberty University, Inc., is an accredited evangelical liberal arts institution based in Lynchburg, Virginia, with seventeen colleges and schools.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: E. Kyle McNew, Esq. J. Gregory Webb, Esq. Lisa S. Brook, Esq. MICHIEHAMLETT 310 3th Street, NE P.O. Box 298 Charlottesville, VA 22902 Phone: 434-951-7231 Fax: 434-951-7254 Email: kmcnew@michiehamlett.com gwebb@michiehamlett.com lbrook@michiehamlett.com - and - Adam J. Levitt, Esq. Amy E. Keller, Esq. Laura E. Reasons, Esq. DICELLO LEVITT GUTZLER LLC Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor Chicago, IL 60602 Phone: 312-214-7900 Email: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com akeller@dicellolevitt.com lreasons@dicellolevitt.com - and - Matthew S. Miller, Esq. MATTHEW S. MILLER LLC 77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 4500 Chicago, IL 60601 Phone: 312-741-1085 Email: mmiller@msmillerlaw.com LINEBARGER GOGGAN: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Hinojoda FDCPA Suit ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, GALAESO CARDONA HINOJOSA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LINEBARGER GOGGAN BLAIR & SAMPSON, LLP, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-02521 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Charles Ronald Norgle of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against the firm Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP and the City of Chicago, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. The case involves an alleged deceptive debt collection. The Plaintiffs claim that a debt collection law firm, on behalf of the City of Chicago, attempted to collect a water bill payment 18 years after the debt was due. Specifically, they allege that it was deceptive for the firm to send them a collection letter without informing them that the city's claim was time-barred by statute of limitations or that Plaintiffs would sacrifice this defense if they made partial payment. In their Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' first claim, for violation of the FDCPA, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because FDCPA regulation cannot apply to the Plaintiffs' water bill as it is not consumer debt that arises out of a consensual "transaction." They also argue that Count I fails because the four-year statute of limitations from Illinois' Uniform Commercial Code invoked by the Plaintiffs does not apply to the water bill, due to the City of Chicago's authority stemming from Home Rule and the doctrine of nellum tempus. Second, they argue that the Plaintiffs' other count, for declaratory and injunctive relief, fails pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because those claims for relief: (1) do not independently confer federal jurisdiction; (2) are not remedies allowed under the FDCPA; and (3) are mere remedies rather than causes of action. Finally, Defendants contend that the second Plaintiff, Galaeso Hinojosa's wife Maria Cardona, is not a proper plaintiff because she was not named on the water bill. Judge Norgle denied the motion in an order dated Dec. 11, 2019 Order, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/BZNlnr from Leagle.com. Having reviewed the pleadings and briefs submitted by the parties, and taking the Plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, Judge Norgle concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims do not fail as a matter of law at this point. The Plaintiffs meet the above pleading standards and put Defendants on notice of the claims against them. In short, they allege that they had a contract with the city for the sale of water. The Judge finds that the attempted collection of the water bill in the case is an example of the government acting in its private capacity. Moreover, the Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is also denied. Count I, which confers subject matter jurisdiction on the Court, survives the Motion. Both claims involve the same circumstances and so both survive the Motion. Plaintiff Cardona will also survive the Motion. As an alleged former co-owner of the relevant property, she may be responsible for the debt involved in the case. While she is not named on the collection letter, she may still qualify as a member of the class and at this point will not be dismissed from the case without further discovery. The Defendants' arguments may prove successful at the summary judgment stage or beyond. However, their motion fails at this early stage. The parties should proceed with discovery, including Rule 26(a) disclosures, pursuant to Federal and Local Rules. Galaeso Cardona Hinojosa, on behalf of plaintiffs and the class members described below & Maria Cardona, on behalf of plaintiffs and the class members described below, Plaintiffs, represented by Daniel A. Edelman, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Tara Leigh Goodwin, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC, Bryan G. Lesser, Edelman, Combs, Latturner, & Goodwin & Cathleen M. Combs, Edelman, Combs, Latturner & Goodwin LLC. Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP & The City of Chicago, Defendants, represented by David M. Schultz -- dschultz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP & Carlos A. Ortiz -- cortiz@hinshawlaw.com -- Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP. LTD FINANCIAL: Summary Judgment Bid in Vedernikov FDCPA Suit Okayed ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IGOR VEDERNIKOV, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES, L.P. and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants, Case No. 3:18-cv-15217 (BRM)(LHG)(D. N.J.), Judge Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted LTD's Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). The dispute arises out of Vedernikov's putative class action claim, alleging LTD's debt collection practice violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA") by failing to convey the requirement that a consumer must dispute a debt in writing. Some time prior to Aug. 10, 2018, Vedernikov allegedly defaulted on a credit card debt which was assigned for collection to LTD. To collect the debt, LTD mailed a collection letter to Vedernikov on Aug. 10, 2018. Vedernikov alleges the Letter violates the FDCPA by omitting the requirements that he must request validation and make any dispute in writing. On Oct. 23, 2018, Vedernikov filed his two-count FDCPA Complaint. On May 10, 2019, LTD filed the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). On May 18, 2019, Vedernikov filed an opposition to LTD's Motion for Summary Judgment. LTD argues summary judgment should be granted because the language in the Letter complies with FDCPA requirements. It claims the statutory construction of the FDCPA does not require the insertion of the words "in writing," nor the removal of the word "if." Vedernikov contends LTD's omission of the words "in writing" in the first sentence of the G-Notice was a per se violation of Section 1692g(a)(3). Furthermore, he alleges LTD violated Section 1692e by using the conditional word "if" in the G-Notice, which communicated multiple and conflicting options for disputing the debt. Judge Martinotti finds that, as Vedernikov concedes in his opposition brief, when allegations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(10) are based on the same language or theories as allegations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g, the analysis of the Section 1692g claim is usually dispositive. Accordingly, the analysis under the Section 1692g claim is dispositive of Vedernikov's Section 1692e(10) claim, and therefore, the Judge begins his analysis there. He finds that the use of the word "unless" in the first sentence informs the consumer the consequences of failing to dispute the debt, while the second sentence instructs how to dispute the debt. Because the Letter clearly conveys to the least sophisticated consumer the requirement disputes be submitted in writing, LTD did not violate the requirements of Section 1692g(a)(3). Finally, he finds that Section 1692e forbids the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. However, in the Circuit, when allegations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(10) are based on the same language or theories as allegations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g, the analysis of the Section 1692g claim is usually dispositive. Therefore, based on the analysis, because Vedernikov fails to state a claim under Section 1692g, his claim under Section 1692e also fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, LTD's debt collection letter does not violate Section 1692g or Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA, and LTD's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, ruled Judge Martinotti in his Opinion dated Jan. 22, 2020, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/kc6wkw from Leagle.com. IGOR VEDERNIKOV, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by YAAKOV SAKS -- ysaks@steinsakslegal.com -- Stein Saks, PLLC. LTD FINANCIAL SERVICES LP, Defendant, represented by MITCHELL L. WILLIAMSON -- mwilliamson@bn-lawyers.com -- Barron & Newburger, P.C.. LYFT INC: Islam Sues in New York Alleging Breach of Contract ------------------------------------------------------------ MD Islam, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v. LYFT, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-03004 (S.D.N.Y., April 13, 2020), is brought for breach of contract on behalf of similarly situated New York City drivers. The Plaintiff alleges that the drivers, during the period from June 27, 2019, to the present, have been subjected to Lyft's unlawful practice, in violation of the driver agreement, of forcibly logging off Lyft drivers from the Lyft app if they perform fewer than 100, or 180 rides in a 30-day period. Such actions violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Taxi and Limousine Commission regulations intended to confer basic labor protections upon some of the City's most vulnerable low-wage workers, the Plaintiff contends. Crucially, the Plaintiff notes, the Lyft contracts specifically provide that drivers shall have no limitations on their ability of where and when to access the Lyft app. Thus, Lyft's forced log-outs and restricted access to the Lyft app constitute a material breach of Lyft's contract with its drivers, the Plaintiff argues. Although Lyft had long had a practice of forcibly logging out drivers, who did not respond to trip requests, indicating that they were not ready to perform work, Lyft had never previously suspended drivers, who were ready, willing, and able to perform trips for Lyft, the Plaintiff adds. Lyft's forced logouts of its affiliated drivers amount to nothing less than short term layoffs of workers, who have come to depend on the availability of full-time work in order to meet their work expenses, let alone the cost of living in New York City, the Plaintiff contends. The effect of Lyft's unilateral shift in policies has been to significantly reduce the working hours of thousands of drivers overnight. These drivers are now earning hundreds of dollars less per week and may, if Lyft's breach of contract continues unchecked, cost drivers thousands of dollars per year in take-home pay, says the complaint. Plaintiff Islam has worked as a Driver for Lyft since 2014. Lyft, Inc., began its New York City operations as a New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission licensed Black Car company, providing private for-hire vehicle transportation.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Zubin Soleimany, Esq. NEW YORK TAXI WORKERS ALLIANCE 31-10 37th Ave., Ste. 300 Long Island City, NY 11101 Phone: (718) 706-9892 Email: zsoleimany@nytwa.org - and - Jeanne Mirer, Esq. Ria Julien, Esq. MIRER MAZZOXXHI & JULIEN, PLLC 1 Whitehall St., 16th Floor New York, NY 10004 Phone: (212) 231-2235 Email: jmirer@mmsjlaw.com rjulien@mmsjlaw.com MAGIC MOUNTAIN: Faces Ruiz Suit Over Unlawful Charging of Fees -------------------------------------------------------------- Francis Ruiz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MAGIC MOUNTAIN LLC, SIX FLAGS THEME PARKS INC., and SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, Case No. 2:20-cv-03436 (C.D. Cal., April 13, 2020), is brought seeking relief on behalf of all of the Defendants' customers nationwide that have paid or were charged fees while the Defendants' parks were closed for violations of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law. According to the complaint, Six Flags has made the unconscionable decision to keep charging its hundreds of thousands of membership and season pass holders monthly membership fees while closing 100 percent of its theme parks as the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, rages throughout the world and the United States economy has gone into a deep recession. To sign up for the Defendants' memberships and passes, customers provide the Defendants with their credit card or debit card information. The Defendants, then, automatically charge their customers' credit or debit cards as payments are due on a monthly basis. On March 13, 2020, the Defendant announced that all of its parks--including Magic Mountain outside of Los Angeles--would be closed through the end of March due to COVID-19. On March 30, 2020, the Defendant "announced that all the company's parks will remain closed until mid-May, or as soon as possible thereafter, reflecting federal and local restrictions in place to mitigate the spread of COVID-19." However, unlike other companies, the Defendants continued charging their customers full price monthly payments fees even though every park they own is closed through at least mid-May. The Defendants have also refused to reimburse pre-paid customers for the time they were unable to access the parks, instead choosing to extend passes "for the number of operating days the park is temporarily closed" and provide "one additional month for each month that the park is closed," says the complaint. Plaintiff Ruiz currently holds a monthly membership with the Defendants for access to their parks, paying $9.95 per month on a month-to-month basis. The Defendants are the operator of 26 regional theme parks and waterparks, 23 of which are located in the United States.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Yeremey Krivoshey, Esq. Frederick J. Klorczyk III, Esq. BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Phone: (925) 300-4455 Facsimile: (925) 407-2700 Email: ykrivoshey@bursor.com fklorczyk@bursor.com MAINTENX INT'L: Binion Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California ------------------------------------------------------------ The class action lawsuit captioned as GARY BINION, as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MAINTENX INTERNATIONAL SERVICE MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., a Florida corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, Case No. 20STCV03475 (Filed Jan. 28, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on March 30, 2020. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-02954-CJC-JPR to the proceeding. The complaint alleges that the Defendants violated the California Labor Code by failing to pay all overtime and minimum wages and to provide rest breaks and meal periods. MaintenX is a total facility maintenance company serving national multi-site retailers.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Daniel H. Handman, Esq. Netta Rotstein, Esq. HIRSCHFELD KRAEMER LLP 233 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600 Santa Monica, CA 90401 Telephone: (310) 255-0705 Facsimile: (310) 255-0986 E-mail: dhandman@hkemploymentlaw.com nrotstein@hkemploymentlaw.com MASSIMO ZANETTI: Sternberg TCPA Suit Removed to S.D. Florida ------------------------------------------------------------ The class action lawsuit captioned as ELAN STERNBERG, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MASSIMO ZANETTI BEVERAGE USA, INC., Case No. 2020-000954-CA-01 (Filed Jan. 15, 2020), was removed from the Florida Circuit Court, Miami-Dade County, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on March 27, 2020. The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:20-cv-21342-RNS to the proceeding. The complaint asserts federal cause of action against the Defendant for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Massimo Zanetti operates as a coffee roasting and manufacturing company. The Company offers cocoa, flavored and non-flavored coffee, and flavored beverages.[BN] The Defendant is represented by: Barbara Fernandez, Esq. Miguel A. Gonzalez, Esq. HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP 2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 4th Floor Coral Gables, FL 33134 Telephone: 305 358 7747 Facsimile: 305 577 1063 E-mail: bfernandez@hinshawlaw.com mgonzalez@hinshawlaw.com MCKENNA & DUPONT: Phillips Suit Seeks to Certify Class ------------------------------------------------------ The Plaintiff in the case, Trecia Phillips, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. McKenna, DuPont, Higgins & Stone, PC, Case No. 2:19-cv-12429-JMV-SCM (D.N.J.), will move the Court on May 4, 2020 for an order: 1. determining that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case may proceed as a class action against Defendant; 2. certifying a single class, defined as: "(a) all individuals (b) with a New Jersey address (c) who were sent a letter from Defendant to Plaintiff's Complaint (d) which was not returned as undeliverable (e) between May 10, 2018 through and including May 30, 2019 (f) where the letter stated: "Our client advises that your account is presently outstanding in the amount of $ [BALANCE INSERTED HERE], plus reasonably attorney fees" and/or "However, if you fail to contact this office, [NAME OF CREDITOR] may consider the debt to be valid and may pursue remedies to recover the balance due.""; 3. appointing the Plaintiff as the class representative; and 4. appointing Ryan Gentile, Esq. as counsel for the defined class. The Defendant mailed a debt-collection letter dated October 29, 2018 to Ms. Phillips (the Letter). The Defendant mailed the Letter as part of their collection efforts seeking to collect a consumer debt that Plaintiff allegedly owed to HOP Energy, LLC d/b/a Metro Energy. The debt allegedly owed to HOP Energy, LLC d/b/a Metro Energy was related to a personal home heating oil account in Plaintiff's name for the Plaintiff's residence. The Plaintiff alleges that the Letter violated sections 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692g(a)(1) because it does not effectively convey "the amount of the debt" that the Plaintiff allegedly owed at the time the Letter was sent, but rather only discloses a portion of the alleged debt. McKenna & Dupont provides legal services.[CC] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ryan Gentile, Esq. 110 Jericho Turnpike - Suite 100 Floral Park, NY 11001 Telephone: (201) 873-7675 Facsimile: (212) 675-4367 E-mail: rlg@lawgmf.com MDL 2641: Ariz. Dist. Ct. Suggests Remand of Cases Over IVC Filters ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, Case No. MDL 15-02641-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz.), Judge David G. Campbell of the U.S. District Court for District of Arizona suggested that the cases listed on Schedule A should be remanded to the transferor courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1407(a). The multidistrict litigation proceeding ("MDL") involves personal injury cases brought against Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. Bard manufactures and markets medical devices, including inferior vena cava ("IVC") filters. The MDL Plaintiffs have received implants of Bard IVC filters and claim they are defective and have caused the Plaintiffs to suffer serious injury or death. The MDL was transferred to the Court in August 2015 when 22 cases had been filed. More than 8,000 cases had been filed when the MDL closed on May 31, 2019. Thousands of cases pending in the MDL have settled or are near settlement. The remaining cases no longer benefit from centralized proceedings. On Aug. 20, 2019, the Court suggested the remand of 35 cases that were transferred to the MDL by the U.S. Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, and transferred more than 500 cases that were directly filed in the MDL to appropriate districts. The Court suggested the remand of another case and transferred nearly 400 cases on Oct. 17, 2019. In updated reports on the settlement status of cases, the parties identify approximately 1,500 pending cases that are not likely to settle. These cases are now subject to remand or transfer. The cases listed on Schedule A should be remanded to the transferor courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1407(a). Judge Campbell therefore provided the Suggestion of Remand to the Panel. The primary purposes of the MDL -- coordinated pretrial discovery and resolution of common issues -- have been fulfilled. All common fact and expert discovery has been completed. The Court has also resolved many Daubert motions and the Defendants' summary judgment motion based on preemption, as well as other summary judgment and in limine motions in the bellwether cases. Six bellwether jury trials were scheduled, three were held, a fourth settled on the eve of trial, one was resolved by summary judgment, and one was dropped when Plaintiffs decided it would not provide helpful information. The MDL cases listed on Schedule A are not likely to settle soon and no longer benefit from centralized proceedings. The remaining case-specific issues are best left to the transferor courts to resolve. The Judge therefore suggested that the Panel remands the cases on Schedule A to the transferor courts for further proceedings. The Clerk will forward a certified copy of the Order to the Panel. The cases listed on Schedule B, which were directly filed in the MDL, will be transferred to appropriate districts for further proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). To assist the courts that receive these cases, the Order described events that have taken place in the MDL. A copy of the Order, along with the case files and materials, will be available to courts after remand or transfer. The cases listed on Schedule C will be unconsolidated from the MDL, will remain in the District of Arizona, and will be assigned to Judge Campbell. The Clerk of the District is directed to unconsolidate from the MDL the cases listed on Schedule C. These cases will remain in the District of Arizona and be assigned to Judge Campbell. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Order including the Schedules is available at https://is.gd/MRY3YG from Leagle.com. Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, Plaintiff, represented by Kristine Lucille Gallardo, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Mark Stephen O'Connor -- mark.oconnor@gknet.com -- Gallagher & Kennedy PA, Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP & Richard B. North, Jr. -- richard.north@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC. Marina Corodemus, Special Master, pro se. George Leus, Plaintiff, represented by Amanda Montee, Montee Law Firm, James P. Cannon, Montee Law Firm, James Albert Montee, Montee Law Firm, Joseph R. Johnson -- jjohnson@babbitt-johnson.com -- Babbitt & Johnson PA & Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP. Gary Milton & Emily Landress, Plaintiffs, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law Offices of Ben C. Martin, Robert M. Hammers, Jr. -- shllc-intakes@schneiderhammers.com -- Schneider Hammers LLC, Thomas William Arbon, Law Offices of Ben C. Martin & Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP. Denise Ocasio, an individual & Carmelo Ocasio, an individual, Plaintiffs, represented by Ben C. Martin, Law Offices of Ben C. Martin, John J. Glenn -- glenn@asglaw.com -- Anderson Glenn LLC, Joseph R. Johnson, Babbitt & Johnson PA, Thomas William Arbon, Law Offices of Ben C. Martin, Wilnar Jeanne Julmiste -- julmiste@asglaw.com -- Anderson Glenn LLC & Ramon Rossi Lopez, Lopez McHugh LLP. C R. Bard Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Aaron A. Clark -- aclark@mcgrathnorth.com -- McGrath North Law Firm, Alex Cameron Walker -- alex.walker@modrall.com -- Modrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA, Andrew J. Rosenzweig -- andrew.rosenzweig@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Andrew J. Trevelise, Reed Smith LLP, Angela M. Higgins -- higgins@bscr-law.com -- Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC, Brandee J. Kowalzyk -- brandee.kowalzyk@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Catherine A. Faught Pollard -- catherine.faught@quarles.com -- Quarles & Brady LLP, Christopher Brian Watt -- cwatt@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Courtland Carter Chillingworth -- cchillingworth@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Daniel K. Winters, Reed Smith LLP, David J. Cooner, McCarter & English LLP, David W. Ledyard, Strong Pipkin Bissell & Ledyard, David Michael Melancon, Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore LLC, David J. Walz , Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Debra A. Djupman, Reed Smith LLP, Dennis Hom -- dennis.hom@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Diana Rabeh, Reed Smith LLP, Edward W. Gerecke , Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Elizabeth S. Fenton, Chamberlain Hrdlicka, Elizabeth C. Helm -- kate.helm@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Eric J. Buhr -- ebuhr@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Gary Robert Tulp, McCarter & English LLP, James P. Catalano, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, James R. Condo, Snell & Wilmer LLP, James Auman Haltom -- james.haltom@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, James F. Rogers -- jim.rogers@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Jane Thompson Davis -- jane.davis@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Jay Joseph Schuttert, Evans Fears & Schuttert LLP, Jennifer A. Guidea, Gorham Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Jennifer J. Hageman, Ulmer & Berne LLP, John A. Camp, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, John G. Mitchell , Secrest Wardle, Jordan L. Chaikin , Parker Waichman LLP, Joshua D. Cools, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Kara Trouslot Stubbs , Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC, Kevin M. Hara -- khara@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Kevin George Lohman -- klohman@reedsmith.co -- Reed Smith LLP, Mark A. Sentenac, Reed Smith LLP, Matthew E. Brown -- matt.brown@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Matthew B. Lerner -- matthew.lerner@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore LLC, Melanie M. Atha , Cabaniss Johnston Gardner Dumas & ONeal LLP, Melissa Dorman Matthews , Hartline Dacus Dreyer & Kern LLP, Michael Kevin Brown, Reed mith LLP, Neville H. Boschert , Jones WalkerWaechter Poitevent Carrere & Denegre, Patrick T. Clendenen, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Philip M. Busman -- phil.busman@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Raymond G. Mullady, Jr. -- ray.mullady@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Richard B. North, Jr. -- richard.north@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Ruth A. Horvatich , McGrath North Law Firm, Sanjay Ghosh -- sanjay.ghosh@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Steven James Boraian -- sboranian@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP, Taylor Tapley Daly -- taylor.daly@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Thomas Melone, Allco Renewable Energy Limited, Tiffany L. Roach Martin, MNodrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA, Vivian M. Quinn, Nixon Peabody LLP, Dell P. Chappell -- dell.chappell@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Mark R. Nash -- mark.nash@nelsonmullins.com -- Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC & Lucas Liben -- lliben@reedsmith.com -- Reed Smith LLP. Bard Peripheral Vascular Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Aaron A. Clark, McGrath North Law Firm, Alex Cameron Walker, Modrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA, Andrew J. Rosenzweig, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Andrew J. Trevelise, Reed Smith LLP, Angela M. Higgins, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC, Brandee J. Kowalzyk, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Catherine A. Faught Pollard, Quarles & Brady LLP, Christopher Brian Watt, Reed Smith LLP, Courtland Carter Chillingworth, Reed Smith LLP, Daniel K. Winters, Reed Smith LLP, David J. Cooner, McCarter & English LLP, David W. Ledyard, Strong Pipkin Bissell & Ledyard, David Michael Melancon, Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore LLC, David J. Walz, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Debra A. Djupman, Reed Smith LLP, Dennis Hom, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Diana Rabeh, Reed Smith LLP, Edward W. Gerecke, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Elizabeth S. Fenton, Chamberlain Hrdlicka, Elizabeth C. Helm, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Eric J. Buhr, Reed Smith LLP, Gary Robert Tulp, McCarter & English LLP, James P. Catalano, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, James R. Condo, Snell & Wilmer LLP, James F. Rogers, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Jane Thompson Davis, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Jay Joseph Schuttert, Evans Fears & Schuttert LLP, Jennifer A. Guidea, Gorham Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Jennifer J. Hageman, Ulmer & Berne LLP, John A. Camp, Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, John G. Mitchell, Secrest Wardle, Joshua D. Cools, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Kara Trouslot Stubbs, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice LLC, Kevin M. Hara, Reed Smith LLP, Kevin George Lohman, Reed Smith LLP, Lucas Liben, Reed Smith LLP, Mark A. Sentenac, Reed Smith LLP, Matthew E. Brown, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Matthew B. Lerner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore LLC, Melanie M. Atha, Cabaniss Johnston Gardner Dumas & ONeal LLP, Melissa Dorman Matthews, Hartline Dacus Dreyer & Kern LLP, Michael Kevin Brown, Reed Smith LLP, Neville H. Boschert, Jones WalkerWaechter Poitevent Carrere & Denegre, Patrick T. Clendenen, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Philip M. Busman, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Raymond G. Mullady, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, Richard B. North, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Ruth A. Horvatich, McGrath North Law Firm, Sanjay Ghosh, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Steven James Boranian, Reed Smith LLP, Taylor Tapley Daly, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC, Thomas Melone, Allco Renewable Energy Limited, Tiffany L. Roach Martin, MNodrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA, Vivian M. Quinn, Nixon Peabody LLP, Dell P. Chappell, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP & Mark R. Nash, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC. Christian Mottas, an individual, Defendant, represented by David J. Walz -- dwalz@carltonfields.com -- Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Edward W. Gerecke -- egerecke@carltonfields.com -- Carlton Fields Jorden Burt PA, Matthew B. Lerner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC & Richard B. North, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC. California Pacific Medical Center, Defendant, represented by Hilary E. Youngblood -- Hilary@orplaw.com -- Davidovitz & Bennett & Robert Diemer -- robert@orplaw.com -- Davidovitz & Bennett. Bard Medical Division, Defendant, represented by Richard B. North, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC. C.R. Bard Incorporated, Defendant, represented by Elizabeth C. Helm, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC & Richard B. North, Jr., Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLC. METROPOLITAN LIFE: McNeely Suit Dismissed Following Settlement -------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, CAROL McNEELY, SHILPA VLK, GEORGE K. BERNHARD, and DEBORAH JOYCE, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, and DAVID T. RUDZIEWICZ, FREDERICK DEMAIO, DONNA R. KOBIELSKI, DONNA MOLTA, NADINE JOY, SAMUEL PENTA, and ROLAND HOGG, Opt-In Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, METROPOLITAN LIFE RETIREMENT PLAN FOR UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT PLAN FOR EMPLOYEES OF METROPOLITAN LIFE AND PARTICIPATING AFFILIATES, METLIFE OPTIONS & CHOICES PLAN, and WELFARE BENEFITS PLAN FOR EMPLOYEES OF METROPOLITAN LIFE AND PARTICIPATING AFFILIATES, Defendants, Case No. 1:18-CV-00885-PAC (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Paul A. Crotty of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has entered the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Certification of the Settlement Class and Collective, Final Approval of the Class Action Settlement, Approval of Class Representative Service Awards, and Approval of Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses. The Order approved the terms of a Class Action Settlement between the parties that resolves all claims raised in the litigation and dismissed the litigation with prejudice subject to the Court's retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the Settlement Agreement and overseeing the distribution of settlement funds. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), the case is dismissed with prejudice to the terms set out in the accompanying Order. A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 15, 2020 Judgment is available at https://is.gd/X5ecQg from Leagle.com. Carol McNeely, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Lauren Nussbaum, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC, Michael Lieder -- mlieder@findjustice.com -- Mehri & Skalet, PLLC & Stacey M. Gray -- sgray@staceygray.com -- Stacey Gray P.C. Scott D. Vlk, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated & Harry M. Tuber, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, represented by Michael Lieder, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC. Deborah Joyce, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Shilpa Vlk, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, George K. Bernhard, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, David T. Rudziewicz, Donna Molta, Frederick DeMaio & Donna R. Kobielski, Plaintiffs, represented by Lauren Nussbaum, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC & Michael Lieder, Mehri & Skalet, PLLC. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Metropolitan Life Retirement Plan for United States Employees, Metlife Options & Choices Plan, Welfare Benefit Plan for Employees for Metropolitan Life & Savings and Investment Plan for Employees of Metropolitan Life and Participating Affiliates, Defendants, represented by Christopher Alan Parlo -- chris.parlo@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Ashley Jean Hale -- ashley.hale@morganlewis.com -- Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Melissa D. Hill -- melissa.hill@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Melissa C. Rodriguez -- melissa.rodriguez@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. Welfare Benefits Plan for Employees of Metropolitan Life and Participating Affiliates, Defendant, represented by Christopher Alan Parlo, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP & Melissa C. Rodriguez, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. MINDBODY INC: Seedman Sues Over Unsolicited Telemarketing Texts --------------------------------------------------------------- Justin Seedman, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MINDBODY, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Case No. 2:20-cv-03397 (C.D. Cal., April 13, 2020), is brought against the Defendant to secure redress for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. On December 18, 2019, the Defendant caused automated text message to be transmitted to the Plaintiff's cellular telephone. The Defendant's text messages constitute telemarketing/advertising because they promote Defendants business, goods and services. At no point in time did the Plaintiff provide the Defendant with his express consent to be contacted by text messages using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS), says the complaint. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. The Plaintiff is a natural person, who was a resident of Broward County, Florida. The Defendant is "leading technology platform for the wellness industry, featuring an app that allows people to discover and book fitness, beauty and salon services and software to help growing businesses thrive."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: William Litvak, Esq. DAPEER ROSENBLIT LITVAK, LLP 11500 W. Olympic Blvd., Suite 550 Los Angeles, CA 90064 Phone: (310) 477-5575 Fax: (310) 477-7090 Email: wlitvak@drllaw.com - and - Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq. HIRALDO P.A. 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: 954.400.4713 Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com - and – Michael Eisenband, Esq. EISENBAND LAW, P.A. 515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: 954.533.4092 Email: MEisenband@Eisenbandlaw.com - and – David S. Ehrlich, Esq. EHRLICH LAW, LLC 401 E Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 1400 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: 954-507-4477 Email: David@EhrlichLawLLC.com MYLAN NV: Faces Kent Securities Suit Challenging Pfizer Merger -------------------------------------------------------------- Michel Kent, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. MYLAN N.V., HEATHER BRESCH, ROBERT J. CINDRICH, ROBERT J. COURY, JOELLEN LYONS DILLON, NEIL DIMICK, MELINA HIGGINS, HARRY A. KORMAN, RAJIV MALIK, RICHARD MARK, MARK W. PARRISH, RANDALL L. VANDERVEEN, PAULINE VAN DER MEER MOHR, SJOERD S. VOLLEBREGT, PFIZER INC., UPJOHN INC., UTAH ACQUISITION SUB INC., MYLAN I B.V., and MYLAN II B.V., Case No. 1:20-cv-00504-UNA (D. Del., April 13, 2020), alleges that the Defendants violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the proxy statement filed in connection with a proposed merger with Pfizer Inc. and affiliates. On July 29, 2019, Mylan N.V.'s Board of Directors caused the Company to enter into a Business Combination Agreement with Pfizer Inc., Upjohn Inc. ("Newco"), Utah Acquisition Sub Inc. ("Newco Sub"), each a Delaware corporation, Mylan I B.V. ("Mylan Newco"), and Mylan II B.V. ("Mylan Newco Sub"). Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Newco and Mylan will combine their businesses, and Mylan shareholders will receive one share of Newco common stock for each Mylan ordinary share (the "Proposed Transaction"). Following the consummation of the Proposed Transaction, Mylan shareholders will hold 43% of the fully diluted outstanding shares of Newco common stock. On February 13, 2020, the Defendants filed a proxy statement with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with the Proposed Transaction, which recommends that the Company's stockholders vote to approve the Proposed Transaction at a special meeting of stockholders scheduled for April 27, 2020. The Proxy Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Proxy Statement false and misleading. First, the Proxy Statement omits material information regarding the Company's and the Upjohn Business's financial projections. Second, the Proxy Statement omits material information regarding the analyses performed by the Company's financial advisors in connection with the Proposed Transaction, Centerview Partners LLC and PJT Partners LP (together, the "Financial Advisors"). Third, the Proxy Statement fails to disclose the amount of compensation PJT received for the past services it provided to Mylan, Pfizer, and their affiliates. The omissions and false and misleading statements in the Proxy Statement are material in that a reasonable stockholder will consider them important in deciding how to vote on the Proposed Transaction. The Plaintiff contends that the Proxy Statement is an essential link in causing the Plaintiff and the Company's stockholders to approve the Proposed Transaction. Because of the false and misleading statements in the Proxy Statement, the Plaintiff and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm, says the complaint. The Plaintiff is the owner of Mylan common stock. Mylan is a global pharmaceutical company.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Brian D. Long, Esq. Gina M. Serra, Esq. RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A. 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1220 Wilmington, DE 19801 Phone: (302) 295-5310 Facsimile: (302) 654-7530 Email: bdl@rl-legal.com gms@rl-legal.com - and - Richard A. Maniskas, Esq. RM LAW, P.C. 1055 Westlakes Drive, Suite 300 Berwyn, PA 19312 Phone: (484) 324-6800 Facsimile: (484) 631-1305 Email: rm@maniskas.com NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE: Whitefield's Unjust Enrichment Claim Dismissed ------------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ANDREA WHITEFIELD, Plaintiff, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC s/b/m to Seterus, Inc., Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-217 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Cynthia M. Rufe of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Whitefield, through her counsel, has sued the Defendant, her mortgage loan servicer, for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. She seeks to bring both the breach of contract claim and the unjust enrichment claim on behalf of a class of similarly situated borrowers. The Defendant has moved to dismiss the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. In 2008, the Plaintiff bought a home in Philadelphia, borrowing $60,000 from Bank of America in the form of a mortgage note secured by a deed of trust on the property. About seven years later, the Defendant began servicing that loan. Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Plaintiff's arrears on the mortgage were part of the chapter 13 reorganization plan. She alleges that she has remained current on her mortgage payments since the reorganization. Over the following several years, the Plaintiff alleges, the Defendant assessed a number of fees in violation of the terms of the mortgage. While she was renovating the property, the Defendant allegedly declared it abandoned and had the locks changed. It also assessed fees for property inspection and preservation, as well as late charges, on the allegedly false premise that the loan was two months delinquent. The mortgage permits such fees only if there is (1) a breach of the covenants and agreements in the note and mortgage, (2) a legal proceeding involving the property that may significantly affect the servicer or owner's interests in the property, or (3) abandonment of the property. The Plaintiff alleges that none of those conditions were met. The Plaintiff disputed the Defendant's preservation efforts and fees directly and through her bankruptcy counsel and also wrote to Defendant pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") asserting these errors and requesting more information. When the Defendant did not take corrective action, the Plaintiff filed the lawsuit. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant breached the mortgage agreement by assessing fees that were not permitted under that agreement. The Defendant moves to dismiss this claim on mootness grounds. Judge Rufe, in a Memorandum Opinion dated Jan. 15, 2020, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/OWBOkK from Leagle.com, finds that it is a paradigmatic case of picking off for four reasons. First, the Plaintiff's claim became moot through the Defendant's conduct -- the Defendant's crediting back of the disputed fees. Second, the Defendant offered the Plaintiff the complete relief she seeks only after she filed the lawsuit styled as a class action. Third, the Plaintiff's individual claim is relatively small; it is likely that litigating a class certification motion would cost Defendant more than picking off individual plaintiffs as they come. Fourth, and similarly, because of the nature of the claims, the Defendant was able to moot the Plaintiff's claims unilaterally and without actually writing a check. All the Defendant had to do was clear from her account charges that the Plaintiff alleges the Defendant was not entitled to anyway, and the Plaintiff had no opportunity to refuse the "settlement." In other words, it is an even clearer case than the typical picking-off scenario, where a defendant makes a settlement offer that the plaintiff may accept or reject. Because the picking-off exception applies, the class claims are not mooted by the Defendant's decision to clear the disputed charges from the Plaintiff's account. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim may proceed. The Plaintiff also asserts an unjust enrichment claim based on the assessment and retention of the fees. The Defendant has moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Judge holds that while the principle might support an unjust enrichment claim here in the abstract, it is not responsive to the Pennsylvania rule the Defendant invokes, which provides that unjust enrichment is not an available theory of recovery when the parties' relationship is based on a contract. In addition, the mistake that the Plaintiff identifies as justifying restitution -- that shef was in default on her mortgage obligation -- is not a mistake of law. It is a mistake of fact. Even on her own theory, then, it cannot save the Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. Judge Rufe concludes that although the Plaintiff's individual claim for breach of contract is moot, she may nevertheless seek to represent a class of similarly situated borrowers. The Plaintiff may seek class certification at an early practicable time despite the mootness of her individual claim. The Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, however, is dismissed with prejudice. ANDREA WHITEFIELD, Plaintiff, represented by ROBERT P. COCCO, LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT P. COCCO PC. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, S/B/M TO SETERUS, INC., Defendant, represented by ADRIENNE N. GITTENS -- adrienne.gittens@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS LLP & STEPHEN A. LONEY, Jr. -- stephen.loney@hoganlovells.com -- HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP. NEWELL BRANDS: Appeal in Securities Class Suit Ongoing ------------------------------------------------------ Newell Brands Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the plaintiffs in the class action suit entitled, In re Newell Brands, Inc. Securities Litigation, have taken an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from a trial court's order dismissing the complaint. The Company and certain of its officers have been named as defendants in two putative securities class action lawsuits, each filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's common stock between February 6, 2017 and January 24, 2018. The first lawsuit was filed on June 21, 2018 and is captioned Bucks County Employees Retirement Fund, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Newell Brands Inc., Michael B. Polk, Ralph J. Nicoletti, and James L. Cunningham, III, Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-10878 (United States District Court for the District of New Jersey). The second lawsuit was filed on June 27, 2018 and is captioned Matthew Barnett, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Newell Brands Inc., Michael B. Polk, Ralph J. Nicoletti, and James L. Cunningham, III, Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-11132 (United States District Court for the District of New Jersey). On September 27, 2018, the court consolidated these two cases under Civil Action No. 18-cv-10878 (JMV)(JBC) bearing the caption In re Newell Brands, Inc. Securities Litigation. The court also named Hampshire County Council Pension Fund as the lead plaintiff in the consolidated case. The operative complaint alleges certain violations of the securities laws, including, among other things, that the defendants made certain materially false and misleading statements and omissions regarding the Company's business, operations, and prospects between February 6, 2017 and January 24, 2018. The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs, among other relief, but have not specified the amount of damages being sought. The Company intends to defend the litigation vigorously. On January 10, 2020, the court in In re Newell Brands Inc. Securities Litigation entered a dismissal with prejudice after granting the Company's motion to dismiss. On February 7, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Newell Brands Inc. designs, manufactures, sources, and distributes consumer and commercial products worldwide. Newell Brands Inc. was formerly known as Newell Rubbermaid Inc. and changed its name to Newell Brands Inc. in April 2016. The company was founded in 1903 and is based in Hoboken, New Jersey. NEWELL BRANDS: Continues to Defend Oklahoma Firefighters Suit ------------------------------------------------------------- Newell Brands Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the company continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System v. Newell Brands Inc., et al. The Company and certain of its current and former officers and directors have been named as defendants in a putative securities class action lawsuit filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, on behalf of all persons who acquired Company common stock pursuant or traceable to the S-4 registration statement and prospectus issued in connection with the April 2016 acquisition of Jarden (the "Registration Statement"). The action was filed on September 6, 2018, and is captioned Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System v. Newell Brands Inc., et al., Civil Action No. HUD-L-003492-18. The operative complaint alleges certain violations of the securities laws, including, among other things, that the defendants made certain materially false and misleading statements and omissions in the Registration Statement regarding the Company's financial results, trends, and metrics. The plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs, among other relief, but has not specified the amount of damages being sought. The Company intends to defend the litigation vigorously. No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report. Newell Brands Inc. designs, manufactures, sources, and distributes consumer and commercial products worldwide. Newell Brands Inc. was formerly known as Newell Rubbermaid Inc. and changed its name to Newell Brands Inc. in April 2016. The company was founded in 1903 and is based in Hoboken, New Jersey. PARTSBASE INC: Fails to Pay NEHPE Overtime Wages, Sullivan Says --------------------------------------------------------------- Sean Sullivan, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. PARTSBASE, INC. d/b/a CERTIFIED LUXURY WATCHES, ROBERT A. HAMMOND, and SIGRID M. HUBER, Case No. 9:20-cv-80630-XXXX (S.D. Fla., April 13, 2020), is brought against the Defendants for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act arising from failure to pay overtime compensation and a premium for all hours worked over 40 in a week. The Plaintiff alleges that, like his fellow Non-Exempt Hourly Paid Employees (NEHPE) in the past 3 years preceding the filing of this complaint, was systematically denied all overtime pay for hours they worked in excess of 40 on behalf of the Defendants. The Defendants maintained a common unlawful pay practice applicable to all NEHPE of shaving or editing off all work hours over 40 reported in each workweek, and precluding the Plaintiff and all other NEHPE from being able to report and log in hours worked outside of the office, says the complaint. Plaintiff Sean Sullivan worked as a NEHPE as an inside sales representative and hourly paid employee for the Defendants working under the titles of "Sales Representative" and "Purchasing Director." PARTSBASE, INC., d/b/a CERTIFIED LUXURY WATCHES, is a foreign for profit corporation with corporate offices located in Boca Raton, Florida.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Mitchell L. Feldman, Esq. FELDMAN LEGAL GROUP 6940 W. Linebaugh Ave., #101 Tampa, FL 33625 Phone: 813-639-9366 Fax: 813-639-9376 Email: mlf@feldmanlegal.us lschindler@feldmanlegal.us PARTY CITY HOLDINGS: Knox Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Texts --------------------------------------------------------------- MEATITER KNOX, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. PARTY CITY HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case No. 7:20-cv-02613 (S.D.N.Y., March 27, 2020), alleges that the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise, in part, by sending unsolicited automated text messages to wireless phone users, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Party City has violated 47 U.S.C. section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 C.F.R. section 64.1200(a)(2) by using an automatic telephone dialing system to bombard consumers' mobile phones with non-emergency advertising and marketing text messages without prior express written consent. The Plaintiff and the Class Members have all suffered and will continue to suffer harm and damages as a result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, says the complaint. Party City, through its subsidiaries, designs, manufactures, distributes and retails decorated party goods such as costumes table ware and games.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Ross H. Schmierer. Esq. Stephen P. DeNittis, Esq. DENITTIS LAW 315 Madison Avenue, 3rd Floor New York, NY 10017 Telephone: (646) 979-3642 E-mail: rschmierer@denittislaw.com POPULAR INC: Appeal in Camacho Class Suit Still Pending ------------------------------------------------------- Popular, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the appeal made in the class action suit entitled, Lilliam Gonzalez Camacho, et al. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, et al., is pending. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR) has been named a defendant in a putative class action captioned Lilliam Gonzalez Camacho, et al. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, et al., filed before the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on behalf of mortgage-holders who have allegedly been subjected to illegal foreclosures and/or loan modifications through their mortgage servicers. Plaintiffs maintain that when they sought to reduce their loan payments, defendants failed to provide them with such reduced loan payments, instead subjecting them to lengthy loss mitigation processes while filing foreclosure claims against them in parallel (or dual tracking). Plaintiffs assert that such actions violate the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"), the Home Affordable Refinance Program ("HARP") and other federally sponsored loan modification programs, as well as the Puerto Rico Mortgage Debtor Assistance Act and the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). For the alleged violations stated above, plaintiffs request that all defendants (over 20, including all local banks) be held jointly and severally liable in an amount no less than $400 million. BPPR filed a motion to dismiss in August 2017, as did most co-defendants, and, in March 2018, the District Court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. After being denied reconsideration by the District Court, on August 2018, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Court of Appeals has entered an order where it consolidated three pending appeals related to the same subset of facts. The plaintiffs filed their appellate brief on August 2019, but on September 2019, the Court of Appeals ordered plaintiffs to submit a new brief for the consolidated appeals that complied with the applicable appellate procedural rules. In October 2019, plaintiffs filed a revised brief, which defendants believe yet again do not comply with applicable court rules. On November 4, 2019, defendants filed their appellate brief, along with a motion to dismiss the appeal due to the plaintiffs' repeated failure to comply with the Circuit Court's rules and orders. The appeal is now fully briefed and pending resolution. Popular, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides various retail, mortgage, and commercial banking products and services. Popular, Inc. was founded in 1893 and is headquartered in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. POPULAR INC: Appeal Sought in Maura Class Action ------------------------------------------------- Popular, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the plaintiffs in the class action entitled, Yiries Josef Saad Maura v. Banco Popular, et al., have taken an appeal from the trial court order denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's decision to dismiss their complaint. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") has been named a defendant in another putative class action captioned Yiries Josef Saad Maura v. Banco Popular, et al., filed by the same counsel who filed the González Camacho action referenced above, on behalf of residential customers of the defendant banks who have allegedly been subject to illegal foreclosures and/or loan modifications through their mortgage servicers. As in Gonzalez Camacho, plaintiffs contend that when they sought to reduce their loan payments, defendants failed to provide them with such reduced loan payments, instead subjecting them to lengthy loss mitigation processes while filing foreclosure claims against them in parallel, all in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and other consumer-protection laws and regulations. Plaintiffs did not include a specific amount of damages in their complaint. After waiving service of process, BPPR filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the same grounds as those asserted in the Gonzalez Camacho action (as did most co-defendants, separately). BPPR further filed a motion to oppose class certification, which the Court granted in September 2018. On April 5, 2019, the Court entered an Opinion and Order granting BPPR's and several other defendants' motions to dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration in April 2019, which Popular timely opposed. In September 2019, the Court issued an Amended Opinion and Order dismissing plaintiffs' claims against all defendants, denying the reconsideration requests and other pending motions, and issuing final judgment. On October 17, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Amended Opinion and Order, which was denied on December 16, 2019. On January 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Court has yet to set a briefing schedule. Popular, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides various retail, mortgage, and commercial banking products and services. Popular, Inc. was founded in 1893 and is headquartered in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. POPULAR INC: Awaits Initial Approval of Torres Case Settlement --------------------------------------------------------------- Popular, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the parties in the class action suit entitled, Ramirez Torres, et al. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, et al, are awaiting preliminarily approval of their settlement. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR) has separately been named a defendant in a putative class action complaint captioned Ramirez Torres, et al. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, et al, filed before the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan Part. The complaint seeks damages and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on behalf of the purported class against the same Popular Defendants, as well as other financial institutions with insurance brokerage subsidiaries in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs contend that in November 2015 Antilles Insurance Company obtained approval from the Puerto Rico Insurance Commissioner to market an endorsement that allowed its customers to obtain reimbursement on their insurance deductible for good experience, but that defendants failed to offer this product or disclose its existence to their customers, favoring other products instead, in violation of their duties as insurance brokers. Plaintiffs seek a determination that defendants unlawfully failed to comply with their duty to disclose the existence of this new insurance product, as well as double or treble damages (the latter subject to a determination that defendants engaged in monopolistic practices in failing to offer this product). In July 2017, after co-defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint and opposed the request for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. In August 2017, plaintiffs appealed this judgment and, in March 2018, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of First Instance's dismissal. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court denied review. On August 15, 2019, the Popular Defendants and the Plaintiffs filed a Joint Motion where they informed the Court that Plaintiffs were simultaneously filing voluntary dismissals with prejudice against all other parties. On September 13, 2019, a status hearing was held where the Plaintiffs and the Popular Defendants informed the Court that the parties were in the process of stipulating a class for settlement purposes. The Court held a further status hearing on February 20, 2020, where it set a hearing for March 12, 2020 to preliminarily approve the terms of a proposed class settlement being negotiated among the parties. Popular, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides various retail, mortgage, and commercial banking products and services. Popular, Inc. was founded in 1893 and is headquartered in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. POPULAR INC: BPPR Faces Soto-Melendez Class Action -------------------------------------------------- Popular, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that Banco Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") has been named as a defendant in a class action suit entitled, Soto-Melendez vs. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico. On February 7, 2020, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") was served with a putative class action complaint captioned Soto-Melendez vs. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, filed before the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The complaint alleges breach of contract due to BPPR's purported practice of (a) assessing more than one insufficient funds fees ("NSF Fees") on the same "item" or transaction and (b) charging both NSF Fees and overdraft fees ("OD Fees") on the same item or transaction, and is filed on behalf of all persons who during the applicable statute of limitations period were charged NSF Fees and/or OD Fees pursuant to this purported practices. BPPR was served with process and expects to timely file a responsive pleading. Popular, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides various retail, mortgage, and commercial banking products and services. Popular, Inc. was founded in 1893 and is headquartered in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. POPULAR INC: Continues to Defend Perez Dias Suit in Puerto Rico --------------------------------------------------------------- Popular, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the court in Perez Diaz v. Popular, Inc., et al, scheduled a pre-trial hearing and tentative trial dates for the second half of 2020. Popular, Inc., Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR) and Popular Insurance, LLC (the "Popular Defendants") have been named defendants in a putative class action complaint captioned Perez Diaz v. Popular, Inc., et al, filed before the Court of First Instance, Arecibo Part. The complaint seeks damages and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on behalf of the purported class against the Popular Defendants, as well as Antilles Insurance Company and MAPFRE-PRAICO Insurance Company (the "Defendant Insurance Companies"). Plaintiffs allege that the Popular Defendants have been unjustly enriched by failing to reimburse them for commissions paid by the Defendant Insurance Companies to the insurance agent and/or mortgagee for policy years when no claims were filed against their hazard insurance policies. They demand the reimbursement to the purported "class" of an estimated $400 million plus legal interest, for the "good experience" commissions allegedly paid by the Defendant Insurance Companies during the relevant time period, as well as injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the Defendant Insurance Companies from paying commissions to the insurance agent/mortgagee and ordering them to pay those fees directly to the insured. A motion for dismissal on the merits filed by the Defendant Insurance Companies was denied with a right to replead following limited targeted discovery. Each of the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court denied the Popular Defendants' request to review the lower court's denial of the motion to dismiss. In December 2017, plaintiffs amended the complaint and, on January 2018, defendants filed an answer thereto. Separately, in October 2017, the Court entered an order whereby it broadly certified the class, after which the Popular Defendants filed a certiorari petition before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals in relation to the class certification, which the Court declined to entertain. In November 2018 and in January 2019, Plaintiffs filed voluntary dismissal petitions against MAPFRE-PRAICO Insurance Company and Antilles Insurance Company, respectively, leaving the Popular Defendants as the sole remaining defendants in the action. In April 2019, the Court amended the class definition to limit it to individual homeowners whose residential units were subject to a mortgage from BPPR who, in turn, obtained risk insurance policies with Antilles Insurance or MAPFRE Insurance through Popular Insurance from 2002 to 2015, and who did not make insurance claims against said policies during their effective term. The Court set March 20, 2020 as the deadline to complete discovery and scheduled a pre-trial hearing and tentative trial dates for the second half of 2020. Popular, Inc., through its subsidiaries, provides various retail, mortgage, and commercial banking products and services. Popular, Inc. was founded in 1893 and is headquartered in Hato Rey, Puerto Rico. PROFESSIONAL STAFF: Court Dismisses Seidemann Civil Rights Suit --------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, DAVID SEIDEMANN, and BRUCE MARTIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS LOCAL 2334; FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF SUFFOLK COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE; UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, FARMINGDALE STATE COLLEGE CHAPTER; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONGRESS; and NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, Defendants, Case No. 18 Civ. 9778 (KPF) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Katherine Polk Failla of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs Seidemann and Martin bring the putative class action against Defendants Professional Staff Congress Local 2334 ("PSC"), American Federation of Teachers ("AFT"), American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), American Association of University Professors Collective Bargaining Congress ("AAUPCBC"), New York State United Teachers ("NYSUT"), National Education Association of the United States ("NEA"), Faculty Association of Suffolk County Community College ("FASCCC"), and United University Professions, Farmingdale State College Chapter ("UUP"). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the Plaintiffs were required to pay agency shop fees to the unions that represented their respective places of employment, in compliance with New York Civil Service Law § 208 and as authorized by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. The Plaintiffs now allege that they are entitled to the return of all agency shop fees previously paid, raising constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and common-law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. Additionally, the Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment stating that both compulsory agency shop fees and New York State laws that authorize them are unconstitutional, as well as an injunction against the collection of those fees. At all relevant times, the Plaintiffs were college professors at public educational institutions in New York. Seidemann was a professor at the City University of New York ("CUNY"), while Bruce Martin was a professor at both Suffolk County Community College ("SCCC") and Farmingdale State College ("FSC"). Both the Plaintiffs thus qualified as "public employees" for purposes of N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law Section 208. As a faculty member at CUNY, Seidemann was represented by Defendant PSC and thus was required to pay agency shop fees to PSC, portions of which were then forwarded to Defendants AFT, AFL-CIO, AAUPCBC, and NYSUT. Of note, however, Seidemann was never a member of PSC and never affirmatively consented to pay agency shop fees. Martin, for his part, was represented by Defendant FASCCC in his capacity as a professor at SCCC and by Defendant UUP in his capacity as a professor at FSC, and thus was required to pay agency shop fees to both organizations. Portions of these agency shop fees were then forwarded to Defendants AFT, AFL-CIO, NEA, and NYSUT. Like Seidemann, Martin was never a member of either FASCCC or UPP, and never affirmatively consented to pay agency shop fees. All agency shop fees were paid via a direct deduction from the Plaintiffs' paychecks, as authorized by N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law Section 208(3). Neither Seidemann nor Martin alleges that he has been required to pay agency shop fees since the Supreme Court's decision in Janus. Seidemann filed his initial complaint in the action on Oct. 24, 2018, several months after Janus was issued; initially, he named AAUPCBC, AFL-CIO, AFT, NYSUT, and PSC as the Defendants. On Jan. 11, 2019, the Defendants asked the Court for leave to file a motion to dismiss, to which Seidemann responded on Jan. 16, 2019. The parties appeared before the Court for a pre-motion conference on Jan. 31, 2019, during which time the Court set a briefing schedule for the proposed motion to dismiss. The Court then adjourned that schedule after granting Seidemann's request of March 20, 2019, to file an amended class action complaint. Seidemann filed an Amended Complaint, joined by Martin, on April 12, 2019, in which the pair added FASCCC, NEA, and UUP as the Defendants. The Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, along with an accompanying memorandum and numerous declarations, on May 24, 2019. The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' suit in its entirety under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition, along with a declaration, on June 21, 2019. The Defendants filed their reply brief on July 12, 2019. The Defendants advance three principal arguments for dismissal: (i) the Plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief are moot due to the Defendants' undisputed compliance with Janus since June 27, 2018; (ii) the Plaintiffs' claims for a refund under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 fail as a matter of law because the Defendants can rely on the good-faith defense; and (iii) the Plaintiffs' common-law claims also fail as a matter of law on various grounds. Among other things, Judge Failla finds that the Court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have standing to pursue prospective relief, whether it be injunctive or declaratory in nature. She has determined that mootness is not at play because of the Plaintiffs' antecedent failure to establish standing. Also, neither the Defendants nor any agent of New York State has argued to the contrary. Thus, in lieu of an actual dispute, the Court is back where it started: the Plaintiffs lack standing. The Judge also (i) agrees with the Plaintiffs that it is appropriate to engage in an analysis of the most closely analogous tort when deciding the applicability of the good-faith defense; (ii) does not accept the Plaintiffs' proposed limitation on the good-faith defense; (iii) finds that the declaratory theory of law does not foreclose the good-faith defense; and (iv) finds that the Plaintiffs' have presented solely legal claims. In sum, the Judge joins the numerous other district courts that have heard substantially the same facts, claims, and arguments, in finding that the Plaintiffs have failed to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to either injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment because they lack standing to request such prospective relief. Accordingly, the Defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted in full. For the reasons she set forth in her Opinion & Order dated Jan. 3, 2020, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/6HNCoz from Leagle.com, Judge Failla granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining dates, and close the case. David Seidemann, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Gregory N. Longworth -- khirozawa@grmny.com -- Clark Hill Plc & Jonathan Daniel Klein, Clark Hill PLC. Bruce Martin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Jonathan Daniel Klein, Clark Hill PLC. Professional Staff Congress Local 2334 & American Federation of Teachers, Defendants, represented by Hanan B. Kolko -- hkolko@cwsny.com -- Cohen Weiss and Simon LLP, Irwin Bluestein -- ibluestein@levyratner.com -- Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., Alan Mark Klinger, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Arthur Justin Herskowitz, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Charles Gerard Moerdler, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan L.L.P., Dina Kolker -- dkolker@stroock.com -- Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Edward J. Greene, Jr., Robert T. Reilly & Michael James Del Piano, New York State. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Defendant, represented by Kent Y. Hirozawa -- khirozawa@grmny.com -- Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss LLP. American Association of University Professors Collective Bargaining Congress, Defendant, represented by David Mark Slutsky, Levy Ratner, P.C. & Nancy Aliquo Long, Aaup. New York State United Teachers, Defendant, represented by Alan Mark Klinger, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Arthur Justin Herskowitz, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Charles Gerard Moerdler, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan L.L.P., Dina Kolker, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, Edward J. Greene, Jr., Robert T. Reilly & Michael James Del Piano, New York State. PROVIDENCE ST. JOSEPH: Gregg Sues Over Hospital Care's High Liens ----------------------------------------------------------------- ANDREA GREGG, and CHARLENE DAVIDSON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. PROVIDENCE ST. JOSEPH HEALTH; PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES; ST. JOSEPH HEALTH; ST. JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM; ST. JOSEPH HEALTH NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, LLC; QUEEN OF THE VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER; SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; SRM ALLIANCE HOSPITAL SERVICES D/B/A PETALUMA VALLEY HOSPITAL; ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL OF EUREKA; REDWOOD MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF FORTUNA; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No. CGC-20-583964 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty, March 26, 2020), arises from the Defendants' alleged unlawful and unfair business acts relating to their high liens for hospital care. According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs received medical services as patients of the Defendants' hospitals in connection with incidents involving third-party tortfeasors. Despite knowing that the Plaintiffs had health care service plans, the Defendants refused to submit the Plaintiffs' medical bills to the health care services plans and instead asserted liens against the Plaintiffs' trial awards or settlements. The Plaintiffs contend that the amounts of the liens were based not on their health plan's contracted negotiated rates but on the Defendants' grossly inflated "customary rate." The Plaintiffs insist that this improper conduct resulted in their facing excessively high liens for hospital care far beyond the "reasonable and necessary charges" that hospitals are allowed to assert under the Hospital Lien Act. The Plaintiffs seek actual and/or compensatory damages, restitution, equitable relief, costs and expenses of litigation, including attorneys' fees, and all additional and further relief. Providence St. Joseph Health is a not-for-profit health care system operating in seven states and serves as the parent organization for 100,000 caregivers.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Robert S. Arns, Esq. Jonathan E. Davis, Esq. Shounak S. Dharap, Esq. THE ARNS LAW FIRM 515 Folsom Street, 3rd Floor San Francisco, CA 94105 Telephone: (415) 495-7800 Facsimile: (415) 495-7888 RECKITT BENCKISER: Prescott Sues Over Woolite Revival Color Claim ----------------------------------------------------------------- STEVEN ROBERT PRESCOTT, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. RECKITT BENCKISER LLC, Case No. 5:20-cv-02101-BLF (N.D. Cal., March 26, 2020), seeks to hold Reckitt Benckiser accountable for its ongoing fraud claiming that Woolite laundry detergent revives color in clothing. The Plaintiff also seeks monetary compensation on behalf of a California Class. Class members paid a price premium due to Reckitt Benckiser's misrepresentations, and Plaintiff seeks to return this money to class members. In February 2017, Reckitt started to make a powerful new claim for its Woolite laundry detergent. Reckitt represented that, when clothing is washed with Woolite laundry detergent, the clothing's color is revived. Reckitt made materially uniform representations through its advertising and on the labels of Woolite laundry detergent bottles. Reckitt's color revival claims were so noticeable that Proctor & Gamble challenged the claims with the National Advertising Division. Reckitt did not turn over any data supporting its claims, and instead stated that it would follow the National Advertising Division's recommendation. In August 2019, NAD recommended that the claims be discontinued. However, as of March 2020, Reckitt Benckiser continues to represent on Woolite laundry detergent bottle labels that the laundry detergent revives color, the Plaintiff notes. The Plaintiff conducted objective testing of the claim that Woolite laundry detergent revives color in clothing. The Plaintiff insists that Woolite laundry detergent failed the objective test. Reckitt is a consumer goods company that sells health, hygiene, and home products.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. Geoffrey Graber, Esq. Eric Kafka, Esq. COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC 2925 PGA Boulevard, Suite 200 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Telephone: (561) 515-1400 Facsimile: (561) 515-1401 E-mail: tleopold@cohenmilstein.com ggraber@cohenmilstein.com ekafka@cohenmilstein.com - and - Charles Reichmann, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES REICHMANN 16 Yale Circle Kensington, CA 94708-1015 Telephone: (415) 373-8849 E-mail: charles.reichmann@gmail.com REGIONAL INDUSTRIES: Lewis Sues Over Unpaid Wages Under NJWPL ------------------------------------------------------------- JERMAINE R. LEWIS v. REGIONAL INDUSTRIES, L.L.C.; and JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10, Case No. HUD-L-001308-20 (N.J. Super., Hudson Cty., March 27, 2020), arises under the New Jersey Wage Payment Law and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law for the Defendants' failure to pay all wages, which were due and owing to the Plaintiff and all other individuals similarly situated. The Plaintiff also asserts claim for wrongful termination, in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act and the Earned Sick Leave Law. The Defendants employed the Plaintiff as a "helper," who typically worked approx. 60 hours per week from June 7, 2019, until his alleged unlawful termination on November 21, 2019. Regardless of the actual number of hours worked, the Defendant never paid him for more than 50 hours, he alleges. Regional Industries provides waste and recycling services. The Company offers collection, subscription, and roll-off services, as well as serves municipal and private sectors.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Daniel T. Silverman, Esq. COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC 18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800 Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 Telephone: (856) 727-9700 RON GALLO: Faces Ermi CEPA Suit Over Unlawful Pay Practices ----------------------------------------------------------- JOSEPH A. ERMI v. RON GALLO CONSTRUCTION, LLC; RONALD GALLO and JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10, Case No. MER-L-000660-20 (N.J. Super., Mercer Cty., March 27, 2020), alleges that in violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, the Defendants retaliated against the Plaintiff and other individuals similarly situated for making complaints regarding unlawful pay practices. The Plaintiff asks the Court to order the Defendants to cease and desist all conduct inconsistent with the claims made, both as to himself and as to all other individuals similarly situated. The Plaintiff contends that on September 5, 2019, upon receiving inaccurate paychecks, weeks, he made a complaint to Mr. Gallo that he had not been paid the correct prevailing rate. On September 10, 2019, he was terminated. The Plaintiff began working for the Defendants as a carpenter in November 2018. Gallo Construction specializes in additions, bathrooms and kitchens, concrete, and tile work.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Kevin M. Costello, Esq. COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC 18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800 Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 Telephone: (856) 727-9700 SAVE MART SUPERMARKETS: Rooney Labor Suit Removed to E.D. Calif. ---------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as SHAUN ROONEY, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. SAVE MART SUPERMARKETS; and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, Case No. 34-2020-00274973 (Filed Feb. 6, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on March 30, 2020. The Eastern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-at-00321 to the proceeding. The complaint asserts claims for relief arising out of the Plaintiff's employment with the Company on behalf of a proposed class of all non-exempt employees of the Company, who worked in California at any time since February 6, 2016, and all non-exempt employees, who were employed by the Company and received a wage statement at any time from November 27, 2018, to the present. Specifically, the Plaintiff brings claims for failure to provide accurate wage statements; failure to pay overtime wages; and failure to keep requisite payroll records in violation of the California's Unfair Competition Law and California Labor Code. Save Mart is an American grocery store operator. Save Mart owns and operates stores under the names of Save Mart, S-Mart Foods, Lucky and FoodMaxx.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Derek R. Havel, Esq. Karina A. Layugan, Esq. Allison E. Cheffer, Esq. SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP 333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-1422 Telephone: 213 620 1780 Facsimile: 213 620 1398 E-mail: dhavel@sheppardmullin.com klayugan@sheppardmullin.com acheffer@sheppardmullin.com SECURITAS ELECTRONIC: Fails to Pay OT Wage Under NJWPL, Khan Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- ATHAR KHAN v. SECURITAS ELECTRONIC SECURITY, INC., NUMBERS ONLY, INC., COMPUNNEL SOFTWARE GROUP, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-5 AND 6-10, Case No. MER-L-000657-20 (N.J. Super., Mercer Cty., March 27, 2020), alleges that the Defendants violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law by failing pay overtime wages to the Plaintiff and all other individuals similarly situated. The Plaintiff alleges that during his first four weeks of employment, he worked 40 hours per week. After that, he worked 54-60 hours per week over the course of six days. However, the Defendants instructed him that he could only submit payment for 48 of those hours per week. Therefore, he argues, the Defendants failed to pay him the amount he was entitled to under the law. The Plaintiff began working for Compunnel on August 14, 2019. Compunnel placed the Plaintiff as an employee and a senior network engineering employee at Defendant Securitas on that date. The Defendant Numbers Only contracted with the Defendants Compunnel and Securitas to supply the Plaintiff as an employee for Securitas. Securitas offers a full portfolio of video, access, intrusion, fire and integrated systems. Numbers Only and Compunnel are IT service management companies.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: Drake P. Bearden, Jr., Esq. COSTELLO & MAINS, LLC 18000 Horizon Way, Suite 800 Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 Telephone: (856) 727-9700 SINCLAIR BROADCAST: Plaintiffs Ask Court to Reconsider Decision --------------------------------------------------------------- Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the plaintiffs in the class action suit entitled, In re Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, Case No. 1:18-CV-02445-CCB, have filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to certify dismissal as final and appealable. On August 9, 2018, Edward Komito, a putative Company shareholder, filed a class action complaint (the "Initial Complaint") in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (the "District of Maryland") against the Company, Christopher Ripley and Lucy Rutishauser, which action is now captioned In re Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, case No. 1:18-CV-02445-CCB (the "Securities Action"). On March 1, 2019, lead counsel in the Securities Action filed an amended complaint, adding David Smith and Steven Marks as defendants, and alleging that defendants violated the federal securities laws by issuing false or misleading disclosures concerning (a) the Merger prior to the termination thereof; and (b) the DOJ investigation concerning the alleged exchange of pacing information. The Securities Action seeks declaratory relief, money damages in an amount to be determined at trial, and attorney's fees and costs. On May 3, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which motion has been opposed by lead plaintiff. On February 4, 2020, the Court issued a decision granting the motion to dismiss in part and denying the motion to dismiss in part. On February 18, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to certify dismissal as final and appealable. Sinclair said, "The Company believes that the allegations in the Securities Action are without merit and intends to vigorously defend against the allegations." Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. operates as a television broadcasting company in the United States. It owns or provides various programming, operating, sales, and other non-programming operating services to television stations. The company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in Hunt Valley, Maryland. SJW GROUP: To Pay $325,000 Mootness Fee in Exchange for Release --------------------------------------------------------------- SJW Group said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 2020, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the parties in a shareholder lawsuit have entered into an agreement pursuant to which the Defendants would pay a mootness fee in the amount of $325,000 in exchange for the release of all of the Plaintiffs' claims. On June 14, 2018, certain shareholders of Connecticut Water Service, Inc. (CTWS) (the "Plaintiffs") filed two nearly identical class-action complaints in Connecticut state court against the CTWS board of directors, SJW Group, Eric W. Thornburg, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of SJW Group, and CTWS (the "Defendants"). The complaints, as amended on September 18, 2018 and September 20, 2018, allege that the CTWS board breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the Merger, that CTWS's preliminary proxy statement, filed with the SEC on August 20, 2018, omitted certain material information and that SJW Group and Mr. Thornburg aided and abetted the alleged breaches by the CTWS board of directors. Among other remedies, the actions sought to recover rescissory and other damages and attorney's fees and costs. SJW Group believed the claims in these complaints were without merit and vigorously defended against such complaints. The parties to the lawsuits agreed in principle to settle the lawsuits in exchange for the issuance of additional disclosures by CTWS. Pursuant to the agreements to settle the lawsuits, the Plaintiffs reserved the right to seek a mootness fee from CTWS. The parties moved to stay proceedings, other than fee-related proceedings, until the closing of the merger with CTWS, and the court initially granted the parties' motion to stay on November 14, 2018. The initial stay of proceedings had expired on February 28, 2019 and after multiple motions by the parties and granting of extensions, the stay of the proceedings continued until November 11, 2019. On November 20, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an opening brief in support of their mootness fee demand of $1.5 million. The merger with CTWS closed on October 9, 2019, and pursuant to the agreement in principle to settle the litigation, the complaints would be dismissed after the closing. On November 12, 2019, the Defendants filed an opposition to the Plaintiffs' fee demand. On November 27, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in further support of their mootness fee demand. On January 8, 2020, the court entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaints. On January 10, 2020, the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which the Defendants would pay a mootness fee amount of $325,000 in exchange for the release of all of the Plaintiffs' claims. SJW Group, through its subsidiaries, provides water utility services in the United States. It engages in the production, purchase, storage, purification, distribution, wholesale, and retail sale of water. SJW Group was founded in 1866 and is headquartered in San Jose, California. SMS VENTURES: Esquivel Sues Over Unsolicited Marketing Calls ------------------------------------------------------------ Christina Esquivel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SMS Ventures, LLC d/b/a Homegrown Oregon, Case No. 6:20-cv-00605-AA (D. Ore., April 13, 2020), seeks damages and other remedies against the Defendant for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. To promote its services, the Defendant engages in unsolicited marketing, harming thousands of consumers in the process. At no point in time did the Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an "automatic telephone dialing system," says the complaint. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt the Defendant's illegal conduct, which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals. The Plaintiff is a natural person, who was a resident of Marion County, Oregon. The Defendant is a cannabis dispensary.[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David J. McGlothlin, Esq. KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC 2633 E. Indian School Road, Ste. 460 Phoenix, AZ 85016 Phone: 800-400-6808 Fax: 800-520-5523 Email: david@kazlg.com SOUTH NASSAU: Class Certification Order in Krobath Suit Affirmed ---------------------------------------------------------------- In the case, ERIC KROBATH, ETC., Respondent, v. SOUTH NASSAU COMMUNITIES HOSPITAL, ETC., Appellant, ET AL., Defendants, 2017-00630, Index No. 602113/15 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, affirmed with costs, the order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered Dec. 12, 2016, granting the Plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR article 9 for class action certification. In 2015, the Plaintiff commenced the putative class action challenging the billing practices of South Nassau Communities Hospital, specifically with respect to self-pay patients who received emergency treatment. He asserted causes of action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligent concealment (first cause of action) and violations of General Business Law Section 349 (third cause of action), and he also sought a declaratory judgment (fourth cause of action). The Plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR article 9 for class action certification. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the hospital appeals. In light of its determination in one of the two companion appeals, the Appellate Court does not reach the hospital's contentions regarding the appropriateness of certifying the proposed class with respect to the Plaintiff's first cause of action, alleging negligent concealment, since that cause of action is no longer part of the action. Contrary to the hospital's contentions, the Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiff demonstrated, with respect to the remaining causes of action to recover damages for violations of General Business Law Section 349 and for related declaratory relief, that there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that the Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class. The commonality requirement of CPLR 901(a)(2) cannot be determined by any mechanical test and the fact that questions peculiar to each individual may remain after resolution of the common questions is not fatal to the class action. Specifically, the potential for different individual damages claims is not a valid reason for denying class action status in the case. Moreover, the Appellate Court finds that the Plaintiff demonstrated that he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. As his attorneys had assumed responsibility for litigation expenses, his personal financial condition was irrelevant. Moreover, contrary to the hospital's contention, the record establishes that the Plaintiff had, at the very least, a general awareness of the nature of the underlying dispute, the ongoing litigation, and the relief sought on behalf of the class. Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed, ruled the Appellate Court in a Dec. 11, 2019 Decision & Order, a full-text copy of which is available at https://is.gd/HFe1qx from Leagle.com. Garfunkel Wild, P.C., Great Neck, NY (Roy W. Breitenbach -- rbreitenbach@garfunkelwild.com -- and Samantha N. Tomey -- stomey@garfunkelwild.com -- of counsel), for appellant. Giskan Solotaroff & Anderson LLP, New York, NY (Oren S. Giskan -- ogiskan@gslawny.com -- and Aliaksandra Ramanenka -- aramanenka@outtengolden.com -- of counsel), for respondent. SSCP PROPERTY: Class Notice in Polk Labor Suit Under FLSA Approved ------------------------------------------------------------------ In the case, MARCIA R. POLK individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SSCP PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC d/b/a SNAPBOX STORAGE, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-04529-JPH-MJD (S.D. Ind.), Judge James Patrick Hanlon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, granted the parties' Joint Motion for Conditional Certification of a FLSA Collective Action and Approval of Proposed Collective Action Notice. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b), the matter is conditionally certified as a Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Action with regard to the collective group described as follows: Present and former hourly paid Property Managers who worked for Defendant at any time from November 12, 2016, to present. Plaintiff Marcia Polk will represent the Opt-In Plaintiffs in the FLSA Collective Action. The Notice will be sent to the collective group described in paragraph 1 using the approved "FLSA Collective Action Notice." The Defendant, by its counsel, will provide the Plaintiff's counsel a complete list of the names and addresses of all persons within the collective group described within 20 days of the date of the Order. The putative collective members will have 60 days to return signed Consent to Join forms commencing from the date the Plaintiff's counsel mails the Class Action and Collective Action Notices to the putative collective members. The Plaintiff's counsel will notify the Court and the Defendant of the date of mailing. Judge Hanlon approved the "Consent to Join" form to be used by the putative members to opt-in to the action. He also approved the following agreed-upon notice schedule as summarized: a. 20 Days From Order Approving Notice - Defendant to disclose the full names, last to known addresses, and dates of employment of Putative Collective the putative collective members. The Members information will be produced in a usable electronic format. b. 20 Days From Receipt of the Contact Information Members From Defendants - Plaintiff's Counsel will send by mail a copy of Approved Notice and Consent to Join Putative Collective Form to the putative collective members. c. 60 Days From Date Notice is Mailed to the Members - The putative collective members will have 60 days to return their signed Consent to Join Putative Collective forms for filing with the Court. The 60-day period will commence on the postmark date of the mailing of the Approved Notice. The Notice will be considered timely received if postmarked no later than the end of the 60-day notice period and filed by the Plaintiff's counsel within seven days after receipt. The Defendant will retain the right to seek de-certification of the collective action in the future and nothing in the Joint Motion or the Order will be construed as the Defendant waiving any arguments about contesting the future appropriateness of certification and/or the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims. A full-text copy of the Court's Jan. 15, 2020 Order is available at https://is.gd/OnZgui from Leagle.com. MARCIA R. POLK, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by Robert Peter Kondras, Jr. -- kodras@hkmlawfirm.com -- HASSLER KONDRAS MILLER LLP. SSCP PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, doing business as SNAPBOX STORAGE, Defendant, represented by Melissa K. Taft -- Melissa.Taft@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS PC & Michael W. Padgett -- Michael.Padgett@jacksonlewis.com -- JACKSON LEWIS PC. STATE FARM: Court Dismisses Sheahan Antitrust Suit -------------------------------------------------- In the case, BRIAN SHEAHAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-cv-06186-EMC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward M. Chen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (i) granted State Farm and the Verisk Defendants' motions to dismiss; and (ii) denied the Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend in order to add an additional Plaintiff(s). The Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint against State Farm and three affiliated software companies -- Verisk Analytics, Inc.; Insurance Services Office, Inc.; and Xactware Solutions, Inc. ("Verisk Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' theory of the case remains unchanged from its earlier complaints. The TAC alleges that Plaintiffs and others similarly situated who purchased homeowners insurance policies from State Farm were injured by inadequate insurance coverage after their homes were destroyed by wildfires. The damage they allegedly suffered resulted from unexpected rebuild costs. The disparity between the insured coverage and actual cost to rebuild allegedly resulted from State Farm using software developed by the Verisk Defendants to determine insurance value and cost to rebuild. They allege the undervaluation was negligent, fraudulent, and/or the product of a conspiracy between State Farm and the Verisk Defendants. In the operative complaint, the Plaintiffs allege six claims: (1) negligent misrepresentation; (2) negligence; (3) violation of California unfair competition law; (4) violation of California Cartwright Act; (5) violation of the Sherman Act for a vertical conspiracy; and (6) violation of the Sherman Act for a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. State Farm sells insurance. The Verisk Defendants sell a digital database of home construction information; it offers two software products to State Farm: (1) 360 Value, which is a zip code calculator used to determine the initial insurance policy value; and (2) Xactimate, which is used to determine the cost to rebuild or repair property after a loss. The Plaintiffs are the named insured under homeowners insurance policies issued by State Farm. Their homes were destroyed in the October 2017 Northern California wildfires and their policies did not cover a complete rebuild. The Plaintiffs argue that State Farm and the Verisk Defendants conspired together to create and apply defective financial technology tools that are not being utilized to issue proper insurance. Currently pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss filed by State Farm and the Verisk Defendants. On the day before the hearing of the Defendants' motions to dismiss, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend in order to add an additional Plaintiff(s) (e.g., the Sheahans' contractor and other similarly-situated contractors). State Farm argues that the Plaintiffs fail to meet the pleading requirements for all six claims. The Verisk Defendants join State Farm's motion, but they also argue two additional defenses: (1) the economic-loss rule bars the Plaintiffs' state law claims; and (2) the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars the Plaintiffs' antitrust claims. As for the first claim, Judge Chen holds that absent an affirmative misrepresentation, the general rule is that an insurance agent does not have a duty to volunteer to an insured that the latter should procure additional or different insurance coverage. As discussed in Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, the general rule changes only in the following three scenarios: (1) the agent misrepresents the nature, extent or scope of the coverage being offered or provided; (2) there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular type or extent of coverage; and (3) the agent assumes an additional duty by either express agreement or by him- or herself out as having expertise in a given field of insurance being sought by the insured. The Plaintiffs attempt to argue that scenario (1) is the instant case, but the Specific Allegations do not describe with any specificity the alleged misrepresentations. Instead, they merely indicate that the Plaintiffs were acting on their assumptions based on, inter alia, State Farm's reputation in the insurance industry. This does not satisfy scenario (1) of Fitzpatrick. There is no allegation that any of the Plaintiffs requested a certain type of insurance coverage, nor is there an allegation that the State Farm agents held themselves out as having any expertise beyond being insurance agents. Even if the Plaintiffs had demonstrated a misrepresentation that fit into one of the Fitzpatrick exceptions thus imposing a duty upon State Farm, any reliance was not reasonable or justified because of the multiple disclaimers that State Farm gave to the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled misrepresentation or reliance, their claim for negligent misrepresentation must fail. State Farm's motion to dismiss the first claim is granted with prejudice. As for the Plaintiffs' second claim for relief, the Judge granted State Farm's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' negligence claim against all the Defendants with prejudice. He holds that State Farm was simply a direct consumer of the 360 Value software; there are no alleged facts providing a basis to apply the third party beneficiary doctrine. Indeed, the Plaintiffs conceded -- and, still concede -- that 360 Value and Xactimate can yield accurate results if properly used. There is nothing inherent in these products that would inevitably injure State Farm's customers. In the third claim for relief, the Plaintiffs allege a violation of California Business & Professions Code Section 17200 against both State Farm and the Verisk Defendants. First, the Plaintiffs have not alleged enough under Rule 9(b) to establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. As to the Verisk Defendants, they have not alleged that the Verisk Defendants made any misrepresentations, and there are insufficient allegations to support a conspiracy to defraud. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' fraudulent-conduct claim under Section 17200 is dismissed with prejudice for failure to plead any misrepresentation with specificity. Second, Section 7028 explicitly refers to a required license when submitting a bid to build homes -- not an estimate for selling insurance. The Plaintiffs do not allege that State Farm or the Verisk Defendants were using 360 Value to submit a bid as contractors. The Jduge's dismissal of the claim with prejudice stands. Third, the Judge granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Section 17200 claim with prejudice because they have not sufficiently pled fraud; they have not identified unlawful conduct; and they have not sought appropriate relief from the Court. The core problem with the Plaintiffs' Section 17200 claim is that the requested relief identified by them for the Defendants' alleged failure to consider all components of cost was already found by the Court to be inappropriate. The fourth, fifth, and sixth claims for relief are antitrust claims brought pursuant to state and federal law -- the Cartwright Act and the Sherman Act, respectively. The Plaintiffs continue to label the three claims as "cartel" and "conspiracy" in their hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory. The Defendants offer various arguments against the antitrust conspiracy. Recognizing their failure to overcome the deficiencies identified by the Court when it dismissed similar claims in the SAC, the Plaintiffs belatedly seek to amend the complaint (yet again) to add a new Plaintiff -- a contractor. But the Plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to allege viable antitrust claim. The Judge will not allow a fourth amended complaint. He therefore granted the Defendants' motions to dismiss. The Plaintiffs' antitrust claims are dismissed with prejudice because the Court has afforded them multiple opportunities to plead antitrust claims, and they are unable to do so. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' request for leave to file an amended complaint to add the Sheahans' contractor as a Plaintiff is denied. Finally, On Dec. 9, 2019 (over a month after the briefing on these motions to dismiss were completed), the Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice, asking the Court to take judicial notice of the chronology of legislation and case law following Fitzpatrick. State Farm objects to the RJN as, among other things, untimely because it was not filed with the Plaintiffs' opposition. The Judge denies the Plaintiffs' request for judicial notice, as it was submitted after briefing closed. The Order disposes of Docket Nos. 70, 72, and 90. The Clerk is instructed to enter Judgment and close the case. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Order is available at https://is.gd/I6Iasz from Leagle.com. Brian Sheahan, Alison Sheahan, Douglas Pope, Neil Wylie & Sandra Wylie, Plaintiffs, represented by Rebecca McWilliams & Julia Anne Donoho -- jdonoho@legalconstructs.com -- Policyholder Pros, LLP. State Farm General Insurance Company, an Illinois company, Defendant, represented by Frank Falzetta -- ffalzetta@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Jeffrey Scott Crowe -- jcrowe@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard, Mullin, Richter and Hampton LLP & Jennifer Marie Hoffman -- jhoffman@sheppardmullin.com -- Sheppard Mullin Richter Hampton. Verisk Analytics, a Delaware corporation, Insurance Services Office, Inc., a Delaware corporation & Xactware Solutions Inc, a Delaware corporation, Defendants, represented by Andrew David Yaphe, Davis Polk, Micah Galvin Block, Davis Polk and Wardwell LLP & Neal Alan Potischman, Davis Polk & Wardwell. STERLING JEWELERS: Aguayo CFEHA Suit Removed to C.D. California --------------------------------------------------------------- The class action lawsuit captioned as RAQUEL AGUAYO, an individual v. STERLING JEWELERS INC., a corporation and Does 1–50, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV08194 (Filed Feb. 27, 2020), was removed from the California Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on March 30, 2020. The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-02952 to the proceeding. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act for sexual harassment and discrimination, retaliation, and failure take steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment and discrimination. The Company sells gold, silver, diamond, and gemstone jewelry, watches, and gifts.[BN] The Defendants are represented by: Brian Mills, Esq. Erin D. Leach, Esq. Kevin M. Brown, Esq. SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 600 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1400 Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7689 Telephone: 714.427.7000 Facsimile: 714.427.7799 E-mail: bmills@swlaw.com eleach@swlaw.com kmbrown@swlaw.com TIME INC: Hall Appeals C.D. California Decision to Ninth Circuit ---------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiff Linda Hall filed an appeal from a court ruling issued in her lawsuit styled Linda Hall v. Time, Inc., et al., Case No. 8:19-cv-01153-CJC-ADS, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Santa Ana. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Ms. Hall alleges that the Defendants failed to present the automatic renewal offer terms or continuous service offer terms in visual proximity to the request for consent to the offer before the subscription or purchasing agreement was fulfilled. She also claims that the Defendants charged her and the class members' credit and debit cards, or third-party accounts without first obtaining their affirmative consent to the agreement containing the automatic renewal offer terms or continuous service offer terms. The appellate case is captioned as Linda Hall v. Time, Inc., et al., Case No. 20-55354, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN] Plaintiff-Appellant, LINDA HALL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by: David P. Pruett, Esq. Michael John Trotter, Esq. CARROLL, KELLY, TROTTER, FRANZEN, MCBRIDE & PEABODY 111 W. Ocean Boulevard 14th Floor P.O. Box Box 22636 Long Beach, CA 90801-5636 Telephone: 562-432-5855 Email: dppruett@cktfmlaw.com mjtrotter@cktfmlaw.com Defendants-Appellees, TIME, INC., a Delaware corporation, and MEREDITH CORPORATION, an Iowa corporation, are represented by: Marcus Shane McCutcheon, Esq. BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 600 Anton Boulevard, Suite 900 Costa Mesa, CA 92626 Telephone: 714-754-6600 Email: mmccutcheon@bakerlaw.com TUTCO LLC: Court Dismisses Toca Suit Over Faulty Heaters -------------------------------------------------------- In the case, MARIO TOCA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TUTCO, LLC, RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY and WATSCO, INC., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-23949-SINGHAL/McAliley (S.D. Fla.), Judge Raag Singhal of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. The case is a putative class action brought against the Defendant for selling defective heaters and failing to include a "non-self-resetting thermal cutoff" ("NSRT"), a safety backup switch. At some point in 2015 and in 2018, Toca purchased air conditioner units ("HVAC units") for both his business and his residence. Rheem manufactures the HVAC units and they are distributed and wholesaled by Watsco. The third named defendant, Tutco, manufactures the heater component of the HVAC units, which is sold to Rheem and installed in the HVAC units. According to Toca, the HVAC units placed in the market by Rheem and Watsco that contain Tutco's heaters are defective, presenting real health and safety risks to consumers. Worse, actually; they are "ticking time bombs" in houses and places of business. These units present the danger because they do not include NSRTs. NSRTs are the "fail safe" mechanisms that regulate the HVAC units when automatically-resetting temperature limiting controls ("ART") fail. Basically, ARTs are designed to act as an internal thermostat. When the "cycling" process of the air conditioner overheats, the unit potentially can ignite. Apparently, NSRTs guard against the well known, dangerous, and life-threatening issue. Without any allegations that the HVAC units malfunctioned, caused personal injury or property damage, nor any allegations of the amount he allegedly overpaid for "safer" HVAC units, Toca filed this multi-count complaint against the Defendants for various causes of action. The seven counts include: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), for breach of a written warranty; (4) violations of the MMWA for breach of an implied warranty; (5) injunctive and declaratory relief; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"). The Defendants now have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Judge Singhal holds that the Defendants correctly point out that the action is not the first to be filed in the district on nearly identical allegations. In Koski v. Carrier Corp., the plaintiffs brought a class action against nine defendants—four HVAC manufacturers, two electric-unitary-heater manufacturers, and three nationally recognized certification laboratories. Two of the nine -- Rheem and Tutco -- are named Defendants in the case. Judge Singhal dismissed with prejudice all claims except for the FDUTPA claim, and even that claim was subject to dismissal with prejudice as to some Plaintiffs. Koski offers some highly persuasive rationale on several issues and claims presented in the case and the Court is guided by much of Koski's reasoning. While Koski is not controlling, nor does it demand dismissal of Toca's claims, the Court will address how Koski's reasoning is sufficiently persuasive for the Court to arrive at the same conclusions. Toca's first four counts are for breaches of warranty against Rheem and Tutco. Judge Singhal finds that Toca lacks standing to bring the four breach-of-warranty claims because he has not—and cannot—plead an injury. Even assuming the Defendants made affirmative promises of fact and created express warranties on which Toca could state a claim, not a single allegation in the Amended Complaint points to a promise that the HVAC units specifically would include NSRTs. Because it is the entire basis of Toca's express-warranty claims, it is fatal to his action. Toca's second and fourth causes of action are claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The Judge finds that Toca was not in privity with any of the Defendants. Toca cannot state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Toca's fifth cause of action is a claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. For either of these two remedies, the Plaintiff must allege an "actual controversy." Judge Singhal finds that Toca's FDUTPA claim is amenable to amending, if he determines the infirmities identified by the Court can be remedied. Thus, if a second amended complaint adequately and properly pleads a claim under FDUTPA, Toca may be able to plead a claim for injective and declaratory relief, as well. Toca's sixth cause of action is a claim for unjust enrichment. He names all three Defendants. The basis for the claim is he paid "a premium price" for the HVAC units and the Defendants benefited by placing into the stream of commerce defective heaters, rather than the enhanced units with NSRTs. Judge Singhal determines there is nothing inequitable about the circumstances. Under the most liberal reading of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, Toca paid D Air Conditioning Company for the HVAC units and received properly functioning HVAC units. The Judge rejects the notion that the Defendants have been "unjustly enriched" by providing properly functioning units. Toca's seventh cause of action is a claim for violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The judge holds that the Amended Complaint falls short of satisfying Rule 9(b). Nevertheless, because a dismissal under Rule 9(b) is a technical dismissal rather than on the merits, he will dismiss the FDUTPA claim without prejudice and with leave to amend. It will conclude the analysis, however, to avoid any construction of the Order's providing guidance or advice on how to replead the claim. For the foregoing reasons, Judge Singhal granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice as to Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI. He dismissed without prejudice Counts V and VII. If Toca can cure the pleading deficiencies identified in this order, he may file a second amended complaint within 14 days from the date of the Order. A full-text copy of the Court's March 4, 2020 Order is available at https://is.gd/NtFhqX from Leagle.com. Mario Toca, On Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, represented by Patrick A. Barthle, II -- pbarthle@forthepeople.com -- Morgan, Morgan Complex Litigation Group, Christopher B. Barbour -- cbb@rhinelawfirm.com -- Rhine Law Firm PC, pro hac vice, Joel R. Rhine -- jrr@rhinelawfirm.com -- Rhine Law Firm, pro hac vice, Martin A. Ramey, Rhine Law Firm PC, pro hac vice & John Allen Yanchunis, Sr. -- jyanchunis@forthepeople.com -- Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group. TUTCO, LLC, Defendant, represented by Darci F. Madden -- dfmadden@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, pro hac vice, David Axelman -- david.axelman@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP & Jeffrey S. Russell -- jsrussell@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, pro hac vice. RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY & WATSCO, INC, Defendants, represented by David A. Coulson, Greenberg Traurig, Elisa Hevia Baca, Greenberg Traurig & Robert Stephen Galbo, Greenberg Traurig, P.A.. UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Capriole Appeals D. Mass. Ruling to 1st Cir. --------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiff John Capriole filed an appeal from a court ruling issued in his lawsuit styled Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-11941-IT, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Boston. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit arises from the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiff Capriole was employed by the Defendants as driver. The appellate case is captioned as Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., Case No. 20-1386, in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.[BN] Plaintiff–Appellant JOHN CAPRIOLE, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, is represented by: Anastasia Doherty, Esq. Anne R. Kramer, Esq. Shannon Erika Liss-Riordan, Esq. Adelaide H. Pagano, Esq. LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN PC 729 Boylston St., Ste. 2000 Boston, MA 02116 Telephone: 617-994-5800 Email: adoherty@llrlaw.com akramer@llrlaw.com sliss@llrlaw.com apagano@llrlaw.com – and - Karla E. Zarbo, Esq. MA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 1 Ashburton Pl. Boston, MA 02108-0000 Telephone: 617-727-2200 Defendants–Appellees UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and DARA KHOSROWSHAHI are represented by: Theane Evangelis, Esq. Heather Richardson, Esq. Brandon Stoker, Esq. GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 333 S Grand Ave. Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197 Telephone: 213-229-7000 Email: tevangelis@gibsondunn.com hrichardson@gibsondunn.com bstoker@gibsondunn.com – and - Joshua S. Lipshutz, Esq. GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036-5306 Telephone: 202-955-8217 Email: jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com UNITED STATES: Gayle Files Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ------------------------------------------------------------- PATRICK GAYLE, APARICIO P. JERONIMO, TOLENTINO MARTINEZ-RIOS, WILDER PEREZ LIMONES, JAVIER ANTONIO ARIAS-MARTINEZ, JUAN CARLOS ALFARO GARCIA, FERMIN TEPETATE-MARTINEZ, ABDUL JALLOH, DARWYN YOVANNY NAVARRETE SANCHEZ, MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN, JOSE CHAVEZ, LAZARO OCANA GUZMAN, NAIM ARRAK, AGANE WARSAME, HASSAN MOHAMED FARAH, RUBEN ORLANDO FLORES RAMOS, MOHAMED HASAN, ELISEO ANTONIO ZAMORA MENDOZA, CESAR ARIEL MENDEZ ESCOBAR, Krome Service Processing Center; and ROSELINE OSTINE, TAHIMI PEREZ, FRANKLIN RAMOS GONZALEZ, FRANCISCO RIVERO VALERON, IRVIN MEDOZA SILIS, GERARDO VARGAS, DAIRON BARREDO SANCHEZ Glades County Detention Center; and RENE JONATHAN ROSAS CARDENAS, ADRIAN SOSA FLETES, ALEJANDRO FERREIRA BORGES, MAIKEL BETANCOURT, GELBER SONTAY FUNEZ, SIRVANILDO BIBIANO SOARES, MAYKEL VALERA RAMIREZ, ERVIN DAVID RODAS PEDRO, Broward Transitional Center; on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Petitioners-Plaintiffs v. MICHAEL W. MEADE, Field Office Director, Miami Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and WILLIAM P. BARR, United States Attorney General; Respondents-Defendants, Case No. 1:20-cv-21553-XXXX (S.D. Fla., April 13, 2020), is brought on behalf of detainees filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus as a result of risks associated with the coronavirus. All Petitioners are at imminent risk of contracting coronavirus disease 2019 ("COVID-19") as a result of their inability to follow Center for Disease Control ("CDC") guidelines and state and local directives due to their continued detention. This action challenges the refusal of the Respondents to release Petitioners, and others in the class they represent, so that they can shelter in place, follow CDC guidelines, and reduce their likelihood of infection and illness. Federal judges across the country have ordered the urgent release of noncitizens, explaining the pressing health risks created by detaining groups of people at this time. On April 8, 2020, U.S. District Court Judge William G. Young ordered the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to release detained individuals because of the COVID-19 threat: "The situation is urgent and unprecedented, and a reduction in the number of people who are held in custody is necessary." The spread of COVID-19 in ICE detention in Florida has been marked by secrecy and cover-up. There is no vaccine against COVID-19 and no known cure. Currently, the only recognized strategies to reduce the risk of exposure to COVID-19 are social distancing, wide spread testing, and improved hygiene, which have led to unprecedented public health measures around the world. Given this reality, the President has declared a national emergency. Every state in the Union and the District of Columbia have declared states of emergency Numerous states and localities--including Florida and many of its cities and counties--have issued "shelter-in place" orders requiring residents to stay in their homes. School mandated closures are in effect in all fifty states. These measures all seek to reduce the spread of the virus and, ultimately, save lives. Unfortunately, the Plaintiffs allege, ICE is preventing people at Krome, Glades, and BTC from complying with sheltering in place protocols and CDC guidelines. Despite warnings from medical and public health professionals that releasing detained immigrants is the only viable option to comply with social distancing, individual quarantine, and other CDC requirements and local and state orders, the agency has generally refused to release in any meaningful way, in the absence of court intervention, says the complaint. The Petitioners bring this action to remedy ICE's violation of their constitutional rights and protect themselves--as well as others in immigration detention at Krome, BTC, and Glades--from the imminent harm that will result from their continued detention. The Petitioners-Plaintiffs are women and men detained by the Respondents-Defendants in civil immigration detention at three Florida detention centers within the jurisdiction of the Miami Field Office of ICE. MICHAEL W. MEADE is the Field Office Director for the ICE Miami Field Office.[BN] The Petitioners-Plaintiffs are represented by: Rebecca Sharpless, Esq. Romy Lerner, Esq. Katarina M. Gomez, Law Student Meredith Hoffman, Law Student Maria A. Llorens, Law Student Jacob S. Morse, Law Student Olivia G. Parise, Law Student Maria A. Piselli, Law Student UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRATION CLINIC 1311 Miller Drive Suite, E-273 Coral Gables, FL 33146 Phone: (305) 284-3576 Fax: (305) 284-6092 Email: rsharpless@law.miami.edu - and - Gregory P. Copeland, Esq. Sarah T. Gillman, Esq. RAPID DEFENSE NETWORK 11 Broadway, Suite 615 New York, NY 10004 Phone: (212) 843-0910 Fax: (212) 257-7033 Email: gregory@defensenetwork.org sarah@defensenetwork.org - and - Mark Andrew Prada, Esq. Anthony Richard Dominguez, Esq. PRADA URIZAR, PLLC 3191 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, FL 33145 Phone: (786) 703-2061 Fax: (786) 708-9508 Email: mprada@pradaurizar.com adominguez@pradaurizar.com - and - Paul R, Chavez, Esq. Maia Fleischman, Esq. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER 2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Ste. 3200 Miami, FL 33101 Phone: (305) 537-0577 Email: paul.chavez@splcenter.org maia.fleischman@splcenter.org - and - Andre Montavon-McKillip, Esq. LEGAL AID SERVICE OF BROWARD COUNTY, INC. 491 North State Road 7 Plantation, FL 33317 Phone: (954) 736-2493 Fax: (954) 736-2484 Email: amontavon@legalaid.org UNITED STATES: Roman Files Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ------------------------------------------------------------- A class action lawsuit has been filed against Chad F. Wolf, et al. The case is styled as Kelvin Hernandez Roman, Beatriz Andrea Forero Chavez, Miguel Aguilar Estrada, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Petitioners v. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Matthew T. Albence, Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; David Marin, Director of the Los Angeles Field Office, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Respondents, Case No. 5:20-cv-00768-TJH-PVC (C.D. Cal., April 13, 2020). The nature of suit is stated as Habeas Corpus--Alien Detainee for Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Chad F. Wolf is the acting Secretary of Homeland Security and Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Strategy, Policy, and Plans.[BN] The Petitioners are represented by: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Esq. Jessica Karp Bansal, Esq. Michael Bryan Kaufman, Esq. Michelle Y. Cho, Esq. ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1313 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 Phone: (213) 977-9500 Fax: (213) 417-2211 Email: aarulanantham@aclusocal.org jbansal@aclusocal.org mkaufman@aclusocal.org mcho@aclusocal.org - and - Jessie Alice Cammack, Esq. Amanda Barnett, Esq. LATHAM AND WATKINS LLP 355 South Grand Avenue, Suite 100 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Phone: (213) 485-1234 Fax: (213) 891-8763 Email: jessie.cammack@lw.com amanda.barnett@lw.com - and - Samir Deger-Sen, Esq. LATHAM AND WATKINS LLP 885 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022-4834 Phone: (212) 906-1200 Fax: (212) 751-4864 Email: samir.deger-sen@lw.com - and - William M Friedman, Esq. LATHAM AND WATKINS LLP 555 Eleventh Street NW Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20004-1304 Phone: (202) 637-2200 Fax: (202) 637-2201 Email: william.friedman@lw.com The Respondents are represented by: Assistant 2241-194 US Attorney LA-CV AUSA-OFFICE OF US ATTORNEY CRIMINAL DIVISION-US COURTHOUSE 312 North Spring Street, 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90012-4700 Phone: (213) 894-2434 Email: USACAC.Habeas@usdoj.gov - and - Daniel A. Beck, Esq. AUSA-OFFICE OF US ATTORNEY 300 North Los Angeles Street Suite 7516 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Phone: (213) 894-2574 Fax: (213) 894-7819 Email: daniel.beck@usdoj.gov - and - OIL-DCS Trial Attorney OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION PO Box 868 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Phone: (202) 353-8806 Email: oil-dcs.cacd@usdoj.gov WAKE COUNTY, NC: Stafford Sues Over Refusal to Issue Gun Permits ---------------------------------------------------------------- KELLY STAFFORD, GRASS ROOTS NORTH CAROLINA, SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, and FIREARMS POLICY COALITION v. GERALD M. BAKER, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Wake County, North Carolina, Case No. 5:20-cv-00123-FL (E.D.N.C., March 27, 2020), is brought against the Defendants for refusing any new applications of the Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated individuals for pistol purchase permits or concealed handgun permits until April 30, 2020, in the midst of a widespread public health crisis. The Plaintiffs allege that in reality the health crisis heightens the need for upholding to the fullest extent of the law the fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. The Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Baker is statutorily required to issue these permits, and within a finite period of time, so long as the applicant meets the eligibility criteria, and no exception exists for administrative complications, inadequate staff or resources, or any other extenuating circumstances in processing the applications. The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive orders, including temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, ultimately compelling Defendant Baker to immediately resume accepting and processing new PPP applications and, barring that, suspending the PPP requirement itself for so long as Defendant Baker may fail or refuse to do so. The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves, and as the representative of the class of similarly situated individuals consisting of law-abiding residents of Wake County, North Carolina, otherwise eligible to apply for and obtain a PPP, but who are precluded from doing so solely because of Defendant Baker's illegal and unconstitutional ban on all new applications for such permits through April 30, 2020. North Carolina is a U.S. state located in the southeastern region of the United States.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Edward H. Green, III, Esq. COATS & BENNETT, PLLC 1400 Crescent Green, Suite 300 Cary, NC 27518 Telephone: 855-369-8895 E-mail: edgreen3@earthlink.net - and - Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, Esq. THE DIGUISEPPE LAW FIRM, P.C. 4320 Southport-Supply Road, Suite 300 Southport, NC 28461 Telephone: 910-713-8804 E-mail: law.rmd@gmail.com - and - Adam Kraut, Esq. FIREARMS POLICY COALITION 1215 K Street, 17th Floor Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 476-2342 E-mail: akraut@fpclaw.org WALMART INC: Fourth Circuit Appeal Filed in Van Buren Fraud Suit ---------------------------------------------------------------- Plaintiff Robert Van Buren filed an appeal from a court ruling in his lawsuit styled Robert Van Buren v. Walmart, Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-00911-DKC, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore. As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiff Robert Van Buren of Annapolis alleged the megacorporation applied a heightened sales tax on items based on their original price when they were sold at a reduced price. Van Buren alleges that he and class members are entitled to compensation for all items sold in this manner. Van Buren alleges that throughout 2018, he bought multiple items that were sold at reduced prices, including a Sonicare product and a nearly $200 Brindale mattress, and was assigned a sales tax that was to be applied to their original costs. He also claims to have experienced similar cases with purchases at Sam's Club, a subsidiary of Walmart. The appellate case is captioned as Robert Van Buren v. Walmart, Inc., Case No. 20-1390, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN] Plaintiff–Appellant ROBERT VAN BUREN, for himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by: Scott C. Borison, Esq. LEGG LAW FIRM, LLC 1900 South Norfolk Road San Mateo, CA 94403 Telephone: 301-620-1016 - and – Peter Albert Holland, Esq. Emanwel Josef Turnbull, Esq. HOLLAND LAW FIRM, PC 914 Bay Ridge Road Annapolis, MD 21403 Telephone: 410-280-6133 Email: peter@hollandlawfirm.com eturnbull@hollandlawfirm.com - and – Robert Persante, Esq. Darren Stotts, Esq. Zackary T. Zuroweste, Esq. PERSANTEZUROWESTE 2555 Enterprise Road Clearwater, FL 33763 Telephone: 727-796-7666 Email: rp@persantelaw.com ds@persantelaw.com zz@persantelaw.com Defendant–Appellee WALMART INC., trading as Sam's Club, is represented by: Chad Jerry Doellinger, Esq. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 77 West Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60601-0000 Telephone: 312-456-1014 Email: doellingerc@gtlaw.com - and - Dawn Allison Ellison, Esq. GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 2101 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-0000 Telephone: 202-331-3157 Email: ellisond@gtlaw.com ZOOM VIDEO: Hurvitz Sues Over Collection of Users' Personal Info ---------------------------------------------------------------- Todd Hurvitz, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ZOOM VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS, INC., FACEBOOK and LINKEDIN CORPORATION, Case No. 2:20-cv-03400 (C.D. Cal., April 13, 2020), accuses the Defendants of illegally harvesting Zoom users' personal information. The lawsuit is brought for monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief in order to: (a) require the Defendants to provide compensation for their unlawful, unfair and deceptive conduct; (b) require the Defendants to disgorge their ill-gotten gains; and (c) prevent and preclude the Defendants from engaging in similar conduct in the future. According to the complaint, the exploitation of Zoom users began simultaneously with the installation of Zoom's software application, especially if they used the iOS operating system--the system to run to Apple products. At that time, and each time thereafter that a Zoom user opened or closed the Zoom App, Defendant Facebook eavesdropped on, and otherwise read, attempted to read and learned the contents and meaning of, communications between Zoom users' devices and the Defendant Zoom's server without the users' knowledge or consent. Facebook engaged in that unlawful conduct in order to gather users' personal information and amass increasingly detailed profiles on Zoom users, which profiles Zoom and Facebook then used for their respective financial benefit. Similarly, Defendant LinkedIn eavesdropped on, and otherwise read, attempted to read and learned the contents and meaning of, communications between Zoom users' devices and Defendant Zoom's server, in order to harvest users' personal information, the Plaintiff alleges. Additionally, Defendant Zoom has misrepresented the nature of the security used to protect Zoom users' video communications. Zoom has also concealed, suppressed and omitted from disclosure various flaws in its products until they are publicly disclosed by third parties, knowing that the disclosures could harm its business, says the complaint. Plaintiff Todd Hurvitz is a California resident. Zoom promotes itself as the "leader in modern enterprise video communications" that "helps businesses and organizations bring their teams together in a frictionless environment to get more done."[BN] The Plaintiff is represented by: David B. Owens, Esq. Mike Kanovitz, Esq. Scott R. Drury, Esq. LOEVY & LOEVY 311 N. Aberdeen St., 3rd Floor Chicago, IL 60607 Phone: (312) 243-5902 Fax: (312) 243-5902 Email: david@loevy.com mike@loevy.com drury@loevy.com ZOOM VIDEO: Kondrat Sues Over Deficient Privacy and Data Security ----------------------------------------------------------------- Tesha Kondrat, Gavin Wolfe, and Chanelle Murphy, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ZOOM VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Case No. 5:20-cv-02520 (N.D. Cal., April 13, 2020), is brought to hold Zoom responsible for its deficient privacy and data security, to stop Zoom from continuing to profit at the expense of consumers' privacy and security, to require that Zoom take all necessary measures to secure the privacy of user accounts and devices, and to compensate the Plaintiffs and Class Members for the damage that its acts and omissions have caused. According to the complaint, Zoom's meteoric rise from a startup with 40 engineers in 2011 to its $20 billion initial public offering in 2019 was celebrated, and its trajectory during the COVID-19 pandemic has exponentially increased as the homebound population uses it as their business and social lifeline. But Zoom's assent came at the expense of consumers' privacy, as it prioritized its breakneck growth above the security of consumers' data and privacy. Zoom's sudden ubiquitous presence in the lives of Americans forced to stay at home and limit face-to-face communications has exposed numerous deficiencies in the technology's data privacy and security, with new problems coming to light as each day passes. Zoom is now playing catch-up to fix each problem as it arises, but it appears to always be one step behind. By using Zoom's rushed-to-market technologies, consumers' private communications and personally-identifying information and data are being exposed to third-parties, both intentionally by Zoom, and maliciously by nefarious actors exploiting flaws in Zoom's data security. As a result of Zoom's intentional and negligent data security failures, the Plaintiffs' personal information has been exposed and is at a significant risk of further exposure, and their privacy-rights have been violated, says the complaint. The Plaintiffs purchased, downloaded and used Zoom. Zoom is a cloud-based video communications platform that offers companies and consumers the ability to hold video conferences, webinars, conference calls, and chats.[BN] The Plaintiffs are represented by: Jason S. Hartley, Esq. HARTLEY LLP 101 West Broadway, Suite 820 San Diego, CA 92101 Phone: 619-400-5822 Email: hartley@hartleyllp.com - and - Norman E. Siegel, Esq. J. Austin Moore, Esq. STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP 460 Nichols Road, Suite 200 Kansas City, MO 64112 Phone: (816) 714-7100 Email: siegel@stuevesiegel.com moore@stuevesiegel.com ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are $25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. *** End of Transmission ***