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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Friday, April 9, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 66

                            Headlines

5 TELLERS ASSOCIATES: Liz's Bid to Certify Class Granted in Part
A.V.M. ENTERPRISES: Wins Summary Judgment in GMI TCPA Class Suit
ADVANCED MARKETING: N.H. Court Narrows Claims in Daschbach Suit
AETNA LIFE: Lake's Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant Dismissed
ALL MY SONS: Vega FLSA Suit Seeks Class Certification

AMERICAN HONDA: Court OKs Aberin, et al. Class Certification Bid
AMERICAN MEDICAL: Court Tosses Mendell Bid to Certify Class
APPLE INC: Claims in Taleshpour Suit Over Defective Laptop Narrowed
APTIM SERVICES: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Action Sought
BALTIMORE CITY, MD: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Hoskins Suit

BOILING CRAB: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Action Sought
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS: Aquilina Suit Seeks to Certify Class
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS: Seeks Denial of Aquilina Class Cert. Bid
CONSUMER GUARDIAN: Bid to Dismiss Hardwick CROA Suit Partly Granted
CVS HEALTH: Joseph Mier Seeks Rule 23 Class Certification

DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Sanchez Bid for Class Status Nixed w/o Prejudice
DAN KEEN: Corey Vasquez Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
DDT CONCRETE: Sensing Suit Seeks FLSA Conditional Certification
ECO SHIELD: Court OKs Initial Approval Quatinetz Settlement
EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Fodera Given Leave to File 3rd Amended Complaint

FACEBOOK INC: Supreme Court Flips 9th Cir. Judgment in Duguid Suit
FCA US: $126K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Tomassini Class Suit
FIFTH THIRD BANK: Klopfenstein Suit Seeks to Certify Two Classes
FORCES OF NATURE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Slowinski Class Suit
FORD MOTOR: Claims in Carter's Second Amended Complaint Narrowed

FRANKLIN COUNTY, OH: Plaintiffs' Bid to Certify Class Terminated
GREYSTAR REAL: Bid to Strike/Dismiss Class Claims in Wallace Nixed
HUDSON HALL: Stewart Labor Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Employees
INDEGENE INC: PHRC Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Nixed
KYOTO SUSHI: Court Denies Chen's Bid to Modify Arbitration Award

MARIA D'S INC.: Conditional Cert. of Collective Action Sought
MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: TASC's Subpoena in Briggs Suit Partly Quashed
MATCH GROUP: Court Dismisses Crutchfield's Amended Securities Suit
MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: Case & Bautista Merged; Lead Counsel Named
MERRILL LYNCH: Class Cert. Briefing Date Extended to September 21

NELNET INC: District of Nebraska Narrows Claims in Johansson Suit
OLLIE'S BARGAIN: Persons With Disabilities Class Certified in Allen
OUTLAW LABORATORIES: Stores to File Amended Class Certification Bid
PG&E CORP: Dismissal of Gantner's Class Action Complaint Affirmed
PLANET FITNESS: Court Dismisses Williams Suit Without Prejudice

PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES: Court Certifies Class of Janitors
SELECT PORTFOLIO: Withdrawal of Giffney Class Cert. Bid OK'd
SVENSK MANAGEMENT: FLSA Collective Action Conditionally Certified
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Fritsch Suit Seeks Rule 23 Class Status
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Faruqi Named Lead Counsel in Halman Aldubi

TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Denson Class Suit
UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Wins Bids to Dismiss Pacific's State-Law Claims
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY: Niblock Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI: Santiago Suit to Proceed as to Breach Claim
WELLS FARGO: Simon Labor Suit Seeks to Certify Five Classes

WELLS FARGO: Wins Prelim. OK of $95.7-Mil. Settlement in Kang Suit
WSP USA: Ford FLSA Suit Seeks Conditional Class Certification

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: AFG Has $572MM Liability for A&E Reserves
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Intl. Defends 3,615 Claims at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Alcoa Has Adequate Reserves for PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: CenterPoint Energy Still Faces PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cincinnati Financial Has $85MM Loss for A&E Claims

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cleveland-Cliffs Still Faces Exposure Suits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Cork Faces 1,500 New PI Claims in 2020
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Curtiss-Wright Has Pending Injury Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas has $572MM Reserves
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Entergy Corp. Faces 200 Exposure Lawsuits

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Everest Re Group Has $194.1MM Loss Reserves
ASBESTOS UPDATE: FMC Corp. Has 9,100 Pending Claims at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Forum Energy's Subsidiary Faces Exposure Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Harsco Corp. Faces 17,159 PI Suits at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Idex Corp. and Subsidiaries Faces PI Lawsuits

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll Rand Faces Numerous PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lantheus Holdings Identifies Asbestos-Related ARO
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Inc. and Subsidiaries Faces PI Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Resolute Forest Products Faces Several PI Suits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Sealed Air Faces Multiple Suits in Canada

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Sempra Energy's Subsidiaries Faces PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Teledyne Technologies Still Faces PI Claims
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Transocean Ltd. Defends 255 PI Lawsuits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Still Defends 4,655 Suits
ASBESTOS UPDATE: United Fire Group Has $2.5MM A&E Loss Reserves

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Solutions Defends 190 PI Cases at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Vontier Corp. Has $68MM Liabilities at Dec. 31
ASBESTOS UPDATE: Xylem Inc. Could Face Future PI Claim


                            *********

5 TELLERS ASSOCIATES: Liz's Bid to Certify Class Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled ANA LIZ AND WALY FERREIRA INDIVIDUALLY, AND
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiffs v. 5
TELLERS ASSOCIATES, L.P., 5 TELLERS DEVELOPMENT FUND COMPANY, INC.,
PARKVIEW APARTMENTS, LLC, PROPERTY MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., JOHN
VOLANDES, AND PETER VOLANDES, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, Defendants,
Case No. 20-CV-212 (MKB) (RER) (E.D.N.Y.), Magistrate Judge Ramon
E. Reyes, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York granted in part the Plaintiff's motion for conditional
class certification.

Named Plaintiff Waly Ferreira and Opt-In Plaintiffs Mario
Villanueva, Jonny Bonilla, and Francisco Antonio Liz
("Superintendents") move for conditional certification of a
collective and permission to send notice to potential opt-in
members pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b). They further request that Defendant Property
Management Group ("PMG") be ordered to provide the contact
information necessary to issue notice.

On January 10, 2020, Named Plaintiffs Ana Liz and Ferreira
commenced the action on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated persons. They allege that PMG, 5 Tellers Associates, L.P.,
5 Tellers Development Fund Co., Inc. ("5 Tellers HDFC"), Parkview
Apartments, LLC, John Volandes, and Peter Volandes violated the
FLSA and New York Labor Law ("NYLL"). Ferreira filed his consent to
be a party in a collective action on January 10, 2020. Villanueva,
J. Bonilla, and F. Liz then each consented to be a party in a
collective action.

The Named Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 5 Tellers L.P., 5
Tellers HDFC, and Parkview are part of a centrally managed real
estate enterprise that owns, controls, and manages apartment
buildings in New York City. They further allege that John and Peter
Volandes exercised ownership and control over the other 5 Tellers
Defendants. The Named Plaintiffs, 5 Tellers Defendants, and PMG
agree that PMG managed certain apartment buildings on behalf of the
5 Tellers Defendants. The Named Plaintiffs and 5 Tellers Defendants
also agree that PMG had control and decision-making authority over
the teens and conditions of employment at those buildings,
including wage policies and practices. PMG counters that it
provided only 'back office' services, such as collecting rent from
tenants and other ministerial activities."

The buildings where the Superintendents worked were owned by
different corporate entities, but Ferreira, Villanueva, J. Bonilla,
and Blanco aver that PMG enforced the same wage and hour practices
at the different buildings it managed. They allege a centralized
management structure of PMG. The Superintendents and Blanco agree
that PMG oversaw payroll and other employment-related issues.

5 Tellers L.P., 5 Tellers HDFC, Parkview, John Volandes, and Peter
Volandes ("5 Tellers Defendants") filed an Answer on March 6, 2020.
They later amended their Answer to include a cross claim against
PMG. PMG answered the Complaint and cross claim on May 13, 2020.
PMG also asserted cross claims against the 5 Tellers Defendants.

The Court referred the case to mediation on February 20, 2020.
Following mediation, the case remained unresolved. The Court then
ordered the parties to complete discovery by June 1, 2021.

The Superintendents filed their Motion to Certify FLSA Collective
Action on November 9, 2020. PMG opposed the motion. While the
motion has been pending, Jose Nicolas Blanco and Ramon R. Ferreira
filed their consent to join the collective.

Judge Reyes opines that the Superintendents' allegations are
sufficient as to PMG-managed buildings in the Bronx, New York. The
Superintendents' submissions satisfy their burden of a modest
factual showing that they are similarly situated to other
superintendents at PMG-managed buildings in the Bronx because five
declarations before the Court corroborate the pleadings and give
rise to an inference that the same wage and hour policy was
enforced across PMG-managed buildings in those locations. The
Superintendents also established that there are similarly situated
employees.

At the conditional certification stage, the Court need only find
that the Superintendents' factual showing adequately supports an
inference that a uniform policy or practice exists under common
ownership or management, Judge Reyes notes, citing Contrera, 278 F.
Supp. 3d at 714 (quoting Cruz v. Ham N Eggery Inc., 2016 WL
4186967, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2016)).

In their Complaint, the Named Plaintiffs anticipated that the FLSA
Collective would refer to "all persons who are, or have been,
employed as superintendents and maintenance workers at the 5
Tellers Buildings from three (3) years prior to this action's
filing through the date of the final disposition who elect to
opt-in to this action."

The Superintendents now requests that the Collective include
"current and former superintendents of all residential apartment
buildings owned and/or managed by PMG who, while performing work
for Defendants at any time between January 10, 2017 and the
present, did not receive pay at least at the minimum wage rate for
all hours worked and/or overtime compensation for all hours over
forty that they worked in a workweek."

PMG argues that the Superintendents' revised definition for the
collective should be construed as an acknowledgment that the
appropriate collective is only those superintendents employed by
the 5 Tellers Defendants in buildings managed by PMG. However, PMG
provides no legal support for its argument that they should not be
permitted to seek conditional certification of the amended proposed
collective, and the Court finds none.

Judge Reyes finds that the Superintendents appropriately modified
part of the anticipated opt-in collective after limited discovery.
For example, maintenance workers were removed from the proposed
collective because Named Plaintiff Ana Liz, a porter, no longer
seeks to represent a collective. The Superintendents are directed
to further modify the collective in accordance with this order;
namely, to include only superintendents who worked at PMG-managed
buildings in the Bronx.

Judge Reyes grants the Superintendents' request for authorization
to send notice and reminder notice by mail, email, and text
message, and their request to distribute the notice in Spanish, as
well as English.

The Superintendents also request that the Court order that "the
FLSA statute of limitations be tolled from the date of filing of
this motion until such time as the Court resolves [it].") PMG does
not oppose this request.

While the limitations period for each potential plaintiff continues
to run until they elect to opt-in to the action, 29 U.S.C. Section
256(b), some plaintiffs may be eligible for equitable tolling,
Judge Reyes holds. It is, therefore, appropriate that notices of
the collective action be sent to prospective plaintiffs, who worked
for the Defendants from six years prior to the filing of the motion
for collective action (November 9, 2020), rather than the date upon
which notice is mailed, Judge Reyes ruled.

The Superintendents further seek an order from the Court directing
PMG "to produce a computer-readable data file containing the names,
last known mailing addresses, all known home and mobile telephone
numbers, all known email addresses, work locations, dates of
employment, and primary languages spoken of all potential
collective action members wild) worked at buildings owned or
managed by PMG at any point from November 9, 2014 to the present."
The Court assumes that this request seeks to include
superintendents, who may have claims under the NYLL.

Judge Reyes rules that notice will be sent to superintendents, who
worked for PMG-managed buildings in the Bronx during the six years
prior to the filing of the motion for collective action.
Accordingly, PMG is directed to produce the requested contact
information.

For the reasons set forth, the Superintendents' motion for
conditional certification of a collective action is granted in
part. A collective action of superintendents, who worked or work at
PMG-managed buildings in the Bronx from January 10, 2017, to
present, is conditionally certified and the proposed notice is
approved with modification. The Superintendents' request for
equitable tolling is granted in part. Within 14 days of the Order,
the Defendants are directed to provide the Plaintiffs' counsel with
the requested contact information for potential collective action
members for the purpose of issuing the notice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum & Order dated April 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/uuthsxdu from
Leagle.com.


A.V.M. ENTERPRISES: Wins Summary Judgment in GMI TCPA Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GORSS MOTELS INC., Plaintiff v. A.V.M. ENTERPRISES,
INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 3:17-CV-01078 (KAD) (D. Conn.),
Judge Kari A. Dooley of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut:

    (i) grants A.V.M.'s motion for summary judgment; and

   (ii) denies Gorss Motels Inc. ("GMI")'s motion for summary
        judgment.

Plaintiff GMI brings the case under the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA"), as amended by the Junk Fax
Prevention Act of 2005 ("JFPA").  GMI alleges that Defendant A.V.M.
sent six unsolicited facsimile advertisements to GMI in violation
of the TCPA.

GMI is the former corporate owner of a Super 8-branded motel and a
franchisee of Wyndham Hotel Group.  Steven Gorss is the former
president of the company.  To become, and then maintain status as,
a Super 8-branded motel, GMI entered into a series of franchise
agreements.  After first becoming a Super-8 franchisee in 1988, GMI
signed an extension to the company's original franchise agreement
in 2009 and a renewed franchise agreement in 2014.  Before entering
into the 2014 Franchise Agreement with Wyndham, GMI was required to
complete and sign a Franchise Application Form, which included the
company's contact information and fax number, and to sign off on
Franchise Disclosure Documents, which included information about
franchise standards and the mechanism by which GMI could purchase
certain goods.

The 2014 Franchise Agreement also included a Property Improvement
Plan, or "PIP," that mandated certain updates to GMI's franchise.
Specifically, the PIP required GMI to, among other things, make
updates to the hotel's breakfast area, bed sets, draperies, and
case goods.  The PIP also stated that Wyndham would provide its
vendors with GMI's contact information.

A.V.M. is a Wyndham-approved supplier of "soft" goods, which
includes items such as bedding, drapes, personal paper products,
small fixtures, small appliances, case goods, and other supplies.
Ut became part of Wyndham's supply chain as an approved supplier in
2009, after signing an agreement with Wyndham-affiliate Worldwide
Sourcing Solutions, Inc. ("WSSI").  WSSI is the entity through
which Wyndham operates the approved supplier program.  With certain
exceptions, Wyndham did not require its franchisees to purchase
their operational materials through approved suppliers, and A.V.M.
was not an exclusive supplier. A handful of suppliers provided the
same types of product as A.V.M.

Nevertheless, Wyndham negotiated with suppliers, including A.V.M.,
to support the purchasing efforts of Wyndham franchisees, and
Wyndham collected a commission for sales made by approved suppliers
through Wyndham's systems.  Wyndham also worked with A.V.M. and its
other approved suppliers to create advertisements for broadcasting
to Wyndham franchisees via fax.  Wyndham arranged to send the fax
advertisements through a third-party company using a recipient list
generated and provided by Wyndham.  A.V.M. does not have GMI's fax
number in A.V.M.'s system.

Between June 15, 2015, and May 16, 2016, GMI received six faxes
advertising A.V.M.'s products.  All six of these advertisements
include descriptions and prices for goods implicated by the PIP.
Five of these six faxes contain a reference to Wyndham.

GMI sold its interest in the Super-8 franchise location at issue on
May 24, 2016, and GMI, as an incorporated entity, brought its
lawsuit against A.V.M. as a class action on June 29, 2017.  After a
hearing, the Court (Bolden, J.) denied A.V.M.'s motion to dismiss
on Feb. 2, 2018.  The Court denied GMI's motion for class
certification on Sept. 10, 2019.

Pending before the Court are the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment.  In its motion for summary judgment, GMI argues that
A.V.M. violated the TCPA by sending six unsolicited fax
advertisements. A.V.M., in its own motion for summary judgment,
argues that the faxes in question were not unsolicited because GMI
gave prior express invitation or permission for approved suppliers,
including A.V.M., to send fax advertisements.  A.V.M. also argues
that GMI should be collaterally estopped from litigating the
question of whether it consented to receive fax advertisements
under the 2014 Franchise Agreement and the 2014 Property
Improvement Plan.

Judge Dooley notes that "prior express permission" has the same
meaning as "prior express consent" under the TCPA, and a consumer
has given its prior express consent to receive a fax advertisement
when that consumer receives an advertisement that is related to the
reason the party provided its contact number.  The Defendant bears
the burden of proving that it had such prior express consent, but a
specifically tailored, signed document memorializing such consent
is not necessary to carrying that burden.

The remaining question, then, is whether, A.V.M. has met its burden
of proof on the issue of whether GMI gave its prior express
permission to receive the facsimile advertisements.  Judge Dooley
answers this question by determining whether the advertisements
were related to the reason GMI provided its fax number.

Judge Dooley finds that GMI gave its consent to Wyndham to provide
its contact information to vendors that might help GMI meet the
requirements in the PIP, and GMI received -- as A.V.M. put it in
its summary judgment memorandum -- "precisely the type of
communication" to which GMI had consented: Dax advertisements about
products that would help the company meet the requirements of the
PIP.  This finding is enough to support granting A.V.M.'s summary
judgement motion because neither party contests the validity of the
2014 Franchise Agreement or the PIP.  Instead, the parties merely
disagree as to the import of those documents on the issues
presented.  The Judge concludes that these documents demonstrate
that GMI provided its express prior invitation or permission to
receive fax advertisements.  Accordingly, the six faxes at issue
were not unsolicited, and A.V.M. did not violate the TCPA, as
amended by the JFPA.

For these reasons, Judge Dooley concludes that A.V.M. has met its
burden to show that the case presents no genuine issues of material
fact in regard to the prior express invitation or permission
defense.  She grants A.V.M.'s motion for summary judgment and
denies GMI's motion for summary judgment.  The Clerk of the Court
is directed to enter judgment and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum of
Decision is available at https://tinyurl.com/jrm6974s from
Leagle.com.


ADVANCED MARKETING: N.H. Court Narrows Claims in Daschbach Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Richard Daschbach, et al. v. Advanced Marketing &
Processing, Inc., Civil No. 20-cv-0706-JL (D.N.H.), Judge Joseph N.
Laplante of the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Hampshire grants the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction as to Person's claim, and denies without
prejudice as to the claims of out-of-state, putative class
members.

The motion before the Court centers on two issues -- the Court's
personal jurisdiction over the claims of an out-of-state named
Plaintiff and putative, out-of-state class members, and the
formation of an online agreement to arbitrate.  The Plaintiffs,
Richard Daschbach and Elcinda Person, are residents of New
Hampshire and Georgia, respectively.  They allege that they
received unsolicited, autodialed telemarketing communications on
their personal cellular telephones from the Defendant Advanced
Marketing and Processing, Inc., doing business as Protect My Car
("PMC"), an auto warranty company headquartered in Florida.
Daschbach and Person filed a putative class action complaint in the
Court in June 2020, arguing that PMC violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by sending these unsolicited
communications.  PMC responded with the instant motion.

In the motion, PMC argues that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over it as to the claims of Person and the
out-of-state putative class members.  Thus, PMC moves to dismiss
these claims for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).  Separately, PMC asserts that, a
couple months prior to the allegedly unsolicited communications,
both Plaintiffs visited websites in which they agreed to receive
communications from PMC and to be bound by the websites' terms,
which included arbitration of any disputes with PMC.  Accordingly,
PMC moves to compel arbitration of the TCPA claims and stay or
dismiss the Plaintiffs' suit, under the Federal Arbitration Act.

Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

PMC moves to dismiss Person's claim and the claims of out-of-state,
putative class members on the ground that the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over PMC as to these claims.

Judge Laplante holds that Person's and Daschbach's claims are based
on two separate sets of underlying facts, so he cannot consider
exercising personal jurisdiction over PMC as to Person's claim
based on the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction.  Since the
Plaintiffs do not present any other arguments for personal
jurisdiction as to Person's claim, and the Judge sees none, the
Judge grants PMC's motion to dismiss Person's claim for lack of
personal jurisdiction.  The Judge denies PMC's motion to dismiss
the claims of out-of-state, putative class members for lack of
personal jurisdiction, without prejudice to raising the claim again
under a different procedural posture.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

PMC moves under the FAA for an order compelling arbitration of
Daschbach's TCPA claim, arguing that Daschbach agreed to arbitrate
any disputes with PMC through his interactions with the Jobs
Website.  It also requests the Court to stay or dismiss Daschbach's
suit upon granting the motion to compel.  Daschbach avers that he
did not consummate an arbitration agreement with PMC, as he did not
visit the Jobs Website, and the Website does not properly provide
notice of, or obtain assent to, the arbitration agreement.

Judge Laplante focuses only on the arguments surrounding the
remaining Plaintiff Daschbach.  Given the material dispute of fact
concerning Daschbach's visit to the Website, he will hold an
evidentiary hearing on the same before deciding the motion to
compel arbitration.  He holds that he will conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Daschbach or someone acting on his
behalf visited the Jobs Website and clicked the "Submit" button.
After resolving the factual dispute, he will consider whether these
actions are sufficient to form an arbitration agreement.

After reviewing the parties' submissions and holding oral argument,
Judge Laplante grants PMC's motion for dismissal of Person's claim
for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the doctrine of
pendent personal jurisdiction does not apply.  He denies without
prejudice the motion to dismiss the claims of putative,
out-of-state class members, as this issue is better resolved at the
class certification stage.  Finally, before deciding the motion to
compel arbitration, the Judge will conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the material factual dispute surrounding the formation of an
arbitration agreement between PMC and remaining Plaintiff
Daschbach.

Accordingly, the Judge grants the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction as to Person's claim and denies without
prejudice as to the claims of out-of-state, putative class members.
The Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss Complaint will be
decided after an evidentiary hearing on the relevant, material
factual dispute.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/aatv4saj from Leagle.com.


AETNA LIFE: Lake's Claim for Breach of Implied Covenant Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SCOTT LAKE, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and
PINELLAS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendants, Case No.
8:20-cv-3010-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla.), Judge Virginia M. Hernandez
Covington of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida, Tampa Division, grants Defendant Pinellas County School
Board's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike.

The motion seeks dismissal of Count II of the complaint, which is
Mr. Lake's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

The case arose out of the denial of insurance coverage for Lake's
prostate cancer treatment.  Lake's wife is an Aetna Life Insurance
Company policyholder with a self-funded insurance plan through her
employer, the School Board.  Lake is covered as a dependent under
that policy.

Following Lake's prostate cancer diagnosis in May 2019, his
oncologist recommended that he undergo proton beam radiation
therapy, a procedure that uses protons to deliver a curative
radiation dose to a tumor, while reducing radiation doses to
healthy tissues and organs.  According to the complaint, proton
beam radiation therapy results in fewer complications and side
effects than traditional radiation therapy.  Lake avers that this
form of treatment "has been well-accepted for over 30 years,"
having been approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1988,
and subject to numerous peer-reviewed studies validating its safety
and efficacy.

However, Aetna denied Lake's request to pre-authorize his proton
beam radiation therapy because his plan does not cover experimental
or investigational services except under certain conditions.  It
stated that it reviewed Lake's condition and circumstances, but
referred him to Aetna's "Clinical Policy Bulletin" on proton beam
radiation therapy, which states: "Aetna considers proton beam
radiotherapy not medically necessary for individuals with localized
prostate cancer because it has not been proven to be more effective
than other radiotherapy modalities for this indication."

Following this denial, "UF Health submitted two internal appeals on
Lake's behalf, asking that Aetna reconsider its decision to deny
coverage or payment for proton beam radiation therapy."  Both of
those appeals were denied.  Lake then formally requested an
external review of Aetna's decision to deny his request for proton
beam radiation therapy.  The independent review conducted by AllMed
Healthcare Management indicated that it agreed with Aetna's denial
of coverage.

Mr. Lake then made one final appeal to the School Board, which
allegedly holds ultimate responsibility for the final review of
claims under Lake's health benefits plan. The School Board again
upheld Aetna's previous denial decisions.  Despite these denials,
Lake followed his oncologist's recommendations, and underwent
proton beam radiation therapy.  Lake personally paid over $78,000
for the treatment.  Although Aetna did not reimburse Lake for the
treatment itself, it did reimburse him for "some ancillary
charges."

On Oct. 30, 2020, Lake initiated the putative class action in state
court.  Thereafter, on Dec. 17, 2020, the case was removed to the
Court on the basis of Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") diversity
jurisdiction.

Lake seeks class certification on behalf of other similarly
situated Aetna customers who were denied coverage for proton beam
radiation therapy.  He also proposes two subclasses: (1) for class
members whose plans were underwritten or administered by Aetna
under Florida law, and (2) for class members whose plans were
underwritten or administered by Aetna for the School Board.  The
complaint includes only one claim against the School Board: breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II).

On Dec. 23, 2020, the School Board moved to dismiss Count II and to
strike Lake's request for disgorgement of the School Board's
profits.  In the alternative, the School Board joins Aetna's motion
to strike Lake as the class representative.  Lake responded on Jan.
20, 2021.

Motion to Dismiss

The School Board argues that Count II, Lake's claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, should be
dismissed because the complaint is devoid of any allegation that
the School Board breached an express term of the parties' contract.
Lake responds that the failure to perform a discretionary act in
good faith may constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.  And, Lake's claim clearly refers to the
provision under the Plan affording the School Board discretion over
the final appeal decision concerning a claim denial.

Judge Covington finds that although Lake refers to his wife's
insurance agreement with the School Board, he does not point to an
express provision of that agreement that the School Board breached
in his complaint.  The complaint does not state that there is any
such express provision in an agreement, nor does it state that such
a provision was breached.

In his response to the Motion, Lake states that this implied duty
stems from provisions of his plan with Aetna, under which the
School Board has the discretion to uphold or reverse the external
review organization's decision on the denials" of Lake's claims.
Lake cites to the "Aetna Select Medical Plan, at pages 8, and 58-59
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint."  However, none of those
pages include the provision Lake alleges they include.  Next, Lake
offers pages 58-59 of the plan, but these pages do not include the
alleged provision either.

Accordingly, the Motion is granted and Count II is dismissed
without prejudice.

Motion to Strike

Next, the School Board moves to strike Lake's request for
disgorgement of its profits, arguing that such equitable relief is
unavailable in breach of contract cases.  In his response to the
instant Motion, Lake "withdraws his claim for disgorgement of
profits and other equitable relief to the extent it is asserted
against the School Board."  Accordingly, the Motion is granted, and
the request for disgorgement of the School Board's profits is
stricken from the complaint.

Given that the School Board's Motion to Strike the Plaintiff as the
class representative was argued in the alternative to its other
Motions -- which have been granted -- and was premised solely on
the arguments in Aetna's first motion to dismiss, which has since
been amended, the Judge denies the Motion without prejudice.  She
grants Lake's request for leave to file an amended complaint.

Accordingly, Judge Covington grants the School Board's Motion to
Dismiss.  She dismisses Count II without prejudice.  Lake may file
an amended complaint by April 9, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3n8undkw from Leagle.com.


ALL MY SONS: Vega FLSA Suit Seeks Class Certification
-----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Jose A. Vega, on behalf of
himself and all those similarly situated, v. All My Sons Business
Development, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; All My Sons
Moving & Storage of Tucson LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; All My Sons Moving & Storage of Phoenix LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, Case No. 4:20-cv-00284-RCC (D. Ariz.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. granting his motion for class certification of the Paid Sick
      Time Class and Unpaid Wage Class be granted under Fed. R.
      Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and/or (b)(3),

      -- Paid Sick Time Class consisting of:

         "All current and former All My Sons employees who worked
         as Helpers from a dispatch center in Arizona, specifically

         the Phoenix and Tucson locations, from July 2, 2017 to the

         present who are subject to Arizona Earned Paid Sick Time
         laws;" and

      -- Unpaid Wages Class, a subclass consisting of:

         "All current and former All My Sons employees who worked
         as Helpers from a dispatch center in Tucson, Arizona from

         July 2, 2017 to the present."

   2. appointing him as class representative for both classes; and

   3. appointing Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., as  
      class counsel.

On March 16, 2021, Vega filed a motion seeking to have this case
conditionally certified as a collective action class for purposes
of the FLSA on behalf of a class consisting of more than 200
current and former employees who worked as Helpers at All My Sons'
location in Tucson, Arizona for the past three years.

All My Sons boasts it is one of the premier residential moving
firms in the country with over 60 offices nationwide, two of which
are in Arizona. All My Sons operates from a central headquarters
that dictates employment policies and payroll policies for the
Movers throughout the country, including the offices in Arizona.

Mr. Vega was employed full-time by All My Sons as a Helper at its
Tucson, Arizona Dispatch Center from May 2020 until July 2020.
During the Class period, All My Sons has employed hundreds of
Helpers, like Vega, at its Phoenix and Tucson Dispatch Centers.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 26,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3wwN35b
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ty D. Frankel, Esq.
          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN,
          FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Road, Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Telephone (602) 274-1100
          E-mail: tfrankel@bffb.com
                  psyverson@bffb.com

AMERICAN HONDA: Court OKs Aberin, et al. Class Certification Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LINDSAY ABERIN, et al., v.
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Case No. 4:16-cv-04384-JST
(N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge Jon S. Tigar entered an order:

   1. denying Honda's motions to strike and granting the
      Plaintiffs' motion for class certification;

   2. certifying the California, Kansas, New York, and Washington
      Rule 23(b)(3) classes; and

   3. appointing Christopher A. Seeger of Seeger Weiss LLP and
      James E. Cecchi of Carella, Byrne, Cecchi, Olstein, Brody &
      Agnello, P.C. as Class Counsel for the certified classes.

The Court sets a further case management conference for April 28,
2021 at 9:30 a.m. An updated joint case management statement is due
April 21, 2021.

The Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b)(3), the Court says.

The Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against the
Defendant American Honda, based on Honda's alleged failure to
disclose a defect in the "hands-free" calling system,
HandsFreeLinkTM ("HFL"), offered in certain Acura vehicles.

This case involves claims arising from Plaintiffs' purchases of
Acura vehicles which contained a Bluetooth pairing device
"HandsFreeLink" that allowed for hands-free cell phone calls.

Acura, was an early adopter of the hands-free technology, so many
consumers purchased the vehicles precisely for this technology and
the technology featured heavily in Honda's advertising campaigns.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 23, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mlPu62 at no extra charge.[CC]


AMERICAN MEDICAL: Court Tosses Mendell Bid to Certify Class
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL MENDELL, v.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE, INC., Case No. 3:19-cv-01227-BAS-KSC
(S.D. Calif.), the Hon. Judge Cynthia Bashant entered an order
denying Mendell's motion to certify the class.

The Court said, "Mendell has not shown that common questions of law
or fact predominate over individualized issues of notice and
consent. Because the Court finds that the predominance requirement
is not satisfied, the Court need not reach the superiority
analysis. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d
Cir. 2008) (finding that the court "need not address whether a
class action is a superior method of adjudicating plaintiffs'
claims" where the predominance requirement was not satisfied)."

Mendell brought this putative class action against AMR, alleging
that AMR violated California's Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) by
recording the collection calls without first obtaining consent from
the members of the proposed classes.

The Defendant AMR provides ambulance transportation services to
patients. The Plaintiff Mendell used AMR's ambulance but could not
pay for it in time. AMR began calling Mendell on a recorded line to
collect the ambulance fees.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 23, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at no extra charge.[CC]


APPLE INC: Claims in Taleshpour Suit Over Defective Laptop Narrowed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MAHAN TALESHPOUR, Plaintiff v. APPLE INC., Defendant,
Case No. 5:20-cv-03122-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, grants in part and denies in part Apple's Motion
to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiffs Mahan Taleshpour, Rory Fielding, Peter Odogwu, Wade
Buscher, Gregory Knutson, Darien Hayes, Liam Stewart, Nathan Combs,
and Kendall Bardin brought the action against Defendant Apple on
behalf of themselves and members of a putative class, raising 20
claims related to an alleged product defect in certain MacBook Pro
laptops.

In 2016, Apple introduced its updated 13- and 15-inch MacBook Pro
models.  To make these MacBook Pros thinner and sleeker than their
predecessors, Apple used thin, flexible backlight ribbon cables to
connect the lighting mechanism of the display screen to the display
controller board.  These backlight ribbon cables wrap around the
display controller board at the hinge of the laptop and are secured
by a pair of spring-loaded covers.

This configuration causes the backlight ribbon display cables rub
against the control board when the laptop is opened and closed.
Over time, the rubbing causes the cables to tear, which leads to
various problems with the display screen.  To varying degrees,
these issues with the display screen all allegedly render the
laptop unusable and unfit for its ordinary purpose.

The Plaintiffs allege that the backlight cables tear because they
are "too short and do not provide enough slack to withstand the
repetitive opening and closing of the MacBook Pros."  Faced with
complaints from numerous consumers about the stage lighting effect
and the failure of the display, Apple attempted to remedy the
Alleged Defect by making the backlight cables two millimeters
longer in the 13- and 15- inch MacBook Pro models released in July
2018.

In May 2019, Apple also introduced the "MacBook Pro Display
Backlight Service Program," through which Apple agreed to replace
the display on all 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro models that exhibited
the stage lighting effect or a total failure of the display
backlight system.  Under the service program, Apple will refund the
owner of a 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro who paid to have the display
fixed.  The service program covers only the 13-inch 2016 MacBook
Pro; it does not cover the 15-inch MacBook Pro, or any MacBook Pro
model released after 2016.

The Plaintiffs are all owners of 15-inch 2016 MacBook Pro or
MacBook Pro models released after 2016 and allege that their
laptops all suffered from the same backlight cable defect as the
13-inch version.  They all experienced issues with their display
screens, including the stage lighting effect or "vertical pink
lines," which ultimately rendered their laptops inoperable.  In all
cases, these issues manifested after the one-year warranty provided
by Apple expired.

The Plaintiffs bring claims for (i) violations of the California
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200, et
sec. ("UCL") (Count 1), the California Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 1761 and 1770 ("CLRA") (Count 2), and
equivalent deceptive trade practice laws in Alaska, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, and
Washington (Counts 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) ("Deceptive
Trade Practice Claims"); (ii) fraudulent concealment (Count 3);
(iii) violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal.
Civ. Code Sections 1791-1794 (Count 4); and (iv) breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability under Alaska, Florida,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, and
Washington law (Counts 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20) ("Implied
Warranty Claims").

Apple seeks to dismiss all of tge Plaintiffs claims pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Apple argues that the Court should dismiss all of the Plaintiffs'
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because each named
Plaintiff lacks Article III standing for various reasons.  First,
Apple argues that four named Plaintiffs lack standing because they
did not suffer any cognizable injury in fact.  It next argues that
the Plaintiffs' purported injuries are not fairly traceable to
Apple's alleged conduct because, according to Apple, seven of the
named Plaintiffs' devices "do not even contain the alleged design
defect."

Among other things, Judge Davila finds that (i) economic injuries
establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing; (ii) Mr.
Knutson did, in fact, experience economic injury sufficient to
establish standing; (iii) it plausible that the Plaintiffs
originally believed the issue to have been remedied by the longer
backlight cable, and only realized that the issue had not been
resolved when the 2018 displays began failing; and (iv) the
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries are fairly traceable to Apple's
alleged conduct in the case.

Apple does not challenge the redressability element of standing.
The Plaintiffs allege various economic injuries, including that
they overpaid for their devices and that they incurred costs to
repair or replace their devices.  The Judge finds that these
alleged injuries, which are purely economic in nature, are capable
of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision in the case.
Thus, the Plaintiffs have established standing to bring their
claims.

Fraud-based Claims

Apple argues that the Plaintiffs' claims for fraudulent
concealment, violation of the Song-Beverly Act, and various state
deceptive trade act claims, including the UCL and CLRA, are all
grounded in fraud.  The Plaintiffs do not raise any arguments to
the contrary but maintain that the omission-based fraud claims are
held to a lesser standard and that generally, Rule 9(b) does not
apply to allegations of knowledge and intent.

Judge Davila agrees that the heightened pleading standard under
Rule 9(b) applies to the Plaintiffs' claims.  He also finds that
with respect to the Plaintiffs' omissions-based fraud claims, the
pleading standard is lowered on account of the reduced ability in
an omission suit to specify the time, place, and specific content,
relative to a claim involving affirmative misrepresentations.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged
that a defect exists.  The Plaintiffs in the case all allege that
the Alleged Defect did, in fact, manifest in their laptops by
causing various display problems.  However, because the Plaintiffs
do not allege that the statements in the advertisements are false
or that they would lead a reasonable consumer to draw inaccurate
conclusions about the reliability or useful life of the display,
the Judge finds that these statements are not affirmative
misrepresentations sufficient to support Plaintiffs' fraud claims.
He grants without prejudice Apple's Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiffs' fraud claims to the extent they are based on
affirmative misrepresentations.

Lastly, because the Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Apple
omitted material information that it was under a duty to disclose
and on which the Plaintiffs would have relied, the Judge finds that
the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their omission-based fraud
claims.  He denies Apple's Motion as to the omission-based
Deceptive Trade Practice Claims and fraudulent concealment claim.

Implied Warranty Claims

The Plaintiffs allege that Apple breached the implied warranty of
merchantability under Alaska, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington law (Counts 6, 8, 10,
12, 14, 16, 18, and 20).  Apple argues that these claims fail
because Apple effectively disclaimed all implied warranties, or
alternatively, limited their duration to one year.

Judge Davila holds that because the Plaintiffs do not dispute the
accuracy of the Limited Warranty and because the Limited Warranty
effectively prevents them from bringing implied warranty claims, he
grants the Motion in relevant part and dismisses the Implied
Warranty Claims with prejudice.  He finds that the fact that the
Limited Warranty highlights multiple (but not all) provisions using
as all-capital letters and underlining does not detract from the
attention-grabbing effect of those techniques.  These
characteristics, he says, make the disclaimer conspicuous, such
that Apple effectively disclaimed or limited all implied
warranties.

Song-Beverly Act Claim

Plaintiff Taleshpour alleges that he has sufficiently stated a
Song-Beverly claim because he alleges that his MacBook contains a
defect that renders the laptop unfit for ordinary purposes.  Apple
argues that Mr. Taleshpour admits that he used his MacBook for
nearly three years, including for two months after the defect first
manifested.  Thus, Apple argues that the Alleged Defect did not
render the laptop unfit for "even the most basic degree" of
ordinary use.

Judge Davila agrees.  While the display issues Mr. Taleshpour faced
were certainly disruptive to his use, the fact that he continued to
use his device for some time after the symptoms began indicates
that the device was still fit for basic use.  Moreover, the
Plaintiffs alleged that the Alleged Defect did, in fact, manifest
in their laptops; however, they failed to include any allegations
indicating that at the time of sale, the Alleged Defect was
substantially certain to manifest.  In other words, the Plaintiffs
have not alleged that to the extent the Alleged Defect is latent in
the relevant MacBook Pros, it is substantially certain to manifest
such that the laptop is rendered unmerchantable.  The Judge,
therefore, grants the Motion as to the Plaintiffs' Song-Beverly Act
claim with prejudice.

Other UCL Claims

Plaintiff Taleshpour argues that Apple's conduct violated the
public policy legislatively declared in the CLRA and Song-Beverly
Act.  For the reasons he stated, Judge Davila, however, finds that
the Plaintiff has not stated a claim under either law and therefore
has not alleged any violation of public policy.  The Plaintiffs
also do not directly address this authority, but rather, argue that
Mr. Taleshpour experienced a substantial injury because Apple
breached the implied warranty of merchantability.  The Judge finds
that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege an implied warranty
of merchantability claim.  Therefore, he finds that Plaintiff
Taleshpour failed to allege "unfairness" under either the tethering
test or the balancing test.  The Motion is granted without
prejudice as to Plaintiff Taleshpour's claim under the unfair prong
of the UCL.

Finally, the Plaintiffs' claims under the unlawful prong of the UCL
are based on their claims under the CLRA and the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act.  Because the Plaintiffs failed to state
viable claims under those laws, they have also "failed to state a
claim under the 'unlawful' prong of the UCL."  The Motion is
granted without prejudice as to Plaintiff Taleshpour's claim under
the unlawful prong of the UCL.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Davila grants in part and denies
in part Apple's Motion.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have standing
and have adequately stated their Deceptive Trade Practice Claims
(Counts 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) and fraudulent concealment
claim (Count 3) to the extent those claims are based on alleged
omissions.  He finds that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately
allege their Deceptive Trade Practice Claims and fraudulent
concealment claim to the extent those claims are based on
affirmative misrepresentations and DISMISSES those claims with
leave to amend.  The Judge otherwise grants the Motion and
dismisses the Plaintiffs' remaining claims with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs will file an amended complaint, if any, by no later
than April 16, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4r83d3t8 from Leagle.com.


APTIM SERVICES: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Action Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOHN HURLOCKER,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
APTIM SERVICES, LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00403-EMC (N.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court on April 29, 2021 to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the action as a collective action
      under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA):

      "All employees of APTIM Services, LLC (APTIM) who were paid
      straight time for overtime in the last three years; and

   2. authorizing distribution of judicial notice.

According to the complaint, the motion is made upon the grounds
that the Plaintiff and the current and former employees he seeks to
represent are "similarly situated," and that notice of this action
should be promptly sent to these individuals giving them notice of
the lawsuit and the opportunity to join.

To facilitate notice, the Plaintiff also requests that within ten
days of the Court's order, APTIM be required to provide the
Plaintiff's counsel with a list of all persons who were paid
straight time for overtime at any time during the three years prior
to the filing of this action. This list should include each
individual's (1) name, (2) job title(s), (3) dates of work, (4)
last known address and telephone number, and (5) last 13 known
email address. Plaintiff seeks a 60-day notice period, with notice
to be distributed by the Plaintiff's counsel via U.S. Mail, email,
and text with an identical notice sent via the same methods 30 days
before the end of the notice period.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 26,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3rXkbQe
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew S. Parmet, Esq.
          PARMET PC
          340 S. Lemon Ave., No. 1228
          Walnut, CA 91789
          Telephone: (310) 928 1277
          E-mail: matt@parmet.law

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Carl A. Fitz, Esq.
          JOSEPSON DUNLAP LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: 713 352 1100
          Facsimile: 713 352 3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  cfitz@mybackwages.com

BALTIMORE CITY, MD: Appeals Court Affirms Dismissal of Hoskins Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirms the trial court's
dismissal of the case styled E. DAVID HOSKINS v. CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY, et al., Case No. 1629 (Md. Spec. App.).

Appellant Hoskins requested three categories of documents from the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City pursuant to the Maryland Public
Information Act ("MPIA") and the Access to Judicial Records rules.
The requests related to the manner in which the circuit court
assigned motions to certify a class action. The court's
administrative judge, the Honorable W. Michel Pierson, found no
documents responsive to Mr. Hoskins' first two categories of
requested documents. Judge Pierson found a small number of
documents that he determined were potentially responsive to the
third category, but withheld those documents because he determined
that they were exempt from disclosure under the Judicial Access
Rules.

Mr. Hoskins sought judicial review of Judge Pierson's decision by
filing a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Mr.
Hoskins named the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and Judge
Pierson, in his official capacity, as defendants. The Defendants
moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The court granted the
Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.

Mr. Hoskins filed a timely notice of appeal, and presents four
questions for the Appellate Court's review, which it has
consolidated and reframed into the following two questions:

   1. Did Mr. Hoskins have a right to seek judicial review of
      Judge Pierson's response to his MPIA request?

   2. Assuming a right to judicial review, did the actions taken
      by Judge Pierson in response to Mr. Hoskins' request
      comport with the relevant provisions of the MPIA and the
      Rules?

The Appellate Court answered both questions in the affirmative and
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

In the State of Maryland, each of the 23 counties as well as
Baltimore City, has its own circuit court, and each circuit court
has its own administrative judge.  Administrative judges have
general administrative responsibility for their respective courts.


Judge Pierson served as the administrative judge for the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City from December 1, 2013, through January 11,
2020. As required by Maryland Rule 16-105(b)(2), Judge Pierson
established a differentiated case management plan in the manner
required by Rule 16-302.  

The Plan provides information on, among other things, the court's
process for handling motions.  It describes the specific types of
motions--none of which are motions to certify class actions--that
are decided by a "discovery judge" or a "chambers judge." The Plan
states that the "Administrative Judge designates certain judges to
hear the various civil matters, and makes final decisions about
whether and to whom a case should be assigned, when necessary." The
circuit court also publishes on its website a general explanation
of its civil motions practice.

Mr. Hoskins noticed that motions to certify class actions were
being "assigned to a specific judge, the Honorable Videtta Brown."
In his view, this practice constituted "an unpublished and
previously undisclosed administrative policy" that did not "comport
with the motions procedures that have been published" on the
court's website. This perceived deviation from the procedures
described on the court's website prompted Mr. Hoskins to issue a
request for documents under the MPIA.

In a letter dated May 21, 2019, to Judge Pierson, Mr. Hoskins
requested three categories of documents. Citing Maryland Rule
16-902(e)(2), Mr. Hoskins further explained that he was "directing
this request to Judge Pierson's attention because" he believed
Judge Pierson "qualified as the 'custodian' of the requested
records." Mr. Hoskins described the three categories of documents
he sought as follows:

   1. The administrative orders, policies, or directives pursuant
      to which motions for class certification are assigned to a
      single designated judge for a decision;

   2. The administrative orders, policies, or directives pursuant
      to which motions for class certification have been assigned
      to the Honorable Videtta A. Brown; and

   3. Documents that would allow for the identification of the
      cases in which a motion for class certification has been
      assigned to the Honorable Videtta A. Brown, or that would
      otherwise allow for the ability to identify the case in
      which Judge Brown has ruled on a motion for class
      certification so that the orders issued can be retrieved
      from the appropriate dockets.

Mr. Hoskins did not receive a response from Judge Pierson within 30
days, and on July 9, 2019, he filed his complaint, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the Defendants "violated the MPIA and the
Access to Judicial Records rules by failing to allow inspection of
the records requested by" Mr. Hoskins. The complaint alleged that
Mr. Hoskins made a proper request under the MPIA and the Rules, and
that Judge Pierson violated Section 4-203 of the MPIA by failing to
respond within 30 days. The complaint sought injunctive relief to
prevent the Defendants from withholding records responsive to his
requests and requiring them to permit him to inspect and copy such
records. The complaint further requested "actual and statutory
damages, as authorized by the MPIA" as well as litigation costs and
"compensation" for Mr. Hoskins' time, pursuant to the MPIA.

Judge Pierson responded to Mr. Hoskins' request by letter dated
August 5, 2019. He stated that his "search of the records in the
custody and control of the court has disclosed no records
responsive to Requests Nos. 1 and 2." Concerning the third request,
Judge Pierson explained that "it is conceivable that such documents
would be contained in individual cases files," but that the
"custodian of such case records is the Clerk of the Court." Judge
Pierson also "identified 34 documents within his custody or control
that were potentially responsive" to the third request, but
explained that such documents consisted of "communications among
one or more judges, and [were] prohibited from inspection by
Maryland Rule 16-905(f)(1) and/or 16-905(f)(3)."

The next day, Mr. Hoskins filed an amended complaint. The amended
complaint alleged that the 34 documents described by Judge Pierson
were administrative records that were not exempt from disclosure
under Maryland Rule 16-905 because they were "the only documents
that established the policy pursuant to which motions for class
certification are assigned to a single designated judge for
decision." The amended complaint also claimed that the Defendants
violated the MPIA by failing to respond to Mr. Hoskins' request
within 30 days as required under Section 4-203 of the MPIA.

The Defendants responded to the amended complaint with a motion to
dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.  Mr. Hoskins
opposed the Defendants' motion.  The court held a hearing on
October 4, 2019. It overruled Mr. Hoskins' objection, noting that
there was no need to provide a Vaughn index because the records
were not voluminous and there was no requirement to do so under the
MPIA or the Rules. The court took a recess so that it could review
the documents in camera.

After its in camera review, the court resumed the hearing and gave
a verbal ruling. The court agreed with the Defendants that neither
the 30-day deadline nor the judicial review provisions of the MPIA
applied to Mr. Hoskins' requests. It also agreed with the
Defendants that the limited basis for judicial review under the
Judicial Access Rules did not apply and, therefore, Mr. Hoskins was
not entitled to judicial review. The court also upheld Judge
Pierson's determination that the 34 documents were subject to the
exemptions set forth in Rule 16-905(f)(1) or (f)(3). Finally, the
court found that the Defendants were not required to provide an
affidavit because Judge Pierson's search was reasonable and the
letter he wrote to Mr. Hoskins "made it clear that he did do a
search." After the hearing, a written order memorializing the
court's verbal ruling was filed.

Mr. Hoskins filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Defendants contend that Mr. Hoskins was not entitled to
judicial review of Judge Pierson's determinations. As the
Defendants see it, the judicial review provisions of the MPIA do
not apply here because with regard to judicial records, the Court
of Appeals chose to limit judicial review to the limited
circumstances provided under Rule 16-914. They maintain, however,
that the Appellate Court should not decide whether Rule 16-914
provides the sole basis for judicial review because Mr. Hoskins
did, in fact, obtain judicial review of Judge Pierson's
determination. Thus, they contend, the issue is moot.

Moreover, the Defendants argue that in light of the changes to the
judicial review provisions of the Rules, this issue is not likely
to recur. Thus, the exception to the mootness doctrine is not
applicable.

Further, arguing that the constitutional avoidance doctrine
applies, the Defendants urge the Appellate Court not to address the
"moot issue of whether a judicial review action may be brought
under GP Section 4-362 to review the denial of access to judicial
records and the fundamental attack on the constitutional authority
of the Court of Appeals to enact rules governing disputes over
access to judicial records."

The Defendants, however, fail to specify which non-constitutional
ground would enable the Appellate Court to resolve this case
without determining, in the first instance, whether the Appellate
Court has jurisdiction over this case, Judge Gould finds.

The Appellate Court agrees with Mr. Hoskins that the judicial
review provision under GP Section 4-362 is applicable. As noted,
Rule 16-905(c)(1) specifically states that the MPIA governs the
right of access to administrative records "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided" by the Rules. Under this rule, therefore, the Appellate
Court starts with the presumption that the judicial review
provisions of GP Section 4-362 apply, and then it looks to see if
there is a provision in the Rules that negates that right.

The Defendants claim to have found a conflicting provision in Rule
16-914(a), which establishes the process for a custodian to follow
if he or she is not sure if a record is subject to disclosure. They
contend that this is the only rule that allows for judicial review,
so in that sense, it negates the right to judicial review under GP
Section 4-362. They further argue that judicial review under this
rule is limited to cases when the custodian is not sure if a record
is subject to inspection. Thus, their argument goes, because the
custodian in this instance was Judge Pierson, and he had no doubt
about the applicability of the exemptions, Mr. Hoskins is not
entitled to judicial review of Judge Pierson's decision.

The Appellate Court disagrees with the Defendants' characterization
of this rule. As stated, Rule 16-914(a) applies when the custodian
is uncertain whether a requested record is subject to disclosure.
When that happens, this rule allows the custodian to relinquish to
a judge the duty of making the initial determination. In other
words, this is not a judicial review provision, because the judge
is making the initial decision, not reviewing it. As such, this
rule does not conflict with the MPIA. See Maryland-Nat'l Cap. Park
& Plan. Comm'n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 183 (2006). Accordingly,
the Appellate Court holds that Rule 16-914 does not preclude
judicial review, and that the right to judicial review under GP
Section 4-362 applies to Mr. Hoskins' request.

The scope of Mr. Hoskins' right to judicial review is another
matter. Judge Gould holds that the right to judicial review applies
"whenever a person or governmental unit is denied inspection of a
public record or is not provided with a copy, printout, or
photograph of a public record." GP Section 4-362(a)(1). Thus,
judicial review is not available when the agency reports that it
has no documents responsive to a request. Mr. Hoskins, therefore,
was not entitled to judicial review of Judge Pierson's response to
his first two requests. But Judge Pierson's response to the third
request--that the request for inspection was denied--is subject to
judicial review.

On appeal, Mr. Hoskins argues that the Defendants did not establish
that Judge Pierson undertook a good faith effort to search for
responsive documents. He contends that the Defendants did not offer
an affidavit, live testimony, or other evidence that Judge Pierson
conducted an adequate search. Relatedly, Mr. Hoskins argues that
there was no basis for him to evaluate Judge Pierson's search
because the Defendants did not produce a "Vaughn index." Thus, he
maintains, the circuit court should not have granted summary
judgment.

Judge Gould holds that neither the MPIA nor the Judicial Access
Rules require a Vaughn index. In any event, it's not as if Mr.
Hoskins was kept in the dark about the nature of the withheld
records because in Judge Pierson's letter, he informed Mr. Hoskins
that the 34 documents were communications between and among various
judges. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Court finds no abuse
of discretion in the circuit court's refusal to order the
Defendants to produce a Vaughn index.

The Appellate Court reaches the same conclusion regarding the
affidavit issue. Under Rule 2-501, affidavits are used to establish
the material facts that are not genuinely disputed or to
demonstrate that the material facts are genuinely disputed. Mr.
Hoskins did not allege in his amended complaint that Judge Pierson
failed to undertake a reasonable and/or good faith search for
responsive documents, thus, whether Judge Pierson conducted an
adequate search for the records was not an issue of material fact
in the summary judgment motions. Thus, no affidavit was necessary.

To be fair, at the hearing before the circuit court, Mr. Hoskins
requested leave to amend his complaint so that he could put the
adequacy of the search at issue. Whether to grant leave to amend
was a discretionary call that the Appellate Court would not disturb
in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Here, the circuit
court dismissed the case without granting leave to amend, for which
the Appellate Court perceives no abuse of discretion.

Judge Pierson was the administrative judge of the circuit court. He
would, therefore, have known which orders, policies, and directives
existed with respect to the assignment of all types of motions, the
Appellate Court notes. He would also have known where to look for
any such records. In light of Judge Pierson's role as
administrative judge, and in the absence of any reason proffered by
Mr. Hoskins to the contrary, the circuit court had ample reason to
believe that the adequacy of the search would be a dead-end issue
for Mr. Hoskins.

Ultimately, the sole material issue as to Mr. Hoskins' third
request was whether Judge Pierson properly invoked the Rule
16-905(f)(1) or (f)(3) exemptions. That's purely a legal question,
Judge Gould notes. As noted, the MPIA grants the circuit court the
discretion to review the subject documents in camera and compels
the court to expedite its review. Thus, when the Defendants brought
the documents to the hearing and tendered them to the court for an
in camera review, the court was well within its authority and
discretion to receive the documents and review them in camera. And
from its own review of the records, the Appellate Court is
satisfied that the trial court correctly concluded that the
documents were exempt from disclosure for the reasons stated by
Judge Pierson.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court for Baltimore City
is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by the Appellant.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated April 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/e8xvapww from Leagle.com.


BOILING CRAB: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Collective Action Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH McDOUGALL and
AUSTIN WALLACE, individually and on behalf of all similarly
situated individuals, v. THE BOILING CRAB VEGAS, LLC, Case No.
2:20-cv-01867-RFB-NJK (D. Nev.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the proposed Fair Labor Standards
      Act (FLSA) collective action;

   2. authorizing a procedure whereby Court-approved collective
      action notice is sent via U.S. Mail and e-mail to:

      "Any employee of The Boiling Crab who participated in a
      mandatory tip pool as a server, bus-runner, host/hostess,
      cashier, or ToGo employee on or after March 23, 2018";

   3. directing the Defendant to produce the names and addresses of

      potential opt-in plaintiffs within 10 days of the order
      granting conditional certification; and

   4. directing the Defendant to post Court-approved notice at a
      conspicuous place in its restaurant.

The Defendant operates a restaurant.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated March 26,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39PIpWi
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Christoper W. Carson, Esq.
          Trent L. Richards, Esq.
          SAGEBRUSH LAWYERS
          112 S. Water Street, Suite 104
          Henderson, NE 89015
          Telephone: (702) 800-7634
          Facsimile: (702) 800-7635
          E-mail: ccarson@sagebrushlawyers.com
                  trichards@sagebrushlawyers.com

               - and -

          T. Christopher Tuck, Esq.
          Robert S. Wood, Esq.
          D. Charles Dukes, II, Esq.
          T.A.C. Hargrove, II, Esq.
          ROGERS, PATRICK, WESTBROOK & BRICKMAN, LLC
          1037 Chuck Dawley Blvd., Bldg. A
          Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
          Telephone: (843) 727-6500
          Facsimile: (843) 216-6509
          E-mail: ctuck@rpwb.com
                  bwood@rpwb.com
                  cdukes@rpwb.com
                  thargrove@rpwb.com

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS: Aquilina Suit Seeks to Certify Class
----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEPHEN G. AQUILINA and
LUCINA J. AQUILINA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated; and DONNA J. CORRIGAN and TODD L. CORRIGAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 2003;
LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 318; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 4020; LLOYD'S
SYNDICATE No. 2121; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 2007; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE
No. 1183; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 1729; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 510;
BORISOFF INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. d/b/a MONARCH E&S INSURANCE
SERVICES; SPECIALTY PROGRAM GROUP, LLC d/b/a SPG INSURANCE
SOLUTIONS, LLC; ALOHA INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.; ILIKEA LLC d/b/a
MOA INSURANCE SERVICES HAWAII; and DOES 1-100, Case No.
1:18-cv-00496-ACK-KJM (D. Haw.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. appointing them as Class Representatives;

   2. certifying the following Class:

      "All persons with a home located in Lava Zone 1 on the
Island
      of Hawaii who purchased a surplus lines homeowner's insurance

      policy with a Lava Exclusion, from January 1, 2012 to May 4,

      2018 (the "Class Period"), that was brokered through Monarch,

      where the policy of insurance was underwritten and/or
      subscribed to by Underwriters;" and

   3. appointing Scott+Scott, Foster Law, and Wood Law, as Class
      Counsel.

This putative class action is brought by the Plaintiffs Stephen G.
Aquilina and Lucina J. Aquilina and Donna J. Corrigan and Todd L.
Corrigan, who own residential properties in the Lower East Rift
Zone of Kīlauea, in areas designated as "Lava Zone 1." Because of
the high likelihood of volcanic eruption, the regular admitted
insurance market does not insure properties located in Lava Zones 1
or 2. Thus, the Plaintiffs purchased surplus lines insurance from
Underwriters' coverholder, Borisoff Insurance Services, Inc. d/b/a
Monarch E&S Insurance Services (Monarch), through Plaintiffs'
respective retail brokers, the Defendants Aloha Insurance Services,
Inc. and Ilikea LLC dba Moa Insurance Services Hawaii. The
Plaintiffs' policies contained an endorsement excluding coverage
for damage caused by lava and/or lava flow (the "Lava Exclusion").
In the aftermath of Kīlauea's May 2018 eruption, the Plaintiffs
tendered notices of loss to Monarch.

The Island of Hawai'i is divided into Lava Zones ranked 1 through
9, which "represent a scale of decreasing hazard as the numbers
increase, based on the probability of coverage by lava flows."

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated March 26,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3g1whWj
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Counsel for the Plaintiffs and proposed Class Counsel are:

          Erin Green Comite, Esq.
          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          Michelle E. Conston, Esq.
          Alex M. Outwater, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
          156 South Main Street
          P.O. Box 192
          Colchester, CT 06415
          Telephone: (860) 537-5537
          Facsimile: (860) 537-4432
          E-mail: ecomite@scott-scott.com
                  jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
                  mconston@scott-scott.com
                  aoutwater@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey E. Foster, Esq.
          FOSTER LAW OFFICES, LLC
          PO Box 127
          Captain Cook, HI 96704
          Telephone: (808) 348-7800
          Facsimile: (808) 443-0277
          E-mail: fosterlaw@gmail.com

               - and -

          E. Kirk Wood, Esq.
          WOOD LAW FIRM, LLC
          P. O. Box 382434
          Birmingham, AL 35238-2434
          Telephone: (205) 908-4906
          Facsimile: (866) 747-3905
          E-mail: ekirkwood1@bellsouth.net

CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS: Seeks Denial of Aquilina Class Cert. Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEPHEN G. AQUILINA and
LUCINA J. AQUILINA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated; and DONNA J. CORRIGAN and TODD L. CORRIGAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, v.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON; LLOYD'S; SYNDICATE No.
2003; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 318; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 4020;
LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 2121; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 2007; LLOYD'S
SYNDICATE No. 1183; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE No. 1729; LLOYD'S SYNDICATE
No. 510; BORISOFF INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. d/b/a MONARCH E&S
INSURANCE SERVICES; SPECIALTY PROGRAM GROUP, LLC d/b/a SPG
INSURANCE SOLUTIONS, LLC; ALOHA INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.; ILIKEA
LLC d/b/a MOA INSURANCE SERVICES HAWAII; and DOES 1-100, Case No.
1:18-cv-00496-ACK-KJM (D. Haw.), the Defendants Certain
Underwriters Participating in Lloyd's Syndicates 2003, 318, 4020,
2121, 2007, 1183, 1729, and 510 move for an order denying
certification of the proposed class, because Plaintiffs cannot meet
the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

This putative class action is brought by the Plaintiffs Stephen G.
Aquilina and Lucina J. Aquilina and Donna J. Corrigan and Todd L.
Corrigan, who own residential properties in the Lower East Rift
Zone of Kīlauea, in areas designated as "Lava Zone 1." Because of
the high likelihood of volcanic eruption, the regular admitted
insurance market does not insure properties located in Lava Zones 1
or 2. Thus, the Plaintiffs purchased surplus lines insurance from
Underwriters' coverholder, Borisoff Insurance Services, Inc. d/b/a
Monarch E&S Insurance Services (Monarch), through Plaintiffs'
respective retail brokers, the Defendants Aloha Insurance Services,
Inc. and Ilikea LLC dba Moa Insurance Services Hawaii. The
Plaintiffs' policies contained an endorsement excluding coverage
for damage caused by lava and/or lava flow (the "Lava Exclusion").
In the aftermath of Kīlauea's May 2018 eruption, the Plaintiffs
tendered notices of loss to Monarch. The claims were investigated,
and Underwriters made substantial payments. Apparently dissatisfied
with this response, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action,
seeking to certify the following class:

   "All persons with a home located in Lava Zones 1 or 2 on the
   island of Hawaii who purchased a surplus lines homeowner's
   insurance policy with a Lava Exclusion brokered through Monarch

   underwritten and/or subscribed to by Underwriters."

The Island of Hawai'i is divided into Lava Zones ranked 1 through
9, which "represent a scale of decreasing hazard as the numbers
increase, based on the probability of coverage by lava flows."

A copy of the Defendants' motion dated March 24, 2020 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/39GRnVR at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Defendants CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS PARTICIPATING
IN LLOYD'S SYNDICATES 2003, 318, 4020, 2121, 2007, 1183, 1729, and
510, are:

          Paul Alston, Esq.
          Erika L. Amatore, Esq.
          Jenny J.N.A. Nakamoto, Esq.
          DENTONS US LLP
          1001 Bishop Street, Suite 1800
          Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813
          Telephone: (808) 524-1800
          Facsimile: (808) 524-4591
          E-mail: paul.alston@dentons.com
                  erika.amatore@dentons.com
                  jenny.nakamoto@dentons.com

               - and -

          David E. Walker, Esq.
          Douglas W. walker, Esq.
          WALKER WILCOX MATOUSEK LLP
          One N. Franklin Street, Suite 3200
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 244-6700
          Facsimile: (312) 244-6800
          E-mail: dwalker@wwmlawyers.com
                  dougwalker@wwmlawyers.com
                  kcalov@wwmlawyers.com

CONSUMER GUARDIAN: Bid to Dismiss Hardwick CROA Suit Partly Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LINDA HARDWICK, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CONSUMER GUARDIAN SPECIALISTS,
LLC, D/B/A CREDIT SHIELD, AND SARAH YOUNG, Defendants, Case No.
2:20-cv-00060 (W.D. Pa.), Judge Mark R. Hornak of the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania grants in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent it seeks dismissal of
Hardwick's claims against Sarah Young for want of jurisdiction.

Before the Court is Defendant Consumer Guardian and Defendant Sarah
Young's joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Linda Hardwick's Amended
Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) through
12(b)(6), in which Hardwick alleges that the Defendants violated
several provisions of the Credit Repair Organizations Act ("CROA"),
15 U.S.C. Section 1679, et seq.  Hardwick filed an Opposition, to
which the Defendants replied.

Ms. Hardwick is a Pittsburgh resident who used Consumer Guardian's
credit repair services.  Defendant Consumer Guardian, doing
business as "Credit Shield," is a registered limited liability
company allegedly domiciled in Florida.  Consumer Guardian is a
"credit repair organization" in the business of assisting consumers
to improve their credit records, credit history, and credit
ratings.  Young is the "managing principal, operator, and
controller" of Consumer Guardian, and she resides in Lutz,
Florida.

In September 2018, Hardwick contracted with Consumer Guardian,
through which Consumer Guardian would allegedly dispute "credit
card or other debts with third party collection agencies" to
improve Hardwick's credit score (a service that Hardwick alleges
Consumer Guardian advertises on its website).  In sum, Hardwick
contends that the Defendants (1) illegally charged her for credit
repair services that they failed to fully perform, an amount
Hardwick alleges to total $3,431.67, all in violation 15 U.S.C.
Section 1697b and (2) "failed to provide the required written
disclosures" in violation of Section 1692a.2 (Id. at 5-9 (referring
to the disclosures listed in Sections 1679c and 1679d).)  Hardwick
contends that because the Defendants violated CROA disclosure
requirements, the contract between Hardwick and Consumer Guardian
"is void and unenforceable" under Section 1697f.

For these alleged CROA violations, Hardwick seeks to have the Court
certify the case as a class action and requests that the Court
orders the Defendants to "pay actual, consequential, statutory,
and/or punitive damages including restitution and disgorgement of
all profits and unjust enrichment."  Hardwick also requests a
declaration that the contracts entered are void and unenforceable,
and seeks the payment of attorney's fees, litigation costs, and
"pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded."

Two main issues are before the Court: (1) whether the Defendants'
contacts, as alleged in the Amended Complaint and in the record
before the Court, show that the Defendants directed their
activities at the forum, such that they purposefully availed
themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within
Pennsylvania; and (2) whether the Court should permit limited
jurisdictional discovery as to either Defendant.

In her Opposition to the Defendants' to Motion to Dismiss, Hardwick
requests jurisdictional discovery to establish all of the
Defendants' contacts with the forum related to the Plaintiffs'
claims.

Judge Hornak holds he must distinctly assess whether it has
specific personal jurisdiction over each Defendant, as well as
whether the filings before the Court suggest with "reasonable
particularity" the possible existence of minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania, thus warranting jurisdictional discovery.  He
addresses these questions as to Young and then turns its attention
to Consumer Guardian.

Defendant Sarah Young

The Judge determines that Young's contacts in her official capacity
as a managing principal or operator of Consumer Guardian do not
establish personal jurisdiction over Young.  Thus, he concludes
that it lacks the power to hear claims against Young via specific
personal jurisdiction.  These circumstances also do not warrant
limited jurisdictional discovery as to her.

Because Hardwick presents no factual allegations that suggest with
"reasonable particularity" the possible existence of contacts
between Young and Pennsylvania, in either her personal capacity or
Consumer Guardian official capacity, the Judge holds that all
claims raised against Young in the Amended Complaint are dismissed
without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.  To the extent
that Hardwick requests limited jurisdictional discovery as to
Young, the request is denied because the facts alleged in
Hardwick's Amended Complaint do not "suggest `with reasonable
particularity' the possible existence of the requisite `contacts
between Young and the forum state."

Defendant Consumer Guardian

Like Young, Consumer Guardian argues that Hardwick has failed to
meet her burden to establish the Court's jurisdiction over the LLC.
It first notes that the contract between Hardwick and Consumer
Guardian "contemplates that `This agreement will be construed and
consummated in State of Florida'" and also includes a
forum-selection clause choosing Orange County, Florida as the forum
for disputes arising out of the contract.  Second, Consumer
Guardian argues that because its principal place of business and
place of incorporation is Florida, haling Consumer Guardian to
court in the Western District of Pennsylvania offends "standards of
fair play and justice."

In turn, Hardwick argues that Consumer Guardian "purposefully
directed activities at the forum as they entered into an unlawful
arrangement with" Hardwick and withdrew money from Hardwick's bank
account in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Hardwick also
asserts that Consumer Guardian "undertook actions that would impact
Hardwick's credit score and corresponding score, which is central
to Hardwick, and therefore affected her in this forum."

In opposition, Hardwick argues that because Young is responsible
for the "management" of Consumer Guardian's actions that lead to
this dispute, she can properly be expected to answer here as the
actions of Consumer Guardian, and that coupled with Pennsylvania's
participation theory make jurisdiction [over Young] proper.
Hardwick also requests "limited jurisdictional discovery" to more
fully establish Young's conduct directed towards the forum state.

The Judge must determine (1) whether Young, outside her official
capacity at Consumer Guardian, has sufficient minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania in her personal capacity.  Second, because Hardwick
argues that personal jurisdiction is proper over Young via a
participation theory and due to her status as a managing principal,
operator, or controller of Consumer Guardian, the Judge must also
assess (2) whether any of Young's acts in her official capacity as
the alleged "managing principal" of Consumer Guardian create
sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania that would subject her to
this Court's jurisdiction.

The Judge concludes that Consumer Guardian's representation in an
official LLC annual report that its current mailing address is in
Pennsylvania, in addition to the matching address listed in the
debt validation letters, suggests with "reasonable particularity"
the possible existence of contacts between Consumer Guardian and
Pennsylvania.  The Judge will therefore permit the parties to
engage in limited jurisdictional discovery for a period of 60 days
from the date of this Opinion.  Discovery is limited to matters
proving or negating Consumer Guardian's jurisdictional contacts
with Pennsylvania and whether those contacts might support either
specific personal jurisdiction or general personal jurisdiction.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Hornak concludes that Hardwick's
allegations against Young do not facially show sufficient contacts
with Pennsylvania such that the Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over Young, and that jurisdictional discovery about
Young's contacts is not warranted.  As to Consumer Guardian,
Hardwick has raised allegations sufficient for the Court to permit
jurisdictional discovery as to Consumer Guardian's jurisdictional
contacts with Pennsylvania, and thus the Juduge will hold in
abeyance its resolution of Consumer Guardian's Motion to Dismiss.

For all the reasons set forth in his Opinion, the Judge grants in
part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent it seeks
dismissal of Hardwick's claims against Sarah Young for want of
jurisdiction.  Thus, he dismisses Hardwick's claims against Sarah
Young without prejudice for want of personal jurisdiction.  As for
the claims brought against Consumer Guardian, the Judge, on the
record at present, holds in abeyance its decision to grant the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Consumer Guardian pending
completion of limited jurisdictional discovery regarding Consumer
Guardian's jurisdictional contacts with Pennsylvania.  The parties
will have 60 days from the date of the issuance of this Opinion to
complete limited jurisdictional discovery regarding Consumer
Guardian's contacts with Pennsylvania.

The action is stayed and administratively closed during that period
of limited jurisdictional discovery and during the pendency of any
renewal of the Motion to Dismiss as to Consumer Guardian.  Further,
the parties will file a joint status report as to the conduct of
such discovery 30 days after the date of the Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/et5eywf5 from Leagle.com.


CVS HEALTH: Joseph Mier Seeks Rule 23 Class Certification
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOSEPH MIER, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. CVS HEALTH, a
Rhode Island limited liability company; and DOES 1 to 100,
inclusive, Case No. 8:20-cv-01979-DOC-ADS (C.D. Calif.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court on April 26, 2021 to enter an order
granting class certification in this matter, on the grounds that
all the prerequisites of Rule 23, including both Rule 23(b)(2) and
Rule 23(b)(3) have been satisfied.

The Plaintiff Joseph Mier has filed a class action against
Defendant CVS Health alleging that its product labeling for
hand-sanitizer -- that it "kills 99.99% of germs" -- is misleading
to consumers. In fact, science proves that alcohol-based
hand-sanitizers do not in fact kill 99.99% of all known germs.

The Plaintiff seeks class certification on the grounds that the
primary issues in this case whether the hand-sanitizer does, in
fact, kill 99.99% of germs, and whether the statement at issue
would be material to a reasonable consumer -- are classwide issues.
And, in fact, all of the Rule 23 prerequisites have been met, the
Plaintiff says.

CVS Health is an American healthcare company that owns CVS
Pharmacy, a retail pharmacy chain; CVS Caremark, a pharmacy
benefits manager; Aetna, a health insurance provider, among many
other brands.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 24,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2PuQwRl
at no extra charge.[CC]

Attorneys for the Plaintiff Joseph Mier and the Putative Class,
are:

          Justin F. Marquez, Esq.
          Thiago M. Coelho, Esq.
          Robert Dart, Esq.
          Cinela Aziz, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: justin@wilshirelawfirm.com
          thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
          rdart@wilshirelawfirm.com
          cinela@wilshirelawfirm.com

DALLAS COUNTY, TX: Sanchez Bid for Class Status Nixed w/o Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Sanchez, et al., v. Dallas
County Sheriff, et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00832 (N.D. Tex.), the
Hon. Judge Ada Brown entered an order denying the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification without prejudice to filing an
amended motion for certification

The nature of suit states Other Civil Rights involving Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Dallas County is a county in the U.S. state of Texas, the state's
second-most populous county, and the eighth-most populous in the
United States.[CC]

DAN KEEN: Corey Vasquez Seeks to Certify FLSA Collective Action
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Corey Vasquez, an Arizona
resident, v. Dan Keen Services, Inc., an Arizona company; Daniel
Keen, an Arizona resident; and Cleo Keen, an Arizona resident, Case
No. 2:21-cv-00320-DLR (D. Ariz.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order conditionally certifying a collective action
pursuant to Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")
consisting of:

   "All persons who work[ed] for Defendants Dan Keen Services,
   Inc., Daniel Keen, and/or Cleo Keen; who work[ed] over 40 hours

   in any given workweek as a past or present employee and/or
   independent contractor, who is/were classified as both employee

   and independent contractor; and who did not receive time-and-a-
   half wages are known as (the "Collective Members")."

Through this lawsuit, the Plaintiff seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages for himself and the Collective Members, requiring
the proper payment of overtime wages to employees, under the
collective action mechanism of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b).

Dan Keen is a licensed, bonded and Insured provider of quality
general contracting services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 23,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2PX84oS
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Zoldan, Esq.
          Jason Barrat, Esq.
          ZOLDAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
          14500 N. Northsight Blvd., Suite 133
          Scottsdale, AZ 85260
          Telephone: (480) 442-3410
          E-mail: mzoldan@zoldangroup.com
                  jbarrat@zoldangroup.com

DDT CONCRETE: Sensing Suit Seeks FLSA Conditional Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JONATHAN SENSING,
Individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated current
and former employees, v. DDT CONCRETE, INC. a Tennessee
Corporation, and MICHAEL WALLACE, individually, Case No.
3:20-cv-00811 (M.D. Tenn.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order:

   1. authorizing his claims to proceed as a Fair Labor Standards
      Act (FLSA) collective action for overtime violations;

   2. directing the Defendants to immediately provide his counsel a

      computer-readable file containing the names (last names
      first), last known physical addresses, last known email
      addresses, social security numbers, dates of employment and
      last known telephone numbers of all putative class members;

   3. providing that Court-approved notice be enclosed with all of

      the Defendants' currently employed putative class members'
      next regularly-scheduled paycheck/stub, be prominently posted

      at the facilities where putative class members work, and be
      mailed and emailed to the putative class members so that they

      can assert their claims on a timely basis as part of this
      litigation;

   4. tolling the statute of limitations for the putative class as

      of the date this Motion is fully briefed; and

   5. requiring that the Opt-in Plaintiffs' Consent to Join Forms
      be deemed "filed" on the date they are postmarked.

DDT offers concrete services including driveways, site preparation,
and grading.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 26,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/31Q1pQ4
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
          J. Russ Bryant, Esq.
          Robert E. Turner, IV, Esq.
          Nathaniel A. Bishop, Esq.
          JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER,
          HOLT, OWEN, & BRYANT

               - and -

          262 German Oak Drive
          Memphis, TN 38018
          Telephone: (901) 754-8001
          Facsimile: (901) 759-1745
          E-mail: rbryant@jsyc.com
                  rturner@jsyc.com
                  nbishop@jsyc.com

               - and -

          Nina Parsley, Esq.
          PONCE LAW
          400 Professional Park Drive
          Goodlettsville, TN 37072
          E-mail: nina@poncelaw.com

ECO SHIELD: Court OKs Initial Approval Quatinetz Settlement
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PAUL QUATINETZ,
individually and on behalf of a class, v. ECO SHIELD PEST CONTROL
NEW YORK CITY, LLC, and OPTIO SOLUTIONS LLC, Case No.
7:19-cv-08576-CS (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Cathy Seibel entered an
order that in compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, the Defendants, through the Settlement Administrator will
cause to be served written notice of the proposed class settlement
on the United States Attorney General and the Attorneys General of
each state in which any Class Member resides.

The Class is defined as:

   "(a) all individuals (b) with a New York address (c) from whom
   the Defendants attempted to collect and/or asserted a right to
   collect, a collection fee in addition to any amount Eco Shield
   claimed such individual owed them (d) from September 16, 2016
   through September 16, 2019."

   The Defendants have identified a total of 472 potential Class
   Members.

The Court hereby appoints Paul Quatinetz as the Class
Representative and appoints Ryan Gentile, Esq. of Law Offices of
Gus Michael Farinella, P.C. and Shimshon Wexler, Esq. of S. Wexler,
LLC as Class Counsel.

The Court preliminarily finds that the settlement of the Lawsuit,
on the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement,
is in all respects fundamentally fair, reasonable, adequate, and in
the best interest of the Class Members, especially in light of the
benefits to the Class Members; the complexity, expense, and
probable duration of further litigation; the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties;
the risk of establishing liability and damages; the risk of
maintaining the class action through trial; the possible recovery
and all the attendant risk of litigation; and the opinions of Class
Counsel.

The Court sets the following schedule:

         Date                          Event

   March 24, 2021         Preliminary Approval Order entered

   April 14, 2021         Notice sent (21 days after entry of
                          Preliminary Approval Order)

   May 17, 2021           Attorneys' Fees Petition due (21 days
                          before exclusion and objection deadline)

   June 7, 2021           Deadline to send exclusion or file
                          objection, or to oppose the Attorneys'
                          Fees Petition (75 days after entry of
                          Preliminary Approval Order)

   June 16, 2021          Motion for Final Approval due (30 days
                          before Final Approval Hearing)

   July 2, 2021           Opposition to Motion for Final Approval,
                          if any, due (14 days before Final
                          Approval Hearing)

   July 9, 2021           Reply in support of Motion for Final
                          Approval, if applicable, due (7 days
                          before Final Approval Hearing)

   July 16, 2021          Final Approval Hearing held

A copy of the Court's order dated March 24, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3dCdlKO at no extra charge.[CC]

EQUINOX HOLDINGS: Fodera Given Leave to File 3rd Amended Complaint
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANK J. FODERA, JR., et al., Plaintiffs, v. EQUINOX
HOLDINGS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 19-cv-05072-WHO (N.D.
Cal.), Judge William H. Orrick of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend to file a Third Amended
Complaint concerning Classes C and D, and granted with respect to
all other proposed amendments.

The case is a putative employment class action brought by
Plaintiffs Frank J. Fodera, Jr. and Michael M. Bonella against
Defendant Equinox, alleging violations of various California wage
and hour laws on behalf of proposed classes of personal trainers
and group fitness instructors.

In the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert eight claims
against Equinox: (1) failure to pay minimum wage; (2) failure to
pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4)
failure to provide rest periods; (5) failure to pay for rest and
recovery periods; (6) failure to furnish accurate wage statements;
(7) failure to pay wages earned at termination under Labor Code
Sections 201, 202; and (8) unfair competition under Bus. & Prof.
Code Sections 17200.

They bring each of these eight claims on behalf of the following
two putative classes in the SAC:

   a. All current and former non-exempt employees employed by any
      Defendant in California as personal trainers, or in any
      other similar capacity, at any time during the four-year
      period preceding the filing of this action through the
      present; and

   b. All current and former non-exempt employees employed by any
      Defendant in California as group fitness instructors, or in
      any other similar capacity, at any time during the
      four-year period preceding the filing of this action
      through the present.

The Plaintiffs' counsel in the action also represent the plaintiffs
in a related state court action, Porter, et al. v. Equinox
Holdings, Inc., Alameda Superior Court Case No. RG19009052,
involving similar alleged wage and hour violations by Equinox.  In
December 2020, Equinox produced a large number of documents in the
Porter action, including compensation plans and sample wage
statements for all of Equinox's non-exempt positions.

In January 2021, the Plaintiffs' counsel deposed Equinox's Person
Most Knowledgeable ("PMK") regarding Equinox's California wage
statements for non-exempt employees, and the job duties and
compensation structure of personal trainers, group fitness
instructors, and pilates instructors.  The Plaintiffs' counsel
represent that they determined they had a factual basis to make the
amendments proposed in the TAC after reviewing the documents
Equinox produced in December 2020 and after completing the PMK
deposition in January.  The Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave
to amend on Feb. 3, 2021, one week after the PMK deposition.

Plaintiffs Bonella and Fodera move for leave to amend to file a TAC
in order to add a new proposed class of pilates instructors, a
proposed class of membership advisors, spa therapists, and
estheticians, and a proposed class of all non-exempt employees who
received meal period and/or rest period premium pay.

In their motion, the Plaintiffs seek leave to add three proposed
classes.  They describe these classes as follows:

   a. Class C: All current and former non-exempt employees
      employed by any Defendant in California as a pilates
      instructor, or in any other similar capacity, at any time
      during the four-year period preceding the filing of this
      action through the present;

   b. Class D: All current and former non-exempt employees
      employed by Defendants as a membership advisor or as a spa
      therapist/esthetician, or any similar positions, however
      titled, in California who worked overtime and received any
      non-discretionary, non-hourly compensation, including
      without limitation commissions, piece rate pay, or bonus
      pay, in the same work week at any time during the four-year
      period preceding the filing of this action through the
      present; and

   c. Class E: All current and former non-exempt employees
      employed by any Defendant in California in a non-exempt
      position and who received meal period and/or rest period
      premium pay at any time during the four year periods
      preceding the filing of this action through the present.

The Plaintiffs seek to bring all eight of their claims on behalf of
Class C and their sixth claim, regarding inaccurate wage
statements, on behalf of Classes D and E.  They also seek leave to
add additional factual allegations in support of their inaccurate
wage statement claim.

Equinox opposes the Plaintiffs' motion on multiple grounds
including: (1) the Plaintiffs lack standing to represent proposed
Classes C and D; (2) Class E is futile because receiving premium
pay is not a freestanding violation of the California Labor Code;
(3) portions of the Plaintiffs' proposed additions are futile due
to res judicata or the first-to-file rule; (4) the Plaintiffs were
not diligent in seeking leave; and (5) amendment would be unduly
prejudicial to Equinox.  Equinox also seeks a ruling that, if
amendment is granted, the amendments will not relate back to the
filing of the original complaint.

Standing to Represent Proposed Classes C & D

Judge Orrick finds that the named Plaintiffs do not appear to be
members of either Class C or D and therefore, do not have standing
to bring claims on their behalf.  In the proposed TAC, the
Plaintiffs allege that Bonella is a former Equinox employee who
worked as "a personal trainer and as a group fitness instructor in
California."  They further allege that Fodera is currently employed
by Equinox "as a group fitness instructor in California" and was
previously "employed by Defendants as a personal trainer in
California.  The Plaintiffs do not allege that they worked as
pilates instructors or as membership advisors, spa therapists, or
estheticians.  Accordingly, Fodera and Bonella appear to be members
of Classes A and B but not Classes C and D.

The Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs' proposed amendment
regarding Class D is futile as drafted because the Plaintiffs lack
standing to represent this class.  However, as with Class C, this
problem could be resolved if the Plaintiffs identify an individual
who belongs to, and has standing, to represent Class D.
Alternatively, the Plaintiffs could revise their class definitions.
For example, the Plaintiffs could propose a single wage statement
class that includes all of the individuals on whose behalf
Plaintiffs seek to bring their wage statement claim -- thereby
eliminating the job description distinctions that they argue are
irrelevant to their wage statement claims.  For these reasons, the
Plaintiffs' motion is denied without prejudice with regard to their
request to add proposed Class D.

The Plaintiffs present separate arguments that they can represent
Classes C and D under the proposed class definitions.  None of
these arguments is convincing.

Viability of Class E Claim

Judge Orrick holds that not only does the Defendant's argument
reflect a misunderstanding of the Plaintiffs' proposed Class E and
the one claim brought on behalf of Class E, it is not appropriate
at the motion to dismiss stage.  He says the Plaintiffs do not seek
to bring meal or rest break claims on behalf of Class E, as
Equinox's argument suggests.  The only claim brought on behalf of
Class E in the proposed TAC is the inaccurate wage statement claim.
Nor do the Plaintiffs allege any "failure to pay a wage premium"
to members of Class E.  The exact opposite is true.  The Class E
definition is limited to employees "who received meal period and/or
rest period premium pay."  The Plaintiffs allege that such
employees received wage statements that were inaccurate in various
ways, including because they listed overtime hours twice.  Finally,
whether Rule 23's "commonality" requirement is met is a question
for the class certification stage, not the pleading stage.

In sum, Equinox's opposition to the addition of Class E misses the
mark. It does not appear that the claims brought on behalf of Class
E are futile.

Res Judicata & First-To-File

Equinox argues that res judicata and the first-to-file rule bar
portions of the new claims the Plaintiffs seek to bring on behalf
of Classes C and D.

While the Judge has concluded that the Plaintiffs' proposed
amendments as to Classes C and D are futile as drafted, he does not
agree that these other reasons would bar these proposed additions.
He says none of these factors justify application of the
first-to-file rule.

First, the case was filed in 2019, well before the Hubert case was
filed, making it the first filed case.  Second, there is only minor
overlap of the putative plaintiff classes.  Third, there is minimal
overlap in the relevant issues. While Hubert and the proposed TAC
both bring wage statement claims on behalf of membership advisors,
there are no other overlapping issues between the actions.  None of
the relevant factors support applying the first-to-file rule and
the rule does render the Plaintiffs' claims as to proposed Class D
futile.  For these reasons, Equinox has failed to demonstrate that
any of the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments are futile due to res
judicata or the first-to-file rule.

Diligence

In their motion, the Plaintiffs argue that they acted diligently in
seeking leave to amend because they only recently discovered the
factual basis for the claims they now seek to add to the action.
Their counsel explain that they represent the plaintiffs in a
related case, Porter, et al. v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., Alameda
Superior Court Case No. RG19009052. They further explain that
Equinox produced a number of documents in Porter in December 2020,
including sample wage statements for all non-exempt positions and
compensation plans.

Equinox argues that the Plaintiffs have not acted diligently.  It
notes that the action was filed close to two years ago in April
2019, and that plaintiffs have already previously amended their
complaint.

Judge Orrick disagrees with Equinox and concludes that the
Plaintiffs have acted with reasonable diligence in seeking
amendment.  It is not clear why it should matter that Plaintiffs
learned the relevant facts to support its proposed amendments as
part of discovery in a related action or why this should undermine
a claim of diligence.  Equinox does not dispute that the Plaintiffs
only recently learned the new relevant facts, nor does it argue
that the Plaintiffs should have been able to discover these facts
through the exercise of reasonable diligence.  Accordingly, the
Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs have acted with reasonable
diligence in seeking leave to amend.

Prejudice

Equinox argues that the proposed amendment would be unduly
prejudicial because it would "expand the scope of the class action,
by including potentially thousands of additional employees (all
with different job titles than the Plaintiffs)" and require
additional discovery.

The Judge holds that there is plenty of time remaining in the
action to conduct the discovery necessary to address the new issues
raised by the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments.  Class certification
is still approximately seven months away and fact discovery does
not close until Jan. 5, 2022.  Accordingly, the Judge says it does
not appear that the proposed amendments are likely to cause undue
prejudice to Equinox.

Relation Back

Finally, Equinox requests that, if the Court chooses to grant the
Plaintiffs' motion for leave, it determines that the Plaintiffs'
amendments do not relate back to the date the original complaint
was filed.  The Plaintiffs argue that this issue is an affirmative
defense, is not properly before the Court, and has no bearing on
whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).

The Judge agrees that this issue is not relevant to the present
motion and declines to address it.

For these reasons, the Judge Orrick denied the Plaintiffs' motion
to amend with respect to Classes C and D and granted in all other
respects.  Because he believes that the Plaintiffs may be able to
represent the individuals included in Classes C and D if they
revised their proposed class definitions, or if they identify a
named plaintiff who is a member of these classes, the Plaintiffs'
motion is denied as to Classes C and D without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4xcfb6yj from Leagle.com.


FACEBOOK INC: Supreme Court Flips 9th Cir. Judgment in Duguid Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the matter titled FACEBOOK, INC., Petitioner/Defendant v. NOAH
DUGUID, ET AL., Plaintiffs/Respondents, Case No. 19-511 (U.S.), the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 proscribes abusive
telemarketing practices by, among other things, imposing
restrictions on making calls with an "automatic telephone dialing
system." As defined by the TCPA, an "automatic telephone dialing
system" is a piece of equipment with the capacity both "to store or
produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or
sequential number generator," and to dial those numbers (47 U.S.C.
Section 227(a)(1)).

The question before the Court is whether that definition
encompasses equipment that can "store" and dial telephone numbers,
even if the device does not "use a random or sequential number
generator."

The case concerns "automatic telephone dialing systems"
(autodialers), which revolutionized telemarketing by allowing
companies to dial random or sequential blocks of telephone numbers
automatically. Congress found autodialer technology to be uniquely
harmful. It threatened public safety by "seizing the telephone
lines of public emergency services, dangerously preventing those
lines from being utilized to receive calls from those needing
emergency services." Indeed, due to the sequential manner in which
they could generate numbers, autodialers could simultaneously tie
up all the lines of any business with sequentially numbered phone
lines. Nor were individual consumers spared: Autodialers could
reach cell phones, pagers, and unlisted numbers, inconveniencing
consumers and imposing unwanted fees.

Petitioner Facebook, maintains a social media platform with an
optional security feature that sends users "login notification"
text messages when an attempt is made to access their Facebook
account from an unknown device or browser. If necessary, the user
can then log into Facebook and take action to secure the account.
To opt in to this service, the user must provide and verify a cell
phone number to which Facebook can send messages.

In 2014, Respondent Noah Duguid received several login notification
text messages from Facebook, alerting him that someone had
attempted to access the Facebook account associated with his phone
number from an unknown browser. But Duguid has never had a Facebook
account and never gave Facebook his phone number. Unable to stop
the notifications, Duguid brought a putative class action against
Facebook. He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining
a database that stored phone numbers and programming its equipment
to send automated text messages to those numbers each time the
associated account was accessed by an unrecognized device or web
browser.

Facebook moved to dismiss the suit, arguing primarily that Duguid
failed to allege that Facebook used an autodialer because he did
not claim Facebook sent text messages to numbers that were randomly
or sequentially generated. Rather, Facebook argued, Duguid alleged
that Facebook sent targeted, individualized texts to numbers linked
to specific accounts. The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California agreed and dismissed Duguid's amended
complaint with prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. As relevant, it held that Duguid had
stated a claim under the TCPA by alleging that Facebook's
notification system automatically dialed stored numbers. An
autodialer, the Court of Appeals held, need not be able to use a
random or sequential generator to store numbers; it need only have
the capacity to "'store numbers to be called'" and "'to dial such
numbers automatically.'"

The Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts
of Appeals regarding whether an autodialer must have the capacity
to generate random or sequential phone numbers.

Facebook argues the clause "using a random or sequential number
generator" modifies both verbs that precede it ("store" and
"produce"), while Duguid contends it modifies only the closest one
("produce"). The Court concludes that the clause modifies both,
specifying how the equipment must either "store" or "produce"
telephone numbers. Because Facebook's notification system neither
stores nor produces numbers "using a random or sequential number
generator," it is not an autodialer.

Judge Sotomayor notes that Congress defined an autodialer in terms
of what it must do ("store or produce telephone numbers to be
called") and how it must do it ("using a random or sequential
number generator"). The definition uses a familiar structure: a
list of verbs followed by a modifying clause. Under conventional
rules of grammar, "when there is a straightforward, parallel
construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series," a
modifier at the end of the list "normally applies to the entire
series."

The Ninth Circuit often applies this interpretative rule, usually
referred to as the "series-qualifier canon." This canon generally
reflects the most natural reading of a sentence. In the case, the
series-qualifier canon recommends qualifying both antecedent verbs,
"store" and "produce," with the phrase "using a random or
sequential number generator." That recommendation produces the most
natural construction, as confirmed by other aspects of Section
227(a)(1)(A)'s text, Judge Sotomayor explains.

To begin, Judge Sotomayor states, the modifier at issue immediately
follows a concise, integrated clause: "store or produce telephone
numbers to be called," citing Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees
Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. _, _ - _ (2018) (slip op., at 21-22).
The clause "hangs together as a unified whole," using the word "or"
to connect two verbs that share a common direct object, "telephone
numbers to be called." It would be odd to apply the modifier
("using a random or sequential number generator") to only a portion
of this cohesive preceding clause.

Judge Sotomayor notes that this interpretation of Section
227(a)(1)(A) also "heeds the commands of its punctuation."  The
comma in Section 227(a)(1)(A), thus, further suggests that Congress
intended the phrase "using a random or sequential number generator"
to apply equally to both preceding elements.

Contrary to Duguid's view, this interpretation does not conflict
with the so-called "rule of the last antecedent," Judge Sotomayor
opines. Under that rule, "a limiting clause or phrase  should
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows," citing Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26
(2003). The rule of the last antecedent is context dependent.

The Supreme Court has declined to apply the rule where, like in the
case, the modifying clause appears after an integrated list, Judge
Sotomayor holds, citing Jama v. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 344, n. 4 (2005) (collecting cases).
Moreover, even if the rule of the last antecedent were relevant in
the case, it would provide no help to Duguid. The last antecedent
before "using a random or sequential number generator" is not
"produce," as Duguid needs it to be, but rather "telephone numbers
to be called." There is "no grammatical basis" for arbitrarily
stretching the modifier back to include "produce," but not so far
back as to include "store."

In sum, Congress' definition of an autodialer requires that in all
cases, whether storing or producing numbers to be called, the
equipment in question must use a random or sequential number
generator, Judge Sotomayor opines. This definition excludes
equipment like Facebook's login notification system, which does not
use such technology.

The statutory context confirms that the autodialer definition
excludes equipment that does not "use a random or sequential number
generator," Judge Sotomayor holds. She adds, among other things,
that expanding the definition of an autodialer to encompass any
equipment that merely stores and dials telephone numbers would take
a chainsaw to these nuanced problems when Congress meant to use a
scalpel.

Mr. Duguid's counterarguments cannot overcome the clear commands of
Section 227(a)(1)(A)'s text and the statutory context, according to
the Opinion. The crux of his argument is that the autodialer
definition calls for a construction that accords with the "sense"
of the text.

Judge Sotomayor holds that Duguid greatly overstates the effects of
accepting Facebook's interpretation. The statute separately
prohibits calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to various
types of phone lines, including home phones and cell phones, unless
an exception applies. "Our decision does not affect that
prohibition. In any event, Duguid's quarrel is with Congress, which
did not define an autodialer as malleably as he would have liked,"
Judge Sotomayor quips.

The Court must interpret what Congress wrote, which is that "using
a random or sequential number generator" modifies both "store" and
"produce," Judge Sotomayor opines. The Court holds that a necessary
feature of an autodialer under Section 227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity
to use a random or sequential number generator to either store or
produce phone numbers to be called.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Opinion.  

Justice Samuel Alito concurs in the judgment, agreeing with the
Court that an "automatic telephone dialing system," as defined in
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, must have the
capacity to "store telephone numbers" by "using a random or
sequential number generator."

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated April 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3rmzwddw from Leagle.com.


FCA US: $126K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Tomassini Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT TOMASSINI, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FCA US LLC, Defendant, Case No.
3:14-CV-1226 (MAD/ML) (N.D.N.Y.), Judge Mae D'Agostino of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of New York awards the
Plaintiff $125,882.78 in attorneys' fees and $4,699.30 in costs.

On Sept. 8, 2014, Plaintiff Tomassini commenced the putative class
action in state court, and Defendant FCA US removed to the Northern
District of New York on Oct. 8, 2014.

On Jan. 25, 2018, Plaintiff Tomassini moved for class certification
on his claim for deceptive business practices under New York
General Business Law Section 349.  The Court denied the Plaintiff's
motion.

Plaintiff Tomassini subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration
or, in the alternative, to permit Thomas Hromowyk to intervene as
an additional class representative.  The Court denied the
Plaintiff's motion to reconsider but allowed him to amend the
complaint to include Mr. Hromowyk.

On Jan. 9, 2019, Plaintiffs Tomassini and Hromowyk filed an amended
complaint alleging violations under Section 349.  The Defendant
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the
Court.

On Sept. 27, 2019, the Defendant filed a motion for sanctions and a
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Hromowyk's claim.  The
Court granted Defendant's motions for sanctions and summary
judgment as to Plaintiff Hromowyk and he was terminated from the
action.

In June 2020, the Defendant moved for leave to deposit funds with
the Court.  The Court denied the Defendant's motion.

On Aug. 17, 2020, the Defendant filed a motion to remand the action
to state court.  Soon thereafter, the Plaintiff accepted the
Defendant's offer of judgment.

Currently before the Court is the Plaintiff's motion for attorneys'
fees and bill of costs.  The Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees
arises out of his acceptance of an offer of judgment.

Motion for Attorneys' Fees

The accepted offer of judgment provides the following: "Pursuant to
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant FCA US
LLC hereby offers to allow entry of judgment to be taken against it
on the individual claim made by Robert Tomassini in the amount of
Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000), plus 1) payment of taxable costs
related to the prosecution of Tomassini's individual claim, and 2)
reasonable attorney fees related to the prosecution of Tomassini's
individual claim (only), as agreed to by the parties, or, in the
absence of an agreement, as determined by the court."

The Plaintiff seeks a total of $151,525.56 in attorneys' fees and
$14,027.84 in taxable costs.  The Defendant argues that the
Plaintiff's motion for fees and costs should be denied in its
entirety, or alternatively, that the Plaintiff's counsel should be
awarded no more than $2,000.  The Plaintiff's counsel seeks an
hourly rate of $350 for partners, $200 for associates, and $100 for
paralegals and law clerks.  The Defendant did not object to the
Plaintiff's requested rate.  Accordingly, Judge D'Agostino finds
that the requested rates, while high for this district, are
reasonable in light of the work and experience of the Plaintiff's
counsel.

However, the Defendant objects to the Plaintiff's calculation of
the number of recoverable hours.  It primarily argues that that the
Plaintiff's fee and cost requests are not related to his
"individual claim (only)" as required by the offer of judgment.
Alternatively, it argues that the fee request is substantively and
procedurally flawed.

Judge D'Agostino holds that the offer of judgment provides that the
Plaintiff's counsel may recover fees which relate to the
Plaintiff's "individual claim (only)."  Thus, the Plaintiff's
counsel may not recover fees for the hours that they dedicated to
issues which either involved class claims or were intertwined with
class issues.  The Judge has reviewed the billing records submitted
by counsel and finds that some of the claimed hours relate to class
issues, while others are unclear.  Additionally, the Plaintiff has
not provided sufficiently detailed information to demonstrate
entitlement to recovery of fees for the hours listed.  Due to the
insufficiency of the documentation, the Judge is unable to
determine whether the billing entries relate to individual or class
issues.  Thus, the Plaintiff has not met his burden for recovery of
fees for the hours listed.   Accordingly, the Plaintiff's counsel
is awarded $125,882.78 in attorneys' fees.

Motion for Bill of Costs

The Plaintiff filed a bill of costs in the amount of $14,027.84.
He asserts that the entire bill is for fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts.  The Defendant argues that the
bill of costs should be rejected because the Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the receipts submitted relate to the prosecution
of his individual claim only.  Rather, it argues, the Plaintiff
seeks compensation for transcripts of witnesses related to class
issues.  The Plaintiff has not responded to the Defendant's
objections.

Judge D'Agostino holds that the offer of judgment provides that the
Defendant will pay "taxable costs related to the prosecution of
Tomassini's individual claim."  For the same reasons that she
detailed, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff may not recover costs
which involve class issues.  The Judge has reviewed the Plaintiff's
bill of costs and finds that some of the costs incurred involve
class issues.  Therefore, the Plaintiff may not recover the
$3,878.35 in costs associated with the depositions of Mr.
Pinsonneault, Mr. Lynch, and Mr. McLellan.

Additionally, the Plaintiff's bill of costs includes requests for
costs associated with the depositions of numerous non-party
witnesses.  The Judge finds that the Plaintiff has not provided any
information about who these witnesses are or the topics of their
testimony, leaving the Court unable to determine whether their
testimony involves class issues.  Due to the insufficiency of the
submission, the Plaintiff's requested taxable costs must be further
reduced by $5,452.19.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff is entitled to an
award of costs in the amount of $4,699.30.

After carefully reviewing the entire record in the matter, Judge
D'Agostino grants in part and denies in part the Plaintiff's motion
for attorneys' fees.  The Plaintiff is awarded $125,882.78 in
attorneys' fees.  The Judge grants in part and denies in part the
Plaintiff's motion to tax costs.  The Plaintiff is awarded
$4,699.30.

The Clerk of the Court will serve a copy of the Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum-Decision
& Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/3nbmrtmk from
Leagle.com.

PARKER WAICHMAN LLP — FL OFFICE, DANIEL C. CALVERT, ESQ. --
dcalvert@yourlawyer.com -- JORDAN L. CHAIKIN, ESQ., in Bonita
Springs, Florida, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

LAW OFFICES OF ELMER, ROBERT KEACH, III, P.C., ELMER R. KEACH, III,
ESQ., in Albany, New York, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

MIGLIACCIO & RATHOD LLP, JASON S. RATHOD, ESQ. --
jrathod@classlawdc.com -- NICHOLAS A. MIGLIACCIO, ESQ. --
nmigliaccio@classlawdc.com -- in Washington, D.C., Attorneys for
the Plaintiff.

KANTROWITZ, GOLDHAMMER & GRAIFMAN, P.C., GARY S. GRAIFMAN, ESQ. --
ggraifman@kgglaw.com -- JAY I. BRODY, ESQ. -- jbrody@kgglaw.com --
in Chestnut Ridge, New York, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

WHITEFIELD BRYSON & MASON, LLP, GARY E. MASON, ESQ. --
gmason@wbmllp.com -- in Washington, D.C., Attorneys for the
Plaintiff.

COUGHLIN, GERHART LAW FIRM -- BINGHAMTON OFFICE, ALAN J. POPE,
ESQ., in Binghamton, New York, Attorneys for the Defendant.

THOMPSON, COBURN LAW FIRM -- ST. LOUIS OFFICE, KATHY A. WISNIEWSKI,
ESQ. -- kwisniewski@thompsoncoburn.com -- SHARON B. ROSENBERG,
ESQ., STEPHEN A. D'AUNOY, ESQ. -- sdaunoy@thompsoncoburn.com --
THOMAS L. AZAR, JR., ESQ., in St. Louis, Missouri, Attorneys for
the Defendant.


FIFTH THIRD BANK: Klopfenstein Suit Seeks to Certify Two Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as William R. Klopfenstein,
et al., v. Fifth Third Bank, Case No. 1:12-cv-00851-MRB (S.D.
Ohio), the Hon. Judge Michael R. Barrett entered an order granting
the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class and appointment of class
counsel.

Pursuant to Rule Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, the Court
certified the following classes:

   -- Breach of Contract Class

      "All persons in the United States who enrolled in Fifth
      Third's Early Access Loan Program prior to May 1, 2013 and
      took out at least one Early Access Loan;" and

   -- TILA Class:

      "All persons in the United States who were enrolled in Fifth

      Third's Early Access Loan Program from August 3, 2011 through

      April 30, 2013;"

The Court also entered an order appointing Plaintiffs as
representatives of the above classes; and appointing Hassan
Zavareei of Tycko & Zavareei, Stuart E. Scott of Spangenberg
Shibley & Liber LLP, and Jason Whittemore of Wagner McLaughlin,
P.A. as counsel for the classes pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(g)(1).

Fifth Third Bank is a bank headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, at
Fifth Third Center. It is the principal subsidiary of Fifth Third
Bancorp, a diversified bank holding company.

A copy of the Court's opinion and order dated March 26, 2020 is
available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3dzqPqs at no
extra charge.[CC]

FORCES OF NATURE: Loses Bid to Dismiss Slowinski Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINE SLOWINSKI, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. FORCES OF NATURE, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 20 CV 2381 (N.D. Ill.), Judge John Robert
Blakey of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denies the Defendant's motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint in its entirety.

Plaintiff Slowinski brings the putative class action under Illinois
law against the Defendant, alleging that the Defendant has
mislabeled its homeopathic over-the-counter ("OTC") drugs, causing
her and other purchasers various economic and non-economic
injuries.

The Defendant manufactures, markets, sells, and distributes
homeopathic medicinal products throughout the State of Illinois and
the country under the brand name "Forces of Nature."  The
Plaintiff, a purchaser of these products, alleges that the
Defendant falsely advertises 13 of its products as containing
certain active ingredients when those products do not, in fact,
contain such ingredients.

For instance, according to the Plaintiff, the Defendant advertises
and labels a maximum strength sinus product as containing the
active ingredients "occimim," "berberis vulgaris," "allium
sativum," "thuja occidentalis," "echinacea angustifoolia,"
"silica," and "trigonella foenum-graceum," when those ingredients
are not present in the product.  She claims she tested a sample of
the Defendant's maximum strength sinus product through a Fourier
Transform Infrared Spectrometer ("FTIR"), which revealed that it
contained no other substance but water and ethanol.

Plaintiff Slowinski alleges that she purchased these products
without knowing they did not contain the listed ingredients and, as
a result, suffered injuries including lost money, time, and
"stress, aggravation, frustration, loss of trust, loss of serenity,
and loss of confidence in product labeling."  She last purchased
Defendant's products on Feb. 10, 2020.

To redress her alleged injuries, the Plaintiff brings a four-count
complaint on behalf of a putative class, asserting claims for
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act ("ICFA") (Count I); common law fraud (Count II);
unjust enrichment (Count III); and breach of express warranties
(Count IV).

The Defendant has moved to dismiss the first amended complaint in
its entirety.  In moving to dismiss, it argues that: (1) it did
not, as a matter of law, deceptively label its products; (2) the
Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in purchasing the products;
(3) federal law preempts the Plaintiff's claims; and (4) the
Plaintiff has failed to plead her fraud-based allegations with
particularity.

The Court first sets forth the federal framework regulating
homeopathic drugs before turning to Defendant's arguments.

Deceptive Labeling

Against this backdrop, the Defendant argues that its labels comply
with federal standards and are thus not deceptive as a matter of
law, therefore foreclosing all of the Plaintiff's claims, which
rely upon the common contention that Defendant misrepresented the
ingredients contained in its products.   Implicit in this argument
is the notion that, because the FDA has signed off on the
Defendant's labeling, its labels cannot be misleading as a matter
of law.  Not so, Judge Blakey holds.  He notes that a drug's
inclusion in HPUS does not mean that the FDA has approved its
labels.

Relatedly, the Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff
fundamentally misunderstands homeopathy, insisting that it
maintains accurate labels and that the Plaintiff has falsely
accused it by alleging otherwise.  While this may (or may not) be
the case ultimately, such an argument is misplaced on a motion to
dismiss.  The Judge must take as true the Plaintiff's allegations
that, after testing samples of Defendant's products via FTIR, the
Plaintiff discovered that they did not contain the active
ingredients listed on the labels.  In short, the Judge cannot
simply conclude at this juncture that the Defendant accurately
labeled its products.

Contributory Negligence

Next, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff was contributorily
negligent because she did not understand the labels on the products
she purchased; that negligence, the Defendants says, bars all of
her claims.

The Judge disagrees.  First, he says, under Illinois law, a
"victim's negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort."
Thus, the Plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence, even if
proven, would not bar her ICFA and fraud claims.  Second,
contributory negligence constitutes an affirmative defense and
ordinarily presents "a factual issue to be decided by the trier of
fact."  At this stage, the record remains undeveloped, and thus,
the Judge has no basis to conclude that the Defendant would succeed
on the merits of its contributory negligence defense.

Preemption and Primary Jurisdiction

The Defendant also argues that the doctrines of preemption and
primary jurisdiction bar the Plaintiff's state-law claims.

The Judge opines that the Plaintiff's state-law claims merely seek
to impose similar requirements to what federal law already
requires—truthful statements on labels.  Therefore, no such
conflict exists between federal and state law.  He also opines that
the FDA does not possess special competence in assessing whether
drug labels are false and misleading.  Instead, courts can, and do,
make these determinations regularly.  The Judge thus declines to
abstain from considering the merits of the case under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.

Sufficiency of Fraud Allegations

Finally, the Defendant challenges the adequacy of the Plaintiff's
fraud-based allegations.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
requires pleadings to "state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud."  The Plaintiff must therefore describe the
who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud.

Judge Blakey opines that the Plaintiff does just that.  She asserts
that the Defendant's labeling is false and misleading because it
causes consumers to believe that the Defendant's products contain
certain active ingredients when they do not.  She also describes in
detail how she formed the basis of these allegations by conducting
the FTIR experiment.  The Plaintiff alleges that she and other
consumers would not be able to understand that the Defendant's
products do not contain the listed active ingredients without any
advanced understanding of chemistry and without conducting complex
experiments on the products.  She also alleges that she purchased
the products most recently on February 10, 2020, and that the
Defendant sells the products throughout Illinois. These allegations
sufficiently describe the who, what, when, where, and how of the
fraud with particularity.

For the reasons he explained, Judge Blakey denies the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.  The parties will meet and confer and file a
joint status report by April 9, 2021 proposing reasonable case
management dates for the remaining life cycle of the case. If the
parties believe that a settlement conference would be fruitful,
they should contact Chambers, and the Court will make a referral to
the assigned Magistrate Judge for this purpose.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/6mj6p23t from
Leagle.com.


FORD MOTOR: Claims in Carter's Second Amended Complaint Narrowed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC CARTER, et al., Plaintiffs v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 19-62646-CIV-ALTMAN (S.D. Fla.), Judge Roy K.
Altman of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted in part and denied in part Ford's Motion to Dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint.

Ford's F-series truck has been America's best-selling vehicle for
the last 42 years.  But the Plaintiffs have highlighted (what they
say is) a material defect in the F-150: A bubbling of the dashboard
panel that affects the trucks' value.

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action on behalf of a
nationwide class of current and former owners and lessees of
2015-20 Ford F-150 XL and XLT trucks.  While Ford offers its F-150
in several "trim levels" -- N.B., depending on the trim level, an
F-Series truck can cost you anywhere from $30,000 to over
$67,000— -- the Plaintiffs' claims concern only two of these trim
levels: the XL and XLT, which are (generally) the least expensive
trim options.  These Class Vehicles (the SAC alleges) are equipped
with an instrument panel -- commonly referred to as a dashboard --
that's defective in that it's prone to warping or bubbling.  The
Defect most often manifests -- in both the Class Vehicles' original
dashboard and Ford's replacement dashboards ("New Dash") -- in the
areas around the defrost vents.  In many cases, the dashboard has
warped and peeled away from the truck's body within Ford's warranty
period.

By April 2015, Ford knew about the Defect because hundreds of F-150
drivers had complained about it to Ford.  Despite this knowledge,
the Plaintiffs say, Ford has continued to sell the Class Vehicles
without ever mentioning the Defect.  In 2018, Ford notified its
dealers about the Defect and instructed them not to try to repair
it.  Again -- as they had done for three years -- Ford and its
dealers decided not to disclose the Defect to consumers.

The next year (2019), Ford told its dealers to replace the Original
Dash with a New Dash Ford was then manufacturing.  Unfortunately,
the SAC alleges, the New Dash -- which uses the very same parts as
the Old Dash -- carries the same Defect.  In other words, even
though the F-Series's other trim levels don't have the Defect --
meaning that Ford was producing and installing very similar,
non-defective dashboards in the more expensive trims of the same
model truck—Ford elected not to use that dash on the Class
Vehicles.  Instead, Ford manufactured (and began installing) a New
Dash that was also defective.  Still, according to the Plaintiffs,
Ford refuses to offer the higher-grade dashboards as replacements
for the Class Vehicles.  As a result, three of the named Plaintiffs
-- Glass, Linderman, and Wooding -- had the Old Dash replaced with
the New Dash, only to see the Defect appear again within a few
weeks.

The eight named Plaintiffs each allege that they purchased or
leased a new 2018 or 2019 Ford F-150 XL or XLT from an authorized
Ford dealer.  The named Plaintiffs hail from four different states
-- Florida, Virginia, California, and Illinois -- and seek to
represent subclasses of residents from each of those states.  They
all allege that Ford failed to disclose the Defect to them.

Alleging that Ford knew about the defect and failed to fix it,
they've filed the lawsuit.  The SAC asserts 11 counts against Ford.
For ease of analysis, Judge Altman divides these counts into three
categories: (1) the non-Florida (i.e., the Illinois, Virginia, and
California) state-law claims (Counts IV-XI); (2) the Florida
state-law claims (Counts II & III); and (3) the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act claim (Count I).

Ford has moved to dismiss all 11 counts.

Ford has moved to dismiss Counts IV-XI -- the non-Florida
Plaintiffs' claims -- for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).  Ford says that it isn't
subject to general jurisdiction in Florida -- a proposition the
Plaintiffs do not dispute.  It also argues that the Court may not
exercise specific jurisdiction over the non-Florida Plaintiffs'
claims.

The Plaintiffs advance three arguments for specific personal
jurisdiction in Florida.  First, the Plaintiffs say that, because
the Court has jurisdiction over Ford for the Florida Plaintiffs'
claims, it also has specific personal jurisdiction over Ford for
unnamed, non-resident Plaintiffs' claims in the class.  Second,
they ask the Court to "exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over
all non-resident named Plaintiffs' claims."  Third, the Plaintiffs
make a last-ditch appeal to judicial efficiency and argue that
Ford's position would undermine Congress's objectives in passing
the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA").

Among other things, Judge Altman holds that (i) the SAC fails to
connect the non-Florida Plaintiffs' claims to Florida in any way;
(ii) he declines to exercise the Court's pendent-party personal
jurisdiction over the claims of the non-Florida Plaintiffs; (iii)
because the Plaintiffs' pendent-party personal-jurisdiction
arguments would require the Court to (needlessly) exercise
jurisdiction over parties whose claims have no connection to
Florida, the Judge elects not to exercise his discretion to apply
that doctrine; and (iv) the Plaintiffs are wrong to hitch their
wagon to CAFA, which endows the district courts with
subject-matter, not personal, jurisdiction.

As this recitation should have made plain, Ford's Motion to Dismiss
the non-Florida named Plaintiffs' claims (Counts IV-XI) is
granted.

In Count II, the Plaintiffs allege that Ford violated Florida's
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), when it
"omitted disclosure of the known and material fact that the
Original and New Dash possess the Defect."

Ford offers four arguments for its assault on the Plaintiffs'
FDUTPA claim.  First, Ford says that the Plaintiffs have failed to
explain what Ford knew, when Ford knew it, or what Ford disclosed
to them.  Second, it suggests that, because the Defect had become
public, Ford had no duty to disclose it.  Third, it lambasts the
Plaintiffs for failing to aver that Ford's omission was likely to
deceive a reasonable purchaser.  Fourth, Ford maintains that the
Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Ford "actively concealed" the
Defect.

Judge Altman finds all these arguments unpersuasive.  First, the
SAC unambiguously outlines precisely what Ford should have
disclosed -- the Defect and when Ford knew about it -- since at
least 2015.  Second, the allegations are more than enough at this
stage of the case.  Third, the delta between what the average
consumer was willing to pay for the truck he thought he was getting
-- aesthetics included -- and the truck he actually got is the
amount by which that average consumer was "deceived."  Fourth,
since active concealment is not an element of a FDUTPA claim, the
Plaintiffs can't be blamed for having failed to include it.

For these reasons, the Judge denied Ford's Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claim (Count II).

Ford also contends that the Plaintiffs failed to plead a viable
breach-of-warranty claim (Count III).   It advances only one
argument in its challenge to Count III -- that "most of the
plaintiffs do not allege they gave Ford an opportunity to repair or
replace their dashboards," and that "none of the Plaintiffs'
allegations shows that Ford would not or could not reasonably
repair the defect within a reasonable number of attempts."

Judge Altman finds that (i) the SAC makes pellucid that the Florida
Plaintiffs -- the only ones left -- did give Ford a chance to
repair or replace their dashboards; (ii) the detailed allegations
are plainly sufficient to "suggest that defendant's limited
remedies were inadequate and failed of their essential purpose;
(iii) the detailed allegations are plainly sufficient to "suggest
that defendant's limited remedies were inadequate and failed of
their essential purpose.  He denied Ford's Motion to Dismiss Count
III.

Finally, Ford challenges the Plaintiffs' MMWA claim (Count I) on
two grounds.  First, Ford says, the MMWA claim is coextensive with
the underlying state warranty claim (Count III), which Ford thinks
the Court should dismiss.  Second, it insists that the Plaintiffs
have failed to comply with the informal dispute-resolution
mechanism Congress created when it passed the MMWA.

The Judge holds that (i) because the Plaintiffs' breach of express
warranty claim under Florida's UCC fails, their breach of express
warranty claim under the MMWA necessarily fails also, and (ii)
while participation in Ford's informal dispute settlement procedure
is a prerequisite to being able to proceed with her MMWA claim,
whether or not it already occurred is an issue of fact that is
premature at this stage.  And, since Ford has offered no other
basis for dismissing the MMWA claim, its Motion to Dismiss Count I
is denied.

After careful review, Judge Altman granted in part and denied in
part Ford's Motion to Dismiss as follows: The Motion to Dismiss
Counts IV-XI for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted and the
Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III for failure to state a
claim is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3ur59m9h from Leagle.com.


FRANKLIN COUNTY, OH: Plaintiffs' Bid to Certify Class Terminated
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Trey Smith-Journigan, and
Paul E. Williams, Jr., both individually and on behalf of a class
of others similarly situated, v. Franklin County, Ohio, Case No.
2:18-cv-00328-MHW-CMV (S.D. Ohio), the Hon. Judge Michael H. Watson
entered an order administratively terminating the Plaintiff's
motion to certify class.

The Court said, "The parties wish to mediate their claims in this
case and have informed the Court that the mediation will take place
on April 22, 2021. If mediation is unsuccessful. The Plaintiff may
reactivate the motion with a brief notice to the Court."

Franklin County is a county in the U.S. state of Ohio. As of 2019
census estimates, the population was 1,316,756, making it the most
populous county in Ohio.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 24, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uwQSFX at no extra charge.[CC]


GREYSTAR REAL: Bid to Strike/Dismiss Class Claims in Wallace Nixed
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATRINA WALLACE, Plaintiff v. GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE
PARTNERS, LLC; GREYSTAR GP II, LLC; GREYSTAR MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
L.P.; GREYSTAR RS NATIONAL, INC.; GREYSTAR RS SE LLC; GREP
SOUTHEAST, LLC; and INNESBROOK APARTMENTS, LLC d/b/a SOUTHPOINT
GLEN, Defendants, Case No. 1:18CV501 (M.D.N.C.), Judge Loretta C.
Biggs of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina denies the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Claims and
to Strike Plaintiff's Class Allegations for Failure to Comply with
Local Rule 23.1(b).

The Plaintiff initiated the putative class action alleging
violations of the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act,
N.C. Gen. Stat. Section 42-46, et seq., the North Carolina Debt
Collection Act, id. Section 75-50, et seq., and the North Carolina
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, id. Section 75-1.1, et
seq.

The Plaintiff filed the action in Durham County Superior Court, and
the Defendants removed it to the Court on June 13, 2018, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332, 1441, 1446.  The Plaintiff then filed
an Amended Complaint on Aug. 24, 2018, and this serves as the
operative complaint before the Court.

In September 2018, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss under
Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) arguing that the Plaintiff had failed
to state a claim and that the Court did not have jurisdiction over
some of the parties.  In response, the Plaintiff moved for
jurisdictional discovery.  The Court granted the Plaintiff's motion
for discovery and additionally ordered that all remaining issues in
the case that had not otherwise been resolved be "stayed pending
resolution by the Court as to whether it has personal jurisdiction
over the specific Defendants named herein."

The jurisdictional discovery period that followed did not proceed
smoothly.  The Defendants first filed a motion to stay discovery,
and the Court subsequently denied it.  According to the Plaintiff,
following this denial, the Defendants objected to providing
requested materials, missed a deadline to file a memorandum, and
were subject to three motions to compel discovery.  The Court even
sanctioned one Defendant in April 2020.

The Plaintiff alleges that such a finding is emblematic of the
Defendants' approach to the litigation and contend that they have
"attempted to stall and delay the case's resolution" throughout its
pendency.

In May 2020, the Court entered a Text Order lifting its stay
following the withdrawal of the Defendants' motions challenging the
Court's jurisdiction.  Ten days later, the Defendants filed the
instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court should "dismiss
the Plaintiff's class claims with prejudice and strike the
Plaintiff's class allegations for failure to comply with Rule
23.1(b) of the Local Rules" of the Middle District of North
Carolina.  More specifically, they argue that the Plaintiff has not
filed a motion to maintain the case as a class action within 90
days of filing her complaint as required by the Local Rules.

The Plaintiff does not deny that she has failed to file a motion
for class certification within the requisite time period, but she
argues that a dismissal of these claims is an extraordinary remedy
that is not in the spirit of the Federal nor the Local Rules.

Judge Biggs opines that there is no dispute as to whether the
Plaintiff has missed the deadline at issue, and thus he need only
determine whether there is good cause to extend the period due to
excusable neglect.

The Defendants allege that they have been prejudiced to the extent
that this delay has prevented them from adding other parties or
claims necessary to the defense of a class.  Defendant Innesbrook
further contends that it has been unable to assert counterclaims
for unpaid rent from putative class members who have not yet been
identified.  Further, it argues that any defendants who may be
joined later would not have "the opportunity to defend themselves
against the many rulings that have already occurred, or to bring
claims against the putative class members."  The remaining
Defendants largely echo these claims and explain that "they have
not had the opportunity to add as parties the owners of apartments
in which the putative class members lived or assert the defense of
failure to join necessary parties."

Such alleged prejudice, however, is not so weighty as to merit the
dismissal of the class action claims, the Judge holds.  For
instance, there is nothing to prevent the Defendants from adding
other parties or claims in the future.  Additionally, the only
rulings the Court has made in the case have done little more than
deny motions to dismiss or resolve discovery disputes.

The Judge next considers the length of the delay and its potential
impact on judicial proceedings.  The Defendants allege that the
Plaintiff has deprived them "of their interest in the orderly
administration of justice and judicial efficiency by failing to
comply with Local Rule 23.1(b)."  Yet, when considering "all
relevant circumstances," such an argument again fails to persuade
the Court.  As discussed, the Defendants have together filed
sixteen motions for extension of time to either respond to the
Plaintiff's motions or to comply with discovery requests.  Further,
the Order following the most recent 26(f) conference conducted by
the Court, though expressly not deciding this issue, supports the
Plaintiff's argument that additional discovery -- and thus time --
is needed in order to determine who might be an appropriate class
member.

In sum, though Judge Biggs advises the Plaintiff to take greater
heed of future deadlines, she finds that its failure to file a
separate motion for class certification was excusable neglect that
has not prejudiced the Defendants in a way that is so significant
as to necessitate dismissing the action.  For these reasons, the
Judge denies the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class
Claims and to Strike Plaintiff's Class Allegations for Failure to
Comply with Local Rule 23.1(b).

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/uhexs7vz from
Leagle.com.


HUDSON HALL: Stewart Labor Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Employees
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DERRICK STEWART, on behalf
of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class, v. HUDSON
HALL LLC d/b/a MERCADO LITTLE SPAIN, HUDSON HALL HOLDINGS LLC d/b/a
MERCADO LITTLE SPAIN, THINK FOOD GROUP, LLC, and JOSE RAMON ANDRES
PUERTA a/k/a JOSE ANDRES, Case No. 1:20-cv-00885-PGG-SLC
(S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying a class of:

      "all current and former non-exempt employees (including but
      not limited to line cooks, cooks, food preparers, stock
      persons, counterpersons, porters, dishwashers, food runners),

      employed by the Defendants during the statutory period;" and


   2. appointing class counsel.

On January 31, 2020, the Plaintiff Stewart filed a class and
collective action complaint against the Defendants seeking unpaid
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor
Law (NYLL).

Mr. Stewart was employed by the Defendants as a line cook at
Mercado Little Spain (MLS), a Spanish restaurant designed to
reproduce the feel of a traditional Spanish food emporium with
multiple vendors. He contends that his employment with the
Defendants began on March 1, 2019 and ended in September 2019. He
usually worked either 35 or 45 hours per week, but sometimes more.
During his employment, he and Class members suffered significant
wage and hour violations, he adds.

A copy of the Plaintiff's notice of motion to certify class dated
March 24, 2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3cSFjCL at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          C.K. Lee, Esq.
          LEE LITIGATION GROUP, PLLC
          148 West 24 th Street, Eighth Floor
          New York, NY 10011
          Telephone: (212) 465-1188
          Facsimile: (212) 465-1181

INDEGENE INC: PHRC Placeholder Bid for Class Certification Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PROGRESSIVE HEALTH AND
REHAB CORP., v. INDEGENE, INC., et al, Case No.
3:20-cv-10106-MAS-DEA (D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Michael A. Shipp
entered an order:

   1. denying the Plaintiff's Placeholder Motion for Class
      Certification without prejudice; and

   2. directing the Plaintiff may file a renewed motion after a
      proper factual development of the claims.

The Court said, "the Motion is virtually identical to those
recently rejected in both Physicians Healthsource and Cooper.
Counsel is reminded "of the undesirability of a premature motion
for class certification, unsupported by discovery and largely
untethered to the requirements for actually certifying a class."

As Plaintiff's counsel seemingly acknowledges, the Third Circuit
disfavors placeholder motions for class certification, Richardson
v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Our ruling today is
intended to have the salutary effect of discouraging these
premature motions in favor of motions brought within a reasonable
period of time and after proper factual development of the claims
has occurred."). And as Plaintiff's counsel correctly notes,
"district courts in this Circuit have typically ruled that
'placeholder' motions for class certification should be 'denied
without prejudice to be renewed following class discovery.'"Indeed,
courts within this district have recently denied as premature
virtually identical placeholder motions filed by Plaintiff's
counsel.

Indegene is a company offering research and development and
management services to healthcare and pharmaceutical enterprises.
It was founded in 1998 and is based in Bangalore, India. Indegene
has offices in North America, Europe, China and India.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 23, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3fOeZMd at no extra charge.[CC]


KYOTO SUSHI: Court Denies Chen's Bid to Modify Arbitration Award
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled SHANG ZHONG CHEN, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, Plaintiff v. KYOTO SUSHI, INC. D/B/A
KYOTO SUSHI, ASQUARED GROUP, INC. D/B/A KYOTO SUSHI, AND ANDY LEE,
Defendants, Case No. 15-CV-7398 (DLI) (RER) (E.D.N.Y.), Magistrate
Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York denied the Plaintiff's motion under
Section 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act to modify an arbitration
award to include reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses.

On December 30, 2015, Chen filed the suit against the Defendants
claiming multiple violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), the Internal Revenue
Code and the New York General Business Law. On April 3, 2016,
Opt-In Plaintiffs Shi Hang Wu and Shu Jun Ma each filed consents to
become parties in a collective action ostensibly pursuant to
Section 216(b) of the FLSA.

Prior to bringing or joining suit, Chen and the Opt-in Plaintiffs
("Claimants") each had signed an arbitration agreement with their
employer. The Defendants moved to compel arbitration.

On September 22, 2017, the Court granted the Defendants' motion to
compel arbitration as to the FLSA and NYLL claims, and the case was
administratively closed.

Consistent with the Agreements, the Claimants then submitted
arbitration demands to the American Arbitration Association
("AAA"). Although the Agreements required individual arbitration,
the Defendants consented to consolidation of the employees' claims.
After a two-day arbitration hearing, the parities filed
post-hearing briefs. The arbitrator subsequently issued an award in
favor of Claimants on April 23, 2020. The arbitrator did not find
any of the Claimants credible; however, the Defendants admitted
liability as to some wage and hour violations under the FLSA and
NYLL.

The arbitrator's award provided that the administrative fees and
compensation of the arbitrator "shall be borne as incurred" but did
not address attorney's fees or other costs. Chen emailed AAA to
request a briefing schedule regarding attorney's fees. In response,
the arbitrator requested briefing as to her continuing jurisdiction
over the matter given that she had already issued a final award.
After reviewing the parties' submissions, the arbitrator issued an
order on July 14, 2020, finding that she did not have continuing
jurisdiction to determine a motion for attorney's fees and costs.

Mr. Chen subsequently filed the instant motion. He timely moves to
modify the arbitration award to include attorney's fees under
Section 11 of the FAA. Specifically, he requests that the Court
modify the arbitration award under Section 11(a) on the basis that
the arbitrator made "an evident material mistake" in failing to
include attorney's fees and costs in the award.

Judge Reyes holds that it was not the arbitrator, who made a
mistake, but Chen, who failed to submit arguments and evidence in
support of reasonable attorney's fees and costs prior to or
concurrently with his post-arbitration brief.

Judge Reyes finds that the arbitrator did not make an evident
material mistake. Judge Reyes opines that Chen has not met his
burden to demonstrate that the arbitrator made an evident material
mistake by failing to award attorney's fees or costs. He identifies
no person, thing, or property that has been mistakenly described or
how such a mistake would relate to his claim for attorney's fees
and costs.

Mr. Chen's counsel had the opportunity to submit post-hearing
briefing to the arbitrator, Judge Reyes notes. That would have been
an appropriate juncture at which to submit an explicit request for,
and to provide proof of, his fees and costs prior to the
arbitrator's final decision. He failed to do either. The FAA limits
the Court's review of the arbitrator's final award, and it
forecloses Chen's post hoc request that the Court modify the award
to include attorney's fees and costs.

Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' motion for modification of
the arbitration award to include an award of attorney's fees,
costs, and expenses is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum & Order dated April 1,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/7pcrajjr from
Leagle.com.


MARIA D'S INC.: Conditional Cert. of Collective Action Sought
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JOWANDA JACKSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
MARIA D'S INC. dba BOTTOMZ UP, dba THUNDERBIRD GENTLEMEN'S CLUB, a
Florida Corporation; VIRGIL L. ADKINS, SR., an individual; REGINALD
WALKER, an individual; DOE MANAGERS 1 through 10; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 3:20-cv-01441-BJD-PDB (M.D. Fla.),
the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the case as a collective action and
      allowing notice of the action to be sent to:

      "dancers who have performed at the Defendants' club Bottomz
      Up (aka Thunderbird Gentlemen’s Club) in the past three
      years;" and

   2. equitably tolling the statute of limitations for putative
      collective members during the notice period so as to allow
      them a reasonable opportunity to opt-in to the present
      action.

Plaintiff Jackson worked as an exotic dancer at Bottomz Up. The
singular establishment is an exotic dance club that has gone by two
names, "Bottomz Up" and "Thunderbird," and is owned and operated by
Maria D's, Inc.

On December 22, 2020, Ms. Jackson brought this action seeking to
recover wages owed to her and other dancers who have been
classified as independent contractors at Bottomz Up under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). On January 13, 2021, Ms. Jackson filed
her First Amended Complaint. She is only seeking conditional
certification for issuance of notice of FLSA claims.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 24,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3dDp9wj
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Alejandro Marin, Esq.
          KRISTENSEN LLP
          12540 Beatrice Street, Suite 200
          Los Angeles, CA 90066
          Telephone: (310) 507-7924
          Facsimile: (310) 507-7906
          E-mail: alejandro@kristensenlaw.com

               - and -

          Raymond R. Dieppa, Esq.
          FLORIDA LEGAL, LLC
          12550 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 209
          North Miami, FL 33181-2536
          Telephone: (305) 901-2209
          Facsimile: (786) 870-4030
          E-mail: ray.dieppa@floridalegal.law

The Defendants is represented by:

          Gary S. Edinger, Esq.
          BENJAMIN, AARONSON, EDINGER & PATANZO, P.A.
          305 N.E. 1st Street
          Gainesville, FL 32601
          Telephone: (352) 338-4440
          Facsimile: (352) 337-0696
          E-mail: GSEdinger12@gmail.com

MARICOPA COUNTY, AZ: TASC's Subpoena in Briggs Suit Partly Quashed
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In the case, Deshawn Briggs, et al., Plaintiffs v. County of
Maricopa, et al., Defendants, Case No. CV-18-02684-PHX-EJM (D.
Ariz.), Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona grants in part the Plaintiffs'
Motion to Quash Defendant TASC's Subpoena to Slepian Smith, PLLC.

Named Plaintiffs Antonio Pascale, Deshawn Briggs, and Lucia Soria
filed the class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated individuals against Defendants Maricopa County,
Allister Adel in her official capacity as Maricopa County Attorney,
and Treatment Assessment Screening Center, Inc. ("TASC").  The
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on Aug. 23, 2018, alleging
claims under Section 1983 for wealth-based discrimination in
violation of the Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights, and
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The Defendants conducted the Marijuana Deferred Prosecution Program
("MDPP") in which the Plaintiffs were enrolled.  The Plaintiffs
allege that their participation in the program was involuntarily
extended solely because they were too poor to pay required program
fees, thus violating their constitutional rights.  The case is now
proceeding on the second amended complaint filed by the Plaintiffs
on Sept. 23, 2019.  The Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory
damages, punitive damages, damages for pain and suffering, and
declaratory and injunctive relief.

On Dec. 11, 2020, TASC served the Plaintiffs' counsel with a Notice
of Intent to Serve a Subpoena on Slepian Smith, PLLC, the law firm
representing Soria in her application for Social Security
disability insurance benefits.  The subpoena requests 11 categories
of documents:

     1. Soria's application for Social Security Disability
Insurance benefits filed on Dec. 28, 2018.

     2. All communications related to Soria's application for
Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

     3. All documents relating to Soria's application for Social
Security Disability Insurance benefits.

     4. All communications relating to any hearing relating to
Soria's application for Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits.

     5. All documents related to any hearing relating to Soria's
application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.

     6. All communications you had with the Social Security
Administration relating to Soria.

     7. All communications you had with medical personnel regarding
any medical or health condition that affected Soria's ability to
work.

     8. All communications you had with any current, former, or
prospective employer for Soria relating to Soria's ability to
work.

     9. All documents relating to Soria's ability to work.

     10. All communications you had with Soria's attorneys in the
Action relating to Soria's application for Social Security
Disability Insurance benefits.

     11. All communications you had with Soria's attorney in this
Action relating to Soria's ability to work.

On Dec. 29, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed their motion to quash TASC's
subpoena to Slepian Smith.  They contend that the subpoenaed
documents are confidential and that Soria has a privacy interest in
them.  They further argue that the subpoena is overbroad, that it
seeks information protected by the attorney work product doctrine,
and that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client
privilege.

TASC contends that: (1) the documents sought by the subpoena are
relevant and Soria has placed them in issue; (2) the Plaintiffs
have not met their burden to demonstrate that either the
attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine apply to
protect any of the documents or communications at issue; (3) even
if the Plaintiffs had met their burden, documents transmitted
between Slepian Smith and the SSA are not protected by the
attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine; (4) Soria
has placed her disability status and ability to work at issue such
that any privilege or protection that might have applied is waived;
and (5) any confidential or otherwise private documents can be
disclosed pursuant to the Court's protective order.

Judge Markovich must determine whether the information sought by
the subpoena is relevant to the underlying action and whether the
requests are sufficiently tailored to identify and produce
responsive information.  He finds that while some of the documents
TASC seeks potentially help to answer the question of whether Soria
was able work and earn money while enrolled in MDPP and are thus
relevant to the action, the subpoena also seeks broad categories of
information such as "all communications related to" and "all
documents relating to" Soria's application for Social Security DIB.
He says these requests are overly broad and not sufficiently
tailored to request specific documents or communications, thus
requiring Slepian Smith "to engage in mental gymnastics to
determine what information may or may not be remotely responsive."
TASC may not simply ask for everything falling into the social
security disability file basket and then peruse the documents at
its leisure in hopes of finding something relevant.

To be clear, the Judge does find that categories 1, 7, 8, and 11
are relevant and sufficiently tailored to produce relevant
information.  These categories request documents and communications
that specifically address the question of whether Soria's medical
conditions affected her ability to work and earn money to pay
TASC's fees.  Because these requests lay out a clear subject of the
communications and specific recipients, they are not overbroad.

The Plaintiffs aver that they have already produced evidence
substantiating that Soria applied for disability benefits shortly
before she began diversion supervision, as well as voluminous
medical records documenting the medical conditions that led her to
do so.  TASC contends that discovery conducted to date fails to
substantiate Soria's claims, and further notes several apparent
contradictions in the medical records that have already been
provided.

In an attempt to resolve the parties' dispute, the Plaintiffs
previously offered to withdraw their objections to several of the
subpoena categories and produce documents responsive to the issues
TASC raised in its response to their motion to quash.  Though TASC
rejected this offer, the Plaintiffs are willing to provide Soria's
application for social security DIB, documentation of Soria's
efforts to schedule a hearing on her disability claim (to confirm
that it remains pending), and any additional medical records that
Soria submitted to the SSA that have not already been provided to
TASC.  The Judge finds that disclosure of these materials is
appropriate and he will order the Plaintiffs to provide the
relevant documents to TASC.

Accordingly, the Judge next considers whether any of the documents
or communications in the categories that he finds are relevant and
not overly broad are protected by the attorney-client privilege or
the work product doctrine.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have
failed to meet their burden to establish the privileged nature of
the communications sought.  While their opposition to the subpoena
is based primarily on relevancy and overbreadth, to the extent that
the Plaintiffs contend any of the requested items are protected by
the attorney-client privilege, it is the Plaintiffs' burden to
establish the privilege by providing a privilege log or affidavit
describing the nature of the withheld documents.  Yet the
Plaintiffs have not produced anything, instead stating that they
"need not submit a privilege log in response to an overly broad
request."  Without some kind of evidence, the Judge is unable to
assess whether the privilege applies to any specific document, just
as TASC is unable to properly challenge the propriety of the
Plaintiffs' privilege claims.

Because the Judge finds that categories 1, 7, 8, and 11 are
relevant and not overly broad, the Plaintiffs would need to submit
a privilege log or other documentation to establish the privileged
nature of the communications sought.  Furthermore, because
categories 7, 8, and 11 involve communications with third parties
and do not specifically request confidential communications between
Soria and her attorneys at Slepian Smith, to the extent that the
attorney-client privilege applies, it is waived.

In contrast to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product
doctrine can protect documents and tangible things that are both
non-privileged and relevant if prepared in anticipation of
litigation by or for another party or its representative.  The
Plaintiffs did not submit a privilege log, affidavit, or other
documentation to support their argument that the documents sought
are protected by the attorney work product doctrine.  Rather, they
assert that the attorney work product doctrine applies because the
documents sought by the subpoena were prepared for litigation.

But conclusory statements of privilege, without affidavits or other
competent support, are not enough for the Court to find privilege,
the Judge holds.  Further, he holds that not every legal matter
constitutes litigation.  An attorney's work drafting a contract or
preparing an individual's tax return is not litigious in nature.
While Slepian Smith represents Soria in her efforts to obtain
social security disability benefits, it is questionable whether
documents prepared in the course of this representation would be
considered "in preparation for litigation" when benefits may be
granted or denied without an administrative hearing.  Nor does
either party provide case law stating whether documents prepared
for DIB proceedings are, or are not, "work product" prepared "in
preparation of litigation."  Regardless, the only category that
this objection applies to is category 1, Soria's application for
social security disability insurance benefits, which the Plaintiffs
have already offered to disclose, making this point moot.

In sum, Judge Markovich finds that categories 1, 7, 8, and 11 are
not overly broad.  To the extent that the Plaintiffs argue any of
the requests in categories 1, 7, 8, and 11 are protected by the
attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, the
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish the
privileged nature of the documents or communications sought.  The
Judge further finds that categories 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10 are
overly broad and not sufficiently tailored to the issues at hand.

Accordingly, Judge Markovich (i) grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Quash as to subpoena categories 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10; (ii)
denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash as to categories 7, 8, and
11; and (iii) moots the Plaintiffs' objection to category 1, as
they have offered to disclose Soria's application for Social
Security DIB.

Within 10 days of the date of the Order, the Plaintiffs will
disclose to TASC: (a) Soria's application for Social Security DIB;
(b) documentation of Soria's efforts to schedule a hearing on her
disability claim (to confirm that it remains pending); and (c) any
additional medical records that Soria submitted to the SSA that
have not already been provided to TASC.

Defendant TASC may draft a new subpoena to Slepian Smith as to
categories 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10 that is narrower in scope and
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ry28dkae from Leagle.com.


MATCH GROUP: Court Dismisses Crutchfield's Amended Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PHILLIP R. CRUTCHFIELD, Individually and on Behalf of
All Others Similarly Situated v. MATCH GROUP, INC., AMANDA W.
GINSBERG, and GARY SWIDLER, Civil Action No. 3:19-CV-2356-S (N.D.
Tex.), Judge Karen Gren Scholer of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, grants the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint.

The case is a putative securities class action brought by co-lead
Plaintiffs Phillip Crutchfield and Samir Ali Cherif Benouis
alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Defendants.  The putative
class consists of all persons and entities, who purchased or
otherwise acquired common stock of Match between Nov. 6, 2018, and
Jan. 31, 2020.

Match is a publicly traded company that operates various dating and
matchmaking websites, including Match.com, Tinder, PlentyofFish,
Meetic, and Pairs, among others.  During the Relevant Time Period,
Swidler was Match's CFO, and Ginsberg was Match's CEO.  
Match's revenue is primarily derived from registered members who
subscribe to a recurring "premium" or "paid" membership.  Members
not subscribed to a premium membership can still use Match's basic
functionalities for free.  In addition to using typical reporting
metrics like revenues and earnings, Match tracks its performance by
evaluating the conversion rate from unpaid to paid memberships,
"paid member count" ("PMC"), that is, the number of members on
premium or paid membership accounts, and "average revenue per
user."

Match's public filings and statements also routinely refer to
"Subscribers," who are "users who purchase a subscription to one of
Match's products," and "Average Revenue per Subscriber" ("ARPU"),
which is "Direct Revenue from Subscribers in the relevant
measurement period divided by the Average Subscribers in such
period further divided by the number of calendar days in such
period," as pertinent operating metric terms.  One of Match's key
goals was to convert unpaid members into paid members.

According to the 170-page Amended Complaint, Match's revenue growth
during the Relevant Time Period was driven, at least in part, by
widespread fraudulent accounts consisting of scammers and "bats"
(autonomous programs that can interact with systems or users).
Such fraud was "widespread knowledge" at Match, and Ginsberg and
Swidler -- as senior leaders -- allegedly knew the statistics on
the number of fraudulent accounts and had detailed discussions
about Match's fraud problem with the Product Division or
developers.  Match's fraud problem was also discussed during
company-wide meetings.

The Defendants allegedly knew of these fraudulent users but failed
to take necessary actions to address the problem, preferring
instead to focus on the revenue-producing metrics.   The Plaintiffs
allege that rather than striving to achieve accurate forecasts to
identify and reduce fraudulent account activity, Ginsberg and
Swidler were more focused on tracking revenue-generating generating
data, such as each brand's PMC or ARPU.  The Amended Complaint
claims that both Ginsberg and Swidler were well aware of these
efforts.  Another alleged strategy to increase paid subscriptions
was to notify non-paying users that other members had "liked" them
or sent them messages to entice the non-paying users to upgrade
their memberships, which would enable them to view the "likes" and
read the messages.  The Amended Complaint also contends that Match
only paid attention to its fraud problem when it created a variance
on forecasted PMC or ARPU figures.

These fraudulent accounts were also relevant to an investigation
and lawsuit by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").  In March
2017, the FTC requested information and documents from Match in
connection with a civil investigation into Match.com's business
practices.  Several months later, in November 2018, the FTC offered
to settle potential claims regarding Match.com's marketing,
chargeback, and online cancellation practices via a consent
judgment, requiring certain changes in Match.com's business
practices, and a $60 million payment.  Match and the FTC discussed
this settlement proposal but did not reach a resolution.

On Aug. 7, 2019, the FTC voted to bring claims against Match and
referred the case to the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ").  On
Sept. 25, 2019, Match reported that the DOJ opted not to pursue a
civil case and referred the matter back to the FTC, which then
filed a lawsuit against Match.  The lawsuit alleged that Match.com,
among other things, "used artificial love interest ads to deceive
customers into buying or upgrading subscriptions, failed to resolve
disputed charges, and intentionally made it difficult to cancel
subscriptions."

Against this factual backdrop, the Plaintiffs allege that Match
defrauded investors.  Specifically, they assert that Match made
material misstatements and/or omissions, regarding: (1) the
integrity of Match's membership base; (2) financial results
reported in public filings; (3) certifications that Match had
adequate internal controls; and (4) the FTC's investigation and
lawsuit.  The Plaintiffs refer to these four categories of alleged
misstatements respectively as: (1) Membership Integrity Fraud; (2)
Reported Results Fraud; (3) Internal Controls Fraud; and (4) FTC
Investigation Fraud.

Based on the foregoing allegations, the Plaintiffs assert two
claims.  Count I alleges that the Defendants violated Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.  Count
II alleges that Ginsberg and Swidler violated Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.  The Defendants move to dismiss all claims.

A. Section 10(b) Claim

The parties dispute the material misstatement or omission,
scienter, and loss causation elements.

Regarding material misstatement or omission, Judge Scholer opines
that (i) the statements regarding Match's financial and operational
conditions are not, without more, false or misleading; (ii) while
the Amended Complaint asserts in a conclusory fashion that at least
some fraudulent users paid for Match subscriptions, it fails to
describe particularly or otherwise specifically allege the extent
of such fraud by paying users, how such fraud would affect Match's
financial figures, if at all, and the degree to which Defendants
knew of fraudulent users with paid subscriptions; (iii) the
Plaintiffs' general assertion that Ginsberg and Swidler knew of,
yet failed to disclose, such faults is insufficient to state a
claim for securities fraud under the heightened pleading standards;
and (iv) the Plaintiffs still have not stated a viable securities
fraud claim because the Amended Complaint does not allege any facts
creating a strong inference that, at the time Match made these
statements, the Defendants knew that the alleged policies and
practices were illegal.

With respect to scienter, the Jugde finds that (i) the Amended
Complaint's allegations regarding the extent of Ginsberg's and
Swidler's knowledge on these various aspects of Match's business do
not evince an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or
otherwise suggest that they acted with severe recklessness when
they made the alleged misstatements; (ii) the Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged that Ginsberg's and Swidler's stock
transactions during the Relevant Time Period occurred in suspicious
amounts or at suspicious times; (iii) the Plaintiffs' allegations
regarding Match's Feb. 8, 2019 private offering announcement do not
support a strong inference of scienter; (iv) Ginsberg's and Yagan's
resignations, without more, do not bear on the scienter analysis;
and (v) the Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to show
that it is the rare case where the special circumstances exception
should apply.

As for loss causation, because she concludes that the Amended
Complaint does not plausibly allege a material misrepresentation or
a strong inference of scienter, the Judge "need not reach the issue
of loss causation."

B. Section 20(a) Claim

In addition to their Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim, the
Plaintiffs allege that Ginsberg and Swidler violated Section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act in their roles as Match control persons during
the Class Period.  Under Section 20(a), a person who exerts control
over a person who violates any provision of the Securities Exchange
Act can be held jointly and severally liable with the primary actor
of the underlying securities law violation.  Nonetheless, "control
person liability is secondary only and cannot exist in the absence
of a primary violation."

As the Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for a primary violation
under the Exchange Act by any control person, their Section 20(a)
claims against Ginsberg and Swidler must also be dismissed.

For the reasons she discussed, Judge Scholer grants the Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.  Because the Plaintiffs have requested further
leave to amend their complaint in response to a ruling from the
Court identifying specific pleading deficiencies, and given the
federal rules' liberal policy of allowing amendments to pleadings,
the Judge grants the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
The Plaintiffs must file an amended complaint by April 23, 2021.
If an amended complaint is not filed within such time, the
Plaintiffs' claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4apapthx from
Leagle.com.


MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: Case & Bautista Merged; Lead Counsel Named
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOYCE CASE, et al., Plaintiffs v. MERLIN
ENTERTAINMENTS GROUP U.S. HOLDINGS INC, et al., Defendants. JESSICA
BAUTISTA, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS GROUP U.S. HOLDINGS
INC., et al., Defendants, Case Nos. 20cv01049 JAH-MSB, 20cv01128
JAH-MSB (S.D. Cal.), Judge John A. Houston of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California entered an order:

   a. consolidating the captioned cases under the low number
      case, Case v. Merlin Entertainments Group U.S. Holding,
      Inc., 20cv1049 JAH-MSB. The parties and the Clerk of Court
      will file all future filings in Case No. 20cv01049-JAH-MSB
      only; and

   b. appointing Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law Group, APC,
      and Todd M. Friedman of the Law Offices of Todd M.
      Friedman, P.C., are appointed as the interim co-lead
      counsel for the consolidated action.

Plaintiffs Joyce Case, William Lum and Tiffany Lamar ("Case
Plaintiffs"), filed a motion to consolidate and appoint interim
class counsel in Case v. Merlin Entertainments Group U.S. Holding,
Inc., 20cv1049.  In response, Jessica Bautista, the plaintiff in
the related matter Bautista v. Merlin Entertainments Group U.S.
Holdings Inc., 20cv1128, filed a motion to intervene.  Thereafter,
the Case Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Bautista filed a joint motion to
intervene seeking to intervene in the other action for the limited
purpose of responding to the parties' motions to appoint interim
counsel.  The Court granted the joint motion.

On Oct. 21, 2020, the Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition
to the motions and Plaintiff Bautista filed an opposition to the
motion filed by the Case Plaintiffs and the Case Plaintiffs filed
their opposition to Plaintiff Bautista's motion.  The parties filed
their respective replies on Oct. 28, 2020.  Finding the motions
suitable for determination without oral argument, Judge Houston
took the matters under submission.

Motion to Consolidate

The Case Plaintiffs move to consolidate the two related actions
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Under
Rule 42, a court may consolidate actions if they "involve a common
question of law or fact."  The Case Plaintiffs contend
consolidation is warranted because Plaintiff Bautista's proposed
class is entirely subsumed by their proposed classes, and Plaintiff
Bautista's claims are duplicative of and subsumed by their causes
of action.

Plaintiff Bautista does not oppose the motion to consolidate.  She
believes consolidation is warranted to promote efficiency, ensure
consistent results and encourage judicial economy based on the
similar claims against various Legoland-related entities.  The
Defendants do not oppose the motion to consolidate.

The parties agree and the allegations of the complaints demonstrate
the actions share common questions of law and fact.  Accordingly,
consolidation is appropriate and the Case Defendants' motion to
consolidate is granted.

Motions to Appoint Interim Class Counsel

The Case Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Bautista have filed competing
motions for appointment of interim class counsel before seeking
certification as a class action.  The Case Plaintiffs argue the Law
Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC and the Law Office of Robert L.
Teel should be appointed interim counsel to promote the orderly and
efficient conduct of the action.  Plaintiff Bautista contends her
counsel, Kazerouni Law Group, APC and the Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C., should be appointed interim co-lead counsel because
they are adequate counsel who are prepared and willing to protect
the best interests of the putative class members.

Both parties submit evidence of their attorneys' work investigating
and identifying claims.  The Case Plaintiffs contend their
attorneys' work demonstrates they are better suited to represent
the class because they prepared a superior complaint with more
claims and detail.  The quality of pleadings may be considered in
determining counsel's ability and adequacy to represent the
interests of the class.  The difference in length of the complaints
is explained by the fact the Case Plaintiffs assert more claims
against more defendants and seek to represent a broader class.  It
is not clear at this early stage of the proceedings that these
differences are superior.

The Case Plaintiffs also attack the SAC filed by Bautista as
insufficiently plead and subject to dismissal.  They essentially
invite the Court to determine whether Bautista's SAC would survive
a motion to dismiss. The Court declines to conduct such a review
which is more appropriately addressed on a motion to dismiss.  A
brief review of the complaints demonstrates all counsel have taken
steps investigating and identifying their clients' claims.

Judge Houston holds that both sets of counsel appear qualified to
serve as interim counsel.  However, Bautista demonstrates her
counsel, which has more relevant experience and knowledge and more
staff, are better suited to adequately and fairly represent the
putative class.

Accordingly, Judge Houston granted in part and denied in part the
Case Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate and appoint interim class
counsel.  He granted the motion as to the request to consolidate
and denied as to the request to appoint interim class counsel.

The Judge consolidated the captioned cases under the low number
case, Case v. Merlin Entertainments Group U.S. Holding, Inc.,
20cv1049 JAH-MSB. The parties and the Clerk of Court will file all
future filings in Case No. 20cv01049-JAH-MSB only.

Plaintiff Bautista's motion for appointment of interim co-lead
counsel is granted.  Abbas Kazerounian of Kazerouni Law Group, APC,
and Todd M. Friedman of the Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C.,
are appointed as the interim co-lead counsel for the consolidated
action.

The interim co-lead counsel will file a consolidated complaint
within 14 days of the date of the Order.  The Defendants will file
a response to the consolidated complaint within 14 days of the
filing of the consolidated complaint, in accordance with the
Court's Order dated Sept. 29, 2020.

The Judge denied as moot the Defendants' motion to dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/33bn8nrd from Leagle.com.


MERRILL LYNCH: Class Cert. Briefing Date Extended to September 21
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al., v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH
INC., et al., Case No. 1:17-cv-06221-KPF (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge
Katherine Polk Failla entered an order grantng a 45-day extension
of the deadline for briefing the pending motion for class
certification, from August 30, 2021, to September 21, 2021 in order
to accommodate the parties' extended discovery schedule, by
Stipulation dated January 25, 2021.

In so doing, the Court has allowed the briefing on the Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification to be filed over a period of seven
months. However, in granting this request as a courtesy to the
parties, the Court has complicated its own administrative calendar;
in particular, the current briefing schedule forecloses the Court's
ability to comply with certain semi-annual reporting obligations to
Congress.

To permit the Court to comply with its obligations without
shortening the briefing schedule or discovery, the Court will
terminate the pending motion for class certification -- solely as
an administrative matter -- and it requests that Plaintiffs refile
their Notice of Motion for Class Certification at the time they
file their reply brief, on or before September 21, 2021, as a
courtesy to the Court.

For avoidance of doubt, the Court confirms that the briefing
schedule set pursuant to docket entry number 410 remains in effect.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at
docket entry number 411.

Merrill is an American investing and wealth management division of
Bank of America. Along with BofA Securities, the investment banking
arm, both firms engage in prime brokerage and broker-dealer
activities.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 26, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uy3fRN at no extra charge.[CC]

NELNET INC: District of Nebraska Narrows Claims in Johansson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW JOHANSSON, HEATHER PORTER, JON PEARCE, LINDA
STANLEY and ANETRA FAISON, on behalf of themselves and the Class of
Members described herein, Plaintiffs v. NELNET, INC., a Nebraska
Corporation, NELNET DIVERSIFIED SOLUTIONS, LLC, a Nebraska limited
liability company, and NELNET SERVICING LLC, a Nebraska limited
liability company, Defendants, Case No. 4:20-CV-3069 (D. Neb.),
Judge John M. Gerrard of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nebraska granted in part and denied in part the Defendants'
motion for dismissal.

The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges individual and class claims
regarding the Defendants' servicing of student loans.  The
Defendants are Nebraska corporations.  Defendant Nelnet Servicing,
LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant Nelnet Diversified
Solutions LLC, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant
Nelnet Inc.  The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants administer,
service and collect student loans throughout the United States.
Additionally, according to the Plaintiffs, Nelnet, Inc. owns over
50 other subsidiaries that also service and collect student loans.
The Defendants, through Nelnet Servicing, contracted with the
federal Department of Education regarding the administration and
collection of student loans.  Further, the Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant Nelnet, Inc., holds itself out to be a major servicer of
federal student loans originating with, and owned by, the
Department (Federal Direct Loan Program), as well as Federal Family
Education Loan Program loans purchased by the Department.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants, as federal loan
servicers, are responsible for administering federal income-driven
repayment plans.  Borrowers who cannot afford to repay their loans
pursuant to the standard repayment plan may enroll in a variety of
income-driven repayment plans.  One such plan is the income-based
repayment plan, in which the borrower's monthly payment is
generally capped at 15% of the borrower's discretionary income.
After 25 (or in some cases 20) years of qualifying payments, the
borrower's debt is then subject to discharge.

Income-driven repayment plans are renewed annually.  To renew a
plan, the borrower must recertify their income and family size by
submitting a renewal application.   Timely submission of a renewal
application and proof of income entitles the borrower to certain
protections.  The borrower's income-driven repayment plan may not
be cancelled while a renewal application is pending, and the
borrower's monthly payment amount must be maintained until the
renewal request has been processed.  Further, loan servicers are
directed to promptly process applications and determine the
borrower's new monthly payment amount.

The Plaintiffs allege that if a borrower submits a timely renewal
application, but the loan servicer needs additional paperwork to
process the application, the borrower's account is given
administrative forbearance.  Administrative forbearance allows the
loan servicer to have up to 60 days to collect and process the
renewal documentation.  Interest that accrues during administrative
forbearance is not capitalized.  If a borrower is unable to make
payments for a variety of acceptable reasons, their account may be
placed in what the Plaintiffs call hardship forbearance.  Hardship
forbearance allows for a temporary cessation of payments, or an
extension of time for making payments, or the temporary acceptance
of smaller payments.  Interest that accrues during hardship
forbearance is capitalized to the borrower's account balance.

All the named Plaintiffs allege claims for breach of the
Defendants' servicing contract with the Department of Education,
breach of the Plaintiffs' promissory notes with the Department of
Education, the Defendants' alleged negligent misrepresentations
regarding the servicing of the Plaintiffs' loans, and for an
accounting at law regarding improper fees and charges allegedly
incurred by the Plaintiffs.  In addition, Johansson alleges a claim
pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2, for the Defendants' alleged
misrepresentations in servicing his loan, and Stanley alleges a
claim pursuant to the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev.
Stat. Section 6-1-105, regarding the Defendants' misrepresentations
in servicing her loans.

The Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), arguing that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for
relief.

First, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently allege facts showing that the separate legal status of
the defendants should be disregarded, and that Nelnet, Inc. and
Nelnet Diversified Solutions should be dismissed.  They contend
that the plaintiffs rely entirely on statements found in Nelnet's
2016 Annual Report filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to support their argument.  The Plaintiffs argue that
they have sufficiently pled that the Defendants are alter egos of
each other, and that Nelnet Servicing is the disclosed agent of
Nelnet, Inc. and Nelnet Diversified.

Judge Gerrard finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged enough such
that it is reasonable to expect that discovery may reveal evidence
to substantiate the necessary elements of their claim.  He says the
allegations regarding the Defendants' ownership structure, and the
specificity of its shared principal place of business address,
together with the representations attributed to Nelnet, Inc. in its
SEC filing, as well as the absence of the Defendants' answer to the
complaint, are sufficient, at this very early stage of this
litigation, to deny the Defendants' motion to dismiss Nelnet, Inc.,
and Nelnet Diversified Solutions.

Second, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs' breach of
contract claims should be dismissed because the Higher Education
Act does not confer a private right of action upon federal student
loan borrowers.  They argue that a private right of action to
enforce the Act would run counter to Congress' intent in giving the
Department of Education "sole and complete control" of the Act's
enforcement regime.

The Judge holds that the Defendants' argument regarding a private
right of action misses the point, and he is not persuaded as to the
Defendants' representations regarding the extent of the Act's
enforcement regime.  He finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged facts showing that their interests, as borrowers
experiencing a partial financial hardship, were specifically
contemplated by the Department in promulgating the relevant
regulations, and specifically contemplated when these same
Department regulations were included by reference in the
Department's serving contract with the Defendants.  The Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged facts showing that the provisions
allowing for affordable repayment plans, loan forgiveness, notice
for renewal, prompt processing of applications, and protections
with respect to plan cancelation, were specifically made for the
benefit of borrowers such as the Plaintiffs, who are experiencing a
partial financial hardships.

Third, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot plausibly
allege that the Department assigned their promissory note to the
Defendants.  They assert that the Plaintiffs' allegation -- that
the servicing contract between the Department and the Defendants
functions as an assignment of the Departments' servicing rights --
is merely an unadorned legal conclusion not entitled to a
presumption of truth.  They also assert that even if the Plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged an assignment of their promissory note, their
claims fail because they cannot identify a specific provision of
the note that has been breached.  The Defendants point to the
governing law provision of the promissory note, and argue that a
breach of contract claim cannot rest on a general governing law
provision.

Judge Gerrard is not persuaded.  He notes that the Defendants, as a
non-signatory to the promissory note, cannot be a party in an
action alleging the breach of that note unless they have assumed or
been assigned the contract, and whether the contract has been
assigned, or the functional equivalent of privity exist, is a
fact-dependent issue, dependent on the parties' dealings, as well
as the language of the relevant contracts.  And contrary to the
Defendants' argument, the Department's regulations are specifically
designated as part of the terms and conditions of the Department's
promissory note.  The plaintiffs' complaint details specific
regulations that they allege were breached by the Defendants in
servicing their loans. The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs
failed to allege a specific provision that has been breached is
without merit.

Fourth, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' negligent
misrepresentation claim fails because they owed no duty of care to
the Plaintiffs.  They are conflating fraudulent concealment with
negligent misrepresentation.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants
negligently misrepresented forbearance options, the status of
renewal applications, and the documentation required for approval
of income-driven repayment applications.  The Plaintiffs' claims
are not ones of concealment, but of the Defendants' duty to
disclose known facts necessary to prevent their representations
from being misleading.  The allegations in the complaint also show
that each of the Plaintiffs detrimentally relied on
misrepresentations made by the Defendants, which forced them into
hardship forbearance, or caused delays in processing their
income-driven repayment applications or renewals.  This reliance
resulted in the capitalization of interest and delayed the
Plaintiff from qualifying for loan forgiveness.  The Judge
concludes that the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
negligent misrepresentation claims should be denied.

Fifth, the Defendants argue that there is no contractual
relationship between the parties.  They also argue that the
exemplar servicing contract attached to the Plaintiffs' complaint
(filing 1-1) provides that servicers, such as the Defendants, are
required to direct borrowers to make payments to specific payment
services designated by the Treasury.  As such, they argue, the
Plaintiffs cannot show that the Defendants received money that was
not theirs.

The Judge has already found that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that the Department partially assigned or delegated their
servicing rights to the Defendants, which obligated them to
administer the Plaintiffs' loan repayment responsibilities.  He has
also found that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they,
as borrowers experiencing a partial financial hardship, are the
intended third-party beneficiaries of the servicing contract
between the Department and the Defendants.  However, the Judge
observes that no Plaintiff alleged that they made a payment
directly to the Defendants, or that the Defendants breached the
servicing contract by requiring payments to be made directly to
them and not to a designated Treasury payment service.  The Judge
finds that the allegations in the Plaintiffs' complaint fail to
state a claim for an accounting at law.

Sixth, the Defendants argue that Johansson does not allege that he
was deceived, or that he relied on anything the Defendants said or
did.  They also argue that Johansson only alleges unspecified
financial harms concerning a delay in his progress toward loan
forgiveness, and an adverse credit reporting.

Judge Gerrard finds that Johansson has sufficiently alleged a claim
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act regarding the Defendants'
alleged deceptive course of conduct.   Among other things,
Johansson alleged that the Defendants' deceptive course of conduct
included several misrepresentations concerning the timeliness of
his renewal application, the Defendants' direction that he enters
into hardship forbearance, that he was subject to a standard
repayment plan, and the capitalization of interest to his loan
balance.  Johansson alleged that he did rely on the Defendants'
misrepresentations when he placed his loans into forbearance and
resubmitted his renewal application after they informed him that
his recertification had not been processed.

Finally, the Defendants assert that Stanley's claim for damages on
behalf of a putative class of Colorado Plaintiffs should be
dismissed because monetary damages are unavailable in class actions
under the Act.

Comparing damages that the Act precludes in a class action with
Stanley's prayer for relief on behalf of the class, the Judge
observes that Stanley does not seek actual or statutory damages
under the Act.  Thus, the Defendants' motion to dismiss or strike
Stanley's claim for money damages on behalf of a class is a
nullity.  Stanley's prayer on behalf of the class for an award of
attorneys' fees is, however, precluded by the plain language of
Section 6-1-113(2)(b), and will be stricken.  Further, the Judge
understands that Stanley's prayer for punitive damages on behalf of
the class would include treble actual damages, and as such, must
also be stricken pursuant to Section 6-1-113(2)(a)(III).

Based on the foregoing, Judge Gerrard granted in part and in part
denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  Plaintiff Anetra
Faison's claims are dismissed without prejudice.  The remaining
Plaintiffs' claim for an accounting at law is dismissed.  Plaintiff
Linda Stanley's prayer for relief on behalf of the class for an
award of attorneys' fees and punitive damages is stricken.  The
matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge for case progression.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/2dbyzb44 from Leagle.com.


OLLIE'S BARGAIN: Persons With Disabilities Class Certified in Allen
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IRMA ALLEN and BARTLEY MICHAEL MULLEN, JR.,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. OLLIE'S BARGAIN OUTLET, INC., Defendant, Civil Action
No. 2:19-cv-281 (W.D. Pa.), Judge William S. Stickman, IV of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania:

    (i) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs'
        Request for Judicial Notice; and

   (ii) granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Plaintiffs Allen and Mullen, filed a putative class action under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b), on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, requesting injunctive
and declaratory relief on the ground that Defendant Ollie's does
not provide people utilizing wheelchairs or scooters with full and
equal enjoyment of its facilities in violation of Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. Sections
12181-12189.  The Plaintiffs maintain that Ollie's used policies
and procedures that facilitated or caused fixed and movable access
barriers to unlawfully restrict the interior pathways of its
stores, thereby, preventing people with disabilities from obtaining
Ollie's goods.

Plaintiffs Allen and Mullen each have mobility disabilities and
require the use of wheelchairs for travel.  Ollie's operates more
than 350 stores throughout the United States.  Allen is a customer
of Ollie's store in New Castle, Pennsylvania, and Mullen is a
customer of Ollie's stores in New Castle, Pennsylvania and Monaca,
Pennsylvania.  Allen and Mullen were prevented from accessing some
of Ollie's goods because of movable barriers, including, among
other things, merchandise displays, clothing racks, display cases,
and boxes, as well as some fixed barriers, such as pillars or
columns.  They produced written complaints detailing the
complications several other wheelchair-bound or individuals with
disabilties endured while shopping at Ollie's stores.  Subsequent
investigations of Ollie's stores also revealed and confirmed some
of the barriers complained of, such as merchandise displays,
clothing displays, and boxes restricting or narrowing the pathways
of Ollie's stores.

The Plaintiffs allege that Ollie's employs uniform policies and
procedures that actively or intentionally facilitate the placement
of barriers in interior paths of travel to facilitate revenue and
profits.  Ollie's corporate designee confirmed that Ollie's uses
company-wide policies and procedures consisting of Visual Store
Standards, Daily Facilities Maintenance Scans, Daily Store Safety
Scans, Monthly Maintenance Scans, and a "Yes, I Can" program.
Ollie's policies do not expressly mention the ADA.  Ollie's does
not train or educate its employees on ADA compliance.

These policies collectively govern the operation and appearance of
Ollie's stores.  Ollie's provides each store with training and
instructions for implementing its policies and procedures, and each
store has an individual charged with ensuring compliance with those
policies.  The Visual Store Standards policy provides instructions
for setting up and displaying merchandise.  The "Yes, I Can" policy
applies to all employees and requires them to retrieve products for
customers that are unable to access the goods on their own.  The
daily and monthly scans of Ollie's stores are designed to ensure,
among other things, that the overall appearance and safety of the
stores are compliant with Ollie's policies and practices.

The Plaintiffs contend that, because Ollie's policies and
procedures intentionally positioned merchandise displays, clothing
racks, boxes, and other movable barriers in a manner that
restricted individuals with mobility issues from accessing Ollie's
goods and services, Ollie's violated several ADA provisions found
in 42 U.S.C. Sections 12182(a) and 12183(a).  They request
permanent injunctive relief in the form of removal of the barriers
at issue, modification of Ollie's policies and procedures, and the
continued monitoring of Ollie's stores.  As the Plaintiffs see it,
they are not the only ones who have encountered allegedly unlawful
barriers at Ollie's stores, and they now request that the Court
certify their action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.  In addition, the Plaintiffs request that the Court
take judicial notice of several pieces of evidence.  Oral argument
was held on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

Judicial Notice

Plaintiffs Allen and Mullen request that the Court take judicial
notice of three things: (1) the Settlement Agreement between the
United States of America and DolgenCorp, LLC ("Dollar General
Settlement Agreement") (ECF No. 65-1); (2) disability statistics
located at https://www.disabilitystatistics.org/. (ECF No. 51-15);
and (3) zip code tabulation statistics compiled by the United
States Census Bureau located at
https://www.census.gove/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areasketas.html.

Ollie's agrees that the Dollar General Settlement Agreement and the
zip code statistics should be judicially noticed.  The parties
disagree as to whether judicial notice of the disability statistics
is appropriate, and upon meeting and conferring on the issue, they
filed a Joint Status Report indicating their continued
disagreement.  Because the parties agreed that the Court may
judicially notice the Dollar General Settlement Agreement and the
zip code tabulation statistics compiled by the United States Census
Bureau, the Court need only address whether the disability
statistics may be judicially noticed.

Judge Stickman finds that the printout contains information that is
not generally known within the community, and the accuracy of the
printout is questionable because it is unauthenticated.  Further,
it is not readily apparent who prepared the printout.  Thus, the
Judge will not take judicial notice of the disability statistics
printout because it is unauthenticated and he cannot definitively
hold that the statistics are not subject to reasonable dispute.

Article III Standing

Moving onto the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Ollie's
argues as a threshold matter that the Court should deny
certification because the Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
they and others suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable
to the conduct of Ollie's, and that their injuries are likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.   The Plaintiffs
counter that they have satisfied the requirements of constitutional
standing.

Judge Stickman holds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown
that they suffered an injury in fact because they allege that
Ollie's policies and procedures directly and physically precluded
them from accessing goods and services.  The Plaintiffs' injuries
are fairly traceable to the policies and procedures because they
allege that they would not have encountered physical access
barriers but for Ollie's discriminatory practices.  The Plaintiffs'
injuries are also likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision because they request a permanent injunction requiring
Ollie's to, among other things, remove the access barriers and
modify their discriminatory policies.

Rule 23 Analysis

The Plaintiffs argue that certification is warranted because they
have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.  Their proposed class
is defined as: "All persons with qualified mobility disabilities
who have attempted, or will attempt, to access the interior of any
store owned or operated by Defendant within the United States and
have, or will have, experienced access barriers in interior paths
of travel."

Ollie's on the other hand counters that the Plaintiffs satisfy none
of Rule 23's requirements.

Judge Stickman is satisfied that the Plaintiffs' proposed class
should be certified because they have shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that their proposed class is numerous enough to the
point that joinder is impracticable, that there are common
questions of law or fact common among the proposed class, that the
claims of the proposed class are typical, that he Plaintiffs and
the law firm of Carlson Lynch, LLP will adequately represent the
interests of the proposed class, and that final injunctive relief
modifying Ollie's policies and procedures will afford appropriate
relief to the proposed class as a whole.

The following class will be certified: "All persons with qualified
mobility disabilities who have attempted, or will attempt, to
access the interior of any store owned or operated by Defendant
within the United States and have, or will have, experienced access
barriers in interior paths of travel."

Allen and Mullen will be appointed as the representative
Plaintiffs, and the law firm of Carlson Lynch, LLP will be
appointed as the counsel for the class.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Stickman grants in part and
denies in part the Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice.  The
Plaintiffs' request that the Court takes judicial notice of the
Dollar General Settlement Agreement and the zip code tabulation
statistics compiled by the United States Census Bureau is granted
because the parties agree that they are judicially noticeable.  The
Plaintiffs' request that the Court takes judicial notice of the
printout of disability statistics is denied because that
information is not authenticated and subject to reasonable dispute.
The Judge also grants the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification because they have established Article III standing
and shown by a preponderance of the evidence that their proposed
class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23.  An Order of Court
will follow.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2huet76h from Leagle.com.


OUTLAW LABORATORIES: Stores to File Amended Class Certification Bid
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE OUTLAW LABORATORIES, LP LITIGATION, Case No.
18-cv-840-GPC-BGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California orders the
Stores to file an amended motion for class certification that
accounts for the altered circumstances.

Pending before the Court, related to the putative class action
presented by the Counterclaimants and Third-Party Plaintiffs in the
case, is a Joint Notice of Settlement.  The Joint Notice was filed
by the "Stores" (consisting of Counterclaimant Roma Mikha, Inc.,
and Third-Party Plaintiffs NMRM, Inc. and Skyline Market, Inc.) and
the "Outlaw Defendants" (consisting of Outlaw Laboratory, LP,
Michael Wear, and Shawn Lynch) -- the parties to be collectively
referred to as the "Settling Parties."

As part of the lawsuit, the Stores filed a class action
counterclaim against Tauler Smith LLP and the Outlaw Defendants.
The Stores moved for class certification on April 2, 2020 under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b) and (c), and requested
certification of three different classes: the "Threatened Stores,"
the "Sued Stores," and the "Payment Class."  At the same time, the
Stores conditionally withdrew their motion to certify the first two
classes on Aug. 17, 2020.  According to the Stores, the Settlement
between them and the Outlaw Defendants would moot the need for
class certification of these two classes.

The Stores and Outlaw Defendants signed the Settlement on June 24,
2020.  And on July 7, 2020, the Settling Parties filed a Joint
Notice of Settlement and Request for Entry of Stipulated
Injunction.

Tauler Smith objected.  Upon multiple briefings, the Court issued
an Order on Sept. 15, 2020.  It denied the Settling Parties'
request for injunction, and directed the Stores to produce a copy
of the Settlement.  While the Court found that Tauler Smith lacked
standing to object and that Rule 23(e) is "inapplicable" to the
Settlement, it concluded it still had a sua sponte duty to review
the need for class notice pursuant to Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac.
Islands, 876 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989).  The Court directed the
parties to provide supplemental briefs after the copy of the
Settlement was produced—to which they did.

The Court conducted a hearing on March 12, 2021.  Recognizing that
part of the obstacles in providing a Diaz notice would be securing
contact information of the relevant individuals, the Court directed
parties to jointly inform the Court whether class notice would be
possible, at least for certain stores that Tauler Smith identified
after further discovery pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Jan. 12,
2021 Order.  On March 19, 2021, the parties filed a Joint
Statement, explaining their respective positions.

Under the Settlement, the Outlaw Defendants would pay $125,000 to
the IOLTA of Gaw Poe, the counsel representing various stores that
are part of the Settlement (including the Stores).  Once these
stores receive payment, "the parties will file a stipulated
dismissal with prejudice."  Relatedly, these stores, "for
themselves, and all who may now or in the future claim, by, through
or under them, hereby fully and finally release, acquit, and
forever discharge" the Outlaw Defendants.

Michael Wear and Shawn Lynch would also agree to testify live at
trial without needing a subpoena. Absent death or "a legally
cognizable Act of God," a violation would amount to liquidated
damages of $50,000 (per violation).

The signing parties intend the Settlement to "be in the broadest
scope possible."  They intend that the Settlement encompass all
conceivable causes of action and claims held, up to the date of
execution of the Settlement, by any of the Parties.  These Parties
further intend that the Settlement resolves all dealings of the
Parties from the beginning of time up to the date of execution, and
completely satisfies all causes of action as are, were or could
have been asserted in the Lawsuit between the Parties, and all
other persons who might in any way be claimed to be legally
responsible or liable, for the claimed occurrences.  The scope of
release does not apply to any claims against Tauler Smith.

In addition, the Settlement contains restriction clauses against
Gaw Poe.  Gaw Poe agrees that none of its attorneys will advertise,
solicit, or represent any new clients for the purpose of bringing
claims against the Outlaw Defendants related to any claim allegedly
resulting from or occurring in connection with the conduct of
Outlaw set forth in the Lawsuit.  Gaw Poe and the stores
participating in the Settlement agree that they will not cooperate
or assist in any manner any non-party with regard to any claims
that non-party may or is asserting against Outlaw Defendants.

Nature of the Settlement

The cases presented by Tauler Smith arguing the need for court
approval presume the existence of a certified class.  Judge Curiel
holds that a review of the Settlement's terms demonstrates that the
Settlement is limited to individual claims by individual stores.
Tauler Smith cites various provisions in the Settlement to argue
that the Settlement dismisses "Payment Class's claims against
Outlaw," but a careful reading of these provisions leads the Judge
to conclude otherwise.

First, Section 2.2 of the Settlement is incorrect.  The entity
releasing, acquitting, and forever discharging the claim is not a
class entity, but the group of stores expressly listed in the first
page of the Settlement.  Next, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 discuss the
scope of the release, and while the Settlement attempts to cover
many contingencies, its scope is still limited to and between the
"Parties," a term again expressly defined in the first page of the
Settlement.  Section 3.1 of the Settlement also means that it does
not bind a store that did not join the Settlement.  This is in line
with the Stores' characterization of the Settlement's scope.
Finally, Tauler Smith references the restriction clauses, which do
not lead the Judge to believe that the Settlement covers more than
the claims among individual parties.

In conclusion, even after a review of the Settlement, the Judge
holds that there is no reason to believe that the Settlement
implicates the putative class.  Therefore, it is unnecessary to
review and approve the Settlement under Rule 23(e).

Class Notice Pursuant to Diaz

The Court's Sept. 15, 2020 Order noted the possible need for "class
notice" pursuant to Diaz, even if the Settlement did not require
review and approval under Rule 23(e).  Upon review of the
Settlement, Judge Curiel concludes that notice is not required.
Under Diaz, the Court is directed to look to three factors when
deciding on the need for class notice: (1) class members' possible
reliance on the filing of the action if they are likely to know of
it either because of publicity or other circumstances, (2) lack of
adequate time for class members to file other actions, because of a
rapidly approaching statute of limitations, (3) any settlement or
concession of class interests made by the class representative or
counsel in order to further their own interests.

The Court previously ruled that the first factor is neutral.  As to
the second factor, it previously found that it does not weigh in
favor of providing notice to the putative class.  Having reviewed
the Settlement Agreement, Judge Curiel maintains the Court's
earlier analysis.  As to third factor, upon reviewing the
Settlement's terms, he concludes that the third factor is neutral.

While the potential conflicts initially led the Court to consider
providing notice to the putative class members, Judge Curiel now
concludes that these considerations are not the basis for Diaz
notice and are best addressed in considering the motion for class
certification that will be amended.  With two of the factors being
neutral and one factor not weighing in favor of a notice, the Judge
will not require Diaz notice to be given to putative class members
and will entertain the Settling Parties' request to dismiss under
the terms of the Settlement.

Even if the Judge found that Diaz notice was required, a
complicating set of facts relates to identifying such putative
class members.  The parties have filed a Joint Statement on the
issue.  According to it, Tauler Smith originally produced a list of
107 stores and their addresses, and pursuant to the Magistrate
Judge's Jan. 12, 2021 Order, produced a list of 34 additional
stores and their contact information.  The Stores inform the Court
that this cumulative list is grossly inadequate, and that Tauler
Smith's representation of receiving settlements from only 141
stores amounting to $377,875 "is just abjectly false."

The Judge sympathizes with the Stores' frustration.  He says there
is reason to believe that the list available at the time of the
Order is far from the complete picture, as indicated by the
Magistrate Judge's Jan. 12, 2021 Order.  Thus, even after
accounting for the newly provided 34 stores and their corresponding
settlement amounts (supposedly Tauler Smith's attempt to comply
with the Magistrate Judge's Order), significant discrepancy exists.
Perjury and misrepresentation in front of the Court will not be
tolerated, and the Court will take up such issues as presented and
proper under the law.  In the meantime, the Judge concurs with the
Stores that it is questionable whether notice could even be
provided to a significant percentage of the putative class
members.

New Joint Motion to Dismiss

While the Settling Parties do not need court approval or class
notice, Jude Curiel finds a new joint motion to dismiss to be
necessary for a proper resolution of the matter.  The original
Joint Notice of Settlement and Request for Entry of Stipulated
Injunction requested in part an injunction that the Court denied
and the document itself is unclear whether the issue of dismissal
was a severable matter that the Court could rule on independently.
To maximize clarity, the Judge finds it appropriate for the
Settling Parties to submit a new joint motion.

The Stores' Class Certification Motion

With the dispute between the Stores and Outlaw Defendants largely
resolved, Judge Curiel still needs to decide on pending class
certification issues, particularly ones related to the Payment
Class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).  The Stores originally moved to
certify three classes, the Threatened Stores, the Sued Stores, and
the Payment Class.  However, the Stores conditionally withdrew
their motion to certify the Threatened Stores and Sued Stores,
arguing that the Settlement, "combined with an injunction
prohibiting resumption of Outlaw Defendants' challenged conduct,
would moot the need."  As of now, the Stores request only to
certify the Payment Class.

Developments in the case have made various parts of the Stores'
certification request (including "conditionally" retracting parts
of it) unworkable if the basis for the request is from the moving
documents on the record.  Accordingly, the Judge directs the Stores
to file an amended motion for class certification, in which parties
will have a renewed opportunity to respond and reply.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Curiel orders the Settling Parties
to file a new joint motion to dismiss the Stores' actions against
the Outlaw Defendants.  In addition, he directs the Stores to file
an amended motion for class certification.  The Judge will present
a briefing schedule on this new motion in a subsequent order.  He
denies as moot the Settling Parties' Joint Motion for Leave to File
Opposition to Motion for Class Certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/dw3bnmcw from Leagle.com.


PG&E CORP: Dismissal of Gantner's Class Action Complaint Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, GANTNER, Plaintiff v. PG&E CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 20-cv-02584-HSG (N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S.
Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California affirms the Bankruptcy Court's March 10, 2020 order
that dismissed Appellant Anthony Gantner's class action complaint.

On Jan. 29, 2019, Appellees PG&E Corporation and Pacific Gas and
Electric Company (collectively, "Debtors") commenced voluntary
cases for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States
Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
California.  Significantly, the Debtors needed to propose a plan of
reorganization that satisfied the requirements of A.B. 1054,
including its June 30, 2020 deadline for plan confirmation.

In light of the "increased risk of catastrophic wildfires," A.B.
1054 created the "Go-Forward Wildfire Fund" as a multi-billion
dollar safety net to compensate future victims of public utility
fires and thereby "reduce the costs to ratepayers in addressing
utility-caused catastrophic wildfires," support "the credit
worthiness of electrical corporations," like the Debtors, and
provide "a mechanism to attract capital for investment in safe,
clean, and reliable power for California at a reasonable cost to
ratepayers."  For the Debtors to qualify for the Go-Forward
Wildfire Fund, however, A.B. 1054 required, among other things, the
Debtors to obtain an order from the Bankruptcy Court confirming a
plan of reorganization by June 30, 2020.

After more than 16 months of negotiations among a variety of
stakeholders, and following confirmation hearings that spanned
several weeks, the Debtors' Plan of Reorganization dated June 19,
2020 was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court on June 20, 2020 and
became effective on July 1, 2020.

On Dec. 19, 2019, the Appellant filed a class action complaint and
initiated an adversary proceeding before the Bankruptcy Court.  His
single negligence claim arises from certain planned power outages,
known as public safety power shutoff ("PSPS") events.  He seeks
damages for losses, such as loss of habitability, loss of food
items, and loss of productivity, that he and putative class members
incurred as a result of five post-petition PSPS events that took
place in October and November 2019.

The proposed class is defined as "All California residents and
business owners who had their power shutoff by PG&E during the
October 9, October 23, October 26, October 28, or November 20, 2019
Outages and any subsequent voluntary Outages PG&E imposes on its
customers during the course of litigation."

The Debtors moved to dismiss Appellant's complaint, and the
Bankruptcy Court granted the motion without leave to amend, finding
that the Appellant's claim is preempted by California Public
Utilities Code Section 1759.  The appeal followed.


The question presented by the appeal is whether the Appellant's
negligence claim, if allowed to proceed, would impermissibly hinder
or interfere with the supervisory and regulatory policies of the
California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") in violation of
California Public Utilities Code Section 1759.

The Appellant argues that California Public Utilities Code Section
2106 makes the Debtors liable for damage caused by their
negligence, and that Section 1759 does not preempt his negligence
claim.  The Debtors respond that the Bankruptcy Court properly
dismissed the Appellant's complaint on the ground that his action
would interfere with the CPUC's regulatory authority to authorize
PSPS events, contrary to Section 1759.

In deciding whether an action is barred by Section 1759, Judge
Gilliam  must ask: (1) whether the PUC had the authority to adopt a
regulatory policy on the subject matter of the litigation; (2)
whether the PUC had exercised that authority; and (3) whether
action in the case before the Court would hinder or interfere with
the PUC's exercise of regulatory authority.

Judge Gilliam finds that the CPUC had the authority to regulate the
PSPS events challenged by the Appellants and that the CPUC
exercised, and continues to exercise, that authority.  As discussed
by the Bankruptcy Court, in February 2019, Debtors submitted their
2019 Wildfire Safety Plan, which included factors to consider when
considering a PSPS event.  This plan was ultimately approved by the
CPUC.  In October and November of 2019, the Debtors conducted the
PSPS events that form the basis for Appellant's complaint.  On Nov.
12, 2019, the CPUC ordered Debtors to show cause why they should
not be sanctioned for failure to properly communicate with their
customers during these PSPS events.  The CPUC also instituted a
broader investigation to determine whether California's utilities,
including the Debtors, prioritized safety and complied with CPUC
regulations and requirements with respect to the PSPC events in
late 2019.

The Judge also finds that the Appellant's claim for damages caused
by PSPS events would interfere with CPUC's PSPS policies and its
"broad and continuing supervisory and regulatory program.  As
correctly noted by the Bankruptcy Court, before the wildfires in
October and November 2019, CPUC had already exercised its authority
to regulate the PSPSs by adopting its guidelines governing the
circumstances in which an investor-owned utility can conduct them.
The CPUC continues to exercise that authority through ongoing
rulemaking and investigations.  Under California law, it is the job
of CPUC to balance the costs and benefits of PSPS events and
regulate them accordingly.  And it is not the job of the courts to
regulate PSPS events through ad hoc imposition of negligence
liability.

Finally, Judge Gilliam holds that the Bankruptcy Court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant's complaint without
leave to amend.  The Appellant's entire negligence theory runs
afoul of Section 1759's jurisdictional limitations, and the
Appellant would be unable to amend without contradicting his
initial complaint.

For these reasons, Judge Gilliam affirms the Bankruptcy Court's
order dismissing the Appellant's complaint.  The Clerk is directed
to terminate the appeal and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/edrprj6m from Leagle.com.


PLANET FITNESS: Court Dismisses Williams Suit Without Prejudice
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JASON WILLIAMS AND GUNNAR AMOS, individually and on
behalf of similarly situated individuals, Plaintiffs v. PLANET
FITNESS, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No. 20 CV 3335 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge John Robert Blakey of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, grants the
Defendants':

     (i) motion to compel arbitration and dismiss Williams'
         claims for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of
         Civil Procedure 12(b)(3); and

    (ii) motion to dismiss Amos' claims under Rule 12(b)(7) for
         failure to join an indispensability party.

Plaintiffs Williams and Amos bring the putative class action
against Defendants Planet Fitness, Inc., Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC, PF
Logan Square, LLC, PLNTF Holdings, LLC, and Planet Fitness
Franchising LLC, alleging that the Defendants have violated various
state laws by charging them membership fees for access to their
fitness gyms even after the COVID-19 pandemic forced those gyms to
shut down.

Defendant Planet Fitness, Inc. operates nearly 2,000 fitness
centers across the country, maintaining over 10 million members.
It offers memberships on either a month-to-month basis—where
customers pay a fixed fee every month along with an annual
membership fee -- or a pre-paid amount for a full year.  The
Plaintiffs also name as Defendants Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC; PF Logan
Square LLC; PLNTF Holdings, LLC; and Planet Fitness Franchising
LLC.

On March 17, 2020, the Defendants charged the Plaintiffs and many
of their other members a monthly membership fee for the billing
period of March 17 through April 17.  A day later, Planet Fitness
announced the closure of all of its corporate stores through March
31 and urged its franchisees to close too.  On March 30, 2020, it
extended the closure of its facilities and indefinitely suspended
operations of both franchise and corporate locations.  Instead of
offering refunds, the Defendants offered to credit members' bills
or to extend their existing memberships, if and when the Defendants
reopen.  The membership agreement contains an arbitration
provision.

The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants' conduct injured them, who
claim to have lost the benefit of their bargain or suffered
out-of-pocket losses due to their inability to access the fitness
centers which they paid to access.  They bring a nine-count amended
complaint against the Defendants.

Mr. Williams asserts claims on behalf of a putative Illinois
sub-class for violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA) (Counts I and II) and for
violations of the Illinois Physical Fitness Services Act (IPFSA)
(Count III); Amos sues on behalf of an Idaho sub-class for
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA) (Count IV
and V); and both Plaintiffs sue for breach of contract (Count VI);
unjust enrichment (Count VII); conversion (Count VIII); and
declaratory judgment (Count IX).

The Defendants now move to compel arbitration and to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue as to Williams.  They also move
under Rule 12(b)(7) to dismiss Amos' claims for failure to join
Silver Lake as an indispensable party.

Rule 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

Courts compel arbitration where: (1) there exists an enforceable
written arbitration agreement; (2) the dispute rests within the
scope of the arbitration agreement; and (3) one party refuses to
arbitrate.   The Plaintiff disputes only the first element --
enforceability, arguing that the arbitration provision contained
within his membership agreement is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable.

Judge Blakey holds that because American Arbitration Association
rules and procedures are easily accessible -- for example, through
a simple internet search -- the membership agreement's reference to
the AAA rules precludes a finding of substantive unconscionability.
The arbitration provision also broadly requires both parties to
submit to arbitration for any "dispute" that the Defendants are
"unable to resolve" to Williams' satisfaction.  Given that the
Plaintiff has not demonstrated why a stay would be more
appropriate, and because the arbitration clause encompasses all of
Williams' claims, the Judge Court compels arbitration and dismisses
his claims without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3).

Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join

The Judge next considers the Defendants' motion to dismiss Amos'
claims under Rule 12(b)(7).  Courts engage in a two-step inquiry
under Rule 12(b)(7), asking: (1) whether a party is necessary under
Rule 19(a), and if so, whether its joinder is feasible; and (2) if
the party is necessary but cannot be joined, whether litigation can
proceed in the party's absence, or alternatively, whether it must
be dismissed because of the party's indispensability.

At step one, the Defendants argue that Silver Lake, the sole
counter-party to Amos' membership agreement, is a necessary party
under Rule 19(a).

Judge Blakey agrees.  Relevant in the matter, Rule 19(a)(1)(B)
provides that a party is necessary if it "claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person's absence may as a practical
matter impair or impede the party's ability to protect the
interest."  The undisputed record shows that Silver Lake is a
limited liability company formed under the laws of Idaho; it
maintains its principal place of business in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho;
it does not conduct any business in Illinois and has never
registered to do business in Illinois; it does not have any
employees or maintain any real property in Illinois; and its
interactions with Amos occurred only in Idaho.  Given its complete
lack of presence in Illinois, the Court cannot exercise either
general or specific personal jurisdiction against Silver Lake.

Having determined that Silver Lake constitutes a necessary party
that cannot be joined, the Judge moves to the final step of the
Rule 12(b)(7) analysis, assessing whether, "in equity and good
conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties."
If not, he must dismiss the case due to Silver Lake's
indispensability.

The Judge holds that (i) a judgment regarding a contract to which
Silver Lake is a party would undoubtedly prejudice Silver Lake;
(ii) due to the nature of Amos' claims -- which center around
Silver Lake's rights and obligations under the membership agreement
-- the Court cannot fashion relief to alleviate that prejudice;
(iii) the Court must consider the adequacy of a judgment rendered
in Silver Lake's absence; and (iv) the Defendants have asserted
that Amos could pursue his claims in Idaho, and Amos has not
disputed this statement.  For these reason, the Judge holds that
the case cannot proceed with Silver Lake, thus rendering it an
indispensable party requiring dismissing the case under Rule
19(b).

For the reasons he explained, Judge Blakey grants the Defendants'
motion compel arbitration and to dismiss for improper venue under
Rule 12(b)(3), and grants the Defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 12(b)(7).  The
Defendants also moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule
12(b)(6), but because the Judge did not need to consider -- and
indeed, did not consider -- the merits of their Rule 12(b)(6)
arguments, he denies that motion as moot.  The Plaintiffs' amended
complaint is dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.  Civil
case terminated.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/awhmfwsn from
Leagle.com.


PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES: Court Certifies Class of Janitors
-------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GUSTAVO ROJAS HERNANDEZ,
MARIA JUAREZ BENAVIDES, v. PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES (SOUTHWEST), LLC,
PRITCHARD INDUSTRIES, INC., Case No. 5:20-cv-00508-XR (W.D. Tex.),
the Hon. Judge Xavier Rodriquez entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiffs' motion to certify a class
consisting
      of the following:

      "All current and former hourly employees employed by the
      Defendants in the State of Texas from [three years prior to
      the date the notice is issued] whose job duties include
      janitorial and cleaning services, and who received only their

      regular rate of pay for any hours worked over 40 during one
      or more workweeks. This includes, without limitation, such
      job titles as "Working Building Supervisor", "General Service

      Worker," "General Cleaner," and "Janitor;" and

   2. directing the to meet and confer regarding the notice that
      will be sent prior to submitting the notice to the Court for

      approval.

The Court said, "In this case there exists a common issue amongst
all the janitor employees -- was a payroll code properly applied to
their weekly paycheck that provided that they were paid 1.5 times
their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per workweek. The fact that the employer will have to review its
records to determine whether each janitor was properly paid in
order to identify class members does not alter the fact that the
janitors are "similarly situated."

The Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of janitorial workers who
the plaintiffs allege were not paid overtime for hours worked over
40 hours per week pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under
the FLSA, covered employees must be paid time and a half for hours
worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 29 U.S.C. section
207(a)(1).

This case arises out of the alleged failure by the Defendants to
pay their employees a proper overtime rate under the FLSA. The
Plaintiffs Gustavo Rojas Hernandez and Maria Juarez Benavides are
former employees of Pritchard Industries.

The Defendants operate an office and building janitorial service in
Texas.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 25, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3sRQSQh at no extra charge.[CC]

SELECT PORTFOLIO: Withdrawal of Giffney Class Cert. Bid OK'd
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Gaffney et al. v. Select
Portfolio Servicing, Inc. et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-12233-BRM-ZNQ
(D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Brian R. Martinotti entered an order
granting the Plaintiff's unopposed motion to certify class for
preliminary approval filed on September 29, 2020 be withdrawn.

According to the Plantiff's counsel, after the Motion was filed, it
was discovered that certain representation made (such as the class
size) were incorrect. As such, and after consulting with the
Honorable Judge Qurashi, it was agreed that the best course of
action would be to withdraw the current motion, and re-file a new
motion with updated and revised numbers. Defendant consents to
Plaintiff's request.

Select Portfolio is a loan servicing company founded in 1989 as
Fairbanks Capital Corp. with operations in Salt Lake City, Utah and
Jacksonville, Florida.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 25, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mxOHyX at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          Ari H. Marcus, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN, LLC
          www.MarcusZelman.com
          Telephone: (732) 695-3282
          Facsimile: (732) 298-6256
          E-mail: YZelman@MarcusZelman.com
                  Ari@MarcusZelman.com

SVENSK MANAGEMENT: FLSA Collective Action Conditionally Certified
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as DEBRON WALLEN and SANJAY
SHAKES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. SVENSK MANAGEMENT, INC. and RICHARD FERNBACH, Case No.
0:20-cv-61690-AHS (S.D. Fla.), the Hon. Judge Raag Singhal entered
an order granting the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.

The following Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action is
conditionally certified:

   "All service technicians who worked for the Defendants at any
   time between August 20, 2017 to the present who, as a result of

   the Defendants’ pay practices – not keeping time records and
not
   paying for all overtime worked during the week -- were not paid

   all wages due for overtime worked during one or more workweeks
   as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act."

The Court said, "The parties shall confer and try to agree on the
form of the notice. Within 15 days of this Order, the Plaintiffs
shall file a motion for approval of the revised proposed notice.
The motion shall attach copies of the revised proposed notice and
proposed consent form and shall note all Defendants' remaining
objections to the notice or consent form that have not been
resolved. If Plaintiffs fail to file a motion by the deadline, the
Court will make its own rulings based on the Notice already."

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have carried their burden of
showing that the FLSA collective action for service technicians
employed by Defendants should be conditionally certified.

Svensk Management is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida and is
part of the Specialty Contractors Industry.

A copy of the Court's order dated March 22, 2020 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/31Lh7vR at no extra charge.[CC]

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION: Fritsch Suit Seeks Rule 23 Class Status
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GRANT FRITSCH, an
individual, v. SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Case
No. 5:17-cv-02226-VAP-KK (C.D. Calif.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order certifying this case as a class action.

In the removed action, San Bernardino Superior Court Case No.
CIV-DS-1518012, class certification was granted by the state court
judge under relevant state law. The Plaintiff desires a similar
ruling now, under Rule 23. The Plaintiff previously filed this
motion on November 10, 2017, but it was never ruled upon as the
matter was remanded to state court before a District Court ruling
occurred.

The Plaintiff hereby re-notices that motion for hearing, and does
move this Court for an Order designating him as Class
Representative and appointing Daniel J. Palay and Brian D.
Hefelfinger of Palay Hefelfinger, APC, and Michael A. Strauss of
Strauss & Strauss, APC, as Class Counsel.

Swift Transportation provides transportation services. The Company
offers logistics, convention facilities, heavy hauling, trans
loading, and trucking services. Swift Transportation serves clients
in the United States.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 24,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3s2bUut
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiff and the Putative Class are:

          Daniel J. Palay, Esq.
          Brian D. Hefelfinger, Esq.
          PALAY HEFELFINGER, APC
          1746 S. Victoria Avenue, Suite 230
          Ventura, CA 93003
          Telephone: (805) 628-8220
          Facsimile: (805) 765-8600
          E-mail: djp@calemploymentcounsel.com
                  bdh@calemploymentcounsel.com

               - and -

          Michael A. Strauss, Esq.
          STRAUSS & STRAUSS, APC
          226 W. Ojai Ave. No. 101-325
          Ojai, CA 93023
          Telephone: (805) 641-6600
          Facsimile: (805) 641-6607
          E-mail: mike@strausslawyers.com

TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL: Faruqi Named Lead Counsel in Halman Aldubi
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DHALMAN ALDUBI PROVIDENT AND PENSION FUNDS LTD.,
Plaintiff v. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 20-4660-KSM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Karen S.
Marston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania appoints The Investor Group, consisting only of Gerald
Forsythe, as the Lead Plaintiff, and approves Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP,
as the Lead Counsel.

The case is a putative class action in which Plaintiff Halman
Aldubi, in its individual capacity and on behalf of others
similarly situated, alleges that Defendants Teva and its former
officers Erez Vigodman, Eyal Desheh, Robert Koremans, and Michael
Derkacz, violated securities laws by making false and misleading
statements.  Specifically, Halman Aldubi accuses Teva, a
pharmaceutical company, of misleading investors about the
profitability of one of Teva's drugs, Copaxone, as Teva allegedly
did not disclose that it made illegal kickback payments as part of
a scheme to inflate Copaxone sales.  Halman Aldubi claims that when
Teva's misconduct was publicly disclosed on Aug. 18, 2020, the
price of Teva's shares dropped precipitously, causing significant
losses to investors who held Teva stock at the time.

Teva is a pharmaceutical company that produces Copaxone, "a
prescription drug that is used to treat relapsing forms of multiple
sclerosis."  Throughout the class period, which is Oct. 29, 2015 to
Aug. 18, 2020, Teva described Copaxone as its "leading specialty
medicine" and reported consistently high sales and revenues for the
drug.  For instance, in the third quarter of 2015, Copaxone
accounted for 22% of Teva's revenue.  It explained that Copaxone
performed so well because there was a high demand for it, patients
were able to get it, and it was safe and effective.  Furthermore,
Teva and the Individual Defendants also consistently represented in
public statements and filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") that Copaxone would be a sustainable source of
revenue for the company.

Unfortunately for Teva's shareholders, Copaxone's success was not
the unmitigated boon it seemed.  On Aug. 18, 2020, the Department
of Justice announced that it had filed a civil action against Teva
under the False Claims Act, alleging that Teva had paid illegal
kickbacks to two non-profit foundations with the understanding that
the foundations would use the money to cover patients' Medicare
copays for their Copaxone prescriptions.  When traders learned of
this news, Teva's stock price fell $1.11, a 9.6% decrease from its
price at close of trading the previous day.  Not only did the stock
price fall sharply, but trading in Teva securities was "unusually
heavy" on August 18.

Halman Aldubi filed the lawsuit as a putative class action on Sept.
23, 2020.  It claims that as a result of Teva's allegedly
fraudulent statements, it and others who owned shares of Teva stock
during the class period suffered damages.  As such, Halman Aldubi
claims that it and others are entitled to recoup their damages from
Teva and the Individual Defendants.

Securities class actions are governed by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as modified by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.  Pursuant to those Acts, courts before which a
securities class action is pending have an obligation to appoint a
lead plaintiff to represent the interests of the purported class in
the litigation.

Presently pending before the Court are motions from two movants --
Menorah and Clal and The Investor Group -- who wish to be appointed
as lead plaintiff in the matter and to have their choice of counsel
approved as lead counsel for the putative class.

On March 1, 2021, the matter was reassigned to the Judge Marston.
On March 3, 2021, the Court held a telephonic status conference
with the parties to discuss the next steps to be taken in the case.
Then, on March 15, 2021, the Court conducted oral argument on
Menorah and Clal and The Investor Group's motions to be appointed
lead counsel.

Menorah and Clal is comprised of five entities: Menorah Mivtachim
Insurance, Ltd.; Menorah Mivtachim Pension & Gemel, Ltd.; Menorah
Mivtachim and the Federation of Engineers Provident Fund Management
Ltd.; Clal Insurance Company Ltd.; and Clal Pension & Provident
Ltd.  Although the Menorah entities and the Clal entities are
members of two separate corporate families, they have worked
together as members of lead plaintiff groups in another securities
class action, Jansen v. International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.,
No. 1:19-cv-07536 (S.D.N.Y.).  Both the Menorah and the Clal
entities have extensive experience acting as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions. In the last three years alone, they have
participated as lead plaintiffs in a combined four securities class
actions, including the Jansen matter in which they were co-lead
plaintiffs.

During the class period, Menorah and Clal owned multiple types of
Teva securities, "including both common stock and bonds."  Menorah
and Clal suffered significant damages as a result of Teva's
allegedly fraudulent statements.  Calculated on a first-in,
first-out ("FIFO") basis, they lost $436,573,220.  Calculated on a
last-in, first-out ("LIFO") basis, their damages were
$372,626,348.

As of March 11, 2021, there are now two members of The Investor
Group: Gerald Forsythe, an individual investor, and the Dekalb
County Pension Fund.  During the class period, The Investor Group
suffered approximately $2,067,327.65 in losses that it says are
attributable to Teva's alleged fraud -- $1,067,327.65 in losses
suffered by the Pension Fund, and "approximately $1 million in
losses" suffered by Mr. Forsythe.  Although they have expressed
their willingness to work together to prosecute this action and
have put procedures in place to help facilitate that process, Mr.
Forsythe and the Pension Fund do not have a pre-existing
relationship.  Mr. Forsythe has not served as a lead plaintiff in a
securities class action.  However, the Pension Fund has extensive
experience actively participating in securities class actions, and
in the last three years it has twice been selected to serve as a
lead plaintiff in one of these actions.

Judge Marston finds that Menorah and Clal have failed to provide
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that The Investor
Group should serve as lead plaintiff in the matter.  However, she
also concludes that at this juncture, the Pension Fund is subject
to the unique defense that it lacks standing.  As such, The
Investor Group, consisting only of Mr. Forsythe, will be appointed
the Lead Plaintiff.

The Judge also finds no reason to disapprove of Faruqi & Faruqi as
The Investor Group's choice of lead counsel.  First, although Mr.
Forsythe has not served as a lead plaintiff in a securities class
action before, he is a sophisticated investor who is "highly
motivated" to pursue this matter on behalf of the class.  Second,
Mr. Forsythe came to Faruqi & Faruqi based on an advertisement that
they had published regarding the matter.  While perhaps not the
most ideal means of selecting a law firm to represent oneself in a
securities class action, given Faruqi & Faruqi's experience in
these matters, the Judge Court cannot fault Mr. Forsythe's choice.
Third, there is no question that Faruqi & Faruqi are qualified and
experienced in securities class actions.  While Mr. Forsythe's
retainer agreement was not subject to negotiation, the terms of his
agreement with Faruqi & Faruqi were reasonable.  And, because
Faruqi & Faruqi has agreed not to seek more than 28% of the class's
recovery in attorneys' fees, the Judge finds that this factor does
not weigh against The Investor Group's selection of Faruqi & Faruqi
as class counsel.  Because the Judge finds no reason to disapprove
of The Investor Group's choice, Faruqi & Faruqi will be appointed
the Lead Counsel in the matter.

For these reasons, Judge Marston holds that The Investor Group,
consisting only of Gerald Forsythe, will be the Lead plaintiff in
the matter, and Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP, will be the Lead Counsel for
the putative class.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/k64vbnk8 from Leagle.com.


TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT: Court Denies Bid to Dismiss Denson Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSICA DENSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. DONALD J. TRUMP FOR
PRESIDENT, INC., Defendant, Case No. 20 Civ. 4737 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.),
Judge Paul G. Gardephe of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied Campaign's motion to dismiss, and
granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Denson brings the putative class action against Defendant
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. ("Campaign"), seeking a
declaratory judgment that an agreement she entered into with the
Campaign -- which contains non-disclosure and non-disparagement
clauses -- is void, as well as an injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses.

In August 2016 -- soon after Donald J. Trump was selected as the
Republican Party's nominee for the office of President of the
United States -- Denson applied to work for the Campaign, and was
hired as a national phone bank administrator.  Prior to beginning
work, the Campaign required Denson -- along with other Campaign
employees -- to sign the Employment Agreement, a form contract that
contains non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses.  Denson
remained an employee of the Campaign until Nov. 10, 2016.
The Employment Agreement defines "Family Member" as any member of
Mr. Trump's family, including, but not limited to, Mr. Trump's
spouse, each of Mr. Trump's children and grandchildren and their
respective spouses, including but not limited to Donald J. Trump
Jr., Eric F. Trump and Ivanka M. Trump, Tiffany Trump, and Barron
Trump, and their respective spouses, children and grandchildren, if
any, and Mr. Trump's siblings and their respective spouses and
children, if any.

The Employment Agreement defines "Family Member Company" as "any
entity, partnership, trust or organization that, in whole or in
part, was created by or for the benefit of any Family Member or is
controlled or owned by any Family Member."  It defines "Trump
Company" as "any entity, partnership, trust or organization that,
in whole or in part, was created by or for the benefit of Mr. Trump
or is controlled or owned by Mr. Trump."  And the Agreement defines
"Trump Person" as "each of Mr. Trump, each Family Member, each
Trump Company (including but not limited to the Company) and each
Family Member Company."

As to dispute resolution, the Employment Agreement provides that it
is to "be interpreted and construed pursuant to the laws of the
State of New York."

On Nov. 9, 2017, Denson filed a complaint against the Campaign in
Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, alleging
sex discrimination, harassment, and slander.

On Dec. 20, 2017, the Campaign commenced an arbitration proceeding
against Denson, claiming that she had "breached confidentiality and
non-disparagement obligations contained in a written agreement she
executed during her employment with the Campaign."  The Campaign
claimed that Denson had "breached her obligations by publishing
certain confidential information and disparaging statements in
connection with a lawsuit she filed against claimant in New York
Supreme Court."

On March 19, 2018, in Supreme Court of the State of New York, New
York County, the Campaign filed a motion to compel arbitration of
certain of Denson's pending claims.  On Sept. 7, 2018, the court
denied the Campaign's motion to compel arbitration.

On March 26, 2018, Denson filed a complaint in the District,
seeking a declaration that the Employment Agreement is void and
unenforceable.  On June 4, 2018, the Campaign moved to compel
arbitration of Denson's claims in the second lawsuit.

The Campaign's arbitration proceeding against Denson -- which had
been commenced in December 2017 -- proceeded even though Denson did
not "meaningfully" participate.  On July 23, 2018, the Campaign
submitted an application for an arbitration award.  In its
application, the Campaign alleged that Denson had "breached her
confidentiality and non-disparagement obligations" by filing the
state and federal lawsuits and by making "numerous public
statements on the internet, including through her Twitter and
GoFundMe accounts."

On Aug. 30, 2018, Judge Furman granted the Campaign's motion to
compel arbitration of the claims alleged in the federal action.

On Oct. 19, 2018, the arbitrator made a partial award to the
Campaign of $24,808.20, finding that Denson had "breached the
Employment Agreement by disclosing, disseminating, and publishing
confidential information in the Federal Action, and by making
disparaging statements about the Campaign and the Employment
Agreement on the Internet on her GoFundMe page and on her Twitter
account."  On Dec. 11, 2018, the arbitrator issued a final award
against Denson in the amount of $49,507.64.

On Dec. 21, 2018, and June 12, 2019, the Campaign moved to have the
Dec. 11, 2018 arbitration award confirmed in the Southern District
of New York and in New York Supreme Court, respectively.

On Feb. 20, 2019, Denson submitted a class-arbitration demand to
the Campaign.  In a June 3, 2019 submission, the Campaign asserted
that if Denson "wants to proceed with a class action lawsuit, she
must file her purported claims in court, rather than with the
American Arbitration Association."

On July 8, 2019, the New York Supreme Court confirmed the Dec. 11,
2018 arbitration award.

In a July 23, 2019 order, Judge Furman ruled "that the state-court
judgment has preclusive effect in this litigation and is
dispositive of the parties' motions."  Accordingly, he denied the
Campaign's petition to confirm, and Denson's cross-petition to
vacate, the Dec. 11, 2018 arbitration award.

On Aug. 2, 2019, the Campaign served subpoenas and restraining
notices on Denson's counsel's escrow accounts in connection with
the New York state court judgment stemming from the Dec. 11, 2018
arbitration award.

On Feb. 6, 2020, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed
the state court decision confirming the Dec. 11, 2018 arbitration
award, and vacated the award in its entirety.

The Campaign has brought claims for arbitration against other
former Campaign workers for alleged breaches of the Employment
Agreement (or similar non-disclosure agreements).

The Complaint was filed on June 1, 2020, in Supreme Court of the
State of New York, New York County, and was removed to the District
on June 19, 2020.   In a June 22, 2020 letter, Denson requested
permission "to immediately serve targeted interrogatories designed
to elicit basic information regarding the nature of the class,"
including "how many individuals signed the same Form NDA, or a
version thereof, and whether those contracts materially differ from
one another."  On June 25, 2020, this Court denied Denson's
motion.

On July 9, 2020, the Court conducted an initial pretrial conference
and issued a briefing schedule concerning the instant motions.

On July 30, 2020, Denson moved for summary judgment, and the
Campaign moved to dismiss.  The Campaign has moved to dismiss,
arguing that Denson lacks standing, and that her claims are barred
by collateral estoppel.

Whether Denson Has Standing

The Campaign contends that Denson lacks standing, because her
"vague and subjective assertion that the Agreement is 'preventing
her' from exercising her right to speak freely about the Campaign
or President Trump is insufficient to create an actual controversy
as a matter of law."  It further contends that Denson "has not (and
cannot) identify any action or threatened action being taken
against her by the Campaign for any alleged speech, which dooms her
declaratory judgment claims as a matter of law."

Denson counters that she has "repeatedly demonstrated an intention
to continue engaging in a course of conduct arguably affected with
a constitutional interest, but proscribed by the Employment
Agreement: namely, criticizing the President, his Administration,
his family, his businesses, and the Campaign, and otherwise sharing
information that the Campaign has argued and could argue is covered
by the Employment Agreement."  Denson further argues that she "and
class members face a credible threat of enforcement," given (1) the
Campaign's efforts to enforce the Employment Agreement against
Denson and other former Campaign employees; and (2) the Employment
Agreement "allows individuals and companies other than the Campaign
to enforce its terms at any time, forever."

Judge Gardephe opines that the Plaintiff has demonstrated "a
substantial risk that the harm will occur."  Among other things, he
finds that (i) Denson has demonstrated a "well-founded fear" that
the Employment Agreement will be enforced against her, and has
adequately alleged -- under the non-speech standard -- that "there
is a substantial risk that the harm will occur; (ii) the Campaign's
representation in briefing that it has no present intention to
enforce the Employment Agreement's non-disclosure and
non-disparagement provisions against Denson is not sufficient,
under the circumstances of the case, to defeat Denson's showing of
a substantial risk of a future action to enforce these provisions;
and (iii) the Campaign has not definitively stated that it will not
assert the non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions against
Denson in the future.  Accordingly, the Judge concludes that Denson
has standing to challenge the validity of the Employment Agreement,
and the Campaign's motion to dismiss on that basis will be denied.

Whether Denson's Claims Are Barred By Collateral Estoppel

The Campaign argues that the Plaintiff's assertions in the lawsuit
that the Agreement is 'void and unenforceable' are the very same
assertions that she unsuccessfully raised in the context of the
parties' prior dispute, which issue was conclusively resolved by
the First Department, which expressly found, among other things,
that there was 'no legal basis' to conclude that the Agreement is
'so broad and over-inclusive' that it is 'void or should be
invalidated as against public policy.'

Denson responds that the First Department, in evaluating whether
the arbitration award should be vacated on public policy grounds,
engaged in a brief discussion of the general enforceability of
non-disparagement agreements.  According to Denson, "the Campaign
quotes the opinion out of order to make it appear that, in making
this statement, the First Department passed on the specific
question of the validity of the agreement at issue in the case,
when in fact the First Department "did no such thing."  Indeed,
according to Denson, the First Department expressly declined to
speak on the enforceability of the Employment Agreement in
particular, stating that `any error by the arbitrator' concerning
its enforceability is at most, a mistake of law that cannot serve
as a predicate basis for vacating these awards.

Judge Gardephe holds that the applicability of collateral estoppel
turns on whether the legal validity of the Employment Agreement's
non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions was "necessarily
decided" in the action before the First Department.  As he
discussed, the First Department ruled that non-disclosure and
non-disparagement agreements do not per se violate public policy,
and do not constitute a prior restraint.  The First Department did
not address the Plaintiff's legal arguments concerning the scope of
the non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions, because any
error by the arbitrator is, at most, a mistake of law that cannot
serve as a predicate basis for vacating the arbitrator's awards.
Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not apply to Denson's legal
arguments regarding the scope of the non-disclosure and
non-disparagement provisions.  To the extent that the Campaign
argues that the scope issues raised by Denson are barred by
collateral estoppel, the Campaign's motion to dismiss is denied.

Denson's Motion for Summary Judgment

Denson argues that the Employment Agreement's non-disclosure and
non-disparagement provisions are unenforceable under New York law
because they (1) do not "contain any temporal limit"; (2) define
"Confidential Information" to include "staggeringly broad
categories" including "anything `Mr. Trump insists remain private
or confidential'"; (3) restrict speech on matters of highest
political importance and subject Campaign workers to potentially
crippling financial penalties for exercising basic rights"; (4)
"lack the requisite definiteness required of all valid agreements";
(5) "contravene public policy" by violating "the United States' and
New York's commitment to public debate on matters of public concern
and New York's public policy against contracts that prevent the
reporting of misconduct"; and (6) are unconscionable.

The Campaign responds that (1) it "has compelling and
constitutionally-based privacy interests"; (2) "there is nothing
about the lack of a durational component that makes a
confidentiality or non-disparagement provision `ipso facto'
unenforceable"; (3) "parties are free to waive their First
Amendment rights contractually," and the non-disclosure and
non-disparagement provisions are not "unreasonably burdensome"; (4)
the definition of "Confidential Information" "specifically includes
the protected categories of information which the courts have found
are intrinsically 'private' for political campaigns," and Denson
"does not present any facts or circumstances against which to
measure the Employment Agreement"; and (5) the Employment Agreement
is not unconscionable.

Denson's motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the
Employment Agreement's non-disclosure provision, Judge Gardephe
holds.  He opines that the broad categories of information covered
by the non-disclosure provision could conceivably cover any
information related to the Campaign.  It is thus impossible for
Denson to know what speech she has agreed to forego, and there is
no possibility of mutual assent.  The breadth of the non-disclosure
provision is such that Denson would have no way of knowing ex ante
what speech will result in enforcement.  Accordingly, the mutual
assent that is required for an enforceable contract under New York
law is not present.

The Judge also concludes that there is no "manifestation of mutual
assent sufficiently definite to assure that the parties are truly
in agreement with respect to the scope of the non-disparagement
provision."  Recognizing the enormous scope of the
non-disparagement provision, the Campaign does not even argue that
it is sufficiently definite to be enforceable, and the Campaign has
not cited any case that finds enforceable a non-disparagement
provision comparable to that at issue.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the
Employment Agreement's non-disparagement provision.

Finally, the Judge finds that "blue penciling" is not appropriate
in the case.  The Campaign has cited no case law suggesting that
this Court may re-write these provisions in that fashion.
Moreover, the Campaign's past efforts to enforce the non-disclosure
and non-disparagement provisions demonstrate that it is not
operating in good faith to protect what it has identified as
legitimate interests.  The evidence before the Court instead
demonstrates that the Campaign has repeatedly sought to enforce the
non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions to suppress speech
that it finds detrimental to its interests.  None of the cases
cited by the Campaign in support of its proposed blue pencil
approach involve comparable facts.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Gardephe denied the Campaign's
motion to dismiss and granted Denson's motion for summary judgment
to the extent that the Employment Agreement's non-disclosure and
non-disparagement provisions are declared invalid and unenforceable
as to Denson.

The Judge granted the motion to file an amicus brief -- submitted
by The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The E.W.
Scripps Company, the First Amendment Coalition, Gannett Co., Inc.,
the International Documentary Assn., The Media Institute, MediaNews
Group Inc., the National Press Club Journalism Institute, The
National Press Club, the National Press Photographers Association,
the New York News Publishers Association, New York Public Radio,
The News Leaders Association, the Online News Association, the
Society of Environmental Journalists, the Society of Professional
Journalists, and the Tully Center for Free Speech -- on consent.

The motion to file an amicus brief submitted by Neil Klausner and
Marissa Comart is denied as moot.

The parties are directed to submit a joint letter by April 12,
2021, stating how they wish to proceed in light of the Opinion.
The Complaint does not seek injunctive relief, however.
Accordingly, the application for injunctive relief is denied.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motions (Dkt. Nos.
19, 23, 28, 29).

A full-text copy of the Court's March 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4ams6efy from
Leagle.com.


UNITED BEHAVIORAL: Wins Bids to Dismiss Pacific's State-Law Claims
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
grants the motions to dismiss with prejudice with respect to the
Plaintiffs' state-law claims in the lawsuit entitled PACIFIC
RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, ET AL., Plaintiffs v. UNITED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH,
ET AL., Defendants, Case No. 4:20-cv-02249 YGR (N.D. Cal.).

The Plaintiffs bring the putative class action against Defendants
United and MultiPlan, Inc. for claims arising out of United's
alleged failure to reimburse the Plaintiffs at "a percentage" of
the Usual, Customary, and Reasonable Rates ("UCR") for Intensive
Outpatient Program ("IOP") services, which the Plaintiffs provided
to patients with health insurance policies administered by United.

The Court dismissed two prior iterations of the complaint, with
leave to amend. The Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint
("SAC"), in which they assert, on their own behalf and on behalf of
a proposed class of similarly-situated out-of-network IOP
providers, multiple claims under California law that arise out of
defendants' alleged under-reimbursement of claims for IOP
services.

Now pending are United's and MultiPlan's motions to dismiss all
claims in the SAC with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that: (1) the Plaintiffs'
state-law claims are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"); and (2) even if such claims are not
preempted by ERISA, the claims are inadequately pleaded.

Having carefully considered the pleadings and the parties' briefs,
and for the reasons set forth in the Order, the Court grants the
motions to dismiss with prejudice with respect to the Plaintiffs'
state-law claims.

The Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") differs from the First Amended
Complaint ("FAC") in the following ways: (1) the Plaintiffs deleted
their claims under the Sherman Act and Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, such that the only claims that remain
are those arising out of state law; (2) the Plaintiffs deleted
their allegations regarding specific claims for IOP services that
the Defendants allegedly under-reimbursed; and (3) the Plaintiffs
added conclusory allegations that the plans that cover the IOP
claims at issue are plans that are not governed by ERISA.

The Plaintiffs assert the following state-law claims against the
Defendants in the SAC: (1) violation of the Unfair Competition Law
("UCL"); (2) intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent
inducement; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) civil conspiracy;
(5) breach of oral or implied contract; and (6) promissory
estoppel. All of these claims are predicated on the theory that
United represented to the Plaintiffs during
verification-of-benefits ("VOB") calls that it would pay for IOP
services at a percentage of the UCR pursuant to the terms of the
patients' healthcare plans.

The Defendants move to dismiss all of these claims on the grounds
that (1) the claims are preempted by ERISA; and (2) even if the
claims are not preempted by ERISA, they are inadequately pleaded.

In its order of December 18, 2020, the Court dismissed the
Plaintiffs' state-law claims with prejudice on the ground that they
are preempted by ERISA Section 514(a) to the extent that they
depend on the existence and terms of a plan that is governed by
ERISA. In the same order, the Court recognized that the Plaintiffs
had alleged in the FAC that some of the plans that cover the claims
for IOP services at issue are not governed by ERISA, but it
concluded that the FAC lacked factual matter to raise the
reasonable inference that the plans in question fall outside of the
scope of ERISA.

Accordingly, the Court granted the Plaintiffs leave to amend the
complaint to allege, in relevant part, "facts identifying which of
the allegedly under-reimbursed claims for IOP services in the FAC
were covered by a plan that falls outside of the scope of ERISA and
showing why[.]"

District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers opines that the SAC fails to
satisfy these requirements. Rather than adding detail to their
allegations as the Court required, the Plaintiffs removed material
averments from the complaint. Specifically, the Plaintiffs removed
from the SAC the detailed factual matter they had alleged in the
FAC with respect to the number of IOP claims at issue, the amounts
that the Defendants allegedly under-reimbursed, and the
misrepresentations that United allegedly made during VOB calls,
presumably because all of those facts pertained to claims for IOP
services that are covered by plans that are governed by ERISA.

In place of the detailed allegations they removed, the Plaintiffs
left conclusory allegations, Judge Rogers finds. Their state-law
claims are now supported only by bare averments that the claims for
IOP services at issue are covered by plans that are "not governed
by ERISA." Judge Rogers also finds that the Plaintiffs do not
identify any non-ERISA claims, plans, or members; nor do they aver
any nonconclusory factual matter that would allow the Court to
reasonably infer that any of the claims for IOP services at issue
are covered by a plan that is not subject to ERISA.

Where, as in the case, the Plaintiffs assert state-law claims that
depend on the terms of certain healthcare plans, but they do not
allege any factual matter giving rise to the inference that such
healthcare plans are not governed by ERISA, the state-law claims
are subject to dismissal on the ground that they are preempted by
ERISA, Judge Rogers says, citing Omega Hospital, LLC v. United
Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 16-00560-JJB-EWD, 2017 WL 4228756,
at *4 (M.D. La. Sept. 22, 2017).

In their opposition to the present motions, the Plaintiffs attempt
to distinguish these authorities on grounds that are immaterial,
such as the fact that the state-law claims at issue in Omega and
Biohealth Med. Lab'y, Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No.
1:15-CV-23075-KMM, 2016 WL 375012 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2016), do not
arise out of similar facts or the same legal theories as the
state-law claims at issue here, Judge Rogers opines.

Judge Rogers holds that the Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish
these authorities is ineffective. As in Omega and Biohealth, the
ERISA preemption analysis here turns on whether the healthcare
plans upon which the claims for benefits depend are governed by
ERISA. As the plaintiffs in Omega and Biohealth, the Plaintiffs
here have failed to aver any factual matter that would permit the
Court to infer that the plans at issue are not governed by ERISA,
Judge Rogers opines. The Plaintiffs' state-law claims, therefore,
are subject to dismissal on the basis that they are preempted by
ERISA Section 514(a).

Because the Court previously provided the Plaintiffs with an
opportunity to amend the complaint to add factual matter to make
plausible their allegations that the plans in question are not
governed by ERISA, and the Plaintiffs failed to do so, the Court
finds that providing the Plaintiffs with a further opportunity to
amend the complaint would be futile.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants' motions to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' state-law claims with prejudice.

The Order terminates Docket Numbers 85 and 86. The Clerk will
terminate this action and enter judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3ajwawma from Leagle.com.


UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY: Niblock Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ELIZABETH NIBLOCK,
Individually and on behalf of all those similarly Plaintiff, v.
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, MITCH BARNHART and ELI CAPILOUTO in their
official capacities, Case No. 5:19-cv-00394-KKC-MAS (E.D. Ky.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. granting her motion for class certification on an expedited
      basis and certifying the case as a class action;

   2. appointing her as class representatives; and

   3. appointing her counsel as class counsel.

The Plaintiff will graduate from the University of Kentucky in July
2021. Expedited relief will permit the case to be addressed before
it is moot for the Plaintiff. Given the nature of college, Title IX
athletic compliance cases are capable of redressability but may
evade review before a single student completes her education. Here,
"class certification is appropriate to avoid mootness that may
arise from students transferring or graduating, " Portz v. St.
Cloud State Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3D 929, 943 (D. Minn. 2018)."

The University of Kentucky is a public land-grant research
university in Lexington, Kentucky.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3cRp7lr
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Lori A. Bullock, Esq.
          Jill Zwagerman, Esq.
          NEWKIRK ZWAGERMAN, P.L.C.
          521 E. Locust Street, Suite 300
          Des Moines, IA 50309
          Telephone: 515-883-2000
          E-mail: jzwagerman@newkirklaw.com
          lbullock@newkirklaw.com

               - and -

          Barbara Bonar, Esq.
          BONAR, BUCHER & RANKIN, PSC
          3611 Decoursey Avenue
          Covington, KY 41015
          Telephone: 859-431-3333
          E-mail: bdbonar@lawatbdb.com

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI: Santiago Suit to Proceed as to Breach Claim
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, AUGUSTINO SANTIAGO, LILLY LEYVA, GUILLERMO CREAMER,
and MARIA ACEITUNO, individually and as representatives of a class
of participants and beneficiaries on behalf of the University of
Miami Retirement Savings Plan, Plaintiffs v. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-21784-GAYLES/LOUIS (S.D. Fla.), Judge
Darrin P. Gayles of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.

According to the Order, the Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint will
proceed as to their breach of duty of prudence claim in Count I.

The matter comes before the Court on Magistrate Judge Lauren
Fleischer Louis's Report and Recommendation regarding Defendant
University of Miami's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6).  On April 29, 2020, Plaintiffs Santiago, Leyva,
Creamer, and Aceituno, individually and as representatives of a
class of participants and beneficiaries of the University of Miami
Retirement Savings Plan, filed their Class Action Complaint
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2) and (3) against the
Defendant.

On Oct. 15, 2020, the Court referred the case to Judge Louis,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B), for a ruling on all
pre-trial, non-dispositive matters and a report and recommendation
on all dispositive matters.  On March 1, 2021, Judge Louis issued
her Report recommending that the Motion be granted in part and
denied in part.

As to the Plaintiffs' breach of the duty of loyalty claims, Judge
Louis recommends granting the Motion as to Counts I, II, and III.
As to the Plaintiffs' breach of the duty of prudence claims, Judge
Louis recommends granting the Motion as to Counts II and III, and
denying the Motion as to Count I.  The Defendant timely filed
objections, to which the Plaintiffs responded.

Having conducted a de novo review of the record, Judge Gayles
agrees with Judge Louis's well-reasoned analysis and conclusion
that the Motion be granted in part and denied in part.  The
Defendant's objection as to the legal standard is meritless, and
the Judge finds that Judge Louis applied the proper standard to the
Motion.  Moreover, the remainder of the Defendant's objections are
nothing more than a rehashing of arguments it made in its Motion to
Dismiss and before Judge Louis.  Several courts in the district
have found that "it is improper for an objecting party to submit
papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing
of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers
submitted to the Magistrate Judge."  The Judge therefore agrees
that the Motion should be granted in part and denied in part for
the reasons stated in Judge Louis's well-reasoned Report.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Lauren Fleischer Louis' Report and
Recommendation on Defendant University of Miami's Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), is affirmed and adopted
and incorporated into the Order by reference.  Defendant University
of Miami's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) is granted in part and denied in part.  The Plaintiffs'
Class Action Complaint will proceed as to their breach of duty of
prudence claim in Count I.

A full-text copy of the Court's March 26, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/6evzzcbh from Leagle.com.


WELLS FARGO: Simon Labor Suit Seeks to Certify Five Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CAUDLEY SIMON, on behalf
of himself, all others similarly situated, v. WELLS FARGO BANK
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a National Banking Association and DOES
1-100, inclusive, Case No. 2:20-cv-00211-JAK-AS (C.D. Cal.), the
Plaintiff will move the Court on June 21, 2021 to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following classes:

      -- Meal and Rest Break Premium Class

         "All Wells Fargo hourly non-exempt employees in
         California who worked in a bank branch from December 2,
         2015 through present and who were paid meal or rest break

         premiums in the same pay period they received any non-
         discretionary compensation in 11 addition to their hourly

         pay;"

      -- Meal break class

         "All Wells Fargo hourly non-exempt employees in
California
         who worked in a bank branch from December 2, 2015 through

         present and who during that period worked a shift in
         excess of 5 hours;"

      -- Rest Break Class

         "All Wells Fargo hourly non-exempt employees in California

         who worked in a bank branch from December 2, 2015 through

         present and who during that period worked a shift of at
         least 3.5 hours;"

      -- Personal Appearance Policy Class

         "All Wells Fargo hourly non-exempt employees in California

         who worked in a bank branch from December 2, 2015 through

         present;" and

      -- Paystub Class

         "All Wells Fargo hourly non-exempt employees in California

         who worked in a bank branch who were paid by direct
         deposit from December 2, 2018 through present;" and

2. appointing Setareh Law Group as class counsel.

Wells Fargo is an American multinational financial services company
with corporate headquarters in San Francisco, California,
operational headquarters in Manhattan, and managerial offices
throughout the United States and overseas.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 22,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/31LQneG
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Segal, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9665 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 430
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Telephone: (310) 888-7771
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          E-mail: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                  thomas@setarehlaw.com

WELLS FARGO: Wins Prelim. OK of $95.7-Mil. Settlement in Kang Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
issued an order granting the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
approval of $95.7 million class action settlement in the lawsuit
captioned JAMES C. KANG, an individual, MICHAEL MOSES, an
individual, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; and DOES 1 through
10, inclusive, Defendant. JACQUELINE F. IBARRA, an individual, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendant, Case Nos. 5:17-cv-06220-BLF, 5:21-cv-00071-BLF (N.D.
Cal.).

Plaintiffs Michael Moses, James C. Kang, and Jacqueline F. Ibarra's
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement came
before the Court on March 18, 2021, at 9:00 a.m.

The Settlement Agreement is entered into between the Plaintiffs and
Wells Fargo, and is intended as a global settlement of all claims
asserted in this action, which was previously consolidated with
Moses v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., United States District Court,
Northern District of California, Case No. 3:18-cv-06679, and in
Ibarra v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., United States District Court,
Northern District of California, Case No. 5:21-cv-00071.

The Settlement creates a non-reversionary Gross Fund Value of
$95,696,122.35, consisting of $25,696,122.35 already paid by Wells
Fargo toward satisfaction of the judgment in Ibarra and partially
distributed to the class members in Ibarra, plus $70 million in
additional funding to be paid by Wells Fargo. The remaining portion
of the amount already paid toward satisfaction of the Ibarra
judgment would also be distributed through the Settlement.

The Court notes that if final approval is granted, the aggregate
Gross Settlement Value will be used to fund the following payments:
an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to Class Counsel not to
exceed one-third of the Gross Fund Value ($31,898,707) plus
litigation expenses actually incurred not to exceed $100,000; a
payment of $562,500 to the California Labor and Workforce
Development Agency ("LWDA") for the State of California's share of
civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys' General Act
("PAGA"); service awards of up to $10,000 each to Class
Representatives Moses and Kang; reasonable settlement
administration costs; and the remaining Net Fund Value to be
distributed as individual settlement payments to Settlement Class
Members. Wells Fargo has further agreed to pay the employer's share
of payroll taxes on the portion of the individual settlement
payments to Settlement Class Members that is allocated to wages, as
set forth in the Settlement Agreement.

The Court finds and concludes that the proposed global Settlement
is the result of serious, informed, arms'-length negotiations
between the parties, conducted after Class Counsel had adequately
investigated Plaintiffs' claims, engaged in substantial motion
practice and discovery, and become familiar with the strengths and
weaknesses of their claims in Kang and Ibarra. The Settlement does
not improperly grant preferential treatment to any individual or
segment of the Settlement Class and does not contain any obvious
deficiencies. The parties reached agreement with the assistance of
an experienced mediator, David Rotman.

In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Court
preliminarily certifies the following Class for the purposes of
settlement only: "All individuals who worked for Wells Fargo in the
State of California in the job title of Home Mortgage Consultant,
Home Mortgage Consultant Jr., Private Mortgage Banker, or Private
Mortgage Banker, Jr. at any time between March 17, 2013 and
December 31, 2019."

In accordance with the Settlement Agreement, the Court
preliminarily certifies the following Subclasses for the purposes
of settlement only:

   a. All individuals who worked for Wells Fargo in the State of
      California in the job title of Home Mortgage Consultant,
      Home Mortgage Consultant Jr., Private Mortgage Banker, or
      Private Mortgage Banker, Jr. at any time between March 17,
      2013 and March 31, 2018 ("the Rest Period Subclass"); and

   b. All individuals who worked for Wells Fargo in the State of
      California in the job title of Home Mortgage Consultant,
      Home Mortgage Consultant Jr., Private Mortgage Banker, or
      Private Mortgage Banker, Jr. at any time between
      October 27, 2013 and December 31, 2019 ("the Non-Rest
      Period Subclass").

The following persons will be excluded from the Settlement Class
and Subclasses: (1) Jasmine Maggiulli, who has her own pending
putative class action in the San Bernardino Superior Court and (2)
any HMCs, who entered into general release agreements following
termination of their employment with Wells Fargo.

The Court confirms the appointment of Stevens, LC and Haffner Law
PC as the Class Counsel.

It approves Rust Consulting ("Settlement Administrator") to perform
the duties of the Settlement Administrator as set forth in the
Settlement Agreement and the Order.

The Court finds that the Revised Notice of Settlement comports with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and all constitutional requirements, including
those of due process.

Within 10 business days after the issuance of the Order, Wells
Fargo will provide the Settlement Administrator with the Class Data
List, as specified in the Settlement Agreement.  Within 10 business
days after receiving the Class Data List, the Settlement
Administrator will mail the Notice to Class Members in the manner
specified in the Settlement Agreement.

The Response Deadline for objections, requests for exclusion from
the Settlement, and disputes regarding dates of employment will be
45 days after the Notice is initially mailed to the Class Members;
provided, however, that the Response Deadline for Notices that are
re-mailed will be the earlier of: (a) 30 days after re-mailing of
the Notice; or (b) 15 days before the date set by the Court for the
final approval hearing.

The Court orders that any request for exclusion from the Settlement
must be postmarked no later than the Response Deadline, and must be
received by the Settlement Administrator to be valid.

The Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing on September 16, 2021,
at 9:00 a.m. to consider whether: (a) the Settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate; (b) the Class and Subclasses should be
finally certified; (c) a final judgment should be entered; (d)
Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and costs should be
granted; and (e) the Class Representative Service Awards should be
granted. The Court may continue the date of the Final Approval
Hearing without further notice to the Class Members.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 1, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2eu84tdn from Leagle.com.

Joshua H. Haffner -- jhh@haffnerlawyers.com -- Graham G. Lambert --
gl@haffnerlawyers.com -- HAFFNER LAW PC, in Los Angeles,
California; Paul D. Stevens -- pstevens@stevenslc.com -- Lauren A.
Bochurberg -- lbochurberg@stevenslc.com -- STEVENS, LC, in Los
Angeles, California, Attorneys for Plaintiffs James C. Kang,
Michael Moses, and the Certified Class.

Michael Rubin -- mrubin@altber.com -- Eileen B. Goldsmith --
egoldsmith@altshulerberzon.com -- ALTSHULER BERZON LLP, in San
Francisco, California, Attorneys for Plaintiffs James C. Kang and
Michael Moses.


WSP USA: Ford FLSA Suit Seeks Conditional Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as HAROLD FORD, Individually
and for Others Similarly Situated, v. WSP USA, INC., Case No.
1:19-cv-11705-LGS (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff will move the Court to
enter an order granting conditional class certification,
court-authorized notice, and expedited discovery, pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), as well as such
other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

According to the complaint, Ford and the Putative Class Members are
similarly situated because they all: (1) received a flat day rate
for each day worked, regardless of the hours worked; (2) were all
required or permitted to work overtime without receiving
compensation at the legal rate of pay; (3) were all staffed to work
for WPS; (4) were all HSE employees of WPS that it mischaracterized
as independent contractors; (5) were never guaranteed a salary; and
(6) were only paid for each day actually worked.

The Plaintiff contends that WSP systematically failed to pay him
and all other HSE Day Rate Workers overtime pay at one and a half
times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty in
a work week. Under FLSA, an employer must pay its employees an
overtime premium of one and a half times their regular rate of pay
when they work over forty hours in a single week.

WSP Global is a Canadian company with American and British roots,
providing management and consultancy services to the built and
natural environment. It is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated March 26,
2020 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mq83G8
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph A. Fitapelli, Esq.
          FITAPELLI & SCHAFFER, LLP
          Dana Cimera
          28 Liberty St. 30th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 300-0375

               - and -

          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Richard M. Schreiber, Esq.
          Andrew Dunlap, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com
                  rschreiber@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH, PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, Tx 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

                        Asbestos Litigation

ASBESTOS UPDATE: AFG Has $572MM Liability for A&E Reserves
----------------------------------------------------------
American Financial Group, Inc. (AFG) has asbestos and environmental
("A&E") exposures arising from its insurance operations and former
railroad and manufacturing operations, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The property and casualty group's liability
for A&E reserves was $572 million at December 31, 2020; related
recoverables from reinsurers (net of allowances for doubtful
accounts) at that date were $150 million.

"Uncertainties surrounding the final resolution of these A&E
liabilities continue, and it is difficult to estimate AFG's
ultimate exposure to such liabilities and related litigation.
Establishing A&E liabilities is subject to uncertainties that are
significantly greater than those presented by other types of
liabilities. Uncertainties include the long delays between exposure
and manifestation of any bodily injury or property damage,
difficulty in identifying the source of the asbestos or
environmental contamination, long reporting delays, the risks
inherent in complex litigation and difficulty in properly
allocating liability for the asbestos or environmental damage. As a
result, A&E liabilities are subject to revision as new information
becomes available and as claims are made and develop. Claimants
continue to assert new and novel theories of recovery, and from
time to time, there is proposed state and federal legislation
regarding A&E liability, which would also affect AFG's exposure. If
AFG has not established adequate reserves to cover future claims,
AFG's results of operations and financial condition could be
materially adversely affected.

"AFG, primarily in its property and casualty insurance operations
and historical operations, is involved in litigation. Litigation by
nature is unpredictable, and the outcome of any case is uncertain
and could result in liabilities that vary from the amounts AFG has
currently recorded. Pervasive or significant changes in the
judicial environment relating to matters such as trends in the size
of jury awards, developments in the law relating to the liability
of insurers or tort defendants, and rulings concerning the
availability or amount of certain types of damages could cause
AFG's ultimate liabilities to change from current expectations.
Changes in federal or state tort litigation laws or other
applicable law could have a similar effect. It is not possible to
predict changes in the judicial and legislative environment,
including in connection with asbestos and environmental claims.
AFG's business, financial condition, results of operations and
liquidity could also be adversely affected if judicial or
legislative developments cause AFG's ultimate liabilities to
increase from current expectations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3wbwV9d




ASBESTOS UPDATE: Albany Intl. Defends 3,615 Claims at Dec. 31
-------------------------------------------------------------
Albany International Corp. is defending 3,615 claims as of December
31, 2020, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "We are a defendant in suits brought in various
courts in the United States by plaintiffs who allege that they have
suffered personal injury as a result of exposure to
asbestos-containing paper machine clothing synthetic dryer fabrics
marketed during the period from 1967 to 1976 and used in certain
paper mills.

"We anticipate that additional claims will be filed against the
Company and related companies in the future, but are unable to
predict the number and timing of such future claims. Due to the
fact that information sufficient to meaningfully estimate a range
of possible loss of a particular claim is typically not available
until late in the discovery process, we do not believe a meaningful
estimate can be made regarding the range of possible loss with
respect to pending or future claims and therefore are unable to
estimate a range of reasonably possible loss in excess of amounts
already accrued for pending or future claims.

"While we believe we have meritorious defenses to these claims, we
have settled certain claims for amounts we consider reasonable
given the facts and circumstances of each case. Our insurance
carrier has defended each case and funded settlements under a
standard reservation of rights. As of December 31, 2020 we had
resolved, by means of settlement or dismissal, 37,949 claims. The
total cost of resolving all claims was $10.4 million. Of this
amount, almost 100% was paid by our insurance carrier, who has
confirmed that we have approximately $140 million of remaining
coverage under primary and excess policies that should be available
with respect to current and future asbestos claims.

"The Company's subsidiary, Brandon Drying Fabrics, Inc.
("Brandon"), is also a separate defendant in many of the asbestos
cases in which Albany is named as a defendant, despite never having
manufactured any fabrics containing asbestos. While Brandon was
defending against 7,710 claims as of December 31, 2020, only twelve
claims have been filed against Brandon since January 1, 2012, and
no settlement costs have been incurred since 2001. Brandon was
acquired by the Company in 1999, and has its own insurance policies
covering periods prior to 1999. Since 2004, Brandon's insurance
carriers have covered 100% of indemnification and defense costs,
subject to policy limits and a standard reservation of rights.

"In some of these asbestos cases, the Company is named both as a
direct defendant and as the "successor in interest" to Mount Vernon
Mills ("Mount Vernon"). We acquired certain assets from Mount
Vernon in 1993. Certain plaintiffs allege injury caused by
asbestos-containing products alleged to have been sold by Mount
Vernon many years prior to this acquisition. Mount Vernon is
contractually obligated to indemnify the Company against any
liability arising out of such products. We deny any liability for
products sold by Mount Vernon prior to the acquisition of the Mount
Vernon assets. Pursuant to its contractual indemnification
obligations, Mount Vernon has assumed the defense of these claims.
On this basis, we have successfully moved for dismissal in a number
of actions."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3dr3GGG



ASBESTOS UPDATE: Alcoa Has Adequate Reserves for PI Lawsuits
------------------------------------------------------------
Alcoa Corporation have significant insurance coverage and believe
that its reserves are adequate for known asbestos exposure related
liabilities, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Some of our subsidiaries as premises owners
are defendants in active lawsuits filed on behalf of persons
alleging injury as a result of occupational exposure to asbestos at
various facilities. A former affiliate of a subsidiary has been
named, along with a large common group of industrial companies, in
a pattern complaint where our involvement is not evident. Since
1999, several thousand such complaints have been filed. To date,
the former affiliate has been dismissed from almost every case that
was actually placed in line for trial. Our subsidiaries and
acquired companies all have had numerous insurance policies over
the years that provide coverage for asbestos based claims. Many of
these policies provide layers of coverage for varying periods of
time and for varying locations. The costs of defense and settlement
have not been and are not expected to be material to the results of
operations, cash flows, and financial position of Alcoa
Corporation."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2Pmdjyy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: CenterPoint Energy Still Faces PI Lawsuits
-----------------------------------------------------------
CenterPoint Energy, Inc., and subsidiaries are from time to time
named, along with numerous others, as defendants in lawsuits filed
by a number of individuals who claim injury due to exposure to
asbestos and anticipates that additional claims may be asserted in
the future, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Some facilities owned by the Registrants or
their predecessors contain or have contained asbestos insulation
and other asbestos-containing materials. Although their ultimate
outcome cannot be predicted at this time, the Registrants do not
expect these matters, either individually or in the aggregate, to
have a material adverse effect on their financial condition,
results of operations or cash flows.

"The Registrants recorded AROs associated with the removal of
asbestos and asbestos-containing material in its buildings,
including substation building structures. CenterPoint Energy
recorded AROs relating to the closure of the ash ponds at A.B.
Brown and F.B. Culley. CenterPoint Energy and Houston Electric also
recorded AROs relating to treated wood poles for electric
distribution, distribution transformers containing PCB (also known
as Polychlorinated Biphenyl), and underground fuel storage tanks.
CenterPoint Energy and CERC also recorded AROs relating to gas
pipelines abandoned in place. The estimates of future liabilities
were developed using historical information, and where available,
quoted prices from outside contractors."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3fxZSWT


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cincinnati Financial Has $85MM Loss for A&E Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Cincinnati Financial Corporation carried $85 million of net loss
and loss expense reserves for asbestos and environmental claims and
$43 million of reserves for mold claims at year-end 2020, compared
with $85 million and $43 million, respectively, for such claims at
year-end 2019, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "The asbestos and environmental claims amounts
for each respective year constituted 1.3% and 1.5% of total net
loss and loss expense reserves at these year-end dates.

"We believe our exposure to asbestos and environmental claims is
limited, largely because our reinsurance retention was $500,000 or
below prior to 1987. We also were predominantly a personal lines
company in the 1960s and 1970s, when asbestos and pollution
exclusions were not widely used by commercial lines insurers.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, commercial lines grew as a
percentage of our overall business and our exposure to asbestos and
environmental claims grew accordingly. Over that period, we
endorsed to or included in most policies an asbestos and
environmental exclusion.

"Additionally, since 2002, we have revised policy terms where
permitted by state regulation to limit our exposure to mold claims
prospectively and further reduce our exposure to other
environmental claims generally. Finally, we have not engaged in any
mergers or acquisitions through which such a liability could have
been assumed. We continue to monitor our claims for evidence of
material exposure to other mass tort classes, but we have found no
such credible evidence to date.

"Reserving data for asbestos and environmental claims has
characteristics that limit the usefulness of the methods and models
used to analyze loss and loss expense reserves for other claims.
Specifically, asbestos and environmental loss and loss expenses for
different accident years do not emerge independently of one another
as loss development and Bornhuetter-Ferguson methods assume. In
addition, asbestos and environmental loss and loss expense data
available to date did not reflect a well-defined tail, greatly
complicating the identification of an appropriate probabilistic
trend family model. At year-end 2020, we used a weighted average of
a paid survival ratio method and report year method to estimate
reserves for IBNR asbestos and environmental claims. Our exposure
to such claims is limited; we believe a weighted average of both
methods produces a sufficient level of reserves."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/31zoztN


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Cleveland-Cliffs Still Faces Exposure Suits
------------------------------------------------------------
Cleveland-Cliffs Inc.'s acquired subsidiaries have been named as
defendants, among many other named defendants, in numerous lawsuits
filed since 1990 claiming injury allegedly resulting from exposure
to asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Similar lawsuits seeking monetary relief
continue to be filed in various jurisdictions in the U.S., which
cases are vigorously defended. Although predictions about the
outcome of pending litigation is subject to uncertainties, based
upon present knowledge, we believe it is unlikely that the
resolution in the aggregate of these claims will have a materially
adverse effect on our consolidated results of operations, cash
flows or financial condition."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/39wxHnD


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Crown Cork Faces 1,500 New PI Claims in 2020
-------------------------------------------------------------
Crown Holdings, Inc.'s wholly-owned subsidiary Crown Cork & Seal
Company, Inc., is one of many defendants in a substantial number of
lawsuits filed throughout the United States by persons alleging
bodily injury as a result of exposure to asbestos, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "In 1963, Crown Cork acquired a subsidiary that
had two operating businesses, one of which is alleged to have
manufactured asbestos-containing insulation products. Crown Cork
believes that the business ceased manufacturing such products in
1963.

"During the year ended December 31, 2020, Crown Cork received
approximately 1,500 new claims, settled or dismissed approximately
1,500 claims, and had approximately 56,000 claims outstanding at
the end of the period. Of these outstanding claims, approximately
16,500 claims relate to claimants alleging first exposure to
asbestos after 1964 and approximately 39,500 relate to claimants
alleging first exposure to asbestos before or during 1964, of which
approximately 13,000 were filed in Texas, 1,500 were filed in
Pennsylvania, 6,000 were filed in other states that have enacted
asbestos legislation and 19,000 were filed in other states. The
outstanding claims at December 31, 2020 also exclude approximately
19,000 inactive claims, as well as claims in Texas filed after June
11, 2003 (as the state of Texas has enacted legislation limiting
asbestos-related liabilities, as further discussed in Note N. Due
to the passage of time, the Company considers it unlikely that the
plaintiffs in these cases will pursue further action. The exclusion
of these inactive claims had no effect on the calculation of the
Company's accrual as the claims were filed in states where the
Company's liability is limited by statute. The Company devotes
significant time and expense to defend against these various
claims, complaints and proceedings, and there can be no assurance
that the expenses or distractions from operating the Company's
businesses arising from these defenses will not increase
materially.

"As of December 31, 2020, Crown Cork's accrual for pending and
future asbestos-related claims and related legal costs was $251
million, including $214 million for unasserted claims. The Company
determines its accrual without limitation to a specific time
period. Assumptions underlying the accrual include that claims for
exposure to asbestos that occurred after the sale of the
subsidiary's insulation business in 1964 would not be entitled to
settlement payouts and that state statutes described under Note N
to the Company's audited consolidated financial statements included
in this Annual Report, including Texas and Pennsylvania statutes,
are expected to have a highly favorable impact on Crown Cork's
ability to settle or defend against asbestos-related claims in
those states and other states where Pennsylvania law may apply.

"Crown Cork made cash payments of $21 million, $22 million and $21
million in 2020, 2019 and 2018 to settle asbestos claims and pay
related legal and defense costs. These payments and any such future
payments will reduce the cash flow available to Crown Cork for its
business operations and debt payments.     

"Asbestos-related payments including defense costs may be
significantly higher than those estimated by Crown Cork because the
outcome of this type of litigation (and, therefore, Crown Cork's
reserve) is subject to a number of assumptions and uncertainties,
such as the number or size of asbestos-related claims or
settlements, the number of financially viable responsible parties,
the extent to which state statutes relating to asbestos liability
are upheld and/or applied by the courts, Crown Cork's ability to
obtain resolution without payment of asbestos-related claims by
persons alleging first exposure to asbestos after 1964, and the
potential impact of any pending or future asbestos-related
legislation. Accordingly, Crown Cork may be required to make
payments for claims substantially in excess of its accrual, which
could reduce the Company's cash flow and impair its ability to
satisfy its obligations."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3cGJrG6


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Curtiss-Wright Has Pending Injury Lawsuits
-----------------------------------------------------------
Curtiss-Wright Corp. has been named in pending lawsuits that allege
injury from exposure to asbestos, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "We believe that the minimal use of asbestos in
our past operations and the relatively non-friable condition of
asbestos in our products make it unlikely that we will face
material liability in any asbestos litigation, whether individually
or in the aggregate. We maintain insurance coverage for these
potential liabilities and we believe adequate coverage exists to
cover any unanticipated asbestos liability.

"We do not believe that the disposition of any of these matters,
individually or in the aggregate, will have a material adverse
effect on our consolidated financial condition, results of
operations, and cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2QLBA1c


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Duke Energy Carolinas has $572MM Reserves
----------------------------------------------------------
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC has recognized asbestos-related reserves
of $572 million and $604 million at December 31, 2020, and 2019,
respectively, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These reserves are classified in Other within
Other Noncurrent Liabilities and Other within Current Liabilities
on the Consolidated Balance Sheets. These reserves are based upon
Duke Energy Carolinas' best estimate for current and future
asbestos claims through 2040 and are recorded on an undiscounted
basis. In light of the uncertainties inherent in a longer-term
forecast, management does not believe they can reasonably estimate
the indemnity and medical costs that might be incurred after 2040
related to such potential claims. It is possible Duke Energy
Carolinas may incur asbestos liabilities in excess of the recorded
reserves.

"As of December 31, 2020, there were 145 asserted claims for
non-malignant cases with the cumulative relief sought of up to $39
million and 56 asserted claims for malignant cases with the
cumulative relief sought of up to $20 million. Duke Energy
Carolinas has experienced numerous claims for indemnification and
medical cost reimbursement related to asbestos exposure. These
claims relate to damages for bodily injuries alleged to have arisen
from exposure to or use of asbestos in connection with construction
and maintenance activities conducted on its electric generation
plants prior to 1985. Based on Duke Energy Carolinas' experience,
it is expected that the ultimate resolution of most of these claims
likely will be less than the amount claimed.

"Duke Energy Carolinas has third-party insurance to cover certain
losses related to asbestos-related injuries and damages above an
aggregate self-insured retention. Duke Energy Carolinas' cumulative
payments began to exceed the self-insurance retention in 2008.
Future payments up to the policy limit will be reimbursed by the
third-party insurance carrier. The insurance policy limit for
potential future insurance recoveries indemnification and medical
cost claim payments is $714 million in excess of the self-insured
retention. Receivables for insurance recoveries were $704 million
and $742 million at December 31, 2020, and 2019, respectively.
These amounts are classified in Other within Other Noncurrent
Assets and Receivables within Current Assets on the Consolidated
Balance Sheets. Duke Energy Carolinas is not aware of any
uncertainties regarding the legal sufficiency of insurance claims.
Duke Energy Carolinas believes the insurance recovery asset is
probable of recovery as the insurance carrier continues to have a
strong financial strength rating.

"Duke Energy adopted the new guidance for credit losses effective
January 1, 2020, using the modified retrospective method of
adoption, which does not require restatement of prior year reported
results. The reserve for credit losses for insurance receivables
for the asbestos-related injuries and damages based on adoption of
the new standard is $15 million for Duke Energy and Duke Energy
Carolinas as of December 31, 2020. The insurance receivable is
evaluated based on the risk of default and the historical losses,
current conditions and expected conditions around collectability.
Management evaluates the risk of default annually based on payment
history, credit rating and changes in the risk of default from
credit agencies."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3m7MRVe


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Entergy Corp. Faces 200 Exposure Lawsuits
----------------------------------------------------------
Entergy Corporation currently has approximately 200 lawsuits
involving approximately 350 claimants, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Numerous lawsuits have been filed in state
courts against primarily Entergy Texas and Entergy Louisiana by
individuals alleging exposure to asbestos while working at Entergy
facilities between 1955 and 1980.  Entergy is being sued as a
premises owner.  Many other defendants are named in these lawsuits
as well.    Management believes that adequate provisions have been
established to cover any exposure.  Additionally, negotiations
continue with insurers to recover reimbursements.  Management
believes that loss exposure has been and will continue to be
handled so that the ultimate resolution of these matters will not
be material, in the aggregate, to the financial position, results
of operation, or cash flows of the Utility operating companies."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3ufZKj5


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Everest Re Group Has $194.1MM Loss Reserves
------------------------------------------------------------
Everest Re Group, Ltd. had net asbestos loss reserves of $194.1
million, or 97.9%, of total net A&E reserves, all of which was for
assumed business, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Everest Re Group state, "The Company's reserves include an estimate
of the Company's ultimate liability for A&E claims. The Company's
A&E liabilities emanate from Mt. McKinley's direct insurance
business and Everest Re’s assumed reinsurance business. All of
the contracts of insurance and reinsurance, under which the Company
has received claims during the past three years, expired more than
20 years ago. There are significant uncertainties surrounding the
Company's reserves for its A&E losses.

"The Company continues to receive claims under expired insurance
and reinsurance contracts asserting injuries and/or damages
relating to or resulting from environmental pollution and hazardous
substances, including asbestos. Environmental claims typically
assert liability for (a) the mitigation or remediation of
environmental contamination or (b) bodily injury or property damage
caused by the release of hazardous substances into the land, air or
water. Asbestos claims typically assert liability for bodily injury
from exposure to asbestos or for property damage resulting from
asbestos or products containing asbestos."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3cExX5Z


ASBESTOS UPDATE: FMC Corp. Has 9,100 Pending Claims at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
FMC Corporation has approximately 9,100 premises and product
asbestos claims pending in several jurisdictions as of December 31,
2020, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Like hundreds of other industrial companies,
we have been named as one of many defendants in asbestos-related
personal injury litigation. Most of these cases allege personal
injury or death resulting from exposure to asbestos in premises of
FMC or to asbestos-containing components installed in machinery or
equipment manufactured or sold by discontinued operations. The
machinery and equipment businesses we owned or operated did not
fabricate the asbestos-containing component parts at issue in the
litigation, and to this day, neither the U.S. Occupational Safety
and Health Administration nor the Environmental Protection Agency
has banned the use of these components. Further, the
asbestos-containing parts for this machinery and equipment were
accessible only at the time of infrequent repair and maintenance. A
few jurisdictions have permitted claims to proceed against
equipment manufacturers relating to insulation installed by other
companies on such machinery and equipment. We believe that,
overall, the claims against FMC are without merit.

"Since the 1980s, approximately 117,000 asbestos claims against FMC
have been discharged, the overwhelming majority of which have been
dismissed without any payment to the claimant. Since the 1980s,
settlements with claimants have totaled approximately $130
million.

"We intend to continue managing these asbestos-related cases in
accordance with our historical experience. We have established a
reserve for this litigation within our discontinued operations and
believe that any exposure of a loss in excess of the established
reserve cannot be reasonably estimated. Our experience has been
that the overall trends in asbestos litigation have changed over
time. Over the last several years, we have seen changes in the
jurisdictions where claims against FMC are being filed and changes
in the mix of products named in the various claims. Because these
claim trends have yet to form a predictable pattern, we are
presently unable to reasonably estimate our asbestos liability with
respect to claims that may be filed in the future."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/39NhM4v


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Forum Energy's Subsidiary Faces Exposure Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
Forum Energy Technologies, Inc.'s subsidiary has been named as one
of many defendants in a number of product liability claims for
alleged exposure to asbestos used in valves, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "These lawsuits are typically filed on behalf
of plaintiffs who allege exposure to asbestos, against numerous
defendants, often forty or more, who are alleged to have
manufactured or distributed products containing asbestos. The
injuries alleged by plaintiffs in these cases range from
mesothelioma and other cancers to asbestosis. The earliest claims
against our subsidiary were filed in New Jersey in 1998, and our
subsidiary currently has active cases in Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Illinois and Delaware. These complaints do not typically
include requests for a specific amount of damages. Our subsidiary
acquired the trademark for the product line in question in 1985. To
date, the claims against our subsidiary alleging illnesses due to
asbestos have generally been based on products manufactured by the
previous owner prior to 1985 that are alleged to have contained
asbestos. Many claimants alleging illnesses due to asbestos sue on
the basis of exposure prior to 1985, as by that date the hazards of
asbestos exposure were well known and asbestos had begun to fall
into disuse. Our subsidiary has been successful in obtaining
dismissals in most lawsuits without any cash contribution including
because the "successor liability" law in most states does not hold
a purchaser in good faith liable for the actions of the seller
prior to the acquisition date unless the purchaser contractually
assumed the liabilities, which our subsidiary did not. There are
exceptions to the successor liability doctrine in many states, so
there are no assurances that our subsidiary will not be found
liable for the actions of its predecessor. The law in other states
on so called "successor liability" may be different or ambiguous in
this regard, and could also expose our subsidiary to liability. Our
subsidiary could also be found liable should a trier of fact reject
our subsidiary's position that it is not responsible for the
alleged asbestos injuries. To date, asbestos claims have not had a
material adverse effect on our business, financial condition,
results of operations, or cash flow, as our annual out-of-pocket
costs over the last five years has been less than $200,000. There
were fewer than 25 new cases filed against our subsidiary in each
of last two years, and a significant number of existing cases were
dismissed, settled or otherwise disposed of over the last year. We
currently have fewer than 150 lawsuits pending against this
subsidiary. Our subsidiary has over $17 million in face amount of
insurance per occurrence and over $23 million of aggregate primary
insurance coverage. In addition, our subsidiary has over $950
million in face amount of excess coverage applicable to the claims.
There can be no guarantee that all of this can be collected due to
policy terms and conditions and insurer insolvencies in the past or
in the future. In January 2011, we entered into an agreement with
seven of our primary insurers under which they have agreed to pay
80% of the costs of handling and settling each asbestos claim
against the affected subsidiary. The insurers' portion of the
settlements is funded by our aggregate primary limits, which are
eroded only by settlements and not legal fees. Approximately $2.0
million in settlements has been paid by insurers and our subsidiary
to date, with approximately $40,000 paid over the course of the
last two years. Our subsidiary and the subscribing insurers have
the right to withdraw from this agreement, but to date, no party
has exercised this right or expressed an intent to do so."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3sSvtWY


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Harsco Corp. Faces 17,159 PI Suits at Dec. 31
--------------------------------------------------------------
Harsco Corporation has approximately 17,159 pending asbestos
personal injury actions filed against the Company at December 31,
2020, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Of those actions, approximately 16,599 were
filed in the New York Supreme Court (New York County),
approximately 119 were filed in other New York State Supreme Court
Counties and approximately 441 were filed in courts located in
other states.

"The Company has been named as one of many defendants
(approximately 90 or more in most cases) in legal actions alleging
personal injury from exposure to airborne asbestos over the past
several decades. In their suits, the plaintiffs have named as
defendants, among others, many manufacturers, distributors and
installers of numerous types of equipment or products that
allegedly contained asbestos. The majority of the asbestos
complaints pending against the Company have been filed in New York.
Almost all of the New York complaints contain a standard claim for
damages of $20 million or $25 million against the approximately 90
defendants, regardless of the individual plaintiff's alleged
medical condition and without specifically identifying any of the
Company's products as the source of plaintiff's asbestos exposure.
If the Company is found to be liable in any of these actions and
the liability exceeds the Company's insurance coverage, results of
operations, cash flows and financial condition could be adversely
affected.

"The complaints in most of those actions generally follow a form
that contains a standard damages demand of $20 million or $25
million, regardless of the individual plaintiff's alleged medical
condition, and without identifying any specific Company product.

"At December 31, 2020, approximately 16,549 of the actions filed in
New York Supreme Court (New York County) were on the
Deferred/Inactive Docket created by the court in December 2002 for
all pending and future asbestos actions filed by persons who cannot
demonstrate that they have a malignant condition or discernible
physical impairment. The remaining approximately 50 cases in New
York County are pending on the Active or In Extremis Docket created
for plaintiffs who can demonstrate a malignant condition or
physical impairment.

"The Company has liability insurance coverage under various primary
and excess policies that the Company believes will be available, if
necessary, to substantially cover any liability that might
ultimately be incurred in the asbestos actions. The costs and
expenses of the asbestos actions are being paid by the Company's
insurers.

"In view of the persistence of asbestos litigation in the U.S., the
Company expects to continue to receive additional claims in the
future. The Company intends to continue its practice of vigorously
defending these claims and cases. At December 31, 2020, the Company
has obtained dismissal in approximately 28,310 cases by stipulation
or summary judgment prior to trial.

"It is not possible to predict the ultimate outcome of
asbestos-related actions in the U.S. due to the unpredictable
nature of this litigation, and no loss provision has been recorded
in the Company's consolidated financial statements because a loss
contingency is not deemed probable or estimable. Despite this
uncertainty, and although results of operations and cash flows for
a given period could be adversely affected by asbestos-related
actions, the Company does not expect that any costs that are
reasonably possible to be incurred by the Company in connection
with asbestos litigation would have a material adverse effect on
the Company's financial condition, results of operations or cash
flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3wghYTq


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Idex Corp. and Subsidiaries Faces PI Lawsuits
--------------------------------------------------------------
Idex Corporation and six of its subsidiaries are presently named as
defendants in a number of lawsuits claiming various
asbestos-related personal injuries, allegedly as a result of
exposure to products manufactured with components that contained
asbestos, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These components were acquired from third
party suppliers and were not manufactured by the Company or any of
the defendant subsidiaries. To date, the majority of the Company's
settlements and legal costs, except for costs of coordination,
administration, insurance investigation and a portion of defense
costs, have been covered in full by insurance, subject to
applicable deductibles. However, the Company cannot predict whether
and to what extent insurance will be available to continue to cover
these settlements and legal costs, or how insurers may respond to
claims that are tendered to them. Asbestos-related claims have been
filed in jurisdictions throughout the United States and the United
Kingdom. Most of the claims resolved to date have been dismissed
without payment. The balance of the claims have been settled for
various immaterial amounts. Only one case has been tried, resulting
in a verdict for the Company's business unit. No provision has been
made in the financial statements of the Company, other than for
insurance deductibles in the ordinary course, and the Company does
not currently believe the asbestos-related claims will have a
material adverse effect on the Company's business, financial
position, results of operations or cash flows.

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2Oaq26V


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Ingersoll Rand Faces Numerous PI Lawsuits
----------------------------------------------------------
Ingersoll Rand Inc. has been named as a defendant in many asbestos
and silica-related personal injury lawsuits, according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "Predecessors to the Company sometimes
manufactured, distributed and/or sold products allegedly at issue
in the pending asbestos and silica-related lawsuits (the
"Products"). However, neither the Company nor its predecessors ever
mined, manufactured, mixed, produced or distributed asbestos fiber
or silica sand, the materials that allegedly caused the injury
underlying the lawsuits. Moreover, the asbestos-containing
components of the Products, if any, were enclosed within the
subject Products.

"Although the Company has never mined, manufactured, mixed,
produced or distributed asbestos fiber or silica sand nor sold
products that could result in a direct asbestos or silica exposure,
many of the companies that did engage in such activities or
produced such products are no longer in operation. This has led to
law firms seeking potential alternative companies to name in
lawsuits where there has been an asbestos or silica related
injury.

"The Company believes that the pending and future asbestos and
silica-related lawsuits are not likely to, in the aggregate, have a
material adverse effect on its consolidated financial position,
results of operations or liquidity, based on: the Company's
anticipated insurance and indemnification rights to address the
risks of such matters; the limited potential asbestos exposure from
the Products described above; the Company's experience that the
vast majority of plaintiffs are not impaired with a disease
attributable to alleged exposure to asbestos or silica from or
relating to the Products or for which the Company otherwise bears
responsibility; various potential defenses available to the Company
with respect to such matters; and the Company's prior disposition
of comparable matters. However, inherent uncertainties of
litigation and future developments, including, without limitation,
potential insolvencies of insurance companies or other defendants,
an adverse determination in the Adams County Case, or other
inability to collect from the Company's historical insurers or
indemnitors, could cause a different outcome. While the outcome of
legal proceedings is inherently uncertain, based on presently known
facts, experience, and circumstances, the Company believes that the
amounts accrued on its balance sheet are adequate and that the
liabilities arising from the asbestos and silica-related personal
injury lawsuits will not have a material adverse effect on the
Company's consolidated financial position, results of operations or
liquidity. "Accrued liabilities" and "Other liabilities" in the
Consolidated Balance Sheets include a total litigation reserve of
$131.4 million and $118.1 million as of December 31, 2020 and
December 31, 2019 respectively, with regards to potential liability
arising from the Company's asbestos-related litigation. Asbestos
related defense costs are excluded from the asbestos claims
liability and are recorded separately as services are incurred. In
the event of unexpected future developments, it is possible that
the ultimate resolution of these matters may be material to the
Company's consolidated financial position, results of operation or
liquidity.

"The Company has entered into a series of agreements with certain
of its or its predecessors' legacy insurers and certain potential
indemnitors to secure insurance coverage and/or reimbursement for
the costs associated with the asbestos and silica-related lawsuits
filed against the Company. The Company has also pursued litigation
against certain insurers or indemnitors, where necessary. The
Company has an insurance recovery receivable for probable asbestos
related recoveries of approximately $132.1 million and $122.4
million as of December 31, 2020 and December 31, 2019,
respectively, which was included in "Other assets" in the
Consolidated Balance Sheets. During the year ended December 31,
2018, the Company received asbestos related insurance recoveries of
$14.4 million, of which $6.2 million related to the recovery of
indemnity payments, and was recorded as a reduction of the
insurance recovery receivable in "Other assets" in the Consolidated
Balance Sheets, and $8.2 million related to the reimbursement of
previously expensed legal defense costs, and was recorded as a
reduction of "Selling and administrative expenses" in the
Consolidated Statements of Operations. There were no material
recoveries received in the years ended December 31, 2020 and
December 31, 2019."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3drH8Wk


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Lantheus Holdings Identifies Asbestos-Related ARO
------------------------------------------------------------------
Lantheus Holdings, Inc., has identified conditional asset
retirement obligations (ARO) related to the future removal and
disposal of asbestos contained in certain of the buildings located
on the Company's North Billerica, Massachusetts campus, according
to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

Lantheus Holdings states, "The Company believes the asbestos is
appropriately contained and it is compliant with all applicable
environmental regulations. If these properties undergo major
renovations or are demolished, certain environmental regulations
are in place, which specify the manner in which asbestos must be
handled and disposed. The Company is required to record the fair
value of these conditional liabilities if they can be reasonably
estimated. As of December 31, 2020 and 2019, sufficient information
was not available to estimate a liability for such conditional
asset retirement obligations as the obligations to remove the
asbestos from these properties have indeterminable settlement
dates. As such, no liability for conditional asset retirement
obligations has been recorded in the accompanying consolidated
balance sheets as of December 31, 2020 and 2019.

"The Company has production facilities which manufacture and
process radioactive materials at its North Billerica, Massachusetts
site. The Company considers its legal obligation to remediate its
facilities upon a decommissioning of its radioactive-related
operations as an asset retirement obligation. The fair value of a
liability for asset retirement obligations is recognized in the
period in which the liability is incurred. The liability is
measured at the present value of the obligation expected to be
incurred and is adjusted in subsequent periods as accretion expense
is recorded. The corresponding asset retirement costs are
capitalized as part of the carrying values of the related
long-lived assets and depreciated over the assets' useful lives."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2PfqhhG


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Pfizer Inc. and Subsidiaries Faces PI Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pfizer Inc. and certain of its previously owned subsidiaries are
defendants in numerous cases related to its pharmaceutical and
other products, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Plaintiffs in these cases seek damages and
other relief on various grounds for alleged personal injury and
economic loss.

"Between 1967 and 1982, Warner-Lambert owned American Optical
Corporation (American Optical), which manufactured and sold
respiratory protective devices and asbestos safety clothing. In
connection with the sale of American Optical in 1982,
Warner-Lambert agreed to indemnify the purchaser for certain
liabilities, including certain asbestos-related and other claims.
Warner-Lambert was acquired by Pfizer in 2000 and is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Pfizer. Warner-Lambert is actively engaged in the
defense of, and will continue to explore various means of
resolving, these claims.

"Numerous lawsuits against American Optical, Pfizer and certain of
its previously owned subsidiaries are pending in various federal
and state courts seeking damages for alleged personal injury from
exposure to products allegedly containing asbestos and other
allegedly hazardous materials sold by Pfizer and certain of its
previously owned subsidiaries.

"There also are a small number of lawsuits pending in various
federal and state courts seeking damages for alleged exposure to
asbestos in facilities owned or formerly owned by Pfizer or its
subsidiaries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3ubFTl2


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Resolute Forest Products Faces Several PI Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------
Resolute Forest Products Inc. is involved in a number of
asbestos-related lawsuits filed primarily in U.S. state courts,
including certain cases involving multiple defendants, according to
the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "These lawsuits principally allege direct or
indirect personal injury or death resulting from exposure to
asbestos-containing premises. While we dispute the plaintiffs'
allegations and intend to vigorously defend these claims, the
ultimate resolution of these matters cannot be determined at this
time. These lawsuits frequently involve claims for unspecified
compensatory and punitive damages, and we are unable to reasonably
estimate a range of possible losses. However, unfavorable rulings,
judgments or settlement terms could materially impact our
Consolidated Financial Statements. Hearings for certain of these
matters are scheduled to occur in 2021."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3cEwJr4

ASBESTOS UPDATE: Sealed Air Faces Multiple Suits in Canada
----------------------------------------------------------
Sealed Air Corporation is a defendant in a number of
asbestos-related actions in Canada arising from Grace's activities
in Canada prior to the 1998 transaction, according to the Company's
Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Although the Settlement agreement has been
implemented and we have been released from the various
asbestos-related, fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and
indemnification claims made against us arising from a 1998
transaction with Grace, if the courts were to refuse to enforce the
injunctions or releases contained in the Plan and the Settlement
agreement with respect to any claims and if Grace were unwilling or
unable to defend and indemnify us for such claims, then we could be
required to pay substantial damages, which could have a material
adverse effect on our consolidated financial condition and results
of operations.

On March 31, 1998, we completed a multi-step transaction (the
"Cryovac transaction") involving W.R. Grace & Co. ("Grace") which
brought the Cryovac packaging business and the former Sealed Air's
business under the common ownership of the Company. As part of that
transaction, Grace and its subsidiaries retained all liabilities
arising out of their operations before the Cryovac transaction
(including asbestos-related liabilities), other than liabilities
relating to Cryovac's operations, and agreed to indemnify the
Company with respect to such retained liabilities. Beginning in
2000, we were served with a number of lawsuits alleging that the
Cryovac transaction was a fraudulent transfer or gave rise to
successor liability or both, and that as a result we were
responsible for alleged asbestos liabilities of Grace and its
subsidiaries. On April 2, 2001, Grace and a number of its
subsidiaries filed petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Court"). In connection with
Grace's Chapter 11 case, the Bankruptcy Court issued orders staying
all asbestos actions against the Company (the "Preliminary
Injunction") but granted the official committees appointed to
represent asbestos claimants in Grace's Chapter 11 case (the
"Committees") permission to pursue fraudulent transfer, successor
liability, and other claims against the Company and its subsidiary
Cryovac, Inc. based upon the Cryovac transaction.

"In November 2002, we reached an agreement in principle with the
Committees to resolve all current and future asbestos-related
claims made against us and our affiliates, as well as
indemnification claims by Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. and
affiliated companies, in each case, in connection with the Cryovac
transaction (as memorialized by the parties and approved by the
Bankruptcy Court, the "Settlement agreement"). A definitive
Settlement agreement was entered into as of November 10, 2003
consistent with the terms of the agreement in principle. On June
27, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement agreement
and the Settlement agreement was subsequently incorporated into the
plan of reorganization for Grace filed in September 2008 (as filed
and amended from time to time, the "Plan"). Subsequently, the
Bankruptcy Court (in January and February 2011) and the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware (in January and
June 2012) entered orders confirming Grace’s plan of
reorganization in its entirety.
On February 3, 2014 (the "Effective Date"), in accordance with the
Plan, Grace emerged from bankruptcy. In accordance with the Plan
and the Settlement agreement, on the Effective Date, Cryovac, Inc.
made aggregate cash payments in the amount of $929.7 million to the
WRG Asbestos PI Trust (the "PI Trust") and the WRG Asbestos PD
Trust (the "PD Trust") and transferred 18 million shares of Sealed
Air common stock to the PI Trust. Among other things, the Plan
incorporated and implemented the Settlement agreement and provided
for the establishment of two asbestos trusts under Section 524(g)
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to which present and future
asbestos-related personal injury and property damage claims are
channeled. The Plan also provided injunctions and releases with
respect to asbestos claims and certain other claims for our
benefit. In addition, under the Plan and the Settlement agreement,
Grace is required to indemnify us with respect to asbestos and
certain other liabilities. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and
although we believe the possibility to be remote, if any courts
were to refuse to enforce the injunctions or releases contained in
the Plan and the Settlement agreement with respect to any claims,
and if, in addition, Grace were unwilling or unable to defend and
indemnify us for such claims, then we could be required to pay
substantial damages, which could have a material adverse effect on
our consolidated financial condition, results of operations,
profitability or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3m6augR


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Sempra Energy's Subsidiaries Faces PI Lawsuits
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sempra Energy's indirect subsidiaries which were acquired as part
of the merger of EFH are defendants in personal injury lawsuits
brought in state courts throughout the U.S., according to the
Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.

The Company states, "As of February 22, 2021, 209 such lawsuits are
pending with 77 such lawsuits having been served. These cases
allege illness or death as a result of exposure to asbestos in
power plants designed and/or built by companies whose assets were
purchased by predecessor entities to the EFH subsidiaries, and
generally assert claims for product defects, negligence, strict
liability and wrongful death. They seek compensatory and punitive
damages. Additionally, in connection with the EFH bankruptcy
proceeding, approximately 28,000 proofs of claim were filed on
behalf of persons who allege exposure to asbestos under similar
circumstances and assert the right to file such lawsuits in the
future. None of these claims or lawsuits were discharged in the EFH
bankruptcy proceeding. The costs to defend or resolve these
lawsuits and the amount of damages that may be imposed or incurred
could have a material adverse effect on Sempra Energy's cash flows,
financial condition and results of operations.

"We are also defendants in ordinary routine litigation incidental
to our businesses, including personal injury, employment
litigation, product liability, property damage and other claims.
Juries have demonstrated an increasing willingness to grant large
awards, including punitive damages, in these types of cases."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3cBlCiN


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Teledyne Technologies Still Faces PI Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
Teledyne Technologies Incorporated has been joined, among a number
of defendants (often over 100), in lawsuits alleging injury or
death as a result of exposure to asbestos and may continue to be
mistakenly joined in lawsuits involving a company or business that
was not assumed by them as part of their 1999 spin-off because of
the prominent "Teledyne" name, according to the Company's Form 10-K
filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "To date, we have not incurred material
liabilities in connection with these lawsuits. However, our
historic insurance coverage, including that of our predecessors,
may not fully cover such claims and the defense of such matters.
Coverage typically depends on the year of purported exposure and
other factors. Nonetheless, we intend to vigorously defend our
position against these claims.

"As a manufacturer and distributor of a wide variety of products,
including monitoring instruments, products used in offshore oil and
gas production, products used in transportation and commercial
aviation and products used in medical devices (including X-Ray
detectors), our results of operations are susceptible to adverse
publicity regarding the quality or safety of our products. In part,
product liability claims challenging the safety of our products may
result in a decline in sales for a product, which could adversely
affect our results of operations. This could be the case even if
the claims themselves are proven to be untrue or settled for
immaterial amounts.

"While we have general liability and other insurance policies
concerning product liabilities and errors and omissions, we have
self-insured retentions or deductibles under such policies with
respect to a portion of these liabilities. Awarded damages could be
more than our accruals. We could incur losses above the aggregate
annual policy limit as well. We cannot ensure that, for 2021 and in
future years, insurance carriers will be willing to renew coverage
or provide new coverage for product liability.

"Product recalls can be expensive and tarnish our reputation and
have a material adverse effect on the sales of our products. We
cannot assure that we will not have additional product liability
claims or that we will not recall any products.

"Teledyne Brown Engineering, Inc. and other Teledyne companies
manufacture components for customers in the nuclear power market,
including utilities and certain governmental entities. Certain
liabilities associated with such products are covered by the
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act and other statutory
and common law defenses, and we have received indemnities from some
of our customers. However, there is no assurance we will not face
product liability claims related to such products or that our
exposure will not exceed the amounts for which we have liability
coverage or protection."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/31BIkkA


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Transocean Ltd. Defends 255 PI Lawsuits
--------------------------------------------------------
Transocean Ltd.'s subsidiary has been named as a defendant, along
with numerous other companies, in lawsuits arising out of the
subsidiary's manufacture and sale of heat exchangers, and
involvement in the construction and refurbishment of major
industrial complexes alleging bodily injury or personal injury as a
result of exposure to asbestos, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "As of December 31, 2020, the subsidiary was a
defendant in approximately 255 lawsuits with a corresponding number
of plaintiffs.  For many of these lawsuits, we have not been
provided sufficient information from the plaintiffs to determine
whether all or some of the plaintiffs have claims against the
subsidiary, the basis of any such claims, or the nature of their
alleged injuries.  The operating assets of the subsidiary were sold
in 1989.  In September 2018, the subsidiary and certain insurers
agreed to a settlement of outstanding disputes that provided the
subsidiary with cash and an annuity.  Together with a
coverage-in-place agreement with certain insurers and additional
coverage issued by other insurers, we believe the subsidiary has
sufficient resources to respond to both the current lawsuits as
well as future lawsuits of a similar nature.  While we cannot
predict or provide assurance as to the outcome of these matters, we
do not expect the ultimate liability, if any, resulting from these
claims to have a material adverse effect on our consolidated
statement of financial position, results of operations or cash
flows.

"In 2004, several of our subsidiaries were named, along with
numerous other unaffiliated defendants, in complaints filed in the
Circuit Courts of the State of Mississippi, and in 2014, a group of
similar complaints were filed in Louisiana.  The plaintiffs, former
employees of some of the defendants, generally allege that the
defendants used or manufactured asbestos containing drilling mud
additives for use in connection with drilling operations, claiming
negligence, products liability, strict liability and claims allowed
under the Jones Act and general maritime law.  The plaintiffs
generally seek awards of unspecified compensatory and punitive
damages, but the court-appointed special master has ruled that a
Jones Act employer defendant, such as us, cannot be sued for
punitive damages.  At December 31, 2020, eight plaintiffs have
claims pending in Louisiana, in which we have or may have an
interest.  We intend to defend these lawsuits vigorously, although
we can provide no assurance as to the outcome.  We historically
have maintained broad liability insurance, although we are not
certain whether insurance will cover the liabilities, if any,
arising out of these claims.  Based on our evaluation of the
exposure to date, we do not expect the liability, if any, resulting
from these claims to have a material adverse effect on our
consolidated statement of financial position, results of operations
or cash flows."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3w9Wojc


ASBESTOS UPDATE: TriMas Corp. Still Defends 4,655 Suits
-------------------------------------------------------
TriMas Corporation's former Lamons business is a party to lawsuits
related to asbestos contained in gaskets formerly manufactured by
it or its predecessors, according to the Company's Form 10-K filing
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "While we sold the Lamons business in December
2019, we retained the asbestos-related liability exposure. Some of
this litigation includes claims for punitive and consequential as
well as compensatory damages. We are not able to predict the
outcome of these matters given that, among other things, claims may
be initially made in jurisdictions without specifying the amount
sought or by simply stating the minimum or maximum permissible
monetary relief, and may be amended to alter the amount sought. Of
the 4,655 claims pending at December 31, 2020, 40 set forth
specific amounts of damages (other than those stating the statutory
minimum or maximum).

"Total settlement costs (exclusive of defense costs) for all such
cases, some of which were filed over 25 years ago, have been
approximately $10.0 million. All relief sought in the asbestos
cases is monetary in nature. To date, approximately 40% of our
costs related to settlement and defense of asbestos litigation have
been covered by our primary insurance. Effective February 14, 2006,
we entered into a coverage-in-place agreement with our first level
excess carriers regarding the coverage to be provided to us for
asbestos-related claims when the primary insurance is exhausted.
The coverage-in-place agreement makes asbestos defense costs and
indemnity insurance coverage available to us that might otherwise
be disputed by the carriers and provides a methodology for the
administration of such expenses. The Company's primary insurance
exhausted in November 2018, and the Company is solely responsible
for defense costs and indemnity payments prior to the commencement
of coverage under this agreement, the duration of which would be
subject to the scope of damage awards and settlements paid. During
this period, we may incur significant litigation costs in defending
these matters. We also may be required to incur additional defense
costs and pay damage awards or settlements or become subject to
equitable remedies in the future that could adversely affect our
businesses."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3fvIfqE


ASBESTOS UPDATE: United Fire Group Has $2.5MM A&E Loss Reserves
---------------------------------------------------------------
United Fire Group, Inc. had $2.5 million and $3.1 million in direct
and assumed asbestos and environmental loss reserves at December
31, 2020 and 2019 respectively, according to the Company's Form
10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Included in the other liability and assumed
reinsurance lines of business are reserves for asbestos and other
environmental losses and loss settlement expenses. The estimation
of loss reserves for environmental claims and claims related to
long-term exposure to asbestos and other substances is one of the
most difficult aspects of establishing reserves, especially given
the inherent uncertainties surrounding such claims. Although we
record our best estimate of loss and loss settlement expense
reserves, the ultimate amounts paid upon settlement of such claims
may be more or less than the amount of the reserves, because of the
significant uncertainties involved and the likelihood that these
uncertainties will not be resolved for many years."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3sFMELy


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Univar Solutions Defends 190 PI Cases at Dec. 31
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Univar Solutions Inc. is obligated to defend and indemnify to
approximately 190 asbestos-related cases as of December 31, 2020;
however, this number tends to fluctuate up and down over time,
according to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.

Univar Solutions states, "The Company is subject to liabilities
from claims alleging personal injury from exposure to asbestos. The
claims result primarily from an indemnification obligation related
to Univar Solutions USA Inc.'s ("Univar") 1986 purchase of McKesson
Chemical Company from McKesson Corporation ("McKesson"). Once
certain conditions have been met, Univar will have the ability to
pursue insurance coverage, if any, that may be available under
McKesson's historical insurance coverage to offset the impact of
any fees, settlements, or judgments that Univar is obligated to pay
because of its obligation to defend and indemnify McKesson.
Historically, the vast majority of these asbestos cases have been
dismissed without payment or with a nominal payment. While the
Company is unable to predict the outcome of these matters, it does
not believe, based upon currently available facts, that the
ultimate resolution of any of these matters will have a material
effect on its overall financial position, results of operations, or
cash flows.

"The Company is not aware of any claims, lawsuits, regulatory
matters or administrative proceedings, pending or threatened, that
are likely to have a material effect on its overall financial
position, results of operations, or cash flows. However, the
Company cannot predict the outcome of any present or future claims
or litigation or the potential for future claims or litigation and
adverse developments could negatively impact earnings or cash flows
in a particular future period."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3sGeYxd


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Vontier Corp. Has $68MM Liabilities at Dec. 31
---------------------------------------------------------------
Vontier Corp. has recorded gross liabilities associated with known
and future expected asbestos claims of $68.0 million and $54.4
million as of December 31, 2020 and 2019, respectively, according
to the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states, "Some of our existing or legacy businesses have
in the past been, and in the future may be, the subject of suits
brought by plaintiffs asserting that they have contracted or may
contract either mesothelioma or another asbestos-related condition
in connection with exposure to or use of products previously made
or sold by such businesses. Many asbestos-related conditions, such
as mesothelioma, have long latency periods in which the disease
process develops, making it difficult to accurately predict the
types and numbers of such claims in the future. While insurance
coverage exists for many of these asbestos litigations, others may
have no such coverage. If our insurance coverage is not applicable
or is not adequate, we may be responsible for all defense
expenditures, as well as any settlements or verdict payouts. Any
future asbestos-related litigation, brought against us or our
subsidiaries, whether with or without merit, could result in
substantial liabilities and costs to us as well as divert the
attention of our management, which could have a material adverse
effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows.

"In connection with the recognition of liabilities for
asbestos-related matters, the Company records insurance recoveries
that are deemed probable and estimable. In assessing the
probability of insurance recovery, we make judgments concerning
insurance coverage that we believe are reasonable and consistent
with our historical dealings, our knowledge of any pertinent
solvency issues surrounding insurers, and litigation and court
rulings potentially impacting coverage. While the substantial
majority of our insurance carriers are solvent, some of our
individual carriers are insolvent, which has been considered in the
analysis of probable recoveries. Projecting future events is
subject to various uncertainties, including litigation and court
rulings potentially impacting coverage, that could cause insurance
recoveries on asbestos-related liabilities to be higher or lower
than those projected and recorded. Given the inherent uncertainty
in making future projections, the Company reevaluates projections
concerning the Company's probable insurance recoveries considering
any changes to the projected liabilities, the Company's recovery
experience or other relevant factors that may impact future
insurance recoveries."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/2O8w2No


ASBESTOS UPDATE: Xylem Inc. Could Face Future PI Claim
------------------------------------------------------
Xylem Inc. may be asserted with claims alleging injury caused by
any of its products resulting from asbestos exposure, according to
the Company's Form 10-K filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.

The Company states. "We believe there are numerous legal defenses
available for such claims and would defend ourselves vigorously.
Pursuant to the Distribution Agreement among ITT Corporation (now
ITT LLC), Exelis (acquired by Harris Corporation, now L3Harris
Technologies, Inc.) and Xylem, ITT Corporation (now ITT LLC) has an
obligation to indemnify, defend and hold Xylem harmless for
asbestos product liability matters, including settlements,
judgments, and legal defense costs associated with all pending and
future claims that may arise from past sales of ITT's legacy
products. We believe ITT Corporation (now ITT LLC) remains a
substantial entity with sufficient financial resources to honor its
obligations to us.

"As part of our 2011 spin-off from our former parent, ITT
Corporation (now ITT LLC), Exelis Inc. (acquired by Harris
Corporation, now L3Harris Technologies, Inc.) and Xylem will
indemnify, defend and hold harmless each of the other parties with
respect to such parties' assumed or retained liabilities under the
Distribution Agreement and breaches of the Distribution Agreement
or related spin agreements. ITT LLC's indemnification obligations
include asserted and unasserted asbestos and silica liability
claims that relate to the presence or alleged presence of asbestos
or silica in products manufactured, repaired or sold prior to
October 31, 2011, the Distribution Date, subject to limited
exceptions with respect to certain employee claims, or in the
structure or material of any building or facility, subject to
exceptions with respect to employee claims relating to Xylem
buildings or facilities. The indemnification associated with
pending and future asbestos claims does not expire. Xylem has not
recorded a liability for material matters for which we expect to be
indemnified by the former parent or Exelis Inc. through the
Distribution Agreement and we are not aware of any claims or other
circumstances that would give rise to material payments from us
under such indemnifications."

A full-text copy of the Form 10-K is available at
https://bit.ly/3sFu71H



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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