/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/210511.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Tuesday, May 11, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 88

                            Headlines

AMERICAN BANKERS: Wood Suit Removed to S.D. West Virginia
AMERICAN COLLEGIATE: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
ANCIENT BRANDS: Winkelbauer Suit Removed to C.D. California
BMW OF NA: Braverman Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling to 9th Cir.
CENTRAL PRODUCTS: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CHEMOCENTRYX INC: Homyx Sues Over False, Misleading Statements
CIGNA HEALTH: Extension of Class Cert. Related Deadlines Sought
CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Milkboy Appeals Insurance Case Dismissal
CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Stone Soup Appeals Insurance Case Dismissal
CROWN LABORATORIES: Somers Sues Over False & Deceptive Advertising

EN-R-G FOODS: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FORMCRETE LLC: Gonzalez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
FORTY EIGHT: Waloven Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Court
GARDAWORLD CASHLINK: Kalb's Bid to Sever & Partially Remand Denied
GDC TECHNICS: Stringham Files Suit in W.D. Texas

GEICO GENERAL: W.D. Washington Certifies Class in Nichols Suit
GEMS911 INC: Faces Boatright Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
GOOGLE LLC: Delahunty Sues Over Unauthorized Disclosure of Info
HARTFORD FINANCIAL: Ralph Kuhen Suit Transferred to C.D. California
HENRY FORD: Faces Hundley Suit Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duties

HOLLYWOOD FEED: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HYKSO INC: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
INDIGO SLEEP: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
INDY TRANSPORT: Class of Dump Truck Drivers Certified in Horta Suit
INTELLIGENTSIA COFFEE: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

JASCO PLUMBING: Roman Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
KF TEA USA: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
KODIAK CAKES: Court Narrows Claims in First Amended Stewart Suit
KOVELS' ANTIQUES: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LAYLA SLEEP: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

LETHA'S PIES: Ark. App. Flips Denial of Arbitration Bid in EBF Suit
LIFEMD INC: Cho Sues Over Securities' Decline in Market Value
LULL VENTURES: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MDL 2873: Farrow Sues Over Injury From AFFF Exposure
MDL 2873: Jendusa Sues Over Injury from AFFF Exposure

MEDICAL SECURITY: Loses Bids to Dismiss & Stay Michigan Urgent Suit
MICHAEL CARR: Norman Files Suit in North District of Texas
NAVIENT CORP: Loses Bid to Strike Class Claims in Ballard Suit
NEW ORLEANS, LA: Court Affirms Class Certification in Caluda Suit
NEW YORK MUTUAL: Lee Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensations

NEW YORK: Labor Unions Can't Intervene in Policing Suit, Court Says
NEW YORK: O'Donnell Suit Remitted to Supreme Court for Judgment
NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Gulino Suit re Azeez
OKONITE COMPANY: Parrish Seeks to Certify Nonexempt Employee Class
PENNSYLVANIA DOH: Chapman Files Suit in M.D. Pennsylvania

PLURALSIGHT INC: INPRS Appeals Securities Suit Dismissal
REHAB AMERICA: Faces Buckley Suit Over Unpaid Wages
RITE AID: Bailey's Bid to Certify Consumer Class Granted in Part
SANTANDER CONSUMER: Stipulated Protective Order Entered in Wilson
SCOTTSDALE BOONDOCKS: Wander Sues Over Failure to Pay OT Wages

SHELLPOINT PARTNERS: Dutcher Files TCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
SPINX GAMES: Court Denies Bid for TRO in Heathcote Class Suit
STERLING BANCORP: Class Settlement in OPPRS Suit Has Prelim. Nod
STEVE'S PAINTING: Wilson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
SUPERVALU INC: Shelton Suit Removed to S.D. Illinois

TEACHERS INSURANCE: Arbitration Award in Luciano Suit Confirmed
THOMAS M. HODGSON: Pearson Files Suit in Massachusetts Sup. Ct.
TRUEACCORD CORP: Hernandez Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. California
W.B. MASON: Sannutti Sues Over Unlawful Payroll Practices
WHIRLPOOL CORP: Claims in Second Amended Redmon Class Suit Narrowed

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION: Connor Suit Removed to S.D. Florida

                            *********

AMERICAN BANKERS: Wood Suit Removed to S.D. West Virginia
---------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Sandra Wood, individually and as Administratrix
of The Estate of Michael Wood, deceased, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. American Bankers Life Assurance
Company of F.L.O.R.I.D.A., Case No. CC-41-02021-C-93, was removed
from the Raleigh County Circuit Court, to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia on May 5, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:21-cv-00281 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Insurance Contract.

American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida --
http://www.assurant.com/-- operates as an insurance company. The
Company provides life, health, and disability insurance
services.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Cheryl A. Fisher, Esq.
          Tony L. O'Dell, Esq.
          TIANO & O'DELL
          P. O. Box 11830
          Charleston, WV 25339
          Phone: (304) 720-6700
          Fax: (304) 720-5800
          Email: cfisher@tolawfirm.com
                 todell@tolawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Alex Manuel Greenberg, Esq.
          HUDDLESTON BOLEN
          P. O. Box 3786
          Charleston, WV 25337
          Phone: (304) 225-1419
          Fax: (304) 296-6116
          Email: alex.greenberg@dinsmore.com

               - and -

          Jill Cranston Rice, Esq.
          DINSMORE & SHOHL
          215 Don Knotts Boulevard, Suite 310
          Morgantown, WV 26501
          Phone: (304) 225-1430
          Fax: (304) 296-6116
          Email: jill.rice@dinsmore.com


AMERICAN COLLEGIATE: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against American Collegiate
Marketing, Inc. The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated v. American Collegiate
Marketing, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04032 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

American Collegiate Marketing -- https://www.magazineline.com/ --
sell discounted magazine subscriptions to students, teachers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


ANCIENT BRANDS: Winkelbauer Suit Removed to C.D. California
-----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Shane Winkelbauer, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated v. Ancient Brands, LLC, Does 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 21STCV10258, was removed from the
Los Angeles County Superior Court to the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California on April 23, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-03503-FLA-KS to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Ancient Brands Grain -- https://www.ancientbrands.com/ -- believes
in providing the natural and organic food industry with the highest
quality Puffed Grains and Ingredients.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan J. Clarkson, Esq.
          Zachary Chrzan, Esq.
          CLARKSON LAW FIRM PC
          9255 Sunset Boulevard Suite 804
          Los Angeles, CA 90069
          Phone: (213) 788-4050
          Fax: (213) 788-4070
          Email: rclarkson@clarksonlawfirm.com
                 zchrzan@clarksonlawfirm.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Matthew B Borden, Esq.
          David Howard Kwasniewski, Esq.
          BRAUNHAGEY AND BORDEN LLP
          351 California Street 10th Floor
          San Francisco, CA 94104
          Phone: (415) 599-0210
          Fax: (415) 276-1808
          Email: borden@braunhagey.com
                 kwasniewski@braunhagey.com


BMW OF NA: Braverman Appeals Summary Judgment Ruling to 9th Cir.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Barry Braverman, et al., filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled BARRY BRAVERMAN, et al., v.
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al., Case No. 8:16-cv-00966-TJH PJW,
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.


As reported in the Class Action Reporter on March 30, 2021, Judge
Terry J. Hatter of the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California, Western Division, granted BMW's motion for summary
judgment.

On May 26, 2016, the Plaintiffs filed this putative class action
against Defendant BMW, alleging that its model years 2014 to 2016
i3 Rex electric car equipped with the "Range Extender" option
contains a design defect which causes the car to suddenly
decelerate when its battery's charge drops to a certain level, and
that BMW hid that defect from consumers.

The Plaintiffs alleged 40 claims related to breach of implied
warranty, breach of express warranty, consumer protection, and
fraudulent concealment under various federal, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and Washington laws. In July, 2018, the parties stipulated to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' Colorado and Georgia claims.

On March 29, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved for class certification on
their breach of implied warranty, consumer protection, and
fraudulent concealment claims for the cars leased or purchased in
California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
and Washington.

The Plaintiffs sought to uniformly apply California law to all the
putative class members, arguing that the common law and statutes of
those states were substantially similar to the following California
laws: (1) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code
Secitons 1790, et seq.; (2) Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code Sections 1750, et seq.; (3) False Advertising statute,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17500; (4) Unlawful Business
Practices statutes, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200, et seq;
and (5) common law fraud.  They , also, sought certification on
their derivative federal implied warranty claim under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. Sections 2301, et seq.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Summary Judgment Order
entered by Judge Hatter.

The appellate case is captioned as Barry Braverman, et al. v. BMW
of North America, LLC, Case No. 21-55427, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on April 29, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellants Barry Braverman, Brandon Cosinteno, Lawrence
Curcio, Hakop Demirchyan, Robert Desatnik, Joel Green, John
Lingsweiler, Charles Olsen, Steve Ridges, Glynda Roberson, Adeel
Siddiqui, Edo Tsoar, Peter Weinstein and Eric Wonderly Mediation
Questionnaire was due on May 6, 2021;

   -- Appellants Barry Braverman, Brandon Cosinteno, Lawrence
Curcio, Hakop Demirchyan, Robert Desatnik, Joel Green, John
Lingsweiler, Charles Olsen, Steve Ridges, Glynda Roberson, Adeel
Siddiqui, Edo Tsoar, Peter Weinstein and Eric Wonderly opening
brief is due on June 29, 2021;

   -- Appellee BMW of North America, LLC answering brief is due on
July 29, 2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.

The cross-appeal briefing schedule also states that:

   -- Appellant BMW of North America, LLC Mediation Questionnaire
was due on May 6, 2021;

   -- First cross appeal brief is due on June 29, 2021 for Barry
Braverman, Brandon Cosinteno, Lawrence Curcio, Hakop Demirchyan,
Robert Desatnik, Joel Green, John Lingsweiler, Charles Olsen, Steve
Ridges, Glynda Roberson, Adeel Siddiqui, Edo Tsoar, Peter Weinstein
and Eric Wonderly;

   -- Second brief on cross appeal is due on July 29, 2021 for BMW
of North America, LLC;

   -- Third brief on cross appeal is due on August 30, 2021 for
Barry Braverman, Brandon Cosinteno, Lawrence Curcio, Hakop
Demirchyan, Robert Desatnik, Joel Green, John Lingsweiler, Charles
Olsen, Steve Ridges, Glynda Roberson, Adeel Siddiqui, Edo Tsoar,
Peter Weinstein and Eric Wonderly; and

   -- Optional cross appeal Reply brief for BMW of North America,
LLC is due within 21 days of service of Third brief on cross
appeal.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants BARRY BRAVERMAN, HAKOP DEMIRCHYAN, JOEL
GREEN, GLYNDA ROBERSON, Dr., EDO TSOAR, PETER WEINSTEIN, LAWRENCE
CURCIO, ADEEL SIDDIQUI, CHARLES OLSEN, ROBERT DESATNIK, ERIC
WONDERLY, JOHN LINGSWEILER, STEVE RIDGES, and BRANDON COSINTENO, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, are
represented by:

          Steve Berman, Esq.
          Sean Matt, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          1301 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          E-mail: steve@hbsslaw.com
                  sean@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Kevin Kamuf Green, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          533 F Street, Suite 207
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 929-3340
          E-mail: keving@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Benjamin F. Johns, Esq.
          CHIMICLES & TIKELLIS LLP
          361 W. Lancaster Avenue
          Haverford, PA 19041
          Telephone: (610) 642-8500
          E-mail: bfj@chimicles.com

               - and -

          Barbara Mahoney, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN
          1918 Eighth Avenue
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-7292
          E-mail: barbaram@hbsslaw.com

               - and -

          Hovanes Margarian, Esq.
          THE MARGARIAN LAW FIRM
          801 N. Brand Boulevard, Suite 210
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 553-1000
          E-mail: hovanes@margarianlaw.com  

               - and -

          Christopher R. Pitoun, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          301 North Lake Avenue, Suite 920
          Pasadena, CA 91101
          Telephone: (213) 330-7150
          E-mail: christopherp@hbsslaw.com  

Defendant-Appellee BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company, is represented by:

          Eric Y. Kizirian, Esq.
          LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP
          633 W. 5th Street, Suite 4000
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 580-3981
          E-mail: eric.kizirian@lewisbrisbois.com

CENTRAL PRODUCTS: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Central Products,
LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Central Products, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-04063-AJN (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Central Products, LLC -- https://www.centralrestaurant.com/ -- was
founded in 2010. The company's line of business includes
distributing commercial equipment, such as cooking and food service
equipment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com



CHEMOCENTRYX INC: Homyx Sues Over False, Misleading Statements
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonnie Homyk, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CHEMOCENTRYX, INC. and THOMAS J. SCHALL, Case No.
3:21-cv-03343 (N.D. Cal., May 5, 2021), is brought on behalf of all
investors who purchased or otherwise acquired ChemoCentryx, Inc.
common stock between November 26, 2019 and May 3, 2021, inclusive,
seeking to recover damages caused by the Defendants' violations of
the federal securities laws and to pursue remedies under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder by the SEC, with regard to the Defendants' wrongful acts
and omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of
the Company's securities.

According to the complaint, after the market closed on November 25,
2019, ChemoCentryx announced "Positive Topline Data from Pivotal
Phase III ADVOCATE Trial Demonstrating Avacopan's Superiority Over
Standard of Care in ANCA Associated Vasculitis." In this
announcement, ChemoCentryx stated that the ADVOCATE Phase III Trial
"met both of its primary endpoints," and that "the topline safety
results revealed an acceptable safety profile in this serious and
life-threatening disease." On this news, ChemoCentryx shares soared
from their November 25, 2019 close of $8.06 per share to a November
26, 2019 opening price of $34.82 – more than quadrupling the
share price.

Over the next several months, as alleged in the complaint, the
Defendants continued to repeatedly laud the results of the ADVOCATE
Phase III trial, as well as the safety profile of avacopan for the
treatment of ANCA-associated vasculitis. On July 9, 2020,
ChemoCentryx announced that it had filed its New Drug Application
("NDA") for avacopan, and on September 17, 2020, the Company
announced that the FDA had accepted the NDA for review. During the
Class Period, ChemoCentryx shares traded to over $70.00 each. On
this news, the price of ChemoCentryx common stock plummeted over
45% in one day, down from its May 3, 2021 closing price of $48.82
to a May 4, 2021 close of $26.63 per share, on unusually high
trading volume. Shares traded intraday as low as $17.79 each. This
represents a one-day loss of approximately $1.5 billion in market
capitalization.

Throughout the Class Period and in violation of the Exchange Act,
the Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements,
as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts to investors.
Specifically, the Defendants misrepresented and/or failed to
disclose to investors that: (1) the study design of the Phase III
ADVOCATE trial presented issues about the interpretability of the
trial data to define a clinically meaningful benefit of avacopan
and its role in the management of ANCA-associated vasculitis; (2)
the data from the Phase III ADVOCATE trial raised serious safety
concerns for avacopan; (3) these issues presented a substantial
concern regarding the viability of ChemoCentryx's NDA for avacopan
for the treatment of ANCA-associated vasculitis; and (4) as a
result of the foregoing, the Defendants' public statements were
materially false and misleading at all relevant times, says the
complaint.

The Plaintiff acquired shares of ChemoCentryx common stock at
artificially inflated prices.

ChemoCentryx is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the
development and commercialization of new medications targeting
inflammatory disorders, autoimmune diseases, and cancer.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Whitney E. Street, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          100 Pine Street, Suite 1250
          San Francisco, CA 94111
          Phone: (415) 968-1852 phone
          Fax: (617) 507-6020 fax
          Email: whitney@blockleviton.com

               - and -

          Jacob A. Walker, Esq.
          BLOCK & LEVITON LLP
          260 Franklin Street, Suite 1860
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: (617) 398-5600 phone
          Fax: (617) 507-6020 fax
          Email: jake@blockleviton.com

CIGNA HEALTH: Extension of Class Cert. Related Deadlines Sought
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ANAFSHEH AKHLAGHI, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v. CIGNA
HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 4:19-cv-03754-JST (N.D.
Calif.), the Plaintiff Akhlaghi and Defendant Cigna Health
stipulate and jointly request that the Court enter an order
modifying the February 12, 2021 Case Management Order to extend all
class certification and related discovery deadlines by
approximately 120 days to allow sufficient time for the parties to
attempt to negotiate a resolution of this matter.

The Plaintiff alleges that Cigna wrongly denies requests for
specialized liposuction to treat lipedema as experimental,
investigational or unproven. The Plaintiff filed this class action
against Cigna on June 27, 2019.

A copy of parties'motion dated April 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3tsRyLl at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert S. Gianelli, Esq.
          Joshua S. Davis, Esq.
          Adrian J. Barrio, Esq.
          GIANELLI & MORRIS
          550 South Hope Street, Suite 1645
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Telephone: (213) 489-1600
          Facsimile: (213) 489-1611
          E-mail: rob.gianelli@gmlawyers.com
                  joshua.davis@gmlawyers.com
                  adrian.barrio@gmlawyers.com

               - and -

          Mazda K. Antia, Esq.
          Jeanne L. Detch, Esq.
          Matthew D. Caplan, Esq.
          COOLEY LLP
          4401 Eastgate Mall
          San Diego, CA 92121
          Telephone: (858) 550-6000
          Facsimile: (858) 550-6420
          E-mail: mantia@cooley.com
                  jdetch@cooley.com
                  mcaplan@cooley.com

CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Milkboy Appeals Insurance Case Dismissal
--------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Milkboy Center City LLC filed an appeal from a court
ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled Milkboy Center City LLC,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. The
Cincinnati Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 2-20-cv-02036, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

The lawsuit alleges that the Defendant wrongfully denied coverage
for the business losses suffered by Plaintiff, a music venue, bar,
and restaurant, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Plaintiff is seeking a review of the Court's Memorandum and
Order dated March 30, 2021, granting Defendants' motion to dismiss
the case with prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Milkboy Center City LLC v.
Cincinnati Insurance Co, et al., Case No. 21-1856, in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on April 30,
2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MILKBOY CENTER CITY LLC, Individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Daniel E. Bacine, Esq.
          Jeffrey A. Barrack, Esq.
          Mark R. Rosen, Esq.
          Meghan J. Talbot, Esq.
          BARRACK RODOS & BACINE
          2001 Market Street, 38th Floor
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 963-0600
          E-mail: dbacine@barrack.com
                  jbarrack@barrack.com
                  mrosen@barrack.com
                  mtalbot@barrack.com

               - and -

          Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          600 West Broadway, Suite 1700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0800  

Defendant-Appellee CINCINNATI INSURANCE CO., CINCINNATI CASUALTY
CO., CINCINNATI INDEMNITY CO., and CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP. are
represented by:

          Lawrence M. Silverman, Esq.
          LITCHFIELD CAVO
          1515 Market Street, Suite 1220
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 557-0111
          E-mail: silverman@litchfieldcavo.com

               - and -

          Daniel G. Litchfield, Esq.
          LITCHFIELD CAVO
          303 West Madison Street, Suite 300
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 781-6669
          E-mail: litchfield@litchfieldcavo.com

CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Stone Soup Appeals Insurance Case Dismissal
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Stone Soup Inc. filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit entitled Stone Soup, Inc., individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. The Cincinnati
Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 2-20-cv-02614, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

The lawsuit alleges that the Defendant wrongfully denied coverage
for the business losses suffered by Plaintiff, a music venue, bar,
and restaurant, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Plaintiff is seeking a review of the Court's Memorandum and
Order dated March 30, 2021, granting Defendants' motion to dismiss
the case with prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Stone Soup Inc. v. Cincinnati
Insurance Co., et al., Case No. 21-1857, in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on April 30, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant STONE SOUP INC., Individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Daniel E. Bacine, Esq.
          Jeffrey A. Barrack, Esq.
          Mark R. Rosen, Esq.
          Meghan J. Talbot, Esq.
          BARRACK RODOS & BACINE
          2001 Market Street, 38th Floor
          3300 Two Commerce Square
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 963-0600
          E-mail: dbacine@barrack.com
                  jbarrack@barrack.com
                  mrosen@barrack.com
                  mtalbot@barrack.com

               - and -

          Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          600 West Broadway, Suite 1700
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0800  

Defendant-Appellee CINCINNATI INSURANCE CO., CINCINNATI CASUALTY
CO., CINCINNATI INDEMNITY CO., and CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP. are
represented by:

          Lawrence M. Silverman, Esq.
          LITCHFIELD CAVO
          1515 Market Street, Suite 1220
          Philadelphia, PA 19102
          Telephone: (215) 557-0111
          E-mail: silverman@litchfieldcavo.com

               - and -

          Daniel G. Litchfield, Esq.
          LITCHFIELD CAVO
          303 West Madison Street, Suite 300
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Telephone: (312) 781-6669
          E-mail: litchfield@litchfieldcavo.com

CROWN LABORATORIES: Somers Sues Over False & Deceptive Advertising
------------------------------------------------------------------
Stacie Somers, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. CROWN LABORATORIES, a Tennessee company, Case No.
3:21-cv-00868-BAS-DEB (S.D. Cal., May 5, 2021), is brought on
behalf of consumers who purchased "mineral-based" Products to halt
the dissemination of false, misleading, and deceptive advertising
message, correct the false and misleading perception it has created
in the minds of consumers, and obtain redress for those who have
purchased the Products. Based on violations of California's
consumer fraud laws, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and restitutionary
relief for consumers who purchased the Products.

The complaint alleges that to obtain an unfair competitive
advantage in the billion-dollar sunscreen market and recognizing
consumers' desire for healthy and safe products without harmful
chemicals, especially as it relates to products for their children,
the Defendant markets the Products as "mineral-based" even though
they contain less desirable, harmful, chemical-based active
ingredients. The purported "mineral-based" products at issue
include Kids Mineral- Based Sunscreen SPF 30+ (5 oz Bottle); Kids
Mineral-Based Sunscreen SPF 30+ (8.75 oz Bottle); Kids
Mineral-Based Sunscreen SPF 50+ (5 oz Tube); Kids Mineral-Based
Sunscreen SPF 50+ (8.75 oz Bottle); Face Mineral-Based Sunscreen
SPF 30+ (3 oz Tube); Active Mineral-Based Sunscreen SPF 50+ (5 oz
Tube); Active Mineral-Based Sunscreen SPF 50+ (8.75 oz Bottle);
Sport Mineral-Based Sunscreen SPF 50+ (5 oz Bottle); and Sport
Mineral-Based Sunscreen SPF 50+ (8.75 oz Bottle).

Contrary to the "mineral-based" representations on the front of
each and every Product label, each of the Products contains
chemical active ingredients: either Octisalate 5% or Octinoxate
5.5%. Octisalate is an organic compound formed by the condensation
of salicylic acid with 2-ethylhexanol that is a weak UVB filter and
must be used with other UV filters to provide adequate sun
protection. Octinoxate is an organic compound formed from
methoxycinnamic acid and 2-ethylhexanol that also filters out UVB
rays and some studies have shown it gets absorbed into the
bloodstream and can cause reproductive problems in animals that
have been tested.

Reasonable consumers, including the Plaintiff, interpret
"mineral-based" representations to mean that a product is free of
chemical active ingredients, much in the same way that reasonable
consumers understand that a product labeled "plant based" does not
contain meat. Thus, a mineral-based sunscreen should be just what
it sounds like--a sunscreen that uses minerals as its active
ingredients. The Products, however, also contain chemical active
ingredients. Thus, the Defendant's mineral-based representations
are false, misleading, and reasonably likely to deceive consumers.
As a result, consumers – including the Plaintiff and putative
Class members – have been injured by their purchases of the
Products, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a citizen of San Diego, California who purchased
the Product on Amazon.com in reliance on the Defendant's
"mineral-based" representations.

The Defendant manufactures, markets, sells, and distributes
sunscreen products under its Blue Lizard brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Patricia N. Syverson, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          600 W. Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (602) 274-1100
          Email: psyverson@bffb.com

               - and -

          Elaine A. Ryan, Esq.
          Carrie A. Laliberte, Esq.
          BONNETT, FAIRBOURN, FRIEDMAN & BALINT, P.C.
          2325 E. Camelback Rd. Suite 300
          Phoenix, AZ 85016
          Phone: (602) 274-1100
          Email: eryan@bffb.com
                 claliberte@bffb.com


EN-R-G FOODS: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against EN-R-G Foods, LLC.
The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. EN-R-G Foods, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-04041 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

En-R-G Foods, LLC doing business as Honey Stinger --
http://www.honeystinger.com/-- is located in Steamboat Springs,
Colorado and is part of the Fruit & Vegetable Processing
Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


FORMCRETE LLC: Gonzalez Seeks to Recover Unpaid Overtime Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
ANA M. GONZALEZ and other similarly situated individuals, v.
FORMCRETE, LLC, and ROMAN PILOTO, individually, Case No.
1:21-cv-21390-XXXX (S.D. Fla., April 12, 2021) seeks to recover
unpaid half-time overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs,
and reasonable attorney's fees under the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all other
current and former employees similarly situated and who worked more
than 40 hours during one or more weeks on or after September 2018,
without being adequately compensated.

Defendants FORMCRETE and ROMAN PILOTO employed Plaintiff ANA M.
GONZALEZ as a non-exempted, full-time labor construction laborer
from approximately September 18, 2018, to April 01, 2021, or 132
weeks.  However, for FLSA purposes, Plaintiff's relevant employment
period is 117 weeks.  Plaintiff did not work overtime hours after
February 26, 2021 (5 weeks), and she did not work with Defendants
from November 22, 2019, to January 31, 2020 (10 weeks).

FORMCRETE is a construction company specializing in non-residential
building construction.  The Company is based in Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com


FORTY EIGHT: Waloven Files Suit in N.Y. Sup. Court
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FORTY EIGHT LOUNGE
LLC. The case is styled as Michelle Waloven, Suchuntra Kawpunna,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
FORTY EIGHT LOUNGE LLC, Case No. 603608/2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau
Cty., May 5, 2021).

The case type is stated as "CONTRACT."

New York City's 48 Lounge -- https://48nyc.com/ -- is an Award
Winning cocktail lounge and NYC event venue in Midtown
Manhattan.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          LEEDS BROWN LAW, P.C.
          One Old Country Road, Ste. 347
          Carle Place, NY 11514
          Phone: (516) 873-9550

The Defendant is represented by:

          FARBER SCHNEIDER FERRARI LLP
          261 Madison Ave., 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 557-7200


GARDAWORLD CASHLINK: Kalb's Bid to Sever & Partially Remand Denied
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRIS KALB, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GARDAWORLD CASHLINK LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:21-cv-01092 (C.D. Ill.), Senior District
Judge Joe Billy McDade of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of Illinois, Peoria Division, denied the Plaintiff's
motion to sever and partially remand.

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action alleging violations
of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), 740 ILCS
14/1, et seq., in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in McLean
County, Illinois.  The Defendant timely removed the case to the
Court on March 16, 2021.  The Complaint raises claims under
sections 15(a) and (b) of BIPA.  Section 15(b) requires informed
consent to "collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or
otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifier or
biometric information."

Presently before the Court is the unusual circumstance in which the
Defendant bears the burden of proving standing lies while the
Plaintiff argues he lacks standing to raise his claim under section
15(a), which he maintains must be severed and remanded.

Every case proceeding in federal court must satisfy the familiar
elements of standing; "the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by
a favorable judicial decision," citing Fox, 980 F.3d at 1151
(quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547).  The
instant Motion challenges the injury-in-fact element, and a
smattering of recent BIPA cases speak to this question: Bryant v.
Compass Group. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020), as amended
on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (June 30, 2020), Miller v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019), Patel v.
Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140
S.Ct. 937 (2020), and Fox, 980 F.3d 1146.

Miller involved "unionized airline employees who were required to
clock in and out of work by scanning their fingerprints."  The
employees alleged that the airlines violated sections 15(a) and (b)
of BIPA by failing to obtain informed consent before collecting and
using their fingerprints in the biometric timekeeping systems, and
by failing to maintain and publish data-retention protocols.  The
Seventh Circuit concluded the plaintiffs had demonstrated an injury
in fact "sufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing
because the collection and use of biometrics for timekeeping is a
subject of collective bargaining between unions and management."

In Patel, the plaintiffs "sued Facebook for violations of sections
15(a) and (b) of BIPA stemming from its 'Tag Suggestions' feature,
which uses facial-recognition technology to identify whether a
user's Facebook friends are depicted in an uploaded photo."  The
plaintiffs argued Facebook failed "to maintain and publicly
disclose a data-retention schedule and data-destruction guidelines"
and "to obtain written informed consent before collecting and using
biometrics."

The Plaintiff's Motion is premised on Bryant.  Bryant involved a
vending machine that did not accept cash; instead, customers had to
create and maintain an electronic payment account, which was
accessed at the vending machine via a fingerprint scanner.  The
plaintiff, a customer of the vending machine, filed a putative
class action alleging the owner and operator of the vending machine
committed two BIPA violations: "it 'never made publicly available'
a data-retention schedule and data-destruction guidelines,
violating section 15(a), and it never obtained her informed consent
in writing, violating section 15(b)."

Similar to the Ninth Circuit in Patel, the Seventh Circuit likened
some BIPA claims to tortious invasion of privacy.  It thus
concluded the plaintiff's claim under section 15(b) involved a
concrete, particularized injury in fact because the plaintiff
asserted "a violation of her own rights -- her fingerprints, her
private information, which was an invasion of her private domain,
much like an act of trespass would be."  The defendant's "failure
to comply with the informed-consent requirements of section 15(b)
deprived the plaintiff of her right to make informed choices about
the use of and control over her inherently sensitive biometric
data."

However, the Seventh Circuit reached a different conclusion with
respect to her section 15(a) claim, which merely alleged the
defendant failed to "make data-retention and data-destruction
policies publicly available."  Because the plaintiff "alleged no
particularized harm that resulted from the defendant's violation of
section 15(a)," she lacked standing to assert the section 15(a)
claim.  However, the plaintiff's claim in Bryant "was extremely
narrow, alleging only a violation of the section 15(a) duty to
publicly disclose data retention and destruction protocols."  The
Seventh Circuit emphasized that its "analysis was limited to the
theory the plaintiff invoked and did not address other provisions
in section 15(a)."

Judge McDade opines that at first blush, Bryant appears to suggest
the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claim under section
15(a).  However, on closer inspection, the Plaintiff's section
15(a) claim is less like that alleged in Bryant and more like those
alleged in Fox and Miller.  The Fox court concluded the plaintiff
had standing to assert the section 15(a) claim there because "an
unlawful retention of a person's biometric data is as concrete and
particularized an injury as an unlawful collection of a person's
biometric data."  The same reasoning applies in Kalb's case.
Furthermore, the Miller court emphasized the role of union
negotiations in this context.  The plaintiffs in Miller alleged an
injury that was sufficiently concrete to confer Article III
standing because the collection and use of biometrics for
timekeeping is a subject of collective bargaining between unions
and management.

For these reasons, Judge McDade finds the Complaint sufficiently
establishes an injury in fact and Article III standing therefore
lies.  Therefore, he denied the Plaintiff's Motion to sever and
partially remand.  The Plaintiff will respond to the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay within 21 days.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order & Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/da2v8vyk from Leagle.com.


GDC TECHNICS: Stringham Files Suit in W.D. Texas
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against GDC Technics, LLC.
The case is styled as Kingslea Stringham, on behalf of herself and
all other similarly situated v. GDC Technics, LLC, Case No.
21-05035-cag (W.D. Tex., May 5, 2021)

The nature of suit is stated as Recovery of Money/Other Property.

GDC Technics -- https://www.gdctechnics.com/ -- is dedicated to DOD
and Government aviation in providing mission-critical
communication, engineering, and integration services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff P. Prostok, Esq.
          FORSHEY & PROSTOK, LLP
          777 Main St., Ste. 1550
          Ft. Worth, TX 76102
          Phone: (817) 877-8855
          Email: jprostok@forsheyprostok.com

The Defendant appears pro se.


GEICO GENERAL: W.D. Washington Certifies Class in Nichols Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MERLE NICHOLS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a
foreign automobile insurance company, Defendant, Case No.
2:18-cv-01253-RAJ (W.D. Wash.), Judge Richard A. Jones of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle,
issued an order:

     a. denying the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment;

     b. denying the Defendant's Motion to Deny Class
        Certification;

     c. granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class; and

     d. adopting the Second Joint Statement Regarding Filing
        Documents Under Seal and the Third Joint Statement
        Regarding Filing Documents Under Seal.

On Jan. 15, 2015, Plaintiff Nichols was injured in an automobile
accident. He then sought personal injury protection ("PIP")
coverage from Defendant GEICO, which insured the vehicle that
injured him.  GEICO initially paid some benefits.

Later, GEICO asked Mr. Nichols to undergo an independent medical
examination ("IME") conducted by a GEICO-hired chiropractor.  The
goal of the IME was "to determine the medical necessity and
relatedness of the treatment to the accident." Mr. Nichols attended
the IME, and the chiropractor issued his report.  Soon after, on
Aug. 21, 2015, GEICO sent Mr. Nichols a letter terminating his
coverage.

In response, Mr. Nichols' counsel informed GEICO that maximum
medical improvement could not "be the basis of discontinuation of
PIP benefits" under WAC 284-30-395.

Based on his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Nichols alleges that
GEICO violated WAC 284-30-395.  According to Mr. Nichols, under
that regulation, PIP benefits may be terminated only "if treatment
is not (1) reasonable, (2) necessary, (3) related to the accident,
or (4) incurred within three years of the accident."  GEICO
violated the regulation, he says, when it terminated his PIP
benefits on the basis that he had achieved "maximum medical
improvement," a basis not permitted by the regulation.

Because Mr. Nichols alleges that GEICO had a "systematic practice"
of doing this to other insureds beyond Mr. Nichols, he is hoping to
bring the suit on behalf of a class.  He asserts claims for
declaratory relief, violation of the Insurance Fairness Conduct
Act, violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act, common law
bad faith, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

Since bringing the action, Mr. Nichols has moved for class
certification.  He has defined the class as: All insured, as
defined within GEICO's Automobile Policy, and all third-party
beneficiaries of such coverage, under any GEICO insurance policy
effective in the state of Washington between July 24, 2012 and the
present, for whom GEICO limited or terminated benefits, or denied
coverage based, even in part, upon its determination that its
insured or beneficiary had reached maximum medical improvement or
that such benefits were not essential in achieving maximum medical
improvement for bodily injury.

GEICO moved to deny class certification.  It has also moved for
summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel bars Mr.
Nichols' claims.

I. Discussion

A. Joint Statements Regarding Filing Documents Under Seal

Explained in a previous order, Judge Jones requires the parties to
submit their sealing requests in the form of a joint statement.
The parties already submitted one such joint statement, the "First
Joint Statement," for sealed documents related to their class
certification motions.  The Judge adopted the joint statement.  He
explained that the parties met the applicable sealing standard for
three categories of documents: "documents containing GEICO's
confidential trade secrets or proprietary competitive information;
confidential medical information of GEICO insureds or claimants who
are not parties to this lawsuit; and briefs or declarations
containing confidential information."  At the time, class
certification briefing was not complete.

Since then, the parties have fully briefed their class
certification motions.  Per the Court's instruction, the parties
have submitted their new sealing requests through two more joint
statements, the "Second Joint Statement" and "Third Joint
Statement" respectively.  The Second Joint Statement relates to
GEICO's opposition to Mr. Nichols's class certification motion.
The Third Joint Statement relates to Mr. Nichols' reply in support
of the class certification motion.

Like last time, Judge Jones agrees with GEICO.  Information of
GEICO insureds or claimants who are not parties to this lawsuit may
remain sealed.  The Judge has reviewed the Second and Third Joint
Statements and sealed documents attached thereto.  He orders that
all newly sealed documents have met the applicable sealing
standards and may remain under seal.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

GEICO argues that collateral estoppel forecloses any relief.
Before bringing the action, Mr. Nichols sued Thomas Sullivan, the
GEICO-insured driver of the vehicle that injured him, in King
County Superior Court.  In that case, Nichols v. Sullivan, Mr.
Nichols alleged that he was riding his bicycle when Mr. Sullivan
collided into him with his car.  Mr. Nichols sued Mr. Sullivan for
negligence.  The case went to trial, and, more than four years
after the accident, a jury determined that although Mr. Sullivan
was indeed negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause Mr.
Nichols's injury.  According to GEICO, the verdict in Sullivan
entitles it to summary judgment.

Judge Jones holds that it is undisputed that Mr. Nichols was a
pedestrian accidentally struck by a GEICO-insured automobile and
that GEICO paid for medical benefits under Mr. Sullivan's PIP
coverage accordingly.  Once GEICO undertook that coverage, certain
statutory and common law obligations began to accrue.  A jury
verdict (entered more than four years after the accident) finding
that Mr. Sullivan was not in fact the proximate or legal cause of
Mr. Nichols' injury did not retroactively nullify those
obligations.  Thus, GEICO vastly overstates the import of Sullivan.
Because the issues in the two cases are not identical, collateral
estoppel does not apply, and GEICO's motion for summary judgment is
denied.

C. Motion for Class Certification & Motion to Deny Class
Certification

Judge Jones begins with Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy.  He then turns to Rule 23(b):
predominance and superiority.  He finds that (i)  the numerosity
requirement is met and GEICO does not argue otherwise; (ii) the
commonality element has been satisfied because common questions
indeed exist; (iii) the typicality requirement is met; (iv) there
are no conflicts of interest and that Mr. Nichols and his able
counsel will vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the
class; (v) common questions predominate over individual ones; and
(vi) given the overlapping legal and factual issues and the fact
that no other action has already begun, a class action would be
more efficient than alternative mechanisms.

II. Disposition

Judge Jones (i) denies the Defendant's motions for summary judgment
and to deny class certification, (ii) grants the Plaintiff's motion
to certify class, and (iii) adopts the parties' joint statements.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ayz2vkwb from Leagle.com.


GEMS911 INC: Faces Boatright Suit Over Unpaid Overtime
------------------------------------------------------
MARK BOATRIGHT, ZACH POINDEXTER, and others similarly situated, v.
GILLEY GREY, GEMS911, INC., and CHUCK PEOPLES, Case No.
3:21-cv-00835-N (N.D. Tex., April 12, 2021) is a class action
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act seeking to recover
unpaid overtime wages of the hourly-paid EMT/paramedics employed by
Defendants, as well as an equal amount of liquidated/double
damages, attorney fees, interest, and costs.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs worked for Defendants as
hourly-paid EMT/paramedics based in Midlothian, Texas, and
regularly worked more than 40 hours per workweek. The Defendants
did not pay them an overtime premium of at least one and one-half
times their regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 in a
workweek.

The suit further states that the Defendants' efforts to evade
wage-and-hour (and tax-related) obligations are so pervasive that
Defendants operate under the business name "GEMS," "GEMS 911,"
and/or "GEMS911, Inc.", but there is no such entity registered with
the State of Texas Secretary of State to do business in the State
of Texas.  Defendants further refuse to issue the EMT/paramedics an
IRS Form W-2 or IRS Form 1099 with a federal tax identification
number, asserts the complaint.

Defendant GEMS911, Inc. is a foreign for-profit corporation
registered in the state of Montana.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Barry S. Hersh, Esq.
          Hersh Law Firm, PC
          3626 N. Hall St., Suite 800
          Dallas, TX 75219-5133
          Telephone: (214) 303-1022
          Facsimile: (214) 550-8170
          E-mail: barry@hersh-law.com


GOOGLE LLC: Delahunty Sues Over Unauthorized Disclosure of Info
---------------------------------------------------------------
Meaghan Delahunty, Meghan Cornelius, John Kevranian, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated v. GOOGLE, LLC, Case
No. 5:21-cv-03360 (N.D. Cal., May 5, 2021), is brought on behalf of
themselves and all Google Customers in the United States who, by
virtue of browsing on the Chrome browser, was subject to violations
of privacy, and other violations of statutory, Constitutional and
common law by having their personal information sold or otherwise
disclosed by Google without their authorization.

According to the complaint, Google repeatedly says that it values
privacy and gives users control of their personal information.
Google promises its hundreds of millions of users that it "will
never sell any personal information to third parties" and "you get
to decide how your information is used." These promises are false.
In fact, Google monitors its consumers' digital footprint, then
makes billions of dollars by selling their sensitive personal
information. While Google lulls its users into a false sense of
privacy, it continually and surreptitiously broadcasts its users'
sensitive personal information to third parties through its
Real-Time Bidding ("RTB") system.

Google's RTB process is largely unseen and unknown to Google
Customers. Google does not disclose to its Google Customers its
creation and use of massive data sets to profile them in these
auctions, and it does not have Google Customers' consent for such
activity. The scale and success of Google's RTB auction process is
based on the fact that it is invisible to the millions of Google
Customers whose personal and sensitive information is bought and
sold every second of every day. But for Google's deceptive
practices concerning its collection and use of its customers'
personal information, users would have turned to other
less-invasive options for browsing the Internet, Google's customer
base would have decreased, and fewer bidders would have
participated in Google's RTB auctions, which in turn would have
decreased the massive profits Google derives from its hidden RTB
auctions. Google's blatant misdirection about user privacy is
astonishing, but is part of Google's general culture of disregard
for users' privacy, and is consistent with Google's unscrupulous
business practices, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs are Google Customers who uses the Internet,
including websites from which Google sold and shared Google
Customer information without authorization.

Google is a limited liability company headquartered in Mountain
View, California.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Nanci E. Nishimura, Esq.
          Brian Danitz, Esq.
          Karin B. Swope, Esq.
          Noorjahan Rahman, Esq.
          Bethany M. Hill
          COTCHETT, PITRE & MCCARTHY, LLP
          840 Malcolm Road
          Burlingame, CA 94010
          Phone: (650) 697-6000
          Facsimile: (650) 697-0577
          Email: nnishimura@cpmlegal.com
                 bdanitz@cpmlegal.com
                 kswope@cpmlegal.com
                 nrahman@cpmlegal.com
                 bhill@cpmlegal.com

               - and -

          Maisie C. Sokolove, Esq.
          Thomas E. Fraysee, Esq.
          Itak K. Moradi, Esq.
          KNOX RICKSEN LLP
          2033 N. Main St., Suite 340
          Walnut Creek, CA 94596
          Phone: (925) 433-2500
          Facsimile: (925) 433-2505
          Email: mcs@knoxricksen.com
                 tef@knoxricksen.com
                 ikm@knoxricksen.com


HARTFORD FINANCIAL: Ralph Kuhen Suit Transferred to C.D. California
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Ralph Kuhen, CPA doing business as: R. Kuhen &
Co Inc., on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated v.
The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., Sentinel Insurance
Company Ltd., Case No. 3:20-cv-01669 was transferred from the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, to the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California on April 23,
2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 8:21-cv-00773-JLS-ADS to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance for Insurance Contract.

The Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc., usually known as The
Hartford -- https://www.thehartford.com/ -- is a United
States-based investment and insurance company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Todd D. Carpenter, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH LLP
          1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Phone: (619) 762-1910
          Fax: (619) 756-6991
          Email: tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Anthony J. Anscombe, Esq.
          STEPTOE AND JOHNSON LLP
          115 South LaSalle Street Suite 3100
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: (312) 577-1265
          Email: aanscombe@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Melanie Atswei Ayerh, Esq.
          STEPTOE AND JOHNSON LLP
          633 West Fifth Street Suite 1900
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (480) 766-8827
          Email: mayerh@steptoe.com

               - and -

          Sarah D. Gordon, Esq.
          STEPTOE AND JOHNSON LLP
          1330 Connecticut Avenue NW
          Washington, DC 20036
          Phone: (202) 429-8005
          Fax: (202) 429-3902
          Email: sgordon@steptoe.com


HENRY FORD: Faces Hundley Suit Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duties
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ruth Hundley, Carol Bujak, Lita Brooks and Carol Rembor,
individually and on behalf of participants and beneficiaries of the
Henry Ford Health System Retirement Savings Plan (the "401(a)
Plan"), and the Henry Ford Health System Heritage 403(b) Plan v.
HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HENRY FORD
HEALTH SYSTEM, INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, and JOHN DOES 1-40, Case No.
2:21-cv-11023-SFC-EAS (E.D. Mich., May 5, 2021), is brought
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
against the Plans' fiduciaries, which include Henry Ford Health
System, ("HFHS"), the Board of Directors of HFHS and its members
during the Class Period, and the Committee and its members during
the Class Period for breaches of their fiduciary duties.

The complaint alleges that during the proposed Class Period of (May
5, 2015 to the present) the Defendants, as "fiduciaries" of the
Plans, breached the duties they owed to the Plans, the Plaintiffs,
and the Plans' other participants by, inter alia: (1) failing to
objectively and adequately review the Plans' investment portfolio
with due care to ensure that each investment option was prudent, in
terms of cost and performance; (2) maintaining certain funds in the
Plans that were managed by companies affiliated with the Plans'
recordkeepers and with expense structures that benefitted the
recordkeepers, despite the availability of identical or similar
investment options with lower costs and equivalent and/or better
performance histories; and (3) in the case of the 403(b) Plan,
retaining multiple recordkeepers that, in combination, offer
roughly 250 investment options, including numerous funds that
employ the same investment strategy and/or style, which has created
a confusing, unmanageable and unreasonably expensive array of
investment options and caused the 403(b) Plan to pay unreasonable
and excessive fees for recordkeeping and other administrative
services.

The Defendants' mismanagement of the Plans, to the detriment of
participants and beneficiaries, constitutes a breach of the
fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty, in violation of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104. Their actions (and omissions) were contrary to actions of
a reasonable fiduciary and cost the Plans and their participants
millions of dollars. Based on this conduct, the Plaintiffs assert
claims against the Defendants for breach of the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and prudence (Count One) and failure to monitor
fiduciaries, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs have participated in both of the Plans.

HFHS, which maintains its principal place of business at One Ford
Place, 4E, Detroit, Michigan, 48202-3450, is the sponsor of each of
the Plans and a fiduciary of each of the Plans within the meaning
of ERISA.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David H. Fink, Esq.
          Nathan J. Fink, Esq.
          FINK BRESSACK
          38500 Woodward Ave., Suite 350
          Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
          Phone: (248) 971-2500
          Email: dfink@finkbressack.com
                 nfink@finkbressack.com

               - and -

          Eric Lechtzin, Esq.
          Marc H. Edelson, Esq.
          EDELSON LECHTZIN LLP
          3 Terry Drive, Suite 205
          Newtown, PA 18940
          Phone: (215) 867-2399
          Email: elechtzin@edelson-law.com
                 medelson@edelson-law.com

               - and -

          John J. Nestico, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
          6000 Fairview Road, Suite 1200
          Scottsdale, AZ 85253
          Phone: (704) 840-5263
          Email: jnestico@schneiderwallace.com

               - and -

          Todd M. Schneider, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Phone: (415) 421-7100
          Email: tschneider@schneiderwallace.com


HOLLYWOOD FEED: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Hollywood Feed, LLC.
The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Hollywood Feed, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-04036 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hollywood Feed -- https://www.hollywoodfeed.com/ -- delivers dog
and cat food, treats, toys and supplies to customers in their
eligible areas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


HYKSO INC: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HYKSO Inc. The case
is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. HYKSO Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04035 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 5, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Hykso -- https://shop.hykso.com/ -- is the first sport tracker
designed specifically for boxing.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


INDIGO SLEEP: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Indigo Sleep, LLC.
The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Indigo Sleep, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-04037 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021)

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Indigo Sleep -- https://indigosleep.com/ -- is a small independent
mattress company with one goal: to get consumers the best night
sleep possible at an unbeatable price.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


INDY TRANSPORT: Class of Dump Truck Drivers Certified in Horta Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MATTHEW E. HORTA individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. INDY TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:20-cv-02659-SEB-MJD (S.D. Ind.), Judge Sarah Evans
Barker of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division, grants the Parties' Joint Motion
for Conditional Certification of a FLSA Collective Action and
Approval of Proposed Collective Action Notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
Section 216(b), filed on Jan. 12, 2021.

Plaintiff Horta is a former dump truck driver for Defendant Indy
Transport.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has a policy
and practice of systematically underpaying regular and overtime
wages to himself and similarly situated truck drivers in violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 201, et
seq.  He also asserts a state law claim under the Indiana Wage
Claims Statute, Ind. Code Section 22-2-904(b).

Defendant Indy Transport is a dump truck business operating in and
around Indianapolis, Indiana.  The Plaintiff was hired by Indy
Transport as a dump truck driver on April 9, 2020 and was
involuntarily terminated on Sept. 14, 2020.  While employed, Mr.
Horta's and other drivers' primary job responsibility was driving
dump trucks within the State of Indiana.  He was paid wages on an
hourly basis and treated as a non-exempt employee under the FLSA.

Mr. Horta alleges that Indy Transport requires its drivers to
inspect dump trucks before the beginning of their scheduled shifts
and to inspect and clean trucks after the end of their scheduled
shifts.  Indy Transport allegedly does not compensate its drivers
for any time spent on these principal work activities, even though
employees report their actual start and end times each day,
resulting in underpayment of roughly one hour each day.  It
allegedly "has been substantially underpaying wages to drivers by
failing to pay on a continuous workday basis."

In addition, Mr. Horta alleges that Indy Transport tracks work
hours called "Non-Prod Time" but only pays "a very small amount of
money without stating the number of hours worked in the category of
'Non-Prod Time'" and does not include them in the determination of
the number of hours drivers work in a week.  Mr. Horta alleges two
harms arising from this practice: (1) workers are not paid for all
earned wages when "Non-Prod Time" is excluded from wage
calculations, and (2) workers who actually work more than forty
hours each week are not paid at the overtime rate required by the
FLSA. Indy Transport allegedly "is and has been underpaying
overtime compensation to its hourly-paid drivers on a systemic,
class-wide basis as a result of an unlawful practice."

Mr. Horta has filed a collective action complaint on behalf of
himself and similarly situated persons employed by Indy Transport
on Oct. 13, 2020, alleging that its policies and practices deprived
them all of compensation for a continuous workday and all earned
wages at regular and overtime rates, in violation of the FLSA.  The
Parties filed a Joint Motion for Conditional Certification of a
FLSA Collective Action and Approval of Proposed Notice of FLSA
Collective Action on Jan. 12, 2021.

Given that Indy Transport has jointly moved with Mr. Horta for the
conditional certification of the collective action, Judge Barker
finds no reason to deny the initial certification.  Accordingly,
she grants conditional certification, noting that final
certification will require more than the "modest factual showing"
required at this early stage.

Judge Barker also finds that the FLSA Collective Action Notice and
Consent to Join forms proffered by the parties set forth all the
information on which the Court typically would rely in granting
approval: It informs eligible collective members of the reason they
are receiving the notice as well as the facts giving rise to this
lawsuit, describes the current procedural posture of the case, and
explains the process by which eligible members may (or may not)
participate in the lawsuit.

Judge Barker, therefore, finds the proposed notice to be
appropriate, accurate, and in furtherance of the goals of FLSA
collective-action notice.  Likewise, she finds the proposed notice
procedures to be appropriate.  Accordingly, she approves the Joint
Motion and authorizes the Plaintiffs to disseminate the notice
documents (attached as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 to the Joint Motion)
as set forth in the Joint Motion.  The Judge notes that in
authorizing notice the Court takes no position on the merits of the
claims.

The Collective described as follows is conditionally certified:
"Present and former hourly dump truck drivers who worked for
Defendant at any time from Oct. 13, 2017 to present."

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2c5w8etf from Leagle.com.


INTELLIGENTSIA COFFEE: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Intelligentsia Coffee
Inc. The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Intelligentsia Coffee Inc.,
Case No. 1:21-cv-04043 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021)

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Intelligentsia Coffee -- https://www.intelligentsia.com/ -- is an
American coffee roasting company and retailer based in Chicago,
Illinois.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


JASCO PLUMBING: Roman Sues Over Failure to Pay Overtime Wages
-------------------------------------------------------------
Derrick Roman, on behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly-situated v. JASCO PLUMBING & HEATING SUPPLY,
INC., and JEFFREY BASS, individually, and MATTHEW BASS,
individually, Case No. 1:21-cv-04030 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021), is
brought for damages and equitable relief based upon violations that
the Defendants committed of the Plaintiff's rights guaranteed to
him by: the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the New York Labor Law; the NYLL's requirement that employers
furnish employees with a wage statement containing specific
categories of accurate information on each payday; the NYLL's
requirement that employers furnish employees with a wage notice
containing specific categories of accurate information at hire; and
any other claim(s) that can be inferred from the facts set forth
herein.

According to the complaint, the Defendants willfully failed to pay
the Plaintiff the overtime wages lawfully due to him under the FLSA
and the NYLL. Specifically, the Defendants required the Plaintiff
to work, and the Plaintiff did in fact work, in excess of forty
hours virtually each week, but the Defendants failed to compensate
the Plaintiff at the rate of one and one-half times his regular
rate of pay for any hours that the Plaintiff worked in excess of
forty in a week.

Instead, the Defendants paid the Plaintiff a flat weekly salary
that the Plaintiff and the Defendants expressly agreed, at the time
of the Plaintiff's hire, was meant to compensate the Plaintiff for
only his first forty hours of work each week, and thus the
Defendants failed to compensate the Plaintiff at any rate of pay,
let alone at the statutorily-required rate of one and one-half
times his regular hourly rate for any hours that the Plaintiff
worked in excess of forty in a week, in violation of the FLSA and
the NYLL. Moreover, the Defendants failed to provide the Plaintiff
with an accurate wage statement on each payday or with an accurate
wage notice at the time of his hire, in violation of the NYLL, says
the complaint.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a salesperson from
March 2016 until March 2020.

The Defendant is a New York corporation that operates a Bronx-based
plumbing and heating supplies business and its day-to-day
overseers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Frank J. Tantone, Esq.
          Alexander T. Coleman, Esq.
          Michael J. Borrelli, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City New York 11530
          Phone: (516) 248-5550
          Fax: (516) 248-6027


KF TEA USA: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against KF Tea USA Inc. The
case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. KF Tea USA Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04039 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021)

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Kung Fu Tea -- https://www.kungfutea.com/ -- is a fresh,
innovative, fearless world of bubble tea (boba) and other tasty,
refreshing beverages.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal



KODIAK CAKES: Court Narrows Claims in First Amended Stewart Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TY STEWART, et al., Plaintiffs v. KODIAK CAKES, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 19-cv-2454-MMA (MSB) (S.D. Cal.), Judge Michael
M. Anello of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California:

    (i) grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion
        to dismiss the First Amended Complaint brought under
        Rule 12(b)(1);

   (ii) grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's motion
        to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6); and

  (iii) denies the Defendant's motion to strike brought under
        Rule 12(f).

Ty Stewart and 22 other Plaintiffs bring the putative class action
against Kodiak Cakes.  The Defendant "manufactures, markets,
advertises, and sells a line of packaged breakfast and snack
products," including pancake and waffle mixes.  The Plaintiffs'
action arises from two overarching issues with the Defendant's
products: (1) "nonfunctional slack fill," which is the empty space
in a package that serves no purpose, and (2) deceptive marketing
statements.

As to nonfunctional slack fill, the Plaintiffs allege the Defendant
packages its products in a manner that "conceals the amount of the
product actually contained in the package and misleads consumers
into believing there is more product inside the packaging than
there actually is."  In particular, they claim less than half of
the packaging is full and thus misrepresents the amount of product
within each package.

As to deceptive marketing statements, the Plaintiffs allege
Defendant makes five types of misleading statements in advertising
its products.  They allege that the Defendant misleadingly labels
and advertises its products as having "no preservatives" as well as
being "free of artificial additives," "non-GMO," "healthy," and
"protein-packed."  The Plaintiffs aver that the Defendant's
marketing strategy is designed to lure consumers to purchase their
products because of these deceptive statements.

The Plaintiffs allege that they relied on the Defendant's
misleading packaging and advertising when purchasing its products.
They seek to rectify these problems.  In doing so, the Plaintiffs
bring six causes of action against the Defendant: (1) "violation of
the consumer protection acts of all 50 states (and the District of
Columbia)" on behalf of the nationwide class; (2) violation of the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal Civ. Code
Sections 1750-1784, on behalf of the California class; (3)
violations of the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200-17210, on behalf of the California
class; (4) violation of the California False Advertising Law
("FAL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17500-17606; (5) breach of
express warranty on behalf of the nationwide class; and (6)
"restation based on quasi-contract and unjust enrichment" on behalf
of the nationwide class.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the causes of action on the grounds
that the Plaintiffs lack standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and fail to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) as well as moves to strike
allegations from the FAC under Rule 12(f).

Discussion

A. Request for Judicial Notice

As an initial matter, the Defendant requests the Court to consider
58 exhibits -- comprising various product packaging labels and
high-resolution "proofs" of the labels -- pursuant to the judicial
notice and incorporation-by-reference doctrines.  The Plaintiffs
object to Defendant's request.

Judge Anello takes judicial notice over the labeling taken from the
Defendant's website but is mindful that the product labels may have
changed over the course of the alleged class periods.  Accordingly,
his grant of judicial notice is limited: It does not extend to
prejudice the Plaintiffs' allegations that pertain to time periods
where the Defendant's proffered labels were not used or nonwebsite
advertising.  Additionally, in examining the exhibits, the Judge
remains mindful of the risk of over-extending the judicial notice
doctrine to avoid a "premature dismissal of a plausible claim."

Accordingly, Judge Anello grants in part and denies in part the
Defendant's request for judicial notice.  He grants the Defendant's
request as it pertains to the labeling taken from its website.  He
denies its request as it pertains to the high-resolution proof
specifications.

Judge Anello also finds that the high-resolution proof
specifications are not proper for incorporation-by-reference
because the Plaintiffs do not refer to the proofs in their FAC, and
the proofs do not form the basis of their claims.  Aside from the
high-resolution proof specifications and the authentication
objection, the labels found on Defendant's website are subject to
incorporation-by-reference.  The Judge considers the advertising on
the Defendant's website as a proper subject of
incorporation-by-reference to the extent that the labels are not a
means to "short-circuit the resolution of a well-pleaded claim" by
"serving to dispute facts stated in a well-pleaded complaint."
Accordingly, he considers the advertising on the Defendant's
website and other online marketing under the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine.  He declines to consider the
high-resolution proof specifications under
incorporation-by-reference.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing for several
reasons: (1) they lack standing to bring claims based on laws of
states where they do not reside and (2) they lack standing to seek
injunctive relief.  In raising its standing challenges, the
Defendant brings a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction.

Judge Anello agrees with the growing trend that courts can "address
the issue of Article III standing at the pleading stage and dismiss
claims asserted under the laws of states in which no plaintiff
resides or has purchased products."  He finds that no named
Plaintiff alleges a connection to forty of the jurisdictions where
they do not reside or have not purchased the Defendant's products.
Therefore, he finds the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims
under the laws of the states where they do not reside or did not
purchase the at-issue products.  Accordingly, he grants the
Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss and dismisses with
leave to amend the causes of action under the laws of states where
named Plaintiffs do not reside or did not purchase the at-issue
products.

However, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs show a concrete injury
that subjects Plaintiffs to an imminent or actual threat of future
harm.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs establish Article III standing to
assert their claim for injunctive relief based on their theory of
misleading "non-GMO" marketing statements.  Accordingly, the Judge
gants in part and denies in part the Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.  He
grants the motion and dismisses without leave to amend the
Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief as to their theory of
misleading slack fill packaging and the "no preservatives," "free
of artificial additives," "healthy," and "protein-packed" marketing
statements.  He denies the motion as to the Plaintiffs' theory of
"non-GMO" marketing statements.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Anello grants in part and denies
in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss brought under Rule
12(b)(1).

C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

The Defendant challenges each of the Plaintiffs' causes of action.
Judge Anello proceeds by addressing whether the Plaintiffs state a
viable claim for each cause of action.

1. Consumer Protection Causes of Action

Given that Judge Anello has dismissed the causes of action under
the laws of states where the named Plaintiffs do not reside or did
not purchase the at-issue products, the Plaintiffs' California
consumer protection causes of action under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL
remain as well as their non-dismissed claims in the first cause of
action.  These causes of action arise from the Plaintiffs'
nonfunctional slack fill and deceptive marketing allegations.  The
Judge begins by addressing the Defendant's objection to the framing
of the Plaintiffs' first cause of action.  He then examines the
CLRA, FAL, and the fraudulent UCL prong together under Rule 9(b)
and the "reasonable consumer test."  The Judge then finally
addresses the remaining unlawful and unfair UCL prongs.

As to nationwide class claims, the Judge grants the Defendant's
motion and dismisses the Plaintiffs' first cause of action with
leave to amend.  He finds that the Plaintiffs do not cite to any
authority that permits the Court to mix together the statutes of 51
separate jurisdictions into a single consumer protection cause of
action.  If the Plaintiffs wish to file a second amended complaint,
the Judge directs the Plaintiffs to separate their allegations of
various state statute violations into separate causes of action.

The Judge then finds that the Plaintiffs meet the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b).  The Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficiently
the "who, what, when, where, and how" of the alleged misconduct.

Turning to whether the Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 8's general
plausibility requirement and whether the Plaintiffs state a viable
claim for relief under the reasonable consumer test,  with the
exception of Plaintiff Stewart and his plausible reliance on the
"healthy" statement, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs fail to
plausibly allege actual reliance on the statements found on the
Defendant's other advertising.  Construing the Plaintiffs'
allegations in the light most favorable to them, the Judge finds
that Plaintiff Stewart plausibly pleads actual reliance on the
alleged "healthy" statement for the Double Dark Chocolate Muffin
Mix as advertised on the Defendant's online store.

As to claims under the CLRA, FAL, or the fraudulent prong of the
UCL, and reasonable consumer test, Judge Anello finds that the
Plaintiffs could plausibly prove that a reasonable consumer would
be deceived by the size of the Defendant's packaging where the
packaging does not provide information about the final product
output.  However, he also finds that the Plaintiffs could not
plausibly prove that a reasonable consumer would be deceived by the
size of the Defendant's packaging where the packaging does provide
information about the final product output.  Accordingly, he grants
in part and dennies in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' CLRA, FAL, and the fraudulent UCL prong causes of
action premised on deceptive fill level.

Turning to the viability of the Plaintiffs' allegations that the
Defendant made several misleading statements in marketing its
products that would deceive a reasonable consumer under the CLRA,
FAL, and the fraudulent UCL prong, the Judge finds that (i) the
Plaintiffs' claims regarding "non-GMO" allegations do not survive
the instant motion because they lack specificity and plausibility;
(ii) the Plaintiffs do not allege or argue that this information is
within the control of the Defendant, the information is based on
sufficient underlying information, or that they do not have the
access or means to test their belief; and (ii) the Plaintiffs do
not state a claim for unalleged substances that serve as the basis
for their "non-GMO" claim.

Accordingly, the Judge grants in part and denies in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CLRA, FAL, and the
fraudulent prong of the UCL causes of action premised on consumer
deception through advertising that contained the statements "no
preservatives," "free of artificial additives," and "non-GMO."  He
grants the Defendant's motion and dismisses with leave to amend the
Plaintiffs' theory as it pertains to their "non-GMO" claim and any
unspecified ingredients that form the basis of the three
statements.  He denies the motion as to the Plaintiffs' "no
preservatives" and "free of artificial additives" claim.

The Judge also finds that the blog post is merely nonactionable
puffery and the Plaintiffs fail to allege how a reasonable consumer
would be deceived.  Accordingly, he grants in part and denies in
part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CLRA, FAL,
and the fraudulent UCL prong causes of action premised on consumer
deception through advertising that contained the statement
"healthy."  He grants the Defendant's motion and dismisses the
Plaintiffs' theory as it pertains to the Defendant's general
comments on the importance of breakfast on its blog post.
Dismissal is with leave to amend to the extent the Plaintiffs can
show that the blog post shows a direct connection that implies
Defendant's products are healthy and goes beyond mere
generalizations on health and breakfast.  The Judge denies the
motion as to the description of the Defendant's Double Dark
Chocolate Muffin Mix.

The Judge further finds that a reasonable person would not find the
Defendant's use of "protein-packed" to be misleading.  Even if a
consumer were still uncertain on the meaning of "protein-packed"
after seeing the grams of protein listed clearly on the front of
the box, a reasonable consumer would be aware of the nutrition
facts label on the back or side of the box as a means to clarify
any uncertainty.  Accordingly, the Judge grants the Defendant's
motion and dismisses the Plaintiffs' CLRA, FAL, and the fraudulent
prong of the UCL causes of action premised on consumer deception
through packaging and advertising that contained the statement
"protein-packed."  Dismissal is with leave to amend to the extent
the Plaintiffs can overcome the contradictory packaging pictured in
their own FAC in addition to the materials subject to judicial
notice and incorporation-by-reference.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Anello grants in part and denies
in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' CLRA,
FAL, and the fraudulent prong of the UCL causes of action premised
on deceptive marketing statements.

In its motion, the Defendant does not directly challenge the
remaining unlawful and unfair UCL prongs and instead focuses on the
fraudulent UCL prong regarding consumer deception.  It appears to
conflate the Plaintiffs' two sub-theories regarding their deceptive
fill level allegations.

Judge Anello finds that the Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient
facts to survive the Defendant's motion to dismiss the unfair and
unlawful UCL prongs.  Accordingly, he denies the Defendant's motion
to dismiss Plaintiffs' unfair and unlawful UCL prong claims.

As to whether the Plaintiffs plead a viable claim under the unfair
and unlawful prongs of the UCL, the Judge that the Plaintiffs plead
a plausible predicate violation based on their viable FAL, CLRA,
and fraudulent UCL prong causes of action.  The Plaintiffs also
plead a plausible predicate violation based upon violation of the
CFPLA.  Accordingly, he denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' unlawful UCL prong claim.

The Judge further finds that the Plaintiffs' allegations survive
the motion to dismiss.  The Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that the
Defendant violated the FAL, CLRA, fraudulent UCL prong, and
unlawful UCL prong.  They plausibly allege that a reasonable
consumer would be deceived and that the Defendant uses misleading
packaging because of nonfunctional slack fill.  Construing the
Plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable to them, these
plausible allegations outweigh the utility of the Defendant's
current packaging or the burden that would be placed on the
Defendant to change its marketing.  Additionally, the Defendant
does not directly address this prong.  Accordingly, the Judge
denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' unfair UCL
prong claim.

2. Breach of Express Warranty Cause of Action

The Defendant criticizes the Plaintiffs for failing to identify the
applicable state law.  It further argues that the Plaintiffs'
warranty claim fails for the same reasons as their other claims.
It adds that it is unclear whether it created a warranty and the
Plaintiffs do not identify an explicit guarantee.  Finally, the
Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs did not provide notice of the
warranty issue.

The Plaintiffs respond they seek to recover under the laws of each
state.  They further argue that the Defendant offers no reason that
the marketing claims did not become part of the bargain.  They also
argue that they issued pre-lawsuit notices and that "no notice is
required when claims are against a defendant in its capacity as a
manufacturer, not a seller."

Given the FAC's defects, Judge Anello declines to address the
parties' arguments as to whether the Plaintiffs plead a viable
breach of express warranty claim under California law.
Accordingly, he grants the Defendant's motion and dismisses the
Plaintiffs' breach of express warranty cause of action with leave
to amend.  If the Plaintiffs wish to file a second amended
complaint, the Judge directs them to identify the applicable state
laws and separate their allegations of various state law violations
into separate causes of action.

3. Restitution Based on Quasi-Contract and Unjust Enrichment Cause
of Action

The Defendant asserts that a claim for "restitution based on
quasi-contract and unjust enrichment" does not exist because
restitution is only a remedy.  Similar to the warranty claim, it
argues that the Plaintiffs fail to allege which law applies.
Further, it contends that a claim based on quasi-contract cannot
stand where there is an express contract, such as the Plaintiffs'
direct purchases.  Finally, the Defendant argues the Plaintiffs
cannot allege unjust enrichment because they purchased the products
for years.  The Plaintiffs respond that restitution and unjust
enrichment are viable causes of action.

The Plaintiffs bring claims for breach of an express warranty and
quasi-contract.  To the extent the Plaintiffs assert a claim under
California law, Judge Anello construes this claim as a
quasi-contract claim.  Accordingly, he garnts the Defendant's
motion and dismisses the Plaintiffs' "restitution based on
quasi-contract and unjust enrichment" cause of action with leave to
amend.  If Plaintiffs wish to file a second amended complaint, the
Judge directs them to identify the applicable state laws and
separate their allegations of various state law violations into
separate causes of action.  Additionally, he grants the Defendant's
motion and dismisses the Plaintiffs' quasi-contract claim without
leave to amend to the extent it is based under California law.

4. Equitable Relief Claims

The Defendant separately argues that the "Plaintiffs' claims for
equitable relief fail on the ground that they do not and cannot
plead that they lack an adequate remedy at law."  In doing so, it
relies on Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 837 (9th
Cir. 2020).  The Defendant asserts the Plaintiffs' claims rest on
overpayments, triggering an adequate monetary remedy at law.  The
Plaintiffs respond they may pursue alternative or different types
of relief.

Judge Anello finds that the Plaintiffs fail to directly confront
Defendant's Sonner argument.  Rather, in a footnote without citing
to support, they argue that Sonner's facts "are inapposite
considering the allegations and the posture of the FAC."  As the
Judge already noted in the Defendant's Article III standing
challenge, the Plaintiffs do show future harm as to the "non-GMO"
deceptive marketing statements.  Thus, the Plaintiffs have
plausibly shown that they lack an adequate remedy at law to at
least some degree.  The Judge finds this finding sufficient to
overcome Defendant's Sonner challenge at this stage.  Additionally,
unlike Sonner, the Plaintiffs are not pursuing equitable remedies
to the exclusion of a remedy at law.  Accordingly, the Judge
declines to dismiss the Plaintiffs' equitable claims at this time.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Anello grants in part and denies
in part the Defendant's motion to dismiss brought under Rule
12(b)(6).

D. Motion to Strike

In the Defendant's notice of motion, it seeks to strike the
following from the Plaintiffs' FAC: (1) "every reference to the
laws of states in which the named plaintiffs do not reside"; (2)
"the Plaintiffs' slack-fill theory to the extent it relies on
online purchases"; (3) "any representation or liability theory to
the extent the Court finds that it fails"; and (4) "all requests
for equitable relief including injunctive relief and restitution."

However, Judge Anello finds that the Defendant fails to argue why
or how these allegations should be struck under the Rule 12(f)
legal standard in their memorandum of points and authorities.  It
appears that it seeks to strike these allegations under the same
arguments underlying its motion to dismiss.  The Judge holds that
the Defendant's motion to strike is an attempt to have certain
portions of the FAC dismissed --" actions better suited for a Rule
12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 motion, not a Rule 12(f) motion."

Furthermore, the Judge finds that the motion to strike does not
meet the Rule 12(f) standard.  First, the four strike requests do
not pertain to an insufficient defense.  Second, the allegations
desired to be stricken are not redundant.  Third, the allegations
are not immaterial because they amount to the Plaintiffs' asserted
causes of action.  Fourth, the allegations are not impertinent
because the allegations desired to be stricken pertain directly to
Plaintiffs' asserted claims.  Fifth, the at-issue allegations,
theories, or causes of action do not appear to be scandalous.
Therefore, the Defendant fails to satisfy Rule 12(f)'s requirements
to show that the Plaintiffs' allegations or causes of action should
be stricken from their FAC.

Accordingly, Judge Anello denies the Defendant's motion to strike.

The Plaintiffs must file an amended complaint curing the
deficiencies noted by May 17, 2021.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/m9katp9z from Leagle.com.


KOVELS' ANTIQUES: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kovels' Antiques,
Inc. The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated v. Kovels' Antiques, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-04031 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021)

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Kovels' Antiques -- https://www.kovels.com/ -- provide collectors
and researchers with up-to-date and informed information on
antiques and collectibles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


LAYLA SLEEP: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Layla Sleep Inc. The
case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Layla Sleep Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04038 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021)

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Layla Sleep -- https://laylasleep.com/ -- provide quality
mattresses for relaxable & peaceful sleep.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


LETHA'S PIES: Ark. App. Flips Denial of Arbitration Bid in EBF Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EBF PARTNERS, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY D/B/A EVEREST BUSINESS FUNDING, Appellant v. LETHA'S PIES,
LLC, AN ARKANSAS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; RHONDA GLENN, AN
INDIVIDUAL; TIMOTHY GLENN, AN INDIVIDUAL; JOHN DOES 1-10; AND JOHN
DOES 11-20, Appellees, Case No. CV-19-949 (Ark. App.), the Court of
Appeals of Arkansas, Division III, reverses the circuit court's
denial of EBF's motion to compel arbitration.

Letha's Pies, LLC, is an Arkansas company that makes frozen fried
pies for resale to restaurants. In December 2016, Letha's Pies
entered into a "Purchase and Sale of Future Receivables Agreement"
("EBF Merchant Agreement") with EBF. That agreement contained the
following arbitration provision:

On July 3, 2019, Letha's Pies, along with the owners of Letha's
Pies, Rhonda and Timothy Glenn, filed a class-action complaint
against EBF, John Does 1-10, and John Does 11-20. Letha's argued
that the arbitration clause contained in the EBF Merchant Agreement
was unenforceable under state contract law and equity because it
lacked mutuality of obligation

EBF moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration. EBF argued that
there was mutuality of obligation; the arbitration agreement could
be "activated" by either party, and once either party requests
arbitration, then the other must arbitrate. EBF emphasized that
Letha's had the option to opt out of arbitration entirely when it
signed the contract.

The circuit court convened a hearing on 10 September 2019. At the
onset, the court asked the parties to focus on the
mutual-obligation issue. EBF argued that its arbitration agreement
is unusual in that it is "conditional," that arbitration could be
requested by either party, and once requested, all parties are
bound to arbitrate. EBF contended that this arrangement was "fair"
and "mutual." It also argued that other provisions for alternative
"remedies" are necessary in case the parties do not choose
arbitration. Letha's responded that only Letha's had to opt out of
arbitration because EBF had already opted out per the terms of the
agreement. Letha's argued that under the provisions in the
contract, it is limited to arbitration to resolve disputes, but EBF
is not.

From the bench, the circuit court found that there was no mutuality
of obligation and denied the motion to compel.  EBF has timely
appealed from this order.  It argues that the circuit court erred
in holding that the arbitration agreement was invalid for lack of
mutual obligation.

The Court of Appeals explains that the agreement provides for two
different types of "forums": Judicial and arbitration.  Although
EBF has substantial judicial remedies if Letha defaults, the
judicial remedies are available only if Letha's does not request
arbitration.  If a defaulting event occurs, EBF had the right to
enforce the agreement in a judicial forum, unless the appellee
requested arbitration.  If the latter occurred, then EBF would be
obligated to pursue arbitration.

That brings the Court of Appeals to the main issue: Does this
agreement fail for lack of mutual obligation?  It holds that it
does not.  The Court of Appeals opines that the circuit court erred
when it found that the agreement was not mutual because EBF could
pursue judicial remedies while Letha's could not.  It holds that
the court cannot invalidate a provision within an arbitration
agreement unless the court would likewise invalidate it under
Arkansas contract law in general.

The recent Arkansas Supreme Court decision, Jorja Trading, Inc. v.
Willis, 2020 Ark. 133, 598 S.W.3d 1, controls.  Jorja issued on
April 9, 2020, well after the circuit court made its ruling, and
nine days after EBF had filed its principal brief with the Court of
Appeals.  In Jorja, the state supreme court addressed the
mutuality-of-obligations element in the context of an arbitration
clause within an installment-sales contract.  The circuit court
denied a motion to compel arbitration finding that the parties'
installment-sales contract lacked mutuality of obligation for three
reasons: (1) the contract reserved the right of both parties to
seek self-help remedies, (2) the contract provided that both
parties waive class-action lawsuits, and (3) it allowed appellants
to reject appellees' selection of an arbitrator.

In other words, the circuit court holds that it cannot invalidate a
provision within an arbitration agreement unless it would likewise
invalidate it under Arkansas contract law in general.  Jorja also
stated that mutuality was not destroyed despite Jorja's access to
the judicial self-help remedy of replevin.  Finally, Jorja
confirmed that mutuality goes to the contract as a whole and not
just an arbitration clause:

For these reasons stated, the Court of Appeals holds that Jorja
requires it to reverse the circuit court's decision to deny the
motion to compel arbitration.  It therefore reverses and remands
for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ny2te5t3 from Leagle.com.

Burr & Forman LLP by: Thomas K. Potter III -- tpotter@burr.com --
pro hac vice, and Zachary D. Miller -- zmiller@burr.com -- pro hac
vice; and Waddell, Cole & Jones, PLLC by: Kevin W. Cole --
kcole@wcjfirm.com -- and Austin E. Parkey, for Appellant.

RMP, LLP, by: Timothy C. Hutchinson -- thutchinson@rmp.law -- Larry
McCredy -- lmccredy@rmp.law -- Seth Haines -- shaines@rmp.law --
and Bo Renner -- brenner@rmp.law; and Bishop Law Firm, by: Matt
Bishop, for Appellees.


LIFEMD INC: Cho Sues Over Securities' Decline in Market Value
-------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Cho, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LIFEMD, INC. F/K/A CONVERSION LABS, INC., JUSTIN
SCHREIBER, JUAN MANUEL PIÑEIRO DAGNERY, and MARC BENATHEN, Case
No. 1:21-cv-04004 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021), is brought on behalf of
persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired LifeMD
securities between January 19, 2021 and April 13, 2021, inclusive;
and pursues claims against the Defendants under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 due to the Defendants' wrongful acts and
omissions, and the precipitous decline in the market value of the
Company's securities.

The Defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements,
as well as failed to disclose material adverse facts about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects. Specifically,
Defendants failed to disclose to investors that: (i) many of
LifeMD's executives were associated with Redwood Scientific
Technologies, Inc. when it was charged for unlawful autoshipping,
abusive telemarketing, and false claims, and that they employed
similar practices at the Company; (ii) LifeMD engaged in
autoshipping products to unwilling customers to record recurring
revenue and the Company made it difficult to cancel such
subscriptions; (iii) certain of the purportedly licensed physicians
on the Company's platform were not in fact licensed and faced
disciplinary action; (iv) as a result of the foregoing practices,
the Company was reasonably likely to face regulatory scrutiny
and/or reputational harm; and (v) as a result of the foregoing,
Defendants' positive statements about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked
a reasonable basis.

On April 14, 2021, Culper Research issued a report alleging that
"LifeMD appears to use unlicensed doctors to dispense OTC
medications, has implemented an autoshipping/autobilling scheme,
failed to honor guarantees, and put in place abusive telemarketing
practices." The report also alleged that several of the Company's
executives were involved in "wide ranging fraud" at Redwood
Scientific, which was charged by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
for "unlawful autoshipping, abusive telemarketing, and false
claims." Specifically, according to Culper, "many customers are
effectively duped into purchasing subscriptions rather than
one-time purchases" and LifeMD "makes cancellations difficult if
not impossible." On this news, the Company's share price fell
$2.84, or 24%, to close at $9.00 per share on April 14, 2021, on
unusually heavy trading volume.

As a result of the Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff purchased LifeMD securities during the Class Period.

LifeMD is a direct-to-patient telehealth company. It offers a
telemedicine platform that purports to help patients access
licensed providers for diagnoses, virtual care, and prescription
medications.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          James M. LoPiano, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com
                 jlopiano@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          Corey D. Holzer, Esq.
          HOLZER & HOLZER, LLC
          211 Perimeter Center Parkway, Suite 1010
          Atlanta, GA 30346
          Phone: (770) 392-0090
          Facsimile: (770) 392-0029
          Email: cholzer@holzerlaw.com


LULL VENTURES: Sanchez Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Lull Ventures, LLC.
The case is styled as Cristian Sanchez, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Lull Ventures, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-04044 (S.D.N.Y., May 5, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Lull -- https://lull.com/ -- is a Santa Barbara-based
direct-to-consumer (DTC) mattress and bedding company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph H. Mizrahi, Esq.
          COHEN & MIZRAHI LLP
          300 Cadman Plaza West, 12th Floor
          Brooklyn, NY 11201
          Phone: (929) 575-4175
          Fax: (929) 575-4195
          Email: joseph@cml.legal


MDL 2873: Farrow Sues Over Injury From AFFF Exposure
----------------------------------------------------
HOWARD S. FARROW v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company); AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; COMPLAINT AND
AMEREX CORPORATION; JURY DEMAND ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.;
BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION;
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.;
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA,
INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION,
INC. (f/k/a GE) Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-01216-RMG
(D.S.C., April 26, 2021) is brought against the Defendants for
damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals
collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS").
PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid
("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related
chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is
a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based
fires.

The complaint alleges that Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop
serious medical conditions and complications, the complaint
asserts.

Plaintiff Howard S. Farrow is a resident and citizen of Hixson,
Tennessee. Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly
exposed to, AFFF in training and to extinguish fires during his
working career as a military and/or civilian firefighter. Plaintiff
was diagnosed with kidney cancer as a result of exposure to
Defendants' AFFF products.

Defendant, 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the
United States. 3M has its principal place of business at 3M Center,
St. Paul, Minnesota 55133. 3M designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting
training and response exercises.

Defendant AGC Chemicals Americas, Inc. is a Delaware corporation
and does business throughout the United States. AGC has its
principal place of business at 55 E. Uwchlan Ave., Suite 201,
Exton, Pennsylvania 19341.

Defendant Amerex Corporation is an Alabama corporation and does
business throughout the United States. Amerex has its principal
place of business at 7595 Gadsden Highway, Trussville, Alabama
35173.

Defendant Archroma U.S. Inc. is a North Carolina company and does
business throughout the United States. Archroma has its principal
place of business at 5435 77 Center Drive, #10 Charlotte, North
Carolina 28217. Archroma was formed in 2013 as part of the
acquisition of Clariant Corporation's Textile Chemicals, Paper
Specialties and Emulsions business by SK Capital Partners.

Defendant Arkema, Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation and does
business throughout the United States. Arkema has its principal
place of business at 900 1st Avenue, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
19406. Assets of Arkema's fluorochemical business were purchased by
Defendant Dupont in 2002.

The Farrow case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: 205-328-9200
          Facsimile: 205-328-9456

                    - and -

          J. Edward Bell, III, Esq.
          Gabrielle Anna Sulpizio, Esq.
          BELL LEGAL GROUP
          219 Ridge Street
          Georgetown, SC 25442
          Telephone: 843-546-2408
          Facsimile: 843-546-9604

MDL 2873: Jendusa Sues Over Injury from AFFF Exposure
-----------------------------------------------------
STEVEN JAMES JENDUSA v. 3M COMPANY (f/k/a Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Company; AGC CHEMICALS AMERICAS INC.; COMPLAINT AND
AMEREX CORPORATION; JURY DEMAND ARCHROMA U.S. INC.; ARKEMA, INC.;
BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY; CARRIER GLOBAL CORPORATION;
CHEMDESIGN PRODUCTS, INC.; CHEMGUARD, INC.; CHEMICALS, INC.;
CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC; CHUBB FIRE, LTD; CLARIANT CORP.; CORTEVA,
INC.; DEEPWATER CHEMICALS, INC.; DU PONT DE NEMOURS INC. (f/k/a
DOWDUPONT INC.); DYNAX CORPORATION; E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND
COMPANY; KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.; KIDDE PLC; NATION FORD CHEMICAL
COMPANY; NATIONAL FOAM, INC.; THE CHEMOURS COMPANY; TYCO FIRE
PRODUCTS LP, as successor-in-interest to The Ansul Company; UNITED
TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION; UTC FIRE & SECURITY AMERICAS CORPORATION,
INC. (f/k/a GE) Interlogix, Inc.), Case No. 2:21-cv-01216-RMG
(D.S.C., April 26, 2021) is brought against the Defendants for
damages for personal injury resulting from exposure to aqueous
film-forming foams ("AFFF") containing the toxic chemicals
collectively known as per and polyfluoroalkyl substances ("PFAS").
PFAS includes, but is not limited to, perfluorooctanoic acid
("PFOA") and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid ("PFOS") and related
chemicals including those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS. AFFF is
a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based
fires.

The complaint alleges that Defendants collectively designed,
marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained
users, produced instructional materials, promoted, sold, and/or
otherwise released into the stream of commerce AFFF with knowledge
that it contained highly toxic and bio persistent PFASs, which
would expose end users of the product to the risks associated with
PFAS. Further, defendants designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used underlying chemicals and/or products added to AFFF
which contained PFAS for use in firefighting.

Defendants' PFAS-containing AFFF products were used by the
Plaintiff in their intended manner, without significant change in
the products' condition. Plaintiff was unaware of the dangerous
properties of the Defendants' AFFF products and relied on the
Defendants' instructions as to the proper handling of the products.
Plaintiff's consumption, inhalation and/or dermal absorption of
PFAS from Defendant's AFFF products caused Plaintiff to develop
serious medical conditions and complications, the complaint
asserts.

Steven James Jendusa is a resident and citizen of Milwaukee, WI.
Plaintiff regularly used, and was thereby directly exposed to, AFFF
in training and to extinguish fires during his working career as a
military and/or civilian firefighter. Plaintiff was diagnosed with
kidney and prostate cancer as a result of exposure to Defendants’
AFFF products.

Defendant, 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the
United States. 3M has its principal place of business at 3M Center,
St. Paul, Minnesota 55133. 3M designed, marketed, developed,
manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced
instructional materials, promoted, sold and/or otherwise handled
and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting
training and response exercises.

Defendant AGC Chemicals Americas, Inc. is a Delaware corporation
and does business throughout the United States. AGC has its
principal place of business at 55 E. Uwchlan Ave., Suite 201,
Exton, Pennsylvania 19341.

Defendant Amerex Corporation is an Alabama corporation and does
business throughout the United States. Amerex has its principal
place of business at 7595 Gadsden Highway, Trussville, Alabama
35173.

Defendant Archroma U.S. Inc. is a North Carolina company and does
business throughout the United States. Archroma has its principal
place of business at 5435 77 Center Drive, #10 Charlotte, North
Carolina 28217. Archroma was formed in 2013 as part of the
acquisition of Clariant Corporation's Textile Chemicals, Paper
Specialties and Emulsions business by SK Capital Partners.

Defendant Arkema, Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation and does
business throughout the United States. Arkema has its principal
place of business at 900 1st Avenue, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
19406. Assets of Arkema's fluorochemical business were purchased by
Defendant Dupont in 2002.

The Jendusa case has been consolidated in MDL No. 2873, In Re:
Aqueous Film-Forming Foams Products Liability Litigation. The case
is assigned to the Hon. Judge Richard Gergel.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory A. Cade, Esq.
          Gary A. Anderson, Esq.
          Kevin B. McKie, Esq.
          ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION GROUP, P.C.
          2160 Highland Avenue South
          Birmingham, AL 35205
          Telephone: 205-328-9200
          Facsimile: 205-328-9456

                    - and -

          J. Edward Bell, III, Esq.
          Gabrielle Anna Sulpizio, Esq.
          BELL LEGAL GROUP
          219 Ridge Street
          Georgetown, SC 25442
          Telephone: 843-546-2408
          Facsimile: 843-546-9604

MEDICAL SECURITY: Loses Bids to Dismiss & Stay Michigan Urgent Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MICHIGAN URGENT CARE & PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS, P.C.,
Plaintiff v. MEDICAL SECURITY CARD COMPANY, LLC D/B/A SCRIPTSAVE
AND WELLRX, and JOHN DOES, 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
2:20-CV-10353-TGB (E.D. Mich.), Judge Terrence G. Berg of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to
Stay.

The Plaintiff brings the class action against Defendant Medical
Security Card ("MSCC") and other unknown individuals alleging a
violation of 47 U.S.C. Section 227, the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA").

The Plaintiff alleges it received a fax advertisement to its
facsimile machine from Defendant, promoting the Defendant's medical
savings plan.  The Plaintiff alleges this fax was unsolicited and
sent in violation of the TCPA (specifically, 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(1)(C)).

Defendant MSCC now seeks to dismiss the case on the ground that the
Court allegedly lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  It is the
Defendant's second motion to dismiss.  It has also filed a Motion
to Stay, seeking to pause these proceedings pending the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, No. 20-4252.

MSCC's facial attack arises from its interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Barr. v. Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants,
Inc., 140 S.Ct. 2335 (July 6, 2020) ("AAPC").  That case found that
a portion of one section of the TCPA was a content-based
restriction that violated the First Amendment.  But the Supreme
Court also found that the offending portion could be severed, so
that the section would no longer be unconstitutional.

Although six Justices in AAPC concluded that the government debt
exception was an impermissible regulation of speech and therefore
unconstitutional, they did so on different grounds, and no single
opinion commanded a majority of the Supreme Court.  Additionally,
seven members of the Supreme Court concluded that it was not
necessary to invalidate the entire robocall restriction, but rather
that the 2015 government-debt exception could be "invalidated and
severed from the remainder of the statute."

Despite this clear articulation of the continued viability of other
parts of the TCPA, including the provision under which the
Plaintiff brings its claims in the case, MSCC argues that the
entire statute -- both the robocall prohibition as well as other
sections of the statute -- was rendered unconstitutional during the
period the government debt-collection exception was in effect.
MSCC points to three district court cases finding that the Supreme
Court's salvaging of the statute by severing the government
debt-collection exception can only have a prospective effect --
Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, No. 1:19 CV 2862, 2020 WL 6361915, at *7
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2020); Hussain v. Sullivan Buick-Cadillac-GMC
Truck, Inc. et al., No. 5:20-CV-38-OC-30PRL, 2020 WL 7346536, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2020); Creasy v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., No. CV
20-1199, 2020 WL 5761117, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2020).

Judge Berg finds that each of these cases concluded that Section
227(b)(1)(A)(iii), the robocall restriction, was rendered entirely
unconstitutional when it was amended to include the government debt
exception in 2015.  Consequently, violations of Section
227(b)(1)(A)(iii) that occurred between Nov. 2, 2015, when the
offending provision was enacted, and July 6, 2020, the date of the
AAPC decision, cannot be enforced.  Put differently, these courts
say the legal effect of the Supreme Court's severing the
unconstitutional government debt exception is prospective only --
it enables the robocall restriction to be applied only after AAPC.

Regardless of the correct position on prospective relief, Judge
Berg holds that the Defendant's argument fails on a second ground.
While a plurality opinion such as the one in the case is generally
not binding in its full form, it is noteworthy that the Justices
were "unanimous" in that all of them only discussed the
constitutionality of TCPA's robocall restrictions; none of them
viewed the case as challenging the constitutionality of the
non-robocall related provisions of the TCPA.

The Judge also rejects the Defendant's assertions that the robocall
restriction is "essential to the statute" such that its partial
invalidity renders the entire statute void.  He says the various
parts of the TCPA regulate different types of communications and
can easily exist independently of each other.

For these reasons, Judge Berg denied the Motion to Dismiss.

In its Motion to Stay, MSCC requests the case be stayed pending the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Lindenbaum.  Lindenbaum is one of the
three cases previously cited by the Defendant; again, the issues
there concern whether the non-stricken portions of the robocall
restrictions at Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) may be enforced for
violations made between 2015 and 2020.  The question before the
Sixth Circuit -- as acknowledged by the Defendant -- is whether the
"robocall restriction was unconstitutional between 2015, when the
exception was enacted, and 2020."

Judge Berg finds no reason to believe the decision in Lindenbaum
will affect the resolution of subject matter jurisdiction issues in
the case, because the case involves a section of the statute which
did not contain the content-based restriction found to be
unconstitutional and which is entirely separate from the robocall
restriction.  Hence, the Motion to Stay is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3rt7pve6 from Leagle.com.


MICHAEL CARR: Norman Files Suit in North District of Texas
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Michael Carr. The
case is styled as Billy Alexis C. Norman, and others similarly
situated v. Michael Carr, FMC Carswell Warden, Case No.
4:21-cv-00630-O (N.D. Tex., May 6, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Pet/Other: Civil Rights
for Prisoner Civil Rights.

Michael Carr is the Warden of FMC Carswell.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

          lexis C Norman
          P.O. BOX 27137
          Fort Worth, TX 76127
          #49210-177
          BOP Carswell FMC
          PRO SE


NAVIENT CORP: Loses Bid to Strike Class Claims in Ballard Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JILL BALLARD, on behalf of herself and the class
members described herein, Plaintiffs v. NAVIENT CORPORATION,
NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, INC. AND NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, LLC., Defendants,
Civil Action No. 3:18-121 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Malachy E. Mannion of
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss and to strike class allegations.

Student loan debt is now the largest category of non-housing
related consumer debt in the United States with more than $1.34
trillion outstanding at the end of June 2017.  The overwhelming
majority of student loans in the United States are owned or
guaranteed by the federal government through the U.S. Department of
Education.

Since June 2009, Defendant Navient Corp. and its predecessors in
interest, through their subsidiaries, Navient Solutions, LLC (NSL)
and Navient Solutions, Inc. (NSI) acting in the capacity of agents
on behalf of their principal, Navient Corp., have served as one of
four primary servicers of federal student loan debt.

Loan servicers who contract with the Department of Education
perform all tasks associated with loan repayment, such as
collecting payments, responding to customer service inquiries,
providing loan documents to borrowers, handling applications for
loan deferment or forbearance based on financial hardship, and
administering repayment programs designed to help borrowers
effectively manage the increasing cost of higher education.  These
programs include the various Income-Driven Repayment Plans (IDR
plans) offered by the federal government, which provide qualifying
borrowers with relief from student loan debt by adjusting their
payments to a reasonably affordable amount based on their income,
occupation, and family size.  Borrowers enrolled in IDR plans can
also apply to have their federal loans forgiven after a certain
number of payments.

Navient Corp. and its predecessors in interest, and/or their duly
appointed agents, NSL and NSI, received and continue to receive
monthly servicing fees for the federal loans that they administer.
Thus, Navient Corp. has a strong financial interest in keeping
loans active for as long as possible to continue collecting these
monthly fees.  To that end, Navient Corp. and its predecessors in
interest, through their duly appointed agents, NSL and NSI, delayed
or failed to process IDR plan applications in order to generate
additional monthly servicing fees.  Because loan payments only
count toward forgiveness once a borrower's application is
processed, this practice extended the duration of loans in the
various IDR programs, and injured borrowers who were required to
make additional payments on loans that otherwise would have been
forgiven at an earlier date.

Navient Corp. and its predecessors in interest, through their duly
appointed agents, NSL and NSI, also improperly placed borrowers
making timely loan payments into deferment or forbearance status-a
designation typically reserved for situations where the borrower
seeks relief from its payment obligations due to financial
hardship.  Borrowers who are in deferment or forbearance cannot
make qualifying payments that count towards loan forgiveness under
the various IDR plans, even though Navient Corp. continues to
collect fees on servicing their loans.  Thus, Navient Corp.'s abuse
of the deferment and forbearance process, through its agents, NSL
and NSI, improperly increased Navient Corp.'s revenue and extended
the duration of the borrowers' loans in the various IDR programs.
Moreover, at the conclusion of each forbearance, any accrued
interest is capitalized, or added to the borrower's principal loan
balance, which may increase the borrower's debt considerably.
Thus, Navient Corp.'s abuse of the forbearance process, through its
agents, NSL and NSI, improperly increased the principal loan
balance of its borrowers, putting them deeper and deeper into
debt.

Navient Corp. had a financial incentive to increase its borrowers'
loan balances because two of its subsidiaries -- Pioneer Credit
Recovery and General Revenue Corp. (GRC) -- provide collection and
rehabilitation services on defaulted federal student loans.  Under
the current compensation structure for companies that provide such
rehabilitation services, collectors earn nearly $40 in compensation
for every $1 in cash recovered through certain rehabilitations.
According to the Plaintiffs' complaint, Navient has a documented,
and widespread, history of mishandling student loan IDR requests
and accounts and has been the subject of thousands of complaints
over its deficiencies in the processing of these accounts.

Cast against this factual backdrop, the Plaintiffs' amended
complaint sets forth in their pleading a series of detailed
substantive factual averments.  These averments explain that, with
the rising cost of college education, students seeking higher
education opportunities have been compelled to increasingly rely
upon student loans to finance their education.  These loans then
come with an array of repayment plans.

Burdened by academic debt, many student loan borrowers cannot
afford the monthly payments prescribed by standard repayment plans
and must turn to various income-driven repayment plans.  Such
income-driven repayment plans, or IDRs, must be renewed annually by
the student, and the failure to timely renew the IDR can result in
increased payments and added interest expense.  In order to assist
students loan borrowers in avoiding these financial-penalties,
student loan servicers are required to timely process IDR requests
within 10 to 15 business days.  In contrast to these IDR plans,
student loan borrowers may also be placed into a temporary loan
forbearance status by loan servicers.  Such temporary forbearance
is more lucrative for the loan servicer, according to the
plaintiffs, but has financial disadvantages for the borrowers.

The Plaintiffs allege that Navient's financial incentives for
mishandling student IDR applications and accounts stem from the
structure of its contract with the Department of Education.  That
contract compensates Navient on a per unit basis for the student
loan accounts it manages, and pays Navient at a higher rate for
accounts that are in forbearance, thus creating incentives to place
accounts in forbearance status and minimize the number of accounts
which are forgiven or discharged.

The amended complaint then details the experience of the three
named Plaintiffs with Navient as their loan servicer.  In each
instance it is alleged that Navient mishandled the named
Plaintiffs' IDR account by failing to meet processing deadlines,
improperly placing accounts in forbearance status, erroneously
capitalizing interest payments, and failing to acknowledge and
process timely student borrower IDR renewal applications.

Pending before the Court is the report of U.S. Magistrate Judge
Martin C. Carlson, which recommends that the Defendants' motion to
dismiss and to strike class allegations be granted in part, and
denied in part.  Specifically, Judge Carlson recommends the motion
to strike the class action allegations should be denied; the motion
to dismiss be granted as to the tortious interference with contract
claim; and the motion to dismiss should be denied in all other
respects.  No objections have been filed to the report.

Judge Mannion has carefully considered the Defendants' motion to
dismiss and related materials, as well as Judge Carlson's rulings
on the matters raised therein, and finds no clear error of law.
Moreover, he agrees with the sound reasoning which has led Judge
Carlson to the conclusions in his report.  As such, the report and
recommendation will be adopted in its entirety as the opinion of
the Court.

Therefore, Judge Mannion adopted in its entirety the report and
recommendation of Judge Carlson as the ruing of the Court.  He
granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss and to strike class allegations.  The motion to strike the
class action allegations is denied.  The motion to dismiss is
granted as to the tortious interference with contract claim and
denied in all other respects.  The instant action is remanded to
Judge Carlson for all future pre-trial proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/amr488 from Leagle.com.


NEW ORLEANS, LA: Court Affirms Class Certification in Caluda Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT J. CALUDA, APLC AND NEW ORLEANS PRIVATE PATROL
SERVICE, INC. v. THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LINEBARGER GOGGAN, BLAIR
& SAMPSON, L.L.P. AND UNITED GOVERNMENT SERVICES OF LOUISIANA,
INC., Case No. 2020-CA-0660 (La. App.), the Court of Appeal of
Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, affirms the judgment of Aug. 18, 2020,
wherein the district court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify a Class.

In March 1998, the New Orleans City Council adopted Ordinance No.
18637, which permitted the City to contract out collection of
delinquent property taxes and impose a penalty for collection
costs.  Delinquent taxpayers filed suit in the Civil District Court
for the Parish of Orleans, arguing out that the ordinance was
unconstitutional -- Fransen v. City of New Orleans, 2008-0076, p. 2
(La. 7/1/2008), 988 So.2d 225, 228-29.

In 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, finding that the
ordinance (codified as the New Orleans Code of Ordinance, Chapter
150, art. II, Sections 150-46.1-150-46.6) went beyond the mandated
tax sales provisions enunciated in the state constitution.
Specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the state
"constitutional provision relating to property taxation permits the
governmental subdivision to impose only the taxes, interests and
costs in proceeding to sell the property for delinquent ad valorem
taxes" and, therefore, the City's action in authorizing delinquent
ad valorem taxes on immovable property for collection with an
attorney or agent and assessing a 30% penalty for costs is
unconstitutional because the state constitution prohibits methods
or proceedings other than tax sales to collect delinquent ad
valorem property taxes.

The matter was remanded to the district court where, on Jan. 18,
2019, the district court certified the Fransen class as one
restricted to only those who paid real estate (immovable) ad
valorem taxes from April 17, 2000 through March 5, 2002, implicitly
excluding the personal property owner taxpayers who paid the
delinquent taxes and collection costs on business personal
(movable) property taxes during the same period.

Shortly thereafter, on Feb. 15, 2019, the Plaintiffs implicitly
excluded from the Fransen class action, i.e., those who paid
delinquent ad valorem property taxes pursuant to the ordinance on
movable property, filed the instant separate class action petition
against the City.  They also named as Defendants the two entities
that collected the disputed taxes on the City's behalf: Linebarger,
Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P. and United Governmental Services of
Louisiana, Inc. (UGSL).

On March 19, 2019, Linebarger and UGSL removed the matter to
federal court.  The federal district court granted a motion to
sever the claims against the City from the claims against
Linebarger and UGSL on July 22, 2019, and remanded the claims
against the City back to state court.

On Aug. 6, 2019, shortly after the remand back to the Civil
District Court of Orleans Parish, the Plaintiffs filed the motion
to file the Motion for Class Certification that had been filed in
the U.S. District Court into the state district court case.  The
district court granted the motion, allowing the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Class Certification to be filed.  After the hearing (held on
March 20, 2020) and the filing of post-hearing memorandum by both
parties, the district court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Class Certification on Aug. 18, 2020.

The class is defined as follows: "Those persons and/or entities or
their heirs, successors, or assigns, who pursuant to New Orleans
City Ordinance No. 18637 were assessed City penalties and
collection/penalty fees by defendants and who paid these
unconstitutional penalties and collection/penalty fees, from April
17, 2000 through March 5, 2002, for late pay of business personal
ad valorem property taxes."

The City timely filed a motion for this devolutive appeal.  The
City assigns a singular error on appeal: "The trial court erred
when it denied the City's Exceptions of Prescription and No Cause
of Action."  However, although the motion for appeal filed by the
City seeks to appeal the district court's judgment of Aug. 18,
2020, that judgment does not deny the City's exceptions, it only
grants the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class.  Although the City
contends that the district court mentioned the exceptions in the
Reasons for Judgment, a "district court's oral or written reasons
for judgment form no part of the judgment, and that appellate
courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment."  Moreover, the
district court states in its Reasons for Judgment that the City's
exceptions were denied prior to the hearing on the Motion to
Certify Class.

Thus, because there is no judgment denying the exceptions contained
in the record before the Court of Appeal, the exceptions are not
properly before it for review.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal
only reviews whether the district court abused its discretion by
granting the Motion to Certify Class.

The issue before the Court in the appeal is whether the district
court erred in granting the Plaintiffs' class certification motion.
On appeal, the City argues that the claims of these Plaintiffs
(who paid delinquent taxes and penalties under the unconstitutional
ordinance on immovable property) is prescribed.  The City's
argument is based on federal jurisprudence and principles not
recognized in Louisiana law and previously rejected by the
Louisiana Supreme Court -- Duckworth, 2011-2835, p. 13, 125 So.2d
at 1065 (consistent with dictates of civil law, in resolving issues
Louisiana courts must first look to the language of the pertinent
codal provision, "not the jurisprudence and not the decisions of
the federal courts").

The Court of Appeal holds that the district court did not err in
granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.  The class
plaintiffs in the matter timely followed Louisiana law and
procedure, timely filing the appropriate petitions and motions at
each stage of the proceeding.  The City does not dispute the
unconstitutionality of the ordinance or that the class plaintiffs
paid tax penalties and collections costs pursuant to the
unconstitutional ordinance.  Its argument that the Court should
look to federal jurisprudence to find the Plaintiffs' claims
prescribed in the matter and, therefore, procedurally barred is
without merit under Louisiana law.

After consideration of the record in light of the applicable law
and arguments of the parties, the district court judgment is
affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/u387rdh9 from Leagle.com.

Allain F. Hardin -- afhardin@aol.com -- FRANSEN & HARDIN, A.P.L.C.,
at 807 Howard Avenue, in New Orleans, Louisiana 70113, COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES.

Lawrence Blake Jones, BLAKE JONES LAW FIRM, LLC, at 701 Poydras
St., Suite 4100, in New Orleans, Louisiana 70139; and Errol Barry
Conley, LAW OFFICE OF ERROL B. CONLEY, at 701 Poydras St., Suite
4100, in New Orleans, Louisiana 70139, COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.


NEW YORK MUTUAL: Lee Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensations
------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathon Lee, on behalf of himself, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly-situated v. NEW YORK MUTUAL TRADING INC., and
MASATOSHI OHATA, individually, Case No. 2:21-cv-10784 (D.N.J., May
5, 2021), is brought for damages and equitable relief based upon
the Defendants' willful violations of the Plaintiff's rights
guaranteed to him by: the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law; the full
payment provisions of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law; and any
other claims that can be inferred from the facts set forth herein.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have willfully failed to
pay the Plaintiff the wages lawfully due to him under the FLSA, the
NJWHL, and the NJWPL. Specifically, the Defendants have required
the Plaintiff to work, and the Plaintiff routinely does work, more
than forty hours in a workweek, but the Defendants have failed to
compensate the Plaintiff at the statutorily-required overtime rate
of one and one-half times his regular rate for many of the hours
that he has worked per week in excess of forty.

Rather, the Defendants pay the Plaintiff based on two monthly pay
periods--from the first through the fifteen of each month and then
from the sixteenth through the end of each month--and while the
Defendants pay the Plaintiff overtime at one and one-half times his
regular rate for the hours that he works over forty in a workweek
when those hours fall within a single bi-monthly pay period, for
the hours worked over forty that occur during a single workweek but
that accumulate over two pay periods, the Defendants pay the
Plaintiff at his regular rate of pay for those hours. Further, the
Defendants do not pay the Plaintiff at any rate for between two and
two and one-half hours each week that Plaintiff works in excess of
forty, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff has worked for the Defendants as a small vehicle
delivery driver from September 1, 2018 through the present.

The Defendants is a New Jersey corporation that provides food and
other supplies to Japanese restaurants in New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Frank J. Tantone, Esq.
          BORRELLI & ASSOCIATES, P.L.L.C.
          910 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
          Garden City New York 11530
          Phone: (516) 248-5550
          Fax: (516) 248-6027
          Email: fjt@employmentlawyernewyork.com


NEW YORK: Labor Unions Can't Intervene in Policing Suit, Court Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Colleen McMahon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied without prejudice the labor unions'
motions to intervene in the case, In Re: New York City Policing
During Summer Demonstrations, Case Nos. 20-cv-8924 (CM)(GWG),
20-cv-10291 (CM)(GWG), 20-cv-10541 (CM)(GWG), 21-cv-322 (CM)(GWG),
21-cv-533 (CM)(GWG), 21-cv-1904 (CM)(GWG)(S.D.N.Y.).

These six consolidated civil rights actions were filed between
October 2020 and March 2021 against the City of New York, the New
York Police Department (NYPD), leaders of both entities, and
multiple individual NYPD officers.  The lawsuits allege that the
Defendants engaged in -- and continue to engage in --
unconstitutional conduct in response to demonstrations throughout
New York City.

Before the Court are motions to intervene filed by labor unions
representing three large groups of police officers: The Sergeant's
Benevolent Association (SBA), the Police Benevolent Association
(PBA), and the Detectives' Endowment Association (DEA).

The SBA and DEA seek to intervene in just one of the six
consolidated cases: People of the State of New York v. City of New
York, et al., No. 21-cv-322, which is the only case not brought on
behalf of individual plaintiffs and the only case that does not
seek any compensatory damages.  The PBA seeks to intervene in all
six cases; it makes essentially the same arguments as the other two
unions.

These six consolidated cases arise from civilian interactions with
NYPD officers during protests for racial justice and police reform
that occurred throughout the summer of 2020.  The lawsuits allege
that the NYPD behaved unconstitutionally in responding to the
protests, and that officers used excessive and unnecessary force
against nonviolent protestors, journalists, and bystanders.  The
Plaintiffs claim that these responses are reflective of a pattern
of unconstitutional conduct by the NYPD in responding to peaceful
protests.

Five of the six actions are filed on behalf of individuals who were
present at various demonstrations -- Payne v. De Blasio, No.
20-cv-8924; Sierra v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-10291; Wood v. De
Blasio, No. 20-cv-10541; Sow v. City of New York, No. 21-cv-533;
Yates v. New York City, No. 21-cv-1904.  Payne was brought on
behalf of a group of identified individuals; Sierra, Wood and Sow
were filed as class actions, with the named plaintiffs seeking to
represent a class of individuals who were wronged by police conduct
during the protests.  In addition to claims against the City, all
five of these cases also allege claims against individual NYPD
officers (some named, some not yet identified) and seek
compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 on behalf of the
named plaintiffs and, presumably, absent class members in the class
action cases.  Two of the five cases -- Payne and Sow -- also seek
injunctive relief against the City, to prevent the continuation of
policies the Plaintiffs assert are illegal.

The sixth case, People, is filed in parens patriae by the Attorney
General of the State of New York. The only defendants in People are
the City, Mayor Bill De Blasio, Police Commissioner Dermot Shea,
and NYPD Chief of Department Terence Monahan ("City Defendants").
The complaint in People alleges three claims under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 and another eight claims under New York law, with the
State claiming jurisdiction to pursue the action pursuant to
Executive Law Section 63(1) and the parens patriae doctrine, which
"allows states to bring suit on behalf of their citizens in certain
circumstances by asserting a 'quasi-sovereign interest.'"  The
lawsuit does not allege any claims against any individual NYPD
officer, and the amended complaint, which focuses exclusively on
the practices and policies of the NYPD, seeks only declaratory and
injunctive relief.

At a Feb. 22, 2021 hearing, the Court set March 3 as the deadline
for any nonparties to file motions to intervene.  By that date four
such motions were filed, three by the police unions and one by a
pro se plaintiff.  As noted, the SBA and DEA have moved to
intervene only in the People action; they do not claim any interest
in any of the actions filed by individual plaintiffs seeking
monetary relief.  The PBA seeks to intervene in all six of the
consolidated cases.

Each union asserts similar interests.  The SBA wishes to intervene
to "defend against potential remedies that will impair police
officer safety and the ability of officers to fulfill their duty to
protect the public," to "defend against court findings and orders
on the particular allegations," and "to defend against potential
remedies that can infringe on collective bargaining rights."  The
DEA asserts interests in the integrity of "statutorily created
collective bargaining rights," "the terms and conditions contained
in its collective bargaining agreement," and "the health and safety
of DEA members."  And the PBA asserts interests in officers'
"personal safety, their collective bargaining and other statutory
rights," as well as "their reputations and other interests that
stand to be affected."

The unions' purported interests can be grouped accordingly: (1) an
interest in their collective-bargaining rights, and how any future
injunctions or settlements/consent decrees might impact working
conditions or officer safety; and (2) an interest in how any
findings of fact made by the Court might impact officer
reputations, any disciplinary proceedings involving individual
officers, or how the NYPD handles disciplinary procedures more
generally. Fundamentally, the unions are worried that this
litigation will lead to changes in NYPD policy over how future
protests are handled, and they insist they need to be able to
defend against any changes they find objectionable.

Both the Plaintiffs and City Defendants have filed briefs in
opposition to the unions' motions.

Judge McMahon denied the unions' motions to intervene.  She
explains that at this stage of the litigation, the focus is on
whether the Defendants are liable for what the Plaintiffs allege --
that certain NYPD tactics during protests are unconstitutional.
When framed this way, she holds that no interest asserted by the
unions is implicated.  The unions might have an interest if the
parties were to propose a settlement that would result in changes
to NYPD tactics/personnel procedures, or if the Court, at the
remedy stage after liability was found, was considering the
imposition of injunctive relief that would have the same effect.
Theoretically, the Judge finds that such relief might have a
practical impact on the unions' collective-bargaining interests,
although that is far from clear.  But any such interest is too
speculative at the current stage of the litigation to warrant
intervention.

The unions' motion in the alternative to be granted permissive
intervention is denied for substantially the same reasons as Judge
McMahon has just outlined with respect to the Rule 24(a).  She says
because the unions have not demonstrated a cognizable interest in
the merits of the litigation with respect to its
collective-bargaining rights or to any collateral consequences,
they have not asserted "a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact."

The three unions' motions to intervene are denied, without
prejudice to renewal if the City agrees to any proposed settlement
or consent decree that impacts the unions' collective-bargaining
rights, or if the Court proposes to order injunctive relief that
does so.

The Clerk is directed to remove the motions at Dkt. Nos. 45, 48,
and 51 from the Court's list of pending motions.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Memorandum Decision
& Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/b64xn3e6 from
Leagle.com.


NEW YORK: O'Donnell Suit Remitted to Supreme Court for Judgment
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, O'DONNELL & SONS, INC., ETC., Appellant v. NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, ET AL., Respondents,
2019-00150, Index No. 52772/17 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department,
remits the matter to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for the
entry of a judgment declaring that mortgages issued by New York
State federal credit unions are not exempt from the imposition of
the New York State mortgage recording tax.

In a purported class action, inter alia, to recover certain New
York State mortgage recording tax payments and for a judgment
declaring that New York State federal credit unions and their
members are exempt from the imposition of the New York State
mortgage recording tax, the Plaintiff appeals from the order of the
Supreme Court, Dutchess County (James D. Pagones, J.), dated Dec.
6, 2018, that granted the Defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR
3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, and denied, as academic, the
Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment declaring that
mortgages issued by New York State federal credit unions are exempt
from the imposition of the New York State mortgage recording tax.

The Appellate Division modified the order, on the law, by deleting
the provision thereof granting that branch of the Defendants'
motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the cause of
action for a judgment declaring that mortgages issued by New York
State federal credit unions are exempt from the imposition of the
New York State mortgage recording tax, and adding thereto a
provision deeming that branch of the Defendants' motion to be for a
declaratory judgment in their favor, and thereupon granting that
branch of the Defendants' motion.  As so modified, the Appellate
Division affirmed the order, with costs to the Defendants.  The
matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for the
entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that mortgages issued by
New York State federal credit unions are not exempt from the
imposition of the New York State mortgage recording tax.

The Plaintiff commenced the purported class action seeking, inter
alia, a declaration that mortgages issued by New York State federal
credit unions are exempt from the imposition of the New York State
mortgage recording tax.  The Defendants moved, among other things,
pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.  The Plaintiff cross-moved for summary
judgment declaring that mortgages issued by New York State federal
credit unions are exempt from the imposition of the New York State
mortgage recording tax.  The Supreme Court granted the Defendants'
motion and denied, as academic, the Plaintiff's cross-motion.

The Appellate Division holds that upon a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action, a court may reach the merits of
a properly pleaded cause of action for a declaratory judgment where
no questions of fact are presented by the controversy.  Under such
circumstances, the motion to dismiss the cause of action for
failure to state a cause of action should be treated as one seeking
a declaration in the defendant's favor and treated accordingly.  
Applying these principles to the case, as a matter of law, the
Appellate Division finds that the Defendants were entitled to a
declaration in their favor that mortgages issued by New York State
federal credit unions are not exempt from the imposition of the New
York State mortgage recording tax.

The precise question was decided in Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union v
New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin. (20 N.Y.3d 1, 13), where
the Court of Appeals held that, based on principles of statutory
interpretation and the legislative history of the Federal Credit
Union Act, mortgages issued by New York State federal credit unions
are not exempt from the imposition of the New York State mortgage
recording tax.  The Appellate Division is bound by the Court of
Appeals' decision in Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union, despite
conflicting federal intermediate court decisions which post-date
it.  The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or
need not be reached in light of the determination.

Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the
Appellate Division remits the matter to the Supreme Court, Dutchess
County, for the entry of a judgment, inter alia, declaring that
mortgages issued by New York State federal credit unions are not
exempt from the imposition of the New York State mortgage recording
tax.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Decision & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4nt96t7u from Leagle.com.

Paul Quartararo, Esq., PLLC (Law Offices of John F. Harnes, PLLC,
in New York City, of counsel), for Appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, in New York City (Steven C. Wu and
Caroline A. Olsen of counsel), for Respondents.


NEW YORK: Second Circuit Appeal Filed in Gulino Suit re Azeez
-------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Board of Education of the City School District of the
City of New York filed an appeal from the District Court's Judgment
dated April 1, 2021, entered in the lawsuit styled GULINO, ET AL.
v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, Case No. 96-cv-8414, in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (New York City).

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the
Plaintiffs, a group of African-American and Latino teachers in the
New York City public school system, alleged that the Defendant, the
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
Section 2000e et seq., by requiring Plaintiffs to pass certain
racially discriminatory standardized tests in order to obtain a
license to teach in New York City public schools. Judge Constance
Baker Motley, to whom the case was originally assigned, certified
the plaintiff class on July 13, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

On December 5, 2012, the Court decertified the Plaintiff class to
the extent it sought damages and individualized injunctive relief
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). The class survived, however, to
the extent Plaintiffs sought relief that may be awarded under Rule
23(b)(2), including a declaratory judgment regarding liability and
class-wide injunctive relief.

The Defendant seeks a review of the Court's Judgment classifying
Mojeed Azeez as a member of the Plaintiff class in this action, and
holding that the Plaintiff is entitled to monetary and injunctive
relief from Defendant as compensation for the injuries she suffered
as a result of what the Court found to be the Defendant's
discrimination.

The appellate case is captioned as In re: New York City Board of
Education, Case No. 21-1118, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, filed on March 25, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York is represented by:

          James Edward Johnson, Esq.
          CORPORATION COUNSEL
          NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT
          100 Church Street
          New York, NY 10007
          Telephone: (212) 356-2500

Plaintiff-Appellee Mojeed Azeez is represented by:

          Joshua S. Sohn, Esq.
          STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP
          180 Maiden Lane
          New York, NY 10038
          Telephone: (212) 806-1245
          E-mail: jsohn@stroock.com

OKONITE COMPANY: Parrish Seeks to Certify Nonexempt Employee Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as WALTER PARRISH,
Individually, and on Behalf of Other Members of the Public
Similarly Situated and the State of California, v. THE OKONITE
COMPANY, INC., a corporation; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,
Case No. 2:20-cv-09000-JFW-JC (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff will move
the Court on May 17, 2021 to enter an order:

   1. granting the motion for class certification;

   2. certifying the Class as follows:

      "any and all persons who are or were employed as an hourly-
      paid nonexempt employee by The Okonite Company, Inc. at its
      Santa Maria, California plant from April 6, 2016, until
      resolution of this lawsuit who were required to remain at the

      plant during meal-and-rest breaks or required to obtain
      permission to leave the premises during meal-and-rest
      breaks;"

   3. appointing the Plaintiff Parrish as class representative;

   4. appointing Mohammed K. Ghods, Jeremy A. Rhyne, and Ruben
      Escobedo as class counsel; and

   5. directing further proceedings regarding notice to the class.

The Plaintiff Parrish filed this putative class action on behalf of
nonexempt hourly-paid employees who worked at The Okonite Company,
Inc.'s plant in Santa Maria, CA (Plant) between April 6, 2016, and
the present (Statutory Period). The Plaintiff alleges that, as a
result of uniform company policies and practices, Class Members
were not free to leave the Plant during their breaks. Okonite
violated California law, says Parrish.

The Okonite Company is an American manufacturer of insulated wire
and cable.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xTsaBQ
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mohammed K. Ghods, Esq.
          Jeremy A. Rhyne, Esq.
          LEX OPUS
          2100 N. Broadway, Suite 210
          Santa Ana, CA 92706
          Telephone: (714) 558-8580
          Facsimile: (714) 558-8579
          E-mail: jrhyne@lexopusfirm.com

               - and -

          Ruben Escobedo, Esq.
          WORKWORLD LAW CORP.
          731 S. Lincoln Street
          Santa Maria, CA 93458
          Telephone: (805) 335-2476
          Facsimile: (805) 892-6213
          E-mail: ruben@workworldlaw.com

PENNSYLVANIA DOH: Chapman Files Suit in M.D. Pennsylvania
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Health, et al. The case is styled as
Lisa Chapman, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of
Health, Insight Global, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-00824-YK (M.D. Pa.,
May 5, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Pennsylvania Department of Health -- https://www.health.pa.gov/ --
provides programs, services and health related information for
adults, business owners, caregivers, health care providers and
more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James C. Haggerty, Esq.
          HAGGERTY, GOLDBERG, SCHLEIFER, & KUPERSMITH
          1835 Market Street, 27th Floor
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Phone: (267) 350-6600
          Email: chesser@hgsklawyers.com

               - and -

          John P. Goodrich, Esq.
          Lauren R. Nichols, Esq.
          429 Fourth Avenue, Suite 900
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Phone: (412) 261-4663

               - and -

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Highway East
          Second Floor
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Phone: (856) 772-7200
          Email: ecf@shublawyers.com
                 klaukaitis@shublawyers.com

               - and -

          Kenneth Nolan, Esq.
          Philip P. Dilucente, Esq.
          310 Grant Street, Suite 1801s
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Phone: (412) 281-5005

               - and -

          Scott B. Cooper, Esq.
          SCHMIDT KRAMER, P.C.
          209 State Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17101
          Phone: (717) 232-6300
          Email: scooper@schmidtkramer.com


PLURALSIGHT INC: INPRS Appeals Securities Suit Dismissal
---------------------------------------------------------
Lead Plaintiffs Indiana Public Retirement System (INPRS) and Public
School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago (CTPF)
filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled
INDIANA PUBLIC RETIREMENT SYSTEM, et al., Plaintiffs v.
PLURALSIGHT, INC., et al., Defendants, Case No.
1:19-cv-00128-JNP-DBP, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Utah.

According to the complaint, during the Class Period, Pluralsight
did not disclose to investors that, by the end of 2018, Pluralsight
was behind in its sales representative ramping capacity plan.
Pluralsight did, however, make numerous positive statements about
its sales force and infrastructure during the Class Period at a
conference, on a conference call with securities analysts and
investors, on its Form 10-K, on its Secondary Public Offering (SPO)
Documents, and on an earnings call with securities analysts and
investors. Also during the Class Period, Defendants, Aaron Skonnard
(Pluralsight's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman) and James
Budge (Pluralsight's Chief Financial Officer), allegedly sold
significant quantities of their Pluralsight stock at peak prices
and in a concentrated period pursuant to 10b5-1 trading plans that
they had created at the end of 2018. The stock quantities that
Skonnard and Budge sold were substantially greater than the amount
of stock that they sold either before or after the Class Period and
represented a significant percentage of each of their respective
total holdings. Skonnard and Budge sold additional shares through
Pluralsight's SPO in March 2019. Skonnard sold more of his shares
on July 26, 2019, the suit asserts.

The Plaintiffs sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. Their Exchange Act claims
are as follows: violations of Section 10(b) and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 against Pluralsight, Skonnard, and
Budge; Section 20(a) against Skonnard and Budge; and Section 20A
against Skonnard and Budge. Plaintiffs' Security Act claims are as
follows: violations of Section 11 against Pluralsight, the Signer
Defendants, and the Underwriter Defendants; Section 12(a)(2)
against Pluralsight and the Underwriter Defendants; and Section 15
against the Signer Defendants. Plaintiffs also allege violations of
Items 303 and 105 of Regulation S-K as part of their Exchange Act
and Securities Act claims.

The Plaintiffs now seek a review of the Court's Order dated March
31, 2021, and Court's Memorandum Decision dated March 31, 2021,
granting, among other things, Defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, and dismissing all claims without
prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Indiana Public Retirement
System, et al. v. Pluralsight, Inc. et al., Case No. 21-4058, in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, filed on
April 29, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiffs-Appellants Indiana Public Retirement System and Public
School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago and the
Proposed Class are represented by:

          Keith M. Woodwell, Esq.
          Joseph D. Watkins, Esq.
          CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS, P.C.
          201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
          Salt Lake City, UT 84111
          Telephone: (801) 322-2516
          Facsimile: (801) 521-6280
          E-mail: kmw@clydesnow.com
                  jdw@clydesnow.com

               - and -

          Carol V. Gilden, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          190 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1705
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 357-0370
          Facsimile: (312) 357-0369
          E-mail: cgilden@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Steve J. Toll, Esq.
          Megan Kistler, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          1100 New York Avenue NW, Suite 500
          Washington, DC 20005
          Telephone: (202) 408-4600
          Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
          E-mail: stoll@cohenmilstein.com
                  mkistler@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Joel P. Laitman, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          88 Pine Street, 14th Fl.
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 838-7797
          Facsimile: (212) 838-7745
          E-mail: jlaitman@cohenmilstein.com

REHAB AMERICA: Faces Buckley Suit Over Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------
GINGER BUCKLEY and RHONDA PERRIGO, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, v. REHAB AMERICA, INC., and TRUADVANTAGE
MISSOURI LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00296 (M.D. Tenn., April 12, 2021)
seeks to recover unpaid wages, including all overtime compensation
due under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as liquidated
damages, interest, costs and expenses, and attorneys' fees.

This is a collective action brought pursuant to the FLSA by
Representative Plaintiffs Ginger Buckley and Rhonda Perrigo, on
behalf of themselves and all similarly situated current and former
non-exempt, hourly-paid occupational therapy assistants, and
physical therapy assistants, who worked at any of the skilled
nursing and rehabilitation facilities at which Defendants provided
occupational and/or physical therapy services from April 12, 2018,
through the present, and who worked "off the clock" or were not
paid for all overtime hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a
workweek.

Ginger Buckley worked as a Physical Therapy Assistant for
Defendants, primarily at Defendants' Northbrooke facility in
Jackson, Tennessee, and was paid hourly.

Rhonda Perrigo worked as a Certified Occupational Therapy Assistant
for Defendants, primarily at Defendants' Northbrooke and West
Tennessee Transitional Care facilities in Jackson, Tennessee, and
was paid an hourly rate of pay.

Rehab America offers physical, speech and occupational therapies in
partnership with skilled nursing facilities and other healthcare
providers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter F. Klett, Esq.
          Joshua Burgener, Esq.
          424 Church Street, Suite 800
          Nashville, TN 37219
          Telephone: (615) 244-6538
          Facsimile: (844) 670-6009
          E-mail: pklett@dickinsonwright.com
                  jburgener@dickinsonwright.com


RITE AID: Bailey's Bid to Certify Consumer Class Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, THOMAS BAILEY, Plaintiff v. RITE AID CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-06926 YGR (N.D. Cal.), Judge Yvonne
Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California:

    (i) grants Bailey's motion for class certification under
        Rule 23(b)(3); and

   (ii) denies without prejudice Bailey's motion for class
        certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

Plaintiff Bailey brings the proposed class action against Defendant
Rite Aid for state-law claims arising out of Rite Aid's marketing
of its over-the-counter acetaminophen gelcaps as "rapid release."
Rite Aid produces, manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells a
generic version of certain over-the-counter drugs under the Rite
Aid brand, including the Rite Aid gelcaps.

In his First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Bailey alleges that Rite
Aid "misled and continues to mislead consumers about the nature,
quality, and effectiveness" of the Rite Aid gelcaps through its
labeling.  As shown on the package of the Rite Aid gelcaps, the
term "'rapid release' does not actually mean that the drug works
faster for consumers than non-rapid release products," as studies
show that "traditional, non-rapid release acetaminophen products
can be equally effective in the same, if not faster, time period
than its Rite Aid rapid release products."  Rite Aid nevertheless
charges a premium for its rapid release gelcaps, and it markets the
Rite Aid gelcaps with "false, misleading, unfair, deceptive
labeling and marketing in an effort to dupe consumers into
purchasing these gelcaps for prices that exceed their true value."

Mr. Bailey purchased a bottle of Rite Aid gelcaps, 100-count, in
mid-2018 at a Rite Aid store in Alameda County, California, for a
price that was higher than Rite Aid's acetaminophen tablets in the
same count, which were not labeled as "rapid release."  He
purchased the Rite Aid gelcaps "over other Rite Aid brand and other
acetaminophen products solely because they were labeled as rapid
release and he was seeking 'faster' relief." Rite Aid's labeling
misled Bailey into believing that the Rite Aid gelcaps he purchased
would provide faster relief than other, cheaper Rite Aid
acetaminophen products. Id. Had Bailey known that the Rite Aid
gelcaps did not act any faster than traditional, cheaper Rite Aid
products, he would not have been willing to pay the premium that he
paid for the Rite Aid gelcaps. Instead, "he would have purchased a
cheaper, just as effective and just as fast acting acetaminophen
product."  "The cost of the Rite Aid gelcaps exceeded the value of
the product and Plaintiff Bailey did not receive the benefit of the
bargain."

In the FAC, Bailey asserts claims for: (1) violations of the False
Advertising Law ("FAL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17500; (2)
violations of the Unfair Competition Law2 ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code Section 17200; (3) violations of the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Cal. Civ. Code Section 1761; and (4) unjust
enrichment.  He seeks an award of actual damages; restitution;
prospective injunctive relief; attorneys' fees and costs; and pre-
and post-judgment interest.

Now pending is Bailey's motion for class certification under Rule
23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2).  In his class certification motion,
Bailey defines the proposed class he seeks to certify under Rules
23(b)(3) and 23(b)(2) as follows: "All persons who purchased the
Class Rapid Release Gelcaps in the State of California within the
applicable statute of limitations established by the State of
California through the final disposition of this action."

The proposed class includes every consumer who purchased Rite Aid
gelcaps in California during the class period.  Bailey conceded
during the hearing held on April 6, 2021, that only consumers who
purchased the Rite Aid gelcaps at Rite Aid brick-and-mortar stores
would be able to make the price and label comparison upon which his
theory of liability depends.  Accordingly, Bailey agreed that his
proposed class can be narrowed to include only consumers who made
in-store purchases of Rite Aid gelcaps.

Judge Rogers' analysis as to whether the requirements of Rule 23
are satisfied is based on the revised and more limited class
definition that Bailey proposed at oral argument.

Discussion

I. Motions to Seal

As a preliminary matter, both sides have submitted administrative
motions to seal documents or portions of documents offered in
support of their class certification briefing.  While the standard
for sealing documents in connection with class certification does
not require "compelling reasons" as set forth in Pintos v. Pacific
Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010), Judge Rogers
nevertheless finds that the sealing requests are overbroad and good
cause has not been established to seal certain documents to the
extent requested.  She has considered the basis offered for
sealing, as well as the significance to her decision of the
portions sought to be sealed, in determining which portions to cite
or quote in her Order.  The motions to seal are granted only
insofar as they are not necessary to her analysis.

Therefore, to the extent that she has quoted or recited in her
Opinion the contents of any specific portion of a document or
material subject to a motion to seal, Judge Rogers denies the
motion to seal that information for lack of good cause.  The
motions to seal, Docket Nos. 92, 95, 107, 115, are otherwise
granted for good cause shown.

II. Motion to Certify Class Under Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2)

A. Rule 23(a)

Judge Rogers finds that (i) Rite Aid does not dispute that Bailey's
showing satisfies the numerosity requirement; (ii) Bailey has met
his burden to show that the question of whether a reasonable
consumer would have found the "rapid release" statement to be
material is capable of resolution with common evidence; (iii)
Bailey has satisfied the typicality requirement, except with
respect to his request to seek prospective injunctive relief on
behalf of a Rule 23(b)(2) class; and (iv) she has no concerns
regarding the adequacy of counsel.

B. Rule 23(b)

As to Rule 23(b)(3), Judge Rogers finds that (i) t the predominance
requirement is satisfied with respect to the UCL, FAL, and CLRA
claims because Bailey has met his burden to show that common
questions predominate over individual ones with respect to his CLRA
claim; (ii) Bailey indicated that, at this juncture, he no longer
seeks class certification with respect to his unjust enrichment
claim; (iii) Bailey has met his burden to show that his proposed
damages model comports with Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27,
33 (2013) and that damages are capable of measurement on a
class-wide basis; and (iv) Rite Aid does not dispute that Bailey's
showing satisfies the superiority requirement.  Hence, Bailey's
motion for class certification is denies without prejudice with
respect to his unjust enrichment claim.

As to Rule 23(b)(2), Judge Rogers finds that Bailey has not shown
that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) would be appropriate because
he has not shown that he can satisfy the typicality and
adequacy-of-representation requirements under Rule 23(a) in light
of his deposition testimony, which suggests that he may not have
standing under Article III to seek prospective injunctive relief.
She denies without prejudice Bailey's motion for certification
under Rule 23(b)(2).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rogers grants Bailey's motion for
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) with respect to his claims
under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA.  While granting the motion, she
reaffirms that it is not a resolution on the merits and had a
properly conducted survey reached the same results as were
presented, the result may have been different.  The Judge otherwise
denies without prejudice Bailey's motion for class certification.
Her Order terminates Docket Numbers 92, 95, 96, 107, 115.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/echy62y4 from Leagle.com.


SANTANDER CONSUMER: Stipulated Protective Order Entered in Wilson
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRENZETTA WILSON, et al., Plaintiffs v. SANTANDER
CONSUMER USA, INC., Defendant, Case No. 4:20-cv-00152-KGB (E.D.
Ark.), Judge Kristine G. Baker of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, signed the Parties'
stipulated protective order.

Pursuant to the Court's authority under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c), among other things, it is ordered that:

     a. Scope: All documents produced in the course of discovery,
including initial disclosures, all responses to discovery requests,
all deposition testimony and exhibits, other materials which may be
subject to restrictions on disclosure for good cause and
information derived directly therefrom, will be subject to the
Order concerning confidential information.  The Order is subject to
the Local Rules of the District and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on matters of procedure and calculation of time periods.

     b. Form and Timing of Designation: A party may designate
documents as confidential and restricted in disclosure under the
Order by placing or affixing the words "CONFIDENTIAL" on the
document in a manner that will not interfere with the legibility of
the document and that will permit complete removal of the
CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER designation.  Documents
will be designated CONFIDENTIAL prior to or at the time of the
production or disclosure of the documents.  When electronically
stored information is produced which itself cannot be marked with
the designation CONFIDENTIAL, the physical media on which such
electronically stored information is or the file name of the
electronically stored information produced will be marked with the
applicable designation.  The party receiving such electronically
stored information will then be responsible for labeling any copies
that it creates thereof, whether electronic or paper, with the
applicable designation.

     c. Documents Which May be Designated CONFIDENTIAL: Any party
may designate documents as CONFIDENTIAL upon making a good faith
determination that the documents contain information protected from
disclosure by statute or that should be protected from disclosure
as confidential personal information, medical or psychiatric
information, trade secrets, personnel records, or such other
sensitive commercial information that is not publicly available.
Public records and other information or documents that are publicly
available may not be designated as CONFIDENTIAL.

     d. Depositions: Oral or transcribed testimony may be
designated by any party or third party as CONFIDENTIAL either by an
oral statement on the record during the deposition, or by providing
written notice to all other parties and the court reporter within
30 days following the deposition, hearing, or other proceeding.

     e. Protection of Confidential Material: Documents designated
CONFIDENTIAL under the Order will not be used or disclosed by the
parties, counsel for the parties or any other persons identified
for any purpose whatsoever other than to prepare for and to conduct
discovery and trial in this action, including any appeal thereof.
Any and all documents that may have been subject to sealing during
discovery or motion practice will not enjoy a protected or
confidential designation if the matter comes on for hearing,
argument, or trial in the courtroom.  The hearing, argument, or
trial will be public in all respects.

     f. Challenges by a Party to Designation as Confidential: Any
CONFIDENTIAL designation is subject to challenge by a
non-designating party to this action. The objecting party will have
an obligation to meet and confer in a good faith effort to resolve
the objection by agreement, at least 14 days before filing any
motions or objections to a confidentiality designation with the
Court.

     g. Action by the Court: Applications to the Court for an order
relating to any documents designated CONFIDENTIAL will be by motion
consistent with the Court's local rules, standing orders, and any
other relevant orders.

     h. Use of Confidential Documents or Information at Trial: All
trials are open to the public.  Absent order of the Court, there
will be no restrictions on the use of any document that may be
introduced by any party during the trial.

     i. Obligations on Conclusion of Litigation: Unless otherwise
agreed or ordered, this Order will remain in force after dismissal
or entry of final judgment not subject to further appeal.  After
dismissal or entry of final judgment not subject to further appeal,
the Clerk may elect to return to counsel for the parties or, after
notice, destroy documents filed or offered at trial under seal or
otherwise restricted by the Court as to disclosure.

     j. Order Subject to Modification: The Order will be subject to
modification by the Court on its own motion or on motion of a party
or any other person with standing concerning the subject matter.
Motions to modify the Order will be served and filed pursuant to
Local Rules, the Court's standing orders, and any other relevant
orders.

     k. No Prior Judicial Determination: The Order is entered based
on the representations and agreements of the parties and for the
purpose of facilitating discovery.

     l. Persons Bound: The Order will take effect when entered and
will be binding upon all counsel and their law firms, the parties,
and persons made subject to the Order by its terms.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/7szphebe from Leagle.com.


SCOTTSDALE BOONDOCKS: Wander Sues Over Failure to Pay OT Wages
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hailey Wander, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Scottsdale Boondocks LLC d/b/a Boondocks Patio and
Grill, an Arizona Corporation; Jacob Kory and Heidi Hedlund Kory, a
Married Couple; and Luke Kory and Angie Kory, a Married Couple,
Case No. 2:21-cv-00805-SPL (D. Ariz., May 5, 2021), is brought
against the Defendants for their unlawful failure to pay overtime
in violation of the Fair Labor Standards.

The Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of
clocking out the Plaintiff and the Collective Members instead of
paying them for the full amount of time worked in violation of the
FLSA. The Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of
forcing the Plaintiff and the Collective Members to pool their tips
and then the Defendants would pay managers and security guards with
a portion of those tips in violation of the FLSA. The Defendants
engaged in the regular policy and practice of subjecting the
Plaintiff and the Collective Members to their policy and practice
of failing to pay them one and one-half times their regular rates
of pay for all time they worked more than 40 hours per week, in
violation of the FLSA, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff began employment with the Defendants as a bartender
and server on May 2018.

Boondocks is patio bar located in Old Town Scottsdale that serves
food, beer, spirits, and wine.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert S. Reder, Esq.
          Shayna Fernandez Watts, Esq.
          BLYTHE GRACE PLLC
          4040 East Camelback Road, Suite 275
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Phone: (602) 237-5366
          Facsimile: (602) 237-5546
          Email: robert@blythegrace.com
                 shayna@blythegrace.com


SHELLPOINT PARTNERS: Dutcher Files TCPA Suit in E.D. Pennsylvania
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Shellpoint Partners
LLC, et al. The case is styled as Ross Dutcher, individually and on
behalf of a class of all persons and entities similarly situated v.
Shellpoint Partners LLC, NEWREZ LLC doing business as: Shellpoint
Mortgage Services, Case No. 2:21-cv-02062-MAK (E.D. Pa., May 5,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act for Restrictions of Use of Telephone
Equipment.

Shellpoint Partners LLC -- https://www.shellpointllc.com/ --
provides residential mortgage services. The Company provides
specialty finance for both lending and servicing solutions to its
clients via its wholly-owned operating platforms.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Lawrence J. Lederer, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP - Morgantown
          1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite 540
          Washington, DC 20007
          Phone: (202) 463-2101
          Fax: (202) 463-2103
          Email: llederer@baileyglasser.com


SPINX GAMES: Court Denies Bid for TRO in Heathcote Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WILLIAM HEATHCOTE, Plaintiff v. SPINX GAMES LTD., et
al., Defendants, Case No. C20-1310-RSM (W.D. Wash.), Chief District
Judge Ricardo S. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Seattle, denied the Plaintiff's
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order against the Defendants.

The Plaintiff is a Washington citizen who began playing "Cash
FrenzyTM Casino - Free Slots Games" and "Vegas Slots - Casino
Slots," which are virtual casino games owned and operated by
Defendants SpinX Games, Grande Games Ltd., and Beijing Bole
Technology Co., Ltd.  All three Defendants are Chinese companies
with principal places of business outside the United States, in
either Hong Kong or Beijing.  However, the Plaintiff claims that
SpinX Games maintains an office at 2021 Fillmore St., #93, in San
Francisco, California, given that U.S.-based customers may contact
the Defendants at that address.

Players play the Defendants' virtual casino games on their mobile
phones.  The Defendants provide a bundle of free "coins" to
first-time visitors used in the slot machine games, but once
players lose their initial bundle of coins, they may purchase
additional coins starting at $1.99 for 750,000 coins.  The
Plaintiff began playing these virtual casino games on or around
spring 2020.  He lost his initial bundle of free coins and began
purchasing additional coins.  Between June 2020 and August 2020,
the Plaintiff lost approximately $300 through playing the
Defendants' virtual casino games.

The Plaintiff initiated the action on Sept. 1, 2020 against Grande
Games on behalf of himself and putative class members, alleging
violations of Washington law for recovery of money lost at
gambling, RCW Section 4.24.070, the Washington Consumer Protection
Act, RCW Section 19.86.010, and unjust enrichment.  After summons
were issued, the Plaintiff moved to strike the case schedule on the
basis that he was commencing service upon Grande Games through the
Hague Convention.  Because the Plaintiff anticipated that service
through the Hague Convention would take "4 to 6 months," the Court
granted his request to strike deadlines and granted him until March
22, 2021 to update the Court as to the status of service.

On March 30, 2021, the Plaintiff submitted a status report advising
that he was "still working through the Hague Convention" to effect
service, but "just learned that the Defendant now has a subsidiary
head quartered in California."  He advised that he would be filing
a petition for alternative service on the subsidiary "in the near
future" and would update the Court on status of service on or
before April 30, 2021.  On April 9, 2021, the Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint adding SpinX Games and Beijing Bole as
Defendants.  As of the date of the instant Order, the Plaintiff has
not filed a petition for alternative service.  Instead, on April
20, 2021, he filed the instant TRO motion.

The Plaintiff's TRO motion seeks emergency relief related to a
pop-up window that currently displays on players' devices when they
open the gaming application.  This pop-up identifies Defendants'
new Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, which was updated on Feb.
8, 2021 and published on the Defendants' website on Feb. 23, 2021.
The updated Terms of Service added an arbitration agreement and
Class Action Waiver not contained in the previous Terms of Service.
Since the updated Terms of Service were published, players opening
any of the Defendants' games encounter a pop-up notice entitled,
"We updated our Terms of Service and Privacy Policy."  Below the
notice is a button that reads in bolded letters: "I agree, Let's
Play!"

In mid-April, the Plaintiff's counsel began to receive phone calls
from players inquiring about the "pop-up" window in the virtual
casino games.  The following week, on April 20, 2021, the Plaintiff
filed the instant TRO requesting that the Court asserts control
over communications by the Defendants with the putative class
members pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d).  Specifically, he
requests the Court requires the Defendants to (1) immediately stop
displaying the pop-up; and (2) restore the Terms of Use to the
version in place at the time the case was filed.  On April 23,
2021, the Defendants filed a Response opposing the Plaintiff's
motion.

Discussion

A. Failure to Effect Service

As an initial matter, the Defendants argue that the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the action given the Plaintiff's failure
to effect service.  The Plaintiff concedes that he has not served
Defendants with the summons and complaint.  Although he claims that
the Defendants "have evaded service of the lawsuit," he has not
petitioned for alternative service.  To the extent he deposited a
copy of the instant motion at a mailbox address in San Francisco,
the Defendants dispute that delivery to the Fillmore Street address
constitutes proper service, given that it is not the address of any
office of the Defendants.

Judge Martinez finds it highly doubtful that the Defendants have
been properly served at this time.  However, he declines to rule on
the service issue before the matter is fully briefed.  Likewise,
given that the Defendants have appeared and filed a response, the
Judge will not deny the instant motion for failure to provide
notice under LCR 65.

B. TRO Motion

The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for
issuing a preliminary injunction.  A TRO is an extraordinary remedy
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is
entitled to such relief.  The proper legal standard for preliminary
injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate (1) that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an injunction
is in the public interest.'

As an alternative to this test, a preliminary injunction is
appropriate if "serious questions going to the merits were raised
and the balance of the hardships tips sharply" in the moving
party's favor, thereby allowing preservation of the status quo when
complex legal questions require further inspection or deliberation.
  However, the "serious questions" approach supports a court's
entry of a TRO only so long as the moving party also shows that
there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction
is in the public interest.   The moving party bears the burden of
persuasion and must make a clear showing that he is entitled to
such relief.

Judge Martinez finds that the Plaintiff has failed to carry his
burden under either test.  He has not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits on his claim that the Defendants'
communication interferes with the putative class members' rights
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d), nor has he raised serious questions
going to the merits of that claim.

First, when considering whether a defendant's effort to obtain an
arbitration provision from putative class members interferes with
their rights under Rule 23(d), courts analyze the timing of the
communication, its potential to mislead putative class members, and
the risk that putative class members may forfeit their rights
"without really knowing what they are."  In contrast, the
communication with the putative class members is deemed proper if
it "does so in a manner that discloses information about the suit
and affords an opt-out."  Second, the Judge finds minimal support
for the Plaintiff's position that the terms of the pop-up window
are improper or coercive.

Because the Plaintiff has failed to show likelihood of success or
serious questions going to the merits, Judge Martinez need not
address the remaining elements to obtain preliminary injunctive
relief.

Conclusion

Judge Martinez denied the Plaintiff's TRO Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/e53m6kzk from Leagle.com.


STERLING BANCORP: Class Settlement in OPPRS Suit Has Prelim. Nod
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff v. STERLING BANCORP, INC.; GARY JUDD; THOMAS LOPP;
MICHAEL MONTEMAYOR; SCOTT SELIGMAN; BARRY ALLEN; JON FOX; SETH
MELTZER; SANDRA SELIGMAN; PETER SINATRA; BENJAMIN WINEMAN; LYLE
WOLBERG; PIPER SANDLER COMPANIES; AND AMERICAN CAPITAL PARTNERS,
LLC, Defendants, Case 5:20-cv-10490-JEL-EAS, Case
5:20-cv-10490-JEL-EAS (E.D. Mich.), Judge Judith E. Levy of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan grants the
Lead Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Proposed Class Action Settlement and the Parties' the Stipulation
of Settlement, dated April 16, 2021.

For purposes of the Settlement only, Judge Levy certifies a
Settlement Class defined as all Persons who purchased or otherwise
acquired Sterling common stock during the Settlement Class Period,
Nov. 17, 2017 through and including March 17, 2020, including
shares sold in the initial public offering that commenced on Nov.
17, 2017, and were damaged as a result.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Lead
Plaintiff Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System is
appointed as the "Class Representative"; and Interim Lead Counsel
Berman Tabacco is appointed as the "Lead Counsel" and the "Class
Counsel."  The Class Counsel and is authorized to act on behalf of
the Class Representative and other Settlement Class Members, with
respect to all acts or consents required by or that may be given
pursuant to the Stipulation, including all acts that are reasonably
necessary to consummate the Settlement.

The Final Approval Hearing will be held before the Court on Sept.
16, 2021, at 2:00 p.m., either via telephonic or video conference,
or at the Federal Building, Courtroom 100, 200 E. Liberty Street,
Ann Arbor, Michigan.  The Court may adjourn the Final Approval
Hearing without further notice to Settlement Class Members.

Judge Levy approves, as to form and content, the Notice of Pendency
of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, Final Approval Hearing,
and Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation
Expenses; the Proof of Claim and Release Form; and Summary Notice
for publication annexed as Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3 thereto.

The firm of A.B. Data, Ltd. is appointed to supervise and
administer the notice procedure as well as the processing of claims
as more fully set forth below:

     (a) Not later than 14 days after entry of the Order ("Notice
Date"), the Claims Administrator will cause a copy of the Notice
and the Claim Form, substantially in the forms annexed as Exhibits
A-1 and A-2 thereto, to be mailed by first-class mail to all the
Settlement Class Members who can be identified with reasonable
effort;

     (b) No later than the Notice Date, the Summary Notice,
substantially in the form annexed as Exhibits A-3 thereto, will be
published once in Investor's Business Daily and once over a
national newswire service; and

     (c) At least seven calendar days prior to the Final Approval
Hearing, the Lead Counsel will cause to be served on the
Defendants' Counsel and filed with the Court proof, by affidavit or
declaration, of such mailing and publishing.

The Defendants will complete service on the appropriate federal and
state government officials of all notices required under the Class
Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1715, no later than 10
calendar days following the filing of the Stipulation with the
Court.

Nominees who purchased Sterling common stock for the beneficial
ownership of Settlement Class Members during the Settlement Class
Period will send the Notice and the Claim Form to all beneficial
owners of such Sterling common stock within 10 days after receipt
thereof, or send a list of the names and addresses of such
beneficial owners to the Claims Administrator within 10 days of
receipt thereof, in which event the Claims Administrator will
promptly mail the Notice and Claim Form to such beneficial owners.
Such holders of record will be reimbursed from the Settlement Fund,
upon receipt by the Claims Administrator of proper documentation,
for the reasonable expense of providing notice to beneficial owners
who are Settlement Class Members out of the Settlement Fund, which
expenses would not have been incurred except for the sending of
such Notice, subject to further order of the Court with respect to
any dispute concerning such compensation.

All Settlement Class Members who wish to participate in the
Settlement will complete and submit Claim Forms in accordance with
the instructions contained therein to obtain a payment.  Unless the
Court orders otherwise, all Claim Forms must be postmarked or
submitted electronically no later than 90 calendar days from the
Notice Date.

Any Person falling within the definition of the Settlement Class
may, upon request, be excluded from the Settlement Class.  Any such
Person must submit to the Claims Administrator a request for
exclusion, post-marked no later than 21 calendar days before the
date of the Final Approval Hearing.

No Settlement Class Member or any other Person will be heard or
entitled to contest such matters, unless that Settlement Class
Member has filed a written objection with the Court and served
copies of such objection on representatives of both the Lead
Counsel and the Defendants' Counsel at the addresses set forth
below no later than 21 days before the date of the Final Approval
Hearing: Lead Counsel Sterling's Counsel Kristin J. Moody Seth L.
Levine Berman Tabacco Kenneth E. Lee 44 Montgomery Street, Suite
650 Levine Lee LLP San Francisco, CA 94104 5 Columbus Circle, 11th
Floor (415) 433-3200 New York, NY 10019 kmoody@bermantabacco.com
(212) 223-4400 slevine@levinelee.com klee@levinelee.com

All funds held by the Escrow Agent will be deemed and considered to
be in custodia legis of the Court, and will remain subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court, until such time as such funds will be
distributed pursuant to the Stipulation and/or further order(s) of
the Court.

The Lead Counsel will be entitled to withdraw up to $200,000 from
the Settlement Fund pursuant to the Stipulation to pay reasonable
expenses of notice and administration of the settlement upon the
execution of the Order, subject to final approval of said expenses
at the Final Approval Hearing and the other provisions of the
Stipulation.

All papers in support of the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation,
and any motion by the Lead Counsel for attorneys' fees or
reimbursement of expenses will be filed and served 35 calendar days
before the date of the Final Approval Hearing.  Additionally, any
reply brief(s) will be filed and served seven calendar days before
the date of the Final Approval Hearing.

The Defendants and their counsel will have no responsibility for
the Plan of Allocation or any motion for attorneys' fees or
reimbursement of expenses submitted by the Lead Counsel, and such
matters will be considered separately from the fairness,
reasonableness, and adequacy of the Settlement.

At or after the Final Approval Hearing, the Court will determine
whether the Plan of Allocation proposed by the Lead Counsel and any
motion for attorneys' fees or reimbursement of expenses will be
approved.

All reasonable expenses incurred in identifying and notifying the
Settlement Class Members, as well as administering the Settlement
Fund, will be paid as set forth in the Stipulation.  In the event
the Settlement is not approved by the Court, or otherwise fails to
become effective, neither the Lead Plaintiff nor the Counsel will
have any obligation to repay any amounts incurred or properly
disbursed pursuant to the Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/y9z2vu97 from Leagle.com.


STEVE'S PAINTING: Wilson Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Wilson, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
v. STEVE'S PAINTING INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, and STEVEN
BLAIR, Individually, Case No. 2:21-cv-00362-JLB-MRM (M.D. Fla., May
5, 2021), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act against
Defendants for unpaid overtime compensation.

The Defendants have a policy and practice of failing to: (1)
accurately record the hours worked by non-exempt hourly paid
painters/laborers by not accounting for compensable meal and rest
breaks as hours worked; and (2) failing to pay non-exempt hourly
paid painters/laborers like the Plaintiff full and proper overtime
compensation for all overtime hours worked. The Defendant failed to
pay the Plaintiff for all overtime hours worked and denied the
Plaintiff overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40
per week, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked as a non-exempt hourly paid painter/laborer
for the Defendants throughout the southwest coast of Florida.

The Defendants operate a large-scale commercial and residential
painting, and pressure cleaning company in Cape Coral,
Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Noah E. Storch, Esq.
          RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.
          10368 W. State Road 84, Suite 103
          Davie, FL 33324
          Phone: (866) 344-9243
          Facsimile: (954) 337-2771
          Email: noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com


SUPERVALU INC: Shelton Suit Removed to S.D. Illinois
----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Tayler Shelton, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. SuperValu Inc., United Natural
Foods, Inc., Case No. 2021-L-000296, was removed from the Third
Judicial Circuit Madison County, Illinois, to the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois on April 23, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 3:21-cv-00408-GCS to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

SuperValu, Inc -- https://www.unfi.com/ -- is an American
wholesaler and retailer of grocery products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kevin P. Green, Esq.
          Mark C. Goldenberg, Esq.
          Thomas P. Rosenfeld, Esq.
          CLARKSON LAW FIRM PC
          2227 South State Route 157
          P.O. Box 959
          Edwardsville, IL 62025
          Phone: (618) 656-5150
          Fax: (618) 656-6230
          Email: kevin@ghalaw.com
                 mark@ghalaw.com
                 tom@ghalaw.com

               - and -

          Daniel Scott Levy, Esq.
          Richard S. Cornfeld, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF RICAHRD S. CORNFELD, LLC
          1010 Market Street, Suite 1645
          St. Louis, MO 63101
          Phone: (314) 241-5799
          Fax: (314) 241-5788
          Email: dlevy@cornfeldlegal.com
                 rcornfeld@cornfeldlegal.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          William Francis Northrip, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON, LLP - Chicago
          111 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 704-7700
          Fax: (312) 558-1195
          Email: wnorthrip@shb.com


TEACHERS INSURANCE: Arbitration Award in Luciano Suit Confirmed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LORRAINE H. LUCIANO, Plaintiff v. TEACHERS INSURANCE
AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA - COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES
FUND (TIAA-CREF), et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 15-6726
(MAS) (DEA) (D.N.J.), Judge Michael A. Shipp of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey granted the Plaintiff's Motion
to Confirm Arbitration Award and Reopen the Case.

The instant putative class action concerns the two ETS retirement
and savings plans of the Plaintiff's deceased husband, James Rosso,
both of which are governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections 1001, et seq.
Mr. Rosso was employed by ETS from 1979 to 1993 and participated in
ETS's 401(a) Plan and 403(b) Plan.

Upon Mr. Rosso's death in 2014, the Plaintiff learned from
Defendants Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America -
College Retirement Equities Fund, Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association of America, and College Retirement Equities Fund
("TIAA-CREF Defendants") that the surviving spouse death benefit
she would receive under both plans would be half of Mr. Rosso's
account balance, with the other half going to Mr. Rosso's sister
and pre-marriage beneficiary, Lucille Rosso.

The Plaintiff subsequently filed a claim for the entire amount of
the account balance, which the TIAA-CREF Defendants denied.  She
appealed the TIAA-CREF Defendants' decision to ETS, and the denial
was affirmed.

On Oct. 2, 2015, the Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint
challenging the Defendants (Educational Testing Service ("ETS") and
the Educational Testing Service Employee Benefits Administration
Committee ("EBAC")) and the TIAA-CREF Defendants' 50% benefit
determination.  On July 29, 2016, upon the Defendants and the
TIAA-CREF Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, the
Court found that the Plan was subject to a mandatory arbitration
provision.  It, accordingly, compelled arbitration for the
surviving claims under the Plan and stayed the action pending
arbitration as it related to the 403(b) Plan.

On April 30, 2018, Ira F. Jaffe, Esq. ("Arbitrator") held in a
35-page opinion that the terms of the Plan were "clear and
unambiguous and require[d] payment to the Plaintiff of a benefit
based upon the full Account Balance value of Mr. Rosso's account."
On July 27, 2018, the Defendants filed a Motion to Vacate the
Arbitration Award and for Equitable Reformation of the Plans.  On
Oct. 26, 2018, having heard oral argument on Oct. 24, 2018, the
Court reopened the action and dismissed the Defendants' Motion
without prejudice.

On Aug. 23, 2019, in an Interim Ruling on Relief, the Arbitrator
found that although the Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs, her petition at the time sought "fees
significantly in excess of those that are properly awardable in the
arbitration."  The Arbitrator, accordingly, directed the Plaintiff
to file a revised fee petition.  In the Second Ruling on Remedy,
Attorneys' Fees, and Costs, the Arbitrator again found the
Plaintiff's fee petition -- this time requesting $472,658.72 -- to
be unreasonable, finding that the Plaintiff "continued to seek
compensation for an outrageously excessive number of hours for the
work that reasonably needed to be performed with this
arbitration."

The Court, however, granted requests for costs by Post, Polak,
Goodsell & Strauchler, P.A. and Cohn, Lifland, Pearlman. Herrmann &
Knopf, LLP for $13,597.22 and $5,377.03, respectively.  The
Plaintiff now moves to confirm all three of the Arbitrator's
decisions and reopen the case.

In opposition to the instant Motion, the Defendants argue the
Arbitrator ignored the EBAC's consideration and analysis of Plan
documents and related materials establishing that the Plan language
was extrinsically ambiguous, and rejected as 'factually
unsupported' the EBAC's contention that Plaintiff's interpretation
of the Plan would frustrate Mr. Rosso's donative intent.  In doing
so, and in refusing to address the extrinsic ambiguity found by the
EBAC, the Arbitrator manifestly disregarded the applicable law
requiring that the EBAC be afforded significant deference in its
resolution of both questions concerning the intent of the Plan and
factual issues raised by claimants.  The Arbitrator further
disregarded the law when, rather than address the issue of
extrinsic ambiguity or remand the issue to the EBAC for
determination, he substituted his own conclusions for those of the
EBAC.

Judge Shipp does not find the instant matter to be one of the
"exceedingly rare circumstances where the manifest disregard of the
law doctrine's "exceedingly narrow" scope applies.  The Arbitrator
held that the language of the Plan, viewed objectively, is
unambiguous and is capable of only one reasonable interpretation --
i.e., that absent a Qualified Election waiving her right to
benefits.  The Plaintiff as the surviving spouse of Mr. Rosso, is
entitled to receive a preretirement survivor benefit equal to the
full Account Balance.  Moreover, the Arbitrator acknowledged the
significant discretion in the interpretation and application of
ambiguous language afforded to the EBAC under the Plan, as well as
Firestone and the deference afforded to plan administrators when
plan language is both ambiguous and unambiguous.

It certainly cannot be said, therefore, that the Arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the appropriate standard of review in the
instant matter, Judge Shipp opines.  Furthermore, despite the
Defendants' assertions to the contrary, the Arbitrator set forth in
detail the reasons why prior practice and administration, extrinsic
ambiguity, and donative intent were not applicable to the instant
matter.  The Arbitrator determined that the Defendants' arguments
in this regard were either factually unsupported or erroneous as a
matter of law.  As the Defendants correctly note, such
determinations are sufficient to overturn a plan administrator's
denial of benefits.

Alternatively, the Defendants argue that "should the Court decide
to confirm the Arbitrator's award in favor of the Plaintiff on the
question of the underlying benefit at issue and decline to remand
to the EBAC, it should confirm the award in full, including the
Arbitrator's complete denial of Plaintiff's 'outrageously
excessive' request for fees."  In her Moving Brief, the Plaintiff
states she "disagrees strenuously with the Arbitrator's denial of
counsel fees and does not now seek to confirm it."  She, however,
concedes that "the grounds to vacate any portion of an arbitration
award are few, and nothing the Arbitrator did in the Arbitration
falls within those limited circumstances."  Moreover, in her Reply,
the Plaintiff again concedes "there simply is no basis for this
Court to undo any of the Arbitrator's rulings.  As such, the
Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' application to enforce the
awards in their entirety."

As stated previously, a reviewing court must take a limited
approach and vacate an arbitration award only in the rarest or
casets.  Judge Shipp, accordingly, confirms the Arbitrator's three
decisions and accompanying awards in their entirety and reopen the
case to resolve the remaining issues related to the 403(b) Plan.

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Shipp granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and Reopen the Case.  An order
consistent with his Memorandum Opinion will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/dtpkput4 from Leagle.com.


THOMAS M. HODGSON: Pearson Files Suit in Massachusetts Sup. Ct.
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Thomas M. Hodgson.
The case is styled as Kellie Pearson, Roger Burrell, Brian Givens,
and the Law Offices of Mark Booker, on behalf of themselves and
those similarly situated v. Thomas M. Hodgson, individually and in
his official capacity as Sheriff of Bristol County, and Securus
Technologies, Inc., Case No. SJC-13110 (Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct.,
April 23, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Civil" for Motion to Waive.

Thomas M. Hodgson -- https://www.bcso-ma.us/meetthesheriff.htm --
is an American law enforcement agent who has served as Sheriff of
Bristol County Massachusetts since 1997.[BN]

The Plaintiffs/Appellants are represented by:

          Stuart T. Rossman, Esq.
          NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
          7 Winthrop Square, 4th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: 617-523-8010

               - and -

          Bonita Tenneriello, Esq.
          Rebecca Schapiro, Esq.
          PRISONERS' LEGAL SERVICES
          50 Federal Street
          4th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: 617-482-2773

               - and -

          Elizabeth A. Ryan, Esq.
          John Roddy, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP
          176 Federal Street, 5th Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: 617-439-6730

               - and -

          James R. Pingeon, Esq.
          PRISONERS' LEGAL SERVICES
          10 Winthrop Square, 3rd Floor
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: 617-482-2773

               - and -

          Roger Bertling, Esq.
          LEGAL SERVICES CENTER
          122 Boylston Street
          Jamaica Plain, MA 02130
          Phone: 617-390-2572

The Defendants/Appellees are represented by:

          Ian D. Roffman, Esq.
          NUTTER, McCLENNEN & FISH, LLP
          Seaport West, 155 Seaport Blvd
          Boston, MA 02210
          Phone: 617-439-2421

               - and -

          Robert M. Novack, Esq.
          16 Bedford St
          Fall River, MA 02720
          Phone: 508-673-2004

               - and -

          Jason D. Frank, Esq.
          MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
          One Federal Street
          Boston, MA 02210
          Phone: 617-951-8153

               - and -

          Elizabeth Hays, Esq.
          One Federal St
          Boston, MA 02110
          Phone: 617-951-8075


TRUEACCORD CORP: Hernandez Files FDCPA Suit in C.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against TrueAccord Corp. The
case is styled as Evelyn Hernandez, on behalf of herself and all
others similarly situated v. TrueAccord Corp., Case No.
2:21-cv-03804 (C.D. Cal., May 5, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

TrueAccord -- https://www.trueaccord.com/ -- is a debt collection
agency.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Trinette Gragirena Kent, Esq.
          TRINETTE KENT LAW OFFICES
          3219 East Camelback Road No 588
          Phoenix, AZ 85018
          Phone: (480) 247-9644
          Fax: (480) 717-4781
          Email: tkent@lemberglaw.com


W.B. MASON: Sannutti Sues Over Unlawful Payroll Practices
---------------------------------------------------------
Joseph Sannutti, John Holahan, and Bradley Gale, on behalf of
themselves and all similarly situated v. W.B. MASON CO., INC., LEO
MEEHAN, CHRIS MEEHAN, STEVE GREENE, ROGER AHLFELD, individually,
Case No. 210402313 (Pa. 1st judicial Ct., Com. Pleas., Philadelphia
Cty., April 23, 2021), is brought to redress violations by the
Defendants of the Pennsylvania Wage & Collection Law, for breach of
contract, and for the commission of common-law fraud.

The Plaintiffs summarily allege that the Defendants have
continually perpetuated fraudulent, criminal, and unlawful payroll
practices of retroactively reducing earned wages and commissions of
Account Executives ("AE") (who are salespeople). In an effort to
knowingly commit wage theft, fraud, and the intentional failure to
pay earned commissions to AEs, Defendant WB (during the 3-year
lookback period from lawsuit filing): (a) has and continues to
willfully refuse to provide commission plans or specific documented
commission structures to AEs in an effort to change commission
entitlements without notice to AEs on a consistent and pervasive
basis; and (b) retroactively after commissions have already been
earned.

The crux of the unlawful scheme by Defendants though is that AEs
sell substantial products based upon their understanding of the
commission structure from their prior payroll (and Commission
Statement), and then all AEs come to find out in a subsequent month
that products (that they already sold) were moved to different
buckets resulting in substantially lower commissions to them. By
the time AEs were paid for such commissions (months later), the
commissions shown to them in commission statements for such
equipment / supplies had been so substantially reduced
retroactively that some individual AEs were reduced in commissions
individually by well in excess of $20,000.00 just in that short
timeframe, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed in the title of "Account Executives."

W.B. Mason Co., Inc. is a corporation which has generally operated
over the last several years with approximately 70 distribution
centers, over 3,000 employees, and it generally manufactures,
distributes and sells office supplies and related products all over
the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ari R. Karpf, Esq.
          KARPF, KARPF & CERUTTI, P.C.
          3331 Street Road
          Two Greenwood Square, Suite 128
          Bensalem, PA 19020
          Phone: (215) 639-0801


WHIRLPOOL CORP: Claims in Second Amended Redmon Class Suit Narrowed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTOPHER REDMON, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 20 C 6626 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Ronald A. Guzman
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, granted in part and denied in part the
Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action
Complaint.

The case is a putative class action in which Redmon sues Whirlpool
for various violations of state law arising from an alleged uniform
defect in Whirlpool-manufactured dishwashers (including
KitchenAid-, JennAir-, Maytag-, and Kenmore-branded dishwashers)
that causes the dishwashers to leak and cause damage to surrounding
kitchen cabinets and floors.

Mr. Redmon claims that Whirlpool designed and manufactured its
dishwashers' pump motor diverter shaft seal ("diverter shaft
seal"), which is part of the sump assembly, with the seal
improperly "affixed in an inverted position, which exposes it to
hot soapy water and debris.  As the debris builds and the seal
degrades, water begins to leak between the sump and the tub of the
dishwasher, eventually leaking through the entire unit."  Redmon
further alleges that Whirlpool knew about the defect prior to
distributing the dishwashers; failed to remedy the defect; failed
to inform consumers about the defect; and put the burden on
consumers to repair the defect and pay for the cost of repairs to
adjacent damaged personal property.

In the Second Amended Class Action Complaint, the Plaintiff brings
claims for (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied
warranty; (3) breach of contract, pleaded in the alternative; (4)
unjust enrichment, pleaded in the alternative; (5) violation of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act; (6)
negligence; and (7) fraudulent concealment.

The Plaintiff's claims are asserted both individually and on behalf
of a putative class of "all persons in the State of Illinois who
own or owned a Whirlpool-manufactured dishwasher with an inverted
diverter shaft seal," "during the fullest period allowed by law."

Whirlpool moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's Second Amended Class
Action Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b),
and 12(b)(6).

Discussion

The parties do not expressly address choice-of-law matters, but
they both rely on Illinois law.  Therefore, Judge Guzman applies
the substantive law of Illinois.

A. Breach of Express and Implied Warranty (Counts I and II)

In Count I, Redmon alleges that Whirlpool breached express
warranties, including that its dishwashers would be free from
defects at the time of purchase and from one year from the date of
purchase and that they were suitable for reliable dishwashing.  He
alleges that Whirlpool "improperly and unlawfully denies valid
warranty claims" and "has failed or refused to adequately repair or
replace the Dishwashers with non-defective units or parts."  Redmon
further alleges that the limitations and exclusions in Whirlpool's
Major Appliance Written Warranty, attached as Exhibit A to the
Second Amended Complaint, are unconscionable, for several reasons.
In Count II, Redmon alleges that Whirlpool breached implied
warranties that the dishwashers were merchantable and fit for their
ordinary purpose.

Whirlpool first argues that (i) the Plaintiff's breach-of-warranty
claims fail because the problem with his dishwasher arose after the
expiration of the one-year limited Written Warranty; (ii) the
Plaintiff's warranty claims must be dismissed because he fails to
allege that he gave Whirlpool "proper notice" of these claims;
(iii) the Plaintiff fails to allege a breach of warranty because
his warranty is limited to repair, and a breach of the promise to
repair cannot occur unless Whirlpool refuses or fails to repair his
dishwasher; (iv) to the extent the Plaintiff's
breach-of-express-warranty claim is based on representations
outside the limited repair warranty; and (v) the Plaintiff's
breach-of-implied-warranty claim in Count II, regarding the
warranty claims, must be dismissed for lack of privity.

Judge Guzman dismisses without prejudice.  He finds that (i) the
Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that the warranty's exclusive
remedy of product repair fails of its essential purpose; (ii)
Whirlpool cites no authority in support of its argument and, in any
event, the Plaintiff alleges that the replacement parts have the
same latent defect and will eventually fail; (iii) the Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged that his repairs were a stopgap because the
diverter-shaft-seal defect exists in the replacements, and at any
rate, Whirlpool failed to offer him a remedy; (iv) to the extent
Count I is based on the existence of express warranties beyond
Exhibit A to the complaint and the warranty described in the
complaint, it is dismissed without prejudice; and (v) the Plaintiff
correctly points out that the privity inquiry is fact-intensive and
often not appropriate to determine at the dismissal stage, but the
Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts that permit a reasonable
inference that an exception to the privity requirement could
apply.

B. Breach of Contract (Count III)

Whirlpool contends that the Plaintiff's claim for breach of
contract (which is pleaded in the alternative to the
breach-of-warranty claims) fails for the same reasons Whirlpool
says the warranty claims fail.  Judge Guzman opines that the
Plaintiff's claim for breach of express warranty has in part
survived the Defendant's motion, so this argument is without merit.
Whirlpool also contends that the same privity issues that doom the
Plaintiff's implied-warranty claim also "doom any breach of
contract claim on the basis of third-party representations."  The
Plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim, however, is not based on
third-party representations.  Whirlpool's motion to dismiss is
denied as to Count III.

C. Unjust Enrichment (Count IV)

Whirlpool asserts that the Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment
should be dismissed, for several reasons: (1) damages for unjust
enrichment are unavailable where the parties have a contract; (2)
Illinois does not recognize unjust enrichment as an independent
cause of action, and the Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded
another cause of action that would support recovery in unjust
enrichment; and (3) the Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded
"Whirlpool's knowledge or any fraudulent conduct that could form
the basis of an unjust enrichment claim."

Judge Guzman holds that the fact that the Plaintiff's
unjust-enrichment claim is pleaded in the alternative to his
contract claim disposes of Whirlpool's first argument.  Whirlpool's
second and third arguments are without merit because the Plaintiff
has plausibly pleaded at least one claim that would support
recovery in unjust enrichment, and the Judge has rejected
Whirlpool's contention that the Plaintiff has insufficiently
pleaded Whirlpool's knowledge of the latent defect.  Hence,
Whirlpool's motion to dismiss is denied as to Count IV.

D. Statutory Fraud (Count V)

Count V is a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq.  Reading the
complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiff alleges that Whirlpool engaged in both deceptive and
unfair conduct.

Whirlpool first argues that the Plaintiff fails to "identify an
actionable" misrepresentation.  To the extent that the Plaintiff's
Consumer Fraud Act claim is based on any affirmative
misrepresentation by Whirlpool, Judge Guzman agrees.  The lack of
adequately-pleaded affirmative misrepresentations, however, does
not end the analysis because the Plaintiff's statutory-fraud claim
is also based in part on Whirlpool's alleged "active concealment"
of, and failure to disclose, the latent defect in the dishwasher
and the eventual leaking that was known to occur.

Whirlpool argues that the Plaintiff cannot base his claim under the
Act "on an alleged omission" because it had no duty to disclose
anything to him.  This argument misstates Illinois law, under which
"an omission or concealment of a material fact in the conduct of
trade or commerce constitutes statutory consumer fraud," and "it is
unnecessary to plead a common law duty to disclose."  Whirlpool
also argues that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that
Whirlpool knew about the diverter-shaft-seal defect at any point in
time, but the Judge has rejected that argument.  Therefore,
Whirlpool's motion to dismiss is be denied as to Count V.

E. Negligence (Count VI)

Next, Whirlpool argues that plaintiff's negligence claim is barred
by the economic-loss doctrine. Plaintiff states that he "concedes"
this claim, and the Court sees no possibility of successful
amendment, so it will be dismissed with prejudice.

F. Fraudulent Concealment (Count VII)

Count VII is a state-law claim for fraudulent concealment.
Whirlpool contends that the Plaintiff has failed to plead
circumstances indicating that it owed him any duty.  Judge Guzman
agrees.  He holds that the Plaintiff does not allege any facts
plausibly suggesting a fiduciary, confidential, or special-trust
relationship with Whirlpool.  The Plaintiff maintains that because
Whirlpool had "exclusive knowledge and experience regarding the
design and manufacture of the Dishwashers," it was in a position of
superiority that triggered a duty to speak.  But "asymmetric
information alone does not show the degree of dominance needed to
establish a special trust relationship," and the Plaintiff alleges
no facts beyond asymmetric information.  Accordingly, Count VII is
dismissed without prejudice.

G. Injunctive Relief

Whirlpool asserts that the Plaintiff's request for injunctive
relief should be dismissed because, absent factual allegations that
indicate a likelihood of future injury, the Plaintiff lacks
standing to pursue such relief.  The Plaintiff states that he
"concedes" this claim, and Judge Guzman sees no possibility of
successful amendment, so it is dismissed with prejudice.

Conclusion

Judge Guzman granted in part and denied in part Defendant
Whirlpool's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Class Action
Complaint.  He dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's claims for
negligence (Count VI) and injunctive relief.  He dismissed without
prejudice the Plaintiff's claims for (1) breach of express warranty
in Count I, to the extent that it is based on the existence of
express warranties beyond Exhibit A to the complaint and the
warranty described in paragraph 45 of the complaint; (2) breach of
implied warranty (Count II); and (3) fraudulent concealment (Count
VII).  The remainder of Defendant's motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 28, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/dhy6n6t4 from
Leagle.com.


WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION: Connor Suit Removed to S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
The case captioned Tammy Lee Connor, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, was removed
from the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and
for St. Lucie County, Florida, to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, Fort Pierce Division on April
23, 2021, and assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-14180-AMC.

The Complaint asserts that the kitchenaid.com website, owned and
operated by Whirlpool, uses "session replay" software to observe
how users interact with the website. Plaintiff alleges that this
conduct violates the Florida Security of Communications Act.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:
          
          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          Garrett O. Berg, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Phone (305) 479-2299
          Fax: (786) 623-0915
          Email: ashamis@shamisgentile.com
                 gberg@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Scott A. Edelsberg, Esq.
          Christopher Gold, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, P.A.
          20900 NE 30th Ave, Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Phone: 305-975-3320
          Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com
                 chris@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Manuel Hiraldo, Esq.
          HIRALDO P.A.
          401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1400
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Phone: 954-400-4713
          Email: MHiraldo@Hiraldolaw.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Alfred J. Saikali, Esq.
          Jennifer A. McLoone, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY &BACON L.L.P.
          Citigroup Center, Suite 3200
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd.
          Miami, FL 33131
          Phone: 305.358.5171
          Email: asaikali@shb.com
                 jmcloone@shb.com



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
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Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

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