/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/210909.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, September 9, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 175

                            Headlines

360 DIGITECH: Bragar Eagel Reminds of September 13 Deadline
4716 INC: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Cabanillas FLSA Suit Granted
A.R. PRODUCE: Vazquez Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
ALJ REGIONAL: Discovery Ongoing in Marshall Suit vs. Faneuil
ARRAY TECHNOLOGIES: Lead Plaintiff Appointment in Plymouth Pending

BABCOCK & WILCOX: Discovery in Parker Class Suit Ongoing
BEVERLY HILLS, CA: Sued Over Wrongful Arrest of Black Protesters
CASSAVA SCIENCES: Gainey McKenna Reminds of October 26 Deadline
CELSION CORP: Continues to Defend Spar Putative Class Suit
CELSIUS HOLDINGS: Bid for Adjudication in Prescod Suit Pending

CENTRUS ENERGY: McGlone et al., Allowed to Amend Complaint
CENTRUS ENERGY: Oral Argument in Matthews Class Suit Postponed
CENTRUS ENERGY: Walburn Class Suit Put on Hold Until Nov. 11
CHASE DENNIS: Samora Has Until Oct. 15 to File Class Cert. Bid
CO-DIAGNOSTICS INC: Suits Over Misleading Press Releases Underway

COMLINK TOTAL: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Treumann Suit Claims
CONTEXTLOGIC INC: IPO Related Putative Class Suits Underway
CORMEDIX INC: Faces DefenCath Related Putative Class Suit
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Fails to Timely Pay Manual Workers, Suit Says
CROSS TIMBERS: Proceedings in Chieftain Royalty Suit Stayed

CYTRX CORP: Proxy Statement Lacks Financial Info, Silverberg Says
DANIMER SCIENTIFIC: Faces Caballero Suit Over Stock Price Drop
DANSKE BANK: Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Plumbers Fund Suit
DILLON LOGISTICS: Faces Siegemund Suit Alleging WARN Act Violations
DISH DBS: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Dec. 6

FINE DINING: Kelley Class Suit Seeks Minimum Wage & OT for Dancers
FIRST ADVANTAGE: Settlements Reached in California Class Suits
FLORIDA HOME-IMPROVEMENT: Vetter Sues Over Unwanted Text Messages
FLYING S. WINGS: Pender Sues Over Restaurant Servers' Unpaid Wages
FREQUENCY THERAPEUTICS: Faces Evans & Hingston Suits in MA

FRITO-LAY NORTH: Tortilla Chips Don't Contain Lime, Ortega Says
FUSION ACQUISITION: Delman Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duty
GENERAC HOLDINGS: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Oct. 19 Deadline
GOHEALTH INC: Consolidated Putative Securities Class Suit Underway
GOODRX HOLDINGS: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Suit Pending

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE: Fails to Provide Proper Wages, Rowden Says
GREAT WALL OF NEPTUNE: Zheng Sues Over Unpaid Wages
GTE FEDERAL: Wrongfully Charges Checking Account Fees, Snyder Says
HERO ADAMS: Faces Arellano Class Suit Over Unpaid Wages & Overtime
HOLIDAY HOSPITALITY: 110 Sunport Sues Over Anticompetitive Scheme

HUNT MILITARY: Skinner Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, AMWA
HYRECAR INC: Securities Artificially Inflated, Baron Suit Alleges
KATAPULT HOLDINGS: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Oct. 26 Deadline
KATAPULT HOLDINGS: Faces McIntosh Suit Over Share Price Drop
KELLOGG SALES: Reinitz Sues Over Mislabeled Chocolate Fudge

KENTUCKY: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bids in Rhoades v. DOC
KEVIN GERSH: Faces Greenhaus Suit Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
KIMBERLY-CLARK: Huggies Diapers "Harmful," Rice Class Suit Says
KNM HOLDINGS: Rayford Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, AMWA
KONZA PRAIRIE: Court Partly Grants Class Settlement in Seawell Suit

L'OREAL USA: Lopez Slams Collagen Skin Care Product Claims
LEGALZOOM.COM: Notice of Dismissal Filed in California Class Suit
LIBERTY FOOD: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez Suit Alleges
MARRIOTT INTL: Drassinower's Bid to Quash Deposition Subpoena Nixed
MIDLAND CREDIT: Can't Compel Arbitration in Rodriguez-Ocasio Suit

MISSOURI HIGHER: Dykes Appeals Dismissal in Consumer Credit Suit
NATROL LLC: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Vitello Suit
NEW MEXICO: 4-H Parents Join Class Action Over Vaccine Mandate
OPPENHEIMER & CO: 6694 Dawson Sues Over Losses in Ponzi Scheme
OZARK PIZZA: Nation Class Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, AMWA

PDS BIOTECHNOLOGY: Rosener Putative Class Suit Underway in Delaware
PROSPER MARKETPLACE: Purported Class Suit Underway in Maryland
PROUD MOMENTS: Malkin Seeks Unpaid Wages, OT Under FLSA, NYLL
PUFF BAR: Simkin Sues Over False Longevity of Puff Plus Vapes
QUEENS TRUCK REPAIRS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Zetino Alleges

RECKITT BENCKISER: Class Action Objector Criticizes Settlement
RENOWN HEALTH: Court Allows Nevett to File 1st Amended Complaint
RESURGENT CAPITAL: N.J. Court Narrows Claims in Saldana FDCPA Suit
ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION: Placide Seeks Minimum Wages for Drivers
ROBERT BOSCH: Faces V.I.P. Suit Over Electronic Braking Systems

SAGINAW, MI: Summary Judgment for Hoskins in Taylor Suit Affirmed
SELLAS LIFE: Settlement Reached in Suit Over Abstral Promos
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Certiorari Petition Filed in Saxon FLSA Suit
STATE FARM: Appeals Class Cert. Bid Ruling in Elegant Suit
STERLING JEWELERS: Faces Kimbro Suit Over False Diamond Weights

STUART'S LANDSCAPING: Krause Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, WWPCL
T-MOBILE US: Fails to Protect Customers' Personal Info, Suit Says
T-MOBILE US: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Harper Suit Alleges
T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customer's Info, Villalon Suit Says
T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Peralta Suit Says

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Simaan Suit Says
T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Savick Suit Says
T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Winkler Suit Says
TAUCK INC: Connecticut Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Beermann Suit
TIBERIAS FOR STUDENTS: Sotoy Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL

TOUHY FRUITY: Fails to Provide Proper Overtime Pay, Vasquez Says
TPUSA INC: Fails to Provide Proper OT Wages, Voltaire Suit Says
TREVENA INC: Settlement in PA Consolidated Suit Gets Final Nod
TRULIEVE INC: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Lyttle FCRA Suit
UNITED STATES: Partial Dismissal of Brigida Suit v. FAA Denied

UNIV. OF SOUTH FLORIDA: Files Appeal in Moore Tuition Refund Suit
WALMART INC: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Johnson Suit
ZF TRW: Faces V.I.P. Motor Suit Over Electronic Braking Systems
ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Court Tosses Altman's Amended FDCPA Complaint

                            *********

360 DIGITECH: Bragar Eagel Reminds of September 13 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of 360 DigiTech, Inc. (NASDAQ:
QFIN), Piedmont Lithium Inc. (NASDAQ: PLL), Iterum Therapeutics plc
(NASDAQ: ITRM), and HyreCar Inc. (NASDAQ: HYRE). Stockholders have
until the deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead
plaintiff. Additional information about each case can be found at
the link provided.

360 DigiTech, Inc. (NASDAQ: QFIN)

Class Period: April 30, 2020 to July 7, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 13, 2021

On July 8, 2021, reports circulated on social media to the effect
that the Company's core product, the 360 IOU app, had been removed
from major app stores. The reports came on the heels of the removal
of other companies' apps as Chinese regulators investigated their
customer data protection practices.

On this news, 360 DigiTech's stock price fell $7.12 per share, or
21.48%, to close at $26.02 per share on July 8, 2021.

On July 9, 2021, Seeking Alpha reported that 360 DigiTech confirmed
the removal of its 360 IOU app from the Android app store and
quoted a Company spokesperson, who disclosed that the Company had
"submitted a new rectification plan and stepped up the whole
process."

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and compliance policies.
Specifically, defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the Company had been collecting
personal information in violation of relevant People's Republic of
China laws and regulations; (ii) accordingly, 360 DigiTech was
exposed to an increased risk of regulatory scrutiny and/or
enforcement action; and (iii) as a result, the Company's public
statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant
times.

For more information on the 360 DigiTech class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/QFIN

Piedmont Lithium Inc. (NASDAQ: PLL)

Class Period: March 16, 2018 and July 19, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 21, 2021

On July 20, 2021, before market hours, Reuters published an article
entitled "In push to supply Tesla, Piedmont Lithium irks North
Carolina neighbors." Among other things, the article reported that
"[t]he company [. . .] has not applied for a state mining permit or
a necessary zoning variance in Gaston County, just west of
Charlotte, despite telling investors since 2018 that it was on the
verge of doing so." The article went on to report that "[f]ive of
the seven members of the county's board of commissioners, who
control zoning changes, say they may block or delay the
project[.]"

On this news, Piedmont shares fell $12.56 per share over the
trading day, or nearly 20%, to close at $50.52 per share on July
20, 2021.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) Piedmont has not, and would not, follow its stated steps
or timeline to secure all proper and necessary permits; (ii)
Piedmont failed to inform relevant people and governmental
authorities of its actual plans; (iii) Piedmont failed to file
proper applications with relevant governmental authorities
(including state and local authorities); (iv) Piedmont and its
lithium business does not have "strong governmental support"; and
(v) as a result, defendants' public statements were materially
false and/or misleading at all relevant times.

For more information on the Piedmont Lithium class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/PLL

Iterum Therapeutics plc (NASDAQ: ITRM)

Class Period: November 30, 2020 to July 23, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 4, 2021

On July 1, 2021, Iterum issued a press release "announc[ing] that
the Company received a letter from the [U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA")] stating that, as part of their ongoing
review of the [sulopenem New Drug Application "NDA"], the agency
has identified deficiencies that preclude the continuation of the
discussion of labeling and post marketing requirements/commitments
at this time."

On this news, Iterum's ordinary share price fell $0.87 per share,
or 37.99%, to close at $1.42 per share on July 2, 2021.

Then, on July 26, 2021, Iterum issued a press release announcing
that it had received a Complete Response Letter from the FDA for
the sulopenem NDA, "provid[ing] that the FDA has completed its
review of the NDA and has determined that it cannot approve the NDA
in its present form."

On this news, Iterum's ordinary share price fell $0.499 per share,
or 44.16%, to close at $0.631 per share on July 26, 2021.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) the sulopenem ("NDA") lacked sufficient data to support
approval for the treatment of adult women with uncomplicated
urinary tract infections ("uUTIs") caused by designated susceptible
microorganisms proven or strongly suspected to be non-susceptible
to a quinolone; (ii) accordingly, it was unlikely that the FDA
would approve the sulopenem NDA in its current form; (iii)
defendants downplayed the severity of issued and deficiencies
associated with the sulopenem NDA; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

For more information on the Iterum class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/ITRM

HyreCar Inc. (NASDAQ: HYRE)

Class Period: May 14, 2020 to August 10, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 26, 2021

On August 10, 2021, HyreCar announced deeply disappointing results
for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021 ("Q2 2021"), including
net losses of $9.3 million compared to losses of $3.8 million in
the same period the prior year. Furthermore, HyreCar's adjusted
EBITDA loss for Q2 2021 was $7.1 million (four times higher than
the $1.7 million adjusted EBITDA loss experienced in the second
quarter of 2020) and its gross profit for Q2 2021 was just $0.8
million (less than one third HyreCar's gross profit in the second
quarter of 2020), with a gross profit margin of just 24%.
Contemporaneously with the release, HyreCar disclosed that HyreCar
had incurred skyrocketing costs of revenue during the quarter
primarily as a result of significantly higher insurance claims
incidence, including claims before March 31, 2021 "in excess of the
reserves." During HyreCar's earnings call, executives revealed that
HyreCar had been forced to revamp its claims processes and
procedures and improve its risk price adjustments for policies
issued by HyreCar. And when asked whether HyreCar was actually on
track to achieve 45% to 50% gross margins in the near term as
previously represented, HyreCar's CFO essentially withdrew this
goal, calling it a "shoot for the sky" aim and stating that
"shooting for margin upwards of 40%" was more realistic. On this
news, HyreCar's stock price fell $9.27 per share, nearly 50%,
closing at $9.85 per share on August 11, 2021.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and misleading statements and failed to disclose that:
(i) HyreCar had materially understated its insurance reserves; (ii)
HyreCar had systematically failed to pay valid insurance claims
incurred prior to the Class Period; (iii) HyreCar had incurred
significant expenses transitioning to its new third-party insurance
claims administrator and processing claims incurred from prior
periods; (iv) HyreCar had failed to appropriately price risk in its
insurance products and was experiencing elevated claims incidence
as a result; (v) HyreCar had been forced to dramatically reform its
claims underwriting, policies, and procedures in response to
unacceptably high claims severity and customer complaints; and (vi)
as a result, HyreCar's operations and prospects were misrepresented
because HyreCar was not on track to meet the financial estimates
provided to investors during the Class Period, and such estimates
lacked a reasonable basis in fact, including HyreCar's purported
gross margin, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization ("EBITDA"), and net loss trajectories.

For more information on the HyreCar class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/HYRE

About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.: Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a
nationally recognized law firm with offices in New York,
California, and South Carolina. The firm represents individual and
institutional investors in commercial, securities, derivative, and
other complex litigation in state and federal courts across the
country. For more information about the firm, please visit
www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee
similar outcomes.

Contact Information: Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. Brandon Walker,
Esq. Melissa Fortunato, Esq. Marion Passmore, Esq. (212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.comwww.bespc.com [GN]

4716 INC: Bid to Compel Arbitration in Cabanillas FLSA Suit Granted
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Alexia Cabanillas, et al., Plaintiffs v. 4716
Incorporated, et al., Defendants, Case No. CV-20-00894-PHX-MTL (D.
Ariz.), Judge Michael T. Liburdi of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Arizona has entered an order:

   a. granting the Defendants' Renewed Motion to Compel
      Plaintiffs Alexia Cabanillas, Christen Ingram, and Gabriela
      Garcia to Binding Arbitration; and

   b. denying the Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Conditional
      Certification and Issuance of Notice Pursuant to Fair Labor
      Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b).

Defendants 4716 Inc., Frank Zanzucchi, Jason Brown, John Zanzucchi,
William V. Zanzucchi, and Paul Johnson own and operate Hi Liter
Gentlemen's Club in Phoenix, Arizona. Plaintiffs Alexia Cabanillas,
Christen Ingram, and Gabriela Garcia are current or former exotic
dancers at Hi Liter.

On the Plaintiffs first day of employment, each signed an
Entertainment License Agreement ("ELA" or "ELAs"). The ELAs outline
the purpose of the agreement and several terms of the agreement,
including privacy, entertainment fees, taxes, license fees, and
severability. Each ELA also includes provisions relating to
arbitration and waivers of class and collective actions. The other
ELAs contain substantially similar language. The document then sets
out detailed arbitration procedures and allows dancers the
opportunity to opt out.

The Plaintiffs filed the action, contending that the Defendants
misclassified them as independent contractors, rather than
employees, and in turn denied them minimum wage and overtime
payments in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
Based on the ELAs, the Defendants filed motions to compel
arbitration for the Plaintiffs Cabanillas, Ingram, and Garcia.
Plaintiff Kristen Ellis then filed a motion for conditional
certification under the FLSA. The Court then granted the
Plaintiffs' request to file an amended complaint and denied those
pending motions as moot. The Plaintiffs and the Defendants have
since refiled those same motions.

Discussion

A. Motion to Compel

To create a valid enforceable contract, there must be "an offer,
acceptance, consideration, a sufficiently specific statement of the
parties' obligations, and mutual assent." These principles apply
with no less vigor to formation of arbitration contracts.

Judge Liburdi finds that the broadly drafted arbitration provisions
cover the disputes at issue between the Plaintiffs and the
Defendants. The clause says that any controversy, dispute, or claim
arising out of the ELA will be resolved by arbitration. This also
includes the statutory claims that the Plaintiffs bring now in
their Amended Complaint. he Plaintiffs seem to concede this point
because nowhere do they argue that their claims are not covered by
the arbitration clauses at issue. Therefore, the arbitration
clauses cover the Plaintiffs' claims.

For these reasons, Plaintiffs Cabanillas, Garcia, and Ingram's ELAs
are valid and enforceable agreements between the parties. By
signing those agreements, the Judge holds that the Plaintiffs
knowingly agreed to have their claims subject to arbitration. As
neither the Attorney Fees Provision nor the Equal Costs Provision
is substantively unconscionable, he grants the Defendants' Motion
to Compel.

B. Motion for Certification

Despite the lenient first-step inquiry when deciding to certify a
collective action, Judge Liburdi states that Courts in the District
have not permitted collective certification to proceed, and will
dismiss the action, where "the Plaintiff and opt-in Plaintiffs are
not capable of representing the class because the claims are wholly
subject to arbitration." At least in the circumstances presented in
the case, the Judge agrees with that approach.

The Judge holds that the Plaintiffs "have no interest in the
outcome of a collective lawsuit because their individual claims
cannot be litigated." There is no evidence provided to the Court
that any putative opt-in Plaintiff would not be subject to a valid
arbitration agreement or class-action waiver. In fact, one
Defendant has stated that he has reviewed every dancer's ELA during
the relevant period and "in every instance the entertainer executed
an ELA that contained a clause waiving the ability to enter into a
collective or class action." The only person who the Plaintiffs
have identified as opting out of the arbitration agreement was
dismissed from the case.

Also, Judge Liburdi finds that allowing a collective action to
proceed would not serve the interests of judicial economy. As one
Court in the District noted, allowing "notice to potential opt-in
litigants at this time would put the proverbial cart in front of
the horse." Given the Court's broad discretion when deciding
whether to notify putative Plaintiffs under the FLSA's framework,
the Judge denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify.

C. Dismiss or Stay the Case

Where parties enter into an enforceable arbitration agreement, the
FAA requires the Court to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The
Ninth Circuit has held that, "notwithstanding the language of
Section 3, a district court may either stay the action or dismiss
it outright when, as in the case, the court determines that all of
the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration."

Because each ELA at issue is valid and enforceable, and because it
covers all of the Plaintiffs' claims, Judge Liburdi finds dismissal
is the appropriate remedy in this situation and will dismiss the
case without prejudice.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Liburdi directs the Clerk of the Court to
dismiss the action without prejudice and close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/yjfakh6d from Leagle.com.


A.R. PRODUCE: Vazquez Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under FLSA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SOCORRO VAZQUEZ, and other similarly situated individuals v. A.R.
PRODUCE & TRUCKING CORPORATION and ANA MARTINEZ, Case No.
1:21-cv-23126 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 30, 2021) is an action to recover
money damages for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

While employed by the Corporate Defendant, Plaintiff worked
approximately an average of 80 hours per week without being
compensated at the rate of not less than one- and one-half times
the regular rate at which he was employed. The Plaintiff was
employed as a packer/receiver, performing the same or similar
duties as that of those other similarly situated Packers/Receivers
whom Plaintiff observed working in excess of 40 hours per week
without overtime compensation, the suit says.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Corporate Defendant as a
packer/receiver for the Corporate Defendant's business.

A.R. Produce is part of the general freight trucking industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Tanesha Walls Blye, Esq.
          Aron Smukler, Esq.
          R. Martin Saenz, Esq.
          SAENZ & ANDERSON, PLLC
          20900 NE 30th Avenue, Ste. 800
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 503-5131
          Facsimile: (888) 270-5549
          E-mail: tblye@saenzanderson.com
                  asmukler@saenzanderson.com
                  msaenz@saenzanderson.com

ALJ REGIONAL: Discovery Ongoing in Marshall Suit vs. Faneuil
------------------------------------------------------------
ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that limited discovery is
ongoing in the class action suit filed against Faneuil, Inc. by
Donna Marshall.

On July 31, 2017, plaintiff Donna Marshall filed a proposed class
action lawsuit in the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Sacramento against Faneuil and ALJ.

Marshall, a previously terminated Faneuil employee, alleges various
California state law employment-related claims against Faneuil.

Faneuil has answered the complaint and removed the matter to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California; however, Marshall filed a motion to remand the case
back to state court, which has been granted.

In connection with the above, an amended complaint was filed by
certain plaintiffs to add a claim for penalties under the
California Private Attorneys General Act (the PAGA Claim).

Faneuil demurred to the PAGA Claim and it was eventually dismissed
by the trial court.

The parties are currently engaged in limited discovery. A mediation
was held on March 11, 2021 and discussions are ongoing.

Faneuil believes this action is without merit and intends to defend
this case vigorously.

ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. provides call center, back-office,
staffing, and toll collection services to government and commercial
clients in the healthcare, utility, consumer goods, toll, and
transportation industries in the United States. It operates through
three segments: Faneuil, Carpets, and Phoenix. The company was
formerly known as YouthStream Media Networks, Inc. and changed its
name to ALJ Regional Holdings, Inc. in October 2006. ALJ Regional
Holdings, Inc. was founded in 1995 and is based in New York, New
York.


ARRAY TECHNOLOGIES: Lead Plaintiff Appointment in Plymouth Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------
Array Technologies, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motions to appoint
lead plaintiff in the "Plymouth Action", is pending.

On May 14, 2021, a putative class action was filed in the Southern
District of New York against the Company and certain officers and
directors alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder, and Sections 11, 12(a)(2) and 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933.

The Plymouth Action alleges misstatements and/or omissions in the
Company's registration statements and prospectuses related to the
Company's October 2020 initial public offering, the Company's
December 2020 offering, and the Company's March 2021 offering
during the putative class period of October 14, 2020 through May
11, 2021.

Lead plaintiff motions were filed on July 13, 2021, and the Court
is expected to appoint a lead plaintiff by August 12, 2021.

The Court has not yet set a schedule for the filing of an amended
complaint or defendants' anticipated motion to dismiss.

On June 30, 2021, a putative class action was filed in the Southern
District of New York against the Company and certain officers and
directors alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5, promulgated
thereunder, and Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1933 alleging misstatements and/or omissions in certain of the
Company's registration statements and prospectuses related to the
Company's October 2020 initial public offering, the Company's
December 2020 offering, and the Company's March 2021 offering
during the putative class period of October 14, 2020 through May
11, 2021.

On July 6, 2021, the Court entered an order, based on the record
before the Court, that this action was in all material respects
substantially similar to the Plymouth Action and both actions arise
out of the same or similar operative facts, and that the parties
are substantially the same parties.

The Court consolidated this action with the Plymouth Action for all
pretrial purposes, ordered all filings in connection with this
Action to be made in the Plymouth Action, and removed this action
from the docket.

Array Technologies, Inc. is one of the world's largest
manufacturers of ground-mounting systems used in solar energy
projects. The company's principal product is an integrated system
of steel supports, electric motors, gearboxes and electronic
controllers commonly referred to as a single-axis "tracker." The
company is based in Albuquerque, New Mexico.


BABCOCK & WILCOX: Discovery in Parker Class Suit Ongoing
--------------------------------------------------------
Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12,
2021, for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that discovery
is ongoing in the derivative and class action complaint entitled,
Parker v. Avril, et al., C.A. No. 2020-0280-PAF.

On April 14, 2020, a putative B&W stockholder filed a derivative
and class action complaint against certain of the Company's
directors (current and former), executives and significant
stockholders and the Company (as a nominal defendant).

The action was filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery and is
captioned Parker v. Avril, et al., C.A. No. 2020-0280-PAF
("Stockholder Litigation").

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, among other things, did not
properly discharge their fiduciary duties in connection with the
2019 rights offering and related transactions.

The case is currently in discovery.

Babcock & Wilcox said, " We believe that the outcome of the
Stockholder Litigation will not have a material adverse impact on
our condensed consolidated financial condition, results of
operations or cash flows, net of any insurance coverage."

Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc., incorporated on January 13,
2015, is a technology-based provider of fossil and renewable power
generation and environmental equipment that includes a suite of
boiler products and environmental systems. The Company operates in
three segments: Power, Renewable and Industrial. The company is
based in Barberton, Ohio.


BEVERLY HILLS, CA: Sued Over Wrongful Arrest of Black Protesters
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fox11 reports that two Black visitors to Beverly Hills in 2020 who
say they were wrongfully arrested while protesting the actions of
police during the "Operation Safe Street" program are suing the
city and the head of the program.

Jasmine Williams and Khalil White brought the proposed class-action
complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court, alleging that Capt. Scott
Dowling's efforts to make the city safer ended up with 105 out of
106 of the arrestees being Black. The civil rights suit seeks
unspecified damages.

A representative for the city did not immediately reply to a
request for comment.

Dowling was in charge of "Operation Safe Street," also known as the
"Rodeo Drive Task Force," from March 1, 2020, to July 1, 2021, and
the only person arrested who was not Black was a Latino who
appeared Black, according to the suit. Dowling referred to Blacks
as "lazy" and laughed after viewing a video entitled "Yellow Fever
With Soul" that was made by two Beverly Hills officers in 2015 and
made fun of Blacks and Asians, the suit states.

Many of those detained during the program were simply riding roller
skates or scooters and Dowling ordered those on his team to arrest
and interrogate Blacks who traveled on Rodeo Drive, according to
the suit.

"While African-Americans as a class were arrested for such actions,
Caucasians . . . who engaged in the same actions were not
arrested," the suit states. "Thus, the defendants engaged in racial
profiling."

Williams and White, while visiting Beverly Hills on Sept. 7, were
riding a scooter and "protesting the unlawful detention and citing
the continuous racial targeting of individuals of color" when they
allegedly were handcuffed and arrested on "multiple fabricated
charges." The two spent the night in jail.

"They were arresting Black people for being Black in Beverly
Hills," attorney Ben Crump stated during a press conference. "Our
system turned a blind eye or even worse, our system intentionally
sent a Black man to jail even though they were innocent and
committed no crime," Crump added.

Khalil White says he was vacationing in LA with his girlfriend at
the time of the arrest. He says the arrest was dramatizing and he
didn't deserve it, for simply riding a scooter on Rodeo Drive.

A judge tossed all the charges and the case was dismissed. [GN]

CASSAVA SCIENCES: Gainey McKenna Reminds of October 26 Deadline
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gainey McKenna & Egleston on Sept. 1 disclosed that a class action
lawsuit has been filed against Cassava Sciences, Inc. ("Cassava
Sciences" or the "Company") (NASDAQ: SAVA) in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas on behalf of those
who purchased or otherwise acquired Cassava publicly traded
securities between February 2, 2021 and August 24, 2021, inclusive
(the "Class Period").

The Complaint alleges that Defendants made false and misleading
statements and failed to disclose that: (1) the quality and
integrity of the scientific data supporting the Company's claims
for simufilam's efficacy had been overstated; (2) the scientific
data supporting the Company's claims for simufilam's efficacy were
biased; and (3) as a result, Defendants' positive statements during
the Class Period about the Company's business metrics and financial
prospects and the likelihood of U.S. Food Drug Administration
("FDA") approval were false and misleading and/or lacked a
reasonable basis.

On August 24, 2021, it was disclosed that the FDA had received a
so-called Citizen Petition commencing an administrative action to
"halt two ongoing trials of the drug [s]imufilam . . . pending a
thorough audit by the FDA." As detailed in the Citizen Petition,
"[i]nformation available to the petitioner . . . raises grave
concerns about the quality and integrity of the laboratory-based
studies surrounding this drug candidate and supporting the claims
for its efficacy." After summarizing its findings, the Citizen
Petition went on to conclude that "the extensive evidence set forth
in the enclosed report, which presents grave concerns about the
quality and integrity of the scientific data supporting Cassava
[Sciences'] claims for [simufilam]'s efficacy, provides compelling
grounds for pausing the ongoing clinical trials until the FDA can
conduct and complete a rigorous audit of Cassava [Sciences']
research." On this news, the price of Cassava Sciences common stock
fell approximately 32%, damaging investors.

Investors who purchased or otherwise acquired shares of the Company
during the Class Period should contact the Firm prior to the
October 26, 2021 lead plaintiff motion deadline. A lead plaintiff
is a representative party acting on behalf of other class members
in directing the litigation. If you wish to discuss your rights or
interests regarding this class action, please contact Thomas J.
McKenna, Esq. or Gregory M. Egleston, Esq. of Gainey McKenna &
Egleston at (212) 983-1300, or via e-mail at tjmckenna@gme-law.com
or gegleston@gme-law.com.

Please visit our website at http://www.gme-law.comfor more
information about the firm. [GN]

CELSION CORP: Continues to Defend Spar Putative Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Celsion Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a putative securities class action suit entitled, Spar v.
Celsion Corporation, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-15228.

On October 29, 2020, a putative securities class action was filed
against the Company and certain of its officers and directors in
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, captioned
Spar v. Celsion Corporation, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-15228.

The plaintiff alleges that the Company and Individual Defendants
made false and misleading statements regarding one of the Company's
product candidates, ThermoDox(R), and brings claims for damages
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder against all Defendants, and under Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act of 1934 against the Spar Individual Defendants.

The Company believes that the case is without merit and intends to
defend it vigorously.

Celsion said, "Due to the early stage of the case neither the
likelihood that a loss, if any, will be realized, nor an estimate
of possible loss or range of loss, if any, can be determined.

Celsion Corporation, a development-stage oncology drug company,
focuses on the development and commercialization of directed
chemotherapies, DNA-mediated immunotherapy, and RNA-based therapies
for the treatment of cancer. Its lead product candidate is
ThermoDox, a liposomal encapsulation of doxorubicin that is in
Phase III clinical trial for treating primary liver cancer. The
company is also developing GEN-1, a DNA-based immunotherapeutic
product for the localized treatment of ovarian and brain cancers.
Celsion Corporation was founded in 1982 and is headquartered in
Lawrenceville, New Jersey.


CELSIUS HOLDINGS: Bid for Adjudication in Prescod Suit Pending
--------------------------------------------------------------
Celsius Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company's motion for
adjudication filed in the class action suit initiated by Daniel
Prescod, is pending.

In March of 2019, Daniel Prescod filed a putative class action
lawsuit against the Company in the Superior Court for the State of
California, County of Los Angeles, Case Number 19STCV09321, filed
on March 19, 2019,.

Daniel Prescod asserts that the Company's use of citric acid in its
products while simultaneously claiming "no preservatives" violates
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Business and
Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., and California Business
and Professions Code Section 17500, et seq., because citric acid
acts as a preservative.

The Company does not use citric acid as a preservative in its
products, but rather as a flavoring, and therefore it believes that
its "no preservatives" claim is fair and not deceptive.

A motion to certify the case as a class action was filed and on
August 2, 2021, that motion was granted.

However, the Company also has a motion for summary adjudication
pending and that motion would be dispositive of plaintiff's claims
if granted. No fact discovery has been conducted on the merits and
this matter is still in its initial stages.

The Company intends to contest the claims vigorously on the merits.
Since merits discovery is still in its initial stages, we are
unable to predict the outcome at this time.

Celsius Holdings, Inc. is a fast-growing company in the functional
energy drink and liquid supplement categories in the United States
and internationally. The company is based in Boca Raton, Florida.


CENTRUS ENERGY: McGlone et al., Allowed to Amend Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------
Centrus Energy Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 13, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the court granted the
McGlone Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint.

On May 26, 2019, the Company, Enrichment Corp., and six other DOE
contractors who have operated facilities at the Portsmouth GDP site
(including, in the case of the Company, the American Centrifuge
Plant site located on the premises) were named as defendants in a
class action complaint filed by Ursula McGlone, Jason McGlone,
Julia Dunham, and K.D. and C.D., minor children by and through
their parent and natural guardian Julia Dunham in the U.S. District
Court in the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.

The complaint seeks damages for alleged off-site contamination
allegedly resulting from activities on the Portsmouth GDP site.

The McGlone Plaintiffs are seeking to represent a class of (i) all
current or former residents within a seven-mile radius of the
Portsmouth GDP site and (ii) all students and their parents at the
Zahn's Corner Middle School from 1993-present.

The complaint was amended on December 10, 2019 and on January 10,
2020 to add additional plaintiffs and new claims. On July 31, 2020,
the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion
to dismiss the case. The court dismissed ten of the fifteen claims
and allowed the remaining claims to proceed to the next stage of
the litigation process.

On August 18, 2020, the McGlone Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave
to file a third amended complaint and notice of dismissal of three
of the individual plaintiffs.

On March 18, 2021, the McGlone Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave
to file a fourth amended complaint to add new plaintiffs and
allegations. On March 19, 2021, the court granted the McGlone
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint.

On May 24, 2021, the Company, Enrichment Corp. and the other
defendants filed their motion to dismiss the complaint. Meanwhile,
the parties are in the discovery stage of litigation where the
parties are seeking the court's ruling on the scope of discovery.
The Company believes that its operations at the Portsmouth GDP site
were fully in compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
regulations. Further, the Company believes that any such liability
should be indemnified under the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries
Indemnity Act. The Company and Enrichment Corp. have provided
notifications to DOE required to invoke indemnification under the
Price-Anderson Act and other contractual provisions.

Centrus Energy Corp. supplies nuclear fuel and services for the
nuclear power industry in the United States, Japan, Belgium, and
internationally. The Company operates in two segments, Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU) and Contract Services. The Company was formerly known
as USEC Inc. and changed its name to Centrus Energy Corp. in
September 2014. Centrus is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.


CENTRUS ENERGY: Oral Argument in Matthews Class Suit Postponed
--------------------------------------------------------------
Centrus Energy Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 13, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the oral argument set by
the court in the class action suit initiated by James Matthews, has
been postponed.

On November 27, 2019, the Company, Enrichment Corp. and six other
DOE contractors who have operated facilities at the Portsmouth GDP
site were named as defendants in a class action complaint filed by
James Matthews, Jennifer Brownfield Clark, Joanne Ross, the Estate
of A.R., and others similarly situated, in the Common Pleas Court
of Pike County, Ohio.

On January 3, 2020, the complaint was removed to the U.S. District
Court in the Southern District of Ohio for adjudication. The
complaint sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, statutory
damages, and any other relief allowed by law for alleged off-site
contamination allegedly resulting from activities on the Portsmouth
GDP site.

The Matthews Plaintiffs expressly contended that the ongoing and
continuous releases that injured the Plaintiffs and class members
were not "nuclear incidents" as that term is defined in the
Price-Anderson Act, but rather "freestanding state law claims
concerning traditional-style state regulation."

On July 27, 2020, the court granted the Company, Enrichment Corp.
and the other defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint because
the Matthews Plaintiffs had opted not to proceed under the
Price-Anderson Act which preempts state law.

On August 18, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On November 17, 2020,
the Matthews Plaintiffs filed their appellant brief and on February
1, 2021, the Matthews Defendants filed their brief. On February 22,
2021, the Matthews Plaintiffs filed their reply brief.

The case, which was originally scheduled for oral argument on July
29, 2021, has been postponed for a second time pursuant to
Plaintiffs' counsel's request; a new date for oral argument has yet
to be determined.

The Company believes that its operations at the Portsmouth GDP site
were fully in compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
regulations. Further, the Company believes that any such liability
should be indemnified under the Price-Anderson Act. The Company and
Enrichment Corp. had provided notifications to DOE required to
invoke indemnification under the Price-Anderson Act and other
contractual provisions.

Centrus Energy Corp. supplies nuclear fuel and services for the
nuclear power industry in the United States, Japan, Belgium, and
internationally. The Company operates in two segments, Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU) and Contract Services. The Company was formerly known
as USEC Inc. and changed its name to Centrus Energy Corp. in
September 2014. Centrus is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.


CENTRUS ENERGY: Walburn Class Suit Put on Hold Until Nov. 11
------------------------------------------------------------
Centrus Energy Corp. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 13, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the court handling the
class action suit initiated by Jeffrey Walburn, has put the case on
hold until November 11, 2021, to give the Plaintiffs the
opportunity to retain new counsel.

On September 3, 2020, the Company, Enrichment Corp., nine other DOE
contractors who have operated facilities at the Portsmouth GDP site
and eleven individuals in their personal capacity some of whom are
current and former DOE employees were named as defendants in a
class action complaint filed by Jeffrey Walburn, Charles O. Lawson
Jr., Kimberly M. Lawson, James A. Brogdon, Stephen Patrick Spriggs,
Donald Slone, Vicki P. Slone, Victoria Slone Moore, Toni West, Carl
R. Hartley, Heather R. Hartley, Vina Colley, Antony Preston, David
B. Rose, Michael E. Groves, George W. Clark, Estate of Kathy Sue
Brogdon (deceased), Estate of Jay Paul Brogdon (deceased), and Jon
Doe(s), and Jane Doe(s), on behalf of themselves and all similarly
situated individuals in the U.S. District Court in the Southern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division.

The complaint alleges that the named defendants conspired and
concealed nuclear incidents in violation of the Price-Anderson Act,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and other
state claims.

The complainants seek damages and equitable and injunctive relief
arising from economic losses, property losses, and non-economic
damages resulting from toxic and radioactive releases from the
Portsmouth GDP.

On November 20, 2020, the Walburn Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint to add two individuals to the complaint as defendants in
their individual capacity. One of those individuals is Daniel
Poneman, Centrus' Chief Executive Officer.

In the 78-page complaint, Mr. Poneman is referenced only twice,
without any cited allegations against him; once in the caption and
once referencing his position at the Company. The Company has
notified its insurance carrier regarding the claim.

On February 11, 2021, the Walburn Plaintiffs amended their
complaint for a second time to replace two corporate defendants
with two others (one of whom was a contractor to Enrichment Corp.
and also to its predecessor prior to its privatization in 1998 and
the other a former DOE contractor) and removed four named
individual defendants from the complaint.

On March 2, 2021, Walburn Defendants filed their motion to dismiss.


On July 14, 2021, the court put the case on hold until November 11,
2021, to give the Plaintiffs the opportunity to retain new counsel.


The court conditionally granted the Plaintiffs' local counsel's
request to withdraw as counsel and terminated the representation of
the two other co-counsel.

The Company believes that its operations at the Portsmouth GDP site
were fully in compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
regulations. Further, the Company believes that any such liability
should be indemnified under the Price-Anderson Act. The Company and
Enrichment Corp. have provided notifications to DOE required to
invoke indemnification under the Price-Anderson Act and other
contractual provisions.

Centrus Energy Corp. supplies nuclear fuel and services for the
nuclear power industry in the United States, Japan, Belgium, and
internationally. The Company operates in two segments, Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU) and Contract Services. The Company was formerly known
as USEC Inc. and changed its name to Centrus Energy Corp. in
September 2014. Centrus is headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland.


CHASE DENNIS: Samora Has Until Oct. 15 to File Class Cert. Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as JULIE SAMORA,
individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, v. CHASE
DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC., a California Corporation;
TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, LLC, a Delaware corporation, Case No.
5:20-cv-02027-BLF (N.D. Cal.), the Hon. Judge entered an order
granting the following briefing schedule for Plaintiff's motion for
class certification:

   -- Plaintiff's Motion for Class        October 15, 2021
      Certification due:

   -- Defendant's Opposition due:         December 3, 2021

   -- Plaintiff's Reply Brief due:        January 21, 2022

The Parties agree that, to the extent any declarations are
submitted in support of their respective briefs, such declarants
will be made available for deposition within the appropriate
briefing periods. The Parties further agree that the mediation on
November 15, 2021 will remain as scheduled.

A copy of the Parties motion dated Aug. 31, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3yNdyDm at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for Plaintiff Julie Samora, individually and on
behalf of others similarly situated, are:

         Matthew J. Matern, Esq.
         Joshua D. Boxer, Esq.
         Sara B. Tosdal, Esq.
         MATERN LAW GROUP, PC
         1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200
         Manhattan Beach, CA 90266
         Telephone: (310) 531-1900
         Facsimile: (310) 531-1901
         E-mail: mmatern@maternlawgroup.com
                jboxer@maternlawgroup.com
                stosdal@maternlawgroup.com

The Attorneys for the defendants Chase Dennis Medical Group, Inc.
and Team Health Holdings, Inc., are:

         Jonathan L. Brophy, Esq.
         Michael Afar, Esq.
         Sofya Perelshteyn, Esq.
         SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
         2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500
         Los Angeles, CA 90067-3021
         Telephone: (310) 277-7200
         Facsimile: (310) 551-8313
         E-mail: jbrophy@seyfarth.com
                 mafar@seyfarth.com
                 sperelsghteyn@sefarth.com

CO-DIAGNOSTICS INC: Suits Over Misleading Press Releases Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Co-Diagnostics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend securities class action suits related to the company's false
and misleading press releases to increase the price of its stock to
improperly benefit the officers and directors of the Company.

In July and September 2020, securities class action complaints were
filed by certain stockholders of the Company against the Company
claiming that the Company promulgated false and misleading press
releases to increase the price of our stock to improperly benefit
the officers and directors of the Company.

The plaintiffs demand compensatory damages sustained as a result of
the Company's alleged wrongdoing in an amount to be proven at
trial.

The Company believes these lawsuits are without merit and intends
to defend the cases vigorously.

The Company is unable to estimate a range of loss, if any, that
could result were there to be an adverse final decision in these
cases.

Co-Diagnostics said, "As of the date of this report, the Company
does not believe it is probable that these cases will result in an
unfavorable outcome; however, if an unfavorable outcome were to
occur in these cases, it is possible that the impact could be
material to the Company's results of operations in the period(s) in
which any such outcome becomes probable and estimable."

Co-Diagnostics, Inc. a Utah corporation, is developing robust and
innovative molecular tools for detection of infectious diseases,
liquid biopsy for cancer screening, and agricultural applications.


COMLINK TOTAL: Has Made Unsolicited Calls, Treumann Suit Claims
---------------------------------------------------------------
JO ANN TREUMANN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. COMLINK TOTAL SOLUTIONS CORP.; and CHARTER
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. d/b/a SPECTRUM, Defendants, Case No.
2:21-cv-04171-BCW (W.D. Mo., Sept. 1, 2021) seeks to stop the
Defendants' practice of making unsolicited calls.

COMLINK TOTAL SOLUTIONS CORP. is an integrated solutions provider
for TV, broadband, Security and VoIP. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John F. Edgar, Esq.
          EDGAR LAW FIRM LLC
          2600 Grand Blvd., Suite 440
          Kansas City, MO 64108
          Telephone: (816) 531-0033
          E-mail:jfe@edgarlawfirm.com

               -and-

          Alexander H. Burke, Esq.
          Daniel J. Marovitch, Esq.
          BURKE LAW OFFICES, LLC
          909 Davis St., Suite 500
          Evanston, IL 60201
          Telephone: (312) 729-5288
          E-mail: aburke@burkelawllc.com
                  dmarovitch@burkelawllc.com

CONTEXTLOGIC INC: IPO Related Putative Class Suits Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------
ContextLogic Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend four putative class action suits related to its initial
public offering (IPO).

Beginning in May 2021, four putative class action lawsuits were
filed in U.S. federal court against the Company, its directors,
certain of its officers and the underwriters named in its IPO
registration statement alleging violations of securities laws based
on statements made in its registration statement on Form S-1 filed
with the SEC in connection with its IPO and seeking monetary
damages.

These lawsuits were filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.

The Company believes these lawsuits are without merit and it
intends to vigorously defend them.  

ContextLogic said, "Based on the preliminary nature of the
proceedings in these cases, the outcome of these matters remains
uncertain. Given that the Company is in the early stages of the
litigation process, it is unable to estimate the range of potential
loss, if any."

ContextLogic Inc. is a mobile electronic commerce company. The
Company provides a discovery-based shopping platform, which
connects merchants' products to users based on user preferences.
The company is based in San Francisco, California.


CORMEDIX INC: Faces DefenCath Related Putative Class Suit
---------------------------------------------------------
CorMedix Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company is facing a
putative class action suit related to DefenCath(TM).

On or around July 22, 2021, a purported stockholder of the Company
filed a putative class action complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, naming as defendants
the Company, Khoso Baluch, Matthew David and Phoebe Mounts.  

The complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, based on
alleged misstatements and omissions in connection with the New Drug
Application (NDA) submitted to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for DefenCath, and the subsequent notification by the FDA
that the NDA could not be approved in its present form.  

The complaint purports to assert claims on behalf of persons that
purchased or otherwise acquired shares of the Company securities
between July 8, 2020 and May 13, 2021.

The Company intends to vigorously contest such claims.

CorMedix Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses on developing
and commercializing therapeutic products for the prevention and
treatment of infectious and inflammatory diseases in the United
States and internationally. The company was formerly known as
Picton Holding Company, Inc. and changed its name to CorMedix, Inc.
in January 2007. CorMedix, Inc. was founded in 2006 and is based in
Berkeley Heights, New Jersey.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Fails to Timely Pay Manual Workers, Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
GEETA UMADAT, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly
situated v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, Case No. 2:21-cv-04814
(E.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2021) is a class action on behalf of the
Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees of
the Defendant who were employed as hourly-paid manual workers in
the State of New York pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to recover statutory damages for violation
of New York Labor Law.

The Defendant operates approximately 19 warehouses and stores
located throughout New York State including warehouses located in
Commack; Holbrook, Lawrence, Melville, Nesconset, Riverhead,
Westbury, Oceanside, Rego Park, Long Island City, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Nanuet, New Rochelle, Port Chester, Rochester, Staten
Island, Syracuse, and Yonkers.

The Defendant employs non-exempt hourly-paid manual workers at its
warehouse locations including, but not limited to, cashiers,
cashier assistants, stockers, food service assistants, bakery
wrappers, service deli assistants, bakers, cake decorators,
forklift drivers, meat cutters, receiving clerks, tire installers,
sanitation assistants and maintenance workers, says the suit.

Accordingly, the Defendant failed to timely pay manual workers
including Plaintiff their wages within seven calendar days after
the end of the week in which their wages were earned, thereby
resulting in an underpayment at the time such wages were due but
not paid. Instead, Defendant has allegedly compensated Plaintiff
and all other manual workers on a bi-weekly basis.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          490 Wheeler Road, Suite 250
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588
          E-mail: promero@romerolawny.com

CROSS TIMBERS: Proceedings in Chieftain Royalty Suit Stayed
-----------------------------------------------------------
Cross Timbers Royalty Trust said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that proceedings in Chieftain
Royalty Company v. XTO Energy Inc., is stayed.

A federal district court approved the settlement of a royalty class
action lawsuit against XTO Energy Inc. (Chieftain Royalty Company
v. XTO Energy Inc.) in March 2018. In July 2018, the class
plaintiffs submitted their plan to allocate the settlement funds
among members of the class. After that plan of allocation was
approved, XTO Energy advised the Trustee that, based upon that
plan, approximately $40,000 should be allocated to the Trust as
additional production costs.

The Trustee has objected to similar claims relating to the
Chieftain settlement with respect to another trust for which it
serves as trustee (the Hugoton Royalty Trust) in an arbitration
styled Simmons Bank (successor to Southwest Bank and Bank of
America, N.A.) vs. XTO Energy Inc. through the American Arbitration
Association.

In that arbitration, the Trustee requested a declaratory judgment
that the Chieftain settlement is not a production cost and that XTO
Energy is prohibited from charging the settlement as a production
cost under the conveyance or otherwise reducing the Hugoton Royalty
Trust's payments now or in the future as a result of the Chieftain
litigation.

Similar issues have arisen as between XTO Energy and the Trust, but
it was agreed those issues would be considered once the Panel
issued its decisions with respect to the Hugoton Royalty Trust.

On January 20, 2021, the Panel issued its Corrected Interim Final
Award (i) "rejecting the Trust's contention that XTO has no right
under the Conveyance to charge the Hugoton Royalty Trust with
amounts XTO paid under section 1.18(a)(i) as royalty obligations to
settle the Chieftain litigation" and (ii) stating "the next phase
will determine how much of the Chieftain settlement can be so
charged, if any of it can be, in the exercise of the right found by
the Panel."

Following briefing by both parties, on May 18, 2021, the Panel
issued its second interim final award over the amount of XTO
Energy's settlement in the Chieftain class action lawsuit that can
be charged to the Hugoton Royalty Trust as a production cost.

The Panel has stayed proceedings and requires a status update no
later than August 31, 2021.

The allocation of a portion of the Chieftain settlement to the
Trust, if ever, will be considered if the arbitration
re-commences.

Cross Timbers Royalty Trust operates as an express trust in the
United States. It holds 90% net profits interests in certain
producing and nonproducing royalty and overriding royalty interest
properties in Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico; and 75% net profits
interests in certain working interest properties in Texas and
Oklahoma. The company was founded in 1991 and is based in Dallas,
Texas.


CYTRX CORP: Proxy Statement Lacks Financial Info, Silverberg Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HERBERT SILVERBERG, individually and on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated stockholders of CYTRX CORPORATION v.
STEVEN A. KRIEGSMAN, LOUIS IGNARRO, JOEL K. CALDWELL, JENNIFER K.
SIMPSON and CYTRX CORPORATION, Case No. 2021-0723 (Del. Ch., Aug.
23, 2021) is a class action in connection with the Company's filing
of a proxy statement with the SEC on August 12, 2021 (the "Proxy
Statement") and a supplement to the Proxy Statement filed with the
SEC on August 16, 2021, with respect to a stockholder's meeting
scheduled for September 23, 2021.

The "Proxy Supplement" and together with the Proxy Statement is
referred as the "Solicitation." The Solicitation is primarily
directed at soliciting stockholder approval of a proposed amendment
to the Company's certificate of incorporation (the "Proposed
Amendment") allowing for an increase in the number of authorized
shares of the Company's common stock (the "CytRx Stock").

The increased authorization of shares relates to a July 13, 2021,
securities purchase agreement (the "SPA") through which CytRx
agreed to sell to Armistice Capital Master Fund Ltd. (the
"Armistice Fund"), which is identified as the "Investor" in the
Solicitation, 8,240 shares of the Company's Series C Preferred
Stock (the "Series C Stock") at a price of $1,000 per share. The
Series C Stock pays 10% interest per annum and is initially
convertible into an aggregate of up to 9,363,637 shares of the
CytRx Stock, at a conversion price of $0.88 per share. Under the
SPA, Armistice Fund also will receive preferred investment options
(the "Preferred Investment Options") to purchase up to 11,363,637
shares of the CytRx Stock with an exercise price of $0.88.

According to the complaint, CytRx's certificate of incorporation
does not authorize the Company to issue those additional 20.727
million shares of CytRx Stock. Therefore, the Defendants are
seeking stockholder approval of the Proposed Amendment, which will
increase the number of shares of CytRx Stock that the Company is
authorized to issue by over 20 million shares.

Allegedly, the Solicitation's representations are materially
incomplete because the Proxy Statement and the Proxy Supplement
fail to disclose that the sale of the Series C Stock and other
securities to the Armistice Fund through the SPA potentially
imperils the value of the Company'snet operating loss ("NOL")
carryforwards which CytRx sought to protect through an amendment to
its rights agreement (or poison pill) adopted in November 2020
limiting beneficial ownership to 4.95%.

The Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times has been, a CytRx
shareholder.

CytRx is a biopharmaceutical research and development company
specializing in oncology and rare diseases. The Company's focus has
been on the discovery, research and clinical development of novel
anti-cancer drug candidates that employ novel linker technologies
to enhance the accumulation and release of cytotoxic anti-cancer
agents at the tumor. The Individual Defendants are directors of the
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey S. Abraham, Esq.
          Michael J. Klein, Esq.
          ABRAHAM, FRUCHTER & TWERSKY, LLP
          450 Seventh Avenue, 38th Floor
          New York, NY 10123
          Telephone: (212) 279-5050
          E-mail: jabraham@aftlaw.com
                  mklein@aftlaw.com

               - and -

          P. Bradford deLeeuw, Esq.
          DE LEEUW LAW LLC
          1301 Walnut Green Road
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Telephone: (302) 274-2180
          Facsimile: (302) 351-6905
          E-mail: brad@deleeuwlaw.com

DANIMER SCIENTIFIC: Faces Caballero Suit Over Stock Price Drop
--------------------------------------------------------------
CARLOS CABALLERO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. DANIMER SCIENTIFIC, INC., STEPHEN E. CROSKREY, and JOHN
A. DOWDY III, Case No. 1:21-cv-04817-KAM-RML (M.D. Ga., Aug. 26,
2021) is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of all
those that purchased Danimer securities during the time period from
December 30, 2020 to May 3, 2021, inclusive (the "Class Period").

The claims are brought against Danimer and certain of the Company's
senior executives, and arise under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.

Danimer became a publicly traded company through the acquisition of
its predecessor company (the "De-SPAC Transaction") by Live Oak
Acquisition Corp. ("Live Oak"), a special purpose acquisition
company ("SPAC"). Danimer began trading on the New York Stock
Exchange (the "NYSE") on December 30, 2020.

Throughout the Class Period, Danimer allegedly misled investors
with regard to Nodax's environmental benefits, its viability as a
fully biodegradable alternative to conventional plastic, the level
of demand for Nodax, and the average selling price for Nodax.

Danimer also reported that it had purchased an additional
production facility in Kentucky (the "Kentucky Facility") and that
"[s]everal components of the first phase of the production capacity
buildout were completed at the end of the third quarter of 2020[.]"
The Company also told investors that the average selling price for
Nodax was "pushing about $2.70 [per pound]" and "increasing."

According to the complaint, these statements were materially false
and misleading. In truth, Nodax does not biodegrade anaerobically,
can be much worse for the environment than traditional plastic in
certain respects, and biodegrades aerobically at a much slower rate
than the Company claims and only under specific conditions not
accessible to all consumers.

The truth began to emerge on March 20, 2021, when The Wall Street
Journal published an article debunking Danimer's claims that Nodax
breaks down far more quickly than fossil-fuel plastics. The article
reported that according to the same expert who co-authored a study
touted by Danimer as "certifying" Nodax's biodegradability, "many
claims about Nodax are exaggerated and misleading."

As a result of these alleged disclosures, the price of Danimer
stock declined by $6.43 per share, from $49.98 per share on March
19, 2021 to $43.55 per share on March 22, 2021, or approximately
13%.

On April 22, 2021, research firm Spruce Point Capital Management
("Spruce Point") issued a report (the "April Report") demonstrating
that the Company's annual report disclosures regarding the purchase
price of the Kentucky Facility were inconsistent with city records.


These disclosures caused the price of Danimer stock to decline by
$2.01 per share, from $25.00 per share on April 21, 2021 to $22.99
per share on April 22, 2021, or approximately 8%, added the suit.

As a result of these disclosures, the price of Danimer stock
declined by $1.49 per share, from $23.63 per share on May 3, 2021
to $22.14 per share on May 4, 2021, or approximately 6%.

Plaintiff Carlos Caballero is a resident of New Jersey. As set
forth in the attached Certification, Plaintiff purchased shares of
Danimer stock during the Class Period and suffered damages as a
result of the alleged violations of the federal securities laws.

Headquartered in Bainbridge, Georgia, Danimer (formerly known as
Meredian Holdings Group, Inc.) is a manufacturer of plastics known
as polyhydroxyalkanoates ("PHAs") that are derived from living
organisms instead of fossil fuels. Danimer's principal product is
Nodax, the brand name of a purportedly biodegradable PHA. Nodax is
made by feeding canola oil to bacteria, from which carbon is
extracted and turned into plastic.

The Individual Defendants  are officers and directors of the
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          H. Lamar Mixson, Esq.
          Amanda Kay Seals, Esq.
          Jennifer L. Peterson, Esq.
          BONDURANT MIXSON & ELMORE, LLP
          1201 West Peachtree Street NW, Suite 3900
          Atlanta, GA 30309
          Telephone: (404) 881-4100
          Facsimile: (404) 881-4111
          E-mail: mixson@bmelaw.com
                  seals@bmelaw.com
                  peterson@bmelaw.com

               - and -

          Avi Josefson, Esq.
          Scott Foglietta, Esq.
          Rebecca Kim, Esq.
          BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER
          & GROSSMANN LLP
          1251 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10020
          Telephone: (212) 554-1400
          Facsimile: (212) 554-1444
          E-mail: avi@blbglaw.com
                  scott.foglietta@blbglaw.com
                  rebecca.kim@blbglaw.com

DANSKE BANK: Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Plumbers Fund Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PLUMBER & STEAMFITTERS LOCAL 773 PENSION FUND, BOSTON
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, TEAMSTERS LOCAL 237 ADDITIONAL SECURITY BENEFIT
FUND AND TEAMSTERS LOCAL 237 SUPPLEMENTAL FUND FOR HOUSING
AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES, individually and behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DANSKE BANK A/S,
THOMAS F. BORGEN, HENRIK RAMLAU-HANSEN, JACOB AARUP-ANDERSEN,
ESTATE OF OLE ANDERSEN, Defendants-Appellees, Case No. 20-3231 (2d
Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the action.

Danske Bank, the largest financial institution in Denmark, acquired
its Estonian Branch by way of a 2006 merger with Sampo Bank.
Problems soon emerged. In 2009, the Estonian Financial Supervisory
Authority (EFSA) censured the branch for failing to comply with
Know Your Customer (KYC) rules, which, inter alia, obligate banks
to verify the identity of a customer before opening an account. An
internal audit conducted in 2012 reported that branch personnel
sometimes failed to screen incoming payments. That same year, the
DFSA approached Danske about "serious AML issues in the Estonian
branch." The Funds allege that, despite these cautions, Danske
failed to strengthen compliance measures at the branch that would
have impaired profitability.

Central to the Estonian Branch's AML issues was its Non-Resident
Portfolio ("NRP"), which it inherited from Sampo. The NRP was
managed by a designated group of employees and was composed of
3,000 to 4,000 foreign clients at any given time, most of them
corporate entities based in Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
British Virgin Islands, with little apparent reason for doing their
banking in Estonia. Although just 2% to 4% of the branch's
customers were part of the NRP, the portfolio accounted for an
average of 56% of the branch's pre-tax profits between 2011 and
2015.

The Funds allege that many NRP customers were intermediaries who
used the branch to launder money. Many of them should have set off
alarms. Some shared addresses with other NRP customers; others
processed transactions incommensurate with their purported size.
But Estonian Branch employees tended not to ask questions about
their clients' financial motives.

The securities fraud class action, brought by three pension funds
against Danske and four of its former executives, principally
alleges that the Bank covered up a money-laundering scandal.
Between 2007 and 2015, a failure to follow anti-money laundering
(AML) protocols in the Bank's Estonian Branch allowed suspicious
transactions of approximately $230 billion to flow through that
branch. News of the scandal first broke in 2016 when the Danish
Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA) reprimanded and later fined
Danske Bank for compliance shortcomings. But it became clear over
the next two years that the amount of money laundered through the
Estonian Branch was far greater than originally thought. As the
scope of the scandal came to light, the price of Danske Bank
securities declined.

In 2018 -- well after news of the Estonian Branch's AML issues
became public, but before its full breadth was revealed -- the
Funds purchased Danske Bank American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).
The Funds claim that the Bank failed to supervise the Estonian
Branch, reacted slowly once it became aware of the AML issues, and
made a series of misstatements and omissions along the way. During
the relevant time period, Defendant Thomas Borgen was Danske's CEO,
Defendants Henrik Ramlau-Hansen and Jacob Aarup-Andersen both
served as its CFO, and Defendant Ole Andersen was the Chairman of
its Board of Directors.

The Funds, which purchased Danske Bank ADRs amid the AML fallout
between March and June of 2018, commenced the action in January
2019 -- seeking to represent a class of ADR investors who purchased
between Jan. 9, 2014 and April 29, 2019 -- and were appointed lead
plaintiffs. The operative pleading, the Third Amended Complaint,
asserts claims under: (1) Section 10 of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5(b); (2) Rule 10b-5(a) and (c); and (3) Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

After several amended pleadings, the district court granted the
Defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, concluding, inter
alia, that the Funds failed to sufficiently allege any materially
misleading statements or omissions. The appeal followed.

Discussion

The core claim is brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b), and its
implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. Section
240.10b-5(b). To state a claim under those provisions, a plaintiff
must plead six familiar elements: (1) a misstatement or omission of
material fact; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or
sale of securities; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss
causation.

The appeal turns on the first element: Whether the Funds
sufficiently alleged that Danske made actionable misstatements or
omissions. Though the 144-page Third Amended Complaint recounts in
fulsome detail all that went wrong at the Estonian Branch over an
eight-year period, the Exchange Act claim is premised on five
particular categories of alleged misstatements and omissions: (1)
the Bank's 2013-2015 financial statements, which allegedly
incorporated revenue from illegal transactions; (2) statements
surrounding the 2014 goodwill impairment; (3) a 2015 statement
regarding the Bank's new anonymous whistleblower reporting system;
(4) corporate governance statements discussing the Bank's
compliance with AML; and (5) the Bank's assertion that it did not
expect the AML scandal to materially impact its financial position.
None of the challenged statements are actionable by the Funds.

A. The Financial Statements

Danske Bank routinely released financial results throughout the
class period, each time summarizing its year-over-year net profits
and revenues. The Funds observe that, in all these reports, the
allegedly ill-gotten profits from the Estonian Branch were baked
into the bank-wide numbers. They go on to argue that it was
misleading for Danske to release those numbers without
simultaneously disclosing what it knew about possible money
laundering at the branch.

The Second Circuit disagrees. It finds that the operative pleading
does not satisfy this heightened pleading requirement. The Funds
baldly state that the challenged deposit contracts are
unenforceable because some of the NRP clients were illegally
laundering money through the Branch. This claim conflates the
distinct concepts of illegality and unenforceability. As the
district court pointed out, whether the deposit contracts are
actually unenforceable turns on foreign contract law. But the Funds
identify no law or contractual provision that would render the
deposit contracts unenforceable. Instead, they posit that "it is
reasonable to infer that illicit transactions do not give rise to
enforceable rights." But under the applicable heightened pleading
requirement, the Funds must come forth with more than a generality
with surface appeal.

B. The Goodwill Impairment

Danske Bank announced the results of its annual goodwill impairment
testing in late 2014. The Bank disclosed that it was taking a
write-down of approximately DKK 9 billion (approximately $1.4
billion) on its assets in Finland, Northern Ireland, and Estonia
due to "assumptions about weaker long-term macroeconomic
developments." Ramlau-Hansen explained on a conference call that
"this is primarily a technical accounting exercise," that "the
goodwill calculation is not related to expected short-term
performance of the affected business areas," and that the
write-down "will not affect Danske Bank's ongoing business or the
strategy for the involved units."

The Funds allege that it was materially misleading to characterize
the write-down as "purely technical" and unrelated to short-term
strategy because the goodwill impairment in Estonia was the direct
consequence of the Bank's decision to eliminate the NRP.
The Second Circuit holds that obviously, not all statements become
immaterial after a similar or set length of time. Whether the
influence of a misstatement or omission survives will depend on its
nature and the intervening load of information on the subject, and
on other developments affecting the market and the enterprise. In
the case, the Second Circuit says,the outpouring of information
about the Estonian Branch between 2016 and 2018 compels the
conclusion that 2014 statements about the goodwill impairment were
too remote in time to have "assumed actual significance in the
deliberations" of a purchaser in 2018. Accordingly, the challenged
statements were stale and immaterial to a reasonable investor in
the Funds' position by the time they invested in Danske Bank in
2018.

C. The Whistleblower Comment

The Funds next challenge the following statement from the Bank's
2015 Corporate Responsibility Report: "In 2014, three cases were
reported in the whistleblower system. All the cases were concluded,
and the appropriate actions were implemented." According to the
Funds, this statement was materially misleading because the B&H
Report concluded years later that the whistleblower report made by
Wilkinson was handled improperly.

Even assuming that this statement was misleading by omission, the
Second Circuit cannot support the Funds' claims for the same reason
as the goodwill impairment. The Bank issued this statement in 2015,
three years before the Funds purchased any ADRs. Whatever impact
this statement might have had on an investor at that time,
intervening events made it such that no "reasonable" investor
contemplating purchasing Danske ADRs in 2018 "would consider it
important in deciding how to act." No reasonable investor would
discount all of the more recent news about AML failures at the
Estonian branch on the basis of this years-old boast about three
whistleblower complaints handled through the Bank's anonymous
reporting system.

D. The Corporate Responsibility Statements

The Funds allege that certain statements made in Danske's 2013 and
2014 Corporate Responsibility Reports were misleading given the
state of things then prevailing in the Estonian Branch. First, they
allege that Danske misled them by claiming that it "strives to
conduct our business in accordance with internationally recognised
principles in the area of anti-corruption." They next take aim at
the Bank's assertions that it "condemns money laundering," "takes
the steps necessary to comply with internationally recognised
standards, including Know Your Customer procedures," and has
procedures for "customer due diligence, reporting, and
communications."

As to the first allegation, the Second Circuit finds that no
investor would take such statements seriously in assessing a
potential investment" because "almost every bank makes these
statements."  "General declarations about the importance of acting
lawfully and with integrity" are inactionable puffery, especially
when expressed in aspirational terms. Danske's bromides about being
good and upright are plainly puffery.

As to the second allegation, the Second Circuit holds that no
reasonable investor -- especially one who purchased ADRs more than
three years after the Reports were published and was well aware of
a gigantic AML scandal at the Estonian Branch -- would weigh these
generic statements in its investment calculus.

E. The 2018 Contingencies Footnote

Finally, the Funds challenge a footnote contained in the Bank's
2018 second quarter financial results. The footnote, which was
first published on July 18, 2018, states: "Danske Bank does not
expect the outcomes of pending lawsuits and disputes, the dialogue
with public authorities or the inspection of compliance with
anti-money laundering legislation to have any material effect on
its financial position." The Funds contend that this statement was
misleading because the Bank then knew that the scope of the scandal
far exceeded what had been publicly reported and was therefore
likely to materially undermine its financial position.

The Second Circuit holds that the Funds have failed to make
actionable claims regarding statements made before their purchase
of ADRs. They therefore cannot rely on the challenged footnote,
which could not have influenced the price of a purchase that had
already been made. Accordingly, the Funds cannot premise a Rule
10b-5(b) claim on the alleged misstatement in the footnote.

F. The Scheme Liability Claim

The Funds add a claim under subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5,
which prohibit (respectively) "employing any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud," and "engaging in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit."
To maintain a 10b-5(a) or (c) claim, a plaintiff must specify "what
deceptive or manipulative acts were performed, which defendants
performed them, when the acts were performed, and the effect the
scheme had on investors in the securities at issue."

The Second Circuit holds that the Funds fail to surmount this
heightened pleading standard. At no point do they articulate with
precision the contours of an alleged scheme to defraud investors,
or which specific acts were conducted in furtherance of it.
Instead, the claim rests upon the incorporation of the previous 140
pages of the pleading paired with the conclusory assertion that the
"Defendants carried out a common plan, scheme, and unlawful course
of conduct that was intended to deceive the investing public" and
"artificially inflate the market price of Danske Bank ADRs."
Money-laundering at a single branch in Estonia cannot alone
establish that Danske Bank itself carried out a deceptive scheme to
defraud investors. Absent some sort of enumeration of which
specific acts constituted an alleged scheme in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, the Funds' claim does not comply
with the applicable heightened pleading standard and cannot go
forward.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Judge Dennis Jacobs, writing for the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/2wzw8e2z from Leagle.com.

CAROL C. VILLEGAS -- cvillegas@labaton.com -- (Alec T. Coquin,
Christine M. Fox, on the brief), Labaton Sucharow LLP, in New York
City, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Samuel H. Rudman -- srudman@rgrdlaw.com -- David A. Rosenfeld,
William Geddish, Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, in Melville, New
York (on the brief), for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

BRIAN T. FRAWLEY -- frawleyb@sullcrom.com -- (Katherine Bagley,
Amanda Shami, on the brief), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, in New York
City, for Defendants-Appellees Danske Bank A/S and Jacob
Aarup-Andersen.

Bruce E. Yannett -- beyannett@debevoise.com -- Helen V. Cantwell,
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, in New York City, and Jonathan R. Tuttle
-- jrtuttle@debevoise.com -- Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, in
Washington, D.C. (on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Ole
Andersen.

Edmund Polubinski III -- edmund.polubinski@davispolk.com -- Patrick
W. Blakemore, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, in New York City (on the
brief), for Defendant-Appellee Thomas F. Borgen.

Daniel J. Kramer -- dkramer@paulweiss.com -- Shane Avidan,
Katherine Warren Gadsden, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
LLP, in New York City, (on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee
Henrik Ramlau-Hansen.


DILLON LOGISTICS: Faces Siegemund Suit Alleging WARN Act Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CORY SIEGESMUND, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. DILLON LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant, Case No.
8:21-cv-02107 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 1, 2021) alleges violation of the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 for the
failure to provide the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated
former employees at least 60 days' advance notice of their
terminations, as required by the WARN Act.

Plaintiff Siegesmund was employed by the Defendants as mechanic.

DILLON LOGISTICS, INC. provides logistics services. The Company
provides logistics services in the dry bulk, chemical, and asphalt
services industries. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Ryan D. Barack, Esq.
          KWALL BARACK NADEAU PLLC
          304 S. Belcher Road, Suite C
          Clearwater, FL 33765
          Telephone: (727) 441-4947
          Facsimile: (727) 447-3158
          E-mail: rbarack@employeerights.com


DISH DBS: Final Settlement Approval Hearing Set for Dec. 6
----------------------------------------------------------
DISH DBS Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 13, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the final settlement
approval hearing in the City of Hallandale Beach Police Officers'
and Firefighters' Personnel Retirement Trust v. Ergen, et al., Case
No. A-19-797799-B, has been scheduled for December 6, 2021.

On July 2, 2019, a putative class action lawsuit was filed by a
purported EchoStar stockholder in the District Court of Clark
County, Nevada under the caption City of Hallandale Beach Police
Officers' and Firefighters' Personnel Retirement Trust ("City of
Hallandale") v. Ergen, et al., Case No. A-19-797799-B.  

The lawsuit named as defendants Mr. Charles Ergen, the other
members of the EchoStar Board, as well as EchoStar, certain of its
officers, DISH Network and certain of DISH Network's and EchoStar's
affiliates.  

Plaintiff alleges, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties
in approving the transactions contemplated under the Master
Transaction Agreement for inadequate consideration and pursuant to
an unfair and conflicted process, and that EchoStar, DISH Network
and certain other defendants aided and abetted such breaches.  

In the operative First Amended Complaint, filed on October 11,
2019, the plaintiff dropped as defendants the EchoStar board
members other than Mr. Ergen.  The Court granted, in part, the
plaintiff's motion for class certification on January 15, 2021.  

The trial of this matter is scheduled to start sometime during the
five-week "stack" beginning September 7, 2021.    

Plaintiff seeks equitable relief, including the issuance of
additional DISH Network Class A common stock, monetary relief and
other costs and disbursements, including attorneys' fees.

The parties have entered into a global settlement agreement,
subject to court approval.  

The parties' joint motion for preliminary approval has been
approved and the final approval hearing has been scheduled for
December 6, 2021.

If the settlement is not approved, DISH Network intends to
vigorously defend this case, but cannot predict with any degree of
certainty the outcome of this suit or determine the extent of any
potential liability or damages.

DISH DBS Corporation, through its subsidiaries, provides pay-TV
services under the DISH and Sling brands in the United States. The
company was founded in 1996 and is headquartered in Englewood,
Colorado. DISH DBS Corporation is a subsidiary of DISH Network
Corporation.


FINE DINING: Kelley Class Suit Seeks Minimum Wage & OT for Dancers
------------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHANIE KELLEY v. FINE DINING CLUB, INC. D/B/A SILVER CITY
CABARET and ERIC LANGAN, Case No. 3:21-cv-02003-X (N.D. Tex., Aug.
25, 2021) alleges that the Defendants evades the mandatory minimum
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
illegally absconding with Plaintiff's tips.

The Defendants own and operate a strip club named Silver City
Cabaret. These causes of action arise from Defendants' willful
actions while Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from April
30, 2018 through February 28, 2020.

Throughout her employment with Defendants, the Plaintiff has been
denied minimum wage payments and denied overtime as part of
Defendants scheme to classify Plaintiff and other
dancers/entertainers as "independent contractors," the suit
says.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jarrett L. Ellzey, Esq.
          Leigh Montgomery, Esq.
          ELLZEY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          1105 Milford Street
          Houston, TX 77066
          Telephone: (713) 554-2377
          Facsimile: (888) 276-3455
          E-mail: jarrett@ellzeylaw.com
                  leigh@ellzeylaw.com

FIRST ADVANTAGE: Settlements Reached in California Class Suits
--------------------------------------------------------------
First Advantage Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that settlements have been
reached in the class action suits in California.

In June 2014 and September 2015, two separate class action cases
were filed against the Company in the State of California.

The two cases are now being coordinated together under a single
judge and a settlement agreement has been agreed to, pending final
court approval.

As a result, the Company has recorded a total liability of $6.3
million for these two cases on June 30, 2021 (Successor) and
December 31, 2020 (Successor).

This liability represents the Company's agreed-upon settlement
amount and related class action administrative fees.

Additionally, the Company maintains liability insurance programs to
manage its litigation risks and the Company's insurers have agreed
to a single deductible to be applied to the two cases.

First Advantage said, "As a result, the Company has recorded a
total insurance recoverable asset of $2.2 million for these two
cases at June 30, 2021 (Successor) and December 31, 2020
(Successor), which represents the portion of the legal settlement
and legal fees incurred expected to be recovered from the Company's
insurers. This is included in prepaid expenses and other current
assets in the accompanying condensed consolidated balance sheets."

First Advantage Corporation is an international provider of risk
mitigation and business solutions. The company operates in six
primary business segments: Lender Services, Data Services, Dealer
Services, Employer Services, Multifamily Services, and
Investigative and Litigation Support Services. It serves mortgage
lenders, automobile dealerships, real estate investment trusts and
property management companies, many of the top providers of
transportation services, insurance agents, the national law firms,
and non-profit organizations.


FLORIDA HOME-IMPROVEMENT: Vetter Sues Over Unwanted Text Messages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ROBERT NICHOLAS VETTER, individually and on behalf of all those
similarly situated v. FLORIDA HOME-IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Case No. CACE-21-016344 (Fla. Cir., Broward Cty., Aug. 26, 2021)
contends that the Defendant promotes and markets its merchandise,
in part, by sending unsolicited text messages to wireless phone
users, in violation of the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.

Defendant Florida Home-Improvement Associates uses automated
systems to send outbound telemarketing text messages to hundreds if
not thousands of consumers across U.S., soliciting consumers to
purchase their products and/or services.

Allegedly, the Defendant failed to identify themselves in the
unsolicited telephonic sales text message they sent to the
consumers. By doing so, the Defendant has violated the provisions
of the FTSA. The Defendant has caused Plaintiff and Class Members
to suffer injuries as a result of placing unwanted telephonic sales
calls to their phones, added the suit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Stefan Coleman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF STEFAN COLEMAN, P.A.
          201 S. Biscayne Blvd, 28th Floor
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: (877) 333-9427
          Facsimile: (888) 498-8946
          E-mail: law@stefancoleman.com

               - and -

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 Northwest 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881

FLYING S. WINGS: Pender Sues Over Restaurant Servers' Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------------------
Kayla Pender, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Flying S. Wings, Inc. d/b/a Buffalo Wild Wings, Case
No. 2:21-cv-04292-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio, Aug. 31, 2021) arises from
the Defendant's alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Ohio Constitution, and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act
by failing to pay its servers, including Plaintiff, the full
minimum wage as required under the federal and state laws.

Ms. Pender was employed by the Defendant as a restaurant server
within the three-year period preceding the filing of this lawsuit.


Flying S. Wings, Inc. operates several Buffalo Wild Wings locations
in Ohio, including the Buffalo Wild Wings in Saint Clairsville,
Ohio, where it employed Plaintiff to work.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert E. DeRose, Esq.
          BARKAN MEIZLISH DEROSE, LLP
          4200 Regent Street, Suite 210
          Columbus, OH 43219
          Telephone: (614) 221-4221
          Facsimile: (614) 744-2300
          E-mail: bderose@barkanmeizlish.com

               - and -

          Drew N. Herrmann, Esq.
          Pamela G. Herrmann, Esq.
          HERRMANN LAW, PLLC
          801 Cherry St., Suite 2365
          Fort Worth, TX 76102
          Telephone: (817) 479-9229
          Facsimile: (817) 840-5102
          E-mail: drew@herrmannlaw.com
                  pamela@herrmannlaw.com

FREQUENCY THERAPEUTICS: Faces Evans & Hingston Suits in MA
----------------------------------------------------------
Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company is
facing putative class action suits entitled, Evans v. Frequency
Therapeutics, Inc. et al. and Hingston v. Frequency Therapeutics,
Inc. et al., respectively.

On June 3, 2021 and June 22, 2021, purported stockholders of the
company filed putative class action lawsuits in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Company
entitled Evans v. Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. et al. and Hingston
v. Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. et al., respectively.

The lawsuits allege violations of Section 10(b), 20(a) and Rule
10b5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, due to
allegedly false and misleading statements and omissions about our
Phase 2a clinical trial (FX-322-202) for the company's product
candidate FX-322 in the company's public disclosures between
November 16, 2020 and March 22, 2021.

The lawsuits seek, among other things, damages in connection with
our allegedly artificially inflated stock price between November
16, 2020, and March 22, 2021 as a result of those allegedly false
and misleading statements and omissions, as well as interest,
attorneys' fees and costs.

Frequency said, "We can make no assurances as to the time or
resources that will need to be devoted to these lawsuits or their
final outcomes, or the impact, if any, of these lawsuits or any
proceedings on our business, financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows. We are vigorously defending against all
claims asserted in both lawsuits."

Frequency Therapeutics, Inc. is a clinical-stage biotechnology
company focused on harnessing the body's innate biology to repair
or reverse damage caused by a broad range of degenerative diseases
and a global leader in the science and development of medicines for
inner-ear cellular regeneration and hearing restoration. The
company is based in Lexington, Massachusetts.


FRITO-LAY NORTH: Tortilla Chips Don't Contain Lime, Ortega Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Frank Ortega, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Frito-Lay North America, Inc., Case No.
2:21-cv-06849-ODW-GJS (C.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2021) is a civil class
action brought individually by Plaintiff on behalf of consumers who
purchased Frito-Lay's "Hint of Lime" tortilla chips under the
Tostitos brand ("Product").

This case arises out of Defendant's deceptive, unfair, and false
advertising practices regarding its "Hint of Lime" tortilla chips.
The product is promoted as containing a "Hint of Lime", when in
fact, the Product does not even contain that "hint" -- it does not
contain any lime at all, the suit says.

The Defendant manufactures, markets, and sells tortilla chips
purporting to contain a "Hint of Lime" under the Tostitos brand.

Allegedly, the front label representations include "HINT OF LIME,"
a transparent cut-out of a lime wedge with several drops
representing lime juice, a green and yellow color pattern, and the
statement, "Here's Another Hint -- Squeeze in More Flavor With Some
Salsa." The representations mislead consumers about whether or not
the Product actually contains lime.

As a result of Defendant's alleged unlawful and highly deceptive
conduct, the Plaintiff and members of the Class have been, and
continue to be, harmed by purchasing the Product under false
pretenses and paying more for it than they otherwise would have, if
they would have purchased it at all.

The Defendant's practices violate California's Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, the California's Unfair Competition Law, and the
California's False Advertising Law. The Plaintiff also brings
claims for breach of express warranty and unjust enrichment.

The Plaintiff purchased the Product at stores including Target
located at 8840 Corbin Ave., Northridge, CA 91324.

Frito-Lay is the world's leading seller of corn and potato chips.
The Tostitos brand is the best-selling brand of tortilla chips in
the world.  Based on current projections, sales of tortilla chips
are on track to eclipse sales of potato chips in 2025.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Hwy E Fl 2
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Telephone: (856) 772-7200
          E-mail: jshub@shublawyers.com
                  klaukaitis@shublawyers.com

               - and -

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 409
          Great Neck, NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

FUSION ACQUISITION: Delman Suit Asserts Breach of Fiduciary Duty
----------------------------------------------------------------
RICHARD DELMAN, on behalf of himself and all other similarly
situated stockholders of FUSION ACQUISITION CORP., Plaintiff v.
FUSION ACQUISITION CORP., BEN BUETTELL, KELLY DRISCOLL, JEFFREY
GARY, JOHN JAMES, and JIM ROSS, Defendants, Case No. 2021-0752
(Del. Ch., Aug. 31, 2021) is brought by the Plaintiff to assert a
claim against the Board for breach of fiduciary duty in connection
with the Delaware General Corporation Law violation.

According to the complaint, on February 11, 2021, the Company
announced that it had entered into an agreement and plan of merger
to acquire MoneyLion Inc. If the Company closes the proposed
merger, Fusion Sponsor's Class B Common Stock will convert into
Class A Common Stock worth approximately $87.5 million -- instantly
providing Fusion Sponsor with a nearly 350,000% return on its
$25,000 investment.

Accordingly, Fusion's Board amended the Charter to increase the
amount of authorized Class A Common Stock to 2 billion shares.
Closing the MoneyLion Business Combination is cross-conditioned on
stockholder approval of the Share Increase Amendment, says the
suit.

Allegedly, the Defendants have proposed to effectuate the Share
Increase Amendment and the Amended Charter based on a vote of
holders of all of the Company's outstanding common stock voting
together, without conducting a vote of the Class A Common
Stockholders voting separately as a class.

The suit further asserts that the Director Defendants are breaching
the fiduciary duties they owe to Plaintiff and the Class by: (a)
conducting the vote on the Charter Proposal at a Special Meeting in
violation of Section 242(b)(2); and (b) making materially false and
misleading statements in the Proxy concerning the vote required to
approve the Amended Charter.

Mr. Delman has owned shares of Class A Common Stock continuously
since August 2020.

Fusion Acquisition Corp. is a dual-class special purpose
acquisition company (SPAC) -- a non-operational shell company
formed exclusively to raise capital and then acquire a private
company (or companies).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David A. Jenkins, Esq.
          Neal C. Belgam, Esq.
          Kelly A. Green, Esq.
          Jason Z. Miller, Esq.
          SMITH KATZENSTEIN & JENKINS LLP
          1000 West Street, Suite 1501
          P.O. Box 410
          Wilmington, DE 19801
          Telephone: (302) 652-8400
          E-mail: djenkins@skjlaw.com
                  nbelgam@skjlaw.com
                  kgreen@skjlaw.com
                  jmiller@skjlaw.com

               - and -

          Steven J. Purcell, Esq.
          Douglas E. Julie, Esq.
          Robert H. Lefkowitz, Esq.
          Anisha Mirchandani, Esq.
          PURCELL JULIE & LEFKOWITZ LLP
          200 Park Avenue, Suite 1700
          New York, NY 10166
          Telephone: (212) 725-1000

               - and -

          Adam Frankel, Esq.
          GREENWICH LEGAL ASSOCIATES, LLC
          881 Lake Avenue
          Greenwich, CT 06831
          Telephone: (203) 622-6001

GENERAC HOLDINGS: Pomerantz Law Firm Reminds of Oct. 19 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pomerantz LLP on Aug. 31 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed against Generac Holdings Inc. ("Generac" or the
"Company") (NYSE: GNRC) and certain of its officers. The class
action, filed in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, and docketed under 21-cv-07009, is on
behalf of a class consisting of all persons and entities other than
Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired publicly traded
Generac securities between February 23, 2021 and July 29, 2021,
inclusive (the "Class Period"). Plaintiff seeks to recover
compensable damages caused by Defendants' violations of the federal
securities laws under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act").

If you are a shareholder who purchased or otherwise acquired
Generac securities during the Class Period, you have until October
19, 2021 to ask the Court to appoint you as Lead Plaintiff for the
Class. A copy of the Complaint can be obtained at
www.pomerantzlaw.com. To discuss this action, contact Robert S.
Willoughby at newaction@pomlaw.com or 888.476.6529 (or
888.4-POMLAW), toll-free, Ext. 7980. Those who inquire by e-mail
are encouraged to include their mailing address, telephone number,
and the number of shares purchased.

Generac purports to be a leading global designer and manufacturer
of a wide range of energy technology solutions, which provides
power generation equipment and other power products serving the
residential, light commercial and industrial markets.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, statements
made by Defendants were materially false and/or misleading because
they misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse
facts about the Company's business, operational and financial
results, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded
by them. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading
statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Generac's portable
generators posed an unreasonable risk of injury to users and the
public; (ii) as a result, at least seven finger amputations and one
crushed finger had been reported to the Company; (iii) as a result,
Generac would face increased regulatory scrutiny; (iv) the Company
would end sales in its Generac(R) and DR(R) 6500 Watt and 8000 Watt
portable generators in the U.S. and Canada in June 2021; (v) the
Company would recall its Generac(R) and DR(R) 6500 Watt and 8000
Watt portable generators in the U.S. and Canada; (vi) the end of
sales and the recall would occur before the Company's noted
hurricane and wildfire seasons and following the Texas
outage-periods the Company has touted for sales; and (vii) as a
result, Defendants' public statements and statements to journalists
were materially false and/or misleading at all relevant times.

On July 29, 2021, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission,
Health Canada, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development announced the Generac portable generator recall,
revealing that the Company had received reports of seven finger
amputations and one finger crushing.

On this news, Generac's stock price fell $31.04 per share, or 7%,
from its July 28, 2021 closing price over the next three trading
days to close at $400.00 per share on August 2, 2021, damaging
investors.

Pomerantz LLP, with offices in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Paris, and Tel Aviv, is acknowledged as one of the premier firms in
the areas of corporate, securities, and antitrust class litigation.
Founded by the late Abraham L. Pomerantz, known as the dean of the
class action bar, Pomerantz pioneered the field of securities class
actions. Today, more than 85 years later, Pomerantz continues in
the tradition he established, fighting for the rights of the
victims of securities fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
corporate misconduct. The Firm has recovered numerous
multimillion-dollar damages awards on behalf of class members. See
www.pomlaw.com.

CONTACT:

Robert S. Willoughby
Pomerantz LLP
rswilloughby@pomlaw.com
888-476-6529 ext. 7980
www.pomerantzlaw.com [GN]

GOHEALTH INC: Consolidated Putative Securities Class Suit Underway
------------------------------------------------------------------
GoHealth, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company continues to
defend a consolidated purported securities class action suit
entitled, In re GoHealth, Inc. Securities Litigation.

In September 2020, three purported securities class action
complaints were filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against the Company, certain of its
officers and directors, and certain underwriters, private equity
firms, and investment vehicles alleging violations of the
Securities Act of 1933.

On December 10, 2020, the court in the earliest filed action
consolidated the three complaints, appointed lead plaintiffs and
lead counsel for the consolidated action, and captioned the
consolidated action In re GoHealth, Inc. Securities Litigation.

Lead plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint on February 25,
2021. Defendants filed responsive pleadings on April 26, 2021 to
dismiss the complaint.

On June 14, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an opposition brief, to
which the defendants replied on July 6, 2021.

On May 19, 2021, a derivative action against certain of the
Company's officers and directors was filed, alleging substantially
the same allegations as the In re GoHealth, Inc. Securities
Litigation.

By suggestion of the plaintiff's counsel, this lawsuit is stayed
until at least as long as the motion to dismiss in the In re
GoHealth, Inc. Securities Litigation is pending.

The Company disputes each and every of plaintiffs' claims and
intends to defend these matters vigorously.

GoHealth, Inc. is a leading health insurance marketplace whose
mission is to improve access to healthcare in America. The
company's proprietary technology platform leverages modern
machine-learning algorithms powered by nearly two decades of
insurance behavioral data optimize the process for helping
individuals find the best health insurance plan for their specific
needs. The company is based in Chicago, Illinois.


GOODRX HOLDINGS: Bid to Dismiss Consolidated Suit Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
GoodRx Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the motion to dismiss
the consolidated class action suit entitled, In re GoodRx Holdings,
Inc.(Case No. 2:20-cv-11444), is pending.

On December 18, 2020, R. Brian Terenzini, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a class action
lawsuit against the Company and certain of its executive officers
in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California (Case No. 2:20-cv-11444).

On January 8, 2021, Bryan Kearney, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, also filed a class action lawsuit
against the Company and certain of its executive officers in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
(Case No. 2:21-cv-00175). The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages
as well as interest, fees and costs.

The complaints allege violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and assert that the Company
failed to disclose to investors that Amazon.com, Inc. was
developing its own mobile and online prescription medication
ordering and fulfillment service that would compete directly with
the Company.

According to the complaints, when Amazon announced its competitor
service, the Company's stock price fell, causing investor losses.
Lead plaintiff applications were submitted February 16, 2021, and
on April 8, 2021, the court consolidated the two lawsuits under the
caption In re GoodRx Holdings, Inc.(Case No. 2:20-cv-11444) and
appointed Betty Kalmanson, Lawrence Kalmanson, Shawn Kalmanson, and
Janice Kasbaum as Lead Plaintiffs.

On June 7, 2021, Lead Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint
containing substantially similar factual allegations as the prior
complaints, but adding claims under Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated case on
August 6, 2021.

The Company believes it has meritorious defenses to the claims of
the plaintiffs and members of the class and intends to defend
itself vigorously.

GoodRx said, "This litigation is at preliminary stages, and the
outcome of any complex legal proceeding is inherently unpredictable
and subject to significant uncertainties. Based upon information
presently known to management, the Company has not accrued a loss
for this matter as a loss is not probable and reasonably estimable.
While it is possible a loss may have been incurred, the Company is
unable to estimate a loss or range of loss in this matter."

GoodRx Holdings, Inc. operates a digital healthcare platform. The
Company develops tele-medicine platform and a free-to-use website.
GoodRx Holdings serves customers in the United States. The company
is based in Santa Monica, California.


GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE: Fails to Provide Proper Wages, Rowden Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
MATTHEW ROWDEN, STEPHANIE KOONTZ, DUSTIN HEDGEPETH, and COLBY
CHARRIER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiffs v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a GEICO, a
Maryland corporation, Defendant, Case No. 8:21-cv-02240-CBD (D.
Md., Aug. 31, 2021) is brought by the Plaintiffs to seek reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act and
applicable provisions of Vermont, Utah, and Maine law due to the
Defendant's failure to pay for all hours worked, including minimum
wage and overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs are current and former non-exempt, hourly employees
who work or worked for GEICO as auto claim and/or damage adjusters
throughout the United States.

GEICO is a wholly owned subsidiary of American multinational
conglomerate holding company Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. and its
headquarters are located at 5260 Western Avenue, Chevy Chase
Village, Maryland.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Brett D. Watson, Esq.
          Carolyn H. Cottrell, Esq.
          David C. Leimbach, Esq.
          SCHNEIDER WALLACE COTTRELL KONECKY, LLP
          2000 Powell Street, Suite 1400
          Emeryville, CA 94608
          Telephone: (415) 421-7100
          Facsimile: (415) 421-7105
          E-mail: bwatson@schneiderwallace.com
                  ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com
                  dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com  

               - and -
        
          Gregg I. Shavitz, Esq.
          Tamra Givens, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com
                  tgivens@shavitzlaw.com


               - and -

          Michael J. Palitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          800 Third Avenue, Suite 2800
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (800) 616-4000
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com


               - and -

          Paige T. Bennett, Esq.
          DANIELS & TREDENNICK PLLC
          6363 Woodway Drive, Suite 700
          Houston, TX 77057
          Telephone: (713) 917-0024
          Facsimile: (713) 917-0026
          E-mail: paige.bennett@dtlawyers.com

GREAT WALL OF NEPTUNE: Zheng Sues Over Unpaid Wages
---------------------------------------------------
Yu Cen Zheng, individually and on behalf of all other employees
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. Great Wall of Neptune, Inc.,
d/b/a Great Wall, Great Wall of Jersey Shore, LLC d/b/a Great Wall,
Yong Dong Dong, Jin Ru Ni, and Nicky Liu, Defendants, Case No.
3:21-cv-16350 (D.N.J., Aug. 31, 2021) arises from the Defendants'
willful and unlawful employment policies, patterns and/or practices
that allegedly violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law.

The complaint asserts that the Defendants are engaged in a pattern
and practice of failing to pay their employees, including
Plaintiff, compensation for all hours worked, overtime compensation
for all hours worked over 40 each week, and improper retention of
tips.

The Plaintiff was hired as a fry wok cook and a helper, from
October 6, 2020, to April 5, 2021.

The Defendants are restaurant companies based in New Jersey.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Qinyu Fan, Esq.
          HANG & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
          136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 10G
          Flushing, NY 11354
          Telephone: (718) 353-8588
          E-mail: qfan@hanglaw.com

GTE FEDERAL: Wrongfully Charges Checking Account Fees, Snyder Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTINE T. SNYDER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated v. GTE FEDERAL CREDIT UNION d/b/a GTE FINANCIAL, Case No.
133671086 (Fla. Cir., Hillsborough Cty., Aug. 30, 2021) alleges
that GTE wrongfully charged Plaintiff and the Class Members fees
related to their checking accounts.

This class action seeks monetary damages, and restitution due to
GTE's policy and practice of maximizing the account fees it imposes
on members. The alleged conduct has the overwhelming common
denominator of breaching its members' contracts and violating laws
so as to maximize GTE's fee income. Specifically, GTE assesses an
overdraft fee ("OD Fee") on debit card transactions when by GTE's
own calculations there was enough available money in the checking
account to cover the transaction at issue when authorized and the
money was specifically held for that transaction but was assessed
an overdraft fee anyway. The charging of such OD Fees breaches
GTE's contracts with its members, which includes Plaintiff and the
members of the Class, says the suit.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff has suffered legally cognizable damages
proximately caused by Defendant's misconduct.

The Plaintiff rejects and declines the arbitration provision which
Defendant contends becomes effective September 1, 2021.

GTE is and has been a credit union with its headquarters located in
Tampa, Florida. GTE has assets of more than $2.5 billion,
approximately 225,000 members, and over 20 branches.

GTE offers checking account services. One of the features of a GTE
checking account is a debit card, which can be used for a variety
of transactions including the purchasing of goods and services. In
addition to receiving a debit card, other features of a GTE
checking account include the ability to write checks; withdraw
money from ATMs; schedule Automated Clearing House (ACH)
transactions (certain recurring payments); and other types of
transactions that debit from a checking account.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeff Ostrow, Esq.
          Jonathan M. Streisfeld, Esq.
          KOPELOWITZ OSTROW
          FERGUSON WEISELBERG GILBERT
          One West Las Olas Blvd., Suite 500
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
          Telephone: (954) 525-4100
          Facsimile: (954) 525-4300
          E-mail: ostrow@kolawyers.com
          streisfeld@kolawyers.com


               - and -

          Taras Kick, Esq.
          John E. Stobart, Esq.
          THE KICK LAW FIRM, APC
          815 Moraga Drive
          Los Angeles, CA 90049
          Telephone: (310) 395-2988
          Facsimile: (310) 395-2088
          E-mail: Taras@Kicklawfirm.com

HERO ADAMS: Faces Arellano Class Suit Over Unpaid Wages & Overtime
------------------------------------------------------------------
GABRIELA ARELLANO, individually  and behalf of other similarly
situated and general public v. HERO ADAMS, INC., a California
corporation; OPA MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., a California corporation;
OPA RESTAURANT GROUP, an unknown business entity; and DOES 1
through 100, inclusive, Case No. 21 CV386201 (Cal. Super., Santa
Clara Cty., Aug. 25, 2021) alleges that the Defendants failed to
pay minimum and overtime wages under the California Labor Code.

Hero Adams is in the eating places industry in Santa Clara,
California.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the other members
were required to work more than eight hours per day and/or 40 hours
per week without overtime compensation for all overtime hours
worked.

Hero Adams is in the eating places industry in Santa Clara,
California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Edwin Aiwazian, Esq.
          LAWYERS for JUSTICE, PC
          410 West Arden Avenue, Suite 203
          County of Santa Clara
          Glendale, CA 91203
          Telephone: (818) 265-1020
          Facsimile: (818) 265-1021

HOLIDAY HOSPITALITY: 110 Sunport Sues Over Anticompetitive Scheme
-----------------------------------------------------------------
110 SUNPORT LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Company,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
HOLIDAY HOSPITALITY FRANCHISING, LLC and SIX CONTINENTS HOTELS,
INC. d/b/a INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP, Case No.
1:21-cv-00844-SCY-JHR (D.N.M., Aug. 26, 2021) seeks to put an end
to IHG/HHF's unlawful, abusive, fraudulent, anticompetitive and
unconscionable practices designed solely to benefit and to enrich
IHG/HHF's shareholders and to do so at the expense and to the
detriment of Plaintiff 110 Sunport, LLC and similarly situated
franchisees, namely, similarly situated HHF franchisees in the
State of New Mexico.

According to the complaint, at the heart of IHG/HHF's unlawful
scheme is its requirement that its franchisees use certain mandated
vendors and suppliers for the purchase of virtually all goods and
services necessary to maintain and to operate a hotel.

Accordingly, IHG/HHF's forced exclusive use of certain chosen
vendors and suppliers imposes well above-market procurement costs
on its franchisees which include, but are not limited to, those
associated with its onerous and exorbitant Property Improvement
Plan. One such PIP is "Formula Blue," which IHG launched in 2014
for the Holiday Inn Express brand. The "Formula Blue" prototype
renovation requires certain, among other things, upgrades to the
exterior of the hotels, as well as other minor site and structure
updates, says the suit.

SCH is the world's largest hotel company by room count, and does
business under the name InterContinental Hotels Group ("IHG") (SCH
and IHG may hereinafter be collectively referred to as "IHG").

IHG operates approximately some 5,600 hotels across more than 15
brands. IHG takes an asset-light approach, owning, franchising
and/or managing hotels for third parties, with Holiday Inn as its
mainstay chain, under such brands as Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn
Express and Holiday Inn Resorts (collectively, the "Holiday Inn
Brands"), each bearing the identification as "an IHG Hotel."

IHG also owns, manages and/or franchises other hotel brands such as
Crowne Plaza, InterContinental, Staybridge Suites, Candlewood
Suites, Hotel Indigo, Regent and Kimpton.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kristina Martinez, Esq.
          EGOLF + FERLIC +
          MARTINEZ + HARWOOD, LLC
          123 W. San Francisco St., Second Floor
          Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
          Telephone: (505) 986-9641
          E-mail: KMartinez@Egolflaw.com

               - and -

          Justin M. Klein, Esq.
          MARKS & KLEIN, LLP
          63 Riverside Avenue
          Red Bank, NJ 07701
          Telephone: (732) 747-7100
          Facsimile: (732) 219-0625
          E-mail: justin@marksklein.com

               - and -

          Andrew P. Bleiman, Esq.
          Mark Fishbein, Esq.
          MARKS & KLEIN, LLP
          1363 Shermer Road, Suite 318
          Northbrook, IL 60062
          Telephone: (312) 206-5162
          Facsimile: (732) 219-0625
          E-mail: andrew@marksklein.com
                  mark@ marksklein.com

               - and -

          Justin E. Proper, Esq.
          WHITE AND WILLIAMS LLP
          1650 Market Street
          One Liberty Place, Suite 1800
          Philadelphia, PA 19103-7395
          Telephone: (215) 864.7165
          E-mail: properj@whiteandwilliams.com

HUNT MILITARY: Skinner Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, AMWA
---------------------------------------------------------------
DALTON SKINNER, individually and on behalf Of all others similarly
situated v. HUNT MILITARY COMMUNITIES MGMT., LLC, Case No.
4:21-cv-00746-LPR (E.D. Ark., Aug. 24, 2021) is a class action and
a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Arkansas Minimum Wage Act for declaratory judgment, monetary
damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, as a result of Defendant's
failure to pay the Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees
lawful minimum wages and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff contends that he and other similarly situated
employees regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week
throughout their tenure with Defendant.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendant based out of Defendant's
facility in Jacksonville and Defendant's pay practices were the
same for all hourly maintenance workers at the Jacksonville
facility.

Hunt Military Communities is a real estate services company that
provides housing and property management services to military
personnel and their families residing on military installations
across the United States.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Chris Burks, Esq.
         WHLAW | WE HELP
         Riverfront Pl. Suite 745
         North Little Rock, AR 72114
         Telephone: (501) 891-6000
         E-mail: chris@wh.law

HYRECAR INC: Securities Artificially Inflated, Baron Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------------
IVAN BARON, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. HYRECAR INC., JOSEPH FURNARI and ROBERT SCOTT BROGI,
Case No. 2:21-cv-06918 (C.D. Cal., Aug. 27, 2021) is a securities
class action on behalf of all purchasers of HyreCar securities
between May 14, 2021 and August 10, 2021, inclusive (the "Class
Period").

The Plaintiff seeks to pursue remedies against HyreCar and certain
of the Company's current and former senior executives under
sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.

The Plaintiff purchased HyreCar securities at artificially inflated
prices during the Class Period and suffered damages as a result of
alleged defendants' alleged misconduct.

HyreCar conducted its initial public offering ("IPO") and began
trading on the NASDAQ in June 2018. The Defendant HyreCar operates
a web-based marketplace that allows car and fleet owners to rent
their cars to Uber, Lyft and other gig economy service drivers.
HyreCar operates a platform that connects gig drivers with
automobiles, while also providing insurance and tactical support.
The Individual Defendants are officers of the company.

HyreCar generates revenue by taking a fee out of each rental
processed on HyreCar's platform. Each rental transaction represents
a driver renting a car from a car owner.

According to the complaint, drivers pay a daily rental rate set by
the car owner, plus a 10% HyreCar Driver Fee as well as direct
daily insurance costs. Owners receive their daily rental rate minus
a 15%-25% HyreCar Owner Fee. As of December 31, 2020, the average
daily rental rate of a HyreCar vehicle nationally was approximately
$36, plus a 10% HyreCar Driver Fee ($3.60), and a daily direct
insurance fee of $13, totaling $52.60 in total daily gross billings
paid by the driver via a credit card transaction. On average,
approximately 80% of the daily rental or $28.80 is transferred to
the owner via the Company's merchant processing partner, says the
suit.

In the Company's most recent annual report, HyreCar highlighted the
insurance policies it sells as offering a "competitive advantage."
HyreCar processes the insurance claims it receives from owners and
drivers via a third-party administrator. Effective March 1, 2021,
the Company entered into a two-year claim adjusting agreement with
Sedgwick, an insurance claim processing partner for many companies
in rideshare transportation and food delivery.

The agreement includes an escrow account requirement of $1,750,000
to be held by Sedgwick for claim payments. This escrow account is
replenished by the Company on a quarterly basis dependent on the
actual claims paid during that quarter. This new relationship
allowed HyreCar to centralize its claims administration and
indicated that Company management was intensely focused on claims
incidence and insurance costs, added the suit.

The Class Period begins on May 14, 2021. On the prior day, after
the market had closed, HyreCar issued a press release which stated
that the Company had achieved "Record First Quarter 2021 Financial
Results" for the quarter ended March 31, 2021 ("Q1 2021"). The
release stated that HyreCar's insurance deposits had more than
doubled during the quarter to $1.7 million, while the amount of the
Company's insurance reserve (which indicates the amount of claims
incurred but not yet paid) had declined more than 17% since year
end to $1.7 million.

Then, on August 10, 2021, after the market had closed, HyreCar
issued a press release announcing deeply disappointing results for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021 ("Q2 2021"), including net
losses of $9.3 million compared to losses of $3.8 million in the
same period the prior year. Furthermore, the Company's adjusted 10
EBITDA loss for Q2 2021 was $7.1 million (four times higher than
the $1.7 million adjusted EBITDA loss experienced in the second
quarter of 2020) and its gross profit for Q2 2021 was just $0.8
million (less than one third the Company's gross profit in the
second quarter of 2020), with a gross profit margin of just 24%.

Contemporaneously with the release, HyreCar allegedly filed with
the SEC a Form 10-Q which disclosed that the Company had incurred
skyrocketing costs of revenue during the quarter primarily as a
result of significantly higher insurance claims incidence --
including claims before March 31, 2021 "in excess of the reserves."


The Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a
class consisting of all purchasers of the securities of HyreCar
during the Class Period (the "Class"). Excluded from the Class are
defendants, the officers and directors of the Company at all
relevant times, 18 members of their immediate families and their
legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity
in which defendants have or had a controlling interest.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Samuel H. Rudman, Esq.
          Danielle S. Myers, Esq.
          Brian E. Cochran, Esq.
          Richard Gonnello, Esq.
          ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN
          & DOWD LLP
          655 West Broadway, Suite 1900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: 619/231-1058
          Facsimile: 619/231-7423
          E-mail: dmyers@rgrdlaw.com
                  bcochran@rgrdlaw.com
                  srudman@rgrdlaw.com
                  rgonnello@rgrdlaw.com

KATAPULT HOLDINGS: Bernstein Liebhard Reminds of Oct. 26 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bernstein Liebhard, a nationally acclaimed investor rights law
firm, on Sept. 1 disclosed that a securities class action lawsuit
has been filed on behalf of investors who purchased or acquired the
securities of Katapult Holdings, Inc. f/k/a FinServ Acquisition
Corp. ("Katapult" or the "Company") (Nasdaq: KPLT) from December
18, 2020 through August 10, 2021 (the "Class Period"). The lawsuit
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York alleges violations of the Securities Act of 1934.

If you purchased Katapult securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit Katapult Holdings
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuit or contact Rujul Patel toll free
at (877) 779-1414 or rpatel@bernlieb.com

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose to investors as follows: (a) Katapult was
experiencing declining e-commerce retail sales and consumer
spending; (b) despite Katapult's assertions that it was clear and
compelling value proposition to both consumers and merchants,
transforming the way nonprime consumers shop for essential goods
and enabling merchant access to this underserved segment, Katapult
lacked visibility into its consumers' future buying behavior; and
(c) as a result, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially false
and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

Katapult issued a press release announcing disappointing financial
results for the second quarter of 2021 including a net loss of $8.1
million, compared to $5.1 million in net income for the second
quarter of 2020. Katapult further disclosed that it "observed
meaningful [negative] changes in both e-commerce retail sales
forecasts and consumer spending behavior" and retracted its full
year 2021 guidance, claiming it could not "accurately predict our
consumer's buying behaviors for the remainder of the year."

On this news, Katapult's share price fell more than 56%, damaging
investors.

If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no
later than October 26, 2021. A lead plaintiff is a representative
party acting on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. Your ability to share in any recovery doesn't require
that you serve as lead plaintiff. If you choose to take no action,
you may remain an absent class member.

If you purchased Katapult securities, and/or would like to discuss
your legal rights and options please visit
https-www-bernlieb-com-cases-katapultholdingsinc-kplt-shareholder-class-action-lawsuit-fraud-stock-436/
or contact Rujul Patel toll free at (877) 779-1414 or
rpatel@bernlieb.com

Since 1993, Bernstein Liebhard LLP has recovered over $3.5 billion
for its clients. In addition to representing individual investors,
the Firm has been retained by some of the largest public and
private pension funds in the country to monitor their assets and
pursue litigation on their behalf. As a result of its success
litigating hundreds of lawsuits and class actions, the Firm has
been named to The National Law Journal's "Plaintiffs' Hot List"
thirteen times and listed in The Legal 500 for ten consecutive
years.

Contact Information:

Rujul Patel
Bernstein Liebhard LLP
https://www.bernlieb.com
(877) 779-1414
rpatel@bernlieb.com [GN]

KATAPULT HOLDINGS: Faces McIntosh Suit Over Share Price Drop
------------------------------------------------------------
GINA MCINTOSH, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. KATAPULT HOLDINGS, INC., LEE EINBINDER, HOWARD KURZ,
ORLANDO ZAYAS, and KARISSA CUPITO, Case No. 1:21-cv-07251
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 27, 2021) is a class action on behalf of persons
and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Katapult
securities between December 18, 2020 and August 10, 2021, inclusive
(the "Class Period") pursuing claims against the the Defendants
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Katapult claims to be a "next-generation platform for digital and
mobile-first commerce focused on the non-prime consumer." Katapult
provides point-of-sale lease-purchase options for non-prime
consumers (i.e. consumers with credit scores are higher than those
of subprime borrowers, but lower than those of prime borrowers) who
cannot access traditional financing products. Katapult allegedly
"solves critical consumer pain points by transforming the way
non-prime consumers shop for durable goods" and claims merchants
benefit from "higher retail conversion and greater marketing spend
efficiency by reaching this underserved segment."

FinServ was a blank check company formed for the purpose of
effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition,
stock purchase, reorganization or similar business combination with
one or more businesses.

On December 18, 2020, FinServ announced that it had entered into a
definitive merger agreement with legacy Katapult 1 whereby the
combined company would operate as Katapult and its shares would
trade on NASDAQ under the new symbol "KPLT." FinServ touted legacy
Katapult as "[a] leading e-commerce POS, lease purchase platform
provider focused on the estimated $50 billion of annual nonprime
consumer durable goods e-commerce spend" with an "[e]stablished
position in e-commerce ecosystem with significant platform support
from top-tier e-commerce retailers, leading e-commerce platforms
and lending partners."

On June 9, 2021, Katapult announced that it had completed the
merger. On June 10, 2021, Katapult announcing that its shares and
warrants would begin trading on the NASDAQ Stock Market under the
symbols "KPLT" and "KPLTW" respectively, says the suit.

On August 10, 2021, Katapult issued a press release announcing
disappointing financial results for the second quarter of 2021
including a net loss of $8.1 million, compared to $5.1 million in
net income for the second quarter of 2020. The Company further
disclosed that it "observed meaningful [negative] changes in both
e-commerce retail sales forecasts and consumer spending behavior"
and retracted its full year 2021 guidance, claiming it could not
"accurately predict our consumer's buying behaviors for the
remainder of the year."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $5.47, or more than
56%, to close at $4.26 per share on August 10, 2021, on unusually
heavy trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants allegedly made materially
false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that Katapult was experiencing declining e-commerce
retail sales and consumer spending.

As a result of the Defendants' alleged wrongful acts and omissions,
and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

Ms. McIntosh purchased Katapult securities during the Class Period,
and suffered damages as a result of the alleged federal securities
law violations and false and/or misleading statements and/or
material omissions.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory B. Linkh, Esq.
          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Avenue, Suite 358
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          E-mail: glinkh@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Howard G. Smith, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD G. SMITH
          3070 Bristol Pike, Suite 112
          Bensalem PA 19020
          Telephone: (215) 638-4847
          Facsimile: (215) 638-4867

KELLOGG SALES: Reinitz Sues Over Mislabeled Chocolate Fudge
-----------------------------------------------------------
Roberta Reinitz, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. Kellogg Sales Company, Case No. 1:21-cv-01239-JES-JEH
(C.D. Ill., Aug. 23, 2021) alleges that the representations of
Frosted Chocolate Fudge are misleading because they give consumers
the impression the Product contains a greater relative and absolute
amount of actual fudge ingredients than it does.

Kellogg manufactures, labels, markets, and sells toaster pastries
labeled as "Frosted Chocolate Fudge," next to a chunk of solid
fudge, under the Pop Tarts brand ("Product").

Fudge "is a type of sugar candy that is made by mixing sugar,
butter and milk." Though fudge can have almost any flavor, milkfat
is the central component. An 1893 recipe for fudge called for "Four
cups granulated sugar; one cup cream; one cup water; one-half cake
chocolate; one-half Cup butter."

In 1896, The Los Angeles Times published the original fudge recipe
by the Vassar students credited with first making fudge: "Two cups
of sugar, one cup of milk, a piece of butter one-half the size of
an egg" and added flavoring.

The Defendant allegedly misrepresented and/or omitted the
attributes and qualities of the Product, that it contained fudge,
understood as being comprised of a non-de minimis amount of milk
fat ingredients, instead of mostly vegetable oils. The Defendant's
fraudulent intent is evinced by its knowledge that the Product was
not consistent with its representations, says the suit.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd. Ste 409
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

KENTUCKY: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bids in Rhoades v. DOC
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CASEY RHOADES, Plaintiff v. JOHN TILLEY, et al.,
Defendants, Civil No. 3:19-cv-000019-GFVT-EBA (E.D. Ky.), Judge
Gregory F. Van Tatenhove of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, Central Division, Frankfort, granted
Defendants John Tilley and James Erwins' Motions for Summary
Judgment.

Since 2011, if the Kentucky Department of Corrections classified an
offender as "close security" or "maximum," Ky. Rev. Stat.
Section532.400(1)(b) allowed the Department to subject offenders to
one year of post-incarceration supervision after their sentence or
parole expired. Plaintiff Rhoades, who was classified as "close
security," joined a group of inmates in a class action lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the Statute.

The Franklin Circuit Court found the Statute unconstitutional and
issued a permanent injunction against the Department from further
enforcement of the Statute. The Circuit Court Judge further ordered
the Department to release any prisoners being held subject to the
Statute. The Department appealed the ruling and sought an emergency
stay of the Order, but a Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to
grant the stay on Oct. 31, 2018. Within 30 minutes of receiving the
Court of Appeals' decision, Department employees began the process
of identifying and releasing those prisoners being held pursuant to
Ky. Rev. Stat. Section 532.400(1)(b).

In March of 2019, the Plaintiff brought the present class-action
suit against the former Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of
Corrections, James Erwin, Deputy Commissioner Randy White, and the
Secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, James Tilley.
The Plaintiff brings Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, as
well as state-law false imprisonment claims against the Defendants
related to the roughly 27 hours in-between the Court of Appeals'
Order and his subsequent release.

The matter is before the Court on Defendants John Tilley and James
Erwins' Motions for Summary Judgment. Both Defendants seek to have
all counts alleged against them dismissed.

Discussion

The Plaintiff brings a host of federal and state claims against the
Defendants. Judge Van Tatenhove first addresses the Plaintiff's
federal constitutional claims against the Defendants and then turns
to the state-law claims of false imprisonment.

A.

The Plaintiff alleges various Constitutional violations pursuant to
Section 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege [1] the violation of [2] a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show [3] that the alleged
violation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law." As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute that Defendants
were officials of the state when detaining Rhoades. The second
element is met as well, "when a prisoner's sentence has expired, he
is entitled to release." Accordingly, only the first element
remains, whether or not the Defendants committed a violation.

The Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his release date. Further, he alleges that he is not
bringing suit against the supervisors named under respondeat
superior, which is not permissible in Section 1983 cases, but
rather claims they also were deliberately indifferent to his
release date, which is a "stringent standard of fault," requiring
that the supervisors knew their actions would lead to a
constitutional right being violated.

Both Defendants Tilley and Erwin move for summary judgment on Count
I, arguing that they are shielded by qualified immunity. In
response, Mr. Rhoades asserts that both Tilley and Erwin meet the
deliberate indifference criteria and that the breadth of knowledge
and lack of action is sufficient to establish a factual despite
that only a jury can decide.

Judge Van Tatenhove opines that the Plaintiff's allegations fail to
show how Tilley was similarly deliberately indifferent. Tilley's
deposition makes clear that his job duties did not include
personally effectuating the release of offenders from custody, nor
supervising the staff of the office that was tasked with such
duties. The Plaintiff has not offered proof of how his
over-detention was a known or obvious consequence of Tilley's
oversight or lack thereof. Although Tilley may have had knowledge
of the KRS 532.400(1)(b) litigation, the Plaintiff has not offered
sufficient proof to satisfy the second or third factors of the
Shorts analysis. Consequently, Tilley is likewise entitled to
summary judgment as to Count I.

B.

In Count II, the Plaintiff alleges that the "Defendants'
procedures, or lack of procedures, for decreasing the risk of
erroneous detention posed a significant risk to Rhoades' liberty
interest." Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that despite the
Kentucky Court of Appeals' Order, the Defendants failed to provide
him a hearing regarding his detention and refused to release him.

To the extent that the Plaintiff seeks to make allegations
regarding the policies of the Kentucky Department of Corrections,
Judge Van Tatenhove holds that the Plaintiff has not alleged, with
particularity, facts that demonstrate what, if anything, either
Tilley or Erwin have done to violate his Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Further, as both the Defendants note, the Plaintiff has
sued Tilley and Erwin in their personal capacities and any
procedures for decreasing the risk for erroneous detention would
have to be adopted by the Department, not either Defendant in their
individual capacities.

The Plaintiff's assertion that he was denied a hearing regarding
his confinement after the Oct. 31, 2018 Court of Appeals Order is
meritless. As the record before the Court shows, the Department of
Corrections began the process of releasing the Plaintiff within 30
minutes of the Case Manager emailing the Court of Appeals' Order to
the Department's attorney, Ms. Brown. Further, it would not have
been the role of either Tilley or Erwin to process the request for
such an administrative hearing had one been submitted. Accordingly,
both Tilley and Erwin are entitled to summary judgment on Count
II.

C.

In Count III, the Plaintiff makes a series of allegations against
both Defendants Tilley and Erwin. He claims that Defendant Tilley:
(1) "encouraged Defendant Erwin's and White's deliberate
indifference, in that he officially authorized, approved, or
knowingly went along with his subordinates' unconstitutional
conduct"; and (2) "knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts
by Defendants Erwin and White, which he knew or reasonably should
have known would cause his subordinates to be deliberately
indifferent." The Plaintiff then goes on to make identical claims
against Erwin as it relates to Erwin's subordinate,
former-Defendant White.

These claims are easy to resolve, as Judge Van Tatenhove has
already determined that neither Tilley nor Erwin acted with
deliberate indifference. Further, the Plaintiff abandoned his
claims against Erwin's subordinate, Randy White. Consequently, both
Defendants Erwin and Tilley are entitled to summary judgment as to
Count III.

D.

Lastly, the Plaintiff alleges state law false-imprisonment claims
against both Tilley and Erwin in their personal capacities. In the
State of Kentucky, false imprisonment is defined as being "any
deprivation of the liberty of one person by another or detention
for however short a time without such person's consent and against
his will, whether done by actual violence, threats, or otherwise."

As an initial matter, Count IV in the Plaintiff's complaint
embodies the kind of conclusory allegations that Iqbal and Twombly
condemned and thus told the Court to ignore when evaluating a
complaint's sufficiency. In their discretion, the Defendants
decided to forego the motion to dismiss stage. Judge Van Tatenhove
need not dismiss Count IV based on the insufficiency of the
pleadings, however, as the false imprisonment claims fail as a
matter of law.

First, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff has failed to establish
that Defendant Erwin had any specific knowledge about the KRS
532.400(1)(b) litigation, nor about the Kentucky Court of Appeals'
Oct. 31, 2019 Order. Because the Plaintiff has not offered any
proof that Erwin had any personal involvement or awareness of the
Plaintiff's incarceration, Erwin is entitled to summary judgment on
Count IV.

Second, the Plaintiff has failed to show that it was either
Tilley's job duties to personally effectuate the release of
offenders from custody, or that he directly supervised the staff of
the office that was tasked with such duties. In fact, Tilley denies
such duties in his deposition. Even if the Plaintiff had shown that
Tilley's decisions as an official led to a delay in the Plaintiff's
release, the Plaintiff has not shown any evidence nor even alleged
that Tilley "willfully or maliciously intended to harm the
plaintiff or acted with a corrupt motive." Consequently, even if
the Plaintiff had sufficiently plead his claim of false
imprisonment, Tilley is protected by qualified immunity for the
state-law claims. Accordingly, Tilley is entitled to summary
judgment as to Count IV.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Van Tatenhove granted Defendant Tilley's Motion
for Summary Judgment as to Counts 1-4. He also granted Defendant
Erwin's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts 1-4. All claims
against Defendant Randy White are considered abandoned and
Defendant White is dismissed as a party to the action. The Judge
denied as moot all pending motions.

The case is stricken from the Court's active docket. The Court will
enter an appropriate Judgment.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/szzdkzhf from
Leagle.com.


KEVIN GERSH: Faces Greenhaus Suit Over Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ELLYNN GREENHAUS and LAURIE GERSH, derivatively on behalf of
themselves and all other similarly situated shareholders of West
Hills Day Camp, Inc. v. KEVIN GERSH, and WEST HILLS DAY CAMP, Inc.,
Case No. 2:21-cv-04849 (.E.D.N.Y., Aug. 27, 2021)  is an action
brought by the Plaintiffs derivatively in the right, and for the
benefit, of West Hills to redress injuries suffered, and to be
suffered, by West Hills  as a direct result of the breaches of
fiduciary duty, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of
corporate assets, looting and unjust enrichment by Kevin.

The Plaintiffs contend that it will adequately and fairly represent
the interests of West Hills and its shareholders in enforcing and
prosecuting its rights.

The Plaintiffs are the owners of West Hills Class B non-voting
common shares and were the owners of West Hills Class B non-voting
common shares at all times relevant to alleged Kevin's wrongful
course of conduct.

There are two hundred (200) outstanding shares of stock in West
Hills. The stock of West Hills is comprised of 20 Class A voting
common shares and one hundred and 180 Class B non-voting common
shares.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Edward N. Gewirtz, Esq.
          BRONSTEIN, GEWIRTZ & GROSSMAN, LLC
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4600
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 697-6484
          E-mail: Chona@bgandg.com

KIMBERLY-CLARK: Huggies Diapers "Harmful," Rice Class Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
TAWANNA RICE and KELLY RICE, and all others similarly situated v.
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Case No.
2:21-at-00793 (E.D. Cal.,  Aug. 24, 2021) is an action for damages
and injunctive relief for harm suffered by the Plaintiffs and
putative class members as a direct and proximate result of the
Defendants' negligent, willful, and wrongful conduct in connection
with the design, development, manufacture, testing, packaging,
promotion, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of the
Huggies brand Snug & Dry diapers in violation of the California
Legal Remedies Act, the California's False Advertising Law, and the
California's Unfair Competition Law.

Kimberley-Clark owns, controls, promotes, and distributes Huggies
brand Sung & Dry diapers (the "Class Product").

According to the complaint, the Defendant advertises these diapers
as helping keep children "dry and comfy" and promises parents that
they "carefully select each ingredient that goes into Huggies
Diapers." Moreover, the Defendant assures parents that their
diapers are hypoallergenic and that "Huggies Snug & Dry has you
covered, with up to 12-hour leak protection to help keep you dry,
comfy, and focused on more interesting things." Unfortunately for
many parents who rely on these representations when choosing
products for their babies, Defendant's Snug & Dry diapers have a
propensity to harm the skin of children and Defendant does not
disclose this known fact prior to or at the time of transacting to
allow parents to make informed decisions for themselves and their
children, says the suit.

As a result of the Defendant's alleged negligent manufacturing,
design, and promotion of the Class Product, a significant number of
children who wear the Snug & Dry diapers will develop a reaction to
those diapers that may manifest in rashes, blistering, peeling, and
what appear to be chemical burns to the areas of the skin that were
covered by the diapers. The injuries that result from the diapers
are serious enough that parents are forced to seek medical
consultation and/or treatment, including prescription medicine.
Unfortunately, many parents do not associate their choice of
diaper, from a brand like Huggies, to be the source of the injuries
to their children.

Kimberly-Clark Corporation is an American multinational personal
care corporation that produces mostly paper-based consumer
products. The company manufactures sanitary paper products and
surgical & medical instruments.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeffrey R. Krinsk, Esq.
          John J. Nelson, Esq.
          Keia James Atkinson, Esq.
          FINKELSTEIN & KRINSK LLP
          501 West Broadway, Suite 1260
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 238-1333
          Facsimile: (619) 238-5425

KNM HOLDINGS: Rayford Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, AMWA
--------------------------------------------------------------
MEYLINDA RAYFORD, individually and on behalf Of all others
similarly situated, v. KNM HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00749-JM
(E.D. Ark., Aug. 24, 2021) is a class action and a collective
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act for declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, as a result of Defendant's failure to pay
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees lawful minimum
wages and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff contends that She and other similarly situated
employees regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week
throughout their tenure with Defendant. The Plaintiff worked for
Defendant as an hourly-paid fast food restaurant shift worker.

The Plaintiff's primary duties as a fast food restaurant shift
worker occupied 100 percent of Plaintiff's time while working at
the Defendant's Pine Bluff restaurant.

Within the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiff and other
similarly-situated employees of the Defendant worked in excess of
40 hours per week for the Defendant at their fast-food restaurant
in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Defendants allegedly set their work
schedules, methods and materials of work, and controlled their
rates of pay.

Accordingly, the Defendant regularly prohibited Plaintiff and other
hourly-paid shift employees from clocking in via their time-clock
system. The Defendant only allowed shift managers to clock
employees in, leading to employees' time not being tracked
accurately for all the hours they worked in a pay period, the
Plaintiff alleges. The Defendant regularly refused to provide pay
checks to her and other hourly-shift employees for the hours worked
in a pay period, she adds.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Chris Burks, Esq.
         WHLAW | We Help
         Riverfront Pl. Suite 745
         North Little Rock, AR 72114
         Telephone: (501) 891-6000
         E-mail: chris@wh.law

KONZA PRAIRIE: Court Partly Grants Class Settlement in Seawell Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINA MARIE SEAWELL, individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. KONZA PRAIRIE PIZZA, INC.,
d/b/a DOMINO'S PIZZA and JEFFREY MADDOX, Defendants, Case No.
20-CV-2130-JAR-KGG (D. Kan.), Judge Julie A. Robinson of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Kansas grants in part and denies
in part the parties' Amended Joint Motion for Settlement Agreement
Approval.

I. Background

Plaintiff Seawell, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated, brings the action against the Defendants asserting
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Kansas
Wage Payment Act ("KWPA"). She alleges that the Defendants failed
to properly reimburse her and other pizza delivery drivers.

The Plaintiff worked for the Defendants as a pizza delivery driver.
She originally filed her Complaint in the Court on March 19, 2020,
asserting an FLSA claim and collective action allegations. She
alleged that the Defendants used a flawed method to determine
reimbursement rates for drivers using their personal vehicles for
business use, which caused wages to fall below federal minimum
wage.

The parties engaged in private mediation in October 2020. In
February 2021, they filed a Joint Motion for Settlement Agreement
Approval which was denied without prejudice to refiling. On April
5, 2021, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting class
and collective action allegations under the KWPA and FLSA. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to properly reimburse
her-and other pizza delivery drivers-for expenses which violated
minimum wage requirements under Kansas and federal law.

On May 6, 2021, the parties filed an Amended Joint Motion for
Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement. The parties request
that the Court: (1) preliminarily approves the Settlement
Agreement; (2) certifies the proposed class for settlement
purposes; (3) approves and authorizes mailing/emailing the proposed
Class Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement; and (4) sets a
date for a final approval hearing.

II. KWPA Claim - Rule 23 Settlement

The Plaintiff seeks certification of the proposed class for
settlement purposes, preliminary approval of the settlement
agreement, and approval of the notice.

A. Class Certification

Class action settlements are premised upon the validity of the
underlying class certification." The district court must conduct a
"rigorous analysis" to ensure that the proposed class meets the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The requirements under Rule
23(a) include (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and
(4) adequate representation. In addition, because the Plaintiff
seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(3), she must show that
"questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy."

The parties' proposed settlement class is "all delivery drivers who
worked for Defendants from July 21, 2017 through [the date the
Court grants preliminary approval]."

In sum, Judge Robinson holds that the proposed settlement class
meets all the requirements under Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3). She finds
that (i) the parties state that the settlement class consists of
more than 1,500 individuals, which is so numerous as to make
joinder impracticable; (ii) the parties assert that the common
questions that satisfy the commonality requirement include whether
the class members' vehicle-related expenses resulted in payment
lower than minimum wage, whether the Defendant violated state and
federal wage and hour laws, and whether the class members sustained
damage; (iii) the legal standards and requirements for proving the
claims are the same for Plaintiff's individual claims and the
putative class members' claims; (iv) the Plaintiff and her counsel
assert that their interests are not antagonistic to the interests
of the putative class members; (v) the common fact of whether the
Plaintiff and the putative class members were properly compensated
for under wage and hour laws for mileage expenses predominate over
any individual questions; and (vi) the Court's resolution as to the
common questions in one action is a superior method.

B. Class Settlement

Pursuant to Rule 23(e), a class action can only be settled with
court approval. The Court must consider whether the settlement is
"fair, reasonable, and adequate." When assessing the proposed
settlement, the Tenth Circuit has set forth four factors for the
district court to consider: (1) whether the proposed settlement was
fairly and honestly negotiated; (2) whether serious questions of
law and fact exist, placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation
in doubt; (3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs
the mere possibility of future relief after protracted and
expensive litigation; and (4) the judgment of the parties that the
settlement is fair and reasonable.

After considering the four factors identified, Judge Robinson finds
that they favor approval of the settlement. First, the parties
engaged in mediation with an experienced wage and hour class and
collective action mediator. As to the second factor, serious
questions of law and fact exist. Third,  the value of an immediate
recovery outweighs the potential for future relief. Finally, the
settlement agreement, for the most part, is fair and reasonable.

The "Release Period," however, causes Judge Robinson some concern
as it has contrary definitions in the Settlement Agreement. In the
Definitions section of the Settlement Agreement, the "Release
Period" is defined as "the period dating back to July 21, 2017
through the date the Court grants Preliminary Approval of this
Settlement." The proposed class also references individuals who
worked for Defendants "between July 21, 2017 and [the date the
Court grants preliminary approval.]" In the "Released Claims"
section, however, the Release Period is stated as "the limitations
period dating back to three years prior to the date the Court
grants preliminary approval ("Release Period"). The Notice also
references the "Release Period" as "the limitations period dating
back to three years prior to the date the Court grants preliminary
approval ("Release Period"). Thus, the parties will need to address
this issue and ensure that the Release Period and the class
definition are consistent throughout.

In sum, the four factors favor preliminary settlement approval, but
Judge Robinson has concerns with the Release Period and how the
Release Period affects the proposed class. Accordingly, the Judge
grants settlement agreement approval in part.

C. Notice

Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(1)(B), the Court "must direct notice in a
reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound" by the
proposed settlement. Notice to class members must "clearly and
concisely state in plain, easily understood language" the
following: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the
class certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv)
that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if
the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the
class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner
for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class
judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).

Judge Robinson cannot approve the Notice as currently drafted
because it has several concerns, including that the Notice does not
clearly and concisely inform class members of the nature of the
action, the definition of the class, or the class claims. First,
the Notice does not adequately inform potential class members of
the KWPA claim. Instead, it simply alleges that Defendants'
practice violated the FLSA. Furthermore, when providing notice of
the class definition, the Notice states that the Court has
certified a collective under the FLSA and does not inform class
members that the Court has certified a class under Rule 23. This
statement is particularly problematic in that the Notice states
that the settlement will bind all members of the Class who have not
excluded themselves, which is contrary to FLSA collective action
opt-in procedures. Thus, the Notice should be amended to clearly
and concisely set forth the KWPA claim and the class definitions
under both the KWPA and FLSA.

In addition, as has been previously noted with regard to the
Settlement Agreement, the Notice will need to adequately reflect
the Release Period. And the timeframe of the Release Period
necessarily affects the proposed class definition. Finally, the
Judge notes that the case number in both the Notice and Settlement
Agreement contains a typo and needs to accurately state the case
number as Case No. 2:20-cv-2130. Other than these concerns, she
finds that the Notice meets the other requirements under Rule
23(c)(2)(B) and complies with due process.

III. FLSA Claim - FLSA Settlement

The District of Kansas has set forth a method for obtaining
settlement approval of an FLSA action "when putative class members
have not yet received notice of the lawsuit and an opportunity to
opt in." To obtain preliminary approval of a collective action
settlement, "such a motion should ask the court to: (1)
conditionally certify the proposed settlement class; (2)
preliminarily approve the proposed settlement; and (3) approve a
proposed notice to the putative class members." Once these three
items occur, a time period will begin "during which putative class
members can opt in to the lawsuit." After the opt-in time period
expires, "the parties again may move for final approval of the
proposed settlement, the attorney's fee award, and the service
awards."

A. Collective Class Certification

As Judge Robinson noted, the parties' proposed settlement class is
"all delivery drivers who worked for Defendants from July 21, 2017
through [the date the Court grants preliminary approval]." In the
parties' motion, they do not specifically address certification of
a collective class under the FLSA and only address the Rule 23
certification factors. The Judge recognizes that the factors for
class certification under Rule 23 require a more rigorous analysis
than the lenient initial certification standard under the FLSA, and
the parties are likely similarly situated. However, because the
parties do not address the issue at all, she cannot certify the
collective action for purposes of sending notice. Thus, the parties
will need to re-submit their motion addressing the standards set
forth by the District of Kansas for FLSA settlement approval and
specifically address whether the proposed settlement class includes
individuals who are similarly situated to the Plaintiff.

B. Collective Class Settlement

To approve an FLSA settlement, the Court must find that the
litigation involves a bona fide dispute and that the proposed
settlement is fair and equitable to all parties concerned. It may
enter a stipulated judgment only after scrutinizing the settlement
for fairness. The settlement agreement must also contain an award
of attorney's fees.

a. Bona Fide Dispute

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants failed to pay its
employees minimum wage, after subtracting un-reimbursed vehicle
expenses. The Defendants contend that its reimbursement policy
reasonably approximated drivers' expenses and thus met the minimum
wage requirements. Either party could be correct. If the Plaintiff
is correct, the Defendant may owe a substantial sum. If the
Defendant is correct, the Plaintiff and the putative class members
could recover nothing. Thus, Judge Robinson finds that a bona fide
dispute exists.

b. Fair and Reasonable

"To be fair and reasonable, an FLSA settlement must be reasonable
to the employee and must not frustrate the policies embodied in the
FLSA." Courts may look to the framework for evaluating class action
fairness as instructive when evaluating whether an FLSA settlement
is fair and reasonable, including the following factors: (1)
whether the parties fairly and honestly negotiated the settlement;
(2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist which place the
ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt; (3) whether the value
of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future
relief after protracted litigation; and (4) the judgment of the
parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable.

The Court previously discussed these factors with regard to the
Plaintiff's KWPA claim and found that the factors weighed in favor
of settlement. That analysis is equally applicable now, Judge
Robinson holds. She says, the concern with the Release Period, and
how it affects the proposed class, however, will need to be
addressed. In addition, there is an additional issue with the
settlement agreement under the FLSA with regard to attorney's
fees.

c. Attorney's Fees

The FLSA requires an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
The Court, however, has the discretion to determine the amount and
reasonableness of the award. When inquiring into the reasonableness
of the fee, the Court must consider "whether plaintiffs' counsel
are adequately compensated and ensure that a conflict of interest
does not taint the amount plaintiffs receive under the agreement."

In the case, the parties do not adequately address attorney's fees
in their motion. They simply state that the Plaintiff's counsel
will receive fees equal to one-third of the gross settlement amount
and costs not to exceed $6,000. The parties also state that the
Defendants will not oppose or object to this request.

The Settlement Agreement provides that there is a total settlement
fund of $330,000, and a maximum settlement amount of $231,928.13.
It also states that the net settlement is $165,000. The Settlement
Agreement provides for a payment from the total settlement fund for
attorney's fees in a gross amount not to exceed $120,000, with the
class counsel fees not to exceed 33% of the total settlement fund
(not to exceed $110,000), and a payment for costs and a service
payment of $10,000. The service payment is later broken out as
$4,000. There are also several provisions in the Settlement
Agreement that allow the reversion of settlement funds to the
Defendants.

Judge Robinson finds is unclear on the breakdown of these amounts
and how the attorney's fee and service award is calculated,
particularly since the parties do not address attorney's fees, or
the service award, in their motion for approval. She encouraged
parties to review Hoffman v. Poulsen Pizza LLC and case law cited
in it with regard to service awards and attorney's fees and costs
so the Judge can make a determination on the reasonableness of the
request for attorney's fees. Accordingly, because issues remain
with regard to the attorney's fees, the Judge cannot approve the
settlement agreement with regard to the Plaintiff's FLSA claim.

C. Notice

As she noted, Judge Robinson finds several issues with the Notice
that does not allow her to approve it in full.

IV. Summary

In sum, Judge Robinson grants in part and denies in part the
parties' motion. The parties will need to address the Release
Period in the Settlement Agreement (and how it affects the proposed
class definition), the Notice, certification of a collective action
under the FLSA, and attorney's fees and the service award under the
FLSA. Once these issues have been addressed, and the parties submit
a revised Settlement Agreement and Notice that meets the Court's
approval, the Court can approve it and set a final settlement
hearing.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/fpmuumwe from Leagle.com.


L'OREAL USA: Lopez Slams Collagen Skin Care Product Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Rocio Lopez and Rachel Lumbra, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.,
Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-07300 (S.D. N.Y., August 31, 2021), seeks
compensatory, statutory and punitive damages, prejudgment interest,
restitution and all other forms of equitable monetary relief,
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and costs of suit resulting
from fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of express and implied
warranty and for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, New
York's general business laws, California's Consumers Legal Remedies
Act and California's False Advertising Law.

L'Oreal Collagen Products markets and sells the collagen skincare
that purports to "restore skin's cushion" and "smooth wrinkles."
However, Plaintiffs claim that collagen as a topical product is
worthless because it cannot penetrate the top layer of skin to
provide such benefits.

Lopez and Lumbra purchased L'Oreal Paris Collagen Moisture Filler
Day/Night Cream.

L'Oreal USA, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with principal place of
business in New York, New York. Soft Sheen-Carson, LLC, is a New
York domestic limited liability company with principal place of
business in New York, New York.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

     Brittany S. Scott, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     1990 N. California Blvd., Suite 940
     Walnut Creek, CA 94596
     Telephone: (925) 300-4455
     Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
     E-Mail: bscott@bursor.com

             - and -

     Alec M. Leslie, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     888 Seventh Avenue, Third Floor
     New York, NY 10019
     Telephone: (646) 837-7150
     Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
     E-Mail: aleslie@bursor.com
             mroberts@bursor.com

             - and -

     Rachel L. Miller, Esq.
     BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
     701 Brickell Ave., Suite 1420
     Miami, FL 33131
     Tel: (305) 330-5512
     Facsimile: (305) 676-9006
     E-mail: rmiller@bursor.com


LEGALZOOM.COM: Notice of Dismissal Filed in California Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
LegalZoom.com, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the plaintiff in the
class action suit Los Angeles Superior Court has filed notice of
dismissal without prejudice.

The company was served on February 9, 2021 with a class action
complaint, filed in Los Angeles Superior Court and removed to
federal court on March 11, 2021, from a Florida resident who claims
to have visited the www.legalzoom.com website.

The plaintiff alleges that the website's use of session replay
software was an unlawful interception of electronic communications
under the Florida Security Communications Act.

The plaintiff sought damages on behalf of the purported class as
well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

On May 7, 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal without
prejudice.

LegalZoom.com said, "We are unable to predict the ultimate outcome
of this matter. We have not recorded any loss or accrual in the
accompanying condensed consolidated financial statements at June
30, 2021 for this matter as a loss is not probable and reasonably
estimable. There is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss
may have been incurred for this contingency, however, we cannot
make an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss. If this
matter is not resolved in our favor, the losses arising from the
result of litigation or settlements may have a material adverse
effect on our business, results of operations, cash flows and
financial condition."

LegalZoom.com, Inc., is an online legal technology company that
helps its customers create legal documents without necessarily
having to hire a lawyer. Available documents include wills and
living trusts, business formation documents, copyright
registrations, and trademark applications.


LIBERTY FOOD: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Perez Suit Alleges
-----------------------------------------------------------
ANTONIO PEREZ; and SANDRA MENA FLORES, individually and on behalf
of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. LIBERTY FOOD
ENTERPRISES, INC. (D/B/A STAGE STAR DELI); SANJIV CHAND; and ANDRES
GARCIA, Defendants, Case No. 1:21-cv-07340 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 1,
2021) seeks to recover from the Defendants unpaid wages and
overtime compensation, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Plaintiffs were employed by the Defendants as kitchen staffs.

LIBERTY FOOD ENTERPRISES, INC. owns and operates a Deli, located at
105 W.55th Street, New York, New York 10019 under the name Stage
Star deli. [BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, New York 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

MARRIOTT INTL: Drassinower's Bid to Quash Deposition Subpoena Nixed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, In re: SUBPOENA ON THIRD-PARTY JULIE DRASSINOWER, TODD
HALL, KEVIN BRANCA, and GEORGE ABDELSAYED, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. MARRIOTT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Case No.: 3:21-cv-1370-JLS-AHG,
Case No. 3:19-cv-1715-JLS-AHG (S.D. Cal.), Magistrate Judge Allison
H. Goddard of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California denies Plaintiff Drassinower's Motion to Quash.

Background

In a case currently pending in the District, various plaintiffs
filed a putative class action against Defendant Marriott, alleging
that the Defendant engages in false and deceptive advertising in
the way it represents the prices for its hotel rooms, services, and
amenities. The Plaintiffs allege unjust enrichment, negligent
misrepresentation, concealment/non-disclosure, and intentional
misrepresentation, as well as violations of California's Consumers
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), CAL. CIV. CODE Sections 1750 et seq.;
False Advertising Law ("FAL"), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE Sections
17500 et seq.; and Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE Sections 17200 et seq. Hall, Doc. No. 82. The underlying
case was also filed on behalf of both a "Nationwide Class" and a
"California Class."

In the underlying case, on Sept. 9, 2019, Plaintiff Todd Hall filed
his original putative class action complaint. On Nov. 22, 2019,
Plaintiff Hall filed his First Amended Class Action Complaint,
adding three additional causes of action. On Jan. 11, 2021, he
filed his Second Amended Class Action Complaint, which retained all
causes of action and added three named Plaintiffs: Julie
Drassinower, Kevin Branca, and Jesse Heineken. On May 27, 2021,
Plaintiff Hall and Plaintiff Branca filed the operative Third
Amended Class Action Complaint, which retained all causes of
action, removed Plaintiffs Drassinower and Heineken, and added a
third Plaintiff from a related case, George Abdelsayed.

On May 18, 2021, the Defendant noticed the deposition of
then-Plaintiff Drassinower for July 1, 2021, at 10:00 a.m. in its
counsel's San Diego office. On June 10, 2021, after Ms. Drassinower
was removed as a named Plaintiff, the Defendant issued a subpoena
for Ms. Drassinower to testify at her deposition on July 19, 2021,
at 10:00 a.m. in ots counsel's San Francisco office.

On July 7, 2021, Ms. Drassinower filed a motion to quash in the
Northern District of California, the district where she resides,
requesting an order from the court quashing the deposition subpoena
or transferring her motion to the Southern District of California.
The Defendant filed its opposition brief on July 21, 2021.

On July 23, 2021, the court found that Ms. Drassinower had
consented to having her motion transferred under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 45(f), and ordered that the case be transferred to
the Southern District. The case was transferred to this district on
July 30, 2021. On Aug. 2, 2021, Ms. Drassinower filed her reply
brief. Judge Goddard found this motion suitable for determination
on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local
Rule 7.1(d)(1).

Parties' Positions

In her motion, Ms. Drassinower contends that permitting the
requested absent class member discovery, and requiring her to
devote significant time and effort to testifying at a deposition,
would constitute an undue burden on her and would elicit only
irrelevant testimony that bears on no issues in the underlying Hall
Action. She contends that the circumstances surrounding the booking
of Marriott hotel rooms by hundreds of thousands of absent Class
members are not discoverable." She states that there is no basis to
single her out among all absent class members, dozens of which have
made complaints and inquiries to Marriott concerning the deceptive
nature of its resort fees and pricing practices. Ms. Drassinower
further argues that her testimony is not necessary to the case,
because she already has answered interrogatories and has produced
documents relating to her reservations at Marriott hotels. Further,
she feels that the deposition subpoena "serves only to harass and
burden."

In its opposition brief, the Defendant contends that Ms.
Drassinower is not merely an absent class member. She is a former
named plaintiff who has injected herself into the Hall Action and
who has asserted verified facts relevant to the legal theories on
which that action is based. The Defendant asserts that deposing Ms.
Drassinower, as well as the current named Plaintiffs and another
former named Plaintiff, "is relevant to its effort to defeat class
certification on commonality and preponderance grounds by showing
that processes and exposure vary from customer to customer."
Further, the "suspicious way in which Ms. Drassinower was dropped
from the case seemingly in response to a deposition notice, and a
few days after failing to serve amended discovery responses raises
legitimate questions about the veracity of her prior statements
regarding Marriott's resort-fee practices."

In Ms. Drassinower's reply brief, the counsel represents that they
"do not intend to rely on any factual declarations from Julie
Drassinower, or other former Plaintiffs, in support of their class
certification motion, and also do not intend to call Julie
Drassinower, or other former plaintiffs, as witnesses at trial."
Ms. Drassinower also notes that she has "no history of
noncompliance with discovery obligations." She reiterates the
objective standard under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, and argues that
the Defendant failed to make a showing that "a deposition from a
single absent class member will advance any of these arguments"
that commonality is lacking.

Discussion

Judge Goddard has considered the arguments of the counsel and the
relevant court rulings on the topic, and is persuaded that Ms.
Drassinower's deposition should move forward. She concludes that
Ms. Drassinower's deposition is "reasonably necessary, not
conducted for an improper purpose, and not unduly burdensome." She
says the deposition is reasonably necessary for preparation for
opposing class certification due to lack of commonality, it is not
conducted for an improper purpose because Ms. Drassinower has
inserted herself in the litigation, and, as a former named
plaintiff who signed up to represent the class, a deposition is not
unduly burdensome.

While she notes that it is not required to utilize the Clark v.
Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 341 (7th Cir. 1974)
standard, and though she holds that since both parties addressed
the Clark standard in their briefing, Judge Goddard also discusses
it. Thus, for completeness, she also addresses whether (1) the
discovery is not designed to take undue advantage of class members
or to reduce the size of the class, (2) the discovery is necessary,
(3) responding to discovery requests would not require the
assistance of counsel, and (4) the discovery seeks information that
is not already known by the proponent.

First, the Judge finds that a deposition of one former named
plaintiff is not meant to take undue advantage of class members or
reduce the size of the class. She agrees with the Defendant that
"the person who Marriott is seeking to depose is not a mere absent
class member but is a former named plaintiff who has injected
herself into the litigation.

Second, the Judge finds that the discovery is necessary. Ms.
Drassinower "has asserted verified facts relevant to the legal
theories on which that action is based. She has provided detailed
responses to Marriott's interrogatories, requests for admission,
and requests for production. She has alleged facts pertaining to
her experience with resort fees and has produced numerous documents
pertaining to her stays at various hotels." The Judge finds that
Ms. Drassinower's deposition is necessary for the Defendant's
opposition to class certification.

Third, Judge Goddard finds that Ms. Drassinower would not require
the assistance of counsel during her deposition. She agrees with
the Defendant that Ms. Drassinower has a relationship with the
class counsel, who would already be present at her deposition since
they filed the motion to quash on her behalf; further, the
Plaintiffs' counsel has not shown that she has had to pay for their
services.

Fourth, the Judge finds that the Defendant seeks information via
deposition that is not already known. For example, since "most of
Ms. Drassinower's written discovery responses have been identical
to those of the other named plaintiffs," such as Mr. Hall, her
deposition is necessary to assess her room booking experience and
her written discovery responses alone are insufficient.

Lastly, though the Plaintiffs' counsel "does not intend to rely on
the testimony or factual declarations of Ms. Drassinower in support
of class certification or at trial," Judge Goddard holds that Ms.
Drassinower discovery responses and filed declaration have not been
formally withdrawn. Even if they had been, the Judge analysis would
remain unchanged. The Judge does not agree that by withdrawing her
declarations, Ms. Drassinower would be on "equal footing with
unnamed, absent class members." Ms. Drassinower did not "inject
herself into the litigation" solely by providing discovery
responses and a declaration for her verified complaint; she also
"injected herself into the litigation" as a named plaintiff, who
agreed to participate in the case in a representative capacity, and
now cannot avoid discovery by withdrawing from the case. As such,
Ms. Drassinower has not met her burden to persuade the Court that
her deposition would be unduly burdensome.

Conclusion

For the reasons she set forth, Judge Goddard denies Ms.
Drassinower's motion to quash deposition subpoena. She, however,
reminds the Defendant of the presumptive ten deposition limit in
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which will apply
to Ms. Drassinower's deposition.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/29m9b4jb from Leagle.com.


MIDLAND CREDIT: Can't Compel Arbitration in Rodriguez-Ocasio Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, LUIS A. RODRIGUEZ-OCASIO; CRYSTAL BALLY-CHOONOO; and
JOYCE R. LINIS, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated, Plaintiffs v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., and JOHN
DOES 1 to 10, Defendants, Civil Action No. 17-3630 (ES) (MAH)
(D.N.J.), Judge Esther Salas of the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey denied Midland Credit Management's motion to
compel arbitration of the Plaintiffs' claims on an individual basis
and dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

Background

Plaintiffs Rodriguez-Ocasio, Bally-Choonoo, and Linis sue Defendant
MCM on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated for
violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15
U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq.

As alleged in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), the Plaintiffs
"incurred or owed certain financial obligations arising from"
certain accounts, "which were primarily for their personal, family,
or household purposes." They further maintain that the Accounts
were assigned to or placed with MCM for collection when they "were
past-due and in default." MCM sought to collect those debts by
mailing collection letters to the Plaintiffs.

Those letters, the FAC alleges, were initial communications between
MCM and the Plaintiffs. The collection letters did not include "a
statement that, upon the consumer's written request within 30 days
after the receipt of this notice, the debt collector will provide
the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if
different from the current creditor." Such a statement, the FAC
goes on, is required under Section 1692g(a)(5) in an initial
written communication between a debt collector and a consumer, and
it is the policy and practice of MCM to send initial written
communications without such a statement.

In bringing their claim under the FDCPA, the Plaintiffs seek to
represent a class consisting of: "All natural persons with an
address within the State of New Jersey, to whom, from May 20, 2016
through the final resolution of this case, Defendant sent one or
more letter(s) in an attempt to collect a consumer debt, which
failed to include the statement required by 15 U.S.C. Section
1692g(a) and/or 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g(a)(5)."

On Aug. 23, 2017, MCM filed a motion to compel arbitration, which
it withdrew after the Plaintiffs amended their complaint. On Oct.
11, 2017, MCM renewed its motion. In a Letter Order dated June 18,
2018, the Court denied MCM's motion without prejudice to renew it
after the parties undertook limited discovery "to ascertain whether
a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties."

That limited discovery is now complete, and MCM once again seeks to
compel arbitration. Under the agreements governing the Accounts,
MCM argues, all claims related to the Accounts must be submitted to
binding arbitration upon request of either party, and the
Plaintiffs waived their right to bring class action claims. MCM has
included the operative agreements for each of the Plaintiffs'
Accounts as exhibits to its motion.

To prove that it acquired the rights to enforce the arbitration
provisions, MCM supplied the bills of sale of the Accounts between
Midland Funding, LLC ("Midland") -- which MCM services -- and the
original creditor, Synchrony Bank. Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs
supplied the "FORWARD FLOW RECEIVABLES PURCHASE AGREEMENT" between
Midland and Synchrony for each of the Accounts.

The Purchase Agreements further define "Account" to mean "any
credit account owned by Seller with respect to which there is a
Receivable," and define "Receivable" to mean "any credit account
receivable that is being sold to Buyer pursuant to the terms of
this Agreement, as such receivable exists as of the Cut-Off Date,
to the extent such receivable is set forth on the applicable
Notification File."

Discussion

At issue is whether the arbitration provisions of the Account
Agreements bind the Plaintiffs to arbitrate claims that they have
against MCM. MCM argues that it is entitled to compel arbitration
because it is an agent of Midland and Midland purchased the rights
to enforce arbitration from Synchrony. The Plaintiffs respond that
Synchrony did not transfer its right to compel arbitration to
Midland through the Purchase Agreements -- because the Purchase
Agreements transferred only rights under the "Receivables," not
under the "Accounts."

Although MCM does not clearly say so, the Plaintiffs understand it
to argue that extraneous evidence -- specifically, the affidavits
of Angel Nayman, an employee of Synchrony, and Sean Mulcahy, an
employee of MCM -- establish that Synchrony intended to transfer
MCM all rights under the Account Agreements. As noted, New Jersey
law permits the use of extraneous evidence to illuminate the
meaning of otherwise clear text. "Such evidence may 'include
consideration of the particular contractual provision, an overview
of all the terms, the circumstances leading up to the formation of
the contract, custom, usage, and the interpretation placed on the
disputed provision by the parties' conduct.'"

Judge Salas holds that neither affidavit offers any such insight.
Rather, they merely cite the various bills of sale and Purchase
Agreements and repeat MCM's litigating position, without analysis
and in cursory fashion, that Midland purchased the Accounts. Thus,
to the extent MCM does rely on extraneous evidence, she does not
find such evidence persuasive.

In response, MCM offers three arguments, none of which is
persuasive. First, MCM argues that the Plaintiffs lack standing to
interpret the assignment of rights between Synchrony and Midland
because they were not parties to the assignment, citing Schiano v.
MBNA, No. 05-1771, 2013 WL 2452681, at *25 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013).

But Judge Salas holds that Schiano involved an instance where,
unlike in the instant case, as a result of the assignment contract,
Obligor's rights and duties under the underlying contract remain
the same. Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs' rights under the Account
Agreements would materially change under MCM's understanding of the
Purchase Agreements because the Plaintiffs could be compelled by a
third-party to arbitrate their FDCPA claims and would no longer be
able to use the Rule 23 device in federal court against that
third-party.

Second, MCM argues that "when a creditor assigns its right to
receive payment on an outstanding debt, the assignee stands in the
shoes of the assignor with respect to the debt."  Thus, it follows,
"a transfer of accounts receivable includes the transfer of the
underlying contractual terms, including arbitration provisions."

Judge Salas finds that Midland has not offered a New Jersey case
standing for the proposition that Section 9-404 does not allow an
assignor and assignee to agree to a partial assignment in which the
latter purchases only some rights of the former under the original
contract. Moreover, Section 9-405 of the U.C.C. appears to
contradict the broad proposition, espoused by MCM, that an assignee
automatically stands in the shoes of the assignor and thereby
receives all rights of the assignor.

Third, and finally, MCM argues that even if Synchrony did not
assign Midland the right to compel arbitration, MCM may compel
arbitration as a third-party beneficiary of the various Account
Agreements.

But the cases on which MCM relies, Judge Salas notes, pointed to
specific language in the relevant contract indicating an intent on
the part of the contracting parties to extend the rights of a
contracting party to the putative third-party beneficiary. In the
case, MCM merely points to the language in the Account Agreements
that permits Synchrony to assign its rights -- something the Court
finds Synchrony did not do under the Purchase Agreements with
respect to its right to compel arbitration.

Moreover, the various arbitration provisions are quite clear with
respect to who may compel arbitration: "If either you or we make a
demand for arbitration, you and we must arbitrate any dispute or
claim between you or any other user of your account, and us, our
affiliates, agents and/or dealers/merchants/retailers that accept
the card or program sponsors if it relates to your account."

Simply put, neither Midland nor MCM is a "we" with Synchrony. Nor
is there evidence in the record that they are within the class of
listed entities.

Conclusion

Judge Salas concludes that because Midland did purchase the rights
to enforce arbitration from Synchrony, its agent MCM cannot compel
arbitration of the Plaintiffs' FDCPA claims. For these reasons,
Judge Salas denies MCM's motion to compel arbitration and dismiss
the FAC. An appropriate Order will be entered.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/29pds5km from Leagle.com.


MISSOURI HIGHER: Dykes Appeals Dismissal in Consumer Credit Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Jeffrey Dykes filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled JEFFREY DYKES, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. MISSOURI HIGHER
EDUCATION LOAN AUTHORITY, Defendant, Case No. 21-cv-00083-RWS, in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St.
Louis.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Jan. 29, 2021, the
lawsuit is an action against the Defendant for failure to service
the Plaintiff's student loans under federal law.

According to the complaint, the Defendant placed Plaintiff on
Income Driven Repayment IDR 2011-2016 plan annual renewal. In 2017,
the Defendant demanded that the Plaintiff begin making $850
payments towards his $80,000 federal student loan debt serviced by
the Defendant based on an increase in his annual employment
income.

Due to prior cumulative financial obligations, the Plaintiff could
only afford roughly $150 monthly payment which the Defendant
rejected.

The Plaintiff was damaged by the Defendant's actions in failing to
offer an Alternative Repayment Plan including to the extent of
increased interest assessed during the forbearance period and an
eventual default because forbearance time is limited and the
payments are unaffordable.

Mr. Dykes now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated August 2,
2021 wherein judgment on the pleadings was entered in favor of the
Defendant, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.

The appellate case is captioned as Jeffrey Dykes v. MO Higher
Education Loan Authority, Case No. 21-2951, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, filed on Aug. 30, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appendix is due on October 12, 2021;

   -- BRIEF OF APPELLANT Jeffrey Dykes is due on October 12, 2021;
and

   -- Appellee brief is due 30 days from the date the court issues
the Notice of Docket Activity filing the brief of appellant.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant Jeffrey Dykes, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Scott Craig Borison, Esq.
          BORISON FIRM LLC
          5830 E. Second Street
          Casper, WY 82609
          Telephone: (301) 620-1016
          E-mail: scott@borisonfirm.com  

               - and -

          Robert P. Cocco, Esq.
          ROBERT P. COCCO, P.C.
          1500 Walnut Street, Suite 900
          Philadelphia, PA 19102-3518
          Telephone: (215) 351-0200
          Facsimile: (215) 827-5403

Defendant-Appellee Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority is
represented by:

          Matthew D. Guletz, Esq.
          THOMPSON & COBURN
          One US Bank Plaza, Suite 2700
          505 N. Seventh Street
          Saint Louis, MO 63101-1693
          Telephone: (314) 552-6000
          E-mail: mguletz@thompsoncoburn.com

NATROL LLC: Court Grants Summary Judgment Bid in Vitello Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CHRISTINE VITELLO, Plaintiff v. NATROL, LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 4:18-cv-00915-SEP (E.D. Mo.), Judge Sarah E.
Pitlyk of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Eastern Division, granted Defendant Natrol's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Background

Plaintiff Vitello brings the action individually and on behalf of
others similarly situated, alleging Defendant Natrol violated the
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) and that Natrol is
liable to purchasers of its product, Cognium, for unjust
enrichment. Cognium is a "nutraceutical" that, according to
Natrol's advertising, improves memory and concentration for
consumers who ingest it twice daily over a period of four weeks.
According to Cognium's packaging, the nutraceutical is "powered" by
Cera-Q, a natural protein found in silkworm cocoons. In her Amended
Complaint, Vitello alleges that Natrol advertised that nine
clinical studies supported its efficacy, when in fact two of those
studies had been discredited.

Ms. Vitello suffers from attention-deficit disorder (ADD), and she
had been taking Adderall to treat her ADD since 2004. In June 2017,
she stopped taking Adderall and began taking Cognium, hoping
"Cognium would be a better alternative to Adderall." Vitello claims
she took Cognium according to the directions provided by Natrol but
did not experience any improvement in her memory, concentration, or
cognition. She contends that she would not have purchased Cognium
had Natrol not made the representations concerning the product's
allegedly proven results.

Ms. Vitello seeks damages as well as establishment of a Missouri
consumer subclass under the MMPA and a nationwide class under the
doctrine of unjust enrichment. In the Case Management Order, the
Court bifurcated discovery, allowing the parties to proceed first
on discovery related to class certification. Discovery related to
Vitello's individual claim is stayed until after the Court's ruling
on class certification.

Natrol moved for summary judgment on Vitello's individual claim on
Oct. 25, 2019. In response, Vitello filed a Rule 56(d) Motion,
stating that she could not respond because individual discovery had
not yet commenced. On March 31, 2021, the Court issued a Memorandum
and Order ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court categorized Natrol's arguments for summary judgment as
follows: (a) that the Plaintiff cannot show ascertainable loss for
the purposes of the MMPA because she admits that she discontinued
taking Adderall when she started taking Cognium and did not consult
a healthcare professional, in violation of the product's warnings;
(b) that the Plaintiff has no admissible evidence of Cognium's
'actual value,' which is required to prove that she experienced an
ascertainable loss under the MMPA; and (c) that the Plaintiff
cannot show any causal connection between any allegedly unlawful
practice and her purported loss because she discontinued taking
Adderall when she started taking Cognium.

The Court found that Natrol's arguments as to the second and third
of those issues were premature, but that the first argument was
"subtly but significantly different." Because the facts Natrol
presents regarding Vitello's admissions are undisputed, the only
remaining question is a legal one, ripe for resolution at this
stage: Do Vitello's admissions preclude her from bringing MMPA and
unjust enrichment claims? The Court directed Vitello to respond to
that question. That issue is fully briefed and before the Court.
All other arguments on summary judgment were denied without
prejudice.

Discussion

I. MMPA

The MMPA prohibits "any deception, fraud, false pretense, false
promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment,
suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with
the sale or advertisement of any merchandise." To succeed on an
MMPA claim, a plaintiff must establish that she "(1) purchased
merchandise from defendants; (2) for personal, family or household
purposes; and (3) suffered an ascertainable loss of money or
property; (4) as a result of an act declared unlawful" under Mo.
Rev. Stat. Section 407.020. Applying that standard to Vitello's
MMPA claim: in order to prevail, she must demonstrate that she
suffered an "ascertainable loss of money or property" as a result
of the inclusion of retracted studies on Cognium's packaging.

Judge Pitlyk holds that Vitello improperly reframes the issue as an
Article III standing challenge. In fact, as Natrol correctly points
out, Article III standing is not at issue. Article III standing
requirements differ from the elements of liability under the MMPA.
Standing can be satisfied by showing only "potential liability" to
"demonstrate a legally cognizable interest in this litigation and a
threatened injury," but a threatened injury is not enough to
sustain a claim on summary judgment. Thus, Vitello's standing
arguments are beside the point.

Unlike Vitello, Judge Pitlyk finds that Natrol correctly identifies
the legal question presented: Whether Vitello can, given her
undisputed admissions, establish ascertainable loss. Vitello never
"bargained" for Cognium as a replacement for Adderall, so she
cannot have lost that purported benefit. Thus, regardless of any
alleged misrepresentation of the clinical basis for the claims
Natrol did make, Vitello cannot succeed on her MMPA claim because
she cannot establish that she suffered an ascertainable loss.

II. Unjust Enrichment

A claim for unjust enrichment under Missouri law has three
elements: 1) "plaintiff must confer a benefit and enrich a
defendant," 2) "the enrichment must be at the expense of the
plaintiff," and 3) "it would be unjust for the defendant to retain
the benefit." The most significant of the elements for a claim of
unjust enrichment is the last element." Finding Natrol's argument
that its retention of the purported benefit is not "unjust" because
Vitello misused the product persuasive, the Court ordered Vitello
to brief that issue.

Ms. Vitello offers two arguments in response. First, Vitello notes
that a money-back guarantee cannot prevent an unjust enrichment
claim. As stated in denying the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Pitlyk
agrees. And second, Vitello states that Natrol's "misuse argument"
was previously rejected by the Court at the motion to dismiss
phase. But there the Court was establishing the sufficiency of the
pleadings, not making a judgment based on evidence. Thus, like her
MMPA claim, Vitello's unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed.

Because Vitello's claims are dismissed, she cannot represent the
purported class. Vitello thus lacks standing to bring the class
action, and the Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Judge Pitlyk granted Defendant Natrol's Motion for
Summary Judgment. She dismissed the Complaint.

A separate Judgment will be entered accordingly.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Memorandum & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4p6syhrb from Leagle.com.


NEW MEXICO: 4-H Parents Join Class Action Over Vaccine Mandate
--------------------------------------------------------------
Spencer Schacht, writing for KOB4, reports that 4-H parents have
joined the class action lawsuit against Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham
and the health department for requiring COVID vaccines to go to the
New Mexico State Fair.

The original lawsuit was filed on Aug. 19, two days after the
governor's new public health order was announced. But a lot has
changed in the last two weeks, and that is highlighted in the
governors' response to the lawsuit.

One plaintiff, Talisha Valdez, is the Union County extension agent
and a mom of two daughters who entered their 4-H animals in the
State Fair. According to the lawsuit, Valdez and her daughters are
not vaccinated and because of the health order, they cannot
participate in the fair.

Even if they wanted to get vaccinated, court documents point out
there is not enough time, "If a child receives their first shot on
Aug.18, that child is not fully vaccinated and able to enter the
New Mexico State Fair Grounds until September 22, which is 3 days
after the New Mexico State Fair ends."

4-H parents join class action lawsuit against Gov. Lujan Grisham,
NMDOH Valdez said her daughters have spent at least 150 hours
working with their animals and spent over $9,000 to prepare for the
fair. Court documents said more than 35 families are in the same
position.

The original filing also points out that the state can't mandate a
vaccine that is not FDA approved under the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act saying, "Where a medical product is 'unapproved' then
no one may be mandated to take it."

Because of this, they are saying they are being discriminated
against and asking for a temporary restraining order, as well as
relief and damages – saying the public health order is
unconstitutional.

But in the governor's and the health department's response, they
say they have seen lawsuits like this throughout the pandemic and
cite similar cases where the judge has ruled in the health
department's favor.

For example, they cite Indiana University students who went to the
Supreme Court saying it's unconstitutional to require vaccines to
attend school but the students lost that trial because "defendants
side with the vast majority of the scientific community --
including the CDC and the state's public health experts -- in
concluding that COVID-19 vaccines are safe."

The response also says the plaintiff's argument that they can't
mandate the vaccine no longer applies because the Pfizer vaccines
"is now fully approved by the food and drug administration," since
the health order first came out.

As of now, the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for the State Fair is still
in place, and the fair starts this week on Sept. 9. [GN]

OPPENHEIMER & CO: 6694 Dawson Sues Over Losses in Ponzi Scheme
--------------------------------------------------------------
6694 Dawson Blvd, LLC, individually and on behalf of a class of
similarly situated persons, Plaintiff, v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,
James Wallace Woods, Michael J. Mooney, Britt Wright, William V.
Conn, Jr., Conn & Co. Tax Practice, LLC, Conn & Company Consulting,
LLC, and Kathleen Lloyd, Defendants, Case No. 21-cv-03625, (N.D.
Ga., August 31, 2021), seeks damages, costs of this suit, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and such other and further relief under
the Georgia RICO Act, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation and unjust enrichment.

Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., is a full-service brokerage and investment
bank that operates from a regional branch office in Atlanta,
Georgia. Oppenheimer is a subsidiary of Oppenheimer Holdings, Inc.,
a publicly traded company listed on the New York Stock Exchange

John J. Woods, an investment adviser at Oppenheimer, founded
"Horizon Private Equity, III, LLC" and began marketing Horizon
Private Equity securities to Oppenheimer's customers as well as the
investing public. Woods resigned from Oppenheimer after he was
caught selling unapproved Horizon equities. For nearly five more
years, the Horizon Private Equity was operated by employees in
Oppenheimer's Atlanta, Georgia branch office, and continued raising
money from investors through Southport Capital. On August 20, 2021,
the Securities & Exchange Commission brought a civil action against
Woods, Southport Capital and Horizon Private Equity for federal
securities fraud and moved for emergency relief including asset
freeze, appointment of receivership and a full accounting. The
SEC's complaint alleges that "John Woods has been running a massive
Ponzi scheme for over a decade" and that as of July 2021, investors
were owed over $110,000,000 in principal.

Plaintiff 6694 Dawson Blvd, LLC is a Georgia limited liability
company that claims to be a victim of the massive $110,000,000
Ponzi scheme that was conceived, founded and operated by the
investment advisers of Oppenheimer. [BN]

Plaintiffs are represented by:

      Craig H. Kuglar, Esq.
      THE LAW OFFICE OF CRAIG KUGLAR, LLC
      931 Monroe Drive NE, Suite A102-353
      Atlanta, GA 30308
      Tel: (404) 432-4448
      Fax: (404) 393-8007
      Email: ck@kuglarlaw.com

             - and -

      John S. Chapman, Esq.
      Jason T. Albin, Esq.
      Philip L. Vujanov, Esq.
      CHAPMAN ALBIN LLC
      700 West St. Clair Avenue, Suite 200
      Cleveland, OH 44113
      Tel: (216) 241-8172
      Fax: (216) 241-8175
      Email: jchapman@chapmanlegal.com
             jalbin@chapmanlegal.com
             pvujanov@chapmanlegal.com


OZARK PIZZA: Nation Class Suit Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, AMWA
------------------------------------------------------------------
TYRONE NATION, individually and on behalf Of all others similarly
situated v. OZARK PIZZA COMPANY, LLC, Case No. 4:21-cv-00747-BSM
(E.D. Ark., Aug. 24, 2021) is a class action and a collective
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum
Wage Act for declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated
damages, prejudgment interest, and costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, as a result of Defendant's failure to pay
Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees lawful minimum
wages and overtime wages.

The Plaintiff contends that he and other similarly situated
employees regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week
throughout their tenure with Defendant. They were classified as
hourly employees and paid an hourly rate. When he was working in
the store his stated hourly rate of pay was $11.00 per hour. During
times that he was working outside of the store as a delivery driver
he was paid $3.50 per hour plus tips, he adds.

The Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees recorded their
hours worked via an electronic time clock, which logged their hours
into a payroll system maintained by Defendant. The Defendant
regularly required him and other similarly situated employees to
work off the clock numerous hours per week. The Defendant also
manipulated the time clock to reflect that when he was working in
the store, he was paid at the tipped delivery driver rate of $3.50
per hour, he alleges.

Ozark Pizza Company, LLC owns and operates approximately 45 Papa
John's Pizza restaurants across several states.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

         Chris Burks, Esq.
         WHLAW | WE HELP
         Riverfront Pl. Suite 745
         North Little Rock, AR 72114
         Telephone: (501) 891-6000
         E-mail: chris@wh.law

PDS BIOTECHNOLOGY: Rosener Putative Class Suit Underway in Delaware
-------------------------------------------------------------------
PDS Biotechnology Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a putative class action suit initiated by David
R. Rosener.

On July 23, 2021, David R. Rosener, a purported stockholder of PDS,
filed a putative class action and shareholder derivative complaint
in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware (C.A. No.
2021-0644) JRS against PDS and all of its directors and certain of
its executive officers.

The plaintiff named all current directors of PDS as defendants as
well as PDS's Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Medical Officer as
defendants and also named PDS as a nominal defendant.  

The plaintiff claims that PDS's bylaws required tabulation of
broker non-votes on Proposal 3 of the proxy, which sought
shareholder approval of the Second Amended and Restated PDS
Biotechnology Corporation 2014 Equity Incentive Plan (the "Restated
Plan") that was voted upon at the 2021 annual stockholder meeting
on June 17, 2021.  

In addition, the complaint asserts claims for breach of fiduciary
duties, declaratory judgment, waste of corporate assets and unjust
enrichment in connection with the Restated Plan and the granting of
an aggregate award of 1,040,700 stock options to certain executive
officers pursuant to the Restated Plan.  

The plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary damages, seeks to have the
Restated Plan declared void, and seeks recission of the grant of
stock options as ultra vires.  

PDS said, "Given the early stage of this lawsuit, PDS is unable to
reasonably estimate the costs associated with the lawsuit or
predict the outcome. Each of the Company, its directors and the
named executives intend to defend this action vigorously. There can
be no guarantee as to the timing of any resolution."

PDS Biotechnology Corporation, a clinical-stage immuno-oncology
company, develops multifunctional immunotherapeutic products. PDS
Biotechnology Corporation is based in Berkeley Heights, New
Jersey.


PROSPER MARKETPLACE: Purported Class Suit Underway in Maryland
---------------------------------------------------------------
Prosper Marketplace, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company together
with Prosper Funding LLC (PFL) continues to defend a purported
class action suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland.

In March 2021, the company (PMI) and Prosper Funding LLC (PFL)
accepted service of a complaint via email. PMI, PFL and Velocity
Investments, LLC, an accounts receivable management company, were
each named in a purported class action lawsuit brought by two
individual plaintiffs in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland, filed on February 3, 2021.

The complaint asserts, on behalf of the plaintiffs and the class
members, claims for violation of certain Maryland state laws and
seeks damages. The plaintiffs also seek a declaration of
requirement for Maryland licensure and that PMI, PFL, and Velocity
did not have the right to collect money from the plaintiffs and the
class members on the loan accounts.

On April 8, 2021, the lawsuit was moved to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.

On July 15, 2021, the plaintiff dismissed its related petition to
stay arbitration and demand declaratory judgment in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, but joined PMI, PFL, and
Velocity to another petition, Khan v. Crown Asset Management, LLC,
Case No. 485569V, which was also filed in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland on March 22, 2021 and restated the
claims described above.

PMI and PFL plan to vigorously contest these claims.

PMI said, "At this time, we cannot predict the outcome of this
matter or estimate the amount of damages, if any, that may be
awarded."

Prosper Marketplace, Inc. provides online peer-to-peer lending
marketplace services. The Company enables borrowers to list loan
requests and individual lenders the option to invest loans based on
credit scores, ratings, histories, personal loan descriptions,
endorsements, and community affiliations. Prosper Marketplace
serves customers in the United States. The company is based in San
Francisco, California.


PROUD MOMENTS: Malkin Seeks Unpaid Wages, OT Under FLSA, NYLL
-------------------------------------------------------------
TZIREL MALKIN, on behalf of herself and on behalf of other
similarly situated individuals v. PROUD MOMENTS LICENSED BEHAVIOR
ANALYSTS, PLLC D/B/A PROUD MOMENTS ABA, Case No. 2:21-cv-04834
(E.D.N.Y., Aug. 26, 2021) alleges that the Defendant has engaged in
illegal and improper wage practices that have deprived the
Plaintiff and its non-exempt hourly employees of millions of
dollars in unpaid wages and overtime compensation in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

During her employment with Defendant, the Plaintiff has worked as a
Licensed Behavioral Analyst as a non-exempt hourly employee. The
Plaintiff worked for Defendant in excess of 40 hours per week,
without appropriate overtime compensation for the hours that she
worked, the suit says.

Rather, when Defendant would pay Plaintiff for her overtime hours,
Defendant would just pay Plaintiff at her regular hourly rate for
all hours worked in excess of 40 hours for the weeks as opposed to
her overtime rate of one and one-half times her regularly hourly
rate for her overtime. The Defendant therefore repeatedly shorted
Plaintiff the overtime premium due for the overtime hours that she
worked, added the suit.

Founded in May of 2014, Proud Moments operates a behavioral health
organization that employs Behavior Analysts and Licensed Behavior
Analysts in at least 10 states, including New York, to work with
autistic children either at home, school or onsite in a Proud
Moments facility.

Proud Moments currently ranks in the top third fastest growing
companies on the annual Inc. 5000 list but has only been able to
obtain that ranking and such incredible growth by engaging in
consistent illegal wage and hour practices.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Julie Goggin, Esq.
          THE LEXICAL LAW FIRM
          26 Broadway, 8th Floor
          New York, NY 10004
          Telephone: (917) 579-1327
          Facsimile: (203) 442-1279
          E-mail: jgoggin@lexicallawfirm.com

               - and -

          Daniel Valles, Esq.
          VALLES LAW, P.C.
          1885 Pacific Avenue, Ste. 103
          San Francisco, CA 94109
          Telephone: (415) 234-0086
          Facsimile: (510) 369-2075
          E-mail: dan@valles.law

PUFF BAR: Simkin Sues Over False Longevity of Puff Plus Vapes
-------------------------------------------------------------
JACOBO SIMKIN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. PUFF BAR, Case No. 1:21-cv-07177 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 25,
2021) is a class action against Puff Bar for its manufacturing,
marketing, and sale of its Puff Plus vapes.

In addition to its reckless disregard for the widespread youth
nicotine epidemic, the Defendant allegedly engaged in deceptive
sale and marketing tactics. The Defendant gained a fortune in its
quick proliferation of misbranded vapes, all while working around
the FDA's intention to shut down its operations for failing to
comply with pre-market authorization requirements, says the suit.

The Plaintiff brings this class action to remedy Defendant's
deceptive marketing and sales tactics for one of its most popular
vapes: Puff Plus (the "Puff Bar Plus"). In selling the Puff Bar
Plus, Defendant sought a competitive advantage by promising that
the vape will last "800 PUFFS." This longevity representation is
prominently made on the front label of the Puff Bar Plus packaging
and is conspicuously visible to every consumer at the point of
purchase.

In reliance on that representation, consumers paid, and continue to
pay, a premium for the Puff Bar Plus. As set forth more fully
below, Defendant's representation far out-promises the actual
lifespan of the Puff Bar Plus -- which in many instances fails
within hours after being purchased.

The Plaintiff purchased Puff Bar Plus vapes based on Defendant's
misleading and fraudulent representation regarding the vapes'
longevity.

The Plaintiff seeks relief in this action on behalf of himself and
similarly situated class members for Defendant's violations of
state consumer protection laws and breach of the express warranties
displayed on the Puff Bar Plus packaging.

The Defendant Puff Bar is a California corporation, having its
principal place of business in Glendale, California. Puff Bar
manufactures, designs, sells, markets, promotes, and distributes
Puff Bar Plus and other Puff Bar products throughout the United
States. At all relevant times herein, Puff Bar purposefully
marketed and sold its products to citizens of the State of New York
and Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Adrian Gucovschi, Esq.
          GUCOVSCHI LAW, PLLC
          630 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
          New York, NY 10111
          Telephone: (212) 884-4230
          Facsimile: (212) 884-4230
          E-Mail: adrian@gucovschi-law.com

QUEENS TRUCK REPAIRS: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Zetino Alleges
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARIO ZETINO, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Plaintiff v. QUEENS TRUCK REPAIRS, INC. d/b/a QUEENS
TRUCK REPAIRS; ANTONIO VOLI; and FRANCO VOLI, Defendants, Case No.
1:21-cv-04918 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 1, 2021) seeks to recover from the
Defendants unpaid wages and overtime compensation, interest,
liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

Plaintiff Zetino was employed by the Defendants as mechanic.

QUEENS TRUCK REPAIRS, INC. is a mechanic garage that specializes in
repairing trucks, including their engines, transmissions,
suspension systems, brakes, and radiators. [BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Louis Pechman, Esq.
          Gianfranco J. Cuadra, Esq.
          PECHMAN LAW GROUP PLLC
          488 Madison Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (212) 583-9500
          E-mail: pechman@pechmanlaw.com
                  cuadra@pechmanlaw.com

RECKITT BENCKISER: Class Action Objector Criticizes Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
Diana Jones, writing for Reuters, reports that an attorney known
for bringing objections to class action settlements said he is
routinely contacted by other lawyers encouraging him to intervene
in cases, hoping he'll throw a wrench in a planned settlement.

Ted Frank, the director of litigation at the Hamilton Lincoln Law
Institute and the founder of the Center for Class Action Fairness,
has made a name for himself backing objections to settlements that
he says provide little to class members and too much to their
attorneys.

That work has drawn the ire of plaintiffs' and defense attorneys
alike, but Frank revealed in a recent court filing that lawyers
also contact him to flag settlements for an attack.

The emails and letters arrive at least once a year, sometimes from
anonymous senders, Frank said in the 76-page filing. In one
instance in 2013, a Perkins Coie partner whom Frank said he didn't
know sent him a message encouraging him to file an amicus brief
opposing an attorney fee request in a settlement involving a firm
client -- even offering to share the fee petition with Frank early,
he said. Frank didn't name the attorney.

A representative for Perkins Coie did not respond to requests for
comment about the anecdote.

Frank said in the filing that the messages don't necessarily drive
him to look at the cases, unless the objection deadline is imminent
or the settlement website is easy to find.

"It's never clear to me whether such attorneys are trying to set me
up, set up a plaintiffs' attorney they're mad at, set up a defense
attorney they're mad at, or set up a defendant they're mad at,"
Frank said.

Frank's comments came in a sworn declaration he submitted in a
class action against supplement maker Reckitt Benckiser LLC that
claims the labeling on its Neuriva brain performance supplements is
misleading. Although Frank typically represents settlement
objectors through the Center for Class Action Fairness, this time
an attorney represented Frank as the objector himself.

Frank has criticized the settlement that creates an $8 million fund
to cover refunds for customers who can provide proof of purchase
and changes the Neuriva labeling from saying "clinically proven" to
"clinically tested." He said it does little more than pay the
plaintiffs' attorneys $2.9 million in fees.

Reckitt Benckiser, represented by Perkins Coie, hit back at Frank's
objection, accusing Frank of buying Neuriva after learning about
the settlement so he could object. David Biderman, a partner at
Perkins Coie representing Reckitt Benckiser, declined to comment.

A magistrate judge overseeing the case asked Frank to submit
briefing on whether a court had ever struck his objections or had
sanctioned him at any point in the last decade.

Frank, who said he heard about the settlement before buying
Neuriva, told the judge that no district court had ever denied a
motion to object filed by one of his clients or his firms' clients.
He also said neither he nor the organizations he works with have
ever been sanctioned.

He cited several cases where his work has been praised by judges or
he was awarded fees for his role in policing settlements.

"It's disappointing that Perkins Coie recruits me to object when
they think its the right thing to do, and then they make these
false personal attacks against me," Frank told Reuters.

In response to Frank's filing, Reckitt Benckiser accused him of
leaving out a court's ruling holding that one of his objecting
clients lacked standing. Frank told Reuters he needs to correct his
statement to mention one instance in which a judge found that his
client did not have standing, a ruling he says was incorrect.

The judge overseeing the case has yet to rule on approval of the
settlement, or Frank's ability to object.

Some of Frank's other recent involvement in settlements include
Hamilton Lincoln's objections brought in March on behalf of a group
of Flint, Michigan, residents in litigation over the city's water
crisis. Also in March, Hamilton Lincoln and Frank represented
another Hamilton Lincoln attorney who objected to a settlement over
claims Monsanto misleadingly marketed its weedkiller Roundup.

The case is Williams v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, No. 1:20-cv-23564.

For Reckitt Benckiser: Lori Lustrin and Melissa Pallett-Vasquez of
Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod; and David Biderman and
Charles Sipos of Perkins Coie

For the class: Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman; Levin
Papantonio Rafferty Proctor Buchanan O'Brien Barr Mougey; Shub Law
Firm; and Barbat, Mansour, Suciu & Tomina

For Frank: Matthew Sarelson of Dhillon Law Group; and Frank Bednarz
of Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute Center for Class Action Fairness
[GN]


RENOWN HEALTH: Court Allows Nevett to File 1st Amended Complaint
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILY NEVETT, on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RENOWN HEALTH, and DOES 1 through
50, inclusive, Defendants, Case No. 3:21-CV-00319-RCJ-WGC (D.
Nev.), Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Nevada granted the Parties' stipulation to
allow the Plaintiff to file a First Amended Complaint.

The Parties stipulate and agree that the Plaintiff may file with
the Court, without further motion, the Proposed First Amended
Complaint. By agreeing to the stipulation, neither Party waives any
rights and/or defenses to the claims and/or factual allegations
asserted in the Proposed First Amended Complaint, including but not
limited to any disputes related to the applicable statute of
limitations, relation back to the filing date of the Original
Complaint, and/or equitable tolling of the limitations period.

Additionally, and in the interest of judicial economy, the parties
also stipulate that the Plaintiff will withdraw her Motion to
Remand to State Court upon granting of the Stipulation and Order.

The Plaintiff will file the First Amended Complaint within seven
days of entry of the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4wx337yx from Leagle.com.

MARK R. THIERMAN, ESQ., JOSHUA D. BUCK, ESQ., LEAH L. JONES, ESQ.,
JOSHUA R. HENDRICKSON, ESQ., THIERMAN BUCK, LLP, in Reno, Nevada,
Attorneys for Plaintiff EMILY NEVETT.

MONTGOMERY Y. PAEK, ESQ. -- mpaek@littler.com -- ETHAN D. THOMAS,
ESQ. -- edthomas@littler.com -- DIANA G. DICKINSON, ESQ. --
ddickinson@littler.com -- EMIL S. KIM, ESQ. -- ekim@littler.com --
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., in Las Vegas, Nevada, Attorneys for
Defendant RENOWN HEALTH.


RESURGENT CAPITAL: N.J. Court Narrows Claims in Saldana FDCPA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JOSUE SALDANA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES,
LP, Defendant, Case No. 2:20-cv-01879 (BRM) (ESK) (D.N.J.), Judge
Brian R. Martinotti of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey granted in part and denied in part the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice.

Background

On Nov. 20, 2020, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against
the Defendant alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA") following
the Defendant's attempt to collect a debt. The Plaintiff is a
resident of Sussex County, New Jersey, and the Defendant is a South
Carolina Limited Partnership with a principal place of business in
Richland County, South Carolina. The Plaintiff contends he is a
consumer and the Defendant is a debt collector, as defined by the
FDCPA.

Some time prior to Oct. 8, 2019, the Plaintiff allegedly incurred
the underlying debt from Comenity Capital Bank as it related to a
PayPal account, used by the Plaintiff for personal purposes only,
which was then placed with the Defendant for debt collection
purposes. On Oct. 8, 2019, the Defendant mailed the Letter to the
Plaintiff in connection with the debt. The Letter was the initial
written communication the Plaintiff received from the Defendant
regarding the alleged debt. The Plaintiff alleges the Letter
violated the FDCPA by failing to accurately convey, from the
perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the correct amount
of the debt. Indeed, the Plaintiff asserts the Letter, which claims
he owes $518.95, is inaccurate as he does not owe $518.953 and does
not owe any money at all to LVNV Funding, LLC, the entity on whose
behalf the Defendant is seeking to collect the debt.

Based on this written communication, on Nov. 20, 2020, the
Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint alleging the Defendant
violated: (1) 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e by making false, deceptive,
or misleading representations in connection with the collection of
the debt; and (2) 15 U.S.C. Section 1692g by seeking to collect a
debt the Plaintiff did not owe on behalf of an entity to whom he
did not owe a debt.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends: the Letter does not comply
with Section 1692g(a)(1) because it does not accurately state the
amount of the debt allegedly owed (Count 1); the Letter violates
Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) because it falsely
suggests the amount stated is the amount owed and because the
Plaintiff did not owe any money at all to LVNV on whose behalf the
Defendant was seeking to collect a debt (Count 2); the Letter does
not comply with the mandates of Section 1692g(a)(2) because it
fails to identify the creditor to whom the alleged debt is
purportedly owed (Count 3); and the Letter falsely suggests the
Plaintiff is indebted to LVNV in violation of Sections 1692e,
1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) (Count 4).

The Plaintiff brings the action against the Defendant on behalf of
himself and all New Jersey consumers who were sent similar
collection letters by it.

On Dec. 4, 2020, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). On Jan. 4, 2021, the Plaintiff filed an
opposition brief. On Jan. 11, 2021, the Defendant filed a reply
brief. On July 28, 2021, the Defendant filed a Notice of New
Supporting Authority citing two Eastern District of New York
("E.D.N.Y.") cases. On July 29, 2021, the Court held oral argument.
On Aug. 4, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a response to the Supplemental
Authority Letter.

Discussion

To succeed on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must establish: "(1) she
is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the
defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a
'debt' as the FDCPA defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated
a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt."
Therefore, the only issue before the Court is whether the Defendant
violated any provisions of the FDCPA during collection.

A. Section 1692g(a)(1)

Section 1692g(a)(1) requires a debt collector to send a consumer a
written notice containing "the amount of the debt" either in the
initial communication with the consumer or within five days after
the initial communication. In the case, the Plaintiff acknowledges
the Letter was the initial written communication the Plaintiff
received from the Defendant concerning the alleged debt. While he
does not dispute the Letter provided him with notice of an amount
of the debt owed, the Plaintiff disputes he owed the amount of
$518.95 as indicated in the Letter. The Defendant argues (1) the
Plaintiff's claim is time-barred; and (2) the Plaintiff fails to
assert a cognizable claim under Section 1692g(a)(1).

Judge Martinotti first turns to the Defendant's argument that the
Plaintiff's Section 1692g(a)(1) claim is time-barred by the
one-year statute of limitations under 15 U.S.C. Section 1692k(d).
Construing the factual allegations in the original Complaint in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as the Court must, the Judge
finds the Plaintiff raised the debt amount issue in the original
Complaint and therefore, any allegation in the Amended Complaint
concerning an issue with the debt amount is not considered
time-barred.

Next, Judge Martinotti turns to the merits of the Plaintiff's
claim. According to the Plaintiff, to comply with 15 U.S.C. Section
1692g(a)(1), a statement of 'the amount of the debt' must
accurately convey the actual amount of the debt. The Judge holds
that this "accurately convey" requirement is not evident in the
statute's plain language. Further, the Plaintiff offers no legal
authority for this alleged requirement, so the Judge need not
consider the Plaintiff's argument on the accuracy of debt amount.
In any case, as the Court already determined in its prior Opinion,
"read in its entirety, the Letter unambiguously identifies the
current creditor by name and provides the Plaintiff with his
account number and the amount of the debt allegedly owed. This is
more than sufficient to satisfy Section 1692g(a)(1)-(2)." be sure,
this provision of the statute is a notice provision, which is
satisfied in the case because the Letter unambiguously conveys
notice as to the amount of the debt allegedly owed.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth, the Plaintiff's Section
1692g(a)(1) claim against the Defendant is dismissed with
prejudice.

B. Section 1692g(a)(2)

Section 1692g(a)(2) requires, "within five days after the initial
communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of
any debt, a debt collector will send the consumer a written notice
containing (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed."
In essence, the Plaintiff asserts the Letter violated 15 U.S.C.
Section 1692g(a)(2) because he was unfamiliar with the current
owner of the debt (LVNV) identified in the Letter.

Judge Martinotti finds that under the text of Section 1692g(a)(2),
the debt collector must simply identify the name of the creditor to
whom the debt is currently owed. Further, to the extent the
Plaintiff asserts he did not consent or ratify the assignment of
the alleged debt from Comenity to LVNV, such a claim cannot be the
basis for an FDCPA violation either. The FDCPA does not require
that the consumer consent to the creditor's assignment of a debt to
another party.

In any event, the Judge holds that the Plaintiff would be
hard-pressed to show the Letter did not effectively convey the
transfer of debt from the original creditor to the current
creditor. Indeed, the Letter very clearly provides in a black,
bolded box in the right-hand corner of the Letter, the name of the
"original creditor" and the name of the "current owner" of the
debt. The Plaintiff is simply unable to demonstrate how the Letter
failed to effectively communicate the "true identity of the current
creditor or why the least sophisticated debtor would otherwise be
misled by the challenged letter."

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Section 1692g(a)(2) claim against the
Defendant is dismissed with prejudice.

C. Sections 1692(e), 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10)

Section 1692e mandates a "debt collector may not use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection
with the collection of any debt." "A debt collection letter is
deceptive where it can be reasonably read to have two or more
different meanings, one of which is inaccurate."

The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant violated Sections 1692e,
1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) by using unfair or unconscionable means
to collect or attempt to collect the debt. Specifically, he
alleges: (1) because the Defendant misstated the amount of the debt
alleged in the Letter, the Defendant violated Sections 1692e,
1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10); and (2) because the Defendant did not
provide an explanation of its relationship to the debt, it violated
Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). The Defendant argues the
Amended Complaint fails to allege how Defendant engaged in
collection efforts that amounted to false, deceptive, or misleading
statements in violation of Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and
1692e(10).

First, because the Plaintiff alleges the debt amount is misstated,
Judge Martinotti finds the allegation, at this stage, sufficient to
amount to a false representation under Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A),
and 1692e(10). Second, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the
Letter failed to effectively communicate or mislead him as to the
identity of the current creditor. Accordingly, only the Plaintiff's
Sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), and 1692e(10) claims premised on the
Defendant's alleged misstatement of the amount of the alleged debt
owed may move forward. The Plaintiff's other claims based on the
Defendant's alleged failure to explain the transfer of the alleged
debt and/or its relationship to the alleged debt are dismissed with
prejudice.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Martinotti granted in part and
denied in part the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate
order follows.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/4mmrsvky from Leagle.com.


ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION: Placide Seeks Minimum Wages for Drivers
------------------------------------------------------------------
Gabe Placide, On Behalf of Himself and Those Similarly Situated v.
Roadrunner Transportation Services, Inc.; Doe Corporation 1–10;
John Doe 1–10, Case No. 2:21-cv-01004-JPS (E.D. Wis., Aug. 27,
2021) seeks redress for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Truth-in-Leasing Act, the Ohio Constitution, Article II,
Section 34a, the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, and unjust enrichment for
failing to pay required minimum wages and unlawfully deducting
amount from the wages of drivers that Defendants misclassified as
independent contractors.

Roadrunner is a domestic corporation which is owned and operated by
related individuals and entities for a common business purpose:
transportation of freight for Roadrunner customers. To accomplish
its business purpose, Roadrunner relies on hundreds, if not
thousands, of long-haul, interstate truck drivers to deliver
freight for Roadrunner's customers across the United States.

Roadrunner utilizes company drivers -- i.e., drivers that
Roadrunner classifies as employees (hereafter Employee Drivers")
--and drivers that Roadrunner misclassifies as independent
contractors ("Drivers").

According to its website, Roadrunner "is one of the nation's
largest transportation companies," provides "services to customers
all over North America," has "annual revenues exceeding
$400,000,000." According to the Roadrunner website, Roadrunner has
"more than 1,000 drivers on the road." Roadrunner "operates 21
service centers in all major metros."

According to the complaint, Roadrunner's classification of Drivers
as independent contractors forms a significant part of a labor
scheme crafted to pay its Drivers less than the minimum wage
required by federal and Ohio law, to shift Roadrunner's business
expenses and risk to the Drivers, and to defeat all federal and
state protections for employees, such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, and wage protection statutes such as the FLSA
and similar state statutes.

By allegedly misclassifying Drivers as independent contractors,
Roadrunner also evades the tax burdens that it would bear for
employees—e.g., Social Security, Federal Unemployment Tax, etc.
-- which burdens are also shifted to the misclassified Drivers.

By unlawfully treating Drivers as independent contractors,
Roadrunner obtains a competitive advantage over competitor trucking
companies that properly treat their drivers as employees and pay
required wages and taxes in compliance with federal and state law,
added the suit.

As one of the nation's largest trucking companies, Roadrunner's
alleged unlawful practices drive down wages across the trucking
industry and undercut fair labor practices throughout the United
States.

Since at least 2018, if not before, Roadrunner knowingly
misclassified Drivers, including Plaintiff and proposed class
members, as independent contractors, failed to pay them
statutorily-required minimum wages, and made unlawful deductions
from their earned compensation.

The Plaintiff brings his federal minimum wage claims under the
collective action provision of the FLSA as set forth in 29 U.S.C.
section 216(b).[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Phil Krzeski, Esq.
          Andrew R. Biller, Esq.
          Andrew P. Kimble, Esq.
          Philip J. Krzeski, Esq.
          Nathan B. Spencer, Esq.
          Riley E. Kane, Esq.
          BILLER & KIMBLE, LLC
          www.billerkimble.com
          8044 Montgomery Rd., Ste. 515
          Cincinnati, OH 45236
          Telephone: (513) 715-8711
          Facsimile: (614) 340-4620
          E-mail: akimble@billerkimble.com
                  abiller@billerkimble.com
                  pkrzeski@billerkimble.com
                  nspencer@billerkimble.com
                  rkane@billerkimble.com

               - and -

          Joseph M. Lyon, Esq.
          THE LYON FIRM
          2754 Erie Ave.
          Cincinnati, OH 45208
          E-mail: jlyon@thelyonfirm.com

ROBERT BOSCH: Faces V.I.P. Suit Over Electronic Braking Systems
---------------------------------------------------------------
V.I.P. MOTOR CARS LTD., McGRATH AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC., HODGES
IMPORTED CARS, INC. d/b/a HODGES SUBARU, PATSY LOU CHEVROLET, INC.,
LANDERS McLARTY LEE'S SUMMIT MO, LLC d/b/a LEE'S SUMMIT CHRYSLER
DODGE JEEP RAM and d/b/a LEE'S SUMMIT NISSAN, RENO DODGE SALES,
INC. d/b/a DON WEIR'S RENO DODGE, and JOHN GREENE CHRYSLER DODGE
JEEP, LLC, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, and ROBERT BOSCH LLC, Case No.
2:21-cv-12000-NGE-APP (E.D. Mich., Aug. 27, 2021) is a class action
for damages, injunctive relief, and other relief pursuant to
federal antitrust laws and state antitrust, unfair competition,
consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws.

This lawsuit is brought as a proposed class action against the
Defendants Robert Bosch GmbH and Robert Bosch LLC (together,
"Bosch" or "Defendants"), named co-conspirators Continental AG,
Continental Teves AG & Co. OHG, Continental Automotive GmbH, and
Continental Automotive Systems, Inc., and unnamed co-conspirators,
manufacturers, and/or suppliers of Electronic Braking Systems
globally and in the United States, for engaging in a long-running
conspiracy to unlawfully fix, artificially raise, maintain and/or
stabilize prices, rig bids for, and allocate the market and
customers in the United States for Electronic Braking Systems.

According to the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the
Defendants' and their co-conspirators' conspiracy successfully
targeted the United States automotive industry, raising prices for
car manufacturers and automobile dealers alike.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent all automobile dealers that,
during the period from and including February 13, 2007 through such
time as the anticompetitive effects of the Defendants' conduct
ceased (the "Class Period"), purchased a new four-wheeled passenger
automobile, van, sport utility vehicle, crossover, or pickup truck
("Vehicle") in the United States which included one or more
Electronic Braking System as a component part, which were
manufactured or sold by the Defendants, any current or former
subsidiary of Defendants, or any co-conspirator of the Defendants.

Braking systems are an essential input for car manufacturers. There
are two main braking systems available: Electronic Braking
Systems—the subject of this complaint -- and hydraulic braking
systems.

Both systems are made up of additional component parts. Electronic
braking systems prevent cars from skidding by providing electronic
stability controls when braking (anti-lock braking system or "ABS")
or under all driving conditions (electronic stability control or
"ESC").

Hydraulic braking systems consist of an actuation system and a
foundation system. The actuation system is further made up of a
brake booster and main brake cylinder, while the foundation system
is further made up of a disc brake with saddle or drum brake and
wheel brake cylinder. Both Electronic Braking Systems and hydraulic
braking systems can be contained within the same vehicle.

The Defendants manufacture, market, and/or sell Electronic Braking
Systems throughout and into the United States. Defendants and their
co-conspirators agreed, combined, and conspired to fix, raise,
maintain and/or stabilize prices, rig bids, and allocate the market
and customers in the United States for Electronic Braking Systems.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gerard V. Mantese, Esq.
          Kathryn R. Eisenstein, Esq.
          MANTESE HONIGMAN P.C.
          1361 E. Big Beaver Road
          Troy, MI 48083
          Telephone: (248) 457-9200
          E-mail: gmantese@manteselaw.com
                  keisenstein@manteselaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan W. Cuneo, Esq.
          Joel Davidow, Esq.
          Daniel Cohen, Esq.
          Victoria Sims, Esq.
          Yifei Li, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          Suite 200
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          E-mail: jonc@cuneolaw.com
                  joel@cuneolaw.com
                  danielc@cuneolaw.com
                  vicky@cuneolaw.com
                 evelyn@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Don Barrett, Esq.
          David McMullan, Esq.
          BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A.
          P.O. Box 927
          404 Court Square
          Lexington, MS 39095
          Telephone: (662) 834-2488
          E-mail: dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com
                  dmcmullan@barrettlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Shawn M. Raiter, Esq.
          LARSON KING, LLP
          2800 Wells Fargo Place
          30 East Seventh Street
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (651) 312-6500
          E-mail: sraiter@larsonking.com

               - and -

          Gerard V. Mantese, Esq.
          Kathryn R. Eisenstein, Esq.
          MANTESE HONIGMAN P.C.
          1361 E. Big Beaver Road
          Troy, MI 48083
          Telephone: (248) 457-9200
          E-mail: gmantese@manteselaw.com
                  keisenstein@manteselaw.com

               - and -

          Don Barrett, Esq.
          David McMullan, Esq.
          BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A.
          P.O. Box 927
          404 Court Square
          Lexington, MS 39095
          Telephone: (662) 834-2488
          E-mail: dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com
                  dmcmullan@barrettlawgroup.com

SAGINAW, MI: Summary Judgment for Hoskins in Taylor Suit Affirmed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. CITY OF SAGINAW, MICHIGAN;
TABITHA HOSKINS, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Case Nos.
20-1538, 20-1588 (6th Cir.), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirms the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Hoskins, reverses regarding the City, and
remands for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Background

The City of Saginaw routinely chalked car tires to enforce its
parking regulations. In the Sixth Circuit's prior opinion, it held
that doing so is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that
"based on the pleadings stage of this litigation, two exceptions to
the warrant requirement -- the 'community caretaking' exception,
and the motor-vehicle exception -- do not apply," citing Taylor v.
City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2019) (Taylor I).
However, the Sixth Circuit left for another day whether the search
could be justified by "some other exception" to the warrant
requirement.

Plaintiff Taylor received several parking tickets from Defendant
City of Saginaw for leaving her car in its downtown area beyond the
time allowed by city ordinance. Each time, Defendant Hoskins
chalked the tire of Taylor's vehicle several hours before issuing
the ticket. Every ticket noted the time Taylor's vehicle was first
"marked" with chalk in the regulated area. Hoskins also documented
the ticket with one or more photographs of the offending vehicle.

Plaintiff Taylor filed this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 complaint
against the City and Hoskins as a putative class action, alleging
that the tire chalking violated her Fourth Amendment rights as
construed by United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). At the
motion-to-dismiss phase, the district court held that tire chalking
fell within the automobile and/or community caretaking exceptions
and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, Taylor moved for class
certification, and the Defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the Defendants' motion, denied the
Plaintiff's class-certification motion as moot, and entered
judgment in the Defendants' favor. The Plaintiff timely appealed,
and the Defendants cross-appealed.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Fourth Amendment
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of the Supreme Court, is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials."

To determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, the
Sixth Circuit asks two primary questions: First, whether the
alleged government conduct constitutes a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment; and second, whether the search was
reasonable.

A.

As the Sixth Circuit held in Taylor I, "chalking is a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes" under the property-based Jones test. And
it sees no reason to depart from that conclusion, which was a
logical extension of the Court's holding in Jones that a physical
trespass to a constitutionally protected area with the intent to
obtain information is a search under the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Because tire chalking is a search that defendants conducted without
an authorizing warrant, it is presumptively unreasonable. However,
the warrant requirement is "subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." It is the government's
burden to establish the applicability of an exception to the
warrant requirement. Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit
focuses solely on the applicability of the administrative-search
exception.

The Sixth Circuit holds that the administrative-search exception
does not justify the City's suspicionless chalking of car tires to
enforce its parking regulations. It finds that tire chalking is not
necessary to meet the ordinary needs of law enforcement, let alone
the extraordinary. In concluding otherwise, the Sixth Circuit
opines that the district court went astray in three significant
respects.

First, it treated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim as a broad
challenge to the City's ability to regulate parking through its
police powers. The issue, rather, is whether the City's chosen
means for exerting that civil authority violates the Fourth
Amendment. Second, it also seemingly placed the burden on Taylor to
demonstrate that the City's parking ordinances were "unreasonable."
But once Taylor established that tire chalking is a search, the
burden shifted to the Defendants to establish the reasonableness of
the search by demonstrating the applicability of an exception to
the warrant requirement. Third, the district court applied the
wrong law when it relied on Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979),
to condone the Defendants' tire-chalking practice, stating "the
City's use of chalk was reasonable because it is in the public
interest to enforce parking regulations and the 'severity of the
interference with individual liberty' is minimal." Brown is not an
administrative-search case (or even a search case at all), and the
balancing test it prescribes has no application to these facts.

The Sixth Court expresses no opinion on the remaining exceptions to
the warrant requirement because it is "a court of review, not first
view."

C.

The Sixth Circuit concludes by addressing whether Hoskins is
entitled to qualified immunity. "Because qualified immunity is "an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability it is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial." Accordingly, qualified immunity should be resolved at the
"earliest possible stage in litigation." For that reason, the Sixth
Circuit exercises its discretion to resolve Hoskins' invocation of
qualified immunity, which was raised below but not resolved by the
district court.

The Sixth Circuit explains that qualified immunity attaches when an
official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Therefore, the clearly established right must be defined
with "specificity," and not "at a high level of generality."
"Notice to officials is paramount; the salient question in
evaluating the clearly established prong is whether officials had
fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional." The focus
must be "whether the violative nature of particular conduct is
clearly established in light of the specific context of the case."

Once raised by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden to
overcome qualified immunity. Taylor attempts to do so by arguing
that "it was clearly apparent after Jones that any physical
intrusion upon a vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information
of its activities without a warrant constitutes a Fourth Amendment
violation."

The Sixth Circuit disagrees. It says, although there need not
always be "a case directly on point for a right to be clearly
established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate." Jones did not do that.
Every reasonable parking officer would not understand from Jones
that suspicionless chalking of car tires violates the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, Hoskins is entitled to qualified immunity.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit holds that because it concludes that it does not,
it reverses the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the City. But because it concludes that the alleged
unconstitutionality of suspicionless tire chalking was not clearly
established, the City's parking officer, Defendant Hoskins, is
entitled to qualified immunity.

For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit affirms in part, reverses in
part, and remands for further proceedings consistent with its
Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/mffuns3k from Leagle.com.

ARGUED: Philip L. Ellison -- pellison@olcplc.com -- OUTSIDE LEGAL
COUNSEL PLC, in Hemlock, Michigan, for the
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Kailen C. Piper -- kpiper@owdpc.com -- O'NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE
P.C., in Saginaw, Michigan, for the Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

ON BRIEF: Philip L. Ellison, OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL PLC, Hemlock,
Michigan, Matthew E. Gronda -- matthewgronda@gmail.com -- in St.
Charles, Michigan, for the Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Kailen C. Piper, O'NEILL, WALLACE & DOYLE P.C., in Saginaw,
Michigan, for the Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Daniel T. Woislaw -- DWoislaw@pacificlegal.org -- PACIFIC LEGAL
FOUNDATION, in Sacramento, California, for Amicus Curiae.


SELLAS LIFE: Settlement Reached in Suit Over Abstral Promos
-----------------------------------------------------------
SELLAS Life Sciences Group, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for
the quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the company has
reached a settlement in principle with the plaintiffs in the
consolidated putative shareholder securities class action suit
related to Abstral(R).

On February 13, 2017, certain putative shareholder securities class
action complaints were filed in federal court alleging, among other
things, that Galena and certain of Galena's former officers and
directors failed to disclose that Galena's promotional practices
for Abstral(R) (fentanyl sublingual tablets) were allegedly
improper and that Galena may be subject to civil and criminal
liability, and that these alleged failures rendered Galena's
statements about its business misleading.

The actions were consolidated, lead plaintiffs were named by the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey and a
consolidated complaint was filed.

The Company filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated complaint.
On August 21, 2018, the Company's motion to dismiss the
consolidated complaint was granted without prejudice to file an
amended complaint.

On September 20, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
On October 22, 2018, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. On November 13, 2019, the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey granted the Company's motion to
dismiss without prejudice to file an amended complaint. On December
20, 2019, the lead plaintiffs filed a second Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint. On January 29, 2020, the Company filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

On January 5, 2021, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted the Company's motion to dismiss without prejudice to
file an amended complaint.

On February 18, 2021, the lead plaintiffs filed a third Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint.

The Company has reached a settlement in principle with the
plaintiffs in this action which is subject to final documentation
and court approval and which will be fully covered by the Company's
directors and officers insurance policy applicable to this case.

SELLAS Life Sciences Group, Inc., a clinical-stage
biopharmaceutical company, focuses on the development of novel
cancer immunotherapies for various cancer indications. SELLAS is
headquartered in New York.


SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: Certiorari Petition Filed in Saxon FLSA Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. filed with the Supreme Court of
United States a petition for a writ of certiorari in the matter
styled SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. Petitioner v. LATRICE SAXON
Respondent, Case No. 21-309.

Response is due on September 30, 2021.

The Defendant petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in the case titled Latrice Saxon v. Southwest Airlines
Company, Case No. 19-3226. The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment compelling arbitration and remanded for
further proceedings on March 31, 2021.

The question presented is: Whether workers who load or unload goods
from vehicles that travel in interstate commerce, but do not
physically transport such goods themselves, are interstate
"transportation workers" exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)?

Ms. Saxon is a ramp agent supervisor for Southwest at Chicago's
Midway Airport. Ms. Saxon and Southwest entered into an agreement
to arbitrate wage disputes arising out of her employment. Despite
that agreement, Ms. Saxon filed a putative collective action
against Southwest under the FLSA, arguing she need not honor her
arbitration agreement because she is a "member of a class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" and exempted by
Section 1 of the FAA.

After Ms. Saxon filed her putative collective action, Southwest
moved to dismiss the suit in favor of arbitration. Ms. Saxon argued
that she is a transportation worker exempt from arbitration under
the FAA because she is responsible for loading and unloading goods
for transportation. Southwest countered that she falls outside the
Section 1 exemption because she does not personally move goods
across state lines or manage those who do. Provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement restrict her ability to load and
unload goods, which she may do on only a minimal basis, the suit
says.

The district court agreed with Southwest. After acknowledging a
divergence among the federal courts, the district court held that
"the linchpin for classification as a transportation worker. . . is
actual transportation, not merely handling goods." After finding
that Ms. Saxon "did not physically transport goods at all, let
alone out-of-state," the court held that she does not qualify for
the exemption.

Ms. Saxon appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court
explained that a worker's exemption under Section 1 hinges on
"whether the interstate movement of goods is a central part of the
class members' job description." In answering that question, the
court found that any performance of "[l]oading and unloading cargo
onto a vehicle so that it may be moved interstate. . . is actual
transportation," even if the worker does not actually transport the
goods. Further, the court determined that "[t]he act of loading
cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself
commerce," explaining that "cargo-loading work is interstate or
foreign commerce." As such, the court held that "cargo loaders
generally are a class of workers engaged in the actual
transportation of goods," and supervisors who occasionally load and
unload passenger baggage "in turn, are airplane cargo loaders and
members of that class, and thus engaged in commerce for purposes of
Section 1."

The Seventh Circuit denied Southwest's request to stay issuance of
the mandate pending the filing of a petition for certiorari with
the Court. This petition followed.[BN]

Defendant-Appellee-Petitioner Southwest Airlines Co. is represented
by:

          Melissa Anne Siebert, Esq.
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
          111 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4700
          Chicago, IL 60606
          E-mail: masiebert@shb.com

STATE FARM: Appeals Class Cert. Bid Ruling in Elegant Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al.,
filed an appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled
ELEGANT MASSAGE, LLC d/b/a LIGHT STREAM SPA, on behalf of itself
and all others similarly situated v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Case
No. 2:20-cv-00265-RAJ-RJK, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia at Norfolk.

On May 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the instant suit. On June 21,
2020, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In its amended
complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that it has owned and operated
Light Stream Spa since 2016, which provides therapeutic massages in
Virginia Beach, Virginia. On July 22, 2019, State Farm sold an
insurance policy to Plaintiff. The Policy issued to Plaintiff is an
"all risk" commercial property policy, which covers loss or damage
to the covered premises resulting from all risks other than those
expressly excluded. The Policy was effective through July 22, 2020
and Plaintiff paid an annual premium of $475.00.

The lawsuit is brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendants,
individually and on behalf of all persons or entities in the United
States who purchased State Farm-branded "all risk" commercial
property insurance policies that included Loss of Income and Extra
Expense Coverage and were denied claims for lost business income
and extra expenses as a result of social distancing guidance and
closure/stay-at-home orders issued in connection with the COVID-19
global pandemic.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 25, 2021, the Hon.
Judge Raymond A. Jackson entered an order:

   1. granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's
      motion for class certification;

   2. denying the Plaintiff's motion to certify a declaratory
      Judgment Class;

   3. certifying the following class:

      "All persons or entities in the Commonwealth of Virginia
      with a Businessowners insurance policy issued by State
      Farm on Form CMP-4100, including a Loss of Income and
      Extra Expense endorsement on Form CMP 4705.1 or CMP
      4705.2, or with the same or substantially similar terms,
      in effect at any time between March 23, 2020 through June
      30, 2020, and who submitted claims for business income
      losses and/or extra expenses incurred as a result of
      social distancing, closure and/or stay-at-home orders
      issued from March 2020 forward, which Defendants denied."

   4. directing the Defendants to provide to Plaintiff's counsel
      the names, last known addresses, home and mobile phone
      numbers, and email addresses of all potential members of
      the certified class within 15 days of the date of this
      Order; and

   5. directing the Plaintiff's counsel shall circulate notices
      of pendency and consent to joinder to all potential
      members of the certified class upon the Court's approval
      of the form of notice;

The Defendants now seek a review of Judge Jackson's order.

The appellate case is captioned as State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company v. Elegant Massage, LLC, Case No. 21-255, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, filed on
Aug. 31, 2021.[BN]

Defendants-Petitioners STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY are represented
by:

          Theodore Ira Brenner, Esq.
          Alexander Spotswood de Witt, Esq.
          FREEBORN & PETERS, LLP
          901 East Byrd Street
          Richmond, VA 23219
          Telephone: (804) 644-1300
          E-mail: tbrenner@freeborn.com
                  adewitt@freeborn.com   

               - and -

          Joseph Anthony Cancila, Jr., Esq.
          James Patrick Gaughan, Esq.
          Rodney Perry, Esq.
          RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP
          70 West Madison Street
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Telephone: (312) 471-8700

               - and -

          Douglas Webber Dunham, Esq.
          Bert Wolff, Esq.
          DECHERT, LLP
          3 Battery Park
          1095 Avenue of the Americas
          New York, NY 10036-6797
          Telephone: (212) 698-3500

               - and -

          Christina Guerola Sarchio, Esq.
          DECHERT LLP
          1900 K Street NW
          Washington, DC 20006-1110
          Telephone: (202) 261-3465

Plaintiff-Respondent ELEGANT MASSAGE, LLC, d/b/a Light Stream Spa,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, is
represented by:

          James Edward Cecchi, Esq.
          Donald Andrew Ecklund, Esq.
          Zachary Allen Jacobs, Esq.
          Lindsey Handley Taylor, Esq.  
          CARELLA, BYRNE, CECCHI, OLSTEON,
           BRODY & AGNELLO, PC
          5 Becker Farm Road
          Roseland, NJ 07068
          Telephone: (973) 994-1700

               - and -

          Eric Gerard, Esq.
          Tyler Stephen Graden, Esq.
          Jordan Elizabeth Jacobson,. Esq.
          Natalie Lesser, Esq.
          Jamie Mitchell McCall, Esq.
          Lauren McGinley, Esq.
          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.  
          Melissa L. Troutner, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK, LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087-0000
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          E-mail: nlesser@ktmc.com
                  jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  mtroutner@ktmc.com   

               - and -

          Michael Andrew Glasser, Esq.
          Marc Christian Greco, Esq.
          Kip Andrew Harbison, Esq.
          William Hanes Monroe, Jr., Esq.
          GLASSER & GLASSER
          Crown Center
          580 East Main Street
          Norfolk, VA 23510-0000
          Telephone: (757) 625-6787
          E-mail: michael@glasserlaw.com
                  marcg@glasserlaw.com
                  bill@glasserlaw.com

STERLING JEWELERS: Faces Kimbro Suit Over False Diamond Weights
---------------------------------------------------------------
THOMAS KIMBRO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. STERLING JEWELERS INC., d/b/a JARED THE GALLERIA OF
JEWELRY, Case No. 1:21-cv-23038-MGC (S.D. Fla., Aug. 23, 2021) is a
class action against the Defendant for overstating diamond weights
on jewelry sold in Jared the Galleria of Jewelry physical stores,
as well as through its website www.jared.com.

The Defendant is a specialty jewelry company headquartered in
Akron, Ohio. The Defendant is the parent company of approximately
at least one dozen store brands operating in the United States,
including "Jared the Galleria of Jewelry."

During the class period, Defendant systematically inflated the
total weights of uncertified diamonds knowing that the average
consumer would have no way of knowing that the weights were
inflated prior to purchase.

According to the Federal Trade Commission, when diamond weight is
stated as a decimal figure, diamond weights must be accurate to the
last decimal place. Likewise, there are certain requirements when
diamond weight is stated as a fraction.

Allegedly, the Defendant's diamond weights, when displayed in
decimal numbers, are not accurate to the last decimal point.
Similarly, Defendant's diamond weights, when displayed as
fractional parts of a carat, are not accompanied by a conspicuous
disclosure of the fact that the diamond weight is not exact, nor is
it accompanied by a disclosure of the weight tolerance used by
Defendant.

The Plaintiff purchased a diamond ring from Defendant at its retail
location in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida on or about August 11,
2018.

The Defendant operates approximately 200 retail "Jared the Galleria
of Jewelry Stores" nationwide, including over 20 stores in the
State of Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. Citron, Esq.
          MAC LEGAL, P.A.
          4601 Sheridan Street, Suite 205
          Hollywood, FL 33021
          Telephone: (954) 395-2954
          E-mail: Michael@maclegalpa.com
          Service@maclegalpa.com

               - and -

          Igor Hernandez, Esq.
          CORNISH HERNANDEZ GONZALEZ, PLLC
          2525 Ponce de Leon Blvd, Suite 300
          Coral Gables, FL 33134
          Telephone: (305) 780-6058
          E-mail: service@CHGLawyers.com
                  ihernandez@chglawyers.com

               - and -

          Ely R. Levy, Esq.
          Venessa Valdes Solis, Esq.
          LEVY & PARTNERS, PLLC
          3230 Stirling Road, Suite 1
          Hollywood, FL 33021
          Telephone: (954) 727-8570
          E-mail: elevy@lawlp.com
                  venessa@lawlp.com
                  Maritza@lawlp.com

STUART'S LANDSCAPING: Krause Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, WWPCL
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BRENT KRAUSE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. STUART'S LANDSCAPING & GARDEN CENTER, INC., Case No.
21-cv-986 (E.D. Wis., Aug. 23, 2021) is a collective and class
action brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and
the Wisconsin's Wage Payment and Collection Laws.

The suit is brought by Mr. Krause, on behalf of himself and all
other similarly situated current and former non-exempt employees of
Defendant, Stuart's Landscaping & Garden Center, Inc., for purposes
of obtaining relief under the FLSA and WWPCL for unpaid overtime
compensation, unpaid agreed upon wages, liquidated damages, costs,
attorneys' fees, declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any
such other relief the Court may deem appropriate.

Defendant is headquartered in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and is a
privately-owned company that provides landscaping and gardening
services.

The Defendant operated (and continues to operate) an unlawful
compensation system that deprived and failed to compensate
Plaintiff and all other current and former non-exempt employees for
all hours worked and work performed each workweek, including at an
overtime rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in
a workweek, by:

   (1) shaving time (via electronic timeclock rounding) from
       hourly-paid, non-exempt employees' weekly timesheets for
       pre-shift, post-shift, and in-shift hours worked and/or work

       performed, to the detriment of said employees and to the
       benefit of Defendant, in violation of the FLSA and WWPCL;
       and

   (2) misclassifying non-exempt employees as salaried-exempt when,

       in reality, they performed non-exempt job duties each work
       day and each workweek and were entitled overtime rate of pay

       for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, in

       violation of the FLSA and WWPCL.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          Facsimile: (262) 565-6469
          E-Mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com

T-MOBILE US: Fails to Protect Customers' Personal Info, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DEIRDRE C. DONOVAN, BETH BYRD, KEVIN CURRAN, and ALLAN SPIELMAN,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
T-Mobile US, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Case No. 2:21-cv-01138
(W.D. Wash., Aug. 23, 2021) is a class action complaint on behalf
of customers harmed as a result of T-Mobile's failure to safeguard
and protect its customers' highly sensitive and personal
information.

According to the complaint, T-Mobile assures its customers that it
uses "administrative, technical, contractual, and physical
safeguards designed to protect [customers'] data while it is under
[T-Mobile's] control."

Despite T-Mobile's strong customer growth, T-Mobile has repeatedly
failed to safeguard the information of its customers responsible
for its success, with regularly recurring instances of data
security deficiencies, the lawsuit says.

In its latest failure, as a result of T-Mobile's alleged lax
security protocols, hackers gained access to multiple T-Mobile
servers and were able to steal the personal information of millions
of customers, including their Social Security numbers, phone
numbers, addresses, unique International Mobile Equipment Identity
("IMEI") numbers (unique 15-digit codes that precisely identify the
device), and Drivers' License numbers (hereinafter referred to as
the "Data Breach.").

As one of the United States' largest wireless carriers, T-Mobile
currently claims to have over 104.8 million customers as of the
second quarter of 2021.

T-Mobile has touted its superior technology to persuade consumers
to purchase its services. T-Mobile states that it "is the leader in
5G," offering 5G download speeds, upload speeds, and availability,
among other things. T-Mobile's efforts have resulted in wireless
coverage that reaches over a hundred million people, representing
the best customer growth in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals whose personal information
was stolen in the Data Breach. The Plaintiffs and Class members
seek remedies including reimbursement of losses due to identity
theft, fraud, and other-out-of-pocket costs; compensation for time
spent responding to the Data Breach; credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; and injunctive relief requiring an overhaul of
T-Mobile's security systems to lessen the chance that another data
security incident is just around the corner.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 N. 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, WA 98103
          Telephone: (206) 206‐816‐6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319‐5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Betsy C. Manifold, Esq.
          Rachele R. Byrd, Esq.
          Marisa C. Livesay, Esq.
          Brittany N. Dejong, Esq.
          Carl V. Malmstrom, Esq.
          WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER
          FREEMAN & HERZ LLP
          750 B Street, Suite 1820
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 239-4599
          Facsimile: (619) 234-4599
          E-mail: byrd@whafh.com
                  malmstrom@whafh.com

T-MOBILE US: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Harper Suit Alleges
----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL HARPER, SUE HARPER, MELANIE JAQUESS, CHUCK SALLADE, AND
MICHAEL MALONE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. T-Mobile US, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Case No.
2:21-cv-01169 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 27, 2021) is a class action
complaint on behalf of customers harmed as a result of T-Mobile's
failure to safeguard and protect its customers' highly sensitive
and personal information.

According to the complaint, T-Mobile assures its customers that it
uses "administrative, technical, contractual, and physical
safeguards designed to protect [customers'] data while it is under
[T-Mobile's] control."

Despite T-Mobile's strong customer growth, T-Mobile has repeatedly
failed to safeguard the information of its customers responsible
for its success, with regularly recurring instances of data
security deficiencies, the lawsuit says.

In its latest failure, as a result of T-Mobile's alleged lax
security protocols, hackers gained access to multiple T-Mobile
servers and were able to steal the personal information of millions
of customers, including their Social Security numbers, phone
numbers, addresses, unique International Mobile Equipment Identity
("IMEI") numbers (unique 15-digit codes that precisely identify the
device), and Drivers' License numbers (hereinafter referred to as
the "Data Breach.").

As one of the United States' largest wireless carriers, T-Mobile
currently claims to have over 104.8 million customers as of the
second quarter of 2021.

T-Mobile has touted its superior technology to persuade consumers
to purchase its services. T-Mobile states that it "is the leader in
5G," offering 5G download speeds, upload speeds, and availability,
among other things. T-Mobile's efforts have resulted in wireless
coverage that reaches over a hundred million people, representing
the best customer growth in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals whose personal information
was stolen in the Data Breach. The Plaintiffs and Class members
seek remedies including reimbursement of losses due to identity
theft, fraud, and other-out-of-pocket costs; compensation for time
spent responding to the Data Breach; credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; and injunctive relief requiring an overhaul of
T-Mobile's security systems to lessen the chance that another data
security incident is just around the corner.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N. Powell, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1200 Fifth Avenue, Suite 1700
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: jdennett@tousley.com
                  kstephens@tousley.com
                  jdennett@tousley.com
                  kpowell@tousley.com

               - and -

          Samuel M. Ward, Esq.
          Stephen R. Basser, Esq.
          BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE
          600 West Broadway, Suite 900
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 230-0800
          Facsimile: (619) 230-1874
          E-mail: sbasser@barrack.com
                  sward@barrack.com

               - and -

          Jordan L. Lurie, Esq.
          Ari Y. Basser, Esq.
          POMERANTZ LLP
          1100 Glendon Avenue, 15 th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90024
          Telephone: (310) 432-8492
          E-mail: jllurie@pomlaw.com
                  abasser@pomlaw.com

               - and -

          John G. Emerson, Esq.
          EMERSON FIRM, PLLC
          2500 Wilcrest, Suite 300
          Houston, TX 77042
          Telephone: (800) 551-8649
          Facsimile: (501) 286-4659
          E-mail: jemerson@emersonfirm.com

               - and -

          I. Stephen Rabin, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF I. STEPHEN RABIN
          Mohican Lane
          Irvington, NY 10533
          Telephone: (212) 880-3722
          E-mail: isteverabin@gmail.com

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customer's Info, Villalon Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ania Villalon, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-01148 (W.D. Wash.,
Aug. 24, 2021) is a class action complaint on behalf of customers
harmed as a result of T-Mobile's failure to safeguard and protect
its customers' highly sensitive and personal information.

According to the complaint, T-Mobile assures its customers that it
uses "administrative, technical, contractual, and physical
safeguards designed to protect [customers'] data while it is under
[T-Mobile's] control."

Despite T-Mobile's strong customer growth, T-Mobile has repeatedly
failed to safeguard the information of its customers responsible
for its success, with regularly recurring instances of data
security deficiencies, the lawsuit says.

In its latest failure, as a result of T-Mobile's alleged lax
security protocols, hackers gained access to multiple T-Mobile
servers and were able to steal the personal information of millions
of customers, including their Social Security numbers, phone
numbers, addresses, unique International Mobile Equipment Identity
("IMEI") numbers (unique 15-digit codes that precisely identify the
device), and Drivers' License numbers (hereinafter referred to as
the "Data Breach.").

As one of the United States' largest wireless carriers, T-Mobile
currently claims to have over 104.8 million customers as of the
second quarter of 2021.

T-Mobile has touted its superior technology to persuade consumers
to purchase its services. T-Mobile states that it "is the leader in
5G," offering 5G download speeds, upload speeds, and availability,
among other things. T-Mobile's efforts have resulted in wireless
coverage that reaches over a hundred million people, representing
the best customer growth in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals whose personal information
was stolen in the Data Breach. The Plaintiffs and Class members
seek remedies including reimbursement of losses due to identity
theft, fraud, and other-out-of-pocket costs; compensation for time
spent responding to the Data Breach; credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; and injunctive relief requiring an overhaul of
T-Mobile's security systems to lessen the chance that another data
security incident is just around the corner.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Beth E. Terrell, Esq.
          TERRELL MARSHALL LAW GROUP PLLC
          936 N. 34th Street, Suite 300
          Seattle, Washington 98103
          Telephone: (206) 206‐816‐6603
          Facsimile: (206) 319‐5450
          E-mail: bterrell@terrellmarshall.com

               - and -

          Kevin Laukaitis, Esq.
          Jonathan Shub, Esq.
          SHUB LAW FIRM LLC
          134 Kings Highway East, 2nd Floor
          Haddonfield, NJ 08033
          Telephone: (856) 772-7200
          Facsimile: (856) 210-9088
          E-mail: klaukaitis@shublawyers.com
                  jshub@shublawyers.com

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Peralta Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
STEPHANIE PERALTA, BRIAN GRADY, AND MICHAEL JONES, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
Case No. 5:21-cv-00838-HE (W.D. Okla, Aug. 24, 2021) is a class
action complaint on behalf of customers harmed as a result of
T-Mobile's failure to safeguard and protect its customers' highly
sensitive and personal information.

According to the complaint, T-Mobile assures its customers that it
uses "administrative, technical, contractual, and physical
safeguards designed to protect [customers'] data while it is under
[T-Mobile's] control."

Despite T-Mobile's strong customer growth, T-Mobile has repeatedly
failed to safeguard the information of its customers responsible
for its success, with regularly recurring instances of data
security deficiencies, the lawsuit says.

In its latest failure, as a result of T-Mobile's alleged lax
security protocols, hackers gained access to multiple T-Mobile
servers and were able to steal the personal information of millions
of customers, including their Social Security numbers, phone
numbers, addresses, unique International Mobile Equipment Identity
("IMEI") numbers (unique 15-digit codes that precisely identify the
device), and Drivers' License numbers (hereinafter referred to as
the "Data Breach.").

As one of the United States' largest wireless carriers, T-Mobile
currently claims to have over 104.8 million customers as of the
second quarter of 2021.

T-Mobile has touted its superior technology to persuade consumers
to purchase its services. T-Mobile states that it "is the leader in
5G," offering 5G download speeds, upload speeds, and availability,
among other things. T-Mobile's efforts have resulted in wireless
coverage that reaches over a hundred million people, representing
the best customer growth in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals whose personal information
was stolen in the Data Breach. The Plaintiffs and Class members
seek remedies including reimbursement of losses due to identity
theft, fraud, and other-out-of-pocket costs; compensation for time
spent responding to the Data Breach; credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; and injunctive relief requiring an overhaul of
T-Mobile's security systems to lessen the chance that another data
security incident is just around the corner.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          Tyler J. Bean, Esq.
          Molly E. Brantley, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Ave.
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239-2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com
                  tjb@federmanlaw.com
                  meb@federmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Cornelius Dukelow, Esq.
          ABINGTON COLE + ELLERY
          320 South Boston Avenue, Suite 1130
          Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
          Telephone: (918) 588-3400
          E-mail: cdukelow@abingtonlaw.com

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Customers' Info, Simaan Suit Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
DANIEL SIMAAN, individually and on behalf of all others similar
situated, Plaintiff v. T-MOBILE USA, INC., Defendant, Case No.
2:21-cv-01181 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 31, 2021) is brought by the
Plaintiff to seek compensation under the California Consumer
Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) and principles of common law negligence,
unjust enrichment, breach of implied contract, and breach of
confidence, for their damages and those of fellow class members.

On August 16, 2021, T-Mobile admitted it was the subject of yet
another massive data breach that affected millions of its
customers. The customer personal identifying information (PII) that
the hackers sold and continue to market for sale is believed to
include: customers' names, addresses, social security numbers,
driver's license information, phone numbers, dates of birth,
security PINs, phone numbers, and, for some customers, unique MSI
and MEI numbers (embedded in customer mobile devices that identify
the device and the SIM card that ties that customer's device to a
telephone number) -- all going back as far as the mid-1990s, says
the suit.

Allegedly, the Defendant violated the CCPA by failing to prevent
Plaintiff's and Class members' non-encrypted PII from unauthorized
access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of
Defendant's violations of its duty to implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information.

As a current T-Mobile customer since at least June 2014, Mr. Simaan
was notified by T-Mobile that he was among the customers targeted
by, and believes his PII was accessed without authorization,
exfiltrated, and/or stolen in the data breach.

T-Mobile USA, Inc., doing business under the global brand name
T-Mobile, is an American wireless network operator.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kim D. Stephens, Esq.
          Jason T. Dennett, Esq.
          Kaleigh N. Powell, Esq.
          TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
          1200 Fifth Avenue, Ste. 1700
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 682-5600
          Facsimile: (206) 682-2992
          E-mail: kstephens@tousley.com
                  jdennett@tousley.com
                  kpowell@tousley.com

               - and -

          Jason S. Hartley, Esq.
          HARTLEY LLP
          101 W. Broadway, Suite 820
          San Diego, CA 92101
          Telephone: (619) 400-5822
          Facsimile: (619) 400-5832
          E-mail: hartley@hartleyllp.com

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Savick Suit Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
NORMA SAVICK AND MARK SAVICK, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated persons and on behalf of the general public v.
T-MOBILE USA, INC., Case No. 3:21-cv-16005-ZNQ-DE (W.D. Wash., Aug.
24, 2021) is a class action complaint on behalf of customers harmed
as a result of T-Mobile's failure to safeguard and protect its
customers' highly sensitive and personal information.

According to the complaint, T-Mobile assures its customers that it
uses "administrative, technical, contractual, and physical
safeguards designed to protect [customers'] data while it is under
[T-Mobile's] control."

Despite T-Mobile's strong customer growth, T-Mobile has repeatedly
failed to safeguard the information of its customers responsible
for its success, with regularly recurring instances of data
security deficiencies, the lawsuit says.

In its latest failure, as a result of T-Mobile's alleged lax
security protocols, hackers gained access to multiple T-Mobile
servers and were able to steal the personal information of millions
of customers, including their Social Security numbers, phone
numbers, addresses, unique International Mobile Equipment Identity
("IMEI") numbers (unique 15-digit codes that precisely identify the
device), and Drivers' License numbers (hereinafter referred to as
the "Data Breach.").

As one of the United States' largest wireless carriers, T-Mobile
currently claims to have over 104.8 million customers as of the
second quarter of 2021.

T-Mobile has touted its superior technology to persuade consumers
to purchase its services. T-Mobile states that it "is the leader in
5G," offering 5G download speeds, upload speeds, and availability,
among other things. T-Mobile's efforts have resulted in wireless
coverage that reaches over a hundred million people, representing
the best customer growth in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals whose personal information
was stolen in the Data Breach. The Plaintiffs and Class members
seek remedies including reimbursement of losses due to identity
theft, fraud, and other-out-of-pocket costs; compensation for time
spent responding to the Data Breach; credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; and injunctive relief requiring an overhaul of
T-Mobile's security systems to lessen the chance that another data
security incident is just around the corner.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Laurence M. Rosen, Esq.
          THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A
          One Gateway Center, Suite 2600
          Newark, NJ 07102
          Telephone: (973) 313-1887
          Facsimile: (973) 833-0399
          E-mail: lrosen@rosenlegal.com

               - and -

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 N. Pennsylvania Ave.
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239-2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Cornelius Dukelow, Esq.
          ABINGTON COLE + ELLERY
          320 South Boston Avenue, Suite 1130
          Tulsa, OK 74103
          Telephone: (918) 588-3400
          E-mail: cdukelow@abingtonlaw.com

T-MOBILE USA: Fails to Protect Personal Info, Winkler Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID WINKLER AND CORY BARTON, individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated persons and on behalf of the general public v.
T-MOBILE USA, INC., Case No. 7:21-cv-00322 (S.D. Tex., Aug. 26,
2021) is a class action complaint on behalf of customers harmed as
a result of T-Mobile's failure to safeguard and protect its
customers' highly sensitive and personal information.

According to the complaint, T-Mobile assures its customers that it
uses "administrative, technical, contractual, and physical
safeguards designed to protect [customers'] data while it is under
[T-Mobile's] control."

Despite T-Mobile's strong customer growth, T-Mobile has repeatedly
failed to safeguard the information of its customers responsible
for its success, with regularly recurring instances of data
security deficiencies, the lawsuit says.

In its latest failure, as a result of T-Mobile's alleged lax
security protocols, hackers gained access to multiple T-Mobile
servers and were able to steal the personal information of millions
of customers, including their Social Security numbers, phone
numbers, addresses, unique International Mobile Equipment Identity
("IMEI") numbers (unique 15-digit codes that precisely identify the
device), and Drivers' License numbers (hereinafter referred to as
the "Data Breach.").

As one of the United States' largest wireless carriers, T-Mobile
currently claims to have over 104.8 million customers as of the
second quarter of 2021.

T-Mobile has touted its superior technology to persuade consumers
to purchase its services. T-Mobile states that it "is the leader in
5G," offering 5G download speeds, upload speeds, and availability,
among other things. T-Mobile's efforts have resulted in wireless
coverage that reaches over a hundred million people, representing
the best customer growth in the industry.

The Plaintiffs seek to remedy these harms on behalf of themselves
and all similarly situated individuals whose personal information
was stolen in the Data Breach. The Plaintiffs and Class members
seek remedies including reimbursement of losses due to identity
theft, fraud, and other-out-of-pocket costs; compensation for time
spent responding to the Data Breach; credit monitoring and identity
theft insurance; and injunctive relief requiring an overhaul of
T-Mobile's security systems to lessen the chance that another data
security incident is just around the corner.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William B. Federman, Esq.
          FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD
          10205 North Pennsylvania Avenue
          Oklahoma City, OK 73120
          Telephone: (405) 235-1560
          Facsimile: (405) 239-2112
          E-mail: wbf@federmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Cornelius Dukelow, Esq.
          ABINGTON COLE + ELLERY
          320 South Boston Avenue, Suite 1130
          Tulsa, OK 74103
          Telephone: (918) 588-3400
          E-mail: cdukelow@abingtonlaw.com

TAUCK INC: Connecticut Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Beermann Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JON BEERMANN, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. TAUCK, INC. D/B/A TAUCK WORLD
DISCOVERY, Defendant, Case No. 3:20-cv-00713 (JAM) (D. Conn.),
Judge Jeffrey Alker Meyer of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut grants Tauck's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff Beermann wanted a travel adventure to Japan, and so he
booked a trip for him and his wife with the Defendant. Tauck is a
company based in Connecticut and that operates world-wide guided
tours and cruises.

Mr. Beermann booked the trip in July 2019 at which time he paid
Tauck more than $29,000 for a tour that was set to start in April
2020. For an added fee of $1,598, Beermann also paid Tauck for a
"protection plan" that would allow him a refund if he decided to
cancel his plans. But then the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, and
Tauck cancelled the Japan tour in March 2020. Tauck refunded
Beermann the more than $29,000 that he had paid for the tour.
Tauck, however, declined to refund the $1,598 that Beermann had
paid for the protection plan.

Mr. Beermann has now filed the class action lawsuit on behalf of
himself and other Tauck customers nationwide whose tours were
cancelled but who were denied refunds of the fees they paid for a
protection plan.

The complaint alleges multiple claims. Count One alleges a claim
for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Count
Two alleges a claim for conversion. Count Three alleges a claim for
civil theft. Count Four alleges a claim for violation of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Count Five alleges
as an alternative to the CUTPA claim a violation of the unfair
trade practice statutes of all of the States other than Connecticut
and Florida. Count Six alleges as an alternative to the CUTPA claim
a violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act. Count Seven alleges a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
Lastly, Count Eight alleges a claim for unjust enrichment.

Tauck now moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

Discussion

Count One - Declaratory Judgment Act

Count One alleges a claim for a declaratory judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
Section 2201. Beermann requests that "the Court declares that Tauck
is required to stop advising consumers falsely of its 'policy'
concerning non-refundability of Protection Plan premiums and
further disclose to consumers that they are entitled to refunds."

Judge Meyer holds that although the Declaratory Judgment Act allows
a court to declare the legal rights of the parties, a court's
authority to do so "does not extend to the declaration of rights
that do not exist under law," and therefore a declaratory judgment
must "rely on a valid legal predicate." Because Beermann has failed
to allege plausible grounds for relief as to any of his substantive
claims, the Judge will dismiss his claim for declaratory relief
under the Declaratory Judgment Act as alleged in Count One.

Count Two - Conversion

Count Two alleges a common law claim for conversion. Under
Connecticut law (which the parties do not dispute applies to all
the claims in this action), a conversion occurs "when one, without
authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property
belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights." "The
essence of the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff
have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with
his right of dominion and to his harm." Thus, "a claim for
conversion may be brought when the relationship is one of bailor
and bailee but not when it is one of debtor and creditor."

For his conversion claim, Beermann alleges that Tauck and other
class members "paid for Tauck's Protection Plan in connection with
their purchase of Tauck Tours" and that he and the other class
members "have an undisputed right to immediate refunds, in lieu of
vouchers or future credits, for Protection Plans purchased in
connection with trips canceled by Tauck."

Judge Meyer finds that neither these allegations nor any other
allegations in the complaint suggest that the refunds sought are of
monies that at all times belonged to Beermann or other Plaintiffs.
To the contrary, the monies once paid to Tauck belonged to Tauck
and only later were allegedly subject to refund upon the occurrence
of a future event (the cancellation of the tour). Because Beermann
at best alleges a debtor-creditor dispute about a mere obligation
to pay money (a refund), he has not alleged facts to plausibly
support a conversion claim. Accordingly, the Judge will dismiss
Beermann's claim for conversion as alleged in Count Two.

Count Three - Civil Theft

Count Three alleges a claim for civil or statutory theft in
violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 52-564. "The elements of
civil theft are largely the same as the elements to prove the tort
of conversion, but theft requires a plaintiff to prove the
additional element of intent over and above what he or she must
demonstrate to prove conversion."

Because Beermann has not alleged facts to support a plausible claim
for conversion, he has therefore not alleged a plausible claim for
civil theft. Accordingly, Judge Meyer will dismiss Beermann's claim
for civil or statutory theft as alleged in Count Three.

Count Four - CUTPA

Count Four alleges a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (CUTPA). This statute prohibits in relevant part any
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce," and it allows for a private cause of action by "any
person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property,
real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method,
act or practice" that is unfair or deceptive.

Mr. Beermann argues that the nature of the parties' relationship
gave rise to a duty to disclose, because Tauck acted as Beermann's
travel agent and assumed a fiduciary duty to act in Beermann's best
interest. Beermann also argues that it was deceptive for Tauck to
tell him after he made a demand for refund of the protection plan
that Tauck had always had a "policy" of no refunds of the
protection plan when in fact Tauck allegedly had no such
established policy.

All in all, Beermann has not alleged facts to plausibly support a
claim of a deceptive or unfair business act or practice by Tauck
that has caused Beermann any ascertainable loss, Judge Meyer holds.
Tauck has not alleged facts that plausibly show unfairness. Tauck
has not plausibly alleged facts to show any substantial injury to
consumers, which is the third factor courts consider when
evaluating CUTPA unfairness claims. Accordingly, Judge Meyer will
dismiss Beermann's CUTPA claim as alleged in Count Four.
Counts Five and Six - Multi-State Consumer Protection Laws

Counts Five and Six allege violations of the unfair trade practices
acts of Florida and all States other than Connecticut. But, as
Beermann acknowledges, these consumer protection laws of other
States are not materially different from CUTPA. "Courts sitting in
diversity may properly rely on the forum state's law where neither
party asserts that another jurisdiction's law meaningfully
differs." Accordingly, because Beermann has failed to allege
plausible grounds for relief under CUTPA and because he does not
point to any meaningful difference in the standards applied by the
consumer protection laws of other States, Judge Meyer will grant
Tauck's motion to dismiss the multi-state unfair trade practice act
claims as alleged in Counts Five and Six.

Count Seven - Negligent Misrepresentation

Count Seven alleges a claim for negligent misrepresentation. An
action for negligent misrepresentation "requires the plaintiff to
establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact
(2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, and (3)
that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and
(4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result."

Mr. Beermann alleges that Tauck engaged in a negligent
misrepresentation because it "failed to disclose, concealed,
suppressed, and omitted material information concerning the
Protection Plan at the time of purchase, including Tauck's 'policy'
that premiums were nonrefundable in all circumstances, and
specifically, if Tauck chose to unilaterally cancel the Tour."
Beermann further alleges that "in its ongoing communications with
its customers, Tauck's continuing reliance and use of a `policy'
that appears nowhere in any of the relevant documents to justify
its improper retention of policy premiums constitutes a continuing
material misrepresentation and omission to Plaintiff and Class
members."

These are the same allegations advanced to support Beermann's CUTPA
claim, and Judge Meyer concludes for the reasons discussed, that
Tauck did not have a duty to disclose that the protection plan fee
would not be refunded if Tauck cancelled the tour. Similarly, he
concludes that any post-denial-of-refund misrepresentation by Tauck
about whether it had a pre-existing "policy" not to refund
protection plan fees did not cause any loss to Beermann.
Accordingly, the Judge will grant Tauck's motion to dismiss the
negligent misrepresentation claim as alleged in Count Seven.

Count Eight - Unjust Enrichment

Count Eight alleges a claim for unjust enrichment. Unjust
enrichment is a "broad and flexible remedy" by which a plaintiff
may seek to recover a benefit that the defendant received unjustly
and for which "no remedy is available by an action on the
contract." A plaintiff must prove three elements to sustain an
unjust enrichment claim: first, that the defendant was benefited;
second, that the defendant unjustly failed to pay the plaintiff for
the benefit; and third, that the failure to pay was to the
plaintiff's detriment.

The same reasons that Judge Meyer has discussed with respect to
Beermann's CUTPA claim show that there is no plausible merit to his
claim for unjust enrichment. Beermann does not suggest that Tauck
had an unjust or unfair reason for cancelling the tour, and
Beermann ultimately received a larger refund from Tauck's
cancellation of the tour than he would have received had he
exercised his right on the same date to cancel his participation in
the tour under the terms of the protection plan. Alas, in light of
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is little reason to
believe he would not have inevitably cancelled his reservation if
Tauck had not acted first to cancel the tour. Accordingly, the
facts do not plausibly establish that Tauck was unjustly enriched,
and the Judge will dismiss Tauck's claim for unjust enrichment as
alleged in Count Eight.

Conclusion

For the reasons he set forth, Judge Meyer grants the motion to
dismiss. The Clerk of Court will close the case. If Beermann
believes there are grounds to file an amended complaint that
overcomes the concerns stated in this ruling, then he may file a
motion to re-open along with an amended complaint within 30 days of
the Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/44nwbaj7 from Leagle.com.


TIBERIAS FOR STUDENTS: Sotoy Seeks Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
----------------------------------------------------------------
ROGELIO SOTOY, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated v. TIBERIAS FOR STUDENTS LLC (D/B/A TIBERIAS), STERNBACH
HOLDINGS, LLC (D/B/A TIBERIAS), OHREL STERNBACH, and ELROM
STERNBACH, Case No. 1:21-cv-07264 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 30, 2021) seeks
to recover for unpaid minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Defendants paid Mr. Sotoy his wages
in cash. From May 2017 until on or about March 2020, the Defendants
paid Plaintiff Sotoy a fixed salary of $30 per day. The Defendants
never granted Plaintiff Sotoy any breaks or meal periods of any
kind. Plaintiff Sotoy was not required to keep track of his time,
nor to his knowledge, did the Defendants utilize any time tracking
device such as punch cards, that accurately reflected his actual
hours worked, says the suit.

The Defendants' alleged pay practices resulted in Plaintiff Sotoy
not receiving payment for all his hours worked, and resulted in
Plaintiff Sotoy’s effective rate of pay falling below the
required minimum wage rate.

Plaintiff Sotoy and all other tipped workers were paid at a rate
that was lower than the lower tip-credit rate by Defendants.

In violation of federal and state law as codified above, the
Defendants classified Plaintiff Sotoy and other tipped workers as
tipped employees, and paid them at a rate that was lower than the
lower tip-credit rate when they should have classified them as
non-tipped employees and paid them at the minimum wage rate, says
the suit.

Mr. Sotoy was employed as a delivery worker at the restaurant
located at 45 East 34th Street, New York.

The Defendants operate a Kosher restaurant located in the Murray
Hill section of Manhattan in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

TOUHY FRUITY: Fails to Provide Proper Overtime Pay, Vasquez Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
JACLYN VASQUEZ, AND CHARNETTE NUTALL on behalf of themselves and
all other plaintiffs similarly situated, known and unknown v. TOUHY
FRUITY, INC., KEVIN TAN-HUNG DUONG, INDIVIDUALLY AND KELLI DUONG,
INDIVIDUALLY, Case No. 1:21-cv-04637 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 30, 2021) is
an action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois
Minimum Wage Law, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act.

The Plaintiff says she received only her straight time pay for all
hours worked in excess of 40 in individual work weeks and did not
receive an overtime premium for overtime eligible hours worked over
40 in individual work weeks. She was regularly denied overtime pay
by Defendants for hours worked over 40 per work week, she
contends.

Ms. Vasquez is a former employee of Defendants who, between
approximately June 2020 and April 2021, was employed by the
Defendants as a kitchen worker and manager. The Plaintiff performed
duties such as food preparation, cooking and general kitchen duties
for Defendants as assigned by Defendants.

TFI owns and operates two food court restaurants located at 3333 W
Touhy Ave., 2nd Floor in Lincolnwood, Illinois. TFI's restaurants
serve a variety of smoothies, teas, ice cream, pho soups, and other
food and beverage items. TFI is engaged in selling and serving
prepared food and beverages to customers for consumption on and off
its premises. The Individual Defendants are the owners of the
company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John W. Billhorn, Esq.
          Samuel D. Engelson, Esq.
          BILLHORN LAW FIRM
          53 West Jackson Blvd., Suite 401
          Chicago, IL 60604
          Telephone: (312) 853-1450

TPUSA INC: Fails to Provide Proper OT Wages, Voltaire Suit Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
ROSE VOLTAIRE, on behalf of herself and all other similarly
situated v. TPUSA, INC., a Foreign Profit Corporation (d/b/a)
TELEPERFORMANCE, Case No. 0:21-cv-61826-XXXX (S.D. Fla., Aug. 30,
2021) is a collective action complaint brought by the Plaintiff, on
behalf of himself and those similarly situated call center
employees who were employed at the Defendant's call centers, to
recover for Defendant's willful violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.

The Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, were subjected to
Defendant's policy and practice of failing to compensate its call
center employees for their necessary pre-shift and post-lunch
activities, which resulted in the failure to properly compensate
them as required under applicable federal and state laws.

Further, Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, worked more than
40 hours per workweek without receiving the proper overtime pay for
all their overtime hours worked because Defendant failed to
properly calculate the overtime pay rate to include
non-discretionary bonuses, says the suit.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an hourly Customer
Service Representative ("CSR") and was hired from on or around
October 16, 2017 through February 26, 2020, in Defendant's North
Lauderdale, Florida call center. The Plaintiff's primary job duties
included, but were not limited to, answering calls.

TPUSA provides telecommunication services. The Company offers
outsourced customer relationship management services.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Noah E. Storch, Esq.
          RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.
          10368 W. State Road 84, Suite 103
          Davie, FL 33324
          Telephone: (866) 344-9243
          Facsimile: (954) 337-2771
          E-mail: noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

TREVENA INC: Settlement in PA Consolidated Suit Gets Final Nod
--------------------------------------------------------------
Trevena, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 12, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended June 30, 2021, that the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has granted final approval
of the settlement in the consolidated suit filed by investors.

In October and November 2018, the Company and certain current and
former officers and directors were sued in three purported class
actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, or the EDPA, alleging violations of the federal
securities laws.

In January 2019, the three lawsuits were consolidated into one
action, and on May 29, 2019, the District Court appointed a group
of five individual investors as lead plaintiffs.

A consolidated amended complaint was filed on August 2, 2019,
alleging, among other things, that the Company and two former
officers made false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and prospects, including certain
statements made relating to the Company's End-of-Phase 2 meeting
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and certain statements
concerning top-line results from the Company's Phase 3 studies.

The plaintiffs seek, among other remedies, unspecified damages,
attorneys' fees and other costs, and unspecified equitable or
injunctive relief. On August 28, 2020, the EDPA granted in part and
denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. On October 2,
2020, the Company and the individual defendants filed their answer
to the amended complaint, denying all liability.

On February 11, 2021, the parties agreed in principle to a
settlement, which is subject to approval by the Court, and the
Court issued its preliminary approval of the settlement on May 3,
2021 and finally approved the settlement on August 2, 2021.

The Company and the individual defendants do not acknowledge any
wrongdoing as part of the settlement, and a monetary payment of
$8.5 million will be made to the plaintiffs and their counsel, all
of which will be funded by the Company's insurance carriers.

The Company has recorded the $8.5 million estimated settlement
liability and the $8.5 million estimated insurance recovery in its
2020 financial statements.

The Company continues to believe that the claims are without merit,
and if necessary, the Company intends to vigorously defend itself
and its former officers against the allegations.

Trevena, Inc., a biopharmaceutical company, focuses on the
development and commercialization of treatment options that target
and treat diseases affecting the central nervous system. The
company was founded in 2007 and is headquartered in Chesterbrook,
Pennsylvania.


TRULIEVE INC: Appeals Class Cert. Ruling in Lyttle FCRA Suit
------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Trulieve, Inc. filed an appeal from a court ruling
entered in the lawsuit styled LOGAN LYTTLE, on his own behalf and
on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff v.
TRULIEVE, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation, Defendant, Case No.
8:19-cv-02313-CEH-TGW, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Aug. 27, 2021, Judge
Charlene Edwards Honeywell granted in part and denied in part the
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification filed in the case.

Mr. Lyttle, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
brought this Fair Credit Reporting Act action against Trulieve.
Trulieve conducts background checks on job applicants as part of a
standard screening process. It also occasionally conducts
background checks on employees during the course of their
employment. In April of 2019, Lyttle applied for employment with
Trulieve. Trulieve procured Lyttle's consumer report from Personal
Security Concepts, LLC. Lyttle did not know the nature or scope of
Trulieve's investigation into his background.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Aug. 27 order entered by
Judge Edwards.

The appellate case is captioned as Trulieve, Inc. v. Logan Lyttle,
Case No. 21-90023, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, filed on Aug. 30, 2021.[BN]

Defendant-Petitioner TRULIEVE, INC., a Florida Profit Corporation,
is represented by:

          Glenn Thomas Burhans, Jr., Esq.
          Christopher Roy Clark, Esq.
          STEARNS WEAVER MILLER WEISSLER ALHADEFF
           & SITTERSON, PA
          106 E College Ave Ste 700
          Tallahassee, FL 32301
          Telephone: (850) 328-4850

               - and -

          Janet Goldberg McEnery, Esq.
          MACFARLANE FERGUSON & MCMULLEN, PA
          201 N Franklin St Ste 2000
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 273-4200

               - and -

          Andrew W. McLaughlin, Esq.
          STEARNS WEAVER MILLER WEISSLER ALHADEFF
           & SITTERSON, PA
          401 E Jackson St. Suite 2200
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-4800

Plaintiff-Respondent LOGAN LYTTLE, on his own behalf and behalf of
all similarly situated individuals, is represented by:

          Luis Antonio Cabassa, Esq.
          Brandon Hill, Esq.
          WENZEL FENTON CABASSA, PA
          1110 N. Florida Ave. Suite 300
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 440-4593
          E-mail: lcabassa@wfclaw.com
                  bhill@wfclaw.com

               - and -

          Marc R. Edelman, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, PA
          201 N Franklin St. Floor 7
          Tampa, FL 33602
          Telephone: (813) 223-5505
          Facsimile: 813-257-0572
          E-mail: MEdelman@forthepeople.com

UNITED STATES: Partial Dismissal of Brigida Suit v. FAA Denied
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, ANDREW J. BRIGIDA, et al., Plaintiffs v. PETE
BUTTIGIEG, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Defendant, Case
No. 16-cv-2227 (DLF) (D.D.C.), Judge Dabney L. Friedrich of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denies Federal
Aviation Administration's Motion to Dismiss in Part the Plaintiffs'
Fourth Amended Complaint.

Background

Plaintiffs Andrew Brigida and Matthew Douglas-Cook, on behalf of
themselves and a putative class, assert employment discrimination
claims against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, et
seq.

The FAA's mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world. To help execute this mission, the
FAA employs Air Traffic Controller Specialists (ATCS). ATCSs carry
out thousands of air traffic control actions daily and require
significant training to prepare for a job with zero margin for
error. The FAA hires air traffic controllers from multiple sources,
including military veterans and members of the general public.
Because of the number of controllers needed, the difficulty of the
training, and the demands of the role, in 1991, the FAA also
established the Air Traffic-Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI
or CTI) program, entering into "partnership agreements with
colleges, universities, and other schools (collectively, CTI
institutions) to administer" the AT-CTI program. According to the
Plaintiffs, CTI institutions provide students with an air traffic
curriculum that includes approximately 200 hours of classroom
instruction.

In the years following the program's creation, AT-CTI candidates
proved successful, and the FAA "actively encouraged potential
applicants to pursue CTI training as the primary means of obtaining
employment as an air traffic controller." By 2008, the FAA used a
separate hiring process for qualified CTI candidates. Graduates of
CTI institutions who were U.S. citizens, received their
institution's recommendation, were below a maximum age, and who
"passed a validated air traffic aptitude test, known as the Air
Traffic Control Selection and Training examination," were "eligible
to apply for CTI-only job postings." Those who scored 85 and above
on the AT-SAT were classified as "well-qualified," while candidates
who scored between 70 and 84.9 were classified as "qualified."

From these three recruitment pipelines -- the general public,
veterans, and AT-CTI candidates -- the FAA "built a substantial
inventory of eligible air traffic controller applicants with
varying degrees of experience and education." The Plaintiffs
allege, however, that "CTI Qualified Applicants received hiring
preference or were more likely to be hired for ATCS positions," and
that CTI students were significantly more likely to succeed once
hired as a trainee and to ultimately obtain "Certified Professional
Controller" status than those hired from the general public.

Allegedly in response to outside pressure, over the course of 2012
and 2013, the FAA conducted a "barrier analysis for the ATCS
positions," to determine whether the existing hiring processes
served to discourage hiring minority applicants. Though the
Plaintiffs characterize it as "deeply flawed and outcome-driven,"
the report determined that "African American applicants comprise
only 5% of the CTI pool compared to an average of 34% African
American representation across the non-CTI applicant sources."

In response to this analysis, in 2014, the FAA implemented several
changes to its hiring process for air traffic controllers,
eliminating CTI-only vacancy announcements, creating a new testing
and evaluation process, and ending its consideration of prior
applicants in the FAA's inventory of eligible applicants. These
changes form the basis of the case.

According to the Plaintiffs, they "had legitimate expectations for
their hiring after they invested thousands of dollars and years of
time to graduate from FAA-partnered academic programs, and pass
FAA-designed, peer-validated, and proctored aptitude tests in order
to be prequalified for hiring as FAA Air Traffic Control
Specialists (ATCS)." The Plaintiffs allege that the FAA violated
Title VII when it "purged" its "merit-based hiring preference for
Qualified Applicants for Air Traffic Controllers with the intent
and purpose of benefitting African American Air Traffic Controller
applicants and hindering the Class members."

The FAA then violated Title VII again when it "implemented" a
"Biographical Questionnaire into the 2014 Air Traffic Controller
hiring process with the intent and purpose of benefitting African
American Air Traffic Controller applicants and hindering the Class
members." The Plaintiffs claim that in so doing "the FAA refused to
accept the outcome of a race-neutral hiring process solely because
of the racial makeup of the successful applicants," and in its
place, created a new "race-motivated hiring scheme."

The Plaintiffs further allege that to accomplish its objective of
limiting the hiring of qualified non-African American CTI
candidates, "the FAA intentionally slowed its hiring in 2012 and
2013 in anticipation of abandoning the CTI Qualified Applicant
hiring preference." Indeed, according to the Plaintiffs, the FAA
"issued a CTI-only ATCS job posting in August of 2012" but "no
hires were made as a result of that posting." These actions were
taken even though the FAA's "hiring plan required the FAA to hire
over 1,000 controllers per year in calendar years 2012, 2013, and
2014." When the FAA opened the "new general public announcement for
the ATCS positions" on Feb. 10, 2014, "approximately 4,000 CTI
graduates took the Biographical Questionnaire" but "less than 14%
of them passed."

Plaintiff Brigida is a Caucasian male, a resident of Arizona, and
an August 2013 graduate of Arizona State University, a CTI
institution. Brigida passed the AT-SAT on April 3, 2013 "with the
top numerical score possible of 100%." Following the FAA's changes
in the air traffic controller hiring process, he took and failed
the newly implemented Biographical Questionnaire in 2014.

Plaintiff Matthew Douglas-Cook, a Native American male, resident of
the State of Washington, and December 2013 graduate of another CTI
institution, also took and passed the AT-SAT, recording the top
numerical score possible. He too subsequently failed the
Biographical Questionnaire. Neither Brigida nor Douglas-Cook was
hired by the FAA as an air traffic controller.

Analysis

The FAA contends that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged
that they were either employees or applicants for employment at the
time the FAA changed its process for appointing air traffic
controllers. As a result, the FAA argues that the Plaintiffs cannot
state a claim under Title VII because the FAA cannot be said to
have taken any employment action, let alone one that was adverse.

A. Applicant Requirement

The parties disagree over when CTI candidates became "applicants"
for purposes of Title VII. The Plaintiffs contend they became
applicants at the point they took the AT-SAT. On the other hand,
the FAA argues that the Plaintiffs were never applicants because
they did not respond to any specific vacancy announcement, and the
FAA "had a highly structured process that only considered those who
responded to specific public vacancy announcements."

Reading the complaint as a whole and crediting all inferences in
favor of the plaintiffs, as the Court must at this stage, Judge
Friedrich holds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged they
were "applicants for employment." The Plaintiffs were U.S. citizens
who had graduated from CTI schools and passed the AT-SAT. They had
been tracked by the FAA, and were part of the FAA's preapproved
inventory of applicants. Neither, however, was able to complete the
application process because the FAA declined to open a vacancy and
then purged its preapproved list of candidates, allegedly for
discriminatory reasons.

Thus, "unlike the typical employment situation where an individual
applies for a particular opening," the Judge holds that the
Plaintiffs were "applicants for Controller positions that could
have become vacant at any time." Consistent with decisions in the
Circuit, and based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the Judge
must reject the FAA's bright-line vacancy response position.

B. Adverse Employment Action Requirement

In the alternative, the FAA argues that, because "Title VII
protects equal treatment, not preferential treatment," the FAA's
decision to withdraw the separate hiring process previously
afforded CTI-applicants was not an adverse employment action.

Judge Friedrich holds that the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged,
at least at this stage, that they "experienced materially adverse
consequences affecting future employment opportunities." The
complaint alleges more than the mere withdrawal of a preference.
Instead, the allegations describe the FAA's decision to abolish,
for allegedly discriminatory purposes, a purportedly race-neutral
application process that the FAA designed and implemented and in
which the plaintiffs had invested substantial time, energy, and
resources at the encouragement of the FAA itself. These
allegations, the Judge finds, mirror those in cases that have found
Title VII violations where an application process was redesigned
solely to change the racial composition of the successful applicant
pool.

Concludes

Because the Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they were
applicants who were subjected to an adverse employment action,
Judge Friedrich denies the FAA's partial motion to dismiss. A
separate order consistent with this decision accompanies the
Memorandum Opinion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Memorandum Opinion is
available at https://tinyurl.com/ypx9s4a2 from Leagle.com.


UNIV. OF SOUTH FLORIDA: Files Appeal in Moore Tuition Refund Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Defendant UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES filed an
appeal from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit styled
VALERIEMARIE MOORE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, Case No. 21-CA-002445, in the Circuit Court of the
Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Hillsborough County.

The lawsuit is brought over Defendant's alleged failure to offer
partial tuition refunds to students after canceling in-person
classes because of COVID-19.

The appellate case is captioned as UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES vs. VALERIEMARIE MOORE, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Case No. 2D21-2685, in the
Florida Second District Court of Appeal, filed on August 30,
2021.[BN]

WALMART INC: Appeals Arbitration Bid Denial in Johnson Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Defendant Walmart Inc. filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit styled KEVIN JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated Plaintiff v. WALMART INC., Defendant,
Case No. 1:20-cv-01360-DAD-JLT, in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California, Fresno.

The Plaintiff asserts that in July 2018, he ordered a set of tires
from Walmart via the Walmart.com website. He claims that while the
tires were being installed at a Walmart location in Cuero, Texas,
he purchased a lifetime tire rotation and balancing plan. He also
contends that in advertising the plan on its website, Walmart
"promises to provide tire balancing and rotation services every
7,500 miles for the life of qualified tires from the original
purchase date." Based on this promise on Walmart's website,
Plaintiff allegedly purchased the lifetime tire rotation and
balancing plan. After obtaining tire rotation and balancing
services in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied such
services in 2020, due to COVID-19 safety protocols. On that basis,
he asserts a claim for breach of contract on behalf of himself and
a putative nationwide class, and a claim for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing on behalf of a putative California
subclass.

The Defendant now seeks a review of the Court's Order dated July
30, 2021, denying its motion to compel arbitration.

The appellate case is captioned as Kevin Johnson v. Walmart Inc.,
Case No. 21-16423, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, filed on Aug. 31, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Walmart Inc. Mediation Questionnaire was due
September 7, 2021;

   -- Appellant Walmart Inc. opening brief is due on October 25,
2021;

   -- Appellee Kevin Johnson answering brief is due on November 24,
2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

Defendant-Appellant WALMART INC. is represented by:

          Aileen McGrath, Esq.
          Michael J. Stortz, Esq.
          AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP
          580 California Street, Suite 1500
          San Francisco, CA 94104-1036
          Telephone: (415) 765-9553
          E-mail: mstortz@akingump.com

Plaintiff-Appellee KEVIN JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, is represented by:

          Stephanie Emi Yasuda, Esq.
          Kenneth H. Yoon, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH H. YOON
          One Wilshire Boulevard
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-3383
          Telephone: (213) 612-0988
          E-mail: syasuda@yoonlaw.com
                  kyoon@yoon-law.com

ZF TRW: Faces V.I.P. Motor Suit Over Electronic Braking Systems
---------------------------------------------------------------
V.I.P. MOTOR CARS LTD., McGRATH AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC., HODGES
IMPORTED CARS, INC. d/b/a HODGES SUBARU, PATSY LOU CHEVROLET, INC.,
LANDERS McLARTY LEE'S SUMMIT MO, LLC d/b/a LEE'S SUMMIT CHRYSLER
DODGE JEEP RAM and d/b/a LEE'S SUMMIT NISSAN, RENO DODGE SALES,
INC. d/b/a DON WEIR'S RENO DODGE, and JOHN GREENE CHRYSLER DODGE
JEEP, LLC, et al., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP., ZF FRIEDRICHSHAFEN
AG, LUCAS AUTOMOTIVE GMBH, ROBERT BOSCH GMBH, and ROBERT BOSCH LLC,
Case No. 2:21-cv-12002-GCS-APP (E.D. Mich., Aug. 27, 2021) is a
class action for damages, injunctive relief, and other relief
pursuant to federal antitrust laws and state antitrust, unfair
competition, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws.

This lawsuit is brought as a proposed class action against the
Defendants ZF TRW Automotive Holdings Corp, ZF Friedrichshafen AG
(the successor in interest into which TRW KFZ Ausrüstung GmbH
merged), and Lucas Automotive GmbH (now known as ZF Active Safety
GmbH) (together, "TRW"), and Robert Bosch GmbH and Robert Bosch LLC
(together, "Bosch") named co-conspirators Continental AG,
Continental Teves AG & Co. oHG, Continental Automotive GmbH, and
Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. (together, "Continental"), and
unnamed co-conspirators, manufacturers, and/or suppliers of
Hydraulic Braking Systems globally and in the United States.

According to the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the
Defendants' and their co-conspirators' conspiracy successfully
targeted the United States automotive industry, raising prices for
car manufacturers and automobile dealers alike.

The Plaintiffs seek to represent all automobile dealers that,
during the period from and including February 13, 2007 through such
time as the anticompetitive effects of the Defendants' conduct
ceased (the "Class Period"), purchased a new four-wheeled passenger
automobile, van, sport utility vehicle, crossover, or pickup truck
("Vehicle") in the United States which included one or more
Electronic Braking System as a component part, which were
manufactured or sold by the Defendants, any current or former
subsidiary of Defendants, or any co-conspirator of the Defendants.

Braking systems are an essential input for car manufacturers. There
are two main braking systems available: Electronic Braking
Systems—the subject of this complaint -- and hydraulic braking
systems.

Both systems are made up of additional component parts. Electronic
braking systems prevent cars from skidding by providing electronic
stability controls when braking (anti-lock braking system or "ABS")
or under all driving conditions (electronic stability control or
"ESC").

Hydraulic braking systems consist of an actuation system and a
foundation system. The actuation system is further made up of a
brake booster and main brake cylinder, while the foundation system
is further made up of a disc brake with saddle or drum brake and
wheel brake cylinder. Both Electronic Braking Systems and
hydraulic
braking systems can be contained within the same vehicle.

The Defendants manufacture, market, and/or sell Electronic Braking
Systems throughout and into the United States. Defendants and their
co-conspirators agreed, combined, and conspired to fix, raise,
maintain and/or stabilize prices, rig bids, and allocate the market
and customers in the United States for Electronic Braking Systems.
[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gerard V. Mantese, Esq.
          Kathryn R. Eisenstein, Esq.
          MANTESE HONIGMAN P.C.
          1361 E. Big Beaver Road
          Troy, MI 48083
          Telephone: (248) 457-9200
          E-mail: gmantese@manteselaw.com
                  keisenstein@manteselaw.com

               - and -

          Jonathan W. Cuneo, Esq.
          Joel Davidow, Esq.
          Daniel Cohen, Esq.
          Victoria Sims, Esq.
          Yifei Li, Esq.
          CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP
          Suite 200
          4725 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
          Washington, DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 789-3960
          E-mail: jonc@cuneolaw.com
                  joel@cuneolaw.com
                  danielc@cuneolaw.com
                  vicky@cuneolaw.com
                 evelyn@cuneolaw.com

               - and -

          Don Barrett, Esq.
          David McMullan, Esq.
          BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A.
          P.O. Box 927
          404 Court Square
          Lexington, MS 39095
          Telephone: (662) 834-2488
          E-mail: dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com
                  dmcmullan@barrettlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Shawn M. Raiter, Esq.
          LARSON KING, LLP
          2800 Wells Fargo Place
          30 East Seventh Street
          St. Paul, MN 55101
          Telephone: (651) 312-6500
          E-mail: sraiter@larsonking.com

               - and -

          Gerard V. Mantese, Esq.
          Kathryn R. Eisenstein, Esq.
          MANTESE HONIGMAN P.C.
          1361 E. Big Beaver Road
          Troy, MI 48083
          Telephone: (248) 457-9200
          E-mail: gmantese@manteselaw.com
                  keisenstein@manteselaw.com

               - and -

          Don Barrett, Esq.
          David McMullan, Esq.
          BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A.
          P.O. Box 927
          404 Court Square
          Lexington, MS 39095
          Telephone: (662) 834-2488
          E-mail: dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com
                  dmcmullan@barrettlawgroup.com

ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES: Court Tosses Altman's Amended FDCPA Complaint
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, YESHAYA ALTMAN, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ZWICKER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Defendant, Case No. 20 CV 6622 (VB) (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Vincent L.
Briccetti of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint.

Plaintiff Altman brings the putative class action against the
Defendant, a debt collector, alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C Sections 1692 et seq.

According to the first amended complaint ("FAC"), the Defendant
sent the Plaintiff a debt collection letter dated April 14, 2020.
The letter stated the Plaintiff owed $2,880.71 to American Express.
Below that, in bold typeface, it stated, "Opportunity to Regain
Card Membership Call for Details." It then stated that "after you
pay your balance in full, American Express will send you an
application for the new Optima Card. Your application will be
approved by American Express unless" one of four conditions
applied: (i) the letter recipient had an active bankruptcy at the
time of the application, (ii) the recipient had accepted another
offer for an Optima Card account from a different agency or from
American Express, (iii) the recipient had an active American
Express account, or (iv) American Express determined the recipient
did not have "the financial capacity to make the minimum payment on
this new Optima Card account."

The Plaintiff alleges the letter was misleading in violation of
Section 1692e of the FDCPA because (i) there was no actual
"selection" process by which consumers were selected to receive an
Optima Card application, (ii) the "selection" process "may
override" the four conditions, and (iii) the absence of a date by
which to respond to the letter misleadingly suggested the offer was
open-ended.

Now pending is the Defendant's motion to dismiss the FAC pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6).

Discussion

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint
must meet a standard of "plausibility." A claim is facially
plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." "The plausibility standard is
not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."

I. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The Defendant argues the Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded the
letter is misleading such that Sections 1692e and 1692e(10) were
violated.

A. "Least Sophisticated Consumer" Standard

The purpose of the FDCPA is to "eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors
who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action
to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." A debt
collection letter may violate the FDCPA when it is sufficiently
ambiguous to give rise to a reasonable, but inaccurate,
interpretation. For purposes of assessing the validity of an FDCPA
claim, a court should review a debt collection letter in its
entirety.

Judge Briccetti explains that the Second Circuit has "made clear
that in crafting a norm that protects the naive and the credulous
the courts have carefully preserved the concept of reasonableness."
He says, the least sophisticated consumer standard reflects the
important balance between the need to protect consumers from
deceptive and abusive collection practices and the need to protect
debt collectors from liability based on unreasonable
interpretations of collection letters. Accordingly, FDCPA
protection does not extend to every bizarre or idiosyncratic
interpretation of a collection notice and courts should apply the
standard in a manner that protects debt collectors against
liability for unreasonable misinterpretations of collection
notices. When "an FDCPA claim is based solely on the language of a
letter to a consumer, the action may properly be disposed of at the
pleadings stage."

B. Section 1692e Claims

The Defendant argues the Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the
debt collection letter is false, deceptive, or misleading.

Judge Briccetti agrees. He says, Section 1692e prohibits the use of
"false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in
connection with the collection of any debt," and contains a
non-exhaustive list of sixteen proscribed acts. As relevant to the
case, subsection (10) prohibits, "the use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect
any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer." "However,
not every technically false representation by a debt collector
amounts to a violation of the FDCPA." Instead, "as a natural
corollary to the least sophisticated consumer test, only material
errors violate Section 1692e." "That is, a false statement is only
actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the
decision-making process of the least sophisticated consumer."

The Judge holds that the Plaintiff offers several interpretations
of the letter that he contends render the letter false, deceptive,
or misleading. However, the Plaintiff fails plausibly to plead the
letter was false, deceptive, or misleading in violation of the
FDCPA.

First, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's idiosyncratic
interpretation of the letter's straightforward language does not
plausibly plead a Section 1692e violation. Second, he finds that
even if the Plaintiff had plausibly pleaded the statement about the
selection process ("You have been selected to receive an Optima
Card application") was false, deceptive, or misleading, the
Plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded the existence or non-existence
of a pre-selection process was material to the least sophisticated
consumer's decision to pay or challenge the debt at issue.

Third, the Judge finds that even the least sophisticated consumer,
who is presumed to be "neither irrational nor a dolt" could not
reasonably interpret the letter as a whole to mean that by virtue
of having been selected to receive an application, the clear
restrictions on application approval listed in the later part of
the letter ("Your application will be approved by American Express
unless," followed by the four conditions) was rendered invalid.
Fourth, teh Defendant could not have withdrawn the offer of sending
an application if the consumer paid the allegedly outstanding debt
without communicating such withdrawal to the consumer. Finally, the
Judge holds that the Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that any
representation in the letter is false, misleading, or deceptive.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Section 1692e and 1692e(10) claims
must be dismissed.

Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, Judge Briccetti granted the motion to
dismiss. The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion and close
the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 25, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/4s9pyb2y from Leagle.com.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***