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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, July 13, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 139

                            Headlines

ABBVIE: Judge Dismisses Antitrust Class Action
ACELL INC: Frazier Suit Removed From Cir. Court to W.D. Missouri
ACER THERAPEUTICS: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Fraud Suit
ACTIVAR INC: Gomez Suit Moved From Super. Ct. to C.D. California
ACTS-AVIATION SECURITY: Abrams Suit Removed to C.D. California

ADIENT PLC: Court Closes Securities Suit
ALASKA USA: Court Refuses to Compel Arbitration in Coleman Suit
ALASKA USA: District of Alaska Narrows Claims in Coleman Class Suit
ALERE HOME: Settlement in Arcare Suit Gets Final Court Approval
ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Von Asten Files Placeholder Class Cert. Bid

ALLY BANK: Court Dismisses Second Amended Chinitz Complaint
ALTA NEWPORT: Cal. Central Dist. Narrows Claims in Holly Class Suit
AMERICA SAVINGS: Moskowitz Appeals D. Hawaii Ruling to Ninth Cir.
AMERIHEALTH CARITAS: $4.25MM Settlement in Wood Gets Final Approval
AMNEAL PHARMA: Appeal from Dismissal of Pension Fund Suit Underway

AMNEAL PHARMA: Bid to Nix Cambridge Retirement System Suit Underway
AMNEAL PHARMA: White et al. Drop Claims in Zantac/Ranitidine Suit
APPLE INC: Second Amended Brodsky Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
ARIZONA: Student Files Class Action Against Board of Regents
ARKANSAS: 2nd Cir. Affirms Class Certification in Pension Fund Suit

AUSTRALIA: Faces Big Compensation Bill in Live Cattle Lawsuit
AUSTRALIA: Fire-Fighting Foam Contamination Class Action Okayed
AUSTRALIA: Opal Tower Unit Owners Launch Class Action Over Defects
BILL GRAHAM: Court Certifies Two Classes in Kihn Suit
BIMBO BAKERIES: 22 Non-Resident Opt-Ins in Camp Suit Dismissed

BLUE APRON: Summary Judgment in Salzberg Securities Suit Reversed
BLUE BOTTLE: Licea Sues Over Charges on Free Trial Subscription
BOHEMIAN CITIZENS: Consent Decree in Dominguez ADA Suit Approved
BOSTON UNIVERSITY: Tran Refund Suit Moved to D. Massachusetts
BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING: Pomerantz Announces Class Action Lawsuit

BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING: RM Law Notes of Class Action Lawsuit
BUSHFIRE GRILL: $206K Settlement in Pacheco Gets Prelim. Approval
CAMPBELL SOUP: Vanlaningham Consumer Suit Moved to S.D. Illinois
CANADIAN HOCKEY: Abuse Class Action Pending
CANADIAN HOCKEY: Board Creates Panel Amid Class Action

CAPITAL ONE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Porteous Class Suit
CARLOS LOPEZ: McMorris Appeals Order in Steven Suit to 2nd Cir.
CASPER SLEEP: Faces Investor Class Action Over IPO
CHASE BANK: Distribution of Remaining Deal Fund in Haynes Approved
CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Bailey Sues Over Decline in Stock Prices

CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Kessler Topaz Reminds of August 17 Deadline
CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Levi & Korsinsky Notes of Aug. 17 Deadline
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA: Summary Judgment Upheld in Lutz Suit
CHINA ZENIX: Judge Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit
CIGNA CORP: Amara Appeals D. Conn. Ruling to Second Circuit

CNMI: Settlement Fund Can Intervene in PSSS Lawsuit
CORINTHIAN COLLEGES: Educ. Dept Ordered to Discharge Student Loans
CREDIT BUREAU: Protective Order Motion in Kang Lawsuit Denied
CVK RESTAURANT: Nunez Sues in S.D. New York Over FLSA Violation
CYTOMX THERAPEUTICS: Jakubowitz Law Reminds of July 20 Deadline

CYTOSPORT INC: Angeion Group Announces Proposed Settlement
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE: Court Holds Settlement Fairness Hearing
DAY & ZIMMERMANN: 2nd Recusal Bid on Judge in Waters Suit Denied
DCG INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Parrott FLSA Suit
DETROIT PROPERTY: Court Deems 38 Releases in James Suit Invalid

DIGNITY HEALTH: Settlement in Klatt Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
DOUGERT MANAGEMENT: Maldonado Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
DUOLINGO INC: Mejico Sues Over Charges on Free Trial Subscription
DYCOM INDUSTRIES: Court Junks Dismissal Bid of Amended Tung Suit
EASYJET PLC: Faces Biggest Personal Data Breach Class Action in UK

EASYJET: 10,000+ People to Join Data Breach Class Action
ELLIOTT AUTO: Gurrola Employment Suit Removed to S.D. California
ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Howard G. Smith Reminds of August 18 Deadline
EQT CORP: Garfield Appeals Decision to Pennsylvania Supreme Court
EROS INT'L: Opus is Lead Plaintiff in Consolidated Securities Suit

EVENTBRITE INC: Court Dismisses IPO-Related Securities Class Suit
FACEBOOK INC: Black Workers Allege Discrimination and Bias
FIAT CHRYSLER: Monostable Gear Shifter Lawsuit Partly Dismissed
FINJAN HOLDINGS: Monteverde Files Shareholders Class Action
FIRST STUDENT: $650K Settlement in Humes Suit Gets Final Approval

FLORIDA: Judge Set to Decide on Unemployment System Class Action
FLORIDA: Leon County Judge Set to Decide on Unemployment Suit
FORESCOUT TECH: Barbuto & Johansson Reminds of Aug. 10 Deadline
FRED BEANS: Wins Summary Judgment in Brogan Class Suit
GATES CORP: Arnold Struck From Lundine Conditional Employees Class

GDS HOLDINGS: Court Dismisses Amended Ramzan Securities Suit
GENERAL MOTORS: Baker Appeals Decisions in Ignition Switch MDL
GENERAL MOTORS: Oil Consumption Suit Certified as Class Action
GEO GROUP: Cross Bids for Summary Judgment in Nwauzor Suit Denied
GERMANY: BaFin, FREP Face Class Action Over Wirecard Insolvency

GOLDMAN SACHS: Seeks SC Review of Abacus CDO Class Action Ruling
GOOGLE INC: Faces Class Action Over Private Mode Browser Tracking
GOYA FOODS: Gets Favorable Ruling on Pleadings in Ortiz Suit
GPB CAPITAL: KlaymanToskes Probes FINRA Arbitration Claims
GRAND CANYON: Lieff Cabraser Reminds of July 13 Deadline

GREAT AMERICAN: Metzler TCPA Suit Moved From E.D. Pa. to N.D. Ga.
GROCERY DELIVERY: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Engen Suit Denied
HAMILTON BEACH: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Class Action Lawsuit
HARRIS COUNTY, TX: TRO Motions in Russell Prisoners Suit Denied
HI-TECH PROPERTY: Taylor Appeals E.D. Virginia Ruling to 4th Cir.

HINGHAM, MA: Belezos Appeals D. Mass. Ruling to First Circuit
HOME DEPOT: Maniglia Labor Class Suit Removed to N.D. California
HORSEPOWER ENTERTAINMENT: Has $450MM Deal on Music Festival Matter
HUGHES, AR: Court Denies Bid for Conditional Class Certification
IDEANOMICS INC: Bernstein Liebhard Announces Class Action Lawsuit

IDEANOMICS INC: Block & Leviton Files Securities Class Action
IDEANOMICS INC: Block & Leviton Reminds of August 27 Deadline
IDEANOMICS INC: Robbins Geller Announces Class Action Lawsuit
IDEANOMICS INC: Rosen Announces Filing of Securities Class Action
IDEANOMICS INC: Rosen Law Reminds Investors of Aug. 27 Deadline

ILLINOIS: Expedited Release of Inmates in Money Suit Denied
IMG COLLEGE: Spielman Appeals Order in Antitrust Suit to 6th Cir.
IMPACT GROUP: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
KANDI TECHNOLOGIES: Frank R. Cruz Reminds of Class Action
KERRY INC: Remand of Fernandez to Cook County Circuit Court Denied

KESSLER TOPAZ: Meltzer & Check Announces Securities Fraud Lawsuit
KINGOLD JEWELRY: Rosen Reminds of Aug. 31 Plaintiff Motion Deadline
KNAUF INSULATION: Brancaccio Remanded to LA County Superior Court
KRAFT FOODS: Appeals N.D. Ill. Ruling in Ploss Suit to 7th Cir.
LA BOOM DISCO: 2nd Cir. Vacates Summary Judgment in Duran Suit

LA SALLE COUNTY, TX: ACLU, Gibbs & Bruns File Class Action
LAWNWOOD MEDICAL: Kepfer Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
LENDINGCLUB CORP: Calif. Judge Dismisses Veal Securities Suit
LIFELABS: Faces Two Privacy Class Actions in Canada
LLOYD'S LONDON: Insurers Denied Leave to Appeal Decision in Drennen

LOUISIANA: Urged to Release Juvenile Detainees Amid Class Action
LYFT INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Rogers Drivers Suit
MACY'S WEST: Vazquez Employment Suit Removed to N.D. California
MACYS WEST: Diaz Appeals Ruling in Labor Suit to Ninth Circuit
MADERA GROUP: Fails to Provide Meal Periods, Mitchell Suit Claims

MAJOR LEAGUE: Court Refuses to Reconsider Dismissal of Olson Suit
MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL: Harris Suit Removed to E.D. California
MDL 2591: Court Denies Recusal Bid in Syngenta MIR 162 Corn Suit
MDL 2672: J. Bertolet Appeals N.D. California Ruling to 9th Cir.
MDL 2924: Clark v. Amneal Suit Over Ranitidine, Consolidated

MDL 2939: Court Denies Centralization of 3 Suits vs. Family Dollar
MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Appeals Decision in Vedernikov FDCPA Suit
MERCEDES-BENZ: Faces Class Action Over Shattering Sunroofs
MIDLAND FUNDING: Lerner Suit Over FDCPA Breach Removed to D.N.J.
MIKE BLOOMBERG: Scott Suit Removed to Southern District of Texas

MISSISSIPPI: Dockery Appeals Ruling in Prisoners Suit to 5th Cir.
MISSOURI: $3.25M Attorneys' Fees Awarded in M.B. Class Suit
MONEYMUTUAL LLC: Bid to Modify Payment Sched of Rilley Deal Denied
MONSANTO: City of Berkeley to Receive $1MM in PCB Settlement
MONTANA UNIV.: Partial Denial of Attorneys Fees in Gendron Upheld

MURPHY OIL: Taylor Appeals Decision in Fraud Suit to 8th Circuit
MYLAN NV: Levi & Korsinsky Notes of Aug. 25 Plaintiff Deadline
NEVADA: DETR Faces Class Action Over Failure to Pay Gig Workers
NEW YORK, NY: Faces Pierre FLSA Suit Over Failure to Pay Wages
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 17 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.

NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 18 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Gym Owners Mull Class Action
NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal Filed v. Richardson in Gulino Suit
NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal v. Hicks Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
NEWELL BRANDS: Court Narrows Claims in Benson Class Suit

NORDSTROM INC: Partial Summary Judgment Bid Granted in Keating Suit
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA: Final Hearing on Osegueda Deal Set for July 27
OAPSE: Court Denies Class Certification in Littler Lawsuit
OHIO UNIVERSITY: Class Action Seeks Refund of Tuition, Fees
OHIO: S.C. Reverses Class Cert. Ruling in Medicaid Recipients' Case

OLAM SPICES: Ramirez Dismissed From Beltran OT Wage Lawsuit
ONE CALL MEDICAL: Dawson Labor Suit Removed to S.D. California
OREGON: Hernandez Seeks Review of Ruling in Sexual Assault Suit
PACESETTER CLAIMS: Tapley-Smith Gets Conditional Certification
PAN AMERICAN: Rodriguez Suit Moved to District of Columbia

PEOPLECONNECT INC: Warnock Class Suit Removed to C.D. California
PETER NYGARD: Defense Lawyer Faces Professional Misconduct
PGA INC: Settlement in Schilling FLSA Suit Gets Final Approval
PLANNED PARENTHOOD: Baker Files Cert. Petition to Supreme Court
PNC BANK: Persuades Court to Limit Scope of Class Action

PORTLAND, OR: ACLU of Oregon Files Class Action Against Police
PRIMERICA INC: Naveja Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
PROASSURANCE CORP: Schall Law Firm Reminds of August 17 Deadline
PRONTO CALIFORNIA: Luna Seeks Overtime Wages Under Labor Code
PROSHARES TRUST: Butler Appeals Decision in Ford Suit to 2nd Cir.

PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: LMB Appeals Order in Dowe Suit to 2nd Cir.
RANCHO FOODS: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Pelayo Says
RNT PROFESSIONAL: Klotz Employees Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma
SAN DIEGO, CA: J.F. Suit Dismissed Without Leave to Amend
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Greif & Lawson Claims in Blakely Suit Dismissed

SARASOTA, FL: Renewed Bid for FLSA Certification Sought
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY: Sanford Heisler Files Class Action
SCL HEALTH: Summary Judgment in Bratton MCPA Suit Upheld
SD PROTECTION: Decision & Order on Fisher Suit Settlement Entered
SEATTLE, WA: Lawsuits Pile Up v. Mayor Over Protest Handling

SIMPLY HEALTHCARE: Jenkins TCPA Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
SMITH MEDICAL: Arkin Suit Stayed Pending Prelim Settlement Approval
SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Class Action
SOUTH CAROLINA: SCE&G Appeals Ruling in Cook Suit to 4th Circuit
SPECIALTY COMMODITIES: Settlement in Quiroz Gets Prelim Approval

SPRINT/UNITED MGMT: Bid to Limit Communications in Amaraut Denied
STEINHOFF: Averts Disgruntled Shareholders' Class Action
TEZOS: ICO Class Action May Conclude in $25MM Settlement
TOP SHIPS: 2nd Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Onel Securities Suit
TRUEACCORD CORP: $2,640 in Attorneys' Fees in Zuniga Suit Denied

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Drivers' Class Action Can Move Forward
UNITED AIRLINES: Utley Suit Moved From N.D. Ohio to N.D. Illinois
UNITED PARCEL: Grigorian Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
UNITED STATES: 6th Cir. Vacates Summary Judgment for DHS in Jones
UNITED STATES: Adelanto ICE Immigrant Detainees File Class Action

UNITED STATES: Bacote's Bid to be Unbound by Cunningham Deal Nixed
UNITED STATES: Brito Appeals Ruling in Alien Habeas Corpus Suit
UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Two Subclasses in Doe APA Suit
UNITED STATES: Protesters Call for Release of ICE Detainees
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Condry Appeals N.D. Calif. Ruling to 9th Cir.

UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Ninth Cir. Appeal Filed in Condry ERISA Suit
VILLAGE OF PUT-IN-BAY: Russo Sues Over Refusal to Pay Comp Time
VIRGINIA: Court Dismisses Hall Prisoner Suit Without Prejudice
VOLARIS: Seeks Dismissal of Ticket Refund Class Action
VULCAN MATERIALS: Sancho Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California

WELLS FARGO: Court Dismisses Negligence Claim in Chang Lawsuit
WEST VIRGINIA-AMERICAN: Court Closes Perez Class Suit
WILD DUNES: Faces Orr FMLA Suit Alleging Wrongful Termination
WIRECARD: Amended Complaint to be Filed in Securities Class Suit
WOODSTOCK, VT: 2nd Circuit Appeal Filed in Bandler Speeding Suit

YOURMECHANIC INC: Brelsford Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
ZARA USA: Magana Appeals C.D. California Ruling to Ninth Circuit
ZORE'S INC: Faces Class Action Over Excessive Towing Storage Fees
[*] Arbitration Clauses Most Effective Tool Against Class Actions
[*] Battea Class Action Services Partners with HedgeServ

[*] Cos. Force Cardholders to Give Up Rights for Stimulus Funds
[*] EU Reaches Deal on Blocwide Rules to Allow Class Actions
[*] List of Class Action Litigation Related to Covid-19
[*] Major Cos. Warn Failure to Curb Class Actions to Hurt Economy
[*] McGuireWoods Attorneys Tackle Class Action Discovery Approach

[*] The Gross Law Firm Announces Shareholders Class Actions

                            *********

ABBVIE: Judge Dismisses Antitrust Class Action
----------------------------------------------
Kevin Noonan, Esq. -- noonan@mbhb.com -- of McDonnell Boehnen
Hulbert & Berghoff LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that on
June 10th, Judge Manish S. Shah, U.S. District Court Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, dismissed (without prejudice) a
class action lawsuit against AbbVie and AbbVie Biotechnology Ltd.
by consumer groups, drug wholesalers, and unions (including the
City of Baltimore, Miami Police Department insurance trust fund,
and a Minnesota-based employee welfare benefits plan for workers in
the pipe trade industries), alleging antitrust violations under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as
corresponding state law causes of action for Alaska, California,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia, over AbbVie's blockbuster
biologic drug, Humira.

Humira (adalimumab) is the world's most valuable biologic drug,
having sales of $56 billion from 2012-2018.  Originally approved
for rheumatoid arthritis, AbbVie has since obtained FDA approval
for treatment of a variety of human autoimmune disorders (including
Crohn's disease and plaque psoriasis according to the Opinion and
Order).  Facing expiration of the patent on the adalimumab molecule
(U.S. Patent No. 6,090,382) on December 31, 2016, AbbVie embarked
on a successful campaign (247 patent applications, resulting in 132
patents, which the opinion characterizes as a .534 "batting
average") to obtain additional patents on ancillary aspects of the
technology, including formulation and manufacturing methods.
Plaintiffs alleged that because some (almost half) of these
applications (continuations of earlier-filed applications) were
filed two years after Humira was first marketed they should be
invalid as being anticipated by earlier Humira-related patents.
(Plaintiffs noted that 5 AbbVie patents were challenged by inter
partes review, with 3 being invalidated and AbbVie abandoning the
other two before judgment.  AbbVie noted that IPRs against 13 other
of its patents were unsuccessful.)  Plaintiffs also alleged
inequitable conduct in AbbVie's acquisition of some of these
patents, based on prior use of claimed manufacturing methods and
failure to disclose these uses to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.

Nevertheless, this "patent thicket" was very effective, and in 2019
several biosimilar applicants, including Amgen (Amjevita), Samsung
Bioepsis (Hadlima), and Sandoz (Hyrimoz), (as well as Mylan
(Hulio), Fresenius (Idacio), Momenta (subsequently abandoned
development), Pfizer (Abrilada), Coherus (CHS-1420), and Boehringer
(Cyltezo), non-defendants in this action), entered into an
agreement wherein AbbVie licensed them to enter the market with
their Humira biosimilars in Europe in October 2018, and in the U.S.
in January 2023.  While these dates were earlier than any likely
date for biosimilar entry even assuming all of AbbVie's patents
that could be asserted were  either found invalid, unenforceable,
or not infringed, nevertheless the class attempted through
antitrust law to get a judgment that would provide Humira
biosimilar market access even more quickly.

In dismissing the complaint under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, Judge Shah set forth Plaintiffs' allegations in a
manner consistent with the requirement that "a court must accept
all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor."  These include:

   * that AbbVie "cornered the market" on Humira (and other,
unnamed biosimilar drugs) by "anticompetitive conduct";

   * that AbbVie obtained and asserted patents "to gain the power
it needed to elbow its competitors" out of the Humira market;

   * that AbbVie then entered into agreements with those
competitors "to keep their competing drugs off the market" (and
then, paradoxically, "gave those competitors permission to market
their drugs in Europe"; unremarked is that AbbVie gave those same
competitors permission to enter the U.S. market a few years
thereafter, without having to face those dastardly and profuse
patents).

While setting forth Plaintiffs' allegations bluntly, Judge Shah's
decision was balanced in this regard; while noting in the first
line of the opinion that "Defendant AbbVie Inc. makes a lot of
money selling the prescription drug Humira," he also notes that
"AbbVie's Humira-related patents (more than a hundred) make it
difficult (if not impossible) to sell competing drugs" and that
"the Food and Drug Administration's lengthy approval process
imposes additional costs on competitors hoping to reach the
market."  And that "a third reason might be the expensive,
complicated, and contentious patent infringement litigation that
often follows on the heels of FDA approval."

The Court also noted AbbVie's actions in Europe to avoid adverse
judicial verdicts and take advantage of "a more fractured patent
system (and a type of European patent application similar to the
continuation application, known as a "divisional application") to
retain patent rights to assert against biosimilar applicants.
While not relevant to the antitrust issues before the Court,
Plaintiff made these allegations to characterize AbbVie as a "bad
actor."

Judge Shah rebuts these arguments (with additional details as set
forth below) efficiently:

Plaintiffs say that AbbVie's plan to extend its power over Humira
amounts to a scheme to violate federal and state antitrust laws.
But what plaintiffs describe is not an antitrust violation.  AbbVie
has exploited advantages conferred on it through lawful practices
and to the extent this has kept prices high for Humira, existing
antitrust doctrine does not prohibit it.  Much of AbbVie's
petitioning was protected by the Noerr–Pennington doctrine, and
plaintiffs' theory of antitrust injury is too speculative.

The Judge set forth the following reasoning in support of his legal
conclusions.  The complaint sounded in antitrust law under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, §§ 1 and 2, as well as state antitrust law
claims.  The Sherman Act Section 1 Count was asserted under a
"pay-for-delay" theory against AbbVie, AbbVie Biotechnology, and
the three biosimilar applicants (Amgen, Samsung Bioepsis, and
Sandoz).  Count 3 was also alleged against all Defendants, based on
a market allocation agreement theory under Sec. 1.  Count V
asserted Section 2 violations against AbbVie alone.  Counts II, IV,
and VI alleged state law claims on grounds analogous to the Federal
Sherman Act Counts, and Count VII against AbbVie alleged state law
unfair competition laws.

With regard to the Sherman Act Sec. 2 allegations against AbbVie,
the Court agreed with AbbVie that "there is nothing illegal about
amassing a broad portfolio of legitimate patents."  To the extent
that some of these patents turn out to be improvidently granted,
"the Noerr–Pennington doctrine immunizes them from liability."
Regarding the Section 1 allegations, the Court similarly agreed
with Defendants that these settlement agreements don't violate the
Sherman Act because "they[] allow AbbVie's competitors to enter the
market before the expiration of AbbVie's patents, do not involve
any reverse payments from AbbVie (the patentee) to Amgen, Samsung
Bioepis, and Sandoz (the alleged infringers), and only divvy up the
market in ways consistent with AbbVie's patent rights."  Finally,
the Court agreed that even if a single one of AbbVie's patents are
not invalid and infringed that would have been sufficient to keep
the biosimilar applicants from marketing Humira biosimilars until
that patent expired (a date that would have been very much later
than January 2023).  For Plaintiffs' antitrust allegations to
create liability against Defendants, Plaintiffs would need to show
that AbbVie had obtained each and every one of its patents
"unlawfully," which the Court found was unlikely, as a "but-for"
cause of Plaintiffs' alleged injury.

One basis for the Court's decision to dismiss was that Plaintiffs'
complaint comprised "a new kind of antitrust claim."  The Court's
basis for this characterization is that the Sherman § 2
allegations, which while analogous to the grounds of antitrust
liability found in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp. and to Prof'l Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. regarding the exemption from
Noerr–Pennington immunity raised by an objectively baseless
assertion of an invalid patent, Plaintiffs had disclaimed those
grounds of legal remedy.  Moreover, the Sherman § 1 allegations
were grounded in F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., despite the fact that
there had been no reverse payment from AbbVie to any of the
biosimilar applicants.  In the Court's view, "[t]he complaint
brings together a disparate set of aggressive but mostly protected
actions to allege a scheme to harm competition and maintain high
prices.  The allegations—even when considered broadly and
together for their potential to restrain trade—fall short of
alleging the kind of competitive harm remedied by antitrust law."

Turning to the specific deficiencies of each of Plaintiffs'
allegations of Sherman Act violations, the Court first plumbed the
bases of liability under Section 2 as pled by Plaintiffs.  The
opinion sets forth the elements of such a violation:  "a plaintiff
must allege '(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident'" citing
United States v. Grinnell Corp.  The opinion summarizes Plaintiffs'
argument in support of this allegation to be that "AbbVie abused
its monopoly over the U.S. market for adalimumab . . . when it
gummed up progress toward lower prices by obtaining and asserting
"swaths of invalid, unenforceable, or noninfringed patents without
regard to the patents' merits" (the "patent thicket" argument).
These allegations did not include that AbbVie had obtained its
patents by "knowing and willful fraud" nor that asserting these
patents in biosimilar litigation was objectively baseless.

The opinion recognizes the equitable basis for Plaintiffs' argument
as being "when a patentee acquires and asserts whole tracts of
questionable patents as part of a bad-faith, intentional effort to
prop up the market for an existing, expiring patented product,"
then "petitioning the government (during patent prosecutions, the
FDA approval process, and in the courts) can violate the antitrust
laws if, in reality, that petitioning is nothing more than a sham
meant to inhibit competition," citing California Motor Transport
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited for the premise that the
Noerr–Pennington doctrine does not immunize activities that are
"means or the pretext for achieving substantive evils which the
legislature has the power to control."  But the Court also
recognized that "because immunized conduct cannot be aggregated
with nonimmunized conduct without nullifying the immunity, it is
necessary to identify protected and unprotected conduct," citing
Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., and that, ultimately,
informs the Court's decision that Plaintiffs should not be
permitted to pursue their cause of action under the theories pled
in their complaint.

Specifically, a recently decided case--U.S. Futures Exch., L.L.C.
v. Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago, Inc.--held that the
objectively baseless prong of the test for vitiating
Noerr–Pennington immunity is not satisfied "merely by showing
that its competitor's purposes were to delay the plaintiff's entry
into the market," which was the basis for Plaintiffs' allegations
here.  The opinion states that "AbbVie's conduct is protected by
Noerr–Pennington (and not subject to antitrust scrutiny) unless
its petitions—its patent applications, patent dance exchanges,
and the lawsuits that followed—were objectively baseless," and
assertions of "numerous flaws" in AbbVie's patents is not enough to
amount to their assertion being objectively baseless.  Moreover,
the Court is not convinced in view of the 53.4% allowance rate,
which the Court believes "compels the conclusion, as a matter of
law, that more than half of AbbVie's patent applications were not
objectively baseless" under U.S. Futures Exch.  This conclusion is
supported by case law from other Circuits where similar success
rates led to the conclusion that assertion thereof was not
objectively baseless.  This conclusion was bolstered by AbbVie's
success before the PTAB in IPRs, where 13 of 18 challenged patents
were upheld.  And although the Court did ascertain that some of the
patent assertions made by AbbVie during the biosimilar "patent
dance" and subsequent litigation may have been objectively
baseless, "a settlement that provides substantial value to an
antitrust defendant accused of initiating that lawsuit as a sham
[which was the case here] is objectively reasonable," citing New
W., L.P. v. City of Joliet (the Court citing the benefits of the
settlements for Plaintiffs and that the settlements "required
concessions from both sides').

Taking these considerations into account, the Court concluded
that:

[T]he vast majority of the alleged scheme is immunized from
antitrust scrutiny, and what's left are a few sharp elbows thrown
at sophisticated competitors participating in regulated patent and
biologic-drug regimes.  Some of AbbVie's conduct was not immunized
by the Noerr–Pennington doctrine -- including what plaintiffs
allege to be the heart of their monopolization claim--but much of
what preceded and followed that conduct was immunized, which makes
the entirety of alleged monopolization scheme immune, because
plaintiffs' theory depends on all the components of AbbVie's
conduct as the means to suppress competition.

The Court also distinguished Plaintiffs' novel antitrust liability
theory here with cases where a court has found "a series of
allegedly sham petitions" because in this case the patent system
was involved.  Although the Court is cognizant that patenting does
not provide blanket antitrust immunity and the patent system is not
perfect, the opinion rejects using antitrust law to "launch a
collateral attack" on AbbVie's patents and related adjudicative
proceedings before the Patent Office and the district courts.

Finally, the Court failed to recognize any antitrust injury based
on Plaintiffs' Section 2 allegations because "it is not plausible
that AbbVie's nonimmunized conduct intimidated the other defendants
into delaying the launch of their biosimilars (or otherwise caused
any antitrust injury)."

Turning to the allegations based on Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the opinion sets out what is required for a well-pleaded complaint:
"[i]n order to state a claim under § 1, plaintiffs must plead
'(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a resultant
unreasonable restraint of trade in [a] relevant market; and (3) an
accompanying injury,'" citing Deppe v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, which are assessed under one of three categories of
analysis: "per se, quick-look, and rule of reason," citing Agnew v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.  The opinion quickly rejects a per
se analysis because the agreements are not "facially
anticompetitive" (not involving price-setting or the quantity of
Humira each defendant could sell), and the Court notes that even
frank "pay-for-delay" agreements are not per se anticompetitive
under FTC v. Actavis.

Regarding Plaintiffs' market allocation argument (wherein Europe
and the U.S. comprise the allocated markets), the Court once again
considers the influence of patents, which permit the patentee to
selectively license in different territories, citing Dunlop Co. v.
Kelsey-Haynes Co.  And the Court notes that per se analysis is
disfavored when a Court considers novel antitrust liability
theories as pled by Plaintiffs.

The Court also rejects the "quick look" analysis, based on whether
"an observer with a rudimentary understanding of economics would
[]conclude that the agreements have an anticompetitive effect,"
citing California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C.  "Even if the rudimentary
economist is informed that most of the patents are likely invalid
and uninfringed and being asserted without regard to their
validity, there are still legitimate, procompetitive justifications
for the agreements that require full rule of reason analysis (for
instance, the agreements provide certainty to both parties and
avoid further litigation costs)" according to the opinion.

Thus the Court concludes that the "rule of reason" approach is the
best analytical tool, consistent with FTC v. Actavis for
pay-for-delay or reverse payment settlements.  However, using this
analysis the Court found that the settlements here fit into the
"important exception" to antitrust liability in settlement
agreements: "[p]arties remain free to settle on other terms—for
example, 'by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the
patentee's market prior to the patent's expiration, without the
patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.'"
And the Court notes an important distinction with FTC v. Actavis:
there, under the 180-day exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act the patent holder and the first-to-file generic drug maker
shared market exclusivity.  Here, in contrast, not just Amgen but
all the other settling defendants were able to enter the market
competitively.  Accordingly, "the package of global patent
settlements were not an Actavis-like unlawful reverse-payment" and
the differential market entry dates between Europe and the U.S. are
permissible under Actavis.  On this motion to dismiss, the Court
asked "whether the complaint alleges a patent settlement that has
Actavis-like anticompetitive features and that warrants further
scrutiny under the rule of reason," deciding that it did not.

Finally the Court considered whether the complaint asserts facts
amounting to antitrust injury, concluding that it does not.  There
is "no hard-and-fast rule" against deciding the antitrust injury
question on the pleadings, according to the opinion, but
"[d]ismissal is appropriate if the claim 'rests at bottom on some
abstract conception or speculative measure of harm,'" citing
Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters.  The antitrust injury here is "monopoly
pricing" under two allegations: first, that "if the biosimilar
manufacturers had pursued the underlying infringement suits, they
could have prevailed and, by invalidating the patents that were
preventing them from entering the market, entered the market even
sooner than they are now able to under their settlement agreements,
driving prices down."  Second, if AbbVie had limited assertion of
its patents to those not invalid and infringed, the biosimilar
applicants would have been able to negotiate more favorable
settlement terms.  The Court found these allegations of "what might
have happened in the underlying infringement litigation [to be] too
speculative and would require legal and factual determinations that
go beyond judicially manageable limits," citing Associated Gen.
Contractors of California.  These allegations describe "a world
where [this] might have happened" but what is conceivable "falls
short of plausible" which is required for establishing antitrust
injury at the pleadings stage.  "[I]t only takes one valid,
infringed patent to render all the rest—whether invalid,
infringed, or not—irrelevant for purposes of cause-in-fact
analysis," according to the opinion. And further, "[i]f the reason
the biosimilar manufacturers could not make it to market was that
AbbVie had a patent that prevented them from doing so, it was the
patent—and not AbbVie's other conduct -- that was the but -- for
cause of the monopoly prices."

The Court finds Plaintiffs' allegations of patent invalidity to be
inadequate because AbbVie needed to be able to assert but one not
invalid, infringed patent to avoid antitrust liability.  The Court
also considered the temporal aspects affecting competition, because
"litigation takes time" and for "complex patent portfolios, it can
take a lot of time."  And the timing of litigation between AbbVie
and the different biosimilar applicants was not consistent with
(and is frankly speculative about) earlier market entry than
January 2023 under the settlement agreements that Plaintiffs'
allege are anticompetitive.

The Court concludes this section of its opinion by stating:

Antitrust injury is a prerequisite for all of plaintiffs' federal
antitrust claims against not only AbbVie but also defendants Amgen,
Samsung Bioepis, and Sandoz.  Because plaintiffs have failed to
plausibly allege that the but-for cause of Humira's monopoly prices
was the biosimilar manufacturers' failure to pursue infringement
litigation to its conclusion, AbbVie's unlawful assertion of its
patent thicket, or the biosimilar manufacturers' failure to use the
leverage that they apparently didn't know they had to reach an
agreement to enter the market sooner than they did, all of the
federal antitrust claims in the complaint fail.

The Court then applied the same reasoning to the state law-based
Counts and found them similarly lacking, based on the parties'
acquiescence that if the Federal law claims are dismissed the state
law claims should be as well.  And finally, the Court dismissed
Count VII as to "unconscionable and unfair" conduct for failure to
give adequate notice of the claim absent the antitrust allegations
that the Court considered inadequate.

The interplay between patent law and antitrust law is complex (see,
e.g., Antitrust Issues in Intellectual Property Law).  There has
been a great deal of angst and upset regarding the Court's decision
to dismiss, based on a concern that dismissal puts the Court's
imprimatur on AbbVie's strategic behavior (no matter what one may
think about it), and that this will chill biosimilar entry.  These
sentiments, while perhaps understandable, ignore the outcome:  more
than half a dozen biosimilar applicants will bring their biosimilar
Humira to market many years earlier than would have happened had
the parties engaged in multiple litigations over multiple rounds of
the patent dance as provided by the statute.  What Judge Shah's
decision means is that antitrust law has established standards in
the pharmaceutical context for what constitutes antitrust behavior
that can be applied without resource, as here, to novel theories of
antitrust liability.  By dismissing without prejudice the Court has
given the Plaintiffs an opportunity to bring their case according
to these standards.  Whether doing so will promote the cause and
goals of bringing biosimilar drugs to market more quickly is less
certain. [GN]


ACELL INC: Frazier Suit Removed From Cir. Court to W.D. Missouri
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as BARBARA FRAZIER, on behalf of
herself and all persons similarly situated v. ACELL, INC., Case No.
20CY-CV04518 (Filed May 19, 2020), was removed from the Missouri
Circuit Court, Clay County, to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Missouri on June 26, 2020.

The Western District of Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:20-cv-00518-FJG to the proceeding.

The damages sought in the Petition include medical bills and
expenses, lost income, lost time and disruption of daily
activities, compensatory value of physical disability or
disfigurement, pain and suffering and emotional distress,
attorneys' fees, punitive damages and litigation costs.

Acell is a regenerative medicine company. The Company focuses on
the development, manufacturing, and commercialization of medical
devices for wound management and surgical soft tissue repair.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Craig R. Klotz, Esq.
          CHILDRESS AHLHEIM CARY LLC
          1010 Market Street, Suite 500
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: 314-621-9800
          Facsimile: 314-621-9802
          E-mail: cklotz@jchildresslaw.com


ACER THERAPEUTICS: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Fraud Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On June 16, 2020, Judge Gregory H. Woods of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part a motion to dismiss a putative securities
fraud class action asserting violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 against a
biotech company (the "Company") as well as certain of its officers
(collectively, "Defendants"). Skiadas v. Acer Therapeutics Inc. et
al., Civ. No. 1:19-cv-6137, 2020 WL 3268495 (S.D.N.Y. June 16,
2020). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants falsely stated that the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") agreed that it would approve
the Company's New Drug Application for EDSIVO, a drug for the
treatment of Vascular Ehlers-Danolos Syndrome ("vEDS"), a rare
genetic connective tissue disorder. The Court denied Defendants'
motion to dismiss as to most of the alleged misstatements, because
plaintiffs adequately alleged falsity and scienter.

No drug has been approved in the United States or internationally
for the treatment of vEDS, but doctors prescribe "beta-blockers"
off-label to manage the disease. Around 2013, the Company began
seeking the FDA's approval of a beta-blocker for the treatment of
vEDS under the brand-name EDSIVO. If approved, EDSIVO would qualify
for Orphan Drug Exclusivity in the United States, enabling the
Company to charge significantly more for the drug than the low-cost
generic beta-blockers currently prescribed to vEDS patients in the
United States. In December 2017 and 2018, the Company performed two
secondary offerings. In the 2017 and 2018 offering documents, the
Company stated that it met with the FDA regarding EDSIVO and the
Company's forthcoming New Drug Application. Significantly, while
the 2017 offering documents stated that the FDA "agreed" that
"additional clinical development" was "not needed," the 2018
offering documents indicated that the FDA "agreed" that "an
additional clinical trial" was "not likely needed." Ultimately, in
June 2019, the FDA rejected the New Drug Application for EDSIVO on
the ground that a clinical trial was necessary to support existing
clinical data on the drug's efficacy for vEDS patients. Plaintiffs
alleged that these statements about the FDA meeting misrepresented
what the FDA had "agreed" to.

First, the Court held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that
statements regarding the meeting with the FDA were false or
misleading. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' statements created
the impression that the FDA "agreed" that it would approve the New
Drug Application and that no further clinical testing was required,
whereas Defendants argued that these statements merely conveyed
that the FDA "agreed" that the Company could submit its New Drug
Application for approval. The Court concluded that the Company's
statements were ambiguous and held that alleged misstatements that
are ambiguous should be construed in favor of plaintiff at the
motion to dismiss stage, without prejudice to revisiting that
conclusion later on summary judgment or trial. The Court found that
plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged how other alleged
statements that the FDA provided the Company with "guidance" on how
to present its clinical data were false or misleading and dismissed
claims based on those statements.

Second, the Court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged scienter.
The Court found it significant that the 2017 statement that the FDA
agreed that "additional clinical development is not needed" was
unqualified whereas the 2018 statement was "hedged" by the phrase
"likely." The Court concluded that the Company's decision to "alter
the wording of their public statements suggests that the first
statement was inaccurate." Finally, the Court rejected Defendants'
argument that the absence of stock sales by the Company's insiders
was inconsistent with an intent to defraud. The Court acknowledged
that this often is true, but observed that in cases where the
Company's survival depends on additional fundraising, officers and
senior executives have "an incentive to bet the farm in a reckless
gamble because the alternative is certain failure." Combined with
the other factual allegations in the complaint, the Court held that
scienter was alleged sufficiently. [GN]


ACTIVAR INC: Gomez Suit Moved From Super. Ct. to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as DANIEL GOMEZ, individually,
and on behalf of all other similarly situated v. ACTIVAR INC., a
Minnesota corporation; ACTIVAR CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS GROUP, INC., a
Minnesota corporation, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case No.
20STCV18752 (Filed May 14, 2020), was removed from the California
Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on June 25, 2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-05693 to the proceeding.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the California Labor Code for
failure to pay wages, including overtime pay.

Activar manufactures products for the commercial construction
industry.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Wendy Sugg, Esq.
          SUGG & PARACUELLOS, LLP
          384 Forest Avenue, Suite 15
          Laguna Beach, CA 92651
          Telephone: (949) 260-9548
          E-mail: wendy@sugglaw.com

               - and -

          Charles G. Frohman, Esq.
          Mary Heath, Esq.
          MASLON LLP
          3300 Wells Fargo Center
          90 South Seventh Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402-4140
          Telephone: (612) 672-8200
          Facsimile: (612) 642-8397
          E-mail: charles.frohman@maslon.com
                  mary.heath@maslon.com


ACTS-AVIATION SECURITY: Abrams Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as ASHLEY ABRAMS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. ACTS-AVIATION
SECURITY, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1-20, inclusive, Case No.
20STCV18399 (Filed May 12, 2020), was removed from the Superior
Court of California, County of Los Angeles, to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California on June 26, 2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-05719 to the proceeding.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the California Labor Code arising
from the Defendants' failure to pay minimum wages, overtime wages,
and meal period and rest period premiums.

ACTS-Aviation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the international
security company ICTS Europe and specializes in the provision of
security solutions.[BN]

The Defendant ACTS-Aviation is represented by:

          Timothy M. Freudenberger, Esq.
          Nancy N. ("Niki") Lubrano, Esq.
          Brian E. Cole II, Esq.
          CAROTHERS DISANTE & FREUDENBERGER LLP
          18300 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800
          Irvine, CA 92612
          Telephone: (949) 622-1661
          E-mail: tfreud@cdflaborlaw.com
                  nlubrano@cdflaborlaw.com
                  bcole@cdflaborlaw.com


ADIENT PLC: Court Closes Securities Suit
----------------------------------------
Judge Ronnie Abrams of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint in IN RE ADIENT
PLC SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 18 CIVIL 9116 (RA) (S.D. N.Y.)
for the reasons stated in the Court's Opinion and Order dated April
2, 2020.  The case is accordingly closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 7, 2020 Judgment is available
at https://is.gd/T800S6 from Leagle.com.


ALASKA USA: Court Refuses to Compel Arbitration in Coleman Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the case captioned
CHRISTINE COLEMAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ALASKA USA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant.
No. 3:19-cv-0229-HRH. (D. Alaska)

Plaintiff Christine Coleman alleges that in November 2018, she
attempted a small payment to Safeway in the amount of $61.57.
Plaintiff alleges that Alaska USA rejected payment of that item due
to insufficient funds in plaintiff's account and charged her a $25
NSF Fee for doing so.  In August 2019, Plaintiff commenced the
action on behalf of herself and others similarly situated.
Plaintiff asserts breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and
Unfair Trade Practices Act claims on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated.

Defendant moves to compel plaintiff to arbitrate her individual
claims.

Defendant argues that the parties had a valid arbitration agreement
via an "Account Agreement" for individual accounts and that there
can be no dispute that plaintiff's claims fall within the scope of
that agreement.  Plaintiff, however, disputes whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists.

Defendant argues that it is for the arbitrator, and not the court,
to decide whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.

The Court notes that "[w]hile the validity of an arbitration clause
can be a question for the arbitrator where the 'crux of the
complaint is that the contract as a whole, (including its
arbitration provision) is invalid, the court determines the
validity of the clause where the challenge is specifically to the
validity of the agreement to arbitrate."  Bridge Fund Capital Corp.
v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444
(2006)).

Defendant argues that the evidence before the court shows that it
could change the terms and conditions of accounts "from time to
time" without "member approval[,]", which is what it did in
February 2019 when it added the arbitration provision to the
Account Agreement.

Defendant is correct that the Account Agreement provided that
defendant could make changes without member approval. However, the
Account Agreement also provided that defendant was required to
provide prior notice of any changes "that would adversely affect"
its members.  And, plaintiff argues that the addition of an
arbitration provision in the Account Agreement was an adverse
change that would require prior notice.

Defendant is correct that the Account Agreement provided that
defendant could make changes without member approval. However, the
Account Agreement also provided that defendant was required to
provide prior notice of any changes that would adversely affect its
members. And, plaintiff argues that the addition of an arbitration
provision in the Account Agreement was an adverse change that would
require prior notice.

The Court says, "Here, defendant's pop notice made no mention of
the specific changes being made to the Account Agreement.  The
notice failed to describe the update or call attention to the new
arbitration provision.  Such notice is insufficient to put a member
on inquiry notice that an arbitration agreement was being added to
its contract with defendant.  Requiring such notice is not an
arbitration-specific rule that would be preempted by the FAA, as
defendant argues. It is a necessary requirement for a binding
contract."

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration.

A full-text copy of the District Court's January 2020 Order is
available at   https://tinyurl.com/v2gb8qg  Leagle.com

Christine Coleman, on behlalf of herself and all others similiarly
situated, Plaintiff, represented by Daniel Ian Pace , Pace Law
Offices, 101 E 9th Avenue, Suite 7A Anchorage, AK, 99501, Jeffrey
M. Ostrow - ostrow@kolawyers.com - Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson
Weiselberg Gilbert, pro hac vice, Daniel Tropin , Kopelowitz Ostrow
Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, One West Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 pro hac vice & Jonathan Streisfeld ,
Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert, One West Las Olas
Blvd., Suite 500 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301, pro hac vice.

Alaska USA Federal Credit Union, Defendant, represented by Kevin M.
Cuddy - kevin.cuddy@stoel.com - Stoel Rives LLP, Andrew John Demko
- andrew.demko@kattenlaw.com - Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac
vice & Stuart Matthew Richter - stuart.richter@kattenlaw.com -
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, pro hac vice.


ALASKA USA: District of Alaska Narrows Claims in Coleman Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINE COLEMAN, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALASKA USA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-0229-HRH (D. Alaska), Judge H. Russell
Holland of the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska
granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

Plaintiff Coleman has a checking account with the Defendant.  She
alleges that on Nov. 15, 2018, she attempted a small payment to
Safeway in the amount of $61.57.  That was apparently an Automated
Clearing House ("ACH") transaction.  ACH transactions are
electronic payments made from one bank account to another and
involve one party providing their account number and routing
number.  Common ACH transactions include online bill pay.

The Plaintiff alleges that "Alaska USA rejected" the Safeway
payment due to insufficient funds in her account and charged her a
$25 NSF Fee for doing so.  She does not dispute the initial fee, as
it is allowed by Alaska USA's Account Documents.  She alleges
however that without her knowledge and not at her request, 11 days
later, on Nov. 26, 2018, Alaska USA processed the same item yet
again, and again rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds
and charged her another $25 NSF Fee.  The Plaintiff alleges that
she was thus charged $50 in NSF Fees in an attempt to process a
single payment.  She Plaintiff alleges that it breached her
agreement with Defendant because Alaska USA's Account Documents
state that it will charge $25 per item that is returned due to
insufficient funds.

The Plaintiff commenced the putative class action on Aug. 21, 2019.
She asserts breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and Alaska Unfair
Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") claims against the Defendant.

The Defendant now moves to dismiss all of the Plaintiff's claims.
First the Defendant argues that she has not stated a plausible
breach of contract claim because there has been no breach of the
contract.  Judge Holland holds that the Account Agreement may be
ambiguous, thereby making the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim
plausible.  The Plaintiff cites to a number of cases in which the
courts found the contract language at issue to be ambiguous.  Given
that other courts have found similar contractual language to be
both unambiguous and ambiguous, the case law provides little
guidance to this court on a motion to dismiss.  The Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is
denied.

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's bad faith claim is
implausible because it did not breach its agreement with her by
charging her two NSF fees.  In short, it argues that the
Plaintiff's bad faith claim fails if her breach of contract claim
fails.  As he discussed, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's
breach of contract claim is plausible.  Accordingly, her breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is also
plausible.  The Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim
is denied.

The Plaintiff brings her unjust enrichment claim in the alternative
and concedes that the claim cannot survive if her contractual
claims succeed.  Given that there is no dispute that the Account
Agreement is a valid, enforceable contract, the Plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim is not plausible.  The Defendant's motion to
dismiss her unjust enrichment claim is granted.  The Plaintiff is
not given leave to amend as to her unjust enrichment claim because
amendment would be futile.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant engaged in an unfair or
deceptive act or practice when it misrepresented and/or omitted in
the account documents its true NSF Fee practices and breached the
express terms of the account documents.  It is a conclusory
allegation that appears to be nothing more than a run-of-the-mill
breach of contract claim.  As currently pled, the Plaintiff's
complaint does not state a plausible UTPA claim.  The Defendant's
motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's UTPA claim is granted.  She is,
however, given leave to amend as to her UTPA claim as it is
possible that she could state a plausible UTPA claim.

Finally, to the extent that the Plaintiff's state law claims are
based on a failure to disclose, the Defendant argues that these
claims are expressly preempted by federal law.  The Jduge need not
consider this argument, however, because the Plaintiff's claims are
not based on a failure to disclose.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Holland granted in part and denied in
part the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  It is denied as to the
Plaintiff's breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing claims.  It is granted as to her
unjust enrichment and UTPA claims. These claims are dismissed.  The
Plaintiff is not given leave to amend her unjust enrichment claim
but is given leave to amend her UTPA claim.  Should she elect to
file an amended complaint, that complaint will be filed by May 14,
2020.

Judge Holland adds one final note that it has some qualms about
whether it has jurisdiction of the case.  The Plaintiff has alleged
that the Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  CAFA confers original jurisdiction
to the district courts of any civil action in which the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5 million, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is a class action in which -- any member of
the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant.  The class also must have at least 100 members.  The
Judge has some concerns as to whether the amount in controversy
could be met, but assumes for now that it has been since the
Defendant, which is in the best position to know the amount in
controversy, has not challenged the Court's jurisdiction.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/RmKHex from Leagle.com.


ALERE HOME: Settlement in Arcare Suit Gets Final Court Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARCARE, INC., On Behalf of Itself and All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. ALERE HOME MONITORING, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 4:17-cv-00147-KGB (E.D. Ark.), Judge Kristine
G. Baker of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, Central Division, granted the motion for final approval
of class action settlement.

Previously, the Court entered an order preliminarily approving
class action Settlement.  The Court provisionally certified the
following class: Subscribers of facsimile telephone numbers to
which there was a successful transmission of one or more facsimiles
by or on behalf of any of the Released Parties from Jan. 1, 2013,
through Nov. 1, 2019, that related in any way to the business of
AHM, and/or any products, goods, or services offered by AHM.  It
also approved the forms of notice of the Settlement to the
Settlement Class Members, directed that notice of the Settlement be
given to the Settlement Class Members, and scheduled a hearing on
final approval.

In accordance with the Settlement Agreement and the Preliminary
Approval Order, the Settlement Class Counsel caused the Notice to
be disseminated as directed by the Court, giving the best notice
practicable under the circumstances.  

At the final approval hearing, Judge Baker adopted and reaffirmed
the findings and conclusions set forth in the Preliminary Approval
Order.

The Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the
best interests of the Class, and is approved in all respects.  The
Judge directed the Parties and their counsel to effectuate the
Settlement according to its terms.

The Settlement Agreement provides for monetary benefits to
Settlement Class Members Eligible for Cash Payment.  The Judge
approved those benefits and approved the distribution plan for the
Settlement Fund as provided in the Settlement Agreement,
specifically reserving to the Court only any determination that may
be necessary regarding a cy pres award.

The five Settlement Class Members, identified by the Settlement
Administrator, who have timely and validly excluded themselves from
the Settlement Class are excluded from the Settlement.  The
Settlement Class Members who have not excluded themselves will be
bound by the Settlement and the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

The Lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice, and each side will bear
his, her, or its own fees and costs.

The Order is final and appealable, and it will constitute a final
judgment for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/falRln from Leagle.com.


ALLTRAN FINANCIAL: Von Asten Files Placeholder Class Cert. Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as TERRY VON ASTEN, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v. ALLTRAN
FINANCIAL, LP, Case No. 2:20-cv-01020-JPS (E.D. Wisc.), the
Plaintiff filed a "placeholder" motion for class certification in
order to prevent against a "buy-off" attempt, a tactic class-action
defendants sometimes use to attempt to prevent a case from
proceeding to a decision on class certification by attempting to
"moot" the named plaintiff's claims by tendering the plaintiff
individual (but not classwide) relief.

The Plaintiff asks the Court for an order to certify class, appoint
her as the class representative, and appoint her attorneys as class
counsel.

In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016), the
Supreme Court held "an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of
judgment does not moot a plaintiff's case," and "a would-be class
representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair
opportunity to show that certification is warranted." The Sixth
Circuit applied Campbell-Ewald in an unreported opinion in Family
Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. MD On-Line Sols., Inc., No. 15-3508,
2016 WL 384823, at (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2016).

In Wilson v. Gordon, F.3d 934, 949-50 (6th Cir. 2016), the Sixth
Circuit held that, even where "[the parties [did] not dispute that
all eleven named plaintiffs' individual claims became moot before
the district court certified the class," the "picking-off"
exception applied and allowed the named plaintiffs with moot
individual claims to pursue class certification, which would
"relate back" to the filing of the complaint, applying Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). The Sixth
Circuit held this ruling was consistent with Campbell-Ewald, 136 S.
Ct. at 672, which refused to put defendants "in the driver's seat"
on class certification.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John D. Blythin, Esq.
          Mark A. Eldridge, Esq.
          Jesse Fruchter, Esq.
          Ben J. Slatky, Esq.
          3620 East Layton Avenue
          Cudahy, WI 53110
          Telephone: (414) 482-8000
          Facsimile: (414) 482-8001
          E-mail: jblythin@ademilaw.com
                  meldridge@ademilaw.com
                  jfruchter@ademilaw.com
                  bslatky@ademilaw.com

ALLY BANK: Court Dismisses Second Amended Chinitz Complaint
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RONALD E. CHINITZ, individually, and on behalf of
similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff, v. ALLY BANK, and DOES
1-50, Defendants, Case No. 2:19-cv-00059 (D. Utah), Magistrate
Judge Dustin B. Pead of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Utah granted the Ally's Motion to Dismiss Chinitz's Second Amended
Complaint.

The putative class action concerns a dispute about the way
Defendant Ally Bank pays interest on funds transferred to Ally's
customers' accounts via standard ACH transfer.  Specifically,
Plaintiff Chinitz alleges Ally wrongfully fails to pay interest on
funds it receives via ACH transfer beginning on the day Ally
receives those funds.

Ally is an internet-only bank that allows customers to transfer
money in and out of their Ally accounts using the Automated
Clearing House ("ACH") Network.  The ACH Network is used to
transfer money and information from one bank account to another.

Chinitz opened an interest-bearing online savings account with Ally
in July 2017.  His online savings account is subject to Ally's
Deposit Agreement and Disclosures ("DAD").  Relevant to theMotion
are the DAD's provisions regarding ACH transfers and interest.

On July 18, 2017, Chinitz initiated a standard ACH transfer from
his external account to his Ally account in the amount of $800.
Ally withdrew the $800 from Chinitz's external account on July 19.
It received the funds no later than July 20, but did not deliver
Chinitz's $800 deposit to his account or start paying interest on
the deposit until July 21.

Chinitz initiated another standard ACH transfer on Aug. 18, 2017,
directing Ally to deposit $1,000 into his online savings account
from an external account.  Ally withdrew the sum from Chinitz's
external account on August 21.  It received the funds no later than
August 22, but did not deliver the funds to Chinitz's account or
start paying interest until August 23.

Believing Ally improperly withheld his interest payments, Chinitz
filed a Complaint in United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on behalf of himself and a putative class.
At Ally's request, the Northern District of California transferred
the case to Utah.

The Court previously dismissed Chinitz's First Amended Complaint on
May 7, 2019.   On June 21, 2019, Chinitz filed his Second Amended
Complaint.  And on July 18, 2019, Ally filed a Motion to Dismiss,
arguing Chinitz's Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

Chinitz brings three causes of action against Ally: (1) conversion;
(2) fraud; and (3) unjust enrichment.  The court will address each
in turn.  For his first cause of action, Chinitz alleges that Ally
willfully and intentionally interfered with his and the Class
Members' right to have interest accrue on money transferred to
their Ally accounts via standard ACH transfers starting from the
day Ally received that money from external financial institutions.

Judge Pead concludes the SAC fails to state a claim for conversion
under Utah law because the SAC alleges neither wrongful receipt of
money by Ally nor misappropriation of funds transferred to Ally.
The SAC does not contain any allegations suggesting Ally
"wrongfully received" any money as a result of Chinitz's
transactions with Ally.  The SAC does not allege Ally's receipt of
Chinitz's inbound transfer was wrongful.  Nor does the SAC allege a
misappropriation of funds placed in the custody of another for a
definite application.  The SAC does not allege Ally misused the
funds Chinitz transferred to his Ally account.

Additionally, Ally also argues Chinitz's conversion claim is barred
by the economic loss rule.  The Judge agrees.  TISA does not
provide a private right of action for violations of the statute.
Instead, enforcement of TISA is left to administrative agencies.
Therefore, Judge Pead concludes that, under Utah law, TISA does not
create an independent duty to pay interest on the day funds are
received for purposes of avoiding the economic loss rule.
Accordingly, Chinitz's conversion claim is barred by the economic
loss rule.

Chinitz's next cause of action is one for fraud.  Specifically,
Chinitz alleges Section I.D.4.d of the DAD, which states "For
Inbound Transfers originated at Ally, the funds are generally
available in your Ally account when they are received," is a false
disclosure that Ally made for the purpose of inducing Chinitz to
open and maintain an online savings account with Ally.

Judge Pead holds that the fact that Chinitz opened an Ally account
and initiated transfers into that account does not demonstrate that
Chinitz in fact relied on Ally's alleged misrepresentation in doing
so.  Indeed, there is any number of reasons why Chinitz might have
opened his Ally account and initiated transfers into that account.
Perhaps Chinitz did so because he sought the convenience of an
online bank account that he could access from anywhere.  Or perhaps
Chinitz had heard good things about Ally from his friends and that
is what motivated his decisionmaking.  Put simply, the SAC fails to
allege any causal link between Ally's alleged misrepresentation and
the actions Chinitz took.  Therefore, Chinitz has failed to
adequately allege that he took any action in actual reliance on
Ally's alleged misrepresentation.  Accordingly, Chinitz's fraud
claim fails under Utah law.

Chinitz's third and final claim is one for unjust enrichment.
Specifically, Chinitz alleges he conferred a benefit upon Ally when
he transferred funds to Ally and Ally enjoyed the use of those
funds without payment of interest for one day, and that it would be
unjust for Ally to retain this benefit without paying Chinitz the
value of the one day of interest.

Judge Pead holds that Chinitz fails to clear the initial hurdle of
establishing certain provisions of the DAD could be unenforceable
under Utah law.  The SAC states in conclusory fashion that certain
provisions of the DAD are "illegal and unenforceable" and
"unenforceable on grounds of public policy."  But legal conclusions
are not entitled to any weight or "assumption of truth" in a Rule
12(b)(6) analysis.  And the SAC does not allege facts from which
the court could determine whether Chinitz's legal conclusions are
correct under Utah law.  In other words, the SAC contains no
allegations related to the two-factor test Utah courts use to
determine whether provisions of the DAD are unenforceable.  Nor
does Chinitz expound upon this legal question in his SAC or
Opposition.

Therefore, the Judge is unable to apply the two-factor test to
determine whether certain provisions of the DAD are unenforceable
under Utah law.  As a result, the Judge is left with nothing but
conclusory allegations regarding the unenforceability of the DAD.
And, "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments
are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based."

In the absence of sufficient factual allegations -- and legal
argument -- to support Chinitz's assertion that provisions of the
DAD relating to payment of interest are unenforceable, the court is
left with an enforceable contract that expressly covers the subject
matter of this litigation.  Therefore, Chinitz's unjust enrichment
claim must be dismissed.

In sum, Judge Pead grants Ally's Motion.  Chinitz's Second Amended
Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Memorandum
Decision & Order is available at https://is.gd/vfKnyV from
Leagle.com.


ALTA NEWPORT: Cal. Central Dist. Narrows Claims in Holly Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SALLIE HOLLY, Plaintiff, v. ALTA NEWPORT HOSPITAL,
INC. DBA FOOTHILL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 2:19-cv-07496-ODW (MRWx) (C.D. Cal.), Judge Otis D. Wright, II
of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Sallie Holly's First Amended Complaint and Strike
Class Allegations.

On Oct. 18, 2019, Plaintiff Holly filed her First Amended Complaint
("FAC").  Holly's claims against Defendants Alta Newport Hospital,
Alta Hospital Systems, LLC ("AHS"), and Prospect Medical Holdings,
Inc. stem from allegations that a Hospital employee inadvertently
posted photographs of Holly's personal medical information on the
employee's public Facebook account.

Holly received medical care at Hospital in March 2017 and, as part
of that process, she provided her medical and personal information
to Hospital.  In September 2017, AHS sent Holly a letter informing
her that Hospital discovered an inappropriate disclosure of Holly's
protected health information.  AHS explained that, on Aug. 24,
2017, a new employee was training on a software program, viewing
medical records on a computer.  The employee took six photographs
of those medical records on her personal cellular telephone, some
of which were Holly's medical records.  The employee then
accidentally posted the photographs on her public Facebook account.
The next day, a physician notified Hospital's management about the
photographs being posted.  The information in the posted medical
records included Holly's name, date of birth, account number, and
other diagnostic and treatment information.  After receiving the
letter, both Holly and her counsel contacted Defendants to seek
remediation but received no response.

Based on these allegations, Holly asserts eight causes of action
against the Defendants: (1) public disclosure of private facts
(invasion of privacy); (2) negligent disclosure; (3) negligent
training; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of fiduciary medical
information by providers); (7) violation of 42 U.S.C. Section
1320d-2 (wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health
information); and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress.


Holly brings her claims on behalf of a class of similarly situated
persons defined as: All persons who have been patients of the
Defendants whose personal data has been published without their
permission on the Internet during the Data Breach that occurred
from at least Aug. 24, 2017 to Sept. 5, 2017 including all persons
who were sent the Sept. 5, 2017 letter informing them of the Data
Breach.

The matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Sallie Holly's First Amended Complaint and strike
class allegations.  The Defendants argue Holly's claims against AHS
and Prospect ("Non-Hospital Defendants") fail because Holly does
not allege facts sufficient to support liability because the claims
are barred by the statute of limitations of the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA"), and second, because Holly fails
to allege any non-speculative damages, which the Defendants argue
is necessary to her negligence, contract, and fiduciary-based
claims.

Judge Wright finds that Holly fails to establish an alter ego or
agency relationship between Non-Hospital Defendants and Hospital.
Holly must first allege sufficient facts to satisfy Rule 8.  As
Holly's claims against Non-Hospital Defendants fail for this
reason, the Judge does not address the Defendants' other arguments
for dismissal of these claims.  Accordingly, he grans the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Holly's claims against the
Non-Hospital Defendants.

Next, the Judge finds that although the duty to maintain private
health information is one owed only to patients rather than the
general public, the alleged negligence that led to the public
disclosure of Holly's private health information occurred after the
completion of her medical treatment.  It was thus not a predicate
to her receiving medical care and therefore did not occur in the
rendering of professional services for purposes of MICRA.
Moreover, the Defendant does not provide a single case that has
held the public disclosure of private health information falls
under MICRA and the Court has found none.  Accordingly, MICRA's
one-year statute of limitations does not apply to Holly's claims
against Hospital, and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on that
ground is denied.

Because Holly's conclusory and vague allegations are insufficient
to establish that she suffered actual damages as a result of the
data breach, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Holly's breach of
contract and negligence claims is granted.  However, as a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty may be sustained on nominal damages, the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Holly's breach of fiduciary duty
claim is denied.

Finally, turning to the Defendants' Motion to Strike, the Judge
finds that Holly fails to allege any facts in the FAC to support
numerosity.  Holly's implicit suggestion that the six photographs
may have contained the medical records of other individuals does
not establish numerosity on its own.  Moreover, the claims that
Holly makes about the alleged numerosity of the class in her
Opposition are absent from the FAC.  Accordingly, the Defendants'
Motion to Strike is grantedD with leave to amend the class
allegations.

For these reasons, Judge Wright granted the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Holly's claims against Non-Hospital Defendants and Holly's
negligence and breach of contract claims against Hospital with
leave to amend.  The Judge granted leave to amend the FAC because
it is unclear whether amendment would be futile.  The Judge denied
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all of Holly's claims against
Hospital under MICRA and Holly's breach of fiduciary duty claim
against Hospital.  The Judge granted the Defendants' Motion to
Strike Holly's class allegations with leave to amend.  Holly may
file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies identified.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/7eMG6H from Leagle.com.


AMERICA SAVINGS: Moskowitz Appeals D. Hawaii Ruling to Ninth Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Craig Moskowitz filed an appeal from a court ruling
issued in his lawsuit entitled Craig Moskowitz v. American Savings
Bank, F.S.B., Case No. 1:17-cv-00299-HG-RT, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Hawaii, Honolulu.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
brought over alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA).

The appellate case is captioned as Craig Moskowitz v. American
Savings Bank, F.S.B., Case No. 20-15024, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CRAIG MOSKOWITZ, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Aytan Y. Bellin, Esq.
          BELLIN & ASSOCIATES LLC
          85 Miles Avenue
          White Plains, NY 10606
          Telephone: (914) 358-5345
          E-mail: aytan.bellin@bellinlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK, F.S.B. is represented
by:

          Steven D. Allison, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
          5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400
          Irvine, CA 92614-2545
          Telephone: (949) 622-2700
          E-mail: steven.allison@troutman.com

               - and -

          Kevin W. Herring, Esq.
          ASHFORD & WRISTON LLP
          1099 Alakea Street
          Honolulu, HI 96813
          Telephone: (808) 539-0400
          E-mail: kherring@awlaw.com

               - and -

          Robin L. McGrath, Esq.
          DUANE MORRIS LLP
          1075 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 2000
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 253-6900
          E-mail: rlmcgrath@duanemorris.com


AMERIHEALTH CARITAS: $4.25MM Settlement in Wood Gets Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANN WOOD and MICHAELENE BARKER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. AMERIHEALTH
CARITAS SERVICES, LLC, Defendant. BRENDA HEPP and TARA HARDY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. AMERIHEALTH CARITAS SERVICES, LLC, Defendant, Civil
Action Nos. 17-3697, 19-2194 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Gerald J. Pappert of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of a $4.25
million gross settlement, an award of reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs, and service awards for Named Plaintiffs and certain FLSA
Opt-In Plaintiffs.

The Defendant is a managed care organization operating in multiple
states.  The Plaintiffs and the similarly situated individuals they
represent are current and former Clinical Care Reviewers and
Clinical Care Reviewer Senior for the Defendant.  Named Plaintiff
Wood has been a Clinical Care Reviewer for the Defendant in
Pennsylvania since November 2012.  Named Plaintiff Barker worked
for the Defendant as a Clinical Care Reviewer in Iowa from August
2017 to October 2017.

On Nov. 12, 2019, the Court consolidated for settlement purposes
Wood and Barker's action with a related action filed by Brenda Hepp
and Tara Hardy -- Hepp v. Amerihealth Caritas Services, LLC (E.D.
Pa. Civ. A. No. 19-2194).  The Defendant employed Hepp as a
Clinical Care Reviewer in Pennsylvania from approximately April
2018 to April 2019 and Hardy as a Clinical Care Reviewer in
Pennsylvania from approximately April 2014 to the end of December
2016.

The Plaintiffs in both cases allege that the Defendant unlawfully
classified them and other similarly situated employees as exempt
from overtime laws when their "primary job duty was non-exempt work
consisting of reviewing medical authorization requests submitted by
healthcare providers against pre-determined guidelines and criteria
for coverage and payment purposes."  As a result, the Plaintiffs
were paid a salary with no overtime pay even though they were
required to work long hours, including overtime hours, to complete
all of their job responsibilities and meet the Defendant's
productivity standards.  They seek unpaid back wages at the
applicable overtime rates.

On May 15, 2018, when Wood was still the only Named Plaintiff, the
Court granted Conditional Collective Action Certification for her
FLSA overtime claims and required the Defendant to provide her
counsel with a list of all persons working for AmeriHealth Caritas
who are, or were Clinical Care Reviewers performing utilization
reviews at any time from three years prior to May 15, 2018.
Ninety-seven individuals timely signed and filed consent forms and
are now FLSA Opt-In Plaintiffs.

The parties engaged in discovery between August 2017 and July 2019.
After two rounds of private mediation, first on Nov. 12, 2018 and
then on Sept. 27, 2019, the parties executed a Memorandum of
Understanding. They finalized a Settlement Agreement on Nov. 11,
2019.  The non-reversionary Settlement resolves the Plaintiffs'
asserted claims for $4.25 million, less attorneys' fees and costs,
service payments for Plaintiffs, a contingency fund and costs
incurred in payment to the Settlement Administrator.

It resolves the claims of all eligible members of the
FLSA-Collective ("FLSA Opt-In Plaintiffs"3), all members of the
asserted Rule 23 classes in Pennsylvania and Iowa ("Rule 23
Settlement Class Members"), and the claims of five Clinical Care
reviewers who are part of the Hepp v. AmeriHealth case.   In
addition, the parties have agreed to resolve the claims of two
additional individuals who contacted the Settlement Administrator.
In total, the Settlement Agreement resolves 347 individuals'
claims.  

The $4.25 million Gross Settlement Amount less (1) Class Counsel's
attorneys' fees and costs; (2) service payments for Plaintiffs; (3)
a contingency fund; and (4) the cost of the Settlement
Administrator yields a Net Allocation Fund of no less than
$2,752,905.80 for distribution to Participating Settlement Class
Members.

The Plaintiffs' Counsel assigned a pro rata allocation percentage
to each Participating Settlement Class Member considering: (1) the
number of eligible weeks worked as a Clinical Care Reviewer during
applicable statutory periods; (2) annual base salary data; (3) an
assumed average of 48 hours of work per week; and (4) available
remedies under the FLSA and/or relevant state law remedies.  Each
Participating Settlement Class Member's individual settlement offer
was derived by applying their individual pro rata percentage to the
Net Allocation Fund.  Before fees and costs, the Settlement
provides Participating Settlement Class Members with an average
settlement distribution of $12,248.84, or $131.47 per eligible
workweek.

The Settlement Agreement provides for service payments to the Named
Plaintiffs, including the Hepp v. Amerihealth Named Plaintiffs,
and, in recognition of time spent on the case leading up to the
Settlement, to certain other Participating Class Members who
participated significantly in discovery.  Specifically, the
Plaintiffs seek a $5,000 service payment to the original Named
Plaintiff, Ann Wood.  Among other things, she has been actively
involved in the litigation since it began, participated in numerous
discussions regarding her claims, worked with the Class Counsel to
prepare a declaration in support of the Plaintiffs' motion for
conditional certification of the FLSA collective and agreed to
serve as a class representative for the Pennsylvania Rule 23 class.
Wood also sat for a deposition, responded to written discovery and
was interviewed as part of the construction of damage models.

The Settlement Agreement allows the Class Counsel to seek
reimbursement of their litigation costs, in an amount not to exceed
$65,000 to be paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount.  It also
provides for a contingency fund of up to $20,000 that will allow
the parties to effectuate the Settlement.  The contingency fund
will cover any errors relating to the allocations and will cover
payments to individuals who were not specifically included under
the Settlement Agreement's terms but who have a good faith claim
for participation.  Any unused portion of the contingency fund will
be reallocated on a pro rata basis in the final allocations to
Participating Settlement Class Members.  Also, $18,526 has been set
aside to pay expenses incurred by the Settlement Administrator, JND
Legal Administration. (Pls'. Mem. at 6.) Unused funds will be
reallocated on a pro rata basis in the final allocations.

In exchange for monetary relief, the Participating Settlement Class
Members who cash their settlement checks release the Defendant and
its past and present parents, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint
ventures and each of their directors, officers, employees, lawyers,
and each of their successors and assigns from all known and unknown
claims for overtime compensation, straight time, minimum wages,
liquidated damages, penalties and interest and fees/costs under the
FLSA and all state/local laws and regulations and common law
theories of the states where the Participating Settlement Class
Member worked, including the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law, arising from the Participating Settlement Class
Member's employment with Defendant as a Clinical Care Reviewer
(including Clinical Care Reviewer Seniors) up to the preliminary
approval date -- Dec. 13, 2019.  For Participating Settlement Class
Members who do not cash their checks, the FLSA Opt-In Plaintiffs
will be bound by the full release and Rule 23 Settlement Class
Members will be bound only by the state law release.

Upon review, Judge Pappert granted the Plaintiffs' motions for
final approval of the class settlement.  Because all the relevant
Rule 23(a) and (b) factors are met, the Pennsylvania Settlement
Class and Iowa Settlement Class are certified for purposes of
settlement approval.

The Settlement Agreement authorizes Class Counsel to seek an
attorneys' fee award of up to one-third of the $4.25 million gross
settlement amount, which is what they seek here: $1,416,666.66.
The percentage-of-recovery method is generally favored in common
fund cases and wage and hour cases in the Third Circuit and the
Court applies it in the case.  The Class Counsel requests
reimbursement for $61,901.53 in litigation costs, less than the
$65,000 permitted pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.  No
objections have been received regarding the requested reimbursement
of costs from the settlement fund and the expenses incurred are
reasonable given the litigation's complexity and duration.  The
Judge granted the request for costs.

The requested service payments are reasonable. The Judge awarded
the requested service payments.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/2y1O8J from Leagle.com.


AMNEAL PHARMA: Appeal from Dismissal of Pension Fund Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
The appeal of lead plaintiff New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel
Association of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund from the District
Court's orders dismissing its securities class action is ongoing,
according to Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2020.

On April 17, 2017, lead plaintiff New York Hotel Trades Council &
Hotel Association of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund filed an
amended class action complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California on behalf of itself and
others similarly situated against Impax and four current or former
Impax officers alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 (Fleming v.
Impax Laboratories Inc., et al., No. 4:16-cv-06557-HSG).

Plaintiff asserts claims regarding alleged misrepresentations about
three generic drugs.  Its principal claim alleges that Impax
concealed that it colluded with competitor Lannett Corp. to fix the
price of generic drug digoxin, and that its digoxin profits stemmed
from this collusive pricing.  Plaintiff also alleges that Impax
concealed from the market anticipated erosion in the price of
generic drug diclofenac and that Impax overstated the value of
budesonide, a generic drug that it acquired from Teva.

On June 1, 2017, Impax filed its motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.

On September 7, 2018, the Court granted Impax's motion, dismissing
plaintiff's claims without prejudice and with leave to amend the
complaint.  Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint October 26,
2018.  Impax filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint
on December 6, 2018; plaintiffs' opposition thereto was filed on
January 17, 2019; and Impax's reply in support of its motion to
dismiss was filed on February 7, 2019.  A hearing before the Court
on the motion to dismiss took place on May 2, 2019.  

On August 12, 2019, the Court entered an order granting Impax's
motion, dismissing plaintiff's second amended complaint with
prejudice.  

On September 5, 2019, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from both
dismissal orders with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.

The Company said, "By order of the Ninth Circuit dated November 26,
2019, plaintiff's opening brief presently was filed on February 14,
2020, with Impax's answering brief due on May 15, 2020."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
and specialty pharmaceutical products for various dosage forms and
therapeutic areas. It operates through two segments, Generics and
Specialty. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2002 and is
based in Bridgewater, New Jersey.


AMNEAL PHARMA: Bid to Nix Cambridge Retirement System Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s motion to dismiss Cambridge
Retirement System's securities class action suit in New Jersey is
ongoing, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2020.

On December 18, 2019, Cambridge Retirement System filed a class
action complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Somerset
County, on behalf of itself and others similarly situated against
the Company and fourteen current or former officers alleging
violations of Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities Act of
1933 (Cambridge Retirement System v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
et al., No. SOM-L-001701-19).

Plaintiff principally alleges that the amended registration
statement and prospectus issued on May 7, 2018 in connection with
the Amneal/Impax business combination was materially false and/or
misleading, insofar as it purportedly failed to disclose that
Amneal was an active participant in an alleged antitrust conspiracy
with several other pharmaceutical manufacturers to fix generic drug
prices, and that this secret collusion improperly bolstered
Amneal's financial results reflected in the registration statement.
Plaintiff seeks, among other things, certification of a class and
unspecified compensatory and/or recessionary damages.

On March 31, 2020, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint.

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
and specialty pharmaceutical products for various dosage forms and
therapeutic areas. It operates through two segments, Generics and
Specialty. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2002 and is
based in Bridgewater, New Jersey.


AMNEAL PHARMA: White et al. Drop Claims in Zantac/Ranitidine Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on May 11, 2020, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2020, that the plaintiffs in
the putative class action complaint styled White, et al., v.
GlaxoSmithKline plc, et al., No. 1:19-cv-07773, which has been
transferred to and consolidated with MDL No. 2924 in February 2020,
have voluntarily dismissed their claims without prejudice against
the generic ranitidine manufacturers named as defendants.

On January 27, 2020, the Company and Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC
("Amneal") were named in a putative class action complaint filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois by several named plaintiffs on behalf of consumers who
purchased Zantac(R) (ranitidine) and have not been diagnosed with,
but "live in constant fear of developing," cancer, alleging that
the defendants, comprising various entities alleged to have
manufactured or sold brand-name Zantac(R) or generic ranitidine,
failed to disclose and/or concealed the product's "dangerous
propensities" in respect of the alleged presence in the product of
N-Nitrosodimethylamine (or NDMA) (White, et al., v. GlaxoSmithKline
plc, et al., No. 1:19-cv-07773).

The complaint purports to state claims for violations of state
consumer protection acts, breaches of implied warranties,
negligence/gross negligence, and fraudulent concealment (and seeks
the certification of corresponding nationwide classes and
subclasses).

In addition to class certification, plaintiffs seek, among other
things, unspecified monetary damages and equitable relief,
including the implementation and funding of a medical monitoring
program.  The complaint is one of hundreds of similar putative
class actions and personal injury/product liability lawsuits filed
in federal courts nationwide.

In November 2019, the JPML established In re Zantac/Ranitidine NDMA
Litigation (MDL No. 2924) for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings and, on February 6, 2020, ordered the MDL centralized
in the Southern District of Florida.  

On February 24, 2020 this lawsuit was transferred to and
consolidated with MDL No. 2924.

On March 2, 2020, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims
without prejudice against the generic ranitidine manufacturers
named as defendants (including the Company and Amneal).

Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc., together with its subsidiaries,
develops, licenses, manufactures, markets, and distributes generic
and specialty pharmaceutical products for various dosage forms and
therapeutic areas. It operates through two segments, Generics and
Specialty. Amneal Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was founded in 2002 and is
based in Bridgewater, New Jersey.


APPLE INC: Second Amended Brodsky Suit Dismissed with Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAY BRODSKY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-00712-LHK (N.D. Cal.), Judge Lucy H. Koh
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, granted Apple's motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint with prejudice.

Plaintiffs Brodsky, Brian Tracey, Alex Bishop, Brendan Schwartz,
William Richardson, and John Kyslowsky bring the putative class
action against Apple for alleged privacy and property violations
based on Apple's two-factor authentication login tool.  The Court
previously granted Apple's motion to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint ("FAC"), but granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend.  

The Plaintiffs are residents of New York, California, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Texas.   Apple is a California
corporation that designs and sells products including iPhones,
iPads, Macbooks, Apple TVs, and Apple Watches.  Once a consumer
buys an Apple product, the Apple product is associated with the
consumer's Apple ID, which is an individual's email address.  An
Apple ID is required to use Apple services, such as FaceTime and
iMessage.

The Plaintiffs allege that Apple's provision of two-factor
authentication ("2FA") as an Apple ID login process violates their
right to privacy.  As in the FAC, the SAC identically alleges that
2FA is enabled in three instances: (i) a software update occurs on
one of the Apple devices; (ii) on creation of a new Apple ID; or
(iii) owner of the Apple device turns on two-factor authentication
in the Settings.  When enabled, 2FA requires a multi-step login
process before a user can access Apple services.  After 2FA is
enabled, Apple will sometimes send an email to the user that
explains that the user can disable 2FA.  The Plaintiffs allege that
the link allowing a user to disable 2FA expires within 14 days
after 2FA's enablement, and that afterwards, Plaintiffs cannot
disable 2FA.

The Plaintiffs, however, do assert that they paid for third-party
apps in "monthly, yearly, or one-time subscriptions" and that 2FA
"intercepts access to Third-Party Apps" and Apple services.
According to them, 2FA thereby "virtually dispossesses" them of
their access to these third-party apps and Apple services for the
duration of time necessary to login through 2FA.

On Feb. 8, 2019, Plaintiff Brodsky filed the instant case against
Apple.  On March 29, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the FAC, which
added Tracey, Bishop, and Schwartz as the named Plaintiffs.  The
FAC alleged five causes of action: (1) trespass to chattels; (2)
violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"); (3)
violation of the California Computer Crime Law ("CCCL"); (4)
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"); and (5)
unjust enrichment.  

The Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of the following putative
class: All persons or entities in the United States who own or
owned an Apple Watch, iPhone, iPad, MacBook, or iMac or use Apple
Services that have enabled two-factor authentication (2FA),
subsequently want to disable 2FA, and are not allowed to disable
2FA.  The class period began when Apple introduced 2FA in 2015.

On Sept. 26, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the SAC.  The SAC realleges
the same five causes of action as the FAC: (1) trespass to
chattels; (2) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act
("CIPA"); (3) violation of the California Computer Crime Law
("CCCL"); (4) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
("CFAA"); and (5) unjust enrichment.  

The Plaintiffs again bring suit on behalf of the following putative
class: All persons or entities in the United States who own or
owned an Apple Watch, iPhone, iPad, MacBook, or iMac or use Apple
Services that have enabled two-factor authentication (2FA),
subsequently want to disable 2FA, and are not allowed to disable
2FA.  The class period began "when Apple introduced 2FA in 2015."

The Plaintiffs again seek to represent subclasses as in the FAC.
The SAC, however, includes a new subclass whereby Plaintiffs
Richardson and Kyslowsky seek to represent an analogous subclass of
"senior persons in the United States."

On Oct. 22, 2019, Apple filed the instant motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's SAC.  Apple moves to dismiss each of Plaintiffs' claims
for failure to state a claim.  Apple also contends that certain
claims are fail to satisfy Rule 8's pleading standard or are barred
by the statute of limitations.  As with the previous motion to
dismiss, Apple argues that (1) Apple did not enable 2FA without
Plaintiffs' authorization; and (2) the Plaintiffs have not alleged
that Apple damaged them.

Judge Koh holds that SAC offers no information about Plaintiff
Brodsky's 2015 software update that allegedly enabled 2FA on his
phone, nor about whether Plaintiff Brodsky read or reviewed the
message that accompanied the update and whether the message
disclosed that the update would enable 2FA.  Nor has Plaintiff
Tracey alleged any facts related to his alleged involuntary
enablement of 2FA through voluntary software updates.  The
Plaintiffs' bald assertions in the SAC that they did not consent to
enabling 2FA is a legal conclusion not entitled to the presumption
of truth.  Indeed, none of the remaining Named Plaintiffs --
Plaintiffs Bishop, Schwartz, Richardson, and Kyslowsky -- even
specify how they enabled 2FA on their Apple devices.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiffs have not alleged that 2FA was enabled without their
authorization.

Judge Koh also holds that the Plaintiffs have not adequately
alleged a claim for trespass to chattels.  Therefore, the Judge
grants Apple's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for trespass
to chattels.  The Plaintiffs failed to cure the same deficiencies
the Court previously identified in its prior Order, and the SAC
offers no new facts to justify a different conclusion.  As the
Court previously warned, failure to cure the deficiencies
identified herein or in Apple's motion to dismiss will result in
dismissal with prejudice.  Furthermore, courts are justified in
denying leave to amend when a plaintiff repeatedly fails to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.  This is precisely
the situation, as the Court's prior Order put the Plaintiffs on
notice that the Plaintiffs' claim for trespass to chattels was
deficient for the same exact reasons as stated in the Order.

The Judge next addresses the Plaintiffs' CIPA claim.  In the
instant case, the Plaintiffs contend that 2FA violates their
privacy rights under the CIPA.  Apple responds that (1) the CIPA
prohibits only a third party's interceptions and that Apple is not
a third party; and (2) the Plaintiffs fail to allege the contents
of any communications that Apple intercepted.

Judge Koh grants Apple's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CIPA
claim with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs failed to cure the same
deficiencies the Court previously identified in its prior Order,
and any new allegations fail to justify a different conclusion.  As
the Court previously warned, failure to cure the deficiencies
identified herein or in Apple's motion to dismiss will result in
dismissal with prejudice.  Furthermore, courts are justified in
denying leave to amend when a plaintiff repeatedly fails to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.  This is precisely
the situation here, as the Court's prior Order put Plaintiffs on
notice that the Plaintiffs' CIPA claim was deficient for the same
exact reasons as stated in the Order.

Next, the Judge discusses the Plaintiffs' claims under the federal
CFAA.  The Plaintiffs allege that Apple intentionally accessed
through the 2FA feature their and the Class Members' computers and
that Apple knowingly caused the transmission of information, i.e.
sending and receiving of six-digit verification code on another
device.  They bring claims under two provisions of the CFAA, 18
U.S.C. Section 1030(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(a)(5).

Judge Koh grants Apple's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CFAA
claims with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs failed to cure the same or
similar deficiencies the Court previously identified in its prior
Order, and the SAC offers no new facts to justify a different
conclusion.  As the Court previously warned, failure to cure the
deficiencies identified herein or in Apple's motion to dismiss will
result in dismissal with prejudice.  Furthermore, courts are
justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff repeatedly
fails to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.  This
is precisely the situation here, as the Court's prior Order put the
Plaintiffs on notice that their CFAA claims were deficient for the
same or similar reasons as stated in the Order.  Accordingly, Judge
Koh grants Apple's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' CFAA claims with
prejudice.

The Plaintiffs' fifth and final claim is for unjust enrichment with
prejudice.  Judge Koh grants Apple's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim.  The Plaintiffs failed to cure
similar deficiencies the Court previously identified in its prior
Order, and the SAC offers no new facts to justify a different
conclusion.   As the Court previously warned, failure to cure the
deficiencies identified herein or in Apple's motion to dismiss will
result in dismissal with prejudice.  Furthermore, courts are
justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff repeatedly
failsto cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.  This
is precisely the situation, as the Court's prior Order put the
Plaintiffs on notice that their unjust enrichment claim was
deficient for similar reasons as stated in the Order.

Finally, the Judge addresses Apple's Rule 8 and statute of
limitations argument.  She holds that the statute of limitations
bars Plaintiff Brodsky's CIPA, CFAA, and CCCL claims and Plaintiff
Tracey's CIPA claim.  Therefore, she grants Apple's motion to
dismiss Plaintiff Brodsky's CIPA, CFAA, and CCCL claims and
Plaintiff Tracey's CIPA claim on that ground.  The Plaintiffs
failed to cure the same deficiencies the Court previously
identified in its prior Order, and the SAC offers no new facts to
justify a different conclusion.   As the Court previously warned,
failure to cure the deficiencies identified herein or in Apple's
motion to dismiss will result in dismissal with prejudice.
Furthermore, courts are justified in denying leave to amend when a
plaintiff repeatedly fails to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed.  This is precisely the situation, as the
Court's prior Order put the Plaintiffs on notice that many of their
claims were time-barred. Accordingly, Judge Koh grants Apple's
motion to dismiss Plaintiff Brodsky's CIPA, CFAA, and CCCL claims
and Plaintiff Tracey's CIPA claim with prejudice.

In sum, Judge Koh grants Apple's motion to dismiss with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/bfwO1C from Leagle.com.


ARIZONA: Student Files Class Action Against Board of Regents
------------------------------------------------------------
Piper Hansen, writing for The State Press, reports that an ASU
student filed a class-action lawsuit against the Arizona Board of
Regents, the third in the past three months, claiming Arizona's
public universities violated its contract with students and should
refund money they paid for the spring semester.

This suit, filed by Brock Doemel, a sophomore studying finance, and
the one filed in March are very similar: Both ask for a
class-action designation, pro-rate proportional refunds, have the
same defendant and claim ABOR breached their contract with students
as they were not able to provide services a number of students paid
for.

The new coronavirus caused all three public universities to move
courses online and later asked students to move out of dorms if
they were able, in the interest of public health.

Doemel said he understands the University had to transition classes
online and encourage students to leave campus under guidance from
ABOR and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, but he
said the consequence was a breach of contract with financial
repercussions.

Doemel explained he did not return to his hourly-paid on-campus job
after spring break because he wanted to protect his health. He said
he's seeking a class-action designation for the case in order to
represent other students like him who paid for an educational
experience they never finished.

"I don't fault the University for doing what they did," Doemel
said. "However, what I think is a little egregious is that the
University only gave out credit to individuals who lived in
University housing, especially with a pandemic and so many students
and their families hurting financially."

Doemel said the difference between his lawsuit and the class-action
suit filed by UA parents is that his takes into account the payment
students received as a housing credit and asks ABOR to look at the
way universities continued to deliver class content and services to
students.

"The universities have not refunded any amount of the tuition or
any portion of the mandatory fees, even though it has implemented
online distance learning since mid-March," the suit says.

The first suit made a point to highlight how ASU had yet to address
the financial issues students were facing when it came to housing.
The school has since offered any student who was living on-campus
in the spring a credit of $1,500.

A University spokesperson explained the credit would be applied to
student accounts on May 15 for those "who are eligible and have
finished the checkout process."

"The University tuition price reflects an immersive experience,"
Doemel said, explaining he felt he was only offered about half of
what he paid for.

The suit says a breach of contract occurred when payments for
housing and dining were made in full but students were encouraged
to leave campus. In addition, students who paid fees used for
services and facilities that were later not provided to all
students, was another possible breach of contract.

"Plaintiff and the members of the Class have paid tuition for a
first-rate education and educational experience, with all the
appurtenant benefits offered by a first-rate university, and were
provided a materially deficient and insufficient alternative, which
constitutes a breach of the contracts entered into," the suit says.


The suit asks for "appropriate compensatory damages in return of
the pro-rated portion of its tuition, housing, dining, and
mandatory fees, proportionate to the amount of time that remained
in the spring semester 2020, summer semester 2020, and any further
semesters" where similar health precautions may be taken.

ABOR and ASU do not comment on pending litigation.

"An online education through Canvas and Zoom is not nearly worth
the amount of an on-campus immersive education," Doemel said.
[GN]


ARKANSAS: 2nd Cir. Affirms Class Certification in Pension Fund Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARKANSAS TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM, WEST VIRGINIA
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BOARD, PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS PENSION
GROUP, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PENSION FUNDS, ILENE RICHMAN,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, HOWARD SORKIN, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, TIKVA BOCHNER, On behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, DR. EHSAN AFSHANI, LOUIS GOLD,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, THOMAS
DRAFT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Consolidated Plaintiffs, v. GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., LLOYD C.
BLANKFEIN, DAVID A. VINIAR, GARY D. COHN, Defendants-Appellants,
SARAH E. SMITH, Consolidated Defendant, Docket No. 18-3667 (2d
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's class certification order.

It is the second time the securities class action has arrived at
the doorstep on a Rule 23(f) appeal.  The first time the Court took
the case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Crotty, J.) had certified under Rule 23(b)(3) a shareholder
class suing Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and a handful of its
executives for securities fraud.  It vacated the class
certification order, holding that the district court did not apply
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard for determining
whether Goldman had rebutted a legal presumption, known as the
Basic presumption, that the shareholders relied on Goldman's
allegedly material misstatements in choosing to purchase its stock
at the market price.  It also held that the court erroneously
declined to consider some of Goldman's evidence of "price impact"
-- that is, the question of whether the revelation that Goldman's
statements were false affected its share price.

On remand, the district court ordered additional briefing and held
an evidentiary hearing.  After concluding that Goldman failed to
rebut the Basic presumption by a preponderance of the evidence, the
court certified the class once more.  The Court again granted
Goldman's petition for permission to appeal under Rule 23(f).

Goldman raises two objections to the district court's application
of the inflation-maintenance theory: (A) in its view, the theory
applies only when alleged misstatements prop up "fraud-induced
inflation" and the court failed to make a finding to this effect;
and (B) the court erred by finding that what Goldman describes as
"general statements" can ever satisfy the inflation-maintenance
theory.

The question before the Second Circuit now is whether the district
court abused its discretion by certifying the shareholder class,
either on legal grounds or in its application of the Basic
presumption.

The Second Circuit holds that it did not.  The Second Circuit finds
no abuse of discretion in the court's finding that the inflation
maintained by Goldman's statements equaled the price drop caused by
the corrective disclosures.  The district court found that the
inflation was demonstrated on [the corrective-disclosure dates,
when the falsity of the misstatements was revealed.  The Second
Circuit also credited Dr. Finnerty's testimony that the price
declines following these corrective disclosures were caused by the
news of Goldman's conflicts.

It is also true that Barclays' statements were about a specific
high-frequency exchange, while Goldman's challenged statements were
more generally about its controls for handling conflicts of
interest.  But Goldman's alleged lack of, or disregard for, these
controls is the specific problem that led to the corrective
disclosures.  That Barclays mentioned a specific exchange does
little to distinguish its statements from those at issue here; each
is an alleged misrepresentation about general business practices.

The Second Circuit is not blind to the widespread understanding
that class certification can pressure defendants into settling
large claims, meritorious or not, because of the financial risk of
going to trial.  Referencing these legitimate policy concerns,
Goldman argues that rejecting its theory would open the floodgates
to unmeritorious litigation by allowing courts to certify classes
that it believes should lose on the merits.

The Second Circuit holds that it would indeed be troubling.  But
the law already beats back this parade of horribles in three
meaningful ways.  First, materiality challenges are fair game under
Rule 12(b)(6).  Rule 23 does not give defendants a do-over on
materiality.  Second, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do offer
securities defendants a do-over on materiality prior to trial:
summary judgment.  Third, even though defendants may not challenge
materiality at the Rule 23 stage, they may present evidence to
disprove price impact when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.
In sum, while securities class action defendants have numerous
avenues for challenging materiality, Rule 23 is not one of them.
The inflation-maintenance theory does not discriminate between
general and specific misstatements.

Goldman's second argument is that the district court abused its
discretion in holding that Goldman failed to rebut the Basic
presumption.  The district court applied the preponderance
standard, credited the shareholders' expert's theory, and rejected
the theories of Goldman's experts.  Goldman argues that the court
(A) erroneously construed Goldman's rebuttal evidence and (B)
misapplied the preponderance standard in holding that Goldman
failed to rebut the Basic presumption.

First, the Second Circuit holds that Goldman does not meaningfully
engage with the district court's detailed rejection of Dr. Choi's
report.  Its most substantial argument is that the court
erroneously found that Dr. Choi's opinion rested on "the premise
that the first price decline is consistent with price declines that
four other companies previously experienced upon the news of
similar enforcement events."  Goldman argues that Dr. Choi actually
concluded that the price declines were "not statistically
significantly different."  Even if the court mistakenly referred to
consistency rather than a lack of statistically significant
difference, the difference is splitting hairs.  Goldman does not
clearly explain how this subtle difference in terminology renders
clearly erroneous the court's extensive reasons for rejecting Dr.
Choi's conclusions.  Nor do Goldman's remaining arguments point to
an abuse of discretion.

Second, although Goldman bears the burden of persuasion, it focuses
heavily on the supposed lack of evidence the shareholders
introduced to undermine its contention that its statements had no
price impact.  Goldman is free to make its merits arguments at
summary judgment or trial.  The issue is simply whether the
district court abused its discretion by finding that Goldman failed
to rebut the Basic presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Second Circuit finds no abuse of discretion in the court's
reasonable conclusion that Goldman failed to meet this burden.

The Second Circuit disagrees with Judge Wesley's ultimate
conclusion.  In his view, Goldman and its co-defendants offered
persuasive and uncontradicted evidence that Goldman's share price
was unaffected by earlier disclosures of Defendants' alleged
conflicts of interest.  What the dissent really wants to do is to
revisit the question of whether the statements are too general as a
matter of law to be deemed material.  The Second Circuit would
inject materiality into the Rule 23 analysis in the name of
limiting the types of statements that can be considered for price
maintenance.  The question of whether the statements on which
plaintiffs rely were not material as a matter of law will be
addressed by the district court at an appropriate time.  But for
now, the procedural posture of the case and the understanding of
binding precedent from the Court and the Supreme Court preclude
reaching the matter.  If acknowledging that limitation while
further recognizing that some (but perhaps not all) will view the
merits of the shareholders' claim through the colleague's lens is
"tiptoeing," then so be it.  Careful footwork is often required in
intricate judicial tasks.  

For these reasons, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court, remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with his Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's April 7, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ydM8tP from Leagle.com.

ROBERT J. GIUFFRA, JR. -- giuffrar@sullcrom.com -- (Richard H.
Klapper, David M.J. Rein, Benjamin R. Walker, Jacob E. Cohen, on
the brief), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, NY, for
Defendants-Appellants.

THOMAS C. GOLDSTEIN -- tgoldstein@goldsteinrussell.com -- Goldstein
& Russell, P.C., Bethesda, MD ( Kevin K. Russell, Goldstein &
Russell, P.C., Bethesda, MD; Spencer A. Burkholz, Joseph D. Daley,
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San Diego, CA; Thomas A. Dubbs,
James W. Johnson, Michael H. Rogers, Irina Vasilchenko, Labatow
Sucharow LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Lewis J. Liman, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, NY
( Jared M. Gerber, Lina Bensman, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton
LLP, New York, NY; Steven P. Lehotsky, U.S. Chamber Litigation
Center, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Amicus Curiae Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of
Defendants-Appellants.

Todd G. Cosenza -- tcosenza@willkie.com -- (Maxwell A. Bryer, on
the brief), Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, NY, for Amici
Curiae Former United States Securities and Exchange Commission
Officials and Securities Scholars in Support of
Defendants-Appellants.

Michael C. Keats -- michael.keats@friedfrank.com -- Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York, NY, for Amici Curiae
Economic Scholars in Support of Defendants-Appellants.

Jonathan K. Youngwood -- jyoungwood@stblaw.com -- Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP, New York, NY ( Craig S. Waldman, Joshua C. Polster,
Daniel H. Owsley, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, NY; Ira
D. Hammerman, Kevin M. Carroll, Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association, Washington, D.C.; Gregg Rozansky, Bank Policy
Institute, Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Amici Curiae
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Bank
Policy Institute in Support of Defendants-Appellants.

Deepak Gupta -- deepak@guptawessler.com -- Gupta Wessler PLLC,
Washington, D.C. ( Gregory A. Beck, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington,
D.C.; Salvatore J. Graziano, Jai K. Chandrasekhar, Bernstein
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for
Amici Curiae Securities Law Scholars in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Marc I. Gross -- migross@pomlaw.com -- Pomerantz LLP, New York, NY
( Jeremy A. Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, New York, NY; Ernest A.
Young, Apex, NC, on the brief), for Amici Curiae Procedure Scholars
in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

J. Carl Cecere, Cecere PC, Dallas, TX ( David Kessler, Darren
Check, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check LLP, Radnor, PA, on the
brief), for Amicus Curiae National Conference on Public Employee
Retirement Systems in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.


AUSTRALIA: Faces Big Compensation Bill in Live Cattle Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shan Goodwin, writing for Farm Weekly, reports that the awarding of
almost $3 million in damages to Northern Territory live cattle
suppliers the Brett Cattle Company for losses incurred from the
2011 ban on the trade to Indonesia has paved the way for
substantial compensation claims from hundreds more graziers and
beef industry businesses.

The Federal Government could well face a compensation bill in the
hundreds of millions as a result of the Gillard Government decision
which has long been described by the beef industry as a knee-jerk
reaction and one which wreaked havoc on the northern cattle game.

In a case management hearing on June 29, Justice Steven Rares put a
figure on the value of the cattle involved: $2.15 per kilogram for
steers and $1.95 for heifers.

That price will be locked in for the future of the class action,
which could involve several hundred additional litigants.

The Bretts, who acted as lead litigants, have been awarded $2.936m
in compensation, plus costs, after the Federal Court found the
decision by then agricultural minister Joe Ludwig to implement a
total ban on the live export trade with Indonesia to be invalid.

That was the full amount they were seeking.

Justice Rares also on June 29 determined, from the evidence before
him in the Brett case, that at least 88,000 head of cattle could
have been exported to Indonesia had the ban not been put in place.

Facilitator of the court action, former Northern Territory
Cattlemen's Association chief executive officer Tracey Hayes said
that was a significant outcome.

"That number is the minimum head. Once we start to work through
evidence from the members of the class, if numbers exceed that
figure we can argue greater capacity of the supply chains to handle
more numbers," she explained.

"The other important thing established as that three common
questions have been answered -- the ban was not valid; the tort of
misfeasance in public office did occur and had the minister acted
lawfully he would have allowed the trade to continue for those
supply chains operating in an appropriate manner.

"Further members of the class action will now not be required to
prove those three facts."

The class action is still open, however Mrs Hayes said a closing
date would soon be advertised.

It is expected parties will return to court some time this year to
determine the quantum of damages for other members of the class
action.

The clock is now ticking on the current Federal Government's option
to appeal the ruling, which was handed down on June 2. The Morrison
Government has until July 27 to appeal.

"Our message to the Prime Minister on that has not changed," Mrs
Hayes said.

"Compensation is one thing but closure is another. We don't want to
have to continue to fight this but we will if we have to.

"We don't believe that is in the public interest for the
Commonwealth to appeal." [GN]


AUSTRALIA: Fire-Fighting Foam Contamination Class Action Okayed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Patrick Davies, writing for World Socialist Web Site, reports that
an Australian Federal Court judge in June approved as "fair and
reasonable" a class action legal settlement over fire-fighting foam
contamination covering over 3,000 people and three polluted towns.
The deal reached with the Defence Department, will see victims
share only $126 million of a $212 million payout.

While the payout is possibly a world first for compensation for
economic loss as a result of toxic PFAS contamination, over 40
percent of the settlement will be swallowed up as profits and
expenses for the litigation funder and two law firms involved.

Three separate class actions were initiated in 2016 by 500
residents from Williamtown in New South Wales (NSW), 450 from Oakey
in Queensland and 2,500 from Katherine in the Northern Territory
after fire-fighting foam run-off from air force bases was found to
have contaminated groundwater in all three areas.

Before the payout is distributed to the victims, Omni Bridgeway,
the litigation funder will take $53.1 million in profits and
$940,000 in costs. Lawyers from Denton and Shine law firms will
take $30.1 million for their costs. Another $2 million will be used
to administer the distribution of the funds.

The settlement releases the Defence Department from any further
claim over financial loss, property losses, mental anguish or
nuisance for those involved, even though the areas remain polluted.
There is no admission of liability by the government. This still
leaves it open to future personal injury compensation litigation
once the health dangers become more difficult to obscure.

Workers and their families living in affected towns have seen
property prices plummet, with some properties considered
unsellable. Small businesses and family farms have faced a dramatic
loss of income, leaving many financially chained to their
contaminated properties.

Fire-fighting foam has been used in aviation fire and emergency
training exercises since the 1960s. The foam contains a family of
chemicals known as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFASs),
which contaminate water sources and build up in the populations
that use this water. It was known to be "toxic" by the Defence
Department as far back as 1987, but no action was taken to phase it
out until 2000, and waterways were only discovered to be
contaminated in 2012.

The potential dangers for those exposed to high concentrations are
still being fully identified. The limited research available points
to probable links with a number of deadly cancers and diseases. A
Newcastle Herald investigation in 2017 discovered 50 cases of
cancer that had occurred on Cabbage Tree road in Williamtown during
the time period of the contamination.

As federal and state government authorities became aware of the
extent of the pollution, following its discovery in Williamtown and
later at Oakey and Katherine, they used every effort to downplay
the impacts on the victims. They denied any adverse health effects,
asserting there was "limited to no evidence" of disease or illness
from PFAS exposure. Government health authorities only conducted
blood testing after significant petitioning by local residents.

A federally-funded "expert health panel" report in 2018 attempted a
whitewash, claiming there was only "weak and inconsistent evidence"
of any adverse effects. The government then refused to carry out
health screening on affected communities, seeking to protect itself
from any future liability.

An independent expert report ordered by the Federal Court helped to
vindicate the residents' concerns. Prepared by Nick Osbourne of the
University of Queensland, it said there is "general agreement" in
the scientific community that the chemicals can cause kidney
cancer, testicular cancer and high cholesterol.

The June settlement comes six years after Williamtown residents
were informed for the first time that their homes had been
contaminated.

The entire political establishment has waged a campaign to wear
down the victims and force them to settle. A Greens-backed Senate
inquiry in 2015 recommended, among other things, financial
compensation but its proposals were non-binding. The Labor Party
worked to block Senate motions calling for investigations into
buyouts of victims' properties. Empty promises continued for years,
while victims continued to suffer.

Toxic PFAS has been the responsibility of countless authorities and
governments, Labor and Liberal-National alike. It continues to be
discovered at other sites and poses a danger to fire fighters and
the general population. Earlier this year, PFAS chemicals were
found at all Metropolitan Fire Brigade sites in Victoria.

There were 75 objections to the settlement from participants, many
of whom argued that the compensation would be insufficient for them
to leave their contaminated properties. A property devaluation
figure of 21.5 percent was used to guide the settlement
negotiations in Williamtown, but some losses were shown to exceed
that.

Rob Roseworne, a resident living close to the Williamtown base,
estimates he has lost $200,000 off the value of his property. He
received a letter from the class action lawyers saying he was
likely to receive just $32,986 for the property loss and $32,300
for inconvenience and distress. An Oakey cattle farmer, Diane
Priddle, with losses professionally estimated at over $2 million,
will receive just $152,000.

The judge insisted that the only alternative to the settlement was
a trial that could take years and still result in a loss.
Williamtown steering committee member Cain Gorfine told the court:
"We cannot afford another four years of legal action, mounting
legal costs with the risk of getting no outcome whatsoever."

This settlement shows how the capitalist court system treats the
interests of the working class. Justice would, at the very least,
require full individually assessed compensation for those who have
paid for this pollution with their life savings and health. Their
suffering was essentially reduced to a risky but lucrative
investment opportunity for litigation funders and law firms. During
the proceedings, Federal Court Justice Michael Lee admitted that
litigation is a "brutal business," with a winner-takes-all model.

The Defence Department has displayed its essential hostility to
those impacted by its operations. The Newcastle Herald recently
reported that Defence had set aside $53.8 million for legal fees to
fight six cases, including PFAS-related lawsuits.

Over the past 10 years, the government has spent $137 billion on
major military weapons systems, preparing for war, but just $125
million on PFAS remediation. [GN]


AUSTRALIA: Opal Tower Unit Owners Launch Class Action Over Defects
------------------------------------------------------------------
Kathleen Calderwood, writing for ABC, reports that owners of units
in Sydney's Opal Tower have launched legal action against the NSW
Government after discovering more than 500 new defects in the
beleaguered building.

The owners' corporation launched the proceedings in the NSW Supreme
Court against the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) -- a NSW
Government entity -- and the builder Icon.

The tower was evacuated on Christmas Eve 2018 when cracks started
to appear in the building.

The owners' corporation claimed it had found more defects in the
building and wanted SOPA held to account.

"We've been kept in the dark, as they've strung us along thinking
its only the major defect you saw well publicised, but I can tell
you there are over 500 other defects we were not aware of that have
now come to light," owners' corporation chairman Shady Eskander
said.

Mr Eskander said these defects were found by independent experts
hired by the owners' corporation to inspect the building.

He said the insurance premium for the whole building this year came
to more than $1 million -- up from $100,000 in 2018.

This lawsuit is separate to a class action which was launched a
year ago.

Mr Eskander said the owners were suing for the cost of fixing all
defects in common areas, building inspections, project managers,
insurance and legal fees.

Some residents who had been out of their apartments for seven
months moved back into Opal Tower in August last year, but
Mr Eskander said living in the building was not easy.

"It's very difficult to put into words, our homes are our greatest
asset, it's where we make lasting memories," Mr Eskander said.

"We've had to deal with over 100 construction workers on the site,
drilling noise all day . . . sometimes we've found we only have one
lift working and we have to wait 10 minutes."

Mr Eskander said people had experienced difficulty with banks as a
result of owning property in the well-known building.

"You say you own a property in Opal Tower, that property was worth
$500,000 [or] $700,000 . . . the bank puts a zero against your
name, you can't refinance, you can't get a small loan to buy a
car."

NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian said on June 29 she wasn't aware of
the new lawsuit, but said the Government was working to support the
affected residents.

"We certainly have been there doing what we can and recently not
only have we appointed a building commissioner but put through new
legislation to protect owners into the future so certainly we
appreciate the angst they're going through and we'll continue to
support them in whichever way feels appropriate," Ms Berejiklian
said.

Apartment owner Andrew Neverly said he had bought the unit as part
of his retirement plan, but now it's worth nothing and he had to
let his previous tenants break their lease.

"They had to move out they didn't feel safe, that was just weeks
after the evacuation," he said.

"We've been fortunate in finding another tenant.

"It's emotionally been a real rollercoaster, when we bought into
this we thought we were buying into the Australian dream."

A spokesperson for Icon said it had spent $40 million on
remediation since the 2018 evacuation and were providing a 20-year
structural warranty on 'rectification work' at the Opal Tower.

"Despite weekly meetings with the Opal Tower Owners Corporation, we
only became aware of the overwhelming majority of recently
identified alleged issues when legal action was launched," the
spokesperson said.

"Icon remains ready to address any actual defects in Opal Tower as
a priority and has asked the Owners Corporation for access to the
building to identify any legitimate defects.

"While this permission has been denied to date, Icon will continue
to address legitimate issues within apartments that are not the
property of the Owners Corporation and has written to directly to
individual apartment owners to obtain access."

A SOPA spokesperson declined to comment while the matter was before
the court. [GN]


BILL GRAHAM: Court Certifies Two Classes in Kihn Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
In the case, GREG KIHN, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. BILL GRAHAM
ARCHIVES, LLC, ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 17-cv-05343-YGR (N.D.
Cal.), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification.

The case arises from the Defendants' exploitation of audio and
video recordings of live musical performances, and the musical
compositions performed therein, from the 1950s to the 1990s.
Plaintiffs Kihn and Rye Boy Music, LLC (Kihn's music publisher)
allege that Defendants Graham, doing business as Wolfgang's Vault;
Norton, LLC; and William Sagan distributed and sold in thousands of
recordings acquired from a dozen private collections -- recordings
that captured live performances spanning several decades, made by
concert producers and sound engineers without the performers'
authorization.  The Plaintiffs allege that the conduct began in
2006 when defendants began offering digital downloads or on-demand
streaming on two websites: (1) wolfgangs.com, which offers audio
recordings; and (2) concertvault.com, which offers both audio and
audiovisual recordings for on-demand streaming.

Plaintiffs Kihn and Rye Boy filed a motion seeking to certify two
classes: a Composer Class and a Performer Class.  With respect to
the Composer Class, Plaintiff Rye Boy seeks to represent a putative
class of composers of musical works alleging infringement of
copyrighted musical compositions based upon unauthorized sale and
distribution of sound recordings and audiovisual recordings.  With
respect to the Performer Class, Plaintiff Kihn seeks to represent a
putative class of live music performers, alleging that the
Defendants trafficked in recordings of their live musical
performances without authorization in violation of 17 U.S.C.
section 1101.

Rye Boy, as representative of the Composer Class, alleges two
claims for copyright infringement based upon unauthorized sale and
distribution on defendants' Websites of reproductions of their
copyrighted compositions: (1) within audio recordings; and (2)
within video concert footage.  Kihn, for himself and on behalf of
the proposed Performer Class, asserts a claim for violation of
section 1101 of the Copyright Act, sometimes called the
"Anti-Bootlegging Act."

Defendants oppose class certification arguing that the Plaintiffs
cannot meet any of the requirements to certify a class under either
Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3).  In summary, they contend that
individualized issues arise from the creation and ownership of the
live music recordings, as well as from licensing arrangements and
their alleged defenses of consent, fair use, and untimeliness.
While the Defendants raise arguments in their opposition as to all
the elements of Rule 23, the focus of the fight here is whether
common issues of fact and law would predominate, as required by
Rule 23(b)(3).

Judge Rogers first analyzes the Rule 23(a) factors for both
putative classes given the substantial overlap in the factual
issues relative to those preliminary issues.  The Judge then turns
to an examination of the Rule 23(b) factors for each proposed class
separately, taking into account the differences between the claims
asserted.

As set forth more fully in the Order, with respect to the Composer
Class, Judge Rogers concludes that the Plaintiffs' prima facie case
for copyright infringement may be established readily on common
evidence.  In opposition to the class certification, the Defendants
have put forward a common set of contractual agreements, applicable
to the entire class, which they contend preclude liability.
Consequently, the Judge concludes that common issues of fact and
law would predominate on the copyright infringement claims and the
Composer Class should be certified.

For much the same reasons, the Judge concludes that common issues
would predominate on the section 1101 claim of the Performer Class.
The Judge has considered the novel legal question of the
evidentiary burdens on a claim under section 1101.  Having
carefully examined the text and purposes of the statute, as well as
principles of evidence and statutory interpretation bearing on the
question, the Judge finds the authorization requirement is an
affirmative defense, and the Defendants bear the burden to
establish authorization.  As with their affirmative defenses to the
Composer Class's claims, the Defendants' opposition to
certification of the Performer Class relies on the same limited
number of agreements, applicable to all class members, for their
contention that the recordings and their exploitation were
authorized.  Thus, on the record put forward by the parties at
class certification, common issues of fact and law predominate on
the Performer Class's section 1101 claim, and certification of the
Performer Class is appropriate.

Accordingly, Judge Rogers granted the Motion for Class
Certification of: (1) a Composer Class for copyright infringement,
and (2) a Performer Class for violation of the Anti-Bootlegging
Statute, 17 U.S.C. section 1101.

The Composer Class is defined as: All owners of the musical
compositions encompassed in sound recordings and audiovisual works
of non-studio performances reproduced, performed, distributed, or
otherwise exploited by Defendants during the period from Sept. 14,
2014, to the present.

The Performer Class defined as: All persons whose non-studio live
musical performances are captured in the recordings of sounds or
sounds and images which have been reproduced, performed,
distributed, or otherwise exploited by the Defendants during the
period from Sept. 14, 2014, to the present.

The Court will entertain any arguments for sub-classing, whether by
the Exploitation Agreement covering the recording(s) or
performer(s), or by other criteria.  Likewise, the Court will
consider the parties' proposals for the best notice practicable to
the members of the classes.

The Defendants is directed to provide class lists identifying the
members of the Composer and Performer Classes to the Plaintiffs.

The parties are directed to meet and confer on these issues and
submit a single joint brief on the issues of subclassing and
notice, preferably with side-by-side comparisons of their proposals
on issues as to which they cannot reach agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/wabD91 from Leagle.com.


BIMBO BAKERIES: 22 Non-Resident Opt-Ins in Camp Suit Dismissed
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, David Camp and Keith Hadmack, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Bimbo Bakeries
USA, Inc. and Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, LLC, Defendants,
Case No. 18-cv-378-SM (D. N.H.), Judge Steven J. McAuliffe of the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire (i) granted
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims of 22 non-resident
opt-in Plaintiffs, and (ii) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' motion
to amend their complaint to add state law wage claims on behalf of
those non-resident opt-in Plaintiffs.

In the wage and hour suit, the Plaintiffs Camp and Hadmack have
alleged that the Defendants unlawfully treated them as independent
contractors when, in fact, they were employees.   

The Defendants are in the business of manufacturing, selling, and
delivering baked goods under brand names that include Sara Lee and
Nature's Harvest.  Bimbo Bakeries USA is incorporated in Delaware,
while Bimbo Food Bakeries Distribution is organized in Delaware.
Both are headquartered in Horsham, Pennsylvania.  The Defendants'
website asserts that they operate more than 6 bakeries, and employ
more than 22,000 associates, distributing products over some
11,0000 sales routes throughout the United States.  In New
Hampshire, defendants operate out of sales centers located in
Hooksett and Keene.

The Plaintiffs are "distributors" who deliver Bimbo Bakeries
products to stock shelves in various stores.  The parties dispute
whether the Plaintiffs (and similarly situated individuals) are
entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA.  The Defendants contend
that its distributors are independent contractors, and, therefore,
not entitled to overtime.  The Plaintiffs contend they are actually
employees, and have been wrongfully denied overtime pay.

In February, 2019, the Court conditionally certified a collective
action under the FLSA.  Subsequently, approximately 560
distributors who have operated distributorships in New England
since May of 2015 received notice of their right to opt into the
action.  In response to that notice, close to 40 distributors
joined the action, 22 of whom are not residents of New Hampshire.
Those 22 Plaintiffs are citizens of Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine.

The Defendants say that the 22 non-resident Plaintiffs lack any
connection to New Hampshire with respect to the operation of their
businesses.  The non-resident Plaintiffs purchase and pick up
Bimbo's bakery products outside New Hampshire, and distribute those
products along routes wholly outside New Hampshire, to customers
located outside New Hampshire.  And, the Defendants argue, any
revenue earned by the non-resident Plaintiffs from the sale of
Bimbo's products occurs outside New Hampshire as well.

The Plaintiffs answer that Bimbo employs "countless" employees in
New Hampshire, including a Regional Sales Manager (who oversees
operations in New Hampshire and Maine); a Market Sales Leader, with
responsibilities over a portion of New Hampshire; an Operational
Sales Leader, who is responsible for giving paperwork to newly
hired distributors; as well as shippers, and outlet clerks

Bimbo's operations in New Hampshire, the Plaintiffs say, are part
of a nationwide bakery distribution network that splits the United
States into "regions" that are not limited to a single state.  The
Plaintiffs point out that Bimbo operates a bakery distribution
center in New York, from which its drivers transport product to New
Hampshire sales centers, where those products are picked up by the
Plaintiffs to deliver to stores.

The Defendants now move to dismiss the claims of 22 non-resident
opt-in Plaintiffs.  The Plaintiffs, for their part, have moved to
amend their complaint to add state law wage claims on behalf of
those non-resident opt-in Plaintiffs.

Judge McAuliffe finds that within New Hampshire, the Defendants
operate two warehouses, and employ only a handful of individuals.
Given the Defendants' extensive operations outside the state, those
New Hampshire contacts are insufficient to render them essentially
at home in the state.  Accordingly, the Defendants' contacts with
the state are insufficient to permit the exercise of general
jurisdiction.

The issue then becomes whether the non-resident Plaintiffs have
sufficiently established the Court's specific jurisdiction over the
Defendants.  The Judge concludes that Bristol-Myers applies because
"Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from collective
actions under the FLSA.  While he does not express an opinion on
the propriety of the use of class-action nomenclature, he does note
that there are significant differences between certification under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the joinder process under
Section 216(b).  Opt-in" plaintiffs in FLSA collective actions are
more like the individual plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers than members
of a Rule 23 class, and that close similarity requires similar
outcomes.

Accordingly, each opt-in Plaintiff must establish that a nexus
exists between New Hampshire and their individual FLSA claim
against the Defendants.  Because the non-resident Plaintiffs have
not sufficiently established that nexus, the Court lacks specific
jurisdiction over their claims.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those argued in Defendants'
briefing, Judge McAuliffe granted the motion to dismiss claims
brought by the non-resident opt-in Plaintiffs.  The Judge denied as
moot the Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add claims
on behalf of the non-resident opt-in Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/rrrngQ from Leagle.com.


BLUE APRON: Summary Judgment in Salzberg Securities Suit Reversed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATTHEW B. SALZBERG, JULIE M.B. BRADLEY, TRACY BRITT
COOL, KENNETH A. FOX, ROBERT P. GOODMAN, GARY R. HIRSHBERG, BRIAN
P. KELLEY, KATRINA LAKE, STEVEN ANDERSON, J. WILLIAM GURLEY, MARKA
HANSEN, SHARON McCOLLAM, ANTHONY WOOD, RAVI AHUJA, SHAWN CAROLAN,
JEFFREY HASTINGS, ALAN HENDRICKS, NEIL HUNT, DANIEL LEFF, and RAY
ROTHROCK, Defendants Below, Appellants, and BLUE APRON HOLDINGS,
INC., STITCH FIX, INC., and ROKU, INC., Nominal Defendants Below,
Appellants, v. MATTHEW SCIABACUCCHI, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, Case No. 346,
2019 (Del.), Judge Karen L. Valihura of the Supreme Court of
Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's decision to grant summary
judgment.

The Supreme Court is asked to determine the validity of a provision
in several Delaware corporations' charters requiring actions
arising under the federal Securities Act of 1933 to be filed in a
federal court.  Blue Apron, Roku, and Stitch are all Delaware
corporations that launched initial public offerings in 2017.
Before filing their registration statements with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, each company adopted a
federal-forum provision.

An example of such a federal-forum provision ("FFP") provides:
Unless the Company consents in writing to the selection of an
alternative forum, the federal district courts of the United States
of America will be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any
complaint asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities
Act of 1933.  Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise
acquiring any interest in any security of the Company will be
deemed to have notice of and consented to the provision.

Appellee Sciabacucchi bought shares of each company in its initial
public offering or a short time later.  On Dec. 29, 2017, he filed
a putative class-action complaint in the Court of Chancery against
the individuals who had served as the companies' directors since
they went public, and named the companies as the nominal
Defendants.  The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the
federal-forum provisions are invalid under Delaware law.

The Court of Chancery granted the motion for summary judgment.  In
reaching that result, the court examined its 2013 decision in
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., the
Court's 2014 decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,
federal case law, and what the Court of Chancery described as
"first principles" of Delaware corporate law.  It decided that the
constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation cannot bind a
plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not involve
rights or relationships that were established by or under
Delaware's corporate law.  Because the Federal Forum Provisions
attempt to accomplish that feat, the court held that the
federal-forum provisions are ineffective and invalid.

The Supreme Court reviews the Court of Chancery's decision to grant
summary judgment de novo.  A court may grant summary judgment only
if, based on the undisputed material facts, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  There are no material
facts in dispute in the appeal, and the issues on which she decides
the appeal concern the interpretation of the statutes governing the
permissible contents of a Delaware corporation's certificate of
incorporation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  The
Plaintiff must show that the federal-forum provisions do not
address a proper subject matter of charter provisions under 8 Del.
C. Section 102(b)(1).

The Supreme Court concludes that FFPs are a relatively recent
phenomenon designed to address the post-Cyan difficulties presented
by multi-forum litigation of Securities Act claims.  The policies
underlying the DGCL include certainty and predictability,
uniformity, and prompt judicial resolution to corporate disputes.
The law strives to enhance flexibility in order to engage in
private ordering, and to defer to case-by-case law development.
Delaware courts attempt to achieve judicial economy and avoid
duplicative efforts among courts in resolving disputes.  FFPs
advance these goals.

The General Assembly has also recognized the need to maintain
balance, efficiency, fairness, and predictability in protecting the
legitimate interests of all stakeholders, and to ensure that the
laws do not impose unnecessary costs on Delaware entities.  FFPs do
not violate that sense of balance as they allow for litigation of
federal Securities Act claims in a federal court of the Plaintiff's
choosing, but also allow for consolidation and coordination of such
claims to avoid inefficiencies and unnecessary costs.

Finally, the DGCL was intended to provide directors and
stockholders with flexibility and wide discretion for private
ordering and adaptation to new situations.  That a board's action
might involve a new use of plain statutory authority does not make
it invalid under the law, and the boards of Delaware corporations
have the flexibility to respond to changing dynamics in ways that
are authorized by our statutory law.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Court of Chancery.

A full-text copy of the Delaware Supreme Court's April 14, 2020
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/GMeeJQ from Leagle.com.

William B. Chandler, III, Esquire (argued) -- wchandler@wsgr.com --
Bradley D. Sorrels, Esquire, Lindsay Kwoka Faccenda, Esquire,
Andrew D. Berni, Esquire, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.,
Wilmington, Delaware; Boris Feldman, Esquire, David J. Berger,
Esquire, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C., Palo Alto,
California; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Katrina Lake,
Steven Anderson, J. William Gurley, Marka Hansen, Sharon McCollam,
Anthony Wood, Ravi Ahuja, Shawn Carolan, Jeffrey Hastings, Alan
Hendricks, Neil Hunt, Daniel Leff, Ray Rothrock, Stitch Fix, Inc.,
and Roku, Inc.

Catherine G. Dearlove, Esquire -- dearlove@rlf.com -- Anthony M.
Calvano, Esquire, Tyre Tindall, Esquire, RICHARDS LAYTON & FINGER,
P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Michael G. Bongiorno, Esquire, WILMER
CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, New York, New York; Timothy J.
Perla, Esquire, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR, LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Matthew B.
Salzberg, Julie M.B. Bradley, Tracy Britt Cool, Kenneth A. Fox,
Robert P. Goodman, Gary R. Hirshberg, Brian P. Kelley, and Blue
Apron Holdings, Inc.

Kurt M. Heyman, Esquire -- kheyman@hegh.law -- Melissa N.
Donimirski, Esquire -- mdonimirski@hegh.law -- Aaron M. Nelson,
Esquire, HEYMAN ENERIO GATTUSO & HIRZEL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware;
Jason M. Leviton, Esquire, Joel A. Fleming, Esquire (argued),
Lauren Godles Milgroom, Esquire, Amanda R. Crawford, Esquire, BLOCK
& LEVITON LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellee Matthew Sciabacucchi.


BLUE BOTTLE: Licea Sues Over Charges on Free Trial Subscription
---------------------------------------------------------------
LUIS LICEA, an individual v. BLUE BOTTLE COFFEE, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV24156 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 25, 2020), is brought on behalf of
the Plaintiff and others similarly situated alleging that the
Defendants made and continues to make offers of "free" services and
products that violate California law.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to include a
"clear and conspicuous" explanation of the price that will be
charged after the trial ends, in violation of California's
Automatic Renewal Law and California's Unfair Competition Law.

The Defendants also violates California law by charging consumer
credit or debit cards without first obtaining "affirmative consent"
to automatically renewing charges, the Plaintiff asserts.

The Plaintiff is a blind California consumer. The Plaintiff
accepted a "free" trial subscription of coffee delivery service and
related products from the Defendants.

Blue Bottle is a coffee roaster and retailer headquartered in
Oakland, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott J. Ferrell, Esq.
          PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS
          4100 Newport Place Drive, Ste. 800
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 706-6464
          Facsimile: (949) 706-6469
          E-mail: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


BOHEMIAN CITIZENS: Consent Decree in Dominguez ADA Suit Approved
----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge James L. Cott of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted the proposed Consent Decree
in the case, YOVANNY DOMINGUEZ, for himself and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BOHEMIAN CITIZENS
BENEVOLENT SOCIETY OF ASTORIA L.I.N.Y., et al., Defendants, Case
No. 19-CV-11932 (JLC) (S.D. N.Y.).

By letter dated March 27, 2020, the counsel for the Defendants
presented for the Court's approval the parties' proposed Consent
Decree, which they submit, is fair and reasonable and in the public
interest.  However, this is not the correct standard to apply in
the case.

The correct standard for a non-class action settlement brought by a
party other than an enforcement agency, such as the case, is
whether the proposed consent decree:  (1) springs from and serves
to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction, (2) comes within the general scope of the case made
by the pleadings, and (3) furthers the objectives of the law upon
which the complaint was based.

It should not come as a surprise as Magistrate Judge Gorenstein had
recently corrected defense counsel on this very point in a case
cited in a footnote to the cover letter.  Indeed, the cases that
the defense counsel cite in the body of the cover letter are the
exact same cases that Judge Gorenstein pointed out were inapposite.
Consequently, the counsel should reconsider the form letter that
they apparently submit to the court in any future analogous cases
and modify the case law contained therein.

In any event, Magistrate Judge Cott reviewed the proposed Consent
Decree and finds that it meets the requirements set forth in
Kozlowski v. Coughlin and its progeny.  Accordingly, the proposed
Consent Decree is approved.  In addition, consistent with the
Memorandum Order, the Magistrate Judge has struck the proposed
finding regarding the "public interest" (as it is inapplicable) and
the reference to the Plaintiff acting as a "private attorney
general" (as it is irrelevant) and replaced it with a reference to
the Memorandum Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Memorandum
Order is available at https://is.gd/bWXg9G from Leagle.com.


BOSTON UNIVERSITY: Tran Refund Suit Moved to D. Massachusetts
-------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as Venus Tran, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. BOSTON UNIVERSITY,
Case No. 4:20-cv-03088, was transferred from the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts (Boston) on July 1, 2020.

The District of Massachusetts Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-11260-PBS to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Patti B. Saris.

The class action lawsuit is brought on behalf of all people, who
paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 academic term at Boston
University, and who, because of BU's response to the COVID-19
pandemic, lost the benefit of the education for which they paid,
and/or the services for which their fees were paid, without having
their tuition and fees refunded to them.

BU is a large private university with an enrollment of
approximately 34,657 students. The University is organized into
school and colleges on two campuses and offers more than 300
programs of study. BU also operates an online program offering more
than 44 online degree programs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          L. Timothy Fisher, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 300-4455
          E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Lisa A. Tenerowicz, Esq.
          BOSTON UNIVERSITY
          125 Bay State Rd.
          Boston, MA 02215
          Telephone: (617) 353-2326
          E-mail: latenero@bu.edu

               - and -

          Natasha Julie Baker, Esq.
          NOVUS LAW FIRM, INC.
          1450 Maria Lane, Suite 300
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 239-0343
          E-mail: natasha@novuslawfirm.com

               - and -

          Christine S. Collins, Esq.
          125 Bay State Road
          Boston, MA 02215
          Telephone: (617) 353-2326
          Facsimile: (617) 353-5529
          E-mail: cscoll@bu.edu

               - and -

          Ian Worthington Forgie, Esq.
          NOVUS LAW FIRM, INC.
          1450 Maria Lane, Suite 330
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Telephone: (925) 239-0345
          E-mail: ian@novuslawfirm.com


BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING: Pomerantz Announces Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. (BKD) and certain of its
officers.  The class action, filed in United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, is on
behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise, acquired Brookdale
securities between August 10, 2016, and April 29, 2020, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Brookdale securities during
the class period, you have until August 24, 2020, to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Brookdale is headquartered in Brentwood, Tennessee.  The Company is
the nation's largest senior living community operator, with $4
billion in reported revenue in 2019.

As of February 1, 2020, Brookdale owned 356 communities, leased 307
communities, managed seventy-seven communities on behalf of third
parties, and three communities for which it has an equity interest.
The Company operates independent living, assisted living and
dementia-care communities and continuing care retirement centers
("CCRCs").   Through its ancillary services programs, the Company
also offers a range of outpatient therapy, home health,
personalized living, and hospice services.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operational, and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Brookdale's financial
performance was sustained by, among other things, the Company's
purposeful understaffing of its senior living communities; (ii) the
foregoing conduct subjected Brookdale to an increased risk of
litigation and, once revealed, was foreseeably likely to have a
material negative impact on the Company's financial results and
reputation; (iii) as a result, the Company's financial results were
unsustainable; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

On April 30, 2020, Nashville Business Journal reported that a
proposed class-action lawsuit had been filed against Brookdale in
this Judicial District, which accused the Company of, among other
things, purposeful "chronically insufficient staffing" at its
facilities to meet financial benchmarks since at least April 24,
2016.  According to the lawsuit, Brookdale misled residents and
their families when it promised to provide basic care and daily
living services.  The lawsuit also claims that the proposed class
of plaintiffs "have not received the care and services they paid
for."  The lawsuit asks for damages and Brookdale to "stop the
unlawful and fraudulent practices."

On this news, Brookdale's stock price fell $0.56 per share, or
15.22%, over two trading sessions, closing at $3.12 per share on
May 1, 2020.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members.

Contact:

         Robert S. Willoughby
         Pomerantz LLP
         E-mail: rswilloughby@pomlaw.com
         Web site: http://www.pomerantzlaw.com/
[GN]


BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING: RM Law Notes of Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
RM LAW, P.C., announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased Brookdale
Senior Living, Inc. (NYSE: BKD) securities during the period from
August 10, 2016 through April 29, 2020, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

Brookdale Senior Living shareholders may, no later than August 24,
2020, move the Court for appointment as a lead plaintiff of the
Class. If you purchased shares of Brookdale Senior Living and would
like to learn more about these claims or if you wish to discuss
these matters and have any questions concerning this announcement
or your rights, contact Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire toll-free at
(844) 291-9299 or to sign up online, click here.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Brookdale's financial performance was sustained by, among
other things, the Company's purposeful understaffing of its senior
living communities; (2) the foregoing conduct subjected Brookdale
to an increased risk of litigation and, once revealed, was
foreseeably likely to have a material negative impact on the
Company's financial results and reputation; (3) as a result, the
Company's financial results were unsustainable; and (4) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

If you are a member of the class, you may, no later than August 24,
2020, request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff of the
class.  A lead plaintiff is a representative party that acts on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation.  In
order to be appointed lead plaintiff, the Court must determine that
the class member's claim is typical of the claims of other class
members, and that the class member will adequately represent the
class.  Under certain circumstances, one or more class members may
together serve as "lead plaintiff."  Your ability to share in any
recovery is not, however, affected by the decision whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.  You may retain RM LAW, P.C. or other
counsel of your choice, to serve as your counsel in this action.

For more information regarding this, please contact RM LAW, P.C.
(Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire) toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or by
email at rm@maniskas.com or click here.   For more information
about class action cases in general or to learn more about RM LAW,
P.C. please visit our website by clicking here.

RM LAW, P.C. is a national shareholder litigation firm.  RM LAW,
P.C. is devoted to protecting the interests of individual and
institutional investors in shareholder actions in state and federal
courts nationwide.

Contact:

          RM LAW, P.C.
          Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire
          1055 Westlakes Dr., Ste. 300
          Berwyn, PA 19312
          Tel: 484-324-6800
               844-291-9299
          E-mail: rm@maniskas.com
[GN]


BUSHFIRE GRILL: $206K Settlement in Pacheco Gets Prelim. Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAIRO PACHECO, individually and on behalf of other
similarly situated current and former employees, Plaintiffs, v.
BUSHFIRE GRILL, INC., a California corporation; BUSHFIRE BEACHSIDE,
INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 18cv1696-JAH (WVG) (S.D. Cal.), Judge John A.
Houston of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California granted Plaintiff Pacheco's Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The Court finds that the terms of the Settlement Agreement appear
to be fair, adequate and reasonable and the Gross Class Settlement
Amount of $206,000 appears to be within the range of possible final
approval.  The Gross PAGA Settlement Amount of $11,500 appears to
serve the punitive and deterrent purposes of the PAGA and is
approved.

The Court also preliminary appointed (i) Plaintiff Pacheco as the
Class Representative, (ii) Mayall Hurley P.C., by and through Lead
Counsel Jenny D. Baysinger, Robert J. Wasserman, William J. Gorham,
III, and Nicholas J. Scardigli as the Class Counsel; and (iii)
Atticus Administration, LLC as the Settlement Administrator.

The Court preliminarily approved the declared fees and costs of
administering the Settlement of up to $7,000 for administration of
the Class Settlement.  The Court further preliminarily approved the
declared fees and costs of up to $1,500 to administer the PAGA
allocation associated with the Settlement, as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.

The Court preliminarily approved and conditionally certified for
settlement purposes three Settlement Classes defined as follows:

  a. A Meal Break Class consisting of all current and former non-
     exempt employees of the Defendants, and either of them,
     employed within California who worked at least one shift in
     excess of five hours between May 24, 2014 and Dec. 31, 2018
     and who did not enter into a written Arbitration Agreement
     with the Defendants.

  b. A Rest Break Class consisting of all current and former non-
     exempt employees of the Defendants, and either of them,
     employed within California who worked at least one shift in
     excess of three and one hal hours between May 24, 2014 and
     Dec. 31, 2018 and who did not enter into a written
     Arbitration Agreement with the Defendants.

  c. A Former Employee Sub-Class consisting of all individuals who

     are members of either the Rest Break Class or the Meal Break
     Class and whose employment with the Defendants ended at any
     time between May 24, 2015 and Dec. 31, 2018.

The Meal Break Class is estimated to include approximately 207
total individuals, the Rest Break Class is estimated to include
approximately 207 individuals, and the Former Employee Sub-Class is
estimated to include approximately 184 individuals.

The Court approved (i) as to form and content, the Class Notice,
and (ii) the procedure by which the Class Members may opt out of,
or to object to, the Settlement as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement and the Class Notice.

Subject to further consideration by the Court at the time of the
Final Approval Hearing, the proposed Service Payment of $2,000 to
Pacheco or .0.97% of the Gross Class Settlement Amount, for his
service as Class Representative is preliminarily approved.

Subject to further consideration by the Court at the time of the
Final Approval Hearing, the Class Counsel's request of attorneys'
fees in the amount of one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount
(which includes the Gross Class Settlement Amount and the Gross
PAGA Settlement Amount), or $72,500, and declared costs of up to
$7,500, are preliminarily approved.

The final approval hearing is scheduled for Aug. 10, 2020 at 2:30
p.m.

The parties to the Agreement are directed to carry out their
obligations under the Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/6mx4Xf from Leagle.com.


CAMPBELL SOUP: Vanlaningham Consumer Suit Moved to S.D. Illinois
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as HAUNAH VANLANINGHAM and
DANIELLE SCHWARTZ, individually and on behalf of all
similarly-situated current citizens of Illinois v. CAMPBELL SOUP
CO., Case No. 2019 WL 126188 (Filed March 6, 2020), was removed
from the Illinois Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit,
St. Clair County, to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois on July 1, 2020.

The Southern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:20-cv-00647 to the proceeding.

The complaint alleges causes of action against Campbell: violation
of Illinois Consumer Fraud Act; breach of express Warranty, and
unjust enrichment. These claims arise out of Campbell allegedly
false and deceptive marketing and sale of the following Campbell
"Home Style" and "Slow Kettle" soups: Harvest Tomato With Basil,
Healthy Request Harvest With Basil, Zesty Tomato Bisque, New
England Clam Chowder, Vegetable Medley, Minestrone, Potato Broccoli
Cheese, Tomato & Sweet Basil Bisque, Roasted Red Pepper & Smoked
Gouda Bisque, New England Clam Chowder with Fresh Cream, and Creamy
Broccoli Cheddar Bisque.

Campbell Soup, also known as just Campbell's, is an American
processed food and snack company.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David C. Nelson, Esq.
          NELSON & NELSON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, P.C.
          420 North High Street
          Belleville, IL 62220
          Telephone: 618-277-4000
          E-mail: dnelson@nelsonlawpc.com

               - and -

          Matthew H. Armstrong, Esq.
          ARMSTRONG LAW FIRM LLC
          8816 Manchester Rd., No. 109
          St. Louis, MO 63144
          Telephone: 314-258-0212
          E-mail: matt@mattarmstronglaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Kathleen A. Stetsko, Esq.
          Charles C. Sipos, Esq.
          Lauren W. Staniar, Esq.
          PERKINS COIE LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900
          Seattle, WA 98101-3099
          Telephone: (312) 324-8400
          Facsimile: (312) 324-9400
          E-mail: CSipos@perkinscoie.com
                  LStaniar@perkinscoie.com


CANADIAN HOCKEY: Abuse Class Action Pending
-------------------------------------------
Ken Campbell, writing for The Hockey News, reports that at the age
of 29, Garrett Taylor has developed a facial tic and routinely
cracks his jaw, even when he's sleeping. He struggles keeping
steady employment and finding a true career path. He suffers from
depression and sometimes has random panic attacks. He has been
diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and has been
institutionalized. "It's manageable, but it's never curable," said
Taylor's mother, Kim. "He has struggled along the way. It hasn't
been easy since he hung up the skates."

The abuse class action lawsuit launched against the Canadian Hockey
League has two public faces. The first, and most prominent, is
former NHLer Daniel Carcillo, whose allegations have been well
documented. Carcillo alleges he endured unspeakable acts, then went
on to play 10 years of pro hockey, winning two Stanley Cups and
amassing $7.4 million in career earnings.

The other face in this lawsuit is Garrett Taylor, who played just
79 games of major junior hockey over two seasons in the Western
League, then finished his career playing nine games for the Des
Moines Buccaneers of the USHL. Taylor did not endure sexual abuse
during his time with the Lethbridge Hurricanes and Prince Albert
Raiders, but alleges in his statement of claim that the abuse he
endured, "left him permanently traumatized. He suffered severe
mental health issues (that) were not present before the abuse he
endured. He was hospitalized for a lengthy period after his time in
the WHL. He continues to suffer from the psychological and physical
injuries he suffered while playing in the WHL."

The crux of Taylor's argument stems from an alleged incident that
ended his time with the Hurricanes. Early in the 2009-10 season,
Taylor's second with the Hurricanes, he alleges he was removed from
the team bus just moments before it was due to depart for a road
trip to be told he was being reassigned to the Canmore Eagles Jr. A
team. "The humiliation of the way he was cut really was his PTSD
moment," Kim Taylor said. "It was a life-changing moment for him."

The statement of claim refers to the incident as "the garbage bag
treatment," a term that is well known in junior hockey circles that
refers to when a player is dropped by his team. Kim Taylor said
when her son was reassigned, there were no calls made to any of
her, Taylor's agent or his billet family. Nor was he given any
money or further direction. The lawsuit alleges that he was told
the news in front of the team and had to retrieve his belongings
from the bus and his equipment from the storage area. Kim Taylor
said she learned of the situation when the father of one of her
son's teammates called her to tell her that his son was upset by
the situation. "He had five minutes to… this coach is waiting for
him and that he needs to go there," Kim said. "And that's it.
You're done. He's told to leave the billets and report to Canmore.
That's how I found out. Isn't that nice?"

Kim Taylor wants people to know that she has no issue with the fact
that her son was deemed not good enough to play in the WHL. She
also pointed out that she noticed some signs of depression and
anxiety in her son when he was playing minor hockey in California
before he began in the WHL. It's the way his situation was handled
that she believes scarred her son. And she has a point. When junior
hockey wants to justify paying its players poverty wages, it refers
to them as "student athletes" and "amateurs", but when some of its
teams cut players loose, they expect them to take it like adult
professionals. You can't suck and blow at the same time. Kim Taylor
said her son called her from Canmore before his first practice in
the midst of a panic attack that he thought was a heart attack. She
believes that's what triggered his the OCD he lives with to this
day.

There were other allegations in the Taylor lawsuit that appear to
center around Michael Dyck (although he is not mentioned by name in
the statement of claim), who was the Hurricanes coach during
Taylor's rookie season and is now the head coach of the Vancouver
Giants. (To be clear, Dyck was no longer the coach of the
Hurricanes when Taylor was reassigned in 2009-10. TheHockeyNews.com
has tried to contact Dyck through the Giants, but has not received
a reply.) It was alleged in the statement of claim that the head
coach provided the team credit card to one of the veterans for a
rookie party, where players were made to dress in women's clothing
and consume large amounts of alcohol, to the point where some
players were blacking out and vomiting. "It's illegal, that's the
bottom line," Kim said. "I don't think I need to say anything
more."

The statement of claim also alleges that, during his rookie season,
the head coach took Taylor aside in practices and demanded he fight
to increase the intensity level of the group. Kim Taylor said her
son had three documented concussions during his WHL career, "and
Garrett said one of his worst concussions happened doing that,
fighting in a practice."

None of the allegations has been proven in court and there has been
no specific amount of damages set out in the statement of claim.
But Kim Taylor said the purpose of the lawsuit is to affect change
in junior hockey. "We love hockey," she said. "We just want to
ensure this doesn't happen to other families." [GN]


CANADIAN HOCKEY: Board Creates Panel Amid Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
GoErie.com reports that the Canadian Hockey League's board of
directors has announced the creation of an independent panel that
will review its current policies regarding players' off-ice
safety.

That panel will study the league's response to incidents of
physical or emotional abuse, such as bullying, harassment and
hazing, as well as how it can better respond going forward.

The league hopes the panel will complete its review and announce
any changes in protocol in time for the 2020-21 season. The OHL,
Quebec Major Junior Hockey League and Western Hockey League also
fall under its governance.

The decision to create the panel came a week after a class-action
lawsuit was filed against the CHL in Toronto. Various media outlets
reported that Daniel Carcillo, who played for five NHL teams
between 2006-15, is the lead plaintiff.

Carcillo alleges that as a rookie with the OHL's Sarnia Sting, he
was one of an estimated 12 players who were subjected to hazing
rituals throughout the franchise's 2002-03 season.

Garrett Taylor is another player who publicly came forward as part
of the suit.

Taylor played for the WHL's Lethbridge (Alberta) Hurricanes between
2008-10. Among the allegations during his time there was being
forced by his coach to fight teammates during practices as a way to
install toughness. [GN]


CAPITAL ONE: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Porteous Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NATASHA PORTEOUS, Plaintiff(s), v. CAPITAL ONE
SERVICES II, LLC, Defendant(s), Case No. 2:17-CV-2866 JCM (GWF) (D.
Nev.), Judge James C. Mahan of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada denied (i) the Defendant's motion to dismiss;
(ii) the Plaintiff's motion for circulation of notice; and (iii)
the Defendant's motion to strike the declarations of Ayesha
Elliott, Chidi Emetanjo, Cole Squires, and Porteous.  

On July 7, 2018, the District Court granted Capital One's motion
and dismissed Natasha Porteous' putative class action in its
entirety.  The Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed
on all counts.

Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's
decision only as it pertains to the Defendant's motion to dismiss.
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred by considering
the documents pertaining to the Plaintiff's motion for circulation
of notice, thus engaging in impermissible fact-finding at the
pleadings stage, failing to draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the Plaintiff, and impermissibly assuming the truth of extrinsic
documents for the purpose of contesting the allegations in the
complaint.  The Ninth Circuit did not consider the Plaintiff's
motion for circulation of notice.

Judge Mahan considers the declarations that both parties provide
when adjudicating the Plaintiff's motion for circulation.  The
Court has already discussed the shortcomings in the Plaintiff's
allegations, and that analysis applies with equal if not greater
force to the Plaintiff's motion for circulation.  For instance, the
Court previously found that the Plaintiff's theory as to how the
Defendant calculated and tracked hourly call center employees' time
worked has shifted over time.  And, regardless of which theory the
Plaintiff advanced, it is belied by the Defendant's evidence.

The Court also analyzed the Defendant's policy of paid "prep time"
for employees to perform certain pre-shift work duties, such as
logging into and out of their computers and reviewing daily memos,
company emails, and program and script updates.  Several of the the
Plaintiff's allegations are belied by records of her arrival at
work.  For instance, a vast majority of her self-reported start
times fell within the paid prep period.  Further, her self-reported
that she began working before she even entered the building for 35%
of the shifts that she worked. Finally, the Plaintiff never denies
that she and the members of the putative class were responsible for
manually recording their time worked into the Defendant's
timekeeping system.

Thus, Judge Mahan finds that the Plaintiff has not shown a single
employer policy or that she is similarly situation to potential
opt-in Plaintiffs. The Plaintiff's motion for circulation is
denied. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's memorandum, the
Plaintiff may proceed on her individual claims against the
Defendant.

Accordingly, Judge Mahan vacated District Court's prior order.  The
Judge denied (i) the Defendant's motion to dismiss, consistent with
the Ninth Circuit's memorandum; (ii) the Plaintiff's motion for
circulation of notice; and (iii) the Defendant's motion to strike
the declarations of Elliott, Emetanjo, Squires, and Porteous.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 12, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/8lc5bU from Leagle.com.


CARLOS LOPEZ: McMorris Appeals Order in Steven Suit to 2nd Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Devonne McMorris filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Steven v. Carlos Lopez & Associates, LLC, Case
No. 18-cv-6500, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Jesse M.
Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied approval of the parties' settlement in the class
action.

In June 2018, an employee of Defendant Carlos Lopez & Associates,
LLC ("CLA"), a provider of mental and behavioral health services to
veterans and others, accidentally sent an email containing personal
information about approximately 130 current and former CLA
employees to a distribution list of current CLA employees (a group
numbering about 65). Although there is no evidence that the
personal information contained in the email was shared with anyone
outside of CLA, let alone misused, several people whose information
had been shared sued on behalf of a class of all those whose
information had been shared, alleging negligence and violations of
several states' laws.

Defendants CLA and Carlos Lopez moved to dismiss for, among other
things, lack of Article III standing, but before the Plaintiffs
filed any opposition to that motion, the parties reached a
class-wide settlement. The Plaintiffs now move for approval of the
parties' settlement and an award of attorney's fees.

Judge Furman holds that although unopposed, the Plaintiffs' motion
will be denied. He explains that a court is powerless to approve a
proposed class settlement if it lacks jurisdiction over the
dispute, and federal courts lack jurisdiction if no named plaintiff
has standing. Thus, although the parties have reached a settlement
- and in light of that settlement, the Defendants have apparently
agreed not to press their arguments about standing despite
remaining of the view that Plaintiffs do not actually have standing
- the Court is not free to stick its head in the sand. Instead, it
must confirm for itself that the Plaintiffs have standing. The
Judge concludes that they do not. In the absence of an allegation
or evidence that an unauthorized third party intentionally stole
the data at issue, courts have concluded that the risk of identity
theft is too speculative to support Article III standing.

The appellate case is captioned as Steven v. Carlos Lopez &
Associates, LLC, Case No. 19-4310, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Devonne McMorris is represented by:

          Abraham Melamed, Esq.
          DEREK SMITH LAW GROUP, PLLC
          1 Penn Plaza
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (303) 929-3903
          E-mail: abe@dereksmithlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees Carlos Lopez & Associates, LLC and Carlos
Lopez are represented by:

          Michael B. Miller, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          250 West 55th Street
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 468-8000
          E-mail: mbmiller@mofo.com


CASPER SLEEP: Faces Investor Class Action Over IPO
--------------------------------------------------
Business Times reports that Casper Sleep duped investors into
pouring US$100 million into its initial public offering (IPO),
knowing its financial prospects were far dimmer than it promised,
according to a lawsuit seeking class action status.

It's the latest in a series of blows to the online mattress
retailer, which went public at US$12 a share in February. The stock
closed at US$13.50 on its first day out, for a market
capitalisation of less than half the US$1.10 billion Casper was
valued at in a private funding round last year. The bed-in-a-box
startup ended on June 26 with a share price of US$8.50 and a market
value of US$337.2 million.

In registering for the IPO, Casper failed to disclose that its
profit margins were narrowing and that it was selling "a glut of
old and outdated mattress inventory" at clearance prices, according
to the lawsuit, which was filed in federal court in New York and
demands unspecified damages.

Then, in April, Casper said it was working to "improve its cash
position and business model", the suit continues, "notwithstanding
the fact that the company had raised more than US$100 million in
gross offering proceeds from the IPO" less than three months
earlier.

"The claims in this lawsuit are without merit, and we will defend
against them," a Casper spokesperson said.

Casper's IPO followed the stock market debuts of much bigger
"unicorns" -- private startups valued at more than US$1 billion --
such as Uber Technologies and Peloton Interactive, whose shares
have taken investors on their own roller-coaster rides but which
are still valued at billions of dollars.

To read the lawsuit, that's not in the cards for Casper.

In the complaint, Robert Lematta, the individual investor seeking
to represent others who bought the stock, notes that the New York
retailer has retrenched its global operations and announced a 21
per cent reduction in its workforce. He cites its "ballooning
losses and deteriorating cash position" as responsible for these
"drastic measures" and calls the departure of chief financial
officer Gregory Macfarlane "an extraordinary move so soon after the
IPO".

Casper's troubles could colour investors' view of other brands that
cut out the middleman and entice consumers with the savings. The
category's heavy reliance on social media advertising lowered
barriers to entry, spurring the arrival of competitors and making
it costlier to get new customers. A raft of online brands started
opening stores and adding ancillary products.

Founded in 2014, Casper popularised the practice of buying a
mattress online that arrived bundled in a box. It won acclaim
through marketing campaigns featuring YouTube stars and other
celebrities, expanding rapidly. Casper attracted a series of famous
investors, including the rapper Nas and the actor Ashton Kutcher.
Kylie Jenner posted about the brand on Instagram in 2015.

As the IPO approached, the company "claimed to have significantly
improved its profit margins, placing it on a path to
profitability", according to the suit. Still, it slashed its
offering price, to a range of US$12 to US$13 a share from US$17 to
US$19, just before it listed.

During its expansion, Casper incurred net losses of US$73.4 million
in 2017 and US$92.1 million in 2018, according to the suit, and in
its first quarter as a public company posted a net loss of US$34.5
million on net revenue of US$113 million. It spent US$423 million
on marketing from 2016 to September, Casper said in a January
securities filing.

In the run-up to the stock offering, the retailer reassured
investors that its fortunes would be driven by revenue growth and
profit margin improvements, according to the suit. Shortly after
the IPO, Mr Lematta said in the suit, it announced a downward trend
in its gross margin and "substantially impaired operations as a
result of an increasingly dire cash flow situation". [GN]


CHASE BANK: Distribution of Remaining Deal Fund in Haynes Approved
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RUSTY HAYNES, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK USA, N.A., Defendant,
Case No. 7:18-CV-03307 (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
approved the Parties' request to redistribute the money remaining
in the Settlement Fund, and the cy pres award to the State
University of New York ("SUNY") School of Social Welfare and the
National Foundation for Credit Counseling ("NFCC").

The Court approved the class-action settlement in the case on Aug.
24, 2018.  The Settlement Agreement included an $11.5 million
Settlement Fund for distribution to the Settlement Class, in
addition to other relief.  The distributions from the Settlement
Fund were made in the manner set forth in the Settlement Agreement;
however, following a first round of distributions, 781 of the
checks sent to Class Members remain uncashed, resulting in
$404,501.66 remaining in the Settlement Fund.

In order to maximize the relief to the Class, the Parties have
agreed to redistribute the money remaining in the Settlement Fund,
less the anticipated cost of a second distribution, on a pro rata
basis to Class Members who cashed their first Distribution Claim
check.  They've requested that the Court approves SUNY School of
Social Welfare and NFCC as cy pres recipients for any funds
remaining after that second distribution.

Judge Briccetti ordered the Parties to redistribute the money
remaining in the Settlement Fund, less the anticipated cost of a
second distribution, on a pro rata basis to the Class Members who
cashed their first Distribution Claim check.  Should there be a
balance remaining in the Settlement Fund following the second
distribution, after all costs are paid and after the deadline for
cashing checks has passed, the Judge approved the SUNY School of
Social Welfare and the NFCC as cy pres recipients, each to receive
50% of money remaining in the Settlement Fund.

The Judge finds that, after the second distribution, a cy pres
award would be consistent with the objectives underlying the
litigation.  The Judge further finds that the designated
organizations' interests are aligned with the interests of the
Plaintiff and the Class.

The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/4smiPw from Leagle.com.


CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Bailey Sues Over Decline in Stock Prices
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Bailey, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS, INC., RICHARD L. EBERLY, GAIL S.
PAGE, and NEIL A. GOLDMAN, Case No. 2:20-cv-02961 (E.D.N.Y., July
3, 2020), seeks to recover damages caused by the Defendants'
violations of federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because of the Defendants'
wrongful acts and omissions resulting in the precipitous decline in
the market value of the Company's securities.

The lawsuit is brought against the Company and certain of its top
officials, on behalf of a class consisting of all persons and
entities other than Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired
Chembio securities between April 1, 2020, and June 16, 2020, both
dates inclusive.

Amidst the SARS-CoV-2, or COVID-19, pandemic, the Company focused
on the development and commercialization of a serological or
antibody test. In April 2020, Chembio's DPP COVID-19 antibody test
was among the first such tests to be granted Emergency Use
Authorization ("EUA") by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (the
"FDA").

According to the complaint, the Defendants made materially false
and misleading statements regarding the Company's business,
operational and compliance policies. Specifically, the Defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) Chembio's DPP COVID-19 test did not provide high-quality
results and there were material performance concerns with the
accuracy of the Company's DPP COVID-19 test; (ii) the Company's DPP
COVID-19 test generates a higher than expected rate of false
results and higher than that reflected in the authorized labeling
for the device, and was not effective in detecting antibodies
against COVID-19; (iii) accordingly, it was not reasonable to
believe that the test may be effective in detecting antibodies
against COVID-19 and, as a result, there was a material risk to
public health from the false test results; (iv) all the foregoing,
once revealed, was foreseeably likely to have a material negative
impact on the Company's financial results; and (v) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

On June 16, 2020, after the market closed, the FDA issued a press
release disclosing that it had revoked Chembio's EUA for the
Company's DPP COVID-19 Igm/IgG System. On June 17, 2020, Chembio
filed a Current Report on Form 8-K with the SEC that acknowledged
receipt of the FDA's June 16, 2020 letter. As a result of the
disclosure of the FDA letter, Chembio's stock price fell $6.04 per
share, or 60.83%, to close at $3.89 per share on June 17, 2020, on
heavier than usual volume of over 25 million shares.

After markets closed on June 17, 2020, Bloomberg published a report
titled "FDA Reversal on Chembio Antibody Test Sends Stock Down 63%"
that noted that, in light of the FDA revocation of the Company's
EUA, five analysts downgraded Chembio stock. As a result of
Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
decline in the market value of the Company's securities, Plaintiff
and other Class members have suffered significant losses and
damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff acquired Chembio securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period.

Chembio, together with its subsidiaries, develops, manufactures,
and commercializes point-of-care ("POC") diagnostic tests that are
used to detect or diagnose diseases.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Patrick V. Dahlstrom, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          10 South La Salle Street, Suite 3505
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: (312) 377-1181
          Facsimile: (312) 377-1184
          Email: pdahlstrom@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
          PORTNOY LAW FIRM
          8240 Beverly Blvd., Suite 9
          Los Angeles, CA 90048
          Phone: (310) 692-8883
          Email: lesley@portnoylaw.com


CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Kessler Topaz Reminds of August 17 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP reminds that an
investor securities fraud class action lawsuit has been filed
against Chembio Diagnostics, Inc. (NASDAQ: CEMI) ("Chembio") on
behalf of those who purchased or otherwise acquired Chembio common
stock between March 12, 2020 and June 16, 2020, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

Chembio investors who purchased or otherwise acquired common stock
during the Class Period may, no later than August 17, 2020, seek to
be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class.

Investors who wish to discuss this securities fraud class action
lawsuit or request additional information about this litigation are
encouraged to contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check attorneys James
Maro, Jr. or Adrienne Bell at (844) 877-9500 (toll free) or online,
click http://www.ktmc.com/chembio-diagnostics-inc-class-action.

According to the complaint, Chembio develops diagnostic solutions
and offers products for treatment, detection, and diagnosis of
infectious diseases. Chembio claims to have developed and patented
a new and innovative technology called the Dual Path Platform
("DPP(R)"), which allows for rapid diagnostic testing of a variety
of chemical substances. On its website, Chembio maintains that its
products "meet the highest standards for accuracy and superior
performance to help prevent the spread of infectious diseases" and
that its "innovative solutions, like the Chembio Dual Path Platform
(DPP(R)), make [point-of-care] testing faster, more accurate, and
more cost effective."

On March 12, 2020, Chembio entered into a worldwide strategic
partnership with LumiraDx Limited, a company focused on developing,
manufacturing, and commercializing industry-leading point-of-care
diagnostic platforms, with the aim of developing a diagnostic test
for the detection of the COVID-19 virus and IgM and IgG antibodies
on both of their DPP(R) platforms (the "DPP COVID-19 Test").
Following this news, Chembio's shares jumped 65% during pre-market
trading. Throughout the Class Period, the defendants touted their
progress in developing the DPP COVID-19 Test, representing that it:
(i) successfully aided in determining current or past exposure to
the COVID-19 virus; (ii) provided high sensitivity and specificity;
and (iii) was 100% accurate. The defendants' overly positive
progress updates convinced some entities to place purchase orders
for the DPP COVID-19 Tests worth millions of dollars. These events
further boosted the price of Chembio shares, including on March 20,
2020, when Chembio's shares rose 54%. Chembio's representations
ultimately drove its stock from a closing price of $3.10 per share
on March 11, 2020, to a Class Period high of $15.54 per share on
April 24, 2020, an increase of more than 400%.

The complaint alleges that, on June 16, 2020, after the market
closed, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") issued a
press release disclosing that it had revoked Chembio's Emergency
Use Authorization ("EUA") for its DPP COVID-19 Test. In a public
announcement, the FDA informed that its decision was "due to
performance concerns with the accuracy of the test." More
specifically, the FDA informed that the DPP COVID-19 Test
"generate[d] a higher than expected rate of false results and
higher than that reflected in the authorized labeling for the
device." As a result, the FDA concluded that the "test's benefits
no longer outweigh its risks." The next day, on June 17, 2020,
Chembio publicly acknowledged the receipt of the FDA's June 16,
2020 letter and informed the public of the FDA's revocation of its
EUA. Following this news, Chembio shares declined from a closing
price on June 16, 2020 of $9.93 per share to close at $3.89 per
share on June 17, 2020, a decline of more than 60%.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that Chembio's DPP COVID-19 Test did not provide
high-quality results and there were material performance concerns
with the accuracy of its DPP COVID-19 Test.

Chembioinvestors may, no later than August 17, 2020, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation. In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class. Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world. The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars). The complaint in this action was
not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check. For more information
about Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, please visit www.ktmc.com.
[GN]


CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Levi & Korsinsky Notes of Aug. 17 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, announces that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of publicly-traded Chembio
Diagnostics, Inc. (CEMI).  Shareholders interested in serving as
lead plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the
court. Further details about the cases can be found at the links
provided. There is no cost or obligation to you.

CEMI Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/chembio-diagnostics-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=7748&wire=1

Chembio Diagnostics, Inc. (CEMI)

CEMI Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased March 12, 2020 -
June 16, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline : August 17, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/chembio-diagnostics-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=7748&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, defendants engaged in a scheme to
deceive the market and a course of conduct that artificially
inflated Chembio's stock price and operated as a fraud or deceit by
misrepresenting the efficacy of the Company's Dual Path Platform
("DPP") COVID-19 test. Defendants allegedly achieved this by making
false statements about Chembio's DPP COVID-19 test, although they
knew or at least recklessly disregarded that there were material
performance concerns with the test. When defendants' prior
misrepresentations were disclosed and became apparent to the
market, the price of Chembio stock fell precipitously as the prior
artificial inflation came out of Chembio's stock price.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders.

Contact:

          Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
          Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
          55 Broadway, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10006
          E-mail: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
          Tel: (212) 363-7500
          Fax: (212) 363-7171
          Web site: http://www.zlk.com/
[GN]


CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA: Summary Judgment Upheld in Lutz Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's summary judgment in the case, REGIS F. LUTZ,
MARION L. LUTZ, LEONARD YOCHMAN, JOSEPH L. YOCHMAN, C.Y.V. LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, L.L.C.,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 19-3315 (6th Cir.).

How to calculate royalty payments under natural gas contracts has
resulted in a spate of litigation in several states against various
gas companies.  The Plaintiffs pursued a similar course of
litigation here.  At summary judgment, the district court held that
the Plaintiffs had failed to bring their royalty claims within
Ohio's four-year limitations period, and that they similarly had
failed to show that the limitations period should be tolled.  With
the case now on appeal, the Sixth Circuit is asked to resolve
whether the Plaintiffs' failure to meet the limitations period
should be excused because Defendant Chesapeake Appalachia
fraudulently concealed both the submarket prices it used to
calculate royalty payments and the deductions it made from those
payments for production costs.

For more than 30 years, Chesapeake Appalachia and its corporate
predecessors have leased parcels of land that contain natural gas
deposits in several states along the Appalachian Plateau.  The
Plaintiffs own several of the leased parcels that run along the
Ohio-Pennsylvania border.  Each lease agreement requires Chesapeake
to pay the respective Plaintiff/lessor monthly royalties equal to
1/8th of the market value of the gas produced.  To show how the
royalty payments are calculated, Chesapeake sends monthly check
stubs to each Plaintiff/lessor.  The stubs disclose the volume of
gas produced, the price paid per unit, and the portion of the
production costs allocated to the lessor.

The parties have a long-running dispute over whether Chesapeake
properly calculated those royalty payments.  In 2009, that dispute
boiled over into litigation.  Invoking the Court's diversity
jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs brought a putative class action
against Chesapeake.  They alleged that beginning in at least 1993,
Chesapeake breached the royalty provisions of the natural gas
leases by paying them significantly less than the market price for
natural gas as well as by misreporting the volume of gas produced
and the production costs charged to the lessors.  The district
court initially dismissed the Plaintiffs' claims as time-barred
under the applicable Ohio four-year limitations period, finding
that the limitations period began to run with the first monthly
royalty payment in 1993, and that the payments were not divisible
for limitations purposes.

The Sixth Circuit reversed.  To its eye, each royalty payment was a
divisible contractual obligation under Ohio law, each with its own
four-year limitations period.  The Sixth Circuit accordingly held
that the Plaintiffs' claims regarding payments made after September
2005 were not time-barred.  As to earlier payments, the Sixth
Circuit found that the Plaintiffs, for purposes of overcoming a
motion to dismiss, had sufficiently alleged that Chesapeake
fraudulently concealed the basis for their pre-2005 claims.  It
thus remanded the dispute back to the district court to consider,
with the benefit of discovery, whether such concealment tolled the
statute of limitations.

Discovery did not prove helpful to the Plaintiffs.  During
discovery, they admitted that they had barely looked at the check
stubs sent along with the royalty payments.  In particular, they
admitted they neither compared the pay rate column to the publicly
available market prices for natural gas, nor examined the column
that reflected deductions for production costs.  And they conceded
they could easily have reached out to Chesapeake with questions
regarding any aspect of their royalty payments, but did not.

These admissions, the district court concluded, undermined the
Plaintiffs' claim that the alleged underpayments were fraudulently
concealed to prevent discovery by the Plaintiffs.  If the
Plaintiffs expect to toll the statute of limitations under Ohio
law, the district court observed, due diligence requires that they
had checked the stubs Chesapeake sent them.  Yet the Plaintiffs
failed to undertake any investigation -- neither by examining their
check stubs, consulting available market prices, nor contacting
Chesapeake.  Accordingly, the district court held that the
Plaintiffs' pre-September 2005 claims were time-barred, awarding
Chesapeake summary judgment as to those claims.

The Plaintiffs now appeal that ruling.  Although their notice of
appeal was not limited to the issue of fraudulent concealment as to
the Plaintiffs' pre-2005 claims, the parties agree that the appeal
is confined solely to that issue.

The Plaintiffs believe the statute of limitations should be tolled
under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.  Their theory is that
Chesapeake misreported to them much of the information underlying
how their royalty payments were calculated, including the volume of
gas harvested, the price per unit for which Chesapeake sold the
gas, and the portion of Chesapeake's production costs charged to
the Plaintiffs.

Through the check stubs, the Plaintiffs had before them the volume
of gas harvested, the price paid per unit, the allocation of
production costs, and the net payment amount.  True, if the
Plaintiffs' claims are believed, both the volumes and allocated
production costs were misreported.  But the Plaintiffs did not
review that information.  And unlike in Venture Global Engineering,
LLC v. Satyam Computer Services, Ltd., the Plaintiffs had available
to them public information regarding gas prices.   Any dispute
about the payment was thus discoverable not by moving heaven and
earth, but rather by seeking out public information through the
internet or other means.  Yet they undertook no investigation.
Even measured against the more lenient fraudulent concealment
framework, absent some means of diligence, the Plaintiffs are not
entitled to tolling of the limitations period.

Any other conclusion regarding the statute of limitations seemingly
would undermine the statute itself, at least as to claims for
royalty payments.  After all, a similarly idle lessor could always
claim that she simply took a defendant at its word in computing
royalties.  But if "doing nothing" constitutes reasonable due
diligence in the context of royalty payments, the limitations
period would always be tolled save for instances where the
defendant outright admitted the fraud, or the amount reported on a
check stub was so wildly low as to trigger a duty to investigate.
Understandably, the Ohio Supreme Court has held otherwise.

The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that Venture Global, in applying the
wrongful concealment doctrine, cited favorably to the Court's
earlier decision in Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC.  But both
Venture Global and Lutz reviewed the Plaintiffs' claims against the
backdrop of a motion to dismiss.  So, in Lutz, the Court assumed
the truth of the Plaintiffs' factual allegations, including the
claim that the Plaintiffs had no practical way to independently
determine the amount of royalty payments due them.  It likewise
assumed that the Plaintiffs relied on the reports and documents
that Chesapeake furnished to them.

With the benefit of discovery, neither of those claims holds up.
The Plaintiffs did not read the check stubs, and thus could not
have relied upon any purported discrepancy in the price or costs
listed there, let alone to their detriment.  In failing to take
even those pedestrian steps, it was the Plaintiffs' own conduct
that "kept them from timely bringing suit."  To the same end, to
the extent Chesapeake's alleged fraud was not apparent on the face
of the check stubs, the record reveals several avenues through
which the Plaintiffs could have discovered the alleged
underpayments -- including an internet search, phone call, or other
public inquiry.  In this setting, an Ohio court would not toll the
limitations period.  Out of respect for those courts, neither will
the Sixth Circuit.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's April 3, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/H37y8t from Leagle.com.


CHINA ZENIX: Judge Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling LLP, in an article for JDSupra, reports that on
June 12, 2020, Judge Kevin McNulty of the of United States District
of New Jersey granted in part and denied in part a motion to
dismiss a putative securities fraud class action asserting
violations of Sections 9(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 against a Chinese manufacturer
of wheels for commercial vehicles (the "Company") as well as the
Company's CEO and CFO (collectively, "Defendants"). He v. China
Zenix Auto Int'l Ltd. et al., Civ. No. 2:18-cv-15530, 2020 WL
31695006 (D.N.J. June 12, 2020). Plaintiffs alleged that, in an
effort to prevent the Company from being de-listed by the New York
Stock Exchange (the "NYSE"), certain of the Company's employees
engaged in improper trading that artificially inflated the
Company's stock price. Plaintiffs further alleged that the
Company's ongoing statements regarding its compliance with NYSE
listing requirements were materially misleading, because these
statements did not disclose that it achieved compliance only as a
result of improper trading. The Court denied Defendants' motion to
dismiss as to the Section 10(b) claims against the Company and the
CEO, but granted the motion to dismiss the Section 10(b) claims
against the CFO for failure to adequately allege scienter. The
Court dismissed the Section 9(a) claims for failure to adequately
allege a series of purportedly manipulative transactions.

In 2011, the Company completed an initial public offering of
American Depository Shares ("ADS"). In 2015, the NYSE informed the
Company that its ADS price had dropped below $1.00 over a period of
30 trading days, and that it would be de-listed if at the end of
the six-month cure period, the price remained below $1.00 for the
previous 30 trading days. In 2015 and 2016, the Company issued
press releases announcing it had cured the violation. However, in
its 2017 Annual Report, the Company announced that the NYSE had
launched an investigation into trading conducted by a number of
Company employees in the Company's stock during certain periods in
2015 and 2016. Subsequently, in June 2018, the NYSE announced it
had decided to de-list the Company for engaging in conduct
"contrary to the public interest."

With respect to Section 10(b), plaintiffs alleged that the Company
made materially misleading statements about the risk of being
de-listed in its disclosures, because the Company failed to
disclose that: (1) it knew its employees were trading the ADS
improperly; (2) this trading was the reason the Company was able to
satisfy NYSE's listing requirements; and (3) the Company was aware
that it faced a material risk of being de-listed because of the
NYSE's investigation into the improper trading. Plaintiffs also
alleged that the improper trading activity constituted market
manipulation in violation of Section 9(a).

The Court held that plaintiffs adequately pleaded that, when the
Company disclosed it had "cured" its violations in 2015 and 2016,
its failure to also disclose the improper trading scheme that
enabled the Company's compliance was materially misleading. With
respect to the 2017 Annual Report, although the Company disclosed
the existence of an NYSE investigation, the Court found that this
disclosure was nonetheless misleading, because it failed to
disclose "that the trading practices being investigated had in fact
occurred; that they were in fact improper; and that the Company
knew it." The Court noted that the NYSE's decision to de-list the
Company in 2018 was a "key subsequent fact" that supported
plaintiffs' allegation that Company employees participated in
improper trading in 2015 and 2016.

With respect to scienter, the Court held that a variety of facts
supported the inference that the CEO, and the Company on the basis
of respondeat superior, acted with the requisite scienter, most
importantly that: (1) the CEO was also the founder and Chairman of
the Board of Directors; (2) he beneficially owned approximately 70%
of the Company's ordinary shares whereas no one else held more than
one percent of the shares; and (3) he ran the Company like a
"family business," making family members officers and senior
executives. In contrast, plaintiffs did not adequately allege the
CFO's scienter, because they alleged nothing beyond the fact he
held the position of CFO during the relevant time.

Notably, even though the Court found the allegations of the
Company's knowledge of its employees' improper trading were
sufficient to support plaintiffs' 10(b) claim, the Court dismissed
plaintiffs' Section 9(a) market manipulation claims predicated on
allegations of this same improper trading. The Court noted that,
while "a vague description of an improper trading scheme" was
sufficient to demonstrate that the Company's disclosures were
misleading, a claim under Section 9(a) requires an "explanation of
who traded, or when and how they traded." Moreover, the Court noted
that, to state a Section 9(a) claim, plaintiffs were required to
allege more than the CEO's or CFO's knowledge of the improper
trading. Specifically, plaintiffs were required to allege the
culpable participation of the CEO and CFO in the improper trading,
which they failed to do. [GN]


CIGNA CORP: Amara Appeals D. Conn. Ruling to Second Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Janice C. Amara, et al., filed an appeal from the
District Court's ruling dated July 14, 2017, November 1, 2017, and
August 16, 2019, and Order dated January 10, 2020, entered in the
lawsuit entitled Amara v. CIGNA Corporation, Case No. 01-cv-2361,
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (New
Haven).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the class
action lawsuit is brought for alleged violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

The appellate case is captioned as Amara v. CIGNA Corporation, Case
No. 20-202, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Janice C. Amara, individually, and on behalf
of other similarly situated, Gisela R. Broderick, and Annette S.
Glanz, are represented by:

          Stephen Robert Bruce, Esq.
          STEPHEN R. BRUCE, ESQ.
          1667 K Street, NW
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 289-1117

Defendants-Appellees Cigna Corporation and CIGNA Pension Plan are
represented by:

          Bradford Sargent Babbitt, Esq.
          ROBINSON & COLE LLP
          280 Trumbull Street
          Hartford, CT 06103
          Telephone: (860) 275-8200
          E-mail: bbabbitt@rc.com

               - and -

          Alice Klair Fitzpatrick, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          1701 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 963-4935
          E-mail: klair.fitzpatrick@morganlewis.com


CNMI: Settlement Fund Can Intervene in PSSS Lawsuit
---------------------------------------------------
Ferdie De La Torre, writing for Saipan Tribune, reports that
Superior Court Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho granted on June 26
the NMI Settlement Fund's motion to intervene in the lawsuit filed
by the Public School System and Education Commissioner Dr. Alfred
Ada against Gov. Ralph DLG Torres and Finance Secretary David
Atalig.

Camacho, however, denied the Settlement Fund's motion to suspend
the proceedings in the lawsuit.

At a status conference/motion hearing at the CNMI Supreme Court
courtroom, Camacho ruled that since the Office of the Attorney
General did not argue that they could adequately also represent the
retirees, the motion to intervene is granted but, citing the
Settlement Fund's failure to articulate its grounds, Camacho denied
suspending the proceedings in the lawsuit.

PSS and Ada's motion for summary judgment will be heard on Aug. 28,
2020.

PSS and Ada, through counsel Tiberius Mocanu said he will file an
amended complaint that will drop any language referencing the
Settlement Fund so that it will not be part of the case.

Settlement Fund trustee Joyce Tang argued on the motion to
intervene. Settlement Fund counsel Nicole M. Torres-Ripple argued
on the motion to stay.

On the motion to stay, assistant attorney general John P. Lowrey
first did not take a position for or against the motion to stay. He
later changed his mind and joined PSS in opposing the motion.

But Camacho ruled that the CNMI court is a separate jurisdiction
and no decision has been made that would affect the settlement
agreement in Betty Johnson's class action.

In their opposition to the motions filed on June 24, PSS and Ada,
through Mocanu, asserted that the Settlement Fund's basis for its
desire to intervene is "entirely fabricated" and unsupported by
fact. Mocanu said the Settlement Fund does not have standing to
intervene as it does not have any interest in the lawsuit's
outcome.

He said the Settlement Fund essentially argues that, should PSS
succeed in this suit, the CNMI would risk defaulting on the
settlement agreement in the Betty Johnson class action. That
position prompted the Settlement Fund to intervene in the case and
to suspend the proceedings so that it can enforce the settlement
agreement in in the U.S. District Court for the NMI.

"However, PSS does not seek to take a literal 25% of the earmarked
funds to the Settlement Fund. Nor does it seek to limit, reduce, or
stop any payment to the Settlement Fund," he said.

Instead, Mocanu said, PSS asks that the Superior Court find the
earmarks listed in its complaint unconstitutional inasmuch as they
do not function to create special revenue and thus shield the same
from the calculation of PSS' constitutional entitlement to 25% of
general revenue.

He said PSS is not trying to take 25% of what is owed the
Settlement Fund.

PSS, the lawyer said, just wants the $43 million the Settlement
Fund was paid this year to be declared as paid from the general
revenues of the Commonwealth and thus to be included in the
calculation of the total amount available for appropriation, of
which PSS is entitled to 25%.

"It's that simple," Mocanu said.

He said the Settlement Fund may have a semblance of an argument to
intervene had PSS actually moved forward with its prior intention
to file for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction. Mocanu said PSS has already dropped its bid for any
form of injunctive relief.

He said PSS' prior intention to do so was a consequence of no
longer receiving appropriations from the government and thus being
unable to fund the continued operation of its schools. "However, on
account of the pandemic and the governor's executive order, the
schools were closed for another reason and PSS furloughed its
employees," Mocanu said.

PSS and Ada sued Torres and Atalig to guarantee for PSS an annual
budget of not less than 25% of the Commonwealth's general revenue.

In their lawsuit, PSS and Ada alleged that Torres is in violation
of the NMI Constitution because he is carrying out payments and
collections under Public Law 21-08, which established the
Commonwealth government budget for fiscal year 2020. That law,
Mocanu said, appropriated $37,718,904 to PSS, which is
approximately 16% of the budget.

PSS and Ada also alleged that Atalig is in violation of the CNMI
Constitution because every allotment and disbursement made pursuant
to P.L. 21-08 is unconstitutional.

PSS and Ada asked the court to declare that P.L. 21-08 is
unconstitutional.

In their answer to the lawsuit, Torres and Atalig, through the
Office of the Attorney General, said the governor's actions are
licensed by the state of emergency declared by Executive Order
2020-04, pursuant to the CNMI Constitution, the Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Act, and the CNMI Emergency Health Powers
Act of 2003. [GN]


CORINTHIAN COLLEGES: Educ. Dept Ordered to Discharge Student Loans
------------------------------------------------------------------
Aarthi Swaminathan, writing for Yahoo!Money, reports that a federal
court ordered the discharge of student loans under an Obama-era
borrower defense rule for the first time on the same day that a
vote to override President Trump's veto related to the same rule
failed in the House.

The implications of the events bring more uncertainty to hundreds
of thousands of affected borrowers as the watershed court ruling
faces a potential appeal and consumer advocates vow to continue
fighting the Trump administration's repeal of rules designed to
protect defrauded student borrowers.

Massachusetts ruling grants debt relief to 7,200

On June 26, a federal judge ordered the Department of Education
(ED) to cancel roughly 7,200 former Corinthian Colleges' student
debt in Massachusetts.

"Thousands of Massachusetts students cheated by Corinthian have
finally had their day in court, and they have won," Massachusetts
Attorney General Maura Healey stated. "This landmark victory for
students will cancel the federal loans for thousands of defrauded
borrowers, mostly Black and Latinx students, targeted by a
predatory for-profit school and abandoned by Secretary DeVos and
the Trump Administration. For five years, our office and the
Project on Predatory Student Lending have fought to win students
the relief they deserve and today we have won decisively."

Beyond erasing debt for the defrauded students, who had attended
Everest schools operated by now-defunct for-profit giant
Corinthian, the decision instructed the ED to make borrower defense
to repayment process less opaque.

But while the Massachusetts ruling only applies to the 7,200
members of the class action suit (which may face an appeal by ED or
the Department of Justice), the remainder of borrower defense
applicants are uncertain. Defrauded students previously told Yahoo
Finance that their claims continued to be denied.

Those applications were deemed to be ineligible for loan
forgiveness, even though some of the students had not even obtained
a degree and could neither transfer their credits to complete it
nor access further federal funding to support a fresh start.

About 200,000 to 300,000 defrauded students have filed an
application for debt relief but are still in the queue or have been
recently deemed ineligible (and are able to appeal). The
Massachusetts ruling provides hope for similar class actions
suits.

Debt relief made harder for future applicants

The Massachusetts ruling is good news for past student borrowers
who allege fraud, while a failure to override a presidential veto
on the same day is bad news for future student borrowers.

In May, President Donald Trump vetoed a bipartisan resolution
passed both by the House and the GOP-controlled Senate that aimed
to re-establish a loan forgiveness policy designed in 1995 and
bolstered during the Obama administration.

On June 26, House Democrats Capitol Hill failed to secure
sufficient votes to override the Trump veto on borrower defense.
The chamber voted 238-173 on H.J.Res 76, failing to secure a
two-thirds majority that was needed to override the presidential
veto.

"On June 28 the House has one final opportunity to ensure the
defrauded students get the relief they deserve by overriding that
veto," Congressman Bobby Scott (D-VA) argued on the floor of the
House on June 26, prior to the vote. "I urge my colleagues to vote
to override the president's veto."

Trump-appointed Education Secretary Betsy DeVos dismantled the
established borrower defense policy in July 2019 by changing how
the ED processed debt relief claims made by students who had been
defrauded by mainly for-profit colleges that were deemed predatory.
The new policy goes into effect on July 1, 2020.

"The DeVos rules will limit relief to only about 3% of defrauded
student borrowers, and only 1% of schools guilty of misleading
students would have to reimburse taxpayers, leaving hundreds of
thousands of students trapped deep in debt with no job and a
worthless degree," the National Consumer Law Center said in a press
release.

New America's Wesley Whistle, who was following the vote on June
26, told Yahoo Finance that the new policy does not bode well for
defrauded student borrowers or American taxpayers.

"DeVos's rule fails to protect students or taxpayers because it
lets sham colleges off the hook and shifts the burden to students,"
Whistle said. "And when those students default on their loans, that
costs taxpayers too."

Ben Miller at the Center for American Progress agreed with that
sentiment.

"From the start, this administration has sat on its hands while
tens of thousands more borrowers lawfully seek relief," Miller
said. "And it has denied significant relief to students inarguably
ripped off by predatory actors such as Corinthian Colleges through
innumerate formulas that do things such as deny full relief to
borrowers for not having negative earnings." [GN]


CREDIT BUREAU: Protective Order Motion in Kang Lawsuit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUNG GON KANG, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT BUREAU CONNECTION, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01359-AWI-SKO (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Sheila K. Oberto of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California, Fresno Division, denied the Defendant's
motion for protective order.

On Oct. 2, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action
against the Defendant alleging violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), and the California Consumer Credit
Reporting Agencies Act ("CCRAA").  The Plaintiff alleges that the
Defendant provides businesses with consumer credit information,
which may include whether a consumer is included on the United
States Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") list.  Among other consequences, inclusion on the OFAC
list makes a consumer ineligible for credit in the United States.
The Defendant allegedly provided to businesses inaccurate
information that consumers, including Plaintiff, were included on
the OFAC list.  The Plaintiff seeks to represent classes consisting
of individuals "about whom the Defendant sold a consumer report to
a third party" that included an OFAC Hit.

On March 19, 2019, the Defendant served answers and objections to
the Plaintiff's first set of written discovery requests.  The
discovery requests at issue here are as follows:

     a. INTERROGATORY 5: Identify all natural persons about whom
        You provided an OFAC Hit to a third party from Oct. 2,
        2011 to the present.

     b. INTERROGATORY 6: Identify the entity to which You provided
        each OFAC Hit you identified in Your response to
        Interrogatory 5 and the date of each.

     c. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 3: All documents and electronically
        stored information in Your possession, custody, or control
        concerning individuals about whom You reported an OFAC Hit
        to a third party from Oct. 2, 2011 to the present.

     d. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 7: All documents and electronically
        stored information in Your possession, custody, or control
        concerning pertaining to Your policies and procedures
        concerning the accuracy of Your OFAC Hits in effect from
        Oct. 2, 2011 to the present.

The Defendant objected to the requests, in part, because they are
unduly burdensome, and seek information which is privileged against
discovery on the basis of individual privacy rights.

On Sept. 20, 2019, the Court held an informal discovery dispute
conference.  Following the conference, the Court found the
information requested relevant, granted the Plaintiff's request for
further responses to the discovery requests and directed the
parties to meet and confer regarding whether the electronically
stored information ("ESI") is reasonably accessible and obtainable
without undue burden or cost.

The Defendant filed objections to the Court's order pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), which the assigned district
judge overruled.  On Dec. 19, 2019, following a second informal
discovery dispute, the Court directed the Defendant to produce
Chief Technology Officer Frank Larsen for deposition and deferred
ruling on the ESI's accessibility until after the deposition.  The
Defendant filed the motion for protective order on Feb. 19, 2020.

Magistrate Judge Oberto holds that the Defendant has not met its
burden of making "particular and specific demonstrations of fact"
that "provide sufficient detail" as to an alleged undue burden or
cost involved in producing the ESI at issue.  Even if some portion
of the Defendant's representations about the processes described is
supportable, the fact that there are numerous files, or the
Defendant has stored them in an unorganized fashion, does not
excuse their production.  Further, the fact that the obligatory
production of relevant information and documents will be time
consuming and expensive is similarly not a sufficient reason to
refuse production.  Accordingly, the Defendant has not shown that
the processes allegedly necessary to produce the requested
information, considered in combination, are unduly burdensome or
costly and has failed to show that the ESI is inaccessible on that
basis.

In addition, the Plaintiff's discovery requests are specific, the
information appears to be in the sole possession of the Defendant
and not available from any other source, it is highly likely that
relevant, responsive information will be found in its database, and
the information will be useful -- and in fact is essential -- to
the Plaintiff's class certification motion.  Thus, the Plaintiff
has demonstrated good cause to order production of the information
notwithstanding any possible burden and has further demonstrated
"need and relevance that outweighs the costs and burdens of
retrieving and processing" the ESI.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff
would be entitled to production of the information with the
Defendant bearing the full cost of production, even if the
Defendant could show that the ESI was inaccessible based on undue
burden or cost.

The Defendant raised objections to the discovery requests based on
privacy, although it devotes little of its briefing to the issue.
The requests seek information including the contact information for
individuals who had an OFAC Hit and any documents in the
Defendant's possession regarding those individuals.  As stated, the
Judge holds that the requested information is highly relevant to
the Plaintiff's claims, and the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's
need for the information significantly outweighs any privacy rights
in the information.  Further, any privacy concerns can be
adequately addressed by a confidentiality protective order.
Accordingly, the Court will direct the parties to file a stipulated
confidentiality protective order, that complies with Local Rule
141.110 to cover the requested information.

Finally, the Judge holds that good cause appearing, and to allow
the parties sufficient time to complete class certification
discovery, particularly in light of the national, regional and
local public health emergency posed by the coronavirus (COVID-19)
outbreak, the case schedule will be modified to continue the class
certification discovery and briefing deadlines by 180 days to allow
for the Defendant to produce the information.  The parties will
meet and confer to agree upon a production schedule, accommodating
the Defendant's production efforts and the Plaintiff's need to
conduct additional discovery once the ESI is produced.  If either
party fails to comply with the order, the Court will entertain a
request for sanctions.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Oberto denied the Defendant's motion
for protective order.  The parties will file a stipulated proposed
confidentiality protective order covering the information.

The Magistrate Judge modified the case schedule as follows:

     1. The class certification discovery deadline is continued
        to Nov. 2, 2020.

     2. The class certification motion filing deadline is
        continued to Nov. 30, 2020.

     3. The class certification opposition brief filing deadline
        is continued to December 2020.

     4. The class certification reply brief filing deadline is
        continued to Jan. 12, 2021.

     5. The motion for class certification will be heard on
        Feb. 1, 2021, at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom 2 before the
        Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, Senior United States
        District Judge.

     6. A status conference is set for April 6, 2021, at
        9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 7 before United States
        Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto. By no later
        than March 30, 2021, the parties will file and email
        to skoorders@caed.uscourts.gov in MS Word format a
        report providing (a) dates agreed to by all the
        counsel for all remaining deadlines and (b) an
        updated status of the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/7oFP9x from Leagle.com.


CVK RESTAURANT: Nunez Sues in S.D. New York Over FLSA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CVK Restaurant Corp.,
et al. The case is captioned as Yesenia Nunez, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated v. CVK Restaurant Corp., doing
business as: Murray Hill Diner; Christos Katsanos; Vasilios
Katsanos; and Antony Alexatos, Case No. 1:20-cv-04986 (S.D.N.Y.,
June 29, 2020).

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant refuses to pay overtime
compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

CVK Restaurant Corp. is in the eating places business.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Antonio Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: michael@faillacelaw.com


CYTOMX THERAPEUTICS: Jakubowitz Law Reminds of July 20 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jakubowitz Law on June 29 announced that securities fraud class
action lawsuits have commenced on behalf of shareholders of the
following publicly-traded companies who purchased shares within the
class periods listed below. Shareholders interested in representing
the class of wronged shareholders have until the lead plaintiff
deadline to petition the court. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff. For
more details and to speak with our firm without cost or obligation,
follow the links below.

CytomX Therapeutics, Inc. (CTMX)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT CTMX:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/cytomx-therapeutics-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7609&from=1

Class Period: May 17, 2018 - May 13, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 20, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
CytomX had downplayed issues with CX-072's efficacy observed in the
PROCLAIM-CX-072 clinical program; (ii) CytomX had similarly
downplayed issues with CX-2009's efficacy and safety observed in
the PROCLAIM-CX-2009 clinical program; and (iii) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

Wells Fargo & Company (WFC)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT WFC:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/wells-fargo-company-loss-submission-form/?id=7609&from=1

Class Period: April 5, 2020 - May 5, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 3, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Wells Fargo planned to, and did, improperly allocate
government-backed loans under the Paycheck Protection Program
("PPP"), and/or had inadequate controls in place to prevent such
misallocation; (ii) the foregoing foreseeably increased the
Company's litigation risk with respect to PPP allocation, as well
as increased regulatory scrutiny and/or potential enforcement
actions; and (iii) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Jakubowitz Law is vigorous in pursuit of justice for shareholders
who have been the victim of securities fraud. Attorney advertising.
Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

  JAKUBOWITZ LAW
  1140 Avenue of the Americas
  9th Floor
  New York, New York 10036
  T: (212) 867-4490
  F: (212) 537-5887 [GN]


CYTOSPORT INC: Angeion Group Announces Proposed Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
Angeion Group announced July 2, 2020, a proposed class action
settlement involving purchasers of certain CytoSport and/or Muscle
Milk Ready-To-Drink Shake Products or Muscle Milk Protein Powder
Products. If you purchased certain CytoSport and/or Muscle Milk
Ready-To-Drink Shake Products or Muscle Milk Protein Powder
Products, between January 23, 2011 (January 23, 2009 in MI) and May
5, 2020, you may be eligible to receive a payment from a class
action settlement.

WHO IS AFFECTED?

You are affected by this class action settlement if you purchased
in the United States any of the following products during the
specified time period:

Shake Class: Cytosport Whey Isolate Protein Drink; Monster Milk:
Protein Power Shake; Genuine Muscle Milk: Protein Nutrition Shake;
and Muscle Milk Pro Series 40: Mega Protein Shake, if the product
was purchased between January 23, 2011 (January 23, 2009 in
Michigan) and May 5, 2020.

Powder Class: any of the following powder products that had the
phrase "lean lipids," "lean protein," "lean muscle protein," or
"new leaner formula" on the label: Muscle Milk: Lean Muscle Protein
Powder; Muscle Milk Light: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk
Naturals: Nature's Ultimate Lean Muscle Protein; Muscle Milk
Gainer; High Protein Gainer Powder Drink Mix; Muscle Milk Pro
Series 50: Lean Muscle Mega Protein Powder; and Monster Milk: Lean
Muscle Protein Supplement, if the product was purchased between
January 23, 2011 and December 31, 2018.

For the precise terms and conditions of the settlement, please
visit www.LeanProteinSettlement.com or contact the Class
Administrator at the telephone number or address below.

WHAT IS THE SETTLEMENT RELIEF PROVIDED?

To settle the case, Defendant will create a Settlement Fund in the
amount of $12,000,000. If you make a valid claim in the Settlement,
you will be eligible to receive settlement compensation of:

Shake Class: $1.00 per product.  Class Members are able to claim
$1.00 per product, up to 25 products, without proof of purchase,
which amounts to $25.00. Consumers who provide actual purchase
receipts for additional purchases to the satisfaction of the Class
Administrator may receive $1.00 per product as settlement
compensation for all packages purchased, subject to pro rata
adjustment.

Powder Class: $3.00 per product of 2.75 lbs. or less and $5.00 per
product weighing more than 2.75 lbs. Class Members are able to
claim $3.00 per product weighing 2.75 lbs. or less and $5.00 per
product weighing more than 2.75 lbs., up to a claim amount of
$25.00, without proof of purchase.  Consumers who provide actual
purchase receipts for additional purchases to the satisfaction of
the Class Administrator may receive the per product settlement
compensation for all packages purchased, subject to pro rata
adjustment.

Proof of purchase means itemized retail sales receipts showing, at
a minimum, the name of the product, and the date, place, and amount
of purchase.

For more information about the Settlement Fund and the requirements
to make a valid claim, please visit www.LeanProteinSettlement.com.

If, after subtracting from the Settlement Fund amount the
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, and any Service Awards made by the
Court to Plaintiffs, the recovery of every other claimant will be
proportionally adjusted to account for the available portion of the
Settlement Fund.  Depending on the total dollar amount of all valid
claims, this adjustment may increase or decrease recovery.

HOW TO GET THE SETTLEMENT COMPENSATION?

To receive settlement compensation, visit the Settlement Website at
www.LeanProteinSettlement.com and download or complete a claim
form. You can also obtain a claim form by contacting the Class
Administrator. All claims must be submitted online or postmarked no
later than September 16, 2020.

HOW TO OPT OUT OF THE SETTLEMENT?

Any Class Member who wishes to opt out of the settlement must do so
in writing, by mailing or submitting online a request for exclusion
to the Class Administrator no later than September 16, 2020.
Additional information on Opting Out of the Settlement, including
an exclusion form, is available on the Settlement Website,
www.LeanProteinSettlement.com.

OBJECTING TO THE SETTLEMENT

Any Class Member who does not timely and properly opt out of the
settlement may object to the fairness, reasonableness or adequacy
of the proposed settlement. Written objections must be filed no
later than September 16, 2020. Oral objections may be made at the
court hearing on October 19, 2020 at 10:30 a.m. For specific
details on how to object, please visit
www.LeanProteinSettlement.com or contact the Class Administrator. A
class member may both object and submit a claim for settlement
compensation.

COURT HEARING AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

The Court will hold a hearing on October 19, 2020 at 10:30 a.m. to
consider whether to approve the settlement. The attorneys for the
class will ask the court to award them attorneys' fees and expenses
of up to one-third of the Settlement Fund, as well as service
awards in the amount of $10,000 for each of the Class
Representatives, to be drawn from the Settlement Fund. If any
balance remains in the Settlement Fund after payment of claims and
court-awarded fees, costs and incentives, the remaining amounts
will be applied to offset the costs of class notice and
administration.  Note that the hearing date may change without
further notice to you. Consult the Settlement Website at
www.LeanProteinSettlement.com for updated information on the
hearing date and time.

The case is Clay et al. v. Cytosport, Inc., United States District
Court for the Southern District of California, Case No.
3:15-cv-00165-L-DHB.

For additional information, contact:

          Class Administrator
          E-mail: info@LeanProteinSettlement.com
          Tel: 1-833-934-2606
          Lean Protein Settlement, c/o Class Administrator
          1650 Arch St., Ste. 2210
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          http://www.LeanProteinSettlement.com/[GN]


DARTMOUTH COLLEGE: Court Holds Settlement Fairness Hearing
----------------------------------------------------------
Nora Doyle-Burr, writing for Valley News, reports that lawyers for
nine women and Dartmouth College were scheduled to appear in court
via videoconference this month to determine if a proposed $14
million settlement of their sexual misconduct lawsuit against the
school is reasonable.

The so-called "fairness" hearing on July 9 will give the parties a
chance to weigh in on the settlement first reached last summer.

In addition to Dartmouth, parties include nine named plaintiffs who
allege that the college turned a blind eye to misconduct by three
former Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences professors
and another 67 potential class-action members.

U.S. District Court Chief Judge Landya McCafferty, the judge in the
case, gave preliminary approval to the agreement in January.

"We're past the end of the beginning," said Holderness, N.H.-based
attorney Eric MacLeish, who is not involved in the Dartmouth case
but has represented victims of sexual abuse by priests and
litigated against several New England private schools.

The suit, which was first filed in November 2018, is now "at the
beginning of the end," MacLeish said.

A spokesperson for the firm of Sanford Heisler Sharp, which
represents the plaintiffs, declined comment via email on June 23.

The parties are seeking McCafferty's final approval of the
settlement, which in addition to the $14 million also includes
Dartmouth-funded efforts under what is known as the Campus Climate
and Culture Initiative to prevent similar misconduct in the
future.

Dartmouth's Title IX Office will release an annual report for the
academic year 2018-19 in the coming weeks, which for the first time
will include every matter reported to the office and its
disposition, college spokeswoman Diana Lawrence said in a June 23
email.

She also noted that despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the switch to
remote work and learning, "Dartmouth has continued to conduct
active formal investigations."

In addition to the settlement's approval, parties to the lawsuit
also are seeking McCafferty's approval of the composition of the
class.

As proposed, the class includes 76 current and former women
graduate students at Dartmouth who were advisees or assistants of
one of the three professors between April 1, 2012, and Aug. 31,
2017, and those who co-authored papers with the professors during
that time period.

It also includes those who do not fit within those categories, but
were graduate students in the department between March 31, 2015,
and Aug. 31, 2017, and say they experienced harm as a result of the
professors' alleged misconduct.

Four of the members of the class have opted out, according to
recent court filings. Their names have been redacted from court
documents to protect their privacy.

In their request for exclusion, two of the four simply say they'd
like to opt out. The third said that she was a teaching assistant
for former professor William Kelley, but she did not experience
"wrong doings." She asked that her share of the settlement be
allocated to other women "who need support."

The fourth, however, alleges she suffered "emotional and
educational harm between March 31, 2015 and August 31, 2017 as a
direct result of the misconduct of William Kelley and Paul
Whalen."

Kelley and Whalen resigned, and the third professor, Todd
Heatherton, retired in summer 2018 before any of them could be
fired by the college following investigations into their
misconduct, which the plaintiffs alleged included a range of
behaviors from comments about female students' appearance to sexual
assault.

In settling the case, Dartmouth acknowledged no wrongdoing by the
college itself.

The former professors were not named as defendants in the lawsuit
but remain under criminal investigation by the New Hampshire
Attorney General's Office.

An attorney for Heatherton declined to comment. Kelley and Whalen
could not be reached for comment.

Opting out of the class allows the four women to retain the right
to pursue separate legal action against the college on their own if
they so choose, MacLeish said.

"Their claims will not be extinguished," he said.

Following the judge's approval, the money will be distributed to
the plaintiffs, MacLeish said.

The Dartmouth researchers who remain as members of the class would
also be eligible for payments but would not be able to sue the
college separately, he said.

According to the settlement agreement, the size of the payments
will be determined by an independent claims expert--a neutral
third-party who will be retained by the plaintiffs'
attorneys--based on several factors, including: the severity of
allegations; the duration of the mistreatment; and the severity and
duration of resulting emotional distress, physical illness,
economic losses and other harm.

The July 9 hearing was scheduled to take place at 10 a.m. via Zoom
videoconference. [GN]


DAY & ZIMMERMANN: 2nd Recusal Bid on Judge in Waters Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, John Waters, Plaintiff, v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-11585-NMG (D. Mass.), Judge
Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts denied Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Disqualify Judge
with prejudice.

The case is a putative class action which arises under the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").  Plaintiff Waters alleges that the
Defendant has failed to pay overtime wages in violation of the
law.

After his first motion to disqualify the judge was denied without
prejudice, the Plaintiff has filed a second motion to disqualify
and asks the judicial officer assigned to the session of the Court
to recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 455.  Before the
Court can consider the other pending motions in the case, it must
address the Plaintiff's second motion for recusal.

The Plaintiff states that one of his several attorneys, Attorney
Philip J. Gordon, represented an employee of Slade Gorton & Co.
Inc. in a potential litigation after she was discharged.  In March,
2018, Attorney Gordon negotiated a Confidential Separation
Agreement whereby that employee received a severance package in
exchange for a release of her claims.  That release included all
"directors, officers and employees."  The Plaintiff claims that
because the judicial officer has a relationship with SG & Co.,
there is reason to question his impartiality in matters involving
Attorney Gordon and, therefore, he should recuse himself in the
case.

Judge Gorton finds that judicial officer has a familial
relationship with SG & Co. and is recused from matters involving
its retained counsel, Seyfarth Shaw LLP.  The Plaintiff does not,
however, allege (nor is it true) that the judicial officer has any
involvement in the day-to-day operation of the business or
awareness of the employment matter handled by Attorney Gordon.  Nor
does he allege that the judicial officer has had any interaction
with Attorney Gordon with respect to that dispute.

Moreover, the Plaintiff has proffered no evidence whatsoever to
suggest that the judicial officer's impartiality toward him could
be questioned as a result of his attorney's representation of
another client.  The test established by 28 U.S.C. Section 455(a)
addresses a judicial officer's impartiality with respect to a
party, not a party's attorney.

In sum, the Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to meet the
"high threshold" under the recusal statute and his renewed motion
to recuse will be denied.  Accordingly, Judge Gorton denied the
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Disqualify Judge with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Memorandum
& Order is available at https://is.gd/V9FPVE from Leagle.com.


DCG INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Parrott FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------
In the case, LAURA PARROTT ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs, v. D.C.G., INC., d/b/a
THE LODGE and DAWN M. RIZOS, Defendants (N.D. Tex.), Judge David C.
Godbey of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division, ordered the parties to proceed to
arbitration if they wish to litigate the claims, and exercised
discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice.

The dispute arose from the employment relationship between
Plaintiff Parrott, a dancer, and The Lodge, a Dallas nightclub
employing Parrott.  On July 18, 2019, Parrott filed the class
action lawsuit claiming that The Lodge had violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") by first misclassifying her and similarly
situated personnel as independent contractors rather than employees
and then denying them minimum wages required by FLSA.  The Lodge
filed the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss or to stay and compel
arbitration, arguing that Parrott signed a contract with an
arbitration clause requiring arbitration of any employment disputes
and waiving the right to bring a class or collective action
lawsuit.

Judge Godbey finds that when it filed its motion to compel
arbitration, The Lodge attached a copy of the arbitration agreement
that was part of the contract Parrott allegedly signed at the
outset of her employment with The Lodge but did not include a
declaration authenticating the arbitration agreement at the time.
The Lodge did provide a declaration by a sworn affiant with its
reply brief, as well as the arbitration agreement it had included
with its motion and the entire contract from which the arbitration
agreement was excerpted.  The declaration attested to the
authenticity of the arbitration agreement and the contract that The
Lodge submitted.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1), the
testimony of The Lodge's affiant and custodian of its records is
sufficient to authenticate the document as constituting an accurate
copy of the arbitration agreement.

The Court next must determine whether the admissible document
produced by The Lodge evinces a valid arbitration agreement.
Parrott does not dispute that the arbitration agreement satisfies
the elements for a contract under Texas law or suggest that she did
not sign it.  Instead, Parrott argues that the agreement is void
for illegality and unconscionability.  These arguments are largely
based on the same underlying premise -- that one of the arbitration
clause's provisions is at odds with mandatory FLSA provisions.

Because the arbitration agreement is subject to a severability
clause and the offending portions of the clause may be severed,
Judge Godbey holds that the arbitration agreement is neither
illegal nor unconscionable.  Although an arbitration agreement may
be found unconscionable if it imposes substantial costs on one of
the parties such that it prevents vindicating statutory rights, the
contesting party still must prove the likelihood that it will incur
prohibitive costs.  A bare assertion that the costs are prohibitive
is insufficient.  Consequently, Judge Godbey holds that she has not
carried her burden of establishing that the cost of arbitration
would be substantial or prohibitive for her.  The arbitration
agreement is thus not void for unconscionability on either of the
grounds Parrott proffers.

Finally, the arbitration clause in question states that any
disputes under the Agreement, as well as any disputes that may have
arisen at any time during the relationship between the parties are
subject to arbitration.  The language qualifies the arbitration
agreement as "broad."  Because there is no countervailing evidence
overriding this general provision in the context of FLSA claims,
much less the forceful evidence required by the Fifth Circuit, the
Judge holds that Parrott's claims are not clearly outside the scope
of the agreement and must be referred to arbitration.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Godbey severed the provision in the
arbitration clause prohibiting arbitrators from awarding attorneys'
fees and held that Parrott's claims are subject to a valid
arbitration agreement in the absence of the provision.
Consequently, the Judge ordered the parties to proceed to
arbitration if they wish to litigate these claims.  Because all
Parrott's claims are subject to arbitration, the Court further
exercised its discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/IGfxDp from
Leagle.com.


DETROIT PROPERTY: Court Deems 38 Releases in James Suit Invalid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Natalie James, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Detroit Property
Exchange, Defendants, Case No. 18-13601 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Sean F.
Cox of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' Motion to Deem Releases Invalid.

The putative class action was filed on Nov. 19, 2018, and amended
on March 7, 2019.  

By March 12, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed an "Amended Motion To
Invalidate Releases, Send Curative Notice And Enjoin Defendants
From Communicating With Putative Class Members Regarding Release Of
Claims."  In that motion, their Counsel claimed that the Defendants
had engaged in improper communications with putative class members
and asked the Court to invalidate all releases that putative class
members have signed and enjoin the Defendants from any further
communications with class members.

After the parties briefed the issues, the Court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing.  It held that evidentiary hearing over the
course of two days.  The Court also entertained oral argument from
the Counsel.  After the evidentiary hearing concluded, the Defense
Counsel advised that the Defendants were amenable to some
restrictions in their future communications with the putative class
members, and with sending a curative notice and allowing the
putative class members who had signed a release the option of
canceling it.

The Court had the parties submit supplemental briefs and each side
provided a proposed curative notice.  The Plaintiffs' Counsel
wanted the Court to invalidate all releases signed by any putative
class member, without their input.  In their supplemental brief,
the Defendants proposed certain restrictions on their future
communications with the putative class members and stipulated to
sending a curative notice and offering putative class members "who
have signed a release" the "option of canceling the release."

On July 11, 2019, the Court issued an "Opinion & Order On
Plaintiffs' Amended Motion To Invalidate Releases."  The Court
granted that motion in part and denied it in part.  The Court then
considered what relief should be ordered under the circumstances
presented.

The Court concluded that all the putative class members should
receive a curative notice and be given the opportunity to
invalidate the releases they signed.  It noted that, based on the
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, one putative class
member who signed a release wishes to invalidate it, while other
putative class members "testified that they do not wish to
invalidate the Releases they signed."  The Court expressly declined
to invalidate all of the releases that had been signed by the
putative class members, as the Plaintiffs' Counsel had requested.


In connection with the motion, each party submitted a proposed
curative notice to be sent to the putative class members.  The
Court ultimately used the Defendants' proposed curative notice,
with two very minor changes.  During the course of the motion, the
Defendants never asserted that a putative class member who elects
to cancel his or her release should be ordered to return any money
or rent credits received from Defendants.  Thus, the curative
notices sent to the putative class members did not state that any
money or rent credits that had been received from Defendants would
have to be returned if a putative class member elected to cancel
his or her release.

On Aug. 30, 2019, the Defense Counsel filed a "List of Putative
Class Members Who Returned Curative Notice Indicating They Wished
To Have Their Releases Invalidated."  In it -- for the first time
-- the Defendants asserted that any persons who wish to have their
releases invalidated must return (or agree to repay) money or rent
credits received from them.

In that same filing, the Defense Counsel also stated that: (1) 24
putative class members timely delivered a signed form directly to
Detroit Property Exchange; (2) the Defense Counsel received signed
forms from 14 other putative class members within the 30-day
window, but the forms were sent from the Plaintiffs' Counsel to the
Defense Counsel (not Detroit Property Exchange); (3) the Defense
Counsel received, via email, a signed form by one putative class
member past the Aug. 23, 2019 deadline; and (4) 11 other putative
class members returned signed forms, but had never signed a Release
with the Defendants.

On Oct. 2, 2019, the Plaintiff's Counsel filed a notice stating
that since the Defendants August 30 filing, the Plaintiffs have
received two additional requests to invalidate by: (1) Ms. Ebony
White (signed 9/3/19, and she also indicated to Plaintiffs' counsel
that she never received the Defendants' initial mailing), and (2)
Yolandita Vega and Jorge Belarob Cuenco (signed 9/9/19 on the same
form).  The Plaintiffs request that the Court honors these person's
requests to invalidate the releases in the case.

The Court held a Status Conference on Oct. 3, 2019.  During that
conference, it urged the counsel to meet and confer to discuss
these issues.  On Oct. 4, 2019, a Stipulated Order was issued that
stated, in pertinent part, that by Nov. 6, 2019, the Plaintiffs'
Counsel would file a motion to deem invalidation requests
effective.  On Nov. 6, the Plaintiffs' Counsel filed a "Motion To
Deem Releases Invalid."  The Defendants oppose the motion.

Judge Cox granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Deem Releases Invalid.  The Judge:

  (1) declines to address the merits of a new legal challenge to
      all releases signed by putative class members, that the
      Plaintiffs' Counsel did not raise previously, as to do so
      would be an improper advisory opinion on a legal issue that
      does not impact the named Plaintiffs;

  (2) rules that nothing be done as to release requests received
      from putative class members who never actually signed a
      release; and

  (3) rules that, as to the handful of individuals who returned
      late requests to cancel their releases, that they may file
      individual motions requesting that relief if a class action
      is certified.

Finally, as to the individuals who returned timely forms seeking to
cancel their releases, the Judge (1) issues an order stating that
those releases are declared invalidated; and (2) rules that, given
Kelly's conduct and the Defendants' failure to raise the issue
during the prior proceedings, he declines the Defendants' request
for the Court to order those individuals to repay (or promise to
repay) any money or rent credits before invalidating the releases
they signed.  The Judge is, however, willing to consider offsetting
payments or rent credits received by the putative class members
from any future payments, if a class action is ultimately
certified.

As to the following 38 individuals, the Court rules that the
releases they signed are invalidated:  (1) Angela Chevis; (2)
Arnold Goins; (3) Phelisha Thompson; (4) Tiffany Henley; (5) Ray
Randall, Jr.; (6) Tonya Hyler; (7) Sandra Thompson; (8) Tiarre
Jackson; (9) Christopher McArdory; (10) Terrell Chestnut; (11)
Domonique Bell; (12) Donald Swinney; (13) Evelyn Steele; (14)
Johnnie Ray Bragg, Jr.; (15) Natasha Duffey; (16) Nicole
Parker-Jones; (17) Nuhshaummie Pruitt; (18) Ramone Jones; (19)
Steven Kirk; (20) Terrance Jones; (21) Wesley Fountain; (22) Van
Hempill; (23) Ieshaie Jeanette Houston; (24) Candice Goins; (25)
Chrystal Goins; (26) David Swinney; (27) John Campbell; (28) Jevon
Warren; (29) Jasmyn Jones; (30) Keidronn Sanders; (31) Katresa
Rolfe; (32) Marquitta Tolbert; (33) Michael Taylor; (34) Olga
Santiago; (35) Robert James; (36) Sabrina Benson; (37) Tameika
Bailey; and (38) Maurice Walker.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/yZDW49 from Leagle.com.


DIGNITY HEALTH: Settlement in Klatt Suit Gets Prelim. Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MEGAN E. KLATT, an individual, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DIGNITY HEALTH, a
California corporation; DOES 1-50, unknown individuals; and ROE
COMPANIES 1-50, unknown business entities, Defendants, Case No.
2:17-cv-02425-RFB-BNW (D. Nev.), Judge Richard F. Boulware, II of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted
preliminary approval of the proposed class settlement.

The Court approved, as to form and content: (i) the Notice of
Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, and Hearing Date
for Final Court Approval of Settlement (Notices of Pendency of
Class Action); (ii) the Claim and Consent Form; and (iii) the
Exclusion Form.  The procedure for the Class Members to participate
in, to opt out of and to object to, the Settlement as set forth in
the Notices of Pendency of Class Action, are also approved.

Plaintiff Megan Klatt is confirmed as the Class Representative and
Semenza Kircher Rickard as the Class Counsel.    

CPT Group., Inc. is also confirmed as Class Action Administrator.

The following schedule has been set for further proceedings:

     a. April 17, 2020 - Deadline for the Parties to sign the
        Settlement Agreement

     b. May 4, 2020 - Deadline for Defendant to Submit Class
        Member Information to Claims Administrator

     c. May 15, 2020 - Deadline for Claims Administrator to Mail
        the Notices of Pendency of Class Action, Claim and Consent
        Form, and Exclusion Form to Class Members

     d. Aug. 7, 2020 - Deadline for Class Members to Postmark
        or submit Exclusion Forms and Claim and Consent Forms
        electronically through the website,
        www.klattdignityhealth.com

     e. Aug. 7, 2020 - Deadline for Receipt by the Court and the
        Counsel of any Objections to Settlement

     f. Aug. 10, 2020 - Deadline for Class Counsel to file
        Motion for Final Approval of (15 calendar days before
        Final Settlement, Attorneys' Fees, Costs, Approval
        Hearing) and Enhancement Award

     g. Aug. 10, 2020 - Deadline for Class Counsel to File
        Declaration from Claims (15 calendar days before Final
        Administrator of Due Diligence Approval Hearing) and
        Proof of Mailing

     h. Aug. 25, 2020 at 2:00 p.m. in IV Courtroom 7C - Final
        Fairness Hearing and Final Approval

     i. Sept. 4, 2020 - Deadline for Defendant to deposit the
        Net Settlement Amount into an (10 days after the Final
        Fairness and escrow account set up by the Final
        Approval hearing) Claims Administrator

     j. Deadline for Claims Administrator (30 calendar days
        after Effective to mail the Settlement Awards and
        Date) the Enhancement Awards, and to wire transfer
        the Attorneys' Fees and Costs (if Settlement is
        Effective)

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/U3B3V9 from Leagle.com.

Megan E. Klatt, Plaintiff, represented by Christopher D. Kircher
--cdk@skrlawyers.com -- Semenza Kircher Rickard,Jarrod L. Rickard
--jlr@skrlawyers.com -- Semenza Kircher Rickard & Lawrence J.
Semenza, III -- ljs@skrlawyers.com -- Semenza Kircher Rickard.

Dignity Health, Defendant, represented by Kirsten Ann Milton
--Kirsten.Milton@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis PC, pro hac vice
& Daniel Aquino -- Daniel.Aquino@jacksonlewis.com -- Jackson Lewis
P.C.


DOUGERT MANAGEMENT: Maldonado Sues Over Unpaid Minimum & OT Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jose Maldonado, on behalf of himself and similarly situated
individuals v. DOUGERT MANAGEMENT CORP., Case No. 1:20-cv-05122
(S.D.N.Y., July 3, 2020), alleges that pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, the Plaintiff is entitled
to recover from the Defendant: unpaid wages at the overtime wage
rate, unpaid wages at the minimum wage rate, statutory penalties,
liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendant knowingly and willfully operated business with a
policy of not paying the Plaintiff wages for hours worked over 40
hours in a week at the overtime wage rate and lawful wage rate for
all hours worked in violation of the FLSA and NYLL and the
supporting Federal and New York State Department of Labor
Regulations, according to the complaint. The Defendant did not
provide the Plaintiff with an accurate wage statement or summary,
accurately accounting for the actual hours worked, and setting
forth the hourly rate of pay and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff has been employed by the Defendant for the last 15
years.

Dougert Management Corp. is a domestic business corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of the State of New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lawrence Spasojevich, Esq.
          Imran Ansari, Esq.
          AIDALA, BERTUNA & KAMINS, P.C.
          546 5th Avenue
          Phone New York, NY 10036
          Phone: (212) 486-0011
          Email: ls@aidalalaw.com


DUOLINGO INC: Mejico Sues Over Charges on Free Trial Subscription
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRITTNEY MEJICO, an individual v. DUOLINGO, INC., a Delaware
corporation; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV24160 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 25, 2020), is brought on behalf of
the Plaintiff and others similarly situated alleging that the
Defendants made and continues to make offers of "free" services and
products that violate California law.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants failed to include a
"clear and conspicuous" explanation of the price that will be
charged after their mobile app trial ends, in violation of
California's Automatic Renewal Law and California's Unfair
Competition Law.

The Defendants also violates California law by charging consumer
credit or debit cards without first obtaining "affirmative consent"
to automatically renewing charges, the Plaintiff adds.

The Plaintiff is a blind California consumer. The Plaintiff
accepted a "free" trial subscription of online language training
and related products from the Defendants.

Duolingo is an American platform that includes a language-learning
Web site and mobile app.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott J. Ferrell, Esq.
          PACIFIC TRIAL ATTORNEYS
          4100 Newport Place Drive, Ste. 800
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 706-6464
          Facsimile: (949) 706-6469
          E-mail: sferrell@pacifictrialattorneys.com


DYCOM INDUSTRIES: Court Junks Dismissal Bid of Amended Tung Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JENNIFER TUNG, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. DYCOM INDUSTRIES, INC.,
STEVEN E. NIELSEN, and ANDREW DEFERRARI Defendant, Case No.
19-cv-81448-SINGHAL/Matthewman (S.D. Fla.), Judge Raag Singhal of
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied
the Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

The case is a class action against Dycom, its CEO Nielsen, and its
CFO DeFarrari, for securities fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a)
of the Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  The class members all
purchased or otherwise acquired Dycom common stock between Nov. 20,
2017 and Aug. 10, 2018.

Dycom provides specialty contracting services to telecommunications
providers -- services like engineering, construction, maintenance,
and installation.  Over 75% of its revenue comes from business with
some of the most well-known companies in the United States,
including AT&T, CenturyLink, Charter Communications, Comcast, and
Verizon.  Over the past few years with the increasing ubiquity of
cellular data and smartphones, Dycom's work with these
telecommunications companies has seen unprecedent growth.

Tung, one such purchaser, first filed the action on Oct. 25, 2018.
No more than a few days later, a second putative class filed an
identical complaint against the Defendants.  The two actions were
consolidated and Boston Retirement System was appointed the Lead
Plaintiff.

As a general overview, the Plaintiffs allege Dycom, through CEO and
CFO, both intentionally misled the public and intentionally failed
to fully inform the market about its financial strength.  They
point specifically to approximately sixty statements (spanning
almost 100 paragraphs in the complaints) the Defendants made as
intentionally misleading.

According to the Plaintiffs, Dycom hid from the market and its
investors, all of the foregoing issues with obtaining permits and
maintaining its relationships with partner companies.  Beginning on
Nov. 20, 2017 -- the opening bookmark date of the Class Period --
the CEO and the CFO began what the Plaintiffs describe as a
coordinated campaign to make false statements, mislead the market
and investors, and hide Dycom's issues.  Specifically, again, they
identify nearly 60.

The current operative pleading is the Second Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiffs bring two causes of action against the Defendants:
securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5; and derivative personal liability against CEO and CFO under
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Defendants move to dismiss both counts.  They focus on three
elements: that the Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient allegations
as to (1) material misrepresentations or omissions, (2) scienter,
and (3) loss causation.

Judge Singhal finds that the Plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient
to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  In coming to that
conclusion, the Judge has thoroughly analyzed the panoply of
statements on which the Plaintiffs base their claims. While
(unsurprisingly) each side takes divergent positions -- the
Plaintiffs argue all 60 statements are actionable; the Defendants
insist none are -- the answer is more nuanced; some are.  However,
given the sheer amount, it would be neither sound nor sensible for
the Court to parse each and every statement at this juncture.
Suffice it to say, at this stage of the proceeding, the Judge holds
that the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for securities
fraud.  At a later time, it can be determined which statements are
allowed to be tried before the factfinder.  With that established,
Judge Singhal denied the Motion to Dismiss.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/cwClBW from Leagle.com.


EASYJET PLC: Faces Biggest Personal Data Breach Class Action in UK
------------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Cunha, writing for Alliance News, reports that a class action
claim levelled at easyJet PLC over its recent personal data breach
will be the largest in UK history, according to a statement on June
24 by the law firm leading the case against the airline.

London-based PGMBM Ltd said 10,000 victims have joined the class
action suit, making "it the UK's biggest and fastest growing
group-action personal data claim just three weeks after papers were
filed".

Back on May 19, easyJet said it was the victim of a cyber attack
that left the details of 9 million customers compromised.

The low-cost airline said its investigation revealed that the email
addresses and travel details of around 9 million customers were
accessed. For a "very small subset" of customers, being 2,208,
credit card details were accessed.

"The breach itself occurred in January 2020 but despite notifying
the UK's Information Commissioner's Office at that time, EasyJet
waited four months to notify its customers," PGMBM commented.

"Under Article 82 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation,
easyJet customers who have had their data compromised by this huge
breach have a right to compensation for inconvenience, distress,
annoyance and loss of control of their personal data. PGMBM
estimate that the nine million victims could be owed up to GBP2,000
in compensation, which would see easyJet subject to a potential
GBP18 billion liability." [GN]


EASYJET: 10,000+ People to Join Data Breach Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Phil Davies, writing for Travel Weekly, reports that about 10,000
people are reported to have joined a group class action against
easyJet after personal details of nine million customers were
breached in a cyber attack.

The level of customers from more than 50 countries make it one of
the UK's biggest group-action personal data claims, the Financial
Times reported.

Law firm PGMBM is leading the case against the budget carrier after
filing papers in May.

The airline revealed in May that it was the victim of a cyberattack
and its investigation revealed that the email addresses and travel
details of around 9 million customers were accessed.

About 2,200 passengers had their credit card details stolen.

The airline said: "We are aware that a class-action law firm has
filed a claim against easyJet in the High Court and that other
firms are advertising their services to do the same.

"This is not uncommon and just because these firms are advertising
does not mean they have a strong claim."

Several thousand British Airways customers are also bringing a
claim against the company over a hack in 2018 that put 500,000
customers' data at risk. They were granted a group litigation order
last year and are seeking to sign up more claimants. [GN]


ELLIOTT AUTO: Gurrola Employment Suit Removed to S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as AMELIA SALAS GURROLA, as an
individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
ELLIOTT AUTO SUPPLY CO., INC., a Minnesota corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, Case No. 37-2020-00015368-CU-OE-CTL (Filed May 26,
2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California, County of San Diego, to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California on June 26, 2020.

The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:20-cv-01180-WQH-AHG to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges claims arising from her employment with the
Defendant and alleged Unfair Competition. She seeks, on a
class-wide basis, an award including damages for overtime pay,
minimum wage violations, rest period violations, meal period
violations, wage statement violations, waiting time penalties,
liquidated damages, special damages, restitution under California
Business and Professions Code Section 17200, plus prejudgment
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

Elliot markets and distributes automotive parts.[BN]

Defendant Elliott Auto is represented by:

          William J. Brown, Jr., Esq.
          Matthew K. Wegner, Esq.
          Lidia D. Sykisz, Esq.
          BROWN WEGNER LLP
          2010 Main Street, Suite 1260
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: 949 705 0080
          E-mail: bill@brownwegner.com
                  mwegner@brownwegner.com
                  lsykisz@brownwegner.com


ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Howard G. Smith Reminds of August 18 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith on June 23 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased
Endo International plc ("Endo" or "the Company") (NASDAQ: ENDP)
securities between August 8, 2017 and June 10, 2020, inclusive (the
"Class Period"). Endo investors have until August 18, 2020 to file
a lead plaintiff motion.

Investors suffering losses on their Endo investments are encouraged
to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss their
legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email to
howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On June 10, 2020, the New York Department of Financial Services
("DFS") announced that it "has filed charges and initiated
administrative proceedings against Endo International plc" and
certain of its subsidiaries in connection with "DFS' ongoing
investigation into the entities that created and perpetuated the
opioid crisis." According to the DFS press release, "Endo . . .
[k]nowingly furthered a false narrative to legitimize opioids as
appropriate for broad treatment of pain by downplaying their
long-known addictive nature and risks"; "[m]isrepresented the
safety and efficacy of opioids, without legitimate scientific
substantiation"; and "[d]eployed a large sales force to target
healthcare providers directly with these misrepresentations."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.66, or nearly 15%,
to close at $3.85 per share on June 10, 2020, thereby injuring
investors.

The complaint alleges that defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose:
(1) that the full scope of Endo's and/or its subsidiaries'
contributions to the opioid crisis, including, but not limited to,
their opioid products' disproportionately negative impact on New
York, one of the most populous states in the U.S., as well as the
fraud that Defendants perpetrated on the New York insurance market;
(2) that part of that contribution to the crisis included Endo
publishing and disseminating false information to health care
providers regarding the risks and benefits of opioids; (3) that the
foregoing, once revealed, was foreseeably likely to subject Endo
and/or its subsidiaries to increased regulatory scrutiny and
enforcement, as well as significant financial and/or reputational
harm, particularly with respect to New York; and (4) that, as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

If you purchased Endo securities, have information or would like to
learn more about these claims, or have any questions concerning
this announcement or your rights or interests with respect to these
matters, please contact Howard G. Smith, Esquire, of Law Offices of
Howard G. Smith, 3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112, Bensalem,
Pennsylvania 19020 by telephone at (215) 638-4847, toll-free at
(888) 638-4847, or by email to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com, or
visit our website at www.howardsmithlaw.com.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]


EQT CORP: Garfield Appeals Decision to Pennsylvania Supreme Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Robert Garfield filed an appeal from a court ruling
issued in his lawsuit entitled Robert Garfield, on Behalf of
Himself and all Others Similarly Situated v. EQT Corp., Case No.
254 WDA 2019, in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for
Allegheny County.

The appellate case is captioned as Garfield, R., et al. v. EQT
Corp., Case No. 4 WAL 2020, in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 31,
2020, Judge John T. Bender of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the trial court's Jan. 29, 2019 order, sustaining the
Defendant-Appellee's preliminary objections and dismissing the
Plaintiff-Appellant's second amended complaint ("SAC") with
prejudice.

The case is a shareholder class action brought under Pennsylvania
law by the Appellant, a shareholder of EQT, against the members of
EQT's Board of Directors and EQT.  The action arises out of EQT's
acquisition of Rice Energy for stock and cash, pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger entered into on June 19, 2017. On
that date, EQT and Rice announced that they had entered into a
definitive Agreement and Plan of Merger under which EQT would
acquire all of the outstanding shares of Rice common stock for
total consideration of approximately $6.7 billion--consisting of
.37 shares of EQT common stock and $5.30 in cash per share of Rice
common stock.

The Appellant contends that the Merger and the related issuance of
additional EQT shares to pay for the Merger was fundamentally
unfair to EQT shareholders.  He also contends that the Board and
EQT persuaded EQT shareholders to support an unfair acquisition by
misrepresenting the value of the transaction and by misrepresenting
and concealing other conflicts of interest.

The Appellant filed his Amended Shareholder Class Action Complaint
on Dec. 19, 2017, asserting claims for Fundamental Unfairness
pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S. Section 1105 (Count I), Intentional
Interference with Voting Rights (Count II), and Unjust Enrichment
(Count III). Preliminary objections were then filed, and by order
dated Aug. 21, 2018, the Court sustained all of the objections and
dismissed the Amended Complaint without prejudice.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner Robert Garfield is represented by:

          Joseph N. Kravec, Jr., Esq.
          FEINSTEIN DOYLE PAYNE & KRAVEC, LLC
          429 Fourth Ave., Ste. 1300
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 281-8400
          E-mail: jkravec@fdpklaw.com

Defendant-Respondent EQT Corporation is represented by:

          Thomas Lee Allen, Esq.
          James Louis Rockney, Jr., Esq.
          Kim M. Watterson, Esq.
          Brian Joseph Willett, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          225 5th Ave., Ste. 1200
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222-2716
          Telephone: (412) 288-3066
          E-mail: tallen@reedsmith.com
                  jrockney@reedsmith.com
                  kwatterson@reedsmith.com
                  bwillett@reedsmith.com


EROS INT'L: Opus is Lead Plaintiff in Consolidated Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, PAUL MONTESANO, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EROS INTERNATIONAL PLC, et
al., Defendants; JOHN SCHRAUFNAGEL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. EROS INTERNATIONAL
PLC, et al., Defendants; and OPUS CHARTERED ISSUANCES S.A.,
COMPARTMENT 127 and AI UNDERTAKING IV, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EROS INTERNATIONAL
PLC, et al., Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 19-14125 (JMV)(JAD),
19-14445 (KM)(JBC), 19-18547 (ES)(SCM)(D. N.J.), Judge John Michael
Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey:

   (1) granted the parties' motions to consolidate;

   (2) granted the motion filed by Opus Chartered and AI for
       appointment of Lead Plaintiff and class counsel;

   (3) denied the motion filed by Vijay Singh for appointment of
       Lead Plaintiff and class counsel; and

   (4) denied as moot the remaining motions for appointment of
       Lead Plaintiff and class counsel.

The matter involves three putative class actions filed pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  All three allege that
Defendants Eros and certain Eros officers made false statements
that concealed adverse information and misled investors about Eros'
financial health.  All three also bring suit on behalf of all
persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired publicly
traded Eros securities between July 28, 2017, and June 5, 2019.

On June 21, 2019, Plaintiff Montesano filed his class action
complaint pursuant to the 1934 Act.  On June 28, 2019, Plaintiff
Schraufnagel filed his class action complaint.  On Aug. 20, 2019,
Plaintiff Opus filed its class action complaint.  Opus originally
filed its complaint in the Central District of California, which
was subsequently transferred to the District of New Jersey.

The PSLRA requires that notice be published in the first-filed
action informing putative class members of, inter alia, their right
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff within 60 days of such
notice.  Notice was timely published in the Montesano case on June
21, 2019, which indicated that any class member seeking appointment
as lead plaintiff must move the Court no later than Aug. 20, 2019.

On Aug. 20, 2019, three movants filed motions in the Montesano case
to serve as the Lead Plaintiff, to consolidate the Schraufnagel
case into the Montesano case, and to appoint the class counsel: (1)
Singh; (2) Sunil Chirania and Martin Mayer; and (3) Janine
Ellenberger.  One day later, on Aug. 21, 2019, Opus filed its
motion to serve as the Lead Plaintiff, to consolidate the
Schraufnagel case into the Montesano case, and to appoint the class
counsel.  Opus also submitted a letter requesting that the Court
additionally consolidate the Opus case, No. 19-18547, into the
Montesano case.  On Sept. 3, 2019, Chirania, Mayer, and Ellenberger
filed notices of non-opposition to Opus' motion.  Accordingly, only
Singh contests Opus' motion.

On review, Judge Vazquez finds that the three suits at issue rely
on the same or similar public statements and reports regarding
Eros' financial health, name the same Defendants, and assert claims
arising out of Section 10(b) (and the corresponding Rule 10b-5) and
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act.  The three matters involve common
questions of law and fact, and consolidation will promote
efficiency and avoid unnecessary costs or delay.  As a result, the
parties' motions to consolidate are granted.

Opus maintains that it has held legal title to the securities at
issue in this action at all relevant times and that it owns the
Eros securities at issue.  Singh presents no evidence to the
contrary.  As such, because Opus has legal title to the securities
at issue, it has suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of the
Defendants' alleged unlawful conduct.  Because Singh has not
rebutted the presumption, Opus' motion to be appointed the Lead
Plaintiff is granted, the Court rules.

Opus has selected and retained Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP to serve
as the lead counsel, and Carella Byrne Cecchi Olstein Brody &
Agnello, PC to serve as the liaison counsel for the class.  After
reviewing the firms' resumes, Judge Vasquez finds that both firms
have substantial experience litigating securities fraud class
actions and are thus "competent to fulfill the duties of the lead
counsel and the liaison counsel.  As a result, Opus' motion to
appoint lead counsel is granted, the Court rules.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/GuJcMB from Leagle.com.


EVENTBRITE INC: Court Dismisses IPO-Related Securities Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Eventbrite, Inc. disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission for the quarterly period ended
March 31, 2020, that a federal court has dismissed, with leave to
amend, a consolidated securities class action related to the
Company's initial public offering.

Beginning on April 15, 2019, purported stockholders of the Company
filed two putative securities class action complaints in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, and
three putative securities class action complaints in the Superior
Court of California for the County of San Mateo, against the
Company, certain of its executives and directors, and its
underwriters for the IPO.  Some of these actions also name as
defendants venture capital firms that were investors in the Company
as of the IPO.

On August 22, 2019, the federal court consolidated the two pending
actions and appointed lead plaintiffs and lead counsel (the Federal
Action).

On October 11, 2019, the lead plaintiffs in the Federal Action
filed their amended consolidated complaint.  The amended complaint
generally alleges that the Company misrepresented and/or omitted
material information in its IPO offering documents in violation of
the Securities Act of 1933.  The amended complaint also challenges
public statements made after the IPO in violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.  The amended complaint seeks unspecified
monetary damages and other relief on behalf of investors who
purchased the Company's Class A common stock issued pursuant and/or
traceable to the IPO offering documents, or between September 20,
2018 and May 1, 2019, inclusive.

On December 11, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint.

On March 18, 2020, the court vacated the hearing on the defendants'
motion to dismiss set for April 16, 2020.

On April 28, 2020, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss
in its entirety with leave to amend.  Lead plaintiffs' deadline to
file a second amended consolidated complaint was June 24, 2020.

On June 24, 2019, the state court consolidated two state actions
pending at that time (the State Action).

On July 24, 2019, the two plaintiffs in the State Action filed a
consolidated complaint.  The consolidated complaint generally
alleged that the Company misrepresented and/or omitted material
information in the IPO offering documents, in violation of the
Securities Act of 1933.  The amended complaint sought unspecified
monetary damages and other relief on behalf of investors who
purchased the Company's Class A common stock issued pursuant and/or
traceable to the IPO offering documents.

On August 23, 2019, defendants filed demurrers to the consolidated
complaint.  A third state-court action was filed on August 23,
2019.

On September 11, 2019, that complaint was consolidated into the
operative complaint filed on July 24, 2019, and the court ordered
that the arguments in defendants' pending demurrers would apply to
that newly filed complaint.  At the hearing on defendants'
demurrers on November 1, 2019, the court sustained the demurrer
with leave to amend.

On December 13, 2019, the court granted requests by two plaintiffs
to voluntarily dismiss their claims without prejudice.  The
remaining plaintiff and two new named plaintiffs filed a first
amended consolidated complaint (FAC) on February 10, 2020.
Defendants' filed demurrers to the FAC on March 26, 2020.

On April 14, 2020, the court indefinitely vacated the May 1, 2020
hearing on the demurrers given the novel coronavirus pandemic,
stating it would reschedule the hearing once regular court
proceedings are allowed to resume.

Eventbrite, Inc. operates a ticketing and experience technology
platform in the United States and internationally. Its platform
integrates components needed to plan, promote, and produce live
events that allow creators to reduce friction and costs, increase
reach, and drive ticket sales. The company was formerly known as
Mollyguard Corporation and changed its name to Eventbrite, Inc. in
2009. Eventbrite, Inc. was incorporated in 2008 and is
headquartered in San Francisco, California.



FACEBOOK INC: Black Workers Allege Discrimination and Bias
----------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Carbone of Fox News reports that a group of black
workers filed a class action charge against Facebook, alleging that
the company discriminates against African-American workers in
hiring, promotions, evaluations, and pay.

The charge, which was filed with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, also alleges that black employees at
Facebook do not feel respected, valued, or heard. The people making
the charge are calling on the company led by CEO Mark Zuckerberg to
substantially increase the number of black workers hired and
promoted at all levels.

"Facebook is a great company, but it has a long way to go when it
comes to treating Black workers fairly, promoting our careers,
respecting us, and valuing our tremendous contributions," said
Oscar Veneszee Jr., who has worked as an operations program manager
at Facebook since 2017, in a statement provided to Fox News. He
claims that he has not been fairly evaluated or promoted, despite
his excellent performance and achievement at Facebook.

"We hope that this discrimination charge starts a constructive
dialogue with Facebook about how deepening its commitment to
diversity and Black workers will make Facebook a stronger and more
dynamic company," Veneszee, a 23-year veteran of the U.S. Navy
whose work at Facebook focuses on outreach to veterans, diversity,
and organizations, added.

Black workers represent only 3.8 percent of Facebook's nearly
45,000 employees, and even smaller percentages when broken down by
technical or leadership roles.  Two other black professionals,
Howard Winns, Jr., and Jazsmin Smith, joined in filing the charge,
claiming they were unlawfully denied jobs at the tech giant,
despite excellent qualifications and credentials.

The workers want the EEOC to probe what they claim is a pattern of
bias against black workers at the social network.
placeholder

The charge doesn't arrive at a good time for Facebook. Organizers
of the Stop Hate for Profit boycott say that at least 750 different
brands are halting or pausing their advertising on Facebook this
month in protest of how the company has handled hate speech. In
November 2018, Mark Luckie, a former Facebook employee who is
black, wrote a memo saying the company was "failing" its black
users and employees.

"There are so many exceptionally qualified black workers that
Facebook can hire and promote, including the courageous
professionals who filed this discrimination charge," said Peter
Romer-Friedman, a principal at Gupta Wessler PLLC and counsel for
the workers who filed the charge. "Facebook can and must do a far
better job recruiting, hiring, promoting, and retaining black
workers. It's time to close the gap between Facebook's words and
deeds on the issue of diversity."

A spokesperson for Facebook provided Fox News with the following
statement via email:

"We believe it is essential to provide all employees with a
respectful and safe working environment. We take any allegations of
discrimination seriously and investigate every case."   [GN]


FIAT CHRYSLER: Monostable Gear Shifter Lawsuit Partly Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a
Chrysler monostable gear shifter class action lawsuit has been
partly dismissed after the plaintiff failed to convince the judge
that all claims against the automaker should proceed.

The Fiat Chrysler (FCA US) class action lawsuit was filed by
Florida plaintiff Sarah Lalli, owner of a Jeep Grand Cherokee.
Lalli says she hasn't suffered any injuries caused by the
monostable shifter, but she sued for "economic loss damages"
because the Jeep is equipped with an electronic shifter.

A different Florida plaintiff was also included in the lawsuit, but
her claims were dismissed when she "disappeared" from the
proceedings.

According to the lawsuit, Chrysler created the vehicles with
monostable gear shifters that are too confusing for drivers to
operate properly. Multiple class actions were filed over the
shifters in Dodge Chargers, Jeep Grand Cherokees and Chrysler 300s
alleging the vehicles are too dangerous to own or drive.

The lawsuits followed the much-publicized death of actor Anton
Yelchin who was killed when his 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee rolled
backward and trapped him between a concrete mailbox and the
vehicle.

The electronic monostable shifter works by going back to the same
central position, as opposed to shifting a lever into different
gears. Drivers complain they don't know what gears the
transmissions are in unless they look at the indicator lights.

According to the class action, owners have reported more than 300
crashes and dozens of injuries allegedly caused by mistakes made
when using the shifters.

Chrysler owners say the dangers are real because the vehicles
aren't equipped with safety override systems that automatically put
the transmissions in PARK when the driver-side doors are opened and
the brake pedals aren't pressed.

According to the plaintiff, Chrysler violated Florida's Deceptive
and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), and violated laws
concerning fraudulent concealment, breach of express warranty and
unjust enrichment.

In its motion to dismiss, FCA argues the FDUTPA claim is untimely
and the fraudulent concealment claim is barred by Florida's
economic loss doctrine.

In addition, the breach of express warranty claim allegedly cannot
be maintained because the plaintiff didn't provide Chrysler with
pre-suit notice of the warranty claim.

And the automaker says "under Florida law an unjust enrichment
claim based on the same factual premises as a breach of contract
(warranty) claim must be dismissed as defectively pleaded."

Judge David M. Lawson ruled certain claims can proceed, but
important class action claims under the FDUTPA are dismissed,
although the plaintiff can move forward with her individual claim
under that statute.

The plaintiff had better success with her fraudulent concealment
claim when the judge denied Chrysler's motion to dismiss, but the
judge went the other way concerning a breach of express warranty
claim.

Additionally, the judge dismissed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
claim because it is dependent on the express warranty claim.

The Chrysler monostable gear shifter lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan: In Re: FCA US
LLC Monostable Electronic Gearshift Litigation. [GN]


FINJAN HOLDINGS: Monteverde Files Shareholders Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Monteverde & Associates PC has filed a class action lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Case No. 5:20-cv-04343-WHO, on behalf of common
shareholders of Finjan Holdings, Inc. (Nasdaq: FNJN) who hold
Finjan securities as of the close of the tender offer (the "Class
Period"), and have been harmed by Finjan and its board of
directors' (the "Board") alleged violations of Sections 14(e) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")
in connection with the sale of the Company to CFIP Goldfish
Holdings, LLC. ("CFIP").

Under the terms of the sale, each share of Finjan common stock will
be converted into the right to receive $1.55 in cash per share of
Finjan common stock owned. The complaint alleges that the Merger
Consideration is inadequate and that the Recommendation Statement
provides shareholders with materially incomplete and misleading
information with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in
violation of Sections 14(e) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In
particular, the complaint alleges that the Recommendation Statement
contains materially incomplete and misleading information
concerning: (i) financial projections for Finjan; (ii) the
valuation analyses performed by Finjan's financial advisor Atlas
Technology Group LLC, in support of its fairness opinion; and (iii)
background information of the offer. The tender offer is set to
expire on July 22, 2020, one minute after 11:59 PM.

Mr. Juan Monteverde is available to personally discuss this case
with you and if you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move
the Court no later than August 31, 2020. Any member of the putative
class may move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff through counsel
of their choice or may choose to do nothing and remain an absent
class member.

Click here for more information:
https://www.monteverdelaw.com/case/finjan-holdings-inc. It is free
and there is no cost or obligation to you.

Monteverde & Associates PC is a national class action securities
litigation law firm that has recovered millions of dollars and is
committed to protecting shareholders from corporate wrongdoing.
Our lawyers have significant experience litigating Mergers &
Acquisitions and Securities Class Actions. Mr. Monteverde is
recognized by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in Securities
Litigation in 2013, 2017-2019, an award given to less than 2.5% of
attorneys in a particular field.  He has also been selected by
Martindale-Hubbell as a 2017-2019 Top Rated Lawyer.  Our firm's
recent successes include changing the law in a significant victory
that lowered the standard of liability under Section 14(e) of the
Exchange Act in the Ninth Circuit. Thereafter, the firm
successfully preserved this victory by obtaining dismissal of a
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted at the United States
Supreme Court. Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
Also, in 2019 the firm recovered or secured six cash common funds
for shareholders in mergers & acquisitions class action cases.

Contact:

          Juan E. Monteverde, Esq.
          MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
          The Empire State Building
          350 Fifth Ave, Suite 4405
          New York, NY 10118
          United States of America
          E-mail: jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
          Tel: (212) 971-1341
[GN]


FIRST STUDENT: $650K Settlement in Humes Suit Gets Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DELORES HUMES, an individual, DIANE ABELLA, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and others Assigned to: Hon.
Barbara A. McAuliffe similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST
STUDENT, INC., an entity; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 1:15-CV-01861-BAM (E.D. Cal.), Magistrate
Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the Plaintiffs' motion for
final approval of their class settlement.

For settlement purposes, Judge McAuliffe confirmed the
certification of the Class defined as: "non-exempt employees of
Defendant who were employed as drivers at Defendant's Fresno,
California location from Oct. 28, 2014 to Nov. 27, 2016."

Judge McAuliffe finds and determines that the Gross Settlement
Amount in the amount of $650,000 and the Settlement Shares to be
paid to the Participating Class Members as provided for by the
Settlement are fair and reasonable.  The Judge granted final
approval to and ordered the payment of those amounts be distributed
to the Participating Class Members out of the Net Settlement Amount
in accordance with the Agreement.

Judge McAuliffe further finds and determines that the fees and
expenses of Simpluris, Inc. in administrating the settlement, in
the amount of $8,999, are fair and reasonable.  The Judge granted
final approval to and orders that the payment of that amount be
paid out of the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with the
Agreement.

Judge McAuliffe also finds and determines that the request by the
Plaintiff and the Class Counsel to the Class Representative Service
Payment and the attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Agreement
are fair and reasonable.  The Judge granted final approval to and
ordered that the payment of $7,500 to Delores Humes and $5,000 to
Diane Abella for their Class Representative Service Payments,
$216,666.66 for attorneys' fees to the Class Counsel, and
$49,566.73 for reimbursement of costs be paid out of the Gross
Settlement Amount in accordance with the Settlement.

By virtue of the final approval of the Class Settlement, the action
is dismissed with prejudice, each side to bear its own costs and
attorneys' fees except as provided by the Settlement and the
Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/rzx4Wt from Leagle.com.


FLORIDA: Judge Set to Decide on Unemployment System Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Saunders, writing for Orlando Weekly, reports that after four
hours of arguments on June 22, a Leon County circuit judge will
decide whether to move forward with a potential class-action
lawsuit stemming from massive problems in Florida's
unemployment-compensation system.

Attorneys for the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity and
Deloitte Consulting, a contractor that helped put the online system
in place in 2013, argued that Judge John Cooper should dismiss the
lawsuit, which was filed after a crush of coronavirus-caused
unemployment claims overwhelmed the system this spring.

The lawsuit makes a series of allegations, including negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty. Cooper in May rejected a preliminary
injunction that plaintiffs sought to force the Department of
Economic Opportunity to "fix" the system.

Department of Economic Opportunity attorney Daniel Nordby argued on
June 22, in part, that the lawsuit should be dismissed because of
the constitutional separation of powers between judges and the
executive branch. He said decisions by the department "involve a
great deal of discretion" that cannot be second-guessed by judges
under the separation of powers.

But Marie Mattox, an attorney for the plaintiffs, said the
department is required by law to properly maintain the system and
that three audits said the system needed changes before the
problems this year. She said properly maintaining and operating the
system was not a discretionary duty.

Cooper was not specific about when he will rule on the motions by
the state and Deloitte to dismiss the case, though he indicated he
expected the issues to ultimately go to the 1st District Court of
Appeal. He also seemed to be considering dismissing at least parts
of the case but allowing the plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint.

"Do you want to get up to the DCA quicker, or do you want to drag
it out?" Cooper said at one point to Mattox.

The plaintiffs' attorneys filed the lawsuit in April after major
problems with Florida's CONNECT online unemployment system, which
even Gov. Ron DeSantis has described as a "jalopy." The state
scrambled to take steps to shore up the system, but many people who
lost jobs when the pandemic shuttered businesses remained
frustrated as they tried to get benefits.

Deloitte has sought to distance itself from the problem, saying in
court documents it has not been involved with the CONNECT system
for more than five years. Deloitte attorney John Boudet on June 22
disputed the legal arguments made by the plaintiffs, while
acknowledging the frustrations of many people who sought benefits.

"I don't mean to minimize them in the least," Boudet said. "But
this lawsuit is not the right place to address those concerns."

But when Cooper asked, at one point, whether the state or Deloitte
was at fault for the problems, Mattox quickly responded, "It's
both."

With Florida's unemployment rate hitting 14.5 percent in May, the
state paid 1.47 million claimants from March 15 to June 28,
according to the Department of Economic Opportunity. Meanwhile,
479,161 people had been determined ineligible for benefits. [GN]


FLORIDA: Leon County Judge Set to Decide on Unemployment Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gina Jordan, writing for WUSF, reports that after four hours of
arguments, a Leon County circuit judge will decide whether to move
forward with a potential class-action lawsuit stemming from massive
problems in Florida's unemployment-compensation system.

Attorneys for the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity and
Deloitte Consulting, a contractor that helped put the online system
in place in 2013, argued that Judge John Cooper should dismiss the
lawsuit, which was filed after a crush of coronavirus-caused
unemployment claims overwhelmed the system this spring.

The lawsuit makes a series of allegations, including negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty. Cooper in May rejected a preliminary
injunction that plaintiffs sought to force the Department of
Economic Opportunity to "fix" the system.

Department of Economic Opportunity attorney Daniel Nordby argued in
part, that the lawsuit should be dismissed because of the
constitutional separation of powers between judges and the
executive branch. He said decisions by the department "involve a
great deal of discretion" that cannot be second-guessed by judges
under the separation of powers.

But Marie Mattox, an attorney for the plaintiffs, said the
department is required by law to properly maintain the system and
that three audits said the system needed changes before the
problems this year. She said properly maintaining and operating the
system was not a discretionary duty.

Cooper was not specific about when he will rule on the motions by
the state and Deloitte to dismiss the case, though he indicated he
expected the issues to ultimately go to the 1st District Court of
Appeal. He also seemed to be considering dismissing at least parts
of the case but allowing the plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint.

"Do you want to get up to the DCA quicker, or do you want to drag
it out?" Cooper said at one point to Mattox.

The plaintiffs' attorneys filed the lawsuit in April after major
problems with Florida's CONNECT online unemployment system, which
even Gov. Ron DeSantis has described as a "jalopy." The state
scrambled to take steps to shore up the system, but many people who
lost jobs when the pandemic shuttered businesses remained
frustrated as they tried to get benefits.

Deloitte has sought to distance itself from the problem, saying in
court documents it has not been involved with the CONNECT system
for more than five years. Deloitte attorney John Boudet disputed
the legal arguments made by the plaintiffs, while acknowledging the
frustrations of many people who sought benefits.

"I don't mean to minimize them in the least," Boudet said. "But
this lawsuit is not the right place to address those concerns."

But when Cooper asked, at one point, whether the state or Deloitte
was at fault for the problems, Mattox quickly responded, "It's
both."

With Florida's unemployment rate hitting 14.5 percent in May, the
state paid 1.47 million claimants from March 15 to June 28.
according to the Department of Economic Opportunity. Meanwhile,
479,161 people had been determined ineligible for benefits. [GN]


FORESCOUT TECH: Barbuto & Johansson Reminds of Aug. 10 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Barbuto & Johansson, P.A. ("BARJO" or the "Firm") and Of Counsel,
Neil Rothstein, Esq. (with over 30 years of Securities Class Action
experience, including cases against ENRON and HALLIBURTON) remind
investors of the upcoming deadline in the class action lawsuit
filed against Forescout Technologies, Inc. (NasdaqGS: FSCT).  The
Firm encourages shareholders with losses exceeding $100,000 to
contact the Firm to discuss the case and their options as class
members and qualifications to serve as lead plaintiff.  The
deadline to petition the court to act as a lead plaintiff is August
10, 2020.

The case, The Arbitrage Fund, et al. v. Forescout Technologies,
Inc., et al., Case No.: 3:20-cv-03819, was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of
shareholders who purchased the Company's common stock between
February 6, 2020 and May 15, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period").
The lawsuit alleges that Forescout and certain of its executives
failed to disclose material information during the Class Period
relating to its planned merger, violating federal securities laws.


On May 18, 2020, Forescout announced that it had received notice
from its acquisition partner, Advent International Corporation,
that Advent "would not be proceeding to consummate the acquisition
of Forescout" pursuant to the parties' merger agreement.  As a
result of the disclosure, Forescout's stock price plummeted, wiping
out approximately $300 million in market capitalization.  The
lawsuit alleges that Forescout failed to disclose during the Class
Period, among other things, that the Company was not meeting its
obligations under the merger agreement and that there was a
material risk that the merger would not close.

If you purchased shares of Forescout during the Class Period and
would like to discuss the case and your options as a class member
and potential lead plaintiff, you may, without obligation or cost,
contact Anthony Barbuto, at (888) 715-2520, or via email at
anthony@barjolaw.com, or Neil Rothstein via email at
neil@barjolaw.com.  The Firm believes strongly that the choice of a
qualified lead plaintiff can have a significant impact on the
successful outcome of a case.

Barbuto & Johansson, P.A.
Anthony Barbuto, Esq.
1-888-715-2520
12773 Forest Hill Blvd., 101
Wellington, FL 33414
http://www.barjolaw.com[GN]


FRED BEANS: Wins Summary Judgment in Brogan Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER BROGAN, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FRED BEANS MOTORS OF
DOYLESTOWN, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 17-5628 (E.D. Pa.),
Judge Chad F. Kenney of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The case arises from the purchase of a vehicle from an automotive
dealership.  The purchaser, Plaintiff Brogan, brought the action on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated vehicle purchasers
against the Defendant alleging breach of contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of
the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance ("MVSF"), the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA"), the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), and the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA").

The Plaintiff asserted the following claims in his Second Amended
Complaint:  breach of contract for stating incorrect finance
charges and failing to cancel the previous RISCs in writing (Count
I); breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
for stating incorrect finance charges and failing to cancel the
previous RISCs in writing (Count II); MVSF claims for stating
incorrect finance charges (Count III); TILA claims for stating
incorrect finance charges and requiring multiple RISCs (Count IV);
UTPCPL claims for stating incorrect finance charges, issuing
multiple RISCs, and imposing a $138 Dealer Fee (Count V); and FCRA
claims for continuing to conduct credit inquiries after executing a
RISC (Count VI).

At the pretrial conference hearing held pursuant to Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Dec. 14, 2018, the Plaintiff's
counsel represented that the crux of the case was that the
Defendants had a practice of leading customers to believe the
vehicle purchase transaction was complete so that the dealership
could continue to shop the financing deal terms in order to garner
a better financing rate for itself all while the unpaid balances on
their trade-ins when trade-ins are involved are not getting paid
off.

In other words, unbeknownst to the consumer the allegation is
they're still shopping the deal around and they're shopping the
deal around to keep on pulling the credit to see what the best
deals the car dealership can really get.  The Plaintiff asserted
that to the detriment of himself and the putative class, the
Defendant was trying to find their best quote/unquote brokerage fee
from the deal, just immediately transferring the financing out.  In
response, the Defendant stated that discovery will establish that
the circumstances of Mr. Brogan's purchase involving the multiple
retail installment contracts and multiple credit checks are an
individualized circumstance and not a common practice of the
dealership.

At a status conference held on July 8, 2019, apparently not finding
through discovery that his speculated theory that the dealership
was shopping the deal around in all of these installment sales
contracts, the Plaintiff shifted his theory of the case to an
entirely new one: that the Defendant had the Plaintiff sign RISC #1
and leave the dealership with the Subaru without properly securing
financing in order to "get these transactions done."  However, the
record or the facts do not support this theory either, and, as a
result, the Court is left with amorphous speculations by the
Plaintiff in search of a class pointing to allegations in the
complaint and very little else.  The Plaintiff made arguments in
search of a foundation, and despite extensive discovery finding no
foundation, still soldiered on so as to now ask the Court, through
its own efforts and initiative, to find a basis to deny summary
judgment and find a class by a rigorous review of the record that
the Plaintiff himself, despite extensive discovery, could not
find.

The Defendant moves for summary judgment on all counts of the
Second Amended Complaint.  The Plaintiff filed a Response in
Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Defendant thereafter filed a Reply.  The Court heard oral argument
on the motion on Jan. 16, 2020.

In Count I, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant breached the
contracts between the parties in two ways: (1) by falsely
requesting an amount that exceeds the amount which is supposed to
be paid based on the length of financing, the amount financed, and
annual percentage rate; and (2) despite entering into final and
binding contracts for the sale of vehicles with the Plaintiff, the
Defendant breaches retail installment sales contracts (RISCs) by
issuing new retail installment sales contracts on different terms
than those in the initially executed and binding agreements,
without anything in writing confirming that the prior agreement was
cancelled.  The Plaintiff asserts it is entitled to damages in the
amount that the court may allow, along with attorneys' fees and
expenses.

Judge Kenney finds that RISC #3 was a novation of RISC #1 and thus,
the Defendant did not breach RISC #1.  First, neither party
disputes that RISC #1 was a valid contract.  Next, the record makes
clear that RISC #3 substituted RISC #1 and that the parties
intended so and consented to such.  The Plaintiff's own testimony
evidences the parties' intent for RISC #3 to replace RISC #1.
Indeed, the Plaintiff testified that he did not make any payments
pursuant to RISC #1.  And more ruinous to the Plaintiff's argument,
the Plaintiff also acknowledged that he did not think he was buying
two Subaru vehicles, nor did he expect that signing the additional
RISCs would require him to pay additional money to the Defendant.
Because the Court finds that the Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law as to both parts of Count I's breach of contract
claim, Count I will be accordingly denied as a matter of law.

In Count II, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed in its
duty of good faith and fair dealing by charging the Plaintiff and
the members of the Putative Class a finance charge that exceeded
the amount set forth in the retail sales installment contracts and
that the Defendant further failed in its duty of good faith and
fair dealing by failing to perform as required under retail sales
installment contracts, and reissuing new retail installment sales
contracts at new terms, at its whim, to the detriment of the
Plaintiff and members of the Putative Classes.

The Court holds that the Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law
because even if the Court found that the delay in Defendant's
payoff of the Hyundai loan constituted a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, though it does not,
Plaintiff admits that he has suffered no harm from the alleged
breach.  The loan was eventually paid off by Defendant in
accordance with the transaction terms, and Plaintiff has put forth
no evidence to show that any alleged delay in payment caused any
damage to the Plaintiff.  Accordingly, Count II will be denied as a
matter of law.

In Count III, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
intentionally miscalculated the finance charge in each of the RISCs
based on the amount financed and the annual rate and failed to
adhere to 12 Pa. C.S.A. Section 6243(b)(2)(i), (ii) and (iii).  The
Defendant contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law as to Count III because the finance calculations were done
correctly and the MVSF does not provide a private cause of action.


The Court finds that regardless of whether the Plaintiff's MVSF
claim is duplicative of his UTPCPL claim, the Defendant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law as to Count III because the
Plaintiff has again failed to show that there is a genuine issue of
material fact prohibiting Count III from being denied on summary
judgment.  The Plaintiff carries the burden of proving each one of
his claims, and although he has offered an alternative calculation
in his briefs opposing the Defendant's motions to dismiss, the
Plaintiff has offered no evidence or citation to authority to show
that the Defendant's method of calculation is impermissible under
the MVSF.  Furthermore, the Plaintiff is unable at this time to
articulate to the Court how the Defendant's calculations
specifically violate the MVSF, much less to present any evidence
either to support such a claim or to show that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact that warrants denial of the
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
Accordingly, Count III will be denied as a matter of law.

In Count IV, the Plaintiff alleges that the Federal Truth in
Lending Disclosures in the retail sales installment contracts were
false and misleading as, among other reasons, the dealership
repeatedly miscalculated financing terms in its favor in order to
generate further revenue from automobile sales and that the
Defendant had no intention to honor the financing terms contained
in its retail sales installment contracts, which were subject to
the Defendant's unilateral determination.

The Court holds that the Plaintiff's inability at this late stage
in litigation to articulate how the Defendant's conduct violated
specific provisions of a statute upon which he sought not only to
state a claim for himself but also for an entire class of allegedly
harmed consumers is insufficient.  The Defendant has painstakingly
explained how its calculations complied with TILA and in response
the Plaintiff only merely reiterates the allegations he made in the
Second Amended Complaint.  Accordingly, Count IV will be denied as
a matter of law.

In Count V, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated the
UTPCPL by charging consumers in its retail sales installment
agreements dealer fees that were purportedly for services rendered
in preparing documentation for automobile sales.  The Court holds
that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
Count V as against the Plaintiff.  The fee is not hidden in a
random provision of the agreement or pre-printed on the form in the
sense that it is part of the boilerplate language automatically
included in each RISC.  Rather, it is inserted into the RISCs by
Defendant along with all of the other variable terms of the
agreement and presented to the Plaintiff for his voluntary
agreement and execution.

Finally, In Count VI, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant
violated Sections 1681 of the FCRA by willfully and negligently
causing unauthorized and excessive credit inquiries to be made of
the Plaintiff and the Class.  The Plaintiff asserts that the
conduct of the Defendant was a direct and proximate cause, as well
as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the Plaintiff
and that the violations were willful.

The Court finds that the three consumer report inquiries were
obtained with permissible purpose under the FCRA because the
Plaintiff granted permission for his consumer report to be obtained
in connection with his purchase of the Subaru and the ongoing
financing relationship arrangement thereafter.  The Defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the Plaintiff's FCRA
claims, and Count VI will be accordingly dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kenney granted the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/rJA8nN from Leagle.com.


GATES CORP: Arnold Struck From Lundine Conditional Employees Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEGGY LUNDINE, on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GATES CORPORATION, Defendant,
Case No. 18-1235-EFM (D. Kan.), Judge Eric F. Melgren of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas granted Gates' Motion to
Strike Opt-In Plaintiff Hannah Arnold from the Conditional Class.

Peggy Lundine filed the action on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated to recover alleged unpaid overtime wages from
Gates.  The Court granted conditional class certification on July
11, 2019, defining the putative class as all current and former
nonexempt manufacturing employees who were employed by Gates from
July 11, 2016, to the present.  On Sept. 21, 2018, Hannah Arnold
filed a consent to join the action.

Arnold worked at Gates' Siloam Springs, Arkansas facility for five
weeks between September and October 2017.  Gates hired her through
a temporary staffing agency, 1st Employment Staffing.  It utilizes
the Staffing Agency and other companies like it to temporarily fill
its fluctuating employment needs.  Gates hires only a small portion
of its overall workforce through temporary staffing agencies.  The
workers hired by this method are commonly prescreened and paid by
the agencies, and the agencies maintain their personnel files.
Gates does not directly pay workers hired through temporary
agencies.  Rather, the agencies -- including the Staffing Agency in
the case -- submit invoices to Gates which includes amounts for
labor as well as administrative and overhead fees.  It pays the
agencies a lump sum for each invoice amount.  The agencies then
apportion Gates' payments to their workers according to the nature
and duration of their work.

Before the Court is Defendant Gates' Motion to Strike Opt-In
Plaintiff Hannah Arnold from the Conditional Class.  Gates argues
that Opt-In Arnold falls outside of the conditional class
definition because Gates never "employed" her, and she was only
engaged for a short assignment through a staffing agency.  Gates
argues that temporary contract workers like Arnold do not meet the
conditional class definition as having been "employed by Gates."

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Judge Melgren
concludes that Arnold is not an employee of Gates for purposes of
the FLSA collective action.  Although some factors weigh in favor
of categorizing Arnold as an employee, the unique business
relationship between Gates and the Staffing Agency indicates that
Gates did not employ Arnold in either the traditional or FLSA sense
of the word.  Lundine filed the action on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated to recover alleged unpaid overtime wages
from Gates.  But Gates does not pay wages to workers placed at its
facilities through the Staffing Agency.  Rather, Gates pays the
Staffing Agency a lump sum based on invoices calculated by the
Staffing Agency, which includes, among other things, amounts
eventually directed to temporary workers.  For that reason and the
others, Arnold and other similarly situated temporary workers do
not satisfy the putative class definition in the case.

Therefore, the Court granted the Defendant's Motion to Strike
Opt-In Plaintiff Hannah Arnold from the Conditional Class.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Memorandum
& Order is available at https://is.gd/KMpQp2 from Leagle.com.


GDS HOLDINGS: Court Dismisses Amended Ramzan Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint in HAMZA RAMZAN, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GDS HOLDINGS LIMITED,
WILLIAM WEI HUANG, and DANIEL NEWMAN, Defendants, Case No.
19-cv-9154 (LAK) (S.D. N.Y.).

In July 2018, short seller Blue Orca Capital released a report
accusing Defendant GDS Holdings Limited of engaging in fraudulent
conduct.  GDS' share price fell approximately 37% following the
report's publication.  The Plaintiffs seized on these allegations
and now bring claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against GDS and two GDS executives
based on the conduct described in Blue Orca's report.

Defendant GDS is a Cayman Islands company headquartered in China.
GDS develops, acquires, and operates data centers in China,
including in Guangzhou and Shenzhen.  The company provides its data
center customers with colocation services, among others.  The
colocation service provides GDS customers with physical space,
power supply, and other services necessary to operate the
customers' IT systems.  Profits from this service accounted for
over 70% of GDS' total revenue from 2015 through 2017.

The alleged fraud concerns four of GDS' data centers: GZ1, GZ2, and
GZ3 in Guangzhou, and SZ5 in Shenzhen.  GZ1, located in what is
called the G6 data building in the Guangzhou Innovations Park, was
acquired in May 2016, six months before GDS held its initial public
offering ("IPO").  In its 2017 Form 20-F report, GDS reported that,
as of Dec. 31, 2017, the company had received commitments from
customers to use 100% of GZ1's "usable space" and that 90% of the
usable space had begun to generate revenue.  Presentation slides
used during GDS's 2018 Q1 earnings call, which was hosted by
William Wei Huang (founder, CEO, and chairman of the board of
directors) and Daniel Newman (CFO), stated that GZ1's utilization
rate had increased to 93.7%.

The Plaintiffs filed the action on Aug. 2, 2018.  They assert
claims under the Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act
against GDS and against current GDS executives Huang and Newman.
Parroting Blue Orca's allegations, plaintiffs allege that (1) GDS'
disclosures regarding the GZ1 data center falsely stated the
commitment rate and utilization rate, and that (2) in its SEC
filings, GDS listed false acquisition prices of the GZ2, GZ3, and
SZ5 data centers.

The Defendants move to dismiss for failure to allege a material
misstatement, scienter, or loss causation.  As corporate executives
at GDS, the amended complaint alleges adequately that Huang and
Newman had the opportunity to commit fraud.  However, it offers no
allegations that either had a motive to do so.  Accordingly, Judge
Kaplan holds that the amended complaint fails to allege motive and
opportunity as to the Individual Defendants.

Next, the "most straightforward" way to raise an inference of
corporate scienter is to plead scienter for an individual
Defendant.  The Plaintiffs have not even attempted to do so.  The
Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations are couched in
conditional language and speculation.  Missing from the amended
complaint are allegations that anyone at GDS did misappropriate
company funds or in fact raised capital for any illicit purpose.
These allegations are insufficient to satisfy the heightened
pleading standard required by Rule 9 and the PSLRA.  Finally, as to
the commercialization fraud, the Plaintiffs argue that the
acquisition of GZ1 six months before the company held its IPO
demonstrates defendants' motive to commit fraud.  The amended
complaint alleges only the timing of the IPO.  The Judge cannot
infer scienter based only on the proximity of one corporate action
to another.  Hence, the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled
motive to commit the alleged fraud.

To allege recklessness sufficiently, the Plaintiffs must plead
facts sufficient to show that a Defendant's conduct was "highly
unreasonable" and represented "an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care to the extent that the danger was either
known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have
been aware of it."  Where the Plaintiffs have failed to plead
motive, the strength of the circumstantial allegations of conscious
misbehavior or recklessness must be correspondingly greater.

The Judge finds that while signing the SOX certifications might be
indicative of scienter, a plaintiff cannot raise an inference of
fraudulent intent based on the signing of a certification without
alleging any facts to show a concomitant awareness of or
recklessness to the materially misleading nature of the statements.
In the case, the Plaintiffs have not provided facts sufficient to
allege awareness or recklessness, and instead rely on general
allegations about the Individual Defendants' senior position within
the company.  These conclusory allegations cannot withstand the
motion to dismiss.

Having failed to plead facts sufficient to give rise to a strong
inference of scienter as to Huang or Newman, or to allege facts
concerning the intent of any other individuals at GDS, the amended
complaint does not plead scienter as to GDS.  And because the
Plaintiffs have not alleged a primary violation of the Exchange
Act, their claims under Section 20(a) are dismissed.

Because he agrees that the amended complaint does not adequately
allege scienter, Judge Kaplan granted the Defendants' motion is
granted.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/FwtDMt from Leagle.com.

Laurence Rosen -- lrosen@rosenlegal.com -- Phillip Kim --
pkim@rosenlegal.com -- Yu Shi -- yshi@rosenlegal.com -- Jing Chen,
THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A., Attorneys for Lead Plaintiffs.

James G. Kreissman -- jkreissman@stblaw.com -- Alan C. Turner --
aturner@stblaw.com -- SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, Attorneys for
Defendants.


GENERAL MOTORS: Baker Appeals Decisions in Ignition Switch MDL
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Patricia Baker, et al., filed an appeal from court
rulings entered in the multidistrict litigation entitled In re:
General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, Case No. 14-md-2543,
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
(New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Jesse
Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York issued an Opinion and Order denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Summary Judgment Ruling in the
General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation.

The litigation arises from alleged defects in the ignition switches
and other features of certain General Motors vehicles. Some of the
claims are brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of putative classes of
GM car owners and lessors whose vehicles were subject to recalls
and who now seek to recover economic losses, on the theory that
they overpaid for their vehicles because a car with a safety defect
is worth less than a car without a safety defect.

In particular, the Court reached three significant conclusions.
First, the Court held that, in all three Bellwether States,
Plaintiffs' benefit-of-the-bargain damages are properly measured as
the lesser of (1) the cost of repair, or (2) the difference in fair
market value between the Plaintiffs' cars as warranted and those
same cars as sold.

Second, the Court explained: That means that evidence of New GM's
post-sale repairs is relevant to the calculation of Plaintiffs'
damages and, indeed, could theoretically eliminate those damages
altogether.

Third, and most significantly, the Court concluded that, whether or
not Plaintiffs' claims for cost-of-repair damages could survive New
GM's motion, Plaintiffs' claims for difference-in-value' damages
could not because Plaintiffs' sole evidence of such damages, the
expert testimony of Stefan Boedeker was insufficient as a matter of
Bellwether State law to establish the existence of damages, an
essential element of any such claim.

The Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of three aspects of the Court's
summary judgment Opinion and Order.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: General Motors LLC
Ignition Switch Litigation, Case No. 19-4314, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Patricia Barker, individually and on behalf
of all other similarly situated; Chimen Basseri; Michael Benton;
Sylvia Benton, indiviually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; Kimberly Brown-Shipley; Kellie Cereceres; Crystal Hardin;
Yvonne James-Bivens; Javier F. Malaga, an individual; and on behalf
of all others similarly situated; Winifred Mattos; Santiago Orosco;
David Padilla; Esperanza Ramirez, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; William L. Rukeyser; Michelle Thomas;
Brad Akers; Deloris Hamilton; Cynthia Hawkins; Kenneth Robinson;
Ronald Robinson; Mario Stefano; Christopher Tinen; Patrice
Witherspoon; Gareebah Al-ghamdi; Dawn Bacon; Dawn Fuller; Michael
Graciano; Shenyesa Henry; Keisha Hunter; Lisa McClellan; Lisa
Simmons; and Malinda Stafford are represented by:

          Steve W. Berman, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1301 2nd Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com

Defendant-Appellee General Motors LLC is represented by:

          Andrew Baker Bloomer, Esq.
          Richard C. Godfrey, Esq.
          KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
          300 North LaSalle Street
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Telephone: (312) 862-2482
          E-mail: andrew.bloomer@kirkland.com
                  richard.godfrey@kirkland.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Oil Consumption Suit Certified as Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a
General Motors (GM) oil consumption lawsuit has been certified as a
class action, but only for General Motors customers in California,
North Carolina and Texas.

The GM oil consumption lawsuit was filed in 2016 and alleges the
Gen IV Vortec 5300 engines have defects that cause excessive oil
consumption that eventually damages the engines in 2010-2014
vehicles.

The class action initially included multiple vehicles nationwide,
but the judge dismissed the lawsuit in 2017 and then allowed the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

The oil consumption lawsuit alleges the Vortec 5300 engines have
piston rings that "do not maintain sufficient tension to keep oil
in the crankcase" which allows oil to "burn[] or accumulate[] as
carbon buildup on the combustion chamber's surfaces."

The oil consumption allegedly causes serious safety problems when
the engine is starved of oil and oil pressure is lost. The spark
plugs are also fouled due to oil in the combustion chamber and may
cause the vehicle to break down.

Although class action certification was granted for three states,
there are modifications compared to the original lawsuit concerning
which models and years are included.

   -- 2011-2014 Chevrolet Avalanche
   -- 2011-2014 Chevrolet Silverado
   -- 2011-2014 Chevrolet Suburban
   -- 2011-2014 Chevrolet Tahoe
   -- 2011-2014 GMC Sierra
   -- 2011-2014 GMC Yukon
   -- 2011-2014 GMC Yukon XL

The original oil consumption lawsuit included the LC9, LMG, LH9 and
LMF engines, but the latest version includes the above vehicles if
equipped with LC9 engines and manufactured on or after February 10,
2011.

Any vehicle that has already received adequate piston replacement
(piston replacement in which the new pistons were not merely new
versions of the same defective pistons) is excluded from the class
action.

According to the judge, there is enough evidence to show the
alleged oil consumption problem is a safety defect within the
context of fraudulent omission, implied warranty and consumer
protection claims.

In addition, the judge ruled at this stage there is enough evidence
to suggest GM failed to properly resolve oil consumption problems.

On the claim of an intent to deceive, the judge ruled the "evidence
raises issues of material fact regarding fraudulent intent; a
reasonable jury could find in Plaintiffs' favor on this issue."

The judge seemed to have issues with claims the automaker concealed
defects by saying the allegations against the automaker do little
more than use the word conceal, but without any specific
affirmative acts of concealment. However, at this stage the judge
must view evidence in the "light most favorable" to the
plaintiffs.

Finally, the judge ruled a "reasonable jury could conclude that the
evidence before the Court supports the conclusion that the alleged
Oil Consumption Defect constitutes a safety defect and that GM
actively concealed information about the defect."

The GM oil consumption lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California: Monteville Sloan, et al.,
v. General Motors LLC.

CarComplaints.com has complaints about the vehicles named in the GM
oil consumption lawsuit.

   -- Chevrolet Avalanche - 2011 / 2012 / 2013 /
   -- Chevrolet Silverado 1500 - 2012 / 2013 / 2014
   -- Chevrolet Suburban - 2011 / 2012 / 2013 / 2014
   -- Chevrolet Tahoe - 2011 / 2012 / 2013 / 2014
   -- GMC Sierra 1500 - 2011 / 2012 / 2013 / 2014
   -- GMC Yukon - 2011 / 2012 / 2013 / 2014 [GN]


GEO GROUP: Cross Bids for Summary Judgment in Nwauzor Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, UGOCHUKWU GOODLUCK NWAUZOR, FERNANDO AGUIRRE-URBINA,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. THE GEO GROUP, INC., Defendant, Case No. C17-5769RJB
(W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court for
Washington, Tacoma, denied (i) the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and (ii) the GEO Group, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment.

On Sept. 26, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed the class action, alleging
that Defendant GEO failed to comply with the State of Washington's
Minimum Wage Act ("MWA") regarding work performed by civil
detainees at the Northwest Detention Center ("NWDC"), which was
recently renamed the "Northwest ICE Processing Center."  On Aug. 6,
2018, the Court certified a class in the case of all civil
immigration detainees who participated in the Voluntary Work
Program ("VWP") at the NWDC from Sept. 26, 2014 and the date of
final judgment in the matter.

GEO is a private for-profit corporation that provides correctional
and detention services.  The NWDC, a 1,575-bed facility, is owned
and operated by GEO.  In 2009, and through a renewed agreement in
2015, GEO contracted with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") to provide detention management services including the
facility, detention officers, management personnel, supervision,
manpower, training certificates, licenses and supplies.  GEO also
agreed to be responsible for other ancillary services including but
not limited to transportation and food service.

The contracts with ICE require that GEO comply with ICE's
Performance-Based National Standards ("PBNDS"), which are a set of
national detention standards to ensure all entities that ICE
contracts with meet baseline requirements.  The contracts also
require GEO to comply with all federal, state, and local laws and
regulations.  If ambiguity arises, the most stringent standard
applies.

According to ICE official, Tae D. Johnson, the NWDC operates
pursuant to a performance-based contracts, which is a
results-oriented method of contracting focused on outputs, quality,
and outcomes.  Performance-based contracts do not designate how a
contractor is to perform the work, but rather establishes the
expected outcomes and results that the government expects.  Further
the contracts are also firm-fixed price contracts, which means that
GEO responded to the government's requirements by quoting fully
burdened rates (i.e. bed day rate, transportation rate, etc.) at
which it would perform the requirements.  The program also allows
detainees to earn money to buy commissary goods and pay for phone
calls. The State of Washington operates civil detention centers
where it pays less than minimum wage for work performed by
detainees.  The State has also contemplated contracting with GEO to
provide out-of-state detention services (which included a work
program) for people convicted of a crime, but no contract was
completed.

On Sept. 20, 2017, the State filed a case against GEO, maintaining
that GEO failed to pay civil detainees participating in the VWP in
accord with MWA -- Washington v. GEO Grp., Inc., Western District
of Washington Case No. 17-5806 RJB.  As one of its affirmative
defenses in Washington, GEO maintained that it was entitled to
intergovernmental immunity.  In December 2018, the Court denied
GEO's motion for summary judgment on its defense of
intergovernmental immunity and denied its motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for summary judgment.
The discovery in Washington continued.

On May 28, 2019, the class action case was consolidated with the
State case, Washington v. GEO Grp., Inc., Western District of
Washington Case No. 17-5806 RJB, for liability purposes only.  The
Court ordered that the deadlines in the cases would remain
unchanged.  On Aug. 6, 2019, GEO's motion for summary judgment
based on the defense of derivative sovereign immunity and the State
and GEO's cross motions for summary judgment on the State' MWA
claim were all denied.

After the close of discovery in Washington and after giving the
parties another opportunity to address the defense of
intergovernmental immunity, on Oct. 9, 2019, the Court reaffirmed
its prior ruling and denied GEO's motion for summary judgment on
the defense of intergovernmental immunity.  On Oct. 28, 2019, GEO's
motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative, to reopen
discovery and move for summary judgment, was denied in Washington.


The Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment asserting that (1) GEO
is an "employer," the Plaintiffs are "employees" under the MWA, (2)
GEO's contract with ICE does not prevent GEO from paying detainee
workers minimum wage, and (3) GEO's counterclaim and affirmative
defense of "offset/unjust enrichment" should be dismissed because
GEO contracted with ICE and received payment for the benefits it
now seeks to disgorge from the Plaintiffs.

GEO opposes the motion and argues that (1) the detainees are not
"employees" under the plain language of the MWA, (2) the Plaintiffs
cannot satisfy the economic dependence test and so are not
"employees," (3) there are issues of fact as to whether GEO is
entitled to "offset/unjust enrichment."

Judge Bryan first addresses the Plaintiffs' motion for findings of
fact under Rule 56(g); second, provides the standard of review on a
motion for summary judgment; third, addresses both parties
arguments regarding whether the Plaintiffs are "employees" under
the MWA; fourth, GEO's defense of intergovernmental immunity;
fifth, GEO's defense of derivative immunity and; last the
Plaintiffs' motion to summarily dismiss GEO's counterclaim and/or
affirmative defense for offset/unjust enrichment.

GEO points to the state's work program at the Special Commitment
Center for sexually violent predators, Pierce County's work program
for inmates and pre-trial detainees, and the State's contract to
have GEO house prisoners out-of-state (which was never completed)
to demonstrate that the State of Washington treats itself better
than it treats the federal government.  There are issues of fact as
to whether these various programs are sufficiently similar to the
VWP to show discrimination.  

Unlike GEO's NWDC, the Special Commitment Center and the Pierce
County facilities are government owned and operated. Contractor
involvement, if any, appears, on the record, to be limited.  There
are sufficient questions as to whether GEO points to a contractor
that was sufficiently similar to it in either facility.  Moreover,
the contract (between GEO and the State of Washington) to which GEO
refers was never finalized and related to the provision of services
out-of-state.  GEO's motion for summary judgment based on the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity should be denied.

GEO's motion for summary judgment, based on derivative sovereign
immunity should also be denied.  The Judge holds that GEO has not
shown that it was directed by the government to pay participants in
the VWP only $1 per day.  GEO has not shown that it had "no
discretion in the design process and completely followed government
specifications.  The record indicates that GEO has, in the past,
paid workers more than a $1 a day and has the ability to, and has
requested, changes to the contracts, including modifications to be
reimbursed more than was originally agreed upon. GEO's motion to
for summary judgment based on derivative sovereign immunity should
be denied.

Finally, even though it is a motion for summary judgment, the
result is the same -- there are facts at issue precluding summary
judgment.  GEO points out that if it has to pay detainees more than
the amount allotted under the ICE contract for the VWP, it may well
have to bear that cost.  Whether that would be "inequitable" is an
issue of fact for the jury.

Moreover, as they did in the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs
again advance the argument, that GEO cannot recover restitution
from Plaintiff because it has already been fully paid by ICE.  As
was the case in the motion to dismiss, is still valid - that
argument is relevant to the second and third elements and "is an
equitable argument better reached at trial."  The Plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on the GEO's counterclaim/affirmative
defense of unjust enrichment/offset should be denied.  The issue
appears to be triable only if the Plaintiffs prevail on their MWA
claims.

In sum, Judge Bryan denied the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/hHKP1D from Leagle.com.


GERMANY: BaFin, FREP Face Class Action Over Wirecard Insolvency
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Berlin attorneys Dr. Marc Liebscher (Dr. Spaeth & Partner
Rechtsanwaelte) and Dr. Wolfgang Schirp (Schirp & Partner
Rechtsanwaelte) have been commissioned by Wirecard investors to
prepare the filing of class action lawsuits against the Federal
Republic of Germany on the grounds of state liability. The reason
is the failure of the German regulatory authorities in the Wirecard
AG case.

"It is clear from the press reports and statements made by those
responsible that BaFin and FREP have made blatant mistakes. We will
therefore sue the Federal Republic of Germany for damages on behalf
of our clients. Class actions for state liability are already in
preparation," says attorney Dr. Marc Liebscher.

"We have already sued BaFin for damages because of P&R and will now
sue again. A violation of European law is in the offing, so that a
possible liability privilege of the BaFin, which is in any case
contrary to European law, will not apply. And there is no liability
privilege for the FREP anyway," says attorney Dr. Wolfgang Schirp.

The media reports are undisputed: As early as February 2019, the
German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) saw grounds
for investigating Wirecard AG for balance sheet manipulation. In
accordance with German supervisory law, which has a two-tiered
structure in this area, it passed the investigation mandate on to
the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP). The FREP
is an association organized under private law, which is entrusted
with sovereign duties in this area. The FREP seconded a single
employee to Wirecard for the examination. This employee failed to
submit an audit report until the collapse of the Wirecard Group in
June 2020, i.e. within a period of one and a half years. For its
part, BaFin protected Wirecard for a long time in 2019 by
prohibiting the short selling of shares. This was despite the fact
that even then very substantiated accusations had been made against
the company's accounting, primarily by the Financial Times, but
also by other media. These accusations pointed to a fraudulent
inflating of the balance sheet. All in all, a blatant failure of
supervision is evident. Federal Finance Minister Scholz has
expressly admitted this. The head of BaFin, Felix Hufeld, has also
already admitted mistakes. It is therefore not unexpected that on
June 29, the responsible ministries will terminate the agreement
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the FREP according to
media reports. EU Vice Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis has also
announced an investigation. It is to be examined whether Germany
has violated EU law due to insufficient supervision. Above all, the
peculiar division of responsibilities between BaFin and the FREP is
the focus of criticism by the EU.

"However, this is not enough as a political reaction. Wirecard has
uncontrollably destroyed billions of euros in investor money. The
reputation of Germany as a financial center has been damaged to an
unprecedented extent worldwide. Consequences must be drawn and
responsibility must be taken," said lawyers Schirp and Liebscher.

Lawyer Dr. Wolfgang Schirp sees a parallel in the renewed failure
of supervision to the giant insolvency of the container provider
P&R, where the BaFin also watched for years as investor money was
destroyed.

Dr. Wolfgang Schirp, Berlin, who is already conducting official
liability proceedings against BaFin in the matter of P&R: "The
state tries to protect BaFin from any official liability. Such a
liability privilege has been specifically included in par. 4 para.
of the Financial Services Supervision Act (FinDAG). However, this
is not only deeply indecent, but also violates European law. How
can it be that an authority whose supervision millions of investors
have to rely on for existential decisions never has to answer for
even the most blatant failure? Such quasi-medieval privileges do
not exist anywhere else! We call for EU intervention, and we demand
that pending German legal disputes against BaFin be referred to the
European Court of Justice so that the latter can declare the
liability privileges null and void and restore order. However, it
is also clear that the FREP has not regulated such a liability
privilege: Wirecard investors should sue."

Dr. Marc Liebscher, Berlin, who has been following the work of the
FREP critically for years: "There are scandalous conflicts of
interest within the FREP. A private-law association, the FREP, is
involved in the sovereign supervision. And the President of the
FREP - the so-called balance sheet police -- simultaneously sits on
the supervisory boards of three large corporations, where he even
chairs the audit committee. Prof. Dr. Ernst has been President of
the FREP since July 2011 and is also Chairman of the Audit
Committee at TUI, Vonovia and Metro. This is a first-rate conflict
of interest! This is to put the fox in charge of the henhouse. I am
curious to see when the opposition in Federal Parliament will wake
up and demand an investigative committee -- in the decisive year of
the Chancellor's election. It can not be, that the millions of
private and institutional investors from Germany and abroad must
pay for blatent failure of supervision. In Germany we finally need
effective control structures in line with international standards.
Proposals have been on the table for years."

For further information please contact us:

  Dr. Wolfgang Schirp
  Schirp & Partner Rechtsanwaelte mbB
  Leipziger Platz 9, D-10117 Berlin
  Tel. 0049-30-326170 und 0049-179-5320213
  Mail: schirp@schirp.com
  URL: www.schirp.com

  Dr. Marc Liebscher, LL.M. (Washington, D.C.)
  Dr. Spaeth & Partner Rechtsanwaelte mbB
  Kurfuerstendamm 102, D-10711 Berlin
  Tel. 0049-30-326170 und 0049-176-93150194
  Mail: liebscher@dr-spaeth.com
  URL: www.ey-klage.de [GN]


GOLDMAN SACHS: Seeks SC Review of Abacus CDO Class Action Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that Goldman Sachs
signaled on June 19 that it will ask the U.S. Supreme Court to
review a decision by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
upholding certification of a class of investors who contend the
bank lied about putting clients' interests ahead of its own in
advance of revelations about Goldman's controversial Abacus CDO
offering.

The hint came in the form of a motion asking the 2nd Circuit to
stay the case in advance of Goldman's petition for Supreme Court
review. I sincerely doubt the 2nd Circuit will grant the stay. As
I'll explain, the court has twice agreed to Goldman's interlocutory
requests to review class certification rulings by the trial judge,
U.S. District Judge Paul Crotty of Manhattan. And after the 2nd
Circuit's ruling in April (955 F.3d 254), the bank asked for a
rehearing, mustering considerable amicus support from the business
lobby. The 2nd Circuit denied that request on June 15. The new stay
motion, in other words, isn't telling the 2nd Circuit anything it
hasn't already heard from Goldman and its supporters.

But the stay motion serves as a preview of the arguments that
Goldman Sachs will eventually make at the Supreme Court in a case
that--at least according to the bank and the business lobby--gives
shareholders nearly unfettered power to win certification of class
actions based on anodyne and ubiquitous corporate mission
statements. The Supreme Court, as you know, held in 2014's
Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund (134 S.Ct. 2398) that defendants
are entitled to attempt to rebut the presumption that investors
relied on corporate misrepresentations, the keystone of shareholder
class actions. Goldman is poised to argue that the 2nd Circuit has
tied defendants' hands by refusing to consider the nature of the
alleged corporate lies.

I reached out to Thomas Goldstein of Goldstein & Russell, who
successfully represented the shareholders suing Goldman at the 2nd
Circuit. He did not provide comment on Goldman's motion. The lead
plaintiff in the class action is the Arkansas Teacher Retirement
System. Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd and Labaton Sucharow are lead
counsel.

The case is based on Goldman Sachs' notorious Abacus collateralized
debt obligation, a subprime mortgage-based financial instrument
that Goldman assembled in 2007 at the request of, and with
assistance from, the hedge fund Paulson & Co. In 2010, Goldman
reached a $550 million settlement with the Securities & Exchange
Commission to resolve allegations that it duped Abacus investors by
failing to disclose Paulson's involvement--and failing to reveal
that the hedge fund had simultaneously bet on the CDO to fail.
(Goldman acknowledged in the settlement that its marketing
materials contained incomplete information.)

The Arkansas Teachers' case alleges that Goldman Sachs misled its
shareholders in corporate statements about the bank's robust
conflict of interest policies and commitment to putting its
clients' interests ahead of its own. The shareholders' theory is
that Goldman's share price remained artificially high because
investors believed the bank's allegedly false statements and
ultimately fell when revelations about Abacus and related CDOs
proved the falsity of those assurances.

Goldman has long argued, among other points, that generic
statements about business integrity were immaterial to investors.
Broadly speaking, the bank contended that its share price did not
fall because investors suddenly realized they'd been misled about
Goldman's commitment to clients' interests--but rather because
shareholders were rattled by news of the government's investigation
of Abacus and other Goldman CDOs.

The class action first came to the 2nd Circuit in 2018. The appeals
court vacated Judge Crotty's original class certification decision
and remanded the case with instructions that he decide whether
Goldman could meet a burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption
that shareholders relied on its alleged misrepresentations.

In the case's second interlocutory trip to the appeals court, the
2nd Circuit majority, Judges Richard Wesley and Denny Chin, said
Judge Crotty had fairly weighed the evidence when he concluded that
the bank failed rebut the presumption. In dissent, Judge Richard
Sullivan said the majority had looked at the issue from the wrong
vantage point. No reasonable investor, Judge Sullivan said, could
have relied on Goldman's generic assurances about its business
practices.

That's the theme Goldman is emphasizing in the new stay motion,
seemingly in a preview of the points it will eventually argue to
the Supreme Court. (The bank has added counsel from Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison to the Sullivan & Cromwell team that
has represented it throughout this decade-long case.) According to
Goldman, the 2nd Circuit majority disregarded the Supreme Court's
directive in the 2014 Halliburton decision by failing to consider
whether the bank's allegedly deceptive representations about its
business practices were inherently immaterial and therefore had no
impact on Goldman's share price.

"This case is an excellent vehicle for the Supreme Court to address
whether the nature of challenged statements may be used to show
lack of price impact at the class-certification stage, because that
issue is outcome-determinative," the motion said. "If the court had
allowed itself to consider the nature of these generic statements,
this case would have been decided in defendants' favor."

The Supreme Court held in 2013's Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans (133 S.Ct. 1184) that shareholders need not prove the
materiality of alleged corporate misrepresentations in order to win
class certification. But Goldman's stay motion argues that the 2nd
Circuit went too far by deciding not even to consider materiality,
ignoring Halliburton's holding that (in the bank's description)
"defendants are entitled to present price impact evidence at the
class-certification stage even if such evidence also bears on a
merits issue."

As I said, I don't think the 2nd Circuit will be swayed by the
motion. Will the Supreme Court? Goldman Sachs does not cite a
circuit split on whether courts can consider the materiality of
alleged misstatements in deciding if defendants have rebutted the
presumption of reliance. Instead, Goldman appears to be hoping that
the justices will take note of its argument that the 2nd Circuit
has drastically expanded corporate exposure to shareholders by
making it impossible to defeat class certification in cases based
on generic statements of business principles.

That seems like a tough sell, but you can be sure Goldman won't
settle this case until it has made its pitch at the Supreme Court.
[GN]


GOOGLE INC: Faces Class Action Over Private Mode Browser Tracking
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Booth, writing for ITWeb, reports that Google will pay some
media groups in Australia, Brazil and Germany for high-quality
content and expects to do more deals with others. In addition, it
has been sued in a proposed class action that accuses it of
illegally invading the privacy of millions of users by pervasively
tracking their Internet use through browsers set in 'private' mode.
[GN]


GOYA FOODS: Gets Favorable Ruling on Pleadings in Ortiz Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE ORTIZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. GOYA FOODS, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-19003 (SRC) (D. N.J.), Judge
Stanley R. Chesler of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), filed by
Defendants Goya and A.N.E. Services, Inc.

The case is a labor misclassification action.  Plaintiff Ortiz, a
resident of Pennsylvania, is a sales representative for Defendant
Goya, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Jersey City, New
Jersey.  Goya is engaged in the manufacturer and distribution of
food products.  Defendant A.N.E. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Goya Foods.

According to the Complaint, A.N.E. functions as an intermediary
between Goya and its sales force and requires Goya's sales
representatives, including Ortiz, to enter into a form Broker
Agreement for their services.  Ortiz alleges that he has been a
sales representative for Goya since the mid-1980s.  In or about
August 2014, he began performing his work through a business entity
known as Grateful Souls, LLC, a company he alleges Defendants
required him to form as a condition of continuing his relationship
with the Defendants.  According to the Complaint, Ortiz is one of
over 300 Goya sales representatives nationwide.

The Complaint, filed as a putative class action, avers that Ortiz
and other similarly situated sales representatives have been
improperly treated as independent contractors when they are, in
fact, employees of Goya.  According to the Complaint, they have
been misclassified by Defendants in order to reduce costs, shift
the costs of operating Goya's sales force to the individuals who
perform the work and to avoid worker and wage protection laws,
including obligations as basic as workers compensation rights and
the right to be free from illegal wage deductions.  The Complaint
alleges that the Defendants have illegally shifted to the Plaintiff
and the members of the proposed class the burden of purchasing and
maintain certain tools, equipment and supplies necessary to operate
the Defendants' business, makes deductions from their pay, and
forces the Plaintiff and the proposed class to pay for their own
workers' compensation and other insurance.

Ortiz seeks relief for himself and the putative class under the
following causes of action: violation of the New Jersey Wage
Payment Law ("NJWPL"), unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The matter comes before the Court on the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), filed
by Defendants Goya and A.N.E.  Ortiz has opposed the motion.  He
has filed his own motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint.

The Defendants seek dismissal of the Plaintiff's NJWPL claim on the
grounds that the statute has no extraterritorial application and
thus cannot provide relief to Ortiz for any alleged
misclassification of work he performed entirely outside of New
Jersey.

Judge Chesler agrees with the court's analysis in Lupian v. Joseph
Cory Holding, LLC as well as the other available decisional law on
the NJWPL's reach and accordingly finds that Ortiz, an admittedly
out-of-state employee, has failed to state a plausible claim for
relief under the NJWPL.  Ortiz's reliance on the choice of law
provision in the Broker Agreement, even assuming it applies, is
unavailing.  New Jersey will not uphold a contractual choice of law
if application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to
a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue and which would be the state of the applicable law
in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.  New
Jersey has little to no interest in providing employment
protections, including the NJWPL, to individuals outside of New
Jersey.  In fact, New Jersey has a well-established public policy
against governing out-of-state conduct.

In contrast, the Plaintiff's home state of Pennsylvania has a
marked interest in ensuring that persons who live and work in that
state have wage protections, as its comparable statute, the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, demonstrates.  The
Pennsylvania statute defines "employer" using language almost
identical to the NJWPL: it provides that the obligations of the
Pennsylvania statute will apply to "every" individual, firm,
partnership and other entity "employing any person in this
Commonwealth."  In addition to the relative state interests
militating against Plaintiff's effort to use a choice of law
provision to enforce rights under the NJWPL, the Court notes that
Plaintiff cites no controlling authority in support of his
position.

The Plaintiff will, however, be given leave to amend his complaint
to assert a claim under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law on behalf of a putative "Pennsylvania Class," as he
seeks to do in his separately-filed motion to amend pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).  Rule 15 provides that a
court should liberally grant leave to amend pleadings when justice
so requires.  Given that Ortiz performs his sales work for the
Defendants in Pennsylvania, it would appear that the Defendants are
subject to the Pennsylvania statute, assuming that it is an
"employer" as the Plaintiff alleges.  When a litigant's request to
amend is "a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an
opportunity to test his claim on the merits."  For this same
reason, the Plaintiff may also name two additional
Pennsylvania-based Goya sales representatives, Saul Hernandez and
Pedro Urena, as the Plaintiffs in the action, as requested in the
motion to for leave to file an Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants have been unjustly
enriched by reaping the benefits of his services while shifting
costs, such as various operating expenses and workers' compensation
insurance, that the Defendants should have borne had they treated
him as an employee.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim
for unjust enrichment under New Jersey law.  The Plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law for the Defendants' alleged wrongdoing.
Based on the facts pled by the Complaint, the Plaintiff's claim for
unjust enrichment must be dismissed.  Moreover, because the
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he could allege facts
establishing a viable claim, the Judge cannot grant leave to file
the proposed Amended Complaint insofar as it reasserts the unjust
enrichment claim.

Finally, Judge Chesler finds that the Complaint is devoid of
factual allegations that the Defendants engaged in conduct which
deprived the Plaintiff of the fruits of their contract.  The
Plaintiff does not indicate that facts alleged in the proposed
Amended Complaint would cure this defect, and thus leave to
re-plead the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing will not be granted.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Chesler granted the Defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  The Judge granted the motion
for leave to file an amended complaint insofar as it seeks to add
two named Plaintiffs and to plead a claim for relief under the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, but denied in all
other respects.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/zeg2Y7 from Leagle.com.


GPB CAPITAL: KlaymanToskes Probes FINRA Arbitration Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
National investor fraud law firm, KlaymanToskes ("KT"), continues
to investigate and pursue FINRA arbitration claims on behalf of
investors who were solicited to purchase millions of dollars of
private placement securities in GPB Capital Holdings ("GPB") in the
form of notes. Brokerage firms were required to perform due
diligence prior to recommending GPB to their customers and the
failure to do so may result in liability. More than 60
broker-dealers sold GPB funds, including Ascendant Alternative
Strategies, LLC, Royal Alliance Associates Inc., Sagepoint
Financial Inc., FSC Securities Corp., and Woodbury Financial
Services Inc.

Investors who have lost more than $100,000 should consider whether
they should file individual FINRA securities arbitration claims
instead of participating in a class action suit. KT reminds
investors of the benefits of filing individual securities
arbitration claims, as opposed to participating in a class action
lawsuit. By participating in a class action lawsuit, an investor
may only recover a nominal amount. However, if one has experienced
significant losses, it may be more beneficial for them to file an
individual FINRA securities arbitration claim. In 2003, KT
conducted a detailed study of securities arbitration versus class
action. The study concluded that investors who file securities
arbitration claims traditionally obtain an overall higher rate of
recovery as opposed to participating in a class action lawsuit. To
view the full results of the comparison, Click Here. Since this
study was published, the same remains true through today.

The sole purpose of this release is to investigate on behalf of our
clients who purchased GPB notes. Investors who have information
regarding the presentation and sale of these notes are encouraged
to contact Lawrence L. Klayman, Esq., at (561) 542-5131, and
download our Special Investor Report.

KlaymanToskes is a leading national securities law firm which
practices exclusively in the field of securities arbitration and
litigation, on behalf of retail and institutional investors
throughout the world in large and complex securities matters. The
firm represents high net-worth, ultra-high-net-worth, and
institutional investors, such as non-profit organizations, unions,
public and multi-employer pension funds. KT has office locations in
California, Florida, New York and Puerto Rico.

Destination: https://klaymantoskes.com/gpb-capital-investor-alert

Contact:

          KlaymanToskes
          Lawrence L. Klayman, Esq.
          Tel: (561) 542-5131
          E-mail: lklayman@klaymantoskes.com
          Web site: http://www.klaymantoskes.com/[GN]


GRAND CANYON: Lieff Cabraser Reminds of July 13 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP reminds
investors of the deadline to move for appointment as lead plaintiff
in the class action litigation on behalf of investors who purchased
or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common stock of Grand
Canyon Education, Inc. ("Grand Canyon" or the "Company") (LOPE)
between January 5, 2018 and January 27, 2020, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

If you purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded common
stock of Grand Canyon during the Class Period, you may move the
Court for appointment as lead plaintiff by no later than July 13,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party who acts on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. Your share of
any recovery in the actions will not be affected by your decision
of whether to seek appointment as lead plaintiff. You may retain
Lieff Cabraser, or other attorneys, as your counsel in the action.

Grand Canyon investors who wish to learn more about the litigation
and how to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should click here or
contact Sharon M. Lee of Lieff Cabraser toll-free at
1-800-541-7358.

Background on the Grand Canyon Securities Class Litigation

Grand Canyon, headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, is an education
services company. The action alleges that Grand Canyon made
misrepresentations and omissions concerning the spin-off of the
Company's education assets into Grand Canyon University ("GCU").
Defendants allegedly inflated the Company's financial results by
treating GCU as an off-balance sheet entity into which Grand Canyon
stuffed with its own expenses and costs to increase Grand Canyon's
reported profits. The Company repeatedly misled investors by
characterizing GCU as a proper "non-profit" and "independent"
institution and misrepresenting Grand Canyon's role as a
third-party provider of education services to GCU.

On September 9, 2019, Citron Research published a report examining
Grand Canyon's financials and finding that the Company "is stuffing
GCU with expenses to inflate its own profitability and, as a result
bankrupting GCU." On this news, the price of Grand Canyon stock
fell $4.85 per share, or 4.2%, from its closing price of $114.47 on
September 9, 2019 to close at $109.62 the next day.

On November 6, 2019, after market close, Grand Canyon disclosed
that it had received a letter from the U.S. Department of Education
("DOE") denying the Company's application to designate GCU as a
non-profit entity. DOE's denial was based on its findings that GCU
was Grand Canyon's "captive client," and GCU "is not the entity

actually operating [GCU]." On this news, the price of Grand Canyon
stock declined $3.80 per share, or 4.13%, from its closing price of
$91.88 on November 6, 2019, to close at $88.08 on November 7,
2019.

On January 28, 2020, Citron Research released a second report
containing additional details about the DOE's findings and
referenced hundreds of pages of documentation GCE had submitted to
DOE that Citron obtained through a Freedom of Information Act
request. The report called Grand Canyon the "educational Enron,"
and concluded that Grand Canyon used a "captive non-reporting
subsidiary" in order to "dump expenses and liabilities while
receiving a disproportionate amount of revenue at inflated margins
in order to artificially inflate the stock price." On this news,
the price of Grand Canyon stock fell $7.43 per share, or 8.12%,
from its closing price of $91.50 on January 27, 2020, to close at
$84.07 on January 28, 2020, on extremely heavy trading volume.

                      About Lieff Cabraser

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, with offices in San
Francisco, New York, and Nashville, is a nationally recognized law
firm committed to advancing the rights of investors and promoting
corporate responsibility.

The National Law Journal has recognized Lieff Cabraser as one of
the nation's top plaintiffs' law firms for fourteen years. In
compiling the list, the National Law Journal examines recent
verdicts and settlements and looked for firms "representing the
best qualities of the plaintiffs' bar and that demonstrated unusual
dedication and creativity." Law360 has selected Lieff Cabraser as
one of the Top 50 law firms nationwide for litigation, highlighting
our firm's "laser focus" and noting that our firm routinely finds
itself "facing off against some of the largest and strongest
defense law firms in the world." Benchmark Litigation has named
Lieff Cabraser one of the "Top 10 Plaintiffs' Firms in America."

For more information about Lieff Cabraser and the firm's
representation of investors, please visit
https://www.lieffcabraser.com/.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]


GREAT AMERICAN: Metzler TCPA Suit Moved From E.D. Pa. to N.D. Ga.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as MARK METZLER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. GREAT AMERICAN
POWER, LLC, a Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company, Case No.
2:20-cv-00803, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta) on June 29, 2020.

The Northern District of Georgia Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-02718-SDG to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Steven D. Grimberg.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.

The Defendant is an energy supply company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: kjustice@ktmc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Fridrikh V. Shrayber, Esq.
          DENTONS COHEN & GRIGSBY P.C.
          625 Liberty Ave., 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222-3152
          Telephone: (412) 297-4612
          E-mail: fred.shrayber@dentons.com


GROCERY DELIVERY: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Engen Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Amanda Engen, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Grocery Delivery E-Services USA
Inc. doing business as Hello Fresh, Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-2433
(ECT/TNL) (D. Minn.), Judge Eric C. Tostrud of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota denied the Defendant's motion
to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Plaintiff Engen alleges that telephone calls she received from
Defendant Grocery Delivery E-Services USA Inc. ("HelloFresh") in
early 2019 violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA").  In the case, she seeks injunctive relief and damages on
her own behalf and, if certified, on behalf of two nationwide
classes of persons who received telephone calls from HelloFresh
under like circumstances.

Engen's contractual relationship with HelloFresh began Jan. 21,
2017.  That day, Engen visited HelloFresh's website, created an
account, signed up to receive meal-kit delivery service, and placed
her first meal-kit delivery order.  She went through several steps
to create her HelloFresh account.  She entered her name, address,
telephone number, billing address, and delivery instructions.
After entering this information, Engen was directed to a "Payment
Information" page where she chose her payment method and provided
information to enable payment for any charges she incurred.

Before leaving that page and entering her first order, Engen was
required to click a box next to the phrase "I accept the terms and
conditions and I have read the privacy policy."  The words "terms
and conditions" were hyperlinked to document entitled "Terms and
Conditions of Grocery Delivery E-Services USA INC.," which were the
Terms and Conditions in effect on that date, Jan. 21, 2017.  Engen
then placed a meal kit delivery order.  That would be the first of
only two orders Engen ever placed with HelloFresh and the only one
resulting in delivery of a meal kit.  After receiving the meal kit,
Engen says she "deactivated" her subscription.  The Terms and
Conditions in effect on Jan. 21, 2017, were first effective July 7,
2016, and they contained no arbitration provision.

Engen did not return to the HelloFresh website until Jan. 6, 2019.
That day, she logged into her account, reactivated her
subscription, changed her meal subscription plan, and placed one
meal-kit delivery order.  However, she canceled that order later
that same day.  Her credit card never made payment on a 2019
HelloFresh order.

Engen and HelloFresh have different accounts of what happened next.
Engen says that for "months", she received repeated calls from
HelloFresh asking her to re-subscribe and purchase meal kits and
that she "asked HelloFresh on numerous occasions to stop calling
her.  These calls are the basis for her TCPA claims in the case.

HelloFresh says its "vendors made a total of three calls" to Engen,
two in January 2019 and one in March 2019.  According to
HelloFresh, Engen did not answer the first call, answered the
second but did not tell HelloFresh to stop calling during that
call, and answered the third call and asked HelloFresh to stop
calling her.  HelloFresh says that in response to that request it
immediately placed her phone number on its internal Do-Not-Call
('DNC') list and, based on its records, never called Engen again.

HelloFresh has moved to compel individual arbitration of Engen's
TCPA claim.  It says that Engen agreed to the individual
arbitration of her claim by creating a HelloFresh account in
January 2017 and then, after receiving notice that HelloFresh had
revised its Terms and Conditions of use to include arbitration
provisions, returning to HelloFresh's website to use her account
once more in January 2019.

Judge Tostrud finds that as a matter of law, Engen and HelloFresh
did not agree to arbitrate disputes.  It is undisputed that Engen
did not agree to arbitrate disputes with HelloFresh during her
January 2017 website visit.  No doubt Engen assented to the
then-effective 2016 Terms and Conditions when she visited
HelloFresh's website on Jan. 21, 2017, and placed her first order.
However, as noted earlier, the 2016 Terms and Conditions had no
arbitration provisions.

HelloFresh still must show that Engen manifested assent to the 2018
Terms and Conditions and their arbitration provisions, but the
record evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to show that she
did.  The record shows that HelloFresh sent Engen "over 50 emails"
from April 2017 through March 2019 and that every e-mail included a
hyperlink to the version of the Terms and Conditions in effect at
the time of the email.  HelloFresh has filed with its motion one of
these emails that it says Engen "opened to review."  As a matter of
law, however, the email and others like it do not show that Engen
received sufficient notice of or assented to the 2018 Terms and
Conditions or their arbitration provisions.  The email was not sent
to inform Engen of modifications to the 2016 Terms and Conditions
or the content of the 2018 Terms and Conditions.

The determination that as a matter of law Engen and HelloFresh did
not agree to arbitrate means that HelloFresh's motion to compel
arbitration must be denied and makes it unnecessary to consider
whether Engen's TCPA claims fall within the scope of an arbitration
agreement.

Accordingly, Judge Tostrud denied the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration and stay proceedings.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/8Zo8c5 from Leagle.com.

Michael D. Reif and Brenda L. Joly, Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis,
MN; Samuel J. Strauss -- sam@turkestrauss.com -- Turke & Strauss
LLP, Madison, WI; and Anthony I. Paronich --
anthony@paronichlaw.com -- Paronich Law, P.C., Hingham, MA, for
Plaintiff Amanda Engen and proposed class.

Robert J. Gilbertson -- bgilbertson@greeneespel.com -- and
Caitlinrose H. Fisher, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, MN; and
Shannon Z. Petersen and Lisa S. Yun , Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant Grocery Delivery
E-Services USA Inc. d/b/a Hello Fresh.


HAMILTON BEACH: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Class Action Lawsuit
------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Hamilton Beach Brands
Holding Company (: HBB). Stockholders have until the deadlines
below to petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional
information about each case can be found at the link provided.

Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company (: HBB)

Class Period: February 27, 2020 to May 8, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 21, 2020

On May 11, 2020, Hamilton announced that it could not timely file
its 1Q20 10-Q because of "certain accounting irregularities with
respect to the timing of recognition of selling and marketing
expenses and the classification of certain expenditures within the
statement of operations at its Mexican subsidiary." Hamilton
further stated that its "Audit Review Committee has commenced an
internal investigation" regarding "the realizability of certain
assets of the Mexican subsidiary."

Following these disclosures, Hamilton's stock price fell $1.03 per
share, or 8.99%, to close at $10.43 per share on May 11, 2020.

The complaint, filed on May 26, 2020, alleges that throughout the
Class Period defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about Hamilton's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically,
defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (i) Hamilton had
inadequate disclosure controls and procedures and internal control
over financial reporting, particularly with respect to one of its
Mexican subsidiaries; (ii) consequently, the Company's accounting
included certain irregularities with respect to the timing of
recognition of selling and marketing expenses and the
classification of certain expenditures within the statement of
operations at this Mexican subsidiary, as well as potential
misconduct with respect to the realizability of certain assets of
the Mexican subsidiary; (iii) as a result of all the foregoing,
Hamilton could not accurately attest to its financial results,
particularly with respect to these metrics, and was consequently at
an increased risk of delaying the filing of its periodic reports
with the SEC; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

For more information on the Hamilton Beach Brands class action go
to: https://bespc.com/HBB

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com.

Contact:

        Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
        Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
        Marion Passmore, Esq.
        Tel: (212) 355-4648
        E-mail: investigations@bespc.com
        Web site: http://www.bespc.com/
[GN]


HARRIS COUNTY, TX: TRO Motions in Russell Prisoners Suit Denied
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DWIGHT RUSSELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HARRIS COUNTY,
TEXAS, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. H-19-226 (S.D. Tex.),
Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' temporary restraining order motions.

Individuals arrested in Harris County, Texas, for felony charges
are usually brought to the Harris County Jail to wait for hearings
and trials. Those who can post the money bond usually imposed under
a preset bail schedule do so.  Those who cannot, because they are
too poor to post the bond premium, wait.  First, they wait for
counsel to be appointed, then for opportunities to seek release on
a personal bond with no upfront payment.  

In the lawsuit, three Plaintiffs allege that many indigent
arrestees are in jail because they were denied a pretrial personal
bond and cannot make the upfront payment on a financial bond.  They
would, they argue, be released without delay if they could make the
bond payment.  They argue that Harris County provides an inadequate
process for individually assessing who can meet the requirements
for safe release on a personal bond.  They claim due process and
equal protection violations from wealth-based detention before
formal bail hearings. The plaintiffs asserted these claims before
the coronavirus and pandemic produced the national emergency now
facing the country.

The Plaintiffs urge that approximately 4,000 felony arrestees, not
convicted of the charged offense, are kept in the densely packed
Harris County Jail for weeks or months longer than those able to
post a bond.  They incur the costs of prolonged pretrial detention,
including job loss, eviction, a greater likelihood of pleading
guilty, and a higher chance of receiving a harsher sentence.  Now
they face a greater risk of exposure to, or exposing others to, the
coronavirus.  COVID-19 raised and changed the stakes.

In the crowded Jail, social distancing and adequate sanitation are
hard to maintain.  There are daily arrivals of new arrestees with a
variety of underlying health and medical issues, likely including
COVID-19.  Those with the disease risk infecting other arrestees,
as well as the deputies and employees who guard them, feed and care
for them, and who then go home, potentially to infect their own
families and communities.

These motions and opinion are not directly about prison conditions
or whether public health is best served by releasing which
arrestees.  They are instead about the process and timing of
individualized hearings to determine whether a particular pretrial
felony arrestee can be dismissed on a personal bond.  

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to authorize the Harris County Sheriff
to release many felony arrestees, who have not had a trial or been
convicted, and cannot post the upfront payment based on
bail-schedule amounts, if they do not promptly get formal,
individualized, evidentiary hearings to determine whether they
could be safely released on a personal bond.  They also ask the
Court to overturn as unconstitutional part of Gov. Greg Abbott's
Executive Order GA-13, which limits state district judges'
discretion to issue personal bonds during the COVID-19 crisis.
That Order was one of several issuing from those with authority to
set and implement policies to meet the COVID-19 crisis in our
state's jails and prisons.  The Harris County Commissioners Court
Judge and the State Administrative Judge both issued orders that
attempt, in different ways, to expedite the release of pretrial,
not convicted, low-level, nonviolent felony arrestees from the
Harris County Jail on personal bonds to safely reduce the Jail
population.

State and local policymakers agree that the Harris County Jail
population must be reduced, but they disagree on how to safely do
so.  A federal district court asked to wade into policy and
political disagreements among State and County elected officials is
in risky territory.  There is no good, clearly safe,
constitutionally, and jurisdictionally right solution to many of
the short-term problems and disagreements the pandemic has made so
acute.  And when, as in the case, these disagreements appear to
have been somewhat resolved, at least to the extent necessary to
achieve a workable, voluntary process for the safe release of
appropriate pretrial, not convicted, arrestees within the present
pandemic constraints, that is a powerful reason for a federal court
to decline to intervene through the blunt instrument of a temporary
restraining order.

Judge Rosenthal concludes that the case is far from easy.  There
are risks no matter what the Court decides.  Institutions charged
with safeguarding the public and upholding the Constitution have an
extraordinary and difficult task, made more difficult and more
consequential during this pandemic.  Mindful of the sparse record
and of its own limited authority, the Court has done its best to
balance the constitutional and public safety interests at stake.

The Judge has not addressed, much less foreclosed, the substantive
issues on the merits.  Those remain open to be decided on a motion
for a preliminary injunction.  And, as noted, the Judge is not
foreclosing any party or interested nonparty from raising
additional issues or substantially different facts that the
pandemic continues to produce.  But for now, the Plaintiffs'
temporary restraining order motions, are denied without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Memorandum
& Order is available at https://is.gd/kgemeH from Leagle.com.


HI-TECH PROPERTY: Taylor Appeals E.D. Virginia Ruling to 4th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff JACQUELINE CALOUN-SMITH TAYLOR, f/k/a Jacqueline L.
Taylor filed an appeal from a court ruling issued in her lawsuit
titled Jacqueline Taylor v. James Whitlock, Case No.
3:19-cv-00606-JAG, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia at Richmond.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case type
is stated as Civil Rights Act: Other.

Hi-Tech Property Maintenance is a domestic property maintenance
company in Melbourne that specializes in timber door and window
replacements.

The appellate case is captioned as Jacqueline Taylor v. James
Whitlock, Case No. 20-1026, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellant JACQUELINE CALOUN-SMITH TAYLOR, f/k/a
Jacqueline L. Taylor, of Midlothian, Virginia, appears pro se.[BN]


HINGHAM, MA: Belezos Appeals D. Mass. Ruling to First Circuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Nicholas G. Belezos filed an appeal from a court ruling
issued in his lawsuit entitled Belezos v. Board of Selectmen of
Hingham, Case No. 1:17-cv-12570-MBB, in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, Boston.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Dec. 20,
2019, Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Belezos' motion for
class certification.

The Plaintiff filed a motion to certify a proposed class, designate
himself as class representative, and designate the Plaintiff's
current counsel, Frederic P. Zotos, Esq., as the class counsel
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) and (g). The Plaintiff contends
that Defendants Board of Selectmen of Hingham, Massachusetts
erected, maintained, and enforced speed limit signs without
regulatory authority. According to him, the claims can be proven on
a classwide basis and 382 potential Plaintiff class members have
already been identified. The Defendants maintain that the proposed
class does not satisfy the requirements for class certification.

A first amended complaint sets out eight causes of action against
the Defendants arising out of a speeding ticket the Plaintiff
received for traveling in excess of a 30-mile-per-hour speed limit
reflected in a posted speed limit sign on Gardner Street in
Hingham, Massachusetts in violation of Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 90, section 18. Counts IV through VIII allege federal
constitutional claims, while counts I through III are pendent ultra
vires claims under state law.

The appellate case is captioned as Belezos v. Board of Selectmen of
Hingham, Case No. 20-1030, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant NICHOLAS G. BELEZOS, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Frederic Peter Zotos, Esq.
          PATHOGENICS INC.
          28 Old Coach Rd.
          Cohasset, MA 02025
          Telephone: (781) 836-4295
          E-mail: fzotos@pathogenics.com

Defendant-Appellee BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS, in
their official capacity, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, is represented by:

          Joseph Adam Padolsky, Esq.
          LOUISON COSTELLO CONDON & PFAFF LLP
          101 Summer St., 4th Flr.
          Boston, MA 02110-0000
          Telephone: (617) 439-0305


HOME DEPOT: Maniglia Labor Class Suit Removed to N.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JARED MANIGLIA, an
individual, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., a Delaware
corporation and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No. 20-CV-366619
(Filed May 19, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of
California, County of Santa Clara, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California on June 25, 2020.

The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
20-CV-366619 to the proceeding.

Plaintiff Jared Maniglia is a former hourly employee of Home Depot.
He alleges that Home Depot failed to pay minimum and overtime
wages, failed to provide required meal and rest periods, failed to
provide accurate itemized wage statements, failed to reimburse
employees for required expenses, and failed to provide wages when
due, and that Home Depot violated California's unfair competition
law.

Home Depot is a home improvement retailer in the United States,
supplying tools, construction products, and services.[BN]

Defendant Home Depot is represented by:

          Gregory W. Knopp, Esq.
          Donna M. Mezias, Esq.
          Dorothy F. Kaslow, Esq.
          Lowell B. Ritter, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: 310-552-6436
          Facsimile: 310-229-1001
          E-mail: gknopp@akingump.com
                  dmezias@akingump.com
                  dkaslow@akingump.com
                  lritter@akingump.com


HORSEPOWER ENTERTAINMENT: Has $450MM Deal on Music Festival Matter
------------------------------------------------------------------
Angeion Group on July 2, 2020, announced that a proposed settlement
has been reached in a class action involving the Thunder on the
Mountain music festival to be held in Ozark, Arkansas, in June of
2015. The festival was canceled just before it was to begin, and
many purchasers of various passes and vendor booths, were never
refunded. This summary notice informs you of the proposed
settlement so that you can decide what to do about it.

Who is included?

The Class is defined as all persons who purchased day passes,
children passes, VIP passes, camping passes, RV passes, hotel
passes or packages, reserved seating, shower passes, passes of any
other kind, or vendor booths to Thunder on the Mountain to be held
on Mulberry Mountain, near Ozark, Arkansas between June 26th and
28th, 2015 (the "Class"), and failed to receive a refund or charge
back on their debit or credit card.

What is the settlement?

There was a previous partial settlement of the case (the "Williams
Settlement") involving the organizers of the festival, which were
Brett Mosiman, Pipeline Productions, and Backwood Entertainment
("Pipeline Defendants"). The Pipeline Defendants had sued two other
firms, HorsePower Entertainment, LLC, and The Madison Companies,
LLC ("HorsePower Defendants"), in federal court in Kansas for
allegedly reneging on their alleged agreement to fund the festival.
That action has recently been settled after a judgment (the "Kansas
Judgment") was entered in favor of the Pipeline Defendants (the
"Kansas Settlement"). In the Williams Settlement, the Pipeline
Defendants agreed to a 7% assignment to the Class of their interest
in the Kansas claims, allowing up to a potential recovery of $1
million for the Class, but no less than $450,000.00. HorsePower
Defendants have now reached an agreement with the Pipeline
Defendants to settle the Kansas Judgment (the "Global Settlement"),
and based on the Williams Settlement, the value of the Class's lien
on the Kansas Judgment and the Global Settlement is $450,000.00.

In this settlement between the Class and HorsePower Defendants, the
Horsepower Defendants agree not to further contest the Kansas
Judgment by post-trial motion, appeal, or otherwise, and to instead
take all steps necessary to proceed and effectuate the Global
Settlement, whereby a fund will be created from which $450,000.00
will be paid to the Class pursuant to the terms of the Williams
Settlement. In the Williams Settlement, Class Counsel was awarded
attorneys' fees of up to 1/3 of any amount recovered and no more
than $50,000.00 in costs, which will be deducted from the amount
paid pursuant to this settlement and the Williams Settlement. In
addition, the Class Representative in the Williams Settlement was
previously awarded an incentive award in an amount not to exceed
$2,500.00. The Court in this case will also determine the amount of
any fees and costs that could be awarded to Class Counsel. Those
fees and costs, which will not exceed a total of $15,000.00, are
being paid in addition to the $450,000. Those fees and costs
therefore will not reduce the amount payable to you as a Class
member. Additionally, any incentive award to the Class
Representative in this case may not exceed the sum of $2,500.00 and
likewise is being paid separately and will not in any way reduce
the amount payable to you under this Settlement.

Your options

If you do not exclude yourself by August 10, 2020, you will release
your rights except as provided by the settlement. If you do not
exclude yourself, you may appear in the case through your own
attorney at your expense and object to the terms of this
settlement. You must file an objection to the settlement by August
10, 2020. Your objection must set forth your full name, current
address and telephone number, the reasons for your objection, and a
statement as to whether you intend to appear at the Final Approval
Hearing on August 18, 2020 at the Lonoke County Circuit Courthouse
Annex Courtroom, located at 210 N. Center Street, Lonoke, Arkansas,
72086 at 9:00 am. If you do not properly and timely file and serve
your objection by August 10, 2020, any objections you have to the
settlement will be waived and you will be foreclosed from objecting
to the settlement. If you file an objection, you may be asked to
provide deposition testimony in support of it. If you decide to
exclude yourself from the Settlement or object to it, you must file
your exclusion or objection by August 10 2020, by mailing it to the
Court's Clerk for filing and postmarked by August 10, 2020 at
Lonoke County Circuit Clerk, Case No. 43CV-18-843, 301 N. Center
St. #301, Lonoke, AR 72086. You should also mail your exclusion or
objection to Class Counsel Scott Poynter at 407 President Clinton
Ave., Suite 201, Little Rock, AR 72201, or email it to him at
scott@poynterlawgroup.com.

Filing a Claim: You may file a claim electronically at
www.ThunderMountainSettlement.com or contact Settlement's
Administrator at (833) 553-0365 or
info@ThunderMountainSettlement.com for a claim form to mail to the
administrator.  All claims must be filed or postmarked by December
22, 2020.

For more information, please visit
www.ThunderMountainSettlement.com, or
www.ThunderMountainLawsuit.com for additional information about the
settlement and for filing a claim against the settlement fund, call
the Settlement's Administrator at (833) 553-0365 or email at
info@ThunderMountainSettlement.com. You may also email Class
Counsel at scott@poynterlawgroup.com, or call 501-812-3943 and
speak to Class Counsel, Scott Poynter.  [GN]


HUGHES, AR: Court Denies Bid for Conditional Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as ROBERT SMART, TERRY ROSS
RIGGS, and JOHNATHAN JACKSON, Each Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated v. CITY OF HUGHES, ARKANSAS, Case No.
2:19-cv-00047-KGB (E.D. Ark.), the Hon. Judge Kristine G. Baker
entered an order:

   1. denying, without prejudice, the Plaintiffs' motion for
      conditional certification, for approval and distribution
      of notice, and for disclosure of contact information;

   2. directing the Plaintiffs to may, but need not, file a
      motion for conditional certification of a narrower class
      within 30 days from the entry of this Order; and

   3. directing the parties to confer and file a joint proposed
      amended scheduling order within 45 days from the entry of
      this Order; and

   4. directing the parties to request that the Court not enter
      an amended final scheduling order until after it has ruled
      on any such request if the plaintiffs renew their request
      for conditional certification.

The Court said, "Having carefully reviewed the motion and related
filings, the applicable legal authorities, and the entire record in
this matter, the Court finds that the declarations submitted by Mr.
Smart and Mr. Jackson do not offer evidence sufficient to show that
all members of the proposed collective were subject to a common
employment policy or plan. Here, the sole evidence of similarly
situated employees is two similarly worded affidavits by employees
with different job titles, different job responsibilities, and who
are subject to different overtime thresholds. If the Court were to
conditionally certify a collective action, it would need to engage
in a fact-intensive, case-by-case examination of the daily tasks of
each putative collective action member to determine whether they
are similarly situated."

Hughes is a city in St. Francis County, Arkansas. The population
was 1,441 at the 2010 census, a decline from 1,867 in 2000.[CC]


IDEANOMICS INC: Bernstein Liebhard Announces Class Action Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, announces that a securities class action has been filed on
behalf of investors that purchased or acquired the securities of
Ideanomics Inc. ("Ideanomics" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: IDEX)
between  March 20, 2020 and June 25, 2020 (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleges violations of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.

If you purchased Ideanomics securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit Ideanomics IDEX
Shareholder Lawsuit or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at
(877) 779-1414 or MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations and prospects. Specifically,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose: (i) Ideanomics' MEG Center in Qingdao was not "a one
million square foot EV expo center"; (ii) the Company had been
using doctored or altered photographs of the purported MEG Center
in Qingdao; (iii) the Company's electric vehicle business in China
was not performing nearly as strong as Ideanomics had represented;
and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On June 25, 2020, analyst Hindenburg Research issued a series of
tweets announcing Hindenburg's conclusion that Ideanomics, Inc.
(NASDAQ: IDEX) "is an egregious & obvious fraud." Hindenburg
asserted that it found evidence that Ideanomics "doctored photos in
its PR to suggest it owns/operates" a facility, and that this
"strikes us as a clear effort by the company to manipulate the
photographs in order to drive its stock price up." Hindenburg
further asserted that it had an investigator who visited Ideanomics
"supposed MEG sales center," and that the "facility is actually
operated by almost 100 sales groups," none of whom had "heard of
[Ideanomics] or MEG." Furthermore, Hindenburg stated that it had
its "investigator call five of [Ideanomics'] purported customers
that are helping drive its supposed [electric vehicle] business,"
and that "[n]one of them were aware of Ideanomics and none were
able to confirm doing business with" Ideanomics.

Also on June 25, 2020, analyst J Capital Research issued a report
on Ideanomics entitled "Champion of Promotes." J Capital wrote, in
part, that "Ideanomics . . . is a zero. The company changes its
name and promotional story so frequently that it's hard to keep up.
One thing remains a constant, despite all the press releases,
buzzwords and hype: shareholders get wiped out." J Capital
continued, in a tweet, that "[w]e called all the 'buyers' named in
[Ideanomics'] press releases this month. Not a single one had made
a purchase. One of them thanked us for alerting them to 'fake
news.'"

On this announcement, Ideanomics shares fell approximately 21% in
one day, down to $2.44 per share from their June 24, 2020 close of
$3.09 per share. Shares continued to plummet on June 26, 2020,
closing at just $1.46 per share, a drop of approximately 53%.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 27, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Ideanomics securities, and/or would like to
discuss your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/ideanomicsinc-idex-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-stock-fraud-280/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact:

           Matthew E. Guarnero
           Bernstein Liebhard LLP
           https://www.bernlieb.com
           Tel: (877) 779-1414
           E-mail: MGuarnero@bernlieb.com
           Web site: https://www.bernlieb.com/
[GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Block & Leviton Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP (www.blockesq.com), a national securities
litigation firm, on June 28 disclosed that it has filed a class
action lawsuit on behalf of shareholders against Ideanomics, Inc.
(NASDAQ: IDEX) and certain of its executives for securities fraud.
The lead plaintiff deadline is August 27, 2020. Investors who
purchased Ideanomics shares between March 20, 2020 and June 25,
2020 and who lost money are encouraged to contact the firm for a
free case evaluation.

On June 25, 2020, analyst Hindenburg Research issued a series of
tweets announcing Hindenburg's conclusion that Ideanomics, Inc.
(NASDAQ: IDEX) "is an egregious & obvious fraud." Hindenburg
asserted that it found evidence that Ideanomics "doctored photos in
its PR to suggest it owns/operates" a facility, and that this
"strikes us as a clear effort by the company to manipulate the
photographs in order to drive its stock price up." Hindenburg
further asserted that it had an investigator who visited Ideanomics
"supposed MEG sales center," and that the "facility is actually
operated by almost 100 sales groups," none of whom had "heard of
[Ideanomics] or MEG." Furthermore, Hindenburg stated that it had
its "investigator call five of [Ideanomics'] purported customers
that are helping drive its supposed [electric vehicle] business,"
and that "[n]one of them were aware of Ideanomics and none were
able to confirm doing business with" Ideanomics.

Also on June 25, 2020, analyst J Capital Research issued a report
on Ideanomics entitled "Champion of Promotes." J Capital wrote, in
part, that "Ideanomics . . . is a zero. The company changes its
name and promotional story so frequently that it's hard to keep up.
One thing remains a constant, despite all the press releases,
buzzwords and hype: shareholders get wiped out." J Capital
continued, in a tweet, that "[w]e called all the 'buyers' named in
[Ideanomics'] press releases in June. Not a single one had made a
purchase. One of them thanked us for alerting them to 'fake
news.'"

On this announcement, Ideanomics shares fell approximately 21% in
one day, down to $2.44 per share from their June 24, 2020 close of
$3.09 per share. Shares continued to plummet on June 26, 2020,
closing at just $1.46 per share, a drop of approximately 53%.

The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, located at 500 Pearl Street, New
York, NY 10007. The case is captioned Lundy v. Ideanomics, Inc., et
al., No 1:20-cv-4944 (S.D.N.Y.), and has not yet been assigned to a
judge.

If you purchased or acquired shares of Ideanomics and have
questions about your legal rights or possess information relevant
to this matter, please contact Block & Leviton attorneys at (617)
398-5600, via email at cases@blockesq.com, or at
https://shareholder.law/idex. Ideanomics investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired shares of Ideanomics common stock may, no later
than August 27, 2020, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff
representative of the Class.

Block & Leviton LLP -- http://www.blockesq.com-- is a firm
dedicated to representing investors and maintaining the integrity
of the country's financial markets. The firm represents many of the
nation's largest institutional investors as well as individual
investors in securities litigation throughout the United States.
The firm's lawyers have recovered billions of dollars for its
clients.

This notice may constitute attorney advertising.

CONTACT:
BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
260 Franklin St., Suite 1860
Boston, MA 02110
Phone: (617) 398-5600
Email: cases@blockesq.com [GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Block & Leviton Reminds of August 27 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP (www.blockesq.com), a national securities
litigation firm, on June 28 disclosed that it has filed a class
action lawsuit on behalf of shareholders against Ideanomics, Inc.
(IDEX) and certain of its executives for securities fraud. The lead
plaintiff deadline is August 27, 2020. Investors who purchased
Ideanomics shares between March 20, 2020 and June 25, 2020 and who
lost money are encouraged to contact the firm for a free case
evaluation.

On June 25, 2020, analyst Hindenburg Research issued a series of
tweets announcing Hindenburg's conclusion that Ideanomics, Inc.
(IDEX) "is an egregious & obvious fraud." Hindenburg asserted that
it found evidence that Ideanomics "doctored photos in its PR to
suggest it owns/operates" a facility, and that this "strikes us as
a clear effort by the company to manipulate the photographs in
order to drive its stock price up." Hindenburg further asserted
that it had an investigator who visited Ideanomics "supposed MEG
sales center," and that the "facility is actually operated by
almost 100 sales groups," none of whom had "heard of [Ideanomics]
or MEG." Furthermore, Hindenburg stated that it had its
"investigator call five of [Ideanomics'] purported customers that
are helping drive its supposed [electric vehicle] business," and
that "[n]one of them were aware of Ideanomics and none were able to
confirm doing business with" Ideanomics.

Also on June 25, 2020, analyst J Capital Research issued a report
on Ideanomics entitled "Champion of Promotes." J Capital wrote, in
part, that "Ideanomics . . . is a zero. The company changes its
name and promotional story so frequently that it's hard to keep up.
One thing remains a constant, despite all the press releases,
buzzwords and hype: shareholders get wiped out." J Capital
continued, in a tweet, that "[w]e called all the ‘buyers' named
in [Ideanomics'] press releases in June. Not a single one had made
a purchase. One of them thanked us for alerting them to ‘fake
news.'"

On this announcement, Ideanomics shares fell approximately 21% in
one day, down to $2.44 per share from their June 24, 2020 close of
$3.09 per share. Shares continued to plummet on June 26, 2020,
closing at just $1.46 per share, a drop of approximately 53%.

If you purchased or acquired shares of Ideanomics and have
questions about your legal rights or possess information relevant
to this matter, please contact Block & Leviton attorneys at (617)
398-5600, via email at cases@blockesq.com, or at
https://shareholder.law/idex. Ideanomics investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired shares of Ideanomics common stock may, no later
than August 27, 2020, seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff
representative of the Class.

Block & Leviton LLP -- http://www.blockesq.com-- is a firm
dedicated to representing investors and maintaining the integrity
of the country's financial markets. The firm represents many of the
nation's largest institutional investors as well as individual
investors in securities litigation throughout the United States.
The firm's lawyers have recovered billions of dollars for its
clients.

This notice may constitute attorney advertising.

CONTACT:

BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
260 Franklin St., Suite 1860
Boston, MA 02110
Phone: (617) 398-5600
Email: cases@blockesq.com [GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Robbins Geller Announces Class Action Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in the Southern District of New York on
behalf of purchasers of Ideanomics, Inc. (NASDAQ:IDEX) common stock
between March 20, 2020 and June 25, 2020 (the "Class Period"). The
case is captioned Lundy v. Ideanomics, Inc., No. 20-cv-04944, and
is assigned to Judge George B. Daniels. The Ideanomics class action
lawsuit charges Ideanomics and certain of its officers with
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased Ideanomics common stock during the Class
Period to seek appointment as lead plaintiff in the Ideanomics
class action lawsuit. A lead plaintiff acts on behalf of all other
class members in directing the Ideanomics class action lawsuit. The
lead plaintiff can select a law firm of its choice to litigate the
Ideanomics class action lawsuit. An investor's ability to share in
any potential future recovery of the Ideanomics class action
lawsuit is not dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff. If you
wish to serve as lead plaintiff of the Ideanomics class action
lawsuit or have questions concerning your rights regarding the
Ideanomics class action lawsuit, please provide your information
here or contact counsel, J.C. Sanchez of Robbins Geller at
800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at
jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com. Lead plaintiff motions for the Ideanomics
class action lawsuit must be filed with the court no later than
August 27, 2020.

Ideanomics purports to be a global company focused on facilitating
the adoption of commercial electric vehicles (or "EVs") and
developing next generation financial services and Fintech products.
In recent press releases, Ideanomics has lauded its "one million
square foot EV expo center in Qingdao, Shandong Province," China,
also known as Ideanomics' Mobile Energy Global ("MEG") Division, or
the "MEG Center." According to Ideanomics, the MEG Center is "the
largest auto trading market in Qingdao," China.

The Ideanomics class action lawsuit alleges that defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(i) Ideanomics' MEG Center in Qingdao was not "a one million square
foot EV expo center"; (ii) Ideanomics had been using doctored or
altered photographs of the purported MEG Center in Qingdao; (iii)
Ideanomics' electric vehicle business in China was not performing
nearly as strong as Ideanomics had represented; and (iv) as a
result, Ideanomics' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On June 25, 2020, analyst Hindenburg Research issued a series of
tweets calling Ideanomics "an egregious [and] obvious fraud."
Hindenburg also asserted that it had found evidence that Ideanomics
doctored photos for use in its press releases to suggest that
Ideanomics owns or operates a vehicle sales center in Qingdao,
China, when it in fact it does not. Also that day, analyst J
Capital Research issued a report concluding that "Ideanomics . . .
is a zero. [Ideanomics] changes its name and promotional story so
frequently that it's hard to keep up. One thing remains a constant,
despite all the press releases, buzzwords and hype: shareholders
get wiped out." J Capital continued, in a tweet, stating that "[w]e
called all the ‘buyers' named in [Ideanomics'] press releases
this month. Not a single one had made a purchase. One of them
thanked us for alerting them to ‘fake news.'" On this news, the
price of Ideanomics stock fell approximately 21%.

Then on June 26, 2020, Ideanomics issued a press release in which
it sought to "clarify the status" of its purported EV hub in
Qingdao, China. In this release, Ideanomics walked back certain of
its prior statements regarding the MEG Center in Qingdao, stating
that it was launching three phases of its MEG Center that would
eventually total one million square feet. The first phase,
according to Ideanomics, occupies only 215,000 square feet. On this
news, the price of Ideanomics stock fell an additional 40%.

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is one of the world's leading law
firms representing investors in securities class action litigation.
With 200 lawyers in 9 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of
the largest securities class action recoveries in history. For
seven consecutive years, ISS Securities Class Action Services has
ranked the Firm in its annual SCAS Top 50 Report as one of the top
law firms in the world in both amount recovered for shareholders
and total number of class action settlements. Robbins Geller
attorneys have helped shape the securities laws and have recovered
tens of billions of dollars on behalf of aggrieved victims. Beyond
securing financial recoveries for defrauded investors, Robbins
Geller also specializes in implementing corporate governance
reforms, helping to improve the financial markets for investors
worldwide. Robbins Geller attorneys are consistently recognized by
courts, professional organizations, and the media as leading
lawyers in the industry.

Contact:

          Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
          J.C. Sanchez
          Tel: 800-449-4900
          E-mail: jsanchez@rgrdlaw.com
          http://www.rgrdlaw.com/
[GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Rosen Announces Filing of Securities Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Ideanomics, Inc. (NASDAQ: IDEX) between March 20,
2020 and June 25, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit
seeks to recover damages for Ideanomics investors under the federal
securities laws.

To join the Ideanomics class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1888.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Ideanomics' Mobile Energy Global (MEG) Division (the "MEG
Center") in Qingdao was not "a one million square foot EV expo
center"; (2) the Company had been using doctored or altered
photographs of the purported MEG Center in Qingdao; (3) the
Company's electric vehicle business in China was not performing
nearly as strong as Ideanomics had represented; and (4) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. According to the suit, these true
details were disclosed by market research firms. When the true
details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 27,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1888.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm, on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm/.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

          Laurence Rosen, Esq.
          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Tel: (212) 686-1060
          Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
          Fax: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                  pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  cases@rosenlegal.com
          Web site: http://www.rosenlegal.com/
[GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Rosen Law Reminds Investors of Aug. 27 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Ideanomics, Inc. between March 20,
2020 and June 25, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"), of the
important August 27, 2020 lead plaintiff deadline in securities
class action. The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Ideanomics
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Ideanomics class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1888.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Ideanomics' Mobile Energy Global (MEG) Division (the "MEG
Center") in Qingdao was not "a one million square foot EV expo
center"; (2) the Company had been using doctored or altered
photographs of the purported MEG Center in Qingdao; (3) the
Company's electric vehicle business in China was not performing
nearly as strong as Ideanomics had represented; and (4) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. According to the suit, these true
details were disclosed by market research firms. When the true
details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 27,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1888.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors. Attorney Advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Contact Information:

          Laurence Rosen, Esq.
          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Tel: (212) 686-1060
          Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
          Fax: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                  pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  cases@rosenlegal.com
          Web site: http://www.rosenlegal.com/
[GN]


ILLINOIS: Expedited Release of Inmates in Money Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, JAMES MONEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. J.B. PRITZKER, et
al., Defendants and JAMES MONEY, et al., Petitioners, v. ROB
JEFFREYS, in his official capacity as DIRECTOR OF THE ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent, Case Nos. 20-cv-2093,
20-cv-209 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division:

  (1) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining
      order and preliminary injunction in Money v. Pritzker, Case
      No. 20-cv-2093;

  (2) granted the Plaintiffs' motions for leave to file oversized
      brief and for expedited treatment in that same case;

  (3) granted the Defendants' motion for leave to file sur-reply
      in that case; and

  (4) granted the Petitioners' motion for expedited treatment in
      Money v. Jeffreys, Case No. 20-cv-2094, but denied their
      request for expedited release.

In these two cases, the Plaintiffs have raised issues of great
importance concerning the safety and well-being of inmates in the
custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") during
the current national crisis occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic.
As myriad citations in both sides' briefs confirm, the issue has
occupied all three branches of government in both the federal and
state governments in recent weeks.  News reports are replete with
actions taken by Governors, Attorneys General, state Supreme
Courts, and individual trial judges to accelerate the release of
inmates and detainees where consistent with overall public safety
and to protect those who remain in custodial settings.  And rightly
so, for the stakes are incredibly high for the Plaintiffs, their
families, and the public at large.  As emphasized by the medical
experts whose appearances at daily press briefings rivet the
nation, nobody is immune from the virus.  However, due to the way
in which the virus spreads, individuals living in congregate
settings -- such as nursing homes and prisons -- are especially
vulnerable because of difficulty of observing social distancing and
recommended hygiene practices in close quarters.

The named Plaintiffs are 10 individuals convicted of a range of
felonies, including murder, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted
robbery.  They are currently serving sentences in various IDOC
facilities, none of which are in Cook County.  IDOC operates 28
adult correctional facilities throughout the State of Illinois,
houses around 37,000 individuals, and has 11,600 employees.  The
Plaintiffs have brought two purported class action lawsuits --
Pritzker and Money v. Jeffreys -- seeking release of prisoners from
IDOC facilities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Plaintiffs ask the Court to force the state executive branch to
start a process for the potential release of thousands of inmates,
through medical furlough or home detention under state law.  The
scope of the potential release is sweeping.  By their own
admission, the Plaintiffs want a process to potentially release at
least 12,000 inmates, almost one-third of the prison population in
Illinois.  The Defendants submit that they have a process and
already are doing most of what the Plaintiffs are requesting in
their proposed remedial plan -- albeit not at the pace the
Plaintiffs would like to see.

The immediate question before the Court is whether the Plaintiffs
are entitled to some form of immediate relief -- in the form of a
temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or writs of
habeas corpus -- imposed by a federal court on state officials.

The Court answers that question in the negative and denies the
requested relief.  The Court holds that the Plaintiffs are correct
in asserting that the issue of inmate health and safety is
deserving of the highest degree of attention.  And the record shows
that the authorities in the state are doing just that, with
constantly evolving procedures increasing the number of inmates
released on a daily basis.  But the release of inmates requires a
process that gives close attention to detail, for the safety of
each inmate, his or her family, and the community at large demands
a sensible and individualized release plan -- especially during a
pandemic.

Even if the steps Illinois has taken and the pace with which they
are proceeding is not exactly what the Plaintiffs want, those steps
and that pace plainly pass constitutional muster.  The Plaintiffs
have provided no convincing reason for a federal court to intrude
there and now -- either to issue a blanket order for the release of
thousands of inmates or to superimpose a court-mandated and
court-superintended process on the mechanisms currently in place to
determine which IDOC inmates can and should be safely removed from
prison facilities at this time.

The care of state inmates is entrusted, in the first instance, to
state officials, unless the conditions rise to the level of
constitutional violations.  And state law empowers state officials
with the discretion to release individual inmates for medical
furlough or home detention, if they deem it appropriate.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have no likelihood of
success on their constitutional claims because the record does not
support the notion that the Defendants are showing deliberate
indifference to the inmates' plight or discriminating against
inmates with disabilities.  Even if they had a colorable claim, the
Plaintiffs' request for release is untenable on a class-wide basis
because the possibility of release is an inherently inmate-specific
inquiry.  Other considerations -- such as the public interest from
the potential release of thousands of inmates -- weigh heavily in
the analysis, too.  In the end, the Court concludes that the
Plaintiffs are not entitled to their request for extraordinary
relief, even in these extraordinary times.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/dQxiIy from
Leagle.com.


IMG COLLEGE: Spielman Appeals Order in Antitrust Suit to 6th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Charles Spielman filed an appeal from a court ruling
issued in his lawsuit entitled Charles Spielman v. IMG College, et
al., Case No. 2:17-cv-00612, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
an action for damages as a result of the Defendants' practice of
engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy and a group boycott/refusal
to deal that has unlawfully foreclosed class members from receiving
compensation in connection with the commercial exploitation of
their images following their cessation of intercollegiate athletic
competition.

The appellate case is captioned as Charles Spielman v. IMG College,
et al., Case No. 20-3001, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant CHARLES C. SPIELMAN, Individually (and/or as an
officer, shareholder and/or affiliate of Profectus Group, Inc.,
d/b/a THe College Football Players Club) on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated, aka Chris Spielman, is represented
by:

          Samir Bradley Dahman, Esq.
          KOHRMAN, JACKSON & KRANTZ
          10 W. Broad Street, Suite 1900
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Telephone: (614) 636-1250
      
Defendants-Appellees IMG COLLEGE, LLC; IMG WORLDWIDE, INC.; WME
ENTERTAINMENT, collectively referred to as "IMG," aka WME, dba IMG,
dba International Management Group, dba Ohio State IMG Sports
Marketing; and THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, aka OSU, are represented
by:

          Joseph A. Castrodale, Esq.
          BENESCH FRIEDLANDER
          200 Public Square, Suite 2300
          Cleveland, OH 44114
          Telephone: (216) 363-4500
          E-mail: jcastrodale@beneschlaw.com


IMPACT GROUP: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
The Orange County employment law attorneys at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, filed a class action complaint alleging that
Impact Group, LLC failed to provide their California employees with
meal and rest periods as required by California law. The Impact
Group, LLC class action lawsuit, Case No.
30-2020-01141107-CU-OE-CXC, is currently pending in the Orange
Superior Court of the State of California. A copy of the Complaint
can be read here.

According to the lawsuit filed against Impact Group, LLC, the
company allegedly (a) failed to provide PLAINTIFF accurate itemized
wage statements, (b) failed to properly record and provide legally
required meal and rest periods, (c) failed to pay overtime wages,
(d) failed to pay minimum wages, (e) failed to reimburse employees
for required expenses, and (f) failed to pay wages when due, all in
violation of the applicable Labor Code sections listed in Labor
Code Sections §§ 201, 202, 203, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197,
1197.1, 2802, and the applicable Wage Order(s), and thereby gives
rise to civil penalties as a result of such alleged conduct.

Additionally, the complaint further alleges Impact Group, LLC,
committed acts of unfair competition in violation of the California
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.
(the "UCL"), by engaging in a company-wide policy and procedure
which failed to accurately calculate and record the correct
overtime rate for the overtime worked by PLAINTIFF and other
CALIFORNIA CLASS Members. As a result of DEFENDANT's intentional
disregard of the obligation to meet this burden, DEFENDANT
allegedly failed to properly calculate and/or pay all required
compensation for work performed by the members of the CALIFORNIA
CLASS and violated the California Labor Code.

If you would like to know more about the Impact Group, LLC,
lawsuit, please contact Attorney Nicholas J. De Blouw today by
calling (800) 568-8020.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP is an employment law
firm with offices located in San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento,
Los Angeles, Riverside and Chicago that dedicates its practice to
helping employees, investors and consumers fight back against
unfair business practices, including violations of the California
Labor Code and Fair Labor Standards Act. If you need help in
collecting unpaid overtime wages, unpaid commissions, being
wrongfully terminated from work, and other employment law claims,
contact one of their attorneys today. [GN]


KANDI TECHNOLOGIES: Frank R. Cruz Reminds of Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz reminds investors that class
action lawsuits have been filed on behalf of shareholders of the
following publicly-traded companies.  Investors have until the
deadlines listed below to file a lead plaintiff motion.

Investors suffering losses on their investments are encouraged to
contact The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz to discuss their legal
rights in these class actions at 310-914-5007 or by email to
fcruz@frankcruzlaw.com.

Kandi Technologies Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: KNDI)

Class Period: June 10, 2015 - March 13, 2017

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 10, 2020

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that certain areas in the Company's previously
issued financial statements for the years ended December 31, 2015
and 2014, and the first three quarters for the year ended December
31, 2016 required adjustment; (2) that in turn, the Company lacked
effective controls over financial reporting; and (3) that as a
result, Defendants' statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially false and misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

Follow us for updates on Twitter: twitter.com/FRC_LAW.

To be a member of these class actions, you need not take any action
at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no
action and remain an absent member of the class action.  If you
wish to learn more about these class actions, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact:

          The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz, Los Angeles
          Frank R. Cruz
          Tel: 310-914-5007
          E-mail: fcruz@frankcruzlaw.com
          Web site: http://www.frankcruzlaw.com/
[GN]


KERRY INC: Remand of Fernandez to Cook County Circuit Court Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jorge L. Alonso of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Plaintiffs'
motion to remand the case, MAXIMO FERNANDEZ, ARTURO CORDONA, SERGIO
DURAN, RODRIGO PUENTES, and ISAIAS VILLANUEVA, Plaintiffs, v.
KERRY, INC., Defendant, Case No. 17 C 8971 (N.D. Ill.), to the
Circuit Court of Cook County.

On Nov. 7, 2017, the five named Plaintiffs, each of whom is a
citizen of Illinois, filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County a
suit alleging that Defendant Kerry violated Illinois's Biometric
Information Privacy Act ("BIPA").  The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendant's time-tracking system requires employees to use their
fingerprints to 'punch' in to or out of work.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of "200-500 individuals"
who, like the Plaintiffs, were required to use their fingerprints
to clock in and out of work each day.  In Count I, they asserted
that the Defendant violated BIPA by failing to inform them that
their biometric information was being collected and stored; by
failing to obtain the Plaintiffs' consent for such collection and
storage; by failing to inform plaintiffs as to the purpose and
length of time their biometric information would be collected and
stored; and by failing to provide a retention policy.  In Count II,
the Plaintiffs asserted that the Defendant was negligent.

On Dec. 13, 2017, the Defendant removed the case to the Northern
Illinois District Court, citing 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(a), 1441
and 1446.  In its notice of removal, the Defendant stated that it
is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in
Wisconsin.  It also alleged that the amount in controversy is
greater than $75,000.  In support of that allegation, the Defendant
stated that BIPA provides statutory damages of $1,000 to $5,000 per
violation and that each Plaintiff punched in via fingerprint at
least 75 times.  The Defendant also noted that the amount in
controversy includes the cost a defendant incurs in complying with
injunctive relief, and that the Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief.

On Nov. 7, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand.  They
have pled four violations of BIPA.  Therefore, with damages of up
to $5,000 per violation, each Plaintiff's maximum potential damages
reaches just $20,000.  The Plaintiffs argue that the District Court
lacks jurisdiction.  Specifically, they argue that: (1) the Court
lacks diversity jurisdiction in that the amount in controversy is
less than $75,000; and (2) the Plaintiffs have no standing.

The Defendant argues the District Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction on a number of bases, including diversity, federal
question and the Class Action Fairness Act.  It also argues that
the Plaintiffs' motion for remand comes too late.

Judge Alonso holds that the Plaintiffs have standing.  The
Defendant has put forth evidence that every named Plaintiff was a
member of a union and subject to a collective bargaining agreement.
The Seventh Circuit has held that, in such circumstances, the
plaintiffs asserting BIPA violations based on fingerprint time
clocks have Article III standing, because the claim could result in
additional pay or benefits or in the elimination of the practice.

Next, the Judge considers the Plaintiffs' argument as to
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Generally, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed.  Judge Alonso agrees
that the Plaintiffs have not shown it is legally impossible to
recover an amount greater than $75,000.  

The case also meets the amount-in-controversy requirement.  Under
Section 1332(d), the claims of the individual class members are
aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $5 million.  Thus, even if the Plaintiffs are
correct that each Plaintiff can obtain only $20,000, then the
amount in controversy would be $10 million, because they allege the
class contains between 200 and 500 members.  Accordingly, the
District Court has jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act.  The case was removable.

Finally, the important point is that the Seventh Circuit has
concluded that it is not possible to resolve a BIPA dispute over
fingerprint time clocks without reference to the collective
bargaining agreement.  Because the Plaintiffs' BIPA claim
necessarily requires interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, it is preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA.  The Court
has original jurisdiction over the claim, and the case was
removable.  

Accordingly, Judge Alonso concludes that the District Court has
jurisdiction over the case.  The Judge denied the Plaintiffs'
motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/1za8fB from
Leagle.com.


KESSLER TOPAZ: Meltzer & Check Announces Securities Fraud Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP reminds that an
investor securities fraud class action lawsuit has been filed
against Ideanomics, Inc. (NASDAQ: IDEX) on behalf of those who
purchased or otherwise acquired Ideanomics common stock between
March 20, 2020 and June 25, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Ideanomics investors who purchased or otherwise acquired common
stock during the Class Period may, no later than August 27, 2020,
seek to be appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the
class.

Investors who wish to discuss this securities fraud class action
lawsuit or request additional information about this litigation are
encouraged to contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check attorneys James
Maro, Jr. or Adrienne Bell at (844) 877-9500 (toll free) or online,
click
https://www.ktmc.com/ideanomics-inc-class-action?utm_source=PR&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=ideanomics.

According to the complaint, Ideanomics is a global company focused
on facilitating the adoption of commercial electric vehicles ("EV")
and developing next generation financial services and Fintech
products.

The Class Period commences on March 20, 2020, when Ideanomics
issued a press release in which it announced "that the Qingdao-MEG
Sales Center, branded as Mobile Energy Group Center, is scheduled
to start sales operations by May 1." Throughout the Class Period,
Ideanomics continued to laud its EV expo center, claiming the MEG
Center is "the largest auto trading market in Qingdao," China.
However, the truth was eventually revealed.

According to the complaint, on June 25, 2020, analyst Hindenburg
Research issued a series of tweets in which it called Ideanomics
"an egregious & obvious fraud." Hindenburg asserted that it found
evidence that Ideanomics had doctored photos for use in its press
releases to suggest that it owns or operates a vehicle sales center
in Qingdao, China, when it in fact does not. Hindenburg further
asserted that it had an investigator go to Ideanomics' purported
MEG Center in Qingdao, China, where the investigator was unable to
find any trace of Ideanomics or its purported MEG Center. Also, on
June 25, 2020, analyst J Capital Research issued a report on
Ideanomics entitled "Champion of Promotes". J Capital Research
wrote, in part, that "Ideanomics . . . is a zero. The company
changes its name and promotional story so frequently that it's hard
to keep up. One thing remains a constant, despite all the press
releases, buzzwords and hype: shareholders get wiped out." J
Capital Research continued, in a tweet, that "[w]e called all the
‘buyers' named in [Ideanomics'] press releases this month. Not a
single one had made a purchase. One of them thanked us for alerting
them to ‘fake news.'" Following this news, Ideanomics' stock
price fell from its June 24, 2020 close of $3.09 to a June 25, 2020
close of $2.44 per share, a one day drop of $0.65 or approximately
21%.

Then, on June 26, 2020, Ideanomics issued a press release in which
it sought to "clarify the status" of its purported EV hub in
Qingdao, China. In this release, Ideanomics walked back certain of
its prior statements regarding the MEG Center in Qingdao, stating
that it was launching three phases of its MEG Center that will
eventually total one million square feet. The first phase,
according to Ideanomics, occupies only 215,000 square feet.
Following this news, the stock price continued to fall on June 26,
2020, dropping to a close of $1.46 per share. This represents a two
day drop of approximately 53%.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, the
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Ideanomics' MEG Center in Qingdao was not "a one
million square foot EV expo center"; (ii) Ideanomics had been using
doctored or altered photographs of the purported MEG Center in
Qingdao; (iii) Ideanomics' EV business in China was not performing
nearly as strong as Ideanomics had represented; and (iv) as a
result, Ideanomics' public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

Ideanomics investors may, no later than August 27, 2020, seek to be
appointed as a lead plaintiff representative of the class through
Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, or other counsel, or may choose to
do nothing and remain an absent class member. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of all class members in
directing the litigation. In order to be appointed as a lead
plaintiff, the Court must determine that the class member's claim
is typical of the claims of other class members, and that the class
member will adequately represent the class. Your ability to share
in any recovery is not affected by the decision of whether or not
to serve as a lead plaintiff.

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check prosecutes class actions in state and
federal courts throughout the country involving securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties and other violations of state and
federal law. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check is a driving force
behind corporate governance reform, and has recovered billions of
dollars on behalf of institutional and individual investors from
the United States and around the world. The firm represents
investors, consumers and whistleblowers (private citizens who
report fraudulent practices against the government and share in the
recovery of government dollars). The complaint in this action was
not filed by Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check. For more information
about Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, please visit:

           Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
           James Maro, Jr., Esq.
           Adrienne Bell, Esq.
           280 King of Prussia Road
           Radnor, PA 19087
           Toll free: (844) 877-9500
                      (610) 667-7706
           E-mail: info@ktmc.com
           http://www.ktmc.com/
[GN]


KINGOLD JEWELRY: Rosen Reminds of Aug. 31 Plaintiff Motion Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
purchasers of the securities of Kingold Jewelry, Inc. (NASDAQ:
KGJI) between March 15, 2018 and June 28, 2020, inclusive (the
"Class Period") of the important August 31, 2020 lead plaintiff
deadline in the securities class action commenced by the firm. The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Kingold investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the Kingold class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1891.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Kingold used fake gold as collateral to fraudulently
secure loans; (2) consequently, the Company would face creditor
lawsuits and be delisted from the Shanghai Gold Exchange; and (3)
as a result, defendants' statements about its business, operations,
and prospects, were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times. When the true details
entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered
damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than August 31,
2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf
of other class members in directing the litigation. If you wish to
join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1891.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

Follow us for updates on LinkedIn:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-rosen-law-firm or on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/rosen_firm or on Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/rosenlawfirm.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has secured hundreds of
millions of dollars for investors.

Contact:

          Laurence Rosen, Esq.
          Phillip Kim, Esq.
          The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
          275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Tel: (212) 686-1060
          Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
          Fax: (212) 202-3827
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
                  pkim@rosenlegal.com
                  cases@rosenlegal.com
          Web site: http://www.rosenlegal.com/
[GN]


KNAUF INSULATION: Brancaccio Remanded to LA County Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Cormac J. Carney of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California granted the Plaintiff's motion to remand the
case, RICHARD BRANCACCIO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. KNAUF INSULATION, INC.; KNAUF
INSULATION USA; KNAUF INSULATION, GMBH; KNAUF INSULATION; and DOES
1-100, Defendants, Case No. CV 20-01439-CJC (AGRx) (C.D. Cal.), to
the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

Plaintiff Brancaccio filed the wage-and-hour class action against
the Defendants.  The Plaintiff allegedly worked for the Defendants
as an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee in the positions of
production associate, quality assurance, and backup line
technician, from approximately January 2016 to approximately Jan.
27, 2019.  The Plaintiff's final base rate was $18.34 per hour.

On Jan. 3, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action
against the Defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court.  In
his original Complaint, he asserted nine causes of action under
California's Labor Code for (1) unpaid overtime wages, (2) unpaid
meal period premiums, (3) unpaid rest period premiums, (4) unpaid
minimum wages, (5) final wages not timely paid, (6) untimely wages
during employment, (7) non-compliant wage statements, (8) failure
to keep accurate payroll records, and (9) unreimbursed business
expenses, as well as a tenth cause of action for (10) violations of
California's Unfair Competition Law.

In February 2020, Knauf filed a Notice of Removal.  Knauf asserts
that the Court has jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").  Alternatively, it
claims that the Court has federal question jurisdiction because the
action involves valid and applicable collective bargaining
agreements pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, as well as purportedly concerted action by employees
covered under the National Labor Relations Act.

After removal, the Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended
Complaint.  In it, Plaintiff withdraws the first, sixth, and eighth
causes of action—for unpaid overtime wages, untimely wages during
employment, and failure to keep accurate payroll records—from the
original Complaint.  The remaining seven causes of action appear
unchanged.  

Plaintiff asserts these claims on behalf of a proposed class of all
current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees who worked
for any of the Defendants within the State of California at any
time during the period from Jan. 3, 2016 to final judgment and who
reside in California.

The Plaintiff alleges broadly that the Defendants engaged in a
pattern and practice of wage abuse against their hourly-paid or
non-exempt employees that involved, inter alia, failing to pay them
for all regular wages earned and for missed, short, late, and/or
interrupted meal periods and rest breaks in violation of California
law.  The boilerplate allegations assert that the Defendants failed
to properly compensate employees, forced them to work through
required breaks, and failed to keep accurate records.  The
Plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts about the Defendants'
practices and policies or the frequency of the alleged violations.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion to remand.  Plaintiff
contends that the case must be remanded because Knauf has not
properly established the amount in controversy.  The Plaintiff's
overtime wages claim accounts for more than half of the estimated
amount in controversy—approximately $3.5 million.

Because the figure relies on unsupported and unreasonable
assumptions, Judge Carney finds that Knauf has failed to carry its
burden.  And because there are no allegations or evidence that
suggest the case is exceptional, the Judge finds Knauf's assumption
unreasonable.  Without the inflated estimate of the Plaintiff's
overtime wage claim, the amount in controversy falls short of $5
million.  Accordingly, Knauf has not satisfied its burden of
meeting the jurisdictional threshold, and the Court therefore lacks
CAFA jurisdiction over the action.

Judge Carney also finds that Knauf has not carried its burden of
establishing federal preemption under Section 301 of the LMRA.  In
the instant motion to remand, the Plaintiff argues that even if the
parties may need to refer to CBAs at some point to determine rates
of pay or other policies governing the putative class employment,
the Court will not be called to interpret the CBAs.  Knauf does not
respond to this argument in its Opposition, (see Opp. at 22-24),
and the Court agrees with the Plaintiff.  When the meaning of
contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a
collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of
state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be
extinguished.

In addition, Knauf has not carried its burden of establishing
federal question jurisdiction.  The Plaintiff does not seek to
renegotiate the terms of anyone's employment -- indeed, he no
longer works for the Defendants.  As a matter of law, the Judge
concludes that Section 9 of the NLRA has no preemptive force in the
action.  Knauf has not identified any precedent or persuasive
argument to the contrary.  The test for "complete preemption" is
demanding, and Knauf has not shown that it is satisfied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Carney holds that Knauf has not
carried its burden to show that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the action under either CAFA or 28 U.S.C. Section
1331.  Accordingly, the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to
remand.  The case is remanded to Los Angeles County Superior
Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/lBlkck from Leagle.com.


KRAFT FOODS: Appeals N.D. Ill. Ruling in Ploss Suit to 7th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Kraft Foods Group, Inc. and Mondelez Global LLC filed an
appeal from a court ruling in the lawsuit entitled HARRY PLOSS, as
Trustee for the HARRY PLOSS TRUST DTD 8/16/1993, on behalf of
himself and a proposed class, et al. v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC. and
MONDELEZ GLOBAL LLC, Case No. 1:15-cv-02937, in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Feb. 3,
2020, Judge Edmond E. Chang of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, (a) granted Ploss'
motion for class certification, and (b) denief Kraft's motions (i)
to exclude Dr. Craig Pirrong's opening report, and (ii) to strike
his rebuttal report.

Harry Ploss and the other Plaintiffs brought the proposed
class-action lawsuit against Kraft and Mondelez Global, alleging
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"); the Sherman
Antitrust Act; and unjust enrichment.  In the Consolidated Class
Action Complaint ("Complaint"), Ploss alleged that Kraft
manipulated the wheat-futures market using two schemes: the long
wheat futures scheme, and the wash trading scheme.

The appellate case is captioned as Kraft Foods Group, Inc., et al.
v. Harry Ploss, et al., Case No. 20-8001, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents HARRY PLOSS, as Trustee for the Harry Ploss
Trust DTD 8/16/1993, on behalf of Plaintiff and all others
similarly situated, ROBERT WALLACE, NATHAN WALLACE, KEVIN BROWN,
and JOSEPH CAPRINO are represented by:

          Christopher Lovell, Esq.
          LOVELL STEWART HALEBIAN JACOBSON LLP
          61 Broadway
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 608-1900
          E-mail: CLovell@lshllp.com

Defendants-Petitioners KRAFT FOODS GROUP, INC. and MONDELEZ GLOBAL
LLC are represented by:

          Nicole A. Allen, Esq.
          Dean N. Panos, Esq.
          Kevin McCall, Esq.
          Thomas Edward Quinn, Esq.
          JENNER & BLOCK LLP
          353 N. Clark Street
          Chicago, IL 60654-3456
          Telephone: (312) 923-2868
          E-mail: nallen@jenner.com
                  dpanos@jenner.com
                  jmccall@jenner.com
                  tquinn@jenner.com


LA BOOM DISCO: 2nd Cir. Vacates Summary Judgment in Duran Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RADAMES DURAN, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LA BOOM DISCO, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 19-600-cv (2d Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court order
granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff-Appellant Duran claims that he received, over the course
of more than a year-and-a-half, hundreds of unsolicited text
messages from Defendant-Appellee La Boom Disco ("LBD"), a nightclub
in Queens, New York, all sent using automatic telephone dialing
system ("ATDS").  LBD acknowledges that it sent the messages, but
counters that its actions were not prohibited by the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") because the texting platforms it
used to send them were not, in fact, ATDSs.  Of course, only one
party can be right: either LBD used ATDSs, or it did not.  If LBD
did do so, then it is liable to Duran under the TCPA.  But if LBD
did not do so -- if it used some non-ATDS technology to send its
texts -- then Duran has no case.

In March 2016, Duran had seen an LBD Facebook advertisement
inviting interested club-goers to text a code to a designated phone
number in order to secure free admission to a party, which he
voluntarily did. From that point on, his number was on a list that
LBD maintained, and he would receive, according to his complaint,
"anywhere from 7 to 15 messages a month" totaling "at least 300
unsolicited text messages" overall.  These text messages, some of
which were produced for the District Court, featured advertisements
for LBD, describing events that would take place there.

Over a year-and-a-half after the texts started, Duran brought a
putative class action against LBD in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, seeking damages under the TCPA for each message
received. He claimed that the messages were sent without his
consent and that they were sent using an ATDS, triggering
TCPA-liability.

LBD responded by denying that it violated the TCPA.  It conceded
that the texts were sent (though by its count, there were only 121,
not somewhere near 300).  Still, LBD argued that no matter the
number, the messages were properly conveyed, since the technologies
used to send them were not covered by the statute.

As LBD explained, it sent the messages using two online systems:
the ExpressText Program and the EZ Texting Program.  Although these
programs permitted LBD to blast out text messages to hundreds of
numbers at once, they were not ATDSs, according to LBD, because,
among other things, they required too much human intervention when
dialing.  Contrary to Duran's claims, LBD argued that the programs
lacked the critical feature of those dialing systems regulated by
the TCPA.  Simply put, they were not automatic.

The District Court agreed.  It granted summary judgment for LBD,
deciding that the programs LBD used to text Duran were not, as a
matter of law, ATDSs.  In making its determination, the District
Court concluded that what sets apart an ATDS from a non-ATDS is
whether a human determines the time at which a text message gets
sent out.  Accordingly, it held that because a user determines the
time at which the ExpressText and EZ Texting programs send messages
to recipients, they operate with too much human involvement to meet
the definition of an autodialer.

Duran appealed to the Second Circuit, seeking vacatur of the
judgment on the basis that the District Court misinterpreted the
TCPA.  Since Duran's appeal presents a pure question of statutory
interpretation, the Second Circuit reviews the District Court's
judgment de novo, coming to its own conclusion about what an ATDS
is.

To avoid the problem of surplusage, to effectuate Congress's intent
in passing the statute as enacted, and to follow the FCC's
long-standing and still valid interpretation of the TCPA, the
Second Circuit holds that an ATDS may call numbers from stored
lists, such as those generated, initially, by humans.  Since there
is no factual dispute that the ExpressText and EZ Texting programs
call from just such lists of numbers, they, too, have the first
capacity -- the capacity to "store" numbers -- required under the
TCPA to be considered ATDSs.

The Second Circuit do not agree that the human-intervention test
turns solely on this timing factor.  While it may be true, as the
2003 Order states, that the key feature of a predictive dialer is a
timing function, the programs used by LBD here are not predictive
dialers, a fact that the District Court readily acknowledges.
Therefore, any controlling reliance on the fact that LBD's programs
do not automatically determine the time at which messages are sent
out is misplaced.  The District Court, in stressing the importance
of the "timing function" to the human-intervention test, seems to
imply that only predictive dialers can be considered ATDSs.  But
the TCPA predates the use of predictive dialers -- which is exactly
why the FCC felt compelled to specify its application to the new
technology in 2003.  To assume that a key feature of predictive
dialers must be a key feature of all ATDSs, especially when we know
that many early ATDSs did not have the ability to automatically
determine the time at which a call or text would get sent out, is
anachronistic at best.

Accordingly, since the programs required only a human to click
"send" or some similar button in order to initiate a text campaign,
the Second Circuit concludes that the programs did not require
human intervention in order to dial.  Therefore, LBD's programs
have the second capacity necessary to be considered ATDSs.  They
both can dial numbers on their own -- which is to say,
automatically.

To summarize, the Second Circuit holds that (1) the EZ-Texting and
ExpressText programs have the first capacity necessary to qualify
as automatic telephone dialing systems, or ATDSs, because they
store lists of numbers, as is permitted under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act; (ii) the EZ-Texting and ExpressText
programs have the second capacity necessary to qualify as automatic
telephone dialing systems, or ATDSs, because they dial those stored
numbers without human intervention, as is required by the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act; and (iii) having both necessary capacities
within the meaning of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the
EZ-Texting and ExpressText programs are automatic telephone dialing
systems, or ATDSs, under the statute.  

Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's
judgment, and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent
with its Opinion, including the calculation of such penalties as
may be appropriate in the circumstances presented.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/YFsjpY from Leagle.com.

C.K. Lee -- cklee@leelitigation.com -- Lee Litigation Group, PLLC,
New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Raymond J. Aab -- rja120@msn.com -- New York, NY, for
Defendant-Appellee.


LA SALLE COUNTY, TX: ACLU, Gibbs & Bruns File Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
The Gilmer Mirror reports that the American Civil Liberties Union
of Texas and the law firm of Gibbs & Bruns LLP recently filed a
class-action lawsuit on behalf of nearly 150 people detained as
potential witnesses for federal prosecutions at La Salle County
Regional Detention Center near Laredo. None of the people detained
have had a hearing or opportunity to contest the legality of their
detention.

The petition was filed on behalf of six people who have been
detained between three and six months, and who seek to represent
all others detained as material witnesses in Laredo. The
petitioners were never charged with a crime, but were automatically
detained and issued a $25,000 cash bond without access to a lawyer.
The petition contends that these practices violate federal statutes
and the U.S. Constitution.

"The government cannot automatically detain people, automatically
impose an unaffordable bail amount, and hold human beings in jail
for months without a hearing," said David Donatti, attorney for the
ACLU of Texas. "The right to liberty is fundamental, and the
government must comply with the Constitution before stripping
anyone of that right. Our laws, Constitution, and our basic human
dignity demand more."

"We are honored to work with the ACLU of Texas on this important
matter," said Caitlin Halpern, an associate at Gibbs & Bruns. "It
is our responsibility as lawyers to provide zealous representation
to people in our society who have been wrongfully deprived of
fundamental rights but cannot otherwise obtain or afford legal
assistance, and we are eager to fight for our clients and class
members experiencing the same harms."

The six petitioners are currently detained at La Salle County
Regional Detention Center in Encinal, Texas.

Gloria Carolina Manzo-Hernanez has been detained for more than
three months since her arrest on March 3, 2020. Though she is a
mother and provider to four children, she was told that she would
have to "wait it out."

Victor Zepeta- Jasso has been detained since March 12, 2020. He has
not spoken to his wife and three young daughters since his arrest.
At his first and only court appearance, he was told he would not be
free until the end of the criminal case against an alleged
smuggler.

Moises Amadeo Mancia-Mendoza has been detained for the same period.
He fled El Salvador due to violence, but instead of receiving an
asylum hearing, he was detained as a material witness. He was
advised that his right to counsel was unnecessary, because nothing
could be done to expedite his release.

Mercy Rocio Duchi-Vargas has been detained for more than six
months. Having fled religious persecution, her husband is seeking
asylum in New York. Mercy is separated from her daughter as well.
The criminal defendants against whom Duchi-Vargas is designated to
testify were released on unsecured bonds in February, yet she
remains in custody.

Jatzeel Antonio Cuevas-Cortes is set to be a material witness in
the same criminal proceeding as Duchi-Vargas. He has been detained
for more than six months. Cuevas-Cortes has consistently been told
by government officers that there is nothing to do but wait.

Victor Manuel Nuñez-Hernandez was detained on March 18, 2020. He
too was told that he was automatically detained for an estimated 30
to 90 days, and that there was no recourse for release before the
end of criminal proceedings against the defendant.

The petition details that all class members have been detained
without findings as to the necessity of detention, with a blanket
$25,000 bond, and without ever having had a hearing. The ACLU of
Texas, represented by David Donatti and Andre Segura, and Gibbs &
Bruns, including attorneys Caitlin Halpern, Barrett Reasoner, and
Sam Cruse, are seeking to end these unlawful and systematic
practices.

A copy of the complaint is available here:
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/manzo-hernandez_et_al_v._juarez._.pdf


A copy of the motion for class certification is available here:
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/mot._for_class_cert_manzo-hernandez.pdf


A copy of the request for temporary restraining order is available
here:
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/manzo-hernandez_tro.pdf
[GN]



LAWNWOOD MEDICAL: Kepfer Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
Percy Kepfer, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v.
LAWNWOOD MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, d/b/a
Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF
FLORIDA, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, d/b/a Lawnwood
Regional Medical Center, Case No. 2:20-cv-14222-XXXX (S.D. Fla.,
July 3, 2020), is brought against the Defendants to recover unpaid
overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff worked for Lawnwood in excess of 40 hours within a
workweek, but Lawnwood failed to compensate the Plaintiff and
others at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of
pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single
workweek, according to the complaint. Lawnwood has policies and
practices pursuant to which the Plaintiff was required to manually
delete hours over forty worked from the Defendant's records, such
that they were not paid for same; and was sometimes required to
come in to delete hours on their days off, for which time the
Defendant had a policy and practice of not compensating the
Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants to work as a non-exempt,
hourly-paid employee providing direct care to patients.

The Defendants operated, and operate, Lawnwood Regional Medical
Center in St. Lucie County, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Angeli Murthy, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          8151 Peters Rd., Suite 4000
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Phone: (954) 327-5369
          Facsimile: (954) 327-3016
          Email: amurthy@forthepeople.com


LENDINGCLUB CORP: Calif. Judge Dismisses Veal Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Beth Labson Freeman, on June 12, 2020, of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a
purported securities class action against a peer-to-peer lending
company (the "Company") and certain of its officers under Sections
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  Veal
v. LendingClub Corporation, et. al., No. 5:18-cv-02599 (N.D. Cal.
June 12, 2020).  Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made
misstatements and omissions regarding an investigation by the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") into the Company's allegedly
deceptive conduct related to certain consumer practices.  The Court
dismissed plaintiffs' claims (mostly without prejudice), because
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege falsity or scienter.

In May 2016, the Company disclosed that some of its senior
executives and managers had engaged in deceptive conduct by
knowingly misleading investors as to the characteristics of certain
loans, and that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") were conducting
investigations into the disclosed misconduct.  That same month, the
FTC began a separate investigation into certain of the Company's
consumer practices, including its disclosures related to
origination fees and certainty of loan approval.  The Company
publicly disclosed the FTC investigation for the first time in
November 2016.  In April 2018, the FTC announced that it had filed
a complaint against the Company for engaging in "deceptive acts" by
charging up-front "hidden fees" and representing to borrowers that
they would receive loans before making final approval decisions.

The Court previously granted a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first
amended complaint, which alleged that defendants misled investors
by failing to disclose the deceptive consumer-facing practices
investigated by the FTC.  In the second amended complaint that was
the subject of this decision, plaintiffs asserted a new theory
based on allegations that defendants failed to timely disclose the
FTC investigation and that, when they did, they misled investors by
"lumping together all regulatory investigations" and "omitting that
the FTC [i]nvestigation involved wholly distinct conduct" covered
by the DOJ and SEC investigations.  The Court again dismissed the
claims (most without prejudice), because it found that plaintiffs'
allegations of falsity and scienter were inadequate.

The Court first held that the Company "was not required to 'make an
immediate disclosure of the [FTC] investigation.'"  The Court held
that there was no independent duty to make such a disclosure and
that plaintiffs failed to allege that the omission of the FTC
investigation "create[d] an impression of a state of affairs that
differ[ed] in a material way from the one that actually
exist[ed]"-i.e., that the Company was not under FTC scrutiny.

The Court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the disclosure that
the Company was under investigation by the DOJ, SEC and FTC
misleadingly created the impression that the FTC investigation
related to the same subject matter as the DOJ and SEC
investigations when it did not.  The Court explained that the
factual allegations and the actual disclosures did not support
plaintiffs' claims that defendants knew what the FTC was looking
into, including whether the FTC was looking into the same issues
under scrutiny by the DOJ and the SEC.  Because plaintiffs failed
to allege facts showing when defendants learned about what the FTC
was investigating, the Court found that the complaint failed to
allege adequately that the Company's statement that it was under
investigation by the SEC, DOJ and FTC was false (or misrepresented
what the Company knew about the FTC investigation) when it was
made.  For similar reasons, the Court held that plaintiffs failed
to allege scienter, concluding it could not infer from allegations
that defendants were aware of underlying issues with the Company's
lending practices that defendants also knew those same practices
were under FTC investigation.

Finally, the Court found that plaintiffs' allegations on the whole
failed to "evince fraudulent intent or deliberate recklessness as
to make the inference of scienter cogent."  In particular, the
Court noted that there were no allegations that any individual
defendants sold Company stock during the relevant period.  To the
contrary, certain of the individual defendants purchased Company
stock, which according to the Court was "'significant[] for the
holistic assessment' and 'weigh[ed] against an inference of
scienter.'"

Because the second amended complaint asserted an entirely different
theory from the first amended complaint, the Court's dismissal was
without prejudice (except as to certain claims against one
individual defendant that was held to have been inadequately
alleged). [GN]


LIFELABS: Faces Two Privacy Class Actions in Canada
---------------------------------------------------
Lyle Arian, writing for Insurance Business, reports that a joint
investigation by Ontario and British Columbia's information and
privacy commissioners has concluded that laboratory testing company
LifeLabs failed to protect the personal health information of 15
million Canadians.

LifeLabs first reported that it suffered a massive cyberattack last
December. The attack primarily affected the information of BC and
Ontario residents.

Not long after LifeLabs announced that it had sustained a
cyberattack, two class action lawsuits were filed against the
company in both BC and Ontario. The lawsuits accused the lab
testing firm of negligence, breach of contract, violating their
customers' confidence as well as privacy and consumer protection
laws, and inadequate security/security training for employees.

An investigation into the data breach was later launched, and it
found that LifeLabs failed to implement "reasonable" defences to
protect personal health information. The inadequate cyber defences
violated BC's personal information protection law, Ontario's health
privacy law and the Personal Health Information Protection Act, the
investigation concluded.

"LifeLabs' failure to properly protect the personal health
information of British Columbians and Canadians is unacceptable,"
BC information and privacy commissioner Michael McEvoy said in a
statement.

McEvoy added that LifeLabs left millions of Canadians exposed to
"potential identity theft, financial loss and reputational harm."

The investigation also found that LifeLabs failed to secure
adequate technology security policies, and that the company was
collecting more personal information than necessary.

"The breach should serve as a reminder to organizations, big and
small, that they have a duty to be vigilant against these types of
attacks," commented Ontario information and privacy commissioner
Brian Beamish.

LifeLabs has been ordered by both commissioners to immediately
implement cybersecurity measures, CBC News reported. [GN]


LLOYD'S LONDON: Insurers Denied Leave to Appeal Decision in Drennen
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S, LONDON, et al.,
Appellants, v. ROWENA DRENNEN, FLORA GASKIN, ROGER TURNER, CHRISTIE
TURNER, JOHN PICARD and REBECCA PICARD, individually and as the
representatives of the KESSLER SETTLEMENT CLASS, STEVEN MITCHELL
and RUTH MITCHELL, individually and as the representatives of the
MITCHELL SETTLEMENT CLASS, and RESCAP LIQUIDATING TRUST, Appellees,
Case 20-cv-1645 (LJL) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Lewis J. Liman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the
Defendant Insurers' motion for leave to appeal from the Memorandum
of Decision of Hon. Sean H. Lane, dated Dec. 27, 2019 and entered
Jan. 14, 2020.

At issue in the appeal is language in the policy titled the
Combined Directors and Officers Liability and Company Liability
(including Employment Practices Liability), Errors and Omissions
Liability, Pension Trust Liability, and Mortgagee Errors and
Omissions Insurance Policy, No. 823/FD0001142 that certain of the
Defendant Insurers issued to General Motors Corporation.  The other
Defendant Insurers also issued excess policies that mirror the
Primary Policy with respect to the Primary Policy's insurance
clause, the relevant coverage exclusions under another clause
("Clause III.C."), and the definitions in the Policies.  The
Policies cover claims made against General Motors Corporation or
its subsidiaries between Dec. 15, 2000 and Dec. 15, 2003.  One of
those subsidiaries is Residential Funding Co., LLC ("RFC"), which
filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in May
2012.

Between 2000 and 2003, during the policy years at issue and before
the bankruptcy filing, RFC was named as a defendant in numerous
class action lawsuits.  The lawsuits arose out of RFC's business of
purchasing closed mortgage loans on the secondary market and then
securitizing those loans to sell to investors.  The plaintiffs in
those actions were borrowers who claimed that various state and
federal lending laws were violated in the origination of their
second mortgage loans by virtue of fees that they paid to the
originating banks and that RFC was liable for those violations.
RFC timely sought coverage under the Policies for liability as well
as for defense costs.

Prior to RFC's Chapter 11 filing, RFC paid $15.6 million in
compensatory damages and related attorneys' fees to one set of the
class action plaintiffs ("Mitchell Plaintiffs") and reached a
settlement on the remaining punitive damages claim for $14.5
million.  RFC had not paid any portion of the Mitchell Settlement
prior to its Chapter 11 filing.

During the bankruptcy proceedings, in November 2013, RFC reached a
settlement with a second set of plaintiffs ("Kessler Plaintiffs"),
which provided those plaintiffs with a $300 million allowed claim
against RFC's bankruptcy estate.  As part of the Kessler
Settlement, RFC's rights under the applicable insurance policies
issued to RFC by the Defendant Insurers were assigned to the
Kessler Plaintiffs and to a liquidating trust for the purpose of
liquidating and distributing RFC's remaining assets to its
unsecured creditors ("Liquidating Trust").

In December 2013, the Court approved a Chapter 11 plan in which it
also established ResCap Liquidating Trust as the Liquidating Trust.
It also approved the terms of the Mitchell Settlement and the
resulting allowed claim against RFC's bankruptcy estate in the
amount of $14.5 million in punitive damages, and it assigned the
Mitchell Plaintiffs the right to pursue the Defendant Insurers for
any insurance proceeds under the applicable policies to satisfy
that claim.  Additionally, the Chapter 11 Plan assigned to the
Liquidating Trust any rights of RFC to recover $6.1 million from
the Defendant Insurers in costs incurred by RFC in defense against
the Mitchell Plaintiffs, as well as RFC's rights to payment from
the Defendant Insurers for the $15.6 million in compensatory
damages paid by RFC to the Mitchell Plaintiffs prior to the
bankruptcy filing.

The adversary proceeding in the instant action grew out of the
claims by the Plaintiffs and by the Liquidating Trust under the
Policies.  The Plaintiffs seek coverage of their allowed claims
under their respective settlements as losses under the insurance
policies.  The Liquidating Trust seeks coverage for RFC's payment
of the compensatory damages to the Mitchell Plaintiffs.  The
Defendant Insurers argue that coverage for the liability was
excluded under one or both of two exclusions under Clause III.C. in
the Policies.

Pursuant to a joint stipulation in February 2018, the parties filed
cross-motions for partial summary judgment regarding whether either
or both of the exclusions precluded coverage of the Plaintiffs'
claims.  On Dec. 27, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court issued the decision
holding that neither exclusion applied to bar the Plaintiffs'
claims, and, on Jan. 14, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an
order granting the Plaintiffs' partial motions for summary judgment
and denying the Defendant Insurers' partial motion for summary
judgment.  The Bankruptcy Court did not address the dispute between
the Liquidating Trust and Defendant Insurers as to defense costs.
That dispute was not a subject of the summary judgment briefing.

On Jan. 28, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court extended the time to move
for leave to appeal until Feb. 18, 2020.  The Defendant Insurers
filed their motion on February 18.

Judge Liman holds that the appeal concerns contract interpretation
of the Policies, an issue that does not typically present a pure
"question of law" that is controlling.  While the meaning of a
contract generally is considered to be a question of law for the
court, a question of contract interpretation typically is not a
'controlling question of law' that serves as a basis for
interlocutory appeal.

The Judge also holds that the Defendant Insurers have not shown
that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.  The
papers before the Court at this stage of the proceedings do not
leave it with genuine doubt.  The Bankruptcy Court applied standard
principles of contract interpretation to the language of the
agreement between the parties and reached a result that, at first
glance, appears to be reasonable.

The Defendant Insurers also have not met their burden to
demonstrate that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.  They have
highlighted several other defenses to coverage in their bankruptcy
filings, which -- if resolved in their favor -- could obviate the
need for the Court to address the contract issues at all.  And
although there is some force to their argument that a decision
reversing the Bankruptcy Court would dismiss the Mitchell and
Kessler Plaintiffs' claims against seven of the eight Defendant
Insurers, even that reversal would not "materially advance" the
ultimate termination of the litigation because the issue of defense
costs would remain with respect to the Liquidating Trust's claims
against all the Defendant Insurers.  That issue remains hotly
disputed and, accordingly, even a resolution of the appeal in favor
of the Defendant Insurers would not result in termination of the
litigation.

For the reasons stated, Judge Liman denied the motion for leave to
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 10, 2020 Opinion & Order is
available at https://is.gd/WE2CiT from Leagle.com.


LOUISIANA: Urged to Release Juvenile Detainees Amid Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
RJ Vogt, writing for Law360, reports that of the approximately 220
young people incarcerated in Louisiana juvenile detention
facilities, only 30 have been tested for COVID-19, the deadly viral
disease that has proven especially contagious in jails and prisons
around the world.

Twenty-eight of those tested had the virus, and since April 12, no
children have been tested at all because facilities say no children
are reporting symptoms.

In May, the high rate of infections and low rate of testing among
detained Louisiana youth helped spur O'Melveny & Myers LLP
attorneys to launch a pro bono effort aimed at securing their
release, especially those already set to go home within the next
six months as well as those deemed "at-risk" based on Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention guidelines.

In a proposed class action joined by the advocacy groups Juvenile
Law Center and The Promise of Justice Initiative, the firm also
contested a decision by the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice to
postpone all furloughs, or extended stays with family, until
further notice.

One parent, identified by the initials J.P. in an affidavit, said
her son had been on furlough on March 16, when the OJJ required him
to return to one of its facilities early due to the pandemic.

Since then, J.P. said her son has received just one mask and
continues to share a dorm room with "at least eight other
children."

"My son is not provided with any educational services or other
programming," she added. "His dorm is regularly not permitted
outside for 4 to 5 days at a time. Now when they go anywhere, it is
to a dirty, poorly ventilated gym that is not cleaned between
different dorms using it and has no air flow. I am worried about
the risk of infection."

J.P. isn't the only one: Juvenile justice advocates from California
to Pennsylvania have been arguing for weeks that purportedly
"rehabilitative" juvenile detention facilities ought to prevent
contagion by discharging young people, especially at a time when
educational services have ground to a halt due to social distancing
guidelines.

"Some facilities have implemented restrictions where children are
in their dorm rooms for 23 hours per day," said Laura Aronsson, one
of the O'Melveny lawyers on the Louisiana case. "There have been
some efforts to circulate worksheets . . . but education
programming has been completely inadequate."

According to a June 24 tally by the Sentencing Project, more than
650 detained youth nationwide have tested positive for COVID-19 as
of June 24, as well as more than 770 staff.

The organization estimates that roughly 70% of incarcerated youth
are held on nonviolent offenses.

As both coronavirus cases and pressure from juvenile advocates have
mounted, some governors and state officials in states like Colorado
and Michigan have instructed detention facility administrators and
judges to consider releasing youth that pose a low public safety
risk and even halting new admissions to facilities.

As a result, the rate of young people entering detention facilities
fell by more than half over the months of March and April,
according to an Annie E. Casey Foundation survey of select
facilities.

But while admissions have slowed, that same survey found that the
rate of discharges has also slowed, dropping to below pre-COVID-19
levels in April.

"It is understandable and laudable that jurisdictions have focused
so much of their energy on keeping youth out of detention," said
Nate Balis, director of the Annie E. Casey Foundation's Juvenile
Justice Strategy Group. "The next frontiers are getting youth out
of detention more quickly and understanding and tackling the
obstacles standing in the way."

One of the obstacles has been getting information about the
goings-on inside facilities. In the Louisiana lawsuit, for example,
attorneys for the confined children have complained that OJJ has
"obstructed putative class members from contacting plaintiffs'
counsel."

And a Louisiana federal judge refused to order the youth released,
finding that the OJJ was within its right to consider "the need to
protect the youth and the community from the perils of the COVID-19
virus" as well "public safety and potential recidivism."

"The question is not whether plaintiffs can offer a better plan for
the OJJ," U.S. District Judge John W. deGravelles wrote, denying a
bid for a temporary restraining order. "The sole question is
whether plaintiffs have demonstrated that OJJ's COVID-19 response
is unconstitutional. They have not done so. OJJ's response has been
reasonable."

A spokesperson for the OJJ declined to answer questions about the
case, instead pointing to the ruling. Counsel for the detained
youth also declined to comment on the ruling or whether they will
continue to see class certification in the case.

Hours before the ruling was issued, Marsha Levick, co-founder of
the Juvenile Law Center, told Law360 that her organization's
release efforts in Pennsylvania ended in a similarly disappointing
fashion as the state's Supreme Court declined to order the
immediate release of certain juvenile offenders.

"The immediate release of juveniles detained in various facilities,
as sought by petitioners, fails to take into account the individual
circumstances of each juvenile, including any danger to them or to
others, as well as the diversity of situations present within
individual institutions and communities," the justices wrote.

The order did direct judges to review groups of juveniles who could
be safely released, and Levick noted that Pennsylvania's detained
juvenile population has dropped 20% during the pandemic.

Only approximately 3% to 5% of those sent home have been
rearrested, a recidivism rate that she said highlights how "we lock
up too many people."

"COVID is forcing us to examine whether we need to be locking kids
up to keep them safe," she said. "And what we're learning every day
is that for many of these kids, we actually can send them home."
[GN]


LYFT INC: Can Compel Arbitration in Rogers Drivers Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN ROGERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LYFT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-01938-VC (N.D. Cal.), Judge Vince
Chhabria of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California (i) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for an emergency
injunction reclassifying Lyft drivers; (ii) granted Lyft's motion
to compel the individual claims to arbitration; (iii) granted
Lyft's motion to strike the class allegations; and (iv) remanded
the remaining claim for public injunctive relief to state court
because the District Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.

In the case, three Lyft drivers have filed an emergency motion to
require Lyft to reclassify all of its drivers in California from
"independent contractor" to "employee" status, as required by
California's new law governing worker classification.  The
Plaintiffs' frustration with Lyft's steadfast refusal to comply
with the new law is understandable.  While the status of Lyft
drivers was previously uncertain, it is now clear that drivers for
companies like Lyft must be classified as employees.

But the lawsuit -- which was filed hurriedly in an attempt to
capitalize on the coronavirus pandemic -- is riddled with defects.
The fact that Lyft is ignoring an obvious legal obligation does not
permit the Court to brush those defects aside.  Nor, for that
matter, does the current health crisis.  

The Court notes that the question whether Lyft drivers qualify for
California sick pay is less of an emergency than the Plaintiffs
suggest, for at least three reasons.  First, even if drivers were
reclassified, the amount of sick pay involved would be small.
Second, if the Court ordered Lyft to reclassify its drivers
immediately, it's possible that the drivers would lose the
opportunity to obtain emergency assistance totaling thousands of
dollars from the federal government.  Third, even if the drivers
wouldn't lose federal relief upon reclassification, it is
indisputable that the small amounts of paid sick leave that would
be available to some Lyft drivers under California Labor Code
Section 246 pale in comparison to the assistance workers will be
able to get from the emergency legislation.

In short, there are no heroes in the story of the case.  But there
are several complicated legal questions, to which the ruling now
turns.  The first question is whether the Plaintiffs' individual
claims must be compelled to arbitration.  The second is whether the
Plaintiffs have waived their right to pursue claims on behalf of a
class of Lyft drivers in California.  The third involves how the
Court should handle the Plaintiffs' request for a "public
injunction."

The Plaintiffs resist Lyft's motion to compel arbitration on three
grounds.  First, they assert that the Court should sidestep the
motion to compel and proceed directly to their motion for a
preliminary injunction.  Second, they invoke the exemption in the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") for transportation workers.  And
third, they contend that their request for a public injunction is
not arbitrable even if the FAA applies to the arbitration
agreement.

On review, Judge Chhabria grants Lyft's motion to compel as to the
Plaintiffs' claims for individualized relief.  Although Lyft
requested a stay in the event arbitration is compelled, the Judge
exercises his discretion to dismiss the arbitrable claims without
prejudice.  The class allegations are stricken because the
Plaintiffs waived the right to represent a class in any forum.  And
Lyft's motion to compel the request for a public injunction to
arbitration is denied, because although the Plaintiffs purported to
waive the right to seek such relief, the waiver is invalid, and the
parties agreed that in the event the waiver is invalid, the claim
is for a court (not an arbitrator) to decide.

The Plaintiffs thus have one live claim for relief in this Court:
their request for a public injunction based on Lyft's denial of
paid sick leave.  The question is whether they have standing in
federal court to seek such relief.  The Plaintiffs clearly would
have standing to assert claims for paid sick leave premised on
their own injuries, had they not agreed to arbitrate their
entitlement to individualized relief.  And they clearly would have
standing to assert claims for sick leave on behalf of a class of
Lyft drivers, had they not waived the right to seek class relief.
Yet they must demonstrate standing separately for each form of
relief sought.  Given the decision on Lyft's motion to compel
arbitration and the contract's remedy-splitting provision, the only
remedy that the Plaintiffs can seek in the lawsuit is a public
injunction.

In light of this case's unusual posture, where the Plaintiffs
agreed to arbitrate the availability of remedies specific to their
injuries and waived the right to pursue any type of class remedy,
the question presented is whether the Plaintiffs can invoke
federal-court jurisdiction to adjudicate only a request for a
public injunction.  The answer is no.  The Court holds that the
purpose of a public injunction is not to resolve a private dispute
but to remedy a public wrong.  But the judicial power under Article
III "exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury
to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may
benefit others collaterally.  Thus, even if state law authorizes a
plaintiff to seek a public injunction on behalf of the general
public, that authorization, standing alone, does not confer
standing in federal court.

Indeed, the Plaintiffs appear to conflate the magnitude of the
public interest in a private injunction with the manner in which a
public injunction benefits the general population in equal shares
(for example, by enjoining false advertising or deceptive labeling
that could trick any member of the public).  That being said,
California case law has not drawn the brightest of lines between a
"private injunction" and a "public injunction," so remand would not
be an exercise in futility.  The state court will consider the
matter in the first instance.

Lyft's motion to compel arbitration is granted as to the
Plaintiffs' claims for individualized relief, the Court orders.
The class allegations are stricken.  The remaining claim for a
public injunction is remanded to San Francisco Superior Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/4rnZxY from Leagle.com.


MACY'S WEST: Vazquez Employment Suit Removed to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as KARLA VAZQUEZ, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. MACY'S WEST
STORES, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Case
No. 20CV365246 (Filed March 18, 2020), was removed from the
Superior Court of California for the County of Santa Clara to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on June
26, 2020.

The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:20-cv-04277 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges class claims for the Defendants' failure to
permit rest periods, failure to provide accurate itemized wage
statements, and failure to pay all wages due upon separation of
employment pursuant to the California Labor Code.

Macy's West operates department stores.[BN]

Defendant Macy's West is represented by:

          Cary G. Palmer, Esq.
          Erika Barbara Pickles, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1600
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Telephone: (916) 341-0404
          Facsimile: (916) 341-0404
          E-mail: cary.palmer@jacksonlewis.com
                  erika.pickles@jacksonlewis.com

               - and -

          Michael C. Christman, Esq.
          MACY'S LAW DEPARTMENT
          11477 Olde Cabin Road, Suite 400
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 342-6334
          Facsimile: (314) 342-6366
          E-mail: michael.christman@macys.com


MACYS WEST: Diaz Appeals Ruling in Labor Suit to Ninth Circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Yuriria Diaz filed an appeal from a court ruling issued
in her lawsuit entitled Yuriria Diaz v. Macys West Stores, Inc.,
Case No. 8:19-cv-00303-ODW-MAA, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Santa Ana.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case was
filed in the Superior Court of California and was removed to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
on February 14, 2019. The District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
19-cv-00303 to the proceeding.

Ms. Diaz seeks to recover statutory penalties under Labor Code for
the Defendant's failure to provide accurate wage statements. Macy's
cites: that the class easily exceeds the 100-member requirement
imposed by the Class Action Fairness Act; that the amount in
controversy exceeds $5,000,000; and that she and the Defendant are
citizens of different states, as basis for removal.

The appellate case is captioned as Yuriria Diaz v. Macys West
Stores, Inc., Case No. 20-55011, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant YURIRIA DIAZ, as an individual and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Armond Marced Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON LAW, APC
          2 Venture Plaza, Suite 240
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 281-6857
          E-mail: ajackson@jlaw-pc.com

Defendant-Appellee MACYS WEST STORES, INC., an Ohio corporation,
DBA Macy's, is represented by:

          Pejmon Dustin Bodaghi, Esq.
          BRAYTON PURCELL LLP
          222 Rush Landing Road
          Novato, CA 94948-6169
          Telephone: (415) 898-1555

               - and -

          Fermin H. Llaguno, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          2050 Main Street, Suite 900
          Irvine, CA 92614
          Telephone: (949) 705-3000
          E-mail: fllaguno@littler.com


MADERA GROUP: Fails to Provide Meal Periods, Mitchell Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GIOVANNI MITCHELL, as an individual and on behalf of all other
aggrieved employees v. THE MADERA GROUP LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company; TOCAYA ORGANICA, LLC, a California limited
liability company; TOCAYA MANAGEMENT LLC, a Nevada limited
liability company; TOCA MADERA WEHO LLC, a California limited
liability company; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Case No.
20STCV24075 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles Cty., June 25, 2020), seeks
civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, California
Labor Code.

The Plaintiff alleges that he was not provided all legally required
meal periods due to the Defendants' meal period policies/practices,
which routinely failed to provide him and other aggrieved employees
with legally compliant meal periods. The Plaintiff also asserts
that there are compliance issues vis-a-vis meal breaks--some are
late, missed, short, or interrupted.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as an hourly employee
from June 2018 to May 2019.

The Madera Group is a team of artist-engineers dedicated to
realizing the evolution of hospitality.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony J. Orshansky, Esq.
          Justin Kachadoorian, Esq.
          COUNSELONE, P.C.
          9301 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 650
          Beverly Hills, CA 90210
          Telephone: (310) 277-9945
          Facsimile: (424) 277-3727
          E-mail: anthony@counselonegroup.com
                  justin@counselonegroup.com


MAJOR LEAGUE: Court Refuses to Reconsider Dismissal of Olson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KRISTOPHER R. OLSON, CHRISTOPHER LOPEZ, WARREN BARBER,
CHRISTOPHER CLIFFORD, AND ERIK LIPTAK, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL; MLB ADVANCED MEDIA, L.P.; HOUSTON ASTROS, LLC; and BOSTON
RED SOX BASEBALL CLUB, L.P., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-632 (JSR)
(S.D. N.Y.), Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider the dismissal of the case with prejudice.

The case is a putative class action lawsuit brought by fantasy
sports players against Major League Baseball and MLB Advanced
Media, L.P., the Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, L.P., and the
Houston Astros, LLC.  The named Plaintiffs are five individuals who
participated in daily fantasy baseball contests hosted by
DraftKings, Inc. between 2017 and 2019.  The original complaint
asserted various claims of fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment,
and violations of consumer protection laws based on alleged
misrepresentations made by the defendants in connection with what
became something of a sign-stealing scandal.

Following the filing of a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), the
Defendants moved to dismiss all claims for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court
granted the dismissal.  Although the Court's precise reasoning
varied from claim to claim, the Court's dismissal of the FAC was
rooted in two fundamental deficiencies in the complaint.  

The Court notes that first, the Plaintiffs failed to plausibly
allege that the Defendants made any misrepresentations about
fantasy baseball itself, those being the only representations on
which the fantasy baseball players could reasonably rely or base a
claim.  Second, the Plaintiffs failed to allege a sufficient nexus
among themselves, the fantasy baseball transactions they entered,
and the Defendants to support their various theories of liability.


In addition, as relevant in the case, the Court dismissed the
unjust enrichment claim because of a lack of plausible allegations
that defendants were enriched at the Plaintiffs' expense.  Because
the Court found that these deficiencies were not curable by
anything alleged or suggested by the Plaintiffs, it dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.  The Clerk entered judgment against the
Plaintiffs on April 7, 2020.

The Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of the Court's MTD
Opinion only as to its conclusion that the complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.  Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court
to set aside the April 7 judgment and grant them leave to file a
Proposed Amended Complaint ("PAC").  The Plaintiffs argue that the
PAC cures the defects in the FAC identified by the Court.  The PAC
does so, according to the Plaintiffs, by supplementing the FAC with
new allegations drawn from various materials obtained from the
Defendants during discovery.

The Plaintiffs urge that the PAC demonstrates that the Court should
reconsider its conclusion that amendment of the FAC would be futile
because the PAC cures the deficiencies identified by the Court.
First, they argue that the PAC identifies two new
misrepresentations by defendants that plaintiffs relied on.
Second, they argue that the PAC alleges a sufficient nexus among
the Defendants, the Plaintiffs, and the fantasy baseball
transactions plaintiffs entered into to support their various
theories of liability.  Third, the Plaintiffs argue that the PAC
alleges facts sufficient to support their unjust enrichment claim.

Judge Rakoff finds that none of these arguments is persuasive, that
amendment would thus be futile, and that denying the motion for
reconsideration is warranted.  Ultimately, the PAC fails to remedy
the deficiencies that led the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs' FAC.
It thus provides no basis for reconsidering the Court's conclusion
that the FAC's deficiencies could not be cured by amendment and
that dismissal with prejudice was warranted.  In other words,
although the Judge appreciates the appropriately zealous passion
with which the Plaintiffs press their suit, in the end they do not
even make it to first base.  Accordingly, the motion for
reconsideration and for leave to amend is denied, Judge Rakoff
rules.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 5, 2020 Memorandum
Order is available at https://is.gd/nVjP8e from Leagle.com.


MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL: Harris Suit Removed to E.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as KEVIN HARRIS, individually
and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL INC., a Virginia Corporation; and DOES
1-50, inclusive, Case No. SCV0044686 (Filed April 30, 2020), was
removed the Superior Court for the State of California, County of
Placer, to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California on July 1, 2020.

The Eastern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-at-00646 to the proceeding.

The complaint asserts claims for the Defendants' failure to
accurately pay all wages earned, including overtime; failure to
authorize and permit rest periods; failure to timely pay wages owed
upon separation from employment; and failure to provide accurate
itemized wage statements in violation of the California Labor
Code.

McKesson is a medical distributor of medical supplies, durable
medical equipment, surgical supplies, and medical lab
supplies.[BN]

The Defendant McKesson Medical is represented by:

          Tanja L. Darrow, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          633 West 5th Street, 63rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213 443 4300
          Facsimile: 213 443 4299
          E-mail: Tdarrow@littler.com

               - and -

          Simerdip Khangura, Esq.
          Nathaniel H. Jenkins, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          500 Capitol Mall, Suite 2000
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Telephone: 916 830 7200
          E-mail: Skhangura@littler.com
                  Njenkins@littler.com


MDL 2591: Court Denies Recusal Bid in Syngenta MIR 162 Corn Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: SYNGENTA AG MIR 162 CORN LITIGATION. This
Document Relates To: Kellogg, et al. v. Watts Guerra, LLP, et al.,
No. 18-2408-JWL, MDL No. 2591, Case No. 14-md-2591-JWL (D. Kan.),
Judge John W. Lungstrum of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas denied the Plaintiffs' motion for recusal.

While the instant motion was pending, the Plaintiffs filed yet
another motion in which they also ask the Court to recuse and to
vacate orders.  In that motion, the Plaintiffs additionally request
a stay of proceedings in the Court during the pendency of their
latest direct appeal and their petition for mandamus to the Tenth
Circuit.  The Court declines to stay the matter and will proceed to
decide the motion.

As the Tenth Circuit has already ruled and as the Court has
repeatedly held, the Court retains jurisdiction over the matter
because the case is not yet final.  The Plaintiffs have not argued
that their mandamus petition automatically robs the Court of
jurisdiction.  Moreover, the Court concludes in its discretion that
a stay is not warranted and that the case should proceed.

As the Court has previously noted, the litigation of the case has
been delayed far too long, and any stay to allow for proceedings in
the Tenth Circuit must now come from the Circuit itself.  In
addition, the Plaintiffs rely on their new expert report in seeking
mandamus, and the Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider
that report.  Accordingly, it is appropriate for the Court to
address that report in the first instance and thus to rule on the
motion.

The Plaintiffs have now supported their request for recusal with an
expert report by Richard Painter, a law school professor, who
opines that the Court should recuse.  Prof. Painter discusses
recusal to satisfy constitutional due process and recusal under 28
U.S.C. Section 455.  He states that he does not opine on ultimate
questions of law, including whether due process requires recusal in
the case.  Prof. Painter nevertheless states in his report that the
undersigned judge's participation in the case will destroy the due
process rights of the parties.  He also opines that various bases
for mandatory recusal under Section 455 have been met.

On review, Judge Lungstrum opines that there is no basis for
recusal.  The Plaintiffs opposed transfer to the MDL, which was
their right.  They have consistently sought to return to their home
forum, which is understandable.  But, as noted, they did not raise
the question of a conflict of interest or the need for the Court to
recuse until after they had received adverse rulings.  That is
telling.  They have built an argument based on speculation and
faulty reason, bolstered by an expert report that adds little to
the analysis.  Once again, the Court finds it must deny the motion
to recuse.  The Plaintiffs' additional requests for orders to be
vacated and for a suggestion of remand to their preferred forum are
based on their arguments for recusal.  Therefore, the Judge will
deny the instant motion in its entirety.

In sum, Judge Lungstrum denied the Plaintiffs' motion for recusal
and for other relief.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://is.gd/ps09gI from Leagle.com.


MDL 2672: J. Bertolet Appeals N.D. California Ruling to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs J. Bertolet, Inc., et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit titled J. Bertolet, Inc., et al. v. Robert
Bosch, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02086-CRB, in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San
Francisco.

The lawsuit is part of the multidistrict litigation is styled as IN
RE: VOLKSWAGEN "CLEAN DIESEL" MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, Case No. 15-MD-2672-CRB (JSC).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Charles
R. Breyer of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California granted Robert Bosch GmbH and Robert Bosch, LLC's motion
to dismiss the complaint in Direct Auto, with leave to amend.

Direct Auto is a case brought against the Defendants by an
individual who planned to, but ultimately did not, open a
VW-branded dealership in Westerville, Ohio.  The case arises out of
Volkswagen's "clean diesel" emissions scandal, which the Plaintiff
alleges the Bosch Defendants participated in.

The Plaintiffs are the owners of certain Volkswagen-branded
franchise dealerships (Franchise Dealers). They contend that Bosch
conspired with Volkswagen to develop and implement the defeat
device that Volkswagen used in its clean diesel vehicles to evade
U.S. emission standards. By doing so, the Franchise Dealers allege
that Bosch participated in a racketeering enterprise in violation
of the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(c), and also
conspired to violate that statute.

The appellate case is captioned as J. Bertolet, Inc., et al. v.
Robert Bosch, LLC, et al., Case No. 20-15034, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants J. BERTOLET, INC., a Pennsylvania
corporation, DBA J. Bertolet Volkswagen; DIRECT B, LLC, a Florida
limited liability company, DBA Brandon Volkswagen; and SAI AUTO
GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, individually,
on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons and
entities, DBA Bozzani Volkswagen, are represented by:

          Steve Berman, Esq.
          Thomas Loeser, Esq.
          Jerrod C. Patterson, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN
          1301 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  toml@hbsslaw.com
                  jerrodp@hbsslaw.com

Defendants-Appellees ROBERT BOSCH, LLC, a Michigan limited
liability company; and ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, a German corporation, are
represented by:

          Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr., Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
          One Liberty Plaza
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 225-2508
          E-mail: cboccuzzi@cgsh.com

               - and -

          Matthew D. Slater, Esq.
          CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP
          2112 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20037
          Telephone: (202) 974-1930
          E-mail: mslater@cgsh.com


MDL 2924: Clark v. Amneal Suit Over Ranitidine, Consolidated
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as RENEE CLARK, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. AMNEAL
PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-05350 (Filed April 30,
2020), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida (West Palm Beach) on July 1, 2020.

The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No.
9:20-cv-81028-RLR to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Robin L. Rosenberg.

The case is a class action lawsuit regarding Amneal's manufacturing
of ranitidine-based over-the-counter and prescription medications
that allegedly contain dangerously high levels of
N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a carcinogenic and liver-damaging
impurity. Ranitidine is designed to decrease the amount of acid
created by the stomach.

The Clark case is being consolidated with MDL 2924, In re: ZANTAC
(RANITIDINE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.

The MDL was created by Order of the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation on Feb. 6 2020. These actions share
factual questions arising from allegations that ranitidine, the
active molecule in Zantac and similar heartburn medications, can
form the carcinogen NDMA, either during storage or when metabolized
in the human body.

In its 2020 Order, the MDL Panel found that the actions in this MDL
involve common questions of fact and that centralization in the
Southern District of Florida will serve the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of
this litigation. The lead case is Case No. 9:20-md-02924-RLR.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Sarah N. Westcot, Esq.
          Andrew J. Obergfell, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: swescot@bursor.com
                  aobergfell@bursor.com


MDL 2939: Court Denies Centralization of 3 Suits vs. Family Dollar
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC., ACCESS FOR
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES LITIGATION, MDL No. 2939, Judge Karen
K. Caldwell of the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
has denied the Family Dollar Stores, Inc.'s motion for
centralization of three actions into the Northern District of
Illinois.

The three actions are:

   District of Colorado
   AGARDY v. FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC., C.A. No. 1:19-03381
   
   Northern District of Illinois
   RENEAU v. FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC., C.A. No. 1:20-00938
   
   Western District of Pennsylvania
   LEWANDOWSKI v. FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC., C.A. No. 2:19-00858

Common defendant Family Dollar Stores, Inc., moves under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1407 to centralize pretrial proceedings in this litigation in
the Northern District of Illinois. The litigation consists of three
actions pending in the District of Colorado, the Northern District
of Illinois, and the Western District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs
did not file a response to the motion.

After considering the arguments of counsel, Judge Caldwell
concludes that centralization is not necessary for the convenience
of the parties and witnesses or to further the just and efficient
conduct of this litigation. The three actions are brought on behalf
of various classes of persons with qualified mobility disabilities
asserting that certain conditions inside Family Dollar stores
violate the Americans with Disabilities Act. The actions share
allegations that (1) the aisles of Family Dollar stores are blocked
or narrowed with a host of obstructions (e.g., merchandise,
merchandise displays, and stocking carts); (2) this practice is
intentional, and done for the purpose of increasing sales and
profits; and (3) the access barriers are systemic, recurring, and
reflective of defendant's marketing and store policies and
practices. Centralization thus likely would avoid a certain amount
of duplicative discovery, eliminate the possibility of conflicting
rulings on the scope of discovery and other pretrial matters, and
create some efficiencies for the parties and the judiciary. There
are, however, only three involved actions and no potential
tag-along actions. The putative classes do not appear to overlap.
Significant amount of discovery appears almost certain to be
case-specific -- i.e., directed to conditions in the Family Dollar
stores in the state or "operational area" unique to each action.
All plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel, and one law
firm is defending Family Dollar in all actions. Given these
circumstances -- only three actions, non-overlapping classes, the
likelihood of substantial case-specific discovery, and the presence
of common counsel -- the Court said it is not persuaded that formal
centralization under Section 1407 is warranted.

A full-text copy of the Court's June 2, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/0Mv419

MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT: Appeals Decision in Vedernikov FDCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Mercantile Adjustment Bureau LLC filed an appeal from a
court ruling in the lawsuit entitled Igor Vedernikov v. Mercantile
Adjustment Bureau LLC, Case No. 3-18-cv-17364, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Igor
Vedernikov filed the lawsuit on December 18, 2018. The docket of
the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit filed
pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, provides collection and accounts
receivable management services to lenders, debt purchasers, and
universities in the United States. The Company offers services in
the areas of dismissed bankruptcy, pre legal and legal, and other
collection; call center, legal and compliance, client policy and
procedures certification, skip tracing, and reminder dunning
notice, and more; confidentiality, ongoing, and other training, as
well as client services.

The appellate case is captioned as Igor Vedernikov v. Mercantile
Adjustment Bureau LLC, Case No. 20-1003, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee IGOR VEDERNIKOV, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Yaakov Saks, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Telephone: (201) 282-6500
          E-mail: ysaks@steinsakslegal.com

Defendant-Appellant MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU LLC is represented
by:

          Andrew J. Blady, Esq.
          Michael T. Sweeney, Esq.
          SESSIONS FISHMAN NATHAN & ISRAEL
          3682 Green Ridge Road
          Furlong, PA 18925
          Telephone: (267) 544-0840
          E-mail: ablady@sessions.legal
                  msweeney@sessions.legal


MERCEDES-BENZ: Faces Class Action Over Shattering Sunroofs
----------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a
Mercedes-Benz sunroof class action lawsuit alleges the automaker
should pay $200 million, plus court costs and attorney fees, for
selling vehicles with shattering sunroofs.

The plaintiff says he owns a 2015 Mercedes-Benz ML350 which was
being driven by his sister in March 2020 when the sunroof suddenly
exploded.

The class action alleges the incident occurred while driving 55 mph
on a highway in clear and sunny weather. The plaintiff says his
sister heard something like a shotgun blast which caused her to
pull over to check the outside of the vehicle.

The driver didn't find any external damage to the vehicle, but when
she entered the Mercedes, glass allegedly fell onto her as the
sunroof caved in.

The class action alleges large panoramic sunroofs require exact
engineering as well as precise strengthening and attachment of the
glass. Mercedes has allegedly failed to meet the required standards
according to owners who claim the sunroofs cracked, shattered or
exploded.

Customers say they are terrified when the sunroofs explode and
glass showers vehicle occupants. Mercedes drivers also say they
were dangerously distracted when the sunroofs exploded, yet
Mercedes-Benz allegedly refuses to recall the vehicles.

In addition, the automaker allegedly fails to warn customers about
the sunroof glass, and when customers complain, Mercedes allegedly
offers $250 to $500 as good faith gestures as long as the customers
agree not to sue.

According to the class action lawsuit, replacing the panoramic
sunroof can cost up to $2,000, but the plaintiff claims he was
quoted a price of $9,000 to replace his Mercedes sunroof.

According to the plaintiff, he purchased the Mercedes-Benz because
he relied on marketing which represented the safety of the
vehicle.

Mercedes allegedly should have known about the exploding sunroofs
because of complaints from vehicle owners who described their shock
of a large explosion followed by falling pieces of glass.

Mercedes-Benz continues to market and sell vehicles with allegedly
defective sunroofs, concealing the dangers from customers and
potential customers.

The Mercedes sunroof class action lawsuit includes all "persons in
the United States of America who purchased one or more of
Defendants' vehicles anytime between 2010 and the present."

In addition, glass manufacturer Saint-Gobain Sekurit is also named
as a defendant.

The Mercedes sunroof class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division: Pickens, et al., v. Daimler AG, et al.

The plaintiff is represented by the Washington Law Offices, P.C.,
of Chicago. [GN]


MIDLAND FUNDING: Lerner Suit Over FDCPA Breach Removed to D.N.J.
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as SVETLANA LERNER, on behalf of
herself and those similarly situated v. MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, and
MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Case No. ESX-L-3655-20, was
removed from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex County, to the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on June 26,
2020.

The District of New Jersey Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-07838 to the proceeding.

The complaint alleges that Midland violated the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Midland Funding is one of the nation's largest buyers of unpaid
debt.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Han Sheng Beh, Esq.
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: 212-471-6200
          Facsimile: 212-935-1166


MIKE BLOOMBERG: Scott Suit Removed to Southern District of Texas
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as TRACY YVETTE SCOTT,
(Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated) v.
MIKE BLOOMBERG 2020, INC., Case No. 2020-30649, was removed from
the Texas District Court, Harris County, to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas (Houston) on June 26, 2020.

The Southern District of Texas Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:20-cv-02261 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages. She alleges that she has
"been damaged by loss of employment, loss of income, loss of
healthcare and expenses incurred to move forward without
employment."

The 2020 presidential campaign of Michael Bloomberg, a businessman
and former mayor of New York City, began when he filed a statement
of candidacy with the Federal Election Commission for the office of
President of the United States as a member of the Democratic Party
on November 21, 2019. His principal campaign committee was called
"Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Carrol G. Robinson, Esq.
          Nekketta M. Archie, Esq.
          ROBINSON LAW GROUP, PLLC
          4203 Yoakum Blvd., Suite 310
          Houston, TX 77006
          Telephone: 713-526-2900
          Facsimile: (713) 526-2902
          E-mail: info@rlglawpllc.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Greg W. Curry, Esq.
          THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP
          One Arts Plaza
          1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500
          Dallas, TX 75201
          Telephone: (214) 969-1700
          Facsimile: (214) 969-1751
          E-mail: Greg.Curry@tklaw.com

               - and -

          Rex VanMiddlesworth, Esq.
          J. Meghan Nylin McCaig, Esq.
          Emily W. Miller, Esq.
          THOMPSON & KNIGHT LLP
          98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1900
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 404-6701
          Facsimile: (512) 482-5087
          E-mail: Rex.Vanm@tklaw.com
                  Emily.Miller@tklaw.com


MISSISSIPPI: Dockery Appeals Ruling in Prisoners Suit to 5th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Jermaine Dockery, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling in the lawsuit entitled Jermaine Dockery, et al. v. Pelicia
Hall, Commissioner, et al., Case No. 3:13-CV-326, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson.

Pelicia Hall is the former commissioner of the Mississippi
Corrections Department.

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of prisoners confined at the East
Mississippi Correctional Facility ("EMCF") in Meridian,
Mississippi, which is designed to provide treatment and housing for
mentally ill prisoners. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that
the conditions at EMCF under which they are confined violate their
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, and they seek to redress these violations under 42
U.S.C. Section 1983. The relief requested includes that Defendants
be ordered to "eliminate the substantial risks of serious harm"
that have allegedly resulted from, inter alia, inadequate medical
and mental health care, unsanitary environmental conditions, the
use of excessive force by EMCF personnel, and the use of isolated
confinement.

The appellate case is captioned as Jermaine Dockery, et al. v.
Pelicia Hall, Commissioner, et al., Case No. 20-60086, in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants JERMAINE DOCKERY, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situate; JEFFREY COVINGTON, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated; JOSEPH OSBORNE, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; PHILLIP
FREDENBURG, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated; JOHN BARRETT, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated; DERRICK HAYES, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated; ALVIN LUCKETT, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated; and JAMES VANN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Mark Putnam Gimbel, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING, L.L.P.
          The New York Times Building
          620 8th Avenue
          New York, NY 10018-1405
          Telephone: (212) 841-1161
          E-mail: mgimbel@cov.com

               - and -

          Paloma Wu, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Avenue
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (601) 948-8882
          E-mail: pwu@aclu-ms.org

Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellants MICHAEL COMBS, EDDIE PUGH, DERRICK
LANE, TAVARES FLAGGS, and HENRY MOORE are represented by:

          Mark Putnam Gimbel, Esq.
          COVINGTON & BURLING, L.L.P.
          The New York Times Building
          620 8th Avenue
          New York, NY 10018-1405
          Telephone: (212) 841-1161
          E-mail: mgimbel@cov.com

               - and -

          Paloma Wu, Esq.
          SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER
          400 Washington Avenue
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Telephone: (601) 948-8882
          E-mail: pwu@aclu-ms.org

Defendants-Appellees PELICIA HALL, COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, in her official capacity as Commissioner
of the Mississippi Department of Corrections; ARCHIE LONGLEY, in
his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner for Institutions of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections; and GLORIA PERRY, in her
official capacity as Chief Medical Officer for the Mississippi
Department of Corrections, are represented by:

          Gary Erwin Friedman, Esq.
          Nicholas Francis Morisani, Esq.
          PHELPS DUNBAR, L.L.P.
          4270 I-55, N.
          Jackson, MS 39211-6391
          Telephone: (601) 352-2300
          E-mail: gary.friedman@phelps.com
                  nick.morisani@phelps.com


MISSOURI: $3.25M Attorneys' Fees Awarded in M.B. Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, M.B., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jennifer Tidball, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 2:17-cv-4102-NKL (W.D. Mo.), Judge Nanette K.
Laughrey of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, Central Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiffs' motion for fees.

On June 12, 2017, the Plaintiffs, by their Next Friends and through
the counsel, commenced the action -- which they say is the first of
its kind -- against the Director of the Children's Division ("CD")
of the Department of Social Services ("DSS") and the Acting
Director of the Department of Social Services, each in their
official capacities.   The class action was brought on behalf of
children in foster care who alleged that the Defendants had failed
to implement a system of safeguards and oversight with respect to
the administration of psychotropic drugs to children in their
custody.

The complaint was over 45 pages in length.  As amended on July 3,
2017, the complaint alleged substantive and procedural due process
violations and sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding
at least three alleged deficiencies in the Defendants' policies,
procedures, practices, and customs with respect to the
administration of psychotropic drugs: (1) failure to maintain, and
to furnish to caregivers and prescribing physicians, up-to-date
medical records detailing each child's physical and mental health
history; (2) failure to ensure informed consent to the
administration of psychotropic medication, both at the outset and
as treatment continues; and (3) failure to ensure secondary review
of all outlier prescriptions by a qualified, independent child
psychiatrist.

The Court certified a class consisting of all children in
Children's Division foster care custody who presently are, or in
the future will be, prescribed or administered one or more
psychotropic medications while in state care.

Before dispositive motions were filed, however, the parties engaged
in extensive mediation and ultimately reached an agreement settling
the case.  The settlement agreement includes specific "Commitments"
by the state agencies with regard to training, monitoring,
maintenance of medical records, review, informed consent,
oversight, and enforcement.

The Plaintiffs' counsel, consisting of attorneys from various
non-profit organizations and one major law firm, have moved for an
award of $3,894,975.22 in fees (for 11,417.6 hours of work) and
$132,907.56 in expenses.  The Plaintiffs' attorneys' work involved
not only investigations and research undertaken before the case was
filed, but also motion practice -- some of which was peculiarly
necessitated by the Defendants' decisions to move to dismiss the
case, to appeal the Court's class certification decision, and to
seek to stay the litigation in the Court pending resolution of
their appeal from the class certification decision, as well as more
minor matters such as oppositions to motions for appointment of
Next Friends for the minor children and the voluntary withdrawal of
a Named Plaintiff, as well as the filing of a discovery motion
aimed at procuring private therapy notes for a child that the Court
found were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.  No
less important was the work the Plaintiffs undertook to reach a
comprehensive settlement with respect to complicated issues
surrounding the administration of psychotropic drugs to children in
Missouri's foster care system.

The Defendants argue that the amount of the fees and expenses that
the Plaintiffs seek is unreasonable.  

Judge Laughrey turns to the issue of reasonableness.  To determine
whether the fees that the Plaintiffs seek are reasonable, the Judge
must determine (1) a reasonable rate for the attorneys' time and
(2) the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.

The Plaintiffs seek rates between $400 and $500 per hour for their
most senior litigators, rates between $225 and $375 per hour for
associates and staff attorneys, and the rate of $150 per hour for
paralegals.  The Defendants seek to cap the attorney rates at $382
per hour and to reduce the other rates correspondingly.

Judge Laughrey holds that the Defendants' argument for application
of the average rate as a ceiling is contrary to the law on the
subject.  The Judge therefore will not cap rates at the "average"
Missouri rate, but will consider each attorney's rate in light of
his or her experience and Missouri fees for civil rights and class
action litigation.

In light of the uniquely technical and complex issues involving
science, policy and governance, civil rights law, and class action
lawsuits that the case involved, it was not only reasonable, but
appropriate for the Plaintiffs to utilize the counsel with
specialized experience and knowledge in these areas, and it
therefore is appropriate for that the counsel to be compensated in
accordance with the value they brought to the case.  The counsel
without adequate resources, expertise, and experience would not
have been able to reach the comprehensive settlement that the
Plaintiffs' counsel reached -- a settlement that will improve the
processes by which children in foster care are administered
psychotropic drugs, reducing the risk of inappropriate and
excessive medication.  Thus, although the Court's rulings regarding
rates will be in keeping with Missouri rates, they will take into
account any unique experience, knowledge, or specialization that a
given attorney brought to bear on the case.

The following are the Court's rulings concerning the hourly rates
for each biller: (i)Samantha Bartosz - $500; (ii) Bill Grimm -
$500; (iii) Scott T. Schutte - $475; (iv) Leecia Welch - $450; (v)
John Ammann - $400; (vi) Elizabeth Gretter - $350; (vii) Poonam
Juneja - $350; (viii) Stephanie Schuster - $325; (ix) Stephen Dixon
- $300; (x) Aaron Finch - $300; (xi) Catherine Frizell - $300:
(xii) Jonathan King - $300; (xiii) Daniele Gerard - $300; (xiv)
Danielle Rosenthal - $300; (xv) Freya Pitts - $300; (xvi) Courtney
J. McCormick 2010 - $275; (xvii) Ning He - $250; (xviii) Erin
McGuinness - $225; (xix) Amanda Grill - $200; (xx) Jacqueline
Stolzenberg - $200; (xxi) Genevieve Caffrey Paralegal - $150;
(xxii) Hailey Cherepon Paralegal - $150; (xxiii) Meghan Kacsmar
Paralegal - $150 $150; and (xxiv) Kira Setren Paralegal - $150.

Because of these inefficiencies inherent in cases that are staffed
by multiple attorneys from multiple organizations -- inefficiencies
reflected in the time entries -- the Court applies a 10% reduction
to the hours (outside of time spent traveling) of the attorneys
alone.  Also, several of Mr. Dixon's time entries are vague.
Accordingly, Judge Laughrey reduces Attorney Dixon's hours by 25%.
In light of the fact that the Plaintiffs have already halved their
bill rate for travel time, and their consultant has reduced the
number of travel-related hours for which they seek compensation,
Judge Laughrey finds that no additional reduction in travel time is
warranted.  In light of the vagueness in some descriptions of the
subjects of the stakeholder communications, the Judge reduces the
attorneys' hours, outside of travel time, by an additional 5%.

Next, Judge Laughrey finds that the fee produced through the
lodestar calculation is fair.  The case was both important and
complicated, in terms of the facts and associated sensitivities,
the science and associated complexities, and the law.  The
Plaintiffs who have "won excellent results," as they have done, are
entitled to a fully compensatory fee award.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' counsel seeks $132,907.56 in expenses.
This figure was reduced by $98,518.04 -- 42.6% -- following review
by Sterling Analytics.  Having reviewed the itemized lists of
expenses submitted by the Plaintiffs' counsel, Judge Laughrey sees
no reason for disallowing any expense.

For the reasons noted, Judge Laughrey granted in part and denied in
part the motion for fees and expenses.  The Court awarded to the
Plaintiffs' counsel a total of $3,253,651.25 in fees and
$132,907.56 in expenses.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/D8r0Zc from Leagle.com.


MONEYMUTUAL LLC: Bid to Modify Payment Sched of Rilley Deal Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Scott Rilley, Michelle Kunza, Venus
Colquitt-Montgomery, Jonathon Aldrich, and Kendra Buettner,
individually and on behalf of the class, Plaintiffs, v.
MoneyMutual, LLC, Selling Source, LLC, and PartnerWeekly, LLC,
Defendants, Civil No. 16-4001 (DWF/LIB) (D. Minn.), Judge Donovan
W. Frank of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
denied the Defendants' Motion to Modify the Settlement Agreement
pursuant to their desired payment schedule.

On Nov. 11, 2019, the Parties finalized a Settlement Agreement,
providing for the settlement of the case on a class action basis.
The Settlement Agreement provides payment of $2 million plus
injunctive relief.  It also specifies that payment of the $2
million will be made within seven days of the Effective Date of the
Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Agreement further provides
that except as otherwise stated therein, each substantive term of
the Agreement is a material term that the Parties have relied upon
in making the Agreement.

The Plaintiffs filed an unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval
of Class Action Settlement on Nov. 12, 2019.  On Dec. 2, 2019, the
Court held a hearing on the Preliminary Approval and entered an
Order granting the Preliminary Approval the following day.  The
Notice was then sent to the Class and no objections were filed.

The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Approval of Final Settlement on
March 13, 2020.  The Court held a Fairness Hearing on April 2,
2020, during which the Court found that the Settlement Agreement
was fair, reasonable and adequate, and approved it in all respects.
Notwithstanding, it delayed entering a Final Order approving the
Settlement Agreement because the Defendants requested additional
time to pay the Settlement Agreement funds.  The Court encouraged
the Parties to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with respect
to a payment schedule and directed the Parties to notify the Court
whether there was an agreement by April 6.  In the event that the
Parties could not agree, the Court directed each Party to submit a
proposal by April 7.  The Parties did not reach an agreement.  The
Defendants now move to Modify the Settlement Agreement pursuant to
their desired payment schedule.

The Defendants contend that their Proposal does not amend the
material terms of the Settlement Agreement, but merely extends the
time period for them to fund the settlement as a result of changed,
and unforeseen, circumstances affecting their financial condition.
They argue that a court may impose conditions upon a grant of final
approval if, absent the conditions, the settlement would fail to
satisfy the court's approval analysis.  Therefore, the Defendants
ask the Court to impose an extension of time to fund the Settlement
Agreement as a condition of final approval so that they can avoid
bankruptcy and fully fund the Settlement Agreement.

The Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny the Defendants' motion and
grant the Final Approval pursuant to the terms set forth in the
Settlement Agreement.  They assert that the Defendants' Proposal
does alter the material terms of the Settlement Agreement because
timing of payment, clearly set forth in the Settlement Agreement,
is not designated as "non-material."  Accordingly, they argue that
the Court lacks the authority to provide the relief that the
Defendants request.

Judge Frank agrees.  The Plaintiffs do not agree to the Proposal;
therefore, he must approve the Final Order as is.  The Court found
the Settlement Agreement fair, reasonable, and adequate at the
April 2, 2020 Fairness Hearing.  Therefore, the Judge may no longer
impose conditions.  Accordingly, the Judge must deny the
Defendants' Motion and issue a Final Order approving the Settlement
Agreement as is.

Notwithstanding, Judge Frank strongly encourages the Parties to
continue to negotiate and to resolve the issue.  With a very
limited basis to appeal, it truly benefits no one to prolong this
matter.  The Court hopes that during this time of global crisis,
the Parties may work together to find common ground and to reach an
agreement that respects the Defendants' financial concerns while
honoring the commitments agreed to in the Settlement Agreement.

In sum, Judge Frank denied the Defendants' Motion to Modify
Settlement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/hm5zNy from Leagle.com.


MONSANTO: City of Berkeley to Receive $1MM in PCB Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
Alexandra Feldman, writing for The Daily Californian, reports that
the city of Berkeley will receive at least $1 million to mitigate
polychlorinated biphenyl, or PCB, contamination of water sources
from a recent settlement with multinational agrochemical company
Monsanto, as first reported by Berkeleyside.

Berkeley was among a group of 13 cities and counties that filed a
class action complaint against Monsanto. The action resulted in a
$550 million settlement, announced on June 24, aimed at
compensating affected areas for the cost of managing contamination
of water and sediment caused by PCBs. The settlement will be paid
by the international pharmaceutical company Bayer, which acquired
Monsanto in 2018.

Before they were banned in the United States in 1979, PCBs were
common industrial compounds used internationally. PCBs have been
shown to cause health problems in the immune, nervous and
reproductive systems of humans, as well as cancer in animals,
according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Monsanto, the sole manufacturer of PCBs in the United States, sold
the compounds legally between 1935 and 1977, but a series of
lawsuits alleged that the company knew PCBs were hazardous to
public health and the environment.

According to City Attorney Farimah Brown, the class action
settlement was reached after five years of "contentious" litigation
between the plaintiffs and Monsanto. More than a dozen lawsuits
have been filed against Monsanto since 2015 seeking cost recovery
for stormwater and environmental contamination caused by PCBs,
Brown added.

According to Brown, the settlement will be distributed to 2,528
cities, counties and other districts following court approval.

"Berkeley is one of the relatively small number of jurisdictions
that actively pursued claims against Monsanto, and those entities
have now negotiated a settlement that will have a nationwide
benefit," Brown said in an email.

Many bodies of water nationwide, including San Francisco Bay, have
been contaminated due to discharges of PCBs, according to Brown.
Because Berkeley operates a municipal separate storm sewer system
that releases in San Francisco Bay, Brown said in the email,
Berkeley became involved in the litigation against Monsanto.

The City Council will determine how to use the funds from the
settlement, Brown added.

"The San Francisco Bay is a precious regional resource and Berkeley
has been at the forefront of the national movement to protect our
waterways," said Berkeley Mayor Jesse Arreguín in a press release.
"We are proud to lead efforts to protect it, yet again, and to
protect waters throughout the state and nation."

The resolution of this class action settlement was one of a series
of agreements over Monsanto litigation that Bayer recently
completed, resulting in total settlement payments of more than $10
billion, according to a Bayer press release. These agreements do
not admit liability or wrongdoing, the press release adds.

Bayer has also entered into separate agreements with Washington,
New Mexico and Washington, D.C., regarding similar PCB claims,
which will result in settlements totaling about $170 million,
according to the press release. [GN]


MONTANA UNIV.: Partial Denial of Attorneys Fees in Gendron Upheld
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WHITNEY ERIN GENDRON, individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MONTANA
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, and JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 101-150, Defendants and Appellees, Case No. DA 19-0115
(Mont.), Judge James Jeremiah Shea of the Supreme Court of Montana
affirmed the Jan. 25, 2019 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order Re Attorneys' Fees of the Eighteenth Judicial District
Court, Gallatin County, partially denying Gendron's motion for
attorney fees.

In October 2009, Gendron filed individual and class action claims
against her employer, Montana University System ("MUS"), based on
violations of certain provisions of Montana's insurance law
relating to benefits claims she requested under the MUS group
health plan following an automobile collision.

In November 2016, the parties reached a partial settlement wherein
MUS agreed to pay class members for certain insurance claims
withheld and modify its policy language.  The parties then filed a
joint motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, class
certification, and appointment of class counsel.  On March 24,
2017, the District Court granted the motion and appointed Gendron
the Class Representative and her attorneys as the Class Counsel.
The District Court's order further provided, the Class Counsel are
entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, over
and above, and separate from, the amount paid to the Class
Members.

On Jan. 4, 2018, the District Court gave its final approval of the
settlement.  The parties were unable to agree to a total attorney
fees and costs award.  The District Court held an evidentiary
hearing over the course of three different days to determine the
amount of the award.  At the hearing, the Class Counsel stated they
took Gendron's case on a contingency fee basis and requested the
District Court calculate a fee award based on 332153% of the
estimated aggregate settlement value of $10,842,000, for a total
fee award of $3,610,386.  

The Class Counsel alternatively requested the District Court award
fees based on hourly rates of $350 and $400, respectively, with
application of a multiplier of 4.22 to account for the additional
responsibility and risk of taking on a class action, for a total
fee award of $3,108,013.12.  The Class Counsel admitted they both
retrospectively created their time records because they took
Gendron's case on a contingency fee basis and typically do not keep
contemporaneous time records for such cases.

On Jan. 25, 2019, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Re: Attorneys' Fees, declining to
award Class Counsel their requested fees under a percentage-based
calculation.  It reasoned that the relief obtained by Gendron and
other class members was primarily "injunctive in nature" and
therefore could not be "easily monetized" or "estimated with
reasonable certainty," nor did the parties agree on a total
settlement value.  

The District Court instead calculated the Class Counsel's fee award
by multiplying the hours worked on the case by hourly rates of $275
and $375, respectively, finding those rates to be customary of
other attorneys in the area.  The District Court did not apply a
multiplier to the calculation, concluding it would have increased
each Class Counsel's hourly rate to over a thousand dollars an
hour. It also reduced the Class Counsels' claimed hours not
contemporaneously recorded by 20%, resulting in a total fee award
of $511,463.40.  As added support for its analysis, the District
Court cross-checked its fee against a percentage of the actual
class member payout as of October 2018, $1,219,672.76, which would
have resulted in a lower fee award of $406,557.55.  It directed MUS
to pay Gendron's fees and costs within 30 days of the order.

On Feb. 22, 2019, Gendron filed her notice of appeal of the
District Court's attorney fee award.  Pending appeal, MUS tendered
full payment of the attorney fee award to the Class Counsel, but
the latter refused to accept the funds.  MUS then moved the
District Court to deposit the funds with the Clerk of District
Court or in a trust account, and requested a ruling that it would
not have to pay interest on the attorney fee judgment because the
Class Counsel refused to accept the funds.  The Class Counsel
subsequently moved to stay execution of the judgment.

On May 17, 2019, the District Court granted the Class Counsel's
motion to stay, but it declined to rule whether interest would
accrue on the judgment and ordered MUS to hold the funds pending
resolution of the case on appeal, stating that pursuant to Rule
19(4), the Court does not have authority to deny interest on the
judgment as requested by MUS.  The issue should be raised with the
Montana Supreme Court.

The Appellate Court addresses the following issues on appeal: (i)
Issue One: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in its
determination of whether the attorney fees awarded to Class Counsel
were reasonable? and (ii) Issue Two: Is Gendron entitled to
interest accrued on the award of attorney fees?

On the first issue, the Appellate Court holds that the District
Court held a hearing and expert testimony was presented from both
sides. The District Court issued a detailed order determining the
lodestar method was the most appropriate calculation under the
circumstances of the case, particularly given the structure of the
settlement and the lack of a traditional common fund from which the
Class Counsel could be awarded a percentage.  In setting the Class
Counsel's hourly rate, the District Court cited both Stimac and
Talcott and applied several of the reasonableness factors to find
the customary rate for similar attorneys in the area was much less
than what the Class Counsel requested.

The District Court also considered adjusting the fee award upward
using the 4.22 multiplier as requested by the Class Counsel, but
ultimately rejected it, finding it would have significantly
increased the Class Counsel's hourly rate.  It then reduced the
number of Class Counsel's claimed hours by 20% for those hours not
contemporaneously recorded, finding counsel's approximation of that
time years later to be incredible and inflated.  It then
cross-checked its lodestar calculation against the percentage-based
calculation to further support its fee amount.  The District
Court's calculation was supported by an adequate rationale at every
step, and Gendron has failed to show the District Court's decision
was arbitrary, decided without employment of conscientious
judgment, or in excess of the bounds of reason under the
circumstances.

On the second issue, MUS argues that Gendron should not be awarded
interest on the attorney fee award because MUS attempted to pay
Gendron the award within 30 days as required by the District
Court's order, but it was prevented from making the payment because
the Class Counsel refused to accept the funds and the District
Court ordered MUS to hold the funds pending resolution of the case
on appeal.

The Appellate Court holds that aside from urging them to apply a
statute that they have previously determined to be inapposite to
post-judgment interest, MUS has not substantively argued for an
exception to the established case law regarding the right to
post-judgment interest.  Therefore, the Appellate Court concludes
that Gendron is entitled to post-judgment interest in the case.

Bases on the foregoing, the Appellate Court concludes that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of
whether the attorney fees awarded to the Class Counsel were
reasonable.  MUS' reliance on Section 27-1-211, MCA, as a basis for
opposing interest on the attorney fee award is misplaced.  Gendron
is entitled to interest in accordance with Section 25-9-205, MCA.
The Appellate Court remanded the case to the District Court for a
determination as to the interest to which Gendron is entitled.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's April 7, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/rCcDxz from Leagle.com.

Hillary P. Carls, Blackford Carls, P.C., Bozeman, Montana, Erik B.
Thueson, Thueson Law Office, Helena, Montana, Mark J. Luebeck,
Angel, Coil & Bartlett, Bozeman, Montana, for Appellants.

Robert C. Lukes -- rclukes@GARLINGTON.COM -- J. Andrew Person --
japerson@GARLINGTON.COM -- Garlington Lohn & Robinson, PLLP,
Missoula, Montana, for Appellee.

John C. Heenan, Heenan & Cook, Billings, Montana, for Amicus
Montana Trial Lawyers Association.

Matthew B. Hayhurst -- mhayhurst@boonekarlberg.com -- Randy J.
Tanner, Boone Karlberg P.C., Missoula, Montana, for Amicus Montana
Defense Trial Lawyers.


MURPHY OIL: Taylor Appeals Decision in Fraud Suit to 8th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff John Taylor filed an appeal from a Court ruling issued in
his lawsuit entitled John Taylor v. Murphy Oil, USA, Case No.
4:19-cv-01705-RWS, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri, St. Louis.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case was
transferred from the Circuit Court for St. Louis County, Missouri,
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on
June 14, 2019. This fraud-related lawsuit is assigned to Magistrate
Judge Nannette A. Baker. The District Court has now assigned Case
No. 4:19-cv-01705-NAB to the proceeding.

Headquartered in El Dorado, Arkansas, Murphy Oil Corporation is a
global oil exploration and production company. The Firm produces
oil and/or natural gas in the United States, Canada, and Malaysia
and conducts exploration activities worldwide.

The appellate case is captioned as John Taylor v. Murphy Oil, USA,
Case No. 20-1199, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant John Taylor, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Robert Schultz, Esq.
          SCHULTZ & ASSOCIATES
          640 Cepi Drive, Suite A
          Chesterfield, MO 63005-1221
          Telephone: (636) 537-4645
          E-mail: rschultz@sl-lawyers.com

Defendant-Appellee Murphy Oil USA, Inc., is represented by:

          Brandon Alan Black, Esq.
          Christopher A. Smith, Esq.
          HUSCH BLACKWELL LLP
          190 Carondelet Plaza, Suite 600
          Saint Louis, MO 63105-3441
          Telephone: (314) 480-1500
          E-mail: Brandon.Black@huschblackwell.com
                  chris.smith@huschblackwell.com


MYLAN NV: Levi & Korsinsky Notes of Aug. 25 Plaintiff Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, notified that all persons or entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired securities of Mylan N.V. (NASDAQ:
MYL) between February 16, 2016 and May 7, 2019, that a securities
class action lawsuit has been commenced in the the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. To get
more information go to:

https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/mylan-n-v-loss-submission-form?prid=7726&wire=5

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500. There is
no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
issued materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: 1) the Food and Drug Administration's
investigation into the Company's manufacturing plant in Morgantown,
West Virginia was the result of whistleblower allegations, and not,
as Mylan insinuated, the result of a "regular" inspection; and 2)
defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing that, as a result
of Mylan's continued efforts to remain uncooperative with the Food
and Drug Administration, the Morgantown plant would continue to
incur substantial setbacks.

If you suffered a loss in Mylan you have until August 25, 2020 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability
to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders.

Contact:

         Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
         Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
         55 Broadway, 10th Floor
         New York, NY 10006
         E-mail: jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
         Tel: (212) 363-7500
         Fax: (212) 363-7171
         Web site: http://www.zlk.com/
[GN]


NEVADA: DETR Faces Class Action Over Failure to Pay Gig Workers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amy Abdelsayed, writing for KTNV, reports that Nevada's
unemployment department is reporting improved jobless numbers in
the state at the same time a class action lawsuit filed against the
department is alleging it's failing to pay approximately 60,000 gig
workers in a timely manner.

The Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, known as
DETR, released its May 2020 economic report on June 23. The report
shows the state's seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was 25.3%
in May compared to 30.1% in April.

While that seems like good news, countless people have reached out
to 13 Action News in recent weeks saying they are still unable to
receive benefits they are entitled through DETR, especially when it
comes to the federally funded Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, or
PUA, for gig workers who might not otherwise be eligible for
Unemployment Insurance.

A writ of mandamus filed in court on June 22 claims DETR is failing
its statutory obligations by not paying unemployment "when due."

Lawyers representing gig workers say an accounting issue at DETR is
to blame and are calling on the department to pay out claims now
and then collect overpayments at a later date.

The letter addressed to "putative class members--(all gig workers
still not being paid unemployment compensation even though they
have a valid claim pending with DETR)" reads in part:

This is a putative class action. You don't have to "join" in order
to be covered. Later you may or may not be given an opportunity to
opt out of the class, but for now, you don't have to do anything to
get the benefits of our litigation.

However, you can help by contacting your elective representative to
ask for help. Although it is not your responsibility to figure out
why DETR is not doing its job of paying unemployment compensation
quickly, the governor and other higher up politicians can talk to
the people at DETR who can fix this problem. DETR has a statutory
duty to pay claims "when due" which means as quickly as possible
once DETR determines the claim is not totally phony. DETR is simply
not doing its job. [GN]


NEW YORK, NY: Faces Pierre FLSA Suit Over Failure to Pay Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Burbran Pierre, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, TD BANK N.A.,
DUANE READE INC., B & H PHOTO VIDEO PRO AUDIO LLC, BLOOMBERG L.P.,
WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., TRIHOP 14TH STREET LLC, and DOES
NOS. 1-10, Case No. 1:20-cv-05116 (S.D.N.Y., July 3, 2020), alleges
that the Defendants routinely fail to pay the Plaintiff's wages, in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New York Labor Law,
and the Freelance Isn't Free Act.

Pursuant to its Paid Detail Program, the NYPD staffs Police
Officers, Detectives, Sergeants, and Lieutenants at private
businesses throughout New York City--including those owned and
operated by certain vendors--to perform off-duty uniformed security
work for hourly pay. The NYPD and the Vendors together control the
compensation and terms and conditions of employment of the
officials assigned to the Vendors' places of business.

The Plaintiff alleges that the NYPD and the Vendors engage in a
pattern and practice of failing to compensate Police Officers,
Detectives, Sergeants, and Lieutenants for the work they perform
through the Paid Detail Program, routinely failing to pay their
wages until weeks or even months after their regularly scheduled
pay days.

Further, the NYPD and TD Bank engage in a pattern and practice of
failing to pay Police Officers, Detectives, Sergeants, and
Lieutenants at all for the work they perform through the Paid
Detail Program, according to the complaint. Additionally, the
Vendors fail to provide their employees with Notices of Pay Rate
and accurate wage statements, as required by law. When the
Plaintiff complained to the NYPD regarding Defendants' late payment
and non-payment of his wages, the NYPD immediately removed him from
the Paid Detail Program.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York and has been
employed by the Defendants from July 10, 2010, through the
present.

The City of New York is a municipal corporation that controls and
oversees, inter alia, the operations of the NYPD throughout its
five boroughs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Innessa M. Huot, Esq.
          Alex J. Hartzband, Esq.
          Patrick J. Collopy, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Phone: 212-983-9330
          Facsimile: 212-983-9331
          Email: ihuot@faruqilaw.com
                 ahartzband@faruqilaw.com
                 pcollopy@faruqilaw.com


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 17 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed 17 appeals from the District Court's rulings
in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
Case No. 96-cv-8414, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate cases brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit are:

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4224;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4226;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4225;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4229;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4230;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4247;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4248;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 19-4259;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-98;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-100;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-105;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-151;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-153;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-162;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-108;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-134; and

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-122.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Sonia Valdez, Jason Murray, Herve Manigat,
Reyna Molina, Jena Ferguson, Sharon Henry, Florence Obimba, Janet
Wright, Barbara Burns, Margarita Hoque, Deborah Thomas, Rosemarie
Worrie, Moises Barreto, Grecian Harrison, Milagros Garcia, Maria
Romero-Toral and Kathleen Ferdinand are represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by one or more of
these lawyers:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          Claude S. Platton, Esq.
          Devin Slack, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500
          E-mail: cplatton@law.nyc.gov
                  dslack@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 18 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed 18 appeals from the District Court's rulings
in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
Case No. 96-cv-8414, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate cases brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit are:

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-138;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-164;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-165;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-166;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-171;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-173;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-174;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-177;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-181;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-182;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-183;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-184;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-185;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-190;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-191;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-197;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-237; and

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-250.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Jose Carrasco, Melva Green, Joan
Stanley-Duvernay, Verna Reid, Maritza Nunez, Normy Vega, Maria
Tapiero, Gladys De Los Santos, Inez Haskins, Ana Abreu, Elizabeth
Morales, Doris Milerson, Gail Manwaring, Enriqueta Alvarez, Juan
Pina, Juanita Rosario, Hester Barkley and Emma Abreu-Perez

are represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by one or more of
these lawyers:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          Claude S. Platton, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500
          E-mail: cplatton@law.nyc.gov


NEW YORK: Gym Owners Mull Class Action
--------------------------------------
WRGB reports that Phase Four changes have frustrated gym owners,
and now they're taking their frustration to the state.

The governor took gyms out of the Phase Four plans, along with
malls and movie theaters.

In response, dozens of gym owners across the state are assembling
together, via social media, to file a class action lawsuit against
the state of New York for this action.

Over 200 people joined a Zoom call on June 29 to discuss the action
and assemble a plan of action moving forward.

Many of the owners believe they are being targeted by the state.

One of the organizers of this movement, say it's key to their
movement that they want to show the governor that they can handle a
safe opening.

The gyms are looking for clarification from the governor on a
number of topics. [GN]



NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal Filed v. Richardson in Gulino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from District Court's judgment
entered on May 19, 2020, in the lawsuit styled GULINO, ET AL. v.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in the
New York City public school system, alleged that Defendant, the
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq., by requiring Plaintiffs to pass certain
racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a
license to teach in New York City public schools. Judge Constance
Baker Motley, to whom the case was originally assigned, certified
the plaintiff class on July 13, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

On December 5, 2012, the Court decertified the Plaintiff class to
the extent it sought damages and individualized injunctive relief
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). The class survived, however, to
the extent Plaintiffs sought relief that may be awarded under Rule
23(b)(2), including a declaratory judgment regarding liability and
classwide injunctive relief.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: New York City Board of
Education, Case No. 20-320, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Jermaine Richardson is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          Email: joshua.sohn@dlapiper.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500


NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal v. Hicks Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from District Court's judgment
entered in the lawsuit styled GULINO, ET AL. v. THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Case
No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in the
New York City public school system, alleged that Defendant, the
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq., by requiring Plaintiffs to pass certain
racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a
license to teach in New York City public schools. Judge Constance
Baker Motley, to whom the case was originally assigned, certified
the plaintiff class on July 13, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

On December 5, 2012, the Court decertified the Plaintiff class to
the extent it sought damages and individualized injunctive relief
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). The class survived, however, to
the extent Plaintiffs sought relief that may be awarded under Rule
23(b)(2), including a declaratory judgment regarding liability and
classwide injunctive relief.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: New York City Board of
Education, Case No. 20-224, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Pamela Hicks is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          Email: joshua.sohn@dlapiper.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500


NEWELL BRANDS: Court Narrows Claims in Benson Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHELLY BENSON and LISA CAPARELLIL, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. NEWELL
BRANDS, INC. and NUK USA LLC, Defendants, Case No. 19 C 6836 (N.D.
Ill.), Judge Ronald A. Guzman of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted in part
and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and to strike under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).

It is a putative class action for consumer fraud and unjust
enrichment.  Plaintiffs Benson and Caparellil allege that
Defendants Newell and its subsidiary NUK USA, engaged in false and
misleading advertising of their NUK brand pacifiers.  Specifically,
the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants falsely represented that
their pacifiers are "orthodontic" and beneficial for dental
development and alignment; falsely represented that their pacifiers
are beneficial for the dental health of children over the age of 24
months; and failed to disclose in their advertising the material
fact that prolonged pacifier use by children over the age of 24
months significantly increases the risk of developing dental
malocclusions (misalignments).

The Plaintiffs assert claims for (1) violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (the "CFDBPA"),
on behalf of a class of persons who purchased NUK pacifiers in
Illinois and a subclass of persons who purchased the pacifiers for
use by a child 24 months or older; (2) violation of the Illinois
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the "DTPA"), on behalf of the same
Illinois class and subclass; (3) violation of the consumer-fraud
statutes of Illinois and "any state with similar" consumer-fraud
laws, on behalf of a multi-state consumer class and subclass; and
(4) "unjust enrichment/quasi-contract," on behalf of a nationwide
class and subclass.

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) and to strike the Plaintiffs' nationwide-class allegations
under Rule 12(f).

The Defendants' first argument is that the complaint must be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the
Plaintiffs fail to allege an injury in fact that confers Article
III standing.  They contend that the Plaintiffs lack standing
because they do not allege that their children experienced any
dental misalignment, much less any dental problems caused by NUK
pacifiers; that their children are at an increased risk of
developing dental misalignment as a result of using NUK pacifiers;
or that NUK pacifiers failed to eliminate or prevent teeth
misalignment in their children.

Judge Guzman holds that Benson and Caparellil allege that if they
had known of the falsity of the Defendants' claims that NUK
pacifiers are orthodontic" and beneficial (or at least not
detrimental) to their children's dental health and that the
pacifiers are safe for use in children over the age of 24 months,
they would not have purchased the pacifiers and would not have paid
a premium price.  Therefore, they have sufficiently alleged
standing.

The Defendants' next argument is that plaintiffs lack
constitutional standing to seek prospective injunctive relief,
because they fail to allege facts showing an "actual and imminent"
future injury.  The Court holds that if the Plaintiffs are aware of
the Defendants' allegedly deceptive practices in marketing the NUK
pacifiers, there is no "real and immediate" threat that the
marketing will injure them again.  The Plaintiffs therefore cannot
pursue injunctive relief.

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' DTPA claims should be
dismissed because the statute allows consumer Plaintiffs to recover
only injunctive relief, and to obtain such relief, the Plaintiffs
would have to allege facts indicating a likelihood of future
injury.  They also contend that the Plaintiffs' claim regarding the
use of the term "orthodontic" fails as a matter of law, because no
reasonable consumer would interpret that word on the pacifiers'
packaging to mean that the pacifier is capable of preventing dental
malocclusions.

The Court is not persuaded.  A reasonable consumer therefore could
interpret the Defendants' use of the term "orthodontic" to refer
not merely to the shape of the pacifier, but also as implying
positive dental-health outcomes resulting from the use of that
shape.  And, as the Plaintiffs point out, the Defendants'
interpretation does not comport with the plain meaning of the term.
"Orthodontics" is defined as the branch of dentistry concerned
with the correction and prevention of irregularities and
malocclusion of the teeth.

The Defendants' final argument is that the Plaintiffs'
unjust-enrichment claim must be dismissed because it is
"generically pled" on behalf of a nationwide class and does not
identify under which states' laws it is asserted.  But the
Plaintiffs, as Illinois citizens, do not generically plead the
claim; they invoke Illinois law.  The Defendants further contend
that to the extent the Plaintiffs seek to assert an
unjust-enrichment claim on behalf of a nationwide class, the Judge
should dismiss or strike such a claim under Rule 12(f) because the
law of unjust enrichment varies too much from state to state to be
amenable to adjudication on a nationwide basis.  The Defendants'
request is premature and therefore denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Guzman granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and to strike under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).  The Plaintiffs' claims for
injunctive relief for lack of standing, and the Plaintiffs' claims
under the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act are dismissed
without prejudice.  The remainder of the Defendants' motion is
denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/z7wbqW from
Leagle.com.


NORDSTROM INC: Partial Summary Judgment Bid Granted in Keating Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAUREEN KEATING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NORDSTROM,
INC., etal., Defendant, Case No. 3:17-cv-00030-SLG (D. Alaska),
Judge Sharon L. Gleason of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Alaska granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment.

The case is a dispute about Nordstrom's sales and advertising
practices.  In the operative Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
Keating, Christina Freitag, and Nancy Rheeston allege violations by
Nordstrom of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Alaska's
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act ("UTPA"), and
California Civil Code Sections 1750 et seq., California's Consumer
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA").  The Plaintiffs also sought class
certification for Nordstrom customers in Alaska and California
affected by Nordstrom's allegedly deceptive practices.

At issue in the current motion for summary judgment are the
Plaintiffs' "preseason sale" and "summer sale" claims.  Their
preseason sale claims arise from their allegations that Nordstrom
regularly advertises pre-season sales in which it purports to
discount the prices of fashion items, which it buys in limited
quantities and does not intend to sell at the purported full,
regular price, and/or nor does it sell such items in any
substantial quantities at the purported full value.
  
The Plaintiffs' summer sale claims are based on their contention
that Nordstrom's practices, including but not limited to the use of
serrated hang tags, are designed to misstate and/or omit
information about the prevailing market price for the goods offered
in the summer sale by omitting the price at which these items were
offered during the pre-season (by removal of the lower part of the
hang tag) and misstating the amount of the discount being offered
vis-à-vis the actual savings from the price at which substantial
quantities were sold.  The Plaintiffs' summer sale claims are
limited to those items that were on sale at the previous preseason
sale.

On April 19, 2019, Nordstrom filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the Plaintiffs' preseason and summer sales pricing
claims on three grounds: (1) that Plaintiffs Keating and Freitag
lacked standing; (2) that Nordstrom's sales practices were not
deceptive as a matter of law because the goods that the Plaintiffs
purchased on sale were sold at full price either before or after
the sale; and (3) that the Plaintiffs could not establish damages
because they had paid less than the full value of the items they
received.

On Nov. 8, 2019, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Nordstrom's motion.  First, with respect to standing, the Court
denied Nordstrom's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Freitag's
claims in light of outstanding discovery.  The Court also denied
Nordstrom's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Keating's claims
arising from her 2013 purchases, without prejudice to renew.  The
Court granted Nordstrom summary judgment on Ms. Keating's preseason
and summer sales claims pursuant to the UCL and CLRA arising from
her 2017 purchases, as those purchases were made after the filing
of the complaint; however, it denied the motion as it related to
her claims under the UTPA, where actual injury as a result of
deception is not required.  Next, the Court denied Nordstrom's
motion for summary judgment with respect to liability.  Finally, on
the issue of damages, it granted summary judgment to Nordstrom on
the Plaintiffs' claims for monetary restitution, but not on their
claims for other monetary relief under the CLRA and UTPA.

On Dec. 3, 2019, finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to file a
motion for class certification by the Oct. 31, 2019 deadline, the
Court ordered the Plaintiffs' class allegations stricken from the
complaint.

On Dec. 19, 2019, Nordstrom filed the instant motion for partial
summary judgment.  Nordstrom moves for summary judgment on the
Plaintiffs' preseason and summer sales pricing claims on two
grounds.  First, Nordstrom moves for summary judgment on Ms.
Freitag's preseason claims for lack of standing.  Second, Nordstrom
seeks summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' claims for monetary
damages in connection with their preseason sales claims under the
CLRA and UTPA.

As the Court explained in its prior order on summary judgment, the
Plaintiffs have not set forth any evidence or particularized facts
about purchases by Ms. Freitag at either a preseason or summer
sale, and therefore cannot establish that she suffered an injury
traceable to Nordstrom's allegedly unlawful conduct.  The Court
gave them an opportunity to supplement the record, but they have
not done so.  Accordingly, Judge Gleason grants Nordstrom's motion
for summary judgment as to Ms. Freitag's preseason and summer sale
claims.

Next, Nordstrom correctly notes that a plaintiff must prove actual
damages to recover monetary relief under the UTPA.  In the case,
the Plaintiffs have put forth evidence that they were damaged in
the full amount of the price they paid for their purchases.  Ms.
Keating and Ms. Rheeston declare that they would not have purchased
the items absent Nordstrom's allegedly deceptive advertising
practices, and that the items they purchased only had value to them
insofar as they were getting the deal they thought they were
getting.  

The Defendant responds that the Plaintiffs received items with real
value, pointing to the full-price sale of those items, either
before or after they purchased them.  However, accepting the
Plaintiffs' evidence as true, and drawing all justifiable
inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that Ms. Keating and Ms. Rheeston suffered an
ascertainable loss of money in connection with their preseason and
summer season purchases.  Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute
for trial on the topic, and Nordstrom's motion for summary judgment
on the Plaintiffs' remaining claims for monetary damages under the
UTPA is denied.

Judge Gleason then finds that the Plaintiffs are not representing a
class, their subjective model of damages does not present the same
challenges as it would if applied to class-wide damages.  The
Plaintiffs' full-refund model of damages corresponds with their
theory of liability, and while they may ultimately fail to prove
their damages, they have produced sufficient evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could conclude they suffered actual damages.
Thus, whether they can prove damages to a reasonable certainty on
the basis of their full-refund model is a question of fact that
should be decided at trial.  For the aforementioned reasons,
Nordstrom's motion for summary judgment on monetary damages arising
from Plaintiffs Keating's and Rheeston's preseason and summer sales
claims is denied.

Finally, Judge Gleason has reviewed the Plaintiffs' evidentiary
objections, but does not rely on the data presented in either Mr.
Ramsey's or Mr. Miller's declaration to resolve the questions of
standing and damages at issue in the motion.  Accordingly, the
Court will not further address the Plaintiffs' objections at this
time.

In sum, Judge Gleason granted in part and denied in part
Nordstrom's Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Nordstrom's Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Freitag's Preseason
and Summer Sales claims for lack of standing is granted and her
preseason and summer sales claims under the CLRA and UTPA are
dismissed with prejudice.  Nordstrom's Motion for Summary Judgment
on Ms. Keating's and Ms. Rheeston's claims for monetary damages
under the CLRA and the UTPA based on the preseason and summer sale
claims is denied.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/zz7kGo from Leagle.com.


NORTHERN CALIFORNIA: Final Hearing on Osegueda Deal Set for July 27
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSEPH OSEGUEDA, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated and/or aggrieved employees of Defendants in the
State of California, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INALLIANCE;
and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No.
2:18-cv-00835-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal.), Judge William A. Shubb of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California set the
hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion for Final Approval of the Class
Action Settlement for July 27, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 5.

The Plaintiff was directed to file his motion for Final Approval of
the Class Action Settlement and Petition for Attorney's Fees and
Costs on June 29, 2020.
  
A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/jG19xB from Leagle.com.

Joseph Osegueda, Plaintiff, represented by Graham S.P. Hollis --
ghollis@grahamhollis.com -- GrahamHollis, APC, Nicole Rachelle
Roysdon -- nroysdon@wilsonturnerkosmo.com -- GrahamHollis, APC &
Vilmarie Cordero, Graham Hollis A.P.C., 3555 Fifth Avenue, Suite
200, San Diego, CA 92103.

Northern California Inalliance, Defendant, represented by Matthew
Charles Jaime -- mjaime@mathenysears.com -- Matheny Sears Linkert
and Jaime LLP & Robert W. Sweetin -- rsweetin@mathenysears.com --
Matheny Sears Linkert & Jaime LLP.


OAPSE: Court Denies Class Certification in Littler Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Christina Littler, Plaintiff, v. Ohio Association of
Public School Employees, Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-1745 (S.D.
Ohio), Judge Sarah D. Morrison of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, (i) granted in part
and denied in part Defendant Ohio Association of Public School
Employees ("OAPSE")' Motion to Exclude Report of David A.
Macpherson; and (ii) denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Class
Certification.

Around 2001, Plaintiff Littler began working for Upper Arlington
City Schools as a bus driver.  On March 27, 2007, Ms. Littler
signed an OAPSE membership card, agreeing to join OAPSE and pay
dues to the union.  OAPSE represents over 30,000 Ohio state
employees, including non-teaching school employees.  Ms. Littler
claims that she joined OAPSE because she thought that she was
required to join the union as a part of her job.

In 2011, Ms. Littler began working for the South-Western City
School District ("SWCSD") as a substitute bus driver.  After making
the career change, Ms. Littler was not initially an OAPSE member
and instead paid agency fees to the union rather than full dues.
She claims that she did so because she thought that substitute
drivers could not join the union.  On Jan. 16, 2015, Ms. Littler
signed a second OAPSE membership card.  By that point, Ms. Littler
had begun working full time for SWCSD, and she again thought she
was required to join the union.

Prior to June 2018, the OAPSE union contract required members of
the bargaining unit who declined to join the union to pay agency
fees.  On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court voided mandatory agency
fee provisions.  In response, OAPSE stopped collecting agency fees.


On Aug. 22, 2018, Ms. Littler notified OAPSE of her desire to
withdraw from the union.  The withdrawal attempt was not
successful.  However, at some point, her dues deductions ceased.
She also received but has not cashed a check from OAPSE refunding
all dues that she paid after Aug. 22, 2018.

On Dec. 19, 2018, Ms. Littler sued OAPSE on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated for previously requiring Ohio public
school employees to either join the union or to pay agency fees,
for continuing to deduct union fees post Janus, and for deducting
union fees without securing "freely given consent."  Ms. Littler
asserts that she filed the lawsuit because she thought her
constitutional rights were being violated and she wanted people to
have a choice of joining or not joining the union.  Ms. Littler
later filed an Amended Complaint with little substantive
difference.

On Nov. 15, 2019, Ms. Littler filed a Motion for Class
Certification.  She proposes a class consisting of every public
employee who was offered membership in OAPSE or its affiliates
while working in an agency shop.  The proposed class effectively
includes every current member, as well as former members, of the
seventy percent of OAPSE bargaining units that had agency fee
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements.  The Court
refers to the putative class as the "OAPSE class" given that it
would encompass a substantial number of former and current members
of OAPSE's bargaining unit.

Ms. Littler, in an effort to be flexible in the proposed class
definitions, has also proposed three sub-classes in lieu of the
OAPSE class: (1) OAPSE agency fee payers "agency fee class"), (2)
members of the bargaining unit who opposed payments to the union
but who reluctantly joined because they decided that the difference
between the cost of full membership dues and the agency fees would
not have been worth the loss of their voice and vote in
collective-bargaining matters ("reluctant voting member class"),
and (3) members of the bargaining unit who opposed payments to the
union but who joined because they were never informed of their
constitutional right to decline union membership and pay a reduced
amount in agency fees ("reluctant uninformed member class").

In support of her Motion for Class Certification, Ms. Littler
offers an expert report by an economist, David A. Macpherson, Ph.D.
Dr. Macpherson "was asked to analyze whether the case meets the
requirements for class action qualification," and his report is
similarly titled an "Analysis of Class Action Qualification."  

Dr. Macpherson offers the following 10 general conclusions in his
report:

      a. Conclusion One: "The class definition appears to be met
because the class is clearly defined, and the definition is a
sensical means of identifying people with common claims." Dr.
Macpherson offers no methodology as to how he arrived at Conclusion
One.

      b. Conclusion Two: Each member of the OAPSE class can be
surveyed "using standard survey techniques" to find out who is part
of the reluctant member class.  Dr. Macpherson contends that
"[t]his means of surveying employees is readily accepted in the
field of economics."  He does not, however, identify what such a
survey would look like or offer any evidence to support the idea of
a survey.

      c. Conclusion Three: "There is a healthy number of class
members" in general.  With respect to the OAPSE class, Dr.
Macpherson points to the 32,645 public employees that OAPSE
represented in fiscal year 2018.  He also highlights the number of
individuals who paid agency fees and the number of OAPSE members
who withdrew from the union in various years, ostensibly in support
of the contention that the agency fee and reluctant member classes
are numerous.

      d. Conclusion Four: "A significant portion of union members"
are part of the reluctant member class.  Dr. Macpherson relies on
five sets of data in support of Conclusion Four: Michigan's decline
in union membership and contract coverage in the public sector
after it banned agency fees in 2013; two public sector
unions—AFSCME and SEIU—lost well over ninety percent of their
agency fee payers in 2018; unionization rates among teachers are
twenty-four percent lower in states that prohibited agency fees
before Janus than in states that permitted them; a high percentage
of National Education Association members reported that they would
stop paying dues if the union would still represent them; and
documents produced by OAPSE in discovery show that a number of
members have expressed a desire to resign their memberships.

      e. Conclusion Five: Damages awards for each individual
plaintiff with a similar cause of action to Ms. Littler "may not be
particularly large" and thus it may be "uneconomical for a
plaintiff to pursue the claim."  Dr. Macpherson offers no
methodology as to how he arrived at Conclusion Five.

      f. Conclusion Six: Prior to Janus, "many" members of the
OAPSE bargaining unit, when deciding whether to join OAPSE, were
"constrained in their choice by two different but not dissimilar
options," the belief that they had to join the union to keep their
job and the reality that they had to join the union or pay the
agency fee.  Dr. Macpherson also concludes that "under the
principles of economics, neither of these 'choices' was a free
choice" and that each putative member of the OAPSE class "has this
fact in common."  This lack of a free choice was "the predominant
fact in the decision to become a union member or not."

      g. Conclusion Seven: Dr. Macpherson identifies five
commonalities that he sees among the putative class members -- the
union's conduct because "the union provides the same services
across all of the occupations represented by the union"; the
questions whether the union members could have resigned at any
time, whether Janus has universal application, and whether the
putative class members are entitled to repayment of their prior
payments to the union; and the question of "how far back the
putative class members can seek the return of" their payments to
the union.  Dr. Macpherson concludes that "litigating these issues
over and over in separate actions would be an enormous waste of the
Court's time and resources as well as those of the parties."

      h. Conclusion Eight: "The choices faced by the named
plaintiff is typical of the choices of facing every public employee
represented by OAPSE."  Dr. Macpherson offers no methodology as to
how he arrived at Conclusion Eight.

      i. Conclusion Nine: Ms. Littler "is motivated to provide
every class member a free and fair choice regarding union
membership. She appears to be a woman of conviction about making
sure that every union member is treated fairly and represented
equally."  Dr. Macpherson bases this on Ms. Littler's Complaint and
on her deposition.

      j. Conclusion Ten: Proposed class counsel's incentives are
aligned with the putative class members.  This conclusion is based
on Dr. Macpherson's discussions with proposed class counsel
regarding their fee arrangements.

The Court notes that Ms. Littler is correct in asserting that even
if Dr. Macpherson's report contains defects, the entire report
should not necessarily be excluded merely because it has
objectionable aspects.  Judge Morrison thus analyzes each of Dr.
Macpherson's 10 conclusions to determine whether any meet the
requirements of Rule 702.  In doing so, the Judge initially focuses
on Dr. Macpherson's first eight conclusions and finds that they
suffer from three main flaws -- they are improper conclusions of
law; they are not helpful in understanding the evidence or
determining a fact in issue; and they are conclusory, speculative,
reflect no expert methodology, and demonstrate a lack of scientific
rigor.

Judge Morrison finds that Dr. Macpherson improperly renders legal
conclusions in determining that the class is "clearly defined"
(Conclusion One), identifying "common" legal questions among the
putative class members (Conclusion Seven), and characterizing the
choices of the putative class members as "typical" (Conclusion
Eight).  While these words have lay usages, they have legal meaning
in the class certification context, and Dr. Macpherson's report
makes clear that he inappropriately uses these words in their legal
sense to draw legal conclusions.  Macpherson acknowledges that this
is precisely what he was hired to do -- to analyze whether this
case meets the requirements for class action qualification.

Next, several of Dr. Macpherson's conclusions are not helpful
because they do not observe anything beyond the abilities of a
layperson, the Court finds.  For example, Conclusions Three and
Four are based on rudimentary arithmetic and observations of data
that require no special expertise.  Conclusion Five is not helpful
because it is common sense that litigation is costly and that
individual Plaintiffs may not pursue a claim when they do not
anticipate their damages being particularly large.  Conclusion
Seven identifies supposed commonalities among OAPSE bargaining unit
members, but such an unsophisticated observation requires no
special expertise.  None of these conclusions requires expertise,
and they do not assist the Court in understanding the evidence or
determining a fact in issue.  Dr. Macpherson is not entitled to the
testimonial latitude of an expert when he merely offers opinions
requiring none of the knowledge and experience that warranted that
latitude in the first place.

Judge Morrison holds that Conclusions One and Eight are mere
conclusory statements without any methodological basis for them.

Having determined that Conclusions One through Eight are
inadmissible, that leaves Dr. Macpherson's final two conclusions.
Conclusion Nine is improper.  Experts may not testify about the
credibility of other witnesses.  Dr. Macpherson inappropriately
opines on the credibility of Ms. Littler when it is not his role to
do so.

Conclusion Ten, however, appears methodologically sound. Based on
his conversations with the proposed class counsel, Dr. Macpherson
has used his economics experience to determine that the counsel's
incentives align with members of the putative class.  The Judge
takes no issue with this conclusion and will not exclude it.

Accordingly, the Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to
Conclusions One through Nine, and denied with respect to Conclusion
Ten, the Court rules.

The Court next considers whether Ms. Littler's proposed class or
any of her proposed subclasses can properly be certified.  The
Court focuses most acutely on the commonality, typicality, adequacy
of representation, predominance, suitability, and ascertainability
requirements.  Given the Court's findings that Ms. Littler's
proposed classes cannot clear these hurdles, the Court need not
examine numerosity or adequacy of the proposed class counsel.

The Court finds that neither the OAPSE class nor the agency fee
class can be certified due to the presence of intra-class
conflicts, and Ms. Littler is also not an adequate representative
of the agency fee class.  Only agency fee payers would have
standing to pursue a class action premised on the harm of being
denied a choice.  They were indeed denied the ability to withhold
financial support from the union because their choices were either
to join the union and pay dues or to do nothing and to pay agency
fees.  But Ms. Littler is not an adequate representative for a
class of agency fee payers because she voluntarily chose to join
the union and thus did not suffer the asserted harm.

Even assuming common questions of law or fact under Rule 23(a)(2),
in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the reviewing court still must
find that those common questions predominate.  The Court holds that
virtually any class could be characterized as a "subjective class"
if framed in turns of feelings about the relief sought.  And that
is not the same as using feelings to define the harm that binds the
class together.  Subjective attitudes about relief are a function
of litigation and would not impede the certification of a class.
Defining a common harm using subjective feelings undermines the
idea that individualized questions cannot predominate in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action.

Finally, if a class were certified, the members of the reluctant
class would need to prove as a component of liability that they did
not voluntarily join the union, for OAPSE cannot be responsible for
individuals' voluntary choices to join the union.  That is, the
Plaintiffs cannot circumvent their burden of proof by relying on a
survey that effectively asks each putative class member whether
his/her decision was voluntary.  That would raise serious due
process concerns based on the Defendants' inability to challenge
effectively the survey results.  Instead, individualized proof
would be required, which is not well-suited to a class action.

In sum, Judge Morrison (i) granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's Motion to Exclude Report of David A. Macpherson, and
(ii) denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at
https://is.gd/nFao1t from Leagle.com.


OHIO UNIVERSITY: Class Action Seeks Refund of Tuition, Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------
Heather Willard, writing for The Logan Daily News, reports that a
class action lawsuit against Ohio University was filed in the Ohio
Court of Claims, seeking restitution for fees and expenses that may
not have been fully rendered during Spring and Summer semesters
2020.

The suit was leveled by Lily Zahn, who graduated from Ohio
University with a Bachelors of Strategic Communication and Social
Media this year.

The suit seeks to act on behalf of any who was on the rolls for
classes during the spring and summer 2020 semesters at OU.
Coursework was moved online during Spring 2020 and will remain
online during the Summer semester. Zahn alleges in the suit that OU
has not refunded any tuition or mandatory fees despite moving to
online learning March 10, 2020.

The suit argues that because the services OU offers are now online,
the mandatory fees which were intended to cover services or
facilities should be refunded for a pro-rated portion of the
tuition and mandatory fees, stating that she and other students
"have paid fees for services and facilities which are simply not
being provided; this failure also constitutes a breach of the
contracts entered into by Plaintiff and the Class with the
University."

Full-time students at Ohio University on the Athens Campus during
Spring 2020 (those taking between 12-20 credit hours per semester),
faced an instructional fee of $5,522, a general fee of $712, and
for those from out of state, a non-resident fee of $4,897, for
totals of $6,234 for in-state students and $11,131 for out-of-state
students.

OU also offers an "eCampus" for online classes, with a separate
tuition and fees scale. For Ohio residents, this would cost a total
of $240 per credit hour or $243 for out-of-state students.

The class action suit argues that Zahn, along with her classmates,
paid these fees so they could "benefit throughout the Spring 2020
semester from improved access to and assistance with information
technology, the promotion of students' emotional and physical
wellbring (sic), as well as the social development outside the
classroom."

Students have asked for a return of the prorated portion of their
payments, even creating a petition to demand the return of the
funds.

"In tacit acknowledgement that the online education system is
substantially different and inadequate, the University allowed
students to receive a 'Satisfactory/No Credit' grade rather than
the traditional letter grading system," the suit points out.

OU has been facing significant budget issues, laying off around 400
workers since the onset of COVID-19 as a global pandemic; however,
the institution's financial struggles date back for years.

The university has been facing many budget issues for a while,
which have worsened due to COVID-19, and resulted in the loss of
about 400 positions at the university since the pandemic's onset.
This includes a loss of about $18 million of revenue, which was
issued in refunds to students for pro-rated housing, dining and
parking fees--however, this measure did not include tuition and
fees.

This is not the first such class action lawsuit leveled against
higher education institutions due to COVID-19-related issues with
in-person teaching. [GN]


OHIO: S.C. Reverses Class Cert. Ruling in Medicaid Recipients' Case
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Court News Ohio reports that Ohio law now requires a Medicaid
recipient to use an administrative appeals process when claiming
the state recouped too much of the money a recipient received from
a third-party wrongdoer, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on June 30.

A Supreme Court majority reversed an Eighth District Court of
Appeals decision that allowed the certification of a class-action
lawsuit by injured Medicaid recipients who maintained the state's
Medicaid recovery law is unconstitutional.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice Judith L. French stated
Ohio lawmakers established an administrative appeal process as the
"sole remedy" in disputes with the state regarding Medicaid
recovery from civil lawsuits.

The Court's decision directed the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas
Court to determine if some of the potential members of the
class-action lawsuit could still maintain class-action status.  

Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor and Justices Sharon L. Kennedy,
Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, and Melody J. Stewart joined
the opinion. Justice Michael P. Donnelly concurred in judgment
only.

Injured Recipients Challenge Fluctuating Medicaid Law Michael A.
Pivonka and Lisa Rijos were the named plaintiffs in a class-action
lawsuit filed to declare that a Medicaid reimbursement law was
unconstitutional. Medicaid was created by federal law in 1965 and
is jointly funded by state and federal governments to cover the
medical costs of low-income and disabled individuals.

Pivonka was on Medicaid when he was injured by someone, and
Medicaid paid for Pivonka's medical bills. In 2012, Pivonka reached
a settlement with the wrongdoer who injured him. Citing the version
of R.C. 5101.58 in effect at the time, the Ohio Department of Job
and Family Services sent a demand letter to Pivonka notifying him
that under the "subrogation statute," the state could recoup the
amount of Medicaid funds it paid for his injuries. The department
collected $7,108 from his settlement with the wrongdoer.

Rijos was on Medicaid when someone injured her. A jury awarded her
damages in 2013 from the accident. The department collected $703 of
the verdict award paid by the wrongdoer.

In 2013, Pivonka and Rijos sought to certify a class comprised of
anyone who, under the subrogation statute, had to pay back Medicaid
funds to the department from April 6, 2007, to the present without
the requirement of a court order.

The department disputed the formation of the class, arguing R.C.
5101.58 was constitutional. The department also maintained the
updated version of the law after it was amended in 2015 required
those who disputed the repayment to use an administrative
procedure.

The trial court rejected the state's arguments and ruled that some
of the arguments could be raised after the class-action lawsuit
commenced. The state appealed the decision to the Eighth District,
which affirmed the trial court's decision.

The state appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the
case.

State Adapted Law after Court Rulings

The opinion explains how the Medicaid law was adjusted after U.S.
Supreme Court decisions regarding Medicaid reimbursement laws
passed by other states. Medicaid requires each state to adopt a law
giving the state the right to recover certain costs paid by
Medicaid that should have been paid by other sources.

When a wrongdoer injures a Medicaid recipient, the wrongdoer may be
required to pay the medical costs for the injured recipients. When
the costs are not paid by the wrongdoer, Medicaid pays the medical
bills. Under the federal requirement, if the Medicaid recipient
files a personal lawsuit against the wrongdoer, a portion of any
settlement or award received by the recipient can be tapped by the
state to recover the Medicaid funds used to pay the medical costs.

Other states, including Arkansas, had Medicaid subrogation statutes
similar to Ohio's. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a
portion of the Arkansas subrogation law. Although no court declared
Ohio's R.C. 5101.58 invalid, state lawmakers amended the law in
2007 to avoid having the same issue as Arkansas.

In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a portion of North
Carolina's Medicaid subrogation law, which also was similar to the
revised Ohio law. Ohio changed the law in 2013, and again in 2015.
The 2015 version contained provisions of the subrogation law that
gave the state the automatic right to recover medical costs from
personal-injury lawsuits without getting a court order first.

The law presumed the state was entitled to half the amount of any
award after attorney fees, legal expenses, and other litigation
costs were paid. The 2015 version added a provision that allowed
the Medicaid recipient to challenge the presumption through an
administrative proceeding operated by the department. If the
recipient disputed the department's final decision about how much
it could recover, the person could  appeal the department's
decision to the common pleas court.

"The administrative process is, by its own terms, the 'sole remedy'
available to those individuals," the opinion stated.

Pivonka and Rijos argued they and the class members should not be
required to follow the administrative procedure because the process
allowing the state to recoup the money without a court order is
unconstitutional and the department was not entitled to recoup any
money.

The Court stated the class members cannot circumvent the
administrative process by raising a constitutional challenge in
common pleas court. Rather, the constitutional challenge can be
raised after the recipient goes through the department's appeals
process. Then, the appeal reaches the common pleas court, the
opinion concluded.

Because part of the changing Medicaid law did not apply to those
who repaid money between April 6 and Sept. 28, 2007, the Supreme
Court directed the trial court to determine whether those
recipients could maintain an action in the common pleas court.

2019-0084. Pivonka v. Corcoran, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3476.
[GN]


OLAM SPICES: Ramirez Dismissed From Beltran OT Wage Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California dismissed Mariana Ramirez as a named party
in the case, THOMAS BELTRAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. OLAM SPICES AND
VEGETABLES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:18-cv-01676-NONE-SAB (E.D.
Cal.), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1).

On July 7, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed the class action in Alameda
Superior Court alleging violations of California labor law, and on
Dec. 10, 2018, the action was removed to the Eastern California
District Court.  

On Dec. 13, 2019, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(a)(1), the counsel for the Plaintiffs filed a notice and
suggestion of the death of Plaintiff Ramirez.  According to the
notice and attached death certificate, Plaintiff Ramirez passed
away on Oct. 14, 2019.

Since becoming aware of the passing, the counsel has made diligent
efforts to contact the next of kin and identify legal successors or
representatives of the deceased.  The Counsel served the notice and
suggestion of death on the possible successors or representatives
of the deceased through personal service.

The Plaintiffs have filed the formal notice suggesting death on the
record and have submitted an affidavit stating the notice has been
personally served on the possible successors or representatives of
the deceased.  They have demonstrated compliance with the initial
requirements of Rule 25 and the 90-day period began on Dec. 13,
2019.  The death of Plaintiff Ramirez was suggested upon the record
more than 90 days ago, and no motion for substitution was made.

Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Plaintiff Ramirez as a
named party in the action, and the Clerk of the Court is directed
to note the death on the record and terminate her from the docket.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/lTJllb from Leagle.com.


ONE CALL MEDICAL: Dawson Labor Suit Removed to S.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as CHARLES DAWSON, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. ONE CALL
MEDICAL, INC. DBA ONE CALL CARE MANAGEMENT, a New Jersey
corporation; ALIGN NETWORKS, a Florida corporation; RONE BALDWIN,
an individual; and DOES 1-50, Inclusive, Case No.
37-2020-00016855-CU-OE-CTL, (Filed May 26, 2020), was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San
Diego to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California on June 26, 2020.

The Southern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:20-cv-01188-LAB-KSC to the proceeding.

The claims alleged in the complaint are unpaid minimum wages and
liquidated damages, failure to pay minimum hourly rate, failure to
pay sick time benefits, failure to pay overtime wages, and failure
to provide meal periods or rest periods or compensation in lieu
thereof pursuant to the California Labor Code.

One Call provides health care services. The Company offers medical
care, diagnostic, nursing, dental, and physical therapy
services.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Oshua S. Lipshutz, Esq.
          Christine Demana, Esq.
          Amina Mousa, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
          San Francisco, CA 94105-0921
          Telephone: 415 393 8200
          Facsimile: 415 393 8306
          E-mail: jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com
                  cdemana@gibsondunn.com
                  amousa@gibsondunn.com


OREGON: Hernandez Seeks Review of Ruling in Sexual Assault Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Aracely Hernandez filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit styled Aracely Hernandez, et al. v. Robert Snider, et
al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00624-SI, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, Portland.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Torres, Aracely Hernandez, and Gloria Seleen, have brought an
action against Dr. Snider, Dr. S. Shelton, and D. Brown, alleging
that while the Plaintiffs were incarcerated at Coffee Creek
Corrections Facility they were each sexually assaulted by Dr.
Snider during mandatory gynecological exams and other medical
procedures. They have filed the putative "class action" complaint
bringing one federal claim and two state common law tort claims
against the Defendants. Although they titled their Complaint as a
"class action," the Plaintiffs never filed a motion for class
certification, which was due on Feb. 1, 2018. The Defendants assert
that the case should, therefore, not be considered a class action,
which the Plaintiffs do not contest in any of their responsive
pleadings. Accordingly, the Court will not treat the case as a
class action.

In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege (1) federal 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 claims for violations of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, (2) state tort
claims for medical negligence, and (3) state tort claims for sexual
battery.

The appellate case is captioned as Aracely Hernandez, et al. v.
Robert Snider, et al., Case No. 20-35014, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellant ARACELY HERNANDEZ, Individually and On Behalf
of a Class of Others Similarly Situated, who is currently
incarcerated at Coffee Creek Corrections Facility, in Wilsonville,
Oregon, appears prose.[BN]

Defendants-Appellees ROBERT SNIDER, Dr., S. SHELTON, Dr., and D.
BROWN, are represented by:

          Jessica B. Spooner, Esq.
          Michael R. Washington, Esq.
          OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          1162 Court Street N.E.
          Salem, OR 97301
          Telephone: (503) 947-4700
          E-mail: Jessica.Spooner@doj.state.or.us


PACESETTER CLAIMS: Tapley-Smith Gets Conditional Certification
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELODY TAPLEY-SMITH, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. PACESETTER CLAIMS SERVICE,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 3:18-cv-1488-J-32JRK (M.D. Fla.), Judge
Timothy J. Corrigan of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, granted the Plaintiff's
Motion for Conditional Certification Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(b) (Doc. 76).

On Dec. 18, 2018, Tapley-Smith filed an Individual and Collective
Action Complaint against Pacesetter under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("the FLSA") on behalf of her and all others similarly
situated.  A total of 91 Plaintiffs have joined Tapley-Smith in the
action.  Tapley-Smith alleges a single cause of action under the
FLSA, individually and collectively, claiming that Pacesetter
violated 29 U.S.C. Section 207 by failing to pay overtime wages in
weeks which she and similarly situated employees worked more than
40 hours.

Tapley-Smith worked for Pacesetter as an insurance adjuster in
Florida from Aug. 7, 2017, to March 30, 2019.  Pacesetter provides
field inspection services, adjusting, loss consulting, and workflow
management services.  Tapley-Smith alleges that she and other
similarly situated employees were not paid overtime compensation to
which they were entitled, and instead were paid a non-guaranteed
"day rate," which is a flat sum for each day worked.  Tapley-Smith
estimates that the proposed class numbers more than 150 employees.
Finally, Tapley-Smith alleges that Pacesetter willfully violated
the FLSA, thus extending the statute of limitations to three years.


Tapley-Smith asks the Court to conditionally certify a class
composed of the following persons: All current and former employees
of Pacesetter Claims Service, Inc., who between Aug. 7, 2017 and
March 30, 2019:

  1. Have held the positions of Associate Adjuster, Adjusters,
     Adjuster I, Adjuster II, Adjuster III, Team Lead I, Team Lead
     II, Lit Admin, Admin, Litigation Administrator, Appraiser,
     Claims Analysts, Claims Adjuster, Independent Adjuster,
     Litigation Claims Specialist, Litigation Desk Adjuster,
     Litigation Administrator, or Litigation Specialists or who
     have performed duties similar to the duties performed by
     Plaintiffs in providing services related to adjusting
     insurance claims in Florida for Pacesetter clients;

  2. Were paid a daily rate of pay for their services; and

  3. Worked more than 40 hours in workweeks without being paid
     overtime premium wages for the hours worked over 40
     pursuant to the federal FLSA.

Judge Corrigan finds that, through the pleadings and affidavits,
Tapley-Smith has alleged a "reasonable basis" for her claim that
there are other employees similarly situated to her with respect to
job requirements and pay provisions.  Further, 91 of those
employees have already joined the lawsuit.  This satisfies the
Eleventh Circuit's test for conditional certification.  As
Pacesetter does not contest conditional certification at this
stage, the Court will conditionally certify the collective and
allow Tapley-Smith to disseminate the Proposed Notice of Lawsuit
and Consent to Sue Under FLSA Forms specifying a 30-day opt-in
period, subject to the provisions he discussed.

Pacesetter objects to the description of the proposed class in the
Notice.  Specifically, Pacesetter asks the Court to delete the
provision of the class description that states: "Were paid a daily
rate for their services."  It argues that because it disputes the
factual issue, such an allegation should not appear in the Notice.
The class description on page one of the Notice will remain the
same.  Additionally, the Court is unsure why the language is absent
from Section 3 of the Notice and directs the parties to add it to
avoid any confusion on the scope of the class.

Next, Pacesetter points out that the Notice lacks any language
describing its position in the lawsuit and asks the Court to insert
the following language into Section 2 of the Notice.  Tapley-Smith
objects only to the final sentence of Pacesetter's proposed
addition on the grounds that it is duplicative of the rest of the
paragraph.  The Judge disagrees that it is duplicative.  The second
half of the second sentence of the proposed language relates to
Pacesetter's conduct prior to the lawsuit.  The final sentence
relates to Pacesetter's position on the outcome of these
proceedings.  Therefore, it is not duplicative and the Court will
allow Pacesetter to insert the entire paragraph into Section 2 of
the Notice.

Pacesetter objects to the use of e-mail to disseminate the Notice.
The Court will qualify the use of email by limiting it to the
potential class members' personal email addresses.  Therefore, the
Court will order Pacesetter to produce any available personal email
addresses of the potential class members and allow Tapley-Smith to
send the Notice to those email addresses.  Accordingly, the Court
also directs the parties to review the Consent Form and add an
option to return it via email.

Pacesetter also objects to Tapley-Smith's request to send a
reminder notice, within the 30-day opt-in period.  It argues that
such a reminder is superfluous and could be viewed as harassment or
as encouragement by the Court to join the lawsuit.  As the Court is
allowing Tapley-Smith to use email as a means of disseminating the
initial Notice in addition to first-class mail, its finds a
reminder unnecessary.

Finally, Pacesetter requests that the Court allow a neutral third
party administrator to facilitate notice and consent at
Pacesetter's expense.  Its primary concern is the potential for
abuse by the Plaintiff's counsel.  The Court finds that
Tapley-Smith is not requesting sensitive information such as social
security numbers -- or even telephone numbers -- that would
necessitate heightened privacy protection.  Further, it is not a
case where the number of the potential opt-in Plaintiffs might
overwhelm Tapley-Smith's counsel.  The number of potential
plaintiffs will likely be somewhere between 150 and 200.
Tapley-Smith's counsel has recently handled cases of similar size
in the district without using a third party administrator.
Therefore, the Court finds that a third party administrator is
unnecessary.

Accordingly, Judge Corrigan granted Tapley-Smith's Motion for
Conditional Certification.  The Proposed Notice Form is approved
subject to the addition of Pacesetter's proposed language to
Section 2 and the Court's suggested language to Section 3.  The
Proposed Consent Form is approved subject to the addition of an
option to return the Consent Form via email.  The Proposed Reminder
Form is not approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/5bR28w from Leagle.com.


PAN AMERICAN: Rodriguez Suit Moved to District of Columbia
----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RAMONA MATOS RODRIGUEZ, TATIANA CARBALLO GOMEZ, FIDEL
CRUZ HERNANDEZ, and RUSSELA MARGARITA RIVERO SARABIA, Plaintiffs,
v. PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, JOAQUIN MOLINA, ALBERTO
KLEIMAN, INDIVIDUAL DOES NO. 1-10, Defendant, Case No.
18-cv-24995-GAYLES (S.D. Fla.), Judge Darrin P. Gayles of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the
Defendant's Motion to Transfer the Action to the District of
Columbia.

The case is an action brought under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), against an international organization
that raises a first impression question of whether the venue
restrictions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), as
codified in 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(f), extend to international
organizations as part of their congressionally-afforded immunity
from suit.

Plaintiffs Rodriguez, Gomez, Hernandez, and Sarabia are Cuban
doctors residing in Miami.  Defendant Pan American Health
Organization ("PAHO") is an international organization
headquartered in Washington, D.C., that promotes and coordinates
efforts of the countries of the Western Hemisphere to combat
disease, lengthen life, and promote[s] the physical and mental
health of the people.  PAHO receives funding from its member
countries and the United Nations. Defendants Joaquin Molina,
Alberto Kleiman, and Individual Does Nos. 1-10 are PAHO directors.

According to the First Amended Class Action Complaint, the
Plaintiffs (and other Cuban doctors) were recruited into a
Brazilian aid program under the terms of an agreement between PAHO,
Brazil, and a Cuban organization called Sociedad Mercantil
Comercializadora de Servicios Medicos Cubans SA.  The program was
called "Mais Medicos" and it sent foreign doctors to treat
residents of lower income neighborhoods in Brazil.  Under the
agreement's terms, Brazil paid PAHO for the Plaintiffs' services.
PAHO then sent 85% of Brazil's payment to the Cuban government,
kept 5% for itself, and paid the remainder to Plaintiffs—a paltry
10% of the total payment owed to them.  The Plaintiffs allege that,
since 2013, PAHO has retained more than $75 million from this
arrangement and Cuba has retained more than $1.3 billion, while the
Plaintiffs have received a fraction of what their services are
worth.

The Plaintiffs allege that their participation in Mais Medicos was
equivalent to forced labor and human trafficking.  The Cuban
government allegedly recruited the Plaintiffs using a combination
of political and economic pressure, threats against family members,
and other forms of intimidation unique to Cuba's totalitarian
government.  Then, while in Brazil, the Plaintiffs were subjected
to restrictions that violated international labor laws, including
being assigned a "minder" who would watch their movements, told to
campaign in favor of Brazilian political parties that Cuba
supported, and paid a fraction of what their services were worth.
The Plaintiffs point out that PAHO paid every non-Cuban doctor
their entire salary, as opposed to the 10% that PAHO paid them, for
the same work.  They allege that they suffered harassment and
intimidation for speaking out against Mais Medicos.

The Plaintiffs further allege that PAHO and the entire
international community were aware of the detrimental and abusive
conditions that they faced as a result of this arrangement: The
United States Department of State's reports on Cuban medical
missions abroad, for example, say that Cuban doctors' participation
in Mais Medicos and similar programs is tantamount to forced labor.
And numerous international bodies, as well as PAHO's own internal
auditors, have raised concerns about the way PAHO pays the Cuban
doctors -- or fails to do so.

The Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint seeking to
recover both their unpaid wages and damages.  PAHO then specially
appeared for the sole purpose of moving to transfer venue without
waiving its other arguments as to immunity.  Its Motion to Transfer
the Action to the District of Columbia raised two primary
arguments: (1) that venue is wrong in the Southern District of
Florida under 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a) because the FSIA's venue
provision exclusively governs venue for lawsuits against
international organizations like PAHO, and (2) that venue here is
otherwise inappropriate under the balancing requirements of 28
U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

The Court referred the matter for all pretrial proceedings to
Magistrate Judge Alicia Otazo-Reyes.  Judge Otazo-Reyes held a
hearing on the Motion and subsequently denied it.  Judge
Otazo-Reyes held that Section 1406(a) did not require transfer from
the Southern District of Florida because Section 1391(c)(2) allows
the Plaintiffs to lay venue here through RICO's alternative venue
provision.  The Judge held that PAHO could not claim immunity from
non-FSIA approved venues and that its arguments rested on state
sovereign immunity cases that were inapposite because those cases
arose in a different context and relied on different legal
principles.  Judge Otazo-Reyes also held that Section 1391(f)'s
terms were permissive, which allowed the Plaintiffs to use Section
1391(c)(2) to reach RICO's alternative venue provision.  Finally,
the Judge held that venue in Miami was also proper under Section
1404(a).

PAHO appealed Judge Otazo-Reyes's Order.  The Court held a hearing
on PAHO's appeal on July 18, 2019, and the matter is now ripe for
review.

PAHO challenges solely the portion of Judge Otazo-Reyes's Order
relating to transfer under Section 1406(a).  It argues that venue
is "wrong" because the FSIA requires that Section 1391(f) be the
exclusive venue provision for cases against foreign states and, by
extension, international organizations; and under Section 1391(f),
venue is only proper in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.

Judge Gayles agrees that transfer is warranted.  Foreign sovereign
immunity -- the immunity from suit that Congress granted to foreign
states by virtue of their sovereignty and codified in the FSIA --
extends in its entirety to international organizations under the
International Organizations Immunities Act.  That immunity includes
not just the FSIA's provisions waiving immunity for certain types
of activities that generate litigation ("whether" foreign states
can be sued), but also its limitations on venues found in Section
1391(f) ("where" foreign states can be sued).  Foreign states and
international organizations can therefore only be sued in
jurisdictions where Congress has specifically waived their
immunity.  Those exclusive venue waivers are set forth in Section
1391(f).  And Section 1391(f) requires that venue be laid in the
District of Columbia because it is the only proper venue for the
suit.

Accordingly, Judge Gayles sustained the Defendant's Objections to
and Appeal from Magistrate Judge's Denial of Motion to Transfer the
Action to the District of Columbia; and granted the Motion to
Transfer Venue.  The action will be transferred to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia for all further
proceedings.

A full-text copy of Judge Gayles' April 3, 2020 Order is available
at https://is.gd/7wjzGS from Leagle.com.


PEOPLECONNECT INC: Warnock Class Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as SANDRA WARNOCK, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. PEOPLECONNECT
INC. d/b/a Intelius; ABNI HELLER, and DOES 1-10, Case No. 19CV-0539
(Filed September 12, 2019), was removed from the Superior Court of
the State of California for the County of San Luis Obispo to the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on June
25, 2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No. e
2:20-cv-05676 to the proceeding.

The action is a putative class action against PeopleConnect and its
former CEO on behalf of those who, according to the Plaintiff, were
charged an automatic renewal fee for PeopleConnect's products. The
Plaintiff alleges violations of the California's Unfair Competition
Law, the California Business and Professions Code, and the
California's False Advertising Law.

Peopleconnect provides online social network services. The Company
offers basic people search, list management, criminal records,
employee screening, human resources background checks, and identity
theft protection services.[BN]

The Defendant PeopleConnect is represented by:

          Christine M. Reilly, Esq.
          Justin Jones Rodriguez, Esq.
          Kristin E. Haule, Esq.
          MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP
          2049 Century Park East, Suite 1700
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 312-4000
          Facsimile: (310) 312-4224
          E-mail: CReilly@manatt.com
                  JJRodriguez@manatt.com
                  KHaule@manatt.com


PETER NYGARD: Defense Lawyer Faces Professional Misconduct
----------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Barghout, writing for CBC News, reports that an Ottawa
human rights lawyer says Jay Prober has crossed the line while
defending his client Peter Nygard against sexual assault
allegations, and that he has filed a professional misconduct
complaint with the Law Society of Manitoba.

"It's entirely appropriate for Mr. Prober to defend his client to
the best of his ability . . . where it goes beyond what is
acceptable conduct for a lawyer, I believe, is where he states that
people are fabricating evidence," said Richard Warman in a phone
interview with CBC News.

Fifty-seven women have filed a civil class-action lawsuit in New
York against Nygard claiming they were raped or sexually assaulted.
Some of them say they were just 14 or 15 years old when the alleged
assaults occurred.

There were three comments in particular that Warman took issue
with.

April Telek, a Vancouver actress and former beauty pageant
contestant, says Nygard held her against her will and raped her
when she came to Winnipeg for a modelling job in 1993 -- a claim he
denies unequivocally through his lawyer Jay Prober.

"She is a purported actress who is now playing another role," said
Prober in a statement to CBC's The Fifth Estate in response to
Telek's allegations which were published on June 20.

Nygard claims his former neighbour in the Bahamas -- billionaire
Louis Bacon, who he's been feuding with for years -- is paying the
women to make up allegations as part of a conspiracy to destroy his
reputation and business.

"Telek has jumped on the perceived money train and has nothing to
lose, especially if her legal fees are being paid as we suspect
they are," said Prober's statement to The Fifth Estate.

Warman believes Prober crossed the line.

"That just really feeds into myths and stereotypes from historical
perspectives about women who complain about sexual assault," he
says.

"Whatever you may think of the person's allegations against your
client, it doesn't give you free rein to go nuclear on that person.
And that's what the rules of professional conduct are designed to
restrain counsel from doing," said Warman.

Warman also has concerns about what Prober said to CBC News in May,
while defending his client against allegations made by a woman
known only as Jane Doe 16. She says she was raped and sodomized by
Nygard while at his home in the Bahamas in 1998.

Prober said she is "probably another complainant who has been paid
for false evidence."

Prober threatens lawsuit

Prober was unaware that Warman had filed a complaint against him
and called the allegations of professional misconduct unfounded.

"Maybe the complaint has been made (if it has) in order to impede
the vigorous defence of my client," Prober said in an email
statement.

He said if CBC published the allegations, he would contact a lawyer
and would consider suing Warman for defamation for sending his
complaint to CBC.

He says Warman has nothing to do with this case and doesn't know
the background.

"It seems he's based his complaint on a news story and as such has
taken comments and statements out of context. He has no idea of the
back and forth between [CBC journalist with The Fifth Estate]
Timothy Sawa and myself and has no idea of all the information
provided to Sawa unless he was given it which I very much doubt,"
said Prober.

"At best he's simply seeking attention and publicity and, at worst,
he's involved with CBC in attacking me," said Prober's email.

Prober is involved in two sets of lawsuits against CBC and its
journalists for stories that were published about Nygard and
another Fifth Estate story.

Two Canadian women have come forward to say they were raped by
fashion designer Peter Nygard. An investigation by The Fifth Estate
confirms key elements of their allegations are backed up by
witnesses, confidants, family members, and in one case, an RCMP
officer. Nygard says their stories are "false" and a "lie."

Former model KC Allan, who grew up in Winnipeg but now lives in the
U.S., says she added her name to the long list of women who say
Nygard sexually assaulted them, in part because of Prober's
comments in the media.

"As a result of Prober's cynical and callous attacks on the
survivors, I felt compelled to add my voice to theirs. And in
initiating a criminal action I seek not just to stop Nygard from
re-offending, but to also silence Prober's verbal assault and
prevent my sisters from being re-victimized," said Allan in a
statement to CBC News.

Allan says Nygard raped her in 1979, when she was 17 years old.
They met at a nightclub and he offered her a ride home, but stopped
at his Winnipeg warehouse on the way.

"Jay Prober's accusation of criminal conspiracy is laughable were
it not so wrong and so hurtful to the innocent," Allan's statement
said.

Nygard denies the allegations against him and none have been proven
in court. No criminal charges have been filed.

Uncharted Ground

"I have to say that when I hear Jay Prober's comments some of the
time, I think that's pretty close to the line. But that's going to
be for Law Society to make that determination," said Karen Busby,
law professor and director of the Centre for Human Rights Research
at the University of Manitoba.

Busby has never heard of a misconduct complaint being made against
a lawyer for comments made in the media, and thinks this is a
first.

"This is really uncharted ground in terms of professional
misconduct," she says.

"If the intention and maybe even if the effect is to intimidate the
women so that they don't continue to participate, then you do have
a professional misconduct situation at hand," Busby said.

The Law Society of Manitoba won't say if it's investigating the
complaint, or confirm if it's received one.

Busby says that's not unusual. If there is disciplinary action, it
will be posted on the law society's website when the investigation
is complete. [GN]


PGA INC: Settlement in Schilling FLSA Suit Gets Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC SCHILLING, BLAINE KROHN, and ERIK SINCLAIR, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
PGA INC., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-202-wmc (W.D. Wis.), Judge
William M. Conley of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin granted final approval of the proposed class
settlement in the case.

On behalf of themselves and other similarly situated employees,
Plaintiffs Schilling, Krohn and Sinclair allege that their employer
Defendant PGA: (1) failed to pay overtime on cash payments in lieu
of fringe payments that PGA made to employees who worked certain
prevailing wage jobs; and (2) should have used the average rate to
calculate overtime during weeks in which two or more rates were
paid to the same individual, in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA"), and Wisconsin state law.

The District Court previously certified an FLSA collective action
and a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23,
and in response to the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,
entered judgment on these claims in the Defendant's favor.  On
appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the parties reached a settlement,
and the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for the limited purpose
of conducting settlement approval.

Based on the fairness hearing, the parties' written submissions,
the lack of any objections, and the entire record in the case as a
whole, Judge Conley concludes that: (1) the parties' settlement of
the Plaintiffs' state law claims is fair, reasonable and adequate
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e); and (2) the
settlement of the Plaintiffs' FSLA claim was a fair and reasonable
resolution of bona fide disputes under Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v.
United States.

Specifically, as detailed in the Plaintiffs' submissions, all but
two of the members received notice of the settlement and none of
the members of the FLSA collective action and/or Rule 23 class
action objected to the settlement.  Moreover, the settlement
payments reflect a range of 25% to 175% of the Plaintiffs'
calculation of the maximum recovery under the various FLSA and
collective action claims.  In light of the Court's prior decision
granting summary judgment in the Defendants' favor on all claims,
the Judge has little trouble finding the parties' settlement to be
fair, reasonable and adequate.

In addition to the payouts to each individual class member, the
settlement provides for an individual award of $1,400 to the three
named Plaintiffs, Eric Schilling, Blaine Krohn and Erik Sinclair.
The Judge finds that the award is eminently reasonable in light of
the named Plaintiffs' significant involvement in the litigation,
including assisting in responding to discovery, sitting for
depositions, and providing declarations in support of the class
claims.

Also before the Court is the class counsel's motion for attorneys'
fees and costs.  The class counsel seeks $25,000 in fees and costs,
the full amount allowed under the settlement agreement.  While the
Judge rejects the Plaintiffs' invitation to solely rely on the fact
that these claims involved a fee-shifting provision and, therefore,
approves the requested attorneys' fees and costs without reference
to the total settlement fund, the requested attorneys' fees
represent a fairly significant discount from the lodestar amount,
given that the counsel's reasonable hourly rate almost certainly
exceeds the $112 rate calculated by accounting for the 186 hours
spent on this litigation, which approximately results in the
requested $21,000 in fees.

Moreover, given the substantial challenges presented by the class
and collective action claims on the merits, the Judge finds the
result achieved by the Plaintiffs' counsel to be an "exceptional
settlement," warranting a significant fee award as a percentage of
the total settlement fund.  Accordingly, the Judge will grant the
Plaintiffs' fee petition and award $25,000 in attorneys' fees and
costs.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Conley granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for attorney fees and costs in the requested amount of $25,000.
The Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of settlement agreement
is granted, and the parties are directed to carry out its terms and
provisions.  The Settlement payments, including the $1,400 payment
to the named Plaintiffs, are approved.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/BYYQ70 from Leagle.com.


PLANNED PARENTHOOD: Baker Files Cert. Petition to Supreme Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Joshua Baker filed with the Supreme Court of United
States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter styled
Joshua Baker, Director, South Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services, Petitioner v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, et
al., Case No. 19A752.

Joshua Baker is sued in his official capacity as Director of the
South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services.

Petitioner Joshua Baker petitions for a writ of certiorari to
review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in the case titled JOSHUA BAKER, in his official
capacity as Director, South Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services, Applicant/Petitioner, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTH
ATLANTIC; JULIE EDWARDS, on her behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Respondents, Case No. 18-2133.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the District
Court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the individual
plaintiff, a Medicaid recipient, in her suit challenging South
Carolina's decision to terminate Planned Parenthood South
Atlantic's (PPSAT) provider agreement because it offers abortion
services. The Plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of this
claim, the district court held, for two interrelated reasons:
first, the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider provision, 42
U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(23)(A), confers on "any individual" a
private right to sue that may be enforced under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983; and second, South Carolina denied plaintiff the right to
select the willing, qualified family-planning provider of her
choice.

This dispute arose following South Carolina's termination of two
Planned Parenthood centers as Medicaid providers. PPSAT operates
two healthcare centers in South Carolina, one in Charleston and the
other in Columbia. These centers provide a range of family planning
and preventative care services, including physical exams, cancer
screenings, contraceptive counseling, and pregnancy testing. For
four decades, PPSAT has been a South Carolina Medicaid provider
that receives reimbursements for care provided to Medicaid
beneficiaries. In recent years, PPSAT's South Carolina centers have
treated hundreds of patients insured through Medicaid annually.

In July 2018, South Carolina's Department of Health and Human
Services (SCDHHS) terminated PPSAT's Medicaid provider agreement.
SCDHHS did not contend that PPSAT was providing subpar service to
its Medicaid patients, or to any other patients. Instead, PPSAT was
terminated solely because it performed abortions outside of the
Medicaid program. According to SCDHHS, PPSAT's termination was part
of a plan by Governor Henry McMaster designed to prevent the state
from indirectly subsidizing abortion services. In 1995, the South
Carolina legislature passed a law preventing state funds
appropriated for family planning services from being used to fund
abortions.

On July 27, 2018, PPSAT and the individual plaintiff filed suit in
federal district court in South Carolina against Joshua Baker, in
his official capacity as Director of SCDHHS. The individual
plaintiff brought suit on her own behalf and that of a purported
class of South Carolina Medicaid beneficiaries who received, or
would like to receive, healthcare services at PPSAT. Plaintiffs
brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds that SCDHHS
violated their rights under the Medicaid Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment. On July 30, plaintiffs filed for preliminary injunctive
relief solely on the basis of their Medicaid Act claims. The
district court held hearings on plaintiffs' motion on August 23. In
their complaint and at the hearing, plaintiffs argued that the
Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider provision confers on
recipients a private right, to use the qualified and willing
provider of their choice, and that South Carolina violated this
right when it terminated PPSAT for reasons unrelated to its
professional competence to provide medical services.

The District Court agreed with the Plaintiffs and granted a
preliminary injunction on August 28, 2018. Because the district
court held that injunctive relief was appropriate based on the
individual plaintiffs Medicaid Act claim alone, it did not analyze
PPSAT's Medicaid Act claim.

Because the individual plaintiff has a private right of action to
challenge South Carolina's denial of her right to the qualified and
willing family-planning provider of her choice, the Court of
Appeals agree with the district court that she has demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on her free-choice-of-provider
claim. They also hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in enjoining South Carolina from terminating PPSAT's
provider agreement.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner Joshua Baker is represented by:

          Kelly McPherson Jolley, Esq.
          JOLLEY LAW GROUP, LLC
          1201 Main Street Suite 1100
          Columbia, SC 29201
          E-mail: kmj@jolleylawgroup.com


PNC BANK: Persuades Court to Limit Scope of Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Holly Barker, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that PNC Bank NA
persuaded a federal court in California to limit the scope of a
class action claiming that it failed to pay mortgage loan officers
for rest breaks in accordance with the state's labor laws.

The order, issued on June 22 by Chief Magistrate Judge Joesph C.
Spero on behalf of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, narrowed the class definition to include
only those loan officers employed through June 30, 2019--the date
that PNC revised its compensation plans and instituted an
arbitration agreement encompassing wage disputes. [GN]


PORTLAND, OR: ACLU of Oregon Files Class Action Against Police
--------------------------------------------------------------
KPTV reports that the ACLU of Oregon on June 28 announced it has
filed a class-action lawsuit against Portland police and the city
of Portland. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of journalists and
legal observers who they say were targeted and attacked by police
while documenting the recent protests in Portland.

The ACLU says police have fired rubber bullets at journalists and
legal observers, tear-gassed them, pepper-sprayed them in the face,
beat them with batons, and thrown flash bangs directly at them.

Police have also arrested journalists and legal observers,
according to the ACLU.

"They have an absolute constitutional right to record what's going
on and report that to the rest of the world," Co-counsel Matt
Borden said.

The suit outlines more than a dozen examples of what the ACLU calls
targeting, including video from KBOO reporter Cory Elia showing him
getting pepper sprayed in the face as he was live streaming while
walking through a park. In the video, you can see an officer turn
abruptly, and without warning, spray Elia in the eyes. The spray
gets on the camera lens.

"They just sprayed me," Elia yelled in the video. "I'm down, I
can't see," he continues from the ground.

Two ACLU legal observers are listed as plaintiffs in the case.
Legal observers attend protests to watch and document interactions
between protestors and police. Doug Brown is one of the
plaintiffs.

In the complaint, Brown said police fired flash bangs directly at
him, hit him with their batons, and also threatened to arrest him.

"They're calling out, 'hey ACLU guy, hey you in the ACLU vest, get
out of here or you're going to be arrested,'" Brown said.

According to the court document, rubber bullets barely missed legal
observer Kat Mahoney's head on June 10.

"In this past month, I've seen police violence on a level I've
never seen before, and I've been doing this since about 2017,"
Mahoney said.

The four other plaintiffs in the case are independent, freelance
journalists.

The lawsuit seeks an order to declare law enforcement's actions
unconstitutional and prohibit them from targeting and attacking
journalists again. The suit also seeks damages for injuries
sustained.

FOX 12 reached out to the Portland Police Bureau, but have not
heard back.

A spokesperson with the city of Portland said the city doesn't
comment on pending litigation.

Borden, with BraunHagey & Borden LLP, expects the case will be
heard in court soon. [GN]


PRIMERICA INC: Naveja Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as MARIA NAVEJA, individually,
and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated v. PRIMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation; PRIMERICA
FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company;
PRIMERICA CLIENT SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; PRIMERICA
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Tennessee corporation; and DOES 1 through
100, inclusive, Case No. (Filed May 13, 2020), was removed from the
Superior Court of the State of California, Sacramento County, to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on
June 29, 2020.

The Eastern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-01298-MCE-KJN to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that the Defendants and
their related entities violated various California state laws by
failing to pay the Plaintiff and other similarly situated
individuals minimum wage and overtime and by failing to provide
meal and rest periods.

Primerica is a United States-based multi-level marketing company
that sells insurance and financial services.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Brian M. Lutz, Esq.
          Stephen C. Whittaker, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
          San Francisco, CA 94105-0921
          Telephone: (415) 393-8200
          Facsimile: (415) 393-8306
          E-mail: blutz@gibsondunn.com
                  cwhittaker@gibsondunn.com

               - and -

          CARY G. PALMER, Esq.
          Nathan W. Austin, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1600
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Telephone: (916) 341-0404
          Facsimile: (916) 341-0141
          E-mail: cary.palmer@jacksonlewis.com
                  nathan.austin@jacksonlewis.com


PROASSURANCE CORP: Schall Law Firm Reminds of August 17 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announces the filing of a class-action lawsuit against ProAssurance
Corporation ("ProAssurance" or "the Company") (NYSE:PRA) for
violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between April 26,
2019 and May 7, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before August 17, 2020.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. ProAssurance failed to maintain
appropriate controls on underwriting and risk management,
particularly in setting lose reserves. The Company was incapable of
properly assessing a major healthcare account whose losses far
exceeded assumptions that were made in underwriting. Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about ProAssurance, investors suffered damages.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics.

CONTACT:

The Schall Law Firm
Brian Schall, Esq.
310-301-3335
info@schallfirm.com [GN]


PRONTO CALIFORNIA: Luna Seeks Overtime Wages Under Labor Code
-------------------------------------------------------------
JENNY M. LUNA, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
aggrieved v. PRONTO CALIFORNIA GENERAL AGENCY, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER SERVICE COMPANY,
INC., a surrendered Delaware corporation; ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER &
CO., a surrendered Delaware corporation; ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER & CO.
INSURANCE BROKERS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., a California corporation;
ARTHUR J. GALLAGHER RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a Illinois
corporation; H & H AGENCY, INC., a California corporation; DASHERS
INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV24379 (Cal. Super., June 29,
2020), seeks civil penalties under Labor Code Private Attorneys'
General Act of 2004

The Plaintiff alleges that she and other aggrieved employees have
not been paid wages for all time worked, including overtime wages.
The Plaintiff also alleges that she is employed by the Defendants
as a non-exempt employee, with duties that included customer
service and insurance sales from January of 2017 through March 17,
2019.

Pronto California General Agency, LLC, is a Delaware limited
liability company and a subsidiary of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., a
US-based global insurance brokerage and risk management services
firm headquartered in Rolling Meadows, Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David D. Bibiyan, Esq.
          Diego Aviles, Esq.
          Sara Ehsani-Nia, Esq.
          BIBIYAN LAW GROUP, P.C.
          8484 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 500
          Beverly Hill, CA 90211
          Telephone: (310) 438 5555
          Facsimile: (310) 300 1705
          E-mail: david@tomorrowlaw.com
                  diego@tomorrowlaw.com
                  sara@tomorrowlaw.com


PROSHARES TRUST: Butler Appeals Decision in Ford Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Movants Thomas Butler, et al., filed an appeal from the District
Court's Opinion and Order dated January 3, 2020 and Judgment dated
January 3, 2020, entered in the lawsuit entitled Ford v. ProShares
Trust II, Case No. 19-cv-886, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge Denise
Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") in IN RE PROSHARES TRUST II
SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 19cv0886 (DLC) (S.D. N.Y.).

SVXY is a derivative financial product that loses value when stock
market volatility rises and gains value when the market is calm. On
Feb. 6, 2018, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") halted trading
for several hours in SVXY. When trading resumed in the late
morning, the SVXY share price had suffered a sharp drop.

The putative class action is brought on behalf of investors, who
purchased or otherwise acquired SVXY shares between May 15, 2017,
and Feb. 6, 2018. The Plaintiffs principally assert that a May 15,
2017 Registration Statement and related filings for the SVXY Fund
contained material omissions.

ProShares Trust II is a Delaware statutory trust that manages
investment funds with combined assets of $29 billion.  Among the
investment funds managed by ProShares are inverse and leveraged
exchange-traded funds ("ETFs"). The SAC alleges that ProShares is
one of the world's largest managers of these types of ETFs.

The appellate case is captioned as Ford v. ProShares Trust II, Case
No. 20-419, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.[BN]

Movants-Appellants Thomas Butler, III, Anthony Ludovici, and Lisa
Ludovici are represented by:

          Erin Whitney Boardman, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          58 South Service Road
          Melville, NY 11747
          Telephone: (631) 454-7710
          E-mail: eboardman@rgrdlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees ProShares Trust II, ProShare Capital
Management LLC, Todd B. Johnson, Edward Karpowicz, Michael L.
Sapir, Louis M. Mayberg, ABN AMRO Clearing Chicago, Deutsche Bank
Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC,
Knight Execution & Clearing Service, LLC, Merrill Lynch
Professional Clearing Corp., SG Americans Securities, LLC, Virtu
Financial BD LLC, and Newedge USA LLC are represented by:

          Robert A. Skinner, Esq.
          ROPES & GRAY LLP
          Prudential Tower, 800 Boylston Street
          Boston, MA 02199
          Telephone: (617) 951-7000
          E-mail: Robert.Skinner@ropesgray.com

               - and -

          Adam Selim Hakki, Esq.
          SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP
          599 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 848-4924
          E-mail: ahakki@shearman.com


PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL: LMB Appeals Order in Dowe Suit to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Leeds, Morelli and Brown PC filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled Dowe v. Prudential Financial
Inc., Case No. 18-cv-11633, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 20,
2020, Judge Denise Cote of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (i) granted Prudential's motion to compel
arbitration; (ii) denied LMB's motion to compel arbitration; and
(iii) granted LMB's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs Dowe, Moore, and Buckram are former employees of
Prudential and former clients of the law firm Leeds & Morelli, P.C.
or its successors ("LMB"). In the putative class action, the
Plaintiffs allege that LMB conspired with Prudential to settle
discrimination claims against Prudential for less than their true
value, in exchange for side payments from Prudential to LMB.

The appellate case is captioned as Dowe v. Prudential Financial
Inc., Case No. 20-16, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees Maureen Dowe, individually and on behalf of
those Class Members similarly situated, Elvie Moore, and Esther
Buckram are represented by:

          John W. Moscow, Esq.
          LEWIS BAACH KAUFMANN MIDDLEMISS PLLC
          The Chrysler Building
          405 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10174
          Telephone: (212) 826-7001
          E-mail: john.moscow@lbkmlaw.com

Defendants-Appellants Leeds, Morelli and Brown PC, Leeds, Morelli
and Brown LLP, Lenard Leeds, Steven A. Morelli, Jeffrey K. Brown,
Leeds Brown Law P.C. and Leeds and Morelli, PC are represented by:

          Janice J. DiGennaro, Esq.
          RIVKIN RADLER LLP
          926 RXR Plaza
          Uniondale, NY 11556
          Telephone: (516) 357-3000
          E-mail: janice.digennaro@rivkin.com


RANCHO FOODS: Fails to Pay Minimum & Overtime Wages, Pelayo Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
LUIS PELAYO, individually, and on behalf of aggrieved employees v.
RANCHO FOODS, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 through
100, inclusive, Case No. 20NWCV00359 (Cal. Super., Los Angeles
Cty., June 25, 2020), seeks civil penalties pursuant to the Private
Attorneys General Act, California Labor Code.

The complaint challenges the Defendants' alleged systemic illegal
employment practices resulting in violations of the Labor Code by
failing to pay all meal period wages and rest break wages, failing
to properly calculate and pay all minimum and overtime wages,
failing to provide compliant wage statements, failing to pay all
wages due and owing during employment and upon termination of
employment, and failing to reimburse all necessary business
expenses.

Rancho foods employed Mr. Pelayo as an hourly-paid non-exempt
employee.

Rancho Foods distributes meat products. The Company offers pork,
poultry, deli, and related products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Douglas Han, Esq.
          Shunt Tatavos-Gharajeh, Esq.
          Phillip Song, Esq.
          JUSTICE LAW CORPORATION
          751 N. Fair Oaks Ave., Suite 101
          Pasadena, CA 91103
          Telephone: (818) 230-7502
          Facsimile: (818) 230-7259


RNT PROFESSIONAL: Klotz Employees Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as ANDREAS KLOTZ and BRENDA
KOEHLER, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v.
RNT PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, LLC, and TERESA RULE, an individual,
Case No. CJ-2020-502 (Filed May 13, 2020), was removed from the
Oklahoma District Court, Cleveland County, to the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on July 1, 2020.

The Western District of Oklahoma Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:20-cv-00624-G to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs have asserted cause of action pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act for alleged failure to pay them, and those who
are similarly situated, minimum wages and overtime wages.[BN]

RNT is an information and cyber security firm with an expertise in
both small and large business security compliance.

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark Hammons, Esq.
          Amber L. Hurst, Esq.
          Brandon D. Roberts, Esq.
          HAMMONS, HURST & ASSOCIATES
          325 Dean A. McGee Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102

The Defendants are represented by:

          Elaine R. Turner, Esq.
          Lindsay N. Kistler, Esq.
          HALL, ESTILL, HARDWICK,
          GABLE, GOLDEN & NELSON, P.C.
          100 North Broadway, Suite 2900
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102-8865
          Telephone: (405) 553-2828
          Facsimile: (405) 553-2855
          E-mail: eturner@hallestill.com
                  lkistler@hallestill.com


SAN DIEGO, CA: J.F. Suit Dismissed Without Leave to Amend
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, J.F., a minor, individually and on behalf of a
proposed class, Plaintiff, v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-2495-CAB-LL (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Cathy Ann Bencivengo of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted Defendant San Diego Unified School
District's ("SDUSD") motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

Plaintiff J.F. is a minor who qualifies as an individual with a
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  The Plaintiff is enrolled as a
public-school student at Defendant SDUSD's Gage Elementary School
and alleges that as far back as 2017, SDUSD has known that its
staffing and funding for special education services was inadequate
when it was reported that the school board cut the department's
budget significantly.

The Plaintiff suffers from autism spectrum disorder and has speech
issues.  SDUSD and his parents developed an Individualized
Education Plan ("IEP") for the Plaintiff which entitles him to,
among other things, a 1:1 aide.  In October 2018, the Plaintiff's
mother learned that the 1:1 aide was being removed from his
classroom, so she wrote to the school principal that removal of the
aide would be detrimental to his education.  

After repeated attempts contacting school officials and board
members to follow up on the issue and the failure to provide an
updated IEP through April 2019, the Plaintiff finally received a
1:1 aide in May 2019, but only for the remaining three weeks of the
school year.  Throughout the 2019-2020 school year, SDUSD has again
failed to consistently provide the Plaintiff with the 1:1 aide,
which has resulted in an escalation of problematic behaviors and
unnecessary difficulties, ultimately denying him of a proper
education.

On Feb. 10, 2020, Plaintiff J.F., by and through his guardians ad
litem, individually and on behalf of a proposed class, filed the
First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleging: (1) violations of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"); (2) civil
rights violations; (3) violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"); and (4) violations of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.  

On Feb. 24, 2020, Defendant SDUSD moved to dismiss the FAC without
leave to amend.  SDUSD primarily contends that the Plaintiff failed
to exhaust the IDEA's administrative remedies.  The parties do not
dispute that the IDEA's exhaustion requirements apply equally to
each of the Plaintiff's causes of action.  However, the Plaintiff
avers that he and the class satisfy all three of the exceptions to
be excused from exhaustion.

The Plaintiff argues that exhaustion in the case is both futile and
inadequate because SDUSD had already agreed to provide a 1:1 aide
to the Plaintiff and the class but fails to provide the aides.
Therefore, he contends that the best outcome he and the class would
receive from an administrative proceeding is mere confirmation that
SDUSD failed to provide the 1:1 aides.

Judge Bencivengo holds that the Plaintiff has not shown that the
administrative process in the case would be futile or inadequate.
The administrative process has the potential for producing the
results the Plaintiff and the class seek in the case.  Ultimately,
he and the class seek consistent 1:1 aides as entitled by each of
their IEP's.  Whether that involves additional funding or resources
remains in question and the administrative process should be able
to resolve such issues.

The Plaintiff also argues that his complaint presents a facially
illegal policy and purely legal question. The purported policy is
SDUSD's failure to comply with him and the class members' IEP's -
specifically, the failure to allocate adequate funding and
resources to provide 1:1 aides.

The Judge holds that even where local school policies appear on
their face to violate the IDEA, administrative exhaustion may be
necessary to give the state a reasonable opportunity to investigate
and correct such policies.  The Plaintiff's characterization of a
systemic policy by SDUSD failing to allocate enough resources to
provide 1:1 aides appears overstated to overcome the exhaustion
requirements.  Further, even if the failure to allocate adequate
resources appears on its face to violate the IDEA, the Ninth
Circuit has held that administrative exhaustion may still be
necessary to give the state a reasonable opportunity to investigate
and correct such policy.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not shown
that this case presents a facially illegal policy such that
administrative exhaustion should be excused.

Finally, the Judge finds that the administrative process can
address the Plaintiff's and the class members' disputes and, if
they remain aggrieved after exhaustion of the administrative
process, they can bring a civil action at that time.  As stated by
the Ninth Circuit, the IDEA's exhaustion requirement "recognizes
the traditionally strong state and local interest in education, as
reflected in the statute's emphasis on state and local
responsibility."  Thus, it would be inappropriate for the Court to
consider this matter before the Plaintiff and the class give state
and local interests the opportunity.

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Bencivengo granted Defendant
SDUSD's motion to dismiss the FAC.  The Judge dismissed the
Plaintiff's FAC without leave to amend.  The Clerk of Court will
close the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/vLFtb3 from Leagle.com.


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Greif & Lawson Claims in Blakely Suit Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VICKI BLAKELY, STEVEN LAWSON, CHRISTY MITCHELL, LESLIE
WILLIAMS, JAMES ROLLAND, JAYNELLIS SALINAS, KATHLEEN JONES, ANNIE
BLUITT, SAMUEL CARTER, & KEVIN GREIF, on, behalf, of, themselves,
and, all, others, similarly, situated, Plaintiff, v. SANTANDER
CONSUMER USA INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:18-cv-01647-WBS-EFB (E.D.
Cal.), Judge William B. Shubb of the U.S. District Court for
Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division, granted the
Parties' Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice.

The matter before the Court is the joint stipulation of Plaintiffs
Grief and Lawson, and Defendant Santander Consumer to dismiss with
prejudice the Plaintiffs' individual claims against Santander
Consumer and to dismiss any claims that they assert on behalf of
absent the putative class members without prejudice.

Having considered the Parties' Stipulation of Dismissal with
Prejudice, and good cause appearing, Judge Shubb dismissed without
prejudice (i) Grief's individual claims against SC; (ii) Lawson's
individual claims against SC; and (iii) any claims that Grief and
Lawson assert on behalf of absent the putative class members in the
action.  Each party will bear its own attorneys' fees and costs
associated with the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/eAog2u from Leagle.com.


SARASOTA, FL: Renewed Bid for FLSA Certification Sought
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit styled as DESIREE ABELSON v. SARASOTA
COUNTY, FLORIDA, Case No. 8:19-cv-03092-VMC-SPF (M.D. Fla.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court for an order:

   1. granting her renewed motion for conditional certification
      of a Fair Labor Standards Act collection action on behalf
      of a class of:

      "all former and current employees of the Defendant who
      hold, or previously held, the positions of "Caseworker II"
      and "Caseworker III," in the three years prior to the
      filing of the complaint in this case";

   2. authorizing and/or facilitating notice to be sent to
      putative class members and the sending of follow-up
      postcards to any class members who have not responded 30
      days after the mailing of the initial notice, and
      requiring the Defendant to post the initial notice of this
      lawsuit and consent to sue affidavits in a conspicuous
      location in the workplace; and

   3. directing the Defendant to provide the Plaintiff's counsel
      with the last known addresses of all putative class
      members and the telephone number, date of birth, and last
      four digits of the social security number of any potential
      class members whose notice is returned by the post office,
      so that the Plaintiff's counsel may provide effective
      notice to the class.

This is the Plaintiff's second attempt at conditional certification
in this case. The Court denied the Plaintiff's initial motion for
condition certification because affidavits filed by the two opt-in
Plaintiffs failed to state whether (1) they were classified as
non-exempt; (2) were paid insufficient overtime compensation; and
(3) whether they were similarly situated in regard to their job
duties.

Ms. Abelson filed this action on behalf of herself and other
similarly situated current and former employees. She alleges that
Sarasota County, Florida willfully failed to pay her and a class of
similarly situated employees overtime wages in accordance with the
FLSA. The Plaintiff also filed an individual claim for wrongful
termination under Florida's Whistle-blower Act, however that claim
is unrelated to this motion.

The Plaintiff began working for the Defendant in June 2016. She was
initially hired to the position of "Caseworker II." After working
on this position for some time, she was promoted to the position of
"Caseworker III."

Sarasota County is located in Southwest Florida on the Gulf Coast.
As of the 2010 US Census, the population was 379,448. Its county
seat is Sarasota and its largest city is North Port with an
estimated 2018 population of 68,628.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the putative class are:

          Nicholas J. Castellano, II, Esq.
          Y. Drake Buckman, II, Esq.
          BUCKMAN & BUCKMAN, P.A.
          2023 Constitution Boulevard
          Sarasota, FL 34231
          Telephone: (941) 923-7700
          Facsimile: (941) 923-7736
          E-mail: nick@buckmanandbuckman.com
                  attorney@buckmandbuckman.com

SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY: Sanford Heisler Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
On June 23, 2020, Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP filed a class action
lawsuit against oil and gas behemoth Schlumberger Technology
Corporation, the largest oilfield services company in the world, on
behalf of women who work on oil rigs in the United States.

The Complaint documents a longstanding pattern of abuse in which
Schlumberger knowingly permits women who work on male-dominated oil
rigs to be sexually harassed, assaulted, and discriminated against
by their male colleagues.

The Plaintiff is represented by Michael D. Palmer, Nicole E.
Wiitala, and Carolin E. Guentert of Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP and
Todd Slobin and Melinda Arbuckle of Shellist Lazarz Slobin LLP.

Sexual Harassment, Discrimination, and Assault on Oil Rigs

Men dominate oil rigs.  Women make up only 5% of the Schlumberger
employees staffed on the hundreds of oil rigs to which the Company
provides services.  The lawsuit details how women on oil rigs are
sexually harassed, groped, leered at, objectified, threatened, and
labeled as "cunts," "bitches," and "sluts" who are undeserving of
equal pay by their male colleagues on the rig.

Schlumberger requires women to share living quarters and even a
bedroom with multiple men who work with them on the oil rig—often
the same men who sexually harass, denigrate, and discriminate
against them on a daily basis—making it impossible for women to
escape the harassment inflicted by their male colleagues.

Plaintiff Sara Saidman, who was just twenty-one years old when she
began working for Schlumberger as a Field Engineer, reached her
breaking point when one of her male colleagues (with whom she was
forced to share living quarters) encouraged other men to break into
her bedroom while she was sleeping and ignore her if she resisted
their sexual advances, assuring them that Ms. Saidman "likes it
whether or not she wants it" and "the more she screams, the more
she wants it."  Ms. Saidman alleges that she reported these
comments to a Human Resources representative, who responded by
asking her: "So you don't know what a joke is?"

"For years, women working on oil rigs have been bullied, harassed,
and abused by male workers," said Michael Palmer, a partner with
Sanford Heisler Sharp.  "By filing a class action lawsuit, Ms.
Saidman has put Schlumberger on notice that gender discrimination
will no longer be buried from public view."

Schlumberger Turns a Blind Eye to the Treatment of Women on Oil
Rigs

The Complaint alleges that Schlumberger makes it nearly impossible
for women who have been sexually harassed to find recourse.  The
Company's own written harassment policy requires women who have
been harassed to first "politely" confront the harasser themselves
before seeking assistance from management.  The lawsuit chronicles
how Schlumberger either ignores sexual harassment complaints
entirely, dismisses them as "just oil field talk" or "a joke," or
retaliates against the victim.

"Schlumberger's perpetual inaction and indifference to instances of
women being sexually harassed and discriminated against on oil rigs
makes it clear that the Company condones the treatment of women as
second-class citizens," said Sanford Heisler Sharp attorney Nicole
Wiitala.

According to the Complaint, Ms. Saidman was repeatedly advised
against reporting her experiences to Schlumberger and told to "get
over herself," "learn to deal with it," and "not make a fuss"
because seeking redress from the Company would "backfire" on her
and "torpedo" her career.  These warnings came to fruition: When
Ms. Saidman continued to complain about sexual harassment and
discrimination, Schlumberger swiftly retaliated against her by
terminating her employment.

"When Ms. Saidman reported egregious examples of sexual harassment
and gender discrimination to Schlumberger, she was targeted by the
Company.  This lawsuit is the only means Ms. Saidman has to remedy
the Company's past wrongs and ensure that women who work on oil
rigs are safe from harassment and discrimination," said Carolin
Guentert, an attorney at Sanford Heisler Sharp.

                     About Sanford Heisler Sharp

Sanford Heisler Sharp, LLP -- https://sanfordheisler.com/. -- is a
national public interest class-action litigation law firm, which
has offices in New York, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, San
Diego, Nashville, and Baltimore. Sanford Heisler Sharp focuses on
employment discrimination, wage and hour, qui tam, criminal/sexual
violence, and financial services matters. The firm represents
select individual clients such as executives, lawyers in employment
disputes, and whistleblowers. The firm has recovered over $1
billion for its clients. For more information about the firm, call
202-499-5202 or email dsanford@sanfordheisler.com. More information
about the firm and its successes can be found at
https://sanfordheisler.com/. [GN]


SCL HEALTH: Summary Judgment in Bratton MCPA Suit Upheld
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHERYL BRATTON, individually and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated Montanans, Appellants, v. SISTERS OF CHARITY
OF LEAVENWORTH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. d/b/a SCL HEALTH, Appellee, Case
No. DA 19-0357 (Mont.), Judge Jim Rice of the Supreme Court of
Montana affirmed the District Court's order (i) granting summary
judgment to SCL Health on Bratton's claims, and (ii) denying
Bratton's cross motions for summary judgment.

In January 2015, SCL Health began issuing refunds to its patients,
for such reasons as overpayment on an account, in the form of
prepaid MasterCard debit cards issued through Bank of America (the
Patient Refund Card Program or Program).  Prior to initiation of
the Program, SCL had effectuated patient refunds via bank drafts or
checks issued through its internal billing department. This
internal process cost SCL approximately $5 per check, and involved
delay in the issuance of refund checks to patients.  SCL
implemented the Program to reduce costs, as the cost of issuing
prepaid debit cards was approximately $3.50 each, and to provide
patients with more timely access to their refunds.

Bratton received services at a SCL Health facility in 2018, and
after Bratton's primary health insurer provided payment for those
services, SCL billed Bratton for the remaining cost, which Bratton
paid.  Subsequently, Bratton's secondary insurer also paid the
remaining cost.  Thus, SCL Health had been overpaid, and owed
Bratton a refund in the amount of $12.75, for which it initiated
issuance to Bratton of a Patient Refund Card from Bank of America
in that amount, in June of 2018.  In December 2018, under similar
circumstances, SCL Health had a second Patient Refund Card issued
to Bratton, in the amount of $15, bringing the total amount
refunded to Bratton through the Program to $27.75.

Under the Patient Refund Card Program, when a patient is owed a
refund, SCL Health transmits the amount, name, and contact
information of the patient to Bank of America.  Bank of America
removes the amount due to the patient from SCL Health's depository
account, creates and loads a prepaid debit card, and sends the card
to the patient.  For 14 days after the money has been debited from
SCL's account, SCL may request that the money be returned to its
account and the card unloaded. After fourteen days have passed, SCL
can no longer reverse the card transaction.

Along with the card, Bank of America also sends a short letter, or
card carrier, bearing SCL Health's logo to the patient.  The letter
explains that, upon activating the card, the patient may access her
funds in a number of ways without incurring any fee: the patient
may use the card as payment at any vendor who accepts MasterCard;
may take the card to any bank that accepts MasterCard and ask for
the card to be exchanged for cash; or, may withdraw the money on
the card at any Allpoint ATM, including 94 locations in Montana.
To activate the card, the patient need only call the Bank of
America number provided in the letter and enter the last four
digits of their phone number.  Although, by activating the card,
the patient agrees to Bank of America's terms of service for the
card, the patient is not required to open an account with Bank of
America.

The letter provides customer service telephone numbers for both SCL
Health and Bank of America.  At any time a balance remains on the
card, if the patient wishes to receive a check instead of using the
card, she may request a check.  Although checks may be issued even
after the card is activated, a patient does not need to activate
the card to request a check.  In Montana, as of Feb. 6, 2019, 194
checks were requested via this method and sent to patients for SCL
Health refunds.  The checks are issued without charge.

Neither SCL nor Bank of America retain unused funds associated with
the Program.  The Patient Refund Cards have a three-year expiration
date and, after the card expires, the Patient's money remains in
the account until the balance becomes eligible for escheatment to
the State of Montana after five years, in accordance with Montana's
unclaimed property statute.

Bratton did not incur any fees associated with either of the refund
cards she was issued.  Her husband activated the first refund card,
but the card was not used.  She did not activate the second card,
request issuance of checks for the cards, use the cards to pay for
goods, withdraw the money from the cards at an ATM, or exchange the
cards for cash at a bank.

In October 2018, Bratton brought the suit against SCL Health,
alleging constructive trust, conversion, unjust enrichment,
violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), money
had and received, and declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
During her deposition in the case, Bratton made her first request
to SCL that the cards be cancelled, and that checks be issued for
her refunds.  Pursuant to that request, SCL asked Bank of America
to issue checks to Bratton for her total refunds, which Bank of
America did.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and after
hearing, the District Court issued an order granting SCL Health's
motions for summary judgment and denying Bratton's cross motion for
summary judgment.  Bratton appeals the dismissal of her claims for
declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment and constructive trust,
money had and received, and unfair trade practices under the MCPA.
She does not appeal the dismissal of her conversion claim.

First question before the Supreme Court is whether the District
Court erred by granting SCL Health's motion for summary judgment
based on Bratton's request for a declaratory judgment that SCL
violated Section 28-1-1002, MCA.  Bratton asserts the District
Court erred by denying her declaratory claim that SCL Health's use
of the Patient Refund Card Program violated Section 28-1-1002, MCA.
SCL answers that use of the Program does not violate the statute
because it does not transfer or otherwise discharge SCL Health's
obligation to pay Bratton.  Rather, the Program is simply a
financial mechanism by which SCL fulfilled its obligation to
Bratton.

The Supreme Court concludes the District Court did not err in
holding SCL Health is entitled to summary judgment regarding
Bratton's request for a declaration that SCL violated Section
28-1-1002, MCA, by refunding the money it owed to her through the
Patient Refund Card.  Bratton's attempt to equate SCL's inability
to reverse a transfer from its bank account to a debit card after
14 days, to the disclaimer of liability by the insurer in AICCO,
Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., is not persuasive . Unlike the insurer
in AICCO, Inc., SCL did not contend that, after 14 days, it no
longer owed Bratton the money.  Rather, after 14 days, SCL's funds
remained in an account, which would not revert to SCL.  Thus, in
addition to involving the obligations of an insurer, AICCO, Inc.,
concerned a disclaimed liability not at issue in the instant case.

The next question before the Supreme Court is whether the District
Court erred by granting SCL Health's motion for summary judgment on
Bratton's request for a constructive trust based on unjust
enrichment.  Bratton argues she is entitled to relief on her claim
of unjust enrichment because SCL Health indisputably saved money by
implementing the Program, which SCL unjustly retained the benefit
of in light of its violation of Section 28-1-1002, MCA.  SCL Health
contends the District Court correctly entered summary judgment in
its favor because Bratton "cannot prove that SCL Health unjustly
retained the benefit she conferred," as SCL returned the value of
her refund to her.

The Supreme Court holds concludes that the District Court did not
err by holding SCL was entitled to summary judgment on Bratton's
unjust enrichment claims, and therefore, was not entitled to the
remedy of constructive trust.  The Supreme Court is unpersuaded by
Bratton's argument that the benefit conferred in the case is the
money SCL Health saved by issuing her a prepaid debit card rather
than a check.  In any event, Bratton eventually requested issuance
of her refunds by checks, which were issued to her, and therefore
any savings SCL could have obtained under the Program did not occur
in her case, eliminating any "benefit conferred."

Turning to the third question before the Court, whether the
District Court erred by granting SCL Health's motion for summary
judgment on Bratton's Montana Consumer Protection Act claim, the
Supreme Court concludes that the District Court did not err in
concluding SCL Health is entitled to summary judgment on Bratton's
MCPA claims.  Bratton did not establish that SCL had transferred
its obligation or otherwise disclaimed liability for her refunds.
Similarly, while Bratton is not required to show actual damages to
support a MCPA claim, she has not established an ascertainable
loss.  Because he finds Bratton was not entitled to bring suit
under Section 30-14-133(1), MCA, he need not further address
Bratton's claims that SCL Health's actions were deceptive or
unfair.

Finally, the fourth question before the Supreme Court is whether
the District Court erred by granting SCL Health's motion for
summary judgment on Bratton's "money had and received" claim.
Bratton contends the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment to SCL on her money had and received claim because it is
undisputed that SCL was obligated to return Bratton's overpayment
but rather than returning the overpayment directly to Bratton, SCL
paid it to Bank of America, ceded all control over the funds, and
disclaimed any further liability.  SCL maintains Bratton's claim
for money had and received fails because Bratton received the funds
owed to her by SCL Health through the prepaid debit cards.
Similarly, the District Court held that SCL Health paid Bratton the
money it owed her, and therefore, Bratton's claim failed.

Based on the record in Bratton's individual case, the Supreme Court
concludes that the District Court did not err by granting summary
judgment to SCL Health on Bratton's money had and received claims.
As determined, Bratton received the money owed to her by SCL
Health.  Additionally, as he has concluded, SCL Health's use of
Bank of America to distribute the payments does not equate to SCL
Health disclaiming the obligation to refund the money to Bratton.

Based on the record in Bratton's individual case, the Supreme Court
concludes that the District Court did not err by granting summary
judgment to SCL Health on Bratton's claims, and by denying
Bratton's cross motions for summary judgment.  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's rulings.

A full-text copy of the Montana Supreme Court's April 14, 2020
Order is available at https://is.gd/3PmIvZ from Leagle.com.

John Heenan -- john@lawmontana.com -- Joe Cook --
joe@lawmontana.com -- Heenan & Cook, PLLC, Billings, Montana.

Michael P. Manning -- mmanning@rmkfirm.com -- Ritchie Manning Kautz
PLLP, Billings, Montana, for Appellants.

Robert C. Lukes -- rclukes@GARLINGTON.COM -- Garlington, Lohn &
Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, Montana.

Kathryn A. Reilly -- reilly@wtotrial.com -- Jessica G. Scott,
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP, Denver, Colorado.

For Amici Curiae Montana Legal Services, National Consumer Law
Center, and National Association of Consumer Advocates:

David K. W. Wilson, Jr. , Morrison, Sherwood, Wilson & Deola, PLLP,
Helena, Montana.

Mark Elliott Budnitz -- mark.elliott@pillsburylaw.com -- Bobby Lee
Cook , Georgia State University College of Law, Atlanta, Georgia.

For Amici Montana Bankers Association, American Bankers
Association, and Consumer Bankers Association

Kenneth K. Lay -- klay@crowleyfleck.com -- Crowley Fleck, PLLP,
Helena, Montana, for Appellee.


SD PROTECTION: Decision & Order on Fisher Suit Settlement Entered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL FISHER, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SD PROTECTION INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 17 Civ. 2229 (RMB) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Richard
M. Berman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York has entered a decion and order on the parties'
settlement.

Having reviewed the record, Judge Berman advises the parties as
follows:

     a. Lee Litigation Group's proposed costs and fees are not
reasonable based upon the factors set forth in Goldberger v.
Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000).  Goldberger is
widely applied by district courts in assessing the reasonableness
of attorneys' fees in wage cases.

     b. The Court recommends that the Plaintiff's counsel receive:
(i) $4,733.60 to cover their costs; and (ii) $9,096.40 as
reasonable attorneys' fees.

     c. The Court would approve the $25,000 settlement as "fair and
reasonable" under Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d
199 (2d Cir. 2015) and the factors set forth in Wolinsky v.
Scholastic Inc., 900 F.Supp.2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) and Noel v.
Laidlaw & Company, LTD, 16-Civ. 3975, slip op. at 3. (See July 27,
2018 Order at 2); and

     d. The Court would approve a Plaintiff's award in the amount
of $11,170 reflecting, among other things, the Complaint's NYLL
claims.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant will submit any comments they may
have in writing without delay.

The Plaintiff's counsel's application, dated March 4, 2020, which
requests that the Court "grants Plaintiff's May 23, 2019 Motion to
Enforce the Settlement and enters judgment in the amount of $21,000
(representing the outstanding settlement balance), plus $1,650
representing time spent by the Plaintiff's counsel in connection
with enforcement of the settlement, so the Plaintiff may begin
collection procedures," is denied as moot as there is currently no
approved settlement.

The Court is fully prepared to conduct a trial on the merits of the
case in the event that a settlement cannot be reached by the
parties.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Decision &
Order is available at https://is.gd/6oWZ5I from Leagle.com.


SEATTLE, WA: Lawsuits Pile Up v. Mayor Over Protest Handling
------------------------------------------------------------
Evie Fordham, writing for FOXBusiness, reports that the lawsuits
are starting to pile up for Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan over the
city's handling of the Capitol Hill Occupied Protest, where a
shooting left one man dead earlier in June.

Washington attorney Jacob Bozeman recently filed a suit against
Durkan and Washington Gov. Jay Inslee, both Democrats, over CHOP,
part of a Seattle neighborhood where protesters calling for racial
justice have tried to create a police-free zone.

"Allowing a group of people to say who comes, who goes, that's a
violation of the 1st, 4th and 14th Amendments," Bozeman told FOX
Business. "Damage has been done to all the citizens who wanted to
exercise their free rights."

Roughly 30 people have reached out to him to either thank him or
ask to join the lawsuit, Bozeman said. He's practiced law in the
area for 29 years.

"What if every special interest group wanted to take over a portion
of the city?" Bozeman said.

"I can't understand how anybody could say the mayor and the
governor of the state should abdicate their enforcement authority .
. . to just give that up to an armed group of people who aren't
elected."

Bozeman said he visited CHOP twice.

"I certainly felt danger, a very well-founded danger of physical
violence against me if I were to do anything that wasn't down with
the program," he said.

"We intend to review this complaint and respond accordingly," the
Seattle City Attorney's Office told KING 5.

In addition to Bozeman's suit, Durkan also faces a class action
lawsuit from area businesses who say she and other leaders allowed
lawlessness to take over part of Seattle.

FOX Business' inquiries to Bozeman, Durkan's office and Inslee's
office were not immediately returned. [GN]


SIMPLY HEALTHCARE: Jenkins TCPA Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as NAKIA JENKINS, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. SIMPLY HEALTHCARE
PLANS, INC., Case No. 2020-011730-CA-01 (Filed June 3, 2020), was
removed from the Florida Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(Miami) on June 29, 2020.

The Southern District of Florida Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-22677-XXXX to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff asserts claims against Simply Healthcare purportedly
arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, based on a
single text message allegedly sent without recipients' prior
express consent.

Simply Healthcare is a Florida licensed health maintenance
organization offering health plans for people enrolled in Medicaid
and/or Medicare programs.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                  gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelberg, Esq.
          Aaron M. Ahlzadeh, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (786) 289-9471
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                  aaron@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Michael Eisenband, Esq.
          EISENBAND LAW, P.A.
          515 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 120
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 533-4092
          E-mail: meisenband@eisenbandlaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 400-4713
          E-mail: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com

               - and -

          Ignacio J. Hiraldo, Esq.
          IJH Law
          14 NE First Ave., 10th Floor
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (786) 351-8709
          E-mail: ijhiraldo@ijhlaw.com

Defendant Simply Healthcare is represented by:

          Gillian D. Williston, Esq.
          TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
          222 Central Park Avenue, Suite 2000
          Virginia Beach, VA 23462
          Telephone: (757) 687-7500
          Facsimile: (757) 687-7510
          E-mail: gillian.williston@troutman.com


SMITH MEDICAL: Arkin Suit Stayed Pending Prelim Settlement Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DR. STEVEN ARKIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SMITH MEDICAL
PARTNERS, LLC, et al., Defendants, Consolidated Case No.
8:19-cv-2410-T-36TGW, Case No. 8:19-cv-1723-T-36AEP (M.D. Fla.),
Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, (i) granted the
Defendants' Motion to Stay Pending Preliminary Settlement Approval,
and (ii) granted in part and denied in part the Pillbox Plaintiffs'
Motion for Entry of a Supplemental Case Management Order and a
Confidentiality Order.

The case involves three consolidated actions.  In September 2017,
Dr. Steven Arkin filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida
against Smith Medical Partners and H.D. Smith, LLC for alleged
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA").  The Florida Court dismissed the lawsuit based on a
stipulation by the parties, but the settlement was subsequently
terminated.  Thereafter, Dr. William P. Sawyer filed a class action
lawsuit against the Defendants in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, entitled Sawyer v. Smith Medical
Partners, LLC, et al.  Additionally, Pressman, Inc., Weston Pill
Box, Inc., Davie Pill Box, LLC, and Pill Box Pines West, LLC
("Pillbox Plaintiffs") filed a class action lawsuit against the
Defendants in Illinois state court, entitled Pressman, Inc., et al.
v. Smith Medical Partners, LLC, et al., which was removed to the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  The
Northern District of Illinois consolidated Pillbox with Sawyer and
transferred Sawyer to the Florida Court.

Meanwhile, in July 2019, the Plaintiff filed the present action
against the Defendants.  Following the transfer of Sawyer to the
Florida Court, the Court consolidated Sawyer with the present
action on Dec. 18, 2019.  In consolidating Sawyer with the present
action, the Florida Court explained that the cases involve common
questions of law or fact and discovery would overlap.  It also
explained that consolidation would conserve resources, at least
during the initial stages and for discovery purposes.  The Anderson
+ Wanca law firm represents Plaintiff Arkin and Plaintiff Sawyer,
whereas the Bock Hatch law firm represents the Pillbox Plaintiffs.

On Dec. 10, 2019, the Florida Court entered the Case Management and
Scheduling Order in the action.  The Pillbox Plaintiffs filed the
Motion for Supplemental CMSO on Jan. 6, 2020.  Significantly,
Plaintiff Pressman filed its Renewed Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement and Certification of Settlement
Class on Feb. 21, 2020.  Plaintiff Arkin opposes the Motion for
Preliminary Approval.  The Defendants move the Florida Court to
stay the litigation while it evaluates the proposed settlement.

In the Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiff Pressman moves
individually and as the representative of the proposed settlement
class for preliminary approval of the parties' settlement
agreement.  The attached settlement agreement provides that it is
by and between Plaintiff Pressman, on behalf of itself and a
settlement class of purportedly similarly situated persons, and the
Defendants.  According to the Motion for Preliminary Approval, the
Defendants and Plaintiff Pressman agreed to define the "settlement
class" as, except as otherwise provided, "All persons who were
sent, by or on behalf of H.D. Smith, LLC or Smith Medical Partners,
LLC, one or more advertisements by facsimile from Sept. 26, 2013
through Jan. 25, 2019."  The Motion for Preliminary Approval also
references proposed settlement provisions, such as the Defendants
paying $4.5 million into a non-reversionary Settlement Fund, at
least $3.25 million of which will be paid to claiming class
members.

Given the implications that approving the settlement would have on
the action, Judge Honeywell holds that a limited stay is warranted.
The Defendants' arguments are persuasive, the Judge says.  Based
on the terms of the settlement agreement, including the "settlement
class" definition, preliminarily approving the settlement would
avoid duplicative discovery efforts and related, overlapping
issues.  These efforts and issues may ultimately prove unnecessary
if the Court approves of the settlement.  Entering a limited stay
of the action will allow the parties -- and the Court -- to focus
on the propriety of the Motion for Preliminary Approval.
Therefore, the Judge will exercise its broad discretion to grant
the Defendants' request for a stay.  In doing so, she emphasizes
that the stay will be limited in duration, for a period of 120
days.

In the Motion for Supplemental CMSO, filed before the Motion for
Preliminary Approval and Motion to Stay, the Pillbox Plaintiffs
request the Court to: (1) order that all deadlines in the Case
Management and Scheduling Order, which was entered before the
consolidation of Sawyer with the action, are applicable to Sawyer
and Pillbox, and, therefore, a Rule 26(f) conference is unnecessary
for Plaintiff Sawyer and the Pillbox Plaintiffs; (2) order that the
Agreement regarding Discovery and Use of Confidential Discovery
Materials, as agreed by the parties in the initial Arkin case,
applies to the action; and (3) order the Defendants to answer or
otherwise respond to the Sawyer and Pillbox complaints within 28
days or, if the Court orders the filing of a consolidated
complaint, within 28 days of the consolidated complaint's filing.

The Judge holds that requiring the parties to abide by different
deadlines during the action's preliminary stages and discovery
would thwart the stated purpose of conserving resources.  Plaintiff
Arkin's argument is thus unavailing.  Of course, to the extent that
a party seeks modification of a deadline in the Case Management and
Scheduling Order, the entry of an amended case management and
scheduling order, or another Rule 26(f) conference, that party may
request such relief.

As for the request for the Court to implement a confidentiality
agreement, the request is due to be denied without prejudice in
light of the Court's decision to impose a stay.  The Pillbox
Plaintiffs may renew the request following the stay, as needed.

Finally, the Defendants did not respond to the complaints in Sawyer
or Pillbox prior to consolidation.  In consolidating Sawyer with
this action, the Court explained that it could not yet determine
whether the cases should be tried together.  Consequently, whether
the actions will remain consolidated following the stay remains to
be seen.  Permitting the Defendants to forego answering or
responding to the Sawyer and Pillbox complaints would significantly
stall litigation in the event of future un-consolidation.  Thus,
the plaintiffs from Sawyer and Pillbox will file their respective
complaints, as originally filed in those actions, on the docket
within seven days of the conclusion of the stay, as needed.  Within
21 days thereafter, the Defendants will respond to the complaints.

Accordingly, Judge Honeywell granted the Defendants' Motion to Stay
Pending Preliminary Settlement Approval to the extent that the
action is stayed for 120 DAYS from the date of the Order.  The
Clerk is directed to administratively close the case.  Any party
may move to lift the stay and re-open this case at the conclusion
of the 120 days or the issuance of an order on Plaintiff Pressman's
Renewed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement
and Certification of Settlement Class, whichever occurs first.

Judge Honeywell granted in part and denied in part the Pillbox
Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of a Supplemental Case Management
Order and a Confidentiality Order.  The deadlines in the Case
Management and Scheduling Order apply to all parties to this
action.  A party seeking a modification of a deadline therein, an
amended case management and scheduling order, or another Rule 26(f)
conference may move for such relief.  

The Pillbox Plaintiffs' request for the Court to implement a
confidentiality agreement is denied without prejudice to the
Pillbox Plaintiffs' right to renew such request following the
conclusion of the stay, as needed.  Within seven days from the
conclusion of the stay, Plaintiff William P. Sawyer and the Pillbox
Plaintiffs will file their complaints from Sawyer, et al. v. Smith
Med. Partners, LLC, et al., No. 8:19-cv-2410-T-36TGW (M.D. Fla.)
and Pressman, Inc., et al. v. H.D. Smith, LLC, et al., No.
1:19-cv-4826 (N.D. Ill.), respectively.  The Defendants will
respond to each complaint within 21 days from the date of that
complaint's filing.

A full-text copy of the Florida Court's April 3, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/XDYenF from Leagle.com.


SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc.
(SRNE).  Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition
the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about
each case can be found at the link provided.

Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. ( SRNE)

Class Period: May 15, 2020 to May 22, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 27, 2020

On May 15, 2020, Sorrento announced that it had discovered an
antibody that had "demonstrated 100% inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 virus
infection." On that same day, Defendant Henry Ji, founder and Chief
Executive Officer of Sorrento referred to Sorrento's breakthrough
as a "cure."

On this news, Sorrento shares increased $4.14 to close at $6.76 on
May 15, 2020. The stock continued to increase after hours and
opened at $9.98 on May 18, 2020, trading at a high of $10.00 that
same day, which represented an increase of 281.7% from the May 14,
2020 closing price.

On May 20, 2020, Hindenburg Research issued a report doubting the
validity of Sorrento's claims and calling them "sensational,"
"nonsense" and "too good to be true."

On this news, Sorrento shares closed at $5.70 per share on May 20,
2020, representing a decline of $4.30, or 43.0%, from the Class
Period high.

Finally, on May 22, 2020, BioSpace published an article stating
that in a May 21, 2020 interview with Defendants Ji and Brunswick,
Ji "insist[ed] that they did not say it was a cure."

On this news, Sorrento shares closed at $5.07 per share on May 22,
2020, representing a decline of $4.93, or 49.4%, from the Class
Period high.

The complaint, filed on May 26, 2020, alleges that Sorrento failed
to disclose that: (i) the Company's initial finding of "100%
inhibition" in an in vitro virus infection will not necessarily
translate to success or safety in vivo, or in person; (ii) the
Company's finding was not a "cure" for COVID-19; and (iii) as a
result of the foregoing, the lawsuit alleges that Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.

For more information on the Sorrento class action go to:
https://bespc.com/SRNE

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country.

Contact:

        Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
        Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
        Marion Passmore, Esq.
        Tel: (212) 355-4648
        E-mail: investigations@bespc.com
        Web site: http://www.bespc.com/
[GN]


SOUTH CAROLINA: SCE&G Appeals Ruling in Cook Suit to 4th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, SCANA Corporation
and SCANA Services, Inc., filed an appeal from a court ruling in
the lawsuit entitled Jessica S. Cook, et al., PLAINTIFFS v. South
Carolina Public Service Authority, et al., DEFENDANTS, Case No.
6:19-cv-03285-TLW, in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina at Greenville.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case arose
out of a project to build two new nuclear power plants at the V.C.
Summer Nuclear Station in South Carolina (the Project). SCE&G and
South Carolina Public Service Authority, an agency of the State of
South Carolina (also known as Santee Cooper) jointly owned the
Project. After several years of construction, the Project was
abandoned in 2017, following the bankruptcy of the contractor hired
to build the nuclear plants.

The Plaintiffs are eight individuals, who allege to be "direct" or
"indirect" utility customers of the South Carolina Public Service
Authority. They claim that they purchased electricity either
directly from Santee Cooper or through certain electric
cooperatives, including Central Electric Cooperative, Inc. and
Palmetto Electric Cooperative, Inc., that distributed power
purchased from Santee Cooper.

The Plaintiffs claim that Santee Cooper charged them increased
utility rates--either directly or through Central, Palmetto, or
another electricity cooperative--to finance the Project.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that Santee Cooper customers
have financed approximately $4.7 billion in pre-construction,
capital, in-service, construction, interest, and other
pre-operational costs associated with the Project.

The Plaintiffs allege that Santee Cooper and SCE&G mismanaged
critical aspects of the Project and that they should not have been
required to pay increased utility rates to cover Project-related
costs. The Plaintiffs seek actual, consequential, and punitive
damages on that basis.

The appellate case is captioned as SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS
COMPANY; SCANA CORPORATION; and SCANA SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants-Petitioners v. SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY,
an agency of the State of South Carolina (also known as Santee
Cooper), et al. Defendants-Respondents, v. JESSICA S. COOK, CORRIN
F. BOWERS & SON, CYRIL B. RUSH, JR., BOBBY BOSTICK, KYLE COOK,
DONNA JENKINS, CHRIS KOLBE, RUTH ANN KEFFER, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs
Respondents, Case No. 20-134, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents JESSICA S. COOK, CORRIN F. BOWERS & SON,
CYRIL B. RUSH, JR., BOBBY BOSTICK, KYLE COOK, DONNA JENKINS, CHRIS
KOLBE, RUTH ANN KEFFER, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, are represented by:

          Ross A. Appel, Esq.
          Clayton B. McCullough, Esq.
          MCCULLOUGH KHAN, LLC
          359 King Street
          Charleston, SC 29401
          Telephone: (843) 937-0400
          E-mail: ross@mklawsc.com
                  clay@mklawsc.com

               - and -

          Jerry Hudson Evans, Esq.
          Edward J. Westbrook, Esq.
          RICHARDSON, PATRICK, WESTBROOK & BRICKMAN, LLC
          1037 Chuck Dawley Boulevard
          Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464-0000
          Telephone: (843) 727-6500
          E-mail: jevans@rpwb.com
                  ewestbrook@rpwb.com

               - and -

          Jessica L. Fickling, Esq.
          Joseph Preston Strom, Jr., Esq.
          STROM LAW FIRM, LLC
          2110 North Beltline Boulevard
          Columbia, SC 29204
          Telephone: (803) 252-4800

               - and -

          Gregory Galvin, Esq.
          GALVIN LAW GROUP, INC.
          P. O. Box 887
          Bluffton, SC 29910
          Telephone: (843) 277-2231

               - and -

          Daniel Haltiwanger, Esq.
          Terry E. Richardson, Jr., Esq.
          RICHARDSON, PATRICK, WESTBROOK & BRICKMAN, LLC
          1730 Jackson Street
          Barnwell, SC 29812-0000
          Telephone: (803) 541-7850
          E-mail: dhaltiwanger@rpwb.com
                  trichardson@rpwb.com

               - and -

          Whitney Boykin Harrison, Esq.
          MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC
          1517 Hampton Street
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 779-0100

               - and -

          Ranee Saunders, Esq.
          James Lamar Ward, Jr., Esq.
          MCGOWAN HOOD & FELDER, LLC
          321 Wingo Way
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 988-7202

               - and -

          Vincent Austin Sheheen, Esq.
          SAVAGE, ROYALL & SHEHEEN, LLP
          P. O. Drawer 10
          1111 Church Street
          Camden, SC 29020-0000
          Telephone: (803) 432-4391

               - and -

          Algernon Gibson Solomons, III, Esq.
          Daniel A. Speights, Esq.
          SPEIGHTS & SOLOMONS
          100 Oak Street, E
          Hampton, SC 29924
          Telephone: (803) 943-4444

Defendants-Petitioners SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY; SCANA
CORPORATION; and SCANA SERVICES, INC. are represented by:

          David L. Balser, Esq.
          Jonathan R. Chally, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING, LLP
          1180 Peachtree Street, NE
          Atlanta, GA 30309-3521
          Telephone: (404) 572-4600
          E-mail: dbalser@kslaw.com
                  jchally@kslaw.com

               - and -

          I. Cason Hewgley, IV, Esq.
          Ashley Charles Parrish, Esq.
          Kathryn Running, Esq.
          Amy R. Upshaw, Esq.
          KING & SPALDING, LLP
          1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20006-0000
          Telephone: (202) 626-2627
          E-mail: chewgley@kslaw.com
                  aparrish@kslaw.com
                  krunning@kslaw.com
          
Defendants-Respondents SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY,
a/k/a Santee Cooper, an agency of the state of South Carolina, et
al., are represented by:

          Allen Mattison Bogan, Esq.
          William C. Hubbard, Esq.
          B. Rush Smith, III, Esq.
          Carmen Harper Thomas, Esq.
          NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP
          P. O. Box 11070
          Columbia, SC 29211
          Telephone: (803) 255-9589
          E-mail: matt.bogan@nelsonmullins.com
                  william.hubbard@nelsonmullins.com
                  rush.smith@nelsonmullins.com
                  carmen.thomas@nelsonmullins.com


SPECIALTY COMMODITIES: Settlement in Quiroz Gets Prelim Approval
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW QUIRUZ, on behalf of himself, all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SPECIALTY COMMODITIES, INC., a
North Dakota corporation; ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY, a
business entity form unknown; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 5:17-cv-03300-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Beth
Labson Freeman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California, San Jose Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement.

The Court rules that Named Plaintiff Quiroz is a suitable class
representative and is appointed as the Class Representative for the
Settlement Class.  The Court also orders that Named Plaintiff's
counsel, Shaun Setareh and William M. Pao of the Setareh Law Group,
is experienced in matters of this nature and is appointed as the
Class Counsel for the Settlement Class.

The proposed Settlement Class and the California FLSA Collective
defined in the Settlement are provisionally certified for purposes
of the settlement only.

The proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement is sufficient to
inform Class Members of the terms of the Settlement, their rights
under the Settlement, their rights to object to the Settlement,
their rights to dispute their number of workweeks, and their rights
to elect not to participate in the Settlement; the processes for
doing so; and the date and location of the final approval hearing,
and are therefore approved.

A Final Approval Hearing on the question of whether the proposed
Settlement, attorneys' fees and costs to the Class Counsel, payment
to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency, and the Named
Plaintiffs' enhancement awards should be finally approved as fair,
reasonable, and adequate as to the members of the Class is
scheduled in Courtroom 3 of the Court on Sept. 10, 2020 at 9:00
a.m.

The Court approved, as to form and content, the Notice of Class
Action Settlement.  The Court approved the procedure for the
Settlement Class members to participate in, to opt out of, and to
object to, the Settlement as set forth in the Class Notice.

The Court directed the mailing of the Class Notice Packet to all
the Settlement Class members by First-Class Mail.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 3, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/bu0zRP from Leagle.com.

Shaun Setareh -- shaun@setarehlaw.com -- William M. Pao, Alexandra
R. McIntosh, SETAREH LAW GROUP, Beverly Hills, California,
Attorneys for Plaintiff, ANDREW QUIRUZ.


SPRINT/UNITED MGMT: Bid to Limit Communications in Amaraut Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VLADIMIR AMARAUT, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 3:19-cv-411-WQH-AHG (S.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California denied the Defendant's Motion
for Order Limiting Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' Counsel's
Communication with Class and Collective Members.

On Nov. 1, 2019, Plaintiffs Amaraut, Katherine Almonte, Corbin
Beltz, Kristopher Fox, Dylan McCollum, and Quinn Myers filed their
First Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint against the
Defendant.  There, the Plaintiffs brought a hybrid collective and
class action: an "opt-in" collective action for FLSA claims and an
"opt-out" state-specific class action for state law wage and hour
claims.

On Dec. 12, 2019, the Defendant filed a Notice of Settlement in two
related actions, Navarette v. Sprint/United Management Company, No.
8:19-cv-794-AG-ADS (C.D. Cal.) and Navarette v. Sprint/United
Management Company, No. 30-2019-01062047-CU-OE-CXC (Orange Cnty.
Super. Ct.) ("Navarette lawsuits"), which had settled via private
mediation.  The same day, the Defendant filed an Emergency Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order, requesting that the Court halts
notice administration in the instant case in light of the Navarette
settlement, which the Plaintiffs opposed, and the Court ultimately
denied.

On Dec. 20, 2019, the parties filed a Joint Motion for
Determination of Discovery Dispute, in which the Plaintiffs sought
to compel production of putative class and collective members'
contact information.  In anticipation that the Court would order
the Defendant to produce the contact information to the Plaintiffs,
on Dec. 27, 2019, the Defendant filed its Motion for Order Limiting
Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' Counsel's Communications with Class and
Collective Members.  Though the Defendant requested that the Court
consider both issues concurrently when evaluating the discovery
motion, the Court denied the Defendant's request to shorten the
briefing schedule on its motion to limit the Plaintiffs' and the
Plaintiffs' counsel's communications.

On Jan. 14, 2020, the Court issued its order resolving the parties'
discovery dispute and ordered the Defendant to produce contact
information for the putative class and collective members to the
Plaintiffs.  

The Defendant seeks an order from the Court prohibiting the
Plaintiffs and their counsel from (1) commenting in any way
regarding the settlement of the Navarrete lawsuits; (2) providing
an opinion of any kind regarding the class members' rights as
relates to the Navarrete lawsuits and settlement of those lawsuits;
and (3) encouraging the class members in any way to opt-out of the
Navarrete settlement or to opt-in to the instant action.  The
Plaintiffs contend that the Court should deny the Defendant's
requests because the Defendant's motion is based on speculation and
fear, when the Supreme Court requires a clear record and specific
findings.  In response, the Defendant asserts that there are
specific facts that warrant a limitation on communications.

Judge Goddard evaluates whether the Defendant has identified
potential or actual abuses sufficient to justify the imposition of
an order limiting communications.  After considering the
Plaintiffs' statements in context, and given that there is no
evidence the Plaintiffs' statements directly coerced or mislead the
putative class members, Judge Goddard finds that the Defendant has
not identified actual abuses that warrant an order limiting
communications.

Having decided that the Plaintiffs' statements were not abusive,
misleading, or coercive, the Judge addressed the Defendant's
argument that there is a high risk of abuse.  He finds that
Defendant has presented only speculative concerns and, as such, the
Defendant has not identified adequate potential abuses that warrant
an order limiting communications.  The Plaintiffs do not have the
employer-employee relationship with the putative class members, so
the Defendant's concerns regarding a heightened likelihood for
coercion are not persuasive.

In requesting that the Plaintiffs and their counsel be prevented
from commenting or providing an opinion regarding the settlement of
the Navarette class action and PAGA lawsuit, the Defendant
implicitly asserts that the Plaintiffs know information about the
Navarette settlement.  

The Judge is persuaded by the Plaintiff's citation to the Court's
order denying the Defendant's motion for temporary restraining
order.  The Defendants provide no evidence that the Plaintiffs have
communicated with the putative class members to convince them to
opt-out of the Navarette settlement.  The Judge declines to limit
communications on such speculative concerns.  Moreover, the Judge
is highly skeptical of the Defendant's professed concern for the
class members.  The Defendant has an obvious interest in limiting
the number of opt-outs from the Navarette class as much as
possible, because if a person is a class member in Navarette and in
the case, that person will potentially lose their claim in this
case if they do act affirmatively to opt out of Navarette.

Alternatively, had the Court found that the Defendant sufficiently
demonstrated that there was a clear record and specific findings of
abusive, misleading, or coercive communications, as opposed to mere
speculation, any limitation narrow enough to the circumstance is
already in place.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Goddard finds that the Defendants
have not shown that actual abuse has occurred or that there is a
high potential for abuse, and instead based its motion on
speculation.  Accordingly, Judge Goddard denied the Defendant's
Motion for Order Limiting Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' Counsel's
Communication with Class and Collective Members.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/tSZ9f1 from Leagle.com.


STEINHOFF: Averts Disgruntled Shareholders' Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Ann Corty, writing for The Citizen, reports that a recent court
ruling has closed a door for disgruntled Steinhoff shareholders.

The court's decision prevents a Steinhoff shareholder from
launching a class action intended to get compensation for the
losses suffered by thousands of individual investors as a result of
the R185 billion collapse in value of the group's shares in late
2017 and early 2018.

"If politicians want shareholders to be able to hold directors to
account they will have to change the law," said one legal expert in
response to the decision by the South Gauteng High Court in a
Steinhoff-related matter.

The decision means that the first shareholder class action to apply
for certification before a South African court has come to an
abrupt, and possibly permanent, end.

The court's ruling is being hailed as a victory by the 42
respondents -- including Steinhoff, its directors, auditors and
financial advisors -- but is likely to incur the wrath of
parliamentarians who have been tracking Steinhoff-related
developments since early 2018.

Widespread impact

In an unprecedented move, reflecting the widespread impact of the
collapse in the Steinhoff share price, representatives from the
company as well as a number of regulators were called before
parliament in January 2018 to explain the events behind the
collapse. The same parties have been called back to provide updates
on a regular basis to parliamentarians, who have exhibited
increasing signs of frustration at the apparent lack of
accountability at senior corporate level.

On December 5, 2017, Steinhoff issued a press release informing
shareholders that information had come to light concerning
"accounting irregularities" and also that CEO Markus Jooste had
resigned, and that publication of the 2017 results was being
postponed indefinitely. Over the next few weeks the share price
plummeted from over R50 to around R2.

Read: Jooste profited from Steinhoff land deal in 2007, filings
show

Retired pensioner Anthea de Bruyn, who bought Steinhoff shares for
R80 000 between 2013 and 2016, was hoping the court would grant her
the authority to represent thousands of individual Steinhoff
shareholders in a class action case against the parties alleged to
have contributed to the 'accounting irregularities'.

Read: Steinhoff's former CEO rebuffs demand for return of R850m in
pay

De Bruyn's lawyers, who are being financed by parties who will be
paid a percentage of any funds recovered, opted to use Section
218(2) and Section 20(6) of the Companies Act. The former section
reads: "Any person who contravenes any provision of this act is
liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that
person as a result of that contravention."

Section 20(6) also encourages the view that individual shareholders
have claims against directors.

It reads: "Each shareholder of a company has a claim for damages
against any person who intentionally, fraudulently or due to gross
negligence causes the company to do anything inconsistent with this
act."

Ruling trumps arguments

Sadly for De Bruyn, the court found that a ruling in a 177-year old
English case trumped her legal arguments.

"That shareholders should seek redress, given the scale of their
losses, is unsurprising," said Judge David Unterhalter in the South
Gauteng High Court.

"That this is sought to be done by way of a class action entails
some novelty.

"The premise of the application for certification is that many
retail investors, who have suffered losses important to them, will
not be able to bring their cases to court, if these claims are
brought by each shareholder. Like Ms De Bruyn, their claims are too
modest to justify the cost of complex litigation.

"A class action, however, would secure access to the courts and the
prospect of redress for thousands of individual shareholders who
lack the resources of institutional investors," said Unterhalter on
page six of his 100-page ruling.

Ninety three pages later, the judge confirms De Bruyn does not have
a 'triable' case, which is why he could not grant the necessary
certification.

The rule that dictated that De Bruyn's case was not 'triable' was
set all the way back in England in 1843 in the Foss v Harbottle
matter. The essence of that ruling was that the shareholders
suffered losses because the company was wronged by its directors,
therefore it was only the company that was able to sue the
directors.

It is explained in Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 that
the Foss v Harbottle rule is the consequence of the fact that the
corporation is a separate legal entity; other consequences are
limited liability and limited rights: "The company is liable for
its contracts and torts, the shareholder has no such liability,"
states Henochsberg.

Expectations of the law

"I am aware that this conclusion [not to certify De Bruyn's
application] will disappoint the expectations of Steinhoff
shareholders that the law must be able to compensate them for
losses," said Unterhalter, explaining that the action relied upon
by De Bruyn's lawyers -- largely Section 218(2) and Section 20(6)
of the Companies Act -- doesn't allow for such compensation.

But in what may be an attempt to encourage further action by De
Bruyn or other frustrated shareholders, Unterhalter suggests there
is still hope.

"This does not mean the shareholders are without remedy. It is for
the Steinhoff companies to hold the Steinhoff directors and
Deloitte liable for any breach of duty to the companies that caused
loss. If the Steinhoff companies will not do so, the Companies Act
makes generous provision in S.165 for shareholders to require the
Steinhoff companies to commence legal proceedings," said
Unterhalter.

That so-called 'generous provision' has only been tested once. In
United Manganese vs Mbethe, the aggrieved shareholders lost on a
technicality in the Supreme Court of Appeal.

Read: The winners in the Steinhoff mess

An additional discouragement for shareholders tempted to pursue a
Section 165 derivative action is that, if successful, any
compensation is paid to the company. This is of little use to many
of Steinhoff shareholders who dumped their shares in the aftermath
of the December 2017 meltdown.

Furthermore, to launch a class action based on Section 165
shareholders will have to persuade a court that the company is not
already taking the necessary action against the directors.

Meanwhile, parliamentarians may want someone to explain why Section
20 of the Companies Act does not allow shareholders to make claims
against directors; and if that is always in the best interests of
corporate accountability. [GN]


TEZOS: ICO Class Action May Conclude in $25MM Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------
Osato Avan-Nomayo, writing for Coin Telegraph, reports that the
Tezos (XTZ) class-action lawsuit from law firm Block & Leviton will
likely conclude in a $25-million settlement on August 27.  Tezos,
like many initial coin offerings (ICO) from 2017, has come under
scrutiny from both investors and regulators alike alleging that its
token sale constituted an illegal offering of securities.

Indeed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has come
down hard on numerous 2017-era ICOs demanding penalties for
securities violation.  Even distributions to non-U.S. citizens have
also come under the SEC's radar, as was the case with Telegram.

The SEC has consistently maintained that most ICOs are indeed
unlicensed securities offerings despite pushback from stakeholders
in the country to exempt a wider range of tokens from securities
regulation.  With more jurisdictions paying greater attention to
crypto-based fundraising, the ICO model appears to be a thing of
the past with more focus on regulated token sales.

One settlement to rule them all

In late October 2017, Block & Leviton revealed that it was opening
an investigation into the Tezos ICO for securities fraud.  By
mid-December of 2017, the Boston-based law firm, which specializes
in securities cases, sued the principal actors in the Tezos ICO.

By the time Block & Leviton initiated its own legal proceedings,
the Tezos Foundation and Dynamic Ledger Solutions -- the company
created by Tezos co-founder Arthur Breitman -- was already the
subject of two other lawsuits. In November 2017, cases against
Tezos were also filed in Federal District courts in California and
Florida respectively.

The suit also came amid a power struggle within the project itself.
This internal wrangling even affected the release of the XTZ tokens
to investors who participated in the $232 million ICO back in July
2017.

In early 2018, the SEC refused a request for information by the
plaintiffs in the Florida case. According to the SEC at the time,
the release of such documents could impede any future enforcement
activities. The U.S. securities regulator has so far not brought
any charges against the principal actors in the Tezos ICO.

By August 2018, these lawsuits became consolidated into one case
before the Northern District Court of California.  As reported by
Cointelegraph at the time, U.S. District Judge Richard Seeborg
refused to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the case, paving
the way for the matter to move forward.

With the court refusing to dismiss the case and the lawsuit
dragging on for about two years, the Tezos Foundation announced its
intention to seek a settlement in March 2020.  At the time, the
Foundation declared that a one-time settlement was preferable to
the legal fees associated with a long-drawn-out court battle.

SEC immunity for $25 million

At the start of May, Cointelegraph reported that the court had
granted preliminary approval for a $25-million settlement in the
Tezos ICO class-action lawsuit.  In an email to Cointelegraph, a
spokesperson for the Tezos Foundation commented on the decision to
settle the case, stating:

"The Tezos Foundation chose to settle all claims because the
Foundation believes it is in the best interest of the Tezos project
and community as a whole to resolve all pending lawsuits. The
Foundation continues to believe the lawsuits were meritless and
continues to deny any wrongdoing. But lawsuits are expensive and
time-consuming, and the Tezos Foundation decided that the one-time
financial cost of a settlement was preferable to the distractions
and legal costs associated with continuing to fight in the courts.
The Tezos Foundation can now focus on its mission to support the
long-term success of the Tezos protocol and ecosystem."

Block & Leviton has already notified Tezos ICO investors to submit
claims to be eligible for a share of the settlement offer.  Final
arguments on the case will take place in August, at which time the
court will determine if $25 million constitutes reasonable
restitution for the plaintiffs and if legal fees are covered in the
payment.

Despite moving to settle the lawsuit, the Tezos Foundation
maintains that its 2017 ICO broke no laws, declaring:  "The
Foundation does not believe that it did anything wrong, and it did
not admit to any wrongdoing as part of the settlement."

Cointelegraph also reached out to the legal representatives of both
sides of the case but has received no comments as of the time of
writing.

Aside from putting an end to the consolidated class-action
lawsuits, the $25-million settlement could also prevent any future
enforcement action by the SEC. Quentin Herbrecht, CEO of blockchain
marketing platform Markchain, offered a similar argument in
conversation with Cointelegraph.

According to Herbrecht, "The plaintiffs such as the general belief
think that Tezos agreed to settle this fine to prevent the SEC from
re-characterizing their ICO as illegal securities offering, and
this could have been a fatal blow to the project. I sincerely
believe that if the agreement is accepted, it will be a lesser evil
for the foundation and the Tezos team, which currently holds more
than $635 million in various assets."

For the Tezos Foundation, the conclusion of the case will give
project developers a clearer path towards achieving their stated
goals.  A spokesperson for the foundation told Cointelegraph:

"The rapid growth of the ecosystem is clearly evident with rising
interest to build on Tezos. Between BTG Pactual's issuance of
ReitBZ on the Tezos blockchain, the creation of tzBTC a 1:1
Bitcoin-backed token on the Tezos blockchain created by a group of
Swiss crypto firms and a host of industry leading developer tools
that have integrated Tezos, such as Truffle and Magic, we are
seeing more and more use cases and implementations. We look forward
to what the rest of 2020 has in store."

SEC enforcement hammer and the demise of the ICO model

While the Tezos Foundation might escape the SEC, the commission has
been going after ICOs, securing millions of dollars in penalties
paid by errant projects. In one of the highlights of 2020, the SEC
went head-to-head with Telegram, leading to discontinuation of its
planned crypto operations after raising over $1.7 billion in a
pre-sale back in 2018.

For Herbrecht who is also a consultant and project evaluator for
the European Union's Horizon 2020, the issue lies with projects
failing to understand American securities regulation, adding:

"From my point of view, it was important for the SEC to look in the
ICOs, in order to achieve regulation and prevent malicious players
from taking advantage of less experienced investors [. . .].  We
can clearly see that at the moment the SEC is at war with ICOs who
have not registered their token as a security (and have its
properties), with the example of Bitclave recently. It is therefore
up to the project leader who wishes to raise funds in the U.S.A. to
find out about these laws and obligations, to comply with them or
to find a way for his tokens to be purely ‘utility' and to be
100% sure of it at the risk of suffering the wrath of the SEC later
on."

The SEC's ICO enforcement action has not spared celebrities like
boxing champion Floyd Mayweather and music producer DJ Khaled,
charging both with illegal endorsement activities. Both individuals
did eventually see their parts in the matter dropped from the
case.

However, there is some contention that the SEC's enforcement action
is not the same across the board. Critics of the commission say
some projects are forced to pay hefty fines while others get away
with only a slap on the wrist.

The lack of clarity over how securities law should be applied to
ICO tokens is also affecting the American crypto trading scene.
Trading platforms in the U.S., wary of running afoul of regulators,
are often forced to geofence certain altcoin tokens or create a
separate trading arena for their customers stateside.

Currently, Congress is considering bills like the Token Taxonomy
Act and the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020. The former seeks to create
a provision where altcoin tokens do not fall under securities
regulation while also establishing a de minimis tax exemption for
crypto gains under a specified threshold. The latter legislative
piece aims among other things to divide digital assets into
distinct categories as well as the Federal regulatory agencies that
will have jurisdiction over each cadre.

The seemingly unrelenting actions of the SEC against ICOs has
reportedly contributed to the decline of the fundraising method.
With regulators across the world insisting on regulated token
offerings, startups seem to be pivoting towards equity funding or
creating security token offerings (STO). Back in March 2020,
Cointelegraph reported that ICO fundraising plummeted 95%
year-over-year in 2019. [GN]


TOP SHIPS: 2nd Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Onel Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in
the case captioned MOSHE ONEL, AMARDEEP SINDHU, JOEL SOFER,
Movants-Appellants, CHRISTOPHER BRADY, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED, MICKEY NARDIELLO, ZHENZHE WANG,
Plaintiffs, TOMY LUCKOSE, ANTHONY NGUYEN, CARLA BYRD, TODD
LOCCISANO, JOSEPH M. PETITE, MARTINE-VIVIANNE PETITE, Movants, v.
TOP SHIPS, INC., EVANGELOS J. PISTIOLIS, ALEXANDROS TSIRIKOS,
KALANI INVESTMENTS LIMITED, MURCHINSON LTD., MARC BISTRICER, XANTHE
HOLDINGS, LTD., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-2693-cv, (2nd
Cir.).

Plaintiffs Moshe Onel, Amardeep Sindhu, and Joel Sofer were
appointed as lead plaintiffs on behalf of a putative class of
shareholders of defendant-appellee Top Ships, Inc. ("Top Ships")
who purchased or acquired the company's common stock between
November 23, 2016, and April 3, 2018.  

Defendant-appellee Evangelos Pistiolis is the CEO and President of
Top Ships, and defendant-appellee Alexandros Tsirikos is the
company's CFO.  (Court refers to Top Ships, Pistiolis, and
Tsirikos, collectively, as the "Top Ships defendants").
Plaintiffs' claims arise from a series of transactions undertaken
by Top Ships during the class period: Top Ships entered into a
number of share-purchase agreements with two affiliated hedge
funds, defendants-appellees Kalani Investments Ltd. ("Kalani") and
Xanthe Holdings Ltd. ("Xanthe"), which are alleged to be controlled
by defendant-appellee Murchinson Ltd. ("Murchinson"), a Canadian
hedge fund itself controlled by defendant-appellee Marc Bistricer.
(Court refers to Kalani, Xanthe, Murchinson, and Bistricer,
collectively, as the "Kalani defendants").  In addition to the
share purchase agreements with Kalani and Xanthe, Plaintiffs
identify a number of "reverse stock splits," as well as certain
other share issuances and purchase agreements with third parties,
as collectively amounting to a "death spiral financing scheme"
jointly undertaken by the Top Ships and Kalani defendants.

The Complaint alleges five causes of action sounding in securities
fraud.  The first three are alleged against all defendants: Count I
alleges the making of material misrepresentations or omissions in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5(b);
Count II alleges market manipulation in violation of Section 10(b)
and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c); and Count III alleges market
manipulation in violation of Sections 9(a)(2) and (4) of the
Exchange Act.  Count IV alleges that Pistiolis, Tsirikos,
Murchinson, and Bistricer were "control persons" of their
respective entities and thus liable under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.  And finally, Count V alleges that, based on the
underlying violation of Section 10(b), the Kalani defendants were
liable to the class members as contemporaneous traders under
Exchange Act Section 20A.

The two sets of defendants moved separately to dismiss the entire
Complaint.  In August 2019, the district court granted both
motions, reasoning primarily that the Complaint failed to state a
claim because the transactions comprising the allegedly fraudulent
scheme were fully disclosed to the investing public and, further,
that the Complaint failed to allege any actionable
misrepresentation or omission.  The district court also denied
Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint, concluding that any
amendment would be futile.  

Movants-appellants Moshe Onel, Amardeep Sindhu, and Joel Sofer
(collectively, "Plaintiffs") appeal from the dismissal of their
Consolidated Amended Class-Action Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Market Manipulation Claims

A claim of market manipulation requires a showing that the
defendants took some action that was intended to mislead the
investing public concerning the price of the relevant security,
which in turn requires an allegation that the defendants' conduct
included a misrepresentation or nondisclosure.

Here, Plaintiffs do not -- and cannot -- argue that any of the
individual transactions comprising the alleged scheme were not
fully disclosed. The full terms of each purchase agreement were
disclosed via Top Ships' public registration statements.

Unable to point to any nondisclosure related to a specific
transaction within the alleged scheme, Plaintiffs argue that the
Complaint alleges manipulation via the failure of the defendants to
disclose the full nature or extent of the alleged scheme to
investors at its outset.  As the district court correctly noted,
however, such an allegation falls short of stating a claim for
manipulation.  The Complaint does not allege any specific fact that
would give rise to a plausible inference that the defendants knew
or intended either that the parties would undertake the number and
scope of transactions they ultimately did, or that the transactions
would have the cumulative effect on Top Ships' value that they
ultimately did.

Without more, Plaintiffs' claim is essentially that the defendants'
failure to disclose at the outset that they were undertaking a
manipulative scheme transformed their transactions into a
manipulative scheme.  The Second Circuit agrees with the district
court that this version of Plaintiffs' claim amounts to circular
reasoning, such that Plaintiffs' allegations of a manipulative act
are fatally conclusory.  For this reason, the Second Circuit
affirms the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' market
manipulation claims.

Misrepresentation/Omission Claims

The Second Circuit likewise agrees with the district court that the
Complaint fails to state a claim for misrepresentation or omission
in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b).  As the district
court's order thoroughly documents, none of the statements
identified in the Complaint constitute a material misrepresentation
or omission, and the statements are therefore not actionable.   

Nowhere do Plaintiffs plead with the requisite particularity that
there was any such agreement or that the defendants otherwise knew
that their disclosures to the market were materially inaccurate or
incomplete.

Because each of the identified alleged misrepresentations or
omissions is not actionable, the Second Circuit agrees that
dismissal of these claims was appropriate.

Secondary Claims

Because it agrees with the district court that Plaintiffs fail to
state a claim for either market manipulation or a material
misrepresentation or omission, the Second Circuit further agrees
with the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' related secondary claims.
Because Plaintiffs' allegations concerning the scheme cannot
support a claim that the Kalani defendants possessed any material,
nonpublic information, Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Kalani
defendants engaged in insider trading or any other violation of the
securities laws -- and thus do not state a claim under Section 20A
of the Exchange Act.

Plaintiffs' claims against Murchinson and Bistricer were also
rightly dismissed, the Second Circuit adds.  The Complaint does not
allege any specific conduct by either defendant sufficient to
support a claim that they themselves violated the securities laws.


And, lastly, the Complaint also does not state a claim that these
defendants may be liable as "control persons" under Exchange Act
Sec. 20(a), 15 U.S.C §78t(a), because, Plaintiffs fail to allege a
primary violation of the securities laws, the Second Circuit
opines.

Denial of Leave to Amend

Finally, the Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's
denial of leave to amend the Complaint.  Though generally leave to
amend should be given freely in the context of market manipulation
claims, the Second Circuit agrees with the district court that in
this case, the flaw in Plaintiffs' claim - that the defendants
fully disclosed each of the complained-about transactions - could
not be readily remedied via amendment.  As a result, any amendment
would be futile.

In sum, the Second Circuit affirms the judgment of the district
court.

A full-text copy of the Second Circuit's April 2, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/vth3aem from Leagle.com.

LEIGH M. HANDELMAN SMOLLAR R - lsmollar@pomlaw.com - Pomerantz LLP,
Chicago, IL; Cara Joy David ,  600 3rd Ave Fl 20, New York, NY
10016-1917, Jeremy Alan Lieberman -  jalieberman@pomlaw.com -
Pomerantz LLP, New York, NY, for Movants-Appellants.

MICHAEL G. BONGIORNO - michael.bongiorno@wilmerhale.com - Jeremy
Adler - jeremy.adler@wilmerhale.com - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP, New York, NY; Felicia H. Ellsworth -
felicia.ellsworth@wilmerhale.com - Peter J. Kolovos -
peter.kolovos@wilmerhale.com - Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, For Defendants-Appellees Top Ships, Inc.,
Evangelos J. Pistiolis, Alexandros Tsirikos.

NOAH GILLESPIE - noah.gillespie@srz.com - Peter H. White -
pete.white@srz.com - Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, Washington, DC, For
Defendants-Appellees Kalani Investments Ltd., Murchinson Ltd., Marc
Bistricer, Xanthe Holdings, Ltd.


TRUEACCORD CORP: $2,640 in Attorneys' Fees in Zuniga Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARISA ZUNIGA, Plaintiff, v. TRUEACCORD, Defendant,
Case No. 2:18-cv-00683-KG-KRS (D. N.M.), Magistrate Judge Kevin R.
Sweazea of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
denied the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees.

On Dec. 4, 2020, the Court denied the Defendant's renewed motion to
compel seeking production of the Plaintiff's retainer agreement
with her attorney.  As the prevailing party, the Plaintiff asks the
Defendant to pay $2,640 representing 9.6 hours it took her attorney
to respond to Defendant's motion, an amount, the Plaintiff insists,
is considerably less than normal.  The bulk of the preparation
occurred as part responding to the Defendant's original motion to
compel.  For its part, the Defendant disagrees that attorney fees
are warranted and insists its motion was substantially justified.

Magistrate Judge Sweazea has considered the parties' submissions
and determines that attorneys' fees are not warranted under the
circumstances.

The Defendant's motion to compel sought the Plaintiff's retainer
agreement as the class representative in the case.  The Court
denied that motion for two reasons.  First, the request that
specifically asked the Plaintiff to produce the document was
untimely.  Second, to the extent the Defendant relied on a timely
propounded "catch all" request, that request was too broad for the
Plaintiff's attorney to divine that it sought the retainer
agreement.

As initial matter, federal courts disagree whether, in a class
action lawsuit, a retainer agreement has bearing on suitability of
a plaintiff to serve as a class representative, among other
elements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The Tenth Circuit
has not offered any guidance.  Considering a lack of controlling
authority and the competing positions of other courts, the
Defendant had a basis in law and fact to ask for the Plaintiff's
retainer agreement.

The Defendant's specific request was, of course, untimely and the
timely catch all request for documents that might encompass the
retainer agreement was overly broad.  At the same time, however,
the defense counsel did ask during the Plaintiff's deposition for
the retainer agreement, which occurred within the extended
discovery window.  The Plaintiff's counsel indicated that he would
take the full 30 days to respond to the request but did not raise
timeliness at that point.  Under the Federal Rules and the Court's
scheduling order, the Defendant was obligated to propound a request
for production in writing and with enough time to allow the
Plaintiff to respond before the discovery period expired.
Nonetheless, exercising his discretion, the Magistrate determines
that the circumstances militate against an award of fees.

Moreover, while the timely request was broad, at least a colorable
argument exists that its language encompassed the retainer
agreement.  Taking the view of courts that have found relevant and
required the production of retainer agreements, the one at issue in
the case is a document or other tangible item which refer to,
concern, relate to, or reflect on the Plaintiff's adequacy to serve
as representative of other persons you allege are similarly
situated in the litigation.  The Court did not ultimately share the
Defendant's view and declined to exercise its discretion to narrow
the request to include the retainer agreement.  But had the Court
narrowed the request as it could have, it is unlikely the Plaintiff
would be seeking fees.  In sum, given the unsettled nature of the
law and taking into account the totality of the other
circumstances, the Magistrate concludes an award of attorneys' fees
is unwarranted.

Accordingly, the Court denied the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys'
fees.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/9yZEQi from Leagle.com.


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Drivers' Class Action Can Move Forward
---------------------------------------------------------
AFP reports that the Supreme Court of Canada cleared the way for a
CAD400 million (USD300 million) class action lawsuit to force Uber
to recognise drivers as employees, while ruling on June 26 its
arbitration scheme void.

In an eight-to-one decision, the top court found that the
ride-share company's costly arbitration process to settle disputes
is "unconscionable and therefore invalid".

"Respect for arbitration is based on its being a cost-effective and
efficient method of resolving disputes," Chief Justice Richard
Wagner wrote in the decision.

"When arbitration is realistically unattainable, it amounts to no
dispute resolution mechanism at all."

The case involved David Heller, a delivery driver for UberEats who
sought in 2017 to launch a class-action to force Uber to recognise
its drivers as employees rather than independent contractors.

He was opposed to a new Uber compensation package, and wanted for
drivers a minimum wage, vacation pay and other protections under
Canadian labour laws.

Uber, seeking to quash the litigation, insisted that his grievances
must be dealt with through arbitration.

It cited a contract clause requiring disputes between drivers and
the company to be arbitrated in the Netherlands, at an upfront cost
of USD14,500. But the top court said arbitration was "out of reach
for him and other drivers in his position".

"His contractual rights are, as a result, illusory," it said.

The Supreme Court also agreed with the Ontario appeals' court that
said the arbitration scheme amounted to an illegal outsourcing of
employment standards.

Uber has long argued it is merely a platform linking self-employed
drivers with riders, a model which allows for avoidance of certain
taxes and social charges as well as paid vacations.

However that practice, which underpins the gig economy that
employees 1.7 million Canadians or 8.2 per cent of the workforce,
has increasingly come under legal attack in many countries.

In March, a French court ruled in a similar case against Uber's
appeal of a 2019 decision that a former driver who sued the firm
effectively had a work contract. It found that Uber had control
over the driver by his connection to the app which directs him to
clients, and thus should not be considered an independent
contractor but an employee.

Heller no longer works for Uber.

But his court victory is seen as another step toward recognition of
gig economy workers as employees, rather than contractors. [GN]


UNITED AIRLINES: Utley Suit Moved From N.D. Ohio to N.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as PAMELA M. UTLEY; ANDREA
UTLEY; and ALEXANDRA C. SCHROCK, On behalf of herself and all those
similarly situated v. UNITED AIRLINES HOLDINGS, INC. AND UNITED
AIRLINES, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-00756 (Filed April 7, 2020), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois (Chicago) on June 25, 2020.

The Northern District of Illinois Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-03727 to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge John Robert Blakey.

According to the complaint, United has cancelled and/or effectively
cancelled and/or caused the Plaintiffs and Class Members to incur
such significant delays regarding their contracted flights that
United must provide the Plaintiffs and Class Members with full and
immediate refunds for the unused portion(s) of their respective
flight tickets, but United refuses to offer and/or provide said
full and immediate refunds.

The Plaintiffs purchased airfare directly from United for travel
within the United State of America and internationally, including
airfare for travel between Ohio and Paris, France.

United is a major American airline headquartered at Willis Tower in
Chicago, Illinois. United operates a large domestic and
international route network spanning cities large and small across
the United States and all six continents.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Thomas John Connick, Esq.
          CONNICK LAW, LLC
          25201 Chagrin Blvd.
          Cleveland, OH 44122
          Telephone: (216) 364-0512
          E-mail: tconnick@connicklawllc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Scott Raymond Torpey, Esq.
          JAFFE, RAITT, HEUER & WEISS, PC
          27777 Franklin Road, Suite 2500
          Southfield, MI 48034


UNITED PARCEL: Grigorian Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as MAEROUJAN GRIGORIAN, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated v. UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE, INC., an OHIO corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
Inclusive, Case No. 20STCV12175 (Filed March 26, 2020), was removed
from the Superior Court of the State of California for the County
of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California on June 26, 2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-05720 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's "policies and procedures
were applied to all non-exempt warehouse employees in California at
times during the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint
and resulted in non-exempt warehouse employees working time which
was not compensated any wages as required under California law."
The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant "never paid" the
unpaid minimum and overtime wages or meal and rest period premiums
allegedly owed to the Plaintiff and putative class members
following their separation of employment from the Defendant.

United Parcel is an American multinational package delivery and
supply chain management company.[BN]

The Defendant United Parcel is represented by:

          Tritia M. Murata, Esq.
          Wendy J. Ray, Esq.
          Maya Harel, Esq.
          Lauren R. Leibovitch, Esq.
          MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
          707 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 6000
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-3543
          Telephone: 213 892 5200
          Facsimile: 213 892 5454
          E-mail: TMurata@mofo.com
                  WRay@mofo.com
                  MHarel@mofo.com
                  LLeibovitch@mofo.com


UNITED STATES: 6th Cir. Vacates Summary Judgment for DHS in Jones
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated a district
court judgment granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in
the case captioned KYISHA JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEH
JOHNSON, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 18-2252. (6th Cir.).

Kyisha Jones appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment
to her employer, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
dismissing her Title VII failure-to-promote sex-discrimination
claim after permitting only limited discovery.

Jones began working as an Immigration Maritime Inspector in June
2002.  She was a Customs and Border Protection Officer (CBPO) from
2003 until April 2007, when she was awarded a position as CBP
Enforcement Officer (CBPEO).  In 2011, Jones applied for promotion
to Supervisory CBP Officer (SCBPO) (vacancy 382705). Roderick
Blanchard, Port Director for Detroit CBP Field Operations since
February 2008, recommended that four males and one female be
promoted in the June 2011 round of promotions, and one male and one
female in the August 2011 round of promotions. Christopher Perry,
Blanchard's superior, accepted Blanchard's promotion
recommendations; Jones was not promoted.  All seven of those who
received promotions were promoted under vacancy 382705 and were
drawn from the same pool of applicants.  

Jones filed her complaint in May 2014.  Jones's twenty-four count
amended complaint alleged that her gender was a factor that made a
difference in Defendant's decision not to promote her on two
occasions in 2011, and that Defendant was predisposed to
discriminate on the basis of gender and acted in accordance with
that predisposition. Jones alleged that Defendant's actions
constituted both a violation and a continuous violation of Title
VII.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment,
asserting that "Plaintiff fails to establish that the male
candidate's discipline was comparably serious to Plaintiff's
suspension."  Relying on Blanchard's declaration, the district
court dismissed Jones's sex-discrimination claim without permitting
Jones any discovery.

Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
limiting and denying her discovery.  At issue is the district
court's February 13, 2018 opinion denying most of the discovery
Jones sought in her second application for stay, which requested,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(d), an opportunity to conduct
discovery before the district court ruled on Defendant's
dispositive motion.

On review, the Sixth Circuit notes that the district court's
rulings, in effect, accepted as unassailable Blanchard's
determination that a certain "Danny" was the only proper male
comparator -- but an employer may not unilaterally determine who is
similarly situated to a plaintiff alleging employment
discrimination. Bobo v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F.3d 741,
749 (6th Cir. 2012).

Defendant maintains that much of the discovery Jones sought is not
relevant, pointing to the fact that Jones was provided the entire
job selection file, which was what Blanchard reviewed.  But
Blanchard's deposition testimony is clear that his decision not to
recommend Jones for promotion was based on asserted statements of
the APDs, not just the contents of the job selection file.  The
district court should have permitted Jones to depose APDs Nowack
and Beculheimer, whose statements Blanchard relied on in not
promoting Jones, the Sixth Circuit opines.

Defendant also asserts that the district court correctly denied
Jones's request to depose a Human Resources representative because
Jones already possessed the Merit Promotion Plan, thus such
deposition testimony would have been duplicative.  Defendant is
incorrect; the Merit Promotion Plan does not address the length of
time disciplinary actions remain in personnel records and the use
of disciplinary actions in staffing decisions.  In addition,
Defendant at no time addressed Jones's affidavit asserting that the
rule under which she was suspended in 2007, two years earlier than
Danny was suspended in 2009, had been changed or eliminated and
thus no longer resulted in disciplinary action.  A Human Resources
representative can shed light on that issue as well.  In addition,
a Human Resources representative can shed light on whether the two
promotion rounds were a unitary process, and how the candidates'
ratings and rankings were arrived at.  The district court should
have permitted Jones to depose a Human Resources representative,
the Sixth Circuit relates.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit vacates the grant of summary
judgment to the Department of Homeland Security on the basis of the
district court's unduly restrictive discovery rulings, and remands
for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

A full-text copy of the Sixth Circuit's January 2020 Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/uhqjbu9 from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Adelanto ICE Immigrant Detainees File Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rebecca Plevin, writing for Palm Springs Desert Sun, reports that
detained immigrants in Southern California are alleging that staff
at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in the Mojave Desert are
disinfecting the facility amid the pandemic by spraying hazardous
chemicals in poorly ventilated areas, causing people to develop
bloody noses, burning eyes and coughing fits, which could further
spread the coronavirus.

Immigrant advocates, attorneys and members of Congress are now
decrying the practice and calling for answers.

Chris Arissol, a Seychelles native who has been detained at
Adelanto for about 22 months, said guards "constantly" spray a
product called HDQ Neutral on door handles, railings and tables,
even while people are eating and drinking nearby.

HDQ Neutral "destroys antibiotic-resistant bacteria including MRSA
and tough viruses," according to manufacturer Spartan Chemical.
Safety data posted on the company's website warns the product is
harmful if swallowed or inhaled, and causes severe skin burns and
eye damage. It says people should not eat or drink when using the
product and should not breathe the mist vapors or spray. It should
be used "only outdoors or in a well-ventilated area."

"They really shouldn't be spraying it by us," Arissol said. "It
might be different if there was some sort of ventilation, but
there's nothing."

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement defends its use of
disinfectants at Adelanto during the pandemic.

In a brief filed in federal court on June 26, lawyers for ICE said
the agency has been ordered to follow the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention's guidance on managing COVID-19 in
correctional and detention facilities, which contains cleaning and
disinfecting protocols. The guidance allows for the possibility of
"lifting restrictions on undiluted disinfectants."

The brief was filed a part of a class-action lawsuit filed in
federal court in April to demand a drastic reduction in the number
of people detained at the Mojave Desert detention center during the
pandemic.

"The CDC requires facilities to implement intensified cleaning and
disinfecting procedures that include EPA-registered disinfectants
effective against the virus that causes COVID-19," attorneys wrote
in a footnote. "The CDC advised that such cleaning procedures may
require lifting restrictions on undiluted disinfectants and
increasing the number of staff and detained persons trained and
responsible for cleaning common areas."

HDQ Neutral: Helping or harming?

Agency spokesperson Alexx Pons, meanwhile, said HDQ Neutral has
been used at Adelanto for nearly 10 years. He said the concentrated
solution is diluted before use, and that Spartan representatives
make "routine visits" to the facility "to ensure dilution is safely
performed only by detention center staff." Air circulation and
ventilation is also closely monitored and reviewed throughout the
facility, he said.

He said the disinfectant formulations used at Adelanto are
compliant with detention standards, registered by the Environmental
Protection Agency and used according to manufacturer instructions
for routine cleaning and maintenance of the facility.

"Any assertion or claim to the contrary remains false, and likely
stems from ongoing disinformation campaigns against the agency,"
Pons said in a statement.

He also said staff using the disinfectant solutions are provided
gloves, eye protection and face masks, while detainees are provided
gloves and face masks, and vacated from target areas before
cleaning.

But those inside Adelanto tell a different story. Arissol said the
chemicals cause eye and skin irritation. He can taste them when
they linger in the air.

"Nobody really enjoys the mist in their face," he said. "We've gone
as far as to ask them not to spray us."

Minju Cho, an attorney with the ACLU of Southern California, has
heard similar complaints.

"Since April, ICE's use of HDQ Neutral inside poorly ventilated
dormitories has been one of the most frequent complaints we have
heard from people inside Adelanto," Cho said in an email to The
Desert Sun. "They have described how officers do not pause spraying
HDQ Neutral when they are walking by, causing the chemical to
directly land on their faces or bodies.

"ICE insists that it must use HDQ Neutral to supposedly protect
detainees from COVID-19, but in reality its use of this chemical is
weakening and damaging people's respiratory systems, ultimately
making them more susceptible to contracting—and then getting very
ill from—the virus," she said.

Outcry grows over HDQ Neutral

Concerns over the use of the chemicals have grown louder in recent
weeks.

Rebecca Merton, with California-based Freedom for Immigrants, and
Lizbeth Abeln, with the Inland Coalition for Immigrant Justice,
filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties more than a month ago,
detailing the serious health problems detainees have suffered as a
result of the chemicals used at Adelanto.

They said facility guards are "rampantly spraying chemicals" ever
15 to 30 minutes around housing units, causing detainees to cough
up blood and suffer bloody noses, burning eyes, headaches and skin
reactions.

"We are especially concerned that the misuse of and purposeful
exposure to such harsh chemicals is retaliatory," they wrote. "In
late April, we received and made public reports from people in
detention in Adelanto that they were cleaning the facility "just
with water" or shampoo and were not provided appropriate cleaning
supplies to sanitize the facility."

On May 23 and again on June 23, a Florida advocacy group, Friends
of Miami Dade Detainees, and Freedom for Immigrants filed a similar
complaint with the Homeland Security, ICE and the Glades County
Sheriff's Office. They reported that immigrants at the Glades
County Detention Center in Florida were also being exposed to
hazardous chemicals, Mint Disinfectant and Combat Disinfectant.

And more than 30 members of Congress called on Joseph Cuffari,
Homeland Security's inspector general, to conduct an "immediate
investigation" into the use of chemical disinfectants at the
Adelanto and Glades detention facilities.

The congressional members, including Reps. Mark Takano,
D-Riverside, and Juan Vargas, D-San Diego, said they were "very
concerned" about reports of people suffering from chemical exposure
at Adelanto and Glades. They reiterated the worry that the exposure
could spread the coronavirus.

"Since COVID-19 spreads through droplets of mucus and spit in the
air produced by coughing or sneezing, chemical agents that irritate
the throat or other respiratory functions can help the virus
proliferate," they wrote in a June 23 letter.

"Therefore, the inappropriate and dangerous use of toxic chemical
disinfectants used in close proximity to people in detention
undermines its stated intended function of outbreak management,
which remains critical as facilities still report high numbers of
confirmed cases."

As of June 27, 751 of the 23,429 people currently in ICE custody
had tested positive for COVID-19. Of those, a total of 10 people at
Adelanto and 78 at Glades have tested positive for the virus. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Bacote's Bid to be Unbound by Cunningham Deal Nixed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HAROLD CUNNINGHAM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS, Defendant, Civil Action No. 12-cv-01570-CMA-MEH
(D. Colo.), Judge Christine M. Arguello of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado struck Michael Bacote, Jr.'s Motion
for Order Confirming that He Appropriately Exercised His Right Not
to Be Bound by Settlement Agreement.

The case involves a class action that was resolved by a settlement
agreement.  After the Court accepted the agreement, the case was
dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court entered final
judgment on Jan. 17, 2017.  Nearly three years later, Mr. Bacote
filed the instant Motion in which he requests that the Court
affirms that he has exercised his statutory right not to be bound
by the settlement agreement.

Because the Court entered a final judgment that resolved the
dispute years ago, there is no case or controversy currently
pending.  Therefore, the relief Mr. Bacote is seeking would
constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.  

Based on the foregoing, Judge Arguello struck Mr. Bacote's Motion
for Order Confirming that he Appropriately Exercised his Right Not
to Be Bound by Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 10, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/Y7qJJD from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Brito Appeals Ruling in Alien Habeas Corpus Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Gilberto Pereira Brito, et al., filed an appeal from a
court ruling in their lawsuit entitled Brito, et al. v. Barr, et
al., Case No. 1:19-cv-11314-PBS, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, Boston.

William P. Barr is sued in his capacity as U.S. Attorney General.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiffs
Brito, Lucas, and Celicourt challenge the procedures at immigration
court bond hearings for aliens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
Section 1226(a). They allege that the allocation of the burden of
proof to the alien and failure to consider alternative conditions
of release and the alien's ability to pay violate the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"), and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").

According to the Plaintiffs' uncontroverted data, the Boston and
Hartford Immigration Courts, the latter of which has jurisdiction
over removal proceedings for aliens detained in western
Massachusetts, held bond hearings for 700 and 77 aliens,
respectively, during the six-month period between Nov. 1, 2018, and
May 7, 2019.  An immigration judge issued a decision after 651 of
those hearings, denying release on bond in approximately 41% of
cases. The average bond amount set during this period was $6,302
and $28,700 in the Boston and Hartford Immigration Courts,
respectively. About half of individuals were still in custody ten
days after bond was set.

The appellate case is captioned as Brito, et al. v. Barr, et al.,
Case No. 20-1037, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.

Interested Party John A. Hawkinson, of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
represents himself.[BN]

Petitioners-Appellants GILBERTO PEREIRA BRITO, individually and on
behalf of all those similarly situated; FLORENTINE AVILA LUCAS,
individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated; and
JACKY CELICOURT, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, are represented by:

          Gilles R. Bissonnette, Esq.
          SangYeob Kim, Esq.
          Henry R. Klementowicz, Esq.
          ACLU OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
          18 Low Avenue
          Concord, NH 03301-0000
          Telephone: (603) 224-5591
          E-mail: gilles@aclu-nh.org
                  sangyeob@aclu-nh.org
                  henry@aclu-nh.org

               - and -

          Susan J. Cohen, Esq.
          Ryan T. Dougherty, Esq.
          Susan M. Finegan, Esq.
          Jennifer J. Mather, Esq.
          Mathilda McGee-Tubb, Esq.
          Andrew N. Nathanson, Esq.
          MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC
          1 Financial Ctr.
          Boston, MA 02111-0000
          Telephone: (617) 542-6000
          E-mail: SJCohen@mintz.com
                  RTDougherty@mintz.com
                  SMFinegan@mintz.com
                  JMMcCarthy@mintz.com
                  MSMcGee-Tubb@mintz.com
                  ANNathanson@mintz.com

               - and -

          Adriana Lafaille, Esq.
          Daniel Louis McFadden, Esq.
          Matthew R. Segal, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASSACHUSETTS
          211 Congress St., 3rd Flr.
          Boston, MA 02110-2485
          Telephone: (617) 482-3470

               - and -

          Michael King Thomas Tan, Esq.
          AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
          125 Broad St., 18th Flr.
          New York, NY 10004-0000
          Telephone: (212) 519-7848
          E-mail: mtan@aclu.org

Respondents-Appellees WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice; TIMOTHY S. ROBBINS, Acting Field Office
Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; MATTHEW T. ALBENCE, Acting Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; CHAD WOLF, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; JAMES MCHENRY, Director, Executive
Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice; ANTONE
MONIZ, Superintendent of the Plymouth County Correctional Facility;
YOLANDA SMITH, Superintendent of the Suffolk County House of
Corrections; STEVE SOUZA, Superintendent of the Bristol County
House of Corrections; CHRISTOPHER BRACKETT, Superintendent of the
Strafford County Department of Corrections; and LORI STREETER,
Superintendent of the Franklin County House of Corrections, are
represented by:

          Rayford A. Farquhar, Esq.
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          1 Courthouse Way, Ste. 9200
          Boston, MA 02210
          Telephone: (617) 748-3100

               - and -

          Huy Le, Esq.
          Carlton Frederick Sheffield, Esq.
          J. Max Weintraub, Esq.
          U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
          PO Box 868
          Washington, DC 20044
          Telephone: (202) 353-4028


UNITED STATES: Court Certifies Two Subclasses in Doe APA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN DOE #1; et al., Plaintiffs, v. DONALD TRUMP, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-1743-SI (D. Or.), Judge Michael
H. Simon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

On Oct. 4, 2019, the President of the United States issued
Proclamation No. 9945, titled "Presidential Proclamation on the
Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially Burden the
United States Healthcare System."  The Proclamation requires
certain immigrants to show proof of health insurance or sufficient
financial resources to pay for the costs of anticipated health care
before those immigrants may qualify for immigrant visas.

On Oct. 30, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their putative class action
complaint, alleging that: (1) the Defendants violated the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"); (2) the Defendants violated
the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause's requirement of equal
protection based on race, ethnicity, and national origin; (3) the
Defendants' actions are ultra vires, including that the President's
issuance of the Proclamation violates the separation of powers
doctrine and is outside the authority delegated to him in 8 U.S.C.
Section 1182(f); and (4) the Defendants violated the Fifth
Amendment Due Process clause's procedural due process guarantee.

On Nov. 2, 2019, the Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order,
temporarily enjoining the Defendants from taking any action to
implement or enforce the Proclamation through Nov. 30, 2019.  On
Nov. 26, 2019, the Court entered a preliminary injunction order,
enjoining the Defendants from taking any action to implement or
enforce the Proclamation until the Court resolves the case on the
merits.  The Court then permitted discovery relating to the
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and allowed supplemental
briefing on that motion.

The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is now before the
Court.  They request certification of two classes: (1) a class of
United States citizens who are petitioners sponsoring a visa for
family members; and (2) a class of foreign nationals who are visa
applicants.

The Plaintiffs move to certify the following two subclasses:

      (1) Individuals in the United States who currently have an
approved or pending petition to the United States government to
sponsor a noncitizen family member for an immigrant visa, or who
will soon file such a petition; and whose sponsored family member
is subject to the Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to a
consular officer's satisfaction that he or she will be covered by
approved health insurance within 30 days after entry or will be
able to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs (U.S.
Petitioner Subclass); and

      (2) Individuals who are foreign nationals who (i) have
applied for or will soon apply to the United States government for
an immigrant visa; (ii) are otherwise eligible to be granted the
visa; but (iii) are subject to the Proclamation and unable to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of a consular officer that they
will be covered by approved health insurance within 30 days after
entry or will be able to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical
costs (Visa Applicant Subclass).

The Defendants argue that certification is inappropriate because:
(1) Mr. Castellanos received his visa, mooting his claims and
rendering the Visa Applicant Subclass without a class
representative; (2) the Plaintiffs in the U.S. Petitioner Subclass
lack standing; and (3) the U.S. Petitioner Subclass does not
satisfy the requirements of Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), or 23(b)(1)(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Simon granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification,
with a modified subclass definition.  The Judge certified under
Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure these two
subclasses:

      (1) U.S. Petitioner Subclass: Individuals in the United
States who currently have or will have an approved or pending
petition to the United States government to sponsor a noncitizen
family member for an immigrant visa; and whose sponsored family
member is subject to the Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to
a consular officer's satisfaction that he or she will be covered by
approved health insurance within 30 days after entry or will be
able to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs; and

      (2) Visa Applicant Subclass: Individuals who are foreign
nationals who (i) have applied for or will soon apply to the United
States government for an immigrant visa; (ii) are otherwise
eligible to be granted the visa; but (iii) are subject to the
Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a
consular officer that they will be covered by approved health
insurance within 30 days after entry or will be able to pay for
reasonably foreseeable medical costs.

Among other things, Judge Simon finds that based on the Plaintiffs'
course of conduct, there is a credible threat that the Proclamation
will cause them injury, and that is sufficient for standing.  The
Plaintiffs have also meet the Rule 23(a) requirements.

Under Rule 23(g), Judge Simon appointed Karen C. Tumlin and Esther
H. Sung of Justice Action Center; Stephen Manning, Nadia Dahab, and
Tess Hellgren of Innovation Law Lab; Scott D. Stein and Kevin M.
Fee of Sidley Austin; and Jesse Bless of American Immigration
Lawyers Association as the Class Counsel.  The Judge also appointed
Plaintiffs John Doe #1; Juan Ramon Morales; Jane Doe #2; Jane Doe
#3; Iris Angelina Castro; Blake Doe; Brenda Villarruel; Gabino
Soriano Castellanos, and Latino Network as the class
representatives.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/1VmyaK from Leagle.com.

Stephen Manning and Nadia Dahab, INNOVATION LAW LAB, 333 SW Fifth
Avenue, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97204; Karen C. Tumlin and Esther
H. Sung, JUSTICE ACTION CENTER, PO Box 27280, Los Angeles, CA
90027; Scott D. Stein and Kevin M. Fee, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, One
South Dearborn Street, Chicago IL 60603; and Jesse Bless, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, 1301 G. Street, Suite 300,
Washington D.C. 20005. Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Billy J. Williams,
United States Attorney for the District of Oregon; August E.
Flentje, Special Counsel; William C. Peachey, Director, Office of
Immigration Litigation; Brian C. Ward, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Courtney E. Moran, Trial Attorney; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Office of Immigration Litigation, District Court Section, PO Box
868, Ben Franklin Station, Washington D.C., 20044. Of Attorneys for
Defendants.


UNITED STATES: Protesters Call for Release of ICE Detainees
-----------------------------------------------------------
Karen Dandurant, writing for Fosters.com, reports that about 50
cars formed a solemn parade passing the Strafford County Department
of Corrections on June 28, a call to release Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement detainees that has been held every Sunday since
April.

No one honked. No one yelled slogans. They made three passes from
the courthouse, past the jail and then returned to the courthouse
where speakers urged freeing the detainees. In past rallies,
because of the coronavirus pandemic, the protesters remained in
their cars. On June 28, they parked at the courthouse and everyone
emerged with masks on to hear the speakers.

The group organizing the weekly "rolling rally," Never Again
Action, want the immigrants released, taking the position they
don't belong in jail as they face no criminal charges. The pandemic
makes more urgent that they are released due to health concerns in
the jail setting, the group states.

Never Again Action organizer Laura Aronson said, "Strafford County
is under contract with ICE to house detained immigrants. With the
ongoing pandemic, we urge New Hampshire lawmakers to communicate
with state officials to safeguard vulnerable, incarcerated
populations, officers and other staff, their families, courts, and
communities. One important action they can take is to urge ICE to
release all civilly detained persons currently held at the jail.
All immigrants in civil detention should be released now to return
to their children, families and communities. There is ample
evidence that immigrants who are free from detention under local
case management while awaiting court hearings have nearly a 100%
compliance rate for future court appearances."

The speakers stood in front of a line of 60 cutout figures
representing people being detained in the jail, each with one line
to tell their story. Tess George of Never Again Action said there
is one figure for each detainee.

"There used to be 77," said George. "We will continue doing this
until there are zero. We will keep up the pressure until we have an
immigration policy that stands for equal justice no matter how much
money you have, what color your skin is or what country you came
from."

The cutouts had lines like, "I had to leave my country," "I miss my
kids so much," "I need protection from Covid," and "I am human."

Somersworth resident Emmett Soldati has a long reputation as an
activist. The owner of Teatotaller in the Hilltop City, Soldati is
running for the state Executive Council's District 2 seat. He said
he believes law enforcement should not be cooperating with ICE.

Soldati talked about how the small city of Somersworth grew strong
because it welcomes all its citizens, no matter their color,
nationality or sexual orientation.

"When my father was mayor, I learned about the growing Indonesian
population in Somersworth," said Soldati. "Community is the best
line of defense against oppression. When hundreds of deportation
notices were given, I went to our police chief (David Kretschmar)
to ask him to stand for the Indonesian population because police
are not obligated to help ICE. He told me his kids went to school
with the Indonesians. He has been to their churches and had meals
with them. He said, ‘I will protect them.' Win or lose the
election, I am in this fight."

Andru Volinsky, the current executive councilor for District 2 and
a Democratic candidate for governor, told the crowd Volinsky was
not his family's true name.

"I don't know my name," he said. "Volinsky was the name given to my
great grandfather at Ellis Island."

Volinsky said he has served as an attorney for the American Civil
Liberties Union, fighting against the death penalty for 40 years.

In talking about civil rights, Volinsky said, "We are at the lowest
time in this country's history, worse than before the Civil War.
ICE is a symptom. Donald Trump is a symptom. We need to talk with
each other. We need to listen. We need to call out conduct that
fails."

Leah Plunkett of Concord is also running for Executive Council,
like Soldati seeking the District 2 seat being vacated by
Volinsky.

Plunkett is a law professor and said she went to law school to
fight for human rights.

"Can they hear us in the jail?" Plunkett asked. "As a country we
have failed to keep the most vulnerable safe. These detainees are
vulnerable by virtue of being detained during the COVID-19 crisis,
making it more urgent at this moment to secure their freedom."

Plunkett spoke about her Jewish heritage, saying her grandfather
was first in the country as a poor child in Brooklyn.

"He was brought in to interrogate German prisoners in the war
because he spoke the language," said Plunkett. "He was one of the
Ritchie Boys. He went on to become a diplomat and then was later
accused of communism in the McCarthy era. We, the Jewish,
understand persecution."

The June 28 rally is part of a series of events the group calls
Days of Action.

On July 3, Never Again Action will present to Gov. Chris Sununu its
petition with over 1,000 signatures and an 80-signature clergy
letter representing a wide range of religious denominations. The
group previously sent Sununu its petition with 400 signatures.

The immigrants' rights group will host an art display, called Don't
Look Away, in front of the State House in Concord on July 3 from
noon to 2 p.m., and will hold a 1 p.m. press conference there.

U.S. District Court Judge Landya McCafferty has begun freeing some
medically vulnerable ICE detainees following bail hearings, in
response to an ACLU class-action lawsuit.

Never Again Action, a national organization, was founded in 2019 by
Jewish people motivated by their prophetic tradition and their
history of oppression. Its goal is to prevent ICE, DHS, CBP, and
the corporations that support them from doing business as usual.

Chris Brackett, superintendent of the jail, said he and his staff
will continue to do everything they can to support the rallies.

"We support their ability to peacefully protest," said Brackett.
"They are continuing to cooperate with the procedures put in place
by the sheriff."

Brackett had an update to say, there were 63 immigrants being held
at the jail.

"We are knocking on wood and so far everyone is healthy," said
Brackett. "We continue to vigorously monitor everyone coming in,
including staff."

Two cases of COVID-19 had been detected at the jail during the
pandemic, but Brackett said there are none at this time. [GN]


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Condry Appeals N.D. Calif. Ruling to 9th Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Rachel Condry, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling issued in their lawsuit styled Rachel Condry, et al. v.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00183-VC, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

The questions presented are: 1. Whether the District Court erred in
denying Rule 23(b)(2) certification when it was undisputed that
each of UHC's non-grandfathered, nonfederal health plans was
required to comply with the ACA's preventive services mandate and
UHC had an express written policy, challenged in this Action, that
stated that out-of-network lactation services were not eligible for
ACA coverage; 2. Whether the District Court erred in denying Rule
23(b)(2) certification by erroneously conducting a damages-like
predominance analysis that was erroneously applied by the District
Court in contravention of this Court's decisions in Wolin and
Parsons; 3. Whether the District Court erred in denying, under Rule
23(b)(2), certification of classes comprised of insureds seeking to
enjoin an insurer's illegal conduct and to secure the reprocessing
of their medical claims, which classes are routinely certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) by courts in the Ninth Circuit; and 4. Whether
the District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs standing to enjoin
UHC from its continued use of its non-ACA compliant policy, and
denying Intervenor the right to intervene for purposes of class
certification to address the Court's erroneous position that the
named Plaintiffs did not have standing.
As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 7,
2020, the Hon. Vince Chhabria granted in part and denied in part
the motion for class certification filed in the lawsuit.

According to the Order, the Court ruled at summary judgment that
United Healthcare, when it denied five named plaintiffs' claims for
reimbursement of out-of-network lactation services, violated the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act's requirement that the plan
administrator "write a denial in a manner calculated to be
understood by the claimant."

The Plaintiffs now seek certification of a class of ERISA plan
participants, who received the same denial letters as the five
named plaintiffs, with an eye towards a court order requiring
United Healthcare to send class members new letters that explain
the basis for denial in a comprehensible fashion (which would, in
turn, allow participants to meaningfully assess whether to contest
the denial).

Judge Chhabria concludes that in sum, the data and evidence the
Plaintiffs have provided do not come close to proving that United
Healthcare failed to comply with the Affordable Care Act in a
uniform way. "This precludes a finding, on this record, that the
members of the proposed nationwide class had their claims denied
due to a uniform standard or practice. This aspect of the motion
for class certification is therefore denied."

The appellate case is captioned as RACHEL CONDRY, JANCE HOY,
CHRISTINE ENDICOTT, LAURA BISHOP, FELICITY BARBER, and RACHEL
CARROLL, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Petitioners, TERESA HARRIS, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Intervenor Plaintiff-Petitioner v.
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC.; et al., Defendants-Respondents, Case No.
20-80005, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Petitioners RACHEL CONDRY, JANCE HOY, CHRISTINE
ENDICOTT, LAURA BISHOP, FELICITY BARBER, and RACHEL CARROLL, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Kolin C. Tang, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER AND SHAH, LLP
          1401 Dove Street, Suite 540
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (323) 510-4060
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: ktang@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Nicholas E. Chimicles, Esq.
          Kimberly Donaldson-Smith, Esq.
          Stephanie E. Saunders, Esq.
          CHIMICLES SCHWARTZ KRINER & DONALDSON-SMITH LLP
          361 W. Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          Facsimile: (610) 649-3633
          E-mail: NEC@Chimicles.com
                  KMD@Chimicles.com
                  SES@Chimicles.com

               - and -

          Nathan Zipperian, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER AND SHAH, LLP
          1625 N. Commerce Pkwy., #320
          Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33326
          Telephone: (954) 515-0123
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: nzipperian@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Marc A. Goldich, Esq.
          Noah Axler, Esq.
          AXLER GOLDICH LLC
          1520 Locust Street, Suite 301
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (267) 534-7400
          Facsimile: (267) 534-7407
          E-mail: mgoldich@axgolaw.com
                  naxler@axgolaw.com

               - and -

          James E. Miller, Esq.
          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER AND SHAH, LLP
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Telephone: (860) 526-1100
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: jmiller@sfmslaw.com
                  lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan W. Cuneo, Esq.
          Pamela B. Gilbert, Esq.
          Monica E. Miller, Esq.
          Katherine Van Dyck, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813

               - and -

          Sabita J. Soneji, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          483 Ninth Street, Suite 200
          Oakland, CA 94607
          Telephone: (510) 254-6808
          E-mail: ssoneji@tzlegal.com

Defendants-Respondents UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE,
INC., UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITED HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC. and UMR, INC. are represented by:

          Martin J. Bishop, Esq.
          Rebecca R. Hanson, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          10 S. Wacker Drive, 40th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 207-1000
          E-mail: mbishop@reedsmith.com
                  rhanson@reedsmith.com

               - and -

          Raymond A. Cardozo, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          101 Second Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 543-8700
          E-mail: rcardozo@reedsmith.com


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Ninth Cir. Appeal Filed in Condry ERISA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants UnitedHealth Group, Inc., et al., filed an appeal from a
court ruling issued in the lawsuit styled Rachel Condry, et al. v.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-00183-VC, in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 7,
2020, the Hon. Vince Chhabria granted in part and denied in part
the motion for class certification filed in the lawsuit.

According to the Order, the Court ruled at summary judgment that
United Healthcare, when it denied five named plaintiffs' claims for
reimbursement of out-of-network lactation services, violated the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act's requirement that the plan
administrator "write a denial in a manner calculated to be
understood by the claimant."

The Plaintiffs now seek certification of a class of ERISA plan
participants, who received the same denial letters as the five
named plaintiffs, with an eye towards a court order requiring
United Healthcare to send class members new letters that explain
the basis for denial in a comprehensible fashion (which would, in
turn, allow participants to meaningfully assess whether to contest
the denial).

Judge Chhabria concludes that in sum, the data and evidence the
Plaintiffs have provided do not come close to proving that United
Healthcare failed to comply with the Affordable Care Act in a
uniform way. "This precludes a finding, on this record, that the
members of the proposed nationwide class had their claims denied
due to a uniform standard or practice. This aspect of the motion
for class certification is therefore denied."

The appellate case is captioned as Rachel Condry, et al. v.
Unitedhealth Group Inc. et al., Case No. 20-80006, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents RACHEL CONDRY, JANCE HOY, FELICITY BARBER,
RACHEL CARROLL, CHRISTINE ENDICOTT, and LAURA BISHOP, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, are represented by:

          Jonathan W. Cuneo, Esq.
          Monica Evan Miller, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016

               - and -

          James E. Miller, Esq.
          Laurie Rubinow, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH LLC
          65 Main Street
          Chester, CT 06412
          Telephone: (860) 526-1100
          E-mail: jmiller@sfmslaw.com
                  lrubinow@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Nathan C. Zipperian, Esq.
          SHEPHERD, FINKELMAN, MILLER & SHAH, LLC
          1640 Town Center Circle
          Weston, PA 19063
          E-mail: nzipperian@sfmslaw.com

               - and -

          Marc Adam Goldich, Esq.
          AXLER GOLDICH LLC
          1520 Locust Street, Suite 301
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (267) 534-7400
          E-mail: mgoldich@axgolaw.com

               - and -

          Kolin Tang, Esq.
          SHEPHERD FINKELMAN MILLER & SHAH, LLP
          1401 Dove Street, Suite 540
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (323) 510-4060
          E-mail: ktang@sfmslaw.com

Defendants-Petitioners UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE,
INC., UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY, UNITED HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC. and UMR, INC. are represented by:

          Martin J. Bishop, Esq.
          Rebecca R. Hanson, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          10 S. Wacker Drive, 40th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 207-1000
          E-mail: mbishop@reedsmith.com
                  rhanson@reedsmith.com

               - and -

          Raymond A. Cardozo, Esq.
          REED SMITH LLP
          101 Second Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 543-8700
          E-mail: rcardozo@reedsmith.com


VILLAGE OF PUT-IN-BAY: Russo Sues Over Refusal to Pay Comp Time
---------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Russo, On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. VILLAGE OF PUT-IN-BAY, Case No. 3:20-cv-01469 (N.D.
Ohio, July 3, 2020), is brought to challenge policies and practices
of the Village of Put-in-Bay that violated the overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant only paid "straight time"
for compensatory time off ("comp time") hours; the Defendant only
allowed comp time to be accrued up to 160 hours, and did not paid
any comp time above that amount; and the Defendant refused to pay
comp time upon termination of employment.

Under the FLSA, employees of local government agencies may receive
comp time, at a rate of not less than one and one-half hours for
each overtime hour instead of cash overtime pay under certain
proscribed conditions. Upon termination of employment, the
Plaintiff says he had over 800 hours of unpaid comp time for which
he was not paid.

The Defendant's deliberate failure to pay hourly employees their
earned wages and overtime compensation violates the FLSA, according
to the complaint. The Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA
Collective are entitled to earned wages and overtime compensation
as a result of the Defendant's comp time and overtime violations.
The Defendant's illegal pay practices concerning comp time were the
result of systematic policies applied to the Plaintiff and other
members of the FLSA Collective employed by the Put-in-Bay police
department.

Plaintiff Michael Russo was employed by the Defendants from January
2019 to June 2020 as a police officer. He was promoted to
Lieutenant in February 2020.

The Defendant operates a police department, which serves the
residents and visitors of the Village of Put-in-Bay.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Caxton Building
          812 Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Phone: (216) 912-2221
          Fax: (216) 350-6313
          Email: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                 rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                 kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com


VIRGINIA: Court Dismisses Hall Prisoner Suit Without Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Glen E. Conrad of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, Roanoke Division, dismissed without prejudice
the case, JERRY RAY HALL, Plaintiff, v. DR. SMITH, ET AL.,
Defendants, Case No. 7:19CV00812 (W.D. Va.).

Jerry Ray Hall, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed the
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging
that he has been denied adequate medical care in prison.  He is
currently confined at Augusta Correctional Center.  In the claims
section of his Section 1983 form, Hall states that Dr. Smith said
he doesn't take out hernias and he gets Augusta Health to put mesh
inside a person.  Hall asserts that the only treatment for a hernia
is surgery.  In the complaint, Hall does not allege that he has a
hernia.

In a later submission, docketed as additional evidence, Hall
alleges that he has had three hernias on his right side for a year,
which Dr. Smith says are "reducible."  He states further that it is
hanging out more, causes him pain while walking, and stops him from
exercising.  Hall claims that the medical department does not care
and that nothing has been done for him.

In another later submission, Hall complains that on Jan. 24, 2020,
he fell and injured his right wrist when it "folded backward."
That same day, Hall filed a sick call request, followed by four
emergency grievances over the next three days.  Each time a nurse
responded and said that his situation was not an emergency.  He was
notified that if he had placed a sick call request, he should watch
the master pass list for a doctor's appointment.  On Jan. 27, 2020,
Dr. Smith examined Hall and ordered an X ray of his hand to be
conducted the next day.

In Hall's Section 1983 complaint, he sues Dr. Smith and the
"medical department," asking for monetary damages.  He admits that
he has not filed any grievances regarding his medical complaints,
alleging that they refused him the grievance procedure.  Hall also
moves for certification of his case as a class action involving
unspecified other persons.

A prison official's deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious
medical need violates the Eighth Amendment.  A prison official is
"deliberately indifferent" if he or she knows of and disregards [or
responds unreasonably to] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.  A significant delay in the treatment of a serious medical
condition may indicate an Eighth Amendment violation, but only if
the delay results in some substantial harm to the patient.

Thus, a hernia sufferer like Hall states a Section 1983 claim only
if he plausibly alleges that the delay in his surgery caused him
substantial harm -- evidenced by, for example, a marked increase in
his hernia's size, frequent complaints of severe pain, or signs
that his hernia was becoming non-reducible or incarcerated.

Judge Conrad finds that Hall's complaint and other submissions do
not provide a factual basis for an Eighth Amendment claim regarding
his hernia.  By his own admission, Dr. Smith has advised that his
hernias are reducible and has mentioned a treatment option
involving mesh that Hall apparently does not find sufficient.
Hall's belief that he should have had surgery by now is nothing
more than a disagreement with the doctor's medical judgment that
surgery is not currently a medical necessity and that other options
should be considered.  Such disagreements between a patient and his
medical providers are not actionable under Section 1983.  Because
Hall does not plausibly allege that the delay in ordering surgery
has caused, or will cause, him substantial harm, he fails to state
an Eighth Amendment claim against anyone concerning his hernias.

The Judge construes Hall's later-added allegations about his wrist
injury as a motion to amend the complaint.  The information about a
new and separate medical complaint does not cure any of the noted
deficiencies in Hall's complaint and amendments about his hernias.
Because he has found the underlying complaint must be dismissed for
failure to state an actionable claim, the Judge will dismiss the
motion to amend as moot.

For the reasons stated, Judge Conrad dismissed Hall's complaint
without prejudice, pursuant to Section 1915A(b)(1), for failure to
state a claim.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 14, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion is available at https://is.gd/FyRSPt from Leagle.com.


VOLARIS: Seeks Dismissal of Ticket Refund Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Lauraann Wood, writing for Law360, reports that Mexican airline
Volaris on June 22 asked an Illinois federal court to dismiss a
proposed class action over its cancellation of several of its U.S.
flights to Mexico amid the coronavirus pandemic, saying the claims
are "undeniably moot" because the airline has been offering
passengers refunds.

In response to a notice from the U.S. Department of Transportation
in April warning airlines that they could face an enforcement
action if they fail to offer refunds to ticket buyers whose flights
were canceled or significantly changed in the wake of the pandemic,
Volaris instituted a program to offer passengers whose flights had
been canceled the option of refunds or electronic travel credits,
leaving no basis for the lawsuit, the airline said in its dismissal
bid.

"A comparable remedy has already been offered to passengers and
there is no other value this court could add by means of this class
action," the airline said.

Additionally, all of the state law claims asserted by named
plaintiff and Chicago resident Samantha Levey--accusing the airline
of breach of contract, unjust enrichment and unconscionability and
a statutory claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act--are preempted by the Airline Deregulation
Act, a federal law that preempts state common law and statutory
consumer protection claims relating to an air carrier's "prices"
and "services," Volaris said.

"Plaintiff's claims here--arising from airline ticket refund and
cancellation policies--clearly relate to an airline's prices and
services," the airline said. "Plaintiff's breach of contract action
likewise faces preemption because it relies on alleged obligations
outside the contract."

Levey also lacks standing, because no breach of contract occurred,
the airline argued, saying it performed its contractual obligations
when it offered Levey alternate transportation to Mexico from a
different airport on the same date after her flight was canceled.
Levey failed to show for that flight and Volaris offered travel
vouchers valued at $636.56, the airline said.

"The claim also should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction due to lack of standing given that plaintiff was sent
notice of the airport change and did not check in for the flight,"
Volaris said. "Here, the standing requirements are not met because
any alleged injury is not traceable to Volaris, but rather to
plaintiff. Additionally, because plaintiff had been given travel
vouchers, her injury claim likewise is in doubt."

The proposed class action, filed in April, alleges thay Volaris
quietly canceled several of its U.S. flights to Mexico during the
coronavirus pandemic and has unlawfully refused to refund its
travelers or let them rebook their flights without penalty.

The suit claims the airline violated U.S. Department of
Transportation rules and its own carriage contracts when it refused
to reimburse travelers' fares after canceling their U.S. flights to
Mexico without warning over the COVID-19 pandemic.

The United States and Mexico have agreed to restrict ground travel
across their shared border to limit spreading the novel
coronavirus, but those restrictions never applied to air travel,
Levey said. Even so, the airline canceled numerous flights through
April 20 and either won't return travelers' airfare or makes them
pay a penalty to rebook, her suit said.

Levey seeks to represent a nationwide class of travelers who have
either been been refused refunds or made to pay rebooking penalties
in light of their unannounced Volaris flight cancelations. There
may be thousands of class members for the suit, and the exact
number can be ascertained through the airline's records, the suit
says.

Representatives for the parties did not immediately respond to
requests for comment on June 23.

Levey is represented by William Sweetnam of Keogh Law Ltd.

Volaris is represented by Robert E. Tonn of Holland & Knight LLC.

The case is Levey v. Concesionaria Vuela Compania de Aviacion SAPI
de CV et al., case number 1:20-cv-02215, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. [GN]


VULCAN MATERIALS: Sancho Labor Suit Removed to E.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JAMES SANCHO, individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. VULCAN MATERIALS
COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive, Case No. BCV-20-101222 (May 20, 2020), was removed from
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of
Kern to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California (Fresno) on June 26, 2020.

The Eastern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-00898-NONE-JLT to the proceeding.

The complaint asserts claims for the Defendants' failure to pay all
wages; failure to furnish accurate, itemized wage statements;
failure to pay all wages owed at termination; and violation of
California Business & Professions Code.

Vulcan Materials is an American company based in Birmingham,
Alabama. Vulcan is principally engaged in the production,
distribution and sale of construction materials.[BN]

The Defendant Vulcan Materials is represented by:

          Roland M. Juare, Esq.
          Debra Urteaga, Esq.
          HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 2000
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-2627
          Telephone: 213 532 2000
          Facsimile: 213 532 2020
          E-mail: rjuarez@hunton.com
                  durteaga@hunton.com


WELLS FARGO: Court Dismisses Negligence Claim in Chang Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANNIE CHANG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WELLS FARGO BANK,
N.A., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01973-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge
Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs Chang, Tiger Chang Investments, LLC, Asians Investing in
Real Estate, LLC, Melanie Gonzales, Gary Gonzales, and G&M
You-Nique Property, LLC, allege three causes of action: (1) Aiding
and Abetting Fraud; (2) Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, and (3) Negligence.  The Plaintiffs bring the putative class
action alleging Wells Fargo aided and abetted an alleged Ponzi
scheme conceived by non-parties Jerome and Shaun Cohen and their
entities Equitybuild, Inc. and Equitybuild Finance, LLC fka Hard
Money Co., LLC.

Equitybuild solicited investors by promising them returns generated
by investments in a real estate investment program that purchased,
renovated, and developed real estate in Chicago.  The Cohens raised
funds through offering and selling promissory notes, and offering
investments in real estate pooled "funds" (with names such as
"Chicago Capital Fund").   However, the Equitybuild Scheme was a
"sham," as the Cohens raised money from investors through
misrepresentations and omissions, siphoned much of it, improperly
commingled it, used it for Ponzi payments to other investors, and
skimmed between 15% and 30% off each investment by taking
undisclosed fees.  It came to light on Aug. 15, 2018, when the SEC
filed a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois against
Equitybuild and the Cohens, charging them with fraud under U.S.
securities laws.

According to the Plaintiffs, Wells Fargo was the only bank that
Equitybuild used for the Scheme, and all transactions were
processed through Wells Fargo.  Among other allegations, they
contend that Wells Fargo knew the accounts it maintained for
Equitybuild held investor money, in a fiduciary capacity, had
knowledge, or was on notice of the fact that investor money was
being misused and misappropriated, and at risk of misuse and
misappropriation, was aware that Equitybuild had received far less
money from property managers into the Equitybuild accounts than
what investors were paid in 'interest' out of those same accounts,
knew that Equitybuild was managing investor funds, and that those
funds were commingled among Equitybuild's various accounts with
Wells Fargo, and that Equitybuild's contact at Wells Fargo 'seemed
like she was willing to do pretty much anything' for Jerry Cohen.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the putative class action complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  

As for the first cause of action, Judge Gilliam holds that the
Plaintiffs have adequately pled a claim for aiding and abetting
fraud, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss that claim is denied.
Viewing all of the allegations together, the Judge finds that the
Complaint pleads facts sufficient to establish the plausibility of
the Plaintiffs' claim that the Defendant had actual knowledge of
the fraud allegedly aided and abetted.

As for the second cause of action, once again, Judge Gilliam holds
that it is unnecessary for the Plaintiff to allege who at Wells
Fargo knew that Equitybuild owed depositors a fiduciary duty, or
when or how they acquired such knowledge.  Accordingly, the Judge
concludes that the allegations are sufficient to state a claim for
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and the Defendant's
motion to dismiss the claim is denied.

Finally, as for the third cause of action, because the Plaintiffs
fail to allege duty, breach, and causation, Judge Gilliam granted
the Defendant's motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action,
with leave to amend consistent with the Order.  Even if the
Defendant did owe a duty to the Plaintiffs to police Equitybuild's
accounts, they have not alleged that Wells Fargo learned anything
by way of its BSA/AML obligations that would transform bank
transactions into a negligent act.  

The Plaintiffs contend that Wells Fargo breached a duty by
"receiving money via wire transfer," "overseeing the commingling of
funds," "executing transactions," "modifying and/or accepting
Direct Deposit Authorization Forms," and "transferring payments" to
investors.  The Plaintiffs similarly fail to allege anything other
than a conclusion that Wells Fargo proximately caused their alleged
injuries.  They make no plausible allegation that, but for any
action or inaction by Wells Fargo, the Plaintiffs would not have
lost their investments.  Dismissal of the negligence claim is thus
warranted on this ground as well.

In sum, Judge Gilliam denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss as
to (1) Aiding and Abetting Fraud and (2) Aiding and Abetting Breach
of Fiduciary Duty; and granted with leave to amend the Defendant's
motion to dismiss as to (3) Negligence.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/YUNlIp from Leagle.com.


WEST VIRGINIA-AMERICAN: Court Closes Perez Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia, Charleston, dismissed and
closed the case, ROBERT PEREZ, Plaintiff, v. WEST VIRGINIA-AMERICAN
WATER COMPANY, AMERICAN WATER COMPANY, and EASTMAN CHEMICAL
COMPANY, Defendants, GOOD et al, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN WATER
WORKS COMPANY, INC. et al, Defendants, Civil Action Nos. 2:16-1606,
2:14-1374 (S.D. W. Va.).

By order entered July 31, 2017, the case was consolidated with the
Good case.  As prescribed in that order, upon consolidation, the
Plaintiff may participate in the pending class action settlement.
Plaintiff Perez has done so by filing two claims that have been
acted upon as set forth in the email received by the undersigned
from Smith, Cochran and Hicks, the Settlement Administrator, on
April 3, 2020, which email is ordered filed therein.

The Clerk is directed to forward copies of the written Memorandum
Opinion and Order to the Plaintiff, all counsel of record, and the
United States Magistrate Judge.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 7, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/JZAwYV from
Leagle.com.


WILD DUNES: Faces Orr FMLA Suit Alleging Wrongful Termination
-------------------------------------------------------------
Kathleen Orr, and similarly situated employees v. WILD DUNES LLC,
LOWE HOSPITALITY GROUP, INC., AND HYATT CORPORATION, Case No.
2:20-cv-02525-RMG-MGB (D.S.C., July 5, 2020), alleges that the
Defendants wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff for exercising her
rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.

On December 8, 2019, the Plaintiff contracted pneumonia. She had a
serious health condition that required continuing treatment by a
health care provider. Furthermore, the Plaintiff needed to take
leave because she unable to work. Despite this, the Defendants
discouraged the Plaintiff from taking leave. The Plaintiff advised
her supervisors that she would need to take FMLA leave due to her
medical condition.

The Plaintiff followed up by submitting a certification from her
physician that she had serious health condition justifying her
leave request. The Plaintiff's FMLA started on December 11, 2019.
Her last day at work before she began her leave was December 8,
2019. Prior to December 8th, the Plaintiff could not have foreseen
the need for leave. The Plaintiff provided the Defendants with
notice, as soon as practicable, once she learned of the seriousness
of her medical condition.

According to the complaint, the information the Plaintiff gave to
the Defendants was sufficient to reasonably to apprise them of the
Plaintiff's request to take time off. The Defendants interfered
with and discriminated against the Plaintiff because she exercised
her rights granted in FMLA. Despite the fact that the Plaintiff had
advised her supervisors that she had pneumonia, on January 5, 2020,
while she was on FMLA leave, the Defendants terminated her. The
Defendants refused to allow the Plaintiff to return to her job.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a Housekeeping
Supervisor at the Wild Dunes Resort from October 15, 2019, until
January 4, 2020.

Wild Dunes is a beach resort located in Isle of Palms, South
Carolina, consisting of a hotel, private condominiums and beach
houses.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marybeth Mullaney, Esq.
          MULLANEY LAW
          1037-D Chuck Dawley Blvd., Suite 100
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Phone (843) 588-5587
          Fac: (843) 593-9334
          Email: marybeth@mullaneylaw.net


WIRECARD: Amended Complaint to be Filed in Securities Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman, who on May 6, 2019 was appointed Lead Counsel in a
securities class action brought on behalf of investors in Wirecard
American Depository Shares (ADS) before Hon. Fernando M. Olguin,
DelPoggetto v. Wirecard AG et al., 2:19-cv-00986-FMO-SK (C.D.
Cal.), notifies investors in Wirecard ADS purchased in the United
States with tickers WCAGY or WRCDF, that it will be filing an
amended complaint on Aug. 14, 2020, as directed by the court.

The amended complaint will expand the alleged fraudulent period to
recover losses suffered by investors who purchased Wirecard ADS in
the U.S. due to recent events, including ex-Wirecard CEO Markus
Braun's reported arrest and the widening criminal probes amid the
disclosed $2.1 billion missing from the company's balance sheet.

Hagens Berman urges persons with knowledge of the alleged fraud or
who could otherwise further assist with the investigation to
contact the firm:

            WRCDF@hbsslaw.com
            844-916-0895

Wirecard (WCAGY; WRCDF) Securities Fraud Class Action:

The case concerns Defendants' deliberate use of improper accounting
designed to inflate sales and profits.  Throughout the Class
Period, Defendants repeatedly affirmed the effectiveness of
Wirecard's internal controls and processes for financial reporting.
In truth, Defendants were fabricating financial results by, among
other things, inflating receivables.

The truth emerged through a series of exposé articles published by
the Financial Times beginning on Jan. 30, 2019, revealing an
elaborate accounting fraud orchestrated at the highest levels of
Wirecard.

On May 6, 2019, the Court appointed an individual Wirecard investor
Lead Plaintiff for the Class and Hagens Berman as Lead Counsel.

On Feb. 14, 2020, Lead Plaintiff filed a first amended class action
complaint.

Since this time, revelations about the full extent of the alleged
accounting fraud continued and became worse.  On June 18, 2020,
Wirecard disclosed that its external auditor was unable to confirm
the existence of $2.1 billion in cash balances on trust accounts.
Moreover, Wirecard warned that a failure to provide certified
annual and consolidated financial statements by June 19, 2020 would
allow approximately $2 billion worth of loans to be terminated. The
scandal intensified when it was reported Markus Braun, the CEO who
left the company on June 19, was arrested in Germany, accused of
inflating the company's balance sheet.  Altogether, this news has
sent the price of Wirecard ADS crashing by over 80%.

The court has granted Lead Plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint on Aug. 14, 2020, which will expand the alleged
fraudulent period to cover recent stock drops caused by the
revelation of Wirecard's financial fraud, including the company's
June 18 disclosure and the recent arrest of former CEO Markus
Braun.

"Wirecard has long lied about its finances and almost fooled
investors that information to the contrary was false. We are
focusing our investigation on who knew what and when, including
their accountants," said Hagens Berman partner Reed Kathrein.

For more information about the case visit:
https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/WRCDF

Whistleblowers:  Persons with non-public information regarding
Wirecard should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.  Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC.  For more information, call Reed Kathrein
at 510-725-3000 or email WRCDF@hbsslaw.com.

                      About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman -- http://www.hbsslaw.com-- is a national law firm
with nine offices in eight cities around the country and eighty
attorneys. The firm represents investors, whistleblowers, workers
and consumers in complex litigation. [GN]


WOODSTOCK, VT: 2nd Circuit Appeal Filed in Bandler Speeding Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Michael Bandler filed an appeal from a court ruling
issued in his lawsuit entitled Bandler v. Town of Woodstock, Case
No. 18-cv-128, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Vermont (Burlington).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Judge
Christina Reiss of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Vermont issued an Opinion and Order denying the Plaintiffs' motion
to amend complaint.

Plaintiff Michael Bandler commenced the action on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated persons against the Town of
Woodstock (the "Town"), the Village of Woodstock (the "Village"),
the State of Vermont (the "State"), and John Doe Defendants, who
are "in privy with the named Defendants".

The Plaintiff seeks four claims arising out of a traffic citation
in the Village: (1) the Village ordinance authorizing the citation
is void for vagueness; (2) the relevant speed limit sign in the
Village was illegal and violated Plaintiff's due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Vermont Constitution; (3)
citations issued pursuant to 23 V.S.A. Section 1007 are illegal and
violate Plaintiff's and putative class members' due process rights;
and (4) Defendants Town, Village, and proposed new defendants
Philip B. Swanson, Robbie Blish, and Candace Coburn committed civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 based on the lack of
sufficient notice they provided to motorists regarding the legal
basis for speeding violations.

The appellate case is captioned as Bandler v. Town of Woodstock,
Case No. 19-4334, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Bandler, of Quechee, Vermont, appears
pro se.[BN]

Defendants-Appellees Town of Woodstock, and all other
municipalities who have issued illegal traffic tickets; Woodstock
Village, and all other municipalities who have usted illegal
traffic tickets; and State of Vermont, and all other
municipalities, who have issued illegal traffic tickets, are
represented by:

          Kaveh S. Shahi, Esq.
          CLEARY SHAHI & AICHER, P.C.
          110 Merchants Row, P.O. Box 6740
          Rutland, VT 05702
          Telephone: (802) 775-8800
          E-mail: kss@clearyshahi.com

               - and -

          David McLean, Esq.
          VERMONT OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          109 State Street
          Montpelier, VT 05609
          Telephone: (802) 828-5341
          E-mail: David.McLean@vermont.gov


YOURMECHANIC INC: Brelsford Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Brelsford, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. YOURMECHANIC, INC., a California corporation, doing
business as YOUR and DOES 1-10, MECHANIC, Case No. 3:20-cv-04452
(N.D. Cal., July 5, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid wages and
penalties pursuant to the Labor Code and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Company misclassified and continues to misclassify its
mechanics as independent contractors, when under California law,
these mechanics must be classified as non-exempt, hourly employees,
according to the complaint. The Defendant's misclassification of
its mechanics as independent contractors is a violation of the
California Labor Code as well as California Industrial Welfare
Commission, which include: failing to pay its employees premium
wages for missed meal periods; failing to pay its employees premium
wages for missed rest periods; failing to pay its employees minimum
wage as required by California law for every hour worked; failing
to maintain accurate employment records for its employees in
California; and failing to pay its employees amounts owed at the
end of employment.

The Plaintiff is a former "journeyman" automotive technician or
mechanic for the Defendant in California.

The Defendant provides mobile automobile repair and maintenance
services to automobile owners at their home.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Anthony J. Nunes, Esq.
          NUNES WORKER RIGHTS LAW, APC
          15260 Ventura Blvd., Suite 1200
          Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
          Phone: 530-848-1515
          Fax: 424-252-4301
          Email: tony@nunesworkerrightslaw.com


ZARA USA: Magana Appeals C.D. California Ruling to Ninth Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Melissa Magana filed an appeal from a court ruling issued
in her lawsuit entitled Melissa Magana v. Zara USA, Inc., et al.,
Case No. 8:18-cv-02249-DOC-ADS, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Santa Ana.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged employment discrimination.

The appellate case is captioned as Melissa Magana v. Zara USA,
Inc., et al., Case No. 20-55027, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MELISSA MAGANA, as an individual and on behalf
of others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Armond Marced Jackson, Esq.
          JACKSON LAW, APC
          2 Venture Plaza, Suite 240
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Telephone: (949) 281-6857
          E-mail: ajackson@jlaw-pc.com

Defendants-Appellees ZARA USA, INC., a New York corporation; and
MASSIMO DUTTI USA, INC., a New York corporation, are represented
by:

          Nancy Ellen Pritikin, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          379 Lytton Avenue
          Palo Alto, CA 94301
          E-mail: npritikin@sheppardmullin.com

          - and -

          Jinny S. Hwang, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          50 California Street
          San Francisco, CA 94111-4615
          Telephone: (415) 796-5497

               - and -

          Tyler James Johnson, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071-1448
          Telephone: (213) 620-1780
          E-mail: tjjohnson@sheppardmullin.com

               - and -

          Adam Ryan Rosenthal, Esq.
          SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
          12275 El Camino Real, Suite 200
          San Diego, CA 92130
          Telephone: (858) 720-8900
          E-mail: arosenthal@sheppardmullin.com


ZORE'S INC: Faces Class Action Over Excessive Towing Storage Fees
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kara Kenney, writing for The Indy Channel, reports that a local
towing company is facing a class-action lawsuit for allegedly
charging drivers excessive and illegal storage fees.

Indianapolis resident Max Ketcham and his attorney Eric Pavlack
filed the lawsuit in Marion County Superior Court on June 18
against Zore's, Inc.

Max alleges Zore's charged him "excessive" and "unlawful" storage
fees and accuses the towing company of violating Indiana's
Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.

The City of Indianapolis towing ordinance states you can charge a
maximum of $150 for a tow and $30/day for storing a vehicle.

However, a storage fee may not begin to accrue until 24 hours have
passed since the vehicle arrived at the vehicle storage facility,
according to the ordinance.

Max Ketcham lives at Sebring Court Apartments in Indianapolis. He
got his windshield fixed and forgot to replace his parking
sticker.

"First thing in the morning, I was getting ready to go to work, and
I go outside, and I see my vehicle is missing," said Ketcham.

Max went to Zore's to pick up his towed vehicle and looked up the
Indianapolis ordinance on the way.

Max expected to pay $150 for the tow but was shocked when he says
Zore's initially tried to charge him $60 in storage fees.

"I showed him the law on my cellphone," said Max.

When Max pushed back, he says they gave him credit for one day, but
still charged him $30 for storage.

His receipt shows his car was "held in impound" for "2 days."

The same receipt shows Max's vehicle was impounded at 7:14 pm on
June 10 and released the next day at 9:53 am, which is 14.5 hours
-- less than the 24 hours stated in the Indianapolis ordinance that
would prompt a $30 storage fee.

Max's lawsuit accuses Zore's of "unfair and unlawful" business
practices and violating the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.

"Zore's charges excessive storage fees in violation of Indianapolis
Marion County Municipal Code Section 995-305 through a scheme,
artifice, and/or device with intent to defraud and/or mislead,"
read the lawsuit.

His attorney, Eric Pavlack, suspects Max is not alone.

"Our goal is to get money back for all the people who were
overcharged by Zore's in violation of the ordinance," said Pavlack.
"The ordinance could not be more clear as to when a storage fee of
$30 should be charged. It can only be charged when the vehicle has
been at the tow lot for at least 24 hours, and that is simply not
how Zore's is charging the fee, and they should know better. "

Max says it's only $30, but he doesn't want this to happen to
anyone else.

"We don't want other people being overcharged," said Max. "We don't
want other people being hurt because a lot of the people are not in
a position to afford an extra $30 or $60."

RTV6 has called, emailed and Facebook messaged Zore's for a
response to the lawsuit. Here is the company's response:

Zore's is a family-owned and operated company that has been in
business since 1927. Zore's is now and always has been committed to
providing quality, dependable services to the citizens of
Indianapolis. Late on Saturday, June 20, 2020, Zore's received a
copy of the complaint filed by Mr. Ketcham. We also received an
inquiry from Lucy West, Licensing Supervisor for the City of
Indianapolis - Bureau of License and Permit Services, Department of
Business and Neighborhood Services. In accordance with Ms. West's
determination, we have refunded Mr. Ketcham's initial storage fee,
in full, which was apparently at issue in his claim with the City
of Indianapolis. With regard to the litigation, our attorneys are
investigating the claims raised in the Complaint.

You can report a towing complaint to the City of Indianapolis at
tows@indy.gov.

A spokeswoman for the city's Department of Business and
Neighborhood Services, Brandi Pahl, said they were unaware of the
lawsuit, and have not received any complaints aside from Max's
regarding Zore's overcharging.

Pahl said the city also found Zore's license expired on June 4, and
the company submitted an application for renewal on June 5.

Max's vehicle was towed on June 10, while Zore's was not licensed,
said Pahl.

"This tow shouldn't have happened," said Pahl. "That's why we've
asked Zore's to refund the customer the towing fee and storage fee,
or $180."

The city is working with Zore's to renew their license.

Until Zore's license is renewed, they are not allowed to do
non-consensual tows in the City of Indianapolis. [GN]


[*] Arbitration Clauses Most Effective Tool Against Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jay Ramsey, Esq.--jramsey@sheppardmullin.com--and Abby Meyer,
Esq.-- ameyer@sheppardmullin.com--of Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton LLP, in an article for The National Law Review, report that
arbitration clauses with class action waivers remain one of the
most effective tools that consumer-facing companies can employ to
fend off consumer class action litigation.  Yet many companies
stumble both in getting their customers to agree to the arbitration
clause and in drafting a clause that captures all claims that they
might face.  As we continue to work, shop, and engage with the
world from home, companies should perform a quick "health-check" of
their arbitration clause, asking themselves at least the following
questions:

(1)  If you contract with your customers through formally executed
documents, do you ensure that your customers execute those
documents?  Do you maintain records sufficient to prove that your
customers signed the contracts?  If you use e-signatures, is the
process compliant with the federal E-Sign Act and any state
equivalents such as California's Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA), Civil Code section 1633.1 et seq.?

(2) If you engage your customers online, does your website have a
sign-in, sign-up, or purchase process that results in an
enforceable agreement?

(a)  When signing in, signing up, or making a purchase on your
website, are customers asked to check a box  confirming agreement
to a set of terms and conditions?  If so, is the box pre-checked?
It shouldn't be.

(b)  If customers aren't asked to check a box to confirm their
agreement to a set of terms, are they explicitly told that by
signing in, signing up, continuing with the website, or making a
purchase that they are agreeing to the set of terms and conditions?
Does your website say something like: "By signing up, you agree to
the Terms and Conditions"?

(c)  Is the above sentence (or something like it) near the button
that has to be clicked to sign up, sign in, continue, or make a
purchase?  Is it above the button or below it?  Is the sentence
near images or other material that might draw attention away from
it?  Is it near other text that might confuse a customer?  Is the
font large enough?  Is the font color visible?  Could a customer
reasonably claim that they would not have seen the sentence?

(e)  Does the sentence, or the sentence next to a check box if a
check box is used, have a hyperlink to the terms that is noticeable
and identifiable as a hyperlink?  Is the hyperlink underlined?  Is
it in a different color font?  Does the hyperlink actually take the
customer to the correct set of terms?  Could a customer reasonably
claim that they did not know that there was a hyperlink?

(f)  Does your website follow the same process each time a
customer signs up, signs in, or makes a purchase?

(g)  If you allow signing up, signing in, or payment via a
third-party application (e.g., sign in through  Facebook or pay
with PayPal), are you still ensuring agreement to your company's
set of terms and conditions?

(h)  Do you maintain records sufficient to prove the website
design and content of the sign-up, sign-in, and purchase page?

(3)  If you engage your customers on a mobile website or through
an application, all of the above questions should be asked.  In
addition:

(a)  Does a pop-up keyboard block the sentence notifying customers
of the terms and conditions?

(b)  Is the hyperlink a real link?  Does it look like a
hyperlink?

(4)  Is your arbitration clause broad enough?  Does it cover all
claims that a customer may assert?  Does it cover claims brought
against you resulting from actions taken by your agents?  Does it
cover claims asserted against your agents?  Does it cover claims
against all entities that may be sued, including all of your
affiliates?  Does it cover all claims that may arise in the future
and claims that arose in the past?

(5)  Does your arbitration clause include a class action waiver?

(6)  Does your arbitration clause comply with consumer arbitration
standards?  Most arbitration tribunals have minimum requirements
for consumer arbitrations, and some require that the clause be
registered and pre-approved by the tribunal.

(7)  Does your arbitration clause grant a court or the arbitrator
the authority to determine whether a claim must be arbitrated?

(8)  If you do business in California or with California-based
customers, does your arbitration clause and set of terms more
generally prohibit the award of public injunctive relief?  Does it
include a poison pill?  Does it run afoul of McGill v. CitiBank,
N.A., 2 Cal.5th 945 (2017).  For more information about McGill and
these issues, please see here and here.

(9)  If you engage your customers through a variety of different
agreements (purchase or service contracts, website terms of use,
rewards programs, and so forth), all of the above questions should
be asked about each.  And does each separate contract have the same
arbitration clause?

The above questions may not cover everything that you and your
company should consider when it comes to implementing or updating
an arbitration clause.  And not all of the above may apply in every
circumstance.  Crafting an arbitration solution for each company,
satisfying the concerns and desires of the legal department, the
marketing department, and the business teams can sometimes be
challenging, but it should be done. [GN]


[*] Battea Class Action Services Partners with HedgeServ
--------------------------------------------------------
Battea Class Action Services, a specialist in providing turn-key
class and collective action antitrust and securities litigation
recovery services, international litigation research and monitoring
to more than 900 institutional investors, banks and hedge funds,
has partnered with global fund administrator HedgeServ.

"Battea Class Action Services is excited to partner with HedgeServ
to provide its clients with best in class global damage analysis
and class and collective action claim filing for securities,
derivatives, currencies, foreign exchange, & interest rate
derivatives," says Michael McCreesh, CFA, President of Battea Class
Action Services.

"Our clients are asking for the most comprehensive and accurate
global recovery solution provider. We believe that Battea Class
Action Services offers an industry leading suite of global
litigation research tools," says HedgeServ's Chairman Jim Kelly.
"We are already receiving positive feedback from our clients about
the value of our combined service offering. We are delighted to be
working with the Battea team."  [GN]


[*] Cos. Force Cardholders to Give Up Rights for Stimulus Funds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Shahar Ziv, writing for Forbes, reports that the rollout of prepaid
stimulus debit cards to deliver economic impact payments to
Americans has gone from bad to worse to terrible. Most recently, an
analysis of the cardholder agreement identified that card
recipients are being held hostage by the card's issuer and service
provider, Metabank and Money Network Financial, respectively. The
companies are foisting an arbitration agreement that forces
cardholders to give up their right to a trial by jury in order to
access their stimulus funds. They are also potentially selling
Americans' personally identifiable information to third-parties and
service providers, raising important privacy concerns.

Prepaid Stimulus Card Background:

Intended for individuals who didn't have their bank account
information on file with the IRS, the 4 million prepaid debit cards
were mailed a few weeks ago and came loaded with economic impact
payments, commonly referred to as stimulus payments. The problems
started immediately with some people mistaking the cards, which
came in plain white envelopes, for junk mail. Then, many
individuals encountered another problem: incorrect names printed on
the card.

Now, additional concerns have come to light about shady terms that
MetaBank and Money Network are imposing on consumers.

Forced Arbitration Clauses:

As reported by Paul Bland in Daily Kos, a mandatory arbitration
clause is included in Section 16 of the cardholder agreement. This
means that if a recipient of a prepaid stimulus card has a dispute,
she must agree to arbitrate the dispute through a third-party
arbitrator rather than pursue the claim in court. "This is
virtually universal for prepaid debit cards, but unusual for
something authorized by the U.S. government as a payment,
especially when only a fraction of recipients got the EIP Cards as
opposed to paper checks," David Dayen of The American Prospect
points out.

According to Section 16 of the cardholder agreement, cardholders
are required to give up their rights to:

1. Have juries decide Disputes.
2. Have courts, other than small-claims courts, decide Disputes.
3. Serve as a private attorney general or in a representative
capacity.
4. Join a Dispute you have with a dispute by other consumers.
5. Bring or be a class member in a class action or class
arbitration.

"For the government to say you only get this money if you give up
the right to trial by jury, it's really unusual," said Bland, who
first noticed the arbitration clause. For consumers, there are many
downsides to arbitration including being unable to join a
class-action lawsuit, being unable to have their case heard by a
jury of their peers, being compelled to secrecy, being roped into
using corporate-friendly arbitration companies "where private
arbitrators are likely to favor [the card's program manager] Money
Network over the consumers," and being forced to pay high fees even
if the claim is a small amount.

"Companies insert arbitration clauses because they work, protecting
them from liability and incentivizing them to steal with impunity,"
says Dayen. There's also an important public interest and oversight
component as the secret nature of arbitration means that "if
Treasury or its private bank contractor Money Network breaks the
law, operates illegally, or overcharges people, it's much less
likely that the public will ever learn about it," according to
Bland.

Here's What To Do Immediately If You Received A Prepaid Stimulus
Card:
Notably, the cardholder agreement includes a 60-day period to
opt-out of arbitration. Given that the cards were only mailed in
mid-May, most, if not all Americans who received them are still
within the 60 day period. If you received a card, please take two
minutes to write a short note and mail it to Money Network to
opt-out of the arbitration clause.

Here are the key steps:

You must send a signed notice within 60 calendar days after you
receive the Card.
Provide your name, address and Card account number. State that you
"opt out" of the Arbitration Clause."

You must send the notice in writing (and not electronically) to our
Notice Address.

Here is the address to use:

Money Network Financial, LLC
5565 Glenridge Connector NE
Mail Stop GH-52
Atlanta, GA 30342

MetaBank and Money Network will undoubtedly argue that because
consumers have the technical ability to opt-out, nothing is being
forced on them. This would be a misleading argument, given that we
have so much insight on the power of defaults as well as research
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) showing that
"consumers are generally unaware of whether their credit card
contracts include arbitration clauses" and that "consumers are
generally unaware of any arbitration clause opt-out opportunities
they may have been offered by their card issuer."

Sale Of Information To Third Parties And Marketers

Additionally, a group of Senators - Mark R. Warner (D-Virginia),
Maggie Hassan (D-New Hampshire), Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), and Jack
Reed (D-Rhode Island) - recently sent a letter to Treasury
Secretary, Steve Mnuchin, raising a concern about the sale of card
recipients' personal information.

The Senators point out that the cardholder agreement for the
stimulus debit cards allows Metabank and Money Network to share
personal information with third parties for marketing and other
purposes. Indeed, in Section 8 of the cardholder agreement,
individuals must agree that Metabank and Money Network "may
disclose information to third parties about your Card account or
the transactions you make" to many parties including "affiliates
[and] service providers."

"This ambiguous language raises serious questions about whether
Money Network Financial is permitted to sell personal information
of individuals who activated stimulus payment debit cards," the
Senators letter states. Given that individuals who received their
stimulus payment by direct deposit or paper check are not subject
to these provisions, it would seem unfair to force prepaid card
recipients to give up their right to privacy just to access their
money.

The Senators rightly ask for Mnuchin and Treasury to validate if
Money Network is permitted to give Americans personally
identifiable information to affiliates and service providers "for
marketing or any other commercial purposes not necessary for the
activation or use of the debit card." They also request information
about how Money Network is storing and using the information
provided and whether the Treasury Department is performing any
oversight.

Conclusion:

While the use of prepaid cards was a novel idea, there were myriad
missteps in getting them into the hands of struggling Americans in
a timely and effective manner. The forced use of arbitration and
potential sale of personal information also show that Americans
receiving prepaid cards are disadvantaged in other ways compared to
those receiving economic impact payments via direct deposit or
paper check. It behooves the Treasury Department, or another body
like the Consumer Financial Protection Board, to step in to correct
these egregious imbalances and protect the rights of Americans.
[GN]


[*] EU Reaches Deal on Blocwide Rules to Allow Class Actions
------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reports that European Union lawmakers have reached a deal on
blocwide rules that will allow groups of individuals to seek
compensation through bringing collective actions against companies.
[GN]

[*] List of Class Action Litigation Related to Covid-19
-------------------------------------------------------
Pierce Atwood LLP wrote on The National Law Review a list of Class
Action Litigation Related to COVID-19: Filed and Anticipated Cases
(Updated July 2):

Although the COVID-19 pandemic is still unfolding, class actions
related to the coronavirus have already arrived and are on the
rise. Despite unprecedented court closures and changing procedural
rules, COVID-19 class actions have steadily increased and are
expected to expand across industries, jurisdictions, and areas of
law. The impact of COVID-19 on business operations, consumer
activity, and economic forecasts has made clear that the filings to
date are only an early indication of what is to come.

The following is a categorized summary of coronavirus-related class
action litigation filed to date, highlighting the core allegations
of each complaint. We also note where no recently filed actions
have been identified, but we anticipate significant litigation.

We will be updating this list as new class action cases are filed.
Other guidance and information related to the COVID-19 pandemic is
available on the firm's directory of COVID-19 resources.

BANKING AND DEBT COLLECTION

Banks and financial institutions are facing class action litigation
aimed at preventing foreclosures and suspending debt collection.
These businesses may also encounter class action litigation from
commercial clients based on their role in providing access to
government relief under the CARES Act and other legislation.
CARES/PPP

Cases filed to date against banks concerning their administration
of loans under the CARES Act Payroll Protection Program seeking
monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief include:

    Lopez v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 20-cv-04172 (N.D. Cal. June
24, 2020); Panda Group, PC v. Bank of America Corp., No.
20-cv-00045 (D. Utah May 11, 2020);  Studio 1220, Inc. v. Bank of
America, N.A., No. 20-cv-03081 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2020); Profiles,
Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:20-cv-00894 (D. Md. Apr. 3,
2020);

        Motion for Multidistrict Litigation pending: MDL No. 2952

    Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv-04858 (S.D.N.Y.
June 24, 2020); Quinn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv-04100
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020); Smukler v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
20-cv-03413 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2020); VR Consultants, Inc. v. JP
Morgan Chase & Co., No. 20-cv-06110 (D.N.J. May 20, 2020); KPA
Promotions & Awards, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 20-cv-03910
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2020); ImpAcct, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No.
20-cv-01344 (D. Colo. May 12, 2020); TDD Dallas LLC v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. DC-20-06259 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2020);
Sha-Poppin Gourmet Popcorn LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
1:20-cv-02523 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020); Hyde-Edwards Salon & Spa
v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 20-cv-00762 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22,
2020);

    Henning v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., No. 20-cv-00905
(W.D. Pa. June 17, 2020); Winner v. PNC Financial Services Group,
Inc., No. 20-cv-03515 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2020); Lincoln Network,
Inc. v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., No. 20-cv-02824 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 23, 2020);

    Henning v. Summit Bank, No. 20-cv-00899 (W.D. Pa. June 17,
2020);

    Prinzo & Associates LLC v. IberiaBank Corp., No. 20-cv-00904
(W.D. Pa. June 17, 2020);

    Ratliff CPA Firm, PC v. Citizens Bank, No. 20-cv-02240 (D.S.C.
June 12, 2020); Ratliff CPA Firm, PC v. Intuit Inc., No.
20-cv-02241 (D.S.C. June 12, 2020); Ratliff CPA Firm, PC v. First
Reliance Bank, No. 20-cv-02208 (D.S.C. June 11, 2020); Ratliff CPA
Firm, PC v. Pinnacle Bank, No. 20-cv-02225 (D.S.C. June 11, 2020);
Ratliff CPA Firm, PC v. Truist Bank, No. 20-cv-02207 (D.S.C. June
11, 2020); Ratliff CPA Firm, PC v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
No. 20-cv-02041 (D.S.C. May 29, 2020);

    Fahmia, Inc. v. Comerica Inc., No. 20-cv-01536 (N.D. Tex. June
11, 2020); Fahmia, Inc. v. Zions Bancorporation, N.A., No.
20-cv-05104 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2020);

    Fruci & Associates, PS v. A10 Capital LLC, No. 20-cv-00864
(W.D. Wash. June 6, 2020);

    Aloha Accounting & Tax LLC v. First Hawaiian Bank, No.
20-cv-00254 (D. Haw. June 2, 2020);

    Prinzo & Associates, LLC v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., No.
20-cv-03256 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2020);

    Fahmia, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 20-cv-04146 (S.D.N.Y. May
29, 2020); Am. Video Duplicating, Inc. v. Citigroup Inc., No.
20-cv-03815 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2020);

    Fahmia, Inc. v. MUFG Americas Holding Co., No. 20-cv-04145
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020);

    Quinn v. Signature Bank Corp., No. 20-cv-04144 (S.D.N.Y. May
29, 2020);

    Fahmia, Inc. v. Pacific Premier Bancorp, Inc., No. 20-cv-00965
(C.D. Cal. May 26, 2020);

    Panda Accounting LLC v. Academy Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv-00985 (D.
Ariz. May 20, 2020);

    Hallockshannon, PC v. Citizens & Northern Corp., No.
20-cv-00714 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2020);

    Alliant CPA Group, LLC v. Bank of America, No. 20-cv-02026
(N.D. Ga. May 11, 2020);

        Transferred into a Multi-District Litigation: MDL No. 2950

    Zamora-Orduna Realty Group, LLC v. BBVA USA, No. 20-cv-00579
(W.D. Tex. May 11, 2020);

    Brunner Accounting Group v. SVB Financial Group, No.
20-cv-04235 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2020);

    BAM Navigation, LLC v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 20-cv-01345 (D.
Minn. June 11, 2020); Marselian v. Wells Fargo & Co., No.
20-cv-03166 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2020);

        Motion for Multidistrict Litigation pending: MDL No. 2954

    Byrnes v. Fountainhead Commercial Capital, LLC, No. 20-cv-04149
(C.D. Cal. May 6, 2020);

    Bookmyer v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 20-cv-02284 (S.D. Ohio May 5,
2020);

    In re JP Morgan Chase Paycheck Protection Plan Litigation, MDL
No. 2944 (May 1, 2020);

    Am. Video Duplicating, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, No.
2:20-cv-04036 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2020);

    A.D. Sims, LLC v. Wintrust Financial Corp., No. 20-cv-02644
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020);

    Lowry v. U.S. Bancorp., No. 1:20-cv-00348 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30,
2020); Ryan M. Kull Licensed Clinical Social Work LLC v. Chase Bank
USA, N.A., No. 1:20-cv-03138 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020);

    Leigh, King, Norton & Underwood, LLC v. Regions Financial
Corp., No. 2:20-cv-00591 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 28, 2020);

    Zamora-Orduna Realty Group, LLC v. BBVA USA, No. 2020CI07450
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 2020);

        Defendant filed a notice of removal to the District Court
for the Western District of Texas on May 11, 2020: No.
20-cv-00579;

    Kennard Law, P.C. v. Frost Bank, No. 2020-24432 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Apr. 18, 2020);

    Scherer v. Frost Bank, No. 4:20-cv-01297 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 12,
2020); Scherer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:20-cv-01295 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 11, 2020).

DEBT RELIEF

Cases filed to date against financial institutions seeking the
suspension of loan repayment, debt collection, and foreclosure
include:

    Sass v. Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc., No.
20-cv-03424 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2020) (alleging that loan servicers
and credit reporting agencies inaccurately reported information
regarding loans that were suspended by the CARES Act);

    Oksenendler v. Northstar Education Finance, Inc., No.
20-cv-00805 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2020) (seeks suspension of a student
loan repayment program based on changed conditions);

    Shuff v. Bank of America, No. 5:20-cv-00184 (S.D. W. Va. Mar.
16, 2020) (seeks an injunction to temporarily suspend foreclosure
actions).

EDUCATION

Educational programs and institutions, in particular colleges and
universities, are facing class action claims by students related to
campus closures, access to resources, and future operations. Cases
filed to date against educational institutions seeking the refund
of university tuition, room, board, and other fees paid by students
based on breach of contract and other theories include:

    Schultz v. Emory University, No. 20-cv-022661 (N.D. Ga. June
24, 2020); DeMasi v. Emory University, No. 20-cv-02002 (N.D. Ga.
May 8, 2020);

    Choi v. University of Southern California, No. 20-cv-05573
(C.D. Cal. June 23, 2020); Doe v. University of Southern
California, No. 20-cv-04172 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2020); Watson v.
University of Southern California, No. 20-cv-04107 (C.D. Cal. May
5, 2020); Diaz v. University of Southern California, No. 20-cv-4066
(C.D. Cal. May 4, 2020);

    Barkhordar v. Harvard University, No. 20-cv-11203 (D. Mass.
June 22, 2020); Student A v. Harvard University, No. 20-cv-10968
(D. Mass. May 20, 2020);

    Ninivaggi v. University of Delaware, No. 20-cv-02762 (E.D.N.Y.
June 22, 2020);

        Notice of Removal filed in the Eastern District of New York
on June 22, 2020 – No. 20-cv-02762;

    Doemel v. Arizona Board of Regents, No. 20-cv-01203 (D. Ariz.
June 17, 2020); Diaz v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. 20-cv-01126 (D.
Ariz. June 8; 2020); Raftopoulous-Johnson v. Arizona Bd. Of
Regents, No. 20-cv-04399 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2020); Rosenkrantz v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. 20-cv-00613 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2020);

    Ballas v. University of Nevada, No. CV-20-00922 (Nev. Dist. Ct.
June 17, 2020);

    Student A v. Santa Clara University, No. 20-cv-04045 (N.D. Cal.
June 17, 2020);

    Ballas v. State of Nevada ex rel. Board of Regents of the
Nevada System of Higher Education, No. CV20-00922 (Nev. Dist. Ct.
June 17, 2020);

    Romankow v. New York University, No. 20-cv-04616 (S.D.N.Y. June
16, 2020); Morales v. New York University, No. 20-cv-04418
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2020); Zagoria v. New York University, No.
20-cv-03610 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020); Rynasko v. New York University,
No. 20-cv-03250 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020);

    Longo v. Campus Advantage, Inc., No. 20-cv-01363 (M.D. Fla.
June 12, 2020) (campus housing);

    Placko v. University of Illinois, No. 20-cv-03451 (N.D. Ill.
June 12, 2020);

    Crawford v. Board of Regents of Georgetown University, No.
20-cv-01539 (D.D.C. June 11, 2020); Doe v. Georgetown University,
No. 20-cv-01370 (D.D.C. May 21, 2020); Student A v. Georgetown
University, No. 20-cv-05937 (D.N.J. May 15, 2020);

    Oyoque v. DePaul University, No. 20-cv-03431 (N.D. Ill. June
11, 2020); Chavez v. DePaul University, No. 20-cv-02865 (N.D. Ill.
May 12, 2020);

    Buschauer v. Columbia College Chicago, No. 20-cv-03394 (N.D.
Ill. June 9, 2020);

    Montesano v. Catholic University of America, No. 20-cv-01496
(D.D.C. June 8, 2020);

    Birdsall v. BYU, No. 20-cv-00270 (D. Idaho June 8, 2020);

    Metzner v. Quinnipiac University, No. 20-cv-00784 (D. Conn.
June 5, 2020); Hotter v. Quinnipiac University, No. 20-cv-05592
(D.N.J. May 6, 2020);

    Gunter v. Louisiana State University & Agricultural &
Mechanical College, No. 20-cv-00346 (M.D. La. June 5, 2020);

    Salerno v. Florida Southern College, No. 20-cv-04314 (S.D.N.Y.
June 5, 2020);

    Desai v. Carnegie Mellon University, No. 20-cv-00844 (W.D. Pa.
June 5, 2020); Pfingsten v. Carnegie Mellon University, No.
20-cv-716 (W.D. Penn. May 15, 2020);

    Camarena v. Baylor University, No. 20-cv-01436 (N.D. Tex. June
5, 2020); King v. Baylor University, No. 20-cv-00504 (W.D. Tex.
June 5, 2020);

    Pinzon v. Pepperdine University, No. 20-cv-04928 (C.D. Cal.
June 3, 2020);

    Gold v. University of Miami, No. 20-cv-22316 (S.D. Fla. June 3,
2020); Weiss v. University of Miami, No. 20-cv-22207 (S.D. Fla. May
27, 2020);

    Rabinowitz v. American University, No. 20-cv-01454 (D.D.C. June
2, 2020); Arif v. American University, No. 20-cv-60902 (S.D. Fla.
May 4, 2020); Qureshi v. American University, No. 20-cv-01141
(D.D.C. May 1, 2020);

    Washington v. Johnson & Wales University, No. 20-cv-00246
(D.R.I. June 2, 2020); Hazel v. Johsnon & Wales University, No.
20-cv-22251 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2020); Alexander v. Johnson & Wales
University, No. 20-cv-01092 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 2020);

    Talab v. Board of Trustees of Duke University, No. 20-cv-00480
(M.D.N.C. June 1, 2020);

    Rahman v. Cornell University, No. 20-cv-00592 (N.D.N.Y. May 31,
2020); Faber v. Cornell University, No. 20-cv-00471 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.
25, 2020); Haynie v. Cornell University, No. 20-cv-00467 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2020);

    Omoro v. Brandeis University, No. 20-cv-11030 (D. Mass. May 29,
2020); Doe v. Brandeis University, No. 20-cv-11021 (D. Mass. May
28, 2020);

    Botts v. Johns Hopkins University, No. 20-cv-01335 (D. Md. May
29, 2020);

    Rhodes v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Inc., No.
20-cv-00927 (M.D. Fla. May 28, 2020);

    Alfred v. Dartmouth College, No. 20-cv-00637 (D.N.H. May 28,
2020);

    Mauldin v. George Washington University, No. 20-cv-01417
(D.D.C. May 28, 2020);

    Dougherty v. Drew University, No. 20-cv-06518 (D.N.J. May 28,
2020);

    Vijay v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, No.
20-cv-00499 (W.D. Okla. May 28, 2020);

    Taylor v. Charleston Southern University, No. 2020CP1002357
(S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. May 28, 2020);

    Lynn v. Merrimack College, No. 20-cv-00632 (D.N.H. May 27,
2020);

    Buckley v. Hofstra University, No. 20-cv-02424 (E.D.N.Y. June
1, 2020); Latvala v. Hofstra University, No. 20-cv-02368 (E.D.N.Y.
May 27, 2020); Stellato v. Hofstra University, No. 20-cv-01999
(E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020);

    McCarthy v. Loyola Marymount University, No. 20-cv-04668 (C.D.
Cal. May 26, 2020); Shoham v. Loyola Marymount University, No.
20-cv-04329 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2020);

    Gociman v. Loyola University Chicago, No. 20-cv-03116 (N.D.
Ill. May 26, 2020);

    Ramey v. Pennsylvania State University, No. 20-cv-00753 (W.D.
Penn. May 26, 2020); Thomson v. Pennsylvania State University, No.
20-cv-00725 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2020);

    Yoo v. Regents of the University of California, No.
30-2020-01140827 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2020); Lee v. Regents of
the University of California, No. 20-cv-03241 (N.D. Cal. May 12,
2020); Ritter v. Regents of the University of California, No.
20-cv-02925 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020); Brandmeyer v. Regents of the
University of California, No. 20-cv-2886 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27,
2020);

    Chapusette v. Touro College and University System, No.
20-cv-04018 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020)

    Hannibal-Fisher v. Grand Canyon University, No. 20-cv-01007 (D.
Ariz. May 22, 2020); Little v. Grand Canyon University, No.
20-cv-00795 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24, 2020);

    Thiele v. Illinois State University, No. 20-cv-01197 (C.D. Ill.
May 21, 2020);

    Durbeck v. Suffolk University, No. 20-cv-10985 (D. Mass. May
21, 2020);

    Simmons-Telep v. Roger Williams University, No. 20-cv-00226
(D.R.I. May 21, 2020);

    Hernandez v. Illinois Institute of Technology, No. 20-cv-03010
(N.D. Ill. May 20, 2020);

    Doe v. Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, No.
MDL-L-003039-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 20, 2020);

    Kincheloe v. University of Chicago, No. 20-cv-03015 (N.D. Ill.
May 20, 2020);

    Coffman v. California University of Pennsylvania, No.
20-cv-00733 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2020);

    Legge v. University of San Francisco, No. 20-cv-03406 (N.D.
Cal. May 19, 2020);

    Awlia v. Southern New Hampshire University, No. 20-cv-00609
(D.N.H. May 19, 2020);

    Mycek v. Rochester Institute of Technology, No. 20-cv-06324
(W.D.N.Y. May 19, 2020); Bergeron v. Rochester Institute of
Technology, No. 20-cv-06283 (W.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020);

    Bahrani v. Northeastern University, No. 20-cv-10946 (D. Mass.
May 18, 2020); Satam v. Northeastern University, No. 20-cv-10915
(D. Mass. May 13, 2020); Chong v. Northeastern University, No.
20-cv-10844 (D. Mass. May 1, 2020);

    Doval v. Fairleigh Dickinson University, No. 20-cv-06010
(D.N.J. May 18, 2020);

    Bolland v. Seattle Pacific University, No. 20-cv-00741 (W.D.
Wash. May 18, 2020);

    Jones v. Carrington College, Inc., No. 20-cv-00989 (E.D. Cal.
May 15, 2020);

    Amable v. The New School, No. 20-cv-03811 (S.D.N.Y. May 15,
2020);

    Fiore v. The University of Tampa, No. 20-cv-03744 (S.D.N.Y. May
14, 2020);

    Soriano v. University of New Haven, No. 20-cv-00662 (D. Conn.
May 13, 2020);

    Silulu v. Trustees of Boston University, No. 20-cv-10915 (D.
Mass. May 13, 2020); Bornstein v. Trustees of Boston University,
No. 2084-cv-00962 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 5, 2020); Tran v. Boston
University, No. 20-cv-03088 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2020); Cox v.
Trustees of Boston University, No. 1:20-cv-10834 (D. Mass. Apr. 30,
2020); Dutra v. Trustees of Boston University, No. 1:20-cv-10827
(D. Mass. Apr. 29, 2020);

    Student A v. Wagner College, No. 20-cv-02170 (E.D.N.Y. May 13,
2020);

    Raimo v. Washington University in St. Louis, No. 20-cv-00634
(E.D. Mo. May 12, 2020);

    Egleston v. University of Florida Board of Trustees, No.
20-cv-00106 (N.D. Fla. May 11, 2020);

    Saroya v. University of the Pacific, No. 20-cv-03196 (N.D. Cal.
May 10, 2020);

    Klein v. Parker University, No. 20-cv-03194 (N.D. Cal. May 9,
2020);

    Mitelberg v. Stevens Institute of Technology, No. 20-cv-05748
(D.N.J. May 8, 2020);

    Patel v. St. John's University, No. 20-cv-02114 (E.D.N.Y. May
8, 2020);

    Hickey v. University of Pittsburgh, No. 20-cv-00690 (W.D. Pa.
May 8, 2020);

    Fedele v. Marist College, No. 20-cv-03559 (S.D.N.Y. May 7,
2020);

    Thomas v. Mercy College; No. 20-cv-03584 (S.D.N.Y. May 7,
2020);

    Quiroz v. Rider University, No. 20-cv-05620 (D.N.J. May 6,
2020);

    Spiegel v. Indiana University, No. 53C06-2005-CT-000771 (Cir.
Ct. Monroe Cty., Ind., May 6, 2020);

    Lawson v. Pennsylvania College of Technology, No. 20-cv-00736
(M.D. Pa. May 5, 2020);

    Ryan v. Temple University, No. 20-cv-02164 (E.D. Pa. May 5,
2020);

    Schoening v. Seton Hall University, No. 20-cv-05566 (D.N.J. May
5, 2020);

    Pinkney v. State University of New York, No. 20-cv-02048
(E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020);

    Fittipaldi v. Monmouth University, No. 20-cv-05526 (D.N.J. May
4, 2020);

    Paris v. University of Connecticut, No. 20-cv-02018 (E.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2020);

    Deecher v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, No. 20-cv-00498
(N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2020);

    Rojas v. Florida Board of Governors Foundation, Inc., No.
2020-CA-000846 (Fla. Circ. Ct. May 4, 2020);

    Mebrahtu v. Manchester University, No. 20-cv-05457 (D.N.J. May
1, 2020);

    Hewitt v. Pratt Institute, No. 20-cv-2007 (E.D.N.Y. May 1,
2020);

    Yin v. Syracuse University, No. 20-cv-00494 (N.D.N.Y. May 1,
2020);

    Rosado v. Barry University, Inc., No. 20-cv-21813 (S.D. Fla.
May 1, 2020);

    Rocchio v. Rutgers, No. 20-cv-05390 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2020);

    Smith v. University of Pennsylvania, No. 20-cv-2086 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 30, 2020);

    Doe v. Brown University, No. 20-cv-00191 (D.R.I. Apr. 30,
2020);

    Shak v. Adelphi University, No. 20-cv-01951 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28,
2020);

    Doe v. Vanderbilt University, No. 20-cv-00356 (M.D. Tenn. Apr.
28, 2020); Doe v. Vanderbilt University, No. 20-mc-09999 (M.D.
Tenn. Apr. 27, 2020);

    Rifat v. Board of Trustees of the California State University,
No. 20-cv-04421 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2020); Miller v. Board of
Trustees of the California State University, No. 20-cv-03833 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2020);

    Dieckhaus v. University of North Carolina System, No.
20-cv-00069 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2020); McAllister v. University of
North Carolina System, No. 20-cv-00078 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2020);
Allen v. University of North Carolina System, No. 20-cv-00254
(W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2020); Burnett v. University of North Carolina
System, No. 20-cv-00103 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2020);

    Friedman v. Drexel University, No. 20-cv-05147 (D.N.J. Apr. 27,
2020); Rickenbaker v. Drexel University, No. 20-cv-1358 (D.S.C.
Apr. 8, 2020);

    Dimitryuk v. University of Miami, No. 20-cv-60851 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 26, 2020);

    Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, No. 20-cv-00470
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2020);

    Hassan v. Fordham University, No. 20-cv-03265 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
25, 2020);

    Beck v. Manhattan College, No. 20-cv-03229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23,
2020);

    Student A v. Columbia University, No. 20-cv-3208 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
23, 2020); Bennett v. Columbia University, No. 20-cv-3227 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2020);

    Marbury v. Pace University, No. 20-cv-03210 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23,
2020);

    Kai v. Western Michigan University, No. 20-000063-MK (Mich. Ct.
Claims Apr. 22, 2020);

    Patel v. University of Vermont, No. 20-cv-00061 (D. Vt. Apr.
21, 2020);

    Irizarry v. Long Island University, No. 20-cv-03160 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 21, 2020);

    Burgos v. Pa. State University, No. 20-cv-03143 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
20, 2020);

    Peyton v. Wayne State University, No. 20-000059-MK (Mich. Ct.
Claims. Apr. 20, 2020);

    Carpey v. Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, No. 20-cv-01064 (D. Colo.
Apr. 15, 2020);

    Student A v. Liberty University, Inc., No. 20-cv-00023 (W.D.
Va. Apr. 13, 2020);

    Kliment v. University of Michigan, No. 20-000056-MK (Mich. Ct.
Claims. Apr. 16, 2020);

    Allen v. Michigan State University, No. 20-000057-MK (Mich. Ct.
Claims. Apr. 16, 2020);

    Church v. Purdue University & Trustees, No. 20-cv-00025 (N.D.
Ind. Apr. 9, 2020);

    Dixon v. Univ. of Miami, No. 20-cv-1348 (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 2020);

EMPLOYMENT

Employers are facing wage and hour, workplace safety, paid leave,
WARN Act, ERISA, employee privacy, worker classification,
disability accommodation, and discrimination claims. Cases filed to
date include:

    Richard v. Ambulnz Health, LLC, No. 510337/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 17, 2020): asserts claims under New York Labor Laws based on
alleged unpaid wages and coerced release agreements;

    Rodriguez v. Allen Distribution, LP, No. 20-at-00573 (E.D. Cal.
June 16, 2020): asserts claims under FLSA and California Labor Code
for alleged unpaid compensation and policy of rounding time;

    Arias v. High Tech Landscapes, Inc., No. 20-cv-07046 (D.N.J.
June 10, 2020): asserts claims under FLSA for alleged failure to
pay overtime wages;

    Garcia Chantez v. Victory Hospitality Management LLC, No.
20-cv-02590 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020): asserts claims under FLSA for
alleged unpaid wages, including overtime wages;

    Osvatics v. Lyft, Inc., No. 20-cv-01426 (D.D.C. May 29, 2020):
asserts claims under worker protection statutes based on alleged
failure to provide paid sick leave to Lyft drivers;

    Benson v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., No. 20-cv-00891 (M.D. Fla.
May 27, 2020): asserts claims under WARN Act for alleged failure to
provide notice before laying off hundreds of employees;

    Toc v. SNL Meat & Produce Corp., No. 20-cv-02339 (E.D.N.Y. May
26, 2020): asserts claims under FLSA for alleged unpaid wages,
including overtime wages;

    Lange v. 24-Hour Medical Staffing Servs. LLC, No.
30-2020-01140958 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2020): asserts claims
under California Labor Code for alleged unpaid wages and failure to
provide adequate rest periods;

    Hernandez v. Galenos Medical Center Corp., No. 20-cv-22162
(S.D. Fla. May 25, 2020): asserts claims under FLSA for alleged
unpaid overtime wages;

    Morales v. Sunrise Meats, Inc., No. 20-cv-61017 (S.D. Fla. May
22, 2020): asserts claims under FLSA and Florida Whistleblower Act
for alleged failure to pay wages;

    McGhee v. Postmates, Inc., No. CGC-20-584341 (Cal. Super. Ct.
May 22, 2020): asserts claims under California Labor Code for
alleged unpaid wages and failure to provide necessary PPE;

    Maglana v. Celebrity Cruise Inc., No. 20-cv-221233 (S.D. Fla.
May 21, 2020): asserts claims for, inter alia, employment
discrimination on the basis of national origin;

    De La Cruz v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No. 20-cv-04558 (C.D. Cal.
May 21, 2020): asserts claims under WARN Act, FLSA, and California
Labor Code for alleged improper termination and alleged failure to
pay wages owed and to provide required employee protections;

    Zhang v. Fortune No. 1 Inc., No. 20 GDCV 00456 (Cal. Super. Ct.
May 17, 2020): asserts claims under California Labor Code for
alleged failure to pay minimum compensation and provide adequate
rest periods;

    Gomez v. Chamiara, No. 20-cv-02190 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2020):
asserts claims under Fair Labor Standards Act for alleged failure
to pay employees' minimum compensation.

    England v. United Airlines, No. 20-cv-02877 (N.D. Ill. May 13,
2020): asserts breach of contract claims on behalf of employees;

    Smith v. Ideal Image Development Corp., No. 20SL-CC02511 (Mo.
Circ. Ct. May 6, 2020): asserts claims under WARN Act and state
employment laws for alleged improper layoffs during pandemic and
failure to pay wages owed;

        Notice of Removal filed on June 12, 2020: No. 20-cv-00761
(E.D. Mo. June 12, 2020);

    Green v. Hertz Corp., No. 20-cv-01006 (Apr. 30, 2020): asserts
a violation of the WARN Act for failure to provide written notice
before termination of employees;

    Hartstein v. Hyatt Corp., No. 20-cv-04874 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr.
24, 2020): asserts a violation of the WARN Act and alleges failure
to pay accrued wages and vacation time;

        Notice of Removal filed on June 1, 2020 – No. 20-cv-04874
(C.D. Cal. June 1, 2020);

    Evans v. Dart, 20-cv-02453 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2020): asserts
claims under Fair Labor Standards Act for alleged failure to pay
employees' minimum compensation.

    Miller v. Creative Hairdressers, Inc., 20-cv-00912 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 20, 2020): asserts claims under Fair Labor Standards Act for
alleged failure to pay wages for the two weeks preceding closure of
the restaurant.

    Scott v. Hooters III, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-00882 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
16, 2020): asserts a violation of the WARN Act for failure to
provide written notice before termination of employees.

    Allen v. Tableseide Restaurant Group LLC, No. 8:20-cv-843 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 13, 2020): asserts claims under Fair Labor Standards Act
for alleged failure to pay wages for the two weeks preceding
closure of the restaurant.

    Olsen v. Hair Cuttery, No. 1:20-cv-03760 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2020):
asserts claim under Fair Labor Standards Act for allegedly closing
hair salons in the middle of a pay period without payment.

    Siers v. Velodyne Lidar, No. 5:20-cv-02290 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3,
2020): asserts claim under WARN Act for allegedly terminating over
140 employees with insufficient notice and using the pandemic as a
pretext for layoffs.

    Alaska State Employees v State of Alaska, No. 20-5652 (Super.
Ct. Ak. Mar. 24, 2020): asserts claim for injunctive relief for
public employees to reduce health risks.

    Burr v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-CA-002640 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar.
19, 2020): asserts claims by entertainers hired by cruise ships who
claim entitlement to full compensation for canceled events.

    Verhines v. Uber Technology, Inc., No. 20-583684 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Mar. 12, 2020): asserts claim for paid sick leave based on
worker classification.

    Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., No. CGC-20-583685 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
12, 2020): claims that Lyft failed to provide adequate paid sick
leave, making drivers feel compelled to drive even if sick.

EVENT CANCELLATION AND SERVICE DISRUPTION

Consumer claims based on the cancellation or disruption of events
and services are likely to dominate court dockets in coming
months.
Travel Cancellation

Cases filed to date against airlines seeking the refund of payments
for cancelled flights based on breach of contract, consumer
protection, and other theories include:

    Bess v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No. 20-cv-01837 (D. Colo. June
22, 2020); Johnson v. Frontier Airlines, No. 20-cv-01751 (D. Colo.
June 15, 2020); Rivera-De Leon v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., No.
20-cv-01518 (D. Colo. May 28, 2020); Sweet v. Frontier Airlines,
Inc., No. 20-cv-00662 (D. Conn. May 13, 2020); Young v. Frontier
Airlines, Inc., No. 20-cv-1152 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2020); Obertman
v. Frontier Airlines Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00820 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2020);

    In re COVID-19 Airfare Refund Litigation, MDL No. 2957 (June
16, 2020);

    Gimello v. American Airlines Group, Inc., No. 20-cv-02834 (E.D.
Pa. June 15, 2020); Ward v. American Airlines, Inc., No.
20-cv-00371 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2020);

    Morris v. Assicurazaioni Generali Group, S.p.A., No.
20-cv-04430 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020); Robbins v. Generali Global
Assistance, Inc., No. 20-cv-04904 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2020) (travel
insurance);

    Polk v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 20-cv-02461 (N.D. Ga. June
9, 2020); Daniels v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01664 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 17, 2020);

    Singh Lupien v. Westjet Airlines Ltd., No. 108481648 (Fla.
Circ. Ct. June 5, 2020);

    Belanger v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana S.A. Operadora, No.
20-cv-03087 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2020);

    Subramanyam v. Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 20-cv-11296 (E.D.
Mich. May 22, 2020);

    Jauregui v. China Eastern Airlines Corp. Ltd., No. 20-cv-04552
(C.D. Cal. May 20, 2020);

    Chandler v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH, No. 20-cv-00810 (D. Or. May
20, 2020);

    Bugarin v. All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd., No. 20-cv-03341 (N.D.
Cal. May 15, 2020);

    Williams v. Air China Ltd., No. 20-cv-01883 (D.S.C. May 15,
2020);

    Maree v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No. 20-cv-00885 (C.D. Cal. May
12, 2020); Castanares v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, No. 20-cv-04261
(C.D. Cal. May 11, 2020);

    Zawacki v. Swoop, Inc., No. 20-cv-01100 (M.D. Fla. May 12,
2020);

    Dumitrescu v. Compania Panamena De Aviacion, No. 20-cv-02125
(E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2020);

    Diaz v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 20-cv-60933 (S.D. Fla. May
8, 2020); Boucher v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 20-cv-60829 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 22, 2020); Manchur v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No.
20-cv-10771 (D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2020);

    Reaves v. Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, No. 20-cv-02121 (E.D.N.Y.
May 9, 2020); Daversa-Evdyriadis v. Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, No.
20-cv-00767 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2020);

    Suarez v. Emirates, No. 20-cv-03623 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020);

    Chaves v. TAP Air Portugal, No. 20-cv-02086 (E.D.N.Y. May 5,
2020);

    Ide v. British Airways, PLC, No. 20-cv-03542 (S.D.N.Y. May 6,
2020);

    Fensterer v. Capital One, N.A., No. 20-cv-05558 (D.N.J. May 5,
2020);

    Vozzolo v. Air Canada, Inc., No. 20-cv-03503 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
2020); Levu v. Air Canada, Inc., No. 20-cv-00703 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
23, 2020);

    Herrera v. Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd., No. 20-cv-03019 (N.D.
Cal. May 1, 2020);

    Martinez-Sanchez v. Concesionaria Vuela Compania De Aviacion,
No. 20-cv-1966 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020);

    Bratcher v. Allegiant Travel Co., No. 2:20-cv-00767 (D. Nev.
Apr. 28, 2020);

    Milosevic v. Turk Hava Yollari A.O., Inc., No. 20-cv-03328
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020);

    Sholopa v. Turkish Airlines, Inc., No. 20-cv-03294 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 27, 2020);

    Snyder v. Grupo Aeromexico S.A.B. de C.V., No. 2:20-cv-03649
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020);

    Alvarez v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. 1-20-cv-00175 (D. Haw.
Apr. 20, 2020);

    Herr v. Allegiant Air, LLC, No. 20-cv-01002 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
15, 2020);

    Bombin v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 20-cv-01883 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 13, 2020);

    Levey v. Concesionaria Vuela Compania de Aviacion, No.
1:20-cv-02215 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2020);

    Utley v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00756
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2020); Rudolph v. United Airlines Holdings,
Inc., No. 20-cv-02142 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2020).

Cases filed to date against non-airline travel companies seeking
the refund of payments for cancelled itineraries based on breach of
contract, consumer protection, and other theories include:

    Fitzgerald v. Grand Circle, LLC, No. 20-cv-02586 (E.D. Pa. June
1, 2020) (international trips);

    Corrigan v. EF Education Tours, Inc., No. 20-cv-11010 (D. Mass.
May 27, 2020) (educational tours);

    Tirozzi v. Lakeland Tours, LLC, No. 20-cv-30065 (D. Mass. Apr.
30, 2020) (pre-paid trip);

    Sides v. Global Travel Alliance, Inc., No. 1_20-cv-00053 (D.
Mont. Apr. 24, 2020) (educational tours);

    Mitchell v. NurseCon at Sea LLC, No. 1:20-cv-21503 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 8, 2020) (cruise);

    Douglas v. EF Inst. for Cultural Exch., Inc., No.
37-2020-00013374 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2020); Grabovsky v. EF
Inst. for Cultural Exch., No. 20-cv-00508 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020)
(educational tours).

Event Cancellation

Cases filed to date against event and ticketing companies seeking
the refund of payments for sporting, music, theater, and other
cultural events based on breach of contract, consumer protection,
and other theories include:

    Wood v. StubHub, Inc., No. 20-cv-04125 (N.D. Cal. June 22,
2020); Reynolds v. StubHub, Inc., No. 20-cv-03508 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
2020); Kopfmann v. StubHub, Inc., No. 20-cv-03025 (N.D. Cal. May 1,
2020); Alcaraz v. StubHub, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-02595 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
14, 2020); McMillan v StubHub, No. 20-cv-00319 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 2,
2020);

        Some of these actions are included in a motion for a
Multidistrict Litigation: MDL No. 2951

    Hatchmed Corp. v. Healthcare Information & Management Systems
Society, Inc., No. 20-cv-03377 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2020);

    Wellins v. Lockn' LLC, No. 20-cv-03641 (N.D. Cal. June 1,
2020);

    Hernandez v. Ultra Enterprises Inc., No. 20-cv-22185 (S.D. Fla.
May 26, 2020);

    Ellenwood v. World Triathalon Corp., No. 20-cv-01182 (M.D. Fla.
May 22, 2020);

    Wallach v. Houston Astros, LLC, No. 2020-10637 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
May 4, 2020);

    Bromley v. SXSW, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-439 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 24,
2020);

    Trader v. SeatGeek, Inc., No. 20-cv-03248 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2020);

    Tezak v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc., No. 20-cv-02482 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 23, 2020);

    Nellis v. Vivid Seats LTD, No. 20-cv-02486 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23,
2020);

    Ajzenman v. Office of the Comm'r of Baseball, No. 2:20-cv-03643
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020);

    Hansen v. Ticketmaster Entm't, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-02685 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 17, 2020);

    Nesis v. Do Lab, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-03452 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14,
2020); Rutledge v. Do LaB Inc., (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2020).

Memberships, Services, and Subscriptions

Cases filed to date against fitness clubs, ski resorts, amusement
parks, and other organizations seeking the refund of season passes
and membership fees based on breach of contract, consumer
protection, and other theories include:

    Du v. Alterra Mountain Co., No. 20-cv-01699 (D. Colo. June 11,
2020); Simpson v. Alterra Mountain Co., No. 20-cv-01691 (D. Colo.
June 10, 2020); Kress v. Alterra Mountain Co., No. 20-cv-01583 (D.
Colo. June 2, 2020); Werner v. Alterra Mountain Co., No.
20-cv-01254 (D. Colo. May 5, 2020); Farmer v. Alterra Mountain Co.,
No. 1:20-cv-01175 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2020); Eckert v. Alterra
Mountain Co., No. 1:20-cv-01158 (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2020) (ski
resort);

    Case v. Merlin Entertainments Group U.S. Holdings, Inc., No.
20-cv-01049 (S.D. Cal. June 8, 2020) (amusement parks);

    Shepherd v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 706075/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 29, 2020) (Amazon Prime membership);

    Bellafatto v. Vail Corp., No. 20-cv-01585 (D. Colo. June 2,
2020); Malachowky v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No. 20-cv-01529 (D. Colo.
May 28, 2020); DiPirro v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No. 20-cv-01468 (D.
Colo. May 22, 2020); Gasman v. Vail Corp., No. 20-cv-01475 (D.
Colo. May 22, 2020); Rarick v. Vail Corp., No. 20-cv-01364 (D.
Colo. May 13, 2020); McAuliffe v. Vail Corp., No. 1:20-cv-01176 (D.
Colo. Apr. 27, 2020);  Clarke v. Vail Corp., No. 1:20-cv-01163 (D.
Colo. Apr. 24, 2020); Faydenko v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No.
20-cv-01134 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2020); Han v. Vail Resorts, Inc.,
No. 20-cv-01121 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2020); Hunt v. Vail Corp., No.
4:20-cv-02463 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (ski resort);

    Davis v. Youfit Health Clubs, LLC, No. 107917643 (Fla. Circ.
Ct. May 26, 2020) (fitness club);

    Rossi v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00411 (W.D. Mo. May 24, 2020)
(insured ski passes);

    Hong v. Clubcorp USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-01310 (N.D. Tex. May 19,
2020) (private club membership); Cuenco v. Clubcorp USA, Inc., No.
20-cv-00744 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (private club);

    Bradley v. United Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-520 (E.D. Ark.
May 18, 2020) (insured ski passes)

    Vodden v. WW International, Inc., No. 20-cv-03856 (S.D.N.Y. May
18, 2020) (nutritional program);

    Muller v. Durham School Services, L.P., No. 20-cv-05813 (D.N.J.
May 12, 2020) (bussing services);

    Kouball v. Seaworld Parks & Entertainment, Inc., No.
20-cv-00870 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2020);

    Williams v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-03096 (N.D.
Cal. May 5, 2020); Labib v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, No. 3:20-cv-02134
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020) (fitness club);

    Holloway v. Planet Fitness Franchising LLC, No. 1:20-cv-01868
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2020) (fitness club);

    Reingold v. Elements Therapeutic Massage, LLC, No. 20-cv-00785
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020) (massage studios);

    Danforth v. Town Sports International, LLC, No. 7:20-cv-03195
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2020) (fitness club);

    McConnell v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., No. 20-cv-03665
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2020) (amusement park);

    Hunt v. Fitness Evolution Inc., No. 4:20-cv-02461 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 10, 2020) (fitness club);

    Rezai-Hariri v. Magic Mountain LLC, No. 20-cv-00716 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 10, 2020) (ski resort);

    Delvecchio v. Boston Sports Clubs, No. 20-cv-10666 (D. Mass.
Apr. 5, 2020) (fitness club);

    Jampol v. Blink Holdings, No. 20-cv-02760 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,
2020) (fitness club);

    Carisi v. Events and Adventures California, No. 3:20-cv-02260
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2020) (dating service);

    Barnett v. Fitness International, LLC, No. 0:20-cv-60658 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 30, 2020) (fitness club);

    Namorato v. New York Sports Clubs, No. 20-cv-02580 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2020) (fitness club).

GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Governments and public officials may face a higher risk of class
action litigation based on their response to COVID-19 and handling
of prison inmates and detainees.
Prisoner and Detainee Release

Cases filed to date against corrections facilities seeking habeas
corpus and other constitutional relief for prisoners and
immigration detainees based on the risk of exposure to COVID-19
include:

    Williams v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 20-cv-00890 (D.D.C.
June 2, 2020) (prisoners);

    Torres v. Milusnic, No. 20-cv-04450 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Wilson v. Ponce, No. 20-cv-04451 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Denbow v. Maine Department of Corrections, No. 20-cv-00175 (D.
Me. May 15, 2020) (prisoners);

    J.H. v. Edwards, No. 20-cv-00293 (M.D. La. May 14, 2020)
(juvenile prisoners);

    Waddell v. Taylor, No. 20-cv-00340 (S.D. Miss. May 14, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Lucero-Gonzales v. Kline, No. 20-cv-00901 (D. Az. May 8, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Russel v. Wayne County, Michigan, No. 20-cv-11094 (E.D. Mich.
May 4, 2020) (prisoners);

    Wragg v. Ortiz, No. 20-cv-05496 (D.N.J. May 4, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Gottlieb v. Lamont, No. 20-cv-00623 (D. Conn. May 6, 2020)
(challenging government's decision to require in-person ballots for
primaries and general elections); McPherson v. Lamont, No.
20-cv-534 (D. Conn. April 20, 2020) (prisoners); Wilkes v. Lamont,
No. 20-cv-00594 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020) (patients committed to
psychiatric facility);

    Swain v. Junior, No. 20-cv-21457 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2020)
(prisoners) (the court granted the request for preliminary
injunction, which the defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on
Apr. 30, 2020, No. 20-11622).

    Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, No. 1:20-cv-03315
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (prisoners);

    Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv-00569 (D. Conn. Apr. 27,
2020) (prisoners);

    Cullors v. County of Los Angeles, No. 20-cv-03760 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 24, 2020) (prisoners);

    Voltz-Loomis v. McMaster, No. 20-cv-01533 (D.S.C. Apr. 21,
2020) (prisoners);

    Frazier v. Kelley, No. 4:20-cv-00434 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 21, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Seth v. McDonough, No. 8:20-cv-01028 (D. Md. Apr. 21, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Baez v. McDonald, No. 20-cv-10753 (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Novoa v. The GEO Group, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02514 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
16, 2020) (prisoners and detainees);

    Grinis v. Spaulding, No. 1:20-cv-10738 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2020)
(prisoners and detainees);

    Hernandez Roman v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-00768 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13,
2020) (detainees);

    Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-cv-21553 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2020)
(detainees);

    Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-cv-00794 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Sanchez v. Dallas County Sheriff Marian Brown; No. 20-cv-00832
(N.D. Texas Apr. 9, 2020) (prisoners);

    Augusto v. Moniz, No. 20-cv-10685 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2020)
(detainees);

    Maney v. Brown, No. 20-cv-00570 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Barnes v. Jeffreys, No. 20-cv-02137 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Mays v. Dart, No. 1:20-cv-2134 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Hope v. Doll, No. 20-cv-00562 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2020)
(detainees)

        The court granted the request for preliminary injunction on
April 7, 2020. The government appealed this decision on April 10,
2020;

    Money v. Jeffreys, No. 20-cv-02094 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2020)
(prisoners);

    Banks v. Booth, No. 20-cv-00849 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020)
(prisoners and detainees);

    National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild v.
Executive Office of Immigration Review, No. 1:20-cv-00852 (D.D.C.
Mar. 30, 2020) (detainees);

    Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-cv-01115 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30,
2020) (prisoners and detainees);

    Savino v. Hodgson, No. 1:20-cv-10617 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2020)
(prisoners and detainees);

    Nellson v. Barnhart, No. 1:20-cv-00756 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2020)
(prisoners and detainees);

    Dawson v. Asher, No. 20-civ-0409JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2020)
(prisoners and detainees).

State and Federal Executive Orders and Government Actions

Cases filed to date against federal and state governments asserting
civil rights and constitutional claims based on executive orders
and other actions in response to COVID-19 include:

    The NOLC, Inc. v. United States, No. 20-cv-00294 (N.D. Okla.
June 19, 2020): asserting constitutional claims based on alleged
discrimination against businesses owned by women and minorities in
implementing the CARES Act;

    Nowlin v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-01229 (C.D. Ill. June 15, 2020):
asserts constitutional claims challenging the state's stay-at-home
order;

    Hotze v. Abbott, No. 20-cv-02104 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2020):
asserts constitutional claims challenging the state's stay-at-home
order and reopening plan

    Ent Int'l Realty Corp. v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-04277 (S.D.N.Y. June
4, 2020): seeking an injunction preventing the collection of
property taxes based on state executive order limiting landlords'
ability to collect rent;

    Cole v. Mnuchin, No. 20-cv-01423 (D.D.C. May 29, 2020)
(alleging violation of the CARES Act based on the offset of student
loan debt on federal tax refunds for student loan borrowers);

    Talleywhacker, Inc. v. Cooper, No. 20-cv-00218 (E.D.N.C. May
26, 2020): asserting constitutional claims challenging the state
executive order causing business closures during the pandemic;

    Democracy North Carolina v. North Carolina State Board of
Elections, No. 20-cv-00457 (M.D.N.C. May 22, 2020) (asserting civil
rights claims based on alleged failure to create a safe and
accessible voting system);

    Devine v. Sununu, No. 218-2020-cv-00602 (N.H. Super. Cut. May
22, 2020) (asserting constitutional claims based on the state's
allegedly inadequate implementation of remote learning
procedures);

    Hall v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, No. 20-cv-03454 (N.D. Cal.
May 21, 2020) (challenging the USDA's interpretation of the
Families First Act);

    Clark v. Bel Edwards, No. 20-cv-00308 (M.D. La. May 19, 2020)
(challenging state government's alleged failure to create adequate
and safe voting procedures during the pandemic);

    F Four, LLC v. Page, No. 20-cv-00656 (E.D. Mo. May 18, 2020)
(challenging county order causing business closures during the
pandemic);

    The Local Spot, Inc. v. Lee, No. 20-cv-00421 (M.D. Tenn. May
18, 2020) (challenging travel restrictions and state orders causing
business closures during the pandemic);

    Blackburn v. Dare County, No. 20-cv-00027 (E.D.N.C. May 15,
2020) (challenging county orders prohibiting entry of non-resident
landowners);

    TD's Western Wear and Tack, LLC v. Tennessee, No. 20-cv-00206
(E.D. Tenn. May 13, 2020) (challenging state executive orders
directing business closures during the pandemic);

    Fugazi v. Padilla, No. 20-at-00467 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2020)
(challenging the county's treatment of mail-in-ballots and voting
procedures during the pandemic);

    Omnistone Corp. v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-02153 (E.D.N.Y. May 12,
2020) (challenging state executive orders causing closure of
businesses);

    Ramsek v. Beshear, No. 20-cv-00036 (E.D. Ky. May 10, 2020)
(challenging state executive orders limiting mass gatherings during
the pandemic);

    McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-02124 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2020):
asserting constitutional claims challenging state order causing
closure of businesses and challenging implementation of the PPP
program by the Small Business Administration;

    Michie v. Newsom, No. 20-cv-4213 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2020)
(challenging the state executive order and state actions curtailing
rent payments during the pandemic);

    Does v. Trump, No. 20-cv-00704 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2020); Doe v.
Trump, No. 20-cv-858 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2020); Doe v. Trump, No.
20-cv-00430 (W.D. Wis. May 6, 2020); Doe v. Trump, No.
1:20-cv-02531 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020) (alleged discriminatory
purpose and intent in implementing the CARES Act);

    Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-02782
(N.D. Ill. May 7, 2020): challenging state executive order limiting
mass gatherings and its impact on worship services;

    Spell v. Edwards, No. 20-cv-00282 (M.D. La. May 7, 2020)
(challenging state executive orders limiting mass gatherings during
the pandemic);

    Power Coalition for Equity & Justice v. Edwards, No.
20-cv-00283 (M.D. La. May 7, 2020) (challenging the state's
restrictions on absentee voting during the pandemic);

    Fair Maps Nevada v. Cegavske, No. 20-cv-00271 (D. Nev. May 6,
2020)): seeking relief from ballot initiative deadlines based on
difficulty of collecting signatures during the pandemic;

    R.V. v. Mnuchin, No. 20-cv-01148 (D. Md. May 5, 2020) (alleging
discriminatory intent in implementing the CARES Act by excluding
U.S. children who have undocumented immigrants as parents);

    Benner v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-00775 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2020);
Paradise Concepts, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-02161 (E.D. Pa. May 5,
2020) (challenging the Pennsylvania government's policy of denying
waivers for companies that are required to be shut down by COVID-19
executive orders);

    Simon v. City of Knoxville, No. 20-cv-00197 (E.D. Tenn. May 5,
2020) (challenging city orders requiring the closure of businesses
during the pandemic);

    Carranza v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
No. 20-cv-424 (D.N.M. May 4, 2020) (seeks relief for alleged
violations of constitutional and statutory rights of detainees
facing pending immigration proceedings).

    Frank v. City of St. Louis, No. 20-cv-00597 (E.D. Mo. May 1,
2020) (seeks relief for unsheltered individuals threatened with
punishment under stay at home orders);

    Barber v. DeVos, No. 20-cv-01137 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2020) (seeks
compliance with student loan wage garnishment suspension directive
of the CARES act);

    Martinez v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-03338 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020)
(challenging accessibility of government briefings for the hearing
impaired under the ADA);

    AALFA Family Clinic v. Walz, No. 20-cv-01037 (D. Minn. Apr. 28,
2020) (challenging state stay-at home order as a violation of
fundamental rights and challenging state's allowance of using PPE
for abortions but not other elective surgeries);

    Yang v. New York State Board of Elections, No. 20-cv-03325
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (seeking damages as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief for the cancellation of the New York Democratic
Presidential Primary);

    Gill v. Pa. Dep't of Health, No. 2:20-cv-02038 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
28, 2020) (alleged failure to complete ADA inspections of long term
care facilities during the pandemic);

    Uzoegwu v. Mnuchin, No. 20-cv-03264 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020)
(alleged discrimination on the basis of familial status in
implementing stimulus payments under the CARES Act);

    Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 20-cv-00204 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 24, 2020) (challenging state executive orders related to the
pandemic and their impact on worship services);

    Infinity Consulting Group, LLC v. United States, No.
20-cv-00981 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 2020) (alleged discriminatory purpose
and intent in implementing the CARES Act);

    Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, No. 20-cv-00278
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2020) (challenging state executive order
limiting worship services);

    Jani-King International, Inc. v. U.S. Small Business
Administration, No. 20-cv-00989 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2020) (alleging
improper implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program);

    Beemer v. Whitmer, No. 1:20-cv-00323 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2020)
(challenging the state stay-at-home order as a violation of
fundamental rights);

    Roberts v. Neace, No. 20-cv-00054 (E.D. Ky. Apr 14, 2020)
(challenging the state stay-at-home order as a violation of
fundamental rights);

    DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC v. U.S. Small Business
Administration, No. 20-cv-10899 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2020) (alleging
improper discrimination in the implementation of the Paycheck
Protection Program);

    CommCan, Inc. v. Baker (Mass. Super. Ct. No. 2084CV00808, Apr.
8, 2020) (challenging classification of recreational marijuana
stores as non-essential);

    Piilani v. Colorado, No. 20-cv-00960 (D. Colo. Apr. 6, 2020)
(challenging the state stay-at-home order as a violation of
fundamental rights);

    Lawrence v. Colorado, No. 20-cv-00862 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2020)
(challenging state pandemic orders and their impact on church
services);

    Stafford v. Baker, No. 5_20-cv-00123 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2020)
(challenging an executive order limiting the number of gun permits
issued during the pandemic);

    Schulmerich Bells, LLC v. Wolf, No. 2:20-cv-01637 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 26, 2020) (challenging closure orders for failure to
compensate for diminution of value in property interests).

Foreign Government and NGO Actions

Cases filed to date against foreign governments and international
non-governmental organizations based on their response to the
COVID-19 pandemic include:

    Patella v. People's Republic of China, No. 20-cv-00433
(M.D.N.C. May 15, 2020) (asserts claims of negligence and fraud for
failure to contain the virus);

    Edwards v. People's Republic of China, No. 20-cv-01393 (E.D.
La. May 8, 2020) (asserts claims of negligence and fraud for
failure to contain the virus);

    Benitez-White v. People's Republic of China, No. 20-cv-01562
(S.D. Tex. May 3, 2020) (asserts claims for wrongful death,
personal injury, gross negligence, and unjust enrichment based on
allegations the COVID-19 virus originated from the Wuhan Biosafety
Level 4 lab);

    Kling v. World Health Org., No. 7:20-cv-03124 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
20, 2020) (asserts claims of negligence for the WHO's alleged
failure in containing the COVID-19 virus and in failing to timely
declare the crisis a public health emergency);

    Smith v. People's Republic of China, No. 20-cv-01958 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 20, 2020) (asserts claims of negligence and reckless
indifference for failure to contain the virus);

    Aharon v. Chinese Communist Party, No. 9:20-cv-80604 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 7, 2020) (alleging that China has been stockpiling personal
protective equipment during the COVID-19 crisis);

    Bella Vista LLC et al. v. People's Republic of China et al.,
No. 2:20-cv-00574 (D. Nev. Mar. 23 2020); Alters et al. v. People's
Republic of China et al., No. 1:20-cv-21108-UU (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12,
2020) (assert claims by small businesses for negligence, strict
liability, and public nuisance against Chinese government entities
and ministries for failing to take appropriate actions to stem the
spread of the coronavirus).

HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS AND NURSING FACILITIES

Hospitals, healthcare providers and nursing and residential care
facilities may face class action litigation based in contract or
tort relating to their response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unless
states have laws or orders limiting civil liability, these entities
are potentially at risk of class action litigation.

    The following states have enacted legislation or executive
orders to shield healthcare providers from civil liability arising
from the pandemic: Connecticut; Illinois; Massachusetts; Michigan;
New Jersey; New York. The Pennsylvania legislature rejected similar
legislation.  

    Schoengood v. Hofgur LLC, No. 20-cv-02022 (E.D.N.Y. May 4,
2020): asserts claims under ADA and Rehabilitation Act for alleged
failure to provide adequate care to long term care residents;

    Estate of Joseph Maglioli v. Andover Subacute Rehabilitation
Center I, No. 20-cv-06605 (N.J. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2020);

        Notice of Removal filed on May 29, 2020 – Docket No.
20-cv-06605 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020);

INSURANCE

Insurers face heightened class action litigation risk as insured
businesses encounter disruptions and look to their policies for
relief and healthcare providers and health insurance subscribers
seek coverage for COVID-19 treatments. Cases filed to date
asserting breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims
against insurers for failure to cover losses from forced business
closures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and state executive
orders include:

    Poughkeepsie Waterfront Development, LLC v. Travelers Indemnity
Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-04890 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2020); WM Bang LLC
v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-04540 (S.D.N.Y.
June 12, 2020); Bath v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am., No.
20-cv-00774 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2020); Real Hospitality, LLC v.
Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-00087 (S.D. Miss. May
8, 2020); J.G. Optical, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., Inc., No.
20-cv-05744 (D.N.J. May 8, 2020); Fox v. Travelers Casualty Ins.
Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-0059 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2020); Nguyen v.
Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-00597 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 21, 2020);

    Saucy Brew Works LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. CV 20 933932
(Ohio Comm. Pleas June 25, 2020); Dr. Clark Thomas, PC v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00895 (N.D. Ala. June 24, 2020);
Uncork & Create LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00401 (D.W.V.
June 12, 2020); Moe's Original BBQ Hoover, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., No. 20-cv-00832 (N.D. Ala. June 11, 2020);

    Neuro-Communication Services, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-01275 (N.D. Ohio June 10, 2020); Stone Soup, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02614 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2020);
Hirschfield-Louik v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00816 (W.D. Pa.
June 3, 2020); Gilreath Family & Cosmetic Dentistry, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02248 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2020);
Bulldog Yoga Holdings LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02358
(E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020); Saucy Brew Works LLC v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., No. CV 20 932532 (Ohio Comm. Pleas May 12, 2020); Homestate
Seafood LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00649 (N.D. Ala. May
8, 2020); Derek Scott Williams PLLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-02806 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2020); Taste of Belgium LLC v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00357 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2020); St.
Julian Wine Co., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00374 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 30, 2020); Studio 417, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No.
6_20-cv-03127 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2020); Milkboy Center City LLC v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-02036 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020);
Grand Street Dining, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00330
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 23, 2020); Milkboy Center City LLC v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-02036 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020); Grand Street
Dining, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00330 (W.D. Mo. Apr.
23, 2020); Promotional Headwear Int'l v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No.
2_20-cv-02211 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 2020); Troy Stacy Enters. Inc. v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-00312 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2020);

    Fountain Enterprises, LLC v. Markel Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03689
(N.D. Ill. June 24, 2020);

    Kennedy Hodges & Associates Ltd., LLP v. Hartford Fin. Servs.
Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-00853 (D. Conn. June 19, 2020); Taube v.
Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-00565 (S.D. Ill. June
15, 2020); Pure Fitness, LLC v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc.,
No. 20-cv-00775 (N.D. Ala. June 3, 2020); Metropolitan Dental Arts
P.C. v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-02443 (E.D.N.Y.
June 2, 2020); Back2Health Chiropractic Center, LLC v. Hartford
Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-06717 (D.N.J. June 1, 2020);
Gonzalez v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-22151 (S.D.
Fla. May 22, 2020); Independence Barbershop, LLC v. Hartford Fin.
Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-00555 (W.D. Tex. May 22, 2020); Karmel
Davis & Assocs., Attorneys-At-Law, LLC v. Hartford Fin. Servs.
Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-02181 (N.D. Ga. May 21, 2020);  Robert Levy,
D.M.D., LLC v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00643 (E.D. Mo.
May 14, 2020); Milton v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00640
(D. Conn. May 8, 2020); Eye Care Center of N.J., PA v. Hartford
Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-05743 (D.N.J. May 8, 2020);
Johnson v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-02000 (N.D.
Ga. May 8, 2020); Rinnigade Art Works v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp.,
Inc., No. 20-cv-10867 (D. Mass. May 7, 2020); Red Apple Dental PC
v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-03549 (S.D.N.Y. May
06, 2020); Hair Studio 1208, LLC v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.,
No. 20-cv0-02171 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2020); Food for Thought Caterers
Corp. v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-03418 (S.D.N.Y.
May 1, 2020); Pigment, Inc. v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No.
3:20-cv-00794 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020); GCDC LLC v. Hartford Fin.
Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01094 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2020);
Lansdale 329 Prop, LLC v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., No.
2:20-cv-02034 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020); SA Hospitality Group, LLC
v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-03258 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
24, 2020); Chorak v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00627
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2020);

    Turek Enterprises, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-11655 (E.D. Mich. June 23, 2020); Elegant Massage, LLC v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00265 (E.D. Va. May 27,
2020); Royal Palm Optical, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
No. 20-cv-80749 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2020);

    Monarch Ballroom, LLC v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-05493
(C.D. Cal. June 19, 2020);

    Unmasked Management, LLC v. Century-National Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-01129 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2020);

    Daij, Inc. v. Wesco Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02739 (E.D.N.Y. June
19, 2020);

    Tappo of Buffalo, LLC v. Erie Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00754
(W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020); High Tech Hair, LLC v. Erie Ins.
Exchange, No. 20-cv-02895 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2020); Sulimay's Hair
Design Inc. v. Erie Ins. Ex., No. 20-cv-02731 (E.D. Pa. June 10,
2020); La Campagna Inc. v. Erie Ins. Grp., No. 20-cv-02689 (E.D.
Pa. June 8, 2020); Capriccio Parkway, LLC v. Erie Ins. Ex., No.
200600011 (Pa. Comm. Pleas May 29, 2020);  Daly v. Erie Ins. Prop &
Casualty Co., No. 20-cv-01406 (D.D.C. May 27, 2020); Menns Inc. v.
Erie Ins. Ex., No. 20-cv-2875 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2020); Geneva
Foreign & Sports, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 1:20-cv-00093
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2020); PGB Restaurant, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Co.,
No. 1-20-cv-02403 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2020);

    Michael Cetta, Inc. v. Admiral Indemnity Co., No. 20-cv-04612
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020);

    Susan Spath Hegedus, Inc. v. Chubb Ltd., No. 20-cv-02832 (E.D.
Pa. June 15, 2020); Beniak Enterprises, Inc. v. Chubb Ltd., No.
20-cv-05536 (D.N.J. May 5, 2020); Truhaven Enters. Inc. v. Chubb
Ltd., No. 2:20-cv-04586 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2020); Café Int'l Holding
Co. LLC v. Chubb Ltd., No. 1-20-cv-21641 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20,
2020);

    Byberry Services & Solutions, LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. (N.D.
Ill. June 8, 2020);

    America's Kids, LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03520
(N.D. Ill. June 16, 2020); Big Red Management Corp. v. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02113 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2020);

    Fink v. Hanover Ins. Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-03907 (N.D. Cal.
June 12, 2020);

    Monday Restaurants LLC v. Intrepid Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00767
(E.D. Mo. June 12, 2020);

    RJH Management Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, No.
20-cv-03143 (C.D. Ill. June 11, 2020); Independence Beer Garden v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 20-cv-02365 (E.D. Penn.
May 20, 2020); 632 Metacom Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, No. 20-cv-03905 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2020); Fire Island
Retreat v. Lloyd's of London, No. 20-cv-02312 (E.D. Pa. May 15,
2020); Sun Cuisine, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
No. 1:20-cv-21827 (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2020); Town Kitchen, LLC v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 106527294 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Apr. 21, 2020); Gio Pizzeria & Bar Hospitality, LLC v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 20-cv-03107 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,
2020); SA Palm Beach LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London,
No. 20-cv-80677 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020);

    726 West Grand LLC v. Society Ins., No. 20-cv-03432 (N.D. Ill.
June 11, 2020); Cardelli Enterprise, LLC v. Society Ins., No.
20-cv-03263 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2020); Barn Investment LLC v.
Society Ins., No. 20-cv-03142 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2020); Ambrosia
Restaurant v. Society Ins., No. 20-cv-00771 (E.D. Wis. May 21,
2020); Roscoe Same LLC v. Society Ins., No. 1:20-cv-02641 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 30, 2020); JDS 1455, Inc. d/b/a/ West on North v. Society
Ins., No. 1:20-cv-02546 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2020); Biscuit Café
Inc. v. Society Ins., No. 20-cv-02514 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020);
Rising Dough Inc. v. Society Ins., No. 2-20-cv-00623 (E.D. Wis.
Apr. 17, 2020); Billy Goat Tavern I v. Society Ins., No.
1:20-cv-02068 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2020); Big Onion Tavern Group,
LLC v. Society Ins., No. 20-cv-02005 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2020);

    1 S.A.N.T., Inc. v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. 20-cv-00862
(W.D. Pa. June 11, 2020);

    Jae Y. Hong, PLLC v. Transportation Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-05556
(W.D. Wash. June 9, 2020); O'Brien Sales & Marketing, Inc. v.
Transportation Ins. Co., No. 4:20-cv-02951 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
2020);

    Hong v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00891 (W.D. Wash. June
9, 2020); Noskenda Inc. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00854
(W.D. Wash. June 4, 2020); McCulloch v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00809 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2020); JDL Inc. v. Valley Forge
Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-02681 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2020);

    Auburn Racquet Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co.,
No. 20-cv-02666 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2020); Crossroads Investments,
LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02329 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 2020);

    Sweetwater Grill LLC v. Grange Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00853 (W.D.
Pa. June 8, 2020);

    Water Sports Kauai, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-03750 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2020);

    Caterer's In the Park LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 20-cv-06867
(D.N.J. June 4, 2020); Starjem Restaurant Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins., No. 20-cv-03672 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020); Biltrite Furniture,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 20-cv-656 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 24, 2020);
Torre Rossa LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. CV-20-931885 (Ohio Comm.
Pleas Apr. 15, 2020);

    In The Park Savoy Caterers LLC v. Selective Ins. Grp., No.
20-cv-06869 (D.N.J. June 4, 2020);

    Till Metro Entertainment v. Covington Specialty Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00255 (N.D. Okla. June 4, 2020);

    LJ New Haven LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00751 (D. Conn.
June 1, 2020);

    Chief of Staff LLC v. Hiscox Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-03169 (N.D.
Ill. May 29, 2020);

    Stanford Dental, PLLC v. Hanover Ins. Grp., Inc., No.
20-cv-11384 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2020);

    Crunch Logistics Inc. v. Donegal Ins. Grp., No. 20-cv-02525
(E.D. Pa. May 28, 2020);

    Sunsations Tanning Salon, LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-02510 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 2020);

    Argenas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00770 (W.D. Pa.
May 28, 2020); Border Chicken AZ LLC v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 20-cv-00785 (D. Az. Apr. 22, 2020);

    Captain Skrip's Office LLC v. Conifer Holdings, Inc., No.
20-cv-11291 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020);

    RPR Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Western Group, LLC, No.
20-cv-02256 (D. Kan. May 22, 2020);

    Club 31 Sports Bar & Lounge, LLC v. Mesa Underwriters Specialty
Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00397 (W.D. Mo. May 18, 2020);

    Broadway 104, LLC v. AXA Financial, Inc., No. 20-cv-03813
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020);

    Colby Restaurant Group., Inc. v. Utica Nat'l Ins. Group, No.
20-cv-05927 (D.N.J. May 15, 2020); Slate Hill Daycare Center Inc.
v. Utica Nat'l Ins. Group, No. 20-cv-03565 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020);

    Ital Uomo of N.Y., Inc. v. Starr Indemnity & Liability Co., No.
20-cv-02209 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020);

    Holloman v. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc., No. 20-002399-CI (Fla.
Cir. Ct. May 15, 2020);

    Hirbox H. Rowshan DDS, P.S. v. Ohio Security Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00730 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2020);

    Cascadia Dental Specialists, Inc. v. Am. Fire and Caus. Co.,
No. 20-cv-00732 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 2020);

    Deoleo v. U.S. Liability Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-02301 (E.D. Pa.
May 14, 2020);

    Sero, Inc. v. Berkley North Pacific Grp., LLC, No. 20-cv-00776
(D. Ore. May 13, 2020);

    Blue Springs Dental Care LLC v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-383
(W.D. Mo. May 13, 2020);

    Raven and the Bow LLC v. First Mercury Ins., No. 20-cv-03264
(N.D. Cal. May 13, 2020);

    Karla Aylen, DDS PLLC v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00717
(W.D. Wash. May 13, 2020); Marler v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00616 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2020); Mikkelson v. Aspen Am. Ins.
Co., No. 3:20-cv-05378 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2020); Christie Jo
Berkseth-Rojas v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-00948 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 17, 2020);

    Kahn v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00781 (M.D. Pa.
May 12, 2020);

    Paradigm Care & Enrichment Center, LLC v. West Bend Mut. Ins.
Co., 20-cv-00720 (E.D. Wis. May 12, 2020);

    Protégé Restaurant Partners LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd.,
No. 20-cv-03674 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2020); Glow Medispa LLC v.
Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., No. 20-cv-00712 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 2020);
One40 Beauty Lounge LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., No. 20-cv-00643
(D. Conn. May 8, 2020); Lee v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 3_20-cv-05422
(W.D. Wash. May 4, 2020); Lina Kim, DDS, P.S. v. Sentinel Ins. Co.,
Ltd., No. 20-cv-00657 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2020); Prato v. Sentinel
Ins. Co., Ltd., No. 3:20-cv-05402 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2020); Hair
Perfect, Int'l, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co. Ltd., No. 20-cv-03729
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020);

    Carlos O. Caballero DDS, MS, PS v. Mass. Bay Ins., No.
20-cv-05437 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2020);

    Drama Camp Productions, Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00266 (S.D. Ala. May 8, 2020);

    Cosmetic Laser, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00638 (D. Conn. May 8, 2020);

    Wash.Wash.Big Tomato LLC v. State Auto Property & Casualty Ins.
Co., No. 20-cv-00086 (S.D. Miss. May 8, 2020); Young Blood Coffee
Roasters, LLC v. State Auto Property & Casualty Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-01076 (D. Minn. May 4, 2020);

    Image Dental, LLC v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-02759
(N.D. Ill. May 6, 2020);

    The Hair Place v. IMT Insurance Company, No. 20-cv-01102 (D.
Minn. May 06, 2020);

    Nue Seattle v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00676 (W.D.
Wash. May 5, 2020);

    Pappy's Barber Shops, Inc. v. Farmer's Group Inc., No.
20-cv-00907 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2020); Kingray Inc. v. Farmers Group
Inc., No. 20-cv-00963 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2020);

    Coates v. Foremost Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00383 (W.D. Mich. May 4,
2020);

    Nixon v. Generali US Branch, No. 20-cv-02670 (N.D. Ill. May 2,
2020) (travel insurance);

    GV KB Store LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-21815 (S.D.
Fla. May 1, 2020);

    BBMS, LLC v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 20-cv-00353 (W.D.
Mo. May 1, 2020);

    Germack v. Dentists Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00661 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 30, 2020);

    Alliance Radiology, P.A. v. CAN Financial Corp., No.
20-cv-02218 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 2020);

    N&S Restaurant, LLC v. Cumberland Mutual Fire Ins. Co., No.
1:20-cv-05289 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2020);

    Camp 1382 LLC v. Lancer Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-03336 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 29, 2020);

    Project Lion LLC v. Badger Mutual Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00768
(D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020);

    Atma Beauty, Inc. v. HDI Global Specialty SE, Docket no.
1:20-cv-21745 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020);

    Zwillo V, Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-339 (W.D. Mo.
Apr. 27, 2020);

    Equity Planning Corp. v. Westfield Ins. Co., No. CV 20 932122
(Ohio Comm. Pleas Apr. 27, 2020);

        Notice of Removal filed on June 1, 2020 – No. 20-cv-01204
(N.D. Ohio June 1, 2020);

    Dino Palmieri Salons, Inc., v. State Automobile Mutual Ins.
Co., No. CV 20 932117 (Ohio Comm. Pleas Apr. 26, 2020);

    Egg Works Holding Co., LLC v. Acuity, No. 2_20-cv-00748 (D.
Nev. Apr. 25, 2020);

    Egg and I, LLC v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-00747 (D.
Nev. Apr. 24, 2020);

    Windber Hospital v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of Am., No.
20-cv-00080 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2020);

    Pacific Endodontics, P.S. v. The Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00620 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2020);

    Stan's Bar-B-Q LLC v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-00613 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2020);

    The K's Inc. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No.
20-cv-01724 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2010);

    In re COVID-19 Business Interruption Protection Insurance
Litigation, No. 2942 (U.S.J.P.M.L. Apr. 20, 2020);

    Café Plaza De Mesilla Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., No.
20-cv-00354 (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2020);

    Dakota Ventures, LLC v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3-20-cv-00630
(D. Or. Apr. 17, 2020);

    Bridal Expressions LLC v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-00833
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2020);

PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY

Companies are facing privacy and cybersecurity claims by employers
and consumers based on the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal information and the unauthorized access by third parties
in data security incidents. Cases filed to date include:

    Julius v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No. 20-cv-00542 (S.D. Ill.
June 8, 2020); Neal v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No. 20-cv-04362
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2020); Alexander v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No.
20-cv-04129 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020); Burns v. Deloitte Consulting
LLP, No. 20-cv-04077 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020); Culbertson v.
Deloitte Consulting LLP, No. 20-cv-03962 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020)
(asserts claims of violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
negligence, breach of implied contract, and invasion of privacy for
alleged failure to protect personally identifiable information of
unemployment applicants);

    St. Paulus Lutheran Church v. Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No.
20-cv-03252 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2020); Kirpekar v. Zoom Video
Comms., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-03042 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2020); Buxbaum v.
Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-02939 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
2020); Simins v. Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-02893 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 27, 2020); Greenbaum v. Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No.
5:20-cv-02861 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020); Henry v. Zoom Video
Comms., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-02691 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2020); Jimenez
v. Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-02591 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14,
2020); Hurvitz v. Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-03400 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 13, 2020); Kondrat v. Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No.
5:20-cv-02520 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2020); Ohlweiler v. Zoom Video
Comms., Inc., No. 20-cv-03281 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020); Cullen v.
Zoom Video Comms., Inc., No. 20-cv-02155 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2020)
(assert claims for consumer privacy, consumer fraud, negligence,
invasion of privacy, and unjust enrichment based on the collection,
misuse, and disclosure to third parties (including Facebook) of
user information).

    Sweeney v. Life of Air, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00742 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
17, 2020) (asserts claims of negligence, consumer privacy, and
breach of contract for collection and disclosure of personal
information through the social networking app Houseparty).

PRODUCT PRICING, MARKETING & LABELING

Manufacturers and sellers of products with medical, sanitation, and
hygiene applications are facing class action claims related to the
pricing, marketing and labeling of their products based on
advertising and consumer protection laws. Cases filed to date
include:

    Golditch v. Alphabet, Inc., No. 20-cv-11142 (D. Mass. June 16,
2020): asserts consumer protection and unjust enrichment claims
regarding alleged false advertising regarding cleaning products;

    Lagorio v. GermBloc, Inc., No. 20-cv-11074 (D. Mass. June 5,
2020): asserts consumer protection and unjust enrichment claims
regarding alleged false advertising regarding hand sanitizer
products.

    Redmond v. Albertsons Companies, Inc., No. 20-cv-03692 (N.D.
Cal. June 3, 2020): asserts consumer protection claims for alleged
price gouging of essential items during the pandemic;

    Lagorio v. Staples, Inc., No. 20-cv-11015 (D. Mass. May 28,
2020): asserts consumer protection claims for alleged false
advertising regarding hand sanitizer products;

    Mier v. CVS Health, No. 30-2020-0114024 (Cal. Super. Ct. May
26, 2020): asserts consumer protection and misrepresentation claims
for alleged false advertising regarding hand sanitizer products;

    CO Craft, LLC v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 20-cv-01327 (D. Colo. May
11, 2020) (alleging that Grubhub uses a false advertising campaign
to convince customers that their competitors' restaurants are
closed);

    Miclaus v. Invention Submission Corp., No. 20-cv-00681 (W.D.
Pa. May 7, 2020) (challenging the company's alleged use of
deceptive and fraudulent marketing to promote products during the
pandemic).

    Mercado v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-03053 (N.D. Cal. May 4,
2020): asserts consumer protection and quasi-contract claims based
on alleged price gouging of personal protective equipment and
personal hygiene products.

    McQueen v. Amazon.com, No. 20-cv-02782 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2020); Armas v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 104631782 (Cir. Ct. Fla. Mar.
10, 2020): assert claim for consumer fraud based on alleged price
gouging of essential consumer products.

    Bell v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00461 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 30, 2020); Fraser v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 20-cv-02733
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020): asserts consumer protection claims for
alleged price gouging of essential groceries.

    Taslakian v. Target Co., 2:20-cv-2667 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20,
2020): asserts claims for false advertising, consumer fraud, and
misrepresentation based on claims about benefits of hand
sanitizers.

    Miller v. Gojo Indus., Inc., No. 4:20-cv-562 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
13, 2020); Jurkiewicz v. Gojo Indus., Inc., No. 5:20-cv-279 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 9, 2020); Gonzalez v. Gojo Indus., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-888
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2020); Marinovich v. Gojo Indus., Inc., No.
3:20-cv-747 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020); Aleisa v. Gojo Indus., Inc.,
No. 2:20-cv-1045 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020): assert claims for false
advertising, consumer fraud, and misrepresentation based on claims
about benefits of hand sanitizers.

    David v. Vi-Jon, Inc. dba Germ-X, No. 3:20-cv-00424 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2020): asserts claims for false advertising, consumer
fraud, and misrepresentation based on claims about benefits of hand
sanitizers.

SHAREHOLDER AND SECURITIES LITIGATION

Public companies face class action claims by shareholders
concerning statements and omissions concerning the impact of
COVID-19 on their operations and performance. Cases filed to date
include:

    Gowen v. Chembio Diagnostics, Inc., No. 20-cv-02758 (E.D.N.Y.
June 22, 2020); Chernysh v. Chembio Diagnostics, Inc., No.
20-cv-02706 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020): asserts federal securities
law claims based on allegedly false and misleading statements
regarding the development of an antibody to counteract COVID-19;

    Leonard v. SCWorx Corp., No. 20-cv-04777 (S.D.N.Y. June 22,
2020);  Leeburn v. SCWorx Corp., No. 20-cv-04072 (S.D.N.Y. May 27,
2020); Yannes v. SCWorx Corp., No. 1:20-cv-03349 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,
2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on allegedly
false and misleading statements regarding the production and sale
of COVID-19 tests;

    Lucas v. United States Oil Fund, L.P., No. 20-cv-04740
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims
based on alleged failure to disclose risks of investing in oil
futures during the pandemic;

    Calvo v. Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc., No. 20-cv-1066 (S.D. Cal.
June 11, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on
allegedly false and misleading statements regarding the development
of an antibody to counteract COVID-19;

    Arbitrage Fund v. Forescout Technologies, Inc., No. 20-cv-03819
(N.D. Cal. June 10, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims
based on allegedly false and misleading statements related to the
company's financial well-being and their compliance with a  merger
agreement during the pandemic;

    Lombard v. Portola Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 20-cv-00769 (D.
Del. June 8, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on
allegedly false and misleading statements related to the financial
well-being of the company and the merits of a proposed merger
agreement;

    Ma v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 20-cv-03697 (N.D. Cal. June 4,
2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on allegedly
false and misleading statements relating to the bank's
participation in and administration of the PPP program;

    Elmensdorp v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-cv-22319 (S.D. Fla. June
3, 2020); Service Lamp Corp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Carnival Corp.,
No. 20-cv-22202 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2020): asserts federal
securities law claims based on allegedly false and misleading
statements relating to the business's health and safety protocols
and the company's role in exacerbating the transmission of the
virus;

    McCann v. Hill, No. 20-cv-06435 (D.N.J. May 27, 2020): asserts
claims under ERISA against plan administrator of ERISA plan based
on decline in value of plan assets;

    Wasa Medical Holdings v. Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc., No.
20-cv-00966 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2020): asserts federal securities
law claims based on allegedly false and misleading statements
regarding the development of an antibody treatment for COVID-19;

    Hunter v. Elanco Animal Health Inc., No. 20-cv-01460 (S.D. Ind.
May 20, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on
allegedly false and misleading statements that minimized the effect
of the pandemic on the company's financial performance;

    Banuelos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, No. 20-cv-21685 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 22, 2020); Atachbarian v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, No.
1:20-cv-21386 (S.D. Fla. Mar 31, 2020); Douglas v. Norwegian Cruise
Lines, No. 20-cv-21107 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2020): assert federal
securities law claims based on allegedly false and misleading
statements that minimized the health crisis and its impact on the
company's business.

    Cedeno v. iAnthus Capital Holdings Inc., No. 20-cv-03513
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2020); Finch v. iAnthus Capital Holdings Inc., No.
1:20-cv-03135 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020); Riback v. iAnthus Capital
Holdings Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03044 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020): asserts
federal securities law claims based on a company alleged use of the
COVID-19 crisis to improperly avoid making interest payments on its
loans.

    Brams v. Zoom Video Communications, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-02396
(N.D. Cal. Apr 8, 2020); Drieu v. Zoom Video Communications, Inc.,
No. 3:20-cv-02353 (N.D. Cal. Apr 7, 2020): assert federal
securities law claims based on Zoom's allegedly inadequate security
and privacy measures, which were exposed by Zoom's increased use
during the pandemic.

    McDermid v. Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 20-cv-01402 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 12, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on
allegedly false and misleading statements about the development of
a COVID-19 vaccine.

    Douglas v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, No. 20-cv-21107 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 12, 2020): asserts federal securities law claims based on
allegedly false and misleading statements regarding business
operations and projected performance of the company;

Transmission and Exacerbation of COVID-19

Plaintiffs have filed class actions alleging that businesses
negligently promoted the spread of COVID-19 or hid information
about the risks of COVID-19 transmission or complications. Cases
filed to date include:

    Chung v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-cv-04954 (C.D. Cal. June 4,
2020); Archer v. Carnival Corporation, et al., No. 20-cv-02381
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2020): asserts claims including negligence and
gross negligence based on an outbreak of COVID-10 on the Diamond
Princess cruise ship and other Carnival cruise ships.

    Eicher v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 20-cv-04958 (C.D.
Cal. June 4, 2020); Heinzer v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No.
20-cv-04959 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2020): asserts negligence and
infliction of emotional distress claims for failure to protect
passengers from transmission of COVID-19;

    Schoengood v. Hofgur LLC, No. 20-cv-02022 (E.D.N.Y. May 4,
2020): alleging failure of a senior care facility to take adequate
measures to protects its elderly and disabled residents.

    Molchun v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1_20-cv-21792
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2020): asserts admiralty and negligence claims
for alleged failure to protect crew members of cruise from exposure
to COVID-19.

    Kantrow v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., No. 20-cv-21997 (S.D. Fla.
May 13, 2020); Nedeltcheva v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., No.
20-cv-21569 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2020): asserts claims of negligence
for alleged failure to protect crew members of cruise from exposure
to COVID-19.

    In re: Juul Labs, Inc. Marketing, Sales Practices & Products
Liability Litigation, 19-md-2913 (Apr. 10, 2020): amends complaint
to assert claims based on allegations that vaping product users are
at greater risk of complications from COVID-19.

    Turner v. Costa Crociere SPA, No. 20-cv-21481 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
7, 2020): asserts claims including negligence and negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress related to cruise
line's decision to embark on cruise despite allegedly knowing a
passenger was showing symptoms of COVID-19.

WEBSITE, DIGITAL, AND PHYSICAL ACCESSIBILITY

Companies are likely to face Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and other claims based on the ability of consumers with
disabilities to access brick-and-mortar establishments governed by
new health and safety standards and to understand their websites,
mobile applications, and electronic platforms, especially as goods
and services that were previously available at brick-and-mortar
sites move to the internet.

    Kapp v. Belk, Inc., No. 20-cv-00578 (M.D.N.C. June 24, 2020):
asserts claims under ADA for alleged failure to provide adequate
access to the website of a brick and mortar department store to the
visually impaired;

    Sosa v. W.B. Mason, Inc., No. 20-cv-04828 (S.D.N.Y. June 23,
2020): asserts claims under ADA for alleged failure to provide
adequate access to an online shopping website to the visually
impaired;

    McKnight-Nero v. Walmart, Inc., No. 20-cv-01541 (D.D.C. June
11, 2020): asserts claims under D.C. Human Rights Act and ADA for
alleged discrimination in implementing store hours reserved for
elderly and highly susceptible shoppers;

    Drenth v. Boockvar, No. 20-cv-00829 (M.D. Pa. May 21, 2020):
asserts claims under ADA for alleged inadequate accessibility for
blind individuals provided under absentee ballot system;

    J.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Educational Testing Services, No.
20-cv-04502 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2020): asserting claims for damages
and injunctive relief based on alleged inadequate access to
Advanced Placement exams for high school students;

    Lewis v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-02836 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2020):
asserting claims under the ADA based on alleged discriminatory
enforcement of health conditions exemptions to face mask
requirements;

    Winegard v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 20-cv-02132 (E.D.N.Y. May
11, 2020): asserting claims under the ADA based on alleged
difficulty in access to products on website for the hard of
hearing. [GN]


[*] Major Cos. Warn Failure to Curb Class Actions to Hurt Economy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sally Patten, writing for Australian Financial Review, reports that
major companies warn that a failure to curb class actions will hurt
the economy, stymie job creation and deter directors from joining
ASX boards.

In a submission to a parliamentary inquiry into litigation funding,
the Business Council of Australia, led by Jennifer Westacott,
argued that left unchecked, the rise in class actions would create
"risk-averse, compliance oriented" companies and would be "contrary
to the long-term interests of the growth of the Australian economy
and investors' returns on equity". [GN]




[*] McGuireWoods Attorneys Tackle Class Action Discovery Approach
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Cole Geddy, Esq. -- cgeddy@mcguirewoods.com -- and Brian Jackson,
Esq. -- bjackson@mcguirewoods.com -- of McGuireWoods LLP, in an
article for JDSupra, report that despite the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic, plaintiffs continue to file class actions, shouldering
defendants with potentially massive discovery costs. With the
economic slowdown associated with the pandemic, businesses face
increased pressure to manage litigation costs like these. One way
to manage those costs is to rethink the traditional approach to
conducting class action discovery.

Traditionally, courts have bifurcated discovery into class and
merits stages based on the notion that narrow class discovery will
preserve party resources until and unless a class is certified.
However, this benefit often proves illusory as plaintiffs
undertake, and courts allow, broad class discovery that
substantially overlaps with the merits of the action. After going
through a round of often broad discovery, defendants are subjected
to another round of merits discovery before briefing summary
judgment.

This approach invites wasteful duplication and abuse of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions. For example, in class
actions predicated on a product defect, what discovery about the
commonality of a defect across a purported class can be separated
from the existence of that defect?

For a defect to be common, it must exist. But under the traditional
approach, plaintiffs in such an action could depose a corporate
representative about the common defect, then take another
deposition on the existence of the defect itself. In effect,
plaintiffs get a second bite at the apple.

In the merits stage, they can correct mistakes made in a class
deposition. The same issue occurs in other contexts: In a wage and
hour action, a common underpayment allegation depends on individual
employees actually being underpaid.

Defendants face several other disadvantages with this arrangement,
as it allows plaintiffs to move for class certification on a
limited record, eliminates opportunities for early summary judgment
motions and leads to duplication when discovery shifts to the
merits stage.

On the other side of the coin, a defendant cannot realistically
separate discovery from named plaintiffs into class and merits
issues. The merits of each named plaintiff's claim determine the
commonality of any liability issues, the typicality of the
plaintiff's claim and the adequacy of the plaintiff as a class
representative.

Class certification massively increases potential exposure and
gives plaintiffs substantial settlement leverage, even when
defendants have strong defenses on the merits. Bifurcated class
discovery also means that plaintiffs can strategically limit the
record before the court at class certification.

Early class certification decisions made with a limited look at the
merits of the case tip the scales in the plaintiffs' favor without
testing their allegations through a summary judgment motion.

A defendant's options to mitigate this harm still leave the
business at a disadvantage: rush to try to produce complete
discovery in the class stage or file an early summary judgment
motion with its class certification opposition. Neither option
provides much assurance of avoiding the merits phase of discovery.

Given these disadvantages, why do corporate defendants and
experienced practitioners use the bifurcated discovery approach?
The desire to control discovery costs often underlies the
traditional approach, but faces the problems described above.

Another reason may be the understandable, but mistaken, belief that
Rule 23's "at an early practicable time" language on when class
certification should be decided necessarily means before summary
judgment. However, the rule does not impose that inflexible
structure. Finally, filing a motion to strike class allegations at
the pleading stage can offer an opportunity to eliminate class
claims early, but some jurisdictions consider them premature before
class certification.

To avoid these problems and their associated costs, businesses
facing class actions should consider arguing for a single discovery
period covering all issues. This approach allows the court to hear
summary judgment before or with class certification, forcing
plaintiffs to make a stronger evidentiary showing than a bifurcated
schedule would require. A single phase requires an investment in
full discovery but eliminates costly duplication and gives
defendants an opportunity to prevail on the merits of some or all
claims before facing potential class certification.

Defendants should be mindful to use a single discovery period as
part of a larger strategy to conduct cost-effective litigation.

First, work on limiting the class definition and weeding out claims
early wherever possible. Striking a nationwide class or classes
including products the named plaintiffs did not purchase will
necessarily limit the scope of any discovery taken later.

Second, set a realistic time period for conducting discovery.
Ensure discovery can be completed without giving plaintiffs more
time than needed to raise unnecessary discovery disputes.

Finally, use Rule 26 to prevent duplicative or overly burdensome
discovery. Discovery requests calibrated for a putative nationwide
class covering a whole range of products will be overly broad for a
class covering a single product in a single state.

As always, a thorough early investigation of the plaintiffs' claims
is essential to evaluate the best approach given the facts of a
particular case. In some situations bifurcation may provide the
best chance of success, such as when the named plaintiffs have
particularly unique or idiosyncratic claims undermining their
adequacy as class representatives.

However, when the merits of plaintiffs' case are weak, but could
support class certification on a limited record, conducting a
single phase of discovery and moving for summary judgment early may
ultimately save the defendant money and increase the odds of
defeating the class action altogether. [GN]


[*] The Gross Law Firm Announces Shareholders Class Actions
-----------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of The Gross Law Firm issues the
following notice on behalf of shareholders in the following
publicly traded companies. Shareholders who purchased shares in the
following companies during the dates listed are encouraged to
contact the firm regarding possible Lead Plaintiff appointment.
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff is not required to partake in any
recovery.

Forescout Technologies, Inc. (FSCT)

Investors Affected: February 6, 2020 - May 15, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Forescout Technologies, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Forescout was experiencing a
significant and disproportionate decline in its financial
performance; (2) the foregoing was reasonably likely to have a
material negative impact on Forescout's planned acquisition by
Advent International Corp.; and (3) as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' statements about its business and operations were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/forescout-technologies-inc-loss-submission-form-2/?id=7497&from=1

Endo International Plc (ENDP)

Investors Affected: August 8, 2017 - June 10, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Endo International Plc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Endo's and/or its subsidiaries' contributions to
the opioid crisis (including, but not limited to, their opioid
products' disproportionately negative impact on New York and the
fraud that Defendants perpetrated on the New York insurance market)
were larger in scope than the Company had represented; (ii) part of
that contribution to the crisis included Endo publishing and
disseminating false information to health care providers regarding
the risks and benefits of opioids; (iii) the foregoing, once
revealed, was foreseeably likely to subject Endo and/or its
subsidiaries to increased regulatory scrutiny and enforcement, as
well as significant financial and/or reputational harm,
particularly with respect to New York; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/endo-international-plc-loss-submission-form/?id=7497&from=1

Casper Sleep Inc. (CSPR)

in or traceable to the Company's public offering conducted on or
around February 7, 2020.

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Casper Sleep Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Casper's profit margins were actually declining,
rather than growing; (2) Casper was changing an important
distribution partner, costing it 130 basis points of gross margin
in the first quarter of 2020 alone; (3) Casper was holding a glut
of old and outdated mattress inventory that it was selling at
steeply discounted clearance prices, further impairing the
Company's profitability; (4) Casper was suffering accelerating
losses, further placing its ability to achieve positive cash flows
and profitability out of reach; (5) Casper's core operations were
not profitable, but were causing the Company to suffer over $40
million in negative cash flows during the first quarter of 2020
alone and doubling its quarterly net loss year over year; (6) as a
result of the foregoing, Casper's ability to achieve profitability,
implement its growth initiatives, and expand internationally had
been misrepresented in the documents issued in connection with
Casper's initial public offering, as the Company needed to shutter
its European operations, halt all international expansion, jettison
over one fifth of its global corporate workforce, and significantly
curtail new store openings in order to avoid an imminent cash and
liquidity crisis, let alone achieve positive operating cash flows;
and (7) as a result of the foregoing, Casper's revenue growth rate
was not sustainable and had not positioned the Company to achieve
profitability.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/casper-sleep-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7497&from=1

The Gross Law Firm is committed to ensuring that companies adhere
to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

The Gross Law Firm
15 West 38th Street, 12th floor
New York, NY, 10018
Email: dg@securitiesclasslaw.com
Phone: (212) 537-9430
Fax: (833) 862-7770 [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
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