---

              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, March 9, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 43

                            Headlines

AARGON AGENCY: Stipulation to Dismiss Roberts Class Suit Granted
ABBVIE INC: Continues to Defend Niaspan Direct Purchasers Suit
ADVANCE AUTO: Delaware Class Action Suit Underway
APOLLO GLOBAL: Securities Suit Over PlayAGS Disclosures Ongoing
ARMOUR RESIDENTIAL: Bid to Nix Javelin Shareholder Suit Pending

ASPEN ANESTHESIA: Navarro Files FDCPA Suit in Colorado
ATHENEX INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
ATHENEX INC: Scott+Scott Attorneys Reminds of May 3 Deadline
BLUEBIRD BIO: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of April 13 Deadline
BOISE SD 1: Court Denies Bid for Summary Judgment in Zeyen Suit

CENTERLIGHT HEALTHCARE: Miller Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
CHARLESTON SOUTHERN: Taylor Suit Remanded to Court of Common Pleas
CHEGG INC: ADA Related Class Suit in New York Underway
CHEGG INC: Continues to Defend Shah Class Suit
CHEGG INC: Continues to Defend Unruh Violation Related Suit

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: Court Trims Claims in Tuition Refund Suit
COOK COUNTY JAIL: Court Decertifies Employees' Harassment Lawsuit
CORECIVIC INC: Immigration Detainees' Suit Ongoing in California
CORECIVIC INC: Trial in Grae Class Suit Set for May
CROWN CASTLE: Continues to Defend Putative Class Suit in New Jersey

CVS PHARMACY: Court Dismisses Lokey's First Amended Complaint
CWS AMSTERDAM: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Orozco Suit Says
DISH NETWORK: Court Junks Appeal Related to Claims Admin Process
DISH NETWORK: Trial in Stockholder Suit vs Ergen to Start Sept. 7
EBIX INC: Lieff Cabraser Reminds Investors of April 23 Deadline

EDWARD JONES: 9th Circuit Revives Fee Class Action Lawsuit
ELI LILLY: Continues to Defend Actos-Related Class Suits in Canada
ELI LILLY: Court Consolidates Purported Class Suits in New Jersey
ENTIRELYPETS PHARMACY: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FACEBOOK INC: $650M Class Deal in BIPA Suit Wins Final Approval

FCA US: Loses Bid to Reconsider Denial Ruling in Victorino Suit
FIRST CHINESE: New York Court Denies Bids to Remand in Guzman Suit
FLINT, MI: Atty. Fletcher Must Submit Corrective Communication
GEICO: Faces Suit Claiming It Overcharged During Pandemic
GERBER PRODUCTS: Moore Sues Over Toxic Metals in Baby Food Products

GOLDMAN SACHS: Accord in Indirect Forex Purchasers' Suit Approved
GOLDMAN SACHS: Bid to Dismiss Suit Over 1MDB Scandal Still Pending
GOLDMAN SACHS: Deal in Valeant Securities Suit in Canada OK'd
GOLDMAN SACHS: Denial of Bid to Nix Alnylam-Related Suit Appealed
GOLDMAN SACHS: Dismissal of Commodities-Related Suit Under Appeal

GRANITE CONSTRUCTION: Bid to Nix Layne Merger Related Suit Pending
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION: Securities Class Suit in California Underway
HARTFORD FINANCIAL: Illinois Court Narrows Claims in Taube Suit
HEARTWARE INT'L: Distribution Plan in Securities Suit Approved
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP: Facing Drulias Putative Class Suit in New York

IAC/INTERACTIVECORP: March 9 Hearing to Assign Lead Plaintiff Set
ILLINOIS: Ross Plaintiffs Not Allowed to Revise Requests to Admit
IMMUNOVANT INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of April 20 Deadline
INFINITY Q: Kirby McInerney Announces Securities Class Action
INT'L FLAVORS: Bid to Dismiss Jansen Putative Class Suit Pending

INT'L FLAVORS: Court Stays Yehudai $20MM Bonus Related Suit
INT'L FLAVORS: Securities Class Suits in Tel Aviv Underway
IOWA HEALTH: McCall Allowed to Opt-Out of Class Settlement in Fox
J.P. MORGAN: Court Dismisses Roeder's Amended Class Complaint
JACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY: Allen's Class Action Complaint Struck

JARINC LTD: Settlement in Blose Suit Wins Preliminary Approval
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: AWP Suit in New Jersey Ongoing
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Bid to Dismiss ERISA-Related Class Suit Pending
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Bid to Junk XARELTO Sales Suit Pending
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Bid to Nix Talc-Related Suit in Illinois Pending

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Dismissal of TRACLEER(R) Antitrust Suit Appealed
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Perrone ERISA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
KRAFT HEINZ: Facing Union Asset Management Class Suit
KRAFT HEINZ: Osborne Suit v. Employee Benefits Board Underway
LEIDOS HOLDINGS: Morton Sues Over Decline in Securities Value

MAIN DRAG MUSIC: Hedges Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MAYES EDUCATION: Southern District of New York Tosses Hedges Suit
MCKINSEY & COMPANY: Board of County Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma
MELVIN & MELVIN: Shepard Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. New York
MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses Brown Civil Suit v. MDOC With Prejudice

MOUSEFLOW INC: Deadline to Answer Sacco Suit Extended to March 17
MULTIPLAN CORPORATION: Pomerantz Law Reminds of April 26 Deadline
MUSCULOSKELETAL INSTITUTE: Fla. Court Stays Stoll Data Breach Suit
NATIONAL DEBT: Cucuzza Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
NEW YORK: Class Certification Order in Stewart v. Roberts Affirmed

ONTRAK INC: Federman & Sherwood Reminds of May 3 Deadline
PHARMA BRO: Martin Shkreli Faces Suit Over Drug 'Monopoly'
PROSPECTS DM: Moore Suit Moved to N.D. Ohio
RANGE RESOURCES: Federman & Sherwood Reminds of May 3 Deadline
RANGE RESOURCES: Rosen Law Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline

RENEWABLE ENERGY: Kahn Swick Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
RENEWABLE ENERGY: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of May 3 Deadline
RENEWABLE ENERGY: Pawar Law Group Reminds of May 3 Deadline
RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS: $105K Class Settlement in Foster Suit OK'd
SEATTLE CHILDREN: 15 Patients Join Lawsuit Over Mold Infections

SIMON FRASER: Slater Vecchio Files Class Action Due to Data Breach
ST. MICHAEL: Hospital Settles Class Lawsuit Over Unpaid Breaks
STATE FARM FIRE: Court Refuses to Dismiss COVID Claims Class Action
TOYOTA MOTOR: Murphy Sues Over RAV4 Vehicles' Defective Batteries
UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Planned Class Suit by Drivers Gets Support

UNITED STATES: Appeals in Rivas Suit Referred to Mediation Program
US FOODS: Class Settlement in Flerlage Suit Wins Final Approval
VELODYNE LIDAR: Kahn Swick Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
VELODYNE LIDAR: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of May 3 Deadline
VERB TECHNOLOGY: Final Judgment Issued in Hartmann Class Suit

WB STUDIO: Ettedgui Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court
WELLPET LLC: California Northern District Certifies Class in Zeiger
WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Wins Bid to Dismiss Equity Planning Class Suit
YOURMECHANIC INC: Suris Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York

                            *********

AARGON AGENCY: Stipulation to Dismiss Roberts Class Suit Granted
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada grants the
stipulation of Plaintiff Roberts and Defendant Aaron Agency to
dismiss the lawsuit entitled DEIDRE ROBERTS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AARGON
AGENCY, INC. d/b/a AARGON COLLECTION AGENCY AND John Does 1-25,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-00586-APG-VCF (D. Nev.).

Judge Andrew P. Gordon has reviewed the Stipulation to Dismiss and
for good cause appearing, he grants the parties' Stipulation to
Dismiss the Plaintiff's individual claim with prejudice, and to
dismiss without prejudice the putative class action claims asserted
by the Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to bear their respective
attorneys' fees and costs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2m4p29a4 from Leagle.com.

ALVERSON, TAYLOR, MORTENSEN & SANDERS, Kurt R. Bonds, Esq. --
kbonds@alversontaylor.com -- Trevor R. Waite, Esq. --
twaite@alversontaylor.com -- in Las Vegas, Nevada, Attorneys for
Defendant AARGON AGENCY, INC., d/b/a AARGON COLLECTION AGENCY.


ABBVIE INC: Continues to Defend Niaspan Direct Purchasers Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
AbbVie Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 19, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a purported class action suit entitled, In re: Niaspan
Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2460.

Lawsuits are pending against AbbVie and others generally alleging
that the 2005 patent litigation settlement involving Niaspan
entered into between Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a company acquired
by Abbott in 2006 and presently a subsidiary of AbbVie) and a
generic company violates federal and state antitrust laws and state
unfair and deceptive trade practices and unjust enrichment laws.
Plaintiffs generally seek monetary damages and/or injunctive relief
and attorneys' fees.

The lawsuits pending in federal court consist of four individual
plaintiff lawsuits and two consolidated purported class actions:
one brought by Niaspan direct purchasers and one brought by Niaspan
end-payers. The cases are pending in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for coordinated or
consolidated pre-trial proceedings under the MDL Rules as In re:
Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2460.

In August 2019, the court certified a class of direct purchasers of
Niaspan. In June 2020, the court denied the end-payers' motion to
certify a class.

In October 2016, the Orange County, California District Attorney's
Office filed a lawsuit on behalf of the State of California
regarding the Niaspan patent litigation settlement in Orange County
Superior Court, asserting a claim under the unfair competition
provision of the California Business and Professions Code seeking
injunctive relief, restitution, civil penalties and attorneys'
fees.

AbbVie Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and sells
pharmaceutical products worldwide. The company offers HUMIRA, a
therapy administered as an injection for autoimmune diseases;
IMBRUVICA, an oral therapy for treating chronic lymphocytic
leukemia; and VIEKIRA PAK, an interferon-free therapy, with or
without ribavirin, to treat adults with genotype 1 chronic
hepatitis C. The company was incorporated in 2012 and is based in
North Chicago, Illinois.

ADVANCE AUTO: Delaware Class Action Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------
Advance Auto Parts, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021,
for the fiscal year ended January 2, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit in the  U.S. District Court
for the District of Delaware.

On February 6, 2018, a putative class action on behalf of
purchasers of the Company's securities who purchased or otherwise
acquired their securities between November 14, 2016 and August 15,
2017, inclusive, was commenced against the company and certain of
its current and former officers in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the company's financial well-being,
business relationships, and prospects during the alleged Class
Period in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

On February 7, 2020 the court granted in part and denied in part
the company's motion to dismiss.

The surviving claims are subject to discovery. On November 6, 2020
the court granted plaintiff's motion for class certification.

In addition, derivative complaints purportedly on behalf of the
Company were filed against the company as nominal defendant and
certain of the company's current and former officers and directors
related to similar allegations for the Class Period on April 29,
2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware and
August 13, 2020 in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the federal derivative
complaint and the state court derivative claim is stayed pending
the determination of the federal motion to dismiss.

Advance Auto Parts said, "We strongly dispute the allegations of
the complaints and intend to defend the cases vigorously."

Advance Auto Parts, Inc. provides automotive replacement parts,
accessories, batteries, and maintenance items for domestic and
imported cars, vans, sport utility vehicles, and light and heavy
duty trucks. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. was founded in 1929 and is
based in Raleigh, North Carolina.

APOLLO GLOBAL: Securities Suit Over PlayAGS Disclosures Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Apollo Global Management, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 19,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that AGM Inc.,
Apollo Investment Fund VIII, L.P., Apollo Gaming Holdings, L.P.,
and Apollo Gaming Voteco, LLC together with PlayAGS Inc. continues
to defend a putative class action suit currently pending before the
District of Nevada.

On August 4, 2020, a putative class action complaint was filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada against
PlayAGS Inc., all of the members of PlayAGS's board of directors
(including three directors who are affiliated with Apollo), certain
underwriters of PlayAGS (including Apollo Global Securities, LLC),
as well as AGM Inc., Apollo Investment Fund VIII, L.P., Apollo
Gaming Holdings, L.P., and Apollo Gaming Voteco, LLC.

The complaint asserts claims arising under the Securities Act of
1933 in connection with certain secondary offerings of PlayAGS
stock conducted in August 2018 and March 2019, alleging that the
registration statements issued in connection with those offerings
did not fully disclose certain business challenges facing PlayAGS.
Such claims are asserted against all defendants, including Apollo
Global Securities, LLC and the Apollo Defendants, as well as all
directors (including the directors affiliated with Apollo).

The complaint further asserts a control person claim under Section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the Apollo
Defendants and the director defendants (including the directors
affiliated with Apollo), alleging that the Apollo Defendants and
the director defendants were responsible for certain misstatements
and omissions by PlayAGS about its business during a putative class
period from May 3, 2018 through August 7, 2019.

Plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint on January 21,
2021.

Apollo believes the claims in this action are without merit.
Because this action is in the early stages, no reasonable estimate
of possible loss, if any, can be made at this time.

Apollo Global Management, Inc. is a publicly owned investment
manager. The firm primarily provides its services to endowment and
sovereign wealth funds, as well as other institutional and
individual investors. It manages client-focused portfolios.  The
firm was formerly known as Apollo Global Management, LLC.  Apollo
Global Management, Inc. was founded in 1990 and is headquartered in
New York City, with additional offices in North America, Asia and
Europe.

ARMOUR RESIDENTIAL: Bid to Nix Javelin Shareholder Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
ARMOUR Residential REIT, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the motion
to dismiss filed in the class action suit entitled, In re JAVELIN
Mortgage Investment Corp. Shareholder Litigation (Case No.
24-C-16-001542), is pending.

Nine putative class action lawsuits have been filed in connection
with the tender offer and merger for JAVELIN. The Tender Offer and
Merger are collectively defined herein as the "Transactions."

All nine suits name ARMOUR, the previous members of JAVELIN's board
of directors prior to the Merger (of which eight are current
members of ARMOUR's board of directors) and JMI Acquisition
Corporation as defendants.

Certain cases also name ACM and JAVELIN as additional defendants.
The lawsuits were brought by purported holders of JAVELIN's common
stock, both individually and on behalf of a putative class of
JAVELIN's stockholders, alleging that the Individual Defendants
breached their fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiffs and the
putative class of JAVELIN stockholders, including claims that the
Individual Defendants failed to properly value JAVELIN; failed to
take steps to maximize the value of JAVELIN to its stockholders;
ignored or failed to protect against conflicts of interest; failed
to disclose material information about the Transactions; took steps
to avoid competitive bidding and to give ARMOUR an unfair advantage
by failing to adequately solicit other potential acquirors or
alternative transactions; and erected unreasonable barriers to
other third-party bidders. The suits also allege that ARMOUR,
JAVELIN, ACM and Acquisition aided and abetted the alleged breaches
of fiduciary duties by the Individual Defendants.

The lawsuits seek equitable relief, including, among other relief,
to enjoin consummation of the Transactions, or rescind or unwind
the Transactions if already consummated, and award costs and
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.

The sole Florida lawsuit was never served on the defendants, and
that case was voluntarily dismissed and closed on January 20, 2017.


On April 25, 2016, the Maryland court issued an order consolidating
the eight Maryland cases into one action, captioned In re JAVELIN
Mortgage Investment Corp. Shareholder Litigation (Case No.
24-C-16-001542), and designated counsel for one of the Maryland
cases as interim lead co-counsel.

On May 26, 2016, interim lead counsel filed the Consolidated
Amended Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
asserting consolidated claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding
and abetting the breaches of fiduciary duty, and waste.

On June 27, 2016, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint for failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. A hearing was held on the
Motion to Dismiss on March 3, 2017, and the Court reserved ruling.
On September 27, 2019, the court further deferred the matter for
six months.

On June 15, 2020, co-counsel for the plaintiff filed a notice of
supplemental authority requesting to move the matter forward.

On August 19, 2020, a Notification To Parties of Contemplated
Dismissal was sent out by the Clerk of the Circuit Court to all
parties. Counsel for the plaintiff responded on August 24, 2020,
with a Motion to Defer Dismissal.

No further action has been taken by the court.

Each of ARMOUR, JAVELIN, ACM and the Individual Defendants intends
to defend the claims made in these lawsuits vigorously; however,
there can be no assurance that any of ARMOUR, JAVELIN, ACM or the
Individual Defendants will prevail in its defense of any of these
lawsuits to which it is a party.

ARMOUR said, "An unfavorable resolution of any such litigation
surrounding the Transactions may result in monetary damages being
awarded to the plaintiffs and the putative class of former
stockholders of JAVELIN and the cost of defending the litigation,
even if resolved favorably, could be substantial. Due to the
preliminary nature all of these suits, ARMOUR is not able at this
time to estimate their outcome."

ARMOUR Residential REIT, Inc. invests in residential
mortgage-backed securities in the United States. The company is
managed by ARMOUR Capital Management LP. The company was founded in
2008 and is based in Vero Beach, Florida.


ASPEN ANESTHESIA: Navarro Files FDCPA Suit in Colorado
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Aspen Anesthesia,
Inc. The case is styled as Rafael Navarro, on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated v. Aspen Anesthesia, Inc., CVI SGP-CO
Acquisition Trust, Case No. 1:21-cv-00649-NRN (D. Colo., March 4,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Aspen Anesthesia, Inc. -- https://aspenanesthesia.org/ -- is a pain
medicine anesthesiologist practice located in Aspen, Colorado.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hunter H. Hoestenbach, Esq.
          HOESTENBACH LAW
          550 West B Street, 4th Floor
          San Diego, CA 92101-3537
          Phone: (619) 940-4868
          Fax: (619) 363-0373
          Email: Hunter@HoestenbachLaw.com


ATHENEX INC: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Athenex, Inc. Shareholders
interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the deadline
listed to petition the court. Further details about the case can be
found at the link provided. There is no cost or obligation to you.

ATNX Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/athenex-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=13343&wire=1

Athenex, Inc. (NASDAQ:ATNX)

ATNX Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased August 7, 2019 -
February 26, 2021
Lead Plaintiff Deadline : May 3, 2021
TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/athenex-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=13343&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Athenex,
Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose that: (i) the data included in the Oral
Paclitaxel plus Encequidar NDA presented a safety risk to patients
in terms of an increase in neutropenia-related sequalae; (ii) the
uncertainty over the results of the primary endpoint of objective
response rate (ORR) at week 19 conducted by BICR; (iii) the BICR
reconciliation and re-read process may have introduced unmeasured
bias and influence on the BICR; (iv) the Company's Phase 3 study
that was used to file the NDA was inadequate and not well-conducted
in a patient population with metastatic breast cancer
representative of the U.S. population, such that the FDA would
recommended a new such clinical trial; (v) as a result, it was
foreseeable that the FDA would not approve the

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]

ATHENEX INC: Scott+Scott Attorneys Reminds of May 3 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP ("Scott+Scott"), an international
shareholder and consumer rights litigation firm, announces the
filing of a class action lawsuit against Athenex, Inc. ("Athenex"
or the "Company") (NASDAQ: ATNX) and certain of its officers,
alleging violations of federal securities laws. If you purchased
Athenex common stock between August 7, 2019 and February 26, 2021,
inclusive (the "Class Period"), and have suffered a loss, you are
encouraged to contact attorney Joe Pettigrew for additional
information at (844) 818-6982 or jpettigrew@scott-scott.com.

Athenex is a "global clinical stage biopharmaceutical company
dedicated to becoming a leader in discovery, development, and
commercialization of next generation drugs." One of Athenex's main
drug candidates is Oral Paclitaxel and Encequidar, designed to
treat metastatic breast cancer.

The lawsuit alleges, among other things, that the Company made
materially false and/or misleading statements by failing to
disclose in its New Drug Application ("NDA") to the Federal Drug
Administration ("FDA") that its drug presented a safety risk to
patients; that its drug's efficacy was in question; that the
Company's testing and review processes were both flawed and
introduced unmeasured bias and influence; and that, as a result, it
was foreseeable that the FDA would not approve the NDA. The lawsuit
also alleges the Company made misleading statements touting the
effectiveness of its drug, its strong communications with the FDA
throughout the drug-development process, and the imminence of
realizing its commercial goals for the drug.  

On March 1, 2021 the Company announced that the FDA had issued a
Complete Response Letter for the drug stating that it "recommended
that Athenex conduct a new adequate and well-conducted clinical
trial."

On this news, the price of Athenex's shares plummeted from the
February 26, 2021 close price of $21.10 per share to a close price
of just $5.46 on March 1, 2021, a one-day drop of nearly 55%.

What You Can Do

If you purchased Athenex common stock between August 7, 2019 and
February 26, 2021, or if you have questions about this notice or
your legal rights, you are encouraged to contact attorney Joe
Pettigrew at (844) 818-6982 or jpettigrew@scott-scott.com. The lead
plaintiff deadline is May 3, 2021.

About Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP

Scott+Scott has significant experience in prosecuting major
securities, antitrust, and employee retirement plan actions
throughout the United States. The firm represents pension funds,
foundations, individuals, and other entities worldwide with offices
in New York, London, Connecticut, California, and Ohio.

Attorney Advertising

CONTACT:

Joe Pettigrew
Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP
230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10169-1820
(844) 818-6982
jpettigrew@scott-scott.com [GN]

BLUEBIRD BIO: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of April 13 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
The following statement is being issued by Levi & Korsinsky, LLP:

To: All persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired
securities of bluebird bio, Inc. ("bluebird") (NASDAQ: BLUE)
between May 11, 2020 and November 4, 2020. You are hereby notified
that a securities class action lawsuit has been commenced in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
To get more information go to:

https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/bluebird-bio-inc-loss-form?prid=13346&wire=5

or contact Joseph E. Levi, Esq. either via email at
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com or by telephone at (212) 363-7500. There is
no cost or obligation to you.

The complaint alleges that throughout the class period Defendants
issued materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed
to disclose that: (i) data supporting bluebird's BLA submission for
LentiGlobin for SCD was insufficient to demonstrate drug product
comparability; (ii) Defendants downplayed the foreseeable impact of
disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic on the Company's BLA
submission schedule for LentiGlobin for SCD, particularly with
respect to manufacturing; (iii) as a result of all the foregoing,
it was foreseeable that the Company would not submit the BLA for
LentiGlobin for SCD in the second half of 2021; and (iv) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times.

If you suffered a loss in bluebird you have until April 13, 2021 to
request that the Court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability
to share in any recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead
plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]

BOISE SD 1: Court Denies Bid for Summary Judgment in Zeyen Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MIKE ZEYEN, et al., Plaintiffs v. BOISE SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 1, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-207-BLW (D.
Idaho), Judge B. Lynn Winmill of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Idaho has entered Memorandum Decision and Order
denying:

   (1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment;
   (2) Plaintiffs' motion for class certification; and
   (3) Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

The case is a class action challenging fees charged by school
districts in contravention of the Idaho Constitution's requirement
that education be free.  The Plaintiffs, who have students
attending schools in the Pocatello and Bonneville School Districts,
seek to proceed as class representatives of all patrons--that is,
all students and parents--in 115 school districts and charter
schools in the state of Idaho.  The Plaintiffs allege that the fees
charged by these school districts violate Article IX, Section 1 of
the Idaho Constitution.

The Plaintiffs argue that certain types of fees imposed by school
districts violate this constitutional requirement that education be
free and therefore constitute a taking of property without due
process in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Their
lawsuit seeks to recover the fees paid and obtain a declaratory
judgment that prohibits the imposition of such fees in the future.
In the specific motions now before the Court, the Plaintiffs seek
to certify a class of all patrons in the 115 Idaho school districts
who have paid such fees, and to obtain a partial summary judgment
declaring that the fees for second-half day kindergarten violate
the free-education provision of the Idaho Constitution.

The Defendants respond by seeking summary judgment dismissing all
of the Plaintiffs' claims.  Their central argument is that the
Idaho Legislature has limited the relief available under the Idaho
Constitution's education provision.  By passing the
Constitutionally Based Educational Claims Act ("CBECA"), Idaho Code
Section 6-2201-2216, the Idaho Legislature prohibited patrons from
seeking reimbursement of fees, the Defendants argue, requiring that
this lawsuit be dismissed.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Judge Winmill will deny the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment.  He finds that (i) CBECA is an outright ban on the right
to recover fees, and cannot be deemed a statute of limitations;
(ii) other fees were "imposed generally on all students whether
they participate in extra-curricular activities or not, becoming a
charge on attendance at the school, that contravenes the
constitutional mandate that the school be free; and (iii) summary
judgment cannot be based on the mere fact that the Plaintiffs
received educational benefits.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification

The Plaintiffs seek certification of a class of all students
enrolled in kindergarten through 12th grade in the public and
charter schools of Idaho, and their parents and/or guardians,
commencing with the school year 2014-2015, and continuing
thereafter, who have been or will be subjected to assessment for
and/or paid fees that violate the Idaho Constitution.

The Defendants respond that the Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23 for a class certification.

Judge Winmill finds that the definition of the proposed class does
not meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) because it fails
to specify the categories of fees sought, and fails to show a
sufficient similarity of interest between the named Plaintiffs and
the proposed class members, all as discussed above.  He will
accordingly deny the motion to certify class filed by the
Plaintiffs.

He will likewise give the Plaintiffs one more opportunity to narrow
the litigation to satisfy Rule 23.  The counsel will contact the
Clerk Jamie Gearhart upon receiving the decision to schedule a
telephone hearing to discuss logistics with the Court's Law Clerk
such as time limits for the filing of another motion to certify
along with briefing page limits and any other matters.

Finally, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the Defendants'
response briefs to the motion to certify.  The Defendants filed a
motion for extension that sought a lengthy extension that the Court
denied but the Court did allow them to file the response brief that
had already been filed by that point on June 5, 2020.  Accordingly,
the Judge will deny the Plaintiffs' motion to strike that response
brief.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

In their motion for partial summary judgment, the Plaintiffs seek a
declaratory judgment that, the Idaho Constitution prohibits Idaho
School Districts and Charter Schools from charging fees for
students to attend Second-Session Kindergarten; and if any
defendants collected any such fees, they must refund them to
qualified plaintiffs who apply for a refund.  In support of their
motion, the Plaintiffs identified 23 elementary schools in the West
Ada County School District that assessed and collected a total of
$8,712,170.12 in tuition fees for second-half-day kindergarten from
school years 2014-2015 through 2019-2020.

Judge Winmill finds no evidence in the present case that the named
Plaintiffs have ever been enrolled in second-half-day kindergarten
or paid any fees for that program.  The named Plaintiffs are all at
ages where they would have finished kindergarten many years ago.
The statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 are governed by the forum state's statute of
limitations for personal injury actions.  The Judge must apply
Idaho's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions,
instead of the limitations period urged by the Plaintiffs set forth
in Idaho's inverse condemnation statute.

If the named Plaintiffs even attended kindergarten and paid
fees--an assumption without any support in the record--they have
waited well past the two year statute of limitations to bring the
action.  Accordingly, their motion for summary judgment must be
denied.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Winmill concludes that CBECA's ban on
lawsuits to recover fees imposed in violation of the Idaho
Constitution essentially nullifies the Takings Clause and therefore
violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
With regard to the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class, he finds
that the Plaintiffs have not sufficiently identified the types of
fees they are challenging and hence are not now entitled to a class
certification.  Finally, the Judge will deny the Plaintiffs' motion
for partial summary judgment because no named Plaintiff has shown
they attended kindergarten and paid fees not authorized by the
free-education provision of the Idaho Constitution.

In accordance with his Memorandum Decision, Judge Wilmill denied
the Defendants' motions for summary judgment.  He also denied the
Plaintiffs' motion to certify class.  The Plaintiffs will be
allowed one more attempt to file a motion to certify that addresses
the concerns set forth.  The counsel is directed to contact the
Court's Clerk Jamie Gearhart (jamie_gearhart@id.uscourts.gov) to
schedule a conference with the Law Clerk to set a schedule for the
filing of that motion and any logistical issues.

Finally, the Judge denied both the Plaintiffs' (i) motion for
partial summary judgment, and (ii) motion to strike.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Memorandum Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/2459xmzb from
Leagle.com.


CENTERLIGHT HEALTHCARE: Miller Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CENTERLIGHT
HEALTHCARE, INC. The case is styled as Robert Miller, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. CENTERLIGHT
HEALTHCARE, INC., Case No. 34038/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty.,
March 4, 2021).

The case type is stated as "E-FILED OTHER TORTS."

CenterLight -- https://www.centerlighthealthcare.org/ -- is a
managed long-term care organization that provides and coordinates
healthcare services throughout New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          LOUIS GINSBERG, P.C.
          Phone: (516) 625-0105

The Defendant is represented by:

          BRENLLA, LLC
          250 PARK AVENUE, 7TH FLR
          NEW YORK, NY 10177
          Phone: (212) 364-5173


CHARLESTON SOUTHERN: Taylor Suit Remanded to Court of Common Pleas
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina grants
the Plaintiff's motion to remand to the Charleston County Court of
Common Pleas the case captioned as Jessica Taylor, individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Charleston
Southern University, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-2731-BHH (D.S.C.).

On May 28, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a proposed class action
complaint against the Defendant in the Charleston County Court of
Common Pleas, alleging claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and conversion stemming from Charleston Southern's
alleged withholding of tuition and fees after altering its courses
to online-only in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The initial
complaint identified the Plaintiff and the putative class members
as "individuals who paid the cost of tuition and other mandatory
fees for the Spring 2020 Semester at CSU."

The initial complaint included the following specific class
definitions:

   -- The Tuition Class:

      All individuals who paid tuition and fees, either for
      themselves or on behalf of a student, for enrollment in
      in-person classes and educational services at Charleston
      Southern University for the Spring 2020 Semester who were
      denied live, in-person instruction and opportunities and
      instead forced to take classes online from the date
      Defendant imposed online instruction; and

   -- The Fees Subclass:

      All individuals who paid fees, either for themselves or on
      behalf of a student, to Charleston Southern University
      related to on-campus facilities or services or particular
      to certain courses, such as lab fees, clinical fees, etc.
      for the Spring 2020 Semester.

On July 24, 2020, the Defendant removed the case to the Court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"),
alleging: (1) there are 100 or more members in the Plaintiff's
alleged classes; (2) the citizenship of at least some members of
the proposed classes are minimally diverse from the citizenship of
Charleston Southern; and (3) based on the Plaintiff's allegations,
the claims of the putative class members exceeds the sum or value
of $5 million in the aggregate, exclusive of interest and costs.

Shortly after removing the case, the Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

On August 12, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the time
to respond to the Defendant's motion to dismiss, indicating that
the Plaintiff intended to file a motion to remand and suggesting
that the Court expand the deadline to respond to the Defendant's
motion to dismiss until 21 days after the Court's ruling on the
Plaintiff's forthcoming motion to remand. The Court granted the
Plaintiff's motion via text order and extended the deadline for
responding to the Defendant's motion to dismiss for 14 days
following the Court's order on the Plaintiff's forthcoming motion
to remand.

Five days later, on August 17, 2020, the Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The amended complaint identifies
the putative class as follows:

     All individuals who paid Defendant tuition, fees, room,
     and/or board either for themselves or on behalf of a
     student, for enrollment in regular session in-person and/or
     on-campus classes, services, events, opportunities, and/or
     use of facilities at Charleston Southern University for the
     Spring 2020 Semester, but were denied use of and/or access
     to the same as a result of Defendant's closure of its
     campus.

The amended complaint also asserts that the case was improperly
removed to the Court and must be remanded pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1332(d). The same day, the Plaintiff filed an "amended
class definition" describing the class as: 141 Charleston Southern
University students who enrolled in and paid, personally or through
another, tuition, fees, room, and/or board for the "Regular
Session" Spring 2020 Semester."

On August 21, 2020, the Plaintiff filed her motion to remand,
alleging that the "home state" exception to CAFA requires the Court
to remand this case to the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas
because more than two-thirds of the Plaintiff class members are
citizens of South Carolina. In her motion, the Plaintiff asserts
that the filing of a motion for an extension of time and an amended
complaint does not constitute a waiver of the right to remand, and
Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs in connection
with litigating the removal and remand.

On September 14, 2020, the Defendant filed a response in opposition
to the Plaintiff's motion to remand, asserting that its removal was
authorized under CAFA and that the Plaintiff has failed to meet her
burden of proving that the home-state exception to CAFA applies.
The Defendant also asserts that the Plaintiff engaged in
post-removal conduct that constitutes a waiver of the right to
remand. Finally, the Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's request
for costs and fees is not supported by the applicable law.

As an initial matter, the Court rejects the Defendant's argument
that the Plaintiff's filing of a motion for extension and/or an
amended complaint prior to filing her motion to remand constitutes
a waiver of her right to seek remand. First of all, the rule on
which the Defendant relies, which imputes a waiver of the right to
remand on a plaintiff, who engages in affirmative activity in
federal court before filing a motion to remand, is not established
in the Fourth Circuit. The Defendant points to a decision from the
District of Maryland in support of its argument, but the Court is
not persuaded by the Defendant's argument.

Instead, the Fourth Circuit, in affirming Moffit v. Residential
Funding Co., LLC, 604 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2010), noted that the
plaintiffs there amended their complaints after they appeared in
federal court and that the amended complaints included facts that
clearly gave rise to federal jurisdiction, explains District Judge
Bruce H. Hendricks.  Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Moffitt
was not based on any waiver of the right to remand.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's amended complaint invokes
federal jurisdiction, similar to the amended complaint in Moffitt,
because the Plaintiff references both South Carolina Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

However, Judge Hendricks notes, the Defendant's argument completely
overlooks the fact that the Plaintiff's amended complaint
specifically states that this case was improperly removed or,
alternatively, must be remanded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
1332(d). Thus, unlike Moffitt, the Plaintiff's amended complaint
does not include facts clearly giving rise to federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, it was abundantly clear on the face of all of the
Plaintiff's pre-motion filings that she intended to file a motion
to remand, and there is simply no reason to find that her
pre-motion activity somehow waived that right, Judge Hendricks
holds. Thus, the remaining question for the Court is whether the
Plaintiff has carried her burden of demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that the "home state exception" to
federal jurisdiction under CAFA applies. The Court finds that she
has.

The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's reference to Charleston
Southern's in-state student population statistics merely show that
approximately 83% of students are South Carolina residents. But, as
the Plaintiff points out in her reply, the Defendant's argument
overlooks the fact that, by law, Charleston Southern's
classification of students as "in-state" means that they are
domiciled in South Carolina, Judge Hendricks notes.

The Court finds that this law is even stricter than the typical
"intent to remain" analysis for purposes of determining
citizenship, and thus it is clear that an in-state resident seeking
to take in-person classes at Charleston Southern clearly has the
intent to remain in South Carolina at least for that purpose. In
this case, the Plaintiff, as the master of her complaint, has
indicated that the proposed class includes students who enrolled in
and paid, personally or through another, for the regular session
spring 2020 semester at Charleston Southern, and the Plaintiff has
shown, through the Defendant's records, that 83% of Charleston
Southern's student body is domiciled in South Carolina.

Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that at least two-thirds of the
individuals in the putative class are citizens of South Carolina.
Because the Defendant is also a citizen of South Carolina and this
matter was initially brought in South Carolina, the Court must
remand this case pursuant to Section 1332(d)(4).

Finally, after consideration, the Court declines to award
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 1447. Although it is
remanding the case, the Court does not find that the Defendant's
removal was frivolous or was one in bad faith or as a delay tactic.
For these reasons, the Plaintiff's motion to remand is granted, and
the case is remanded to the Charleston County Court of Common
Pleas.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yw8s3j8z from Leagle.com.


CHEGG INC: ADA Related Class Suit in New York Underway
------------------------------------------------------
Chegg, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the compan continues to
defend a class action suit in New York, related to to  American
with Disabilities Act (ADA).

On December 1, 2020 the company received notice that a class action
lawsuit was filed against Chegg in New York alleging violations of
the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The claim asserted that one of Chegg's websites is not compatible
with software used by vision-impaired individuals. The claims seek
an injunction and monetary relief.

Chegg said, "We dispute these claims and filed an answer on January
28, 2021."

Chegg, Inc. operates direct-to-student learning platform that
supports students on their journey from high school to college and
into their career with tools designed to help them pass their test,
pass their class, and save money on required materials. Chegg, Inc.
was founded in 2003 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


CHEGG INC: Continues to Defend Shah Class Suit
----------------------------------------------
Chegg, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend itself in a class action suit entitled, Shah v. Chegg, Inc.
et. al.

Following the 2018 Data Incident, a purported securities class
action captioned Shah v. Chegg, Inc. et. al. (Case No.
3:18-cv-05956-CRB) was filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California against the company and its CEO.

The complaint was filed by a purported Chegg stockholder and
alleges claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, based on allegedly misleading
statements regarding our security measures to protect users' data
and related internal controls and procedures, as well as our second
quarter 2018 financial results.

Such litigation, regulatory investigations, and the company's
technical activities intended to prevent future security breaches
are likely to require additional management resources and
expenditures.

Chegg, Inc. operates direct-to-student learning platform that
supports students on their journey from high school to college and
into their career with tools designed to help them pass their test,
pass their class, and save money on required materials. Chegg, Inc.
was founded in 2003 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


CHEGG INC: Continues to Defend Unruh Violation Related Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Chegg, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit related to the company's violations of
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

On August 18, 2020, the company received notice that a class action
lawsuit was filed against Chegg in California alleging violations
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

The claim asserted that one of Chegg's websites is not compatible
with software used by vision-impaired individuals.

The claims seek an injunction and monetary relief.

Chegg said, "We dispute these claims and are working with
plaintiffs' class counsel toward amicably dismissing/settling this
claim."

Chegg, Inc. operates direct-to-student learning platform that
supports students on their journey from high school to college and
into their career with tools designed to help them pass their test,
pass their class, and save money on required materials. Chegg, Inc.
was founded in 2003 and is headquartered in Santa Clara,
California.


COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: Court Trims Claims in Tuition Refund Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE COLUMBIA TUITION REFUND ACTION. XAVIERA MARBURY,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff
v. PACE UNIVERSITY, Defendant, Case Nos. 20-CV-3208 (JMF),
20-CV-3210 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Jesse M. Furman of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in
part and denied in part Columbia's motion to dismiss and Pace's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In the Spring of 2020, after the novel coronavirus arrived in the
United States, colleges and universities throughout the country did
their part to stop the spread of COVID-19 by moving classes online
and halting various in-person activities and services.  For the
most part, this response earned institutions of higher education
praise for acting in the interests of public health.  But it also
earned them a host of lawsuits from students seeking partial
refunds for tuition and fees that they had allegedly paid for
in-person learning and other services.  Thus far, these kinds of
claims have received a mixed reception in the courts.

To the extent that students have brought claims based on the
quality of their educations or general promises of excellence, they
have fared poorly, as courts have been reluctant to second guess
schools when it comes to academic matters.  But to the extent that
students have identified specific services or facility access that
schools promised in exchange for tuition or fees, they have met
with greater success.

These putative class actions are two of the many that have been
brought against colleges and universities in the last year raising
such claims.  In one, students bring claims against Columbia
University.  In the other, a student brings claims against Pace
University.

Plaintiffs Student A, Chris Riotta, Lisa Guerra, and Alexandra
Taylor-Gutt ("Columbia Plaintiffs") were students at Columbia
University during the Spring 2020 semester. Plaintiff Xaviera
Marbury was a student at Pace University during the same semester.
When the COVID-19 pandemic reached New York in March 2020, Columbia
and Pace took similar actions to prevent the spread of illness.
Most relevant, both Universities moved all classes online from the
middle of March through the end of the Spring 2020 semester; closed
certain campus facilities; canceled various campus activities; and
encouraged students who lived on campus to vacate their dormitory
rooms.

The Plaintiffs do not question the wisdom of the actions the
Universities took to prevent the spread of a highly contagious,
sometimes fatal disease.  Nevertheless, they contend that the
actions breached the Universities' contractual obligations to
provide in-person instruction and various on-campus services in
exchange for tuition and fees.

On this theory, the Columbia Plaintiffs bring a putative class
action against the Board of Trustees of Columbia University in the
City of New York pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. Section 11.  Marbury does the same against
Pace.  The Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to pro rata
refunds of tuition and fees reflecting the difference in fair
market value of the services that they were allegedly promised and
the services that they actually received.

In each case, the University now moves to dismiss -- in the case of
Columbia, by way of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in the case of Pace, by way of a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c).  The cases are not
formally consolidated, but the Court addresses the two motions
together because they raise similar issues.

Judge Furman explains that in each of these cases, the primary
claim is that the Defendant University breached its contractual
obligations to provide certain services, including in-person
instruction and access to campus facilities and activities, when
the Universities modified and curtailed their activities in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The Plaintiff or the Plaintiffs
in each case also bring claims for unjust enrichment (in the
alternative to their contract claims), conversion, and violations
of New York's consumer protection statutes.

Applying well-established principles of New York law governing the
relationship between educational institutions and their students,
and consistent with the decisions of most courts that have
addressed these kinds of claims, Judge Furman holds that some of
the students' claims can proceed, while others must be dismissed.
More specifically, to the extent that the students plausibly allege
that their University violated specific contractual promises for
particular services or access to facilities, their claims survive;
to the extent that they fail to identify such promises, their
claims must be and are dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Furman granted in part and denied
in part Columbia's motion to dismiss and Pace's motion for judgment
on the pleadings.  In particular, to the extent that the Plaintiffs
in each case identify specific promises in their respective
Universities' publications that the Universities allegedly
breached, the motions are denied; to the extent they fail to do so,
their claims are dismissed.

More specifically, the Judge holds that (i) the Columbia
Plaintiffs' contract claim relating to instructional format is
dismissed, (ii) Marbury's contract claim relating to instructional
format survives, (iii) the contract claims relating to on-campus
facilities and activities survive in both cases, (iv) Marbury's
contract claims relating to on-campus housing and meals are
dismissed, (v) the claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, and
violations of the New York General Business Law are dismissed in
both cases.

By separate Orders to be entered today, Judge Furman will set a
deadline for Columbia to file its answer and will schedule an
initial pretrial conference in each case.

The Judge declined to grant the Plaintiffs leave to amend their
Complaints.  He holds that although leave to amend a complaint
should be freely given "when justice so requires," it is within the
sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to
amend.  In the case, he finds that the Columbia Plaintiffs do not
request leave to amend, and although Marbury does, she does not
suggest that she is in possession of facts that would cure the
problems with her dismissed claims.

Additionally, the Judge granted the Plaintiffs in both cases leave
to amend their prior Complaints in response to the Defendants'
motions and explicitly warned that they would "not be given any
further opportunity to amend the complaint to address issues raised
by the motion."

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate 20-CV-3208, ECF No. 35
and 20-CV-3210, ECF No. 38.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/7bcf5t8t from Leagle.com.


COOK COUNTY JAIL: Court Decertifies Employees' Harassment Lawsuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kirsten Williams at jurist.org reports that the US Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit repealed a lower court's order certifying a
class action lawsuit filed by nearly 2,000 female employees
alleging an "epidemic" of sexual harassment while working at the
Cook County Jail in Cook County, Illinois.

In a 38-page opinion, the three-judge panel held that the lower
court "abused its discretion in certifying the class" and that the
class cannot stand "because it comprises class members with
materially different working environments whose claims require
separate, individual analyses."

The 10 named plaintiffs in the case are women who work at the jail
complex -- one of the largest single-site jails in the US. Spaning
eight city blocks, the campus consists of 36 separate buildings and
houses approximately 100,000 inmates annually. The women brought
suit against the jail and the Cook County Sheriff's Office,
alleging they "endured frequent and extreme sexual harassment by
male inmates," including exhibitionist masturbation, sexual
epithets and threats, and sexual violence. They further allege they
have complained about the harassment to no avail and that the jail
ignored their complaints and took no preventative measures to
prevent the harassment.

In 2017 the women, on behalf of themselves and other
similarly-situated women working in the jail complex, sued for
"permitting a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964." The US District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois originally certified the class in
August 2019, but narrowed the class.

The Sherrif's Office and the jail appealed the certification that
following November. They argued that the lower court erroneously
accepted "ambient harassment," which they defined as a theory "that
sexual harassment of some individuals can be so severe that it
invades an entire workplace, causing individuals who have not
directly suffered harassment to nonetheless become atmospheric
victims with their own actionable claims."

The appellate court agreed. "[A]mbient harassment does not unite
the modified class because it is no longer a central issue in the
case and the plaintiffs have not shown that it manifests in the
same way across different parts of the jail complex," wrote circuit
judge Amy St. Eve. "The significant variation in harassment levels
across different parts of the jail complex renders certain class
members' work environments materially different from those of
others." [GN]

CORECIVIC INC: Immigration Detainees' Suit Ongoing in California
----------------------------------------------------------------
CoreCivic, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by two former U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detainees.

On May 31, 2017, two former ICE detainees, who were detained at the
Company's Otay Mesa Detention Center ("OMDC") in San Diego,
California, filed a class action lawsuit against the Company in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
California.

The complaint alleged that the Company forces detainees to perform
labor under threat of punishment in violation of state and federal
anti-trafficking laws and that OMDC's Voluntary Work Program
("VWP") violates state labor laws including state minimum wage law.
ICE requires that CoreCivic offer and operate the VWP in
conformance with ICE standards and ICE prescribes the minimum rate
of pay for VWP participants.

The Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, exemplary damages,
restitution, penalties, and interest as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief on behalf of former and current detainees.

On April 1, 2020, the district court certified a nationwide
anti-trafficking claims class of former and current detainees at
all CoreCivic ICE detention facilities.

It also certified a state law class of former and current detainees
at the Company's ICE detention facilities in California. The court
did not certify any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.

Since this case was initially filed, four similar lawsuits have
been filed in other courts in California, Texas, Maryland, and
Georgia.

The Company disputes these allegations and intends to take all
necessary steps to vigorously defend itself against all claims.

CoreCivic, Inc. is a diversified government solutions company with
the scale and experience needed to solve tough government
challenges in flexible, cost-effective ways. The company is based
in Nashville, Tennessee.

CORECIVIC INC: Trial in Grae Class Suit Set for May
---------------------------------------------------
CoreCivic, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the trial in Grae v.
Corrections Corporation of America et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02267,
is scheduled for May 2021.

In a memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Prisons dated August 18,
2016, the Department of Justice directed that, as each contract
with privately operated prisons reaches the end of its term, the
BOP should either decline to renew that contract or substantially
reduce its scope in a manner consistent with law and the overall
decline of the BOP's inmate population.  

In addition to the decline in the BOP's inmate population, the DOJ
memorandum cites purported operational, programming, and cost
efficiency factors as reasons for the DOJ directive. On February
21, 2017, the newly appointed U.S. Attorney General issued a
memorandum rescinding the DOJ's prior directive stating the
memorandum changed long-standing policy and practice and impaired
the BOP's ability to meet the future needs of the federal
correctional system.

Following the release of the August 18, 2016 DOJ memorandum, a
purported securities class action lawsuit was filed on August 23,
2016 against the Company and certain of its current and former
officers in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee, captioned Grae v. Corrections Corporation of
America et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-02267.  

The lawsuit is brought on behalf of a putative class of
shareholders who purchased or acquired the Company's securities
between February 27, 2012 and August 17, 2016. The Plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages and costs incurred in connection with the
lawsuit.  

In general, the lawsuit alleges that, during this timeframe, the
Company's public statements were false and/or misleading regarding
the purported operational, programming, and cost efficiency factors
cited in the DOJ memorandum and, as a result, the Company's stock
price was artificially inflated.  

The lawsuit alleges that the publication of the DOJ memorandum on
August 18, 2016 revealed the alleged fraud, causing the per share
price of the Company's stock to decline, thereby causing harm to
the putative class of shareholders.  

On December 18, 2017, the District Court denied the Company's
motion to dismiss.

On March 26, 2019, the District Court certified the class proposed
by the plaintiff. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit denied the Company's appeal of the class certification
order on August 23, 2019.  

A trial before United States District Judge Aleta Trauger is
scheduled for May 2021 in the Middle District of Tennessee.  

CoreCivic believes the lawsuit is entirely without merit and
intends to vigorously defend against it.  

CoreCivic, Inc. is a diversified government solutions company with
the scale and experience needed to solve tough government
challenges in flexible, cost-effective ways. The company is based
in Nashville, Tennessee.


CROWN CASTLE: Continues to Defend Putative Class Suit in New Jersey
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Crown Castle International Corp. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated putative securities class action
suit in New Jersey entitled, In re Crown Castle International Corp.
Securities Litigation, No. 2:20-cv-02156.

In February and March 2020, putative securities class action suits
were filed in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey against the Company and certain of its current officers.


The lawsuits were filed against the Company on behalf of investors
that purchased or otherwise acquired stock of the Company between
February 26, 2018 and February 26, 2020.

The allegations concern allegedly false or misleading statements or
other alleged failures to disclose information about the Company's
business, operations and prospects.

The plaintiffs seek monetary damages and the award of plaintiffs'
costs and expenses incurred.

In December 2020, the cases were consolidated as In re Crown Castle
International Corp. Securities Litigation, No. 2:20-cv-02156 in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

The Company is currently unable to determine the likelihood of an
outcome or estimate a range of reasonably possible losses, if any.


The Company believes the putative class action is without merit and
intends to defend itself vigorously.

Crown Castle International Corp. owns, operates and leases shared
wireless infrastructure, including towers and other structures like
rooftops and small cell networks supported by fiber. The
Houston-based Company's wireless infrastructure is geographically
dispersed throughout the U.S., including Puerto Rico. The company
is based in Houston, Texas.

CVS PHARMACY: Court Dismisses Lokey's First Amended Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
dismissed the first amended complaint in the lawsuit styled
DANIELLE LOKEY, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, Plaintiff v. CVS PHARMACY, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 20-cv-04782-LB (N.D. Cal.).

In the putative class action, the Plaintiff challenges CVS
Pharmacy's marketing of its CVS-branded pain-and-fever medicine for
infants (called Infants' acetaminophen) at a higher price than its
CVS-branded pain-and fever medicine for children (called Children's
acetaminophen), even though the ingredients in the two products are
the same. She claims that this practice violates three California
consumer-protection laws: (1) California's False Advertising Law;
(2) California's Unfair Competition Law; and (3) California's
Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

The Court previously dismissed the Plaintiff's initial complaint on
the ground that--as a matter of law--the labels disclosed the
products' composition and would not deceive a reasonable consumer.
The amended complaint changes the allegations about product
placement in the store and adds allegations about consumer
confusion.  CVS moved to dismiss it. All parties consented to
magistrate-judge jurisdiction. The court held a hearing on February
18, 2021.

CVS moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that the
Plaintiff did not plausibly plead that the products'
packaging--which disclosed that the products were compositionally
identical and differ in that they display different pictures of
children and different dosing devices (a syringe for infants and a
cup for children)--would deceive a reasonable consumer. The
Plaintiff countered that she plausibly alleged consumer confusion,
and it is a fact question--not suitable for resolution at a motion
to dismiss--whether the labels are misleading or deceptive.

Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler finds that the labels at issue are
not deceptive. As a result, the Plaintiff's challenge is only to
the different pricing, which is not justiciable.

As the Court held previously, the labels are not deceptive. The
front labels for both products show their concentrations of 160
milligrams per 5 milliliters (the 160 mg/5 ml reflected on the
labels). Obviously, the products are targeting different markets:
parents of infants and parents of children. Obviously, the CVS
labeled the products differently, branding them an infants' product
and a children's product (shown by the names, the photographs of
the children, and the different devices to deliver the doses: a
syringe for infants and a cup for children).  But nothing about the
labels is misleading about the products or their composition, Judge
Beeler points out. To the contrary, the labels are accurate.

According to the Order, this case is like Boris v. Wal-Mart Stores,
addressed in the earlier order. Like Boris, the case involves
compositionally identical products targeted at two audiences
(there, migraine sufferers and headache sufferers and here, parents
of infants and parents of children). Both involve different
branding (the backgrounds in Boris and the images of infants and
children here) to entice different audiences. Both cases involve a
price premium on a product marketed to one audience. Applying
Boris, because there is no deception beyond the price differential,
the Plaintiff's challenge is a non-justiciable challenge to CVS's
pricing decisions.

The Plaintiff cites two out-of-district cases, Elkies v. Johnson &
Johnson Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-07320-GW, Order--ECF No. 53 at 2
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2018); and Youngblood v. CVS, No.
2:20-cv-06251-MCS-MRW, Order--ECF No. 31 at 2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15,
2020)--both involving challenges to pain relievers with identical
compositions that were marketed to different audiences (parents of
infants and parents of children)--to support her contention that
she plausibly pleads a case of deception. In Elkies, the products
were infants' Tylenol and children's Tylenol. In Youngblood, the
products were the products in the instant case.

As the Court held previously, Elkies is distinguishable: there was
no express disclosure that the "medicine in the Infants' bottle is
exactly the same, and provided at the exact same concentration, as
Children's." In Elkies, the picture of a mother and baby ("along
with the word 'Infants'" but without the express disclosure that
the medicine was the same) could lead a "significant portion of the
general consuming public" to conclude that the infants' product was
"unique or specially formulated for children under two." By
contrast, the front label here expressly discloses the medicine's
composition.

In Youngblood, involving the products in the present case, the
court held that the front labels--with their different photographs
of children of different ages--plausibly pleaded consumer deception
(in the form of a belief that the product was formulated for
infants) in part because the label branded the products for
"children under two."

Judge Beeler states that in the case (and in Youngblood), the
Plaintiffs do not challenge the efficacy of the product (a fact
disputed in Mullins) and instead challenge marketing that allegedly
misleads a consumer into believing that the medicine is specially
formulated for children under age two. Like the products in Boris,
products that are identical can be marketed to different audiences:
migraine-headache sufferers and regular-headache sufferers, parents
of infants and parents of children, adults and children (or other
age ranges), professional athletes and weekend athletes, or
different genders, to name a few. If the labels are accurate, and
the difference is only the pricing, then the claim is not
justiciable.

For this reason, the Plaintiff's citation to other cases involving
products that were marketed as effective (when they allegedly were
not) does not compel a contrary conclusion, Judge Beeler opines.
The claim in the case is not that the Infants' product was
ineffective or did not perform as advertised. To the contrary, the
representations on the label are accurate.

A final point is that the products are different, Judge Beeler
notes. They are marketed in different quantities (two ounces for
the infants' product and four ounces for the children's product)
and with different devices to deliver the doses (a syringe for
infants and a cup for children).

Often claims involving misleading labels involve questions of fact
"not appropriate for decision" on a motion to dismiss, Judge Beeler
says, citing Williams, 552 F.3d at 938; Zeiger v. WellPet LLC, 304
F.Supp.3d 837, 852 (N.D. Cal. 2018). That is not the case in the
present action. The labels are accurate. The challenge in the end
is to pricing, which is not justiciable, the Judge points out.

The Court, hence, grants the motion to dismiss with prejudice. The
Order disposes of ECF No. 42.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/365z33cj from Leagle.com.


CWS AMSTERDAM: Fails to Properly Pay Workers, Orozco Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Cardenas Orozco, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. CWS Amsterdam Ave, Inc; CWS Yonkers, Inc.; CWS Yonkers
2, Inc.; Ahmed Amin; Tony De Desisso; and MD R Chowdhury, Case No.
7:21-cv-01902 (S.D.N.Y., March 4, 2021), is brought pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, to recover
from the Defendants: unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid "spread
of hours" premium for each day they worked in excess of 10 hours,
damages for failure to give required notices and wage statements,
liquidated damages on those amounts, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with
a policy of not properly paying Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees the New York State minimum wage, the FLSA
overtime rate (of time and one-half), and the New York State
overtime rate (of time and one-half), in direct violation of the
FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York
State Department of Labor Regulations, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from July 14, 2020 to
September 27, 2020.

The Defendants run a chain of wireless telecommunications
establishments located throughout the State of New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mohammed Gangat, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF MOHAMMED GANGAT
          675 3rd Avenue, Suite 1810
          New York, NY
          Phone: (718) 669-0714
          Email: mgangat@gangatllc.com


DISH NETWORK: Court Junks Appeal Related to Claims Admin Process
----------------------------------------------------------------
DISH Network Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021,
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted Krakauer's motion
to dismiss the company's second appeal finding that the appeal was
premature. The appeal was to the district court's orders on the
claims administration process to identify, and disburse funds to,
individual class members.

A portion of the alleged telemarketing violations by an independent
third-party retailer that were at issue in the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Action are also the subject of a certified class
action filed against DISH Network L.L.C. in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina (the
"Krakauer Action").  

Following a five-day trial, on January 19, 2017, a jury, in that
case, found that the independent third-party retailer was acting as
DISH Network L.L.C.'s agent when it made the 51,119 calls at issue
in that case, and that class members are eligible to recover $400
in damages for each call made in violation of the TCPA.

On May 22, 2017, the Court ruled that the violations were willful
and knowing, and trebled the damages award to $1,200 for each call
made in violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).   

On April 5, 2018, the Court entered a $61 million judgment in favor
of the class. DISH Network L.L.C. appealed and on May 30, 2019, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.  

October 15, 2019, DISH Network L.L.C. filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, requesting that the United States Supreme Court agree
to hear a further appeal, but it denied the petition on December
16, 2019.  

On January 21, 2020, DISH Network L.L.C. filed a second notice of
appeal relating to the district court's orders on the claims
administration process to identify, and disburse funds to,
individual class members.

On June 29, 2020, Krakauer filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.  

On December 1, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit granted the motion, finding that the appeal was
premature.  

The district court currently is deciding how to handle the $10.76
million in disbursable judgment funds for which no corresponding
class member was identified, but has indicated that it will not
refund those monies to DISH Network L.L.C.  DISH Network L.L.C.
will renew its appeal when the unclaimed funds issue is finally
resolved.  

During the third quarter 2019, the $61 million judgment was paid to
the court.  

DISH Network Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
pay-TV services in the United States. The company operates in two
segments, Pay-TV and Wireless. DISH Network Corporation was founded
in 1980 and is headquartered in Englewood, Colorado.

DISH NETWORK: Trial in Stockholder Suit vs Ergen to Start Sept. 7
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DISH Network Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021,
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that trial in the
putative class action suit entitled, Hallandale Beach Police
Officers' and Firefighters' Personnel Retirement Trust v. Ergen, et
al., Case No. A-19-797799-B, is scheduled to start sometime during
the five-week "stack" beginning September 7, 2021.

On July 2, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by a
purported EchoStar stockholder in the District Court of Clark
County, Nevada under the caption City of Hallandale Beach Police
Officers' and Firefighters' Personnel Retirement Trust v. Ergen, et
al., Case No. A-19-797799-B.  

The lawsuit named as defendants Mr. Charles W. Ergen, the other
members of the EchoStar Board, as well as EchoStar, certain of its
officers, DISH Network and certain of DISH Network's and EchoStar's
affiliates.  

Plaintiff alleges, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties
in approving the transactions contemplated under the Master
Transaction Agreement for inadequate consideration and pursuant to
an unfair and conflicted process, and that EchoStar, DISH Network
and certain other defendants aided and abetted such breaches.  

In the operative First Amended Complaint, filed on October 11,
2019, the plaintiff dropped as defendants the EchoStar board
members other than Mr. Ergen.  

The trial of this matter is scheduled to start sometime during the
five-week "stack" beginning September 7, 2021.

Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, including the issuance of
additional DISH Network Class A common stock, monetary relief and
other costs and disbursements, including attorneys' fees.

DISH Network said, "We intend to vigorously defend this case, but
cannot predict with any degree of certainty the outcome of this
suit or determine the extent of any potential liability or
damages."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

DISH Network Corporation, together with its subsidiaries, provides
pay-TV services in the United States. The company operates in two
segments, Pay-TV and Wireless. DISH Network Corporation was founded
in 1980 and is headquartered in Englewood, Colorado.

EBIX INC: Lieff Cabraser Reminds Investors of April 23 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP announces
that class action litigation has been filed on behalf of investors
who purchased or otherwise acquired the securities of Ebix, Inc.
("Ebix" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: EBIX) between November 9, 2020
and February 19, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Ebix securities during the
Class Period, you may move the Court for appointment as lead
plaintiff by no later than April 23, 2021. A lead plaintiff is a
representative party who acts on behalf of other class members in
directing the litigation. Your share of any recovery in the actions
will not be affected by your decision of whether to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff. You may retain Lieff Cabraser, or
other attorneys, as your counsel in the action.

Ebix investors who wish to learn more about the litigation and how
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff should click here or contact
Sharon M. Lee of Lieff Cabraser toll-free at 1-800-541-7358.

Background on the Ebix Securities Class Litigation

Ebix, headquartered in Johns Creek, Georgia, supplies
infrastructure exchanges to the insurance, financial, travel, cash
remittances, and healthcare industries. The action alleges that,
during the Class Period, defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements and failed to disclose to investors that (1)
there was insufficient audit evidence to determine the business
purpose of certain transactions in Ebix's gift card business in
India during the fourth quarter of 2020; (2) there was a material
weakness in Ebix's internal controls over the gift or prepaid
revenue transaction cycle; and (3) Ebix's independent auditor was
likely to resign over disagreements with the Company over $30
million that had been transferred into a commingled trust account
of Ebix's outside legal counsel.

On February 19, 2021, following the close of the market, Ebix
announced the sudden resignation of its independent auditor, RSM US
LLP ("RSM"), which had been "unable, despite repeated inquiries, to
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that would allow it to
evaluate the business purpose of significant unusual transactions
that occurred in the fourth quarter of 2020." These "significant
unusual transactions" were connected to Ebix's gift card business
in India which was a critical part of Ebix's portfolio. In
addition, RSM disclosed that "management did not design or
implement the necessary procedures and controls over the gift or
prepaid card revenue transaction cycle sufficient to prevent or
detect a material misstatement." The Company and RSM also allegedly
disagreed over whether to classify $30 million that had been
transferred into a commingled trust account of Ebix's outside legal
counsel in December 2020 as cash on Ebix's balance sheet. On this
news, Ebix's stock price fell $20.24 per share, or approximately
40%, from its closing price of $50.74 on February 21, 2021, to
close at $30.50 on February 22, 2021, on unusually heavy trading
volume.

About Lieff Cabraser

Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, with offices in San
Francisco, New York, and Nashville, is a nationally recognized law
firm committed to advancing the rights of investors and promoting
corporate responsibility.

The National Law Journal has recognized Lieff Cabraser as one of
the nation's top plaintiffs' law firms for fourteen years. In
compiling the list, the National Law Journal examines recent
verdicts and settlements and looked for firms "representing the
best qualities of the plaintiffs' bar and that demonstrated unusual
dedication and creativity." Law360 has selected Lieff Cabraser as
one of the Top 50 law firms nationwide for litigation, highlighting
our firm's "laser focus" and noting that our firm routinely finds
itself "facing off against some of the largest and strongest
defense law firms in the world." Benchmark Litigation has named
Lieff Cabraser one of the "Top 10 Plaintiffs' Firms in America."

For more information about Lieff Cabraser and the firm's
representation of investors, please visit
https://www.lieffcabraser.com.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]

EDWARD JONES: 9th Circuit Revives Fee Class Action Lawsuit
----------------------------------------------------------
Jody Godoy at Reuters reports that the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals has revived a proposed class action accusing brokerage
Edward D. Jones & Co. of violating California and Missouri laws by
pushing thousands of retail investors into accounts with higher
fees.

A three-judge panel for the court held that the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which bars securities
fraud class actions from being brought under state law, did not
prohibit claims that the firm breached its duties by failing to
consider whether the higher fee accounts were suitable for certain
clients. U.S. Circuit Court Judge Milan Smith Jr. wrote for the
court that the claims related to account type and not "the purchase
or sale" of securities, meaning they were not barred by SLUSA. [GN]

ELI LILLY: Continues to Defend Actos-Related Class Suits in Canada
------------------------------------------------------------------
Eli Lilly and Company said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues
to defend class action suits in Canada related to personal injuries
caused by Actos.

The company is named along with Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.
and Takeda affiliates as a defendant in four purported product
liability class actions in Canada related to Actos, which the
company commercialized with Takeda in Canada until 2009, including
one in Ontario filed December 2011 (Casseres et al. v. Takeda
Pharmaceutical North America, Inc., et al.), one in Quebec filed
July 2012 (Whyte et al. v. Eli Lilly et al.), one in Saskatchewan
filed November 2017 (Weiler v. Takeda Canada Inc. et al.), and one
in Alberta filed January 2013 (Epp v. Takeda Canada Inc. et al.).

In general, plaintiffs in these actions alleged that Actos caused
or contributed to their bladder cancer.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Eli Lilly and Company discovers, develops, manufactures, and
markets pharmaceutical products worldwide. The company operates in
two segments, Human Pharmaceutical Products and Animal Health
Products. Eli Lilly and Company was founded in 1876 and is
headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana.


ELI LILLY: Court Consolidates Purported Class Suits in New Jersey
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Eli Lilly and Company said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that plaintiffs' motion to
consolidate FWK Holdings, LLC v. Novo Nordisk Inc., et al.,
Rochester Drug Co-Operative Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. et al., and
Value Drug Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. et al.

In December 2017, the company, along with Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC
and Novo Nordisk, Inc. were named as defendants in a consolidated
purported class action lawsuit, In re. Insulin Pricing Litigation,
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey relating
to insulin pricing seeking damages under various state consumer
protection laws and the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (federal RICO Act).

Separately, in February 2018, the company, along with Sanofi and
Novo Nordisk, were named as defendants in MSP Recovery Claims,
Series, LLC et al. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC et al., in the same
court, seeking damages under various state consumer protection
laws, common law fraud, unjust enrichment, and the federal RICO
Act.

In both In re. Insulin Pricing Litigation and the MSP Recovery
Claims litigation, the court dismissed claims under the federal
RICO Act and certain state laws.

Also, filed in the same court in November 2020, the company, along
with Sanofi, Novo Nordisk, CVS, Express Scripts, and Optum, have
been sued in a purported class action, FWK Holdings, LLC v. Novo
Nordisk Inc., et al., for alleged violations of the federal RICO
Act as well as the New Jersey RICO Act and anti-trust law.

That same group of defendants, along with Medco Health and United
Health Group, also have been sued in other purported class actions
in the same court, Rochester Drug Co-Operative Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co. et al. and Value Drug Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. et al. both
initiated in March 2020, for alleged violations of the federal RICO
Act.

In September 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted plaintiffs' motion to consolidate FWK Holdings, LLC
v. Novo Nordisk Inc., et al., Rochester Drug Co-Operative Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co. et al., and Value Drug Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. et
al.

Eli Lilly and Company discovers, develops, manufactures, and
markets pharmaceutical products worldwide. The company operates in
two segments, Human Pharmaceutical Products and Animal Health
Products. Eli Lilly and Company was founded in 1876 and is
headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana.

ENTIRELYPETS PHARMACY: Tucker Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Entirelypets
Pharmacy, LLC. The case is styled as Henry Tucker, on behalf of
himself and all other persons similarly situated v. Entirelypets
Pharmacy, LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-01914-JPO-RWL (S.D.N.Y., March 4,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

EntirelyPets Pharmacy -- https://entirelypetspharmacy.com/ -- is an
online pet pharmacy for all pet's prescription medication and
supplies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Michael Gottlieb, Esq.
          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: nyjg@aol.com
                 michael@gottlieb.legal


FACEBOOK INC: $650M Class Deal in BIPA Suit Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE FACEBOOK BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY
LITIGATION, Case No. 15-cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal.), Judge James Donato
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the class
action settlement, and motion for fees, expenses, and costs.

By any measure, the $650 million settlement in the biometric
privacy class action is a landmark result.  It is one the largest
settlements ever for a privacy violation, and it will put at least
$345 into the hands of every class member interested in being
compensated.  At the Court's request, the parties jointly developed
an innovative notice and claims procedure that generated an
impressive claims rate.  The settlement attracted widespread
support from the class, and drew only three objections out of
millions of class members.

All of this was achieved in the context of a new and untested
statute, the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"),
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1 et seq. (2008).  The case raised several
complicated and intensely litigated issues, including the question
of whether a statutory privacy injury was sufficiently "real" and
concrete to establish an injury in fact for standing under Article
III and the BIPA.  The Court determined that it was, and two other
courts -- the Illinois Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit --
reached the same conclusion.  The standing issue makes the
settlement all the more valuable because Facebook and other big
tech companies continue to fight the proposition that a statutory
privacy violation is a genuine harm.

In a pending Supreme Court case about the Fair Credit Reporting Act
-- Trans Union LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297 (U.S. Feb. 8, 2021) --
which is unrelated to the action, Facebook, Google, and eBay filed
an amicus brief that points to the settlement and asks the Court to
reverse the "mistaken holding" that a statutory privacy violation
is an actual injury.  This underscores the considerable legal risks
both sides would have faced had the case continued on.

Judge Donato resolves the Plaintiffs' motion for final approval,
and motion for fees, expenses, and costs.  He also addresses and
overrules three objections filed by four objectors -- Kevin C.
Williams, Dawn Frankfother, Cathy Flanagan, and Kara Ross.
Objectors Frankfother and Flanagan also filed an opposition to the
Plaintiffs' motion for final approval.

On Jan. 14, 2021, the Judge held a lengthy final approval hearing.
The hearing featured arguments by the parties, the objectors
Frankfother, Flanagan, and Ross, who appeared through their
counsel, as well as remarks by the class's expert, Professor
William B. Rubenstein of Harvard Law School.  Having carefully
reviewed all of the voluminous filings with respect to final
approval and fees, which include expert declarations, letters from
class members, and other materials, the Judge concludes that
overall, the settlement is a major win for consumers in the hotly
contested area of digital privacy.  Therefore, the final approval
of the proposed class action settlement will be granted.

The Judge will also grant the motion for attorneys' fees and costs,
and incentive awards to the named Plaintiffs, although in lesser
amounts than requested.  Reducing the fee to $97.5 million, reduces
the multiplier to 4.71.  He finds it more in line with comparable
settlements, still sufficiently and appropriately generous, and
more reasonable in the circumstances.  The results obtained and the
risks at trial warrant a higher-end multiplier of 4.71, but not
more.

The Judge will award $97.5 million in attorneys' fees to the three
class counsel firms.  The 15% of the award will be held back
pending further order, to be issued after counsel have filed the
post-distribution accounting required by the District's Procedural
Guidance on Class Action Settlements.  Consequently, $82.875
million is authorized for disbursement from the common fund upon
entry of the Order.

The class counsel has also requested reimbursement of expenses in
the amount of $915,454.37.  These amounts were sufficiently
documented and were for reasonable expenses incurred in the normal
course of the litigation.  Therefore, the requested reimbursement
will be granted.  The proposed settlement administrator's costs
will also be approved.

Finally, the class counsel has requested $7,500 incentive awards
for each of the three named Plaintiffs in the case.  The Objectors'
arguments to the contrary, circuit authority permits the Court to
order incentive awards.  Incentive awards are fairly typical in
class action cases.  In the case, there are just three named
Plaintiffs who would be receiving incentive payments.  The payments
would be a miniscule proportion of the settlement amount, and the
requested size of each payment is $7,500.

It is true that the case was a long-running litigation and each
Plaintiff was deposed at least twice.  The named Plaintiffs also
each submitted declarations attesting to having spent 55-60 hours
in service of the litigation.  However, the Judge finds that $7,500
is still too high, especially in comparison to the amount other
class members will be receiving.  He will award $5,000 to each of
the three named Plaintiffs.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Donato granted final approval of
the class action settlement.  The 109 persons who opted out are
ordered excluded from the settlement.

The Judge awarded the class counsel $97.5 million in attorneys'
fees, with 15% of the award to be held back pending a further
order, which will be issued after counsel have filed the
post-distribution accounting required under our District's
Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlement settlements. See
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/procedural-guidance-for-class-action-settlements/.
The payment of $82.875 million is authorized now.

The class counsel is ordered reimbursed $915,454.37 for their
litigation expenses.  The settlement administrator is awarded costs
in the amount of $1,828,009.89.  The three named class
representatives are each awarded $5,000 incentive payments.

The Judge ordered that the remaining settlement fund be distributed
pro rata to claiming class members, consistent with the Settlement
Agreement and as expeditiously as possible.  The parties will
comply with all other provisions of the Settlement Agreement, as
well as the District's Procedural Guidance for Class Action
Settlements.

All objections are overruled for the reasons discussed in the Order
and at the final approval hearing.  The case will be closed, but
the counsel can and should file the post-distribution accounting
document on the ECF docket when the time comes.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2wwcua2c from Leagle.com.


FCA US: Loses Bid to Reconsider Denial Ruling in Victorino Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
issued an order denying the Defendant's motion for reconsideration
in the lawsuit captioned CARLOS VICTORINO and ADAM TAVITIAN,
individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. FCA US LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company, Defendant, Case No. 16cv1617-GPC(JLB) (S.D.
Cal.).

The Defendant's moved for reconsideration of the Court's May 8,
2020 order denying its motion to modify the class definition and to
limit the certified class to those purchasers, who still own the
Class Vehicles. The Plaintiff filed a response and Defendant
replied. The Court finds that the matter is appropriate for
decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civ. R.
7.1(d)(1).

Plaintiff Victorino filed the operative putative first amended
class action complaint ("FAC"), on June 19, 2017, against Defendant
FCA based on alleged defects in the 2013-2015 Dodge Dart vehicles
equipped with a Fiat C635 manual transmission built on or before
November 12, 2014. The Plaintiff alleges that the alleged defect
causes his vehicle's clutch to fail and stick to the floor
preventing him from accelerating causing a safety hazard as well as
adversely affecting the vehicle's driveability.

After the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion for summary judgment
and subsequent motion for reconsideration, the remaining causes of
action in the case are the breach of implied warranty of
merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and a California unfair competition law
claim premised on the breach of implied warranty claims.

While class certification was initially denied on June 13, 2018, a
class was later certified on the Plaintiff's renewed motion for
class certification on October 17, 2019. The class is currently
defined as: All persons who purchased or leased in California, from
an authorized dealership, a new Class Vehicle primarily for
personal, family or household purposes.

The Defendant subsequently filed a motion to decertify class, or,
alternatively, to modify the class definition as follows:
California residents who purchased a Class Vehicle from an FCA US
LLC authorized dealership in the state of California primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, and who still own the
vehicle and have not settled any disputed claim with FCA US related
to the vehicle.

On May 8, 2020, the Court denied the Defendant's motion to
decertify class, and in the alternative, motion to modify class
definition. After full briefing regarding disputes over the class
notice and notice plan, on August 27, 2020, the Court granted in
part the Plaintiff's renewed motion for order for approval of class
notice and notice plan.

On November 20, 2020, in light of two recent cases, Niedermeier v.
FCA US LLC, 56 Cal. App. 5th 1052 (2020) and In re Volkswagen
"Clean Diesel' Mktg. Sales Pracs. and Products Liab. Litig., _ F.
Supp. 3d _, 2020 WL 6688912 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) ("Clean
Diesel"), the Defendant filed the instant motion for
reconsideration solely on the issue of modifying the class
definition to "all persons who purchased and still own, or who
leased, in California, from an authorized dealership, a new Class
Vehicle primarily for personal, family or household purposes." The
Plaintiff responds that these two cases are not on point and the
class definition is line with his theory of damages. FCA replied.

District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel notes that the litigation has been
ongoing for almost five years. By its motion for reconsideration,
FCA seeks once more to modify the class definition to effectively
exclude former owners and narrow the class to original purchasers
who still own the Class Vehicles. Further, in that the purchases of
the Class Vehicles, consisting of 2013-2015 Dodge Dart, occurred at
least six or more years ago, there is a strong likelihood that a
significant amount of the original purchasers have resold or
disposed of their vehicles.

By limiting the Class Vehicles to the purchasers who still own the
Class Vehicles would render FCA free of any significant damages if
liability were found and would not compensate the former purchasers
of the injuries they suffered when they purchased the Class
Vehicles, Judge Curiel points out.

FCA argues that the action is required based on two recent cases
that "unequivocally concluded that any alleged damages recouped by
a vehicle owner upon resale/disposal are an element of the
awardable damages and not a matter of an affirmative defense to be
treated as a set-off." According to FCA, the Plaintiff's damage
methodology fails to account for this recoupment and does not fit
his theory of liability for former owners. In response, the
Plaintiff contends that the two cases are inapposite, that his
damages model fits his theory of liability as approved by the Ninth
Circuit in Nguyen v. Nissan N. America, Inc., 932 F.3d 811 (9th
Cir. 2019), and post-sale events are irrelevant for class
certification and is an attempt to further delay the case.

The Court has already concluded on more than one occasion, for
purposes of class certification, that the Plaintiff has presented a
benefit of the bargain damages model that is consistent with his
breach of implied warranty claims. Relying on the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Nguyen v. Nissan North Am., Inc., 932 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2019), the Court ruled that the Plaintiff's benefit of the bargain
theory purports to measure the economic harm at the point of sale
or before based on the difference in value between a defective and
a defect-free Clutch System. The damages would be the average cost
of replacing the allegedly defective clutch system.

Similar to the theory of liability in Nguyen, the Plaintiff's
theory is that the clutch system itself was the injury and occurred
at the time of sale irrespective of whether the clutch system
caused any subsequent performance issues. Therefore, the purchasers
of the Class Vehicles all suffered an injury at the time of sale
and damages are determined at that point in time.

In modifying the class definition, FCA seeks to exclude former
owners of the Class Vehicles and prevent them from being
compensated for the injuries they suffered. Moreover, in effect,
FCA would escape liability for a significant number of Class
Vehicles that were resold or disposed of by the original
purchasers, Judge Curiel holds.

On their earlier motion to decertify, FCA first raised the issue
concerning the recoupment of money upon the purchasers' resale or
disposal raised in this motion for reconsideration. In that motion,
FCA argued that the class definition should be modified to include
only current owners of the Class Vehicles because individual
determinations would predominate over common ones based on the
possibility that the original purchasers who resold the Class
Vehicles would have recouped some or all of the damages from the
resale.

The Court addressed this argument and rejected this position and
found Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, Case No. 16-cv-07244-EMC, 2020 WL
1955643, at *48 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020), a case relied on by FCA,
distinguishable. The Sloan case involved both current and former
owners or lessees of the class vehicle; therefore, the court was
confronted with a potential damages calculation problem given that
current and prior owners of the same class vehicles would have to
split the damages and splitting damages would not satisfy the
remedy of the cost of repair for the current owner. Moreover,
requiring "GM to pay a current owner of a used vehicle the full
cost of repair in addition to paying some pro-rata benefit to prior
owners would subject GM to multiple recovery." Therefore, the Sloan
court modified the class definition to include only the current
owners or lessees.

In its prior order, the Court noted that the dilemma presented in
Sloan was not present in the instant case where the class includes
only the original purchasers of new Class Vehicles from an
authorized dealership and does not include subsequent owners.

Now, in its reconsideration motion, FCA argues that two recent
cases, demonstrate that any money recouped by a purchaser through
the resale or disposal of the Class Vehicles must be considered as
part of damages to be determined at class certification and not as
an offset to be determined later during the damages phase at trial.
FCA explains that because the Plaintiff's damages model fails to
account for any recoupment upon resale, it does not "fit" for
former owners of the Class Vehicles.

In Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC, 56 Cal. App. 5th 1052 (2020), the
court of appeal held that the Song-Beverly Act's restitution remedy
for breach of express warranty under section 1793.2(d)(2)(B)
requiring a manufacturer to make restitution in an amount equal to
the actual price paid or payable by the buyer excludes amounts
recovered from the trade-in of the defective vehicle. Niedermeier
dealt with a "restitution interest" under a breach of express
warranty claim, Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B), which the Court
has previously explained, is distinct from an "expectation
interest" in receiving the benefit of the bargain under an implied
warranty claim under Commercial Code section 2714.

Niedermeier did not decide whether the recoupment upon resale or
trade-in operated as a set-off under a benefit-of-the-bargain
damages model, Judge Curiel notes. Further, Niedermeier was not a
class action case requiring analysis of the damages model under
Comcast. Finally, Niedermeier dealt with the lemon law provisions
of the Song-Beverly Act requiring the defendant to buyback the
vehicle at the original purchase price; in contrast, this case
concerns damages in the form of the average replacement cost of the
clutch system.

Judge Curiel concludes that Niedermeier does not compel the Court
to modify the class definition.

The second case, In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel' Mktg. Sales Pracs.
and Products Liab. Litig., _ F. Supp. 3d _, 2020 WL 6688912 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 12, 2020), involved a putative class action where the
district court excluded the plaintiffs' expert on damages,
concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction.

Judge Curiel finds that the Clean Diesel case was unique with its
own set of complex facts not applicable to this case. In Clean
Diesel, VW sold plaintiffs "clean diesel" vehicles which were
marketed as environmentally friendly, fuel efficient, and high
performing. Consumers were unaware that VW had installed defeat
devices that permitted the vehicles to evade the emissions test
procedures such that, on the road, the "clean diesel" vehicles
produced nitrogen oxides at 40 times over the permitted level.

Clean Diesel does not inform the Court that the class definition in
this case should be altered for purposes of class certification,
Judge Curiel finds. In contrast to Clean Diesel, the Plaintiff has
standing and suffered injury based upon a defective clutch system
at the time of sale, the Judge points out. The Court reiterates
that the purchasers of the new Class Vehicles were all damaged at
the time of sale and damages of the average cost of replacement is
in line with breach of implied warranty claims and complies with
Comcast.

Remaining for the Court to address at the motions in limine hearing
are the following issues: (1) whether an owner's resale of a
Subject Vehicle are factors that reduce the amount of
benefit-of-the-bargain damages that the class members are entitled
to receive; (2) if so, do these amounts constitute an offset to
damages; and (3) which party has the burden of proving an offset.
In the event that the Court determines that the resale or disposal
of the Class Vehicles is relevant to the calculation of the benefit
of the bargain damages, it "can be readily determined in individual
hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of
subclasses."

At this time, the Court concludes that the case involves a "single,
central, common issue of liability" that supports class
certification for the proposed class as defined. Further, all class
members have sufficiently alleged injury because they were denied
the benefit-of-the-bargain at the time of purchase. The Court will
defer the remaining questions regarding possible set offs or
recoupment until trial. Therefore, the Court denies FCA's motion
for reconsideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/jhn9z7ea from Leagle.com.


FIRST CHINESE: New York Court Denies Bids to Remand in Guzman Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied the Plaintiffs' motions to remand in the lawsuit entitled
ALVARO RAMIREZ GUZMAN, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. FIRST CHINESE
PRESBYTERIAN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS HOME ATTENDANT CORPORATION,
Defendant and EUGENIA BARAHONA ALVARADO, Plaintiff v. ALLIANCE FOR
HEALTH, INC., Defendant, Case Nos. 20-cv-3929 (JGK), 20-cv-3930
(JGK) (S.D.N.Y.).

Plaintiffs Alvaro Ramirez Guzman, Elida Agustina Mejia Herrera, and
Leticia Panama Rivas ("FCP Plaintiffs") and Eugenia Barahona
Alvarado are former home health aides, who brought separate suits
in state court against their respective former employers, First
Chinese Presbyterian Community Affairs Home Attendant Corp. ("FCP")
and Alliance for Health, Inc., alleging violations of New York
State and New York City Labor Law, individually and on behalf of
putative classes.

While the Plaintiffs' state court cases were pending, 1199SEIU
United Healthcare Workers East commenced an industry-wide class
action grievance dispute process against over forty home health aid
agencies including FCP and Alliance on behalf of the Union's
members for violations of certain federal and state wage and hour
laws, and on April 17, 2020, the selected Arbitrator issued an
award, deciding two jurisdictional issues.

1199SEIU is a union that serves as the sole and exclusive
representative for home care employees at FCP and Alliance. It has
entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with both
Defendants that requires the arbitration of grievances by
Union-represented employees. In 2016, 1199SEIU and the Defendants
executed a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA"), which amended the CBA
to add a new Alternative Dispute Provision, which explicitly
requires that "all claims brought by either the Union or Employees,
asserting violations of or arising under the Fair Labor Standards
Act ('FLSA'), New York Home Care Worker Wage Parity Law, or New
York Labor Law ("Covered Statutes"), in any manner, will be subject
exclusively to the grievance and arbitration procedures," set forth
in the provision.

After the Plaintiffs each filed an Order to Show Cause seeking to
vacate parts of the Arbitrator's Award and to stay further
arbitration, Alliance removed Alvarado's suit and FCP removed the
FCP Plaintiffs' suit to the Court, alleging that the Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. Section 185.
The Plaintiffs each now move to remand their respective cases to
state court, alleging that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs move to remand the action to state court, arguing
that their state law claims are not preempted by Section 301 of the
LMRA, and that their Orders to Show Cause do not require consulting
the CBA and do not warrant removal. The Defendants argue that the
Court has jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs' Orders to Show Cause
to stay the Union's arbitration or vacate the Award pursuant to
N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 7511 are completely preempted by Section 301
because they relate to rights created by the CBA and are
substantially dependent on the interpretation of the CBA.

The Plaintiffs assert that removal was improper because the state
court did not need to review any labor agreement in light of the
previous state court decisions that already interpreted the scope
of the MOA and CBA. However, this argument appears to confuse
preclusion principles with federal question jurisdiction and
misconceives the nature of Section 301's "complete preemption,"
District Judge John G. Koeltl holds.

Judge Koeltl notes that in the case, removal was timely under 28
U.S.C. Section 1446(b)(3), because both Defendants filed within 30
days after service of the Plaintiffs' Proposed Orders to Show
Cause.

The Plaintiffs also allege that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority, because their state law claims are not covered by the
grievance procedures in the CBA and the MOA's amendments to the CBA
do not apply to them. Therefore, their effort to vacate the Award
and stay arbitration depends on the interpretation of the scope and
coverage of the CBA and the MOA. The resolution of the Plaintiffs'
claims, thus, turn on the "rights created by" the CBA and "are
substantially dependent on the analysis of" the CBA and MOA's
grievance and arbitration provisions, Judge Koeltl opines, citing
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. at 394-95 (1987).

Accordingly, the Court holds that it has jurisdiction over the
action pursuant to Section 301, and the Plaintiffs cannot escape
that jurisdiction by packaging their objective of vacating a
federal labor arbitral award as a state court motion, pursuant to
N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section 7511.

By seeking to vacate the Award on the grounds that the Arbitrator
exceeded his authority, the Plaintiffs have made the interpretation
of the CBA and the MOA key issues in dispute and, thus, removal is
proper, Judge Koeltl opines.

The Plaintiffs' arguments about the effect of state court decisions
may be relevant on the merits of the case, but do not divest the
Court of subject matter jurisdiction, Judge Koeltl holds.  Nor does
the Plaintiffs' claim that they seek to represent a putative class
compel a different result.

Instead, Judge Koeltl explains, courts in the Circuit have long
understood that a plaintiff cannot escape Section 301's preemptive
sweep through the use of state court motions, including efforts to
challenge federal labor arbitrations on state law grounds, citing
Jenkins Bros. v. Local 5623, United Steelworkers of Am., 230 F.
Supp. 871, 872 (D. Conn. 1964).

Finally, the Plaintiffs make various arguments about the "law of
the case" doctrine. Although the FCP Plaintiffs claim that the
Arbitrator's Award "violated" the FCP Injunction Order, this does
not appear to be supported by the record, Judge Koeltl finds.
Despite the FCP Plaintiffs' claims, the Injunction Order was only
on behalf of the named plaintiffs, and the Arbitrator excluded them
from the scope of his Award. There is no inconsistency between this
Court's jurisdiction and the state court's FCP Injunction Order.

Moreover, although the law of the case doctrine applies when a
state court case is removed to federal court, the law of the case
directs a court's discretion, but it does not limit the tribunal's
power, Judge Koeltl opines. Indeed, the doctrine does not prevent a
court from reconsidering prior opinions when there is an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.

Because the Plaintiffs' motions to remand are denied, so too are
the Plaintiffs' requests for costs and fees, Judge Koeltl adds.

To the extent not discussed, Judge Koeltl concludes that the
arguments are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing
reasons, the Plaintiffs' motions to remand are denied. The Clerk is
directed to close all pending motions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Feb. 18,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4vwwc2p9 from
Leagle.com.


FLINT, MI: Atty. Fletcher Must Submit Corrective Communication
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the matter styled In re: Flint Water Cases, Case No.
5:16-cv-10444-JEL-MKM (E.D. Mich.), the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan issued a joint order directing
Attorney Loyst Fletcher to submit a proposed corrective
communication for court approval.

The other case and court involved are IN RE FLINT WATER LITIGATION,
Case No. 17-108646-NO, in the Michigan Circuit Court for the County
of Genesee. The session was Court was held at the Circuit Court in
the City of Flint, County of Genesee, on February 18, 2021. Present
is the Honorable Joseph J. Farah, Circuit Judge.

Mr. Fletcher is counsel to a group of Plaintiffs in the State Court
Flint Water cases, who are known as the Collins Plaintiffs. The
Collins Plaintiffs allege unjust enrichment against the City of
Flint based on their payment of water bills during the Flint Water
Crisis. The Collins Plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene in the
Federal Court cases (No. 16-10444; ECF No. 1355), which the Federal
Court denied. On February 9, 2021, the Collins Plaintiffs filed a
Notice of Appeal of that Order, which is pending with the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals (No. 16-10444; ECF No. 1421.)

The subject of the Order is Loyst Fletcher, Jr., Esq., of the law
firm Loyst Fletcher, Jr. & Associates located in Flint, Michigan.
On January 17, 2021, Mr. Fletcher mailed a packet related to the
Flint Water Cases and partial settlement to 298 individuals and/or
entities in the Flint, Michigan area. The Flint Water Cases include
many separate lawsuits pending in the Genesee County Circuit Court,
the Michigan Court of Claims, and this Court.

The incident was first brought to both the Federal Court and the
Genesee County Circuit Court in the State of Michigan's attention
after several Plaintiffs' attorneys in the Flint Water Cases case
informed the Court that Mr. Fletcher had solicited their clients
through this packet.

Upon careful review of the packet, the supplemental information
that Mr. Fletcher provided to the Federal Court under seal (No.
16-10444; ECF No. 1420), and the Special Master's report and
analysis of that information (No. 16-10444; ECF No. 1426), the
Court finds that:

   (1) the packet contains incorrect and misleading information
       regarding the partial settlement, which is highly likely
       to have a detrimental effect on many individuals' decision
       regarding whether to join the settlement;

   (2) Mr. Fletcher likely violated the Michigan Rules of
       Professional Conduct by, for his own pecuniary gain,
       improperly soliciting various individuals who had already
       retained law firms other than Mr. Fletcher's; and

   (3) Mr. Fletcher's retainer agreement contains an illegally
       excessive contingency fee provision in likely violation of
       the Michigan Court Rules and the Michigan Rules of
       Professional Conduct.

On February 5, 2021, the Court held a hearing on the matter, with
both the Hon. Judith E. Levy and the Hon. Joseph J. Farah
presiding, which Mr. Fletcher attended. At the hearing, Mr.
Fletcher admitted that he had mailed the packets at issue. He also
stated at the hearing that he had sent similar packets to
approximately 200 other individuals and/or entities.

On February 8, 2021, the Federal Court issued an Order requiring
that Mr. Fletcher file under seal a list of all of the names and
contact information for all of the individuals and/or entities
included in Mr. Fletcher's mailing, as well as a list of those who
signed his retainer agreement as a result of the mailing. Mr.
Fletcher submitted this information to the Federal Court on
February 9, 2021.

Accordingly, Mr. Fletcher is ordered to mail a Federal and State
Court-approved retraction and corrective communication to the 298
individuals and entities, who received his initial letter. To
effectuate this corrective communication, Mr. Fletcher is first
ordered to file a draft communication with the Federal and State
Courts for review and approval for the reasons and in the manner
set forth in this Order. Finally, he is ordered to dissolve all
attorney retainers that resulted from this improper communication.

District Judge Judith E. Levy states that Mr. Fletcher's
communication to the 298 individuals and/or entities must be
corrected for three reasons. First, Mr. Fletcher's letter contains
patently incorrect and misleading statements related to the Master
Settlement Agreement ("MSA"). Second, based on the representations
by Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel for Individual
Plaintiffs, at least some of their clients who received Mr.
Fletcher's packets had never contacted Mr. Fletcher and did not
have a familial or prior professional relationship with him before
receiving the packet, which raises a serious potential breach of
the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. Third, Mr. Fletcher's
40% contingency fee in his retainer agreement violates Michigan
Court Rule 8.121(b), which caps contingency fees in cases that
involve personal injury and wrongful death--such as this one--to a
maximum of one-third of the amount recovered.

Judge Levy also opines that Mr. Fletcher's retainer agreement must
be dissolved. If those individuals still wish to retain Mr.
Fletcher given these facts, any such retainer agreement must be
rewritten to either limit the representation to non-personal injury
and wrongful death, or to limit Mr. Fletcher's fee to one that is
not excessive.

For the reasons set forth in the Joint Order, Mr. Fletcher is
ordered to submit to the Federal and State Court a draft corrective
response to the 298 individuals and/or entities for both Courts'
approval. The letter should explain and retract all misstatements.
He must also submit a separate draft addressing the individuals,
who signed his illegal retainer agreement indicating that the
retainer is dissolved.

Another Order will follow with further direction once the Courts
have reviewed and approved the corrective communication.

All other provisions in the Federal Court's February 8, 2021 Order
remain in full force and effect, including the provisions that
enjoin Mr. Fletcher from making, providing, or disseminating any
future communications with or to any and all putative class
members, including members of the proposed settlement class or any
individuals currently represented by other lawyers in the proposed
partial settlement, where such contact or communication contains
information that is incorrect, misleading, or improper related to
the Flint Water litigation or partial settlement.

The Special Master is authorized to post in a secure electronic
site the list of individuals on Mr. Fletcher's list, who are
represented by counsel other than Mr. Fletcher according to the
census data collected by the Special Master. The relevant law firms
will be given access to the site so that they may identify the
clients who received the letter. Mr. Fletcher will also be given
access to the site so that he is informed of the individuals who
are represented by other counsel.

A full-text copy of the Court's Joint Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/29ypju3j from Leagle.com.


GEICO: Faces Suit Claiming It Overcharged During Pandemic
---------------------------------------------------------
The Washington Post reports that the auto insurer Geico, a unit of
Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway, must face a proposed class
action claiming it overcharged policyholders as the coronavirus
pandemic led to less driving and fewer accidents, a judge has
ruled.

In a decision U.S. District Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman in Chicago
said Illinois drivers may try to prove that Geico violated a state
consumer fraud law by unfairly and deceptively marketing its "Geico
Giveback" discount program. She dismissed breach-of-contract and
unjust-enrichment claims.

Neither Geico nor its lawyers immediately responded to requests for
comment. Lawyers for the plaintiffs did not immediately respond to
similar requests.

Geico last April offered policyholders $2.5 billion in credits,
including 15 percent on renewals from April to October, averaging
about $150 per policy.

But policyholders led by Briana Siegal said this induced them to
renew and pay excessive premiums rather than shop around, as
stay-at-home orders and closures resulted in less time on the
road.

Siegal also said Geico's credits compared unfavorably with refunds
offered by other insurers.

She cited a report by the Consumer Federation of America and the
Center for Economic Justice awarding Geico's program a "D-minus,"
below the "A" and "B" grades given to State Farm and Allstate,
which offered refunds.

Without ruling on the merits, Coleman said the plaintiffs
adequately alleged that Geico misled them into thinking it was
passing on all its savings from reduced driving and did not
disclose that its premiums were "not based on an accurate
assessment of risk during COVID-19." [GN]

GERBER PRODUCTS: Moore Sues Over Toxic Metals in Baby Food Products
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Moore, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated
v. GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY, Case No. 1:21-cv-00277 (E.D. Va., March
4, 2021), is brought against the Defendant for its negligent,
reckless, and/or intentional practice of misrepresenting and
failing to fully disclose the presence of toxic metals in its baby
food products sold throughout the United States.

Parents like the Plaintiff trust manufacturers like Defendant
Gerber to sell baby food that is safe, nutritious, and free from
harmful toxins, contaminants and chemicals. Parents purchase Baby
Food Products with the expectation that they are free from heavy
metals, substances known to have significant, harmful health
effects. Because consumers do not have the scientific knowledge
necessary to determine whether the Baby Food Products contain heavy
metals or to know or ascertain the true nature of the ingredients
in the Baby Food Products, they must rely on the Defendant to
honestly represent the contents of its products.

On February 4, 2021, the U.S. House of Representatives'
Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy, Committee on
Oversight and Reform, released the results of an investigation into
leading baby food manufacturers in the United States relating to
alleged high amounts of detrimental metals in baby food.

According to the complaint, heavy metals are not listed as an
ingredient on the product labels of the Defendant's Baby Food
Products. Nor does the Defendant warn of the potential presence of
heavy metals in the Baby Food Products. Unbeknownst to the
Plaintiff, and contrary to the representations on marketing and
advertising, the Baby Food Products contain toxic heavy metals,
including inorganic arsenic, lead, cadmium, and mercury, at levels
above what is considered safe for babies. Had the presence of these
heavy metals been disclosed to the Plaintiff prior to their
purchase of the Baby Food Products, they would not have purchased
the Baby Food Products. Further, absent accurate marketing and
advertising in the future, there is no way for the Plaintiff to
determine whether the Defendant has reformulated or removed the
heavy metals from its Baby Food Products and, thus, will be unable
to rely on Defendant's representations.

The Defendant's Baby Food Products and corresponding marketing do
not have a disclaimer or warning that the items may contain heavy
metals or other undesirable toxins or contaminants that can
accumulate in a child's body over time and cause deleterious
effects. The Defendant's wrongful marketing and advertising, which
includes misleading, deceptive, unfair, and false marketing and
omissions, allowed the company to capitalize on, and reap enormous
profits from, consumers who paid the purchase price or a premium
price for the Baby Food Products that were not sold as advertised.
Defendant continues to wrongfully induce consumers to purchase its
Baby Food Products that are not as advertised, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased four of the Defendant's products.

The Defendant manufactures, distributes, markets, offers for sale
and sells the Baby Food Products throughout the United States,
including in this District.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Francis J. Balint, Jr., Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT PC
          Joshua Gunnell House, Suite 4
          4023 Chain Bridge Road
          Fairfax, VA 22030
          Phone: (602) 776-5903
          Fax: (602) 274-1199
          Email: fbalint@bffb.com

               - and -

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          BONNETT FAIRBOURN FRIEDMAN & BALINT PC
          2325 E. Camelback Rd., Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Phone: (602) 274-1100
          Fax: (602) 274-1199
          Email: eryan@bffb.com

               - and -

          Mark R. Rosen, Esq.
          Jeffrey A. Barrack, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          2001 Market Street
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 963-0600
          Fax: (215) 963-0838
          Email: mrosen@barrack.com
                 jbarrack@barrack.com

               - and -

          Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 230-0800
          Fax: (619) 230-1874
          Email: sbasser@barrack.com

               - and -

          John G. Emerson, Esq.
          EMERSON FIRM, PLLC
          2500 Wilcrest, Suite 300
          Houston, TX 77042
          Phone: (800)-551-8649
          Fax: (501)-286-4659
          Email: jemerson@emersonfirm.com


GOLDMAN SACHS: Accord in Indirect Forex Purchasers' Suit Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the court
approved the settlement in the putative class action suit initiated
by indirect purchasers of foreign exchange instruments.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (GS&Co.) and the company (Group Inc.) are
among the defendants named in putative class actions filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York beginning
in September 2016 on behalf of putative indirect purchasers of
foreign exchange instruments.

On November 28, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second-consolidated
amended complaint generally alleging a conspiracy to manipulate the
foreign currency exchange markets, asserting claims under various
state antitrust laws and state consumer protection laws and seeking
treble damages in an unspecified amount.

On November 19, 2020, the court approved a settlement among the
parties.

The firm has reserved the full amount of its contribution to the
settlement.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide. It
operates in four segments: Investment Banking, Institutional Client
Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. was founded in 1869 and is headquartered
in New York, New York.

GOLDMAN SACHS: Bid to Dismiss Suit Over 1MDB Scandal Still Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that  the
company's motion to dismiss the class action suit related to 1MDB
remains pending.

On December 20, 2018, a putative securities class action lawsuit
was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York against Group Inc. and certain former officers of the firm
alleging violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange
Act with respect to Group Inc.'s disclosures concerning 1MDB and
seeking unspecified damages.

The plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint on October 28,
2019, which the defendants moved to dismiss on January 9, 2020.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide. It
operates in four segments: Investment Banking, Institutional Client
Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. was founded in 1869 and is headquartered
in New York, New York.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Deal in Valeant Securities Suit in Canada OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the court
approved the settlement agreement among the parties in putative
class action suit related to Valeant Pharmaceuticals International,
Inc.'s sales of securities.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (GS&Co.) and Goldman Sachs Canada Inc. are
among the underwriters and initial purchasers named as defendants
in a putative class action filed on March 2, 2016 in the Superior
Court of Quebec, Canada. In addition to the underwriters and
initial purchasers, the defendants include Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc., certain directors and officers of Valeant and
Valeant's auditor. As to GS&Co. and GS Canada, the complaint
relates to the June 2013 public offering of $2.3 billion of common
stock, the June 2013 Rule 144A offering of $3.2 billion principal
amount of senior notes, and the November 2013 Rule 144A offering of
$900 million principal amount of senior notes.

The complaint asserts claims under the Quebec Securities Act and
the Civil Code of Quebec. On August 29, 2017, the court certified a
class that includes only non-U.S. purchasers in the offerings.

Defendants' motion for leave to appeal the certification was denied
on November 30, 2017.

On November 16, 2020, the court approved a settlement agreement
among the parties.

Under the terms of the agreement, the firm will not be required to
contribute to the settlement.

GS&Co. and GS Canada, as sole underwriters, sold 5,334,897 shares
of common stock in the June 2013 offering to non-U.S. purchasers
representing an aggregate offering price of approximately $453
million and, as initial purchasers, had a proportional share of
sales to non-U.S. purchasers of approximately CAD14.2 million in
principal amount of senior notes in the June 2013 and November 2013
Rule 144A offerings.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide. It
operates in four segments: Investment Banking, Institutional Client
Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. was founded in 1869 and is headquartered
in New York, New York.

GOLDMAN SACHS: Denial of Bid to Nix Alnylam-Related Suit Appealed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the
defendants' appeal on the court's denial of motion to dismiss the
putative securities class action suit related to  Alnylam
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s $805 million November 2017 public offering
of common stock, is pending.

Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC (GS&Co.) is among the underwriters named as
defendants in a putative securities class action filed on September
12, 2019 in New York Supreme Court, County of New York, relating to
Alnylam Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s (Alnylam) $805 million November
2017 public offering of common stock.

In addition to the underwriters, the defendants include Alnylam and
certain of its officers and directors. GS&Co. underwrote 2,576,000
shares of common stock representing an aggregate offering price of
approximately $322 million. On October 30, 2020, the court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed on
November 7, 2019.

On November 12, 2020, defendants appealed the denial to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
for the First Department.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide. It
operates in four segments: Investment Banking, Institutional Client
Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. was founded in 1869 and is headquartered
in New York, New York.

GOLDMAN SACHS: Dismissal of Commodities-Related Suit Under Appeal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22,
2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the
plaintiffs in the class action suit related to alleged violations
of antitrust laws and the Commodity Exchange Act by Goldman Sachs
International (GSI) have taken an appeal to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals from the decision granting the defendants' motions
to dismiss and for reconsideration.

GSI is among the defendants named in putative class actions
relating to trading in platinum and palladium, filed beginning on
November 25, 2014 and most recently amended on May 15, 2017, in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The amended complaint generally alleges that the defendants
violated federal antitrust laws and the Commodity Exchange Act in
connection with an alleged conspiracy to manipulate a benchmark for
physical platinum and palladium prices and seek declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as treble damages in an unspecified
amount.

On March 29, 2020, the court granted the defendants' motions to
dismiss and for reconsideration, resulting in the dismissal of all
claims.

On April 27, 2020, plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. operates as an investment banking,
securities, and investment management company worldwide. It
operates in four segments: Investment Banking, Institutional Client
Services, Investing & Lending, and Investment Management. The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. was founded in 1869 and is headquartered
in New York, New York.

GRANITE CONSTRUCTION: Bid to Nix Layne Merger Related Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Granite Construction Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February
22, 2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the
company's demurrer seeking to dismiss the amended complaint in the
putative class action suit related to the Layne Christensen Company
merger, is pending.

On June 14, 2018, the company completed the $349.8 million
acquisition of Layne Christensen Company, a U.S.-based global water
management, infrastructure services and drilling company in a
stock-for-stock merger which was comprised of $321.0 million in
Company common stock, $28.8 million in cash to settle all
outstanding stock options, restricted stock awards and unvested
Layne performance shares and the company assumed $191.5 million in
convertible notes at fair value.

On October 23, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in
the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Cruz against the
Company, James H. Roberts, its former President and Chief Executive
Officer; Laurel Krzeminski, its former Chief Financial Officer, and
the then-serving Board of Directors on behalf of persons who
acquired shares of Company common stock in the Company's June 2018
merger with Layne Christensen Company (Layne).

The complaint asserts causes of action under the Securities Act of
1933 and alleges that the registration statement and prospectus
were negligently prepared and included materially false and
misleading statements and failed to disclose facts required to be
disclosed.

On August 10, 2020, the Court sustained the company's demurrer
dismissing the complaint with leave to amend.  

On September 16, 2020, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
asserting causes of action under the Securities Act of 1933 against
the previously named defendants and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.  

The company had filed a demurrer seeking to dismiss the amended
complaint.

Granite said, "We are in the preliminary stages of the litigation
and, as a result, we cannot predict the outcome or consequences of
the case, which we intend to defend vigorously."

Granite Construction Incorporated is one of the largest diversified
infrastructure companies in the United States, engaged in
heavy-civil infrastructure projects including the construction of
streets, roads, highways, mass transit facilities, airport
infrastructure, bridges, trenchless and underground utilities,
power-related facilities, water-related facilities, well drilling,
utilities, tunnels, dams and other infrastructure-related projects,
site preparation, mining services, and infrastructure services for
residential development, energy development, commercial and
industrial sites, and other facilities, as well as construction
management professional services. The company had four reportable
business segments: Transportation, Water, Specialty and Materials.
The company is based in Watsonville, California.

GRANITE CONSTRUCTION: Securities Class Suit in California Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
Granite Construction Incorporated said in its Form 10-K report
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February
22, 2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019, that the
company continues to defend a securities class action suit filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California.

On August 13, 2019, a securities class action was filed in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California against the Company, James H. Roberts, the company's
former President and Chief Executive Officer, and Jigisha Desai,
the company's former Senior Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer and current Executive Vice President and Chief Strategy
Officer.

An Amended Complaint was filed on February 20, 2020 that, among
other things, added Laurel Krzeminski, the company's former Chief
Financial Officer, as a defendant. The amended complaint is brought
on behalf of an alleged class of persons or entities that acquired
the company's common stock between April 30, 2018 and October 24,
2019, and alleges claims arising under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

The Amended Complaint seeks damages based on allegations that in
the Company's SEC filings the defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and failed to disclose material adverse facts
about the Company's business, operations and prospects. On May 20,
2020, the Court denied, in part, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.  

On January 21, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for class
certification.  

Granite said, "We are in the pretrial stages of the litigation, and
we cannot predict the outcome or consequences of this case, which
we intend to defend vigorously."

Granite Construction Incorporated is one of the largest diversified
infrastructure companies in the United States, engaged in
heavy-civil infrastructure projects including the construction of
streets, roads, highways, mass transit facilities, airport
infrastructure, bridges, trenchless and underground utilities,
power-related facilities, water-related facilities, well drilling,
utilities, tunnels, dams and other infrastructure-related projects,
site preparation, mining services, and infrastructure services for
residential development, energy development, commercial and
industrial sites, and other facilities, as well as construction
management professional services. The company had four reportable
business segments: Transportation, Water, Specialty and Materials.
The company is based in Watsonville, California.

HARTFORD FINANCIAL: Illinois Court Narrows Claims in Taube Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
granted in part and denied in part HFSG's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiff's first amended complaint in the lawsuit titled ERIK
TAUBE, DMD, DBA TAUBE FAMILY DENTAL, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL
SERVICES GROUP INC., DBA THE HARTFORD, a Delaware Corporation, and
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Indiana Corporation,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-00565-NJR (S.D. Ill.).

Before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, Eric Taube, a dentist from
Mascoutah, Illinois, purchased a commercial insurance policy from
The Hartford. The policy purportedly provides coverage for direct
physical loss of or physical damage to Covered Property at the
premises caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss. The
policy also includes coverage for loss of business income caused by
or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss.

During the pandemic, Taube unfortunately lost income from shutting
down his practice except to see patients for non-elective and
urgent care. As a result, Taube submitted a claim for coverage of
his losses to The Hartford noting that COVID-19 is a "covered cause
of loss" under the policy. The Hartford allegedly denied the claim
for coverage, explaining that the insurance policy does not cover
losses caused by COVID-19.

Mr. Taube commenced the action against HFSG, doing business as The
Hartford, and Twin City Fire Insurance Co. In all, Taube brings six
claims against HSFG and Twin City: business income breach of
contract (Count I); damages pursuant to 215 ILCS 5/155 (Count II);
declaratory relief applicable to business income (Count III); extra
expense breach of contract (Count IV); another claim of damages
pursuant to 215 ILCS 5/155 (Count V); and declaratory relief
applicable to extra expense (Count VI). Taube also seeks to
represent other similarly situated "persons and entities operating
dental practices in Illinois."

HFSG timely filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the First Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Additionally, HFSG argues the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it under Rule 12(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Chief District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel notes that HFSG's
standing argument appears to be a facial challenge. Specifically,
HFSG argues that Taube lacks standing to sue HFSG because he does
not have a contract with HFSG, and his alleged injury is not fairly
traceable to HFSG. On the surface, it would appear that HFSG has a
sound argument because the Seventh Circuit and district courts have
acknowledged that nonparties to contracts generally lack standing
to bring breach of contract claims, the Judge finds, citing Laurens
v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 868 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2011), et
al.

The Judge opines, however, that Taube is a party to the contract
and he is the one bringing the breach of contract claims. Applying
the Seventh Circuit's standard for facial challenges to standing,
Taube alleges a contract with The Hartford, who HFSG was
purportedly "doing business as," and he suffered harm when The
Hartford denied coverage, thus, the Court finds Taube has
sufficiently alleged standing.

Like HFSG's standing argument, HFSG points out that Taube fails to
allege that he has a contractual relationship with HFSG, and, thus,
fails to state a claim for breach of contract or to obtain a
declaratory judgment under a contract. Judge Rosenstengel notes
that in a diversity case, the Court applies state law to
substantive issues. When neither party raises a conflict of law
issue in a diversity case, the applicable law is that of the state
in which the federal court sits. Here, the parties have not raised
a conflict of law issue and have instead briefed the issues on the
merits under Illinois law. The Court, as a result, will apply the
law of Illinois.

Mr. Taube argues HFSG is a party to the policy because the policy
repeatedly references The Hartford. He points to the first page of
the policy, which states that the policy is from The Hartford. He
continues by referring to another page of the policy which states,
"Taube is a valued customer of The Hartford." He also alleges that
the 225-page policy refers to "The Harford" more than 100 times,
not even counting the many appearances of the corporate logo, which
consists of the words, 'The Hartford,' below a reindeer.

After reviewing the allegations in the complaint, the insurance
policy, and the other judicially noticeable materials, the Court
finds HFSG is not a party to the policy. Taube insists that The
Hartford issued the policy even though Taube's policy explains that
"this insurance is provided by the stock insurance company of The
Hartford Insurance Group shown below," and lists Twin City as the
insurer. Indeed, "HFSG," "The Hartford Financial Services Group,"
and "The Hartford Financial," are not included anywhere in the
policy.

Mr. Taube also argues that the term "The Hartford" is ambiguous,
and "ambiguous terms are construed strictly against the drafter of
the policy and in favor of coverage," quoting Outboard Marine Corp.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Ill. 1992).

Not only has Taube failed to allege facts that HFSG was a drafter
of the policy, but also "The Hartford" is not a policy term that
limits an insurer's liability, Judge Rosenstengel finds, citing
Hobbs v. The Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 823 N.E.2d 561, 564
(Ill. 2005). Taube concedes Twin City is listed as the "insurer"
for the effective policy period of September 10, 2019, to September
10, 2020. Accordingly, the term "The Hartford" must limit Twin
City's liability of providing coverage to be a policy term. The
problem is Taube is not arguing the meaning of "The Hartford" to
ensure coverage--Taube is arguing the meaning of "The Hartford" to
add HFSG to the policy, Judge Rosenstengel observes.

Even if "The Hartford" is a policy term, it is not ambiguous, Judge
Rosenstengel opines. Taube's policy includes the following
language: "your Policy was issued by The Hartford writing company
identified on your policy Declarations page." Then on the first
page of the Declarations Page, the policy identifies Twin City as
the company providing insurance. Accordingly, HFSG's Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted.

The Plaintiff also argues that the Court should allow discovery on
whether HFSG is the alter ego of the other Defendants. Notably,
Taube's complaint contains no allegations regarding the corporate
relationship between HFSG and The Hartford or Twin City or about
the level of control, if any, that HFSG exerted over The Hartford
or Twin City's procedures, Judge Rosenstengel says.

Mr. Taube's response to HFSG's Motion to Dismiss, however, spills
considerable ink regarding the fact that Ms. Levin, Mr. Elliot, and
Ms. Castaneda signed the insurance policy. Taube points out that
neither Ms. Levin nor Mr. Elliot "say whose President and Secretary
they are." He continues noting that Ms. Levin's LinkedIn page
indicates that her employer for the past 13 years has been HFSG,
Mr. Elliot is the President of HFSG, and Ms. Castaneda's LinkedIn
suggests that she is the Vice President and P&C compliance Officer
of "The Hartford," "where she has worked for nearly 15 years."
Taube also attaches a letter from Gregory Waller to the complaint,
dated June 3, 2020, rejecting his claim for coverage. Gregory
Waller's signature block, however, includes the writing company as
Twin City.

Allowing Taube to proceed against HFSG under an alter ego liability
theory based on the arguments appears to conflict with the
well-established principle of corporate law that "directors and
officers holding positions with a parent and its subsidiary can and
do 'change hats' to represent the two corporations separately,
despite their common ownership," Judge Rosenstengel opines, citing
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998).

But simply because it may be difficult for Taube to pierce the
corporate veil--does not prohibit Taube from amending his
complaint, and conducting discovery into this alter ego theory,
Judge Rosenstengel holds. Accordingly, the Court grants Taube leave
to amend his complaint. The Court will by separate order set the
matter for a telephonic status conference for the purpose of
entering a scheduling order on alter ego discovery.

For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant HFSG is
granted in part and denied in part. As Taube fails to state a
claim, the Court need not address HFSG's arguments as to personal
jurisdiction.  The Court dismisses Taube's claims against HFSG
without prejudice.  Taube has until March 11, 2021, to file a
Second Amended Complaint consistent with Rule 11.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Feb. 18,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/432fzwwy from
Leagle.com.


HEARTWARE INT'L: Distribution Plan in Securities Suit Approved
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled IN RE HEARTWARE INTERNATIONAL, INC., Case No.
1:16-cv-00520-RA (S.D.N.Y.), the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York approved the Lead Plaintiff's Renewed
Motion for Approval of Distribution Plan.

District Judge Ronnie Abrams rules that the Order incorporates by
reference the definitions in the Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement dated November 13, 2018, and the Simmons Declaration,
and all terms used in the Order will have the same meanings as
defined in the Stipulation or in the Declaration of Richard Simmons
in Support of Lead Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Approval of
Distribution Plan.

The Lead Plaintiff's plan for distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund to Authorized Claimants is approved. Accordingly:

   (a) The administrative recommendations of the Court-approved
       Claims Administrator, Analytics Consulting, LLC
       (Analytics), to accept the Timely Eligible Claims stated
       in Exhibit C to the Simmons Declaration and the Late But
       Otherwise Eligible Claims stated in Exhibit D to the
       Simmons Declaration, are adopted;

   (b) The Claims Administrator's administrative recommendations
       to reject ineligible Claims, as stated in Exhibit E to the
       Simmons Declaration, including the Disputed Claims
       discussed in paragraphs 31 to 41 of the Simmons
       Declaration, as stated in Exhibit B, are adopted;

   (c) Analytics is directed to conduct an initial distribution
       of the Net Settlement Fund, after deducting all payments
       previously allowed and the payments approved by this
       Order, and after deducting the payment of any taxes or
       estimated taxes, the costs of preparing appropriate tax
       returns, and any escrow fees, while maintaining a 5%
       reserve from the Net Settlement Fund to address any tax
       liability and claims administration-related contingencies
       that may arise, as stated in paragraph 50(a) of the
       Simmons Declaration (the Initial Distribution);

   (d) In order to encourage Authorized Claimants to cash their
       checks promptly, all distribution checks will bear the
       following notation: CASH PROMPTLY. VOID AND SUBJECT TO
       REDISTRIBUTION IF NOT CASHED BY [DATE 90 DAYS AFTER ISSUE
       DATE]. Lead Counsel and Analytics are authorized to take
       appropriate action to locate and contact Authorized
       Claimants who have not cashed their check within said time
       as detailed in paragraph 50(b) footnote 8 of the Simmons
       Declaration;

   (e) Authorized Claimants who do not cash their Initial
       Distribution checks within the time allotted or on the
       conditions stated in paragraph 50(b) footnote 8 of the
       Simmons Declaration will irrevocably forfeit all recovery
       from the Settlement, and the funds allocated to all such
       stale-dated checks will be available to be distributed to
       other Authorized Claimants in the second distribution.
       Similarly, Authorized Claimants who do not cash their
       check from a second or subsequent distribution, should
       such distributions occur, within the time allotted or on
       the conditions stated in paragraph 50(b) footnote 8 of the
       Simmons Declaration will irrevocably forfeit any further
       recovery from the Net Settlement Fund;

   (f) After Analytics has made reasonable and diligent efforts
       to have Authorized Claimants cash their Initial
       Distribution checks, as provided in paragraph 50(b)
       footnote 8 of the Simmons Declaration, but not earlier
       than seven (7) months after the Initial Distribution,
       Analytics will conduct a second distribution (the Second
       Distribution);

   (g) When Lead Counsel, in consultation with Analytics,
       determines that further distribution of the funds
       remaining in the Net Settlement Fund is not
       cost-effective, if sufficient funds remain to warrant the
       processing of Claims received after March 9, 2020, those
       Claims will be processed;

   (h) No new Claims submitted after March 9, 2020, may be
       accepted, and no further adjustments to Claims received on
       or before March 9, 2020, that would result in an increased
       Recognized Claim amount, may be made for any reason after
       March 9, 2020, subject to certain exception;

   (i) All persons involved in the review, verification,
       calculation, tabulation, or any other aspect of the
       processing of the Claims submitted, or who are otherwise
       involved in the administration or taxation of the
       Settlement Fund or the Net Settlement Fund, are released
       and discharged from any and all claims arising out of that
       involvement;

   (j) All of Analytics' fees and expenses incurred in the
       administration of the Settlement and estimated to be
       incurred in connection with the Initial Distribution of
       the Net Settlement Fund as stated in the invoices attached
       as Exhibit F to the Simmons Declaration are approved, and
       Lead Counsel is directed to pay the outstanding balance of
       $112,269.32 out of the Settlement Fund to Analytics; and

   (k) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, Analytics may
       destroy the paper copies of the Claims and all supporting
       documentation one year after the Second Distribution, and
       Analytics may destroy electronic copies of the same one
       year after all funds have been distributed.

The Court retains jurisdiction to consider any further applications
concerning the administration of the Settlement, and any other and
further relief that this Court deems appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/38h9kvtb from Leagle.com.


IAC/INTERACTIVECORP: Facing Drulias Putative Class Suit in New York
-------------------------------------------------------------------
IAC/InterActiveCorp said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company is facing
a putative class action suit entitled, Dean Drulias v. Joseph Levin
et al., No. 650504/2021 (Supreme Court, New York County).

On January 22, 2021, a putative shareholder class action was filed
in New York state court against IAC and the members of IAC's board
of directors.

The gravamen of the complaint is that the Company's proposed
spin-off of its Vimeo subsidiary is being driven by IAC's
controlling shareholder, Chairman and Senior Executive Barry
Diller, allegedly in order to: (i) generate additional cash for IAC
to invest in the gaming industry, (ii) decrease IAC's stock price
to facilitate additional share purchases by Mr. Diller and (iii)
generate additional cash for Mr. Diller without diluting his
controlling interest in IAC.

The complaint also asserts claims under Delaware law against IAC's
board of directors for breach of fiduciary duty on account of its
approval of the Spin-off and against IAC and its board of directors
for their respective failures to include certain allegedly material
information in the Company's proxy materials related to the
proposed transaction.

The complaint seeks damages in an unspecified amount, as well as an
order requiring the Company to include additional disclosures in
the proxy materials related to the proposed transaction.

IAC believes that the allegations in this lawsuit are without merit
and will defend vigorously against them.

IAC/InterActiveCorp, together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
media and Internet company in the United States and
internationally. It operates through Match Group, ANGI
Homeservices, Video, Applications, and Publishing segments.
IAC/InterActiveCorp was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in New
York, New York.

IAC/INTERACTIVECORP: March 9 Hearing to Assign Lead Plaintiff Set
------------------------------------------------------------------
IAC/InterActiveCorp said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the court has
scheduled a hearing for March 9, 2021 to determine who will serve
as lead plaintiff(s) and lead counsel for the plaintiff(s) in the
consolidated suit entitled, In re Match Group, Inc. Derivative
Litigation, No. 2020-0505.

On June 24, 2020, a shareholder class action and derivative lawsuit
was filed in Delaware state court against then IAC/InterActiveCorp
(now Match Group, Inc.), then IAC Holdings, Inc. (now
IAC/InterActiveCorp), IAC's Chairman and Senior Executive. Barry
Diller, former Match Group (as a nominal defendant only), and the
ten members of former Match Group's Board of Directors at the time
of the MTCH Separation, challenging, on behalf of a putative class
of then Match Group public shareholders, the agreed-upon terms of
the MTCH Separation.

David Newman v. IAC/InterActiveCorp et al., No. 2020-0505 (Delaware
Chancery Court).

The gravamen of the complaint is that the terms of the MTCH
Separation are unfair to former Match Group and unduly beneficial
to IAC as a result of undue influence by IAC and Mr. Diller over
the then Match Group directors who unanimously approved the
transaction.

The complaint asserts direct and derivative claims for: (i) breach
of fiduciary duty against IAC and Mr. Diller as former controlling
shareholders of Match Group, (ii) breach of fiduciary duty against
the Match Group directors who unanimously approved the MTCH
Separation, (iii) breach of contract (i.e., a provision of former
Match Group's charter), (iv) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and (v) tortious interference with contract
against IAC.

The complaint seeks various declarations and damages in an
unspecified amount.

On September 24, 2020, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the
complaint.

On January 8, 2021, instead of responding to the motions to
dismiss, the plaintiff, joined by another plaintiff, Boilermakers
National Annuity Trust, filed an amended complaint.

In addition, on January 7, 2021, another complaint challenging the
MTCH separation was filed against substantially the same defendants
in the same court.  

Construction Industry & Laborers Joint Pension Trust for Southern
Nevada Plan A v. IAC/InterActiveCorp et al. (Delaware Chancery
Court).

The two cases have been consolidated under the caption In re Match
Group, Inc. Derivative Litigation, No. 2020-0505.

In light of the competing complaints, the court has scheduled a
hearing for March 9, 2021 to determine who will serve as lead
plaintiff(s) and lead counsel for the plaintiff(s) in this
litigation.

IAC believes that the allegations in this litigation are without
merit and will continue to defend vigorously against them.

IAC/InterActiveCorp, together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
media and Internet company in the United States and
internationally. It operates through Match Group, ANGI
Homeservices, Video, Applications, and Publishing segments.
IAC/InterActiveCorp was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in New
York, New York.


ILLINOIS: Ross Plaintiffs Not Allowed to Revise Requests to Admit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Leave to Serve Revised Requests to Admit and Motion for Extension
of Time to Complete Discovery as to Certain Specified Items in the
lawsuit titled DEMETRIUS ROSS, et al., Plaintiffs v. GREG GOSSETT,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:15-CV-309-SMY-MAB (S.D. Ill.).

The matter is before the Court on the Motion for Protective Order
Regarding Certain Topics of Plaintiffs' Notice for Rule 30(b)(6)
Deposition filed by all Defendants, the Motion for Leave to Serve
Revised Requests to Admit filed by the Plaintiffs, and the Motion
for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery as to Certain Specified
Items filed by the Plaintiffs. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
636(b)(1)(A) and Amended Administrative Order No. 257, District
Judge Staci M. Yandle referred these three motions to the
Magistrate Judge for a ruling.

The Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the three motions on
February 2, 2021. The Defendants' motion for protective order was
denied on the record at the hearing and the Plaintiffs' two motions
were taken under advisement.

The class action concerns facility-wide shakedowns conducted in
2014 at four Illinois Department of Corrections prisons: Menard,
Illinois River, Big Muddy, and Lawrence. The Plaintiffs are inmates
and they contend the shakedowns were executed in a uniform manner
by the "Orange Crush" Tact Team in accordance with a plan that was
formulated by senior prison officials. The Plaintiffs further
contend that the shakedowns were conducted in an abusive and
unconstitutional fashion.

Judge Yandle granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
on March 26, 2020, and certified a class against the 22
administrative Defendants. She subsequently instructed the parties
to submit a joint proposed revised scheduling order, including
deadlines for discovery on the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims.
The parties proposed a deadline of September 7, 2020, for fact
discovery and a deadline of December 7, 2020, for expert discovery,
which were accepted by Judge Yandle in a scheduling order entered
on April 14, 2020.

The Defendants then requested a stay of discovery while they
pursued an appeal of the class certification order. The Plaintiffs
opposed the Defendants' request, arguing that a stay on all
discovery would "grind all progress to a halt" and simply prolong
the inevitable because fact discovery would have to take place
regardless of the outcome of the appeal. That is, even if class
certification was overturned, the Plaintiffs' individual claims
related to the shakedowns would still move forward. On July 21,
2020, Judge Yandle agreed to stay expert discovery but ordered fact
discovery to continue.

On September 1, 2020--six days before the deadline for fact
discovery--the Plaintiffs filed a motion asking to extend the
deadline.  Judge Yandle agreed to a slight extension and ordered
written discovery to be served by October 15, 2020, and all fact
discovery to be completed by December 15, 2020. Judge Yandle warned
the parties that the deadlines would not be continued "absent
extraordinary circumstances."

The Plaintiffs issued two sets of Requests to Admit, the first on
September 29 and the second on October 15, 2020, to each of the 22
class Defendants. In total, there were 178 Requests that required a
response from each Defendant individually. It amounted to 3,916
Requests. The Defendants asked for and were granted a protective
order and relieved of their obligation to respond to the Requests.

Magistrate Judge Beatty concluded that the Plaintiffs' shotgun
approach was inappropriate. The number of Requests--3,916 in
total--was excessive, particularly at this stage of the proceedings
after a massive amount of discovery had already been done. The
Requests did not reflect the discovery already obtained, were not
tailored to the specific Defendants, and were duplicative of
discovery already obtained.

On December 15, 2020--the deadline for all fact discovery--the
Plaintiffs filed motions seeking another extension of the deadline
for an unspecified duration so that they could conduct 32
additional depositions and issue to the 22 class Defendants against
whom the class was certified a collective total of 925 revised
Requests to Admit and 506 revised interrogatories. The Defendants
filed responses in opposition to both motions. The Plaintiffs filed
a reply in support of their motion to extend the discovery
deadline.

Magistrate Judge Beatty notes that a massive amount of discovery
has already taken place in the case. He holds that the Plaintiff's
last-minute wish list is eye-popping, given the timing of it and
the extent of what they are seeking on top of the mountains of
discovery already furnished. The Judge notes that they did not
articulate any extraordinary circumstances that justify extending
the discovery deadline. Nor did the Plaintiffs explain how they
have been diligent in pursuing discovery. As previously indicated,
the Plaintiffs conducted no discovery whatsoever for the first four
and a half months after the scheduling order was entered and had to
request an extension of time. Then, they waited until the last four
days of the extended discovery period to tell the Defendants they
wanted to take 32 more depositions.

In addition to the Plaintiffs' dilatoriness and lack of exceptional
circumstances, the Court also has concerns regarding the purpose of
the additional discovery the Plaintiffs want to conduct. It is not
clear or obvious to the Court what the importance of the discovery
is in resolving the issues. The volume of the last-minute discovery
the Plaintiffs seek is staggering. As the Defendants pointed out,
the 32 depositions the Plaintiffs now want to take is more than ten
times the number of depositions they noticed up during the entire
merits-based discovery period from April 2020 to December 15, 2020.
And it is more than the total number of depositions the Plaintiffs
took--26--over the course of the entire case.

Additionally, Magistrate Judge Beatty notes, the Plaintiffs have
long known about the individuals they want to depose. Twenty of
those individuals are named as Defendants in the operative
complaint but are not part of the group of 22 against whom the
class was certified. The Plaintiffs have known about some of these
individuals since the inception of the case in March 2015 and
others since at least October 2016, when the amended complaint was
filed. The other 12 individuals that the Plaintiffs want to depose
are IDOC medical officials. The Plaintiffs have known that medical
personnel were potential witnesses since April 2016, when the
Defendants filed their initial disclosures. And the Plaintiffs
learned the specific identity of these medical personnel on October
30, 2020. That left the Plaintiffs with 45 days until the discovery
cutoff on December 15, 2020, to notice up the depositions. But they
never did, Magistrate Judge Beatty observes. Rather, the Plaintiffs
waited until four days before discovery cutoff to tell defense
counsel that they wanted to depose the 12 medical officials and six
of the individual Defendants. And they waited until one day before
the discovery cutoff to say that they wanted to schedule
depositions for 14 other Defendants.

The Court was wholly unpersuaded by the reasons the Plaintiffs gave
as to why they waited until the eleventh hour to get the ball
rolling on deposing these 32 individuals. The Plaintiffs' main
contention was there was a misunderstanding between the
parties--they thought the Defendants did not object to conducting
depositions past the discovery deadline so long as the deponents
had been identified before the discovery cut-off. But that simply
does nothing to explain why the Plaintiffs waited until the waning
hours of discovery to divulge their intention to depose these
individuals when they could have done so much sooner, Magistrate
Judge Beatty opines.

In short, the Plaintiffs did not provide any good reason why they
could not have sought to depose these 32 individuals sooner,
Magistrate Judge Beatty points out.

The Plaintiffs also did not give the Court any reason to think that
all 32 depositions were necessary. The most they could offer is
that they were "trying to avoid trial by ambush." But it is clear
that the Plaintiffs are not completely in the dark as to what these
individuals will testify about. Simply put, when the Plaintiffs
were specifically asked why these depositions were necessary and
what new information they hoped to gain, they offered one
generality, without any concrete reasons or specifics, Magistrate
Judge Beatty adds.

Finally, Magistrate Judge Beatty holds, the Plaintiffs never tried
to negotiate with defense counsel or propose a number of
depositions less than 32. And they never gave the Court a
compromise position either. Once again, the Plaintiffs have taken
an all or nothing approach to this particular discovery issue.

As for the revised Requests to Admit, the Plaintiffs want to serve
37 Requests on all 22 Defendants, as well as, three additional
Requests for each of the four facilities on only "the sub-set of
Defendants likely to have knowledge about that specific facility"
(as Plaintiffs put it). All in all, it amounts to a collective
total of 925 Requests to Admit. As outlined, the Plaintiffs were
not particularly diligent in seeking to issue their original
Requests to Admit or the revised version. And the Court has
concerns regarding the form of these Requests and whether they will
actually serve a useful purpose.

The Court notes that the Plaintiffs have cleaved away
three-quarters of the Requests they originally served. They went
from a collective total of 3,916 Requests to a revised collective
total of 925. The Defendants assert the revised number is still
excessive. While 925 is certainly a lot, the Court is not
necessarily convinced that it is per se excessive given the number
of Defendants and the nature of the claims. However, there are
other problems with the Plaintiffs' Requests, Magistrate Judge
Beatty notes.

The Plaintiffs have been adamant in their briefs and at the hearing
that the purpose of their Requests is to take uncontested issues of
fact off the table at trial. But that assertion does not hold water
for many of the Requests, Magistrate Judge Beatty opines. He
insists that this is not the proper use of Requests to Admit.
Requests to Admit are intended to confirm facts already known to
both sides.

The Court still does not understand what purpose it serves to ask
all 22 Defendants to admit what happened at each facility. The
Plaintiffs did not offer any satisfactory explanation, Magistrate
Judge Beatty opines. And even if all 22 Defendants against whom the
class is served admit a Request, there are still some 500 other
Defendants still in the case who will not be bound by the
responses. Therefore, it cannot be determined at this point what
effect an admission from all 22 class Defendants will actually have
on issues at trial.

In considering the totality of the circumstances, particularly the
Plaintiffs' unexplained dilatoriness in pursuing their Requests to
Admit, the lack of exceptional circumstances, and the myriad
problems with the revised Requests, the Plaintiffs' motion for
leave to serve them must be denied, Magistrate Judge Beatty
concludes.

Magistrate Judge Beatty notes that there is an obvious benefit to
eliminating uncontested issues of fact and reducing the time spent
in trial. The Court is, therefore, willing to entertain a request
for leave to serve Requests to Admit from either side after fact
discovery is fully complete. Any such Requests must be carefully
drafted--simple, straightforward, and precise--must reflect the
evidence produced in the case, and must be directed only at the
appropriate parties. To the extent Requests are directed at all
Plaintiffs or all Defendants, counsel must have a clear and
defensible reason for doing so.

As a final matter, the parties are instructed that before filing
any future motions about discovery disputes, they are expected to
engage in the meet and confer process outlined in Magistrate Judge
Beatty's case management procedures. Namely, the parties must, in
good faith, confer or attempt to confer with one another regarding
the dispute. Simply put, the parties are expected to have actually
spoken to one another about the issue in dispute. Any future
discovery motion that does not satisfy this meet and confer process
will be summarily denied.

Additionally, the parties are further cautioned that, for any
future discovery disputes in the case, the Court will consider
imposing attorney fees and costs against the non-prevailing party.

Hence, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Serve Revised Requests
to Admit and Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery as
to Certain Specified Items are denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Feb. 18,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/24wfhpam from
Leagle.com.


IMMUNOVANT INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of April 20 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming April 20, 2021 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion in
the class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired Immunovant, Inc. f/k/a Health Sciences
Acquisitions Corporation ("HSAC", "Immunovant", or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: IMVT) securities between October 2, 2019 and February 1,
2021, inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you suffered a loss on your Immunovant investments or would like
to inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at https://www.glancylaw.com/cases/immunovant-inc/. You
can also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or via email at
shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn more about your rights.

On September 29, 2019, HSAC entered into an agreement with
Immunovant Sciences Ltd. ("Legacy Immunovant") to effect a merger
between the two entities (the "Merger").

Immunovant is developing IMVT-1401, a novel fully human monoclonal
antibody, which is Phase IIa clinical trials for the treatment of
myasthenia gravis ("MG") and thyroid eye disease ("TED"). The
Company has also completed initiation of Phase II clinical trials
of IMVT-1401 for the treatment of warm autoimmune hemolytic anemia
("WAIHA").

On February 2, 2021, the Company issued a press release
"announc[ing] a voluntary pause of dosing in its ongoing clinical
trials for IMVT-1401." The Company also disclosed that it "has
become aware of a physiological signal consisting of elevated total
cholesterol and LDL [low-density lipoproteins] levels in
IMVT-1401-treated patients" and "[o]ut of an abundance of caution,
the Company has decided to voluntarily pause dosing in ongoing
clinical studies in both TED and in [WAIHA], in order to inform
patients, investigators, and regulators as well as to modify the
monitoring program."

On this news, the Company's stock price fell $18.22 per share, or
42.08%, to close at $25.08 per share on February 2, 2021, thereby
injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) HSAC had performed inadequate due diligence into Legacy
Immunovant prior to the Merger, and/or ignored or failed to
disclose safety issues associated with IMVT-1401; (2) IMVT-1401 was
less safe than the Company had led investors to believe,
particularly with respect to treating TED and WAIHA; (3) the
foregoing foreseeably diminished IMVT-1401's prospects for
regulatory approval, commercial viability, and profitability; and
(4) as a result, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Immunovant securities during
the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than April 20,
2021 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles
Charles Linehan, 310-201-9150 or 888-773-9224
shareholders@glancylaw.com
www.glancylaw.com [GN]

INFINITY Q: Kirby McInerney Announces Securities Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
The law firm of Kirby McInerney LLP reminds investors that a class
action lawsuit has been filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York on behalf of those who acquired
Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund ("Infinity Q" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: IQDAX, IQDNX) securities from December 21, 2018 through
February 22, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period"). Investors have
until April 27, 2021 to apply to the Court to be appointed as lead
plaintiff in the lawsuit.

According to the lawsuit, defendants throughout the Class Period
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (1) Infinity Q's Chief Investment Officer made adjustments to
certain parameters within the third-party pricing model that
affected the valuation of the swaps held by the Fund; (2)
consequently, Infinity Q would not be able to calculate the Net
Asset Value ("NAV") correctly; (3) as a result, the previously
reported NAVs were unreliable; (4) because of the foregoing, the
Fund would halt redemptions and liquidate its assets; and (5) as a
result, the Prospectuses were materially false and/or misleading
and failed to state information required to be stated therein. When
the true details entered the market, the lawsuit claims that
investors suffered damages.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired Infinity Q securities, have
information, or would like to learn more about these claims, please
contact Thomas W. Elrod of Kirby McInerney LLP at 212-371-6600, by
email at investigations@kmllp.com, or by filling out this contact
form, to discuss your rights or interests with respect to these
matters without any cost to you.

Kirby McInerney LLP is a New York-based plaintiffs' law firm
concentrating in securities, antitrust, whistleblower, and consumer
litigation. The firm's efforts on behalf of shareholders in
securities litigation have resulted in recoveries totaling billions
of dollars. Additional information about the firm can be found at
Kirby McInerney LLP's website: http://www.kmllp.com.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules.

Contacts
Kirby McInerney LLP
Thomas W. Elrod, Esq.
212-371-6600
https://www.kmllp.com
investigations@kmllp.com [GN]

INT'L FLAVORS: Bid to Dismiss Jansen Putative Class Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. (IFF) said in its Form
10-K report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
on February 22, 2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020,
that the motion to dismiss  the putative class action suit
initiated by Marc Jansen, is pending.

On August 12, 2019, Jansen filed a putative securities class action
against IFF, its Chairman and CEO, and its then-CFO, in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The lawsuit was filed after IFF disclosed that preliminary results
of investigations indicated that Frutarom businesses operating
principally in Russia and Ukraine had made improper payments to
representatives of customers.

On December 26, 2019, the Court appointed a group of six investment
funds as lead plaintiff and Pomerantz LLP as lead counsel. On March
16, 2020, lead plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which added
Frutarom and certain former officers of Frutarom as defendants.

The amended complaint alleges, among other things, that defendants
made materially false and misleading statements or omissions
concerning IFF's acquisition of Frutarom, the integration of the
two companies, and the companies' financial reporting and results.


The amended complaint asserts claims under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, and under the
Israeli Securities Act-1968, against all defendants, and under
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against the
individual defendants, on behalf of a putative class of persons and
entities who purchased or otherwise acquired IFF securities on the
New York Stock Exchange between May 7, 2018 and August 12, 2019 and
persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired IFF
securities on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between October 9, 2018
and August 12, 2019.

The amended complaint seeks an award of unspecified compensatory
damages, costs, and expenses.

IFF, its officers, and Frutarom filed a motion to dismiss the case
on June 26, 2020.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

New York-based International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., together
with its subsidiaries, engages in the creation and manufacture of
flavor and fragrance products in the United States and
internationally.

INT'L FLAVORS: Court Stays Yehudai $20MM Bonus Related Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. said in its Form 10-K
report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
February 22, 2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020,
that the proceedings in the putative class action suit related to
the US $20 million bonus paid to Ori Yehudai, is stayed.

On March 11, 2020, an IFF shareholder filed a motion to approve a
class action in Israel against, among others, Frutarom, Yehudai,
and Frutarom's former board of directors, alleging that former
minority shareholders of Frutarom were harmed as a result of the US
$20 million bonus paid to Ori Yehudai.

The parties to this motion agreed to attempt to resolve the dispute
through mediation to take place regarding the aforesaid claim
against Yehudai, which as noted is still ongoing, during which the
proceedings relating to this motion are stayed.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

New York-based International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., together
with its subsidiaries, engages in the creation and manufacture of
flavor and fragrance products in the United States and
internationally.


INT'L FLAVORS: Securities Class Suits in Tel Aviv Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. said in its Form 10-K
report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
February 22, 2021, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020,
that the company continues to defend putative securities class
action suits in Tel Aviv District Court, Israel.

Two motions to approve securities class actions were filed in the
Tel Aviv District Court, Israel, in August 2019, similarly
alleging, among other things, false and misleading statements
largely in connection with IFF's acquisition of Frutarom and the
above-mentioned improper payments.

One motion ("Borg") asserts claims under the U.S. federal
securities laws against IFF, its Chairman and CEO, and its former
CFO. On November 8, 2020, IFF and its officers filed their response
to the Borg motion.

The other motion ("Oman") (following an initial amendment) asserted
claims under the Israeli Securities Act-1968 against IFF, its
Chairman and CEO, and its former CFO, and against Frutarom and
certain former Frutarom officers and directors, as well as claims
under the Israeli Companies Act-1999 against certain former
Frutarom officers and directors.

On October 4, 2020, the Oman plaintiff filed a motion to remove IFF
and its officers from the motion and to add factual allegations
from the U.S. amended complaint. Responses to the motion to amend
the Oman motion were filed during November 2020. The court granted
the motion to amend the Oman motion on February 17, 2021.

New York-based International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., together
with its subsidiaries, engages in the creation and manufacture of
flavor and fragrance products in the United States and
internationally.

IOWA HEALTH: McCall Allowed to Opt-Out of Class Settlement in Fox
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YVONNE MART FOX, GRANT NESHEIM, DANIELLE DUCKLEY, and
SHELLEY KITSIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM d.b.a. UNITYPOINT
HEALTH, Defendant, Case No. 18-cv-327-jdp (W.D. Wis.), Judge James
D. Peterson of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin allowed Kayla McCall to opt out of the proposed
settlement.

The proposed class action involves two data breaches in which, the
Plaintiffs allege, Defendant UnityPoint failed to protect their
personal data and the personal data of about 1.4 million others.
The Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion for final
approval of a proposed settlement of the action.  It is prepared to
approve the settlement, but an untimely opt-out request requires a
decision from the Court.

Ms. McCall says that she didn't receive notice of the proposed
settlement until after the Jan. 4, 2021 opt-out deadline, when the
notice was forwarded from her old address after some delay.  The
parties have briefed the issue as requested by the Court.

A district court has discretion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b) to allow a class member to opt out of a proposed
settlement after the deadline to do so.  The question is whether
the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

Judge Peterson allowed McCall to opt out of the settlement.  He
holds that UnityPoint may face some prejudice, because there are
now 68 rather than 67 class members who will not be bound by the
settlement.  A single additional opt-out from a class of 1.4
million members does not impose undue prejudice on UnityPoint.
Regarding the length of the delay, the Judge says McCall's response
was postmarked 19 days after the opt-out deadline, a significant
delay, but not patently unreasonable.

In addition, requiring McCall to bring the motion herself would be
needlessly formalistic and wasteful, the Judge opines.  He finds
that it would require McCall either to (1) appear in the action; or
(2) bring a new lawsuit against UnityPoint, wait for UnityPoint to
move to dismiss her claims as barred by the judgment in the case,
and then move for an extension.  If excusable neglect were a closer
question in the case, it might make sense to require McCall to make
her own motion.  But the question isn't close, so the Judge sees no
reason to force McCall to take these steps.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/38z65ptb from Leagle.com.


J.P. MORGAN: Court Dismisses Roeder's Amended Class Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID M. ROEDER, SUSANNE A. ROEDER, RODNEY SICKMANN,
DON COOKE, and MARK SCHAEFER, individually and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE
& CO., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-2400 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Lewis J. Liman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted Defendants J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s motion to dismiss the amended
class action complaint against them.

On Nov. 4, 1979, a group of armed Iranian militants scaled the wall
of the American Embassy compound in Tehran, Iran, capturing the
Embassy and taking 63 American citizens as hostages.  Shortly
thereafter, U.S. Charge d'affaires Bruce Laingen and two other
Americans were seized at the Iranian Foreign ministry.  For the
next 444 days, 52 of the 66 Americans continued to be held as
hostages.  The hostage takers, who were supported by the
provisional government of Iran, demanded that the United States
turn over the Shah of Iran as the price for the release of the
hostages.  The Shah was then in the United States for medical
treatment.  The Americans remained hostage until Jan. 20, 1981.
They were released on the date of Ronald Reagan's inauguration as
President.  Throughout their long captivity, the hostages were
blindfolded, tortured, taunted, and threatened with death.  The
impact on family members was also horrific.

The lawsuit seeks to recover from Chase for damages incurred as a
result of the seizure of the hostages and their delayed release.
The Plaintiffs include three former hostages: David M. Roeder, who
was Assistant Air Force Attache when he was taken hostage; Rodney
Sickmann, an enlisted Marine serving at the American Embassy in
Tehran when he was taken hostage; and Don Cooke, a Consular Officer
at the American Embassy in Tehran when he was taken hostage.  They
also include David M. Roeder's spouse, Susanne Roeder, and Mark
Schaefer, son of hostage Colonel Thomas E. Schaefer, the American
Defense and Air Attache at the American Embassy in Tehran when he
was taken hostage.

The Plaintiffs bring the action on behalf of themselves and as
representatives of a class of all Americans taken hostage from the
American Embassy in Tehran or from the Iranian Foreign Ministry in
1979, including the hostages' estates and successors, the hostages'
immediate family members at the time, and the estates and
successors of those immediate family members.

The persons alleged to have engaged in the conduct forming the
basis of the Complaint include David Rockefeller, who served as
President of Chase Manhattan Bank (a predecessor of J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co.) from 1960 to 1968 and Chairman and CEO of Chase
Manhattan Corporation from 1969 to 1981 and Joseph Verner Reed, who
served as Vice President of Chase Manhattan Corporation and
Assistant to Rockefeller from 1963 to 1981.  Other persons also
allegedly involved included Henry Kissinger, who had previously
served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State of the
United States and, as pertinent here, was Chairman of Chase's Board
of Advisers in 1979; John J. McCloy, former Chairman of Chase
Manhattan Bank and lawyer to the Shah and Chase Manhattan
Corporation; Robert F. Armao, a public relations agent for the
Shah; and Benjamin H. Kean, Joseph Reed's personal physician.

The Plaintiffs allege that Chase "fomented the seizure of American
hostages in Iran and then sabotaged the talks to free them."  They
claim that Chase had a profit motive in campaigning to have the
Shah admitted to the United States.  They allege that Chase had
financial interests in preserving the Iranian monarchy.  It
processed billions in dollar-denominated oil revenue for the
National Iranian Oil Company.  It handled the Shah's family fortune
in the Pahlavi Foundation. In 1975, it helped form the
International Bank of Iran, in which it owned a 35% share.  By
1979, Chase had syndicated more than $1.7 billion in loans for
Iranian public projects (the equivalent of about $5.8 billion in
2020).  Protecting those business interests meant protecting the
Shah.  In taking these actions to protect its business interests,
the Plaintiffs claim that Chase acted as an unregistered foreign
agent of the Iranian monarchy under the Foreign Agent Registration
Act ("FARA").

After the hostages were seized in November 1979, Plaintiffs allege
that Chase had a "new goal" of sabotaging the hostage talks because
of its "direct financial interest in the outcome of the Hostage
Talks."  The Plaintiffs allege that Chase knew that its actions on
behalf of the Shah would likely trigger an attack on the American
Embassy in Tehran.  They allege Chase actively monitored the
political situation in Iran closely and knew that the risk to
Americans had increased steadily and substantially since Feb. 14,
1979; it reduced its staff in the country to one secretary.

The Plaintiffs allege that it was a direct and proximate result of
Chase's actions to have the Shah admitted to the United States that
the hostages were captured.  They also allege that, as a direct and
proximate result of Chase's sabotage of the hostage talks, the
hostages were subjected to further prolonger captivity and torture,
and that "Chase purposefully and maliciously forced the hostages to
languish even longer in their captors' hands."

The Plaintiffs bring one federal law claim, for conspiracy to
impede or injure an officer of the United States in violation of 42
U.S.C. Section 1985(1), and the following eight state law claims:
negligence; negligence per se in connection with the Logan Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 953; negligence per se in connection with 18 U.S.C.
Section 372; negligence per se in connection with FARA, 22 U.S.C.
Sections 611-621; gross negligence; false imprisonment; intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

Chase moves, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss all
the claims in the amended class action complaint against them on
grounds of statute of limitations.

As an initial matter, Judge Liman opines that all of the
Plaintiffs' state law claims are prima facie time-barred.  The
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the state claims accrued upon injury
in 1981 and not discovery in 2019 and thus that, absent an
exception to the applicable statute of limitations, their claims
are time-barred.  In addition, the Plaintiffs' Section 1985(1)
claim was complete and accrued in January 1981 when the hostages
were released from imprisonment.  Because the statute of
limitations governing actions brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985
is three years, the Plaintiffs' federal claim is prima facie
time-barred.

Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants are equitably
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because the
Defendants prevented the timely filing of the action through
misrepresentations upon which the Plaintiffs relied.  The principle
of equitable tolling under federal law applicable to the
Plaintiffs' federal claim is similar to the principle of equitable
estoppel under New York law applicable to their state law claims.  
To toll the statute of limitations for a federal claim, a plaintiff
must establish (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.

The Judge opines that none of the Plaintiffs' allegations, viewed
individually or collectively, establish equitable estoppel of their
state law claims and equitable tolling of their federal claim.  He
holds that the fact that the Plaintiffs received the Project Eagle
papers but only after the limitations period expired cannot have
the effect of extending that limitations period.  Finally, the
Plaintiffs' allegations with respect to other alleged acts of
concealment fail because the Plaintiffs do not allege either that
they were "taken to prevent them from bringing a claim," or that
they induced the Plaintiffs not to bring a timely suit.

The Plaintiffs' attempt to secure equitable estoppel also fails for
a second reason: even assuming they saw the alleged
misrepresentations and relied on them, they have not demonstrated
how such reliance was reasonable and dissuaded them from learning
of their cause of action or timely bringing suit.  Finally, to meet
the standards for the application of both equitable estoppel and
equitable tolling, the Plaintiffs must allege that specific actions
by Defendants somehow kept them from becoming aware of the
existence of a cause of action or from timely bringing suit.  They
have not done so.

For these reasons, Judge Liman concludes that the Plaintiffs'
argument for tolling the statute of limitations must be rejected.
Therefore he granted the motion to dismiss and denied as moot the
Plaintiffs' remaining arguments.  The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 42 and to terminate the
action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/8rzn65hf from Leagle.com.


JACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY: Allen's Class Action Complaint Struck
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ASHLEY ALLEN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. JACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-178-MMH-JRK (M.D. Fla.), Judge Marcia
Morales Howard of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
of Florida, Jacksonville Division, struck the class action
complaint.

The cause is before the Court sua sponte.  The Plaintiff initiated
the instant action on Feb. 23, 2021, by filing a seven-count Class
Action Complaint.

Upon review, Judge Howard finds that the Complaint constitutes an
impermissible "shotgun pleading."  He explains that a shotgun
complaint contains "multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count
to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint."

As a result, most of the counts contain irrelevant factual
allegations and legal conclusions.  Consequently, in ruling on the
sufficiency of a claim, the Court is faced with the onerous task of
sifting out irrelevancies in order to decide for itself which facts
are relevant to a particular cause of action asserted.  In the
case, the Judge finds that Counts Two through Seven of the
Complaint incorporate by reference all allegations of all the
preceding counts.  Accordingly, she will strike the Complaint and
direct the Plaintiff to file a corrected complaint.

In addition, the Plaintiff invokes the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d) because at least
one class member is of diverse citizenship from one Defendant,
there are more than 100 Class members, and the aggregate amount in
controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs.
In support, the Plaintiff alleges that she is a citizen of
California, and Defendant Jacksonville University is an institution
of higher learning located in Jacksonville, Florida.

However, upon review of these allegations, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiff has inadequately pled the citizenship of Jacksonville
University.  Indeed, "Section 1332 does not mention institutions of
higher learning."  Although it appears likely that class action
diversity jurisdiction will be easily met, because she is striking
the Complaint and directing the Plaintiff to file a corrected
complaint as stated, the Judge will also direct the Plaintiff to
correct the jurisdictional allegation regarding the Defendant's
citizenship to clarify the record in the event of an appeal.

Accordingly, Judge Howard struck the Class Action Complaint.  The
Plaintiff will file a corrected complaint consistent with the
directives of her Order by March 12, 2021.  Failure to do so may
result in a dismissal of the action.  The Defendant will respond to
the corrected complaint in accordance with the requirements of Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/36k3dnxy from Leagle.com.


JARINC LTD: Settlement in Blose Suit Wins Preliminary Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado grants the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary settlement approval in
the lawsuit captioned NATHAN BLOSE, et al., on behalf of himself
and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. JARINC, LTD. d/b/a
Domino's Pizza, et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:18-cv-02184-RM-SKC
(D. Colo.).

Having reviewed the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary
Settlement Approval, including the Settlement Agreement attached
thereto as Exhibit 1, and the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint, Judge Raymond P. Moore granted them.

Under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge
Moore certified the following Proposed Class for settlement
purposes:

     All current and former traditional delivery drivers employed
     from August 24, 2015 to December 31, 2020 at Defendants'
     Domino's stores owned, operated, and/or controlled by
     Defendants.

     and

     All current and former on-demand delivery drivers employed
     from August 24, 2015 to December 31, 2020 at Defendants'
     Domino's stores owned, operated, and/or controlled by
     Defendants.

The Proposed Class is also certified, for settlement purposes, as a
collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Notice of Settlement and Claim Form and procedure set forth in
the Settlement Agreement for providing notice to the Class will
provide the best notice practicable, satisfies the notice
requirements of Rule 23(e), adequately advises the Proposed Class
of their rights under the settlement, and therefore, meets the
requirements of due process.  It is approved.

The proposed plan for mailing the Notice of Settlement and the
Claim form by first class mail and email to the Proposed Class
members' last known addresses is an appropriate method, reasonably
designed to reach all individuals who would be bound by the
settlement, and the proposed Notice of Settlement and notice plan
are the best practicable notice under the facts and circumstances
of the case. Likewise, the proposed plan of allowing the
Administrator to take reasonable measures to update contact
information is likewise appropriate. Further, given the length of
time that class members can make claims, a website regarding the
settlement, as described in the Agreement, is also appropriate.

The attorney fees associated with the Settlement (paid separately
from the class settlement fund), and the requested costs are also
provisionally approved. The fees and costs will be approved after
the final hearing occurs, taking into account any objections.

A Final Fairness Hearing will be held on August 17, 2021, at 10:00
a.m. Any objectors wishing to be heard through themselves or
counsel must comply with the terms of the Class Notice to submit
written objections and to appear at the Final Hearing to present
such objections.

Any pleadings in support of the proposed settlement will be filed
by 10 days before the Final Fairness Hearing.  In the event that
the settlement is not finally approved, or otherwise does not
become effective, the Parties will revert to their respective
positions as of before entering into the settlement as set forth in
their settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/44cfd68k from Leagle.com.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: AWP Suit in New Jersey Ongoing
-------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended January 3, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative Average Wholesale Price (AWP) related suit in New
Jersey.

Johnson & Johnson and several of its pharmaceutical subsidiaries
(the J&J AWP Defendants), along with numerous other pharmaceutical
companies, were named as defendants in a series of lawsuits in
state and federal courts involving allegations that the pricing and
marketing of certain pharmaceutical products amounted to fraudulent
and otherwise actionable conduct because, among other things, the
companies allegedly reported an inflated Average Wholesale Price
(AWP) for the drugs at issue. Payors alleged that they used those
AWPs in calculating provider reimbursement levels.

The plaintiffs in these cases included three classes of private
persons or entities that paid for any portion of the purchase of
the drugs at issue based on AWP, and state government entities that
made Medicaid payments for the drugs at issue based on AWP.

Many of these cases, both federal actions and state actions removed
to federal court, were consolidated for pre-trial purposes in a
multi-district litigation in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, where all claims against the J&J AWP
Defendants were ultimately dismissed.

The J&J AWP Defendants also prevailed in a case brought by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Other AWP cases have been resolved through court order or
settlement.

The case brought by Illinois was settled after trial. In New
Jersey, a putative class action based upon AWP allegations is
pending against Centocor, Inc. and Ortho Biotech Inc. (both now
Janssen Biotech, Inc.), Johnson & Johnson and ALZA Corporation.

All other cases have been resolved.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Bid to Dismiss ERISA-Related Class Suit Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended January 3, 2021, that the motion to dismiss
litigation related to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), is pending.

In January 2019, two ERISA class action lawsuits were filed by
participants in the Johnson & Johnson Savings Plan against Johnson
& Johnson, its Pension and Benefits Committee, and certain named
officers in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties by offering Johnson & Johnson stock as a Johnson & Johnson
Savings Plan investment option when it was imprudent to do so
because of failures to disclose alleged asbestos contamination in
body powders containing talc, primarily JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder.
Plaintiffs are seeking damages and injunctive relief.

In September 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In April
2020, the Court granted Defendants' motion but granted leave to
amend.

In June 2020, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and in July
2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

As of October 2020, briefing on Defendants' motion was complete.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Bid to Junk XARELTO Sales Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended January 3, 2021, that the motion to dismiss filed
in the purported class action suit related to improper marketing
and promotion of XARELTO(R), is pending.

In August 2015, two third-party payors filed a purported class
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana against Janssen Research & Development, LLC, Janssen
Ortho LLC, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson (as well as certain
Bayer entities), alleging that the defendants improperly marketed
and promoted XARELTO(R) as safer and more effective than less
expensive alternative medications while failing to fully disclose
its risks.

The complaint seeks damages.

In November 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Bid to Nix Talc-Related Suit in Illinois Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended January 3, 2021, that the motion to dismiss filed
by Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. (JJCI) in the purported class
action suit related to talc contained in JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder,
is pending.

In March 2018, a purported class action was filed in the Circuit
Court Third Judicial District Madison County, Illinois against
JJCI, alleging violations of state consumer fraud statutes based on
nondisclosure of alleged health risks associated with talc
contained in JOHNSON'S(R) Baby Powder.

The complaint seeks damages but does not allege personal injury.

In October 2020, JJCI moved to dismiss the complaint.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Dismissal of TRACLEER(R) Antitrust Suit Appealed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Johnson & Johnson said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 22, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended January 3, 2021, that the appeal made by the
plaintiffs in the class action suit related to TRACLEER(R) is still
pending.

In October 2018, two separate putative class actions were filed
against Actelion Pharmaceutical Ltd., Actelion Pharmaceuticals US,
Inc., and Actelion Clinical Research, Inc. in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland and United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.  

The complaints allege that Actelion violated state and federal
antitrust and unfair competition laws by allegedly refusing to
supply generic pharmaceutical manufacturers with samples of
TRACLEER(R).  

TRACLEER(R) is subject to a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy
required by the Food and Drug Administration, which imposes
restrictions on distribution of the product.  

In January 2019, the plaintiffs dismissed the District of Columbia
case and filed a consolidated complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.  

In October 2019, the Court granted Actelion's motion to dismiss the
amended complaint.

Plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Johnson & Johnson, together with its subsidiaries, researches and
develops, manufactures, and sells various products in the health
care field worldwide. It operates in three segments: Consumer,
Pharmaceutical, and Medical Devices. The company was incorporated
in 1887 and is based in New Brunswick, New Jersey.


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Perrone ERISA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHAEL PERRONE, TOM TARANTINO, and ROCHELLE ROSEN,
Plaintiffs v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al., Defendants, Civil Action
No. 19-00923 (FLW) (D.N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

In the consolidated class action, Plaintiffs Perrone, Tarantino,
and Rosen, who are all participants in the Johnson & Johnson
Savings Plan, assert violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") by Defendants Johnson & Johnson
("J&J"), Peter Fasolo, and Dominic Caruso.  The Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to participants
in the Johnson & Johnson Savings Plan, the Johnson & Johnson
Savings Plan for Union Represented Employees, and the Johnson &
Johnson Retirement Savings Plan, because J&J's senior leadership,
including Fasolo and Caruso, have been aware for decades that J&J's
talc-based products, including J&J's Baby Powder, contain asbestos
and concealed that information from investors, resulting in an
artificial inflation of the value of the Company's stock.

In a prior opinion, dated April 29, 2020, Judge Wolfson granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint and gave the
Plaintiffs leave to amend their claims.  The Plaintiffs filed an
Amended Complaint.

Like in their prior complaint, the Amended Complaint alleges that
the Defendants had the "opportunity to correct the record and make
the truth about asbestos in Johnson & Johnson's talc products known
to the public" and if they had done so, "the Plans' participants
could have avoided millions of dollars in purchases of artificially
inflated J&J shares, and subsequent losses in the value of the J&J
stock in their Plan accounts when the truth was revealed to the
market ("corrective disclosure theory")."  Thus, the Plaintiffs
allege that those securities filings were "not merely
communications made by J&] officers in their corporate capacity,
but by ERISA fiduciaries in their fiduciary capacity to the extent
that those filings were made part of fiduciary communications to
Plan participants.

As an alternative to disclosure, the Plaintiffs also allege,
referred to as the "cash buffer theory," that the Defendants could
have used the unitized nature of the Plans' stock funds to increase
the cash buffer of the funds rather than invest in new stock
purchases until such time as the stock was no longer artificially
inflated.  They explain that under the Plans' terms "the Employee
Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") component of the Plan is designed to
invest primarily in Employer Shares."  Therefore, they aver that
the Defendants could have directed the Plans to hold incoming ESOP
assets in cash until J&J stock was no longer artificially
inflated.

Now, the Defendants, once again, move to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  They also
seek to strike the Plaintiffs' jury demand.  The Plaintiffs oppose
the motion.

As noted, the Plaintiffs allege two different alternate actions:
the corrective disclosure theory and the cash buffer theory.

The Corrective Disclosure Theory

The Defendants challenge the Plaintiffs' corrective disclosure
theory on two bases.  First, they assert that issuing a corrective
disclosure in a regular SEC filing is not a viable alternative,
because it is not an action that the Individual Defendants could
have taken in their fiduciary capacities.  Further, they assert
that, even if issuing a corrective disclosure was a viable
alternative, it does not satisfy the second prong of the
Dudenhoffer test, because it is not plausible that a prudent
fiduciary in the same position could have concluded that it would
cause more harm than good.

The Plaintiffs argue that ERISA fiduciaries have a duty under ERISA
to disclose nonpublic information about a plan sponsor, even if
that information was obtained in the fiduciary's capacity as a
corporate executive, and therefore, the Defendants should have
issued a corrective disclosure revealing the alleged truth about
the talc in J&J's products.  They acknowledge that in the Prior
Opinion, Judge Wolfon held that issuing a corrective disclosure was
not a viable alternative action under Dudenhoeffer, but they argue
that "given the newly pleaded allegations showing that the
Defendants intentionally linked their securities disclosures with
their ERISA-covered fiduciary communications, the Plaintiffs
respectfully submit that the failure to disclose non-public
information is subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties in the case."
In other words, they reason that by incorporating J&J's securities
filings "into plan-related documents," i.e., the Summary Plan
Description and Prospectus, issuing a corrective securities
disclosure, or failing to issue such a disclosure, is no longer "a
purely corporate" act.

Judge Wolfson remains unconvinced.  In their attempt to cure that
deficiency, the Plaintiffs have not identified a new alternative
action; rather, they now seek to reconstrue what the Judge
previously held was a corporate act, i.e., issuing a corrective SEC
disclosure, as a fiduciary action.  The crux of the alternative
action asserted by the Plaintiffs has not changed: the Amended
Complaint, like its predecessor, alleges that "a proper disclosure
could have, and should have, been made in the regular course of
Johnson & Johnson's securities filings" and that "making a
corrective disclosure once it became inevitable that the public
would learn about the asbestos in the talc powder was an
alternative action that the Defendants could have taken that would
have been entirely consistent with the securities laws and which no
prudent fiduciary could have viewed as more likely to harm the Plan
than to help it."

Neither her instant Opinion nor her Prior Opinion are intended to
foreclose the possibility that the Plaintiffs may allege a duty of
prudence based on insider information; rather, the alleged
alternative identified -- issuing a corrective disclosure in a
regular SEC filing -- is inconsistent with ERISA's functional
approach to fiduciary liability because it would have required the
Defendants to take an action which could only have been taken
outside of their fiduciary capacity.  Accordingly, the Judge finds,
as she did on the prior motion to dismiss, that issuing a
corrective SEC disclosure revealing the alleged truth about the
over inflation of J&J stock and/or the asbestos in the company's
talc products, is not a viable alternative action because it is not
one which could be taken in a fiduciary capacity, but only in a
corporate one.

The Cash Buffer Theory

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' cash buffer theory must
be rejected, because a prudent fiduciary could have concluded that
diverting new contributions would have done more harm than good.
First, they contend that they would have been required to issue a
public disclosure explaining why the fund was no longer investing
in J&J stock, and such a disclosure would have caused the Company's
stock prices to drop, negatively impacting the Plans' funds.
Alternatively, the Defendants argue that even if they were not
expressly required to disclose the precise reason for increasing
the cash buffer, i.e., the alleged asbestos in J&J's talc products,
increasing the Plans' cash buffers would have caused market
speculation and a resulting decline in stock price.  Finally, they
assert that even absent a decrease in the Company's stock price,
increasing the cash buffer could have harmed the fund by creating
an "investment drag," and other courts have rejected similar
arguments based on the possibility that increasing an ESOP plan's
cash reserves "reduces the return of the stock portion of the fund
and hurts current investors."

In response, the Plaintiffs argue that increasing the Plans' cash
holdings would not have required disclosure, either under the
federal securities laws or under ERSA.  They maintain that, unlike
when an ESOP freezes trading activity entirely, "redirecting
cash-and-stock purchases into cash-only purchases, while keeping
the ESOP open for continued trading activity" does not require
disclosure.  The Plaintiffs also challenge the Defendants' position
on "investment drag," noting that "only two district courts have
embraced this theory; neither is controlling authority in the
case."  Further, the Plaintiffs emphasize that the probability of
'investment drag' is minimal; the amount of harm caused to the ESOP
if the stock price goes up temporarily is also minimal, because the
ESOP would still closely track Johnson & Johnson stock, because the
enormous size of the ESOP's stock holdings would dwarf any increase
in cash holdings that would occur.  Finally, they remark that if
the cash buffer alternative is not viable, then no action would
satisfy the more-harm-than-good test, and ESOP fiduciaries are
essentially immune from liability.

Judge Wolfson finds that increasing the fund's cash buffer would
have triggered a disclosure under both ERISA and the federal
securities laws.  ERISA contains a number of reporting and
disclosure requirements.  Relevant in the case, ERISA requires that
plan administrators provide notice of blackout periods where plan
participants' rights, such as the right to direct or diversify
assets credited to their accounts will be either temporarily
suspended, limited, or restricted for more than three consecutive
business days.  Moreover, the blackout notice is required to
provide "the reasons for the blackout period."  Further
complicating matters, the federal securities laws seemingly would
have prevented the Defendants from making a limited disclosure to
only the ERISA plan participants.

Indeed, the Judge opines, under the securities regulations,
whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses
any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its
securities the issuer is also required to simultaneously make a
disclosure to the public at large.  Failing to make a public
disclosure could have exposed Defendants to liability under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Accordingly, she says if the Defendants
opted to increase the Plans' cash buffers, they would have been
required to reveal to the public-at-large that they were doing so,
and to explain that they were doing so because the Company's stock
was artificially inflated and/or that J&J's talc based products
contain asbestos.  In essence, increasing the cash buffer -- like
issuing a corrective disclosure -- would have required the Company
to reveal the alleged truth about the talc in its products.

"More Harm Than Good"

The Plaintiffs allege that Dudenhoeffer's "more harm than good"
standard is satisfied because by the outset of the class period the
disclosure of the truth about J&J's talc products was inevitable in
light of the increasing number of lawsuits filed against J&J, and
the discovery process attendant to such proceedings.  In light of
this inevitability, they allege that corrective disclosure would
not have done more harm than good to the Plans or their
participants.

Because disclosure would have been required, Judge Wolfson finds
that a prudent fiduciary could have concluded that the disclosure
would have resulted in a drop of the Company's stock price and thus
would have done "more harm than good."  Notably, she finds that the
Plaintiffs have not tied their economic theories to
context-specific allegations which quantify the hypothetical
economic effect of making an earlier disclosure as it applies to
J&J's stock, and she finds that they must do so in order to satisfy
the pleading standard.  In so finding, she is not imposing a
heightened pleading standard; however, the Plaintiffs must do more
than make assertions based on general economic studies regarding
the market's response to fraud.

For these reasons, the Judge will grant the Plaintiffs one last
opportunity to amend their complaint and incorporate
context-specific allegations regarding J&J, which could demonstrate
that increasing the Plans' cash buffer would not have done more
harm than good.  Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Complaint is
dismissed, because they have failed to allege that a prudent
fiduciary could not have viewed the alternative action as doing
"more harm than good."

Based on the foregoing, Judge Wolfson granted the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed without prejudice the Plaintiffs'
Complaint.  The Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege an
alternative action that a prudent fiduciary in the same
circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund
than to help it.  However, the Judge permitted the Plaintiffs the
opportunity to re-plead their allegations with respect to more harm
than good within 30 days from the date of the accompanying Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ykf4vxf2 from Leagle.com.


KRAFT HEINZ: Facing Union Asset Management Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
The Kraft Heinz Company said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 26, 2020, that the Kraft Heinz
Company and certain of its current and former officers and
directors are currently defendants in a consolidated securities
class action lawsuit pending in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois: Union Asset Management
Holding AG, et al. v. The Kraft Heinz Company, et al.

The consolidated amended class action complaint, which was filed on
August 14, 2020 and also names 3G Capital, Inc. and several of its
subsidiaries and affiliates ("3G Entities") as defendants, asserts
claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder,
based on allegedly materially false or misleading statements and
omissions in public statements, press releases, investor
presentations, earnings calls, Company documents, and SEC filings
regarding the Company's business, financial results, and internal
controls, and further alleges the 3G Entities engaged in insider
trading and misappropriated the Company's material, non-public
information.

The plaintiffs seek damages in an unspecified amount, attorneys'
fees, and other relief.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Kraft Heinz Company manufactures and markets food and beverage
products in the United States, Canada, Europe, and internationally.
Its products include condiments and sauces, cheese and dairy
products, meals, meats, refreshment beverages, coffee, and other
grocery products. The company was formerly known as H.J. Heinz
Holding Corporation and changed its name to The Kraft Heinz Company
in July 2015. The Kraft Heinz Company was founded in 1869 and is
headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

KRAFT HEINZ: Osborne Suit v. Employee Benefits Board Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Kraft Heinz Company said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 26, 2020, that the company's
Employee Benefits Administration Board continues to defend a class
action suit entitled, Osborne v. Employee Benefits Administration
Board of Kraft Heinz, et al.

The company's Employee Benefits Administration Board and certain of
The Kraft Heinz Company's current and former officers and employees
are currently defendants in an Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) class action lawsuit, Osborne v. Employee Benefits
Administration Board of Kraft Heinz, et al., which is pending in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.

Plaintiffs in the lawsuit purport to represent a class of current
and former employees who were participants in and beneficiaries of
various retirement plans which were co-invested in a commingled
investment fund known as the Kraft Foods Savings Plan Master Trust
during the period of May 4, 2017 through February 21, 2019.

An amended complaint was filed on June 28, 2019. The amended
complaint alleges violations of Section 502 of ERISA based on
alleged breaches of obligations as fiduciaries subject to ERISA by
allowing the Master Trust to continue investing in the company's
common stock, and alleges additional breaches of fiduciary duties
by current and former officers for their purported failure to
monitor Master Trust fiduciaries.

The plaintiffs seek damages in an unspecified amount, attorneys'
fees, and other relief.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

The Kraft Heinz Company manufactures and markets food and beverage
products in the United States, Canada, Europe, and internationally.
Its products include condiments and sauces, cheese and dairy
products, meals, meats, refreshment beverages, coffee, and other
grocery products. The company was formerly known as H.J. Heinz
Holding Corporation and changed its name to The Kraft Heinz Company
in July 2015. The Kraft Heinz Company was founded in 1869 and is
headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

LEIDOS HOLDINGS: Morton Sues Over Decline in Securities Value
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony G. Morton, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. LEIDOS HOLDINGS, INC., ROGER A. KRONE, and
JAMES C. REAGAN, Case No. 1:21-cv-01911 (S.D.N.Y., March 4, 2021),
is brought on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired Leidos securities between May 4, 2020 and
February 23, 2021, inclusive; and to pursue claims against the
Defendants under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with regard to
materially false and/or misleading statements, and to the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities.

On February 16, 2021, Spruce Point Capital Management LLC
published a research report, alleging, among other things that
"Leidos is potentially covering up at least $100m of fictitious
sales, mischaracterizing $355 - $367m of international revenue."
The report also alleged that the Company was "concealing numerous
product defects from investors, notably faulty explosive detection
systems at airports and borders." On this news, the Company's share
price fell $2.58, or 2.4%, to close at $105.22 per share on
February 16, 2021, on unusually heavy trading volume.

On February 23, 2021, Leidos announced its fourth quarter and full
year 2020 financial results in a press release. Therein, the
Company reported $89 million revenue related to the SD&A businesses
for the fourth quarter, meaning that after two full quarters, the
acquisition generated only $163 million in sales (or $326 million
annualized), falling well short of projected $500 million sales.
The Company expected cash flow of $850 million, well below analyst
estimates of $1.083 billion. On this news, the Company's stock
price fell $10.29, or 9.91%, to close at $93.51 per share on
February 23, 2021.

On February 24, 2021, Spruce Point highlighted that Leidos had
"materially expanded" the risk disclosures in its annual report for
the year ended December 31, 2020. Spruce Point tweeted: "We believe
it is validating all the major points of our report." On this news,
the Company's stock price fell $3.13, or 3.3%, to close at $90.38
per share on February 24, 2021, on unusually heavy trading volume.

The complaint alleges that the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that the purported benefits of the Company's
acquisition of L3Harris' Security Detection & Automation businesses
were significantly overstated; (2) that Leidos' products suffered
from numerous product defects, including faulty explosive detection
systems at airports, ports, and borders; (3) that, as a result of
the foregoing, the Company's financial results were significantly
overstated; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing, the
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis. As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts
and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of
the Company's securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members
have suffered significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased Leidos securities during the Class Period.

Leidos is a science, engineering, and information technology
company that provides services and solutions in the defense,
intelligence, homeland security, civil and health markets, both
domestically and internationally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory B. Linkh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite. 530
          New York, NY 10169
          Phone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          Email: glinkh@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Phone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160


MAIN DRAG MUSIC: Hedges Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Main Drag Music Inc.
The case is styled as Donna Hedges, on behalf of herself and all
other persons similarly situated v. Main Drag Music Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01915 (S.D.N.Y., March 4, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Main Drag -- https://maindragmusic.com/ -- is an independent
musical instrument and supply store, repair shop, and event space
in NYC.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18th Street, Suite Phr
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


MAYES EDUCATION: Southern District of New York Tosses Hedges Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the case, DONNA HEDGES, on
behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. MAYES EDUCATION, INC., Defendant, Case No. 20 CV
8583-LTS-RWL (S.D.N.Y.), with prejudice as to the named Plaintiff
and without prejudice as to all other Plaintiffs and without costs
to either party.

The attorneys for the parties have advised the Court that the
putative class action has been or will be settled.

The dismissal is without prejudice to restoration of the action to
the calendar of the undersigned if settlement is not achieved
within 30 days of the date of the Order.  If a party wishes to
reopen the matter or extend the time within which it may be
settled, the party must make a letter application before the 30-day
period expires.

The parties are advised that if they wish the Court to retain
jurisdiction in the matter for purposes of enforcing any settlement
agreement, they will submit the settlement agreement to the Court
to be so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2bevmcnm from Leagle.com.


MCKINSEY & COMPANY: Board of County Suit Removed to W.D. Oklahoma
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned as Board of County Commissioners of Kay County,
on behalf of itself and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v. McKinsey & Company Inc, Case No. CJ-20-00012 was removed from
the District Court of Kay County, to the U.S. District Court for
Western District of Oklahoma on March 3, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:21-cv-00176-SLP to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as 367 Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury.

McKinsey & Company -- https://www.mckinsey.com/ -- is an American
worldwide management consulting firm, founded in 1926 by University
of Chicago professor James O. McKinsey, that advises on strategic
management to corporations, governments, and other
organizations.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradley C West, Esq.
          Terry W West, Esq.
          THE WEST LAW FIRM
          124 W Highland St
          Shawnee, OK 74801
          Phone: (405) 275-0040
          Fax: (405) 275-0052
          Email: brad@thewestlawfirm.com
                 terry@thewestlawfirm.com

               - and -

          Curtis N Bruehl, Esq.
          THE BRUEHL LAW FIRM PLLC
          14005 N Eastern Ave
          Edmond, OK 73013
          Phone: (405) 657-1221
          Fax: (405) 509-6268
          Email: cbruehl@bruehllaw.com

               - and -

          Harrison C Lujan, Esq.
          FULMER SILL PLLC
          1101 N Broadway Ave, Suite 102
          Oklahoma City, OK 73103
          Phone: (405) 510-0077
          Fax: (405) 510-0077
          Email: hlujan@fulmersill.com

               - and -

          James D Sill, Esq.
          SILL BEADLES JOHNSON BISCONE & WHITE
          P O Box 3759
          Shawnee, OK 74802
          Phone: (405) 275-0060
          Fax: (405) 275-8419

               - and -

          Matthew J Sill, Esq.
          SILL LAW GROUP PLLC
          1101 N BroadwayM Suite 102
          Oklahoma City, OK 73103
          Phone: (405) 509-6300
          Fax: (405) 509-6268
          Email: Matt@sill-law.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Jeffrey A Curran, Esq.
          Kyle D Evans, Esq.
          Robert G McCampbell, Esq.
          GABLE & GOTWALS-OKC
          211 N Robinson Ave, 15th Fl
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Phone: (405) 235-5537
          Fax: (405) 235-2875
          Email: jcurran@gablelaw.com
                 kevans@gablelaw.com
                 rmccampbell@gablelaw.com


MELVIN & MELVIN: Shepard Files FDCPA Suit in W.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Melvin & Melvin,
PLLC. The case is styled as Jean Shepard, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Melvin & Melvin, PLLC,
Case No. 6:21-cv-06213 (W.D.N.Y., March 4, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Melvin & Melvin, PLLC -- https://www.melvinlaw.com/ -- is a full
service law firm that has been serving the people of Central New
York since 1921.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN, LLC–NJ
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          P.O. Box 07712
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (732) 695-3282
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses Brown Civil Suit v. MDOC With Prejudice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Terrence G. Berg of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, Southern Division, dismissed with prejudice
the case, ANTRELL V. BROWN, a/k/a ISLAMIC ALI, Plaintiff v. STATE
OF MICHIGAN, STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, HEIDI E. WASHINGTON,
and MACOMB ADMINISTRATION, Defendants, Case No. 20-CV-13402-TGB-DRG
(E.D. Mich.).

Plaintiff Brown, a state prisoner also known as Islamic Ali,
recently filed a pro se civil rights complaint.  The Plaintiff is
incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility in Lenox Township,
Michigan.  The Defendants are the State of Michigan, the Michigan
Department of Corrections ("MDOC") and its director, Heidi E.
Washington, and the Macomb Administration.

The complaint and exhibits indicate that Brown is confined in a
segregation unit at the Macomb Correctional Facility.  He appears
to be trying to bring a class action on behalf of other inmates
similarly situated.  The Court understands Brown to be alleging
that the Defendants have deprived him and other similarly situated
prisoners with adequate access to the prison library since March
2020, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Specifically, Brown contends that, prison officials initially
granted access to the library only to wealthy inmates and failed to
provide the same services and benefits to the poorer prisoners.
After four months, officials granted limited access to the library
only to prisoners who were engaged in ongoing litigation.  Prison
officials withheld certain legal materials requested by prisoners
in segregation.  Brown asserts that there has been unequal access
to legal services and that prison officials have arbitrarily and
capriciously limited the legal research capabilities of segregated
prisoners.

Brown's second and final claim is that the Defendants have treated
prisoners in general segregation to harsher penalties than
prisoners in a makeshift segregated housing unit known as Block 5.
According to Brown, the prisoners in Block 5 have access to store
items, and they enjoy privileges, benefits, and opportunities that
prisoners in the general segregation unit do not have.

Brown seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief from
Defendants in their personal and official capacities.  He cites
various provisions of both the federal and Michigan state
constitutions as providing a basis for relief.

Judge Berg finds that the first two Defendants named by Brown are
the State of Michigan and MDOC.  But the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against a state or one of its agencies or departments unless
the state has consented to suit.  Therefore, the State of Michigan
and MDOC are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and
Brown's claims against them are legally frivolous and fail to state
a claim.

The third Defendant named in Brown's Complaint is Heidi E.
Washington, Director of MDOC.  Neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under Section
1983.  Therefore, the Judge holds that Brown cannot state a claim
against Washington in her official capacity.

The only other Defendant named in Brown's Complaint is the
Administration at the Macomb Correctional Facility.  A prison's
administrative department, however, is not an entity that can be
sued under Section 1983, either because it is not an entity capable
of being sued or because it is not a person under Section 1983, as
defined by the statute and case law.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Berg concludes that Brown's Complaint
is legally frivolous and fails to state any plausible claim for
which relief may be granted.  The Complaint also seeks relief from
the Defendants who are immune from suit.  Accordingly, the Judge
dismissed the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b).  He also certified that an appeal from the Order would be
frivolous and could not be taken in good faith.  The Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2p3n22vz from Leagle.com.


MOUSEFLOW INC: Deadline to Answer Sacco Suit Extended to March 17
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRIAN SACCO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MOUSEFLOW, INC., Defendant, Case
No. 2:20-cv-02330-TLN-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge Troy L. Nunley of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California extended
the deadline for the Defendant to respond to the First Amended
Class Action Complaint by 14 days, from March 3, 2021, to March 17,
2021.

Plaintiff Sacco and Mouseflow have stipulated to extend the
deadline for Mouseflow to respond to Mr. Sacco's FAC.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/z4f37385 from Leagle.com.


MULTIPLAN CORPORATION: Pomerantz Law Reminds of April 26 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has been filed
against MultiPlan Corporation f/k/a Churchill Capital Corp. III
("Churchill III" or the "Company") (NYSE: MPLN; MPLN.WS; CCXX;
CCXX.WS; CCXX.U) and certain of its officers, directors, and
sponsors. The class action, filed in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, and docketed under
21-cv-01965, is on behalf of a class consisting of: (i) all
purchasers of Churchill III securities between July 12, 2020 and
November 10, 2020, inclusive (the "Class Period"); and (ii) all
holders of Churchill III Class A common stock entitled to vote on
Churchill III's merger with and acquisition of Polaris Parent Corp.
and its consolidated subsidiaries (collectively, "MultiPlan")
consummated in October 2020 (the "Merger").

If you are a shareholder who purchased Churchill III securities
during the Class Period and/or a holder of Churchill III Class A
common stock entitled to vote on the Merger, you have until April
26, 2021 to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the
class. A copy of the Complaint can be obtained at
www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action, contact Robert S.
Willoughby at newaction@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Churchill III was formed in October 2019 as a blank check company.
A blank check company is sometimes referred to as a special purpose
acquisition vehicle, or "SPAC," and does not initially have any
operations or business of its own. Rather, it raises money from
investors in an initial public offering and then uses the proceeds
from the offering to acquire a business or operational assets,
usually from a private company that does not publicly report
financial or operating results. As a result, investors in blank
check companies rely on the skill, transparency, and honesty of the
blank check company's sponsor to spend the offering proceeds to
acquire a fundamentally sound target company that offers attractive
risk-adjusted returns for investors.

On or about February 14, 2020, Churchill III completed its initial
public offering, selling 110 million ownership units to investors
for gross proceeds of $1.1 billion. Each unit was priced at $10 and
consisted of one share of Class A common stock and one-fourth of
one warrant to purchase Class A shares. Each whole warrant entitled
the holder to purchase one share of Churchill III Class A common
stock at $11.50 per share.

In July 2020, Churchill III announced that it had entered into a
preliminary agreement, subject to shareholder approval, to merge
with MultiPlan, a New York-based data analytics end-to-end cost
management solutions provider to the U.S. healthcare industry.
MultiPlan's customers include large national insurance companies,
provider-sponsored health plans, bill review companies,
Taft-Hartley plans, and other entities that pay medical bills in
the commercial healthcare, government, workers' compensation, auto,
medical, and dental markets.

On October 7, 2020, shareholders voted to approve the Merger at a
special shareholders meeting.

The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading because Defendants made false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and compliance policies. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) MultiPlan
was losing tens of millions of dollars in sales and revenues to
Naviguard, a competitor created by one of MultiPlan's largest
customers, UnitedHealthcare, which threatened up to 35% of the
Company's sales and 80% of its levered cash flows by 2022; (ii)
sales and revenue declines in the quarters leading up to the Merger
were not due to "idiosyncratic" customer behaviors as represented,
but rather due to a fundamental deterioration in demand for
MultiPlan's services and increased competition, as payors developed
competing services and sought alternatives to eliminating excessive
healthcare costs; (iii) MultiPlan was facing significant pricing
pressures for its services and had been forced to materially reduce
its take rate in the lead up to the Merger by insurers, who had
expressed dissatisfaction with the price and quality of MultiPlan's
services and balanced billing practices, causing the Company to cut
its take rate by up to half in some cases; (iv) as a result of all
the foregoing, MultiPlan was set to continue to suffer from
revenues and earnings declines, increased competition, and
deteriorating pricing dynamics following the Merger; (v) as a
result of all the foregoing, MultiPlan was forced to seek continued
revenue growth and to improve its competitive positioning through
pricey acquisitions, including through the purchase of HST for $140
million at a premium price from a former MultiPlan executive only
one month after the Merger; (vi) as a result of all the foregoing,
Churchill III investors had grossly overpaid for the acquisition of
MultiPlan in the Merger, and MultiPlan's business was worth far
less than represented to investors; and (vii) as a result of all
the foregoing, the Company's public statements were materially
false and misleading at all relevant times.

On November 11, 2020, just one month after the close of the Merger,
short research investment firm Muddy Waters published a report on
Churchill III titled "MultiPlan: Private Equity Necrophilia Meets
The Great 2020 Money Grab" (the "Muddy Waters Report"). The Muddy
Waters Report was based on extensive non-public sources such as
interviews with former MultiPlan executives and other industry
experts, as well as proprietary analysis. The Muddy Waters Report
revealed that MultiPlan was in the process of losing its largest
client, UnitedHealthcare, which was estimated to cost the Company
up to 35% of its revenues and 80% of its levered free cash flow
within two years.

According to the Muddy Waters Report, MultiPlan was in significant
financial decline because of its fundamentally flawed business
model, which profited from excessively high healthcare costs.
UnitedHealth had purportedly launched a competitor, Naviguard, to
reduce its business with MultiPlan and bring the over-priced and
conflicted services offered by MultiPlan in-house. The Muddy Waters
Report also accused MultiPlan of obscuring its deteriorating
financial position in presentations to investors by, among other
things, manipulating cash reserves to show inflated earnings
figures in the years leading up to the Merger. The Muddy Waters
Report also stated that MultiPlan had suffered from material,
undisclosed pricing pressures that had caused it to slash the "take
rate" it charged customers in half in some instances and falsely
characterized revenue declines as "idiosyncratic" when in fact they
were due to sustained, negative pricing trends afflicting
MultiPlan's business.

The Muddy Waters Report further stated that MultiPlan's four
previous private equity firm owners had "loot[ed] the business" for
cash in the lead up to the Merger. According to the Muddy Waters
Report, the sale to Churchill III was necessitated because
MultiPlan's private equity owners could not find anyone else
willing to buy the failing business after these deep cuts, which
had resulted in deteriorating service quality and increased
customer complaints. The Muddy Waters Report quoted two former
MultiPlan executives who spoke about the private equity stewardship
of the Company right before the Merger, which had purportedly left
Churchill III's unwitting shareholders "hold[ing] the bag."

The Muddy Waters Report stated that the decline in MultiPlan's
sales left the Company "no choice but to try to buy some form of
revenue growth to mask eroding fundamentals." Indeed, MultiPlan had
just recently announced the acquisition of healthcare technology
company HST for $140 million, which performed similar functions to
those offered by Naviguard. The Muddy Waters Report described HST
as "an attempt to buy an inferior, significantly smaller Naviguard
stand-in, and at a premium price" from a former MultiPlan
executive.

As a result of this news, the price of Churchill III securities
plummeted. By November 12, 2020, the price of Churchill III Class A
common stock fell to a low of just $6.12 per share, nearly 40%
below the price at which shareholders could have redeemed their
shares at the time of the shareholder vote on the Merger.

The Pomerantz Firm, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Paris is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in the areas
of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation. Founded
by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the class
action bar, the Pomerantz Firm pioneered the field of securities
class actions. Today, more than 80 years later, the Pomerantz Firm
continues in the tradition he established, fighting for the rights
of the victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members.

CONTACT:
Robert S. Willoughby
Pomerantz LLP
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com
888-476-6529 ext. 7980 [GN]

MUSCULOSKELETAL INSTITUTE: Fla. Court Stays Stoll Data Breach Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida grants
the Defendant's motion to stay the lawsuit entitled RAY STOLL and
HEIDI IMHOF, Plaintiffs v. MUSCULOSKELETAL INSTITUTE, CHARTERED,
Defendant, Case No. 8:20-cv-1798-CEH-AAS (M.D. Fla.).

The Defendant seeks a stay of the action pending the United States
Supreme Court's review of a ruling on standing issued by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
review of a decision as to standing issued by the Court.

Plaintiffs Stoll and Imhoff filed the class action on June 30,
2020, in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in
and for Hillsborough County, Florida, and it was removed to the
Court by the Defendant on August 3, 2020. The Plaintiffs allege
that on April 9, 2020, the Defendant experienced a ransomware
attack, which resulted in exposure of sensitive and private
personally identifiable information ("PII") of at least 100,000
patients, and potentially in excess of 150,000 patients of the
Defendant. They further allege that they were customers and
patients of the Defendant, and their PII was disclosed as a result
of the data disclosure.

According to the complaint, the data disclosure resulted from the
Defendant's failure to implement and follow basic security
procedures as well as contractually-agreed upon,
federally-prescribed, industry standard security procedures. The
claims against the Defendant include (i) negligence, (ii) invasion
of privacy, (iii) breach of implied contract, (iv) negligence per
se, (v) unjust enrichment, (vi) breach of fiduciary duty, (vii)
violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,
and (viii) breach of confidence.

The Defendant moved to dismiss six of the eight counts, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It subsequently moved to
stay the case, pending the Eleventh Circuit decision on standing in
data-breach class action cases and the Supreme Court's review of
class certification.

The Supreme Court will consider the Ninth Circuit's split decision
in Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2020) and the
Eleventh Circuit has since issued its ruling in I Tan Tsao v.
Captiva MVP Restaurant Partners, LLC, _ F.3d. _, 2021 WL 381948
(11th Cir. 2021). According to the Defendant, the resolution of
these appeals will provide significant--and likely
dispositive--clarity as to what any individual person needs to
establish for Article III standing in a data breach case in the
Eleventh Circuit (Tsao), and what standard the approximately
650,000 individuals in the putative class in this case must satisfy
when considering Plaintiffs' motion for class certification
(TransUnion). In fact, it contends that the class certification
briefs will significantly depend on these cases. Accordingly, the
Defendant believes the Court should stay this case pending issuance
of the decisions in those cases.

In response, the Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that the
Defendant overstates the potential impact of Tsao and TransUnion.
In fact, they argue that neither decision is likely to have any
dispositive impact on the case, especially in light of their Motion
to Amend Class Action Complaint and because the Defendant did not
move for dismissal on standing grounds pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

While, as the Plaintiffs point out, the case is not at the class
certification stage, the Court notes that class certification
deadlines are fast approaching. Certainly, the issue before the
Supreme Court bears on the Court's class certification decision.
Additionally, the parties would benefit significantly from the
Supreme Court's ruling in litigating the issue as to whether a
class can be certified and who may be included within that class.
The Supreme Court is expected to rule on that issue in TransUnion
by the end of June 2021--the end of its term. As such, the stay is
not indefinite, as the Plaintiffs claim, and the proposed duration
weighs in favor of staying the case, District Judge Charlene
Edwards Honeywell holds.

Additionally, staying the case will eliminate any possibility of
duplicative litigation regarding class certification as the parties
will have the Supreme Court's guidance on the relevant standards
and parameters governing class certification, Judge Honeywell
opines. It is well established that stays pending appellate
resolution of a related case, that is likely to have a substantial
or controlling effect on the claims and issues in the stayed case
are approved.

This is just one of those cases where a pending appellate decision
will have a substantial or controlling effect on the issues
involved, Judge Honeywell notes. Accordingly, the Court will
exercise its discretion to stay this case pending the Supreme
Court's decision on class certification in TransUnion.

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

   1. the Defendant's Motion to Stay is granted;

   2. the case is stayed until June 30, 2021, pending a decision
      from the United States Supreme Court in TransUnion;

   3. the Clerk is directed to administratively close the case
      and terminate all pending motions; and

   4. On or before July 14, 2021, the parties will move to lift
      the stay and re-open the case and re-new any previously
      pending motions.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ptkkr845 from Leagle.com.


NATIONAL DEBT: Cucuzza Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Ct.
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against NATIONAL DEBT RELIEF,
LLC. The case is styled as Gary Cucuzza and Edwin Santiago, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. NATIONAL
DEBT RELIEF, LLC, Case No. 601631/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.,
March 4, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Other."

National Debt Relief, LLC-- https://www.nationaldebtrelief.com/ --
offers debt relief services to consumers, including consolidation
and non-bankruptcy options including debt settlement and debt
negotiation.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          KESSLER MATURA LLP
          534 BROADHOLLOW ROAD, STE 275
          MELVILLE, NY 11747
          Phone: (631) 499-9100

          FITAPELI & SCHAFFER LLP
          Phone: (212) 300-0375

The Defendant is represented by:

          GREENBERG TRAURIG
          1717 ARCH STREET, STE 400
          PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
          Phone: (215) 988-7833


NEW YORK: Class Certification Order in Stewart v. Roberts Affirmed
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third
Department, affirmed, as modified, the class certification order in
the case titled In the Matter of Tricia Stewart, Individually and
as the Parent of Zas, et al., and on Behalf of Similarly Situated
Individuals, Respondent v. Samuel D. Roberts, as Commissioner of
the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Appellant, et
al., Respondent, Case No. 530344 (N.Y. App. Div.).

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Collins, J.), entered
September 27, 2019, in Albany County, which, in a combined
proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory
judgment, granted the petitioner's motion for class certification
and awarded retroactive class relief.

In the Appellate Court's prior decision regarding the matter, the
Panel affirmed so much of Supreme Court's judgment as annulled a
determination of the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance
("OTDA") denying the petitioner's application for public assistance
(163 A.D.3d 89 [2018]). The Appellate Court agreed with the Supreme
Court that the methodology that OTDA was using to calculate whether
an applicant had available resources from an automobile--which
focused on the fair market value ("FMV") of the applicant's vehicle
in excess of the statutory exemption regardless of whether the
applicant had any equity interest therein--was "irrational and
unreasonable."

However, the Appellate Court reversed so much of the Supreme
Court's judgment as denied the petitioner's motion for class action
certification, finding the denial of her motion to be premature in
the absence of further discovery on the prerequisite of numerosity.
In so doing, it rejected the argument by respondent Commissioner of
OTDA that the governmental operations rule rendered a class action
inferior to other methods of adjudication "where, as in the case, a
class action provided the only mechanism available to secure
retroactive benefits for potential class members" and "the members
of the proposed class were indigent individuals who sought modest
benefits and for whom commencement of individual actions would be
burdensome."

Moreover, the Appellate Court was unpersuaded that the
administrative burden involved in identifying class members would
be too cumbersome, noting the petitioner's assertion that "OTDA
maintains a coding system that would permit a tailored search of
its electronic database." It, therefore, remitted the matter to the
Supreme Court for discovery on that issue and a redetermination of
the motion upon completion thereof.

On remittal, the parties exchanged discovery and the petitioner
renewed her motion for class certification. In support of her
motion, the petitioner submitted certain evidence that came to
light during the discovery process, including the respondent's
response to her notice to admit. The respondent admitted therein
that, between July 20, 2015 (four months prior to the commencement
of the proceeding/action) and October 9, 2018 (when respondent
answered the petitioner's notice to admit), at least 50 households
in New York were denied public assistance because of a vehicle with
an FMV over the applicable automobile resource limit--which
effectively satisfies the numerosity component for a class action.

The respondent opposed the motion, submitting an affidavit from the
director of OTDA's Temporary Assistance and Home Energy Assistance
programs, who opined that managing a class action would be unduly
burdensome because, contrary to the petitioner's prior
representation upon which the Court previously relied, OTDA's
computer database does not allow a tailored search to identify
putative class members and OTDA would be required to manually
review over 10,000 case files to do so. Finding that the
requirements set forth in CPLR 901(a) had been demonstrated and
that the manual review process would be "manageable," the Supreme
Court granted the petitioner's motion and granted class
certification.

After permitting both parties to submit draft proposed judgments,
the Supreme Court issued a class action judgment that, among other
things, defined the class and set forth detailed provisions for
determining how putative class members would be identified and
provided with class relief. The Respondent appealed.

The Appellate Court agrees with the Supreme Court that class
certification is appropriate in the case. The respondent does not
challenge the Supreme Court's finding that the prerequisites of
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation
have been established. Instead, the respondent argues that a class
action is not a superior method by which to adjudicate the matter.

Although the respondent continues to argue otherwise, the Appellate
Court had already determined that the governmental operations rule
does not bar the class action, and the respondent has proffered no
new evidence that would change the analysis or compel a different
result.

As recently reiterated by the Court of Appeals, New York's
statutory class certification provisions are to be liberally
construed, and claims of uniform systemwide violations are
particularly appropriate" for class relief, according to Justice
Michael C. Lynch, writing for the Panel.

Considerations of judicial economy, as well as the burden that
would be placed upon these putative class members--consisting of
"indigent individuals who seek modest benefits"--if they were
required to litigate their rights on an individual basis, weigh
heavily in favor of class certification, Judge Lynch opines. In
these circumstances, the Panel discerns no compelling reason to
depart from the Supreme Court's finding that "a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."

The Appellate Court is, however, persuaded by the respondent's
argument that the process set forth in the judgment to identify
putative class members places a significant burden on OTDA. On
remittal, the respondent proposed incorporating into any issued
class action judgment an "opt-in" procedure whereby putative class
members would self-identify. The 10,000-plus case files include all
cases denied during a defined period for having excess resources.

Judge Lynch notes that it is fair to say that, in many of these
cases, the excess resource threshold was not based on the FMV of an
automobile. In such cases, a manual review would come up empty,
wasting valuable administrative resources. The Respondent's opt-in
methodology approaches the member identification process from a
different angle. The Respondent has confirmed that it can readily
identify the 10,000-plus case files through its computer database.
Under the proposed opt-in method, a notice would be sent to each
member of this category advising that the recipient may be entitled
to a corrective payment for a wrongful denial of benefits as
defined in this case based on the agency's incorrect valuation of
an automobile. The notice recipients could, in turn, request an
interview to determine whether they qualified for a corrective
payment.

Although the petitioner maintains that this approach places an
undue burden on the recipient to initiate a review, the record
suggests otherwise. Case in point is the notice of decision issued
to petitioner on May 22, 2015, which explained that her request for
public assistance was not approved because her resources exceeded
the permitted limit. Notably, the notice provided a detailed
calculation as to how OTDA utilized the FMV of her automobile in
calculating her resources, demonstrating that benefits were denied
due to the valuation of her automobile. Coupling the explanation in
the notice of decision with the proposed opt-in notice would
reasonably alert the notice recipients of their eligibility to
participate in the class.

Judge Lynch finds that correspondingly, the opt-in approach would
prove more efficient by focusing agency review on case files where
an interview was requested. In short, the respondent's proposal
mitigates the administrative burden, compels notice to potential
class members and implements a reasoned process to obtain relief.
In those instances where the opt-in notice is returned as
undeliverable, OTDA should then be required to conduct a manual
file review.

In the Panel's view, the opt-in procedure is a more palatable
solution than the procedure fashioned by Supreme Court, Judge Lynch
holds.

The Appellate Court, therefore, modifies the judgment to implement
the opt-in procedure by striking all of paragraphs 6 and 9 and
subdivisions (a) and (b)(i)-(ii) of paragraph 7, replacing them
with the following provisions: Within 60 days of this decision,
OTDA will provide each social services district with a list of
potential class members, as that term is defined in paragraph 5 (a)
of the judgment, which will contain instructions about how to
identify class members and calculate any corrective benefits owed.


Within 45 days of receiving such list, the social services
districts will send a notice to each potential class member on the
list using the procedure set forth in paragraphs 8 and 11 of the
judgment. Within 15 days of this decision, petitioner's counsel
will provide respondent's counsel with suggested language for the
notices, the content of which will be in substantial conformance
with the content requirements set forth in paragraph 8 (a) (i) and
(ii) of the judgment.

The notice will also advise potential class members that they are
entitled to an interview to determine whether they are putative
class members and will contain a designated contact number for the
purpose of scheduling an interview. Any interview must be scheduled
within 30 days of the request. For envelopes that are returned as
undeliverable, the relevant social services district will, within
30 days, undertake a manual review of those potential class
members' case files to determine whether they are putative class
members who may be entitled to corrective payments. For any
putative class members identified in this manner, the social
services district will make a note in their case file and, if a new
mailing address is identified through the procedure set forth in
paragraph 11, will send another notice advising such individuals of
their status as putative class members and providing information as
to how to schedule an interview. The remaining provisions of the
judgment will remain in full force and effect.

To the extent that it has not addressed any of the respondent's
remaining contentions, the Appellate Court has considered them and
finds them to be unavailing.

Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons and Pritzker, JJ., concur.

Hence, it is ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law and
the facts, without costs, by implementing the opt-in procedure
proposed by respondent Commissioner of the Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance to the extent set forth herein, and, as so
modified, affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Appellate Court's Opinion dated Feb. 18,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/38kyvr2m from
Leagle.com.

Empire Justice Center, in Albany, New York (Saima A. Akhtar of
National Center for Law and Economic Justice, in New York City, of
counsel), for Tricia Stewart, respondent.

Letitia James -- Letitia.james@ag.ny.gov -- Attorney General, in
Albany, New York (Laura Etlinger -- Laura.Etlinger@ag.ny.gov -- of
counsel), for appellant.


ONTRAK INC: Federman & Sherwood Reminds of May 3 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood announces that on March 3, 2021, a class action
lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against Ontrak, Inc. (NASDAQ: OTRK).
The complaint alleges violations of federal securities laws,
Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5, including allegations of issuing a series of material
or false misrepresentations to the market which had the effect of
artificially inflating the market price during the Class Period,
which is November 5, 2020 through February 26, 2021.

To learn how to participate in this action, please visit
https://www.federmanlaw.com/blog/federman-sherwood-announces-the-filing-of-a-securities-class-action-lawsuit-against-ontrak-inc/

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Ontrak, Inc.
shareholders who purchased common stock during the Class Period and
are therefore a member of the Class as described above. You may
move the Court no later than May 3, 2021 to serve as a lead
plaintiff for the entire Class. However, in order to do so, you
must meet certain legal requirements pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information and
participate in this or any other securities litigation, or should
you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice or
preservation of your rights, please contact:

Robin Hester
FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
Oklahoma City, OK 73120
Email to: rkh@federmanlaw.com
Or, visit the firm’s website at www.federmanlaw.com [GN]

PHARMA BRO: Martin Shkreli Faces Suit Over Drug 'Monopoly'
----------------------------------------------------------
Gustaf Kilander at The Independent reports that Pharma Bro Martin
Shkreli, who became infamous when he raised the price of Daraprim
by over 4,100 per cent, is facing a class-action lawsuit from
health insurers who say he created a drug monopoly around the HIV
medication.

Insurers Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota sued Mr Shkreli in
a Manhattan federal court claiming that he and his company Vyera
Pharmaceuticals facilitated the monopoly on the drug by stopping
"competitors from obtaining the Daraprim samples they needed to
launch a generic product," The New York Post reported.

The drug is given to HIV patients with compromised immune systems
and is also used to treat toxoplasmosis, a disease coming from
parasites that can be deadly.

Generic products are cheaper versions of a brand-name drug. Mr
Shkreli and Vyera Pharmaceuticals hid their actions, publicly
rejecting the idea that they were stopping companies from getting
samples, the suit claims.

Without any competitors, Mr Shkreli decided to raise the price of
the drug from $17.50 to $750. The lawsuit said the "Defendants
determined they could impose monopoly prices and reap significant
profits at the expense of Plaintiff and Class members, who were
forced to pay inflated prices in violation of the federal antitrust
laws".

Mr Shkreli is currently serving a seven-year prison sentence after
he was convicted of securities fraud concerning two hedge funds he
managed. Mr Shkreli's business partner Kevin Mulleady is also part
of the lawsuit, according to The New York Daily News.

Maintaining the monopoly by limiting the supply of the drug, the
lawsuit claims that Vyera Pharmaceuticals also enforced its actions
by making distributors and customers of the drug sign agreements
that they wouldn't sell samples of the drug to companies that would
then make a generic version at a lower price to consumers.

Mr Shkreli orchestrated the scheme from prison, telling Mr Mulleady
and fellow Vyera executive Akeel Mithani in August 2019 to start to
sell the drug one bottle at a time, The New York Daily News
alleged.

The lawsuit states that Mr Shkreli "urged Mulleady to 'really
carefully screen every doctor; and ensure that no one could 'sell
more than one bottle at a time' to prevent a generic company from
"get[ting its] hands on anything,'".

According to The Wall Street Journal, Mr Shkreli used a contraband
phone to tweet and run the drug company Phoenixus AG from prison.

New York Attorney General Letitia James and the Federal Trade
Commission filed a lawsuit concerning Daraprim in January of last
year. They want Vyera's profits to be returned and to forever ban
the 37-year-old Mr Shkreli from working in the drug market.

The Independent has reached out to Vyera Pharmaceuticals, Mr
Mulleady, Mr Mithani, and Mr Shkreli's lawyer Benjamin Brafman for
comment. [GN]

PROSPECTS DM: Moore Suit Moved to N.D. Ohio
-------------------------------------------
The case styled George Moore, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. Prospects DM, Inc., Case No. 1:19-cv-02504,
was moved from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio on March 4, 2021, and assigned Case No. 1:21-mc-00013-JRA.

Plaintiff George Moore has filed a Motion to Compel Production of
Documents.

Prospects DM -- https://prospectsdm.com/ -- offers full BPO service
solutions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian K. Murphy, Esq.
          Jonathan P. Misny, Esq.
          MURRAY, MURPHY, MOUL & BASIL
          1114 Dublin Road
          Columbus, OH 43215
          Phone: (614) 488-0400
          Fax: (614) 488-0401
          Email: murphy@mmmb.com
                 misny@mmmb.com

RANGE RESOURCES: Federman & Sherwood Reminds of May 3 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
Federman & Sherwood announces that on March 4, 2021, a class action
lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania against Range Resources
Corporation (NYSE: RRC). The complaint alleges violations of
federal securities laws, Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, including allegations of
issuing a series of material or false misrepresentations to the
market which had the effect of artificially inflating the market
price during the Class Period, which is April 29, 2016 through
February 10, 2021.

To learn how to participate in this action, please visit
https://www.federmanlaw.com/blog/federman-sherwood-announces-the-filing-of-a-securities-class-action-lawsuit-against-range-resources-corporation/.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on behalf of all Range Resources
Corporation shareholders who purchased common stock during the
Class Period and are therefore a member of the Class as described
above. You may move the Court no later than May 3, 2021 to serve as
a lead plaintiff for the entire Class. However, in order to do so,
you must meet certain legal requirements pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

If you wish to discuss this action, obtain further information and
participate in this or any other securities litigation, or should
you have any questions or concerns regarding this notice or
preservation of your rights, please contact:

Robin Hester
FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
Oklahoma City, OK 73120
Email to: rkh@federmanlaw.com
Or, visit the firm’s website at www.federmanlaw.com [GN]

RANGE RESOURCES: Rosen Law Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
WHY: Rosen Law Firm, a global investor rights law firm, announces
the filing of a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of the
securities of Range Resources Corporation (NYSE: RRC) between April
29, 2016 and February 10, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period"). A
class action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve
as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than May 3,
2021.

SO WHAT: If you purchased Range Resources securities during the
Class Period you may be entitled to compensation without payment of
any out of pocket fees or costs through a contingency fee
arrangement.

WHAT TO DO NEXT: To join the Range Resources class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2053.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action. A class
action lawsuit has already been filed. If you wish to serve as lead
plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than May 3, 2021. A
lead plaintiff is a representative party acting on behalf of other
class members in directing the litigation.

WHY ROSEN LAW: We encourage investors to select qualified counsel
with a track record of success in leadership roles. Often, firms
issuing notices do not have comparable experience or resources. The
Rosen Law Firm represents investors throughout the globe,
concentrating its practice in securities class actions and
shareholder derivative litigation. Rosen Law Firm has achieved the
largest ever securities class action settlement against a Chinese
Company. Rosen Law Firm was Ranked No. 1 by ISS Securities Class
Action Services for number of securities class action settlements
in 2017. The firm has been ranked in the top 3 each year since 2013
and has recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. In
2019 alone the firm secured over $438 million for investors. In
2020 founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a Titan
of Plaintiffs' Bar. Many of the firm's attorneys have been
recognized by Lawdragon and Super Lawyers.

DETAILS OF THE CASE: According to the lawsuit, defendants
throughout the Class Period made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) Range Resources had improperly
designated the status of its wells in Pennsylvania since at least
2013; (2) the foregoing conduct subjected the Company to a
heightened risk of regulatory investigation and enforcement, as
well as artificially decreased the Company's periodically reported
cost estimates to plug and abandon its wells; (3) the Company was
the subject of a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") investigation from sometime between September
2017 to January 2021 for improperly designating the status of its
wells; (4) the DEP investigation foreseeably would and ultimately
did lead to the Company incurring regulatory fines; and (5) as a
result, the Company's public statements were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. When the true details entered the
market, the lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

To join the Range Resources class action, go to
http://www.rosenlegal.com/cases-register-2053.htmlor call Phillip
Kim, Esq. toll-free at 866-767-3653 or email pkim@rosenlegal.com or
cases@rosenlegal.com for information on the class action.

No Class Has Been Certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you retain one. You may select
counsel of your choice. You may also remain an absent class member
and do nothing at this point. An investor's ability to share in any
potential future recovery is not dependent upon serving as lead
plaintiff.

Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar
outcome.

View source version on
businesswire.com:https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210305005466/en/

CONTACT: Laurence Rosen, Esq.
Phillip Kim, Esq.
The Rosen Law Firm, P.A.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10016
Tel: (212) 686-1060
Toll Free: (866) 767-3653
Fax: (212) 202-3827
lrosen@rosenlegal.com
pkim@rosenlegal.com
cases@rosenlegal.com
www.rosenlegal.com [GN]

RENEWABLE ENERGY: Kahn Swick Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadline in the following securities class action lawsuit:

Renewable Energy Group, Inc. (REGI)
Class Period: 5/3/2018 - 2/25/2021
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: May 3, 2021
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-regi/

If you purchased shares of the above company and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case link above.

If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.

                               About KSF

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients
– including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors – in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California and Louisiana.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.

Contact:

Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

Lewis Kahn, Managing Partner
lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163 [GN]

RENEWABLE ENERGY: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of May 3 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Renewable Energy Group, Inc.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadline listed to petition the court. Further details about the
case can be found at the link provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

REGI Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/renewable-energy-group-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=13343&wire=1

Renewable Energy Group, Inc. (NASDAQ:REGI)

REGI Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased May 3, 2018 -
February 25, 2021
Lead Plaintiff Deadline : May 3, 2021
TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/renewable-energy-group-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=13343&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period,
Renewable Energy Group, Inc. made materially false and/or
misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) due to
failures in the diesel additive system, petroleum diesel was not
periodically added to certain loads by the Company and was instead
added by the Company's customers; (2) as a result, Renewable Energy
was not the proper claimant for certain BTC payments on biodiesel
it sold between January 1, 2017 and September 30, 2020; (3) as a
result, Renewable Energy's revenue and net income were overstated
for certain periods; (4) there was a material weakness in the
Company's internal control over financial reporting related to the
purchase and use of the petroleum diesel gallons when blending with
biodiesel; and (5) as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]

RENEWABLE ENERGY: Pawar Law Group Reminds of May 3 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pawar Law Group announces a class action lawsuit on behalf of
shareholders who purchased shares of  Renewable Energy Group, Inc.
(NASDAQ: REGI) from May 3, 2018 through February 25, 2021,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit seeks to recover
damages for Renewable Energy Group, Inc. investors under the
federal securities laws.

To join the class action, go here or call Vik Pawar, Esq. toll-free
at 888-589-9804 or email info@pawarlawgroup.com for information on
the class action.

According to the lawsuit,  defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: due to failures in the
diesel additive system, petroleum diesel was not periodically added
to certain loads by the Company and was instead added by the
Company's customers; as a result, Renewable Energy Group was not
the proper claimant for certain biodiesel tax credit (BTC) payments
on biodiesel it sold between January 1, 2017 and September 30,
2020; a result, Renewable Energy Group's revenue and net income
were overstated for certain periods; there was a material weakness
in the Company's internal control over financial reporting related
to the purchase and use of the petroleum diesel gallons when
blending with biodiesel; and that, as a result of the foregoing,
defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis. When the true details entered the market, the
lawsuit claims that investors suffered damages.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than May 3, 2021. A lead plaintiff is a representative party
acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation.

No class has been certified. Until a class is certified, you are
not represented by counsel unless you hire one. You may hire
counsel of your choice. You may also do nothing at this time and be
an absent member of the class. Your ability to share in any future
recovery is not dependent upon being a lead plaintiff.

Pawar Law Group represents investors from around the world.
Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee or predict a
similar outcome with respect to any future matter.

Vik Pawar, Esq.  
Pawar Law Group  
20 Vesey Street, Suite 1410  
New York, NY 10007  
Tel: (917) 261-2277  
Fax: (212) 571-0938  
info@pawarlawgroup.com [GN]

RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS: $105K Class Settlement in Foster Suit OK'd
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled TROY FOSTER, Plaintiff v. RESIDENTIAL
PROGRAMS, INC., et al., Case No. 2:19-cv-2358 (S.D. Ohio), the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio grants the
parties' amended joint motion for approval of settlement and
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.

On June 4, 2019, Representative Plaintiff Troy Foster filed the
action as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), and alleged that the Defendants unlawfully failed to pay
their hourly, non-exempt employees, including Mr. Foster, for all
time worked and overtime compensation at the rate of one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for all of the hours they
worked over 40 each workweek, in violation of the FLSA, as well as
a Rule 23 class action to remedy violations of the Ohio Minimum
Fair Wage Standards Act.

Mr. Foster alleges that he and other similarly situated employees
were not paid for work performed before clocking-in and after
clocking-out each day, work performed between fundraising
campaigns, and attendance at mandatory meetings. The Defendants
deny the allegations.

On February 21, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation to
Conditional Certification and Notice, in which the parties
stipulated to the following class:

     All former and current telephone sales representatives or
     persons with jobs performing substantially identical
     functions and/or duties to telephone sales representatives
     employed by Residential Programs, Inc. at any time between
     June 1, 2016 and the present.

The Court approved the Joint Stipulation. The Notice to Potential
Class Members was issued on March 13, 2020, and the opt-in period
closed on April 13, 2020.

The parties previously filed a Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice. However,
the Court denied the Motion because it was unable to determine the
reasonableness of the proposed award of attorneys' fees and costs.

The Court now considers the parties' Amended Joint Motion for
Approval, which represents that the Proposed Settlement results
from these efforts:

   * Substantial investigation and informal discovery, and
     exchange of relevant information and discovery;

   * Comprehensive exchange of information, including a complete
     analysis and calculations of alleged damages;

   * Extensive legal discussion between counsel for the parties
     between May 2019, and May 2020;

   * Extensive settlement negotiations between January 30, 2020,
     and June 25, 2020; and

   * A full day of mediation on June 25, 2020, during which the
     parties reached an agreement to settle the action.

The Proposed Settlement applies to Mr. Foster and the 81 opt-in
Plaintiffs. Pursuant to the Proposed Settlement, the Defendants
will pay a total of $105,000 to cover (a) all individual damages
payments ("Individual Payments") to the Plaintiffs, (b) Mr.
Foster's fee for serving as Representative Plaintiff, and (c) the
Plaintiffs' counsel's fees and expenses incurred in litigating the
action.

The Individual Payments, totaling $47,180, "were calculated
proportionally on each Plaintiff's alleged overtime damages during
the" covered period, with each Plaintiff receiving at least $200.
The parties represent that the Individual Payments will provide
"each Plaintiff approximately 111.52%" of their alleged lost
overtime compensation.

For serving as the Representative Plaintiff, and as consideration
for executing a general release of claims, Mr. Foster will receive
an additional $3,500 payment. Finally, the Proposed Settlement
awards $50,000 in attorneys' fees and $4,319.92 in costs to the
Plaintiffs' counsel. Through the Proposed Settlement, the parties
further request that this Court retain jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of the settlement.

In contrast to their initial Motion for Approval, the parties now
present evidence to support the reasonableness of the attorneys'
fees awarded by the Proposed Settlement. First, the parties present
comparative data about class settlements, indicating that class
members receive, on average, only 7-11% of claimed damages. Second,
they reference a recent case in which this Court approved an
attorneys' fee award for current counsel at similar rates, citing
Rosenbohm et al. v. Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless, No.
2:17-cv-00731 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2020) (Marbley, J.). Third, the
parties provide multiple sworn declarations to support the
reasonableness of counsel's professed hourly rates and hours worked
in this matter.

District Judge Sarah D. Morrison finds that the Proposed Settlement
is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide legal dispute
among the parties. The Court approves the Proposed Settlement based
on these findings: First, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants are
engaged in a bona fide dispute. Second, analysis of the seven
factors shows that the Proposed Settlement is fair and reasonable.
Third, the proposed award of attorneys' fees is reasonable under
the lodestar analysis and furthers the objectives of the FLSA. And
finally, the award of costs and the Representative Plaintiff's fee
are appropriate.

For these reasons, the parties' Amended Joint Motion for Approval
of Settlement and Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice is
granted. The Proposed Settlement is approved. In accordance with
the terms thereof, the action is dismissed with prejudice. The
Court will retain limited jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
Proposed Settlement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated Feb. 18,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/6t2hfmpy from
Leagle.com.


SEATTLE CHILDREN: 15 Patients Join Lawsuit Over Mold Infections
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fifteen more patients have joined a class-action lawsuit against
Seattle Children's hospital alleging they were exposed to
Aspergillus mold, attorneys announced.

Since 2001, there have been at least 14 young Seattle Children's
patients infected by Aspergillus mold, which is a common mold that
can be problematic for people with weakened immune systems. Seven
patients have died.

The complaint alleges that between 2000 and 2019, Seattle
Children's didn't alert patients, doctors or the public that there
were problems with its air handling system. It claims that even
when patients got sick from Aspergillus, the hospital "concealed
its culpability."

The family of Ana Hernandez, a teen patient who died after being
treated at Seattle Children's, spoke out.

"For us, it's very important that no one else go through the
situation that we went through," Norma, Hernandez's mother, said
through a translator. "They wish no other kids go through the same
situation."

Hernandez had surgery at Seattle Children's in 2014 for a brain
tumor. However, her condition worsened once she got home to
Wenatchee, and Hernandez was airlifted back to Seattle Children's
where doctors discovered Aspergillus in her brain, according to
attorneys.

Lawyers for Hernandez's family claim the only way the fungus could
have gotten there was by entering her brain during surgery at the
hospital.

The class-action lawsuit was initially filed in December 2019. Four
cases in the group have settled, leaving a total of 19 cases
remaining.

Dangerous levels of mold forced the hospital to temporarily close
its operating rooms in May 2019, and the hospital closed its main
operating rooms again in November 2019 after mold was detected a
second time. Routine air tests detected more mold in the hospitals
operating rooms and an equipment storage room in May 2020. [GN]

SIMON FRASER: Slater Vecchio Files Class Action Due to Data Breach
------------------------------------------------------------------
Slater Vecchio LLP has filed a class action lawsuit against Simon
Fraser University on behalf of all individuals whose personal
information was accessed by unauthorized cybercriminals in a recent
data breach. Included in this class group are the approximately
200,000 individuals who had their personal information exposed.
This is the second data breach to affect SFU students, faculty, and
alumni in the past 12 months.

The action claims that Simon Fraser University owes their students
a higher standard of care in storing their personal information
than what was provided. SFU stored hundreds of thousands of
individual's personal information on a spreadsheet without
encryption, making it an easy target for cybercriminals.
Individuals can check to see if their personal information was
exposed by referring to the list on SFU's website. However, the
largest group affected was all individuals enrolled between 2012
and 2020.

About Slater Vecchio LLP

Slater Vecchio LLP is a boutique law firm located in British
Columbia. Over the past 20 years, Slater Vecchio has represented
thousands of clients and has grown into one of the largest personal
injury and class action firms in the province. Slater Vecchio's
goal is to exceed every client's expectations, not only with the
best results possible, but throughout the experience as we work
together.

Class Member Contacts:

If you are a potential Class Member, we encourage you to complete
the information form on the website of Slater Vecchio LLP at:
https://www.slatervecchio.com/sfu-privacy-breach-class-action/

SOURCE Slater Vecchio LLP

For further information: Media Contacts: Mary Vecchio, Slater
Vecchio LLP, media@slatervecchio.com

Related Links
http://www.slatervecchio.com/[GN]

ST. MICHAEL: Hospital Settles Class Lawsuit Over Unpaid Breaks
--------------------------------------------------------------
Austen Macalus at Kitsap Sun reports that St. Michael Medical
Center has settled a class-action lawsuit brought by a nurse who
alleged staff members weren't properly compensated for lunch and
other breaks.

The 2019 lawsuit, filed in federal court by a nurse at the
hospital's former Bremerton campus, alleged that nurses' unpaid
breaks and 30 minutes for lunch are "continuously subject to
interruption," which violates Washington state labor laws and the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act.  

Virginia Mason Franciscan Health, the hospital system that owns St.
Michael, reached a settlement on the case in late January,
according to court documents filed last month. The settlement
amount is undisclosed.

"While we disagree with the findings in this case, we believe the
best use of our resources is to focus on quality patient care and
the well-being of our dedicated employees during this pandemic,
rather than further extending a legal case," said Cary Evans,
VMFH's vice president of communications and government affairs.

"Virginia Mason Franciscan Health is dedicated to the fair
treatment of all our employees and all the patients we serve,"
Evans said in an emailed statement.

According to the lawsuit, "Instead of making nursing staff clock
out for their meal periods then clock back in at the end of a meal
period, Defendants assume nursing staff are able to find a
30-minute block of time to enjoy a bona fide meal period. In fact,
this does not typically occur."

Lawyers for the nurses, which include Seattle-based Terrell
Marshall Law Group and California's Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky, did not respond to several requests for comment. [GN]

STATE FARM FIRE: Court Refuses to Dismiss COVID Claims Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A federal judge recently permitted a class action lawsuit to
proceed against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (the "State Farm Defendants")
concerning the denial of loss of business income claims (business
interruption) stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. The case is
pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Norfolk Division and is captioned Elegant
Massage, LLC d/b/a Light Stream Spa v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-00265 (the "Action").

Any persons or entities who purchased State Farm insurance coverage
and were denied claims for the loss of business income relating to
COVID-19 are encouraged to contact Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check,
LLP: James Maro, Esq. (484) 270-1453 or Adrienne Bell, Esq. (484)
270-1435; or (888) 299-7706 (toll free); or via e-mail at
info@ktmc.com. For additional information please visit:
https://www.ktmc.com/State-Farm-Insurance-Company-Business-Interruption-Claims


The Action alleges that in March 2020, and continuing to the
present, many individuals and businesses suffered and continue to
suffer financial hardship. In the midst of the COVID-19 global
pandemic, states and localities across the nation issued orders
that limited human interaction and required residents to stay at
home. Such orders have prevented businesses from being able to
operate and generate revenue. To protect against any unexpected
interruption to their businesses, many persons or entities
purchased commercial property insurance policies that guaranteed
policyholders the reimbursement of lost income and other expenses
in the event that their businesses were suspended. Given the
complete disruption of their businesses as a direct result of these
social distancing and/or stay-at-home orders, policyholders
submitted claims to the State Farm Defendants seeking reimbursement
for their lost income and other expenses under their policy's
applicable provisions.

The Action alleges that the State Farm Defendants violated their
obligations pursuant to these commercial property insurance
policies by arbitrarily and without justification refusing to
reimburse policyholders for loss of business income and other
expenses incurred as a result of social distancing and/or
stay-at-home orders in connection with the COVID-19 global
pandemic.

The Honorable Raymond A. Jackson denied, in large part, the State
Farm Defendants' motion to dismiss the Action and held that the
plaintiff pled sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of
contract and for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.


Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP prosecutes class actions in
state and federal courts throughout the country. Kessler Topaz
Meltzer & Check, LLP is a driving force behind corporate governance
reform and has recovered billions of dollars on behalf of
institutional and individual investors from the United States and
around the world. The firm represents investors, consumers and
whistleblowers (private citizens who report fraudulent practices
against the government and share in the recovery of government
dollars).

CONTACT:

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
James Maro, Esq.
Adrienne Bell, Esq.
280 King of Prussia Road
Radnor, PA 19087
(888) 299-7706 (toll free)
info@ktmc.com [GN]

TOYOTA MOTOR: Murphy Sues Over RAV4 Vehicles' Defective Batteries
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Juliet Murphy, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION; TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A.,
INC.; TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC., TOYOTA MOTOR ENGINEERING &
MANUFACTURING NORTH AMERICA, INC.; AND DOES 1-50, inclusive, Case
No. 4:21-cv-00178 (E.D. Tex., March 4, 2021), seeks damages against
Toyota for breach of the manufacturer's warranty and for unfair or
deceptive acts or practices pertaining to its design and
manufacture of 2013-2018 Toyota RAV4 vehicles (the "Class
Vehicles").

The Class Vehicles contain a significant design and/or
manufacturing defect in the 12-volt battery B+ terminal, which
shorts to the battery hold down frame (the "Battery Defect"). When
this short occurs, it can cause a catastrophic failure of the
battery, leading the automobile to lose electrical power, vehicle
stalling, and potentially a fire originating in the engine
compartment. The Plaintiff thereon alleges that Toyota defectively
designed and/or manufactured these defective battery/charging
systems and incorporated them into the Class Vehicles designed
and/or manufactured by Defendants. Plaintiff is informed and
believes that the Battery Defect directly affects the Plaintiff's
use, enjoyment, safety, and value of the Class Vehicles.

The Battery Defect poses an obvious and material safety risk to the
operator and passengers of all Class Vehicles. The dangers of a
battery that can short out, causing the loss of electrical power,
stalling, or fire—even while the automobile is in operation—are
manifest, including increased risk of injury or death. For years,
according to the complaint, Toyota has concealed the Battery Defect
from owners and lessees of the Class Vehicles, withholding its
knowledge because once known to those owners, the Battery Defect
would diminish the Class Vehicles' intrinsic and resale value and
cause Toyota automobile owners to demand immediate and costly
repairs.

The Battery Defect not only threatens every passenger in a Class
Vehicle, it materially undermines the Class Vehicles' intrinsic
value as well. Plaintiff and other Toyota automobile owners and/or
lessees would have been less likely to purchase and/or lease their
vehicles had they known about the Battery Defect prior to their
purchase or lease, or they would have paid substantially less for
them. Because of Toyota's unfair, deceptive, and/or fraudulent
business practices, owners and/or lessees of the Class Vehicles,
including Plaintiff, have suffered an ascertainable loss of money
and/or property and/or loss in value. Toyota further conducted the
unfair and deceptive trade practices described herein in a manner
giving rise to substantial aggravating circumstances. As a result
of the Battery Defect, the Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact,
incurred damages, and have otherwise been harmed by Toyota's
conduct, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff leased a new 2015 Toyota RAV4 from Suburban Toyota,
Troy, Michigan.

The Defendants manufacture and sell the Class Vehicles throughout
the United States, including within the State of Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bruce W. Steckler, Esq.
          L. Kirstine Rogers, Esq.
          Austin P. Smith, Esq.
          Paul D. Stickney, Esq.
          STECKLER WAYNE COCHRAN CHERRY PLLC
          12720 Hillcrest Road, Suite 1045
          Dallas, TX 75230
          Phone: (972) 387-4040
          Facsimile: (972) 387-4041
          Email: bruce@swclaw.com
                 krogers@swclaw.com
                 austin@swclaw.com
                 judgestickney@swclaw.com

               - and -

          Kimberly A. Justice, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Jagher, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          923 Fayette Street
          Conshohocken, PA 19428
          Phone: (610) 234-6487
          Facsimile: (224) 632-4521
          Email: kjustice@fklmlaw.com
                 jjagher@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          Douglas A. Millen, Esq.
          FREED KANNER LONDON & MILLEN LLC
          2201 Waukegan Road, #130
          Bannockburn, IL 60015
          Phone: (224) 632-4500
          Facsimile: (224) 632-4521
          Email: dmillen@fklmlaw.com

               - and -

          Peter A. Muhic, Esq.
          LeVAN MUHIC STAPLETON LLC
          One Liberty Place
          1650 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: 215.561.1500
          Email: pmuhic@levanmuhic.com

               - and -

          Katrina Carroll, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
          111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 750-1265
          Facsimile: (312) 750-1591
          Email: kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Edwin J. Kilpela, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Phone: (412) 253-4996
          Facsimile: (412) 231-0346
          Email: ekilpela@carlsonlynch.com

               - and -

          Richard D. McCune, Esq.
          David C. Wright, Esq.
          Steven A. Haskins, Esq.
          Mark I. Richards, Esq.
          MCCUNE WRIGHT AREVALO, LLP
          3281 E. Guasti, Road, Suite 100
          Ontario, CA 91761
          Phone: (909) 557-1250
          Facsimile: (909) 557-1275
          Email: rdm@mccunewright.com
                 dcw@mccunewright.com
                 sah@mccunewright.com
                 mir@mccunewright.com


UBER TECHNOLOGIES: Planned Class Suit by Drivers Gets Support
-------------------------------------------------------------
Ernest Mabuza at timeslive.co.za reports that the Centre for
Transformative Regulation of Work (Centrow) at the University of
the Western Cape (UWC) says it supports a planned class action
against Uber SA, and its holding company in the Netherlands, Uber
BV.

Centrow said its research, and that of labour law specialists
elsewhere, supported Uber drivers' claim that Uber had
misclassified them as independent contractors whereas they were
employees.

Centrow's support follows an announcement made late last month by
Mbuyisa Moleele Attorneys in Johannesburg, assisted by Leigh Day in
the UK, that a class action will be filed in the Johannesburg
labour court against Uber BV and Uber SA on behalf of SA Uber
drivers.

The law firms said the claim will be based on the drivers'
entitlement to rights as employees under SA legislation and will
seek compensation for unpaid overtime and holiday pay.

The planned action follows a decision by the UK Supreme Court on
February 19 that Uber drivers should be legally classified as
workers rather than independent contractors, and as such are
entitled to similar benefits.

Leigh Day represented the UK Uber drivers in the case in which the
lower courts, including the English Court of Appeal, also ruled in
favour of the drivers.

SA legislation relating to employment status and rights -- the
Labour Relations Act (LRA) and the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act (BCEA) -- was very similar to UK employment law, it said.

Centrow said the planned action is set to be a landmark case that
will go a long way to protecting the rights of platform workers and
freelance contractors throughout the country.

As in most countries, worker protection in SA was mainly limited to
employees. Uber drivers were denied this protection because Uber
classified them as independent contractors, Centrow said.

"However, research and court judgments in SA and around the world
have demonstrated that many 'independent contractors' are employees
in all but name and are misclassified for the purpose of avoiding
applicability of protective legislation."

Centrow said this stance has once again been confirmed by the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court of the UK that Uber drivers
are not independent contractors, but that they work for Uber and
are entitled to the applicable statutory protection.

"We therefore call on trade unions and progressive researchers to
join in giving any possible support to the class action, also in
the form of research where necessary to clarify contentious legal
or practical issues." [GN]

UNITED STATES: Appeals in Rivas Suit Referred to Mediation Program
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a
Memorandum resolving certain threshold issues and referring to the
Circuit Mediation Program the appeals filed in the lawsuit styled
ANGEL DE JESUS ZEPEDA RIVAS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. DAVID
JENNINGS, Acting Field Officer Director, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants, and GEO GROUP, INC.; NATHAN ALLEN, Warden,
Defendants, Case Nos. 20-16276, 20-16690 (9th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs, civil immigration detainees housed at Mesa Verde
Detention Facility and Yuba County Jail, filed a class petition for
writ of habeas corpus, and a class complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief. The Plaintiffs alleged the conditions of
confinement at the Facilities violated their Fifth Amendment right
to due process in light of the threat posed by the COVID-19
pandemic. Through a series of orders, the district court
established a system to consider individual bail applications and
subsequently issued multiple bail orders granting indefinite
release to over 130 detainees.

The Defendants first filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the
temporary restraining order entered April 29, 2020, the bail orders
issued thereunder, and the preliminary injunction entered June 9,
2020. They separately appealed additional bail orders issued after
the preliminary injunction. This Memorandum disposition resolves
certain threshold issues presented in these appeals and is
accompanied by a separate order referring the remaining issues to
mediation.

The Appellate Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to review
the April 29, 2020 temporary restraining order, the June 9, 2020
order granting preliminary injunction, and the bail orders; that
the Plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on their claim that
conditions at the Facilities fell below a constitutional minimum at
least as of the time the temporary restraining order was entered;
and that, contrary to the government's argument, district courts
have authority to enter injunctive relief to remedy
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including overcrowding
that poses health dangers, under certain circumstances.

The Appellate Court also concludes the individual bail orders
issued pursuant to the temporary restraining order and appealed are
reviewable pursuant to Section 1292(a)(1). The district court
issued each bail order following adversarial briefing by both
parties and the government strenuously challenged the district
court's legal basis for issuing each bail order. Moreover, the
district court's bail orders were entered for an indefinite period,
thus, exceeding the presumptive 14-day duration of temporary
restraining orders.

Because it concludes the bail orders are appealable, the Appellate
Court also holds the temporary restraining order entered on April
29, 2020 is appealable.  Because the April 29 temporary restraining
order articulated the district court's legal justification for the
bail orders, the bail orders and the temporary restraining order
worked in tandem. Accordingly, the Appellate Court has jurisdiction
to review the April 29 temporary restraining order.

The Appellate Court further concludes that the Plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their
conditions-of-confinement claim as of the time the district court
entered its April 29 temporary restraining order.

When the temporary restraining order was entered, the district
found COVID-19 posed grave health risks, the crowded detention
facilities were a "tinderbox" for COVID-19 transmission, and
COVID-19 posed a serious health-risk to all detainees--not only
those in high-risk categories, the Appellate Court holds. Despite
these risks, the district court found the government had only
recently taken modest measures in response to the pandemic and that
social distancing was still impossible for most detainees. The
government had not yet identified detainees with medical conditions
that made them more vulnerable to COVID-19. Further, the government
had only tested two detainees at the Facilities even though
detainees regularly arrived from facilities with confirmed COVID-19
cases.

Addressing the conditions that existed at that time of the
temporary restraining order, the government primarily argues that
the lack of confirmed COVID-19 cases at the Facilities undercuts
the Plaintiffs' claim that they were entitled to injunctive relief.
The Appellate Court opines that this argument is defeated by the
well-established principle that to prevail on a
conditions-of-confinement claim, the Plaintiffs need only prove a
"sufficiently imminent danger," because a "remedy for unsafe
conditions need not await a tragic event," citing Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993). On this record, the Appellate
Court agrees with the district court that the Plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that conditions
at the Facilities fell below the constitutional threshold when the
April 29 temporary restraining order was entered.

The government argues that to the extent the Plaintiffs' claims
rely on habeas corpus, the district court lacked authority to
remedy the Plaintiffs' conditions of confinement. But in Roman v.
Wolf (Roman I), 977 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2020), the Appellate
Court recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
provides civil immigration detainees an implied cause of action to
seek equitable relief from unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. As in Roman I, the Appellate Court says it need not
decide whether a writ habeas corpus is the proper vehicle to pursue
the Plaintiffs' claim because they also brought a class action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the condition.

Accordingly, although it does not decide the scope of the district
court's authority to enter injunctive relief, the Appellate Court
concludes the district court had authority to enter appropriate
injunctive relief to remedy ongoing violations.

It does not decide here whether unconstitutional conditions of
confinement persisted as of the time the district court entered the
preliminary injunction on June 9, 2020. By the time the district
court entered the preliminary injunction, it had already held eight
status conferences, and the preliminary injunction order includes
the district court's finding that the government unreasonably
resisted taking measures to safeguard detainees in response to
COVID-19. The parties are no doubt aware of the positions asserted
at the status conferences but those transcripts were not included
in the parties' excerpts of record. Whether the district court's
finding that the government unreasonably failed to take action is
supported by the record will likely require review of those
transcripts. Accordingly, the Appellate Court does not decide
whether the district court exceeded the scope of its authority to
enter injunctive relief as of June 9.

The government separately argues the district court did not have
authority to release any Plaintiffs detained pursuant to the
mandatory detention statutes, 8 U.S.C. Sections 1226(c) and
1231(a)(2). Neither party briefed whether the district court was
required to prioritize releasing detainees who were not subject to
mandatory detention. Rather than decide these questions and the
other unresolved issues, in the accompanying Order, the Appellate
Court refers the appeal to the Circuit Mediation Program.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/abj3b6tz from Leagle.com.


US FOODS: Class Settlement in Flerlage Suit Wins Final Approval
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled MARGARET FLERLAGE & MARKUS MURRAY,
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. US FOODS, INC., Defendant, Case No. 18-2614-DDC-TJJ
(D. Kan.), the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
grants the Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Final Settlement
Approval and Suggestions in Support Thereof.

On February 4, 2021, the Court held a Settlement Approval Hearing
in Kansas City, Kansas, and by Zoom Video Conference.

District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree finds that the terms of the
parties' Settlement Agreement are fair, reasonable, and adequate
compromise of a bona fide dispute under both the state common laws
and wage and hour laws pled and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

He finally approves the collective and class action settlement, as
set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

Solely for purposes of effectuating the settlement, the Judge
finally certifies the 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) Collective Class and
the Rule 23 Class, as defined in the Agreement and related
documents.

The Defendant is directed to issue settlement payments to the
Settlement Classes in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. Payment of approved attorneys' fees and costs requested
will be made in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

Without affecting the finality of the Settlement or the Order, the
Court retains jurisdiction over the case to the extent permitted by
law for purposes of resolving any issues pertaining to settlement
administration, and consummation, enforcement, and interpretation
of the Agreement.

The action is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, and the
Clerk will enter final judgment dismissing the action with
prejudice, for the Plaintiffs and members of the Settlement Classes
as set forth in the Agreement and without costs to any party,
except to the extent otherwise expressly provided in the Agreement,
having the fullest res judicata effect.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated Feb. 18,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/26d3eda5 from
Leagle.com.


VELODYNE LIDAR: Kahn Swick Reminds Investors of May 3 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadline in the following securities class action lawsuit:

Velodyne Lidar, Inc. (VLDR)
Class Period: 11/9/2020 - 2/19/2021
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: May 3, 2021
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-vldr/

If you purchased shares of the above company and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case link above.

If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.

                           About KSF

KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients
– including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors – in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California and Louisiana.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.

Contact:

Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC

Lewis Kahn, Managing Partner
lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163 [GN]

VELODYNE LIDAR: Levi & Korsinsky Reminds of May 3 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP announces that a class action lawsuit has
commenced on behalf of shareholders of Velodyne Lidar, Inc.
Shareholders interested in serving as lead plaintiff have until the
deadline listed to petition the court. Further details about the
case can be found at the link provided. There is no cost or
obligation to you.

VLDR Shareholders Click Here:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/velodyne-lidar-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=13343&wire=1

Velodyne Lidar, Inc. (NASDAQ:VLDR)

VLDR Lawsuit on behalf of: investors who purchased November 9, 2020
- February 19, 2021
Lead Plaintiff Deadline : May 3, 2021
TO LEARN MORE, VISIT:
https://www.zlk.com/pslra-1/velodyne-lidar-inc-loss-submission-form?prid=13343&wire=1

According to the filed complaint, during the class period, Velodyne
Lidar, Inc. made materially false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (1) certain of Velodyne's directors
had failed to operate with respect, honesty, integrity, and candor
in their dealings with the Company's officers and directors; (2)
the Company was investigating the foregoing matters; and (3) as a
result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

You have until the lead plaintiff deadlines to request that the
court appoint you as lead plaintiff. Your ability to share in any
recovery doesn't require that you serve as a lead plaintiff.

Levi & Korsinsky is a nationally recognized firm with offices in
New York, California, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. The firm's
attorneys have extensive expertise and experience representing
investors in securities litigation and have recovered hundreds of
millions of dollars for aggrieved shareholders. Attorney
advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

CONTACT:
Levi & Korsinsky, LLP
Joseph E. Levi, Esq.
55 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10006
jlevi@levikorsinsky.com
Tel: (212) 363-7500
Fax: (212) 363-7171
www.zlk.com [GN]

VERB TECHNOLOGY: Final Judgment Issued in Hartmann Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
issued an Order and Final Judgment approving the settlement in the
lawsuit entitled SCOTT C. HARTMANN, Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. VERB TECHNOLOGY
COMPANY, INC., and RORY J. CUTAIA, Defendants, and BUMJIN KIM,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. VERB TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, INC., and RORY J. CUTAIA,
Defendants, Case Nos. CV 19-5896-GW-MAAx, CV 19-6944-GW-MAAx (C.D.
Cal.).

On February 18, 2021, a hearing was held before the Court to
determine, among other things, whether the terms and conditions of
the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated September 17,
2020 are fair, reasonable and adequate for the settlement of all
claims asserted by the Settlement Class against the Defendants
should be approved.  The Court finds that the prerequisites for a
class action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been satisfied.

The Court finally certifies the action as a class action for
purposes of the Settlement, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all Persons
(including their beneficiaries) who purchased common stock of Verb
Technology Company, Inc. during the period from January 3, 2018
through May 2, 2018, inclusive.

In accordance with the Court's Preliminary Approval Order, the
Court finds that Settlement is approved as fair, reasonable and
adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class. The
Parties are directed to consummate the Settlement in accordance
with the terms and provisions of the Stipulation.

The Action and all claims contained therein, as well as all of the
Released Claims, are dismissed with prejudice as against each and
all of the Defendants. The Parties are to bear their own costs,
except as otherwise provided in the Settlement Stipulation.

Upon the Effective Date, the Releasing Parties, on behalf of
themselves, their successors and assigns, will have, fully,
finally, and forever released, relinquished, and discharged all
Released Claims against the Released Parties.

Exclusive jurisdiction is retained over the Parties and the
Settlement Class Members for all matters relating to the Action,
including the administration, interpretation, effectuation or
enforcement of the Stipulation and this Final Judgment, and
including any application for fees and expenses incurred in
connection with administering and distributing the Settlement Fund
to the Settlement Class Members.

Without further order of the Court, the Defendants and Class
Representatives may agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry
out any of the provisions of the Stipulation.

The finality of the Final Judgment will not be affected, in any
manner, by rulings that the Court makes herein on the proposed Plan
of Allocation or Class Counsel's application for an award of
attorneys' fees and expenses or an award to Class Representatives.

The Class Counsel are awarded $160,000, or 25% of the Settlement
Amount in fees, which the Court finds to be fair and reasonable,
and $17,264.10 in reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Each
Class Representative is awarded $1,000, which the Court finds to be
fair and reasonable. The Defendants and the Released Parties will
have no responsibility for, and no liability whatsoever with
respect to, any payments to Class Counsel, Class Representatives,
the Settlement Class and/or any other Person who receives payment
from the Settlement Fund.

In the event the Settlement is not consummated in accordance with
the terms of the Stipulation, then the Stipulation and the Final
Judgment will have no further force and effect with respect to the
Parties and will not be used in the Action or in any other
proceeding for any purpose, and any judgment or order entered by
the Court in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation will be
treated as vacated, nunc pro tunc, and each Party will be restored
to his, her or its respective litigation positions as they existed
prior to September 17, 2020, pursuant to the terms of the
Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Final Judgment dated Feb.
18, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/ymxssr5p from
Leagle.com.


WB STUDIO: Ettedgui Suit Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled DAVID ETTEDGUI, on behalf of himself and on
behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WB STUDIO
ENTERPRISES INC., a Corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-11410-MCS-MAA (C.D. Cal.), the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California issued an
order:

   -- granting motion to remand to the Superior Court of the
      State of California for the County of Los Angeles;

   -- denying as moot motion to dismiss; and

   -- denying as moot motion to consolidate.

The Court rejected in David Ettedgui v. WB Studio Enterprises,
Inc., Case No. 2:20-cv-08053-MCS-MAA ("Ettedgui I") the argument
that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA")
preempts the Plaintiff's meal period claim. See Order Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss ("MTD Order").

Pending in the matter, Ettedgui II, is a claim under California
Labor Code Section 2699, et seq., removed to the Court based on the
deficient preemption theory in Ettedgui I.

The Plaintiff's instant Motion to Remand argues that the MTD Order
means that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Ettedgui II. WB filed an Opposition and the Plaintiff filed a
Reply. The Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without
oral argument and vacates the hearing.

WB employed the Plaintiff as a "Tour Guide/Floater" from December
4, 2019, to January 4, 2020. Due to the Plaintiff's "rigorous" work
schedule, he was sometimes unable to take meal breaks or rest
periods. WB required the Plaintiff to have a walkie talkie on his
person, which resulted in interrupted breaks. Because of these
interruptions and WB's other violations, the Plaintiff was not
compensated for all hours worked. WB terminated the Plaintiff after
he complained about WB's practices. A collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") "provides for a meal period to be not less than
one-half hour and must be provided not later than six hours after
either reporting for work or after the end of a prior meal
period."

Article 30 of the CBA states in part: Penalty for Delayed
Meals--Straight time allowance at the scheduled Studio Hourly Base
Rate for length of delay. Minimum allowance: one-half hour. Such
allowance will be in addition to the compensation for work time
during the delay, and will not be applied as part of any
guarantee.

The Plaintiff brings a claim for civil penalties under Labor Code
Section 2699, et seq. for violations of California Labor Code
Sections 201-204 210, 226(a), 226.7, 510, 512, 558(a)(1)(2), 1194,
1197, 1197.1, 1198, 2802, and the applicable Wage Orders on behalf
of himself and putative classes of other employees.

Both parties ask the Court to consider pleadings from Ettedgui I
and other cases. WB seeks judicial notice of the CBA and
Memorandums of Agreement between WB and the Professional Employees
International Union, Local #174. The Court considers the CBA and
Memorandums of Agreement, Johnson v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 2012 WL
4483225, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2012).

The parties agree that Ettedgui I's meal period allegations are
"nearly identical" to the Complaint's allegations. Notwithstanding
Ettedgui I's contrary determination, WB argues that removal was
proper because Section 301 preempts at least part of the
Plaintiff's meal period claim. WB alternatively argues that the
Court should consolidate Ettedgui I and II and exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's state law claims.

As in Ettedgui I, the Plaintiff's meal period claim is premised on
the allegations that he could not take timely off-duty breaks, was
not given a second off-duty meal period or penalty pay, and was
required to carry a walkie talkie during meal periods.

District Judge Mark C. Scarsi notes that courts in the Ninth
Circuit apply a two-step analysis to determine whether LMRA
preemption applies, citing Buckner v. Universal Television, LLC,
2017 WL 5956678, at *1 (C.D. Cal. November 30, 2017). First, courts
assess whether the asserted cause of action involves a right
conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law instead of a CBA;
if the right exists solely because of the CBA then the claim is
preempted (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053,
1059 (9th Cir. 2007)). Second, if the right exists independently of
the CBA, courts must still consider whether it is nevertheless
substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA.

WB contends that the Plaintiff's meal period claim is barred by
Section 512(d) of the Labor Code. It specifically contends that the
following CBA provision includes a monetary remedy if the employee
does not receive a meal period required by the agreement: "Penalty
for Delayed Meals--Straight time allowance at the scheduled Studio
Hourly Base Rate for length of delay. Minimum allowance: one-half
hour. Such allowance will be in addition to the compensation for
work time during the delay, and will not be applied as part of any
guarantee."

The Plaintiff avers that this provision pertains only to delayed
meal periods, not denied meal periods, and that his sole recourse
for such denied meal periods, therefore, lies in the Labor Code.

When assessing these arguments and provisions at the pleading stage
in Ettedgui I, the Court affirmed the Plaintiff's interpretation
based on the "CBA's plain language read in light of section
512(d)." The complaints in both matters seek recovery for denied
meal periods, a harm for which the CBA does not include a monetary
remedy whereas Labor Code section 512(a) does. The Court says it
could not conclude in Ettedgui I that the Plaintiff's meal period
claim is solely based on rights conferred by the CBA.

Even if this determination were sound, WB argues, section 301
preempts the claim to the extent it is based on delayed meal
periods, independently supplying jurisdiction. But WB's Notice of
Removal in this action and Motion to Dismiss in Ettedgui I argue
that section 301 completely preempts the Plaintiff's meal period
claim, making no distinction between portions of that claim based
on delayed meals and those based on missed or shortened meals,
Judge Scarsi notes. Only after denial of that argument did WB
contend that jurisdiction exists because some of the Plaintiff's
meal periods may be eligible for compensation under the CBA instead
of state law.

Neither WB's post-hoc removal justification nor the possibility
that some of the Plaintiff's meals were delayed instead of denied
demonstrates that the Plaintiff's state law claims were properly
removed in the first instance, Judge Scarsi opines. WB's argument
concedes that significant portions of the Plaintiff's meal period
claim--i.e. missed or shortened meal periods--are evaluated under
state law and, thus, are not preempted.

Judge Scarsi also notes that WB cites no case denying remand based
on post-removal suggestions that, given the right facts, one
manifestation of an otherwise unremovable claim may trigger a CBA's
remedy. Given the present record and resolving ambiguity in favor
of remand, WB's retrospective "partial" preemption argument does
not satisfy its heavy burden to show that section 301 completely
preempts the Plaintiff's meal period claim. The Court, thus,
declines to recharacterize the Plaintiff's meal period claim as
arising under federal law based on this theory.

WB next argues that the Plaintiff's entire meal period claim
necessitates analysis of the CBA, a point rejected in Ettedgui I.
WB reasons the result here should be different because the Court is
no longer confined to the pleadings and can now consider evidence
that the parties and industry have long considered the CBA to
encompass "all meal periods that are not received timely, including
meal periods that are missed entirely."

An executive's claimed "understanding" that the CBA's "Penalty for
Delayed Meals" actually encompasses all meal periods cannot
circumvent the CBA's plain language or that the Plaintiff seeks to
remedy statutory harms--missed or shortened meal periods--omitted
from that language, according to Judge Scarsi.

Testimony that WB historically paid more meal period penalties than
the CBA required does not establish that the right to such
penalties stems solely from the CBA, nor does it demonstrate that
Plaintiff's asserted rights are substantially dependent on analysis
of the CBA, Judge Scarsi holds.

Finally, WB argues that simply raising its preemption argument
confers jurisdiction. The Court disagrees, as its determination
with respect to the two-step Burnside analysis means that WB's
preemption arguments must be litigated in state court. WB has,
therefore, failed to satisfy its heavy burden to rebut the
presumption against removal.

WB alternatively requests that the Court consolidate Ettedgui I and
II and exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all state law
claims. Judge Scarsi rules that WB's request is denied because the
Court adjudicates remand before consolidation and no independent
jurisdictional basis exists in Ettedgui II.

Accordingly, the Motion to Remand is granted. This matter is
remanded to the Superior Court of California for the County of Los
Angeles Case No. 20BBCV00719. WB's motions to dismiss and to
consolidate and the motion to consolidate in Ettedgui I are denied
as moot. The Clerk of Court will close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated Feb. 18, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/heksxcy from Leagle.com.a


WELLPET LLC: California Northern District Certifies Class in Zeiger
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANIEL ZEIGER, Plaintiff, v. WELLPET LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 3:17-cv-04056-WHO (N.D. Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California has
entered an order:

      a. grating in part and denying in part both the parties'
motions to exclude;

      b. grating in part and denying in part WellPet's motion for
summary judgment on Zeiger's individual claim;

      c. denying without prejudice Zeiger's motion to certify a
23(b)(3) class; and

      d. granting Zeiger's motion to certify a 23(b)(2) class.

Defendant WellPet makes premium-priced dog food that it holds out
to be healthy, nutritious, natural, and high quality.  According to
Plaintiff Zeiger, three WellPet dog foods actually contain small
amounts of arsenic, lead, and bisphenol A ("BPA").  He alleges, on
behalf of himself and several proposed classes, that WellPet misled
consumers by failing to disclose the presence of these substances
and by making claims on the products' packaging that would lead
reasonable consumers to believe the substances were not present.

The case concerns three dog food products manufactured and marketed
by WellPet as part of its "Wellness" line: Complete Health Adult
Whitefish & Sweet Potato, Complete Health Grain Free Adult
Whitefish & Menhaden Fish Meal, and CORE Ocean (with Whitefish,
Herring Meal and Salmon Meal).  Zeiger's broad theory is one of
misrepresentation.  He alleges that WellPet marketed the Wellness
Products as "premium dog food" at a "premium price" that held
itself out as "natural and nutritious."  In reality, he claims, the
Wellness products contain lead, arsenic, and BPA, the presence of
which WellPet did not disclose to consumers.

Zeiger filed the suit in September 2017 on behalf of himself and a
proposed class.  In December 2019, Zeiger moved to file a third
amended complaint, which the Court denied for failure to show
diligence and for the prejudice to WellPet.

The operative complaint alleges six causes of action: (1) negligent
misrepresentation, (2) violation of the California Consumers Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"), (3) violation of California's False
Advertising Law ("FAL"), (4) violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"), (5) breach of express warranty under
California law, and (6) breach of implied warranty under California
law.

WellPet has numerous responses, including that arsenic and lead are
naturally occurring and ubiquitous in the environment and that
small amounts of the substances are likely present in many pet
foods, that all three substances are impossible to fully remove
from the food supply, and that they do not present a health risk in
these small quantities.

Before the Court are WellPet's motion for summary judgment on
Zeiger's individual claims, Zeiger's motion to certify classes, and
both parties' motions to strike and exclude.  Judge Orrick
consolidated the hearing on all pending motions, which was held on
Jan. 27, 2021.

WellPet's Daubert Motion

WellPet moves to exclude the opinions of two of Zeiger's technical
experts and of his damages experts.  WellPet moves to exclude
several opinions of Dr. Gary Pusillo, who opines, among other
things, that (1) there is no safe amount of arsenic, lead, or BPA
in dog food for consumption by dogs and (2) WellPet could have but
did not prevent inclusion of arsenic, lead, and BPA in its dog
food.  Given the weak materiality of that study, Judge Orrick holds
that Pusillo's nebulous assertions of "experience" are insufficient
to show reliability of a theory that appears to have no other
scholarly support.  Accordingly, this opinion will be excluded.

WellPet also moves to exclude Pusillo's opinion that it could have
prevented inclusion of arsenic and lead.  The Judge holds that
Pusillo's opinion on lead and arsenic is admissible (except for his
opinion that the products contained lead and arsenic "for years"),
hence his opinion on BPA will be excluded.

WellPet moves to exclude several opinions of Dr. Sean Callan,
another of Zeiger's experts who analyzed WellPet's products in a
laboratory for traces of BPA.  To form his opinions, Callan tested
105 of WellPet's products for BPA and found that 59 contain
"quantifiable levels of BPA."  Callan offers several opinions about
these results that WellPet does not challenge.  WellPet objects,
though, to Callan's opinions about WellPet's quality control
procedures and possible sources of BPA in pet food.

Judge Orrick granted the motion to strike Callan's opinions about
quality control and alternate sources of BPA.  Callan's other
opinions, including the lab results, are not struck.  He is also
permitted to testify that he was unable to review the suitability
of WellPet's BPA testing methodology, a subject he is properly
qualified to opine about.  He is not permitted to offer the
remaining opinions in the paragraph quoted in the Order.

Finally, WellPet moves to exclude the opinions of Zeiger's damages
experts, Colin Weir and Steven Gaskin.  Zeiger's economic experts
conducted a conjoint analysis where they determine how much more a
consumer is paying for a WellPet product with the presence of the
Wellness Statements and/or the absence of the omissions.  Gaskin
has produced a full refund model.  Although Zeiger resists this
characterization, the end-result of the analysis would be a full
refund for two of the three products and very close to it for the
third if Zeiger's theories were accepted at trial.

Judge Orrick finds it is conceivable that the problems may have
resulted from not revealing a sufficient amount of information
about arsenic, lead, and BPA to the survey participants.  But it
seems more than possible for an analysis to sufficiently capture
the price premium consumers paid due to the Wellness Statements and
omissions; there appears to be no barrier to some price being
applied that is sufficiently reliable and tied to the injury.  This
is a fairly standard case in terms of how one might measure
damages.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Orrick granted in part and denied in
part WellPet's Daubert Motion.

Zeiger's Motion to Strike

Zeiger moves to strike portions of the Declaration of Gregory G.
Kean, WellPet's Vice President of Innovation and Product
Development, that WellPet submitted in support of its Opposition to
class certification.  He argues that Kean was not disclosed as an
expert yet renders expert opinions; he also argues that Kean offers
inadmissible legal opinions.

As an initial matter, WellPet argues that the motion should be
rejected because it was not made earlier.  Judge Orrick disagrees.
He holds that at the time of that dispute, WellPet had not
identified Kean as an expert.  If WellPet had disclosed Kean as an
expert, he would be subject to such a motion today.  Because
WellPet did not, it is fair for Zeiger to move to strike and for
WellPet to oppose that motion.

Next, Zeiger objects to two types of testimony from Kean.  First,
Kean discusses the Association of American Feed Control Officials
("AAFCO"), a voluntary association of animal food and drug
regulators.  Second, Zeiger objects to testimony about heavy metals
and BPA in five paragraphs of the declaration.

The Judge holds that Kean may not opine that WellPet's products
"satisfy the AAFCO definition of 'natural.'  All of that is plainly
specialized knowledge that requires expertise.  Although Kean may
have acquired this knowledge during the course of his job, the
opinions themselves cross the line into "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge."  They--but not the other evidence
discussed above--will be struck.  Also, allowing Kean's improper
opinions and denying this motion to strike would mean that Kean
could testify to expert opinions without having gone through any of
the hurdles that other experts do.

Finally, Zeiger moves to strike the opinions in four paragraphs of
Kean's Declaration as "improper legal opinions."  The Judge agrees
that the portion of this opinion purporting to show consistency
with FDA regulations--and interpreting them--is not admissible.
The first sentence, however, is admissible on this ground to the
extent it simply relates what WellPet did or determined.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Orrick granted in part and denied in
part Zeiger's Motion to Strike.

WellPet's Motion for Summary Judgment

WellPet moves for summary judgment on all of Zeiger's (individual)
claims.  WellPet contends that (i) Zeiger cannot show that the
amounts of arsenic, lead, and BPA in the Wellness Products are a
health risk to dogs; (ii) there is no evidence that Zeiger relied
on the Wellness Statements or omissions; (iii) Zeiger cannot prove
damages or establish that he is entitled to restitution under
California law; (iv) Zeiger has an adequate remedy at law and so
cannot seek equitable relief, including an injunction; (v) Zeiger's
negligent misrepresentation claim is barred by the economic loss
rule; and (vi) there is not, as a matter of law, anything
misleading about its packaging.

Judge Orrick holds that Zeiger has shown genuine disputes of
material fact about the safety of these levels of arsenic and lead
in dog food.  But Zeiger has not shown that these levels of BPA
present any risk.  He has also shown genuine disputes of material
fact about most remaining issues, including whether reasonable
consumers would be misled by the representations and omissions.

For these reasons, he granted in part and denied in part WellPet's
Motion for Summary Judgment.  He granted the motion (1) to the
extent that Zeiger claims that the amount of BPA in the Wellness
Products is a safety risk, (2) with regard to damages, and (3) on
the negligent misrepresentation claim.  He otherwise denied the
motion.

Zeiger's Motion for Class Certification

Zeiger moves for certification on all of his claims.  Zeiger
proposes that three classes be certified, one for each of the
Wellness Products.  His proposed definitions are as follows:

      a. Wellness Class: All persons in California who, from July
1, 2013, to the present, purchased Wellness Complete Health Adult
Dry Whitefish and Sweet Potato dog food for household or business
use, and not for resale.

      b. Wellness Grain-Free Class: All persons in California who,
from July 1, 2013, to the present, purchased Wellness Complete
Health Adult Grain Free Whitefish and Menhaden Fish Meal dog food
for household or business use, and not for resale.

      c. Core Class: All persons in California who, from July 1,
2013, to the present, purchased Wellness CORE Adult Dry Ocean
Whitefish, Herring Meal and Salmon Meal dog food for household or
business use, and not for resale.

WellPet's primary objections to the 23(b)(3) class is that Zeiger
has failed to show that common issues predominate because (1) he
cannot demonstrate misrepresentation or causation on a class-wide
basis and (2) damages cannot be measured on a class-wide basis.
WellPet also argues that Zeiger does not satisfy the typicality
requirement, lacks standing to pursue some claims, and has not
shown that his alternative injunctive relief or liability classes
should be certified.

Judge Orrick holds that Zeiger has met many of the requirements for
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
Zeiger has not, however, put forward an admissible damages model or
shown that he can.  As a result, his motion to certify under Rule
23(b)(3) is denied.  Because the lack of an admissible damages
model is the only barrier to certification and it appears possible
that such a model could be advanced, Zeiger has leave to renew his
motion with a new damages model.  His motion to certify classes
under Rule 23(b)(2) is granted; the classes he proposes will be
certified for purposes of injunctive relief.

Zeiger alternatively moves to certify a liability-only class under
Rule 23(c)(4).  Because Rule 23(c)(4) is the fallback,
certification is denied without prejudice on the understanding that
Zeiger will move to certify a class with an appropriate damages
model.  At that time, Zeiger may also move for a 23(c)(4) class as
an alternative if he wishes.  If--after reviewing this ruling and
consulting with experts--Zeiger concludes that no admissible
damages model can be put forward, he may also elect to move again
for a Rule 23(c)(4) class if he wishes.  If he does so, he should
illustrate that there is sufficient added utility to doing so in
light of the 23(b)(2) certification.

Motions to Seal

WellPet seeks to redact and seal information and exhibits.  Judge
Orrick granted these motions.  He holds that the information it
seeks to seal is narrowly tailored and falls into two sealable
categories.  First, WellPet seeks to redact the suggested and
minimum prices for its products (the prices charged are public) as
well as its strategy for determining those prices.  These
redactions are narrow and the information could reasonably place
WellPet at a competitive disadvantage if disclosed.  To the extent
that prices matter to the labelling debate discussed, that
information is disclosed in the parties' briefs; accordingly, this
information does not require sealing anything in the Order.  Should
this information become important at trial, including for purposes
of calculating damages, it will be unsealed.  Second, WellPet moves
to redact individual consumers' identifying information, which is
plainly sealable and narrowly tailed.

The parties may stipulate to a schedule for creation of a new
expert report, discovery on that report, a renewed motion to
certify, and (perhaps) a Daubert motion from WellPet about the
proffered damages model.  Renewed briefing on class certification
should focus exclusively on the damages model because the issues
have otherwise been settled; the page limits for both a motion to
certify and a Daubert motion will be 15 for motions and oppositions
and 8 for replies.  If the parties cannot agree to a schedule
within 21 days, they should submit a joint letter brief of no more
than 5 pages total laying out their proposed timelines and Judge
Orrick will set one.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/9zttk4eu from Leagle.com.


WESTFIELD INSURANCE: Wins Bid to Dismiss Equity Planning Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EQUITY PLANNING CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. WESTFIELD
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:20-CV-01204 (N.D. Ohio),
Judge Pamela A. Barker of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio granted Westfield's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff
Equity Planning Corporation's Complaint.

On April 27, 2020, Plaintiff E.P. filed a Class Action Complaint
stemming from losses it alleges it suffered as a result of the
global COVID-19 pandemic.  E.P. is a commercial real estate
management and leasing company.  It leases properties to tenants
throughout Ohio and other states.  It alleges that it suffered a
loss of use of its properties, resulting in a substantial loss of
business income when its tenants were forced to shut down their
non-essential businesses during Ohio's Stay At Home Order, thus
prohibiting its tenants' ability to pay rent to E.P.

E.P. alleges that at all relevant times, Westfield insured E.P.
under an "all-risk" commercial/business owner policy numbered TRA
0-343-47M.  According to E.P., the Policy included Business Income
and Extra Expense Coverage, which E.P. alleges was meant to provide
coverage in the event of business closures by order of Civil
Authority.  It alleges that, under the Policy, insurance applies to
the "actual loss of business income sustained and the actual,
necessary and reasonable extra expenses incurred" when access to
its property is prohibited by order of Civil Authority as "the
direct result of a covered loss to property" in the immediate
vicinity of its property.

According to E.P., "covered physical loss includes, without
limitation, loss of use and/or loss of utilization of the
properties."  It alleges that under the terms of the Policy, a
"physical loss" does not mean and/or require tangible "physical
damage" to its property.  It alleges that the COVID-19 global
pandemic has "physically impacted both public and private property
and physical spaces around the world," because COVID-19 can
"physically infect and stay on surfaces of objects or materials for
up to 28 days."

As the seriousness of the COVID-19 global pandemic became clear,
health officials across the globe began issuing public health
orders in an attempt to halt COVID-19's spread.  On March 23, 2020,
the State of Ohio issued its Stay At Home Order, which ordered all
Ohioans to stay at home and all non-essential businesses to cease
their activities until further notice.  E.P. alleges that certain
of its tenants were forced to shut down their non-essential
businesses during Ohio's Stay At Home Order, thus prohibiting its
tenants' ability to pay rent to E.P.  E.P. alleges that because its
tenants were forced to shut down, E.P. suffered "a loss of use of
its Properties," and also a "substantial loss of business income.

After several of its tenants became unable to pay rent, E.P. made a
claim with Westfield under the Policy's business income coverage.
According to E.P., Westfield acknowledged the claim on March 26,
2020 and assigned it claim number 0002131022.  On April 20, 2020,
Westfield issued a letter denying coverage to E.P.

E.P. alleges that a pandemic is a covered loss under the subject
Policy and that Westfield based its denial of E.P.'s claim based on
"exclusions that are not applicable to a pandemic."  It seeks to
certify a nationwide Declaratory Relief Class, a nationwide
Restitution/Monetary Relief Sub-Class, and an Ohio State Sub-Class
for Insurance Bad Faith.  Its Complaint sets forth three causes of
action: (1) declaratory judgment; (2) breach of contract; and (3)
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

On April 27, 2020, E.P. filed its Complaint in the Court of Common
Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio against Westfield.  On June 1, 2020,
Defendant removed the action to the Court, pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").  On June 3, 2020, the Defendant filed
the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
or in the alternative, to strike the Class allegations.

E.P. moved to remand the matter back to the Court of Common Pleas
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  The Court denied E.P.'s Motion to Remand
on Oct. 6, 2020.  Subsequently, E.P. filed a Response to
Westfield's Motion to Dismiss on Oct. 27, 2020.  Westfield filed a
Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss on Nov. 10, 2020.  Thus,
Westfield's Motion to Dismiss became ripe for a decision on Nov.
10, 2020.

Westfield argues that E.P.'s Complaint should be dismissed for four
overarching reasons: (1) a "loss of use or loss of market", as
alleged by E.P. is excluded from the definition of what constitutes
a Covered Cause of Loss capable of giving rise to Business Income
and Extra Expense coverage; (2) because E.P. fails to allege that
the suspected or actual presence of coronavirus at its properties
resulted in a tangible structural alteration to the affected
properties it does not constitute "direct physical loss of or
damage to" its properties under Ohio law; (3) E.P.'s Civil
Authority coverage claim fails because Ohio's Stay At Home Order
was issued to prevent the spread of COVID-19, not to remediate
existing damage at a property adjacent to E.P.'s; and (4) E.P.'s
Policy contains an unambiguous Virus Exclusion that bars coverage
for loss or damage resulting from any virus capable of inducing
disease or illness.

In its Response to Westfield's Motion to Dismiss, E.P. argues that
the Virus Exclusion does not bar coverage because it is ambiguous
and does not contain an anti-concurrent causation clause;
Westfield's definition of "direct physical loss of or damage to"
covered property is overly narrow; E.P. properly pleaded direct
physical loss or damage to its covered property "due to the
probable presence" of COVID-19 particles; and that the Covered
Cause of Loss exclusion for "loss of use or loss of market" does
not exclude coverage here.

Judge Barker finds that E.P. fails to plausibly allege a threshold
claim of "direct physical loss of or damage to" its insured
premises, and therefore, E.P.'s claim for Business Income and Extra
Expense coverage fails.  She says the form does not define "direct
physical loss of or damage to" insured property.  However, simply
because a term in a contract is not defined does not mean that the
policy is ambiguous.  When an insurance contract does not define a
term, the Court looks to the plain and ordinary meaning of the
language used in the policy unless another meaning is clearly
apparent from the contents of the policy.

Next, the Judge finds that threshold coverage under the Business
Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage Form requires "direct physical
loss of or damage to" insured property.  The plain, ordinary
meaning of "direct physical loss of or damage to" contemplates
tangible, demonstrable alteration to the insured premises.  This
reading is supported by persuasive Ohio appellate case law that the
plaintiff-insured plead distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration
of the insured property.  Accepting the factual allegations in
E.P.'s Complaint as true, the Judge holds that E.P. fails to plead
any physical alteration of its insured property.  Accordingly, E.P.
fails to meet the threshold for coverage under the Business Income
(and Extra Expense) Coverage Form.

The Judge then finds that E.P. is not entitled to Civil Authority
coverage, based on the plain, ordinary meaning of the Policy
language.  The availability of Civil Authority coverage turns on
the meaning of the undefined term "direct physical loss."  The
plain, ordinary meaning of the term "direct physical loss" does not
apply to the COVID-19-related economic losses that E.P. alleges in
its Complaint.  Thus, E.P. is not entitled to Civil Authority
coverage under the Business Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage
Form.  Moreover, a plain reading of the Civil Authority provision
confirms that E.P. cannot plausibly allege coverage under the
provision.  E.P. fails to allege any damage to "property other than
property at the described premises," within one mile of any of its
own properties.

The Judge further finds that Westfield demonstrated that the Virus
Exclusion applies to bar coverage in the instant matter.  He finds
that the language is plain and unambiguous.  The Virus Exclusion
unambiguously excludes coverage for E.P.'s alleged COVID-19-related
losses.  And E.P.'s argument that the Virus Exclusion is
inapplicable when the alleged cause of loss is a "100-year
pandemic" is unavailing.  To refer to COVID-19 as a "pandemic" is
to refer to the worldwide outbreak and spread of the disease caused
by the COVID-19 virus.  By the Virus Exclusion's own terms, claims
for loss or damage resulting from viruses are excluded.

Finally, in its Motion to Dismiss, Westfield argues that E.P.'s
Count III claim, for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, fails as a matter of law because E.P. is not entitled to
coverage as a matter of law and, therefore, Westfield's denial of
coverage was per se reasonable.  E.P. did not respond to
Westfield's argument that Westfield's coverage position was per se
reasonable.  As she discussed, the Judge holds that the Policy does
not provide coverage for E.P.'s claimed losses.  Thus, Westfield's
denial of coverage was reasonable and E.P.'s bad faith claim must
be dismissed.

As an alternative to its Motion to Dismiss, Westfield also moved to
strike E.P.'s class allegations.  Because she dismisses E.P.'s
Complaint in its entirety, the Judge will deny as moot Westfield's
Alternative Motion to Strike Class Allegations.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Barker concludes that E.P. fails to
plausibly allege claims that meet the threshold to trigger coverage
under the Policy.  Accordingly, she granted Westfield's Motion to
Dismiss, and denied as moot itsMotion to Strike Class Allegations.

A full-text copy of the Court's Feb. 26, 2021 Memorandum of Opinion
& Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4pw2cn27 from
Leagle.com.


YOURMECHANIC INC: Suris Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Yourmechanic, Inc.
The case is styled as Yaroslav Suris, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Yourmechanic, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-01172 (E.D.N.Y., March 4, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

YourMechanic -- https://www.yourmechanic.com/ -- is an online
marketplace that enables vehicle owners to find local mechanics for
home or office car repair services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mitchell Segal, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL SEGAL P.C.
          1129 Northern Boulevard, Suite 404
          Manhasset, NY 11030
          Phone: (516) 415-0100
          Email: msegal@segallegal.com




                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***