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              C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, May 13, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 90

                            Headlines

3M CO: Discovery Ongoing in Defective Earplugs Suit
3M CO: Mediation Discussions Ongoing in Michigan Suit
3M CO: Mediation in Billings Case Ongoing
3M CO: Mediation Ongoing in PFOA Related Putative Class Suit in NY
3M CO: Settlement Reached in Parchment Resident's Class Suit

A-1 EXTERMINATING: Wrenns' Writ of Mandamus Bid in Wright Granted
ADVANCED MICRO: Nunez Putative Class Suit Dismissed
ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Seeks OK of Settlement Reached in Martin Suit
AMGEN INC: Bid to Nix Sensipar(R) Antitrust Class Suit Pending
AMGEN INC: Dismissal of Humira Related Class Suits Under Appeal

ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND: Ethanol Price Rigged Related Suits Underway
ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND: Settlement Reached in Suit v. Golden Peanut
BABCOCK & WILCOX: Ollila Net Settlement Fund Distribution Plan OK'd
BANK OF AMERICA: Clark Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Mortgagors
BILLY MCFARLAND: Fyre Festival Class Action Proceeding Stayed

BLOOMBERG LP: Bid to Amend Pleadings in Doe Suit Granted in Part
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: E.D. Louisiana Narrows Claims in Baker Suit
BREWSTER CHEESE: Class Settlement in Cook Unpaid OT Suit Approved
BRINKER INT'L: Class Cert. Bid in Data Breach Suit Partly OK'd
CABOT OIL: Uronis Appeals FLSA Suit Dismissal to 3rd Cir.

CARDONE CAPITAL: Final Judgment Entered in Pino Securities Suit
CELLCOM ISRAEL: Faces Human Response Related Putative Class Suit
CELLCOM ISRAEL: Handsets Loan Transaction Related Suit Underway
CELLCOM ISRAEL: Settlement Deal in Privacy Violation Suit OK'd
CELLCOM ISRAEL: Suit Over Raised Service Charges Underway

CELLCOM ISRAEL: Suit Over Unlawful Charges Underway
CHOICE SITTER: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Walborn Files Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
CONNECTICUT GENERAL: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Slam Dunk Suit
COSTAR GROUP: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CSG PETROLEUM: Gomez Files Suit in California Superior Court
ESPRESSO ZONE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FCA US: Ordered to Disclose Complete Calibration Data in Bledsoe
FERRARA MARKET: Monegro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Adams Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York

FINVOLUTION GROUP: Bid to Dismiss PPDAI Securities Suit Terminated
FMA ALLIANCE: Lewis Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Georgia
FOODSERVICEDIRECT.COM: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
FORD MOTOR: Class Settlement in Persad Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
FRONTIER AIRLINES: Solomon Suit Remanded to Kenton Circuit Court

GEICO GENERAL: Nichols' Bid to Certify Insureds Class Approved
GENERAL ELECTRIC: Continues to Defend Houston Putative Class Suit
GOLDMAN SACHS: Falberg Seeks to Certify Class of Plan Participants
HALEN BRANDS: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
HALLCON CORPORATION: Lewis Sues Over FCRA Violation

HENDERSON, NE: Woodburns Seek to Certify Corrections Officer Class
HERTZ CORP: Court Dismisses Lee's FCRA Class Suit With Prejudice
HM BRADLEY INC: Monegro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
IBM CORP: Agreement to Settle ERISA-Related Suit Reached
ILLINOIS STATE POLICE: Court Tosses McFarland Bid to Certify Class

IMPINJ INC: Awaits Court Order to Discontinue Plymouth County Suit
INNATE PHARMA: California Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
INSIGHT VENTURE: Colacurcio Suit Seeks to Certify Damages Class
INSTORE GROUP: Hogan Employment Suit Gets Class Certification
JAY STREET: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

JOYY INC: Hershewe Putative Securities Class Suit Underway
JUUL LABS: Bautista-Perez Suit Wins Conditional Certification
KINDRED HEALTHCARE: Court Grants Final Approval of Class Settlement
KITTY POO: Tatum-Rios Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Grantham Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas

LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Hayes Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Huggins Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Jackson Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Smith Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
LEXINFINTECH HOLDINGS: Bid to Nix Oregon Class Suit Pending

LIBERTY MUTUAL: Massachusetts Court Dismisses Smith's Amended Suit
LOUISIANA: Plaisance Suit Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
MAGIC SPOON: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
MASIMO CORP: Continues to Defend Physicians Healthsource Suit
MERAKEY USA: Class of BSCs & LBSCs in Kyem Labor Suit Certified

MERCK & CO: Second Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Kaye Suit
MIDLAND CREDIT: Taub Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Debt
MIMEDX GROUP: Bid for Reconsideration on Dismissal Order Pending
MOMO INC: July 29 Marchand Final Settlement Approval Hearing
MONDELEZ INT'L: Continues to Defend Wheat Trading-Related Suit

MRS BPO: Adams Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
NAVIENT CORP: Discovery in Lord Abbett Fund Class Suit Ongoing
NAVIENT CORP: Discovery Ongoing in NJ Consolidated Securities Suit
NCAA: Thomassey Sues Over Disregard for Health & Safety of Athletes
NCR CORPORATION: N.D. California Remands Kalaveras Class Suit

NEW MEXICO: 10th Cir. Affirms SRSA Approval in Duran v. Grisham
NEW YORK: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification in Soriano Suit
NORTH CENTRAL VIRGINIA: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Claim Sought
NUTS ARE GOOD!: Monegro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
OLIN CORP: Suits Against Unit Over Sale of Caustic Soda Underway

OLIN CORP: Unit Defends Suits Over Sale of Caustic Soda in Canada
OPKO HEALTH: Settlement in Florida Suit Granted Final Approval
PACIFICA, CA: Bid for Provisional Class Cert. Denied as Moot
PAPA MURPHY'S: Court Adopts R&R and Denies Bid to Toss Brown Suit
PARTS AUTHORITY: Jaime Directed to Refile Bid to Certify Class

PHILIP MORRIS: Blais Class Action Ongoing in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Adams Class Suit in Canada
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Bourassa Class Suit
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Class Suit in New York
PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Letourneau Class Suit

PINTEREST INC: Putative Class Suit in California Underway
PITTSBURGH LOGISTICS: Conditional Cert. of Collective Class Sought
PLAID INC: California Court Narrows Claims in Amended Cottle Suit
POLARIS INC: Awaits 8th Cir. Ruling in Johannessohn Appeal
POLARIS INC: Expert Discovery & Motion Practice in Guzman Ongoing

POLARIS INC: Plaintiffs Appeal Dismissal of Claims
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Lewis Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Georgia
PROGRESSIVE DIRECT: Wins Summary Judgment in Kleinsasser Class Suit
PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL: Wins Judgment on Pleadings in Connors Suit
QUALCOMM INC: Appeal on Grant of Class Certification Bid Pending

QUALCOMM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Remains Pending
QUALCOMM INC: Consumer Class Suits Underway in Canada
QUALCOMM INC: Dismissal of Broadcom Merger-Related Suit Appealed
RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES: Darnis Putative Class Action Underway
RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES: Defends Putative Securities Class Suit in AZ

RED DIAMOND: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
RITE AID: Consolidated Stafford Putative Class Suit Underway
ROMEO POWER: Faces Toner Suit Over Wrongful Acts and Omissions
ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE: Hearing on Class Cert. Bid Moved to Oct. 29
RUDEEN MGMT: Washington Supreme Ct. Flips Dismissal of Silver Suit

RUST-OLEUM CORP: Stevens Files Suit in E.D. California
S-L DISTRIBUTION: Marston & Safi Seek to Certify Class
SECOND NATURE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES: Pratt Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
SELENE FINANCE: Dismissal of Wheeling Class Suit Affirmed in Part

SIMON'S AGENCY: New Jersey Consumers Win Class Certification
SOCIAL FINANCE: Answer to First Amended Juarez Suit Due on May 17
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Bid to Dismiss Texas Securities Suit Pending
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Discovery Ongoing in Boeing MAX Defect Suit
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Settlement in Airfare-Related Suit Under Appeal

STATE FARM: Court Grants in Part Bid to Stay in Clippinger Suit
SWEETWATER CAR WASH: Gonzalez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: Amended Securities Complaint Dismissed
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Agreements Reached in Scott and Turizo Suits
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: California Consolidated TCPA Class Suit Tossed

SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Claims in Stichting Depositary Suit Narrowed
TESLA INC: 9th Cir. Junks Plaintiffs' Request for Rehearing
TESLA INC: Trial on Twitter Post Related Suit Set for May 2022
TIECHERT PIPELINES: Olea Suit Removed to N.D. California
TRANSDEV SERVICES: Court Decertifies Drug Test Class

UNITED STATES: Certiorari Petition Filed in Common Ground Suit
UNITED STATES: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Brooks Suit
UNITED STATES: Court of Federal Claims Dismisses Rodgers Suit
UNITED STATES: Southern District of Ohio Dismisses Day v. Miller
USAA CASUALTY: 11th Circuit Vacates Dismissal of Mack Class Suit

VALARIS PLC: Zhang Class Action Remains Stayed
VALOR INTELLIGENT: Lewis Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Georgia
VERTAFORE INC: Masciotra Suit Moved to Southern District of Texas
VERTAFORE INC: Mulvey Suit Seeks Class Certification
VIRGINIA: 4th Cir. Affirms Entry of Injunction in Scott v. Clarke

WAYNE, MI: Bowles, Taylor Seek to Certify Class of Property Owners
WAYSIDE CONSTRUCTION: Mendez Sues to Recover Unpaid Wages
WELLS FARGO: N.D. Florida Dismissed Claims in Ible Class Suit
WHITEPAGES INC: Loses Bid to Dismiss Kolebuck-Utz Class Suit
XPO LOGISTICS: Gonzalez Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Drivers


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3M CO: Discovery Ongoing in Defective Earplugs Suit
---------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that discovery in the next 20 bellwether
cases in the Defective Earplugs Suit in the MDL court is ongoing
and is scheduled to be complete by the end of 2021.

Aearo Technologies sold Dual-Ended Combat Arms Version 2 earplugs
starting in about 2003. 3M acquired Aearo Technologies in 2008 and
sold these earplugs from 2008 through 2015, when the product was
discontinued.

In December 2018, a military veteran filed an individual lawsuit
against 3M in the San Bernardino Superior Court in California
alleging that he sustained personal injuries while serving in the
military caused by 3M's Dual-Ended Combat Arms earplugs Version 2.


The plaintiff asserts claims of product liability and fraudulent
misrepresentation and concealment. The plaintiff seeks various
damages, including medical and related expenses, loss of income,
and punitive damages.

As of March 31, 2021, the Company is a named defendant in
approximately 3,349 lawsuits (including 14 putative class actions)
in various state and federal courts that purport to represent
approximately 12,700 individual claimants making similar
allegations.

In April 2019, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
granted motions to transfer and consolidate all cases pending in
federal courts to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Florida to be managed in a multi-district litigation (MDL)
proceeding to centralize pre-trial proceedings. Discovery is
underway.

The plaintiffs and 3M filed preliminary summary judgment motions on
the government contractor defense. In July 2020, the court granted
the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and denied the defendants'
summary judgment motion, ruling that plaintiffs' claims are not
barred by the government contractor defense. The court denied the
Company's request to immediately certify the summary judgment
ruling for appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.

In December 2020, the MDL court granted the plaintiffs' motion to
consolidate three plaintiffs for the first bellwether trial, which
began in March 2021. Individual trials for the next two bellwether
plaintiffs are scheduled to proceed in May and June of 2021.
Discovery in the next 20 bellwether cases in the MDL court is
ongoing and is scheduled to be complete by the end of 2021.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.

3M CO: Mediation Discussions Ongoing in Michigan Suit
-----------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that mediation is ongoing in the consolidated
putative class action suit pending in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Michigan.

In Michigan, one consolidated putative class action is pending in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan
against 3M and Wolverine World Wide.

The action arises from Wolverine's allegedly improper disposal of
materials and wastes, including 3M Scotchgard, related to
Wolverine's shoe manufacturing operations.

Plaintiffs allege Wolverine used 3M Scotchgard in its manufacturing
process and that chemicals from 3M's product contaminated the
environment and drinking water sources after disposal.

In January 2021, 3M moved to dismiss certain claims in the
complaint, and the case remains in early stages of litigation.

The court has set a trial date in January 2022.

In addition to the consolidated federal court putative class
action, as of March 31, 2021, 3M is a defendant in approximately
277 private individual actions in Michigan state court based on
similar allegations. These cases are coordinated for pre-trial
purposes.

Five of these cases were selected over time for bellwether trials.
In January 2020, the court issued the first round of dispositive
motion rulings related to the first two bellwether cases, including
dismissing the second bellwether case entirely and dismissing
certain plaintiffs' medical monitoring and risk of future disease
claims, and granting summary judgment to the defendants on one
plaintiff's cholesterol injury claims.

The parties settled the first bellwether case in early 2020.

In June 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider
the dismissal of the second bellwether case, and the plaintiffs
have appealed the decision to the state appellate court.

In January 2021, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants in one of three remaining bellwether cases. The
plaintiffs in this dismissed bellwether case have also appealed the
dismissal to the state appellate court.

The remaining two bellwether trials are preliminarily scheduled for
October 2021.

The parties have engaged in mediation efforts in both the putative
class action and the state court mass action cases.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.

3M CO: Mediation in Billings Case Ongoing
-----------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that mediation in the Billings case is
ongoing.

In August 2016, a group of over 200 plaintiffs filed a putative
class action against West Morgan-East Lawrence Water and Sewer
Authority (Water Authority), 3M, Dyneon, Daikin, BFI Waste Systems
of Alabama (BFI), and the City of Decatur in state court in
Lawrence County, Alabama (the "Billings" case).

Plaintiffs are residents of Lawrence, Morgan and other counties who
are or have been customers of the Water Authority. They contend
defendants have released per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)
that contaminate the Tennessee River and, in turn, their drinking
water, causing damage to their health and properties.

In January 2017, the court in the St. John case, stayed this
litigation pending resolution of the St. John case.

Plaintiffs in the Billings case have amended their complaint
numerous times to add additional plaintiffs. There are now
approximately 4,000 named plaintiffs.

Mediation in the Billings case is ongoing, but plaintiffs have
moved to lift the stay, and that motion is set for hearing in May
2021.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M CO: Mediation Ongoing in PFOA Related Putative Class Suit in NY
------------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that mediation is ongoing in the putative
class action suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York.

In New York, 3M is defending 40 individual cases and one putative
class action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of New York and four additional cases filed in New York
state court against 3M, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
Honeywell International Inc. and E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co.

The plaintiffs allege that 3M manufactured and sold
perfluorooctanoate (PFOA) that was used for manufacturing purposes
at Saint-Gobain's and Honeywell's facilities located in the Village
of Hoosick Falls and the Town of Hoosick.

The plaintiffs claim that the drinking water around Hoosick Falls
became contaminated with unsafe levels of PFOA due to the
activities of the defendants and allege that they suffered bodily
injury due to the ingestion and inhalation of PFOA.

The four state court cases also include Tonaga, Inc. (Taconic) as a
defendant and make similar allegations related to Taconic's
facility in neighboring Petersburg. The plaintiffs seek unstated
compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages, as well as
attorneys' fees and costs. 3M has answered the complaints in these
individual cases, which are now proceeding through discovery.

In the putative class action, briefings on class certification have
been completed and the parties are engaging in mediation efforts.

3M is also defending 12 individual cases in New York filed by
Nassau County drinking water providers in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs in these cases
allege that 3M, DuPont, and additional unnamed defendants are
responsible for the contamination of plaintiffs' water supply
sources with various PFAS compounds.

DuPont's motion to transfer these cases to the AFFF MDL was denied
in March 2020. 3M has filed answers in the cases in which it has
been served. Preliminary discovery is ongoing.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


3M CO: Settlement Reached in Parchment Resident's Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
3M Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that a settlement has been reached in the
putative class action suit brought by residents of Parchment.

3M is a defendant, together with Georgia-Pacific as co-defendant,
in a putative class action in federal court in Michigan brought by
residents of Parchment, who allege that the municipal drinking
water was contaminated from waste generated by a paper mill owned
by Georgia-Pacific's corporate predecessor.

The defendants' motion to dismiss certain claims in the complaint
was denied in January 2021. A trial date is set for January 2022.

The parties have engaged in mediation and in April 2021 reached a
preliminary settlement agreement, subject to court approval, under
which 3M and Georgia-Pacific would pay an amount and be released
from plaintiffs' putative class action claims.

Separately, as a result of discussions among Georgia-Pacific, 3M
and municipalities near Parchment, Georgia-Pacific and 3M
contributed to a fund in November 2020 to provide expanded
municipal water service in the area.

These municipalities released 3M from claims relating to or arising
out of the extension of municipal water or the alleged PFAS
contamination in the area of that extension. 3M's portion relative
to the preliminary agreement and contribution above was not
material.

3M Company operates as a technology company worldwide. The
company's Industrial segment offers tapes, abrasives, adhesives,
ceramics, sealants, specialty materials, purification products,
closure systems, acoustic systems products, automotive components,
abrasion-resistant films, and paint finishing and detailing
products. The company was founded in 1902 and is headquartered in
St. Paul, Minnesota.


A-1 EXTERMINATING: Wrenns' Writ of Mandamus Bid in Wright Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Ex parte Edward Wrenn and David Wrenn, (In re: Jeffrey
E. Wright v. A-1 Exterminating Company, Inc., et al.), Case No.
1190567 (Ala.), Judge William B. Seller of the Supreme Court of
Alabama grants the petition of Edward Wrenn and David Wrenn for a
writ of mandamus directing the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate an
order requiring them to disclose their personal income-tax returns
to Plaintiff Jeffrey E. Wright and to enter a protective order
shielding the tax returns from production.

Mr. Wright alleges that he contracted with A-1 Exterminating Co.,
Inc. for periodic termite treatments of his house.  Over the course
of several decades of treatments, Wright says, A-1 Exterminating
used a "watered-down pesticide so weak that it may only kill ants
and 'maybe' spiders."  A-1 Exterminating allegedly concealed the
practice from him until recently.  As a result, Wright contends
that his house is infected by termites and has been damaged by
termites.  Wright sued Edward, David, A-1 Exterminating, A-1
Insulating Co., Inc., and Wrenn Enterprises, Inc., alleging breach
of warranty, breach of contract, negligence, and wantonness.

Mr. Wright sought to represent a class consisting of himself and
other A-1 Exterminating customers allegedly harmed by the
Defendants' actions.  In support of his request to certify a class,
Wright alleged that a "limited fund" existed that would support a
class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), Ala. R. Civ. P.  That rule
provides that a class action is appropriate when "adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests."

According to Wright, the class he proposes fits within the
limited-fund framework because the total amount of potential
judgments against the defendants exceeds their ability to pay.
Accordingly, Wright says, adjudications in favor of individual
members of the proposed class would impair the other potential
members' ability to recover.

Mr. Wright sought production of several years' worth of Edward's
and David's personal income-tax returns, which Edward and David say
they filed jointly with their spouses.  Wright sought the tax
returns because, he claims, they will help establish that the
Defendants' assets are insufficient to satisfy the proposed class
members' potential judgments and will therefore support his
assertion that a limited-fund class should be certified.

The trial court initially entered an order ruling that Edward and
David would not be required to produce their tax returns.  Later,
however, the trial court granted a motion to compel filed by
Wright, which sought production of tax returns and other materials.
Edward and David moved the trial court to enter a protective
order.  The trial court, however, denied that motion, and Edward
and David filed the instant mandamus petition.

As Edward and David point out, Judge Sellers opines that income-tax
returns identify the source and amount of income for a particular
tax year, as opposed to assets and liabilities.  They also contain
significant personal and confidential information wholly unrelated
to assets and liabilities.  Thus, Edward's and David's tax returns
are not "highly" relevant to Wright's theory that a class should be
certified because the Defendants have limited assets available to
satisfy potential judgments.

Before directing the disclosure of tax returns, trial courts should
carefully consider the private nature of the information contained
in the returns, the specific information sought by a litigant, and
whether that information can be obtained from a different source.
For tax returns to be discoverable, they must be highly relevant,
the litigant seeking their disclosure must show a compelling need
for them, and their disclosure must be clearly required in the
interests of justice.

Judge Sellers finds that those standards have not been met in the
case.  Accordingly, he grants the petition and issues a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order requiring
disclosure of Edward's and David's tax returns and to enter a
protective order shielding those returns from production.

Judge Jay Mitchell dissents.  He finds no basis to conclude that
the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion.  Wright sought the
Wrenns' tax returns for the purpose of establishing a "limited
fund" class action.  He says that the tax returns could help
determine the veracity of other financial information produced in
discovery thus far, reveal the possible disposal of A-1
Exterminating's assets in anticipation of litigation, and show
whether and how much money was diverted from A-1 Exterminating to
the Wrenns.

Given the trial court's proximity to the facts, the parties, and
the "thousands of pages" of asset-related discovery in the case, it
is in a far better position than the Court to determine whether
there is a compelling need for the tax returns and whether their
probative value outweighs any prejudice or burden to the Wrenns.
And given the materials before us and the deference due to a trial
court in a discovery dispute, Judge Mitchell sees no reason to
conclude that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion.  He
would therefore deny the petition for the writ of mandamus.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2a8pkr65 from Leagle.com.


ADVANCED MICRO: Nunez Putative Class Suit Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 27, 2021, that the putative class
action suit entitled, Nunez v. Xilinx, Case No. 656971/2020, has
been dismissed.

On October 26, 2020, the Company, its wholly-owned subsidiary,
Thrones Merger Sub, Inc., and Xilinx, Inc. entered a definitive
agreement in which the Company will acquire Xilinx by merging
Thrones Merger Sub, Inc. with and into Xilinx, with Xilinx
continuing as the surviving corporation and becoming a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Company (the "Proposed Transaction").  

On December 3, 2020, the Company and Xilinx filed a Registration
Statement on Form S-4 describing the Proposed Transaction and other
related matters.

On December 11, 2020, a Xilinx shareholder filed a putative class
action in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County,
regarding the Proposed Transaction. Nunez v. Xilinx, Case No.
656971/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).

The lawsuit alleges that the Board of Directors of Xilinx breached
their fiduciary duties to Xilinx shareholders in connection with
the Proposed Transaction by allegedly failing to obtain fair,
adequate and maximum consideration for Xilinx shareholders in
connection with the Proposed Transaction and by not disclosing
certain material information about the Proposed Transaction in the
Registration Statement.

The lawsuit asserts a single claim against the Company, alleging
that it aided and abetted the Xilinx directors' breach of their
fiduciary duties.

The lawsuit seeks to enjoin or rescind any transaction with Xilinx
as well as certain other equitable relief, unspecified damages and
attorneys' fees and costs.

On December 15, 2020, a Xilinx shareholder filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
regarding the Proposed Transaction. Shumacher v. Xilinx, Case No.
1:20-cv-10595 (S.D.N.Y.).

The lawsuit alleges that Xilinx and its Board of Directors
disseminated a false and misleading Registration Statement that
omitted material information regarding the Proposed Transaction,
thereby violating Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended.

The lawsuit also asserts a single claim against the Company,
alleging that it acted as a controlling person of Xilinx within the
meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act by virtue of its
supervisory control over the composition of the Registration
Statement. The lawsuit seeks to enjoin or rescind any transaction
with Xilinx as well as certain other equitable relief, unspecified
damages and attorneys' fees and costs.

On December 23, 2020, a shareholder of the Company filed a lawsuit
in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New
York regarding the Proposed Transaction. Vazirani v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Case No. 1:20-cv-10894 (S.D.N.Y).

The lawsuit alleges that the Company and its Board of Directors
disseminated a false and misleading Registration Statement that
omitted material information regarding the Proposed Transaction,
thereby violating Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The
lawsuit seeks to enjoin or rescind any transaction with Xilinx as
well as certain other equitable relief, unspecified damages and
attorneys' fees and costs.

On March 22, 2021, the Nunez complaint was voluntarily dismissed,
and on March 25, 2021, the Vazirani complaint was voluntarily
dismissed. The Shumacher complaint was voluntarily dismissed on
April 9, 2021.

Advanced Micro said, "Based upon information presently known to
management, the Company believes that the potential liability, if
any, will not have a material adverse effect on its financial
condition, cash flows or results of operations."

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. operates as a semiconductor company
worldwide. The company operates in two segments, Computing and
Graphics; and Enterprise, Embedded and Semi-Custom. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. was founded in 1969 and is headquartered in Santa
Clara, California.

ALBERTSONS COMPANIES: Seeks OK of Settlement Reached in Martin Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Albertsons Companies, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended February 27, 2021, that the parties in the
class action case entitled, Martin v. Safeway, will seek court
approval of the settlement reached.

On May 31, 2019, a putative class action complaint entitled Martin
v. Safeway was filed in the California Superior Court for the
County of Alameda, alleging the Company failed to comply with the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA") by printing
receipts that failed to adequately mask payment card numbers as
required by FACTA. The plaintiff claims the violation was "willful"
and exposes the Company to statutory damages provided for in FACTA.


The Company has answered the complaint and is vigorously defending
the matter.

On January 8, 2020, the Company commenced mediation discussions
with plaintiff's counsel and reached a settlement in principle on
February 24, 2020.

The parties will seek court approval of the settlement. The Company
has recorded an estimated liability for this matter.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Albertsons Companies, Inc., through its subsidiaries, operates as a
food and drug retailer in the United States. Its food and drug
retail stores offer grocery products, general merchandise, health
and beauty care products, pharmacy, fuel, and other items and
services. The company is headquartered in Boise, Idaho. Albertsons
Companies, Inc. is a subsidiary of Albertsons Investor Holdings
LLC.


AMGEN INC: Bid to Nix Sensipar(R) Antitrust Class Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Amgen Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the motions to dismiss filed in the
antitrust class action lawsuit related to Sensipar(R), is pending.

On February 16, 2021, the plaintiffs in the antitrust class action
lawsuit brought on behalf of putative classes of direct or indirect
purchasers of Sensipar(R) filed their amended complaints.

On March 4, 2021, a stipulation and order regarding the filing of a
second amended complaint were filed to add another plaintiff:
Teamsters Western Region & Local 177 Health Care Fund.

On March 17, 2021, a defendant, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC,
filed its notice of voluntary dismissal.

On March 30, 2021, the remaining defendants, including Amgen, filed
their motions to dismiss the second amended complaint.

Amgen Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and delivers human
therapeutics worldwide. It offers products for the treatment of
oncology/hematology, cardiovascular, inflammation, bone health, and
neuroscience. Amgen Inc. was founded in 1980 and is headquartered
in Thousand Oaks, California.


AMGEN INC: Dismissal of Humira Related Class Suits Under Appeal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Amgen Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the appeal made by plaintiffs-appellants
on the  lower court's dismissal of the consolidated complaint with
prejudice, on the Humira(R) Biosimilar Antitrust Class Actions, is
pending.

On February 25, 2021, oral argument was held by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the appeal by
plaintiffs-appellants of the lower court's dismissal of the
consolidated complaint with prejudice.

Amgen Inc. discovers, develops, manufactures, and delivers human
therapeutics worldwide. It offers products for the treatment of
oncology/hematology, cardiovascular, inflammation, bone health, and
neuroscience. Amgen Inc. was founded in 1980 and is headquartered
in Thousand Oaks, California.


ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND: Ethanol Price Rigged Related Suits Underway
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company
continues to defend putative class action suits related to the
alleged manipulation of the benchmark price used to price and
settle ethanol derivatives traded on futures exchanges.

On September 4, 2019, AOT Holding AG filed a putative class action
under the U.S. Commodities Exchange Act in federal district court
in Urbana, Illinois, alleging that the Company sought to manipulate
the benchmark price used to price and settle ethanol derivatives
traded on futures exchanges.

AOT alleges that members of the putative class suffered "hundreds
of millions of dollars in damages" as a result of the Company's
alleged actions. On July 14, 2020, Green Plains Inc. and its
related entities filed a putative class action lawsuit, alleging
substantially the same operative facts, in federal court in
Nebraska, seeking to represent all sellers of ethanol.

On July 23, 2020, Midwest Renewable Energy, LLC filed a putative
class action in federal court in Illinois alleging substantially
the same operative facts and asserting claims under the Sherman
Act.

On November 11, 2020, six ethanol producers filed a lawsuit in
federal court in Illinois alleging substantially the same facts and
asserting claims under the Sherman Act and Illinois and Wisconsin
law.

The Company denies liability, and is vigorously defending itself in
these actions.

Archer-Daniels-Midland said, "As these actions are in pretrial
proceedings, the Company is unable at this time to predict the
final outcome with any reasonable degree of certainty, but believes
the outcome will not have a material adverse effect on its
financial condition, results of operations, or cash flows."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Archer-Daniels-Midland Company procures, transports, stores,
processes, and merchandises agricultural commodities, products, and
ingredients. The Company was founded in 1898 and is headquartered
in Chicago, Illinois.


ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND: Settlement Reached in Suit v. Golden Peanut
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that Golden Peanut
settled for $45 million with the plaintiff class in the putative
class action suit initiated by D&M Farms, Mark Hasty, and Dustin
Land.

On September 5, 2019, D&M Farms, Mark Hasty, and Dustin Land filed
a putative class action on behalf of a purported class of peanut
farmers under the U.S. federal antitrust laws in federal court in
Norfolk, Virginia, alleging that the Company's subsidiary, Golden
Peanut, and another peanut shelling company, Birdsong, conspired to
fix the price they paid to farmers for raw peanuts.

Plaintiffs subsequently added a third peanut shelling company,
Olam, to the case. In the fourth quarter of 2020, Olam and Birdsong
settled with the plaintiff class for approximately $8 million and
$50 million, respectively.

In February 2021, Golden Peanut settled for $45 million with the
plaintiff class.

The court approved the Olam and Birdsong settlements on April 5,
2021, and preliminarily approved the ADM settlement on April 23,
2021.

These settlements will, if finally approved, resolve all of class
plaintiffs' claims in this matter.

Archer-Daniels-Midland Company procures, transports, stores,
processes, and merchandises agricultural commodities, products, and
ingredients. The Company was founded in 1898 and is headquartered
in Chicago, Illinois.


BABCOCK & WILCOX: Ollila Net Settlement Fund Distribution Plan OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ERIC OLLILA, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v. BABCOCK & WILCOX ENTERPRISES,
INC., E. JAMES FERLAND and JENNY L. APKER, Defendants, Case No.
3:17cv109-MOC-DCK (W.D.N.C.), Judge Max O. Cogburn of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, granted the motion of Lead Plaintiff, Arkansas
Teacher Retirement System, for an order approving administrative
determinations and authorizing the distribution of the Net
Settlement Fund.

Having considered all of the materials and arguments submitted in
support of the motion, Judge Cogburn approved the distribution plan
proposed by JND Legal Administration as set forth in the
Declaration of Luiggy Segura in Support of Lead Plaintiff's Motion
for Approval of Distribution Plan.

Accordingly, the administrative determinations of the Claims
Administrator to accept the timely submitted Proof of Claim Forms
set forth in Exhibit B to the Segura Declaration, and to accept the
late but otherwise valid Proof of Claim Forms submitted after the
Jan. 2, 2020 deadline but by March 10, 2021, as set forth in
Exhibit C to the Segura Declaration, are adopted.

The administrative determinations of the Claims Administrator to
reject the Proof of Claim Forms set forth in Exhibit D to the
Segura Declaration are hereby approved, and those claims are
rejected.

No new Proof of Claim Forms may be accepted after March 10, 2021,
and no further adjustments to Proofs of Claim that would result in
an increased Recognized Loss may be made for any reason after March
10, 2021.

Pursuant to the Distribution Plan for the distribution of the Net
Settlement Fund, JND will distribute the Net Settlement Fund as
follows:

     1) JND will distribute 100% of the available balance of the
Net Settlement Fund, after deducting any Notice and Administration
Costs, Taxes, and Tax Expenses, to the Authorized Claimants set
forth in Exhibits B and C to the Segura Declaration who would
receive at least $10 based on their Recognized Loss in comparison
to the total Recognized Losses of all Authorized Claimants.

     2) In order to encourage Authorized Claimants to promptly
deposit their payments, all distribution checks will bear a
notation "CASH PROMPTLY. VOID AND SUBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION IF NOT
CASHED BY 90 DAYS AFTER ISSUE DATE."  JND is authorized to take
appropriate action to locate and/or contact any Authorized Claimant
who has not cashed his, her, or its check within said time as
detailed in footnote 3 of the Segura Declaration;

     3) Authorized Claimants who do not negotiate their
distribution checks within the time allotted or on the conditions
set forth in footnote 3 of the Segura Declaration will irrevocably
forfeit all recovery from the Settlement.  The funds allocated to
all such stale-dated checks will be available to be distributed to
other Authorized Claimants if Lead Counsel determines that it is
cost-effective to conduct a second distribution.  Similarly,
Authorized Claimants who do not negotiate their second or
subsequent distributions (should such distributions occur) within
the time allotted or on the conditions set forth in footnote 3 of
the Segura Declaration will irrevocably forfeit any further
recovery from the Net Settlement Fund;

     4) Consistent with the Plan of Allocation, after JND has made
reasonable and diligent efforts to have Authorized Claimants cash
their Initial Distribution Checks, which efforts will consist of
the follow-up efforts described in footnote 3 of the Segura
Declaration, but not earlier than nine  months after the Initial
Distribution, JND will, after consulting with Lead Counsel, conduct
a second distribution of the Net Settlement Fund (the Second
Distribution).  Any amounts remaining in the Net Settlement Fund
after the Initial Distribution (including the funds for all void
stale-dated checks), after deducting JND's unpaid fees and expenses
incurred in connection with administering the Settlement (including
JND's estimated costs of the Second Distribution), and after
deducting the payment of any estimated taxes, the costs of
preparing appropriate tax returns, and any escrow fees, will be
distributed to all Authorized Claimants in the Initial Distribution
who cashed their first distribution check and who would receive at
least $10 from such distribution based on their pro rata share of
the remaining funds.  Additional distributions, after deduction of
costs and expenses as described and subject to the same conditions,
may occur thereafter in six-month intervals until Lead Counsel, in
consultation with JND, determines that further distribution is not
cost-effective.

     5) At such time as Lead Counsel, in consultation with JND,
determines that further distribution of the funds remaining in the
Net Settlement Fund is not cost-effective, the remaining balance of
the Net Settlement Fund, after payment of any unpaid fees or
expenses incurred in connection with administering the Net
Settlement Fund and after the payment of any estimated taxes, the
costs of preparing appropriate tax returns, and any escrow fees,
will be contributed to non-sectarian, not-for-profit 501(c)(3)
organization(s), to be recommended by Lead Counsel and approved by
the Court.

All persons involved in the review, verification, calculation,
tabulation, or any other aspect of the processing of the Proof of
Claim Forms submitted therein, or otherwise involved in the
administration or taxation of the Settlement Fund or the Net
Settlement Fund, are released and discharged from any and all
claims arising out of such involvement, and all members of the
Settlement Class, whether or not they receive payment from the Net
Settlement Fund, are barred from making any further claims against
the Net Settlement Fund, Lead Plaintiff, Lead Counsel, the Claims
Administrator, the Escrow Agent, or any other agent retained by
Lead Plaintiff or Lead Counsel in connection with the
administration or taxation of the Settlement Fund or the Net
Settlement Fund beyond the amount allocated to them as Authorized
Claimant.

The Claims Administrator is authorized to destroy the paper copies
of the Claims and all supporting documentation one year after the
Initial Distribution, and may destroy electronic copies of the same
one year after all funds have been distributed.

Fees and expenses in the amount of $223,475.37 that have been
incurred or are expected to be incurred by JND in connection with
the administration of the Settlement and the initial distribution
of the Net Settlement Fund as set forth in paragraph 43 and Exhibit
E of the Segura Declaration, are approved.

The Court retains jurisdiction over any further application or
matter that may arise in connection with the administration of the
Settlement and such other and further relief as the Court deems
appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/nj2nhzar from Leagle.com.


BANK OF AMERICA: Clark Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Mortgagors
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CYNTHIA CLARK,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Case No. 1:18-cv-03672-SAG (D. Md.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following Class: pursuant to Federal Rules of
      Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b):

      "All mortgagors who at any time between July 1, 2008 and the

      date of class certification (I) were a party to a loan
secure
      d by a first deed of trust on any interest in residential
      real property located in Maryland to which Bank of America,
      N.A. (collectively, "BofA") was the lending institution as
      that term is defined in Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 12-109(a)
      (2); (ii) for whom was maintained a loan escrow account, as
      that term is defined in Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 12-109(a)
      (3); (iii) with said escrow account serviced by or for BofA;

      and (iv) who were not annually paid interest on their funds
      held in escrow in accordance with the statutory formula
      specified in Md. Code Ann., Com. Law section 12-109(b) (the
      "Class").

      Specifically excluded from the putative Class are Defendant,

      any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest,
      any of the Defendant's parents, subsidiaries, affiliates,
      officers, directors, employees and members of such persons'
      immediate families, and the presiding judge(s) in this case,

      their staff, and his, her, or their immediate family;

   2. appointing herself as representative of the Class;

   3. appointing Anna Haac of Tycko & Zavareei; Jonathan Streisfeld

      of Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert; Todd Garber

      of Finkelstein, Blankinship, Frei-Pearson & Garber, LLP; and

      Jeffrey Goldenberg of Goldenberg Schneider, L.P.A. as counsel

      for the Class pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1) and for such further

      relief as the Court deems appropriate.

Bank of America, National Association operates as a bank. The Bank
offers saving and current account, investment and financial
services, online banking, and mortgage and non-mortgage loan
facilities, as well as issues credit card and business loans.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 28,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33uaSgN
at no extra charge.[CC]

The attorneys for Plaintiff and Putative Class, are:

          Anna C. Haac, Esq.
          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street, NW Suite 1000
          Washington, DC 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  ahaac@tzlegal.com

               - and -

          Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
          Daniel Tropin, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW FERGUSON
          WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One W. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
          Telephone No. (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile No. (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: streisfeld@kolawyers.com
                  tropin@kolawyers.com

               - and -

          Todd S. Garber, Esq.
          Bradley F. Silverman, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN, BLANKINSHIP,
          FREI-PEARSON & GARBER, LLP
          One North Broadway, Suite 900
          White Plains, NY 10601
          Telephone: (914) 298-3281
          Facsimile: (914) 908-6709
          E-mail: tgarber@fbfglaw.com
                  bsilverman@fbfglaw.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey S. Goldenberg, Esq.
          GOLDENBERG SCHNEIDER, L.P.A.
          4445 Lake Forest Drive, Suite 490
          Cincinnati, Ohio 45242
          Telephone: (513) 345-8297
          Facsimile: (513) 345-8294
          E-mail: jgoldenberg@gs-legal.com

BILLY MCFARLAND: Fyre Festival Class Action Proceeding Stayed
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE: FYRE FESTIVAL LITIGATION, Case No.
1:17-cv-03296-PKC (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge Kevin Castel entered
an order staying the class action proceeding until after the
petition under Rule 23(f), Fed. R. Civ. P. is adjudicated, and if
granted, until ten days after the later of when the appeal is
decided or the mandate is issued from the Court of Appeals.

In an Opinion and Order of December 1, 2020, the Court denied class
certification and ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine if
the entry of a default judgment against defendant Billy McFarland
is proper as to the fraud claims of the named plaintiffs. In their
proposed witness list for the hearing, the plaintiffs inform the
Court that they have appealed the Opinion and Order, and ask the
Court to stay the proceeding on the requested default judgment.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 29, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2RJNXvu at no extra charge.[CC]


BLOOMBERG LP: Bid to Amend Pleadings in Doe Suit Granted in Part
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey issued a
Memorandum Opinion granting in part and denying in part the
Plaintiffs' motion to amend the pleadings in the lawsuit entitled
JANE DOE 1, and JANE DOE 2, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BLOOMBERG L.P., Defendant, Case
No. 19-9471 (FLW) (D.N.J.).

On April 10, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed the instant action. It is a
putative class action brought by current and former employees of
Defendant seeking compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL"), and the New
Jersey Wage Payment Law ("NJWPL") for failure to pay overtime at
the rate of time and one half to individuals with the job titles
'Data Analyst' and 'Data Specialist' (and related titles) who
worked in Bloomberg's Global Data Division. On September 6, 2019,
the Defendant filed its Answer.

On January 19, 2020, the Court issued an Order of Designation for
Mediation, appointing a mediator and staying all proceedings until
May 18, 2020. The Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification
of a class action and for the issuance of notice under the FLSA
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b) and the Defendant's motion to
compel the Jane Doe plaintiffs to disclose their names were
terminated pending the mediation with statutes of limitations
periods tolled.

In a stipulation filed March 11, 2020, the parties stated that in
the interest of furthering settlement discussions the parties agree
that a FLSA collective action with respect to New York class should
be conditionally certified. The parties also agreed to issue a
collective action notice to putative class members, who work or
worked in New York. On March 26, 2020, the District Court issued
the Stipulation and Order that so ordered the agreement of the
parties.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the mediation was delayed,
and the stay continued until November 30, 2020. All claims of the
putative FLSA class were tolled through that date.

A conference was held on Dec. 8, 2020, where the Plaintiffs were
directed to file any motion to amend by Jan. 8, 2021. On Dec. 28,
2020, by text order, the motion for conditional class certification
was deemed refiled.

On Jan. 8, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to amend,
seeking leave to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") to (1)
substitute proposed named plaintiffs Rohan Vagle, John Hughes, and
Stefan Petkovic for Plaintiffs; (2) include claims under the NJWPL
and NJWHL that extend from "six years preceding the filing of the
complaint" instead of the two years cited in the initial Complaint
and add a claim for liquidated damages; and (3) add claims under
New York Labor Law that extend from "six years preceding the filing
of the Complaint" until the date of final judgment in the case. The
Defendant opposes the motion on the grounds of futility and undue
prejudice.

The Plaintiffs seek to substitute Rohan Vagle, John Hughes, and
Stefan Petkovic as named plaintiffs. Given that the Defendant does
not explicitly oppose this proposed amendment and that the NYLL
claims are neither futile nor unduly prejudicial, the Court grants
the Plaintiffs' motion to the extent it seeks to substitute the
proposed named plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs allege that they have plausible claims under the
NJWPL for the Defendant's alleged failure to pay premium overtime
wages because those wages were withheld and, thus, qualify as
claims under the NJWPL. However, the NJWPL, NJSA 34:11-4.1, et
seq., regulates deductions from an employee's wages, while the
NJWHL, NJSA 34:11-56a4, et seq., sets the amount for minimum wage
and overtime rates, Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni
explains, citing Rodriguez v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., Civ. No.
14-6897 (KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL 5770502, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2015).

Because the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments
are futile to the extent they seek to gain a six-year statute of
limitations by asserting an overtime pay under the NJWPL, it will
next address whether adding those claims by asserting a six-year
statute of limitations under the NJWHL and claim for liquidated
damages based on the 2019 amendments under the Wage Theft Act is
futile.

Judge Bongiovanni notes that New Jersey courts have long favored
the prospective application of statutes, citing Phillips v.
Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 615 (1992).

According to the Memorandum Opinion, district courts have
previously found that "New Jersey law does not support the
retroactive application of the amendment to the statute of
limitations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law." First, the
legislature did not explicitly state its intent to apply the
statute retroactively in the text of the statute or in the related
legislative history; nor is implied retroactivity necessary to make
the statute workable or to give it the most sensible
interpretation. Second, the amendment to the statute of limitations
is not curative, or designed to remedy a perceived imperfection in
or misapplication of a statute. Third, the expectations of the
parties do not warrant retroactive application of the amendment.

Since none of the three factors favor retroactive application of
the amendment expanding the statute of limitations to six years,
the Court need not look to whether such retroactive application
will cause an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a
manifest injustice. The three-factor test similarly militates
against retroactive application of the liquidated damages provided
for in the 2019 amendments to the NJWHL. Although none of the cases
discussed specifically address liquidated damages, the analysis is
the same with the addition that retroactive application of this
provision would cause a "manifest injustice" by expanding
Defendant's liability dramatically, Judge Bongiovanni states.

In light of these, the Court finds that the proposed amendments to
the Complaint seeking to expand the statute of limitations period
for the New Jersey claims from two years to six years are futile.

The Court next addresses whether adding the Plaintiffs' proposed
claims under the NYLL would be futile under Rule 15(c) to the
extent that the overtime claims it agreed to toll as of April 30,
2020, and the claims under NYLL Section 195 do not relate back to
the filing of the Complaint and because adding the NYLL claims
would be unduly prejudicial.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' proposed claims under the NYLL
are not futile because they relate back to the filing of the
Complaint and adding them would not be unduly prejudicial. The
Plaintiffs' original complaint asserts FLSA claims on behalf of a
class that includes "individuals who worked in the Global Data
Division anywhere in the United States." Although the Plaintiffs
did not bring claims under the NYLL in the Complaint, they made
clear that their claims relate to the Defendant's failure to pay
overtime to all individuals in its Global Data Division with the
specified titles. The Defendant was on notice that the Plaintiffs
might later add parallel claims under the NYLL to its complaint.

As for the proposed claims under NYLL Section 195, the claims for
failure to provide proper wage statements or notices upon hiring
all stem from the Defendant's alleged failure to pay appropriate
overtime to the Plaintiffs. They arise "out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence" that is the subject of the Complaint,
as required by Rule 15(c). Therefore, they relate back to the
filing of the original complaint.

Finally, given the lack of undue delay by the Plaintiffs and the
early stage of litigation in this matter, the Defendant will not be
unduly prejudiced by the proposed amendments to add the NYLL
claims, Judge Bongiovanni opines. The proposed amendments to the
Complaint seeking to add claims under the NYLL that relate back to
the filing of the Complaint are neither futile nor unduly
prejudicial, she adds.

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion, the Plaintiffs'
motion to amend is granted in part and denied in part. An
appropriate Order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion dated April 22,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/49ewv626 from
Leagle.com.


BMW OF NORTH AMERICA: E.D. Louisiana Narrows Claims in Baker Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit styled RICHARD BAKER v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,
SECTION: "A" (1), Case No. 20-274 (E.D. La.), District Judge Jay C.
Zainey of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana entered an order ruling that the Defendants':

   -- Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied
      in part; and

   -- Motion to Exclude Expert is denied.

The Plaintiff, Richard Baker, has sued BMW for a manufacturing
defect in the N63 engine in the pre-owned 2009 BMW 750i that he
purchased in 2013 for $58,790. He believes that the engine is
defective because it consumes an excessive amount of oil at an
extremely rapid rate requiring him to add BMW-approved engine oil
well before the recommended oil change intervals. He concedes that
he noticed the problem not long after he purchased the vehicle but
he alleges that a technician with a local authorized BMW dealer
assured him that such oil consumption was normal and BMW
persistently refused to acknowledge the defect. He alleges that the
problem continued to worsen requiring him to add two quarts of oil
for every 200 miles of use in order to prevent catastrophic engine
damage or failure.

According to Baker, it has become widely known throughout the
automotive industry that the N63 may be defective due to the oil
consumption problem. He contends that BMW knew as far back as 2008
about the N63's oil consumption problem. He believes that BMW
fraudulently concealed the presence of the defect.

Mr. Baker contends that the oil consumption defect substantially
impairs the use, value, and safety of the vehicle, and that he
either would not have purchased the vehicle or would have paid
significantly less for it had he known about the problems with the
N63 prior to the purchase. As for damages, Baker claims that it
would cost about $15,000 dollars to repair the problem (assuming
that replacing the engine would be required to repair the problem),
and he claims that he has incurred out of pocket expenses
associated with the engine oil consumption problem.

On August 10, 2018, Baker opted out of a nationwide class action
settlement reached in Bang v. BMW of North America, LLC (No.
15-6945, District of New Jersey), and joined with several other
opt-out plaintiffs to file an action in the District of New Jersey
on December 3, 2018. Baker's claims in that lawsuit, none of which
were based on Louisiana law, were dismissed without prejudice so
that Baker and the other individual opt-out plaintiffs could file
separate actions in their respective states (Sarwar v. BMW of N.
Am., LLC, No. 18-16750, 2019 WL 7499157 (D. N.J.) (Nov. 27, 2019)).
The presiding judge ordered that the statute of limitations for any
claim asserted in that case was deemed tolled during the pendency
of the action and for a period of 30 days from the date of the
order (11/27/19).

Mr. Baker filed the individual suit on January 27, 2020, asserting
several claims related to the N63 engine. The claims are based on
the MMWA (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act), 15 U.S.C. Section 2301, et
seq., and Louisiana law.

BMW has always taken the position that Baker's claims in this civil
action are prescribed. In July 2020, the Court rejected BMW's
argument that all of Baker's claims are prescribed on the face of
his complaint. The Court left open the possibility, however, that
BMW could possibly prevail on the prescription defense when moving
for summary judgment at a later time.

A jury trial had been scheduled for May 24, 2021. The Court granted
the parties' joint motion to amend the scheduling order in light of
COVID-19 General Order No. 21-4, which suspends all jury trial in
this district until at least June 7, 2021. A status conference (for
the purpose of selecting a new trial date) will be scheduled
following this ruling for the claims that remain for trial.

BMW now moves for judgment as a matter of law on all claims,
identified as follows: 1) breach of warranty pursuant to the MMWA;
2) breach of implied warranty against redhibitory defects pursuant
to Louisiana Civil Code article 2520 (redhibition) and the MMWA; 3)
breach of express warranties pursuant to the Louisiana Products
Liability Act, La. R.S. Sections 9:2800.53(6) and 2800.58; 4)
violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, La. R.S. Section 51:1401, et seq.; and 5)
fraudulent concealment.

The Court begins with the question of which, if any, of Baker's
claims survive summary judgment on the merits. For the surviving
claims, the Court then considers whether BMW has established that
they are time-barred.

The MMWA establishes standards governing the content of warranties
and creates a statutory cause of action for consumers damaged by
the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with any obligation under the MMWA or a warranty (written or
implied) to bring suit for damages and other appropriate relief.
State law standards govern the breach of a written or implied
warranty except where expressly modified by the MMWA.

The parties do not dispute that the appropriate Louisiana state law
claim under the facts of the case is redhibition.

BMW's position is that Baker's state law redhibition claim, and
likewise the MMWA claim, fails because the N63 had no latent
defect, and even if it did, Baker should have discovered the defect
before buying the car, Judge Zainey notes. Whether the engine
suffered from a latent defect is a question for the jury. And the
Court is not persuaded that BMW can avoid liability by pointing out
that its customer should have combed through internet complaints to
discover potential defects prior to purchasing the vehicle.

The Court does not find the case to be similar to the In re Ford
Motor Co., 982 F.Supp. 388 (E. D. La. 1997), decision cited by BMW.
The notoriety associated with the Bronco II's stability problems
was far more well known than the oil consumption problem with the
N63 engine, Judge Zainey opines.

In addition to determining whether the N63 suffered from a latent
defect the jury must also determine whether that defect should have
been discovered by Baker before he purchased the vehicle so as to
trigger Article 2521. While his testimony confirms that he really
liked the car and might very well have purchased it anyway had he
been aware of all of the problems, he surely would have been
hesitant to pay nearly $60,000.00 for the second-hand car. Summary
judgment will not be granted as to the merits on the MMWA and
redhibition claims, Judge Zainey rules.

But Baker's claim for breach of an express warranty pursuant to the
Louisiana Products Liability Act fails because he neither points to
an express warranty pertaining to the oil consumption issue nor
establishes that he relied on such a warranty when purchasing the
vehicle, Judge Zainey opines. While Baker's testimony establishes
that he purchased the vehicle because it was under warranty, the
Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a general vehicle warranty
will not suffice to support an express warranty claim under the
LPLA, citing Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So.3d 607, 615 (La. 2015).

Furthermore, although BMW did not raise this point, Baker's
allegedly defective engine did not injure anyone else and the oil
consumption problem did not damage the engine itself (the only
damage to the product was the manufacturing defect, not engine
damage caused by the defect), Judge Zainey finds. And while damage
under the LPLA can include economic loss arising from a deficiency
in the product, that loss is cognizable under the LPLA only to the
extent that the redhibition articles would not apply to the loss.
That is not the case here because the redhibition articles do
apply, Judge Zainey points out. Summary judgment will be granted in
favor of BMW on the LPLA claim.

The Court now turns its attention to whether BMW has demonstrated
as a matter of law that Baker's MMWA and redhibition claims are
untimely. Civil Code article 2534 provides that appropriate
prescriptive period for both claims. Under that article, Baker had
one year from the day that he discovered the defect to bring suit.

After considering Baker's deposition testimony, the Court is
persuaded that the jury should determine whether the defect with
the N63 was known to Baker as early as 2013 so as to trigger the
running of prescription prior to the date that the Bang class
action was filed. Likewise, the jury will determine whether Baker
can avail himself of the doctrine of contra non valentem to toll
the running of prescription. Baker's testimony creates an issue of
fact as to whether he was misled by the local BMW dealership
regarding the problem with his vehicle, and whether BMW itself took
actions (via directives to dealers) to actively conceal the problem
from consumers like Baker. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by
BMW's contention that prescription necessarily began to run
sometime in 2013.

If BMW cannot prevail on the prescription defense at trial, i.e.,
cannot establish that Baker's claim was prescribed before the Bang
class action complaint was filed on September 18, 2015, then the
question becomes whether the Bang class action and subsequent
Sarwar case tolled prescription on Baker's claims so as to render
this action timely. This latter inquiry is a legal question for the
Court not the jury. With respect to Bang, BMW argues that class
action tolling under Louisiana law does not apply when a class
member like Baker opts out of a class that is certified.

A simple Erie analysis convinces the Court that BMW is incorrect.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 596, which governs
prescription pertaining to claims "arising out of or occurrences
described" in a class petition, clearly envisions suspension until
a person elects to be excluded from the class.

BMW's arguments pertaining to the Sarwar case are similarly
unconvincing, particularly insofar as the MMWA claim is concerned,
Judge Zainey holds. Thus, unless BMW persuades the jury that
Baker's claims were prescribed prior to the date that Bang was
filed, Baker's claims will be considered as timely.

For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to the Louisiana
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law claim, the
fraudulent concealment claim, and the LPLA claim. The motion is
denied as to the MMWA claim and the redhibition claim.

BMW seeks to exclude the testimony of Baker's expert, Mr. Darren
Manzari, contending that his opinions are speculative and that some
of his opinions invade the province of the trier of fact. The Court
is persuaded that all of the deficiencies raised by BMW can be
addressed via vigorous cross-examination and that none of the
challenges require wholesale exclusion of the witness.

The motion to exclude is, therefore, denied.

It is further ordered that the Case Manager for Section A will
notice a telephone conference for the purpose of scheduling a
pretrial conference and jury trial. No other deadlines are
extended.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Reasons dated April 22,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/29wx27w8 from
Leagle.com.


BREWSTER CHEESE: Class Settlement in Cook Unpaid OT Suit Approved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, KATHY COOK, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v. BREWSTER CHEESE COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 5:20-CV-445 (N.D. Ohio), Judge Sara Lioi of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division, approves the parties' Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement and Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice.

Plaintiff Cook, on behalf of herself and similarly situated
employees, filed a collective action against the Defendant,
alleging it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") (29
U.S.C. Section 201 et seq.) and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage
Standards Act ("Ohio Wage Laws") (Ohio Rev. Code Section 4111 et
seq.) by failing to pay the Plaintiffs overtime wages.  In the
Collective First Amended Complaint, Cook also brought individual
claims alleging discrimination under federal and state law.

The Defendant is an Ohio corporation that "engages in the
processing of milk, cheese, and whey and the production and
packaging of swiss cheese."  The Plaintiffs alleges that the
Defendant has violated the FLSA and Ohio Wage Laws by failing to
compensate employees for donning and doffing sanitary and
protective equipment and taking required sanitation steps at the
start of each shift.  The Defendant denies that it violated the
FLSA and Ohio Wage Laws and disputes the amount of time the
Plaintiffs allege that they spent donning and doffing.  It also
disagrees with the Plaintiffs on the appropriate limitations period
to apply to their claims.

On Oct. 5, 2020, the Court granted in part Cook's motion to
conditionally certify the collective.  In the Memorandum Opinion
and Order ("MOO"), the Court conditionally certified the following
collective: All former and current hourly production employees at
defendant's Brewster, Ohio facility who were required to: (1) don
and doff personal protective equipment and sanitary gear or
otherwise perform mandatory anti-contamination steps; and (2) who
worked 40 or more hours in any workweek within three years
preceding the date of filing of the motion for conditional
certification.

After the opt-in period concluded, the membership of the collective
totaled 32.

In order to avoid the burden, expense, and uncertainty of
litigation, the parties agreed to participate in mediation.  Prior
to mediation, the Defendant produced the Plaintiffs' time punches,
payroll records, and shift schedules for the period from April 10,
2017 through approximately October 2020.  On March 4, 2021, at the
conclusion of a mediation session before Magistrate Judge Carmen E.
Henderson, the parties reached a settlement.  On April 5, 2021, the
parties filed the present Joint Motion.

Having reviewed the terms of the Settlement, Judge Lioi finds that
the Settlement represents a fair and reasonable resolution to bona
fide disputes.  Further, she notes that the Settlement was the
result of arms'-length negotiations between parties that were
represented by able counsel.  As such, she finds no risk of fraud
or collusion.

With respect to the monetary awards to the Plaintiffs, the
Settlement provides that the Plaintiffs will receive 50 minutes of
compensation for each disputed week worked (or 10 minutes per day).
Judge Lioi agrees with the parties that the anticipated individual
settlements represent an excellent result.  Moreover, she has taken
into account the opinion of counsel in the collective action, who
has expressed the opinion that the proposed settlement is a fair
and adequate compromise of the disputed claims and in the best
interest of the Plaintiffs.

As for the award of attorney fees to the Plaintiffs' counsel, Judge
Lioi finds that the award, which is supported by a declaration of
counsel, is reasonable, taking into consideration the fact that a
settlement was reached early in the litigation and the successful
outcome provides substantial relief to the Plaintiffs.  Moreover,
she notes that the attorney fee award amount aligns with the
amounts awarded in other FLSA collective action cases in the
Northern District of Ohio.

In addition, the Settlement provides for a service award to the
Plaintiffs' representative, Cook.  Such awards are not uncommon,
and "courts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate named
plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they
incurred during the course of the class action litigation."
Plaintiff Cook played an active role in assisting the Plaintiffs'
counsel.  As such, Judge Lioi approves the modest service award set
forth in the Settlement to the Representative Plaintiff in
recognition of her service in the action.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Judge Lioi approves the
Settlement.  The claims in the Plaintiffs' complaint are dismissed
with prejudice, and the case is closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/5btvhyts from
Leagle.com.


BRINKER INT'L: Class Cert. Bid in Data Breach Suit Partly OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
Brinker International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 24, 2021, that the district court
handling the putative class action suit entitled, In re: Brinker
Data Incident Litigation, Case No. 18-cv-00686-TJC-MCR, issued an
order granting in part and deferring in part the plaintiffs' motion
for class certification.

In fiscal 2018, the Company discovered malware at certain Chili's
restaurants that may have resulted in unauthorized access or
acquisition of customer payment card data.

The Company was named as a defendant in a putative class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida styled In re: Brinker Data Incident Litigation, Case No.
18-cv-00686-TJC-MCR relating to the cyber security incident.

In the Litigation, plaintiffs assert various claims stemming from
the cyber security incident at the Company's Chili's restaurants
involving customer payment card information and seek monetary
damages in excess of $5.0 million, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and attorney's fees and costs.

Mediation was held on November 18, 2020 but was unsuccessful.

On April 14, 2021, the district court issued an order granting in
part and deferring in part the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.

Brinker said, "We believe we have defenses and intend to continue
defending the Litigation. As such, as of March 24, 2021, we have
concluded that a loss, or range of loss, from this matter is not
determinable, therefore, we have not recorded a liability related
to the Litigation. We will continue to evaluate this matter based
on new information as it becomes available."

Brinker International, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, owns,
develops, operates, and franchises casual dining restaurants in the
United States and internationally. As of June 27, 2018, it owned,
operated, or franchised 1,686 restaurants comprising 997
company-owned restaurants and 689 franchised restaurants under the
Chili's Grill & Bar and Maggiano's Little Italy brand names. The
company was founded in 1975 and is based in Dallas, Texas.


CABOT OIL: Uronis Appeals FLSA Suit Dismissal to 3rd Cir.
---------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Matthew Uronis filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled Matthew Uronis v. Cabot Oil & Gas
Corp, et al., Case No. 3-19-cv-01557, in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, the lawsuit
seeks judgment against Defendants for violation of 29 U.S.C.
section 215(a)(3), as well as back pay, an equal amount in
liquidated damages, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, reasonable costs and attorneys' fees under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Mr. Uronis has suffered unlawful retaliation under the FLSA both in
the denial of his request for employment, and in CABOT's concerted
effort to keep individuals affiliated with the Messenger Action
from getting work at all CABOT locations, in order to pressure and
intimidate them into not participating or dropping their claims.

The Messenger Action seeks unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA
from inter alia CABOT, for work performed on CABOT well pads. The
Plaintiff is an opt-in plaintiff in the Messenger Action.

The Plaintiff is now seeking a review of the Court's Memorandum and
Order dated March 31, 2021, granting Defendants' motion to dismiss
the Plaintiff's amended complaint.

The appellate case is captioned as Matthew Uronis v. Cabot Oil &
Gas Corp, et al., Case No. 21-1874, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on May 4, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant MATTHEW URONIS, for himself and on behalf of
those similarly situated, is represented by:

          Angeli Murthy, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN
          8151 Peters Road, Suite 4000
          Plantation, FL 33324
          Telephone: (954) 318-0268
          E-mail: amurthy@forthepeople.com

Defendants-Appellees CABOT OIL & GAS CORP, a Texas Corporation; and
GASSEARCH DRILLING SERVICES CORP, a West Virginia Corporation and
subsidiary of Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation, are represented by:

          Christian C. Antkowiak, Esq.
          Curtis M. Schaffner, Esq.
          BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY
          501 Grant Street
          Union Trust Building, Suite 200
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 562-3988
          E-mail: christian.antkowiak@bipc.com
                  curtis.schaffner@bipc.com

               - and -
        
          Amy L. Barrette, Esq.
          BLANK ROME
          501 Grant Street, Suite 850
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 562-1626
          E-mail: amy.barrette@bipc.com

CARDONE CAPITAL: Final Judgment Entered in Pino Securities Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge John F. Walter of the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Western Division, entered final judgment in
the case, LUIS PINO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC, GRANT CARDONE,
CARDONE EQUITY FUND V, LLC, and CARDONE EQUITY FUND VI, LLC,
Defendants, Case No. 2:20-cv-08499-JFW (KSx) (C.D. Cal.).

The Court has granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint.  Judgment is entered in favor of the
Defendants against the Plaintiff on all of his claims.

The Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the action is dismissed
without leave to amend, and the action is dismissed with prejudice
in its entirety.

The Plaintiff will recover nothing by his complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Final Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3dtdcabu from Leagle.com.

Joseph N. Akrotirianakis -- jakro@kslaw.com -- Paul R. Bessette --
pbessette@kslaw.com -- Lisa Bugni -- lbugni@kslaw.com -- King &
Spalding LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Attorneys for Defendants, Cardone
Capital, LLC, Grant, Cardone, Cardone Equity Fund V, LLC, and
Cardone Equity Fund VI, LLC, Attorneys for Defendants.

Susman Godfrey L.L.P. Krysta Kauble Pachman --
kpachman@susmangodfrey.com -- Marc M. Seltzer --
mselzer@susmangodfrey.com -- Steven Sklaver --
ssklaver@susmangodfrey.com -- in Los Angeles, California, Attorneys
for Lead Plaintiff.


CELLCOM ISRAEL: Faces Human Response Related Putative Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Cellcom Israel Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company faces a
purported class action suit related to the company's breached in
its obligation to provide human response in its call centers as
required by law and its license.  

A purported class action filed with the Tel-Aviv District Court on
February 2021, alleging the company breached its obligation to
provide human response in its call centers as required by law and
its license.  

The total amount claimed should it be approved as class action, was
estimated by the plaintiff at NIS 150 million.

Cellcom Israel Ltd., established in 1994, is a leading Israeli
communications group, providing a wide range of communications
services. Cellcom Israel is the largest Israeli cellular provider,
providing its approximately 2.805 million cellular subscribers (as
at September 30, 2017) with a broad range of services including
cellular telephony, roaming services for tourists in Israel and for
its subscribers abroad text and multimedia messaging, advanced
cellular content and data services and other value-added services
in the areas of music, video, mobile office etc., based on Cellcom
Israel's technologically advanced infrastructure.


CELLCOM ISRAEL: Handsets Loan Transaction Related Suit Underway
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cellcom Israel Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a purported class action suit related to the company's
unlawful collection of interest on handsets loan transaction.

A purported class action filed with the Tel-Aviv District Court on
November 2016, alleging the company unlawfully collected interest
on handsets loan transaction, in which the effective interest
exceeded the one permitted by law and/or without indicating the
interest rate.

In a court hearing held November 2020, the plaintiff retracted the
excess interest cause of action.

The total amount claimed should it be approved as class action, was
estimated by the plaintiff at NIS 73 million.

Cellcom Israel Ltd., established in 1994, is a leading Israeli
communications group, providing a wide range of communications
services. Cellcom Israel is the largest Israeli cellular provider,
providing its approximately 2.805 million cellular subscribers (as
at September 30, 2017) with a broad range of services including
cellular telephony, roaming services for tourists in Israel and for
its subscribers abroad text and multimedia messaging, advanced
cellular content and data services and other value-added services
in the areas of music, video, mobile office etc., based on Cellcom
Israel's technologically advanced infrastructure.


CELLCOM ISRAEL: Settlement Deal in Privacy Violation Suit OK'd
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cellcom Israel Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the court approved the
settlement agreement in the purported class action suit related to
the company's unlawful violation of the privacy of its
subscribers.

In 2015, a purported class action was filed against the company, by
plaintiffs alleging to be subscribers of the Company, claiming
compensation for non-monetary damages in the amount of NIS 15
billion, in connection with allegations that the company unlawfully
violated the privacy of its subscribers and were unlawfully
enriched by so doing.

In March 2020, the court approved a settlement agreement filed with
the court in February 2017. The settlement shall not have a
material effect on the Company's financial statements.

Cellcom Israel Ltd., established in 1994, is a leading Israeli
communications group, providing a wide range of communications
services. Cellcom Israel is the largest Israeli cellular provider,
providing its approximately 2.805 million cellular subscribers (as
at September 30, 2017) with a broad range of services including
cellular telephony, roaming services for tourists in Israel and for
its subscribers abroad text and multimedia messaging, advanced
cellular content and data services and other value-added services
in the areas of music, video, mobile office etc., based on Cellcom
Israel's technologically advanced infrastructure.

CELLCOM ISRAEL: Suit Over Raised Service Charges Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Cellcom Israel Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a purported class action suit related to raised service
charges.

A purported class action filed with the Tel-Aviv District Court on
July 2020, alleging the company unlawfully and in violation of the
agreement, raised service charges.

The total amount claimed should it be approved as class action, was
estimated by the plaintiff at NIS 100 million.

Cellcom Israel Ltd., established in 1994, is a leading Israeli
communications group, providing a wide range of communications
services. Cellcom Israel is the largest Israeli cellular provider,
providing its approximately 2.805 million cellular subscribers (as
at September 30, 2017) with a broad range of services including
cellular telephony, roaming services for tourists in Israel and for
its subscribers abroad text and multimedia messaging, advanced
cellular content and data services and other value-added services
in the areas of music, video, mobile office etc., based on Cellcom
Israel's technologically advanced infrastructure.


CELLCOM ISRAEL: Suit Over Unlawful Charges Underway
---------------------------------------------------
Cellcom Israel Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a purported class action suit related to its unlawful charge
of sums and legal proceedings for their collection taken by the
content provider.

A purported class action was filed with the Tel-Aviv District Court
on July 2014 against the company, two other cellular operators and
a content provider, alleging sum charged and legal proceedings for
their collection taken by the content provider are unlawful.

In October 2020 the court recommended the plaintiff withdraws the
claim and in December 2020 the plaintiff informed the court that it
insists the motion be heard.

The total amount claimed should it be approved as class action, was
estimated by the plaintiff at NIS 300 million.

Cellcom Israel Ltd., established in 1994, is a leading Israeli
communications group, providing a wide range of communications
services. Cellcom Israel is the largest Israeli cellular provider,
providing its approximately 2.805 million cellular subscribers (as
at September 30, 2017) with a broad range of services including
cellular telephony, roaming services for tourists in Israel and for
its subscribers abroad text and multimedia messaging, advanced
cellular content and data services and other value-added services
in the areas of music, video, mobile office etc., based on Cellcom
Israel's technologically advanced infrastructure.

CHOICE SITTER: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Choice Sitter
Solutions LLC. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated v. Choice Sitter
Solutions LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-04067 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Choice Sitter Solutions doing business as Sittercity --
https://www.sittercity.com/ -- is an American online marketplace
for families, individuals, and corporate employees wishing to hire
local in-home care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CINCINNATI INSURANCE: Walborn Files Suit in W.D. Pennsylvania
-------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against THE CINCINNATI
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. The case is styled as Teri Walborn doing
business as: TERI'S PLACE, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated v. THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, THE
CINCINNATI CASUALTY COMPANY, THE CINCINNATI INDEMNITY COMPANY, Case
No. 2:21-cv-00604-MRH (W.D. Pa., May 6, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Insurance.

The Cincinnati Insurance Company -- https://www.cinfin.com/ --
operating since 1950, stands among the nation's top 25 property
casualty insurer groups based on net written premiums.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gary F. Lynch, Esq.
          CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
          1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor
          Pittsburgh, PA 15222
          Phone: (412) 322-9243
          Fax: (412) 231-0246
          Email: glynch@carlsonlynch.com


CONNECTICUT GENERAL: 11th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Slam Dunk Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms
the order granting dismissal in the lawsuit titled SLAM DUNK I,
LLC, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 20-13706 (11th Cir.).

Slam Dunk appeals the district court's order granting Connecticut
General's motion to dismiss with prejudice. Slam Dunk asserts that
it stated a claim for breach of contract by alleging Connecticut
General improperly increased cost-of-insurance rates, thereby,
increasing fees collected from its insureds.

The case involves group universal life insurance ("GUL") policies.
Several decades ago, Connecticut General issued GUL policies to
employees of several companies, including Hyatt Corporation,
Magellan Health Services, and Continental Airlines. In 2010, Slam
Dunk, a life settlement company that purchases life insurance
policies through the secondary market acquired 22 GUL policies
issued to individuals by Connecticut General.

According to Slam Dunk, GUL policies are obtained voluntarily and
paid for by an employee. GUL policies are also less expensive than
what is typically available to an individual, permanent (in that
they can be maintained even after an employee leaves his or her
job), and feature a savings component. The savings component is the
policy's "cash value," which consists of money held in trust by the
insurer plus any money the policyholder contributes. When making
such a contribution, the policyholder is guaranteed a minimum fixed
interest rate.

The policyholder pays for a policy through deductions that
Connecticut General makes each month from the policy's cash value.
This deduction is calculated by using a set of cost-of-insurance
("COI") rates. Connecticut General selects the COI rate that best
corresponds to the insured and then deducts the COI monthly charge
from the GUL policy's cash value.

Slam Dunk brought the putative class action against Connecticut
General, seeking to represent similarly situated policyholders
whose monthly COI rates have been increased at least once since May
16, 2014. Because, as a general matter, advancements in medicine
and science have improved life expectancy over time, Slam Dunk
alleges that Connecticut General should have either reduced or at
least not increased the COI rate.

In its initial complaint, Slam Dunk asserted that this improving
life expectancy trend triggered a contractual obligation for
Connecticut to reduce the COI rate. Connecticut General moved to
dismiss the initial complaint, and the district court granted that
motion without prejudice, allowing Slam Dunk leave to file an
amended complaint. Slam Dunk then amended its complaint, this time
shifting its theory from faulting Connecticut General for not
changing the COI rate to faulting Connecticut General for changing
the rate, i.e., Slam Dunk alleges that, despite life expectancy
improving, Connecticut General improperly increased the COI rate.
According to Slam Dunk, because the COI rate is to be "based on"
expectations of "future mortality experience," Connecticut General
violated the GUL policies by increasing the COI rate.

Connecticut General again moved to dismiss Slam Dunk's action,
arguing that Slam Dunk failed to state a plausible claim for breach
of contract. On Sept. 29, 2020, the district court dismissed Slam
Dunk's amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the policies'
plain language did not support Slam Dunk's allegations in its
amended complaint. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Slam Dunk argues that Connecticut General breached its
contractual obligations that it would base COI rate adjustments on
mortality expectations. Because mortality experiences across the
board are improving, Slam Dunk argues that the language of the GUL
policies prohibited Connecticut General from increasing the COI
rate.

Accepting Slam Dunk's factual allegations as true and viewing them
in the light most favorable to Slam Dunk, in order to state a cause
of action for breach of contract, Connecticut General's duty to
adjust the COI rate would have to be based exclusively on
expectations of future mortality experience, and Connecticut
General could not consider any other factors without breaching the
GUL policies, says Circuit Judge Barbara Lagoa, writing for the
Panel.

Judge Lagoa opines that this reading of the contract fails for two
reasons. First, Slam Dunk's interpretation ignores the other
sentences of the GUL policies. Second, Slam Dunk advances a reading
of the COI provision that is contrary to its plain language by
incorrectly reading exclusivity into the phrase "based on." Nothing
about the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "based on"
connotes exclusivity, and nothing about it implies the list that
follows is exhaustive. And while it recognizes there is some
disagreement among state and district courts, the Panel concludes
that this interpretation is most consistent with Florida contract
law. The Appellate Court, therefore, declines to adopt Slam Dunk's
proposed interpretation because to do so would rewrite the GUL
policies.

The Appellate Court has considered the other arguments raised by
Slam Dunk and find them unavailing. The district court read the COI
provisions of the GUL policies according to their plain and
ordinary meaning and properly dismissed the case.

For these reasons, the Appellate Court affirms the district court's
dismissal of Slam Dunk's claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5y27m6h6 from Leagle.com.


COSTAR GROUP: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Costar Group, Inc.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Costar Group, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04066 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

CoStar Group -- http://www.costargroup.com/-- is a provider of
information, analytics and marketing services to the commercial
property industry in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and Spain.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


CSG PETROLEUM: Gomez Files Suit in California Superior Court
------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against CSG PETROLEUM. The
case is styled as Denis Luis Gomez, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. CSG PETROLEUM, a California
Corporation; BRUNDAGE PETROLEUM, INC., a California Corporation;
PRABHJOT SINGH, Case No. BCV-21-100943 (Cal. Super. Ct., Kern Cty.,
April 26, 2021).

The case type is stated as "CV Other Employment - Civil
Unlimited."

Csg Petroleum Inc. is located in Bakersfield, California and is
part of the Convenience Stores & Truck Stops Industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Marco A. Palau, Esq.
          ADVCOATES FOR WORKER RIGHTS LLP
          212 9th St., Ste. 314
          Oakland, CA 94607-4479
          Phone: 510-269-4200
          Fax: 510-269-4200
          Email: marco@advocatesforworkers.com


ESPRESSO ZONE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Espresso Zone. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Espresso Zone, Case No. 1:21-cv-04073
(S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Espresso Zone -- https://www.espressozone.com/ -- offers gourmet
products for the coffee enthusiast.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


FCA US: Ordered to Disclose Complete Calibration Data in Bledsoe
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES BLEDSOE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FCA US LLC, a
Delaware corporation, and CUMMINS INC., an Indiana corporation,
Defendant, Case No. 4:16-cv-14024 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Terrence G.
Berg of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, grants the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel, and grants in part and denies in part Defendant Cummins'
motion to compel.

The Plaintiffs are proposed putative class members who purchased
Defendant FCA's 2007-2012 Dodge Ram 2500 and 3500 trucks, which are
equipped with diesel engines manufactured by Defendant Cummins.
The Plaintiffs' main claim is that the trucks are equipped with
defeat devices that allow its diesel engines to emit nitrogen
oxides at levels that exceed federal and state emissions standards
and the expectations of reasonable consumers.

The discovery dispute hinges on whether the Defendants must produce
its calibration data and emissions software in their native format.
The Plaintiffs, in addition, move to compel production of the
Class Vehicles' Auxiliary Emissions Control Devices ("AECD")
disclosures that Defendant Cummins made to the Environmental
Protection Agency in unredacted form.  For its part, Defendant
Cummins moves to compel the Plaintiffs to identify and describe
with particularity its basis for alleging the existence of a defeat
device.

Discussion

A. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel

The Plaintiffs move to compel the inspection and production of
Defendant Cummins' complete calibration data and emissions
software, as well as its AECD disclosures to the EPA in unredacted
form.

First, the Plaintiffs seek the production of Defendant Cummins'
complete calibration data and emissions software "installed in the
Affected Vehicles in a 'reasonably usable form.'"  Defendant
Cummins responds that it has already produced a "complete,
unredacted and searchable calibration" data set in accordance with
its obligations under the Stipulation and Order Governing the
Collection and Production of Documents and Electronically Stored
Information, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court's
Model ESI Order.

Judge Berg holds that the production the Plaintiffs seek is
relevant, not subject to any privileges, and the Defendant has not
established that disclosure in native format would be
disproportionate or unduly burdensome.  Accordingly, he grants the
Plaintiffs' motion to compel Defendant Cummins to produce its
emissions software and calibration data installed in the vehicles
at issue in their native format.  Production will be done pursuant
to the parties' Stipulation and Order Governing the Collection and
Production of Documents and Electronically Stored Information, and
Stipulation and Order Regarding Non-waiver of Privileges and
Production of Privilege Logs.

In order to mitigate concerns about inadvertent disclosures,
Defendant Cummins is ordered to load its calibration files and
emissions software onto a single secured stand-alone laptop that
may not be connected to any network or external storage device,
whether wirelessly or by direct connection.  The Plaintiffs must
store the laptop in a locked storage container and may not remove
or export the data.

Second, the Plaintiffs next seek the production of information
regarding AECDs in the Class Vehicles that Defendant Cummins
disclosed to the EPA -- and they want this information produced in
an unredacted format.  Defendant Cummins argues that in order to
protect its competitive advantage, the Plaintiffs should only be
allowed to view the AECDs that are relevant to the issues in the
case.  In addition, it contends that it is redacting portions of
the AECD disclosures that constitute trade secrets.

In considering the parties' briefs, Judge Berg is unpersuaded by
Defendant Cummins' argument that it may "redact individual AECDs
that do not relate in any way to the Plaintiffs' allegations or the
Defendants' defenses."  He says relevance redactions are generally
inappropriate, especially where parties have agreed to a
Stipulation and Order governing the process for designating certain
materials as confidential or highly confidential.

Consequently, the Judge orders Defendant Cummins to produce its
Class Vehicles' AECD disclosures to the EPA in unredacted format.
As with the production of its complete calibration data and
emissions software, Defendant Cummins will produce such materials
in the same single secured stand-alone laptop described in Section
II(a)(i) of the Order.  Production of the unredacted AECD
disclosures will be subject to the parties' Stipulation and Order
Governing the Collection and Production of Documents and
Electronically Stored Information, and Stipulation and Order
Regarding Non-waiver of Privileges and Production of Privilege
Logs.

B. Defendant Cummins' Motion to Compel

Defendant Cummins challenges the Plaintiffs' response to
Interrogatory No. 2 and moves to compel them "to provide a complete
and substantive response."  Interrogatory No. 2 asks, in essence,
for the Plaintiffs to "identify and describe with particularity all
defeat devices" that are allegedly "present in the Subject
Vehicles."  Defendant Cummins argues that the Plaintiffs'
unwillingness to provide a response to this question "prejudices
Cummins' ability to defend against" allegations that it "installed
defeat devices in the RAM Trucks."   The Plaintiffs objected to
Interrogatory No. 2, arguing that their responses were limited
because "Cummins has deliberately and systematically withheld
evidence that Plaintiffs need to answer" Interrogatory No. 2.

Judge Berg holds that Interrogatory No. 2 is relevant to the core
issue of whether Defendant Cummins knowingly installed defeat
devices in the vehicles at issue.  He says while perhaps little
will be accomplished by compelling the Plaintiffs to provide a
complete and substantive response to Interrogatory No. 2 when they
lack the underlying information to do so, it is nevertheless wrong
for them to avoid supplying a good faith answer, even if part of
that answer is an admission that they do not currently know for
certain what the exact nature of the defeat device is or how it
works.  Furthermore, production of complex information in its
native form naturally calls for the use of an expert to analyze
that information.

Therefore, the Judge orders the Plaintiffs to supplement their
response to Interrogatory No. 2 by providing a good faith answer
consistent with whatever facts they currently possess, and
qualified by whatever explanations may be necessary, including if
appropriate an admission of a lack of sufficient knowledge or
information.  In such an answer, the Plaintiffs may also indicate
that their full and complete response to the Interrogatory will be
provided after they receive adequate information involving complete
calibration data, emissions software, and AECD disclosures.  If the
Plaintiffs require an expert to process said disclosures in order
to respond to Interrogatory No. 2, then they will supplement their
response when they produce their expert report.

Disposition

For all the reasons stated, Judge Berg grants the Plaintiffs'
motion to compel and grants in part and denies in part Defendant
Cummins' motion to compel.

Defendant Cummins is directed to disclose its complete calibration
data in native format, including its emissions software, pursuant
to the directives outlined in the Order.  Defendant Cummins is
further directed to produce its Class Vehicles' AECD disclosures to
the EPA in unredacted form.

In addition, the Plaintiffs are directed to answer Interrogatory
No. 2 to the best of their current ability, as well as provide a
more complete and substantive response to that Interrogatory after
they have received the necessary materials to do so.  Finally, the
Plaintiffs are ordered to refile any of the sworn declarations that
were submitted under the pseudonym "E1" in a form bearing the true
name and signature of the declarant.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/vayn6snj from Leagle.com.


FERRARA MARKET: Monegro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Ferrara Market, Inc.
The case is styled as Frankie Monegro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Ferrara Market, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04059 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Ferrara Market, Inc. -- https://www.ferraramarketinc.com/ -- offers
Funko, Jada Toys, Marvel Legends, Figpin and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


FINANCIAL RECOVERY: Adams Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Financial Recovery
Services, Inc. The case is styled as Shante Adams, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Financial Recovery
Services, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-02522 (E.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Financial Recovery Services, Inc. -- https://www.fin-rec.com/ --
provides debt collection services. The Company offers comprehensive
coverage, auditing, monitoring, electronic file transfer, legal
collections, skiptracing, bilingual capability, and comprehensive
data security services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


FINVOLUTION GROUP: Bid to Dismiss PPDAI Securities Suit Terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------
FinVolution Group said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the federal court
handling the case entitled, In re PPDAI Group Inc. Securities
Litigation, No. 18-cv-6716-FB -JO, terminated the pending motion to
dismiss with leave to renew if the settlement is not approved.

Starting in September 2018, the company and certain of its current
and former officers and directors, the underwriters of the
company's initial public offering in November 2017, and its agent
for the service of process in the U.S. have been named as
defendants in putative securities class actions captioned Yizhong
Huang v. PPDAI Group Inc., et al. Case No. 654482/2018 (New York
County of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, filed on
September 10, 2018); Ravindra Vora v. PPDAI Group Inc., et al.,
Case No. 654777/2018 (New York County of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, filed on September 27, 2018); Lai v. PPDAI Group
Inc., et al. Case No. 1:2018-cv-06716 (U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, filed on November 26, 2018); and
Goyal v. PPDAI Group Inc., et al. Case No. 2:2019-cv-00168 (U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, filed on
January 9, 2019).

These actions allege that defendants made misstatements and
omissions in connection with the company's initial public offering
in November 2017 in violation of the Securities Act of 1933.

The Lai Case also advances claims under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.

On October 16, 2018, the Supreme Court of the State of New York
consolidated the two state court lawsuits (the Huang Case and the
Vora Case) under the caption In re PPDAI Group Securities
Litigation, No. 654482/2018 (the "New York State Action").

On December 17, 2018, the plaintiffs in the New York State Action
filed a consolidated amended complaint, which the Company and
certain other defendants moved to dismiss.

On July 31, 2019, Company and certain other defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the New York State Action. On February 26, 2020,
the Court in the New York State Action granted in part and denied
in part the motion to dismiss.

The Company and certain other defendants have appealed the partial
denial of their motion, and that appeal is in the process of being
briefed.

On February 21, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York consolidated the two federal court lawsuits
(the Lai Case and the Goyal Case) under the caption In re PPDAI
Group Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 18-cv-6716-FB -JO (the
"Federal Court Action"), appointed lead plaintiffs of the Federal
Court Action, and approved a scheduling stipulation for the filing
of the plaintiffs' amended complaint and the defendants' responsive
pleadings.

On April 22, 2019, plaintiffs in the Federal Court Action filed a
second amended complaint. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Federal Court Action, which was fully briefed as of January 17,
2020.

On December 9, 2020, the parties notified both courts that they
reached an agreement in principle to settle both lawsuits. The
parties are in the process of finalizing the settlement, which will
then be subject to court approval.

In light of the pending settlement, on March 26, 2021, the federal
court terminated the pending motion to dismiss with leave to renew
if the settlement is not approved. Both the New York State Action
and the Federal Court Action otherwise remain in their preliminary
stages.

FinVolution Group develops online consumer finance platform. The
Company offers credit risk assessment, fraud detection, big data,
automated loan transaction, and artificial intelligence solutions.
FinVolution Group serves clients in China.


FMA ALLIANCE: Lewis Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Georgia
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against FMA ALLIANCE LTD. The
case is styled as Joe Lewis, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. FMA ALLIANCE LTD, Case No.
4:21-cv-00074-CDL (M.D. Ga., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

FMA Alliance, Ltd. (FMA) -- https://www.fmaalliance.com/ -- is a
privately-owned receivables management company originally formed in
1983 and headquartered in Houston, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com

               - and -

          Misty Oaks Paxton, Esq.
          3895 Brookgreen Pt.
          Decatur, GA 30034
          Phone: (404) 500-7861
          Email: attyoaks@yahoo.com


FOODSERVICEDIRECT.COM: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
--------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against
Foodservicedirect.com, Inc. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on
behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v.
Foodservicedirect.com, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04064 (S.D.N.Y., May
6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

FoodServiceDirect -- https://www.foodservicedirect.com/ -- is your
source for restaurant supplies, dry foods, refrigerated & frozen
foods, paper products, and all other restaurant needs including
disposable & janitorial products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com



FORD MOTOR: Class Settlement in Persad Suit Wins Prelim. Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SURESH PERSAD, DANIEL G. WRIGHT, and ROBERT S.
DRUMMOND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant, Case No.
2:17-cv-12599-TGB-MKM (E.D. Mich.), Judge Terrence G. Berg of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, grants the Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement.

Judge Berg held a hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Approval on
Jan. 11, 2021.  Having fully considered the record and the
requirements of law, he preliminarily approves the Settlement.  He
finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate and meets
the standards for preliminary approval under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)
and (b).

The Judge conditionally certifies, for settlement purposes only,
the following Settlement Class: All entities and natural persons in
the United States (including its Territories and the District of
Columbia) who currently own or lease (or who in the past owned or
leased) a model year 2016 and 2017 Ford Explorer sold or leased in
the United States, excluding 2016 and 2017 Police Interceptor
Utility Ford Explorers.

The Judge conditionally appoints the following Plaintiffs as the
Class Representatives for the Settlement Class: Suresh Persad,
Daniel G. Wright, and Robert S. Drummond.

The Judge has reviewed and finds that the content of the revised
proposed forms of Notice attached as Exhibits C and D to the
Parties' Joint Notice of Supplemental Filing, replacing Exhibits C
and D to the Settlement Agreement, which are to be displayed, along
with the Settlement Agreement and its Exhibits, on the Settlement
Website, satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1), and Due Process and accordingly approved the
Notice and Claim Form.

Judge Berg further approves the proposed methods for giving notice
of the Settlement to members of the Settlement Class, as reflected
in the Settlement Agreement.  He finds that Settlement Class
members will receive the best notice practicable under the
circumstances.

The Judge specifically approves the Parties' proposal that on an
agreed upon date with the Settlement Claims Administrator, but in
no event more than 75 days after entry of the Preliminary Approval
Order, the Settlement Claims Administrator will cause individual
Short Form Class Notice, substantially in the form attached to the
Parties' Joint Notice of Supplemental Filing as Exhibit C, to be
mailed, by first class mail, to the current or last known addresses
of all reasonably identifiable Settlement Class Members.

Judge Berg specifically approves the procedures set forth in the
Settlement Agreement for identifying Settlement Class Members and
notifying Settlement Class Members whose initial mailings are
returned undeliverable.  He finds that these procedures, carried
out with reasonable diligence, will constitute the best notice
practicable under the circumstances and will satisfy the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(1) and Due Process.

Judge Berg preliminarily finds that the following counsel fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the Settlement Class and
conditionally appoints Joseph H. Meltzer, E. Powell Miller and the
law firms Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP and The Miller Law
Firm, P.C. as the Class Counsel.

A Fairness Hearing will be held on Nov. 15, 2021.  The Judge
directs that no later than 14 days prior to the Final Fairness
Hearing, the Class Counsel will file all memoranda, including
affidavits, declarations, and other evidence in support of the
request for final approval of the Settlement; the Class Counsels'
request for approval of attorneys' fees, costs, and reimbursement
of expenses; and the request for Service Awards to the individual
Named Plaintiffs.

Judge Berg further directs that no later than seven days prior to
the Final Fairness Hearing, the Class Counsel will file any
supplemental memoranda addressing any objections and/or opt-outs.
If the Class Counsel and the Defense Counsel do not reach agreement
on reasonable attorney fees and costs/expenses, the Parties will
meet and confer to agree upon a schedule for Defendant to file
opposition to the Class Counsel's motion for attorney fees and
costs/expenses, which will be at least 60 days, the Plaintiffs'
reply thereto, and whether the date of the Fairness Hearing needs
to be changed.

Persons wishing to object to the proposed Settlement and/or be
heard at the Fairness hearing will following the following
procedure:

     (a) To object, a member of the Settlement Class, individually
or through counsel, must file a written objection with the Court,
and must also serve a copy thereof upon the following, postmarked
no later than 45 days after the Notice Date:

           i. Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
Ethan J. Barlieb, Esq. Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP 280 King
of Prussia Road Radnor, PA 19087 E. Powell Miller, Esq. The Miller
Law Firm, P.C 950 West University Drive, Suite 300 Rochester, MI
48307

          ii. Counsel for the Defendant: David M. George, Esq.
Dykema Gossett PLLC 2723 South State Street, Suite 400 Ann Arbor,
MI 48104 Joel A. Dewey, Esq. DLA Piper, LLP 6225 Smith Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland 21209

     (b) Any objecting Settlement Class member must include with
his or her objection:

          i. The objecting Settlement Class Member's full name,
address, and telephone number;

          ii. The model, model year, and vehicle identification
number of the objecting Settlement Class Member's Class Vehicle,
along with proof that the objector has owned or leased a Class
Vehicle (i.e., a true copy of a vehicle title, registration, or
license receipt);

          iii. A written statement of all grounds for the
objection, accompanied by any legal support for the objection;

          iv. Copies of any papers, briefs, or other documents upon
which the objection is based;

          v. A list of all cases in which the Settlement Class
Member and/or his or her counsel filed or in any way participated
-- financially or otherwise -- objecting to a class settlement
during the preceding five years.

          vi. The name, address, email address, and telephone
number of every attorney representing the objector; and

          vii. A statement indicating whether the objector and/or
his or her counsel intends to appear at the Fairness Hearing and,
if so, a list of all persons, if any, who will be called to testify
in support of the objection.

     (c) Subject to the approval of the Court, any objecting
Settlement Class Member may appear, personally or by counsel, at
the final fairness hearing to explain why the proposed settlement
should not be approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate, or to
object to any motion for Class Counsel Fees and Expenses or
incentive awards.

     (d) Any Class Member who does not make his, her, or its
objection in the manner provided will be deemed to have waived his,
her, or its right to object to any aspect of the proposed
Settlement and/or Class Counsel's motion for attorneys' fees and
reimbursement of litigation expenses.

Judge Berg appoints KCC Class Action Services as the Settlement
Claims Administrator. The Parties are authorized to retain the
Settlement Claims Administrator to supervise and administer the
Notice procedure as well as the processing of Claims.

All Settlement Class members will have the right to opt out of the
Settlement Class at any time during the opt-out period.  The
opt-out period will run for 45 days from the Notice Date.

The Settlement Claims Administrator will tabulate communications
from the Settlement Class Members asking to be excluded from the
Settlement Class and will report the names and addresses of such
entities and natural persons to the Court and to the Class Counsel
no less than seven days before the Fairness Hearing.

Pending final determination of the joint application for approval
of the Settlement Agreement, all proceedings in the Litigation
other than settlement approval proceedings are stayed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5uaxv25e from Leagle.com.


FRONTIER AIRLINES: Solomon Suit Remanded to Kenton Circuit Court
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DANYAL SOLOMON, et al., Plaintiffs v. FRONTIER
AIRLINES, INC., Defendant, Civil Action No. 20-165-DLB-CJS (E.D.
Ky.), Judge David L. Bunning of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington, granted
the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand to Kenton Circuit Court.

Plaintiffs Danyal Solomon and Amelia Solomon allege that Frontier
Airlines engaged in unfair and deceptive practices to avoid paying
refunds for flights that were cancelled due to the coronavirus
pandemic.  Acting on behalf of a putative class of similarly
situated individuals, the Plaintiffs brought claims under the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act and Kentucky common law in Kenton
Circuit Court.  In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs request "relief
for damages incurred as a result of the Defendant's failure to
refund money paid for Frontier flights that Defendant ultimately
cancelled."

In Nov. 2020, the Defendant removed the case to the Court "pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(a), 1441(b) and 1446(a)."  It then filed
a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, as
well as a Motion to Transfer the case to the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.

In response, the Plaintiffs have moved to remand the matter to
Kenton Circuit Court, asserting that removal jurisdiction is
lacking because the Defendant has failed to establish an amount in
controversy above the $75,000 minimum required in 28 U.S.C. Section
1332(a).  On the Plaintiffs' Motion, the Court stayed the deadlines
to respond to the Defendant's Motions pending the resolution of the
Motion to Remand.  The Motion to Remand is now fully briefed.

Judge Bunning opines that remand to Kenton Circuit Court is
required in the case, as there is no evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.  In
its Notice of Removal, the Defendant asserts that more than $75,000
is at stake because the Plaintiffs allege compensatory damages in
the amount of $861.62 (the combined value of the two airline
tickets) plus punitive damages, and "seek to represent a class they
believe 'will consist of more than a thousand members.'"

A straightforward reading of these allegations in the Notice of
Removal suggests that although no individual Plaintiff will recover
more than $75,000, the combined value of all the Plaintiffs' claims
will exceed that amount.  However, it is well settled that a
defendant may not aggregate claims of multiple plaintiffs to reach
the jurisdictional threshold under Section 1332(a).  While a single
plaintiff may aggregate the value of her claims against a defendant
to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, the same is not true
with respect to multiple plaintiffs."

Judge Bunning opines that this rule holds true in the class action
context.  Accordingly, as the Defendant's Notice of Removal relies
on aggregation of claims by multiple plaintiffs, it does not
establish the presence of diversity jurisdiction.

To the extent that the Notice of Removal can be read to allege an
amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 for claims of a single
Plaintiff (as the Defendant insists in its Response brief), that
allegation is not plausible on its face and does not withstand the
Plaintiffs' challenge.  When, as in the case, the plaintiff
contests the amount in controversy, "the removing defendant bears
the burden of showing that the amount in controversy requirement
'more likely than not' is satisfied."

As the Notice of Removal indicates, each of the named Plaintiffs
alleges $430.31 in compensatory damages (the value of one airline
ticket) as well as punitive damages.  In order to reach an amount
greater than $75,000, the Plaintiffs would need to recover 174
times the amount of compensatory damages.  Despite having the
burden of proof on the issue, the Judge finds that the Defendant
provides no argument, let alone evidence, as to why such a large
punitive damages ratio would be warranted in the case.  Nor is it
likely that an award that large would hold up in Court.  The
Supreme Court has noted that a punitive damages award that is
merely four times the amount of compensatory damages "might be
close to the line of constitutional impropriety," citing State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).

In its Response to the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, the Defendant
argues that each Plaintiff is actually seeking much more than
$430.31 in compensatory damages because the Complaint alleges
damages in excess of the $5,000 jurisdictional limit in Kenton
Circuit Court.  According to the Defendant, these heightened
compensatory damages, combined with punitive damages and attorney's
fees, "suffice to satisfy the amount in controversy" for each
individual Plaintiff.

But if a state's procedural rules prohibit plaintiffs from
specifying the amount of damages in their complaints, as they do in
Kentucky, a defendant must go beyond the pleadings to prove the
amount in controversy."  This means that a defendant's claims
regarding the amount in controversy "must be supported by
'competent proof,' which can include affidavits, documents, or
interrogatories."  Rather than providing such proof, however, the
Judge holds that the Defendant improperly attempts to flip the
burden, pointing out that "Plaintiffs fail to admit that they
intend to seek less than $75,000."

While a defendant "need not show to a legal certainty that the
amount in controversy met the federal requirement, it must do more
than show a mere possibility that the jurisdictional amount is
satisfied."  Unsurprisingly, district courts in Kentucky have
consistently remanded cases in which the defendant offers nothing
more than speculation regarding the amount in controversy,
including the likely amount of punitive damages and attorney's
fees. That is the case in the instant.

Accordingly, Judge Bunning granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
and remanded the matter to the Kenton Circuit Court.  He denied as
moot the Defendant's Motion to Change Venue.  The decision on the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be left to the deliberation of
the Kenton Circuit Court.  The matter is stricken from the Court's
active docket.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/hu45nxfp from
Leagle.com.


GEICO GENERAL: Nichols' Bid to Certify Insureds Class Approved
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MERLE NICHOLS, on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, v. GEICO GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign automobile insurance company, Case No.
2:18-cv-01253-RAJ (W.D. Wash.), the Hon. Judge Richard A. Jones
entered an order:

   1. denying the Defendant's motions for summary judgment;

   2. granting the Plaintiff's motion to certify class of:

      "All insured, as defined within GEICO's Automobile Policy,
      and all third-party beneficiaries of such coverage, under any

      GEICO insurance policy effective in the state of Washington
      between July 24, 2012 and the present, for whom GEICO limited

      or terminated benefits, or denied coverage based, even in
      part, upon its determination that its insured or beneficiary

      had reached "maximum medical improvement" or that such
      benefits were not "essential in achieving maximum medical
      improvement for bodily injury;" and

   3. adopting the parties' joint statements.

On January 15, 2015, the Plaintiff Merle Nichols was injured in an
automobile accident. He then sought personal injury protection
(PIP) coverage from Defendant GEICO, which insured the vehicle that
injured him. GEICO initially paid some benefits.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 28, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3f60Xn4 at no extra charge.[CC]

GENERAL ELECTRIC: Continues to Defend Houston Putative Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
General Electric Company said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the plaintiffs in the
"Houston" putative class action suit had filed an amended
complaint.

In October 2018, a putative class action (the Houston case) was
filed in New York state court naming as defendants GE, certain GE
subsidiaries and current and former GE executive officers and
employees.

It alleges violations of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933 and seeks damages on behalf of purchasers of senior
notes issued in 2016 and rescission of transactions involving those
notes. This case was stayed pending resolution of the motion to
dismiss the Hachem case.

In April 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.

General Electric Company operates as a high-tech industrial company
worldwide. It operates in Power, Renewable Energy, Aviation, Oil &
Gas, Healthcare, Transportation, Lighting, and Capital segments.
The company was founded in 1892 and is headquartered in Boston,
Massachusetts.


GOLDMAN SACHS: Falberg Seeks to Certify Class of Plan Participants
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Leonid Falberg, as
representative of a class of similarly situated persons, and on
behalf of The Goldman Sachs 401(k) Plan, v. The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., The Goldman Sachs 401(k) Plan Retirement Committee,
and John Does 1-20, Case No. 1:19-cv-09910-ER (S.D.N.Y.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the following proposed class in this action (or
in
      the alternative, such other class(es) as the Court may
      determine to be appropriate):

      "All participants and beneficiaries of the Goldman Sachs
      401(k) Plan whose Plan account held any Goldman Sachs mutual

      fund (other than money market funds) any time on or after
      October 25, 2013, excluding Defendants, any of their
      directors, and any officers or employees of Defendants with
      responsibility for the Plan's investment or administrative
      functions;"

   2. appointing the Plaintiff as the class representative for the
      class; and

   3. appointing the Plaintiff's counsel as class counsel.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 30,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uBJ9GV
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kai Richter, Esq.
          Michele R. Fisher, Esq.
          Paul J. Lukas, Esq.
          Brock J Specht, Esq.
          Ben Bauer, Esq.
          NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP
          4700 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55402
          Telephone: (612) 256-3200
          Facsimile: (612) 338-4878
          E-mail: krichter@nka.com
                  mfisher@nka.com
                  lukas@nka.com
                  bspecht@nka.com
                  bbauer@nka.com

               - and -

          Major Khan, Esq
          MKLLC LAW
          1120 Avenue of the Americas, 4th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          Telephone: (646) 546-5664
          Facsimile: (646) 546-5755
          E-mail: mk@mk-llc.com

HALEN BRANDS: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Halen Brands, Inc.
The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Halen Brands, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04072 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Halen Brands Inc. -- https://www.halenbrands.com/ -- is an
operating company specializing in investing in the food
sector.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


HALLCON CORPORATION: Lewis Sues Over FCRA Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Marcell Lewis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. HALLCON CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; LOOP
TRASPORTATION, INC., a California corporation; Does 1 through 100,
inclusive, Case No. RG21097034 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty.,
April 26, 2021), is brought against the Defendants to seeks
compensatory and punitive damages due to the Defendants' systematic
and willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants routinely acquire
investigative consumer and/or consumer credit reports to conduct
background checks on the Plaintiff and other prospective, current,
and former employees and use information from credit and background
reports in connection with their hiring process without providing
disclosures and obtaining proper authorization in compliance with
the law proper, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is an individual residing in the State of
California.

HALLCON CORPORATION is a Delaware corporation doing business in the
State of California..[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Shaun Setareh, Esq.
          Thomas Segal, Esq.
          Farrah Grant, Esq.
          SETAREH LAW GROUP
          9665 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 430
          Beverly Hills, CA 90212
          Phone: (3l0) 888-777l
          Facsimile: (310) 888-0109
          Email: shaun@setarehlaw.com
                 thomas@setarehlaw.com
                 farrah@setarehlaw.com


HENDERSON, NE: Woodburns Seek to Certify Corrections Officer Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KELLY WOODBURN and THOMAS
WOODBURN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. CITY OF HENDERSON; DOES I through V, inclusive; and
ROE CORPORATIONS I through V, inclusive, Case No.
2:19-cv-01488-JAD-VCF (D. Nev.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. granting a collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b)
      for all persons employed by City of Henderson as Corrections

      Officers (COs) from July 3, 2016, through present;

   2. directing City of Henderson to provide Plaintiffs' counsel
      the last known contact information for all Cos;

   3. permitting Plaintiffs to circulate the Notice of Pendency;
      and

   4. tolling the statute of limitations pending circulation of the

      notice of pendency.

The Woodburns file this Motion on behalf of themselves and other
current and former City of Henderson COs who were made to work
off-the-clock without overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated April 29,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3hbaRq8
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Sean K. Claggett, Esq.
          Joseph N. Mott, Esq.
          4101 Meadows Lane, Ste. 100
          Las Vegas, NE 89107
          Telephone: (702) 655-2346
          Facsimile: (702) 655-3763
          E-mail: sclaggett@claggettlaw.com
                  joey@claggettlaw.com

The Attorneys for Defendant City of Henderson, are:

          Montgomery Y. Paek, Esq.
          Ethan Thomas, Esq.
          LITTLER MENDELSON
          3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 300
          Las Vegas, NE 89169
          Telephone: (702) 862-8800
          E-mail: edthomas@littler.com

HERTZ CORP: Court Dismisses Lee's FCRA Class Suit With Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, San Francisco Division, dismissed with
prejudice the case, Peter Lee, et al., Plaintiffs v. The Hertz
Corporation and Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc., Defendants,
Case No. 3:18-cv-07481 (N.D. Cal.).

On Dec. 12, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
alleging violations of Title VII.  The Plaintiffs defeated a motion
to dismiss and the parties then engaged in significant discovery
(including discovery motions).

On May 22, 2020, the Defendants filed a voluntary petition for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court of the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware.  On May 29, 2020, they
filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy, automatically staying the
matter.

The Plaintiffs continued to litigate their claims in bankruptcy and
filed notices of proof of claim on Oct. 21, 2020.  On Dec. 18,
2020, they filed a motion for certification of class proof of claim
under Bankruptcy Rule 7023.

On Jan. 26, 2020, the Parties attended a mediation with mediator
Kelly A. Knight.  At that mediation, the Parties executed a
memorandum of understanding for a classwide settlement of the
Plaintiffs' claims.  On March 26, 2021, the Parties executed the
Settlement Agreement and Release.

On March 26, 2021, the Defendants moved in Bankruptcy Court for an
order certifying the class for settlement purposes only and
approving the Settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.  On
April 13, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court approved the Settlement and
certified the class.  The Bankruptcy Court will retain exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or in
relation to the interpretation and implementation of the
Settlement.

The Settlement and the order approving it require the Plaintiffs to
voluntarily dismiss this action with prejudice within three days of
the effective date of the Settlement.  The Settlement became
effective on April 27, 2020.  Each party will bear its own costs
and fees.

The Parties, through their respective counsel, stipulate to dismiss
the action with prejudice.

Having reviewed and considered the Joint Stipulation and good cause
appearing for the same, Judge dismissed with prejudice the action.
Each party will bear its own costs and fees.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/rtpbymca from Leagle.com.

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP, Jahan C. Sagafi -- jsagafi@outtengolden.com --
Relic Sun -- rsun@outtengolden.com -- Adam Koshkin --
akoshkin@outtengolden.com -- in San Francisco, California.

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP, Christopher M. McNerney --
cmcnerney@outtengolden.com -- (admitted pro hac vice), in New York
City.

LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA
Elisa Della-Piana -- edellapiana@lccr.com -- in San Francisco,
California, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Peter Lee and Latonya
Campbell.

McGUIREWOODS LLP Sabrina A. Beldner, Esq. --
sbeldner@mcguirewoods.com -- in Los Angeles, California.

Joel S. Allen -- jallen@mcguirewoods.com -- (Pro Hac Vice) Olga A.
Bograd -- obograd@mcguirewoods.com -- (Pro Hac Vice) MCGUIREWOODS
LLP, in Dallas, Texas.

William E. Doyle -- wdoyle@mcguirewoods.com -- (Pro Hac Vice)
McGUIREWOODS LLP, in Raleigh, North Carolina, Attorneys for
Defendants, THE HERTZ CORPORATION and, DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE
GROUP, INC.


HM BRADLEY INC: Monegro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against HM Bradley, Inc. The
case is styled as Frankie Monegro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. HM Bradley, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04089-VSB (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

HM Bradley -- https://www.hmbradley.com/ -- is a digital banking
platform that develops programs to reward savers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


IBM CORP: Agreement to Settle ERISA-Related Suit Reached
--------------------------------------------------------
International Business Machines Corporation said in its Form 10-Q
Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April
27, 2021, for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the
parties in the putative class action suit related to the company's
alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), reached an agreement to settle the matter subject to court
approval.

In May 2015, a putative class action was commenced in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York related
to the company's October 2014 announcement that it was divesting
its global commercial semiconductor technology business, alleging
violations of ERISA.

Management's Retirement Plans Committee and three current or former
IBM executives are named as defendants.

On September 29, 2017, the Court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint. On December 10, 2018, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court order.


On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated
the decision and remanded the case to the Second Circuit.

On June 22, 2020, the Second Circuit reinstated its prior decision
and remanded the case to the District Court.

In February 2021, the parties reached an agreement to settle the
matter subject to court approval.

International Business Machines Corporation operates as an
integrated technology and services company worldwide. The company
was formerly known as Computing-Tabulating-Recording Co. and
changed its name to International Business Machines Corporation in
1924. The company was incorporated in 1911 and is headquartered in
Armonk, New York.

ILLINOIS STATE POLICE: Court Tosses McFarland Bid to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TOMMY MCFARLAND v. BRENDAN
KELLY, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois State
Police, Case No. 2:20-cv-02334 (C.D. Ill.), the Hon. Judge Colin
Stirling Bruce entered an order denying the Plaintiff's motion to
certify class with leave to refile it once the parties have enough
information to competently brief the issue of whether a class
should be certified.

The parties' joint motion to stay is denied as moot considering the
court's denial without prejudice of Plaintiff's class certification
motion.

The suit alleges violation of the Civil Rights Act.

The Illinois State Police is the state police force of Illinois.
Officially established in 1922, the Illinois State Police have over
3,000 personnel and 21 districts.[CC]

IMPINJ INC: Awaits Court Order to Discontinue Plymouth County Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Impinj, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the New York State court has not yet
entered an order discontinuing the Plymouth County Retirement
System v. Impinj, Inc., et al.

On January 31, 2019, a related class-action complaint for violation
of the federal securities laws was filed in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York for the County of New York against the
company, its chief executive officer, former chief operating
officer, former chief financial officer, members of the company's
board of directors and the underwriters of the company's July 2016
initial public stock offering, or IPO, and December 2016 secondary
public offering, or SPO.

Captioned Plymouth County Retirement System v. Impinj, Inc., et
al., the complaint, purportedly brought on behalf of purchasers of
the company's stock pursuant to or traceable to its IPO and SPO,
alleged that the company made false or misleading statements in the
registration statements and prospectuses in those offerings
concerning demand for our products and inventory in violation of
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.

On April 9, 2019, the New York Supreme Court entered an order
staying the action and requiring the parties to update the court
every 90 days as to the status of the pending consolidated federal
securities class actions.

On July 9, 2020, the parties in both this action and the federal
securities class actions executed a stipulation of settlement that
resolved the claims in both actions.

On November 20, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington entered an order finally approving the
settlement, and the action pending in Washington federal court has
been dismissed with prejudice.

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, the parties in this action
filed stipulation discontinuing this action with prejudice.

The New York State court, significantly hampered by Covid-19, has
not yet entered an order discontinuing the action with prejudice.

Impinj, Inc. operates a platform that enables wireless connectivity
for everyday items by delivering each items unique identity,
location, and authenticity to business and consumer applications.
Impinj, Inc. was founded in 2000 and is headquartered in Seattle,
Washington.


INNATE PHARMA: California Class Action Voluntarily Dismissed
------------------------------------------------------------
Innate Pharma S.A. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that on March 29 2021, the
class action introduced on October 23, 2020 in the United-States
(California) was volontarily dismissed.

This class action was introduced against Innate Pharma, Mondher
Mahjoubi and Laure-Helene Mercier on the basis of an alleged
violation of federal securities laws based on publications relating
to monalizumab trials between March 2020 and September 2020.

Innate Pharma S.A. is a global, clinical-stage, oncology-focused
biotech company dedicated to improving oncology treatment and
clinical outcomes for patients through therapeutic antibodies that
harness the immune system to fight cancer. Innate Pharma's broad
pipeline of antibodies includes several potentially first-in-class
clinical and preclinical candidates for cancers patients with high
unmet medical need. The company is based in Marseille France.


INSIGHT VENTURE: Colacurcio Suit Seeks to Certify Damages Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PATRICK COLACURCIO, MARIS
and DAVID HANSON, and JAMES McMURCHIE, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, v. INSIGHT VENTURE PARTNERS VII,
L.P., a Cayman Islands limited partnership; INSIGHT VENTURE
PARTNERS (CAYMAN) VII, L.P., a Cayman Islands limited partnership;
INSIGHT VENTURE PARTNERS VII (CO-INVESTORS), L.P., a Cayman Islands
limited partnership; INSIGHT VENTURE PARTNERS (DELAWARE) VII, L.P.,
a Delaware limited partnership; INSIGHT VENTURE PARTNERS
COINVESTMENT FUND II, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership; INSIGHT
VENTURE ASSOCIATES VII, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership;
INSIGHT VENTURE ASSOCIATES VII, LTD., a Cayman Islands limited
company; INSIGHT VENTURE ASSOCIATES COINVESTMENT II, L.P., a
Delaware limited partnership; INSIGHT VENTURE MANAGEMENT, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company; INSIGHT HOLDING GROUP, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company, and RYAN HINKLE, Case No.
2:20-cv-01856-RSM (W.D. Wash.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to
enter an order:

   1. certifying the proposed 23(b)(3) damages class;

   2. appointing James McMurchie, David Hanson, and Maris Hanson
to
      represent the class; and

   3. appointing Tousley Brain Stephens PLLC as Class Counsel.

The Plaintiffs David and Maris Hanson and James McMurchie brought
claims for violations of the WSSA, RCW 21.20.010, and for breach of
Hinkle's fiduciary duty, to recover the profits Insight generated
from its fraud.

Smartsheet is a software company that makes a leading cloud-based
collaboration software. From its founding in 2005 until its April
2018 IPO, Smartsheet was privately-held, and its shares could not
be resold or transferred without the consent of the company.
Insight is a collection of private equity funds that invest money
from outside investors, Insight's investments in Smartsheet gave
them a seat on the Board as well as limited liability companies and
partnerships that manage those investments.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 29,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3bf863i
at no extra charge.[CC]

          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, Washington 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992

               - and -

          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Cecily C. Shiel, Esq.
          Kaleigh N. Powell, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: jdennett@tousley.com
                  kstephens@tousley.com
                  cshiel@tousley.com
                  kpowell@tousley.com

               - and -

          Avi J. Lipman, Esq.
          Malaika M. Eaton, Esq.
          Ai-Li Chiong-Martinson, Esq.
          Michael P. Hatley, Esq.
          McNAUL EBEL NAWROT & HELGREN PLLC
          600 University Street, Suite 2700
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone (206) 467-1816
          E-mail: meaton@mcnaul.com
                  alipman@mcnaul.com
                  achiongmartinson@mcnaul.com
                  mhatley@mcnaul.com

INSTORE GROUP: Hogan Employment Suit Gets Class Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as PARADISE HOGAN,
Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Similarly Situated,
v. THE INSTORE GROUP, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-10717-DPW (D. Mass.,
Filed Jan. 11, 2021), the Hon. Judge Douglas P. Woodlock entered an
order:

   1. granting Mr. Hogan's Motion for Leave to Amend his Original
      Complaint, and, on the First Amended Complaint;

   2. granting Mr. Hogan's for partial summary judgment
      establishing statutory employee status;

   3. granting class certification;

   4. denying InStore's Motion for Summary Judgment; and

   5. directing the parties to submit on or before January 25, 2021

      a status report with a proposed scheduling order designed to

      bring this case to final judgment.

Given the common evidence and common issue of employment
classification under InStore's policies, a class action is the
superior method for adjudicating this case. Accordingly, I will
allow Mr. Hogan's motion for class certification, Judge Woodlock
says.

Mr. Hogan filed his Original Complaint against InStore in this
Court on January 6, 2017, "individually and on behalf of himself
and all other similarly situated persons." The Original Complaint
alleged six separate claims against InStore: (1) a violation of the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. sections 201 et
seq.; (2) violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sections 148,
148B(a), 150; (3) breach of contract; (4) unjust enrichment; (5)
quantum meruit; and (6) breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

Paradise Hogan brought this action seeking damages for his
misclassification as an independent contractor by the Defendant
InStore, allegedly in disregard of his status as a statutory
employee. Mr. Hogan seeks to represent a class of similarly
situated plaintiffs -- "vendor associates" -- who have worked on
behalf of InStore in Massachusetts since January 6, 2014.

InStore contracts with retailers and manufacturers to provide labor
for certain retail services, including inventory correction, order
entry, display building, audits, surveys, and rack placing.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xXP237 at no extra charge.[CC]

JAY STREET: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
---------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Jay Street Foods,
Inc. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Jay Street Foods, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04062 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Jay Street Foods, Inc. doing business as Over Easy Foods --
https://overeasyfoods.com/ -- offers over easy breakfast bars, a
high-protein, high-fiber, gluten-free, dairy-free start to a
perfect day.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com

JOYY INC: Hershewe Putative Securities Class Suit Underway
----------------------------------------------------------
Joyy Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company continues to
defend a putative securities class action suit entitled, Hershewe
v. JOYY Inc. et al., No. 2:20-cv-10611.

On November 20, 2020, a putative securities class action complaint
captioned Hershewe v. JOYY Inc. et al., No. 2:20-cv-10611 (C.D.
Cal.) was filed in the United States District Court for Central
District of California against the Company and certain of its
current and former officers.

The complaint asserts claims for violations of Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder and seeks damages based on alleged material
misrepresentations and omissions about the Company's revenue,
component businesses, and acquisition of Bigo.

The proposed class period is April 28, 2016, through November 18,
2020, inclusive.

The Company cannot reasonably estimate a potential future loss.

JOYY Inc. operates a global social media platform. The Company
offers platform which enables users to interact with each other in
real time through online live media by creating, sharing, and
enjoying a vast range of entertainment content and activities. JOYY
serves customers in China.


JUUL LABS: Bautista-Perez Suit Wins Conditional Certification
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MARIA DE LA LUZ
BAUTISTA-PEREZ, et al., v. JUUL LABS, INC., et al., Case No.
4:20-cv-01613-HSG (N.D. Calif.), the Hon. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam,
Jr.

   1. granting the motion for conditional certification and
      approving the proposed class notice; and

   2. denying the Defendants' motions to dismiss.

Within two weeks of this order, the Defendants are directed to
provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of names and contact
information of the prospective collective action members. Once that
information is received, plaintiffs are directed to distribute the
proposed notice by mail, Judge Gilliam Says.

The Court finds that the 75-day response period is reasonable given
the number of former employees and the potential difficulty of
locating employees whose employment lasted at most two and a half
months and who were terminated over eighteen months ago.

The Plaintiffs now allege that the Campaign was funded and operated
by JLI with JLI controlling the Campaign finances and strategy and
hiring the upper-level managers who directed the day-to-day
operations.

The Plaintiffs filed an amended motion for conditional
certification of a collective action under Plaintiffs' Motion For
Conditional Certification on September 24, 2020. They seek
conditional certification of a group of similarly situated Campaign
workers who worked uncompensated overtime while phone banking and
canvassing for the Campaign.

The proposed representative group includes: All individuals who
were hired by Long Ying International, Inc. to work on the Yes on C
Campaign and who either: (a) worked 11 or more shifts in a work
week; or (b) worked 10 shifts in a work week and reported to two
different work locations in at least one day of that week.

A copy of the Court's order:dated April 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3oahlak at no extra charge.[CC]


KINDRED HEALTHCARE: Court Grants Final Approval of Class Settlement
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SARAH S TONEHOCKER, v.
KINDRED HEALTHCARE OPERATING LLC, ET AL., Case No.
4:19-cv-02494-YGR (N.D. Calif., Filed Feb. 14, 2019), the Hon.
Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers entered an order:

   1. granting the motion for final approval of class settlement;

   3. granting class certification to the following Settlement
      Class:

      "All persons who are or were employed by one or more
      Defendants as non-exempt Skilled Clinicians to work at a
      skilled nursing facility in California at any time from
      February 14, 2015 through September 1, 2020;"

      The following persons are excluded from the Settlement Class:

      all persons who timely excluded themselves from the
      Settlement Class.

   2. granting in part the motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and
      service awards as follows:

       -- Class Counsel is awarded $498,750.00 in attorney's fees
          and $12,140.18 in litigation costs.

       -- The Plaintiff Stonehocker is granted an incentive award
          of $5,000.00.

   3. directing the parties to file a post-distribution accounting

      in accordance with this District's Procedural Guidance for
      Class Action Settlements no later than August 20, 2021; and

   4. setting the compliance deadline on August 27, 2021 on the
      Court's 9:01 a.m. calendar to verify timely filing of the
      post-distribution accounting.

The Court finds that they indicate the settlement here is fair and
reasonable. Liability was contested and the settlement provides
class members with a guaranteed and not insubstantial monetary
award. There is risk that the evidence could have diminished the
value of the claims. The Defendant Kindred strenuously contested
the allegations and would have persisted in their position to prove
their claimed policy regarding off-the-clock work. If Kindred
prevailed, the plaintiff and the class members would not receive
any amount.

The Plaintiff alleges that Kindred Healthcare's strict productivity
standards resulted in plaintiff and other individuals clocking in
hours for which they were not paid.

Kindred Healthcare provides nursing and rehabilitation centers
service.

A copy of the Court's order:dated April 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uzdp5i at no extra charge.[CC]

KITTY POO: Tatum-Rios Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Kitty Poo Club, LLC.
The case is styled as Lynnette Tatum-Rios, individually and on
behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. Kitty Poo Club,
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-04086 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Kitty Poo Club -- https://kittypooclub.com/ -- delivers a chic,
biodegradable litter box to your door every month pre-filled with
odor-free mineral-based litter.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Christopher Howard Lowe, Esq.
          LIPSKY LOWE LLP
          420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 1830
          New York, NY 10170
          Phone: (212) 764-7171
          Email: chris@lipskylowe.com


LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Grantham Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rutledge. The case is
styled as Billy Joe Grantham, On behalf of himself and all others
Similarly Situated v. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General of
Arkansas, Case No. 6:21-cv-06073-RTD (W.D. Ark., May 6, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Petitions - Prison
Conditions for Prisoner Civil Rights.

Leslie Carol Rutledge -- https://arkansasag.gov/ -- is an American
attorney and politician from the state of Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

          Billy Joe Grantham
          P. O. Box 1630
          Malvern, AR 72104
          Phone: (501) 467-3400
          551396
          ADC - OUACHITA RIVER UNIT
          PRO SE


LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Hayes Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Leslie Rutledge. The
case is styled as John Hayes, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated inmates v. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General of
Arkansas, Case No. 6:21-cv-06074-RTD (W.D. Ark., May 6, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Petitions - Prison
Conditions for Prisoner Civil Rights.

Leslie Carol Rutledge -- https://arkansasag.gov/ -- is an American
attorney and politician from the state of Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

          John Hayes
          P. O. Box 1630
          Malvern, AR 72104
          Phone: (501) 467-3400
          145724
          ADC - OUACHITA RIVER UNIT
          PRO SE


LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Huggins Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Leslie Rutledge. The
case is styled as Ron Huggins, on behalf of himself and all other
similarly situated inmates v. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General of
Arkansas, Case No. 6:21-cv-06077-RTD (W.D. Ark., May 6, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Petitions - Prison
Conditions for Prisoner Civil Rights.

Leslie Carol Rutledge -- https://arkansasag.gov/ -- is an American
attorney and politician from the state of Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

          Ron Huggins
          Post Office Box 1630
          Malvern, AR 72104
          ADC #143066
          OUACHITA RIVER UNIT
          Arkansas Division of Correction
          PRO SE

LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Jackson Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Leslie Rutledge. The
case is styled as John S. Jackson, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated inmates v. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney
General of Arkansas, Case No. 6:21-cv-06075-RTD (W.D. Ark., May 6,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Petitions - Prison
Conditions for Prisoner Civil Rights.

Leslie Carol Rutledge -- https://arkansasag.gov/ -- is an American
attorney and politician from the state of Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

          John S. Jackson
          Post Office Box 1630
          Malvern, AR 72104
          ADC #143066
          Phone: (501) 467-3400
          152239
          ADC - OUACHITA RIVER UNIT
          PRO SE


LESLIE RUTLEDGE: Smith Files Suit in W.D. Arkansas
--------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Leslie Rutledge. The
case is styled as Kerry Smith, On behalf of himself and all others
Similarly Situated v. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General of
Arkansas, Case No. 6:21-cv-06076-RTD (W.D. Ark., May 6, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Prisoner Petitions - Prison
Conditions for Prisoner Civil Rights.

Leslie Carol Rutledge -- https://arkansasag.gov/ -- is an American
attorney and politician from the state of Arkansas.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se:

          Kerry Smith
          P. O. Box 1630
          Malvern, AR 72104
          Phone: (501) 467-3400
          171919
          ADC - OUACHITA RIVER UNIT
          PRO SE


LEXINFINTECH HOLDINGS: Bid to Nix Oregon Class Suit Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. said in its Form 20-F report filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company's motion
to dismiss the putative securities class action suit entitled, In
re LexinFintech Holdings, LTD Sec. Litig., No. 3:20-cv-01562-SI, is
pending.

In September 2020, the company and certain of its officers and
directors were named as defendants in two putative federal
securities class actions captioned In re LexinFintech Holdings, LTD
Sec. Litig., No. 3:20-cv-01562-SI (U.S. District Court for the
District of Oregon, First Amended Complaint filed on September 18,
2020) (the "Oregon Action") and Ernesto Vela v. LexinFintech
Holdings, Ltd. et al., No. 1:20-cv-12606 (U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey, Complaint filed on September 11, 2020)
(the "New Jersey Action").

Both actions allege that the defendants made misstatements and
omissions regarding our business, operations and financial
performance in violation of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act.

On November 9, 2020, plaintiffs in the New Jersey Action
voluntarily dismissed their complaint.

On November 19, 2020, the court entered an order appointing Lead
Plaintiff in the Oregon Action. On January 19, 2021, Lead Plaintiff
filed the Second Amended Complaint.

On March 22, 2021, the company filed a Motion to Dismiss. The
Oregon Action remains in its preliminary stages.

LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. is a leading online consumption and
consumer finance platform for new generation consumers in China.


LIBERTY MUTUAL: Massachusetts Court Dismisses Smith's Amended Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a
Memorandum and Order in the lawsuit titled RUTH SMITH, on her own
behalf and others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-11583-ADB (D. Mass.):

   -- granting without prejudice Liberty Mutual's motion to
      dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint;

   -- denying the Plaintiff's motion to strike portions of
      Liberty Mutual's reply brief; and

   -- denying as moot the Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a
      second amended complaint.

In the putative class action, Plaintiff Ruth alleges that
Defendants Liberty Mutual and John Does 1-10 made phone calls to
cellular telephones using an automated telephone dialing system, in
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Plaintiff is an individual, who resides in Fairfax County,
Virginia, and uses a residential cell phone number, ending in
-9650, primarily for non-business purposes. Liberty Mutual,
incorporated and with its principal place of business in
Massachusetts, is an insurance corporation. John Does 1-10 are
other persons responsible for making calls that allegedly violated
the TCPA.

Liberty Mutual contracts with third-party "aggregators" to make
telephone calls to increase its number of customers. Liberty
Mutual, either on its own or through its third-party aggregators,
operates a call center that uses equipment to place large numbers
of telemarketing calls. The call center equipment uses a random or
sequential number generator to store, produce, and dial telephone
numbers, which allows for a large volume of calls to be made.

On April 22, 2020, the Plaintiff answered an automated call from
the number (310) 525-8127. After answering, she said "hello"
several times with no response. The Plaintiff then heard a "click"
and a live person from "Vehicle Insurance Services" requested
information about her vehicle and offered an auto insurance plan.
She said she was not interested and ended the call. Two days later,
the same number called the Plaintiff again. She was asked for her
vehicle identification number. She declined to share the requested
information over the phone, asked to communicate via e-mail, and
gave the caller her email address. Within thirty minutes after the
second phone call, the Plaintiff received an email from Liberty
Mutual about obtaining a quote for auto insurance from Liberty
Mutual.

The Plaintiff asserts that she did not provide her cell phone
number to the Defendants or consent to receiving any calls from
them. She contends that the two calls she received included
characteristics indicative of an automated telephone dialing
system, including the pauses and clicks and the dead air after
answering.

The Plaintiff filed her complaint on Aug. 24, 2020, and then filed
an amended complaint on Sept. 17, 2020.

The Plaintiff's one-count amended complaint claims that Liberty
Mutual and/or its third-party aggregators violated the TCPA by
making unsolicited, automated calls to cellular telephone numbers
without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and other
members of the putative class. The Plaintiff's proposed class
consists of:

     (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior
     to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. Section 1658), (c)
     received calls from Defendant or its third party aggregators
     on behalf of Defendant, on their cell phones, (d) placed
     using an automated dialer or a pre-recorded or artificial
     voice.

The Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and putative class members,
seeks statutory damages, injunctive relief, litigation costs, and
any other relief the Court deems proper.

On April 15, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint, to account for a recent U.S. Supreme
Court ruling, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.Ct. 1163 (2021), and
to add allegations regarding "Do Not Call" violations on behalf of
the Plaintiff and a putative class.

Motion to Dismiss

Liberty Mutual moves to dismiss the amended complaint because the
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support the
inference that Liberty Mutual is vicariously liable for the actions
of the callers, who contacted her, either through an agency
relationship where Liberty Mutual controlled the callers or through
ratification of the callers' conduct. The Plaintiff argues that she
has alleged enough facts at this stage to survive a motion to
dismiss.

Motion to Strike

As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff argues that the Court cannot
consider arguments raised in Section II of Liberty Mutual's reply
in support of its motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Plaintiff
contends that because Liberty Mutual's opening brief did not claim
that she failed to adequately plead a ratification theory of
vicarious liability, that argument is waived. Liberty Mutual
counters that Section II of its reply brief is permissible because
it responds to arguments raised in the Plaintiff's opposition.

District Judge Allison D. Burroughs opines that Liberty Mutual's
reply brief properly responds to arguments raised by the Plaintiff
in her opposition. In that opposition, the Plaintiff argues that
the amended complaint should not be dismissed because its "factual
allegations are indicative of an agency relationship under a
ratification theory" and cites cases in support. The Plaintiff
contends that "Section II of defendant's reply does not address any
of the cases cited in plaintiff's response on this issue and
instead only asserts new arguments and cases that plaintiff has not
had the opportunity to address."

The Court disagrees. Section II of Liberty Mutual's reply brief
responds directly to the Plaintiff's ratification arguments rather
than raising a new theory for the first time on reply. Second, the
Plaintiff cites no authority that holds that a reply brief is
limited to referencing only the cases cited in the opposition.
Because Liberty Mutual does not raise a new argument on reply and
its response to the argument raised in the Plaintiff's opposition
is permissible, the Plaintiff's motion to strike is denied.

Vicarious Liability Under the TCPA

Liberty Mutual moves to dismiss the amended complaint because it
does not allege enough facts to adequately plead a relationship
between Liberty Mutual and the entities or individuals that called
the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Plaintiff does not allege that
Liberty exercised the kind of control over the callers that is
necessary to state a vicarious liability theory of TCPA liability.
The Plaintiff appears to contend that her factual allegations
plausibly state an agency relationship because given Liberty
Mutual's business model, nobody would have an incentive to make
such calls, and send such follow up emails unless they were
retained by Liberty Mutual.

Judge Burroughs finds that the Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient
facts to plausibly suggest that Liberty Mutual had any control over
the unnamed entities or individuals, who placed the offending calls
to her. In relevant part, the amended complaint alleges that
Liberty Mutual had contracts with third-party aggregators, that
these third-party aggregators generate business for Liberty Mutual
and make calls on behalf of Liberty Mutual using autodialer
equipment, and that Liberty Mutual directed the requirements for
its third-party aggregators to generate prospective customers for
it.

Even accepting these conclusory factual allegations as true, the
amended complaint never connects Liberty Mutual's "third-party
aggregators" to the two calls placed to the Plaintiff and never
alleges that Liberty Mutual had control over or any other
relationship with the callers, who contacted her, Judge Burroughs
notes. In sum, none of the factual allegations about the two phone
calls tend to demonstrate an agreement between the caller and
defendant that the caller would act on the principal's behalf and
subject to the principal's control.

This finding, however, does not end the analysis, Judge Burroughs
states. A classical agency relationship based on the principal's
control of an agent is one theory of vicarious liability, but
potential TCPA liability under general agency-related principles
extends beyond classical agency, citing In re Dish Network, LLC, 28
F.C.C. Rcd. at 6586. Accordingly, the Court next considers whether
the Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Liberty Mutual is
vicariously liable under a ratification theory.

Liberty Mutual's Ratification of the Callers' Conduct

The Plaintiff argues the motion to dismiss should be denied because
her factual allegations are indicative of an agency relationship
under a ratification theory. In its reply, Liberty Mutual counters
that the Plaintiff has failed to allege the elements of
ratification.

Despite contending otherwise, the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
allege that Liberty Mutual ratified the actions of the callers that
contacted her because she does not allege that Liberty Mutual had
any knowledge of the circumstances of the calls made to her or
purposely shuts its eyes to the circumstances surrounding the call,
Judge Burroughs holds. The amended complaint states that thirty
minutes after the second call, the Plaintiff received an email from
Liberty Mutual. There is no factual allegation in the amended
complaint that the callers identified Liberty Mutual, indicated
that Liberty Mutual was aware that call was taking place, or that
Liberty Mutual was aware of or should have been aware of the
methods used in making the calls to the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the allegations in the amended complaint do not state a
plausible claim that Liberty Mutual is vicariously liable under a
ratification theory, Judge Burroughs holds.

The Court acknowledges that complaints alleging TCPA violations are
not held to the usual levels of particularity and prior to
discovery, much of the information regarding Liberty Mutual's
relationships with third parties is solely within the control of
Liberty Mutual. This, however, cannot excuse the Plaintiff's
failure to allege any facts that connect Liberty Mutual and/or its
"third party aggregators" with the conduct of the callers that
contacted the Plaintiff. For this reason, the Court grants Liberty
Mutual's motion to dismiss without prejudice and allows the
Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within 21 days.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the Plaintiff's motion to
strike is denied. Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss is granted
without prejudice. The Plaintiff may file a second amended
complaint within 21 days but is urged to consider this ruling in
determining if the claim can be re-pled to withstand a motion to
dismiss.

Because the Court grants the motion to dismiss without prejudice
and allows the Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, the
Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is
denied as moot.

A full-text copy of the Court's Memorandum and Order dated April
22, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4jtbhrzs from
Leagle.com.


LOUISIANA: Plaisance Suit Seeks to Certify Class & Subclasses
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BROOK PLAISANCE, FREDRICK
BASS, AMANDA COLEMAN, STEPHEN STRICK, AND WILLIAM GRIESHABER on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v. STATE OF
LOUISIANA; LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION; AVA DEJOIE, in her
official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Workforce
Commission; and JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as
chief executive officer of the State of Louisiana, Case No.
3:21-cv-00121-BAJ-EWD (M.D. La.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. certifying this case as a class action, with the class
      defined as:

      "All individuals who, since March 13, 2020, applied for
      unemployment insurance benefits through the Louisiana
      Workforce Commission and have been, are being, or will be
      denied access to State Unemployment Compensation, Federal
      Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, Pandemic Emergency
      Unemployment Compensation, Mixed Earner Unemployment
      Compensation or Pandemic Unemployment Assistance benefits
      without a determination of benefits eligibility.

   2. certifying two subclasses, consisting of:

      a. Denial of Benefits Subclass

         "Individuals that have neither received an unemployment
         compensation benefit nor a written decision regarding
         their eligibility for benefits, including, in the event
         that benefits denied, a statement of their right to appeal

         this determination to the Louisiana Workforce Commission;"

         and

      b. Termination of Benefits Subclass.

         "Individuals who, at some time since March 13, 2020, have

         received Unemployment Compensation benefits but whose
         benefits were terminated by the Louisiana Workforce
         Commission without notice and opportunity to dispute this

         adverse action, either prior to or following the
         termination of their benefits;" and

   3. appointing their counsel as Class Counsel pursuant to Fed. R.

      Civ. P. Rule 23(g).

Louisiana is a southeastern U.S. state on the Gulf of Mexico. Its
history as a melting pot of French, African, American and
French-Canadian cultures is reflected in its Creole and Cajun
cultures.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated April 30,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33zJHBc
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ellyn J. Clevenger, Esq.
          Wendy Manard, Esq.
          MANARD LAW
          1100 Poydras Street, Suite 2610
          New Orleans, LA 70163
          Telephone: (504) 585-7777
          Facsimile: (504) 556-2977
          E-mail: wendy@wmanard.com
                  ellyn@wmanard.com

               - and -

          Saima A. Akhtar, Esq.
          NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND
          ECONOMIC JUSTICE
          275 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1506
          New York, NY 10001
          Telephone: (212) 633-6967
          Facsimile: (212) 633-6371
          E-mail: akhtar@nclej.org

MAGIC SPOON: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Magic Spoon Inc. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Magic Spoon Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04069
(S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Magic Spoon -- https://magicspoon.com/ -- offers cereal with
high-protein, low-sugar, keto-friendly, and gluten-free.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


MASIMO CORP: Continues to Defend Physicians Healthsource Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
Masimo Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended April 3, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a class action suit initiated by Physicians Healthsource,
Inc. (PHI).

On January 2, 2014, a putative class action complaint was filed
against the Company in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California by PHI.

The complaint alleges that the Company sent unsolicited facsimile
advertisements in violation of the Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005
and related regulations.

The complaint seeks $500 for each alleged violation, treble damages
if the District Court finds the alleged violations to be knowing,
plus interest, costs and injunctive relief.

On March 26, 2019, an amended complaint was filed adding Radha
Geismann, M.D. PC as an additional named plaintiff. On June 17,
2019, the plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification. O

n September 10, 2019, the parties filed motions for summary
judgment. On September 30, 2019, the Company filed its opposition
to the motion for class certification, and the plaintiffs filed
their reply on October 7, 2019.

On November 21, 2019, the District Court issued an order denying
the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and granting in part
and denying in part the Company's motion for summary judgment, and
deferring ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

On December 5, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a petition for permission
to appeal the order denying class certification, which was denied
on January 24, 2020. Trial of the individual plaintiffs' claims was
scheduled for June 2, 2020, but on April 1, 2020, the District
Court vacated the trial date and directed the parties to conduct an
in-person mediation. The mediation has not occurred and no new
trial date has been set.

On July 13, 2020, the District Court issued an order granting in
part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.

The Company believes it has good and substantial defenses to the
claims, but there is no guarantee that the Company will prevail.

Masimo said, "The Company is unable to determine whether any loss
will ultimately occur or to estimate the range of such loss;
therefore, no amount of loss has been accrued by the Company in the
accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Masimo Corporation, a medical technology company, develops,
manufactures, and markets noninvasive monitoring technologies
worldwide. Masimo Corporation was founded in 1989 and is
headquartered in Irvine, California.

MERAKEY USA: Class of BSCs & LBSCs in Kyem Labor Suit Certified
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, FRANCIS KYEM, Plaintiff v. MERAKEY USA, et al.,
Defendants, Civil Action No. 19-5577-KSM (E.D. Pa.), Judge Karen S.
Marston of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff's
motion for preliminary certification of the matter as a collective
action and approval of notice to the putative collective.

Plaintiff Kyem is employed as a Behavioral Specialist Consultant
("BSC") with Defendant Merakey Children's Services, a non-profit
corporation owned and operated by Merakey USA (also a non-profit
organization).  BSCs "provide clinical behavior health services" to
Merakey's clients -- generally schoolchildren located in the
Philadelphia area.  At some point, Mr. Kyem earned his license and
was promoted from a BSC to a Licensed Behavioral Specialist
Consultant ("LBSC"), which is the role he currently holds.   
At all times during his employment, Mr. Kyem has been paid on an
hourly basis.  Although his job title and hourly rate changed after
he became an LBSC, Mr. Kyem's "job duties remained effectively the
same."  Nonetheless, he was not compensated or paid overtime for
his non-billable hours. Kyem claims that the same is true of all of
Merakey's BSCs and LBSCs, as well as of their Mobile Therapists
("MTs") and Therapeutic Support Staff ("TSSs").   Mr. Kyem alleges
that he was an hourly employee, but that Merakey failed to
appropriately compensate him for all the hours that he worked;
specifically, he alleges that time spent on certain "non-billable"
work went uncompensated.

On Nov. 26, 2019, Mr. Kyem brings the lawsuit, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, alleging that Merakey's policy
or practice of not paying employees for "non-billable" work
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. Sections
201, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act ("PMWA"), 43
P.S. Section 333.100, et seq.  He alleges that Merakey had violated
his and others' rights under the FLSA and the PMWA, by refusing to
compensate for overtime when the combination of billable and
non-billable work exceeded 40 hours a week.

After an extension, Merakey answered the complaint on Jan. 16,
2020.  In their answer, Merakey asserted that Mr. Kyem, like all of
Merakey's BSCs, LBSCs, MTs, and TSSs, was paid "on a fee for
service basis," because he was an administrative or professional
employee who was exempt from the minimum wage requirements of the
FLSA the PMWA.

Mr. Kyem filed his motion for conditional certification on June 9,
2020.  He argues that conditional certification is merited because
Merakey conceded in their answer and in subsequent discovery
responses that he and all of Merakey's BSCs, LBSCs, MTs, and TSSs
were paid on a fee-for-service basis and were not paid overtime.
Mr. Kyem asserts that, given these concessions, all of Merakey's
BSCs, LBSCs, MTs, and TSSs have identical legal claims against
Merakey: namely, that they were misclassified as FLSA-exempt and
not paid overtime as a result.

In his motion, Mr. Kyem proposes conditional certification of a
collective consisting of "all persons presently or formerly
employed by Defendants Merakey USA and/or Merakey Children's
Service in the positions of Behavioral Specialist Consultant,
Licensed Behavioral Specialist Consultant, Mobile Therapist, and/or
Therapeutic Staff Support who were paid on a fee-for-service basis
and who were paid for at least 32 hours of work in two or more
workweeks during the past three years."

Judge Marston finds that Mr. Kyem has made a modest factual showing
that he is similarly situated to Merakey's BSCs and LBSCs who are
paid on an hourly basis.  Among othenr things, she finds that (i)
Mr. Kyem's and Ms. Johnson's affidavits demonstrate that they both
are similarly situated with their BSC and LBSC colleagues; (ii) Mr.
Kyem's timesheets lend credence to the allegations that Merakey
refused to pay overtime when billable and non-billable hours
exceeded 40 hours a week; and (iii) Merakey proffers no evidence to
show that Mr. Kyem or any BSC or LBSC, actually viewed this alleged
training module.

The Judge also finds that Mr. Kyem has not shown that preliminary
certification is warranted with respect to MTs or TSSs, or with
respect to employees of corporate entities other than Merakey
Children's Services and Merakey USA.  First, Mr. Kyem has never
been employed as an MT or a TSS.  Second, there is no basis for
including employees of Merakey USA's affiliates -- other than
Merakey Children's Services, for whom Mr. Kyem and Ms. Johnson
worked -- in the collective.  Simply put, Mr. Kyem has provided no
evidence regarding these affiliates.

In addition to moving for conditional certification of the
collective, Mr. Kyem moves for approval of his proposed notice to
the putative collective.  However, in light of the Memorandum and
Merakey's pending motion to amend its answer, the proposed notice
must be revised.  Accordingly, the notice, as proposed, will not be
approved.  Instead, the parties will meet and confer regarding an
amended notice, which they will jointly propose to the Court.

Lastly, Mr. Kyem seeks to have the Court's prior order equitably
tolling the statute of limitations for all members of the putative
collective by 30 days applied to the calculation of the lookback
period for conditional certification.  Merakey opposes this
request, arguing that equitable tolling is inappropriate because it
is not supported by the extraordinary circumstances generally
necessary to justify such a remedy.

Judge Marston finds that Merakey failed to follow the proper
procedures for challenging the Court's tolling order, so she will
not now consider the merits of their challenge.  Accordingly, the
Court's order equitably tolling the statute of limitations stands.

For these reasons, Judge Marston granted in part Mr. Kyem's motion
seeking preliminary certification of the collective and she
preliminarily certified a collective consisting of all persons
presently or formerly employed by Merakey USA or Merakey Children's
Services in the positions of Behavioral Specialist Consultant or
Licensed Behavioral Specialist Consultant who were paid on an
hourly basis and who were paid for at least 21 hours of work in two
or more workweeks during the last three years.  The Judge denied
Mr. Kyem's motion seeking approval of the notice to the collective.
The parties will meet and confer to produce a mutually agreeable
notice.  An appropriate order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/zy3h4u4s from Leagle.com.


MERCK & CO: Second Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Kaye Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled ROGER H. KAYE, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, ROGER H. KAYE, MD PC, on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants
v. MERCK & CO., INC.; MEDLEARNING, INC., Defendants-Appellees, Case
No. 20-1097 (2d Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirms the summary judgment granted to Merck.

The Panel is composed of Circuit Judges Guido Calabresi, Steven J.
Menashi and John G. Koeltl.

Plaintiffs Roger H. Kaye and Roger H. Kaye, MD, PC (together,
"Kaye"), bring the putative class action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section 227, alleging
that Kaye received an unsolicited fax advertisement from the
Defendants. The TCPA makes it unlawful to send "unsolicited"
advertisements to fax machines and creates a private right of
action entitling the recipient of such a fax to recover $500 in
statutory damages. Kaye argues that he consented to receive a fax
but did not consent to receive an advertisement.

Merck and MedLearning deny that the fax Kaye received--an
invitation to a telesymposium--was unsolicited.

The district court granted summary judgment to Merck and ruled that
the faxed invitation was within the scope of the consent granted by
Kaye's answering service.

According to the Summary Order, the main question is whether the
fax Kaye received is sufficiently similar to the one he gave
permission to receive. The TCPA generally prohibits an advertiser
from sending advertisements via fax unless it has (1) an
established business relationship with the recipient and follows
certain requirements, or (2) the recipient's prior express
permission or invitation.

In Dec. 2009, Merck hired MedLearning to manage a series of
telesymposia discussing schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and the
use of Saphris, a nongeneric drug used to treat these conditions.
As part of the agreement between Merck and MedLearning, the latter
was responsible for recruiting all participants from the list
provided by the client. To recruit physicians to participate,
MedLearning employed callers to telephone physicians on a list
provided by Merck. The callers were instructed to request
permission to send a fax invitation to the telesymposium using a
script.

On April 28, 2010, a MedLearning representative called Kaye's
office and reached the answering service. The representative used
the script and was affirmatively given permission to fax the
invitation. Later that day, MedLearning faxed the invitation to
Kaye's fax machine.

On Sept. 29, 2010, Kaye sued Merck and MedLearning over the receipt
of the fax. On Oct. 30, 2019, Kaye filed a motion for summary
judgment. On March 27, 2020, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Merck. Kaye v. Merck & Co., Inc., No.
3:10-CV-1546, 2020 WL 1492794 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2020). The
district court concluded that Kaye, by agreeing to receive a faxed
invitation to a telesymposium sponsored by Merck, consented to the
receipt of an advertisement.

The district court relied on the Appellate Court's decision in
Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc.,
847 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2017).

The Appellate Court agrees with the district court. The Panel
explains that there is a strong nexus between the fax to which Kaye
consented and the fax that Kaye received. The fax was an invitation
to a seminar on clinical information about medical conditions. It
is hard to imagine a symposium (at least one that a physician would
want to attend) providing clinical information that does not
address treatment. A reasonable doctor would expect a seminar
addressing clinical treatment sponsored by Merck to showcase
treatments manufactured by Merck. Therefore, Kaye consented to a
fax advertisement, and the claim was properly dismissed.

On Sept. 14, 2018, Merck filed its motion to strike Kaye's class
allegations. On March 29, 2019, the district court granted the
motion because "individualized inquiry" would be required to
determine whether class members had consented to be sent fax
advertisements. The Panel notes that it need not reach Kaye's
argument on this point, however. Because, having concluded that
Kaye provided his express consent to receive the fax advertisement,
Kaye no longer has a cognizable TCPA claim.

Accordingly, Kaye is not an adequate class representative for any
TCPA class action regarding the Merck faxed advertisement, and
thus, class certification cannot be maintained, the Panel holds,
citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) and Irvin v. Harris, 944 F.3d 63,
71 (2d Cir. 2019).

Because it concludes that class certification is not available to
Kaye, the Panel need not consider his claims with respect to
discovery concerning class certification.

The Appellate Court has considered Kaye's remaining arguments,
which it concludes are without merit. For these reasons, the
Appellate Court affirms the judgment of the district court.

A full-text copy of the Court's Summary Order dated April 22, 2021,
is available at https://tinyurl.com/5p7kxsz from Leagle.com.

AYTAN Y. BELLIN -- aytan.bellin@bellinlaw.com -- Bellin &
Associates LLC, in White Plains, New York (Roger Furman --
roger.furman@yahoo.com -- in Los Angeles, California, on the
brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

KIM E. RINEHART -- krinehart@wiggin.com -- Wiggin and Dana LLP, in
New Haven, Connecticut (Jeffrey R. Babbin -- jbabbin@wiggin.com --
Wiggin and Dana LLP, in New Haven, Connecticut; Matthew H. Geelan
-- MGeelan@ddnctlaw.com -- Donahue, Durham & Noonan, P.C., in
Guilford, Connecticut, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Taub Sues Over Unlawful Collection of Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Jacob Taub, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-02271-RPK-VMS (E.D.N.Y., April 26, 2021), is brought to
seek damages and declaratory relief on behalf of a class of New
York consumers under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act.

According to the complaint, prior to November 19, 2020, an
obligation was allegedly created to the original creditor, Capital
One, N.A. Capital One transferred the subject debt to Midland
Credit Management, Inc for the purpose of debt collection. The
Defendant purchased the subject debt for the purpose of debt
collection. On or about November 19, 2020, the Defendant sent the
Plaintiff a collection letter ("Letter 1") regarding the alleged
debt. On December 23, 2020, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff a
second collection letter ("Letter 2") regarding the alleged debt.
On January 28, 2021, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff a third
collection letter ("Letter 3") regarding the alleged debt.

After including no less than 5 warnings in Letter 1, 10 warnings in
Letter 2, and 6 warnings in Letter 3 that the Defendant threatened
litigation against the Plaintiff, the Defendant has failed to bring
any such action against the Plaintiff, up until and including the
time of the filing of this Complaint. It is now clear that
Defendant did not in fact intend to bring an imminent lawsuit
against the Plaintiff. Moreover, despite writing "FINAL NOTICE" in
Letter 3 and threatening a final chance to avoid litigation, the
Defendant has failed to deliver on its threats. The Plaintiff was
injured in result of these numerous threats.

Specifically, the Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as the
Defendant misrepresented its intention of bringing a lawsuit
against the Plaintiff. After each and every letter, the Plaintiff
believed he was going to receive a lawsuit shortly thereafter. The
Plaintiff has lived in fear of a lawsuit occurring for months due
to the threats in these letters. Clearly, the Defendant's
repetition of threats of litigation against the Plaintiff was only
used in a deceptive and harassing fashion to inflict fear upon the
Plaintiff that he would be sued imminently. As a result of the
Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection
practices, Plaintiff has been damaged, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York, County of
Kings.

The Defendant is a "debt collector."[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tamir Saland, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: 201-282-6500 ext. 122
          Fax: 201-282-6501
          Email: tsaland@steinsakslegal.com


MIMEDX GROUP: Bid for Reconsideration on Dismissal Order Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
MiMedx Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that Carpenters Pension Fund
of Illinois (CPFI) filed a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal and for leave to amend to add a new plaintiff to attempt
to cure the standing and loss causation issues.

On January 16, 2019, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia entered an order consolidating two
purported securities class actions (MacPhee v. MiMedx Group, Inc.,
et al. filed February 23, 2018 and Kline v. MiMedx Group, Inc., et
al. filed February 26, 2018). The order also appointed CPFI as lead
plaintiff.

On May 1, 2019, CPFI filed a consolidated amended complaint, naming
as defendants the Company, Michael J. Senken, Parker H. Petit,
William C. Taylor, Christopher M. Cashman and Cherry Bekaert &
Holland LLP. The amended complaint alleged violations of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.


It asserted a class period of March 7, 2013 through June 29, 2018.
Following the filing of motions to dismiss by the various
defendants, CPFI was granted leave to file an amended complaint.

CPFI filed its amended complaint against the Company, Michael
Senken, Pete Petit, William Taylor, and Cherry Bekaert & Holland
(Christopher Cashman was dropped as a defendant) on March 30, 2020;
defendants filed motions to dismiss on May 29, 2020.

On March 25, 2021, the Court granted defendants' respective motions
to dismiss, finding that CPFI lacked standing to bring the
underlying claims and also could not establish loss causation
because it sold all of its shares in MiMedx prior to any corrective
disclosures, and dismissed the case.

On April 22, 2021, CPFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal and for leave to amend to add a new plaintiff to attempt
to cure the standing and loss causation issues.

MiMedx Group, Inc. is an industry leader in advanced wound care and
an emerging therapeutic biologics company, developing and
distributing placental tissue allografts with patent-protected
processes for multiple sectors of healthcare. The company is based
in Marietta, Georgia.


MOMO INC: July 29 Marchand Final Settlement Approval Hearing
------------------------------------------------------------
Momo Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the Final Settlement
Approval Hearing in Marchand v. Momo Inc., et al, Civil Action No.
19 CV 04433 (S.D.N.Y.) is set for July 29, 2021.

In May 2019, a putative shareholder class action lawsuit was filed
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against the company, its chief executive officer and its
chief financial officer: Marchand v. Momo Inc., et al, Civil Action
No. 19 CV 04433 (S.D.N.Y.) (filed on May 15, 2019).

On September 18, 2019, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York appointed a lead plaintiff and
approved the lead plaintiff's selection of lead counsel for the
class action lawsuit.

On November 20, 2019, lead and named plaintiffs filed - purportedly
on behalf of a class of persons who allegedly suffered damages as a
result of their purchases, acquisitions, and sales of the company's
American Depositary Shares (ADSs) between April 20, 2015 and May
10, 2019 - an amended class action complaint, which advances that
the company's public filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission contained material misstatements or omissions in
violation of the federal securities laws.

On January 24, 2020, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended class action complaint. On August 3, 2020, with the motion
to dismiss pending, the court granted the parties' joint request to
stay the action while the parties explore mediation.

On December 4, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed a letter notifying
the court that the parties reached an agreement in principle to
resolve all claims in the action.

On March 23, 2021, the parties executed a stipulation of
settlement. On March 31, 2021, the court granted preliminary
approval of the settlement and set a final approval hearing for
July 29, 2021.

Momo Inc. operates as a mobile-based social networking platform.
The Company enables users to establish and expand social
relationships based on location and interests. Momo Inc. operates
out of the Peoples Republic of China.

MONDELEZ INT'L: Continues to Defend Wheat Trading-Related Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Mondelez International, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated class action suit related to
wheat trading contracts.

On April 1, 2015, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") filed a complaint against Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez
Global LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division following its investigation of
activities related to the trading of December 2011 wheat futures
contracts that occurred prior to the spin-off of Kraft Foods Group.


The complaint alleges that Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global
(1) manipulated or attempted to manipulate the wheat markets during
the fall of 2011; (2) violated position limit levels for wheat
futures and (3) engaged in non-competitive trades by trading both
sides of exchange-for-physical Chicago Board of Trade wheat
contracts. The CFTC seeks civil monetary penalties of either triple
the monetary gain for each violation of the Commodity Exchange Act
or $1 million for each violation of Section 6(c)(1), 6(c)(3) or
9(a)(2) of the Act and $140,000 for each additional violation of
the Act, plus post-judgment interest; an order of permanent
injunction prohibiting Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez Global from
violating specified provisions of the Act; disgorgement of profits;
and costs and fees.

On August 15, 2019, the District Court approved a settlement
agreement between the CFTC and Mondelez Global.

The terms of the settlement, which are available in the District
Court's docket, had an immaterial impact on the company's financial
position, results of operations and cash flows.

On October 23, 2019, following a ruling by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit regarding Mondelez Global's
allegations that the CFTC and its Commissioners violated certain
terms of the settlement agreement and the CFTC's argument that the
Commissioners were not bound by the terms of the settlement
agreement, the District Court vacated the settlement agreement and
reinstated all pending motions that the District Court had
previously mooted as a result of the settlement. The parties have
reached a new agreement in principle to resolve the CFTC action and
have submitted the settlement to the District Court for approval.

The District Court cancelled a scheduled conference on June 4, 2020
to discuss the proposed settlement agreement but indicated that it
would rule on pending motions in due course. Additionally, several
class action complaints were filed against Kraft Foods Group and
Mondelez Global in the District Court by investors in wheat futures
and options on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.
The complaints make similar allegations as those made in the CFTC
action, and the plaintiffs are seeking class action certification;
monetary damages, interest and unjust enrichment; costs and fees;
and injunctive, declaratory and other unspecified relief. In June
2015, these suits were consolidated in the District Court.

On January 3, 2020, the District Court granted plantiffs' request
to certify a class.

Mondelez said, "It is not possible to predict the outcome of these
matters; however, based on our Separation and Distribution
Agreement with Kraft Foods Group dated as of September 27, 2012, we
expect to bear any monetary penalties or other payments in
connection with the CFTC action and the class action. Although the
CFTC action and the class action complaints involve the same
alleged conduct, a resolution or decision with respect to one of
the matters may not be dispositive as to the outcome of the other
matter."

Mondelez International, Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and markets snack food and beverage products
worldwide. It offers biscuits, including cookies, crackers, and
salted snacks; chocolates; gums and candies; coffee and powdered
beverages; and cheese and grocery products. Mondelez International,
Inc. was founded in 2000 and is based in Deerfield, Illinois.


MRS BPO: Adams Files FDCPA Suit in E.D. New York
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against MRS BPO, L.L.C. The
case is styled as Shante Adams, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. MRS BPO, L.L.C., Case No.
1:21-cv-02524 (E.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

MRS BPO -- https://www.mrsbpo.com/ -- is a financial services
company offering accounts receivable business and accounts billing
services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com


NAVIENT CORP: Discovery in Lord Abbett Fund Class Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------------
Navient Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that discovery is ongoing in
the class action suit entitled, Lord Abbett Affiliated Fund, Inc.,
et al. v. Navient Corporation, et al.

During the first quarter of 2016, Navient Corporation, certain
Navient officers and directors, and the underwriters of certain
Navient securities offerings were sued in three putative securities
class action lawsuits filed on behalf of certain investors in
Navient stock or Navient unsecured debt.

These three cases, which were filed in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Delaware, were consolidated by the District Court,
with Lord Abbett Funds appointed as Lead Plaintiff.

The caption of the consolidated case is Lord Abbett Affiliated
Fund, Inc., et al. v. Navient Corporation, et al.

The plaintiffs filed their amended and consolidated complaint in
September 2016. In September 2017, the Court granted the Navient
defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety with
leave to amend.

The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with the court in
November 2017 and the Navient defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the second amended complaint in January 2018.

In January 2019, the Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the
Navient defendants' motion to dismiss. The Navient defendants deny
the allegations and intend to vigorously defend against the
allegation in this lawsuit. Discovery is on-going.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Navient Corporation, incorporated on November 7, 2013, provides
asset management and business processing services to education,
healthcare and government clients at the federal, state and local
levels. The Company holds the portfolio of education loans insured
or federally guaranteed under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP). The Company operates through four segments: FFELP
Loans, Private Education Loans, Business Services and Other. It
also holds the portfolio of Private Education Loans. The company is
based in Wilmington, Delaware.


NAVIENT CORP: Discovery Ongoing in NJ Consolidated Securities Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Navient Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that discovery is ongoing in
the class action suit entitled, In RE Navient Corporation
Securities Litigation.

Two putative class actions have been filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey captioned Eli Pope v. Navient
Corporation, John F. Remondi, Somsak Chivavibul and Christian Lown,
and Melvin Gross v. Navient Corporation, John F. Remondi, Somsak
Chivavibul and Christian M. Lown, both of which allege violations
of the federal securities laws under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

After the cases were consolidated by the Court in February 2018
under the caption In Re Navient Corporation Securities Litigation,
the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint in April 2018
and the Company filed a motion to dismiss in June 2018.

In December 2019, the Court denied the Company's motion to dismiss
and discovery is on-going.

The Company continues to deny the allegations and intends to
vigorously defend itself.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Navient Corporation, incorporated on November 7, 2013, provides
asset management and business processing services to education,
healthcare and government clients at the federal, state and local
levels. The Company holds the portfolio of education loans insured
or federally guaranteed under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP). The Company operates through four segments: FFELP
Loans, Private Education Loans, Business Services and Other. It
also holds the portfolio of Private Education Loans. The company is
based in Wilmington, Delaware.


NCAA: Thomassey Sues Over Disregard for Health & Safety of Athletes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Edward Thomassey, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
Case No. 1:21-cv-01136-SEB-MG (S.D. Ind., May 6, 2021), is brought
against the Defendants to obtain redress for injuries sustained as
a result of the Defendants' reckless disregard for the health and
safety of generations of Otterbein University student-athletes.

Despite knowing for decades of a vast body of scientific research
describing the danger of traumatic brain injuries like those the
Plaintiff experienced, the Defendants failed to implement adequate
procedures to protect the Plaintiff and other Otterbein football
players from the long-term dangers associated with them. They did
so knowingly and for profit. As a direct result of the Defendants'
acts and omissions, the Plaintiff and countless former Otterbein
football players suffered brain and other neurocognitive injuries
from playing NCAA football. As such, the Plaintiff brings this
Class Action Complaint in order to vindicate those players' rights
and hold the NCAA accountable, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff Anthony Edward Thomassey is a natural person and
citizen of the State of Pennsylvania.

The NCAA is the governing body of collegiate athletics that
oversees twenty-three college sports and over 400,000 students who
participate in intercollegiate athletics, including the football
program at Greensboro.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff Raizner, Esq.
          RAIZNER SLANIA LLP
          2402 Dunlavy Street
          Houston, TX 77006
          Phone: 713.554.9099
          Fax: 713.554.9098
          Email: efile@raiznerlaw.com

               - and -

          Jay Edelson, Esq.
          Benjamin H. Richman, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60654
          Phone: 312.589.6370
          Fax: 312.589.6378
          Email: jedelson@edelson.com
                 brichman@edelson.com

               - and -

          Rafey S. Balabanian, Esq.
          EDELSON PC
          123 Townsend Street, Suite 100
          San Francisco, CA 94107
          Phone: 415.212.9300
          Fax: 415.373.9435
          Email: rbalabanian@edelson.com


NCR CORPORATION: N.D. California Remands Kalaveras Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit entitled ANGELO KALAVERAS, Plaintiff v. NCR
CORPORATION, Defendant, Case No. 20-CV-6930 YGR (N.D. Cal.),
District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California issued an order granting
motion to remand and denying stay as moot.

Plaintiff Kalaveras filed the action on June 25, 2020, in the
Superior Court of the State of California, County of Contra Costa.
He alleged claims on behalf of himself and a putative class, as
well as representative claims under California's Private Attorney
General Act, Cal. Labor Code section 2698, et seq. (PAGA).
Defendant NCR removed the complaint to this Court by Notice of
Removal filed Oct. 5, 2020, asserting federal jurisdiction pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act.

On March 1, 2021, the Plaintiff represented that he would stipulate
to submit all his individual claims asserted in this action to
final and binding arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration
agreement. The parties so indicated at the March 1, 2021 case
management conference, and thereafter filed a stipulation, then
approved by order of the Court, submitting his individual claims to
arbitration and amending the complaint to state only his individual
and representative PAGA claims.

The stipulation further indicated that NCR intended to move to stay
the action pending completion of arbitration of the Plaintiff's
individual claims and that he intended to move to remand the action
to state court.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that PAGA claims are not
subject to arbitration under California or federal law. Indeed, in
an effort to avoid any ambiguity in the matter, the Plaintiff
agrees and requests that his individual claims (alleged in the SAC
but subject to arbitration) may be dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 41(a)(2),
leaving only the PAGA claims in issue.

The parties' disagreement centers on whether the Court should
retain jurisdiction over the only remaining claim for litigation,
the representative PAGA claim. The Plaintiff contends the Court has
only discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA claim
and that it should decline to exercise that discretion here for
reasons of efficiency, convenience, fairness and comity under 28
U.S.C. Section 1367(c). The Defendant argues that a court retains
jurisdiction under CAFA regardless of post-removal developments or
amendments and, alternatively, even the Court should retain
supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA claim here.

Judge Rogers holds that first, as to the question of whether CAFA
jurisdiction continues even if all class allegations have been
dismissed and a representative PAGA claim is the sole remaining
claim for litigation, the caselaw is unsettled. The parties do not
cite, nor has the Court found, any published Ninth Circuit decision
deciding whether a complaint removed pursuant to CAFA may be
remanded after an amendment eliminating all individual and class
claims and leaving only a representative PAGA claim.

The Court acknowledges that, in the usual case, a denial of class
certification or amendment of the complaint to eliminate class
allegations does not generally divest the court of CAFA
jurisdiction, citing United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg.,
Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v.
Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010). The Plaintiff
acknowledges that to the extent original jurisdiction existed under
CAFA at the time of removal, it arguably survives dismissal of the
class claims.

On the other hand, Judge Rogers notes, the Ninth Circuit has
repeatedly held that a PAGA claim alone would not be subject to
removal under CAFA since it is neither a class nor mass action.

The parties cite a number of district court and unpublished Ninth
Circuit decisions coming down on either side of the question of
whether remand of a PAGA claim should be granted once the class
allegations are eliminated. The Court has considered those and
others on the issue and concludes that the decisions in Herd v.
Smart & Final Stores LLC, No. CV 20-8873-MWF (SKX) 2020 WL 6940699,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020), et al., provide the more
persuasive reasoning. The Court adopts the reasoning of these
decisions and concludes that it has jurisdiction here, if at all,
only under Section 1367's supplemental jurisdiction provisions.

As in Herd, et al., and taking the factors into account under
section 1367, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the PAGA claim here, especially given the
procedural posture of this case. PAGA implicates complex issues of
California law which, in the interests of comity, are best
determined by the state court. This case is in its very early days
and the Court has not heard any motions or other disputes prior to
these motions. No efficiency would be gained by retaining
jurisdiction.

The Defendant's arguments that the Plaintiff has engaged in unfair
forum manipulation ring hollow where the Defendant elected to
remove this action to federal court knowing that all claims other
than the PAGA claim would be subject to arbitration. The record
reveals no evidence of other factors that would favor maintaining
federal jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to extend supplemental
jurisdiction over the sole remaining PAGA claim and grants the
motion to dismiss. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand the
action to the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa.
Consequently, the motion to stay is denied as moot.

The Order terminates Docket Nos. 22 and 23.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5t78993v from Leagle.com.


NEW MEXICO: 10th Cir. Affirms SRSA Approval in Duran v. Grisham
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit captioned DWIGHT DURAN, Plaintiff-Appellee v.
MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM; ALISHA TAFOYA LUCERO, Defendants-Appellees.
DAVID S. PETERSON, Objector-Appellant, Case No. 20-2033 (10th
Cir.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirms the order approving the Second Revised Settlement
Agreement.

Ms. Grisham is the governor of New Mexico.  Objector-Appellant
David S. Peterson, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court's order approving the parties' Second Revised
Settlement Agreement (SRSA). The SRSA modified a 1991 Consent
Decree governing conditions in New Mexico's state prisons.

Background

The lawsuit is a class action originally brought in 1977 alleging
violations of the federal constitutional rights of certain inmates
in the State of New Mexico's custody. By the parties' agreement,
the Court entered an order on July 15, 1980, noting that the
Plaintiff class had been certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(1) and (2), and redefining the class as: all those
inmates who are now, or in the future may be, incarcerated in the
Penitentiary of New Mexico at Santa Fe or at any maximum, close, or
medium security facility open for operation by the State of New
Mexico after June 12, 1980.

After extensive litigation, on June 10, 1991, the parties entered
into a settlement agreement resolving all then-pending motions. The
Court issued an order (1991 Consent Decree) adopting the parties'
agreement on Sept. 20, 1991. By July 16, 1999, all of the
substantive requirements in the 1991 Consent Decree had been
satisfied and vacated, except for certain restrictions on
overcrowding. According to the decree, these overcrowding
restrictions were to remain in place in perpetuity.

The litigation was dormant from late 1999 to late 2015, when a
class member revived it by filing pro se motions for an emergency
injunction and a contempt order. Class counsel resumed active
representation of the Plaintiff class, and on August 5, 2016, with
the assistance of a magistrate judge, the parties reached a
settlement of the then pending disputes. The Court approved this
settlement on August 31, 2016.

Almost a year later, on July 5, 2017, class counsel filed the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Remedial Relief
regarding Violations of the Court's Stipulated Orders, alleging
that Defendants were violating the 1991 Consent Decree and the
parties' 2016 settlement agreement. That motion remains pending, as
do two additional motions for declaratory, injunctive, and remedial
relief that class counsel later filed.

The Plaintiff class has alleged ongoing violations of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
including unreasonable risks to class members' health and safety
due to overcrowding, violence, misclassification, disproportionate
discipline, understaffing, environmental conditions including
vermin and constitutionally inadequate bathroom facilities and
plumbing, constitutionally inadequate healthcare, and failure to
timely release inmates at prison facilities operated by the New
Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD).

The Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs' motions. They also filed
motions to dismiss seeking termination of all prospective relief
and an automatic stay on Dec. 5, 2018. However, the Defendants
subsequently withdrew these motions without prejudice to allow the
parties to pursue settlement negotiations. The parties have
conducted extensive investigation and discovery regarding the
claims and defenses raised in their respective motions.

The parties filed a second Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Settlement Agreement on Aug. 21, 2019. On Aug. 28, 2019, the Court
held a hearing on the parties' Aug. 21, 2019 motion. At the
hearing, counsel and NMCD Cabinet Secretary Alisha Tafoya Lucero
made presentations and responded to the Court's questions regarding
the parties' agreement.

The Court entered an Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement Agreement, and Approving and Directing the
Issuance of Notice to Plaintiff Class Members (Order Granting
Preliminary Approval) on Sept. 5, 2019. In its Order Granting
Preliminary Approval, the Court preliminarily held that the Revised
Settlement Agreement was fair, adequate, reasonable, and likely to
meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. Section 3626.

The Court also approved the Notice to the Plaintiff Class Members
attached to the Order Granting Preliminary Approval and found that
it satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 and due process. The Court
directed the Defendants to provide the Notice and Revised
Settlement Agreement to class members by posting them in English
and Spanish in the law library, general library, dining facilities,
recreational facilities, and on a bulletin board in every unit in
every NMCD facility in New Mexico, from Sept. 24, 2019, through
Dec. 23, 2019. The Court further directed the Defendants to provide
the Notice and Revised Settlement Agreement to each inmate housed
in any segregated housing unit between Sept. 24, 2019, and Dec. 23,
2019, in English or Spanish at the inmate's election.

The Defendants provided notice of the proposed settlement to the
Plaintiff class as the Court directed, including at covered NMCD
facilities operated by private contractors. The Defendants
monitored whether the Notice and Revised Settlement Agreement
remained posted as prescribed during the objection period and, when
inmates at the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility (GCCF)
removed some posted copies, replaced them reasonably promptly.

In its Order Granting Preliminary Approval, the Court directed any
class member who wished to object to the Revised Settlement
Agreement to file his or her objections in writing by Dec. 23,
2019, and directed the Defendants to allow class members to submit
timely objections free of charge.

Between Sept. 12, 2019, and Jan. 27, 2020, approximately 152
members of the Plaintiff class filed objections to the Revised
Settlement Agreement. The Court has also carefully reviewed and
considered the objections that seven class members sent to class
counsel between Sept. 24, 2019, and Dec. 23, 2019 and later
directed counsel to file.

The SRSA contained minor revisions to the Revised Settlement
Agreement. The district court determined the SRSA should be finally
approved under the standards set forth in Rule 23(e) and the PLRA.
It made extensive findings in support of approval of the settlement
and found that none of the objections warranted its disapproval.
Peterson, who objected to the settlement, filed this pro se
appeal.

Discussion

On appeal, Peterson raises six objections to the order approving
the SRSA. He argues that (1) the notice provided to class members
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 contained inadequate information; (2) the
1991 Consent Decree was not terminable under the PLRA; (3) the
state violated the 1991 Consent Decree, because the cells at the
Clayton Prison do not provide 60 square feet of space per prisoner;
(4) the SRSA violates a New Mexico statute that limits prison
population; (5) the Plaintiffs' Class Counsel abandoned the class
by failing to make or support the arguments he now raises; and (6)
the district court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction
to resume enforcement of this case in 2015.

Judge Holmes notes that most of these arguments involve issues of
law, which the Appellate Court reviews de novo. This includes the
issue of whether class counsel adequately represented the interests
of the class.

Judge Holmes begins with Peterson's threshold challenges to
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. He argues that once the
1991 Consent Decree's relief provisions were satisfied, ongoing
federal-court jurisdiction over the decree terminated. This
argument lacks merit. This case was reactivated in 2015 in response
to a class member's complaint about alleged overcrowding. The
Consent Decree itself had not been vacated and its overcrowding
provisions had never been terminated. Those provisions were to
exist in perpetuity and to remain enforceable in any federal or
state court of competent jurisdiction.

Although the parties ultimately agreed through the SRSA to settle
their differences on a wide range of issues, the district court's
power to approve the SRSA arose from a permissible exercise of the
retained jurisdiction specified in the parties' settlement
agreement and incorporated in the 1991 Consent Decree.

Mr. Peterson next argues that the class member who complained in
2015 failed to exhaust his prison remedies, as the PLRA requires.
But he fails to show that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies
to Class Counsel's subsequent efforts to enforce the Consent
Decree, Judge Holmes observes.

Mr. Peterson also asserts that the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the defendants and the class members, because no
new complaint was filed or served. But Class Counsel's efforts to
enforce the Consent Decree did not require service of a new
complaint, Judge Holmes holds. He next contends no statute or
constitutional provision grants subject-matter jurisdiction over
this proceeding. The Appellate Court previously recognized that the
underlying action that produced the 1991 Consent Decree was founded
on federal-question jurisdiction. See Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d
1485, 1486 (10th Cir. 1989). Judge Holmes insists that Peterson
fails to show that this recognition was erroneous. And the district
court exercised its retained jurisdiction to approve the SRSA.

Finally, Peterson argues the Eleventh Amendment bars this action to
enforce what he refers to as a settlement contract between the
class members and the State of New Mexico. The Appellate Court
previously held that the Eleventh Amendment did not require the
district court to vacate a previous consent decree entered in this
case on July 14, 1980. The same rationale applies to enforcement of
the 1991 Consent Decree.

Notice to Class Members

The district court approved the form and content of the notice as
satisfying the requirements of Rule 23 and due process. But
Peterson complains that the Rule 23 notice failed to provide class
members with adequate historical facts and legal analysis to permit
them to make a knowing and intelligent decision concerning the
settlement. Specifically, he contends the notice failed to (1)
include a copy of the 1991 settlement agreement; (2) discuss a PLRA
provision concerning private settlement agreements; (3) identify or
discuss a New Mexico statute concerning prison overcrowding; (4)
provide copies of the documents or pleadings filed in this case;
and (5) discuss alternatives to settlement, given the defendants'
alleged violations of the Consent Decree.

Judge Holmes holds that none of these arguments has merit. The
notice informed class members about the 1991 settlement agreement,
its overcrowding provisions that were intended to be perpetual, and
the risk that these provisions could be terminated under the PLRA
if a settlement were not achieved. Also, Peterson misunderstands
the effect of the statutes he cites--the PLRA provision concerning
private settlement agreements and a New Mexico statute concerning
overcrowding. The notice was not deficient for failing to discuss
these provisions. The notice provided to class members was
adequate.

Consent Decree and PLRA

Mr. Peterson argues that the 1991 Consent Decree was ended or wiped
out, leaving only a contract between the State and its prisoners.
He contends this contractual agreement is exempt from PLRA's
termination provisions, citing 18 U.S.C. Section 3626(c)(2), which
exempts private settlement agreements from PLRA's limitations on
relief.

Judge Holmes explains that first, his contention that the 1991
Consent Decree was terminated is incorrect; as the Appellate Court
has noted, its overcrowding provisions were designed to remain in
effect even after the other provisions were vacated. More
importantly, although the parties did reach a settlement agreement
in 1991, which was incorporated into the 1991 Consent Decree, the
Consent Decree does not meet the PLRA's definition of a private
settlement agreement, which only applies to agreements that are not
generally subject to judicial enforcement. Rather, it is a consent
decree under the statute, because it provides relief entered by the
court that is based in whole or in part upon the consent or
acquiescence of the parties. Because the 1991 Consent Decree was
entered by the court and provided for prospective relief, it is
subject to the PLRA's termination provisions. Peterson's argument
therefore lacks merit.

Size of Cells at Clayton Prison

Mr. Peterson contends the State of New Mexico breached the 1991
Consent Decree by providing less than 60 square feet per prisoner
at the Northeastern New Mexico Correctional Facility in Clayton.
But the factual record presented in this case disproves his
argument, Judge Holmes notes. To the extent Peterson argues that
each inmate in double cells has only approximately 51 square feet
of unencumbered space, he fails to show that the 60-foot
requirement in the 1991 Consent Decree applies to unencumbered
space.

New Mexico Corrections Population Control Act

The SRSA limits prison population to 120 percent of capacity.
Peterson argues this violates the Corrections Population Control
Act, a New Mexico statute that he claims limits a prison's
population to 100 percent of its capacity. But as the district
court noted, Section 33-2A-6 does not actually limit New Mexico
prisons to 100 percent of capacity. Instead, the statute provides
certain mechanisms that will be taken to reduce capacity where the
inmate population exceeds one hundred percent of rated capacity for
a period of thirty consecutive days. Hence, Peterson's challenge
lacks merit.

"Abandonment" by Plaintiffs' Class Counsel

The district court determined that Class Counsel adequately
represented the class. Peterson disagrees; he argues instead that
counsel abandoned the class. He complains that counsel failed to
raise the square-feet-per-prisoner issue at Clayton Prison. But, as
the Appellate Court has seen, that issue lacks merit. Counsel's
failure to raise it, therefore, did not amount to inadequate
representation.

Mr. Peterson next complains that Class Counsel refused to defend
the 1991 settlement contract and failed to react when the state
violated the 1991 settlement contract by using a 1996 law to attack
the contract, presumably referring to the PLRA's termination
provision.

Judge Holmes notes that this argument appears to rest on Peterson's
mistaken belief that the 1991 Consent Decree was exempt from
termination under the PLRA. To the contrary, Class Counsel
correctly informed class members of the high risk that the Consent
Decree could be terminated under the PLRA and negotiated the
binding and enforceable benefits for the class contained in the
SRSA.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit affirms the district court's decision approving
the SRSA.

Timothy M. Tymkovich, Chief Judge, dissenting. He dissents from the
majority's order and judgment because he believes the district
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the
SRSA.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order and Judgment dated April 22,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/he7kb9jy from
Leagle.com.


NEW YORK: Court Denies Bid for Class Certification in Soriano Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Paul A. Goetz of the Supreme Court of New York, New York
County, denied the Plaintiffs' request for class certification in
the lawsuit styled MAOLI SORIANO, SHEALEAN SMITH, Plaintiffs v. NEW
YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMPORARY AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, MICHAEL
P. HEIN, AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF TEMPORARY
AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, Defendants, Case No. 450315/2021 (N.Y.
Sup.).

The Plaintiffs move by order to show cause for an order certifying
the action as a class action pursuant to Article 9 of the New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) on behalf of all individuals
residing in New York City, who would be eligible to receive rental
assistance through the Family Homelessness and Eviction Prevention
Supplement (FHEPS) program but for the fact that they have not been
sued in Housing Court and for a preliminary injunction pursuant to
CPLR Section 6301 restraining the Defendants from denying the
Plaintiffs and all putative class members rental assistance through
the FHEPS program on the basis that they have not yet been sued in
Housing Court for nonpayment of rent for the duration of the
COVID-19 pandemic.

The Plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration that the Defendants have violated certain sections of
the New York Social Services Law (SSL) and the New York State and
the United States Constitutions. The Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the
Defendants from denying eligible families access to FHEPS benefits
by enforcing the "the lawsuit requirement" for those benefits at
least for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Background

Local social service districts (districts) are responsible for
providing public assistance (PA) to individuals and families within
their district (SSL Section 62[1]). Districts determine eligibility
by applying statewide standards of monthly need as set forth in
Defendant New York State Office of Temporary and Disability
Assistance's (OTDA's) regulations (18 NYCRR Section 352.1). The
district in New York City is the New York City Department of Social
Services (DSS). PA grants include allowances for shelter (NYCRR
Section 352.2) and for families receiving Family Assistance (FA)
which operates under federal Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families guidelines the shelter allowances will be adequate to
enable the father, mother or other relative to bring up the child
properly, having regard for the physical, mental and moral
well-being of such child (SSL Section 350[a][1]).

The FHEPS program was developed to settle a class action lawsuit,
Tejada v. Roberts, (NY Co SC Index No 453245/15) on behalf of FA
recipients with children in New York City. The class action alleged
that the shelter and rent supplement allowances for FA recipients
were inadequate. Under the terms of the stipulation of settlement
OTDA agreed to replace the New York City Human Resources
Administration's (HRA) Family Eviction Prevention Rent Supplement
program with the FHEPS A Rent Supplement Plan to resolve the issue
of adequacy of rental supplement allowances.

To obtain benefits under the FHEPS program a family must
demonstrate that: (i) at least one minor child lives in the
household, (ii) at least one family member in the household
receives public assistance, (iii) the family has a lease for at
least one year or an apartment subject to rent regulation, (iv) the
family's rent arrears do not exceed $9,000 and (v) the family has
been sued for eviction in Housing Court for failure to pay rent
(the lawsuit requirement).

The Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction restraining
enforcement of the lawsuit requirement on the grounds that the
Defendants' enforcement of it violates their duty to provide an
adequate shelter allowance because by the time eviction proceedings
resume, many families will have become ineligible for FHEPS since
their rent arrears will have exceeded the $9,000 limit.

On Dec. 28, 2020, the State enacted the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction
and Foreclosure Prevention Act (EEFPA) which established a
moratorium on all evictions based on nonpayment of rent through
February 26, 2021, and further prohibits through May 1, 2021,
nonpayment eviction proceedings against tenants, who submit
hardship declarations (2020 NY SB 9114 Sections 2 & 4).

By letter dated March 2, 2021, OTDA advised the Plaintiffs that in
light of the moratorium on new eviction proceedings contained in
the EEFPA it would waive the lawsuit requirement until at least May
1, 2021, or until such time as the eviction moratorium is no longer
in effect. The Defendants argue in light of the waiver, the
Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction request is now moot. The
Plaintiffs counter that their request is not moot because, inter
alia, they requested a stay for the pendency of this case and the
Defendants' waiver does not offer relief to those who will be
subject to eviction on May 2, 2021, whose arrears now exceed the
$9,000 limit for FHEPS benefits.

Discussion

Pursuant to CPLR Section 902, the Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification is premature, Judge Goetz holds. CPLR Section 902
provides in relevant part that the Plaintiffs will move for class
certification within 60 days after the time to serve a responsive
pleading has expired for all persons named as defendants.

The Court signed the Plaintiffs' order to show cause on Feb. 18,
2021, and the Defendants' time to serve a responsive pleading was
by March 11, 2021, which was then extended by stipulation to April
1, 2021.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was
premature since it was made before the Defendants' time to serve
their answer had expired. While the Plaintiffs are correct that
this timing irregularity may be disregarded, the Defendants have
since moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds and
resolution of that motion may moot the class certification issue.

Accordingly, that branch of the Plaintiffs' order to show cause
seeking class certification will be denied without prejudice to
renew after a decision and order are issued on the Defendants'
motion to dismiss.

Preliminary Injunction

In support of their preliminary injunction request, the Plaintiffs
submit affidavits from each named plaintiff. Each Plaintiff states
that she owes rental arrears, is in need of rental assistance and
that she would be eligible for the FHEPS program but has been
prevented from applying because she has not been sued by her
landlord.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction is now moot in light of the March 2, 2021 waiver of the
lawsuit requirement. In reply, the Plaintiffs aver that their
request is not moot because their request for a preliminary
injunction is for the duration of this court case and the
Defendants' waiver of the lawsuit requirement is only in effect
until May 1, 2021, and as of May 2nd without a preliminary
injunction there will be no protection for the Plaintiffs or any
putative class member.

Judge Goetz holds that the Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction is indeed moot. The Plaintiffs state that they would
have applied for FHEPS benefits but for the lawsuit requirement, as
of March 2nd that requirement is waived. The Plaintiffs can now
apply for FHEPS benefits. Notwithstanding the waiver of the lawsuit
requirement, the Plaintiffs' reply affidavits dated March 22, 2021,
and March 23, 2021, do not indicate whether they applied for FHEPS
benefits after the Defendants issued the waiver. Because the
Plaintiffs received the relief they need to apply for FHEPS
benefits, their request for a preliminary injunction is now moot.

The Plaintiffs also argue in reply that their arrears now exceed
the $9,000 limit on rental arrears making them ineligible for FHEPS
benefits. Significantly, neither of the Plaintiff states the amount
of her rental arrears in her initial affidavit, Judge Goetz notes.
It is only in their reply affidavits that each of the Plaintiffs
states the amount of her arrears. Plaintiff Maoli Soriano states in
her reply affidavit that when she first sought rental assistance
her arrears were under $9,000 but now her arrears are $13,046.71
through March 31, 2021. Plaintiff Shealean Smith states in her
reply affidavit that when she first sought rental assistance her
arrears were under $9,000 but are now $11,292.46 March 31, 2021.
However, Judge Goetz holds, the Plaintiffs did not request an
increase in the rental arrears limit, they only requested an order
enjoining the enforcement of the lawsuit requirement.

The Plaintiffs' reply papers include new arguments, grounds and
evidence in support of their order to show cause, and expressly
requests relief that is dramatically unlike the relief sought in
the original motion and are, therefore, not properly before the
court, Judge Goetz holds. Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not dispute
that DSS has the discretion to increase the rental arrears cap on a
case-by-case basis. Yet neither Plaintiff states in her reply
affidavit that she applied for FHEPS after OTDA issued the waiver
of the lawsuit requirement and was rejected because her arrears
exceeded the $9,000 limit.

Even if the newly proffered arguments, evidence and grounds
contained in the Plaintiffs' reply papers were considered, they
have failed to show they were rejected for FHEPs after OTDA issued
the waiver of the lawsuit requirement, therefore, they have failed
to establish any imminent and non-speculative harm that would
befall them in the absence of the preliminary injunction, Judge
Goetz rules, citing Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel.
Network, 74 A.D.3d 738, 740 (2nd Dept 2010).

Accordingly, that branch of the Plaintiffs' order to show cause
seeking a preliminary injunction will be denied.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing it is:

   -- ordered that that branch of the Plaintiffs' order to show
      cause seeking class certification is denied without
      prejudice; and it is further

   -- ordered that that branch of the Plaintiffs' order to show
      cause for a preliminary injunction is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Decision dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/jrbry8r9 from Leagle.com.


NORTH CENTRAL VIRGINIA: Conditional Cert. of FLSA Claim Sought
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MICHAEL DEREK COMPTON,
individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons, v. NORTH
CENTRAL VIRGINIA RESTAURANTS, INC. d/b/a "Papa John's Pizza," Case
No. 5:20-cv-00073-TTC-JCH (W.D. Va.), the Plaintiff asks the Court
to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying a company-wide Fair Labor Standards
      Act (FLSA) claim and authorizing dissemination of the
notice;

   2. directing the Defendant to identify all delivery drivers
they
      have employed at any time in the last three years;

   3. directing the Defendant to provide the notice-related
      information to Plaintiff's attorneys within 14 days; and

   4. directing the issuance of the Plaintiff's proposed notice and

      consent form to all such persons.

The Defendant owns and operates a chain of approximately 26 Papa
John's franchisee stores in Virginia, Maryland and West Virginia.
The Defendant requires its delivery drivers to furnish their own
delivery vehicles and pay out of pocket for all automobile expenses
they incur in making deliveries. The Defendant provides only a
partial, and unreasonably low, reimbursement for these costs.

Because the Defendant pays its delivery drivers the exact
applicable minimum wage, or very close to it, while grossly
under-reimbursing them for vehicle costs its delivery drivers incur
in performing their job, the unreimbursed vehicle costs constitute
"de facto deductions" that cause drivers' wages to fall below the
minimum wage in violation of the FLSA.

The Plaintiff Compton was employed by the Defendant as a delivery
driver at its Papa John’s store located in Waynesboro, Virginia
from about August 2019 to March 2020, then he was employed by the
Defendant at its Papa John's store located in Stanton, Virginia
from about March 2020 to September 2020.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 28,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3vRQy58
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark A. Potashnick, Esq.
          WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK
          11500 Olive Blvd., Suite 133
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 997-9150
          E-mail: markp@wp-attorneys.com

               - and -

          Kevin J. Dolley, Esq.
          DOLLEY LAW, LLC
          12977 N. Outer Forty Drive, Suite 230
          St. Louis, MO 63141
          Telephone: (314) 645-4100
          E-mail: kevin@dolleylaw.com

               - and -

          Cary Powell Moseley, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF CARY
          POWELL MOSELEY, PLLC
          401 Otey Street
          Bedford, VA 24523
          Telephone: (540) 583-5362
          E-mail: cary@carymoseley.com

NUTS ARE GOOD!: Monegro Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Nuts Are Good! Inc.
The case is styled as Frankie Monegro, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated v. Nuts Are Good! Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-04088 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Nuts are Good! Inc. -- http://freshroastedalmondco.com/-- now
makes and carries hundreds of natural and organic nuts, seeds,
granolas, dried fruits, and candies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mark Rozenberg, Esq.
          STEIN SAKS, PLLC
          285 Passaic Street
          Hackensack, NJ 07601
          Phone: (201) 282-6500
          Email: mrozenberg@steinsakslegal.com


OLIN CORP: Suits Against Unit Over Sale of Caustic Soda Underway
----------------------------------------------------------------
Olin Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that Olin, K.A. Steel
Chemicals continues to defend several class action suits related to
the sale of caustic soda.

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemicals (a wholly owned subsidiary of Olin) and
other caustic soda producers were named as defendants in six
purported class action civil lawsuits filed March 22, 25 and 26,
2019 and April 12, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of New York on behalf of the respective named plaintiffs
and a putative class comprised of all persons and entities who
purchased caustic soda in the U.S. directly from one or more of the
defendants, their parents, predecessors, subsidiaries or affiliates
at any time on or after October 1, 2015.  

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemicals and other caustic soda producers were
also named as defendants in two purported class action civil
lawsuits filed July 25 and 29, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of New York on behalf of the respective named
plaintiffs and a putative class comprised of all persons and
entities who purchased caustic soda in the U.S. indirectly from
distributors at any time on or after October 1, 2015.  

The other defendants named in the lawsuits are Occidental Petroleum
Corporation, Occidental Chemical Corporation d/b/a OxyChem,
Westlake Chemical Corporation, Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd.,
Shintech Incorporated, Formosa Plastics Corporation, and Formosa
Plastics Corporation, U.S.A.

The lawsuits allege the defendants conspired to fix, raise,
maintain and stabilize the price of caustic soda, restrict domestic
(U.S.) supply of caustic soda and allocate caustic soda customers.
Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of damages and injunctive
relief.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Olin Corporation, incorporated on August 13, 1892, is a
manufacturer and distributor of chemical products, and ammunition.
The Company operates through three segments: Chlor Alkali Products
and Vinyls, Epoxy and Winchester. The company is based in Clayton.


OLIN CORP: Unit Defends Suits Over Sale of Caustic Soda in Canada
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Olin Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that Olin, K.A. Steel
Chemicals
continues to defend several class action suits related to the sale
of caustic soda in Canada.

Olin, K.A. Steel Chemical, Olin Canada ULC, 3229897 Nova Scotia Co.
(wholly owned subsidiaries of Olin) and other alleged caustic soda
producers were named as defendants in a proposed class action civil
lawsuit filed on October 7, 2020 in the Quebec Superior Court on
behalf of the respective named plaintiff and a putative class
comprised of all Canadian persons and entities who, between October
1, 2015 and the date of the eventual class action certification,
directly or indirectly purchased caustic soda or products
containing caustic soda, produced by one or more of the defendants.


Olin, K.A. Steel Chemical, Olin Canada ULC, 3229897 Nova Scotia Co.
and other alleged caustic soda producers were also named as
defendants in a proposed class action civil lawsuit filed November
13, 2020 in the Federal Court of Canada on behalf of the respective
named plaintiff and a putative class comprised of all legal persons
in Canada who, at any time on or after October 1, 2015 to the
present, directly or indirectly purchased caustic soda.

The other defendants named in the two Canadian lawsuits are
Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Occidental Chemical Corporation,
Oxy Canada Sales, Inc., Westlake Chemical Corporation, Axiall
Canada, Inc., Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd., Shintech Incorporated,
Formosa Plastics Corporation, and Formosa Plastics Corporation,
U.S.A.

The lawsuits allege the defendants conspired to fix, raise,
maintain control, and stabilize the price of caustic soda, divide
and allocate markets, sales, customers and territories, fix,
maintain, control, prevent, restrict, lessen or eliminate
production and supply of caustic soda, and agree to idle capacity
of production and/or refrain from increasing their production
capacity.

Plaintiffs seek an unspecified amount of damages, including
punitive damages.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Olin Corporation, incorporated on August 13, 1892, is a
manufacturer and distributor of chemical products, and ammunition.
The Company operates through three segments: Chlor Alkali Products
and Vinyls, Epoxy and Winchester. The company is based in Clayton,
Missouri.


OPKO HEALTH: Settlement in Florida Suit Granted Final Approval
--------------------------------------------------------------
OPKO Health, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that an Order Granting Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement and Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice was entered in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, approving the
settlement in the class action suit headed by Amitim Funds.

On September 7, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed
a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against a number of
individuals and entities, including the Company and its CEO and
Chairman, Dr. Phillip Frost.

The SEC alleged, among other things, that the Company (i) aided and
abetted an illegal "pump and dump" scheme perpetrated by a number
of the Defendants, and (ii) failed to file required Schedules 13D
or 13G with the SEC.

The Company and Dr. Frost entered into settlement agreements with
the SEC that resolved the SEC Complaint against each of them, which
were approved by the court in January 2019.

Pursuant to the settlement, and without admitting or denying any of
the allegations of the SEC Complaint, the Company is enjoined from
violating Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act and paid a $100,000
penalty. Liability under Section 13(d) can be established without
any showing of wrongful intent or negligence.

Following the SEC's announcement of the SEC Complaint, the company
was named in several class action lawsuits, more than a dozen
derivative suits which have now been settled, and other litigation
relating to the allegations in the SEC Complaint among other
matters.

On June 26, 2020, The Amitim Funds, the lead plaintiff in the class
action lawsuits, filed a Stipulation of Settlement in the Southern
District of Florida of behalf of itself and the remainder of the
class, which provides for the settlement of and release of the
class action claims against the Company and Dr. Frost for $16.5
million.

The company's insurance carriers have agreed to provide coverage
for a significant portion of the settlement amount in connection
with the class action lawsuits.

On April 28, 2021, an Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice was entered in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Miami Division, approving the settlement.

OPKO Health, Inc., a healthcare company, engages in the diagnostics
and pharmaceuticals business in the United States, Ireland, Chile,
Spain, Israel, Mexico, and internationally. OPKO Health, Inc. was
incorporated in 1991 and is headquartered in Miami, Florida.


PACIFICA, CA: Bid for Provisional Class Cert. Denied as Moot
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SEAN GEARY, et al., v.
CITY OF PACIFICA, Case No. 3:21-cv-01780-VC (N.D. Cal.), the Hon.
Judge Vince Chhabria entered an order that the motion for
provisional class certification is not necessary, and it is denied
as moot.

The Court understands the parties' stipulation to mean the
following: if the Court enters any preliminary injunction enjoining
the City from enforcing all or part of its ban on oversized vehicle
parking against the named plaintiffs, the City agrees that it will
cease to enforce those rules against any person within its
jurisdiction in accordance with the terms of the injunction.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 28, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3y9XYCS at no extra charge.[CC]

PAPA MURPHY'S: Court Adopts R&R and Denies Bid to Toss Brown Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled EVAN BROWN, Plaintiff v. PAPA MURPHY'S
HOLDINGS INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants, Case No. C19-5514
BHS-JRC (W.D. Wash.), District Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma,
issued an order adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation for the denial of the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.

The matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
("R&R") of the Honorable J. Richard Creatura, United States
Magistrate Judge, and Defendants Papa Murphy's Holdings, Inc. and
Weldon Spangler's objections to the R&R.

Plaintiff Evan Brown, a former Papa Murphy's shareholder, initiated
this putative class action in June 2019. Following the Court's
adoption of Judge Creatura's Report and Recommendation dismissing
his complaint, Brown filed a second amended complaint ("SAC") In
the SAC, Brown alleges that the Defendants violated Sections 14(e)
and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by allegedly
making materially false and misleading statements contained in a
Recommendation Statement made in connection with a tender offer to
acquire shares of Papa Murphy's. He alleges that the Recommendation
Statement was materially false and misleading as to Papa Murphy's
financial projections, the value of the company's shares, and the
fairness of the tender offer consideration.

Specifically, Brown asserts that the Defendants engaged a financial
advisor in connection with the merger and that the financial
advisor created a downwardly revised set of projections ("Base Case
Projections"), which were unreasonably lower than Papa Murphy's
management's significantly higher projections ("Management Case
Projections").

The Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC, and on Jan. 12, 2021,
Judge Creatura issued the instant R&R, recommending that the Court
deny the Defendants' motion to dismiss. On Jan. 26, 2021, the
Defendants objected, and on Feb. 11, 2021, Brown responded. The
Defendants filed a notice of supplemental authority on April 9,
2021, notifying the Court that the Ninth Circuit held oral argument
for the case Mutza v. Emulex Corp., No. 20-55339. Brown then filed
a notice of supplemental authority on April 16, 2021, regarding
Emulex and informing the Court that the Ninth Circuit issued a
non-precedential Memorandum Opinion in the case.

Judge Settle notes that Brown's claims are subject to the
heightened pleading standards set forth in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").

The Defendants object to the R&R's conclusion that Brown adequately
alleged a Section 14(e) claim. They specifically object to the
R&R's conclusions that (1) Papa Murphy's made material
representations that were objectively and subjectively false; (2)
the SAC adequately pleads negligence; (3) the SAC adequately pleads
loss causation; and (4) Section 14(e) provides a private right of
action for negligence-based claims.

Mr. Brown alleges that the Defendants' Recommendation Statement
made to shareholders in a tender offer to buy shares as part of
Papa Murphy's merger with MTY Food Group, Inc., included materially
false or misleading statements. The parties agree that false or
misleading nature of the challenged statements is dependent on
whether the Base Case Projections were false.

The R&R concluded that Brown adequately alleged the Base Case
Projection's objective and subjective falsity and their
materiality. The allegations and the inferences therefrom plausibly
plead that "the Base Case Projections were unreasonably prepared in
order to justify the allegedly unfair Merger Consideration" and
that the "[D]efendants' alleged statements in the Recommendation
Statement endorsing the Base Case Projections and fairness of the
Merger Consideration would be material to a reasonable investor
considering the MTY merger."

The Defendants object to this conclusion, arguing that there is no
material difference between the falsity allegations in Brown's
amended complaint, which was dismissed, and the SAC. They
additionally object to the R&R in that it did not discuss or
analyze the assumptions underlying the Base Case Projections. And
finally, they argue that the alleged falsehood of the Base Case
Projections is immaterial as a matter of law. The Court disagrees.

First, the Court will not consider the Defendants' objections to
the R&R that assert their own factual theory. On a motion to
dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pled allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Judge
Settle opines, citing In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation,
536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). The R&R properly did just
that. The Defendants will have the opportunity to contest the
validity of Brown's claims at a later stage in the litigation.

Further, Judge Settle adds, among other things, that there are
material differences between the first amended complaint and the
SAC, which the R&R rightfully credits as plausible allegations
evidencing the Base Case Projections' objective and subjective
falsity. These allegations summarized in the R&R, and the
inferences therefrom plausibly allege that the Base Case
Projections were objectively and subjectively false.

The Defendants also argue that the alleged falsity of the Base Case
Projections is not material as a matter of law. They also argue
that a single factor applied to a single analysis is not material
to "'the overall multifaceted financial analysis.'"

These arguments, however, repeat what Judge Creatura already
considered in issuing the R&R, Judge Settle finds. Objections to a
R&R are not a vehicle to relitigate the same arguments carefully
considered and rejected by the Magistrate Judge, Judge Settle
holds.

Therefore, the Court agrees with Judge Creatura's thorough analysis
that the complaint adequately alleges materially false or
misleading statements. It, thus, adopts the R&R as to this issue.

The R&R concluded that the SAC adequately alleged that the
Defendants acted with negligence based on Defendant Spangler's
alleged knowledge, inclusion, and endorsement of the allegedly
false Base Case Projections and based on his endorsement of the
allegedly unfair Merger Consideration.

The Defendants reiterate their position that the Base Case
Projections were not false and assert that, because the projections
were not false, no one could have acted negligently. The Court does
not consider this argument because it has concluded that Brown has
adequately alleged materially false or misleading statements. The
Defendants also attempt to create factual disputes in explaining
why Spangler was not negligent; but the Court cannot resolve
factual disputes at the pleading stage.

As the R&R emphasized, a corporate officer's deliberate decision
can demonstrate a culpable state of mind far in excess of
negligence.

The Court agrees with the R&R's conclusion that Brown adequately
alleged a negligent state of mind. Brown alleges that Spangler did
not genuinely believe in the Base Case Projections, as he had
endorsed the Management Case Projections, but still made a
"deliberate decision" to disseminate the Base Case Projections in
connection with the Recommendation Statement. These are sufficient
allegations "giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind."

The Court, thus, adopts the R&R on this issue.

The final element of a Section 14(e) claim requires a showing that
the defendant caused the loss for which plaintiff seeks to recover
damages. Brown alleges that the material misrepresentations in the
Recommendation Statement misled Papa Murphy's shareholders to
tender their shares into the undervalued Tender Offer. Accordingly,
Papa Murphy's shareholders were misled and harmed millions of
dollars in the aggregate. He further alleges that the materially
false or misleading representations prompted Papa Murphy's
shareholders to accept the unfair Merger Consideration in exchange
for their shares rather than recoup a greater value through
appraisal remedies available in the Merger. The R&R concluded that
these were well-pled, plausible allegations to establish loss
causation.

The Defendants object to the R&R, but their objections are based in
factual arguments. The Defendants provide factual context for the
other bids, arguing that one higher bid in particular effectively
was no bid at all because the company could not provide the
assurances the Defendants assert they required. This is necessarily
a factual contention.

Judge Creatura carefully and thoroughly analyzed the SAC's
allegations regarding loss causation, and the Defendant's
objections do not alter this analysis. The Court agrees with the
R&R that the SAC plausibly alleges loss causation. The Court, thus,
adopts the R&R as to this issue.

Finally, the Defendants object to the R&R's conclusion that Brown
may maintain a private right of action for negligence-based Section
14(e) claims. The Defendants again advocate for a ruling that there
is no private right of action for such Section 14(e) claims
premised on negligence. But the R&R correctly declined to disturb
existing Ninth Circuit precedent. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
recently declined to address this exact issue in the Emulex case.

Absent a directive from the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court and
even if there is some logic in the Defendants' arguments, the Court
will not overturn precedent in holding that no private right of
action for negligence-based claims exists. It, thus, adopts the R&R
on this issue.

The Court having considered the R&R, the Defendants' objections,
and the remaining record, does find and order as follows:

   (1) The R&R is adopted;

   (2) Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied; and

   (3) This matter is re-referred for further consideration.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/476rnuy6 from Leagle.com.


PARTS AUTHORITY: Jaime Directed to Refile Bid to Certify Class
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Hugo Jaime, et al., v.
Parts Authority LLC, et al., Case No. 2:21-cv-00015-SPL (D. Ariz.),
the Hon. Judge Steven P. Logan entered an order:

   1. denying the Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Reply
in
      Further Support of Their Motion for Leave to Amend Their
      Complaint / Request to File Sur-Reply in Support of Motion to

      Dismiss or Transfer;

   2. granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Their
      Complaint;

   3. directing the Plaintiffs to file a clean copy of the Second
      Amended Complaint by 5 p.m. on Monday, May 3, 2021.

   4. directing the Plaintiffs to file responses to the pending
      Motions to Dismiss no later than June 1, 2021;

   5. denying without prejudice the Motion to Conditionally Certify

      Collective Action, Order Disclosure of Putative Members'
      Names and Contact Information, and to Facilitate Class
      Notice;

   6. directing the Plaintiffs to refile the Motion to Certify with

      any changes due to the Amended Class Action Complaint no
      later than seven days following the Court's ruling on the
      pending Motions to Dismiss; and

   7. denying as moot the Motion to Stay Litigation Pending
      Resolution of Motion to Dismiss.

Parts Authority is an aftermarket / truck part distributor.

A copy of he Court's order dated April 29, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xZ4wUH at no extra charge.[CC]

PHILIP MORRIS: Blais Class Action Ongoing in Canada
---------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Conseil Quebecois
Sur Le Tabac Et La Sante and Jean-Yves Blais v. Imperial Tobacco
Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. and JTI-Macdonald Corp.

In a class action pending in Canada, Conseil Quebecois Sur Le Tabac
Et La Sante and Jean-Yves Blais v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans,
Benson & Hedges Inc. (RBH) and JTI-Macdonald Corp., Quebec Superior
Court, Canada, filed in November 1998, RBH and other Canadian
manufacturers (Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. and JTI-Macdonald
Corp.) are defendants.

The plaintiffs, an anti-smoking organization and an individual
smoker, sought compensatory and punitive damages for each member of
the class who allegedly suffers from certain smoking-related
diseases. The class was certified in 2005.

The trial court issued its judgment on May 27, 2015. The trial
court found RBH and two other Canadian manufacturers liable and
found that the class members' compensatory damages totaled
approximately CAD 15.5 billion, including pre-judgment interest
(approximately $12.4 billion).

The trial court awarded compensatory damages on a joint and several
liability basis, allocating 20% to our subsidiary (approximately
CAD 3.1 billion, including pre-judgment interest (approximately
$2.5 billion)). In addition, the trial court awarded CAD 90,000
(approximately $71,990) in punitive damages, allocating CAD 30,000
(approximately $24,000) to RBH.

The trial court estimated the disease class at 99,957 members. RBH
appealed to the Court of Appeal of Quebec.

In October 2015, the Court of Appeal ordered RBH to furnish
security totaling CAD 226 million (approximately $180.8 million) to
cover both the Letourneau and Blais cases, which RBH has paid in
installments through March 2017. The Court of Appeal ordered
Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. to furnish security totaling CAD 758
million (approximately $606 million) in installments through June
2017.

JTI Macdonald Corp. was not required to furnish security in
accordance with plaintiffs' motion. The Court of Appeal ordered
that the security is payable upon a final judgment of the Court of
Appeal affirming the trial court's judgment or upon further order
of the Court of Appeal.

On March 1, 2019, the Court of Appeal issued a decision largely
affirming the trial court's findings of liability and the
compensatory and punitive damages award while reducing the total
amount of compensatory damages to approximately CAD 13.5 billion
including interest (approximately $10.8 billion) due to the trial
court's error in the calculation of interest.

The compensatory damages award is on a joint and several basis with
an allocation of 20% to RBH (approximately CAD 2.7 billion,
including pre-judgment interest (approximately $2.16 billion)).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's findings that
defendants violated the Civil Code of Quebec, the Quebec Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Quebec Consumer Protection Act
by failing to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking and by
conspiring to prevent consumers from learning of the dangers of
smoking.

The Court of Appeal further held that the plaintiffs either need
not prove, or had adequately proven, that these faults were a cause
of the class members' injuries.

In accordance with the judgment, defendants are required to deposit
their respective portions of the damages awarded in both the
Letourneau case and the Blais case, approximately CAD 1.1 billion
(approximately $880 million), into trust accounts within 60 days.
RBH's share of the deposit is approximately CAD 257 million
(approximately $194 million).

PMI recorded a pre-tax charge of $194 million in its consolidated
results, representing $142 million net of tax, as tobacco
litigation-related expense, in the first quarter of 2019. The
charge reflects PMI's assessment of the portion of the judgment
that represents probable and estimable loss prior to the
deconsolidation of RBH and corresponds to the trust account deposit
required by the judgment.

RBH and PMI believe the findings of liability and damages in both
Letourneau and the Blais cases were incorrect and in contravention
of applicable law on several grounds including the following:

(i) defendants had no obligation to warn class members who knew, or
should have known, of the risks of smoking; (ii) defendants cannot
be liable to class members who would have smoked regardless of what
warnings were given; and (iii) defendants cannot be liable to all
class members given the individual differences between class
members.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Adams Class Suit in Canada
-------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Adams v. Canadian
Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, et al.

In a class action pending in Canada, Adams v. Canadian Tobacco
Manufacturers' Council, et al., The Queen's Bench, Saskatchewan,
Canada, filed July 10, 2009, the company, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges
Inc. (RBH), and the company's indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and
other members of the industry are defendants.

The plaintiff, an individual smoker, alleges her own addiction to
tobacco products and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD")
resulting from the use of tobacco products.

She is seeking compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a
proposed class comprised of all smokers who have smoked a minimum
of 25,000 cigarettes and have allegedly suffered, or suffer, from
COPD, emphysema, heart disease, or cancer, as well as restitution
of profits.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Bourassa Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Bourassa v.
Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, et al.

In the class action pending in Canada and filed on June 25, 2010,
the company, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. ("RBH"), and the
company's indemnitees (PM USA and Altria), and other members of the
industry are defendants.

The plaintiff, the heir to a deceased smoker, alleges that the
decedent was addicted to tobacco products and suffered from
emphysema resulting from the use of tobacco products.

She is seeking compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of a
proposed class comprised of all smokers who were alive on June 12,
2007, and who suffered from chronic respiratory diseases allegedly
caused by smoking, their estates, dependents and family members,
plus disgorgement of revenues earned by the defendants from January
1, 1954, to the date the claim was filed.

In December 2014, plaintiff filed an amended statement of claim.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Class Suit in New York
---------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a putative shareholder class action suit
entitled, In re Philip Morris International Inc. Securities
Litigation.

A putative shareholder class action lawsuit, In re Philip Morris
International Inc. Securities Litigation, is pending in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
purportedly on behalf of purchasers of Philip Morris International
Inc. stock between July 26, 2016 and April 18, 2018.  

The lawsuit names Philip Morris International Inc. and certain
officers and employees as defendants and includes allegations that
the defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or
failed to disclose information about PMI's business, operations,
financial condition, and prospects, related to product sales of,
and alleged irregularities in clinical studies of, PMI's Platform 1
product.  The lawsuit seeks various forms of relief, including
damages.

In November 2018, the court consolidated three putative shareholder
class action lawsuits with similar allegations previously filed in
the Southern District of New York (namely, City of Westland Police
and Fire Retirement System v. Philip Morris International Inc., et
al, Greater Pennsylvania Carpenters' Pension Fund v. Philip Morris
International Inc., et al., and Gilchrist v. Philip Morris
International Inc., et al.) into these proceedings.

A putative shareholder class action lawsuit, Rubenstahl v. Philip
Morris International Inc., et al., that had been previously filed
in December 2017 in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff
due to similar allegations in these proceedings. On February 4,
2020, the court granted defendants' motion in its entirety,
dismissing all but one of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.  

The court noted that one of plaintiffs' claims (allegations
relating to four non-clinical studies of PMI's Platform 1 product)
did not state a viable claim but allowed plaintiffs to replead that
claim by March 3, 2020. On February 18, 2020, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for reconsideration of the court's February 4th decision;
this motion was denied on September 21, 2020.

On September 28, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
seeking to replead allegations relating to four non-clinical
studies of PMI's Platform 1 product.

Philip Morris said, "We believe that this lawsuit is without merit
and will continue to defend it vigorously."

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.


PHILIP MORRIS: Continues to Defend Letourneau Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------
Philip Morris International Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that  the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Cecilia
Letourneau v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.
(RBH) and JTI-Macdonald Corp.

In the second class action pending in Canada, Cecilia Letourneau v.
Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. and
JTI-Macdonald Corp., Quebec Superior Court, Canada, filed in
September 1998, RBH and other Canadian manufacturers (Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd. and JTI-Macdonald Corp.) are defendants.  

The plaintiff, an individual smoker, sought compensatory and
punitive damages for each member of the class who is deemed
addicted to smoking.

The class was certified in 2005. The trial court issued its
judgment on May 27, 2015. The trial court found RBH and two other
Canadian manufacturers liable and awarded a total of CAD 131
million (approximately $104.8 million) in punitive damages,
allocating CAD 46 million (approximately $37 million) to RBH.

The trial court estimated the size of the addiction class at
918,000 members but declined to award compensatory damages to the
addiction class because the evidence did not establish the claims
with sufficient accuracy. The trial court found that a claims
process to allocate the awarded punitive damages to individual
class members would be too expensive and difficult to administer.

On March 1, 2019, the Court of Appeal issued a decision largely
affirming the trial court's findings of liability and the total
amount of punitive damages awarded allocating CAD 57 million
including interest (approximately $45.6 million) to RBH.  

RBH and PMI believe the findings of liability and damages in both
Létourneau and the Blais cases were incorrect and in contravention
of applicable law on several grounds including the following:

(i) defendants had no obligation to warn class members who knew, or
should have known, of the risks of smoking; (ii) defendants cannot
be liable to class members who would have smoked regardless of what
warnings were given; and (iii) defendants cannot be liable to all
class members given the individual differences between class
members.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Philip Morris International Inc., through its subsidiaries,
manufactures and sells cigarettes, other nicotine-containing
products, and smoke-free products and related electronic devices
and accessories. The company was incorporated in 1987 and is
headquartered in New York, New York.

PINTEREST INC: Putative Class Suit in California Underway
---------------------------------------------------------
Pinterest, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company continues
to defend a putative securities class action suit filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California.

On November 23, 2020, Pinterest and its Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer were named as defendants in a putative
securities class action filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.

The lawsuit alleges claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934  and alleges that defendants made
material false and misleading public statements about the company's
revenue and user growth in 2019.

The complaint seeks damages, litigation costs, and interest.

Pinterest said, "We continue to evaluate these claims but do not
believe this litigation will have a material impact on our
financial position or results of operations."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Pinterest, Inc. operates and maintains social networking site. The
Company provides online venue for personal photos, ideas, oddities,
decorations, places to visit, recipes, and other items. Pinterest
serves customers worldwide. The company is based in San Francisco,
California.

PITTSBURGH LOGISTICS: Conditional Cert. of Collective Class Sought
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHRISTIAN ALESIUS, et al.
Individually and on Behalf of All Similarly Situated Employees, v.
PITTSBURGH LOGISTICS SYSTEMS, INC. d/b/a PLS LOGISTICS SERVICES,
Case No. 2:20-cv-01067-MJH (W.D. Pa.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court
to enter an order grantng thier motion for conditional
certification of a collective class and to facilitate
identification and notice to similarly situated employees pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiffs move the Court to grant conditional certification
for the wage and overtime claims. The Plaintiffs request that the
case proceed as a collective action.

PLS Logistics is a third-party logistics provider. PLS provides
international freight transportation, logistics, and technology
services. It was founded in 1991 as Pittsburgh Logistics Systems.
The company is headquartered in Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated April 30,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3eBVaqd
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Benjamin L. Davis, III, Esq.
          Kelly A. Burgy, Esq.
          Scott E. Nevin, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF PETER T. NICHOLL
          36 South Charles Street, Suite 1700
          Baltimore, MD 21201
          Telephone: (410) 244-7005
          Facsimile: (410) 244-8454
          E-mail: bdavis@nicholllaw.com
                  kaburgy@nicholllaw.com
                  snevin@nicholllaw.com

               - and -

          Kenneth J. Hardin, III, Esq.
          Emilia Rinaldi, Esq.
          Hardin Thompson, P.C.
          The Frick Building
          437 Grant Street, Suite 620
          Pittsburgh, PA 15219
          Telephone: (412) 315-7195
          Facsimile: (412) 315-7356
          E-mail: kenhardin@hardinlawpc.net
                  emiliarinaldi@hardinlawpc.net

PLAID INC: California Court Narrows Claims in Amended Cottle Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES COTTLE, et al., Plaintiffs v. PLAID INC.,
Defendant, JAMES COTTLE, et al., Plaintiffs v. PLAID INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-03056-DMR (N.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge
Donna M. Ryu of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
motion to dismiss.

Plaid's motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
consolidated amended class action complaint ("CFAC").

The action consists of five separately-filed putative class actions
in which 11 named Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Plaid uses
consumers' banking login credentials to harvest and sell detailed
financial data without their consent.  The Court consolidated the
matters in July 2020 and the Plaintiffs filed their CFAC.

Plaid is a tech startup in the financial technology or "fintech"
industry.  It provides bank "linking" and verification services for
fintech apps that consumers use to send and receive money from
their financial accounts, such as Venmo, Coinbase, Cash App, and
Stripe.  Fintech apps typically verify accounts either by making
micro-deposits to a user's account and then requiring the user to
report the amounts back to the app, or by asking a user to log in
to an account directly to confirm their status as account holder.

For the first several years of Plaid's operations, fintech apps
collected user bank login information and passed that information
to Plaid, which approached banks directly.  Starting around 2016,
Plaid implemented a new "Managed OAuth" system.  Plaid designed the
login screens in its interface to give them the look and feel of
login screens used by individual financial institutions.  According
to Plaintiffs, Plaid fails to disclose to its users that they are
not actually interfacing with their bank.  This lulls users into a
false sense of security resulting in "increased customer
conversion."

The Plaintiffs allege that this "scheme defies industry norms and
consumers' reasonable expectations" and that consumers are "left in
the dark" about Plaid's collection of banking account credentials.
They further allege that Plaid fails to properly protect the
sensitive information it acquires, and that it uses only a single
level of encryption that "leaves login credentials open to
interception" by malicious actors with minimal expertise.

Additionally, the Plaintiffs allege that by using the accumulated
consumer bank login information, "Plaid has collected—and now
stores, analyzes, and offers to its fintech clients for sale -- a
staggering amount of consumer banking data."  They allege that
Plaid routinely sells the consumer banking data it collects,
including to the fintech apps who use its services.  They allege
that Plaid and the fintech apps conceal Plaid's conduct from users,
because at no time are users ever informed that Plaid receives and
retains access to their financial institution account login
credentials.

The Plaintiffs each allege that they do not recall being prompted
to read any privacy policy from Plaid or having read any privacy
policy from Plaid when they linked their financial accounts.  They
further allege that to the extent that they recall specific details
of logging into their financial accounts in the Venmo, Cash App,
and Coinbase apps, the details of logging in "are consistent with
the discussion of Plaid's interface" in the CFAC.

Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs bring the following claims
against Plaid: 1) invasion of privacy—intrusion into private
affairs; 2) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. Section 1030; 3) violation of the Stored Communications Act,
18 U.S.C. Section 2701 et seq.; 4) declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief; 5) unjust enrichment (quasi-contract claim for
restitution and disgorgement); 6) violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law ("UCL"), California Business & Professions Code
section 17200 et seq.; 7) violation of Article I, Section I of the
California Constitution; 8) violation of the California
Anti-Phishing Act of 2005, California Business & Professions Code
section 22948 et seq.; 9) violation of California Civil Code
sections 1709 and 1710; and 10) violation of California's
Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, California Penal
Code section 502.

The Plaintiffs bring the first six claims on behalf of themselves
and the following "Nationwide Class": All natural persons in the
United States whose accounts at a financial institution were
accessed by Plaid using login credentials obtained through Plaid's
software incorporated in a mobile or web-based fintech app that
enables payments (including ACH payments) or other money transfers,
including without limitation users of Venmo, Square's Cash App,
Coinbase, and Strike, from Jan. 1, 2013 to the present.

In addition, Cottle, Evans, Mitchell, Schoeneman, Sotelo, and Umali
bring the seventh through tenth claims on behalf of themselves and
the following "California class": All natural persons in California
whose accounts at a financial institution were accessed by Plaid
using login credentials obtained through Plaid's software
incorporated in a mobile or web-based fintech app that enables
payments (including ACH payments) or other money transfers,
including without limitation users of Venmo, Square's Cash App,
Coinbase, and Strike, from Jan. 1, 2013 to the present.

The Plaintiffs filed their original complaints in five separate
lawsuits in May, June, and July 2020.  The Court related the cases
and subsequently consolidated them in one action, No. 20-cv-3056,
In re Plaid Inc. Privacy Litigation, and granted the parties'
request to appoint Interim Co-Lead Counsel and a Steering
Committee.  Pursuant to Court order, the Plaintiffs filed the CFAC
on Aug. 5, 2020.

Plaid now moves to dismiss the CFAC pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

Discussion

I. Requests for Judicial Notice and Incorporation by Reference

Plaid asks the Court to take judicial notice of four documents and
a series of screenshots from the Venmo app, and to consider the
same materials under the incorporation by reference doctrine.  The
Plaintiffs oppose the request.  After the briefing on the motion to
dismiss was complete, the Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a
supplemental RJN, to which Plaid did not file an opposition or
response.

Magistrate Judge Ryu concludes that judicial notice of the Western
District of Pennsylvania proceeding is appropriate.  Plaintiff
Mullen alleges that her accounts at PNC were linked to Venmo
through Plaid, and the CFAC alleges that banks, including PNC, have
objected to Plaid's alleged practices and taken steps to prevent
Plaid from accessing its banking customers' information for Venmo
and other apps.  Additionally, Plaid argues that the allegation in
the CFAC that it acted "without obtaining the approval or
authority" of the financial institutions is unsupported and should
be disregarded.  PNC's allegations are relevant to Plaintiff's
response to that claim.  Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Ryu takes
judicial notice of the PNC Complaint.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Plaid moves to dismiss the CFAC on several grounds.  It argues that
1) the Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III; 2) most of the
Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred; 3) the Plaintiffs' equitable
claims fail because they have adequate legal remedies; and 4) the
Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law.  Additionally, Plaid
argues that Plaintiffs' claims fail because they do not allege that
they used Plaid to link their bank accounts to the fintech apps.

Magistrate Judge Ryu granted in part and denied in part Plaid's
motion to dismiss the CFAC.  She dismissed with prejudice the
Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
their claims under the SCA, UCL, CFAA and CDAFA.

Among other things, Magistrate Judge Ryu finds that (i) the
Plaintiffs do not oppose Plaid's motion to dismiss their
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claim on the basis that
it is not a standalone claim for relief; (ii) while the "in
electronic storage" defect could potentially be addressed through
amendment, the allegations regarding an SCA "facility" cannot;
(iii) the Plaintiffs' UCL claim must be dismissed based on their
failure to allege that they lost money or property as a result of
Plaid's alleged conduct; (iv) the CFAC fails to plead cognizable
loss of at least $5,000 in value; and (v) given the CFAC's failure
to plead that the Plaintiffs have suffered "damage or loss" due to
the alleged Section 502 violations, the CDAFA claims also fail.

The Plaintiffs amended their complaint once already.  At the
hearing, the Court gave them the opportunity to articulate any
other facts that could cure the pleading defects, and the Order
addresses those facts.  Therefore, further amendment would be
futile.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2jhwuxbc from Leagle.com.


POLARIS INC: Awaits 8th Cir. Ruling in Johannessohn Appeal
----------------------------------------------------------
Polaris Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the company is awaiting the  Eighth
Circuit's decision on the appeal on the denial of class
certification in Riley Johannessohn, Daniel Badilla, James Kelley,
Kevin Wonders, William Bates and James Pinion, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Polaris Industries
(D.Minn.).

The putative class action is pending in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota and alleges excessive heat
hazards on Sportsman ATV, seeking damages for alleged economic
loss.

On March 31, 2020, the district court judge denied class
certification.

The plaintiffs appealed denial of class certification to the Eighth
Circuit. The Court heard oral arguments on April 13, 2021.

Polaris said that they are waiting on the Court's decision.

Polaris Inc. is an American manufacturer of motorcycles,
snowmobiles, ATV, and neighborhood electric vehicles. Polaris was
founded in Roseau, Minnesota, USA, where it still has engineering
and manufacturing. The company's corporate headquarters is in
Medina, Minnesota. The company manufactured motorcycles through its
Victory Motorcycles subsidiary until January 2017, and currently
produces motorcycles through the Indian Motorcycle subsidiary,
which it purchased in April 2011. Polaris produced personal
watercraft from 1994-2004. The company was originally named Polaris
Industries Inc. and was renamed in 2019 to Polaris Inc.


POLARIS INC: Expert Discovery & Motion Practice in Guzman Ongoing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Polaris Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that expert discovery and motion practice is
ongoing in the putative class action suit entitled, Paul Guzman and
Jeremy Albright v. Polaris Inc., Polaris Industries Inc., and
Polaris Sales Inc.

A putative class action is pending in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California and alleges violations
of various California consumer protection laws focused on rollover
protection systems' certifications, for various Polaris off-road
vehicles sold in California: Paul Guzman and Jeremy Albright v.
Polaris Inc., Polaris Industries Inc., and Polaris Sales Inc.,
August 8, 2019.

Fact discovery has now closed while expert discovery and motion
practice continues.

Polaris Inc. is an American manufacturer of motorcycles,
snowmobiles, ATV, and neighborhood electric vehicles. Polaris was
founded in Roseau, Minnesota, USA, where it still has engineering
and manufacturing. The company's corporate headquarters is in
Medina, Minnesota. The company manufactured motorcycles through its
Victory Motorcycles subsidiary until January 2017, and currently
produces motorcycles through the Indian Motorcycle subsidiary,
which it purchased in April 2011. Polaris produced personal
watercraft from 1994-2004. The company was originally named Polaris
Industries Inc. and was renamed in 2019 to Polaris Inc.


POLARIS INC: Plaintiffs Appeal Dismissal of Claims
--------------------------------------------------
Polaris Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the appeal in the putative class action
suit entitled, In re Polaris Marketing, Sales Practices, and
Product Liability Litigation (D. Minn.), is pending.

A putative class action is pending in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota and arises out of allegations
that certain Polaris products suffer from purportedly unresolved
fire hazards allegedly resulting in economic loss, and is the
result of the consolidation of the three putative class actions
that were filed between April 5-10, 2018 and that we disclosed in
our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31,
2018: In re Polaris Marketing, Sales Practices, and Product
Liability Litigation (D. Minn.), June 15, 2018.

On February 26, 2020, the district court dismissed the majority of
plaintiffs and claims.

Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed the remaining
plaintiffs and have appealed, as of right, to the Eight Circuit on
behalf of the Court dismissed plaintiffs.

Polaris Inc. is an American manufacturer of motorcycles,
snowmobiles, ATV, and neighborhood electric vehicles. Polaris was
founded in Roseau, Minnesota, USA, where it still has engineering
and manufacturing. The company's corporate headquarters is in
Medina, Minnesota. The company manufactured motorcycles through its
Victory Motorcycles subsidiary until January 2017, and currently
produces motorcycles through the Indian Motorcycle subsidiary,
which it purchased in April 2011. Polaris produced personal
watercraft from 1994-2004. The company was originally named Polaris
Industries Inc. and was renamed in 2019 to Polaris Inc.

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY: Lewis Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Georgia
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC. The case is styled as Joe Lewis, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00073-CDL (M.D. Ga., May 6,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC --
https://www.portfoliorecovery.com/ -- provides debt recovery and
collection services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com

               - and -

          Misty Oaks Paxton, Esq.
          3895 Brookgreen Pt.
          Decatur, GA 30034
          Phone: (404) 500-7861
          Email: attyoaks@yahoo.com


PROGRESSIVE DIRECT: Wins Summary Judgment in Kleinsasser Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK D. KLEINSASSER, Plaintiff v. PROGRESSIVE DIRECT
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Case No. C17-5499 BHS (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, Tacoma, grants Defendants
Progressive Direct Insurance Co. and Progressive Max Insurance
Co.'s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Kleinsasser filed a class action complaint against
Progressive in Pierce County Superior Court for the State of
Washington.  Kleinsasser sought to recover diminished value on a
class-wide basis and individual loss of use damages under the
Underinsured Motorists Property Damage provisions of his insurance
contract.

On Sept. 18, 2015, an uninsured driver hit Kleinsasser's 2015 Ford
F150 truck causing significant damage.  Kleinsasser had purchased
insurance coverage with Progressive Direct.  The truck was towed to
a repair shop, and Kleinsasser submitted a claim to Progressive
Direct.  Kleinsasser could not use his truck until Nov. 24, 2015,
and, on two subsequent occasions, returned the truck to the repair
shop for additional repairs.  He alleges that he properly presented
the truck to Progressive Direct to have the loss adjusted and paid,
but Progressive Direct did not adjust the loss to include
diminished value loss.

On March 6, 2016, Kleinsasser's expert Darrell M. Harber evaluated
the diminished value loss to the truck.  He concluded that the
truck lost $7,375 in actual cash value as a result of the
collision.  Kleinsasser filed suit on April 1, 2016.

On June 28, 2017, the Defendants removed the matter to federal
court.  On June 21, 2019, the Court denied Kleinsasser's motion to
certify.  On May 6, 2020, the Court granted in part Kleinsasser's
motion for partial summary judgment as to the existence of a valid
contract that covered damages caused by an uninsured motorist and
as to the availability of diminished value under the specific
language of the insurance contract.

While litigation was ongoing, Kleinsasser attempted to trade in the
truck at local dealerships, including Fugate Ford.  On Nov. 20,
2019, Shane McNeill, an employee at Fugate Ford, emailed
Kleinsasser a letter stating that Fugate was not interested in
trading in the truck due to previous structural damage from the
accident.

On Dec. 23, 2020, the Court granted Progressive's motion to amend
to add a material misrepresentation affirmative defense.  On Jan.
7, 2021, Progressive filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
On March 8, 2021, Kleinsasser responded.  On March 12, 2021,
Progressive replied.

Progressive contends that the Fugate letter is a material
misrepresentation voiding coverage under the policy --
specifically, that Kleinsasser asked McNeil to write a false letter
to inflate the value of his claim with Progressive.  Kleinsasser
counters that: (1) the misrepresentation provision in the policy
does not apply after litigation begins; (2) any misrepresentation
was not material; (3) Progressive did not rely on the Fugate
letter; and (4) the Fugate letter was truthful when written, not
ghostwritten by Kleinsasser, and does not constitute a false
statement during the claims process.

Mr. Kleinsasser also argues that the policy's Fraud or
Misrepresentation provision does not apply to his conduct, and even
if it does apply, there is at least a dispute of fact about whether
he made any materially false representations.  While the insured
has the burden of proving that claims fall within a grant of
coverage, the insurer has the burden of proving that an exclusion
bars coverage.

Judge Settle finds Kleinsasser's contention that the Fraud and
Misrepresentation provision Progressive invokes does not extend to
conduct during litigation not persuasive.  He says Kleinsasser's
interpretation would read the phrase "in connection with" out of
the policy.  A reasonable person purchasing insurance would not
conclude that they were relieved of their contractual duty to
refrain from concealing or misrepresenting material facts or
circumstances because they sued to compel the insurance company to
pay the value of their claim.  A reasonable person would not
conclude that they could provide misleading material to the
insurance company simply because it would pass through their lawyer
rather than directly to the insurer.

As the Judge concludes Kleinsasser has not put forward a reasonable
interpretation of the provision, he does not find ambiguity and
does not construe the clause against Progressive.  Therefore, the
clause applies to Kleinsasser's conduct, and the Judge turns to
evaluate whether that conduct voids coverage.

The Judge holds that Progressive correctly asserts that because it
does not have to demonstrate prejudice, what did or did not occur
once Progressive received the Fugate letter is immaterial.
Instead, the question is whether the misrepresentation could have
affected its investigation.  The misrepresentation pertains to the
only claim at issue -- the diminished value of the truck.
Therefore, as reasonable minds could not differ on materiality, the
Juudge concludes that Progressive has demonstrated materiality as a
matter of law.

Kleinsasser's explanation of his innocent intent appears to be his
contention that the letter was true at the time it was written --
that at some point in the fall of 2019, Fugate Ford was not
interested in trading in or purchasing his truck.  However, that is
not what Kleinsasser's testimony reflects that he knew to be true.
Kleinsasser has thus failed to rebut the presumption that he
intended to deceive Progressive.

Judge Settle concludes that Progressive has therefore established
an absence of disputed facts on each element of its material
misrepresentation defense.  Therefore, the Fraud and
Misrepresentation Clause is applicable.  Progressive appropriately
invokes it as an affirmative defense precluding coverage and is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Therefore, the Judge
grants Progressive's motion for summary judgment.  The Clerk will
enter a judgment and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ud2n78su from Leagle.com.


PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL: Wins Judgment on Pleadings in Connors Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SHAUNA CONNORS, Plaintiff v. PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 20 CV 7342 (N.D. Ill.),
Judge Manish S. Shah of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted Progressive's
motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiff Connors had a car-insurance policy with Defendant
Progressive.  When her Jeep was totaled, Progressive paid her the
actual cash value of the totaled car, minus her deductible, and a
sales tax reimbursement.  Connors bought a replacement car, and
alleges that Progressive's reimbursement was about $70 less than
what she paid in taxes and fees on the new car.  She seeks to
represent a class of similarly underpaid policyholders.  She brings
a breach-of-contract and an unjust-enrichment claim against
Progressive.

Progressive moved for judgment on the pleadings.

Judge Shah explains that Connors's policy obligated Progressive to
pay for "loss" caused by a collision.  The policy included a limit
of liability, specifying that Progressive wouldn't pay more than
the lower of either the actual cash value of the wrecked car, the
cost to replace or repair it, or an alternative amount.  As Connors
reads the policy, this limit-of-liability section obligated
Progressive to pay the full cost of replacing her vehicle,
including sales tax and title and transfer fees on the new car.
But a "limit of liability" section "doesn't promise to pay these
costs regardless of whether the insured incurs them."  Rather, it
describes "the most" that an insurance company will pay in the
event of a covered loss.  So Connors's treatment of the
limit-of-liability provision as an obligation to pay is wrong, and
Progressive did not breach the contract by failing to reimburse her
for the full cost of replacing her car.

Instead of replacement costs, Progressive paid Connors the actual
cash value of the totaled car, minus her deductible.  Connors'
alternative argument is that "actual cash value" is ambiguous, so
should be construed against the insurer to encompass sales tax and
transfer and title fees.

Judge Shah opines that the term isn't ambiguous.  He finds that the
policy states that actual cash value is determined by the market
value, age, and condition of the totaled car when the loss
occurred.  The factors to consider are straightforward.  And the
market value, age, and condition of the wrecked car all speak to
the worth of the car at the time of the collision.  There's no
reasonable suggestion that those metrics are in any way related to
the cost of taxes and fees for a new vehicle.

To the extent Connors argues that the policy entitles her to both
the actual cash value of the totaled car and replacement fees for a
new car, Judge Shah opines that that's wrong too.  The policy
limits the settlement amount to the lowest of the actual cash value
or the vehicle replacement fees, among other options.  The "or" is
disjunctive -- the cost of replacing the vehicle and the actual
cash value of the totaled vehicle are alternatives, not cumulative
sources of recovery. Nor can Connors state a claim under the state
administrative code, which provides that, in the event of a total
loss, an insurer may either replace the insured car or pay the
insured driver a cash settlement.

According to Connors's complaint, she submitted a bill of sale
detailing the taxes and fees she paid to Progressive "as part of
her submissions for the Claim."   But she doesn't say when she
submitted those documents.  According to her response brief, she
bought her replacement car 11 days after the accident and
"informed" Progressive "of the sales transaction" the same day she
bought the new car.  Notwithstanding that those allegations aren't
in the complaint, the Judge holds that merely telling Progressive
that she bought a new car is not enough.  Connors must
"substantiate the purchase and payment of those taxes and fees by
submitting appropriate documentation to the insurer" within 33 days
of receiving the settlement.  Progressive was obligated to
reimburse her "if and only if" she followed the procedures as laid
out in the regulation.  And that it insured Connors's new car is
not enough, on its own, to establish that Connors timely
substantiated her payment of sales tax and title and transfer fees.
Without those allegations, she can't state a claim for breach of
contract under the administrative code.

Ms. Connors also fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment,
Judge Shah finds.  Unjust enrichment is based on an implied
contract.  Since Connors and Progressive had an insurance policy,
she cannot state a claim for unjust enrichment.  Alternatively, a
plaintiff can bring an unjust-enrichment claim based on conduct
such as fraud or duress.  In that case, unjust enrichment rises and
falls with the underlying claim.  Connors doesn't allege any
standalone claim of fraud or duress to support the
unjust-enrichment claim, so that claim is dismissed.

Finally, because a contract governs this dispute, amendment of the
unjust-enrichment claim would be futile.  So that claim is
dismissed with prejudice.  But Connors suggests that she can add
allegations that she timely substantiated payment of her sales tax
and title and transfer fees.  And in Progressive's jurisdictional
supplement, Progressive asserts that it paid tax and fee
reimbursements only to customers who complied with the regulatory
code, suggesting that Connors was one such customer.  So Connors
may amend that claim.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Shah granted Progressive's motion
for judgment on the pleadings.  Count I is dismissed without
prejudice.  Count II is dismissed with prejudice.  If Connors
doesn't file an amended complaint by May 21, 2021, the dismissal
will convert to one with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/hasr49hr from
Leagle.com.


QUALCOMM INC: Appeal on Grant of Class Certification Bid Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 28, 2021, that the U.S. Court
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the company's
appeal regarding the grant of class certification motion.

Since January 18, 2017, a number of consumer class action
complaints have been filed against the company in the United States
District Courts for the Southern and Northern Districts of
California, each on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of
cellular phones and other cellular devices.

In April 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
transferred the cases that had been filed in the Southern District
of California to the Northern District of California. On May 15,
2017, the court entered an order appointing the plaintiffs' co-lead
counsel.

On July 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint alleging that the company violated California and federal
antitrust and unfair competition laws by, among other things,
refusing to license standard-essential patents to the company's
competitors, conditioning the supply of certain of the company's
baseband chipsets on the purchaser first agreeing to license our
entire patent portfolio, entering into exclusive deals with
companies, including Apple Inc., and charging unreasonably high
royalties that do not comply with the company's commitments to
standard setting organizations.

The complaint seeks unspecified damages and disgorgement and/or
restitution, as well as an order that we be enjoined from further
unlawful conduct.

On August 11, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. On November 10, 2017, the court
denied the company's motion, except to the extent that certain
claims seek damages under the Sherman Antitrust Act.

On July 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class
certification, and the court granted that motion on September 27,
2018. On January 23, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) granted the company permission to
appeal the court's class certification order.

On January 24, 2019, the court stayed the case pending the
company's appeal. On December 2, 2019, a hearing on the company's
appeal of the class certification order was held before the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the appeal.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Bid for Judgment on Pleadings Remains Pending
-----------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 28, 2021, that the company's motion
for judgment on the pleadings in the consolidated class action suit
filed by purported stockholders remains pending in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California.

On January 23, 2017 and January 26, 2017, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of us in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California
against us and certain of our current and former officers and
directors. The complaints alleged, among other things, that we
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by making false and
misleading statements and omissions of material fact in connection
with certain allegations that we are or were engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.

The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees and
costs. On May 4, 2017, the court consolidated the two actions and
appointed lead plaintiffs.

On July 3, 2017, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint asserting the same basic theories of liability and
requesting the same basic relief.

On September 1, 2017, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated amended complaint. On March 18, 2019, the court denied
the company's motion to dismiss.

On January 15, 2020, the company filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

QUALCOMM said, "The court has not yet ruled on our motion. We
believe the plaintiffs' claims are without merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Consumer Class Suits Underway in Canada
-----------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 28, 2021, that the company
continues to defend consumer class action lawsuits in Canada.

Since November 2017, several other consumer class action complaints
have been filed against us in Canada (in the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice, the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the Quebec
Superior Court), Israel (in the Haifa District Court) and the
United Kingdom (in the Competition Appeal Tribunal), each on behalf
of a putative class of purchasers of cellular phones and other
cellular devices, alleging violations of certain of those
countries' competition and consumer protection laws.

The claims in these complaints are similar to those in the U.S.
consumer class action complaints. The complaints seek damages.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs' claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


QUALCOMM INC: Dismissal of Broadcom Merger-Related Suit Appealed
----------------------------------------------------------------
QUALCOMM Incorporated said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 28, 2021, that the appeal in the order
of dismissal in the securities class action suit entitled, In re
Qualcomm/Broadcom Merger Securities Litigation, is pending.

On June 8, 2018 and June 26, 2018, securities class action
complaints were filed by purported stockholders of the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California against the company and two of its then current
officers.

The complaints alleged, among other things, that the company
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, by failing to disclose
that the company had submitted a notice to the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in January 2018.

The complaints sought unspecified damages, interest, fees and
costs. On January 22, 2019, the court appointed the lead plaintiff
in the action.

On March 18, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint
asserting the same basic theories of liability and requesting the
same basic relief.

On May 10, 2019, the company filed a motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint, and on March 10, 2020, the court granted
the company's motion.

On May 11, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint,
and on October 8, 2020, the court granted the company's motion to
dismiss the case with prejudice.

On November 7, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. No
hearing date has been set.

QUALCOMM said, "We believe the plaintiffs claims are without
merit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

QUALCOMM Incorporated designs, develops, manufactures, and markets
digital communication products worldwide. It operates through three
segments: Qualcomm CDMA Technologies (QCT); Qualcomm Technology
Licensing (QTL); and Qualcomm Strategic Initiatives (QSI). QUALCOMM
Incorporated was founded in 1985 and is headquartered in San Diego,
California.


RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES: Darnis Putative Class Action Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
Raytheon Technologies Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27,
2021, for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the
company continues to defend a purported class action suit entitled,
Geraud Darnis, et al. v. Raytheon Technologies Corporation, et al.

On August 12, 2020, several former employees of United Technologies
Corporation (UTC) or its subsidiaries filed a putative class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut against the Company, Otis, Carrier, the former members
of the UTC Board of Directors, and the members of the Carrier and
Otis Boards of Directors.

The complaint challenges the method by which UTC equity awards were
converted to Company, Otis, and Carrier equity awards following the
separation of UTC into three independent, publicly-traded companies
on April 3, 2020.

The complaint claims that the defendants are liable for breach of
certain equity compensation plans and for breach of fiduciary duty,
and also asserts claims under certain provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

Raytheon said, "We believe that the Company has meritorious
defenses to these claims. At this time, the Company is unable to
predict the outcome, or the possible range of loss, if any, which
could result from this action."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Raytheon Technologies Corporation is a global premier systems
provider of high technology products and services to the aerospace
and defense industries. The company is based in Waltham,
Massachusetts.


RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES: Defends Putative Securities Class Suit in AZ
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Raytheon Technologies Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27,
2021, for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the
company continues to defend a putative securities class action
lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Arizona.

On October 8, 2020, the Company received a criminal subpoena from
the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking information and documents
in connection with an investigation relating to financial
accounting, internal controls over financial reporting, and cost
reporting regarding Raytheon Company's Missiles & Defense business
(RMD) since 2009.

The investigation includes potential civil defective pricing claims
for three RMD contracts entered into between 2011 and 2013. As part
of the same investigation, on March 24, 2021, the Company received
a second criminal subpoena from the DOJ seeking documents relating
to a different RMD contract entered into in 2017.

The company is cooperating fully with the DOJ's ongoing
investigation. Although the company believes it has defenses to the
potential claims, the Company has determined that there is a
meaningful risk of civil liability for damages, interest and
potential penalties.

At this time, the Company is unable to predict either the outcome
of the criminal investigation or the outcome of any potential civil
claims based on facts revealed in, or related to, the
investigation. Based on the information available to date, however,
we do not believe the results of the investigation or of any
potential civil litigation will have a material adverse effect on
our financial condition, results of operations or liquidity.

Four shareholder lawsuits were filed against the Company after the
DOJ investigation was first disclosed. A putative securities class
action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Arizona against the Company and certain of its
executives alleging that the defendants violated federal securities
laws by making material misstatements in regulatory filings
regarding internal controls over financial reporting in RMD.

Three shareholder derivative lawsuits were filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware against the
former Raytheon Company Board of Directors, the Company and certain
of its executives, each alleging that defendants violated federal
securities laws and breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in
improper accounting practices, failing to implement sufficient
internal financial and compliance controls, and making a series of
false and misleading statements in regulatory filings.

Raytheon said, "We believe that each of these lawsuits lacks
merit."

Raytheon Technologies Corporation is a global premier systems
provider of high technology products and services to the aerospace
and defense industries. The company is based in Waltham,
Massachusetts.


RED DIAMOND: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Red Diamond, Inc. The
case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated v. Red Diamond, Inc., Case No. 1:21-cv-04070
(S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Red Diamond -- https://reddiamond.com/ -- is the 3rd oldest
family-owned and operated coffee and tea company in the U.S..[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


RITE AID: Consolidated Stafford Putative Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended February 27, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated class action suit entitled, Byron Stafford v.
Rite Aid Corp.

The Company is involved in a putative consumer class action lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California captioned Byron Stafford v. Rite Aid Corp.

A separate lawsuit, Robert Josten v. Rite Aid Corp., was
consolidated with this lawsuit in November, 2019.

The lawsuit contains allegations that (i) the Company was obligated
to charge the plaintiffs' insurance companies its usual and
customary prices for their prescription drugs; and (ii) the Company
failed to do so because the prices it reported were not equal to or
adjusted to account for the prices that Rite Aid offers to
uninsured and underinsured customers through its Rx Savings
Program.

The cases are currently stayed pending an appeal of an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration of claims in Stafford.

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. The company operates
through two segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite
Aid Corporation was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp
Hill, Pennsylvania.


ROMEO POWER: Faces Toner Suit Over Wrongful Acts and Omissions
--------------------------------------------------------------
Victor J. Toner, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. ROMEO POWER, INC. (f/k/a RMG ACQUISITION CORP.), LIONEL
E. SELWOOD, JR., LAUREN WEBB, ROBERT S. MANCINI, PHILIP KASSIN, D.
JAMES CARPENTER, STEVEN P. BUFFONE, W. GRANT GREGORY, W. THADDEUS
MILLER, and CRAIG BRODERICK, Case No. 1:21-cv-04058 (S.D.N.Y., May
6, 2021), is brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5 by the Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of all persons
and entities who purchased the publicly traded securities of Romeo
during the period October 5, 2020 through March 30, 2021,
inclusive.

During the Class Period, the Defendants represented that for 2020,
Romeo estimated revenue of $11 million, and for 2021 Romeo
estimated revenue of $140 million. The Defendants further
represented that Romeo had "key partnerships" and close
relationships with LG Chem, Samsung, Murata and SK Innovation,
which manufacture battery cells, a key component in Romeo's battery
modules and packs and that they were supplying Romeo with battery
cells, the complaint asserts.

Unknown to investors, Romeo was suffering from an acute shortage of
high quality battery cells, which are key raw materials for Romeo's
battery packs and modules, because of supply constraints. Contrary
to the Defendants' representations: (i) Romeo had only two battery
cell suppliers, not four; (ii) the future potential risks that
Defendants warned of concerning supply disruption or shortage had
already occurred and were already negatively affecting Romeo's
business, operations, and prospects; (iii) Romeo did not have the
battery cell inventory to accommodate end-user demand and ramp up
production in 2021; (iv) Romeo's supply constraint was a material
hindrance to Romeo's revenue growth; and (v) Romeo's supply chain
for battery cells was not hedged, but in fact, was totally at risk
and beholden to just two battery cell suppliers and the spot market
for their 2021 inventory. Given the supply constraint that Romeo
was experiencing during the Class Period, Defendants had no
reasonable basis to represent that the Company had the ability to
meet customer demand and that it would support growth in revenue in
2021.

As a result of Defendants' wrongful acts and omissions, and the
precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff acquired Romeo's publicly traded securities at
artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

Romeo was founded in 2016 and purports to be an industry leading
energy technology company focused on designing and manufacturing
lithium-ion battery modules and packs for commercial electric
vehicles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II, Esq.
          James M. LoPiano, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue
          New York, NY 10016
          Phone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          Email: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                 ahood@pomlaw.com
                 jlopiano@pomlaw.com


ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE: Hearing on Class Cert. Bid Moved to Oct. 29
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AMYE ELBERT, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated, v. ROUNDPOINT MORTGAGE
SERVICING CORPORATION, Case No. 3:20-cv-00250-MMC (N.D. Calif.),
the Hon. Judge Hon. Maxine M. Chesney entered an order continuing
class certification motion hearing to October 29, 2021, at 9:00
a.m., and continuing the Further Case Management Conference to
December 17, 2021, at 10:30 a.m.

The following deadlines are continued by 90-days:

                                   Current Date       New Date

   Deadline to File Class          May 21, 2021    Aug. 19, 2021
   Certification Motion

   Deadline to File Opposition     June 18, 2021   Sept. 16, 2021

   Deadline to File Reply          July 9, 2021    Oct. 7, 2021

   Class Certification             July 30, 2021   Oct. 29, 2021
   Motion Hearing

   Further Case Management         Sept. 24, 2021  Dec. 17, 2021
   Conference

   Joint Case Management           Sept. 17, 2021  Seven days
   Conference Statement                            before 11 due
                                                   the CMC

RoundPoint is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Freedom Mortgage,
one of the nation's largest full-service mortgage companies.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2SEYgRS at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Hassan A. Zavareei, Esq.
          Kristen G. Simplicio, Esq.
          TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
          1828 L Street NW, Suite 1000
          Washington, D.C. 20036
          Telephone: (202) 973-0900
          Facsimile: (202) 973-0950
          E-mail: hzavareei@tzlegal.com
                  ksimplicio@tzlegal.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Todd Walburg, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          475 14th Street, Suite 610
          Oakland, CA 94612
          Telephone: (510) 207-8633
          E-mail: twalburg@baileyglasser.com

               - and -

          Victor S. Woods, Esq.
          BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
          209 Capitol Street
          Charleston, West Virginia
          E-mail: jmarshall@baileyglasser.com

Attorneys for the Defendant, are:

          Cheryl S. Chang, Esq.
          Jessica A. McElroy, Esq.
          BLANK ROME LLP
          2029 Century Park East, 6th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (424) 239-3400
          Facsimile: (424) 239-3434
          E-mail: Chang@BlankRome.com
                  JMcElroy@BlankRome.com

RUDEEN MGMT: Washington Supreme Ct. Flips Dismissal of Silver Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Supreme Court of Washington reverses the dismissal of the
Plaintiff's complaint in the lawsuit titled THOMAS SILVER,
Petitioner v. RUDEEN MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., Respondent, Case No.
98024-1 (Wash.).

During a period of transformation in landlord-tenant law aimed at
improving living conditions and balancing the bargaining positions
between landlord and tenants, the Washington Legislature passed the
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), ch. 59.18 RCW. The
RLTA regulates the landlord-tenant relationship in Washington,
imposing interdependent obligations on the parties to a residential
lease and providing remedies for breaches of those duties. However,
it does not specify a statute of limitations applicable to actions
brought under the Act.

On August 10, 2017--more than two years but less than three years
after the deadline for the deposit statement--Silver filed a
complaint for damages against Rudeen to recover the deposit. Silver
brought the complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated
former tenants whose deposits Rudeen had withheld in violation of
RCW 59.18.280.2 He alleged one cause of action under the RLTA. He
alleged facts relating to the terms of the lease agreement, but he
did not state a cause of action for breach of contract.

Mr. Silver claimed that Rudeen violated the RLTA because it did not
provide a full and specific statement of the basis for retaining
any of the deposit or return any portion of the deposit within 14
days after tenants vacated the premises as required under the RLTA.
He argued that the preliminary deposit statement reflected an
estimate or anticipated charges and should not qualify as "a full
and specific statement" required by RCW 59.18.280(1). Even if the
final statement, which included invoices for specific services,
qualified as "a full and specific statement," Rudeen sent it well
past 14 days after Silver vacated the premises. Therefore, Silver
alleged, Rudeen failed to send a full and specific statement or any
refund of the deposit within the time period specified by RCW
59.18.280(1).

Mr. Silver sought to recover tenants' deposits, pursuant to RCW
59.18.280(2), based on Rudeen's alleged willful and wrongful
withholding of their deposits after the termination of their
tenancies. He requested refunds of each class member's deposit. RCW
59.18.280(2). He also requested declaratory relief--holding that
Rudeen's actions were willful--and two times the amount of the
deposits Rudeen wrongfully retained and reasonable attorney fees
and costs.

Rudeen filed a CR 12(c) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that the two-year catchall statute of limitations, RCW 4.16.130,
should apply and that the limitations period had expired because
Silver filed the complaint more than two years after the cause of
action had accrued.4 The trial court granted Rudeen's motion and
dismissed the case with prejudice. It also awarded Rudeen costs and
attorney fees in the amount of $15,225.50.

Silver appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of
Appeals rejected Silver's argument that the three-year statute of
limitations under RCW 4.16.080(2) should apply because he filed an
action for return of personal property. It concluded that the
two-year catchall statute of limitations applied because Silver had
filed "an action to enforce the deposit return obligation of the
RLTA," and an action to enforce a statute should fall under RCW
4.16.130. Therefore, the court reasoned, the trial court correctly
dismissed the action because it was commenced more than two years
after it had accrued. Silver filed a petition for review in this
court, which it granted.

Justice Raquel D. Montoya-Lewis, writing for the Court concludes
that a tenant's security deposit is the personal property of the
tenant unless and until they breach their duties under the RLTA.
When a landlord fails to return the deposit along with a full and
specific statement for retaining any portion of the deposit within
the time frame required by the RLTA, the tenant may file an action
under RCW 59.18.280 to recover their deposit. Such an action is an
action for the specific recovery of personal property, and it is
thus governed by the three-year statute of limitations under RCW
4.16.080(2). Silver's complaint was, therefore, timely.
Accordingly, the Court reverses and remands to the superior court.

GONZALEZ, C.J., JOHNSON, MADSEN, OWENS, STEPHENS, GORDON McCLOUD,
YU and WHITENER, JJ., concurs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/affhdsnu from Leagle.com.

Brian Cameron -- bcameron@cameronsutherland.com -- Attorney at Law,
at 421 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 660, in Spokane, Washington
99201-0410, Kirk David Miller -- kmiller@millerlawspokane.com --
Kirk D. Miller, P.S., at 421 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 660, in
Spokane, Washington 99201-0410, Counsel for Petitioner(s).

Timothy W. Durkop -- mail@durkoplaw.com -- Attorney at Law, 9116 E.
Sprague #812, in Spokane Valley, Washington 99206-3601, Counsel for
Respondent(s).

Blythe H. Chandler -- bchandler@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Mar
will Law Group PLLC, 936 N. 34th St., Ste. 300, in Seattle,
Washington 98103-8869, Brittany J. Glass --
bglass@terrellmarshall.com -- Terrell Mar will Law Group PLLC, 936
N. 34th St., Ste. 300, in Seattle, Washington, 98103-8869, Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Northwest Consumer Law Center.


RUST-OLEUM CORP: Stevens Files Suit in E.D. California
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Rust-Oleum
Corporation. The case is styled as Neil Stevens, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Rust-Oleum
Corporation, Case No. 1:21-cv-00743-NONE-BAM (E.D. Cal., May 6,
2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Fraud.

Rust-Oleum -- https://www.rustoleum.com/ -- is a manufacturer of
protective paints and coatings for home and industrial use.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tina Wolfson, Esq.
          Andrew W. Ferich, PHV, Esq.
          Christopher Eric Stiner, Esq.
          ADHOOT & WOLFSON, PC
          2600 W. Olive Avenue, Suite 500
          Burbank, CA 91505
          Phone: (310) 474-9111
          Fax: (310) 474-8585
          Email: twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
                 cstiner@ahdootwolfson.com

S-L DISTRIBUTION: Marston & Safi Seek to Certify Class
------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as KEVIN MARSTON and BELAL
SAFI, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, v.
S-L DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 1:19-cv-02187-JEJ (M.D.
Pa.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order certifying a
class of:

   "all similarly situated individuals who performed work for
   Defendant as an IBO in New Hampshire during the relevant
   statutory period."

S-L Distribution produces and distributes food products.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated April 30,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3y6sk99
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Matthew Thomson, Esq.
          Harold L. Lichten, Esq.
          Matthew Thomson, Esq.
          Zach Rubin, Esq.
          LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
          729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
          Boston, MA 02116
          Telephone: (617) 994-5800

               - and -

          Peter Winebrake, Esq.
          R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
          Mark J. Gottesfeld, Esq.
          WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
          715 Twining Road, Suite 211
          Dresher, PA 19025
          Telephone:  (215) 884-2491

               - and -

          Chad Hatmaker, Esq.
          J. Keith Coates, Esq.
          WOOLF, MCCLANE, BRIGHT, ALLEN
          & CARPENTER, PLLC
          Post Office Box 900
          Knoxville, TN 37901
          Telephone: (865) 215-1000

SECOND NATURE: Quezada Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Second Nature Brands,
Inc. The case is styled as Jose Quezada, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated v. Second Nature Brands, Inc., Case
No. 1:21-cv-04061 (S.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Second Nature Brands -- https://secondnaturebrandsus.com/ -- is a
leading creator of snacks and treats that make lives better,
naturally.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Mars Khaimov, Esq.
          10826 64th Avenue, Ste. 2nd Floor
          Forest Hills, NY 11375
          Phone: (917) 915-7415
          Email: marskhaimovlaw@gmail.com


SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES: Pratt Suit Dismissed With Leave to Amend
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JEREMY PRATT, et al., Plaintiffs v. SECURUS
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00295-JDL (D. Me.),
Judge Jon D. Levy of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maine:

    (i) granted Securus' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' First
        Amended Complaint;

   (ii) denied as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited
        Discovery; and

  (iii) denied as moot Securus' Motion to Strike the Class
        Allegations.

Attorney Plaintiffs Jeremy Pratt, John W. Tebbetts, and Robert J.
Ruffner, along with Steven Belleau and Matthew Perry, both of whom
were formerly incarcerated in Maine county jails ("Client
Plaintiffs"), filed the putative class action against Securus,
which provides telecommunications services to several Maine jails.
The Plaintiffs allege that Securus violated federal and Maine
wiretap laws when it recorded phone calls between attorneys and
their clients and distributed those recordings to law enforcement
officials and prosecutors.

Securus provides telecommunications services to multiple Maine
jails, including the Aroostook County Jail.  As part of that
arrangement, Securus records phone calls made by prisoners.

According to the Complaint, Securus failed to screen out
Attorney-Client privileged calls from those calls it recorded," and
distributed recordings of those allegedly privileged calls to jail
administrators and prosecutors.  The Complaint also alleges that
"several of the calls provided by Securus to the Maine Attorney
General's office are protected by the Attorney-Client privilege."
The Plaintiffs allege that, since July 2019, Securus "has recorded
over 800 calls between Attorneys and inmates" in Maine jails, and
"copies of these recordings have on several occasions been handed
over to" local prosecutors or the Attorney General's office.

The Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on Nov. 6, 2020,
asserting claims under the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
Sections 2510-2523 (West 2021), and Maine's Interception of Wire
and Oral Communications Act, 15 M.R.S.A. Sections 709-713 (West
2021), as well as class action allegations.  Two weeks later,
Securus filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), as well as a Motion to Strike the Class
Allegations in the Complaint.  On Dec. 4, 2020, the Plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Expedited Discovery.  Also before the Court is
Securus' motion to strike two affidavits that the Plaintiffs
submitted in support of their Motion for Expedited Discovery.  The
Court held a consolidated hearing on the pending motions on Feb.
23, 2021.

Securus argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because it
does not sufficiently allege (1) a concrete injury which
establishes the Plaintiffs' standing, and (2) that Securus violated
the wiretap statutes.

In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert that the harm that they
suffered or risk suffering due to Securus's allegedly illegal
conduct is the violation of their attorney-client privilege.
Securus contends, however, that the Complaint's allegations, even
if proven, are insufficient to establish that any of the allegedly
unlawfully recorded phone calls were subject to the attorney-client
privilege, and thus that the Plaintiffs have failed to establish a
concrete injury traceable to the recordings.  Securus argues that
the Complaint fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to
show that any particular, allegedly recorded phone call satisfies
the First Circuit's eight-element test for determining the
existence of the privilege.

Judge Levy holds that Securus' argument that the Complaint is
deficient in alleging violations of the attorney-client privilege
because it fails to set forth, in minute detail, the subject or
context of the allegedly unlawfully recorded phone calls is
unpersuasive.  Experience and common sense teach that persons
incarcerated in prison typically speak to their defense attorneys
by phone to discuss matters related to their professional
relationship, as opposed to engaging in a casual or social chat.
Thus, the Complaint plausibly sets forth facts from which a
violation of the attorney-client privilege might be found and,
therefore, the Client Plaintiffs have standing to sue.
Additionally, because the Attorney Plaintiffs seek the same
injunctive relief as that sought by the Client Plaintiffs, the
Judge does not address whether the Attorney Plaintiffs have
independent standing.  For these reasons, the Complaint is not
subject to dismissal for lack of standing.

Securus next argues that the Complaint fails to state a plausible
claim that Securus violated the federal or Maine wiretap statutes,
because the Complaint does not plausibly allege that Securus
intentionally recorded privileged phone calls.

Judge Levy agrees.  He finds that the Complaint does not allege
that Securus was actually aware that it was intercepting and
recording attorney-client calls, and it does not otherwise contain
non-conclusory allegations which, if proven, would show that
Securus' conduct was "intentional" within the meaning of the
Federal Wiretap Act.  Because the Complaint does not plausibly
allege that Securus' "conscious objective" was to record
attorney-client calls, it fails to state a claim that Securus
violated the Federal Wiretap Act or the Maine Wiretap Act.

In their response to Securus' motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs
also request leave to file a second amended complaint.  However,
the Plaintiffs have not filed a formal motion seeking leave to
amend, nor have they proposed any particular amendments or
additions to the Complaint.  If they wish to seek leave to amend
the Complaint a second time, they must file a motion setting forth
the particular grounds to support granting leave to amend, and must
include a copy of the proposed amended complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Levy granted Securus' Motion to
Dismiss.  In light of this disposition, he denies as moot the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Discovery and Securus' Motions to
Strike.  However, the disposition is subject to the Plaintiffs
filing a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint within
10 days from the issuance of the Order, absent which the
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint will be dismissed and final
judgment entered in favor of Securus.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/ryz33y6e from Leagle.com.


SELENE FINANCE: Dismissal of Wheeling Class Suit Affirmed in Part
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WHITNEY WHEELING, et al. v. SELENE FINANCE LP, et al.,
No. 27, September Term, 2020 (Md.), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reverses in part and affirms in part the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals dismissing the amended complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The case requires that the Court of Appeals determines whether the
circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing
an amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  The Petitioners, Eric and Whitney Wheeling, and
Joanne Rodriguez, were occupants of residential property that they
owned or leased.  They initiated the action in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, against Respondents, Selene, a mortgage
servicer, and Gina Gargeu, doing business as Century 21 Downtown, a
real estate broker, after the Respondents posted eviction notices
on Petitioners' properties, attempting to gain possession of the
properties through self-help measures without a court order.

The Petitioners' amended complaint alleges that the Respondents
violated two statutes--Maryland Code Real Property Article ("RP")
Section 7-113, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"),
codified at Maryland Code Commercial Law Article ("CL") Section
13-101, et seq.  Both statutes create a private right of action
that authorizes, among other things, a plaintiff to recover his or
her actual damages incurred as a result of the defendant's unlawful
conduct.

RP Section 7-113 was enacted by the General Assembly in 2013 and
restricts the use of self-help in certain kinds of residential
evictions.  Without a court order, a person claiming the right to
possession of a residential property may only resort to self-help
evictions if the person posts a notice that complies with the
requirements of the statute, and only if he or she "reasonably
believes the protected resident has abandoned or surrendered
possession of the property based on a reasonable inquiry into the
occupancy status of the property."

After learning of the eviction notices that were posted on their
respective properties, the Petitioners allege that they consulted
with counsel to "know their rights."  In both instances, the
Petitioners did not vacate the premises in response to the eviction
notices.  Although the Respondents' actions did not cause them to
leave, the Petitioners allege that the Respondents' unlawful act of
posting the eviction notices without ascertaining the occupancy
status of the property caused them to suffer two forms of
compensable damages -- (1) "emotional damages and losses with
physical manifestations" such as fear that they would lose their
home; and (2) economic damages in the form of attorney's fees they
incurred to understand their rights.

Selene and Ms. Gargeu filed motions to dismiss the amended
complaint on the basis that it failed to state a cause of action.
The circuit court granted both motions.  The Wheelings and Ms.
Rodriguez noted a timely appeal.  In a reported opinion, the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

The intermediate appellate court determined that the amended
complaint alleges facts that, if proven, establish that the
Respondents violated RP Section 7-113. However, the court concluded
that a private cause of action arising under RP Section 7-113 is
only extended to residents who vacate the property as the result of
the improperly posted eviction notice.  The Court of Special
Appeals further determined that "assuming for purposes of analysis
that Selene's actions violated the MCPA, the amended complaint
fails to allege damages with the specificity required for private
causes of action under that statute."

The Court of Appeals reverses in part and affirms in part the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  It holds that the
Petitioners' amended complaint adequately sets forth a cause of
action under RP Section 7-113 and that the statute does not require
that a protected resident be deprived of actual possession as a
condition to bringing a private cause of action.  It further holds
that, under its jurisprudence, it has not established a more
demanding standard for pleading damages in private actions brought
under the MCPA.  Although actual damages must be pleaded in a
private cause of action brought under that statute, the general
rule of pleading as articulated in Maryland Rule 2-303(b) applies.

The Court of Appeals opines that under Maryland law, damages for
emotional injury may only be recovered if they are accompanied by
physical manifestations capable of objective determination.  The
Petitioners' amended complaint alleges that they suffered
"emotional damages and losses with physical manifestations."
Although the emotional damages pleaded in the amended complaint are
sparse, they supply the minimum to state a claim.  It affirms the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, however, with respect to
the Petitioners' assertion that they are entitled to their
attorney's fees incurred to "know their rights" as separate
compensable damages.

Under both RP Section 7-113 and the MCPA, the Petitioners would be
entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees incurred to prosecute
their case (assuming they prevail).  The Court of Appeals
determines that the Petitioners' damages claim related to their
pre-litigation, consultation attorney's fees do not fall within any
of its common law exceptions to the American Rule, which prohibits
recovery of attorney's fees as separate compensable damages.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yy4n6eu8 from Leagle.com.


SIMON'S AGENCY: New Jersey Consumers Win Class Certification
------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Hassine v. Simon's Agency,
Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-09031-FLW-TJB (D.N.J.), the Hon. Judge Freda
L. Wolfson entered an order:

   1. granting the Plaintiff's motion for class certification
      consisting of:

      "all West Long Branch, New Jersey consumers who (1) who
      received a "Letter 1" Collection letter from the Defendant
      (2) on an obligation owed or allegedly owed to Meridian
      Medical Group, (3) which stated "Because of interest, late
      charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the

      amount due on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you
      pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary
      after we received your payment, in which event we will notify

      you" (4) during the time period of May 10, 2017 to May 30,
      2018"; and

   2. appointing the Marcus Firm as class counsel.

In this putative class action, brought pursuant to the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Plaintiff Estefania Hassine
moves to certify a class. The Court previously granted Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Simon's Agency, Inc.

On February 9, 2018, the Plaintiff received a collection letter
from Defendant for a debt owed to Meridian Medical Group. The
collection letter included a 30-day Validation Notice, setting
forth the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. section 1692g. In a box
labeled, "Account Summary," the letter indicated that the "Amount
Just Placed" was $210.00 and the "Total Balance" was $210.00.

A copy of the Court's order dated April 29, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2RAKrDs at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712

               - and -

          Alyse Eva Berger Heilpern, Esq.
          L'Abbate Balkan Clavita & Contini
          100 Eagle Rock Avenue, Suite 220
          East Hanover, NJ 07936

SOCIAL FINANCE: Answer to First Amended Juarez Suit Due on May 17
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the lawsuit titled RUBEN JUAREZ and CONSTANTIN CALIN SEGARCEANU,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. SOCIAL FINANCE, INC. d/b/a SOFI, and SOFI LENDING
CORP. d/b/a SOFI, Defendants, Case No. 4:20-cv-03386-HSG (N.D.
Cal.), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California signed the parties' joint stipulation and order to set
deadline in response to the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint,
including the May 17 deadline for the Defendant to answer to the
current pending first amended complaint.

On May 19, 2020, Plaintiff Juarez filed a putative class action
Complaint against SoFi. On June 5, 2020, Plaintiff Juarez and SoFi
filed a Joint Stipulation to Extend Time to Respond to Initial
Complaint, extending the time for SoFi to respond to the Complaint.
On July 7, 2020, Plaintiff Juarez and SoFi filed a Joint
Stipulation to Set a Briefing Schedule in Response to Plaintiff's
Complaint, which the Court granted on July 7, 2020. On July 10,
2020, Plaintiff Juarez and Sofi filed a Joint Stipulation to Set a
Briefing Schedule in Response to Defendants' Motion to Stay, which
the Court granted on July 14, 2020. On July 30, 2020, Plaintiff
Juarez and Sofi filed a Joint Stipulation to Set a Briefing
Schedule Regarding Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and to
Continue the CMC, which the Court granted on July 31, 2020.

On July 30, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint.
On Oct. 8, 2020, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation seeking to
stay discovery and to postpone the Case Management Conference until
a ruling on SoFi's Motion to Compel Arbitration, or in the
alternative Dismiss, or in the Alternative Strike Portions of
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("Dispositive Motion"), which
the Court granted on Oct. 8, 2020. On Oct. 23, 2020, the Court
continued the hearing on SoFi's Dispositive Motion to Nov. 12,
2020. On Nov. 5, 2020, the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation
seeking to continue the hearing on SoFi's Dispositive until Dec. 3,
2020, which the Court granted on Nov. 6, 2020.

On April 12, 2021, the Court issued an Order (1) denying SoFi's
Motion to Compel Arbitration and granting in part and denying in
part SoFi's Motion to Dismiss, (2) providing the Plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend to address the deficiencies as to the Unruh
Civil Right Act claim within 21 days of the Order, and (3) setting
the Case Management Conference on May 4, 2021. The Parties have met
and conferred, and the Plaintiffs were to file a Second Amended
Complaint on May 3, 2021.

The Parties have agreed that SoFi will file an Answer or otherwise
respond to the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint within 30 days
of filing, or by June 2, 2021, negating any need to file an answer
to the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.

In the event that the Plaintiffs do not amend, SoFi's Answer to the
First Amended Complaint will be due on or before May 17, 2021.

The Parties state that this request is not the result of dilatory
conduct. The stipulation will not alter the date or any event or
deadline already fixed by Court order. The Parties affirm that no
party will be prejudiced by the stipulation, nor will the requested
extension unduly delay the case.

Therefore, it is stipulated and agreed, by and between the
Plaintiffs and SoFi through their respective counsel that:

   1. SoFi will Answer or otherwise respond to the Plaintiffs'
      Second Amended Complaint within 30 days of filing, or by
      June 2, 2021, negating the need to file an answer to the
      Plaintiffs' currently pending First Amended Complaint;

   2. In the event that the Plaintiffs do not amend, SoFi's
      Answer to the First Amended Complaint will be due on or
      before May 17, 2021;

   3. The requested relief will not affect any other deadlines
      set by the Court in this case;

   4. This stipulation is without prejudice to the rights,
      claims, arguments, and defenses of all Parties; and

   5. All other signatories listed, and on whose behalf the
      filing is submitted, concur with the content in this
      Stipulation and have authorized the filing.

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Joint Stipulation and Order dated
April 22, 2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/4twefptb from
Leagle.com.

OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP, Moira Heiges-Goepfert -- mhg@outtengolden.com
-- in San Francisco, California, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Oren
Nimni -- onimni@lawyersforcivilrights.org -- in Boston,
Massachusetts, Ossai Miazad -- om@outtengolden.com -- in New York
City, Mikael Rojas -- mrojas@outtengolden.com -- OUTTEN & GOLDEN
LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class.

McGUIREWOODS LLP, Jamie D. Wells -- jwells@mcguirewoods.com -- in
San Francisco, California, K. Issac deVyver --
kdevyver@mcguirewoods.com -- (pro hac vice), Karla Johnson --
kjohnson@mcguirewoods.com -- (pro hac vice), in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendants, Social Finance, Inc. d/b/a
SoFi and SoFi Lending Corp. d/b/a SoFi.


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Bid to Dismiss Texas Securities Suit Pending
----------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest Airlines Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the motion seeking to
dismiss the putative class action suit before the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Dallas remains
pending.

On February 19, 2020, a complaint alleging violations of federal
securities laws and seeking certification as a class action was
filed against the Company and certain of its officers in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Dallas.


A lead plaintiff has been appointed in the case, and an amended
complaint was filed on July 2, 2020.

The amended complaint seeks damages on behalf of a putative class
of persons who purchased the Company's common stock between
February 7, 2017, and January 29, 2020. The amended complaint
asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act and alleges that the Company made material
misstatements to investors regarding the Company's safety and
maintenance practices and its compliance with federal regulations
and requirements.

The amended complaint generally seeks money damages, pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest, and attorneys' fees and other costs. On
August 17, 2020, the Company and the individual defendants filed a
motion to dismiss.

On October 1, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed a response in
opposition to the motion to dismiss. The Company filed a reply on
or about October 21, 2020, such that the motion is now fully
briefed, although the parties have each supplemented their prior
briefing with regard to more recent case holdings in other matters.


The Company denies all allegations of wrongdoing, including those
in the amended complaint. The Company believes the plaintiffs'
positions are without merit and intends to vigorously defend
itself.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Southwest Airlines Co. operates a passenger airline that provides
scheduled air transportation services in the United States and
near-international markets. Southwest Airlines Co. was founded in
1967 and is based in Dallas, Texas.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Discovery Ongoing in Boeing MAX Defect Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest Airlines Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that discovery is ongoing in
the class action suit related to the company's concealment of
defects in the Boeing MAX aircraft.

On July 11, 2019, a complaint alleging violations of federal and
state laws and seeking certification as a class action was filed
against Boeing and the Company in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas in Sherman.

The complaint alleges that Boeing and the Company colluded to
conceal defects with the MAX aircraft in violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") and also asserts
related state law claims based upon the same alleged facts.

The complaint seeks damages on behalf of putative classes of
customers who purchased tickets for air travel from either the
Company or American Airlines between August 29, 2017, and March 13,
2019.

The complaint generally seeks money damages, equitable monetary
relief, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees
and other costs. On September 13, 2019, the Company filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint and to strike certain class allegations.
Boeing also moved to dismiss.

On February 14, 2020, the trial court issued a ruling that granted
in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss the complaint.

The trial court order, among other things: (i) dismissed without
prejudice various state law claims that the plaintiffs abandoned in
response to the motions, (ii) dismissed with prejudice the
remaining state law claims, including fraud by concealment, fraud
by misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation on the
grounds that federal law preempts those claims, and (iii) found
that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to pursue one of the
plaintiffs' theories of RICO injury.

The order denied the motion to dismiss with respect to two RICO
claims premised upon a second theory of RICO injury and denied the
motion to strike the class allegations at the pleadings stage.
Discovery is ongoing, class certification briefing has been
completed, and a class certification hearing was held before the
court on April 26, 2021.

The Company denies all allegations of wrongdoing, including those
in the complaint that were not dismissed. The Company believes the
plaintiffs' positions are without merit and intends to vigorously
defend itself.

Southwest Airlines Co. operates a passenger airline that provides
scheduled air transportation services in the United States and
near-international markets. Southwest Airlines Co. was founded in
1967 and is based in Dallas, Texas.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Settlement in Airfare-Related Suit Under Appeal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest Airlines Co. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the appeal from a lower
court decision approving the settlement of the airfare-related
class suit remains pending even as objectors to the settlement have
opted to drop the appeal.

On July 1, 2015, a complaint was filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of
putative classes of consumers alleging collusion among the Company,
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines to limit
capacity and maintain higher fares in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.

Since then, a number of similar class action complaints were filed
in the United States District Courts for the Central District of
California, the Northern District of California, the District of
Columbia, the Middle District of Florida, the Southern District of
Florida, the Northern District of Georgia, the Northern District of
Illinois, the Southern District of Indiana, the Eastern District of
Louisiana, the District of Minnesota, the District of New Jersey,
the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of New
York, the Middle District of North Carolina, the District of
Oklahoma, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern
District of Texas, the District of Vermont, and the Eastern
District of Wisconsin.

On October 13, 2015, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation centralized the cases to the United States District
Court in the District of Columbia.

On March 25, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Amended
Complaint in the consolidated cases alleging that the defendants
conspired to restrict capacity from 2009 to present.

The plaintiffs seek to bring their claims on behalf of a class of
persons who purchased tickets for domestic airline travel on the
defendants' airlines from July 1, 2011 to present. They seek treble
damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and expenses.

On May 11, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the Consolidated
Amended Complaint, and on October 28, 2016, the Court denied this
motion.

On December 20, 2017, the Company reached an agreement to settle
these cases with a proposed class of all persons who purchased
domestic airline transportation services from July 1, 2011, to the
date of the settlement.

The Company agreed to pay $15 million and to provide certain
cooperation with the plaintiffs as set forth in the settlement
agreement.

The Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement on January
3, 2018, and the plaintiffs provided notice to the proposed
settlement class.

The Court held a fairness hearing on March 22, 2019, and it issued
an order granting final approval of the settlement on May 9, 2019.


On June 10, 2019, three sets of objectors filed notices of appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. Two sets of the objectors dismissed their appeals, and the
Company and the other settling parties moved to dismiss the
remaining appeal because the district court did not certify the
approval order as appealable. The court of appeals ordered the
parties to brief the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the
objections raised in the appeal, and oral argument was held on
April 14, 2021.

The case is continuing as to the remaining defendants.

The Company denies all allegations of wrongdoing.

Southwest Airlines Co. operates a passenger airline that provides
scheduled air transportation services in the United States and
near-international markets. Southwest Airlines Co. was founded in
1967 and is based in Dallas, Texas.


STATE FARM: Court Grants in Part Bid to Stay in Clippinger Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,
Western Division, grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's
motion to stay in the lawsuit titled JESSICA CLIPPINGER, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Defendant, Case No.
2:20-cv-02482-TLP-cgc (W.D. Tenn.).

The parties filed a flurry of discovery motions in the case.
Indeed, four discovery motions are currently pending before the
Court. First is the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. There, the
Plaintiff seeks to compel evidence related to class certification.
But the Defendant moves to stay all discovery until the Court
decides its Motion for Summary Judgment.

What is more, District Judge Thomas L. Parker notes, the Defendant
also moves for a Protective Order. This is because, following the
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Stay, the
Plaintiff served the Defendant with six deposition notices and a
request for written discovery. Now, the Defendant asks the Court to
stop the Plaintiff from seeking this discovery.

Only one minute after the Defendant moved for a Protective Order,
the Plaintiff moved for Rule 56(d) discovery. She argues that the
Defendant is refusing her a reasonable and fair opportunity to seek
discovery about the issues raised in the Motion for Summary
Judgment. She, thus, submits a Rule 56(d) motion and affidavit,
asking the Court to (1) permit additional discovery, (2) direct the
Defendant to make witnesses Peter Herzog and Lynn Vanderford
available for depositions within 14 days, and (3) extend the
deadline for the Plaintiff to respond to the Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Discovery Related to Class Certification

The Plaintiff moves for an order requiring the Defendant to produce
"three interrelated categories of documents." In particular, she
requests: (1) all data maintained in the Defendant's computer
system related to her property claim for her total loss vehicle;
(2) the documents the Defendant used to claim CAFA jurisdiction in
its Notice of Removal; and (3) 21 categories of data relevant to
identifying other potential class action members. In effect, these
discovery requests seek information about class certification.

The Defendant, however, argues that the Court should stay discovery
pending its decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment. That a
party filed a motion for summary judgment is not enough by itself
to support a stay of discovery, Judge Parker notes. But the
Defendant has other reasons for its request. The Defendant argues
that the discovery the Plaintiff seeks is disproportionate to the
needs of the case and is too burdensome. And it argues that much of
the discovery the Plaintiff requests will not resolve any contested
issues about the class size or damages. The Defendant further
argues that the Plaintiff is atypical of the class and that class
discovery is, therefore, inappropriate.

The Court finds that discovery on class certification at this early
stage in the litigation may be burdensome on the Defendant and
disproportionate to the needs of the case. Plus, class
certification discovery is not relevant to the pending Motion for
Summary Judgment. So, the Plaintiff will suffer little hardship if
the Court stays class certification discovery.

The Court, therefore, uses its broad discretion to stay discovery
on class certification. That said, the Court finds it would be
premature to stay such discovery until the Court decides the Motion
for Summary Judgment. And so, the Court grants in part and denies
in part the Defendant's Motion to Stay. The Court stays discovery
as to class certification only until further Order of the Court.
The Court will notify the parties when it reopens discovery on this
issue. The Court further holds in abeyance the Plaintiff's Motion
to Compel. The Court will consider the Motion to Compel when it
reopens class discovery.

Discovery Related to the Motion for Summary Judgment

The Defendant moves for a Protective Order forbidding the Plaintiff
from seeking the discovery that she served on April 7, 2021, until
the Court has decided the Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Plaintiff, however, argues that she needs more discovery in order
to respond to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. She
argues that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment includes
declarations from two newly revealed witness. What is more, the
declarations involve contested facts. For example, the Plaintiff
disputes the Defendant's claim that she never objected to the
Defendant's valuation of her total-loss vehicle.

Also of note, Mr. Herzog's declaration is the only evidence
supporting the Defendant's claim that it requested appraisal and
that the Plaintiff refused to participate in appraisal. But it is
not clear how Mr. Herzog knows this information or what documents
he relied on to make these assertions. And as the Plaintiff
emphasizes, there are also questions about the documents Ms.
Vanderford relied on in her declaration.

The Plaintiff, thus, argues that the Defendant is refusing her a
reasonable and fair opportunity to seek discovery on the issues
raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment. As a result, she submits
a Rule 56(d) order and affidavit, asking the Court to (1) permit
additional discovery, (2) direct the Defendant to make witnesses
Peter Herzog and Lynn Vanderford available within fourteen days,
and (3) extend the deadline for her to respond to the Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff satisfies her burden under Rule
56(d) and shows that additional discovery is necessary. Her
affidavit identifies the specific facts that she seeks to find
through discovery and why these facts are material to her response
to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff clearly explains
that she seeks to depose Mr. Herzog and Ms. Vanderford in order to
learn about their personal knowledge of the attested facts and the
documents that they used to make their declarations.

The affidavit also explains in detail her efforts to obtain
discovery from the Defendant. There is no evidence that the
Plaintiff has been dilatory in her discovery efforts, either. Plus,
as the Defendant admits, this case is in the early stages of
discovery and the Plaintiff just learned about these witnesses when
the Defendant filed the Motion for Summary Judgment.

All in all, the Plaintiff has explained why she needs discovery,
what material facts she hopes to uncover, and why she has not
previously discovered the information, Judge Parker opines, citing
Doe v. City of Memphis, 928 F.3d at 490.

So the Court grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(d)
Discovery. And as a result of the Court's Order on the Motion to
Stay and the Motion for Rule 56(d) Discovery, the Court denies as
moot the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order.

Conclusion

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant's Motion
to Stay. All discovery related to class certification is stayed
until further notice. As a result, the Court holds in abeyance the
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. The Court further grants the
Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 56(d) Discovery. The Plaintiff may seek
additional discovery related to the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. And finally, the Court denies as moot the Defendant's
Motion for a Protective Order.

As a result of this Order, the Court also extends the Plaintiff's
deadline for filing a motion for class certification. The Court
will reset that deadline, the Defendant's deadline to respond, and
the Plaintiff's deadline to reply at a later date.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/yj53j9fe from Leagle.com.


SWEETWATER CAR WASH: Gonzalez Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Sweetwater Car Wash,
Inc., et al. The case is styled as Leonardo Gonzalez, Individually,
and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated Current and Former
Employees of Defendants v. Sweetwater Car Wash, Inc., A California
Corporation; Peter Staab, An Individual; Does 1 through 50,
Inclusive; Case No. 2021-00020303 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty.,
May 6, 2021).

Sweetwater Car Wash -- https://sweetwatercw.com/ -- provides car
wash services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Danielle Sherrod, Esq.
          RASTERGAR LAW GROUP, APC
          22760 Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 200
          Torrance, CA 90505
          Phone: (310) 961-9600
          Fax: (310) 961-9094
          Email: danielle@rastegarlawgroup.com



SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES: Amended Securities Complaint Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE SYNCHRONOSS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. SECURITIES
LITIGATION. THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: ALL ACTIONS, Civil Action No.
17-7173 (FLW) (LHG) (D.N.J.), Judge Freda L. Wolfson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Verified
Shareholder Derivative Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23.1 and 12(b)(6).

In the consolidated class action, shareholder Plaintiff LaBoeuf
alleges, inter alia, that when Synchronoss divested its Activation
business, a component of the Company which provides mobile handset
activation and network services, the then-Synchronoss Board of
Directors breached its fiduciary duties to the Company and its
shareholders by approving the sale.

Synchronoss, a Delaware corporation, is a global software and
services company that provides services for mobile transformation
of business.  The most consistently profitable line of the
Company's business was the Activation business, through which the
Company provides "mobile handset activation and network services to
mobile phone carriers around the world."  Presently before the
Court is a motion by Defendants Stephen G. Waldis, William J.
Cadogan, Thomas J. Hopkins ("Director Defendants"), James M.
McCormick and Donnie M. Moore, and Nominal Defendant Synchronoss,
to dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Amended Complaint.

In 2017, at the time the Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit,
Synchronoss had a five-member board of directors consisting of
Waldis, Cadogan, Hopkins, McCormick, and Moore ("Prior Board").  On
Nov. 16, 2017, Synchronoss announced that Glenn Lurie, who had
previously been CEO of AT&T's Mobility and Consumer Operations,
would be joining the Synchronoss Board and taking over as CEO, and
that Waldis would remain Chairman of the Board.  Since that time,
Synchronoss has increased its Board of Directors to 10 members.
Additionally, in June 2019, McCormick and Moore both stepped down
from the Company's Board of Directors.

Thus, at the time the Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint in July
2020, the Company's Board of Directors was made up of Defendants
Waldis, Hopkins, and Cadogan, and non-defendants Lurie, Frank
Baker, Peter Berger, Robert Aquilina, Kristin Rinne, Laurie Harris,
and Mohan Gyani ("Current Board").

On Dec.6, 2016, in a Form 8-K filed with the SEC, the Company
announced that it would be divesting 70% of its Activation
business.  Synchronoss revealed that it had formed a new entity,
Sequential Technology International ("STI") and transferred the
bulk of the assets comprising the Activation business to that
entity.  Further, Sequential Technology Holdings, Inc. and
Synchronoss had entered into a purchase agreement, pursuant to
which Sequential would purchase a 70% interest in STI for a cash
payment of $146 million.  Synchronoss would retain 30% interest in
STI.  The same day, Synchronoss announced that it had bought
Intralinks, a tech company, for $821 million.  In connection with
the Sequential transaction, Synchronoss and Sequential also entered
into a "non-exclusive perpetual license agreement," under which
Sequential obtained a license for certain analytics software
products owned by Synchronoss.  Sequential paid Synchronoss a $9.2
million licensing fee, which the Company included as revenue in the
fourth quarter of 2016, but the Company allegedly did not disclose
that fact until months later in February 2017.

Initially, the public at large was purportedly unaware of who made
up the buyers behind Sequential.  It would later be publicly
revealed, that Sequential was previously known as Omniglobe
International LLC, an entity affiliated with friends and family of
Synchronoss management and had been renamed prior to the Activation
transaction.  According to the Plaintiff, Omniglobe was referred by
name in the Prior Board's presentations leading up the transaction,
and the Prior Board was aware that it was run by friends and family
of Synchronoss insiders.

In February 2017, in an article published by the Southern
Investigative Reporting Foundation ("SIRF"), it was revealed that
at the time of the divestiture, Rumson Hitters owned 50% of
Sequential/Omniglobe, and an individual named Jaswinder Matharu
owned the other half.  The Plaintiff alleges that although Waldis,
Irving, Berry, and Garcia no longer owned shares in Rumson Hitters
at the time Synchronoss entered into the transaction with
OmniGlobe, the transaction was problematic because Synchronoss sold
the Activation business to friends and family of corporate
insiders, i.e, Methfessel, Claussen, and Miller.  They further
alleges that one of the key motivations behind the transaction was
"to help people other than shareholders," including Waldis' friends
and family.

The Plaintiff also alleges that Waldis, Moore, Cadogan, and Hopkins
sold millions of dollars' worth of Synchronoss stock and received
substantial profits between 2014 and 2016, when Synchronoss was
misstating its revenues, and between September 2016, when the Board
first began discussing the potential Activation Divestiture, and
Feb. 27, 2017, when the Plaintiff alleges that Sequential's true
identity was revealed and Synchronoss's stock price collapsed.

The Plaintiff further alleges that between 2016, following the
announcement of the Activation Divesture, and 2017, prior to the
reveal that Omniglobe was behind Sequential, Waldis sold 9.6% of
his shares; Moore, sold 48.3% of his shares; Hopkins sold 43.4% of
his shares and Cadogan sold 10.5% of his shares.  With the
exception of Waldis, none of the Defendants has made a single sale
since the SIRF article was published in February 2017

Between April 27, 2017 and May 4, 2017, Siris Capital Group, LLC
purchased nearly six million shares of Synchronoss common stock,
constituting approximately 13% of the Company's outstanding shares,
which positioned Siris as the Company's largest shareholder.  Then,
Siris Co-Founder Frank Baker met with Waldis on May 4, 2017, and
expressed Siris' interest in acquiring Synchronoss.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Siris deal was a poor one for
Synchronoss' shareholders and was motivated by protecting the Board
from a proxy contest, rather than the Company's best interests.  As
reflected in Synchronoss' 2017 Proxy Statement, all of the
Company's Directors and Officers owned approximately 10.5% of
Synchronoss' shares, while three institutional investors owned
approximately 24.8% of the Company's shares (not including Siris'
recent stake).  The Plaintiff alleges that the Director Defendants
were threatened by the institutional investors' stakes, and the
sale of Intralinks and the $185 million deal with Siris allegedly
permitted Defendants to maintain their Board seats at the Company
while providing no benefit to shareholders.

Previously, Judge Wolfson granted the Defendants' first motion to
dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint, granting the Plaintiff leave to
amend, after finding that the complaint did not adequately allege
that the Plaintiff's failure to make demand on the Board was
excused.  The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and now, the
Defendants, once again, move to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims for
failure to assert a pre-suit demand as required under Section 327
of Delaware General Corporation Law and failure to adequately plead
demand futility under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.

Judge Wolfson assesses whether the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient
facts to demonstrate that the Director Defendants face a
substantial likelihood of personal liability for the claims alleged
and whether the Non-Defendant Directors are disinterested and
independent.

The Amended Complaint alleges one count of breach of fiduciary duty
against the Defendants, stemming from 1) the alleged failure to act
in a disinterested and independent fashion with respect to the
Activation Divestiture; 2) the alleged sale of Synchronoss stock,
while certain Defendants were in possession of non-public
information concerning the Activation Divestiture and the need to
restate the Company's financial statements; and 3) the failure to
exercise care in the management and administration of the Company's
affairs.

Judge Wolfson opines that the Plaintiff has not alleged any facts
suggesting that the Non-Defendant Directors would be unable to act
in a disinterested or independent fashion regarding the other two
bases for liability against the Director Defendants -- the insider
trading claim or the Caremark claim emanating from the accounting
restatement.  Nor has the Plaintiff specifically alleged that
Baker, Berger, and Aquilina are "so beholden to an interested
director," that they would be unable to impartially consider demand
with respect to any and every claim involving the Director
Defendants, who were board members during the time period
contemporaneous with the transactions in the Amended Complaint.

Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the Director Defendants face
substantial risk of liability with respect to all of the claims
asserted in the Amended Complaint, that would only render demand
futile as to them, and not the Non-Defendant Directors.  Put
differently, the Plaintiff has not proffered any basis for the
Court to find that demand would be futile as to the Non-Defendant
Directors on the insider trading claim, or Caremark claims, and
absent such allegations, the Plaintiff is unable to establish
demand futility on those claims, because even assuming that demand
was futile as to the Director Defendants, the Plaintiff would,
nonetheless, fall two directors short of alleging that a majority
of the Current Board was unable to consider a demand impartially.

Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Wolfson only addresses the
Plaintiff's demand futility arguments with respect to the four
Non-Defendant Directors, regarding the claims stemming from the
Activation Divestiture and the Siris transactions.  She does not
find that the Company's determination that Lurie was an "interested
director," under the Nasdaq rules, sufficient to establish that he
could not impartially consider demand for claims related to the
Activation Divestiture.  Further, while the Plaintiff has alleged
that Lurie was "in favor" of the Activation Divestiture, in his
capacity as AT&T's CEO nearly one year before he joined
Synchronoss, that is also insufficient to establish that Lurie
would have been interested respect to claims stemming from the
Activation Divestiture.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not alleged
facts suggesting that demand would have been futile with respect to
Lurie.

Similarly, Magistrate Judge Wolfson does not find that Baker,
Berger, and Aquilina's status as the co-founders or officers of
Siris, respectively, creates reasonable doubt that they could act
impartially to consider demand against the Director Defendants with
respect to the Siris transactions.  Further, the fact that Baker,
Berger and Aquilina obtained their seats on the Board as a result
of Siris transactions, wherein Siris obtained, inter alia, the
right to approve four members of the Synchronoss Board of
Directors, is also insufficient to render them incapable of acting
disinterested in the face of demand.  She also does do not find
that Berger, Baker, and Aquilina's presumption of independence is
overcome by virtual of the fact that they were Siris's nominees to
the Board of Directors.

Having found that demand is not excused with respect to the four
non-Defendant Directors on the claims involving the Activation
Divestiture and the Siris transactions with Siris, Magistrate Judge
Wolfson need not addresses the parties' arguments with respect to
the Director Defendants on these claims.  As she explained, in
order to survive a motion to dismiss based on failure to allege
demand futility, the Plaintiff "stockholder must show that a
'majority' of the directors could not impartially consider a
demand."  Because the Current Board consists of 10 members, the
Plaintiff is required to allege sufficient facts demonstrating that
demand would have been excused as to at least five members, and
even if she concluded that demand was excused with respect to
Waldis, Cadogan, and Hopkins, Plaintiff would be two member short
of a "majority" of the Board.  Accordingly, the Amended Complaint
will be dismissed for failure to plead demand futility pursuant to
Federal Rule of Procedure 23.

For the foregoing reasons, Magistrate Judge Wolfson granted the
Defendants' motion.  The Plaintiff has not alleged facts
demonstrating that a majority of the Board of Directors, as it
existed at the time the Amended Complaint was filed, would not have
acted in a disinterested and independent fashion in the face of
demand.  Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not shown that demand was
excused, and the Complaint is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/je576kv9 from Leagle.com.


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Agreements Reached in Scott and Turizo Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Synchrony Financial said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company has reached
agreements to resolve the Scott et al. v. Synchrony Financial and
Turizo et al. v. Synchrony Financial cases on an individual basis.

Scott et al. v. Synchrony Financial was filed on February 12, 2021
in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for
Duval County, Florida.

Turizo et al. v. Synchrony Financial was filed on February 25, 2021
in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuity in and
for Broward County, Florida.

Unlike the Scott action, which relates to phone calls, the Turizo
complaint is based on the alleged receipt of a text message. In
April 2021, Synchrony reached agreements in principle with the
representative plaintiffs in both the Scott and Turizo cases to
resolve those matters on an individual basis.

Synchrony Financial, incorporated on September 12, 2003, is a
consumer financial services company. The Company provides a range
of credit products through programs it has established with a group
of national and regional retailers, local merchants, manufacturers,
buying groups, industry associations and healthcare service
providers. The Company's revenue activities are managed through
three sales platforms: Retail Card, Payment Solutions and
CareCredit. It offers its credit products through its subsidiary,
Bank. The company is based in Stamford, Connecticut.


SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: California Consolidated TCPA Class Suit Tossed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Synchrony Financial said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the District Court
granted final approval of the settlement and entered final judgment
and order of dismissal, in the consolidated Campbell and Neal
putative class suit.

The Bank or the Company is, or has been, defending a number of
putative class actions alleging claims under the federal Telephone
Consumer Protection Act as a result of phone calls made by the
Bank.

The complaints generally have alleged that the Bank or the Company
placed calls to consumers by an automated telephone dialing system
or using a pre-recorded message or automated voice without their
consent and seek up to $1,500 for each violation, without
specifying an aggregate amount.

Campbell et al. v. Synchrony Bank was filed on January 25, 2017 in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The
original complaint named only J.C. Penney Company, Inc. and J.C.
Penney Corporation, Inc. as the defendants but was amended on April
7, 2017 to replace those defendants with the Bank.

Neal et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Synchrony Bank, for which
the Bank is indemnifying Wal-Mart, was filed on January 17, 2017 in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.
The original complaint named only Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as a
defendant but was amended on March 30, 2017 to add Synchrony Bank
as an additional defendant.

On October 2, 2020, Synchrony entered an agreement to resolve the
Campbell and Neal lawsuits, which had been consolidated before the
United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, on a class basis.

On October 19, 2020, the District Court entered an order
preliminarily approving the class action settlement.

On March 19, 2021, the District Court granted final approval of the
settlement and entered final judgment and order of dismissal.

Synchrony Financial, incorporated on September 12, 2003, is a
consumer financial services company. The Company provides a range
of credit products through programs it has established with a group
of national and regional retailers, local merchants, manufacturers,
buying groups, industry associations and healthcare service
providers. The Company's revenue activities are managed through
three sales platforms: Retail Card, Payment Solutions and
CareCredit. It offers its credit products through its subsidiary,
Bank. The company is based in Stamford, Connecticut.

SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL: Claims in Stichting Depositary Suit Narrowed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Synchrony Financial said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on April 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Securities Act
claims and all of the claims under the Exchange Act in Stichting
Depositary APG Developed Markets Equity Pool and Stichting
Depositary APG Fixed Income Credit Pool v. Synchrony Financial et
al., with the exception of a claim relating to a single statement
on January 19, 2018 regarding whether Synchrony was receiving
pushback on credit from its retail partners.

On November 2, 2018, a putative class action lawsuit, Retail
Wholesale Department Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v.
Synchrony Financial, et al., was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Connecticut, naming as defendants the Company
and two of its officers.

The lawsuit asserts violations of the Exchange Act for allegedly
making materially misleading statements and/or omitting material
information concerning the Company's underwriting practices and
private-label card business, and was filed on behalf of a putative
class of persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company's
common stock between October 21, 2016 and November 1, 2018.

The complaint seeks an award of unspecified compensatory damages,
costs and expenses.

On February 5, 2019, the court appointed Stichting Depositary APG
Developed Markets Equity Pool as lead plaintiff for the putative
class.

On April 5, 2019, an amended complaint was filed, asserting a new
claim for violations of the Securities Act in connection with
statements in the offering materials for the Company's December 1,
2017 note offering.

The Securities Act claims are filed on behalf of persons who
purchased or otherwise acquired Company bonds in or traceable to
the December 1, 2017 note offering between December 1, 2017 and
November 1, 2018.

The amended complaint names as additional defendants two additional
Company officers, the Company's board of directors, and the
underwriters of the December 1, 2017 note offering.

The amended complaint is captioned Stichting Depositary APG
Developed Markets Equity Pool and Stichting Depositary APG Fixed
Income Credit Pool v. Synchrony Financial et al. On March 26, 2020,
the District Court recaptioned the case In re Synchrony Financial
Securities Litigation and on March 31, 2020, the District Court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice.

On April 20, 2020, plaintiffs filed a notice to appeal the decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

On February 16, 2021, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of the Securities Act claims and all of the
claims under the Exchange Act with the exception of a claim
relating to a single statement on January 19, 2018 regarding
whether Synchrony was receiving pushback on credit from its retail
partners.

Synchrony Financial, incorporated on September 12, 2003, is a
consumer financial services company. The Company provides a range
of credit products through programs it has established with a group
of national and regional retailers, local merchants, manufacturers,
buying groups, industry associations and healthcare service
providers. The Company's revenue activities are managed through
three sales platforms: Retail Card, Payment Solutions and
CareCredit. It offers its credit products through its subsidiary,
Bank. The company is based in Stamford, Connecticut.


TESLA INC: 9th Cir. Junks Plaintiffs' Request for Rehearing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tesla Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the Ninth Circuit denied plaintiffs'
request for a rehearing before the full court.

On October 10, 2017, a purported stockholder class action was filed
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
against Tesla, two of its current officers and a former officer.

The complaint alleges violations of federal securities laws and
seeks unspecified compensatory damages and other relief on behalf
of a purported class of purchasers of Tesla securities from May 4,
2016 to October 6, 2017.

The lawsuit claims that Tesla supposedly made materially false and
misleading statements regarding Tesla's preparedness to produce
Model 3 vehicles.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 23, 2018, and
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 25, 2018. The court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend.
Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on September 28, 2018, and
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on
February 15, 2019.

The hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on March 22, 2019,
and on March 25, 2019, the Court ruled in favor of defendants and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On April 8, 2019,
plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and on July 17, 2019 filed their opening
brief.

The company filed its opposition on September 16, 2019, and
plaintiffs filed their reply on October 8, 2019. A hearing on the
appeal was held before a three-judge panel on April 30, 2020. On
January 26, 2021, the panel affirmed the District Court's dismissal
of the complaint with prejudice.

On March 5, 2021, the Ninth Circuit denied plaintiffs' request for
a rehearing before the full court, and a mandate issued on March
16, 2021.

On October 26, 2018, in a similar action, a purported stockholder
class action was filed in the Superior Court of California in Santa
Clara County against Tesla, Elon Musk and seven initial purchasers
in an offering of debt securities by Tesla in August 2017.

The complaint alleges misrepresentations made by Tesla regarding
the number of Model 3 vehicles Tesla expected to produce by the end
of 2017 in connection with such offering and seeks unspecified
compensatory damages and other relief on behalf of a purported
class of purchasers of Tesla securities in such offering. Tesla
thereafter removed the case to federal court.

On January 22, 2019, plaintiff abandoned its effort to proceed in
state court, instead filing an amended complaint against Tesla,
Elon Musk and seven initial purchasers in the debt offering before
the same judge in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California who is hearing the above-referenced earlier-filed
federal case.

On February 5, 2019, the Court stayed this new case pending a
ruling on the motion to dismiss the complaint in the earlier-filed
federal case. After such earlier-filed federal case was dismissed,
defendants filed a motion on July 2, 2019 to dismiss this case as
well. The case was then stayed pending a ruling from the Ninth
Circuit on the earlier-filed federal case, with an agreement that
if defendants prevailed on the appeal, plaintiffs would dismiss the
later-filed case.

Following the Ninth Circuit's affirmance discussed above, the
plaintiffs dismissed the later-filed case with prejudice on April
15, 2021.

Tesla Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells high-performance
electric vehicles and electric vehicle powertrain components. The
Company owns its sales and service network and sells electric
powertrain components to other automobile manufacturers. Tesla
serves customers worldwide. The company is based in Palo Alto,
California.


TESLA INC: Trial on Twitter Post Related Suit Set for May 2022
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tesla Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that Trial is set for May 2022, in the
consolidated class action suit related to Elon Musk's August 7,
2018 Twitter post that he was considering taking Tesla private.

Between August 10, 2018 and September 6, 2018, nine purported
stockholder class actions were filed against Tesla and Elon Musk in
connection with Mr. Musk's August 7, 2018 Twitter post that he was
considering taking Tesla private.

All of the suits are now pending in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.

Although the complaints vary in certain respects, they each purport
to assert claims for violations of federal securities laws related
to Mr. Musk's statement and seek unspecified compensatory damages
and other relief on behalf of a purported class of purchasers of
Tesla's securities.

Plaintiffs filed their consolidated complaint on January 16, 2019
and added as defendants the members of Tesla's board of directors.


The now-consolidated purported stockholder class action was stayed
while the issue of selection of lead counsel was briefed and argued
before the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit ruled regarding lead counsel. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on November 22, 2019.

The hearing on the motion was held on March 6, 2020. On April 15,
2020, the Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The parties
stipulated to certification of a class of stockholders, which the
court granted on November 25, 2020.

Trial is set for May 2022.

Tesla Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells high-performance
electric vehicles and electric vehicle powertrain components. The
Company owns its sales and service network and sells electric
powertrain components to other automobile manufacturers. Tesla
serves customers worldwide. The company is based in Palo Alto,
California.


TIECHERT PIPELINES: Olea Suit Removed to N.D. California
--------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Eliazar Olea, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. Teichert Pipelines, Inc., Case No.
RG21090069, was removed from the Raleigh County Circuit Court to
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on
April 26, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-03016-KAW to the
proceeding.

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.

Teichert -- https://www.teichert.com/ -- is a construction company
operating in California since 1887.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph Lavi, Esq.
          Pooja Virendra Patel, Esq.
          Vincent Charles Granberry, Esq.
          LAVI & EBRAHIMIAN LLP
          8889 W. Olympic Boulevard, Suite 200
          Beverly Hills, CA 90211
          Phone: (310) 432-0000
          Fax: (310) 432-0001
          Email: jlavi@lelawfirm.com
                 todell@tolawfirm.com
                 vgranberry@lelawfirm.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Alexandra Kathleen LaFountain, Esq.
          Samuel Aaron Micon, Esq.
          Cassandra M Ferrannini, Esq.
          DOWNEY BRAND LLP
          621 Capitol Mall, 18th Floor
          Sacramento, CA 95814-4731
          Phone: (916) 444-1000
          Fax: (916) 444-2100
          Email: alafountain@downeybrand.com
                 smicon@downeybrand.com
                 cferrannini@downeybrand.com


TRANSDEV SERVICES: Court Decertifies Drug Test Class
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CHAUENGA M HAKEEM, v.
TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC., et al., Case No. 3:19-cv-02161-VC (N.D.
Calif.), the Hon. Judge Vince Chhabria entered an order:

   1. decertifying class as to drug test claims; and

   2. granting motion for summary judgment as to Hakeem on drug
      test claims.

      -- Decertification of drug test class.

         The evidence presented at the class certification stage
         suggested that the experiences of proposed class members
         with respect to the initial drug tests they took as a
         contingency of employment were more or less the same, and

         that Hakeem's experience was representative of these
         experiences. Indeed, Transdev did not identify differences

         between the circumstances of class members' initial drug
         tests. Transdev’s primary argument against class
         certification was that the drug test claims lacked merit,

         which is not a reason to decline to certify a class.

      -- Summary judgment as to Hakeem's individual drug test
         claims.

         With the drug test class decertified, the Court will
         adjudicate Transdev's motion for summary judgment as to
         Hakeem's drug test claims on an individual basis. Hakeem
         asserts that she is entitled to compensation for the time

         spent taking the initial drug test required for her
         employment with Transdev. Whether this time is compensable

         depends on whether Hakeem was acting as Transdev's
         "employee" when she took the test. It is clear that the
         fact that Transdev labeled the drug test a "pre-
         employment" test and provided that Hakeem's employment was

         "contingent" on her passing the test does not itself
         establish that Hakeem was not acting as an employee.
         Beyond that, it is unclear exactly, under California law,

         how the Court should assess whether Hakeem was acting as
         an "employee" at the time of her drug test. The question
         does not squarely fit within the traditional employer-
         employee analytical framework.

      -- Blended paycheck claim.

         The class of all current and former employees who
received
         a blended paycheck remains intact. As discussed with the
         parties, the process for adjudicating this claim will be
         discussed at the further case management conference on
         June 2, 2021. The parties should file a joint CMS one week

         prior with their positions on this issue.

This case has a somewhat strange history. Two classes were
certified: (i) a class of Transdev employees who underwent
mandatory drug testing required as a contingency of employment; and
(ii) a class of Transdev employees who received blended paycheck
stubs. Transdev then moved for summary judgment only as to the
claims relating to the drug test class. The evidence submitted in
connection with the summary judgment motion cast doubt on whether
the drug test claims were properly certified for class
treatment.The drug test class is now decertified, and Transdev's
motion for summary judgment as to Hakeem's drug test claims is
granted on an individual basis.

Transdev Services provides passenger transportation services. The
Company operates and manages transportation networks such as bus,
commuter rail, and light rail in cities on a contract basis.

A copy of the Court's order:dated April 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3xWqtDP at no extra charge.[CC]


UNITED STATES: Certiorari Petition Filed in Common Ground Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant United States of America filed with the Supreme Court of
United States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter
styled UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CROSS-PETITIONER v. COMMON GROUND
HEALTHCARE COOPERATIVE, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, Case No. 20-1536.

Response is due on June 3, 2021.

The Defendant seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the
case titled COMMON GROUND HEALTHCARE COOPERATIVE, on behalf of
itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 2020-1286.

The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in
concluding that Congress intended to afford insurers an implied
money-damages remedy as compensation for cost-sharing reductions
(CSR) payments that were not made because the government determined
that it lacked an appropriation to pay them and that could
generally be offset under other Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act provisions that insurers invoked to obtain a recovery?

As previously reported in the Class Action Reporter, Plaintiff
Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative contends, for itself and on
behalf of those similarly situated, that the federal government
ceased making the cost-sharing reduction payments to which it and
other insurers are entitled under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and its implementing regulations.[BN]

Defendant-Appellee-Petitioner United States is represented by:

          Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Esq.
          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20530-0001
          E-mail: SupremeCtBriefs@USDOJ.gov

UNITED STATES: Court Denies Bid to Certify Class in Brooks Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VERNON BROOKS, JR., et al., Plaintiffs v. STEVEN
MNUCHIN, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No. 7:21-cv-00223 (W.D.
Va.), Chief District Judge Michael F. Urbanski of the U.S. District
Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division, denied the Plaintiffs'
request for class certification, and denied without prejudice the
Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of counsel.

The Plaintiffs, 12 Virginia inmates proceeding pro se, filed the
case as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Because the Defendants are all federal officials or agencies,
however, the Clerk docketed the case as an action brought pursuant
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The Plaintiffs, though, invoke the Court's federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1346(a), also known as the "Little Tucker Act," which gives
the Court jurisdiction over certain claims against the United
States, if the value of the claims is less than $10,000.  The
complaint names as Defendants the United States, the U.S.
Department of Treasury, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, and
Steven Mnuchin and Charles Rettig, who are named only in their
official capacities as Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service, respectively.

The complaint, which purports to bring claims on behalf of a class
and seeks class certification, asserts claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief, all arising from defendants' alleged failure to
send the Plaintiffs economic impact payments ("EIPs") under the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act ("CARES Act"),
26 U.S.C. Section 6428.  The complaint reference three sets of
EIPs, and alleges that most of the Plaintiffs filed for their first
and second EIPs using a 2019 and 2020 IRS 1040 form, but did not
receive them, and that they have not received the third $1400
payment, either.  Some of the Plaintiffs have received one of the
three payments, though.

The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment "that the Defendants
lack statutory authority to withhold or unreasonably delay delivery
of EIP benefits to the Plaintiffs," and seeks an injunction
ordering "the Defendants to issue EIP benefits to all eligible the
Plaintiffs in a timely manner."  The Plaintiffs also have filed a
motion to appoint counsel, which is not signed by any of the
Plaintiffs, and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
which is signed by all the Plaintiffs except Lamont Jefferson.

Upon initial review of the complaint, Judge Urbanski determines
that it is appropriate to sever the claims of each Plaintiff into
separate cases.  Thus, he directs that the claims of each Plaintiff
be severed from the case and filed in a new and separate civil
action for each Plaintiff, to be prosecuted by each Plaintiff
separately.  The Judge makes no ruling at this time as to whether
the Plaintiff's claims will survive any initial screening under 28
U.S.C. Section 1915A(a).

Turning first to the Plaintiffs' request for class certification,
and despite the Plaintiffs' statement that they are bringing the
action as a class action, Judge Urbanski holds that pro se
plaintiffs may not represent one another and pro se class actions
are not permissible.  Thus, the complaint's request to certify the
case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23, Compl. 10-12 is denied.
Instead, each of the Plaintiffs will be required to prosecute his
own case.

The Judge also has considered whether to allow all of the
Plaintiffs to proceed in a single action or whether severance is
appropriate.  He joins other judges of the Court in concluding that
multiple prisoners are not prohibited from joining together as
plaintiffs in a single civil rights action.  In the case, however,
whether or not a particular Plaintiff has been improperly denied
any payments under the CARES Act potentially will depend on a
number of particularized factors, including what steps each
plaintiff has taken to obtain their payment, and whether and when
they filed their tax returns for different years.  Additionally,
the complaint actually references three different payments, and
indicates that most the Plaintiffs have received none of those
payments, but some have received at least one.  All of those issues
will require individualized factual development and an individual
determination as to eligibility or entitlement to the payments.

In light of this fact, as well as the general difficulties inherent
in allowing multiple plaintiffs in any prisoner case, Judge
Urbanski concludes that pre-trial severance will best serve the
interests of the parties and the interests of justice.  Thus, he
exercises discretion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
21, to sever each Plaintiff's claims into a separate action.
Durthermore, even if he were not severing their respective claims,
but allowing them to remain joined in a single suit, each Plaintiff
would be required to comply with the financial requirements and to
pay a separate filing fee.  To hold otherwise would allow prisoners
to circumvent the plain requirement of the PLRA's filing fee
provisions.

Lastly, the Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of counsel is denied
without prejudice.  Judge Urbanski holds that the Court cannot
require an attorney to represent an indigent civil plaintiff.
Instead, it may only request that an attorney represent an indigent
plaintiff when "exceptional circumstances" exist.  As it relates to
the only plaintiff who will remain in the case, Brooks, the Judge
does not find that he is unable to prosecute his own case and,
indeed, he has previously -- and competently -- prosecuted at least
one other civil rights case before the Court.  Moreover, at this
stage, it does not appear that the claims are so factually or
legally complicated so as to require counsel.

Nor may the Plaintiffs bootstrap their request for counsel onto
their request that the case be a class action.  Nothing in the
Court's ruling, however, precludes Brooks or any other Plaintiff
from obtaining counsel willing to represent them in a class action.
Additionally, in the event that the matter is set for trial, any
Plaintiff may renew a request for counsel in his case at that
time.

An appropriate order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Memorandum Opinion
is available at https://tinyurl.com/2ksfcjyc from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Court of Federal Claims Dismisses Rodgers Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MELODY J. RODGERS, Plaintiff v. THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00793 (Fed. Cl.), Judge Eleni M. Roumel
of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims:

    (i) grants the Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in
        forma pauperis;

   (ii) grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss;

  (iii) denies the Plaintiff's motion to amend her pleadings; and

   (iv) denies the Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.

Plaintiff Rodgers, appearing pro se and purporting to represent a
class, claims that the United States -- through the Department of
Health and Human Services, judges, court officials, social workers,
police officers, attorneys, adoptions agencies, "CASA Volunteers,"
counties and their agencies -- is liable for a myriad of tortious,
criminal, and Constitutional violations based on alleged abuses
that have occurred in this country's foster care system.
Complaint.

On March 11, 2021, the Government timely filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to United States Court of Federal
Claims Rule 12(b)(1).

In conjunction with her complaint, the Plaintiff filed a motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Additionally, she has filed
both a motion to amend her pleadings and a motion for sanctions.

Discussion

I. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

On Jan. 21, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis in the matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1915.  In support of her motion, she submitted documentation
satisfying the statute's requirements.  Accordingly, Judge Roumel
grants the Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis in the matter.

II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

Judge Roumel finds that the Plaintiff's allegations are numerous
and somewhat difficult to follow.  Even viewing each allegation in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and affording her
leniency as a pro se litigant, the Judge finds that the Court lacks
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims.

First, the Plaintiff alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over
her claims under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (Federal Question
Jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. Section 1332 (Diversity Jurisdiction), and
28 U.S.C. Section 1711-1715 (Class Action Fairness Act).  However,
it is well-established that none of these statutes confers
jurisdiction on the Court.  Second, to the extent the Plaintiff
seeks to bring a class action suit and names herself as a class
representative, she may not do so in the Court.  Third, Ms. Rodgers
raises claims against a varied list of unnamed government officials
and judges at both the state and federal levels.  Fourth, Ms.
Rodgers makes several claims sounding in tort.  Fifth, the
Plaintiff alleges that the purported defendants violated the
criminal code.  Sixth, she alleges that the named Defendants
committed several violations of the United States Constitution's
Due Process Clause.  Finally, the Court also lacks authority to
issue the relief the Plaintiff seeks.

The Court's ability to grant equitable relief under the Tucker Act
is limited.  As established, the Plaintiff has not made a claim
pursuant to any money-mandating source.  The equitable relief she
requests is plainly not incidental of and collateral to money
damages.  The Court also lacks the ability to grant her request for
a trial by jury.  Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction
over the relief sought by the Plaintiff.

III. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Pleadings

On April 23, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion to amend her
complaint.  In her motion to amend, the Plaintiff states she wants
to add "additional complainants" and to attach "sub contracts and
Affidavits from participants.  She states that "the proposed
amended complaint does not change the nature of the relief
requested."  On April 29, 2021, the Defendant filed its response to
the Plaintiff's motion to amend.  It argues that the Plaintiff's
proposed amendments do not cure the jurisdictional deficiencies in
her complaint.

Judge Roumel agrees with the Defendant. As she explained, the Court
does not have jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims; therefore,
because her amendments will not amend her underlying claims or
relief requested, her amendment is denied as futile.

IV. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions

On April 29, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions
against the Defendant.  In her motion, she argues that sanctions
are warranted against the Defendant because it allegedly failed to
serve its motion to dismiss on her.  However, on Feb. 4, 2021, the
Plaintiff filed an "e-notification consent form" with the Court
averring that she consented to service by email.  On March 11,
2021, the Defendant electronically filed its motion to dismiss on
the Court's Electronic Court Filing system, which triggered and
automatic, electronic notification to all parties.

Pursuant to Appendix E of the Rules of the Court, Judge Roumel
holds that that notification satisfied the service requirement.
The Plaintiff's timely response to the Defendant's motion to
dismiss also clearly indicates that the Plaintiff received the
Defendant's Motion.  Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for sanctions is
denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, Judge Roumel grants the Plaintiff's
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis; grants the
Defendant's motion to dismiss and dismisses the Plaintiff's
complaint; denies the Plaintiff's motion to amend pleadings; and
denies the Plaintiff's motion for sanctions.  Because she finds
that the Plaintiff cannot plead any facts that would plausibly
state a claim for relief, the Judge dismisses the action against
the Defendant without leave to replead.

The Judge certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3), that
any appeal from her Order would not be taken in good faith, and
therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an
appeal.  The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment
accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/uarw28yw from Leagle.com.

Melody J. Rodgers, in Jacksonville, North Carolina, appears pro
se.

Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Martin F.
Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, in Washington, District of Columbia, for the
Defendant.


UNITED STATES: Southern District of Ohio Dismisses Day v. Miller
----------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern
Division, dismisses the lawsuit entitled ROGER CHARLES DAY, JR.,
Plaintiff v. RICHARD A. MILLER, et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:20-cv-2978 (S.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff Day is an inmate at Terre Haute Federal Correctional
Institution. The matter is currently before the Court on his
Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation that
recommended that the Court dismisses his claims.

Background

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the facts surrounding
the crime for which the Plaintiff was convicted. In United States
v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2012), the court stated that in
late 2004 and early 2005, Day began running a business scheme
involving his then-girlfriend, Susan Crotty Neufeld, and his
friends, Nathan Carroll and Greg Stewart. Acting at Day's
direction, Neufeld, Carroll, and Stewart would set up companies
that could bid on parts-supply contracts for the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA), the agency within the United States Department of
Defense ("DOD") responsible for acquiring parts for the military
services.

Using Day's custom-designed software program, the companies would
then bid en masse on low-dollar value DLA contracts. When one of
the newly formed companies won a contract, Day would purchase the
necessary parts and have them shipped to Neufeld or Carroll, who
would in turn deliver the parts to a packaging company for shipping
to the DLA to complete the contract. Day would then share a portion
of the profit with the others.

The arrangement between Day and his co-conspirators lasted three
years, during which the various companies secured some 987
contracts worth approximately $8,670,380.78. Like all too many
get-rich-quick ideas, however, this scheme was too good to be true.
The trick was in the parts: rather than delivering parts that
complied with the exacting military specifications called for in
the various contracts, Day would purchase similar sounding--yet
cheaper and nonconforming--items.

Early on in the scheme, in May 2005, Day moved to Mexico where he
directed Neufeld, Carroll, and Stewart through emails, phone calls,
and internet chats. The scheme unraveled as the Plaintiff's
co-conspirators were arrested in 2006 and 2007. After a year in
Mexico evading United States law enforcement agents, the Plaintiff
was arrested there in 2008 and imprisoned while awaiting
extradition.

He was subsequently indicted in the Eastern Division of Virginia
for wire fraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. Section 1349; wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. Section 1343; aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. Section
1028A; money laundering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(h);
smuggling conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. Sections 371, 554; and obstruction
of justice, 18 U.S.C. Section 1503. After extradition, he was
convicted following a jury trial and sentenced to 1,260 months
imprisonment.

Procedural Posture

The Plaintiff has filed a complaint in the Court, alleging a civil
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18
U.S.C. Sections 1961-68, class action on behalf of a class of
persons, who contracted with the United States Department of
Defense ("DOD"), including the Defense Logistics Agency and various
Defense Supply Centers, using the "DD1155 form that contained the
express waiver of the contractor's signature for acceptance of 'the
contract' terms and conditions and the waiver of the contractor's
return of a signed DD1155 contract to the contract administrator,
from 2004 to the present."

The Defendants are "contracting/ordering officers" and contract
administrators, who allegedly worked for the DOD during that time
period. They allegedly approved "illegal" contracts in violation of
various federal regulations. In doing so, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants engaged in a civil RICO conspiracy.

Discussion

The Magistrate Judge concluded that the Plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. She explained that, as a
pro se litigant, he is not permitted to prosecute a class action.
The Magistrate Judge also found that any individual civil RICO
claim that the Plaintiff could possibly bring is barred by the
statute of limitations applicable to such claims. Civil RICO claims
have a four-year statute of limitations.

In his Objection, the Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge
erred in both of these findings. He asserts that the Magistrate
Judge failed to recognize that he alleges a continuing violation of
Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et seq. RICO." Specifically, he
asserts that the harmful acts have never ceased and continued until
today as fully alleged in the instant complaint. He continues,
arguing that under the continuing tort doctrine, the statute of
limitations begins to run only when the plaintiff's exposure to the
harmful condition ceases, regardless of when the plaintiff
discovered the injury and its cause. He also footnotes that a
continuing tort tolls the statute of limitations until the
cessation of the wrong.

The Plaintiff, however, is mistaken, District Judge Edmund A.
Sargus, Jr., holds. First, the statute of limitations in a civil
RICO claim is not triggered, as the Plaintiff contends, when the
harmful condition ceases. Instead, as the Magistrate Judge
correctly held, RICO's four-year statute of limitations begins to
run when a party knew, or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, that the party was injured by a
RICO violation.

The Plaintiff himself indicates that he has known of the violation
from the time it began, before he was imprisoned over eight years
ago, Judge Sargus notes. The fact that the violation allegedly
continues today is irrelevant to when the statute of limitations
was triggered. The statute began to run when the Plaintiff first
knew, or by the exercise of due diligence should have known, of the
alleged violation, i.e., over eight years ago. Consequently, his
RICO claim is barred.

Second, the law relied upon by the Plaintiff, 54 C.J.S. Limitations
of Actions Section 169, p. 128, states that the general rule in
tort law is that in the case of a continuing tort and injury whose
damages cannot be determined until the cessation of the wrong, the
statute of limitations begins to run no earlier than the last date
of the wrong. As this Court has recognized, 54 C.J.S. Limitations
of Actions Section 169 refers to the theory of continuing tort in a
negligence claim. The Plaintiff's case, however, is brought under
RICO, not a common law tort theory. And, as stated, the law is
clear that there is a discovery rule applicable to alleged RICO
violations, which bars his RICO cause of action.

Class Representative

In Plaintiff's Objection, he contends that 28 U.S.C Section 1654
provides him the ability to act as class counsel. The Plaintiff is,
however, mistaken, Judge Sargus holds. The law developed under 28
U.S.C Section 1654 unequivocally dictates that a nonlawyer can't
handle a case on behalf of anyone except himself. Consequently, the
Magistrate Judge did not err in so finding.

The Court permitted the Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis in
the instant action. In the case sub judice, even if the Plaintiff
were to qualify for in forma pauperis status from a financial
standpoint, the Plaintiff's appeal would not be taken in good
faith. The Court reaches this determination because, as explained,
his Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.

Conclusion

Based on the de novo review, the Court concludes that the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is well reasoned, sets
forth the proper law, and correctly applies the law to the facts of
the case. That is, because the Plaintiff is not a lawyer he may
only represent himself, not a class. And, as to his RICO claim, it
is barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the Court overrules the Plaintiffs' Objection, adopts
the Report and Recommendation, dismisses the case, and finds that
an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Clerk is directed
to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated April 22,
2021, is available at https://tinyurl.com/pvu2bvks from
Leagle.com.


USAA CASUALTY: 11th Circuit Vacates Dismissal of Mack Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacates
the dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint in the lawsuit styled
LEROY MACK, Plaintiff-Appellant v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee, Case No. 19-14958 (11th Cir.).

Plaintiff Mack totaled his car and was not satisfied with the
method his insurer, the Defendant-Appellee, used to calculate what
it paid him. So he sued USAA on behalf of himself and a putative
class for declaratory judgments that USAA's method was inconsistent
with Florida law and the insurance policy. As supplemental relief
to those declaratory judgment claims, Mack also asked for USAA to
recalculate the class members' claims using a legal method and make
them new offers. Mack concedes, however, that a "correct"
calculation method will not necessarily result in higher offers.

Mr. Mack filed the class-action complaint in Florida state court on
behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated
policyholders against USAA seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that
USAA's use of the CCC ONE system violates Florida law and
supplemental relief in the form of an order requiring USAA to
recalculate the class members' total loss claims under a compliant
method and to make new offers based on those recalculations; (2) a
declaratory judgment that USAA's refusal to pay separate title,
license, and dealer fees in connection with total loss claims
breaches its coverage policy and supplemental relief in the form of
an order requiring USAA to pay the title and license fees and offer
dealer fees to the class members; and (3) damages for breach of
contract based on USAA's failure to pay Mack and the purported
class members $83.25 in title and license fees.

Importantly, and in contrast to his claim for title and license
fees, Mack did not seek damages for USAA's failure to pay dealer
fees or an order requiring their payment. USAA contended that
dealer fees are included in the advertised vehicle prices used by
the CCC system and, therefore, they were necessarily included in
the actual cash value payments made to each class member.

USAA interpreted the complaint as contesting its valuation of
Mack's vehicle and invoked its right under the policy to demand
appraisal. USAA then filed a notice of removal to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441 and 1446 and the Class Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332(d) and 1453.

After removal, USAA moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis
that it amounted to a dispute over the amount of loss and that the
policy required Mack to fully comply with the appraisal and other
provisions before filing suit.  Mack responded that his claims
raised purely legal questions and did not constitute a dispute over
the amount of loss, therefore, they were not amenable to appraisal.
The district court determined that "its is a case about payment of
money," not "about legal coverage or whether or not a contract
provides for anything." Accordingly, the court dismissed the case
without prejudice "pending appraisal." Mack timely appealed.

After Mack filed his initial brief with this Court, the parties
reached a settlement as to the title and license fees claims,
thereby mooting the only damages claim. The only remaining count is
for declaratory judgment and supplemental relief, in which Mack
seeks two declaratory judgments: (1) that USAA's use of the CCC
System violates Florida law and the policy and (2) that Florida law
and the policy require that USAA pay dealer fees as part of any
total loss settlement.

Supplemental to those declarations, Mack seeks (1) a recalculation
of all class members' total loss claims under a new method and new
offers based on those amounts if they are higher than the amount
originally offered and (2) an order requiring USAA to offer dealer
fees to the class members. As to his request for supplemental
relief related to his CCC claim, Mack insists before the Court that
a recalculation of his and other class members' claims under a new
method will not necessarily result in a higher offer by USAA.
Instead, he states that "recalculation using a legal method might
or might not result in a higher value than the CCC system value"
and that he "does not claim his vehicle's value was greater than
USAA's calculation."

The Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing whether Mack has Article III standing to pursue those
remaining claims in federal court.

Circuit Judge Andrew L. Brasher, writing for the Panel, notes that
the Circuit's caselaw is clear that Mack does not have standing to
seek prospective relief on the off chance that he might total a car
again in the future. The question for the Panel, then, is whether
Mack has Article III standing because he requests that USAA make
new settlement offers as supplemental relief if his declaratory
judgment claim succeeds.

After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, the
Appellate Court holds that a plaintiff's request for supplemental
relief does not change the standing analysis for a declaratory
judgment claim. The Appellate Court concludes that if the district
court had determined that Mack lacked standing to bring his
declaratory judgment claims, it would have been required to remand
those claims back to state court.  Because "all doubts about
jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court,"
the Appellate Court, therefore, vacates the district court's order
of dismissal and remands to the district court with instructions
for the district court to remand the unsettled claims to the
Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County,
Florida.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/48332npz from Leagle.com.


VALARIS PLC: Zhang Class Action Remains Stayed
----------------------------------------------
Valaris PLC said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on April 28, 2021, for the quarterly period
ended March 31, 2021, that the class action suit initiated by
Xiaoyuan Zhang, remains stayed.

On August 20, 2019, plaintiff Xiaoyuan Zhang, a purported Valaris
shareholder, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of Valaris
shareholders against Valaris plc and certain of the company's
executive officers, alleging violations of federal securities laws.


The complaint cites general statements in press releases and SEC
filings and alleges that the defendants made false or misleading
statements or failed to disclose material information regarding the
performance of our ultra-deepwater segment, among other things.

The complaint asserts claims on behalf of a class of investors who
purchased Valaris plc shares between April 11, 2019 and July 31,
2019.

The court appointed a lead plaintiff and lead counsel.

The case has now been stayed in light of the Valaris plc bankruptcy
filing, with the exception that lead plaintiff may file an amended
complaint.

Valaris said, "At this time, we are unable to predict the outcome
of these matters or the extent of any resulting liability."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Valaris PLC provides offshore contract drilling services. The
Company owns, operates, and manages rig fleets and provides
drilling services. Valaris serves customers globally. The company
is based in London, England.


VALOR INTELLIGENT: Lewis Files FDCPA Suit in M.D. Georgia
---------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Valor Intelligent
Processing, LLC. The case is styled as Joe Lewis, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Valor Intelligent
Processing, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00075-CDL (M.D. Ga., May 6,
2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act.

Valor Intelligent Processing, LLC -- https://www.valorvip.com/ --
also known as "VIP" is a digital, tech-enabled and cutting edge
Accounts Receivable Management (ARM) company with headquarters in
Jacksonville, Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Yitzchak Zelman, Esq.
          MARCUS & ZELMAN LLC
          701 Cookman Avenue, Suite 300
          Asbury Park, NJ 07712
          Phone: (845) 367-7146
          Fax: (732) 298-6256
          Email: yzelman@marcuszelman.com

               - and -

          Misty Oaks Paxton, Esq.
          3895 Brookgreen Pt.
          Decatur, GA 30034
          Phone: (404) 500-7861
          Email: attyoaks@yahoo.com


VERTAFORE INC: Masciotra Suit Moved to Southern District of Texas
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CONNER MASCIOTRA, Plaintiff v. VERTAFORE, INC.,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 20-cv-3603-WJM-NYW (D. Colo.), Judge
William J. Martinez of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado granted Vertafore's Motion to Transfer Pursuant to the
First-Filed Rule and 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).

The Defendant, an insurance software provider, provides software to
thousands of agencies, carriers, and insurance professionals, and
in that capacity, collects sensitive and confidential personal
information.  According to the allegations of Plaintiff Masciotra's
First Amended Class Action Complaint ("FACAC"), the Defendant
"knowingly designed and configured servers and systems to be
publicly accessible without even the most basic security
protections (e.g., password protection or encryption), making
highly sensitive personal information stored on those servers and
systems available to anyone on the internet without
authorization."

Allegedly, "Vertafore knowingly disclosed approximately 27.7
million Texas drivers' personal information to unauthorized third
parties when it placed that information on publicly accessible,
unprotected servers."  On Nov. 10, 2020, "Vertafore admitted on
Nov. 10, 2020, that unauthorized third parties had accessed this
unsecured personal information disclosed on their servers between
March 11, 2020 until Aug. 1, 2020."

On Dec. 4, 2020, three Texas driver's license holders sued the
Defendant in a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, Allen, et al. v. Vertafore, Inc.,
Case No. 4:20-cv-4139.  The Allen Class Action alleges that the
Defendant violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA") 18
U.S.C. Section 2721, et seq., as it "knowingly disclosed the
Driver's License Information of the Plaintiffs and approximately
27.7 million other Class members by storing that information on
unsecured external servers."  The Allen Class Action defines
potential class members as "all persons whose Texas driver's
license information was stored by Vertafore on an unsecured
external storage service online and accessed without
authorization."

Four days after the Allen Class Action was filed, on Dec. 8, 2020,
the Plaintiff, who is a Texas resident, filed a putative class
action in the District Court against the Defendant based on the
same data breach.  The same day, he filed a Notice of Related Case
identifying the Allen Class Action as a related case.

On Dec. 30, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the FACAC, bringing a
putative class action on behalf of the following Nationwide Class
of individuals: All individuals in the United States whose personal
information was disclosed in the Vertafore data breach announced on
Nov. 10, 2020.  He brings one claim for violation of the DPPA.

On Jan.12, 2021, the Defendant filed the Motion, arguing that the
Court should transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas
under the first-to-file rule and Section 1404(a).  The Plaintiff
opposes the Motion, contending that the Southern District of Texas
lacks jurisdiction over the Defendant, and that the first-to-file
rule and factors of Section 1404(a) weigh against transfer.  The
Defendant filed a reply.  On Feb. 3, 2021, Magistrate Judge Nina Y.
Wang stayed the case pending resolution of the Motion.

When determining whether to apply the first-to-file rule, Judge
Martinez explains that courts examine the following factors: (1)
the chronology of the actions; (2) the similarity of the parties
involved; and (3) the similarity of the issues at stake, citing
Brannon v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 2018 WL 263237, at *3 (D.
Kan. Jan. 2, 2018).

Judge Martinez finds that (i) the Texas lawsuit was filed first and
that first factor weighs in favor of transfer; (ii) the second
factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer because the parties in
the action and the Allen Class Action are virtually identical; and
(iii) there is no question as to the similarity of the issues
because both cases arise from the same alleged data breach on Nov.
10, 2020, in which approximately 27.7 million Texans' driver's
information was disclosed by the Defendant because it was stored on
an unsecured system and both cases also assert claims under the
DPPA.

The Judge notes that the Plaintiff's remaining arguments against
transfer arise under Section 1404(a).  But given that courts have
found that the Section 1404(a) factors have "little applicability"
in a case such as the case, where the Court has determined transfer
is appropriate under the first-to-file rule, the Judge need not
address these arguments.

However, because the Plaintiff's choice of forum often receives
considerable deference, the Judge briefly addresses it separately.
The Plaintiff is a Texas citizen.  When the plaintiff does not
reside in the chosen forum, as is the case, the rationale for
allowing the plaintiff to dictate the forum evaporates."  Although
he does not explicitly analyze the Plaintiff's remaining arguments
in his Order, the Judge has carefully considered them and finds
transfer to the Southern District of Texas is nonetheless
appropriate.

Because venue is proper in the Southern District of Texas, and the
first-to-file rule warrants deference to that court, Judge Martinez
transfers the case to the Southern District of Texas.  He grants
the Motion to Transfer and lifts the stay of proceedings.  The
Clerk of Court will transfer the case to the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas and will terminate the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's April 30, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5e8bu9e7 from Leagle.com.


VERTAFORE INC: Mulvey Suit Seeks Class Certification
----------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as AARON MULVEY,
individually, and on behalf of himself, and all others similarly
situated individuals, v. VERTAFORE INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-00213-E
(N.D. Tex.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order for
class certification of his First Amended Complaint, filed against
Defendant Vertafore.

Vertafore, Inc. provides enterprise software solutions.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 29,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at  https://bit.ly/3xXpOlF
at no extra charge.[CC]

Counsel for Plaintiff and Putative Class are:

          Joseph H. Malley, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH H. MALLEY P.C.
          1045 North Zang Blvd
          Dallas, TX 75208
          Telephone: (214) 943-6100
          Facsimile: (214) 943-6170
          E-mail: mallevlawa@gmail.com

VIRGINIA: 4th Cir. Affirms Entry of Injunction in Scott v. Clarke
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirms
district court's entry of an injunction in the lawsuit captioned
CYNTHIA SCOTT, a prisoner residing at Fluvanna Correctional Center
for Women, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated; TONI HARTLOVE, a prisoner residing at Fluvanna
Correctional Center for Women, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated; MELISSA ATKINS, a prisoner residing at
Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and
BOBINETTE D. FEARCE; BELINDA GRAY; PATRICIA B. KNIGHT; KAREN
CHANITA POWELL; MARGUERITE RICHARDS; LUCETIA ROBINSON; REBECCA L.
SCOTT, prisoners residing at Fluvanna Correctional Center for
Women, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director, Virginia Department of
Corrections; A. DAVID ROBINSON, Chief of Corrections Operations,
Virginia Department of Corrections; STEPHEN M. HERRICK; ERIC
ALDRIDGE; PAUL TARGONSKI, in his official capacity as Medical
Director for the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women,
Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 19-1719 (4th Cir.).

The Plaintiffs in these class action proceedings--that is, women
incarcerated at Virginia's Fluvanna Correctional Center for
Women--appeal the district court's entry of an injunction and its
failure to find the Defendant Prison Officials in contempt of a
2016 settlement agreement ("Settlement Agreement"). The
Defendants--sued in their official capacities only--are Harold W.
Clarke, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections
("VDOC"); VDOC's Chief of Corrections Operations and its Director
of Health Services; plus the Warden at Fluvanna Correctional Center
and its Medical Director (collectively, the "VDOC Officials").

The challenged rulings were made by the district court in Western
Virginia after a bench trial conducted in June 2018. The court's
opinion of Jan. 2, 2019, resolved the trial, recited the findings
of fact and conclusions of law resulting therefrom, and was
accompanied by an injunction (See Scott v. Clarke, No.
3:12-cv-00036 (W.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2019), ECF Nos. 544 & 545 ("Trial
Opinion")). In May 2019, after the parties had sought post-trial
modifications of the Trial Opinion and the injunction, the court
resolved those requests and amended the injunction (the
"Injunction"). The plaintiffs have appealed and, as explained here,
the Appellate Court affirms.

The Plaintiffs initiated these class action proceedings in July
2012, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment.
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the VDOC
Officials with respect to constitutionally deficient medical care
allegedly being afforded to them. In Nov. 2014, the district court
certified the class, consisting of the Plaintiffs and all other
women who currently reside or will in the future reside at the
Fluvanna Correctional Center and who have sought, are currently
seeking or will seek adequate, appropriate medical care for serious
medical needs, as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment.

In Dec. 2014, the parties--that is, the Plaintiffs (including the
certified class) and the VDOC Officials--settled their dispute on
the eve of trial. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the VDOC
Officials agreed to undertake a host of measures designed to ensure
that medical care for the class of plaintiffs would meet or exceed
constitutional standards. The Agreement included a provision that,
if the VDOC Officials failed to uphold their obligations
thereunder, the Agreement was enforceable by contempt proceedings.

On Sept. 15, 2015, the Settlement Agreement was submitted to the
district court. On Feb. 5, 2016, the court explained its approval
thereof and entered an order that approved the Agreement and deemed
it implemented ("Approval Order"). The court retained jurisdiction
in the proceedings to oversee, as necessary and appropriate,
enforcement of the Agreement's terms and conditions. Although the
Approval Order referenced the Agreement, it did not explicitly
incorporate its provisions. None of the parties sought appellate
review.

For several months after the Settlement Agreement was approved and
implemented by the district court, a compliance monitor designated
under the Approval Order rendered reports to the Plaintiffs and the
VDOC Officials that detailed how those Officials were failing to
comply with--and were lacking meaningful progress towards
compliance with--the requirements of the Agreement. On Sept. 6,
2017, the Plaintiffs, relying primarily on the reports by the
compliance monitor, sought a show cause order from the court
against the VDOC Officials--asking that they be adjudged in
contempt--for noncompliance with the Agreement.

In June 2018, following discovery, the district court conducted a
week-long bench trial. At the close of the evidence, the court
sought and secured post-trial briefing. After filing its Trial
Opinion, the court, on May 22, 2019, entered the Injunction that
underlies this appeal.

On June 20, 2019, the VDOC Officials timely noted an appeal. On
July 3, 2019, the Plaintiffs noticed a cross-appeal. Three months
later, however, the VDOC Officials withdrew their appeal, which was
dismissed on Oct. 3, 2019. The cross-appeal of the Plaintiffs is
the only appeal left to be resolved, and the Appellate Court
possesses jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and
Section 1292(a).

In the proceedings underlying this appeal, the VDOC Officials
asserted to the district court that it was not entitled to enforce
the Settlement Agreement by way of contempt proceedings, in that
the Approval Order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65(d). From their standpoint, the Plaintiffs did not
dispute in the district court the fact that the Approval Order, by
not incorporating therein the terms of the Agreement, failed to
conform to the mandate of Rule 65(d). The Plaintiffs argued,
however, that the VDOC Officials had waived and forfeited their
right to contest that issue in that, despite numerous
opportunities, they had not timely raised or preserved a Rule 65(d)
contention.

In the Trial Opinion, the district court agreed with the VDOC
Officials that the Approval Order was not an injunction, and the
court acknowledged that, "by referencing but not itself containing
the terms of the 28-page Settlement Agreement, the Approval Order
did not conform to Rule 65." The court agreed as well that strict
compliance with Rule 65(d) is mandatory and no "mere technical
requirement" in this circuit. The court also found, however, that
the Rule 65(d) issue was neither raised nor preserved by the VDOC
Officials, and if ever a case evinced forfeiture of a Rule 65(d)
argument, or warranted a functional rather than formalist approach
to the rule, it would be this one. The Trial Opinion emphasized
that the VDOC Officials, upon entry of the Approval Order, did not
raise the Rule 65(d) issue with the Court, and they did not file an
appeal.

As the district court further explained, it was not until 20 months
after entry of the Approval Order, in response to the Plaintiffs'
request for a show cause order, that the VDOC Officials made
(seemingly as an afterthought) a solitary mention of Rule 65(d).
Indeed, as the Trial Opinion recited, the VDOC Officials did not
advance their present contention that the flaw with enforcement via
contempt is the Approval Order's extrinsic reference to the
Settlement Agreement. The court nevertheless concluded that it was
bound by the Fourth Circuit's clear statements that Rule 65(d) is
mandatory, and thus that the court could not enforce the Settlement
Agreement through contempt.

Even though the district court accepted the proposition that it
could not enforce the Settlement Agreement by way of contempt, the
court was satisfied that it could enforce the Agreement under
breach of contract principles. The Trial Opinion, thus, concluded
that the Agreement and the Approval Order gave the court continuing
jurisdiction to ensure implementation and enforcement of the
Agreement. The court then ruled that the VDOC Officials had failed
to comply with their obligations under the Eighth Amendment and the
Agreement.

In support thereof, the court explained that the record showed that
VDOC's and the Fluvanna Correctional Center's own officials,
had--by their own admission--actual knowledge that the Center was
not complying with parts of the Settlement Agreement. Predicated on
those findings, the court issued the Injunction that is challenged
by Phe plaintiffs in this appeal. The Injunction requires the VDOC
Officials to implement specific steps--including, for example,
having an essential number of full-time nurses on staff and
ensuring that the nurses are adequately trained--in order to comply
with the Agreement.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiffs substantially
prevailed in the bench trial conducted in the district court, and
notwithstanding the fact that the VDOC Officials have now abandoned
their appeal, the Plaintiffs pursue this appeal to the Appellate
Court and challenge the Injunction and the district court's failure
to find the VDOC Officials in contempt. In support, they maintain
that the VDOC Officials forfeited their Rule 65(d) defense and that
the court erred by requiring strict compliance with Rule 65(d).

Applying these legal principles to the issues presented, the
Appellate Court says it has thoroughly assessed the record and the
contentions of the parties. After doing so, the Appellate Court is
satisfied that the district court did not fatally err in any way,
and that it did not abuse its discretion in any respect, in
disposing of the issues before it.

Indeed, the capable and astute district judge that handled these
proceedings did so in a characteristically patient and thorough
manner. The Trial Opinion is well-reasoned and carefully crafted,
and we are satisfied to resolve this appeal by adopting the
reasoning embodied in that Opinion and in the Injunction. Put
succinctly, the Appellate Court rejects the challenges being
pursued by the Plaintiffs and affirms the judgment of the district
court.

Affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Opinion dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/seuas9ha from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Theodore A. Howard -- thoward@wiley.law -- WILEY REIN LLP,
in Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Nathan H. Schnetzler -- nschnetzler@faplawfirm.com -- FRITH,
ANDERSON & PEAKE, PC, in Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF: Angela Ciolfi -- angela@justice4all.org -- Brenda E.
Castaneda -- brenda@justice4all.org -- Abigail Turner --
abigail@justice4all.org -- Shannon M. Ellis --
shannon@justice4all.org -- LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER, in
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellants.

Katherine C. Londos -- klondos@faplawfirm.com -- FRITH, ANDERSON &
PEAKE, PC, in Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellees.


WAYNE, MI: Bowles, Taylor Seek to Certify Class of Property Owners
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TONYA BOWLES, for herself
and all those similarly situated, and BRUCE TAYLOR, for himself and
all those similarly situated, v. COUNTY OF WAYNE by its BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS also sometimes known as CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE by
its BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ERIC R. SABREE, in his official and
personal capacity, COUNTY OF OAKLAND by its BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
and ANDREW MEISNER, in his official and personal capacity, Case No.
2:20-cv-12838-LVP-KGA (E.D. Mich.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order certifying a class consisting of:

   "All property owners formerly owning property from within the
   counties of Wayne and Oakland who, during the relevant statutory

   period, had said property seized by Defendants via the General
   Property Tax Act, MCL 211.78 et seq, which was worth more and/or

   was sold at tax auction for more than the total tax delinquency

   and was not refunded the excess/surplus equity but excluding any

   property owner who has filed their own post-forfeiture civil
   lawsuit to obtain such relief."

This is a class action lawsuit challenging the legality of certain
voluntarily undertaken practices of the Counties of Wayne and
Oakland, by, with, and through their respective current and past
treasurers seizing highly valuable real property for relatively
small unpaid tax debts and destroying/retaining the remaining
excess equity. Defendants have voluntarily agreed to administer
Michigan's tax foreclosure process in such a way as to foreclose on
properties whose value far exceeds the tax delinquency, sell the
properties, and then destroy and/or withhold the surplus after the
entire tax delinquency is resolved.

The Plaintiffs in this case are two such property owners who both
seek to litigate this case as to their own circumstances and also
on behalf of their fellow property owners in their home counties
who have suffered from the same unconstitutional misconduct. The
Defendants uniformly applied the unlawful practice at issue.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated April 28,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3tEOrQQ
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          David J. Shea, Esq.
          Ashley D. Shea, Esq.
          SHEA LAW, PLLC
          26100 American Dr., Suite 200
          Southfield, MI 48034
          Telephone: (248) 354-0224
          E-mail: david.shea@sadplaw.com
                  ashley.shea@sadplaw.com

               - and -

          Aaron D. Cox, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF AARON D. COX, PLLC
          23380 Goddard Rd.
          Taylor, MI 48180
          Telephone: (734) 287-3664
          E-mail: aaron@aaroncoxlaw.com

               - and -

          Mark K. Wasvary, Esq.
          MARK K. WASVARY, P.C.
          Counsel for Plaintiffs
          2401 W. Big Beaver Rd., Suite 100
          Troy, MI 48084
          Telephone: (248) 649-5667
          E-mail: markwasvary@hotmail.com

               - and -

          Philip L. Ellison, Esq.
          Outside Legal Counsel PLC
          PO Box 107
          Hemlock, MI 48626
          Telephone: (989) 642-0055
          E-mail: pellison@olcplc.com

               - and -

          Matthew E. Gronda, Esq.
          PO Box 70
          St. Charles, MI 48655
          Telephone: (989) 249-0350
          E-mail: matt@matthewgronda.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          William H. Horton, Esq.
          GIARMARCO, MULLINS & HORTON, PC
          Attorney for Oakland Defendants
          101 West Big Beaver Road, 10fl
          Troy, MI 48084-5280
          Telephone: (248) 457-7000
          E-mail: bhorton@gmhlaw.com

               - and -

          Theodore W. Seitz, Esq.
          Nasseem S. Ramin, Esq.
          Samantha L. Walls, Esq.
          DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC
          Attorneys for wayne Defendants
          400 Renaissance Center, 37fl
          Detroit, MI 48243
          Telephone: (313) 568-6800
          E-mail: tseitz@dykema.com
                  nramin@dykema.com
                  swalls@dykema.com

WAYSIDE CONSTRUCTION: Mendez Sues to Recover Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------------
Floriberto Mendez, on behalf of himself and all other persons
similarly situated v. WAYSIDE CONSTRUCTION CORP. and LUIS PORTAL,
Case No. 2:21-cv-02529 (E.D.N.Y., May 6, 2021), is brought to
recover unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New
York Labor Law Articles 6 and 19, and the supporting New York State
Department of Labor Regulations.

The Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The
Defendants did not pay Plaintiff overtime compensation at the rate
of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for hours worked
after 40 hours per workweek. The Defendants willfully disregarded
and purposefully evaded record keeping requirements of the FLSA and
the NYLL by failing to maintain accurate records of the hours
worked by and wages paid to the Plaintiff. The Defendant, failed to
pay the Plaintiff premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess
of forty hours per week in violation of both the FLSA, and the
NYLL, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a construction
laborer during the period May 2015 to October 2020.

The Defendants are engaged in the construction industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          825 Veterans Highway Ste. B
          Hauppauge, New York 11788
          Phone: (631) 257-5588
          Email: Promero@RomeroLawNY.com


WELLS FARGO: N.D. Florida Dismissed Claims in Ible Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
Tallahassee Division, dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiff's
claims in the lawsuit styled ISHANNA IBLE, Plaintiff v. WELLS FARGO
BANK, et al., Defendants, Case No. 4:21cv15-MW/MAF (N.D. Fla.).

The Court has considered, without hearing, the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation, and has also reviewed de novo the
Plaintiff's objections to the report and recommendation.

Accordingly, the Court ordered that the report and recommendation
is accepted and adopted, over the Plaintiff's objections, as its
opinion. Defendant Wells Fargo Bank's motion to dismiss is
granted.

The Clerk will enter judgment stating, "Plaintiff's claims are
dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim." The Plaintiff's motion to
commence a class action is denied as moot, and the Clerk will close
the file.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/25y9t9vv from Leagle.com.


WHITEPAGES INC: Loses Bid to Dismiss Kolebuck-Utz Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, denies the Defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit
captioned as ANGELA KOLEBUCK-UTZ, individually and on behalf of
those similarly situated, Plaintiff v. WHITEPAGES INC., Defendant,
Case No. C21-0053-JCC (W.D. Wash.).

The Defendant owns and operates a website that sells "background
reports" and monthly subscription services to access such reports.
To entice users to purchase these products, the Defendant allows a
user to initially search for a person using that person's name,
without charge; the user is then provided a list of possible
persons, including identifying information, and given the option of
receiving a "free preview" of the Defendant's "report" on the
searched individual.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant used her name and likeness
in its free previews and advertisements to entice users to purchase
Whitepages' services. After the user viewed the free preview and
clicked on the buttons "View Full Report," "Unlock Full Report," or
"Sign Up," the Defendant presented the user with the option to
purchase a monthly subscription service. The Plaintiff argues that
the Defendant's use of her persona violated Ohio's right of
publicity law, Ohio Revised Code Section 2741.01, et seq., because
the Defendant did not obtain written consent to use her persona in
its advertisements.

In the putative class action, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory,
statutory, and punitive damages and injunctive relief, among other
relief, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals,
for the alleged violation.

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing its use of the
Plaintiff's name (a) did not violate Ohio Revised Code Section
2741.01, et seq., (b) was protected as noncommercial "directory
information" under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Article 1, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution, and (c) was
immunized by the Communications Decency Act ("CDA").

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant used her "persona" for a
commercial purpose in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section
2741.02. The Defendant argues it used only her name, rather than
her persona, and, regardless, even if it did use her persona, her
persona does not have "commercial value" and, therefore, cannot
constitute a violation of the statute. The statute defines
"persona" as "an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph,
image, likeness, or distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects
have commercial value."

The Plaintiff's complaint clearly alleges that the Defendant
displayed her name and identifying information on its website, in
what as been described as a free preview, as an enticement to
purchase the Defendant's subscription service. Although use of
identifying characteristics may not be required to represent a
violation under the statute, the Defendant's alleged use of the
Plaintiff's uniquely identifiable characteristics further supports
her allegation that it really was her name and persona that the
Defendant used, rather than the name of a similarly named person.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's name, as a non-public
person, could not have commercial value as a matter of law and,
even if it could, she did not plead adequate facts to establish its
commercial value here. The Court disagrees. To assert a right of
publicity claim, the Plaintiff must only plead that there is some
value in associating a good or service with her identity.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant used her name to entice
users to purchase its product. This is sufficient to establish
commercial value as a matter of law, says District Judge John C.
Coughenour. Moreover, the Plaintiff provides sufficient facts to
plausibly allege a violation of Ohio's right of publicity law,
based on the allegations of commercial use. Therefore, the
Plaintiff states a claim for relief based on alleged violations of
Ohio's right of publicity law.

The Defendant next argues that Ohio's right of publicity law's
limitation, if any, on its use of the Plaintiff's persona
represents a First Amendment violation.

The Plaintiff alleges that: (i) the Defendant's advertisements
using her persona were found on the same web page as its enticement
for its subscription services; (ii) the enticements were described
as the "full report" of her identity, available through the
Defendant's monthly subscription service; and (iii) the Defendant's
motive was singularly to entice users to purchase the Defendant's
services."

Judge Coughenour opines that these allegations are sufficient to
establish that the Defendant's advertisements using the Plaintiff's
persona were, in fact, commercial speech. He also finds that the
Defendant's briefing provides the Court no basis to dismiss the
Plaintiff's claim on First Amendment grounds.

Finally, the Defendant argues dismissal is warranted based on the
protections afforded by the CDA. According to the Defendant, it
does not generate content and, therefore, its use of the
Plaintiff's persona is protected by the CDA.

Judge Coughenour points out that the Defendant does, in fact,
generate content. At this stage, the Court must accept the
allegations in the Plaintiff's complaint as true. The Defendant's
argument does not provide a basis for dismissal of the Plaintiff's
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendant's motion to
dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's Order dated April 22, 2021, is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4hybu6ev from Leagle.com.


XPO LOGISTICS: Gonzalez Suit Seeks to Certify Class of Drivers
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RAMON GONZALEZ, VICTOR
RODRIGUEZ ORTIZ, and ADDELYN MARTE, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, v. XPO LAST MILE, INC., d/b/a XPO
LOGISTICS, Case No. 1:19-cv-10290-TSH (D. Mass.), the Plaintiff
asks the Court to enter an order certifying a class of:

   "all drivers who, like them, performed deliveries in
   Massachusetts on behalf of XPO to Lowe's customers within the
   period of July 20, 2015 to present, excluding helpers and any
   drivers who signed contracts with XPO.

The Plaintiffs seek class certification as to Counts I and II,
alleging violations of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor
Statute, M.G.L. c. 149, section 148B, and violations of the
Massachusetts Payment of Wages Law, M.G.L. c. 149, section 148.
According to data provided by XPO, there are approximately 544
individuals in the class.

This case involves claims by delivery drivers against XPO, a
last-mile transportation company that delivers appliances and other
goods for Lowe's and other clients. The Plaintiffs Ramon Gonzalez,
Victor Rodriguez Ortiz, and Addelyn Marte filed a complaint on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated on July 20,
2018. The complaint was filed in Massachusetts Superior Court, and
XPO removed the case to this Court in February 2019.

XPO's business is to make so-called "last mile" deliveries and
installations on behalf of various clients. It touts the key
aspects of its business, including its workforce of drivers, on
its
website.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated April 30,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/33DqyhS
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Stephen Churchill, Esq.
          Rachel Smit, Esq.
          FAIR WORK, P.C.
          192 South Street, Suite 450
          Boston, MA 02111
          Telephone: 617-607-3260
          E-mail: steve@fairworklaw.com
                  rachel@fairworklaw.com


                            *********

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