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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, February 12, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 26

                            Headlines

AMAZON.COM INC: To Pay $61.7MM to Settle Charges Over Driver Tips
AMBASSADOR GROUP: DPYB Sues Over Non-existent Insurance Policies
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Bid to Strike Hansen Declaration in Mendell Nixed
AMERICAN TRAFFIC: 2 Questions Certified to Supreme Court in Pincus
ANAGRAM RESTAURANT: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Acuna Says

BADGER BROTHERS: $70K Settlement in Neeck Suit Wins Prelim. Nod
BEACON WINES: Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Spread-of-Hours Pay
BETTYS MILLS: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
BHP GROUP: Brazilian Claimants to Seek Review of Dam Collapse Suit
BHP GROUP: Brazilian Claimants' Lawyers Optimistic on Appeal

BLUE RIDGE NET: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CAMERON'S SEAFOOD: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Canada Emergency Response Benefit
CAPITAL ONE: Bid to Alter or Amend Judgment in Robinson Suit Denied
CAR AUTO HOLDINGS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Khatabi Suit Claims

CENTURY INC: Bid to Dismiss Appeal in Securities Suit Granted
CINMAR LLC: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CLARKSON RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Tomlinson Suit Says
CLEAR IMAGE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CLEARVIEW AI: 7th Circuit Affirms Decision to Remand Class Action

COLORADO: Governor Polis Proper Defendant in Raven Suit, Court Says
COMENITY BANK: Boyd Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Indiana
COMPANDSAVE.COM INC: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CONGREGATE CONNECT: Ramirez Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Caregivers
COUNTRY MUTUAL: Partly Compelled to Show Docs in Hansen Class Suit

DANTE GROVE: Toledo, et al., Sue Over Unpaid Minimum Wages & OT
DETROIT PROPERTY: Bid to Amend Restrictions in James Suit Denied
DOMETIC CORP: Denial of Class Certification in Cherry Suit Vacated
DRAGON ALLIANCE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ENURESIS ASSOCIATES: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

FCA US: Gerritsen Suit Transferred to E.D. Michigan
FIESTA TABLEWARE: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FLO HEALTH: Faces Class Action Suit Over Health Data Disclosures
FRANCESCAS COLLECTIONS: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. California
FRONTIER UTILITIES: Frey Suit Stayed Pending Ruling in FB v. Duguid

GEISINGER HEALTH: Leib Sues Over "No Poach Agreement" Practice
GOLDEN STATE: Directed to File Response to Hearing Re-Schedule Bid
GOOGLE LLC: Manipulates Advertising Auctions, Negron Alleges
GRAYBAR ELECTRONIC: Newsome Files FCRA Suit in N.D. California
HAAT BAZAAR: Tapia Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum, OT Under FLSA, NYLL

HANDY SEAFOOD: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
INDIANA: Scroggin's Suit Against Sgt. Diaz May Proceed, Court Says
JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: Summary Judgment Dismissing Vazquez Vacated
JOHNSON STRING: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
JOSE PEPPER'S: Partly Compelled to Answer Florece's Interrogatories

L.L.C. INC: Magistrate Judge Endorses Denial of Bid to Toss Heath
LENOVO US: Claims in Gisairo Suit Over Defective Laptops Narrowed
LIVING WELL: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LOLA & SOTO: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Alleges
M&C MANAGEMENT: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Says

MAKE'N MUSIC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
McCREARY VESELKA: Bid to Compel in Perez FDCPA Suit Partly Granted
MDL 2804: Ohio Court Denies NAS Guardians' Class Certification Bid
MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Cavanaugh Says
MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Clemenson Says

MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Deray Alleges
MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Smith Alleges
MELALEUCA INC: Order Granting Arbitration Bid in Wainwright Upheld
METTLER-TOLEDO LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime, Marsh Suit Alleges
MGM RESORTS: Smallman's Bid to Appoint Interim Class Counsel OK'd

MIDLAND CREDIT: Pacifico FDCPA Suit Removed to E.D. New York
MUNCHERY INC: $400K Class Settlement in Philips Suit Gets Final OK
NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S: Morris' Class of Psychometricians Certified
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL: MSP Suit Under MSPA Dismissed Without Prejudice
NEW PIG: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

NEW YORK: Court Dismisses First Amended Complaint in West vs. MTA
ONE SOURCE: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
OREGON: Court in Maney Suit Orders ODOC to Give AICs COVID Vaccine
PARENTGIVING LLC: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
PINE TAVERN: Jurgelevicius Seeks Minimum Wage for Tipped Employees

PROJECT MANAGEMENT: Claims in Mahr Discrimination Suit Narrowed
RATER8 LLC: Wilson TCPA-UCL Suit Stayed Pending Ruling in Duguid
RESOLUTE ENERGY: Wins Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Securities Suit
RESURGENT CAPITAL: LVNV Can Compel Arbitration in Cobb FDCPA Suit
RIP N DIP: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: Faces Lawsuits Over Stock Trading Restrictions
ROBINHOOD MARKETS: Days Files Suit Over Stock Market Interference
RUBIN & ROTHMAN: Faces Stern FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
S&P GLOBAL: Snitkoff Suit Challenges Purchase Deal of IHS Markit
SALTY CREW: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

SANOFI-AVENTIS US: Shampoo Causes Hair Loss, Lewis Suit Alleges
SCOOTER DIRECT: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SEQUEL LLC: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SHAR PRODUCTS: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SHERRILL MANUFACTURING: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

SHOE SHOW: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Alleges
SIGHT AND SOUND: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SIMPLE HEALTH: Insurance Fraud Class Action Can Proceed
SISTINA RESTAURANT: Paredes et al. Seek to Recover Proper OT Wages
SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY: McAvoy Consolidated With Butler Class Suit

SYNERGY CLOTHING: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
TACTILE SYSTEMS: St. Clair Appointed Lead Plaintiff in Mart Suit
TAMPA BAY: Carlton Fields Attorneys Discuss Settlement Ruling
TAPESTRY INC: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Alleges
THUNDER BAY, ON: Law Firm Seeks to Expedite Water Leak Class Action

TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Fails to Pay 300% Cash Value Increase, Wren Says
UNITED FOOD: Minn. Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Nagel Suit
UNITED STATES: Bid to Extend Discovery in Juarez v. ICE Denied
US FERTILITY LLC: Patients Sue Over Data Security Breach
WEINERT ENTERPRISES: 7th Cir. Affirms Class Certification Denial

WELLS FARGO: Sued Over Automatic Forbearance Scheme Enrollment
WFS EXPRESS: Wins Initial OK of Class Settlement in Bautista Suit
[*] Buckley LLP Discusses BIPA Class Action Ruling
[*] Curare Legal Discusses Consumer Class Actions in India
[*] Indiana Financial Cos. Targeted in Overdraft and NSF Lawsuits

[*] Jackson Lewis Issues Class Action Trends Report Winter 2021
[*] Workplace-Related Class Action Ruling Spiked Due to Pandemic

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Has $5.4MM Estimated Liabilities


                            *********

AMAZON.COM INC: To Pay $61.7MM to Settle Charges Over Driver Tips
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Perez, writing for TechCrunch, reports that the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission announced on Feb. 2 that Amazon will be required
to pay $61.7 million to settle charges that it withheld some
customer tips from its Amazon Flex drivers over a two and a half
year period. According to the complaint against Amazon and its
subsidiary Amazon Logistics, the company had advertised that it
paid 100% of tips to drivers. But in reality, Amazon used the
customer tips to cover the difference after it lowered the hourly
rate -- a change it didn't inform drivers about, the complaint
says.

The FTC also alleged that Amazon didn't stop this behavior until it
became aware of the FTC investigation in 2019.

The complaint specifically has to do with the Amazon Flex service,
launched in 2015, which allowed anyone to sign up to deliver Amazon
packages to customers. These Flex drivers were paid an hourly rate
for those deliveries and could also receive customer tips.

In the FAQ section of the Amazon Flex app, the company had promised
drivers they would receive 100% of their tips, saying: "For Prime
Now, AmazonFresh, and store deliveries, the customer can choose to
tip. You will receive 100% of the tips you earn while delivering
with Amazon Flex." An earlier version of this document had also
stated that Amazon "will pass to you 100% of tips you earn," back
in May 2018.

Amazon also promoted the tips benefits in ads recruiting drivers,
where the company offered a rate of up to $18-25 per hour and the
ability to "make more" via tips. And when drivers signed up for the
Amazon Flex service, its terms also promised 100% of tips, the FTC
complaint explains.

Despite the language being used, when Flex drivers used the app to
accept their delivery gigs, they would be assigns delivery
"blocks," only some of which were tips-eligible. Initially, this
included Prime Now but later expanded to include Amazon Fresh and
Amazon Restaurants. Those that weren't eligible for tips were paid
a flat rate. Meanwhile, customers using the Amazon app were
encouraged to tip drivers through the app, which noted that "cash
is not accepted upon delivery."

Initially, Amazon from 2015 to 2016 paid drivers $18 per hour plus
100% of tips, as it claimed. But in 2016, it made changes to the
program to adopt "variable base pay," which ran over the course of
two and a half years. During this time, Amazon would reduce its own
contribution to drivers' pay to an algorithmically set, internal
"base rate" using data it collected about average tips in the area.
This base rate was often below the $18-$25 advertised rate. Then,
instead of paying out 100% of tips to drivers, Amazon treated the
bottom of the range as a guaranteed minimum and used drivers' tips
to meet that minimum, the FTC says.

When Amazon made these changes, it didn't ask for drivers' consent
or otherwise inform them. It also had internal discussions where
the company tried to decide what level of detail about earnings to
actually show to drivers, knowing that the changes would reduce
their earnings.

Drivers began to realize they were no longer receiving 100% of tips
and hundreds complained both to the company and publicly on social
media. When reporters asked Amazon to respond to these complaints,
the company continued to say that it paid 100% of tips -- even as
it internally acknowledged the situation represented "a huge PR
risk to Amazon" and described it as a "reputation tinderbox."

The FTC says it issued a civil investigative demand to Amazon on
May 23, 2019, and only afterwards -- on August 22, 2019 -- did
Amazon announce an "updated earnings experience" to drivers, which
was similar to the original compensation. In other words, it
appears the investigation forced Amazon to stop the deceptive
practice.

The FTC settlement includes a $61.7 million fine, which is the full
amount of money withheld from drivers, the FTC says. This will be
used to compensate drivers who can sign up to receive updates on
the refund status here.

"Rather than passing along 100 percent of customers' tips to
drivers, as it had promised to do, Amazon used the money itself,"
said Daniel Kaufman, acting director of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, in a statement. "Our action returns to drivers
the tens of millions of dollars in tips that Amazon
misappropriated, and requires Amazon to get drivers' permission
before changing its treatment of tips in the future."

In addition to the fine, the settlement also prohibits Amazon from
making further changes to how drivers' tips are used as
compensation without first obtaining their "express informed
consent."

For Amazon, however, the FTC fine is barely a slap on the hand,
given the scale of its business. The company in the third quarter
of 2020 pulled in $96.15 billion in revenue and earnings of $12.37
per share. It said revenue would climb to $112-121 billion in Q4,
or annual growth of 28%-38%.

Fines like this, then, become just a cost of doing business and not
a disincentive on unfair practices, as intended.

Amazon is not the only delivery business that has received
complaints over messing with driver pay. Instacart also found
itself in hot water over its own tipping debacle in 2019, which
included a class action lawsuit over also taking driver tips to pay
wages. Other companies, like DoorDash, Shipt and more, have also
faced complaints and even lawsuits over tips.

At the core of these issues is the fundamental problem of the shaky
economics of same-day and online grocery delivery businesses, with
small margin items and additional costs associated with picking,
labor and cold food storage. These costs require businesses
operating in this space to charge premium subscriptions and
delivery fees, and/or to mark up the cost of the items over
in-store prices in order to make money. But even still, they often
feel the need to tap into another income stream by taking driver
tips.

Tips, of course, are never given to sustain a business -- they're
meant to benefit an individual worker.

Reached for comment, Amazon says it disagreed with the FTC
complaint but is glad it's over.

"While we disagree that the historical way we reported pay to
drivers was unclear, we added additional clarity in 2019 and are
pleased to put this matter behind us," an Amazon spokesperson said.
"Amazon Flex delivery partners play an important role in serving
customers every day, which is why they earn among the best in the
industry at over $25 per hour on average." [GN]


AMBASSADOR GROUP: DPYB Sues Over Non-existent Insurance Policies
----------------------------------------------------------------
Del Obispo Youth Baseball, Inc., individually and on behalf of all
other similarly situated individuals and entities, Plaintiffs, v.
The Ambassador Group LLC, Performance Insurance Company SPC,
Brandon White, Goldenstar Specialty Insurance, LLC and Does 1
through 50, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-00199 (C.D. Cal., January
28, 2021), seeks damages and equitable relief under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) including
applicable liquidated damages, interest, attorneys' fees and costs
resulting from allegedly selling counterfeited and nonexistent
insurance policies.

Del Obispo Youth Baseball, Inc. operated as Dana Point Youth
Baseball (DPYB). It is a nonprofit organization that has provided
the means for community youth in South Orange County to develop
qualities and attributes through baseball since 1968.

Ambassador is a Kentucky limited liability company registered to do
business in California. Performance Insurance Company SPC is a
segregated portfolio company based in the Cayman Islands which
maintains an office in Louisville, Kentucky. Goldenstar Holdings
Company SP is a segregated portfolio of Performance Insurance
Company SPC based in the Cayman Islands. Goldenstar Specialty
Insurance, LLC (formerly known as Goldenstar Underwriting Company,
LLC) is a Pennsylvania limited liability company in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Defendants provide general commercial, accident,
directors' and officers' auto and other types of insurance.
Gagliardi Insurance Services, Inc. which served as the insurance
broker.

DPYB claims that it paid more than $64,000 to Gagliardi over the
course of ten years for non-existent and forged insurance coverage.
[BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Michael F. Ram, Esq.
      Marie N. Appel, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
      711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500
      San Francisco, CA 94102
      Telephone: (415) 358-6913
      Facsimile: (415) 358-6293
      Email: mram@forthepeople.com
             mappel@forthepeople.com

             - and -

      Ra O. Amen, Esq.
      201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Telephone: (813) 223-5505
      Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
      Email: Ramen@forthepeople.com


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Bid to Strike Hansen Declaration in Mendell Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL MENDELL, Plaintiff v. AMERICAN MEDICAL
RESPONSE, INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-01227-BAS-KSC (S.D.
Cal.), Judge Cynthia Bashant of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California denied the Defendant's motion to
strike the declarations of Mendell's counsel and expert witness,
which Mendell filed in support of his reply to the motion to
certify class.

Plaintiff Mendell brought the putative class action for damages and
injunctive relief against Defendant American Medical Response
("AMR"), alleging that AMR made unauthorized recordings of
conversations with the Plaintiff and the putative class members
without providing notification or warning required under the
California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA"), Cal. Penal Code
Sections 630 et seq.

On June 5, 2020, Mendell moved to certify class.  He proposed the
following class definitions:

     a. The HIPAA Confidential Communication Class: All persons in
California, that never called Defendant, whose first call from
Defendant was recorded without their consent by Defendant and/or
its agent/s from July 1, 2018 through July 31, 2019 (the date when
AMR modified its practice to notify callers of recording at the
outset of the call.); and

     b. The Cellular Phone Communication Sub-Class: All persons in
California, that never called Defendant, whose first call from
Defendant to their cellular phone was recorded without their
consent by Defendant and/or its agent/s from July 1, 2018 through
July 31, 2019 (the date when AMR modified its practice to notify
callers of recording at the outset of the call.).

Mr. Mendell attached to his motion a declaration of his expert
witness, Jeffrey A. Hansen, dated June 4, 2020.  Hansen was
retained to analyze AMR's phone call records to (1) identify and
manage the class and (2) advise the Plaintiff's counsel on the
capabilities of the software system used by AMR's third-party
vendor, LiveVox, Inc., who managed the phone call records for AMR.
Specifically, Hansen was retained to advise "what types of
information and reports regarding the makeup and identity of the
class can be gleaned from the data maintained by the LiveVox
system."  Hansen stated that he was "extremely familiar with the
LiveVox system" and thus was qualified to advise Mendell about the
system.

Mr. Hansen proposed a methodology to identify the class.  He relied
on his knowledge of the LiveVox system to state that the system can
generate a report with different fields that would allow him to
identify "which of the Call Records were first time outbound calls,
to patients that never called AMR, and identify the subset of such
first-time outbound calls to wireless numbers."  In addition,
Hansen stated that he could supplement the class identification
process by transcribing the audio recordings of the phone calls at
issue, using a tool called IBM Watson.

On July 3, 2020, AMR deposed Hansen.  It questioned Hansen about
his experience in using IBM Watson.  AMR then asked Hansen about
class identification, to which Hansen testified.

On Aug. 4, 2020, AMR filed its response in opposition to Mendell's
motion to certify class.  It argued that the Court should deny
Mendell's motion for class certification because, among other
reasons, Mendell had not set forth a feasible methodology to
identify the class.  It argued that Mendell is not an adequate
class representative because, among other reasons, he has a pending
state court action against AMR filed in July 2019 that arises from
the same set of operative facts in the federal action.

Mr. Mendell filed a reply in support of his motion to certify
class.  He argued in his Reply that narrowing the class period can
address any concerns about the alleged overlap of the periods when
the three transcripts were used because only PBS 2 was used between
Aug. 1, 2018 through March 31, 2019.  As to AMR's argument that his
pending state court action created a conflict of interest, Mendell
argued that he had demonstrated his fidelity to the class by
refusing AMR's settlement offer that would have required him to
enter a "broad general release" of the class claims.

On October 1, 2020, AMR filed the present motion to strike
Mendell's evidence submitted on Reply, arguing that the
supplemental declaration of Hansen should be stricken as untimely
and that the Shay Declaration should be stricken as untimely and
prejudicial.  Mendell filed a response in opposition to the motion
to strike and AMR filed a reply.

Judge Bashant denies AMR's request to strike the supplemental
declaration of Hansen.  She holds that Hansen's initial declaration
already stated that the phone records produced by LiveVox could be
used to generate a report with different fields to identify "which
of the Call Records were first time outbound calls, to patients
that never called AMR, and identify the subset of such first-time
outbound calls to wireless numbers."  AMR had the opportunity to
depose Hansen about how he would use the LiveVox phone records.
Further, because he did not have access to the LiveVox call records
at the time of his filing of the motion, Mendell did not exceed the
permissible scope of the reply brief by attaching his supplemental
declaration discussing the details of the data that was made
available to him.

Judge Bashant also denies AMR's motion to strike Shay's
declaration.  She says the allegations raised in the Shay
Declaration are not new because they respond to AMR's allegation
that Mendell has a conflict of interest due to the pending state
court action.  And because class certification is a preliminary
procedure, it "is not accompanied by the traditional rules and
procedures applicable to civil trials."  For this reason, at the
class certification stage, the Court may consider evidence not
admissible at trial.  Therefore, Judge Bashant overrules AMR's
evidentiary objections.

Finally, the Judge finds that it would be in the interest of
fairness to allow AMR to respond to the final class identification
method set forth in Mendell's Reply and in Hansen's supplemental
declaration.  AMR has raised an unopposed allegation that Mendell's
own delay in serving LiveVox with a subpoena caused the delay in
LiveVox's production of the phone records.  Under these
circumstances, Judge Bashant finds that AMR should be given an
opportunity to brief the merits of the final class identification
procedure proposed by Mendell.  Although AMR asks for another
opportunity to depose Hansen, shet finds that another deposition is
neither merited nor necessary.

For these reasons, Judge Bashant denied the Defendant's motion to
strike.  In the interest of fairness, she provided the Defendant an
opportunity to respond to the Plaintiff's Reply only as to the
proposed class identification procedure.  The Defendant may move to
file a sur-reply by Feb. 10, 2021.  The Defendant must attach a
proposed sur-reply, not to exceed five pages, to its motion to file
a sur-reply.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2cx27fyo from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN TRAFFIC: 2 Questions Certified to Supreme Court in Pincus
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN J. PINCUS, an individual, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant v. AMERICAN
TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, INC, a Kansas corporation, Defendant-Appellee,
Case No. 19-10474 (11th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Court of
Florida:

   (1) Did ATS violate Florida law when it imposed a five percent
       fee on individuals who chose to pay their red light
       traffic ticket with a credit card? and

   (2) If there was a violation of a Florida statute, can that
       violation support a claim for unjust enrichment?

American Traffic Solutions ("ATS") was the exclusive vendor for the
City of North Miami Beach's red light photo enforcement program.
Under its agreement with the City, ATS installed and maintained the
necessary equipment, including cameras to capture images of
motorists running red lights; monitored intersections for red light
violations; issued and mailed citations to violators; and processed
violators' payments of civil penalties.  ATS received a monthly
service fee based on the number of cameras it operated. In addition
to the monthly fee, the agreement permitted ATS "to charge, collect
and retain a convenience fee of up to 5% of the total dollar amount
of each electronic payment processed" to be "paid by the
violator."

An ATS camera in North Miami Beach captured an image of Pincus'
vehicle running a red light.  Shortly afterward, Pincus received in
the mail a Notice of Violation from the City.  The notice informed
Pincus that he was required to pay a "statutory penalty" of $158.
The notice instructed Pincus that he could pay the penalty online,
by phone, or by mail using a check or money order.

According to the notice, the first two options required violators
to pay a "convenience/service fee for this service."  In effect,
ATS charged a fee for the privilege of paying by credit card.
Pincus could avoid the fee only if he paid his penalty by mail
using a check or money order.  He paid the penalty online with a
credit card. The fee Pincus paid as a result of using his credit
card totaled $7.90--5% of his $158 penalty.

After paying the fee, Pincus filed the putative class action in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging
three counts of unjust enrichment based on violations of Florida
Statutes Sections 316.0083(b)(4), 318.121, and 560.204.
ATS filed a motion to dismiss these counts, arguing that under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Pincus failed to state a
claim for relief.  The district court granted the motion to dismiss
on the ground that Pincus failed to state a claim for unjust
enrichment under Florida law.  The district court reasoned that
Pincus failed to state a claim because: (1) the challenged fee was
not a "commission" within the meaning of Section 316.0083; (2) the
fee was not barred as a surcharge under Section 318.121, as it was
assessed exclusively under Chapter 316; and (3) a private cause of
action for unjust enrichment could not be maintained under Section
560.240.  The appeal followed.

Pincus appeals the district court's dismissal of his complaint for
failure to state a claim.  On appeal, he argues that the district
court erred in dismissing his complaint because (1) the fee ATS
charged him was an illegal commission under Florida Statutes
Section 316.0083(b)(4); (2) the fee was a prohibited surcharge
under Section 318.121; and (3) ATS violated Section 560.204(1)
because it operated as an unlicensed money transmitter, all
violations that he contends support a claim for unjust enrichment
under Florida law.  Each count of Pincus' unjust enrichment claim
turns on the proper application of Florida statutory and common
law.

The Eleventh Circuit explains that more than 8 million notices have
been issued for red light camera violations in Florida, including
1,054,234 issued between July 1, 2018 and June 30, 2019.  In that
period, at least 46 jurisdictions in Florida operated red light
cameras, all of which contracted with ATS or similar vendors.  So,
the statutory issues raised by the case--which will determine
whether a vendor may add a surcharge to red light camera penalties
in exchange for permitting individuals to pay their penalties by
credit card--may affect millions of Floridians and dozens of
Florida's municipal traffic enforcement regimes.  Resolution of the
common law issues may also reverberate throughout Florida,
affecting Florida's unjust enrichment law across diverse contexts.

Principles of federalism and comity counsel the Eleventh Circuit
not to attempt to divine the answers to these challenging and
important questions of Florida statutory and common law, citing In
re Cassell, 688 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012), that "when there
is substantial doubt about the correct answer to a dispositive
question of state law, a better option is to certify the question
to the state supreme court."

Accordingly, the Appellate Court certifies the following questions
to the Supreme Court of Florida:

   (1) Did ATS violate Florida law when it imposed a five percent
       fee on individuals who chose to pay their red light
       traffic ticket with a credit card?  In particular:

       a. Does the challenged fee constitute a commission from
          any revenue collected from violations detected through
          the use of a traffic infraction detector under Fla.
          Stat. Section 316.0083(1)(b)(4)?

       b. Was the fee assessed under Chapter 318 and therefore
          subject to Section 318.121's surcharge prohibition?

       c. Was ATS a money transmitter that was required to be
          licensed under Fla. Stat. Section 560.204(1)?

   (2) If there was a violation of a Florida statute, can that
       violation support a claim for unjust enrichment? In
       particular:

       a. Does Pincus's unjust enrichment claim fail because the
          statutes at issue provide no private right of action?

       b. Does Pincus's unjust enrichment claim fail because he
          received adequate consideration in exchange for the
          challenged fee when he took advantage of the privilege
          of using his credit card to pay the penalty?

Of course, the Eleventh Circuit's statement of any of the questions
certified does not "limit the inquiry" of the Supreme Court of
Florida or restrict its consideration of the issues that it
perceives are raised by the record certified in the case.  The
entire record on appeal in the case, including copies of the
parties' briefs, is transmitted along with the certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/1ibc49p5 from Leagle.com.


ANAGRAM RESTAURANT: Website Not Accessible to Blind, Acuna Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROGER ACUNA, individually and on behalf all others similarly
situated v. ANAGRAM RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC d/b/a LAZY BEAR, a
California limited liability company; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive,
Case No. 3:21-cv-00608-JCS (N.D. Cal., Jan. 26, 2021) alleges that
the Defendants failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate
its Website to be fully and equally accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually impaired people.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its Website, https://www.lazybearsf.com/, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Because the Defendants' Website is not fully or equally accessible
to blind and visually impaired consumers, resulting in violation of
the ADA, the Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's policies, practices, and procedures so
that the Defendant's Website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read Website content using her
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition blindness in that they have a visual
acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some
blind people who meet this definition have limited vision. Others
have no vision.

Anagram offers the Website to the public. The Website offers
features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and
services which Anagram offers in connection with its physical
location. The Defendant's Website, include ordering online for
pickup; the camp commissary menu which allows consumers to order
takeout food a la carte or dinner kit pickups such as the
take-and-bake cookie dough, aged cheddar fondue, radicchio and
marinated Romanesco salad, brown steakhouse bread, roasted hen of
the woods mushrooms, wagyu striploin, and honeynut squash
cheesecake; tickets, which serve the function of reservations;
dinner tickets; private events such as off-site events outdoors or
at a private residence, cooking classes, cocktail and spirits
classes, and wine tastings; wine list containing over 1,500
selections; the Defendant’s story; contact information; career
opportunities; and gift cards. Consumers can further access
information regarding the restaurant location and hours, social
media Web pages, joining Defendant's email list, and Covid-19
policies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com

BADGER BROTHERS: $70K Settlement in Neeck Suit Wins Prelim. Nod
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
grants the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of
settlement agreement in the lawsuit captioned CONNOR NEECK and
ISAIAH WEST, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. BADGER BROTHERS MOVING LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 19-cv-834-wmc (W.D. Wis.).

The Court also grants the parties' joint stipulation to certify a
class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court sets a fairness hearing for May 13, 2021 at 11:00 a.m.

Plaintiffs Neeck and West bring the putative class action on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated, claiming that
Defendant Badger Brothers Moving LLC violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act and Wisconsin state law, by (1) miscalculating
overtime compensation, (2) failing to pay employees for time worked
off the clock, and (3) making unlawful deductions from wages.

As set forth in the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary
approval of a class action settlement, and in the underlying
settlement agreement attached to that motion, the outline of the
parties' agreement is as follows:

   * There is a $70,000 settlement fund;

   * There is no claims process -- class members will receive
     settlement funds unless they exclude themselves;

   * If class members exclude themselves, cannot be located, or
     fail to cash their settlement check within 90 days of
     mailing, their allocated settlement amounts revert to the
     Defendant;

   * Class members will receive a minimum allocation of $20;

   * Class members and FLSA opt-ins will release the Defendant of
     their claims through May 4, 2020;

   * Enhancement payments of $1,000 each will be requested for
     the two named plaintiffs; and

   * Class counsel will request attorney's fees in the amount of
     one-third of the settlement amount.

As detailed in the Plaintiffs' brief, the class counsel created a
model to calculate settlement allocations for each of the FLSA
opt-in plaintiffs (11) and for the Rule 23 class members
(approximately 110). The calculations took into account the number
of hours worked, the number of shifts worked, the pay rate or rates
used, and the amount of wages paid for each work week to each
putative class member. The calculations also accounted for the
liquidated damages available for the FLSA opt-in plaintiffs.

Based on these calculations, the class members will receive 80% of
their maximum, fully-liquidated claim value under the settlement.
Further, the settlement amounts range from the minimum $20 to
$4,258, with the average claim of $465. Finally, all parties
represent that the settlement terms, which counsel attest, were
reached through arm's-length negotiations following mediation, will
provide all participating class members a substantial benefit.

Based upon the Court's review of the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion
for preliminary approval of class action settlement agreement, as
well as their brief in support and other materials submitted in
connection with the motion, preliminary approval of the proposed
settlement is granted because the proposed settlement appears
"within the range of possible approval"; and it appears to have
been reached as a result of vigorously contested litigation to
resolve bona fide disputes.

The Court further finds that the proposed settlement appears to be
the result of extensive, arm's-length negotiations by the counsel,
who were well-versed in the prosecution and defense of
wage-and-hour class action lawsuits.

For these reasons, the Court is satisfied that the settlement is
facially reasonable, except for:

   (a) a lack of adequate explanation for the provision for
       unclaimed settlement funds to revert to the Defendant,
       which the parties should be prepared to justify in their
       motion for final approval and at the fairness hearing; and

   (b) a better understanding of the basis for counsel's
       application for attorneys' fees, including review of
       counsel's hourly billing records and rates as a factor in
       determining an appropriate fee award before final approval
       of the settlement.

The parties' joint stipulation to certify class under Rule 23 is
granted. For settlement purposes, the Court certifies the following
class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e):

     All persons who have been or are currently employed by
     Badger Brothers Moving LLC as laborers and/or crew leads in
     the state of Wisconsin between October 9, 2017 and May 4,
     2020.

The Court appoints Hawks Quindel, S.C., as the Class Counsel. The
court appoints Plaintiffs Connor Neeck and Isaiah West as the Class
Representatives.

With one change, the Court approves the proposed Notice of Class
Action Settlement attached as Appendix B to the parties' Settlement
Agreement, and it directs the distribution of the Notice.

District Judge William M. Conley rules that under Paragraph 9, the
Class Counsel should amend the notice to require the Class members
objecting to the settlement to send their objections to the Court
only. More specifically, objectors need not send copies to the
parties' counsel; instead, the Court will docket any objections
received. In that same section, the counsel should include the
Court's address.

The Notice satisfies each of the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B), and it gives the Class members adequate notice of the
proposed settlement. The Court approves the following settlement
procedure and timeline:

   a) no later than February 22, 2021, Class counsel will mail
      the Notice of Settlement to the class members;

   b) Class members will have 45 days from the date of the
      mailing to review the terms of the Notice and submit a
      request to be excluded or any objections;

   c) no later than April 22, 2021, Class counsel will file a
      petition for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs not to
      exceed $23,333.33;

   d) any supplemental briefing on the parties' motion for final
      approval of the settlement and any objective to class
      counsel's fee petition, are due on or before May 6, 2021;
      and

   e) the Court will hold a fairness hearing on May 13, 2021, at
      11:00 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Feb. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/uktno9lb from
Leagle.com.


BEACON WINES: Staff Seeks Unpaid Overtime, Spread-of-Hours Pay
--------------------------------------------------------------
William Escalante, Ruben Bruno and Luis Orlando Zhinin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff, v. Funsan K. Corp., Kyong Suk Yi as personal
representative of the estate of Chi Young Chung, deceased, Kyong
Suk Yi, and Christopher Rudney, jointly and severally, Defendants,
Case No. 21-cv-00795, (S.D. N.Y., January 28, 2021), seeks to
recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime premium pay owed pursuant
to both the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law
including claims for unpaid spread-of-hours premiums, unlawfully
withheld gratuities and for failure to provide proper wage notices
and wage statement violations.

Defendants own and operate a liquor store "Beacon Wines & Spirits,"
located in Manhattan, New York where Plaintiffs are former
stockers, floor employees, counter employees, and delivery
employees. The latter claims to be paid a flat weekly rate or on an
hourly basis that did not compensate employees at the statutory
minimum wage or provide overtime premiums for hours worked in
excess of forty hours per week. They seek to recover unpaid minimum
wage and overtime premium pay owed, including claims for unpaid
spread-of-hours premiums and for failure to provide accurate wage
statements and wage notices. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

      Brent E. Pelton, Esq.
      Taylor B. Graham, Esq.
      PELTON GRAHAM LLC
      111 Broadway, Suite 1503
      New York, NY 10006
      Telephone: (212) 385-9700
      Email: pelton@peltongraham.com
             graham@peltongraham.com


BETTYS MILLS: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Betty Mills Company,
Inc. The case is styled as Ramon Jaquez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Betty Mills Company, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-01120 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Betty Mills -- https://www.bettymills.com/ -- offers online
cleaning, medical and sanitary supplies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


BHP GROUP: Brazilian Claimants to Seek Review of Dam Collapse Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Yahoo!News reports that about 200,000 Brazilian claimants whose
multi-billion dollar lawsuit against Anglo-Australian miner BHP
over a 2015 dam collapse was struck down, will petition the English
Court of Appeal to review the case.

"This is a challenging case for the courts but we are optimistic we
can establish jurisdiction in England and see justice done for our
clients," said Tom Goodhead, managing partner at PGMBM, which is
representing the claimants, on Feb. 2.

"In the event of any adverse costs ruling, these would be covered
by the funders and insurers of the case, not the victims of the
disaster. In no circumstances would we allow our clients to incur
the costs," he said.

He also said any costs would be appealed as part of the appeal
process.

Claimants are suing the mining giant and for 5 billion pounds
($A9.00 billion) in damages after the Fundao tailings dam
collapsed, killing 19 residents in Minas Gerais and causing
Brazil's worst environmental disaster.

BHP and Vale are the parent companies of the dam operator Samarco.

A High Court judge in Manchester refused on Jan. 29 to allow the
claimants to appeal against his November ruling, saying he remained
convinced the claim was not merely challenging but "irredeemably
unmanageable if allowed to proceed further in this jurisdiction".

The judge ordered the claimants to pay 8 million pounds in interim
costs to BHP by February 12.

The claimants have 21 days from the Jan. 29 ruling to apply for
permission to appeal their case at the Court of Appeal.

BHP declined to comment on the Jan. 29 decision or on the case
being taken to the Court of Appeal. [GN]


BHP GROUP: Brazilian Claimants' Lawyers Optimistic on Appeal
------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Reid, writing for Reuters, reports that lawyers for about
200,000 Brazilian claimants, whose 5 billion pound ($6.82 billion)
lawsuit against Anglo-Australian miner BHP over a 2015 dam collapse
was struck out last November, are optimistic about going to the
Court of Appeal.

A High Court judge in Manchester refused on Jan. 29 to allow the
claimants to appeal against his November ruling, saying he remained
convinced the claim was not merely challenging but "irredeemably
unmanageable if allowed to proceed further in this jurisdiction".

The judge ordered the claimants to pay 8 million pounds in interim
costs to BHP by 1600 GMT on Feb. 12.

The claimants have 21 days from the Jan. 29 ruling to file their
case at the Court of Appeal.

"This is a challenging case for the courts, but we are optimistic
that we can establish jurisdiction in England and see justice done
for our clients," said Tom Goodhead, managing partner at PGMBM,
which is representing the claimants.

BHP declined to comment on the Jan. 29 decision or on the case
being taken to the Court of Appeal. [GN]


BLUE RIDGE NET: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Blue Ridge Net
Publishing, Inc. The case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Blue Ridge Net
Publishing, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-01128 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Blue Ridge Net Publishing Inc. -- https://www.weathershack.com/ --
is located in Roanoke, Virginia and is part of the Internet &
Mail-Order Retail Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


CAMERON'S SEAFOOD: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cameron's Seafood
Online. The case is styled as Dilenia Paguada, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated v. Cameron's Seafood Online, Case
No. 1:21-cv-01097 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Cameron's Seafood Online -- https://www.cameronsseafood.com/ --
delivers authentic Maryland Crabs, crab cakes, and seafood to
customers nationwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CANADA: Faces Class Action Over Canada Emergency Response Benefit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rosa Saba, writing for Toronto Star, reports that a semi-retired
Mississauga teacher is the representative plaintiff for a proposed
class-action lawsuit against the federal government, on behalf of
self-employed pensioners affected by the confusion over eligibility
for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit.

However, the lawyer behind the proposed lawsuit hopes that if it's
successful, it will help all self-employed Canadians affected by
the confusion over gross versus net income, not just pensioners.

Janet Ryan, the representative plaintiff, made $5,000 in 2019
before taxes through part-time tutoring, according to the statement
of claim. She also got payments from the Canada Pension Plan and
from Old Age Security, which her tutoring supplemented.

Lawyer Jan Weir said Ryan's self-employment income was affected by
COVID-19 and, after checking the eligibility requirements on the
government's website, she applied for and received CERB. Weir heard
from Ryan shortly after she received the same letter in late 2020
that had 441,000 other Canadians worried they may have to pay their
benefits back.

The letter was sent to anyone for whom the Canada Revenue Agency
could not confirm eligibility for the CERB, and does not
necessarily mean the individual must repay it. However, for many
self-employed Canadians, it was the first time they realized that
their eligibility was based on net income, and not gross income.
Some made more than $5,000 in 2019 via gross self-employed income,
but netted less than $5,000, and suddenly realized they weren't
eligible for the thousands of dollars they'd received.

Many of these self-employed CERB recipients were told by CRA agents
before they applied for the benefit that they qualified based on
their gross income. The CRA later admitted some agents were given
the wrong information, but individuals affected by this confusion
are still required to repay the benefit if their net self-employed
income was less than $5,000 in 2019.

The Star found that the government web pages concerning CERB did
not mention the distinction until some time between April 21 and
25, even though applications for the benefit opened April 6. Weir
said he believes the confusion was a "human error" that he hopes
the government will accept responsibility for.

The proposed class action, which has yet to be certified, is not
seeking financial damages other than legal costs; it simply asks
that those represented not be required to pay back the CERB they
got.

Though the proposed suit is technically on behalf of pensioners
like Ryan, Weir believes that if the class action is successful,
all self-employed Canadians affected by the uncertainty will
benefit: "In that sense, it's a tide that lifts all boats," he
said.

In an emailed statement, Ryan said she hopes to "help others who
rightly qualified for the CERB relief to be able to keep the money,
which was extremely helpful."

On Jan. 27, Green Party MP Paul Manly presented a petition to the
House of Commons asking that the government let self-employed CERB
recipients retroactively use their gross self-employed income
instead of net to determine their eligibility.

A CRA spokesperson told the Star in an email Jan. 27 that the
agency "is sensitive to cases of hardship for Canadians" hit hard
financially by the pandemic, and added that the government "will
have more information on this shortly." The press secretary for
Employment Minister Carla Qualtrough said that same day that the
government is "actively looking at options to respond . . . We will
have more to say very soon."

That's what Allan Lanthier, a former government adviser and retired
partner of an international accounting firm, calls "dithering."
Lanthier said while he thinks it's "a bit premature" for a lawsuit,
given that the government has not definitively told these
self-employed Canadians whether or not they'll have to repay CERB,
he thinks it's high time for Ottawa to do so.

"Most individuals are in limbo," he said, adding that the amount
paid out is likely not a lot of money for the government, but is
significant for the recipients. "How long can it possibly take for
the government to come to a conclusion on this? It's a simple
issue."

Both Lanthier and Peterborough accountant Kevin Dunn think the
government doesn't have a legal leg to stand on. "The law is not
necessarily on their side," said Dunn, who is optimistic that
self-employed Canadians affected by the confusion over gross and
net income will eventually get the answer they're looking for, or
something close to it.

"I think the longer the government goes without clearing this up,
the better the chances that it's going to be forgiven." [GN]


CAPITAL ONE: Bid to Alter or Amend Judgment in Robinson Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANTHONY T. ROBINSON, Plaintiff v. CAPITAL ONE BANK
(USA), N.A., Defendant, Case No. 19-2275-DDC-KGG (D. Kan.), Judge
Daniel D. Crabtree denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment.

The dispute emerges from Plaintiff Robinson's class action lawsuit
against Defendant Capital One alleging violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").  The Plaintiff filed a Second
Amended Complaint in his class action lawsuit.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint, Dismiss Class Claims for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction,
and Strike Plaintiff's Class Allegations.  The Court granted the
Defendant's motion in part, and denied it in part.  The Court
denied the motion in part because the Court concluded that the
Plaintiff had standing under Article III to assert his claim.  But
more relevant to the Plaintiff's now-pending Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment is the Court's decision to grant in part the Motion
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Court--in its Memorandum and Order
granting in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss--committed
"clear error" because it "adopted and applied a heightened pleading
standard to" the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.  He reasons
that the "heightened pleading standard" is "manifestly unjust"
because it "essentially requires the Plaintiff to anticipate and
defeat affirmative defenses based on information solely in the
Defendant's possession, which is not something that requires.

The Defendant filed a Response and asserts that the Court "did not
apply some 'heightened pleading standard'" but, instead, "correctly
held that the Plaintiff failed to allege facts that, if proved
true, would permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that the
Defendant acted without a permissible purpose, and properly
dismissed the Complaint.

The Defendant asserts that "what the Plaintiff calls an
'affirmative defense' is actually a basic element of his claim; and
what he calls a 'heightened pleading standard' is nothing more than
the pleading requirement elaborated by the Supreme Court more than
a decade ago, citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); then citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).  The Plaintiff filed a Reply addressing the Defendant's
argument and reiterating the Plaintiff's theory of clear error.

Judge Crabtree agrees with the Defendant.  He notes that the
Plaintiff's arguments fall short for two reasons.  First, they do
not apply controlling law, but rather offer the Plaintiff's view of
what controlling law should be.  Second, they are arguments that
the Plaintiff raised or could have raised in the underlying
briefs.

Judge Crabtree explains that the Plaintiff asserts that the Court
committed clear error producing manifest injustice by subjecting
his claims to the controlling pleading standards in the Court.  The
Plaintiff asserts that the Court misapplied Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) by
requiring the Complaint to plead around affirmative defenses.  But
he fails to show that what he terms "affirmative defenses" are
anything more than his failure to allege facts capable of
supporting a finding or reasonable inference that he would meet an
element of the FCRA cause of action he sues under.  The Plaintiff
points to cases decided by courts outside the Circuit who have
altered pleading rules for FCRA claims by reinterpreting the
failure to plead an element of the cause of action as an
affirmative defense. Since those cases are not controlling, the
court's decision not to adopt their views was not clear error.

In sum, Judge Crabtree concludes the Court did not misapprehend the
facts, a party's position, or the controlling law.  It simply found
unpersuasive some non-binding caselaw that the Plaintiff has come
to fancy since briefing the issue and applied the controlling law
in the Circuit.  Neither provides a basis for granting a motion
under Rule 59(e).

For these reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5t2qyxcz from Leagle.com.


CAR AUTO HOLDINGS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Khatabi Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MALAK KHATABI, individually and on behalf of all other similarly
SITUATED, PLAINTIFF V. CAR AUTO HOLDINGS LLC d/b/a PALMETTO ALFA
ROMEO – FIAT; and CARLOS A. RIOS, Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-20458 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 3, 2021)
seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Khatabi was employed by the Defendants as salesman.

Car Auto Holdings LLC d/b/a Palmetto Alfa Romeo - Fiat is engaged
in distributing motor vehicle parts, accessories, tools, and
equipment. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tanesha W. Blye, Esq.
          Aron Smukler, Esq.
          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: tblye@saenzanderson.com
                  asmukler@saenzanderson.com
                  msaenz@saenzanderson.com


CENTURY INC: Bid to Dismiss Appeal in Securities Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: CenturyLink Sales Practices and Securities
Litigation. Victor Romero; Pamela Romero, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Edwin
Miller; Vonita Taylor; Patrick West, Movants-Appellants v.
CenturyLink, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-1294
(8th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit grants
CenturyLink's motion to dismiss the appeal.

Various plaintiffs filed lawsuits against CenturyLink that later
were centralized in a multidistrict litigation in the District of
Minnesota.  The Plaintiffs moved the district court for provisional
class certification and preliminary approval of the class
settlement.  The district court entered an order that provisionally
certified the class, preliminarily approved the class settlement,
and temporarily enjoined certain persons from filing or maintaining
an action in arbitration against CenturyLink relating to the claims
brought in the multidistrict litigation.

Shortly after the district court issued the Preliminary Approval
Order, the counsel for the Movants entered an appearance and
appealed the Preliminary Approval Order and preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Movants argue solely that the preliminary
injunction violated (1) the Federal Arbitration Act, and (2) their
due process rights by enjoining them from commencing an arbitration
action against CenturyLink.  Since appealing, the Movants have
opted out of the class, and the district court granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the settlement and entered
final judgment.  CenturyLink then moved to dismiss the appeal,
arguing it is moot because the preliminary injunction has since
expired.

The Eighth Circuit agrees, so it grants the motion to dismiss.  It
finds that at this point, the challenged preliminary injunction in
the Preliminary Approval Order has expired.  The Preliminary
Approval Order stated that the Releasing Parties are enjoined from
filing or maintaining an arbitration pending the Final Approval
Hearing and issuance of the Final Approval Order and Final
Judgment.  On Nov. 19, 2020, the district court held a final
approval hearing.  On Dec. 4, 2020, the district court entered the
final approval order.  And on Dec. 14, 2020, the district court
entered a final judgment.  Therefore, the appealed injunction has
expired by its own terms, and there is no longer a live controversy
on appeal.

Despite conceding that the preliminary injunction has expired, the
Movants claim that there still is a live controversy because the
district court's Preliminary Approval Order will, through issue
preclusion, bar them from pursuing a breach-of-contract claim
against CenturyLink.

Even assuming, without deciding, that issue preclusion would create
a live controversy, the Eighth Circuit finds that the Movants have
not shown they would be precluded from bringing such a suit because
the Preliminary Approval Order was not a final judgment.  Neither
the Preliminary Approval Order (by its own terms) nor the
preliminary injunction within it were "final judgments."

The Movants also claim that an exception to the mootness doctrine
applies, which would permit the Court to hear the case because:
"(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be
subject to the same action again."

The argument fails, the Eighth Circuit holds, as the Movants have
not shown a reasonable expectation that they will be subject to
such an injunction again.  The Movants proffer but one reason in
support of their argument: The class members who objected to the
settlement could appeal the settlement, and if the settlement is
overturned on appeal, the whole process of entering a preliminary
approval order with an injunction could begin again.  The Movants
offer no argument as to why they believe there is a reasonable
expectation that the settlement will be overturned on appeal.
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit declines to apply this exception to
the mootness doctrine.

In the alternative, if the Court finds the appeal moot, the Movants
urge it to vacate the district court's Preliminary Approval Order.
When a civil suit becomes moot pending appeal, the Court normally
only vacates "judgments" between "parties."  In the case, the
Preliminary Approval Order is not a judgment.  Nor are the Movants
"parties," because they opted out of the settlement.

Furthermore, even assuming that Camreta applies to a non-judgment
and non-parties, "vacatur is an equitable remedy, not an automatic
right."  Generally, before the Eighth Circuit may vacate a district
court's order, the party seeking vacatur must show both that they
are not at fault for the mootness and that vacatur is in the public
interest.  In the case, vacatur is improper because the Movants
have not shown that vacatur is in the public interest.  The Movants
provide no reason why the public interest would be served by
vacatur.

Finally, even taking into account other traditional equitable
factors, such as harm to the Movant and harm to other interested
parties, vacatur would be inappropriate.  The Movants are no longer
affected by the preliminary injunction because it expired.  As it
has explained, the Appellate Court finds that the Movants' only
alleged legal consequence, issue preclusion, is inapplicable.
Lastly, vacating the Preliminary Approval Order could vacate
portions of the order necessary to the class-action lawsuit,
including but not limited to the section governing timely opt-outs
from the proposed settlement, none of which the Movants challenge.
Accordingly, the Court declines to vacate the Preliminary Approval
Order.

For the foregoing reasons, the Eighth Circuit grants the
CenturyLink's motion to dismiss the appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/y58ptwvg from Leagle.com.


CINMAR LLC: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Cinmar, LLC. The case
is styled as Milton Williams, on behalf of himself and all other
persons similarly situated v. Cinmar, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-01142
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Cinmar, LLC is located in West Chester, Ohio and is part of the
Nonstore Retail Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite Phr
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


CLARKSON RESTAURANT: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Tomlinson Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
KEVIN TOMLINSON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. CLARKSON RESTAURANT, INC., and GREGORY
KHONONOV, Defendants, Case No. 502698/2021 (N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty.,
Feb. 3, 2021) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff Tomlinson was employed by the Defendants as staff.

Clarkson Restaurant, Inc. is engaged in the restaurant business.
[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mohammed Gangat, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MOHAMMED GANGAT
          675 Third Avenue, Suite 1810
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (718) 669-0714
          E-mail: mgangat@gangatllc.com


CLEAR IMAGE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Clear Image, Inc. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Clear Image, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-01088
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Clear Image, Inc. -- https://clearimageinc.com/ -- is located in
Glendale, Arizona and is part of the Plastic & Rubber Product
Manufacturing Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CLEARVIEW AI: 7th Circuit Affirms Decision to Remand Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Lamoureux, Esq. -- christina.lamoureux@squirepb.com -- of
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, in an article for The National Law
Review, report that several weeks ago, ConsumerPrivacyWorld
reported that the Seventh Circuit had affirmed a district court
decision to remand a putative class action brought under Illinois'
Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA") to Illinois state court.
In Thornley v. Clearview AI, No. 20-3249, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 1006
(7th Cir. Jan. 14, 2021), the Seventh Circuit found that the
complaint alleged only a statutory violation, and did not allege
any particularized injury -- which was intentional and a
permissible strategic choice, as Plaintiffs preferred to litigate
in state court -- and the case was remanded for lack of Article III
standing to sue in federal court. The defendant, Clearview AI,
filed a petition for rehearing, claiming that the complaint
sufficiently alleges an injury in fact and that the Seventh
Circuit's holding conflicts with existing precedent on BIPA and on
Spokeo.

Clearview first claimed that the complaint alleges a concrete and
particularized injury in fact, giving Plaintiffs Article III
standing. [As a quick reminder, to establish Article III standing,
which is necessary to sue in federal court, plaintiffs must
generally show: (1) a concrete injury in fact; (2) that the injury
was caused by the defendant; and (3) that the injury would likely
be redressed by the requested relief.] Plaintiffs had alleged a
statutory violation of BIPA, section 15(c), which prevents a
private entity from selling or profiting from an individual's
biometric data, on the basis of Clearview selling access to its
digital database containing Plaintiffs' biometric identifiers or
information. Clearview argued that this allegation is concrete and
particularized because the harm posed by having one's personal
information sold is experienced in a unique way, as each person has
a private and possessory information in their own biometric data.

The petition also claims that the Seventh Circuit's holding is
inconsistent with existing precedent on BIPA and on Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), the Supreme Court case that found
that Article III standing requires allegations of an injury in fact
even where only a statutory violation has been alleged. Clearview
claimed that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's finding, an alleged
violation of BIPA section 15(c) is a type of statutory violation
that necessarily gives rise to an injury in fact, given the risk of
harm to the concrete privacy interest an individual has in their
own biometric information. It pointed to other Seventh Circuit
decisions that had interpreted different provisions of BIPA and
found that the nature of the statutory violations alleged also
alleged a concrete and particularized harm. With respect to Spokeo,
Clearview pointed out the wide variety of case law interpreting the
injury in fact requirement differently, as highlighted in Judge
Hamilton's concurrence in Thornley. It asked for rehearing or en
banc review to clarify the law on what constitutes an injury in
fact when a statutory violation is alleged. [GN]


COLORADO: Governor Polis Proper Defendant in Raven Suit, Court Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Colorado holds that the Governor is a proper
defendant for the claims asserted in the lawsuit captioned In Re
Kandice Raven, Jane Gallentine, Taliyah Murphy, Amber Miller, Megan
Gulley, Lavenya Karpierz, and Cupcake Rivers, as representatives of
themselves and all others similarly situated in this class action,
Plaintiffs v. Jared Polis, Governor of Colorado; Colorado
Department of Corrections; Dean Williams, Executive Director of the
Colorado Department of Corrections; Travis Trani, Director of
Prisons; Randolph Maul, M.D., Colorado Department of Corrections
Chief Medical Officer; Sarah Butler, M.D., Chief of the Gender
Dysphoria Committee and Chief of Psychiatry; William Frost, M.D.,
former Colorado Department of Corrections Chief Medical Officer;
and Darren Lish, M.D., former Chief of Psychiatry, Defendants, Case
No. 20SA321 (Colo.).

In the original proceeding, Governor Polis asks the Supreme Court
to conclude that he is not a proper named defendant in a suit
challenging the implementation of Colorado law and policy by the
Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"), an executive agency
over which he has ultimate authority. The Governor argues that
after the Supreme Court's decision in Developmental Pathways v.
Ritter, 178 P.3d 524 (Colo. 2008), he should no longer be named as
a defendant if there is an identifiable agency, official, or
employee responsible for administering a challenged law.  The
Governor argues that the CDOC and its employees are the only
appropriate Defendants.

The class action challenges the treatment of transgender women in
CDOC custody. The named Plaintiffs representing the class are seven
transgender women, who are currently confined in CDOC correctional
facilities. The Plaintiffs' amended complaint names the Governor,
the CDOC, the CDOC Executive Director, and multiple current and
former CDOC employees as defendants. The amended complaint alleges
that the Defendants' policies and practices discriminate against
transgender women by refusing to recognize them as women and, thus,
subjecting them to unreasonable risks of violence, failing to
provide necessary accommodations, and offering inadequate medical
and mental health care. On behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated transgender women, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief for alleged violations of the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA") and the Colorado
Constitution.

Many of the detailed allegations contained in the amended complaint
are directed at specific actions allegedly undertaken by the
Executive Director or individual employees at the CDOC. The amended
complaint also names the Governor, in his official capacity, noting
that he is statutorily responsible for appointing the Executive
Director of the CDOC and is responsible for the overall
administration of the laws of the state.

Shortly after the suit was filed, the Governor moved for dismissal
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing that he was an improper party. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that the Governor is
always an appropriate defendant in a suit challenging
implementation of statutes or regulations by Colorado's executive
agencies. In reaching this conclusion, the district court rejected
the argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Developmental
Pathways had created a new standard for assessing when the Governor
was properly named as a defendant in litigation. The Governor then
filed the present C.A.R. 21 petition.

The Supreme Court issued an order to show cause and now discharges
the rule.

In concluding that the Governor was properly named as a defendant
in the action, the Supreme Court rejects the contention that its
decision in Developmental Pathways marked a departure from the
well-settled rule that a suit seeking to enjoin or mandate
enforcement of a state law may include the Governor, in his
official capacity, as a named Defendant.

Justice Melissa Hart, who delivered the Opinion of the Supreme
Court, notes that the Panel first considers whether relief in the
nature of an original proceeding is appropriate for the Governor's
claim that the district court should have dismissed him from this
action because he is not a proper defendant. The Supreme Court
concludes that it is.

The Governor argues that the exercise of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction is appropriate because he should not be
subject to the burdens of discovery and trial and that direct
appeal would be an inadequate remedy in this instance because it
would come only after his participation in these processes. The
Panel agrees. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that
original jurisdiction is appropriate when "the district court's
alleged error" involves a right that "would be moot after trial,"
rendering appellate review inadequate, citing People v. Tafoya,
2019 CO 13, ¶ 15, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. That is the case here, and
the Supreme Court, therefore, concludes that exercise of its
original jurisdiction is appropriate.

The Governor argues that in Developmental Pathways, the Supreme
Court moved away from the long-recognized practice of permitting
plaintiffs to name the Governor in his official capacity. Instead,
he contends, after Developmental Pathways, a plaintiff may no
longer sue the Governor as the "embodiment of the state" if some
other agency, official, or employee is specifically charged with
administration of or compliance with the challenged state law. His
argument rests on the Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he
evaluation of whether a person or entity is a proper party in a
lawsuit must be determined in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances."

But this statement, viewed in context, does not carry the weight
the Governor seeks to place upon it, Justice Hart holds.

Developmental Pathways involved a constitutional challenge to the
"gift ban" contained in Amendment 41 of the Colorado Constitution,
Justice Hart notes. That amendment, which the voters passed in
2006, not only banned the receipt of certain gifts by public
employees, but also created the Independent Ethics Commission
("Commission") and charged it with creating rules and hearing
complaints to enforce the amendment. At the time of the suit,
however, no Commission members had been appointed, and the
Commission existed in name only.

The Supreme Court, thus, explained, given the absence of an
alternative entity, that the only appropriate state agent for
litigation purposes was the Governor. As a personification of the
state, the Governor was the proper party defendant in this suit at
the time of its filing.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that had the
Commission been in existence at the time the lawsuit was filed, the
Supreme Court may have reached a different conclusion with regard
to this issue. The impetus for this observation was the fact that
the Commission was deliberately designed to be "separate and
distinct from the executive and legislative branches." Indeed, its
members are appointed by various bodies -- not exclusively by the
Governor or the legislature -- to preserve the Commission's
independence.

The circumstances presented by this case are quite different. In
the case, the Supreme Court is faced with a lawsuit challenging the
actions of an executive agency that is explicitly under the control
of the Governor as the state's "supreme executive."

Justice Hart also finds that none of the cases the Governor cites
-- in particular, a 30-year-old opinion of a division of the court
of appeals and two district court orders -- convince the Supreme
Court to abandon this precedent. Not only are those decisions not
binding on this Court, but each involved unique circumstances quite
different from those presented here.

In Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185, 1194 (Colo. App. 1990), the
division affirmed the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint
against the Governor in his official capacity because the
Governor's "specific duties" would not be "affected" by a judicial
declaration as to the constitutionality of a tax statute that was
implemented by local tax officials. The government actions being
challenged here are not undertaken by local officials, but instead
by employees of an executive agency subject to the Governor's
authority.

In both district court cases cited by the Governor, the plaintiffs
consented to his dismissal where the remaining defendants were
adequate to protect their asserted interests. The fact that some
plaintiffs may choose not to name the Governor as a defendant does
not mean that others are prohibited from doing so, Justice Hart
points out.

The Plaintiffs are not interested in dropping the Governor from the
face of their complaint. And they are not required to do so. The
CDOC is an executive agency directly within the Governor's control.
As such, the Governor remains one of the proper defendants for the
claims asserted.

The Supreme Court's longstanding precedent confirms that the
Governor, acting in his official capacity, may be included as a
defendant in a suit to enjoin or mandate the enforcement of state
law or to challenge the implementation of state law by executive
agencies. The Supreme Court's decision in Developmental Pathways
did not alter this basic principle. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
discharges the rule to show cause.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2yiusz4e from Leagle.com.

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Suneeta Hazra --
suneeta.hazra@arnoldporter.com -- in Denver, Colorado, Attorneys
for Plaintiffs.

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, Michael Roig --
michael.roig@arnoldporter.com -- in New York City.

King & Greisen, LLP, Paula Greisen -- kg@kinggreisen.com -- Jessica
Freeman, in Denver, Colorado.

Transgender Law Center, Lynly S. Egyes --
lynly@transgenderlawcenter.org -- Shawn Thomas Meerkamper --
shawn@transgenderlawcenter.org -- Dale Melchert --
dale@transgenderlawcenter.org -- in Oakland, California.

Philip J. Weiser -- Philip.Weiser@coag.gov -- Attorney General,
LeeAnn Morrill -- leeann.morrill@coag.gov -- First Assistant
Attorney General, in Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant
Jared Polis.


COMENITY BANK: Boyd Files TCPA Suit in S.D. Indiana
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against COMENITY BANK. The
case is styled as Barbara Boyd, Zachary Boyd, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. COMENITY BANK, Case No.
1:21-cv-00323-RLY-DLP (S.D. Ind., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Comenity Bank -- https://comenity.com/ -- is a major credit card
company that has 93 credit programs for many top U.S. retail
stores, focusing heavily on store-branded credit cards.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Victor T. Metroff, Esq.
          Mohammed O. Badwan, Esq.
          SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD.
          2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200
          Lombard, IL 60148
          Phone: (630) 575-8181
          Email: vmetroff@sulaimanlaw.com
                 mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com

The Defendant appears pro se.


COMPANDSAVE.COM INC: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CompAndSave.Com Inc.
The case is styled as Dilenia Paguada, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. CompAndSave.Com Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01095 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

CompAndSave.com Inc. -- https://www.compandsave.com/ -- is located
and incorporated in the Bay Area, California who specializes in
providing quality printer inkjet cartridges, laser toner, printer
accessories and peripherals at a deep discount.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CONGREGATE CONNECT: Ramirez Sues Over Unpaid Wages for Caregivers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
TEISSY ANGEL RAMIREZ v. CONGREGATE CONNECT, LLC; KADIJAH SHANEL
BRANSON; and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, Case No. 21STCV03906 (Cal.
Super., Los Angeles Cty., Feb. 1, 2021) is brought on behalf of the
Plaintiff and on behalf of other similarly situated aggrieved
employees alleging that Congregate Connect did not provide minimum
wages and overtime, and did not compensate all hours worked
pursuant to the California Labor Code.

The Plaintiff started working for Congregate Connect on November
2019 as a caregiver. She was classified as an hourly, non-exempt
employee and her last day worked was on August 4, 2020. She
resigned on August 5, 2020. Her duties as a caregiver entailed
going to patient's homes and cooking, cleaning, doing grocery
shopping, taking the patient to doctor's appointments, and
essentially helping the patient with their activities of daily
living. She was paid $15/hour as her latest rate of pay, says the
complaint.

Congregate Connect offers services for the elderly and persons with
disabilities.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Harout Messrelian, Esq.
          MESSRELIAN LAW INC.
          500 N. Central Ave., Suite 840
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 484-6531
          Facsimile: (818) 956-1983

COUNTRY MUTUAL: Partly Compelled to Show Docs in Hansen Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHAD HANSEN and MELISSA HANSEN, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. COUNTRY
MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. d/b/a COUNTRY FINANCIAL and ELITE CONSTRUCTION
CO. INC., Defendants, Case No. 18 CV 244 (N.D. Ill.), Magistrate
Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division:

    (i) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
        renewed motion to compel the production of documents and
        to allow an inspection/use of the XactAnalysis software
        of Defendant Country Mutual Insurance Co. ("CMIC");

   (ii) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to modify the discovery
        schedule and the motion for class action briefing
        schedule; and

  (iii) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a short
        document in response to CMIC's supplemental memorandum.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action alleging that CMIC
engaged in multiple acts of breach of contract, common law fraud,
consumer fraud and deceptive business practices, unreasonable and
vexatious claims practices, negligence, and conversion.  As the
Court explained in its Order on the Plaintiffs' most recent motion
to compel, discovery in the case has been on-going for more than
two years and CMIC has expended significant effort and produced a
massive amount of material in response to the Plaintiffs' discovery
requests.  CMIC also certified its compliance with the Order with a
10-page statement supported by the sworn declarations of its
Director of Property Claims (John Butkus) and its XactAnalysis
Account Manager (Gary Kiester).

In their renewed motion to compel, the Plaintiffs--in reliance on
their outdated and overly expansive view of the appropriate scope
of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 261--challenge
CMIC's compliance with the Court's prior ruling and their discovery
requests as a whole.  Specifically, they  assert that the Court
should order CMIC to: (1) grant them access to CMIC's XactAnalysis
software for inspection and use; (2) produce ESX files from CMIC's
sample claim forms to the extent that they reside on CMIC's network
or in Veriskk's cloud; (3) produce all Xactimate and Xactcontents
macros and certify compliance; (4) produce the remaining document
it asserts is protected by the attorney-client privilege in
unredacted form; and (5) produce its unprivileged internal policy,
procedure, and practice documents from June 2016 through the
present.

CMIC reports that Verisk can produce an additional field of
XactAnalysis data that it previously believed could not be captured
and it represents that it will produce said data to the Plaintiffs
"in short order" as soon as it receives the data from Verisk.  CMIC
does not oppose an extension of the expert discovery deadlines so
that the Plaintiffs' experts can incorporate this additional data
into their analyses.  The parties also agree that CMIC has all ESX
files in Verisk's cloud regardless of the date of the files.  CMIC
otherwise opposes the Plaintiffs' renewed motion to compel.

Judge Cummings opines that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to
access, inspect, and use CMIC's XactAnalysis Software.  The
Plaintiffs renew their assertion that the Court should permit them
to access, inspect, and use CMIC's XactAnalysis software based on
their claim that CMIC has, in several respects, failed to comply
with the Order.  Judge Cummings disagrees for the various reasons.

First, CMIC and Verisk have (with one exception) produced the
accessible XactAnalysis data sought by the Plaintiffs.  The Judge
orders CMIC to obtain the waste data referenced from Verisk and
produce it to the Plaintiffs by Feb. 16, 2021.  Second, CMIC has
produced the XactAnalysis data to the Plaintiffs in a reasonably
usable form as defined by Rule 34.  The Plaintiffs have been able
to conduct meaningful searches through the XactAnalysis data
notwithstanding the errors that they have identified. Third, the
Plaintiffs are not entitled to access CMIC's XactAnalysis database.
The Court has already considered and denied the Plaintiffs'
request for access to CMIC's database and the Judge adheres to that
ruling for the reasons stated in the Order.

Next, Judge Cummings holds that CMIC has complied with the Court's
Order regarding the production of Xactimate Macros.  Although the
Plaintiffs now seek the production of the Macros within the
"technical support" file, they have offered no explanation as to
how these documents are relevant to the parties' claims or
defenses.  Because they have failed to make a showing that the
additional discovery is relevant and proportional to the needs of
the case in light of the voluminous discovery already produced by
CMIC, the Judge will not order CMIC to produce the Macros within
the technical support file.

CMIC must produce a revised version of the March 2010 Storm meeting
notes that redacts only legal advice rendered by its in-house
attorneys to its claims personnel, Judge Cummings finds.  He finds
that finds that the document was appropriately redacted to protect
legal advice covered by CMIC's attorney-client privilege with the
exception of two unnecessary redactions that concern business
advice.  The first redaction is on page six of nine beginning with
the thirteenth line of text through the end of the page.  The
second redaction is on page seven of nine beginning with the
thirteenth line of text through the eighteenth line of text.  The
Judge orders CMIC to provide the Plaintiffs with a revised version
of the Storm meeting notes document that eliminates these two
redactions by Feb. 5, 2021.

CMIC need not produce any further otherwise responsive documents
that were created after the filing of the Grundy County action on
June 15, 2016, Judge Cummings further holds.  He finds, pursuant to
the parties' Agreement, that CMIC has no obligation to produce its
unprivileged internal policy, procedure, and practice documents
that were created after June 15, 2016.  He also declines in his
discretion to relieve the Plaintiffs of the consequences of the
Agreement.  Given the significant volume of discovery that has
already been exchanged (including CMIC's policy documents that were
created after mid-June 2016 but were produced to plaintiffs prior
to the Agreement) and the amount of time that the parties have
already spent engaging in discovery, the further delay forecasted
by the Plaintiffs would be unacceptable.

Finally, Judge Cummings examines the Plaintiffs' motion to modify
the discovery schedule and the briefing schedule for the motion for
class certification in anticipation of receiving relief on their
renewed motion to compel.  Although CMIC initially opposed this
motion, it now acknowledges that some extension of the deadlines
will be necessary to permit the Plaintiffs' experts to incorporate
the additional XactAnalysis data that CMIC and Verisk will
produce.

Given the relief provided to the Plaintiffs and the timeframe
within which CMIC and Verisk have to produce the additional data,
Judge Cummings adjusts the discovery schedule and briefing schedule
as follows.  Fact discovery will remain open until Feb. 16, 2021
for the limited purpose of addressing the matters discussed.  The
Plaintiffs' Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures are due on March 16, 2021 and
the depositions of their experts are to be completed by April 20,
2021.  CMIC's Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures are due on May 18, 2021 and
the depositions of CMIC's experts are to be completed by June 22,
2021.  The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is due on
July 27, 2021, CMIC's response is due on Aug. 31, 2021, and the
Plaintiffs' reply is due Sept. 28, 2021.

For these reasons, Judge Cummings granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' renewed motion to compel.  The Plaintiffs'
motion to modify the discovery schedule and the class action
briefing schedule and their motion for leave to file a short
document addressing representations in the Defendant's supplemental
memorandum are granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/v3zo5syy from
Leagle.com.


DANTE GROVE: Toledo, et al., Sue Over Unpaid Minimum Wages & OT
---------------------------------------------------------------
FRANKLIN TOLEDO, ARTURO CRUZ VELASCO, and DAVID CRUZ, on behalf of
themselves, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class v. DANTE
GROVE ST LLC d/b/a DANTE, PERRY & HUDSON LLC d/b/a DANTE WEST
VILLAGE, LINDEN PRIDE, NATALIE HUDSON, JAMES SYMOND, and
CHRISTOPHER CHEUNG, Case No. 1:21-cv-00876 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 1, 2021)
seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime, unpaid
wages for off-the-clock work, unpaid wages due to invalid tip
credit, illegally retained gratuities, liquidated damages, and
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs bring claims for relief as a collective action, on
behalf of all non-exempt front-of-house and back-of-house employees
(including delivery persons, servers, porters, busboys, food
runners, barback, and bartenders) employed by the Defendants on or
after the date that is six years before the filing of the
complaint.

The Plaintiffs contend that they and the other FLSA Collective
Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had
substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are
and have been subjected to the Defendants' decisions, policies,
plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and
rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them
their proper overtime premium at one and a half times the regular
rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek and their proper
wages due to a policy of time shaving.

The Defendants owned and operated two restaurants as a single
integrated enterprise under the trade names "Dante" and "Dante West
Village" in the state of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          Anne Seelig, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

DETROIT PROPERTY: Bid to Amend Restrictions in James Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled Natalie James, et al., Plaintiffs v.
Detroit Property Exchange, et al., Defendants, Case No. 18-13601
(E.D. Mich.), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan issued an Opinion & Order denying the Defendants' motion
to amend court's order.

The contentious putative class action is currently before the Court
on the Defendants' motion asking the Court to amend the prior
restrictions with the putative class members that the Court put in
place back in July 2019, due to the improper conduct of Defendant
Michael Kelly.

The putative class action was filed on November 19, 2018. On March
11, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a motion alleging that the
Defendants were having improper communications with putative class
members and seeking relief from the Court. There was extensive
briefing, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing over the course
of two days. There were also supplemental briefs filed after the
evidentiary hearing.

On July 11, 2019, the Court issued a 28-page Opinion and Order. In
it, the Court concluded that "verbal statements made by Kelly
during conversations with the putative class members, and the
statements made in a challenged Gift Letter that Kelly sent out on
behalf of the Defendants, are abusive and threaten the proper
functioning of this putative class action."

The Court explained that the Gift Letter, which was sent to an
unknown subset of putative class members, is very misleading and
deceptive. The document is drafted to look like a check but it is
not a check. Rather, it is a written communication designed to
entice the putative class members to come to the Defendants' office
so that they could then be asked to sign broad releases of claims,
including the claims in the case. The Gift Letter makes no
reference to signing any release of claims. Rather, it only asks
for the individual's support and references the $250 payment or
rent voucher as a gift, rather than a payment to be made in
exchange for a release of claims.

Moreover, at least some of the in-person conversations with the
putative class members, such as the recorded conversation with
Shannon Cobb, involved inappropriate or misleading statements made
on behalf of the Defendants by Kelly.

Given that it finds that those written and verbal communications
were improper and misleading, the Court must determine what is the
appropriate relief.

In addition to having a curative notice sent to the putative class
members, the Court imposed some restrictions on future
communications with putative class members.

As to those restrictions, the Defendants themselves proposed that
"the Defendants be permitted to hold further settlement meetings
with the putative class members, provided the meetings are recorded
and the recordings are provided to the Plaintiffs' counsel within
72 hours of the meeting."

After considering all the facts and circumstances, the Court ruled
as to future communications that it must consider what is the
narrowest relief that will protect the putative class members, and
the fairness of the action, yet not limit the Defendants' speech
more than necessary.

As a practical matter, the Defendants have ongoing business
relationships with the putative class members and, as such, the
Court said it cannot broadly restrict all written or oral
communications that the Defendants or their employees have with
them. But the Court concludes that Kelly and the Defendants'
employees should be enjoined from communicating with the putative
class members about releases of claims or the case.

The Court concludes that Kelly made misleading statements during
in-person meetings with putative class members. Kelly also sent out
the blatantly misleading Gift Letter to putative class members--and
did so after this motion had been filed, and without the knowledge
or approval of his counsel.

Given that deliberate conduct by Kelly, the Court concludes it is
appropriate to enjoin Kelly and the Defendants' employees from any
further written or verbal communications with putative class
members regarding releases of claims or the case. Kelly and the
Defendants' employees must refer any inquires from putative class
members about this case to the Defendants' attorneys of record in
this case. The Court also expressly cautions Kelly that the Court
will not hesitate to impose sanctions should he or his employees
violate the Court's order.

There is no credible evidence, however, that Defense counsel
William E. Semaan, Jr., was misleading or coercive during any of
the meetings he had with the putative class members. And there have
been no allegations, let alone any evidence, that any of the
Defendants' attorneys at the Miller Law Firm had any inappropriate
communications with putative class members. As such, the Court
concludes that the Defendants' attorneys of record in this case may
hold in-person meetings with the putative class members, provided
that: 1) those meetings take place at the counsel's offices (not at
the Defendants' offices); and 2) such meetings are recorded and a
copy of the audio recordings are provided to the Plaintiffs'
counsel within seventy-two hours of the meetings. Kelly may not
attend such meetings.

The Court also concludes that the Defendants' attorneys of record
in this case may communicate in writing with putative class
members, provided that copies of those writings are filed with the
Court within seventy-two hours of being sent.

On January 28, 2020, a "Stipulated Order To Amend The Court's July
11, 2019 Order" was issued ordering that:

   1. Defendants' counsel of record, and their staff, may
      initiate and respond to phone calls to/from putative class
      members for the purpose of scheduling in-person meetings
      but they may not discuss (during these phone calls) the
      substance of the pending lawsuits or the substance of any
      settlement offer;

   2. All phone calls referenced above, between William E.
      Semaan, Jr. and any putative class member will be
      recorded;

   3. All of these recordings will be provided to Plaintiffs'
      counsel within 48 hours; and

   4. Except as Amended by the Order, the Court's July 11, 2019
      Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Invalidate
      Releases remains in full force and effect.

The matter is now before the Court on Defendants' motion, asking
the Court to amend its prior orders regarding communication
restrictions.

In the pending motion, the Defendants ask the Court to amend its
order, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and allow the Defense
Counsel to have meetings with putative class members through video
conferencing or telephone conferencing. They contend that in order
to comply with social distancing and safety measures, and to
protect all parties, the Court should allow them to hold such video
conferences, or telephone conferences if video conferencing is not
an option for a given putative class member. They contend that
allowing them to do so will not "risk abusive communications as
video recordings of the meetings will be provided to the
Plaintiff's counsel" for their review. They contend that such
videos will allow for a more thorough review than what is provided
now (audio recordings).

The Plaintiffs oppose the request. In doing so, they assert that
they have had problems with even the measures that are currently in
place. They note that in some instances, recordings of meetings
with Mr. Semaan appear to indicate that Semaan has had other
telephone calls with them, during which the case or settlement have
been discussed. They further note that some recordings have gaps,
during which the recording stops but the meeting does not appear to
stop. Given the prior history, they are concerned that opening up
communications to video or telephone calls will invite more
problems. That is especially so because these putative class
members "have a direct, continuing business relationship with
Defendant that involves their housing situation in the midst of a
pandemic." The Plaintiff note that the Defense counsel can still
contact putative class members in writing and may hold in-person
meetings with appropriate precautions.

Having considered the parties' respective arguments, the Court will
deny the motion for several reasons.

For starters, District Judge Sean F. Cox states, the Defense
counsel had a considerable period of time, from the Court's July
11, 2019 Opinion and Order, until March of 2020 (approximately
eight months), to hold in-person meetings with the putative class
members before COVID-19 ever came into play. In addition, the
Miller Law Firm has a large conference room and could hold
in-person meetings there with appropriate precautions, such as
limiting them to a few persons and wearing masks.

There is at least some suggestion, set forth in the Plaintiffs'
brief, that the Defense counsel Mr. Semaan may not have fully
complied with the existing restrictions as they stand.

While the Defendants have a point that video recordings would
provide a good review of recorded meetings, as a practical matter,
many of the putative Plaintiffs may not have access to video
conferencing capabilities. That would leave the Defendants to
contact putative class members by telephone, which is far more
problematic.

Finally, the restrictions in the case were put in place for good
reason -- because of Defendant Kelly's misconduct.

For all of these reasons, it is ordered that the Defendants' motion
is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Feb. 1, 2021,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/46jfg2c8 from Leagle.com.


DOMETIC CORP: Denial of Class Certification in Cherry Suit Vacated
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TIMOTHY CHERRY, JILL GARRETT, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Appellees v. DOMETIC CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant, Case No. 19-13242 (11th Cir.),
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
district court's order denying class certification and dismissing
the action, and remanded for further proceedings.

Dometic manufactures and sells gas-absorption refrigerators that
are used in recreational vehicles.  Unlike regular refrigerators,
Dometic refrigerators are designed to remain operable even when
disconnected from electricity.  They rely on a chemical solution
that can be dangerous if it leaks.

Some Dometic refrigerators have a defect that exacerbates the risk
of leakage and creates a risk of fire.  In 2006 and 2008, Dometic
initiated limited recalls to address the defect.  It estimated that
the defect affected one hundredth of one percent of the
refrigerators it recalled.

The putative class representatives--18 owners of Dometic
refrigerators--argue that the defect is far more widespread.  In
their view, almost every refrigerator that Dometic sold between
1997 and 2016 has a design defect that corrodes the refrigerator's
boiler tubes.  They allege that the defect has caused thousands of
fires or leaks and that it gradually ruins the functionality of the
refrigerators.  They also allege that Dometic knew of but concealed
these facts.

Based on these allegations, the putative class representatives sued
Dometic for violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and
various state laws.  They moved for class certification under Rule
23(b)(3).  They proposed a class consisting of all persons who
purchased in selected states certain models of Dometic
refrigerators that were built since 1997.

The main issue at the class-certification stage was whether the
proposed class satisfied the ascertainability requirement of Rule
23.  The putative class representatives framed ascertainability as
an issue of class definition and argued that "the proposed class is
ascertainable because the class definition relies exclusively on
objective criteria."  They also argued that class-member
identification would be administratively feasible, in any event.
They supported their analysis with a citation to Briseno v. ConAgra
Foods, Inc., a decision that rejects administrative feasibility as
a prerequisite to certification.  Dometic argued that
ascertainability requires proof of administrative feasibility.  It
contended that the class representatives failed to satisfy that
element because they provided no evidence that their proposed
method of identification would be workable.

The district court denied class certification because it agreed
that the class representatives failed to prove administrative
feasibility.  It based the decision on one of the Eleventh
Circuit's unpublished opinions, which stated that administrative
feasibility is an element of the ascertainability requirement --
Karhu v. Vital Pharms., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 947-48 (11th Cir.
2015).  The district court then determined that the denial of
certification divested it of subject-matter jurisdiction under the
Class Action Fairness Act, the only asserted basis for
jurisdiction.  So it dismissed the action without prejudice.

The class representatives appeal the denial and dismissal.  They
ask the Court to clarify that Rule 23 does not require proof of
administrative feasibility.  Dometic cross-appeals the dismissal.
Several groups submitted briefs as amicus curiae regarding the
validity of an administrative-feasibility requirement.

The Eleventh Circuit divides its discussion in three parts.  It
first explains that the doctrines of invited error and forfeiture
do not bar its review of the administrative-feasibility issue.  It
next reviews the role of administrative feasibility in
class-certification analysis: it is not a requirement for
certification, either as an element of ascertainability or
otherwise.  But a district court may consider administrative
feasibility as one factor among several under Rule 23(b)(3).  The
Eleventh Circuit last reiterates that jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act does not turn on the availability of class
certification.

For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the district
court erred.  Because jurisdiction does not turn on the denial of
class certification and Rule 23 provides no basis to require
administrative feasibility, it vacated the order denying class
certification and dismissing the action, and remanded for further
proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/1ocx8mcw from Leagle.com.


DRAGON ALLIANCE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Dragon Alliance LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Dragon Alliance LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-01086 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Dragon Alliance -- https://www.dragonalliance.com/ -- provides
eyewear and accessories. The Company offers sunglasses, snow
goggles, optical, and softgoods.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


ENURESIS ASSOCIATES: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Enuresis Associates
LLC. The case is styled as Ramon Jaquez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Enuresis Associates LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-01169 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 9, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Enuresis Associates, located in Fulton, Maryland, --
https://enuresisassociates.com/ -- is a company that specializes in
providing products and care for those adults and children who
suffer from bladder control problems or bedwetting.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


FCA US: Gerritsen Suit Transferred to E.D. Michigan
---------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Corey Gerritsen, Sara Elice, Justin Bagley,
Elizabeth Bagley, Marcus Swindle, individuals and on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. FCA US LLC, Case
No. 2:19-cv-08268, was transferred from the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California, to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan on Feb. 8, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-10278-LJM-DRG to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability.

FCA US LLC -- https://www.fcagroup.com/ -- is a North American
automaker based in Auburn Hills, Michigan. It designs,
manufactures, and sells or distributes vehicles under the Chrysler,
Dodge, Jeep, Ram, FIAT and Alfa Romeo brands, as well as the SRT
performance designation.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Graham G Lambert, Esq.
          Joshua Haffner, Esq.
          HAFFNER LAW PC
          445 S. Figueroa Street, Ste 2625
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 514-5681
          Email: gl@haffnerlawyers.com
                 jhh@haffnerlawyers.com

               - and -

          Cody R. Padgett, Esq.
          Steven R. Weinmann, Esq.
          Tarek H. Zohdy, Esq.
          Trisha K. Monesi, Esq.
          CAPSTONE LAW, APC
          1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 556-4811
          Fax: (310) 943-0396
          Email: Cody.Padgett@capstonelawyers.com
                 Steven.Weinmann@capstonelawyers.com
                 Tarek.Zohdy@capstonelawyers.com
                 trisha.monesi@capstonelawyers.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey Laurence Osterwise, Esq.
          Lawrence Deutsch, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 875-4642
          Email: josterwise@bm.net
                 ldeutsch@bm.net

The Defendant is represented by:

          Stephen A. D'Aunoy, Esq.
          Thomas L. Azar, Jr., Esq.
          THOMPSON COBURN LLP
          One US Bank Plaza
          Saint Louis, MO 63101
          Phone: (314) 552-6354
          Fax: (314) 552-7000
          Email: sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com
                 tazar@thompsoncoburn.com


FIESTA TABLEWARE: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against The Fiesta Tableware
Company. The case is styled as Milton Williams, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated v. The Fiesta
Tableware Company, Case No. 1:21-cv-01138 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

The Fiesta Tableware Company -- https://www.fiestatableware.com/ --
is America's largest dinnerware manufacturer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite Phr
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


FLO HEALTH: Faces Class Action Suit Over Health Data Disclosures
----------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Tabacco, writing for Law Street, reports that a user of
the popular fertility tracking application Flo Period & Ovulation
Tracker (Flo App) has filed suit against Flo Health, Inc. for
violations of state and federal privacy laws. The user claimed that
though the company assured users that it would not share their
intimate health data, in actuality, Flo Health repeatedly disclosed
users' information to third-parties, including Facebook and
Google.

The complaint comes on the heels of a settlement Flo Health reached
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) over allegations that the
defendant made a variety of fraudulent misrepresentations to Flo
App users in violation of their privacy rights. The settlement
requires the company to reform its practices. For example, an
independent reviewer must now approve its data privacy practices
and the company must obtain user consent before sharing users'
health information.

The private action explains that in 2015, a group of mobile app
developers based in Minsk, Belarus started Flo Health. The company
launched its first iteration of the Flo App the same year using
artificial intelligence to accurately predict reproductive cycles,
the filing states. Reportedly, the team expanded the app's features
over the years to provide "advice and assistance related to women's
health, such as by serving as an ovulation calendar, period
tracker, pregnancy guide, and wellness and lifestyle tracker."

As of December 2020, the complaint contends, the Flo App had been
downloaded by 150 million users. Through its success, the plaintiff
asserts, Flo Health obtained those users' intimate health
information, which it repeatedly promised never to share. However,
in February 2019, the Wall Street Journal published a report
revealing that, despite the company's assurances, it had "spent
years disclosing the intimate health data that users entered into
the Flo App to dozens of third parties, including major advertising
companies such as Facebook, Inc. and Google, LLC, who were free to
use this data for their own purposes."

The filing claims that had the plaintiff and putative class members
known that Flo Health would share their highly personal health and
sexual activity information, they would not have used the app. The
plaintiff has brought eight federal and state claims for relief
including for breach of contract, invasion of privacy and claims
under the federal Stored Communications Act and the California
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.

The complaint seeks to certify a nationwide class of people who
used the Flo App any time since June 2016. The plaintiff asks for
declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory, punitive, and
other damages, her attorneys' fees and costs, and any other relief
the court deems appropriate.

The plaintiff is represented by Wagstaffe, Von Loewenfeldt, Busch &
Radwick LLP, Lowey Dannenberg, P.C., and Labaton Sucharow LLP.
[GN]


FRANCESCAS COLLECTIONS: Young Files ADA Suit in S.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Francescas
Collections, Inc., et al. The case is styled as Sarah Young,
individually and on behalf all others similarly situated v.
Francescas Collections, Inc. doing business as: Francescas, a Texas
corporation; Does 1-10 inclusive; Case No. 3:21-cv-00245-MMA-BGS
(S.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Francesca's -- https://www.francescas.com/ -- is a boutique for a
curated collection of on-trend women's clothing, dresses, jewelry,
shoes & unique gifts.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago M. Coelho, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Boulevard 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Phone: (213) 381-9988
          Fax: (213) 381-9989
          Email: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com


FRONTIER UTILITIES: Frey Suit Stayed Pending Ruling in FB v. Duguid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
grants the Plaintiff's Motion for a Stay in the lawsuit titled JON
FREY, Plaintiff v. FRONTIER UTILITIES NORTHEAST LLC, et al., Case
No. 19-2372-KSM (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Frey's Motion for a Stay asks that the Court stay
proceedings in the case pending a ruling by the United States
Supreme Court in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, No. 19-511 (petition
granted July 9, 2020). Defendants Frontier and Energy Acquisitions
Group, LLC oppose the motion.

Plaintiff Frey brings a putative class action claim under Section
227(b) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In Facebook v. Duguid, the Ninth Circuit adopted a broad
interpretation of Section 227(a)(1), finding that "an ATDS need not
be able to use a random or sequential generator to store
numbers--it suffices to merely have the capacity to 'store numbers
to be called' and 'to dial such numbers automatically.'" With this
broad definition in mind, the circuit court held that "Duguid
adequately alleges Facebook utilized an ATDS."

Facebook petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court, raising two questions for the Court's consideration.
The Court agreed to review the case as to the second question:
"Whether the definition of ATDS in the TCPA encompasses any device
that can 'store' and 'automatically dial' telephone numbers, even
if the device does not 'use a random or sequential number
generator.'" Frey asks that the Court stay the case pending the
Court's ruling on that question.

District Judge Karen S. Marston notes that in determining whether
to stay an action under its inherent authority, a court must weigh
the competing interests of and possible harms to the parties,
citing Stokes v. Real Page, Inc., No. 15-1520, 2016 WL 9711699 at
*1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2016). In making determination, courts
weigh the following factors: whether the proposed stay would
prejudice the non-moving party, whether the proponent of the stay
would suffer a hardship or inequity if forced to proceed, and
whether granting the stay would further the interest of judicial
economy." Courts also consider whether "discovery is complete
and/or a trial date has been set."

The Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of granting the
stay. It begins with the third factor: considerations of judicial
economy. Because the use of an ATDS is a prerequisite for TCPA
liability, the Supreme Court's ruling about the meaning of ATDS may
affect the ruling in the case. The Defendants argue that Facebook
will not be dispositive because unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Third
Circuit has adopted a narrow view of what constitutes an ATDS. They
also argue that even if the Supreme Court's ruling affects the
prevailing standard in the Third Circuit, it is of little
significance in the case because Frey's claim fails for other
reasons.

Without a summary judgment brief before it, the Court will not rule
on whether Frey's claim fails regardless of the definition of ATDS.
As for the Defendants' other argument, even if the Supreme Court's
ruling is not dispositive of the case, it will clarify the meaning
of ATDS, and by extension, the scope of liability under the TCPA,
Judge Marston explains. Indeed, the Defendants have repeatedly
noted that a dispositive issue in this case is whether an ATDS was
used. The Supreme Court's decision in Facebook will certainly
inform the Court's ruling on that issue, the Judge adds.

Turning to the remaining factors, the Court finds that the
Defendants will not be substantially harmed by a delay. For one,
the Supreme Court held oral argument in Facebook over a month ago,
suggesting that the stay will not be in effect for more than a few
months. In addition, the Court notes that it previously granted
Frontier's own motion to stay the case pending a different Supreme
Court ruling.

The Court is not convinced that Frontier will be substantially
harmed by an additional few months' delay merely because this time
the delay is the result of Frey's motion.

Denying the stay, however, could harm both parties, requiring them
to expend resources litigating whether Frey was contacted using an
ATDS, even though the definition of ATDS is under review, Judge
Marston holds. Last, the Court finds that the open issues related
to discovery and the lack of a trial date in the case weigh in
favor of granting the stay.

For those reasons, the motion is granted, and the case is stayed
pending a ruling by the Supreme Court in Duguid.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/at2dtesg from Leagle.com.


GEISINGER HEALTH: Leib Sues Over "No Poach Agreement" Practice
--------------------------------------------------------------
NICOLE LEIB; KEVIN BROKENSHIRE; and DIANE WEIGLEY, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GEISINGER
HEALTH; and EVANGELICAL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendants, Case No.
Case No. 4:21-cv-00196-MWB (M.D. Pa., Feb. 3, 2021) is an action
alleging the Defendants' illegal agreement of not recruiting each
other's physician, nurses, psychologists, therapists, and other
healthcare professionals (the "No Poach Agreement").

The Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that the No Poach Agreement
of the Defendants was intended to reduce competition for healthcare
workers, and as a result, suppressed the job mobility and enabled
the Defendants to pay their employees, much lesser than they would
have been paid.

Geisinger Health offers medical healthcare services. The Company
provides general medical and surgical hospital services adolescent
and young adult medicine, allergy, anesthesia, bariatric surgery,
and cardiology. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shanon Jude Carson, Esq.
          Eric L. Cramer, Esq.
          Mark R. Suter, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-4604
          Facsimile: (215) 875-5707
          E-mail: scarson@bm.net
                  ecramer@bm.net
                  msuter@bm.net

               -and-

          Daniel J. Walker, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          2001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 300
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 559-9745
          Facsimile: (215) 875-5707
          E-mail: dwalker@bm.net

               -and-

          Adam J. Zapala, Esq.
          Elizabeth T. Castillo, Esq.
          James G.B. Dallal, Esq.
          Tamarah P. Prevost, Esq.
          COTCHETT PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
          840 Malcolm Road
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Telephone: (650) 697-6000
          Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
          E-mail: azapala@cpmlegal.com
                  ecastillo@cpmlegal.com
                  jdallal@cpmlegal.com
                  tprevost@cpmlegal.com

          -and-

          Alexander E. Barnett, Esq.
          COTCHETT PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP
          40 Worth Street, 10th Floor
          New York, NY 10013
          Telephone: (212) 201-6820
          E-mail: abarnett@cpmlegal.com


GOLDEN STATE: Directed to File Response to Hearing Re-Schedule Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Trevino v. Golden State FC
LLC, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-00120 (E.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe entered an order directing
the Defendants to file a response or statement of non-opposition,
within 10 days of the date of this Order, to the Plaintiff's
request rescheduling the hearing on Plaintiffs class certification
motion.

The Court has received and reviewed Plaintiffs' Notice of Stay in
MDL Action and Request to Schedule Class Certification Hearing. The
Plaintiffs request that the Court reschedule the hearing on
Plaintiffs class certification motion, says Magistrate Judge
McAuliffe.

The case is brought over alleged employment violations.

Golden State is part of the warehousing and storage industry.[CC]



GOOGLE LLC: Manipulates Advertising Auctions, Negron Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------
KIMBERLY NEGRON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. GOOGLE LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00801 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 1,
2021) is a class action complaint filed on behalf of the Plaintiff
and on behalf of advertisers on Facebook who were victimized by the
unlawful agreement between Google and Facebook.

According to the complaint, Google has achieved dominance by
control over the overwhelming amount of advertising sold on its
advertising exchange and sought to suppress competition and
protect its position through a multitude of exclusionary tactics,
including an unlawful agreement with Facebook, Inc. Google is
responsible for all the damages incurred by the Class because of
the unlawful agreement and its concentration of power with
advertising exchanges, the suit says.

Allegedly, Google's agreement with Facebook, its largest potential
competitive threat, allowed Google to manipulate advertising
auctions on the advertising exchange, the Plaintiff contends.

Google and Facebook are, advertising companies, each of which makes
billions of dollars a year by using individuals' personal
information to sell targeted digital advertising to their clients
-- the Class.

Plaintiff Kimberly Negron, a purchaser of display advertisements on
Facebook, brings this lawsuit pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act.

Google is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. Alphabet Inc.
is a publicly traded company incorporated and existing under the
laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Mountain View,
California. Google is an online advertising technology company best
known for its popular search engine. Google additionally offers
many internet-related products, including various online
advertising technologies, directly and through subsidiaries and
business units under its ownership and control.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Solomon B. Cera, Esq.
          Pamela A. Markert, Esq.
          CERA LLP
          595 Market St. Suite 1350
          San Francisco, CA 94105
          Telephone: (415) 777-2230
          Facsimile: (415) 777-5189
          E-mail: scera@cerallp.com
                  pmarkert@cerallp.com

               - and -

          Fred T. Isquith, Sr., Esq.
          Robert S. Schachter, Esq.
          Sona R. Shah, Esq.
          Dan Drachler, Esq.
          Henry Avery, Esq
          ZWERLING, SCHACHTER
          & ZWERLING, LLP
          Madison Avenue, 32nd Floor
          New York, NY 10010
          Telephone: (212) 223-3900
          Facsimile: (212) 371-5969
          E-mail: ftisquith@zsz.com
                  rschachter@zsz.com
                  sshah@zsz.com
                  ddrachler@zsz.com
                  havery@zsz.com

               - and -

          Fred T. Isquith, Jr., Esq.
          ISQUITH LAW
          220 East 80th Street
          New York, NY 10075
          Telephone: (607) 277-6513
          E-mail: isquithlaw@gmail.com

               - and -

          Richard Vita, Esq.
          VITA LAW OFFICES, P.C.
          100 State Street, Suite 900
          Boston, MA 02109
          Telephone: (617) 426-6566
          E-mail: rjv@vitalaw.com

               - and -

          Heidi Silton, Esq.
          LOCKRIDGE GRINDAL NAUEN P.L.L.
          100 Washington Avenue S., Suite 2200
          Minneapolis, MN 55401-2159
          Telephone: (612) 596-4092
          E-mail: hmsilton@locklaw.com

GRAYBAR ELECTRONIC: Newsome Files FCRA Suit in N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Graybar Electric
Company, Inc. The case is styled as Andre Newsome, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated v. Graybar Electric Company,
Inc., Case No. 4:21-cv-01000-KAW (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Graybar -- https://www.graybar.com/ -- is an American
employee-owned corporation, based in Clayton, Missouri. It conducts
a wholesale distribution business for electrical, communications
and data networking products, and is a provider of related
supply-chain management and logistics services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Emil Davtyan, Esq.
          DAVTYAN LAW FIRM, INC.
          880 E. Broadway
          Glendale, CA 91205
          Phone: (818) 875-2008
          Fax: (818) 722-3974
          Email: emil@davtyanlaw.com

               - and -

          Eric B. Kingsley, Esq.
          Kelsey M. Szamet, Esq.
          KINGSLEY & KINGSLEY, APC
          16133 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1200
          Encino, CA 91436
          Phone: (818) 990-8300
          Fax: (818) 990-2903
          Email: ekingsley@kingsleykingsley.com
                 kelsey@kingsleykingsley.com


HAAT BAZAAR: Tapia Suit Seeks Unpaid Minimum, OT Under FLSA, NYLL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MANUEL TAPIA and PASCUAL CEGUEDA RAMIREZ (a.k.a Juan), individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. HAAT BAZAAR INC.
(D/B/A HAAT BAZAAR), MONSUR CHOWDHURY, PITUBAI DOE, NONI DOE, and
VADOBAI DOE, Case No. 1:21-cv-00539 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 1, 2021) seeks
to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

The Plaintiffs contend that they have worked for the Defendants in
excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate minimum wage,
overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the hours that they
have worked. Rather, the Defendants have failed to maintain
accurate recordkeeping of the hours worked and have failed to pay
them appropriately for any hours worked, either at the straight
rate of pay or for any additional overtime premium, the Plaintiff
adds.

The Plaintiffs are both current and former employees of the
Defendants.

The Defendants own, operate, or control a Bangladeshi market
restaurant, located at 3711 73 rd Street, Jackson Heights, New
York.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620
          E-mail: Faillace@employmentcompliance.com

HANDY SEAFOOD: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Handy Seafood
Incorporated. The case is styled as Dilenia Paguada, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated v. Handy Seafood
Incorporated, Case No. 1:21-cv-01096 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Handy Seafood -- https://handyseafoodstore.com/ -- is a seafood
processor with a global presence, processing in several overseas
countries and marketing products internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


INDIANA: Scroggin's Suit Against Sgt. Diaz May Proceed, Court Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRANDON LEE SCROGGIN, Plaintiff v. DANIEL DIAZ,
Defendant, Cause No. 3:20-CV-441-DRL-MGG (N.D. Ind.), Judge Damon
R. Leichty of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division, granted Mr. Scroggin leave to proceed
against Sgt. Diaz of the Indiana Department of Correction in his
individual capacity, and dismissed all other claims.

Mr. Scroggin, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a second amended
complaint alleging he was not protected from attack by fellow
inmates.  He alleges that other inmates threatened to assault and
kill him in 8-Dorm in April 2019.  He contends Sgt. Diaz refused to
move him out of the dorm unless he shared the location of drugs or
weapons in the dorm.

After Mr. Scroggin provided the information, he alleges Sgt. Diaz
told the inmates on the dorm he was a snitch.  He was then moved to
D-2-W Dorm for a few weeks before being returned to 8-Dorm.  Once
there, he says he was attacked several times between April and
September.  After several moves, he was placed in O-1 Dorm.  He
says he was beaten by a gang member in O-1 Dorm in December 2019.
After several more moves, he was placed in O-1 Dorm, where he
alleges a gang member raped him on Jan. 6 or 7, 2020.  On Feb. 3,
2020, he says four gang members attacked him while he was leaving
the chow hall.  He says these incidents occurred because the
perpetrators believed he was a snitch.

Under the Eighth Amendment, correctional officials have a
constitutional duty to protect inmates from violence.  To state a
claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must establish the
defendant "had actual knowledge of an impending harm easily
preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the
harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it."
Prison officials may be liable when they knew an inmate "faced a
significant risk of harm from a 'particular vulnerability' and
exposed him to that risk anyway."  Such are the allegations in the
instant case.  Sgt. Diaz is alleged to have labeled Mr. Scroggin a
snitch in front of other inmates.  As a result, Mr. Scroggin says
he was attacked numerous times because of that label.  These
allegations state a claim against Sgt. Diaz.

Judge Leichty opines that Mr. Scroggin makes many
failure-to-protect allegations, but none of them state a claim.
Among other things, Mr. Scroggin alleges before he was returned in
April or May 2019 to 8-Dorm where he was attacked, he told someone
he would be in danger if he went back there.  However, he does not
say who he told.  He alleges before he was moved in November 2019
to O-1 Dorm where he was attacked, he told Director Philip
Sonnenberg he did not want to leave B-1 Dorm, but he makes no
mention of saying he would be unsafe in O-1 Dorm.  He alleges
before he was moved in January 2020 from D-2-W Dorm to O-1 Dorm
where he was attacked, he told Sgt. Diaz and Ms. Motsenhagen he had
been threatened by inmates in D-2-W and C-1 Dorms, but he makes no
mention of telling them he faced an impending risk of harm if he
was returned to O-1 Dorm.  The complaint does not allege facts
indicating that either the Defendant knew he had been attacked in
O-1 Dorm the month before; but, as Klebanowski explained, even if
they did, that alone would not be sufficient to put them on notice
that he was in danger if he returned.

Mr. Scroggin captioned his complaint as a "Class Action" though he
did not file a motion asking to certify a class under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.  However, because he is proceeding without
counsel, Judge Leichty considers his class action request anyway.
To be certified as a class, Mr. Scroggin must first satisfy the
four elements in Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.  Then, the case must fall under one
of the conditions specified in Rule 23(b).

In the case, the only surviving claim is that Sgt. Diaz labeled Mr.
Scroggin a snitch, causing gang members to attack him multiple
times.  Numerosity requires there be so many members of the
potential class that "joinder of all members is impracticable."
What is clear is there is no allegation that any other inmate was
labeled a snitch by Sgt. Diaz or anyone else -- much less so many
they could not be joined if that were otherwise appropriate.

For these reasons, Judge Leichty granted Mr. Scroggin leave to
proceed against Sgt. Diaz in his individual capacity for
compensatory and punitive damages for labeling the Plaintiff a
snitch in front of other inmates on 8-Dorm in April 2019 thereby
causing gang members to attack him (a) several times between April
and September in 8-Dorm, (b) in December 2019 in O-1 Dorm, (c) on
January 6 or 7, 2020, in O-1 Dorm, and (d) and on Feb. 3, 2020, as
he was leaving the chow hall in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Judge Leichty dismissed all other claims.  He also dismissed
Galipeau, C. McKinney, Coronet, Motsenhagen, Jessica Alvarez
Statham, Hicks, Kenneth Watts, Department of Investigations and
Intelligence, John Does, Phillip Sonnenberg, and John Does.

The Clerk is directed to request a Waiver of Service from (and if
necessary, the United States Marshals Service to serve process on)
Sgt. Diaz, at the Indiana Department of Correction and to send them
a copy of the Order and the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915(d).

Judge Leichty ordered the Indiana Department of Correction to
provide the United States Marshals Service with the full name, date
of birth, social security number, last employment date, work
location, and last known home address of Sgt. Daniel Diaz, if he
does not waive service and if it has such information.

Finally, he ordered, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g)(2),
Sgt. Diaz to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1(b), only to the claim for which
the Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in the screening
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/7ea5s9l5 from Leagle.com.


JAN-PRO FRANCHISING: Summary Judgment Dismissing Vazquez Vacated
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GERARDO VAZQUEZ, GLORIA ROMAN, and JUAN AGUILAR, on
behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants v. JAN-PRO FRANCHISING INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 17-16096 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of
summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In the putative class action, the Ninth Circuit is tasked with
having to decide the applicability of a decision by the high court
of California, Dynamex Ops. W. Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1
(Cal. 2018)--postdating the district court's decision.  Dynamex
adopted the so-called "ABC test" for determining whether workers
are independent contractors or employees under California wage
order laws.

The case dates back over a decade.  In 2008, a putative class
action was filed in the District of Massachusetts by a
Massachusetts plaintiff, Giovani Depianti, and two Pennsylvania
Plaintiffs, against the Defendant-Appellee, Jan-Pro, a Georgia
corporation.  By the end of that year, there was an additional
Plaintiff from Massachusetts plus seven more from other states,
including the three individual Plaintiffs-Appellants ("Plaintiffs")
in the case, who are California residents.  They all had a common
cause to pursue: that Jan-Pro, a major international janitorial
cleaning business, had developed a sophisticated "three-tier"
franchising model to avoid paying its janitors minimum wages and
overtime compensation by misclassifying them as independent
contractors.

Because of the variety of state laws involved, the Massachusetts
district court chose Depianti's claim as a test case and, over
Jan-Pro's opposition, severed the California Plaintiffs' claims and
sent them to the Northern District of California, the Plaintiffs'
place of residence.  Depianti's case ultimately made its way to the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, which in 2017 affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint, but not on the merits--Depianti
v. Jan-Pro Franchising Intl, Inc., 873 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2017)
("Depianti-CA1").  The claims of all the other Plaintiffs before
the Massachusetts district court were also dismissed without
reaching the merits.  But the California Plaintiffs have remained
steadfast and, as their litigation enters its second decade, they
have now brought their battle to the Court.

Jan-Pro obviously has a financial interest in not opening the
floodgates to nationwide liability for multiple years of back wages
and overtime pay.  However, the case has broader ramifications.
The National Employment Law Project, which asserts that it has a
strong interest in the case because of the impacts of Jan Pro's
franchising schemes and those of similar janitorial companies on
low-wage and immigrant workers and their communities, has submitted
an amicus brief (joined by other similarly interested
not-for-profit organizations) to bring to the Court's attention
"details about the kinds of franchising and labor intermediary
structures used by Jan-Pro, and their impacts on workers, competing
employers, and on state and federal coffers."

In support of Jan-Pro, the International Franchise Association,
"the oldest and largest trade association in the world devoted to
representing the interests of franchising," rails against applying
the ABC test adopted by the California Supreme Court because it
"would sound the death knell for Franchising in California,"
casting the case as "of profound importance to franchising" not
only in California but also for the "national economies."

Because Dynamex postdated the district court's decision, the Ninth
Circuit issued an order directing the parties to brief its effect
on the merits of the case.  The Plaintiffs devoted most of their
supplemental brief to the merits, concluding that "in light of
Dynamex, there can be no question that the District Court's order
granting summary judgment to Jan-Pro must be reversed," and that
the Ninth Circuit should "remand the case for further
proceedings."

By contrast, Jan-Pro devoted only two pages of its 16-page
supplemental brief to the merits, citing but one clearly
distinguishable case.  It argued principally that "the Dynamex
decision should not be applied retroactively," and that, in any
event, it should prevail under the doctrines of the law of the case
and res judicata.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that Dynamex does apply retroactively,
that none of Jan-Pro's other efforts to avoid reaching the merits
are viable, and that the case must be remanded to the district
court to consider the merits in light of Dynamex.

First, by applying Dynamex retroactively, the Ninth Circuit ensures
that the California Supreme Court's concerns are respected.
Besides ensuring that the Plaintiffs can provide for themselves and
their families, retroactivity protects the janitorial industry as a
whole, putting Jan-Pro on equal footing with other industry
participants who treated those providing services for them as
employees for purposes of California's wage order laws prior to
Dynamex.  And retroactive application ensures that California will
not be burdened with supporting the Plaintiffs because of the "ill
effects" that "result from substandard wages."  Moreover, liability
is placed on the entity that created the business structure at
issue.

Second, the First Circuit's Depianti decision factually explained
the uncontested multi-tiered franchise model and several aspects of
Jan-Pro's franchise agreements with its master franchisees.  But it
was only a "brief synopsis of the factual background," sufficient
for the limited purpose of resolving the case on res judicata
grounds, not on the merits.

Finally, as the California Supreme Court explained, the "suffer or
permit to work standard in California wage orders" is meant to be
"exceptionally broad," because "wage orders are the type of
remedial legislation that must be liberally construed in a manner
that serves their remedial purposes."  The district court had no
opportunity to consider whether the Plaintiffs are employees of
Jan-Pro under the Dynamex standard, and neither party had the
opportunity to supplement the record with regard to the Dynamex
criteria.  Given the fact-intensive nature of the Dynamex inquiry,
the Ninth Circuit leaves it to the district court to consider the
question in the first instance with the benefit of a more developed
record.

In applying the ABC test on remand, the district court may choose
to allow further development of the record.  Application of Prongs
A and C is most likely to trigger the need for further factual
development, because the considerations relevant to those prongs
are the most factually oriented.  But the ABC test is conjunctive,
so a finding of any prong against the hiring entity directs a
finding of an employer-employee relationship.  Prong B may be the
most susceptible to summary judgment on the record already
developed.

In light of the foregoing, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment
of the district court granting summary judgment for the Defendant,
and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with its Opinion.  Each side will bear its own costs on
appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order & Amended
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/9jglkp6m from
Leagle.com.

Shannon Liss-Riordan -- sliss@llrlaw.com -- (argued), Lichten &
Liss-Riordan P.C., in Boston, Massachusetts, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jeffrey M. Rosin -- jrosin@constangy.com -- (argued), O'Hagan Meyer
PLLC, in Boston, Massachusetts; Theodore J. Boutrous Jr., Theane D.
Evangelis , Bradley J. Hamburger, and Samuel Eckman, Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, in Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

Catherine K. Ruckelshaus -- cruckelshaus@nelp.org -- and Najah A.
Farley, National Employment Law Project, in New York City, for
Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project, Equal Rights
Advocates, Dolores Street Community Services, Legal Aid at Work,
and Worksafe, Inc.

Jonathan Solish -- jonathan.solish@bclplaw.com -- Bryan Cave
Leighton Paisner LLP, in Santa Monica, California; Norman M. Leon
-- norman.leon@dlapiper.com -- DLA Piper LLP, in Chicago, Illinois;
Amicus Curiae The International Franchise Association.

Bradley A. Benbrook -- bbenbrook@hicks-thomas.com -- and Stephen M.
Duvernay -- duves@law.berkeley.edu -- Benbrook Law Group PC, in
Sacramento, California; Luke A. Wake, NFIB Small Business Legal
Center, in Sacramento, California; for Amicus Curiae National
Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center.

Adam G. Unikowsky -- aunikowsky@jenner.com -- Jenner & Block LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Steven P Lehotsky, U.S. Chamber Litigation
Center, in Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America.

James F. Speyer -- james.speyer@arnoldporter.com -- Arnold & Porter
Kaye Scholer LLP, in Los Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae
California Chamber of Commerce.

Catherine K. Ruckelhaus, National Employment Law Project, in New
York City, for Amicus Curiae National Employment Law Project.

Paul Grossman -- paulgrossman@paulhastings.com -- and Paul W. Cane
Jr. -- paulcane@paulhastings.com -- Paul Hastings LLP, in Los
Angeles, California, for Amicus Curiae California Employment Law
Council.


JOHNSON STRING: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Johnson String
Instrument, Inc. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Johnson String
Instrument, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-01090 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Johnson String Instrument -- https://www.johnsonstring.com/ -- is a
full service provider of new and previously owned stringed
instruments and accessories, including their rental, sales,
restoration, repair and appraisal.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


JOSE PEPPER'S: Partly Compelled to Answer Florece's Interrogatories
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KIRA FLORECE, on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JOSE PEPPER'S RESTAURANTS, LLC, et
al., Defendants, Case No. 20-2339-TC-ADM (D. Kan.), Magistrate
Judge Angel D. Mitchell of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Kansas granted in part and denied in part without prejudice
Florece's Motion to Compel.

Ms. Florece's complaint alleges that Defendant Jose Pepper's owns
and operates nine Jose Pepper's restaurants in Kansas, and that
Defendant Edward J. Gieselman owns and operates four Jose Pepper's
restaurants in Missouri.  Florece alleges that she worked as a
server at the Jose Pepper's restaurant in Belton, Missouri, from
April 2019 through February 2020.  She contends that she and
similarly situated employees across the thirteen Jose Pepper's
locations were not properly paid minimum wage and overtime
compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
and, as to Missouri employees, the Missouri Minimum Wage Law
("MMWL").

Specifically, Florece contends that she and similarly situated
employees were: (1) prohibited from clocking in until they began
serving customers, even though they were required to be present and
working prior to clocking in; (2) allowed to work overtime if they
did not clock in; (3) denied overtime compensation after defendants
removed reported overtime hours from the timekeeping system; and
(4) asked to report overtime hours worked as regular hours worked
under another employee's name.  Florece alleges that she personally
refused to work overtime if she was not clocked in or to report
overtime hours as regular hours under another employee's name.

On July 7, 2020, Florece filed the lawsuit as a putative collective
and class action in which she asserts claims for violations of the
FLSA and MMWL.  The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Florece's
complaint, which is currently pending.  In that motion, they argue
that Florece does not have standing to bring claims based on the
alleged policies with which she refused to comply and that she
cannot represent employees who were victims of those policies.
They also argue that Florece's complaint fails to allege with any
particularity that she or anyone else worked overtime.  Finally,
with respect to Florece's MMWL claims, the Defendants argue that
the Court should either decline to exercise jurisdiction over those
claims or find that they are preempted by the FLSA.

On September 22, the Court entered a scheduling order bifurcating
discovery into two phases.  The case is currently in the first
phase, which involves discovery relating to whether conditional
certification of an FLSA collective action is appropriate.

Florece served discovery on the Defendants seeking the name,
address, phone number, and dates of employment for all servers who
worked at their 13 restaurant locations in the three years before
Florece filed her complaint (Interrogatory No. 7) and the same
information for lead managers (Interrogatory No. 8).  She also
seeks the name and job title of any nonexempt hourly employee who
made complaints to management alleging failure to pay for time
worked in the last five years, along with the date of the complaint
and the person who received it (Interrogatory No. 4).  Florece also
seeks copies of any identified complaints.

The Defendants object to providing the discovery primarily on
relevance grounds, and further object to the complaint-related
requests as overly broad and not properly limited in temporal
scope.

Florece first asks the Court to compel the Defendants to answer
Interrogatory No. 7.  It seeks the names, contact information, and
dates of employment for all servers who worked at thirteen Jose
Pepper's restaurants in the three years before Florece filed the
lawsuit.  Her complaint alleges that these servers were subject to
the same policies and practices that denied them minimum wage and
overtime pay.

Judge Mitchell finds that Florece has met her threshold burden to
show that the information she seeks is relevant.  Individuals who
worked as servers at Jose Pepper's restaurants would likely have
information about the pay policies and practices alleged in the
complaint and whether they were also subject to those policies and
practices.  Servers' names, contact information, and employment
locations would potentially assist Florece in establishing the
contours of the proposed collective action and whether Florece and
other servers are similarly situated.  Accordingly, the burden
shifts to the Defendants to support their objections.

In addition, the discovery Florece seeks in Interrogatory No. 7 is
relevant to the central issue at the pre-certification
stage--namely, whether the pay policies and practices at issue in
the complaint applied to servers working at all Jose Pepper's
restaurants.  The Defendants have not supported their relevance
objection, nor do they rely on any proportionality objections that
would justify limiting or denying this discovery.  Judge Mitchell
therefore grants this aspect of Florece's motion to compel.

In Interrogatory No. 8, Florece seeks the names, contact
information, and dates of employment for anyone holding a lead
manager title at any of the 13 Jose Pepper's locations in the three
years prior to Florece filing her complaint.  She explains that
testimony from managers "could easily support her allegations
regarding denial of overtime pay from off-the-clock work.

Judge Mitchell finds that Florece has met her low burden of
initially establishing relevance.  Interrogatory No. 8 is akin to
interrogatories asking a party to identify witnesses with knowledge
regarding an important issue in the case, which is generally an
appropriate area of discovery.  Like the server-related information
discussed, the manager-related information Florece seeks in
Interrogatory No. 8 could shed light on whether servers at Jose
Pepper's restaurants were generally subject to the same uniform pay
policies and practices at issue.  The Defendants have not supported
their relevance objection, and the Judge will not deny Florece's
motion simply because her counsel may not be able to communicate
with some lead managers ex parte.  Again, absent the Defendants'
reliance on any properly supported proportionality objections that
would justify limiting or denying the discovery, Judge Mitchell
also grants this aspect of Florece's motion to compel.

Florece also asks the Court to compel the Defendants to respond to
Interrogatory No. 4.  It seeks information on complaints regarding
failure to pay for time worked made by any nonexempt hourly
employee over the past five years.  In the subject RFP, Florece
further asks the court to compel defendants to produce copies of
any identified complaints.  She contends that this information
bears on whether the pay policies and practices alleged in the
complaint existed.

The Defendants object to the discovery, arguing that the
interrogatory "is overbroad, not properly limited in temporal
scope, and seeks information irrelevant to class certification."

Judge Mitchell agrees with the Defendants.  She recognizes that
responsive information might be relevant to conditional
certification, but these discovery requests are facially overbroad.
They are not tailored to the issues in the case--namely, whether
the putative opt-in Plaintiffs were subject to the same
complained-of decision, policy, or plan.  In addition, these
discovery requests seek information about complaints made by
nonexempt hourly employees without regard to whether those
employees were working as servers.  Complaints by employees who
were not working as servers have no bearing as to whether the
putative opt-in Plaintiff (all servers) were subject to the same
pay policies and practices.

Furthermore, any such complaints made outside of the three-year
statute of limitations applicable to alleged willful violations of
the FLSA would be irrelevant to conditional certification.  In sum,
these discovery requests are overbroad because they are not
tailored to the issues on conditional certification.

For the reasons she discussed, Magistrate Judge Mitchell overruled
the Defendants' relevance objections to Interrogatory Nos. 7 and 8.
The Defendants must serve responses to these by Feb. 10, 2021.
The Defendants' objections to Interrogatory No. 4 and the related
RFP are sustained, although the Magistrate Judge denied this aspect
of Florece's motion without prejudice because this information may
be relevant at a later stage of the case.  Accordingly, Florece's
Motion to Compel is granted in part and denied in part without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/kwnkd8cb from Leagle.com.


L.L.C. INC: Magistrate Judge Endorses Denial of Bid to Toss Heath
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas issued a report and recommendation
recommending the denial of the Defendants' motion to dismiss in the
lawsuit styled NATALIE HEATH v. L.L.C., INC. d/b/a PERFECT 10 MEN'S
CLUB, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-0391-RP (W.D. Tex.).

Before the Court are the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or
Strike Plaintiff's Claims for Class or Collective Action; the
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaims and Motion
to Strike; the Defendants' First Amended Motion to Dismiss and/or
Strike Plaintiff's Claims for Class or Collective Action; the
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaims and Motion
to Strike; and all associated responses and replies.

The District Court referred the Motions to the Magistrate Judge for
a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of
Appendix C of the Local Court Rules.

Plaintiff Heath brings the collective action seeking relief under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. She asserts that Defendants L.L.C.,
Inc., doing business as Perfect 10 Men's Club, the Club's
owners/officers, and the club managers, misclassified her and other
exotic dancers as independent contractors in order to avoid wage,
tax, and other obligations owed employees.

In their initial motion to dismiss Heath's class claims, the
Defendants assert that she entered into two contracts in which she
waived her right to bring or participate in any collective actions,
or to act as the representative of any class or other individual.
The Defendants assert that contractual class action waivers are
enforceable, and Heath's collective or class action claims should
be dismissed. On the same date, the Defendants also filed their
Answer and Counterclaim, alleging that Heath breached the contracts
by filing a purported collective action. When Heath moved to
dismiss the counterclaim and strike the affirmative defenses, the
Defendants filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and an Amended
Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Plaintiff's Claims for Class or
Collective Action.

In the Amended Motion to Dismiss or Strike, the Defendants repeat
the arguments of their original motion and add that because Heath's
claims are subject to an arbitration agreement, that too deprives
the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the
Defendants argue that Heath does not have standing to act as class
representative or to seek class certification because she waived
those rights and that capacity.

For her part, Heath moves to dismiss the Defendants' counterclaim
and strike their affirmative defenses. She argues that the
Defendants' breach of contract counterclaim should not be brought
in the context of her FLSA action. Heath argues that the
Defendants' affirmative defenses should be stricken for the same
reasons--that these defenses cannot be brought in the context of an
FLSA action.

Discussion

Though she never explicitly states it, Heath appears to believe
that the correct or only time for the issue relating to the
affirmative defenses to be resolved would be if and when she seeks
certification of the case as a class or collective action. Based on
this view, she has not submitted any evidence to challenge the
validity of the contracts, despite stating that she intends to
vigorously dispute" their enforceability. But the Defendants are
not seeking the dismissal of Heath's individual FLSA claim, only
her class allegations.

The Court disagrees with Heath's view of the pleadings, as the
Defendants have in fact asked the Court to determine this issue and
have done so in a procedurally permissible manner. Notably, Heath
fails to provide any authority for her view that the Court cannot
decide this issue through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.

Having said that, the Court is reluctant to dismiss the class
claims without giving Heath an opportunity to present her arguments
and evidence on the issue. Accordingly, it will recommend that the
motion and amended motion to dismiss or strike be denied and that
Heath be ordered to file an amended complaint setting forth the
facts she contends support her argument that she is not
contractually prohibited from seeking to have her case certified as
a class or collective action. If thereafter the Defendants believe
those allegations are insufficient to render the contracts
unenforceable, they may file a new motion to dismiss raising the
issue, and the Court will decide it on whatever facts Heath and the
Defendants present at that time.

The breach of contract counterclaim is not one that is permissible
in an FLSA suit, Judge Austin holds. "Set-offs against back pay
awards deprive the employee of the 'cash in hand' contemplated by
the Act, and are, therefore, inappropriate in any proceeding
brought to enforce the FLSA."

Judge Austin finds that the counterclaim has nothing to do with the
actual wages paid. Indeed, it appears that the counterclaim is a
duplicative means of raising the very same argument addressed in
the first section of the Report and Recommendation--may Heath bring
this case as a collective action--and is a vehicle through which
Perfect 10 seeks to recover some attorney's fees. The counterclaim
is not compulsory, does not relate to Heath's wage claim, and
should, therefore, be dismissed without prejudice.

The Defendants assert a number of affirmative defenses: fraud or
fraudulent inducement, mistake, waiver, estoppel, unclean hands,
limitations, ratification, payment, failure to mitigate,
repudiation, the dispute is subject to arbitration, and a
restatement of the arguments raised in the prior section (that
Heath is contractually barred from pursuing the claims in a
collective action). Heath argues that any defenses related to the
employment contract, including the arbitration clause and the
waiver of class claims, do not relate to her status as an
"employee" pursuant to the FLSA and, therefore, should be
stricken.

The Court disagrees. Though it is too early to know if the
Defendants can prove the factual predicate of any of these
defenses, they are sufficiently stated to survive a Rule 12(f)
motion to strike, it holds.

Recommendation

For the reasons stated, Judge Austin recommends that the District
Court denies the Defendants' Motion and Amended Motion to Dismiss
and/or Strike without prejudice to being re-urged after Heath
amends her complaint, and further recommends that the District
Court orders Heath to file an amended complaint by a date certain,
setting forth the facts she contends support her argument that she
is not contractually prohibited from bringing this case as a class
or collective action.

The Court further recommends that Plaintiff's Motions to Dismiss
Defendants' Counterclaims and Motions to Strike be granted in part
and denied in part. Specifically, Judge Austin recommends that the
request to dismiss the counterclaim be granted and the counterclaim
be dismissed without prejudice; and the request to strike the
Defendants' affirmative defenses be denied.

The Clerk is directed to remove the case from the docket of Judge
Austin and return it to the docket of the Honorable Robert Pitman.

Warnings

The parties may file objections to the Report and Recommendation. A
party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings
and recommendations contained in the Report within 14 days after
the party is served with a copy of the Report will bar that party
from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings
and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain
error, will bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
District Court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Report and Recommendation dated
Feb. 1, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/1cieq1pm from
Leagle.com.


LENOVO US: Claims in Gisairo Suit Over Defective Laptops Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Martin Gisairo, Plaintiff v. Lenovo (United States)
Inc., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-2727 (WMW/LIB) (D. Minn.), Judge
Wilhelmina M. Wright of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Minnesota granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's motion
to dismiss the Plaintiff's first amended complaint.

Plaintiff Gisairo is a United States citizen residing in Minnesota.
Defendant Lenovo is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in North Carolina.  Lenovo designs, manufactures,
and sells computers over the internet to consumers in the United
States.  The putative class-action lawsuit arises from the alleged
defects in two Lenovo computer models, the Yoga 520, which is
better known as the Flex 5 laptop in the North American market, and
the Yoga 730.

Lenovo represents to consumers that the Flex 5 has a "360-degree
hinge" and is able to "easily flip into tablet mode or tent mode."
The Yoga 730 includes a similar functionality, including 360-degree
flexibility and the ability to "transition from tablet mode to
laptop mode and back."  Gisairo alleges that "Lenovo's marketing
materials also boast of 'Ultra HD' and '4k' high resolution
displays, claiming that 'you'll see every detail' and 'you'll be
able to watch movies and browse the web in vivid detail from nearly
every angle.'"

On Dec. 29, 2017, Gisairo purchased a Lenovo Flex 5 laptop that
included a limited warranty stating, in part: "each Lenovo hardware
product that you purchase is free from defects in materials and
workmanship under normal use during the warranty period."

Gisairo alleges that the Yoga 730 and the Flex 5 laptops are
designed and manufactured with a monitor display defect.  According
to him, the defect causes part or all of the monitor display to
"flicker, freeze, black out, and/or display corrupted visuals."  He
also alleges that when these issues occur, "use of the computer is,
at best, difficult, and often impossible because the user cannot
see their own input or the computer's visual output."  This alleged
defect "renders the device partially or wholly unusable."  And the
defect is "triggered and exacerbated when the display is opened or
moved, such as when the user folds the monitor into tent or tablet
mode," Gisairo alleges.

Gisairo commenced the putative class-action lawsuit, arising from
the alleged defects in both the Yoga 730 and Flex 5 devices, on
Oct. 17, 2019.  Lenovo moved to dismiss Gisairo's complaint on Jan.
3, 2020.  Gisairo filed an amended complaint approximately one
month later on Feb. 10, 2020.

The amended complaint alleges 10 counts against Lenovo. Counts I
through V allege violations of the following statutes: Minnesota
Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act ("MPCFA"), Minnesota Deceptive
Trade Practices Act ("MDTPA"), Minnesota Unlawful Trade Practices
Act ("MUTPA"), Minnesota False Statements in Advertising Act
("MFSAA"), and Minnesota's Private Attorney General Statute,
respectively.  Counts VI through X allege the following: breach of
express warranty in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
breach of implied warranty in violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("MMWA"), breach of implied warranty, breach of
express warranty, and unjust enrichment, respectively.  Gisairo
seeks both injunctive relief and damages.

Lenovo moves to dismiss Counts I-V, VII, VIII, and X, for lack of
standing, failure to plead with particularity, and failure to state
a claim on which relief can be granted.

Judge Wright granted in part and denied in part Defendant Lenovo's
motion to dismiss Gisairo's first amended complaint.  Lenovo's
motion to dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, V and X is granted, and
those claims are dismissed without prejudice.  Lenovo's motion to
dismiss Counts VII and VIII is denied.

Lenovo argues that Gisairo's breach-of-implied-warranty claims
(Counts VII and VIII) brought under the MMWA and Minnesota state
law, respectively, must be dismissed because Lenovo's limited
express warranty disclaims any implied warranties.  It argues that
Gisairo's breach-of-warranty claims fail because his
implied-warranty claims were disclaimed by Lenovo's limited
warranty.  Gisairo challenges the application of this warranty on
two grounds, first arguing that the warranty is not conspicuous,
and second arguing that the warranty is unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.

Judge Wright finds that Gisairo's complaint alleges that "any
attempt by Lenovo to disclaim or limit its implied warranties is
unconscionable and unenforceable under the circumstances."
Standing alone, this legal conclusion without a factual basis would
be insufficient to meet the pleading standards.  But Gisairo also
alleges that Lenovo knowingly sold a defective product without
informing consumers about the defect and that, because of this
knowledge, Lenovo's attempts to limit its implied warranties are
unenforceable.

Similar allegations have been found sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss.  At this stage in the litigation, Judge Wright
concludes that these claims in Gisairo's complaint are sufficient.
To the extent that any argument for dismissal of Counts VII and
VIII rests on a determination of unconscionability, a decision on
that matter is premature until the parties have had an opportunity
to submit evidence as to the disclaimer's commercial setting,
purpose, and effect.  Accordingly, the Judge denied Lenovo's motion
to dismiss Counts VII and VIII.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/c8ilcdg6 from Leagle.com.


LIVING WELL: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Living Well Stores,
Inc. The case is styled as Ramon Jaquez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Living Well Stores, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01172 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 9, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Living Well Stores -- https://www.livingwellstores.com/ --
specializes in power scooters with 3-5 year warranties, lift
chairs, wheelchair accessories and health and wellness products
including batteries.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


LOLA & SOTO: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Alleges
------------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LOLA & SOTO BUSINESS GROUP, INC. d/b/a MISS LOLA, a
California corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No.
2:21-cv-00158-TLN-DB (E.D. Cal., Jan. 26, 2021) alleges that the
Defendants failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
Website to be fully and equally accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually impaired people.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its Website, https://www.misslola.com/, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Because the Defendants' Website is not fully or equally accessible
to blind and visually impaired consumers, resulting in violation of
the ADA, the Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's policies, practices, and procedures so
that the Defendant's Website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read Website content using her
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition blindness in that they have a visual
acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some
blind people who meet this definition have limited vision. Others
have no vision.

Lola & Soto offers the Website to the public. The Website offers
features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and
services which Lola & Soto offers in connection with its physical
location. The goods and services offered by Defendant include new
arrivals; apparel back in stock; shoes such as sandals, flats,
mules, platforms, pumps, slides, sneakers, wedges, espadrilles,
boots, booties, black boots, combat boots, and heels; clothing such
as curve activewear, loungewear, denim, jumpsuits, rompers, sets,
swimwear, bodysuits, bralettes, crop tops, sweaters, jackets,
joggers, pants, skirts, shorts, and dresses; accessories such as
sunglasses, masks, bags, belts, and hats; jewelry such as anklets,
bracelets, earrings, hair clips, necklaces, and rings; exclusive
merchandise; kids’ apparel such as shoes, clothing, and
accessories; and goods marked half off.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com

M&C MANAGEMENT: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. M&C MANAGEMENT SERVICES (USA) INC. d/b/a MILLENNIUM
HOTELS AND RESORTS, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:21-cv-00152-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal., Jan. 26,
2021) alleges that the Defendants failed to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its Website to be fully and equally
accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind
or visually impaired people.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its Website, https://www.millenniumhotels.com/, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Because the Defendants' Website is not fully or equally accessible
to blind and visually impaired consumers, resulting in violation of
the ADA, the Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's policies, practices, and procedures so
that the Defendant's Website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read Website content using her
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition blindness in that they have a visual
acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some
blind people who meet this definition have limited vision. Others
have no vision.

M&C Manangement offers the Website to the public. The Website
offers features which should allow all consumers to access the
goods and services which the Defendant offers in connection with
its physical locations. The goods and services offered by M&C
include hotel destinations in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the
United States, and New Zealand; offers such as more with
Millennium, curated by Millennium, romantic retreat, Anchorage
staycation, LA city break, and park and fly; venues for large and
small events such as conferences, business meetings, trainings,
weddings, and social events; exclusive rewards and rates for
businesses such as meet with more and My Millennium Pro; My
Millennium, which rewards consumers for each and every stay, at any
Millennium Hotel in the world; and reservations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com

MAKE'N MUSIC: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Make'n Music, LLC.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Make'n Music, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-01091 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Make'n Music -- https://www.makenmusic.com/ -- is a boutique guitar
shop since 1973, selling high-end guitars, guitar amps, pedals and
more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


McCREARY VESELKA: Bid to Compel in Perez FDCPA Suit Partly Granted
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARIELA PEREZ, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. McCREARY, VESELKA, BRAGG & ALLEN, P.C., et
al, Case No. 1:19-cv-0724-RP (W.D. Tex.), Magistrate Judge Andrew
W. Austin of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, Austin Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff Mariela Perez's Motion to Compel.

The dispute arises out of a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA") suit brought by Plaintiff Perez against Defendants MVBA,
McCreary, and John Does.  On Nov. 15, 2019, Perez served the
Plaintiff's First Request for Production and First Set of
Interrogatories to Defendant MVBA.  On Nov. 27, 2019, Perez served
her First Request for Production and First Set of Interrogatories
on Defendant McCreary.

In the instant motion, Perez seeks an order compelling MVBA, and
McCreary to supplement certain responses to her interrogatories.
Specifically, she seeks discovery to "clarify the extent of the
involvement of each of the two entities regarding the claims that
are the basis of the amended complaint," and to ascertain any other
possible parties.  Further, in light of the class action
allegations in the suit, Perez seeks discovery to address potential
class and subclass members and the net worth of the Defendants, in
accordance with 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(A)(2)(B).

After briefing, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation as to Perez's
motion, indicating that the parties had resolved most of the
disputes and identifying those issues no longer in dispute.  The
Court now turns to the remaining disputes.

With Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, and 6, Perez seeks information
related to the creation of the letters on which she bases her FDCPA
claims.  Interrogatory No. 2 asks for the names of the persons who
authorized, approved, created, supervised, and/or directed use of
the letters.  Interrogatory No. 3 requests information regarding
the process of preparation for the letter.  And Interrogatory No. 6
asks "why MVBA sent letters in the form of Exhibit A to Texas
residents which did not state that that if the debt was not
disputed only the debt collector could assume the debt to be
valid."

Ms. Perez argues that discovery into these matters is necessary
because it relates to the "bona fide error" defense.  She further
asserts that the responses may help clarify the relationship
between the two Defendant entities and Perez's potential claims of
joint enterprise and alter ego.

MVBA objects to these interrogatories as irrelevant, arguing that
FDCPA claims are strict liability claims and thus the names of the
persons handling the letters are not relevant to whether a
violation has occurred.  It further objects that Interrogatory No.
6 seeks trade secrets, confidential information, and proprietary
information.  With regard to Perez's argument that these responses
may clarify the relationship between the two Defendants, MVBA
asserts that its supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 1
states clearly that MVBA and McCreary, Veleska are two distinct
entities.

Magistrate Judge Austin holds that under the FDCPA, to be entitled
to the bona fide error defense, a defendant must establish that a
violation was not intentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and
that there were policies or procedures in place reasonably adapted
to avoid such an error.  Accordingly, MVBA's objections to
Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3 are overruled because information
regarding those involved in preparing the letter, and any policies
or processes for preparation of the letter in question, are
relevant to any bona fide error defense MVBA may raise.

MVBA is, therefore, ordered to answer Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3.
The information sought by Interrogatory No. 6, however, is
irrelevant to this issue and disproportionate to the needs of the
case, and the burden of the proposed discovery would outweigh its
likely benefit.  Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Austin
grants Perez's Motion to Compel as to Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3
and denies the Motion as to Interrogatory No. 6.

Interrogatory Nos. 14 and 15 relate to the ownership and
organizational structure of MVBA and the names and job titles of
MVBA employees.  Perez argues this information is relevant based on
her claims of alter ego or joint enterprise liability between the
Defendants.  MVBA maintains that no relationship exists, and thus
argues that these requests are irrelevant.

Magistrate Judge Austin finds that information such as MVBA's
ownership and organizational structure and employee data are
relevant to Perez's allegations of alter ego and joint enterprise.
It is also relevant to determining who the proper party or parties
to the suit are, given that there is a dispute as to that question.
Accordingly, Perez's motion is granted as to Interrogatory Nos. 14
and 15.

In Interrogatory No. 21, Perez requests a description of all
documents received from the original creditor by MVBA regarding the
debt.  In her motion, Perez again contends that this information is
relevant to her claims for alter ego or joint enterprise, as well
as a bona fide error defense.  MVBA responds again stating that
because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, this information
is irrelevant as to her claims.  It further disputes Perez's
argument that the request relates to a potential bona fide error
defense, as any documents from the original creditor would have no
bearing on a bona fide error elements.

Magistrate Judge Austin agrees with MVBA that Perez's request is
not relevant.  Relevance is to be construed broadly, but the scope
of discovery is not unlimited.  He therefore denies Perez's Motion
to Compel as to Interrogatory No. 21.

Interrogatory No. 24 requests MVBA's net worth as well as a
description of how the calculation was made.  The FDCPA explicitly
states that damages in a class action case may be calculated based
on a defendant's net worth.  However, MVBA objects to the request,
asserting that since there has been no finding of liability and no
certification of a class, its net worth is irrelevant. The Court
disagrees.

Given that damages in a class action may be calculated based on a
defendant's net worth, information concerning the Defendant's net
worth is relevant and potentially useful in determining whether a
class action is proper, Magistrate Judge Austin holds.  Because he
finds that the requested information is relevant to Perez's claims,
MVBA is ordered to supplement its answer to Interrogatory No. 24 to
include full and complete responses.

Magistrate Judge Austin applies the same analysis he mentioned in
his rulings on Perez's Motion to Compel MVBA to Interrogatory Nos.
14 and 15 seeking information regarding McCreary's organizational
structure and employees.  Accordingly, Perez's Motion to Compel a
response to Interrogatory Nos. 14 and 15 is granted.

Finally, Magistrate Judge Austin applies the same analysis as
mentioned in his rulings on Perez's Motion to Compel MVBA to
Interrogatory No. 24 seeking information regarding McCreary's net
worth.  Accordingly, Perez's Motion to Compel a response to
Interrogatory No. 24 is granted.

In light of the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Austin granted in part
and denied in part Perez's Motion to Compel.  Specifically, he
ordered that no later than Feb. 16, 2021, (i) Defendant MVBA
supplements its responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 14, 15 and 24
as specified; and (ii) Defendant McCreary supplements its responses
to Interrogatory Nos. 14, 15 and 24 as specified.  The Judge denied
all other relief requested in the motion, and denied as moot the
duplicate Motion to Compel filed at Dkt. No. 42.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4qeauzsj from Leagle.com.


MDL 2804: Ohio Court Denies NAS Guardians' Class Certification Bid
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied
NAS Guardians' Motion for Class Certification in the multidistrict
litigation titled IN RE NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE LITIGATION,
Case No. 1:17-md-2804 (N.D. Ohio).

The document relates to: Doyle v. Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., Case
No. 1:18-op-46327. Artz v. Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., Case No.
1:19-op-45459. Salmons v. Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., Case No.
1:18-op-45268.

Before the Court is the Guardians' Motion for Class Certification.
The Defendants collectively filed a brief in opposition, and
Assertio Therapeutics, Inc. filed a separate brief in opposition.
The NAS Guardians ("Plaintiffs") filed a reply, and the Defendants
and Assertio filed sur-replies. During the course of briefing, the
Court allowed the NAS Guardians numerous opportunities to amend
their class definition, to identify and change the proposed class
representatives, and to extend the time period for class-related
discovery.

The Guardians' Motion pertains to two of the nearly three thousand
cases that make up this multidistrict litigation. The cases in the
MDL share common questions concerning, among other things, the
Defendants' conduct regarding alleged diversion and improper
marketing of prescription opioids. Most of the cases are brought by
cities and counties alleging the Defendants' conduct caused harm to
the greater public (that is, caused a public nuisance).

In contrast, the Plaintiffs seeking class certification here are
Guardians of individual children diagnosed at birth with Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome ("NAS"). These children are sometimes referred
to colloquially as "NAS Babies." The Guardians allege the
Defendants were the ultimate cause of the harms their wards suffer
associated with NAS, and the Guardians must now shoulder greater
burdens of care for these children.

In support of their Motion, the Guardians repeatedly refer to the
Court's earlier certification of a Negotiation Class for settlement
purposes. Specifically, when addressing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a), the Guardians "discuss the legal requirements as
briefly as possible" and instead simply adopt the Court's findings
from its Memorandum Opinion Certifying a Negotiation Class. While
the Plaintiffs' Motion was pending, the Sixth Circuit reversed this
Court's Negotiation Class certification, although it did not fully
reach the Court's conclusions regarding Rule 23(a).

District Judge Dan Aaron Polster opines that more significant than
the Sixth Circuit's reversal, however, is that the Guardians
advance allegations, claims, and injuries meaningfully different
from those of the government entities that sought certification of
the Negotiation Class. The different legal theories of these
dissimilar groups cannot be viewed equally under Rule 23(a), and
the proposed litigation classes of Guardians are simply not
analogous to the negotiation class that this Court certified for
settlement, the Judge adds. Accordingly, the Court will not apply
or refer to the analysis it used in the Negotiation Class Opinion
and Order.

The Guardians propose two different nationwide classes, two
different California statewide classes, and two different Ohio
statewide classes. Specifically, the Plaintiffs first ask the Court
to certify two nationwide classes--an expansive class and a
narrower class--of Guardians of children diagnosed with NAS at
birth. The nationwide classes assert claims for violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against certain
marketing and supply chain defendants. The nationwide classes
request relief in the form of: medical monitoring; creation of a
science panel; compensatory damages; punitive damages; and
attorneys' fees.

The Plaintiffs also request certification of expansive and narrow
statewide classes of legal guardians of Ohio and California
residents. The statewide class claims are made against a broader
set of Defendants. In addition to the same RICO claims made against
the nationwide class, the Ohio statewide class claims include
negligence, negligence per se, civil battery, and civil conspiracy.
The Ohio statewide class requests the same relief as the nationwide
class. Similarly, the California statewide class asserts RICO
claims, negligence, negligence per se, and violations of the
California Unfair Competition Law. In addition to the relief sought
by the nationwide and Ohio classes, the California class also seeks
disgorgement and other relief pursuant to the Unfair Competition
Law.

The proposed class representatives are Guardians of four children
residing in Ohio and California. These Guardians are the proposed
representatives for the nationwide classes and also the statewide
classes in the state where they reside. Three families comprise the
representative Guardians and their children. Guardians Jacqueline
and Roman Ramirez are the birth parents and guardians of R.R. They
reside in California. Guardian Melissa Barnwell is the birth mother
of C.G. and E.G. They all reside in California. Guardian Ashley Poe
is the guardian of P.P. They reside in Ohio.

The key characteristics of the mother and child are: (1) which
opioids the mother ingested, and when; (2) whether the child was
diagnosed with NAS at birth; and (3) whether the child was ever
treated with opioids later in life.

The Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes injunctive
relief where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class." They also seek
certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which applies where "the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Rule 23(b)(3) classes
must also be "ascertainable."

In their Motion, Memorandum, and Appendix A, the Guardians attempt
to set out objective definitions for the nationwide and statewide
classes, Judge Polster finds. All three documents contain slight
variations from the others that the Guardians do not explain. For
example, in their Memorandum, the Guardians summarize the class
definitions first by stating the "two primary objective and readily
ascertainable criteria" of each class definition are: "(1) the
birth mother of every NAS Child received a prescription for opioids
prior to the birth of her child and (2) that child was medically
diagnosed with NAS." Then, elsewhere in their brief, the Guardians
highlight "three objective criteria" of the class definitions: (1)
legal guardian; (2) child medically diagnosed with NAS; and (3)
birth mother received a prescription for opioids.

Still later, Judge Polster notes, in their reply brief, the
Guardians assert the definition is sufficient because class
membership is established on the basis of documentary evidence of:
(a) guardianship of a ward; (b) diagnosis of NAS at birth; and (c)
either (i) a prescription for opioids received by the birth mother
any time before the birth; or (ii) a prescription for opioids
received during pregnancy. Elsewhere in the reply brief, the
Plaintiffs do not include "at or near birth" when referencing the
NAS diagnosis.

In addition to these confusingly inconsistent statements of the
affirmative criteria of class membership, the Plaintiffs omit from
certain iterations of their definitions the exclusionary criteria
that elsewhere they state apply to all classes, Judge Polster
finds.

The Plaintiffs' differing definitions and summaries of the class
are inconsistent and imprecise, yielding a moving target for the
Defendants and the Court, Judge Polster holds. The Court must
clarify and more accurately calibrate the definitions before it can
determine whether any class is certifiable. The Court identifies
the criteria included in the Plaintiffs' various class definitions
and clarifies those criteria to make them as objective and definite
as possible, in order to maximize ascertainability. But even the
Court's best attempt to enhance the Plaintiffs' proposed criteria
cannot cure fatal flaws in their proposed class definitions, Judge
Polster points out.

Given the Plaintiffs' failure to offer a class definition that is
sufficiently ascertainable and administratively feasible, the rest
of the Court's analysis is not strictly necessary, Judge Polster
notes. Nonetheless, the Court's observations strengthen its
ultimate conclusion that the Guardians' motion for class
certification must be denied.

As the Defendants note, the Plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate
class membership of three of their four proposed
guardian-representatives is especially significant "given that
proposed class counsel represents more than 75 plaintiffs from
which they could try to select a suitable representative." The
Plaintiffs have added and removed multiple representatives and have
come up with only one representative who might meet the class
definition. Judge Polster points out, among other things, that this
highlights the flaws in their class definition and their attempt to
satisfy Rule 23(a).

Having concluded that the Plaintiffs cannot possibly show
typicality, and also that most of the proposed class
representatives are not actually class members, no further analysis
is necessary, Judge Polster opines. Still, the Court adds certain
observation. The Plaintiffs argue class certification is a
practical and ethical imperative to ensure finite funds are
allocated fairly among MDL Plaintiffs, because the MDL Plaintiffs
Executive Committee ("PEC") is ignoring the interests of the NAS
Guardian Plaintiffs. The Guardians claim the lawyers appointed to
the PEC have "devoted themselves solely to the pursuit of the
cities' and counties' interests and have ignored the conflicting
interests of non-clients, including the Guardians and the NAS
children." The Guardians suggest they will only be heard in MDL
settlement negotiations if the Court recognizes the class-wide
merit of their claims. They highlight that the city and county
plaintiffs can neither sue on behalf of the guardians or children,
nor release their claims.

While the Guardians may prefer class status, they do not need to
operate as a class in order to maintain their claims, Judge Polster
holds. And as long as their claims remain, the Guardians can pursue
them as MDL Case Management Orders allow, and the Guardians can
engage in settlement negotiations through or alongside the PEC. The
same is true for all MDL Plaintiffs.

The Court does not harbor any doubt that, across the nation, many
mothers and their newborn children have been injured by the opioid
epidemic. In some cases, the harms these children suffered may be
serious and lifelong, forcing the guardians of these children to
shoulder a tremendous and continuing burden. For all of the reasons
stated in Opinion and Order, however, the law does not permit these
guardians to pursue claims against the Defendants and seek relief
as a class under Rule 23.

The Court concludes that: (1) the Guardians' proposed class
definitions are not administratively feasible; (2) the proposed
classes do not meet Rule 23(a)'s typicality requirement; (3) the
proposed classes do not satisfy the implied requirement that class
membership must be ascertainable. Also, indicative of the problems
with the Guardians' proposed class definition, at most only one of
the Guardians' three proposed class representatives actually
belongs to one of the proposed classes.  Accordingly, the
Guardians' Motion for Class Certification is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Feb. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ciw4l68a from
Leagle.com.


MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Cavanaugh Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SUNNY CAVANAUGH,v. MERCK & CO., INC. and MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,
Case No. 2:21-cv-00463-HB  (E.D. Pa., Feb. 1, 2021), is brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated patients
alleging that Merck failed to exercise reasonable care in the
design, formulation, manufacture, sale, testing, quality assurance,
quality control, labeling, marketing, promotions, and distribution
of Zostavax because Merck knew, or should have known, that its
product caused viral infection, and was therefore not safe for
administration to consumers.

The Plaintiff contends that Merck failed to exercise due care in
the labeling of Zostavax and failed to issue to consumers and/or
their healthcare providers adequate warnings as to the risk of
serious bodily injury, including viral infection, resulting from
its use.

Merck continued to manufacture and market its product despite the
knowledge, whether direct or ascertained with reasonable care, that
Zostavax posed a serious risk of bodily harm to consumers. This is
especially true given its tenuous efficacy, the Plaintiff adds.

Zostavax was designed, developed, marketed, and sold with the
intended purpose of preventing shingles, which is caused by the
varicella zoster virus (VZV). Varicella zoster is a virus that
causes chickenpox.

The Plaintiff was and is a citizen of the state of Florida,
residing in Punta Gorda, Florida. In October 11, 2016, the
Plaintiff was inoculated with the Defendants' Zostavax vaccine for
routine health maintenance and for its intended purpose: the
prevention of shingles (herpes zoster). Shortly after receiving the
vaccine, the Plaintiff suffered a raised area the size of a
softball in her upper left arm that turned black and blue and hot
to the touch, facial droop, uncontrolled diabetes, hypertension.
The Plaintiff was diagnosed with acute Bell's Palsy, hypertension,
chest pain and diabetes with hyperglycemia, says the complaint.

The case is consolidated in MDL NO. 2848 RE: ZOSTAVAX (ZOSTER
VACCINE LIVE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicole Lovett, Esq.
          Michael Goetz, Esq.
          T. Michael Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 222-4737
          E-mail: NLovett@ForThePeople.com
                  MGoetz@ForThePeople.com
                  MMorgan@ForThepeople.com

MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Clemenson Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
GARY D. CLEMENSON v. MERCK & CO., INC. and MERCK SHARP & DOHME
CORP., Case No. 2:21-cv-00461-HB (Feb. 1, 2021), is brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated patients
alleging that Merck failed to exercise reasonable care in the
design, formulation, manufacture, sale, testing, quality assurance,
quality control, labeling, marketing, promotions, and distribution
of Zostavax because Merck knew, or should have known, that its
product caused viral infection, and was therefore not safe for
administration to consumers.

The Plaintiff contends that Merck failed to exercise due care in
the labeling of Zostavax and failed to issue to consumers and/or
their healthcare providers adequate warnings as to the risk of
serious bodily injury, including viral infection, resulting from
its use.

Merck continued to manufacture and market its product despite the
knowledge, whether direct or ascertained with reasonable care, that
Zostavax posed a serious risk of bodily harm to consumers. This is
especially true given its tenuous efficacy, the Plaintiff adds.

Zostavax was designed, developed, marketed, and sold with the
intended purpose of preventing shingles, which is caused by the
varicella zoster virus (VZV). Varicella zoster is a virus that
causes chickenpox.

In November 4, 2015, the Plaintiff was inoculated with the
Defendants' Zostavax vaccine for routine health maintenance and for
its intended purpose: the prevention of shingles (herpes zoster).
Shortly after receiving the Defendants' vaccine, the Plaintiff
suffered cough, sputum production, with sometimes streaks of blood,
rhinorrhea, facial pressure and myalgias. The Plaintiff was
diagnosed with pneumonia, says the complaint.

The case is consolidated in MDL NO. 2848 RE: ZOSTAVAX (ZOSTER
VACCINE LIVE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicole Lovett, Esq.
          Michael Goetz, Esq.
          T. Michael Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 222-4737
          E-mail: NLovett@ForThePeople.com
                  MGoetz@ForThePeople.com
                  MMorgan@ForThepeople.com

MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Deray Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID DERAY v. MERCK & CO., INC. and MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,
Case No. 2:21-cv-00447-HB (Feb. 1, 2021), is brought on behalf of
the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated patients alleging
that Merck failed to exercise reasonable care in the design,
formulation, manufacture, sale, testing, quality assurance, quality
control, labeling, marketing, promotions, and distribution of
Zostavax because Merck knew, or should have known, that its product
caused viral infection, and was therefore not safe for
administration to consumers.

The Plaintiff contends that Merck failed to exercise due care in
the labeling of Zostavax and failed to issue to consumers and/or
their healthcare providers adequate warnings as to the risk of
serious bodily injury, including viral infection, resulting from
its use.

Merck continued to manufacture and market its product despite the
knowledge, whether direct or ascertained with reasonable care, that
Zostavax posed a serious risk of bodily harm to consumers. This is
especially true given its tenuous efficacy, the Plaintiff adds.

Merck designed, manufactured, licensed, labeled, tested,
distributed, marketed and sold the Zostavax vaccine.

Zostavax was designed, developed, marketed, and sold with the
intended purpose of preventing shingles, which is caused by the
varicella zoster virus (VZV). Varicella zoster is a virus that
causes chickenpox.

In October 30, 2014, the Plaintiff was inoculated with the
Defendants' Zostavax vaccine for routine health maintenance and for
its intended purpose: the prevention of shingles (herpes zoster).
Shortly after receiving the Defendants' vaccine, the Plaintiff
suffered varicella type rashes, the suit alleges.

The case is consolidated in MDL NO. 2848 RE: ZOSTAVAX (ZOSTER
VACCINE LIVE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nicole Lovett, Esq.
          Michael Goetz, Esq.
          T. Michael Morgan, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          201 North Franklin Street, 7th Floor
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: (813) 222-4737
          E-mail: NLovett@ForThePeople.com
                  MGoetz@ForThePeople.com
                  MMorgan@ForThepeople.com

MDL 2848: Zostavax Vaccine Causes Viral Infection, Smith Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
SHARON SMITH v. MERCK & CO., INC. and MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP.,
Case No. 2:21-cv-00337-HB (E.D. Pa., Jan. 25, 2021), is brought on
behalf of the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated patients
alleging that Merck failed to exercise reasonable care in the
design, formulation, manufacture, sale, testing, quality assurance,
quality control, labeling, marketing, promotions, and distribution
of Zostavax because Merck knew, or should have known, that its
product caused viral infection, and was therefore not safe for
administration to consumers.

The Plaintiff contends that Merck failed to exercise due care in
the labeling of Zostavax and failed to issue to consumers and/or
their healthcare providers adequate warnings as to the risk of
serious bodily injury, including viral infection, resulting from
its use.

Merck continued to manufacture and market its product despite the
knowledge, whether direct or ascertained with reasonable care, that
Zostavax posed a serious risk of bodily harm to consumers. This is
especially true given its tenuous efficacy, the Plaintiff adds.

Zostavax was designed, developed, marketed, and sold with the
intended purpose of preventing shingles, which is caused by the
varicella zoster virus (VZV). Varicella zoster is a virus that
causes chickenpox.

The Plaintiff at all times relevant to this action was and is a
citizen of the state of Tennessee, residing in Maryville,
Tennessee. In 2016, the Plaintiff was inoculated with the
Defendants' Zostavax vaccine for routine health maintenance and for
its intended purpose: the prevention of shingles (herpes zoster).
Shortly after receiving the Defendants' Zostavax vaccine, the
Plaintiff suffered Bell's palsy. As a direct and proximate result
of Merck's defective Zostavax vaccine, the Plaintiff's  symptoms
have resulted in physical limitations not present prior to using
Merck's product. The Plaintiff also experiences mental and
emotional distress due to resulting physical limitations and
seriousness of her condition, says the complaint.

The case is consolidated in MDL NO. 2848 RE: ZOSTAVAX (ZOSTER
VACCINE LIVE) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adam T. Funk, Esq.
          POTTS LAW FIRM
          3737 Buffalo Speedway, Suite 1900
          Houston, TX 77098
          Telephone: (713) 963-8881
          Facsimile: (713) 583.5388
          E-mail: afunk@potts-law.com

MELALEUCA INC: Order Granting Arbitration Bid in Wainwright Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOANN WAINWRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant v. MELALEUCA,
INC., Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 20-15329 (9th Cir.), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's order granting Melaleuca's motion to compel arbitration and
dismissing Wainwright's claims without prejudice.

Appellee Melaleuca is a company incorporated and headquartered in
Idaho that designs, manufactures, and markets a variety of
nutritional, personal care, and household products. On June 8,
2019, Appellant Wainwright, a California citizen, enrolled as a
Marketing Executive with Melaleuca.  As part of her enrollment,
Wainwright signed an Agreement with the company which requires that
disputes between the parties be arbitrated.  The Agreement includes
a choice-of-law provision which provides that the "Agreement will
be governed by the laws of the State of Idaho and the Federal
Arbitration Act."  The Agreement also contains a delegation clause,
which provides that "all issues are for the arbitrator to decide,
including issues relating to the scope and enforceability of the
arbitration provision."

After terminating her employment with Melaleuca, Wainwright filed
suit in the Superior Court of California for the County of
Sacramento alleging eight claims on behalf of herself and a
putative class.  Melaleuca removed the case to federal court under
the Class Action Fairness Act.  Thereafter, Melaleuca moved to
compel arbitration in accordance with the Agreement.

On Jan. 27, 2020, the district court granted Melaleuca's motion and
dismissed Wainwright's claims without prejudice for refiling in the
appropriate forum should the arbitrator find her claims
non-arbitrable.

The district court concluded that the Agreement's choice-of-law
provision is enforceable and that the delegation clause was not
unconscionable under Idaho law.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  It holds that the district court did
not err in applying Idaho law pursuant to the Agreement's
choice-of-law provision.  As a federal court sitting in diversity,
the district court applied the choice of law rules of California,
the forum state.  When "determining the enforceability of
arm's-length contractual choice-of-law provisions," California
courts "apply the principles set forth in Restatement section 187,
which reflect a strong policy favoring enforcement of such
provisions."

Under Section 187, a choice-of-law provision is enforceable unless
one of two exceptions apply: (1) "the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction"; or (2)
"application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of a particular
issue and which, under the rule of Section 188, would be the state
of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law
by the parties."

Applying this analysis, the Ninth Circuit holds that the district
court correctly concluded that neither exception applied in the
case.  First, Melaleuca has a substantial relationship with Idaho,
where it is incorporated and has its headquarters.  Second,
Wainwright fails to identify a fundamental policy difference
between California's and Idaho's unconscionability laws.

Ms. Wainwright next argues that the district court should have
automatically applied California's unconscionability analysis to
the delegation clause before considering the Agreement's
choice-of-law provision.  The Ninth Circuit finds it inconsistent
with California's framework for evaluating choice-of-law clauses,
which requires courts to "evaluate the clause's enforceability
pursuant to the Restatement Second approach.

Because the district court correctly applied Idaho law under the
Agreement's choice-of-law provision, the Ninth Circuit does not
consider Wainwright's argument that the delegation clause is
unconscionable under California law.  Further, Wainwright does not
argue that the delegation clause is unconscionable under Idaho law.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that the delegation clause is not unconscionable.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit does "not consider" Wainwright's
"arguments raised for the first time on appeal, citing AMA
Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1213 (9th Cir. 2020)
(simplified).

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 4, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2vcawfx7 from Leagle.com.


METTLER-TOLEDO LLC: Fails to Pay Overtime, Marsh Suit Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------
HENRY MITCHELL MARSH, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. METTLER-TOLEDO, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 8:21-cv-00262 (M.D. Fla., Feb. 3, 2021) is an action
against the Defendant's failure to pay the Plaintiff and the class
overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week.

Plaintiff Marsh was employed by the Defendant as inventory
specialist.

Mettler-Toledo, LLC is engaged in the business of manufacturing of
paper coated and laminated packaging. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary L. Printy, Jr., Esq.
          Jason W. Imler, Esq.
          PRINTY & PRINTY, P.A.
          3411 W. Fletcher Ave., Suite A
          Tampa, Florida 33618
          Telephone: (813) 434-0649
          Facsimile: (813) 423-6543
          E-mail: garyjr@printylawfirm.com
                  jason.imler@printylawfirm.com


MGM RESORTS: Smallman's Bid to Appoint Interim Class Counsel OK'd
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled JOHN SMALLMAN, et al., Plaintiff v. MGM
RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-00376-GMN-NJK
(D. Nev.), the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada
grants the Smallman Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment of Interim
Class Counsel and denies the Cameron Plaintiffs' Motion.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Ryan Bohlim, Larry Lawter,
John Smallman, Dolores Scott, Julie Mutsko, Victor Wukovits, and
Kerri Shapiro's ("Smallman Plaintiffs'") Motion for Appointment of
Interim Class Counsel. Also pending before the Court is Plaintiffs
Jeffrey Scott Cameron, Kevin V. Horne, and Bryan Khalilirad's
("Cameron Plaintiffs'") Motion for Appointment of Interim Class
Counsel.

The case arises out of a data breach announced by Defendant MGM
indicating that the personally identifiable information of MGM's
customers was stolen. The Plaintiffs filed seven separate class
action complaints in the District, alleging similar claims, such as
negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, as well as
violations of state consumer protection laws.

On March 30, 2020, the Court granted the parties' stipulation to
consolidate the separate cases into the prospective class action.
Pursuant to Rule 23(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Smallman Plaintiffs and the Cameron Plaintiffs both moved to
appoint the interim class counsel, pending class certification, to
submit a consolidated complaint and conduct pretrial proceedings.

District Judge Gloria M. Navarro notes that in the present case,
appointing interim class counsel is appropriate; this is a
consolidated action and two teams of attorneys are competing to
represent the putative class. Accordingly, the Court finds that it
is necessary to appoint interim class counsel to protect the
interests of the class.

The Smallman Plaintiffs ask the Court to appoint John A. Yanchunis
of Morgan & Morgan; Douglas J. McNamara of Cohen Milstein Sellers &
Toll, PLLC; David M. Berger of Gibbs Law Group LLP; and E. Michelle
Drake of Berger Montague PC as the co-lead interim class counsel,
with Miles Clark of Knepper & Clark LLC and Don Springmeyer of
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP as the co-liaison
counsel (collectively, "Morgan Cohen").

The Cameron Plaintiffs request the appointment of Katrina Carroll
of Carlson Lynch LLP; Erin Comite of Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law
LLP; and Christian Levis of Lowey Dannenberg, P.C. as the co-lead
interim class counsel, with Jennifer Fornetti of The Bourassa Law
Group as the liaison counsel (collectively, "Carlson Scott").

The Morgan Cohen team is comprised of attorneys, who have "had
leadership roles in virtually every major consumer data breach case
litigated to date." Likewise, the Carlson Scott team brings
"complementary knowledge of managing complex class action cases and
experiences regarding data breaches and the protection of consumer
privacy." Both Morgan Cohen and Carlson Scott have secured millions
of dollars in settlements for class action and data breach cases.

After reviewing the application materials from both teams,
including the resumes of the individual attorneys, as well as the
track records of their respective firms, it is clear to the Court
that both the Morgan Cohen and Carlson Scott teams have the
knowledge, experience, and resources required to litigate the
case.

To set themselves apart, the Cameron Plaintiffs stress the
importance of diversity in court-appointed leadership structures to
avoid the "repeat player dynamic" and encourage "fresh outlooks and
innovative ideas" (citing Standards and Best Practices for Large
and Mass-Tort MDLs at 46, 58 (1st ed., Dec. 19, 2014)). Carlson
Scott argues that its team, which is comprised of two female lead
attorneys and young partners, reflects a diversity of gender, age,
and experience, making it better suited to represent what is surely
a diverse class.

Judge Navarro, however, observes that the Morgan Cohen team does
not lack diversity of gender, age, or experience; it includes a
female lead attorney, first-time lead attorneys, and a young
partner, as well as attorneys with over 20 years of class action
experience. As such, the Court is confident that the selection of
either team will adequately represent a diverse putative class.

Clearly both teams of attorneys are more than qualified to handle
this action; each has the knowledge, experience, and resources
needed to pursue this litigation. However, the Court notes that the
Cameron Plaintiffs' Motion neglected to discuss one of the four
factors courts must consider when appointing interim class counsel:
the work that Carlson Scott has done in identifying and
investigating potential claims for this action.

While the Court's own initiative revealed that Carlson Scott's
attorneys filed detailed Complaints in their respective originating
cases, the failure to address an essential factor of a prescribed
balancing test is an oversight indicating to the Court that Carlson
Scott would not be best suited to advocate for the interests of the
putative class. Moreover, because the first Plaintiff to file suit
was John Smallman, represented by John A. Yanchunis, it would be
appropriate to assign Morgan Cohen as co-lead counsel, Judge
Navarro holds, citing Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1159 (Del.
Ch. 2003). Accordingly, the Court finds that Morgan Cohen would
best be able to represent the interests of the putative class and,
thus, grants the Smallman Plaintiffs' Motion.

Hence, Smallman Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment of Interim Class
Counsel is granted. The Cameron Plaintiffs' Motion for Appointment
of Interim Class Counsel is denied. The Cameron Plaintiffs' Motions
for Leave to File Supplemental Authority are denied as moot.

The Court also directed the Plaintiffs to file a consolidated
complaint within 60 days of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yo4x8cfc from Leagle.com.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Pacifico FDCPA Suit Removed to E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Alex Pacifico, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Case
No. 600780/2021 was removed from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County,
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on
Feb. 8, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-00661 to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Midland Credit Management, Inc. (MCM) --
https://www.midlandcredit.com/ -- is a specialty finance company
providing debt recovery solutions for consumers across a broad
range of assets.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.

The Defendants are represented by:

          Dana Brett Briganti
          HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP
          800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Phone: (212) 471-6200
          Fax: (212) 935-1166
          Email: dbriganti@hinshawlaw.com


MUNCHERY INC: $400K Class Settlement in Philips Suit Gets Final OK
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned JOSHUA JAMES EATON PHILIPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs v. MUNCHERY INC., Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-00469-JSC
(N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of class action settlement,
motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and class representative award.

Plaintiffs Phillips and Christina Brooks bring the putative class
action under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
("WARN Act"), 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(2), and its California
state law counterpart, California Labor Code Sections 1400, et seq.
("CAL-WARN"), against their former employer, Defendant Munchery.
The Plaintiffs allege that Munchery failed to provide its employees
with written notice 60 days prior to their termination, as required
under the WARN Acts.

Munchery operated an online food delivery service in the San
Francisco Bay Area until January 21, 2019, when it went out of
business. On January 25, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the action
alleging that Munchery failed to comply with the WARN Act and
provide 60 days of written notice to its employees before ordering
the mass layoff. Two weeks later, the Plaintiffs filed a First
Amended Complaint ("FAC") adding a claim under the California WARN
Act.

Shortly thereafter, Munchery filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (In
re: Munchery, No. 19-30232 (N.D. Cal. Bankr. Feb. 28, 2019). The
bankruptcy filing resulted in a stay in the action under 11 U.S.C.
Section 362(a)(1). In May 2019, the bankruptcy court lifted the
automatic stay under Section 362(a)(1) and proceedings in the
action resumed.

In August 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification. The parties jointly requested that the Court delay
hearing the motion for class certification in light of the parties'
upcoming mediation with Bankruptcy Judge Roger Efremsky and other
constituencies in the Chapter 11 proceeding. Over the next several
months, with the assistance of Judge Efremsky, the parties
continued to negotiate a collective resolution to this matter
culminating in a settlement agreement.

In February 2020, the parties reached a settlement of the
Plaintiffs' claims. After reviewing the moving papers, and
supporting evidence, and as no objections to the settlement have
been made, the Court vacates the February 4, 2021 hearing, and
grants the motion for final approval and motion for attorneys' fees
and costs and an incentive award.

The settlement class consists of:

     Plaintiffs and all persons who worked at, were based out of,
     received assignments from, or reported to Defendant's
     facility at 200 Shaw Road, South San Francisco, California,
     (ii) who were terminated without cause, as part of, or as
     the result of, a mass layoff or plant closing ordered by
     Defendant and carried out on or about January 21, 2019 and
     within 30 days of that date or in reasonable anticipation of
     or as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the mass
     layoff or plant closing ordered by Defendant on or about
     January 21, 2019, (iii) who are affected employees within
     the meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section 2101(a)(5), and (iv) who
     have not filed a timely request to opt-out of the class.

The class is comprised of 268 individuals.

The gross Settlement Amount is $400,000. The following amounts will
be deducted from the gross settlement amount: Class Representative
Payments of $5,000, Class Counsel's fees of up to $126,666.67,
expenses of up to $15,000, and the employer's share of the payroll
taxes in the amount of $30,622.61. The remaining $222,710 will be
distributed to the Class Members in pro rata shares. The Class
Counsel has provided pro rata calculations for the distributions to
Class Members, including the deduction of the employer taxes. Any
settlement checks which remain undeposited after 180 days will be
electronically transferred by the settlement administrator to the
State of California's Unclaimed Property Fund,
https://www.sco.ca.gov/upd_rptg.html in the name of the Class
Member.

The Settlement Amount is inclusive of all payroll taxes; the
Settlement Administrator retained by Class Counsel is responsible
for withholding, paying, and reporting all income tax withholdings
and statutory taxes.

Upon final approval of the Settlement Agreement, the Class Members
will release "all claims of the members of the Class against the
Debtor's estate arising from the facts alleged in the class action
Complaint, including, but not limited to, any administrative,
priority, and general unsecured claims."

On November 20, 2020, the Settlement Administrator, American Legal
Claim Services, LLC ("ALCS"), mailed notice to all 268 Class
Members. Twelve class notices were returned as undeliverable. ALCS
performed "skip traces" and obtained updated addresses for seven of
the twelve individuals. ALCS remailed notice to all seven of these
individuals and none of the notices were returned. The Class
Counsel also published notice of the settlement on the website:
https://www.warnlawyers.com/recent-cases/munchery-inc.

The deadline to opt-out of or object to the settlement was January
11, 2021, and to date, no opt-outs or objections have been
received.

Because the settlement class satisfies Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3),
and notice was in accordance with Rule 23(c), the Court grants
final class certification.

The Court also concludes, among other things, that the amount
offered in settlement also weighs in favor of final approval, given
the limited assets in the estate. In sum, Judge Corley holds, the
fairness factors weigh in favor of granting the Plaintiffs' motion
for final approval of the class action settlement.

For the reasons stated in the Order, the Court grants the
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the parties' class action
settlement. In addition, the Court grants the Plaintiffs' motion
for attorneys' fees and costs; specifically, the Court awards the
following: $126,666.67 in attorneys' fees; $14,591.07 in costs; and
$2,500 as incentive award for each Class Representative.

The Clerk is directed to close the case. Thw Order disposes of
Docket Nos. 63 and 65.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/pt5xz4lm from Leagle.com.


NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S: Morris' Class of Psychometricians Certified
------------------------------------------------------------------
NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S: Psychometricians Class Certified in Morris

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio grants
the Motion for Conditional Class Certification in the lawsuit
entitled NATALIE MORRIS, et al., on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. NATIONWIDE CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-3194 (S.D. Ohio).

The matter before the Court is Plaintiff Morris' Motion for
Conditional Class Certification and Court-Supervised Notice to
Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs, Defendant Nationwide's Memorandum in
Opposition and the Plaintiff's Reply.

Defendant Nationwide has employed Plaintiff Morris as a
psychometrician since October 17, 2016. In this role, Ms. Morris
administers cognitive and executive functioning testing for
pediatric patients under the direction of a licensed psychologist.
Nationwide is an Ohio non-profit pediatric hospital and research
center that provides pediatric medical care, among other things.

Ms. Morris claims she was not paid for work she performed in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and
corresponding Ohio law. She identifies three categories of unpaid
work: pre-shift, post-shift, and meal break. Moreover, by combining
her unpaid work with her paid work, Ms. Morris alleges that
Nationwide failed to pay her one-and-half-times her regular rate
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. She claims that
she witnessed other employees suffer the same pay practices. She
supports these allegations with her declaration and the
declarations of two other Nationwide psychometricians, Ms. Studer
and Mr. Hannon.

In July 2018, Mr. Hannon submitted a complaint to the United States
Department of Labor ("DOL"). The DOL Complaint alleged that
Nationwide incorrectly classified the psychometrician position as
exempt. Around two years later, in June 2020, Ms. Morris received a
letter from Nationwide admitting that it had improperly classified
the psychometrician position as exempt. The position was then
reclassified as a non-exempt.

At the same time, Ms. Morris received a letter from the DOL
concerning back wages under the FLSA. The back wages covered the
period from February 3, 2018, to November 9, 2019. The DOL also
notified Mr. Hannon that he was entitled to receive back wages
earned under the FLSA for November 25, 2017, through November 9,
2019.

The period referenced in the DOL letter fails to align with the
period of alleged wage and hour violations, which extend from
October 2016 to the filing of the Complaint. Ms. Morris, for
example, was not offered back wages for hours worked in excess of
40 hours per workweek from October 17, 2016, through February 3,
2018, or after November 9, 2019. Likewise, Mr. Hannon was not
offered back wages for hours worked from October 17, 2016, through
November 25, 2017, or after November 9, 2019. Ms. Studer started
work in August 2019 and claims that she suffered similar violations
since starting and she does not address receiving an offer for back
wages.

Ms. Morris filed the Complaint shortly after she received the
letters from Nationwide and the DOL. Nationwide denied all claims.
Ms. Morris then moved for Conditional Certification and
Court-Authorized Notice ("Motion"). While Ms. Morris' Complaint
presents a hybrid collective and class action, she now moves only
for collective action status under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

Ms. Morris seeks to collectively certify the following collective
class as "similarly situated" under 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b):

     All current or former Psychometricians employed by
     Nationwide Children's Hospital during the past three years
     who were paid from the beginning of their shift until the
     end of their shift and not paid for the work they performed
     before and after they clocked in each day and were not paid
     150% of their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of
     40 in a workweek.

The Court holds that Ms. Morris meets the factors set forth in
Lewis v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 789 F.Supp.2d 863, 868 (S.D. Ohio
2011), including whether the potential plaintiffs were identified
and whether affidavits of potential plaintiffs were submitted.

The Court turns to whether the putative collective class should
contain all current and former psychometricians from the "past
three years." Nationwide argues that the putative collective class
should be limited to two years instead of three.

The Court may grant a request to certify a three-year putative
collective class based only on the plaintiff's allegation that an
employer willfully violated the FLSA. Again, a lenient standard is
employed at the conditional certification stage, says District
Judge Sarah D. Morrison.

Because Ms. Morris makes such an allegation, the Court
conditionally certifies the class for a three-year period; the
class period runs three years from the date of this Opinion and
Order. Accordingly, Ms. Morris' Motion for Conditional Class
Certification is granted.

Ms. Morris also moves the Court to authorize sending her Proposed
Notice and Consent to Join form to all putative class members.
Nationwide requests that the Parties meet and confer regarding the
proposed notice, and in the alternative, presents several
modifications. The Court says it will resolve three issues before
ordering the Parties to meet and confer.

First, Nationwide need not provide Ms. Morris the phone numbers of
all the putative collective class members. It is duplicative and
unnecessarily obtrusive at this stage in the litigation, especially
considering that Nationwide is willing to provide names, mailing
addresses, and email addresses.

Second, the Court approves the 90-day opt-in period requested by
Ms. Morris. This strikes the right balance between providing
putative collective class members time to consider their options
during the present pandemic and a timely resolution.

Third, Ms. Morris asks for a reminder notice. Nationwide accepts
that the first notice may be provided by email and first-class
mail. But with that concession, asks that the Court decline a
reminder notice. Judge Morrison notes that courts generally reject
reminder notices because there is a risk that it crosses the line
from advising potential opt-in plaintiffs of the existence of the
lawsuit to encouraging participation.  Ms. Morris points to Hamm v.
S. Ohio Med. Ctr., 275 F.Supp.3d 863, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (Black,
J.), but there the defendant failed to object to the reminder
notice. She also argues that the mail delivery system may be
suspect considering the current pandemic, but that risk is covered
by the dual notice method: email and first-class mail. Accordingly,
the Court declines to approve the requested reminder notice.

Within 10 days of the date of the Opinion and Order, Nationwide
will identify all the putative class members by providing a list in
electronic and importable format of the full names, dates of
employment, positions of employment, locations of employment, last
known mailing addresses, and e-mail addresses of all current and
former employees fitting the class to Ms. Morris' counsel.

Within 14 DAYS of the date of the Opinion and Order, the counsel
will confer and submit a joint draft of a proposed notice to the
potential plaintiffs about the collective action and a proposed
opt-in consent form to morrison_chambers@ohsd.uscourts.gov. The
Court will resolve any disputes noted in the draft in an order
granting final approval of the notice and opt-in consent form.

The motion to approve Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs is
denied without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Feb. 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/sggilyxz from
Leagle.com.


NATIONWIDE MUTUAL: MSP Suit Under MSPA Dismissed Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MSP Recovery Claims Series, LLC, and others,
Plaintiffs v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and others,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 20-21573-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla.), Judge
Robert N. Scola, Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, granted the Insurance Companies' joint motion
to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed the
complaint without prejudice.

Plaintiffs MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and
Series PMPI, a designated series of MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC seek
to recover, through the putative class action, reimbursement from
25 Defendant insurers ("Insurance Companies") for amounts they
claim to be owed as a result of Medicare payments their assignors,
and other Medicare Advantage Organizations, made to or on behalf of
the Insurance Companies' insureds.  The Plaintiffs claim
entitlement to these funds as provided for under the Medicare
Secondary Payer Act ("MSPA").

The Insurance Companies are all auto or other liability insurers
that provide either "no-fault" or "med-pay" insurance to their
customers, including Medicare beneficiaries enrolled under Part C
of the Medicare Act ("Enrollees").  The Plaintiffs say that under
the Insurance Companies' contractual obligations with their
insureds, and under state law, the Insurance Companies must provide
coverage for their insureds' accident-related medical expenses on a
"no-fault" basis.  The Insurance Companies are considered to have
primary responsibility, under the MSPA, regarding Enrollee medical
expenses occasioned by car or other accidents.  That is, Medicare's
responsibility to pay for the accident-related medical expenses of
the Enrollees is secondary to the Insurance Companies'
responsibility.

Medicare and Medicare Advantage Organizations, however, routinely
pay these medical expenses, albeit on a conditional basis.  These
payments are typically made "as an accommodation" for the
Enrollees, subject to being recouped from the primary payer, so
long as the payment is for a service that was, or should have been,
covered by a primary insurer.  The Plaintiffs complain, generally,
"that primary payers like Defendants" "rarely honor their
obligations and, instead, take steps to ensure the burden for those
accident-related medical expenses is borne by Medicare and MA
Plans."

Various Medicare Advantage Plans that provide Medicare benefits
have assigned their rights to recover these payments, under the
MSPA, to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs say they use a proprietary
system to process health-care claims data from various sources in
order to track down which primary payers have failed to honor their
reimbursement obligations under the MSPA.

Sixteen of the Insurance Companies have principal places of
business in Ohio; four in Iowa; and one each in Texas,
Pennsylvania, Arizona, New Mexico, and Michigan.  The Plaintiffs
say the Insurance Companies "have systematically and uniformly
failed to pay or reimburse conditional payments by their assignors
and the Class Members on behalf of Enrollees for accident-related
medical expenses."  They have provided a spreadsheet that they say
identifies "numerous instances where Defendants admitted they were
obligated to provide primary payment on behalf Enrollees."  The
Plaintiffs also describe this list as identifying "instances where
Defendants have failed to pay and/or reimburse conditional payments
made Plaintiffs' assignors for accident-related expenses."

The Plaintiffs describe with more detail three "Exemplar No-Fault
Claims" and two "Exemplar Settlement Claims."  The three exemplar
no-fault claims involve Enrollees of MA Plans issued and
administered by AvMed, Inc.

The Insurance Companies, jointly, seek dismissal of the complaint
because the Plaintiffs have failed to establish the Court's
personal jurisdiction over the Insurance Companies or, if the Court
finds it does have jurisdiction, because the Plaintiffs have failed
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.  The
Insurance Companies, alternatively, maintain the case should be
transferred to the United District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio.  The Plaintiffs counter the Court does have jurisdiction
over the Insurance Companies, that venue is proper in the Court,
and that they have stated a claim for relief under the MSPA.  The
Insurance Companies have timely replied.

Judge Scola concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden of alleging facts supporting either general or personal
jurisdiction over any of the Insurance Companies in the case.  He
finds that the Plaintiffs do not allege Florida is one of the two
paradigm forums for exercising general jurisdiction over any of the
Insurance Companies.  Nor have they alleged facts in their
complaint that would allow the Court to infer the presence of any
exceptional circumstances that would otherwise trigger the Court's
general personal jurisdiction over any of the Insurance Companies.

None of the Plaintiffs' bare allegations, alone or taken together,
comes even close to establishing fact that show any of the
Insurance Companies' operations in Florida are "so substantial and
of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in" Florida.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs' argument that general jurisdiction can
be exercised over the Insurance Companies because the conduct at
issue simply "involves" Florida in some way, is similarly
deficient.

Judge Scola also concludes that the case arises out of the
Insurance Companies' alleged failure to reimburse the Plaintiffs'
assignors for claims the assignors purportedly made on behalf of
the Insurance Companies' insureds.  It does not, however, arise out
of the Insurance Companies' business or contracts with their
insureds themselves.  The Plaintiffs do not make any allegations
that the events that actually triggered the lawsuit -- that is, the
Insurance Companies' failures to reimburse their assignors --
occurred in Florida at all.  Indeed, all indications are that any
alleged failure to reimburse affirmatively did not occur in
Florida.

Accordingly, Judge Scola finds the Plaintiffs have failed to allege
facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case that the provisions
of the long-arm statute they rely on have been satisfied.  Because
the Plaintiffs do not clear this first hurdle, the Judge need not
evaluate whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the Insurance
Companies would otherwise comport with due process and traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Scola, therefore, granted the
Insurance Companies' joint motion to dismiss for a lack of personal
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, he dismissed the complaint without
prejudice and directed the Clerk to close the case.

Furthermore, Judge Scola denied the Plaintiffs' request for leave
to amend, inserted, as an afterthought, at the end of their
opposition to the Insurance Companies' motion: The request is both
procedurally defective and lacking in substantive support.  He
denied any other pending motions as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yal9u6cz from Leagle.com.


NEW PIG: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against New Pig Corporation.
The case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. New Pig Corporation, Case No.
1:21-cv-01135 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

New Pig Corporation -- https://www.newpig.com/ -- offers the
world's largest selection of absorbent products to industrial,
utility, military, and government facilities worldwide.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


NEW YORK: Court Dismisses First Amended Complaint in West vs. MTA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted in its entirety the Defendants' motion to dismiss the first
amended complaint in the lawsuit entitled MARY WEST and JENIE LEE
MARIANI, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, NEW YORK CITY
TRANSIT AUTHORITY, and LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD COMPANY D/B/A MTA LONG
ISLAND RAIL ROAD COMPANY, Defendants, Case No. 18-CV-1743 (WFK)
(RML) (E.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs West and Mariani bring the putative class action against
Defendants Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA"), New York
City Transit Authority ("NYCTA"), and Long Island Rail Road Company
("LIRR,") asserting common law negligence, as well as claims
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), the New York
City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), and the New York State Human
Rights Law ("NYSHRL").

The Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of "all persons or
entities in New York who paid to use the Transit System in New York
during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as
the Court may deem appropriate." They additionally seek to
represent subclasses consisting of (1) "all members who were
injured due to the failure of Defendants to install platform
barriers ("Physical Injury Subclass")" and (2) "all class members
who are visually impaired ("Visually Impaired Subclass").

The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants maintain train platforms
that are "unreasonably unsafe" and "lack basic safety features that
have been employed for decades on the train platforms of large- and
mid-sized cities around the world." Specifically, they argue the
law requires the Defendants to install safety barriers between the
platform and the tracks. The Plaintiffs allege the lack of
consistent platform barriers between the platform and the tracks
has led to a number of instances in which riders have fallen or
been pushed onto the subway tracks, and further, that the lack of
platform barriers presents particular challenges for disabled and
visually impaired passengers.

In response, the Defendants argue they are in compliance with
Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. They maintain the
DOT is "exclusively" responsible for setting accessibility
standards for public transportation facilities. The Defendants
argue DOT regulations only require the MTA to install "platform
edge warnings," which they have, but not the "platform barriers"
the Plaintiffs desire.

On July 11, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint
in this action. They assert federal claims under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act, claims sounding in common law negligence, as
well as state law claims arising under the NYCHRL and the NYSHRL.

On September 17, 2018, the Defendants filed the instant motion to
dismiss. The Plaintiffs filed their response, and the Defendants
filed their reply. On December 12, 2019, the Court entered a
decision and order granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss in
its entirety. The Court writes now to provide the reasoning for its
decision.

The Court first turns to the question of whether the Plaintiffs
have adequately alleged violations of the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act, as without these claims, federal jurisdiction is in jeopardy.
It finds the ADA does not require the Defendants to erect the
platform barriers the Plaintiffs demand. Compliance with DOT's
implementing regulations is sufficient to comply with the ADA, says
District Judge William F. Kuntz, II, citing DeJesus v. Metro.
Transportation Auth., 17-CV-7054, 2019 WL 1059971, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2019) (Swain, J.).

The relevant regulation contemplates platform "edges."
Specifically, the regulation reads, "platform boarding edges not
protected by platform screens or guards will have detectible
warnings." This regulation does not require platform barriers.
Instead, it specifically requires the Defendants to install
"detectable warning surfaces at platform edges" that are two feet
wide and extend the full length of the platform, Judge Kuntz finds.
Judge Kuntz holds that the Defendants are in compliance, having
installed detectable warning surfaces on platform edges across the
transit system. Because the Defendants have complied with DOT's
regulation, they have complied with Title II.

Further, the Plaintiffs are foreclosed from asserting their claims
under a reasonable modification theory. Because Congress intended
compliance with DOT regulations would be sufficient to satisfy a
public transit entity's Title II obligations, and because DOT's
regulations do not require the installation of platform barriers,
the Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims must be
dismissed, Judge Kuntz holds.

Having dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs'
remaining claims.

The Plaintiffs assert, notwithstanding the dismissal of their
federal ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the Court may retain
jurisdiction of their state and city law claims under the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). However, CAFA instructs district
courts to decline jurisdiction if "two-thirds or more of the
members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed."

The Defendants argue the allegations in the First Amended Complaint
are insufficient to establish the predicates for exercise of CAFA
jurisdiction. Specifically, the Defendants, who are all New York
residents assert, nearly all users of the Long Island Rail Road,
and a large majority of users of the New York City subway are New
York Residents, noting in particular, members of the proposed
visually impaired subclass are almost entirely New York Residents.
The Plaintiffs assert tourists make up a large share of subway
passengers, including visually impaired passengers.

Even accepting the Plaintiffs' representation as true, the Court
agrees with the Defendants that it would be unreasonable to infer
from the tourism figures that tourists make up more than one-third
of the proposed class.

For these reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint is granted, and the Plaintiffs' claims under the
Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act are
dismissed. To the extent that the Plaintiff asserts state and city
law claims, the Court finds no basis for the exercise of CAFA
jurisdiction and declines, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c),
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs state and city law claims are also
dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum of Decision dated Feb.
1, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/52kgqvzs from
Leagle.com.


ONE SOURCE: Paguada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against One Source To Market,
LLC. The case is styled as Josue Paguada, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. One Source To Market, LLC, Case
No. 1:21-cv-01098 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

One Source To Market, which also operates under the name Juice
Presso, is located in Los Angeles, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


OREGON: Court in Maney Suit Orders ODOC to Give AICs COVID Vaccine
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PAUL MANEY; GARY CLIFT; GEORGE NULPH; THERON HALL;
DAVID HART; MICAH RHODES; and SHERYL LYNN SUBLET, individually, on
behalf of a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. KATE
BROWN; COLETTE PETERS; HEIDI STEWARD; MIKE GOWER; MARK NOOTH; ROB
PERSSON; KEN JESKE; and PATRICK ALLEN, Defendants, Case No.
6:20-cv-00570-SB (D. Or.), Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for provisional class certification and the
Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

The Court also ordered the Defendants to offer all AICs housed in
ODOC facilities, who have not been offered a COVID-19 vaccine, a
COVID-19 vaccine as if they had been included in Phase 1A, Group 2,
of Oregon's Vaccination Plan.

Plaintiffs Maney, Clift, Nulph, Hall, Hart, Rhodes, and Sublet,
adults in custody ("AIC") at Oregon Department of Corrections
("ODOC") institutions, filed a third amended complaint alleging
constitutional and state law violations against Defendants Gov.
Brown, Peters, Steward, Gower, Nooth, Persson, Jeske, and Allen.

From the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was clear that the
country's prisons were uniquely vulnerable to the transmission and
spread of the virus.  To date, over 366,000 incarcerated
individuals have tested positive for COVID-19, and over 2,300 have
died.  Oregon prisons have not been spared from this reality, as
COVID-19's toll continues to mount behind bars.

The Defendants are aware of the higher risk of COVID-19 exposure
and infection to individuals living and working in congregate
living facilities, and do not dispute that vaccination is an
essential component of protecting against COVID-19 exposure.  For
these reasons, Defendants Gov. Brown and Oregon Health Authority
("OHA") Director Allen have prioritized in Phase 1A of Oregon's
COVID-19 Vaccination Plan the vaccination of those living and
working in congregate care facilities and those working in
correctional settings.  Yet, Gov. Brown and Allen have excluded
from Phase 1A individuals living in correctional settings.

The Plaintiffs assert allegations on behalf of a class of similarly
situated AICs, and propose three classes: (1) the "Injunctive
Relief Class"; (2) the "Damages Class"; and (3) the "Vaccine
Class."  The Plaintiffs allege that the Injunctive Relief Class
consists of all AICs at the highest risk of dying or suffering from
severe illness from COVID-19 who are currently or who will be in
the future held in ODOC custody.  The Damages Class includes all
AICs who have been continuously housed at ODOC facilities after
Feb. 1, 2020 and who have been diagnosed with COVID-19 illness.
The Vaccine Class consists of all prisoners housed in ODOC
facilities who have not been offered a COVID-19 vaccine.  The
Plaintiffs seek only certification of the Vaccine Class at this
time.

The Plaintiffs filed the action in April 2020.  On May 12, 2020,
they filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, alleging that the Defendants' response to
the COVID-19 pandemic violated the Eighth Amendment.  On June 1,
2020, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion.

On June 26, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint
("SAC"), alleging that the Defendants (1) violated the Eighth
Amendment by subjecting AICs to cruel and unusual punishment by
failing to provide adequate healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic
and by operating ODOC facilities without the capacity to treat,
test, or prevent the spread of COVID-19, and (2) committed
negligence in failing to carry out proper preventative measures.
On Aug. 3, 2020, the Defendants moved for partial summary judgment
on the damages portion of the Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim
and on the entirety of the Plaintiffs' state law negligence claim.

On Dec. 15, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part the
Defendants' motion.  On Jan. 22, 2020, the Court granted the
Plaintiffs' motion to file a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC").  The
TAC proposes a third class of AICs, the Vaccine Class, and adds
Allen as a Defendant.  The Plaintiffs now seek certification of the
Vaccine Class and move for a preliminary injunction.

The Plaintiffs seek to provisionally certify the following class:
"All adults in custody housed at Oregon Department of Corrections
facilities (ODOC) who have not been offered COVID-19 vaccinations."
The Defendants argue that the proposed class is overbroad and ask
the Court to limit the class to medically vulnerable and elderly
AICs.

Magistrate Judge Beckerman acknowledges the difficult and
unenviable task faced by Defendants Allen and Gov. Brown: they must
determine the order in which Oregon citizens will receive a
lifesaving vaccine that is limited in supply during a global
pandemic.  The question of which groups of Oregonians should
receive priority is best left to the policymakers, and is not the
question before the Court.  The narrow question before the Court is
whether prioritizing those living and working in congregate care
facilities and those working in correctional settings to receive
the vaccine, but denying the same priority for those living in
correctional settings, demonstrates deliberate indifference to the
health and safety of those relying on the state's care.

Magistrate Beckerman explains that the people's constitutional
rights are not suspended during a crisis.  On the contrary, during
difficult times they must remain the most vigilant to protect the
constitutional rights of the powerless.  Even when faced with
limited resources, the state must fulfill its duty of protecting
those in its custody.  Magistrate Beckerman finds that the law and
facts clearly favor the Plaintiffs' position, and therefore grants
their request for preliminary injunctive relief.

As to Plaintiffs' motion for provisional class certification,
Magistrate Judge Beckerman finds that the Plaintiffs have satisfied
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)'s requirements.  And, because the Defendants'
actions and inaction apply to the class generally, she determines
that Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirements are also satisfied.  The
Defendants' failure to offer available COVID-19 vaccine doses to
AICs is applicable to each member of the class so that injunctive
relief is appropriate to the class as a whole.  Accordingly, Rule
23(b)(2) is satisfied.  For these reasons, the Plaintiffs have met
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2)'s requirements provisionally to
certify the Vaccine Class.

For the reasons she stated, Magistrate Beckerman granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for provisional class certification, granted the
Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and ordered that
the Defendants will offer all AICs housed in ODOC facilities, who
have not been offered a COVID-19 vaccine, a COVID-19 vaccine as if
they had been included in Phase 1A, Group 2, of Oregon's
Vaccination Plan.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/336cikrc from Leagle.com.


PARENTGIVING LLC: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against ParentGiving LLC. The
case is styled as Ramon Jaquez, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. ParentGiving LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-01176
(S.D.N.Y., Feb. 9, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Parentgiving -- https://www.parentgiving.com/ -- is a one-stop shop
for all home care products and elderly care equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


PINE TAVERN: Jurgelevicius Seeks Minimum Wage for Tipped Employees
------------------------------------------------------------------
CASEY JURGELEVICIUS, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated v. PINE TAVERN, INC., individually; CLAGS INC. d/b/a PINE
TAVERN; LUIGI BONGIOVI, individually; GIUSEPPE BONGIOVI,
individually, Case No. 1:21-cv-01588 (D.N.J., Feb. 1, 2021) is a
collective and class action complaint against the Defendants for
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage and
Hour Law, and the New Jersey Wage Payment Law.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants engaged in a policy or
practice requiring her and members of the putative class and
similarly situated persons to surrender a percentage of rightfully
earned tips to the Pine Tavern in violation of applicable federal
and state law and to not pay tipped employees the New Jersey
minimum wage.

The putative class and persons similarly situated to Plaintiff
include all tipped employees such as servers and bartenders
employed by the Defendants since February 1, 2018.

The Plaintiff was employed as a part-time waitress by Pine Tavern
from July 5, 2020 to January 11, 2021.

Pine Tavern is a restaurant operating at 151 NJ-34 in Matawan, New
Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Susan L. Swatski, Esq.
          HILL WALLACK LLP
          21 Roszel Rd.
          Princeton, NJ 08543-5226
          Telephone: (609) 924-0808
          E-mail: sswatski@hillwallack.com

PROJECT MANAGEMENT: Claims in Mahr Discrimination Suit Narrowed
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion to
partially dismiss the lawsuit entitled BERNADETTE MAHR, Plaintiff
v. PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
20-3653 (E.D. Pa.).

Plaintiff Mahr sued Project Management, Nicholas Verrekia and Lisa
McCann alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act, Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act during her
employment at PMI. Mahr worked as a Project Manager III at PMI from
2012 to January 15, 2019. During her first six years, she says
consistently received excellent evaluations, as well as annual pay
increases and bonuses.

Ms. Mahr alleges that her trajectory at PMI changed when the
company hired Verrekia as Director of the Office of Strategy
Delivery in February of 2018. She alleges that Verrekia was intent
on terminating her and after his arrival she was harassed, subject
to a hostile and abusive work environment, threatened and demeaned,
physically intimidated and ultimately constructively discharged.

According to the complaint, Verrekia treated women differently from
men. He had a "propensity for using profanity" that was intended to
harass women. He "ridiculed women who contributed or participated
in discussions in which he was a participant and bristled when
corrected by a woman." His behavior negatively affected PMI's
female employees. He was "instrumental" in one woman's termination
and "forced" another woman to transfer her position outside his
supervision. That woman claimed she received positive performance
reviews until Verrekia's arrival and thereafter received negative
feedback. He opened a meeting between himself and three women,
including Mahr, by "repeatedly using the 'f' word" causing one
woman to return the favor and give him the middle finger. PMI fired
that woman within two months of the meeting for use of foul
language in the workplace while Verrekia retained his position.

Mr. Verrekia's actions also personally affected Mahr. Once, after
Mahr asked him to enter his time consistent with her Project
Manager duties, Verrekia falsely claimed he was exempt from time
entry, "expressed anger that a woman would ask him to do something"
and told Mahr she was to check with him before doing anything like
that again. Three days later, he set up a meeting with Mahr during
which he demonstrated anger, hostility and aggression and addressed
Mahr in an intimidating fashion by thrusting his hands on his desk
and pushing his face toward hers. He told Mahr he "watches" women,
her in particular, in meetings. He also told her not to speak
during department meetings, stating her comments "were not
necessary and did not add any value."

Ms. Mahr and another woman were sufficiently offended by Verrekia's
conduct that they complained to human resources. Mahr herself
complained twice to human resources and once to four PMI Vice
Presidents regarding, among other things, Verrekia's harassment and
discrimination. She alleges PMI did not properly address,
investigate or resolve her complaints. Moreover, she says she was
retaliated against for telling human resources her concerns. She
believes PMI's responses to her complaints "condoned, ratified,
endorsed and encouraged the conduct of Defendants Verrekia and
McCann." She says because "[n]o reasonable person would remain at a
workplace where repeated complaints of sex discrimination, hostile
workplace, and retaliation went systematically ignored while
repeated efforts to fabricate a basis for termination were
generated" she was constructively discharged from the company.

The Plaintiff also alleges throughout her tenure at PMI she was
paid less than male Project Manager IIIs "who were performing a
substantially similar job and doing substantially similar
activities for PMI" even though she handled more projects than
them. She further alleges female Project Manager IIIs in general
"were paid a lesser rate of pay than male employees holding
substantially similar positions" and that PMI has "consistently
paid female employees less than men in comparable positions"
because of their gender.

On February 26, 2019, Mahr dual-filed a charge against the
Defendants with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission and Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging violations of Title VII
and the PHRA based on the facts described. The EEOC issued Mahr a
Notice of Right to Sue on July 16, 2020. On March 3, 2020, the PHRC
advised Mahr of her right to bring a lawsuit because one year had
passed since she filed her charge.

On July 28, 2020, Mahr filed the lawsuit alleging against PMI
gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII and the PHRA (Counts I and II); retaliation against PMI
in violation of Title VII (Count III) and against all Defendants in
violation of the PHRA (Count IV); aiding and abetting against
Verrekia and McCann in violation of the PHRA (Count V); and
violation of the EPA against PMI (Count VI). See (Compl. 16-24).
She asserts Counts I, II and VI on her own behalf as well as
purportedly on behalf of similarly situated individuals. She brings
Counts III, IV and V only on her own behalf.

The Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II and VI pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to
Counts I and II, they argue Mahr failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies before pursuing class action claims. They
also contend she has not adequately pled facts supporting her
hostile work environment claims. The Defendants assert Mahr
provides no factual support for her claim in Count VI but rather
merely recites the elements of such a claim under the EPA.

District Judge Gerald J. Pappert notes that to the extent Mahr
intends to bring the claims in Counts I and II on behalf of a
class, such allegations seem at this point to be reasonably within
the scope of her original charge, citing Cf. Lusardi v. Lechner,
855 F.2d 1062, 1078 (3d Cir. 1988). The Judge opines that the
Defendants correctly point out that Mahr's charge does not state
specifically that it is on behalf of a class or similarly situated
employees and that she refers to herself more than to others. But
the charge also contains numerous assertions about Verrekia or
PMI's treatment of all women in the workplace, including Verrekia
treats women as second-class citizens, who are to be seen but not
heard, and that since his hiring Respondent Verrekia has
discriminated against Mahr and other women working at PMI.

Ms. Mahr's Complaint does not, however, comply with Local Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1, which requires her to specify she is
asserting class action allegations, reference the portion(s) of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 that make a lawsuit properly
maintainable as a class action and allege facts justifying a class
claim, including but not limited to the size and definition of the
alleged class, the reason she is an adequate representative for the
class and common questions of law and fact to the class, Judge
Pappert opines, citing Local R. Civ. P. 23.1(a)-(b) (2017). Her
purported class claims in Counts I and II of the Complaint are,
accordingly, dismissed without prejudice.

Judge Pappert rules that Mahr may amend her class claims, but must
remember that although no minimum number of plaintiffs is required
to maintain a suit as a class action, a plaintiff in this circuit
can generally satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement by
establishing that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40.'

Considering the totality of Mahr's allegations in the light most
favorable to her, she has stated plausible claims for hostile work
environment, Judge Pappert finds. She alleges men and women are
treated differently at PMI and that she endured an abusive
environment between Verrekia's hiring in February of 2018 until she
left in January of 2019. Judge Pappert adds that Mahr has also
stated a plausible claim of respondeat superior liability.

The Plaintiff alleges she received less pay than men with her same
job title at her same level and she handled more projects than her
male counterparts. The Defendants argue these allegations are
"merely vague and conclusory statements" that do no more than
recite the elements of an EPA claim.

Though Mahr's allegations are somewhat conclusory, accepting them
as true at this stage barely "nudges them across the line from
conceivable to plausible," Judge Pappert holds, quoting Phillips v.
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). Judge Pappert
rules that Mahr can proceed with these claims in her individual
capacity, and the Defendants may renew their argument at summary
judgment.

Even under a liberal reading, however, Mahr's Complaint fails to
allege facts plausibly establishing a collective action for an EPA
claim, Judge Pappert opines. Mahr alleges other female Project
Manager IIIs received less pay than men in similar positions, but
she does not allege the job title(s), roles or responsibilities
belonging to the men to whom she is referring. She also vaguely
alleges PMI pays women less than men in comparable positions
performing equal work, but provides no specificity to bolster that
claim for the Court to ascertain who she is comparing or whether
her comparison is fair. Accordingly, Count VI of Mahr's Complaint
is dismissed, albeit with leave to amend, as to its collective
action claims.

Judge Pappert also rules that Mahr may amend Counts I, II and VI
consistent with the Memorandum and to the extent she can allege
facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/wvcmh28l from Leagle.com.


RATER8 LLC: Wilson TCPA-UCL Suit Stayed Pending Ruling in Duguid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT WILSON, Plaintiff v. RATER8, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; SAN DIEGO ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES MEDICAL
GROUP, a California Corporation; LARRY D. DODGE, M.D., INC., a
California Corporation, Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-1515-DMS-LL
(S.D. Cal.), Chief District Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California granted the
Defendants' motion to stay the action pending a decision from the
United States Supreme Court in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, et al.,
Case No. 19-511.

On Aug. 6, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the class action against
Defendants, alleging a violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA"), and California Business & Professions Code
Section 17200 ("UCL").  He alleges that immediately after seeing
Larry D. Dodge, M.D. for an independent medical examination, the
Plaintiff wrongfully received a text message asking him to complete
a survey regarding his visit with Dr. Dodge.  He alleges the
Defendants used an Automatic Telephone Dialing System ("ATDS") to
send the text message without his consent.

On Oct. 27, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings
pending a decision from the Supreme Court in Duguid.  They claim
the forthcoming decision could have a significant and potentially
dispositive impact on the case because the Supreme Court may
determine what technology qualifies as an ATDS, and thus whether
the Plaintiff's claims under the TCPA are viable.

On Nov. 4, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint
("FAC").  In his FAC, the Plaintiff asserts an additional state law
claim for violations of the Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act.  He also named Maneesh Bawa, M.D. as an additional Defendant.
On Nov. 20, 2020, the Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's
motion to stay, and the Defendants filed a reply brief on Nov. 27,
2020.

Judge Sabraw explains that the Supreme Court's decision in Duguid
will clarify a core legal issue in the instant action, namely
"whether the definition of ATDS in the TCPA encompasses any device
that can 'store' and 'automatically dial' telephone numbers, even
if the device does not use a random or sequential number
generator.'"  As noted, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
unlawfully used an ATDS to message him without his express written
consent.  As the Defendants argue, the adjudication of the issue
may well determine whether the device used to message the Plaintiff
constitutes an ATDS under the TCPA.  Allowing the case to proceed
pending a decision in Duguid could be wasteful and result in
duplicative proceedings.

Additionally, in the absence of a stay, Judge Sabraw finds that the
parties would expend resources conducting discovery.  The burden of
discovery could be reduced by the outcome of Duguid.  While being
required to defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a
clear case of hardship or inequity, the burden of litigating an
issue that may be mooted adds to that potential hardship.  The
Defendants' interest in avoiding potentially unnecessary litigation
and discovery is consistent with the Court's interest in preserving
judicial resources and efficiency.  These factors, therefore, weigh
in favor of staying the case.

By contrast, the risk of prejudice to the Plaintiff is minimal.
Judge Sabraw notes that the duration of the stay requested by the
Defendants is reasonably determinate.  Under the Supreme Court's
customary practice, a decision in Duguid will likely be issued by
the end of this summer.

The Plaintiff argues that a stay will prejudice his case because
evidence may become unavailable pending the decision in Duguid.
However, even crediting his assertion that certain third-party
carriers retain call and text message logs for only 18 to 24
months, Judge Sabraw holds that the the issuance of a stay in the
matter should not result in loss of such evidence.

The Plaintiff alleges that he received the subject messages on June
23, 2020.  If the Supreme Court issues its decision in Duguid as
late as August 2021, the Plaintiff should still have several months
to initiate discovery and obtain the relevant text logs before they
become unavailable.  The possibility that a stay would limit his
access to this evidence is speculative, and largely undermined by
his own projections.  The Plaintiff could also move the Court to
lift the stay and pursue targeted discovery in the event a ruling
by the Supreme Court is delayed.

Considering the interests of justice, competing equities and likely
limited duration of the stay, Judge Sabraw is persuaded that a stay
of the case is appropriate.  For these reasons, she granted the
Defendants' motion.  All proceedings in the matter will be stayed
pending the Supreme Court's decision in Duguid.  The parties will
notify the Court within 14 days after the Supreme Court issues its
decision.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/vz2odzo2 from Leagle.com.


RESOLUTE ENERGY: Wins Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Securities Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss in the matter styled In re: RESOLUTE
ENERGY CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION, Case No. 19-77-RGA (D.
Del.).

In the consolidated class action, Lead Plaintiff William A.
Langdon, Jr. asserts claims on behalf of himself and other
stockholders against Resolute and the members of its Board of
Directors for violations of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as breaches of fiduciary
duty. The Lead Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants authorized the
filing of a materially incomplete and misleading Registration
Statement on Form S-4 ("Proxy") with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Proxy was used to solicit stockholder votes in
favor of the merger of Resolute and Cimarex Energy Company, which
was completed on March 1, 2019.

On March 18, 2020, the Court dismissed the Lead Plaintiff's
original complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), but with leave to
amend. The Lead Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 13,
2020, and the Defendants responded with another motion to dismiss
on May 28, 2020. The Court now resolves the Defendants' second
motion to dismiss.

In dismissing the original complaint, the Court found that the Lead
Plaintiff failed to plead, among other things, loss causation. Loss
causation requires a showing of "a causal connection between the
material misrepresentation and the loss."

The Court noted that the original complaint failed to "offer any
notice of what the relevant economic loss might have been." It
further explained that there were two possible economic loss
theories the Lead Plaintiff could have argued, but both were
insufficient.

Under the first theory, in an alternate reality, Resolute
stockholders vote against the merger because there were no material
misstatements and, as a result, the Resolute stockholders are left
holding Resolute stock on March 1, 2019, the date the merger
closed. Thus, the measure of the harm under the first theory is the
difference between the actual merger consideration and the value of
Resolute stock, as a standalone company, on March 1, 2019. Because
the merger consideration was $35 per share (to be paid in cash,
Cimarex stock, or a mix of stock and cash), the Lead Plaintiff
would have had to show that the market value of Resolute's stock on
March 1, 2019, if it had remained a standalone company, would have
been greater than $35 per share.

The Court concluded, however, that it was "virtually impossible to
plausibly allege that if the merger had been voted down, Resolute
stock would have been trading at over $35 per share (or close to
that) on March 1, 2019." As a factual matter, Resolute stock was
trading at about $30 per share immediately before the merger was
announced, so "the merger consideration was about 15% greater than
the value the market placed on Resolute stock at the time of the
merger announcement. And, as a theoretical matter, the merger
consideration is usually going to be greater than the market value
or actual value of the shares without consideration of the merger
due to the existence of a merger premium.

Finally, for the reasons explained in the opinion, the financial
analyses of Goldman Sachs and Petrie Partners detailed in the proxy
statement do not support an assertion that Resolute shares would
have been trading at above $35 at the time of the merger.
Accordingly, the Lead Plaintiff had not plead and appeared unable
to plead loss causation based on a theory that stockholders would
have received more than $35 per share by voting down the merger.

Under the second theory, also in an alternate reality, Resolute
stockholders vote in favor of the merger, but because the Board
negotiated a better deal with Cimarex, the Resolute stockholders
receive more than $35 per share. The measure of the harm under the
second theory is the difference between the merger consideration
the Board actually obtained and a hypothetical better merger
consideration the Board could have obtained. Thus, the cause of the
harm under the second theory is the failure of the Board to
negotiate a better deal, not the material misstatements that
persuaded stockholders to vote in favor of the merger. Loss
causation requires "a causal connection" between the material
misrepresentation and the monetary loss. Because the actions of the
Board, and not the material misstatements, are the cause of harm
under the second theory, the Court previously rejected the second
theory as an adequate basis to plead loss causation.

The amended complaint contains some new allegations. One area where
it is unchanged is in its description of the Lead Plaintiff. The
Lead Plaintiff was at all relevant times a Resolute stockholder.
Based on the attached certification, the Lead Plaintiff held 50,000
shares of Resolute stock before the announcement of the merger on
November 19, 2018.

The Court says it does not know what form of merger consideration
the Lead Plaintiff asked for or received in exchange for his
Resolute stock, but it knows he did not receive all cash. The Court
knows this because of another new allegation: "insufficient funds
had been set aside so that under the proration formula no
stockholder was able to receive all cash consideration no matter
which election he or she made."

What Lead Plaintiff has done with the Cimarex stock he received as
merger consideration is not alleged. He might still own some or all
of it. The Lead Plaintiff still does not assert that in the absence
of the merger that the Resolute stock would have been trading at
more than $35 on March 1, 2019, or any other date. Nor does he make
any allegations about market events relating to Cimarex stock after
March 1, 2019.

Instead, the Lead Plaintiff now asserts that at $35 per share, the
merger consideration "undervalued Resolute shares by more than
$3.50 per share" or by $28,578,396 for the class. Specifically, the
Lead Plaintiff asserts that the amended complaint adequately pleads
loss causation and directs the Court's attention to paragraphs
107-111 therein. In those paragraphs, the Lead Plaintiff alleges
that "the 'cash election consideration' of $35 per share of
Resolute was unfairly low at the time the Merger was announced,";
"the $35 nominal offer price was too low,"; and Resolute stock was
"undervalued in the merger agreement."

These allegations, District Judge Richard G. Andrews notes, focused
on the low "offer price" in the "merger agreement," suggest that
the Lead Plaintiff is proceeding under the second theory, where the
loss is a hypothetically better offer price in the merger
agreement, because the Board negotiates a better deal. As the Court
previously explained, however, loss causation cannot be based on a
theory that the stockholder could have received a better deal,
because then the cause of the harm is the Board's failure to
negotiate a better offer and not, as required by the law, the
material misstatements.

Put simply, the Lead Plaintiff cannot rely on the theory that
whatever combination of cash and Cimarex stock that he obtained in
the merger makes out an economic loss caused by the material
omissions and/or false statements of which he complains, Judge
Andrews holds. He points out that there are no allegations of an
actual economic loss for two reasons.

First, there are no allegations about what the Lead Plaintiff did
with his shares of Cimarex stock after the merger. Second, even
were that not the case, and the Lead Plaintiff stated that he had
indeed received all cash, he cannot state an economic loss and loss
causation simply by alleging that the Resolute stock was
undervalued at the time of the merger (no matter how precisely, if
not plausibly, he puts a number on it).

Accordingly, Judge Andrews holds that the amended complaint fails
to adequately plead loss causation, an essential element of a
Section 14(a) claim. The Section 14(a) claim (Count I) is dismissed
with prejudice.

Because the Lead Plaintiff did not adequately plead an underlying
Section 14(a) violation, his Section 20(a) control-person claim
also fails as a matter of law. Thus, the Section 20(a) claim (Count
II) is also dismissed with prejudice.

For these reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Lead
Plaintiff's consolidated amended class action complaint is granted.
The federal securities claims (Counts I and II) are dismissed with
prejudice, and the state law claim (Count III) is dismissed without
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/1lgjkewy from Leagle.com.


RESURGENT CAPITAL: LVNV Can Compel Arbitration in Cobb FDCPA Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration in the lawsuit titled Janay Cobb, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Resurgent
Capital Services, LP, LVNV Funding LLC, and John Does 1-25,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-5833-MLB (N.D. Ga.).

In April 2015, the Plaintiff opened a credit card account with
Credit One Bank, N.A. The Account is governed by a written
cardholder agreement. The Agreement includes an arbitration clause.


In November 2015, Credit One assigned the Account to another
company. After a series of further assignations from one company to
another, the Account was ultimately assigned to Defendant LVNV in
December 2015. Defendant LVNV retained Defendant Resurgent to
service the Account on its behalf.

In January 2019, Defendant Resurgent sent the Plaintiff a letter
about an alleged debt on her Account. Plaintiff Cobb brings the
putative class action against Defendants Resurgent, LVNV and John
Does 1-25 for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"). The Plaintiff filed the lawsuit in December 2019,
claiming the letter violated the FDCPA.

The Defendants moved to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's
claims and to dismiss this case with prejudice.

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the Defendants' motion for
arbitration but staying, rather than dismissing, the case while
arbitration takes place. The Plaintiff filed objections. The
Defendants filed a response.

The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
("R&R") as modified.

In InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003), a
party who attempts to compel arbitration must show that a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists, that the movant is entitled to
invoke the arbitration clause, that the other party is bound by
that clause, and that the claim asserted comes within the clause's
scope.

District Judge Michael L. Brown finds that only the second element
is disputed in the case: Whether the Defendants can invoke the
arbitration clause despite their status as non-signatories to the
Agreement. The Magistrate Judge found (1) the parties must
arbitrate whether Defendant LVNV can invoke the clause; (2) the
Court need not reach whether Defendant Resurgent can invoke the
clause; and (3) the case should be stayed pending arbitration. The
Plaintiff's sole objection is to the first finding.

The Court sustains the Plaintiff's objection but concludes
Defendant LVNV can invoke the arbitration clause--so the Court
still agrees with the Magistrate Judge that arbitration is required
here. The Court also agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge's
other findings.

The Agreement says the parties to the Agreement ("you or we") can
invoke the arbitration clause. The Agreement defines those parties
as the Plaintiff and "Credit One Bank, N.A., its successors or
assigns." The Magistrate Judge concluded an arbitrator--rather than
a court--must decide whether Defendant LVNV falls within this
definition. The Court disagrees. It further finds, upon its own
review, that Defendant LVNV falls within the definition of a party
to the Agreement (and can invoke the arbitration clause).

The Agreement also provides for "mandatory, binding arbitration" of
certain disputes, including disputes about "the application,
enforceability or interpretation of this Agreement, including th[e]
arbitration provision." The Magistrate Judge thought this language
"clearly and unmistakably" makes the arbitrator responsible for
deciding whether Defendant LVNV counts as a party to the Agreement
(within the meaning of "Credit One Bank, N.A., its successors or
assigns"). The Court disagrees.

The Court cannot say parties contractually agreed to send a dispute
to arbitration (including a dispute over their relationship to the
contract) until the Court first determines whether they entered
into contract at all, citing China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp.
Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 288 (3d Cir. 2003). To do
otherwise, at least on current facts, would assume an answer to the
very question being sent to the arbitrator to resolve. Judge Brown
notes that neither the Defendants nor the Magistrate Judge cite any
authority requiring that illogical result. And the Court sees none.
The Court, therefore, holds that it, not the arbitrator, must
determine whether Defendant LVNV is a party to the Agreement (who
can thus invoke the arbitration clause).

Ultimately, no matter how you slice it--whether Defendant LVNV is
Credit One's "assign," whether it stands in for "Credit One Bank,
N.A." directly, or whether it is both--Defendant LVNV is a party to
the Agreement and can, thus, invoke the arbitration clause against
the Plaintiff, Judge Brown opines. This means Defendant LVNV can
require the Plaintiff to arbitrate (1) the merits of her claims
against Defendant LVNV or (2) whether those claims are arbitrable
in the first place if there is any other dispute about that.

The Magistrate Judge also concluded it was unnecessary to address
Defendant Resurgent's ability to invoke the arbitration clause by
itself because the issue may never be relevant depending on the
arbitrator's findings." The Magistrate Judge further concluded
that, in the event that the arbitrator finds that LVNV/'Credit One'
is not contractually entitled to compel arbitration of the jointly
asserted claims against itself and Resurgent, then the parties
should be able to return to this Court to address any remaining
issues of arbitrability of any non-party claims under third party
beneficiary and/or estoppel theories. No one objects to these
conclusions. The Court, thus, adopts them.

The Magistrate Judge found the case should be stayed, rather than
dismissed, because there may be other issues for the Court to
resolve pending the outcome of arbitration. The Magistrate Judge
further found that the parties should provide the Court with
regular updates about the status of the arbitration while the stay
is in place. Again, no one objects to these conclusions. So the
Court adopts them.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Objections are sustained and the
Magistrate Judge's Non-Final Report and Recommendation is adopted
as modified in the Order. The Defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted to
the extent Defendant LVNV seeks to compel arbitration, denied
without prejudice to the extent Defendant Resurgent seeks to compel
arbitration, and denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of the
case.

The action is stayed and administratively closed pending the
outcome of arbitration. The Court orders the parties to provide the
Court with status updates on their arbitration (1) every three
months after the entry date of the Order and (2) within 14 days
after any final order on the merits or any other order on the issue
of arbitrability. Failure to comply with these instructions could
result in dismissal of the case (without further warning).

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion & Order dated Feb. 1, 2021,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/yjgmguln from Leagle.com.


RIP N DIP: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rip N Dip, Inc. The
case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Rip N Dip, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01136 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

RipNDip -- https://www.ripndipclothing.com/ -- offers clothing,
accessories, and footwear.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL: Faces Lawsuits Over Stock Trading Restrictions
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Kan, writing for PC, reports that angry internet users have
filed over 30 class-action lawsuits against Robinhood for
restricting stock buys on the app.

The lawsuits have been piling up in the PACER court database days
after Robinhood stopped stock buys for GameStop and seven other
companies. On Feb. 2, PCMag counted 34 civil complaints against the
company.

A Massachusetts-based man named Brendon Nelson was the first to
file a class-action lawsuit against Robinhood, demanding it pay up
in damages for depriving users of the chance to buy GameStop stock.
Since then, dozens of users across the US have filed similar
complaints.

Some of the lawsuits point out Robinhood users could only hold or
sell the affected stocks as the share price for GameStop began to
fall, benefiting short-sellers. "This is what the Hedge Funds
wanted. When everyone is only selling, the price cannot go up
because no one can buy the shares," reads a complaint filed in
Florida.  

Another complaint filed in California names all the major stock
trading platforms, claiming they engaged in a conspiracy and
violated antitrust laws by preventing retail investors from buying
the stocks. "In other words, Robinhood (and Apex Clearing
Corporation) stole from the poor to give to the rich," writes a
separate class-action lawsuit filed in San Francisco.

However, the lawsuits may not have much of a chance in court.
Robinhood's customer agreement notes it has the power to stop stock
buys, without any prior notice.

The company also claims it had no choice but to restrict the stock
buys due to it running out of cash to cover the transactions. "The
amount required by clearinghouses to cover the settlement period of
some securities rose tremendously. How much? To put it in
perspective, our clearinghouse-mandated deposit requirements
related to equities increased ten-fold," the company wrote in a
blog post.

"We did this because the required amount we had to deposit with the
clearinghouse was so large -- with individual volatile securities
accounting for hundreds of millions of dollars in deposit
requirements -- that we had to take steps to limit buying in those
volatile securities," it added.

The company is now allowing users to buy as much as 20 shares in
GameStop. Nevertheless, Robinhood's reputation may have been
irrevocably damaged over restricting the stock buys.

The company's CEO is expected to testify before Congress on  Feb.
18. In the meantime, the share price for GameStop plummeted this
morning from $227 to $93. [GN]


ROBINHOOD MARKETS: Days Files Suit Over Stock Market Interference
------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Days, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff, v. Robinhood Markets, Inc.; Robinhood
Financial LLC; Robinhood Securities, LLC; Apex Clearing Holdings
LLC and Apex Clearing Corporation, Defendants, Case No.
21-cv-00696, (N.D. Cal., January 28, 2021) seeks monetary damages
and injunctive relief resulting from breach of contract, breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty,
detrimental reliance, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage, intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage and for violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law and California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

Robinhood provides a service allowing its customers to effectuate
trades in the stock market, targeted at retail customers. Its
platform is primarily app-based and aims to provide everyone with
access to the financial markets.

Apex is in the financial services industry, and partners with
Robinhood to effectuate the trades make on its platform.

Beginning in January of 2021, the stock prices for GameStop Corp.
began to rise, based upon increased investor interest caused by the
excessive short positions in the company. This event received
significant coverage in the press. As investors began to look for
the next GameStop, investor interest in AMC Entertainment Holdings
Inc. and Nokia began to rise, causing their stock prices to
increase. Until January 28, 2021, Robinhood allowed its users to
take positions in these securities, both buying and selling. Upon
information and belief, many Robinhood customers purchased AMC and
NOK in reliance on the continued availability of the Robinhood
platform, allowing the customers to buy and sell when most
advantageous to do so. However, on January 28, 2021, after the rise
in GME gained widespread media coverage, Robinhood barred its
customers from buying several stocks, including AMC and NOK.
Robinhood blamed this bar publicly on an action taken by Apex.
Robinhood has announced it will allow limited transactions of these
securities starting on January 29, 2021. This action artificially
deflated the price of the effected stocks, including AMC and NOK,
harming all investors who held the stock, to the benefit of those
holding short positions. Robinhood's and Apex's interference in
free trade left customers and retail investors with only two
choices, either sell immediately at the rapidly falling price, or
hold, and risk losing their entire investment.

Days uses the Robinhood app to trade securities, including those of
AMC and Nokia. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Matthew L. Venezia, Esq.
     BROWNE GEORGE ROSS O'BRIEN ANNAGUEY & ELLIS LLP
     2121 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800
     Los Angeles, CA 90067
     Telephone: (310) 274-7100
     Facsimile: (310) 275-5697
     Email: mvenezia@bgrfirm.com


RUBIN & ROTHMAN: Faces Stern FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action has been filed against Rubin & Rothman, LLC. The
case is captioned as Stern v. Rubin & Rothman, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-00427-KAM-RML (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 26, 2021).

The suit alleges violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act involving consumer credit. The case is assigned to the Hon.
Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto.

Rubin & Rothman is a New York and New Jersey creditor's rights law
firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Craig B. Sanders, Esq.
          Jonathan Mark Cader, Esq.
          BARSHAY SANDERS, PLLC
          100 Garden City Plaza, Suite 500
          Garden City, NY 11530
          Telephone: (516) 203-7600
          Facsimile: (516) 706-5055
          E-mail: csanders@barshaysanders.com
                  jcader@barshaysanders.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          RUBIN & ROTHMAN, LLC
          1787 Veterans Memorial Hwy
          Islandia, NY 11749
          Telephone: (631) 234-1500

S&P GLOBAL: Snitkoff Suit Challenges Purchase Deal of IHS Markit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Snitkoff, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly
Situated v. Marco Alvera, William J. Amelio, William D. Green,
Charles E. Haldeman, Jr., Stephanie C. Hill, Rebecca Jacoby,
Monique F. Leroux, Ian Paul Livingston, Maria R. Morris, Douglas L.
Peterson, Edward B. Rust, Jr., Kurt L. Schmoke, Richard E.
Thornburgh, S&P Global Inc., and IHS Markit Ltd., Case No.
650576/2021 (N.Y. Sup., New York., Jan. 26, 2021) is a shareholder
class action brought by a shareholder of S&P Global Inc. against
S&P Global and the members of its board of directors as well as IHS
Markit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the
agreement to acquire IHS Markit.

The action challenges the conduct of S&P Global's directors in
causing the Company to enter into an agreement (the "Acquisition
Agreement") to acquire IHS Markit (the "Acquisition"), which
allegedly benefits S&P Global's senior management and directors but
is to the detriment of Plaintiff and S&P Global's other public
shareholders.

Pursuant to the Acquisition Agreement, S&P Global will pay IHS
Markit's shareholders 0.2838 of a share of S&P Global's common
stock (the "Acquisition Consideration") for each share of IHS
Markit (the "Exchange Ratio"). To fund the Acquisition, S&P Global
expects to issue over 122 million shares of S&P Global common stock
(the "Share Issuance"). The Share Issuance is subject to the
approval of S&P Global's shareholders (the "Shareholder Vote").

Upon completion of the Acquisition, S&P Global's shareholders
immediately prior to the Acquisition will own approximately 67.75%
of the combined Company and IHS Markit shareholders immediately
prior to the Acquisition will own approximately 32.25% of the
combined Company.

The Plaintiff challenges the Acquisition and the related Share
Issuance because each is the product of S&P Global's directors'
breaches of their fiduciary duties to the shareholders . In order
to persuade S&P Global's shareholders to approve the highly
dilutive Share Issuance the Individual Defendants caused S&P to
file a joint prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC") and mail the Joint Prospectus to Plaintiff and other
S&P's shareholders in connection with soliciting their vote on the
Share Issuance. The Joint Prospectus is deficient however because
it fails to disclose material information regarding (a) the
conflicts of interest of the Individual Defendants, (b) the
conflicts of interest of Goldman Sachs, (c) information upon which
Goldman Sachs relied in formulating its Fairness Opinion, and (d)
the process in which Defendants engaged in connection with the
Acquisition, the suit says.

Plaintiff Adam Snitkoff is the owner of shares of S&P Global's
common stock and has owned such shares at all relevant times.

Defendant S&P Global is a publicly traded New York corporation
headquartered at 55 Water Street, New York, New York 10041. S&P
Global is a provider of independent ratings, benchmarks, analytics
and data to the capital and commodity markets worldwide. S&P
Global's common stock trades on the NYSE under the ticker "SPGI."
The Individual Defendants are directors of the Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Richard B. Brualdi, Esq.
          Gaitri Boodhoo, Esq.
          David Titus, Esq.
          THE BRUALDI LAW FIRM, P.C.
          29 Broadway, Suite 2400
          New York, NY 10006
          Telephone: (212) 952-0602
          Facsimile: (212) 952-0608
          E-mail: rbrualdi@brualdilawfirm.com
                  gboodhoo@brualdilawfirm.com
                  dtitus@brualdilwfirm.com

SALTY CREW: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Salty Crew, Inc. The
case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. Salty Crew, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01133 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Salty Crew -- https://www.salty-crew.com/ -- is a brand that seeks
to bring surf culture back to its outcast roots.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


SANOFI-AVENTIS US: Shampoo Causes Hair Loss, Lewis Suit Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
EMILY LEWIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. SANOFI-AVENTIS US, LLC, Defendant, Case No.
1:21-cv-00616 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 3, 2021) is an action against the
Defendant's false, misleading, and deceptive advertising of its
anti-dandruff shampoo products, the "Maximum Strength Selsun
Blue".

According to the complaint, the Defendant advertises that its
shampoo products provide a number of benefits for consumers,
including featuring directly on the product labeling that they
provide "Antidandruff" treatment, and "Helps Prevent and Eliminate
Itchy Scalp & Visible Flakes." However, despite the express
representations made by the Defendant, the shampoo products all
contain a toxic chemical, DMDM hydantoin ("DMDM"), which is a
"formaldehyde donor" that can actually cause further scalp
irritation and hair loss, the suit says.

Furthermore, the Defendant's shampoo products all allegedly contain
selenium sulfide, a key ingredient used to combat dandruff. Like
DMDM, selenium sulfide is also known to cause hair damage and hair
loss.

Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC develops, manufactures, and markets
pharmaceutical products. The Company was founded in 1950 and is
located in Bridgewater, New Jersey. Areas that Sanofi US cover
include cardiovascular disease, central nervous system ailments,
and metabolic disorders. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Eugene Y. Turin, Esq.
          MCGUIRE LAW, P.C.
          55 W. Wacker Dr., 9th Fl.
          Chicago, IL 60601
          Telephone: (312) 893-7002
          E-mail: eturin@mcgpc.com


SCOOTER DIRECT: Jaquez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Scooter Direct, LLC.
The case is styled as Ramon Jaquez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Scooter Direct, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-01177 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 9, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Scooter Direct -- https://www.scooterdirect.com/ -- provides
high-quality power mobility scooters for sale along with
wheelchairs and lifts at an affordable prices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


SEQUEL LLC: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sequel LLC. The case
is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. Sequel LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-01137 (S.D.N.Y.,
Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Sequel Holdings -- https://www.sequelholdings.com/ -- is a private
equity firm focused on making control equity investments in
profitable food and beverage, agribusiness and plastics and
specialty materials companies within the middle market.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


SHAR PRODUCTS: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shar Products
Company. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Shar Products Company, Case
No. 1:21-cv-01093 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

SHAR -- https://www.sharmusic.com/ -- has been serving the string
community since 1962. Specializing in bowed stringed
instruments.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


SHERRILL MANUFACTURING: Williams Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sherrill
Manufacturing, Inc. The case is styled as Milton Williams, on
behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v.
Sherrill Manufacturing, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-01143 (S.D.N.Y.,
Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Sherrill Manufacturing, Inc., -- https://www.sherrillmfg.com/ --
which operates under the brand name Liberty Tabletop, is a
manufacturer of flatware located in Sherrill, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite Phr
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


SHOE SHOW: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. SHOE SHOW, INC. d/b/a SHOE SHOW MEGA, a North Carolina
corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No.
2:21-cv-00155-JAM-JDP (E.D. Cal., Jan. 26, 2021), alleges that the
Defendants failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
Website to be fully and equally accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually impaired people.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its Website, https://www.shoeshowmega.com/, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Because the Defendants' Website is not fully or equally accessible
to blind and visually impaired consumers, resulting in violation of
the ADA, the Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's policies, practices, and procedures so
that the Defendant's Website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read Website content using her
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition blindness in that they have a visual
acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some
blind people who meet this definition have limited vision. Others
have no vision.

Show Show offers the Website to the public. The Website offers
features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and
services which Show Show offers in connection with its physical
locations. The goods and services offered by Show Show include but
are not limited to the following: women's and men's shoes such as
athletic, boots, casuals, dress, sandals, slippers, wide, work, and
sizes and and up, respectively; kids' shoes for boys, girls, and
infants; accessories such as face masks, backpacks, handbags, shoe
care, socks, scarves, watches, winter headwear, and hats; notable
brand names such as, Nike, Skechers, New Balance, Fila, Adidas,
Converse, and Vans; sale items; and extended sizes. Consumers can
further access information regarding personalized accounts, reward
points, store locations, gift cards, shipping information, in store
pickup of online orders, Defendant's news and events, Defendant's
social media Webpages, Defendant's contact information, returns
information, tracking orders, and layaway.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com

SIGHT AND SOUND: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sight and Sound
Productions, Incorporated. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Sight and
Sound Productions, Incorporated, Case No. 1:21-cv-01092 (S.D.N.Y.,
Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Sight & Sound Productions -- https://www.ssav.net/ -- have grown
into a leading resource for event planning and audio-visual
production services in Jacksonville, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


SIMPLE HEALTH: Insurance Fraud Class Action Can Proceed
-------------------------------------------------------
Ron Hurtibise, writing for Sun Sentinel, reports that more than
200,000 customers of an alleged health insurance fraud scheme
marketed by a Hollywood agency will be able to sign on as class
members in a nationwide lawsuit against the agency's Tampa-based
distributor.

Simple Health Plans LLC, founded by Steven J. Dorfman, remains
shuttered more than two years after the Federal Trade Commission
secured a temporary restraining order halting its operation and
freezing its assets. A lawsuit by the FTC seeking to permanently
close the company and distribute its remaining assets to purchasers
of what the FTC called "junk" insurance plans is continuing.
Dorfman has denied the FTC's charges.

After details of the operation surfaced in the FTC's complaint,
seven consumers who purchased health insurance from Simple Health
Plans sued the company's distributor, Health Insurance Innovations
Inc., claiming it directed, aided and abetted the marketing scheme
that generated nearly $150 million between 2013 and 2018.

Michael Kosloske, founder of Health Insurance Innovations LLC, is
named as co-defendant along with affiliate Health Plan
Intermediaries Holdings LLC. Kosloske was terminated by his
company's board in June 2018 just a few months before the FTC sued
Simple Health Plans and Dorfman. He left with about $1.06 million
in severance pay and more than $40 million from his sale of company
stock.

Last March, Health Insurance Innovations Inc. changed its name to
Benefytt Technologies Inc., and in August it was acquired by
private equity firm Madison Dearborn Partners for $625 million and
delisted from NASDAQ.

On Feb. 1, federal judge Raag Singhal certified class action status
of the consumers' suit, clearing the way for it to move forward. In
his ruling, Singhal wrote that the plaintiffs met required legal
standards for establishing the right of all potential victims to
present their claims as a unified class.

The complaint accuses the distributor of developing the limited
benefit indemnity and medical discount plans that Simple Health
Plans and another agency, Nationwide Health Advisors, sold to
consumers as PPO plans compliant with requirements of the
Affordable Care Act.

The suit claims that Health Insurance Innovations Inc. funded the
agencies' sales operations, trained their sales agents, reviewed
and edited telephone scripts used by the sales team, provided an
online platform that the sales team used to quote and sell the
products, collected monthly premiums, and distributed "extremely
generous commissions" for the sales.

Attorneys for Health Insurance Innovations Inc. did not immediately
respond to a request for comment about the certification.

The lawsuit recounts experiences of seven named Simple Health Plans
customers who said they found ads for the agency while searching
for affordable health insurance plans. Some of the ads included
logos of Blue Cross/Blue Shield took users to websites with
misleading names such as obamacare-healthquotes.com.

After submitting their personal information, the consumers were
contacted by phone by sales agents who assured them their
applications were being shopped among numerous PPOs of "A-listed
carriers."

Ultimately, the consumers were persuaded to buy what they were told
was major medical coverage but were actually limited benefit
indemnity plans and medical discount plans with benefits that paled
in comparison to actual ACA-compliant plans.

One of the consumers paid $5,513 in fees and premiums before he was
injured in an auto accident and billed $35,000 for medical expenses
not covered by the plan he bought.

In a written statement, plaintiffs' attorney Jason Kellogg of
Miami-based Levine Kellogg Lehman Schneider + Grossman LLP, said
the marketing activities "targeted the most vulnerable medical
patients in the country, leaving devastating financial consequences
for the victims in their wake." He added, "thanks to this ruling,
we will be able to move forward in seeking justice on behalf of
those victimized."

Consumers who purchased health care plans from Health Insurance
Innovations Inc. won't have to contact attorneys in the case,
Kellogg said. They will receive a notice from the attorneys based
on information in the company's records. [GN]


SISTINA RESTAURANT: Paredes et al. Seek to Recover Proper OT Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
JULIO PAREDES, ANGEL ARMIJOS, LUIS GARCIA VASQUEZ, CARLOS CUJI,
GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ ESCAMILA, and WILSON GALLEGOS, on behalf of
themselves, and all others similarly situated v. SISTINA RESTAURANT
INC., and GIUSEPPE BRUNO, Case No. 1:21-cv-00708 (S.D.N.Y., Jan.
26, 2021) seeks to recover damages for the Defendants' egregious
violations of state and federal wage and hour laws arising out of
the Plaintiffs' employment at Defendants' restaurant.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants willfully failed to pay
them overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week at a wage rate of one and a half times the regular wage, to
which they were entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
New York Labor Law.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Roman Avshalumov, Esq.
          HELEN F. DALTON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          80-02 Kew Gardens Road, Suite 601
          Kew Gardens, NY 11415
          Telephone: (718) 263-9591

SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY: McAvoy Consolidated With Butler Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MATTHEW JOSEPH MCAVOY, Plaintiff v. SUFFOLK
COUNTY and SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, Defendants, Case No.
21-CV-0349(JS)(ST) (E.D.N.Y.), the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted the Plaintiff's application to
proceed in forma pauperis and consolidated the case with an
existing class action lawsuit filed by Butler, et al.

On January 20, 2021, pro se plaintiff McAvoy, who is incarcerated,
commenced the action by filing a Complaint along with an
application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and an application
for the appointment of pro bono counsel.

Upon review of the Plaintiff's declaration submitted in support of
his IFP application, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is
qualified by his financial status to commence the action without
prepayment of the filing fee. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's
application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Pursuant to the Court's January 23, 2012 Consolidation Order in
Butler, et al. v. DeMarco, et al., No. 11-CV-2602 (JS)(ST)
(E.D.N.Y.) ("Consolidated Action"), the Court has reviewed the
instant Complaint and finds that it relates to the subject matter
of the Consolidated Action. Accordingly, the action will be
consolidated with the Consolidated Action. This affects the
Plaintiff in the following ways:

   1. Plaintiff in the action will become a member of the
      certified classes in Butler (No. 11-CV-2602);

   2. Any claims in the instant Complaint that are not included
      in the Consolidated Amended Complaint in Butler will be
      severed (see Consol. Order at 17 (describing the process
      for proceeding with any severed claims after the resolution
      of the Consolidated Action)); and

   3. Plaintiff, as a member of the class, will be represented by
      pro bono counsel, Shearman & Sterling LLP. Accordingly,
      Plaintiff's application for the appointment of pro bono
      counsel is denied as moot.

The classes are defined as follows: (1) An Injunctive Class
comprised of all persons who, now or at any time in the future, are
or will be detainees or prisoners in the custody of the Suffolk
County Sheriff's Department and housed in the SCCF [Suffolk County
Correctional Facility], with separate subclasses for those persons
detained in Riverhead and Yaphank; and (2) A Damages Class
comprised of all persons who are or were detainees or prisoners in
the custody of the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department and housed
in the SCCF and who were or will be released from the SCCF on or
after April 5, 2009, with separate subclasses for those persons
detained in Riverhead and Yaphank.

District Judge Joanna Seybert notes that if the Plaintiff does not
wish to proceed as a member of the Consolidated Action, he must
inform the Court, in writing, within 30 days after receiving a copy
of the Order. Upon receipt of such a letter, the Court will direct
the Clerk of the Court to sever this Complaint from the
Consolidated Amended Complaint and reopen and reinstate the
individual pro se action.

For the indicated reasons, the Plaintiff's application to proceed
in forma pauperis is granted and his application for the
appointment of pro bono counsel is denied as moot. The Clerk of the
Court is directed to consolidate the matter with Butler, et al. v.
DeMarco, et al., No. 11-CV-2602; to mail a copy of this Order, the
Order of Consolidation (No. 11-CV-2602, ECF No. 327), and the
Consolidated Amended Complaint (No. 11-CV-2602, ECF No. 334) to the
Plaintiff at his last known address; and to mark the case closed.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3) that
any appeal from the Order would not be taken in good faith and,
therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of
any appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/54grn5u8 from Leagle.com.

Plaintiff Matthew Joseph McAvoy, at Auburn Correctional Facility,
in Auburn, New York, appears pro se.

No appearances, For Defendants.


SYNERGY CLOTHING: Angeles Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Synergy Clothing,
Inc. The case is styled as Jenisa Angeles, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated v. Synergy Clothing, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01134 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 8, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Synergy Organic Clothing -- https://synergyclothing.com/ --
produces sustainable and GOTS Certified organic clothing using only
fair labor practices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


TACTILE SYSTEMS: St. Clair Appointed Lead Plaintiff in Mart Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota entered an
order appointing lead plaintiff and approving selection of counsel
in the lawsuit styled BRIAN MART, individually and on behalf Case
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TACTILE SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY, INC., GERALD R. MATTYS, LYNN BLAKE, and BRENT A. MOEN,
Defendants, ST. CLAIR COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Movant,
Case No. 20-CV-2074 (NEB/BRT) (D. Minn.).

District Judge Nancy E. Brasel ruled that:

   1. The Motion of Brian Mart for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff
      and Approval of Selection of Lead and Liaison Counsel is
      denied;

   2. St. Clair County Employees' Retirement System's Motion for
      Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Lead
      Plaintiff's Selection of Counsel is granted;

   3. St. Clair County Employees' Retirement System is appointed
      Lead Plaintiff; and

   4. Lead Plaintiff's selection of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd
      LLP as lead counsel and Zimmerman Reed LLP as local counsel
      is approved.

Plaintiff Mart filed a putative class action against Defendants
Tactile and three of its officers, alleging violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( "Act"). Mart proposes a class of
investors, who purchased Tactile securities between May 7, 2018,
and June 8, 2020. The Complaint alleges that the Defendants made
materially false and misleading statements regarding Tactile's
business, operational and compliance policies, and financial
results.

Mr. Mart asserts two counts on behalf of the proposed class: (1)
violation of Section 10(b) of the Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, against all Defendants, and (2) violation of Section
20(a) of the Act by the individual defendants.

Mr. Mart moves for appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of
his selection of lead counsel. The St. Clair County Employees'
Retirement System ("System") opposes Mart's motion, and moves for
appointment as lead plaintiff and approval of its selection of
counsel. Mart initially opposed the System's motion, but has since
withdrawn his opposition. No other party responded to the System's
or Mart's motions.

The System has demonstrated that it purchased Tactile stock during
the class period, which subsequently lost value as a result of the
Defendants' allegedly false and misleading statements. The Court
finds that the System's interests are similar to those of the class
in litigating the alleged securities violations related to the
valuation of Tactile stock. And the Court has no concerns that the
System would not adequately represent the interests of the class.

As an institutional investor, the System is the type of "large,
institutional lead plaintiff envisioned by Congress" when it
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Judge Brasel
opines, citing Mayer v. Apogee Enters., Inc., No. 18-CV-3097
(NEB/SER), 2019 WL 927315, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2019).

The Court is not aware of any unique defenses precluding the System
from being appointed lead plaintiff. Because the System has made a
preliminary showing of typicality and adequacy, the Court presumes
the System to be the most adequate plaintiff under Section
78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). Mart has not rebutted this presumption and
withdrew his opposition to the System's motion. Therefore, the
Court appoints the System as lead plaintiff.

The System asks the Court to approve the law firm of Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP to serve as lead counsel and the law firm of
Zimmerman Reed LLP to serve as local counsel. The Court says it
should not disturb the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel unless it
is necessary to protect the interests of the class. Robbins Geller
is regularly appointed as lead counsel by courts around the country
and in this District. The firm is experienced with securities
litigation and has achieved favorable results for its clients.
Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to disturb the System's
choice of counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/1xvqhfc0 from Leagle.com.


TAMPA BAY: Carlton Fields Attorneys Discuss Settlement Ruling
-------------------------------------------------------------
D. Matthew Allen, Esq. -- mallen@carltonfields.com -- and Nathaniel
Foell, Esq. -- ngfoell@carltonfields.com -- of Carlton Fields, in
an article for JDSupra, report that the Eleventh Circuit recently
imparted an important message to the class action bar, and in
particular to attorneys representing different named plaintiffs in
competing class actions: there is "only one gatekeeper under Rule
23," so any challenge to a proposed class action settlement should
be presented to the district judge deciding whether to approve that
settlement, not to a different judge by way of a collateral attack
on the proposed settlement.

Several years ago, multiple class actions were filed against the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers (affectionately known here in Tampa as the
Super Bowl-bound "Bucs"). The lawsuits alleged that the Bucs sent
telefax advertisements in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA). Here is the play-by-play.

First Quarter. At the kickoff, Firm 1 filed a TCPA class action
against the Bucs. When Firm 1 filed that class action, one of its
players was Lawyer A. But Lawyer A later filed for free agency and
left Firm 1 for Firm 2. A month after he did, Firm 2 filed a TCPA
class action against the Bucs. Firm 2's class action alleged
essentially the same claims on behalf of essentially the same
putative class as Firm 1's, but with different named plaintiffs.
Did Lawyer A steal the playbook from Firm 1? And is that against
the rules? Stay tuned to find out!

Second Quarter. When Firm 2 filed its case against the Bucs, a
motion for class certification was pending in Firm 1's case. But
despite Firm 1's early lead over Firm 2, Firm 2 reached a
settlement with the Bucs before Firm 1's case was settled or
otherwise resolved. Touchdown! But wait: Firm 1 has thrown the
challenge flag! Firm 1, on behalf of one of the named plaintiffs in
Firm 1's case (Client 1), intervened in Firm 2's case to challenge
the proposed settlement negotiated by Firm 2.

Third Quarter. The second half began with Firm 1 filing a state
court lawsuit on behalf of Client 1 -- the named plaintiff in Firm
1's case who intervened in Firm 2's case to challenge the
settlement negotiated by Firm 2 -- against Lawyer A and Firm 2. The
state court suit advanced the stolen playbook theory of liability,
which featured two key allegations: (1) because Lawyer A
represented Client 1 when he worked at Firm 1 and because attorneys
have fiduciary duties to their former clients, Lawyer A had
specific fiduciary duties to Client 1; and (2) Lawyer A violated
his duty of loyalty and confidentiality to Client 1 by sharing
information with Firm 2 that he learned representing Client 1 in
Firm 1's case, information that enabled Firm 2 to reach a proposed
settlement with the Bucs faster than it otherwise would have been
able to do so. The suit also alleged that Firm 2 committed a
personal foul by aiding and abetting Lawyer A's breach of fiduciary
duty. Client 1 sought damages, attorneys' fees, and an injunction
barring Firm 2 from continuing as counsel in its TCPA case against
the Bucs or from reaching a settlement with the Bucs in any case
substantially related to Firm 1's TCPA case against the Bucs. Firm
1 and Client 1 were in the red zone.

Fourth Quarter. Interception! Lawyer A and Firm 2 promptly removed
Client 1's state court suit against them to federal court, where
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

The Eleventh Circuit called the state court suit "a thinly-veiled
attempt to derail" Firm 2's proposed settlement with the Bucs. It
emphasized that any objection to Firm 2's proposed settlement,
including any claim that the proposed settlement injured Client 1,
should have been presented to the district judge deciding whether
to approve that settlement. This decision sends a strong message
that the Eleventh Circuit will not countenance collateral attacks
on proposed class action settlements.

The panel also addressed what it called a "unique question:" "does
class counsel owe a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to a named
class representative that is distinct from the duty owed to the
putative class?" It answered that class counsel does not have a
"separate and heightened fiduciary duty to class representatives."
Class counsel instead "owes a duty to the class as a whole and not
to any individual member of the class." Because Client 1 asserted
not that Lawyer A "violated a duty owed to the [putative] class" in
Firm 1's case but rather that Lawyer A violated a "heightened
fiduciary duty" he owed to Client 1 as a "putative class
representative" in Firm 1's case, this separate holding that Lawyer
A owed no such heightened duty to Client 1 similarly disposed of
the fiduciary duty claims asserted by Client 1. Game over.

Post-Game Analysis. One may wonder why the panel chose to address
class counsel's duties to putative class representatives when the
holding that challenges to a proposed class action settlement
should be presented to the district judge deciding whether to
approve that settlement seems sufficient to resolve the case,
especially because the panel's treatment of class counsel's duties
to putative class representatives is not without complications.

One complication is that while the panel ostensibly holds that
Lawyer A owed no fiduciary duty to Client 1 as an individual member
of the putative class in Firm 1's case, it still felt the need to
mention that Lawyer A never acquired any confidential information
about Client 1 while working at Firm 1 and that Firm 2 screened
Lawyer A from any involvement in Firm 2's TCPA case against the
Bucs. One may wonder why those facts were included in the decision
if Lawyer 1 truly owed no duty of loyalty or confidentiality to
Client 1.

Another complication is revealed by considering the following
scenario: what if Lawyer A had actually learned confidential
information about Client 1 while working at Firm 1, had actually
shared that information with Firm 2, and by doing so had actually
enabled Firm 2 to reach a settlement with the Bucs before Firm 1
when Firm 2 otherwise would not have been able to do so, thus
depriving Client 1 of an incentive award that in this scenario
would now go to a named plaintiff in Firm 2's case? The panel says
in a footnote that another Eleventh Circuit panel recently
concluded that incentive awards are "foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent" -- a petition pending before the Eleventh Circuit seeks
en banc review of that conclusion, which has been reached by no
other circuit -- but that may strike some as a less than fully
satisfying answer. By contrast, the answer that in this scenario
Client 1 could ask the district judge deciding whether to approve
the proposed settlement to order that an incentive award be paid to
Client 1 may seem more satisfactory.

In sum, one clear takeaway from this Eleventh Circuit decision is
that proposed class action settlements should not be collaterally
attacked. The other key ruling -- that class counsel owe a duty to
the class as a whole and not to any individual member of the class
-- seems like one that may need to be revisited and clarified in
future seasons.

Go Bucs!

Medical & Chiropractic Clinic v. Oppenheim, 981 F.3d 983 (11th Cir.
2020). [GN]


TAPESTRY INC: Website Not Accessible to Blind Users, Brooks Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
VALERIE BROOKS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. TAPESTRY, INC. d/b/a KATE SPADE, a Maryland
corporation; and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, Case No.
2:21-cv-00156-TLN-JDP (E.D. Cal., Jan. 26, 2021), alleges that the
Defendants failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its
Website to be fully and equally accessible to and independently
usable by Plaintiff and other blind or visually impaired people.

According to the complaint, the Defendants' denial of full and
equal access to its Website, https://www.katespade.com/, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical locations, is a violation of the
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Because the Defendants' Website is not fully or equally accessible
to blind and visually impaired consumers, resulting in violation of
the ADA, the Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a
change in the Defendant's policies, practices, and procedures so
that the Defendant's Website will become and remain accessible to
blind and visually-impaired consumers.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read Website content using her
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition blindness in that they have a visual
acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200. Some
blind people who meet this definition have limited vision. Others
have no vision.

Tapestry offers the Website to the public. The Website offers
features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and
services which Tapestry offers in connection with its physical
locations. The goods and services offered by Tapestry include new
arrivals; handbags such as satchels, shoulder bags, totes,
crossbodies, clutches, belt bags, camera bags, mini bags, box bags,
backpacks, travel bags, and diaper bags; wallets such as wristlets,
pouches, cardholders, bifold wallets, coin purses, keychain
wallets, and crossbody wallets; clothing such as dresses,
jumpsuits, matching sets, skirts, pants, jackets, outerwear, tops,
sweaters, swimwear, and sleepwear; shoes such as heels, flats,
boots, booties, sneakers, sandals, and kids; jewelry such as
earrings, bracelets, necklaces, and rings; accessories such as
watches, Apple watch bands, Tech, travel accessories, scarves,
hats, hair accessories, keychains, bags accessories, makeup bags,
legwear, fragrance, sunglasses, and reading glasses; goods that can
be personalized with monograms and the like home goods such as desk
and stationery, kitchen and dining, bedding, bath, home accents and
decor, and lighting; Valentine's day gifts; and sale items.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago Coelho, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com

THUNDER BAY, ON: Law Firm Seeks to Expedite Water Leak Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Gary Rinne, writing for tbnewswatch.com, reports that a
spokesperson for the law firm handling a $350 million class action
suit against the City of Thunder Bay over pinhole water leaks says
every effort will be made to expedite the process.

David O'Connor of Toronto-based Roy O'Connor LLP says he has "no
expectation at all that this case is going to take eight or nine
years."

That's how long a $375 million class action lawsuit over the 2012
flooding of hundreds of basements -- involving a different law firm
-- has taken so far. As yet, no settlement has been announced.

"Our intention is to push this case forward as soon as we can,"
O'Connor told TBNewswatch in an interview. "This is a problem that
is significant and very personal to people, and is ongoing. People
need relief . . . so we're going to try to get it to move
quickly."

He hopes to have a hearing for certification of the suit by a judge
sometime this summer.

"Getting to a hearing within six months is actually quite speedy
and relatively aggressive," O'Connor said, adding that he thinks
it's appropriate given the issues people are still experiencing in
their homes or businesses.

"It is not a wildly complicated case. We don't have a million
different fact patterns. It appears to be the introduction of a
common chemical (sodium hydroxide) into the water supply. That can
be analyzed by a court relatively quickly, I would have thought."

According to O'Connor, more than 1,000 residents to date have
contacted his firm to date to inquire about the lawsuit.

Under Ontario law, every property owner who qualifies for relief
under any settlement will be covered by it, and is not required to
formally register for participation in the suit.

O'Connor believes the number of people who have an interest in the
case "is probably in the thousands."

The City of Thunder Bay recently filed a Statement of Defence
against a separate $350,000 lawsuit filed by St. Joseph's Care
Group for damage allegedly caused by pinhole leaks at the PR Cook
apartment building at St. Joseph's Heritage.

The city denies that it was negligent in any way in its management
of the water system, and argues that in any case SJCG knew that the
copper water pipes in its building were old and in need of
replacement before any leaks developed.

O'Connor expects the city will present a similar case in the class
action suit, but it's not required to file a statement of defence
at this point in the process. [GN]


TRANSAMERICA LIFE: Fails to Pay 300% Cash Value Increase, Wren Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
WILLIAM F. WREN, a California resident, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated v. TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation, Case No. 5:21-cv-00178-JGB-SP (C.D.
Cal., Feb. 1, 2021) asserts claims arising out of TLIC's breach of
its obligation to pay the 300% "Cash Value Increase" due on the
30th policy anniversary of the TLIC "Direct Recognition Life I"
policy issued to Plaintiff in 1990.

The Plaintiff contends that TLIC has also anticipatorily breached
its similar obligation to pay the 300% "Cash Value Increase" due on
the 40th policy anniversary of the Plaintiff's policy. TLIC's sole
justification for doing so is the pretextual assertion that it was
somehow relieved of that obligation under the terms of the 2000
class action settlement (the "Oakes Settlement") reached in certain
litigation in Texas state court, styled Richard Oakes, et al. v.
Bankers United Assurance Company, et al., Case No. 96-06849 (Dallas
County, Texas, Dist. Ct., 192nd 13 Judicial District) (the "Oakes
Action`"). The Plaintiff adds that TLIC's contention is unsupported
by the terms of settlement as communicated to the Oakes Settlement
class, and is inconsistent with TLIC's subsequent ratification and
course of performance for 15 years following the Oakes Settlement.

In 1990 TLIC's predecessor-in-interest General Service Insurance
Company issued to the Plaintiff a certificate of insurance for a
"Direct Recognition Life I" second-to-die life insurance policy
(No. 000G016164) insuring the lives of his parents, William A. Wren
and Joan F. Wren, in the face amount of $1,000,000 (the Policy).
The Policy was issued under a Master Contract between TLIC and the
Insurance Coalition of America (the "Master Contract"), and is
evidenced by Group Insurance Certificate No. G016164, dated
September 7, 1990 (the Group Insurance Certificate).

The Plaintiff is a domicile and resident of San Bernadino County,
California.

TLIC is a corporation organized under Iowa law, with its principal
place of business located in Iowa. TLIC has assumed responsibility
to perform the obligations of its predecessor-in-interest General
Services Life Insurance Company and Bankers United Life Assurance
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          Andrew S. Friedman, Esq.
          Francis J. Balint, Jr., Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN
          FRIEDMAN & BALINT, PC
          600 West Broadway, No. 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 798-4292
          Facsimile: (602) 274-1199
          E-mail: psyverson@bffb.com
                  afriedman@bffb.com
                  fbalint@bffb.com

               - and -

          Randy D. Curry, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF RANDY D. CURRY
          2901 W. Coast Highway, Suite 200
          Newport Beach, CA 92663
          Telephone: (949) 258-4381
          Facsimile: (949) 258-4382
          E-mail: randydcurrylaw@gmail.com

UNITED FOOD: Minn. Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Nagel Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Matthew Nagel, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, Local 653, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-1053 (WMW/ECW)
(D. Minn.), Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota denied Nagel's motion for class
certification.

The dispute arises from a 2018 collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") negotiated between Defendant Local 653 and SuperValu Cub
Foods and other independent grocers located in the Minneapolis
metropolitan area ("Grocers").  Nagel is employed by SuperValu and
is a member of Local 653.  Local 653 is the exclusive bargaining
agent for all meat and food market employees of the Grocers.

Under previous collective bargaining agreements with the Grocers,
certain Local 653 members qualified for a "30-and-out" pension
plan, which permitted those members to take full retirement pension
benefits after completing 30 years of qualifying employment
service.  Both parties acknowledge that the 30-and-out pension plan
was a highly valued and important benefit.  Nagel alleges that
Local 653 unilaterally conceded the 30-and-out pension benefit and
intentionally withheld and suppressed material information from
Local 653 members regarding its concession of the benefit.  Had
Local 653 members been adequately and meaningfully informed about
the "bargaining away" of the 30-and-out benefit, Nagel contends,
the members could have opposed the loss of the benefit, rejected
the proposed CBA, or demanded that Local 653 negotiate additional
considerations for the loss of the benefit.

Nagel brought the action individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, asserting claims against Local 653 for breach
of the duty of fair representation and violation of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA").  Local 653
moved to dismiss Nagel's claims, and the Court concluded that Nagel
has sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim for a breach of the
duty of fair representation by bad-faith conduct.  It also
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction Nagel's claim for
violation of the LMRDA.

Nagel brings the present motion to certify a class of: All members
of United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 653 (the Local)
who (1) are bound by March 4, 2018 collective bargaining agreements
between the Local and SuperValu, Inc. (dba Cub Foods); Almsted's
Fresh Market; Driskill's Downtown Market; Haug Companies; Jubilee
Foods-Mound; Knowlan's Supermarkets, Inc; Oxendale's Market; or
Shakopee 1997 LLC (dba Radermacher's); and (2) under the terms of
the collective bargaining agreements as implemented by the Pension
Fund, lost preexisting eligibility for 30-and-out early retirement
benefits.

Initially, Judge Wright finds that Nagel alleges that Local 653
breached its duty of fair representation.  As a result of the
breach, the complaint alleges, Nagel and the other members of the
putative class lost the opportunity for full retirement after 30
years' service.  As alleged, the claim constitutes an injury in
fact that is attributable to Local 653's conduct and redressable by
damages.  Because the class is defined as members of the bargaining
unit that lost preexisting eligibility for 30-and-out benefits, any
member would have standing to bring a claim for Local 653's alleged
breach of the duty of fair representation.  Accordingly, Nagel has
presented a justiciable claim.

Turning to the Class Certification under Rule 23, Judge Wright
explains that class certification is warranted when (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
questions of law or fact that are common to the class exist, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

A putative class size of 40 or more will establish numerosity,
although smaller classes have been found acceptable.  Nagel
estimates that the class has more than 1,000 members, and Local 653
does not contest that the numerosity requirement has been met.
Judge Wright concludes that the numerosity requirement is
satisfied.

She next considers whether there are "questions of law or fact
common to the class."  Local 653 contends that Nagel has not
established commonality because all class members did not suffer a
common injury.  Judge Wright disagrees.  She says while the extent
of the injury may vary among the putative members, there is a
common question of liability.  That common question is whether
Local 653 breached its duty of fair representation by bad-faith
conduct.  All the class members share this element of the cause of
action, which is sufficient to establish commonality under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

Judge Wright also must determine whether "the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class."  Local 653 contends that, as a member of the SuperValu
bargaining unit, Nagel lacks standing to bring claims against Local
653 for breaching the duty of fair representation owed to members
of other bargaining units to which Nagel is not a member.  Nagel
counters that an agreement regarding 30-and-out benefits already
existed when the Grocers split and began bargaining separately and
that Local 653 fails to identify any material differences in its
communications strategy or the information provided to members of
different bargaining units.

But Nagel bears the burden to establish that the requirements for
class certification are met.  And his claim is not typical of those
of members of the other bargaining units because those claims will
depend on a separate and distinct course of conduct, namely, Local
653's conduct in dealing with members of the independent grocers,
how that conduct affected each bargaining unit's vote, and what the
independent grocers would have been willing to exchange for
conceding the 30-and-out benefit.  Consequently, Judge Wright holds
that Nagel has not established that the typicality requirement is
satisfied.  She is mindful of her discretion to redefine a proposed
class so as to allow the class action to proceed.  But she declines
to do so because Nagel also fails to establish that the adequacy
requirement is met.

Under the final requirement of Rule 23(a), the Judge determines
whether "the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."  Nagel argues that he is an
adequate representative because there is no known conflict of
interest between other class members and him and that he shares the
same stake in a favorable outcome as other class members do.  But
Local 653 maintains that a conflict exists between Nagel's
interests and some members of the putative class.

Judge Wright is unpersuaded.  She holds that the fact that the
putative class members may opt out does not necessarily alleviate
an intra-class conflict so as to establish, as Nagel must, that the
Rule 23 requirements are met.

Finally, because the record does not reflect that Nagel will
adequately and fairly protect the interests of the class, Nagel has
not satisfied the adequacy requirement for class certification
under Rule 23(a)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Based on the foregoing analysis and all of the files, records and
proceedings in the case, Judge Wright denied Nagel's motion for
class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/12v4a4i4 from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Bid to Extend Discovery in Juarez v. ICE Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSUE CASTANEDA JUAREZ, et al., Petitioners-Plaintiffs
v. NATHALIE ASHER, et al., Respondents-Defendants, Case No. C20-700
JLR-MLP (W.D. Wash.), Magistrate Judge Michaelle L. Peterson of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, denied the Petitioners' motion to extend the current
discovery and dispositive motions deadlines by 90 days.

Nathalie Asher is the Seattle Field Office Director of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE's) Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO).

The Petitioners assert there is good cause to modify the scheduling
order because there is a pending Report and Recommendation
recommending the Court grants the Petitioners' motion for class
certification, and that to date, discovery has been limited to
Petitioner Khan.  They assert that they will be unable to obtain
discovery relevant to class members under the current schedule.

The Federal Respondents oppose the Petitioners' motion.  They argue
that the Petitioners' request is premature because the Court has
not yet ruled on the pending Report and Recommendation.  They also
argue that the Court granted only limited discovery that requires
court approval and the Petitioners have not identified or proposed
what additional discovery they would seek regarding the potential
class.  The Respondents further note that much of the discovery
produced relates to the proposed putative class.
Magistrate Judge Peterson finds an extension of the discovery and
dispositive motions deadlines unwarranted at this time.  Because
the Court has yet to rule on the Report and Recommendation
regarding class certification, the matter is not a class action and
the current deadlines are sufficient to address the permitted
discovery regarding Petitioner Khan. Accordingly, the Petitioners'
motion is denied.  Should the Court grant the Petitioners' motion
for class certification, the Petitioners may renew their motion and
identify the additional proposed discovery they seek for Court
approval.

The Clerk is directed to send copies of the Order to the parties
and to the Hon. James L. Robart.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 2, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5bd3drgw from Leagle.com.


US FERTILITY LLC: Patients Sue Over Data Security Breach
--------------------------------------------------------
Jane Doe and John Doe, on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. US Fertility, LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 21-cv-00248 (D. Md., January 28, 2021), seeks injunctive
and other equitable relief resulting from the failure to properly
secure and safeguard personal identifiable information and
protected health information that US Fertility acquired from or
created for its patients, including without limitation, names,
addresses, dates of birth, patient identification numbers, Social
Security numbers, driver's license/state ID numbers, passport
numbers, credit/debit card information and financial account
information.

On September 14, 2020, US Fertility experienced an IT security
event that involved the inaccessibility of certain computer systems
on their network as a result of a malware infection thus
compromising its patients' database. Plaintiffs allege that US
Fertility did not use reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the sensitive, unencrypted information
they were maintaining for current and former patients.

Plaintiffs are current and/or former patients of US Fertility and
seek redress for negligence, breach of contract/confidence and for
violations of various state consumer protection laws. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      George G. Triantis, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Telephone: (813) 223-5505
      Facsimile: (813) 257-0572
      Email: GTriantis@forthepeople.com

             - and -

      John A. Yanchunis, Esq.
      Ryan D. Maxey, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN
      201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Tel: (813) 223-5505
      Email: jyanchunis@ForThePeople.com
             rmaxey@ForThePeople.com

             - and -

      Joel R. Rhine, Esq.
      Martin Ramey, Esq.
      RHINE LAW FIRM, P.C.
      1612 Military Cutoff Rd, Suite 300
      Wilmington, NC 28403
      Tel: (910) 772-9960
      Fax: (910) 772-9062
      Email: jrr@rhinelawfirm.com
             mjr@rhinelawfirm.com


WEINERT ENTERPRISES: 7th Cir. Affirms Class Certification Denial
----------------------------------------------------------------
Noah Finkel, Esq., of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in an article for JDSupra,
reports that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
district court's denial of class certification of a state overtime
claim on numerosity grounds, reasoning that the touchstone for that
element is whether joinder of putative class members is
practicable, and a factor to consider is how easily the plaintiff
could contact those class members for joinder. Because the FLSA's
collective action mechanism makes joinder easy, this ruling
suggests that district courts should consider whether to reject
class treatment when a collective action is available for members
of a proposed class.

Outside of California, the FLSA's collective action mechanism long
has garnered the greatest amount of attention of most wage-hour
practitioners because it applies nationally, contains the most
developed case law, and allows for early conditional certification
of a collective action based on a "lenient standard" under which a
plaintiff need made only a "modest showing" to carry a "low
burden." Indeed, as our colleagues showed us last month in
Seyfarth's annual Workplace Class Action Report, federal district
courts granted 84% of conditional certification motions in 2020.

But collective actions have their limits. While conditional
certification of a collective action results in a notice of the
lawsuit being sent to all of those eligible to be in the
collective, participation in a collective action requires one to
affirmatively file a consent to join, or opt in. Anecdotally, we
tend to see about 5 to 25 percent of those eligible actually join a
collective action, thus limiting a defendant's FLSA exposure.

Enter state overtime laws, however. Usually very similar to the
FLSA substantively, state overtime laws differ from the FLSA in one
huge way: they allow for an opt-out class action, rather than an
opt-in collective action. An opt-out class action does not require
a class member to do anything to participate. Once a state overtime
law class is certified, a class member is a participant unless they
opt out, and opt outs are very rare. A case that has, say, 15%
participation under the FLSA often sees 100% participation under
state overtime class action claim, thus inflating a defendant's
potential exposure. This is why the plaintiff's wage-hour bar
prefers to file hybrid collective/class actions rather than just
one or the other.

However, the 7th Circuit may have made hybrid cases more difficult
for the plaintiff's bar in Anderson v. Weinert Enterprises, Inc.,
No. 20-1030 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2021), by putting some teeth into
Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement. It is rare to see class
treatment denied on numerosity grounds. Indeed, courts often have
assumed that a 40-member class meets numerosity. This approach,
however, miscomprehends the numerosity requirement, reasoned the
7th Circuit. A class plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a
class is, in the language of Rule 23(a)(1), "so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable." To do so, they must show
that "it is extremely difficult or inconvenient to join all members
of the class." Answering that question, the 7th Circuit reasoned,
involves evaluating "the nature of the action, the size of the
individual claims, and the location of the members of the class . .
. ." In the Anderson case, the 7th Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify a class
action, given (i) the proposed class's geographic dispersion (the
class members all worked at the same facility), (ii) the overall
size of the class (it numbered 37, but the 7th Circuit said that if
it were larger, it probably wouldn't have mattered), (iii) the
dollar amounts involved with each individual claim (considering the
availability of attorney fee shifting), and (iv) the plaintiff's
ability to easily contact the class members.

The last two factors discussed by the 7th Circuit warrant emphasis.
Wage-hour claims typically involve a relatively small dollar amount
for each individual claim, which might help a plaintiff show that
joinder is impracticable. But the 7th Circuit noted that
fee-shifting provisions, which are present in the FLSA and all
state overtime laws, lower the barrier to joinder of these claims.

The plaintiff's ability to easily contact the class members, which
the 7th Circuit weighed against finding numerosity in this case, is
present in just about every hybrid collective/class action. If
conditional certification is granted, the defendant is compelled to
provide the plaintiff with the name and address or other contact
information for all collective action members, and there likely is
substantial overlap between the collective action and class action
members. The plaintiff is then authorized to send notice to each of
them to invite them join the case. The collective action mechanism
thus is a practicable method for joinder -- and one that may
preclude class certification.

To be sure, and as the 7th Circuit recognized, availability of a
collective action does not mean that every class action in a hybrid
matter fails to establish numerosity. But the 7th Circuit's
decision is a reminder that Rule 23 numerosity requires the
plaintiff to show the impracticality of joinder, and that, the
availability of the collective action device may mean the plaintiff
cannot show that. [GN]


WELLS FARGO: Sued Over Automatic Forbearance Scheme Enrollment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Brian Echard, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs, v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo &
Co.,, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00112 (W.D. Wash., January 28,
2021), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including public
injunctive relief permanently enjoining Wells Fargo from performing
further unfair and unlawful acts as alleged, disgorgement of Wells
Fargo's ill-gotten gains to pay restitution, statutory,
compensatory, consequential, treble and punitive damages, all costs
of prosecuting this action, including attorneys' fees and expert
fees, award of pre-and post-judgment interest, an imposition of a
constructive trust containing all assets, funds, and property
derived from Wells Fargo's wrongly acquired gains for the benefit
of Plaintiff and class members, an accounting of all assets, funds,
revenues, and profits received and retained by Wells Fargo,
appropriate individual relief and such other relief resulting from
fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty and for violation of the
Service Members' Civil Relief Act, Truth in Lending Act, Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act and
the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

Service members and veterans can obtain assistance in securing a
mortgage to buy a home through a Veterans Administration (VA)
guaranteed loan. It also provides veterans with protections and
assistance throughout the period of the loan. These protections are
guaranteed by statutes, regulations, and detailed guidance provided
by the VA where Wells Fargo, like many banks and lenders, competes
for the business of military borrowers by promising support,
dedicated services and protections beyond those required by law.

Brian Echard, a military veteran, has a mortgage serviced by Wells
Fargo for his primary residence located in Westerville, Ohio.
Echard's mortgage is a VA backed mortgage. Around March 31, 2020,
Mr. Echard submitted an inquiry to Wells Fargo to ask about payment
deferment options, as he was concerned about his future financial
security in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

On July 21, 2020, Echard learned he was in forbearance when he
attempted to refinance his mortgage and was denied. He accuses Well
Fargo of wrongfully enrolling him into a forbearance program
without his informed and legal consent.

After learning that his account had been wrongfully placed in
forbearance, he resumed payments on his mortgage. However, Wells
Fargo failed to properly apply those payments to the mortgage,
report those payments to credit agencies or calculate information
on subsequent periodic payments. On December 1, 2020, his FICO
Credit Score 8 dropped by at least 74 points from 747 to 673. Given
that interest rates are at all-time lows, and many homeowners are
seeking to take advantage of these historically low rates by
refinancing. If an account is placed into forbearance, borrowers
cannot typically refinance for many months, if not years, even
after bringing the account current. This forbearance allowed Wells
Fargo to receive additional compensation for each loan placed in
forbearance and retain these mortgages at above-market rates.

Wells Fargo & Co. is a diversified financial services company that
provides banking, insurance, investments, mortgage banking, and
consumer finance through banking stores, the internet, and other
distribution channels to customers, businesses, and other
institutions in all 50 states and in other countries. It is the
parent corporation of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Knoll Lowney, Esq.
      Alyssa Englebrecht, Esq.
      Meredith Crafton, Esq.
      March Zemel, Esq.
      Savannah Rose, Esq.
      SMITH & LOWNEY, PLLC
      2317 E. John Street
      Seattle, WA 98112
      Tel: (206) 860-2883
      Fax: (206) 860-4187
      Email: knoll@smithandlowney.com
             alyssa@smithandlowney.com
             meredith@smithandlowney.com
             marc@smithandlowney.com
             savannah@smithandlowney.com

             - and -

      Garrett D. Blanchfield, Esq.
      Brant Penney, Esq.
      REINHARDT WENDORF & BLANCHFIELD
      332 Minnesota Street, Suite W1050
      St. Paul, MN 55101
      Tel: (651) 287-2100
      Fax: (651) 287-2103
      Email: g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com
             b.penney@rwblawfirm.com

WFS EXPRESS: Wins Initial OK of Class Settlement in Bautista Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
grants the Parties' Stipulated Motion for Certification of
Settlement Class and for Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement in the lawsuit styled JIKIRI BAUTISTA, an individual,
ARI SILVA, an individual; Plaintiffs v. WFS EXPRESS, a Delaware
corporation, CONSOLIDATED AVIATION SERVICES, a New York
corporation, Defendants, Case No. 2:18-cv-00757 RSM (W.D. Wash.).

The Parties' Conditional Settlement Agreement is preliminarily
approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate and within the range of
reasonableness for preliminary settlement approval. The Court finds
that: (a) the Agreement resulted from extensive arm's-length
negotiations; and (b) the Agreement is sufficient to warrant notice
of the Settlement to persons in the Settlement Class and a full
hearing on the approval of the Settlement.

Pursuant to Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court conditionally certifies, for settlement purposes only, the
following Settlement Class:

     All hourly employees at Employers' Sea-Tac International
     Airport (STIA) facility who worked on the Amazon contract
     during the period between May 15, 2016 and November 21,
     2020, and who have not disclaimed in sworn testimony
     experiencing missed meal or rest periods.

The Court finds that the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied for settlement
purposes. The Court also finds that the predominance,
manageability, and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are
satisfied for settlement purposes.

Accordingly, the Court orders as follows:

   1. The Plaintiffs are appointed Class Representative; and

   2. The Plaintiffs' counsel are appointed and designated as
counsel
      for the Settlement Class and are authorized to act on
      behalf of the members of the Settlement Class.

A final approval hearing will be held before the Honorable Ricardo
S. Martinez on June 3, 2021, at 9:00 a.m.

The Class Notice will be sent within 30 days following entry of the
Order. CMT is appointed as Claims Administrator. The Claims
Administrator will provide mail notice to persons in the Settlement
Class for whom the Defendants possess mailing addresses. Mail
Notice will be sent via first-class mail to the most recent mailing
address as reflected in reasonably available employment records of
the Defendant.

The Court finds that the program of Class Notice and the manner of
its dissemination is the best practicable notice under the
circumstances and is reasonably calculated to apprise the
Settlement Class of the pendency of this action and their right to
object to or exclude themselves from the Settlement Class. It
further finds that the Class Notice program is reasonable, that it
constitutes due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons
entitled to receive notice and that it meets the requirements of
due process and FRCP 23. The Court approves the Notice in
substantially the same form as that attached as Exhibit Two to the
Declaration of Duncan C. Turner filed in support of the Stipulated
Motion.

The Court confirms that it is appropriate for the Defendants to
provide the information necessary to provide the notice
contemplated herein and to administer the settlement, including
names, addresses, and personal identifying information.

Persons in the Settlement Class will possess the right to opt out
by sending a written request to a designated address within 30 days
after the Notice Mailing Date. All the Settlement Class Members,
who do not opt out in accordance with the terms set forth herein
will be bound by all determinations and judgments in the action.

Any person in the Settlement Class, who has not timely submitted a
valid request for exclusion from the Settlement Class, and thus is
a Settlement Class Member, may object to the proposed Settlement
and appear at the Final Approval Hearing to argue that the proposed
Settlement should not be approved and/or to oppose the application
of Class Counsel for an award of attorneys' fees and the incentive
award to the named Plaintiffs.

The Class Counsel's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and the Motion for
Final Approval will be filed within 30 days of the
Exclusion/Objection Deadline.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/m729z59z from Leagle.com.


[*] Buckley LLP Discusses BIPA Class Action Ruling
--------------------------------------------------
Buckley LLP disclosed that on January 28, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois denied a motion to reconsider
and a motion to certify questions for appeal and stay proceedings
pending appeal in a matter concerning class claims that an auto
leasing company and its parent company (collectively, "defendants")
violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by
unlawfully collecting biometric fingerprint data without first
receiving informed consent. The court previously denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss after concluding the plaintiff stated
a BIPA claim against both defendants. However, the auto leasing
company argued, among other things, that the parent company should
not be held liable because it was never the plaintiff's employer,
did not control her work environment, and had nothing to do with
the fingerprint timekeeping system. The court disagreed, finding
that under BIPA, the plaintiff's allegations of the parent company
were not "legal conclusions," and "control over employee
timekeeping and privacy [] describes a relevant factual aspect of
her personal experience working for defendants." According to the
court, "[t]his factual allegation raises the reasonable inference
that [the parent company] administered the alleged
fingerprint-scanning system, and in turn, plausibly suggests that
[the parent company] collected, retained, and disseminated her
fingerprints." The parent company will have the opportunity to
address alternative theories of liability while seeking summary
judgment against the plaintiff or at trial, the court wrote. [GN]


[*] Curare Legal Discusses Consumer Class Actions in India
----------------------------------------------------------
Curare Legal, in an article for Mondaq, reports that class action
claims are a unique and vital part of the civil dispute resolution
ecosystem. A class action proceeding is initiated when a group of
litigants bring a suit or other proceedings before a
court/tribunal/forums on behalf of a larger group of persons.1

Class action cases contemplate commonality of facts and reliefs
sought in the proceedings where all the members of the class have a
common grievance and some of the persons in the said group initiate
proceedings before courts in their representative capacity for
other members of the class. Class action proceedings provide the
courts/forums with an opportunity to adjudicate claims of similarly
placed persons; a class action proceeding is advantageous as
prevents initiation and adjudication of multiple proceedings in
courts but also allows the adjudicating court to asses and award
claims for all members of the class which in turn aids in reducing
litigation, avoiding multiplicity and expediting the whole
process.

While the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contemplates class
proceedings under Order I Rule 8, CPC, the provision is
infrequently invoked. Another recent enactment i.e. Companies Act,
2013 introduced Section 245 which provided the right to initiate
class action proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal
to shareholders and depositors against the Company, its directors,
auditors(auditing firms) and experts, advisors, consultants and
other persons.

It would not be out of place to mention that class action
proceedings can also be maintained in the form of Public Interest
Litigation/social action litigation under Articles 32 and 226 for
enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of
India before the Supreme Court and High Courts in India, it would
be however important to highlight a crucial distinction between a
PIL and ordinary class action proceeding i.e. lack of locus standi
in PILs. In a PIL the Petitioner is not an aggrieved party and does
not form part of the class it represents; however in a class action
proceedings, the parties are required to possess necessary locus to
maintain proceedings arising out of the same cause of action.

The remedy to initiate class action cases was also incorporated in
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 through the Consumer Protection
(Amendment) Act, 1993 which inserted specific provisions for
initiating proceedings before the consumer forums by expanding the
definition of 'complainant'23 under the 1986 act and inserted
Section 2(1)(b)(iv) which stated "one or more consumers, where
there are numerous consumers having the same interest;"

The amendment also provided for adoption of the provisions of Order
I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in proceedings under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 through introduction of Section
13(6)4 5to the act thereby mandating the procedure provided in the
Civil Procedure Code to be followed in cases of class action
consumer claims.

With the introduction of the provisions for initiating class action
proceedings, the law in respect of the practice and procedure in
cases of class complaints also developed and evolved with time.

What is also important to highlight here is that that class
complaints have primarily been initiated in the Real Estate6 sector
(specially relating to residential real estate disputes), which
invariably brought the litigation before the National Consumer
Dispute Redressal Commission7 as the pecuniary limit of the
National Commission was for reliefs valued at more than Rs. 1
Crore( Rupees Ten Million)8.

Therefore the National Commission and the Supreme Court of India9
had the occasion to examine, adjudicate and frame the law relating
to class action complaints under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986.

One of the leading cases relating to interpretation of the law with
respect of class action proceedings under Section 13 was
adjudicated in Ambrish Kumar Shukla & Ors. V. Ferrous
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd10 11. The full bench of the National
Consumer Disputes Resolution Commission examined the scope, import
and limitations of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in relation to
class action complaints. The issues relating to class action
complaints were referred to the larger bench in this matter and the
Commission held that:

Issue No. (i)

As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board
(supra), the interest of the persons on whose behalf the claim is
brought must be common or they must have a common grievance which
they seek to get addressed. The defect or deficiency in the goods
purchased, or the services hired or availed of by them should be
the same for all the consumers on whose behalf or for whose benefit
the complaint is filed. Therefore, the oneness of the interest is
akin to a common grievance against the same person. If, for
instance, a number of flats or plots in a project are sold by a
builder / developer to a number of persons, he fails to deliver
possession of the said flats/plots within the time frame promised
by him, and a complaint is filed by one or more such persons,
either seeking delivery of possession of flats / plots purchased by
them and other purchasers in the said project, or refund of the
money paid by them and the other purchasers to the developer /
builder is sought, the grievance of such persons being common i.e.
the failure of the builder / developer to deliver timely possession
of the flats/plots sold to them, they would have same interest in
the subject matter of the complaint and sufficient community of
interest to justify the adoption of the procedure prescribed in
Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provided that the
complaint is filed on behalf of or for the benefit of all the
persons having a common grievance against the same developer /
builder, and identical relief is sought for all such consumers.

The primary object behind permitting a class action such as a
complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act
being to facilitate the decision of a consumer dispute in which a
large number of consumers are interested, without recourse to each
of them filing an individual complaint, it is necessary that such a
complaint is filed on behalf of or for the benefit of all the
persons having such a community of interest. A complaint on behalf
of only some of them therefore will not be maintainable. If for
instance, 100 flat buyers / plot buyers in a project have a common
grievance against the Builder / Developer and a complaint under
Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act is filed on behalf
of or for the benefit of say 10 of them, the primary purpose behind
permitting a class action will not be achieved, since the remaining
90 aggrieved persons will be compelled either to file individual
complaints or to file complaints on behalf of or for the benefit of
the different group of purchasers in the same project. This, in our
view, could not have been the Legislative intent. The term 'persons
so interested' and 'persons having the same interest' used in
Section 12(1)(c) mean, the persons having a common grievance
against the same service provider. The use of the words "all
consumers so interested' and "on behalf of or for the benefit of
all consumers so interested", in Section 12(1)(c) leaves no doubt
that such a complaint must necessarily be filed on behalf of or for
the benefit of all the persons having a common grievance, seeking a
common relief and consequently having a community of interest
against the same service provider.

Sub rule (2) of Rule 8 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure
mandates the Court to give notice of the institution of the suit
/complaint to all the persons "so interested", meaning thereby to
the persons having the same interest, i.e. a common grievance, on
whose behalf or for whose benefit the complaint is instituted.
Notice can be either by way of personal service or where personal
service is not reasonably practicable, by way of a public
advertisement. The aforesaid provision clearly envisages
institution of a suit / complaint on behalf or for the benefit of
not only those who approach the Court/Forum but also on behalf of
or for the benefit of the persons other than the plaintiffs /
complainants, but having the same grievance. Had the Legislative
intent been to permit such a complaint only on behalf of the
persons deciding to approach the Court/ Forum, there could be no
occasion for requiring the service of notice in the aforesaid
manner, since there can be no question of serving any notice on
those who are already before the Court/Forum.

Sub Rule (5) of Rule 8 of Order I enables the Court to substitute
the name of any person having same interest in the suit as
plaintiff where it finds that the person suing the suit is not
proceeding with due diligence in the suit. The aforesaid power
given to the Court also indicates that a suit in terms of order 1
Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure commonly termed as a class
suit is intended on behalf or for the benefit of all the persons
having a common grievance against the same party and seeking the
same relief not on behalf of or for the benefit of only some of
them.

12.Issue No. (ii) and (iii)

Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, to the extent it is
relevant provides that this Commission shall have jurisdiction to
entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and
compensation, if any, claimed exceeds Rs.1.00 crore. Therefore,
what has to be seen, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary
jurisdiction, is the value of the goods or services and the amount
of the compensation claimed in the complaint. If the aggregate of
(i) the value of the goods or services and (ii) the compensation
claimed in the complaint exceeds Rs.1.00 crore, this Commission
would have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
Similarly, if the aggregate of the value of (i) the goods or
services and (ii) compensation, if any, claimed in the complaint
exceeds Rs.20.00 lacs but does not exceed Rs.1.00 Crore, the State
Commission would have the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint. Since a complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer
Protection Act can be filed only where there are numerous consumers
having the same interest and it has to be filed on behalf of or for
the benefit of all the consumers so interested i.e. all of the
numerous consumers having the same interest, it is the aggregate of
the value of the goods purchased or services hired or availed of,
by all those numerous consumers and the total compensation, if any,
claimed for all those numerous consumers, which would determine the
pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. If the aggregate of the
value of the goods purchased or the services hired or availed of by
all the consumers having the same interest and the total
compensation, if any, claimed for all of them comes to more than
Rs.1.00 crore, the pecuniary jurisdiction would rest with this
Commission alone. The value of the goods purchased or the services
hired or availed of and the quantum of compensation, if any,
claimed in respect of the one individual consumer therefore, would
be absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of determining the
pecuniary jurisdiction in such a complaint. In fact, this issue is
no more res Integra in view of the decision of a Four-Members Bench
of this Commission in Public Health Engineering Department Vs.
Upbhokta Sanrakshan Samiti I (1992) CPJ 182 (NC).In the above
referred case, a complaint was preferred, seeking to recover
compensation for alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner
which had resulted in a large number of persons getting infected by
Jaundice. The names of 46 such persons were mentioned in the
complaint but it was alleged that there were thousands of other
sufferers who were similarly placed and that complaint was filed on
behalf of all of them. The complainant had sought compensation of
Rs.20,000/- for every student victim, Rs.10,000/- for every general
victim and Rs.1,00,000/- for the legal representatives of those who
had died due to Jaundice. The District Forum held that it had no
pecuniary jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the complaint. The State
Commission took the view that the District Forum has to go by the
value as specified for each consumer. Rejecting the view taken by
the State Commission, this Commission inter-alia held as under:

"5. In our opinion this proposition is clearly wrong since under
the terms of Section 11 of the Act the pecuniary jurisdiction of
the District Forum would depend upon the quantum of compensation
claimed in the petition. The view expressed by the State Commission
is not based on a correct understanding or interpretation of
Section 11. On the plain words used in Section 11 of the Act, the
aggregate quantum of compensation claimed in the petition will
determine the question of jurisdiction and when the complaint is
filed in a representative capacity on behalf of several persons, as
in the present case, the total amount of compensation claimed by
the representative body on behalf of all the persons whom it
represents will govern the valuation of the complaint petition for
purposes of jurisdiction".

6. The quantum of compensation claimed in the petition being far in
excess of Rs.1.00 lac the District Forum was perfectly right in
holding that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
complaint. The reversal of the said order by the State Commission
was contrary to law".

Therefore, irrespective of the value of the goods purchased or the
service hired and availed of by an individual purchaser / allottee
and the compensation claimed in respect of an individual purchaser
/ allottee, this Commission would have the pecuniary jurisdiction
to entertain the complaint if the aggregate of the value of the
goods purchased or the services hired or availed of by the numerous
consumers on whose behalf or for whose benefit the complaint is
filed and the total compensation claimed for all of them exceeds
Rs.1.00 crore.

Issue No. (iv)

13. As noted earlier, what is required for the applicability of
Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act read with Order I
Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the sameness of the
interest i.e. a common grievance of numerous persons which is
sought to get redressed through a representative action. Therefore,
so long as the grievance of the consumers is common and identical
relief is claimed for all of them, the cost, size, area of the flat
/ plot and the date of booking / allotment / purchase, would be
wholly immaterial. For instance, if a builder / developer has sold
100 flats in a project out of which 25 are three-bed room flats, 25
are two-bed room flats and 50 are one-bed room flats and he has
failed to deliver timely possession of those flats, all the
allottees irrespective of size of their respective flats / plots,
the date of their respective purchase and the cost agreed to be
paid by them have a common grievance i.e. the failure of the
builder/ developer to deliver possession of the flat / plot sold to
them and a complaint filed for the benefit of or on behalf of all
such consumers and claiming same relief for all of them, would be
maintainable under Section 12(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act.
The relief claimed will be the same / identical if for instance, in
a case of failure of the builder to deliver timely possession,
refund, or possession or in the alternative refund with or without
compensation is claimed for all of them. Different reliefs for one
or more of the consumers on whose behalf or for whose benefit the
complaint is filed cannot be claimed in such a complaint.

(emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court of India thereafter also had the occasion to
examine the correctness and applicability of Ambrish Kumar
Shukla(supra) in context of the class action/class complaint
proceedings while considering the case of Anjum Hussain and Ors.
Vs. Intellicity Business Park Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.12. In Anjum
Hussain (supra) the NCDRC had dismissed a class complaint on the
ground that although the allottees had common grievance of delay on
construction of a commercial project, however it was not shown as
to how many of the allottees had booked the shops/commercial units
solely for the purpose of earning their livelihood by way of
self-employment.

The NCDRC thus effectively negatived the option of class
action/class complaint purely on the ground that some of the
allottees may not be covered by the ambit of Consumer Protection
Act, 198613 and would not be entitled to reliefs as claimed in the
class complaint. This distinction between allottees of commercial
offices in the case was erroneous in as much as mere allotment to
"non-consumer" would not defeat or extinguish the right of
"consumers" under the act to initiate class action complaints
against the builder.

The Supreme Court quoting with approval the law laid down by the
full bench of the NCDRC in Ambrish Kumar Shukla(supra) held that
the essential test for the consumer forum while entertaining a
class complaint is to consider the test of oneness of the interest
is akin to a common grievance against the same person; once the
test is satisfied in a class complaint, the matter ought to be
adjudicated on merits and proceeded to revive the class complaint
and remanded for adjudication on merits.

The Supreme Court as recently in February, 202014 had the occasion
to examine the locus of an association to file a class action/class
complaint. The question before the court was whether an association
which was formed by virtue of any law or rule wherein the
membership was mandatory and not voluntary could maintain a class
complaint.

The court after examining the definition of complainant/consumer
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and also the scope of
provisions relating to representative complaints concluded and held
that since the definition of 'complainant' is restrictive and not
exhaustive or inclusive, hence associations which are not
'voluntary' in nature cannot maintain a complaint under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

It would however be proper to clarify that Sobha Hibiscus
Condominium(supra) does not take away the right of an involuntary
association or any association which is formed by mandate of any
law or rule or regulation from otherwise maintaining a consumer
complaint as a definition of person, consumer and complainant
expressly includes 'every other association of persons'15.

Lastly, for the sake of completeness, it would be important to
highlight that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stood repealed and
replaced with the Consumer Protection Act, 201916 which has
retained the provisions for initiating class action complaints
under the 2019 law.

Footnotes

1 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/classaction.asp

2 Section 2(1)(b) of the Consumer protection act, 1986:

3
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1868?sam_handle=123456789/1362


4 Section 13(6) Where the complainant is a consumer referred to in
sub-clause (iv) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 2, the
provisions of rule 8 of Order I of the First Schedule to the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply subject to the modification
that every reference therein to a suit or decree shall be construed
as a reference to a complaint or the order of the District Forum
thereon.

5
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1868?sam_handle=123456789/1362


6 https://curarelegal.com/real-estate/

7 www.ncdrc.nic.in

8 Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986:
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1868?sam_handle=123456789/1362


9 www.sci.gov.in

10
http://cms.nic.in/ncdrcusersWeb/GetJudgement.do?method=GetJudgement&caseidin=0%2F0%2FCC%2F97%2F2016&dtofhearing=2016-10-07


11 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1117

12 MANU/SC/0750/2019: (2019) 6 SCC 519

13 Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defines
consumer and excludes purchasers of goods and receipt of services
for "commercial purpose" the explanation of the sub clause excludes
goods purchased or services availed for earning livelihood for
purposes of self-employment.

14 Sobha Hibiscus Condominium vs. Managing Director, Sobha
Developers Ltd. and Ors. (14.02.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0178/2020

15 Section 2(1)(m) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

16 Notified in official gazette of the Government of India w.e.f
09-08-2019, the law has not come in force yet as no commencement
date has been notified.

17 Section 38, 49 and 59 of The Consumer Protection Act, 2019
referring to procedure before the District Consumer Forum, State
Commission and National Commission respectively. [GN]


[*] Indiana Financial Cos. Targeted in Overdraft and NSF Lawsuits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Brett J. Ashton, Esq., Libby Yin Goodknight, Esq., Kay Dee Baird,
Esq., Scott S. Morrisson, Esq., and Mark J.R. Merkle, Esq., of
Krieg DeVault, in an article for Lexology, report that over the
past two years, no fewer than seventeen Indiana banks and credit
unions have been targeted with class action lawsuits based on their
overdraft fee practices ("Overdraft Cases"), their non-sufficient
funds ("NSF") fee practices ("NSF Cases"), or in many instances,
both. While many of these cases are ongoing, some financial
institutions have paid substantial amounts to settle the litigation
on a classwide basis in order to achieve certainty and avoid the
risk of incurring even greater liability in the event of an adverse
judgment. Some of these matters have been settled on a pre-suit
basis, based on a demand from plaintiffs' counsel and the threat of
litigation.

While there is nothing to prevent someone filing a lawsuit, taking
simple, proactive steps may help you avoid, or at the very least
minimize, the potential for becoming the next financial institution
to be targeted with a class action lawsuit challenging your
assessment of overdraft fees and/or NSF fees. First, review your
deposit account agreements, including all fee disclosures and
Regulation E opt-in forms, to ensure they accurately reflect your
current practices with respect to overdraft fees and NSF fees.

Pay particular attention to language discussing when an overdraft
fee is charged, and whether you are using the customer's actual or
available balance to determine and assess fees. Plaintiffs in OD
Cases typically assert that the customer should never receive an
overdraft fee if their balance (whether that is their available
balance or their actual balance - whichever is most advantageous to
the particular plaintiff's claim) is positive at the time a debit
card transaction is approved. These plaintiffs allege that
financial institutions "sequester" funds approved in connection
with a debit card transaction from the customer's other account
funds, so as to use those purportedly "sequestered" funds to pay
the transaction when it is ultimately presented for payment by the
merchant. While this is simply not how the debit transaction
process works in the real world, plaintiffs are able to survive
motions to dismiss such baseless theories given the deferential
procedural rules that apply to pleading a complaint. Therefore,
adding clear language to your deposit account agreements and
related disclosures, describing at which point of the posting
process an overdraft fee is triggered and on which balance the
institution bases its determination of a negative balance, is
critical.

NSF Cases typically assert that the financial institution engages
in an improper assessment of NSF fees when it fails to adequately
disclose the potential for more than one NSF fee to be assessed on
the customer's overall transaction with a merchant, if an ACH item
is declined for a negative account balance and then later
re-presented for payment a second time. For example, a plaintiff in
one of these NSF Cases alleged as follows:

"[BANK] promises its customers that if their account balance drops
too low to cover a particular "item" or "transaction" such as a
check, withdrawal, or electronic transaction, [BANK] will charge
the customer a single $35 Return Items Fee ("NSF Fee") per item.
But as Plaintiff and [BANK's] other customers have discovered,
[BANK] doesn't abide by this promise. Instead, [BANK] routinely
charges its customers multiple NSF Fees for the same item, driving
its customers' account balances deeper into negative territory."

Again, these types of allegations can be overcome with clear
language in the deposit account agreements and related
disclosures.

Finally, perhaps the best protection against having to defend
against Overdraft Cases and NSF Cases is to add arbitration and
class action waiver language to your deposit account agreements.
While this may not prevent someone from suing your financial
institution, it typically does help avoid the claim being converted
into a class action, and as a result significantly reduce the
exposure to the financial institution.

Krieg DeVault's financial institutions litigation team is closely
monitoring developments in this area of the law, and can provide
assistance with updating your deposit account agreement and
disclosures, or if necessary, with defending against overdraft and
NSF class action litigation. [GN]


[*] Jackson Lewis Issues Class Action Trends Report Winter 2021
---------------------------------------------------------------
Brett Anders, Esq., Jamie Goetz-Anderson, Esq., Justin Barnes,
Esq., Lindsey Chopin, Esq., Alison Crane, Esq., and Jenna Decker,
Esq., of Jackson Lewis P.C., in an article for JDSupra, report that
last year presented many challenges, and 2021 offers a fresh start.
In this issue of the Class Actions Trends Report the law firm
reviews the most significant developments of 2020 and take a look
forward to what a new year and a new presidential administration
may mean for employers.

Topics addressed in this issue include:

* Top 10 class action stories and trends from 2020-

* What employers can expect from the Biden administration . . .

Please see full Report below for more Information.

https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/class-action-trends-report-winter-2021-1993515/
[GN]


[*] Workplace-Related Class Action Ruling Spiked Due to Pandemic
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Herzlich, writing for Newsday, reports that the pandemic has
produced a record number of workplace-related class-action rulings,
according to a new report from a national law firm.

The pandemic spiked more class action lawsuits for all types of
workplace issues, with 1,548 rulings in 2020, according to the
Chicago-based Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Of those rulings, the metropolitan area, which includes New York,
New Jersey and Connecticut, had the most wage and hour lawsuits --
which included claims that businesses failed to pay minimum wage or
overtime for compensable work hours -- than any other part of the
country, totaling 40 cases processed and certified out of 113 filed
nationwide.

"Metro-NY was the absolute epicenter of wage-and-hour class-action
litigation," says Gerald Maatman, Jr., a partner at Seyfarth Shaw
and author of its Workplace Class Action Litigation Report. (Long
Island-specific data was unavailable.)

Termination, which was the top issue according to the report, was
cited in 690 cases.

Maatman says, in general, the rise in litigation likely stems from

the fact that whenever there is a significant disruption in the
economy and job loss there tends to be increased litigation that
follows.

Among issues prompting lawsuits in the wage and hour space in the
metro area were complaints from employees alleging they are working
more than 40 hours and not getting paid the correct amount of
overtime and those claiming they were misclassified as independent
contractors and the work they performed entitled them to overtime,
Maatman says.

He expects these kinds of claims to continue into 2021 since
employees don't necessarily file litigation the day they're laid
off, noting there's usually some lag time.

Also noteworthy, the report says, is that "with a change from red
to blue in the White House, a likely expansion of workers' rights,
increased regulation of businesses, and aggressive enforcement of
workplace laws is apt to take place in the next four years."

Still, wage and hour litigation will remain prevalent in 2021, due
to "a more friendly DOL that makes wage theft its enforcement
priority and with minimum wage increases in 25 states in 2021,"
Seyfarth Shaw says.

Subsequently, it pays to look at how you're classifying employees,
says Yale Pollack, a partner at Ronkonkoma-based Campolo, Middleton
& McCormick LLP.

"You may want to do an updated analysis of whether or not employees
should be classified as exempt or nonexempt," he says.

Barbara DeMatteo, director of HR Consulting at Jericho-based
Portnoy, Messinger, Pearl & Associates, Inc., agrees. Whether
employees are exempt or nonexempt from overtime can change based
upon how their jobs have changed since the pandemic.

For instance, she says, the status of an employee whose job
pre-COVID was doing outside sales (as an exempt employee) could
have changed to nonexempt because the employee is no longer "on the
road making sales."

DeMatteo also finds that employers are getting into problems by not
formally tracking the number of hours worked by nonexempt
employees.

Doug Rowe, a partner at Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman in East
Meadow, says he didn't see a "record" number of claims being filed
in 2020 locally, but definitely saw more claims than he did in
2019.

"What I saw more glaringly was an increase in the difficulty with
staying in compliance with all the new employment laws," he says.

He said employers should keep abreast of new laws including the NY
Paid Sick Leave Law (see nwsdy.li/paidsickleave) that went into
effect Jan. 1 in addition to last year's COVID-19 paid sick leave
law.

Rowe also saw discrimination claims arising from terminations and
layoffs due to COVID-19 (i.e., employees questioning why they
weren't permitted to work from home when other employees could or
why they were laid off when another was not.)

Consider that COVID-19 lawsuits are also arising against businesses
by those alleging that the business spread the coronavirus to their
workers or customers through negligence, Rowe says.

Given that Republicans didn't get pandemic-liability protections
for businesses in the latest federal stimulus bill, businesses
should "tread carefully in 2021 in ensuring that the safety and
health of their employees and customers remain a priority," Rowe
says.

Beyond that, employers should be mindful of potential claims that
could arise from mandating employees to get the COVID vaccine, says
Pollack, noting that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
has issued guidance that employers should be aware of.

Some employees with disabilities or religious beliefs may be
eligible for a reasonable accommodation, he says, adding, "this is
going to be a potential new wave of litigation." [GN]


                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Columbus McKinnon Has $5.4MM Estimated Liabilities
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Columbus McKinnon Corporation has estimated its net
asbestos-related aggregate liability including related legal costs
to range between $5,400,000 and $9,700,000 using actuarial
parameters of continued claims for a period of 37 years from
December 31, 2020, according to the Company's Form 10-Q filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on January 28, 2021.

The Columbus McKinnon Corp. states, "The Company's estimation of
its net asbestos-related aggregate liability that is probable and
estimable, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles approximates $7,150,000, which has been reflected as a
liability in the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet as of
December 31, 2020. The recorded liability does not consider the
impact of any potential favorable federal legislation. This
liability will fluctuate based on the uncertainty in the number of
future claims that will be filed and the cost to resolve those
claims, which may be influenced by a number of factors, including
the outcome of the ongoing broad-based settlement negotiations,
defensive strategies, and the cost to resolve claims outside the
broad-based settlement program. Of this amount, management expects
to incur asbestos liability payments of approximately $2,000,000
over the next 12 months. Because payment of the liability is likely
to extend over many years, management believes that the potential
additional costs for claims will not have a material effect on the
financial condition of the Company or its liquidity, although the
effect of any future liabilities recorded could be material to
earnings in a future period.

"A share of the Company's previously incurred asbestos-related
expenses and future asbestos-related expenses are covered by
pre-existing insurance policies. The Company had been engaged in a
legal action against the insurance carriers for those policies to
recover past expenses and future costs incurred. In March of fiscal
2020, the Company came to a tentative agreement with the insurance
carriers to settle its case against them for recovery of a portion
of past costs and future costs for asbestos-related legal defense
costs. The agreement was finalized during the quarter ended
September 30, 2020. The terms of the settlement require the
carriers to pay gross defense costs prior to retro-premiums of 65%
for future asbestos-related defense costs subject to an annual cap
of $1,650,000 for claims covered by the settlement. The
reimbursement net of retro-premiums is approximately 47% which
resulted in a $1,830,000 increase to the Company’s asbestos
liability during the nine months ended December 31, 2020.

"In addition, the insurance carriers are required to reimburse the
Company for past defense costs through the date of the settlement
amounting to $3,006,000. Of this amount, $2,842,000 has been paid
prior to December 31, 2020 with the remaining expected to be paid
before the end of fiscal 2021. The reimbursement for past cost is
recorded net of a contingent legal fee of $1,500,000 which was paid
in the third quarter of fiscal 2021. Further, the insurance
carriers accept 100% coverage for indemnity costs related to all
covered cases. Estimates of the future cost sharing have been
included in the loss reserve calculation as of December 31, 2020
and March 31, 2020. The Company has recorded a receivable for the
estimated future cost sharing in Other assets in the Condensed
Consolidated Balance Sheet at December 31, 2020 in the amount of
$8,391,000, which offsets its asbestos reserves.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-Q is available at
https://bit.ly/3dbZhcv


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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