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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Monday, July 20, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 144

                            Headlines

3A COMPOSITES: Must Face Cladding Class Action
ACTAVIS PLC: P69.5-Mil. Attorney's Fees Awarded in Namenda Suit
AFM: Kevin Risto Seeks Class Action Status for Royalty Dispute
ALL MY SONS: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Vega Alleges
ALLERGAN INC: Lorne Class Suit Moved From E.D. Missouri to D.N.J.

ALLERGAN INC: MoginRubin Discusses Cert. Ruling in Antitrust Suit
ALTERRA MOUNTAIN: Jie Du Slams Cancelled Ski Passes, Seeks Refund
ALTOM TRANSPORT: 7th Cir. Upheld Decertification in Stampley Suit
AMERICAN AIRLINES: Gimello Sues Over Shelved Flight, Seeks Refund
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Connors et al. Sue Over Unpaid Overtime

APPLE INC: Battery Health Class Action Pending
ARVEST CENTRAL: Miller Sues in Florida Over Breach of Contract
AUDRY MINI-MARKET: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Taveraz Claims
AUSTRALIA: Class Action Lawyers Seek Answers on Robo-Debt Payment
AUSTRALIA: Opal Tower Owners File Class Action v. NSW Government

BAYER AG: Judge Criticizes Roundup Class-Action Settlement
BIJORA INC: Tenzer-Fuchs Sues in E.D. New York Over ADA Violation
BOB'S DISCOUNT: Valerio Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH: Goings Sue for Deprived Retirement Benefits
BROOKDALE SENIOR: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Aug. 24 Deadline

BROOKDALE SENIOR: Order to Compel Quinlan in Stiner Partly Reversed
BROOKDALE SENIOR: Robbins Geller Announces Class Action
CALIBER HOME: Morgan Appeals Ruling in RESPA Suit to 4th Circuit
CALIFORNIA: Cal. App. Affirms Order Sustaining Demurrer by Counties
CALIFORNIA: Lipsey Can Intervene in Coleman Inmates Suit

CANADA: Ex-Prison Inmates to File Strip Search Class Action
CHAMPION PETFOODS: Weaver Appeals E.D. Wis. Rulings to 7th Cir.
CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Hayes Sues over Misleading Proxy Statement
CITIZEN WATCH: Nisbett Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
CO-DIAGNOSTICS INC: Gelt Sues Over Share Price Drop

CO-DIAGNOSTICS INC: Pomerantz LLP Reminds of Aug. 17 Deadline
COCA-COLA COMPANY: Salerno Suit Moved From E.D. to S.D. New York
COLUMBIA GAS: Court Denies Partial Bid to Dismiss Parsons Suit
COMMONWEALTH BANK: Maurice Blackburn to Proceed with Class Action
CONNECTICUT: Bid to Certify Class in A.R. IDEA Suit Granted

COOKWARE COMPANY: Wins in Part Bid to Dismiss Lamb Breach Suit
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL: College Student Files Class Action
COVERALL NORTH: Arbitration Ruling in Richardson Partly Reversed
CREDIT CONTROL: Kio Asserts Breach of FDCPA in New Jersey
CREDIT PROS: Warren Files Suit in Florida

CREDIT SUISSE: Court Dismisses Rubinstein Securities Suit
CVS PHARMACY: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Truong Suit Alleges
DALLAS, TX: Women Protesters File Anti-Rioting Law Class Action
DELUCA ASSOCIATES: Faces Rittenhouse Employment Suit in Calif.
DENVER, CO: Sued Over Police Response to George Floyd Protests

DEVA CONCEPTS: Bell Suit Removed From Cir. Court to W.D. Missouri
DIRECT ENERGY: S.D. Illinois Dismisses Lane ICFA Class Suit
EMJ APPAREL: Conner Sues in E.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
ENDO INT'L: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Aug. 18 Deadline
ERIE INSURANCE: Faces Class Action Over Insurance Payout Denial

ERIE INSURANCE: Lieff Cabraser and Co-Counsel File Class Action
ES STONE: Installers Sue Over Denied Overtime Pay, Wage Statements
EVENTBRITE INC: California Northern Dist. Dismisses Securities Suit
FARMERS & MERCHANTS: Johnson Files Suit in California
FCA US: Court Denies Bid to Decertify Class in Victorino Suit

FCA US: Fails to Obtain Summary Judgment on Gilvin's Claims
FENTY BEAUTY LLC: Williams Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
FERRARA CANDY: Davis Polk Secures Appellate Win in Class Action
FIRST NATIONAL: Expert Disclosures Production in Lundquist Ordered
FIRST STUDENT: Stewart Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Drivers

FIRST TRANSIT: Faces Frazier FCRA Class Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
FLORIDA'S NATURAL: 2nd Circuit Affirms Axon Class Action Dismissal
FLORIDA: Governors Board Seek Dismissal of Suit on Fees Refund
FLORIDA: Raysor Asks Sup. Ct. to Flip Ruling in Pay-to-Vote Suit
GEORGETOWN REGENTS: Crawford Suit Seeks Tuition Fee Refund

GROCERY DELIVERY: Tippett Sues Over Illegal Marketing Practices
GUAM: Attorney Seeks Payment of $2MM in Retirees Suit
GUESTLOGIX INC: Approval Hearing in Securities Suit Set for Aug. 13
HAMILTON BEACH: Frank R. Cruz Law Reminds of July 21 Deadline
HANSEN & ADKINS: Summary Adjudication of Luna's Claim Upheld

HARTFORD FINANCIAL: Faces William Class Suit in District of Utah
HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Barkhordar Files Class Action for Reimbursement
HARVEST HOSPITALITIES: Duke Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
HAVEN LIFE INSURANCE: Sosa Alleges Violation under ADA
HIMAGINE SOLUTIONS: Hazel Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California

HONG HUANG: Goins Sues to Recover Withheld Tips
HORIZONS ETFS: Norton Rose Attorney Discusses Ruling in Wright Suit
HORIZONS ETFS: Torys Attorneys Discuss Ruling in Wright Suit
HSBC BANK: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in Cheng Suit
IDEANOMICS INC: Gainey McKenna Reminds of Aug. 27 Motion Deadline

IDEANOMICS INC: Hagens Berman Reminds of Aug. 27 Deadline
IDEANOMICS INC: Jakubowitz Law Reminds of August 27 Deadline
IDEANOMICS INC: Pomerantz LLP Reminds of Aug. 27 Deadline
IDEANOMICS INC: Schall Law Reminds of Aug. 27 Deadline
IKEA US: Agrees to Settle Suit Over Rest Breaks for $7.5 Million

IKES PLACE: Failing to Pay for All Hours Worked, Bogues Suit Says
ILLINOIS: Norfleet Has Til July 27 to File Class Certification Bid
INFUSION SOFTWARE: Court Approves $1.5MM Deal in McNamara Suit
J.P. MORGAN: Grace Sues Over Treasury Futures Contracts Rigging
JAGUAR LAND: Faces Class Action Over Windshield Leaking Issue

JOE MACHENS: App. Ct. Holds Fogelsong Parties Should Arbitrate
JP MORGAN: Ninth Circuit Upholds Arbitration Ruling in Nypl Suit
KANSAS: Bid to Dismiss Defendant H. Jones in Shaw Suit Denied
KELLOGG: Judge Tosses Class Action Over Vanilla Flavor Labeling
KIA MOTORS: Faegre Drinker Atty. Discusses Little Class Suit Ruling

KINGOLD JEWELRY: Pomerantz LLP Reminds of Class Action Filed
KIRKLAND LAKE: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Aug. 28 Deadline
KIRKLAND LAKE: Lowey Dannenberg Files Securities Class Action
LENWICH MANAGEMENT: Dornates Seeks Overtime Pay, Wage Statements
LIMA RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Esquivel Claims

LOS ANGELES, CA: George Floyd Protesters File Class Action
LOWE'S HOME: Melody Suit Over Unpaid Wages Removed to C.D. Calif.
MACRO COMPANIES: Guillory Seeks Conditional Class Certification
MACY'S WEST: Aboyte Labor Class Suit Removed to N.D. California
MANHATTAN SCHOOL OF MUSIC: Flatscher Suit Seeks Tuition Fee Refund

MDL 2047: Bid to Sever Claims in Chinese Drywall Suit Granted
MDL 2047: Summary Judgment Orders in Chinese Drywall Suit Entered
MDL 2473: Judge Directs KCC to Release Rosen's Share to US LBM
MIDWAY NIGHTCLUB: Mohammed Seeks Refund of Cancelled Concert
MIRACLE-EAR INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Baldwin et al. Claim

MONARCH RECOVERY: Faces Lopez FDCPA Class Suit in E.D. New York
MONSANTO COMPANY: Forman Sues Over Sale of Herbicide Roundup(TM)
MOUNTAIRE FARMS: Judge Tosses Motion to Dismiss Class Action
NCB MANAGEMENT: Kendrick Asserts Breach of FDCPA
NEVADA DETR: Faces Class Action Over Unemployment Benefits

NEW HAMPSHIRE: Bid to Dismiss Hospitals' Amended Complaint Denied
NEW YORK, NY: McQueen, Cedeno Slam Unlawful Detention
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 11 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 13 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 22 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.

NEW YORK: Gym Owner Mulls Class Action Over Phase 4 Reopening
NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal v. Daniels Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
NISOURCE INC: Spent $143 Million to Resolve Class Action Claims
NISSAN: Court Dismisses Elis' Murano Soft Brake Pedal Class Action
NORTH CAROLINA: Federal Inmates Withdraw COVID-19 Class Action

NORTHWOOD, NOVA SCOTIA: Class Action Mulled Over COVID-19 Deaths
OHIO: Settlement in Ball ADA Class Suit Gets Final Approval
OHIO: Top Court Overturns Medicaid Class Certification Ruling
OKLAHOMA: Cole Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
PAQ INC: Faces Smith Employment Suit in California Super. Court

PARETEUM CORP: Court Dismisses Class & Patel Securities Suits
PETER NYGARD: Seeks to Dismiss Class Action Filed by 57 Women
PG&E CORP: New Mexico PERA Appeals Decision to N.D. California
PIEDMONT NATURAL: Court Dismisses Second Amended Pridy ERISA Suit
PLAID INC: Squire Patton Discusses Mitchell's Privacy Class Suit

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN: 9th Cir. Appeal Filed in Andrews Fisher Suit
PLAYAGS INC: Block & Leviton Announces Securities Class Action
PLAYAGS INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Aug. 24 Deadline
PORTLAND, OR: Third Class Action Filed Over Police Use of Force
PREMIER NUTRITION: 9th Cir. Upheld Dismissal of Sonner Class Suit

PUBLIC HEALTH: Fails to Pay Overtime Wage Under PMWA, Govens Says
REBBL INC: Martinez Sues in E.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
ROMAN HEALTH: Young Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
SAMARCO MINERACAO: Banco Safra Appeals Rulings to Second Circuit
SAMARITANS-AT-LAST LLC: Biptar Sues Over Unpaid Overtime

SAN JOSE, CA: Bohrn Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
SAN JOSE, CA: Transgender Attorney Files Class Action
SANTA BARBARA, CA: Murray Inmates Class Action Nears Settlement
SCHLEGEL VILLAGES: Hit With C$20-Mil. Class Action Lawsuit
SERVICEMASTER COMPANY: Cooley Labor Suit Moved to E.D. California

SK ENERGY: Cleveland Suit Moved From S.D. to N.D. California
SKIP THE DISHES: Class Action Can Proceed in Manitoba Courts
SOCIAL FINANCE: Sosa Sues in S.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Klein Law Reminds of July 27 Deadline
SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of July 27 Deadline

SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Wolf Haldenstein Reminds of Class Action
SOUTH CAROLINA: Griffin Appeals Ruling in Voltz-Loomis Class Suit
SOUTH KOREA: University Students' Lawsuit Seeks Tuition Refunds
SPICE HOUSE: Crosson Sues in E.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
STATE FARM MUTUAL: Lopez Suit Transferred to Arkansas Dist. Ct.

STATE FARM: App. Court Upholds $34MM Ruling in Class Action
STEINHOFF: Shareholders Lose Class Certification Bid
STEWARD HEALTH: Fails to Bill BCBST for Services, Williams Says
STITCH FIX: Tenzer-Fuchs Sues in E.D. New York Over ADA Violation
STOJO PRODUCTS: Slade Sues in S.D. New York Over Violation of ADA

TD AMERITRADE: Sued by Wang for Recklessly Operating Business
TELADOC HEALTH: Hale Files TCPA Suit in New York
TESLA: Class Action Over Congo Children Abuse Pending
TEXAS: Seeks 5th Cir. Review of Ruling in M.D. Civil Rights Suit
TICKETMASTER: Concertgoers Seek Terms of Use Click Rates

TOMMIE COPPER: Faces Young Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
TREADWELL PARK: Restaurant Staff Sue Over Denied Overtime Pay
TRUMAN ROAD: Obtains Partial Summary Judgment on Claims in Z. Smith
TULSA, OK: Court Enters Protective Orders in Feltz Detainees Suit
TWC PRODUCT AND TECH: Hart Slams App Location Tracking

UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Canadian Supreme Court Sides With Drivers
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Allows Drivers' Class Action to Proceed
ULTRA MUSIC: Faces Class Action Over Unjust Refund Policy
UNITED STATES: Court Narrows Claims in Vita Nouva Suit
UNITED STATES: Wolf Appeals Rulings in Velesaca Suit to 2nd Cir.

VARSITY BRANDS: Suit Alleges Monopoly in Cheerleaders Apparel
VITA-MIX CORP: Faces Tenzer-Fuchs ADA Class Suit in E.D. New York
WASTE CONNECTIONS: Can't Compel Replies in Ictech-Bendeck Suit
WELLS FARGO: Easton FLSA Suit Moved From N.D. to C.D. California
WHITEHOUSE ESTATES: Appeals Ruling in Casey Suit to N.Y. Sup. Ct.

WILLIS TOWERS: Halper Sadeh Reminds of Shareholder Class Action
WWE: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action on Saudi Arabia Business
YOUNG LIVING: Denial of Arbitration Bids in O'Shaughnessy Upheld
YOUTUBE LLC: Scheider et al. Allege Violation of Copyright Laws
YOUTUBE: Maria Schneider Files Class Action Over Content ID

ZOOM VIDEO: Ahdoot & Wolfson, Cotchett Pitre to Lead Class Action
[*] AMP CEO Wants Increased Oversight of Litigation Funders
[*] Business Interruption Insurance Class Suit Launched in Canada
[*] Cannabis Companies Face TCPA Litigation Risks
[*] Gross Law Firm Announces Shareholder Class Action Filings

[*] Law Firms File Class Action Against Land Deal Promoters
[*] Survey Shows Spike in COVID-19-Related Class Action Filings

                            *********

3A COMPOSITES: Must Face Cladding Class Action
----------------------------------------------
Insurance News reports that a class action seeking product
liability damages from a cladding maker has scored a "major
win" in the Federal Court of Australia, paving the way for the
lawsuit to continue, litigation funder Omni Bridgeway says.

German manufacturer 3A Composites, one of two respondents named
in the class action, had submitted that the proceeding should no
longer continue or alternatively, there should be a cap on the
number of people who are entitled to participate.

But the court has rejected the submission, which means the
plaintiffs can proceed with the class action against the maker
of Alucobond PE and Plus cladding, Omni Bridgeway says.

"This is a major win for the claimants and means they can continue
to pursue compensation from the manufacturers," Investment
Manager Gavin Beardsell said. "We are delighted with the
Federal Court's decision."

Mr. Beardsell told insuranceNEWS.com.au the next step of the
class action will see the parties confer to identify an interim set
of questions to be determined at the initial trial as well as the
form and scope of discovery.

The class action against 3A Composites and Sydney-based HVG
commenced last year and last February, it gained approval from the
court to also seek damages for false or misleading representations.
[GN]


ACTAVIS PLC: P69.5-Mil. Attorney's Fees Awarded in Namenda Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued an Opinion and Order granting in part Class Counsels'
Request for Attorney's Fees in the case captioned In re Namenda
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 15 Civ. 7488 (CM)
(S.D.N.Y.).

Following the Court's preliminary approval of a settlement in this
pharmaceutical direct purchaser antitrust class action for
$750,000,000, Class counsel made a timely motion for fees, expenses
and incentive awards. Class counsel originally sought 27.5% of the
common fund (or an award of X), reimbursement of expenses of
$5,823,928.91, and incentive awards of $150,000 for each
representative plaintiff. After negotiations with an objector,
class counsel reduced the request to 21% of the common fund, or
$157,500,000; the rest of the proposal remains the same.

The Court granted Class counsel's motion for a fee award, but the
amount awarded is lower than requested.

The fee award is requested on behalf of six law firms, who
apparently operate in tandem on pay for delay cases, regardless of
who is appointed lead counsel. The six firms, and the total
billable hours for each firm, are as follows: (a) Berger &
Montague, P.C. (12,470 hours) (b) Faruqi & Faruqi LLP (9,699.5
hours) (c) Garwin Gerstein & Fisher LLP (9,268.15 hours) (d) Heim
Payne & Chorush LLP (4,243.8 hours) (e) Odom & Des Roches (10,135.6
hours) and (f) Smith Segura & Raphael LLP (6,294 hours).

This makes up the lodestar amount of $34,769,008.35 in per hour
billings.

Given the sheer magnitude of the numbers, the Court is not prepared
to award anything like the 4.5 times lodestar requested by class
counsel even if that number is only 21% of the common fund.

Chief District Judge Colleen McMahon says: Because I believe the
lodestar to be inflated for the reasons stated, the Court have
decided to award twice the lodestar as a success fee, which brings
the counsel award to $69,538,016.70, representing approximately
9.3% of the common fund. It is still a handsome payday for
counsel.

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for fees, expenses and
incentive awards on part, approving awards in the following
amounts:

   * Class counsel shall be reimbursed for its expenses of
     $5,823,928.91;

   * Each class representative shall receive an incentive award
     of $75,000; and

   * Class counsel shall collect an attorney's fees award of
     $69,538,016.70 out of the common settlement fund; and

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 15, 2020 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/yaxv2xlw from Leagle.com


AFM: Kevin Risto Seeks Class Action Status for Royalty Dispute
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Cooke, writing for Complete Music Update, reports that
songwriter and record producer Kevin Risto has asked a court in
California to grant class action status to his legal dispute with
American performer unions AFM and SAG-AFTRA and the IP Rights
Distribution Fund that they set up.  If granted, it would mean a
win in the dispute would benefit any session musician due royalties
from their music being played on online or satellite radio services
in the US.

The two unions created the IP Rights Distribution Fund to collect
various royalties due to session musicians, the most important of
which is the Performer ER royalties due when the performing rights
of a sound recording are exploited.  In the US, that money is paid
by online and satellite radio stations initially to the collecting
society SoundExchange.  Featured artists get their cut of that
money directly from SoundExchange itself, but the allocation due to
session musicians (5% of total income) is handed over to the IP
Rights Distribution Fund which then pays the performers.

Risto's lawsuit takes issue with a decision made by the trustees of
the IP Rights Distribution Fund back in 2013 to start paying both
AFM and SAG-AFTRA a 1.5% fee for the services and data they provide
to the fund. He argues that the trustees violated their fiduciary
duty to the fund's beneficiaries, ie the session musicians, by
allowing regular payments to be made to the unions that set it up.

For their part, the various defendants have argued that the fund's
governing document gives the trustees wide discretion on how best
to run the royalty body and specific permission to pay the two
unions for any services or information they provide. Which means
that, although such payments only began in 2013, the right to pay
the unions for their input was there from the start.

Risto intended his lawsuit to be a class action, benefiting all
session musicians, when he first filed it in 2018. But on June 29
he filed paperwork with the court seeking formal approval of that
class action status, defining his class as "all non-featured
musicians and non-featured vocalists, their agents, successors in
interest, assigns, heirs, executors, trustees, and administrators,
entitled to royalties under the Copyright Act after 22 Jul 2013".

Among other things, Risto's lawyers argue that class action status
is appropriate for this action because, if it is successful, it
will have demonstrated that all session musicians lost out when the
union fees were agreed in 2013. But, given many beneficiaries
likely receive nominal income from the fund -- and given the
complexities of cases like this -- most performers wouldn't be able
to pursue their own legal action to secure compensation.

"A class action is superior in this case because there are
thousands of class members, many of whom likely have relatively
small claims, and the class-wide adjudication of their claims is
the most efficient and economical option for the parties and the
judiciary", the June 29 court filing said.

"It is also highly unlikely that any class member would seek to
pursue their own claim individually, and plaintiff's counsel has
not found any similarly filed litigation against the defendants for
the claims at issue here", it went on. "Furthermore, this
litigation is complex and costly; it involves issues that require
substantial targeted discovery of sophisticated defendants who have
prolonged the productions of documents and witnesses at every step
of this process". [GN]


ALL MY SONS: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Vega Alleges
----------------------------------------------------
JOSE A. VEGA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. ALL MY SONS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, LLC; All
My Sons Moving & Storage of Tucson LLC; All My Sons Moving &
Storage of Phoenix LLC; All My Sons of Mesa LLC, Defendants, Case
4:20-cv-00284-RCC (D. Ariz., July 2, 2020) seeks to recover from
the Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Vega was employed by the Defendant as mover.

All My Sons Business Development, LLC is a Delaware limited
liability company that does business as a moving and storage
company in Arizona. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ty D. Frankel, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BONNETT FAIRBOURN
          FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, Arizona 85016
          Telephone: (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: tfrankel@bffb.com

               - and -

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF BONNETT FAIRBOURN
          FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, California 92101
          Telephone: (619) 756-7748
          E-mail: psyverson@bffb.com


ALLERGAN INC: Lorne Class Suit Moved From E.D. Missouri to D.N.J.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Jean Lorne, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Allergan, Inc., formerly known as:
Inamed Corporation, Allergan USA, Inc., Allergan PLC, Case No.
4:20-cv-00802, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
Eastern District of Missouri to the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey on July 9, 2020.

The New Jersey District Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-08517-BRM-JAD to the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability.

Allergan, Inc., was an American global pharmaceutical company
focused on eye care, neurosciences, medical dermatology, medical
aesthetics, breast enhancement, obesity intervention and
urologics.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey J. Lowe, Esq.
          CAREY AND DANIS
          8235 Forsyth Boulevard, Suite 1100
          St. Louis, MO 63105
          Phone: (314) 678-3400
          Fax: (314) 678-3401
          Email: jlowe@careydanis.com

               - and -

          John S. Steward, Esq.
          STEWARD LAW FIRM LLC
          1717 Park Avenue
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Phone: (314) 571-7134
          Fax: (314) 594-5950
          Email: glaw123@aol.com

               - and -

          Joseph V. Neill, Esq.
          5201 Hampton Avenue
          St. Louis, MO 63109
          Phone: (314) 353-1001
          Fax: (314) 353-0181
          Email: neill5300@aol.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Erick E. VanDorn, Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          525 W. Main Street
          Belleville, IL 62220
          Phone: (618) 277-4700
          Fax: (618) 236-3434
          Email: evandorn@thompsoncoburn.com


ALLERGAN INC: MoginRubin Discusses Cert. Ruling in Antitrust Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jennifer M. Oliver, Esq. -- joliver@moginrubin.com -- of
MoginRubin, in an article for The National Law Review, reports that
on May 5, 2020, U.S. Judge Nina Gershon of New York granted
certification to a class of end-payor plaintiffs (EPPs) who
purchased the successful dry-eye treatment Restasis, created and
manufactured by Allergan, Inc. in In re: Restasis (Cyclosporine
Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litigation, 1:18-md-02819-NG-LB
(E.D.N.Y 2018). The certified class includes individuals with and
without health insurance, and third-party payors like union benefit
funds, that pay or provide reimbursement for drug costs for people
they insure.

The EPPs alleged that the drug maker illegally extended its
exclusive reign as the drug's sole manufacturer and seller after
its patents expired in May 2014. They argued that, but for
Allergan's illegal conduct delaying the entry of lower-cost
equivalent drugs into the market, the plaintiffs would have paid
much less for Restasis, a drug purchased over and over again due to
the chronic nature of the condition it treats.

Specifically, the plaintiffs accused Allergan of taking multiple
steps to manipulate the country's patent and drug laws to
facilitate its monopoly. They argued that the company:

   -- Filed a sham citizen's petition with the Food and Drug
      Administration;

   -- Duped the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office into issuing a
      secondary set of patents for Restasis;

   -- Used those patents to file groundless infringement lawsuits
      against several generic drug manufactures;

   -- And finally, denied challengers the ability to invalidate
      the patents by selling them to a Native American tribe,
      which licensed them back to Allergan, effectively,  
      "rent[ing] the Tribe's sovereign immunity" to protect
      its monopoly status, according to the class certification
      order.

Pay-for-Delay Recap

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013) caused a surge of antitrust case filings on reverse
payment or "pay-for-delay" claims when it applied the rule of
reason to such conduct. In a pay-for-delay case, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer creates, tests, and brings a brand drug to market.
Instead of letting their legal monopoly expire with the drug's
patents, the manufacturer offers a financial "inducement" to a
would-be generic competitor to settle patent litigation or to
obtain a later market entry date than the generic competitor
otherwise would have accepted without the inducement.

But brand drug manufacturer schemes have become less overt and more
elaborate in recent years. Twists on the traditional patent
litigation settlement have be expanded to other forms of valuable
consideration like development, manufacture, co-promotion, and
other non-authorized generic agreements. The defendant in In re:
Restasis paid for Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe's shield of the
sovereign immunity to continue its drug monopoly.

Drug makers argue setting their own prices is essential to the
time-consuming and costly creation of new treatments, but the
practice of illegal monopoly extension has cost defendants billions
in antitrust liability. Plaintiffs, including direct action
plaintiffs such as large hospital systems and healthcare insurers,
direct purchasers, and indirect purchasers (end-payors), have
generally had success at the class certification stage in recent
pay-for-delay cases. The class of end-payor plaintiffs in In re:
Restasis is the latest.

Class Certification Issues in Restasis

The court's opinion focused primarily on Allergan's contention that
class certification should fail based the existence of uninjured
class members, such as "brand retainers," or those who choose to
purchase the brand name version even when generics become
available. The defendant also argued that the need for
individualized inquiry to "cull" the uninjured from the class,
defeated Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement.

Judge Gershon considered dueling expert testimony on the question
of what percentage of class members would have been brand retainers
in the but-for world. Crediting the EPPs' expert as "thorough" and
"thoughtful," the court accepted the expert's use of another eye
medication as a market analog in approximating the number of brand
retainers at 5.7% of the class. The court concluded that the EPPs
had put forth "a workable methodology" to present class-wide proof
of injury-in-fact and concluded the same with damages calculations,
while acknowledging that the claim administration process would
include some individualized calculations.

The court dealt with Allergan's contention that cumulative
antitrust, consumer protection, and other alleged violations from
more than thirty states would "swamp" common legal issues. Judge
Gershon engaged in lengthy analysis weighing choice-of-law issues
and whether the states' varying proof requirements "present[ed]
insuperable obstacles." She concluded that specific state law
questions did not predominate or "render the class unmanageable"
because the laws' differences "address factual and legal questions
common to the entire class, or discrete subsections thereof[,] are
remediable by additional questions to the jury[,] and/or are more
appropriately raised on summary judgment." Finally, in a separate
Daubert opinion, the court excluded expert testimony from two of
Allergan's witnesses, finding their proffered testimony unreliable
and biased.

Commentary

"Pay for delay" is now a well-known ploy by pharmaceutical drug
manufacturers. With courts and consumers now well aware of these
schemes, "big pharma" must try to protect their huge monopoly
profits through other means like sham petitions and, in this case,
an outrageous end run attempting to leverage and abuse the
sovereign immunity of Native American tribes. This case is an
excellent example of the flexibility of American antitrust law.
Hopefully cases like this will show that as long as we have
talented agencies and private plaintiffs willing to enforce the
law, the Sherman Act and its brethren are both broad and flexible
enough to address any type of anticompetitive scheme. [GN]


ALTERRA MOUNTAIN: Jie Du Slams Cancelled Ski Passes, Seeks Refund
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jie Du, an individual person on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Alterra Mountain Company U.S.
Inc. and Ikon Pass Inc., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-01699, (D.
Colo., June 2, 2020), seeks restitutionary damages, a full cash
refund, an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs and such
other and further relief resulting from breach of contract/warranty
and for violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Alterra operates ski resorts in Colorado where Jie Du purchased
season Ikon Passes for the 2019-2020 ski season but was canceled as
a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Jie Du claims to be denied a
refund. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Katrina Carroll, Esq.
     Nicholas R. Lange, Esq.
     CARLSON LYNCH LLP
     111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
     Chicago, IL 60602
     Telephone: (312) 750-1265
     Email: kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com
            nlange@carlsonlynch.com


ALTOM TRANSPORT: 7th Cir. Upheld Decertification in Stampley Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL STAMPLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALTOM
TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 19-3154 (7th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district courts order (i) denying Stampley's motion for summary
judgment, and (ii) granting Altom's motion to decertify the class.

Plaintiff Stampley, the owner-operator of a tractor-trailer,
provided hauling services for Altom Transport.  Altom agreed to pay
Stampley 70% of the "gross" revenues that it collected for each
load he hauled.  Altom also agreed to give Stampley a copy of the
"rated freight bill" or a "computer-generated document with the
same information" to prove that it had properly paid Stampley for
each load.  Importantly, the contract granted Stampley the right to
examine any underlying documents used to create a
computer-generated document.  Regardless of whether Stampley
exercised that right, however, the contract required him to bring
any dispute regarding his pay within 30 days.

Several years after he hauled his last load for Altom, Stampley
filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging that Altom had
shortchanged him and similarly situated drivers by not paying them
a portion of the gross revenues it had collected on their loads.
The district court eventually certified a class and held that
Altom's withholdings had indeed violated the terms of the contract.
However, concerned that the provision requiring all contests to
his pay be made within 30 days would bar his claim, Stampley moved
for summary judgment on that issue before the class received
notice.

The district court subsequently denied Stampley's motion for
summary judgment and granted Altom's motion to decertify the class.
It also later granted Altom's motion for summary judgment and held
that Stampley's individual claims were barred.  Stampley now
appeals both the district court's decertification order and the
entry of summary judgment for Altom.

The Seventh Circuit cannot conclude that the representation finding
was an abuse of discretion.  The record shows that Stampley clearly
focused on protecting his own claim against a contractual defense,
rather than representing the class as constituted.  Indeed, the
record consistently supports the district court's understanding
that the motion for summary judgment prior to class notice was an
attempt to moot the need for that notice, taking into account that
the class would be amended and expanded if Stampley had been
successful.  Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in finding Stampley an inadequate class representative and
decertifying the class, the Seventh Circuit opines.  With that, the
Seventh Circuit turns to the substance of Stampley's summary
judgment motion.

The Seventh Circuit agrees with the district court that the parties
bargained for a limited window of time to have payment disputes and
Stampley was bound to that bargain regardless of whether the
computer-generated document Stampley received contained all the
information within the rated freight bill.  Stampley's
counterarguments are unpersuasive.  First, Altom's provision of an
insufficient computer-generated document neither prevented Stampley
from exercising his right under the Inspection Clause to examine
the underlying documents, nor from challenging his payments.
Second, because Stampley admits that he never requested the
underlying documentation for any of the computer-gen-erated
documents he received, the hypothetical situation in which Altom
would have brought him the wrong documents even if he had asked for
them cannot save his claim.  Third, and finally, nothing in the
Truth-in-Leasing regulations militates a different result.

For the reasons stated, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decertification order and entry of summary judgment for
Altom.

A full-text copy of the Seventh Circuit's May 1, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/e0DHay from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN AIRLINES: Gimello Sues Over Shelved Flight, Seeks Refund
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paula Gimello, an individual person on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. American Airlines Group
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-02834, (E.D. Pa., June 15, 2020),
seeks a full cash refund, an award of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs and such other and further relief resulting from unjust
enrichment, fraud and breach of contract.

American Airlines Group Inc. (AAG), one of the largest airlines in
the world, is a holding company that owns American Airlines, Inc.,
Envoy Aviation Group Inc., PSA Airlines, Inc. and Piedmont
Airlines, Inc. Its business was disrupted as a result of
government-mandated restrictions on travel in response to the
COVID19 pandemic.

On or about February 2, 2020, Gimello purchased a one-way ticket
for travel from St. Maarten to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
departing on March 17, 2020. However, the flight was cancelled by
AAG due to the coronavirus so she requested a refund. She alleged
that AAG was only issuing credits for the flight cancellations, not
cash refunds. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Benjamin F. Johns, Esq.
      CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
      One Haverford Centre
      361 W. Lancaster Avenue
      Haverford, PA 19041
      Telephone: (610) 642-8500
      Facsimile: (610) 649-3633
      Email: bfj@chimicles.com

             - and -

      Robert Ahdoot, Esq.
      Bradley K. King, SBN 274399
      AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
      10728 Lindbrook Drive
      Los Angeles, CA 90024
      Telephone: (310) 474-9111
      Facsimile: (310) 474-8585
      Email: rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
             bking@ahdootwolfson.com

             - and -

      David R. Dubin, Esq.
      Nicholas A. Coulson. Esq.
      LIDDLE & DUBIN, P.C.
      975 E. Jefferson Ave.
      Detroit, MI 48207
      Tel: (313) 392-0015
      Fax: (313) 392-0025
      Email: ddubin@ldclassaction.com
             ncoulson@ldclassaction.com


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Connors et al. Sue Over Unpaid Overtime
---------------------------------------------------------
JOSEPH CONNORS; and JOSE LUNA RUBIO, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN MEDICAL
RESPONSE, INC.; and SENIORCARE EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants, Case 1:20-cv-05046 (S.D.N.Y., July 1, 2020) is an
action against the Defendants' failure to pay the Plaintiff and the
class overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per week.

The Plaintiff Connors was employed by the Defendants as medical
technician. The Plaintiff Rubio was employed as paramedic.

American Medical Response, Inc. provides medical transportation
services. The Company offers emergency ambulance and emergency
medical services for health plans, hospitals, and rehabilitation
and skilled nursing facilities, and managed transportation
services. American Medical Response provides mobile healthcare
services, including onsite medical care, and occupational health
services. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Steven J. Moser, Esq.
          Paul A. Pagano, Esq.
          MOSER LAW FIRM, P.C.
          5 East Main Street
          Huntington, NY 11743
          Telephone: (516) 671-1150
          Facsimile: (631) 759-9766
          E-mail: steven.moser@moserlawfirm.com
                  paul.pagano@moserlawfirm.com


APPLE INC: Battery Health Class Action Pending
----------------------------------------------
Matt Drange, writing for Herald Cloud, reports that earlier this
year, an online hearing was actually kept using Zoom permitting
U.S. District Judge Edward J. Davila to offer initial commendation
to a negotiation in between Apple and also a lot of litigants that
were actually participants in a class-action fit versus Apple.
What Apple carried out, as you may recollect, is actually include
an attribute to particular apple iphone versions in iphone 10.2.1
without the understanding or even authorization of these apple
iphone customers. After iphone 10.2.1 was actually put in, Apple
possessed the potential to from another location choke the CPU on
particular models of its own mobile.

Prior to the launch of iphone 10.2.1, some apple iphone customers
were actually whining that their phones were actually restarting
and also plunging after managing complicated activities.  Apple was
actually indicted of prepared extinction, essentially generating
these versions along with a minimal life time requiring proprietors
to ultimately purchase brand-new apples iphone. What really took
place was actually that the electric batteries on the plunging
apple iphone systems were actually also flimsy and also Apple
believed that through strangling the CPU, these electric batteries
may be actually capable to store up far better.  The Battery Health
component right now observes whether the present electric battery
on your apple iphone may take care of complicated activities

Apple ultimately blew its own digestive tracts in December 2017,
excusing the act.  Chief Executive Officer Tim Cook mentioned that
Apple will certainly never carry out just about anything to reduce
the lifestyles of its own items and also delivered $50 or even 63%
off the cost of an electric battery substitute on the apple iphone
6 collection, the apple iphone sixes collection, and also the apple
iphone SE.  That took the cost to change the electric battery on
those versions up to $29 and also created it virtually difficult to
arrange a Genius Bar session for months.  Apple determined that it
will change one to 2 thousand apple iphone electric batteries and
also wound up conducting the transplant function around 11 thousand
opportunities during the course of 2018.
Apple delivered to spend each participant of the course $25 (also
while the lawyers accumulate an overall of $93 for their
understanding).  A hearing will definitely be actually composed
December to make sure that the court may provide a last judgment on
the settlement deal.  Depending on to Dutch magazine iCulture, 5
European individual teams are actually obtaining in to the show.
They are actually asking for remuneration coming from Apple and
also claim that they prefer the firm to spend each client
influenced due to the strangling 60 Euros (equal to $6747 at
present currency exchange rate).

The previously mentioned 5 European individual teams exemplify
nations consisting of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and also Brazil.  The
second nation belongs to the team despite the fact that it is
actually certainly not European. After interpretation, iCulture
claims, "The strategy is actually to receive Apple to spend 60
europeans to apple iphone customers that experience deceived
considering that Apple is actually mentioned to become 'prepared
extinction,'"  It seems that the European individual teams
determined to receive entailed after the French authorities
resolved along with Apple in February; the technology titan paid
for the nation EUR25,000, equal to US$27,000.

If just about anything excellent stemmed from this, it is actually
the addition of the Battery Health component on the apple iphone.
Most likely to Settings - Battery - Battery Health.  When the part
is actually updates, the Maximum Capacity percent will definitely
inform you exactly how a lot electric battery ability stays on your
apple iphone's electric battery contrasted to the 100% analysis
that looks.  After 5 months along with the apple iphone 11 Pro Max,
the Maximum Capacity of the 3969 mAh electric battery is actually
98%.

On the Battery Health web page, you may toggle on or even off
Optimized Battery Charging. When you commonly story your apple
iphone off of the battery charger every early morning, this
component makes use of Artificial Intelligence to discover. To
lengthen the lifestyle of the electric battery, it will definitely
after that credit 80% and also quit. When it may begin demanding
once again thus that it strikes 100% precisely when you generally
disconnect the gadget every time, the phone will definitely after
that figure out. If you commonly disconnect the battery charger at
9 am, the electric battery may quit demanding at 7 am and also
demand to 100% over the following 2 hrs. Through this your electric
battery does not totally demand at 8 am and also flow cost over the
following hr to remain at 100%. Flow demanding may lessen the
endurance of an electric battery with time. When you connect the
phone in to a channel you will definitely find an approximated
opportunity when the electric battery will definitely attack 100%
when utilizing improved demanding. If you need to have the gadget
demanded prior to after that, touch on the "Charge Now" switch to
turn off the improved demanding component. [GN]


ARVEST CENTRAL: Miller Sues in Florida Over Breach of Contract
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Arvest Central
Mortgage Co. The case is styled as Andrew Miller, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Arvest Central
Mortgage Co., Case No. 1:20-cv-22820-XXXX (S.D. Fla., July 9,
2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Breach of
Contract.

Arvest Central Mortgage Company is a financial services
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff represents himself:

          Andrew Miller, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone: (305) 479-2299

The Defendants are represented by:

          Brian W. Toth, Esq.
          GELBERG SCHACHTER & GREENBERG, P.A.
          1221 Brickell Avenue, Suite 2010
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: (305) 728-0950
          Fax: (305) 728-0951
          Email: btoth@gsgpa.com


AUDRY MINI-MARKET: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Taveraz Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
CESAR TAVERAS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. AUDRY MINI-MARKET, INC.; and SANTANA
LANTIGUA, Defendants, Case 1:20-cv-05080 (S.D.N.Y., July 2, 2020)
to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime compensation, minimum
wages, and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff Taveras was employed by the Defendants as store
clerk.

Audry Mini-Market, Inc. operates as a delicatessen and grocer
selling groceries and prepared food items in the Bronx, New York.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Caitlin Duffy, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          655 Third Avenue, Suite 1821
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 679-5000
          Facsimile: (212) 679-5005


AUSTRALIA: Class Action Lawyers Seek Answers on Robo-Debt Payment
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Nick Bonyhady, writing for The Sydney Morning Herald, reports that
the legal firm pursuing a class action over the unlawful
"robo-debt" scheme will demand the government explain how it plans
to repay the 373,000 people it owes money to after it said some
would be repaid in instalments.

A spokesman for Government Services Minister Stuart Robert said
only a small number of the 470,000 debts that Centrelink raised
using an income averaging method would be repaid in instalments.

"This is due to system limitations on the size of daily payments,"
the spokesman said but declined to say what the dollar limits on
payments was.  One source close to Services Australia, the
government department that administered the program, who did not
want to be named for fear of jeopardising her employment, said the
limit was about $10,000 per transaction.

Mr. Robert's spokesman said payments would be made on consecutive
days if they were too big to be paid in one go. He denied a claim
on social media that some refunds would be made in $80 instalments,
calling it "categorically false".

The government is facing a class action over the scheme from law
firm Gordon Legal -- despite the refunds -- that is due to go to
trial in September. The Federal Court in November last year found
the income-averaging method was inaccurate and unlawful. Andrew
Grech, a partner at the firm, said government's approach would
"muck people about" and the court had the power to stop parties to
class actions confusing plaintiffs.

"We will be writing to the government's legal representatives, the
Australian Government Solicitor, and asking them to clarify the
[refund] process that's being undertaken," Mr. Grech said.  If that
failed, he said Gordon Legal could ask the court to force the
government to clarify its position.

The government estimates it will refund about $720 million it
clawed back from welfare recipients through the robo-debt process,
which used averaged income data rather than real earnings to assess
whether people had been paid too much welfare.  The Gordon Legal
claim wants court-ordered interest and damages for its clients, on
top of refunds.

A Services Australia spokeswoman said the department had already
made a small number of repayments to test the system, with more
from the middle of the month and most refunds expected to be
completed by November.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has apologised for any "hurt or harm"
caused by robo-debt but also said last month the government would
pursue legitimate welfare debts.

"I think all Australians would agree that it's important that if
there are overpayments of welfare or other things like that, then
the government has to be diligent about taxpayers funds and make
sure that we recover moneys where it's right to do so," Mr Morrison
said.

Labor's government services spokesman Bill Shorten, who has called
for a royal commission into robo-debt, said the instalment plan was
"simply not good enough".

"Stuart Robert needs to come clean: What is the latest digi-bungle
that prevents the robo-debt victims being repaid in full? What is
the digital repayment cap? And why can't the victims simply be cut
a bank cheque?" Mr. Shorten said. [GN]


AUSTRALIA: Opal Tower Owners File Class Action v. NSW Government
----------------------------------------------------------------
Insurance News reports that the owners of Opal Tower have launched
a class action against the NSW Government, seeking compensation for
new defects found in the building.

It is the second lawsuit filed against the state-owned Sydney
Olympic Park Authority (SOPA), which owns the land the building
sits on.  Last year, the owners launched legal action for
individual losses they claim to have suffered due to lower property
values and rental income.

SOPA is named as second defendant in the latest class action filed
in the NSW Supreme Court. Icon, the builder of the 36-storey block,
is first defendant, according to a copy of the court summons seen
by insuranceNEWS.com.au.

A spokesman for SOPA declined to comment as the matter is before
the court.

Residents were forced to evacuate on Christmas Eve in 2018 from the
then recently completed tower after cracks were found in the
structure.

According to local media reports, new defects have been found in
the common areas by independent experts engaged by the owners,
prompting them to launch the latest class action.

Opal Towers Owners Corporation Chairman Shady Eskander was quoted
as saying the new defects have pushed up the insurance premium to
$1.1 million. insuranceNEWS.com.au has reached out to Mr Eskander
and the lawyer representing the plaintiffs for more details.

The NSW Government also declined to comment on the latest legal
action but says it has delivered on its promise to reform the
building and construction industry.

It says the new legislation, the Design and Building Practitioners
Bill and the Residential Apartment Buildings Bill, will give
consumers "peace of mind" when they enter the property market.

"For homeowners with existing defects in their buildings, the
legislation provides new protections and recourse by stipulating
that anyone carrying out building work has a legal duty to avoid
construction defects both for new buildings and retrospectively for
buildings built up to 10 years before the legislation was passed,"
the spokesman told insuranceNEWS.com.au.

"This gives homeowners in properties built in the past 10 years new
legal rights to recover the cost of repairing defects from
responsible third parties through the courts, and has been
universally welcomed by consumer groups." [GN]


BAYER AG: Judge Criticizes Roundup Class-Action Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------
Carey Gillam, writing for US RTK, reports that a federal judge on
July 6 had harsh words for Bayer AG's plan to delay potential
future Roundup cancer lawsuits and block jury trials, criticizing
the highly unusual proposal crafted by Bayer and a small group of
plaintiffs' attorneys as potentially unconstitutional.

The "Court is skeptical of the propriety and fairness of the
proposed settlement, and is tentatively inclined to deny the
motion," reads the preliminary order issued by Judge Vince Chhabria
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
The judge's position appears to be a sharp blow to Bayer and the
company's efforts to resolve a legacy of litigation attached to
Monsanto, which Bayer bought two years ago.

More than 100,000 people in the United States claim exposure to
Monsanto's glyphosate-based Roundup herbicides caused them to
develop non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) and that Monsanto long knew
about and covered up the cancer risks.

Three jury trials have been held in the last two years and Monsanto
lost all three with juries awarding more than $2 billion in
damages. All the cases are now on appeal and Bayer has been
scrambling to avoid future jury trials.

Last month Bayer said it had reached agreements to settle the
majority of lawsuits currently filed and had crafted a plan for
handling cases that likely would be filed in the future. To handle
the current litigation Bayer said it will pay up to $9.6 billion to
resolve roughly 75 percent of the current claims and will continue
working to settle the rest.

In the plan for handling potential future cases, Bayer said it was
working with a small group of plaintiffs' attorneys who stand to
make more than $150 million in fees in exchange for agreeing to a
four-year "standstill" in filing cases. This plan would apply to
people who may be diagnosed in the future with NHL they believe is
due to Roundup exposure. In contrast to Monsanto's settlement of
the pending cases against it, settlement of this new "futures"
class action requires court approval.

In addition to delaying more trials, the deal calls for the
establishment of a five-member "science panel" that would take any
future findings on cancer claims out of the hands of juries.
Instead, a "Class Science Panel" would be established to determine
whether Roundup can cause non-Hodgkin lymphoma, and if so, at what
minimum exposure levels.  Bayer would get to appoint two of the
five panel members. If the panel determined there was no causal
connection between Roundup and non-Hodgkin lymphoma then the class
members would be barred from future such claims.

Several members of the lead law firms who won the three Roundup
cancer trials oppose the proposed class action settlement plan,
saying it would deprive future plaintiffs of their rights while
enriching a handful of lawyers who have not previously been at the
forefront of the Roundup litigation.

The plan requires the approval of Judge Chhabria, but the order
issued on July 6 indicated he does not plan to grant approval.

"In an area where the science may be evolving, how could it be
appropriate to lock in a decision from a panel of scientists for
all future cases?" the judge asked in his order.

The judge said he will hold a hearing on July 24 on the motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement. "Given the
Court's current skepticism, it could be contrary to everyone's
interest to delay the hearing on preliminary approval," he wrote in
his order. [GN]


BIJORA INC: Tenzer-Fuchs Sues in E.D. New York Over ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against BIJORA, INC. The case
is styled as Michelle Tenzer-Fuchs, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. BIJORA, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-03075
(E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bijora, which also operates under the name Akira, is located in
Chicago, Illinois. This organization primarily operates in the
Ready-to-wear Apparel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
          SHALOM LAW, PLLC
          124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
          Kew Gardens, NY 11374
          Phone: (718) 971-9474
          Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


BOB'S DISCOUNT: Valerio Sues to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Camilo Antonio Garcia Valerio, On behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated persons v. BOB'S DISCOUNT FURNITURE, LLC, XPO
LAST MILE, INC., MIKE SKIRVIN, KARL MEYER, ABC CORPS. 1-10 and JANE
& JOHN DOES 1-10, Case No. 1:20-cv-08536 (D.N.J., July 9, 2020), is
brought to recover damages under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law,
the New Jersey Wage Payment Law and the doctrine of unjust
enrichment for unpaid and/or underpaid overtime wages and unlawful
deductions withheld or diverted from the Plaintiff's wages.
The Plaintiff and all Class Members routinely work far in excess of
40 hours per week for the Defendants and are not paid 1.5 times
their hourly rate or 1.5 times the minimum wage rate when they work
over 40 hours per week, according to the complaint. The Defendants'
ongoing uniform illegal policy of failing to pay Class Members for
all time worked has resulted in Class Members being denied
substantial legally required compensation and/or overtime payments
given that Class Members routinely work in excess of forty hours
per week. In addition, the wages earned by the Plaintiff and other
Class Members are reduced to account for various deductions,
charges and/or expenses that do not benefit the Plaintiffs or other
Class Members.

The Plaintiff has and does currently work as a truck driver
delivering BOB'S furniture and goods from the Swedesboro Facility
to BOB'S various customer locations.

BOB'S is in the business of selling furniture and goods to
customers and operates stores and locations in the Northeastern and
Mid-Atlantic regions of the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ravi Sattiraju, Esq.
          SATTIRAJU & THARNEY, LLP
          50 Millstone Road
          Building 300, Suite 202
          East Windsor, NJ 08520
          Phone: (609) 469-2110
          Fax: (609) 228-5649
          Email: rsattiraju@s-tlawfirm.com


BOILERMAKER-BLACKSMITH: Goings Sue for Deprived Retirement Benefits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The plaintiff in the case captioned Lawrence Goings, Plaintiff, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Board of Trustees of
the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Terry AnCel,
Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, J.
Tom Baca, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension
Trust, Jeff Brown, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust, Scott Anderson, Trustee of the
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Warren Fairley,
Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, D.
David Haggerty, Jr., Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust, Charles Hancock, Trustee of the
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Robert Hutsell,
Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Eric
A. Heuser, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension
Trust, Mike Hidas, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust, Robert Lunsford, Jr., Trustee of the
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Lawrence J.
McManamon, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension
Trust, Larry Jansen, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust, Michael Morash, Trustee of the
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, James A. Pressley,
Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, John
J. Skermont, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension
Trust, Ronnie L. Traxler, Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith
National Pension Trust, Mark Vandiver, Trustee of the
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, David J. Zach,
Trustee of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-02294, (D. Kan., June 12, 2020), seeks
to recover benefits due, and declare his rights and remedy
violations of the terms of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National
Pension Trust and the Employee Income Security Act of 1974.

From November 1977 to April 2007, Lawrence Goings was employed as a
boilermaker by various employers that had collective bargaining
agreements pursuant to which employers were required to contribute
to the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, a defined
benefit employee pension benefit plan which was established and
maintained for the purpose of providing retirement benefits for
participants and their beneficiaries. Mr. Goings' last job as a
boilermaker prior to his retirement was with Sterling Boiler and
Mechanical.

At various times on and after 2002, Mr. Goings also worked in
Quality Control positions sometimes for the same employers who also
employed him as a boilermaker, of which Quality Control work was
neither covered under the pension plan or the Collective Bargaining
Agreements. Mr. Goings did not receive credit and did not earn
benefits under the Plan for his employment in Quality Control
positions.

Prior to his retirement on June 3, 2010, Mr. Goings requested a
determination as to whether his contemplated post-retirement
employment as a Quality Control employee constituted prohibited
employment. By letter dated July 15, 2010, Defendants advised
Goings that he could retire and could work as a Quality Control
employee following retirement without loss or suspension of pension
benefits. Goings retired effective on or about September 1, 2010.
Following his retirement, Goings worked as a Quality Control
employee and performed such work intermittently. His employment in
Quality Control positions ended in or around May 2018.

On October 17, 2018, Goings was notified that his pension benefits
would be suspended for his Quality Control work for Cortec
Precision Sheetmetal effective August 2017 through May 2018 stating
that he had purportedly been overpaid pension benefits for the
months of August 2017 through May 2018 and that he was required to
pay the Plan $47,037.80 and that if he did not repay such amount to
Defendants, he would face a reduction in his monthly pension
benefits for more than three years to pay the purported payment. In
or around May 2019, Goings paid the $47,037.80 in response to the
demand for the purported overpayment.

According to the complaint, even though Defendants had expressly
approved that work in 2010, they imposed an additional three months
penalty which can only be imposed if a participant does not advise
Defendants in advance of post-retirement employment. Defendants did
not pay Plaintiff his monthly pension benefits for the months of
May 1, 2019 through July 1, 2019 thereby depriving him of 13 months
of benefits which should not have been suspended and to which he is
entitled. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Rik N. Siro, Esq.
     Eric W. Smith, Esq.
     Athena M. Dickson, Esq.
     Raymond A. Dake, Esq.
     Ryan P. McEnaney, Esq.
     SIRO SMITH DICKSON PC
     1621 Baltimore Avenue
     Kansas City, MO 64108
     Tel: (816) 471-4881
     Fax: (816) 471-4883
     Email: rsiro@sirosmithdickson.com
            esmith@sirosmithdickson.com
            adickson@sirosmithdickson.com
            rdake@sirosmithdickson.com
            rmcenaney@sirosmithdickson.com

            - and -

     Susan Martin, Esq.
     Jennifer Kroll, Esq.
     Michael M. Licata, Esq.
     MARTIN & BONNETT, PLLC
     4647 N. 32nd St., Suite 185
     Phoenix, AZ 85018
     Tel: (602) 240-6900
     Fax: (602) 240-2345
     Email: smartin@martinbonnett.com
            jkroll@martinbonnett.com
            mlicata@martinbonnett.com


BROOKDALE SENIOR: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Aug. 24 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Brookdale Senior Living,
Inc. (NYSE: BKD), Kingold Jewelry, Inc. (NASDAQ: KGJI), and
Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (NASDAQ: PPC). Stockholders have until
the deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead
plaintiff. Additional information about each case can be found at
the link provided.

Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. (NYSE: BKD)

Class Period: August 10, 2016 to April 29, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 24, 2020

As of February 1, 2020, Brookdale owned 356 communities, leased 307
communities, managed seventy-seven communities on behalf of third
parties, and three communities for which it has an equity interest.
The Company operates independent living, assisted living and
dementia-care communities and continuing care retirement centers
("CCRCs"). Through its ancillary services programs, the Company
also offers a range of outpatient therapy, home health,
personalized living, and hospice services.

On April 30, 2020, Nashville Business Journal reported that a
proposed class-action lawsuit had been filed against Brookdale in
this Judicial District, which accused the Company of, among other
things, purposeful "chronically insufficient staffing" at its
facilities to meet financial benchmarks since at least April 24,
2016. According to the lawsuit, Brookdale misled residents and
their families when it promised to provide basic care and daily
living services. The lawsuit also claims that the proposed class of
plaintiffs "have not received the care and services they paid for."
The lawsuit asks for damages and Brookdale to "stop the unlawful
and fraudulent practices."

On this news, Brookdale's stock price fell $0.56 per share, or
15.22%, over two trading sessions to close at $3.12 per share on
May 1, 2020.

The complaint, filed on June 25, 2020, alleges that throughout the
Class Period Defendants made materially false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's business, operational, and
compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Brookdale's financial performance was sustained by, among other
things, the Company's purposeful understaffing of its senior living
communities; (ii) the foregoing conduct subjected Brookdale to an
increased risk of litigation and, once revealed, was foreseeably
likely to have a material negative impact on the Company's
financial results and reputation; (iii) as a result, the Company's
financial results were unsustainable; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

For more information on the Brookdale class action go to:
https://bespc.com/BKD

Kingold Jewelry, Inc. (NASDAQ: KGJI)

Class Period: March 15, 2018 to June 28, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 31, 2020

On June 29, 2020, Caixin Global published an article entitled
"Cover Story: The Mystery of $2 Billion of Loans Backed by Fake
Gold." The article stated, among other things, that Kingold had
used gold bars that were actually gilded copper as collateral in
loans and was now facing lawsuits as a result, and that Kingold had
been delisted from the Shanghai Gold Exchange.

On this news, shares of Kingold stock fell $0.27 per share, or over
24%, to close at $0.85 per share on June 29, 2020.

The complaint, filed on June 30, 2020, alleges that defendants made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that:
(1) Kingold used fake gold as collateral to fraudulently secure
loans; (2) consequently, the Company would face creditor lawsuits
and be delisted from the Shanghai Gold Exchange; and (3) as a
result, defendants' statements about its business, operations, and
prospects, were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis at all relevant times.

For more information on the Kingold Securities class action go to:
https://bespc.com/KGJI

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (NADSAQ: PPC)

Class Period: February 9, 2017 to June 3, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 4, 2020

Throughout the Class Period, the defendants touted Pilgrim's
Pride's competitive strengths, advantages, and market positioning,
which the defendants claimed had been achieved through legitimate
business strategies such as a broad product portfolio and
disciplined capital allocation.

However, on June 3, 2020, the truth about the source of Pilgrim's
Pride's purported competitive strengths and advantages was revealed
when the United States Department of Justice announced criminal
charges (the "Indictment") charging four executives in the chicken
industry with criminal antitrust violations, including defendant
Jayson J. Penn, Pilgrim's Pride's President and Chief Executive
Officer since March 2019, and Roger Austin, a former Pilgrim's
Pride Vice President.

Following this news, the price of Pilgrim's Pride common stock
declined $2.58 per share, or approximately 12.4%, from a close of
$20.87 per share on June 2, 2020, to close at $18.29 per share on
June 3, 2020.

The complaint, filed on July 6, 2020, alleges that throughout the
Class Period the defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Pilgrim's Pride and its
executives had participated in an illegal antitrust conspiracy to
fix prices and rig bids from at least as early as 2012 and
continuing through at least early 2017; (2) Pilgrim's Pride
received competitive advantages, which persisted during the Class
Period, from its anticompetitive conduct; and (3) as a result, the
defendants' statements about the Pilgrim's Pride's business,
operations, and prospects lacked a reasonable basis.

For more information on the Pilgrim's Pride class action go to:
https://bespc.com/PPC

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. -- http://www.bespc.com-- is a
nationally recognized law firm with offices in New York and
California. The firm represents individual and institutional
investors in commercial, securities, derivative, and other complex
litigation in state and federal courts across the country. Attorney
advertising.  Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com [GN]


BROOKDALE SENIOR: Order to Compel Quinlan in Stiner Partly Reversed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STACIA STINER; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING, INC.; BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING COMMUNITIES,
INC., Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 19-15334 (9th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part the district court's denial of Brookdale Senior
Living, Inc., and Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc.'s
motion to compel Helen Carlson and Lawrence Quinlan to arbitrate.

The Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their motion
to compel Carlson and Quinlan to arbitrate.  Carlson and Quinlan
were residents at Brookdale.  They, among others, sued Brookdale as
part of a putative class action, alleging claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), section
17200, et seq., of the California Business and Professions Code
("UCL), and section 15610.30 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code.  Brookdale moved to compel Carlson and Quinlan
to arbitrate based on their residency agreements.

The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration as to
Carlson because Carlson's earlier agreement to arbitrate was
superseded by her most recent agreement's opt-out.

The Ninth Circuit agrees and affirms as to Carlson.  In 2017,
Carlson's legal representative and power of attorney signed her
most recent agreement, which constituted the entire agreement
between the parties and superseded all prior and contemporaneous
discussions, representations, correspondence, and agreements
whether oral or written.  In that agreement, Carlson opted out of
arbitration.  According to the terms of the agreement, it applied
to any and all claims or controversies arising out of, or in any
way relating to, this Agreement or Carlson's stay at Brookdale
whether existing or arising in the future.

In California, a court's interpretation of a contract begins and
ends with the language if the language is "clear and explicit."
Carlson's 2017 residency agreement clearly covered any claims she
may have had against Brookdale, including those existing at the
time Carlson's representative signed the agreement.  Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's denial of
Brookdale's motion to compel arbitration as to Carlson.

The Ninth Circuit next considers Brookdale's appeal as to Quinlan.
The district court denied Brookdale's motion to compel Quinlan to
arbitrate for two reasons: (1) because Quinlan's son, who signed
Quinlan's residency agreement, did not have apparent authority to
bind Quinlan; and (2) because Quinlan's claims were extricable from
the residency agreement, so equitable estoppel did not apply.

The Ninth Circuit agrees on the first point but disagrees on the
second.  Quinlan's claims under the CLRA, the UCL, and section
15610.30 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code are
founded on the residency agreement, but his claims under the ADA
and the Unruh Act are not.  Accordingly, it affirms in part and
reverses in part as to Quinlan.

The Ninth Circuit holds that Quinlan's son did not have apparent
authority to bind Quinlan to the residency agreement.  Apparent
authority arises when a principal's actions would cause a
reasonable person to believe that an agent had the authority to act
for the principal.  Quinlan's son signed Quinlan's residency
agreement, including on lines marked "Legal Representative," and
Quinlan took no action to disclaim his son's agency.  Quinlan's
silence, however, "communicated nothing" because there was no
"historical relationship or course of conduct" that would allow
Brookdale to infer such silence established apparent agency.

The Ninth Circuit next holds that Quinlan is estopped from
disclaiming the arbitration clause for his claims under the CLRA,
UCL, and section 15610.30 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code (elder financial abuse).  Under California law, a
litigant may not assert claims based on a contract while
simultaneously arguing that an arbitration clause in that contract
is ineffective.  The question is whether the claims are intimately
founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract.

Quinlan's CLRA, UCL, and elder financial abuse claims are
predicated on the allegation that Brookdale did not perform as the
residency agreement required.  Quinlan alleges that his son and
granddaughter read the agreement and reasonably understood that
Brookdale would provide the services that Brookdale promised and
for which Quinlan was paying.  Quinlan then pleads these claims on
the ground that the agreement, and other communications
predominantly derivative of the transaction such as resident
evaluations and invoices, were "false and misleading."  But the
communications' falsity is dependent on the allegation, reasserted
in each of the three claims, that Brookdale's policies failed to
ensure that all residents receive the services they have been
promised and for which they are paying.  The Ninth Circuit holds
that Quinlan is estopped from disclaiming the arbitration clause in
asserting his UCL, CLRA, and elder financial abuse claims because
those claims are founded on the residency agreement.

Quinlan's claims under the ADA and the Unruh Act are different.
These claims as pleaded do not rest upon the residency agreement.
For example, the claim that Brookdale's facilities must meet the
access requirements under Title III of the ADA is not intertwined
with" the agreement and thus Quinlan is not required to arbitrate
this claim under principles of equitable estoppel.  The Ninth
Circuit therefore holds that Quinlan is not bound to arbitrate his
ADA and Unruh Act claims.

Based on the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Brookdale's motion to compel arbitration as to
Carlson's claims and to Quinlan's ADA and Unruh Act claims.  The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Brookdale's
motion to compel arbitration as to Quinlan's CLRA, UCL, and elder
financial abuse claims.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's April 24, 2020 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/e46KBD from Leagle.com.


BROOKDALE SENIOR: Robbins Geller Announces Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP announces that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in the Middle District of Tennessee on
behalf of purchasers of Brookdale Senior Living Inc. (NYSE:BKD)
securities between August 10, 2016 and April 29, 2020 (the "Class
Period"). The case is captioned Posey v. Brookdale Senior Living
Inc., No. 20-cv-00543, and is assigned to Judge Trauger. The
Brookdale Senior Living class action lawsuit charges Brookdale
Senior Living and certain of its current and former officers with
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 permits any
investor who purchased Brookdale Senior Living securities during
the Class Period to seek appointment as lead plaintiff in the
Brookdale Senior Living class action lawsuit. A lead plaintiff acts
on behalf of all other class members in directing the Brookdale
Senior Living class action lawsuit. The lead plaintiff can select a
law firm of its choice to litigate the Brookdale Senior Living
class action lawsuit. An investor's ability to share in any
potential future recovery of the Brookdale Senior Living class
action lawsuit is not dependent upon serving as lead plaintiff. If
you wish to serve as lead plaintiff of the Brookdale Senior Living
class action lawsuit or have questions concerning your rights
regarding the Brookdale Senior Living class action lawsuit, please
provide your information here or contact counsel, Michael Albert of
Robbins Geller at 800/449-4900 or 619/231-1058, or via e-mail at
malbert@rgrdlaw.com. Lead plaintiff motions for the Brookdale
Senior Living class action lawsuit must be filed with the court no
later than August 24, 2020.

Brookdale Senior Living is the nation's largest senior-living
community operator, with $4 billion in reported revenue in 2019.

The complaint filed in Posey v. Brookdale Senior Living Inc.
alleges that defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose that: (i) "Brookdale[
Senior Living]'s financial performance was sustained by, among
other things, the Company's purposeful understaffing of its senior
living communities"; (ii) "the foregoing conduct subjected
Brookdale [Senior Living] to an increased risk of litigation and,
once revealed, was foreseeably likely to have a material negative
impact on [Brookdale Senior Living's] financial results and
reputation"; (iii) "as a result, [Brookdale Senior Living's]
financial results were unsustainable"; and (iv) "as a result,
[Brookdale Senior Living's] public statements were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times."

On April 30, 2020, Nashville Business Journal reported that a
proposed class action lawsuit had been filed against Brookdale
Senior Living accusing Brookdale Senior Living of, among other
things, purposeful "chronically insufficient staffing" at its
facilities in an effort to meet financial benchmarks since at least
April 24, 2016. According to the lawsuit, Brookdale Senior Living
misled residents and their families when it promised to provide
basic care and daily living services. The lawsuit also claims that
the proposed class of plaintiffs "have not received the care and
services they paid for." The lawsuit asks for damages and for
Brookdale Senior Living to "stop the unlawful and fraudulent
practices." The complaint filed in Posey v. Brookdale Senior Living
Inc. alleges that, on this news, Brookdale Senior Living's stock
price fell more than 15% over two trading sessions.

Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP is one of the world's leading law
firms representing investors in securities class action litigation.
With 200 lawyers in 9 offices, Robbins Geller has obtained many of
the largest securities class action recoveries in history. For
seven consecutive years, ISS Securities Class Action Services has
ranked the Firm in its annual SCAS Top 50 Report as one of the top
law firms in the world in both amount recovered for shareholders
and total number of class action settlements. Robbins Geller
attorneys have helped shape the securities laws and have recovered
tens of billions of dollars on behalf of aggrieved victims. Beyond
securing financial recoveries for defrauded investors, Robbins
Geller also specializes in implementing corporate governance
reforms, helping to improve the financial markets for investors
worldwide. Robbins Geller attorneys are consistently recognized by
courts, professional organizations, and the media as leading
lawyers in the industry.  Please visit http://www.rgrdlaw.comfor
more information.

Contact:

         Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP
         Michael Albert
         Tel: 800-449-4900
         E-mail: malbert@rgrdlaw.com [GN]


CALIBER HOME: Morgan Appeals Ruling in RESPA Suit to 4th Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Rogers Morgan, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling issued in their lawsuit entitled Rogers Morgan, et al. v.
Caliber Home Loans, Inc., Case No. 8:19-cv-02797-PX, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland at Greenbelt.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit is
a class action filed pursuant to the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act.

The Plaintiffs allege that Caliber places its interest and pattern
of unsafe and unsound mortgage service practices above the remedial
rights of homeowners and consumers. Moreover, Caliber unfairly and
deceptively ignores its statutory and contractual duties, including
those which were agreed to as part of their license to legally
operate in the State of Maryland and nationwide. These practices
are compounded when homeowners, like Johnson, Morgan, and the
putative class members, try in good faith to resolve their
situation and Caliber disregards its duty to conduct a reasonable
investigation of their notices of error and makes material
misstatements of law in reply which confirm the underlying claim in
this matter.

As a matter of standard policy and practice, Caliber disregards the
express requirements in the RESPA to cease furnishing or providing
adverse information to any consumer reporting agency regarding any
payments or sums demanded due that are subject of the Qualified
Written Requests/Notices of Error ("QWR/NOE") received from the
Plaintiffs and Class members for a period of sixty days, the
Plaintiffs contend. The Plaintiffs add that Caliber simply
continues the disputed, adverse reporting with knowing and reckless
disregard to their rights. As a direct and proximate result of
Caliber's violations of the RESPA, the Plaintiffs and the class
members have been proximately harmed by Caliber's publishing of
derogatory information to the credit reporting agencies subject to
disputes regarding the borrower's payments and sums claimed due,
says the complaint.

The appellate case is captioned as Rogers Morgan, et al. v. Caliber
Home Loans, Inc., Case No. 20-1745, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants ROGERS MORGAN and PATRICE L. JOHNSON, On
behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of a Class and
Subclass of similarly situated persons, are represented by:
       
          Phillip R. Robinson, Esq.
          CONSUMER LAW CENTER LLC
          8737 Colesville Road
          Silver Spring, MD 20910-0000
          Telephone: (301) 637-6270
          E-mail: phillip@marylandconsumer.com

Defendant-Appellee CALIBER HOME LOANS, INC. is represented by:

          Melissa O. Martinez, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS, LLP
          500 East Pratt Street
          Baltimore, MD 21202
          Telephone: (410) 659-4432
          E-mail: mmartinez@mcguirewoods.com

               - and -

          Brian Emory Pumphrey, Esq.
          MCGUIREWOODS, LLP
          800 East Canal Street
          P. O. Box 3916
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 775-7745
          E-mail: bpumphrey@mcguirewoods.com


CALIFORNIA: Cal. App. Affirms Order Sustaining Demurrer by Counties
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, COUNTY INMATE TELEPHONE SERVICE CASES, Case No.
B291341 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
Second District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's order
sustaining a demurrer by the counties without leave to amend.

In the coordinated proceeding, inmates in county jails in nine
California counties challenge the exorbitant commissions paid by
telecommunications companies to the nine counties under contracts
giving the telecommunications companies the exclusive right to
provide telephone service for the inmates.  The telecommunications
companies pass on the cost of the commissions to the inmates and
their families in the fees charged to use the inmate calling
system, the only telephone system available to them.  The phone
rates would be significantly lower if they did not include charges
to recoup the commissions paid to the counties.  The rates are not
related to the cost of the services provided.

The inmates say these fees are unlawful taxes under Proposition 26,
which requires voter approval of any levy, charge or exaction of
any kind imposed by a local government" unless limited to the
reasonable cost or value.  None of the commissions in the nine
county contracts was approved by the voters.  The inmates also
allege the commissions violate several statutory provisions.

The Plaintiffs are inmates in jail facilities in nine counties and
their families.  The nine counties are the Defendants.  Each
Defendant county has contracted with a telecommunications company
(these companies are not parties), giving the company the exclusive
right to establish an inmate calling system in the respective
county jails.  The inmates must use that system, and relatives who
wish to speak with them must establish a prepaid account with the
telecommunications company.  According to the Plaintiffs, their
families "are charged unreasonable, unjust and exorbitant rates" in
order to maintain contact with county inmates.

In exchange for the exclusive right to provide telephone service to
inmates, the telecommunications company pays the Defendants a
guaranteed fee against an identified percentage of the inmate
calling system charges.  The rates charged to inmates are far
greater than those paid for ordinary telephone service.  The
Defendants' share of the revenue collected from inmate calls is
referred to as a "site commission," and in all cases is more than
50 percent of the revenue from inmate calls.  Under a Los Angeles
County agreement with its service provider, for example, the county
is guaranteed the greater of $15 million annually or 67.5 of the
revenues for specified charges described in the contract.

The Plaintiffs filed the putative class action lawsuit to put an
end to this unconscionable practice by California counties.  They
allege the telecommunications companies make a substantial profit
even after payment of the commissions; that without the
commissions, the charges would be substantially lower; and the
commissions are not based on the actual cost or reasonable value of
the inmate calling service.  They allege the full amount of the
charges due to the counties is incurred by the customers of the
telecommunications company, and not by the telecommunications
company itself.

The Plaintiffs acknowledge the Defendants have complied with Penal
Code section 4025, which specifies that the commissions described
in the Plaintiffs' complaint be deposited in an inmate welfare
fund.  They allege the commissions are actually an unlawful tax in
violation of the California Constitution.  Because none of the
commissions was approved by voters, the Plaintiffs say they are
entitled to a refund of the illegal taxes.

The Plaintiffs say the jail population is disproportionately
composed of African-Americans and Latinos, as well as persons with
mental illnesses or substance abuse problems, compared to the
overall population of the respective counties.  The telephone
charges that provide the source of the commissions received by
defendants, and consequently the commissions, have a disparate
impact on African-Americans and Latinos, in violation of Government
Code section 11135.  Further, they allege the Defendants have
violated the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act because the commissions
unlawfully deprive the Plaintiffs of their rights through
intimidation, threat or coercion.

The Defendants demurred to the complaint.  The trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.  The court entered
judgment on June 6, 2018, and the Plaintiffs filed a timely notice
of appeal.

The trial court ruled, and the Appellate Court agrees, that the
Plaintiffs do not have standing to contend the commissions are an
unconstitutional tax.  The pertinent point is that no precedents
support the Plaintiffs' claim that a consumer who pays charges to a
third party vendor has standing to seek a refund of those charges
from the taxing authority.  As it has said, the Appellate Court
sees no basis for treating purported Proposition 26 taxes, for
standing purposes, differently than sales taxes, or property taxes,
or telephone user taxes, or airplane fuel taxes, or any other
taxes.  The change that Proposition 26 effected was an expansion in
the definition of a tax -- not an expansion in long-established
principles governing who may sue for a refund of that tax.  That
continues to be the person upon whom the tax is imposed by the
taxing authority or who has a legal obligation to pay it to the
taxing authority.  That is not the Plaintiffs.

Because it concludes the trial court correctly found plaintiffs
have no standing to bring a claim under Proposition 26, the
Appellate Court refrains from addressing the merits of their claim
that the telephone charges are a tax in violation of Proposition
26.

Next, the trial court concluded the Plaintiffs did not state a
claim, because they did not allege African-American or Latino
inmates and their families are treated differently from inmates and
their families who are not members of those groups.  The Appellate
Court holds that the court did not err.  No matter who bears the
cost, inmates or their families and friends, it remains the case
that the complaint does not allege defendant counties provide
telephone service to the general population, and consequently the
general population of telephone users cannot be the appropriate
"comparator group."

Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, the Legislature
established a basis for treating inmate families differently from
other taxpayers in Penal Code section 4025.  The Plaintiffs allege
no basis to conclude the Legislature's determination to permit such
commissions and direct their use is not an adequate rationale for
treating plaintiffs differently from other taxpayers.  In short,
the complaint does not state a claim for discrimination on the
basis of race or any other protected category in connection with
the telephone charges inmates pay to use the inmate calling
system.

The Appellate Court also finds no support in any authorities under
the Bane Act for the proposition that a choice between paying an
exorbitant telephone charge or foregoing telephone communication
constitutes the "threat, intimidation, or coercion" required to
establish a Bane Act violation.  It is so under either of the
analyses courts have applied, in the context of Fourth Amendment
violations, to determine whether coercion has been shown.  And,
entirely aside from those analyses, the Appellate Court does not
think the imposition of a tax, however exorbitant, may constitute
coercion within the meaning of the Bane Act.

Based on the foregoing, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment.  The Defendants will recover their costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's April 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/lPgW6p from Leagle.com.

Kaye, McLane, Bednarski & Litt, Barrett S. Litt, Ronald O. Kaye ;
Rapkin & Associates, Michael S. Rapkin and Scott B. Rapkin for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Jonathan M. Coupal, Timothy A. Bittle and Laura E. Dougherty for
Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Schonbrun Seplow Harris & Hoffman and Catherine Sweetser for Human
Rights Defense Center, Public Counsel, American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California, Worth Rises, Prison Law Office, and
Impact Fund as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and
Appellants.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Raul L. Martinez --
Raul.Martinez@lewisbrisbois.com -- and Ryan D. Harvey for
Defendants and Respondents Counties of Los Angeles, Orange, San
Bernardino, Ventura, Alameda and Santa Clara.

James R. Williams, County Counsel (Santa Clara), and Michael Leon
Guerrero, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent
County of Santa Clara.

Arias & Lockwood, Christopher D. Lockwood ; Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard
& Smith, John M. Porter and Arthur K. Cunningham for Defendant and
Respondent County of Riverside.

Sharon L. Anderson, County Counsel (Contra Costa) and D. Cameron
Baker, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent County
of Contra Costa.

Wagstaffe, Von Loewenfeldt, Busch & Radwick, Michael Von
Loewenfeldt, Frank Busch; John C. Beiers, County Counsel (San
Mateo) and David Silberman, Chief Deputy County Counsel, for
Defendant and Respondent County of San Mateo.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel (San Diego), Joshua Heinlein
and Jeffrey P. Michalowski, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for
California State Association of Counties and League of California
Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.


CALIFORNIA: Lipsey Can Intervene in Coleman Inmates Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
issued an Order granting Lipsey's Motion to Intervene in the case
captioned RALPH COLEMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GAVIN NEWSOM, et
al., Defendants, Case No. S-90-0520-KJM-DB P. (E.D. Cal.).

In November 2019, Christopher Lipsey, an inmate at California State
Prison, Corcoran (CSP Corcoran), filed a motion to intervene in the
R. Coleman class action, which is in its remedial phase.  Lipsey's
motion concerns the use of Guard One, an electronic monitoring
system installed by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) defendants in all administrative segregation
units (ASUs), including short term and long term restrictive
housing units (STRHs and LTRHs), psychiatric services units (PSUs),
Security Housing Units (SHUs), and Condemned Housing Units to track
correctional officer compliance with inmate welfare checks required
in these units.  Lipsey claims that the use of Guard One violates
his Eighth Amendment right under the U.S. Constitution because it
creates noise during the night that prevents Lipsey from sleeping.
Lipsey, a member of the plaintiff class in thes case, alleges he is
subject to Guard One because he is currently housed in the SHU at
California State Prison-Corcoran (CSP-Corcoran).  After filing the
motion to intervene, Lipsey filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order in the case.

Plaintiffs do not oppose permissive intervention here and agree
that Lipsey shares an interest with the class representative and
other class members in avoiding sleep deprivation caused by Guard
One checks.  

Defendants oppose both mandatory and permissive intervention,
arguing that the class representatives and class counsel adequately
represented Lipsey's interests in connection with adopting the
Guard One protocol, and the use of Guard One has been litigated in
the Court.

The Court finds permissive intervention is warranted here under
Rule 24(b)(1)(B).  Lipsey's Section 1983 claim raises a federal
question, and therefore independent grounds for jurisdiction exist.
The motion is as timely as can be expected, considering the time
it has taken Lipsey to purportedly exhaust administrative remedies,
obtain representation, file an independent lawsuit in the Northern
District, which was transferred to the undersigned, and oppose a
motion to dismiss in his independent case.

Finally, it is undisputed that Lipsey's claim, that the
implementation of Guard One causes sleep deprivation in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, presents a question of law and fact
directly relevant to the implementation of the remedial plan in the
case.  

Accordingly, Lipsey's motion to intervene is granted, the Court
rules.

A full-text copy of the District Court's February 27, 2020 Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/r2cjeso from Leagle.com

Matthew A. Lopes, Jr., Special Master, pro se.
Ralph Coleman, Plaintiff, represented by Cara Elizabeth Trapani -
CTrapani@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Jessica L.
Winter  - jwinter@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Lisa
Adrienne Ells - lells@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan and Grunfeld
LLP, Michael Bien  - mbien@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld
LLP, Alexander Ross Gourse - agourse@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan
and Grunfeld LLP, Claudia B. Center - ccenter@aclu.org - American
Civil Liberties Union, Donald Specter - dspecter@prisonlaw.com -
Prison Law Office, Ernest Galvan - egalvan@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien
Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Jeffrey L. Bornstein - JBornstein@rbgg.com -
Rosen Bien Galvan Grunfeld LLP, Jenny Snay Yelin - jyelin@rbgg.com
- Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld LLP, Marc J. Shinn-Krantz -
mshinn-krantz@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, LLP, Margot
Knight Mendelson - mmendelson@prisonlaw.com - Prison Law Office,
Michael S. Nunez - mnunez@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld &
Thomas Bengt Nolan - tnolan@rbgg.com - Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld
LLP.

Jorge Andrade Rico, Plaintiff, represented by Kate Martin
Falkenstien - kfalkenstien@reichmanjorgensen.com - Reichman
Jorgensen LLP.

Christopher Lipsey, Jr., Intervenor Plaintiff, represented by Kate
Martin Falkenstien -- kfalkenstien@reichmanjorgensen.com --
Reichman Jorgensen LLP.

Gavin Newsom, Defendant, represented by Adriano Hrvatin ,
Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Elise Owens
Thorn , CA Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General,
Glenn A. Danas , Robins Kaplan LLP, Kyle Anthony Lewis , Office of
the Attorney General for the State of California Department Of
Justice, Lucas L. Hennes , Office of the Attorney General,
Nasstaran Ruhparwar , Department of Justice - Office of the
Attorney General, Roman M. Silberfeld , Robins Kaplan LLP, Tyler
Vance Heath , Attorney General's Office for the State of
California, Damon Grant McClain , Department of Justice, Office of
the Attorney General, Paul B. Mello , Hanson Bridgett LLP & Xavier
Becerra , CA Office of the Attorney General.

Michael Cohen, Director of the Department of Finance for the State
of California, Ralph Diaz, Pamela Ahlin, Director of the Department
of State Hospitals, Katherine Tebrock, Deputy Director of the
Statewide Mental Health Program & Diana Toche, Undersecretary for
Health Care Services of the CDCR, Defendants, represented by
Adriano Hrvatin , Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney
General, Elise Owens Thorn , CA Department of Justice, Office of
the Attorney General, Glenn A. Danas , Robins Kaplan LLP, Kyle
Anthony Lewis , Office of the Attorney General for the State of
California Department Of Justice, Roman M. Silberfeld , Robins
Kaplan LLP, Tyler Vance Heath , Attorney General's Office for the
State of California, Damon Grant McClain, Department of Justice,
Office of the Attorney General & Xavier Becerra , CA Office of the
Attorney General.


CANADA: Ex-Prison Inmates to File Strip Search Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Catharine Tunney, writing for CBC News, reports that two former
federal prison inmates are trying to bring a class-action lawsuit
against the federal government to argue strip searches represent a
"serious deprivation of liberty."

Under federal law, prison staff can strip search inmates if they
have reasonable grounds to suspect an inmate has contraband on
their body. They can also perform routine strip searches when an
inmate enters or leaves a "structured intervention unit," which
replaced solitary confinement cells.

But the two plaintiffs, Michael Farrell and Kim Major, allege their
bodies--including their genitals and buttocks--were inspected
indiscriminately and without any suspicion of wrongdoing, according
to the statement of claim, which was served to the federal
government on July 6.

"These are not trivial intrusions. The class members were forced to
remove all of their clothing, bend over, spread open their
buttocks, manipulate their genitalia, remove soiled tampons, and/or
cough while squatting naked in front of others," says the claim,
which is being represented by Abby Deshman of the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association and Kent Kent Elson of Elson Advocacy.

The lawyers say this situation has been repeated "hundreds of
thousands of times" on inmates "and has thus violated their rights
under the common law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms."

The claims have not been proven in court. A class-action lawsuit
must be examined and certified by a judge before it can proceed.

Farrell, 51, was incarcerated for drug-related offences after
becoming addicted to opioids following a back injury, the statement
of claim says.

He alleges staff forced him to bend over and spread open his
buttocks and ordered him to move his penis so that staff could look
under and around it.

This traumatized Farrell, who was sexually and physically abused as
a child during stints in foster homes, the claim says.

The lawyers say Farrell was unnecessarily strip searched every time
he was transferred from one prison to another--each time he left
the first prison and again when he arrived at the second
prison--though he had no opportunity to access contraband.

Major, 55, was also sexually abused as a young child and then later
on by her husband, according to the statement of claim. She served
time on fraud charges and now lives in southern Ontario.

According to the statement of claim, she was forced to strip naked,
including removing her dentures, whenever she left prison to attend
medical appointments, was transferred to other prisons and upon her
release, and risked being penalized or face physical force if she
objected.

"These strip searches have caused deep emotional scars and
exacerbated her pre-existing trauma," the claim says.

Co-counsels Deshman and Elson argue that strip searches are
intrusions on individual liberty.

"The strip searches also engaged the right to security of the
person," said the claim. "The strip searches violated the class
members' physical and psychological integrity and caused
significant harm."

Elson said illegal strip-searches make the public less safe, too.

"They psychologically scar prisoners, making rehabilitation harder
and reoffending more likely," he said.

The Correctional Service of Canada said it has received the
statement of claim and is reviewing it. [GN]


CHAMPION PETFOODS: Weaver Appeals E.D. Wis. Rulings to 7th Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Scott Weaver filed an appeal from the District Court's
Order dated July 8, 2020, and Judgment dated July 8, 2020, entered
in the lawsuit entitled SCOTT WEAVER, Individually and on Behalf of
All others Similarly Situated v. CHAMPION PETFOODS USA, INC., and
CHAMPION PETFOODS LP, Case No. 18-cv-1996-JPS, in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter on Mar. 5,
2020, Judge J.P. Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin (i) granted the Defendants' motion to
exclude the opinions of Jon Krosnick and Colin Weir; (ii) denied
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment; (iii) denied the
Plaintiff's motion for class certification; and (iv) granted the
parties' motions to restrict documents.

The case is a class action alleging that the Defendants have
marketed their dog foods as being natural and of high-quality, and
sold them at a premium price, when their advertisements were
misleading at best, meaning that the products' price was unfairly
inflated.

The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking
dismissal of the case in its entirety. The Plaintiff has filed his
own motion for class certification. The parties have also moved to
exclude the opinions of various experts pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Judge Stadtmueller addresses only one such motion--the Defendants'
motion to exclude two of the Plaintiff's damages experts, Jon
Krosnick and Colin Weir. The Judge sees the motion is pivotal to
the case and may drastically change the parties' approaches to the
litigation moving forward.

The appellate case is captioned as SCOTT WEAVER,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. CHAMPION PETFOODS USA INC. and CHAMPION
PETFOODS LP, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-2235, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case is set as follows:

   -- Transcript information sheet is due on July 23, 2020; and

   -- Appellant's brief is due on August 18, 2020.[BN]

Plaintiff Appellant SCOTT WEAVER, Individually and on Behalf of All
others Similarly Situated, is represented by:

          Umar Sattar, Esq.
          Michelle Perkovic, Esq.
          WEXLER WALLACE LLP
          55 West Monroe Street, Suite 3300
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 346-2222
          Facsimile: (312) 346-0022
          E-mail: kaw@wexlerwallace.com
                  us@wexlerwallace.com
                  mp@wexlerwallace.com

               - and -

          Mark J. Tamblyn, Esq.
          WEXLER WALLACE LLP
          333 University Avenue Suite 200
          Sacramento, CA 95825
          Telephone: (916) 565-7692
          Facsimile: (312) 346-0022
          E-mail: mjt@wexlerwallace.com

               - and -

          Charles N. Nauen, Esq,
          Robert K. Shelquist, Esq.
          Rebecca A. Peterson, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.P.
          100 Washington Avenue South, Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401
          Telephone: (612) 339-6900
          Facsimile: (612) 339-0981
          E-mail: cnnauen@locklaw.com
                  rkshelquist@locklaw.com
                  rapeterson@locklaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          Karla M. Gluek, Esq.
          Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK, PLLC
          Canadian Pacific Plaza
          120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          Facsimile: (612) 339-6622
          E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
                  kgluek@gustafsongluek.com
                  rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com

               - and -

          Kevin A. Seely, Esq.
          Steven M. Mckany
          ROBBINS LLP
          5040 Shoreham Place
          San Diego, CA 92122
          Telephone: (619) 525-3990
          Facsimile: (619) 525-3991
          E-mail: kseely@robbinsllp.com
                  smckany@robbinsllp.com

               - and -

          Charles Laduca, Esq.
          Katherine van Dyck, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 200
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          Facsimile: (202) 789-1813
          E-mail: kvandyck@cuneolaw.com
                  charles@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph Depalma, Esq.
          Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.
          LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC
          570 Broad Street, Suite 1201
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 623-3000
          E-mail: jdepalma@litedepalma.com
                  scruzhodge@litedepalma.com

               - and -

          Mark A. Peterson, Esq.
          PETERSON LAW AND MEDIATION, LLC
          1433 N. Water Street, Suite 400
          Milwaukee, WI 53202
          Telephone: (414) 877-7312
          E-mail: mark@markpetersonlaw.com

Defendants-Appellees Champion Petfoods USA Inc. and Champion
Petfoods LP are represented by:

          David A. Coulson, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          333 SE 2nd Ave., 41st Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (305) 579−0754
          Facsimile: (305) 579−0717
          E-mail: coulsond@gtlaw.com

               - and -

          Derek J. Waterstreet, Esq.
          Mark E. Schmidt, Esq.
          Susan E. Lovern, Esq.
          VON BRIESEN & ROPER, SC
          411 East Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1000
          Milwaukee, WI 53202
          Telephone: (414) 287−1519
          Facsimile: (414) 238−6434
          E-mail: dwaterstreet@vonbriesen.com
                  mschmidt@vonbriesen.com
                  slovern@vonbriesen.com

               - and -

          Ricky L. Shackelford, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
          1840 Century Park E, Ste. 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 586−7700
          E-mail: shackelfordr@gtlaw.com

Interested Parties JBS USA Food Company and JBS Souderton Inc,
doing business as MOPAC, are represented by:

          Sarah L. Brew, Esq.
          FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP
          2200 Wells Fargo Center
          90 S 7th St.
          Minneapolis, MN 55402−3901
          Telephone: (612) 766−7470
          E-mail: sarah.brew@faegredrinker.com


CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS: Hayes Sues over Misleading Proxy Statement
---------------------------------------------------------------
KEN HAYES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CHEMBIO DIAGNOSTICS, INC.; RICHARD L.
EBERLY; GAIL S. PAGE; KATHERINE L. DAVIS; MARY LAKE POLAN, and JOHN
G. POTTHOFF, Defendants, Case 2:20-cv-02918-SJF-AKT (E.D.N.Y., July
1, 2020) is a shareholder class action on behalf of the Plaintiff
and all other Chembio public stockholders against the Defendants to
remedy numerous misstatements of material information in the proxy
statement disseminated by Chembio in advance of the Annual Meeting
of Stockholders of Chembio Diagnostics, Inc. to be held on Tuesday,
July 28, 2020.

On June 16, 2020, the Company filed a Schedule 14A Proxy Statement
(the "Proxy") with the SEC in which the Defendants are soliciting
stockholder approval of a proposal to change the Company's state of
incorporation from the State of Nevada to the State of Delaware
(the "Reincorporation Proposal").

The Defendants, however, claim in the Proxy that approval of the
Reincorporation Proposal requires only a majority of the votes
entitled to be cast and present in person or represented by proxy
at the Annual Meeting. This lesser standard excludes not only
shares that are not present or represented by proxy, but also
shares whose beneficial owners do not provide voting instructions.
To this end, the Defendants also erroneously disclose that these
uninstructed shares, which will be recorded as broker non-votes,
will have no effect on the outcome of the Reincorporation
Proposal.

In making these misstatements, the Defendants misrepresent critical
facts that Chembio stockholders need to know when deciding whether
and/or how to vote on the Reincorporation Proposal. As it stands,
because they have been wrongly advised concerning both the
applicable voting standard and what will happen if they do not
provide voting instructions to their brokers, Chembio stockholders
have been left with the mistaken impression that, if they do not
participate in the vote, their shares will not factor into the
equation, when in fact such shares' voting power will have the same
effect as votes against the Reincorporation Proposal.

Chembio Diagnostics Inc develops diagnostic solutions. The Company
offers products for treatment of malaria, ebola, febrile illness,
dengue fever, and influenza, as well as provides human and
veterinary diagnostics. Chembo Diagnostics serves patients in the
United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gustavo F. Bruckner, Esq.
          Samuel J. Adams, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (917) 463-1044
          E-mail: gfbruckner@pomlaw.com
                  sadams@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          William J. Fields, Esq.
          Christopher J. Kupka, Esq.
          Samir Shukurov, Esq.
          FIELDS KUPKA & SHUKUROV LLP
          1370 Broadway, 5th Floor – 5100
          New York, NY 10018
          Telephone: (212) 231-1500
          Facsimile: (646) 851-0076
          E-mail: wfields@fksfirm.com
                  ckupka@fksfirm.com
                  sshukurov@fksfirm.com


CITIZEN WATCH: Nisbett Sues in S.D. New York Over ADA Violation
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Citizen Watch Company
of America, Inc. The case is styled as Kareem Nisbett, Individually
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Citizen
Watch Company of America, Inc. doing business as: Bulova, Case No.
1:20-cv-05284 (S.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Citizen Watch Company of America Inc. provides apparel products.
The Company offers watch products.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN]


CO-DIAGNOSTICS INC: Gelt Sues Over Share Price Drop
---------------------------------------------------
Gelt Trading, Ltd., on behalf of itself and all similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Co-Diagnostics, Inc., Dwight Egan, James Nelson,
Eugene Durenard, Edward Murphy, Richard Serbin, Reed Bensen, Brent
Satterfield, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00368 (D. Utah, June 15,
2020), seeks compensatory damages, including interest thereon,
reasonable costs and expenses incurred in this action, including
counsel fees and expert fees and such other and further relief for
violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

Co-Diagnostics's main product is a COVID-19 diagnostic test.
Co-Diagnostics announced that it had received regulatory clearance
to sell its tests in the European Community on February 24, 2020.
Then on April 6, 2020 the company announced that it had received
emergency use authorization for its tests from the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration. Co-Diagnostics' market-first test, together
with its claims that its tests were perfectly accurate, allowed
Co-Diagnostics to sign lucrative contracts with state governments
in the U.S. and governments around the world.

However, Co-Diagnostics' tests are materially less than 100%
accurate. If these tests are used on a widespread basis, as
intended, the effect are more pronounced.

Prior to the release of the news undermining Co-Diagnostics' false
claims of 100% accuracy, Co-Diagnostics' stock enjoyed an all-time
high stock price of $29.72 per share and a market capitalization of
over $800 million.

As public reports casting doubt on Co-Diagnostics claims of 100%
accuracy began to circulate, the stock went from its daily high of
$29.52, down to $20 and hit an intra-day low of $18.35 before
closing at $22.13 on May 14, 2020. On May 15, 2020, the stock slid
to $15.80 per share and never rebounded and today trades at
severely reduced volume for between $15-16 per share.

Gelt purchased Co-Diagnostics publicly traded securities at
artificially inflated prices. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      D. Loren Washburn, Esq.
      SMITH WASHBURN, LLP
      8 East Broadway, Suite 320
      Salt Lake City, UT 84111
      Telephone: (801) 584-1800
      Facsimile: (801) 584-1820
      Email: lwashburn@smithwashburn.com

             - and -

      Michael A. Pineiro, Esq.
      MARCUS NEIMAN RASHBAUM & PINEIRO LLP
      2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 1750
      Miami, FL 33131
      Telephone: (305) 400-4268
      Email: mpineiro@mnrlawfirm.com

             - and -

      Michael C. Fasano, Esq.
      FASANO LAW FIRM, PLLC
      2 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 1750
      Miami, FL 33131
      Telephone: (786) 530-5239
      Email: mfasano@fasanolaw.com


CO-DIAGNOSTICS INC: Pomerantz LLP Reminds of Aug. 17 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on July 2 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Co-Diagnostics, Inc. ("Co-Diagnostics" or the
"Company")(NASDAQ: CODX) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in United States District Court for the District of
Utah, Central Division, and indexed under 20-cv-00481, is on behalf
of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than
Defendants who purchased or otherwise acquired Co-Diagnostics
securities between February 25, 2020, and May 15, 2020, both dates
inclusive (the "Class Period"), seeking to recover damages caused
by Defendants' violations of the federal securities laws and to
pursue remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
officials.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Co-Diagnostics securities
during the class period, you have until August 17, 2020, to ask the
Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of
the Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at [email protected] or
888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who
inquire by e-mail are encouraged to include their mailing address,
telephone number, and the number of shares purchased.

Co-Diagnostics, Inc., a molecular diagnostics company, intends to
manufacture and sell reagents used for diagnostic tests that
function via the detection and/or analysis of nucleic acid
molecules. It also intends to sell diagnostic equipment from other
manufacturers as self-contained lab systems.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made continual, knowing and
willful misstatements about their main product, a COVID-19
diagnostic test, to pump of the price of Co-Diagnostics' stock
while the officers and directors exercised low priced options and
dumped their stock into the market. Their fraudulent misstatements,
and disregard for the basic scientific principles that make the
falsity of their statements clear in retrospect, cost investors to
lose millions of dollars.

In the late morning and early afternoon of May 14, 2020, third
parties revealed startling information about Co-Diagnostics'
allegedly 100% accurate test.

The Salt Lake Tribune ("Tribune") reported that TestUtah.com, which
used tests developed by Co-Diagnostics, "declined to join other
major Utah labs in a joint experiment to confirm one another's
quality."  Moreover, the Tribune revealed that TestUtah's tests (by
Co-Diagnostics) "have a higher 'limit of detection' -- that is,
they require more of the virus to trigger a positive result -- than
most other coronavirus tests approved for sale in the U.S.,
according to an analysis by the life sciences publication
BioCentury."  This meant that Co-Diagnostics' tests were likely to
have a much higher false-negative reporting rate, meaning that
potentially thousands of infected people were inaccurately told
that they did not have the disease, an observation that was
consistent with earlier concerns about TestUtah's lower rate of
positive test results.

The Tribune article also expressed concern relating to
TestNebraska.com and TestIowa.com testing services that also used
Co-Diagnostics' tests.

Also on May 14, 2020, Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds issued a public
statement, stating, "I'm pleased to announce that the State
Hygienic Lab completed the Test Iowa validation process on
July 1, achieving high ratings of 95 percent accuracy for
determining positives and 99.7 percent accuracy for determining
negatives."  These results did not comport with statements
previously made by Co-Diagnostics on May 1, 2020.

In fact, Defendant Brent Satterfield ("Satterfield"), Ph. D.,
Co-Diagnostics' Chief Science Officer, himself has recently
confessed that the lower positive rates for Co-Diagnostics' tests
"has certainly got all of us scratching our heads a bit," and that
the tests will correctly identify 95% of true positive results—a
massive discrepancy from Co-Diagnostics' representations of 100%
accuracy given that the tests are intended to be administered among
hundreds of thousands or even millions of people.

Based on the release of third-party information casting serious
doubt as to Co-Diagnostics' bold claims of 100% accuracy, the stock
price began to fall, closing the day at $22.13 per share on May 14,
2020, after hitting an intra-day low of $18.35 per share, a greater
than 38% decrease in price within hours.

At that point, Co-Diagnostics could have, but did not, revise its
claims of 100% test accuracy, given that Co-Diagnostics released
earnings and first-quarter 2020 financials to the public
after-hours and had a scheduled investor call for the same
evening.

Co-Diagnostics reported that it achieved record sales and that the
start-up had finally, after nearly seven years, reached
profitability.  However, it did not address the testing accuracy or
sensitivity allegations or correct Defendant Satterfield's prior
statements about tests being 100% accurate.

Rather, the call was described by The Gazette, a Cedar Rapids, Iowa
publication covering TestIowa.com, as sounding "more like
Thanksgiving with drunk uncles -- dogs were barking, people were
swearing, and someone was moaning."  The Gazette also noted that
"[n]one of Co-Diagnostics or Nomi Health's news releases about the
Logix Smart tests have revealed how many tests have been sold, for
how much, and so far all three testing initiatives in Iowa,
Nebraska and Utah have been secretive about the tests and the
results."

That same day, the FDA issued a press release about testing
accuracy.  Another, much larger drug company had created a
diagnostic test for COVID-19 that was under increasing public
scrutiny for apparent inaccuracy.  The FDA announced to the public
that "[t]he FDA looks at a variety of sources to identify and
understand potential patterns or significant issues with the use of
the Abbott test.  No diagnostic test will be 100% accurate due to
performance characteristics, specimen handling, or user error,
which is why it is important to study patterns and identify the
cause of suspected false results so any significant issues can be
addressed quickly."

Based on the multiple third-party sources revealing serious
problems that were known, or should have been known, in advance of
May 14, 2020, the stock price further fell to close at $17.07 per
share on May 15, 2020, or a decrease of 22.86% from the prior day's
closing price.

By May 20, 2020, a statistician, Zhiyuan Sun, wrote an article
specifically about Co-Diagnostics' allegedly 100% accurate COVID-19
test.  Sun explained:

"In May, Co-Diagnostics announced its COVID-19 in vitro test had
been found to have 100% accuracy, 100% specificity (likelihood of
preventing a false-negative error), and 100% sensitivity
(likelihood of preventing a false-positive error), as per
independent verification in laboratories across the world.

To start off, Co-Diagnostics came to the conclusion that its test
was 100% effective on all three diagnostic dimensions (specificity,
accuracy, and sensitivity) based on studies with small sample
sizes. For example, laboratory testing of the Logix test kit
conducted in Australia involved about 100 COVID-19-positive
patients and 100 COVID-19-negative patients. With a sample size
that small, a low error rate, say 1% to 2%, could be really hard to
detect. In fact, the study itself explicitly stated that the test
could in fact be between 96% to 98% effective, rather than 100%.

In addition, the testing environment is by no means indicative of
the actual prevalence of COVID-19 in the population at this point
in the pandemic. Among the test samples, 50% contained SARS-CoV-2,
and obviously, at this point, nowhere near half the people in the
world have been exposed to the coronavirus. "But wait a minute!"
the intelligent reader might say. "Nothing in the world is perfect,
so who cares if a test's results are off by 1% or 3%? Effectiveness
of 97% is still nothing short of an A-plus. You're just being a
devil's advocate, Zhiyuan!" Unfortunately, this is one of the cases
where it is critical to pay attention to the devil in the details.
In fact, a 1% or 3% error rate can render a in vitro test almost
useless. Here's why.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, the true sensitivity of
Logix is 98%, and its true specificity is also 98%. In other words,
the probability of the test delivering a false positive is 2%, and
the probability of the test returning a false negative is also 2%.
Both of these values are directly stated as being probable in
studies citing Logix's range of effectiveness, and they are valid
assumptions given that the test has not been fully vetted by the
FDA or other regulators. It is also common knowledge that because
there are not enough viral tests for the COVID-19, the number of
people who have the virus is likely to be significantly higher than
official figures. For example, it is estimated that up to 4.1% of
the residents of Los Angeles County have COVID-19 antibodies. Let's
use that 4.1% figure in our calculations as a measure of prevalence
of COVID-19 (a lower prevalence would hurt the test even more).
Assuming 1 million people are given the Logix test, 41,000 should
test positive for an ongoing SARS-CoV-2 infection. However, if the
test provides a false negative 2% of the time, only 98% of those
41,000 -- 40,180 -- would show up as positives.

On the other hand, out of the 959,000 people who were actually
negative for the virus, a 2% error rate would yield 19,180 cases of
false positives -- individuals who don't have the disease despite
the test saying they do. All told, that makes 59,360 people getting
positive results, but only 40,180 of them would actually be
positive. That yields a predictive value of 67.7%.

In other words, if the Logix test only works as well as it does in
this scenario -- and it's right 98% of the time -- there's still a
1-in-3 chance that the test will indicate you have COVID-19 even
though you don't! As one can see, a 32.3% false-positive error rate
isn't very good at all. This problem gets worse if we assume the
same prevalence, but lower Logix's potential sensitivity and
specificity estimates to 95% for both. In this scenario, the
probability of getting a false positive increases to 55.2%! While
the results are surprising, they nonetheless use the basics of
conditional probability; here is a calculator in case you want to
try it out for yourself.  Furthermore, a recent New York University
study on COVID-19 in vitro tests developed by Abbott Laboratories
(NYSE: ABT) found them to be widely inaccurate and unacceptable for
use in patients.  Keep in mind, those tests were also promoted as
having 100% sensitivity and 99.9% specificity in earlier
investigations. Unfortunately, this just serves to highlight how
difficult it is to develop an accurate test for diseases with a low
rate of prevalence like COVID-19."

Co-Diagnostics knew that even a highly accurate test -- such as
96%, 98%, or even 99% -- was not the same, and not remotely as
valuable, as a 100% accurate test.  That is because having a 100%
accurate test would have significantly distinguished Co-Diagnostics
from other, larger, more reputable competitors introducing COVID-19
tests into the marketplace.  Additionally, the widespread
administration of a COVID-19 test that is even minimally inaccurate
can have highly adverse public health consequences.  Co-Diagnostics
knew this, and so it intentionally issued statements to the public
to fend off truthful analysis and scientific skepticism about its
supposed miracle test.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members. [GN]


COCA-COLA COMPANY: Salerno Suit Moved From E.D. to S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as Monique Salerno, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. The Coca-Cola
Company, Case No. 1:20-cv-00711 (Filed Feb. 8, 2020), was
transferred from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Foley Square) on July 8, 2020.

The Southern District of New York Court Clerk assigned Case No.
1:20-cv-05235-UA to the proceeding. The suit demands $5 million in
damages alleging violation of fraud-related laws.

The Coca-Cola Company manufactures, distributes, markets, labels
and sells iced tea beverages purporting to be low in sugar under
the Gold Peak brand (Products). The Products are available to
consumers from retail and online stores of third-parties and are
sold in bottles in sizes including 18.5 OZ (547 ML). The relevant
front label statements include "Slightly Sweet," "Tea" and
"Sweetened with 50% less sugar than our original sweet tea" and "90
Calories Per Bottle."

The representations are misleading because though being represented
as low in sugar, they actually contain objectively high amounts of
sugar, as added sugar, the Plaintiff contends.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          505 Northern Blvd., Ste. 311
          Great Neck, NY 11021-5101
          Telephone: (516) 303-0552
          Facsimile: (516) 234-7800
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

               - and -

          Michael R. Reese, Esq.
          Reese LLP
          100 West 93rd Street, 16th Floor
          New York, NY 10025
          Telephone: (212) 643-0500
          Facsimile: (212) 253-4272
          E-mail: mreese@reesellp.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jane Metcalf, Esq.
          Steven Alan Zalesin, Esq.
          PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP
          1133 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (212) 336-2152
          Facsimile: (212) 336-2222
          E-mail: jmetcalf@pbwt.com
                  sazalesin@pbwt.com


COLUMBIA GAS: Court Denies Partial Bid to Dismiss Parsons Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RODERICK D. PARSONS, et al., individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated in the State of West
Virginia, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00649 (S.D. W.Va.), Judge
Dwayne L. Tinsley of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, Charleston Division, denied the
Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

Plaintiffs Parsons, Charles B. Hunt, Brenda L. Hunt, Jerry E.
Cunningham, Belinda Cunningham, Chelsea R. Miller, James D. Miller,
Bruce W. Cunningham, Joseph Cunningham, Annettea S. Fields, Kelvin
M. Greathouse, Kay M. Greathouse, David S. Casto, Debra D. Casto,
Jacob Somerville, and Pamela Doss bring the purported class action
against Defendants Columbia Gas Transmission ("CGT") and Columbia
Pipeline Group Services Co. ("CPG"), alleging that the Defendants
unlawfully stored natural gas in a storage field underlying the
Plaintiffs' properties and, in the process of withdrawing the
storage gas, unlawfully removed "native gas" that occupied the
storage field prior to the injection of storage gas.

The Plaintiffs are landowners whose real property lies within the
boundaries of CGT's Ripley Storage Field.  The Ripley Storage Field
is one of twelve such underground natural gas storage fields that
CGT, a subsidiary of CPG, operates throughout West Virginia "under
authorization granted by, and subject to the jurisdiction of, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")."  When the demand
for natural gas is low, the Defendants inject natural gas into
these underground storage fields, and the natural gas is withdrawn
when demand is high.  But in the process, the Defendants also
remove some quantity of 'native gas' that pre-existed their
injection of storage gas into the underground storage field.

The Defendants obtain the legal right to store and remove natural
gas by either negotiating an agreement with the landowners within
whose property the underground storage field lies or using eminent
domain authority granted under the Natural Gas Act ("NGA").
However, the Defendants cannot do so without first procuring a
FERC-approved certificate of public convenience and necessity
designating the boundaries of the underground storage field.  A
predecessor of the Defendants first obtained such a certificate for
the Ripley Storage Field on March 23, 1953, and began gas-storage
operations at some point between that date and 1971.  The
Defendants later determined that the FERC certificate did not cover
the entirety of their operations in the Ripley Storage Field, so
they sought and obtained an expanded FERC certificate, which was
awarded on Sept. 21, 1992.

Although the Defendants maintain records identifying the landowners
whose real property lies within the boundaries of their underground
storage fields, those records are not available to the general
public or even to the persons or entities who own real property or
mineral rights within the certificated boundaries.  Therefore, the
landowners cannot themselves ascertain whether one of Defendants'
underground storage fields extends below their real property or any
real property to which they hold mineral rights, thereby allowing
them to use the property without paying just compensation.

The Defendants have previously notified some Plaintiffs that their
real property is located above the Ripley Storage Field, and that
they have been using the Ripley Storage Field for an indeterminate
amount of time without previous notice and without paying just
compensation" for that use.  The Plaintiffs have not reached an
agreement with the Defendants to allow for the use of their
property, nor have they acquired the right to use the Plaintiffs'
property through eminent domain during the time they have operated
the Ripley Storage Field.  As a result, the Defendants have
knowingly and wrongfully taken the Plaintiffs' property without
paying just compensation.

Based upon this conduct, the Plaintiffs allege claims for trespass,
conversion, unjust enrichment, and inverse condemnation.  They also
seek a declaratory judgment that they are entitled to just
compensation for the Defendants' use of their properties for
storage of gas, past and present, and that the Defendants must
negotiate an agreement to use the Plaintiffs' property or institute
eminent domain proceedings, as well as a permanent injunction
prohibiting the use of their property unless the Defendants do so.

The Defendants filed their Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint on Nov. 1, 2019.  The Plaintiffs timely responded on Jan.
15, 2020, and the Defendants timely replied on Jan. 31, 2020.

CGT moves to dismiss Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Six, and Seven
of the Plaintiffs' complaint, and CPG moves to dismiss all of the
Plaintiffs' claims against it.  Specifically, the Defendants argue
that the Plaintiffs' claims for trespass, conversion, and unjust
enrichment are preempted by the NGA and are barred by the
applicable statute of limitation, leaving only claims for inverse
condemnation, which do not entitle Plaintiffs to the damages,
injunctive relief, and declaratory relief sought.  In addition,
they argue that no claims lie against CPG because it does not
operate the Ripley Storage Field.

Judge Tinsley finds that the facts necessary for the Defendants to
establish that the Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred are not
apparent on the face of the complaint.  Although the Plaintiffs
aver that the Defendants began gas storage operations in the Ripley
Field in or before 1971, the complaint's allegations do not
indicate whether the Plaintiffs owned their property at the time
those operations began.  Because it is unclear from the complaint
whether the Plaintiffs owned their property in 1971, it cannot be
said that the allegedly unlawful conduct giving rise to the
Plaintiffs' claims occurred then.  The Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment
claims on that basis is denied.

The Defendants also argue that the NGA preempts the Plaintiffs'
claims for trespass, conversion, and unjust enrichment.  To the
extent the Plaintiffs' claims for trespass, conversion, and unjust
enrichment address the Defendants' use of the Plaintiffs' land
either outside the boundaries of the FERC certificate, or in the
absence of an agreement with the landowner or a court order
condemning the property or otherwise providing for the Defendants'
immediate possession, those claims are not preempted by the NGA.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims is denied.

The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs cannot seek unjust
enrichment damages and injunctive or declaratory relief is based on
their assertion that the Plaintiffs are limited to claims for
inverse condemnation.  As the Judge has just explained, however, a
landowner may bring an inverse-condemnation action to seek
compensation for a taking of property that lies within the bounds
of the natural gas company's FERC certificate but is outside the
scope of the landowner's contract with the company or the court
order authorizing condemnation.  It is simply not clear at this
juncture whether the Plaintiffs' claims for inverse condemnation
would provide them the totality of the relief to which they would
be entitled.  Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and to
preclude unjust enrichment damages is denied.

Finally, the Defendants assert that all of the Plaintiffs' claims
against CPG should be dismissed because the complaint alleges --
and it is apparently true -- that CGT, not CPG, operates the Ripley
Storage Field.  The Plaintiffs contend that it is an issue of fact
which must be shown in discovery.  However, the complaint indeed
avers that CGT operates twelve underground storage fields in West
Virginia and that CGT is a subsidiary of CPG.  The Judge must
accept those facts as true in ruling on the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  But the Court is also bound by the complaint's assertions
that both the Defendants collectively engaged in the conduct that
is alleged to be unlawful.  In light of those allegations, the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against CPG is
denied.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Tinsley denied the Defendants'
Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/8UB3zN from
Leagle.com.


COMMONWEALTH BANK: Maurice Blackburn to Proceed with Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Aleks Vickovich, writing for Financial Review, reports that Maurice
Blackburn Lawyers will push ahead with a lawsuit seeking damages
from the Commonwealth Bank for allegedly delaying the transfer of
$3.2 billion in customer balances to lower-fee products.

The law firm is undeterred by a finding that the bank did not break
the law.  The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority on July 2
slapped licence conditions on CBA subsidiary Colonial First State
Investments, ordering it to keep better records of how it
considered "members' best interests" when making decisions.

An investigation by the watchdog found concerns about the "adequacy
of internal processes" at the bank, but did not conclude it had
breached superannuation laws.

The probe was sparked by a formal referral from the Hayne royal
commission, which noted the bank-owned trustee was "bound to
transfer accrued default amounts promptly [and] did not".

Maurice Blackburn managing principal lawyer Ben Slade, who is
leading the class action litigation suit against CBA's wealth arm
Colonial First State that was filed in October 2019, said he was
unfazed by the findings.

"The fact that APRA says their investigation hasn't found a penalty
provision to be sparked is not of great concern to us," Mr Slade
told The Australian Financial Review.

"The allegation we're making is that the bank failed in its
obligations to its members to act in their best interests."

To that end, the plaintiff lawyer said APRA's investigation may be
helpful to Maurice Blackburn's case, notwithstanding the legal
clearance granted by the prudential regulator on the charge of
breaches of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993.

"It is encouraging that our perception of Colonial's lack of
vigilance in transferring member funds into the MySuper product
appears to be reinforced by the APRA statement," Mr. Slade said.

'Trucking along'

The lawsuit alleges that failure to transition $3.2 billion of ADAs
(accrued default amounts) of customers in the bank's FirstChoice
Employer Super fund to a "lower cost, higher-performing MySuper
product in a timely" manner amounted to a breach of trustees'
duties.

It also alleges the bank's aligned financial advisers encouraged
customers to stay in products with higher fees even though it was
not in their best interests.

APRA's finding of inadequate systems was inconsistent with CBA's
defence that the transfer of the ADAs was complex and required a
long transition time, Mr. Slade added.

The firm is bracing for a dump of company and customer documents as
part of the first round of discovery in the CBA matter.

"It is trucking along pretty well," he said of the class action.
"There's a lot of work to do before mediation in November."

He declined to disclose a target for the value of damages sought on
behalf of clients but said it would be a "large number" given it
was based on "fees and outcomes" relating to a $3.2 billion
transaction.

'Not surprising'

The update follows criticism of the class action industry by AMP
chief executive Francesco De Ferrari when he appeared before a
parliamentary hearing.

"Australia is the second most attractive class action jurisdiction
[in the world]," Mr De Ferrari said.

"[Litigation funders] have created an escalating cost of doing
business in Australia and it is reflected in professional indemnity
insurance, it will result in job losses and higher costs passed on
to consumers. This is something I really worry about."

Mr De Ferrari, whose organisation operates multiple Australian
Financial Services Licences (AFSLs), backed a government plan to
bring financiers of class action litigation under the AFSL regime.

But Mr Slade, who also serves as co-chairman of the Law Council of
Australia's class actions committee, rejected the AMP CEO's
suggestion that litigation funding was not in the public interest.

"It is not surprising to us that wrongdoers don't like being held
to account," he said.

"It's not the job for regulators to be solely responsible for
ensuring compensation when financial products are sold in breach of
consumer protection laws. There is a sensible role for class
actions. [But] without litigation funding it would be very
difficult."

Maurice Blackburn has two active class actions afoot against AMP on
behalf of superannuation customers, one of which relates to
evidence uncovered by the royal commission.

A CBA spokesman declined to comment as the matter was before the
courts. [GN]


CONNECTICUT: Bid to Certify Class in A.R. IDEA Suit Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, A.R., on behalf of a class of those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant, Case No. 3:16-cv-01197 (CSH) (D. Conn.), Judge Charles
S. Haight, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut granted the Plaintiff's renewed motion for class
certification.

Plaintiff A.R., an individual with a disability, brings the
putative class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) against Connecticut State Board of Education, alleging
that the Board's enforcement of age limitations to special
education established by Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-76d(b) and
Conn. Agencies Reg. Section 10-76d-1(a)(4) violates the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").

Defendant Connecticut State Board of Education maintains "general
supervision and control" of elementary and secondary education,
special education, and adult education in the state of Connecticut.
As the educational agency responsible for general supervision of
special education in Connecticut, the Board is also responsible for
ensuring the state's compliance with the requirements of the
federally enacted IDEA.

Plaintiff A.R. is an individual with a disability who turned 21
years old on April 7, 2020.  In November 2014, A.R. began receiving
special education from West Hartford Public School district.  Due
to various disability-related issues, A.R. was able to earn only
5.625 credits towards her high school diploma by November 2017.
Since then, A.R. has been earning additional credits at Options
Employment and Education Services, LLC.  Nevertheless, A.R.
anticipates that she will not be able to earn the credits needed to
receive her high school diploma before her eligibility for special
education terminates in June 2020, at the end of the school year
during which A.R. turns 21.

A.R.'s eligibility to receive special education will terminate
pursuant to Connecticut statute and regulations, which provide that
a child with a disability, who turns 21 during the school year, is
entitled to receive special education only until the end of that
school year.  A.R. contends that the Board's enforcement of this
age limitation violates the IDEA, which obligates a state to
provide a free appropriate public education to children with
disabilities until the age of 22 if the state also provides public
education to non-disabled persons of the same age.  She asserts
that, because the Board generally provides public education to
non-disabled persons regardless of their age, the Board must also
provide special education to individuals with disabilities between
ages of 21 and 22.

A.R. brings the action against the Board on behalf of herself and a
class of similarly situated individuals defined as follows:

  All individuals who were over 21 and under 22 within two years
  before the filing of the action or will turn 21 during the
  pendency of the action who are provided or were provided a free
  appropriate public education under the IDEA by any Local
  Education Agency in the State of Connecticut and who, but for
  turning 21, would otherwise qualify or would have qualified for
  a free appropriate public education until age 22 because they
  have not or had not yet earned a regular high school diploma.

A.R., on behalf of the Class, seeks a declaratory judgment that
Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-76d(b) and Conn. Agencies Reg. Section
10-76d-1(a)(4) violate the IDEA because there is no Connecticut law
or regulation that imposes an age limitation of 21 on the
entitlement to public education generally -- rather, the age
limitation applies only to special education students and does not
apply to "non-special education students" who may continue to
receive public education as adults.  The Plaintiff requests a
declaration that the Board's current or future refusal to provide a
free appropriate public education to the Plaintiff and the members
of the Class on account of their age violates the IDEA.  She also
seeks to enjoin the Board from terminating a free appropriate
public education as to the Plaintiff and the members of the Class
who have not yet turned 22.

Additionally, the Plaintiff, who believes that she would
meaningfully benefit from receiving special education until she
turns 22, requests the Court to award compensatory education to
members of the Plaintiff Class to the extent they have already been
denied a free appropriate public education unlawfully.  She also
seeks an award of reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses.

Several motions are pending before the Court, including the
Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification, and the
parties' cross motions for summary judgment.  The instant ruling
resolves the Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification.

Judge Haight holds that the Plaintiff affirmatively demonstrates
that the purported class complies with Rule 23 requirements.  The
class satisfies the numerosity, the commonality, the typicality and
the adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a).  

For certification under Rule 23(b), the Judge holds that despite
the Plaintiff's failure to seek certification of compensatory
education claims under Rule 23(b)(3), he will consider whether the
claims may be so certified.  He finds that the issues common to the
class predominate over any issues affecting only individual class
members.  He also finds that the certification of the class
members' compensatory education claims is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.  A class action would "achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense" for all parties to this litigation.   Because
both predominance and superiority requirements are satisfied,
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate.

Accordingly, Judge Haight certified the class members' claims for
class-wide injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2).
He also certified the class members' claims for compensatory
education under Rule 23(b)(3).

Both classes are defined as follows: All individuals who were over
21 and under 22 within two years before the filing of the action or
will turn 21 during the pendency of this action who are provided or
were provided a FAPE under the IDEA by any Loca Education Agency in
the State of Connecticut and who, but for turning 21, would
otherwise qualify or would have qualified for a FAPE until age 22
because they have not or had not yet earned a regular high school
diploma.

In accordance with Rule 23(g), Judge Haight appointed Attorney
Jason H. Kim of Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky Wotkyns LLP, The
Law Offices of Sonja L. Deyoe P.C., and Disability Rights
Connecticut as the counsel for both classes.  The counsel
collectively possesses the expertise, knowledge and experience
needed to adequately represent the classes in the litigation.

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs' claims for class-wide
injunctive and declaratory relief are certified under Rule
23(b)(2), and the Plaintiffs' claims for compensatory education are
certified under Rule 23(b)(3).

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 1, 2020 Ruling is
available at https://is.gd/bEkdMk from Leagle.com.


COOKWARE COMPANY: Wins in Part Bid to Dismiss Lamb Breach Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
issued an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case captioned ELENA LAMB,
on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. THE
COOKWARE COMPANY (USA), LLC, Case No. 20 Civ. 704 (LLS)
(S.D.N.Y.).

The Plaintiff brought this putative class action against the
Defendant for falsely representing that its line of cooking pan
products is non-stick. The Plaintiff alleges violations of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, breach of express warranty; breach of implied
warranty of merchantability; and unjust enrichment.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of standing and
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Breach of Express Warranty

The Plaintiff concedes that her breach of express warranty claim is
deficient because she did not give the seller notice of the breach
before bringing this action. The claim is dismissed.

Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Cookware argues that there is no privity of contract between itself
and plaintiff because she purchased the pan from a Walmart store.
The Plaintiff argues that privity is not required because she is an
intended third-party beneficiary, citing Sanchez-Knutson v. Ford
Motor Co., 52 F.Supp.3d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

The Court notes that other federal district courts applying Florida
law to breach of implied warranty claims have also declined to
follow Sanchez-Knutson.

Because most courts have not accepted the third-party beneficiary
exception under Florida law, it will not be applied here. There is
no privity between Lamb and Cookware, and the breach of implied
warranty claim is dismissed.

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claim

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) grants relief to a consumer
who is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with any
obligation under a written warranty. To state a claim under the
MMWA, plaintiffs must adequately plead a cause of action for breach
of written or implied warranty under state law.

Because the breach of express and implied warranty claims are both
dismissed, the MMWA claim is also dismissed.

Unjust Enrichment

The Plaintiff claims that Cookware was unjustly enriched by her
purchase of the pan.

Under Florida law, the theory of unjust enrichment is equitable in
nature and is, therefore, not available where there is an adequate
legal remedy.

The Limited Lifetime Warranty included with each Blue Diamond pan
is applicable on defects in material or workmanship of the product
and its nonstick coating. That warranty is an express contract
concerning the subject matter of Lamb's claims, providing her with
an adequate legal remedy.

Nor can Lamb plead unjust enrichment in the alternative, as she
does not contest the existence or validity of the Limited Lifetime
Warranty. The unjust enrichment claim is dismissed.

Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act

To state a claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deceptive act or
unfair trade practice (2) causation and (3) actual damages
Cookware argues that plaintiff's FDUTPA claim does not satisfy the
heightened pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which
requires that plaintiff state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.

Lamb's allegations supporting her FDUTPA claim are sufficient under
Rule 9(b)'s pleading standard. The complaint alleges that Cookware
represented to Lamb (and other consumers in Florida and throughout
the United States) on the Blue Diamond pan's packaging label that
the pan is non-stick. Specifically, the label states that the pan
is a ceramic, diamond infused, nonstick pan with coating 5 times
harder, 4 times faster, and 10 times longer lasting than
traditional nonstick coatings.

Such statements are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer into
believing that the pan is non-stick and that food will not stick to
it during the cooking process. The complaint also alleges that Lamb
read and relied on the label's representations in purchasing the
pan in Florida in 2019, and that those representations are false
because the pan is not non-stick.

The motion to dismiss the FDUTPA claim is denied.

Standing for Injunctive Relief

To establish standing in federal court, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) he or she has suffered an injury (2) the
injury is traceable to the defendants' conduct and (3) a federal
court decision is likely to redress the injury.

The Plaintiff does not allege that she is likely to be injured in
the future, as she does not state that she will purchase the Blue
Diamond pan again.

The possibility that Lamb purchases another defective non-stick pan
under a different brand that Cookware owns or might acquire in the
future, however, is not sufficient to demonstrate that she is
likely to be harmed again in the future in a similar way. The
Plaintiff's argument that FDUTPA confers standing is also
unavailing.

Although the FDUTPA allows a plaintiff to pursue injunctive relief
even where the individual plaintiff will not benefit from an
injunction, it cannot supplant Constitutional standing
requirements. Article III of the Constitution requires that a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief allege a threat of future
harm.

The Plaintiff does not have standing to seek injunctive relief.

Hence, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint is
granted in part and denied in part.

The motion to dismiss the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
and unjust enrichment claims (Counts I-IV) is granted. The motion
to dismiss the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
claim (Count V) is denied.

The motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief
for lack of standing is granted.

With the dismissal of the Magnuson-Moss and common-law claims,
there remains only the claims of the Florida-plaintiff sub-class,
brought by a Florida resident, under Florida law on a purchase made
in Florida, against a New York resident, which sold its product in
Florida.

Any party wishing to retain the action in this Court must show
cause, within the next three weeks, why it should not be
transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 15, 2020 Opinion and
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/ya3jjlow from Leagle.com


COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL: College Student Files Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Megan Gray, writing for Press Herald, reports that a college
student has filed a lawsuit against the Council on International
Education Exchange over its decision not to refund the costs of
study abroad programs cut short by COVID-19.

Portland-based CIEE suspended all of its spring programs in March,
and nearly all students have returned home. The nonprofit's website
says only those who could not finish their classes virtually would
be considered for refunds.

Annie Zhao filed her complaint in Cumberland County Superior Court
last month, and the case was transferred to federal court. She is a
Harvard College student from Texas, and she was studying at the
University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands earlier this spring when
the nonprofit suspended her program. She seeks class-action status
to represent other students and interns who were similarly sent
home and not refunded any of their costs.

"CIEE undeniably made the right decision to cancel its study abroad
programs in light of travel restrictions and safety concerns posed
by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it erred by placing 100 percent of
the financial burden of that cancellation on financially strapped
young adults, many of whom went into debt to pay for overseas
educational programs, internships, housing, activities, and
services that CIEE did not deliver," the complaint states.

The case reflects other legal challenges spurred by the pandemic.
The Associated Press reported in May that students at more than 25
American universities have sued their schools, demanding partial
refunds on tuition and campus fees.

Sigmund Schutz, one of the attorneys representing Zhao, said those
complaints are similar to this one in that they generally involve
legal claims about breach of contract and unjust enrichment. But he
also said this case stands apart because the premise of study
abroad programs is traveling to other countries for in-person
experiences.

"But the raison d'etre of CIEE's study abroad programs is living
and studying in a different culture – an immersive international
experience that cannot be replicated by remote learning online.
Students bargained and paid for an actual study abroad experience,
not online education from their kitchen tables," the complaint
says.

Schutz sometimes represents the Portland Press Herald in First
Amendment matters.

Attorney Chad Higgins, who is representing CIEE, said neither he
nor the nonprofit could answer questions about the case on
July 8. He also declined to answer general questions about CIEE,
such as how many students participated in study abroad programs
this spring and how many employees work there. A spokeswoman for
CIEE did not respond to an email or a voicemail on July 8.

The complaint says the cost of a study abroad program through CIEE
ranges from $15,000 to $25,000 per semester, and about one-quarter
of that fee goes toward room and board. Inside Higher Ed reported
in April that some programs and universities promised to refund
housing costs and other fees for students who were studying
abroad.

CIEE says it sends more than 15,000 Americans to study, intern and
teach abroad every year. It also arranges for more than 30,000
international exchange visitors to the United States. The
organization operates in 63 sites across 42 countries.

The organization's website says most spring students returned early
from abroad, except for a small number who, against
recommendations, declined to leave.

All summer programs were also suspended, and those courses are
being offered online instead. It was not clear from the CIEE
website whether that fee would be reduced as a result or whether
any refunds would be offered for payments already made.

The website also says CIEE still plans to offer more than 30 fall
programs in 17 locations for college students.

The complaint says about 4,000 students were studying abroad
through CIEE this spring, and it details the organization's
response as the virus spread across the globe. In January and
February, the organization canceled programs in China, South Korea
and Rome. As the weeks progressed, it said students in other
programs could choose whether to return home or remain on site.
Then, within days in March, it suspended a number of European
programs and then extended that decision to all spring programs.

Also in March, the nonprofit laid off more than 600 employees,
including 248 who worked in the Portland office. It was not clear
on July 8 how many employees still work for CIEE or staff its
headquarters in Maine.

The organization released a statement at the time that indicated a
dire financial position but did not include specifics: "As a
nonprofit, we rely almost exclusively on revenue earned through our
programs to support our staff and the ongoing efforts of our
organization. In a matter of days, our programs around the world
were suspended, requiring us to help thousands of students return
to the U.S. immediately. With prospects for travel and exchange
highly uncertain at this time, the negative financial impact on
CIEE is massive."

On a 2017 tax form, the most recent available online, the nonprofit
reported net revenue of $153 million. Nearly all -- $150 million --
came from international study fees. Neither Higgins nor the
nonprofit spokeswoman responded on July 8 to a request for more
recent tax forms.

On April 1, the organization announced its no-refund policy.
Students who could not finish their spring courses online would be
considered for refunds on a case-by-cases basis. And those who
signed up for shorter spring programs that had not started before
they were suspended did have an opportunity for a refund. The
organization reimbursed up to $500 for change fees from airlines
but did not otherwise cover the cost of travel home.

The deadline for CIEE to file an answer to the complaint in court
was July 13. [GN]


COVERALL NORTH: Arbitration Ruling in Richardson Partly Reversed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, ERICKA RICHARDSON; LUIS A. SILVA, On behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated persons, v. COVERALL
NORTH AMERICA, INC.; SUJOL, LLC, DBA Coverall of Southern, NJ; ABC
CORPS. 1-10; JANE & JOHN DOES 1-10 SUJOL, LLC, DBA Coverall of
Southern, NJ, Appellant in Appeal No. 18-3393, COVERALL NORTH
AMERICA, INC., Appellant in Appeal No. 18-3399, Case Nos. 18-3393,
18-3399 (3d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed in part and vacated in part the District Court's Order on
the interpretation of the agreements, and remanded for further
consideration.

Ericka Richardson and Luis Silva each wanted to open a commercial
cleaning business.  So each bought a franchise from Coverall North
America ("CNA") through Sujol.  But disagreements followed the
signed agreements, and Richardson and Silva filed a putative class
action alleging they are the Defendants' employees, not independent
contractors, under New Jersey law.

CNA sells commercial cleaning services.  It operates a franchise
business system through geographically designated territories.
Sujol, known as a "master franchisee," owns one of these
territories and entered into agreements with Richardson (in 2016)
and Silva (in 2005) to operate cleaning businesses.  CNA is not a
named party to either the Richardson or Silva agreement.  Rather,
CNA has an agreement with Sujol allowing Sujol to sell franchises
using CNA's trademarks and operating system.

Problems arose in 2017, as Richardson and Silva began to question
their relationship with Sujol and, as a result, the fees due under
the Agreements.  So they filed a putative class action in the
Superior Court of Middlesex County, New Jersey, claiming that while
the Agreements label them as "independent contractors," they are
really employees under New Jersey law.

The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants had violated the New
Jersey Wage Payment Law, by allegedly misclassifying them as
independent contractors, charging them for a job, and taking
unlawful deductions from their wages.  CNA and Sujol removed the
matter to federal court, and then moved under Section 3 of the
Federal Arbitration Act to stay the proceedings in favor of
arbitration.

The District Court considered both the who and the what: whether
the parties agreed to delegate questions of arbitrability to an
arbitrator and, in Richardson's case, whether CNA could enforce the
arbitration clause.  First, the District Court found the
incorporation of the American Arbitration Association Commercial
Arbitration Rules in Silva's agreement did not satisfy the clarity
needed for delegation, at least with an "unsophisticated party."
Applying New Jersey law, the District Court also held that the
arbitration agreement did not cover Silva's NJWPL claims.  Second,
the District Court found Richardson's agreement with Sujol
delegated arbitrability questions to the arbitrator.  But the court
determined that CNA could not invoke the arbitration clause.

Timely appeals by Sujol and CNA followed.  

The Third Circuit uses a two-step process to evaluate an
arbitration clause in a contract: (1) whether there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate; and (2) whether that agreement encompasses
the dispute at issue.  The Third Circuit starts with who decides,
as the Defendants argue that the incorporation of the AAA Rules in
Silva's arbitration clause constitutes clear and unmistakable
evidence that the parties agreed to delegate arbitrability.

The Third Circuit agrees.  Silva's agreement provides that all
controversies, disputes or claims between Coverall and Franchisee
shall be submitted promptly for arbitration and that arbitration
shall be subject to the then current Rules of the American
Arbitration Association for Commercial Arbitration.  Clearly and
unmistakably then, the AAA Rules govern the arbitration of any
dispute between Silva and Sujol.

Silva responds that relying on incorporated rules is unreasonable
in agreements involving "unsophisticated parties."  But that likely
stretches too far and would disregard the "clear and unmistakable"
standard and ignore even the plainest of delegations.  The clarity
of Silva's agreement shows the intent to delegate the
arbitrability.  So the Third Circuit will reverse the District
Court's contrary conclusion and remand.

The District Court held that CNA could not enforce Richardson's
arbitration clause, because it was not a third-party beneficiary of
Richardson's agreement with Sujol.  CNA advances several
interpretive arguments, paired with pleas for equitable estoppel,
all aimed at allowing CNA to compel arbitration. Some of these
issues arise for the first time on appeal; others arose before the
District Court only in a cursory manner.  

All are best fully considered by the District Court in the first
instance, a path that follows from the Court's conclusions on the
Silva agreement.  Because it holds that Silva and Sujol agreed to
delegate arbitrability, the Third Circuit likewise will vacate the
District Court's determination that Silva's arbitration clause does
not encompass his claim against Sujol. That leaves undecided
whether CNA can also enforce Silva's arbitration clause, an issue
not raised in this appeal.  And since CNA's rights in both the
Silva and Richardson agreements may benefit from discovery, he will
vacate the District Court's Order regarding whether CNA is a
third-party beneficiary of the Richardson contract.

In light of the foregoing, the Third Circuit reversed in part and
vacated in part the District Court's Order on the interpretation of
the agreements, and remanded for further consideration.

A full-text copy of the Third Circuit's April 28, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/ZTRXlg from Leagle.com.

Randall Richardson, Plaintiff, represented by F. Skip Sugarman --
ssugarman@bloomsugarman.com -- Bloom Sugarman, LLP.

Randall Richardson, Plaintiff, represented by John Nicholas
Phillips -- nphillips@bloomsugarman.com -- Bloom Sugarman, LLP &
Ryan T. Pumpian, Bloom Sugarman, LLP.

Janitorial Tech, LLC, Individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, represented by F. Skip Sugarman,
Bloom Sugarman, LLP, John Nicholas Phillips, Bloom Sugarman, LLP
& Ryan T. Pumpian, Bloom Sugarman, LLP.

Coverall North America, Inc., Defendant, represented by Norman M.
Leon -- norman.leon@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP, pro hac vice,
Christopher G. Campbell -- christopher.campbell@dlapiper.com --
DLA Piper US LLP & Delia Gervin Frazier --
delia.frazier@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP.


CREDIT CONTROL: Kio Asserts Breach of FDCPA in New Jersey
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Credit Control, LLC.
The case is styled as Danielle Kio, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Credit Control, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-08509-SDW-LDW (S.D. N.J., July 8,
2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Act.

Credit Control, LLC provides financial services. The Company
provides early out solutions, collections, and debt settlement
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Lawrence C. Hersh, Esq.
   17 Sylvan Street, Suite 102B
   Rutherford, NJ 07070
   Tel: (201) 507-6300
   Email: lh@hershlegal.com




CREDIT PROS: Warren Files Suit in Florida
-----------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Credit Pros
International Corporation. The case is styled as Victoria Warren,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. The Credit Pros International Corporation, a New
Jersey Corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:20-cv-00763 (M.D. Fla.,
July 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) filed over Restrictions of Use of
Telephone Equipment.

The Credit Pros International Corporation is a credit repair
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Aaron Matthew Ahlzadeh, Esq.
   Edelsberg Law PA
   20900 NE 30th Avenue, Suite 417
   Aventura, FL 33180
   Tel: (786) 289-9589
   Fax: (786) 623-0915
   Email: Aaron@Edelsberglaw.com



CREDIT SUISSE: Court Dismisses Rubinstein Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIAN RUBINSTEIN, BARBARA ANTINORO and DAVID FLEER
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs, v. CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG, CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT
SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC, TIDJANE THIAM, and DAVID R. MATHERS
Defendants, Case No. 19-CV-1069 (VEC) (S.D. N.Y.), Judge Valerie E.
Caproni of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiffs commenced the securities class action on behalf of
all investors who purchased or acquired VelocityShares Daily
Inverse VIX Medium-Term Exchange Traded Notes ("ZIV ETNs") between
June 30, 2017 and Feb. 5, 2018.  The Plaintiffs assert claims
pursuant to Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, as
well as Regulation S-K, alleging that the Defendants' Offering
Documents failed to disclose certain risks associated with the ZIV
ETNs.

The ZIV ETNs1 at issue in the case were created and issued by
Defendant Credit Suisse and were designed to inversely track the
performance of the S&P 500 Mid-Term VIX Index.  The Volatility
Index ("VIX index"), sometimes referred to as Wall Street's "fear
index," or "fear gauge," is calculated by the Chicago Board of
Exchange ("CBOE"), and it is a measure of the expected future
volatility in the S&P 500 Index ("SPX").  The VIX index is based on
real time pricing of SPX Options and is calculated by averaging the
weighted prices of call and put options over a wide range of strike
prices.  Although investors cannot invest directly in the VIX, as
it is not an actual security, they can purchase VIX future
contracts on the VIX index ("VIX Futures"), which trade over a
seven-month expiration period.

Futures contracts allow investors to invest based on their
assessment of likely future movement of the VIX index; the futures
contracts settle on a single day based on the difference between
the VIX index on that day and the strike price for the futures
contract.  The Mid-Term VIX Index ("SPVIXMTR") "measures the return
of a daily rolling long position" of VIX Futures expiring in four,
five six, and seven months.  The Mid-Term VIX Index is less popular
and less volatile than the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index,
which measures VIX Futures expiring in one and two-months.  As
noted, the ZIV ETNs were designed to track the inverse performance
of the SPVIXMTR; in other words, the value of the ZIV ETNs
increased as the SPVIXMTR declined and vice versa.

The ZIV ETNs were issued by Credit Suisse pursuant to a
registration statement, prospectus, prospectus supplement, and a
pricing supplement, each of which was filed with the SEC and each
of which contained extensive disclosures regarding the risks of
investing in and holding the ETNs.  For example, the Pricing
Supplement explained that the ZIV ETNs were intended for
sophisticated, "knowledgeable" investors to use on a short-term
basis, and that investors who chose to hold the ETNs for longer
periods faced significant risks, including losing their entire
investment.  As a result, the Supplement included bolded and
underlined warnings, indicating that the ETNs were not appropriate
for investors seeking a "guaranteed return" on their investment and
that the "long term expected value" of the ETN was zero.

The Court is neither the first nor the only court to analyze
investors' Section 11 claims based on the securities at issue in
the case.  

On Feb. 5, 2018, the markets became volatile and the ZIV share
price fell 14.5% from the prior day's closing value.  The
Plaintiffs, who suffered damages as a result of the price drop, now
assert claims for violations of Sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act.  Despite acknowledging several of the numerous
disclosures contained in the Pricing Supplement, the Plaintiffs
argue that the Supplement was materially false or misleading
because it failed to adequately disclose the risks associated with
the ZIV ETNs.

The Defendants respond that the disclosures sufficiently warned the
Plaintiffs of the risks and accordingly move to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim.  

Although the complaint acknowledges some of the warnings included
in the Pricing Supplement, the Plaintiffs claim that the
disclosures were insufficient and that they were misled about the
risks of investing in the ZIV ETNs.  Specifically, they  allege
that: (1) Credit Suisse misrepresented the extent of its hedging
and the effect that such hedging activity might have on the value
of the ETNs; (2) the disclosures failed to indicate that the VIX
Futures market lacked the necessary liquidity to handle Credit
Suisse's rebalancing and hedging activity; and (3) that the
Registration Statement did not adequately indicate that the ZIV ETN
was an inappropriate investment even for "investors managing their
portfolios on a daily basis."

Judge Caproni disagrees.  The Pricing Supplement adequately and
repeatedly warned investors of these exact risks associated with
the ZIV ETNs.  The Pricing Supplement adequately warned investors
of the extent and effect of Credit Suisse's hedging activities as
well as the impact that it and myriad other factors, including
liquidity vel non in the underlying futures market, might have on
the value of the ETNs.  In addition, it does not contain any
material misstatements or omissions sufficient to support a section
11 claim.

To state a claim under Section 15 of the Securities Act, a
plaintiff must allege a primary violation by a controlled person,
and control by the defendant of the primary violator.  As such, a
Section 15 claim must be dismissed in the absence of any primary
liability.  The complaint does not state a claim for primary
liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act.  Thus, the
Plaintiff's Section 15 claim is dismissed.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants violated Items 303 and
105 of Regulation S-K by failing to disclose certain risks
associated with the ZIV ETNs.  The Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege that the Defendants
knew of any undisclosed information concerning the risks of the
ETNs.

Although the Plaintiffs concede that they are required to plausibly
allege that the Defendants knew of the underlying facts, they
maintain that because Credit Suisse was a major participant in the
VIX Futures market, it can be presumed to have known the relevant
facts concerning the prior spikes in the VIX Futures market.  Thats
is conclusory and insufficient; the Plaintiffs must demonstrate
actual knowledge of an existing trend, event, or risk to allege
violations of Section 303 and 105.  Because the Plaintiffs fail to
allege any plausible facts indicating that Defendants knew of any
undisclosed risk factors, their Regulation S-K claims are
dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Caproni granted the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.  Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/2GwopN from Leagle.com.


CVS PHARMACY: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Truong Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN TRUONG, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CVS PHARMACY, INC., Defendant, Case
8:20-cv-01176 (C.D. Cal., July 2, 2020) seeks to stop the
Defendant's unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.

CVS Pharmacy Inc. distributes pharmaceutical products. The Company
offers prescription, drugs, vitamins, beauty aids, diaper, health
supplement, and other medical products. CVS Pharmacy markets its
products throughout the United States. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Abbas Kazerounian, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          245 Fischer Avenue, Unit D1
          Costa Mesa, CA 92626
          Telephone: (800) 400-6808
          Facsimile: (800) 520-5523
          E-mail: ak@kazlg.com

               - and -

          Yana Hart, Esq.
          KAZEROUNI LAW GROUP, APC
          2221 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 101
          San Diego, CA 92108
          Telephone: (619) 233-7770
          Facsimile: (619) 297-1022
          E-mail: yana@kazlg.com


DALLAS, TX: Women Protesters File Anti-Rioting Law Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
CBSDFW.COM/AP report that three women arrested during protests
against systemic racism and police violence have sued the city of
Dallas and Dallas County in a challenge to the Texas anti-rioting
law.

Yolanda Dobbins, 55, Lily Godinez, 20, and Megan Nordyke, 35, filed
suit in federal court, contending their constitutional rights were
violated when they were arrested during protests over the police
killing of George Floyd.

Floyd, who spent the majority of his life in the Houston-area, died
after a Minneapolis police officer pressed his knee on his neck for
more than eight minutes. His death sparked global demonstrations.

The women were among hundreds of people who police arrested during
protests last month but later declined to charge.

Their class action suit claims police selectively enforced Texas'
anti-rioting law in a way that targeted activities protected by the
First Amendment. It seeks to have the law ruled unconstitutional,
as well as discipline for some officers and further training on the
use of force and de-escalation for the whole department. The women
also request unspecified other "relief."

The Dallas city attorney and the Dallas County judge's offices did
not immediately respond to requests for comment on June 30. [GN]


DELUCA ASSOCIATES: Faces Rittenhouse Employment Suit in Calif.
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Deluca Associates
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Tatyana Rittenhouse, Ishatpal
Momi, other members of the general public similarly situated and as
proxies for the State of California v. Deluca Associates Inc., AMC
Entertainment Holdings Inc., Cinemark USA Inc., Does 1-25, Case No.
34-2020-00281631-CU-OE-GDS (Cal. Super., Sacramento Cty., July 9,
2020).

The case type is stated as "Other Employment."

Deluca Associates, Inc., provides investigation services.

The Plaintiffs are represented by Edward J. Wynne, Esq., and Bryan
J. McCormack, Esq.[BN]


DENVER, CO: Sued Over Police Response to George Floyd Protests
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Tabachnik, writing for The Denver Post, reports that Denver was
hit with another federal lawsuit on July 1 over its aggressive
police response to the George Floyd protests last month.

The class-action lawsuit, which seeks damages for those arrested
for curfew violations or who were injured during the
demonstrations, alleges that police used "constitutionally unlawful
crowd control tactics, including kettling (also known as
containment or corralling), indiscriminate and unwarned launching
of tear gas and flashbangs into crowds and at individuals, and
shooting projectiles at protesters," the complaint reads.

Police "knowingly placed these protesters in physical danger
through indiscriminate use of excessive force," according to the
lawsuit.

Officers used less-lethal weapons "indiscriminately and without
warning, even at times when the crowd was merely chanting, kneeling
or standing with their hands up," according to the complaint.

The lawsuit also alleges that Mayor Michael Hancock's emergency
curfew -- imposed from May 30 to June 4 -- was unconstitutional and
infringed on protesters' First Amendment rights.

"As if to prove the point of the protests themselves -- the
discriminatory policing against people of color -- the targets of
these police attacks 'included many young Black and Brown people,"
Loevy & Loevy Attorneys at Law, the firm representing the
plaintiffs, said in a news release.

The named plaintiffs include a freelance photojournalist, a lawyer,
a union organizer, a software engineer, a juvenile justice
advocate, a small business owner and a veteran.

The July 1 lawsuit marks the latest legal action against Denver for
its police response to the protests, which began in late May after
Floyd, a Black man, was killed after a Minneapolis police officer
knelt on his neck for early nine minutes.

The ACLU of Colorado filed a federal lawsuit against the department
on behalf of Black Lives Matter 5280, among others, claiming the
police department's tactics were used to "corral, intimidate and
silence protesters."

The city also settled a lawsuit filed by four protesters who sued
over the police department's use of force. Earlier in June, as part
of that lawsuit, a federal judge in Denver ordered police to limit
firing tear gas and projectiles at peaceful protesters, saying that
protecting First Amendment rights was more important than
protecting buildings. [GN]


DEVA CONCEPTS: Bell Suit Removed From Cir. Court to W.D. Missouri
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JULIE BELL, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. DEVA CONCEPTS, LLC,
d/b/a DEVACURL, 560 Broadway, Suite 206 New York, NY 100121, Case
No. 2016-CV12392 (Filed May 27, 2020), was removed from the
Missouri Circuit Court, Jackson County, to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Missouri on July 8, 2020.

The Western District of Missouri Court Clerk assigned Case No.
4:20-cv-00541-RK to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant formulates, manufactures,
advertises, and sells 16 hair products bearing false, deceptive,
and misleading labels and marketing. The Plaintiff also alleges
that the Defendant concealed and failed to warn consumers that use
of the Products may result in adverse outcomes. Specifically, the
Plaintiff alleges that the Products, which are sold at a premium,
cause hair loss, hair thinning, breakage, excessive shedding, scalp
irritation, skin burning, and other issues despite being marketed
as gentle.

Deva Concepts manufactures hair care products. The Company produces
and markets a range products for cleaning, conditioning, and
styling curly hair.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bryan T. White, Esq.
          William L. Carr, Esq.
          WHITE, GRAHAM, BUCKLEY, & CARR, L.L.C
          19049 E Valley View, Parkway
          Independence, MO 64055
          E-mail: bwhite@wagblaw.com
                  bcarr@wagblaw.com

               - and -

          Thomas V. Bender, Esq.
          Dirk Hubbard, Esq.
          HORN, AYLWARD & BANDY, LLC
          2600 Grand, Ste. 1100
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          E-mail: tbender@hab-law.com
                  dhubbard@hab-law.com

               - and -

          Clayton A. Jones, Esq.
          CLAYTON JONES, ATTORNEY AT LAW
          PO Box 257
          405 W. 58 Hwy.
          Raymore, MO 64083
          E-mail: Claytonjoneslaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Robert H. Bernstein, Esq.
          GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
          500 Campus Drive, Suite 400
          Florham Park, NJ 07932
          Telephone: 973.360.7900
          E-mail: bernsteinrob@gtlaw.com


DIRECT ENERGY: S.D. Illinois Dismisses Lane ICFA Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
issued a Memorandum and Order granting the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in the case captioned JULIE LANE and RICHARD LANE v. DIRECT
ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 19-cv-674-SMY (S.D. Ill.).

Plaintiffs Julie and Richard Lane, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, filed this putative class action
against Defendant Direct Energy Services, LLC (Direct Energy)
alleging violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (ICFA), breach of contract, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
enrichment.

Direct Energy seeks to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) on numerous
grounds, including: (1) Plaintiffs fail to allege deceptive or
unfair conduct under the ICFA (2) there is no violation of the
advertising rule under the ICFA (3) Plaintiffs fail to allege a
breach of contract and (4) Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is
barred by the contract.

According to the Court's Memorandum and Order, the Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for deceptive or unfair
practice under the ICFA. The Plaintiffs also fail to state a
colorable claim for violation of ICFA's Advertising Rule.

To state a claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing, the
allegations must suggest that "the contract vested the opposing
party with discretion in performing an obligation under the
contract and the opposing party exercised that discretion in bad
faith. However, it has long been established under Illinois law
that breach of good faith and fair dealing cannot be an independent
cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiffs' breach of good faith and
fair dealing claim will also be dismissed.

Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a separate cause of
action that, standing alone, would justify an action for recovery.
And, a claim for unjust enrichment is not actionable where, as
here, the parties have entered into a contract which governs the
dispute. Plaintiffs recognize that they cannot plead an unjust
enrichment claim based on the same allegations as their claims for
breach of contract, but maintain that they assert the claim in the
alternative.

While a plaintiff may plead such a claim in the alternative where
the existence of a valid contract is questioned, if as is true in
this case there is no dispute over the existence of a contract, a
claim for unjust enrichment necessarily fails.

Hence, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. The
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
All pending motions are terminated as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 15, 2020 Memorandum
and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y9pufeu5 from
Leagle.com.


EMJ APPAREL: Conner Sues in E.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Apparel Group, LLC.
The case is styled as Mary Conner, Individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. EMJ
Apparel Group, LLC doing business as: Bella Dahl, Case No.
1:20-cv-03062 (E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Apparel Group LLC was founded in 1998. The Company's line of
business includes the wholesale distribution of women's,
children's, and infants' clothing and accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP, P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


ENDO INT'L: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Aug. 18 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, on July 1 disclosed that a securities class action has been
filed on behalf of investors that purchased or acquired the
securities of Endo International plc ("Endo" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: ENDP) between August 8, 2017 and May 1, 2020 (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey alleges violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

If you purchased Endo securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options please visit Endo Shareholder Lawsuit or
contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations and prospects. Specifically,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose: (i) the full scope of Endo's and/or its subsidiaries'
contributions to the opioid crisis, including, but not limited to,
their opioid products' disproportionately negative impact on New
York, one of the most populous states in the U.S., as well as the
fraud that Defendants perpetrated on the New York insurance market;
(ii) part of that contribution to the crisis included Endo
publishing and disseminating false information to health care
providers regarding the risks and benefits of opioids; (iii) that
the foregoing, once revealed, was foreseeably likely to subject
Endo and/or its subsidiaries to increased regulatory scrutiny and
enforcement, as well as significant financial and/or reputational
harm, particularly with respect to New York; and (iv) that, as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

On June 10, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo ("Governor Cuomo")
announced that the New York Department of Financial Services
("DFS") had filed administrative charges against Endo in connection
with its role in the opioid crisis, alleging that Endo fraudulently
misrepresented the safety and efficacy of its opioid drugs while
minimizing the risk of addiction and other ill effects. That same
day, DFS issued its own press release specifically announcing that
it "has filed charges and initiated administrative proceedings
against Endo . . . and its subsidiaries, [EHS], [EPI], and [PPCI]"
in connection with "DFS' ongoing investigation into the entities
that created and perpetuated the opioid crisis"; that "[t]he DFS'
statement of charges alleges that, like other opioid Manufactures,
Endo . . . [k]nowingly furthered a false narrative to legitimize
opioids as appropriate for broad treatment of pain by downplaying
their long-known addictive nature and risks"; and that Endo and its
subsidiaries "m]isrepresented the safety and efficacy of opioids,
without legitimate scientific substantiation," and "[d]eployed a
large sales force to target healthcare providers directly with
these misrepresentations." On this news, Endo's Ordinary share
price fell $0.66 per share, or 14.63%, to close at $3.85 per share
on June 10, 2020.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 18, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Endo securities, and/or would like to discuss your
legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/endointernationalplc-endp-shareholder-class-action-stock-fraud-279/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact Information:

Matthew E. Guarnero
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(877) 779-1414 [GN]


ERIE INSURANCE: Faces Class Action Over Insurance Payout Denial
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jeremy Finley, writing for WSMV, reports that Outside Joe's Place
in Green Hills, fans blow to cool off an empty beer garden.

At the Crow's Nest next door, the lunch crowd is there but
considerably slimmer.

Dalton Crow, the manager of both businesses, said his industry
needs financial help.

"Whatever we can get to help us -- especially in these times --
sales are down I'm assuming for everyone in town. Whatever we can
get will help," said Crow.

Both bar/restaurants had what's called "business interruption
insurance" that they thought would cover their loss of income from
the city's mandated shutdown at the beginning of the pandemic.

But when they filed their claims, their insurance company, Erie
Insurance Exchange, denied them.

"They paid their premiums for years -- and when they need the
insurance to pay -- the insurance companies denied them," said
attorney Mark Chalos, who represents the businesses.

Now, the two businesses, along with four others in Middle
Tennessee, are suing Erie, claiming a breach of contact for failing
to pay for insurance claims on interruption of services.

News4 Investigates obtained one of Erie's denial letters in which
Erie wrote the business isn't covered because there is no direct
physical loss or damage to the business. [GN]


ERIE INSURANCE: Lieff Cabraser and Co-Counsel File Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, The Higgins Firm, and the
Law Office of Alexandra Foote have filed a federal nationwide class
action lawsuit against Erie Insurance Exchange on behalf of six
Nashville-area restaurants and bars accusing the insurance carrier
of breach of contract in its failure to pay valid business
interruption insurance claims. This is the first such federal class
action filed in Nashville.

The plaintiffs are six popular restaurants and bars in the
Nashville area: Crow's Nest, Hillwood Pub, Joe's Place, Plaintiff
Plantation Pub, Inc., Sidelines Grill Pleasant View, and Sidelines
Grill Ashland City. Several, like Sidelines Grill, are family-owned
and host live music. Others, like Hillwood Pub and Plantation Pub,
are nightlife-oriented but also serve "pub style" food popular in
local communities. In 2014, Hillwood Pub participated in and won
the "Music City Hot Wings Festival." The plaintiffs are bringing
claims on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of restaurants and
bars.

As set forth in the complaint, several months ago all six plaintiff
establishments were forced to shut down at the order of both state
and local governments who required the restaurants, their workers,
and their customers to "shelter in place" and abide by strict
"social distancing" guidelines. These compulsory shutdowns forced
the restaurants to lay off employees and to lose income for several
months while continuing to pay many regular expenses, causing
severe financial losses, which the plaintiffs' restaurants and bars
were unable to recoup even after they were permitted to re-open
with limitations.

As the complaint details, to protect their business from
catastrophic situations like this one, the plaintiffs purchased
insurance from Erie Insurance Exchange that included coverage for
business interruption. The policies expressly provide coverage for
"Lost Income" and the consequences of actions by "Civil Authority."
Accordingly, the restaurants expected that their policies would
help protect their businesses in the event that the government ever
ordered them to stop or severely restrict operations in connection
with a pandemic or any other covered cause of loss.

When plaintiffs submitted their claims to Erie Insurance Exchange,
the claims were summarily denied. The complaint alleges that these
denials were part of a premeditated strategy by Erie to deny all
claims related to the "shelter in place" orders and COVID-19. The
complaint alleges these denials were untethered to the facts of the
claims, which Erie did not adequately investigate, or to the
specific coverage provided by the plaintiffs' business insurance
policies.

"These small businesses bought insurance to protect against
business interruption," notes Lieff Cabraser partner Mark P.
Chalos, who represents the plaintiffs in the lawsuit. "The last
thing that small businesses need right now is their billionaire
insurance company wrongfully denying claims."

"We're proud to represent this group of locally-owned Nashville
bars and restaurants, businesses that serve our community," notes
The Higgins Firm's Jim Higgins, who also represents the plaintiffs
in the suit. "Erie's systematic, blanket denial of their insurance
claims is just wrong, and this lawsuit seeks to correct that
wrong."

"It has been a difficult time for many small businesses in
Tennessee, especially restaurants and bars," said Doug Crow, owner
and operator of the plaintiff businesses. "We are standing up to
these insurance companies that are refusing to do what they
promised to do."

The class in the lawsuit is defined as "All persons or entities in
the United States who own an interest in a business that served
food or drink on the premises and was insured by Erie Insurance
Exchange in March 2020, made (or attempted to make) a claim with
Erie arising from loss of income (or extra expense or other losses
related to business interruption) at that business related to
COVID-19, and did not receive coverage for that claim."

The lawsuit states claims for breach of contract and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and seeks injunctive
relief as well as damages.

Contacts:

Mark P. Chalos
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP
222 2nd Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37201
Telephone: 315-313-9000
mchalos@lchb.com

Jim Higgins
The Higgins Firm
525 4th Ave South
Nashville, TN 37210
Telephone: 615-353-0930 [GN]


ES STONE: Installers Sue Over Denied Overtime Pay, Wage Statements
------------------------------------------------------------------
Israel I. Bautista, Jose A. Campos Flores, Jose De Jesus Reyes,
Wilson Fajardo, Carlos Bautista Irineo and Miguel A. Reyes Conde,
individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, v. ES Stone & Tiles Inc., Lup Kam Fung and Kaiping Luo,
jointly and severally, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-02619, (E.D.
N.Y., June 11, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid wages,
spread-of-hours wages, interests, statutory penalties, liquidated
damages, and attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and New York labor law.

ES Stone & Tiles is a supplier and fabricator of granite, marble
and engineered stone where Plaintiffs worked as installers. They
claim to have worked more than forty hours each work week but was
not paid overtime compensation and spread-of-hours compensation.
They also claim to be denied accurate wage statements. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Justin A. Zeller, Esq.
      John M. Gurrieri, Esq.
      LAW OFFICE OF JUSTIN A. ZELLER, P.C.
      277 Broadway, Suite 408
      New York, NY 10007-2036
      Telephone: (212) 229-2249
      Facsimile: (212) 229-2246
      Email: jazeller@zellerlegal.com
             jmgurrieri@zellerlegal.com


EVENTBRITE INC: California Northern Dist. Dismisses Securities Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted Defendant Eventbrite and the
Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss in IN RE EVENTBRITE, INC.
SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 5:18-cv-02019-EJD (N.D. Cal.).

The class action arises out of the Defendants' alleged violations
of Section 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, Item 303 of SEC
Regulation S-K, and Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.  Lead Plaintiffs Michael Gomes, Melvin
Pastores, Mohit Uppal, and Bruce Bones purchased Eventbrite
securities during Eventbrite's September 2018 Initial Public
Offering ("IPO").  Eventbrite hosts a platform through which live
event creators can plan for, market, and sell tickets to their
events.   Unlike Eventbrite's competitors, whose platforms are
focused on a specific industry, Eventbrite serves four core
markets—festivals, music, registration events, and endurance
events—regardless of their subject-matter.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants made misleading
statements to and concealed known risks from investors.  

The Complaint names multiple Defendants: (1) Eventbrite, (2)
Individual Defendants Julia Hartz (the CEO and a director), Randy
Befumo (the CFO), Andrew Dreskin (a director), Katherine
August-deWilde (a director), Roelof Botha (a director), Kevin Hartz
(a director), Sean P. Moriarty (a director), Lorrie M. Norrington
(a director), Helen Riley (a director), and Steffan C. Tomlinson (a
director), and (3) Underwriter Defendants Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC,
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Allen & Company LLC, RBC Capital
Markets, LLC, SunTrust Robinson Humphrey, Inc., and Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co., Inc.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants made seven materially
false, misleading, and/or incomplete statements concerning the
Ticketfly acquisition: (i) the Registration Statement; (ii) the
2018 10-K Statement; (iii) the Q3 2018 Earning Results Letter; (iv)
their strategy to operate a single technical platform globally; (v)
Q3 2018 Earning Results Phone Call; (vi) losses from the
re-platforming of Ticketfly; and (vii) the decision to integrate
Ticketfly onto the Eventbrite platform.

Following the continued stock decline, multiple lawsuits were filed
against the Defendants.  One of these -- Gomes v. Eventbrite et al.
-- was randomly assigned to the California Court.  The Court
consolidated Gomes with other related ones.  On Nov. 11, 2019, the
Plaintiffs filed their amended consolidated complaint, which is the
subject of the Defendants' current motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).  On Jan. 31, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss.  The Defendants filed
their reply on March 3, 2020.

The Defendants also request judicial notice regarding facts
pertaining to their motion to dismiss.  On Jan. 31, 2020, the
Plaintiffs filed a response to the Defendants' request for judicial
notice.  The Defendants subsequently filed a reply to the
Plaintiffs' opposition to judicial notice.

Defendant Eventbrite and the Individual Defendants have filed a
motion to dismiss the lawsuit arguing that the Plaintiffs have not
met the heightened pleading requirements applicable in securities
fraud cases.   

Judge Davila finds that there are two problems with the Plaintiffs'
theory of falsity.  First, the Court is not persuaded that
Defendant Befumo mislead investors by failing to state that
Ticketfly customers were dissatisfied with Eventbrite's platform.
If anything, Defendant Befumo admitted that the Ticketfly
acquisition was facing a multitude of problems by stating that,
"There's no one overwhelming factor to explain why not all
Ticketfly customers migrated to Eventbrite's platform.
Accordingly, there are insufficient, particularized facts to
support falsity as to that statement.

The Court then finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead
falsity as required by the PSLRA for Statements 1-7, and grants the
Defendants' motion to dismiss these statements.  The Defendants
argue, and the Court agrees, that the statement is too vague to be
actionable.  Statements that consist of nothing more than mildly
optimistic, subjective assessments, which investors know how to
devalue, are not actionable.  Statement 7 is nothing more than an
optimistic statement about Eventbrite's integration of the
Ticketfly platform.  Indeed, run-of-the-mill statements like
"business remained strong" or statements about a product's
"technological leadership, "innovative features," and "significant
performance advantages" are inactionable puffery.  A statement
about delivering the full power of a product is similarly vague.
Accordingly, Statement 7 is not actionable.

The Plaintiffs challenge a single disclosure in the Registration
Statement - Statement 1 - which is also challenged under Section
10(b).  They argue that their Section 11 claim does not "sound in
fraud" and thus is not subject to the heightened pleading standard
of Rule 9(b).  In their view, the Complaint "clearly delineates"
the Securities Act claims from the Exchange Act claims.  

Not so, Judge Davila holds.  The Plaintiffs' entire Complaint is
built around the idea that Defendants knew the Ticketfly migration
was failing because of Eventbrite's incompatible platform and
fraudulently concealed information about the Ticketfly acquisition.
They cannot allege fraud based on events that occurred before and
after the offering, and then scissor out a non-fraud claim from the
center of that unified course of conduct in order to evade the Rule
9(b) requirement.  Accordingly, because the course of conduct pled
in connection with the Plaintiffs' Section 11 claim is so
substantively similar to the conduct pled in connection with their
Section 10(b) claim, the Court holds that the Plaintiffs' Section
11 claim does sound in fraud.  The heightened pleading standard of
Rule 9(b) thus applies.  As analyze, because Statement 1 was not
plead with sufficient particularity, the Defendants' motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' Section 11 claim.

The Plaintiffs argue that these are meaningless boilerplate
disclosures.  The Judge disagrees.  On the same page as the risk
disclosure, Eventbrite specifically named Ticketfly as a recent
acquisition and noted potential impacts that the Ticketfly
acquisition could have on business.  Hence, unlike cases like South
Ferry LP No. 2 v. Killinger, where the risk disclosures did not
address the risks at-issue but rather addressed only a related
risk, Eventbrite's risk disclosure adequately identified the risks
facing the Ticketfly acquisition.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have
not pled sufficient facts to show an Item 303 violation and thus
the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to Item 303.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Davila granted the Defendants' motion
to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety.  When
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, a court should
grant leave to amend "unless it determines that the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.  Although
the Court has determined that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim,
it is possible they can cure their allegations by alleging more
particular facts to support their theory of falsity.  Should the
Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they must do so by
June 24, 2020.  Failure to do so, or failure to cure the
deficiencies addressed in the Order, will result in dismissal of
the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.  The Plaintiffs may not add
new claims or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation by
the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/IIJk3W from Leagle.com.


FARMERS & MERCHANTS: Johnson Files Suit in California
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Farmers & Merchants
Bank of Long Beach. The case is styled as Robin Johnson, doing
business as: CG Johnson & Company, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank of Long Beach, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-06078-CBM-E (C.D.
Cal., July 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Contract: Other
filed pursuant to Diversity-Conversion.

Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach is a commercial bank
offering a wide range of real estate mortgage, consumer, and
commercial loans.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jonathan D Selbin, Esq.
   Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP
   250 Hudson Street 8th Floor
   New York, NY 10013
   Tel: (212) 355-9500
   Fax: (212) 355-9592
   Email: jselbin@lchb.com

     - and -

   Anne B. Shaver, Esq.
   Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP
   275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 956-1000
   Fax: (415) 956-1008
   Email: ashaver@lchb.com

     - and -

   Michael W Sobol, Esq.
   Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP
   275 Battery Street 29th Floor
   San Francisco, CA 94111-3339
   Tel: (415) 956-1000
   Fax: (415) 956-1008
   Email: msobol@lchb.com

     - and -

   Roger Norton Heller, Esq.
   Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP
   275 Battery Street 29th Floor
   San Francisco, CA 94111
   Tel: (415) 956-1000
   Fax: (415) 956-1008
   Email: rheller@lchb.com




FCA US: Court Denies Bid to Decertify Class in Victorino Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CARLOS VICTORINO and ADAM TAVITIAN, individually, and
on behalf of other members of the general public similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company, Defendant, Case No. 16cv1617-GPC (JLB) (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California (i) denied the Defendant's motion to
decertify class, or in the alternative, motion to modify class
definition; and (ii) denied without prejudice the Plaintiff's
motion for approval of class notice and notice plan.

Plaintiff Victorino filed a putative first amended class action
complaint ("FAC") against Defendant FCA based on defects in the
2013-2015 Dodge Dart vehicles equipped with a Fiat C635 manual
transmission built on Nov. 12, 2014 that cause his vehicle's clutch
to fail and stick to the floor.  The FAC alleged five causes of
action for violations of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
("CLRA"), California's unfair competition law ("UCL"), a state law
breach of implied warranty pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, a federal law breach of implied warranty pursuant to
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), and unjust enrichment.

After the Court's ruling on the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment and subsequent motion for reconsideration, the remaining
causes of action in the case are the breach of implied warranty of
merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act and the MMWA, and a UCL
claim premised on the breach of implied warranty claims.

On June 13, 2018, the Court denied class certification and relied
on the reasoning in Nguyen v. Nissan North Am., Case No.
16cv5591-LHK, 2018 WL 1831857 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2019), to deny
class certification on the issue of whether the Plaintiff's damages
model satisfied predominance.  On July 26, 2019, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of class certification in
Nguyen and remanded the case for further proceedings.  

Relying on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Nguyen, on Oct. 17,
2019, the Court granted the Plaintiff's renewed motion for class
certification.  The class is defined as:  All persons who purchased
or leased in California, from an authorized dealership, a new Class
Vehicle primarily for personal, family or household purposes.

During the hotly contested briefing on class notice, the Defendant
filed the instant motion to decertify class contending that
predominance and superiority cannot be met due to numerous
individualized issues that will need to be tried before a jury.
Alternatively, FCA contends that the class definition should be
modified to the following: California residents who purchased a
Class Vehicle from an FCA US LLC authorized dealership in the state
of California primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, and who still own the vehicle and have not settled any
disputed claim with FCA US related to the vehicle.

The Defendant presents three arguments why the class should be
decertified as lacking predominance and superiority.  First, it
contends that the class as currently defined raises significant
individual issues in identifying the class members; second, the
class as defined will require numerous individual trials in
determining affirmative defenses; and third, individual issues will
predominate concerning damages.

Judge Curiel denies FCA's motion to decertify based on the
identification of class members.  The Court certified a class
consisting of all persons who purchased or leased in California,
from an authorized dealership, a new Class Vehicle primarily for
personal, family or household purposes.  Therefore, the class
definition complies with the elements of a breach of implied
warranty claim under state law.  It is clear that those class
members who did not purchase the Class Vehicle primarily for
personal, family or household use may not be a class member.
Logically, those class members will not file a claim.  

However, the Defendant may be given the opportunity during the
claims administration process to challenge any claims and the
claims administrator can devise a procedure to ensure that those
claimants purchased the Class Vehicles for personal, family, or
household purposes.  Contrary to the Defendant's argument,
identifying the class members will not result in a series of
separate trials to determine whether a class member purchased the
Class Vehicles primarily for personal, family or household
purposes.

Next, the Judge finds that FCA is in possession of the settlement
agreements it has executed with owners of the Class Vehicles.
Those owners who settled with FCA with a full release and return of
the Class Vehicle would likely not file a claim.  However, any such
challenges can be made at the claims administration stage. Contrary
to FCA's claim, determining which owners have settled with FCA will
not entail months of mini-trials.  Accordingly, the Judge declines
to decertify the class based on the affirmative defenses asserted
by FCA.

Lastly, the class includes only those persons who purchased or
leased in California, from an authorized dealership, a new Class
Vehicle.  The class only includes the original purchasers of new
Class Vehicles from an authorized dealership and does not include
subsequent owners. Therefore, FCA's reliance on Sloan is misplaced
and does not support decertifying or modifying the class.
Accordingly, the Judge denies the Defendant's motion to decertify
based allegations that damage calculations will involve
individualized inquiries.  In sum, the Jduge denies the Defendant's
motion to decertify class.  He also denies the Defendant's
alternative request to modify the class definition.

On Feb. 12, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a motion for approval of
proposed class notice and notice plan.  In light of his order on
the Defendant's motion to decertify the class, the Judge directs
both parties to engage in a meaningful meet and confer on the
remaining disputed issues in the Plaintiff's proposed class notice
and notice plan.  

If the parties are able to agree on a joint proposed class notice
and notice plan, they will file it with the Court on May 29, 2020.
In the event the parties are still unable to agree, the Plaintiff
will file a renewed motion for approval of a proposed class notice
and notice plan on May 29, 2020.  The Defendant will file an
opposition on June 5, 2020.  The Plaintiff may file a reply on June
12, 2020.  No other filings will be permitted without leave of
court.

Based on these reasoning, Judge Curiel denied the Defendant's
motion to decertify class action.  Judge Curiel also denied the
Plaintiff's motion for approval of proposed class notice and notice
plan without prejudice, and denied the Plaintiff's ex parte motion
to strike the Defendant's unauthorized reply as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 8, 2020 Order is available at
https://is.gd/gLdtxE from Leagle.com.


FCA US: Fails to Obtain Summary Judgment on Gilvin's Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELISSA GILVIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FCA US, LLC.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-107 (S.D. Ohio), Magistrate
Judge Stephanie K. Bowman of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, recommended that FCA's
motion for summary judgment be denied.

The Plaintiffs reside in Clermont County, Ohio.  Defendant FCA,
distributes, markets, and sells FCA motor vehicles to persons in
Ohio.  Defendant ISG is an agent of FCA.

On May 4, 2016, the Plaintiffs entered into a written lease
agreement with the Jeff Wyler Eastgate dealership for a model-year
2016 Ram 1500 truck.  The 2016 Ram truck was sold, manufactured or
distributed by Defendant FCA.  In the Retail Lease Order they
signed, the Plaintiffs' acknowledged that they understood Jeff
Wyler Eastgate was in no respect the agent of the Manufacturer, and
that they and the dealership were the sole parties to it.

The vehicle was out of service by reason of repair for a cumulative
total of 30 or more calendar days.  The vehicle had battery and
transmission issues and often would not start.  Additionally, the
digital dashboard screens had problems and the check engine light
was on.  The Plaintiffs have submitted a lengthy service record
from Jeff Wyler.

FCA, their agents and/or their authorized dealer, were unable to
conform the Plaintiffs' motor vehicle to any applicable express
warranty by repairing or correcting the nonconformity after a
reasonable number of repair attempts.   In January 2017, the
Plaintiffs returned the vehicle to Jeff Wyler.  Thereafter, they
were forwarded to Defendant FCA's agent, ISG, to facilitate an
informal dispute resolution regarding the refund process.

During the informal dispute resolution process, the Plaintiffs'
contend that FCA told them that in exchange for the return of their
truck, the "buy back" amount they would receive would be
reimbursement for the lease payments they made minus the amount of
minor damage to the bumper.  Notably, at the time of the offer in
April 2017, the Plaintiffs were current on their lease payments
having paid $5,046.69.  Their total lease payments required to be
made to the lessor amounted to $5,046.69 ($458.79 × 11 months).
They understood that they were responsible for minor damage to the
bumper totaling $465.64.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs contend that
the amount refunded to them for their nonconforming vehicle's lease
payments minus the damage to the bumper should have been $4,581.05
($5,046.69 - $465.64).

ISG was authorized by FCA to offer the Plaintiffs' $4,106.05, which
was less than the full amount of the lease payments minus a certain
amount for the bumper damage.  The Plaintiffs were told that since
FCA had paid the costs of taxes, title fees, and security deposits
(or simply waived these costs), they were not included in the offer
being made.  ISG gave the Plaintiffs a few days to either accept
the settlement offer or ISG would close the case.  The Plaintiffs
did not accept the settlement offer from ISG.  The action
followed.

The Plaintiffs originally filed the action in the Court of Common
Pleas for Clermont County, Ohio in January 2018.  They seek relief
for, inter alia, damages in excess of $25,000 for the refund of the
full purchase price of their nonconforming motor vehicles.  In
addition to compensatory damages, the Plaintiffs also seek punitive
damages, attorneys' fees, and injunctive and declaratory relief.
They also seek to bring this action on behalf of themselves as well
as two classes of persons.

Thereafter, the Defendants filed a notice of removal with the Court
on Feb. 14, 2018.  The Defendants' notice of removal asserted
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2), which is commonly
referred to as the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), as well as
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a).

The Plaintiffs then sought to remand the matter back to state
court.  The Defendants also asked the Court to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' claims.  The Plaintiffs' motion to remand was denied.
The Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in
part.  Namely, the Plaintiffs' class allegations relating to a
"fail-safe" class, paragraphs 45, 57, and 94 were dismissed and
Defendant Ally was dismissed from the action.

FCA now moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's claims
against it.  

Magistrate Judge Bowman finds that the Plaintiffs have provided
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment that they complied
with Ohio's lemon law where they allowed a reasonable number of
attempts for the manufacturer to repair their vehicle, then
returned their nonconforming vehicle, and finally, requested a
refund for said vehicle under the applicable Ohio law.   As such,
FCA has failed to establish that they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law with respect to the Plaintiffs' lemon law claim.

She then finds that whether or not fraud exists is generally a
question of fact.  The Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence
establishing genuine issues of fact relating to FCA's alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations of the lease agreement and/or during
the buy-back process.  Accordingly, FCA's motion for summary
judgement is not well taken in that regard.

Finally, the Magistrate finds that the Plaintiffs' have stated
viable Lemon Law and fraud claims, sufficient to defeat FCA's
motion for judgment as a matter of law.  As the District has
recognized, a claim for an "injunction" "is not an independent
cause of action, but rather a request for relief that is wholly
dependent on the merits of" a viable substantive legal claim.
FCA's contention is not well-taken.

For the reasons she explained, Magistrate Judge Bowman recommended
that Defendant FCA's motion for summary judgment be denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 24, 2020 Report &
Recommendation is available at https://is.gd/SoRkMt from
Leagle.com.


FENTY BEAUTY LLC: Williams Sues Over Blind-Inaccessible Website
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pamela Williams, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
situated visually-impaired individuals, Plaintiff, v. Fenty Beauty
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-04557 (S.D. N.Y., June 15, 2020),
seeks preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory, statutory
and punitive damages and fines, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest, costs and expenses of this action together with
reasonable attorneys' and expert fees and such other and further
relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, New York State
Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law.

Fenty Beauty is a cosmetics and beauty company that owns and
operates www.fentybeauty.com. It offers products and services for
online sale and general delivery to the public. Plaintiff is
legally blind and claims that said website cannot be accessed by
the visually-impaired. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      David Paul Force, Esq.
      STEIN SAKS, PLLC
      285 Passaic Street
      Hackensack, NJ 07601
      Tel: (201) 282-6500 Ext. 107
      Fax: (201) 282-6501
      Email: dforce@steinsakslegal.com


FERRARA CANDY: Davis Polk Secures Appellate Win in Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ambrogio Visconti, writing for Global Legal Chronicle, reports that
Davis Polk secured an appellate victory for its client Ferrara
Candy Company, the maker of SweeTARTS, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The panel unanimously affirmed approval of a nationwide,
injunctive-relief-only class action settlement reached in 2019.

The lawsuit was one of several brought by plaintiffs' lawyers on
behalf of California consumers who purchased products that
allegedly contained synthetic malic acid. Plaintiffs claimed that
SweeTARTS were misbranded and deceptively marketed on the basis
that they contain "No Artificial Flavors." The complaint sought
injunctive relief, restitution and damages on behalf of the class,
based on a purported "price premium" that class members paid.

The parties engaged in pre-discovery mediation and reached a
favorable settlement, in which Ferrara agreed to implement
modifications to product packaging without offering monetary
compensation to the class. Under the terms of the settlement, the
parties agreed to expand the definition of the class to include
consumers nationwide, and class members were required to waive
future damages claims. Three individuals, including the director of
the Center for Class Action Fairness -- a frequent objector to
class action settlements -- filed objections, including on the
grounds that (i) the promised relief did not provide any meaningful
benefit to the class as distinct from future purchasers, and (ii)
the release of the right to pursue damages claims was improper in
the absence of compensation.

After a hearing, the district court overruled those objections and
granted approval of the settlement. One of the objectors appealed,
again arguing that the settlement provided no meaningful relief and
that it is impermissible for a class action settlement to waive the
right of class members to pursue damages claims when a settlement
affords purely injunctive relief. In its opinion affirming the
district court's decision to approve the settlement, the Ninth
Circuit rejected these arguments. The court agreed that the
settlement provided value to the class on the ground that
purchasers of the SweeTARTS products at issue "tend to be repeat
buyers who would derive value from the Settlement's injunctive
relief upon each future purchase." The court also agreed with our
argument that approval of the settlement—including the nationwide
release of money damages claims—was consistent with governing
Ninth Circuit law.

Ferrara, a related company of The Ferrero Group, is an industry
leader in U.S. confections and one of the fastest growing
confections companies in the country.

The Davis Polk litigation team acted for Ferrara Candy Company
included partner Neal A. Potischman (Picture), counsel Andrew Yaphe
and associate Catherine Kennedy. All members of the Davis Polk team
are based in the Northern California office.

Involved fees earner: Catherine Kennedy--Davis Polk & Wardwell;
Neal Potischman--Davis Polk & Wardwell; Andrew Yaphe--Davis Polk &
Wardwell;

Law Firms: Davis Polk & Wardwell

Clients: Ferrara Candy Company [GN]


FIRST NATIONAL: Expert Disclosures Production in Lundquist Ordered
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAMERON LUNDQUIST, an individual, and LEEANA LARA, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. FIRST NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA, a New Hampshire Corporation, and LM GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Illinois Corporation, and CCC INFORMATION SERVICES
INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 18-5301
RJB (W.D. Wash.), Judge Robert J. Bryan of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma, granted the
Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of Rule 26 Expert
Disclosures.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendants' practice of using unexplained and unjustified condition
adjustments to comparable vehicles when valuing a total loss claim
for a vehicle, violates the Washington Administrative Code ("WAC"),
specifically WAC 284-30-391 (4)(b) and (5)(d), and so constitutes:
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, (3) violation of Washington's Consumer
Protection Act and (4) civil conspiracy.  The Plaintiffs seek
damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and
costs.

The class has not been certified.  

The Second Amended Complaint proposes to define the class as: All
individuals insured by First National and LMGIC under a private
passenger vehicle policy who, from the earliest allowable time to
the date of judgment, received a first-party total loss settlement
or settlement offer based in whole or in part on the price of
comparable vehicles reduced by a condition adjustment.  The Second
Amended Complaint further provides that, while the exact number of
members cannot be determined, the class consists at a minimum of
thousands of persons located throughout the State of Washington.

The Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification and by
agreement of the parties, the briefing schedule and other case
deadlines were extended.  The Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification is now noted for consideration on Aug. 3, 2020.  In
support of their motion to certify the class, the Plaintiffs rely,
in part, on the expert opinions of Lance Kaufman and Larry
Hausman-Cohen.

As is relevant to the motion and the Plaintiffs' showing on
damages, Mr. Kaufman's report indicates that he coordinated with
the Plaintiffs' Expert Larry Hausman-Cohen to convert the
information from Defendant CCC Information Services Inc.'s reports
into a Database.  Mr. Kaufman's report further provides that the
Declaration of Larry Hausman-Cohen dated Feb. 20, 2020, describes
the content of the Database and how it was created.  Mr. Kaufman's
expert opinion report then relies extensively on the Database to
draw conclusions about the Plaintiffs' fact of injury and damages.
Hausman-Cohen states that to create the Database, he converted the
documents from a .pdf format to pure text format, then he conducted
search queries and "extracted metrics."

In their motion to compel, the Defendants seek the Database
identified in Paragraph 19 of Hausman-Cohen's report which was
relied upon by Mr. Kaufman.  The request of the Database includes
all of its tables and fields, including the 'Main table,' 'Comps
table,' 'Conditions table,' 'Refurbishments table,' 'Allowances
table,' and 'Notes table' as well as the underlying programs,
computer spreadsheets, calculations, intermediate data files,
computer output files, printouts, and execution logs that were used
to create the Database.  The Defendants argue that Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B) requires the Plaintiffs disclose the Database, and
processes and programs used to create it.  

They note that the Plaintiffs' rely heavily on the two experts'
opinions and the information sought in the motion is relevant to
the Defendants' challenge of the Plaintiff's class certification
arguments.  The Defendants argue that the two partial tables from
the Database that the Plaintiffs finally turned over in late March
are not sufficient because they are not complete and are not the
entire Database.  They also maintain that the Plaintiffs are
required, under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii), to turn over the Database
and how it was made as part of the Plaintiffs' initial disclosure
of their damages.

The Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing that they have met their
obligations under Rule 26.  They argue that they turned over the
portion of the tables the experts relied on, and they did not
manipulate data, but only converted it from .pdf to a text format.
The Plaintiffs assert that all the data at issue is in CCC's
possession and the information sought by the Defendants is
protected by attorney work product.

The Defendants replied.  The deadline for the Plaintiffs' motion
for class certification is Aug. 3, 2020, the fact discovery
deadline is Oct. 15, 2020, the dispositive motions deadline is Oct.
29, 2020, and the trial is set to begin on Feb. 1, 2021.  

Judge Bryan opines that the Defendants' motion to compel should be
granted.  The Plaintiffs' rely on the opinions of both experts in
the motion to certify the class and the experts rely on the
Database.  The information that the Defendants seek (the Database
and the way it was created) is the information both experts
"considered" for purposes of Rule 26.  It is relevant to the
Defendants' challenge of the experts' opinions.  The Defendants are
entitled to the Database and Database-related information they
seek.  In addition, the Plaintiffs fail to offer any grounds as to
why the materials requested constitute attorney work product.  The
experts acknowledge that the Database was a collaborative effort
between these experts.  

Without delay, the Plaintiffs should disclose the Database,
including all of its tables and fields, as well as the underlying
programs, computer spreadsheets, calculations, intermediate data
files, computer output files, printouts, and execution logs that
were used to create the Database.

The Defendants' motion to compel based on Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii)
should also be granted.  The Plaintiffs base their damages
computation, in part, on the Database.  Accordingly, the Database
and how it was created should be disclosed.

For these reasons, Judge Bryan granted the Defendants' Motion to
Compel Production of Rule 26 Expert Disclosures.    

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/ds7UbF from Leagle.com.


FIRST STUDENT: Stewart Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Drivers
-------------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT STEWART, REBECCA
HOWARD and PHILIP MCCALL, for themselves and all others similarly
situated, v. FIRST STUDENT, INC., Case No. 2:20-cv-02556-CDJ (E.D.
Pa.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for an order:

   1. granting conditional certification of and authorizing them
      to disseminate notice of this lawsuit to:

     "all individuals who have worked as First Student Drivers
     in any week during the maximum Fair Labor Standards Act
     limitations period"; and

   2. granting other relief.

First Student, a division of FirstGroup America, is a brand used by
the Scottish transport company FirstGroup for student transport in
the United States. According to the company's website, it is the
largest provider of school bus services in the United States. The
company operates in 39 US states.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David J. Cohen, Esq.
          James B. Zouras, Esq.
          STEPHAN ZOURAS LLP
          604 Spruce Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19106

FIRST TRANSIT: Faces Frazier FCRA Class Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FIRST TRANSIT, INC.
The case is styled as Edward Frazier, on behalf of himself and all
those similarly situated v. FIRST TRANSIT, INC., Case No.
2:20-cv-03368 (E.D. Pa., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

First Transit, Inc. designs, implements, and manages transportation
systems. The Company offers fixed route, shuttle, transit
management, management consulting, and transit contracting
services.

The Plaintiff appears pro se.[BN]


FLORIDA'S NATURAL: 2nd Circuit Affirms Axon Class Action Dismissal
------------------------------------------------------------------
King & Spalding, in an article for JDSupra, reports that on May 29,
the Second Circuit held that an orange juice company's use of the
word "Natural" in its brand name was not deceptive as a matter of
law, notwithstanding the presence of trace amounts of an artificial
herbicide in the company's orange juice products. The court
concluded that a reasonable consumer would not be misled by the
"Natural" brand name because the term appeared nowhere else on the
product packaging, nor did the brand name connote that the orange
juice was "pure" or "100% natural."

* Plaintiff Alexandra Axon filed suit on behalf of a putative class
of consumers who purchased orange juice products from Florida's
Natural Growers ("Florida's Natural"), asserting claims under New
York's consumer protection statutes, as well as claims for breach
of express warranty and unjust enrichment.

* Axon claimed that use of the term "natural" in the "Florida's
Natural" brand name was deceptive because its orange juice products
contained trace amounts of glyphosate (an herbicide used to kill
weeds that is not a natural ingredient).

-- Florida's Natural moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court granted the motion, and Axon appealed.

* On appeal, Axon argued that the district court made improper
evidentiary determinations, applied an overly strict pleading
standard, erred in analyzing the deceptive significance of the
branding, and incorrectly dismissed her unjust enrichment claims as
duplicative. The Second Circuit disagreed.

* The Second Circuit held that the district court correctly
concluded that a reasonable consumer would not be misled by the
word "natural" in the brand name.

   -- The court ruled that a survey that Axon attached to her
proposed amended complaint did not support her allegations because
it did not specifically address any aspect of "Florida's Natural"
products or packaging. As the court noted, the survey concerned the
use of a "natural label," not a brand name that used the term
"natural," and thus the complaint's conclusory allegations were
unsupported by the survey.

   -- The court also reasoned that additional representations on
the packaging, such as "100% Orange Juice," "Non-GMO," and "Not
From Concentrate," provided sufficient context for the brand name
such that it would not mislead a reasonable consumer.

   -- Moreover, the Second Circuit concluded that because the
presence of glyphosate in the orange juice was merely an unintended
byproduct of the production process, rather than an
"intentionally-added ingredient," a reasonable consumer "would not
make assumptions regarding the presence or absence of trace amounts
of glyphosate." This distinguished the case from others in which
the defendant added unnatural ingredients to its product or touted
the products as "pure" or "100% natural"—terms that, unlike
"natural," indicate the absolute absence of contaminants.

* The Second Circuit's ruling adds further complexity to the wide
range of false advertising case law concerning "natural" products.
In particular, it underscores the need to analyze deceptive
labeling claims in their proper context by examining the product
packaging as a whole.

* The case is Axon v. Florida's Natural Growers, Inc. et al., No.
19-203-cv (2d Cir. 2020). [GN]


FLORIDA: Governors Board Seek Dismissal of Suit on Fees Refund
--------------------------------------------------------------
Siddie Friar, writing for Spinnaker, reports that in May, a
University of Florida student filed a class action lawsuit against
the Florida Board of Governors.  Now, the Florida Board of
Governors is filing a motion to dismiss.

This lawsuit differs from others that are asking for refunds on
tuition in that it only asks for refunds for fees paid for on
campus services -- services which were unavailable due to the BOG
mandating remote instruction during the spring semester and the
Governor mandating that campuses close their facilities.

Attorney Matthew Miller and plaintiff Anthony Rojas both
acknowledge that despite the differences in distance learning,
students were still able to continue their studies therefore
tuition costs are valid, which is why they are only seeking refunds
for fees paid for on campus services. The suit states that the BOG
has unlawfully kept these funds during times of financial hardship
for many of their students across the state, passing their losses
to those same families.  

In most consumer situations of this nature, if you pay for a
service or item and can no longer access that service or item, a
refund would be issued without question. The BOG does not seem to
see it that way.

According to the lawsuit, "FBOG is the final authority concerning
waivers of fees at all the constituent Universities and,
accordingly, is ultimately responsible and liable for its decision
not to order prorated refunds of campus fees."

BOG has so far been unwilling to make any comments about the
pending litigation.

According to Miller, the BOG intends to file a motion to dismiss
the class action.

"We do not yet know their reasons, why they think they can have the
case dismissed, but they have said that they do not believe they
have any contracts with the students. We obviously disagree,"
Miller stated.  

"No schedule has been set but we expect a schedule to be set very
soon, and this schedule will provide the time for the defense to
file their motion and for us to respond. We also will be asking to
begin discovery in the case. The Board of Governors has stated that
they will oppose that, too."

Their strategic mission states the BOG has a "commitment to
achieving excellence in the tripartite mission of its state
universities -- teaching, research, and public service -- for the
benefit of Florida's citizens, their communities, and the state
economy." This statement could be taken as language for a contract.
College is expensive. Students and their families often incur great
debt to attend and those institutions have a responsibility to act
in the best interest of their patrons, the students.

Perhaps another pressing issue is that these suits point to
possible future class actions that Universities would be wise to
consider. For example, if a student returned to campus, became ill,
and could not continue their coursework, would the student be
eligible for a refund then?

What would be the overall cost for a campus that finds itself with
an outbreak come fall? The chances of which seem more and more
likely as Florida's COVID-19 numbers continue to rise.

UNF has sent out an email for those who have housing and dining
contracts for the Fall 2020 semester, stating they will not be
entitled to any reimbursement should their contracts end early,
even if they end substantially early.

During the most recent BOG meeting, it was acknowledged that
students will inevitably fall ill during the fall semester. The
campuses primary objective at that point would be to isolate and
contain any outbreaks. All of these factors give rise to questions
about students' safety and potential financial losses which could,
quite possibly, fall squarely on the shoulders of students and
their families.

Faculty have their own concerns about campuses reopening. Recent
articles put out by Inside Higher Ed point to growing faculty
concern across the U.S. about reopening for any face-to-face
instruction come fall semester.

Kevin McClure, an associate professor of higher education at the
University of North Carolina, Wilmington wrote in a column, "during
a global pandemic that has killed more than 120,000 people and
counting in the U.S. alone, what is the responsibility of higher
education institutions? The answer I would like to see from college
leaders is that we have a duty more profound than institutional
budgets or student preferences."

In North Carolina, legislation was passed recently specifically
protecting universities from litigation connected to COVID-19 and
the spring semester. The legislation states "as long as actions
were done to protect public health in response to COVID-19 and the
colleges provided remote learning options for students to complete
coursework," they do not have an obligation to issue refunds for
tuition and other fees.

Whether other states will follow suit remains to be seen at this
point.

There are some serious questions on the table for administrators
and the BOG. The future is shrouded in uncertainty while the
pandemic rages on. No one can say with certainty what higher
education will look like this fall.

Miller hopes that the BOG will 'do the right thing' and issue
prorated refunds to students for services they couldn't use,
setting precedent for any future class action suits for students in
the state. While faculty members continue to push for their input
to be heard and actually implemented in potential reopening plans.


It would seem the ball is in the administrators court, giving them
an opportunity to put their money where their mouth is by putting
'the benefit of Florida's citizens, their communities, and the
state economy' at the heart of their upcoming difficult decisions.
[GN]


FLORIDA: Raysor Asks Sup. Ct. to Flip Ruling in Pay-to-Vote Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Applicants Bonnie Raysor, et al., filed with the Supreme Court of
United States an application to vacate the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's Stay of the Order issued by the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida in the
matter styled BONNIE RAYSOR, ET AL., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Applicants v. RON DESANTIS, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, ET AL., Respondents, Case
No. 19A1071.

Applicants BONNIE RAYSOR, et al., petition to vacate the Stay of
the Order issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit in the case titled Bonnie Raysor, et al. v. Ron
DeSantis, Governor of Florida, et al., Case No. 20-12003.

This application concerns Florida's requirement that three-quarters
of a million of its citizens--persons with prior felony
convictions, who have completed all carceral and supervisory terms
of their sentences--pay money in order to vote.

The Applicants filed suit in cases consolidated before the Northern
District of Florida Judge Robert L. Hinkle in July 2019, alleging,
inter alia, that Florida's pay-to-vote system imposed wealth
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for those
unable to afford their legal financial obligations ("LFOs"), was a
"poll tax or other tax" in violation of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, and-given the State's unnavigable system for determining
the amount of money owed in order to vote-violated applicants'
procedural due process rights and was void for vagueness.

The District Court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to
applicants' wealth discrimination claim on October 18, 2019, citing
Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2019). The
Governor immediately issued a press statement expressing his
agreement with the preliminary injunction and support for the
ruling that those genuinely unable to pay should still have an
avenue for rights restoration, a position his counsel affirmed on
the record, see Order Denying Stay at 5, ECF No. 244, but then
reversed course and appealed.

Following the Eleventh Circuit's panel decision, the court
concluded that the pay-to-vote system failed heightened scrutiny by
creating a wealth barrier to rights restoration without sufficient
justification. The court concluded that Florida's implementation of
the pay-to-vote system is plagued by intractable administrative
problems, which demonstrate its irrationality but also underscore
its separate procedural due process and vagueness infirmities.

The Supreme Court is also likely to grant review of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment claim if the Eleventh Circuit reverses the
district court in order to ensure the Amendment's plain text is
properly applied. That Amendment provides that "[t]he right of
citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for
President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other
tax."[BN]

Applicants-Petitioners Bonnie Raysor, et al., are represented by:

          Paul March Smith, Esq.
          CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
          1101 14th Street, NW, Suite 400
          Washington, DC 20005
          E-mail: psmith@campaignlegalcenter.org


GEORGETOWN REGENTS: Crawford Suit Seeks Tuition Fee Refund
----------------------------------------------------------
Daria Crawford, on behalf of herself and other individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Board of Regents of Georgetown
University, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-01539 (D.C., June 11, 2020),
seeks disgorgement of all amounts wrongfully obtained for tuition,
fees, on-campus housing, and meals, injunctive relief including
enjoining Georgetown University from retaining the pro-rated,
unused monies paid for tuition, fees, on-campus housing and meals,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded and such other and
further relief as may be just and proper, refunds of all tuition
fees paid on a pro-rata basis, together with other damages
resulting from breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Board of Regents of Georgetown University is the governing board
for Georgetown University where Crawford was a full-time
undergraduate student during Spring 2020 semester. Georgetown
decided to close campus, constructively evict students, and
transition all classes to an online/remote format as a result of
the Novel Coronavirus Disease. Crawford claims to be deprived the
benefits of in-person instruction, access to campus facilities,
student activities and other benefits and services in exchange for
which they had already paid fees and tuition. Georgetown University
refused to provide reimbursement for the tuition, fees and other
costs. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Jonathan B. Nace, Esq.
      NIDEL & NACE, PLLC
      2201 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Suite 200
      Washington, DC 20007
      Tel: (202) 780-5153
      Email: jon@nidellaw.com

             - and -

      Jason P. Sultzer, Esq.
      Adam Gonnelli, Esq.
      Jeremy Francis, Esq.
      THE SULTZER LAW GROUP, P.C.
      85 Civic Center Plaza, Suite 104
      Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
      Telephone: (854) 705-9460
      Facsimile: (888) 749-7747
      Email: sultzerj@thesultzerlawgroup.com

             - and -

      Michael A. Tompkins, Esq.
      Jeffrey K. Brown, Esq.
      Brett R. Cohen, Esq.
      LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
      One Old Country Road, Suite 347
      Carle Place, NY 11514
      Tel: (516) 873-9550
      Email: mtompkins@leedsbrownlaw.com
             jbrown@leedsbrownlaw.com
             bcohen@leedsbrownlaw.com


GROCERY DELIVERY: Tippett Sues Over Illegal Marketing Practices
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jeanne Tippett and Stephen Bauer, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated v. GROCERY DELIVERY E-SERVICES USA INC.
DBA HELLO FRESH, Case No. 1:20-cv-05271 (S.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020),
is brought to enforce the consumer-privacy provisions of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The TCPA is a federal statute enacted in 1991 in response to
widespread public outrage about the proliferation of intrusive,
nuisance telemarketing practices.

The Defendant repeatedly violated the TCPA by calling the
Plaintiffs and other putative class members without their consent
using an automated telephone dialer system, according to the
complaint. The Plaintiffs are former Hello Fresh customers and
HelloFresh's repeated calls were part of a telemarketing campaign
aimed at "winning back" their and other former customers'
business.

A class action is the best means of obtaining redress for Hello
Fresh's widespread illegal telemarketing and is consistent both
with the private right of action afforded by the TCPA, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs are adult residents of Michigan.

Hello Fresh is a business headquartered in New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stacey P. Slaughter, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          399 Park Avenue, Suite 3600
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: 212-980-7400
          Email: sslaughter@robinskaplan.com

               - and –

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
          936 North 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103-8869
          Phone: (608) 237-1775
          Email: sam@turkestrauss.com

               - and -

          Anthony Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln Street, Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Phone: 617-485-0018
          Email: anthony@paronichlaw.com


GUAM: Attorney Seeks Payment of $2MM in Retirees Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The Guam Daily reports that after winning a class-action lawsuit
over the cost-of-living allowance for government retirees in 2006,
attorney Mike Phillips is back in court, this time fighting for
approximately $2 million owed to him for more than 12 years.

In November 2006, the Superior Court of Guam issued a judgment
awarding the COLA class and their attorney $123.5 million.
Phillips, as class counsel, was awarded approximately $12.4 million
and periodic payments were made from 2007 through 2009.

The COLA Relief Act, enacted into Public Law 29-19, on Sept. 23,
2007, allowed Phillips to request and receive a certificate for no
more than 50% of the amount owed to him by the government of Guam.

In an amended petition filed with the District Court of Guam on
July 2, Phillips alleges that Department of Administration Director
Edward Birn and the government of Guam have denied what is owed to
him despite prior admissions of their responsibility to issue a
certificate of claim for the amount of money owed.

Phillips alleges Birn consulted with "highly and politically
connected individuals" and decided not to honor his valid
certificate of claim, in large part because of allegations
Phillips' law firm did not "sufficiently support the candidacy of
Birn's chosen team for governor and lieutenant governor," court
documents state.

The complaint alleges Birn's actions violated Phillips'
constitutional and Organic Act rights.

The lawsuit also alleges Birn utilized funds secured from
commercial notes sold for a limited purpose and further used these
restricted funds appropriated by the Legislature, only to pay for
certificates of claim, as he desired, singling out the petitioner
without justification and for an illegal motive.

Phillips has asked the court to require Birn to personally pay back
and return all moneys secured from investors and order the
government to issue the certificate of claim as mandated by law.
[GN]


GUESTLOGIX INC: Approval Hearing in Securities Suit Set for Aug. 13
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Spark LLP announced that if you are a person or entity, other than
an "Excluded Person", who acquired securities of GuestLogix Inc.
("GuestLogix") during the period from June 8, 2015 to and including
November 12, 2015, and who held some or all of those securities at
the close of trading on November 12, 2015 (defined as the "Class"),
then this notice is for you.

In 2016, a proposed securities class action was commenced against
GuestLogix and two of its former officers in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice (the "Court").  It is alleged that during the
period from June 8, 2015 to and including November 12, 2015 (the
"Class Period"), the Defendants made misrepresentations and/or
omissions of material fact regarding credit facilities that
GuestLogix had entered into and in regard to financial covenants
pertaining to those credit facilities. The parties have reached a
proposed settlement of the class action, which is subject to
approval by the Court (the "Agreement").  The Defendants do not
admit any wrongdoing or liability.  The Agreement is a compromise
of disputed claims.  This Notice provides a summary of the proposed
settlement.

Under the Agreement, the Defendants will pay or cause to be paid
CAD$1,275,000 (the "Settlement Amount") in full and final
settlement of all claims against them, including Class Counsel's
fees, applicable taxes and expenses, and interest, in exchange for
a full release and a dismissal of the class action.  The Settlement
Amount, less Class Counsel's fees and disbursements, administration
expenses and taxes will be distributed to the Class on a pro rata
share in accordance with the Court-approved Plan of Allocation.
The Agreement and Plan of Allocation may be viewed at
https://spark.law/guestlogix/ .

There will be a hearing (the "Approval Hearing") in which Class
Counsel will request the Court to approve (i) the Agreement; and
(ii) their legal fees and expenses.  The Approval Hearing shall
take place on August 13, 2020 via video-conferencing methods such
as Zoom or by conference call.

At the Approval Hearing, the Court will determine whether the
Agreement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the
Class.  At the Approval Hearing, Class Counsel will also seek Court
approval of their request for fees equal to 28% of the Settlement
Amount plus reimbursement of their relevant expenses.  Class
Counsel has been working under a contingency-fee agreement and has
not been paid as the matter has proceeded, and has paid all the
expenses of conducting the litigation.  Class Counsel will be
requesting that the legal fees and disbursements be deducted from
the Settlement Amount.

Class Members do not have to do anything to stay in the class
action.  If the Court approves the Agreement and any benefits,
including the Settlement Amount become available for distribution
to the Class, you will be notified about how to request a portion.
If you stay in the action you will be legally bound by all orders
and judgments of the Court and will not be able to sue the
Defendants regarding the legal claims made in this case.
Conversely, investors can opt-out of the proposed settlement and
pursue their own action with their own lawyer at their own expense.
A copy of the long-form notice providing greater detail about the
settlement, including about Class Counsel's fees that will be
requested of the Court, your right to oppose the settlement, the
hearing of the motion to approve the settlement, and the right to
opt-out is available at https://spark.law/guestlogix/.  Interested
class members may submit their email addresses to the website to
stay informed of developments.

Any Class Member may participate in the Approval Hearing to object
to the Agreement or comment on the Agreement or Class Counsel's
request for fees, so long as they email any objections or comments
to Class Counsel at guestlogix@spark.law no later than August 5,
2020. Class Members who do not email an objection or comment by
August 5, 2020 will not be permitted to participate in the Approval
Hearing.

Contact:

        Spark LLP
        Sarah Petersen
        Tel: 416-639-2158 [GN]


HAMILTON BEACH: Frank R. Cruz Law Reminds of July 21 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz reminds investors that class
action lawsuits have been filed on behalf of shareholders of the
following publicly-traded companies.  Investors have until the
deadlines listed below to file a lead plaintiff motion.

Investors suffering losses on their investments are encouraged to
contact The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz to discuss their legal
rights in these class actions at 310-914-5007 or by email to
fcruz@frankcruzlaw.com.

Elanco Animal Health Incorporated (NYSE: ELAN)
Class Period:  January 10, 2020 – May 6, 2020
Lead Plaintiff Deadline:  July 20, 2020

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Elanco made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, Elanco failed to disclose to investors: (1) that,
after consolidating its distributors from eight to four, the
Company increased the amount of inventory, including companion
animal products, held by each distributor; (2) that Elanco's
distributors were not experiencing sufficient demand to sell
through the inventory; (3) that, as a result, the Company's revenue
was reasonably likely to decline; (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Elanco would reduce its channel inventory with respect
to companion animal products; and (5) that, as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Ryder System, Inc. (NYSE: R)
Class Period:  July 23, 2015 – February 13, 2020
Lead Plaintiff Deadline:  July 20, 2020

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Ryder made
false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose: (1)
that Ryder's financial results were inflated as a result of the
Company's practice of overstating the residual values of the
vehicles in its fleet because there was no reasonable basis to
believe that the Company would sell its used vehicles for the
amounts that it had assigned to them; and (2) that, as a result,
Ryder's residual values for its fleet of vehicles exceeded the
expected future values that would be realized upon the sale of
those vehicles by such a degree that the Company ultimately took a
$357 million depreciation charge in 2019 related to Ryder's
reduction of its residual values to align them with the amounts for
which they could realistically be sold.

Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company (NYSE: HBB)
Class Period:  February 27, 2020 – May 8, 2020
Lead Plaintiff Deadline:  July 21, 2020

The complaint alleges that Hamilton made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose: (1) that Hamilton had
inadequate disclosure controls and procedures and internal control
over financial reporting, particularly with respect to one of its
Mexican subsidiaries; (2) consequently, Hamilton's accounting
included certain irregularities with respect to the timing of
recognition of selling and marketing expenses and the
classification of certain expenditures within the statement of
operations at this Mexican subsidiary, as well as potential
misconduct with respect to the realizability of certain assets of
the Mexican subsidiary; (3) as a result of all the foregoing,
Hamilton could not accurately attest to its financial results,
particularly with respect to these metrics, and was consequently at
an increased risk of delaying the filing of its period reports with
the SEC; and (4) as a result, the Company's public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

To be a member of these class actions, you need not take any action
at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice or take no
action and remain an absent member of the class action.  If you
wish to learn more about these class actions, or if you have any
questions concerning this announcement or your rights or interests
with respect to these matters, please contact Frank R. Cruz, of The
Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz, 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1100,
Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-914-5007, by email to
info@frankcruzlaw.com, or visit our website at
www.frankcruzlaw.com.  If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number, and number of shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts

The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz, Los Angeles
Frank R. Cruz, 310-914-5007
fcruz@frankcruzlaw.com
www.frankcruzlaw.com [GN]


HANSEN & ADKINS: Summary Adjudication of Luna's Claim Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LEONARD LUNA, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated; IAN HALL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HANSEN AND
ADKINS AUTO TRANSPORT, INC., a California Corporation; DOES, 1-10,
inclusive, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 18-55804 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's summary adjudication of Luna's claim.

Luna joins a long line of litigants challenging aspects of the
federal consumer credit report regime.  His theory, however, is
more novel than most: Luna contends an employer violates the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by providing a FCRA disclosure
simultaneously with other employment materials, and by failing to
place a FCRA authorization on a standalone document.  

Luna is a former employee of Hansen & Adkins, a vehicle
transportation business employing over 1,100 big rig truckers,
mechanics, dispatchers, and other support staff.  His FCRA claim
stems from Hansen & Adkins's hiring process, which involved a
Commercial Driver Employment Application.  That multi-form,
multi-page application included notices and authorizations
permitting Hansen & Adkins to retrieve safety history and driving
records, and conduct drug and background checks.

Luna filed a putative class action alleging Hansen & Adkins's
hiring process violated FCRA's disclosure and authorization
requirements.  FCRA forbids procurement of a consumer report for
employment purposes unless a clear and conspicuous disclosure has
been made in writing to the consumer in a document that consists
solely of the disclosure.  Luna claims Hansen & Adkins violated
that provision by presenting the disclosure together with other
application materials.  The argument stretches the statute's
requirements beyond the limits of law and common sense.  It is true
that FCRA requires that a disclosure form contain nothing more than
the disclosure itself, but no authority suggests that a disclosure
must be distinct in time, as well.

Luna nevertheless attempts to bootstrap FCRA's physical requirement
into a temporal one, relying on Syed v. M-I, LLC.  In Syed, the
Court held that the inclusion of a liability waiver in a disclosure
document violated FCRA, because the statute unambiguously requires
a document that consists solely of the disclosure.  Observing that
the "ordinary meaning of 'solely' is 'alone; 'singly' or 'entirely;
'exclusively,' Judge McKeown concluded that FCRA precludes the
inclusion of any terms besides a disclosure and an exempted
authorization.  But nothing in Syed can be read to prohibit an
employer from providing a standalone FCRA disclosure
contemporaneously with other employment documents.

Indeed, the Judge decisively rejected the argument last year,
noting that no judicial authority, legislative history or
dictionary definition" supports the proposition that the word
'document,' as used in FCRA, encompasses the universe of employment
application materials furnished by an employer to a prospective
employee."  Were she to accept Luna's argument that a FCRA
disclosure cannot be presented together with other employment
documents, the Judge holds it is difficult to see how an employer
could ever provide an applicant written application materials
without violating FCRA's standalone document requirement.  Hansen &
Adkins's disclosure may have been provided alongside other
application materials, but it appeared in a standalone
document—precisely what FCRA requires.

The disclosure is similarly "clear and conspicuous," which the
Judge has interpreted in the context of FCRA to mean a "reasonably
understandable form" that is "readily noticeable to the consumer."
The disclosure, entitled "FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT," explains in plain language that, as required by law,
the applicant is "informed that reports verifying your previous
employment, previous drug and alcohol test results, and your
driving record may be obtained on you for employment purposes."
Aside from that notice, the disclosure contains nothing but the
employer logos and signature lines.

Luna contends the co-presentation of the disclosure and
authorization renders the disclosure neither clear nor conspicuous.
But it is both, and applicants, such as big-rig truckers, can be
expected to notice a standalone document featuring a bolded,
underlined, capital-lettered heading.

Luna argues Hansen & Adkins also violated FCRA by failing to put
the authorization in a clear and conspicuous, standalone document.
The attempted wholesale importation of FCRA's disclosure
requirements runs aground on the statutory language, which provides
only that a prospective employer must obtain the authorization "in
writing."   Crucially, the authorization subsection of FCRA lacks
the disclosure subsection's standalone document requirement.  The
authorization form is not relevant to the disclosure form standard
set forth in the statute where, as in the case, the authorization
is not included in the Disclosure.  As FCRA dictates only that a
consumer authorization be "in writing," without specifying its
format, Hansen & Adkins's authorization conformed to the
requirements of the statute.

In light of the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's summary adjudication of Luna's claim.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's April 24, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/TOT0sS from Leagle.com.

Leonard Luna, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated & Ian Hall, Plaintiffs, represented by Aashish Y. Desai --
aashish@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm PC & Maria Adrianne De
Castro -- adrianne@desai-law.com -- Desai Law Firm PC.

Hansen and Adkins Auto Transport, Inc, a California Corporation,
Defendant, represented by Victor J. Cosentino, Larson and Gaston
LLP.


HARTFORD FINANCIAL: Faces William Class Suit in District of Utah
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Hartford
Financial Services Group. The case is styled as William W. Simpson
Enterprises, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. The Hartford Financial Services Group, Case No.
4:20-cv-00075-DN (D. Utah, July 9, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance Contract.

The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., usually known as The
Hartford, is a United States-based investment and insurance
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Walter J. Bird, Esq.
          PO BOX 14
          Monticello, UT 84535
          Phone: (435) 459-1838
          Email: walterbird@hotmail.com


HARVARD UNIVERSITY: Barkhordar Files Class Action for Reimbursement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
J. Griffin, writing for the Harvard Crimson, reports that Harvard
Law School student Abraham Barkhordar filed a class action lawsuit
against Harvard asking for partial reimbursement of tuition for the
online spring semester.

Barkhordar - a rising second-year student - filed a complaint in
the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts alleging the school
provided a "subpar" educational experience following its transition
to remote instruction in March due to the coronavirus pandemic. The
complaint demands the University proportionally refund tuition to
all class members for the spring and for any future online academic
terms — damages, the suit argues, that exceed $5 million.

The lawsuit claims the lack of in-person access to resources and a
collaborative learning environment during the remote semester
failed to meet the quality of education students were promised in
exchange for their tuition and fees.

"While students enrolled and paid Defendant for a comprehensive
academic experience, Defendant instead offered Plaintiff and the
Class Members something far less: a limited online experience
presented by Zoom, void of face-to-face faculty and peer
interaction, separated from program resources, and barred from
facilities vital to study," it reads.

In an interview with The Crimson, Barkhordar attributed his
decision to attend the Law School to his ability to interact with
professors and students across campus and in class.

"A lot of law school revolves around a lively in-class debate —
whether it's a heated argument or funny banter," he said. "It's
just not the same over Zoom."

The complaint also argues Barkhordar experienced a decrease in
academic rigor and standards. The Law School shifted to a mandatory
credit-fail grading system shortly after the transition to online
learning.

"Such decreased assignments and reduced expectations in turn have
reduced and negated the educational experience for which Plaintiff
paid Defendant," the complaint reads.

University spokesperson Jonathan L. Swain and Law School
spokesperson Jeff Neal declined to comment on the lawsuit.
Advertisement

Warren T. Burns, one of the lawyers representing Barkhordar, said
in an interview that the University approached the move to remote
instruction with "pretty deaf ears" by not discounting tuition
after the lives of students were disrupted.

"By continuing distance learning and refusing to refund or rebate
tuition and fees, the University is, in essence, unjustly enriched
as a result," Burns said.

The lawsuit follows a June 3 announcement that the Law School,
among other graduate schools at the University, will hold its fall
semester online.

The school subsequently faced backlash after hosting a series of
informational webinars about the decision in which administrators
made comments about the fall semester which students alleged were
insulting. The controversial statements during the webinars
included a suggestion for students to use grants and loans to rent
an office space if they need a quiet place to study remotely.

Law School spokesperson Jeff Neal wrote in a statement at the time
that students needed to determine what option was best for them.

"Ultimately, we indicated that every student must determine which
options make the most sense for them, depending on their particular
circumstances," Neal wrote at the time.

Barkhordar said his decision to take legal action against the
University stemmed from these comments and the administration's
handling of worries about the fall semester.

"The administration's response to students' valid concerns has been
really disrespectful," he said. "To say the least, I wanted to take
a stand against it and represent my classmates who are some of the
most amazing, motivated people I've met in my life."

The Law School administration did address tuition concerns on its
website, noting that it already canceled its expected tuition
increase, but that cutting tuition is a University-level decision.

Barkhordar's complaint marks the second multi-million dollar
lawsuit filed against Harvard for its online educational experience
during the pandemic. Several other Ivy League schools, including
Brown, Columbia, and Cornell, face similar class action lawsuits
for tuition reimbursements.
Advertisement

LeElle B. Slifer, a Law School graduate and another attorney for
Barkhordar, said she understands the difficult decisions and
financial situation Harvard faces due to the pandemic but
ultimately agrees that students should not pay for on-campus
benefits they are not receiving.

"Harvard is being incredibly tone-deaf right now, and it's
basically trying to profit off of these 18 and
20-something-year-olds, and that's just not fair," she said. "We're
just trying to get what's fair for the students who are taking out
loans in their name."  [GN]


HARVEST HOSPITALITIES: Duke Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
-----------------------------------------------------
Taylor Duke, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Harvest Hospitalities, Inc. and Sattar
Shaik, Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-00865, (W.D. Pa., June 12, 2020),
seeks unpaid overtime compensation owed, liquidated damages,
billed, unpaid and unreimbursed expenses, pre- and post-judgment
interest as well as the litigation costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees incurred and such further relief under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.

Harvest Hospitalities is a restaurant chain owned by Sattar Shaik
operating over twenty "IHOP" restaurants in Pennsylvania. Duke
worked for Harvest as a shift manager from on or about January 1,
2020, at Harvest's Robinson, PA, IHOP restaurant until she was
transferred to the Homestead, PA, IHOP restaurant on or about March
18, 2020. She regularly worked more than 40 hours in workweeks but
was not paid overtime. Harvest also allegedly falsified employees'
time records in order to reduce their pay. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

     Joseph H. Chivers, Esq.
     THE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS GROUP, LLC
     First & Market Building, Suite 650
     100 First Avenue
     Pittsburgh, PA 15222
     Tel: (412) 227-0763
     Fax: (412) 774-1994
     Email: jchivers@employmentrightsgroup.com


HAVEN LIFE INSURANCE: Sosa Alleges Violation under ADA
------------------------------------------------------
Haven Life Insurance Agency, LLC is facing a class action lawsuit
filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is
styled as Yony Sosa, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Haven Life Insurance Agency, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-05255 (S.D. N.Y., July 8, 2020).

Haven Life Insurance Agency, LLC operates as an insurance
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
   150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
   New York, NY 10003
   Tel: (212) 228-9795
   Fax: (212) 982-6284
   Email: nyjg@aol.com



HIMAGINE SOLUTIONS: Hazel Labor Suit Removed to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as BRIAN HAZEL, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. HIMAGINE SOLUTIONS,
INC., and DOES 1-100, inclusive, Case No. 20STCV17008 (Filed April
29, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California on July 8, 2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-06072 to the proceeding.

The complaint asserts claims against Himagine under California
state law for failure to compensate for all hours worked, failure
to pay minimum wage, failure to pay overtime wages, and failure to
timely reimburse for necessary business expenditures.

Himagine Solutions provides healthcare outsourcing solutions.[BN]

The Defendant Himagine Solutions is represented by:

          Zachary P. Hutton, Esq.
          Anna M. Skaggs, Esq.
          Emily R. Pidot, Esq.
          PAUL HASTINGS LLP
          101 California Street, 48th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 856-7000
          Facsimile: (415) 856-7100
          E-mail: zachhutton@paulhastings.com
                  annaskaggs@paulhastings.com
                  emilypidot@paulhastings.com


HONG HUANG: Goins Sues to Recover Withheld Tips
-----------------------------------------------
Rochelle E. Goins, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. Hong Huang, Bapu Teafresh LLC,
Thrivingteehee, LLC and A&A Food LLC, Defendants, Case No.
20-cv-01621 (S.D. Ind., June 12, 2020), seeks all available
damages, including all equitable relief, all available compensatory
damages, all available punitive damages, lost wages and benefits,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses under the Fair Labor
Standards Act in order to recover tip wages which have been
illegally withheld.

Defendants operate three restaurants in Bloomington, Indiana called
Bapu Teahouse, Bapu Fresh and Zero Degrees. Plaintiff was hired in
early May 2019 and voluntarily resigned her employment on June 5,
2020. She claims that her credit and debit card paid tips have been
illegally kept by the Defendants. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Robert P. Kondras, Jr., Esq.
      HUNT, HASSLER, KONDRAS & MILLER LLP
      100 Cherry Street
      Terre Haute, IN 47807
      Tel: (812) 232-9691
      Facsimile: (812) 234-2881
      Email: kondras@huntlawfirm.net

             - and -

      James L. Whitlatch, Esq.
      BUNGER & ROBERTSON
      226 South College Avenue
      Bloomington, IN 47404
      Tel: (812) 332-9295
      Email: jwhit@lawbr.com


HORIZONS ETFS: Norton Rose Attorney Discusses Ruling in Wright Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Erika Anschuetz, Esq. -- erika.anschuetz@nortonrosefulbright.com --
of Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP, in an article for Mondaq,
reports that the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Wright v. Horizons ETFS Management (Canada) Inc. (2020 ONCA 337) is
significant for two reasons.  First, it recognizes the existence of
a duty of care owed by a fund manager to purchasers of units of the
fund in relation to the allegedly negligent design of the fund. In
addition, it opens the door to potential claims under s. 130 of the
Ontario Securities Act against fund managers in relation to
misrepresentations in the fund's prospectus notwithstanding that
the funds are sold over a stock exchange.

The proposed class action was commenced on behalf of investors in a
complex, derivatives-based exchange-traded fund (the Fund) managed
by Horizons ETFS Management (Canada) Inc. (Horizons).  The fund,
which invested in futures contracts, was meant to provide inverse
exposure to stock market volatility.

Units in the fund were distributed by Horizons to brokers and
dealers through a continuous distribution agreement.  The newly
created units were called Creation Units.  Units were sold over the
stock exchange, and investors did not know if they were purchasing
Creation Units or units from inventory that had previously been in
circulation on the secondary market.

Prior to trading units of the Fund, Horizons filed a prospectus in
which the Fund was described as "highly speculative" and involving
a "high degree of risk".

As a result of the Fund experiencing a dramatic loss of value of
over 80% in a single day, the representative plaintiff, Graham
Wright (Wright), brought a class action under Ontario's Class
Proceedings Act, 1992.  The claim alleged that Horizons was
negligent in designing, developing, offering, and promoting the
Fund, which was excessively risky and doomed to fail.  Second, it
asserted a statutory cause of action under s. 130 of the Securities
Act based upon alleged misrepresentations in the Fund's
prospectus.

Wright's motion for certification of the claim as a class action
failed as it did not disclose a cause of action (reported at 2019
ONSC 3827). The Motion Judge held that it was plain and obvious
that Horizons owed the class no duty of care. Further, the class
did not have a cause of action under s. 130 of the Securities Act.
Because units of the Fund were bought and sold by brokers and
dealers in the secondary market, the action ought to have been
brought under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act (which creates a cause
of action for misrepresentations for secondary market purchasers),
rather than s. 130 (which provides a cause of action in relation to
misrepresentations in a prospectus for funds distributed on the
primary market).

On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the Motion
Judge's conclusion that Horizons did not owe a duty of care to the
class, finding that the claim disclosed a duty of care under the
recognized category of negligent performance of a service.
Specifically, the claim alleged that Horizons created the Fund for
investment, earned money from the promotion and management of the
Fund, and undertook to provide a financial product that was
suitable for investors.  The claim further alleged that the Fund
was not suitable for some investors, contained an undisclosed
design flaw, and was doomed to fail. On the basis of those alleged
facts, the claim demonstrated a relationship of proximity between
Horizons and the class such that the risk of injury to the class
was reasonably foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal held that even if the claim did not fall within
the recognized category of negligent performance of a service, the
claim nonetheless disclosed a novel claim for breach of the duty of
care. According to the Court, Horizons undertook to act honestly,
in good faith, and in the best interests of the Fund, and to
exercise the degree of care and diligence that a prudent person
would exercise in the circumstances, as provided for in s. 116 of
the Securities Act.  In failing to disclose the alleged design flaw
that doomed the Fund to failure, Horizons breached its duty of care
and statutory duties under the Securities Act. It was not plain and
obvious that any of the usual policy considerations negated the
imposition of a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal also disagreed with the basis of the Motion
Judge's determination that it was plain and obvious that the claim
was not properly brought under s. 130 of the Securities Act.  The
Court determined that the sale of Creation Units constitutes a
"distribution" as defined in the Securities Act and that Creation
Units were therefore primary market units under the Securities Act.
Purchasers of Creation Units should be entitled to invoke their
rights under s. 130 of the Securities Act to seek redress for
misrepresentations made in the Fund's prospectus.

The fact that Creation Units were commingled with other units
trading in the secondary market, making it difficult for class
members to determine whether they had received Creation Units or
secondary market units, should not deny them the right to seek
relief under s. 130.  However, the statement of claim, as drafted,
did not disclose a cause of action under s. 130 because Wright
failed to plead that he purchased one or more Creation Units.

As a result, the appeal was allowed in part. Wright was given leave
to amend the statement of claim to plead material facts to support
the cause of action under s. 130 of the Securities Act, and the
matter was remitted the matter to the Motion Judge for
determination as to whether the remaining certification criteria
are satisfied.

Takeaways

While the decision makes it possible for a fund purchaser to bring
a s. 130 claim in respect to an alleged misrepresentation in a fund
prospectus, the decision suggests that simply because a class
member does not to know if he or she purchased a unit in the
primary offering does not mean that the class member has a cause of
action under s. 130.  If a class member purchased in the secondary
market, a s. 138.3 claim must be pursued, which unlike s. 130 will
require leave of the court. [GN]


HORIZONS ETFS: Torys Attorneys Discuss Ruling in Wright Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
John A. Fabello, Esq. -- jfabello@torys.com -- Gillian Dingle, Esq.
-- gdingle@torys.com -- and Lara Guest, Esq. -- lguest@torys.com --
of Torys LLP, in an article for Mondaq, report that in Wright v.
Horizons ETFs Management (Canada) Inc. (Horizons), the Ontario
Court of Appeal concluded, in the context of a class action
certification motion, that investment fund managers may owe a new
common law duty of care to investors with respect to the creation,
marketing and/or management of an exchange traded investment fund
(ETF) (ETFs are securities that are comprised of a basket of
securities. Unlike a mutual fund whose units are not traded on an
exchange, ETFs trade on exchanges and their prices can fluctuate
throughout the trading day.).  Further, the Court determined, for
the first time in Canadian law, that claims for misrepresentations
arising out of the sale of ETFs may be brought under section 130 of
the Ontario Securities Act (OSA) (which relates to primary, rather
than secondary market misrepresentations).

Background

The Fund

Horizons ETFs Management Inc. (Horizons) offered what the court
described as a highly complex derivative ETF designed to provide
inverse exposure to stock market volatility (the Fund). Like many
ETFs, the Fund was passively managed.

The Fund's prospectus, for which the Ontario Securities Commission
(OSC) had issued a receipt, included a warning that the units in
the Fund were "highly speculative" and "involve a high degree of
risk."

ETFs are unlike other investment funds in the way they are
distributed, and the manner of distribution was a key fact in this
case. All ETF fund units are acquired by investment dealers from
the fund, and sold on to investors through the stock exchanges, at
prices dictated by the net asset value of the fund and its market
price. When investors purchase units of an ETF, they are either
buying newly created fund units—Creation Units—that were
distributed pursuant to a prospectus, or units that are in the
dealer's inventory—Inventory Units—but have already been in
circulation and trading on an exchange. Investors have no way of
knowing whether they have received Creation Units or Inventory
Units and thus, whether they have purchased units issued under a
prospectus, or units which have been freely traded in the
marketplace. The distinction bears on whether investors who sue for
damages have a cause of action for prospectus misrepresentation
(under section 130 of the OSA) or for misrepresentations in the
secondary market (the cause of action under Part XXIII.1 of the
OSA).

The events of February 5, 2018

On February 5, 2018 the stock markets experienced significant
volatility, which resulted in the Fund sustaining a loss of more
than 80% of its value in one day. As a result, investors saw a
drastic loss of value in their investments in the Fund.

On April 10, 2018, Horizons announced it was terminating the Fund,
on the basis that it no longer offered an acceptable risk/reward
trade-off for investors.

Lower Court decision

Graham Wright commenced a proposed class proceeding against
Horizons on behalf of investors in the Fund. He brought a motion to
certify two causes of action against Horizons: common law
negligence and prospectus misrepresentation under section 130 of
the OSA. The motion judge assessed whether these causes of action
were tenable. He refused certification on the basis that it was
plain and obvious that neither claims disclosed a reasonable cause
of action.

Wright pleaded that Horizons was negligent in the development,
promotion and management of the Fund. The motion judge declined to
recognize a novel duty of care in these circumstances. He held that
the plaintiff's claims were not within the scope of Horizons'
undertaking as an ETF provider to operate an ETF product as
described in the accompanying disclosure document. Horizon had
operated its Fund in accordance with the prospectus. As a result,
Horizons could not be held responsible for investors' losses.

The motion judge held that there were policy reasons against
extending a duty of care for pure economic loss in these
circumstances. For example, this novel duty of care might:

  1. deter useful economic activity where the parties are best
     left to allocate risks through the autonomy of contract,
     insurance, and due diligence;

  2. encourage a multiplicity of inappropriate lawsuits;

  3. arguably disturb the balance between statutory and
     common law securities actions envisioned by the
     legislator; and

4. introduce the courts to a significant regulatory
    function when existing causes of action, the regulators,
    and the marketplace already provide remedies.

The judge also found it plain and obvious that Wright had no cause
of action for prospectus misrepresentation under section 130 of the
OSA. He reasoned that because investors could only purchase ETFs
from investment dealers and not from Horizons directly, they would
not know if they were purchasing Creation Units (primary market) or
Inventory Units (secondary market) such that there was no claim
under section 130 of the OSA. As a result of his conclusion that it
was plain and obvious that neither the negligence claim nor the
section 130 claim could succeed, the motion judge dismissed the
action.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the motion judge and
ordered that the case be remanded back to him for a determination
of whether the remaining elements of the test for certification
could be met.

The Court of Appeal found that Horizons could owe investors a duty
of care with respect to the design of the Fund, despite it being
structured and sold as a passive index-tracking investment product.
It was possible that the plaintiff had a claim of "negligent
performance of a service". Additionally, the Court of Appeal
concluded that it may be appropriate to recognize a novel duty of
care for investment fund managers. The Court of Appeal held that
Horizons' undertaking to investors could also include a dimension
of suitability. On this basis, the Court of Appeal would not
foreclose that Horizons could owe a duty of care as alleged by the
plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal also found that an ETF investor could bring a
claim under section 130 of the OSA if the investor had purchased
Creation Units. The fact that an investor was unable to tell at the
time of purchase whether they were purchasing a Creation Unit or an
Inventory Unit should not, according to the Court of Appeal,
disentitle purchasers of Creation Units from bringing a claim under
section 130 of the OSA.

Implications of the decision

This decision may have significant legal implications for the
certification of class actions claiming investment fund losses.

A potentially lower bar for class action plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeal has indicated that it is willing to be more permissive than
some class action motion judges regarding the application of
5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, thereby allowing claims
to pass the certification test and proceed to testing the merits on
a full evidentiary record. In this case, that willingness is
demonstrated in the court interpreting and applying established and
long-standing statutory (section 130 of the OSA) and common law
(negligence) causes of action in a generous way so as to permit the
plaintiff to "have his day in court".

An injection of the "suitability" standard into common law
obligations of ETFs. The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that it
was possible that a passively managed fund could owe a duty to
ensure that its product is suitable for investors. It remains to be
determined whether this duty is in fact owed, and how courts will
expect funds to make such suitability determinations, as the
managers of ETFs do not have a direct relationship with investors.

The possibility of new obligations for passively managed funds. It
is unclear whether passively-managed funds may have an obligation
to engage in active management in certain circumstances. Whether
such an obligation exists, and the circumstances in which courts
will expect a passively-management fund to engage in active
management, are yet to be determined. [GN]


HSBC BANK: Court Denies Bid to Compel Arbitration in Cheng Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued
a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration in the case captioned JI DONG CHENG v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., Case No. 20-cv-1551 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y).

The Defendant moves to compel arbitration of this case, brought by
the Plaintiff under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and several
state law causes of action.

On Friday, May 31, 2019, the Plaintiff transferred $100,000 to his
account with the Defendant through an Automated Clearing House
(ACH) network. The Plaintiff alleges, however, that the Defendant
did not apply interest on the account until, at the earliest,
Tuesday, June 4, 2019. Further, on Tuesday, November 26, 2019, the
Plaintiff made another $100,00 ACH transfer to the account, but the
Defendant did not apply interest on the deposit until, at the
earliest, Friday, November 29, 2019.

The Defendant moves to compel the parties to arbitrate this
dispute, citing the arbitration clause in the separate Electronic
Balance Transfer Service Agreement (Service Agreement), which the
Plaintiff signed at the time he opened his account.

In the present case, the dispute concerns the Defendant's
representation in the Terms and Charges Disclosures that interest
begins to accrue on the Business Day you deposit noncash items
(e.g., checks). Because the Service Agreement does not mention
interest at all, the Plaintiff's claims are, at best, collateral to
it. The Defendant's suggestion that the claims are arbitrable
because the evidence HSBC will submit in support of its defense
will necessarily touch on' the Service Agreement demonstrates its
misunderstanding of the broad/narrow distinction.

First, the touch matters standard applies to broad arbitration
clauses, not narrow clauses. Second, the fact that a party's
defenses to a claim may implicate arbitrable subject matter says
very little about whether the claim is itself arbitrable. Rather,
when dealing with narrow arbitration clauses, courts must determine
whether plaintiffs by their particular allegations have brought the
dispute within the terms of the arbitrable agreement.

Here, a fair reading of the complaint evidences that the
allegations do not bring the dispute within the terms of the
Service Agreement.

Perhaps the most relevant section of the Service Agreement in favor
of arbitration in this case is the one titled Business
Days/Processing Time, which provides that the Service will process
requests for transfers on business days. Our business days are
Monday through Friday. Federal Reserve Bank Holidays are not
included. The Electronic Balance Transfer may take up to four
business days before it is credited to your HSBC account.

Put in simpler terms, the Plaintiff's complaint expresses no
opposition to the substance of the Service Agreement. Rather, it
takes issue with the Defendant's interpretation of the Master
Agreement or, alternatively, with the Defendant's failure to abide
by the Master Agreement. This falls outside the limited realm of a
dispute or disagreement with the other regarding the Service.

In the end, the main concern in deciding the scope of arbitration
agreements is to faithfully reflect the reasonable expectations of
those who commit themselves to be bound by them. Given the narrow
application of the Service Agreement's arbitration clause and the
claims plaintiff brings that may relate to, but are not regarding,
the relevant Service, there is no reasonable expectation that the
Plaintiff had pre-committed himself to arbitration for a dispute
like this one.

The Defendant's motion to compel arbitration is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 15, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion and Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/y7un3apu from
Leagle.com.


IDEANOMICS INC: Gainey McKenna Reminds of Aug. 27 Motion Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on July 1 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed against Ideanomics, Inc. ("Ideanomics" or
the "Company") (NASDAQ: IDEX) in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York on behalf of those who
purchased or acquired the securities of Ideanomics between March
20, 2020 and June 25, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period").  The
lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Ideanomics investors under the
federal securities laws.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Ideanomics' Mobile
Energy Global (MEG) Division (the "MEG Center") in Qingdao was not
"a one million square foot EV expo center"; (ii) the Company had
been using doctored or altered photographs of the purported MEG
Center in Qingdao; (iii) the Company's electric vehicle business in
China was not performing nearly as strong as Ideanomics had
represented; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.
According to the suit, these true details were disclosed by market
research firms.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Ideanomics
during the Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the August
27, 2020 lead plaintiff motion deadline.  A lead plaintiff is a
representative party acting on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Hagens Berman Reminds of Aug. 27 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges investors in Ideanomics, Inc. (NASDAQ: IDEX) to
submit their losses now. A securities fraud class action has been
filed, and certain investors may have valuable claims.

  Class Period: Mar. 20, 2020 - June 25, 2020

  Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Aug. 27, 2020

  Visit: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/IDEX

  Contact an Attorney Now: IDEX@hbsslaw.com
  844-916-0895

Ideanomics (IDEX) Securities Class Action:

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendant
misrepresented and omitted facts concerning the development of
Ideanomics' electric vehicle hub in Qingdao, China, the Mobile
Energy Group ("MEG") center, and overstated the strength of its
electric vehicle business. According to the complaint, Defendants
repeatedly lauded its "one million square foot MEG center," while
concealing the MEG Center was not operational. Defendants also
publicized new electric vehicle contracts when, in fact, these
agreements were fabricated.

Investors began to learn the truth, according to the complaint, on
June 25, 2020, when two research firms accused the company of
doctoring photographs of the MEG Center to make it appear
operational and claimed recently promoted electronic vehicle
contracts were phony.

Then, on June 26, 2020, the company issued a press release seeking
to "clarify the status" of its MEG center. Specifically, the
company stated that it was launching three phases of its MEG Center
that will eventually total one million square feet. The first
phase, according to Ideanomics, occupies only "215,000 square
feet."

In response to these disclosures, the price of Ideanomics shares
has crashed by over 50%.

"We're focused on investors' losses and proving Ideanomics falsely
promoted the state of its MEG center and EV business," said Reed
Kathrein, the Hagens Berman partner leading the investigation.

If you purchased shares of Ideanomics and suffered significant
losses, click here to discuss your legal rights with Hagens
Berman.

Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding
Ideanomics should consider their options to help in the
investigation or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.
Under the new program, whistleblowers who provide original
information may receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any
successful recovery made by the SEC. For more information, call
Reed Kathrein at 844-916-0895 or email IDEX@hbsslaw.com.

                      About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys. The firm represents
investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in complex
litigation. More about the firm and its successes is located at
hbsslaw.com. [GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Jakubowitz Law Reminds of August 27 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Jakubowitz Law on July 5 disclosed that securities fraud class
action lawsuits have commenced on behalf of shareholders of the
following publicly-traded companies who purchased shares within the
class periods listed below. Shareholders interested in representing
the class of wronged shareholders have until the lead plaintiff
deadline to petition the court. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff. For
more details and to speak with our firm without cost or obligation,
follow the links below.

Hallmark Financial Services, Inc. (HALL)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT HALL:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/hallmark-financial-services-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7764&from=1

Class Period: March 5, 2019 - March 17, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 6, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
the Company lacked effective internal controls over accounting and
financial reporting related to reserves for unpaid losses; (2) the
Company improperly accounted for reserve for unpaid losses and loss
adjustment expenses related to its Binding Primary Commercial Auto
business; (3) as a result, Hallmark Financial would be forced to
report a $63.8 million loss development for prior underwriting
years; (4) as a result, Hallmark Financial would exit from its
Binding Primary Commercial Auto business; and (5) as a result of
the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Grand Canyon Education, Inc. (LOPE)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT LOPE:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/grand-canyon-education-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7764&from=1

Class Period: January 5, 2018 - January 27, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 13, 2020

According to a filed complaint, statements made by Defendants were
false and/or misleading because, following Grand Canyon's spin-off
of its educational assets as Grand Canyon University ("GCU"): (i)
GCU would not be a proper non-profit organization as it would
remain under the control of Grand Canyon, and (ii) Grand Canyon
would not be a third-party service provider to GCU but rather would
continue to effectively operate the entity, and (iii) Grand Canyon
employees served as executives of GCU and (iv) GCU functioned as an
off-balance-sheet entity to which Grand Canyon would be able to
funnel expenses and costs in exchange for a disproportionate amount
of revenue, thereby inflating Grand Canyon's financial results.

Ideanomics, Inc. (IDEX)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT IDEX:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/ideanomics-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7764&from=1

Class Period: March 20, 2020 - June 25, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 27, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Ideanomics' Mobile Energy Global Division in Qingdao, China (the
"MEG Center") was not "a one million square foot EV expo center" as
the Company had stated in press releases; (ii) the Company had been
using doctored or altered photographs of the purported MEG Center
in Qingdao; (iii) the Company's electric vehicle business in China
was not performing nearly as strongly as Ideanomics had
represented; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Jakubowitz Law is vigorous in pursuit of justice for shareholders
who have been the victim of securities fraud. Attorney advertising.
Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
JAKUBOWITZ LAW
1140 Avenue of the Americas
9th Floor
New York, New York 10036
T: (212) 867-4490
F: (212) 537-5887 [GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Pomerantz LLP Reminds of Aug. 27 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on July 8 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Ideanomics, Inc. ("Ideanomics" or the
"Company")(NASDAQ: IDEX) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, and indexed under 20-cv-05203, is on behalf
of all investors who purchased or otherwise acquired Ideanomics,
Inc. ("Ideanomics" or the "Company") securities between March 20,
2020, and June 25, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period").  This
action is brought on behalf of the Class for violations of Sections
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a) and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

If you are a shareholder who purchased Ideanomics securities during
the Class Period, you have until August 27, 2020, to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Ideanomics purports to be a global company focused on facilitating
the adoption of commercial electric vehicles and developing next
generation financial services and Fintech products.  Ideanomics
common stock trades on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the ticker
"IDEX."  The Company is headquartered in New York, New York, and
maintains offices in Beijing and Qingdao, China.

In recent press releases, Ideanomics has lauded its "one million
square foot EV expo center in Qingdao, Shandong Province," in
China, also known as the Company's Mobile Energy Global (MEG)
Division, or the "MEG Center."  According to Ideanomics, the MEG
Center is "the largest auto trading market in Qingdao," China.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and
misleading statements regarding the Company's business.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Ideanomics' MEG Center in
Qingdao was not "a one million square foot EV expo center"; (ii)
the Company had been using doctored or altered photographs of the
purported MEG Center in Qingdao; (iii) the Company's electric
vehicle business in China was not performing nearly as strong as
Ideanomics had represented; and (iv) as a result, the Company's
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

On June 25, 2020, analyst Hindenburg Research ("Hindenburg") issued
a series of tweets in which it called Ideanomics "an egregious &
obvious fraud."  Hindenburg asserted that it found evidence that
Ideanomics had doctored photos for use in its press releases to
suggest that the Company owns or operates a vehicle sales center in
Qingdao, China, when it in fact does not.  Hindenburg further
asserted that it had an investigator go to Ideanomics' purported
MEG Center in Qingdao, China, where the investigator was unable to
find any trace of Ideanomics or its purported MEG Center.

Also on June 25, 2020, analyst J Capital Research issued a report
on Ideanomics entitled "Champion of Promotes."  J Capital wrote, in
part, that "Ideanomics . . . is a zero. The company changes its
name and promotional story so frequently that it's hard to keep up.
One thing remains a constant, despite all the press releases,
buzzwords and hype: shareholders get wiped out."  J Capital
continued, in a tweet, that "[w]e called all the 'buyers' named in
[Ideanomics'] press releases this month. Not a single one had made
a purchase. One of them thanked us for alerting them to 'fake
news.'"

On this news, Ideanomics' stock price fell from its June 24, 2020
closing price of $3.09 per share to a June 25, 2020 closing price
of $2.44 per share, a one day drop of $0.65 per share, or
approximately 21%.

Then on June 26, 2020, Ideanomics issued a press release in which
it sought to "clarify the status" of its purported EV hub in
Qingdao, China.  In this release, Ideanomics walked back certain of
its prior statements regarding the MEG Center in Qingdao, stating
that it was launching three phases of its MEG Center that will
eventually total one million square feet.  The first phase,
according to Ideanomics, occupies only 215,000 square feet.

The stock price continued to plummet on June 26, 2020, dropping to
a close of $1.46 per share.  This represents a two day drop of
approximately 53%.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members.

CONTACT:

Robert S. Willoughby
Pomerantz LLP
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


IDEANOMICS INC: Schall Law Reminds of Aug. 27 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
announced the filing of a class-action lawsuit against Ideanomics,
Inc. ("Ideanomics" or "the Company") (NASDAQ:IDEX) for violations
of §§10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between March 20,
2020 and June 25, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before August 27, 2020.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Ideanomics' Mobile Energy Global (MEG)
Division (the "MEG Center"), located in Qingdao, China, was not "a
one million square foot EV expo center" as claimed by the Company.
In fact, the Company used altered photographs to tout the purported
MEG Center. The Company's electric vehicle in China was not
performing at the high levels it represented to the market. Based
on these facts, the Company's public statements were false and
materially misleading throughout the class period. When the market
learned the truth about Ideanomics, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics.

CONTACT:

The Schall Law Firm
Brian Schall, Esq.
www.schallfirm.com
Office: 310-301-3335
Cell: 424-303-1964
info@schallfirm.com [GN]


IKEA US: Agrees to Settle Suit Over Rest Breaks for $7.5 Million
----------------------------------------------------------------
HRDive reports that Ikea U.S. Retail has agreed to pay $7.5 million
to settle a class action lawsuit alleging the retailer violated
California law by failing to provide proper paid rest breaks, among
other claims.  A federal judge gave the settlement preliminary
approval June 17 (Cahilig et al. v. Ikea U.S. Reteail, LLC, No.
19-cv-01182 (C.D. Cali. June 17, 2020)).

The plaintiffs contended that Ikea's written rest period policy
violated California law becuase it required employees "to stay on
the premises during paid rest breaks" and to take breaks "in either
the Staff Cafe or other desinated non-work areas."  The California
Supreme Court has held that employers must "reliquish control over
how employees spend their time" during rest periods, the court said
in the order.  Ikea also failed to pay wages owed in a timely
manner and provide accurate wage statements, the plaintiffs
alleged.

The 6,400 class members will get about 75% of the total amount of
the award with the rest going toward attorney's fees and costs.
The $7.5 million settlement represents 44% of the realistic
potential exposure in the case, the court said, adding that "in
light of the significant hurdles to recovery if litigation were to
continue, it appears that the agreement reflects a fair result."
[GN]


IKES PLACE: Failing to Pay for All Hours Worked, Bogues Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Vaughan Bogues and Dylan Montague, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated v. IKES PLACE # 6, a California
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Case No.
37-2020-00023727-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super., San Diego Cty., July 9,
2020), arises from the Defendants' consistent policy or practice of
failing to pay their employees for all hours worked, including
during their meal and rest periods.

The Plaintiffs also accuse the Defendants of failing to pay
applicable overtime rates, and failing to pay minimum wages for all
time worked, as required by California Law, the California Labor
Code, relevant orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC),
and California Business & Professions Code, and seeks redress
therefore.

According to the complaint, the Defendants had a consistent policy
or practice of failing to pay Employees overtime compensation at
premium overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of 8 hours a
day and/or 40 hours a week, and double-time rates for all hours
worked in excess of 12 hours a day, in violation of Labor Code and
the corresponding sections of IWC Wage Orders. Additionally, the
Defendants failed to provide all the legally required unpaid,
off-duty meal periods and all the legally required paid, off-duty
rest periods to the Plaintiffs, as required by the applicable Wage
Order and Labor Code. The Defendants did not have a policy or
practice, which provided or recorded all the legally required
unpaid, off-duty meal periods and all the legally required paid,
off-duty rest periods to the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as non-exempt hourly
employee within the State of California at the Defendants'
facilities and offices in San Diego, California.

IKES PLACE # 6, is a California corporation with its principal
executive office located in San Diego, California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David Yeremian, Esq.
          Roman Shkodnik, Esq.
          DAVID YEREMIAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
          535 N. Brand Blvd., Suite 705
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Phone: (818) 230-8380
          Facsimile: (818) 230 0308
          Email: david@yeremianlaw.com
                 roman@yeremianlaw.com

               - and -

          Walter Haines, Esq.
          UNITED EMPLOYEES LAW GROUP
          5500 Bolsa Avenue, Suite 201
          Huntington Beach, CA 92649
          Phone: 888.474.7242
          Fax: 562.256.1006
          Email: walterhaines@yahoo.com


ILLINOIS: Norfleet Has Til July 27 to File Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARC NORFLEET, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:15-cv-01279-GCS (S.D.
Ill.), Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison of the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois allowed Norfleet up to and
including July 27, 2020, to file the motion for class certification
and to respond to the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

The Court amended the scheduling order in February 2019 extending
the deadlines in the case.  Specifically, the Court extended the
time for Norfleet to file a motion for class certification to Oct.
23, 2019.  As of June 2020, Norfleet has not filed the motion for
class certification.

Further, on May 22, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of prosecution.  In addition to not filing the motion for
class certification, the Defendants argue that the Court should
dismiss the case because Norfleet has failed to conduct discovery
regarding his class action claims, he has failed to pay all
outstanding fees and sanctions, and he has failed to prosecute the
case.  Further, they argue that they will be prejudiced if they
must spend time and expend resources deposing Norfleet and filing a
summary judgment motion to which Norfleet will be unable to
respond.  As of June 2020, Norfleet has not responded to the
Defendants' motion.

Magistrate Judge Sison reminded Norfleet that pursuant to an Order
entered by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on April 9, 2019,
the clerks of all federal courts in the Circuit must return unfiled
any papers submitted either directly or indirectly by or on behalf
of the Plaintiff until he has paid in full all outstanding fees and
any sanctions in all civil actions he has filed.  Thus, if he
wishes to file a motion for class certification and file a response
to the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, he must first
comply with the Seventh Circuit's Order.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge allows Norfleet up to and
including July 27, 2020, to file the motion for class certification
and to respond to the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
Should Norfleet fail to file his motion for class certification and
fail to respond to the motion to dismiss within the allotted time
or consistent with the instructions in the Order, the entire case
will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court
order and/or for failure to prosecute his claims.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 26, 2020 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://is.gd/IIpmZJ from Leagle.com.


INFUSION SOFTWARE: Court Approves $1.5MM Deal in McNamara Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Mary McNamara, Individually, and on Behalf of All
Other Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. Infusion Software, Inc.,
et al., Defendants, Case No. CV-17-04026-PHX-SPL (D. Ariz.), Judge
Steven P. Logan of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona granted in full the Parties' Renewed Joint Motion to
Approve Settlement Agreement.

Before the Court is the parties' Renewed Joint Motion.  The
Defendants had agreed to the first such motion, reserving the
rights to object to the upcoming motion and application for
attorneys' fees which the Plaintiff indicated she will file
following approval of the Settlement Agreement, and the Court
assumes that Defendants still reserve the right to object.  The
parties set forth the terms and conditions of their settlement in
their Revised Class Action Settlement Agreement.  Judge Logan finds
that the parties properly addressed its concerns regarding the
first version of the Settlement Agreement and accordingly, will
approve the newest version of the Settlement Agreement.  

Furthermore, and more importantly, the parties provided data for
each Plaintiff who submitted hours as part of the case in a clear
and concise table.  The Court requested information regarding the
amount of overtime hours claimed by each employee, the overtime
calculations made on behalf of each employee, how much each
employee's damages were contained within the two-year and
three-year statute of limitations periods, and the exemptions
asserted by Defendants on each employee.  The parties provided that
information and more.

The Judge finds that the settlement amount provided for each
Plaintiff listed in the table is fair and reasonable because it
appears to take into account the amount of damages involved in each
of the two statutes of limitations periods, the relative strength
and weaknesses of each case, and whether the Plaintiff claimed full
hours or partial hours for the relevant time periods.  Accordingly,
the Judge finds that the settlement amounts for each Plaintiff and
the overall settlement amount of $1,525,000 are fair and
reasonable.

For these reasons, Judge Logan granted in full the Parties' Renewed
Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement.  The Parties are
directed to consummate the Settlement Agreement in accordance with
its terms.  

By operation of the Order, the Plaintiff and the Collective release
and forever discharge the Released Entities from the claims
identified in Section 3.1 of the Settlement Agreement.

The Court made the following awards pursuant to the Settlement
Agreement:

  a. $1,525,000 as total payment to the Plaintiff and the
     Collective to be paid as set forth in Exhibit A to the
     Settlement Agreement.

  b. The Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as
     determined by the Court once the Plaintiff and the Defendants

     will have filed briefing on the issue.

Without further order of the Court, the Parties may agree to
reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of the provisions of
the Settlement Agreement.  

The Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice without costs
to any party, except as provided in the Settlement Agreement, and
the Clerk of Court will terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/qTdMNl from Leagle.com.


J.P. MORGAN: Grace Sues Over Treasury Futures Contracts Rigging
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Grace, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., J.P. Morgan
Clearing Corp., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-04523 (S.D. N.Y., June 12, 2020), seeks
damages and other relief under the Commodity Exchange Act for
unlawful and intentional manipulation of U.S. Treasury futures
contracts and options on those contracts.

Grace accuses Defendants for manipulating the prices of Treasury
Futures by bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or
offer before execution, including submitting or canceling bids or
offers with intent to create artificial price movements upwards or
downwards.

Mr. Grace is a registered broker and trader with the Chicago Board
of Trade. He has actively purchased and sold Treasury Futures on
his own behalf for more than 30 years.

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. is a multinational banking and financial
services corporation. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, is a primary
dealer of U.S. Treasury securities and transacted in U.S.
Treasury-based instruments, including Treasury Futures and options
on Treasury Futures. J.P. Morgan Clearing Corp. offers securities
and futures clearing, settlement, lending and related services to
traders, hedge fund managers, broker-dealers and investment
advisors. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Roberta D. Liebenberg, Esq.
      Adam J. Pessin, Esq.
      FINE, KAPLAN AND BLACK, R.P.C.
      One S. Broad St., 23rd Floor
      Philadelphia, PA 19107
      Tel: (215) 567-6565
      Email: rliebenberg@finekaplan.com
             apessin@finekaplan.com

             - and -

      Michael E. Criden, Esq.
      Kevin B. Love, Esq.
      Lindsey C. Grossman, Esq.
      CRIDEN & LOVE, P.A.
      7301 S.W. 57th Court, Suite 515
      South Miami, FL 33143
      Tel: (305) 357-9000
      Email: mcriden@cridenlove.com
             klove@cridenlove.com
             lgrossman@cridenlove.com


JAGUAR LAND: Faces Class Action Over Windshield Leaking Issue
-------------------------------------------------------------
Emmariah Holcomb, writing for glassBYTEs.com, reports that TH
Chiro, PLLC has become the lead plaintiff in a class action
complaint, filed in Tennessee, against Jaguar Land Rover North
America LLC (JLRNA). In the class action complaint, Chiro alleges
the auto manufacturer is responsible for windshield leaks that
cause internal damage to select vehicle models. He is seeking
financial reimbursements for damages.

According to the class action complaint, Land Rover Discovery
windshields leak and have caused dashboard computer system failures
due to excess water damage. The class action complaint stated 2013
to 2020 Land Rover Discovery SUVs were impacted. Chiro alleges he
lost all dashboard controls, signals, messaging and instrumentation
after water leaked into the computer system from his vehicle's
windshield. "This created dangerous driving conditions, a problem
allegedly common in 2017 Discovery SUVs," said Chiro.

After water allegedly leaked into the SUV from the windshield.
Chiro took his vehicle to the dealership for repairs and was
allegedly told windshield leaks were a common problem from JLRNA,
according to the class action complaint. Chiro claims his SUV was
at the dealership for two months before he was notified to pick up
the vehicle. According to the class action complaint, Chiro's
Discovery had a moldy odor, oh which he stated was from the
dealership allegedly leaving the vehicle "closed up, wet and un
cleaned for two months." The complaint alleges JLRNA would not
resolve the leaking windshield issues Chiro experienced.

"Land Rover allegedly knew about the windshield problem with its
Discovery models but actively concealed the windshield leak
defect," a portion of the class action complaint reads.

The class action complaint states Land Rover should reimburse
customers the purchase price of its Discovery "if the SUV sustained
serious damage from a leaking windshield." According to Chiro, the
2017 Discovery SUVs should be recalled because of its windshield
leaking issues and should be "properly repaired by the automaker"
as well as an extend windshield warranty for impacted vehicles.

Due to the allegations mentioned in Chiro's class action complaint,
he is seeking a trial by jury as well as financial reimbursements.
As of press time the defendant have not responded to glassBYTEs'
request for comment on the complaint. [GN]


JOE MACHENS: App. Ct. Holds Fogelsong Parties Should Arbitrate
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TINA AND PAUL FOGELSONG, ET AL., Respondents, v. JOE
MACHENS AUTOMOTIVE GROUP INC., ET AL., Appellants, Case No. WD82705
(Mo. App.), the Court of Appeals of Missouri for the Western
District reversed the order of the Circuit Court of Boone County,
Missouri, denying Machens' motion to stay the class action lawsuit,
and compelled the parties to attend arbitration.

Plaintiffs Carol Benna, Patrick Bonnot, and Tina and Paul Fogelsong
filed a class action petition against Machens.  The Plaintiffs
alleged that they purchased vehicles from Machens which Machens
marketed and sold as "factory-fresh" and brand new.  They further
alleged that this representation was false, and that Machens
fraudulently concealed that the vehicles had in fact sustained hail
damage requiring repair prior to the sales. M achens moved to
compel the parties to participate in arbitration and to stay the
civil action pending the outcome of the arbitration.

In its motion, Machens contended that each of the Plaintiffs had
executed a "Retail Buyers Order" in connection with the vehicle
purchases.  The Retail Buyers Order included an agreement which
required the signatories to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or
controversy that might arise between the customer and the company.

After limited discovery and oral arguments by the parties, the
circuit court denied Machens's motion, concluding that the
arbitration agreements were unconscionable.  Days after the circuit
court entered its judgment, the Supreme Court of Missouri handed
down its decision in State ex rel. Pinkerton v. Fahnestock.  In
that case, the Supreme Court held that parties to an arbitration
agreement can delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator
by incorporating by reference the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA Rules").

Machens appealed, citing the language in the Retail Buyers Orders
providing for mandatory arbitration conducted by, and under the
then-applicable rules of, the American Arbitration Association.
Machens contended that the AAA Consumer Rules applied to the
arbitration provisions contained in the Retail Buyers Orders.
Section R-14 of the AAA Consumer Rules states that the arbitrator
will have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or
validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of
any claim or counterclaim.

Because the parties' arbitration agreement incorporated the AAA
Rules, and because the applicable subset of the AAA Rules expressly
delegated threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator,
Machens argued that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement
was an issue for the arbitrator, rather than the circuit court to
decide.  On appeal, the Court agreed that remand was required to
give both parties an equal opportunity to argue the validity of the
delegation provision to the circuit court following the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Pinkerton.

On remand, Machens filed a renewed motion to stay the proceedings
and compel arbitration in light of Pinkerton.  After further
briefing by the parties and oral argument, the circuit court
entered an order denying Machens's renewed motion.  The circuit
court found that the arbitration agreement's incorporation of the
AAA Rules did not clearly and unmistakably evince the parties'
intent to delegate the threshold issue of arbitrability to the
arbitrator.  The appeal follows.

Machens asserts two points on appeal.  In its first point, Machens
argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to stay
the case and compel arbitration because the Retail Buyers Orders
manifest the parties' clear and unmistakable intent to delegate the
issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  In its second point,
Machens argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that the
arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable and otherwise
unenforceable.

The Plaintiffs respond that the arbitration agreement is inherently
ambiguous" as to the question of whether the parties intended to
delegate the issue of arbitrability.  They argue further that the
delegation provision is unconscionable and unenforceable, as is the
arbitration agreement as a whole.

In their brief, the Plaintiffs argue that the delegation provision
is unconscionable because (1) the entire Machens arbitration
provision -- including the clause purporting to incorporate the
'then-applicable' AAA rules -- was nonnegotiable"; (2) Machens was
in a far-superior bargaining position when compared to the
Plaintiffs; (3) the contract's reference to the "then-applicable"
AAA Rules is in tiny font, and part of a boilerplate form; and (4)
Machens's employees were not trained regarding the arbitration
provision and were thus presumably ill-equipped to explain its
contents to potential car buyers.  Based on this evidence, the
Plaintiffs urge the Court to find that the delegation provision is
unconscionable just as the trial court did with the arbitration
provision as a whole.

Although Plaintiffs attempt to frame these contentions as specific
challenges to the delegation provision itself, the Appellate Court
finds that they tacitly acknowledge that they are relying upon the
same arguments they direct at the arbitration agreement as a whole;
an approach specifically rejected by our courts.  In light of the
delegation clause, these arguments should be decided by the
arbitrator, not the Court.

The Appellate Court holds that by incorporating the AAA Rules, the
parties clearly and unmistakably manifested their intent to
delegate gateway issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  The
Plaintiffs' challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration
agreements are therefore reserved for arbitration.  Point I will be
granted.  The case is reversed and remanded with instructions to
stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.

Because it will grant Machens' first point on appeal, the Appellate
Court need not address its second point.

The Appellate Court concludes that the circuit court erred in
denying Machens's motion to stay the Plaintiffs' class action
lawsuit and compel arbitration.  In light of the parties'
incorporation of the AAA Rules, which in turn delegate threshold
issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, any dispute regarding
the enforceability of the arbitration agreements is for the
arbitrator to adjudicate.  The Appellate Court remanded to the
circuit court to enter an order staying the case and compelling the
parties to participate in arbitration.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's April 28, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://is.gd/salGPo from Leagle.com.


JP MORGAN: Ninth Circuit Upholds Arbitration Ruling in Nypl Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOHN NYPL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE &
CO., Defendant-Appellee, SIMON FOWLES,
Real-party-in-interest-Appellee, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Movant-Appellee, Case No. 19-15293 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
denying relief from a magistrate judge's order granting Appellee
Wells Fargo's motion to quash subpoena served by Nypl upon Appellee
Simon Fowles, and denying Nypl's competing motion to compel.

John Nypl is the putative class representative in an antitrust
action pending in the Southern District of New York alleging, among
other things, that between December 2007 and January 2013, agents
of certain domestic and foreign financial institutions, not
including Wells Fargo, along with certain known and unknown
co-conspirators, engaged in price-fixing and other anti-competitive
practices relating to foreign exchange ("FX") rate trading by using
covert chatrooms and coded language to conceal their unlawful
conduct.  

Fowles is a resident of the Northern District of California and
was, prior to his termination in October 2017, the Executive VP of
FX Trading at Wells Fargo in San Francisco.  In April 2018, Fowles
sued Wells Fargo for wrongful termination and retaliation in
California state court, alleging principally that Wells Fargo
terminated his employment after he lodged internal concerns about
Wells Fargo's handling of a transaction dating to August 2014 -- a
date outside the period relevant to the specific improprieties
alleged in the Nypl litigation.

Relying solely upon the allegations in Fowles's publicly-filed
complaint, Nypl believes California-based Fowles has information
that may be relevant to the Nypl litigation in New York.  Thus,
Nypl subpoenaed Fowles for testimony as to all of the "reasons
given" in support of his complaint and for all documents, things,
communications, and information that support his allegations,
including notes, memoranda, or other documents.  After unsuccessful
litigation to compel compliance in the issuing court, Nypl served
Fowles with the same subpoena anew in the Northern District of
California.  Wells Fargo and Nypl then filed dueling motions to
quash and to compel in that district.

After a hearing, a magistrate judge concluded that the allegations
in Fowles' complaint against Wells Fargo -- a wrongful employment
termination and retaliation dispute in California state court --
are insufficient, without more, to show that Fowles has information
that is relevant to the Nypl litigation -- a federal class action
antitrust suit in New York federal court.  Accordingly, the
magistrate judge granted Wells Fargo's motion to quash and denied
Nypl's motion to compel.  Thereafter, the district court denied
Nypl's motion for relief, adopting the magistrate judge's factual
determinations on relevance.

The Ninth Circuit finds that Nypl does not establish that the
district court's decisions were unusual, exceptional, contrary to
law, or based upon an implausible view of the record.  To the
contrary, Nypl's requests were sweeping in nature, covering every
communication touching on any relationship between Fowles and Wells
Fargo.  It was therefore reasonable to find that Nypl's need for
untethered access to the requested information was not sufficient
to outweigh the burden and invasion of Fowles' and Wells Fargo's
privacy interests, especially since they were not parties to the
suit, and to determine that the subpoena sought irrelevant
information.  For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's April 28, 2020 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/Dq7Al5 from Leagle.com.


KANSAS: Bid to Dismiss Defendant H. Jones in Shaw Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BLAINE SHAW, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HERMAN JONES, in
his official capacity as Superintendent of the Kansas Highway
Patrol, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-1343-KHV (D. Kan.),
Judge Kathryn H. Vratil of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas overruled Motion To Dismiss Defendant Herman Jones.

On Jan. 30, 2020, Blaine Shaw, Samuel Shaw and Joshua Bosire, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed an
amended complaint against Kansas Highway Patrol ("KHP")
Superintendent Herman Jones, and KHP troopers Doug Schulte and
Brandon McMillan, alleging that based on their travel origins and
destinations, the Defendants subjected them to prolonged detentions
and vehicle searches.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the
Plaintiffs sue the Defendants for violating their rights under
Article IV and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and they seek compensatory, punitive,
declaratory and injunctive relief.

In 2014, Colorado legalized the recreational cultivation, sale and
possession of marijuana, which Kansas law enforcement quickly
characterized as a threat to the health and safety of Kansas
residents.  In 2016, to determine the impact that Colorado-sourced
marijuana was having on Kansas, Kansas Attorney General Derek
Schmidt issued a survey to law enforcement agencies.  In response,
KHP reported a significant increase in seizures of marijuana which
originated in Colorado.  KHP suspected that in 2015, 69% of all
marijuana that it seized came from Colorado.

As a result, KHP increased its scrutiny of drivers who were
traveling to and from Colorado.  For individuals who made these
trips, defense attorneys reported an uptick in stops and prolonged
detentions by KHP, which was particularly true for out-of-state
drivers.  KHP's stop and forfeiture data show that it
disproportionately stops out-of-state drivers and subjects them to
civil asset forfeiture proceedings.

When KHP troopers suspect that a driver on I-70 is traveling to or
from Colorado, they employ a maneuver called the "Kansas Two Step,"
in which they detain the driver after the initial purpose of the
traffic stop has ended and ask questions about his or her travel
plans.  KHP does so without the driver's consent or a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.  KHP training materials include
instructions on the Kansas Two Step.  If KHP troopers apply the
Kansas Two Step but cannot elicit consent to search, they have
canines search the vehicle for drugs based solely on their belief
that the driver is traveling to or from Colorado.  

In 2016, in Vasquez v. Lewis, the Tenth Circuit held that even when
combined with other factors, a driver's status as a Colorado
resident does not give KHP troopers reasonable suspicion to subject
the driver to prolonged detention and a vehicle search.  Despite
the Tenth Circuit ruling in Vasquez, KHP still instructs its
troopers that when combined with other innocuous factors, a
driver's travel origin or destination grants reasonable suspicion
to search the vehicle.  It does not train its troopers that using
these factors to search vehicles violates the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and it does not include Vasquez in
its training curriculum.  

As Superintendent of KHP, Herman Jones is the chief officer of the
statewide police force.  Accordingly, Jones has the statutory
authority to direct the conduct of KHP troopers, and he is
responsible for training, guiding and directing KHP troopers.
Jones therefore has the authority to stop the Kansas Two Step and
canine searches that are based on driver travel origins or
destinations.

On Jan. 30, 2020, Blaine and Samuel Shaw and Bosire, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, filed an amended
complaint against Jones, Schulte and McMillan.  Pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, each Plaintiff brings several constitutional
claims, and they seek various forms of relief.

As to Jones, the Plaintiffs bring the following claims:

  * Count 1 - Class action claim that Jones violated their Fourth
    Amendment rights by maintaining a practice of detaining
    drivers using innocent indicia of travel, and training KHP
    troopers to do so.

  * Count 2 - Class action claim that Jones violated their rights
    to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of
    Article IV, Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment by creating

    and enforcing a policy to target vehicles with out-of-state
    license plates.

The Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, plus
attorneys' fees, costs and any further relief that the Court deems
just and equitable.  They do not seek damages from Jones under
either count.

The matter is before the Court on the Motion To Dismiss Defendant
Herman Jones filed Feb. 28, 2020.

Judge Vratil finds that the Plaintiffs assert two claims against
Jones: (1) violation of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) violation of their
rights to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Under these
theories, they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and not
damages.  Jones asserts that the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue
these claims.

The Vratil finds that the Plaintiffs have established a real and
immediate threat of future harm.  They plausibly allege that they
frequently drive through Kansas with out-of-state plates on their
way to and from Colorado, and that KHP troopers will do what they
are trained to do: target them for stops, prolonged detentions and
drug searches.  The Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that (1) they
will have another encounter with KHP troopers and (2) KHP not only
authorizes this practice, it expressly instructs its troopers
(presumably all troopers) to apply it.

Jones cites no authority that would negate the Plaintiffs' standing
merely because a future encounter with KHP troopers might follow a
traffic infraction, the Court opines.  Indeed, if Jones'
categorical bar was correct -- that standing for prospective
injunctive relief will not flow if an injury is contingent on
violating the law -- it is difficult to imagine how any Plaintiff
could ever enjoin unconstitutional conduct which occurs after a
police encounter.  The Judge will not be the first to adopt such a
drastic, blanket rule.

For these reasons, Judge Vratil overruled Jones' Motion To Dismiss
Defendant Herman Jones.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 1, 2020 Memorandum &
Order is available at https://is.gd/yKPBYb from Leagle.com.


KELLOGG: Judge Tosses Class Action Over Vanilla Flavor Labeling
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert N. Ward and Jaclyn Metzinger, writing for Ad Law Access,
report that a California federal judge has dismissed a putative
class action against Kellogg for failing to back up the plaintiff's
theory that Kellogg's Bear Naked Granola V'nilla Almond does not
include vanilla flavoring derived exclusively from vanilla beans.

The plaintiff challenged the labeling of Bear Naked Granola V'nilla
Almond as deceptive, claiming that the product's labeling leads
consumers to believe it contains vanilla flavor derived exclusively
from vanilla beans when it actually does not.  To support the
theory that consumers believe the product's vanilla flavoring is
derived exclusively from vanilla beans, the plaintiff relied on the
use of the word "V'nilla" in the product's name, the front of the
product's label displaying "naturally flavored" immediately below
the words "V'nilla Almond," and the back of the label depicting a
vignette of a vanilla plant with only the word "Vanilla" below the
vignette.  As to the allegation that the product's vanilla
flavoring was not derived exclusively from vanilla beans, the
plaintiff claimed that, because vanilla is an unusually expensive
and in-demand ingredient, Kellogg would be incentivized to list it
as an ingredient but did not - instead listing "natural flavors."
Therefore, the plaintiff maintained, Kellogg's "listing of 'natural
flavors' as opposed to vanilla flavor or vanilla extract is tacit
acknowledgment that the 'natural flavors' is not a synonym for the
required vanilla ingredients."  "In other words," the court
explained, "the omission is the admission."

The court rejected this admission-by-omission theory as merely
speculative.  It explained that the plaintiff "provides no factual
basis for this argument other than the lack of vanilla's inclusion
on the ingredients list."  The court emphasized that the plaintiff
did not allege what else might be in the product other than
flavoring derived from vanilla beans.  The plaintiff's speculation,
the court concluded, was insufficient to "nudge [his] claims . . .
across the line from conceivable to plausible."  The court granted
the plaintiff leave to amend.

The decision is Zaback v. Kellogg Sales Co., No. 320CV00268BENMSB,
2020 WL 3414656 (S.D. Cal. June 22, 2020), and is a noteworthy
decision drawing the distinction between speculative and plausible
in one of the numerous vanilla flavor-based actions filed over the
past year.  For example, in Figueroa v. Trader Joe's Co., No.
20-cv-322 (E. D. NY.), Trader Joe's is facing a putative class
action for allegedly misleadingly labeling its Just the Clusters
Vanilla Almond Granola Cereal to lead consumers to believe that
vanilla is the product's exclusive flavoring ingredient when,
according to the complaint, the product's ingredients list shows
that the cereal contains "Natural Flavor" instead of vanilla.

We will continue monitoring this wave of flavoring litigation and
its effect on the food and beverage industry. [GN]


KIA MOTORS: Faegre Drinker Atty. Discusses Little Class Suit Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Erica K. Drew, Esq.--erica.drew@faegredrinker.com--and Kaitlyn E.
Stone, Esq.--kaitlyn.stone@faegredrinker.com--of Faegre Drinker, in
an article for The National Law Review, report that in Little v.
Kia Motors America, Inc., docket no. A-24-18, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently set out the examination New Jersey courts
must undertake before admitting aggregate proof of damages, rather
than individualized proof, in a class action. Siding with defendant
Kia in a vehicle defect suit, the Court ruled that admission of
aggregate proof of damages at trial was inappropriate because an
unknown number of class members would have received a windfall, and
the formula used to estimate such damages was unreliable. This case
reviews the key principles courts and litigants should consider
when choosing between individualized or aggregate proof of damages
in a class action.

Background
A New Jersey resident alleged that the 1997 through 2000 model Kia
Sephia vehicles had design and manufacturing flaws that caused the
front brakes to prematurely wear out. According to the plaintiff,
these flaws remained unresolved even after Kia attempted to fix the
problems. The plaintiff asserted individual and class action claims
against Kia under the California Business & Professions Code, New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, in addition to claims for breach of implied and express
warranties. The class was limited to New Jersey residents who
purchased or leased 1995 through 2000 Kia Sephia vehicles within
six years preceding the filing of the complaint in 2001.

At the four-week trial, the plaintiff asserted two claims for
class-wide damages: (1) decrease in value of the vehicles due to
the brake defect and (2) out-of-pocket costs due to more frequent
brake repairs. To calculate the aggregate repair cost damages, the
plaintiff relied on an expert's calculation taken from analyzing
the average cost of one brake repair, the lifespan of a Kia Sephia,
and the frequency of Sephia brake repairs compared with similar
non-defective vehicles. The jury found that Kia Sephia vehicles did
have a defect, Kia breached express and implied warranties, and
class members were entitled to damages. The jury awarded no damages
for alleged decrease in value of the Kia Sephia vehicles, but
awarded $750 per class member for out-of-pocket repair costs.

The trial court granted Kia's motion for a new trial on the issue
of damages, finding it erred in admitting class-wide proof of
damages "based on an estimate untethered to the experience" of the
class. To resolve the error, the trial court decertified the class
and appointed a special master to calculate the out-of-pocket
repair costs of each individual class member. The plaintiff and Kia
both appealed. The Appellate Division reinstated the original jury
award, and the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately took up the
case.

New Jersey Supreme Court
The New Jersey Supreme Court scrutinized what measure of damages
should have been permitted in this case, individualized or
aggregate. The Court relied heavily on the New Jersey Appellate
Division case Muise v. GPU, Inc. regarding a class action by
electrical utility customers for heat-related power outages. The
Muise court laid out the inquiry it believed was necessary before
admitting aggregate proof of damages in a class action, and held
that the aggregate damages estimate, based on customer surveys, to
be an unreliable measure of damages for the class.

The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the inquiry set forth in Muise
and ruled that to determine when aggregate proof of damages is
permitted, a court must consider the following three principles:

* The underlying cause of action for which the class seeks
recovery

The measure of damages that the law allows if there is a finding
of liability for that claim

* The methodology by which the plaintiff seeks to prove damages on
an aggregate basis.

The Court explained that if a plaintiff is unable to provide a
foundation on which to conclude all class members were damaged,
such aggregate proof raises the likelihood certain class members
with no claim for damages will receive a windfall. Individualized
proof of damages should be used in those circumstances. When
aggregate proof is used, the Court found it imperative that the
proof be based on a reliable mathematical formula.

Applying this inquiry to the case at bar, the Court highlighted how
the plaintiff did not establish that all class members' vehicles
required excessive brake repairs. Notably, three satisfied New
Jersey Kia Sephia owners even testified for Kia at trial. Using the
aggregate measure of damages in this case would have given an
unknown number of class members a windfall. The Court also
determined the formula used to calculate the aggregate
out-of-pocket repair costs was unreliable, largely because its
bases were speculative. The Court held the trial court's grant of
motion for a new trial and decertification as to damages were
proper.

This decision offers guidance for how to determine what measure of
damages is most appropriate in a given class action. While
aggregate proof may be an accurate and reliable measure in certain
cases, litigants should expect that the courts will review it with
a critical eye. [GN]


KINGOLD JEWELRY: Pomerantz LLP Reminds of Class Action Filed
------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on July 8 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Kingold Jewelry, Inc. ("Kingold" or the
"Company")(NASDAQ: KGJI) and certain of its officers.   The class
action, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, and indexed under 20-cv-03050, is on behalf
of persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Kingold
securities between March 15, 2018, and June 28, 2020, inclusive
(the "Class Period").  Plaintiff seeks to recover compensable
damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal securities
laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Kingold securities during
the Class Period, you have until August 31, 2020, to ask the Court
to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the class.  A copy of the
Complaint can be obtained at www.pomerantzlaw.com.   To discuss
this action, contact Robert S. Willoughby at
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or 888.4-POMLAW),
toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail are encouraged to
include their mailing address, telephone number, and the number of
shares purchased.

Kingold purports to design, manufacture, and sell 24-karat gold
jewelry and Chinese ornaments in the People's Republic of China.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading because they misrepresented
and failed to disclose the following adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects, which were known to
Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them.  Specifically,
Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Kingold used fake gold as collateral to
fraudulently secure loans; (ii) consequently, the Company would
face creditor lawsuits and be delisted from the Shanghai Gold
Exchange; and (iii) as a result, Defendants' statements about its
business, operations, and prospects were materially false and
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

On June 29, 2020, before the market opened, Caixin Global published
an article entitled "Cover Story: The Mystery of $2 Billion of
Loans Backed by Fake Gold."  The article stated, among other
things, that Kingold had used gold bars that were actually gilded
copper as collateral in loans and was now facing lawsuits as a
result, and that Kingold had been delisted from the Shanghai Gold
Exchange.

On this news, shares of Kingold stock fell $0.27 per share, or over
24%, to close at $0.85 per share on June 29, 2020.

With offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Paris, The
Pomerantz Firm -- http://www.pomerantzlaw.com-- concentrates its
practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class
litigation. Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the
dean of the class action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the
field of securities class actions. Today, more than 80 years later,
the Pomerantz Firm continues in the tradition he established,
fighting for the rights of the victims of securities fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duty, and corporate misconduct. The Firm has
recovered numerous multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of
class members.

CONTACT:

  Robert S. Willoughby
  Pomerantz LLP
  rswilloughby@pomlaw.com [GN]


KIRKLAND LAKE: Glancy Prongay Reminds of Aug. 28 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM"), a national investors rights
law firm, on July 1 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has been
filed on behalf of investors who purchased Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd.
("Kirkland" or "the Company") (NYSE: KL) securities between January
8, 2018 and November 25, 2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").
Kirkland investors have until August 28, 2020 to file a lead
plaintiff motion.

If you suffered a loss on your Kirkland investments or would like
to inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at
https://www.glancylaw.com/cases/kirkland-lake-gold-ltd/. You can
also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free
at 888-773-9224, or via email at shareholders@glancylaw.com to
learn more about your rights.

On November 25, 2019, Kirkland announced that it would acquire
Detour Gold Corporation ("Detour") for $3.68 billion. The deal was
dilutive to Kirkland's reserve grade: while Kirkland's reserve
grade was 25 g/t before the deal, Detour's reserve grade was 0.96
g/t. Moreover, the deal would lead to a 30% increase in Kirkland's
all-in sustaining costs.

On this news, the Company's share price fell as much as $8.18, or
over 17%, to close at $39.44 per share on November 25, 2019.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that Kirkland lacked adequate internal controls over
financial reporting, especially as it relates to its projections of
risks, reserve grade, and all-in sustaining costs; (2) that as a
result of the known, but undisclosed, impending acquisition of
Detour Gold Corporation, the Company's projections relating to its
risks, reserve grade, and all-in sustaining costs were false and
misleading; (3) that the Company's financial statements and
projections were not fairly presented in conformity with
International Financial Reporting Standards; and (4) that based on
the foregoing, defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects and/or lacked a reasonable basis and omitted material
facts.

If you purchased Kirkland securities during the Class Period, you
may move the Court no later than August 28, 2020 to ask the Court
to appoint you as lead plaintiff. To be a member of the Class you
need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of
your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the
Class. If you wish to learn more about this action, or if you have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights or
interests with respect to these matters, please contact Charles
Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los
Angeles California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at
888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our
website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]


KIRKLAND LAKE: Lowey Dannenberg Files Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lowey Dannenberg P.C., a preeminent law firm in obtaining redress
for consumers and investors, has filed a federal securities class
action in the Southern District of New York on behalf of its client
and all similarly situated investors who purchased or otherwise
acquired common stock of Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd. ("Kirkland" or the
Company") (NYSE: KL) from January 8, 2019 to November 25, 2019,
inclusive (the "Class Period").  The class action alleges
violations of the federal securities laws.

Headquartered in Toronto, Ontario, Kirkland is a gold mining and
exploration company with operations in Canada and Australia.
Historically, Kirkland pursued a strategy based on high-grade
underground mining with low all-in sustaining costs.  During the
months leading up to November 25, 2019, Kirkland negotiated the
acquisition of Detour Gold Corporation ("Detour"), an
underperforming gold miner who's business depended on low-grade
mining and high costs.

The Complaint alleges that Kirkland made false and misleading
statements to the public throughout the Class Period and failed to
disclose that: (i) Kirkland lacked adequate internal controls over
financial reporting, especially as it relates to its projections of
risks, reserve grade, and all-in sustaining costs; (ii) the
Company's projections relating to its risks, reserve grade, and
all-in sustaining costs were false and misleading in light of the
impending acquisition of Detour; (iii) the Company's financial
statements and projections were not fairly presented in conformity
with International Financial Reporting Standards; and (iv) based on
the foregoing, Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects and/or lacked a reasonable basis and omitted material
facts.

On November 25, 2019, the company announced that it had agreed to
acquire Detour.  On news of this acquisition, Kirkland's shares
fell from $47.62 per share to $39.44, a decline of $8.18, more than
17%.

If you wish to serve as Lead Plaintiff for the Class, you must file
a motion with the Court no later than August 28, 2020.  Any member
of the proposed Class may move to serve as the Lead Plaintiff
through counsel of their choice.

If you have suffered a net loss from investment in Kirkland's
common stock from January 8, 2019 to November 25, 2019, you may
obtain additional information about this lawsuit and your ability
to become a Lead Plaintiff, by contacting Christian Levis at
clevis@lowey.com or by calling 914-733-7220 or Andrea Farah at
afarah@lowey.com or by calling 914-733-7256. The class action is
titled Brahms v. Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd., No. 1:20-cv-4953
(S.D.N.Y.). [GN]


LENWICH MANAGEMENT: Dornates Seeks Overtime Pay, Wage Statements
----------------------------------------------------------------
Benito Dornates, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Lenwich Management LLC, Lenwich 83rd LLC,
Lenwich 96th LLC, Lenny Chu, Ana Doe and Ernesto Doe, Defendants,
Case No. 20-cv-04535 (S.D. N.Y., June 12, 2020), seeks to recover
unpaid minimum and overtime wages and redress for failure to
provide itemized wage statements pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable
liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control two sandwich delis in New York
under the name "Lenwich" where Dornates was employed as delivery
worker and general assistant at the delis located at Columbus Ave.
and Broadway. He claims to have worked in excess of 40 hours per
week, without appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of
hours compensation for the hours that they worked. Lenwich also
failed to maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and
failed to pay them appropriately for any hours worked, either at
the straight rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium,
asserts the complaint. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
      Email: michael@faillacelaw.com


LIMA RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Minimum Wage, Esquivel Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------
GIOVANNI ESQUIVEL, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. LIMA RESTAURANT CORP. (D/B/A LIMA RESTAURANT
& BAR); and CARLOS MEIJA , Defendants, Case 1:20-cv-02914-ENV-RLM
(E.D.N.Y., July 1, 2020) seeks to recover from the Defendants
unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest, liquidated
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff Esquivel was employed by the Defendants as waiter.

Lima Restaurant Corp. owns, operates, or controls a Latin American
restaurant, located at Jackson Heights, New York, under the name
"Lima Restaurant & Bar".

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Michael Faillace, Esq.
         MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
         60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
         New York, NY 10165
         Telephone: (212) 317-1200
         Facsimile: (212) 317-1620


LOS ANGELES, CA: George Floyd Protesters File Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
Marjorie Cohn, writing for LA Progressive, reports that protesters
demonstrating against white supremacy and police brutality in the
wake of George Floyd's public lynching have been met with illegal
repression by law enforcement. Police have utilized toxic chemical
and sonic weapons, dangerous projectiles, intrusive surveillance,
physical violence and "kettling" to trap demonstrators after
dispersal orders are given.

In a study conducted by the University of Chicago Law School's
International Human Rights Clinic, researchers found not one police
department in the 20 largest U.S. cities in compliance with minimum
human rights standards governing use of lethal force. They called
the use of force by police "state-sanctioned violence."

Victims of police abuse are filing litigation, and at least one
judge has put a halt to some of the most egregious misconduct.

Widespread, Egregious Police Abuse of Protesters

On May 30, Tina Crnko was marching at the Black Lives Matter Los
Angeles rally when police shot her in the ribcage and bicep with
kinetic impact projectiles (KIPs), also known as "rubber bullets."
KIPs can result in serious organ damage and even death,
particularly when shot at the head, neck or torso.

Crnko is a plaintiff in a class-action lawsuit filed in the U.S.
District Court, Central District of California by the National
Lawyers Guild, Black Lives Matter Los Angeles and the Los Angeles
Community Action Network. Crnko was also hit on her forehead above
the eye. She bled profusely and experienced temporary hearing loss
and extreme pain. Three weeks later, she still suffered nerve
damage.

Another plaintiff in the Los Angeles lawsuit, Alicia
Barrera-Trujillo, participated in a peaceful protest on June 1.
When she tried to leave a little before 5 pm, she and other
protesters were "kettled" -- surrounded by police to prevent anyone
from leaving. Police then fired rubber bullets into the group.
Barrera-Trujillo alleges that an officer sprayed an aerosol agent
at a woman with a small child who was crying. Both the woman and
child exhibited pain from the spray.

Katharine Miller was on the ground kneeling at a June 1 protest
when a Philadelphia police officer pepper sprayed her in the face
and then pulled down the goggles on the woman next to her and
sprayed her too.

"Less-lethal weapons -- such as tear gas and pepper spray grenades,
and impact projectiles such as sponge rounds, baton rounds, and
rubber bullets -- should never be shot at close range or aimed at
the head, as serious injury or death is possible," according to
Amnesty International.

On May 31, Minneapolis police and Minnesota National Guards shot
projectiles at people standing peacefully on their front porches, a
report by Amnesty International concluded. Before they started
firing, the forces yelled, "Light them up." They were apparently
retaliating against people outside after curfew using their
smartphones to videotape the forces.

The report documented 125 incidents of police violence against
protesters in 40 states and Washington, D.C., from May 26 to June
5, committed by state and local police departments, National Guard
troops and security personnel from federal agencies. The abuses,
recorded in 500 videos, include beatings, misuse of pepper spray
and tear gas, and inappropriate, even indiscriminate, firing of
rubber bullets and sponge grenades or sponge-tipped bullets.

"These human rights violations by US police against peaceful
protesters — which were neither proportionate nor necessary to
achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective — are particularly
egregious as they have occurred at demonstrations denouncing just
such police behavior," the Amnesty report noted.

Even when a minority of protesters committed unlawful acts,
"security forces have routinely used disproportionate and
indiscriminate force against entire demonstrations - without
distinguishing, as legally required, between peaceful protesters
and individuals committing unlawful acts," the report found.

The most striking thing about the documented incidents, aside from
the severity of the abuses, is "the national scale of the problem
of police violence," with violations occurring in both large cities
and small towns all over the country

Violations of Protesters' First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
Rights

On June 5, U.S. District Court Judge R. Brooke Jackson issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Denver Police Department
from using "chemical weapons or projectiles of any kind against
persons engaging in peaceful protests or demonstrations." Police
cannot use KIPs to target the head, back or pelvis, or shoot KIPs
indiscriminately into a crowd. Chemical agents or irritants,
including tear gas and pepper spray, can only be used after a
dispersal order is given with adequate time for compliance and
officers must allow safe egress (no kettling).

Judge Jackson found a strong likelihood that Denver police violated
the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force and the First
Amendment right to free speech. Plaintiffs claimed that police
aimed at their heads and groins, which caused broken facial bones
and ruptured testicles. The complaint also alleges that police used
"pepper spray, pepper balls, rubber bullets, flashbang grenades,
and tear gas to punish plaintiffs for demonstrating against police
brutality."

These human rights violations by US police against peaceful
protesters are particularly egregious as they have occurred at
demonstrations denouncing just such police behavior.

The judge found that "irreparable harm" would result if the
plaintiffs were not granted immediate relief because the protests
are ongoing, and the use of excessive force would have a chilling
effect on the plaintiffs' exercise of their freedom of speech. "I
recognize the importance of shielding and uplifting this ongoing,
nationwide movement. As such, I find that irreparable harm would
occur were I to deny this relief," Judge Jackson wrote.

Property damage, according to the judge, "is a small price to pay
for constitutional rights — especially the constitutional right
of the public to speak against widespread injustice." He added,

If a store's windows must be broken to prevent a protestor's facial
bones from being broken or eye being permanently damaged, that is
more than a fair trade. If a building must be graffiti-ed to
prevent the suppression of free speech, that is a fair trade. The
threat to physical safety and free speech outweighs the threat to
property.

The first amended complaint in the Black Lives Matter Los Angeles
lawsuit says that from May 29 to June 3, the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) arrested approximately 3,000 people. The police
chief admitted that well over 92 percent of the individuals
arrested were engaged in peaceful protest.

Plaintiffs allege that police misconduct resulted in the violation
of their First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They charge
that the LAPD used "indiscriminate and unreasonable force against
thousands of protesters" and used unreasonable and excessive force
by hitting "at least close to a thousand protesters with batons
and/or 'rubbers bullets.'" Plaintiffs attest to being restrained
with tight handcuffs, denied bathroom access and access to food or
water, and provided insufficient ventilation during transport,
making them vulnerable to COVID-19.

On June 1, President Trump and Attorney General William Barr
ordered the use of chemical weapons against peaceful protesters in
Lafayette Square in Washington, D.C., to facilitate Trump's
photo-op holding a Bible in front of St. John's Episcopal Church.
Police used tear gas, flash-bang shells, smoke canisters, pepper
balls and/or rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.

The ACLU of District of Columbia, Washington Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law sued Trump and Barr on behalf of Black Lives
Matter DC and other protesters. They allege violation of the
protesters' First and Fourth Amendment rights, including the rights
of peaceful assembly, petition for redress of grievances, freedom
of speech, freedom of the press and freedom from unreasonable
seizures.

Qualified Immunity Excuses Police Abuse

When the plaintiffs litigate these lawsuits, they will be met with
the qualified immunity defense. It shields officers from liability
unless: 1.) They violated the Fourth Amendment by using excessive
force; and 2.) they should have known they were violating "clearly
established" law. Even in the most egregious cases, it is often
difficult to prove the second prong if there is no prior case
finding similar police conduct illegal.

On June 15, the Supreme Court declined to review eight cases that
would have given them the opportunity to reconsider the qualified
immunity defense.

Emma Andersson and the ACLU are handling one of those cases.
"Requiring government actors to be careful before treading on
someone's constitutional rights is the only reasonable approach if
you truly value those rights and want to ensure that they thrive
rather than wither over time," Andersson, a senior staff attorney
at the ACLU, told CBS News. "As qualified immunity has become an
increasingly high bar, it has become tougher for victims of
government misconduct to vindicate their rights in court."

Property damage, according to the judge, "is a small price to pay
for constitutional rights — especially the constitutional right
of the public to speak against widespread injustice."

Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in 1986, "qualified immunity
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law."

Since the Black Lives Matter uprisings began, qualified immunity
has become a hot-button issue. Colorado made history on June 19 by
banning the qualified immunity defense. Congress is considering
proposals that could abolish or water down the defense.

Representatives Justin Amash (D-Michigan) and Ayanna Pressley
(D-Massachusetts) introduced the Ending Qualified Immunity Act in
the House of Representatives on June 4. It provides there will be
no qualified immunity defense if an officer claimed he or she was
acting in good faith, or reasonably believed that his or her
conduct was lawful at the time it was committed. It also specifies
there is no defense even if the law was not clearly established at
the time of the officer's conduct.

Senators Ed Markey (D-Massachusetts), Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont)
and Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) introduced the Senate's
companion bill to the House's Ending Qualified Immunity Act on July
1.

"If we want to change the culture of police violence against Black
and Brown Americans," Markey said, "then we need to start holding
accountable the officers who abuse their positions of trust and
responsibility in our communities. That means once-and-for-all
abolishing the dangerous judicial doctrine known as qualified
immunity."

"At a time when unprecedented numbers of people are demanding an
end to police murder, brutality, and impunity, we have got to
finally abolish 'qualified immunity,'" Sanders declared. "This is
not a radical idea: Police officers must be held fully accountable
for abuses they commit—no one is above the law. If we are serious
about real police reform, the Senate has got to pass our Ending
Qualified Immunity Act."

"For too long," Warren stated, "qualified immunity has shielded
police officers who have engaged in unconstitutional and appalling
conduct from being held accountable in court—it's past time to
end this doctrine. I'm proud to join my colleagues in cosponsoring
this bill and putting forward reforms to help end the systemic
racism that plagues policing in America."

On June 24, Republican Sen. Mike Braun of Indiana introduced the
Reforming Qualified Immunity Act, which would allow the qualified
immunity defense only when the officer's conduct had previously
been "specifically authorized or required by" a federal or state
statute or regulation, or if a court had found it to be consistent
"with the Constitution or Federal laws."

It is unlikely that Republicans will agree to reform, no less
abolish, the qualified immunity defense. It falls to the people to
demand its abolition. [GN]


LOWE'S HOME: Melody Suit Over Unpaid Wages Removed to C.D. Calif.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as DIANA MELODY, an individual,
on behalf of herself and others similarly situated v. LOWE'S HOME
CENTERS, LLC, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No. 20CV01653
(Filed April 15, 2020), was removed from the Superior Court of the
State of California for the County of Santa Barbara to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on July 7,
2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-06047 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff alleges causes of action against Lowe's, including
failure to pay reporting time wages and wrongful termination in
violation of public policy in violation of the California Labor
Code.

Lowe's Home retails home improvement, building materials, and home
appliances.[BN]

Defendant Lowe's Home is represented by:

          Michele L. Maryott, Esq.
          Katie M. Magallanes, Esq.
          Katherine V.A. Smith, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          3161 Michelson Drive
          Irvine, CA 92612-4412
          Telephone: 949 451 3800
          Facsimile: 949 451 4220
          E-mail: mmaryott@gibsondunn.com
                  kmagallanes@gibsondunn.com
                  ksmith@gibsondunn.com


MACRO COMPANIES: Guillory Seeks Conditional Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In class action lawsuit captioned as ROBERT GUILLORY, Individually
And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated, v. MACRO COMPANIES,
INC. OF DELAWARE d/b/a MACRO OIL COMPANY, INC, Case No.
6:19-cv-01298-MJJ-PJH (W.D. La.), the Plaintiff asks the Court for
an order granting conditional certification of the following
defined putative class and authorizing Notice to be sent to the
class:

   "United States based drivers/laborers employed by Macro who
   worked for Macro in the Puerto Rico from approximately
   October 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017 and who were paid a day
   rate during that time period and specifically excluding any
   such driver/laborer who participated in the prior U.S.
   Department of Labor settlement as reflected in the Summary of
   Unpaid Wages Form WH-56 executed by Macro's representative
   and the employee."

The Plaintiff further asks that the Court authorize the following
schedule:

   --  30 Days from entry of order approving notice to Potential
       Class Members:

          The Defendant to provide to the Plaintiff’s counsel in
          Excel (.xlsx) format the following information
          regarding all Putative Class Members: full name; last
          known address(es) with city, state, and zip Code; last
          known e-mail addresses; beginning date(s) of
          employment and ending date(s) of employment (if
          applicable) in Puerto  Rico.

   --  20 Days from Class Counsel's receipt of the Excel
       Spreadsheet Listing from Defendant:

          The Plaintiff's Counsel shall send a copy of the
          Court-approved Notice and Consent Form to the Putative
          Class Members by First Class U.S. Mail and e-mail.
          Plaintiff's counsel shall also submit to counsel for
          Defendant a list of each Putative Class
          Member with the date of mailing to each person.

   --  30 Days from initial mailing and e-mailing Notice and
       Consent Forms to Potential Class Members:

          The Plaintiff's Counsel shall send an identical Notice
          and Consent Form to Potential Class Members by the
          same methods as the initial Notice.

   --  60 Days from mailing of Notice and Consent Forms to
       Potential Class Members:

          The Putative Class Members shall have 60 days from the
          date of mailing of Notice and Consent Forms to return
          their signed Consent forms to Plaintiff’s Counsel for
          filing with the Court.

Macro Companies is in the filling stations, gasoline business.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kenneth W. DeJean, Esq.
          Adam R. Credeur, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH W. DEJEAN
          417 W. University Avenue (70506)
          P.O. Box 4325
          Lafayette, LA 70502
          Telephone: 337-235-5294
          Facsimile: 337-235-1095
          E-mail: kwdejean@kwdejean.com
                  adam@kwdejean.com

               - and -

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713-352-1100
          Facsimile: 713-352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Telecopier: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

MACY'S WEST: Aboyte Labor Class Suit Removed to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as Leslie Aboyte and Azmavete
Zuniga, on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated, and
the general public v. Macy's West Stores, Inc., a Ohio corporation;
Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., a New York corporation; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Case No. 20-CIV-02347 (Filed June 3, 2020),
was removed from the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of San Mateo to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California on July 8, 2020.

The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
3:20-cv-04541 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiffs allege class claims for failure to provide meal
periods and rest periods, failure to pay all wages due upon
separation of employment, failure to maintain accurate records, and
failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation
of the Labor Code.

Macy's West operates department stores. The Company offers
clothing, footwear, bedding, furniture, jewelry, beauty products,
and house wares.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stephen Noel Ilg, Esq.
          George L. Lin, Esq.
          ILG LEGAL OFFICE, P.C.
          156 South Spruce Avenue, Unit 206A
          South San Francisco, CA 94080
          Telephone: (415) 580-2574
          Facsimile: (415) 735-3454
          E-mail: silg@ilglegal.com
                  glin@ilglegal.com

               - and -

          Richard C. Alpers, Esq.
          ALPERS LAW GROUP, INC.
          PO Box 1540
          Aptos, CA 95001
          Telephone: (831) 240-0490
          Facsimile: (855) 870-1129
          E-mail: rca@alperslawgroup.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Cary G. Palmer, Esq.
          Erika Barbara Pickles, Esq.
          JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
          400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1600
          Sacramento, CA 95814
          Telephone: (916) 341-0404
          Facsimile: (916) 341-0141
          E-mail: cary.palmer@jacksonlewis.com
                  erika.pickles@jacksonlewis.com

               - and -

          Michael C. Christman, Esq.
          MACY'S LAW DEPARTMENT
          11477 Olde Cabin Road, Suite 400
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 342-6334
          Facsimile: (314) 342-6366
          E-mail: michael.christman@macys.com


MANHATTAN SCHOOL OF MUSIC: Flatscher Suit Seeks Tuition Fee Refund
------------------------------------------------------------------
Alina Flatscher, on behalf of herself and other individuals
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. The Manhattan School of Music,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-04496 (S.D. N.Y., June 11, 2020), seeks
disgorgement of all amounts wrongfully obtained for tuition, fees,
on-campus housing, and meals, injunctive relief including enjoining
The Manhattan School of Music from retaining the pro-rated, unused
monies paid for tuition, fees, on-campus housing and meals,
reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses, prejudgment and
post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded and such other and
further relief as may be just and proper, refunds of all tuition
fees paid on a pro-rata basis, together with other damages
resulting from breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Flatscher was enrolled at The Manhattan School of Music for the
Spring 2020 semester. The Manhattan School of Music decided to
close campus, constructively evict students, and transition all
classes to an online/remote format as a result of the Novel
Coronavirus Disease. Flatscher claims to be deprived the benefits
of in-person instruction, access to campus facilities, student
activities and other benefits and services in exchange for which
they had already paid fees and tuition. The Manhattan School of
Music refused to provide reimbursement for the tuition, fees and
other costs. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Thomas J. McKenna, Esq.
      Gregory M. Egleston, Esq.
      GAINEY McKENNA & EGLESTON
      501 Fifth Avenue, 19th Floor
      New York, NY 10017
      Tel.: (212) 983-1300
      Email: tjmckenna@gme-law.com
             gegleston@gme-law.com


MDL 2047: Bid to Sever Claims in Chinese Drywall Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, SECTION L (2). THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth
Bennett, et al. v. Gebr. Knauf Verwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al.,
No. 14-2722, Civil Action MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Eldon E.
Fallon of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted the motion to sever the claims of Plaintiffs
Peggy Powell and Wicler Pierre.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages. Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
this litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all the federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Court.  Since that date,
numerous cases have been consolidated, involving thousands of
individua l claims; over 20,000 documents have been entered into
the record, millions of documents have been exchanged in discovery,
depositions have been taken in the United States and in China, and
over thirty Pretrial Orders have been issued; the Court has
appointed steering committees and liaison counsel for plaintiffs,
homebuilders, insurers, installers, and manufacturers, and it has
presided over monthly status conferences, hearings, and several
bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan Entities.
The litigation has focused upon these two entities and their
downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly different
tracks for the claims against each group.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennet raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.  The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf
Entities for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability,
breach of express and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations
of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, private nuisance,
negligent discharge of a corrosive substance, unjust enrichment,
violations of consumer protection laws, and equitable and
injunctive relief and medical monitoring with respect to the
manufacture of allegedly defective Chinese drywall.  In January
2015, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
the case to the Eastern District of Louisiana and consolidated it
with the In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Liability Litigation,
MLD 09-2047, currently pending before the Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of several Individual Plaintiffs.

Relevant to the instant motion, the Court granted summary judgment
in the Defendant's favor and against Plaintiffs Wicler Pierre on
Feb. 14, 2020, and Peggy Powell on March 6, 2020, on the grounds
that their claims were barred under Florida and Mississippi's
applicable statute of limitations.  

Specifically, the Court found that Wicler Pierre had actual
knowledge of the presence of Chinese drywall in his home more than
four years before filing suit in 2016 because he was told by a
repair person that the fuses in his home kept failing due to the
presence of Chinese drywall in 2010 and because he testified that
he discovered the presence of the drywall in 2011 or 2012 after his
neighbors renovated their own home due to drywall problems.
Similarly, the Court found that Peggy Powell had actual knowledge
of the presence of Chinese drywall more than three years before
filing her claims in 2018.  In so finding, the Court relied on Ms.
Powell's deposition, during which she explained that in 2014, an
inspection of her property revealed signs of Chinese drywall, after
which she researched the issue on the internet but decided to deal
with the problem later.

Plaintiffs Wicler Pierre and Peggy Powell seek the severance of
their claims from the above-captioned matter in order to allow them
to pursue an appeal from the Court's grant of summary judgment
against them.  In their view, severance is necessary to allow the
appeals to progress without delaying the adjudication of the claims
of approximately 120 other Plaintiffs named in the action.

The Defendants do not object to the actual severance of these two
claims but do object to the Plaintiff's motion based on the
piecemeal nature of their request.  The Defendants note that all of
the Bennett claims are individualized and distinct, and that they
must all eventually be severed and remanded back to courts of
competent jurisdiction once the purpose of their consolidation in
this MDL has been served.  They explain that although the Court
issued a Case Management Order in the matter, directing the
Plaintiffs to file protective actions in individua l courts of
competent jurisdiction and venue to which the cases would be
eventually remanded, Plaintiffs have not yet filed these protective
actions and accordingly, the majority of the claims will be
remanded to an improper court.  The Defendants suggest that
therefore, any Bennett claim surviving dispositive motion practice
must be severed from the mail action so that they can proceed on
their own 'discrete and separate' claims in courts of competent
venue and jurisdiction.

Judge Fallon holds that although for the sake of judicial economy,
joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged,
the district court has broad discretion to sever.  The parties have
not raised any allegations of misjoinder, as all the Plaintiffs'
claims arise out the alleged presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their properties and are aimed at the same Defendants.
Nevertheless, Wicler Pierre and Peggy Powell seek severance of
their claims because they wish the appeal the summary judgment
entered against them to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.  

The District Court recognizes that it is a lengthy process that
would inevitably stall the adjudication of their fellow Plaintiffs'
claims, which have already been active for over six years.
Accordingly, the District concludes that these two individual
claims should be severed in the interests of convenience and
judicial economy, and the other claims allowed to proceed before
the Court.  The District Court takes note of the Defendant's
arguments that severance of all Bennett claims may be warranted but
will only rule on the matter if and when it is properly presented
to the Court.  The Defendants retain the right to bring the
argument before the Court at a later date.

Considering the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Sever.  The Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to file
amended complaints with respect to Plaintiffs Wicler Pierre and
Peggy Powell.  The caption of the amended complaints will contain
only the names of the Individual Plaintiffs whose claims have been
severed and the Defendants that are the subject of that specific
claim.  Upon filing of the amended complaints, the Clerk of Court
will issue individual civil actions numbers for Plaintiffs Wicler
Pierre and Peggy Powell to proceed apart from the above-captioned
action, but the claims will remain consolidated in MDL 09-2047.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://is.gd/jtNrQe from Leagle.com.


MDL 2047: Summary Judgment Orders in Chinese Drywall Suit Entered
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE CHINESE-MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION, THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Elizabeth Bennett, et al. v.
Gebr. Knauf erwaltungsgesellschaft, KG, et al., No. 14-2722,
SECTION (2), MDL No. 2047 (E.D. La.), Judge Eldon E. Fallon of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has
issued an order on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the claims asserted Carl and Lynn Russell and Ronald and Patricia
Stanfa, Michael and Alice Ginart, Toshonia and Martin Armstrong,
Ronald and Bernice Pendleton, William Foreman, Dung Nguyen, R & S
Properties, LLC, Michael Christovich and Carlisle Place, LLC,
Consuelo Burgos, Johnny Tyler, Carl and Ellen Moore, Gerald Levin,
Jay Wang and Ruby Xi, Ronald and Leslie Bogard, and Rachel
Schoerner.

From 2004 through 2006, the housing boom in Florida and rebuilding
efforts necessitated by Hurricanes Rita and Katrina led to a
shortage of construction materials, including drywall.  As a
result, drywall manufactured in China was brought into the United
States and used to construct and refurbish homes in coastal areas
of the country, notably the Gulf Coast and East Coast.  Sometime
after the installation of the Chinese drywall, homeowners began to
complain of emissions of foul-smelling gas, the corrosion and
blackening of metal wiring, surfaces, and objects, and the breaking
down of appliances and electrical devices in their homes.  Many of
these homeowners also began to complain of various physical
afflictions believed to be caused by the Chinese drywall.

These homeowners then began to file suit in various state and
federal courts against homebuilders, developers, installers,
realtors, brokers, suppliers, importers, exporters, distributors,
and manufacturers who were involved with the Chinese drywall.  As a
result, many homebuilders also filed suit seeking to recoup their
damages.  Because of the commonality of facts in the various cases,
this litigation was designated as a multidistrict litigation.

Pursuant to a Transfer Order from the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation on June 15, 2009, all federal cases
involving Chinese drywall were consolidated for pretrial
proceedings in MDL 09-2047 before the Louisiana District Court.
Since that date, numerous cases have been consolidated, involving
thousands of individual claims; over 20,000 documents have been
entered into the record, millions of documents have been exchanged
in discovery, depositions have been taken in the United States and
in China, and over thirty Pretrial Orders have been issued; the
Court has appointed the steering committees and the liaison counsel
for the Plaintiffs, homebuilders, insurers, installers, and
manufacturers, and it has presided over monthly status conferences,
hearings, and several bellwether trials.

The Chinese drywall at issue was largely manufactured by two groups
of Defendants: (1) the Knauf Entities and (2) the Taishan Entities.
The litigation has focused upon these two entities and their
downstream associates and has proceeded on strikingly different
tracks for the claims against each group.

The Knauf Entities are German-based, international manufacturers of
building products, including drywall, whose Chinese subsidiary,
Knauf Plasterboard (Tianjin) Co., Ltd. ("KPT"), advertised and sold
its Chinese drywall in the United States.  The Knauf Entities are
named defendants in numerous cases consolidated with the MDL
litigation and litigation in state courts.

On Dec. 20, 2011, the Knauf Entities and the PSC entered into a
global, class Settlement Agreement, which was designed to resolve
all Knauf-related, Chinese drywall claims.  In addition to the
Knauf Settlement Agreement and after a jury trial in a bellwether
case, numerous defendants in the chain-of-commerce with the Knauf
Entities have entered into class settlement agreements, the effect
of which settles almost all of the Knauf Entities'
chain-of-commerce litigation.  The total amount of the Knauf
Settlement is approximately $1.1 billion.

The instant matter is a purported class action filed on Nov. 13,
2014 by Elizabeth Bennett in the Northern District of Alabama.  Ms.
Bennett raised claims on her own behalf and on the behalf of a
nationwide class of similarly situated homeowners who allegedly
suffered damages due to the presence of defective Chinese drywall
in their homes.  The Plaintiffs raised claims against the Knauf
Entities for negligence, negligence per se, strict liability,
breach of express and/or implied warranty, redhibition, violations
of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, private nuisance,
negligent discharge of a corrosive substance, unjust enrichment,
violations of consumer protection laws, and equitable and
injunctive relief and medical monitoring with respect to the
manufacture of allegedly defective Chinese drywall.  

In January 2015, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the case to the Eastern District of Louisiana and
consolidated it with the In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall
Liability Litigation, MLD 09-2047, currently pending before the
Court.

On Oct. 31, 2019, the Court granted leave for the Plaintiffs to add
several new Plaintiffs to the action.  The case now involves 130
affected properties.  On that date, the Court also extended many of
the Case Management Order's deadlines.  With discovery well
underway, the Knauf Defendants have begun to file dispositive
motions targeting the claims of individual Plaintiffs.

In various motions, the Defendants seek summary judgment on the
claims asserted Carl and Lynn Russell and Ronald and Patricia
Stanfa, Michael and Alice Ginart, Toshonia and Martin Armstrong,
Ronald and Bernice Pendleton, William Foreman, Dung Nguyen, R & S
Properties, LLC, Michael Christovich and Carlisle Place, LLC,
Consuelo Burgos, Johnny Tyler, Carl and Ellen Moore, Gerald Levin,
Jay Wang and Ruby Xi, Ronald and Leslie Bogard, and Rachel
Schoerner, on the grounds that these claims are barred by the
applicable prescriptive period or statute of limitations.

The Plaintiffs oppose the motions, generally arguing that the
discovery of Chinese drywall in their properties did not occur at
the time the Defendants claim.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs
collectively argue that the applicable statute of limitations
period was tolled by Knauf's failure to report the sale of the
defective drywall to the Consumer Product Safety Commission and
Knauf's "active concealment" of the defect.  The Plaintiffs
generally contend the Defendants should be equitably estopped from
taking unfair advantage of homeowners who may have only received
limited or inaccurate information about the defective
Knauf-manufactured drywall through some source other than the CPSC
or from Defendants during a product recall.

Carl and Lynn Russell's claims arise from the alleged presence of
Chinese drywall in a property located at 5427 Creekside Lane,
Hoover, Alabama.  The Russells filed their claims on Jan. 31, 2016.
Accordingly, under Alabama law, their claims are untimely if they
discovered, or should have discovered, the presence of Chinese
drywall prior to Jan. 31, 2014.

The Russells completed a Plaintiff Profile Form indicating that a
Chinese drywall inspection was conducted, and the presence of
Chinese drywall revealed, on Nov. 12, 2015.  However, the statute
of limitations begins to run under Alabama law not when the full
extent of the injury has been felt or the cause of the damage
identified, but when the plaintiff first discovers, or reasonably
should have discovered, the damage or defect.  Without reviewing a
copy of the letter that was purportedly sent to the Russells, Judge
Fallon is unable to determine whether the Court imported actual
notice on the Russells.  Considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Russells, the Judge will deny summary judgment and
allow the trier of fact to decide whether the Russells acted
reasonably upon receiving a letter mentioning the possible presence
of Chinese drywall in the affected property.

Ronald and Patricia Stanfa's claims arise from the alleged presence
of Chinese drywall in a property located at 180 Sheffield Lane,
Birmingham, Alabama. The Stanfas filed their claims on Sept. 10,
2018.  Accordingly, under Alabama law, the Stanfas' claims are
untimely if they discovered, or should have discovered, the
presence of Chinese drywall prior to Sept. 10, 2016.

The Court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate, as the
Stanfas were repeatedly told by multiple technicians that their
home displayed clear signs of Chinese drywall contamination.  That
information, coming from at least two different professional
sources familiar with Chinese drywall, should have alerted the
Stanfas to the severity of the situation and prompted swift
action.

R&S Properties' claims arise from the alleged presence of Chinese
drywall in a property located at 9810 Bay Road North, Foley,
Alabama.  R&S Properties filed its claims on Sept. 10, 2018.
Accordingly, under Alabama law, R&S Properties' claims are untimely
if R&S Properties knew, or should have known about the defect
before Sept. 10, 2016.

Rocye Cornelison, a member of R&S Properties, was deposed in
conjunction with the litigation and explained that shortly after
purchasing the property as a family retreat, they experienced
multiple failures of the heating and air conditioning units.  He
further explained that a technician informed him that the home
"probably had Chinese drywall" sometime in 2011 or 2012.  Mr.
Cornelison stated that he "just figured it was him talking."  The
Judge finds that summary judgment appropriate because that
information, relayed by an industry professional, should have
altered Mr. Cornelison to the severity of the situation and
prompted swift action.

The Florida Plaintiffs collectively contend that the Defendants
should be estopped from arguing that they were on notice of the
defect any earlier than a formal Chinese drywall inspection because
the Defendants failed to comply with their post-sale duty to warn.
They additionally argue the statute of limitations was tolled by
the Defendants' fraudulent concealment of the defect in violation
of their legal duty under the CPSA.  The Judge has already rejected
this argument with respect to the Alabama Plaintiffs and finds no
reason to rule differently now.

Under Louisiana law, the prescriptive period for products liability
claims is one year.  Typically, the prescriptive period begins to
run from the day the injury or damage is sustained.  The Plaintiffs
collectively contend that the Defendants should be estopped from
arguing that they were on notice of the defect any earlier than a
formal Chinese drywall inspection because the Defendants failed to
comply with their duty to warn.  The Judge has already addressed
and rejected the argument with respect to the Alabama and Florida
Plaintiffs subject to the Order and Reasons and finds no reason to
rule differently now.  Further, for the reasons discussed, he
rejects the Louisiana Plaintiff's argument that prescription was
tolled by the Defendants' failure to report to the CPSC and
fraudulent concealment of the defect.

Under Mississippi law, claims for damage to real property are
subject to a three-year statute of limitations.  The Plaintiffs
collectively contend that the Defendants should be estopped from
arguing that the Plaintiffs were on notice of the defect any
earlier than a formal Chinese drywall inspection because the
Defendants failed to comply with their duty to warn.  However,
Mississippi law does not recognize a post-sale duty to warn.  Under
Mississippi law, liability attaches when a manufacturer fails to
warn of risks known at the time of sale.  Accordingly, the Court
rejects the argument.  Further, for the reasons, the Court also
rejects the Mississippi Plaintiffs' argument that prescription was
tolled by the Defendants' fraudulent concealment of the defect.

Under Texas law, claims for negligence are governed by a two-year
of statute of limitations.  With respect to property damage, Texas
courts apply a "discovery rule" under which the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff discovers, or should
have discovered the injury, regardless of whether the full extent
of the injury is ascertainable.  Product liability claims, as well
as claims arising under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"), are also subject to a
two-year statute of limitations.  In contrast, warranty-based
claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations that
begins to run when the breach occurs.

Considering the foregoing, Judge Fallon granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims
Asserted by Carl and Lynn Russell and Ronald and Patricia Stanfa.
It is granted with respect to Ronald and Patricia Stanfa's claims.
It is denied with respect to Carl and Lynn Russell's claims.

Judge Fallon granted (i) the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Claims Asserted by R & S Properties, LLC; (ii) the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by
Consuelo Burgos, Johnny Tyler, and Carl and Ellen Moore; (iii) the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by
Michael and Alice Ginart; (iv) the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Claims Asserted by Ronald and Bernice Pendleton; and
(v) granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims
Asserted by Gerald Levin.

The Court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Jay Wang and Ruby Xi.
It is granted with respect to Wang and Xi's non-LPLA and
redhibition claims.  It is denied in all other respects.

The Court further granted (i) the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on Claims Asserted by William Foreman; (ii) the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Dung
Nguyen; (iii) the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims
Asserted by Ronald and Leslie Bogard; (iv) the Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by Rachel Schoerner; and
(v) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by
Toshonia and Martin Armstrong.

Finally, the Judge granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Asserted by
Michael Christovich and Carlisle Place, LLC.  It is granted with
respect to Carlisle Place, LLC.  It is denied with respect to
Michael Christovich.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 12, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://is.gd/TiktSO from Leagle.com.


MDL 2473: Judge Directs KCC to Release Rosen's Share to US LBM
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE: DOMESTIC DRYWALL ANTITRUST LITIGATION. THIS
DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS, Civil Action.
MDL No. 13-2437 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Michael M. Baylson of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered
Kurtzman Carson Consultants, LLC ("KCC") to release Rosen
Materials' pro rata share of the Net Settlement Fund from escrow
and remit those proceeds to US LBM Holdings, LLC.

The multidistrict litigation involves allegations that drywall
manufacturers conspired to fix drywall prices and eliminate job
quotes in violation of federal and state antitrust laws.  The Court
separated the Plaintiffs into three groups: the Direct Purchaser
Plaintiffs ("DPPs"); the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs; and the
Homebuilder Plaintiffs.  Following certification of the DPP class,
the Defendants and the DPPs reached a settlement, which was
approved by the Court.

The Court then authorized a plan for distribution of the DPP
settlement funds.  That Order approved KCC as the Claims
Administrator and directed KCC to commence the administration
process.  The Order stated that if KCC could not resolve a claims
dispute, the issue should be brought to the Court for resolution.
Pursuant to the Order, KCC reviewed the claims forms submitted by
potential class members and determined each claimant's share of the
Net Settlement Fund.  The Court approved distribution of the claims
in the amounts determined by KCC, except the approval did not
resolve claims that were disputed.

One such issue that was not resolved by KCC and was brought to the
Court for resolution is a claims dispute between US LBM and Drew
Rosen.  The dispute arose because US LBM and Mr. Rosen each filed
claims for the same purchases made by Rosen Materials, LLC.  Mr.
Rosen held shares in Rosen Materials at the time of Rosen
Materials' drywall purchases, but subsequently sold his shares to
US LBM in 2015.  US LBM and Mr. Rosen disagree about whether Mr.
Rosen, a shareholder and former CEO of Rosen Materials who sold his
shares to US LBM in the 2015 transaction, retained Rosen Materials'
claim to the Net Settlement Fund or whether the Disputed Claim
passed to US LBM with the sale.

The Court must determine who between US LBM and Mr. Rosen is
entitled to the Disputed Claim that US LBM made on behalf of its
subsidiary Rosen Materials.  US LBM and Mr. Rosen each filed briefs
on the issue.  The Court held a hearing on March 12, 2020,
following which supplemental briefing was submitted.

Mr. Rosen initially argued that neither he nor US LBM had knowledge
of Rosen Materials' claim, so the parties could not have bargained
Rosen Materials' claim away.  In his supplemental memorandum, Mr.
Rosen explained that the mistake about the existence of Rosen
Materials' price-fixing claim must have been mutual, because if US
LBM had knowledge of the claim, then by representing that the
Membership Interest Purchase Agreement ("MIPA")'s purchase price
was a "good faith estimate," US LBM misled Mr. Rosen as to a
material fact.  Based on this mutual mistake of fact, Mr. Rosen
seeks reformation of the MIPA and requests award of the Disputed
Claim as his remedy.  He also seeks limited discovery because he
believes US LBM possesses evidence that supports his testimony.

US LBM responds that there was no mistake of fact because Mr. Rosen
had knowledge of Rosen Materials' potential claim prior to selling
his Rosen Materials shares.  According to his own deposition
testimony, not only was he aware that Mr. Todd was interviewed by
the Department of Justice in 2011, but he also knew that Mr. Todd
was deposed in this very case five months before the execution of
the MIPA.  US LBM also argues that in the absence of specific
language in the MIPA carving out class action settlements or claims
associated with the litigation and reserving those rights to Mr.
Rosen, corporate law regards Rosen Materials' claims as
transferring to US LBM with the stock sale.  Additionally, US LBM
contends that Rosen Materials owns the Disputed Claim arising out
of the drywall purchases, and that Mr. Rosen individually has no
standing to recover for purchases made by Rosen Materials.
Finally, US LBM asserts that the MIPA's forum selection clause,
which designates the state or federal courts in Michigan as the
"exclusive" venue for "any action" arising out of the agreement,
requires that Mr. Rosen's claims be resolved in Michigan, not in
the Court.

Judge Baylson concludes that US LBM has the right to receive the
Disputed Claim for the drywall purchases Rosen Materials made from
the defendants in the DPP action.  The Judge's conclusion is
compelled by two observations.  

First, the purchaser of the drywall was Rosen Materials, not Mr.
Rosen.  Mr. Rosen acknowledges that Rosen Materials, the corporate
entity, made the purchases that gave rise to the Disputed Claim.
Although Mr. Rosen owned or controlled a substantial amount of
Rosen Materials' shares during the damages period, the purchases
were made by Rosen Materials, not by Mr. Rosen.  It is therefore
Rosen Materials, and not Mr. Rosen, that has the right to recover.
Mr. Rosen contends that he owns the Disputed Claim "outright" but
he offers no case to support that proposition.

Second, Mr. Rosen's claims are properly resolved by the state or
federal courts in Michigan -- not by the Court.  The heart of Mr.
Rosen's argument is that US LBM will receive a windfall if it
receives the proceeds of the Disputed Claim because the purchase
price under the MIPA did not account for the value of Rosen
Materials' recovery from the DPP settlement.  He therefore seeks,
under Michigan law, reformation and any other relief that is
dictated by the interest of justice.  Mr. Rosen relies on Michigan
law because under the MIPA, the law of the state of Michigan
governs.  However, Mr. Rosen ignores the forum selection clause
that immediately follows the governing law provision in the MIPA.
That forum selection clause is broad -- it requires that any Action
arising out of the MIPA be resolved by a state or federal court in
Michigan.

In summary, US LBM is entitled to recover on behalf of Rosen
Materials, its subsidiary, for drywall purchases that Rosen
Materials made during the damages period.  Rosen Materials
purchased the drywall that gave rise to the Disputed Claim, and
Rosen Materials -- not Mr. Rosen -- has the right to receive the
proceeds from the Net Settlement Fund. Because US LBM purchased
Rosen Materials in 2015, US LBM is entitled to collect on behalf of
Rosen Materials.  Mr. Rosen may be correct that the purchase price
in the MIPA did not reflect the true value of his Rosen Materials
shares and that the MIPA entitles him to relief under Michigan law.
But under the MIPA's forum selection clause, that question must be
resolved by a state or federal court in Michigan.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Baylson held that US LBM is
entitled to the share of the Net Settlement Fund that results from
Rosen Materials' drywall purchases during the damages period.  KCC
will be directed to release Rosen Materials' pro rata share of the
Net Settlement Fund from escrow and remit those proceeds to US
LBM.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 24, 2020 Memorandum
is available at https://is.gd/pcavSc from Leagle.com.


MIDWAY NIGHTCLUB: Mohammed Seeks Refund of Cancelled Concert
------------------------------------------------------------
Yahya Mohammed, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. THE MIDWAY NIGHTCLUB, an entity of unknown form; PETER
GLICKSHTERN, an Individual; SHAP EVENTS, an entity of known form;
JEFFREY SHAPPART, an individual; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Case No. CGC-20-585334 (Cal. Super., San Francisco Cty., July 9,
2020), alleges breach of contract arising from the Defendants'
failure to perform, as promised, of a concert and refusing to pay
refund the monies paid.

On December 5, 2019, the Plaintiff responded to an advertisement
promoting a concert at The Midway, featuring hip hop artists, Quavo
and Sweetie scheduled to play a show on December 5, 2019. The
Plaintiff contacted the number on the advertisement, and spoke with
the Defendant, SHAPPART, of Shap Events, and requested the VIP
Package. SHAPPART transferred the Plaintiff to "Lisa" an employee
of THE MIDWAY, who processed the transaction. The Plaintiff
purchased a VIP Package--consisting of the "best table," admission
for up to 30 people, and top shelf champagne and alcohol--for a
cost of $12,000.

Less than fifteen minutes after the Plaintiff was seated, and paid
for the seating, and received the alcohol and champagne, the DJ
announced from the stage that Quavo and Saweetie had cancelled the
show, and told everyone, "Goodnight," according to the complaint.
The opened bottles of alcohols; and champagne could not be returned
and could not be taken off premises. Since the show had ended, and
the club was closing, the Plaintiff and his entourage had no choice
but to pack up and leave the venue. The Defendants and each of them
have refused, and continue to refuse, to give the Plaintiff a
refund of the monies paid.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Alameda County.

THE MIDWAY NIGHTCLUB is a San Francisco nightclub located in San
Francisco, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Webb, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW J. WEBB
          1382 A Street
          Hayward, CA 94541
          Phone: (510) 444-4224


MIRACLE-EAR INC: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Baldwin et al. Claim
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MILDRED BALDWIN; and RONALD STRUCKHOFF, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MIRACLE-EAR, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-01502-JRT-HB (D. Minn., July 1, 2020)
seeks to stop the Defendants' practice of making unsolicited
calls.

Miracle-Ear, Inc. operates as a hearing aid center. The Company
specializes in ear treatment, hearing health, and ongoing care
services. Miracle-Ear serves its patients in the State of
Minnesota. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daniel E. Gustafson, Esq.
          Catherine K. Smith, Esq.
          Raina C. Borrelli, Esq.
          GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
          Canadian Pacific Plaza
          120 South 6th Street, Suite 2600
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 333-8844
          E-mail: dgustafson@gustafsongluek.com
                  csmith@gustafsongluek.com
                  rborrelli@gustafsongluek.com

               - and -

          Samuel J. Strauss, Esq.
          TURKE & STRAUSS LLP
          936 N. 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103
          Telephone: (608) 237-1775
          E-mail: Sam@turkestrauss.com

               - and -

          Anthony I. Paronich, Esq.
          PARONICH LAW, P.C.
          350 Lincoln St., Suite 2400
          Hingham, MA 02043
          Telephone: (617) 485-0018
          E-mail: anthony@paronichlaw.com


MONARCH RECOVERY: Faces Lopez FDCPA Class Suit in E.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Monarch Recovery
Management, Inc. The case is styled as Joaquin F. Lopez,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-03065
(E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The Plaintiff filed the case under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act.

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., operates as a collection agency.
The Company provides debt recovery services such as new placement
review, advanced skip tracing, and arranging promises to pay, as
well as offers speech analytics, online payment portal, full call
recording, and flexible collection systems.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          BARSHAY SANDERS PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Phone: (516) 203-7600
          Fax: (516) 281-7601
          Email: csanders@barshaysanders.com


MONSANTO COMPANY: Forman Sues Over Sale of Herbicide Roundup(TM)
----------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM FORMAN v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Case No. 5:20-cv-00153-KS-MTP
(S.D. Miss., July 8, 2020), is an action for damages suffered by
the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated as a direct and
proximate result of the Defendant's negligent and wrongful conduct
in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing,
packaging, promoting, marketing, advertising, distribution,
labeling, and/or sale of the herbicide Roundup, containing the
active ingredient glyphosate.

Roundup (TM) refers to all formulations of the Defendant's roundup
products, including Roundup Concentrate Poison Ivy and Tough Brush
Killer 1, Roundup Custom Herbicide, Roundup D-Pak herbicide,
Roundup Dry Concentrate, Roundup Export Herbicide, Roundup Fence &
Hard Edger 1, Roundup Garden Foam Weed & Grass Killer, and Roundup
Grass and Weed Killer.

Glyphosate is the active ingredient in Roundup. Glyphosate is a
broad-spectrum herbicide used to kill weeds and grasses known to
compete with commercial crops grown around the globe. Glyphosate is
a "non-selective" herbicide, meaning it kills indiscriminately
based only on whether a given organism produces a specific enzyme,
5-enolpyruvylshikimic acid-3-phosphate synthase, known as EPSP
synthase.

The Plaintiff maintains that Roundup(TM) and/or glyphosate is
defective, dangerous to human health, unfit and unsuitable to be
marketed and sold in commerce, and lacked proper warnings and
directions as to the dangers associated with its use. The
Plaintiff's injuries, like those striking thousands of similarly
situated victims across the country, were avoidable, the Plaintiff
avers.

The Monsanto Company is an American agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation founded in 1901. In 2018, it was acquired
by Bayer as part of its crop science division.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Walter C. Morrison, IV, Esq.
          M. Palmer Lambert, Esq.
          Claire E. Berg, Esq.
          GAINSBURGH, BENJAMIN, DAVID,
          MEUNIER & WARSHAUER L.L.C.
          2800 Entergy Centre
          1100 Poydras Street
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 521-7643
          Facsimile: (504) 528-9973
          E-mail: wmorrison@gainsben.com
                  plambert@gainsben.com
                  cberg@gainsben.com


MOUNTAIRE FARMS: Judge Tosses Motion to Dismiss Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Mavity, writing for Cape Gazette, reports that Delaware
Superior Court judge has denied Mountaire Farms' motion to dismiss
a class-action lawsuit involving 800 members who allege their
groundwater and drinking water was contaminated by wastewater from
Mountaire's Millsboro plant.

The lawsuit has been ongoing for more than two years; Millsboro
couple Gary and Anna-Marie Cuppels sued Mountaire for negligence,
reckless and unjust enrichment, among other charges. The Cuppels,
represented by Lewes attorney Chase Brockstedt, are seeking
remediation for groundwater and drinking water wells damaged by
Mountaire's wastewater and sludge disposal, implementation of
improvements to Mountaire's wastewater treatment plant, and
compensatory and punitive damages.

In its motion to dismiss, Mountaire argued that Delaware Superior
Court did not have jurisdiction in the case. Mountaire is based in
Arkansas but does business in Delaware under the names Mountaire
Farms and Mountaire Farms of Delaware Inc.

The Cuppels argued that while Mountaire is an Arkansas-based
corporation, it has sufficient contacts in Delaware to support
personal jurisdiction for Delaware courts.

In his decision, Judge Craig Karsnitz agreed, saying Mountaire
Farms of Delaware is an agent for parent company Mountaire
Corporation, which directs and authorizes activities in Delaware.

Karsnitz said Mountaire Corporation is on the mortgage recorded
with the Sussex County Recorder of Deeds and shares liability for
any defaults on that loan, demonstrating a significant interest in
real property in Delaware. Karsnitz said in 2000, when Mountaire
purchased the land for the Millsboro plant, the company considered
the acquisition so important that it held a special meeting of its
board of directors to award CEO Ronald Cameron a $460,000 bonus for
completing the sale.  Karsnitz listed additional reasons for why he
has jurisdiction over the case.  According to the Cuppels,
Mountaire knew about problems with nitrate levels at the Millsboro
plant as early as 2002. In 2009, Karsnitz said, Mountaire bought a
house in Millsboro for the president of Mountaire Farms of
Delaware. He said Mountaire employees routinely fly from Arkansas
to Georgetown for meetings in Millsboro on company business.

The overlap of directors between Mountaire Corporation and
Mountaire Farms of Delaware is 100 percent, Karsnitz said, with
Mountaire Corporation making capital investment decisions for the
Delaware company, as well as managing processing volumes and
production.

All profits from Delaware go to the parent company, he said, which
then decides how to remit that money back to the Delaware
companies.

"In my view, Mountaire Corporation's contacts with the state of
Delaware exceeded minimum contacts; they were numerous and
purposeful," Karsnitz said.

He said Mountaire has not produced any evidence that Mountaire's
Delaware companies act independently of the parent company.

In the beginning of his 25-page opinion, Karsnitz expressed
frustration with the slowness of the case, which was originally
filed in June 2018. Mountaire's motion to dismiss was filed in July
2018. When the Cuppels, who now have more than 800 people as part
of their lawsuit, amended their complaint, Mountaire amended its
motion to dismiss. The case was then stayed, pending resolution of
federal court actions on a lawsuit over improvements to Mountaire's
wastewater treatment plant and resolution of discovery issues.

As the case made its way to fall 2019, the two sides attempted
mediation, which was unsuccessful. Legal wrangling continued as the
case moved into 2020, and in early June, the case was finally ripe
for Karsnitz to make a decision on Mountaire's motion to dismiss.
[GN]


NCB MANAGEMENT: Kendrick Asserts Breach of FDCPA
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against NCB Management
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Lowell Kendrick, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. NCB
Management Services, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-03332 (E.D.
Penn., July 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Consumer Credit
filed pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The Company offers accounts receivable, call center management, and
information technology sourcing services. NCB Management Services
serves clients in the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
   Marcus & Zelman LLC
   701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
   Asbury Park, NJ 07712
   Tel: (732) 695-3282
   Email: ari@marcuszelman.com



NEVADA DETR: Faces Class Action Over Unemployment Benefits
----------------------------------------------------------
KOLO TV reports that Nevada's Department of Employment, Training,
and Rehabilitation (DETR) is facing a class-action lawsuit, filed
June 22, for not paying unemployment benefits to pandemic
unemployment assistance (PUA) claimants in a timely manner. All PUA
claimants in Nevada are automatically included in this lawsuit.

It's called Amethyst Payne, Iris Podesta-Mireles, Anthony
Napolitano, Isaiah Pavia-Cruz, Victoria Waked, Charles Ploski,
Dariush Naimi, Tabitha Asare, Scott Howard, Ralph Wyncoopon, Elaina
Abing, and William Turnley and all other similarly situated vs.
State of Nevada ex rel Nevada Department of Employment, Training
and Rehabilitation (DETR).

The lawsuit states in part, "DETR has made a terrible mistake that
is preventing approximately 60,000 self-employed individuals from
receiving about half a billion dollars in desperately needed
unemployment compensation benefits that they are clearly entitled
to."

The lawsuit started with a simple conversation between friends.
Advertisement

Amethyst Payne recalls the day she told Mark Thierman about Gov.
Sisolak's order to closer her business called Therapeutic Massage
in Reno to prevent the spread of COVID-19. She told Thierman about
the her difficulties and the fact that at that time there was to
way to apply for PUA benefits.

"He realized that multiple other people were not getting paid and
didn't have a way of even getting into a system," said Payne.

Thierman recalls the conversation as well, "She wasn't the first to
talk with me about it and I finally said, ‘OK, lets see what's
going on.'"

He sued DETR to construct a website for PUA applicants May 12th.
Four days later on May 16 the PUA website to apply was
operational.

Thierman gets attention when he files a lawsuit.

He's a Harvard Law School graduate. He says he's responsible for
about a $1 billion in payouts in his 42 year career, has been
featured in the New York Times and Business Week for a settlement
of about $100 million against brokerage firms for violating labor
laws, and has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court.

He's also a partner at the law firm Thierman and Buck.

He says he talked with Nevada's Attorney General Office
representatives Chief Deputy Attorney General of the Boards and
Open Government Division Greg Ott and Robert Whitney the following
Monday, May 18 after the PUA application website was launched.

Thierman then took another new step to push for DETR to make timely
payments.

He recalls saying, ‘"I'm not going to serve you with a lawsuit
unless I find out you're not fixing this and they said, ‘Oh no no
no. We're going to be OK.'"

The delays continued so Thierman filed a second lawsuit June 23.
It's mentioned in the second paragraph of this online report.

This type of law suit is called an "ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE".

Thierman explains how it works this way, "It's a swing and if you
hit it, you hit it out of the ball park and if you miss, you're
out. It's an order from the court that says to the other side, in
this case the State of Nevada, I think that there is a problem that
our side identified. Your wrong unless you can convince the State
of Nevada that you're right. The burden is on you (the State of
Nevada)."

Thierman says a State District Court Judge out of Reno, Barry L.
Breslow approved this lawsuit less than 24 hours after he received
it.

Thierman says his goal is simple. "The plaintiffs are not asking
for money (a payout). What they're asking DETR to do is its job,
which by the way in this case is pay money (that they are owed
because they lost their jobs due to the COVID-19 pandemic)," he
said.

KOLO 8 Evening Anchor Noah Bond asked, "Can you tell me what you
findings are? Why are people not getting paid in a timely manner?"

He explained it's caused by red tape. The U.S. Department of Labor
Wage and Hour Division memo to DETR workers loosely states Nevada
residents can't receive money from unemployment insurance and
pandemic unemployment assistance at the same time. This directive
is causing DETR workers in Nevada to do an extensive back-and-forth
check before issuing payment. Thierman says this makes of 80
percent of all the problems DETR is facing when trying to release
the funds.

This leads to a lengthy adjudication process, which is responsible
for holding up the money and preventing families in need from
getting this critical assistance.

The lawsuit states this is not the approach the State of Nevada
should take when distributing the money.

"Instead of being a mother may I say yes. The process should be
about making the State pay and then try and get it back later. If
one, or two, or three, or four of them are incorrectly paid then
there's a whole mechanism for getting it back. I don't say people
should commit fraud," Thierman.

Judge Breslow agrees with Thierman and has told DETR it must
respond by July 7.

"What will happen if DETR can't make a convincing case?" Bond.

"I get an order from the judge telling DETR pay the money,"
Thierman.

"How long will it take to pay the money after that? Can you tell me
that?" Bond.

"I can't but I don't imagine it will take long," said Thierman.

"I don't believe the people at DETR are anything less than hard
working and sincere and want to help, but they are in the weeds.
They are down in the lower levels. They can't see the forest from
the trees," Thierman. [GN]


NEW HAMPSHIRE: Bid to Dismiss Hospitals' Amended Complaint Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, John Doe, et al. v. Commissioner, New Hampshire
Department of Health and Human Services, Civil No. 18-cv-1039-JD
(D. N.H.), Judge Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Hampshire denied the Commissioner's
motion to dismiss the hospitals' amended complaint.

John Doe, Jane Roe, Charles Coe, and Deborah Taylor filed a
putative class action that challenges practices used by the
Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human
Services ("Commissioner") and four New Hampshire hospitals to
involuntarily detain individuals who experience mental health
crises and seek treatment in hospital emergency rooms.  The New
Hampshire Hospital Association and 20 hospitals ("hospitals") were
granted leave to intervene in the action as Plaintiffs and bring
claims against the Commissioner of DHHS.

The hospital Plaintiffs are the New Hampshire Hospital Association,
Alice Peck Day Memorial Hospital, Androscoggin Valley Hospital,
Catholic Medical Center, Cheshire Medical Center, Concord Hospital,
Cottage Hospital, Elliot Hospital, Frisbie Memorial Hospital, HCA
Health Services of New Hampshire (Parkland Medical Center and
Portsmouth Regional Hospital), Huggins Hospital, Littleton Hospital
Association (Littleton Regional Healthcare), LRGHealthcare
(Franklin Regional Hospital and Lakes Region General Hospital),
Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, Monadnock Community Hospital, New
London Hospital, Southern New Hampshire Medical Center, Speare
Memorial Hospital, Upper Connecticut Valley Hospital, Valley
Regional Hospital, and Weeks Medical Center.

The Individual Plaintiffs and the hospitals name the Commissioner
of DHHS in her official capacity as the Plaintiff in the case.  The
parties, however, from time to time, also refer to DHHS and the
state as the Defendant.  It is understood by the parties that the
Commissioner in her official capacity is the proper party
Defendant.

In the complaint, the hospitals allege that the Commissioner
engages in practices, together known as psychiatric boarding,
through which the hospitals are required to house psychiatric
patients who are subject to the Petition and Certificate for
Involuntary Emergency Admission ("IEA") certificates.  They cite
the DHHS website which describes the IEA process used by DHHS.  The
DHHS website states that the IEA process begins with a visit to a
local hospital Emergency Department or CMHC [community mental
health center], and the completion of an IEA Petition requesting
admission to New Hampshire Hospital.

The Commissioner's psychiatric boarding practice, requiring
hospitals to house IEA-certified persons indefinitely, has
continued for years.  Psychiatric boarding also deprives hospitals
of the use of space in their facilities and requires hospital staff
to provide services, including repeated IEA certification
services.

The financial costs of psychiatric boarding are significant.  The
hospitals have had to undertake new construction and renovations to
make secure space for IEA patients that have cost larger hospitals
more than $1 million and have cost smaller hospitals hundreds of
thousands of dollars.  The hospitals have also incurred
unreimbursed costs for boarding IEA-certified persons.  They allege
the most significant costs are due to increased staffing needs.

The legislature enacted Senate Bill 11 in the 2019 session which
appropriated funds to DHHS for purposes that include additional
beds in designated receiving facilities.  Senate Bill 11 also
requires insurers to pay a per diem rate for IEA patients boarded
in hospitals that are not designated receiving facilities. The bill
took effect on July 1, 2019.

The hospitals bring five claims against the Commissioner.  Counts
I, II, and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.  In
Count I, the hospitals allege that the Commissioner's psychiatric
boarding practice constitutes an unlawful taking of their property
for public use in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Count II, they allege that the practice interferes with their
possessory rights in their emergency departments which constitutes
an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  In
Count III, they allege that the practice violates their rights to
procedural and substantive due process by seizing and taking their
property and denying them their fundamental right to use their
emergency departments.  Count IV alleges an unlawful taking in
violation of the New Hampshire Constitution, and Count V alleges
violations of RSA 135-C:29, I; RSA 135-C:30, V; and RSA 135-C:31,
I.

The hospitals seek a declaration that the Commissioner's practice
violates their federal constitutional rights, state constitutional
rights, and statutory rights.  They also seek a permanent
injunction against the practice, nominal damages, and attorneys'
fees and costs.

The Commissioner moves to dismiss all of the hospitals' claims.
She contends that the claims under Section 1983, Counts I, II, and
III, fail because there is no state action alleged.  She also
contends that Count I does not allege a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, Count II does not allege an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, and Count III does not allege a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.  Presuming that
the federal claims will be dismissed, the Commissioner asks the
court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state claims, Counts IV and V, or alternatively, to dismiss those
claims on the merits.  The hospitals defend their claims on all
grounds raised in the motion.

AS for the state action, Judge DiClerico finds that upon completion
of an IEA certificate, the Commissioner has a duty to provide a bed
in a designated receiving facility where a certified person can be
delivered.  Irrespective of the facilities problem, the
Commissioner has a duty mandated by statute to provide for probable
cause hearings within three days of when an IEA certificate is
completed.  A failure to comply with these statutory duties
constitutes state action.  Therefore, the hospitals have
sufficiently alleged state action to support their claims under
Section 1983.

In addition to state action to support a Section 1983 claim, the
Plaintiffs must allege that they were deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or law of the United States.  The Commissioner
contends that the hospitals have not alleged a taking to support
Count I, an unreasonable seizure of property to support Count II,
or a substantive due process violation to support Count III.

The Judge finds that the Commissioner contends that the hospitals
have not alleged a Fourth Amendment claim of a seizure of their
property because their allegations are insufficient to state a
Fifth Amendment takings claim.  However, the hospitals' allegations
in support of their Fifth Amendment takings claim in Count I are
sufficient to avoid dismissal.  Therefore, the Commissioner has not
shown that Count II must be dismissed.

The broader context in which psychiatric boarding occurs, and has
occurred, and the full extent of the consequences to patients,
hospitals, and hospital staff are relevant to determine the
viability of the substantive due process claim.  Whether the
psychiatric boarding practice shocks the conscience or is legally
irrational without any legitimate governmental interest are issues
that should be factually developed through discovery.  If
appropriate, the claim may be challenged through summary judgment.

Based on the presumption that the hospitals' federal claims, Counts
I, II, and III, would be dismissed, the Commissioner asks the court
to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims,
Counts IV and V.  Counts I, II, and III, however, have not been
dismissed.  Therefore, the Commissioner does not provide grounds to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367.

The Commissioner also moves to dismiss Counts IV and V on the
merits.  She argues that the hospitals' claims under the New
Hampshire Constitution in Count IV should be dismissed for the same
reasons she raised to dismiss the federal claims in Counts I, II,
and III. Because the Commissioner's arguments were not successful,
Count IV also survives the motion to dismiss.

In Count V, the hospitals seek a declaration that the
Commissioner's psychiatric boarding practice violates RSA 135-C:29,
I; 30, V; and 31, I and a permanent injunction against future
violations.  The Commissioner moves to dismiss Count V on the
grounds that the hospitals do not have a private cause of action
under RSA chapter 135-C and that she is not violating the cited
statutes.

The Judge finds that the Commissioner has not shown that the
hospitals lack a cause of action under Section 2201 or that they
are precluded from seeking prospective injunctive relief, and the
hospitals have stated a claim for a declaratory judgment and for
permanent injunctive relief, as alleged in Count V.

In sum, the Judge concludes that the Commissioner has a statutory
duty to provide beds in designated receiving facilities for
delivery of IEA-certified persons immediately after an IEA
certificate is completed.  The Commissioner also has a statutory
duty to provide IEA-certified persons with probable cause hearings
within three days of when an IEA certificate is completed.  

The hospitals allege that the Commissioner has failed to provide
beds in designated receiving facilities for delivery of
IEA-certified persons immediately after IEA certificates are
completed.  They also allege that the Commissioner has failed to
provide probable cause hearings for IEAcertified persons while they
are boarded in hospital emergency rooms.

As alleged, the Commissioner's failure to comply with her statutory
duties is state action for purposes of the Plaintiffs' claims in
Counts I, II, and III.  The hospitals' allegations in support of
Counts I, II, and III are sufficient to state claims of violations
of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.  The Commissioner did not provide grounds to
dismiss the hospitals' claim in Count IV under the New Hampshire
Constitution or their claim in Count V seeking a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief to stop the Commissioner's alleged
violations of RSA 135-C:29, I; 30, V; and 31, I 31, I.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge DiClerico denied the
Commissioner's motion to dismiss the hospitals' amended complaint.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 1, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/RBhpXO from Leagle.com.


NEW YORK, NY: McQueen, Cedeno Slam Unlawful Detention
-----------------------------------------------------
Dewayne McQueen and Ray Cedeno, individually and on behalf of a
class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The City of
New York, Police Commissioner Dermot Shea, Police Officer Peter
Ruotolo, Police Officer Omar Eltabib and New York City Police
Officers John and Jane Does, Defendants, Case No. 509993/2020 (N.Y.
Sup., June 15, 2020), seeks damages as a result of violations of
landmark legislation that reformed bail practices in New York
State, refusal to offer Desk Appearance Tickets, wrongfully
detaining suspects pending arraignments, and redress for violations
of state and federal civil rights.

Plaintiffs have been charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol and who have demonstrated a blood alcohol content of less
than 0.08 percent. Despite the new rules of Bail Reform, they have
been arrested and imprisoned in precincts and jails across the five
boroughs by the New York City. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Alexander Klein, Esq.
      Steven Epstein, Esq.
      Seymour James, Esq.
      BARKET EPSTEIN KEARON ALDEA & LOTURCO, LLP
      666 Old Country Road, Suite 700
      Garden City, NY 11530
      Tel: (516)745-1500


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 11 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed 11 appeals from the District Court's rulings
in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
Case No. 96-cv-8414, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate cases brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit are:

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-78;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-79;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-80;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-81;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-82;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-83;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-84;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-85;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-87;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-93; and

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-97.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Delores Walters, Samuel Warren, Gloria Wilson,
Elaine Carroll, Esther Perez, Nucian Butler, Lisa Sam, Mary Green,
Deborah Knight-Watson, Frances Ramos and Niqueta White are
represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 13 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed 13 appeals from the District Court's rulings
in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
Case No. 96-cv-8414, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate cases brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit are:

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-89;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-90;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-92;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-94;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-95;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-99;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-101;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-102;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-103;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-109;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-110;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-113; and

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-131.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Juan De La Cruz, Emerson Nduonofit, Karina
Almonte, Estela Silverio Alzahiri, Yolanda Figueroa, Regina Wilson,
Margo Lawson, Juana Tippins, Erick Cali, Gloria Cora-Velasquez,
Carmen Lopez-De Jesus, Stephen Djokotoe and Virgilia Castro are
represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500


NEW YORK: Educ. Board Files 22 Appeals in Gulino Suit to 2nd Cir.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed 22 appeals from the District Court's rulings
in the lawsuit styled Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
Case No. 96-cv-8414, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

The Plaintiffs originally filed a class action complaint on
November 8, 1996, alleging that the LAST-1 exam violated Title VII.
The Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in
the New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant,
the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of
New York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq., by requiring the Plaintiffs to pass
certain racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to
obtain a license to teach in New York City public schools.

The appellate cases brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit are:

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-120;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-121;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-123;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-124;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-125;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-126;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-128;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-132;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-135;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-136;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-137;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-141;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-142;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-143;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-145;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-146;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-147;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-148;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-149;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-150;

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-152; and

   -- Gulino, et al. v. Board of Education, et al.,
      Case No. 20-154.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Jacqueline Battle, Adelma Guzman, Helen Valle,
Raguel Rosario, Rock Percy, Sonia Tovar, Devere Morris, Karen
Richardson, Humberto Grullon, Christopher Ekwunife, Francisca
Lopez, Tammi Butler, Sharon Battle, Iris Meza, Sharon Scarville,
Curley Potter, Joanne Argent, Lawrence Harvey, Janet Villa, Josie
Mateo, Lurline Henry and Maritza Perez are represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the New York City School
District of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500


NEW YORK: Gym Owner Mulls Class Action Over Phase 4 Reopening
-------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Albanese, writing for Newsday, reports that local gyms and
fitness studios are fighting back against Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo's
decision to postpone their Phase 4 reopening, with one Long Island
gym owner leading the charge with a class-action lawsuit that's
expected to represent thousands of plaintiffs, his lawyer said.

Charles Cassara, owner of SC Fitness, with locations in Hicksville
and Farmingdale, said Cuomo's decision negatively impacts small
gyms that already have made preparations to reopen with Phase 4,
which is scheduled on Long Island for July 8.  Additionally, with
no reopening date in sight, owners are struggling with financial
insecurity, lease decisions and lack of clarity with regard to
their gyms' futures.

Cassara and his lawyer, James G. Mermigis of Mermigis Law Group in
Syosset, plan to file the suit against the governor, state and
attorney general, and expect to have between 1,500 and 3,000
plaintiffs, Mermigis said. Cassara said he originally had 10 other
gym owners on board but was persuaded to put the message out on
Facebook, where thousands of other owners have joined the cause.

"Phase 4 is here," Cassara said. "There is no Phase 5. There is no
layout, there is no guideline, there is no direction, there is no
timeline, which basically means that after Phase 4, your authority
rule -- whatever we want to call it -- should be given over. We
should be given our opportunity to open."

Cuomo spokesman Jason Conwall said, "We can't comment on a lawsuit
that hasn't been filed yet, but there are some things that don't
fit neatly into a phase that are going to require further study and
we're going through that right now. We're not going to be like
other states that are inviting a second wave."

Jeff Lovering, owner of Goshinkan Dojo in Merrick, said he is
considering participating in the lawsuit. Lovering, who's owned his
dojo since 1983, said he spent a considerable amount of time and
money preparing for reopening, including setting up his gym so his
students can train 6 feet apart, getting temperature gauges and
buying a disinfecting sprayer. He also closed down the locker
rooms.

"I've shut down all the stuff I'm supposed to . . . to comply" with
cleanliness regulations, Lovering said. "But yet we're being
prohibited from allowing [this opening] to happen. I think it's a
total injustice . . . The dictate from the governor is totally
arbitrary."

Dr. Bettina Fries, chief of the division of infectious diseases at
Stony Brook Medicine, said there's a reason gyms are being held
back from Phase 4: Sweat, common touch points, and the aerosols
produced by heavy breathing are very conducive to the spread of
disease.

"You have to be really careful when opening a gym," she said,
adding that these risks aren't necessarily mitigated in smaller,
boutique fitness environments. "People aren't quietly sitting in a
corner with their mouths closed. They have their mouths open, they
cough, they breathe loudly."

There have been instances in South Korea where gym openings have
led to the spread of COVID-19, she said, and it's been evident in
the spread among NBA and MLB players and personnel. A Planet
Fitness in West Virginia recently had to close when a gym-goer
exposed patrons to the virus, according to its Facebook page.

With smaller gyms, "it depends," Fries said. "It's not only about
how many people [are working out] but what kind of room they're in.
A lot of small classes are also in small classrooms. If you set the
same amount of people in a classroom, all two meters apart, and
they don't talk, just listen, that risk is much lower than people
in a classroom where they sweat, they exhale, they talk, maybe they
scream."  

Lovering said he believes he can operate his dojo safely.

"The governor means the best he possibly can for the general
community, but unfortunately, what happens here is we don't have a
specific listing for us," meaning that small studios with limited
class sizes are in the same category as mega-gyms that hold
hundreds of people at a time.

Melanie Ronaldo, owner of My Pilates Studio in Plainview, said
she's joined the Facebook group for the class-action lawsuit and
worries how a delayed opening could adversely affect her clients.

"I have clients with major issues that depend on this — clients
with MS, spinal fusion, a lot of things that this is really helpful
for," she said. "What bothers me the most is that I can't come in
and help them."

She, too, believes that her business is not really a gym in the
traditional sense, and should be classified differently.

"Boutique fitness studios are not gyms," she said. "We would be
following the guidelines. Most of us are less than 10 people a
class - mine is. They're allowing camps to go on and things of that
nature and restaurants and we're [classified] as less than that."
[GN]


NEW YORK: Second Cir. Appeal v. Daniels Filed in Gulino Bias Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from District Court's Judgment,
dated May 29, 2020, entered in the lawsuit styled GULINO, ET AL. v.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in the
New York City public school system, alleged that Defendant, the
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq., by requiring Plaintiffs to pass certain
racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a
license to teach in New York City public schools. Judge Constance
Baker Motley, to whom the case was originally assigned, certified
the plaintiff class on July 13, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

On December 5, 2012, the Court decertified the Plaintiff class to
the extent it sought damages and individualized injunctive relief
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). The class survived, however, to
the extent Plaintiffs sought relief that may be awarded under Rule
23(b)(2), including a declaratory judgment regarding liability and
classwide injunctive relief.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: New York City Board of
Education, Case No. 20-2089, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellee Lillie Daniels is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          Email: joshua.sohn@dlapiper.com

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500


NISOURCE INC: Spent $143 Million to Resolve Class Action Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
Nate Raymond, writing for Insurance Journal, reports that NiSource
Inc. will pay $56 million to resolve a probe into Massachusetts gas
explosions in 2018 linked to a utility it owns that killed one
person and destroyed multiple buildings, the state's attorney
general said on July 2.

Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey said the settlement
with NiSource and its subsidiary Columbia Gas of Massachusetts will
provide debt relief to low-income gas customers and pay for clean
energy programs.

The settlement resolves Healey's probe into Columbia for violating
consumer protection laws and an investigation by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities into its pipeline safety compliance
and response to the explosions.

The Sept. 13, 2018, disaster occurred in Lawrence, North Andover
and Andover, three communities northwest of Boston. Columbia was
replacing aging cast-iron pipes with plastic lines.

The blasts killed one person, injured 22 others, damaged about 131
homes and commercial buildings and prompted the evacuation of
thousands of residents.

"We are pleased to have reached resolution on all pending
investigations related to the Merrimack Valley incident," Dean
Lieberman, a spokesman for Merrillville, Indiana-based NiSource,
said in a statement.

In March, Columbia pleaded guilty to violating a federal pipeline
safety law as part of a plea deal with the U.S. Justice Department
in which it agreed to pay $53 million.

That deal, like the July 2 state accord, also required the company
to leave Massachusetts, prompting NiSource to agree to sell
Columbia's assets to Eversource Energy for $1.1 billion.

The asset transfer is expected on Nov. 1, at which time Eversource
will be required to implement a safety program and address any
remaining remedial actions, Healey's office said.

NiSource has already spent about $1 billion addressing the
explosions, including $143 million to resolve class action claims
by businesses and residents. [GN]


NISSAN: Court Dismisses Elis' Murano Soft Brake Pedal Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a model
year 2009 Nissan Murano soft brake pedal lawsuit has been dismissed
after the plaintiff failed to adequately plead that Nissan
concealed problems with the antilock braking system (ABS) control
modules.

The plaintiff says he purchased a 2009 Nissan Murano in 2011 from a
Missouri Nissan dealership.

In May 2017, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) opened an investigation into possible soft brake pedal
problems, and Nissan admitted there were problems with the ABS
control modules.

In November 2017, the plaintiff's Murano experienced a soft brake
pedal problem and he took the vehicle to a dealership which
couldn't replicate the problem. The plaintiff also alleges
technicians told him they didn't know of any problems with the
Murano braking systems.

Then in March 2018, Nissan issued a service campaign for 2009
Nissan Murano ABS actuator soft brake pedal problems in 93,000
SUVs, and the following month NHTSA upgraded its Murano brake
investigation.

According to the class action lawsuit, the plaintiff's Murano had
another soft brake pedal issue, and this time the dealership
flushed the brake fluid and inspected the ABS actuator. However,
the dealer allegedly wouldn't replace the actuator unless the
plaintiff paid for repairs.

A month later, Nissan issued a formal recall and notified Murano
owners about testing the ABS hydraulic control units to look for
stuck valves.  Nissan replaced the plaintiff's ABS control module
in June 2019.

Three months later, the plaintiff filed the Murano soft brake pedal
class action lawsuit which alleges Nissan knew about problems with
soft brake pedals in 2010 but took no action on the matter.

The plaintiff also argues Nissan hasn't taken the problems
seriously and everything the automaker has done hasn't been
adequate to fix problems with soft brake pedals.

In its motion to dismiss the lawsuit, Nissan argues its actions
have fixed the problems and there is no evidence to suggest the
automaker knew about the problems in 2010.  Nissan told the judge
the plaintiff shouldn't have sued about wanting a new ABS control
module in his Murano because the module had already been replaced.

Nissan also says the plaintiff cannot show any risk of future harm
because Nissan has already replaced his ABS control module, and the
judge agreed the plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief
of a new ABS unit.

As for Nissan allegedly knowing about soft brake pedal problems in
2010 but concealing knowledge of it, the judge ruled the lawsuit
fails to state a claim for fraudulent concealment.

The judge ruled the claim that Nissan knew in 2010 "does not appear
to be based on any facts, or any facts from which such a conclusion
could be inferred.  It appears the earliest date one can infer that
Nissan had knowledge of the defect is 2017."

Judge Greg Kays also dismissed the claim of allegedly violating the
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act by ruling the plaintiff
"presents no evidence Nissan had this information prior to the 2017
investigation."

And finally, the judge dismissed a claim of unjust enrichment
because when the plaintiff made his Murano purchase in 2011, "there
were no circumstances indicating that the sale of the vehicle was
unequitable or unjust."

The Nissan Murano soft brake pedal lawsuit was filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Missouri: Ellis, et al.,
v. Nissan North America Inc., et al. [GN]


NORTH CAROLINA: Federal Inmates Withdraw COVID-19 Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
AllOnGeorgia reports that eleven inmates housed at the Federal
Correctional Complex in Butner, North Carolina ("FCC Butner")
voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit against Federal Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP") officials seeking release from prison as a result
of the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to court documents, the federal inmates, who are
represented by several advocacy groups, filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus, temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction on behalf of themselves and a purported class of current
and future medically vulnerable inmates.  The inmates alleged
violations of their Eighth Amendment rights related to FCC Butner's
response to the COVID-19 crisis, and sought relief including mass
release or transfer of inmates from FCC Butner in order to
facilitate social distancing.  BOP officials filed substantial
responses detailing the significant steps BOP and FCC Butner have
taken to manage the crisis at FCC Butner.

On June 11, 2020, United States District Court Judge Louise W.
Flanagan denied the inmates' motion for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, finding that the BOP officials
made reasonable efforts toward the goals of preventing unnecessary
illness and death and slowing the spread of the virus, that the
claims were not appropriate under a habeas petition, and even if
they were, the inmates failed to show a likelihood of success on
the merits or that equity and public interests favor a temporary
restraining order. (See attached order).  On July 6, the inmates
filed a stipulation of dismissal essentially withdrawing their
remaining claims.

Robert J. Higdon, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
North Carolina commented: "Effectively managing prisons is a
complex and difficult job on any day, but especially so in the
midst of a global pandemic which affects so many people both inside
and outside of the prison system.  We are gratified that the court,
in its ruling denying the inmates' request for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, recognized the
efforts that officials at FCC Butner have made to minimize the risk
of virus infection to the prisoners while doing their usual
excellent job at maintaining order and ensuring the safety of the
public in operating these critical facilities.  I fully support the
professional way in which that the FCC Butner officials continue to
maintain the safety and security of the individuals housed within
their institutions and the responsible manner in which they are
managing the COVID-19 crisis."

Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael Bredenberg, Genna D.
Petre, Christina Kelley, Mallory Brooks Storus, and Assistant U.S.
Attorney Joshua Rogers defended the case on behalf of the BOP
officials.

Related court documents and information are located on the website
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina or on PACER by searching for Case No. 5:20-HC-02088-FL.
[GN]


NORTHWOOD, NOVA SCOTIA: Class Action Mulled Over COVID-19 Deaths
----------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Kimber, writing for Halifax Examiner, reports that the
McNeil government announced its plans for a "review" of the 53
COVID-19 deaths at Northwood.  The problem is that it isn't a
review, just another excuse not to be accountable.

The Halifax Examiner is providing all COVID-19 coverage for free.

On July 2, my colleague Jennifer Henderson ventured where few of us
would willingly dare to venture: into a post-cabinet-meeting
virtual scrum where reporters got to sort-of ask meaningful
questions, and physically distanced, reality-challenging government
ministers got to respond with their usual baffling bafflegab.

Thankfully, she managed to emerge to make sense of the senseless of
it all. Let's explore just one of the outcomes.

Northwood Review: The premier and health minister faced questions
around the government's choice to release only the recommendations
and not the findings from a two-person review panel appointed to
look into practices at Northwood's Halifax facility, where 53
people died during an outbreak of COVID-19.

The government's rationale, as explained by Obfuscator-in-Chief
Stephen McNeil, was that "we need people to come forward and tell
this committee what they believe happened and what they think
should change without incriminating themselves."

Which suggests the possibility, the likelihood, the almost
certainty that if someone actually told the truth about all that
happened, and didn't happen, in the days, months and years leading
up to all those deaths, they would be… well, incriminating
themselves, and probably plenty of others.

That's now significant because a lawyer representing some of the
residents' families wants to launch a class action against
Northwood and the government for their roles in those deaths.

"While this class action suit is ongoing," McNeil declared, "that
information will not be made public."

Which seems to be an acknowledgement, again, that "that
information" would be incriminating.

Time to rewind.

On April 5, Northwood reported its first positive test for
COVID-19. Just two weeks later, on April 19, with the virus raging
through the home, the province and Northwood activated an emergency
plan to combat the outbreak. By then, five residents had died and
more than 150 people, including staff, were already infected.

Not even a suggestion there should be an inquiry into why this had
happened.

Jump ahead to May 5. Northwood now accounted for 35 of the 41
COVID-related deaths in Nova Scotia. Did McNeil promise to launch a
full investigation into what had gone wrong and what was needed to
fix it?

No, but he did express his hope the families of the dead were
feeling the love of their fellow Nova Scotians. "These have been
difficult times," he said. "I want them all to know that we as a
province are mourning with them."

Mourning was still the best he was prepared to offer on June 1 when
-- with 53 residents now dead as a result of COVID-19 -- Wagners
law firm in Halifax filed a proposed class action against Northwood
and its seven subsidiary and associated companies. The suit was
expanded June 24 to include the McNeil government itself because of
its policies that allowed for residents to be warehoused two and
three to a room, and because the province itself failed to lock
down the facility quickly enough or provide adequate protective
gear for staff once the outbreak began.

The government's own "review" was finally announced in a news
release on the eve of the Canada Day holiday (of course).

While the lawsuit asks for unspecified monetary and non-monetary
damages, Ray Wagner, the lawyer for the families, said the real
goal is accountability:

"We must do what we can to look at what has happened, learn from
the past, and develop policies and procedures and protocols and
financing that can provide dignity to those people who are living
the last days of their lives. And that can provide comfort and
assurance to their family members who worry so much about their
care."

Part of that accountability, he said, includes examining the
government's role in long-term care:

"The involvement in terms of funding, and how we fund those types
of facilities where the public purse is heavily involved, is
something that involves an examination not only in Nova Scotia but
across the country."

While it would be naïve to suggest the timely announcement of a
public inquiry would have avoided the lawsuit, the reality is that
many of the families who have joined, and will join, are more
interested in answers than compensation for the loss of their loved
ones.

Unfortunately, Premier Stephen McNeil and his invisible minister of
unhealth, Randy Delorey, seem determined to avoid answering their
reasonable and important-to-all-of-us questions.

Is McNeil seriously suggesting he will pull a Trump and refuse to
allow his officials to provide depositions in the civil case? Or is
he simply hoping it will take so long for that suit to wend its way
through the judicial jungle -- and past whatever legal roadblocks
and devious detours his government lawyers manage to throw in the
families' path -- that nothing will be settled, or really even
known, before at least the next election.

The government's own plan is for a quick and dirty experts' "review
of the COVID-19 outbreak at Northwood's Halifax campus… under the
Quality-improvement Information Protection Act."

You'd have to rummage through a couple of layers of unhelpful
government links to this and that to discover the actual text of
that 2015 Act and then read the damn thing to decipher the shell
game that's being played.

So, back to our ever-helpful guide, Jennifer Henderson, who
explains that the act "provides privacy for health information
involving residents as well as the identity of individuals who are
interviewed."

As the premier explained: "What will be made public is the
recommendations that come from [the review]."

Meaning?

We will get recommendations disconnected from cause and effect that
might have helped us understand what went wrong, and why. There
will be no accountability, for example, for the fact the McNeil
government refused three separate requests over three successive
years from Northwood's board to fund an expansion of its facility
to prevent the double-bunking that is at the heart of the outbreak.
They did so at the very same moment the government was boasting of
its success in balancing its budget, and in the very years it was
choosing to spend $60-million-plus on a ferry going nowhere. How
did those choices get made, and who made them?

We - and the families of those who died - deserve answers to those
questions. Those families are more than just abstractions on a
court filing. Consider:

The proposed representative plaintiff in the class action is Erica
Surette, who lost her mother, Patricia West, on April 22.

West contracted COVID-19 after being moved from a single room to a
shared room at Northwood on March 26. The statement of claim said
West had initially tested negative shortly after the move.

A second test was arranged on April 11, but the statement alleged
that nobody contacted Surette with the positive result until she
contacted Northwood herself.

West was transferred to hospital in mid-April and was placed on a
ventilator. She later died.

"Mom was 66, she was nowhere near her time and if there's anything
that can come out of this, there's got to be some answers," Erica
Surrette told the CBC.

"There's got to be some accountability for her death and all the
other residents who have passed, all the families who have lost
loved ones -- it can't be for nothing. Something went off the rails
somewhere, so I'm hoping out of this will come answers. That
someone, somewhere, owns up to what went wrong."

With this government? Good luck with that. [GN]


OHIO: Settlement in Ball ADA Class Suit Gets Final Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PHYLLIS BALL, et al., on behalf of themselves and a
class of those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN KASICH, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 2:16-cv-282 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Edmund A.
Sargus, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Ohio, Eastern
Division, granted final approval of the proposed class action
settlement.

On March 31, 2016, six individuals and the Ability Center of
Greater Toledo filed the action seeking declarative and injunctive
relief against the following in their official capacities: the
Governor of Ohio and the Directors of the Ohio Department of
Developmental Disabilities ("DODD"), the Ohio Department of
Medicaid, and Opportunities for Ohioans with Disabilities.

In their complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Ohio's provision of
services to people with intellectual and developmental disabilities
violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Social Security Act.
The State Defendants denied liability under any of these
statutes.

Each of the State Defendants moved for dismissal of the Plaintiffs'
claims for failure to state claims upon which relief can be
granted.  The Court granted in part and denied in part those
motions.  The Named Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of
similarly situated individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).
The State Defendants opposed class certification.

On July 25, 2017, the Court granted the request to intervene by the
Ohio Association of County Boards of Developmental Disabilities
("County Boards") and a group of guardians of individuals with
disabilities who are not part of the class of individuals for whom
the Plaintiffs sought to represent ("Guardian-Intervenors").  The
Guardian-Intervenors also opposed class certification.

After two years of litigation, extensive class-based discovery, and
extensive class certification briefing, the Court granted in part
and denied in part the Plaintiffs' request for class certification,
certifying a class consisting of the following: All
Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental
disabilities residing in the state of Ohio who, on or after March
31, 2016, are qualified for home and community-based services, and,
after receiving options counseling, express that they are
interested in community-based services.

After continued briefing, the Court clarified its decision on class
certification several times.

The Defendants each moved for dismissal of the
Guardian-Intervenors' claims for failure to state claims upon which
relief can be granted. At the request of the parties, the Court
withheld consideration of these motions so that the parties could
engage in settlement negotiations.

Following extensive arms-length negotiations, including mediations
held with the Court, all parties entered into a settlement as a
complete and final resolutions of all matters.  The Settlement
Agreement was drafted to provide specific benefits to the Plaintiff
Class and the Guardian-Intervenors in exchange for voluntary
dismissal of their claims against the Defendants.

The Court then granted the unopposed request of the Plaintiffs, the
State Defendants, and the County Boards ("Moving Parties") for
Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement Agreement on
Oct. 18, 2019.  The following month, the Guardian-Intervenors
withdrew from the agreement to settle.

Over the past few years, the DODD has offered options counseling to
people residing in intermediate care facilities ("ICFs"), which
focused on people in ICFs with nine or more beds.  The first round
of the counseling was recently completed.  Under the Settlement
Agreement, the DODD will offer a second round of options counseling
to run through June 30, 2021.  The options counseling will be
offered to individuals who reside in ICFs with eight or more beds
and who are not represented by the Advocacy and Protective
Services, Inc. ("APSI"). Additionally, under the Settlement
Agreement's terms, the County Boards will provide pre-admission
counseling for all individuals with developmental disabilities who
apply for admission to ICFs with eight or more beds.  The
commitment will apply through Jan. 8, 2023.

The Settlement Agreement contains several other details about these
counseling processes.  It outlines the method the DODD (or its
designee) will use when offering options counseling.  It also
memorializes a process by which the County Boards will follow up
with people who might be interested in community services.  Under
the Settlement Agreement, the DODD will continue to maintain and
promote its existing program for peer-to-peer or family-to-family
meetings or community visits.  The DODD will also conduct a focus
group to offer suggestions and revisions regarding counseling
materials.

The Settlement Agreement includes commitments related to
state-funded waivers and other services.  For the upcoming budget
cycle (fiscal years 2020 and 2021), the DODD will request operating
funding to allocate 700 new state-funded individual options waivers
(350 each year).  For the next budget cycle (fiscal years 2022 and
2023), the DODD will assess unmet/future waiver need and request
corresponding funding.  As the Agreement reflects, the Moving
Parties negotiated factors to be considered for this assessment.

The Settlement Agreement also contains provisions relating to other
services. For example, the DODD will provide capital housing
assistance ($24 million) over the current capital-budget cycle and
request capital-housing funding (at least $12 million) during the
next capital-budget cycle.  The DODD will also request $250,000 to
fund transformation grants designed to support transitions to
integrated day and employment services.  Further, the Agreement
includes commitments related to further transition training and
services.  As one example, the DODD will continue to conduct
follow-along visits for people who have recently transitioned to
waivers.

The Moving Parties negotiated the details of the Settlement
Agreement's implementation.  The Agreement contains terms related
to information exchange, monitoring, continuing jurisdiction, and
resolution of any compliance dispute.  It also resolves the amount
of attorney fees for which the Plaintiffs will petition to Court.
As with the Agreement's other provisions, the fee component was
heavily negotiated and represents significant compromises from both
sides.  The Court will consider the attorney fees motion
separately.

In their Motion for Preliminary Approval, the Moving Parties
outlined a notice process, which the Court approved.  Complying
with that process, the Moving Parties timely informed the class of
211 individuals who fell into the class definition at that time and
the public of the proposed Settlement Agreement through both direct
and indirect methods.

Shortly after preliminary approval, the DODD mailed notices to the
class members (and their legal guardians, when applicable).  The
DODD also emailed notice to APSI, which serves as guardian for a
number of class members.  Both the DODD and Disability Rights Ohio
("DRO") posted the notice on their respective websites.  As
instructed, the Moving Parties met their notice obligations within
one week of the Court's Oct. 18, 2019 Order.

The Fairness Hearing was held in December 2019.  At that Hearing,
there were no objections by any class members.  The Court has
already made a preliminary determination that the Settlement
Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, for the reasons set
forth in the Motion for Preliminary Approval.  Judge Sargus now
finds that final approval is appropriate.

In light of the factual, legal, practical, and procedural
considerations raised by the suit, the Judge concludes that the
Modified Settlement Agreement is a fair, reasonable, and adequate
resolution of the class members' claims, is in the public interest,
and does not harm the rights of any non-class members.  He finds
that although the Guardian-Intervenors are not a part of the
settlement, the Modified Settlement Agreement memorializes the
State Defendants' commitment to continue to provide the ICF choice
to Ohioans and the Agreement does nothing to threaten the ICF
choice for non-class members and those whose interests are
represented by the Guardian-Intervenors.  As to the dispute between
the Defendants and the Guardian-Intervenors, the Judge will
reactivate the currently pending motions to dismiss and move
forward with that dispute.

Accordingly, Judge Sargus granted the Joint Motion for Final
Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement Agreement, and
approved the Modified Settlement Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 24, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/X5u6Kt from Leagle.com.


OHIO: Top Court Overturns Medicaid Class Certification Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nate Raymond, writing for Reuters, reports that Ohio's top court
has overturned a ruling that certified a class of Medicaid
recipients who alleged the state recovered too much of the money
they received from lawsuits over their injuries.

The Ohio Supreme Court on June 30 ruled that the Medicaid
recipients, who claimed the state's Medicaid recovery law was
unconstitutional, must pursue their claims for reimbursement
through an administrative appeals process. [GN]


OKLAHOMA: Cole Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
-----------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Scott Crow. The case
is styled as Steven L Cole, for himself and on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff v. Scott Crow, individual capacity,
Scott Crow, Official Capacity as Director of the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections, Kristin Tims, Official Capacity as
Manager Sentence administration Oklahoma Department of Corrections,
Lonnie Lawson, Official Capacity as Warden William S Key
Correctional Center and Donna McCaslin, Official Capacity as Casw
Manager Supervisor William S Key Correctional Center, Defendants,
Case No. 5:20-cv-00655-G (W.D. Okla., July 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Prisoner: Civil
Rights filed pursuant to the Prisoner Civil Rights.

The Defendants are exercising their officials of Oklahoma.

The Plaintiff appears PRO SE.



PAQ INC: Faces Smith Employment Suit in California Super. Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Paq, Inc. The case is
styled as Laura Smith, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Paq, Inc. dba Food 4 Less and/or Rancho San Miguel
Markets, a California Corporation, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2020-0005825
(Cal. Super., San Joaquin Cty., July 9, 2020).

The case type is stated as Unlimited Civil Other Employment.

Food 4 Less is a national grocery store grocery chain, currently
owned by Kroger. Food 4 Less is a no-frills grocery store where the
customers bag their own groceries at the checkout.

The Plaintiff is represented by Samantha A. Smith, Esq.[BN]


PARETEUM CORP: Court Dismisses Class & Patel Securities Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed without prejudice the Class
Complaint and Patel Complaint in the Pareteum Securities
Litigation.

The cases are IN RE PARETEUM SECURITIES LITIGATION; SABBY
VOLATILITY WARRANT MASTER FUND LTD., Plaintiff, v. PARETEUM
CORPORATION, ROBERT H. TURNER, EDWARD O'DONNELL, DENIS McCARTHY,
VICTOR BOZZO, ROBERT LIPPERT, YVES VAN SANTE, and LUIS
JIMENEZ-TUNON, Defendants; WILLIAM H. BAXLEY, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. PARETEUM
CORPORATION, ROBERT H. TURNER, and EDWARD O'DONNELL, Defendants;
SHIV PATEL, derivatively on behalf of PARETEUM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, v. ROBERT H. TURNER, EDWARD O'DONNELL, DENIS McCARTHY,
VICTOR BOZZO, LUIS JIMENEZ-TUÑON, ROBERT LIPPERT, LAURA THOMAS,
and YVES VAN SANTE, Defendants. PARETEUM CORPORATION, Nominal
Defendant; MICHAEL SHAW, derivatively on behalf of PARETEUM
CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. LUIS JIMENEZ-TUÑON, ROBERT LIPPERT,
YVES VAN SANTE, ROBERT H. TURNER, EDWARD O'DONNELL, DENIS McCARTHY,
VICTOR BOZZO, and LAURA THOMAS, Defendants. PARETEUM CORPORATION,
Nominal Defendant, Case Nos. 19 Civ. 9767 (AKH), 19 Civ. 10460
(AKH), 20 Civ. 3738 (AKH), 20 Civ. 359 (AKH), 20 Civ. 740 (AKH)
(S.D. N.Y.).

The related actions -- whether proceeding directly, derivatively,
or on behalf of a putative class -- bring various claims for
alleged violations of federal securities laws, breaches of
fiduciary duty, and infractions of numerous kindred state laws,
against Pareteum, a telecommunications firm, and Pareteum's
officers, directors, investment banker, and auditor.  According to
the claimants, the Defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct that
resulted in Pareteum's stock price plummeting.

The Class Complaint is 220 pages long (not counting an additional
85 pages of exhibits), 445 paragraphs before reaching Count One,
503 paragraphs total, and is saturated with lengthy block
quotations that predominantly lack accompanying statements
explaining if or why the quoted statements are false.  The block
quotations are often generously underlined, italicized, bolded, or
some combination of all three, without an explanation for the
emphases.  And in more than a few instances, the Class Complaint
alleges that statements excerpted over the course of several
paragraphs were materially false and misleading when made for the
reasons outlined in Paragraph 187, with the oft-cited Paragraph 187
itself consisting of seven sub-paragraphs that contain a laundry
list of purported true facts.  And according to the Class
Complaint, even Paragraph 187 is not an exhaustive list of reasons
why the quoted statements are false.

The Patel Complaint is 107 pages long, 288 paragraphs before
reaching Count One, 330 paragraphs total, and, as with the Class
Complaint, is larded with block quotations that span multiple pages
and leave the reader to wonder which aspects of the quotations are
worthy of judicial attention.  It also fails to explain why a
derivative action, seeking a corporate recovery that would benefit
shareholders at the time of potential recovery, would not interfere
with the putative class action that seeks recovery for losses
directly caused to purchasers and sellers of Pareteum securities
during the proposed class period, or how Pareteum, the corporation,
has been damaged by the alleged frauds.

Judge Hellerstein holds that whether the Class Complaint and Patel
Complaint are better characterized as "puzzle pleadings" or
"shotgun pleadings" matters little -- both descriptors are apt in
the sense that neither pleading comports with the Federal Rules or
the Circuit's exhortation that the Plaintiffs must demonstrate with
specificity why and how each statement is false or misleading.  The
Second Circuit has commented that district courts should not have
to search the long quotations in the complaint for particular false
statements, only to then determines on its own initiative how and
why the statements were false.  The pleadings in the Class
Complaint and the Patel Complaint contain the lengthy quotations
and canned allegations, not to mention lack of succinctness, that
made the analysis in Boca Raton Firefighters & Police Pens. Fund v.
Bahash, such a "Sisyphean task."

Accordingly, the Class Complaint and Patel Complaint are dismissed
without prejudice, the Court rules.

The Plaintiffs in each of those two actions are instructed to file
amended complaints on July 17, 2020, which complaints will comport
with Rule 8, as well as the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) as applicable.  The
Defendants will file any motion(s) to dismiss on Aug. 3, 2020,
along with a joint stipulation, signed by all parties, outlining a
briefing schedule that is to be completed by Sept. 3, 2020.  The
Clerk will close the open motions to dismiss and for joinder, such
motions having been mooted by the Order.

A full-text copy of the District Court's June 23, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/loR6ej from Leagle.com.


PETER NYGARD: Seeks to Dismiss Class Action Filed by 57 Women
-------------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Barghout of CBC News reports that fashion mogul Peter
Nygard said a class-action lawsuit by 57 women who allege he
sexually assaulted them should be dismissed because it was filed in
the wrong jurisdiction. (Gustavo Caballero/Churchill Downs/Getty
Images)

Canadian fashion designer Peter Nygard is asking the Southern
District Court of New York to dismiss the claims of 52 out of 57
plaintiffs who filed a class-action lawsuit alleging he sexually
assaulted them.

In the notice of motion sent to the media Thursday morning, Nygard
says not only do 50 of the plaintiffs have no connection to New
York, he argues the American court doesn't have jurisdiction over
him or his companies named in the civil lawsuit.

"Due to the lack of connection between either defendant and New
York and these plaintiffs claims and New York, any exercise of
jurisdiction over defendants with respect to these plaintiffs'
claims would violate due process," Nygard said in court filings.

The lawsuit was filed on behalf of 10 plaintiffs — nine women
from the Bahamas and one American — in the Southern District of
New York in February. Since then, 47 more women, including
plaintiffs from Canada, have joined.

Their allegations against Nygard include rape, sodomy and drugging
in locations that include New York, Winnipeg and Nassau.

The allegations date as far back as 1977, and some of the women
allege they were assaulted when they were as young as 14 or 15.

The FBI raided Nygard's New York offices shortly after the class
action was filed as part of a criminal investigation. No charges
have been laid.

Nygard said he lived in Nassau in the Bahamas from 1970 until 2018,
before moving back to Canada.

The designer, who was raised in Manitoba, claims he's been a
permanent resident of the province since January 2019, and hasn't
been to New York since February of that year.

"Since at least January 2019, I have spent more time in Manitoba,
Canada, than in any other location," Nygard wrote in a signed
declaration attached to the motion to dismiss.

"Since at least February 14, 1958, my passport has been issued to
me by the government of Canada. I have never voted in the United
States. I have no family members who reside or work in New York,"
he said.

Nygard said he is not a citizen or permanent resident of the U.S.,
and has never owned or leased property there, nor does he pay taxes
in New York.

According to the court filings, "New York City has been described
as the Nygard 'world' or 'corporate' headquarters.

"This was done for promotional and marketing purposes, to connect
the Nygard brand to New York City, arguably the most well-known
city for fashion in the world, and to grow business and visibility
for the brand in the United States."

Statute of limitations expired, Nygard claims

In the motion, Nygard also claimed the statute of limitations has
expired for 38 of the plaintiffs.

He said that according to the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, the women should have come forward no later
than 10 years after the alleged assaults, or 10 years after they
turned 18.

Nygard said the 38 plaintiffs have failed to prove that they
couldn't have filed their allegations before the statute of
limitations ran out.

"Although most Canadian provinces do not have a statute of
limitations applicable to sexual assault claims, under the
circumstances here, plaintiffs' Canadian law claims are subject to
the statute of limitations applicable to such claims in New York,"
which Nygard said is five years.

"Accordingly, for the 38 plaintiffs who are asserting Canadian law
claims, if their claims are time barred under the statute of
limitations applicable to the claims in New York, the claims must
be dismissed."

The motion to dismiss also said that 12 of the 57 plaintiffs'
claims allegedly occurred outside of the United States and thus
require "extraterritorial application" under the law.

None of the allegations against Nygard have been proven in court
and no charges have been laid.  [GN]


PG&E CORP: New Mexico PERA Appeals Decision to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiffs Public Employees Retirement Association of New
Mexico, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling in the
bankruptcy litigation styled In re: PG&E Corporation, et al., Case
No. 19-30088 DM, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, PG&E
Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 1, 2020, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2020, that the plaintiffs in the class action suit
entitled, In re PG&E Corporation Securities Litigation, have taken
an appeal regarding the denial of their motion seeking approval
from the Bankruptcy Court to treat its proof of claim as a class
proof of claim.

In June 2018, two purported securities class actions were filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, naming PG&E Corporation and certain of its current and
former officers as defendants, entitled David C. Weston v. PG&E
Corporation, et al. and Jon Paul Moretti v. PG&E Corporation, et
al., respectively.

The complaints alleged material misrepresentations and omissions
related to, among other things, vegetation management and
transmission line safety in various PG&E Corporation public
disclosures. The complaints asserted claims under Section 10(b) and
Section 20(a) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and sought unspecified monetary
relief, interest, attorneys' fees and other costs.

The appellate case is captioned as Official Committee of Tort
Claimants v. PG&E Corporation et al., Case No. 4:20-cv-04567-HSG,
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
(Oakland).[BN]

Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants Public Employees Retirement Association
of New Mexico, York County on Behalf of the County of York
Retirement Fund, City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System,
and Mid-Jersey Trucking Industry & Local No. 701 Pension Fund, are
represented by:

          Aram M. Boghosian, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          34th Floor, 140 Broadway, 34th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          E-mail: ABoghosian@labaton.com

               - and -

          Carol C. Villegas, Esq.
          James Leon Ostaszewski, Esq.
          Jeffrey Dubbin, Esq.
          Louis J. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Michael P. Canty, Esq.
          Thomas A. Dubbs, Esq.
          Wendy Tsang, Esq.
          LABATON SUCHAROW LLP
          140 Broadway
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 907-0700
          E-mail: cvillegas@labaton.com
                  jOstaszewski@labaton.com
                  jdubbin@labaton.com
                  lgottlieb@labaton.com
                  mcanty@labaton.com
                  tdubbs@labaton.com
                  wtsang@labaton.com

               - and -

          Frank H. Busch, Esq.
          WAGSTAFFE, VON LOEWENFELDT, BUSCH & RADWICK LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 725
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 357-8900
          Facsimile: (415) 357-8910
          E-mail: busch@wvbrlaw.com

               - and -

          Randy Michelson, Esq.
          MICHELSON LAW GROUP
          220 Montgomery Street, Suite 2100
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 512-8600
          Facsimile: (415) 512-8601
          E-mail: randy.michelson@michelsonlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Brian Edward Cochran, Esq.
          Darren Jay Robbins, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058
          Facsimile: (619) 231-7423
          E-mail: bcochran@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Hadiya Khan Deshmukh, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          E-mail: hdeshmukh@rgrdlaw.com

               - and -

          Kenneth Joseph Black, Esq.
          Willow E. Radcliffe, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN AND DOWD LLP
          Post Montgomery Center
          One Montgomery Street, Suite 1800
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 288-4545
          E-mail: KennyB@rgrdlaw.com
                  willowr@rgrdlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee PG&E Corporation is represented by:

          Andriana Georgallas, Esq.
          Jared R Friedmann, Esq.
          Jessica Liou, Esq.
          John Nolan, Esq.
          Kevin Bostel, Esq.
          Kevin Kramer, Esq.
          Matthew Goren, Esq.
          Max Africk, Esq.
          Ray C. Schrock, Esq.
          Richard W. Slack, Esq.
          Stephen Karotkin, Esq.
          Stuart J. Goldring, Esq.
          Theodore Tsekerides, Esq.
          WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
          767 Fifth Avenue
          New York, NY 10153
          Telephone: (212) 310-8000
          E-mail: jared.friedmann@weil.com
                  richard.slack@weil.com

               - and -

          Bradley Robert Schneider, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          355 S. Grand Avenue, 35th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 683-9237
          Facsimile: (213) 687-3702
          E-mail: Bradley.Schneider@mto.com

               - and -

          Dara Levinson Silveira, Esq.
          Jane Kim, Esq.
          Peter J. Benvenutti, Esq.
          Thomas B. Rupp, Esq.
          Thomas Bogdan Rupp, Esq.
          Tobias S. Keller, Esq.
          KELLER AND BENVENUTTI LLP
          650 California Street, Suite 1900
          San Francisco, CA 94108
          Telephone: (415) 735-5713
          E-mail: dsilveira@kellerbenvenutti.com
                  jkim@kbkllp.com
                  pbenvenutti@kellerbenvenutti.com
                  trupp@kbkllp.com
                  tkeller@kbkllp.com

               - and -

          David A. Herman, Esq.
          Kevin Orsini, Esq.
          Omid H. Nasab, Esq.
          Paul H. Zumbro, Esq.
          Timothy G. Cameron, Esq.
          CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
          825 Eighth Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (212) 474-1000
          E-mail: korsini@cravath.com
                  onasab@cravath.com
                  pzumbro@cravath.com
                  tcameron@cravath.com

               - and -

          David Levine, Esq.
          Katherine B. Kohn, Esq.
          GROOM LAW GROUP, CHARTERED
          1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW #1200
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 861-5436
          E-mail: dnl@groom.com
                  kkohn@groom.com


PIEDMONT NATURAL: Court Dismisses Second Amended Pridy ERISA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARRELL PRIDY et al., Plaintiffs, v. PIEDMONT NATURAL
GAS COMPANY, INC., And DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION, as the alter ego or
successor in liability to PIEDMONT NATURAL GAS COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 3:19-cv-00468 (M.D. Tenn.), Judge Aleta A.
Trauger of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, Nashville Division, granted the Defendants' joint Motion
to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

Following dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
Local Union 702 of the United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industries and Union
members Darrell Pridy, Gregory Nabors, Michael Sanders, and Randall
Abston, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated,
sought and were granted leave to file their SAC.  In it, they bring
suit against Piedmont Gas and Duke Energy under Section 502 of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"); the Tennessee
Human Rights Act ("THRA"); and Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA").

The factual allegations set forth in the SAC in support of the
Plaintiffs' substantive claims are essentially identical to those
set forth in the First Amended Complaint.  The SAC, however, adds
new allegations differentiating between Piedmont Gas and Duke
Energy and attempting to support their claim that Duke Energy is
liable for the wrongful acts of Piedmont Gas on the grounds that it
is either Piedmont Gas' successor in interest or its alter ego.
And the SAC adds two new "Counts" or claims for relief: one "For
Liability on Behalf of Defendant Duke Energy Under
Veil-Piercing/Alter Ego Theory," and the second "For Liability on
Behalf of Duke Energy as Successor In Interest to Defendant
Piedmont Gas."

Otherwise, like the First Amended Complaint, the SAC alleges that
the Individual Plaintiffs are all over the age of 40, have all been
employed by Piedmont Gas for many years, and have participated in
various employee benefit plans, including a welfare benefit plan
for Company1 employees providing sick leave and short-term
disability benefits.  During their employment, the Individual
Plaintiffs were continuously members of the Union and represented
by it in collective bargaining.  The Plaintiffs claim that, at all
times during the Individual Plaintiffs' employment, Piedmont Gas
was and continues to be a party to the collective bargaining
agreement with the Union.  It asserts that Duke Energy is also a
party to the collective bargaining agreements with the Union on the
basis that it is an alter ego and/or successor in liability to
Piedmont Gas.

The collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in effect from 1989 to
1992 between Piedmont Gas and the Union established a sick leave
and short-term disability benefit plan governed by Section X of
that document.  The 1989 CBA's Plan allowed participants to accrue
sick leave days and to "bank" the accumulated days.  The 1989 CBA
refers to the accrued sick leave account as a "sickness allowance,"
while subsequent CBAs refer to individual accrued sick leave
accounts as "Leave Banks."

The CBA adopted in 1999 and in effect until 2004 was the last CBA
to allow the unlimited accrual of sick leave hours.  The sickness
allowance effectively rewarded individuals who did not take
frequent sick leave by allowing them to continue to accrue an
unused allotment by carrying over those hours from year to year.
The CBA that went into effect on Dec. 31, 2004, eliminated the
accumulation of hours in "Leave Banks" going forward, but it
allowed participants with hours already accrued in their Leave
Banks to carry over and use that time as described in the 2004 CBA.


According to the Plaintiffs, the CBAs in effect from August 2008
through August 2012 and from August 2012 through August 2018
similarly recognized employees' ability to use Leave Bank time
accrued prior to January 2005.  The current CBA went into effect on
April 14, 2018.  The 2018 CBA is silent regarding Leave Banks and
leave hours accrued prior to 2005.  However, in April 2018,
Piedmont Gas eliminated an online portal that had allowed employees
to access their Leave Banks, and it began refusing to honor the
accrued time in employees' Leave Banks.

The Plaintiffs claim that Piedmont Gas provided no prior notice of
the action.  All of the Individual Plaintiffs and the class members
had accrued sick leave hours in their Leave Banks.  At least one of
the Individual Plaintiffs requested to use accrued leave time in
late April 2018 but was informed by his supervisor that the Company
no longer allowed employees to use those benefits.  The Plaintiffs
allege that, during negotiations leading up to execution of the
2018 CBA, the Company unilaterally informed the Union that it would
no longer honor accrued Leave Bank benefits in the new collective
bargaining agreement, and unilaterally chose to deny accrued Leave
Bank benefits" to the individual plaintiffs and the other 60 class
members.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs claim that Piedmont Gas
violated ERISA by wrongfully denying accrued and nonforfeitable
rights to banked sick and disability leave benefits; discriminated
against them on the basis of age, in violation of the THRA; and
violated the LMRA by breaching binding CBAs.  It asserts that Duke
Energy should be held jointly and severally liable with Piedmont
Gas because it is the "alter ego" of Piedmont Gas  or is its
"successor in interest to the applicable collective bargaining
agreements.

The Defendants now move for dismissal of the SAC on the grounds
that (1) Duke Energy is not a proper party; (2) the claims brought
by both the Union and the Individual Plaintiffs have not been
exhausted through the proper grievance and arbitration procedure
provided by the operative CBA; (3) the Individual Plaintiffs' ERISA
claim fails because the program at issue was a 'payroll practice,'
not an ERISA-governed welfare plan, and in any event the 'benefits'
were not vested; and (4) the Individual Plaintiffs' age
discrimination claim under the THRA is preempted by Section 301 of
the LMRA.

In their Response, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss is improper under Rule 12(b)(6), as it asks the Court to
make inferences about matters not contained in the SAC and to
resolve disputes of fact.  More specifically, they contend that (1)
the new allegations in the SAC are sufficient to establish that
Duke Energy is a proper Defendant in the action as either a legal
successor to, or alter ego of, Piedmont Gas; (2) they should be
excused from exhausting the contractual grievance procedure as it
relates to their ERISA and LMRA claims on the grounds of futility;
(3) whether the program at issue was a "payroll practice" rather
than an ERISA-governed welfare plan raises issues of fact that
cannot be resolved in the context of a motion to dismiss, and,
alternatively, if the court determines as a matter of law that the
program is a payroll practice, the Plaintiffs should be permitted
to amend their pleading to assert a claim under Tennessee law; and
(4) the THRA claim is not preempted, because it is not
"substantially dependent" on the terms of any CBA.

Judge Trauger finds that the allegations in the SAC still fail to
establish successor liability in the case.  Even if the Court draws
all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiffs' favor, the allegations
in the SAC make it clear that Piedmont Gas has not "gone anywhere,"
and the Judge stands by the Court's prior analysis to find that the
allegations in the SAC do not establish "successor liability" on
the part of Duke Energy.  The SAC does not allege facts sufficient
to support alter ego liability on the part of Duke Energy or that
piercing the corporate veil between Piedmont Gas and Duke Energy is
warranted.  Duke Energy is not a proper Defendant in the action,
and Counts IV and V of the SAC will be dismissed on that basis.

Because the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust is clear from
the face of the SAC and the Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts
that, if true, would establish that exhaustion would have been
futile, the Plaintiffs' claim in Count III under 29 U.S.C. Section
185(a) is subject to dismissal.  The Judge finds that if Count III
of the SAC is construed as asserting an actual breach of any of the
earlier CBAs, the Plaintiffs have failed to show futility with
respect to these agreements as well.

Bringing class claims is not a recognized exception to the
exhaustion requirement.  The Plaintiffs' ERISA claim is subject to
dismissal on this basis.  The Judge finds that in light of the
Plaintiffs' apparent concession of the issue and the absence of any
indication in the CBAs of an intent to exclude benefits claims from
arbitration, she concludes that the ERISA claim falls within the
scope of those claims that are subject to the grievance procedures
set forth in the various CBAs.  In addition, the absence of an
agreement to arbitrate classwide claims therefore does not mean
that the Plaintiffs can avoid arbitration by bringing class
claims.

Finally, because the Plaintiffs' age discrimination claim is
inextricably intertwined with the 2018 CBA and the collective
bargaining process, including the negotiations leading to execution
of the 2018 CBA, the THRA claim is preempted in its entirety by the
LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a).  As such, it is subject to
dismissal.  

The CBAs and the collective bargaining process are not tangentially
related to the Plaintiffs' age discrimination claim.  They are
inextricably intertwined.  Even if resolution of the claim might
not involve the direct interpretation of a precise term of the CBA,
it will inescapably require the Court to address relationships that
have been created through the collective bargaining process and to
mediate a dispute founded upon rights created by a CBA,
pecifically, the Leave Bank benefits and the decision made during
the course of negotiations not to continue recognizing those
rights.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Trauger granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed the case.  All the claims against
Duke Energy and the THRA claim against Piedmont Gas are dismissed
with prejudice.  The LMRA and ERISA claims is dismissed without
prejudice to the Plaintiffs' ability to attempt to redress them
through the contractual process created by the operative CBAs.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 1, 2020 Memorandum is
available at https://is.gd/XwXPZu from Leagle.com.


PLAID INC: Squire Patton Discusses Mitchell's Privacy Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Zarish Baig, Esq., of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, in an article
for The National Law Review, reports that imagine there is a
company that knows every dollar you deposit or withdraw, every
dollar you charge or pay to your credit card, and every dollar you
put away for retirement, within hours after you make the
transaction.  Imagine this includes every book or movie ticket or
meal you purchase, every bill you pay to a doctor or hospital, and
every payment you make (or miss) on your mortgage, student loan or
credit card bill.  Imagine this company maintains a file on you
containing all of this information going back five years.  Imagine
that this company uses your username and password to log into the
online account you maintain with your bank and updates that file
multiple times a day to stay up to date on every financial move you
make.

Imagine this company is not your bank.  Imagine that, as far as you
know, you never provided your username and password to this company
or otherwise authorized it to access your online accounts.  Imagine
you never heard of this company at all.

Intrigued yet?  This is just the start of the 59 page, 223
paragraph-long complaint recently filed against Plaid, Inc. in the
Northern District of California.  Plaintiff Logan Mitchell alleges
(on behalf of herself and putative class members) that Plaid
violated pretty much every data privacy statute out there.
Plaintiff's complaint for damages and declaratory and equitable
relief alleges violations of: (1) common law invasion of privacy;
(2) Article I, Sec. 1 of the California Constitution; (3) the
Stored Communications Act ("SCA"); (4) the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act ("CFAA"); (5) California's Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud
Act ("CDAFA"); (6) unjust enrichment; (7) California's
Anti-Phishing Act of 2005; (8) California Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"); (9) California Civil Code Sec. 1709; (10) Negligence.  The
UCL cause of action is based upon violations of the foregoing
statutes, but also piles on alleged violations of the Graham Leach
Bliley Act ("GLBA") Privacy Rule, California's Financial
Information Privacy Act ("CalFIPA"), California Penal Code § 502,
California Online Privacy Protection Act ("CalOPPA"), and, with the
California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA") enforcement date right
around the corner, i.e. July 1, 2020, Plaintiff has also alleged
Plaid violates the CCPA by not providing users with the required
notice before collecting and using their personal information.

Plaid is a San Francisco-based financial technology company that
allows users "to connect their banks accounts to an app." Plaid
technology is embedded in personal finance applications, such as
Venmo, to add functionality that the participating apps do not
provide themselves. Plaintiff alleges that Plaid collects and mines
user data without the legally required consent or disclosure.
Plaintiff charges that Plaid is not "truly committed to building
products that are in consumer's best interest." Noting that Plaid's
approach for European users allows the sharing of financial data
without giving Plaid access to their bank login credentials,
Plaintiff states that Plaid could implement the same practices in
the U.S., "regardless of whether it is required by law to do so."

Using an example from the Venmo mobile application, Plaintiff
alleges Plaid's "fine-print click-through" disclosure is
insufficient, misleading and illegal. Plaintiff alleges the text is
smaller than other text on the screen, appears in a light gray
color that is more difficult to read than the other text on the
screen, and a user would not know that this text contains a link to
Plaid's privacy policy unless she were to actually click on it.
Also, the screen contains no requirement that the user must review
(or even scroll through) the privacy policy before clicking
"Continue."

If one clicks on "Plaid End User Privacy Policy," one is directed
to the another screen that discloses, "When you connect your
financial accounts with a developer application or otherwise
connect your financial accounts through Plaid, where applicable, we
collect identifiers and login information required by the provider
of your account, such as your username and password, or a security
token," amongst other information.

So does Plaid really violate a user's "reasonable expectations of
privacy in highly offensive ways that amount to egregious
violations of social norms" as alleged in the complaint?  That
issue may soon be before the court when Plaid files its response to
the complaint, which may likely be a Rule 12(b)6 motion to dismiss
- one of the defense mechanisms commonly launched at the outset of
litigation to dispose of claims as exhaustive as the ones here.
Stay tuned for more on this. [GN]


PLAINS ALL AMERICAN: 9th Cir. Appeal Filed in Andrews Fisher Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Plains All American Pipeline LP, et al., filed an appeal
from a court ruling in the lawsuit titled Keith Andrews, et al. v.
Plains All American Pipeline LP, et al., Case No.
2:15-cv-04113-PSG-JEM, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Los Angeles.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the Hon. Judge
Philip S. Gutierrez has entered an order granting the Plaintiffs'
motion to amend the order certifying fisher subclass; and
certifying the fisher subclass under the Plaintiffs' proposed
amended definition: "all persons and businesses (Fishers) who owned
or worked on a vessel that was in operation as of May 19, 2015 and
that: (1) landed any commercial seafood in California Department of
Fish and Wildlife ("CDFW") fishing blocks 654, 655, or 656; or (2)
landed any commercial seafood, except groundfish or highly
migratory species (as defined by the CDFW and the Pacific Fishery
Management Council), in CDFW fishing blocks 651-656, 664-670,
678-686, 701-707, 718-726, 739-746, 760-765, or 806-809; from May
19, 2010 to May 19, 2015, inclusive; and All persons and businesses
(Processors) in operation as of May 19, 2015 who purchased such
commercial seafood directly from the Fishers and re-sold it at the
retail or wholesale level. Excluded from the proposed Subclass are:
(1) Defendants, any entity or division in which Defendants have a
controlling interest, and their legal representatives, officers,
directors, employees, assigns and successors; (2) the judge to whom
this case is assigned, the judge's staff, and any member of the
judge's immediate family, and (3) businesses that contract directly
with Plains for use of the Pipeline."

The appellate case is captioned as Keith Andrews, et al. v. Plains
All American Pipeline LP, et al., Case No. 19-80167, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Respondents KEITH ANDREWS, et al., are represented by:

          William M. Audet, Esq.
          AUDET & PARTNERS, LLP
          711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500
          San Francisco, CA 94102
          Telephone: 415-568-2555
          E-mail: waudet@audetlaw.com

               - and -

          Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Esq.
          Wilson M. Dunlavey, Esq.
          Sarah R. London, Esq.
          Robert J. Nelson, Esq.
          LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP
          275 Battery Street, 29th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 956-1000
          Facsimile: (415) 956-1008
          E-mail: ecabraser@lchb.com
                  wdunlavey@lchb.com
                  slondon@lchb.com
                  rnelson@lchb.com

               - and -

          A. Barry Cappello, Esq.
          David Cousineau, Esq.
          Leila J. Noel, Esq.
          CAPPELLO & NOEL LLP
          831 State Street
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 564-2444
          Facsimile: (805) 965-5950
          E-mail: abc@cappellonoel.com
                  dcousineau@cappellonoel.com
                  lnoel@cappellonoel.com

               - and -

          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Juli E. Farris, Esq.
          Daniel Parke Mensher, Esq.
          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: gcappio@kellerrohrback.com
                  jfarris@kellerrohrback.com
                  dmensher@kellerrohrback.com
                  lsarko@kellerrohrback.com

               - and -

          Matthew J. Preusch, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496
          E-mail: mpreusch@kellerrohrback.com

Defendants-Petitioners PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P., a
Delaware limited partnership; and PLAINS PIPELINE, L.P., a Texas
limited partnership, are represented by:

          Melinda Eades LeMoine, Esq.
          Daniel Benjamin Levin, Esq.
          Fred Anthony Rowley, Jr., Esq.
          Henry Weissmann, Esq.
          MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
          350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213-683-9171
          E-mail: Melinda.LeMoine@mto.com
                  daniel.levin@mto.com
                  Fred.Rowley@mto.com
                  Henry.Weissmann@mto.com


PLAYAGS INC: Block & Leviton Announces Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Block & Leviton LLP (www.blockesq.com), a national securities
litigation firm, announces that a class action lawsuit on behalf of
shareholders has been filed against PlayAGS, Inc. (NYSE: AGS) and
certain of its officers for violations of the federal securities
laws. Investors who purchased PlayAGS shares between August 2, 2018
and August 7, 2019 and lost money are encouraged to contact the
firm for a free case evaluation.

PlayAGS designs and supplies electronic gaming machines. On August
7, 2019, PlayAGS reported a net loss of $7.6 million for the second
quarter of 2019, including two different impairment charges of $3.5
million to goodwill and $1.3 million to intangible assets. On this
news, the stock price fell approximately 52% in one day, from an
August 7, 2019 close of $17.30 per share to an August 8, 2019 close
of $8.99 per share.

The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Nevada, alleges that PlayAGS failed to disclose to investors that
it was experiencing challenges in its businesses both in Oklahoma
and in its Interactive business segment, that the Company's
recurring revenue would be negatively impacted, and that PlayAGS
was likely to record a goodwill impairment charge.

If you purchased or acquired shares of PlayAGS and have questions
about your legal rights or possess information relevant to this
matter, please contact:

        Block & Leviton
        260 Franklin St., Suite 1860
        Boston, MA 02110
        Tel: (617) 398-5600
        E-mail at cases@blockesq.com

Or click https://shareholder.law/cases/?case=playags

The deadline to move the Court to be appointed lead plaintiff is
August 24, 2020.

Block & Leviton LLP is a firm dedicated to representing investors
and maintaining the integrity of the country's financial markets.
The firm represents many of the nation's largest institutional
investors as well as individual investors in securities litigation
throughout the United States. The firm's lawyers have recovered
billions of dollars for its clients.  [GN]


PLAYAGS INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Aug. 24 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of PlayAGS, Inc. (NYSE: AGS),
Cheetah Mobile, Inc. (NYSE: CMCM), and Brookdale Senior Living,
Inc. (NYSE: BKD). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to
petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional
information about each case can be found at the link provided.

PlayAGS, Inc. (NYSE: AGS)

Class Period: August 2, 2018 to August 7, 2019

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 24, 2020

PlayAGS is a designer and supplier of electronic gaming machines.
It operates with three business segments: (i) electronic gaming
machines ("EGM"), which comprises 95% of the Company's revenue and
provides 380 game titles on EGM cabinets; (ii) table products,
including live felt table games, side bet offerings, progressives,
signage, and other ancillary table game equipment; and (iii)
interactive, which offers social casino games including online
versions of the Company's game titles.

On August 7, 2019, PlayAGS reported a net loss of $7.6 million for
second quarter 2019, which included a $3.5 million impairment to
goodwill and $1.3 million impairment to intangible assets of the
Company's iGaming reporting unit, due to extended regulatory
timelines which delayed revenues.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $8.99, or nearly 52%,
to close at $8.31 per share on August 8, 2019.

The complaint, filed on June 25, 2020, alleges that throughout the
Class Period defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that
PlayAGS was experiencing challenges in its business in Oklahoma;
(2) that, as a result, the Company's recurring revenue would be
negatively impacted; (3) that PlayAGS was experiencing challenges
in its Interactive business segment, including delays in securing
regulatory approvals and relevant licenses; (4) that, as a result
of the foregoing, PlayAGS was reasonably likely to record a
goodwill impairment; and (5) that, as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

For more information on the PlayAGS class actin go to:
https://bespc.com/AGS

Cheetah Mobile, Inc. (NYSE: CMCM)

Class Period: March 25, 2019 to February 20, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 24, 2020

On February 21, 2020, Cheetah Mobile disclosed that its Google Play
Store, Google AdMob, and Google AdManager accounts were disabled on
February 20, 2020 "because some of the Company's apps had not been
compliant with Google policies, resulting in certain invalid
traffic."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.61, or nearly 17%,
to close at $2.99 per share on February 21, 2020.

The complaint, filed on June 25, 2020, alleges that throughout the
Class Period defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that
certain of Cheetah Mobile's apps were not compliant with the terms
of its agreements with Google; (2) that, as a result there was a
reasonable likelihood that Google would terminate its advertising
contracts with the Company; (3) that, as a result of the foregoing,
the Company's ability to attract new users would be adversely
impacted; (4) that, as a result, the Company's revenue was
reasonably likely to decline; and (5) that as a result, defendants'
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects,
were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis at all relevant times.

For more information on the Cheetah Mobile class action go to:
https://bespc.com/CMCM

Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. (NYSE: BKD)

Class Period: August 10, 2016 to April 29, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 24, 2020

As of February 1, 2020, Brookdale owned 356 communities, leased 307
communities, managed seventy-seven communities on behalf of third
parties, and three communities for which it has an equity interest.
The Company operates independent living, assisted living and
dementia-care communities and continuing care retirement centers
("CCRCs"). Through its ancillary services programs, the Company
also offers a range of outpatient therapy, home health,
personalized living, and hospice services.

On April 30, 2020, Nashville Business Journal reported that a
proposed class-action lawsuit had been filed against Brookdale in
this Judicial District, which accused the Company of, among other
things, purposeful "chronically insufficient staffing" at its
facilities to meet financial benchmarks since at least April 24,
2016. According to the lawsuit, Brookdale misled residents and
their families when it promised to provide basic care and daily
living services. The lawsuit also claims that the proposed class of
plaintiffs "have not received the care and services they paid for."
The lawsuit asks for damages and Brookdale to "stop the unlawful
and fraudulent practices."

On this news, Brookdale's stock price fell $0.56 per share, or
15.22%, over two trading sessions to close at $3.12 per share on
May 1, 2020.

The complaint, filed on June 25, 2020, alleges that throughout the
Class Period Defendants made materially false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's business, operational, and
compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
Brookdale's financial performance was sustained by, among other
things, the Company's purposeful understaffing of its senior living
communities; (ii) the foregoing conduct subjected Brookdale to an
increased risk of litigation and, once revealed, was foreseeably
likely to have a material negative impact on the Company's
financial results and reputation; (iii) as a result, the Company's
financial results were unsustainable; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

For more information on the Brookdale class action go to:
https://bespc.com/BKD

                  About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com.  Attorney advertising.  Prior results
do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]


PORTLAND, OR: Third Class Action Filed Over Police Use of Force
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that another class-action lawsuit has
been filed against the city of Portland, marking the third such
lawsuit filed related to the use of force and munitions at protests
that began after the police killing of George Floyd.

The Oregonian/OregonLive reports the class-action complaint named
three plaintiffs, Robert Evans, Bea Lake and Sadie Oliver-Grey, and
contains allegations including assault, battery, negligence, false
arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Don't Shoot PDX sues to ban tear gas in Portland

The suit asks the court to find the plaintiffs within their rights
and to order police to stop brutalizing and unlawfully arresting
protesters. [GN]


PREMIER NUTRITION: 9th Cir. Upheld Dismissal of Sonner Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Bodtke Zambrana, Esq., of Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP,
in an article for The National Law Review, reports that the Ninth
Circuit affirmed dismissal of a consumer fraud class action
pursuing restitution under California's Unfair Competition Law
because the plaintiff failed to show she lacked an adequate legal
remedy.  Sonner v. Premier Nutrition, No. 18-15890 (9th Cir. June
18, 2020).  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit resolved a split in the
California federal courts regarding whether plaintiffs may pursue
solely equitable relief, like restitution under the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL), Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), or False
Advertising Law (FAL), when legal damages under the CLRA are
available in the same amount for the same alleged harm.  This
decision has important implications for consumer class actions in
California federal courts.

Background

The case arose out of allegations that Premier Nutrition marketed
its dietary supplement beverage Joint Juice as supporting
cartilage, lubricating joints and improving joint comfort, and that
Joint Juice failed to provide these benefits. The complaint
demanded injunctive relief, restitution under the UCL and CLRA, and
damages under the CLRA. For those not familiar with the California
statutes, the UCL authorizes restitution only, not damages, whereas
the CLRA allows both. Restitution is considered an equitable
remedy, even though it can result in the payment of money.

Less than two months before trial, Sonner sought leave to file an
amended complaint that dropped the CLRA damages claim.  This was a
transparent strategic move: by dropping the CLRA damages claim,
Sonner could request that the judge award $32 million as
restitution in a bench trial, rather than having to persuade a jury
to award this amount as damages.  Premier opposed, arguing that
Sonner's proposed amended complaint would require dismissing the
restitution claims because there was an adequate remedy at law for
the same injury.  The district court allowed the amendment, but
warned Sonner that if Premier successfully dismissed the
restitution claims, the court would not allow another amendment to
resurrect the damages claims.

Undeterred, Sonner amended her complaint.  Premier moved to
dismiss, and the district court granted the motion, holding that
the UCL and CLRA claims were subject to California's
inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine, and the plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law under the CLRA.

Intra-Circuit Split

The district court's holding put it on one side of an intra-circuit
split.  On one side, courts held that plaintiffs alleging claims
providing an adequate remedy at law were barred from pursuing
claims for equitable relief, including under California's consumer
protection statutes, unless they could show why the available legal
damages were inadequate. See, e.g., Munning v. Gap, Inc., 238 F.
Supp. 3d 1195, 1203–04 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Duttweiler v. Triumph
Motorcycles, 2015 WL 4941780 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015).

On the other side of the split, courts held that, because the UCL
and CLRA state that their remedies are "cumulative" to the remedies
available under other state laws, the availability of damages did
not bar a claim for equitable relief under the UCL and CLRA. See,
e.g., Luong v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 2018 WL 2047646 at *7 (N.D.
Cal. May 2, 2018); Estakhrian v. Obenstine, 233 F. Supp. 3d 824,
846 (C.D. Cal. 2017).

The Ninth Circuit Decision

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sonner district court, but on
federal rather than state grounds.  It held that federal common law
controls a federal court's equitable authority, and state law
cannot expand or limit that authority. As a result, a federal court
must apply traditional equitable principles before awarding
restitution under the UCL and CLRA.

Consequently, before awarding equitable relief under the UCL, CLRA,
or FAL, a federal court must find that the plaintiff lacks an
adequate remedy at law.  In consumer fraud cases seeking
restitution, that will rarely be the case, because the same
recovery available as "restitution" under the UCL and FAL is
generally available as "damages" under the CLRA.  That was the
outcome in Sonner, because the class sought the same sum in
equitable restitution - a full refund of the purchase price,
totaling $32 million for the class - as it requested in damages to
compensate for past harm.

Implications for California Consumer Class Actions in Federal
Courts

The Ninth Circuit's decision prevents plaintiffs in consumer class
actions from eliminating the defendant's right to a jury trial by
seeking monetary recovery under the guise of "restitution" that is
equally available as "damages."  As the Sonner Court recognized,
this is one of the core reasons for the inadequate-remedy-at-law
requirement in the first place -- to protect the constitutional
right to trial by jury.

Yet open questions remain.  For instance, can a plaintiff pursue a
UCL claim at all if they have a viable remedy under the CLRA?
Sonner arguably suggests no, but it does not directly answer the
question since Sonner abandoned her CLRA claim, rather than
pursuing it simultaneously with a UCL claim.  If consumer
plaintiffs are indeed compelled to abandon their UCL claim when the
CLRA affords identical relief, they will also be required to meet
the CLRA's more demanding causation requirement, which could affect
class certification. Specifically, the CLRA requires a showing of
reliance for absent class members, whereas the UCL and FAL do not.
See Steroid Hormone Prod. Cases, 181 Cal. App. 4th 145, 155-56
(2010). While reliance may be inferred by a showing of materiality,
the inference can be rebutted by evidence that some class members
did not rely.  In re 5-Hour Energy Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
2017 WL 2559615, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2017).

Similarly, must a plaintiff allege an inadequate legal remedy in
her complaint to avoid dismissal of equitable claims at the
pleading stage?  This is another issue on which California federal
courts are divided. Compare Robinson v. J.M. Smucker Co., 2019 WL
2029069, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2019) (dismissing UCL and FAL
claims where plaintiff's complaint pled an adequate legal remedy
under the CLRA), with Wildin v. FCA US LLC, 2018 WL 3032986, at
*6–7 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) (allowing plaintiff to plead
"alternative remedies" for equitable and legal relief).  Because
Sonner was decided on the eve of trial, it does not address whether
courts may or must decide this issue at the pleading stage.

Takeaways for Consumer Class Action Defendants

Defendants faced with a choice of agreeing to voluntary dismissal
of CLRA or other legal claims (such as breach of warranty, breach
of contract, etc.) should carefully weigh their options.

Defendants who strongly value a jury trial should not waive this
right by agreeing to voluntary dismissal of CLRA or other legal
claims.

On the other hand, if a defendant is neutral between a bench and
jury trial, agreeing to dismiss the CLRA claim can reduce the
defendant's overall exposure, because the CLRA carries the risk of
punitive damages and automatic attorney's fees for a prevailing
plaintiff, neither of which is available under the UCL or FAL.

Consider an early motion to dismiss UCL and FAL claims,
particularly where the plaintiffs simultaneously allege a CLRA or
other legal claim for the same conduct and seek damages. A
successful motion will not affect the scope of discovery or the
defendant's financial exposure (because the UCL and FAL have
similar substantive elements to the CLRA and provide the same
potential monetary damages), but it can afford defendants an
advantage in opposing class certification, and narrow the
plaintiffs' potential pathways to relief. [GN]


PUBLIC HEALTH: Fails to Pay Overtime Wage Under PMWA, Govens Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Timika Govens, bring this class action on behalf of herself and
putative class of similarly situated persons v. PUBLIC HEALTH
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Case No. 200700483 (Pa. Com. Pleas,
Philadelphia Cty., July 8, 2020), accuses the Defendant of
violating the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 by failing to
pay the Plaintiff's overtime compensation.

According to the complaint, the Defendant paid the Plaintiff on an
hourly basis at the rate of approximately $21.58 an hour; the
Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee under the PMWA. The Defendant
forced the Plaintiff to use her Personal Time Off ("PTO") if she
did not reach the required 37.5 hours per week. The Defendant began
forcing Ms. Govens to use her PTO in September 2015, and has been
doing so ever since. When the Plaintiff worked in excess of forty
hours per week but she was not paid overtime.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant to work as an Accounts
Payable Coordinator.

The Defendant is a nonprofit public health institute based in
Philadelphia.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Graham F. Baird, Esq.
          Scott K. Johnson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF ERIC A. SHORE, P.C.
          Two Penn Center, Suite 1240
          1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
          Philadelphia, PA 19110
          Phone: (267) 546-0131
          Phone: (267) 546-0124
          Fax: (215) 944-6124
          Email: grahamb@ericshore.com
                 scottj@ericshore.com


REBBL INC: Martinez Sues in E.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rebbl, Inc. The case
is styled as Pedro Martinez, individually and as the representative
of a class of similarly situated persons v. Rebbl, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-03064 (E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

REBBL, Inc., produces soft drinks. The Company offers proteins,
fruit juices, and nutrition products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


ROMAN HEALTH: Young Sues in S.D. New York Alleging ADA Violation
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Roman Health Ventures
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Lawrence Young Individually And
On Behalf Of All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Roman Health
Ventures Inc., Roman Health Medical LLC, Defendants, Roman Health
Pharmacy LLC, ADR Provider, Case No. 1:20-cv-05288 (S.D.N.Y., July
9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Roman Health Ventures, Inc., is a tele-health firm that provides an
online portal to afford male consumers with the opportunity to
interact with and receive medical services from a licensed
physician.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com


SAMARCO MINERACAO: Banco Safra Appeals Rulings to Second Circuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiff Banco Safra S.A. appeals to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit from certain rulings entered in
the action styled BANCO SAFRA S.A.-CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH,
Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
SAMARCO MINERACAO S.A., BHP BILLITON LIMITED, BHP BILLITON PLC, BHP
BILLITON BRASIL LTDA., and VALE S.A., Case No. 16-cv-8800, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (New York
City).

The appealed rulings include the Decision and Order entered in this
action on June 18, 2019, and its Judgment  on June 26, 2019,
granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Lead Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint with prejudice, and from the Decision and Order
entered in the action on October 30, 2019, denying the Motion of
Lead Plaintiff for Reconsideration of the Court's June 18, 2019
Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, To Alter
or Amend the Judgment Under Rule 59(e) and For Relief Under Rule
60(b), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9(b) and
12(b)(6), and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4 et seq.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Banco Safra
purports to bring the action on behalf of all purchasers of debt
securities issued by Samarco [Samarco Bonds] during the Class
Period [Oct. 31, 2012 to Nov. 30, 2015], who purchased such
securities in domestic U.S. transactions.  The Samarco Bonds
purchased by Banco Safra were initially offered only outside the
United States and Banco Safra acquired the overwhelming majority of
bonds in the secondary market.

Banco Safra alleges that the Defendants violated U.S. federal
securities laws, particularly Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  It also brings state claims
against the Defendants for common law fraud, aiding and abetting
fraud, and negligent misrepresentations under New York State law.

The appellate case is captioned as Banco Safra S.A.-Cayman Islands
Branch v. Samarco Mineracao S.A., et al., Case No. 19-3976, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Banco Safra S.A.-Cayman Islands Branch is
represented by:

          Emma Gilmore, Esq.
          Jeremy Alan Lieberman, Esq.
          Jennifer Banner Sobers, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: 212-661-1100
          Facsimile: 917-463-1044
          E-mail: egilmore@pomlaw.com
                  jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  egilmore@pomlaw.com

Defendant-Appellee Samarco Mineracao S.A. is represented by:

          Mark Stewart Cohen, Esq.
          Nathaniel P.T. Read, Esq.
          COHEN & GRESSER LLP
          800 3rd Avenue
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 957−7600
          Facsimile: (212)957−4514
          Email: mcohen@cohengresser.com
                 nread@cohengresser.com

Defendants-Appellees BHP Billiton Limited, BHP Billiton PLC and BHP
Billiton Brasil Ltda. are represented by:

          Brendan P. Cullen, Esq.
          SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
          1870 Embarcadero Road
          Palo Alto, CA 94303
          Telephone: 650-461-5650
          E-mail: cullenb@sullcrom.com

Defendant-Appellee Vale S.A. is represented by:

          Christopher Joralemon, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          200 Park Avenue
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: 212-351-2668
          E-mail: cjoralemon@gibsondunn.com


SAMARITANS-AT-LAST LLC: Biptar Sues Over Unpaid Overtime
--------------------------------------------------------
EVELYN BIPTAR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SAMARITANS-AT-LAST, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-03244 (E.D. Pa., July 1, 2020) is an action against the
Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class overtime
compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiff Biptar was employed by the Defendant as home health
aide.

Samaritans-At-Last, LLC specialized In-Home Care for Seniors. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 273-1054
          Facsimile: (215) 525-0210
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com


SAN JOSE, CA: Bohrn Files Prisoner Civil Rights Suit
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against City of San Jose
(Police Department). The case is styled as Keith Bohrn,
individually and on behalf of a Class of Persons similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. City of San Jose (Police Department), City
Of San Jose, Santa Clara County Jail, Santa Clara County Jail
Officials, agent of DOES III through X and San Jose Police
Officers, agent of AVILA and DOES I through III, Defendants, Case
No. 5:20-cv-04529 (N.D. Cal., July 8, 2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Civil Rights:
Other filed pursuant to the Prisoner Civil Rights.

The San Jose Police Department (SJPD) is the police agency for San
Jose, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Bruce William Nickerson, Esq.
   Law Office of Bruce W. Nickerson
   231 Manor Drive
   San Carlos, CA 94070
   Tel: (650) 594-0195
   Fax: (650) 596-0595
   Email: brucenic@pacbell.net



SAN JOSE, CA: Transgender Attorney Files Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Alaina Lancaster, writing for Law.com, reports that a transgender
attorney who was arrested in San Jose while walking home seeks to
represent a class of trans people who allege the city and police
have systemically targeted them under the guise of policing
prostitution.

The class action complaint alleges that the San Jose Police
Department falsely arrests people for prostitution without warrant
or probable cause with the "tacit understanding that it would
promote the unconstitutional and illegal goal of reducing the
number of Transgendered Persons who appear in public." [GN]


SANTA BARBARA, CA: Murray Inmates Class Action Nears Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Malea Martin, writing for Santa Maria Sun, reports that more than
two years after being granted class action certification, Murray v.
County of Santa Barbara is one step closer to reaching a
settlement.

The parties have been in negotiations to try and resolve the case,
which seeks court-ordered reforms within the Santa Barbara County
Jail. Disability Rights California, the litigation counsel
representing the class action members, asserts that the jail
violates the Eighth and 14th Amendment rights of inmates and is not
compliant with disability laws.

"The Main Jail right now does not have a single housing unit,
shower, or living space that is compliant with the Americans with
Disabilities Act rules on mobility standards. They do not have
adequate outdoor space to get everybody outside a few days a week,"
said Aaron Fischer, one of the attorneys representing the class.
"Right now, [mental health] clinicians just go to the cell front
and talk to them. That's not a meaningful mental health contact."

On June 25, Fischer and his team filed a status report that will be
reviewed by the county Board of Supervisors in closed session on
July 7.

Fischer said that this status report is particularly important, as
it informs the court that the parties have reached a full
settlement in principle. If the Board of Supervisors approves it,
then the parties can seek court approval.

Because it's a class action lawsuit, class members then get a
chance to review the proposed settlement and provide comments or
objections. After that process the court can approve a final
settlement, which Fischer said typically takes a few months.

The proposed settlement seeks to ensure that inmates "with
disabilities and people with health care needs are able to get the
care and treatment they're entitled to and that they need." For the
jail to achieve those ends it will require additional resources,
Fischer said.

With some community members calling to take resources and funding
away from the county jail system, Fischer clarified what he
believes the proposed settlement would really mean for the future
of the local jail system.

"Nothing in the settlement prevents the county from meaningfully
reducing its jail system," Fischer said. "It will take resources to
make sure that people with disabilities and people with health care
needs are able to get the care and treatment they're entitled to
and that they need, but there's nothing that says the jail needs to
be a certain size. We fully support a smaller jail system in the
county that is able to meet the needs of our class members who
continue to be in that system."

While the class action lawsuit represents all current and future
inmates of the jail, the county Public Defender's Office also has a
stake in jail conditions since they represent some inmates as
well—especially during a global pandemic.

"The Public Defender's Office represents a large number of people
who are still in custody right now, so our priority has been to try
to see that they're either released or held in conditions that
preserve their rights and safety," Deputy Public Defender Mark
Saatjian told the Sun.

One way to reduce the jail population is through zero-bail policy
measures, something that counties across the state have implemented
in reaction to COVID-19. A statewide zero-bail policy ended on June
20, but the Santa Barbara Superior Court elected to extend it until
further notice.

"I think it's very important that it be extended," Saatjian said.
"It's been helpful to show the community that too many people were
being held in custody pre-trial."

As of June 9, the jail population had 591 inmates in custody, down
from an average of 900 before the pandemic, according to Lt. Erik
Raney from the Sheriff's Office.

The Sheriff's Office is still discussing whether the population
reduction will be possible to maintain long-term, he said.

"While all of these efforts have been successful in reducing the
current jail population, what we do not know, is how will this
ultimately affect public safety," Raney said in an email to the
Sun. [GN]


SCHLEGEL VILLAGES: Hit With C$20-Mil. Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
The Toronto Sun reports that a class-action lawsuit is seeking C$20
million in damages from Schlegel Villages Inc. on behalf of
residents who suffered from COVID-19, families who lost loved ones
from the virus and those whose standard of care was allegedly
reduced during the outbreak at Mississauga's Village of Erin
Meadows.

The lawsuit alleges, among other things, that Village of Erin
Meadows and its corporate parent, Schlegel Villages Inc., failed to
ensure residents and staff were kept safe, failed to comply with
provincial directives to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and failed
to equip their employees with personal protective equipment in a
timely manner.

The key plaintiff, Rossana Carnevale lost her 86-year-old mom,
Giuseppina, to COVID-19 on April 29. The lawsuit indicates that
Giuseppina tested positive for COVID-19 on April 15 and was
confined to a wheelchair on April 19.

On April 29, Rossana was called by a staff member who said they
found her mom "lying face down on the floor of her room" - after
she'd been yelling for help, the lawsuit claims.

Home officials subsequently called Rossana indicating her mom "had
passed away peacefully while resting in her chair," the lawsuit
alleges.

"The Village of Erin Meadows could not even be straight with me on
how my mother died," Rossana said in a statement.  "One staff told
me she was face down on the floor still breathing when she was
found, another said she died peacefully in her wheelchair, and a
third told me she died peacefully in her bed."

She said she considers it her duty to her mother to push for an
investigation of the tragedy.

"It was a very chaotic situation which shouldn't have happened,"
says Gary Will, lead counsel on the case of Erin Meadows' handling
of the pandemic.

The lawsuit alleges that even though a COVID-19 outbreak was
declared on April 2, Erin Meadows still permitted residents with
symptoms to wander out of their room and visit rooms of other
residents.

As late as April 9, Erin Meadows continued to allow residents to
sit together at tables for four in their dining rooms for all three
meals, the lawsuit claims.

The lawsuit alleges that as late as April 17, community officials
continued to allow residents who tested positive for COVID-19 to
wander out of their room and access the rooms of other residents.

The claim also alleges that because of staff shortages, residents
received substandard care, resulting in bladder infections,
dehydration and other ailments that led to hospitalization and even
death.

As of the filing of the lawsuit, 65 residents and 26 staff had been
infected with COVID-19 and there were a total of 21 deaths.

Will said families have told him they really weren't getting "good
communication" from the home's operators.

"The information they were provided was often grossly wrong," he
said.

He said residents were left to wander throughout the facility and
people who'd contracted COVID-19 were left in the same room as
those who didn't have COVID-19 — with only a curtain separating
them.

Matt Drown, director of community connections for Schlegel
Villages, says they'll address the allegations through the proper
legal processes.

"Our efforts are always focused on providing the best care possible
to the residents in our homes, and ensuring that families are
supported through open and transparent communication," he said.

"We know that this has been a very difficult time for many
families, and we are deeply sorry for the losses they have
experienced," he added.

Schlegel Villages owns 19 villages in Ontario containing retirement
and long-term care homes. Erin Meadows has 180 beds in the
long-term care home and houses 332 residents in its retirement
home. [GN]


SERVICEMASTER COMPANY: Cooley Labor Suit Moved to E.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as TYRON COOLEY, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. THE SERVICEMASTER
COMPANY, LLC, TERMINIX INTERNATIONAL, INC., THE TERMINIX
INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive, Case No. 34-2020-00278350 (Filed May 8, 2020), was
removed from the Superior Court in the State of California for the
County of Sacramento to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California on July 8, 2020.

The Eastern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-at-00679 to the proceeding.

The Plaintiff's complaint asserts claims for failure to pay wages
when due, meal period violations, rest period violations,  failure
to pay overtime and wages under the California Labor Code Private
Attorneys General Act.

ServiceMaster provides building maintenance services. The Company
offers termite and pest control, home warranties, disaster response
and reconstruction, cleaning, restoration, furniture repair, and
home inspection services.

Terminix is one of the largest pest control companies in the world,
operating in 47 states in the United States and 22 countries around
the world.[BN]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Douglas A. Wickham, Esq.
          Anne Sweeney Jordan, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.
          633 West 5th Street, 63rd Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: 213 443 4300
          Facsimile: 213 443 4299
          E-mail: dwickham@littler.com
                  ajordan@littler.com


SK ENERGY: Cleveland Suit Moved From S.D. to N.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as ASANTE CLEVELAND, on behalf
of himself, and all others who are similarly situated v. SK ENERGY
AMERICAS, INC.; SK TRADING INTERNATIONAL CO. LTD., VITOL INC., and
JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1-75, Case No. 3:20-cv-00893 (Filed May 13,
2020), was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California (San Jose) on July 8, 2020.

The Northern District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
5:20-cv-04502-VKD to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi.

On February 18, 2015, a massive explosion ripped through the
ExxonMobil gas refinery in Torrance, California. At the time of the
explosion, the ExxonMobil gas refinery supplied about 1/5th of the
gasoline sold in Southern California and about 1/10th of the
gasoline sold across the state of California.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants along with their
employees carried out an illegal price fixing scheme while using
the explosion at the gas refinery in Torrance as cover for the
Scheme. The Defendants are major traders in the spot market for
gasoline and gasoline blending products in California.

The Defendants' illegal conduct came to light on May 4, 2020, when
California Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, filed a redacted
complaint alleging in detail how the Defendants rigged the spot
price of gasoline in California, in violation of the Cartwright Act
and California's Unfair Competition Law.

SK Energy is an independent energy broker.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Azar, Esq.
          MILBERG PHILLIPS GROSSMAN LLP
          16755 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92606
          Telephone: 212-594-5300
          E-mail: dazar@milberg.com

               - and -

          Peggy Wedgworth, Esq.
          Andrei Rado, Esq.
          Blake Yagman, Esq.
          MILBERG PHILLIPS GROSSMAN LLP
          One Pennsylvania Plaza, Suite 1920
          New York, NY 10119
          Telephone: 212-594-5300
          E-mail: pwedgworth@milberg.com
                  arado@milberg.com
                  byagman@milberg.com


SKIP THE DISHES: Class Action Can Proceed in Manitoba Courts
------------------------------------------------------------
Cameron MacLean, writing for CBC News, reports that a proposed
class-action lawsuit against Winnipeg-based food delivery service
Skip the Dishes can now move forward through Manitoba courts, after
the Supreme Court of Canada reached a decision last month in a
similar case involving an Ontario Uber Eats driver.

The lawsuit, filed by former Skip the Dishes courier Charleen
Pokornik in Manitoba's Court of Queen's Bench in summer of 2018,
argues the company misled its drivers by classifying them as
independent contractors rather than employees, allowing it to avoid
labour laws covering minimum wages, paid sick leave and other
benefits.

Pokornik and her lawyers were seeking class-action certification,
but the court process was put on hold last year after the Supreme
Court agreed to hear a case brought forward by Uber Eats driver
David Heller.

Like Pokornik, Heller argues Uber has violated the rights of its
drivers by misclassifying them as independent contractors. He is
also seeking class-action certification.

The Supreme Court decision, released on June 26, doesn't deal with
whether or not Uber drivers are employees or independent
contractors.

Instead, it determined that drivers can seek legal recourse through
Ontario's court system, rather than going through an arbitration
process mandated by Uber and based in the Netherlands.  

In July 2018, days before Pokornik filed her statement of claim,
Skip the Dishes changed its contract with drivers, requiring them
to go through arbitration instead of the courts to resolve
disputes. The new contract also stipulated that any action must be
brought individually, and not as part of a class.

Now that the Supreme Court has ruled in the Uber case, the Skip the
Dishes case is set to move to a case management hearing in
mid-September, says a lawyer representing Pokornik's class-action
application.

"The impact of the Supreme Court decision will be a matter of
debate between the parties on the Skip the Dishes action, because
the facts, of course, are not identical," Paul Edwards said.

"But what . . .  we're grateful for, is the Supreme Court has
engaged in this issue, and the issues arising from the gig economy,
which affects so many people in this country."

A spokesperson for Skip the Dishes declined to comment, as the case
is before the court.

If the court decides that Skip drivers are in fact employees and
not private contractors, the company could be required to pay
drivers retroactively for lost wages, overtime, vacation pay and
more. [GN]


SOCIAL FINANCE: Sosa Sues in S.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Social Finance, Inc.
The case is styled as Yony Sosa, On Behalf of Himself and All Other
Persons Similarly Situated v. Social Finance, Inc., Case No.
1:20-cv-05269 (S.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Social Finance, Inc. (SoFi) operates as an online personal finance
company. The Company offers student loan refinancing, mortgages,
and personal loans to resume-parsing technology, a personalized
strengths assessment, and one-on-one career coaching.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com


SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Klein Law Reminds of July 27 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
The Klein Law Firm on July 6 disclosed that class action complaints
have been filed on behalf of shareholders of the following
companies.  There is no cost to participate in the suit.  If you
suffered a loss, you have until the lead plaintiff deadline to
request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.

Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. (SRNE)

Class Period: May 15, 2020 - May 22, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 27, 2020

Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. allegedly made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the
Company's initial finding of "100% inhibition" in an in vitro virus
infection will not necessarily translate to to success or safety in
vivo, or in person; (ii) the Company's finding was not a "cure" for
COVID-19; and (ii) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

Learn about your recoverable losses in SRNE:
http://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/sorrento-therapeutics-inc-loss-submission-form?id=7763&from=1

Endo International Plc (ENDP)

Class Period: August 8, 2017 - June 10, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 18, 2020

The ENDP lawsuit alleges that Endo International Plc made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (i) Endo's and/or its subsidiaries' contributions to
the opioid crisis (including, but not limited to, their opioid
products' disproportionately negative impact on New York and the
fraud that Defendants perpetrated on the New York insurance market)
were larger in scope than the Company had represented; (ii) part of
that contribution to the crisis included Endo publishing and
disseminating false information to health care providers regarding
the risks and benefits of opioids; (iii) the foregoing, once
revealed, was foreseeably likely to subject Endo and/or its
subsidiaries to increased regulatory scrutiny and enforcement, as
well as significant financial and/or reputational harm,
particularly with respect to New York; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

Learn about your recoverable losses in ENDP:
http://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/endo-international-plc-loss-submission-form?id=7763&from=1

Brookdale Senior Living Inc. (BKD)

Class Period: August 10, 2016 - April 29, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 24, 2020

The complaint alleges that during the class period Brookdale Senior
Living Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Brookdale's financial
performance was sustained by, among other things, the Company's
purposeful understaffing of its senior living communities; (ii) the
foregoing conduct subjected Brookdale to an increased risk of
litigation and, once revealed, was foreseeably likely to have a
material negative impact on the Company's financial results and
reputation; (iii) as a result, the Company's financial results were
unsustainable; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

Learn about your recoverable losses in BKD:
http://www.kleinstocklaw.com/pslra-1/brookdale-senior-living-inc-loss-submission-form?id=7763&from=1

Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that you
serve as a lead plaintiff. If you suffered a loss during the class
period and wish to obtain additional information, please contact J.
Klein, Esq. by telephone at 212-616-4899 or visit the webpages
provided.

J. Klein, Esq. -- http://www.kleinstocklaw.com-- represents
investors and participates in securities litigations involving
financial fraud throughout the nation. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

  J. Klein, Esq.
  Empire State Building
  350 Fifth Avenue
  59th Floor
  New York, NY 10118
  jk@kleinstocklaw.com
  Tel: (212) 616-4899
  Fax: (347) 558-9665 [GN]


SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of July 27 Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on July 1 disclosed that class action
lawsuits have commenced on behalf of shareholders of the following
publicly-traded companies. Shareholders interested in serving as
lead plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the
court. Further details about the cases can be found at the links
provided. There is no cost or obligation to you.

Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. (SRNE)

SRNE Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased May 15, 2020 -
May 22, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: July 27, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/sorrento-therapeutics-inc-information-request-form?prid=7700&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Sorrento
Therapeutics, Inc. made materially false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the Company's
initial finding of "100% inhibition" in an in vitro virus infection
will not necessarily translate to to success or safety in vivo, or
in person; (ii) the Company's finding was not a "cure" for
COVID-19; and (ii) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

Chembio Diagnostics, Inc. (CEMI)

CEMI Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased March 12, 2020 -
June 16, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 17, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/chembio-diagnostics-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=7700&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, defendants engaged in a scheme to
deceive the market and a course of conduct that artificially
inflated Chembio's stock price and operated as a fraud or deceit by
misrepresenting the efficacy of the Company's Dual Path Platform
("DPP") COVID-19 test. Defendants allegedly achieved this by making
false statements about Chembio's DPP COVID-19 test, although they
knew or at least recklessly disregarded that there were material
performance concerns with the test. When defendants' prior
misrepresentations were disclosed and became apparent to the
market, the price of Chembio stock fell precipitously as the prior
artificial inflation came out of Chembio's stock price.

Mylan N.V. (MYL)

MYL Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased February 16, 2016
- May 7, 2019

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: August 25, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/mylan-n-v-loss-submission-form?prid=7700&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Mylan
N.V. made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: 1) the Food and Drug Administration's
investigation into the Company's manufacturing plant in Morgantown,
West Virginia was the result of whistleblower allegations, and not,
as Mylan insinuated, the result of a "regular" inspection; and 2)
defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing that, as a result
of Mylan's continued efforts to remain uncooperative with the Food
and Drug Administration, the Morgantown plant would continue to
incur substantial setbacks.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
http://www.zlk.com[GN]


SORRENTO THERAPEUTICS: Wolf Haldenstein Reminds of Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP  reminds investors that a
federal securities class action lawsuit has been filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. (NASDAQ: SRNE)
common stock between May 15, 2020 and May 22, 2020, inclusive (the
"Class Period").

All investors who purchased shares of Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc.
and incurred losses are urged to contact the firm immediately at
classmember@whafh.com or (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774. You may
obtain additional information concerning the action or join the
case on our website, www.whafh.com.

If you have incurred losses in the shares of you may, no later than
July 27, 2020, request that the Court appoint you lead plaintiff of
the proposed class.  

To join the case, click:

https://www.whafh.com/case/sorrento-therapeutics-inc-nasdaq-srne/

The filed complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period,
defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose:

  -- that the Company's initial finding of "100% inhibition" in
     an in vitro virus infection will not necessarily translate
     to success or safety in vivo, or in person;

  -- the Company's finding was not a "cure" for COVID-19; and

  -- as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
     statements about the Company's business operations, and
     prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a
     reasonable basis.

On May 15, 2020, the Company announced that it had discovered an
antibody which "demonstrated 100% inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 virus
infection" and which Sorrento's CEO called a "cure." On this news,
Sorrento's share price rose more than 280%.

Then, on May 20, 2020, Hindenburg Research called the Company's
claims "too good to be true." In a report citing former Sorrento
employees, Hindenburg Research alleged that it was "too early" to
tell whether the Company had found a cure and that "Sorrento's
actions are manipulative at the worst possible time and simply
amount to an attempt to shamelessly profiteer off the pandemic."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.67 per share, or
over 11%, to close at $5.03 per share on May 21, 2020.

Wolf Haldenstein has extensive experience in the prosecution of
securities class actions and derivative litigation in state and
federal trial and appellate courts across the country.  The firm
has attorneys in various practice areas; and offices in New York,
Chicago and San Diego.  The reputation and expertise of this firm
in shareholder and other class litigation has been repeatedly
recognized by the courts, which have appointed it to major
positions in complex securities multi-district and consolidated
litigation.

If you wish to discuss this action or have any questions regarding
your rights and interests in this case, please immediately
contact:

          Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP
          Kevin Cooper, Esq.
          Gregory Stone, Director of Case and Financial Analysis
          E-mail: gstone@whafh.com
                  kcooper@whafh.com
                  classmember@whafh.com
          Tel: (800) 575-0735 or (212) 545-4774
          Web site: http://www.whafh.com/[GN]


SOUTH CAROLINA: Griffin Appeals Ruling in Voltz-Loomis Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Movant Bennie Griffin filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit titled Jeanne Voltz-Loomis, et al. v. Henry
McMaster, et al., Case No. 5:20-cv-01533-DCC-KDW, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina at Orangeburg.

Henry McMaster is sued in his official capacity as Governor of the
State of South Carolina.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, a petition for
writ of habeas corpus has been filed in the case styled as Jeanne
Voltz-Loomis, Gary Zachariah Thomas, Denise Edgar, Brandon Moore,
Allen Slaughter, Gay Opel Stanley, Brison Akeem Allison, Protection
& Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc., John Does 1 through
10 and Jane Roes 1 through 10 on their own and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated persons, Petitioners v. Henry McMaster, in
his official capacity as Governor of the State of South Carolina,
Bryan Stirling in his official capacity as Director of the South
Carolina Department of Corrections, South Carolina Board of Pardons
and Paroles, Christopher F Gibbs, in his official capacity as
member of the South Carolina Board of Pardons and Paroles, Mollie
Dupriest Taylor, in her official capacity as member of the South
Carolina Board of Pardons and Paroles, Dan Batson, in his official
capacity as member of the South Carolina Board of Pardons and
Paroles, Henry S Eldridge, in his official capacity as member of
the South Carolina Board of Pardons and Paroles, Lonnie Randolph,
in his official capacity as member of the South Carolina Board of
Pardons and Paroles and Kim Frederick, in her official capacity as
member of the South Carolina Board of Pardons and Paroles,
Respondents, Case No. 5:20-cv-01533-DCC-KDW (D. S.C., April 21,
2020)

The appellate case is captioned as Bennie Griffin v. Henry
McMaster, Case No. 20-7010, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.

Movant-Appellant BENNIE GRIFFIN, of Perry Correctional Institution,
in Pelzer, South Carolina, appears pro se.[BN]


SOUTH KOREA: University Students' Lawsuit Seeks Tuition Refunds
---------------------------------------------------------------
KBS World reports that university students filed a class action
lawsuit against the government and universities calling for tuition
refunds, saying they were not provided a proper learning
environment amid the COVID-19 outbreak.

Campaign Headquarters for Tuition Refunds, led by the National
University Student Council Network, held a press conference on July
1 and called for an instant refund of this year's first semester
tuition.

The headquarters said the students went through either a full
online semester or one that included only some in-person classes.

The student group pointed out that universities did not provide
proper classes, school facilities or support for student activities
that are mandatory according to universities' terms and
conditions.

The headquarters added that the government is responsible for
inadequate supervision of classes and lack of tuition refund
measures.

Although the government increased the supplementary budget by
271-point-eight billion won to aid in tuition refunds, the group
claimed that this is insufficient because it amounts to only
400-thousand won per student, roughly ten percent of a full
semester's tuition. [GN]


SPICE HOUSE: Crosson Sues in E.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Spice House, LLC. The
case is styled as Aretha Crosson, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Spice
House, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-03061 (E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Spice House is a purveyor of the finest spices, herbs, blends,
and extracts to customers ranging from renowned Michelin-star chefs
to home cooks everywhere, with products ranging from essential and
rare spice varietals to proprietary rubs and blends.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP P.C.
          44 Court Street, Suite 1217
          Brooklyn, NY 11217
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Fax: (718) 504-7555
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


STATE FARM MUTUAL: Lopez Suit Transferred to Arkansas Dist. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Juan Lopez, on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated persons and entities, Plaintiff v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant, was transferred
from the Circuit Court of Sebastian County with the assigned Case
No. 66FCV-20-00446 to the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas (Fort Smith) on July 8, 2020, and assigned
Case No. 2:20-cv-02112-PKH.

The nature of the case is stated as Insurance.

State Farm is a large group of insurance companies throughout the
United States with corporate headquarters in Bloomington,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Phillip J. Milligan, Esq.
   Milligan Medlock Gramlich LLP
   500 So. 16th Street
   P.O. Box 2347
   Fort Smith, AR 72902
   Tel: (479) 783-2213
   Fax: (479) 783-4329
   Email: patsylund@sbcglobal.net

     - and -

   Thomas P. Thrash, Esq.
   Thrash Law Firm
   1101 Garland Street
   Little Rock, AR 72201
   Tel: (501) 374-1058
   Fax: (501) 374-2222
   Email: tomthrash@sbcglobal.net

     - and -

   William Thomas Crowder, Esq.
   William T. Crowder, PLLC
   1101 Garland Street
   Little Rock, AR 72201-1214
   Tel: (501) 374-1058
   Fax: (501) 374-2222
   Email: willcrowder@thrashlawfirmpa.com

The Defendants are represented by:

   John E. Moore, Esq.
   Munson, Rowlett, Moore & Boone, P.A.
   1900 Regions Center
   400 W. Capitol, Suite 1900
   Little Rock, AR 72201
   Tel: (501) 374-6535
   Fax: (501) 374-5906
   Email: john.moore@mrmblaw.com

     - and -

   Zachary Richmond Hill, Esq.
   Munson, Rowlett, Moore & Boone, P.A.
   400 W. Capitol Ave Ste. 1900
   Little Rock, AR 72201
   Tel: (501) 370-4685
   Email: zachary.hill@mrmblaw.com



STATE FARM: App. Court Upholds $34MM Ruling in Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lyle Adriano, writing for Insurance Business America, reports that
the 8th US Court of Appeals has ruled that State Farm Life
Insurance must repay policyholders in Missouri over $34 million,
for charging them undisclosed fees.

A 25,000-member class action lawsuit was filed against State Farm
in 2016 -- the plaintiffs were individuals who had obtained life
insurance from the company between 1994 and 2004.  The suit alleged
that while State Farm's whole life insurance policies' premiums
were said to be based on customers' age, sex, and applicable rate
class, the insurer was also using other "non-mortality factors" to
determine pricing -- such as taxes, profit assumptions, investment
earnings, and capital & reserve requirements -- which added hidden
fees to the total cost of insurance.

A 2018 jury verdict and pretrial rulings by a Missouri federal
judge ruled against State Farm in the case.  The insurer later
appealed to the 8th US Court of Appeals to overturn the ruling.

But the federal court ruled that the insurer's policy language was
ambiguous, adding that Missouri law requires ambiguous statements
to be construed in favor of customers.  The court also rejected
State Farm's argument that the case's class certification was
inappropriate because the class included members who did not suffer
damages, Bloomberg Law reported.

Kansas City Business Journal said that State Farm could still
appeal to the overall 8th Circuit and ask for the US Supreme Court
to review the case, but the company has yet to reveal its
intentions. [GN]


STEINHOFF: Shareholders Lose Class Certification Bid
----------------------------------------------------
Ann Crotty, writing for Moneyweb, reports that if you were
listening carefully you might have heard the sound of champagne
corks popping in boardrooms all across the corporate landscape.
The celebrations were sparked by the South Gauteng High Court's
confirmation of what most of those in the know already knew --
directors are, by and large, safe from shareholders seeking
recompense for value destruction.

Judge David Unterhalter told lawyers acting for a swathe of
Steinhoff shareholders who wanted to hold the Steinhoff directors
accountable for the destruction in the value of their shares that
there was no point certifying their class action because it would
fail in the courts.  Company law was not on their side, said
Unterhalter.

Days later, in a completely different case, the Supreme Court of
Appeal (SCA) told the directors of Hlumisa (African Bank's BEE
shareholders) the same story. Hlumisa was claiming damages against
the directors of African Bank for the collapse in the value of
their shares on the grounds that the directors had acted in bad
faith, for ulterior purposes, and without the requisite degree of
care, skill and diligence in breach of the provisions of the
Companies Act. Hlumisa had failed to persuade the lower court of
its case and had appealed to the SCA. The SCA dismissed the
appeal.

(Anyone looking for a more scholarly interpretation is urged to
read the 100-page ruling by the South Gauteng High Court or, better
still, the SCA ruling.)

'Derivative action'

So, if shareholders want to go after directors who appear to have
breached their fiduciary duties, they have to do it through the
company. It's called a derivative action.

This of course means persuading the very directors accused of not
doing their job to allow the company to take action against them.

As you can imagine, unless the National Prosecuting Authority gets
its act together, there's little chance of even former Steinhoff
CEO Markus Jooste being called to account.

And it's not just the Steinhoff and African Bank directors who are
off the hook.

Sadly that wasn't the end of the blows to any notion that we have a
rigorous well-functioning corporate governance regime.

Mid-week, the JSE announced it was fining Tongaat R7.5 million
(R2.5 million of it suspended) because the accounts it produced
between 2011 and 2018 were "incorrect, false and misleading".
Presumably it fined the company on the basis of the same logic used
in the above two court actions. So there's a sort of legal
consistency. But what an absolute travesty, just as Tongaat was
getting back on its feet under new and much improved management.

And how comforted should we all be that the chair of Tongaat's
audit committee during that period is now ensconced in a powerful
oversight position where she is required to pass judgement on the
quality of auditors in this country?

The courts' decisions were based on what the law allows; the JSE's
action was based on the JSE's regulations. And the beneficial
shareholders, the ultimate owners, end up with a dog's breakfast.

Chilling insights

But the week was not over. There was more to come. Advocacy group
Open Secrets released a chilling account of the value destruction
wreaked upon the economy by a seemingly hopelessly inept (at times
possibly criminally so) audit profession.

The 86-page report makes for grim but fascinating reading, with our
big law firms also shown to be part of the country's corruption
problem.

Essentially, our corporate governance is in a value-destroying
downward spiral mess. And much of that mess is due to the 'leaders'
-- the directors, the auditors, the regulators, the lawyers.

As the Open Secrets report notes, many of them are enablers. But
why would they bother stopping the rot when there's so much fee
income to be made out of creating it and then cleaning it up.

The institutional shareholders with their tick-all-the-boxes
stewardship codes and 'behind closed doors' discussions are part of
the problem, as is the King Code, to which they slavishly adhere in
form but seldom substance. These well-resourced and powerful
shareholders inevitably pitch up at the scene of the latest
corporate implosion looking perplexed and wondering how their
crony-style exhortations with the top executives could have been so
unsuccessful.

How might things look without any codes?

It's difficult to imagine how much worse the corporate landscape
would be without all these codes and private discussions.

Four iterations of the King code have done nothing more than spawn
an industry of overpaid self-appointed enforcers who appear to do
almost no enforcing.

A fifth iteration will not be tolerated because the likely authors
of such a code -- auditors, directors, lawyers -- are no longer
trusted.

It is time to look to the smaller players for a way out of the
governance morass; independent and irritatingly dogged players such
as Just Share and Active Share, or activist investors such as Theo
Botha, Chris Logan and Albie Cilliers.

These are the kind of people who really do understand that if their
children are to thrive, their investee companies must thrive. [GN]


STEWARD HEALTH: Fails to Bill BCBST for Services, Williams Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Beverly Williams, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. STEWARD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, LLC; AND MEDICAL
REIMBURSEMENTS OF AMERICA, Case No. 5:20-cv-00123 (E.D. Tex., July
9, 2020), seeks an award from the Defendants of all monies they
unlawfully obtained from the Plaintiff arising from their deceptive
conduct in failing to bill Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas for
services rendered to the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident caused by a
third party. The Plaintiff sought medical treatment from her local
hospital, Wadley Regional Medical Center. At the time the services
were provided, the Plaintiff maintained health insurance through
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, which is honored by Wadley
Regional Medical Center and for the payment of service at
established rates. However, the Defendants did not bill BCBST for
services rendered to the Plaintiff.

Instead, the Defendants, acting alone or in concert with each
other, engaged(es) in an unlawful, deceptive scheme of revenue
enhancement through the collection of charges, which Wadley (and
these Defendants) did not ever rightfully possess as asserted and
certainly now no longer possess, the Plaintiff contends. The
Plaintiff adds that Defendant MRA is a third-party debt collector
and required to file a surety bond with the Texas Secretary of
State's office, making all its communications false because it has
not right to collect a debt in Texas.

Based upon the Defendants' formalized revenue enhancement scheme as
evidenced by their conduct and written correspondence, the
Plaintiff alleges her situation is not isolated. These Defendants,
acting alone or in concert with each other, have unlawfully and
deceptively asserted rights for the collection of charges against
other Texas patients in situations similar to the Plaintiff. In
doing so and based upon the Defendants' unlawful and deceptive
scheme, the Plaintiff asserts the Defendants, acting alone or in
concert, have unlawfully collected monies from Texas patients for
which these Defendants were precluded from receiving by virtue of
contracts with health insurance companies and/or Texas law.

The Defendants' unlawful actions include the assertion of entitled
to monies from precluded sources as a matter of contract and Texas
law, the assertion or threats of assignments which exceeded the
amounts which could be assigned, the failure to timely file
insurance claims with Texas patients' health benefit plans, and the
assertion or threats of assignments or liens which no longer
allowed for recovery. Further, Defendant MRA has/is falsely
communicating it has a right to collect debts in Texas--which it
does not, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of Bowie County, Texas.

Steward is the largest private, for-profit hospital operator in the
United States. Steward operates 37 hospitals in nine states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jim Wyly, Esq.
          Sean Rommel, Esq.
          WYLY-ROMMEL, PLLC
          4004 Texas Boulevard
          Texarkana, TX 75503
          Phone: (903) 334-8646
          Facsimile: (903) 334-8645
          Email: jwyly@wylyrommel.com
                 srommel@wylyrommel.com

               - and -

          Ryan Lutz, Esq.
          Brett Thompson, Esq.
          CORY WATSON, P.C.
          2131 Magnolia Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Phone: (205) 328-2200
          Fax: (205) 324-7896
          Email: jtapley@corywatson.com
                 rlutz@corywatson.com
                 bthompson@corywatson.com


STITCH FIX: Tenzer-Fuchs Sues in E.D. New York Over ADA Violation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stitch Fix, Inc. The
case is styled as Michelle Tenzer-Fuchs, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Stitch Fix, Inc., Case No.
2:20-cv-03076-JS-ST (E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Stitch Fix, Inc., is an online personal styling service that
delivers personalized Fixes of apparel and accessories to men,
women and kids.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
          SHALOM LAW, PLLC
          124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
          Kew Gardens, NY 11374
          Phone: (718) 971-9474
          Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


STOJO PRODUCTS: Slade Sues in S.D. New York Over Violation of ADA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Stojo Products Inc.
The case is styled as Linda Slade, individually and as the
representative of a class of similarly situated persons v. Stojo
Products Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-05262 (S.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Stojo is the first collapsible & portable lifestyle brand, making
reuse easy. Stojo is focused on providing people the products they
need to ensure positive reusability habits.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Dan Shaked, Esq.
          SHAKED LAW GROUP  P.C.
          14 Harwood Court, Suite 415
          Scarsdale, NY 10583
          Phone: (917) 373-9128
          Email: shakedlawgroup@gmail.com


TD AMERITRADE: Sued by Wang for Recklessly Operating Business
-------------------------------------------------------------
Wei Wang, and individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TD AMERITRADE, INC., TD AMERITRADE FUTURES & FOREX LLC
dba THINKORSWIM, Case No. 1:20-cv-04028 (N.D. Ill., July 9, 2020),
is brought pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act, and the
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act due to the Defendants being
engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated
recklessly as a fraud or deceit upon the Plaintiff.

According to the complaint, the Defendants mishandled the
Plaintiff's futures and options investments on April 20, 2020, in
that TDFF: i) failed to provide material information to Plaintiffs
regarding the possibility of the price of their NYMEX Light Sweet
May 20 Crude Oil Futures contracts (May 20 Crude Oil) going to a
price of zero; ii) failed to provide the Plaintiff a way to exit,
roll, modify or offset long positions in May 20 Crude Oil; iii)
failed to liquidate the Plaintiff's futures and options on futures
investments in a reasonable manner on April 20, 2020, when May 20
Crude Oil fell to a price of zero and proceeded to trade into
negative prices; and iv) liquidated the Plaintiff's positions in a
commercially unconscionable manner.

While the Plaintiff recognizes that the Defendants had discretion
to liquidate, the Defendants did not have discretion to liquidate
in the reckless and commercially unreasonable way that it did, the
Plaintiff contends. The Plaintiff adds that the Defendants knew
about the potential for the markets' volatile condition--including
the possibility that the price of the May 20 Crude oil contract
could trade into the negative, and that the crude oil contract
becomes more volatile during the delivery period--everything it
needed to exercise its discretion to liquidate in an active and
volatile market in a reasonable manner.

Yet the Defendants recklessly liquidated the Plaintiff's long crude
oil position, causing thousands of dollars in losses to Plaintiff
and other class members' losses that could have been significantly
reduced or completely avoided, says the complaint. The Defendants'
failure to provide its clients with material information, and its
failure to liquidate its client's positions in a commercially
reasonable manner [promptly] also violated the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing contained in its Futures Client
Agreement. The Defendants' reckless actions make them liable for
tens of millions in actual damages incurred by the Plaintiff and
the class.

The Plaintiff was a client of TDFF at all times relevant throughout
the class period.

TDFF is a financial services company and affiliate of TDA.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          R. Tamara de Silva, Esq.
          Cheryl Fitzpatrick-Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF R. TAMARA DE SILVA, LLC
          980 N Michigan Avenue, Suite 1400
          Chicago, IL 60611
          Phone: (312) 913-9999
          Email: tamara@desilvalawoffices.com
                 cheryl@futurescomplianceinc.com

               - and -

          Jonathan Lubin, Esq.
          8800 Bronx Ave., Suite 100H
          Skokie, IL 60077
          Phone: (773) 954-2608
          Email: jonathan@lubinlegal.com


TELADOC HEALTH: Hale Files TCPA Suit in New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Teladoc Health, Inc.
The case is styled as April Hale and Len Cline, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Teladoc
Health, Inc., Defendant, Case No. 7:20-cv-05245 (S.D. N.Y., July 8,
2020).

The docket of the case states the nature of suit as Other Statutory
Actions filed pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991.

Teladoc Health, Inc., formerly referred to as Teladoc, Inc. and
Teladoc Medical Services, is a multinational telemedicine and
virtual healthcare company based in the United States. Primary
services include telehealth, medical opinions, AI and analytics,
and licensable platform services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

   Stefan Louis Coleman, Esq.
   Law Offices Stefan Coleman, LLC
   5 Penn Plaza 23rd Floor
   New York, NY 10001
   Tel: (877) 333-9427
   Fax: (888) 498-9427
   Email: law@stefancoleman.com


TESLA: Class Action Over Congo Children Abuse Pending
-----------------------------------------------------
Gareth Hutchens, writing for ABC News, reports that it's a sign of
the times.

Electric car manufacturer Tesla became the world's most valuable
carmaker, overtaking Toyota, despite never having made an annual
profit.

In the past 12 months, Tesla shares have surged over 400 per cent
to reach a market value of $US210 billion ($302 billion).

In July last year, its share price was $US233. Recently, it closed
at $US1,208.

According to the financial firm Refinitiv, Tesla is now trading at
69 times its estimated 2022 earnings.

What's behind the eye-watering rally?

A broader improvement in the tech sector has helped.

A report that Tesla sold 11,095 Shanghai-made Model 3 vehicles in
China in May, more than triple the number sold in April, has helped
too.

But Tesla's financial update was the spur. It showed the company
just achieved its best first quarter for production and deliveries
in its history, despite the COVID-19 lockdowns.

Long-term forecasts for demand for electric vehicles would also be
very supportive because they're staggering.

According to BloombergNEF, global sales of new cars with an
internal combustion engine, which run on oil and diesel, peaked in
2017 and are "in permanent decline".

But sales of electric vehicles are forecast to grow dramatically in
the coming decades.

It said electric vehicle sales could hit 10 per cent of global
passenger vehicle sales by 2025, rising to 28 per cent in 2030 and
58 per cent in 2040.

There's so much room for growth in electric vehicles it's hard to
fathom -- just like the scale of the global transition to renewable
energy generally.

Electric cars the 'green' option, but they present their own
issues

In fact, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) released a report on the topic last month, telling the
world to prepare for electric vehicles.

It said a global transition was underway to decarbonise energy and
transport systems, and as the importance of oil as a source of
energy receded, demand for lithium-ion batteries would grow
rapidly.

This would create its own problems, it said, because the mining
industries extracting the key materials needed for rechargeable
batteries -- lithium, graphite, manganese and cobalt -- caused
unique environmental and social consequences.

It said there was an "urgent need" to address them to ensure the
transition to a low-carbon energy system was done sustainably and
ethically.

But the bulk of the 72-page report was spent explaining the
economics of battery manufacturing and supply chains.

It dedicated one page to the social and environmental problems
associated with lithium-ion batteries.

Nevertheless, the problems were serious.

"Most of the cobalt supplied to global markets originates from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), of which 20 per cent comes
from artisanal mines where child labour and human rights issues
have been identified," the report warned.

"Up to 40,000 children are estimated to be working in extremely
dangerous conditions, with inadequate safety equipment, for very
little money in the mines in Southern Katanga.

"The children are exposed to multiple physical risks and
psychological violations and abuse, only to earn a meagre income to
support their families."

That figure of 40,000 children came from a UNICEF report from eight
years ago.

Lauren Armistead, an Amnesty International researcher, told the ABC
in 2018 the figure was probably a severe underestimate now, given
the rise in global demand for cobalt since then.

The UNCTAD report also failed to mention that tech companies have
been put under scrutiny in recent years to clean up their supply
chains.

In December, for instance, five of the world's largest tech
companies (Apple, Alphabet, Dell, Microsoft and Tesla) were accused
in a federal class-action lawsuit filed in Washington DC of
"knowingly benefiting from, and aiding and abetting, the cruel and
brutal use of young children in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to mine cobalt".

It was the first lawsuit of its kind.

It was filed on behalf of 14 Congolese families whose children were
killed or maimed while mining cobalt supplied to those companies.

An amended complaint was filed last month, with new details of the
defendants' supply chain connections.

That type of pressure for change has had an effect on tech and auto
companies.

Tesla says it is trying to eliminate cobalt from its products

It's hard to keep up with the mindset of Tesla's chief executive
Elon Musk on the best of days, but in 2018 he said Tesla's next
generation of batteries would contain no cobalt.

Last month, Tesla's 2019 impact report explained how much effort
the company had gone through recently to source ethical cobalt from
the DRC.

It said it supported sourcing from the DRC "where we can be assured
that minerals, including cobalt, are coming from mines that meet
our social and environmental standards".

"[But] our ultimate goal [is] to eliminate cobalt completely from
our cells," it said.

A senior adviser at the OECD in Paris, Tyler Gillard, was reported
saying Tesla's disclosures were "a positive step towards
recognising the reality of copper and cobalt supply chains on the
ground".

A week later, the Financial Times reported global mining giant
Glencore, which has operations in Australia, had signed a deal with
Tesla to supply cobalt from its mines in the DRC to Tesla's new
Shanghai Gigafactory and Berlin plant.

The Times said the deal would increase Tesla's reliance on cobalt
from the DRC but would also allow Tesla to control supply from
Glencore's mines to where the mineral was processed in China.

The UNCTAD report mentioned none of this.

It just said the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
recognised "the issue of child labour" and "it is expected that by
2025 child labour will be eliminated from the mines".

Regarding lithium mining, the UNCTAD report focused on problems in
South America.

"Indigenous communities that have lived in the Andean region of
Chile, Bolivia and Argentina (which holds more than half the
world's supply of lithium beneath its salt flats) for centuries
must contend with miners for access to communal land and water," it
said.

"The mining industry depends on a large amount of groundwater in
one of the driest desert regions in the world to pump out brines
from drilled wells.

"In Chile's Salar de Atacama, lithium and other mining activities
consumed 65 per cent of the region's water. That is having a big
impact on local farmers -- who grow quinoa and herd llamas -- in an
area where some communities already must get water driven in from
elsewhere."

It relied on a two-year-old article from Wired magazine for that
information.

The dirty truth about mining
When the UNCTAD report was released, some right-wing websites
seized on it as proof of the disastrous environmental and social
consequences of renewable energy.

That's mining. It's a filthy business.

There are attempts to limit the damage from mining: environmental,
social and cultural.

Think of the disasters that have plagued the oil and gas industries
since their inception.

Even recently, a report from Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN),
an international resource watchdog, found oil refineries in western
Europe have been sourcing high-quality crude from the Niger delta,
blending it with toxic chemicals to make high-sulphur fuels that
exceed Europe's pollution limits by hundreds of times, and selling
it back to Nigeria's poorly regulated market.

That "official" fuel, which is sold in bowsers, is so toxic it's
more polluting than unofficial black-market fuel sold in the
country.

Nigeria has some of the worst air pollution in the world.

According to the State of Global Air database, it has recorded over
110,000 premature deaths annually for decades, attributable to air
pollution.

That's just one small story from the oil industry recently. One
that barely made a ripple. [GN]


TEXAS: Seeks 5th Cir. Review of Ruling in M.D. Civil Rights Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Greg Abbott, et al., filed an appeal from a court ruling
issued in the lawsuit entitled M.D., et al. v. Greg Abbott, et al.,
Case No. 2:11-CV-84, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Greg Abbott is sued in his official capacity as Governor of the
State of Texas.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the nature of
suit is stated as other civil rights.

The appellate case is captioned as M.D., et al. v. Greg Abbott, et
al., Case No. 19-41015, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellees M. D., by next friend Sarah R. Stukenberg; Z.
H., by next friend Carla B. Morrison; S. A., by next friend Javier
Solis; A. M., by next friend Jennifer Talley; J. S., by next friend
Anna J. Ricker; H. V., by next friend Anna J. Ricker; L. H., by
next friend Estela C. Vasquez; C. H., by next friend Estela C.
Vasquez; and A. R., by next friend Tom McKenzie, individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situated, are represented by:

          Sara Michelle Bartosz, Esq.
          Stephen Andrew Dixon, Esq.
          Christina Wilson Remlin, Esq.
          CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, INCORPORATED
          88 Pine Street
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 683-2210
          E-mail: sbartosz@childrensrights.org
                  sdixon@childrensrights.org
                  cremlin@childrensrights.org

               - and -

          Dori Kornfeld Goldman, Esq.
          Lonny Jacob Hoffman, Esq.
          Reagan William Simpson, Esq.
          Christian J. Ward, Esq.
          R. Paul Yetter, Esq.
          YETTER COLEMAN, L.L.P.
          811 Main Street
          2 Houston Center
          Houston, TX 77002
          Telephone: (713) 632-8027
          E-mail: dgoldman@yettercoleman.com
                  lhoffman@yettercoleman.com
                  rsimpson@yettercoleman.com
                  cward@yettercoleman.com
                  pyetter@yettercoleman.com

               - and -

          Marcia Lowry, Esq.
          A BETTER CHILDHOOD, INCORPORATED
          355 Lexington Avenue
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: 646-795-4463
          E-mail: mlowry@childrensrights.org

               - and -

          Barry Frank McNeil, Esq.
          HAYNES & BOONE, L.L.P.
          2323 Victory Avenue
          Dallas, TX 75219
          Telephone: (214) 651-5580
          E-mail: barry.mcneil@haynesboone.com

Defendants-Appellants GREG ABBOTT, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Texas; COURTNEY PHILLIPS, in her official
capacity as Executive Commissioner of the Health and Human Services
Commission of Texas; and JAIME MASTERS, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the Department of Family and Protective Services of
the State of Texas, are represented by:

          Christopher D. Hilton, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          P.O. Box 12548
          Capitol Station
          Austin, TX 78711-2548
          Telephone: (512) 463-2798

               - and -

          Andrew Bowman Stephens, Esq.
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          300 W. 15th Street
          William P. Clements Building
          Austin, TX 78701
          Telephone: (512) 463-2120
          E-mail: andrew.stephens@texasattorneygeneral.gov


TICKETMASTER: Concertgoers Seek Terms of Use Click Rates
--------------------------------------------------------
The Hollywood Reporter reports that concertgoers suing Ticketmaster
and Live Nation over live event ticket fees believe no one actually
reads the terms of service that bind them to arbitration and are
asking a California federal judge for discovery that could help
them prove the websites' formats are to blame.

Olivia Van Iderstine and Mitch Oberstein in April sued Ticketmaster
and its parent Live Nation claiming the companies have a monopoly
on live events and therefore can charge "extraordinarily high fees"
for tickets.

The companies responded in June with a motion to compel
arbitration. They argue that in order to buy tickets through their
sites users have to affirmatively agree to their terms of service
at least three times - and those terms include a mandatory
arbitration provision and a waiver of class action rights.

Now, the plaintiffs are asking the court to allow them to conduct
discovery to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists
so they're prepared to oppose the motion to compel. They believe
the website and mobile app are formatted in a way that users
clicking to proceed with their purchases doesn't actually amount to
them accepting the terms.

"As they have in other cases, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
agreed to arbitration clauses that are buried in Terms of Use on
www.ticketmaster.com, www.livenation.com, and the Ticketmaster
mobile application," writes attorney Frederick Lorig. "The Terms of
Use are presented to users in a 'browsewrap'-type format that does
not affirmatively require consumers to read the Terms, or indicate
they have read them, before making a purchase."

The plaintiffs want Live Nation and Ticketmaster to turn over the
total number of times users signed into ticketmaster.com and the
Ticketmaster mobile app from January 1, 2010 to present and the
number of times users clicked to view the terms of use on the site
and in the app during the same time period. They also want
interrogatories on the subjects and depositions of the defense
witnesses who provided declarations in support of the motion to
compel.

"Plaintiffs intend to show on opposition that ticketmaster.com and
livenation.com are designed in a way to actively dissuade consumers
from knowing or understanding that the Terms of Use are something
they can or should read," writes Lorig. "If it turns out that, as
Plaintiffs suspect, the vast majority of users do not view the
Terms of Use, that would tend to show that the website and app
provide insufficient notice of the Terms of Use, and thus the
arbitration agreement contained in it." [GN]


TOMMIE COPPER: Faces Young Suit Over Blind-Inaccessible Web Site
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lawrence Young, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated v. TOMMIE COPPER, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-05292
(S.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020), is brought against the Defendant for its
failure to design, construct, maintain, and operate its Web site to
be fully accessible to and independently usable by the Plaintiff
and other blind or visually-impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its Web site,
https://www.tommiecopper.com/, and, therefore, denial of its
products and services offered thereby and in conjunction with its
physical location, is a violation of the Plaintiff's rights under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, according to the complaint.
Because the Web site is not equally accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers, the Web site violates the ADA.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who
requires screen-reading software to read Web site content using his
computer. The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that the Defendant's Web site will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Defendant operates the Tommie Copper online retail store, as
well as the Tommie Copper Web site and advertises, markets, and
operates in the State of New York and throughout the United
States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003-2461
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Fax: (212) 982-6284
          Email: nyjg@aol.com
                 danalgottlieb@aol.com


TREADWELL PARK: Restaurant Staff Sue Over Denied Overtime Pay
-------------------------------------------------------------
Abel Gonzalez Gonzalez and Olman Eliseo Velasquez Fuentes,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v. Treadwell Park LLC, 301 South LLC, CAMGT 510 Restaurant
Operating LLC, 1125 First LLC, 245 Park LLC, Abraham Merchant,
Andrew Emmet and Fernando Rodriguez, Defendants, Case No.
20-cv-04568 (S.D. N.Y., June 15, 2020), seeks to recover unpaid
minimum and overtime wages and redress for failure to provide
itemized wage statements pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 and New York Labor Law, including applicable liquidated
damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

Defendants own, operate, or control four American bars and a fast
food Mexican restaurant in New York, NY 10065 under the name
"Treadwell Park" where Plaintiffs were employed as dishwasher, food
preparer, line cook, sous chef, head chef, manager and porter. They
claim to have worked in excess of 40 hours per week, without
appropriate minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours
compensation for the hours that they worked. Treadwell failed to
maintain accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and failed to
pay them appropriately for any hours worked, either at the straight
rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Michael Faillace, Esq.
      MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
      60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
      New York, NY 10165
      Tel: (212) 317-1200
      Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
      Email: michael@faillacelaw.com


TRUMAN ROAD: Obtains Partial Summary Judgment on Claims in Z. Smith
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ZACHARY SMITH and BRIAN KAGARICE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRUMAN ROAD
DEVELOPMENT, LLC d/b/a NO OTHER PUB, THE CORDISH COMPANIES, INC.,
ENTERTAINMENT CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendants, Case No.
4:18-cv-00670-NKL (W.D. Mo.), Judge Nanette K. Laughrey of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Western
Division:

   (i) denied the Plaintiffs' motion partial summary judgment;

  (ii) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion
for
       summary judgment;

(iii) denied the Defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony;
and

  (iv) denied Plaintiff Smith's motion for class certification.

Plaintiffs Smith and Kagarice's Second Amended Class Action
Complaint against Defendants Truman Road, doing business as No
Other Pub, the Cordish Companies, Inc., and Entertainment
Consulting International, LLC ("ECI") alleges violations of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and its implementing
regulations.  

The Second Amended Complaint states that between April 25, 2014 and
April 4, 2018, the Plaintiffs and putative class members received
text messages and phone calls that they had not consented to from
the Defendants advertising No Other Pub's products and services.

Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action:


* Count I (the ATDS Claim) - violations of 47 U.S.C. Section
   227(b)(1)(A)(iii) for using an ATDS to send text messages
without
   consent;

* Count II (the Procedural Claim) - violations of 47 U.S.C.
Section
   227(c) and 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d) for sending text
messages
   without first implementing adequate procedures to prevent
   telemarketing calls or text messages to persons who request not
to
   receive calls or text messages by that entity

* Count III (the Do-Not-Call Claim) - violations of 47 U.S.C.
   Section 227(c) and 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(c)(2) for making
more
   than one telephone solicitation to a person on the NDNCR in a
12-
   month period

* Count IV (the Revocation Claim) - violations of 47 U.S.C.
Section
   227(c) and 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(d)(3) for transmitting more

   than one advertising and/or telemarketing text message and/or
   telemarketing phone call within any 12-month period after being

   requested to stop.  

Plaintiff Smith seeks to certify a class under Count I.

No Other Pub is one of a series of drinking establishments located
within the Kansas City Power & Light District, which is a retail,
entertainment, office, and residential district located in downtown
Kansas City, Missouri.  As part of its promotions, No Other Pub
offered contests, promotions, giveaways, and cocktail parties to
individuals through text messages.  No Other Pub contends these
messages were sent to its patrons who visited and voluntarily
provided their contact information in order to sign-in to a happy
hour or win one of these prizes or events.  The putative class
members' contact information was obtained when guests submitted
their information on a Paper Card or signed into a hosted happy
hour on a sign-in sheet in order to receive drink specials.  No
Other Pub claims that upon collecting contact information, its
employees manually entered the information into the bar's texting
platform Txt Live and subsequently shredded the sign-in sheets or
Paper Cards.

During the relevant time period, No Other Pub used Txt Live to send
its promotional messages, a messaging platform developed by ECI.
In order to send messages using Txt Live, a venue employee imported
contacts into the system database, either by individually typing in
the contact's information or by uploading a spreadsheet of contacts
in a comma-separated values ("CSV") file.  This step was essential,
as the platforms could not generate phone numbers independently.

The precise nature of the relationship between No Other Pub, ECI,
and Cordish Companies as well as ECI's and Cordish Companies'
involvement with the messaging campaigns are disputed.  ECI is a
consultant firm based in Maryland that provides marketing and
customer service-related support for restaurants, bars, and
nightclubs including Kansas City Power & Light venues.  It
contracted with a software development company to build Txt Live
for ECI and the venues ECI worked with, including the Kansas City
Power & Light venues.  As part of its marketing consulting, ECI
allowed Kansas City Power & Light venues access to Txt Live in
order to send text messages promoting their venues.  Although the
Defendants claim that venues reimbursed ECI for their use of Txt
Live, Id., they did not produce records of reimbursement payments
from No Other Pub to ECI or Cordish Companies.

ECI developed detailed district-wide policies for how venues
including No Other Pub should collect data and use the Txt Live
platform.  Cordish Companies is a corporation incorporated in
Maryland.  On The Cordish Companies' website www.Cordish.com, it
promotes itself as a real estate developer that owns and manages
the businesses it creates.  It also lists a number of individuals
on its website who are part of "Our Team."  

The Defendants claim, however, that the website statements are
inaccurate, and they point to a disclaimer located on the "Terms
and Conditions" page of its website, which states that "Cordish
Companies, The Cordish Companies, The Cordish Company, Cordish,
Entertainment Consulting International and ECI are trade names for
a group of corporations, limited liability companies and
partnerships" that do not actually own any of the properties
described on the website.

The Plaintiffs dispute it and, in addition to the statements
regarding ownership and management on the corporation's website,
offer evidence indicating that Cordish Companies is more than just
a passive entity and that it oversees the Kansas City Power & Light
District's operation and marketing scheme.

Pending before the Court are the Plaintiff Smith's motion for class
certification, the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment,
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Defendants'
motion to exclude expert testimony.  

Judge Laughrey holds that although the statutory interpretation is
perhaps imperfect, it is the Court's best reading of a thorny
statutory provision.  Because it is undisputed that Txt Live does
not have the capacity to randomly or sequentially generate numbers,
the Judge need not consider the parties' additional arguments
regarding human intervention or prior express consent.  The
Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count I is granted.
The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to Count I
is denied.

Next, Judge Laughrey finds that Smith had an EBR with No Other Pub
as of January 2017.  Each of the texts sent to him were within an
18-month period following the establishment of that relationship.
Therefore, the messages No Other Pub sent to Smith were not
violations of 47 C.F.R. Section 64.1200(c), because they were not
telephone solicitations as they were made to a recipient with whom
No Other Pub had an EBR.  The Judge need not address Defendants'
remaining arguments as to Smith on that Count.  The Defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smith on Count III is
granted.

The Judge also finds his sworn testimony demonstrates a dispute of
material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.  Therefore, a
dispute of fact remains as to the alleged phone calls.  If a jury
believes Kagarice that either of these phone calls took place
within one-year of the text message he received, then he may be
entitled to a relief on this claim.  Therefore, the Defendants
motion for summary judgment as to Kagarice on Count III is denied.

As to Plaintiff Kagarice, the Defendants' Section II.B describes
their argument that he has provided insufficient proof regarding
the alleged calls before and after his message exchange with No
Other Pub in April 2017.  Therefore, as for the reasons as to Count
III, the Judge finds that a dispute of fact remains as to whether
these calls occurred.  The Defendants' motion for summary judgment
as to both Plaintiffs on Count II is denied.

Because Kagarice's Count IV is redundant of his Count II, the Judge
strikes Count IV pursuant to Rule 12(f).  Although Kagarice asserts
that Count IV is distinct from Count II, Kagarice has pointed to no
authority, and the Judge is aware of none, where a Defendant has
been found liable for both a violation of 47 C.F.R. Section
64.1200(d) and an independent violation of one of the "minimum
standards" enumerated by that subsection.  The Judge need not
address the Defendants' remaining arguments on this Count.

While the evidence is not overwhelming, when viewing all facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiffs, Judge Laughrey finds that they have presented
sufficient evidence that, when characterized properly, would permit
a reasonable jury to find ECI and Cordish Companies vicariously
liable for the text messages.  Cordish Companies and ECI's motion
for summary judgment as to their vicarious liability is denied.

The Defendants have moved to exclude the expert opinion of the
Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Michael Shamos.  Dr. Shamos' expert report
reviews the functionality and operation of the Txt Live platform.
The material facts related to the core functionality of the Txt
Live platform are undisputed.  The Plaintiffs admit that the
platforms do not have the capacity to generate random or sequential
phone numbers.  Therefore, the Judge need not reach the Defendants'
Motion to Exclude the Expert Opinion of Dr. Shamos, and it is
denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/XlIQ58 from Leagle.com.


TULSA, OK: Court Enters Protective Orders in Feltz Detainees Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Jodi F. Jayne of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma entered orders on several motions for
protective orders in a class action complaint on certain policies
practices at the Tulsa County jail.

The case is RICHARD FELTZ, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
THE COUNTY OF TULSA; VIC REGALADO, Tulsa County Sheriff, in his
official capacity; TERRY H. BITTING; TAMMY BRUCE; MARTHA RUPP
CARTER; STEPHEN R. CLARK; THERESA DREILING; OWEN EVENS; JAMES W.
KEELEY; DEBORAH LUDI LEITCH; J. ANTHONY MILLER; DAWN MOODY; MILLIE
OTEY; KIRSTEN PACE; APRIL SEIBERT; CLIFFORD SMITH; SARAH SMITH, in
their capacity as Tulsa County Special Judges; and WILLIAM
MUSSEMAN, in his capacity as Tulsa County District Court Judge,
Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-298-CVE-JFJ (N.D. Okla.).

On June 6, 2018, the Plaintiff filed the class-action lawsuit
challenging the policies and practices governing pretrial detention
of arrestees detained in the Tulsa County Jail.  Named Defendants
include Tulsa County Sheriff Vic Regalado, in his official
capacity; Board of County Commissioners of County of Tulsa County;
numerous Tulsa County Special Judges; and Tulsa County District
Judge William Musseman.  On Oct. 4, 2018, Judge Musseman signed two
Administrative Orders related to pretrial detention that took
effect Oct. 15, 2018 ("AOs").  On Oct. 22, 2018, the Plaintiffs
filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") solely for the purpose of a
name correction of County.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violate: his equal
protection and due process rights by jailing them because they
cannot afford a monetary payment (count one); his right to pretrial
liberty by jailing them without procedural due process (count two);
and his right to the counsel by not providing them with the counsel
adequate to challenge their wealth-based pretrial detention (count
three).

The Named Plaintiffs are currently confined in Tulsa County jail
cells solely because they do not have enough money to purchase
their pretrial release.  They are jailed pursuant to Tulsa County's
wealth-based detention scheme, which jails people who are unable to
meet secured financial conditions of release.  No official has
conducted any inquiry into any Plaintiffs' ability to pay or made
any inquiry into or findings concerning alternative conditions of
pretrial release or the necessity of pretrial detention.  Because
they cannot access the payments the Defendants require for their
release, the presumptively innocent Plaintiffs will be detained in
the Tulsa County Jail for days, weeks, or months.

On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, the
named Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Defendants.  

After arresting a person, the Defendants require secured financial
conditions of release, almost always according to a predetermined
chart of offenses and corresponding dollar amounts.  They do not
provide any process for assessing a person's ability to pay or
determining the necessity of imposing monetary conditions of
release in any individual case.  People who are arrested and are
unable to pay preset cash deposits to secure their release must
remain in jail cells for six or more days before an arraignment,
which is the first appearance in front of a judicial officer.
Those who cannot afford private counsel are not appointed counsel
during the initial period of wealth-based detention, and no lawyer
appears with them at arraignment.  The Defendants refuse to address
conditions of release at arraignments.

The "pre-determined chart of offenses" is a secured money bail
schedule that was in place at the time of the Plaintiff's arrest.
Plaintiff alleges that County, Sheriff, and Judges maintain
policies and practices that result in these violations of the
Plaintiff's constitutional rights.  The Plaintiff seeks
certification of the following class, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2): All people who are or will be detained in
the Tulsa County Jail because they are unable to pay a secured
financial condition of release.  The Plaintiff seeks only
prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.

On March 15, 2019, the district judge ruled on a motion to dismiss
filed by Defendant Judges.  The district judge's ruling clarifies
that the putative class consists of all individuals who are
detained for any length of time solely because they cannot afford
their bond amounts, even if they are released just hours after
their arrests.  Further, he does not seek relief past the time the
class members are given counsel and an opportunity to be heard on
bail reduction motions.

Count one remains pending only against Judge Musseman, Sheriff, and
County; count two remains pending against all the Defendants; and
count three has been dismissed.  Injunctive relief remains as an
available remedy against Judge Musseman in his role as presiding
judge.  Declaratory relief is the only requested remedy against
Special Judges.

Effective Aug. 19, 2019, Tulsa County District Judges enacted a
revised version of Tulsa County District Court Local Criminal Rule
2, which relates to pretrial detention procedures.  For ease of
reference, the Court refers to policies in place at the time of the
Plaintiff's arrest in June of 2018 as the "pre-suit policies" and
the new policies, including the AOs and Rule 2, as the "post-suit
policies."  On Oct. 15, 2019, Judges moved for a settlement
conference before a magistrate judge, which was granted.

Meanwhile, discovery was ongoing. Due to various objections and
disagreements as to precise wording, the parties reached very few
factual stipulations.  The Plaintiff did not issue interrogatories
or requests for admission to any particular Defendant.  The
Plaintiff made an omnibus document request of all parties, and
document productions are ongoing.  He did not file any motions to
compel or seek rulings on objections raised in the stipulations.  

Prior to the relevant phase II deadline, the Plaintiff requested
seven depositions: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)
deposition of Sheriff, in his official capacity of administering
the Tulsa County Jail; (2) Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of County, in
its official capacity of administering a pretrial release program
authorized by state statute; (3) Judge Musseman (Defendant); (4)
Judge Moody (Defendant), (5) Judge Ludi-Leitch (Defendant); (6)
Judge Hiddle (non-party), and (7) Judge Guten (non-party).  All the
Defendants moved for protective orders that are the subject of the
Opinion and Order.

The Court stayed ruling on the pending discovery motions and struck
the remaining deadlines pending the court-ordered settlement
conference.  It found a limited stay warranted to determine whether
the parties could reach agreed prospective relief prior to engaging
in phase II discovery. The parties did not settle, and there is no
clear end date for settlement negotiations.  The Court therefore
lifted the stay and scheduled oral argument on April 3, 2020.

On April 2, 2020, Judges filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
constitutional and prudential mootness.  Essentially, the Judges
argue their voluntary conduct has mooted the controversy and that
Rule 2's procedures satisfy constitutional requirements.  The
Judges raise a factual attack on jurisdiction, attaching affidavits
of Judge Musseman and Judge Guten explaining Rule 2 and its
implementation.  The Plaintiff argues that the post-suit policies
do not render the controversy moot or cure the alleged
constitutional violations and that discovery is necessary to prove
allegations in the FAC and to address mootness.  On April 3, 2020,
the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.  Both motions remain pending.

All the Defendants seek protective orders pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)(C) and 26(c)(1).  

In the Sheriff's and the County's Motions for Protective Orders,
the Plaintiff seeks Rule 30(b)(6) testimony regarding the policies,
practices, and procedures used by Sheriff in relation to pretrial
detention of arrestees at Tulsa County Jail, and used by County in
relation to its administration of the pretrial release program,
from Jan. 1, 2015, to the present.  The Sheriff and the County make
blanket relevance objections as to all Rule 30(b)(6) topics and
argue that, if the depositions are permitted, the notices are
facially overbroad, unduly burdensome, and should be limited in
time and subject matter.

Magistrate Jayne finds that Sheriff, as policymaker for Tulsa
County Jail, possesses relevant information and must testify or
designate others to testify pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6).  First, the
Plaintiff is entitled to explore any policies and procedures
promulgated by Sheriff that relate to his office's role in pretrial
detention and/or release of arrestees, such as those attached to
the Plaintiff's response brief.  The Plaintiff asserts claims
against Sheriff, and those claims remain in the case.  Further, the
Plaintiff is entitled to discovery on Sheriff's practices regarding
day-to-day execution of relevant policies promulgated by Judges.

It is not disputed that the Plaintiff was informed of his bail
amount by a Sheriff's deputy and jailed by a Sheriff's deputy.
Sheriff has relevant information regarding his deputies' practices
in carrying out pretrial release and detention policies.  Finally,
the Sheriff maintains and possesses relevant data regarding the
number of people who are detained for inability to afford money
bail, the amount of time they have spent detained, and the timing
of their court appearances.  Accordingly, Sheriff's blanket
relevance objection is overruled.

The Plaintiff seeks to depose County regarding its administration
of the pretrial services program.  The County argues that the
Plaintiff challenges only wealth-based "detention" procedures
rather than pretrial release and that Feltz did not interact with
any County employees.  

The Judge finds that County, as administrator of the pretrial
release program, possesses relevant information and must designate
a witness to testify.  First, policies and practices related to the
pretrial release program, while not expressly challenged, are
relevant to the Plaintiff's constitutional claims.  Second,
discovery regarding the program is relevant to mootness.

With respect to the time period after Feltz's arrest, the Judge
finds that the entire period after filing of the FAC through the
present is relevant.  The Defendants contend Rule 2 moots the
controversy and satisfies constitutional requirements.  However,
Rule 2 cannot be viewed in a vacuum, as it was preceded by the two
AOs executed by Judge Musseman in October of 2018.  The Plaintiff
is entitled to discovery regarding the overall evolution of events
that allegedly moot the controversy.  It includes policies,
practices, and statistical information during the interim period
prior to Rule 2.

Next, the Judge finds that the discovery is relevant to the
Plaintiff's allegations and motion for class certification.  The
Plaintiff seeks to certify the class defined in the FAC, which
extends to people who are or will be detained in the Tulsa County
Jail because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition
of release.  Although the Defendants will dispute the class
definition and whether Feltz may adequately represent other types
of arrestees, the Judge permits the discovery.  To avoid any
potential vagueness, she deletes the phrase "including but not
limited to" and expressly limits the definition to the listed types
of pretrial detainees.

The Judge agrees with the Defendants that the instruction regarding
"governmental entity" and the definition of "employee" are overly
broad and impose an unreasonable burden on the Rule 30(b)(6)
witness in preparing.  These definitions are stricken, and the
Judge adopts the Defendants' proposal set forth at page 18 of their
reply.  To the extent the term "employees" and the names of listed
governmental entities are used in the noticed topics, they will be
given their ordinary meaning and interpreted in light of the
noticed topic.

The Judge also finds the Plaintiff's requests for information
regarding databases used by the Defendants to track information
related to pretrial detainees to be relevant and not overly
burdensome, with the limits imposed by the Court.  To avoid
overbreadth and vagueness of these topics, she strikes the phrase
"including but not limited to information relating to" and limits
the topic to electronic databases used to track the five categories
listed.

With the time limits imposed by the Court, Topics 3 and 4 would
require County to calculate various numbers for three different
periods of time: March 1, 2018 to Oct. 14, 2018; Oct. 15, 2018 to
Aug. 21, 2019, and Aug. 22, 2019 to present.  Topic 4 would require
Sheriff to calculate two numbers for those same periods of time.
The Plaintiff seeks to compare and contrast these numbers under the
pre-suit and post-suit policies.  With the time limits imposed by
the Court, the requested data is relevant and proportional to the
needs of the case.  If the Defendants are unable to prepare certain
calculations or lack data to do so, they will be prepared to
explain that during the deposition.

Turning to the Judges' Motions for Protective Orders, the Judge
finds that Judge Musseman has not identified any topics that appear
to invade the judicial deliberations privilege and has not shown
good cause for a protective order.  The Special Judges also have
not identified any topics that appear to invade the judicial
deliberations privilege and have not shown good cause for a
protective order.  Although the questions relate to their duties as
Special Judges, the questions are aimed at factual procedures that
were observable during public proceedings or on public dockets;
what policies or authority they generally follow; and any training
they received in conducting the docket.  The Judge denies the
Judges' motions for any privilege-based protective order in the
pre-deposition posture and reserves ruling on all privilege
objections.  They may assert privileges in good faith, and refuse
to answer any question under the relevant rules for any questions
deemed to cross into adjudicative or legislative deliberative
processes.

Although the Judges argue the "policies speak for themselves," the
Plaintiff makes an as-applied challenge and seeks information
regarding actual practices in carrying out the policies.
Plaintiff's counsel submitted an affidavit stating that, based on
her observations at certain times, post-suit policies were not
being implemented as written.  To avoid undue disruption to the
state judicial system, the Judge limits the depositions to three
hours each.  The Judges may assert privilege and refuse to answer
pursuant to the applicable rule.

Judges Moody and Hiddle have met their burden for a protective
order preventing an oral deposition at this time, the Court notes.
While they both have relevant and non-stale information, written
interrogatories and/or written depositions are a proportional and
reasonable "first resort" for discovery of these judicial
officers.

Finally, the Judge finds good cause for a protective order
preventing further oral or written discovery from Judge Ludi-Leitch
on grounds of lack of relevance and proportionality to the needs of
the case.  For the same reasons the Judge did not require Sheriff
and County to prepare for questions or compile statistics regarding
past practices dating back to 2015, she finds that facts possessed
by this special judge regarding how she historically conducted the
arraignment docket from 2015 to 2017 to be of only marginal
relevance and not proportional to the needs of the case.  To the
extent Judge Ludi-Leitch has weekend duty on the current bond
docket, the Judge finds her testimony cumulative to Judges Guten
and Hiddle and of minor importance to the issues at stake.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Jayne:

  (i) granted Judge Ludi-Leitch's Motion for Protective Order;

(ii) granted in part and denied in part Judges Hiddle and Guten's

      Motion for Protective Order;

(iii) granted in part and denied in part Judge Musseman's Motion
for
      Protective Order;

(iv) granted in part and denied in part Judge Moody's Motion for
      Protective Order;

  (v) granted in part and denied in part the Sheriff's Motion to
      Quash 30(b)(6) Deposition Notice and for Protective Order;
and

(vi) granted in part and denied in part the County's Motion to
Quash
      and for Protective Order.

The parties will confer regarding these rulings and attempt to
reach agreement on a new discovery deadline, a new dispositive
motion deadline, and any other deadlines the parties deem necessary
at this juncture.  The Plaintiff will submit a report to the Court
regarding these deadlines no later than one week from the date of
the Order, or later by agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Opinion &
Order is available at https://is.gd/ZvWKhK from Leagle.com.


TWC PRODUCT AND TECH: Hart Slams App Location Tracking
------------------------------------------------------
Jon Hart, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. TWC Product and Technology LLC, Defendant, Case No.
20-cv-03842 (N.D. Cal., June 11, 2020), seeks an injunction on
collection, maintenance and sharing of users' geolocation data,
awarding damages, including nominal, statutory and punitive where
applicable, costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' and
experts' fees and expenses, prejudgment and post-judgment interest
and such other further injunctive and declaratory relief for
violation of the Unfair Competition Law of California's Business &
Professions Code.

TWC Product and Technology, LLC is the internet, mobile, and cloud
based arm of the popular "The Weather Channel" television station.
Hart alleges that TWC fraudulently and deceptively induced Weather
Channel App users to grant Defendants access to their personal
geolocation data under the guise of providing better weather
information. TWC then tracked users' locations. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Nicholas W. Armstrong, Esq.
      Oscar M. Price, IV, Esq.
      PRICE ARMSTRONG LLC
      2226 1st Ave S Suite 105
      Birmingham, AL 35233
      Phone: 205.706.7517
      Fax: 205.209.9588
      Email: nick@pricearmstrong.com

             - and -

      Lucas Williams, Esq.
      WILLIAMS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
      2030 Addison Street, Suite 410
      Berkeley, CA 94704
      Phone: (510) 548-2060
      Fax: (510) 548-7080
      Email: lucas@williams-envirolaw.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Canadian Supreme Court Sides With Drivers
------------------------------------------------------------
CBC Canada reports that Canada's highest court opened the door to a
proposed $400-million class-action lawsuit against Uber after it
sided with a driver in a case over whether workers can settle
disputes with the ride-hailing company through a costly, foreign
arbitration process or through Ontario courts.

In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that
drivers can have labour issues resolved through Ontario courts,
opening up the possibility of Uber drivers being seen as employees
within the meaning of Ontario's Employment Standards Act.

Uber had challenged an Ontario Court of Appeal decision that found
the company's contract clause, which relies on a costly arbitration
process in the Netherlands to settle disputes, was "unconscionable"
and "unenforceable."

In an email statement, a spokesperson for Uber said the company
will amend its contracts to align with the court's principles.

"Going forward, dispute resolution will be more accessible to
drivers, bringing Uber Canada closer in line with other
jurisdictions," the statement said.

"We are proud to offer a flexible earning opportunity to tens of
thousands of independent drivers throughout Ontario."

The lower court ruling came after David Heller, a driver for
UberEATS, attempted to launch a class-action lawsuit in 2017 to
force the company to recognize its drivers as employees rather than
independent contractors. [GN]


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Court Allows Drivers' Class Action to Proceed
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jane Mundy, writing for LawyersandSettlements.com, reports that
Uber and Lyft are getting slammed, from California to Canada.  In
May, California sued the ride-hailing companies claiming they
misclassified their drivers as independent contractors under the
state's new labor law, Bill AB5.  North of the border, the Canadian
Supreme Court has allowed Uber drivers to forge ahead with a class
action lawsuit that will classify them as employers rather than
independent contractors.

RIDE-HAILING IN CANADA

In a ruling on June 26, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a
decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal that cleared the path for
a class action lawsuit filed by a Toronto driver for UberEats,
which delivers food from restaurants to customers at home—a
service that likely did a brisk business during the pandemic.
Plaintiff David Heller argues that Uber drivers are employees and
they are entitled to protections under Ontario's Employment
Standards Act.

According to the Canadian Press, Heller earns about $400 to $600 a
week before paying taxes and expenses.  Using his own vehicle and
working 40 to 50 hours a week, he can make approximately $21,000
and $31,000 annually.
Heller says this works out to $10 to $12 an hour, while the
minimum wage in Ontario is $14 an hour.

THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION AND UBER/LYFT DRIVERS

In another blow to Uber, the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) has ruled that "TNC (transportation network companies)
drivers are presumed to be employees and the Commission must ensure
that TNCs comply with those requirements that are applicable to the
employees of an entity subject to the Commission's jurisdiction."

"I understand that CPUC has regulatory insight over certain
utilities and public safety, such as passenger carriers like
limos," says labor and employment lawyer Michael Warren with the
McManis Faulkner law firm. Transportation network companies include
Uber, Lyft, and any companies that drive on public roadways.

"The CPUC has said it understands that AB5 is a law, that Uber
filed a lawsuit against the state of California and the initiative
has been qualified for the November ballot. So everything is in a
flux, but in the meantime we are obligated to deem drivers as
employees. And they are employees until a higher court - the
Supreme Court, appeal court or the people of California - say
otherwise."

Warren goes on. "And with employee classification comes Workers
Compensation and other benefits.  Obviously this puts more pressure
on Uber and Lyft, and they will probably determine whether they can
challenge the CPUC, and on what basis.  The goal here, I think, is
to get them to November."  (Warren is referring to the national
election day –below.)

Warren sees this ongoing battle as a "large political chess game
with high stakes".

Currently, consumers appear to approve of the status quo. "Whether
they are swayed by arguments to the contrary remains to be seen,
but there could be litigation afterwards to challenge it," adds
Warren. "Of course if the people vote "Yay" it will put Uber and
Lyft in a better legal position. Uber and Lyft are banking on a
high turnout on our national Election Day, but can they challenge
CPUC and on what basis? "

VOTE TO REPEAL AB5

Uber and Lyft are counting on winning the November initiative that
would repeal AB5.  And they are heavily investing.  Uber is not
only giving its drivers election day off, Uber Eats will be
"feeding people in line to vote," said Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi,
"The feel-good, get-out-the-vote announcement came three days after
Uber drivers paraded outside Khosrowshahi's San Francisco home,
admonishing him for throwing money at a major ballot initiative in
California to exempt Uber from the state's new AB5 law aimed at
elevating the status of gig workers," reported Politico.com.

The ballot initiative, known as the California App-Based Drivers
Regulations Initiative, is on the ballot in California as an
initiated state statute on November 3, 2020. It would consider
app-based drivers to be independent contractors and enact several
wage and labor policies that would affect app-based drivers and
companies.

This means that the ballot measure would override AB5 on the
question of whether app-based drivers are employees or independent
contractors. [GN]


ULTRA MUSIC: Faces Class Action Over Unjust Refund Policy
---------------------------------------------------------
News Lagoon reports that Ultra Music Festival, one of the first
major music events to be pushed back amid the coronavirus pandemic,
is facing a class action lawsuit on behalf of ticket holders who
claim they were denied refunds following the swift rescheduling of
the concert when the pandemic first hit the U.S. in March.

The suit, filed on July 7 at the U.S. District Court's Southern
District of Florida, alleges Ultra's refund policy is unjust and
inequitable and that its conversion from the refund "damaged
Plaintiffs and the Class in the amount that they paid for 2020
festival tickets." The suit seeks damages and monetary relief for
the plaintiffs and class, and/or refund ticket holders the cash
they paid for their tickets in full.

According to the complaint, after the city of Miami announced
Ultra's 2020 axing on March 6th, the company sent emails to ticket
holders informing them their tickets would be valid for either
Ultra Miami 2021 or 2022. It also offered special deals, ticket
packages and merchandise discounts to customers, but the company
made no mention of cash refunds to ticket holders. Ticket buyers
were originally given 30 days to choose which Ultra Miami date they
wanted to attend, but the suit alleges the company had repeatedly
extended the decision deadline because ticket buyers were reluctant
to take the deal.

Ultra Music Festival was one of the first major music events to get
pushed as the coronavirus pandemic came to head in the U.S.,
followed quickly by major festivals such as South by Southwest and
Coachella. Since Ultra's announcement, much of the live music
industry has also stopped, and artists have turned to livestreams
from their homes.

According to the refund policy in its terms and conditions, Ultra
reserves the right to issue a full or partial refund or not issue
one at all, and further specifies that if an event is cancelled for
reasons out of Ultra's control, such as government action, the
company can, at its own discretion "issue purchaser full or partial
refund," postpone the event for a future date and/or offer
purchaser a comparable "make good."

The lawsuit, however, calls such a provision an "unenforceable
unilateral option contract." Ultra's terms and conditions also
states that if the company reschedules an event, customers wouldn't
be entitled to a refund. Ultra referred to the year-long bump as a
rescheduling, but the lawsuit argues that such a move is
effectively a cancellation.

The suit also called Ultra's mention in its terms and conditions to
"modify, add, remove, supplement, amend, update or revise any of
[the] terms and conditions, without advanced notification . . .
'illusory and void in their entirety'" because the company didn't
indicate any limitations on that provision.

The suit identifies two plaintiffs. Miami resident Samuel Hernandez
bought six tickets for $3,000 and according to the suit, he
inquired about a refund and was directed to the email instructions
before claiming the deferral benefit on two of his tickets on May
20th, but not on the other four. Richard Montoure of Grayland,
Washington also inquired about a cash refund but claimed he never
received a response from Ultra. He later received an email
prompting him of the April 9th deadline to redeem the benefit. He
did so on April 7th to avoid losing the value of his tickets before
getting email announcements of repeated deadline extensions, the
lawsuit states. Per the complaint, neither plaintiff received a
refund.

"We understand that the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted every part
of the global economy but we do not believe that gives the Ultra
Music Festival the right to shift the burden of this extraordinary
crisis onto its customers, who, in some cases, paid hundreds of
dollars to attend this festival and now the COVID-19 pandemic has
or will preclude them from ever using any credit," Joe Sauder of
Sauder Schelkopf LLC, which is representing the plaintiffs in the
case, said in a statement to Rolling Stone. "We look forward to
seeking to recover cash refunds for our clients and the class
members."

Ultra Music Festival did not immediately respond to a request for
comment. [GN]


UNITED STATES: Court Narrows Claims in Vita Nouva Suit
------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VITA NUOVA, INC., Plaintiff, v. ALEX M. AZAR II, in
his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-00532-O (N.D. Tex.),
Judge Reed O'Connon of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, granted in part and denied
in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint.

At the heart of the case is 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-6 -- originally
Section 1008 of Title X of the Public Health Service Act -- the
provision prohibiting Title X recipients from using abortion as a
method of family planning.  Since Title X's genesis, the Department
of Health and Human Services ("HHS")'s interpretations of Section
1008 have resembled a pendulum -- oscillating from one stance to
another.  

HHS' current stance supports Plaintiff Vita Nuova's position.  In
other words, Vita Nuova and HHS agree on the proper interpretation
of Section 1008 -- that the language of Title X does not allow for
abortion referrals or abortion counseling.  However, Vita Nuova
brings tes action, inter alia, for a declaratory judgment in fear
of a recrudescence toward a former interpretive stance -- one that
would penalize Title X recipients for not providing abortion
referrals or counseling.

The facts of the case create a labyrinthine setting to navigate;
HHS' history of fluctuating interpretations of Section 1008
provides a backdrop that lends credence to Vita Nuova's worries.
But worries -- without more -- are not sufficient to overcome
Article III standing requirements.  Even so, one of Vita Nuova's
three claims manages to reach beyond the maze's periphery.

Vita Nuova is a Christian, pro-life organization that wishes to
participate in the federal government's Title X program.  As such,
Vita Nuova refuses to provide abortion referrals or abortion
counseling.  It intends to apply for Title X funds at the next
available opportunity in November 2020; the next round of grants is
scheduled to be awarded in the Spring of 2021.  Vita Nuova contends
that the ongoing lawsuits against the 2019 Rule raise the prospect
that a court will vacate the 2019 Rule or resurrect the nationwide
injunctions against its enforcement.  Additionally, it avers that
the 2019 Rule is certain to be revoked if a Democratic
administration takes office in January 2021.

Several potential donors have told Vita Nuova that they are
unwilling to contribute funds unless Vita Nuova receives assurance
that it will remain eligible to participate in Title X, regardless
of what happens in the ongoing litigation over the 2019 Rule or the
outcome of the next presidential election.  Due to this, Vita Nova
argues that it is suffering present-day injury because these
uncertainties are hindering its ability to raise funds and recruit
employees.  Further, Vita Nuova asserts that there is a substantial
risk that it will be disqualified from participating in Title X in
the future due to the uncertainties.  Vita Nuova thus requests that
the Court declares the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")
and federal conscience-protection laws -- including the Church
Amendments, the Coats-Snowe Amendment, and the Weldon Amendment, --
prohibit the Government from excluding Vita Nuova from the Title X
program on account of its unwillingness to provide abortion
referrals or abortion counseling.

In addition to Section 1008, Vita Nuova highlights two additional
obstacles to participating in the Title X program: (1) 45 C.F.R.
Section 75.300(d); and (2) 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-7(c)(1)-(2).  Its
second claim focuses on 45 C.F.R. Section 75.300(d) -- issued by
HHS as part of a final rule that took effect on Jan. 11, 2017.
That final rule reads that in accordance with the Supreme Court
decisions in United States v. Windsor and in Obergefell v. Hodges,
all recipients must treat as valid the marriages of same-sex
couples. Vita Nuova is unwilling to recognize same-sex marriage on
account of its Christian beliefs, and it will not accept Title X
funds if it is compelled to recognize same-sex marriage as a
condition of participating in the Title X program.

To that end, Vita Nuova requests the Court: (1) declares that 45
C.F.R. Section 75.300(d) violates RFRA and is not authorized by any
congressional enactment; (2) holds unlawful and set aside 45 C.F.R.
Section 75.300(d) under Section 706 of the APA; (3) permanently
enjoins the Secretary of HHS, along with his officers, agents,
servants, employees, attorneys, designees, subordinates, and
successors, as well as any person acting in concert or
participation with them; (4) permanently enjoins the Secretary and
all relevant persons from requiring any private citizen or entity
to recognize same-sex marriage as a condition of receiving federal
funds, until Congress enacts legislation that authorizes the
Secretary to impose such a requirement; and (5) permanently enjoin
the Secretary and all relevant persons from requiring any private
citizen or entity that opposes same-sex marriage for sincere
religious reasons to recognize same-sex marriage as a condition of
receiving federal funds, until Congress enacts legislation that
authorizes the Secretary of HHS to impose such a requirement and
that exempts the Secretary of HHS from the requirements of RFRA.

Vita Nuova's third claim is a class-action RFRA challenge to 42
U.S.C. Section 300a-7(c), a provision in the Church Amendments. The
statute forbids Title X recipients to discriminate in the
employment, promotion, or termination of employment of any
physician or other health care professional" who performs or
assists in elective abortions.  Vita Nuova contends that 42 U.S.C.
Section 300a-7(c) substantially burdens its exercise of religion
because it prevents Vita Nuova from participating in the Title X
program unless it allows it employees to perform or assist in
elective abortions.  As such, it submits that enforcement of 42
U.S.C. Section 300a-7(c) also hinders its efforts to raise funds
and build a network of potential providers. Id.

To that end, Vita Nuova requests that the Court: (1) certifies a
class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) that includes
every present and future entity in the United States that: (i)
opposes abortion for sincere religious reasons; and (ii) is
receiving or intends to apply for a grant, contract, loan, or loan
guarantee under the Public Health Service Act, Community Mental
Health Centers Act, Developmental Disabilities Services and
Facilities Construction Act, or a grant or contract for biomedical
or behavioral services under any program administered by the
Secretary; (2) declares that 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-7(c)(1) and
(c)(2)'s requirements conflict with RFRA, but only as applied to
entities that oppose abortion for sincere religious reasons, and
only to the extent that they prohibit such entities from
discriminating against physicians and health-care personnel that
performed or assisted in the performance of abortions; and (3)
permanently enjoins the Secretary and all relevant persons from
enforcing 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-7(c)(1) and (c)(2) against
entities that oppose abortion for sincere religious reasons, to the
extent those provisions forbid discrimination against physicians
and health-care personnel that performed or assisted in the
performance of abortions.

The Defendants argue that all claims must be dismissed.  On the
first claim -- relating to the 2019 Rule and Title X -- the
Defendants contend that Vita Nuova is not injured because Vita
Nuova does not object to the 2019 Rule and the result of the
ongoing lawsuits will not affect Vita Nuova's ability to
participate in the Title X program.  As to the second claim --
relating to 45 C.F.R. Section 75.300(d) -- they argue that the
claim is moot because HHS issued a "Notice of Non-Enforcement"
informing the public that Section 75.300(d) would not be enforced.
Finally, as to the third claim -- relating to 42 U.S.C. Section
300a-7(c) -- the Defendants argue that Vita Nuova fails to allege
any concrete and imminent injury sufficient to confer Article III
standing.

Based on the Defendants' brief in support of their Motion to
Dismiss, there are two relevant issues: (1) whether HHS'
long-standing policy of exempting religious entities from
abortion-counseling and abortion-referral requirements defeats
standing; and (2) whether Vita Nuova's injury is too conjectural or
speculative.

Vita Nuova has acknowledged that it can no longer pursue its
now-abandoned APA claims against the rule requiring that Title X
projects must provide counseling and referrals for abortion upon
request in light of the Ninth Circuit's announcement, because a
court cannot set aside an agency rule that has been repealed by
subsequent legislation.  As a result, the Court's focus is solely
on whether Vita Nuova has standing for declaratory relief in light
of the 2019 Rule.

Judge O'Connon finds that because non-enforcement is irrelevant if
the law is valid for future administrations' enforcement against
Vita Nuova, HHS' long-standing policy of exempting religious
entities from abortion-counseling and abortion-referral
requirements does not defeat standing.  The Supreme Court
recognized that having a valid law on the books renders
non-enforcement ineffectual for the purpose of concluding that a
party does not have Article III standing.  This argument is
inapposite for the 2019 Rule, as the 2019 Rule does not harm Vita
Nuova, and the 2000 Rule is now defunct.

The Judge finds that because layers of hypothetical events must
come to fruition before Vita Nuova could suffer a concrete harm,
its alleged injuries are conjectural and speculative.  Vita Nuova's
claim of future injury presents a couple layers of conjecture.
First, for Vita Nuova to show injury, a different administration
must take office in January 2021.  Second, that administration must
revoke the 2019 Rule and return it to some form of the 2000 Rule
stating a requirement of abortion referrals or counseling to remain
in the Title X program.  Vita Nuova's claim of future injury and
present injury cannot survive the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

The Defendants make additional arguments toward Vita Nuova's second
claim; in addition to the contentions that the claim is speculative
and moot because of non-enforcement, the Defendants argue that Vita
Nuova has not alleged any actual injury from Section 75.300(d), has
never applied for Title X funds, and does not plead facts
demonstrating that it would be a qualified applicant or
subrecipient for Title X funds.  This previously untried argument
fails.  Because there exists little to no credible threat of
enforcement related to 45 C.F.R. Section 75.300(d), Vita Nuova's
second claim cannot survive the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Finally, the Defendants argue that third claim must be dismissed
because the Plaintiff fails to allege any concrete and imminent
injury sufficient to confer Article III standing.  The set of
arguments presents a parallel to the arguments submitted on present
and future injury over Section 1008—albeit with different facts.
By the same token, the relevant questions are: (1) whether the
future injury is certainly impending; and (2) whether the present
injury meets Article III standing on its own.  Vita Nuova prevails
on the latter.  As a result, Vita Nuova's present injury --
traceable to 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-7 -- can be redressed by its
proposed relief, and the claim survives the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.

Based on the reasoning above, Judge O'Connon granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Vita Nuova's first and second
claims, and denied as to Vita Nuova's third claim.  Accordingly,
Vita Nuova's first and second claims are dismissed because they do
not meet Article III standing requirements, but Vita Nuova's third
claim -- against 42 U.S.C. Section 300a-7(c)(1)-(2) of the Church
Amendments -- may proceed.

A full-text copy of the District Court's May 1, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://is.gd/f6XJLD from
Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Wolf Appeals Rulings in Velesaca Suit to 2nd Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants-Respondents Chad F. Wolf, et al., filed an appeal from
the District Court's Order dated March 31, 2020, Opinion and Order
dated May 4, 2020, and Order dated May 15, 2020 and July 6, 2020,
entered in the lawsuit entitled Velesaca v. Wolf, Case No.
20-cv-1803, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York (New York City).

Chad F. Wolf is sued in his official capacity as Acting Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the case is
assigned to the Hon. Judge John G. Koeltl.

The lawsuit alleges violation of the Immigration & Nationality
Act.

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a federal law
enforcement agency under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
The United States Department of Homeland Security is a cabinet
department of the U.S. federal government with responsibilities in
public security, roughly comparable to the interior or home
ministries of other countries.[BN]

Plaintiff-Petitioner-Appellee Jose L. Velesaca, on behalf of
himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          Christopher Thomas Dunn, Esq.
          NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
          125 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 607-3317
          E-mail: cdunn@nyclu.org

Defendants-Petitioners-Appellees Abraham Carlo Uzategui Navarro, on
behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated;
Chad F. Wolf, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Thomas R. Decker, in his
official capacity as New York Field Office Director for U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Matthew Albence, in his
official capacity as the Acting Director for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; United States Department of Homeland Security; and
Carl E. Dubois, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Orange
County, are represented by:

          Robert Hodgson, Esq.
          NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
          125 Broad Street
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (212) 607-3317

               - and -

          Benjamin H. Torrance, Esq.
          Assistant U.S. Attorney
          UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE SOUTHERN
          DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
          86 Chambers Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 637-2703
          Facsimile: (212) 637-2702
          E-mail: benjamin.torrance@usdoj.gov


VARSITY BRANDS: Suit Alleges Monopoly in Cheerleaders Apparel
-------------------------------------------------------------
STARS AND STRIPES GYMNASTICS ACADEMY INC. D/B/A STARS AND STRIPES
KIDS ACTIVITY CENTER, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VARSITY BRANDS, LLC; VARSITY
SPIRIT, LLC; VARSITY SPIRIT FASHION & SUPPLIES, LLC; and U.S. ALL
STAR FEDERATION, INC., Defendants, Case 2:20-cv-03277 (E.D. Pa.,
July 2, 2020) alleges violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

Over the past 15 years, Varsity has, in combination with US All
Star, acquired, enhanced, and maintained monopoly power in the
All-Star Competition Market (the "primary market") and the All-Star
Apparel Market (the "ancillary market") in the United States
through an unlawful scheme consisting of exploiting its substantial
market power in the Relevant Markets.

During the Class Period, Varsity collectively controlled
approximately 90% of the All-Star Competition Market and 80% of the
All-Star Apparel Market. Varsity has used its dominant market power
in the Relevant Markets to substantially foreclose competition in
both markets and thereby maintain and enhance its dominance in both
markets. In so doing, Varsity's Exclusionary Scheme has led to
reduced output, supracompetitive prices, and reduced choice in both
Relevant Markets. During the period relevant to this case, for
instance, the number and variety of All-Star Competitions have
fallen, the number of rivals in both Relevant Markets has dropped,
and prices in both markets have risen.

Varsity has used its control of the primary All-Star Competition
Market to acquire, enhance, and maintain monopoly power in the
ancillary All-Star Apparel Market by impairing and/or excluding
actual and potential All-Star Apparel rivals through the
Exclusionary Scheme alleged herein. The All-Cheer Competitions are,
in part, market-dominant trade shows, and Varsity forbids or
severely restricts its All-Star Apparel rivals from displaying
wares in those events' "showrooms." Moreover, Varsity rewards
All-Star Gyms that purchase Varsity's All-Star Apparel for their
All-Star Cheerleaders to use in Varsity's market-dominant All-Star
Competitions, with extra points awarded at All-Star Competitions.
Given that Varsity's competitions are the dominant events and
comprise the majority of an All-Star Team's schedule, and that it
would be prohibitively expensive for most participants to purchase
multiple competition uniforms for a season, Varsity's exclusion of
competing sellers of All-Star Apparel has a powerful exclusionary
effect. Varsity's conduct blocks rivals from both a key marketing
channel which comprises the main, if not only reason, All-Star Gyms
buy All-Star Apparel in the first place—for use at All-Star
Competitions.

Varsity Brands, LLC provides cheer-leading and dance team products
and services. The Company sells uniforms, equipment, and footwear
as well as offers events, competitions, and instruction at camps
and clinics. Varsity Brands serves customers in the State of
Tennessee. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberta D. Liebenberg, Esq.
          Jeffrey S. Istvan, Esq.
          Mary L. Russell, Esq.
          FINE KAPLAN AND BLACK, R.P.C
          One South Broad St., 23rd Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19107
          Telephone: (215) 567-6565
          E-mail: rliebenberg@finekaplan.com
                  jistvan@finekaplan.com
                  mrussell@finekaplan.com


VITA-MIX CORP: Faces Tenzer-Fuchs ADA Class Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vita-Mix Corporation.
The case is styled as Michelle Tenzer-Fuchs, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Vita-Mix Corporation, Case No.
1:20-cv-03077 (E.D.N.Y., July 9, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Vitamix, privately owned and operated by the Barnard family since
1921, manufactures blenders for consumers and for the restaurant
and hospitality industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shalom, Esq.
          SHALOM LAW, PLLC
          124-04 Metropolitan Avenue
          Kew Gardens, NY 11374
          Phone: (718) 971-9474
          Email: jshalom@jonathanshalomlaw.com


WASTE CONNECTIONS: Can't Compel Replies in Ictech-Bendeck Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, ELIAS JORGE "GEORGE" ICTECH-BENDECK, Plaintiff, v.
WASTE CONNECTIONS BAYOU, INC., ET AL., Defendants FREDERICK
ADDISON, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. LOUISIANA REGIONAL LANDFILL
COMPANY, ET AL., SECTION: "E" (5). Defendants, Case Civil Action
Nos. 18-7889 c/w 18-8071, 18-8218, 18-9312, 19-11133, c/w 19-14512,
Applies to: 18-7889; 18-8071; 18-8218; 18-9312 (E.D. La.), Judge
Susie Morgan of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana denied the Defendants' motion to compel the production of
questionnaire responses in the possession of the Plaintiffs'
attorneys filed in actions 18-7889; 18-8071; 18-8218; 18-9312.

Case number 18-7889 was removed to the Lousiana District Court on
Aug. 17, 2018.  The other class action cases were removed to the
Louisiana Court on Aug. 23, 2018, Aug. 29, 2018, and Oct. 5, 2018.
The Plaintiffs in each class action filed motions to remand.  On
March 14, 2019, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motions to remand
these class action suits, which had not yet been consolidated, and
permitted the suits to continue in federal court.  After the
motions to remand were denied, the Court and the parties started
the process of determining how discovery would proceed.  Initially,
in a letter dated March 25, 2019, the Defendants in the class
actions proposed proceeding with discovery on all issues in the
class actions simultaneously, with a focus on discovery related to
class certification.

The class actions were consolidated on April 5, 2019.  Discovery
discussions were quickly put on hold when, on April 24, 2019, the
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated class
actions.  The related mass actions, Addison v. Louisiana Regional
Landfill Co.10 and Fleming v. Louisiana Regional Landfill Co., had
not yet been removed.  On June 10, 2019, while the motion to
dismiss the consolidated class actions was pending, one related
mass action, Addison, was removed to federal court.  On Aug. 29,
2019, the Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
consolidated class actions.

After the consolidated class actions were permitted to continue in
federal court, discussions about discovery resumed.  Now, however,
because the related Addison mass action had joined the fray,
discovery could not focus only on class certification issues but
also had to focus on the related mass action.  That changed the
nature of discussions.  The Defendants proposed the Court enter a
"Lone Pine" case management order that permitted discovery on both
general and specific causation.  Such orders usually require a
plaintiff to set forth evidence of causation early in a tort case
and are used to weed out frivolous claims and assist in the
management of complex issues in mass tort litigation.  The
Defendants submitted a proposed Lone Pine case management order.

At a status conference on Sept. 10, 2019, the parties in both the
consolidated class actions and the related Addison mass action
agreed to pursue discovery on general causation before pursuing
discovery on specific causation, presumably because general
causation might be determinative in the matter and thereby obviate
the need to engage in any further discovery in these actions.  At
that same status conference, the parties also began working out a
protocol for an inspection of the landfill and for producing
electronically stored information.  In letters to the Court dated
Sept. 27, 2019, the parties set out the information they believed
they needed during the "general causation phase" of discovery.

After discussion with the parties, on Nov. 5, 2019, the Court
entered a First Case Management Order applicable to the
consolidated class actions, and the related Addison mass action,
that laid out a plan for the parties to engage first in discovery
on issues pertaining to general causation.  The First Case
Management Order provided for additional time for the Parties to
agree upon a schedule and sequence to complete discovery on
remaining issues.  The parties were directed not to propound
additional discovery to the Plaintiffs or the Defendants between
now and Jan. 15, 2021 without leave of Court.

Shortly thereafter, on Dec. 12, 2019, the Court entered an Order
governing the Plaintiffs' production of "fact sheets."  The Order
set out the form of the fact sheets to be completed and set out the
dates by which the named Plaintiffs in the consolidated class
actions and all plaintiffs in the related Addison mass action must
submit them to Defendants.  Section 3.a of the fact sheet Order set
forth the first deadline by stating, 200 Plaintiffs from the
Addison action and all of the named Ictech-Bendeck Plaintiffs shall
submit their completed forms by April 1, 2020.  Section 6 of the
Order allowed the parties to file motions to compel only with
respect to the Plaintiffs' fact sheets and medical authorizations.

The First Case Management Order required the Plaintiffs to produce,
by Dec. 5, 2019, certain categories of documents in their counsel's
possession relating to general causation.  According to the
Defendants, the Plaintiffs in the consolidated class actions failed
to meet this obligation by withholding responses to questionnaires
titled "Jefferson Parish Landfill Data Sheet" that were
distributed, beginning in 2018, by the Plaintiffs' counsel to
residents of Jefferson Parish.  The questionnaires asked the
residents if they noticed any odors from the Jefferson Parish
Landfill at their home, and, if so, asked the residents to describe
any odors from the Jefferson Parish Landfill at their home.  It
also asked how those odors affected their ability to use and/or
enjoy their home.

Soon after the Dec. 5, 2019, deadline for the Plaintiffs' counsel
to produce certain documents related to general causation in the
counsels' possession, the Defendants demanded that the Plaintiffs
produce the questionnaire responses.  On Jan. 2, 2020, the
Plaintiffs' counsel responded by asserting the questionnaire
responses are privileged and only provide information about odors
from the Jefferson Parish Landfill.  They produced a privilege log
on Feb. 3, 2020.  The Defendants objected to the Plaintiffs' claim
of privilege and demanded they produce an engagement letter from
each respondent to the questionnaire. After the Plaintiffs failed
to comply, the Defendants notified them that, unless they produced
the responses, the Defendants planned to seek relief in court.  The
Plaintiffs did not respond.

On March 17, 2020, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
compel.  The motion seeks to compel the Plaintiffs to produce the
completed data sheets under the Case Management Order.  The
documents Defendants are seeking, however, clearly are not the
"Plaintiff Data Sheets" contemplated in the First Case Management
Order and in the subsequent Order governing Plaintiff fact sheets.

On April 7, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion
to compel.  In their opposition, the Plaintiffs argue the
questionnaire responses are protected by attorney-client privilege
and the discovery request is premature because the First Case
Management Order prioritizes discovery on general causation for a
Daubert hearing now scheduled on June 11, 2021 by virtue of the
Second Case Management Order.  The Plaintiffs argue the responses
relate only to specific causation because they deal with the
particular harms each resident may have suffered.

On April 15, 2020, the Defendants filed a reply in support of their
motion to compel, and it is only in their reply that they address
the issue of whether the questionnaire responses relate to general
causation.  They attempt to shoehorn the questionnaire responses
into discovery on general causation by asserting they should have
been produced pursuant to section B.6.b of the First Case
Management Order.  They assert the responses should have been
produced under this section of the First Case Management Order
because the responses may shed light on whether "other sources" of
odor contributed to the harm Plaintiffs' allegedly suffered.

After considering the intentions of the parties as consistently
expressed in their communications with the Court, Judge Morgan
finds the Defendants' arguments unpersuasive.  Section B.6.b of the
First Case Management order was intended to require the production
of information from third parties relating to their knowledge of
"emissions or impacts to air quality" from the Jefferson Parish
Landfill.  Section B.6.b was not intended to require the Plaintiffs
to produce documents received from them or any putative class
members themselves.

The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs are not required to produce the
questionnaire responses, at least not at this time.  Discovery
issues pertaining to specific causation, including the production
of the questionnaire responses, will be handled at a later point in
the proceedings.  Pursuant to the Second Case Management Order, on
March 8, 2021, the Parties shall submit a joint letter concerning a
proposed case management schedule to resolve all remaining issues
in the respective cases.  The Court will discuss remaining
discovery issues at the March 15, 2021, status conference.

In the Dec. 11, 2019, Order, the Court ordered the parties not to
propound additional discovery between that date and the 2021 status
conference without leave of Court.  The Defendants did not request
leave of court to propound additional discovery on specific
causation, even though such leave would be required for the request
for the production of the questionnaire responses at issue.  Under
the Court's Order of Dec. 12, 2019, at this point, motions to
compel may only be filed with respect the Plaintiffs' data sheets
and medical authorizations.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Morgan denied the Defendants'
motion to compel.

A full-text copy of the District Court's April 28, 2020 Order &
Reasons is available at https://is.gd/nsrbXP from Leagle.com.


WELLS FARGO: Easton FLSA Suit Moved From N.D. to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------------
The class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPHINE EASTON, an
individual, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; WELLS FARGO BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case No.
4:20-cv-02193, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California (Los Angeles) on July 8, 2020.

The Central District of California Court Clerk assigned Case No.
2:20-cv-06070-AB-RAO to the proceeding. The case is assigned to the
Hon. Judge Andre Birotte Jr.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay wages,
failed to pay regular and minimum wages; failed to pay overtime
compensation; and failed to provide rest and meal periods or
compensation in lieu thereof in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company
headquartered in San Francisco, California, with central offices
throughout the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard E. Quintilone II, Esq.
          Alejandro Quinones, Esq.
          Brianna NM. McCovey, Esq.
          QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES
          22974 El Toro Road, Suite 100
          Lake Forest, CA 92630
          Telephone: (949) 458-9675
          Facsimile: (949) 458-9679
          E-mail : REQ@QUINTLAW.COM
                   AXQ@UINTLAW.COM
                   BMM@QUINTLAW.COM

               - and -

          Roger R. Carter, Esq.
          Bianca A. Sofonio, Esq.
          THE CARTER LAW FIRM
          23 Corporate Plaza, suite 150
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 245-7500
          E-mail: ROGER@CARTERLAWFIRM.NET
                  BIANCA@CARTERLAWFIRM.NET

               - and -

          Marc H. Phelps, Esq.
          THE PHELPS LAW GROUP
          23 Corporate Plaza, Suite 150
          Newport Beach, CA 92660
          Telephone: (949) 629-2533
          Facsimile: (949) 629-2501
          E-mail: MARC@PHELPSLAWGROUP.COM


WHITEHOUSE ESTATES: Appeals Ruling in Casey Suit to N.Y. Sup. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendants Whitehouse Estates, Inc., et al., filed an appeal from a
court decision and order in the matter styled KATHRYN CASEY, LAURIE
CAGNASSOLA, GERALD COHEN, BETTY FURR, FRANCESCA GAGLIANO, CAROLYN
KLEIN, JOSEPH MORGAN, RICHARD ROSE, JESSICA SAKS, and KIRK SWANSON,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, and PAMELA RENNA, VITINA DEGRBZIA aka VITINA LUPPINO,
Intervenors-Plaintiffs v. WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, INC., KOEPPEL &
KOEPPEL, INC., DUELL 5 MANAGEMENT LLC d/b/a DUELL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS, WILLIAM W. KOEPPEL and EASTGATE WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 111723/2011, in the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, County of New York.

The lawsuit is a putative class action brought by tenants of 350
East 52nd Street a/k/a 939 First Avenue in Manhattan. The
Defendants are the owner/landlord of the building, which contains
approximately 137 apartments.

Plaintiffs Kathryn Casey, Laurie Cagnassola, Gerald Cohen, Betty
Furr, Francesa Gagliano, Carolyn Klein, Joseph Morgan, Richard
Rose, Jessica Saks, and Kirk Swanson are tenants, who moved into
the apartment building between 2002 and 2011.

The Plaintiffs allege that their landlord illegally charged them
market rate rents for their apartments. They allege that, as J-51
recipients, the Defendants were required to keep the apartments
rent stabilized pursuant to the Court of Appeals decision in
Roberts v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., 13 NY3d 270 (2009).
Plaintiffs are suing under the RSL for reimbursement of the excess
rent amounts they allegedly paid defendants while defendants were
participating in the J-51 tax benefit program. The complaint
alleges that approximately 72 apartments have been improperly
deregulated.

The appellate case is captioned as KATHRYN CASEY, LAURIE
CAGNASSOLA, GERALD COHEN, BETTY FURR, FRANCESCA GAGLIANO, CAROLYN
KLEIN, JOSEPH MORGAN, RICHARD ROSE, JESSICA SAKS, and KIRK SWANSON,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, and PAMELA RENNA, VITINA DEGRBZIA aka VITINA LUPPINO,
Intervenors-Plaintiffs v. WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, INC., KOEPPEL &
KOEPPEL, INC., DUELL 5 MANAGEMENT LLC d/b/a DUELL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS, WILLIAM W. KOEPPEL and EASTGATE WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2020-03001, in the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, Appellate Division: First Judicial Department.[BN]

Defendants-Appellants WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, INC., KOEPPEL & KOEPPEL,
INC., DUELL 5 MANAGEMENT LLC d/b/a DUELL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,
WILLIAM W. KOEPPEL and EASTGATE WHITEHOUSE ESTATES, LLC, are
represented by:

          Anthony J. Genovesi, Jr., Esq.
          Brian T. McCarthy, Esq.
          Christopher J. Alvarado, Esq.
          ABRAMS, FENSTERMAN, FENSTERMAN, EISMAN, FORMATO,
          FERRARA & WOLF, LLP
          630 Third Avenue, Fifth Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 279-9200
          E-mail: agenovesi@abramslaw.com
                  bmccarthy@abramslaw.com


WILLIS TOWERS: Halper Sadeh Reminds of Shareholder Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Halper Sadeh LLP, a global investor rights law firm, reminds
investors of the shareholder class action lawsuit against Willis
Towers Watson Public Limited Company (NASDAQ: WLTW) in connection
with the proposed merger between Willis Towers and Aon plc. The
lawsuit seeks damages and/or equitable relief on behalf of Willis
Towers shareholders under the federal securities laws.

If you are a Willis Towers shareholder and would like to join the
action or discuss your legal rights and options, please visit
Willis Towers Class Action or contact Daniel Sadeh or Zachary
Halper, free of charge, at (212) 763-0060 or [email protected] or
[email protected].

The lawsuit alleges that Defendants issued a materially misleading
proxy statement recommending that Willis Towers shareholders vote
in favor of the proposed merger between Willis Towers and Aon.
According to the complaint, the proxy statement contains materially
incomplete and misleading information concerning, among other
things, Willis Towers', Aon's, and the combined company's financial
projections and the analyses performed by Willis Towers' financial
advisor.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than August 3, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. If you would like to join the action or discuss your
legal rights and options, please visit
https://halpersadeh.com/actions/willis-towers-watson-public-limited-company-wltw-stock-merger-aon-plc/
or contact Daniel Sadeh or Zachary Halper, free of charge, at (212)
763-0060 or [email protected] or [email protected].

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE OR YOU MAY REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT.

Halper Sadeh LLP represents investors all over the world who have
fallen victim to securities fraud and corporate misconduct. Our
attorneys have been instrumental in implementing corporate reforms
and recovering millions of dollars on behalf of defrauded
investors.

Contact:

         Halper Sadeh LLP
         Daniel Sadeh, Esq.
         Zachary Halper, Esq.
         Tel: (212) 763-0060
         Web site: https://www.halpersadeh.com [GN]


WWE: Seeks Dismissal of Class Action on Saudi Arabia Business
-------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Lee, writing for 4111 Mania, reports that as previously
reported, WWE was hit with a class action lawsuit over the
company's business in Saudi Arabia.  Wrestlenomics Radio reports
that WWE has filed a motion to dismiss one class action lawsuit
from the City of Warren Police and Fire Retirement System.  The
motion was filed on June 26.

The Firefighters Pension System of the City of Kansas City Missouri
Trust claim that they lost $121 million due to the decrease in WWE
stock price.  They say investors were misled about the relationship
with Saudi Arabia, including talks of a TV deal in the MENA region.
It also included rumors of the tension between Vince McMahon and
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman Al Saud, where it was
claimed that McMahon cut the Saudi feed of Crown Jewel 2019 over
money and wrestlers were "held hostage" after it was over.

WWE wrote in the motion: "The only sources cited in the CAC are two
confidential witnesses (neither of whom interacted with the
Individual Defendants, participated in negotiations over the MENA
rights deal, or worked at WWE's corporate offices), declarations
provided by Defendants prior to filing the CAC, and a series of
'news reports' that consist almost exclusively of unsupported
content cherry-picked from wrestling websites founded on multiple
layers of hearsay and unverified statements from Twitter. The
allegations are all based on 'speculation' from 'news reports,'
such as 'a wrestling-focused website' that itself is based on
statements by a 'WWE Spanish commentator' (who is not employed by
WWE and who based his own story on another unnamed party)."

The commentator mentioned is Hugo Savinovich, who first made the
claims.

The statement continues: "The so-called 'media reports' also
include other unidentified 'wrestling-focused websites' that cite
to 'an individual' who was supposedly 'in contact with sources in
the WWE' that stated 'the [Saudis] come up short' by a couple
million dollars every show (i.e., the three done so far)quotes in
the CAC are from the Twitter page of a self-proclaimed wrestling
journalist. Even if these websites and Twitter cites could be
deemed 'news sources,' none of these unverified, non-particularized
hearsay allegations supports that any payments breached a contract
or indicates a relationship so tattered that no deal could be done.
Finally, Plaintiff's allegation that the WWE-Saudi Arabia
relationship was strained by the activities surrounding the 2019
Crown Jewel event (i.e., the supposed "cut feed" and alleged
incidents related to travel back to the United States) are also
conclusory and do not establish any falsity or scienter. As
Plaintiff acknowledges , WWE and the charter airline company
released statements explaining the mechanical issues with the
plane. Ex. 21 (Forbes, 11/01/19).  In contrast, Plaintiff relies on
the same speculative so-called "news outlets" and Twitter accounts
described above, as well as a former wrestler (CW-2).  The CAC also
cites an article that acknowledges WWE's description of the
mechanical issues, while also citing a radio commentator who
(without any explanation or sources) offered his own contrary
opinion on his radio show and Twitter."

The motion claims that $2.4 million hasn't been paid for Crown
Jewel 2019.  This followed an amendment filed last month when a
former wrestler gave an anonymous account of the 'hostage'
incident.  The wrestler is referred to as CW-2 in the lawsuit.  He
claimed that he was told by Senior Director of Talent Relations
Mark Carrano that McMahon and Bin Salman had an argument over late
payments from Super Showdown in June 2019.  CW-2 then found out the
feed was cut and the Crown Prince was 'very mad'.

WWE said in response: "As to CW-2, most of the allegations he
raises are innocuous or completely irrelevant to issues of falsity
or scienter, such as CW-2's observation that persons boarding an
airplane 'appear[ed] to be 'in a hurry,' a flight attendant made a
colloquial statement about not taking off, CW-2's opinion that the
pilot's voice sounded "distressed," and CW-2's observation
regarding the presence of armed security at an airport. The most
specific item CW-2 provides -- the hearsay that a WWE Senior
Director of Talent Relations informed him that Defendant McMahon
cut the live feed and got into an argument with the Crown Prince as
to late payments -- is directly contradicted by Plaintiff's own
allegations and items Plaintiff relied upon. KSA made the $60
million payment before the Crown Jewel event began, as was publicly
disclosed earlier that day on the earnings call. It thus does not
make sense, logically, that this payment (even accepting the
conclusory allegation that it was 'late') would have prompted
Defendant McMahon to temporarily 'cut' and then shortly thereafter
resume a live broadcast feed." [GN]


YOUNG LIVING: Denial of Arbitration Bids in O'Shaughnessy Upheld
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JULIE O'SHAUGHNESSY, Individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YOUNG LIVING
ESSENTIAL OILS, L.C., doing business as Young Living Essential
Oils; YOUNG LIVING FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED; MARY YOUNG,
Co-conspirator; JARED TURNER, Co-conspirator; BENJAMIN RILEY,
Co-conspirator, Defendants-Appellants, Case No. 19-51169 (5th
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying Young Living Essential Oils' and the
Young Living Foundation's motions to compel arbitration.

O'Shaughnessy filed suit in federal district court against Young
Living and related parties, asserting various claims under the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act.  In 2015,
O'Shaughnessy joined Young Living after attending a party hosted by
a friend.  Julie joined the company as a member by signing an
online document titled the Young Living Member Agreement.  The
Agreement contains a "Jurisdiction and Choice of Law" clause.  It
also contains what is commonly known as a "merger clause" or
"integration clause."

The Agreement incorporates by reference two other documents: (1)
the Policies and Procedures ("P&Ps") and (2) the Compensation Plan.
O'Shaughnessy was not required to sign either of these online
documents.  The Compensation Plan is silent as to dispute
resolution.  The P&Ps, however, contain an arbitration clause.

The P&Ps do not contain any language to the effect that they
supersede or trump in the event of a conflict with another
document.

On April 12, 2019, O'Shaughnessy, individually and on behalf of all
those similarly situated, filed a class action suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas against Young
Living for damages and other relief under RICO.  She alleged that
Young Living operates an illegal pyramid scheme created under the
guise of selling essential oils for quasi-medicinal purposes.  She
argued that hundreds of thousands of putative class members just
like her, paid and lost hundreds (and in some cases thousands) of
dollars to become Young Living Essential Rewards enrollees based on
the promise of financial and physical health, through its brand of
essential oils.  

Plaintiff contended that Young Living falsely represents to its
members that joining the company will result in wealth as long as
they continue to solicit additional recruits to become members of
the company.  In reality, she asserted, Young Living has "created
nothing more than an unlawful pyramid scheme -- the cornerstone of
which is Young Living's emphasis on new member recruitment over the
sale of products.  According to O'Shaughnessy, Young Living's
activities violate RICO.

On June 11, 2019, Young Living filed two motions to compel
arbitration arguing that the arbitration provision in the P&Ps
required the parties to arbitrate their dispute.  O'Shaughnessy
responded on June 18, 2019, countering that an irreconcilable
conflict existed between the Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clause
in the Agreement and the arbitration clause in the P&Ps.  On this
basis, Plaintiff argued that there was no "meeting of the minds"
between the parties with regard to arbitration.  Plaintiff also
contended that any ambiguities in the contract should be construed
against the drafter, Young Living.

The matter was submitted to the magistrate judge who issued a
report and recommendation that the district court deny Young
Living's motions to compel on grounds that the Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law clause in the Agreement and the arbitration clause in
the P&Ps irreconcilably conflicted with each other and could not be
harmonized.  Applying Utah contract law, the magistrate judge
concluded that there could not have been a "meeting of the minds"
between the parties with respect to arbitration.  The magistrate
judge also noted that, at best, the documents drafted by Young
Living were ambiguous as to any agreement to arbitrate and the
ambiguity should be construed against the drafter.

The district court agreed and adopted the magistrate judge's report
and recommendation for the reasons stated therein.  In its order
denying Young Living's motions to compel, the district court also
dismissed as meritless Young Living's argument that a paragraph it
calls the "Arbitration Carve-Out" in the P&Ps clarifies that the
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law clause in the Agreement was only
intended to cover a sub-set of disputes not subject to arbitration,
implying that all other disputes between the parties are subject to
arbitration.

Young Living filed the interlocutory appeal requesting expedited
consideration so that the appellate proceedings would take place
prior to the class certification proceedings set for July 2020.
The district court has now stayed all proceedings pending the
resolution of the appeal.

In support of its position, Young Living directs the Court to
language in the arbitration clause that it refers to as the
"Arbitration Carve-Out."  According to Young Living, it
specifically excepts a subset of disputes from the arbitration
clause.  Young Living argues that the presence of the "carve-out"
means that the Agreement contemplates both litigation and
arbitration.  So, Young Living avers, the Court should read the
Forum Selection Clauses as only dictating the selected forum for
disputes under the Agreement that are not subject to arbitration.

The Court disagrees.  First, the Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
clause in the Agreement does not contain any limiting language
indicating that it only applies to disputes not covered by
arbitration. In fact, nowhere in the Agreement is the word
"arbitration" even mentioned.  Second, the arbitration clause in
the P&Ps remains in total conflict with the Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law provision in the Agreement and the "Arbitration Carve-Out"
does nothing to reconcile that conflict.  The arbitration clause's
exemption of certain litigatory rights from its purview does not
cure its inherent conflict with the Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
provision.  The two provisions irreconcilably conflict and for that
reason, the Court agrees that there was no "meeting of the minds"
with respect to arbitration in the case. S

Finally, citing Edwards v. Doordash, Inc., Young Living argues that
because the Agreement contains a valid and enforceable delegation
clause, the Court must compel arbitration.  In that case, the Court
explained that a court makes two determinations when deciding a
motion to enforce an arbitration agreement.  First, the court asks
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and, second,
whether the current dispute falls within the scope of a valid
agreement.  If the party seeking arbitration argues that there is a
delegation clause, the court performs the first step -- an analysis
of contract formation -- but the only question, after finding that
there is in fact a valid agreement, is whether the purported
delegation clause is in fact a delegation clause.  If there is a
delegation clause, the motion to compel arbitration should be
granted in almost all cases.  Given its determination, however,
that there is no valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties,
the Court does not reach the secondary issue of the scope of the
arbitration agreement and the effect of the delegation clause on
the analysis of that issue.

For the aforementioned reasons, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying the Appellants' motions to compel.

A full-text copy of the Fifth Circuit's April 28, 2020 Order is
available at https://is.gd/AP9bdE from Leagle.com.


YOUTUBE LLC: Scheider et al. Allege Violation of Copyright Laws
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA SCHNEIDER; and PIRATE MONITOR LTD, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. YOUTUBE, LLC;
GOOGLE LLC; and ALPHABET INC.; Defendants, Case 5:20-cv-04423 (N.D.
Cal., July 2, 2020) alleges violation of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA).

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that YouTube, the largest
video-sharing website in the world, is replete with videos
infringing on the rights of copyright holders. YouTube has
facilitated and induced this hotbed of copyright infringement
through its development and implementation of a copyright
enforcement system that protects only the most powerful copyright
owners such as major studios and record labels. The Plaintiffs and
the Class are the ordinary creators of copyrighted works. They are
denied any meaningful opportunity to prevent YouTube's public
display of works that infringe their copyrights—no matter how
many times their works have previously been pirated on the
platform. They are thus left behind by YouTube's copyright
enforcement system and instead are provided no meaningful ability
to police the extensive infringement of their copyrighted work.
These limitations are deliberate and designed to maximize
YouTube's, and its parents Google's and Alphabet's, focused but
reckless drive for user volume and advertising revenue.

The overall effect of the Defendants' inducement of copyright
infringement, manipulation of search, willful blindness, data
harvesting, and selective enforcement of copyright screening tools
is to depress the value of creators' work and destroy the free
marketplace for those works, where willing buyers and willing
sellers can transact business. Instead, the Defendants have created
an alternative and unlawful marketplace, where the advertising
revenue and  valuable data it derives from publishing those works
-- free of charge to the consumer -- bears no rational relationship
to the creator's real cost of producing those works; this
significantly injures the creators, but enormously benefits the
Defendants. The ready availability on YouTube of unauthorized
copyrighted materials and the whack-a-mole approach required for
creators to remove infringing material works disincentivize the
creation of new works and reduce the value of all works.

Youtube, LLC was founded in 2006. The company's line of business
includes providing on-line information retrieval services on a
contract or fee basis. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          George A. Zelcs, Esq.
          Randall P. Ewing, Jr., Esq.
          Ryan Z. Cortazar, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
          205 North Michigan, Suite 1950
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 641-9750
          Facsimile: (312) 641-9751
          E-mail: gzelcs@koreintillery.com
                  rewing@koreintillery.com
                  rcortazar@koreintillery.com

               - and -

          Stephen M. Tillery, Esq.
          Steven M. Berezney, Esq.
          Michael E. Klenov, Esq.
          Carol O'Keefe, Esq.
          KOREIN TILLERY, LLC
          505 North 7th Street, Suite 3600
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Telephone: (314) 241-4844
          Facsimile: (314) 241-3525
          E-mail: stillery@koreintillery.com
                  sberezney@koreintillery.com
                  mklenov@koreintillery.com
                  cokeefe@koreintillery.com

               - and -

          Joshua Irwin Schiller, Esq.
          BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
          44 Montgomery St., 41st Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Telephone: (415) 293-6800
          Facsimile: (415) 293-6899
          E-mail: jischiller@bsfllp.com

               - and -

          Philip C. Korologos, Esq.
          BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
          55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 446-2300
          Facsimile: (212) 446-2350
          E-mail: pkorologos@bsfllp.com


YOUTUBE: Maria Schneider Files Class Action Over Content ID
-----------------------------------------------------------
Music:)Ally reports that artist and composer Maria Schneider has
criticised YouTube publicly several times in the past. For example
this open letter in 2016 calling the service "a resounding
disaster" for musicians; and this piece in 2017 about the net
neutrality issue which included the claim that "they deny musicians
like me access to their Content ID blocking program". Three years
on, that latter claim is the subject of a class action lawsuit
filed against YouTube by Schneider.

The claim is that independent musicians (like Schneider) are
"denied access to Content ID and thus are relegated to vastly
inferior and time-consuming manual means of trying to police and
manage their copyrights such as scanning the entirety of YouTube
postings, searching for keywords, titles, and other potential
identifiers".

YouTube has not commented yet, although its support website says
that "YouTube only grants Content ID to copyright owners who meet
specific criteria. To be approved, they must own exclusive rights
to a substantial body of original material that is frequently
uploaded by the YouTube creator community".

A further page on that site mentions criteria including "whether
the copyright owner's content can be claimed through Content ID and
their demonstrated need". If the class action suit gathers
momentum, we may find out more about how these requirements are
applied in practice. [GN]


ZOOM VIDEO: Ahdoot & Wolfson, Cotchett Pitre to Lead Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alaina Lancaster, writing for Law.com, reports that U.S. District
Judge Lucy Koh issued specific guidelines on adding new law firms
to the litigation after pushing back on attorney billing in major
class action cases over the last couple years.

Attorneys from Ahdoot & Wolfson and Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy will
lead a privacy class action against Zoom Video Communications.
[GN]



[*] AMP CEO Wants Increased Oversight of Litigation Funders
-----------------------------------------------------------
Insurance News reports that AMP CEO Francesco De Ferrari has voiced
support for increased oversight of litigation funders, tying their
financial backing of class actions to the escalating cost of
securing professional indemnity (PI) insurance.

He told the House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Economics hearing that major reinsurers now view Australia as a
"very dangerous litigation risk", and as a result PI premiums have
shot up with potentially severe consequences for consumers.

Citing a recent study from public policy think-tank the Menzies
Research Centre, he says Australia is presently the second most
attractive jurisdiction for class action litigation, after the US.

The study found plaintiffs' share of settlements has declined,
falling from 59% in 2016 to 39% last year.

"So litigation plaintiffs are taking a much bigger share of the
settlements," Mr De Ferrari said. "That creates an escalating cost
of doing business in Australia.

"It's reflected in higher professional indemnity insurance. It's
reflected in the fact that today a number of the large reinsurers
globally consider Australia to be a very dangerous litigation
risk.

"Ultimately, that will result in a higher cost of doing business,
which will result in job losses and higher costs being passed on to
consumers."

He backs the Government's recent measures to rein in litigation
funders, requiring them to hold an Australian Financial Services
Licence from late next month.

The Government has also referred an inquiry into litigation funding
and the regulation of class actions to the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. A report will be
released by December 7.

"The whole area of litigation funding is a topic that I really
worry about," Mr De Ferrari said. "I welcome the Government's push
to get these litigation funders to have an AFSL licence because
that will require them to also act in the best interests of the
plaintiffs, which is not true, I believe, with the setup that we
have today."

But law firm Slater and Gordon has hit back at Mr De Ferrari's
comments, calling them a "kind of clumsy attack" from a financial
services giant that is at the centre of two class actions -- one of
which is led by the law firm.

"CEOs like Francesco De Ferrari are telling politicians the
solution to getting hit by class actions is to make it harder
for Australians to sue them," Head of Class Actions Ben Hardwick
said. "I would argue the solution is to stop breaking the law.

"Those of us who run class actions against financial sector giants
must be doing something right to trigger this kind of clumsy attack
from the boss of AMP." [GN]


[*] Business Interruption Insurance Class Suit Launched in Canada
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Koskie Minsky LLP and the Merchant Law Group have launched a
proposed national class action lawsuit alleging that Canadian
insurance companies have breached their contracts with business
owners by refusing to pay for business interruptions caused by the
coronavirus pandemic.

The plaintiffs further allege that the insurance industry has
conspired to deny coverage before claims are even made. Negligence
and breaches of the duty of good faith are also alleged.

"Business interruption insurance is designed for circumstances such
as the current pandemic. The insurance companies appear to be
failing small businesses when coverage is needed most," said Kirk
Baert, a partner with Koskie Minsky. [GN]





[*] Cannabis Companies Face TCPA Litigation Risks
-------------------------------------------------
David Biderman, Esq. -- DBiderman@perkinscoie.com -- Barak Cohen,
Esq. --BCohen@perkinscoie.com -- Nicola Menaldo, Esq. --
NMenaldo@perkinscoie.com -- and Tommy Tobin, Esq., of Perkins Coie
LLP, in an article for Bloomberg Law, report that over a dozen
putative class action lawsuits have appeared in federal courts
across the country alleging that cannabis businesses sent unwanted
texts or phone calls.  Perkins Coie LLP attorneys provide steps for
useful strategies to defend and mitigate the risks of Telephone
Consumer Protection Act suits.

Cannabis companies are facing a slew of class action lawsuits under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which prohibits
unwanted automated calls and text messages.

These businesses should act now to take compliance steps to reduce
their TCPA class action litigation risks.

Potential Damages Under the TCPA

The TCPA governs the use of automatic telephone dialing systems to
send unwanted phone, text, and fax messages. Signed into law in
1991, it has been interpreted in recent years to cover a broad
array of automated dialing systems, including many systems that
help businesses reach out to their customers by phone and text. For
example, some courts have held that the TCPA covers calls and texts
automatically dialed from a stored list of phone numbers and
requires prior express consent for those calls and texts.

TCPA statutory damages can be high. Companies can be liable for
$500 per unwanted text or call, and the statute further provides
courts with discretion to award treble damages of up to $1,500 for
willing and knowing violations.

Moreover, there is no cap under the TCPA for potential strict
liability recovery. Even relatively small numbers of calls, texts,
or potential claimants can result in sizeable damage awards. For
example, one unsolicited message to 1,000 recipients could result
in TCPA damages of $500,000 to $1.5 million. Sending three
unsolicited text messages to that population could triple that
exposure.

Because of the potential for high recoveries, litigants widely
invoke the TCPA for class action lawsuits. Any business reaching
out to customers by phone, text, or fax should know the rules to
avoid the risk of a costly TCPA lawsuit brought by a would-be class
of TCPA plaintiffs.

Lawsuits Targeting the Cannabis Industry

The cannabis industry is increasingly a target for private party
litigation arising under the TCPA. With the rapid growth of the
cannabis industry in recent years, emerging cannabis companies may
not appreciate their risks under the TCPA, which are increasing
because of the higher profile of the industry overall.

Over a dozen putative class action lawsuits have appeared in
federal courts across the country alleging that cannabis businesses
sent unwanted texts or phone calls. These include cases in Arizona,
California, Nevada, Michigan, and Florida.

In general, the cases allege that cannabis company defendants
texted or called customers using automated means without obtaining
prior express written consent in violation of the TCPA. The cases
seek to certify a putative class of similarly situated individuals
and to recover statutory damages of $500 to $1,500 per text message
on behalf of the plaintiff and the putative class.

While most of these TCPA cases remain in early stages of
litigation, in Derval v. Xaler, one marijuana delivery service
recently defeated class certification, meaning that the plaintiff
could only proceed on their individual claims, significantly
reducing potential litigation damages.

Because of the sizable potential damages under the TCPA, these
cases, like other cases under the statute, can result in sizeable
settlement offers.

How Can Cannabis Companies Mitigate TCPA Risks?

The cannabis industry seems poised to weather further TCPA suits.
Companies should also take proactive steps to mitigate the risks
posed by the TCPA, such as:

  * Assessing current marketing practices to reduce risk that
    consumers will receive unwanted text or phone messages;

  * Incorporating TCPA compliance into training for advertising
    and marketing employees;

  * Creating mechanisms to capture, retain, and recall individual
    consumers' prior express written consent for telephonic, fax,
    and/or SMS marketing communications;

  * Developing systems to recognize and honor opt out requests;
    and

  * Considering the incorporation of TCPA compliance into
    warranty and indemnity clauses in contracts when using
    third-party advertising and marketing services and other
    vendors.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc. or its owners. [GN]


[*] Gross Law Firm Announces Shareholder Class Action Filings
-------------------------------------------------------------
The securities litigation law firm of The Gross Law Firm issues the
following notice on behalf of shareholders in the following
publicly traded companies.  Shareholders who purchased shares in
the following companies during the dates listed are encouraged to
contact the firm regarding possible Lead Plaintiff appointment.
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff is not required to partake in any
recovery.

Ryder System, Inc. (NYSE:R)

Investors Affected: July 23, 2015 - February 13, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Ryder System, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that defendants made
materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to
disclose that: (1) Ryder's financial results were inflated as a
result of the Company's practice of overstating the residual values
of the vehicles in its fleet; (2) there was no reasonable basis to
believe that Ryder would sell its used vehicles for the amounts
that it had assigned to them; (3) Ryder's residual values for its
fleet of vehicles exceeded the expected future values that would be
realized upon the sale of those vehicles; and (4) as a result of
the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects, were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/ryder-system-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7760&from=1

CytomX Therapeutics, Inc. (CTMX)

Investors Affected: May 17, 2018 - May 13, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
CytomX Therapeutics, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) CytomX had downplayed issues
with CX-072's efficacy observed in the PROCLAIM-CX-072 clinical
program; (ii) CytomX had similarly downplayed issues with CX-2009's
efficacy and safety observed in the PROCLAIM-CX-2009 clinical
program; and (iii) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/cytomx-therapeutics-inc-loss-submission-form/?id=7760&from=1

Forescout Technologies, Inc. (FSCT)

Investors Affected: February 6, 2020 - May 15, 2020

A class action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in
Forescout Technologies, Inc. The filed complaint alleges that
defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Forescout was experiencing a
significant and disproportionate decline in its financial
performance; (2) the foregoing was reasonably likely to have a
material negative impact on Forescout's planned acquisition by
Advent International Corp.; and (3) as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' statements about its business and operations were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

Shareholders may find more information at
https://securitiesclasslaw.com/securities/forescout-technologies-inc-loss-submission-form-2/?id=7760&from=1

The Gross Law Firm is committed to ensuring that companies adhere
to responsible business practices and engage in good corporate
citizenship. The firm seeks recovery on behalf of investors who
incurred losses when false and/or misleading statements or the
omission of material information by a Company lead to artificial
inflation of the Company's stock. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
The Gross Law Firm
15 West 38th Street, 12th floor
New York, NY, 10018
Email: dg@securitiesclasslaw.com
Phone: (212) 537-9430
Fax: (833) 862-7770 [GN]


[*] Law Firms File Class Action Against Land Deal Promoters
-----------------------------------------------------------
Aysha Bagchi, writing for BloombergTax, reports that a proposed
class action alleges that a network of land deal promoters and
property appraisers engaged in a racketeering enterprise to promote
tax-advantaged transactions that they knew were flawed.

The lawsuit is the second potential class action brought by firms
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP and The Saylor Law Firm LLP
targeting alleged promoters of syndicated conservation easements.
That type of deal, which involves a tax deduction under tax code
Section 170(h) available for donations of property rights to
promote conservation, was flagged by the Internal Revenue Service
on its most recent "Dirty Dozen" list. [GN]





[*] Survey Shows Spike in COVID-19-Related Class Action Filings
---------------------------------------------------------------
The ninth annual Carlton Fields Class Action Survey reveals a spike
in class action filings related to COVID-19, with a majority of
companies expecting the volume of class actions to continue to
increase as a result of the pandemic. By the end of May 2020, more
than 560 COVID-19 class action matters were filed across a wide
variety of industries, with continued growth on a daily basis.

Class action spending has now increased for five consecutive
years--a trend observed even before the onset of the pandemic.
Companies are handling a higher volume of class action matters than
ever before, with complex and high-risk matters making up the bulk
of existing cases.

"The unprecedented COVID-19 health and economic crisis has resulted
in immediate and lasting changes to business practices nationwide,"
said Julianna Thomas McCabe, director of Carlton Fields' Class
Action Survey and chair of the firm's National Class Actions
Practice. "The stakes continue to be high. In-house legal
departments should have their action plans in place to preempt and
defend against class actions. It is critical to analyze changes in
business practices caused by COVID-19 and to adhere to existing
best practices and regulatory compliance."

When asked about class action defense strategies, one general
counsel survey respondent commented: "You have to do a proper risk
assessment. If you miss a big risk or misidentify something as a
bigger risk than it is, you are not properly allocating
resources."

The 2020 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey is based on interviews
with general counsel, chief legal officers, and direct reports to
general counsel at more than 400 Fortune 1000 and other large
companies across a variety of industries.

Labor and employment continues to account for more than 25% of
class action matters and spending. Cases and spending in the
consumer fraud category, on the other hand, are down 8 percentage
points from 2018.

The percentage of companies predicting data privacy and security as
the next wave of class actions increased from 54.3% to 58.2%, with
companies expressing concern about new and anticipated state
privacy legislation. More than three-fourths of companies reported
concern about the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), a data
privacy law that went into effect in January 2020. The percentage
of companies concerned about exposure resulting from the European
Union's privacy regulation (the GDPR) increased by one-third.

Among additional key findings:

   * Insurance class actions rose to 10.7% of matters and 14% of
spending.

   * Companies report that contractor misclassification and
employee data privacy class actions have emerged as new labor and
employment concerns.

   * The percentage of companies facing class actions categorized
as lower exposure matters increased by nearly 10 percentage points
in 2019, while the percentage of companies facing complex,
high-risk, or bet-the-company class actions declined.

   * Companies increased their use of contractual arbitration
clauses in 2019, and the percentage of companies that included
class action waivers in their arbitration agreements increased to
55%.

   * Companies identified and elaborated on five important sources
of innovation for class action management: aggressiveness,
strategic planning, immediate case evaluation, scenario planning,
and the implementation of thoughtful cost management strategies.

The Carlton Fields Class Action Survey is widely recognized as a
powerful resource for in-house counsel who want to manage class
actions effectively and efficiently. Participating companies in the
2020 Class Action Survey have an average annual revenue of $21.8
billion and median annual revenue of $6.7 billion. They operate in
more than 25 industries, including banking and financial services,
consumer goods, energy, high tech, insurance, manufacturing,
pharmaceuticals, professional services, and retail trade.

To download the 2020 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey, please
visit https://ClassActionSurvey.com.

                    About Carlton Fields

Carlton Fields--http://www.carltonfields.com--hasmore than 325
attorneys and government and financial services consultants serving
clients from offices in California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
New Jersey, New York, and Washington, D.C. The firm is known for
its national litigation practice, including class action defense,
trial practice, white-collar representation, and high-stakes
appeals; its insurance practice, including life and financial
lines, property and casualty, reinsurance, and title insurance; its
regulatory practice; and its handling of sophisticated business
transactions and corporate counseling for domestic and
international clients. (Carlton Fields practices law in California
through Carlton Fields, LLP.) [GN]



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***