/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/201027.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, October 27, 2020, Vol. 22, No. 215

                            Headlines

ADECCO USA: Lang Suit Remanded to Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas
ADMIN RECOVERY: Court Dismisses Rozario FDCPA Class Suit
AMERICAN HONDA: Acura RDX Suit Can't Continue as Class Action
ANTHEM: Georgia Joins Multistate Data Breach Settlement
APPLE INC: Class Members Object to $87.7MM Attorney Fee Request

ARDENT LEISURE: Clyde & Co Discuss Insurance Docs Denial in Lawsuit
AUSTRALIA: Wants Court to Pause Hotel Quarantine Class Action
AUTOMATED PET CARE: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE: Faces Class Action Over Robocalls
AVEO PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Dismisses Hackel Securities Suit

B&V ENTERPRISES: Kim TCPA Suit Removed to C.D. California
BAHAMA BUCK'S: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BIOMARIN PHARMA: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 24 Motion Deadline
BIOMARIN PHARMA: Hagens Berman Reminds of Nov. 24 Deadline
BIOMARIN PHARMA: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of Nov. 24 Deadline

BJORN'S STEREO: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CLIENT SERVICES: Court Narrows Claims in Rhee FDCPA Class Suit
COLONY CREDIT: Vincent Wong Reminds of Nov. 9 Motion Deadline
D&A SERVICES: Feldman Files FDCPA Suit in Maryland
DEAN MEILING: Court Dismisses Alexander Class Suit

DEAN POLL: 2018 Workers' Wage Class Action Still Pending
DECATHLON USA: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Labor Class Action
DIAMOND RESORTS: App. Ct. Upholds Settlement Approval in Johnson
EXPLORICA: Faces Class Action Over Cancelled School Trips
FENNEC PHARMA: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 2 Motion Deadline

FIAT CHRYSLER: RAM 2500, 3500 Emissions Lawsuit Partly Tossed
FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Urbina Suit Stayed Until Texas Case is Resolved
GARRETT MOTION: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 24 Motion Deadline
GARRETT MOTION: Rosen Law Alerts of Class Action Filing
GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Oil Consumption Defect

GENIUS BRANDS: Portnoy Law Alerts of Investor Class Action
GENWORTH LIFE: Trial in Brighton Trustees Suit Set for April 2022
GEO GROUP: Novoa Lawsuit Can Proceed as Class Action
GOLAR LNG: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 23 Motion Deadline
GOLAR LNG: Jakubowitz Law Alerts of Class Action Filing

GOLAR LNG: Kirby McInerney Reminds of November 23 Deadline
GOLAR LNG: Levi & Korsinsky Alerts of Class Action Filing
GOLAR LNG: Schall Law Firm Reminds of November 23 Deadline
HAYNES INVESTMENTS: 4th Cir. Upholds Arbitration Denial in Gibbs
ICONIX WATERWORKS: Magee Suit Remanded to Sacramento Superior Court

IDT CORP: Arbitration in Samara Suit Still Ongoing
INVESTORS BANCORP: Interlocutory Appeal Request Refused in Elburn
JUST CANDY: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
KITEC: Plumbing Class Action Payout Faces Delays
LINCOLN LIFE: Judge Denies Transfer of Vida Suit to Pennsylvania

LOCKHEED MARTIN: Pre-Certification Discovery in Ross Suit Denied
LOUISIANA: Certification of Medicaid-Eligible Youth Class Sought
MAYO CLINIC: Court Okays Balance Billing Class Action Settlement
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Langlois Discuss MultiJurisdictional Class Suits
MLR SOLUTIONS: Lipscomb Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Virginia

MODLIN SLINSKY: Nahon Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
NATIONWIDE: Faces Class Action Over Covid-19 Travel Claims
NC STATE UNIVERSITY: SG Passes Legislation Amid Class Action
NIKE INC: Bunn ADA Suit Removed to N.D. California
NIKOLA CORP: Glancy Prongay Reminds of November 16 Deadline

NIKOLA CORP: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 16 Motion Deadline
NINTENDO: Faces Class Action Over Joy-con Drift Defect
NORTHLAND INVESTMENT: Church St South Settlement Has Developments
NOVA SCOTIA: Tip Website Set Up as Part of Mass Shooting Suit
OVERSTOCK.COM: Judge Dismisses Mangrove Partners Class Action

PAPA JOHN'S: Court Dismisses Mendez's ADA Class Action
PATTERSON COS: Plymouth Retirement System Suit Wins Class Status
PEABODY ENERGY: Howard G. Smith Reminds of Nov. 27 Motion Deadline
PETLAND INC: 11th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Cisneros RICO Action
PINTEC TECHNOLOGY: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Lawsuit

PINTEC TECHNOLOGY: Vincent Wong Alerts of Class Action Filing
PORTLAND GENERAL: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 2 Bid Deadline
PRECIGEN INC: Bragar Eagel Alerts of Class Action Filing
PRECIGEN INC: Gainey McKenna Alerts of Securities Class Action
PRECIGEN INC: Hagens Berman Reminds of Class Action Filing

PURSUIT: Faces Another Suit Over Columbia Icefield Crash
RANDSTAD US: 9th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Lopez Suit
RIPPLE: Zakinov Class Action Allowed to Proceed
ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Labaton Sucharow Files Securities Class Action
SALAS CONCRETE: Judge Declines Prelim. Approval of Deal in Cavazos

SARASAS WITAED: Parents File Class Action Over Child Abuse
SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: $65M Settlement in Baker Has Final Approval
SEQUOIA CAPITAL: Arbitration Denial in Gibbs RICO Class Suit Upheld
SLACK: 1st Amended Complaint Filed in Consolidated Securities Suit
STATE FARM: First Amended Clemons TCPA Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice

STATE FARM: Labor Cost Can't Be Depreciated, Court Says in Sproull
STOP & SHOP: Court Dismisses Lopez's ADA Class Action
SWANN: Add-On Product Under Scrutiny as Part of Class Action
TACTILE SYSTEMS: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Nov. 30 Bid Deadline
TACTILE SYSTEMS: Schall Law Alerts of Class Action Filing

TD ASSET: Court Denies Leave to Appeal in Trailing Commission Suit
THOMSON INTERNATIONAL: Faces Class Action Over Onion Recall
TORONTO: Taxicab Plate Owners' Certification Motion Dismissed
TRIWEST HEALTHCARE: Schwartz Class Suit Remanded to State Court
TRUGREEN INC: Bid to Strike Class Claims in Stevens-Bratton Denied

ULTRA PETROLEUM: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 2 Motion Deadline
UNITED STATES: Class in Athey Denied Counsel Fees and Expenses
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN: Wnorowski Files Suit in Conn. Dist. Ct.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA: Lawsuit Seeks Tuition Refunds
VINEYARD VINES: Jariwala Files ADA Suit in S.D. California

WAYNE COUNTY, MI: Bowles Files Civil Rights Suit
WORLD WRESTLING: Labaton Sucharow Seeks Lead Counsel Role
WRAP TECHNOLOGIES: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 23 Motion Deadline
[*] ACU Mulls Class Action Against Governments, PCR Manufacturers
[*] Amendments to Ontario's Class Proceedings Act Come Into Force

[*] Ignoring TCPA Class Actions is Bad Strategy, Squire Patton Says

                            *********

ADECCO USA: Lang Suit Remanded to Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Christopher C. Conner of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania remanded the case, EATON A. LANG,
IV, Plaintiff, v. ADECCO USA, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No.
3:20-CV-44 (M.D. Pa.), to the Lackawanna County Court of Common
Pleas.

On Dec. 3, 2019, Lang filed a putative class-action complaint
against Adecco in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas
alleging violations of Pennsylvania's Medical Marijuana Act in
Count I and an alternative common-law claim of wrongful rescission
of an offer of employment in Count II. Lang avers that he and other
prospective employees were denied employment by Adecco based on
positive marijuana drug tests, notwithstanding their status as
certified medical-marijuana cardholders.  Lang requests
compensatory damages in a sum in excess of $50,000, as well as
punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

Adecco timely removed the action to the District Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1441, asserting federal diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1332.  It then moved to dismiss the case on
the basis that Lang's claims are not cognizable under Pennsylvania
law, while Lang moved to remand the case to state court for lack of
jurisdiction.

The instant motions raise both jurisdictional and merits disputes:
Lang asks the Court to remand the matter to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and Adecco asks to dismiss the case
outright for failure to state a viable claim.  Because district
courts must establish jurisdiction over a case and its parties
before reaching merits determinations, Judge Conner turns first to
Lang's motion to remand.

As the removing party, Adecco bears the burden of proving that the
matter is properly before the federal court.  To establish
diversity jurisdiction, Adecco must demonstrate that this matter is
between citizens of different states and that the amount in
controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $75,000.  It
appears that the diversity requirement is satisfied: Lang is a
Pennsylvania resident, and Adecco is incorporated in Delaware with
its principal place of business in Florida.  The only dispute is
whether the complaint satisfies the amount-in-controversy
requirement.

The Judge finds that a preponderance of the evidence supports an
amount in controversy well below the minimum jurisdictional
threshold.  In the seven weeks between Lang's interview with Adecco
and the start date of his new job, Lang would have accrued $4,060
in lost wages.  Even if he accepts Adecco's claim that the Adidas
position was not seasonal and that Lang will continue to accrue
lost wages through an estimated trial date of January 2023, the
Judge finds that the wage disparity would produce only $3,100 in
additional damages, for a total of just $7,160.  

With a high-end punitive-damages estimate of four times the backpay
award, Lang's total damages could only conceivably reach $35,800.
Because attorneys' fees are very likely unavailable, the $35,800
figure represents the total amount in controversy.  The Judge
therefore holds that Adecco has failed to sustain its burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the case satisfies
the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a).

Lang asks the Court to award attorneys' fees incurred in litigating
the instant motion.  The Judge finds that Adecco's removal of the
action was not objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and
that Lang is not entitled to attorneys' fees.  Accordingly, the
Judge will deny this aspect of Lang's motion.

For the reasons set forth, Judge Conner granted Lang's motion to
remand, and remanded the case to the Lackawanna County Court of
Common Pleas.  He also denied Lang's request for attorneys' fees
and denied as moot Adecco's motion to dismiss as moot.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 24, 2020 Memorandum
is available at https://bit.ly/3dY9J5D from Leagle.com.


ADMIN RECOVERY: Court Dismisses Rozario FDCPA Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHARON R. ROZARIO, individually and on behalf of those
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ADMIN RECOVERY, LLC; FRANK
PARISI; ANGELO NATALE; TIMOTHY CIFFA; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 20-801 (FLW) (D. N.J.), Judge Freda L.
Wolfson of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Rozario has filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants
Admin Recovery LLC, Frank Parisi, Angelo Natale, and Timothy Ciffa
violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act ("FDCPA").  Admin
is a company engaged in the purchase and collection of defaulted
consumer debts, Parisi and Natale are both managing members of
Admin, and Ciffa is the vice president of collections at Admin.

On Jan. 24, 2019, the Defendants allegedly mailed a debt collection
letter to the Plaintiff.  However, according to the Plaintiff, at
the time the Defendants mailed the letter, the statute of
limitations had run on the debt.  The collection letter stated that
Admin is offering you the opportunity to pay 50% of the Account
Balance to close the account.  The letter further asserted that
such payment will be in the total amount of $3,412.81 to close the
account.  It closed with the statement that she would like
additional time to respond to the offer, the Plaintiff may contact
them, and the Defendants are not obliged to renew the offer.

On Jan. 23, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the putative class action
complaint alleging that the Defendants violated the FDCPA.  More
specifically, she claims that the collection letter violates
Section 1692e, which provides, a debt collector may not use any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt, and Section 1692f,
which provides, a debt collector may not use unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.

In the instant matter, the Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint for failure to state a claim.  The Defendants submit that
the collection letter sent to the Plaintiff does not violate the
FDCPA, because it does not use deceptive and misleading language
that would cause the least sophisticated consumer to reasonably
believe the debt was actually legally enforceable.  They argue that
the language of the letter, offering to close the account, does not
qualify as a legal threat nor does it convey a false sense of
urgency that may misled a consumer into believing the debt is still
enforceable.

The Plaintiff, in response, contends that the language of the
letter misrepresents the legal status of the debt and creates a
false sense of urgency to accept the offered terms.  She also
claims that the letter misleadingly offers consumers an opportunity
to save 50%, which is false as the debt is unenforceable.

Judge Wolfson disagrees.  First, the Plaintiff fails to identify
any relevant case law where the use of the language "close this
account" was found to be deceptive or misleading under the FDCPA.
Second, there are no explicit deadlines imposed by the letter in
the case.  Third, the letter, read in its entirety, neither creates
a false sense of urgency, nor threatens litigation.  Finally, the
collection letter never suggests that the Plaintiff would be saving
50% if she accepted the offer.  It merely makes an offer to the
Plaintiff, where she could pay 50% of the current balance of the
debt in order to close the account.   Accordingly, considering the
entirety of the collection letter, the least sophisticated consumer
would not be misled or deceived into believing the debt is legally
enforceable.

Next, the Defendants claim that they are not required by the FDCPA
to disclose that the debt was time-barred, and that they are
permitted under the FDCPA to request payment on a time-barred debt.
They further contend that because partial payment, alone, does not
restart the statute of limitations in New Jersey, failing to
disclose that the debt was time-barred would not be deceptive or
misleading.  In response, the Plaintiff argues that the letter was
deceptive because, in failing to warn her that the debt was outside
the statute of limitations and unenforceable, the letter could
mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing the debt
was still legally enforceable.  The Plaintiff also claims the
failure to disclose the legal status of the debt, coupled with an
offer to resolve the account along with urgency to accept the offer
was deceptive or misleading.

The Judge opines that in requesting payment, the Defendants are not
required to include a disclaimer that the statute of limitations
had run.  There is simply no misrepresentation of the legal status
of the debt in the letter, as its only purpose is to present an
opportunity to the Plaintiff to pay her time-barred debt, an
activity permitted under the FDCPA.  In addition, the lack of
disclosure creates no additional risk for the consumer because a
partial payment would not restart the statute of limitations, and
importantly, there is no indication, or even argument by the
Plaintiff, that if a debtor were to make a partial payment on the
debt, he or she would also have to make a declaration that the
entire debt would also be paid.  Accordingly, the Judge finds that
the letter was not deceptive by not informing the Plaintiff that
the debt that the Defendants sought to collect was time-barred.

Finally, the Plaintiff also alleges that the letter violated
Section 1692f.  The Defendants argue that, as a matter of law that
the letter does not violate Section 1692f for the same reasons the
letter does not violate Section 1692e; in that, 1) a debt collector
is permitted to make certain offers to resolve a timebarred debt,
2) the letter does not make any threat of litigation, and 3) the
Defendants were not required to disclose the debt was time-barred.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiff has failed to allege conduct
that was unfair and unconscionable under Section 1692f and Section
1692f(1).  As the basis for her Section 1962f claim, the Plaintiff
relies on the same alleged conduct under Section 1692e, which the
Judge has already found insufficient to violate the FDCPA.  Because
the Plaintiff does not identify any other misconduct beyond what
she asserted in her Section 1692e claim, her Section 1692f claim
cannot state a claim, as well.  Furthermore, the Plaintiff's
Section 1692f claim fails on the merits, because creditors are
permitted, by law, to request voluntary payment on a timebarred
debt, thus, requesting such payment cannot be an unfair or
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Wolfson granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss; dismissed all the claims against the
Defendants.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/34swYBI from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN HONDA: Acura RDX Suit Can't Continue as Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that an Acura
RDX infotainment lawsuit can continue, but not on a nationwide
class action basis as requested by SUV owners.

The class action now includes only 2019-2020 Acura RDX customers
who purchased the vehicles new from California Honda/Acura
dealerships.

The plaintiffs claim Acura knew the infotainment systems were
faulty prior to selling the vehicles, but the automaker allegedly
concealed its knowledge of the problems.

At the same time, Acura allegedly doesn't offer any real
infotainment system repairs because any defective parts are
allegedly replaced with equally defective components.

Some RDX owners claim they are told to wait for software updates,
so bringing the SUV to a dealership is a wasted trip.

The plaintiffs claim defects in the systems cause delayed audio,
issues with Android Auto and other issues that allegedly diminish
the values of the systems.

One RDX owner says the infotainment system started acting up just
days after he purchased the SUV, with minute-long delays for audio
to play, a problem the dealership says is normal. The infotainment
system also allegedly suddenly shuts off or freezes while driving,
causing severe distraction to the driver.

The class action alleges RDX owners may be left without multiple
services provided by the infotainment systems, including the
navigation systems, audio systems, backup cameras and Bluetooth.

In the case of a failed backup camera, the infotainment malfunction
creates real safety hazards caused by the inability to see images
of the rear of the SUV.

Additionally, the plaintiff says he was promised a software update
for Android Auto, but 10 months later no software update had been
released.

Honda allegedly distributed advertising materials before the
vehicles went on sale in 2018, and those materials said the
infotainment systems were compatible with Android Auto. However,
the new vehicles were sold equipped with only Apple CarPlay.

According to the plaintiffs, their RDX SUVs have lost their values
because of the alleged infotainment system problems.

The lawsuit says the 2019-2020 Acura RDX infotainment system is
equipped with a 10.2-inch display screen and manipulated with a
touchpad, a change compared to previous versions that used
buttons.

Acura RDX lessees from several states were told their claims will
need to enter arbitration, a ruling that doesn't affect RDX owners
who signed purchase agreements.

Judge R. Gary Klausner ruled too many involved states have
different applicable laws, leaving him unable to certify a class
action lawsuit that includes non-California consumers.

The Acura RDX infotainment lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, Western Division:
Banh, et al., v. American Honda Motor Co.

The plaintiffs are represented by Hagens Berman, Goldenberg
Schneider, and Niekamp, Weisensell, Mutersbaugh & Mastrantonio.

CarComplaints.com has complaints about Acura RDX SUVs and many
other Acura vehicles. [GN]


ANTHEM: Georgia Joins Multistate Data Breach Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------
AllOnGeorgia reports that Attorney General Chris Carr says that
Georgia has joined a total $39.5 million settlement with Anthem
stemming from the 2014 data breach that involved the personal
information of 78.8 million Americans. Through the settlement,
Anthem has reached a resolution with the 43-state multistate
coalition and California. Georgia will receive $1,387,257.61 from
the settlement. In addition to the payment, Anthem has also agreed
to a series of data security and good governance provisions
designed to strengthen its practices going forward.

"We considered many factors before joining this multistate
investigation," said Attorney General Chris Carr. "It is important
to remember that in a world where cybersecurity threats are
evolving, so too must our efforts to combat them. We believe Anthem
is being an amicable partner in correcting this situation by taking
the necessary measures to address the issue at hand. Georgia will
continue to cross borders and work with private, public, state,
local and federal partners to make sure that we eliminate the truly
bad actors from the playing field."

In February 2015, Anthem disclosed that cyber attackers had
infiltrated its systems beginning in February 2014, using malware
installed through a phishing email. The attackers were ultimately
able to gain access to Anthem's data warehouse, where they
harvested names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers,
healthcare identification numbers, home addresses, email addresses,
phone numbers, and employment information for 78.8 million
Americans. In Georgia, 3,726,249 residents were affected by the
breach.

Under the settlement, Anthem has agreed to a series of provisions
designed to strengthen its security practices going forward. Those
include:

    * a prohibition against misrepresentations regarding the extent
to which Anthem protects the privacy and security of personal
information;

    * implementation of a comprehensive information security
program, incorporating principles of zero trust architecture, and
including regular security reporting to the Board of Directors and
prompt notice of significant security events to the CEO;

    *  specific security requirements with respect to segmentation,
logging and monitoring, anti-virus maintenance, access controls and
two factor authentication, encryption, risk assessments,
penetration testing, and employee training, among other
requirements; and

    * third-party security assessments and audits for three (3)
years, as well as a requirement that Anthem make its risk
assessments available to a third-party assessor during that term.

In the immediate wake of the breach, Anthem offered an initial two
years of credit monitoring to all affected U.S. individuals.

In addition to this settlement, Anthem previously entered into a
class action settlement that established a $115 million settlement
fund to pay for additional credit monitoring, cash payments of up
to $50, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket losses for affected
consumers. The deadlines for consumers to submit claims under that
settlement have since passed. [GN]


APPLE INC: Class Members Object to $87.7MM Attorney Fee Request
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amanda Bronstad, writing for Law.com, reports that Apple Inc. and
dozens of class members, including one represented by class action
critic Ted Frank, have objected to an attorney fee request of $87.7
million in the iPhone throttling settlement. [GN]


ARDENT LEISURE: Clyde & Co Discuss Insurance Docs Denial in Lawsuit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Smith, Esq. -- christopher.smith@clydeco.com -- Janette
McLennan, Esq. -- janette.mclennan@clydeco.com -- Ronan Guyomarc'h,
Esq. -- ronan.guyomarch@clydeco.com -- and Sarah Sharp, Esq. --
sarah.sharp@clydeco.com -- of Clyde & Co LLP, in an article for
Lexology, report that the controversial issue of whether class
action group members are entitled to have access to a respondent's
insurance policies was again before the Federal Court in Ingram as
trustee for the Ingram Superannuation Fund v Ardent Leisure Limited
[2020] FCA 1302. Clyde & Co has previously reported on a similar
issue in the matter of Evans v Davantage Group Pty Ltd (No 2)
[2020] FCA 473.

The basis of the application was different from Evans. The
documents were sought under s247A of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) rather than s33ZF, 37M and 37P of the Federal Court Act.

Derrington J refused the application on the basis that the request
for documents was not for a proper purpose as required by s247A,
and therefore not a valid exercise of shareholder powers. Her
Honour made a number of observations that were pertinent to her
decision, including that:

   -- The respondent entity was solvent with significant net
      assets that exceeded the claimed quantum;

   -- Insurance documents are commercially confidential between
      the insured and insurer, and the Court should be reluctant
      to break such confidence;

   -- The Court expects that an insured will seek to enforce its
      rights to coverage and to contest any wrongful declinature;

   -- Insurance documents will only be discoverable by one party
      where it has direct relevance to an issue arising on the
      pleadings;

   -- Generally, an applicant has no right to examine the
      creditworthiness of a potential respondent ahead of
      commencing an action in an attempt to ascertain the
      commercial viability of pursuing the matter;

   -- The fact that settlement of a class action requires
      judicial approval does not support the disclosure of
      insurance policies. If insurance becomes an issue
      during the settlement stage, the Court is capable of
      designing appropriate procedures to address the issue;
      and

   -- The disclosure of an insurance policy would confer a
      commercial advantage on the applicants during settlement
      negotiations outside of any benefit acquired derivatively
      upon the application of the Court rules.

Background

Ardent Leisure Limited (Ardent) is a corporate group that operates
amusement parks, including Dreamworld at Coomera in Queensland. On
October 25, 2016, a tragic incident occurred at Dreamworld's
Thunder River Rapids Ride, killing four people. Following the
incident, the price of Ardent's stapled securities fell from $2.55
to $2.00.

The Applicants are group members in a shareholder class action.
They allege that Ardent represented to the public that it
maintained very high safety standards at the amusement parks and in
particular at Dreamworld.  They allege that those representations
were misleading or deceptive in contravention of s1041H of the
Corporations Act and s12DA of the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) because the safety standards
in respect of the amusement rides at Dreamworld fell below the
standard represented.

The Applicants also allege that Ardent was aware of information
which created a material risk or likelihood that a malfunction
would occur on the Thunder River Rapids Ride which might cause
serious injury or death (Incident Information) and if such an
incident occurred, there was a material risk or likelihood that
there would be an adverse impact on the Ardent Leisure Group's
profits in current and future financial periods with a
consequential decline in the value of the stapled securities
(Incident Impact Information).  Central to the claim is the
allegation that Ardent breached its continuous disclosure
obligations pursuant to ASX Listing Rule 3.1 and s674(2) of the
Corporations Act, in that it failed to disclose this information to
the market.

It is alleged that, had the Applicants known of the Incident
Information and/or the Incident Impact Information, they would not
have acquired the stapled securities. Further, they allege that as
a result of Ardent's contravention of its continuous disclosure
obligations, the Applicants acquired stapled securities at an
inflated price.

The Applicants claim the loss of value in their securities, based
on the quoted price of a stapled security of $2.55 at the opening
of the market on 25 October 2016 and its closing price of $2.00 on
the following day. The Group members estimate that the value of the
claim is between $294M and $310M.

The Applicants sought orders under s247A of the Corporations Act
permitting them to inspect documents, including insurance documents
and insurance related correspondence.

In making the application, the Applicants alleged that Ardent's
economic position was worsening over time, due to closure of its
theme parks as a result of COVID-19. They were concerned that
Ardent's total assets would not be sufficient to meet a judgment in
favour of the group members.  Both parties served evidence of the
value of the companies in the Ardent Group. The Applicants'
solicitor also informed the Court that a condition of the
litigation funding agreement required the Applicants to obtain
copies of all relevant policies of insurance and they risked
termination of the funding agreement if they failed to obtain
copies of these documents.

There was no evidence before the Court of the existence of
insurance policies which might respond to the class action,
although the Court accepted that the existence of such policies
might be assumed. The Applicants were unaware of the insurance
policy limits and it was this information which was at the heart of
the application.

The Application

The application for access to the insurance documents was made
pursuant to s247A of the Corporations Act. This section confers a
discretionary power on the Court to permit a shareholder to inspect
a company's books, but only if the applicant shareholder is acting
in good faith and the inspection is made for a proper purpose.

The group members submitted that their request for access to the
documents was made for three reasons:

   -- To assess the commercial viability of the class action;
   -- To conduct the litigation proportionately and efficiently;
      and
   -- To facilitate meaningful and early mediation.

Ardent resisted the application on the basis that this was not "a
proper purpose", as the rights which the group members sought to
advance in the class action were not the rights to which they
derived in their capacity as shareholders. Further, Ardent
submitted that even if the applicant's purpose was proper, the
Court should not exercise its discretion to grant relief.

Judgment

Justice Derrington reviewed a number of cases including Hanks v
Admiralty Resources NL (2011) 85 ACSR 101, in which Gordon J
referred to "proper purpose" being "a purpose connected with the
proper exercise of the rights of a shareholder as a shareholder".
Justice Derrington said that in Hanks, her Honour was identifying
that the purpose is one connected with a shareholder's rights qua
shareholder. Justice Derrington said that where a person who has a
claim or potential claim against a company in which they are a
shareholder, but which arises from events unconnected with their
rights and entitlements as a shareholder, s247A affords them no
avenue to obtain a litigious advantage by inspecting a company's
private and confidential documents.

Her Honour considered that in the present case, the Applicants'
claim did not arise from their rights and entitlements as
shareholders. The Applicants' central allegation is that Ardent
breached its obligations or failed to perform duties which caused
them damage when they made the investment decision to acquire
stapled securities in the Ardent companies. In that sense the
alleged wrongs were done to them in their capacity as potential
investors in the companies and not in their capacity as
shareholders. Similarly, the duties or obligations which the
respondent companies allegedly breached were not owed to the
applicants in their capacity as shareholders. For these reasons,
her Honour determined that the purpose of seeking the insurance
documents was not "a proper purpose". It followed that, although
the Applicants had standing to bring the application given that
they were presently members of Ardent, the purposes for which they
sought the documents in question were not proper purposes with the
meaning of s247A.

Her Honour said that even if the Applicants had established a
proper purpose, she would have exercised the discretion against
granting the relief sought in relation to the insurance policies
and the correspondence between Ardent and its insurer.

In reaching that conclusion, her Honour was mindful of the
following factors considered by Beach J in Evans, noting that the
application in that case was made on a different basis and did not
involve consideration of s274A, identifying each of the matters set
out earlier in this case note.

In addition to the considerations put forward by Beach J, her
Honour also considered the evidence which showed that that Ardent
was solvent and had net assets of approximately $290M, which
exceeded the quantum of the claim in the class action. No evidence
was presented to suggest that there was a risk the proceeds of the
insurance policies would be dissipated, for example having been
used to settle personal injury and wrongful death claims or for
defence costs for any regulatory proceeding linked to the accident
at Dreamworld.

Her Honour also considered the extent to which the application
would, if granted, benefit third parties. While there was no
evidence before the Court as to the proportion of the class who
were no longer members of Ardent, her Honour considered a factor
weighing against the exercise of discretion would be if it would
confer benefits on numerous other persons who would not have been
entitled to make the application of their own motion. As to the
satisfaction of the condition in the litigation funding agreement,
her Honour acknowledged that litigation funding is a necessary fact
of life for litigants in class actions, and this fact would not
have weighed against the exercise of discretion.

Justice Derrington noted that aside from the insurance policy, the
Applicants sought copies of correspondence with Ardent's insurers
concerning the notification of the claims made against the
respondents and the insurers' responses and communications
concerning that notification. Her Honour said there were very good
reasons why inspection of such documents would not be allowed on an
application under s247A. Her Honour considered that there were
unique public policy grounds to maintain the duty of utmost good
faith between insured and insurers both under the Insurance
Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and at common law. Making such documents
available to third parties who may wish to pursue a claim in
respect of which the insurance policy might respond would severely
and detrimentally affect the insurer/insured relationship as it
would necessary prevent the parties to the policy corresponding in
a manner consistent with their duties inter se. Her Honour said
that such an intrusion into that relationship would have
consequences beyond this case and would give rise to a public
policy question. Her Honour stated that even where a proper purpose
was established, an exceptional case would have to be advanced
before the discretion would be exercised to permit inspection of
correspondence between an insurer and insured.

Analysis

While this decision turned (and ultimately failed) on the narrow
issue of whether the applicants were exercising rights in their
capacity as shareholders, the Court nevertheless went on to
consider the discretionary factors that would be relevant had the
applicants been able to satisfy the Court they had a proper purpose
in making the application.  In this sense the decision provides
useful guidance about the likely attitude of the Court in future
applications for the production of insurance policies and documents
under s247A.

The case also provides an insight into the considerations that
litigation funders undertake in considering whether to fund such
actions. Ascertaining prospects of recovery and the existence of
adequate insurance remain a key consideration for litigation
funders.  

Taking a step back from the particular legal basis for the
application, the result could be viewed as another decision which
indicates the reluctance of Federal Court judges to allow class
action Applicants' access to the corporate Respondent's insurance
documents. The judgment certainly throws up multiple obstacles to
the successful outcome of such applications. [GN]


AUSTRALIA: Wants Court to Pause Hotel Quarantine Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
David Estcourt, writing for WAtoday, reports that Andrews
government lawyers have urged a court to press "pause" on the hotel
quarantine class action brought on behalf of businesses until after
the Coate inquiry has released its findings.

Keilor Park restaurant 5 Districts NY is the lead plaintiff in the
class action that could drag former health minister Jenny Mikakos
and Jobs Minister Martin Pakula to court, alleging their bungling
of Victoria's hotel quarantine program led to the imposition of
restrictions that devastated businesses throughout Victoria.

The government is facing a number of lawsuits aimed at different
aspects of its handling of the pandemic, including up to three
class actions and a separate Supreme Court challenge to their
since-ceased curfew policy which is set to be decided in coming
weeks.

Genomic testing has shown that almost all the cases of COVID-19
during Victoria's second wave of transmission - which at its peak
was generating more than 700 cases a day - could be traced back to
a handful of infections among security guards at two quarantine
hotels in Melbourne.

5 Districts NY owner Anthony Ferrara claimed the drop in his
business was directly due to stage three and four restrictions,
which he alleges were introduced as a result of mistakes made by Ms
Mikakos, Mr Pakula and their department secretaries during hotel
quarantine.

"Victorian businesses don't need charity or kind thoughts from
politicians," Mr Ferrara said in a writ filed in August.

"We need certainty and we need it soon. Our situation is not our
doing. We are calling to account those who put us in this dire
position."

In the Supreme Court on Oct. 5, Adam Hochroth, the barrister for
the plaintiffs, said they had contacted defendants on August 26 to
begin discussions, but were yet to hear back.

He said it was unsatisfactory that the Andrews government had
briefed lawyers to appear in the case just a few days before it was
due to go to court.

The COVID-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiry, headed by former judge
Jennifer Coate, is set to hand down its findings on November 6.

Government barrister Liam Brown said several factors, including
findings from the Coate inquiry, the uncertain future of other
class actions and ongoing challenges faced as part of the pandemic,
meant a delay was appropriate.

"Put all that together, we say, the most just and timely and
efficient way of this matter proceeding is for the pause button to
be pressed now," Mr Brown said.

"We think it would be more sensible to wait and see what happens as
a result of the Coate inquiry."

Justice John Dixon warned parties against taking a combative
approach, saying he would force co-operation if the plaintiff and
government could not get along.

"If the parties . . .  each take a big position up on the hill
looking across the valley to the others with buckets of stones to
throw at each other, then I will take different measures to ensure
that the proceeding is effectively brought to one where the parties
are co-operating," Justice Dixon said.

Justice Dixon also said elements of the case were comparable to the
running of the bushfire class action and that some aspects of the
various class actions could be run together if they turn on a
similar, or the same, legal question.

The plaintiffs will file their statement of claim by November 20,
and both parties will face court for a second case management
conference on December 11. [GN]


AUTOMATED PET CARE: Bishop Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Automated Pet Care
Products, LLC. The case is styled as Cedric Bishop, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated v. Automated Pet
Care Products, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-08862 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 22,
2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Automated Pet Care Products, Inc. is a pet products manufacturer
and creator of Litter-Robot, an automatic, self-cleaning litter box
for cats.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE: Faces Class Action Over Robocalls
-----------------------------------------------------
Jon Reid, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that an auto repair
shop in California faces a potential class action alleging it
violated a federal robocall law by calling customers without
consent.

Anderson, Calif.-based Automotive Service Center LLC conducted "a
wide scale telemarketing campaign" advertising vehicle service
contracts to phone numbers on the national do-not-call registry,
plaintiffs Carol Coren and Stewart Smith allege in a proposed class
action filed on Oct. 6 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California.

The calls were an invasion of privacy and violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, which bans entities from using an
autodialing system to contact consumers without permission. [GN]


AVEO PHARMACEUTICALS: Court Dismisses Hackel Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Allison D. Burroughs of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss
the case, DAVID HACKEL, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AVEO PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. et
al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-cv-10783-ADB (D. Mass.).

The case is a federal securities class action lawsuit concerning
alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5, by Defendant AVE and certain
of its current and former executives, including Michael Bailey,
Matthew Dallas, Keith S. Ehrlich, and Michael Needle.  Lead
Plaintiff Andrej Hornak, individually and on behalf of a putative
class, claims that the Defendants made false and misleading
statements between May 4, 2017 and Nov. 5, 2019, in connection with
its efforts to demonstrate the effectiveness of a candidate drug
for treating renal cell carcinoma.

AVEO is a biopharmaceutical company that, during the Class Period,
was developing a once-daily oral medication for the treatment of
renal cell carcinoma.  The Company's lead drug candidate is
tivozanib, which is approved for use in the European Union but is
still undergoing clinical trials in the United States in an effort
to obtain approval from the Food & Drug Administration ("FDA").
Defendant Bailey has referred to tivozanib as "the central focus"
of the Company's strategy, though it also has other drugs in
development.

On May 26, 2016, AVEO announced the start of a new Phase 3 clinical
trial, TIVO-3, which was designed as a randomized, controlled,
multi-center, open-label study that would compare AVEO's tivozanib
to a competitor's drug, sorafenib.  TIVO-3 was intended to address
FDA concerns about the OS of patients from a previous study,
TIVO-1.  The Company announced that the primary endpoint for the
study was progression-free survival ("PFS"), with overall survival
("OS") as one of several secondary endpoints.  The Company also
announced that a "topline readout" of study results was "projected"
to be available in the first quarter of 2018.

By Nov. 5, 2018, AVEO disclosed the topline results of the TIVO-3
study, noting that tivozanib had met its primary endpoint of
demonstrating a statistically significant benefit in
progression-free survival.  At the same time, AVEO reported initial
OS results, but noted that OS data would not be mature until nearly
a year later.  The Company announced that its goal was to submit an
New Drug Application ("NDA") "in approximately six months."

The Plaintiff identifies two categories of the Defendants'
statements as being materially false and misleading: (1) statements
about the timing by which topline data would be available for
analysis, and (2) statements made on Nov. 5, 2018 about OS data.
Plaintiff claims that AVEO stock dropped by 10% on October 1, 2018,
in response to a press release announcing that only 242 PFS events
would be analyzed rather than 255 events as previously planned.

On Jan. 31, 2019, AVEO announced that it had accepted the FDA's
recommendation to delay filing an NDA, explaining that the Company
planned to wait for "more mature OS results" before submitting an
NDA for tivozanib.  That same day, the Company's stock dropped from
$1.07 per share to a closing price of $0.70 per share.  The
following day, analysts downgraded the stock.

On Feb. 25, 2019, Hackel filed a complaint against the Defendants
in the Southern District of New York.  The case was later
transferred to the Massachusetts District Court.  On May 6, 2019,
the Court appointed the Plaintiff as the Lead Plaintiff and
approved his selection of Pomerantz LLP as the Lead Counsel and
Andrews DeValerio LLP as the Liaison Counsel.  On July 24, 2019,
the Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which the Defendants
moved to dismiss on Sept. 27, 2019.  The Plaintiff opposed, and the
Defendants replied.

The Defendants argue that the amended complaint fails to state an
actionable claim for securities fraud because (1) it fails to
sufficiently allege that the Defendants' statements about the
timing of topline results were false when made; (2) the PSLRA safe
harbor protects the topline result estimates; and (3) the
allegations regarding OS results do not state a claim.   In
addition, they state that the Plaintiff has failed to adequately
plead allegations of scienter or loss causation.  

The Plaintiff counters that the safe harbor does not protect the
Defendants' statements about the timing of topline results and that
the allegations about OS results demonstrate that their statements
were misleading.

Judge Burroughs finds that the challenged materials "contained
forward-looking statements, as so stated therein," as well as
relevant and meaningful cautionary language, and therefore come
under the protection of the statutory safe harbor.  Far from being
boilerplate as the Plaintiff claims, the cautionary language used
in AVEO's press releases and SEC filings fits squarely within the
safe harbor, as it explicitly identified the expected timeline of
topline results as uncertain.  It is difficult to determine how the
Defendants could have more explicitly warned the public about the
uncertainty of its timing estimates or what language would have
satisfied the Plaintiff.  In any case, the language used by the
Defendants easily satisfies the requirements of the safe harbor.

The Defendants argue that they did not have a duty to disclose that
subjects were lost to follow-up, but state that they nevertheless
did in fact disclose this information.  The Plaintiff contends that
Defendants had an obligation to share complete data with investors,
including to specify the number of subjects who were lost to
follow-up as opposed to those who had simply withdrawn from the
study, because the number of patients lost to follow-up had the
potential to make the TIVO-3 OS data worse.

Judge Burroughs finds that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that knowing the exact number of additional results that might be
provided through previously-lost-to-follow-up subjects versus
withdrawn subjects or active subjects would be relevant in the
"total mix" of information provided to investors.  The Company
emphasized that, regardless of the source of those additional OS
results, the results could change the outlook of tivozanib for
better or worse.

Because the further disclosure of these unknowns would not have
significantly altered the total mix of information available to
shareholders.  The omissions are therefore not material. Judge
Burroughs finds that a jury could not reasonably find falsity or
materiality on the evidence presented.  Having failed to plead an
essential element of his claim, the Plaintiff fails to state a
claim for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Burroughs concludes that the
Defendants' statements regarding the timing of topline results in
the TIVO-3 clinical trial are protected by the PSLRA safe harbor.
Further, the Plaintiff has failed to allege a material
misrepresentation or omission sufficient to state a claim under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Accordingly, Judge Burroughs granted
the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 24, 2020 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://bit.ly/35BX3xt from Leagle.com.


B&V ENTERPRISES: Kim TCPA Suit Removed to C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Frank Kim, as an individual and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. B&V Enterprises, Inc., a
California Corporation; DOES 1 through 50, inclusive; Case No.
20STCP02315, was removed from the Superior Court of California, Los
Angeles County, to the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California on Oct. 22, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:20-cv-09704 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act.

B & V Enterprises, Inc. produces supermarket products. The Company
offers fruits, meat and sea food, grocery, nuts, and liquor.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          David Charles Bolstad, Esq.
          SAFARIAN CHOI & BOLSTAD LLP
          555 S Flower Street Suite 650
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 481-6565
          Fax: (213) 225-1146
          Email: dbolstad@safarianchoi.com


BAHAMA BUCK'S: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bahama Buck's
Fanchise Corporation. The case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. Bahama
Buck's Fanchise Corporation, Case No. 1:20-cv-08804 (S.D.N.Y., Oct.
22, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bahama Buck's is a privately held franchise specializing in shaved
ice and other frozen non-alcoholic beverages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Paul Force, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: dforce@steinsakslegal.com


BIOMARIN PHARMA: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 24 Motion Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class action has been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of BioMarin Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (NASDAQ: BMRN). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to
petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional
information about each case can be found at the link provided.

BioMarin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: BMRN)

Class Period: February 28, 2020 to August 18, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 24, 2020

BioMarin was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in San Rafael,
California. BioMarin is a biotechnology company that develops and
commercializes therapies for people with serious and
life-threatening rare diseases and medical conditions. The
Company's product candidates include, among others, valoctocogene
roxaparvovec, an investigational adenoassociated virus ("AAV") gene
therapy, which is in Phase 3 clinical development for the treatment
of patients with severe hemophilia A.

On August 19, 2020, BioMarin announced receipt of a Complete
Response Letter ("CRL") from the FDA to the Company's Biologics
License Application ("BLA") for valoctocogene roxaparvovec.
BioMarin advised investors that in the CRL, "the FDA introduced a
new recommendation for two years of data from the Company's ongoing
270-301 study (Phase 3) to provide substantial evidence of a
durable effect using Annualized Bleeding Rate (ABR) as the primary
endpoint" and "recommended that the Company complete the Phase 3
Study and submit two-year follow-up safety and efficacy data on all
study participants." In explaining the new recommendation, the "FDA
concluded that the differences between Study 270-201 (Phase 1/2)
and the Phase 3 study limited its ability to rely on the Phase 1/2
study to support durability of effect."

On this news, BioMarin's stock price fell $41.82 per share, or
35.28%, to close at $76.72 per share on August 19, 2020.

The complaint, filed on September 25, 2020, alleges that throughout
the Class Period defendants made materially false and misleading
statements regarding the Company's business, operational and
compliance policies. Specifically, defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i)
differences between the Phase 1/2 and Phase 3 study of
valoctocogene roxaparvovec limited the reliability of the Phase 1/2
study to support valoctocogene roxaparvovec's durability of effect;
(ii) as a result, it was foreseeable that the FDA would not approve
the BLA for valoctocogene roxaparvovec without additional data; and
(iii) as a result, the Company's public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

For more information on the BioMarin securities class action go to:
https://bespc.com/BMRN

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do
not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]


BIOMARIN PHARMA: Hagens Berman Reminds of Nov. 24 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc. (NASDAQ: BMRN)
investors to contact the firm now.  A securities fraud class action
has been filed and certain investors may have valuable claims.

Class Period: Feb. 28, 2020 - Aug. 18, 2020
Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Nov. 24, 2020
Visit: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/BMRN
Contact An Attorney Now: BMRN@hbsslaw.com
844-916-0895

BioMarin Pharmaceutical (BMRN) Securities Class Action:

The complaint alleges that Defendants' statements misrepresented
and concealed material information about BioMarin's valoctocogene
roxaparvovec product candidate, potentially the first gene therapy
approved by the U.S. FDA for hemophilia in the U.S.

Specifically, throughout the Class Period, Defendants misstated or
omitted to disclose that (1) differences between the phase 1/2 and
phase 3 study of valoctocogene roxaparvovec limited the reliability
of the phase 1/2 study to support valoctocogene roxaparvovec's
durability of effect, and (2) as a result, it was foreseeable that
the FDA would not approve BioMarin's Biologics License Application
("BLA") for valoctocogene roxaparvovec without additional data.

Investors allegedly began to learn the truth on Aug. 19, 2020, when
BioMarin announced it received the FDA's complete response letter
("CRL") to the BLA indicating the FDA recommended the company
submit additional data upon completion of the phase 3 study since
the difference between the phase 1/2 and phase 3 studies limited
the FDA's ability to rely on the phase 1/2 study to support the
durability of effect.

Analysts at Guggenheim were shocked by the Company's disclosure,
noting "[t]his news came as a negative surprise to us in light of
mgt commentary and other launch-related prep (by BMRN and other
payers) and pushes out a potential Roctavian approval until
~2022."

This news drove the price of BioMarin shares down over 35% that
day.

"We're focused on investors' losses and proving Defendants misled
investors about the phase 1/2 reliability for the BLA," said Reed
Kathrein, the Hagens Berman partner leading the investigation.

If you are a BioMarin investor or may assist the firm's
investigation, click here to discuss your legal rights with Hagens
Berman.

Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding
BioMarin should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program.  Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC.  For more information, call Reed Kathrein
at 844-916-0895 or email BMRN@hbsslaw.com.

                      About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys.  The firm
represents investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in
complex litigation.  More about the firm and its successes is
located at hbsslaw.com. [GN]


BIOMARIN PHARMA: Rosen Law Firm Reminds of Nov. 24 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, on Sept. 28
announced the filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of
purchasers of the securities of BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc.
(NASDAQ: BMRN) between February 28, 2020 and August 18, 2020,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for BioMarin investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the BioMarin class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1960.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) differences between the Phase 1/2 and Phase 3 study of
valoctocogene roxaparvovec limited the reliability of the Phase 1/2
study to support valoctocogene roxaparvovec's durability of effect;
(2) as a result, it was foreseeable that the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") would not approve the Biologics License
Application ("BLA") for valoctocogene roxaparvovec without
additional data; and (3) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times. When the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims
that investors suffered damages.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
24, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1960.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest
ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company.
Rosen Law Firm's attorneys are ranked and recognized by numerous
independent and respected sources. Rosen Law Firm has secured
hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. Attorney
Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
[GN]


BJORN'S STEREO: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Bjorn's Stereo
Designs, Inc. The case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Bjorn's Stereo
Designs, Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-08805-JMF (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 22,
2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Bjorn's Stereo Designs, Inc. operates as an electronics store. The
Company retails CD players, television, projectors, headphones,
speakers, home theaters, and other audio and video
accessories.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Paul Force, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: dforce@steinsakslegal.com


CLIENT SERVICES: Court Narrows Claims in Rhee FDCPA Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HIESEOK RHEE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. CLIENT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 19-cv-1225 (D. N.J.), Judge John
Michael Vazquez of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey (i) denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction without prejudice, and (ii) granted in
part and denied in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

The putative class action involves alleged violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA").  The Defendant sent the
Plaintiff a letter attempting to collect a debt from him.  The Debt
Collection Letter provided that the Plaintiff had 30 days to notify
the Defendant that he disputed the validity of the debt or to
obtain verification of the debt.  The Debt Collection Letter also
provided him with an "Account Resolution Offer," giving him the
option to resolve the entire debt by paying less than what was
owed.  The Letter explained that to accept the offer, the Plaintiff
had to make a specific payment within 40 days.  The Debt Collection
Letter also contained two different return addresses.

After receiving the Letter, the Plaintiff filed the putative class
action, alleging violations of the FDCPA.  Count One of his
Complaint alleges that the Account Resolution Offer overshadows the
validation notice and renders the Debt Collection Letter false and
misleading.  Count Two alleges that the Defendant violated the
FDCPA because the letter contained two addresses and failed to
specify which one the Plaintiff should use for submitting written
disputes.  

The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The
Defendant's standing argument stems from the Supreme Court's
decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, as applied by the Seventh
Circuit in Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc.

The Court previously denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss as to
standing without prejudice because the parties failed to analyze
binding precedent in making their arguments.  As discussed in the
Prior Opinion, although the Third Circuit has not addressed the
precise issue before the Court, it has articulated the criteria by
which such decisions should be analyzed.  Accordingly, the Court
ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing that addressed
the Plaintiff's standing, or lack thereof, under the Third
Circuit's criteria.  

Yet, again, the parties largely rely on cases from outside the
Third Circuit in their supplemental briefing.  But the Court has an
obligation to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction, which
standing implicates.  As a result, it conducted independent
research as to whether the Plaintiff has standing to assert his
claims.

Client Services argues that the Plaintiff fails to sufficiently
allege that he suffered harm here, and, thus, does not meet the
injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing.  Client
Services continues that the Plaintiff's Complaint alleges a "bare
procedural violation" with no concrete harm, such that the
Complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing.  The Plaintiff
counters that he suffered a concrete harm, as defined by the
Supreme Court in Spokeo.

The Third Circuit has addressed challenges to standing after Spokeo
by conducting both a historical and a congressional inquiry.  And
an overwhelming majority of the courts in this district have found
that various types of violations under Section 1692e give rise to
concrete, substantive injuries sufficient to establish Article III
standing under the congressional inquiry analysis.  

Judge Vazquez similarly concludes that the Plaintiff suffered a
concrete injury sufficient to establish Article III standing.  The
he receipt of a misleading debt collection letter may constitute a
concrete injury because it is the precise injury that Congress
hoped to stop with the FDCPA.  The Plaintiff contends that the Debt
Collection Letter was misleading in violation of Section 1692e.  He
also alleges that the layout of the Letter overshadowed the
validation notice.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff argues that the
least sophisticated debtor would be unaware of his right to dispute
or validate the debt, which legislative history indicates that the
FDCPA intended to protect.  These allegations are sufficient to
establish a concrete, although intangible injury, establishing
standing.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing because the
alleged harms are hypothetical.  The Judge also disagrees.  The
Plaintiff does not need to plead any additional injury, such as the
fact that he was actually confused by the Debt Collection Letter,
to establish standing.  The applicable standard turns on the least
sophisticated debtor rather than a particular plaintiff.
Consequently, the Judge is satisfied that the Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged an injury in fact.

The Defendant also contends that Plaintiff's injuries are not
redressable.  By creating a private right of action and allowing
for statutory damages for violation of the FDCPA, Congress has
expressed an intent to make the injury redressable.  Accordingly,
the Plaintiff's alleged injury is redressable.

In sum, the Plaintiff has standing to assert his claims and the
Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.
Because the Plaintiff has standing to assert his claims, the Judge
turns to the Defendant's arguments for dismissal pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).

In Count One, the Plaintiff alleges that the "Account Resolution
Offer" in the Debt Collection Letter renders the letter false and
misleading, and overshadowed the validation notice.  The Defendant
argues that these claims must be dismissed because the precise
settlement offer does not violate the FDCPA.

The Judge opines that the fact that the Debt Collection Letter
provided the Plaintiff with 45 days to accept the resolution offer
does not overshadow the 30-day requirement in the validation
notice.  The Debt Collection Letter provides the Plaintiff with two
offers, and there is no demand or threat of legal action if he
decides not to take the settlement offer.  Consequently, the
Plaintiff fails to state a claim with respect to his allegations
that the Account Resolution Offer overshadows the validation notice
or otherwise renders the Debt Collection Letter false or
misleading.  The Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted on these
grounds.

The Plaintiff also alleges in Count One that the Defendant failed
to effectively convey the validation notice in the first instance.
The Defendant counters that the least sophisticated consumer's
attention is obviously directed to the validation notice because it
is at the very top of the Letter, and clearly labeled "Debt
Validation Notice."

Again, Section 1692g(a) requires debt collectors to include written
notice of certain rights in the initial communication or provide
written notice of the rights to the debtor within five days of the
initial communication.  The validation notice must be conveyed
effectively to the debtor.  The least sophisticated debtor may be
confused as to whether the validation notice on the first page of
the Debt Collection Letter, which appears before the direction to
"see below or reverse side," includes all his rights or whether he
was supposed to be informed of additional rights on the second page
of the letter.  The Plaintiff, therefore, sufficiently alleges a
claim based on the Defendant's failure to effectively convey the
required validation notice.  The Defendant's motion to dismiss is
denied on these grounds.

Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that the Debt Collection Letter is
misleading because it contains multiple addresses for the
Defendant.  The Defendant maintains that the presence of two
addresses does not violate the FDCPA because the Debt Collection
Letter clearly instructs Plaintifthe f to send written disputes to
"our office" or "this office."  It continues that the office
address is listed under its name in two separate places on the
Letter, and even the least sophisticated consumer would know that a
PO Box cannot be the location of an office.

The Judge opines that the Debt Collection Letter instructs the
Plaintiff to notify "this office" to dispute the debt.  The Debt
Collection Letter, however, fails to provide a specific address for
debtors to send written disputes.  It states that the Plaintiff
could accept the account resolution offer by sending a payment, and
provides an address to remit payment.  It lists the same address
for remitting payments under the Defendant's name at the top of the
letter but also lists a PO Box, which is in a different city, near
the remit payment address.  In addition, although the least
sophisticated debtor knows that an office cannot physically be
located at a PO Box, it is reasonable to assume that a company can
receive its mail through a PO Box instead of its physical office
location.

Based on the multiple addresses and the Defendant's failure to
provide a specific address to dispute the debt, the least
sophisticated debtor may be confused as to which address he should
use to dispute his debt.  The Plaintiff, therefore, states a
plausible claim under the FDCPA based on these allegations.  Thus,
the Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied on these grounds.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Vazquez granted in part and denied
in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss.  The dismissed claim is
dismissed without prejudice, and the Plaintiff is provided with 30
days to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies
noted.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/35AmBen from Leagle.com.


COLONY CREDIT: Vincent Wong Reminds of Nov. 9 Motion Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong on Oct. 4 disclosed that class
action has commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Colony
Credit.  If you suffered a loss you have until the lead plaintiff
deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead plaintiff.
There will be no obligation or cost to you.

Colony Credit Real Estate, Inc. (NYSE:CLNC)

If you suffered a loss, contact us at:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/colony-credit-real-estate-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=9780&wire=1

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 9, 2020

This lawsuit is on behalf of persons and/or entities who purchased
or otherwise acquired the common stock of Colony Credit pursuant
and/or traceable to the Company's false and/or misleading
Registration Statement and Prospectus issued in connection with the
combination of Colony NorthStar, Inc., NorthStar Real Estate Income
Trust, Inc., and NorthStar Real Estate Income II, Inc. on or about
February 1, 2018 (the "Merger").

Allegations against CLNC include that: (i) the credit quality of
certain of the Company's assets had deteriorated prior to the
Merger, and were continuing to deteriorate at the time of the
Merger; (ii) certain of the Company's loans, including four loans
of approximately $261 million related to a New York hotel, were
substantially impaired, there was insufficient collateral to secure
the loans, and it was unlikely that the loans would be repaid;
(iii) as a result, the valuation attributed to certain of the
Company's assets was overstated; (iv) that certain of the assets
contributed as part of the Merger were of substantially lower value
than reflected in the Company's financial statements and the
Registration Statement; (v) as a result, the Company's financial
condition, including its book value, was materially overstated; and
(vi) as a result of the foregoing, the positive statements in the
Registration Statement about the Company's business, operations,
and prospect were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel. 212.425.1140
Fax. 866.699.3880
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


D&A SERVICES: Feldman Files FDCPA Suit in Maryland
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against D&A Services, LLC, et
al. The case is styled as Natan Feldman, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. D&A Services, LLC, John Does
1-25, Case No. 8:20-cv-03074-PWG (D. Md., Oct. 22, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

D&A services collects retail store debt, credit card, auto
deficiencies, commercial debt, medical bills, student loan debt,
and mortgage debt, nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aryeh E. Stein, Esq.
          MERIDIAN LAW, LLC
          600 Reisterstown Road, Suite 700
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Phone: (443) 326-6011
          Fax: (410) 653-1061
          Email: astein@meridianlawfirm.com

DEAN MEILING: Court Dismisses Alexander Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------
In the case, JERRY ALEXANDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DEAN MEILING,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:16-cv-00572-MMD-CLB (D. Nev.), Judge
Miranda M. Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada
(i) denied the Special Motion to Dismiss Under NRS Section 41.660
and for Attorneys' Fees filed by Defendants Dean Meiling, Madylon
Meiling, Chemeon Surface Technology, LLC, Metalst Surface
Technology, LLC, D&M-MI, LLC, DSM Partners, LP, and Meiling Family
Partners, Ltd. ("Meilings"); and (ii) granted both the Meilings'
Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Defendant Janet Chubb's Motion to
Dismiss.

Investors of Metalast International, LLC initiated the putative
class action against other investors and their alleged
co-conspirators for purportedly engaging in a fraudulent scheme to
control Metalast.  The Plaintiffs are part of a group of over 900
investors who made an initial capital investment of over $90
million in Metalast.  Metalast later acquired more capital and
loans from an array of sources, including the Meilings.

The Defendants later conspired to use the Meilings' capital
contribution and loans to Metalast to fraudulently acquire its
assets.  As part of the scheme, the Defendants misrepresented that
the Meilings would provide Metalast with more funding, but they
never did, causing Metalast to stop seeking funding from other
sources.  As part of the feigned negotiation, the Defendants
obtained access to Metalast's confidential and proprietary
information, and later used the information to file a receivership
action against Metalast to take over its assets.

In fact, the Defendants were planning to file a state court
receivership action when they feigned negotiations, and Dean
Meiling was using the negotiation to obtain further fodder to use
in support of the receivership action.  During negotiations, the
Defendants also misrepresented that the Meilings' legal counsel was
Chubb and their accountant was Proctor.  These misrepresentations
occurred in two meetings sometime in March and April 2013.

On April 16, 2013, Chubb helped the Meilings petition the Nevada
state court for appointment of Proctor and his employer Meridian as
receiver for Metalast.  The State Court granted the Meilings'
petition and initiated a receivership action.

During the Receivership Action, Proctor removed and prevented
Metalast's managing member from contacting Metalast's members,
which further prevented the members from timely participating or
protecting their interests in the Receivership Action.  Moreover,
Proctor improperly appointed Dean and Madylon Meiling to take over
Metalast's operations for the purpose of devaluing Metalast and to
misrepresent that the company could no longer continue.  In the
Receivership Action, the Defendants also misrepresented Metalast's
financial affairs and Proctor's status as an independent party.
The alleged fraudulent scheme culminated with a transfer and
conversion of a majority of Metalast's assets to the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs assert claims against the Meilings for: (1) breach
of contract, (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and (3) tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
(4) unjust enrichment, and (5) conversion.  Additionally, they
assert claims against all the Defendants for: (1) civil conspiracy,
(2) fraud, and (3) negligent misrepresentation.  Finally, the
Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) breach of fiduciary
duty against the Meilings and Proctor; (2) professional negligence
against Proctor and Meridian; and (3) respondeat superior against
Meridian for Proctor's conduct.

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' action is a strategic
lawsuit against public participation ("SLAPP"), which seeks to
collaterally attack their participation in the Receivership Action.


Judge Du finds that the Defendants have not met the threshold
showing that the communications at issue were made in good faith.
The Plaintiffs allege that, prior to the Receivership Action, the
Defendants misrepresented Chubb and Proctor's relationship with the
Meilings and that the Meilings would provide funding to Metalast.
As misrepresentations, these statements do not constitute "good
faith communications" under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Moreover, the alleged communications involved issues unrelated to
the Receivership Action.  The Plaintiffs argue -- and the
Defendants do not dispute -- that the only issue in the
Receivership Action was the apparent solvency of Metalast.  The
State Court did not make any findings of fact regarding the actions
and omissions of the Defendants prior to the date that the
Receivership Action commenced.  Accordingly, the Judge denied the
Anti-SLAPP Motion.

As for the Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs argue that there is no
supporting authority for applying the privilege here to protect the
Defendants "from liability for fraud, conspiracy, or covert and
surreptitious actions.  They essentially allege that the Defendants
engaged in communicative acts in contemplation of the Receivership
Action.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by
litigation privilege.  Litigation privilege clearly applies to the
communicative acts alleged.  

First, the Defendants were planning to file the Receivership Action
when they purportedly feigned negotiations and, in fact, used
information obtained during negotiations by filing it in State
Court.  Second, misrepresentations about funding and Proctor's
relationship with the Meilings clearly relate to issues in the
Receivership Action, i.e. whether Metalast is solvent and, if not,
who should serve as its receiver.  Third, litigation privilege
applies to communicative acts made to both Metalast, a party in the
Receivership Action, and Plaintiffs who, as Metalast investors,
claim they had legal and financial interests in the action.  

Finally, it is noteworthy that the Plaintiffs are essentially suing
the Defendants for participating in the Receivership Action
because: (1) the Plaintiff's sole injury stems from the
Receivership Action; and (2) the Defendants allegedly caused the
injury when they used fraudulently-obtained information to file in
the Receivership Action -- information that the Plaintiffs do not
dispute are accurate.  Therefore, applying litigation privilege in
the case would serve the doctrine's underlying policy of promoting
the truth finding process in a judicial proceeding and lessening
the chilling effect on those who seek to utilize the judicial
process to seek relief.  For these reasons, the Judge granted the
Motion to Dismiss.

Judge Du notes that the parties made several arguments and cited to
several cases not discussed.  The Judge has reviewed these
arguments and cases and determined that they do not warrant
discussion as they do not affect the outcome of the motions before
the Court.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/31HxDgA from Leagle.com.


DEAN POLL: 2018 Workers' Wage Class Action Still Pending
--------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Holliday Smith, writing for The City, reports that indoor
dining has returned to New York, albeit in a limited form. But one
iconic restaurant in the heart of Manhattan can't stay afloat.

The restaurant at the Loeb Boathouse in Central Park, long the site
of lakeside lunches and picturesque weddings, is shutting for the
foreseeable future, according to union officials representing
workers and a state notice of layoffs there.

The owner of the park eatery, restaurateur Dean Poll, had
furloughed workers there in March at the start of the pandemic, the
Department of Labor notice said. But those layoffs "will now be
considered permanent," according to Sept. 8 filing.

All of the venue's 163 workers will be affected by the closure. The
reason given for the layoffs: "Unforeseeable business circumstances
prompted by COVID-19," the labor notice read.

Megan Moriarty, Parks Department spokesperson, said the restaurant
at the Boathouse has been closed since mid-March, but is allowed to
reopen "to the extent it can operate in accordance with the
applicable state COVID-related guidelines."

A lone worker leaving the locked and darkened Boathouse on Oct. 2
told THE CITY that Poll hopes to reopen the restaurant in April. A
separate source with the workers' union, the Hotel Trade Council
Local 6, confirmed Poll had mentioned that idea recently. But no
reopening plan has emerged.

Inquiries to Poll and his restaurant group, which includes
Gallagher's Steakhouse in Midtown, were not returned. Nearly 100
staffers were laid off from Gallagher's, according to a separate
Department of Labor notice posted in early September. However, the
steakhouse reopened for indoor dining Sept. 30, staff there said.

The worker at the Boathouse, who declined to give his name, said
the expansive restaurant usually welcomes in throngs of park-goers
and tourists -- and needs "thousands" of guests to run. Without the
usual crowds in Central Park, the Boathouse can't make a go of it.

"It's a big place," he said of the eatery.

Troubled Waters

The Loeb Boathouse had been operating under a 15-year concession
license agreement with the Department of Parks and Recreation that
began in January of 2017.

Poll is the subject of a federal class-action lawsuit filed in 2018
alleging staff at the restaurant stole wages and harassed workers.
That case is pending. Attorneys for the plaintiff did not return a
request for comment.

In 2018, Poll invested in a $2.9 million renovation of the
restaurant, reopening in late summer of that year. In total, he is
on the hook for $23.9 million to be paid to the city for the right
to operate the Boathouse.

The Parks Department hasn't been looking for payment for months,
Moriarty said.

"The restaurant has been closed since March, and we haven't been
charging the monthly license fees since then," she said.

The Boathouse concession agreement also included responsibility for
running Central Park's famous row boats. The boats have been docked
since the COVID-19 crisis began.

The Loeb Boathouse -- named for banker and philanthropist Carl Loeb
who, with his wife, Adeline, donated $305,000 for an earlier
1870s-era boathouse to be demolished and rebuilt -- first opened in
1954 on the northeast side of Central Park's lake. Since then, it
has been a special-occasion destination for New Yorkers and
tourists alike -- and a fixture in films. The Manchurian Candidate,
When Harry Met Sally and 27 Dresses all feature the beloved
waterside restaurant.

Even with some indoor dining now allowed in the city, Poll is not
alone among restaurateurs struggling to stay above water in New
York right now.

A recent report by New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli found
that by August, only 55% of pre-pandemic employment in the
restaurant industry had returned as of August.

And the outlook for restaurants is bleak, with a looming rent
crisis and a trickle of returning customers, as Eater New York has
recently reported.

The website has kept a running tally of all city restaurants and
bars that have shuttered since the pandemic began. As of September,
Eater had documented nearly 150 closures. [GN]


DECATHLON USA: Blumenthal Nordrehaug Files Labor Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The San Francisco employment law attorneys at Blumenthal Nordrehaug
Bhowmik De Blouw LLP, filed a class action complaint alleging that
Decathlon USA LLC failed to provide their California employees with
proper compensation. The Decathlon USA LLC class action lawsuit,
Case No. RG20073024, is currently pending in the Alameda Superior
Court of the State of California. A copy of the Complaint can be
read here.

According to the lawsuit filed, Decathlon USA LLC allegedly (a)
failed to pay minimum wages, (b) failed to pay overtime wages, (c)
failed to properly record and provide legally required meal and
rest periods, (d) failed to provide accurate itemized wage
statements, (e) failed to reimburse employees for required
expenses, (f) failed to provide wages when due, and (g) failed to
provide personnel files, all in violation of the applicable Labor
Code sections listed in Labor Code Sections §§ 201, 202, 203,
226, 226.7, 510, 512, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198.5, 2802, and the
applicable Wage Order(s), and thereby gives rise to civil penalties
as a result of such alleged conduct.

Additionally, the complaint further alleges Decathlon USA LLC
committed acts of unfair competition in violation of the California
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Secs. 17200, et seq.
(the "UCL"), by engaging in a company-wide policy and procedure
which failed to accurately calculate and record all missed meal and
rest periods by PLAINTIFF and other CALIFORNIA CLASS Members. As a
result of DEFENDANT's intentional disregard of the obligation to
meet this burden, DEFENDANT allegedly failed to properly calculate
and/or pay all required compensation for work performed by the
members of the CALIFORNIA CLASS and violated the California Labor
Code.

If you would like to know more about the Decathlon USA LLC lawsuit,
please contact Attorney Nicholas J. De Blouw today by calling (800)
568-8020.

Blumenthal Nordrehaug Bhowmik De Blouw LLP is an employment law
firm with offices located in San Diego, San Francisco, Sacramento,
Los Angeles, Riverside and Chicago that dedicates its practice to
helping employees, investors and consumers fight back against
unfair business practices, including violations of the California
Labor Code and Fair Labor Standards Act. If you need help in
collecting unpaid overtime wages, unpaid commissions, being
wrongfully terminated from work, and other employment law claims,
contact one of their attorneys today. [GN]


DIAMOND RESORTS: App. Ct. Upholds Settlement Approval in Johnson
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE DIAMOND RESORTS WAGE AND HOUR CASES, Case No.
E071769 (Cal. App.), a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals of
California for the Fourth District, Division Two, affirmed the
trial court's order approving the settlement and affirmed the
judgment.

Diamond Resorts sells memberships in timeshare vacation properties
in California.  Ward Johnson worked for Diamond Resorts from
February 2013 to December 2015.  Johnson's job involved driving to
and from timeshare selling events, setting up and breaking down
advertising materials at those events, and working at sales booths
selling memberships.

According to Johnson, Diamond Resorts failed to pay required wages
(including overtime wages) and failed to pay the wages they did pay
in a timely fashion. He said they also failed to provide required
meal periods, rest periods, and reimbursements for work-related
expenses. He said Diamond Resorts regularly required employees to
punch out for lunch but continue working, forego rest breaks, and
make business calls using their personal cell phones for business
purposes.  He also alleged they failed to pay overtime rates for
days when employees worked a seventh consecutive day and failed to
pay employees their earned wages when they were terminated or
within 72 hours after employees left voluntarily.

In January 2017, Johnson made these allegations against Diamond
Resorts International Marketing, Inc. and Does 1 through 50 in a
wage and hour class action complaint in Orange County Superior
Court.  He alleged assorted Labor Code violations, including that
Diamond Resorts International Marketing, Inc. failed to pay wages
and overtime wages, failed to provide meal periods, failed to
provide rest periods, failed to pay wages on time, and failed to
reimburse business expenses.  He also brought a claim for unfair
competition.

Johnson brought the suit for himself and for the class of all
persons who are or were employed in non-exempt positions, however
titled, by Diamond Resorts in the state of California within four
years prior to the filing of the complaint in the action until
resolution of the lawsuit.  He sought to represent a subclass of
those class members employed at any time between January 2014 and
the present who have separated their employment.

In 2018, Johnson and Diamond Resorts agreed to settle a wage and
hour class action lawsuit for $2.8 million.  Johnson represented a
class of over 3,000 Diamond Resorts employees.  The settlement
results in an average individual payment of over $500 to
participating class members.  The highest individual award is
$4,000.  Notified of the settlement, less than 0.5% of the class
opted out, and only nine would-be class members objected.

The trial court entered judgment on Nov. 7, 2018, and the Smith
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.  

The appeal involves some of those objectors, Autumn Smith, Alice
Alvarez, and Juanita Smith, all of them named Plaintiffs in a
separate wage and hour class action lawsuit against Diamond Resorts
entities.  Appellant Smith had filed a similar wage and hour class
action against Diamond Resorts entities in Riverside County
Superior Court on Aug. 28, 2015.  She brought the case on behalf of
all non-exempt employees of Diamond Resorts Management, Inc.,
Diamond Resorts International, and unknown related entities who
worked for them in California from Aug. 28, 2011 to final
judgment.

The Smith Plaintiffs alleged violations of the California Labor
Code for: (1) unpaid overtime, (2) unpaid meal period premiums, (3)
unpaid rest period premiums, (4) unpaid minimum wages, (5) untimely
payment of final wages, (6) untimely payment of regular wages
during employment, (7) non-complaint wage statements, (8)
inadequate payroll records, and (9) unreimbursed business expenses.
They also alleged claims for unfair competition under California
Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. and sought
recovery of penalties and remedies under California's Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004.

These are the same sorts of violations Johnson alleged, but
Johnson's original complaint did not include causes of action for
the failures to pay regular wages in a timely fashion, to pay
minimum wages, to provide adequate wage statements, or to keep
required payroll records, nor did it seek penalties and remedies
under PAGA.

Johnson filed a petition for coordination of the Johnson and Smith
Class Actions.  In June 2017, the trial court held a hearing and
determined coordination of the two cases was appropriate.  The
court granted the petition and assigned both cases to a
coordinating judge in Riverside County Superior Court under the
title Diamond Resorts Wage and Hour Cases.  

Maria Lourdes Sarabia filed a third class action against Diamond
Resorts Management, Inc. in August 2017.  Sarabia's complaint
alleged wage and hour violations similar to Johnson's complaint.
She alleged claims for failure to pay wages, including overtime;
failure to pay vested vacation time on separation of employment;
failure to provide compliant wage statements; and sought waiting
time penalties under Labor Code section 203. She also alleged an
unfair competition violation.

After the parties in the Johnson class action reached settlement,
Sarabia amended her complaint to add a cause of action seeking
penalties under PAGA.  Diamond Resorts filed a notice of related
case with the trial court on Sept. 20, 2017.  In the end, Sarabia
joined the Johnson class action as a named Plaintiff.

The Smith Plaintiffs argue the claims of the class were worth tens
of millions of dollars more than the settlement amount and argued
at settlement fairness hearings in the trial court that Johnson's
counsel didn't adequately research or value the claims they sought
to settle.  The trial court approved the settlement between Johnson
and Diamond Resorts despite these objections, and the objectors now
appeal that decision.

They argue the trial court abused its discretion by approving the
settlement despite the deficiencies in investigation and valuation.
  They also argue the trial court erred by (i) allowing Johnson to
settle claims dating back to August 2011, beyond the statute of
limitations for any of the named plaintiffs in his lawsuit, (ii)
entering judgment without ensuring proper notice to the class,
(iii) approving a settlement class that is too broad, and (iv)
failing to issue specific findings when objectors requested that it
do so.

The Panel finds that (i) under the abuse of discretion standard of
review the record was sufficient for the trial court to make a
rational and educated determination the settlement was fair,
adequate and reasonable; (ii) the Smith Plaintiffs have provided no
authority to suggest the statute of limitations period applicable
to Labor Code claims is jurisdictional; (iii) the trial court
correctly determined the notice was adequate to describe the effect
of the settlement to interested class members; (iv) the Smith
Plaintiffs provide no authority for the proposition that class
action plaintiffs cannot settle, in addition to the claims they
actually brought, any claims that "could have been brought" in the
same action, and the Court is aware of none; and (v) the Smith
Plaintiffs overstate the need for statements of decision when
approving class action settlements.

For these reasons, the Appellate Court concludes the trial court
acted within its discretion when it concluded the settlement was a
fair and reasonable resolution of the class claims and the other
objections have no merit.  Judge Marsha G. Slough, writing for the
Appellate Court, affirmed the trial court order giving final
approval to the settlement and therefore affirmed the judgment.
The Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's July 21, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3kJuTHn from Leagle.com.

Lawyers for Justice, Edwin Aiwazian -- edwin@calljustice.com --
Arby Aiwazian -- arby@calljustice.com -- and Joanna Ghosh --
joanna@lfjpc.com  -- for Plaintiffs, Intervenors and Appellants,
Autumn Smith, Alice Alvarez and Juanita Smith.

Snell & Wilmer, Todd E. Lundell -- tlundell@swlaw.com -- Brian J.
Mills -- bmills@swlaw.com -- and Anne Dwyer -- adwyer@swlaw.com --
for Defendants and Respondents, Diamond Resorts International
Marketing, Inc., Diamond Resorts Management, Inc., and Diamond
Resorts International, Inc.

Gupta Wessler, Deepak Gupta -- deepak@guptawessler.com -- and
Alexandria Twinem -- alex@guptawessler.com -- for Respondents, Ward
A. Johnson, Gary Coker, Lisa Evans, and Maria Lourdes Sarabia.

James Hawkins, James R. Hawkins -- James@jameshawkinsaplc.com --
and Gregory Mauro -- GREG@MAUROLAWFIRM.NET -- for Respondents, Ward
A. Johnson, Gary Coker, and Lisa Evans.

Law Offices of Sahag Majarian II and Sahag Majarian; Kingsley and
Kingsley, Eric Kingsley -- eric@kingsleykingsley.com -- and Ariel
J. Stiller-Shulman -- ari@kingsleykingsley.com -- for Respondent
Maria Lourdes Sarabia.


EXPLORICA: Faces Class Action Over Cancelled School Trips
---------------------------------------------------------
VOCM reports that a St. John's law firm is moving full steam ahead
with a national class-action lawsuit against companies that were
paid millions of dollars for school trips that didn't happen due to
COVID-19.

Many families are still waiting and hoping to get their money back
but have received little or nothing to date from Explorica, as well
as its insurance companies Old Republic and Arch Insurance.

Lawyer Travis Payne with the firm Curtis Dawe says in this
province, the lawsuit now includes about 150 families, adding it's
unfortunate they've been caught in the middle.

Payne says there's a dispute between the travel and insurance
companies as to who should pay how much, but he believes families
should get their money first and the companies can then hash out
the details between them.

Families across the country are still owed about $10 million in
total, he said. [GN]


FENNEC PHARMA: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 2 Motion Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on Oct. 8 disclosed that class action lawsuit
has commenced on behalf of shareholders of Fennec Pharmaceuticals
Inc. Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have
until the deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details
about the cases can be found at the links provided. There is no
cost or obligation to you.

Fennec Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NASDAQ:FENC)

FENC Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased February 11,
2020 - August 10, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 2, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/fennec-pharmaceuticals-inc-information-request-form?prid=9890&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Fennec
Pharmaceuticals Inc. made materially false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the manufacturing
facilities for PEDMARK, the Company's sole product candidate, did
not comply with current good manufacturing practices; (2) as a
result, regulatory approval for PEDMARK was reasonably likely to be
delayed; and (3) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive
statements about the Company's business, operations, and prospects
were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]


FIAT CHRYSLER: RAM 2500, 3500 Emissions Lawsuit Partly Tossed
-------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Wood, writing for CarComplaints.com, reports that a Ram
2500 and 3500 Cummins diesel engine lawsuit has been partly
dismissed, including dismissal of the important claim Fiat Chrysler
(FCA US) and engine manufacturer Cummins conspired to cheat
emissions tests.

According to the Ram 2500 and 3500 emissions class action lawsuit,
the trucks and their 6.7-liter Cummins diesel engines emit illegal
levels of pollutants that violate federal emissions standards.

The plaintiffs argue the emissions levels exceed limits by 50
percent and when the emissions system shuts down or stops
functioning, drivers receive a "limp mode" warning.

The plaintiffs also claim defects in the diesel aftertreatment
systems mean customers paid up to $10,000 per truck to receive the
advertised fuel economy and emissions benefits that never existed.

In addition to alleged problems with the diesel aftertreatment
defects, the class action alleges a "flash" defect causes a buildup
of soot from clogged diesel particulate filters.

Dealers service the Ram 2500 and 3500 trucks by flashing the power
control modules to burn off the soot, which allegedly causes the
trucks to burn more fuel. However, the lawsuit alleges the fuel
economy drops by 25% and many times truck owners allegedly aren't
told about the flashed control modules.

According to the lawsuit, FCA allegedly sold the 2013-2017 trucks
with faulty sealant in the catalytic reduction system, clogging the
filters which causes more fuel to be injected to burn off the soot.
FCA and Cummins allegedly concealed the emissions problems since at
least 2014

FCA told the judge the Ram trucks may have had issues in the past,
but a previous recall took care of everything and should have
satisfied customers.

According to Cummins, the class action is unnecessary because
previous recalls satisfied the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).

Chrysler further told the judge fraud claims are nonsense because
Cummins and FCA worked with the government on solutions to the
problems. Those solutions were implemented to the satisfaction of
federal regulators.

In addition to the dismissed Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act claim, the judge erased the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim and multiple claims related to
breach of contract, consumer protection and fraud claims.

According to the judge, 16 state law claims can move forward, in
addition to certain alleged misrepresentation claims.

Although the majority of the claims against FCA were dismissed,
Judge Terrence G. Berg says he will allow the plaintiffs to
rearrange their arguments and refile the lawsuit if they choose.

The Ram 2500 and 3500 and Cummins engine lawsuit was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan - Raymo,
et al., v. FCA US LLC, and Cummins Inc.

The plaintiffs are represented by Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP,
The Miller Law Firm PC, Seeger Weiss LLP, Carella Byrne Cecchi
Olstein Brody & Agnello PC, and Mastando & Artrip. [GN]


FREEDOM MORTGAGE: Urbina Suit Stayed Until Texas Case is Resolved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, NERI URBINA and LEONILA URBINA, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FREEDOM
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 1:19-cv-01471-NONE-JLT
(E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California (i) denied without prejudice the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for
failure to state a claim and (ii) granted the Defendant's motion to
stay pursuant to the "first-to-file" rule.

Plaintiffs Neri Urbina and Leonila Urbina filed the class action
lawsuit, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
against the Defendant alleging it charged unauthorized fees in
connection with a home mortgage in violation of California law.
The Plaintiffs assert the Court has federal subject matter
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, which the
Defendant does not contest.

In 2016, the Plaintiffs obtained a loan from the Defendant to
finance their home in Bakersfield, California.   In connection with
the loan, they signed a Deed of Trust setting forth the parties'
obligations with respect to the Plaintiffs' home loan.  Throughout
2017, the Plaintiffs made several monthly mortgage payments over
the phone and online.  Each time they made their payments online,
however, they were charged a $15 fee ("Pay-to-Pay fees").

The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges a violation of California's
Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and a claim for breach of contract.
The first claim alleges that the Defendant's Pay-to-Pay fees
violate California's Rosenthal Act and the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), which in turn violates the
"unlawful" prong of the UCL.  Their second claim alleges that
Pay-to-Pay fees amount to a breach of the Deed of Trust, which
incorporates the Federal Housing Authority's Servicing Guidelines
("FHA Guidelines"), the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA as substantive
terms of the contract.

The Plaintiffs purport to represent the following proposed class
members:  All persons with a California address who paid a fee to
FMC for making a loan payment by telephone, IVR, or the internet
during the applicable statutes of limitations for the Plaintiffs'
claims through the date a class is certified.

The Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice of a class
action complaint filed against it in the Northern District of Texas
-- Caldwell v. Freedom Mortgage Corp., No. 19-2193 (N.D. Tex. filed
Sept. 13, 2019).  In the amended complaint in the Texas case, the
named plaintiffs assert claims under the Texas Debt Collection Act
("TDCA") and for breach of contract against the Defendant for
similar Pay-to-Pay fees.  The named plaintiffs in the Texas case --
who are different from the named Plaintiffs in the instant action
-- purport to represent two classes.

First, they seek to represent the TDCA class, which is defined as:
All persons in the United States (1) with a Security Instrument on
a property located in the State of Texas, (2) that is or was
serviced by FMC, (3) who were charged one or more Pay-to-Pay fee,
and (4) whose Security Instrument did not expressly allow for the
charging of a Pay-to-Pay fee.

Second, the named plaintiffs in the Texas case seek to represent
the FHA Pay-to-Pay class, which is defined as: All persons in the
United States (1) with an FHA-insured mortgage (2) originated or
serviced by FMC (3) who were charged one or more Pay-to-Pay fee and
(4) whose mortgages provide the Lender may collect fees or charges
authorized by the Secretary, or language substantially similar.

Moreover, the Defendant requests the Court to take judicial notice
of other documents filed in the Texas case, including pro hac vice
applications, a class certification scheduling order, and a joint
report pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f).

Judge Drozd explains that a court may take judicial notice of a
fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is
generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction;
or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.  Therefore, he takes
judicial notice of the existence of the filings in the action
pending in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas because they are relevant to adjudicating the Defendant's
motion to stay.

The Defendant urges the Court to stay the lawsuit under the
first-to-file rule until the Texas case is resolved because the
chronology of the lawsuits, similarity of the parties, and
similarity of the issues all weigh in favor of a stay.  The Judge
agrees.  There is no dispute that the chronology of the two
lawsuits weighs in favor of a stay of the instant action because
the Texas case was filed on Sept. 13, 2019, about a month before
the instant case was filed on Oct. 16, 2019.

However, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant disagree over whether the
parties and issues in the case are sufficiently similar to the
Texas case to justify the granting of a stay under the
first-to-file rule.  With respect to the identity of the parties,
Freedom Mortgage Corporation is the sole Defendant both in the case
and the Texas case.  Therefore, the only relevant question is
whether the plaintiffs in both lawsuits are substantially similar.


The Judge finds, as the Plaintiffs concede, there is some overlap
between the proposed class in the lawsuit and the FHA proposed
class in the Texas case.  While there are proposed class members in
the case that are not represented in the Texas case, and vice
versa, "some" overlap exists with the proposed FHA class in the
Texas case and the Plaintiffs in the case who similarly allege
breaches of their deeds based on FHA guideline violations with
respect to properties located in California.  Also, the underlying
factual allegations at issue in the case and in the Texas case
centers on whether the Defendant's use of Pay-to-Pay fees are
prohibited by contract and/or law.  For these reasons, staying the
action is proper under the first-to-file rule.

Finally, the Defendant appears to seek a stay until the case
pending in the Northern District of Texas is completely resolved.
The Judge cannot determine at this time how long the stay of the
action should remain in effect.  At the very least, the Judge will
stay the action until the scope of the class in the Texas case is
resolved.  

Notably, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California has stayed a third lawsuit, filed after the action was
commenced, against the Defendant in which the allegations are
practically the same as those advanced in the case and in the Texas
case.  There, the court permitted the plaintiffs to petition to
lift the stay based on future developments in the Texas case.  The
Judge will afford the Plaintiffs the same opportunity in the case.
They may move to lift the stay in the case based on developments in
the Texas case impacting the status of the California class members
in that litigation.

Accordingly, Judge Drozd (i) granted the Defendant's motion to
stay, and (ii) denied without prejudice the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.  The parties are directed to file a status report every
120 days in the case.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/35Eb0uT from Leagle.com.


GARRETT MOTION: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 24 Motion Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class action has been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of  Garrett Motion, Inc. (NYSE:
GTX). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition the
court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about each
case can be found at the link provided.

Garrett Motion, Inc. (NYSE: GTX)

Class Period: October 1, 2018 to September 18, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 24, 2020

Garrett designs, manufactures and sells turbocharger,
electric-boosting and connected vehicle technologies for original
equipment manufacturers and the aftermarket. In October 2018, the
Company formed as a spin-off of the Transportation Systems business
of Honeywell International Inc. ("Honeywell").

On August 26, 2020, the Company disclosed that its "leveraged
capital structure poses significant challenges to its overall
strategic and financial flexibility and may impair its ability to
gain or hold market share in the highly competitive automotive
supply market, thereby putting Garrett at a meaningful disadvantage
relative to its peers." Garrett further stated that its "high
leverage is exacerbated by significant claims asserted by Honeywell
against certain Garrett subsidiaries under the disputed
subordinated asbestos indemnity and the tax matters agreement."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $3.04, or 44%, to
close at $3.84 per share on August 26, 2020.

On Sunday, September 20, 2020, Garrett announced that it had filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

On Monday, September 21, 2020, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
announced that it would commence proceedings to delist Garrett's
stock from the NYSE after the Company's disclosure that it had
filed for bankruptcy.

On this news, the Company's stock began trading over-the-counter
and closed at $1.76 per share on September 22, 2020, a 12% decline
from the closing price on September 18, 2020.

The complaint, filed on September 25, 2020, alleges that throughout
the Class Period defendants made materially false and/or misleading
statements, as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects.
Specifically, defendants failed to disclose to investors: (1) that,
due to its agreement to indemnify and reimburse Honeywell for
certain asbestos-related liability, Garrett was saddled with an
unsustainable level of debt; (2) that, as a result, Garrett had a
highly leveraged capital structure that posed significant
challenges to its overall strategic and financial flexibility; (3)
that, as a result of the foregoing, Garrett's ability to gain or
hold market share was impaired; (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, the Company was reasonably likely to seek bankruptcy
protection; and (5) that, as a result of the foregoing, defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

For more information on the Garrett Motion class action go to:
https://bespc.com/GTX

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do
not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]


GARRETT MOTION: Rosen Law Alerts of Class Action Filing
-------------------------------------------------------
Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announced the
filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Garrett Motion Inc. (NYSE: GTX) (OTC: GTXMQ) between
October 1, 2018 and September 18, 2020, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover damages for Garrett Motion
investors under the federal securities laws.

To join the Garrett Motion class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1950.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) due to its agreement to indemnify and reimburse Honeywell
for certain asbestos-related liability, Garrett was saddled with an
unsustainable level of debt; (2) as a result, Garrett had a highly
leveraged capital structure that posed significant challenges to
its overall strategic and financial flexibility; (3) as a result of
the foregoing, Garrett's ability to gain or hold market share was
impaired; (4) as a result of the foregoing, the Company was
reasonably likely to seek bankruptcy protection; and (5) as a
result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

A class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November
24, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on
behalf of other class members in directing the litigation. If you
wish to join the litigation, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-1950.htmlor to discuss
your rights or interests regarding this class action, please
contact Phillip Kim, Esq. of Rosen Law Firm toll free at
866-767-3653 or via e-mail at pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com.

NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN
ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT THIS POINT. AN INVESTOR'S
ABILITY TO SHARE IN ANY POTENTIAL FUTURE RECOVERY IS NOT DEPENDENT
UPON SERVING AS LEAD PLAINTIFF.

Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1
by ISS Securities Class Action Services for number of securities
class action settlements in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the
top 3 each year since 2013. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the largest
ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese Company.
Rosen Law Firm's attorneys are ranked and recognized by numerous
independent and respected sources. Rosen Law Firm has secured
hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. Attorney
Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Contact Information:

Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com [GN]


GENERAL MOTORS: Faces Class Action Over Oil Consumption Defect
--------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Hayes, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that General Motors
LLC got most class claims that some of its vehicles have a
defective engine causing excessive oil use trimmed, after the
District of Oregon found the plaintiffs failed to show the warranty
covers design defects.

The court dismissed claims of breach of express warranty, violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, fraudulent omission, and
violation of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practice Act. It gave the
plaintiffs 14 days to replead their claims.

The primary cause of the defect is GM's installation of piston
rings that don't apply enough tension to prevent oil from being
consumed in the combustion chamber. [GN]


GENIUS BRANDS: Portnoy Law Alerts of Investor Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------
The Portnoy Law Firm advises investors that a class action lawsuit
has been filed on behalf of Genius Brands International, Inc..
("Genius" or "the Company") (NASDAQ: GNUS) investors that acquired
securities between March 17, 2020 and July 5, 2020.  

Investors are encouraged to contact attorney Lesley F. Portnoy, to
determine eligibility to participate in this action, by phone
310-692-8883 or email, or click here to join the case.

It is alleged in the complaint filed in this class action that
throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially misleading
and/or false statements, as well as failed to disclose facts that
were materially adverse in regard to the Company's business,
operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to
disclose to investors: (i) that Nickelodeon's purported Rainbow
Rangers expansion was temporary and/or overstated; (ii) that
subscription to the Kartoon Channel! would be subject to fees
through Amazon Prime; and (iii) that the Kartoon Channel! did not
offer the company much viability for future growth.

Please visit our website to review more information and submit your
transaction information.

The Portnoy Law Firm represents investors in pursuing claims
arising from corporate wrongdoing. The Firm's founding partner has
recovered over $5.5 billion for aggrieved investors. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Lesley F. Portnoy, Esq.
Admitted CA and NY Bar
lesley@portnoylaw.com
310-692-8883
www.portnoylaw.com [GN]


GENWORTH LIFE: Trial in Brighton Trustees Suit Set for April 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Susman Godfrey LLP is Court-appointed interim lead counsel in a
proposed class action lawsuit regarding allegations that Genworth
Life and Annuity Insurance Company violated the terms of its
universal life insurance policies by imposing an unlawful and
excessive Cost of Insurance ("COI") increase. The Court ordered the
jury trial in the matter to commence on April 4, 2022.

Genworth announced the COI increase on GE Gold, First Choice Gold,
GE Gold II, and First Choice Gold II products ("qualifying
products") in September 2019. These are all products issued by
Genworth Life Insurance Company and Genworth Life and Annuity
Insurance Company (together, "Genworth"). Anyone that is subject to
this COI increase or owns one of the qualifying products is
encouraged to contact Susman Godfrey to discuss the matter.

As a result of the COI increase, the monthly COI charge on the
qualifying products is expected to increase between 40 to 140
percent. Many of the affected policyholders, many of whom are 75
years or older, purchased their products almost 20 years ago. The
proposed Class seeks damages for the COI increase.

Additionally, through the filing of the lawsuit, it is alleged that
since March 2018 Genworth has refused to provide projections of
future policy values and death benefits upon request. The complaint
includes allegations that Genworth is contractually obligated to
provide such projections, and as such, the proposed Class is
requesting injunctive relief prohibiting Genworth from denying the
requested illustrations.

If you are an eligible policyholder and are interested in joining
this lawsuit as a class representative, please contact Lora
Krsulich at (310) 789-3145 or lkrsulich@susmangodfrey.com. The
deadline to add parties is February 1, 2021.

The Susman Godfrey team is led by partners Steven Sklaver, Seth
Ard, Ryan Kirkpatrick and Jonathan Ross, with associate Lora
Krsulich.

The case, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, is Brighton Trustees, LLC, et al. v. Genworth
Life & Annuity Insurance Company, Case No. 3:20cv240 (DJN).

                     About Susman Godfrey

Susman Godfrey, America's premier litigation boutique, was founded
on a simple vision: Hire only the best; get paid for success; and
handle every case with a relentless focus on winning. That's why
Susman Godfrey has been named Vault's #1 litigation boutique in
America for 10 years straight.

A nationwide trial law firm with 150 talented trial lawyers, Susman
Godfrey handles high-stakes litigation for both plaintiffs and
defendants throughout the country in a broad range of practice
areas. Because we work both sides of the "v," we know what the
other side is thinking. Because we often share risk with our
clients, we stay focused on the most important goal: winning. Visit
susmangodfrey.com to learn more about our unique approach to
winning cases.

Contact:
Lora Krsulich
(310) 789-3145
lkrsulich@susmangodfrey.com [GN]


GEO GROUP: Novoa Lawsuit Can Proceed as Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
JND Legal Administration on Oct. 8 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed in federal court in Riverside, California,
against The GEO Group, Inc. ("GEO"). GEO operates the Adelanto ICE
Processing Center in Adelanto, California as a subcontractor for
the City of Adelanto. The name of the case is Novoa, et al. v. The
GEO Group, Inc., No. 5:17-cv-02514. A federal judge decided that
this lawsuit should be a class action on behalf of the following
"Classes" and "Subclasses":

The Adelanto Wage Class: All civilly detained immigrants who (i)
were detained at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center any time since
December 19, 2014, and either (ii) participated in the Voluntary
Work Program1 at any point during their detention, or (iii)
performed work for no compensation in the Uncompensated Work
Program2 pending their participation in the Voluntary Work Program,
or (iv) performed work for no compensation pursuant to the Adelanto
Housing Unit Sanitation Policy.3

The Adelanto Forced Labor Class: All civil immigration detainees
who were detained at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center any time
since May 1, 2011, with the following subclasses: a) The Work
Program Subclass: All individuals who participated in the Voluntary
Work Program at any point during their detention; and (b) The
Uncompensated Work Program Subclass: All individuals who
participated in the Uncompensated Work Program at any point during
their detention.

Plaintiffs in this lawsuit claim that GEO maintained a practice of
wage theft, unjust enrichment, and forced labor. GEO denies the
allegations made in the lawsuit and argues it has fully complied
with the law. The Court has not decided whether GEO did anything
wrong. There is no money available now, and there is no guarantee
there will be. However, the legal rights of individuals in the
Classes/Subclasses are affected and they have a choice to make
now.

Affected individuals have a choice of whether to stay in the
Classes/Subclasses or not, and this must be decided now. Affected
individuals that stay in the Classes/Subclasses will be legally
bound by all orders and judgments of the Court, and they won't be
able to sue, or continue to sue, GEO as part of any other lawsuit
with the same claims. To stay in the Classes/Subclasses, affected
individuals do not have to do anything now. If you choose to stay
in the class action, you may also engage an attorney of your own
choosing, but at your own expense.

Affected individuals who want to be excluded from the
Classes/Subclasses will not get any money or benefits from this
lawsuit, but they will keep their rights to sue GEO for the claims
made in this lawsuit and will not be bound by any orders or
judgments of the Court. To ask to be excluded, a letter must be
sent to the address below, postmarked by December 22, 2020,
requesting to be excluded from Novoa v. The GEO Group, Inc.:

GEO Adelanto Class Action Notice Administrator
c/o JND Legal Administration
P.O. Box 91350
Seattle, WA 98111

The Court appointed the law firms of Burns Charest LLP of Dallas,
TX, the Law Office of R. Andrew Free of Nashville, TN, and Ahdoot
and Wolfson, PC of Los Angeles, CA, to represent the
Classes/Subclasses.

For more information, visit www.GEOAdelantoClassAction.com; email
info@GEOAdelantoClassAction.com, or call:

Toll-Free in U.S.:  1-888-383-0320
Toll-Free in Mexico:  1-800-062-4329

1 Plaintiffs allege that the "Voluntary Work Program" is the
program GEO operates at Adelanto where detainees work as porters,
janitors, kitchen workers, laundry workers, barbers, or in any
other job in exchange for $1 per day.

2 Plaintiffs allege that the "Uncompensated Work Program" means
GEO's practice of hiring detainees to work as porters, janitors,
kitchen workers, laundry workers, barbers, or in any other job
outside their housing units for no money at all. Detained
immigrants typically complete a Work Detail Application for a
position in the Voluntary Work Program and must work for an
arbitrary period of time-months, in some cases-for no compensation
before they begin to receive $1 per day for their labor.

3 Plaintiffs allege that the "Housing Unit Sanitation Policy" is a
program GEO operates at Adelanto where detainees clean and sanitize
their housing units, dormitories, pods, showers, and common living
areas for no compensation.  If you were detained at Adelanto, you
were part of the Housing Unit Sanitation Policy. [GN]


GOLAR LNG: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 23 Motion Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class action has been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Golar LNG Limited (NASDAQ:
GLNG). Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition the
court to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about each
case can be found at the link provided.

Golar LNG Limited (NASDAQ: GLNG)

Class Period: April 30, 3030 to September 24, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 23, 2020

On September 24, 2020, media reported that the Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") of Golar's joint venture, Hygo Energy Transition
Ltd. ("Hygo"), was involved in a bribery network investigated in
Brazil's Operation Car Wash.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $3.28, or 32%, to
close at $6.86 per share on September 24, 2020.

The complaint, filed on September 24, 2020, alleges that throughout
the Class Period, defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that certain employees, including Hygo's CEO, had
bribed third parties, thereby violating anti-bribery policies; (2)
that, as a result, the Company was likely to face regulatory
scrutiny and possible penalties; (3) that, as a result of the
foregoing reputational harm, Hygo's valuation ahead of its IPO
would be significantly impaired; and (4) that, as a result of the
foregoing, defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

For more information on the Golar LNG class action go to:
https://bespc.com/GLNG

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do
not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]


GOLAR LNG: Jakubowitz Law Alerts of Class Action Filing
-------------------------------------------------------
Jakubowitz Law on Oct. 4 disclosed that securities fraud class
action lawsuit has  commenced on behalf of shareholders of Golar
LNG who purchased shares within the class periods listed below.
Shareholders interested in representing the class of wronged
shareholders have until the lead plaintiff deadline to petition the
court. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require that
you serve as a lead plaintiff. For more details and to speak with
our firm without cost or obligation, follow the links below.

Golar LNG Limited (NASDAQ:GLNG)

CONTACT JAKUBOWITZ ABOUT GLNG:
https://claimyourloss.com/securities/golar-lng-limited-loss-submission-form/?id=9785&from=1

Class Period : April 30, 2020 - September 24, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 23, 2020

The filed complaint alleges that defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
certain employees, including the Chief Executive Officer of Hygo
Energy Transition Ltd. f/k/a Golar Power Limited ("Hygo"), had
bribed third parties, thereby violating anti-bribery policies; (2)
as a result, the Company was likely to face regulatory scrutiny and
possible penalties; (3) as a result of the foregoing reputational
harm, Hygo's valuation ahead of its initial public offering would
be significantly impaired; and (4) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

Jakubowitz Law is vigorous in pursuit of justice for shareholders
who have been the victim of securities fraud. Attorney advertising.
Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
JAKUBOWITZ LAW
1140 Avenue of the Americas
9th Floor
New York, New York 10036
T: (212) 867-4490
F: (212) 537-5887 [GN]


GOLAR LNG: Kirby McInerney Reminds of November 23 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP on Sept. 28 disclosed that a
class action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York on behalf of those who acquired
Golar LNG Limited ("Golar" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: GLNG)
securities during the period from April 30, 2020 through September
24, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors have until
November 23, 2020 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Employees of Golar's joint venture, Hygo
Energy Transition Ltd. ("Hygo"), including Hygo's CEO, engaged in a
scheme to bribe third parties, violating the law. The illegal
scheme impacted Hygo's valuation before its IPO. Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Golar, investors suffered damages.

If you acquired Golar securities, have information, or would like
to learn more about these claims, please contact Thomas W. Elrod of
Kirby McInerney at 212-371-6600, by email at
investigations@kmllp.com, or by filling out this contact form, to
discuss your rights or interests with respect to these matters
without any cost to you.

Kirby McInerney is a New York-based plaintiffs' law firm
concentrating in securities, antitrust, and whistleblower
litigation. The firm's efforts on behalf of shareholders in
securities litigation have resulted in recoveries totaling billions
of dollars. Additional information about the firm can be found at
Kirby McInerney's website: www.kmllp.com.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts
Kirby McInerney LLP
Thomas W. Elrod, Esq., (212) 371-6600
investigations@kmllp.com
www.kmllp.com [GN]


GOLAR LNG: Levi & Korsinsky Alerts of Class Action Filing
---------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on Oct. 8 disclosed that class action lawsuit
has commenced on behalf of shareholders of Golar LNG Inc..
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details about the
cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

Golar LNG Limited (NASDAQ:GLNG)

GLNG Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased April 30, 2020 -
September 24, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 23, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/golar-lng-limited-loss-submission-form?prid=9890&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Golar
LNG Limited made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) certain employees, including
the Chief Executive Officer of Hygo Energy Transition Ltd. f/k/a
Golar Power Limited ("Hygo"), had bribed third parties, thereby
violating anti-bribery policies; (2) as a result, the Company was
likely to face regulatory scrutiny and possible penalties; (3) as a
result of the foregoing reputational harm, Hygo's valuation ahead
of its initial public offering would be significantly impaired; and
(4) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]


GOLAR LNG: Schall Law Firm Reminds of November 23 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
on Sept. 28 announced the filing of a class action lawsuit against
Golar LNG Limited ("Golar" or "the Company") (NASDAQ: GLNG) for
violations of Secs. 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between April 30,
2020 and September 24, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before November 23, 2020.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Employees of Golar's joint venture, Hygo
Energy Transition Ltd. ("Hygo"), including Hygo's CEO, engaged in a
scheme to bribe third parties, violating the law. The illegal
scheme impacted Hygo's valuation before its IPO. Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Golar, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics.

Contacts:
The Schall Law Firm
Brian Schall, Esq.,
www.schallfirm.com
Office: 310-301-3335
info@schallfirm.com [GN]


HAYNES INVESTMENTS: 4th Cir. Upholds Arbitration Denial in Gibbs
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARLENE GIBBS; STEPHANIE EDWARDS; LULA WILLIAMS;
PATRICK INSCHO; LAWRENCE MWETHUKU, on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HAYNES
INVESTMENTS, LLC; L. STEPHEN HAYNES; SOVEREIGN BUSINESS SOLUTIONS,
LLC, Defendants-Appellants, and VICTORY PARK CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC;
VICTORY PARK MANAGEMENT, LLC; SCOTT ZEMNICK; JEFFREY SCHNEIDER;
THOMAS WELCH, Defendants. NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES
ASSOCIATION, Amicus Supporting Appellants, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
JUSTICE, Amicus Supporting Appellees, Case No. 19-1434 (4th Cir.),
a three-judge Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Haynes
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.

The Plaintiffs are Virginia consumers who borrowed money between
2013 and 2016 from one of two online lenders owned by a sovereign
Native American tribe.  The first lender, Plain Green, LLC, is
owned and operated by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's
Reservation in Montana. The second, Great Plains Lending, LLC, is
owned and operated by the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Oklahoma.
Although Virginia usury law generally prohibits interest rates in
excess of twelve percent, the laws of both Tribes permit higher
rates.  As a result, the interest rates on the loans - which varied
in principal amounts from $500 to $1,700 -- ranged from 219.38% to
373.97%.

In order to obtain the loans, each borrower electronically signed a
contract that contained (1) the terms governing the loan as well as
(2) an agreement to arbitrate any disputes.  Both agreements
contained choice-of-law provisions requiring the application of
tribal law.  Further, the arbitration agreement included provisions
stating the agreement will be governed by Tribal Law and the
arbitrator will apply Tribal Law.  Similarly, Mwethuku's older 2013
Plain Green loan provided that both the loan and arbitration
agreements are governed by the laws of the Chippewa Cree Tribe, and
that the arbitrator will apply the laws of the Chippewa Cree
Tribe.

Likewise, all three 2015 and 2016 Great Plains loan agreements
indicated the lender could choose to voluntarily use federal laws
as guidance, but that the agreements ultimately.

In turn, according to the borrowers, the Haynes Defendants --
Haynes Investments, LLC; Sovereign Business Solutions, LLC; and L.
Stephen Haynes, the managing member of both businesses -- funded
and partially operated both tribal lending operations.  Further,
when regulators targeted the operations, Haynes allegedly played a
"critical role" in finding a bank to partner with Plain Green and
Great Plains to continue their operations.

After receiving the loans from the two online lenders, the
borrowers brought a putative class action complaint alleging, among
other claims, that the lenders' loans were unlawful under
Virginia's usury laws and that the Haynes Defendants' receipt of
income derived through collection of unlawful debt and reinvestment
of such income to further the lending scheme violated the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

In response, the Haynes Defendants moved to compel arbitration
under 9 U.S.C. Section 4 or, alternatively, to dismiss the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The
district court denied both motions.

As relevant to the motion to compel arbitration, the district court
relied upon two Fourth Circuit cases -- Hayes v. Delbert Services
Corporation, and Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. -- both of which
considered similar tribal loan and arbitration agreements with
choice-of-law clauses providing for the nearly exclusive
application of tribal law, to the exclusion of state and federal
law.  As in those cases, the district court here found that because
the choice-of-law provisions in the arbitration agreements sought
to prospectively exclude the application of federal law the
agreements ran afoul of the prospective waiver doctrine.  And
because, the court concluded, arbitration agreements that operate
as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory
remedies are not enforceable because they are in violation of
public policy, the arbitration agreements at issue were likewise
unenforceable.

The Haynes Defendants timely appealed, arguing that: (1) the
district court ignored the arbitration agreements' delegation
provisions requiring an arbitrator to resolve all threshold issues
of arbitrability, including whether the choice-of-law clauses
amounted to a prospective waiver; and (2) even if the court was
correct to consider the effect of the provisions, they did not
operate as a prospective waiver.

The Fourth Circuit addresses each issue in turn, mindful of the
strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.
It turns first to the delegation clauses.  Each of the arbitration
agreements contained a delegation clause stipulating that the
parties would arbitrate any issue concerning the validity,
enforceability, or scope of the Agreement or the Agreement to
Arbitrate.  As a result, the Haynes Defendants argue, any threshold
questions as to the enforceability of the arbitration agreements
should have first been sent to an arbitrator.

The Fourth Circuit disagrees.  Because the borrowers sufficiently
challenged the validity of the delegation clauses, the district
court was correct to consider the enforceability of the arbitration
agreements.  In assessing the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement containing a delegation provision, the Panel first must
decide whether the Plaintiff lodged a challenge against the
delegation provision.  Second, if it concludes that he or she
specifically challenged the enforceability of the delegation
provision, it then must decide whether the delegation provision is
unenforceable upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity.

With this legal framework in mind, the Fourth Circuit now considers
whether the borrowers have lodged a sufficient challenge to the
delegation provisions and, if so, whether the district court
properly considered the challenge.  The Haynes Defendants argue
that the delegation provisions are valid and enforceable, which, in
turn, should have compelled the district court to let the
arbitrator resolve all threshold issues of arbitrability.

The Fourth Circuit again disagrees for the simple reason that the
borrowers challenged those clauses with sufficient force and
specificity to warrant the district court's threshold review as to
whether they were enforceable.  Specifically, in their opposition
to the motion to compel arbitration, the borrowers argued that the
delegation clauses are unenforceable for the same reason as the
underlying arbitration agreement -- the wholesale waiver of the
application of federal and state law.  Such a challenge is all that
is required to dispute the viability of the delegation provisions.


In turn, because the challenge to the delegation provisions
necessarily encompassed and included arguments that related to the
validity of the arbitration agreements as a whole, the district
court did not err by considering the challenge to the delegation
clauses in the context of the challenge to the entirety of the
agreements.  Given that the borrowers specifically challenged the
delegation provisions, the question of their enforceability was one
for the courts -- rather than the arbitrator -- to decide.

Turning to the question of whether the choice-of-law provisions
amount to a prospective waiver, rendering the delegation clause
unenforceable, the Fourth Circuit holds that  because the language
of both sets of arbitration agreements provides that tribal law
will preempt the application of any contrary law, and the effect of
such provisions is to thereby make unavailable to the borrowers the
effective vindication of federal statutory protections and
remedies, the arbitration agreements at issue amount to a
prospective waiver.  Consequently, the entire arbitration agreement
is unenforceable.

For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit agrees that the choice-of-law
clauses amount to a prospective waiver such that the arbitration
agreements, including the delegation clauses, are unenforceable.
Therefore, the district court had the authority to decide whether
the arbitration agreements were valid, correctly decided they were
not, and did not err in denying the motion to compel arbitration,
the Fourth Circuit finds.

For these reasons, Judge G. Steven Agee, writing for the Appellate
Panel, affirmed the judgment of the district court.  The Fourth
Circuit dispensed with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Fourth Circuit's July 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/3miB6tY from Leagle.com.

David N. Anthony -- david.anthony@troutman.com -- Timothy St.
George -- tim.stgeorge@troutmansanders.com -- TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP,
Richmond, Virginia; Richard L. Scheff --
rlscheff@armstrongteasdale.com -- David F. Herman --
dherman@armstrongteasdale.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE, LLP,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellants.

Kristi C. Kelly -- kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com -- Andrew J. Guzzo
-- aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com -- KELLY GUZZO, PLC, Fairfax,
Virginia; Matthew W.H. Wessler, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington,
D.C.; Leonard A. Bennett -- lenbennett@clalegal.com -- Craig C.
Marchiando, Elizabeth W. Hanes -- elizabeth@clalegal.com --
CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C., Newport News, Virginia; Anna
C. Haac, TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Patrick O. Daugherty, Frances B. Morris, VAN NESS FELDMAN LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Bruce Stern, Jeffrey R. White,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Curiae.


ICONIX WATERWORKS: Magee Suit Remanded to Sacramento Superior Court
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District remanded the case, MICHAEL MAGEE, individually,
and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v.
ICONIX WATERWORKS (US) INC., GREG PUCCI, and DOES 1-10 Defendants,
Case No. 2:20-cv-00840-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.), to the Sacramento
Superior Court.

On March 3, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in Sacramento
Superior Court on behalf of himself and a class of similarly
situated individuals alleging eight violations of labor laws.  On
April 24, 2020, the Defendants filed a notice of removal under 28
U.S.C. Section 1441(a).  On May 5, 2020, the Plaintiff filed their
motion to remand, alleging the lack of both party diversity and the
required amount in controversy.  He also seeks to recover costs he
has incurred in moving for remand.

The individual named as a Defendant in the case, Greg Pucci, is a
resident of California.  The Defendants argue Mr. Pucci's joinder
was fraudulent, allowing the Court to disregard his citizenship for
diversity purposes.

The Plaintiff alleges, and the Defendant does not dispute, that Mr.
Pucci is the Operations Manager and managing agent of the
Defendant.  He also alleges that California Labor Code section
558.12 establishes Mr. Pucci's individual liability for the alleged
violations as an other person acting on behalf of an employer.

The Plaintiff pleads factual allegations identifying specific
conduct potentially attributable to Mr. Pucci, particularly with
respect to elements of the second and third causes of action, which
allege the alteration of employee timekeeping records to appear
compliant with state statutes.  As the individual responsible for
implementing and enforcing the company's employment policies,
practices and procedure, it can be inferred Mr. Pucci was directly
involved with such alterations.

Judge Mueller holds that the Court's obligation to resolve all
factual ambiguity against the removing party requires adopting this
inference for purposes of the motion.  Thus, the Defendants have
failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
joinder of Mr. Pucci as a Defendant on the California Labor Code
section 558.1 claim is fraudulent and obviously so according to
settled state law.  Mr. Pucci's citizenship must be included in the
evaluation of diversity, and with his inclusion diversity is
destroyed.

The Defendant contends the amount in controversy is $82,247, and
$41,562.50 of which is derived from its estimate of the Plaintiff's
attorney's fees.  The total estimate of class-wide attorney's fees
is $83,125, half of which the Defendant attributes to the Plaintiff
as the representative party.  

This attribution, even after the reduction to half, is improper,
the Judge holds.  Where an underlying statute authorizes an award
of attorneys' fees such fees may be included in the amount in
controversy.  Attorney's fees are authorized under the claims in
the instant case by California Labor Code sections 218.5, 1194,
making their inclusion generally appropriate.  Neither statute,
California Labor Code sections 218.5, 1194, allows for the kind of
attribution argued for by the Defendants.

The Defendants made a lackluster attempt to acknowledge Gibson v.
Chrysler Corp. by attributing only half of their estimate of the
Plaintiff's attorney's fees to the named Plaintiff.  In determining
the proper allocation to a named plaintiff, courts have ruled that
attorney's fees must be divided by the number of class members.  

The Judge applies the same rule in the case, making the Defendants'
estimate only reasonable if the class consisted of only two
individuals, rather than the Plaintiff's estimate of more than 75.
A class of two could not satisfy Rule 23's numerosity requirement,
and to assume an invalid class would violate the presumption
against removal.  The Judge finds that the Defendant has not
satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement by a preponderance
of the evidence.

Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees
under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c) only where the removing party
lacked an objectively reasonably basis for seeking removal.  Given
the newness of California Labor Code section 558.1 and that Gibson
does authorize attorney's fees, properly calculated, to be
attributed exclusively to named plaintiffs in certain cases, the
Judge does not find that the Defendants' removal was unreasonable.
She thus does not award costs incurred by the Plaintiff based on
the Defendants' removal.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Mueller granted the Plaintiff's
motion to remand.  

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2020 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/35EbIZ5 from Leagle.com.


IDT CORP: Arbitration in Samara Suit Still Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------
IDT Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 14, 2020, for the
fiscal year ended July 31, 2020, that the arbitration proceedings
in the class action suit initiated by Scarleth Samara, is still
ongoing.

On April 12, 2019, Scarleth Samara filed a putative class action
against IDT Telecom in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana alleging certain violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.

Plaintiff alleges that in October of 2017, IDT Telecom sent
unauthorized marketing messages to her cellphone. IDT Telecom filed
a motion to compel arbitration.

On or about August 19, 2019, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the
pending court action and the parties intend to proceed with
arbitration.

IDT said, "At this stage, we are unable to estimate our potential
liability, if any. We intend to vigorously defend the claim."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

IDT Corporation operates primarily in the telecommunications and
payment industries in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in two segments, Telecom & Payment Services, and
net2phone-Unified Communications as a Service. IDT Corporation was
founded in 1990 and is headquartered in Newark, New Jersey.


INVESTORS BANCORP: Interlocutory Appeal Request Refused in Elburn
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT ELBURN, derivatively on behalf of INVESTORS
BANCORP, INC., and individually and on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated stockholders of INVESTORS BANCORP, INC.,
Plaintiff, v. ROBERT C. ALBANESE, DENNIS M. BONE, DOREEN R. BYRNES,
DOMENICK A. CAMA, PETER H. CARLIN, WILLIAM V. COSGROVE, KEVIN
CUMMINGS, JAMES J. GARIBALDI, MICHELE N. SIEKERKA, PAUL N.
STATHOULOPOULOS and JAMES H. WARD III, Defendants, and INVESTORS
BANCORP, INC., a Delaware corporation, Nominal Defendant, C.A. No.
2019-0774-JRS (Del. Ch.), Judge Joseph R. Slights III of the Court
of Chancery of Delaware denied the Defendants' application for
certification of an interlocutory appeal.

Plaintiff Elburn filed a Complaint asserting derivative claims and
a direct claim on behalf of himself and a putative class of
stockholders of Investors Bancorp, in which he alleged the
Defendants, each a member of the Company's Board of Directors
approved compensation awards in breach of their fiduciary duties.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure
adequately to plead demand futility under Court of Chancery Rule
23.1 and failure to state a viable claim under Court of Chancery
Rule 12(b)(6).  

The Court issued a Memorandum Opinion, dated April 21, 2020,
denying the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss upon concluding that the
Plaintiff's Complaint had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty and had sufficiently alleged demand futility under Rule 23.1
because it pled, with particularity, sufficient facts to raise a
reasonable doubt that a majority of the Board would have been able
impartially to consider a litigation demand.

On July 2, 2020, the Defendants timely filed an application for
certification of an interlocutory appeal of the Opinion.  The
application asserts five grounds for interlocutory appeal under
Supreme Court Rule 42: (1) the Opinion resolved important questions
of first impression, -- relying on Supreme Court Rule
42(b)(iii)(A); (2) the Opinion conflicts with other decisions of
the Court and the Supreme Court -- relying on Supreme Court Rule
42(b)(iii)(B); (3) the Opinion relates to the construction of a
Delaware statute --relying on Supreme Court Rule 42(b)(iii)(C); (4)
the Opinion sustained the controverted jurisdiction of the Court --
relying on Supreme Court Rule 42(b)(iii)(D); and (5) interlocutory
review of the Opinion would serve considerations of justice --
relying on Supreme Court Rule 42(b)(iii)(H).

On July 13, 2020, the Plaintiff opposed the Application.

Judge Slights has thoroughly reviewed the Application, the
Plaintiff's response and the criteria set forth in Supreme Court
Rule 42.  The Judge is satisfied that the Opinion does not decide a
substantial issue of material importance such that appellate review
of the Opinion before final judgment would serve considerations of
justice.  Specifically, it did not resolve an issue of first
impression, it is not in conflict with precedent and interlocutory
review would likely result in piecemeal litigation.  

The Judge holds that the Application's contrary arguments are
unpersuasive.  First, the Opinion does not decide an issue that
relates to the merits of the case.  It simply concluded that the
Plaintiff's Complaint, backed by well-pled particularized facts,
stated that such an agreement existed and these allegations
supported a finding of demand futility.

Second, the Defendants argue the Opinion decided an issue of first
impression, warranting interlocutory review.  Judge Slights
disagrees.  The Judge finds that there was absolutely nothing
unusual about the demand futility allegations addressed by the
Opinion, or the means by which the Opinion addressed them.
Determining the sufficiency of demand futility allegations is
steady grist for the Chancery mill.  While it is true the Opinion
identified some guideposts that might be useful as the courts
traverse Rule 23.1's "with particularity" landscape, the Opinion
ultimately applied settled law to the specific allegations in the
Complaint to conclude that the Plaintiff had well-pled—under any
definition of particularity -- that a majority of the demand board
faced a substantial likelihood of liability, such that demand was
futile.

Third, the Defendants argue the Opinion improperly conflated Rule
8(a)'s notice pleading standards with Rule 23.1's particularity
requirement, in defiance of well-settled Delaware law.  Again, the
Defendants misconstrue the Opinion.  Indeed, the Opinion made clear
that the stringent requirements of factual particularity within
Rule 23.1 differ substantially from permissive notice pleadings.
And then the Opinion recognized that the pleading standards for
fraudulent omission cases could serve as useful "guideposts" when
considering the sufficiency of factual allegations in the Rule 23.1
context.  Nowhere did the Opinion apply Rule 8(a) or even remotely
suggest that the lower "notice pleading" standard codified in that
rule has any place in the Rule 23.1 demand futility analysis.

Fourth, the Defendants argue the Opinion improperly ignored the
rule that a plaintiff asserting demand futility based on directors'
alleged involvement in claimed misconduct must plead particularized
facts showing not just a claim against the defendant directors --
but also that a majority of the board faces 'a substantial
likelihood' of liability for the claim or lacks independence from a
defendant who does.  Judge Slights finds the argument unfortunate
given that the Opinion explicitly recognized the importance of the
demand futility paradigm.  It then described, at some length, how
the Complaint laid out the manner in which each Defendant
comprising a majority of the Board participated in the alleged quid
pro quo arrangement, and, accepting those particularized
allegations as true, explained the bases for the Court's reasonable
doubt that a majority of the Board could impartially consider a
litigation demand.

Fifth, the Defendants argue the Court improperly lowered the
operative pleading standards to address a derivative plaintiff's
supposed inability to obtain pre-complaint discovery.  Judge
Slights finds that the Opinion rejected that position because, even
with Section 220 documents in hand, derivative plaintiffs would be
hard pressed to plead 'who, what, when, where and how' facts about
fiduciary wrongdoing of the nature alleged.  The Opinion made this
observation not as a justification to shirk precedent and lower the
settled pleading standards, but as a basis to reject the
Defendant's proffered (and extra-heightened) Rule 23.1 pleading
burden.

Sixth, the Defendants argue an interlocutory appeal is appropriate
because resolution of the appeal could terminate the litigation.
But, the Plaintiff's Complaint also asserts a direct disclosure
claim that is pending and presumably proceeding to discovery.  The
legal issues the Defendants seek to press on appeal have no bearing
on the factual determinations required to adjudicate that direct
claim.  The outcome of the appeal, therefore, will not be case
dispositive.  Rather, the certification of the interlocutory appeal
would do nothing more than facilitate wasteful piecemeal
litigation.

Under these circumstances, Judge Slights cannot certify that the
likely benefits of an interlocutory appeal outweigh the probable
costs, such that interlocutory review is in the interests of
justice.  Therefore, Judge Slights denied the Defendants'
application for certification of an interlocutory appeal.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/31LxpVY from Leagle.com.


JUST CANDY: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Just Candy LLC. The
case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Just Candy LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-08808
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 22, 2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Just Candy LLC is an e-commerce retailer specializing in bulk candy
and candy gifts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David Paul Force, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: dforce@steinsakslegal.com


KITEC: Plumbing Class Action Payout Faces Delays
------------------------------------------------
Yvonne Colbert, writing for CBC News, reports that Heather Crocker
has been waiting seven years to learn how much she'll be reimbursed
for the $9,000 she paid to replace Kitec plumbing in her former
Dartmouth, N.S., home.

Some 1,800 kilometres away, Carl Mascarenhas of Toronto hasn't yet
received a penny for his $17,000 claim made in 2014 to replace the
Kitec in his townhouse.

One of the lawyers involved in a class action over the product
tells CBC News the pandemic, a flood of claims before the deadline,
as well as civil unrest in Louisville, Ky., where the claims
administrator's head office is located, are to blame for the delay
in disbursing funds.

It's been almost nine years since Canadian and American courts
approved a settlement worth US$125 million in a class action
lawsuit over Kitec plumbing fixtures and pipes.

An unknown number of Canadians, like Crocker and Mascarenhas, still
don't know when -- or if -- they will be compensated for the
thousands of dollars they've paid to replace plumbing systems.

The settlement included $25 million US for legal fees, notices and
other administration, leaving $100 million US plus interest to pay
claims for damage caused by leaks and floods and replacing the
fixtures and pipes. At the time, Gilardi LLC was appointed as the
claims administrator, although it was subsequently acquired by
another company.

The Kitec plumbing system was widely used in the late 1990s and
early 2000s before it was recalled due to deteriorating fittings
and pipes.

Kitec, billed as a cheaper and easy-to-install alternative to
copper piping, was used primarily in hot water baseboard and
in-floor heating systems. The product may also have other brand
names, including PlumbBetter, IPEX AQUA and WarmRite. It can be
identified by its bright orange and blue piping.

Long claims period frustrating

The window to file a claim was open for eight years and didn't
close until January of this year.

Crocker, who now lives in Eastern Passage, N.S., applied in 2013.
She had no leaks or water damage and said she was told people who
experienced damage would be paid first. She received a cheque for
$247 and was told at the time she might receive more once the
claims period ended. She started checking after that.

"I first called in January, then again in March and early
September," Crocker said, noting she always gets the same story
that they're processing claims.

"It seems very, very slow. They've had my papers for seven years
and they're all correct. It just makes you wonder why it's taking
so long," Crocker said, adding the $9,000 she paid to replace the
Kitec "is a lot of money."

"I'm sure there's lots of people out there just like me," she said.


It's estimated 292,000 North Americans had Kitec in their homes.
Lawyer David Robins, one of those handling the Canadian case, said
20,000 claims were filed by the time the claims period ended in
January. It's unknown how many were Canadians, but $25.5 million US
has been approved in partial payments to Americans and $47 million
Cdn to residents of Canada.

Unlike Crocker, Mascarenhas is still waiting for his first cheque
after filing his claim in late 2014.

"I have received no compensation nor to my knowledge did any of my
fellow condo corp. members, and at this point there is no
indication of whether we will get any portion of that back," he
said.

'It's like a black hole'

He said the settlement administrator has acknowledged receipt of
his claim.  

Mascarenhas started calling routinely after the claims period ended
and was told twice to call back in two months. He said he didn't
fare any better in his most recent call when he was told there was
no further information.

The call centre representative was unable to give him a date when
claims might be paid out, he said.

"It's like a black hole," said Mascarenhas. "I'm free to call or
check the website, which seemingly never changes, and that was the
extent of it."

Mascarenhas called his experience "a never-ending story" and said
he is beyond worn down. His condo corporation, worried about
significant damage to multiple units because of a single leak, gave
him little choice but to replace the system.  

"Now I'm kind of getting angry with the process and angry at this
particular claim," he said.

Both Mascarenhas and Crocker have never been involved in a class
action before and both are disillusioned by the process and the
lack of information about when or whether they will be
compensated.

"I think that if people were to know that this was a common pattern
in class action lawsuits, they would probably second-guess whether
they want to participate because definitely the effort of finding
out the status and then hopefully getting to a settlement is far
more frustrating than it is worth," Mascarenhas said.

Crocker said there's been no communication unless she initiates
it.

"It just makes you wonder why it's taking so long and I've heard
nothing from them unless I call," she said.

Several reasons for delay

Robins said all claims received before the deadline have been
processed but the administrator is still waiting for information
from some claimants.

Mike Dull, a class action lawyer who practises in Halifax and
teaches a course at Dalhousie University about class action
lawsuits, said most people have no idea about the logistics of
class actions.

Class actions are "unique creatures," he said.

"And so class members, folks who are entitled to compensation under
a settled class action, are often then subjected to a land of
confusion."

Dull said many people don't even realize they're included in a
class action. It only takes a few people to start one but when it's
certified by the court, everyone with the same problem is
automatically included. When a settlement is approved by the court,
then individuals must file a claim.

He said dispersing class action settlements can take a long time
because the money in the settlement can't be paid out until all the
claims are filed.

"Then the claims administrator is obligated to distribute the funds
among the number of applicants, prorated to the degree that each
claim is valued," Dull said about the Kitec settlement.

He said the Kitec eight-year claims window was "an unusually long
time" although it's not unheard of. He pointed to the residential
schools and hepatitis C class actions as examples of long claim
periods, but noted those settlements weren't prorated like Kitec
which he called "very unique."

Dull said judges approve all elements of class action settlements
so the claims administrator doesn't get to dictate how long a
claims period will be.

"They just follow the court's order and do what's asked of them,"
he said.

The Kitec settlement stipulates if there are any funds remaining
after all claims have been paid, they are to be returned to the
companies that make Kitec and its insurers.

Robins said his hope "is to ensure class members are fully and
fairly compensated for their losses to the extent that can be
done."

Even though the maker of Kitec agreed to the settlement, it denied
all allegations of fault, wrongdoing or liability by any of the
plaintiffs in other actions against them. [GN]


LINCOLN LIFE: Judge Denies Transfer of Vida Suit to Pennsylvania
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VIDA LONGEVITY FUND, LP, Plaintiff, v. LINCOLN LIFE &
ANNUITY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant, Case No. 19cv6004 (ALC)
(DF) (S.D. N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied both
(i) Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint to add a new
Plaintiff, and (ii) the Defendant's motion to transfer the case to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

In the case, which has been referred to the New York District Court
for general pretrial supervision, Plaintiff Vida Longevity Fund
seeks to assert a breach-of-contract claim on behalf of itself and
a class of policyholders who held life-insurance policies with the
Defendant, based on the Plaintiff's allegations that it overcharged
policyholders for life insurance premiums.  The Plaintiff commenced
the putative class action on June 27, 2019.  The Defendant filed an
Answer to the Complaint on Sept. 27, 2019.

The Plaintiff is a Delaware limited partnership and the 100% owner
of two life-insurance policies that were issued by the Defendant in
2002, in New York.  It alleges that these policies contain
standardized language, and that it was not permitted to negotiate
terms other than the standard terms.  In accordance with the
standard terms of the policies, the Plaintiff was charged a monthly
cost of insurance" ("COI") charge.  It alleges that, although the
provisions in the policies regarding COI charges mandated that the
Defendant set the rate for such charges based on its expectations
of future mortality experience, and despite the Defendant's
awareness and acknowledgement of the continued improvement of
mortality experience, the Defendant has nevertheless assessed COI
charges at the same rate for each of the past six years.  

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant's failure to lower COI
charge rates, based on decreasing mortality experience, constitutes
a breach of contract.  It also alleges that members of the putative
class have all similarly held policies with Defendant, that the
policies have all contained the same standardized terms related to
COI charges, and that the putative class members have all been
similarly overcharged.

In its motion to amend, the Plaintiff seeks to add a new party,
Andrew Nitkewicz, in his capacity as Trustee of the Joan C. Lupe
Family Trust, to assert, on behalf of the Trust and a putative
class of life-insurance policyholders who paid premiums for any
period beyond the end of the policy month of the insured's death
("Premium Refund Class"), a breach-of-contract claim based on
allegations that the Defendant failed to refund those premiums as
required by Section 3203 of the New York Insurance Law, which is
deemed incorporated by reference into the provisions of the
policies.

On Nov. 7, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion to transfer the case
to the E.D. Pa., chiefly arguing that transfer would be proper
because two other cases were already pending in that District,
filed by the same Plaintiff's counsel, each against a life
insurance affiliate of Lincoln National Corp., and, as in the case,
each challenging COI rates.

On December 2, 2019, the Plaintiff opposed Defendant's motion.  It
argues that transfer would be improper because, inter alia, the
Defendant's principal place of business is in New York, it is only
authorized to issue insurance policies in New York, and the conduct
at issue in the Complaint is connected solely to New York.  It
asserts that mere similarities in counsel and in the types of
allegations made in other cases, against different Defendants, is
insufficient to justify transfer.

As discovery has proceeded in the case, the parties have sought to
coordinate discovery in the case with discovery in the cases
currently pending in the E.D. Pa.

Although the Defendant's motion to transfer the case was briefed
prior to the Plaintiff's seeking leave to amend the Complaint,
Magistrate Judge Freeman first addresses the Plaintiff's motion to
amend because the scope of claims and parties in the case could
impact the propriety of transfer.  The Judge gleans two potential
(though underdeveloped) arguments for permissive joinder: first,
that the Plaintiff's claim and the Trust's claim arise from "the
same transaction and occurrence" and share "question[s] of law or
fact" sufficient to permit joinder; and second, that joinder is
warranted because of "overlap" between members of the putative
classes.

As to the first potential argument, the Magistrate rejects any
argument that the Plaintiff may be trying to assert that it and the
Trust share a joint claim for relief.  The Plaintiff has therefore
failed to meet its burden to show that the claim that it has
asserted and the claim that the Trust proposes to assert share
common questions of law or fact that would be material to the
question of Defendant's liability.  As to the  Plaintiff's second
potential argument -- that members of the putative classes could
overlap, thus resulting in common questions of law or fact for
certain class members (even if not for Plaintiff and the Trust
themselves) -- the Plaintiff cites to no authority, and the
Magistrate has located none, that would permit joinder of the
Plaintiffs in a circumstance that, as to the named Plaintiffs
alone, would constitute misjoinder, but where some persons or
entities might be eligible to be members of both proposed classes.

The Magistrate Judge holds that a hypothetical future argument by
the Defendant that may never be raised and that would likely have
no merit cannot overcome the Plaintiff's failure, on its present
motion, to demonstrate that joinder is permissible under Rule 20.
As the Plaintiff's proposed amendment would be futile because
joinder would be improper, the motion to amend is denied.

Having denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend, the Magistrate next
turns to the Defendant's assertions that the case ought to be
transferred to the E.D. Pa.  The inquiry, under 28 U.S.C. Section
1404(a), will require the Court to assess, first, whether the
action might have been brought in the E.D. Pa., and second, whether
transferring the case to that district would, based on the balance
of a number of factors, promote both the convenience of the parties
and witnesses and the interests of justice.  In this instance,
while she finds that the action could have been brought in the
forum to which transfer is sought, the Magistrate Judge holds that
the relevant factors weigh against transfer.

In short, the Defendant has the burden of persuading the Court,
with clear and convincing evidence, that the totality of the
circumstances favors transfer.  The Defendant has not demonstrated
that the cases in the E.D. Pa. are so related to the case as to be
determinative, especially in the absence of any other factors
weighing in favor of transfer.  Upon consideration of the entirety
of the presented record, the Magistrate Judge finds that the
Defendant has failed to meet its burden, and the motion for
transfer is therefore denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/2HEakh5 from Leagle.com.


LOCKHEED MARTIN: Pre-Certification Discovery in Ross Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VERNON ROSS and DEBRA JOSEY, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN
CORP., Defendant, Case No. 16-cv-2508 (KBJ)(D. D.C.), Judge Ketanji
Brown Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the Plaintiff's motion for pre-certification
discovery.

The Court previously denied a motion for preliminary class
certification and for preliminary approval of a settlement
agreement that Plaintiffs Ross and Josey filed along with their
initial complaint ("Ross I"), and in the wake of that
determination, the Plaintiffs have filed a Second Amended Class
Action Complaint, to provide additional details regarding the
operation of Defendant Lockheed Martin's performance review process
("LM Commit") in support of their claim that Lockheed Martin has
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641, in a manner
that can be established, and redressed, on a classwide basis.  The
Plaintiffs have now also requested pre-certification discovery,
ostensibly to gather additional information in support of their
class claims.

The existence of a class action that is plausibly viable is a
prerequisite to getting discovery in aid of a motion for class
certification, and the Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating
that discovery measures are likely to produce information that
substantiates their contention that they have identified a viable
class action.

What is at stake at this point in the instant litigation is whether
the Plaintiffs have alleged discrimination and contract claims
against Lockheed Martin that are plausibly amenable to class-action
treatment, and if so, whether discovery will aid them in
demonstrating that their proposed class action should be certified
under Rule 23.  The Court's north star in answering these questions
is the indisputable fact that the entire point of "the class-action
device" is to save the resources of both the courts and the parties
by permitting an issue potentially affecting every member of the
class to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.

Yet, try as they might, the Plaintiffs have failed to make
allegations that would plausibly permit an economical evaluation of
the purportedly discriminatory operation of the LM Commit system
across-the-board and with respect to all of the members of the
proposed class, for the reasons that the Court previously
articulated in Ross I and others that it sketches out.  Instead,
the Second Amended Complaint's allegations about the LM Commit
evaluation process necessarily portend discrimination claims that
will exhibit fatal dissimilarity among class members, which
inexorably leads to the conclusion that use of the class-action
device would be inefficient.

Consequently, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery, as they
have neither plausibly alleged a "prima facie case" for classwide
relief under Rule 23, nor shown that discovery is "likely to
produce" substantiation of their class allegations such that
pre-certification discovery is warranted.  And the Plaintiffs'
classwide breach-of-contract claim fares no better, since the
Second Amended Complaint lacks any allegations that would support a
plausible inference that the putative class is an intended
third-party beneficiary of the (unidentified) contractual
agreements between Lockheed Martin and the federal government that
they are seeking to enforce.

Judge Jackson concludes that the Plaintiffs' discrimination claims
pertain to a highly individualized performance-evaluation system
that, by its nature, does not plausibly give rise to a classwide
common injury that can be evaluated based on common proof or that
can be redressed by ordering a single, indivisible remedy.  And
because the Plaintiffs have now twice failed to make plausible
allegations with respect to the viability of their putative class
under Rule 23, the only benefit of pre-certification discovery
would be to commence a fishing expedition for new allegations
concerning the effects of Lockheed Martin's evaluation scheme,
which would ultimately do little to shore up their Rule 23 showing.


It is clear beyond cavil that a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 8's
pleading requirements before discovery is warranted, and that the
mere filing of a complaint does not unlock the doors of discovery
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.  Thus,
the Judge declines these Plaintiffs' invitation to relax the
plausibility requirement in the context of Rule 23 to the point
where discovery becomes presumptive upon the filing of a class
complaint.

In the Judge's view, it is entirely implausible to infer that the
Plaintiffs' proposed 5,000-member class has suffered a common
injury from Lockheed Martin's implementation of LM Commit (as the
Plaintiffs describe that system), and because it is likewise
implausible to conclude that any such common injury could be
redressed for each member of the class through a single remedy, or
could be proven through common questions of fact that predominate
over individualized proofs of injury, the Plaintiffs have not
alleged that a plausible viable class exists under Rule 23, as is
necessary to have a plausible prima facie case for class-action
certification that warrants further discovery.

Accordingly, as set forth in the Court's Order of May 28, 2020,
Judge Jackson denied the Plaintiff's motion for pre-certification
discovery.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Memoradum
Opinion is available at https://bit.ly/3mgV0Wm from Leagle.com.


LOUISIANA: Certification of Medicaid-Eligible Youth Class Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as A.A., by and through his
mother, P.A.; B.B., by and through her mother, P.B.; C.C., by and
through her mother, P.C.; D.D., by and through JUDGE BRIAN A.
JACKSON his mother, P.D.; E.E., by and through his mother, P.E.,
and F.F., by and through her mother, P.F., v. REBEKAH GEE in her
official capacity, as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of
Health, and the LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Case No.
3:19-cv-00770-BAJ-SDJ (M.D. La.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court for
an order certifying this case as a class action, with the class
defined as:

   "all Medicaid-eligible youth under the age of 21 in the State
   of Louisiana who are diagnosed with a mental illness or
   condition, not attributable to an intellectual or
   developmental disability, and who are eligible for, but not
   receiving, necessary intensive home and community based
   (mental health) services."

The Louisiana Department of Health, formerly known as the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals, is a state agency of Louisiana,
headquartered in Baton Rouge. It is Louisiana's largest state
agency with a budget of $14 billion and approximately 6,300
personnel.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2ZYy9pR at no
extra charge.[CC]

Counsel for Plaintiffs and class members are:

          Neil S. Ranu, Esq.
          Sophia Mire Hill, Esq.
          Lauren Winkler, Esq.
          Southern Poverty Law Center
          201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 2000
          New Orleans, LA 70170
          Telephone: (504) 486-8982
          Facsimile: (504) 486-8947
          E-mail: neil.ranu@splcenter.org
                  sophia.mire.hill@splcenter.org
                  lauren.winkler@splcenter.org

               - and -

          Kimberly Lewis, Esq.
          Abigail Coursolle, Esq.
          National Health Law Program
          3701 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 750
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (310) 204-6010
          E-mail: lewis@healthlaw.org
                  coursolle@healthlaw.org

               - and -

          Britney Wilson, Esq.
          NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
          275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506
          New York, NY 10001-6860
          Telephone: (212) 633-6967
          Facsimile: (212) 633-6371
          E-mail: wilson@nclej.org

               - and -

          Ronald Lospennato, Esq.
          Evelyn Chuang, Esq.
          DISABILITY RIGHTS LOUISIANA
          8325 Oak Street
          New Orleans, LA 70118
          Telephone: (504) 522-2337
          Facsimile: (504) 522-5507
          E-mail: rlospennato@disabilityrightsla.org
                  echuang@disabilityrightsla.org

               - and -

          Darin W. Snyder, Esq.
          Kristin M. MacDonnell, Esq.
          O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
          Two Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Telephone: (415) 984-8700
          Facsimile: (415) 984-8701
          E-mail: dsnyder@omm.com
                  kmacdonnell@omm.com

MAYO CLINIC: Court Okays Balance Billing Class Action Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alia Paavola, writing for Becker's Hospital Review, reports that a
class-action settlement involving claims that Mayo Clinic
Jacksonville (Fla.) overcharged patients treated for motor
vehicle-related injuries was granted preliminary approval by a
federal court Oct. 6, according to court documents posted by
Bloomberg Law.

The class-action suit was brought by Natalie Kuhr. The plaintiff
alleged Mayo Clinic Jacksonville violated the Florida Consumer
Collection Practices Act and the federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act by balance billing patients whose medical care was
covered by personal injury protection insurance.

Florida law prohibits providers treating patients with personal
injury insurance from charging insurers more than a "reasonable
amount" for their services.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida said
Oct. 6 that the proposed class of 371 patients with personal injury
insurance treated at Mayo Clinic Jacksonville for injuries
sustained via motor vehicle accidents was reasonably defined.

Additionally, the total settlement amount of just over $1 million
appeared to be "sufficiently fair, reasonable, and adequate on its
face to warrant presentation to the class members," the court said.


However, the court said that it must reject any incentive award to
Ms. Kuhr that is requested in the settlement and that their finding
of fairness does not reflect whether the amount of fees requested
by the class attorneys is reasonable.

The settlement agreement will head to a fairness hearing prior to
final approval on Jan. 20, 2021, the court said. [GN]


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Langlois Discuss MultiJurisdictional Class Suits
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Vincent De L'Etoile, Esq. -- vincent.deletoile@langlois.ca -- and
Sandra Desjardins, Esq. -- sandra.desjardins@langlois.ca -- of
Langlois lawyers, LLP, in an article for Mondaq, report that as
multijurisdictional class actions become increasingly common, they
raise difficult questions about the conduct of the same or similar
actions in different courts, the use of scarce judicial resources,
and the costs to the parties.

On September 2, the Quebec Court of Appeal rendered its decision in
Micron Technology Inc. v. Hazan. The decision provides a timely
reminder of the legal framework applicable to the staying of
multijurisdictional class actions in Quebec.

I. Background

On April 30, 2018, the plaintiff filed a proposed class action in
Quebec against the defendants based on anticompetitive behaviour
with respect to an electronic component in violation of the
Competition Act and the Quebec Consumer Protection Act.

Two days later, on May 2, 2018, another plaintiff filed a proposed
class action in Federal Court against the same defendants.

On May 3, 2018, another proposed class action was filed in Quebec
by a different plaintiff. This action was however suspended under
the "first to file" rule. Another proposed class action was filed
in Federal Court but was subsequently discontinued. Similar class
actions have also been instituted in Ontario and British Columbia.

On November 15, 2018, the defendants sought to stay the Quebec
class action in favour of the class action instituted in Federal
Court, alleging a situation of lis pendens between the two actions
and a risk of contradictory judgments. Alleging the prejudice they
would suffer from having to defend themselves against two actions
proceeding simultaneously on behalf of the same members, the
guiding principle of proportionality, and the inherent jurisdiction
of the Superior Court, the defendants argued that the Quebec class
action should be stayed.

II. The judgment of the Superior Court

On February 11, 2019, the Superior Court, presided by Justice
Donald Bisson, dismissed the defendants' application for a
suspension of the class action.

In Justice Bisson's view, the Superior Court and the Federal Court
have concurrent jurisdiction in respect of the action, given that
it is based primarily on the Competition Act. However, although
both actions are directed against the same defendants and seek the
same objectives, they only present a situation of "quasi-lis
pendens" because the Quebec action invokes the Civil Code of Quebec
and the Consumer Protection Act, whereas the Federal Court action
invokes common law remedies.

Also, since the Federal Court cannot be considered a foreign
authority, which would have justified the application of
international lis pendens, and because the Quebec action was
instituted first, the Superior Court concluded that the "first to
file" rule applied and therefore, there was no basis to stay the
Quebec proceedings.

Furthermore, the Superior Court expressed concerns that the
defendants requested a suspension of the Quebec proceedings at the
same time as they requested a suspension of the Federal Court
proceedings pending a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. In
Justice Bisson's view, the suspension of both proceedings would be
contrary to the interests of the class members, thus bolstering the
decision not to suspend the Quebec proceedings.

III. The judgment of the Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal, in reasons delivered by the Honourable Stephen
W. Hamilton, J.A., dismissed the defendants' appeal and upheld the
dismissal of their application for a suspension of the Quebec
action, while offering interesting insights into the legal
framework for staying multijurisdictional class actions.

A. The "first to file" rule for applications filed in Quebec

The "first to file" rule originated in Hotte v. Servier Canada
inc., a decision rendered in the context of concurrent class
actions instituted in Quebec. It established the judicial policy
according to which, in a situation involving multiple class actions
based on the same causes and involving the same subject matter
between parties acting in the same capacity, an appearance of lis
pendens entails that only the first action filed must proceed,
while subsequently filed actions ought to be suspended.

In Schmidt v. Johnson & Johnson inc., the Court of Appeal
subsequently determined that the "first to file" rule could be
applied with flexibility in exceptional circumstances, such that a
second action could proceed to the detriment of the first,
particularly when the first action filed is seriously deficient or
was not undertaken in the best interests of the Quebec members.

B. The "first to file" rule when foreign actions are involved

In the event of an action brought before a foreign authority, the
rules relating to international lis pendens have been codified in
Article 3137 of the Civil Code of Quebec and provide that Quebec
proceedings can only be suspended if the foreign authority was
first seized of the dispute.

With respect to class actions, the rule entails that an action
brought before a court outside Quebec must have been filed before
the Quebec class action for a suspension application to be granted.
The court considering the suspension application must also consider
the application of Article 577 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which requires that the protection of the rights and interests of
Quebec residents be taken into account before granting such an
application.

Indeed, the Court of Appeal in FCA Canada inc. v. Garage Poirier &
Poirier inc. recognized that the application of the rules of
private international law applicable in Quebec does not permit a
Quebec class action to be stayed on the basis of the principles of
international lis pendens if the Quebec forum is the first having
been seized with an action.

Importantly, however, the Court of Appeal also recognized that the
Superior Court has inherent jurisdiction under Article 49 of the
Code of Civil Procedure to suspend a case pending before it, even
if the requirements relating to international lis pendens are not
met, provided that the interests of the Quebec residents and the
proper administration of justice justify such a measure.

C. Concurrent class actions in Federal Court

There is no precedent for the application of the "first to file"
rule to a class action before the Federal Court. The fact that the
action is not brought before the Superior Court means that the
application of the rule in Servier Canada inc cannot be invoked.
Similarly, the action cannot be considered to have been brought
before a foreign authority so as to justify the application of the
rule in FCA Canada inc. Indeed, as per Article 8 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the Federal Court is a court having jurisdiction
in Quebec in matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Acts
of the Parliament of Canada.

For the Court of Appeal, the consideration of an application to
stay a Quebec class action in favour of a class action instituted
in Federal Court thus falls within the inherent powers of the
Superior Court to manage the cases before it and to deal with cases
for which the law does not offer a solution.

Given the comity among the courts in our Canadian federation, and
the idea that courts considering similar issues should reach
similar conclusions, the possibility of a Quebec class action
progressing despite the existence of a class action in Federal
Court may lead the latter Court to stay its proceedings.

D. The appropriate test for an application to stay a class action,
based on the Superior Court's inherent jurisdiction

In the absence of a framework for staying a class action under the
rules on lis pendens, a stay may be granted pursuant to the
inherent powers of the Superior Court if the interests of the
Quebec members and the proper administration of justice militate in
favour of a stay.

For the purposes of considering the best interests of Quebec
residents in presence of duplicative class actions raising similar
issues, the Court identified the following elements relevant to the
analysis:

(a) it will generally not be in the interests of justice or the
parties to have two class actions proceed in parallel¬ at the
merits stage, taking into account the risk of conflicting
judgments, the cost to the parties, and scarce judicial resources;

(b) the causes of action, the remedies sought, the definition of
the class, and the territorial scope of the actions may influence
the scope and content of the means to be deployed before each
court; and

(c) the importance of adequate protection of Quebec residents'
rights and interests and their proper representation, including the
benefits they may derive from the other action, the benefits of any
applicable Quebec legislation, and the language of notices and
other communications likely to be addressed to them.

The Court also pointed out the difficulty that arises from the fact
that an application to stay a class action is generally made before
either action is authorized or certified, entailing that the Court
does not have the benefit of insight into the outcome of the other
action, its class definition, its causes of action, or its common
issues. Thus, an application to stay a Quebec class action before
it has been authorized or before the other class action that gave
rise to the application for suspension has been certified may often
be premature.

E. The outcome of the defendants' application for a stay of
proceedings

In this case, contrary to the finding of the Superior Court, the
"first to file" is not applicable for the determination of the
defendants' application for suspension, since the other action is
being brought in Federal Court.

However, despite the similarity of the actions against the
defendants, the manner in which they are likely to be disputed, the
cost to defend themselves against two class actions, and the other
factors raised by the defendants, consideration of the interests of
the members of the Quebec class action and the proper
administration of justice does not justify a stay of the Quebec
proceedings at this stage, given the lack of progress in the
actions and the many uncertainties with respect to how the cases
might unfold.

Thus, the Court of Appeal found that the application for a
suspension was premature at this stage of the proceedings, but
could be reconsidered at a later stage, depending on the progress
of the concurrent action.

IV. Conclusion

The decision in Micron Technology Inc. will undoubtedly serve as a
guide for courts and practitioners with regard to the suspension of
class actions in Quebec, which will have to strike a balance
between the two fundamental premises set out by the Court of
Appeal:

(a) it is possible to submit an application to suspend a class
action when situations arise that do not call for the conventional
application of the "first to file" rule or lis pendens; and

(b) an application for a suspension at the embryonic stage of a
class action and before the authorization stage (or the
certification stage in the parallel class action) may be premature
and may not permit a comprehensive assessment of the interests of
the members of the Quebec class action and the interests of
justice.

The case law to be developed in this area will certainly be of
great interest, given the importance of multi-jurisdictional class
actions. [GN]



MLR SOLUTIONS: Lipscomb Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. Virginia
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MLR Solutions Inc.,
et al. The case is styled as Nicole Lipscomb, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. MLR Solutions Inc., John
Does 1-25, Case No. 4:20-cv-00157-AWA-LRL (E.D. Va., Oct. 22,
2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Main Line Recovery (MLR) Solutions is a full service collection
agency that applies a combination of telephony and computer
technology coupled with debtor touch point management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Aryeh Eliezer Stein, Esq.
          MERIDIAN LAW, LLC
          600 Reisterstown Road, Suite 700
          Baltimore, MD 21208
          Phone: (443) 326-6011
          Fax: (410) 653-1061
          Email: astein@meridianlawfirm.com


MODLIN SLINSKY: Nahon Files FDCPA Suit in S.D. Florida
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Modlin Slinsky, P.A.,
et al. The case is styled as Avraham Nahon, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Modlin Slinsky, P.A.,
John Does 1-25, Case No. 0:20-cv-62147-RS (S.D. Fla., Oct. 22,
2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Modlin Slinsky, P.A. is a law firm located in Sunrise, Florida
whose practice is solely devoted to the collection of outstanding
accounts debts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin E. Zeig, Esq.
          ZEIG LAW FIRM, LLC
          3475 Sheridan Street, Suite 310
          Hollywood, FL 33024
          Phone and Fax: (754) 217-3084
          Email: justin@zeiglawfirm.com


NATIONWIDE: Faces Class Action Over Covid-19 Travel Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Tristan Navera, writing for Columbus Business First, reports that
Nationwide is facing a lawsuit from a traveler whose plans were
upended by Covid-19 earlier this year.

Illinois customer Christine Dowding booked a trip on Carnival
Cruise Line March 30, as well as a $1,321 roundtrip flight from
Chicago to Miami on Frontier Airlines, and purchased Nationwide's
travel insurance to cover both. According to the suit, this
insurance covered both instances of quarantine and "sickness that
results in medically imposed restrictions as certified by a
physician at the time of loss preventing the insured's
participation in the trip."

Shortly before the trip, though, Dowding developed a cough that a
physician diagnosed as bronchitis, but Covid-19 testing wasn't
available at the time. Nonetheless, she followed the state's
stay-at-home order. The cruise line reimbursed her, but the airline
provided only a travel voucher that expired after 90 days, which
Dowding has described in the lawsuit as "worthless" given pandemic
restrictions.

Nationwide refused to pay the claim for the airfare, according to
the suit, telling her Carnival had instructed Nationwide to deny
all claims.

The suit, initially filed in state court, has since been moved to
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The Columbus-based insurance giant recently filed a motion to
dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim, which Judge Virginia
Kendall ruled on late in September.

She partially sided with the company, stating that Dowding couldn't
seek reimbursement for the cruise line ticket. But the judge said
Dowding could proceed with the suit over the airfare Dowding
purchased to get to port in Miami, and her ruling allows discovery
to proceed in the case.

"We will continue to defend this case vigorously and look forward
to a favorable resolution," Nationwide spokesman Ryan Ankrom said
in an email. "We work in good faith and fully honor our commitments
to our members based on the coverage that policy holders purchased
for that time of loss."

Dowding is seeking class-action status, which could open the
insurer up to other complaints from customers whose travel plans
were upended by the virus, which ground the tourism industry
nationwide to an instantaneous halt in March.

In her ruling, Kendall denied Nationwide's motion to strike
class-action allegations, as the suit could impact "hundreds" of
other Illinois travelers, although it's hard to determine now many.
[GN]


NC STATE UNIVERSITY: SG Passes Legislation Amid Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Caryl J. Espinoza Jaen, writing for Technician, reports that with
the North Carolina (NC) State University administration under fire
since reopening campus, Student Government (SG) has cracked down on
holding the University accountable.

On Sept. 9, SG passed two pieces of legislation, R39 and R42, in
response to various criticisms the administration has received from
students and staff.

Sen. James Withrow, a Ph.D. candidate in biology and entomology,
said R39, the University Management of COVID-19 Act, was written as
a response to university administration blaming students for the
campus outbreak.

"I think that the overwhelming message from the University was that
it was going to be okay to have students back on campus, and that
the safety procedures were safe, and that it basically wasn't a big
deal," Withrow said. "That was reinforced by the confusion around
plans, the lack of clarity about what guidelines were and also
significant lack of enforcement."

R39 states the SG has "no confidence" in NC State administration
because of the mismanaged fall reopening. After a majority pass in
the Senate, the legislative piece was sent by Student Body
President Melanie Flowers and Student Senate President Coleman
Simpson to administrators both on and off campus. Key figures
included Chancellor Randy Woodson, the chairs of the University's
COVID-19 task forces, Director and Medical Director of Student
Health Services Julie Casani and the UNC System Board of Governors.


Sen. Lexie Malico, a Ph.D. candidate in chemistry, said that SG
plans to continue addressing past and future university responses
as the semester progresses towards the spring.

"We've had so many pieces of COVID-related legislation calling out
the administration for failures of this reopening plan and,
ultimately, more recently, calling for how we think this university
strategy should move forward," Malico said. "I think we need to be
focusing on student voices and the voices of those really impacted
by the decisions they're gonna make."

Both Withrow and Malico expressed worry over the spring semester
and its future policies, saying more student and staff voices need
to be considered in the future decisions. Withrow said he was
seeing progress with how the University was holding itself
accountable, with Woodson and Vice Provost Warwick Arden saying the
University did hold some fault at the Graduate Student Association
All Council meeting Sept. 28.

Withrow said the decision to reopen in the fall lacked a
data-driven approach and was pressured due to state funding and
upper management, putting the university administration "in a
position to try to make it work."

At the All Council meeting, Woodson mentioned the tough financial
position the University faced when reopening.

"We reopened because we have an obligation to the people of North
Carolina who pay 75% of our budget," Woodson said.

R42, the Class Action Lawsuit Endorsement Act, is a formal support
declaration from SG to a class action lawsuit filed against the UNC
System by various campus staff, who felt inadequately protected
from the virus both prior and during the campus outbreaks.

"I read through it and clarified that it was just seeking
injunctive relief," Withrow said. "This wasn't, you know, suing the
University for a millions of dollars settlement, and it wasn't
specifically NC State. The legal stuff will be settled in court,
but the fact that university staff are claiming that the University
broke the law is something that should be taken seriously."

Like R39, R42 was distributed by Flowers and Simpson to key
organizations within the UNC System. Figures included the UNC
Association of Student Governments, the NC State Staff Senate and
the Graduate Student Workers Union.

"I want to see accountability from the University and the system
level about what they've done, what went wrong, what went right,
how they can do better in the spring and really see that they're
going to change how they approach the spring semester," Malico
said. "I feel like that's critical in how we're keeping students
safe."

For more information and updates, visit the Student Government
website. [GN]


NIKE INC: Bunn ADA Suit Removed to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Cali Bunn, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Nike, Inc., an Oregon corporation,
Case No. CGC-20-585683, was removed from the Superior Court of
California, San Francisco County, to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California on Oct. 22, 2020.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:20-cv-07403 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

NIKE, Inc. is an American multinational corporation that is engaged
in the design, development, manufacturing, and worldwide marketing
and sales of footwear, apparel, equipment, accessories, and
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendant is represented by:

          Julian Wolfe Kleinbrodt, Esq.
          GIBSON DUNN AND CRUTCHER, LLP
          555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Phone: (415) 393-8382
          Email: JKleinbrodt@gibsondunn.com


NIKOLA CORP: Glancy Prongay Reminds of November 16 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming November 16, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased
Nikola Corporation ("Nikola" or "the Company") (NASDAQ: NKLA)
securities between March 3, 2020 and September 20, 2020, inclusive
(the "Class Period").

If you suffered a loss on your Nikola investments or would like to
inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at https://www.glancylaw.com/cases/nikola-corporation/.
You can also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or via email at
shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn more about your rights.

On September 10, 2020, Hindenburg Research published a report
entitled "Nikola: How to Parlay an Ocean of Lies into a Partnership
with the Largest Auto OEM in America." Therein, Hindenburg alleged
that the Company's founder, Trevor Milton ("Milton"), had misled
partners into signing agreements by falsely claiming to have
extensive proprietary technology. Among other things, the report
claimed that Milton had staged a video of Nikola's semi-truck
cruising down a road by filming the truck rolling down a hill and
that, despite claiming Nikola designs all key components in house,
the Company appears to simply be buying or licensing them from
third-parties.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $10.24, or 24%, over
two consecutive trading sessions to close at $32.13 per share on
September 11, 2020, thereby injuring investors.

On September 14, 2020, after the market closed, Bloomberg reported
that the SEC was "examining" Nikola over the Hindenburg report's
allegations.

On September 15, 2020, before the market opened, Hindenburg
published another report focusing on Nikola's response, entitled
"We View Nikola's Response As a Tacit Admission of Securities
Fraud[.]"

On this news, the Company's share price fell $2.96, or 8%, to close
at $32.83 per share on September 15, 2020, thereby injuring
investors further.

On September 20, 2020, Nikola announced that Milton was stepping
down from the Company.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $6.61, or 19%, to
close at $27.58 per share on September 21, 2020, thereby injuring
investors further.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) VectoIQ did not engage in proper due diligence regarding
its merger with Nikola; (2) Nikola overstated its "in-house"
design, manufacturing, and testing capabilities; (3) Nikola
overstated its hydrogen production capabilities; (4) as a result,
Nikola overstated its ability to lower the cost of hydrogen fuel;
(5) Nikola founder and Executive Chairman, Trevor Milton, tweeted a
misleading "test" video of the Company's Nikola Two truck; (6) the
work experience and background of key Nikola employees, including
Mr. Milton, had been overstated and obfuscated; (7) Nikola did not
have five Tre trucks completed; and (8) as a result of the
foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects were materially misleading
and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Nikola securities during the
Class Period, you may move the Court no later than November 16,
2020 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts:
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
Charles Linehan, 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
shareholders@glancylaw.com
www.glancylaw.com [GN]


NIKOLA CORP: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 16 Motion Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on Oct. 8 disclosed that class action lawsuit
has commenced on behalf of shareholders of Nikola Corp.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details about the
cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

Nikola Corporation, f/k/a VectoIQ Acquisition Corp. (NASDAQ:NKLA)

NKLA Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased March 3, 2020 -
September 15, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 16, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/nikola-corporation-f-k-a-vectoiq-acquisition-corp-information-request-form?prid=9890&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Nikola
Corporation, f/k/a VectoIQ Acquisition Corp. made materially false
and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1)
VectoIQ did not engage in proper due diligence regarding its merger
with Nikola; (2) Nikola overstated its "in-house" design,
manufacturing, and testing capabilities; (3) Nikola overstated its
hydrogen production capabilities; (4) as a result, Nikola
overstated its ability to lower the cost of hydrogen fuel; (5)
Nikola founder and Executive Chairman, Trevor Milton, tweeted a
misleading "test" video of the Company's Nikola Two truck; (6) the
work experience and background of key Nikola employees, including
Mr. Milton, had been overstated and obfuscated; (7) Nikola did not
have five Tre trucks completed; and (8) as a result, defendants'
public statements were materially false and/or misleading at all
relevant times.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]


NINTENDO: Faces Class Action Over Joy-con Drift Defect
------------------------------------------------------
Ryan Pearson, writing for NicheGamer, reports that a mother and
child have sued Nintendo over the infamous Nintendo Switch Joy-con
drift defect, asking for over $5,000,000 USD.

In case you missed our prior reports, the Nintendo Switch's
Joy-Cons have issues with drifting–which is when the joystick
remains untouched, yet input is still registered.

This resulted in a class action lawsuit by Chimicles, Schwartz
Kriner, & Donaldson-Smith in July 2019. Reports suggest Nintendo
even began repairing Joy-Cons for free mere days after the lawsuit
became public knowledge.

The Nintendo Switch Lite was later added to the lawsuit, and the
hardware failure causing the drift was exposed. Curiously, a
Tencent representative (the distributor of the Nintendo Switch in
China) told a customer that the drift was caused by playing an
imported game.

In late December 2019, we also reported how French consumer
magazine 60 millions de consommateurs awarded Nintendo their
"Golden Cactus" award (specifically the "Cactus of the Too Fragile
Product"), which is given to products and services that cause the
most frustration.

Belgian consumer organization Testankoop also demanded Nintendo
repair all Joy-Cons for free, and honor a two year warranty. In May
of thus year, a federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois ruled a lawsuit against Nintendo due
to the Joy-Con drift must go to arbitration.

Nintendo President Shuntaro Furukawa reportedly apologized "for any
inconvenience caused to our customers" due to the drift, during an
investor Q&A in June 2020. Since July 2019, Nintendo have been
repairing Joy-cons even outside of users' warranties.

A leaked patent for a new Joy-Con controller also lead to
speculation that the rumored 4K supporting "Nintendo Switch Pro"
would not support handheld mode. Some also wondered if this new
Joy-Con would no longer have the drifting issue.

Now, Wired reports Luz Sanchez and her son (a 9 or 10 year old only
referred to in court documents as M.S.) have filed a class action
lawsuit in Norther California for over $5,000,000 USD against
Nintendo over the Joy-Con drift issue.

The lawsuit states after Sanchez bought her son a Nintendo Switch
in December 2018, the Joy-cons allegedly began to drift within a
month. Allegedly less than a year later, "the Joy-Con drift became
so pronounced that the controllers became inoperable for general
gameplay use." New Joy-cons were purchased, but seven months later
they allegedly began to drift as well.

"[The] Defendant continues to market and sell the Products with
full knowledge of the defect and without disclosing the Joy-Con
Drift defect to consumers in its marketing, promotion, or
packaging," the lawsuit reportedly claims. "[The] Defendant has had
a financial motive to conceal the defect, as it did not want to
stop selling the Products, and/or would need to expend a
significant amount of money to cure the defect."

Nintendo and Sanchez's lawyers reportedly declined to comment to
Wired. [GN]


NORTHLAND INVESTMENT: Church St South Settlement Has Developments
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Thomas Breen, writing for New Haven Independent, reports that the
proposed $18.75 million settlement of a years-in-the-works Church
Street South class action lawsuit lurched ahead with a new,
streamlined structure -- and a local civil rights attorney's hopes
that a state court system largely shuttered by the pandemic will
resume grinding its gears to allow for hundreds of tenants
displaced from the mold-infested former apartment complex to
finally get paid.

On Oct. 5 and Oct. 6, local lawyer David Rosen and attorneys for
the Massachusetts-based landlord Northland Investment Corp.
submitted 14 new court filings in the case Noble, Personna Et Al v.
Northland Investment Corporation Et Al.

That's the class action lawsuit first filed by Rosen on behalf of a
handful of Church Street South tenants at the end of 2016. The suit
seeks monetary damages for the respiratory problems, skin
disorders, migraines, loss of furniture, dislocation and
homelessness allegedly suffered by families because of rampant
mold, leaking ceilings, and the landlord's overall "demolition by
neglect" of the now-razed former 301-unit complex across from Union
Station. Northland has denied all charges.

The new filings describe a number of structural, if not
substantive, changes to the proposed $18.75 million settlement
first announced by Rosen and Northland representatives on March 6.

If approved by the court, the settlement would still have eligible
former tenants receive up to $17,000 each, depending on how long
they lived at the former complex after December 2013 and on whether
or not they suffered mold-related injuries during their residence.

The updated, 112-page proposed settlement would create a trust to
facilitate payments to minors and disabled class members, as well
as to the estates of deceased class members.

It includes an updated, simplified notice and base payment claim
form for former tenants interested in signing on to the agreement.

And associated filings describe how Rosen's firm has been able to
get in touch with roughly 400 additional former tenants since March
— bringing the total number of potentially eligible class members
his firm is in phone and email contact with to around 730. That's
out of a total estimated number of eligible class members of around
1,050.

"The settlement is fundamentally the same," Rosen told the
Independent on Oct. 7. "The changes are designed to make things
more simple and straightforward in a case that is unavoidably
complicated."

"We would like to thank Mediator and Retired Judge Jonathan Silbert
for his continued guidance and work in helping both sides achieve
this amended agreement," a Northland spokesperson told the
Independent in an email statement. "All parties agree that the
filing strengthens the existing settlement process, and we look
forward to the court's consideration for preliminary and ultimately
final approval. We remain committed to helping the former Church
Street families move forward in a positive way and believe this
improved process will make it easier for claimants to access
funds."

Rosen said that, depending on the court's decisions, he expects
eligible former Church Street South tenants to finally start
getting paid thanks to this settlement by the end of April or the
beginning of May 2021.

"It seems a long way, away," he said. "But it's the best thing that
can be done."

The proposed settlement would still set aside $13.25 million in a
base fund for payment to tenants, $2.65 million in an enhanced fund
for tenants who suffered from alleged mold-related injuries while
living at Church Street South, and $2.85 million to cover Rosen's
attorney fees and other legal expenses incurred over the course of
the nearly four-year suit. It would also still require Northland to
grant former Church Street South tenants preferential rights to
rent affordable apartments at any new housing complex that
Northland builds at the currently vacant 13-acre Union Avenue site,
if the landlord indeed decides to rebuild.

Hanging over these proposed updates to the settlement—and
sometimes even explicitly called out in the legal documents
themselves—is the Covid-19 pandemic and associated, temporary
shut down of the state court.

Rosen and Northland submitted the proposed settlement and a request
for preliminary approval to state Superior Court Judge Linda Lager
on March 6. Later that week, they held two public information
meetings at Trinity Lutheran Church downtown in a rush to get the
word out about the proposed settlement and win the support of
former tenants.

And then the pandemic hit.

On March 10, Gov. Ned Lamont declared a public health and civil
preparedness emergency around Covid-19.

On March 12, the state Judicial Branch announced that the courts
would be largely closed and only processing "Priority 1" matters.

Over the past several months, the state court system has slowly
expanded the number of cases handled remotely. Click here for a
complete timeline of the Judicial Branch's operations during the
pandemic.

"It slowed everything down," Rosen said about the pandemic's impact
on the proposed settlement. "It just stopped everything, and it
also made it harder and slower to complete these improvements that
we thought were important. But now, we think we've finally got
there."

Rosen said that the two legal adversaries have put the intervening
seven months to good use in crafting what they believe to be a
clearer and simpler settlement.

While the first few years of the class action lawsuit were marked
by intense and protracted legal wrangling as the plaintiffs sought
to win the court's certification of a class of former tenants
(according to one recently filed explanation, the case has seen
approximately 200 filings, the parties exchanged approximately
400,000 pages of documents, and each side retained multiple expert
witnesses), Rosen said, "The improvements that we think were made
during the pandemic were all done collaboratively with the defense
counsel and the mediator."

In that spirit of newfound comity, the two have submitted to the
court a stipulation waiving a hearing on their motion for a
preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement.

"The parties have conferred about the fairest and most efficient
way for this case to proceed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and
its effect on court proceedings, including the hearing on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement," that stipulation reads.

"The parties stipulate and agree that . . . waiving the hearing on
the request for preliminary approval of the settlement will benefit
the putative class, the parties and the interests of justice by
permitting the process that will inform the Court's decision on
whether to grant final approval of the settlement to move forward
in an expeditious manner."

Rosen said that the joint waiving of a hearing on the motion for
preliminary approval should hopefully result in Judge Lager soon
signing off—at least on the preliminary approval.

That in turn will allow for Rosen's firm and the proposed class
action settlement administrator, JND Legal Administration, to get
the notice of the settlement out to as many people as possible and
finally start officially signing up former tenants interested in
agreeing to its terms and ultimately getting paid.

"The reaction to the settlement of the more than 700 class members
who are in contact with proposed Class Counsel has been
overwhelmingly positive," Rosen wrote in a recent motion for
preliminary approval.

"None has expressed an intention to object to the settlement or opt
out of the class, much less to simply pass up the benefits of the
settlement. Their uniform reaction has been eagerness - often
accompanied by completely understandable impatience - to have the
settlement confirmed so that they and their families may finally
obtain benefits."

Rosen stressed that eligible class members won't actually start
getting paid until the judge issues a final approval of the
settlement. He also said that a court hearing must and will take
place before the judge decides on whether or not to issue a final
approval.

The primary, structural update included in the amended proposed
settlement is the creation of a trust designed to help smooth out
the process by which minors, disabled class members, and the
estates of deceased class members get paid without having to work
through the probate court process themselves.

"If a child needs money, the parent can get in touch with the
trustee and just say so," Rosen explained. "If the trustee agrees,
he will have the authority to pay out the money. There's no court
proceeding involved once the trust is set up." The proposed trust
structure was designed by attorney Deborah Tedford.

The two sides have proposed that retired long-time former Probate
Judge Jack Keyes serve as the guardian ad litem for the trust
beneficiary class members. They've also proposed that local
attorney William Clendenen be appointed as the trustee of the
trust.

"Attorney Keyes served for 32 years as the Judge of Probate for New
Haven," Rosen wrote in a motion for his appointment. "His vast
experience and his judgment and human understanding make him an
ideal choice for the position of Guardian ad Litem."

In a motion for the appointment of Clendenen, Rosen wrote that the
local attorney has been a lawyer in New Haven since 1968, "has
broad and deep experience handling matters that are both complex
and sensitive," and has previously served as the president of the
New Haven County Bar Association and of the Connecticut Bar
Association.

Rosen also pointed to an updated version of the notice and claim
form for former tenants interested in signing on to the
settlement.

"The notice is supposed to be simple," he said. "The original
notice was very far from simple. This one's better. There are just
a bunch of complexities that we have done our best to explain in a
clear way. We're sure this is clearer."

And the new documents describe the outreach efforts Rosen's office
has undertaken since the proposed settlement was first announced in
March.

He wrote that his firm has been retained by approximately 300 class
members. "Outreach and education efforts to non-client class
members began the day the settlement was made public and Northland
provided our firm with the list of authorized residents."

There were the two group meetings at Trinity Lutheran "held just
before the pandemic precluded face-to-face contact."

"As a result, our office now has direct email or cell phone contact
with about 730 class members (adults and children), including
approximately 80 persons who were not authorized tenants but appear
to be able to establish class membership. We have established
active communication with these class members, which continues with
phone calls and group texts."

If more than 25 class members affirmatively opt out of the
settlement, then Northland can terminate the class settlement
entirely. Or it can stay in the settlement and receive a pro rata
reimbursement from the funds for each opt-out over 25. Rosen said
that the tenants he has spoken to so far have been overwhelmingly
positive in their responses to the settlement, and are eager for it
to be finalized. [GN]


NOVA SCOTIA: Tip Website Set Up as Part of Mass Shooting Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
CBC News reports that a lawyer at the firm behind a proposed
class-action lawsuit on behalf of most of the families affected by
Nova Scotia's mass shooting says a website has been set up to
collect tips and other information from the public.

Rob Pineo of Patterson Law in Truro, N.S., said the Facebook page,
called NS Mass Shooting Tip Page, will receive information to go to
Martin and Associates, the criminal investigation firm working with
Patterson on the file. There is also the ability to submit tips
anonymously.

Pineo said his team knows there are videos and photos from various
parts of the rampage, which started late last April 18 and ended on
the morning of April 19 with 22 people dead. Pineo said the aim is
to gather as much of that information as possible while awaiting
disclosure they'll receive through the courts.

"Friends of friends have told me that they know somebody who has
such information," he said in an interview.

"So we're hoping that by making a tip page where people can easily
engage with the investigators, that we'll get more information on
what took place."

Martin and Associates has been working with Patterson since the law
firm was retained by the families, said Pineo. It's not unusual for
a law firm to work with outside experts, but it's particularly
useful in this case because of its size and scope, he said.

"We recognized early on that we were going to need special
expertise in the policing field and, as lawyers, we're good at
certain things but we're not police officers or former police
officers. So the ability to understand and even just decode some of
the jargon is above what we do."

It also means being able to know what might be missing from any
information packages or what to ask for next upon reviewing
information, said Pineo.

The proposed class-action names the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) and the province of Nova Scotia as defendants. It must be
approved by a judge before it can move to trial.

The federal and provincial governments agreed to call a public
inquiry into the shooting following intense pressure and lobbying
by families of the victims. The third and final commissioner for
the inquiry is currently being vetted. [GN]


OVERSTOCK.COM: Judge Dismisses Mangrove Partners Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Shearman & Sterling reported that on September 28, 2020, Judge Dale
A. Kimball of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah granted a motion to dismiss a putative securities fraud class
action asserting violations of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 against an online
home goods retailer (the "Company") and certain of its current and
former officers.  Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v.
Overstock.com, No. 2:19-CV-709-DAK-DAO (D. Utah Sept. 28, 2020).
Plaintiff, a short seller, alleged that the Company (i) manipulated
the market by issuing a digital dividend through the Company's
newly developed alternative trading platform and triggering a
"short squeeze," and (ii) misrepresented the purpose of the digital
dividend by not disclosing it would result in a short squeeze and
the Company's financial condition by adjusting its earnings
guidance upwards.  The Court dismissed the claims because they were
based on "speculation and fraud-by-hindsight."

The Company developed blockchain technology to create an
alternative trading platform for investors to trade digital
securities as part of its plans to transition from an online
retailer to a blockchain technology business.  In July 2019, the
Company announced it would issue dividends for its common and
preferred stock in digital tokens to promote its alternative
trading platform.  The Company also explained that the digital
tokens would not be (and were not required to be) registered and
that, under federal securities laws, they could not be traded for
approximately six months after their issuance.  During that same
time period, the Company revised its earnings guidance upward based
on increased customer retention for its retail business.  Shortly
after the digital dividends announcement, the Company's CEO
resigned when his relationship with a Russian spy became public.
Approximately one month later, the Company adjusted its earnings
guidance downward and the former CEO sold over 4.7 million Company
shares for $90 million.

Plaintiff, who as noted was a short seller, claimed that the
Company misrepresented (i) its financial condition by revising its
earnings guidance upward, and (ii) its purpose for issuing digital
dividends as business driven when the real objective was to
increase the stock price around the time of the CEO's anticipated
departure.  Plaintiff also claimed that the Company manipulated the
market by causing an artificial short squeeze and an increase in
share price through its digital dividends.  Short sellers—who
borrow stock from a brokerage—sell the borrowed stock at a time
when they believe the market price for the stock is high and
purchase them back when they believe the stock price is low,
returning the newly purchased stock to the brokerage.  If a
dividend is issued on a stock that a short seller has borrowed, the
short seller is obligated to pay the dividend to the lender.  The
digital dividend and the six-month lock-up period thus would force
short sellers to cover their positions at an inflated price.

The Court rejected these claims.  The Court first held that
earnings guidance is "the quintessential example of a
forward-looking statement protected by the PSLRA's safe harbor" and
that plaintiff's reliance on the missed guidance was a "classic
attempt to plead fraud by hindsight."  The Court also held that the
Company's downward revision of its earnings guidance after the CEO
left the Company did not demonstrate that prior guidance was false
but only that a different management team took a different
approach.  The Court also held that there was nothing misleading
about the Company's statements on the digital dividend.  The
Company stated a legitimate business purpose—i.e., facilitating
the Company's transition from an online retailer to a blockchain
company—and plaintiff had failed to allege any facts for their
contention that the purpose of the digital dividend was to target
short sellers.  Additionally, the nature and the terms of the
digital dividend were clearly disclosed such that its impact was
clearly understood, and "[t]here is no duty to disclose something
so obvious that the entire market immediately understands it."  

The Court next held that there was no market manipulation because
defendants "could not 'manipulate' a market via truthful
statements" regarding the nature of the digital dividends.  The
Court further held that plaintiff's claim that defendants knew that
the dividend would cause an increase in share price was
"speculation and fraud-by-hindsight."   In so holding, the Court
rejected plaintiff's argument that deception was not an element of
a market manipulation case because Section 10(b) uses the
disjunctive "or" and prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive
device."  Instead, the Court adhered to well-settled law that
"conduct cannot run afoul of Section 10(b) unless it involves
deception," and here, the Court held there was no deception.  The
Court also held that there was nothing improper about the dividend
being "locked-up," which was a product of the Company's compliance
with the SEC regulations.  The Court explained that "a company
cannot be penalized for taking measures to benefit shareholders who
are hoping for the company to succeed," and short sellers who bet
that a company will fail do so at their own risk and are "not
entitled to special consideration."

The Court also dismissed allegations related to the CEO's departure
and subsequent sale of Company stock, holding that plaintiff failed
to allege any facts to support the contention that defendants were
aware at the time they announced the digital dividend that the CEO
would be leaving the Company and because, at the time the CEO sold
his Company stock, he had left the Company and had the same
information as everyone in the market. [GN]


PAPA JOHN'S: Court Dismisses Mendez's ADA Class Action
------------------------------------------------------
Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
case, HIMELDA MENDEZ, on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. PAPA JOHN'S USA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
19-CV-9892 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y.).

The case, brought by Mendez against Papa John's, is one of dozens
recently filed in the District -- many by the same plaintiffs and
lawyers -- challenging restaurants, stores, and other
establishments for their failures to sell gift cards that are
accessible to the blind.  The Second Circuit has not yet confronted
such a challenge, but may do so soon in a consolidated appeal
(from, among others, a case in which Mendez is the plaintiff).  In
the meantime, judges in the District have been uniform in rejecting
these suits.  Some judges have done so on jurisdictional grounds,
holding that the plaintiff bringing the suit lacks Article III
standing.  Not surprisingly, Papa John's moves to dismiss on both
grounds.

With respect to the issue of standing, it suffices to say that
Judge Furman is persuaded by the thoughtful and well-reasoned
decision of Judge Abrams in Boston Market Corp. to conclude that
Mendez does have Article III standing.  Mendez's allegations in the
case are indistinguishable from the plaintiffs' allegations in
Boston Market Corp.  In fact, the complaints in the two cases,
which were drafted and filed (three days apart) by the same
counsel, are -- with the exception of the parties' names and
relevant dates -- nearly verbatim copies of one another.   Although
the standing issue is "close," Judge Furman shares Judge Abrams's
view that these allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.

With respect to the merits, Judge Furman also follows Judge Abrams,
whose persuasive decision built on the cogent initial analysis of
Judge Woods in Banana Republic, LLC, to conclude that selling
non-accessible gift cards does not run afoul of the ADA.  Notably,
her decision addresses all of the arguments that Mendez makes (a
fact that is not surprising because, like the complaints in the two
cases, the memoranda of law in opposition to the motions to dismiss
in the two cases are nearly identical).

Thus, Judge Furman concludes that Mendez's ADA claim must be and is
dismissed.  That leaves two remaining issues: whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Mendez's claims under state and
local law and whether to grant Mendez leave to amend.

With respect first, having dismissed Mendez's only federal claim,
Judge Furman declines to exercise the Court's supplemental
jurisdiction over her other claims.  The case is, as a legal
matter, still at an early stage.  Thus, the traditional values of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity that the Court
must consider do not counsel in favor of exercising jurisdiction.
Moreover, the claims raise "novel" issues of state and local law.
Accordingly, Mendez's claims under state and local law are
dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court.

As for whether to grant Mendez leave to amend, Judge Furman
declines to do so.  In the case, leave to amend is not warranted
because the problems with Mendez's ADA claim are substantive, and
while Mendez requests leave to amend in her Opposition, she does
not argue that she possesses any additional facts that could cure
the defects in that claim.  Furthermore, Mendez was on notice of
Papa John's' arguments when she filed the amended complaint in
response to Papa John's' original motion to dismiss, and Mendez was
expressly warned that she would not be given any further
opportunity to amend the complaint.  Finally, in a related case
(the one now on appeal), Mendez was given an opportunity to amend
her nearly identical complaint after it was dismissed by Judge
Woods for substantially the same reasons, but she opted not to do
so.  

Based on the foregoing, Judge Furman granted Papa John's' motion to
dismiss.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://bit.ly/3mq3fiK from
Leagle.com.


PATTERSON COS: Plymouth Retirement System Suit Wins Class Status
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PLYMOUTH COUNTY RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated, v. PATTERSON COMPANIES, INC., and SCOTT P. ANDERSON, Case
No. 0:18-cv-00871-MJD-HB (D. Minn.), the Hon. Judge Michael J.
Davis entered an order:

   1. certifying the case as class action pursuant to Rules
      23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
      on behalf of:

      "all person or entities who purchased or otherwise
      acquired Patterson Companies, Inc., common stock between
      June 26, 2013 and February 28, 2018, inclusive (the "Class
      Period")."

      Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, the officers
      and directors of Patterson at all relevant times, members
      of their immediate families, and their legal
      representatives, heirs, agents, affiliates, successors or
      assigns, Defendants' liability insurance carriers, and any
      affiliates or subsidiaries thereof, and any entity in
      which the Defendants or their immediate families have or
      had a controlling interest.;

   2. appointing Plymouth County Retirement System, Pembroke
      Pines Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers, Central
      Laborers Pension Plan, and Gwinnett County Public
      Employees Retirement System as Class Representatives; and

   3. appointing Saxena White P.A. and Robbins Geller Rudman &
      Dowd LLP as Class Counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).

The Court said, "This action meets all four factors [for class
certification]. First, Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of
thousands of Patterson securities purchasers whose individual
damages might be too small to make the expense of litigation
worthwhile. Second, there is no evidence of any other litigation
concerning this controversy already begun by or against Class
members. Third, concentrating the litigation in this forum will
promote judicial efficiency by resolving the claims of thousands of
shareholders in one case. Fourth, there are no manageability
concerns."

The Plaintiff contends that in response to the emergence of Group
Purchasing Organizations (GPOs), Patterson and its chief rivals,
Benco Dental Supply Company and Henry Schein, Inc., conspired to
eliminate GPOs from the dental supply industry by agreeing to
collectively boycott GPOs. The Federal Trade Commission determined
that Patterson's agreement with Benco constituted an illegal
conspiracy that violated federal antitrust laws. According to the
Complaint, in spite of this unlawful conspiracy, the Defendants
repeatedly made material false representations to investors
throughout the Class Period.

Patterson, headquartered in Minnesota, is the second largest
distributor of dental supplies in the United States.

A copy of the Court's memorandum of law & order is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/36xA20B at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lucas F. Olts, Esq.
          Jonah H. Goldstein, Esq.
          Jennifer N. Caringal, Esq.
          Alexi H. Pfeffer-Gillett, Esq.
          Heather G. Schlesier, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP
          655 Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 231-1058

               - and -

          Anne M. Lockner, Esq.
          ROBINS KAPLAN LLP
          800 Lasalle Ave No. 2800
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: 612-349-8500

               - and -

          Steven B. Singer, Esq.
          Kyla Grant, Esq.
          Joshua Saltzman, Esq.
          Maya Saxena, Esq.
          Joseph E. White, III, Esq.
          Lester R. Hooker, Esq.
          Dianne Anderson, Esq.
          SAXENA WHITE P.A.
          7777 Glades Rd No. 300
          Boca Raton, FL 33434
          Telephone: 561 394-3399

               - and -

          Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr., Esq.
          Brant D. Penney, Esq.
          REINHARDT WENDORF & BLANCHFIELD
          First National Bank Building Inc
          332 N Minnesota St. No. E1250
          St Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: 651-287-2100

               - and -

          Robert D. Klausner, Esq.
          KLAUSNER, KAUFMAN, JENSEN & LEVINSON
          7080 NW 4th St.
          Plantation, FL 33317
          Telephone: 954 916-1202

Counsel for the Defendants are:

          Patrick S. Williams, Esq.
          Mark G. Schroeder, Esq.
          Aaron G. Thomas, Esq.
          Jordan L. Weber, Esq.
          TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP
          2200 IDS Center
          80 South Eighth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 977-8400
          Facsimile: (612) 977-8650

PEABODY ENERGY: Howard G. Smith Reminds of Nov. 27 Motion Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------
Law Offices of Howard G. Smith reminds investors of the
upcoming November 27, 2020 deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in the class action filed on behalf of investors who
purchased Peabody Energy Corporation ("Peabody" or the "Company")
(NYSE: BTU) common stock between April 3, 2017 and October 28,
2019, inclusive (the "Class Period").

Investors suffering losses on their Peabody investments are
encouraged to contact the Law Offices of Howard G. Smith to discuss
their legal rights in this class action at 888-638-4847 or by email
to howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com.

On September 28, 2018, Peabody issued a press release announcing
that it did "not expect any production from North Goonyella in the
fourth quarter of 2018" due to a fire occurring within the mine.

On this news, Peabody's stock price fell $5.54, or over 13%, to
close at $35.64 per share on September 28, 2018, thereby injuring
investors.

Then, on February 6, 2019, Peabody reported disappointing financial
earnings for fourth quarter 2018 due to remediation costs and lack
of production at the North Goonyella mine. The Company also
announced that production would not "begin to ramp up in the early
months of 2020."

On this news, Peabody's stock price fell $3.80, or 11%, to close at
$32.05 per share on February 6, 2019, thereby injuring investors
further.

Finally, on October 29, 2019, Peabody disclosed that restarting
operations at the North Goonyella mine would not resume for three
or more years due to local regulator QMI's strict restrictions.

On this news, Peabody's stock price fell $3.56, or 22%, to close at
$12.48 per share on October 29, 2019, thereby injuring investors
further.

The complaint alleges that Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) Peabody had failed to implement adequate safety controls
at the North Goonyella mine to prevent the risk of a spontaneous
combustion event; (2) Peabody failed to follow its own safety
procedures; (3) as a result, the North Goonyella mine was at a
heightened risk of shutdown; (4) Peabody's low-cost plan to restart
operations at the North Goonyella mine posed unreasonable safety
and environmental risks; (5) the Queensland Mines Inspectorate
("QMI"), the Australian body responsible for ensuring acceptable
health and safety standards, would likely mandate a safer,
cost-prohibitive approach; (6) as a result, there would be major
delays in reopening the North Goonyella mine and restarting coal
production; and (5) that, as a result, of the foregoing,
Defendants' statements about the Peabody's business, operations,
and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

If you purchased Peabody common stock, have information or would
like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Howard G. Smith, Esquire,
of Law Offices of Howard G. Smith, 3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112,
Bensalem, Pennsylvania 19020, by telephone at (215) 638-4847,
toll-free at (888) 638-4847, or by email to
howardsmith@howardsmithlaw.com, or visit our website at
www.howardsmithlaw.com.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]


PETLAND INC: 11th Cir. Upholds Dismissal of Cisneros RICO Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
King & Spalding reports that on Aug. 25, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the dismissal of putative class claims brought against
Petland for alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), concluding that the plaintiff
purchaser failed to plausibly allege the existence of a RICO
enterprise or the requisite predicate acts.

Plaintiff Rosalba Cisneros's lawsuit arose following her purchase
of a puppy from Petland in late 2015. According to her complaint,
the dog died less than a week after it was purchased, despite
Petland's representations that a veterinarian had certified the
puppy as healthy.

Ms. Cisneros filed a putative class action against Petland,
asserting a RICO claim based on the theory that the puppy's death
stemmed from a nationwide fraud scheme between Petland and its
franchisees. Specifically, she claimed that Petland and the
franchisees intentionally purchased sick dogs from "puppy mills,"
paid veterinarians to "rubber-stamp" certificates stating that the
animals were healthy, and then sold them for premium prices. She
further claimed that the parties engaged in a pattern of
obfuscation after the sale to aid Petland in avoiding its
warranties. Petland moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

The Northern District of Georgia granted Petland's motion, finding
the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege the existence of a RICO
enterprise or that the defendants engaged in the requisite
predicate acts. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court.

The Eleventh Circuit held that Ms. Cisneros failed to plausibly
allege a RICO "enterprise" under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4), which
requires, among other things, that the plaintiff establish that the
participants in the enterprise share a "qualifying purpose." The
court began its analysis of the issue by making clear that merely
alleging that the participants had a "generally shared interest in
making money[] will not suffice." Rather, "where the participants'
ultimate purpose is to make money for themselves, a RICO plaintiff
must plausibly allege that the participants shared the purpose of
enriching themselves through a particular criminal course of
conduct." The court concluded that the complaint "alleged no facts
that plausibly support the inference that the defendants were
trying to make money in pet sales by fraud, which is a common
purpose sufficient to find a RICO enterprise as opposed to the
'obvious alternative explanation,' that they were simply trying to
make money in pet sales, which is not."

In so doing, the court expressly rejected plaintiff's attempt to
recast the defendants' otherwise "anodyne franchise business model"
as a criminal enterprise, noting that such allegations "could be
made about countless law-abiding companies . . . ." The court also
affirmed the core principle that a RICO enterprise must "be
distinct from any individual defendant—a person cannot conspire
with itself." As a result, otherwise adequate allegations that a
corporate defendant committed fraud through its agents or employees
acting within the scope of their roles for the corporation are not
enough to substantiate an association-in-fact enterprise.

The Eleventh Circuit also agreed with the district court that the
plaintiff had not pled with sufficient particularity that the
defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. To meet
this demanding requirement, a plaintiff must adequately plead at
least two predicate acts of racketeering activity and must do so
with sufficient particularity "with respect to each predicate act
to make it independently indictable as a crime." Additionally, the
plaintiff must "plausibly allege that the defendant is engaged in
criminal conduct of a continuing nature" -- a requirement that is
measured "in years, not in weeks" (quotation marks omitted). The
court concluded that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead a
sufficient number of qualified predicate acts or show how those
acts occurred over a sufficiently "substantial period of time."

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion highlights some of the difficulties
plaintiffs in consumer class actions face when trying to bring
claims for alleged violations of RICO. While such claims may be
desirable from the plaintiffs' perspective because RICO allows for
nationwide service of process and treble damages, they are
difficult to plead (much less prove).

The case is Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., No. 18-12064. [GN]


PINTEC TECHNOLOGY: Glancy Prongay Files Securities Fraud Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay announced in late September 2020 that it has filed a
class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York captioned Yaroni v. Pintec Technology
Holdings Limited, et al., (Case No. 20-cv-08062) on behalf of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Pintec
Technology Holdings Limited ("Pintec" or the "Company") (NASDAQ:
[url="]PT[/url]) securities pursuant and/or traceable to the
registration statement and prospectus (collectively, the
"Registration Statement") issued in connection with the Company's
October 2018 initial public offering ("IPO" or the "Offering").
Plaintiff pursues claims under Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").

Investors are hereby notified that they have 60 days from the date
of this notice to move the Court to serve as lead plaintiff in this
action.

If you suffered a loss on your Pintec investments or would like to
inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at www.glancylaw.com. You can also contact Charles H.
Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or via
email at shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn more about your
rights.

In October 2018, Pintec completed its IPO in which it sold more
than 3.7 million American Depositary Shares ("ADSs" or "shares") at
$11.88 per share.

On July 30, 2019, after the market closed, the Company filed its
fiscal 2018 annual report, in which it restated previously
disclosed financial results. Among other things, the Company
reported net income of $315,000 for fiscal 2018, compared to its
prior disclosure of $1.068 million net income. Pintec also
disclosed that there were material weaknesses in its internal
control over financial reporting related to cash advances outside
the normal course of business to Jimu Group, a related party, and
to a non-routine loan financing transaction with a third-party
entity, Plutux Labs.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $0.53, or more than
13%, over the next several trading sessions, to close at $3.40 per
share on August 5, 2019, thereby injuring investors.

On June 15, 2020, after the market closed, Pintec disclosed that it
could not timely file its fiscal 2019 annual report and that it
anticipated reporting a significant change in results of
operations. Specifically, the Company disclosed that it
"erroneously recorded revenue earned from certain technical service
fee on a net basis" for fiscal 2017 and 2018. Moreover, Pintec
"announced a net loss of RMB906.5 million in the full year of 2019
due to RMB890.7 million of provision for credit loss in amounts due
from a related party, Jimu Group, and RMB200 million of impairment
in prepayment for long-term investment."

By the commencement of this action, Pintec shares were trading as
low as $0.92 per share, a nearly 92% decline from the $11.88 per
share IPO price.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that the
Registration Statement was false and misleading and omitted to
state material facts. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose
to investors: (1) that the Company erroneously recorded revenue
earned from certain technical service fee on a net basis, rather
than a gross basis; (2) that there were material weaknesses in
Pintec's internal control over financial reporting related to cash
advances outside the normal course of business to Jimu Group, a
related party, and to a non-routine loan financing transaction with
a third-party entity, Plutux Labs; (3) that, as a result of the
foregoing, the Company's financial results for fiscal 2017 and 2018
had been misstated; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Pintec securities pursuant
and/or traceable to the IPO, you may move the Court no later than
60 days from the date of this notice to ask the Court to appoint
you as lead plaintiff. To be a member of the Class you need not
take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your choice
or take no action and remain an absent member of the Class. If you
wish to learn more about this action, or if you have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Charles H. Linehan,
Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles,
California 90067 at 310-201-9150, Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by
email to shareholders@glancylaw.com, or visit our website at
[url="]www.glancylaw.com[/url]. If you inquire by email please
include your mailing address, telephone number and number of shares
purchased. [GN]


PINTEC TECHNOLOGY: Vincent Wong Alerts of Class Action Filing
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Vincent Wong announce that class actions have
commenced on behalf of certain shareholders in Pintec Technology
Holdings Limited. If you suffered a loss you have until the lead
plaintiff deadline to request that the court appoint you as lead
plaintiff. There will be no obligation or cost to you.

Pintec Technology Holdings Limited (NASDAQ:PT)

If you suffered a loss, contact us at:
http://www.wongesq.com/pslra-1/pintec-technology-holdings-limited-loss-submission-form?prid=9780&wire=1

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 30, 2020

This lawsuit is on behalf of shareholders who purchased PT
securities pursuant and/or traceable to the registration statement
and prospectus issued in connection with the Company's October 2018
initial public offering.

Allegations against PT include that: (1) the Company erroneously
recorded revenue earned from certain technical service fee on a net
basis, rather than a gross basis; (2) there were material
weaknesses in Pintec's internal control over financial reporting
related to cash advances outside the normal course of business to
Jimu Group, a related party, and to a non-routine loan financing
transaction with a third-party entity, Plutux Labs; (3) as a result
of the foregoing, the Company's financial results for fiscal 2017
and 2018 had been misstated; and (4) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects, were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

To learn more contact Vincent Wong, Esq. either via email
vw@wongesq.com or by telephone at 212.425.1140.

Vincent Wong, Esq. is an experienced attorney who has represented
investors in securities litigations involving financial fraud and
violations of shareholder rights. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

Vincent Wong, Esq.
39 East Broadway
Suite 304
New York, NY 10002
Tel. 212.425.1140
Fax. 866.699.3880
E-Mail: vw@wongesq.com [GN]


PORTLAND GENERAL: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 2 Bid Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on Oct. 4 disclosed that class action lawsuit
has commenced on behalf of shareholders of Portland General
Electric Company. Shareholders interested in serving as lead
plaintiff have until the deadlines listed to petition the court.
Further details about the cases can be found at the links provided.
There is no cost or obligation to you.

Portland General Electric Company (NYSE:POR)

POR Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased April 24, 2020 -
August 24, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 2, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/portland-general-electric-company-information-request-form?prid=9783&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Portland
General Electric Company made materially false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) PGE lacked effective
internal controls over its energy trading practices; (2) PGE
personnel had entered energy trades during 2020, with increasing
volume accumulating late in the second quarter and into the third
quarter, that created significant negative financial exposure for
PGE; (3)as a result, the Company was reasonably likely to incur
significant losses; and (4) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:

Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
https://www.zlk.com [GN]


PRECIGEN INC: Bragar Eagel Alerts of Class Action Filing
--------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, on Oct. 7 disclosed that a class action lawsuit
has been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California on behalf of investors that purchased
Precigen, Inc. f/k/a Intrexon Corporation (NASDAQ: PGEN; XON)
securities between May 10, 2017 and September 25, 2020 (the "Class
Period"). Investors have until December 4, 2020 to apply to the
Court to be appointed as lead plaintiff in the lawsuit.

On September 25, 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") issued a cease and desist order against Precigen. The cease
and desist order involved "inaccurate reports concerning the
company's purported success converting relatively inexpensive
natural gas into more expensive industrial chemicals using a
proprietary methane bioconversion ('MBC') program." The order noted
that the Company was "primarily using significantly more expensive
pure methane for the relevant laboratory experiments but was
indicating that the results had been achieved using natural gas."
The cease-and-desist order further stated that although the Company
"pitched the MBC program privately to numerous potential business
partners over the course of 2017 and 2018" and "[a] number of these
potential partners performed due diligence on the MBC program
including reviewing lab results and plans for commercialization.
[The Company] has not yet found a partner for the MBC program."

The complaint, filed on October 5, 2020, alleges that throughout
the Class Period defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose to investors that: (1) the Company was
using pure methane as feedstock for its announced yields for its
methanotroph bioconversion platform instead of natural gas; (2)
yields from natural gas as a feedstock were substantially lower
than the aforementioned pure methane yields; (3) due to the
substantial price difference between pure methane and natural gas,
pure methane was not a commercially viable feedstock; (4) the
Company's financial statements for the quarter ended March 31, 2018
were false and could not be relied upon; (5) the Company had
material weaknesses in its internal controls over financial
reporting; (6) the Company was under investigation by the SEC since
October 2018; and (7) as a result of the foregoing, defendants'
public statements were materially false and misleading at all
relevant times.

If you purchased Precigen securities during the Class Period and
suffered a loss, are a long-term stockholder, have information,
would like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Brandon Walker, Melissa
Fortunato, or Marion Passmore by email at investigations@bespc.com,
telephone at (212) 355-4648, or by filling out this contact form.
There is no cost or obligation to you.

              About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do
not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]


PRECIGEN INC: Gainey McKenna Alerts of Securities Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on Oct. 7 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed against Precigen, Inc. f/k/a Intrexon
Corporation ("Precigen" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: PGEN; XON) in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California on behalf of those who purchased or acquired the
securities of Precigen between May 10, 2017 and September 25, 2020,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Precigen investors under the federal securities laws.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose to investors that: (1) the
Company was using pure methane as feedstock for its announced
yields for its methanotroph bioconversion platform instead of
natural gas; (2) yields from natural gas as a feedstock were
substantially lower than the aforementioned pure methane yields;
(3) due to the substantial price difference between pure methane
and natural gas, pure methane was not a commercially viable
feedstock; (4) the Company's financial statements for the quarter
ended March 31, 2018 were false and could not be relied upon; (5)
the Company had material weaknesses in its internal controls over
financial reporting; (6) the Company was under investigation by the
SEC since October 2018; and (7) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' public statements were materially false and misleading
at all relevant times. When the true details entered the market,
the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Precigen
during the Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the
December 4, 2020 lead plaintiff motion deadline. A lead plaintiff
is a representative party acting on behalf of other class members
in directing the litigation.  If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]


PRECIGEN INC: Hagens Berman Reminds of Class Action Filing
----------------------------------------------------------
Hagens Berman urges Precigen, Inc. (NASDAQ: PGEN) (f/k/a Intrexon)
investors with significant losses to submit your losses now. A
securities fraud class action has been filed and certain investors
may have valuable claims.

Class Period: May 10, 2017 - Sept. 25, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: Dec. 4, 2020

Visit: www.hbsslaw.com/investor-fraud/PGEN

Contact An Attorney Now: PGEN@hbsslaw.com
         844-916-0895

Precigen, Inc. (PGEN) Securities Fraud Class Action:

The complaint alleges that Defendants misrepresented and concealed
that: (1) the Company was using pure methane as feedstock for its
announced yields for its methanotroph bioconversion ("MCB")
platform instead of natural gas; (2) yields from natural gas as a
feedstock were substantially lower than the announced pure methane
yields; (3) due to the substantial price difference between pure
methane and natural gas, pure methane was not a commercially viable
feedstock; (4) the Company's 1Q 2018 financial statements were
false; (5) the Company had material weaknesses in its internal
controls over financial reporting; and (6) the Company was under
investigation by the SEC since October 2018.

Investors allegedly began to learn the truth through a series of
disclosures beginning on Aug. 9, 2018, when the company announced
that its 1Q 2018 financial results could no longer be relied on.  
In its restated 1Q 2018 results, the company made significant
changes to deferred revenue, collaboration and licensing revenues
and accumulated deficit, as well as admitted to material weaknesses
in its internal controls over financial reporting.

Then, on Mar. 2, 2020, the company disclosed it received a subpoena
in Oct. 2018 from the SEC concerning Precigen's MCB-related
disclosures.

Finally, on Sept. 25, 2020, the SEC issued a cease and desist order
involving "inaccurate reports concerning the company's purported
success converting relatively inexpensive natural gas into more
expensive industrial chemicals using a proprietary [MCB] program."

"We're focused on investors' losses and proving that Precigen
cooked its books and promoted fake technology," said Reed Kathrein,
the Hagens Berman partner leading the investigation.

If you are a Precigen investor and have significant losses, or have
knowledge that may assist the firm's investigation, click here to
discuss your legal rights with Hagens Berman.

Whistleblowers: Persons with non-public information regarding
Precigen should consider their options to help in the investigation
or take advantage of the SEC Whistleblower program. Under the new
program, whistleblowers who provide original information may
receive rewards totaling up to 30 percent of any successful
recovery made by the SEC. For more information, call Reed Kathrein
at 844-916-0895 or email PGEN@hbsslaw.com.

                     About Hagens Berman

Hagens Berman is a national law firm with nine offices in eight
cities around the country and eighty attorneys. The firm represents
investors, whistleblowers, workers and consumers in complex
litigation.   More about the firm and its successes is located at
hbsslaw.com. [GN]


PURSUIT: Faces Another Suit Over Columbia Icefield Crash
--------------------------------------------------------
660News reports that an Alberta woman who survived the Columbia
Icefield crash that killed three people and injured 24 others back
in July says she's living with her pain every day.

Sweta Patel is one of seven people who have filed a lawsuit seeking
$17 million in damages against the tour company.

The 27-year-old was a passenger aboard the glacier sightseeing bus
when it rolled off a road in Jasper National Park.

She says her recovery has been difficult.

"Though I survived, I am left with devastating mental and physical
injuries," said Patel. "I now live a completely dependent life."

Three people, including her uncle and a friend, died July 18 when
the rollover happened.

Patel has a fracture in her neck that is still healing and could be
permanent.

"I have over 20 fractures," she said. "And the pain that I go
through every day, it's not easy. It's been a hard time for us."

The $17 million suit is looking for compensation for medical bills,
and multiple victims have had to find alternate living conditions.

This is the second legal action against the tour bus operators.

In August, a class-action lawsuit was filed against the tour bus
company, Pursuit, claiming it acted recklessly and unreasonably
leading up to the crash. [GN]


RANDSTAD US: 9th Cir. Affirms Arbitration Ruling in Lopez Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSE MARTINEZ LOPEZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
RANDSTAD US, L.P., Defendant-Appellee, and RANDSTAD GENERAL PARTNER
(US) LLC, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-17416 (9th Cir.), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of
the district court granting Randstad's motion to compel arbitration
and dismissing the suit.

Plaintiffs Jose Martinez Lopez, Fernando Lara, and Elisabeth Lopez
brought the putative class action against their employer, Randstad,
alleging violations of California wage-and-hour law.  

The Plaintiffs and Randstad entered into materially identical
arbitration agreements.  Each agreement requires the parties to
arbitrate all "covered claims," defined in relevant part as any
legal claims that relate to the employee's recruitment, hire,
employment, and/or termination including, but not limited to, those
concerning wages or compensation   Each agreement -- though not
Lara's, which is in Spanish but materially identical for present
purposes -- has the class-and-representative-action waiver.

And each agreement has the following poison pill clause: "I agree
that this entire agreement is void if it is determined that I
cannot waive the right to participate in or receive money from any
class, collective, or representative proceeding."

Non-party Freddy Robledo filed a different wage-and-hour suit
against Randstad in California state court as a representative
action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 -- Robledo
v. Randstad US.  The Plaintiffs are among the unnamed aggrieved
employees in Robledo.

Invoking an arbitration agreement materially identical to the
Plaintiffs' agreements in the instant case, Randstad moved to
compel arbitration of Robledo's PAGA action.  The state trial court
denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.
Applying Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, the appellate
court reasoned that where an employment agreement compels the
waiver of representative claims under the PAGA, it is contrary to
public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law.

The Plaintiffs contend that the appellate court's ruling in Robledo
triggers the poison pill clauses in their arbitration agreements,
thereby voiding those agreements and relieving them of the
obligation to arbitrate their claims against Randstad.  As the
Plaintiffs see things, Robledo determined that they -- as aggrieved
employees governed by materially identical arbitration agreements
-- could not waive their right to "participate in" the Robledo PAGA
action, thereby triggering the poison pills in their agreements.

As Randstad sees things, the poison pill clause in a particular
employee's agreement is triggered only by a judicial determination
that the employee herself cannot waive the right to participate in
or receive money from any class, collective, or representative
proceeding.  Put another way, Randstad submits that for a judicial
decision in Case #1 to trigger the poison pill clause in the
arbitration agreement of a plaintiff in Case #2, the decision in
Case #1 must in some fashion be personal to the plaintiff in Case
#2, either by encompassing her as a named plaintiff or by otherwise
deciding her rights under her agreement.

Randstad's view prevails.  The clause's deployment of the word "I"
means that the poison pill is triggered only if Robledo in fact
determined that the Plaintiffs -- Jose Martinez Lopez, Fernando
Lara, and Elisabeth Lopez -- could not waive the right to
participate in or receive money from any class or representative
action.

The Ninth Circuit finds that Robledo did no such thing.  The
appellate court did not mention the ability of employees other than
Robledo himself to participate in the PAGA proceeding; rather, it
addressed only Robledo's ability to proceed under PAGA despite the
representative action waiver in his arbitration agreement.  

The point is confirmed by Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los
Angeles, LLC, which explained that a PAGA claim is not a dispute
between an employer and an employee arising out of their
contractual relationship, but rather a dispute between an employer
and the state, which alleges directly or through its agents that
the employer has violated the Labor Code.  At most, then, Robledo
addressed the ability of Robledo himself to pursue a PAGA action on
behalf of California, not the ability of the Plaintiffs (or any
other Randstad employee) to participate in or benefit from that
action.

Pressing the opposite result, the Plaintiffs argue that even if
Robledo did not determine that they could participate in that PAGA
action, the appellate court's decision necessarily encompassed them
and determined their contractual rights because the case was a
representative action in which the court interpreted an arbitration
agreement materially identical to theirs.  By waiting for their
reply brief to raise the argument, the Plaintiffs forfeited it.

The argument is meritless in any event.  As it noted, the Ninth
Circuit holds that a PAGA action is not a private dispute, but
rather a dispute between an employer and the Labor and Workforce
Development Agency ("LWDA").  Unlike class representatives, who
bring claims on behalf of absent class members, PAGA plaintiffs are
private attorneys general who, stepping into the shoes of the LWDA,
bring claims on behalf of the state agency.  Accordingly, Robledo
addressed only the rights of the state (through the LWDA) and of
Robledo to sue on the state's behalf, not the rights of unnamed
aggrieved employees like the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs next invoke the issue preclusion doctrine to argue
that Robledo controls as to the enforceability of their
representative action waivers.  Again, the Plaintiffs forfeited th
argument by failing to raise it until their reply brief.  And,
again, the argument fails on the merits.  Even if Robledo somehow
had issue preclusive effect in the case, the decision itself does
not decide whether the Plaintiffs themselves could waive their
rights to participate in or receive money from any class,
collective, or representative proceeding -- which means that the
decision does not trigger the poison pill clauses in their
agreements.

The Plaintiffs next turn to a different provision in the
arbitration agreement, which states: "I understand that under the
National Labor Relations Act, I am not prevented from acting in
concert with others to challenge this agreement in any forum, and
understand that I will not be retaliated against if I act with
others to challenge this agreement."  In their view, that provision
contemplates that employees may rely upon rulings obtained by
co-employees in other cases and therefore that the poison pill
clause must be informed by the provision permitting employees to
act in concert to challenge the agreement.

But as it already explained, the Ninth Circuit holds that PAGA
action in Robledo did not entail Robledo acting in concert with his
coworkers in the sense that a class representative acts in concert
with absent members of the class, so the premise of the Plaintiffs'
argument fails.

Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that the poison pill clause is
ambiguous and should be construed against Randstad.  However, they
never raised the issue of ambiguity.  Quite the opposite, the
Plaintiffs argued that the clause was "clear and unambiguous."
Therefore, this issue is forfeited and the Ninth Circuit declines
to consider it.

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
arbitration ruling.

A full-text copy of the Ninth Circuit's July 21, 2020 Memorandum is
available at https://bit.ly/35AzepN from Leagle.com.


RIPPLE: Zakinov Class Action Allowed to Proceed
-----------------------------------------------
John Isige, writing FXStreet, reports that Ripple has been dealing
with multiple lawsuits for several years now. In a new development,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California ruled out a couple of fraud allegations filed against
the blockchain startup. However, the prominent lawsuit against the
cross-border company has been allowed to proceed.

Vladi Zakinov filed a class-action case against Ripple. The two
fraud allegations were part of the class-action. The blockchain
startup was taken to court for violating sections 17500 and 17200
of the California Business and Profession Code. The plaintiff
argued that Ripple's CEO said that cryptocurrencies have the
potential "to be more valuable than gold." In an interview, the CEO
had reckoned that XRP is "solving a real-world user case; it's not
just about speculators."

The court also ruled that the class-action was within the law to
proceed. Ripple is said to have violated the state of California's
Corporate Code 25401 and is directly related to Garlinghouse. The
plaintiff quotes the CEO of Ripple, who once said in an interview:

"'I'm long XRP, I'm very, very long XRP as a percentage of my
personal balance sheet. . . . . [I am] not long on some of the
other [digital] assets, because it is not clear to me what's the
real utility, what problem are they really solving . . . if you're
solving a real problem, if it's a scaled problem, then I think you
have a huge opportunity to continue to grow that. We have been
really fortunate obviously, I remain very, very, very long XRP,
there is an expression in the industry HODL, instead of hold, it's
HODL . . . I'm on the HODL side.'"

The class-action case was allowed to process because Garlinghouse
misinterpreted the "scope and character of his XRP holdings." The
plaintiff was also given leeway to pursue any other cause of action
against the blockchain startup, including the "alleged sales or
offer of unregistered securities in violation of federal and
California state law." [GN]


ROYAL CARIBBEAN: Labaton Sucharow Files Securities Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
Labaton Sucharow LLP disclosed that on October 7, 2020, it filed a
securities class action lawsuit, captioned City of Riviera Beach
General Employees Retirement System v. Royal Caribbean Cruises
Ltd., No. 20-cv-24111 (S.D. Fla.) (the "Action"), on behalf of its
client City of Riviera Beach General Employees Retirement System
("Riviera Beach") against Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. ("Royal
Caribbean" or the "Company") (NYSE: RCL) and certain executive
officers (collectively, "Defendants"). The Action asserts claims
under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or
otherwise acquired Royal Caribbean securities from February 4, 2020
through March 17, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"), and were
damaged thereby (the "Class").

Royal Caribbean is the world's second largest cruise company,
operating 61 cruise ships which visit over 1,000 destinations
across all seven continents. Following the outbreak of COVID-19 in
China, cruise companies, including Royal Caribbean, began to cancel
voyages in that region, and customer bookings were declining
globally as vacationers worried about the global spread of the
virus.

The Action alleges that, from February 4, 2020 through March 17,
2020, Defendants failed to disclose material facts about the
Company's decrease in bookings outside China, instead maintaining
that it was only experiencing a slowdown in bookings from China.
The Action further alleges that Defendants failed to disclose
material facts about the Company's inadequate policies and
procedures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 on its ships.

The truth about the scope of the impact that COVID-19 had on the
Company's overall bookings and the inability of Royal Caribbean to
prevent the virus' spread on its ships was revealed through a
series of disclosures. First, on February 13, 2020, Royal Caribbean
issued a press release stating that it had canceled 18 voyages in
Southeast Asia due to recent travel restrictions and further
warning that recent bookings had been softer for its broader
business. On this news, Royal Caribbean shares fell over 3
percent.

Second, on February 25, 2020, Royal Caribbean filed its 2019 Form
10-K, indicating that COVID-19 concerns were negatively impacting
its overall business. On this news, Royal Caribbean shares fell
over 14 percent.

Third, on March 10, 2020, Royal Caribbean withdrew its 2020
financial guidance, increased its revolving credit facility by $550
million, and announced that it would take cost-cutting actions due
to the proliferation of COVID-19, further revealing that COVID-19
was severely impacting Royal Caribbean's 2020 customer booking and
that its safety measures were inadequate to prevent the spread of
the virus on its ships. On this news, Royal Caribbean shares fell
over 14 percent.

Fourth, on March 11, 2020, Royal Caribbean's largest competitor,
Carnival, announced a 60-day suspension of all operations,
prompting concern that Royal Caribbean would follow suit. At the
same time, Royal Caribbean also cancelled two cruises, beginning a
series of cancellations and suspensions to follow. On this news,
Royal Caribbean shares fell almost 32 percent.

Fifth, on March 14, 2020, Royal Caribbean announced a suspension of
all global cruises for 30 days. On this news, Royal Caribbean stock
fell over 7 percent.

Sixth, on March 16, 2020, the Company revealed that global
operations could be suspended longer than anticipated, announcing
the cancellations of two additional cruises throughout April and
into May. On this news, Royal Caribbean shares fell over 7
percent.

Finally, on March 18, 2020, analysts downgraded Royal Caribbean's
stock and slashed their price targets. On this news, Royal
Caribbean shares fell more than 19 percent.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Royal Caribbean securities
during the Class Period and were damaged thereby, you are a member
of the "Class" and may be able to seek appointment as Lead
Plaintiff. Lead Plaintiff motion papers must be filed with the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida no later than
December 7, 2020. The Lead Plaintiff is a court-appointed
representative for absent members of the Class. You do not need to
seek appointment as Lead Plaintiff to share in any Class recovery
in the Action. If you are a Class member and there is a recovery
for the Class, you can share in that recovery as an absent Class
member. You may retain counsel of your choice to represent you in
the Action.

If you would like to consider serving as Lead Plaintiff or have any
questions about this lawsuit, you may contact David J. Schwartz,
Esq. of Labaton Sucharow, at (800) 321-0476, or via email at
dschwartz@labaton.com.

Riviera Beach is represented by Labaton Sucharow, which represents
many of the largest pension funds in the United States and
internationally with combined assets under management of more than
$2 trillion. Labaton Sucharow has been recognized for its
excellence by the courts and peers, and it is consistently ranked
in leading industry publications. Offices are located in New York,
NY, Wilmington, DE, and Washington, D.C. More information about
Labaton Sucharow is available at www.labaton.com.

CONTACT: David J. Schwartz
(800) 321-0476
dschwartz@labaton.com [GN]


SALAS CONCRETE: Judge Declines Prelim. Approval of Deal in Cavazos
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Dale Drozd of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California declined to adopt the Findings and
Recommendations issued by Magistrate Judge Erica Grosjean on July
21, 2020 in the case JOHN CAVAZOS, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SALAS CONCRETE, INC.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-00062-DAD-EPG (E.D. Cal.).

Defendant Salas Concrete, Inc. is a California corporation and a
licensed concrete contractor that provides a wide range of concrete
services.  Plaintiff John Cavazos began working for Defendant in
2011 as an hourly construction worker in Clovis, California, and
continued to work for the Defendant until Sept. 19, 2018, when it
terminated his employment.

On Jan. 14, 2019, the Plaintiff, as an individual and on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, filed the present action
against the Defendant.  He filed a first amended complaint ("FAC")
on March 27, 2019.  The FAC alleges the following wage and hour
claims against the Defendant on behalf of the Plaintiff and the
proposed class: (1) Failure to pay minimum and overtime wages in
violation of the Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"); (2) Failure
to pay all wages earned for all hours worked at the correct rates
of pay; (3) Failure to provide rest breaks; (4) Failure to provide
meal periods; (5) Failure to indemnify; (6) Wage statement
penalties; (7) Waiting time penalties; (8) Unfair competition; and
(9) Civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act.

On April 22, 2019, the Defendant filed an answer to the FAC in
which it denied liability.  

During the class certification discovery phase, the Plaintiff
sought from the Defendant the names and contact information of
putative class members and the parties agreed to a Belaire-West
Notice to putative class members.  The parties retained ILYM Group,
Inc. to provide for a Belaire-West Notice to the putative class
members.  The Court approved the parties' stipulation to use the
procedure for discovery of the putative class member identities and
contact information.  The Defendant provided ILYM with the names
and contact information for 39 putative class members to whom ILYM
mailed notice.

                      The Class Settlement

On Nov. 6, 2019, the parties participated in a mediation session
with the Hon. Steven M. Vartabedian, retired Associate Justice for
the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  At the
conclusion of the settlement, the parties reached the material
terms of a settlement.

In January 2020, the parties formally entered into the Settlement
Agreement.  The Settlement covers the Class or the Settlement
Class, which is defined as all current and former California
hourly, non-exempt employees Salas Concrete, Inc. employed during
the Class Period.  The Class Period is in turn defined as Jan. 14,
2015 through Nov. 6, 2019. The Class Member or the Settlement Class
Member is defined as any person who is a member of the Settlement
Class, or, if such person is incompetent or deceased, the person's
legal guardian, executor, heir or successor-in-interest.  The Class
Claimant is defined as any and all Class Members who do not submit
a valid and timely Opt Out Request.  The Claims are defined under
the Settlement as the claims asserted in the FAC.  The Released
claims are defined as any and all claims arising out of the facts
and circumstances alleged in the First Amended Complaint during the
Claims Period.

The Defendant agrees to pay a Gross Settlement Amount in the amount
of $175,000 and, in addition, agrees to pay its employer-side
payroll taxes.  The Gross Settlement Amount is proposed to be
distributed as follows:

   (1) the Class attorneys' fees not to exceed $58,333, which is
       33 1/3% of the Gross Settlement Amount;

   (2) the Class attorneys' expenses not to exceed $15,000;

   (3) incentive award to the class representative not to exceed
       $10,000;

   (4) administrative expenses not to exceed $5,000;

   (5) a $4,000 PAGA award, with 75% to be paid to the California
       Labor and Workforce Development Agency ("LDWA") pursuant   
       to California Labor Code Section 2699(i) and 25% to be
       paid to the Class Members; and

   (6) distribution of the Net Settlement Amount to all the Class
       Claimants, less taxes and required withholding associated
       with each Class Claimant's share of the Individual
       Settlement Amount.

The estimated Net Settlement Amount is $83,666.   The Individual
Settlement Amount is estimated to be, on average, $2,091.  The
amount of each Class Claimant's share will be calculated based on
the number of pay periods worked by the Settlement Class Member
while employed by the Defendant during the Class Period.s

The Settlement requires the Defendant to deposit with the
Settlement Administrator, within 90 days of the "effective date" of
the Settlement Agreement, one seventh of the funds sufficient to
pay the Gross Settlement Amount and one seventh of its related
employer-side payroll taxes.  Every 180 days thereafter, the
Defendant is to deposit an additional one seventh of the funds
sufficient to pay the Gross Settlement Amount and one seventh of
its employer-side payroll taxes, until it has fully paid the Gross
Settlement Amount and its employer-side payroll taxes.  Funds are
to be distributed from the Gross Settlement Amount no later than 14
days after the Defendant has deposited all funds required under the
Settlement Agreement with the Settlement Administrator.

The Settlement Agreement also contains a provision that allows the
Defendant to void the Settlement.  Under the provision, if the
Class Members representing more than 20% of the Class' pay periods
timely submit Opt-Out Requests, the Defendant will have the
exclusive right to void the Settlement.

The Plaintiff then sought preliminary approval of the settlement in
March 2020.  They seek an order (1) conditionally certifying the
proposed Settlement Class; (2) preliminarily approving the
Settlement; (3) approving, only for purposes of the Settlement, the
appointment of Plaintiff as Class Representative; (4) approving,
only for purposes of the Settlement, the appointment of the Spivak
Law Firm and United Employees Law Group as Class Counsel; (5)
approving, as to form and content, the Notice of Proposed Class
Action Settlement and Final Hearing, attached to the Settlement
Agreement; (6) appointing, only for purposes of the Settlement,
Simpluris, Inc., as the Settlement Administrator; and (7) setting a
fairness hearing for final approval of the Settlement.

              July 21 Finding and Recommendations

Magistrate Judge Erica Grosjean reviewed the proposed settlement
and issued her Findings and Recommendations on July 21, 2020, a
copy of which is available at https://bit.ly/3kr1O34 from
Leagle.com.

Judge Grosjean found that (i) the requirements for class
certification in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) are
satisfied in the proposed settlement; (ii) preliminary approval of
the Settlement is appropriate; (iii) the payment plan and the delay
in distribution until after the Defendant has deposited all funds
due are reasonable; (iv) the conditional approval of the attorney's
fees award anticipated by the proposed Settlement is appropriate
but requires the Plaintiff to submit appropriate documentation
accounting for the number of hours expended by his counsel and a
proposed reasonable hourly rate to allow the Court to calculate the
lodestar amount; (v) the Plaintiff must submit a clearly organized
expense log that specifically delineates the costs for which
recovery is sought; and (vi) it is appropriate to approve the
appointment of Simpluris as the Class Administrator, and to grant
preliminary approval of administrative expenses not to exceed
$5,000.

For proposed settlements under Rule 23, Judge Grosjean has several
concerns with the proposed Notice.  She recommends that, within 14
days of the issuance of the order granting preliminary approval,
the parties file a revised proposed notice that is consistent with
the Order, including (1) that all portions of the options
provisions accurately and clearly state that a class member may
participate in the settlement if they either do nothing or they
object; (2) that the objections provision accurately reflects the
Court's policy that anyone can raise objections at the fairness
hearing for final approval of the settlement, but that the Court
retains discretion to decline to consider an objection that has not
been timely submitted in writing; and (3) that the final settlement
hearing section set forth the correct courtroom and reflect the
Court's policy on the ability to raise objections during the final
fairness hearing.

Judge Grosjean recommends that the remainder of the Notice packet,
as modified in compliance with the recommendations, be approved.

Judge Grosjean further found that the proposed Notice packet,
including the Class Notice, and opt-out request form, with the
exceptions and recommended modifications discussed, and the notice
procedures, sufficiently provide notice in a reasonable manner to
all the Class Members who would be bound by the Settlement
Agreement and that the proposed mail delivery is also appropriate
under the circumstances.  She also finds the manner of distribution
to be sufficient.

Among other things, Magistrate Judge Grosjean recommended that the
Settlement Agreement be granted preliminary approval.  She also
recommended for the proposed class to be conditionally certified
under Rule 23(c)(1), for purposes of settlement only, and that the
following persons be preliminarily certified as Class Members
solely for the purpose of entering a settlement in this matter:  

   All current and former California hourly, non-exempt employees
   of Salas Concrete, Inc. employed from Jan. 14, 2015 through
   Nov. 6, 2019.

Judge Grosjean further recommended approval of the form and content
of the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement subject to
certain modifications.

It is further recommended that Simpluris be appointed to act as the
Settlement Administrator; John Cavazos be appointed as the Class
Representative; and the Spivak Law Firm and United Employees Law
Group be appointed as the Class Counsel.

                       Sept. 24 Order

However, in a Sept. 24, 2020 Order, Judge Drozd declined to adopt
the Findings and Recommendations dated July 21.

Judge Drozd notes that the Court required the parties on Aug. 28,
2020, to provide supplemental briefing in connection with plaintiff
John Cavazos's pending motion for class certification and for
preliminary approval of a class action settlement.  In September
2020, the parties filed stipulations twice, which the Court has
construed as requests for an extension of time to file the required
brief.

The Court cites that in total, the parties are requesting about 90
days to file their supplemental brief addressing the many concerns
the court raised in its August 28, 2020 order. Those concerns
ranged from whether this court has been divested of its
jurisdiction due to plaintiff's apparent abandonment of his sole
federal claim in this action, a federal Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), to whether various aspects of the parties' class action
settlement agreement are reasonable, fair, and adequate under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

While the court is sympathetic to the difficulties posed by the
ongoing global pandemic, the court will not grant the pending
request for an extension of time to file a supplemental brief
because the concerns it raised in the August 28, 2020 order are
run-of-the-mill issues that routinely arise in FLSA collective and
class action settlements.  The parties should have thoroughly
researched and briefed those issues in the first instance, the
Court opines.

Accordingly, Judge Drozd denied without prejudice Plaintiff's
motion for class certification and for preliminary approval of a
class action settlement.

The matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for
further proceedings, including to set a date for an initial
scheduling conference, and if the parties file a second notice of
settlement, to provide a deadline for the parties to file their
dismissal documents.

A copy of Judge Drozd's Sept. 24, 2020 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/3kJlEHb from Leagle.com.


SARASAS WITAED: Parents File Class Action Over Child Abuse
----------------------------------------------------------
Coconuts Bangkok reports that Sarasas Witaed Ratchaphruek School
parents filed a class-action suit against the school with the
attorney-general, a day after Ornuma "Teacher Joom" Plodprong filed
a complaint against two parents of a child she admits to abusing
after they kicked and slapped her at a meeting.

Ornuma told reporters that she has apologized to all parents,
students and admins of the Sarasas chain of schools and feels very
guilty for assaulting the children (she blames "stress"). Still,
she said that the law compelled her to take legal action against
Chanwit Noisuekying, 37, and his unidentified wife after they took
some revenge and roughed her up in September.

One of numerous clips showing Ornuma violently abusing children
shows her pulling the ear of the couple's child, identified as
"Seu," as he reads a book. At the Sept. 25 meeting where parents
were shown security footage of Ornuma's frequent abuses, the couple
struck Ornuma several times as she sat at a table, which was
partially caught about 18 minutes into a livestream video.

Clip after clip has emerged showing callous and casual eruptions of
traumatic violence perpetrated against the kindergarteners by
Ornuma. She slams their heads into walls and shoves them face-first
down into the floor after ordering them to walk away. Since the
first leaked clip of Sept. 25 showing Ornuma slap a child on the
head so hard he falls to the ground, pulling one's hair and
pinching another's ear, a slew of clips have followed of her and
other teachers assaulting children, prompting a wider examination
of physical punishment at Thai schools.

The suit organized by the parents seeks financial damages from the
school.

Ornuma and the school are both represented by attorney Decha
Kittiwitthayanun in the growing number of complaints. He said more
than 30 cases have emerged and 13 teachers are suspected of abusing
children at the school. He said the legal process must be allowed
to run its course.

The scandal has been exacerbated by the school's owner, who taunted
officials threatening to shut down his schools and bragged about
his questionable educational methods. [GN]


SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT: $65M Settlement in Baker Has Final Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LOU BAKER, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 14-cv-02129-MMA-AGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge
Michael M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of California granted both the Plaintiff's (i) Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation,
and (ii) Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Litigation Expenses.

Class Representatives/Lead Plaintiffs are Arkansas Public Employees
Retirement System ("APERS") and Pensionskassen for Børne-Og
Ungdomspædagoger ("PBU").

Defendants are SeaWorld, The Blackstone Group L.P., James Atchison,
James M. Heaney, and Marc Swanson.  

The Plaintiffs bring the securities fraud class action against the
Defendants asserting claims pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
under Section 10(b).  They bring the action on behalf of all
individuals and entities who purchased or acquired common stock of
SeaWorld throughout the Class Period (Aug. 29, 2013 to Aug. 12,
2014).

SeaWorld is a theme park and entertainment company.  During the
Class Period, SeaWorld owned and operated 11 theme parks in the
United States: SeaWorld Orlando, SeaWorld San Diego, SeaWorld San
Antonio, Aquatica Orlando, Aquatica San Diego, Discovery Cove,
Busch Gardens Tampa, Busch Gardens Williamsburg, Adventure Island,
Water Country USA, and Sesame Place. SeaWorld's brand and
reputation are among the company's most important assets.  SeaWorld
has been subjected to criticism related to captivity issues, even
prior to the release of the 2013 documentary Blackfish.

Mr. Atchison served as SeaWorld's CEO, President, and Director from
before the start of the Class Period until January 2015. Mr. Heaney
has served as SeaWorld's CFO from before the start of the Class
Period to present.  Mr. Swanson has served as SeaWorld's Chief
Accounting Officer from before the start of the Class Period to
present.  Blackstone is a multinational private equity, investment
banking, alternative asset management, and financial services
corporation based in New York, New York.

On May 19, 2017, the Class Representatives filed their motion for
class certification, seeking the Court's certification of a class
of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the
publicly traded common stock of SeaWorld between Aug. 29, 2013 and
Aug. 12, 2014, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby.  On Nov.
29, 2017, granted the Class Certification Motion, certifying the
Class, appointing Lead Plaintiffs APERS and PBU as the Class
Representatives, and appointing Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
and Nix Patterson, LLP as the Class Counsel.

Following the Ninth Circuit's denial of the Defendants' 23(f)
petition, Class Representatives, on Oct. 9, 2018, filed an
unopposed motion to approve the form and manner of notice to the
Class and to appoint Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc. as
the Claims Administrator in connection with the dissemination of
Class Notice.  The Court granted the Class Notice Motion on Dec. 6,
2018.

On April 15, 2019, the Defendants filed their motion for summary
judgment.  On Nov. 18, 2019, the Court denied that motion. On Feb.
11, 2020, the Class Representatives filed a stipulation and
unopposed motion for preliminary approval of proposed settlement
and authorization to disseminate notice of the settlement to the
Class.  On Feb. 19, 2020, the Court entered the Preliminary
Approval Order, scheduling the final hearing on the proposed
settlement and related matters for July 22, 2020 at 10:00 a.m.

On June 17, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motions for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and for Attorneys' Fees
and Litigation Expenses.  The Defendants have not opposed or
otherwise responded to the Plaintiffs' motions, nor have any
objections been filed to the proposed settlement.

The Settlement Class is defined as all persons who have purchased
or otherwise acquired SeaWorld common stock during the Class Period
and held those shares through the alleged Aug. 13, 2014 corrective
disclosure.

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, SeaWorld must pay a
settlement amount of $65 million into an escrow account, which
thereafter will be used to pay any taxes, notice and administration
costs, litigation expenses, attorneys' fees, and any other costs
and fees awarded by the Court.  Thereafter, the remaining balance,
or net settlement fund, will be distributed to authorized claimants
pursuant to the Plan of Allocation.

Specifically, the claims administrator will administer the
Settlement, including but not limited to the process of receiving,
reviewing, and approving or denying Claims, under Class Counsel's
supervision and subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.  In
accordance with the Preliminary Approval Order and March 16 Notice
Order, to date, the claims administrator has, through reasonable
effort, disseminated 16,597 Postcard Notices and 4,244 Notices to
prospective Class Members and Nominees.  The claims administrator
will determine each Authorized Claimant's pro rata share of the Net
Settlement Fund by dividing the Authorized Claimant's Recognized
Claim by the total Recognized Claims of all Authorized Claimants,
multiplied by the total amount in the Net Settlement Fund.  The
Class Representatives' losses will be calculated in the same
manner.

Once the claims administrator has processed all submitted claims
and provided claimants with an opportunity to cure any deficiencies
in their claims or challenge the claims administrator's claim
rejection, the Class Counsel will file a motion for approval of the
claims administrator's determinations with respect to all submitted
Claims and authorization to distribute the Net Settlement Fund to
Authorized Claimants.  

If nine months after the initial distribution, there is a balance
remaining in the Net Settlement Fund, and if it is cost-effective
to do so, the Class Counsel will conduct a re-distribution of the
funds remaining after payment of any unpaid fees and expenses
incurred in administering the Settlement to Authorized Claimants
who have cashed their initial distribution checks and would receive
at least $10 from such re-distribution.  Redistributions will be
repeated until it is determined that re-distribution of the funds
remaining in the Net Settlement Fund would no longer be cost
effective.  Thereafter, any remaining balance will be contributed
to non-sectarian, not-for-profit organization(s), to be recommended
by the Class Counsel and approved by the Court.

Judge Anello granted both the Plaintiff's (i) Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, and (ii) Motion for Attorneys'
Fees and Litigation Expenses.  He finds the Settlement Agreement of
the class action appropriate for final approval pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  The Judge also finds that the
Settlement Agreement appears to be the product of serious,
informed, arms-length negotiations, that the settlement was entered
into in good faith, and that the Plaintiffs have satisfied the
standards for final approval of a class action settlement under
federal law.  Further, the Judge finds attorneys' fees in the
amount of $14.3 million, costs in the amount of $2,104,370.19, and
an award of costs to the Class Representatives in the amount of
$70,569 (i.e., $10,569.00 to APERS and $60,000 to PBU) to be
reasonable.  

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 24, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3e1BbPU from Leagle.com.


SEQUOIA CAPITAL: Arbitration Denial in Gibbs RICO Class Suit Upheld
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a trial
court order denying the Sequoia Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration in a class action complaint against Sequoia Capital
Operations LLC, et al.

The appellate cases are DARLENE GIBBS; STEPHANIE EDWARDS; LULA
WILLIAMS; PATRICK INSCHO; LAWRENCE MWETHUKU; GEORGE HENGLE; TAMARA
PRICE; SHERRY BLACKBURN, on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SEQUOIA
CAPITAL OPERATIONS, LLC; SEQUOIA CAPITAL FRANCHISE PARTNERS, L.P.;
SEQUOIA CAPITAL IX, L.P.; SEQUOIA ENTREPRENEURS ANNEX FUND, L.P.;
SEQUIOA CAPITAL GROWTH III PRINCIPALS FUND, LLC; SEQUOIA CAPITAL
FRANCHISE FUND, L.P.; SEQUOIA CAPITAL GROWTH PARTNERS III, L.P.;
SEQUOIA CAPITAL GROWTH FUND III, L.P., Defendants-Appellants, and
MICHAEL STINSON; 7HBF NO. 2; JOHN DREW; TECHNOLOGY CROSSOVER
VENTURES; TCV V, L.P.; LINDA STINSON; THE STINSON 2009 GRANTOR
RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST; STARTUP CAPITAL VENTURES, L.P.; STEPHEN
SHAPER; SEQUOIA GROWTH FUND IIII, L.P.; SEQUOIA CAPITAL FRANCHISE
PARTNERS, LLC; SEQUOIA CAPITAL GROWTH III PRINCIPALS FUND, L.P.,
Defendants. NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION, Amicus
Supporting Appellants. DARLENE GIBBS; STEPHANIE EDWARDS; LULA
WILLIAMS; PATRICK INSCHO; LAWRENCE MWETHUKU; GEORGE HENGLE; TAMARA
PRICE; SHERRY BLACKBURN, on behalf of themselves and all
individuals similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MICHAEL
STINSON; 7HBF NO. 2; LINDA STINSON; THE STINSON 2009 GRANTOR
RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST; STARTUP CAPITAL VENTURES, L.P.; STEPHEN
SHAPER, Defendants-Appellants, and SEQUOIA CAPITAL OPERATIONS, LLC;
SEQUOIA CAPITAL FRANCHISE PARTNERS, L.P.; SEQUOIA CAPITAL IX, L.P.;
SEQUOIA GROWTH FUND IIII, L.P.; SEQUOIA ENTREPRENEURS ANNEX FUND,
L.P.; SEQUIOA CAPITAL GROWTH III PRINCIPALS FUND, LLC; SEQUOIA
CAPITAL FRANCHISE FUND, L.P.; SEQUOIA CAPITAL GROWTH PARTNERS III,
L.P.; SEQUOIA CAPITAL FRANCHISE PARTNERS, LLC; SEQUOIA CAPITAL
GROWTH III PRINCIPALS FUND, L.P.; SEQUOIA CAPITAL GROWTH FUND III,
L.P.; JOHN DREW; TECHNOLOGY CROSSOVER VENTURES; TCV V, L.P.,
Defendants. NATIVE AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION, Amicus
Supporting Appellants, Case Nos. 19-2108, 19-2113 (4th Cir.).

The plaintiffs are Virginia consumers who borrowed money between
2013 and 2016 from one of two online lenders owned by a sovereign
Native American tribe.  The first lender, Plain Green, LLC, is
owned and operated by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's
Reservation in Montana.  The second, Great Plains Lending, LLC, is
owned and operated by the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Oklahoma.
Although Virginia usury law generally prohibits interest rates in
excess of 12%, the laws of both Tribes permit higher rates.  As a
result, the interest rates on the loans - which varied in principal
amounts from $500 to $1,700 - ranged from 219.38% to 373.97%. J.A.
234, 246.

As recounted in the Haynes Investments case, No. 19-1434, slip op.
at 45, ___ F.3d at ___ , which considered the same agreements that
are at issue in the case, each borrower completed the loan
application process by electronically signing a contract containing
(1) the terms governing the loan as well as (2) an agreement to
arbitrate any disputes.  Both agreements contained choice-of-law
provisions requiring the application of tribal law.  In turn,
Gibbs's arbitration agreement stated that it will be governed by
tribal law and the arbitrator will apply Tribal Law.  Similarly,
Mwethuku's 2013 contract provided that both the loan and
arbitration agreements would be "governed by the law of the
Chippewa Cree Tribe.

Likewise, all three 2015 and 2016 Great Plains loan agreements
indicated the lender could choose to voluntarily use federal laws
as guidance, but that the agreements ultimately would be governed
by tribal law.  Similarly, all of the Great Plains arbitration
agreements specified that "the agreement to arbitrate will be
governed by tribal law; the arbitrator will apply Tribal Law; and
the arbitration award must be consistent with the Agreement and
Tribal Law.

Finally, a number of other provisions in both lenders' loan and
arbitration agreements reinforced the application of tribal law.
Thus, Mwethuku's 2013 loan agreement provided that in the event one
opts out of the agreement to arbitrate, any disputes will
nonetheless be governed under the laws of the Chippewa Cree Tribe
and must be brought within the court system thereof.

After receiving the loans, the borrowers brought a putative class
action complaint alleging, among other claims, that the lenders'
loans were unlawful under Virginia's usury laws and that the
Sequoia Defendants' conduct violated the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.  In response, the Sequoia
Defendants moved to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. Section 4 or,
alternatively, to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The district court denied both motions.

As relevant to the motion to compel arbitration, the district court
relied upon two Fourth Circuit cases -- Hayes v. Delbert Services
Corporation, and Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. -- both of which
also considered tribal arbitration agreements with choice-of-law
clauses providing for the nearly exclusive application of tribal
law, to the exclusion of state and federal law.  As in those cases,
the district court concluded that because the choice-of-law
provisions of the arbitration agreements sought to apply Tribal law
to the exclusion of federal law -- including the assertion of any
federal statutory claims by the borrowers -- the agreements
contravened the prospective waiver doctrine.  Thus, the court
concluded, the arbitration agreements were unenforceable.

The Sequoia Defendants timely appealed, arguing that: (1) the
district court ignored the arbitration agreements' delegation
provision requiring an arbitrator to resolve all threshold issues
of arbitrability, including whether the choice-of-law provisions
amounted to a prospective waiver; and (2) even if the court was
correct to consider the effect of the choice-of-law provisions,
they did not amount to a prospective waiver.

The Fourth Circuit addresses each issue in turn, mindful of the
strong federal policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.
It turns first to the delegation clauses.  Each of the arbitration
agreements contained a delegation clause stipulating that the
parties would arbitrate any issue concerning the validity,
enforceability, or scope of the Agreement or the Agreement to
Arbitrate.  As a result, the Sequoia Defendants argue, any
threshold questions as to the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement should have first been sent to an arbitrator.

The Fourth Circuit disagrees.  Because the borrowers sufficiently
challenged the enforceability of the delegation clauses, the
district court was correct to consider the enforceability of the
arbitration agreements.  Courts have construed a party's argument
that the delegation clause suffers from the same defect as the
arbitration provision to be a sufficient challenge to the
delegation provision itself.

With this legal framework in mind, the Fourth Circuit now considers
whether the borrowers have lodged a sufficient challenge to the
delegation provisions and, if so, whether the district court
properly considered the challenge.  The Sequoia Defendants contend
the district court erroneously considered the enforceability of the
delegation provisions and instead should have let the arbitrator
resolve all threshold issues of arbitrability because the
arbitration agreements contained a valid, enforceable delegation
clause.

But the argument fails for the same reason that it failed in
Haynes: the borrowers challenged the delegation clause with
sufficient force and specificity, to occasion the district court's
review as to whether the agreements to arbitrate were valid.
Specifically, in their brief opposing the Sequoia Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration, they contended that the delegation
clause was unenforceable because of the prospective waiver
doctrine.  Given that the borrowers specifically challenged the
delegation provision, the question of its enforceability was one
for the courts -- rather than the arbitrator -- to decide.
Further, because the challenge to the delegation provision
necessarily encompassed and included arguments that related to the
entire arbitration agreement, the district court did not err by
assessing those arguments.

The Fourth Circuit turns now to the question of whether the
choice-of-law provisions amount to a prospective waiver, rendering
the delegation clause unenforceable. Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, arbitration contracts are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.  Courts must therefore enforce
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.
And in this vein, a court may also invalidate an arbitration
agreement based on generally applicable contract defenses.

The Fourth Circuit discerns no material distinction between the
case at hand and the Court's precedent in Hayes and Dillon.
Because the choice-of-law provisions in both the Great Plains and
Plain Green arbitration agreements prevent the borrowers from
effectively vindicating any federal statutory claims, they violate
the prospective waiver rule.  As a result, the delegation
provisions -- and thus the arbitration agreements -- are
unenforceable.

Because the effect of the choice-of-law provisions is to stymie the
vindication of the federal statutory claims that the borrowers seek
to enforce, they amount to a prospective waiver and render the
delegation provisions unenforceable.  Consequently, the entire
arbitration agreement is unenforceable.  For these reasons, the
Fourth Circuit concludes that the district court had the authority
to decide whether the arbitration agreements were valid, correctly
decided they were not, and did not err in denying the motion to
compel arbitration.

For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court.  The Fourth District dispensed with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's July 21, 2020 Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/2HBDrS7 from Leagle.com.

Stephen D. Hibbard -- sdhibbard@jonesday.com -- San Francisco,
California, Todd R. Geremia -- trgeremia@jonesday.com -- Shirley M.
Chan -- smchan@jonesday.com -- JONES DAY, New York, New York;
Richard L. Scheff -- rlscheff@atllp.com-- David F. Herman --
dherman@atllp.com -- ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, for Appellants.

Kristi C. Kelly -- kkelly@kellyandcrandall.com -- Andrew J. Guzzo
-- aguzzo@kellyandcrandall.com -- KELLY GUZZO, PLC, Fairfax,
Virginia; Matthew W.H. Wessler, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington,
D.C.; Leonard A. Bennett -- lenbennett@clalegal.com -- Craig C.
Marchiando, Elizabeth W. Hanes -- elizabeth@clalegal.com --
CONSUMER LITIGATION ASSOCIATES, P.C., Newport News, Virginia; Anna
C. Haac, TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Patrick O. Daugherty -- pod@vnf.com -- Frances B. Morris, VAN NESS
FELDMAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.


SLACK: 1st Amended Complaint Filed in Consolidated Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Kirsten Errick, writing for Law/Street, reports that on Oct. 5 in
the California State Superior Court of San Mateo County, the
plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
filed a first amended consolidated class action complaint for
securities violations against Slack, a company offering "a
cloud-based collaboration and productivity platform."

This securities class action is for individuals who purchased or
acquired Slack Class A common stock in Slack's June 2019 direct
public offering, during which Slack offered more than 283 million
shares. This action is for violations of Sections 11, 12, and 15 of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act). According to the
plaintiffs, Slack's offering documentation "contained untrue
statements of material fact and omitted to state material facts
required to be stated therein or necessary to make statements
therein not misleading."

On June 20, 2019, Slack's opening share price was $38.50. However,
on September 4, 2019, in a press release Slack announced its
"second quarter fiscal 2020 (‘2Q2020') results and admitted that
‘revenue was negatively impacted by $8.2 million of credits
related to service level disruption in the quarter.'" Consequently,
Slack share values decreased. "The Offering opening price of $38.50
fell 33% to $26. As of this filing, Slack shares are trading in the
range of $21 per share." Moreover, a few days after the offering,
Slack had "three notable service disruptions, resulting in uptime
performance of only 99.9%," which "triggered the penalties in
customers' contracts for falling below the 99.99% service level
requirement." As a result, Slack gave millions of dollars in
credit, "which deeply offset revenue for that quarter."

The plaintiffs contended that shareholders did not know that "Slack
had omitted in its Offering Documents material facts concerning the
Company's excessively punitive contracts with existing customers
that were forcing the Company to suffer much higher revenue losses
than anticipated." Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed that they
have suffered harm, loss, and damages as a result of these
omissions and misleading statements. The plaintiffs proffered that
the defendants are liable for their negligence.

The plaintiffs argued that Slack made misleading statements and
failed to disclose information required by the government.
Specifically, although Slack's documents praised its "
‘go-to-market' enterprise business growth strategy and product
scalability," in actuality, Slack: "was experiencing significant
and intensifying competition from Microsoft Teams due in part to
Microsoft's bundled business productivity suite"; was "attempting
to attract and serve enterprise clients[, which] was creating
vulnerabilities in its platform, including service disruptions, and
Slack was having significant technical difficulties preventing
adequate scaling of its platform"; "could not support its
non-industry standard uptime guarantee of 99.99% [the industry
standard is 99.9%] and had failed to satisfy this threshold in 7
months out of 12 in 2018"; was forced to give customers credit
because of its "failure to satisfy its uptime guarantee"; Slack's
"credit award is subject to an ‘exceptionally generous credit
payout multiplier in its contracts,' requiring Slack, in the event
of an interruption in service to compensate customers up to 100
times the value of the lost service,"; "customers unaffected by
service disruptions are granted credits"; and as a result of
Slack's contract provisions, "even a de minimis service
interruption materially impacts Slack's financial performance."

The plaintiffs have sought to declare this action a proper class
action and to certify the class; an award for damages; an award for
rescission, disgorgement, and other remedies; pre and post judgment
interest; and other relief.  

Co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs are Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
LLP; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP; Pomerantz LLP; and
Scott+Scott Attorneys At Law LLP.

In April, Law Street Media covered an earlier securities suit
against Slack for this same incident. [GN]


STATE FARM: First Amended Clemons TCPA Suit Dismissed w/o Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHERRY L. CLEMONS and JANETTE SCOTT, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
1:20-cv-1050 (C.D. Ill.), Judge Joe Billy McDade of the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria
Division, granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs Clemons and Scott are both citizens of Missouri.  The
Plaintiffs are attempting to bring a class action lawsuit against
Defendant State Farm, arguing the Defendant is vicariously liable
for alleged violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 ("TCPA").

Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege (1) violation(s) of 47 U.S.C.
Sections 227(c)(5) for not having or adhering to proper internal
procedures to monitor phone numbers on the various Do-Not-Call
("DNC") registries; and (2) violation(s) of Section 227(c)(5) for
making telemarketing calls to a number(s) on the National DNC
Registry.  Their theory is that the Defendant vested actual or
apparent authority in various telemarketers to make the phone calls
at issue.

The Plaintiffs allege Bradford O'Neil, Scott Clayton, and Brennan
Sowa, each of whom is a State Farm Agent, made the telemarketing
calls central to the lawsuit.  

Plaintiff Clemons alleges she placed her cell phone number on the
National DNC Registry in 2005 and on the Missouri DNC Registry in
2012.  In January 2019, she began receiving phone calls from
O'Neil.  She claims she asked O'Neil to cease calling her, but the
calls nevertheless continued.  In late January 2019, the Plaintiff
called O'Neil and asked to be placed on State Farm's DNC list, but
two calls followed in February and October of 2019.

Plaintiff Scott similarly alleges she placed her cell phone number
on the National and Missouri DNC Registries in 2012.  In February
2019, she received a phone call from Clayton, and Plaintiff Scott
asked him to cease calling her.  Despite asking Clayton to stop
calling her, Plaintiff Scott allegedly received at least four more
calls from him and from Sowa.

The original complaint was filed in the Central District of
Illinois on Feb. 3, 2020.  The Defendant moved to dismiss the
original complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); that motion was rendered moot by the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.  The Defendant now moves to
dismiss the operative Complaint for want of standing under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

The central issue presently before the Court is whether the
Plaintiffs have properly alleged an injury that is fairly traceable
to the Defendant.  The Defendant asserts a facial challenge and, in
the alternative, a factual challenge to the Plaintiffs' allegations
of standing.  Specifically, it argues that State Farm Agents are
independent contractors, and Defendant is not liable for their
actions unless the Plaintiffs can allege vicarious liability via
actual or apparent authority.

Judge McDade finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate the Defendant vested the alleged
telemarketers with actual authority to place the calls at issue.
The Plaintiffs allege no facts demonstrating Defendant had any
control over the calls.  While the Plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable inferences, the Court is neither required to nor allowed
to layer inference upon inference to make their claim for them.

The Judge also finds that the Plaintiffs' scant allegations in the
Amended Complaint and sweeping, conclusory arguments in their
Response fail to adequately allege standing on an apparent
authority theory.  Without a sufficient factual basis for either
the Defendant's manifestation of intent to vest the telemarketers
with authority to make the calls at issue or the Plaintiffs'
reasonable, detrimental reliance on such a manifestation, the
Defendant's facial standing challenge prevails.

The Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish
standing.  He is cognizant of the fact it is the Plaintiffs' second
bite at the apple where the Defendant's authority arguments are
concerned.  He will nevertheless permit the Plaintiffs one more
bite.  The Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint, so long as
they are able to cure the factual deficiencies identified in a
manner consistent with their obligations under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.

For these reasons, Judge McDade granted the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.  The Judge dismissed the Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint without prejudice.  

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2020 Order & Opinion is
available at https://bit.ly/34vIMTS from Leagle.com.


STATE FARM: Labor Cost Can't Be Depreciated, Court Says in Sproull
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JARRET SPROULL, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM FIRE
AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 5-18-0577 (Ill.
App.), a three-judge panel of the Appellate Court of Illinois for
the Fifth District answered "No" to the certified question, as
reformulated, on whether a labor component of replacement cost
could be depreciated in calculating actual cash value.

On Dec. 28, 2015, Plaintiff Sproull's home sustained wind damage
during a storm.  He submitted a timely property damage claim under
a homeowners policy issued to him by State Farm.

The estimate indicated that repair and replacement cost totaled
$1,711.54, and that depreciation totaled $394.36.  The "actual cash
value" of the Plaintiff's loss was calculated by subtracting
$394.36 in depreciation from $1711.54 in estimated repair costs,
which equaled $1,317.18.  After accounting for the $1,000
deductible, the Plaintiff received a payment of $317.18.

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against State
Farm, and sought damages for breach of contract and declaratory
relief.  He alleged that State Farm improperly depreciated labor
costs when it calculated the "actual cash value" of covered losses
and that State Farm concealed this practice from the Plaintiff and
the similarly situated policyholders.

State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim and argued that its method of calculating actual cash value
fully complied with the terms of its policy and Illinois law.  The
trial court denied State Farm's motion to dismiss, finding that the
term "actual cash value" was ambiguous and that it should be
strictly construed against State Farm.  

The trial court subsequently granted State Farm's motion to certify
the following question for interlocutory review pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a): Where Illinois' insurance
regulations provide that the 'actual cash value' or 'ACV' of an
insured, damaged structure is determined as 'replacement cost of
property at time of loss less depreciation, if any,' and the policy
does not itself define actual cash value, may the insurer
depreciate all components of replacement cost (including labor) in
calculating ACV?

The Appellate Court initially denied State Farm's application for
leave to appeal under Rule 308(a).  The Illinois Supreme Court then
denied State Farm's petition for leave to appeal but issued a
supervisory order directing the Appellate Court to vacate its Jan.
10, 2019, order and allow State Farm's application for leave to
appeal.  Accordingly, the latter vacated its prior order and
granted State Farm's Rule 308(a) application.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) gives the Appellate Court
discretion to grant an appeal from an interlocutory order not
otherwise appealable if the trial court finds that the order
involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.  Generally, the scope of review in a Rule 308 appeal is
limited to the question of law identified by the trial court.  A
reviewing court will decline to answer a certified question where
the answer is dependent upon the underlying facts of a case or
where the question calls for an answer that is advisory or
provisional.  A question certified under Rule 308 presents a
question of law that is reviewed de novo.

In the case, the certified question involves the interpretation of
a personal homeowners insurance policy, drafted and issued by State
Farm. When interpreting the language in an insurance policy, the
general principles of contract construction apply.  A court's
primary objective in construing the language in an insurance policy
is to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties as
expressed by the agreement.  If the language in the policy is clear
and unambiguous, the provision will be applied as written, unless
it contravenes public policy.  Whether an ambiguity exists turns on
whether the policy language is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.  Where competing reasonable interpretations of a
policy exist, courts will construe the policy in favor of the
insured and against the insurer who drafted the policy.

In answering the certified question before the it, the Appellate
Court remains mindful that it must consider whether the average,
ordinary, reasonable person, for whom the policy was written, would
have understood that the "actual cash value" of a covered loss
meant replacement costs of property less depreciation for materials
and labor.  It concludes that an average, ordinary homeowner who
purchased the State Farm policy at issue would have reasonably
expected that depreciation would apply only to property, i.e.,
physical structures and tangible materials, as those lose value
with age, use, and wear and tear.  It further concludes that it is
not reasonable to believe that an average homeowner would consider
labor to be a tangible asset included within the definition of
depreciation.

State Farm sought to apply a technical definition of depreciation
that is not evident in the language of the policy or in the
regulation upon which it relies.  Courts will not adopt an
interpretation which rests on fine distinctions that the average
person, for whom the policy is written, cannot be expected to
understand. Outboard Marine.  The Appellate Court's resolution is
in keeping with the primary purpose of an indemnity clause in an
insurance contract.

The original certified question in the case referred to all
components of replacement cost, including labor.  The parties'
arguments in the trial court and the Appellate Court addressed only
whether the labor component could be depreciated.  Thus, it has
reformulated the common question of law, pursuant to Rule 308 and
have limited our response to the sole issue of whether the cost of
labor can be depreciated when determining the actual cash value of
a loss as defined under "Coverage A" of the State Farm policy at
issue.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court concludes that the answer to the
certified question, as reformulated, is "No."  Where Illinois'
insurance regulations provide that the "actual cash value" of an
insured, damaged structure is determined as replacement cost of
property at time of loss less depreciation, if any, and the policy
does not itself define actual cash value, only the property
structure and materials are subject to a reasonable deduction for
depreciation, and depreciation may not be applied to the intangible
labor component.

Finally, it has considered several motions to cite additional
authorities from jurisdictions outside Illinois, which were filed
by the parties after oral arguments were heard and the case was
under advisement.  Initially, it ordered each motion to be taken
with the case.  Because the language in an insurance policy is
interpreted under the laws of Illinois, decisions from other
jurisdictions generally provide limited guidance.  Nevertheless,
the Appellate Court has granted each motion to cite additional
authority, and it reviewed those decisions as it considered the
issues before it.

In light of the foregoing, the Appellate Court remanded the cause.

A full-text copy of the Court's July 24, 2020 Opinion is available
at https://bit.ly/3dWKikU from Leagle.com.

Craig R. Unrath -- cunrath@heylroyster.com -- Heyl, Royster,
Voelker & Allen, PC, 300 Hamilton Boulevard, Box 6199, Peoria, IL
61601-6199; Patrick Cloud -- pcloud@heylroyster.com -- Heyl,
Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., 105 W. Vandalia Street, Suite 100,
Edwardsville, IL 62025; Joseph A. Cancila, Jr., Heidi Dalenberg,
Jacob L. Kahn, Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, Three First
National Plaza, 70 W. Madison Street, Suite 2900, Chicago, IL
60602, Attorneys for Appellant.

Christopher W. Byron, Christopher J. Petri, Byron, Carlson, Petri &
Kalb, LLC, 411 St. Louis Street, Edwardsville, IL 62025; Joe D.
Jacobson , Allen P. Press, Jacobson, Press & Fields, P.C., 168 N.
Meramec Avenue, Suite 150, St. Louis, MO 63105; David C. Linder, T.
Joseph Snodgrass, Larson King, LLP, 30 E. Seventh Street, Suite
2800, St. Paul, MN 55101; David T. Butsch, Christopher E. Roberts,
Butsch Roberts & Associates, LLC, 231 S. Bemiston Avenue, Suite
260, Clayton, MO 63105, Attorneys for Appellee.

Michael R. Enright -- menright@rc.com -- Robinson & Cole, LLP, 280
Trumbell Street, Hartford, CT 06103-3597 (for American Property
Casualty Insurance Association and National Association of Mutual
Insurance Companies), Amicus Curiae.

Edward Eshoo, Jr. -- eeshoo@MerlinLawGroup.com -- Merlin Law Group,
181 W. Madison, Suite 3475, Chicago, IL 60602; Amy Bach, Executive
Director, United Policyholders, 384 Bush St., 8th Floor, San
Francisco, CA 94104 (for United Policyholders), Amicus Curiae.


STOP & SHOP: Court Dismisses Lopez's ADA Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
case, VICTOR LOPEZ, on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-CV-9913 (JMF) (S.D. N.Y.).

The case, brought by Lopez against the Stop & Shop, is one of
dozens recently filed in the District -- many by the same
plaintiffs and lawyers -- challenging restaurants, stores, and
other establishments for their failures to sell gift cards that are
accessible to the blind.  The Second Circuit has not yet confronted
such a challenge, but may do so soon.  In the meantime, judges in
the District have been uniform in rejecting these suits.  Some
judges have done so on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the
plaintiff bringing the suit lacks Article III standing.  Some
judges have done so on the merits, holding, among other things,
that Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the
federal law on which these suits rely, does not require public
accommodations to sell accessible gift cards.  Not surprisingly,
Stop & Shop moves to dismiss on both grounds.

With respect to the issue of standing, it suffices to say that
Judge Furman is persuaded by the thoughtful and well-reasoned
decision of Judge Abrams in Boston Market Corp. to conclude that
Lopez does have Article III standing.  Lopez's allegations are
indistinguishable from the plaintiffs' allegations in Boston Market
Corp.  In fact, the complaints in the two cases, which were drafted
and filed (three days apart) by the same counsel, are -- with the
exception of the parties' names and relevant dates -- nearly
verbatim copies of one another.  Although the standing issue is
"close," Judge Furman shares Judge Abrams's view that these
allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.

With respect to the merits, Judge Furman also follows Judge Abrams,
whose persuasive decision built on the cogent initial analysis of
Judge Woods in Banana Republic, LLC, to conclude that selling
non-accessible gift cards does not run afoul of the ADA.  Notably,
her decision addresses all of the arguments that Lopez makes (a
fact that is not surprising because, like the complaints in the two
cases, the memoranda of law in opposition to the motions to dismiss
in the two cases are nearly identical).

Thus, Judge Furman concludes that Lopez's ADA claim must be and is
dismissed.  That leaves two remaining issues: whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Lopez's claims under state and local
law and whether to grant Lopez leave to amend.

With respect first, having dismissed Lopez's only federal claim,
tJudge Furman declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
his other claims.  The case is, as a legal matter, still at an
early stage.  Thus, the traditional values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity that the Court must consider do
not counsel in favor of exercising jurisdiction.  Moreover, the
claims raise "novel" issues of state and local law.  Accordingly,
Lopez's claims under state and local law are dismissed without
prejudice to refiling in state court.

As for whether to grant Lopez leave to amend, Judge Furman declines
to do so.  In the case, leave to amend is not warranted because the
problems with Lopez's ADA claim are substantive, and while Lopez
requests leave to amend in his Opposition, he does not argue that
he possesses any additional facts that could cure the defects in
that claim.  Furthermore, Lopez was on notice of Stop & Shop's
arguments when he filed the amended complaint in response to Stop &
Shop's original motion to dismiss, and Lopez was expressly warned
that he would not be given any further opportunity to amend the
complaint.  Finally, Lopez is represented by the same counsel and
filed nearly verbatim copies of the complaints and opposition
papers as in Banana Republic, LLC and Taco Bell Corp., and in each
of those cases, the plaintiff opted not to file second amended
complaints when given leave to do so.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Furman granted Stop & Shop's motion
to dismiss.  

A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2020 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://bit.ly/3owFG9M from Leagle.com.


SWANN: Add-On Product Under Scrutiny as Part of Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
InsuranceNEWS.com.au reports that commission payments and
authorised representative training for add-on product sales will be
under scrutiny as part of a class action against IAG subsidiary
Swann, federal court documents show.

A preliminary hearing has been before Justice Jacqueline Gleeson to
consider the appointment of sub-group members and to clarify
matters to be considered at an initial trial.

The court document shows issues include the business model and
sales system, claims ratios for add-on products and their value,
and whether conduct was misleading or deceptive "leaving aside any
relevant facts which are peculiar to the applicant or a particular
group member".

Questions include whether training of authorised representatives
(ARs) aimed to create in a customer's mind a perceived need to buy
one or more of the add-on products.

"Were the ARs financially incentivised, encouraged, compelled,
forced and/or strongly urged by Swann to sell as many insurance
products as possible?" the document asks.

It also questions if commissions made it likely an AR wouldn't
disclose that a product was not suitable or would not represent
value for money for a particular consumer.

IAG is defending the class action, filed by solicitors Johnson
Winter & Slattery with funding from Balance REV.

The proceeding concerns six add-on products sold along with vehicle
or motor cycle purchases between January 2008 and August 2017.

IAG and Swann say the proceeding spans up to 673,000 individual
transactions entered into by several hundred thousand
policyholders. [GN]


TACTILE SYSTEMS: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Nov. 30 Bid Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, reminds investors of the deadline to file a lead plaintiff
motion in a securities class action that has been filed on behalf
of investors that purchased or acquired the securities of Tactile
Systems Technology, Inc. ("TCMD" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: TCMD)
between May 7, 2018 and June 8, 2020 (the "Class Period"). The
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota alleges violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.

If you purchased Tactile securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit TCMD Shareholder Lawsuit
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877)-779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) while Tactile publicly touted a $4 plus billion or $5
plus billion market opportunity, in truth, the total addressable
market for Tactile's PCDs was materially smaller; (2) to induce
sales growth and share gains, Tactile and/or its employees were
engaged in illicit and illegal sales and marketing activities in
violation of applicable federal and state rules and public payer
regulations; (3) the foregoing illicit and illegal sales and
marketing activities increased the risk of a Medicare audit of
Tactile's claims and criminal and civil liability; (4) Tactile's
revenues were in part the product of unlawful conduct and thus
unsustainable; and that as a result of the foregoing (5)
Defendants' public statements, including Tactile's year-over-year
revenue growth, the purported growth drivers, and the effectiveness
of Tactile's internal controls over financial reporting were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

On June 8, 2020, research firm OSS Research published a scathing
report about the Company entitled "Strong Sell on Tactile Systems:
Bloated Stock Needs Compression Therapy." In the report, OSS
Research accused Tactile of (1) overstating its total addressable
market by nearly $4.7 billion, (2) using a "'daisy-chaining
kick-back scheme' that has resulted in rampant overprescribing and
rapid market share gains at the expense of patients, insurers and
the public," and (3) concealing Medicare audits resulting in
denials, for failure to establish medical necessity, of a whopping
71% of Tactile's submitted claims.

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $6.05, or 11.69%, from
its June 8, 2020 opening price of $51.72 per share to a June 9,
2020 close of $45.67.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than November 30, 2020. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Tactile securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https://www.bernlieb.com/cases/tactilesystemstechnologyinc-tcmd-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-stock-fraud-317/apply/
or contact Matthew E. Guarnero toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com.

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact Information
Matthew E. Guarnero
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(877) 779-1414
MGuarnero@bernlieb.com [GN]


TACTILE SYSTEMS: Schall Law Alerts of Class Action Filing
---------------------------------------------------------
The Schall Law Firm, a national shareholder rights litigation firm,
on Oct. 5 announced the filing of a class action lawsuit against
Tactile Systems Technology, Inc. ("Tactile" or "the Company")
(NASDAQ:TCMD) for violations of Sec. 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Investors who purchased the Company's securities between May 7,
2018 and June 8, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"), are
encouraged to contact the firm before November 30, 2020.

If you are a shareholder who suffered a loss, click here to
participate.

We also encourage you to contact Brian Schall of the Schall Law
Firm, 1880 Century Park East, Suite 404, Los Angeles, CA 90067, at
310-301-3335, to discuss your rights free of charge. You can also
reach us through the firm's website at www.schallfirm.com, or by
email at brian@schallfirm.com.

The class, in this case, has not yet been certified, and until
certification occurs, you are not represented by an attorney. If
you choose to take no action, you can remain an absent class
member.

According to the Complaint, the Company made false and misleading
statements to the market. Tactile publicly touted a market
potential of at least $4 billion for its medical devices while
knowing the actual market potential was far lower. The Company
engaged in illegal marketing schemes to boost sales growth. This
scheme put the Company at risk of a Medicare audit. Based on these
facts, the Company's public statements were false and materially
misleading throughout the class period. When the market learned the
truth about Tactile, investors suffered damages.

Join the case to recover your losses.

The Schall Law Firm represents investors around the world and
specializes in securities class action lawsuits and shareholder
rights litigation.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and rules of ethics.

CONTACT:

The Schall Law Firm
Brian Schall, Esq.
310-301-3335
info@schallfirm.com
www.schallfirm.com [GN]


TD ASSET: Court Denies Leave to Appeal in Trailing Commission Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony O'Brien, Esq. -- anthony.obrien@siskinds.com -- and Garett
Hunter, Esq. -- garett.hunter@siskinds.com -- of Siskinds LLP, in
an article for Mondaq, report that in Stenzler v TD Asset
Management Inc., the Ontario Divisional Court recently denied an
appeal by TD Asset Management Inc. ("TDAM") from a decision
certifying the Plaintiff's action to recover trailing commissions
he alleges were improperly paid by TDAM to Discount Brokers.

TDAM pays trailing commissions to Discount Brokers on behalf of
investors who hold TD Mutual Funds through a Discount Broker.
Trailing commissions are intended to compensate mutual fund dealers
and investment advisors for investment advice. Discount Brokers,
however, are prohibited from providing advice to investors. In
recognition of the problems with this practice, the Canadian
Securities Administrators recently announced a ban on the payment
of trailing commissions to Discount Brokers starting in June 2022.

The Plaintiff in Stenzler v TD Asset Management commenced a
proposed class proceeding seeking to recover the trailing
commissions paid by TDAM to Discount Brokers on his own behalf and
on behalf of a class of others similarly situated. The first step
in a proposed class proceeding is generally for the plaintiff to
seek certification, which is, in essence, court approval to
prosecute the action as a class proceeding.

On February 27, 2020, Justice Belobaba certified the Plaintiff's
action against TDAM as a class proceeding.3 The main issue at
certification was a technical legal dispute concerning whether the
Plaintiff and proposed members of the class could bring an action
against TDAM at all. The TD Mutual Funds are structured as trusts
and are governed by declarations of trust. TDAM is the trustee and
manager of the TD Mutual Funds. The Plaintiff and other investors
who have TD Mutual Fund investments are beneficiaries of the trust.
TDAM argued that the plaintiff and other TD Mutual Fund investors
had no ability to sue TDAM for breach of its alleged
responsibilities as trustee and manager. Justice Belobaba rejected
this argument. In so doing, His Honour relied on a recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision, which determined that trust beneficiaries
(such as the plaintiff and other TD Mutual Fund investors) have the
right to hold a trustee (such as TDAM) responsible for breach of
trust.4

TDAM sought leave to appeal Justice Belobaba's certification
decision. The Ontario Divisional Court refused to grant leave. The
Divisional Court's refusal paves the way for the action to proceed
as a class action and brings investors one step closer to
potentially obtaining compensation for the trailing commissions
TDAM paid to Discount Brokers on their behalf. [GN]


THOMSON INTERNATIONAL: Faces Class Action Over Onion Recall
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tricia Kindleman, writing for CBC News, reports that a class-action
lawsuit is moving ahead after more than 500 Canadians fell ill
after eating red onions that were possibly contaminated with
salmonella. The lawsuit was filed by two Alberta-based law firms.

Rick Mallett, head of class-action lawsuits at James H. Brown and
Associates, called it the largest recall of contaminated onions
ever. He said the latest numbers indicate there is a concentration
of cases in western Canada. That includes 293 cases in Alberta, 121
in British Columbia and the rest in Manitoba.

Mallett is representing the group, which he said is growing every
day.

"There's a number of people that are identified by the [testing]
but that's never everybody," Mallett said.

"Not everybody knows about it, not everybody gets tested. So it's
typically two or three times the actual number that are identified,
so probably two or three times that 515, that are actually affected
across the country."

In August, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) identified
Thomson International Inc. out of Bakersfield, Calif. as the source
of the possibly contaminated onions. On Oct. 1, the CFIA declared
the outbreak over.

Mallett said the next step after Thompson is served will be to have
the suit assigned to a case management judge and to then get the
case certified as a class action. He estimates it could take one to
two years for the case to work its way through the court system.

Class-action lawsuits can be an important way to hold corporations
accountable, Mallett said.

"In a case like this we can do a lot to ensure that the food chain
is safe," he said. "It's such a huge concern for Canadians and
Americans too."

"It can really bring justice to individual people where you could
just not afford to do a case on your own. If you can get together
with a class or a group it gives you a real strength."

He added this is especially true when people are left with
potentially long-term health impacts.

Sydonni Allridge, a 31-year-old student from Sherwood Park, began
to feel ill in early August. She was dealing with nausea and other
stomach-related issues on a daily basis.

"I didn't understand what was going on for a while," Allridge said.
"Eventually I went to the hospital and I had to do [a round of
tests] and I found out I had salmonella poisoning."

While in the hospital in August, she was contacted by the CFIA who
were able to trace her illness back to onions from a fast food
restaurant in Sherwood Park. Allridge says the place was a regular
stop for her at that time and she was ordering the same item, with
onions, each visit.  

She has had multiple rounds of antibiotics since then, but said she
continues to feel ill.

Allridge said she was given a second round of a stronger
antibiotic, but is continuing to work with doctors toward a full
recovery.

She was alerted to the recall situation and potential class-action
lawsuit by her father. She said the ongoing situation has impacted
her ability to live her life normally.

"I couldn't really go out anywhere," she said. "I always had to use
the bathroom or my stomach was just really hurting or I was
vomiting. It was really a struggle."

The CFIA has encouraged Canadians to throw out or return recalled
onions they may have in their homes. [GN]


TORONTO: Taxicab Plate Owners' Certification Motion Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
John Hunter, Esq. -- JHunter@blg.com -- of Borden Ladner Gervais
LLP, in an article for Lexology, reports that in Eisenberg et al v
City of Toronto, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the Court)
dismissed a certification motion brought by taxicab plate owners
and holders affected by the operation of rideshare services in the
City of Toronto (the City). The plaintiffs alleged that members of
the proposed class action had suffered economic loss due to the
City's regulation and enforcement of its taxicab license scheme.

This decision comes after the Court's certification of a similar
class action started by taxicab plate owners and holders against
the City of Ottawa in Metro Taxi Ltd. v City of Ottawa. Eisenberg
highlights the importance of considering whether a reasonable cause
of action is alleged, and provides helpful commentary on the
liability of municipalities in enacting and enforcing bylaws and/or
regulatory schemes.

Proposed class action and factual background

The proposed class included approximately 5,000 taxicab plate
owners or holders. Before July 2016, taxicab owners had to comply
with provisions of the Toronto Municipal Code requiring them to
obtain a license and stick it on their vehicle. The plaintiffs
alleged that the City's regulation of taxi services maintained a
longstanding status quo that, among other things, created a market
value for holding a taxi plate that was based, in part, on the
scarcity of licenses and the requirement to obtain a license.

In 2014, rideshare services began allowing drivers without a taxi
license to transport passengers in Toronto, contrary to the
provisions of the Toronto Municipal Code. The City's attempt to
prohibit the services from operating in Toronto without a taxicab
license was unsuccessful, which led to a specific legislative
amendment to obligate the services to be licensed and dispatch only
licensed taxis. The rideshare service continued to operate in
Toronto.

Ultimately, in July 2016, the City amended portions of the Toronto
Municipal Code to allow rideshare services to operate legally in
Toronto. The amendments converted some forms of taxi plates into
other forms of plates. The plaintiffs alleged that these
amendments, and permitting the service to operate in Toronto
outside of the previous status quo, reduced the value of taxicab
plates by approximately $310,000 each. The plaintiffs alleged the
City was:

    * negligent in enforcing provisions of the Toronto Municipal
     Code that prohibited the service's operation in the City
     prior to July 14, 2016;

   * negligent in enforcing the amended provisions of the Toronto
     Municipal Code; and

   * negligent in adopting the amendments to the Toronto
     Municipal Code, which revised the taxicab license scheme
     that had been in place for a long period of time.

Certification criteria

The City contested certification, submitting that the proposed
class action:

   (a) did not disclose a cause of action;

   (b) the claims did not raise common issues; and

   (c) was not the preferable procedure to resolve
       any common issues.

The City did not dispute that there was an identifiable class or
that there was an appropriate representative plaintiff.

Although satisfied that there were common issues and that a class
action would be the preferable procedure to resolve common issues,
the Court departed from its Metro Taxi decision, finding that the
cause of action criterion had not been satisfied. The certification
motion was dismissed.

No cause of action

While the Eisenberg case would seem, at first blush, to be similar
to the Metro Taxi case, one important difference explains the
different results in the two cases. In Eisenberg, the City of
Toronto took the position that there was no valid cause of action
on the basis that the City did not owe the class a duty of care
when enacting and enforcing bylaws. In Metro Taxi, the City of
Ottawa conceded that the pleadings disclosed a valid cause of
action (including negligence). As a result, the Court in Eisenberg
had to decide for the first time whether the City owed a duty of
care to taxicab license holders when enacting a bylaw.

Duty of care when enacting bylaws

The plaintiffs' key argument on certification was that the City had
been negligent in enacting bylaws relevant to ridesharing services
and enforcing its own bylaws. As noted above, the City argued that
it did not owe a duty of care to the proposed class. While the
Court recognized that the plaintiffs' claims fell into an existing
category of negligence claims for pure economic loss, namely
liability of public authorities, upon review of the statutory
scheme the court concluded that the City did not owe a duty.

With respect to the first duty of care alleged, relating to
enactment of the City's bylaw, the court disagreed with the
plaintiff's assertion that the City had been exercising its
business powers and held that the City had been acting in its
legislative capacity. While the Court noted that the plaintiffs and
class members may have been adversely affected by the enactment of
the bylaw and suffered economic loss, it concluded that a
municipality could not be liable for negligence with respect to its
legislative activities, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v Greater Winnipeg.

With respect to the second duty of care alleged, relating to the
City's alleged failure to enforce its bylaws, the Court held that
there was no duty on a municipality to enforce a bylaw that it
enacted in the exercise of a discretionary power. The Court noted
that this portion of the plaintiffs' negligence claim for pure
economic loss fell into a category where a public authority is
regulating in the public interest and therefore had not undertaken
a private duty of care.

Takeaway

This case highlights the importance of carefully considering
whether a proposed class action discloses a valid cause of action,
even where similar cases have previously been certified. In
Eisenberg, the City's decision to argue the cause of action
criterion created a very different result from Metro Taxi, where
the City of Ottawa had conceded that the plaintiffs alleged a valid
cause of action.

The case also reviews the law with respect to duties owed, or not
owed, by municipalities when enacting, amending and enforcing
bylaws. While a municipality's enactment or enforcement of a bylaw
may ultimately cause harm to citizens, the court has reaffirmed
that the focus of legislative activity is the public interest and
that a municipality's legislative activities are protected from
civil liability. [GN]


TRIWEST HEALTHCARE: Schwartz Class Suit Remanded to State Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted Schwarz' motion to remand
the case, MARION SCHWARZ, individually, and on behalf of other
members of the public similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TRIWEST
HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE CORP., and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants, Case No. 2: 20-cv-00312 KJM EFB (E.D. Cal.), to
Sacramento County Superior Court.

On Dec. 31, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a complaint on behalf of
herself and those similarly situated, in Sacramento County Superior
Court, alleging eight separate violations of the California Labor
and Business and Professions Codes.

On Feb. 20, 2020, the Defendant filed a notice of removal as
provided by the Class Action Fairness Act.  On March 11, 2020, the
Plaintiff moved to remand.  The Defendant has opposed, and the
Plaintiff has replied.

The Plaintiff's motion for remand is based solely on CAFA's
amount-in-controversy requirement.  Specifically, she argues the
Defendant has not established estimates for meal and rest period
violations, overtime violations, waiting period violations, and
attorney's fees by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Defendant has submitted a single declaration from Roger
Wolpert, its Vice President and Controller, with two attached
spreadsheets in tabular form.  The first table, according to the
declaration, details the total number of paychecks issued to the
putative class during the relevant period,, and the second shows
the total hours worked by employees, the number of employees who
worked, and the average hours each employee worked each day.  Based
on the declaration and exhibits, defendant estimates the amount in
controversy to be $8,223,302.45.

The assumptions underlying the Defendant's claimed amount in
controversy are based on an average hourly wage of $18.44 for those
still employed, and $18.43 for those previously terminated.
Furthermore, the Defendant estimates the following: (1) one missed
meal period per week; (2) one missed rest period per week; (3) one
missed hour of overtime per pay period; (4) a 100% violation rate
of waiting period violations at the maximum rate; (5) $2 per pay
check for non-compliant wage statements and unreimbursed business
expenses; (6) attorney's fees equal to 25 of the aggregate amount
previously listed.  Aside from attorney's fees, each of the
Defendant's assumptions explicitly depends on the Plaintiff's
language in the complaint alleging a "pattern and practice" of
violations.

The Plaintiff presents no rebuttal evidence but argues that the
Defendant has not satisfied the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard triggered by her challenge to the defense estimate.  The
Defendant bears the burden of satisfying the standard.

The question for the Court is whether the Defendant's evidence, the
language of the complaint, or some combination of the two
establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount in
controversy is over $5 million.

Judge Mueller finds that the Defendant has offered no evidence
corroborating the claimed $18.44 average hourly wage of the
Plaintiff and the class members.  Mr. Wolpert's declaration, viewed
alone, cannot be relied upon to establish the average wage by a
preponderance of the evidence.  Absent other support, the Judge
cannot find that the Defendant has established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, the average hourly wage rate of $18.44.  Because
the Defendant's estimate for meal and rest periods relies on its
average wage estimate, the Judge will not consider it in
determining the amount in controversy.

The Defendant estimates one hour of unpaid overtime per pay period
for each putative class member.  According to the Wolpert
declaration, the Defendant estimates it issued 43,798 paychecks in
the relevant four-year time-period. For this category, the
Defendant's calculation is "43,798 checks issued x ($18.44 per hour
x 1.5) x 1 hour per check," which provides the
amount-in-controversy estimate of $1,211,452.68 for unpaid
overtime.  

Because the estimate also relies on the Defendant's claimed average
salary, the analysis regarding meal and rest periods is equally
applicable.  Given the lack of a proper evidentiary foundation for
the asserted average salary, the Judge also does not consider the
calculation of missed overtime pay in determining the amount in
controversy.

The Defendant estimates possible damages from the Plaintiff's
waiting period claims to be $2,049,052.80.  In determining whether
the Defendant's assumption of a 100% violation rate at the maximum
penalty is appropriate, the only relevant inquiry is whether the
language of the complaint justifies it, as the Defendant has
offered no "summary-judgement-type" evidence to support its
assertion.

The Judge holds that the limitations of the language in the
complaint and the Defendant's failure to provide evidentiary
support for the $18.44 average hourly wage means defendant fails to
carry its burden on two fronts.  Its estimate of
waiting-period-violation damages will not be considered in
determining the amount in controversy.

The final disputed figure submitted by the Defendant is for
attorney's fees, estimated at $1,588,480, 25% of its estimated
judgment.  The Judge need not address whether the attorney's fees
are properly included in evaluating the jurisdictional amount at
issue in the instant case.  Given her findings, the estimated
judgment on which the proposed attorney's fees figure relies is not
supported by sufficient evidence.  Even assuming arguendo she
accepted the remaining estimates submitted by the Defendant and
incorporated the fees, the Judge finds that the attorney's fees
only amount to a total of $109,495.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Mueller concludes that the Defendant
has not met its burden of demonstrating the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million as required under CAFA.  Therefore, the Judge
granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Remand and remanded the case to
the Sacramento County Superior Court for all further proceedings.


A full-text copy of the Court's July 21, 2020 Order is available at
https://bit.ly/2HBCWqO from Leagle.com.


TRUGREEN INC: Bid to Strike Class Claims in Stevens-Bratton Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KASIE STEVENS-BRATTON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRUGREEN, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 2:15-cv-2472 (W.D. Tenn.), Judge Samuel H.
Mays, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, Western Division, denied TruGreen's July 26, 2017 Motion
to Strike Class Allegations Based on Plaintiff's Class Action
Waiver.

TruGreen is a lawn care service provider with its headquarters in
Memphis, Tennessee.  On May 15, 2013, Stevens-Bratton entered into
an agreement with TruGreen for lawn care services.  The Service
Agreement includes contact, mandatory arbitration, and class action
waiver provisions.  It allows cancellation at any time by written
oral notification.  Cancellation is "without penalty or
obligation."  The Service Agreement is silent on the terms and
obligations, if any, that survive its cancellation.

TruGreen provided lawn care services to Stevens-Bratton from May
15, 2013, until May 15, 2014, when Stevens-Bratton cancelled the
Service Agreement.  The Plaintiff provided two telephone numbers on
the Service Agreement, one under the "Home Phone" section, and a
different one under the "Cell Phone" section.  On Jan. 27, 2015,
Stevens-Bratton began to receive telemarketing calls from TruGreen
on her cellular telephone.  She alleges those calls were made by an
automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS").  She asked TruGreen to
stop calling, but the calls continued.

On July 15, 2015, Stevens-Bratton filed the putative class action
against TruGreen, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.  On July 15, 2015, Stevens-Bratton sought class
certification or, in the alternative, a stay of certification
briefing pending discovery.  On Aug. 26, 2015, TruGreen filed an
answer and a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration or, in the
alternative, to stay the litigation.  On Jan. 12, 2016, the Court
denied Stevens-Bratton's motion for class certification, granted
TruGreen's motion to compel arbitration, dismissed all claims
against TruGreen, and entered a judgment for TruGreen.

Stevens-Bratton appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed.
Stevens-Bratton v. TruGreen, Inc.  The Sixth Circuit held that the
dispute between Stevens-Bratton and TruGreen d[id] not 'arise
under' the Service Agreement], and therefore, the Service
Agreement's arbitration provision did not bind Stevens-Bratton to
arbitration because the presumption in favor of postexpiration
arbitration of matters applies only where a dispute has its real
source in the contract.

On appeal, TruGreen argued that, if the Sixth Circuit held the
arbitration provision inapplicable, the class action waiver
provision in the Service Agreement was applicable, and the Sixth
Circuit should affirm on that ground.  The Sixth Circuit declined
to address TruGreen's class action waiver argument because the
district court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law
regarding the merits of Stevens-Bratton's motion for class
certification and there was no record to review regarding
application of the class action waiver.

On July 26, 2017, TruGreen filed its Motion to Strike Class
Allegations based on the class action waiver provision in the
Service Agreement.  It argues that Stevens-Bratton's class
allegations should be stricken because the Service Agreement's
class action waiver provision requires her to bring any Claim in
her individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in
any purported class, collective, representative, multiple
plaintiff, or similar basis.  Stevens-Bratton argues that, when she
cancelled the Service Agreement, all her obligations, rights, and
responsibilities under the Service Agreement terminated and nothing
in the Service Agreement governs the present lawsuit: including the
Class Action wavier.

It is undisputed that (i) the Service Agreement is a valid
agreement; (ii) that Stevens-Bratton validly cancelled the Service
Agreement around May 15, 2014; (iii) beginning on Jan. 27, 2015,
Stevens-Bratton received telemarketing calls from TruGreen to the
telephone number she had provided TruGreen in the Service
Agreement; and (iv) the Service Agreement does not contain a
survival clause in which the parties expressly stated that the
class action waiver provision would have post-cancellation effect.

Judge Mays holds that although there is language waiving
Stevens-Bratton's ability to bring "any claim" in a class action,
there is no language in the Service Agreement that her waiver
applies post-cancellation.  TruGreen seeks to read into the Service
Agreement a survival clause that does not exist.  Because the class
action waiver is a provision relating to remedies and dispute
resolution, it may survive the cancellation of the Service
Agreement if it is broadly written to apply to any legal dispute
and the dispute turns on facts and occurrences that arose before
the expiration of the contract.

The class action waiver provision is not applicable here because
the current dispute does not involve facts and occurrences that
arose before expiration of the contract.  The Sixth Circuit has
held that the majority of the material facts and occurrences in the
current dispute did not arise before Stevens-Bratton's cancellation
of the Service Agreement.

The class action waiver provision may survive the termination of
the Service Agreement if TruGreen's right to call Stevens-Bratton
accrued or vested under the agreement, or where, under normal
principles of contract interpretation, TruGreen's right survives
expiration of the remainder of the agreement.  The Sixth Circuit
also directly addressed this issue.  It held that TruGreen's right
to call Stevens-Bratton is not the type of right that we typically
view as accruing or vesting under a contract, and its disputed
right to call Stevens-Bratton does not survive expiration under the
contact under normal principles of contract interpretation.  That
conclusion is equally applicable now.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Mays concludes that the Service
Agreement's class action waiver provision is not applicable.
TruGreen has not shown a clear legal bar against class treatment of
the action.  Therefore, the Judge denied TruGreen's Motion to
Strike Class Allegations based on the class action waiver provision
in the Service Agreement.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 24, 2020 Order is
available at https://bit.ly/3mjYXJM from Leagle.com.


ULTRA PETROLEUM: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of Nov. 2 Motion Deadline
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP on Oct. 4 disclosed that class action lawsuit
has commenced on behalf of shareholders of Ultra Petroleum.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadlines listed to petition the court. Further details about the
cases can be found at the links provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

Portland General Electric Company (NYSE:POR)

POR Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased April 24, 2020 -
August 24, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 2, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/portland-general-electric-company-information-request-form?prid=9783&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Portland
General Electric Company made materially false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) PGE lacked effective
internal controls over its energy trading practices; (2) PGE
personnel had entered energy trades during 2020, with increasing
volume accumulating late in the second quarter and into the third
quarter, that created significant negative financial exposure for
PGE; (3)as a result, the Company was reasonably likely to incur
significant losses; and (4) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

Ultra Petroleum Corp. (OTC PINK:UPLCQ)

UPLCQ Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased April 3, 2017 -
August 8, 2019

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 2, 2020

TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/ultra-petroleum-corp-information-request-form?prid=9783&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Ultra
Petroleum Corp. made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (a) Ultra's proved reserves were
materially overstated and, therefore, worth hundreds of millions of
dollars less than represented; (b) Ultra's proved undeveloped
reserves were of de minimis value because they contained low
quality deposits that lacked a commercially viable path to
development; (c) Ultra was unable to meet the production and
development estimates provided to investors and such estimates
lacked a reasonable basis; (d) Ultra was unable to withstand even a
modest downturn in the price of natural gas because, inter alia,
Ultra's business had less financial and production flexibility than
claimed; and (e) Ultra did not have the technical or financial
capabilities or available asset base to sustainably grow its oil
and natural gas production by any meaningful amount.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
https://www.zlk.com [GN]


UNITED STATES: Class in Athey Denied Counsel Fees and Expenses
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT M. ATHEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED
STATES, Defendant, Case No. 99-2051C (Fed. Cl.), Judge David A.
Tapp of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims denied the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses.

At the epilogue of protracted class action litigation, following a
lump-sum settlement between the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
and the class action Plaintiffs, the Class seeks payment of
attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act ("EAJA").  The Class comprises former employees of VA.  From
1993 through 1999, the Class members retired or separated from the
VA.  

In the Complaint, filed June 21, 2006, the Class claimed the VA
omitted pay increases from lump-sum payments received upon
termination of their employment.  These pay increases included Cost
of Living Adjustments, Locality Pay Adjustments, Sunday premium
pay, as well as evening and weekend pay.  Finally, the Class
members sought prejudgment interest under the Back Pay Act.

In widely separated decisions, the Court determined that (1)
"additional pay," which the class members contended should have
been included in the lump-sum payouts they received upon separation
from the VA, did not include evening and weekend pay; (2)
non-General Schedule employees were not entitled to relief; (3)
Sunday pay was not available after Oct. 1, 1997 ("Athey I"); and
(4) the Class was barred from recovering pre-judgment interest
("Athey III").

In early 2017, the parties entered into a final settlement
agreement resolving the remaining claim between the parties ("Athey
IV") and ("Athey V").  During the fairness hearing, both parties
acknowledged that the settlement agreement did not provide for
payment of attorney fees pursuant to the Back Pay Act.  The Class
thereafter appealed the decisions in Athey I and Athey III, and
Athey V.  The Federal Circuit affirmed each of the trial court
rulings thus ending the merits litigation.

The settlement agreement provided for the payment of $637,347.37
consisting of $570,374.49 in lump-sum pay and $66,972.88 for the
employer's contribution of employment-related taxes to the Class
consisting of 3,231 members.

On May 17, 2019, the Class filed its first Motion for Attorney Fees
which the United States opposed on June 13, 2019 as deficient and
premature due to the possibility the parties would be able to
resolve the fees dispute.  The Court stayed the case to facilitate
those negotiations.  On Dec. 19, 2019, the Court lifted that stay
and permitted the class administrator to distribute sums in
accordance with the settlement agreement.  

The Class' present motion for attorney's fees and expenses and
supporting brief followed on Jan. 13, 2020.  The United States
responded on Feb. 12, 2020 and the Class filed its reply in support
on March 20, 2020.

On April 23, 2020, the Court heard oral argument and ordered
additional briefing related to the RCFC 23(h) notice requirement,
supporting invoices, and documents of the Class' consulting
experts.  These issues also prompted the filing of supplemental
documentation by the Class on April 30, 2020 at the direction of
the Court.  Thereafter, the United States and the Class submitted
their final memoranda regarding the issue of attorneys' fees and
expenses on May 18, 2020 and May 26, 2020, respectively.
Additional facts will be developed as required.

Judge Tapp begins by examining the Court's own provisions for the
recovery of attorney's fees and expenses in class actions, as well
as the specific sums sought by the Class, before turning to the
substance of recovery pursuant to EAJA

RCFC 23 sets forth the procedure for class actions in the Claims
Court.  Subsection (h) authorizes an application for reasonable
attorney's fees and nontaxable costs if certain requirements are
met.  Despite reciting these plainly worded provisions, the Judge
finds that the Class counsel did not provide notice of the motion
to class members as RCFC 23(h)(1) requires.  The Class counsel did
not provide notice to members of the Class prior to filing the
motion seeking an award of attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to
Section 2412(b) and (d). However, no cases discuss the effect of
the failure to provide notice required by RCFC 23(h)(1).  Depending
on the nature of a fee request, literal compliance with the notice
requirement of the rule can be significant.

The Judge turns now to the substance of the EAJA claim.  The Class
seeks attorney fees and expenses under subsection (b) and/or (d) of
EAJA.  The United States counters that the Class is not entitled to
an award of attorney fees under either subsection (b) or (d), but
even if the class is entitled to award of fees and expenses, the
sums sought by the Class should be significantly reduced.

Section 2412(b) provides that unless expressly prohibited by
statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of
attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant
to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action
brought by or against the United States or any agency or any
official of the United States acting in his or her official
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action.  The
United States will be liable for such fees and expenses to the same
extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or
under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such
an award.

The Judge finds that no basis for awarding fees under Subsection
(b) of EAJA.  The Judge agrees with the United States that neither
common law exception permits the Class to recover fees or expenses
in the case.  Furthermore, because he finds the Class' EAJA
application contains various defects, and the position of the
United States was "substantially justified," the Judge also rejects
the Class's petition for costs and fees under Subsection (d).

Based on the foregoing, Judge Tapp holds that resolution of the
issue requires him to juxtapose the Class' modest success on the
merits with notice requirements and firmly rooted jurisprudence
governing the payment of attorney fees and expenses where the
position of the United States was substantially justified.  He
reluctantly concludes the considerations preclude recovery.  While
the outcome does not implicate the financial interests of the
Class, it directly affects the Class counsel.  Of equal importance,
because recovery of the expenses of litigation is inexorably linked
to the criteria of EAJA for attorney fees, the as-yet unpaid
third-party Class Administrator is left adrift, burdened by
continuing duties to the Class with no certainty of payment.
Because the Class does not satisfy the conditions of 28 U.S.C.
Section 2412(b) or (d), the Motion for Attorney Fees is denied.

A full-text copy of the District Court's July 21, 2020 Memorandum
Opinion & Order is available at https://bit.ly/3dX2P0i from
Leagle.com.

Ira M. Lechner, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs.

Bryan M. Byrd, Trial Attorney, Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant
Director, Robert E. Kirshman, Jr., Director, and Ethan P. Davis,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, with whom was Gia Chemsian, Department of
Veteran Affairs, Washington D.C., for Defendant.


UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN: Wnorowski Files Suit in Conn. Dist. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against University of New
Haven. The case is styled as Krystian Wnorowski, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated v. University of New Haven,
Case No. 3:20-cv-01589 (D. Conn., Oct. 22, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for
Diversity-(Citizenship).

The University of New Haven is a private university in West Haven,
Connecticut, which borders the larger city of New Haven and Long
Island Sound.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edward Toptani, Esq.
          TOPTANI LAW OFFICES
          375 Pearl St, Ste. 1410
          New York, NY 10038
          Phone: (212) 699-8930
          Fax: (212) 699-8939
          Email: edward@toptanilaw.com


UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA: Lawsuit Seeks Tuition Refunds
----------------------------------------------------------
John Haughey, writing for The Center Square, reports that a
class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of students who attend
Florida's public universities claims the schools committed a breach
of contract by cancelling in-person classes and activities without
offering corresponding reductions in tuition and fees.

University of South Florida (USF) student Jarrett LaFleur filed the
lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
in Tampa. Six students from four other Florida universities signed
onto the case.

The lawsuit against the State University System of Florida (SUSF)
and the 16-member Florida Board of Governors (FBOG) was expanded
into a class-action lawsuit on behalf of all 420,000 students
enrolled in Florida's 12 public universities.

According to Law.com, LaFleur's lawsuit is one of about 200
class-action breach-of-contract lawsuits filed against universities
nationwide that seek refunds for tuition, fees and housing and meal
costs. Lafleur is represented by Manhattan-based Leeds Brown Law,
which has filed 60 of those class-action lawsuits.

Similar actions have been filed against private universities,
including against the University of Miami and Florida Southern
College in Lakeland.

LaFleur, a mechanical engineering major, intramural sports athlete
and member of a fraternity and academic societies at USF, alleges
Florida universities made the college experience less valuable by
moving in-person classes online as a COVID-19 precaution and should
not be charging full tuition.

The lawsuit says universities are guilty of breach of contract and
should refund tuition and fees partially until they fully reopen
campuses.

The SUSF and FBOG filed petitions Oct. 1 to dismiss the lawsuit,
arguing plaintiffs can't claim breach of contract because LaFleur's
seminal lawsuit failed to produce a written copy of any contract
and identify actual terms breached by the universities.

In its petition, the SUSF maintains it is exempt, claiming it
"lacks the legal capacity to be sued."

It is uncertain whether those arguments will prevail in Tampa's
U.S. District Court, where one judge already has ruled a
breach-of-contract lawsuit against Florida Southern College (FSC)
can proceed.

U.S. District Court Judge James Moody rejected in September FSC's
contention it doesn't have contracts with students to breach.

Moody ruled FSC's publications are, essentially, contracts that
"clearly implied the courses would be conducted in-person. The
college's materials also touted its many resources and facilities
– all of which were located on the campus thereby implying
in-person participation."

Moody said the lawsuits are "novel in the sense there is no legal
precedent involving a pandemic's impact on a school's promise to
provide in-person learning" and, as such, must be scrutinized for
precedent-setting impacts.

"Like the ripple in a pond after one throws a stone," Moody wrote,
"the legal system is now feeling COVID-19's havoc with the current
wave of class-action lawsuits that seek tuition reimbursement
related to forced online tutelage."

In his lawsuit, LaFleur contends USF did not offer the in-person
benefits advertised to students, committing a breach of contract
while enriching itself.

According to the lawsuit, the average tuition paid by a full-time,
in-state undergraduate student at a Florida state university is
between $2,375.64 and $2,969.55 per semester.

At USF, LaFleur paid $2,059.72 for four classes last spring and
$1,300 over the summer.

USF charged a distance learning fee of $26.79 per credit hour for
the Tampa campus, $9.67 per credit hour for the St. Petersburg
campus and $15.92 per credit hour for the Sarasota-Manatee campus.

LaFleur's attorney, Jeffrey Brown, said in August university
students should be treated like airline passengers are when flights
are cancelled.

"When they can't offer that same service, for no fault of their
own, the benefit of that bargain shouldn't go to the university,"
Brown said. [GN]


VINEYARD VINES: Jariwala Files ADA Suit in S.D. California
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Vineyard Vines, LLC,
et al. The case is styled as Krishna Jariwala, individually and on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Vineyard
Vines, LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company; Vineyard Vines
Retail, LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company; DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive, Case No. 3:20-cv-02083-LAB-BGS (S.D. Cal., Oct. 22,
2020).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Vineyard Vines, LLC designs, manufactures, and retails apparel and
accessories. The Company offers shirts, pants, ties, jackets,
t-shirts, boxers, sweaters, and other apparel for men, women, and
children.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago M. Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Phone: (213) 381-9988
          Fax: (213) 381-9989
          Email: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


WAYNE COUNTY, MI: Bowles Files Civil Rights Suit
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sabree, et al. The
case is styled as Tonya Bowles, for herself and all those similarly
situated v. Eric R. Sabree, in his official and personal capacity;
County of Wayne, by its Board of Commissioners also sometimes known
as Charter County of Wayne by its Board of Commissioners; Case No.
2:20-cv-12838-LVP-KGA (E.D. Mich., Oct. 22, 2020).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Civil Rights for the Civil
Rights Act.

Eric R. Sabree has been Wayne County Treasurer since April, 2016.
He works on behalf of 43 municipalities and is responsible for the
receipt, custody, investment, and disbursement of all County funds
with a special emphasis on the collection of delinquent property
taxes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David J. Shea, Esq.
          SHEA LAW FIRM PLLC
          26100 American Dr., 2nd Floor
          Southfield, MI 48034
          Phone: (248) 354-0224
          Email: david.shea@sadplaw.com

               - and -

          Philip L. Ellison, Esq.
          OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNCEL PLC
          P.O. Box 107
          Hemlock, MI 48626
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (989) 642-0055
          Fax: (888) 398-7003
          Email: pellison@olcplc.com


WORLD WRESTLING: Labaton Sucharow Seeks Lead Counsel Role
---------------------------------------------------------
John O'Brien, writing for Legal Newsline, reports that the
securities class action law firm Labaton Sucharow has asked a
federal judge to let it lead litigation against World Wrestling
Entertainment over a failed relationship with Saudi Arabia.

On Oct. 6, the prominent firm also asked New York judge Jed Rakoff
to certify a class of investors that lost money when WWE's stock
took a hit. The motion follows an Aug. 6 ruling in which Rakoff
refused to dismiss the case.

"Here, Labaton Sucharow has investigated and vigorously pursued the
class' claims in the action and will continue to do so," the firm
wrote. "Labaton Sucharow has consistently demonstrated its ability
to litigate securities cases, has extensive knowledge of the
applicable securities laws, and has proven its willingness to
commit substantial time and resources to representing the class."

The class would include all persons and entities that purchased WWE
stock from Feb. 7, 2019 to Feb. 5, 2020. Labaton also asked that
its client, the Pension System of the City of Kansas City,
Missouri, be named lead plaintiff.

Rakoff wrote earlier this year that the allegations raise eyebrows
about WWE CEO Vince McMahon's sale of 10% of his stock.

The WWE has called arguments blaming it for a stock drop
"scattershot," but Rakoff ruled they were adequately pled.

Multiple cases were filed earlier this year against the WWE. They
allege WWE officers failed to tell investors about difficulties
with negotiations with Saudi Arabia and the Orbit Showcase Network
(OSN).

The WWE called the Saudi-controlled direct broadcast satellite
provider serving the Middle East and North Africa regions a key
part of its financial future. However, the suits allege the Saudi
deals were in jeopardy when company officials joined fans in
criticizing that country's human rights record.

Things deteriorated further with the murder of journalist Jamal
Khashoggi on Oct. 2, 2018, believed to be directed by the Saudi
government. A decision to hold a WWE live event in Saudi Arabia a
month later was widely panned. This upset the Saudis, the complaint
said.

WWE revealed on Oct. 31, 2019, that the media rights deal had been
delayed and the Saudi government owed the company tens of millions
of dollars. Several wrestlers were stranded by the Saudis when WWE
cut the live broadcasting feed of an event in the country.

When the WWE revealed it failed to secure the Saudi broadcasting
deal, stocks dropped on Feb. 6 to a low of $40.24 per share.

Senior executives sold off stock in what the complaints alleged was
insider trading. Vince McMahon sold more than 3.2 million shares
for $261 million on March 27, 2019.

The WWE says despite the deal falling through, its financial
performance ended up in the range of where it predicted it would
be.

Rakoff's 32-page decision will allow the case to progress into
discovery. He wrote plaintiffs have adequately alleged McMahon's
sale of shares constitutes insider trading.

"The (complaint) alleges that McMahon sold 3,204,427 shares of WWE
stock during the class period for proceeds of more than $261
million, a very significant sum," Rakoff wrote.

"Although this constituted only 10% of his shares, this sale was
unusual in light of McMahon's past trading practices. McMahon's
March 27, 2019, sale was also suspiciously timed, as it occurred
only a few days before the OSN Agreement ended and a month before
the issuance of lower-than-expected income projections for the
second quarter of 2019, which resulted in a drop in WWE's stock
price." [GN]


WRAP TECHNOLOGIES: Bragar Eagel Reminds of Nov. 23 Motion Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class action has been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Wrap Technologies, Inc.
Stockholders have until the deadlines below to petition the court
to serve as lead plaintiff. Additional information about each case
can be found at the link provided.

Wrap Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: WRTC)

Class Period: July 31, 2020 to September 23, 2020

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 23, 2020

On September 23, 2020, White Diamond Research published a report
entitled "Wrap Technologies: Disastrous LAPD BolaWrap Pilot Program
Results, No Evidence These Have Been Communicated To Investors"
alleging, among other things, that the Company's trial pilot
program with the LAPD was a disaster, and that the Company had not
disclosed the results to investors.

On this news, securities of Wrap fell $2.07 per share, or 25.43% to
close at $6.07 per share on September 23, 2020.

The complaint, filed on September 23, 2020, alleges that throughout
the Class Period defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the Company had concealed the
results of the LAPD BolaWrap pilot program, which demonstrated that
the BolaWrap was ineffective, expensive, and sparingly used in the
field; and (2) as a result, defendants' public statements were
materially false and/or misleading at all relevant times. When the
true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that investors
suffered damages.

For more information on the Wrap Technologies class action go to:
https://bespc.com/WRTC

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York and California. The firm represents
individual and institutional investors in commercial, securities,
derivative, and other complex litigation in state and federal
courts across the country. For more information about the firm,
please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do
not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]


[*] ACU Mulls Class Action Against Governments, PCR Manufacturers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Germany is again in the forefront in fighting the devastating,
unjustified, illegal, economy-destructive, people debilitating and
outright genocidal Corona Measures. The German COVID-19
Extra-Parliamentary Inquiry Committee -- in German -- ACU -- German
acronym for Ausserparlamentarischer Corona Untersuchungsausschuss
-- is planning to launch a Class Action Suit against not only
governments and government officials, but specifically against the
manufacturers of the infamous PCR test (PCR - Polymerase Chain
Reaction -- is a technique used to "amplify" small segments of DNA)
which, according to honest virologists all over the world, is
absolutely unsuitable for covid-19 testing. It has actually not
even been licensed to carry out such tests.

Nevertheless, the PCR test has been and is being touted and
promoted by WHO -- and by other leading health institutions in the
western world, such as the US NIAID / NIH and CDC, as well as by
researchers from the German Center for Infection Research (DZIF) at
Charite, Hospital, Berlin.  It was Dr. Christian Drosten, Director
of the Institute of Virology at "Charite", who propagated this test
which eventually was taken over by the German respective Government
and health authorities, who made it a mandatory panacea to test and
count "cases", mostly to manipulate statistics -- which the media
then uses to implant fear in the population.

Other countries followed similar instructions from their highest
health authorities and used the test results for the same purpose
-- planting fear in the clueless population. The media never tell
us, for example, that the error rate of these tests, the so-called
"positive negatives", can be as high as 50%. However, all
"positives" are automatically absorbed into the "case" statistics.
People get often tested several times and may also be reported
several times.

That's how the "case" rates can be manufactured and manipulated.
FEAR is the Name of the Game. So that the governments are justified
in closing their iron fists even stronger around your personal
neck; and by cutting the countries' economic lifeline causing
countless bankruptcies and unemployment in proportions never seen
in modern history - and often deadly misery, famine and suicide.

The iron fist around the peoples' throats include face mask, social
distancing, work from home, semi- or full lockdowns; i.e. keeping
people purposefully apart (the separate-to-conquer principle),
discrimination against the elderly, who in their loneliness get
depressed, sick and may die earlier. Yes, elderly people,
especially with co-morbidities are in a higher risk group, but in
the same as with the common flu every year, which has never been a
reason to discriminate them.

The result we are seeing already today. And the worst is yet to
come. This fall and winter in the Global North the merging with flu
and "covid" may spell even more disaster in data manipulative
mastery, and consequential measures that may, wittingly or
unwittlingly, be copied in the Global South, although the coming
warmer summer climate would suggest the contrary. It's a nasty and
criminal game that, if we don't stop it, will not end soon.

Enough introduction. Listen for yourself what Dr. Reiner Fuellmich,
lawyer of ACU, has to say about the Class Action Suit, and how it
might bring these destructive measures to a halt and reverse them,
by compensating the damaged people and small and medium size
enterprises that had no choice but to declare bankruptcy and lay
off their employees.

As Dr. Fullmich explains, this could happen with what he calls a
BANG, if millions around the world join in the Class Action Law
Suit. Since in Germany and other European countries, Class Action
Suits are not well known, especially because they are complicated,
lacking a similar legal basis they have in the US, this Class
Action Suit would be filed in the US, representing the world
population. [GN]


[*] Amendments to Ontario's Class Proceedings Act Come Into Force
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ranjan K. Agarwal, Esq. -- agarwalr@bennettjones.com - and Katrina
Crocker, Esq. -- crockerk@bennettjones.com -- of Bennett Jones LLP,
in an article for JDSupra, report that on October 1, 2020, recent
amendments to Ontario's Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (CPA), come
into force. The amendments were made as part of the Smarter and
Stronger Justice Act, 2020, which received Royal Assent in July
2020. These changes apply only to any class proceeding commenced on
or after October 1, 2020. That said, in Karasik v Yahoo! Inc., 2020
ONSC 5103, Justice Perell recently applied the amendments to a
current class action under the court's plenary jurisdiction to
manage class actions.

1. Introduction of a Stricter Certification Test

The most substantive change to the CPA is the introduction of
superiority and predominance requirements to the test for
certification. The existing CPA requires that a class proceeding be
the preferable procedure to resolve the common issues. The amended
CPA now requires:

   i. that the proposed class proceeding be a superior means of
determining the rights or entitlement of the class members, as
compared with, among others, any quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings (s. 5(1.1)(a)); and

  ii. that questions of fact or law common to the class members
predominate over the individual issues (s. 5(1.1)(b)).

2. Procedural Amendments Designed to Achieve Faster Resolution of
Cases

Several changes to the CPA should increase procedural efficiency
and streamline class actions in Ontario:

  * Streamlined appeals: Both parties now have a right to appeal
from a certification order to the Court of Appeal for Ontario (s.
30(1)). The plaintiff cannot materially amend their notice of
certification motion, pleadings, or notice of application on appeal
(s. 30(2)).

  * Early dismissal motions: The court must hear dispositive
motions before the certification motion or simultaneously with the
certification motion, unless the court orders otherwise (s. 4.1).

  * Dismissal of dormant actions: The court must dismiss a proposed
class action for delay if, within one year from issuing a claim,
the plaintiff has not filed a final and complete motion record for
certification, the parties have not agreed upon a timetable, the
court has not ordered that the action not be dismissed or imposed a
timetable, or any other steps required by the regulations have not
taken place (s. 29.1(1)).

  * Limitation periods for contribution and indemnity claims: The
limitation period for a defendant's claims for contribution and
indemnity from third parties is suspended upon commencement of a
putative class proceeding (s. 28(3)).

3. Increased Disclosure for Settlement Approvals and Third-Party
Funding

Under the amended CPA, courts must not approve a settlement unless
it determines that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the
best interests of the class or subclass members:

  * Evidence to be filed on settlement: A party seeking approval of
a settlement must disclose information about the settlement,
including why the settlement is fair and reasonable, risks/possible
recovery if litigation continues, the number of class members, and
expected recovery arising from the settlement (s. 27.1(7)).

    After settlement, the administrator must file a comprehensive
report on the performance of the settlement (s. 27(16)). The court
may hold back class counsel's fees until it is "satisfied with the
distribution of the monetary award or settlement funds" (s.
32(6)).

  * Third-party funding: A plaintiff who makes an agreement to
receive third-party funding must receive court approval of the
agreement (s. 33.1(2)). The court will only approve a third-party
funding agreement if it is fair and reasonable, does not diminish
the rights of the representative plaintiff to instruct counsel and
control the litigation, and the funder can satisfy adverse costs
awards (s. 33.1(9)).
Once approved, and to the extent of the indemnity provided under
the funding agreement, defendants will be able to recover any costs
awarded against the plaintiff directly from the funder (s.
33.1(11)) and to obtain security for costs from the funder if
certain conditions are met (s. 33.1(12)).

4. Management for Carriage Motions and Multi-Jurisdictional Cases

In line with legislation in B.C., Alberta, and Saskatchewan, the
CPA is amended to consider multi-jurisdictional class proceedings
commenced in Ontario or elsewhere in Canada:

  * Registration: Plaintiffs must register class proceedings in
accordance with regulations under the CPA (s. 2(1.1)) and serve an
Ontario notice of certification on counsel advancing parallel
proceedings in other provinces (s. 2(4)).

  * Overlapping class proceeding in Ontario (i.e., carriage):
Carriage motions between competing class actions in Ontario need to
be filed within 60 days after the first proceeding is commenced (s.
13.1(3)). The court will determine which proceeding best advances
the claims of the class members in an efficient and cost-effective
manner, heeding each representative plaintiff's theory of its case,
the relative likelihood of success in each proceeding, the
expertise/experience of each solicitor, and the funding of each
proceeding (s. 13.1(4)). No appeals from carriage decisions will be
allowed (s. 13.1(5)).

  * Overlapping class proceedings in Canada: At certification, the
court will have to consider whether there is a class action pending
in another province involving the same subject matter and, if so,
to determine whether it would be preferable for some or all of the
claims in the Ontario action to be resolved in the other proceeding
(s. 5(6)). Parties will also have the right to bring a stay motion
prior to certification where there is an overlapping class action
in another province (s. 5(8)).

  * In making its determination, the court will be guided by
certain objectives (s. 5(7)(a)) and tasked with considering all
relevant factors, including the alleged basis of liability in each
proceeding, the stage each proceeding has reached, the location of
class members, representative plaintiffs, witnesses, and evidence,
and the ease of enforceability in each applicable jurisdiction (s.
5(7)(b)).

5. Additional Obligations for Class Counsel

Changes are made to sections 17 to 19 respecting notice under the
CPA. The court must make such orders as are necessary to ensure
that the notice given is the best notice practicable in the
circumstances. Notices must be written in English and in French (s.
20(2)), and in a plain language manner (s. 20(1)). The plaintiff
must pay for the costs of providing notice of certification at
first, unless they have consent from the defendant at an earlier
time. The plaintiffs may seek to recover those costs from
defendants if ultimately successful in the class proceeding (s.
22(1.1)).

6. Two New Regulations and Other Regulatory Amendments

Finally, regulations and regulatory amendments have been made to
support the amendments to the CPA:

  * A new "General" regulation under the CPA, O Reg 497/20, which
includes details about the registration of proceedings and the
National Class Action Database as well as technical rules related
to starting a proposed class proceeding that includes a claim under
section 138.3 of the Securities Act (i.e., liability for secondary
market disclosure).

  * A new "Subrogated Claims" regulation under the CPA, O Reg
498/20, which contains details for implementing section 27.3 of the
CPA.

  * Consequential amendments to the "Class Proceedings" regulation
under the Law Society Act, O Reg 771/92.

  * Minor amendments to Rule 12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[GN]


[*] Ignoring TCPA Class Actions is Bad Strategy, Squire Patton Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Brent Owen, Esq. -- brent.owen@squirepb.com -- of Squire Patton
Boggs (US) LLP, in an article for The National Law Review, writes
that TCPA class actions cause headaches, or worse. Courts agree.
The Eleventh Circuit recently described the in terrorem character
of the TCPA class action, observing the "pressure to settle the
case" no matter the merits. See Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d
1259, 1276 (11th Cir.  2019).

But refusing to participate is not a good back up plan. The United
States District Court of the Middle District of Florida recently
granted a plaintiff "leave to conduct class certification and
damages-related discovery." Eder v. Aspen Home Improvements, Inc.,
Case No. 8:20-cv-1306-T-23JSS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183768, *2
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2020).  Citing other recent decisions, that
court explained: "It would be unjust to prevent Plaintiff from
attempting to demonstrate the elements for certification of a class
without the benefit of discovery, due to the defendant's failure to
participate in the case." Id. So even though the defendant "failed
to appear in this action, class certification-related discovery is
warranted." Id. at *3.

A defendant that declines to participate in a TCPA class action may
only cause more problems in the long run. [GN]



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