/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/210603.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, June 3, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 105

                            Headlines

9F INC: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Putative Class Suit Pending
ABIOMED INC: Bid to Nix Local 705 Teamsters' Class Suit Pending
ADOMANI INC: Mollik Class Suit Ongoing in California
ADVENT TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks Dismissal of Frey Class Suit
AMAZON.COM: Faces Suit for Online Retail Sales Monopoly

AMERICAN FEDERATION: First Amended Schaszberger Class Suit Tossed
ARK RESTAURANTS: Deal in Tipped Workers' Suit Gets Initial Approval
BAJCO ILLINOIS: Proceedings in Regan BIPA Suit Stayed Until Aug. 19
BLACK DIAMOND: $340K Class Accord in Borelli Suit Has Prelim. OK
BOOZ ALLEN: Amended Langley Complaint Dismissed w/o Prejudice

BRUIN E&P: Royalty, Based on Oil at Well Value, Court Says in Blasi
CHANGE HEALTHCARE: UHG Merger Related Suits Dismissed
CHARGEPOINT HOLDINGS: Faces Switchback Merger Related Suits
CHATTERJEE ADVISORS: New York Court Narrows Claims in Manbro Suit
COMMUNITY REGIONAL: 9th Cir. Affirms Arbitration in Franklin Suit

DANIMER SCIENTIFIC: Rosencrants Class Action in NY Underway
DOLLAR TREE: Faces Coffee Mislabeling Consumer Class Suits
DOLLAR TREE: Smoked Almonds Related Class Suit Underway
DOLLAR TREE: Store Manager Class Suit Concluded
DOLLAR TREE: Zantac-Related Class Suit Underway

ENDO INT'L: Court Certifies Class in Pelletier Securities Suit
FIRST TRANSIT: $397.5K Class Settlement in Alkady Suit Has Final OK
FUSION CONNECT: $224K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Patron Suit
FUSION CONNECT: Order & Final Judgment Entered in Patron Class Suit
GENESIS MOTOR: Southern District of New York Dismisses Sanchez Suit

GROUP HEALTH: Third Circuit Vacates Order Dismissing Plavin Suit
IDAHO: Class Notice in K.W. Suit v. DHW Approved as Modified
LIBERTY INSURANCE: Class Settlement in Schulte Suit Has Final OK
LIVE AUCTIONEERS: Can Compel Arbitration in Zheng Class Suit
LOUISIANA: Bid to Dismiss Brook Suit v. Commission Partly Granted

LUSTRE-CAL CORP: Wisconsin Court Refuses to Dismiss Hulce TCPA Suit
MDL 2886: $12.5M Settlement in Allura Fiber Suit Wins Final Nod
MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses Brooks Prisoners Complaint Against MDOC
MICHIGAN: Thompson Suit Transferred From E.D. to W.D. Michigan
OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: County Defendants Dismissed From Hall Suit

RITE AID: 9th Cir. Affirms Denial of Arbitration in Stafford Suit
SARTON PUERTO: Compelled to Produce Docs in Fiorentine TCPA Suit
SHUTTERFLY INC: 3rd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Garfield Class Suit
SIMON PROPERTY: Bid to Stay Discovery in Cafe Gelato Suit Denied
TRAVELCENTERS: Wiley Slams Non-Disclosure of Background Check

UNITED STATES: Epperson Granted Leave to File First Amended Suit
UNITED STATES: Passut Class Suit v. Dep't of Education Dismissed
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Scott ERISA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice

                            *********

9F INC: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Putative Class Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
9F Inc. said in its Form 20-F report filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on May 18, 2021, for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2020, that the motion to dismiss the putative class
action suit entitled, In re 9F Inc. Securities Litigation, Index
No. 654654/2020, is pending.

Beginning in September 2020, the Group and certain of its current
and former officers, directors and others were named as defendants
in various putative securities class actions captioned In re 9F
Inc. Securities Litigation, Index No. 654654/2020 (Supreme Court of
the State of New York County of New York, Amended Complaint filed
Dec. 7, 2020) (the "State Court Action") and Holland v. 9F Inc. et
al., No. 2:21-cv-00948 (United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, filed Jan. 20, 2021) (the "Federal Court
Action").

Both actions allege that defendants made misstatements and
omissions in connection with the Company's initial public offering
in August 2019 in violation of the federal securities laws.

On April 21, 2021, the parties completed briefing on Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the State Court Action, and a decision is
currently pending.

Both cases remain in their preliminary stages.

9F Inc. initially conducted its business through Jiufu Shuke
Technology Group Co., Ltd. formerly known as Beijing Jiufu Times
Investment Consulting Co., Ltd., Jiufu Internet Finance Holdings
Group Co., Ltd. and Jiufu Jinke Holdings Group Co., Ltd.,
successively), a PRC company incorporated in December 2006. 9F Inc
is a China-based company mainly engaged in the provision of
financial investment services through digital financial account
platform. The Company's products and services mainly include loan
products, online wealth management products, and payment
facilitation.


ABIOMED INC: Bid to Nix Local 705 Teamsters' Class Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------------
Abiomed, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 21, 2021, for the fiscal
year ended March 31, 2021, that the motion to dismiss the
consolidated class action suit headed by Local 705 International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Fund, is pending.

On or about August 6, 2019, the Company received a securities class
action complaint filed on behalf of a single shareholder in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on
behalf of himself and persons or entities that purchased or
acquired the Company's securities between January 31, 2019 through
July 31, 2019.

On October 7, 2019, a similar purported class action complaint was
filed by a different shareholder on behalf of himself and persons
or entities that purchased or acquired the Company's securities
between November 1, 2018 and July 31, 2019.  

Also, on October 7, 2019, four shareholders filed applications to
be appointed lead plaintiff and for their counsel to be appointed
lead counsel for the class.

Two of those shareholders also filed motions to consolidate the two
cases and two of the shareholders have withdrawn their applications
to be lead plaintiff.

The complaints allege that the Company violated Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of and Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act, in connection with
allegedly misleading disclosures made by the Company regarding its
financial condition and results of operations. The Company believes
that the allegations are without merit and plans to defend itself
vigorously.

On June 29, 2020, the Court issued an order consolidating the two
cases and appointed Local 705 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Pension Fund as the lead plaintiff and the Labaton
Sucharow firm as lead counsel.  

On September 17, 2020, the lead plaintiff filed an amended
complaint in which it proposed a new class period of May 3, 2018 to
July 31, 2019.  

As prescribed by a scheduling order, the Company filed a motion to
dismiss on November 16, 2020, lead plaintiff filed its opposition
to that motion on January 15, 2021, and the Company filed its reply
on February 24, 2021.  

Abiomed, Inc. is a provider of mechanical circulatory support
devices and offers a continuum of care in heart recovery to heart
failure patients. The Company develops, manufactures and markets
proprietary products that are designed to enable the heart to rest,
heal and recover by improving blood flow and/or performing the
pumping function of the heart. The Company's products are used in
the cardiac catheterization lab, or cath lab, by interventional
cardiologists and in the heart surgery suite by heart surgeons for
patients who are in need of hemodynamic support prophylactically or
emergently before, during or after angioplasty or heart surgery
procedures. The company is based on Danvers, Massachusetts.


ADOMANI INC: Mollik Class Suit Ongoing in California
----------------------------------------------------
ADOMANI, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 25, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company continues
to
defend a class action suit entitled, M.D. Ariful Mollik v. ADOMANI,
Inc. et al., Case No. RIC 1817493.

On August 23, 2018, a purported class action lawsuit captioned M.D.
Ariful Mollik v. ADOMANI, Inc. et al., Case No. RIC 1817493, was
filed in the Superior Court of the State of California for the
County of Riverside against the company, certain of its executive
officers, Edward R. Monfort, the former Chief Technology Officer
and a former director of ADOMANI, Inc., and the two underwriters of
the company's offering of common stock under Regulation A in June
2017.

This complaint alleges that documents related to the company's
offering of common stock under Regulation A in June 2017 contained
materially false and misleading statements and that all defendants
violated Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, and that the
company and the individual defendants violated Section 15 of the
Securities Act, in connection therewith.

The plaintiff seeks on behalf of himself and all class members: (i)
certification of a class under California substantive law and
procedure; (ii) compensatory damages and interest in an amount to
be proven at trial; (iii) reasonable costs and expenses incurred in
this action, including counsel fees and expert fees; (iv) awarding
of rescission or rescissionary damages; and (v) equitable relief at
the discretion of the Court.

Plaintiff's counsel has subsequently filed a first amended
complaint, a second amended complaint, a third amended complaint,
and a fourth amended complaint.

Plaintiff Mollik was replaced by putative class representatives
Alan K. Brooks and Electric Drivetrains, LLC. Alan K. Brooks was
subsequently dropped as a putative class representative.

On October 27, 2020, the company answered the fourth amended
complaint, generally denying the allegations and asserting
affirmative defenses.

On November 5, 2019, Network 1 and Boustead Securities filed a
cross-complaint against the Company seeking indemnification under
the terms of the underwriting agreement the Company and the
Underwriters entered for the Company's initial public offering.

On December 10, 2019, the Company filed its answer to the
Underwriters' cross-complaint, generally denying the allegations
and asserting affirmative defenses.

Also on this date, the Company filed a cross-complaint against the
Underwriters seeking indemnification under the terms of the
Underwriting Agreement. On January 14, 2020, Mr. Monfort filed a
cross-complaint against the Underwriters seeking indemnification
under the terms of the Underwriting Agreement.

On January 15, 2020, Mr. Monfort filed a cross-complaint against
the Company seeking indemnification under the terms of the
Company's Amended and Restated Bylaws and Section 145 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. On February 18, 2020, the company
filed an answer to Mr. Monfort's cross-complaint, generally denying
the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.

ADOMANI, Inc. provides zero-emission electric and hybrid drivetrain
systems for integration in new and existing school buses and medium
to heavy-duty commercial fleet vehicles. ADOMANI, Inc. was founded
in 2012 and is headquartered in Corona, California.


ADVENT TECHNOLOGIES: Seeks Dismissal of Frey Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------
Advent Technologies Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 20, 2021,
for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that a notice of
dismissal of the complaint initiated by Dillon Frey, was filed in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York.

On December 17, 2020, a purported shareholder class action
complaint was filed by Dillon Frey against the Company in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York,
alleging that the proposed Business Combination with Advent is both
procedurally and substantively unfair and seeking to maintain the
action as a class action and enjoin the Business Combination, among
other things, without stating a specific amount of damages.

The complaint does not provide detail as to how the proposed
Business Combination is unfair, either procedurally or
substantively, and we believe it has no merit.

On February 10, 2021, a notice of dismissal of the complaint was
filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Advent Technologies Holdings, Inc. is a blank check company
incorporated in Delaware on June 18, 2018 formed for the purposes
of effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition,
stock purchase, reorganization or similar business combination with
one or more businesses, which the company refers to as its initial
business combination. The company is based in Boston,
Massachusetts.


AMAZON.COM: Faces Suit for Online Retail Sales Monopoly
-------------------------------------------------------
Kenneth David West and Robert Taylor, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00694, (W.D. Wash., May 26, 2021), seeks
damages and injunctive relief pursuant to federal law and pursuant
to various state antitrust, unfair competition, unjust enrichment
and consumer protection laws of various states.

Amazon is an online retailer with its principal headquarters in
Seattle, Washington. Amazon sells its own products directly to
retail customers and also allows third-party merchants to sell
products on its online retail sales platform.

Amazon deducts a commission (or "referral fee") from its
third-party merchants from the price of each item sold on its
platform, typically around 15%. Optionally, and for an additional
fee, third-party merchants may select Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA)
for Amazon to store products, pack and ship orders, collect
payments, and manage customer service and returns. Majority of
third-party merchants selling on Amazon's platform also sell on
competing platforms, including their own websites and the platforms
offered by companies like eBay, Walmart, and Wayfair. Amazon
imposes fees for the use of its platform that are substantially
higher than the fees charged by other platforms -- especially third
party merchants' own websites, which have no fees at all. Amazon's
alleged monopoly comes from its power to control the prices of a
vast number of goods offered for sale in the U.S. online retail
sales market. In light of the volume of sales that takes place on
Amazon's platform, the overwhelming majority of retailers have no
choice but to list their products on Amazon's platform, says the
complaint.

West and Taylor are regular shoppers on Amazon's platform. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Steve W. Berman, Esq.
      Barbara A. Mahoney, Esq.
      HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
      1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
      Seattle, WA 98101
      Telephone: (206) 623-7292
      Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
      Email: steve@hbsslaw.com
             barbaram@hbsslaw.com

             - and -

      Derek W. Loeser, Esq.
      KELLER ROHRBACK L.L.P.
      1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
      Seattle, WA 98101-3052
      Telephone: (206) 623-1900
      Facsimile: (206) 623-3384
      Email: Dloeser@kellerrohrback.com

             - and -

      Zina Bash, Esq.
      KELLER LENKNER LLC
      501 Congress Avenue, Suite 150
      Austin, TX, 78701
      Telephone: (512) 620-8375
      Email: zina.bash@kellerlenkner.com

             - and -

      Warren D. Postman, Esq.
      Albert Y. Pak, Esq.
      KELLER LENKNER LLC
      1300 I Street N.W., Suite 400E
      Washington DC, 20005
      Telephone: (202) 749-8334
      Email: wdp@kellerlenkner.com
             albert.pak@kellerlenkner.com


AMERICAN FEDERATION: First Amended Schaszberger Class Suit Tossed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DAVID SCHASZBERGER, et al., Plaintiffs v. AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 13,
Defendant, Civil Action No. 3:19-1922 (M.D. Pa.), Judge Malachy E.
Mannion of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint.

The Plaintiffs are non-members of AFSCME seeking to recover
fair-share fees paid to the union when such fees were authorized by
Pennsylvania state law, 71 P.S. Section 575, and had been held
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  They bring the
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and seek
compensatory and declaratory relief against the Union in connection
with its collection of fair-share fees from them prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, _ U.S. _, 138 S.Ct.
2448 (2018).

In Janus, the Supreme Court overruled Abood, and held that "a state
law requiring non-union-member public employees to pay fees to the
union to compensate the union for costs incurred in the
collective-bargaining process" was unconstitutional.  Thus, the
Court in Janus held that "States and public-sector unions may no
longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees."  Further,
the Court held that "neither an agency fee nor any other payment to
the union may be deducted from a non-member's wages, nor may any
other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the
employee affirmatively consents to pay."

Additionally, the Supreme Court in Janus held that it was a
violation of the First Amendment for public sector unions to
require non-members to pay fair-share fees as a condition of public
employment.

Pennsylvania permits certain of its own employees to organize and
bargain collectively with the Commonwealth, through a
representative organization of their choosing, over the terms and
conditions of their employment.  AFSCME is a labor organization
certified as the exclusive representative of certain
classifications of state employees and for several bargaining units
in the state.

The Plaintiffs were employed by the state in jobs that were within
a classification covered by AFSCME and their bargaining units were
represented by AFSCME.  AFSCME had a legal duty to represent
equally the interests of all employees in the bargaining units, in
collective bargaining and grievance administration, whether they
were dues-paying members of the union or not.  The Plaintiffs were
not members of AFSCME, but they allege that the union was legally
allowed to collect fair share fees from them under Pennsylvania's
Public Employee Fair Share Fee Law, 71 P.S. Section 575, since it
represented them in collective bargaining.

Under state law, AFSCME negotiated with the state a Master
Agreement ("MA") for the collection of fair-share fees from
non-members state employees, including the Plaintiffs.  Under the
MA, prior to June 27, 2018, all Commonwealth employees in the
collective bargaining units who were represented by AFSCME and who
were not union members, such as the Plaintiffs, were forced to pay
"fair-share fees" to AFSCME as a condition of their public
employment.

The Plaintiffs state that at no time was any one of them a member
of AFSCME.  They further allege that before June 27, 2018,
government employers covered by the MA, such as they were,
involuntarily had fair-share fees deducted from their paychecks
despite the fact that they "never affirmatively authorized these
fees to be taken from their wages."  Rather, they allege that
"their employer automatically garnished their wages directly from
their paychecks and transmitted them to AFSCME."  The Plaintiffs
further allege that before June 27, 2018, government employers
covered by the CBA "deducted fair share fees from their and other
nonmembers' wages without their consent and, transferred those
funds to AFSCME, which collected those funds."

As such, the Plaintiffs aver that "AFSCME should have known that
its seizure of fair share fees from non-consenting employees likely
violated the First Amendment." They also seek to bring this case as
a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) for themselves and for
all others similarly situated. They define the proposed class as
"all current and former Commonwealth employees from whom AFSCME
collected fair share fees pursuant to its collective bargaining
agreement with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."

The Plaintiffs raise claims in their FAC under the First Amendment.
Specifically, they allege that "AFSCME, acting under color of
state law in concert with Pennsylvania, violated their and the
class members' First Amendment rights to free speech and
association, as secured against state infringement by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, by requiring the payment of fair share fees as
a condition of employment and by collecting such fees."

As relief, the Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 2201(a), "declaring that AFSCME violated the
Plaintiffs' and class members' constitutional rights by compelling
them to pay fair share fees as a condition of their employment and
by collecting fair-share fees from them without consent."
Additionally, they seek monetary damages "in the full amount of
fair share fees and assessments seized from their wages", as well
as costs and attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988.

The Plaintiffs are proceeding on their FAC filed on Dec. 18, 2020.
On Jan. 19, 2021, AFSCME filed its motion to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' FAC, and filed its brief in support on Feb. 2, 2021.
On Feb. 16, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed their brief in opposition.
AFSCME filed its reply brief on March 2, 2021.

The Defendant's motion seeks dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims
against it for retrospective monetary relief under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and it seeks dismissal
of the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment under Rule
12(b)(1).

Specifically, AFSCME contends that the Plaintiffs' First Amendment
claims against it, in the putative class action, for retrospective
monetary relief under Section 1983 should be dismissed since it
relied in good faith on the formerly valid Pennsylvania law and
longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent that allowed it
to collect fair-share fees from public-sector employees who were
not members of the union.  It contends that the Plaintiffs' request
for declarative judgment should be dismissed for lack of standing
and mootness.

The Court states that it has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
28 U.S.C. Section 1331 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1343(a) because the
Plaintiffs aver violations of their rights under the U.S.
Constitution.  Venue is appropriate in the Court since AFSCME is
located in the district and the alleged constitutional violations
occurred in this district.

Judge Mannion explains that the Plaintiffs instituted the case
after the Supreme Court decided Janus.  The Plaintiffs are state
employees who, before Janus, were required to pay fair-share fees
to AFSCME for collective bargaining representation.  Specifically,
the MA contained a fair-share fee provision which required the
Plaintiffs to pay fair share fees to AFSCME.  However, after the
Janus decision, AFSCME stopped receiving fair-share fees from
non-members, including the Plaintiffs.  In the action, the
Plaintiffs seek AFSCME to repay themselves, as well as a putative
class of all non-union state employees, all the fair-share fees
that the union received prior to Janus.

The Plaintiffs essentially argue that they suffered injury from the
pre-Janus agency-shop arrangements because they were forced to pay
AFSCME fair-share fees as a condition of their employment with the
state even though they declined union membership.  They basically
contend that their constitutional right to withhold money from the
union was violated and that this inflicted an injury upon them that
can be redressed under Section 1983 by an award of money damages
for the violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech
and association by forcing them to pay AFSCME fair-share fees as a
condition of their employment.

The Plaintiffs assert that the good faith defense should not apply
to their claim for damages under Section 1983 since they contend it
is contrary to the statute.  They argue that the Third Circuit's
decision in Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n, 972 F.3d
262 (3d Cir. 2020) supports their position, but Judge Mannion does
not find the Plaintiffs' contention persuasive.

AFSCME contends that it is entitled to assert a good faith defense
to the Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim seeking retrospective
monetary relief for their payments of the fair-share fees based on
"Pennsylvania statute and then-controlling and directly on-point
United States Supreme Court precedent that expressly authorized
fair-share fees."  AFSCME contends that since it acted "in
good-faith reliance on presumptively valid state laws in collecting
pre-Janus fair-share fees, it has a complete defense to Section
1983 liability" and cannot be held retrospectively liable to the
Plaintiffs in the case.

Despite the Plaintiffs' arguments in their brief in opposition as
to why the good faith defense should not bar their suit for damages
under Section 1983, Judge Mannion again finds the many cases to
which AFSCME cites are persuasive and concurs with their conclusion
that the good faith defense shields the union from liability with
respect to the Plaintiffs' post-Janus claims for damages under
Section 1983.  To the extent that the Plaintiffs contend AFSCME's
good-faith defense conflicts with the Supreme Court's cases on the
retroactive application of its decisions, even if the Judge court
assumed, arguendo, that Janus applied retroactively, he nonetheless
would find that the good faith defense still precludes the relief
the Plaintiffs seek.

AFSCME was acting in accordance with Abood and state law, prior to
Janus, at the time it allegedly was violating the Plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights.  Thus, as AFSCME points out, both Judge Rendell
and Judge Fisher cited Reynoldsville Casket v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749
(1995), and determined that the unions' defense constituted a
previously existing, independent legal basis for denying the relief
sought by the plaintiffs."

For these reasons, Judge Mannion grants AFSCME's motion and
dismissed with prejudice the Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in
their FAC seeking to hold the union retrospectively liable under
Section 1983.  He finds futility in allowing the Plaintiffs leave
to file a second amended complaint.

Finally, AFSCME argues that the Plaintiffs' request for Declaratory
Judgment should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
standing.  It states that the Plaintiffs do not allege any ongoing
constitutional violation; rather, the deduction of fair share fees
by the Commonwealth and the transmission of those fees to the Union
ceased more than a year before Plaintiffs filed their original
Complaint.  As such, it contends that the Plaintiffs do not have
standing to seek a judgment declaring that the Union's prior
conduct was unconstitutional.

In Wenzig v. SEIU Local 668, 426 F.Supp.3d 88 (M.D. Pa. 2019), the
Court held that "Declaratory judgment is not meant to adjudicate
alleged past unlawful activity."  In Diamond, it also held that the
Plaintiffs' claims for declarative and injunctive relief with
respect to fair-share fees were moot based on the Janus decision
and union defendants' compliance with it.

Judge Mannion again concurs with the courts in Diamond and Hartnett
v. Pennsylvania State Education Association, 390 F.Supp.3d 600
(M.D. Pa. May 17, 2019, and holds that the Plaintiffs' request for
declarative judgment in their FAC is moot based on Janus and, based
on the undisputed fact that AFSCME stopped collecting fair-share
fees from state non-union member employees, including the
Plaintiffs, following the Janus decision.  As AFSCME indicates, the
Janus decision and its subsequent cessation of collecting fair
share fees from state non-union member employees "occurred more
than one year before Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and more than
two years before the Plaintiffs filed their FAC, and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the collection of fair share fees will
reoccur."  Thus, AFSCME's motion to dismiss is granted with respect
to the Plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment.

Based on the foregoing reasons, Judge Mannion granted Defendant
AFSCME's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' FAC pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6).  He dismissed all of the Plaintiffs'
claims with prejudice.  An appropriate order will be issued.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Memorandum is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2srzrspa from Leagle.com.


ARK RESTAURANTS: Deal in Tipped Workers' Suit Gets Initial Approval
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Ark Restaurants Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 18, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended April 3, 2021, that the settlement agreement
in the putative class action suit initiated by two former tipped
service workers, received preliminary approval.

On May 1, 2018, two former tipped service workers, individually and
on behalf of all other similarly situated personnel, filed a
putative class action lawsuit against the Company and certain
subsidiaries as well as certain officers of the Company.  

Plaintiffs alleged, on behalf of themselves and the putative class,
that the Company violated certain of the New York State Labor Laws
and related regulations.  

The Complaint sought unspecified money damages, together with
interest, liquidated damages and attorney fees.  

On December 14, 2020, the parties reached a settlement agreement
resolving all issues alleged in the Complaint, which received
preliminary approval by the New York State Supreme Court, for
approximately the amount which was previously accrued.

Ark Restaurants Corp. owns and operates 20 restaurants and bars, 19
fast food concepts and catering operations in the U.S. The New
York-based Company's portfolio of brands includes Shuckers, The
Rustic Inn, and Southwest Porch.


BAJCO ILLINOIS: Proceedings in Regan BIPA Suit Stayed Until Aug. 19
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division, allowed
Bajco's Motion to Stay Proceedings in the case, JAMES REGAN,
Plaintiff v. BAJCO ILLINOIS LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-3064
(C.D. Ill.).

Plaintiff Regan brings the action against his former employer Bajco
for violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
(BIPA).  Regan filed the action in Illinois Circuit Court for
Sangamon County, Illinois.  Bajco removed that action to the Court.
Regan alleges he previously worked for Bajco.  He alleges that he
was required to provide Bajco, or its agent, with his fingerprint,
and he was required clock-in and clock-out at work by scanning his
fingerprint on the biometric timeclock device.

The Plaintiff alleges Bajco violated the BIPA by failing to create
written policies, make them publicly available, establish a
retention schedule and destruction guidelines for retained
biometric information (Count I); failing to provide required
notices to Regan and securing his written consent before capturing
his fingerprint (Count II); disseminating Regan's fingerprint
without his consent (Count III).

Mr. Regan brings the action on behalf of himself and the other
employees of Bajco's facilities in Illinois.  He seeks declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief.  Regan seeks $1,000 in statutory
damages for each negligent violation of BIPA and $5,000 for each
intentional or reckless violation, plus prejudgment interest.

Bajco has answered and asserted various affirmative defenses.  It
has also moved to stay the proceeding pending the resolution of
four appeals now pending: Cothron v White Castle System, Inc., Case
No. 20-3202 pending before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals;
Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., Case No. 1-20-0562, pending
before the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District; Marion
v. Ring Container Techs., LLC, No. 3-20-0184, pending before the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District; and McDonald v.
Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, No. 126511, pending before the
Illinois Supreme Court.

The Cothron case concerns whether a private entity, such as an
employer, violates BIPA only when the entity allegedly first
collects or first discloses biometric data, such as a fingerprint,
without complying with BIPA, or whether a violation occurs each
time that entity allegedly collects or discloses the individual's
biometric data.  In Regan's case, the issue would be whether one
violation occurred during his employment and the cause of action
accrued when he allegedly provided his fingerprint to Bajco, or did
a separate violation occur each time he allegedly clocked in or out
with his fingerprint and each time Bajco allegedly disseminated his
fingerprint to a third party.

The Tims and Marion cases address which statute of limitations
applies.  The BIPA does not include a statute of limitations.  The
issue in these appeals is which of these three possible statutes of
limitations applies: The Illinois one-year statute of limitations
for publications of matter violating the right to privacy, 735 ILCS
5/13-201; the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury
torts, 735 ILCS 5/13-202; or the five-year catchall statute, 735
ILCS 5/13-205.

The McDonald case addresses whether the Illinois Workers'
Compensation Act (IWCA), 820 ILCS 305/1, preempts employees' claims
against employers under BIPA.  Regan opposes the proposed stay.

Analysis

Regan urges the Court to apply the standard for stays pending
appeal in the case.  Judge Schanzle-Haskins disagrees.  He says a
stay pending appeal stays a proceeding while a party in that
proceeding seeks to challenge a lower court decision in that
proceeding.  The standard for a stay pending appeal tracks the
standard for a preliminary injunction because such a stay
effectively enjoins the effect of lower court's decision.  In the
case, Bajco does not seek to stay an adverse decision in the case.
The question is how to manage the course of the case.  Hence, the
standard for stays pending appeal does not apply.

Judge Schanzle-Haskins addresses the appropriateness of a stay
pending the outcome of the McDonald, Tims, Marion, and Cothron
cases.

A. McDonald

In McDonald, The Illinois Supreme Court will address whether the
IWCA preempts BIPA actions by employees against employers.  The
Illinois Appellate Court, lower Illinois courts, and federal
district courts have consistently found that the IWCA does not
preempt claims for statutory damages.

Judge Schanzle-Haskins holds that the Illinois Supreme Court could
disagree with these courts and find IWCA preemption.  If so, the
matter would be resolved.  Such an outcome is unlikely given
authoritative decision from the Illinois Appellate Court and the
persuasive authority from the other Illinois courts and federal
district courts.  Under these circumstances, the Judge finds that a
stay to wait for a decision in McDonald is not likely to simplify
the issues, streamline the trial, or reduce the burden of
litigation on the parties.  He does not grant a stay to wait for a
decision in McDonald.

B. Tims and Marion

Judge Schanzle-Haskins finds that the Tims and Marion decisions
could also materially affect the case by determining the
appropriate statute of limitations.  He says the applicable statute
of limitations could also affect whether Regan has a claim,
depending on when he worked for Bajco.  The Complaint does not
allege his dates of employment. The five-year catchall statute
would also include more employees in the potential class than the
one-year rights to privacy statute.  The size of the class could
materially affect the scope of discovery.  Knowing whether Regan's
claim is barred and knowing the scope of the possible class claims
would simplify issues and streamline the trial. Greater certainty
about Regan's claim and the scope of the possible class would also
reduce the burden of litigation on the parties.  Further, the
potential delay from waiting for a decision in Tims decision, at
least, may be minimal because the case was fully briefed by the
time the Varnado decision was issued in January 2021.

C. Cothron

Judge Schanzle-Haskins holds that Cothron decision could also
materially affect whether Regan's cause of action accrued.  If the
Seventh Circuit determines that a BIPA cause of action accrues once
when a defendant initially collected biometric data, then the
statute of limitations in the case ran from the day Regan allegedly
first provided his fingerprint to Bajco when he started work.  If
the Seventh Circuit determines that a new violation occurs every
time an employee clocks in or out with a fingerprint, then Regan
accrued a new cause of action each day he worked for Bajco. Regan's
claim would not be entirely barred as long as his last day of work
was within the statute.

The Cothron decision could also materially affect the scope of the
possible class claims.  If the cause accrued only once when the
employee first provided his or her fingerprint, then the class
would be limited to persons hired within the statute of
limitations.  If a new cause accrued every time the employee
clocked in or out, then the class could include every person who
worked for Bajco during the limitations period, even employees
hired before the limitations period.  The scope of the possible
class will materially affect the size of the class, the scope of
discovery on class claims, and the trial of class claims.  In light
of these considerations, staying the matter until a decision in
Cothron will provide clarity that will simplify the issues,
streamline the trial, and reduce the burden of litigation on the
parties.  Given the lack of any showing or even allegation of
concrete harm, Regan's speculation is not sufficient to outweigh
the benefits to the stay to further the litigation.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge Schanzle-Haskins allowed Defendant
Bajco's Motion to Stay Proceedings.  The matter is stayed until
Aug. 19, 2021.  The parties are directed to inform the Court when
decisions are entered in the Tims, Marion, and Cothron cases.  The
parties are also directed to file a status report by Aug. 10, 2021,
informing the Court of the status of the Tims, Marion, and Cothron
cases and the parties' positions on the appropriateness of
continuing the stay.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/5a9kwdwu from Leagle.com.


BLACK DIAMOND: $340K Class Accord in Borelli Suit Has Prelim. OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Edward Borelli, et al., Plaintiffs v. Black Diamond
Aggregates, Inc., et al., Defendants, Case No.
2:14-cv-02093-KJM-KJN (E.D. Cal.), Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted
the Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the
class and collective action settlement.

Several former employees of Black Diamond are pursuing wage and
hour claims on behalf of a putative class against the company and
its parent, Basic Resources, Inc.  The parties have reached a
settlement agreement, and the matter is before the court on the
Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class
and collective action settlement.

According to the operative complaint, Black Diamond used a
compensation scheme that paid drivers less than minimum wages and
wrongfully withheld pay for required rest breaks and other working
time.  The complaint also includes claims for wrongfully withheld
meal breaks, faulty pay stubs, and related wage and hour claims,
among others.  It seeks certification of a class action as well as
a collective action under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).

Black Diamond successfully moved to compel arbitration in 2017.
The Court also compelled Basic Resources to participate in the
arbitration, finding the two companies were alter egos.  While the
arbitration was still ongoing, the parties participated in
mediation with Lisa Klerman, a mediator whom California district
courts have described as "experienced" and "well-respected" in wage
and hour class actions.  The parties eventually reached an
agreement to settle on behalf of all former Black Diamond truck
drivers with the same wage and hour claims.

The agreement creates three overlapping subclasses of former Black
Diamond employees: One with claims under California labor law, a
second with federal FLSA claims, and a third with claims under the
California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).  In total the
class includes 85 drivers who worked at Black Diamond between 2010
and 2014, when the company ceased operations.

Black Diamond and Basic Resources agree to pay $340,000 to settle
these claims.  Of that sum, the parties agree that up to $112,000
may cover attorneys' fees, $12,000 may be allocated to costs, and
$7,500 will be paid to each of the three named Plaintiffs as
service awards.  The parties estimate $5,200 will be paid to
administer the settlement.  The settlement amount will be reduced
by any resulting payroll taxes, approximately $11,300, and a $7,500
payment to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA), as required by the California Labor Code.  These deductions
would result in a net settlement amount of approximately $169,300,
slightly less than half the gross.

The parties propose that notice be given to the class members and
money distributed from the net settlement fund using the contact
information in Black Diamond's employment records.  Members of the
putative Rule 23 subclass may opt out or object; members of the
FLSA collective action must either opt in or have previously
consented as provided in the FLSA; and membership in the PAGA
subclass is automatic under California law.  No class member will
receive less than $25.  The parties propose that any unclaimed
funds be paid cy pres to the Salvation Army in Modesto.

The Plaintiffs move for preliminary approval of the class and
collective claims and of the settlement agreement under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the FLSA.  The motion is unopposed.

First, Judge Mueller finds that the Plaintiffs' claims are likely
to satisfy the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and the requisites
of Rule 23(b)(3).  Therefore, the proposed class is likely to be
certified at this preliminary stage.

Next, the Judge finds that the agreement is likely to be approved
under Rule 23(e)(2) if the concerns expressed can be resolved at
the final approval stage.  At a minimum, she requires a more
searching analysis of (1) the risks of further litigation,
including by in camera review of the parties' mediation briefs; (2)
support and justification for attorneys' fees greater than the 25
percent benchmark, including sufficient information to perform a
lodestar cross-check; and (3) greater support for the requested
incentive awards to the named class members.

The Judge also finds for similar reasons that the members of the
proposed FLSA collective action are similarly situated.  These
commonalities suffice at this stage.  She finds at this preliminary
stage that the settlement agreement is likely to embody "a fair and
reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions."
The final approval will depend on the resolution of the same
concerns described.

Finally, the parties have proposed a combined notice of the
proposed settlement for sending to all three subclasses.  They have
also proposed a combined form for submitting claims and opting into
the FLSA class. The notice explains the nature of the case, the
class definition, and the claims; that the recipient may opt out of
the California subclass and may opt into the federal subclass and
that inclusion in the PAGA is automatic; how to opt in or opt out;
and the binding effect of participating in the class or collective
action.  Its language is sufficiently clear and plain.  The Judge
therefore concludes the proposed notice satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23(b)(2)(B) and 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).  She, however,
strictly enforces the filing requirement of Section 216(b).

For these reasons, Judge Mueller granted the motion for preliminary
approval.  She adopted paragraphs 1-8, 10-12, 17, and 18 of the
proposed order at ECF No. 87-6, which are incorporated in the Order
by reference.  The Plaintiffs are directed to give notice within 14
days of a final approval hearing, which must occur on an available
civil law and motion calendar date.  The Order resolves ECF No.
87.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ym7mr4pt from Leagle.com.


BOOZ ALLEN: Amended Langley Complaint Dismissed w/o Prejudice
-------------------------------------------------------------
Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation said in its Form 10-K
report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
May 21, 2021, for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2021, that the
court overseeing the case, Langley v. Booz Allen Hamilton Holding
Corp., has dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety without
prejudice.

On June 19, 2017, a purported stockholder of the Company filed a
putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia styled Langley v. Booz Allen
Hamilton Holding Corp., No. 17-cv-00696 naming the Company, its
Chief Executive Officer, and its Chief Financial Officer as
defendants purportedly on behalf of all purchasers of the Company's
securities from May 19, 2016 through June 15, 2017.

On September 5, 2017, the court named two lead plaintiffs, and on
October 20, 2017, the lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended
complaint.

The complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, alleging
misrepresentations or omissions by the Company purporting to relate
to matters that are the subject of the DOJ investigation described.


The plaintiffs seek to recover from the Company and the individual
defendants an unspecified amount of damages.

The Company believes the suit lacks merit and intends to defend
against the lawsuit.

Motions to dismiss were argued on January 12, 2018, and on February
8, 2018, the court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety
without prejudice.

Booz Allen said, "At this stage of the lawsuit, the Company is not
able to reasonably estimate the expected amount or range of cost or
any loss associated with the lawsuit."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation provides management and
technology consulting, engineering, analytics, digital, mission
operations, and cyber solutions to governments, corporations, and
not for-profit organizations in the United States and
internationally. Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation was
founded in 1914 and is headquartered in McLean, Virginia.


BRUIN E&P: Royalty, Based on Oil at Well Value, Court Says in Blasi
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, David A. Blasi and Paula J. Blasi, as Trustees of the
Blasi Living Trust, on behalf of themselves and a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v. Bruin E&P Partners, LLC
and Bruin E&P Operating, LLC, Defendants. David A. Blasi and Paula
J. Blasi, as Trustees of the Blasi Living Trust, on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v.
Lime Rock Resources Operating Co., Inc. and Lime Rock Resources
III-A, L.P., Defendants. David A. Blasi and Paula J. Blasi, as
Trustees of the Blasi Living Trust, on behalf of themselves and a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v. Kraken
Development III LLC, Defendant. David A. Blasi and Paula J. Blasi,
as Trustees of the Blasi Living Trust, on behalf of themselves and
a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v. Continental
Resources, Inc., Defendant. David A. Blasi and Paula J. Blasi, as
Trustees of the Blasi Living Trust, on behalf of themselves and a
class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs v. EOG Resources,
Inc., Defendant, Case Nos. 20200327, 20200328, 20200329, 20200330,
20200331 (N.D.), the Supreme Court of North Dakota answered "yes"
to the question certified by the U.S. District Court for the
District of North Dakota to the Court related to the interpretation
of an oil and gas lease:

     "Whether the instant oil royalty provision is interpreted to
      mean the royalty is based on the value of the oil 'at the
      well.'"

The Plaintiffs ("Blasi") sued the Defendants in five separate cases
in federal district court alleging Bruin underpaid royalties due
under the terms of various oil and gas leases.  Central to the
parties' dispute is the interpretation of the following royalty
provision: "Lessee covenants and agrees: To deliver to the credit
of the Lessor, free of cost, in the pipeline to which Lessee may
connect wells on said land, the equal fractional part of all oil
produced and saved from the leased premises."

Blasi accepts the royalties in cash rather than in kind.  Blasi
claims the royalty is to be paid "free of costs" and asserts Bruin
improperly deducted "various costs such as gathering or moving the
oil and other costs" from the marketable price of the oil.  Bruin
moved to dismiss the cases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) arguing
that Blasi's claims fail as a matter of law because the royalty oil
is to be valued at the well, which allows for the deduction of
post-production costs.

The federal district court has not decided Bruin's motion.  It
issued an order certifying the following question to the Court:
"Whether the instant oil royalty provision is interpreted to mean
the royalty is based on the value of the oil at the well."  The
court found there is no controlling precedent in North Dakota and
that a ruling by the Supreme Court of North Dakota may be
determinative of the proceedings.  It also concluded the issue was
"of some magnitude" in North Dakota, noting there are "at least six
separate putative class action suits" in federal district court
concerning the issue and one decision from the district where the
court concluded a lessor in a similar case presented a plausible
claim.

The certified question requires a determination as to whether the
lease establishes a royalty valuation point at the well or whether
the valuation point is at some other place downstream.  As crude
oil travels through the stream of production, its value increases
as costs are incurred to bring it to market.  The work-back method,
which the Supreme Court has adopted, accounts for those costs in a
calculation to determine the royalty value of oil or gas at a point
in the stream of production.  Although it adopted the work-back
method in the context of a royalty valuation point that was "at the
well," parties to a lease are free to set a valuation point
elsewhere.

Blasi claims the royalty provision in the case sets a valuation
point somewhere downstream of the well where the oil enters a
pipeline.  Bruin asserts the valuation point is at the well, where
all reasonable post-production costs may be deducted.  As a
threshold matter, we must decide whether to answer the certified
question.

Blasi has filed a motion urging the Supreme Court to decline to
answer the question because "discovery is needed to flesh out the
facts before resolving the meaning of the disputed oil royalty
clause."  Blasi claims discovery is "particularly important"
because the parties have advanced competing interpretations of the
word "pipeline," and discovery will "provide the context and
factual proof for what a pipeline is."  Blasi also argues discovery
will reveal the nature of the costs deducted by Bruin and allow the
Supreme Court to determine "whether these types of costs, or any
costs, are deductible pre-pipeline."

The Supreme Court denies Blasi's motion.  It opines that the
language at issue is unambiguous and presents a question of law.
It need not consider any extrinsic evidence to reach our holding.
The exact meaning of the word "pipeline," and whether any specific
pipe constitutes a "pipeline," is not dispositive of the issue.
Nor is it necessary to know exactly which costs were deducted to
interpret the royalty provision.  No matter which costs were
deducted, the valuation point will remain the same, and whether
deduction of a certain cost was permissible can only be determined
after a valuation point is established.  The Supreme Court
therefore looks to the language of the lease to interpret the
provision.

The oil royalty clause requires the lessee "to deliver" a fraction
of "all oil produced."  In other words, it requires an in-kind
delivery at a specified location.  The provision specifies the
location for the delivery -- "in the pipeline to which lessee may
connect wells on said land," and it establishes how the oil must be
delivered to that location -- "free of cost."

The Supreme Court opines that it need not look to any industry
standard definition of a pipeline or parse the different types of
pipes used in the oil and gas industry.  The royalty provision
itself identifies the pipeline that is contemplated.  The meaning
is based upon the pipeline's proximity to the wells, not its
physical characteristics -- it is "the pipeline to which the lessee
may connect wells on said land."  The use of "pipeline" in this
context connotes a location in relation to the well; it does not
designate a specific type of pipe as "the pipeline."

The plain language of the provision itself does not require the
actual existence of a pipeline.  It describes a pipeline the lessee
"may" connect to the wells.  In other words, the royalty obligation
exists regardless of whether the lessee constructs a pipeline at
the described location.  The location is at the "wells on said
land."  The royalty provision is unambiguous.  It establishes a
valuation point at the well.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court denies Blasi's motion
requesting that it declines to answer the question.  It holds, as a
matter of law, that the oil royalty provision in the case
unambiguously sets a valuation point at the well.  The answer to
the certified question is "yes."

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/fdj4tnxt from Leagle.com.

Rex A. Sharp -- RSharp@midwest-law.com -- (argued), Prairie
Village, KS, Isaac L. Diel -- IDiel@midwest-law.com -- (appeared),
Charles T. Schimmel (appeared), and Gregory M. Bentz (appeared), in
Overland Park, Kansas, and Michael S. Montgomery (appeared) and
Kyle G. Pender (on brief), in Fargo, North Dakota, for Plaintiffs
David A. Blasi and Paula J. Blasi.

Matthew J. Salzman -- matt.salzman@stinson.com -- (argued), Kansas
City, MO, and Paul J. Forster -- pforster@crowleyfleck.com --
(appeared), and Robin W. Forward (appeared), in Bismarck, North
Dakota, for Defendants Bruin E&P Partners, LLC and Bruin E&P
Operating, LLC, and Kraken Development III LLC.

Daniel T. Donovan -- daniel.donovan@kirkland.com -- (argued) and
Ragan Naresh (appeared), Washington, DC, and Paul J. Forster
(appeared), and Zachary R. Eiken (on brief), in Bismarck, North
Dakota, for Defendants Lime Rock Resources Operating Co., Inc. and
Lime Rock Resources III-A, L.P.

Jeffrey C. King -- Jeffrey.C.King@klgates.com -- (argued) and
Elizabeth L. Tiblets -- Elizabeth.Tiblets@klgates.com --
(appeared), in Fort Worth, Texas, and Ronald H. McLean (appeared)
and Kasey D. McNary (on brief), in Fargo, North Dakota, for
Defendant Continental Resources, Inc.

Daniel M. McClure -- dan.mcclure@nortonrosefulbright.com --
(appeared) and Rebecca J. Cole --
rebecca.cole@nortonrosefulbright.com -- (appeared), Houston, TX,
and Paul J. Forster (appeared) and Zachary R. Eiken (on brief), in
Bismarck, North Dakota, for Defendant EOG Resources, Inc.

Joshua A. Swanson, in Fargo, North Dakota, and George A. Barton, in
Overland Park, Kansas, for amicus curiae White River Royalties,
LLC, and Sara Commack.

Mitchell D. Armstrong, in Bismarck, North Dakota, for amicus curiae
North Dakota Petroleum Council.

Zachary E. Pelham -- zep@pearce-durick.com -- in Bismarck, North
Dakota, and Bruce M. Kramer, in Houston, Texas, for amicus curiae
American Petroleum Institute.

J. Scott Janoe -- scott.janoe@bakerbotts.com -- Macey Reasoner
Stokes, Jason A. Newman, and Laura N. Shoemaker, in Houston, Texas,
for amicus curiae Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC.


CHANGE HEALTHCARE: UHG Merger Related Suits Dismissed
-----------------------------------------------------
Change Healthcare Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on May 27, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended March 31, 2021, that the UnitedHealth Group
Incorporated (UHG) merger related suits have been dismissed.

On January 5, 2021, the company entered into an Agreement and Plan
of Merger with UnitedHealth Group Incorporated, and UnitedHealth
Group's wholly owned subsidiary Cambridge Merger Sub Inc. Pursuant
to the UHG Agreement, UnitedHealth Group has agreed to acquire all
of the outstanding shares of the Company's common stock for $25.75
per share in cash (the "UHG Transaction").

Following the announcement of the UHG Transaction, nine lawsuits
challenging the UHG Transaction were filed in various
jurisdictions.

The first lawsuit, a putative class action alleging breaches of
fiduciary duty, was filed in Tennessee Chancery Court, and was
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on March 17, 2021. The
remaining eight lawsuits were filed in federal court between March
18, 2021 and April 7, 2021.

The operative complaints in those actions named the company and its
Board of Directors as defendants and alleged, among other things,
that the proxy statement filed in conjunction with the UHG
Transaction was materially incomplete and misleading in violation
of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder ("Section 14(a) Actions").

All of the Section 14(a) Actions were dismissed without prejudice
by April 23, 2021.

Change Healthcare Inc. is a leading healthcare technology company,
focused on accelerating the transformation of the healthcare system
through the power of our Change Healthcare platform. The company is
based in Nashville, Tennessee.

CHARGEPOINT HOLDINGS: Faces Switchback Merger Related Suits
-----------------------------------------------------------
ChargePoint Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-K/A report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on May 27, 2021,
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020, that the company faces
putative class action suits related to its merger with Switchback
Energy Acquisition Corporation.

On September 23, 2020, Lightning Merger Sub Inc., a Delaware
corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of the Company (Merger
Sub), ChargePoint, Inc., a Delaware corporation, and Switchback
Energy Acquisition Corporation entered into a business combination
agreement and plan of reorganization (the "Business Combination
Agreement"), pursuant to which, among other things, Merger Sub will
be merged with and into ChargePoint, with ChargePoint surviving the
Merger as a wholly owned subsidiary of Switchback.

On October 29, 2020, a putative class action lawsuit was filed in
the Supreme Court of the State of New York by a purported
Switchback stockholder in connection with the Business Combination:
Bulsa v. Switchback Energy Acquisition Corporation, et al., Index
No. 655800/2020 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.).

Separately, on November 6, 2020, a putative class action lawsuit
was filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York by a
different purported Switchback stockholder in connection with the
Business Combination: Bushansky v. Switchback Energy Acquisition
Corporation, et al., Index No. 656119/2020 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.).

Additionally, on December 15, 2020, a complaint was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
by a purported Switchback stockholder in connection with the
Business Combination: Ward v. Switchback Energy Acquisition
Corporation, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-10577 (S.D.N.Y.).

On December 16, 2020, a separate complaint was filed in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York by a purported Switchback
stockholder in connection with the Business Combination: Baker v.
Switchback Energy Acquisition Corporation, et al., Index No.
657063/2020 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.).

The Complaints name Switchback and current members of the company's
board of directors as defendants.

The Complaints allege, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty
claims against our board of directors in connection with the
Business Combination.

The Complaints also allege that the proxy
statement/prospectus/consent solicitation statement related to the
Business Combination is materially misleading and/or omits material
information concerning the Business Combination, including, with
respect to the Federal Complaint, in violation of Sections 14(a)
and 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

The Complaints generally seek injunctive relief, unspecified
damages and awards of attorneys' and experts' fees, among other
remedies.

ChargePoint Holdings, Inc. is a blank check company incorporated on
May 10, 2019 as a Delaware corporation and formed for the purpose
of effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition,
stock purchase, reorganization or similar business combination with
one or more businesses. The company is based in Campbell,
California.


CHATTERJEE ADVISORS: New York Court Narrows Claims in Manbro Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MANBRO ENERGY CORPORATION, Plaintiff v. CHATTERJEE
ADVISORS, LLC, et al., Defendant, Case No. 20 Civ. 3773 (LGS)
(S.D.N.Y.), Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in
part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff Manbro Energy, a former investor in Winston Partners
Private Equity, LLC ("Fund"), brings the putative class action
seeking damages against those involved in the management of the
Fund, Defendants Chatterjee Advisors, Chatterjee Fund Management,
LP ("CFM"), Chatterjee Management Co. ("CMC"), doing business as
The Chatterjee Group ("TCG"), and Purnendu Chatterjee.  The Amended
Complaint asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with
contractual relations, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment.

In 1996, the Plaintiff, a privately-held company, invested around
$10 million in non-party Winston Partners II, LLC ("WP-II"), a
hedge fund run by Chatterjee and TCG.  In 1998, the Defendants
created the Fund, a limited liability company subsidiary of WP-II,
governed by a Limited Liability Company Agreement dated Dec. 13,
1998.  Non-marketable investments initially made by WP-II were
contributed to the Fund, in exchange for membership interests of
the Fund, and the Plaintiff attained an interest in the Fund based
on its pro rata share of illiquid assets formerly in WP-II.  The
Fund's investment objective is "to dispose of such existing
investment positions in an orderly manner that is intended to
maximize long-term values for both former and continuing members."

The Agreement designates Chatterjee Advisors as Fund Manager of the
Fund.  CFM, CMC and Chatterjee ("Secondary Defendants") also
substantially participated in Fund management, including making
investment decisions on behalf of the Fund.  On May 17, 2017, the
Plaintiff received a "Final Distribution Letter" signed by
Chatterjee on behalf of CFM, which announced that the Fund was in
the process of being dissolved and that a "final distribution" to
investors at NAV would be made as of March 31, 2017.  The final
distribution was allegedly an effort by the Defendants to benefit
themselves at the expense of Fund investors.

At the time of the final distribution, the Fund's only significant
investment was in Haldia Petrochemicals Limited ("HPL"), an Indian
petrochemicals company, which after years of performance issues had
begun to increase in value and was poised for growth.  The
Defendants are familiar with HPL, as Chatterjee is Chairman and
Director of HPL.  Chatterjee is the Chairman and Founder of CMC and
also exercises control over the operations of the other
Defendants.

The Defendants cashed out Fund investors -- by making a final
distribution to Fund investors at an NAV that did not reflect fair
market value -- and captured the upside of the investment by
retaining the HPL shares for themselves.  The redemption price was
based on the NAV of the HPL shares of ten Indian rupees per share
-- approximately 15 U.S. cents -- representing the cost of the
Fund's investment in the HPL shares in the 1990s.  The Defendants
calculated NAV on a "cost less impairment" basis, i.e., at the
lower of the investment cost basis or fair market value.  The fair
market value of the shares in 2017 was orders of magnitude greater
than the Defendants' calculated NAV.

According to the Agreement, the "terms of issuance and the rights
and obligations corresponding to the classes of membership
interests in the Fund" are set forth in the Information Statement.
The Information Statement provides that investors are restricted
from withdrawing at their own option.  The same section states that
Chatterjee Advisors "has the authority to require the withdrawal of
a member's interests on a compulsory basis at net asset value
[("NAV")] in its sole discretion."

Section 13 of the LLC Agreement, titled "Distributions," states
that members of the Fund do not have a right to Fund distributions
except in certain circumstances.  The section further provides that
distributions are made at the times and in the amounts determined
by Chatterjee Advisors, as set forth in the Information Statement.
The Information Statement includes a "Distribution Policy," which
states the "policy of the Fund will be to distribute all net cash
proceeds from realized investments, except to the extent of amounts
determined by CMC in its discretion to be appropriate as reserves
for anticipated future commitments and contingencies."

The Agreement provides that it "shall be governed by, and construed
under, the laws of the State of Delaware, all rights and remedies
being governed by said laws."

The Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Discussion

A. Applicable Law

Judge Schofield opines that all of the claims are governed by
Delaware law except the claim for tortious interference with
contractual relations, which is governed by New York law.  The
Complaint alleges that all entity Defendants have a principal place
of business in New York, the individual Defendant principally
resides in New York and a substantial part of the conduct that gave
rise to the Plaintiff's claims occurred in New York.  Manbro is an
Ohio corporation with its primary place of business in Ohio.  In
the case, the last event for liability is the financial harm Manbro
suffered at its primary place of business in Ohio.  Nevertheless,
New York has a greater interest in regulating business conduct
within its borders, as compared with Ohio or the other states where
multiple investors who are putative class members may be domiciled.
Accordingly, New York law governs the tortious interference
claim.

B. Breach of Contract Claim against Chatterjee Advisors (Count I)

Judge Schofield holds that the Complaint fails to plead a breach of
contract claim against Chatterjee Advisors.  She explains that an
element of a breach of contract claim under Delaware law is "the
breach of an obligation imposed by the contract."  The Plaintiff
presents two related theories of breach: Chatterjee Advisors was
obligated to (1) dissolve the Fund, and in turn, liquidate the HDL
investment, prior to the final distribution and (2) calculate the
final distribution based on fair value rather than "cost less
impairment."  The Agreement unambiguously does not impose these
obligations.  The breach of contract claim is dismissed because the
Complaint does not identify any contractual obligation breached by
Chatterjee Advisors in connection with the final distribution.

C. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
against Chatterjee Advisors (Count II)

The Plaintiff brings a breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing claim against Chatterjee Advisors, in the alternative
if there is no breach of an express contractual obligation.  The
Complaint alleges that Chatterjee Advisors breached its obligation
to act in good faith when it made a final distribution to investors
at NAV rather than fair market value and thereby kept for itself
and its affiliates profits that could have been realized by selling
the HPL investment and distributing to investors the proceeds of
the sale.

Judge Schofield finds that this claim is adequately pleaded.  She
reasons that the purpose of the Agreement is expressly stated in
the Information Statement, which is referenced in Section 8 of the
Agreement as setting forth "the terms of issuance and the rights
and obligations" of the members.  The Information Statement states
that "the principal investment objective" of the Fund is to
"dispose of its existing investment positions in an orderly manner
that is intended to maximize long-term values for both former and
continuing members."  In this context, the Complaint sufficiently
pleads a violation of the duty of good faith to act consistently
with the purpose of the parties' contract.

D. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations Claim against
the Secondary Defendants (Count III)

The Complaint's tortious interference with contract claim alleges
that the Secondary Defendants intentionally caused Chatterjee
Advisors to breach the Agreement.

Judge Schofield opines that this claim is insufficiently pleaded.
She finds that the Complaint alleges no facts that plausibly show
that each of the three Secondary Defendants procured the breach,
that they did so intentionally and that their actions were the "but
for" cause of the alleged breach.  The Complaint alleges that the
Secondary Defendants "intentionally and without justification
orchestrated the scheme to have Chatterjee Advisors make a final
distribution to members of the Fund at below-market NAV."  This
allegation is "conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true."
The only specific allegations are that the Plaintiff was notified
of the final distribution by letter, signed by Defendant Chatterjee
on Defendant CFM's letterhead, and that the NAV calculation was
provided by Defendant CMC.  These allegations are insufficient.
The tortious interference of contractual relations claim is
dismissed.

E. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim against all Defendants (Count
IV)

The Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim against Chatterjee
Advisors is dismissed as it is duplicative of the surviving
contract claim.

Judge Schofield denies the motion to dismiss the breach of
fiduciary duty claim against the Secondary Defendants, as they were
not parties to the Agreement and no contract claim is asserted
against them.  There is no independent basis for the fiduciary duty
claim against Chatterjee Advisors.  Accordingly, the fiduciary duty
claim against Chatterjee Advisors is duplicative of the implied
contract claim.

As to the Secondary Defendants -- against whom no contract claims
are alleged -- the Judge holds that the breach of fiduciary duty
claim survives.  The eComplaint alleges that the Secondary
Defendants "controlled" Chatterjee Advisors, "substantially
participated in the management of the Fund," and accordingly, "owed
fiduciary dutie including the duty not to use the Fund's
investments to benefit themselves at the expense of the Fund's
investors."  These allegations are general but sufficient at this
stage.  Also, the Complaint adequately pleads facts leading to the
inference that these Defendants knowingly participated in a breach
of fiduciary duty, based on their respective roles in connection
with the Fund and their relationship with each other.

The motion to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claim is granted
as to Chatterjee Advisors and denied as to the Secondary
Defendants.

F. Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim against the
Secondary Defendants (Count V)

The aiding and abetting claim against the Secondary Defendants may
proceed in the alternative to the breach of fiduciary duty claim,
Judge Schofield opines.  The Complaint alleges the relationships
among the Defendants, and critically, that along with Chatterjee
Advisors, the Secondary Defendants were substantially involved in
the management of the Fund, which may provide a basis for imputing
knowledge.  This is sufficient to survive dismissal at this stage.
The aiding and abetting claim may proceed against the Secondary
Defendants.

G. Unjust Enrichment Claim against All Defendants (Count VI)

Judge Schofield holds that the unjust enrichment claim survives
against the Secondary Defendants only.  As the Complaint adequately
states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the Secondary
Defendants, it also states a sufficient claim against them for
unjust enrichment.  The unjust enrichment claim against Chatterjee
Advisors is dismissed because it has been abandoned by the
Plaintiff.  Alternatively, the claim against Chatterjee Advisors is
dismissed as duplicative of the implied covenant claim.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim is
granted as to Chatterjee Advisors and denied as to the Secondary
Defendants.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Schofield granted in part and
denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss.  For clarity, the
surviving claims are: (i) Count II - Breach of Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim against Chatterjee Advisors; (ii)
Count IV - Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim against CFM, CMC and
Chatterjee; (iii) Count V - Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claim against CFM, CMC and Chatterjee; and (iv) Count VI -
Unjust Enrichment Claim against CFM, CMC and Chatterjee.  The Clerk
of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at Dkt. No.
42.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/wf49s5zr from Leagle.com.


COMMUNITY REGIONAL: 9th Cir. Affirms Arbitration in Franklin Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ISABELLE FRANKLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. COMMUNITY
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, FKA Fresno Community Hospital and Medical
Center, Defendant-Appellee, and COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTERS, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 19-17570 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's order granting
the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration of Franklin's claims
for statutory hour and wage violations.

Ms. Franklin is a nurse who works on assignment.  She was employed
by a staffing agency, United Staffing Solutions, Inc. (USSI), with
whom she signed a Mediation and Arbitration Policy and Agreement.
The Arbitration Agreement requires Franklin and USSI to arbitrate
all disputes that may arise out of or be related to her employment,
including but not limited to the termination of her employment and
her compensation.

In late 2017, USSI assigned Franklin to work at Community Regional
Medical Center's hospital in Fresno, California.  Franklin signed a
Travel Nurse Assignment Contract with USSI establishing the terms
of her assignment.  The Assignment Contract sets Franklin's hourly
wages, her overtime rate, the length of her shifts, and USSI's
reimbursement policies.  It explains that overtime will be paid "as
dictated by Hospital policy and/or State Law," but any overtime
"must be approved by USSI prior to working."  The Assignment
Contract also includes an arbitration provision for any controversy
or claim arising under federal, state, and local statutory or
common or contract law between USSI and Franklin involving the
construction or application of any of the terms, provisions, or
conditions of the Assignment Contract.

The Hospital is not a signatory to either the Arbitration Agreement
or the Assignment Contract, and there is no contract between
Franklin and the Hospital.  There is also no contract between the
Hospital and USSI.  Instead, the Hospital contracts with a managed
service provider, Comforce Technical Services, Inc.
("RightSourcing") to source contingent nursing staff like Franklin.
RightSourcing, in turn, contracts with USSI to provide the
contingent nursing staff for the Hospital.

Under this arrangement, the Hospital retains supervision over the
contingent nursing staff's provision of clinical services.
RightSourcing bills the Hospital and remits payment to USSI for
time worked by contingent nursing staff.  USSI sets the wages of
the nursing staff and pays them accordingly.  The contract between
RightSourcing and USSI requires that nursing staff use the
Hospital's timekeeping system but allows USSI to review the records
for any discrepancies.  In that contract, USSI agreed to pay its
employees for any missed meal periods, but also agreed it would try
to collect waivers of second meal periods from its employees.

Ms. Franklin worked at the Hospital from December 2017 to January
2018.  Shethen brought a class and collective action against the
Hospital, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), the California Labor Code, and the California Business and
Professions Code.  The FLSA claims allege that the Hospital
required Franklin to work during meal breaks and off the clock but
failed to pay her for that work.  The California Labor Code claims
are substantially similar to the FLSA claims and, in addition,
allege that the Hospital failed to provide accurate itemized wage
statements to Franklin or reimburse her for travel expenses
incurred during orientation at the Hospital.  The California
Business and Professions Code claim alleges unfair business
practices based on the California Labor Code violations.

The district court granted the Hospital's motion to compel
arbitration and dismissed Franklin's claims without prejudice.  The
district court held that the Hospital could compel arbitration as a
nonsignatory because Franklin's statutory claims against the
Hospital were "intimately founded in and intertwined with" her
contracts with USSI.  Thus, under California law, Franklin was
equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions of her
employment contracts.  Franklin timely appealed.

The question before the Ninth Circuit is whether Franklin's claims
against the Hospital are "intimately founded in and intertwined
with" her employment contract with USSI.

The Ninth Circuit opines that it does not matter that Franklin's
allegations are leveled only at the Hospital and not USSI.
Instead, it looks at whether the substance of Franklin's claims
against the Hospital is so intertwined with her employment contract
with USSI that it would be unfair for Franklin to avoid
arbitration.

The thrust of Franklin's claims is that she is owed wages (and
overtime) for unrecorded time that she worked.  The Ninth Circuit
analyzes Franklin's claims by looking at the relationship between
the parties and their connection to the alleged violations.  In
doing so, it finds that Franklin's employment with USSI is central
to her claims.  The record shows that USSI was responsible for
seeking meal period waivers and compensating Franklin for missed
meal breaks, as well as making Franklin available for orientation
at the Hospital that she alleges was "off-the-clock" work.
Although Franklin omits any mention of USSI from her complaint, the
substance of her claims is rooted in her employment relationship
with USSI, which is governed by the Arbitration Agreement.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit finds that Franklin's claims depend on
whether she was paid the wages or overtime she was due, but she
does not dispute that USSI, not the Hospital, was responsible for
paying her.  Not only did the Assignment Contract set her hourly
wage rate and overtime rate, but it also set the regular length of
her shifts, the time her shifts started and ended, and the number
of hours in her workweek.  And under the contract, USSI would pay
all overtime "as dictated by Hospital policy and/or State Law,"
subject to USSI pre-approval.  It is true that Franklin could
hypothetically sustain her claims even if there were no Assignment
Contract, but in that case a fact-finder would still need
information about how and whether Franklin was paid by USSI.

In the case, that necessary information is established by the terms
of her Assignment Contract.  Thus, the Ninth Circuit agrees with
the district court that whether Franklin can maintain liability
against the Hospital, given USSI's role as her employer, cannot be
answered without reference to the Assignment Contract.

Finally, Franklin's other claims -- that the Hospital failed to
provide her accurate wage statements or reimburse her travel
expenses -- cannot stand on their own against the Hospital.  For
example, she alleges that the Hospital "does not provide timely,
accurate itemized wage statements" and "often promises to reimburse
her for travel expenses, but often fails to do so."  But the
Assignment Contract sets out USSI's payroll duties and the amount
of Franklin's travel reimbursement.  Therefore, these claims are
not "fully viable without reference to the terms of the Assignment
Contract."

Accordingly, Franklin's claims against the Hospital are "intimately
founded in and intertwined with" her employment contract with USSI.
The Ninth Circuit thus holds that Franklin is equitably estopped
from avoiding arbitration of her claims against the Hospital.  It
affirms.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/9232phyk from Leagle.com.

David C. Leimbach -- dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com -- (argued) and
Carolyn H. Cottrell -- ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com -- Schneider
Wallace Cottrell Konecky LLP, in Emeryville, California, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andrew M. Paley -- apaley@seyfarth.com -- (argued), Kiran Aftab
Seldon -- kseldon@seyfarth.com -- and Geoffrey C. Westbrook --
gwestbrook@seyfarth.com -- Seyfarth Shaw LLP, in Los Angeles,
California, for Defendant-Appellee.


DANIMER SCIENTIFIC: Rosencrants Class Action in NY Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
Danimer Scientific, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 18, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended March 31, 2021, that the company continues
to defend a class action suit initiated by Darryl Keith
Rosencrants.

On May 14, 2021, a class action complaint was filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York by
Darryl Keith Rosencrants, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated against Danimer Scientific, Inc., Stephen E.
Croskrey, John A. Dowdy, III, John P. Amboian, Richard J. Hendrix,
Christy Basco, Philip Gregory Calhoun, Gregory Hunt, Isao Noda, and
Stuart W. Pratt.

The alleged class consists of all persons and entities other than
Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Danimer securities
between December 30, 2020 and March 19, 2021 (the "Class Period").
Plaintiff is seeking to recover damages caused by Defendants'
alleged violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue
remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.

The complaint is premised upon various allegations that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants allegedly made materially false and
misleading statements regarding, among other things, Danimer's
business, operations, and compliance policies.

Plaintiff seeks the following remedies: (i) determining that the
lawsuit may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (ii) certifying Plaintiff as the
class representative, (iii) requiring Defendants to pay damages
allegedly sustained by Plaintiff and the class by reason of the
aforesaid acts alleged in the complaint, and (iv) awarding
Plaintiff and the other members of the class pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest, as well as their reasonable attorneys'
fees, expert fees and other costs.

Danimer said, "We are unable to estimate the amount or range of
loss, if any, and therefore have not established a loss provision.
The complaint repeats certain allegations, which are already in the
public domain.  Defendants deny the allegations contained in the
complaint, believe this lawsuit is without any merit and intend to
defend it vigorously."

Danimer Scientific, Inc. is a performance polymer company
specializing in bioplastic replacement for traditional
petroleum-based plastics. The company is based in Bainbridge,
Georgia.


DOLLAR TREE: Faces Coffee Mislabeling Consumer Class Suits
----------------------------------------------------------
Dollar Tree, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended May 1, 2021, that the company is facing
consumer class action suits related to coffee mislabeling.

In January and April 2021, state-wide consumer class actions were
filed against the company by the same law firm in Georgia and
Alabama, respectively, for breach of warranty based on the
allegation that the coffee the company sold was mislabeled because
the canisters did not contain enough coffee to make the number of
cups of coffee stated on the label.

Dollar Tree, Inc. operates discount variety retail stores. It
operates through two segments, Dollar Tree and Family Dollar. The
company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in Chesapeake,
Virginia.


DOLLAR TREE: Smoked Almonds Related Class Suit Underway
-------------------------------------------------------
Dollar Tree, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended May 1, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a consumer class action suit related to smoked almonds.

In August 2020, a consumer class action was filed against us in New
York alleging Smoked Almonds sold by the company are mislabeled
because the almonds do not go through a smoking process but rather
acquire their smoky taste through the use of smoked flavoring.

The legal claims include New York consumer protection laws,
negligent misrepresentations, breach of warranties, fraud and
unjust enrichment.

Dollar Tree, Inc. operates discount variety retail stores. It
operates through two segments, Dollar Tree and Family Dollar. The
company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in Chesapeake,
Virginia.


DOLLAR TREE: Store Manager Class Suit Concluded
-----------------------------------------------
Dollar Tree, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended May 1, 2021, that in December 2020, a former
store manager brought a class action in California state court
alleging that the company failed to reimburse employees for
business expenses and in so failing, engaged in unfair competition.
The case has been resolved on a single plaintiff basis.

Dollar Tree, Inc. operates discount variety retail stores. It
operates through two segments, Dollar Tree and Family Dollar. The
company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in Chesapeake,
Virginia.

DOLLAR TREE: Zantac-Related Class Suit Underway
-----------------------------------------------
Dollar Tree, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on May 27, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended May 1, 2021, that the company continues to
defend an Amended Master Personal Injury Complaint related to
Zantac.

In late 2019 and early 2020, personal injury and consumer class
actions were filed alleging that we sold Zantac containing N-
Nitrosodimethylamine, which is classified by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) as a probable carcinogen.

Although all the suits were dismissed in December 2020, on February
8, 2021, an Amended Master Personal Injury Complaint was filed
against the company and other retailers, manufacturers, and
distributors alleging unjust enrichment, physical harm, loss of
consortium, and death.

Dollar Tree, Inc. operates discount variety retail stores. It
operates through two segments, Dollar Tree and Family Dollar. The
company was founded in 1986 and is headquartered in Chesapeake,
Virginia.


ENDO INT'L: Court Certifies Class in Pelletier Securities Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALEXANDRE PELLETIER, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. ENDO INTERNATIONAL PLC, RAJIV KANISHKA
LIYANAARCHCHIE DE SILVA, SUKETU P. UPADHYAY, AND PAUL V.
CAMPANELLI, Civil Action No. 17-cv-5114 (E.D. Pa.), Judge Michael
M. Baylson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the Lead Plaintiffs' motion for class
certification and appointment of the class representatives and the
class counsel.

The Lead Plaintiffs have moved for certification of the action as a
class action on behalf of those who purchased or otherwise acquired
ordinary shares of Endo, and appointment of the class
representatives and the class counsel, pursuant to Rules 23(a),
23(b)(3), and 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judge Baylson has considered the papers and arguments submitted in
support of and in opposition to the motion; and good cause has been
shown.

The Class is defined as follows: All persons and entities who
purchased or otherwise acquired the ordinary shares of Endo from
March 2, 2015 through February 27, 2017, inclusive.

Judge Baylson finds, pursuant to Rule 23(a), that: (i) the Class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (ii)
there are questions of law or fact common to the Class; the claims
of Lead Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class; and (iv)
Lead Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the Class.  Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), that questions of law or
fact common to members of the Class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.

The Judge also finds, pursuant to Rule 23(g), that Court-appointed
Lead Counsel Lawrence F. Stengel, Esquire of Saxton & Stump (Lead
Counsel), co-Lead Counsel Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP (co-Lead
Counsel), and Pomerantz LLP (Counsel for co-Lead Plaintiffs), will
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class

For these reasons, Judge Baylson granted the motion for class
certification and appointment of the class representatives and the
class counsel.  The Class, as defined, is certified pursuant to
Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).  The Lead Plaintiffs are appointed as the
lead and the co-lead class representatives.  The Lead Counsel,
co-Lead Counsel, and Counsel for co-Lead Plaintiffs are appointed
as lead and co-lead class counsel.

The Lead Plaintiffs will draft and serve Defendants with a form of
notice for the claims, with all details required by Rule 23(c)(2),
within 14 days, and the parties, after conferring with each other,
will file either an agreed-upon notice or two separate notices
within 30 days.

The Defendants' Motion to Strike is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/w4a4erer from Leagle.com.


FIRST TRANSIT: $397.5K Class Settlement in Alkady Suit Has Final OK
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW ALKADY, Plaintiff v. FIRST TRANSIT, INC.,
Defendant, Case No. 16-cv2291-L-BGS (S.D. Cal.), Judge M. James
Lorenz of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California:

    (i) granted the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for final
        approval of class action settlement; and

   (ii) granted in part the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for
        attorneys' fees, costs, and class representative's
        incentive award.

The class action alleges wage and hour violations on behalf of
non-exempt fixed-route bus drivers at the Defendant's Orange County
Transportation Authority locations in Santa Ana and Irvine.  In the
operative first amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleges failure to
pay minimum and overtime wages, failure to provide meal periods and
rest breaks, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements,
failure to timely pay all wages due upon termination, violation of
the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200,
et seq. ("UCL"), and a cause of action pursuant to the Private
Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal. Lab. Code Sections 2698, et
seq. ("PAGA").

After investigating the Plaintiff's claims through formal and
informal discovery, and fully briefing a class certification
motion, the parties entered into the First Amended Joint
Stipulation of Class Action Settlement, which is presented for
final approval.  The action was removed from State court.

In his motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement,
the Plaintiff requested certification for and settled only the rest
period claim under California Labor Code Section 226.7 and three
derivative claims for inaccurate wage statements under Section 226,
waiting time penalties under Sections 201-204, and unfair
competition under the UCL on behalf of the class and pursuant to
PAGA.  He proposed to dismiss the remaining claims alleged in the
Amended Complaint without prejudice as to the class and partially
release them as to himself.

The Settlement Agreement provides for the Defendant's payment of a
non-reversionary Gross Settlement Amount of $397,500 to be
distributed as follows: (i) settlement administration expenses not
to exceed $18,500; (ii) class counsel litigation costs not to
exceed $11,000; (iii) Plaintiff's incentive award not to exceed
$10,000; (iv) $15,000 to the California Labor and Workforce
Development Agency ("LWDA") for the PAGA claim; and (v) the class
counsel's attorneys' fees not to exceed $132,500.

What remains of the Gross Settlement Amount after the foregoing
distributions is defined as the Net Settlement Amount, of which
37.5% is to be designated as the Waiting Time Penalty Award
distributed to the subclass members in equal shares.  The remaining
62.5% is to be distributed to the class members pro rata based on
the number of Qualifying Workweeks, as the term is defined in the
Notice and Settlement Agreement.  Any returned or uncashed
settlement checks are to be remitted to the California State
Controller's Unclaimed Property Fund to be held in the name of the
class member.  In exchange, the class members are to release their
claims based on the alleged rest break violations.

On Nov. 13, 2020, the Court granted the Plaintiff's preliminary
approval motion.  On a preliminary basis the Court certified a
settlement class, found that the proposed settlement was fair,
adequate, and reasonable, and approved the content and method of
distribution of the proposed notice of class certification and
settlement.  It appointed the Plaintiff as the class
representative, his counsel as the class counsel, and ILYM Group,
Inc. as the settlement administrator.

The Court-approved notice was distributed on Dec. 14, 2020 by First
Class U.S. Mail to 1,114 putative class members at the addresses
provided by the Defendant and verified by ILYM.  The addresses of
returned notices were updated, and the notices were re-mailed by
First Class U.S. Mail.  The due date for exclusions and objections
was Feb. 17, 2021.

On Jan. 8, 2021, the Plaintiff filed his Fee Motion, and on March
1, 2021, he filed his Settlement Approval Motion.  Out of 1,114
putative class members, 63 notice packets were ultimately deemed
undeliverable.  Two members excluded themselves.  No class members
have objected or disputed their estimated individual settlement
amounts.

For purposes of the Settlement Agreement, Judge Lorenz certifies a
class efined as: "All current and former employees employed by
First Transit as non-exempt fixed route bus drivers at First
Transit's Orange County Transportation Authority locations in Santa
Ana and Irvine, California at any time during the time period of
May 15, 2015 through October 2, 2018."

For purposes of the Settlement Agreement, the Judge also certifies
a Waiting Time Penalty subclass comprised of "all members of the
Class whose employment with Defendant ended at any time during the
period of May 15, 2015 through October 2, 2018."

Paula Rogers and Vincent Huynh requested exclusion from the class
action.  Accordingly, they are excluded from the Class and the
Subclass.

The Judge appoints Plaintiff Andrew Alkady as a class
representative for settlement purposes only pursuant to Rule
23(a)(4), Plaintiff's counsel Samuel A. Wong, Jessica L. Campbell,
Laura Birnbaum, and Simon Kwak as counsel for the Class and
Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(g) for settlement purposes only, and
ILYM as the settlement administrator.  The Class Counsel are
authorized to act on behalf of the class members with respect to
all acts or consents required by, or which may be given pursuant
to, the Settlement Agreement and such other acts reasonably
necessary to consummate the settlement.

The Class Counsel's requested fees and costs totaling approximately
$140,000 and the Plaintiff's requested incentive award of $10,000
are relatively high in relation to the Gross Settlement Amount of
$397,500.  However, these requests are not so large as to raise
questions regarding the integrity of the settlement.  Further, they
are subject to the Court approval to ensure reasonableness.  If the
Court awards less, the Settlement Agreement requires the difference
to be distributed to the class members.

ILYM requests a payment of $17,838 for notice and settlement
administration services.  It is less than the estimated amount
disclosed in the Notice.  Based on review of the record, including
ILYM's detailed invoice, Judge Lorenz finds the amount reasonable.
He also finds that the PAGA amount in the sum of $20,000, of which
$15,000 is to be distributed to the LWDA and $5,000 to the Class,
is reasonable.

Based on the foregoing, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff and the
Class Counsel have adequately represented the Class and the
Subclass.  The relief provided by the Settlement Agreement is
adequate under the circumstances of the case.  Accordingly, the
Settlement Agreement is approved pursuant to Rule 23(e)(2) as fair,
reasonable, and adequate.

The Class Counsel seek $132,500 in attorneys' fees.  The Settlement
Agreement allows for this amount without objection from the
Defendant, and the request was noticed to the class.   Upon review
of the time records and case file, Judge Lorenz reduces the Class
Counsel's lodestar calculation by $60,500.  It is the result of
reducing the $785 hourly rate to $700 and eliminating unnecessary
duplication in billing.  Accordingly, the lode star is $198,536.50,
representing 340.5 hours at an average hourly rate of $583.4.  Even
so, the Class Counsel requests less than the lodestar.  Although
the requested sum of $132,500 is more than the 25% benchmark, it is
reasonable under the circumstances of the case.

The Class Counsel request reimbursement of $8,803.06 in litigation
expenses and court costs.  The request is supported by an itemized
list of costs and expenses, including a $4,375 invoice paid to Data
Analysis in connection with the expert opinion prepared in support
of class certification.  Other costs and expenses include filing
and process server fees, document delivery expenses, legal research
expenses, fees related to a document subpoena and a deposition, as
well as travel expenses.  Upon review of the records provided, the
Judge finds the request to be reasonable.

The Plaintiff requests an incentive award of $10,000.  However, the
Plaintiff's declaration does not support the large sum he is
requesting.  In comparison to the average class member recovery of
$119.92 for rest break violations and $113.01 for the waiting time
penalties, the Plaintiff's request of $10,000 is excessive.  Judge
Lorenz finds that $3,000 adequately compensates him for his work on
behalf of the class.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Lorenz granted the Plaintiff's Final
Approval Motion.  The parties and ILYM will complete their
respective duties and obligations under the Settlement Agreement
and the Order.  ILYM will treat all class member personal
information as confidential, not to be disclosed for any purpose
other than as provided by the Settlement Agreement.

ILYM will receive $17,838 from the Gross Settlement Amount for its
notice and settlement administration services.

The Plaintiff's Fee Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The Class Counsel will receive $132,500 for their fees and
$8,803.06 for costs from the Gross Settlement Amount.  The
Plaintiff will receive $3,000 from the Gross Settlement Amount as
an incentive award.

The Plaintiff and the class members will be deemed to have released
their claims as provided in the Settlement Agreement.

The action is dismissed in its entirety.  The Plaintiff dismissed
the Amended Complaint as provided in the Settlement Agreement
Section 5.02 and Art. I(j).  The class members dismissed without
prejudice the first, second, and third causes of action alleged in
the Amended Complaint and dismissed with prejudice the remaining
causes of action.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/3xfwyk83 from Leagle.com.


FUSION CONNECT: $224K in Attorneys' Fees Awarded in Patron Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT PATRON, Individually and On Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. KEVIN M. DOTTS and KEITH
SOLDAN, Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05362-PGG (S.D.N.Y.), Judge
Paul G. Gardephe of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York awards the Lead Counsel attorneys' fees
totaling 28% of the Settlement Amount, or $224,000, plus
reimbursement of out-of-pocket litigation expenses in the amount of
$25,051.08, together with interest earned thereon at the rate
earned by the Settlement Fund until paid.

The Court has granted final approval of the Settlement of the class
action.  The Lead Counsel has petitioned the Court for an award of
attorneys' fees in compensation for services provided to the Lead
Plaintiff and the Settlement Class, along with reimbursement of
expenses incurred in connection with prosecuting this Action, and
an award to the Lead Plaintiff, to be paid out of the Settlement
Fund.

Judge Gardephe has reviewed the fee application and the supporting
materials filed therewith and has heard the presentation made by
the Lead Counsel during the Settlement Hearing on May 20, 2021, and
due consideration having been had thereon.  He awards the Lead
Counsel attorneys' fees totaling 28% of the Settlement Amount (or
$224,000) plus reimbursement of out-of-pocket litigation expenses
in the amount of $25,051.08, together with interest earned thereon
at the rate earned by the Settlement Fund until paid.  He finds
that the amount of fees and expenses awarded is fair and
reasonable.

The Lead Counsel may allocate the attorneys' fees and expenses
reimbursement to other counsel based on their contribution to the
prosecution of the Action.  The Lead Plaintiff will be awarded
$10,000 as reimbursement for his lost time and expenses in
connection with the prosecution of the Action.

Except as otherwise provided in the Order, the attorneys' fees,
reimbursement of expenses, and award to the Lead Plaintiff will be
paid in the manner and procedure provided for in the Settlement
Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4m6nsfuh from Leagle.com.


FUSION CONNECT: Order & Final Judgment Entered in Patron Class Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Paul G. Gardephe of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York entered an Order and Final Judgment in the
case, ROBERT PATRON, Individually and On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. KEVIN M. DOTTS and KEITH SOLDAN,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-05362-PGG (S.D.N.Y.).

On May 20, 2021, a hearing has been held before the Court to
determine whether the terms and conditions of the Stipulation of
Settlement dated June 8, 2020, are fair, reasonable and adequate
for the settlement of all claims asserted by the Settlement Class
against the Settling Defendants.

Judge Gardephe, having considered all matters submitted to it at
the hearing and otherwise, finds that the Settlement Stipulation
and Settlement are, in all respects, fair, reasonable, and adequate
and in the best interests of the Settlement Class and each of the
Settlement Class Members.

For purposes of the Settlement, the case is a class action on
behalf of all Persons (including, without limitation, their
beneficiaries) who purchased Fusion common stock between May 11,
2018 and April 2, 2019, both dates inclusive.  All members of the
Settlement Class are bound by the Order and Final Judgment.

The Settlement embodied in the Settlement Stipulation is finally
approved in all respects, and will be consummated in accordance
with its terms and provisions.  The Settling Parties are directed
to perform the terms of the Settlement Stipulation.

The Action and the Amended Class Action Complaint are dismissed
with prejudice.  The Settling Parties will bear their own costs and
expenses, except as and to the extent provided in the Settlement
Stipulation and in the Order.

Without further order of the Court, the Settling Defendants and the
Lead Plaintiff may agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry
out any of the provisions of the Settlement Stipulation.

There is no just reason for delay in the entry of the Order and
Final Judgment and immediate entry by the Clerk of the Court is
directed pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The finality of the Order and Final Judgment will not be affected,
in any manner, by rulings that the Court may make with respect to
the Lead Counsel's application for an award of attorneys' fees and
expenses and/or case contribution awards to the Lead Plaintiff.

In the event that the Settlement does not become final and
effective in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in
the Settlement Stipulation, then the Order and Final Judgment will
be rendered null and void and be vacated.  The terms and conditions
of the Settlement Stipulation will govern any termination or the
effect of any termination thereof.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order & Final Judgment
is available at https://tinyurl.com/262xjwn3 from Leagle.com.


GENESIS MOTOR: Southern District of New York Dismisses Sanchez Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the case, CHRISTIAN
SANCHEZ, Plaintiff v. GENESIS MOTOR AMERICA LLC, Defendant, Case
No. 20 CV 10976-LTS-RWL (S.D.N.Y.).

The attorneys for the parties have advised the Court that the
putative class action has been or will be settled.  Accordingly,
the action is dismissed with prejudice as to the named Plaintiff
and without prejudice as to all other Plaintiffs and without costs
to either party, but without prejudice to restoration of the action
to the calendar of the undersigned if settlement is not achieved
within 30 days of the date of the Order.  If a party wishes to
reopen the matter or extend the time within which it may be
settled, the party must make a letter application before the 30-day
period expires.

The parties are advised that if they wish the Court to retain
jurisdiction in the matter for purposes of enforcing any settlement
agreement, they will submit the settlement agreement to the Court
to be so ordered.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/63vnkje7 from Leagle.com.


GROUP HEALTH: Third Circuit Vacates Order Dismissing Plavin Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, STEVEN PLAVIN, Appellant v. GROUP HEALTH INCORPORATED,
Case No. 18-2490 (3d Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit vacates the District Court's order dismissing the
complaint.

Steven Plavin brought the putative class action against Group
Health Inc. (GHI), alleging that GHI made misleading statements
about reimbursement for out-of-network services under its
Comprehensive Benefits Plan.  Plavin asserted claims under New
York's General Business Law (GBL) and Insurance Law and for unjust
enrichment.

New York City offers its employees and retirees eleven health
insurance plans, including the Plan in the case.  GHI provides the
Plan pursuant to a contract between it and the City.  The City pays
for the Plan, and members do not pay out-of-pocket premiums.

Mr. Plavin's claims focus on GHI's Summary Program Description and
Summary of Benefits & Coverage.  In the Summary Program
Description, GHI explains that it provides coverage for
non-participating providers and that reimbursement for these
services is made "under the NYC Non-Participating Provider Schedule
of Allowable Charges.  Plavin alleges that GHI never sent him the
Schedule.  The Summary Program Description also states that
reimbursement levels "may be less" than what the providers charge
and that the participant is responsible for the difference.  The
Summary of Benefits & Coverage provides coverage examples, but also
states that "this is not a cost estimator" and cautions that costs
will be different.  It provides the following out-of-network
example: "If an out-of-network hospital charges $1,500 for an
overnight stay and the allowed amount is $1,000, you may have to
pay the $500 difference" (the 66% reimbursement example).

GHI also offers an "Optional Rider" and catastrophic coverage. GHI
describes the relevant part of the rider as follows: "Enhanced
schedule for certain services increases the reimbursement of the
basic program's non-participating provider fee schedule, on
average, by 75%."  Plavin paid for the rider.  Participants are
eligible for "catastrophic coverage" if they "choose
non-participating providers for predominantly in-hospital care and
incur $1,500 or more in covered expenses."

Mr. Plavin's wife received medical services in 2013 and 2014 that
GHI deemed out-of-network.  He asserts that that he believed, based
on GHI's marketing materials, that he would be reimbursed for a
higher percentage of these services.  But, he alleges, he was only
reimbursed for a "fraction" of what he paid.  The latest date that
GHI reimbursed Plavin for services was February 2015.

A plaintiff bringing a GBL claim must establish, among other
things, that the conduct was "consumer-oriented."  The Third
Circuit certified the question of whether GHI's conduct was
consumer-oriented to the New York Court of Appeals.  The Court of
Appeals answered that it was consumer-oriented.  The Third Circuit
then asked the parties to brief what issues remained.

Analysis

First, the Third Circuit must determine whether Plavin has
adequately pleaded that the statements are materially misleading.
A statement is materially misleading if it is "likely to mislead a
reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances."
The Third Circuit opines that GHI has not shown that it would be
"patently implausible" for a reasonable consumer to believe that
they would be reimbursed at a higher percentage for out-of-network
services.  The District Court erred in dismissing the GBL claims at
this stage, especially given the fact-based reasonableness
standard.

Mr. Plavin has also adequately alleges that he suffered an injury,
the third element of a GBL claim.  He claims that he was injured
because GHI did not provide the amount of reimbursement for
out-of-network services that he anticipated based on GHI's
marketing materials.  This is enough to state the injury element.
And GHI does not dispute that Plavin has sufficiently alleged this
element.

Second, the District Court dismissed Plavin's Insurance Law claim
because Plavin failed to plead material misrepresentations and
scienter.  The Third Circuit holds that Plavin has sufficiently
alleged material misrepresentations.  It also holds that the
District Court erred in requiring that Plavin plead scienter.
Plavin alleges that GHI knowingly made material misrepresentations
about the Plan.  That allegation is enough to plead knowledge.

Third, the District Court dismissed Plavin's unjust enrichment
claim because the contract between the City and GHI covered the
subject matter of the dispute.  If there is a valid contract that
governs the subject matter of the dispute, a plaintiff ordinarily
cannot recover under an unjust enrichment theory.  In the case, the
parties did not submit the contract to the District Court.  Thus,
the Third Circuit does not know if the contract governs the subject
matter of the dispute.  It was therefore premature at this stage to
dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because of the contract.

Finally, the Third Circuit rejects GHI's argument that the
complaint is time-barred.  Unjust enrichment claims have a six-year
limitations period.  GBL and Insurance Law claims have a three-year
limitations period.  GBL claims must be brought within three years
of when a plaintiff is "injured by the actions alleged to have
violated the Statute."  Where "the gravamen of the complaints of
General Business Law Section  349 violations was not false
guarantees of policy terms, but deceptive practices inducing
unrealistic expectations plaintiffs suffered no measurable damage
until the point in time when those expectations were actually not
met.

In the case, Plavin alleges that his expectations were not met when
he received less reimbursement than he anticipated for
out-of-network services.  GHI allegedly reimbursed Plavin in
February 2015, and Plavin filed the complaint in August 2017, less
than three years later.  Thus, the complaint is not time-barred.
And, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plavin's favor, the
allegation that his expectations were not met in February 2015 is
enough to bring the complaint within the statute of limitations.

Disposition

The Third Circuit vacates the District Court's order dismissing the
complaint and remands for further proceedings.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/yz3655x5 from Leagle.com.

William C. Carmody -- bcarmody@susmangodfrey.com -- Nicholas C.
Carullo, Arun S. Subramanian -- asubramanian@susmangodfrey.com --
Susman Godfrey, in New York City.

Halley W. Josephs -- hjosephs@susmangodfrey.com -- (ARGUED) Susman
Godfrey, in Los Angeles, California.

Michael F. Cosgrove, J. Timothy Hinton, Jr., Haggerty Hinton &
Cosgrove, in Dunmore, Pennsylvania, Counsel for Appellant.

John Gleeson -- jgleeson@debevoise.com -- (ARGUED), Anna R.
Gressel, Jared I. Kagan -- jikagan@debevoise.com -- Maura K.
Monaghan -- mkmonaghan@debevoise.com -- Debevoise & Plimpton, in
New York City.

Peter H. LeVan, Jr. -- plevan@levanlawgroup.com -- LeVan Muhic
Stapleton, One Liberty Place, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Counsel for Appellee.


IDAHO: Class Notice in K.W. Suit v. DHW Approved as Modified
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, K.W., by his next friend D.W., et al., Plaintiffs,
(lead case) v. RICHARD ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants. TOBY SCHULTZ,
et al., Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants, Case
Nos. 1:12-cv-00022-BLW, 3:12-cv-58-BLW (D. Idaho), Judge B. Lynn
Winmill of the U.S. District Court of the District of Idaho granted
in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Approve Notice
to Class.

The Plaintiffs are developmentally disabled adults who qualify for
benefits under Medicaid.  They are eligible for long-term
institutional care but choose to live instead in their own homes or
in community settings.  When their Medicaid payments were reduced,
they brought the action against the Idaho Department of Health &
Welfare, alleging, among other things, that: (1) the Department's
budgeting methodology -- referred to as the budget tool --
improperly reduces assistance for some recipients; (2) the
Department used an insufficient notice to inform participants of
reductions in their assistance; and (3) the process for appealing
budget reductions was unfair.

The Court certified a class of disabled adults to challenge the
budget tool, notice form, and hearing procedures.  After the Court
granted summary judgment in the Plaintiffs' favor, the parties
settled the class claims.  In the Class Action Settlement
Agreement, approved by the Court on Jan. 12, 2017, the Department
agreed to develop a new budget tool and to keep the Plaintiffs'
benefits at their prior high level until the new budgets could be
approved and implemented.  As part of the settlement, the
Department set a goal of developing and implementing the new budget
tool within 24 months.  If the Department failed to implement the
new tool within three years (no later than January 2020), the
Plaintiffs could ask the Court "to set a reasonable completion
deadline."

When the Department did not complete its work within 24 months,
both sides asked the Court to impose their version of a reasonable
completion deadline.  In briefs that were filed before the COVID-19
pandemic began, the Department asked the Court to set a completion
deadline of Jan. 12, 2023, while the Plaintiffs wanted the
Department to be done in 120 days.  After the pandemic hit, IDHW
asked the Court to extend the completion deadline to January 2024.
The Plaintiffs asked the Court to send the parties to ADR.

Initially, the Court indicated that it would impose a two-track
deadline system, with one track being a longer deadline for the
restructuring of services and the other track being a shorter
deadline for creation of the new budget tool.  Later, though, the
Court denied the Plaintiffs' request to send the parties to ADR and
scheduled a hearing to resolve outstanding issues.  In December
2020, after hearing the parties' arguments, the Court ordered a
reasonable completion deadline of June 2022.

After the Court decided the reasonable completion deadline, both
parties filed the pending motions for attorneys' fees.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs move for an order approving the form
of a notice to be sent to class members, informing them of the fee
motion.  They further ask the Court to order the Defendants to
print and mail the notice to each class member and the class member
guardian or family member.

Analysis

1. Form of Notice

The Defendants point out that the Court is not required to approve
the notice or the plan for distributing the notice.  But the
Plaintiffs have asked for approval, and the Court finds it
appropriate to provide the requested guidance.

The Plaintiffs' most recent version of the proposed notice
incorporates all of the Defendants' proposed changes except one,
which is aimed at this paragraph: "The settlement gave the
Department up to three years to fix the budget system. Because the
work wasn't done in three years, the lawyers who help argue for you
asked the Court to set a final deadline. The Court set a final
deadline of June 2022 for the Department to finish the work."

Judge Winmill favors readability over the more complex verbiage the
Defendants proffer.  He, however, strikes the word "final" each
time it appears before the word "deadline," which is meant to
address the Defendants' concerns.

The end result is that the subject paragraph should be revised as
follows: "The settlement gave the Department up to three years to
fix the budget system. Because the work wasn't done in three years,
the lawyers who help argue for you asked the Court to set a final
deadline. The Court set a final deadline of June 2022 for the
Department to finish the work."

Otherwise, the form of notice at Dkt. 444 is approved. In the
section of the notice following titled" How will the judge make a
decision?" the Judge directs that the Plaintiffs should select the
option that states "The judge will give a written decision."  And
in the section of the notice entitled "What can you do next?" the
Plaintiffs should instruct class members to mail their letters "on
or before 21 days after mailing."  To be clear though, the counsel
should include an actual date that is 21 days out from the mailing
date.

As for the method of distribution, the Judge directs the class
counsel to: (1) post the notice on the www.OurHealthAndWelfare.org
website; (2) post the notice on the accompanying Our Health and
Welfare Facebook page; and (3) email the notice via the listserv.
The Department is ordered to print and mail the notice.

2. Effecting Notice

Judge Winmill finds it appropriate to shift the cost of providing
the notice to the Defendants.  Neither party disputes that the
Court can place the cost of class notice on the Defendants.  In the
case, where the Department failed to complete its work in the time
frames anticipated in the settlement agreement, and then sought
approval for an extensive delay, the Judge finds it appropriate for
defendants to bear the cost of notifying the class members of the
class counsel's fee motion, and to print and mail the notices.

Order

Based on the foregoing, Judge Winmill granted in part and denied in
part the Plaintiffs' Motion to Approve Notice to Class.  He
approved the Plaintiffs' proposed class notice, as modified.

The class counsel will: (1) post the revised notice on the
OurHealthAndWelfare.org website; (2) post the revised notice on the
Our Health and Welfare Facebook page; and (3) email the notice via
the listserv.

The Defendants will print and mail the notice to each class member
and each class member's guardian or family member.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Memorandum Decision &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/uujbkwf5 from
Leagle.com.


LIBERTY INSURANCE: Class Settlement in Schulte Suit Has Final OK
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the cases, RYAN SCHULTE, individually and on behalf of all other
Ohio residents similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Defendant. ANDREW CARTER, ANTHONY TURCO, LAURA RALPH,
and JAMES RALPH, individually and on behalf of all other Ohio
residents similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SAFECO INSURANCE
COMPANY OF INDIANA, LM INSURANCE CORPORATION, and LIBERTY MUTUAL
FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, Case Nos. 3:19-cv-00026,
3:20-cv-00002 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Thomas M. Rose of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton enters
an Order and Final Judgment granting final approval to the parties'
class action settlement.

The claims of Representative Plaintiffs Ryan Schulte, and Andrew
Carter, Anthony Turco, Laura Ralph, and James Ralph against
Defendants Liberty Insurance Corp., Safeco Insurance Co. of
Indiana, LM Insurance Corp., and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
have been settled pursuant to the Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement dated Feb. 19, 2021.  On Feb. 23, 2021, the Court granted
preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement set
forth in the Agreement and provisionally certified the Settlement
Class for settlement purposes only.

On May 18, 2021, the Court held a duly noticed final approval
hearing.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Judge Rose finally certifies the
Settlement Class, settlement purposes only, as identified in the
Settlement Agreement, defined as follows:

      a. All policyholders within the Settlement Class, but
excluding (i) policyholders whose claims arose under policy forms,
endorsements, or riders expressly permitting Nonmaterial
Depreciation within the text of the policy form, endorsement or
rider (i.e., by express use of the words depreciation and labor);
(ii) policyholders who received one or more ACV Payments for
claims, but not replacement cost value payments, that exhausted the
applicable limits of insurance; (iii) policyholders whose claims
were denied or abandoned without ACV Payment; (iv) Defendants and
their officers and directors; (v) members of the judiciary and
their staff to whom this action is assigned and their immediate
families; and (vi) Class Counsel and their immediate families
(collectively, Exclusions); and

      b. Settlement Class means, except for Exclusions, all
policyholders homeowners residential property insurance policy
issued by Liberty Insurance Corporation, Safeco Insurance Company
of Indiana, LM Insurance Corporation, or Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance Company, except for those excluded, who made a structural
damage claim for property located in the State of Ohio during the
applicable Class periods, which was a Covered Loss; and (b) that
resulted in an actual cash value payment during the class period
from which Nonmaterial Depreciation was withheld, or that would
have resulted in an actual cash value payment but for the
withholding of Nonmaterial Depreciation causing the loss to drop
below the applicable deductible.

Class Periods mean the following time periods:

      i. For Ohio policyholders of Liberty Insurance Corporation,
Structural Loss claims with dates of loss on or after Jan. 28,
2018.

      ii. For Ohio Safeco, LM and Liberty Fire policyholders,
Structural Loss claims with dates of loss on or after Jan. 3,
2019.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g), the Judge appoints the law firms
of Mehr, Fairbanks & Peterson, PLLC, and Whetstone Legal, LLC as
the Class Counsel for the Settlement Class; and also designates
Representative Plaintiffs Ryan Schulte, Andrew Carter, Anthony
Turco, Laura Ralph, and James Ralph, as the representatives of the
Settlement Class.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), the Judge awards the Class
Counsel attorneys' fees in the total amount of $3,414,617.86 and
expenses in the total amount of $16,641.93, payable by the
Defendants pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.  He also awards
service awards in the amount of $7,500 each to Representative
Plaintiffs Ryan Schulte, Andrew Carter, Anthony Turco, Laura Ralph,
and James Ralph, payable by Defendants pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement.  The Defendants will not be responsible for and will not
be liable with respect to the allocation among the Class Counsel or
any other person who may assert a claim thereto of attorneys' fees
and expenses awarded by the Court.

The Representative Plaintiffs and the Class Counsel have
represented and warranted that there are no outstanding liens or
claims against the Action and have acknowledged that they will be
solely responsible for satisfying any liens or claims asserted
against the Action.

Within 10 days after the Effective Date, the Representative
Plaintiffs and the Class Members will dismiss with prejudice all
Released Claims asserted in any actions or proceedings that have
been brought by or involve any Class Member in any jurisdiction.

The Released Claims of Representative Plaintiffs Ryan Schulte,
Andrew Carter, Anthony Turco, Laura Ralph, and James Ralph,
individually and on behalf of the Settlement Class, are settled,
compromised, and dismissed on the merits and with prejudice against
the Defendants without fees (including attorneys' fees) or costs to
any party except as otherwise provided in the Judgment.

The Parties are directed to implement and consummate the Settlement
according to its terms and provisions, as may be modified by Orders
of the Court.  Without further order of the Court, the Parties may
agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of the
provisions of the Agreement, as may be modified by the Preliminary
Approval Order or the Judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Judge Rose enters Final Judgment as
described and expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.  Without impacting the finality of the Judgment, the Court
will retain jurisdiction over the construction, interpretation,
consummation, implementation, and enforcement of the Agreement and
the Judgment, including jurisdiction to enter such further orders
as may be necessary or appropriate.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order & Final Judgment
is available at https://tinyurl.com/tjdhr9zb from Leagle.com.


LIVE AUCTIONEERS: Can Compel Arbitration in Zheng Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PEIRAN ZHENG, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LIVE AUCTIONEERS LLC, Defendant,
Case No. 20-cv-9744 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge John G. Koeltl of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York:

    (i) granted the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and
        stay the litigation; and

   (ii) denied the Plaintiff's motion to strike the Defendant's
        supplemental declaration and for discovery.

The Plaintiff, Peiran Zheng, brings the purported class action
against the Defendant for negligence and violation of Section 349
of New York's General Business Law.  The claims arise out of a data
breach perpetrated by a third party that allegedly resulted in the
plaintiff's private personal information being offered for sale
online.

LiveAuctioneers is a limited liability company organized under the
laws of New York and with its principal place of business in New
York. Compl.  It operates a website that functions as a worldwide
marketplace for auctions.  The Plaintiff is a citizen of Singapore
who used the Defendant's website.  Jurisdiction is based on 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(d) which was added by the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005.

The Plaintiff created an account on the Defendant's website on
April 6, 2017.  During the entire period that the Plaintiff had an
account on the Defendant's website, the Defendant's website has had
its Terms & Conditions hyperlinked at the bottom of every page on
the website.  On Oct. 28, 2019, the Plaintiff was prompted by a
banner to agree to an updated Terms & Conditions, Privacy Policy,
and Cookie Policy upon logging in to the Plaintiff's account on the
website.

The banner at the top of the webpage read "By using
LiveAuctioneers, you agree to our Terms & Conditions, Privacy
Policy, and Cookie Policy" with a large orange button next to it
that said "AGREE."  The Terms & Conditions, Privacy Policy, and
Cookie Policy were hyperlinked, as indicated by capitalized terms,
blue font, and underlining.  Website users could not have bids
considered on the website until they clicked "AGREE."  The
Plaintiff clicked "AGREE" on Oct. 28, 2019.

The 2019 Terms & Conditions, which were provided by hyperlink in
the banner at the top of the webpage, provided that users "must
read and accept all of the terms and conditions in, and referenced
by, this Agreement and our Privacy Policy."  The Terms & Conditions
also had a separately labeled section with a bolded heading
entitled "Arbitration."  The arbitration provision from the 2019
Terms & Conditions was available to the Plaintiff when the
Plaintiff clicked "AGREE."  The arbitration provision in the
Defendant's current Terms & Conditions is materially identical to
the arbitration provision in the 2019 Terms & Condition and is
hyperlinked on the bottom of every page of its website.

At some point prior to June 19, 2020, hackers gained unauthorized
access to the Defendant's computer systems and collected the
private personal information of users of its website.  The
Plaintiff alleges that the hackers were able to make multiple
unauthorized copies of the Plaintiff's private personal information
and offered it for sale online.  The Defendant distributed a
security incident notice to users of its website to inform them of
the data breach.  In its email to its customers, the Defendant
informed its customers that "an unauthorized third party accessed
certain user data in the past two weeks through a security breach
at a LiveAuctioneers data processing partner" and that the stolen
data included "user account information like names, email
addresses, mailing addresses, visit history, phone numbers, last
four digits of credit cards, credit card expiration dates, and
encrypted passwords."

The Plaintiff asserts that the Plaintiff's personal information,
including the Plaintiff's password and credit card information, was
sold multiple times.  The Defendant disputes that the Plaintiff's
credit card information was compromised in the data breach and
asserts that "complete payment card numbers were not accessed."
The Defendant has moved pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. Section 1, et seq., to compel arbitration of the Plaintiff's
claims and stay the case pending arbitration.  The Plaintiff has
moved for discovery and to strike Cummings' Supplemental
Declaration.

Discussion

A. Motion to Compel

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff is bound to arbitrate any
dispute arising out of the terms of the agreement between the
parties, which included the Terms & Conditions, the Privacy Policy,
and the Cookie Policy.  The Plaintiff argues that the parties did
not form a legally binding agreement.  The Plaintiff does not
contest that the dispute at issue in the case would be covered by
the arbitration provision in the agreement.  Therefore, whether the
Defendant can compel arbitration turns on whether the parties
created a binding contract to arbitrate.

Judge Koeltl opines that in the case, it is clear from the totality
of the circumstances that the Plaintiff had reasonable notice of
the Terms & Conditions that contained the arbitration provision and
the arbitration provision itself.  The arbitration provision itself
was not hidden in the Terms & Conditions.  Rather, it was given its
own section with a bolded and numbered heading entitled
"Arbitration."  And the Terms & Conditions in the case were shorter
in length than the other terms and conditions that courts have
found to have included a valid arbitration provision.

Therefore, the parties entered into a valid agreement when the
Plaintiff clicked "AGREE" and continued to use the Defendant's
website.  The Plaintiff had "reasonable notice of the arbitration
provision" in the hyperlinked Terms & Conditions.  Because the
Plaintiff has not contested the validity of the arbitration
provision itself, nor that the dispute in the case falls within the
scope of the arbitration provision, the motion to compel must be
granted.

Section 3 of the FAA directs a district court to stay proceedings
"if satisfied that the parties have agreed in writing to arbitrate
an issue or issues underlying the district court proceeding."
Because the Plaintiff agreed to the contract that included the
arbitration provision, the action is stayed pending mediation and
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

B. Motion for Discovery and to Strike

The Plaintiff has moved for discovery and to strike Cummings'
Supplemental Declaration because it was submitted for the first
time with the Defendant's reply brief.

In the Plaintiff's opposition to the Defendant's motion to compel
arbitration, the Plaintiff asserted that a screenshot of the
webpage containing the clickwrap agreement is a necessary item of
evidence that must be submitted to succeed on a motion to compel
arbitration.  In reply, the Defendant contested that legal
proposition and also submitted a screenshot showing the clickwrap
agreement.  The Plaintiff has now argued that it was too late for
the Defendant to submit a screenshot because it did not include the
screenshot in its declaration submitted with its opening brief.

Judge Koeltl holds that new materials may be submitted with a reply
brief when responding to a new argument made by the responding
party "to avoid giving an unfair advantage to the answering party."
Also, the Plaintiff could have requested leave to file a sur-reply
brief or a supplemental declaration in response to Cummings's
Supplemental Declaration but chose not to do so.  Hence, the
Plaintiff's motion has no merit.

The Plaintiff also moves for discovery.  The Plaintiff contends
that the Defendant's Exhibit F, the screenshot showing the banner
containing the "AGREE" button that the Plaintiff clicked, is
inaccurate.  To support the Plaintiff's position, the Plaintiff
points out that the items for auction in the Defendant's Exhibit F
are from 2021, not 2019, and that the URL indicates that the
webpage was a test page.  However, the Defendant explained in its
opposition brief, declarations, and at oral argument that the
deficiencies described by the Plaintiff are about the background
webpage and not about the clickwrap agreement.

Judge Koeltl that because the Plaintiff has not disputed clicking
"AGREE" to a clickwrap agreement or presented an alternative
version of how the clickwrap agreement appeared, the Plaintiff has
not shown a genuinely disputed material fact.  Accordingly, there
is no need for discovery and the Plaintiff's motion is denied.

Conclusion

Judge Koeltl has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties.  To the extent not discussed, he says the arguments are
either moot or without merit.  For the foregoing reasons, the
Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation
pending the results of arbitration is granted, and the Plaintiff's
motion to strike the Defendant's supplemental declaration and for
discovery is denied.  The Clerk is directed to close Docket Numbers
18 and 33.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/8jt5sx4v from
Leagle.com.


LOUISIANA: Bid to Dismiss Brook Suit v. Commission Partly Granted
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BROOK PLAISANCE, ET AL. v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.,
Civil Action No. 21-00121-BAJ-EWD (M.D. La.), Judge Brian A.
Jackson of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana granted in part and denied in part Louisiana Workforce
Commission and Ava Dejoie's Motion to Dismiss.

In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020)
("CARES Act") in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Section 9021
of the CARES Act created a new temporary federal program called
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance ("PUA"), which generally provides
up to thirty-nine weeks of unemployment benefits to certain
individuals who lost work or are unable to work due to a variety of
complications stemming from the COVID-19 public health emergency.
The CARES Act provides that payments to those eligible under this
section will be made "without any waiting period."

Over the last year, the Commission has experienced well-documented
delays in the administration of PUA benefits.  On Feb. 25, 2021,
the Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint alleging
that they are among those Louisianans whose PUA benefits have been
delayed (or not paid at all), and further alleging that these
delays have resulted in violations of procedural due process,
unconstitutional takings, and violations of Section 303(a)(1) of
the Social Security Act.  Their complaint named the Commission and
Secretary Ava Dejoie, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
Commission, as Defendants.

The Plaintiffs have since filed an Amended Complaint on behalf of
the putative class, arguing that it is the custom, policy, pattern,
and practice of the Defendants to render eligibility determinations
on claims for unemployment benefits that "provide little or no
information about the factual and legal bases for the Commission's
decisions impacting eligibility," and as a result deprive claimants
of "notice and an opportunity to request an administrative appeal
to resolve the denial or termination of benefit to which they have
been subjected" in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteen Amendments, 42 U.S.C. Section 503(a)(1), as well as
Louisiana law through 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

The Defendants argue that while the instant lawsuit is "styled as a
class action," it is in fact an improper suit for monetary damages
on behalf of a few named individuals, and therefore is barred by
sovereign immunity.  The Plaintiffs contend that it is instead a
suit for injunctive relief and therefore the suit is permissible
under the Ex Parte Young doctrine.

Analysis

I. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(B)(1)

The Plaintiffs have filed suit against Ava Dejoie in her official
capacity and seek prospective relief to redress ongoing violations
of federal law.  The Defendants contend that it is not a suit for
prospective relief, but rather a suit for monetary damages as part
of the Plaintiffs' remedy would be payment of past unemployment
benefits, which is impermissible under Ex Parte Young.

Despite the Defendants' argument, Judge Jackson holds that the
Plaintiffs have been clear that they seek "preliminary and
permanent injunctions on behalf of the purported class ordering the
Defendants to provide them with the timely and fair process to
which they are entitled when applying for and receiving
[unemployment compensation] benefits."  While the eventual remedy
may include payment of these benefits, nowhere in the Plaintiffs'
complaint do they specifically request that the Court orders back
payment as a remedy.  Further, while the Defendants assert that the
Plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction "seeks an order
directing payment by LWC of compensation due", the Plaintiffs in
actuality seek an order prohibiting the Defendants from "any
further delays in payment of compensation due."  The Defendants
characterize the Plaintiffs relief as retrospective, when the
Plaintiffs' requested relief is actually prospective.

In addition, the Judge holds that this statement is derived from
the Plaintiffs' Motion for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction.  While the harm the Plaintiffs suffer may
be monetary in nature, their Amended Complaint primarily petitions
the Court for prospective injunctive relief, in the form of more
detailed notices regarding the bases for the Commission's
decisions, advance notice of the termination of benefits, and
timelier processing of both benefit payments and appeal hearings
going forward.

Therefore, the Plaintiffs' suit for prospective, injunctive relief
may proceed against Secretary Dejoie.  However, Ex Parte Young does
not permit suits against the state or arms of the state -- only
against officers.  Therefore, the Commission must be dismissed.

II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(B)(6)

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim upon
which relief can be granted against them under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, because neither Secretary Dejoie nor the Commission is suable
"persons" as contemplated by that statute.

However, as he previously discussed, Judge Jackson holds that under
Ex Parte Young, a case can proceed against individual state
officials named in their official capacities when the claim is for
an ongoing violation of federal law, but the relief sought must be
prospective."  In suits like these, the proper defendant is a state
official acting in violation of federal law who has sufficient
connection to enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional law.

Therefore, because Secretary Dejoie is sued only in her official
capacity, and only for prospective relief, she may properly be sued
under Section 1983 because "official capacity actions for
prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state."
However, as discussed, other claims for relief are not actionable
against her under Section 1983.

Order

Based on the foregoing, Judge Jackson granted in part the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.  He granted the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against the Louisiana Workforce
Commission.  The Plaintiffs' claims against the Louisiana Workforce
Commission are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

The Judge also granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages.  The Plaintiffs'
claims for compensatory damages, excluding any award of costs, or
attorneys' fees, are dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

In all other respects, the Judge denied the Defendants' Motion.

The Defendants' Motion to Stay Discovery and Hearing on Preliminary
Injunction Pending Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot.
The Joint Motion to Set Status Conference is granted.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/55dm8dyd from Leagle.com.


LUSTRE-CAL CORP: Wisconsin Court Refuses to Dismiss Hulce TCPA Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES HULCE, Plaintiff v. LUSTRE-CAL CORPORATION,
Defendant, Case No. 20-cv-775-pp (E.D. Wis.), Judge Pamela Pepper
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
denies with prejudice the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

On May 22, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a class action complaint
against the Defendant alleging consumer-privacy violations under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. Section
227.  The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant sent unsolicited
advertisements to the Plaintiff's facsimile machine as well as to
those of other putative class members.

The Plaintiff is resident of Wisconsin.  The Defendant is a
California corporation with its principal place of business located
in California.  The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant sent
unsolicited facsimile advertisements promoting their face shield
services to putative class members.

The Plaintiff filed the case as a Rule 23 class action.  The
complaint proposes the following definition for the class: "All
persons and entities whom: (a) Defendant and/or a third party
acting on Defendant's behalf sent one or more faxes; (b)
advertising Defendant's goods or services (d) at any time in the
period that begins four years before the date of filing this
complaint and ends at the date of trial."

The Plaintiff seeks damages under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. Section
227(b)(1)(C).  Damages for violations of the TCPA start at $500 and
increase to $1,500 if the violation was willful or knowing.  The
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the defendant
and "all other person who are in active concert or participation
with it" from sending fax advertisements.

On Aug. 24, 2020, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The
Defendant argues that the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the
claim and has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.  The Defendant asks that in the event the Court denies the
motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff be limited to jurisdictional
discovery.

Analysis

The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff received the advertisement
at fax number (262) 293-6698, a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
provided through a carrier called Bandwith.com.  According to the
Defendant, Bandwith.com offers virtual phone numbers to power
Google Voice.  It asserts that "Google Voice numbers are nearly
impossible to use with traditional 'telephone facsimile machines'
because Google Voice is a VoIP which does not integrate with a
traditional telephone fax machine's analog network."  From this,
the Defendant concludes that the Plaintiff does not have a
telephone fax machine connected to a printer; the Defendant asserts
that the Plaintiff has an online fax system that receives faxes
digitally.  The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff has not
suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact because he
received the "fax" by email over the internet rather than through a
"telephone facsimile machine."

The Plaintiff responds that he "received the facsimile
advertisement referenced in the complaint through a traditional
telephone fax machine.  The response includes a photo of this
"telephone fax machine."  The Plaintiff further argues that
"traditional telephone fax machines can be connected to Google
Voice, or any other telephone service provider, using VoIP
technology through the use of an analog telephone adapter device."
The Plaintiff argues that he received the advertisement over a
telephone fax machine, making the fax line "unavailable for
legitimate communications."  He also asserts that the advertisement
was received in a manner that caused him to incur the loss of paper
and toner ink.

The Defendant replies that in his opposition brief, the Plaintiff
has raised new facts that were not alleged in the complaint.  In
his opposition brief and declaration, the Plaintiff has alleged two
injuries; he has asserted that receiving the unsolicited fax tied
up his line so that he could not receive other faxes and he has
alleged that he had to use printer paper and toner as a result of
receiving the unsolicited fax.

At the pleading stage, Judge Pepper finds that it is enough that
the Plaintiff has alleged that receiving the fax made his fax
machine unavailable to receive other faxes.  She requires the
Plaintiff to amend the complaint to allege all the injuries he says
that he suffered, including expenditure of paper and ink.  She then
will give the parties the opportunity to brief the question of
whether Amerifactors is binding on the court.  If she concludes
that Amerifactors is binding, she will give the parties the
opportunity to conduct limited discovery regarding the type of fax
machine the Plaintiff has.

The Judge allows the parties to brief the Court on the binding
nature of Amerifactors.  Even if she determines that Amerifactors
applies, however, a motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle to
decide a factual dispute.  For a motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept as true the Plaintiff's allegation that the Defendant sent
an unsolicited fax advertisement to the Plaintiff's fax machine.
Arguments regarding the type of machine, the classification of the
receiver or the technology's relation to the congressional intent
behind the statute are relevant to the question of whether the
court has subject-matter jurisdiction, not to the question of
whether the plaintiff has stated a claim.  The Judge denies without
prejudice the Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Pepper denies with prejudice the
Defendant's motion to dismiss.  She orders that by the end of the
day on June 4, 2021, the Plaintiff must file an amended complaint
describing all the injuries he allegedly suffered because of
receiving the unsolicited fax advertisement.  By the end of the day
on June 25, 2021, the parties must file simultaneous briefs on the
question of whether the Amerifactors and Ryerson rulings are
binding on the Court.  By the end of the day on July 16, 2021, the
parties may file simultaneous response briefs to the opposing
party's position on whether the Amerifactors and Ryerson rulings
are binding on the Court.  Once the Court has issued a ruling on
the binding nature of the Amerifactors and Ryerson rulings, it will
determine whether to allow jurisdictional discovery and, if it
concludes such discovery is necessary, will set a schedule for
conducting such discovery.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/ytjjydy3 from Leagle.com.


MDL 2886: $12.5M Settlement in Allura Fiber Suit Wins Final Nod
---------------------------------------------------------------
Judge David C. Norton of the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Carolina, Charleston Division, entered a final judgment
and order in the multidistrict litigation styled IN RE: ALLURA
FIBER CEMENT SIDING LITIGATION. This Document Applies to: All
Cases, Civil Action No. 2:19-mn-02886-DCN, MDL No. 2886 (D.S.C.).

The matter is before the Court on (i) the Plaintiffs' Unopposed
Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement that
Plaintiffs Amanda Lowe, Krista Krouse, Christopher Krouse, Donna
Johns, Jameson D. Storm, Andrew Harmel, Antonetta Luongo, and
Robert Severance ("Settling Plaintiffs") have reached with
Defendant Plycem USA, LLC and Elementia USA, Inc., and (ii) the
Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Approval of Attorneys' Fees and
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Service Awards to Class
Representatives.

On Dec. 18, 2020, the Court entered the Order Conditionally
Certifying Settlement Class, Granting Preliminary Approval of
Settlement, and Approving Distribution of Class Notice.  Due and
adequate notice have now been given to the Settlement Class.

On May 17, 2021, the Court held a Final Fairness Hearing, including
a hearing on class certification.  There were no objections and no
opposition from any Settlement Class Members or parties to the
Settlement Agreement.

The Defendants are contributing a total of $12.5 million into the
Settlement Fund in exchange for a full release from all Settlement
Class Members.  The Settlement Fund will be used to make payments
to the Settlement Class Members with Eligible Claims as set forth
in the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Fund will also be used
to pay approved attorneys' fees, litigation costs, incentive
payments to the Settling Plaintiffs, and administrative costs.

Having considered the foregoing materials and information, Judge
Norton finds that the Settlement Agreement and the Notice Plan
comply with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
that the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate.

Given the length of the litigation, the Judge finds that the
Plaintiffs' Counsel's request is reasonable and awards
reimbursement of costs in the amount of $102,771.46.  He finds the
service awards of $5,000 to each of the Proposed Class
Representatives in the action reasonable in recognition of the time
and effort they personally invested in the litigation.

After considering the substantial benefits provided to the
Settlement Class by the Settlement, the Judge finds that the
Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and also approves a
Service Awards, reimbursement of costs, and fee award to the Class
Counsel in the amount of $4 million.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge
Norton affirmed the Court's determination in the Preliminary
Approval Order and finally certified, for purposes of settlement
only, a Settlement Class defined as: All individuals or entities
who, as of the Effective Date, own a single-family house in the
United States on which the Siding is installed.

The following Named Plaintiffs are subject to the Settlement
Agreement and the Order: Amanda Lowe, Krista Krouse, Christopher
Krouse, Donna Johns, Jameson D. Storm, Andrew Harmel, Antonetta
Luongo, and Robert Severance.

The request for final certification of the Settlement Class is
granted pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  Accordingly, Judge Norton authorized and directd the
implementation and performance of all the terms and provisions of
the Settlement Agreement, as well as the terms and provisions
contained in the Final Order.  Except as to any individual claim of
those persons identified in Exhibit 1, who have submitted valid and
timely requests for exclusions from the Settlement Class, and the
claims of the Non-Settling Plaintiffs, the Judge dismissed all
claims asserted by the Settling Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class
with prejudice in accordance with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.

The Judge appointed Angeion Group to serve as the Claims
Administrator and Adjudicator to perform the tasks,
responsibilities and duties set forth in the Settlement Agreement.
In the event the Parties seek to appoint a different Claims
Administrator or Adjudicatory, they will notify the Court.

The Non-Settling Plaintiffs will submit a status report within 90
days after the entry of the Order.

Judge Norton granted final approval to the method of allocation and
distribution of the Settlement Fund as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement.

With respect to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses, the Judge finds that the case
warrants an award of $4 million in attorneys' fees and $102,771.46
in expenses.  The attorneys' fees awarded will be allocated to the
Class Counsel at the sole discretion of the Co-Lead Counsel.

The Judge further approved service awards of $5,000 to each of the
Settling Plaintiffs.  The Service Awards, cost reimbursement, and
attorneys' fee will be paid on the following schedule: (1) Class
Representative Service Awards, $2 million in attorneys' fees, and
reimbursement of costs to be paid within 30 days of the date of the
Order; (2) $1 million in attorneys' fees on Sept. 15, 2021; and (3)
$1 million on Jan. 15, 2021.

The Court retains continuing jurisdiction over the implementation,
enforcement, construction and interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement and the Non-Settling Plaintiffs' claims.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Final Judgment & Order
is available at https://tinyurl.com/wjdtbv6m from Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: Court Dismisses Brooks Prisoners Complaint Against MDOC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TERRY DARCEL BROOKS, et al., Plaintiffs v. HEIDI E.
WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-19 (W.D. Mich.),
Judge Hala Y. Jarbou of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan, Northern Division, dismisses the Plaintiffs'
complaint for failure to state a claim.

The case is a civil rights action brought by multiple state
prisoners under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.   The Plaintiffs are 24
prisoners presently incarcerated in with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in
Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.  The events about which they
complain occurred at that facility.

The Plaintiffs are Terry Darcel Brooks, Ryan Board, Dwayne Leo
Powell, Omar MartinezGarcia, Rommel Ray Reed, Luis Lugo, Raychon
Cajar, Chad White, Desmond Shaw, Kentreze White, Preston Purnell,
Gregory Finnie, Anthony Wright, Deron Brown, Dreshawn Dawon Harris,
Calvin Brown, Billie D. McKinney, Calvin Johnson, Bert Winer Jr.,
Marcel Jerome Robinson, Donald Beebe, Mark D. Jackson, Ranaldo
Ollie, and Demal Dukes.  The Plaintiffs seek money damages against
MDOC Director Heidi L. Washington, URF Warden Connie Horton, and
Shift Command Correctional Officers Unknown Gierke and Unknown
Burke.

The Plaintiffs purport to file a class action with Plaintiffs
Brooks, Board, Powell, Garcia and Reed as the five Lead Plaintiffs.
They allege claims for Eighth Amendment violations, violations of
MDOC Administrative Code 791.718, and MDOC Policy Directive
03.03.130.

The Plaintiffs' claims generally center on the threats they
perceive based on what URF is doing, or not doing, in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic.  They allege generally that, at URF, they
are housed in seven- and eight-men cubes and are within six feet of
each other.  As a result, they cannot practice social distancing.
The Plaintiffs allege that URF administration is aware that the
prisoners in its care cannot escape the COVID-19 virus because
their living quarters are insufficient for appropriate social
distancing.  They allege that URF has shown a blatant and reckless
disregard for human life.

As of the filing of the complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that there
were 130 infected prisoners at URF.  Ninety percent of the infected
prisoners were housed on the west side of the facility.  However,
infected prisoners were also housed on the east side of the
facility where approximately 1200 to 1400 prisoners reside.

The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Washington and Horton have
violated MDOC Policy Directive 03.03.130 and Administrative Code
791.718 by failing to keep all prisoners and staff safe from coming
into contact with the COVID-19 virus, and by placing the
Plaintiffs' lives in imminent danger.  They also allege that
Defendants Gierke and Burke have been scheduling correctional
officers to move back and forth between units that contain
prisoners who are infected with the COVID-19 virus and units that
do not house COVID-19 positive prisoners.

According to the Plaintiffs, these reckless actions have the direct
potential to spread the virus from "G" unit to "H" unit.  They
allege that the reckless conduct of Defendants Geiger and Burke in
moving correctional officers from units with infected prisoners to
units without any infection, placed all prisoners and correctional
staff at very high risk of imminent danger or the possibility of
death.  The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Horton waited a month
before informing the prisoner population that COVID-19 was within
the facility.

On Oct. 9, 2020, Defendant Horton closed the entire yard for
lockdown of the institution until testing was conducted.  On Oct.
13, 2020, all the prisoners were swabbed for COVID-19 virus.  An
unknown number of prisoners tested positive but neither the
prisoners nor the public were informed.

As the days passed and more prisoners tested positive, they were
moved from the west side of the facility to the east side and
housed in Neebish unit for quarantine.  However, Defendant Horton
continued to conceal information from the prison population
regarding the facts about COVID-19 infections in the facility.  On
Nov. 13, 2020, one of the prisoners at URF had to be taken to the
hospital for treatment, which forced Defendant Horton to make
public that there were 63 positive COVID-19 cases at URF.

The Plaintiffs claim that each of them suffer from various medical
conditions, including hypertension, high cholesterol, asthma,
Hepatitis C, and pre-diabetes, and that these conditions make
contracting COVID-19 more dangerous and potentially
life-threatening.

On March 4, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed supplemental pleadings which
show that, after the original complaint was filed, each of them
contracted COVID-19.  They state that some of them had to be
hospitalized and that two of the Plaintiffs died as a result of
contracting the virus.

Discussion

I. Class Action

The Plaintiffs have stated that their pro se complaint is a class
action, with Brooks, Board, Powell, Garcia, and Reed acting as the
Lead Plaintiffs.  Because the appropriateness of class action
status must be determined by the Court under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court construes the Plaintiffs'
statement as a request for class certification.  For a case to
proceed as a class action, the Court must be satisfied on a number
of grounds, including the adequacy of class representation.

Because the Plaintiffs are incarcerated pro se litigants, Judge
Jarbou finds that they are not appropriate representatives of a
class.  Therefore, she denies the Plaintiffs' request for class
certification.

II. Violations of MDOC Administrative Code and Policy Directive

Claims under Section 1983 can only be brought for "deprivations of
rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state
law. Additionally, a defendant's alleged failure to comply with an
administrative rule or policy does not itself rise to the level of
a constitutional violation.  Courts routinely recognize that a
prisoner does not enjoy any federally protected liberty or property
interest in state procedure.  The Plaintiffs' allegations that the
Defendants violated prison policy therefore fail to raise a
cognizable federal due process claim.

III. Eighth Amendment Violations

Although divided into separate claims, the core of the Plaintiffs'
first and fourth claims are the same: that the Defendants conduct
in response to the threat of COVID-19 violated their Eighth
Amendment rights and resulted in them contracting COVID-19.  The
Plaintiffs state that some of them continue to suffer from serious
health issues as a result, including Plaintiffs Powell and Garcia.
They also state that two of the Plaintiffs died as a result of
COVID-19, although the only Plaintiff specifically listed as having
died is Plaintiff Lugo.

Judge Jarbou holds that clearly, the MDOC has taken extensive steps
to address the risk of COVID-19 to inmates statewide.  To the
extent that the Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Washington and
Horton failed to implement and enforce reasonable measures to keep
prisoners protected from COVID-19, their claim fails because they
could not show a violation simply because they were housed in
dormitory-style units.  It does not also appear that the Plaintiffs
assert any other specific misconduct on the part of Defendants
Washington and Horton.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment
claims against them are properly dismissed.

With regard to Defendants Gierke and Burke, the Plaintiffs allege
that, on certain occasions in November 2020, the Defendants were
responsible for allowing corrections officers to work one day in an
infected unit and the next in a non-infected unit, which
potentially exposed the Plaintiffs to a risk of contracting
COVID-19.

However, the Judge finds that the Plaintiffs did not have a
positive test sample collected until Dec. 28, 2020, making it
impossible to attribute their positive tests to the allegations
that the same officers, on occasions in November, worked in both
COVID-19-positive units and COVID-19-negative units.  Moreover, she
finds that the Plaintiffs do not allege that corrections officers
were not regularly tested, were not properly attired in protective
equipment, or disregarded safety procedures instituted by the
MDOC.

The Judge concludes that the mere fact that officers worked on
units that had known COVID-19-positive prisoners, as well as on
units with no known infections, is not sufficient to show that they
acted with reckless disregard to the serious risk posed by COVID-19
in light of other mandated protective measures.  Therefore, the
Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Gierke and
Burke are also properly dismissed.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Judge Jarbou determines that the Plaintiffs' complaint
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(c).  She must next
decide whether an appeal of the action would be in good faith
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3).  Although the
Judge concludes that the Plaintiffs' claims are properly dismissed,
she does not conclude that any issue the Plaintiffs might raise on
appeal would be frivolous.  Accordingly, she does not certify that
an appeal would not be taken in good faith.  Should the Plaintiffs
appeal the decision, the Court will assess the $505 appellate
filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), unless the Plaintiffs
are barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the
"three-strikes" rule of Section 1915(g).  If they are barred, they
will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one
lump sum.

The ruling is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. Section
1915(g).  A judgment consistent with Judge Jarbou's opinion will be
entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/um86pwbt from Leagle.com.


MICHIGAN: Thompson Suit Transferred From E.D. to W.D. Michigan
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ARTHUR V. THOMPSON, #219215, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL
BROWN, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-CV-11044 (E.D. Mich.),
Magistrate Judge David R. Grand of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, transfers the case
to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan.

The case is a pro se civil rights case brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983.  Michigan prisoner Thompson, confined at the
Kinross Correctional Facility in Kincheloe, Michigan, raises claims
concerning the prison's procedures for handling prison transfers
during the Covid-19 pandemic, screening prisoners for illness, and
treating infected prisoners, as well as his potential exposure to
Covid-19.  He names Kinross Warden Michael Brown, Michigan
Department of Corrections Director Heidi Washington, and two
unnamed Kinross nurses (Jane Does) as the Defendants in the action.
He sues the Defendants in their official capacities and seeks
monetary damages.

The Plaintiff seeks to bring the action on behalf of himself and
several other similarly situated prisoners whom he identifies as
"interested parties."  None of those other prisoners, however, have
signed the complaint.

Having reviewed the complaint, Judge Grand concludes that venue is
improper in the Court and that the case should be transferred to
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan.
Venue for a civil action brought in federal court is governed by 28
U.S.C. Section 1391.

The Judge explains that the named Defendants reside in Kincheloe,
Chippewa County, Michigan and Lansing, Ingham County, Michigan and
the events giving rise to the complaint occurred in those counties.
Both of those counties are located in the Western District of
Michigan.  Venue is therefore proper in the U.S District Court for
the Western District of Michigan, not the Court.  The Western
District is also a more convenient forum for the action.

Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406(a) and/or 28 U.S.C.
Section 1404(a), Judge Grand orders the Clerk of the Court to
transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan.  He makes no determination as to the merits
of the complaint.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/uevup4ya from Leagle.com.


OAKLAND COUNTY, MI: County Defendants Dismissed From Hall Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TAWANDA HALL, et al., Plaintiffs v. OAKLAND COUNTY
TREASURER ANDREW MEISNER and OAKLAND COUNTY, et al., Defendants,
Case No. 20-12230 (E.D. Mich.), Judge Paul D. Borman of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, grants the Oakland County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

On Aug. 18, 2020, the Plaintiffs, former real property owners in
the City of Southfield, Michigan, filed a proposed class action
complaint against 13 Defendants.  The Defendants can be separated
into four groups: (1) Oakland County Treasurer Andrew Meisner and
Oakland County ("Oakland County Defendants"); (2) City of
Southfield, City Manager Frederick Zorn, Mayor Ken Siver, Former
City Attorney Susan Ward-Witkowski, Gerald Witkowski (Code
Enforcement and Eviction Administrator for SNRI), and Treasurer
Irvin Lowenberg ("Southfield Defendants"); (3) Southfield
Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative ("SNRI"), Southfield
Nonprofit Housing Corp. ("SNPHC"), Director E' Toille Libbett
("Director SNRI"), and Mitchel Simon ("Treasurer SNPHC") ("SNRI
Defendants"); and (4) Habitat for Humanity of Oakland County, Inc.

The eight named Plaintiffs in the action allege that they
previously owned real property located in the City of Southfield,
Michigan.  All the named Plaintiffs failed to pay property taxes
and their properties were foreclosed by Defendant Oakland County
Treasurer on the basis of non-payment of taxes pursuant to
Michigan's General Property Tax Act ("GPTA"), Mich. Comp. Laws
Section 211.1, et seq.

The Plaintiffs assert that most of them had entered into delinquent
property installment agreements with the County," even though the
Treasurer knew the Circuit Court had already entered a Judgment of
foreclosure prior to entering the delinquent property tax payment
plans with the Plaintiffs which purportedly prevented foreclosure."
They claim that they "made a payment to the Treasurer with the
promise that such payment would prevent tax foreclosure," and "in
many instances made substantial payments of 1-2 years of property
taxes prior to March 31st of the year of foreclosure," but that the
County still foreclosed on their properties.

As a result of the foreclosures, the Plaintiffs lost all title and
interest in their properties, and title in fee vested in the
foreclosing government unit ("FGU"), in the case, the Oakland
County Treasurer.  Pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws Section 211.78m(1)
(as it existed at that time), the Oakland County Treasurer offered
the properties to the City of Southfield under the City's right of
first refusal.  In each case, the City paid the Treasurer the
minimum amount due under the statute -- the delinquent property tax
amount -- with funds provided by Defendant SNPHC.  The City in turn
conveyed each of the properties to SNRI for $1.

The Complaint contains seven counts: Count I - Taking Without Just
Compensation - Fifth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983,
against the Oakland County Defendants and Southfield Defendants
only; Count II - Inverse Condemnation - Fifth Amendment; Count III
- Violation of the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution;
Count IV - Eighth Amendment Violation - Excessive Fine Forfeiture,
against Oakland County only; Count V - Procedural Due Process,
against Southfield and Oakland County Treasurer only; Count VI -
Substantive Due Process, against Southfield and Oakland County
Treasurer only; and Count VII (mislabeled "Count VI") - Unjust
Enrichment, against all the Defendants except Oakland County.  The
Plaintiffs ask the Court to award them the "taken and/or forfeited
equity" in their foreclosed properties along with money damages for
the alleged constitutional violations and claim of unjust
enrichment.

Now before the Court is the Oakland County Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss.  The Court held a hearing using Zoom videoconference
technology on May 18, 2021, at which the counsel for the Plaintiffs
and the Defendants appeared.

Analysis

A. Plaintiffs Miller, American Internet Group, and Akande's Claims
Against the Oakland County Defendants are Barred by Res Judicata

The Oakland County Defendants argue that the claims of three of the
eight named Plaintiffs -- Carolyn Miller, American Internet Group,
LLC, and Anthony Akande -- are barred by res judicata because those
plaintiffs have previously litigated post-foreclosure claims
against the Oakland County Defendants "regarding the foreclosure
and lost."  The Plaintiffs respond that these Plaintiffs' claims
are not barred by res judicata, asserting that the prior litigation
"was an unfair housing case based on racial discrimination in 2018"
and that the "scheme to strip the Plaintiffs' equity" alleged in
the case was "not known at the time of the state suit."

Judge Borman finds that Plaintiffs Miller, American Internet Group,
and Akande's claims against the Oakland County Defendants are
barred by res judicata.  Even if these plaintiffs' claims were not
barred by res judicata, they would nevertheless fail for the
reasons stated infra.

B. Plaintiff Marcus Byers Lacks Standing

Plaintiff Marcus Byers alleges that he held "equitable title" with
his guardian in property that was foreclosed on for $4,113 in
delinquent taxes.  However, the records the Plaintiffs attach to
the Complaint indicate that the subject property was owned by, and
foreclosed under, the ownership of Debbie Byers, who is not a named
Plaintiff in thecase.  After the foreclosure, the property was sold
to the City for the tax debt amount, and then transferred to SNRI
for $1.

The Oakland County Defendants assert that Plaintiff Marcus Byers
lacks standing to bring suit against them because he was not the
owner of the foreclosed property.  Rather, all former title and
interest in that property prior to the tax foreclosure in 2018 was
held by Marcus Byers' former spouse, Debbie Byers, who purchased
the property from Wells Fargo Bank in 2008 (and who, according to
the SNRI Defendants, is presently litigating claims in Bankruptcy
Court related to that property).  Without an ownership interest,
Plaintiff Marcus Byers was not injured and lacks standing.

Judge Borman holds that the Plaintiffs rely on expired guardianship
papers naming "Kiara Napier" as Byers' guardian and an unrecorded
Quit Claim deed from Debbie Byers to herself and Marcus Byers,
dated July 30, 2020, to try to assert that Byers somehow had an
interest in the property in 2018.  However, as the Defendants point
out in their Reply brief, Debbie Byers could only convey the
property interest she had in 2020, which, following the 2018
foreclosure of the property, was none.  Without an interest in the
subject property when the foreclosure and transfers occurred, the
Judge finds that Plaintiff Marcus Byers lacks standing in the case
and dismisses his claims with prejudice.

C. Counts I - IV

The Oakland County Defendants state that Count I through IV of the
Complaint "make the same fundamental allegation: Defendants took
more than what was due."  Counts I through III assert takings
claims under the United States and Michigan Constitutions, and
Count IV asserts an Eighth Amendment - Excessive Fine claim.  The
Oakland County Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot state a
claim against them under Counts I through IV because the Plaintiffs
acknowledge in their Complaint that the Oakland County Defendants
received only the "minimum bid amount which the Plaintiffs
acknowledge was due."  They assert that the Plaintiffs therefore
concede that the Oakland County Defendants did not receive any
"surplus proceeds" when the Treasurer sold the properties to the
City of Southfield.

Judge Borman dismisses Plaintiffs' claims in Counts I through IV of
their Complaint against the Oakland County Defendants for failure
to state a claim.  He finds that the District courts that have
considered this same argument -- that the forfeiture of
proceeds/equity in foreclosed property is punitive in nature and
therefore governed by the Excessive Fines Clause -- have
unanimously rejected such a claim, finding the Michigan Supreme
Court's interpretation of the GPTA controlling.  The Judge
similarly finds that the Plaintiffs fail to state an Eighth
Amendment claim against the Oakland County Defendants.

D. Plaintiffs' Procedural Due Process Claim (Count V)

The Plaintiffs allege a procedural due process claims against the
Oakland County Defendants.  They allege that most of them had
entered into delinquent property installment agreements with the
Oakland County Treasurer "which portended to halt tax foreclosure
and indicated the Plaintiffs and the Class Members would continue
to get notice of tax foreclosures," but that Oakland County
Defendants "did not take additional reasonable steps when it knew
its efforts at providing notice had failed," such as "notifying the
Class Representatives and Members of the default on a tax payer
installment agreement and for re-activation of a tax foreclosure."

The Oakland County Defendants argue that no additional notice of
default on the payment plans is required because the payment plans
plainly state that if the person does not make payments in
accordance with the plan, "I will lose my property," that the
Treasurer "will continue the tax foreclosure process," the plan "is
not a legal contract," and that the "property may be withheld from
auction if all payments are made."  The Plaintiffs do not claim
that they made the required payments, and the Defendants assert
that the Plaintiffs do not cite any statutory or constitutional
provision requiring additional notice.

Judge agrees that the Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim in
Count V of their Complaint fails to state a claim.  The Plaintiffs
do not allege that the Defendants failed to provide notice required
under the GPTA, and the Plaintiffs have failed to cite to any
controlling authority requiring additional notice of default of the
payment plans.  At the hearing on the motion, the Plaintiffs'
counsel asserted the claim regarding the property installment
agreements is not the claim they want to make for their procedural
due process claim, and that the claim should be that the defendants
did not provide notice to Plaintiffs that they would be "taking"
the equity in the properties.  However, Michigan does not recognize
a "property interest" in the alleged lost equity, and accordingly
such a claim, even if made, would fail.  Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs' procedural due process claim against the Oakland County
Defendants is dismissed for failure to state a claim.

E. Plaintiffs' Substantive Due Process Claim (Count VI)

The Plaintiffs allege, in the alternative to their taking claims, a
substantive due process claim against the Southfield and Oakland
County Defendants.  They allege that the Defendants denied them
their constitutional right to fair and just treatment during
executive acts and deceptive communications from site officials who
intentionally acted and deprived Plaintiffs of their property.
They further allege that they were led to believe by the Oakland
County and by Southfield and their respective officials that they
had the ability to maintain their property rights" and that
"government officials including the named Defendants herein engaged
in unconscionable fraud against the Plaintiffs" and "engaged in
conduct that 'shocked the conscience' in the constitutional
sense."

The Oakland County Defendants first argue that the Plaintiffs fail
to "identify who, what, where or when these alleged communications
occurred or the substance of the communications" and that "it is
well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree
of specificity and that vague and conclusory allegations
unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such
a claim under Section 1983."  The Plaintiffs do not directly
respond to this argument.

Judge Borman holds that other courts that have recently considered
similar substantive due process claims by tax-foreclosed plaintiffs
have rejected such claims that "the defendants' conduct of
'destroying and/or seizing' his equity is arbitrary and shocks the
conscience."  The Plaintiffs here fail to plead that the Oakland
County Defendants have engaged in conduct in foreclosing on the
Plaintiffs' properties under the GPTA that is "arbitrary" or
"shocks the conscience," and the Plaintiffs' substantive due
process claim against these Defendants is dismissed.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Borman grants the Oakland County
Defendants' motion to dismiss, and dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims
against Oakland County and Oakland County Treasurer Andrew Meisner
with prejudice.  His Opinion and Order does not resolve all pending
claims and does not close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/v42sdpuw from Leagle.com.


RITE AID: 9th Cir. Affirms Denial of Arbitration in Stafford Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, BRYON STAFFORD, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RITE AID CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant, Case No. 20-55333 (9th Cir.), the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirms the district court's order
denying Rite Aid's motion to compel arbitration.

Stafford brought a class action against Rite Aid, alleging that
Rite Aid fraudulently inflated the reported prices of prescription
drugs to insurance companies.  Stafford alleged that this resulted
in class members paying Rite Aid a higher co-payment for the drugs
than they would have paid if Rite Aid had reported the correct
price to their insurance companies.

Mr. Stafford brought the suit as a putative class action, seeking
to certify the following Class and Subclass:

     a. Class: All persons or entities in the United States and its
territories who, between January 2008 and the present (Class
Period), paid for, in full or in part, a prescription generic drug
included on the Rx Savings Program formulary and were insured for
the purchase through a third-party payor; and

     b. Subclass: All persons or entities in the state of
California who, during the Class Period, paid for, in full or in
part, a prescription generic drug included on the Rx Savings
Program formulary and were insured for the purchase through a
third-party payor.

Mr. Stafford filed a First Amended Complaint on July 28, 2017,
which Rite Aid moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and
for being time-barred.  The district court dismissed the First
Amended Complaint without prejudice on the statute of limitations
ground.  Stafford's Second Amended Complaint included factual
allegations sufficient to support a claim that the statute of
limitations was tolled, and the district court denied Rite Aid's
second motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Rite Aid then moved to compel arbitration.  Although Rite Aid and
Stafford had no contract between them containing an arbitration
clause, Rite Aid did have such contracts with the intermediaries
who coordinated insurance reimbursements and co-payment
calculations, called "pharmacy benefits managers."  Rite Aid sought
to compel Stafford to arbitrate through the theory of equitable
estoppel, contending that Stafford's claims were intertwined with
Rite Aid's contracts with the pharmacy benefits managers.
According to Rite Aid, it would be unfair to permit Stafford to sue
in court for relief provided by contracts with arbitration
clauses.

The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration.  It
held that principles of equitable estoppel did not bind Stafford to
the arbitration agreements in contracts to which he was not a
signatory, because Stafford's claims are not based on Rite Aid's
breach of its contracts with the pharmacy benefits managers.
Instead, Stafford sought recovery under California law for Rite
Aid's fraudulent claims to the pharmacy benefits managers that had
the effect of increasing the cost of Stafford's prescription
drugs.

The district court also rejected Rite Aid's contention that an
arbitrator ought to decide arbitrability on the grounds that (1)
there was no valid arbitration clause; and (2) Stafford could not
have clearly and unmistakably agreed to submit arbitrability to an
arbitrator because he was not a signatory to the contract.
Finally, the district court held that Rite Aid had waived its right
to arbitrate the dispute in any event.  Rite Aid appealed.

On appeal, Rite Aid argues that equitable estoppel binds Stafford
to arbitrate his claims because his claims are based in part on the
contracts between Rite Aid and the pharmacy benefits managers.
Second, Rite Aid contends that the dispute over whether the claims
must be arbitrated must itself be submitted to arbitration under
those contracts' delegation clauses.  Finally, Rite Aid maintains
that it did not waive its right to arbitrate because it could not
have known that Stafford's claims were based on the contracts prior
to conducting discovery.

The Ninth Circuit opines that it is irrelevant whether the
contracts between Rite Aid and the pharmacy benefits managers
required Rite Aid to report the usual and customary price of a
prescription drug.  Even if the contracts contained no provision
requiring Rite Aid to report the usual and customary price, the
fact remains that Rite Aid did report that information and
allegedly purposely inflated it.  Rite Aid's duty not to commit
fraud is independent from any contractual requirements with the
pharmacy benefit managers.  Statutes and common law -- not
provisions in the contracts -- entitle Stafford to relief.  The
principles of equitable estoppel therefore do not require Stafford
to submit to the arbitration clauses of contracts between Rite Aid
and the pharmacy benefits managers.

The Ninth Circuit concludes that Stafford's claims do not depend on
Rite Aid's contractual obligations to the pharmacy benefits
managers.  Consequently, equitable estoppel does not apply to bind
Stafford to the arbitration agreements in those contracts.  The
Ninth Circuit affirms the judgment of the district court and
remands for further proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/d3t32yw from Leagle.com.

Stephanie Schuster -- stephanie.schuster@morganlewis.com --
(argued) and Bryan Killian -- bryan.killian@morganlewis.com --
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, in Washington, D.C.; J. Warren Rissier
-- warren.rissier@morganlewis.com -- and Joseph Bias --
joseph.bias@morganlewis.com -- Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, in Los
Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant.

Andrew S. Love -- alove@rgrdlaw.com -- (argued), Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, in San Francisco, California; David W. Mitchell
-- davidm@rgrdlaw.com -- Brian O. O'Mara -- bomara@rgrdlaw.com --
Robert R. Henssler Jr., and Arthur L. Shingler III --
ashingler@rgrdlaw.com -- Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, in San
Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.


SARTON PUERTO: Compelled to Produce Docs in Fiorentine TCPA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, John Fiorentine, et al., Plaintiffs v. Sarton Puerto
Rico, LLC D/B/A IKEA Puerto Rico, a Puerto Rico limited liability
company, Defendant, Civil No. 20-1491 (GAG-GLS) (D.P.R.),
Magistrate Judge Giselle Lopez-Soler of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico granted the Plaintiffs' motion to
compel.

The Plaintiffs sought to compel the Defendant to produce a log
documenting its message interactions with the putative members of
the instant Class Action Complaint filed pursuant to the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").

On Nov. 13, 2019, Plaintiffs John Fiorentine and Kim Kravitz, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, filed a
Class Action Complaint against the Defendant for alleged violations
to the TCPA.  The Plaintiffs sustain that the Defendant engaged in
unsolicited marketing and, in doing so, harmed thousands of
consumers in contravention to the TCPA, which prohibits any person
from calling a cellular telephone number using an automatic
telephone dialing system without prior express consent from the
recipient.  They pled facts to establish the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the certification of
a class action.

On Nov. 11, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Proposed Discovery Plan
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).  They also moved the Court for
the entry of a Protective Order, which was approved on Nov. 12,
2020.

On Feb. 18, 2021, the Defendant answered the Plaintiffs' First
Request for Production and First Set of Interrogatories.  The
Plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the Defendant's responses to
Request for Production Nos. 6, 7, 8, 16, 29 and 32, which sought:
all the documents related to the transmission of text messages and
their content (Request Nos. 6 and 29), including the contact
information of the recipient (name, address, email and phone
number) and the source where the information was obtained (Request
Nos. 7 and 16); the total number of text messages sent (Request No.
8); and a log of the telephone numbers to which text messages were
transmitted (Request No. 32).  The information provided by the
Defendant was limited to that of John Fiorentine and Kim Kravitz.

The Plaintiffs also took issue with the Defendant's response to
Interrogatory Number 1, which requested the total number of text
messages sent, including the date, content and telephone number of
the recipient, and a description of the equipment used to obtain,
store and send the messages.  Again, the information provided by
the Defendant was limited to that of John Fiorentine and Kim
Kravitz.  After efforts to confer were exhausted, the Plaintiffs
filed the Motion to Compel.

The Court is called to determine whether the Plaintiffs' requests
and interrogatory -- seeking marketing text messages sent by
Defendant, together with the dates, contents, recipient telephone
numbers of those text messages and the source where the information
was obtained, and a description of the equipment used to obtain,
store and send the messages -- are directed to establishing the
prerequisites of Rule 23 in a class action under the TCPA and
whether these requests pose an undue burden for the Defendant.

The Defendant does posit that the Plaintiffs waived class action
discovery because they did not specifically mention in the Rule
26(f) Discovery Plan at Docket No. 34, filed on Nov. 11, 2020, that
the scope of discovery would include information necessary to
certify the class.  It claims that producing the information
requested by the Plaintiffs would breach its privacy policies.

Judge Lopez-Soler concludes that the information requested by the
Plaintiffs is both relevant and proportional to the legitimate
needs of the case, specifically, to demonstrate the propriety of
class certification under Rule 23.  The information requested is
not overly burdensome, and the Protective Order adequately protects
Defendant from privacy concerns.  Notwithstanding the foregoing,
and in the abundance of caution, any personal identifying
information should be redacted, as proposed by the Plaintiffs.

For these reasons, Judge Lopez-Soler granted the Plaintiffs' Motion
to Compel.  The Defendant must submit its responses to Request Nos.
6, 7, 8, 16, 29 and 32 of the Plaintiffs' First Request for
Production to Defendant and to Interrogatory No. 1 of Plaintiffs'
First Set of Interrogatories to the Defendant in a term not to
exceed 15 days after the entry of the Order.  Confidential
documents are to be produced under the terms of the Protective
Order and any personal identifying information must be redacted.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yy9ud3dt from Leagle.com.


SHUTTERFLY INC: 3rd Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Garfield Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ROBERT GARFIELD, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Appellant v. SHUTTERFLY, INC.; RYAN
O'HARA; THOMAS D. HUGHES; WILL LANSING; EVA MANOLIS; ANN MATHER;
ELIZABETH RAFAEL; ELIZABETH SARTAIN; H. TAYLOE STANSBURY; BRIAN
SWETTE; MICHAEL ZEISSER; CHRISTOPHER NORTH, Case No. 20-2249 (3d
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirms the
District Court's May 20, 2020 order granting the Defendants' motion
to dismiss with prejudice.

The securities class action lawsuit involves an allegedly
misleading statement made in a proxy statement issued by
Shutterfly.  The Proxy was issued to gain shareholder support for
the merger of Shutterfly with affiliates of certain funds managed
by Apollo Management IX, L.P.  The Lead Plaintiff and Appellant in
the matter is a former shareholder of Shutterfly, Robert Garfield.
In addition to Shutterfly, the Defendants include the management of
Shutterfly at the time the Proxy was issued.

In recent years, Shutterfly experienced a series of disappointing
quarters.  After its stock price closed at $97 on June 12, 2018,
Shutterfly missed revenue estimates in two straight quarters and
saw its stock price drop significantly.  During this time, it
lowered its Adjusted EBITDA target, announced its CEO, Christopher
North, would depart in August 2019, formed a Strategic Review
committee, retained financial advisor Morgan Stanley, and was
reviewing strategic alternatives, such as a sale of the company.

Shutterfly entered into a merger agreement with Apollo on June 10,
2019.  Under the terms of the agreement, Shutterfly common
stockholders would receive $51 per share.  In support of the
proposed merger, Shutterfly had Morgan Stanley prepare a fairness
opinion.  To reach its conclusion that the proposed merger was
fair, Morgan Stanley received and reviewed the Management Case
Projections, the Sensitivity Case Projections, and certain
projections based on Wall Street research reports.

To persuade shareholders to approve the merger, the Defendants
authorized the dissemination of the Proxy on July 30, 2019.  As
relevant in the appeal, the Proxy included a discussion of the
Morgan Stanley fairness opinion.  Specifically, it included the
estimated implied value per share calculated by Morgan Stanley
based on both the Management Case Projections and the Sensitivity
Case Projections.  Each time the Proxy discussed the value per
share numbers, it stated the values were prepared by Morgan Stanley
and indicated the analysis Morgan Stanley applied.

After the Proxy was released, Jack Wolf initiated the current
lawsuit in the District of Delaware, contending not enough
information had been disclosed.  After a supplemental proxy was
filed in August, Wolf voluntarily dismissed the case.  A majority
of shareholders approved the merger on Aug. 28, 2019, and the
merger closed on Sept. 25, 2019.  Bill Spurlock reopened the case
in October 2019 and filed an amended complaint on Dec. 23, 2019 --
this remains the operative complaint.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), including jurisdictional arguments contending Spurlock
lacked standing.  In response, Spurlock was substituted out and
replaced by Robert Garfield.  The court heard oral arguments on May
20, 2020 and issued its decision granting the motion to dismiss
with prejudice from the bench.  The appeal followed.

The lawsuit is based on alleged violations of Sections 14(a) and
20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
Sections 78n(a), 78t(a).  While the Complaint included five
allegedly misleading statements in the Proxy, the Plaintiff
confines his appeal to only the inclusion of the share valuation
ranges that were based on the Sensitivity Case Projections.
Therefore, the only remaining alleged misstatement is that the
Proxy included Sensitivity Case valuation ranges and misled
shareholders regarding the true value of the company.

The Third Circuit holds that this lone remaining statement fails to
establish a cause of action because it was not misleading, and any
misleading aspect of the share valuation ranges was not material.
It reaches this conclusion due to the ample disclosures provided in
the Proxy that the values were created by Morgan Stanley, the
estimates should not be taken as the true value of the company, and
-- most importantly -- the Sensitivity Case Projections were based
on downside assumptions the company itself believed were less
likely to occur.

The Third Circuit concludes that a reasonable investor could not
plausibly read these statements and believe the Sensitivity Case
Projections should be used to estimate the current actual value of
Shutterfly when the Proxy was issued.  They were warned the value
ranges should not be taken as the actual value of Shutterfly.  With
management having disclaimed values, the shareholders were also
told the Sensitivity Case Projections were a downside estimate and
lower than management anticipated would actually occur.  Therefore,
even if those lower values were misleading as to the true value of
Shutterfly, shareholders were told why those values were lower and
they were placed alongside the values that the Plaintiff contends
were accurate.  Accordingly, these warnings and disclaimers
"directly address the substance of the statement the Plaintiffs
challenge" and render the alleged misrepresentation immaterial.

Alternatively, the District Court concluded that the Complaint
sounded in fraud and the heightened pleading standards of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA") were not met.  The Third Circuit concludes that the
Complaint did sound in fraud and the heightened requirements of
Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. Section 78u-4(b)(1), were not
met.

First, the Complaint does allege negligence in a few instances, but
the gravamen of the Complaint is that management was "aware of the
truth" and proceeded to intentionally deceive shareholders.
Second, the scienter requirement of Section 78u-4(b)(2) does not
apply as the present case is a Section 14(a) action.  Third, the
Plaintiff has failed to show "knowledge by the person who made the
false statement of its falsity" and "ignorance of its falsity by
the person to whom it was made.  Last, the Proxy fully discloses
the nature of the Sensitivity Case Projections.  To the degree the
values were false, a reasonable shareholder would not have been
unaware of their falsity given these disclosures.  Accordingly,
even if the statements were misleading and material, the Plaintiff
failed to meet the pleading requirements required of fraud claims.

The Plaintiff contends he should be permitted to amend his
complaint because he did not have a "detailed roadmap for curing
the deficiencies" in his claims and because this is a "technical
and demanding corner of the law."

The Third Circuit opines that each of the Defendants' reasons
provides a basis for affirming the court's denial of leave to amend
-- especially on an abuse of discretion standard of review.  The
Plaintiff has identified no new facts or arguments that would allow
the Complaint to escape dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds.
Accordingly, amendment would be futile, and the court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing with prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, the Third Circuit affirms the court's
order dismissing the case with prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/dwjvb54t from Leagle.com.

Blake A. Bennett -- bbennett@coochtaylor.com -- Cooch & Taylor, in
Wilmington, Delaware, Adam Frankel, Greenwich Legal Associates,
Greenwich, CT, Juan E. Monteverde -- jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
-- [ARGUED] Miles D. Schreiner -- mschreiner@monteverdelaw.com --
Monteverde & Associates, in New York City, Counsel for Appellant.

Lewis R. Clayton -- lclayton@paulweiss.com -- [ARGUED] Paul A.
Paterson, Justin Ward, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, in
New York City, Daniel A. Mason -- dmason@paulweiss.com --Paul Weiss
Rifkind Wharton & Garrison, in Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for
Appellees.


SIMON PROPERTY: Bid to Stay Discovery in Cafe Gelato Suit Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CAFE, GELATO & PANINI LLC, d/b/a Cafe Gelato Panini,
and DJAMES FOODS, INC., on behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. SIMON PROPERTY GROUP, INC., SIMON
PROPERTY GROUP, L.P., M.S. MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC., and THE
TOWN CENTER AT BOCA RATON TRUST, Defendants, Case No.
20-60981-CIV-CANNON/Hunt (S.D. Fla.), Judge Aileen M. Cannon of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Fort
Lauderdale Division, denied the Defendants' Motion to Temporarily
Stay Discovery Pending a Ruling upon the Motion to Abstain or
Alternatively to Dismiss.

The Plaintiffs, Cafe Gelato and Djames Foods, doing business as
Pete's Burgers, Wings & Drinks, initiated the putative class action
in May 2020, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
tenants.  Subsequently, in September 2020, the Plaintiffs filed the
current operative pleading -- the First Amended Complaint ("FAC")
-- in which they assert seven counts against the Defendants.

The FAC alleges that, during a period exceeding fifteen years, the
Defendants, a commercial real estate company that owns malls across
the country and its real estate management entities (also named
Defendants in the action), acted in concert with one another to
fraudulently misrepresent, through inflated invoices, the actual
amount of electrical energy consumption at the Plaintiffs' leased
commercial spaces.  These inflated invoices, the FAC alleges, then
were sent to tenants across the country through the United States
mail system to receive payments in excess of what the tenants
actually consumed in electricity.  Furthermore, the Plaintiffs
allege that Simon, Inc., Simon Partnership, and M.S. Management
perpetrated a nationwide scheme to implement a standard clause into
leases that barred tenants from performing independent audits on
their energy usage.

In turn, the Defendants allegedly overcharged tenants for
electricity and used the federal mail and wire system to distribute
the leases and the inflated energy bills, thereby deriving illicit
profits from the scheme. Plaintiffs also aver that, in furtherance
of this scheme, Defendants enlisted the aid of nonparty Valquest
Systems, Inc., an independent energy company in Texas that provided
surveys of how much energy the Plaintiffs consumed.  Valquest then
overstated the Plaintiffs and the class members' energy consumption
in order to hide the intentional electrical cost markups by Simon,
Inc., Simon Partnership, and M.S. Management.

Based on these allegations, the Plaintiffs assert the following
seven causes of action: (1) Violation of Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(a),
(c)-(d), against all the Defendants (Count I); (2) Unjust
Enrichment against Defendants Simon, Inc., Simon Partnership, and
M.S. Management on behalf of all putative classes (Count II); (3)
Violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
("FDUPTA"), Fla. Stat. Section 501.201, et seq., against Defendants
Simon, Inc., Simon Partnership, and M.S. Management on behalf of
the Florida Statutory Class and the TCBR class (Count III); (4)
Violation of Florida's Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act
("Florida Rico Act"), Fla. Stat. Sections 772.103(1), (3)-(4),
772.104(1), 777.011, and 777.03(1)(a), against all the Defendants
on behalf of the Florida Statutory Class and the TCBR Class (Count
IV); (5) Breach of Contract against the Defendant Trust on behalf
of the TCBR Class (Count V); (6) Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing against the Trust and on behalf of the
TCBR Class (Count VI); and (7) Breach of Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices - Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Section 17.41, et seq., against Defendants Simon, Inc., Simon
Partnership, and M.S. Management and on behalf of the Texas
Statutory Class (Count VII).

Following the submission of the Plaintiffs' FAC, the Defendants
filed a Motion to Abstain or Alternatively to Dismiss the FAC,
asking the Court to abstain from adjudicating the case, or,
alternatively, to dismiss all counts in the FAC pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).  Shortly thereafter, the Defendants
filed the Motion to Stay at issue, seeking an order staying
discovery pending a Court ruling on the Defendant's Motion to
Abstain or to Dismiss.

The parties then engaged in discovery-related litigation.  The
Plaintiffs moved to compel discovery from the Defendants; the
Defendants opposed the motion; and Magistrate Judge Hunt ultimately
entered an order granting in part the Plaintiffs' motion to compel,
where he crystallized the scope of discovery on certain disputed
matters and instructed the parties to confer to resolve outstanding
discovery issues.

On May 13, 2021 -- almost exactly one year after the case was
filed, and four days before the noticed hearing on the Defendants'
Motions -- the Defendants filed a Notice with the Court indicating
that, on May 12, 2021, they submitted a Petition to the Public
Utility Commission of Texas ("PUCT").  The Defendants' Petition
seeks a declaration from the PUCT that clarifies whether they are
"required to obtain a retail electric provider certificate, under
16 Texas Administrative Code Section 25.107(a)(1), to provide
electric service to Plaintiff Pete's Burgers.

According to the Defendants, they have filed this petition because
Plaintiff Pete's Burger's alleges in the FAC that they illegally
provided retail electric service to Pete's Burgers without first
obtaining a certificate to operate as a retail electric provider
(REP) pursuant to 16 Tex. Admin. Code Section 25.107(a)(1), and
that rule applies only in areas of the state that have adopted
customer choice, and as noted above, the area served by GP&L is not
such an area.  The Defendants argue that a declaratory order by the
PUCT on the issue "is necessary to avoid the possibility that
Commission rules are inappropriately interpreted or misapplied by
the Florida court as part of Pete's Burgers' suit in Florida."

The Defendants believe that a stay of discovery is warranted
because they are likely to prevail on their Motion to Abstain
and/or Dismiss.  Their Motion to Abstain asks the Court to decline
to adjudicate the case based upon the doctrines of Burford
abstention and primary jurisdiction.  They assert that the
Plaintiffs have alleged purported violations of Florida and Texas'
administrative codes governing utilities, and hence that the Court
should abstain from adjudicating the case to permit the relevant
state agencies -- Florida's Public Service Commission ("PSC") and
the PUCT (Public Utility Commission of Texas) -- to decide whether
state regulatory policy precludes the Defendants' conduct.  The
Defendants further claim that the Court's adjudication of this
controversy could result in undue federal interference in those two
states' regulatory processes.  With respect to Rule 12(b), they
argue that the FAC is legally deficient in multiple respects and is
premised on a misreading of the relevant lease provisions.

Beyond the foregoing merits arguments, the Defendants assert that,
absent a stay, they will be forced to incur significant expense in
responding to voluminous discovery requests spanning many
properties nationwide over a 15-year period.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants are not
likely to prevail in their Motion to Abstain under Burford and/or
primary jurisdiction, or in their Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b).  As to abstention and primary jurisdiction, they dispute the
Defendants' assertion that the claims in the FAC are grounded upon
purported regulatory violations, noting that none of the counts in
the FAC raises claims under any state regulatory codes.  The
Plaintiffs also assert that federal district courts resolve the
type of claims asserted in the FAC in a commonplace fashion,
including in the relatively recent and similar CBL Litigation in
the Middle District of Florida.  As to Rule 12(b), they respond
that the FAC contains well-pled allegations and states plausible
claims for relief as to all counts alleged.  Finally, on the
question of discovery burden, the Plaintiffs argue that Defendants
misrepresent the scope of the discovery requests, and that any stay
would prejudice them and the class members with an undue delay in
the progression of the case.

Discussion

A. Burford Abstention Doctrine

The Burford abstention doctrine is "an extraordinary and narrow
exception to a federal court's virtually unflagging obligation" to
exercise jurisdiction, ciiting Deal v. Tugalo Gas Co., Inc., 991
F.3d 1313, 1327 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-33
(1943).  Under Burford, a federal court can decline to adjudicate
-- and can dismiss -- a case that is otherwise within its
jurisdiction, but only in a very particular, and 'narrow,' set of
circumstances."  As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, in Burford
itself, the Supreme Court held that a district court should have
abstained from adjudicating an action in which a plaintiff sought
to enjoin the execution of an order of a Texas agency because the
merits of the order "so clearly involved basic problems of Texas
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the
Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them."

Judge Cannon holds that the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit
have emphasized the narrow and extraordinary nature of the Burford
exception.  The case does not present a reason to employ that
extraordinary doctrine.  The Eleventh Circuit appears never to have
determined that a court was required to abstain under Burford.
And, when the doctrine has been applied in other circuits, it has
arisen under circumstances involving concrete interference with
either developed state proceedings or comprehensive state policy
that directly implicated the matters asserted in the federal
litigation.  No such circumstances are presented in the case.  For
these reasons, the Defendants' Burford abstention argument fails,
and a stay of discovery on that basis is unwarranted.

B. Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine

The Defendants also invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine as a
basis to withhold Court resolution of the case and instead refer
the matter to the relevant Florida and Texas regulatory agencies.
Primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine whereby a
court of competent jurisdiction may dismiss or stay an action
pending a resolution of some portion of the actions by an
administrative agency.  Even where a court is authorized to
adjudicate the claim before it, the primary jurisdiction doctrine
counsels in favor of abstention "whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body."  In such a case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.

Judge Cannon holds that the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
inapplicable in the action for the same reasons discussed in the
foregoing section addressing the Burford abstention doctrine.  The
Plaintiffs seek monetary damages based on common law theories of
liability such as unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as for
alleged violations of various state statutory provisions that
proscribe deceptive commercial practices.  As mentioned, these
causes of action are regularly handled by federal and state trial
courts, and they do not depend in any material way on Defendants'
purported violations of administrative codes governing the
provision of utility services in Florida or Texas.  As such, there
are no issues before the Court that require the special knowledge
of a regulatory body or that otherwise exceed the Court's
competence.  The doctrine of primary jurisdiction doctrine is
inapplicable.

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

Judge Cannon does not address the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
under Rule 12(b) except to conclude that a stay of discovery
pending resolution of the Rule 12(b) arguments is not warranted
under the applicable standard for a stay of discovery.

D. Discovery Burden

As a final matter, Judge Cannon is unpersuaded by the Defendants'
argument that an order granting a stay of discovery is warranted
due to the burden that will be incurred in responding to the
Plaintiffs' discovery requests.  She holds that the Defendants may
present such arguments, as appropriate, to Magistrate Judge Hunt
for resolution according to his discovery procedures and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Cannon denied the Defendants'
Motion to Temporarily Stay Discovery Pending a Ruling upon the
Motion to Abstain or Alternatively to Dismiss.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/8dp7r5zs from Leagle.com.


TRAVELCENTERS: Wiley Slams Non-Disclosure of Background Check
-------------------------------------------------------------
Leandre Wiley, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TRAVELCENTERS of America, LLC,
Case No. 21-cv-01093, (N.D. Ohio, May 26, 2021) seeks statutory
damages plus punitive damages and for attorney's fees and costs
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970.

TRAVELCENTERS is a large, national full-service truck stop and
travel center operator with locations throughout the United States.
It routinely obtains and uses information in consumer reports to
conduct background checks on applicants and employees.

In July 2020, Wiley applied for employment with Travelcenters who
then extended a conditional offer of employment to Plaintiff. When
Wiley showed up for work, he was informed he could not commence
employment because of his background check. Defendant allegedly
denied Wiley employment opportunities based in part or in whole on
the results of Wiley's consumer report without first providing him
notice and a copy of the report. [BN]

Plaintiff is represented by:

      Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
      MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
      201 N. Franklin Street, Suite 700
      Tampa, FL 33602
      Telephone: (813) 577-4761
      Facsimile: (813) 559-4870
      Email: medelman@forthepeople.com


UNITED STATES: Epperson Granted Leave to File First Amended Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRIS EPPERSON, Plaintiff v. FOREIGN MINISTRY AFFAIRS,
et al., Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-00785-DAD-SKO (E.D. Cal.),
Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of California issued first screening order
granting the Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint.

The Plaintiff drafted his complaint using the general complaint
form provided by the Court.  The caption of the complaint lists the
"Foreign Ministry Affairs" located in Moscow, Russia, as the
Defendant.  The complaint lists as Defendants: "Putin Vladimir,"
George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, and David Orsby.  The Plaintiff
has checked both federal question and diversity of citizenship as
the basis of jurisdiction.

In the section in which he is asked to indicate which of his
federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been
violated, he lists the following: Article III Constitution, Article
I Constitution, First Amendment.  In the section directed to the
basis for diversity jurisdiction, the Plaintiff states that he is a
citizen of the State of California, but he leaves blank the section
of the complaint form requesting information regarding the
Defendants' states of citizenship.  The statement of claim and
relief sought sections of the complaint are also blank.  The
Plaintiff lists the amount in controversy as "100 million
damages."

The Civil Cover Sheet lists the Defendant as "Putin Vladimir
Foreign Ministry Affairs Moscow" and states that the basis of
jurisdiction is "U.S. Government Plaintiff," but identifies the
Plaintiff as a citizen of the State and the Defendant is a citizen
or subject of a foreign country.  The nature of suit is listed as
"other civil rights."  The origin of the proceeding is listed as
multidistrict litigation.  The cause of action is described as
"Rule 11" and 50 U.S.C. Section 2251.  The Plaintiff checks the box
on the civil cover sheet indicating the case is a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and lists the demand as
$9 billion.

Discussion

Judge Oberto finds that the complaint does not state any cognizable
claims.  The Plaintiff will be provided with the legal standards
that appear to apply to his claims and will be granted an
opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the identified
deficiencies.

A. Rule 8

Rule 8 requires that a complaint must contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."  The Plaintiff's complaint violates Rule 8 because it does
not contain a short and plain statement of the claim demonstrating
that he is entitled to relief.  The complaint does not list any
relief sought.  The Plaintiff needs to set forth the relief that he
is seeking in the action if he elects to file an amended
complaint.

B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

The Defendants named in the Complaint include the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia.  It is unclear from the information
contained in the Complaint whether this foreign entity would be
subject to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") "provides the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts
of this country."  Under the FSIA, foreign states generally have
immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts, subject to
certain enumerated exceptions.  Such exceptions include, but are
not limited to, circumstances where the foreign state has
explicitly or impliedly waived its immunity, and actions based upon
commercial activities of the foreign state carried on in the United
States or causing a direct effect in the United States.  Without
more information clarifying any potential claims against the state
entity, it is not clear whether one of the specific exceptions to
foreign sovereign immunity would allow for the Complaint to move
forward as to that Defendant.

C. Plaintiff Cannot Maintain a Class Action

The Plaintiff's civil cover sheet indicates that the complaint is a
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  He cannot
bring a class action.  He is a non-lawyer proceeding without
counsel.  It is well established that a layperson cannot ordinarily
represent the interests of a class.  Therefore, unless the
Plaintiff can provide facts demonstrating that he is statutorily
authorized to pursue a claim on behalf of a class, he must amend
his complaint to proceed as an individual litigant.

Conclusion

For the reasons she discussed, Judge Oberto concludes that the
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in the action.  The Plaintiff
is granted leave to file an amended complaint to cure the
deficiencies identified in the Order.  The Plaintiff's amended
complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state
what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of his
constitutional rights.  Although accepted as true, the factual
allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.  Finally, the Plaintiff is advised that an
amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.  Therefore,
his amended complaint must be "complete in itself without reference
to the prior or superseded pleading."

Based on the foregoing, Judge Oberto granted the Plaintiff leave to
file a first amended complaint.  Within 30 days from the date of
service of the Order, the Plaintiff must file a first amended
complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in the
Order or a notice of voluntary dismissal.  If the Plaintiff fails
to file an amended complaint in compliance with the Order, Judge
Oberto will recommend to the assigned district judge that the
action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in her
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/39y3skun from Leagle.com.


UNITED STATES: Passut Class Suit v. Dep't of Education Dismissed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARK PASSUT, et al., Plaintiffs v. MIGUEL CARDONA, in
his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States
Department of Education, et al., Defendants, Civil Action No.
19-1606 (RBW) (D.D.C.), Judge Reggie B. Walton of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia:

    (i) grants in part and denies as moot in part the Defendants'
        Motion to Dismiss; and

   (ii) denies as moot the Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
        Certification and Supporting Memorandum.

Mark Passut and Mark Kaiser, the named Plaintiffs in the case,
bring the putative class action against the Defendants, the United
States Department of Education and Miguel Cardona, in his official
capacity as the Secretary of the Department, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. Sections 701-706.  The Plaintiffs challenge an
April 3, 2018 order by the Secretary that rendered null and void a
Dec. 12, 2016 decision revoking the recognition of the Accrediting
Council for Independent Colleges and Schools ("ACICS") as an
accrediting agency for postsecondary education institutions,
including the Plaintiffs' former school, the defunct Virginia
College.

The Plaintiffs allege that the Secretary's April 2018 Order and the
Accrediting Council's decisions to "issue a directive to show
cause" to Virginia College and to "extend Virginia College's
show-cause directive," "enabled Virginia College to enroll
students, including the Plaintiffs, for the Fall 2018 term -- and
allowed the Department to issue student loans to them."  The
Plaintiffs allege that they "took on thousands of dollars in
Department-issued debt to pay the quarterly tuition" but, "if
Virginia College had not again been able to claim accredited
status, or eligibility for federal student aid, the Plaintiffs
would not have enrolled for the Fall 2018 term."

The Plaintiffs assert that "during the Fall 2018 term, they were
completing fieldwork requirements for their degree that were not
scheduled to be completed until late December 2018 or January
2019."  They allege that "on Dec. 4, 2018, the Accrediting Council
withdrew accreditation from Virginia College," "on Dec 5, 2018,
Virginia College announced that it would shutter its doors," and
"Virginia College's Richmond campus ultimately closed on Dec. 18,
2018."

According to the Plaintiffs, they were informed by an email from
Kathryn Rainey, "their program's Academic Fieldwork Coordinator"
that "because they would not be finished with their fieldwork by
Dec. 18, 2018, when Virginia College would close, they would not be
able to finish their] fieldwork."  The Plaintiffs allege that but
for the closure of Virginia College's Richmond campus on Dec. 18,
2018, they would have been able to finish their fieldwork, and
therefore receive credit for the Fall 2018 term.

On June 3, 2019, the Plaintiffs initiated the action, alleging that
the Secretary's April 2018 Order violated the APA.  On Sept. 23,
2019, the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction
and the Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim to relief, and,
on Nov. 20, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed their motion for class
certification.

Analysis

The Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the
Plaintiffs lack standing.  Specifically, they argue that (1) the
Plaintiffs' "alleged injuries are not traceable to the Secretary's
April 2018 Order"; (2) "even if the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries
were traceable to the Secretary's April 2018 Order, the sole relief
in an APA suit such as this -- setting aside the challenged
decision -- would not impact, let alone redress, the injuries
claimed"; and (3) the Plaintiffs' alleged injuries do not
constitute injuries-in-fact because they are either "not actual and
concrete" or "self-inflicted.

In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that they have standing because
(1) they incurred substantial debt to the Department to attend
Virginia College for the Fall 2018 term-debt which could not have
been issued but for the Department's unlawful reinstatement of the
Accrediting Council in the Secretary's April 2018 Order; (2) the
Court can provide several remedies sufficient to redress their
injuries: it can vacate their loans, it can enjoin the Defendants
from continuing to collect on the loans, and it can declare that
the loans are unenforceable; and (3) the Plaintiffs, through no
fault of their own, could not have finished their fieldwork and
received credit for the term by the time the school closed,
therefore, whether the Plaintiffs' injury is properly construed as
the financial obligations imposed by their student loans, or in
conjunction with their lost credits, the Plaintiffs have adequately
pleaded an injury-in-fact.

First, Judge Walton agrees with the Defendants that the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated Article III standing.  He holds that without any
allegation that the allegedly unlawful nature of the Plaintiffs'
loans resulted in "any concrete consequence," he must conclude that
the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated an injury-in-fact as to this
theory of injury.  Accordingly, he concludes that the Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that their allegedly "unlawful and void ab
initio" loans, constitute an injury-in-fact.

Even if the Judge agreed with the Plaintiffs that the acquisition
of their allegedly unlawful loans constituted an injury-in-fact, he
would nonetheless be compelled to conclude that the Plaintiffs have
failed to show that this injury is "fairly traceable" to the
Secretary's April 2018 Order.  The Plaintiffs' acquisition of their
loans to attend Virginia College for the Fall 2018 semester was
"clearly independent of agency action," and therefore "breaks the
causal chain," between the Secretary's April 2018 Order and the
Plaintiff's loans.   Accordingly, he concludes that, to the extent
that the Plaintiffs allege that they acquired loans that were
"unlawful and void ab initio," their injury is neither an
injury-in-fact nor fairly traceable to the Secretary's April 2018
Order for purposes of Article III standing.

Second, because the Plaintiffs make no allegation that the
Secretary's April 2018 Order impacted the Accrediting Council's
decision to withdraw Virginia College's accreditation on Dec. 4,
2018, Judge Walton concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately allege that their injury of "additional debt for a term
in which they received no academic credit" is "fairly traceable" to
the Secretary's April 2018 Order.  Accordingly, he finds that the
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing under their second theory of
injury.

Finally, Judge Walton holds that the Plaintiffs present no
allegation that the date of withdrawal was in any measure impacted
by the Secretary's April 2018 Order, rather than independent,
discretionary decisions of the Accrediting Council.  Without such
allegations, the Judge cannot conclude that the Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged that their failure to receive credit for their
time and work is "fairly traceable" to the Secretary's April 2018
Order.  Therefore, in accordance with his conclusions, the Judge
determines that the Plaintiffs also lack standing to the extent
that they allege that they received no credit for the time and work
they spent in the Virginia College program during the Fall 2018
term.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Walton concludes that he must
grant in part and deny as moot in part the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  He grants the Defendants' motion to the extent it asserts
that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the case because the
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this matter against the
Defendants.  The motion is denied as moot in all other respects.
Finally, because the Court lacks jurisdiction to resolve the
Plaintiffs' pending motion for class certification, the Judge also
concludes that he must dismiss as moot the Plaintiffs' motion for
class certification.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 21, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/9w7kythr from Leagle.com.


UNITEDHEALTH GROUP: Scott ERISA Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, RICK SCOTT, ROYCE D. KLEIN, JAMES MORRIS, and THOMAS
MANGUM, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC.; UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES,
INC.; UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY; and UNITED HEALTHCARE
SERVICE LLC, Defendants, Case No. 20-CV-1570 (PJS/BRT) (D. Minn.),
Judge Patrick J. Schiltz of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota grants United's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.

The Plaintiffs participate in employer-sponsored group health plans
administered by the Defendants and governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Section 1001,
et seq.  They bring the action under ERISA to challenge United's
practice of cross-plan offsetting -- that is, United's practice of
using the assets of one plan to recoup alleged overpayments made by
a different plan.

The health plans at issue in the case are "employee welfare benefit
plans" under ERISA.  The plans are self-insured, meaning that the
plans use their own assets to pay claims for covered healthcare
expenses.  Self-insured plans are funded by contributions from the
sponsoring employer and payroll contributions from the
participating employees. A self-insured plan is in contrast to a
fully insured plan, under which covered healthcare expenses are
paid by an insurer under the terms of an insurance contract
purchased by the plan.

United acts as a third-party administrator for self-insured plans.
In that role, United accepts and processes benefit claims submitted
by providers on behalf of plan participants, determines if the
provider's services are covered by the plan, and uses plan assets
to pay providers when required by the terms of the plan.

In the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs challenge United's use of cross-plan
offsetting to recover alleged overpayments to healthcare providers.
Cross-plan offsetting involves withholding a payment that is
indisputably owed to a provider by a plan to "offset" a debt that
the provider allegedly owes to a different plan on account of a
prior overpayment.

United does a lot of cross-plan offsetting.  In 2019, for example,
United recovered $1.354 billion through cross-plan offsets.  The
Plaintiffs allege that cross-plan offsetting violates ERISA, and
they seek to bring a class action on behalf of all participants in
all self-insured health plans that are administered by United and
governed by ERISA.

United moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss the
Plaintiffs' amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

In Counts I through IV(a), the Plaintiffs bring claims under 29
U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(2) for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging
that United's practice of cross-plan offsetting violates its duty
of loyalty as well as ERISA's prohibitions on self-dealing,
representing both sides in a transaction, and transacting with a
party in interest.  In Count V, they seek an injunction or other
appropriate equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3) for
United's breaches of fiduciary duty.

Judge Schiltz agrees with United that, because the Plaintiffs
allege that these breaches caused injury to the plan -- and not
injury to the Plaintiffs themselves -- the Plaintiffs lack standing
under Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S.Ct. 1615 (2020).  The Thole
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant fiduciaries mismanaged the
plan's assets, thereby causing the plan to suffer approximately
$750 million in losses.  Like the Plaintiffs in the instant case,
the Thole plaintiffs brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and sought repayment to the plan under Section 1132(a)(2) and
equitable relief under Section 1132(a)(3).  The Supreme Court held
that the alleged $750 million loss to the plan was not sufficient
to establish an Article III injury to the plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs in the case are similarly situated to the plaintiffs
in Thole.  Just as in Thole, the Plaintiffs do not have any claim
to the plans' assets; instead, their only claim is to receive the
benefits to which they are entitled under their respective plans.
While the Plaintiffs suggest that, in theory, the losses to a plan
could be so great that plaintiffs would be personally affected, the
Plaintiffs do not make such a claim in the case or allege facts
that would make such a claim plausible.  Instead, the Plaintiffs
rest their standing argument entirely on the injury that the plans
suffer when plan assets are lost.  The Judge holds that it is
precisely the type of injury that Thole holds is insufficient to
confer standing on plan participants.

In Count IV(b), the Plaintiffs bring a claim under Section 503 of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section 1133.  Section 503 requires a plan to
provide written notice of a denial of benefits and an opportunity
for a "full and fair review" of the denial.

The Plaintiffs allege that, when United pays a provider by engaging
in cross-plan offsetting, that provider has not actually been paid
and thus there has been a denial of benefits.  United does not
notify the participant of this "denial," however; instead, United
informs the participant that his or her claim has been paid.  The
Plaintiffs allege that, by misrepresenting that denied claims have
been paid, United is violating its duty under Section 503 to
provide written notice of denial and an opportunity for a full and
fair review.

Judge Schiltz holds that the most glaring problem with this claim
is that the Plaintiffs do not allege any facts suggesting that any
of their own benefit claims have been subject to cross-plan
offsetting.  Indeed, none of them even alleges that he personally
saw a doctor or otherwise incurred a healthcare expense, much less
that he saw an out-of-network doctor or incurred an out-of-network
healthcare expense -- the only type of expense that could possibly
be the subject of a disputed cross-plan offset.

At oral argument, the Plaintiffs requested discovery and, depending
on what they learn in discovery, leave to amend this claim.  But
they do not need discovery to know whether they themselves incurred
healthcare expenses that are potentially subject to a disputed
cross-plan offset.  Without such an allegation, the Judge holds
that the Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege any injury
under Section 503.  He therefore agrees with United that the
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this claim and grants United's
motion to dismiss.

Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and
proceedings, Judge Schiltz granted the Defendants' motion to
dismiss.  He dismissed the Plaintiffs' amended complaint without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.  Judgment will be entered
accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's May 20, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/kj9n9t5v from Leagle.com.

Karen L. Handorf -- khandorf@cohenmilstein.com -- and Julie S.
Selesnick -- jselesnick@cohenmilstein.com -- COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS
& TOLL, PLLC; June P. Hoidal, Carolyn G. Anderson, and Ian F.
McFarland, ZIMMERMAN REED LLP; and William K. Meyer --
wkmlaw644@gmail.com -- for plaintiffs.

Jonathan D. Hacker -- jhacker@omm.com -- Brian D. Boyle --
bboyle@omm.com -- Elizabeth L. McKeen -- emckeen@omm.com -- and
Amanda L. Genovese -- agenovese@omm.com -- O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP;
and Michelle S. Grant, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, for defendants.



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