/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/211006.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Wednesday, October 6, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 194

                            Headlines

20/20 EYE CARE: Seeks Dismissal of Data Breach Class Action
ACUITY REAL: Lewis Sues Over Unlawful Misrepresentations
ADIRONDACKS PROTECTION: Persaud Sues Over Unpaid Wages
ALLEGRO GROUP: Vera Seeks Unpaid Regular & OT Wages Under FLSA
ALLIED WORLD: Court Dismisses Wellington Suit With Prejudice

ALTRIA GROUP: Class Certification Hearing Schedule Set for Dec. 15
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Thomas Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
AMERICAN EXPRESS: New York Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Zevon Suit
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL: Cadwalader Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
ANNOVIS BIO: Kahn Swick Reminds of October 18 Deadline

APPHARVEST INC: Faces Ragan Class Suit Over 29% Share Price Drop
BALLAD HEALTH: Fails to Properly Pay Security Guards, Martin Says
BALTIMORE BUILDERS: Miller Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
BANK OF NEW YORK: Averts One Coin Fraud Class Action
BAYER HEALTHCARE: Settles Sunscreen Class Action for $2.25 Million

BENIHANA INC: Youngsuk Kim Seeks to Certify Class Action
BLUEMERCURY INC: Bethel Files Bid for Conditional Certification
BOOKSPAN LLC: Unlawfully Discloses Customers Info, Shye Suit Says
BOSTON BEER: Frank R. Cruz Law Reminds of November 15 Deadline
BP CORP: Seeks Dismissal of Pension Conversion Class Action

BROWARD COUNTY, FL: Federal Court Okays Class Action Settlement
BURTON CLAIM: Ferguson Seeks to Certify Claims Adjuster Class
CANADIAN PACIFIC: Class Action May Last Up to Seven Months
CAPELLA UNIVERSITY: Magistrate Judge's Order in Wright Suit Upheld
CASSAVA SCIENCES: Statement Lacks Business Info, Rein Suit Claims

CDCP COLONIAL: Seeks Dismissal of Cybersecurity Litigation
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Loses Bid to Dismiss Hogans Class Suit
CHICK-FIL-A INC: Faces Pittman Suit Over Hidden Delivery Charges
CONSERVICE LLC: Clay Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTS: Fails to Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Rode Says

CRISP MARKETING: Faces Smith TCPA Over Telemarketing Calls
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OH: Class Status Partly Granted in Beck Suit
DANIEL FLEISCHMAN: Bid to Certify Class in Beckendorf Suit Nixed
DEKALB COUNTY, GA: Summary Judgment Granted in IDEA Class Action
DYNCORP INT'L: Del Fierro Bid to Certify Class Nixed w/o Prejudice

ENCOMPASS HEALTH: Cashon to Supplement Briefing on Class Deal
ENERFIN RESOURCES: Deitrich Trust A Suit Seeks to Certify Class
ERICO INTERNATIONAL: Faces McKnight Class Suit Over FLSA Violations
FLEETCOR TECH: Morrison Seeks Unpaid Wages for Call Center Agents
FUJI HANA: Lin Class Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under NYLL

GREAT WESTERN: Faces Pool Class Action Complaint for Unpaid Wages
HARVEST MIDSTREAM: Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages for Day-Rate Workers
HAYNES INVESTMENTS: Sheppard Mullin Attorneys Discuss Ruling
HOME DEPOT: Seeks Extension to Reply on Appiah Class Cert. Bid
HYRECAR INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of October 26 Deadline

HYUNDAI MOTOR: Judge Certifies Panoramic Sunroof Class Action
ICON CLINICAL: Nesbeth Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
J. CAIAZZO PLUMBING: Hall Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
J. M. SMUCKER: Crisco Brand Contains No Butter, Strow Suit Claims
JOEY EAU CLAIRE: Faces Class Action Over COVID-19 Outbreak

KONINKELIJKE PHILIPS: Faces Tobin Suit Over CPAP, BiPAP Machines
LAUREATE GROUP: Initial OK of Settlement Deal in McDaniel Sought
LLOYD'S LONDON: Sun Cuisine's Amended Class Complaint Dismissed
LOGISTIX LLC: Phelps Seeks Overtime Pay for Managers Under FLSA
LOS ANDES 231: Olivas Suit Seeks Overtime Wage Under FLSA, NYLL

LOUIS PERL CONTRACTING: Fails to Pay Premium OT Wages, Perez Says
LUCILE SALTER: Masuda Suit Remanded to Santa Clara Superior Court
MCCLATCHY CO: Borello Test Should Be Used in Carriers' Class Suit
MDL 2836: Direct Purchasers Seek Class Status in Ezetimibe Case
MEDALLIA INC: Andrews & Springer Announces Securities Class Action

MEDALLIA INC: RM LAW Announces Shareholder Class Action
MILK AND HONEY: White Suit Seeks to Certify Collective Action
MITRE CORPORATION: Breaches Fiduciary Duties, Brown ERISA Suit Says
MON CHER: Class Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
MUSCO OLIVE: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind Users, Lucero Alleges

NEW YORK: Navarro Sues Over Civil Rights Violation
NEWLINK GENETICS: Court Enters Final Judgment in Nguyen Class Suit
OSHKOSH CORP: Wisconsin Court Tosses 401(k) Fee Class Action
PHOENIX-VETERANS PRINT: Garnica Sues Over Biometrics Data Retention
PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Dec. 31, 2022 Claims Filing Deadline Set

PLAIN GREEN: Trump 9th Cir. Judge Reversed Class Action Ruling
POINT BLANK: Court Urged to Revive Bulletproof Vest Class Action
PROVIDENCE TITLE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Peden Suit Claims
RANGE RESOURCES: Underpays Royalties Under Class Leases, Suit Says
REXALL SUNDOWN: Multivitamin Product Falsely Advertised, Suit Says

S & K SECURITY: Henderson Suit Seeks OT Wages for Security Guards
SELECTQUOTE INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds of October 15 Deadline
SNAP FINANCIAL: TCPA Class Action Over Robocalls Certified
SOCLEAN INC: Sanitizing Devices Generate Toxic Ozone Gas, Suit Says
SOUTHWEST PATROL: Fails to Pay Wages, Sterling Class Suit Claims

TRIKAM NY LLC: Tianio Sues Over "Time Shaving" Violations
UNITED AIRLINES: Six Employees Class Action Over Vaccine Mandate
UNITED STATES: 6th Circuit Casts Doubt on Associational Standing
VEONEER INC: Sabatini Balks at Merger Deal With Magna International
VIEW INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds of October 18 Deadline

VOLTAGE PICTURES: Can Proceed With Movie Pirates Class Action Suit
WALGREENS CO: Fourth Cir. Hears Arguments in Privacy Class Action
WASHINGTON, DC: Black Female Police Officers File Class Action
WASHINGTON: Court OKs Class Definition and Schedule in D.S. Suit
WEALTHSPIRE ADVISORS: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Suit Says

XTO ENERGY: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Bone's Class Claims
ZOOMINFO TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Dismiss Siegel IRPA Suit Denied
[*] 9th Cir. Reinstates Part of California's Anti-Arbitration Law
[*] Bill Threatens Viability of Class, Collective Action Waivers
[*] U.K. Allows Consumers to Participate in Class Action Lawsuits


                            *********

20/20 EYE CARE: Seeks Dismissal of Data Breach Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jake Holland, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that plaintiffs
can't trace alleged harms to breach, companies argue hearing and
vision companies sued following data incident
A proposed data breach class action should be dismissed because the
plaintiffs "fail to articulate any actual, traceable harm,"
defendants 20/20 Eye Care Network Inc., 20/20 Hearing Care Network
Inc., and iCare Acquisition Inc. are arguing in Florida federal
court.

In addition to failing to allege harm and failing to connect it to
the data incident, the plaintiffs premise their claims on "general
information and legal labels," the health-care companies argued in
a motion to dismiss filed on Sept. 21 in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida.

ACUITY REAL: Lewis Sues Over Unlawful Misrepresentations
--------------------------------------------------------
Coty Lewis, both individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated persons v. ACUITY REAL ESTATE SERVICES, LLC d/b/a
effectiveagents.com, a Florida limited liability company, and KEVIN
STUTEVILLE, individually, Case No. 1:21-cv-12319-TLL-PTM (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2021), is brought with regards to the Defendants'
misrepresentative perversion of traditional broker-broker referral
relationship to consumers and real estate brokers and agents,
anticompetitive, and places upward pressure on brokerage fees.

According to the complaint, an online real estate referral network
generally operates through a website directed at consumers
interested in purchasing or selling in a home. Acuity's website,
www.effectiveagents.com, is very typical for the industry. Acuity's
website purports to have a proprietary algorithm that analyzes
millions of real estate transactions and realtor reviews to provide
consumers with the perfect realtor for their specific transaction.
The website further claims to have analyzed over 1.5 million
realtors from which it "hand-picked" a small group of realtors who
then further underwent a "rigorous approval process." These "top
talent" realtors, it is claimed, will offer "unbiased advice" at
"no cost" to the consumer.

The website promises to consumers that it has "better research"
which will result in a pairing with "an exact, perfect fit" and
"your own local expert" resulting in faster sales for more money.
All a consumer need do to get this "free" assistance is fill out an
online form. On September 1, 2021, a website visitor could express
an interest in selling the Saginaw County Courthouse. The website
indicates that it has "good news" as there are 389 local realtors
who are interested in helping. Acuity does not--as it purports to
do--conduct some meaningful mathematical analysis of the total 389
realtors it states conduct business in the local market. Instead,
Acuity primarily, or even only, refers consumers to real estate
agents who have agreed to pay Acuity a percentage-based referral
fee.

A recent transaction between Acuity and Lewis illustrates this
business model and the harm it causes to Lewis, real estate agents,
consumers, and the real estate market The brokerage company of
which Lewis was a member of, Re/Max New Image, entered into a
referral agreement with Acuity in 2019. Through that agreement,
Acuity, whom is a licensed real estate broker in the State of
Florida, and not Michigan, set the terms upon which it would refer
its clients interested in selling or purchasing a home. The
referral agreement was a blanket referral agreement not only
covering all future referrals but all future transactions involving
each referred client. In the most material part, and as a condition
of referral, Acuity required payment of 35% of the sales commission
received by Lewis' brokerage in connection with any transaction
closed for a referred client.

Acuity failed to disclose to Lewis or Lewis' brokerage that it does
not actually have any "clients" insofar as that term is used to
describe a broker-client relationship. The Defendant does not have
a brokerage-client relationship with consumers visiting its website
at all. It does not know them, has little to no communication with
them, and has no responsibility to them. In short, it disclaims all
of the fiduciary responsibilities associated with a broker-client
relationship.

Acuity's deception is therefore two-fold. First, Acuity deceives
consumers into inputting contact information into its webform on
the representation that it is performing some sophisticated math
analysis of all local realtors. Although it repeatedly tells
consumers that its service is free to them, in reality they are
paying Acuity 35% of their agent fee. Second, Acuity deceives real
estate brokers and agents by representing that it has professional
"clients" when it in fact has none. Instead, Acuity it is simply
targeting local consumers on the internet and routing them back to
local agents in exchange for a substantial share of professional
fees, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is a licensed real estate agent with a primary place
of business in Saginaw County, Michigan.

Acuity is a Florida limited liability company regularly conducting
business in the State of Michigan and within the territory
comprising the Eastern District of Michigan.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew E. Gronda, Esq.
          GRONDA, PLC
          PO Box 70
          St. Charles, MI 48655
          Phone: 989-249-0350
          Email: matt@matthewgronda.com


ADIRONDACKS PROTECTION: Persaud Sues Over Unpaid Wages
------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Persaud, Adrian Holder, and Romano Chotkoe, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated in the proposed FLSA
Collective Action v. Adirondacks Protection Services, LLC, and
Colin Blackman, Ronald Williams, and Collin James, Case No.
1:21-cv-08115 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2021), seeks recovery, for
themselves and all other similarly situated individuals, against
Defendants' violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
violations of Articles 6 and 19 of the New York State Labor Law
("NYLL") and their supporting New York State Department of Labor
regulations and seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime
wages, unpaid spread-of-hours, unlawfully deducted wages,
liquidated and statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest,
and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the FLSA, NYLL, and the
NYLL's Wage Theft Prevention Act.

The Plaintiffs regularly worked for the Defendants in excess of 40
hours a week but never received an overtime premium of one and
one-half times their regular rate of pay for those hours. The
Plaintiffs' wages did not vary regardless of how many additional
hours they worked in a week. The Defendants did not compensate the
Plaintiffs for one hour's pay at the basic minimum hourly wage rate
for each day their shift exceeded 10 hours. As a result, the
Defendants consistently underpaid the Plaintiffs. The Defendants
never granted the Plaintiffs with meal breaks or rest periods of
any length. No notification, either in the form of posted notices,
or other means, was ever given to Plaintiffs regarding wages are
required under the FLSA or NYLL. The Defendants did not provide
Plaintiffs a statement of wages, as required by NYLL. The
Defendants did not give any notice to the Plaintiffs, in English
(Plaintiffs' primary language), of his rate of pay, employer's
regular pay day, and such other information as required by NYLL.
The Defendants did not pay the Plaintiffs at the rate of one and
one-half times their hourly wage rate for hours worked in excess of
forty per workweek, says the complaint.

The Plaintiffs were employed as security guards at the Defendants'
security company.

The Defendants own, operate and/or control a security company known
as "Adirondacks Protection Services."[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
          Jason Mizrahi, Esq.
          LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
          New York, NY 10165
          Phone: (212) 792-0046
          Email: Joshua@levinepstein.com


ALLEGRO GROUP: Vera Seeks Unpaid Regular & OT Wages Under FLSA
--------------------------------------------------------------
Antonio Vera and other similarly situated individuals v. Allegro
Group of SW FL, LLC, and Hector C. Diaz, JR, individually, Case No.
2:21-cv-00712 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 24, 2021) is an action to recover
money damages for unpaid regular and overtime wages and retaliation
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and all other current and
former employees similarly situated to Plaintiff who worked more
than 40 hours during one or more weeks on or after February 2019,
were not being adequately compensated.

Mr. Vera is a resident of Collier County, Florida. He is a covered
employee for purposes of the Act.

Allegro Group is a landscaping company that provides landscape
designing and irrigation systems installation services. The
individual Defendant Diaz, was and is now the owner/officer and
Manager of Defendant Corporation Allegro Group.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Zandro E. Palma, Esq.
          ZANDRO E. PALMA, P.A.
          9100 S. Dadeland Blvd., Suite 1500
          Miami, FL 33156
          Telephone: (305) 446-1500
          Facsimile: (305) 446-1502
          E-mail: zep@thepalmalawgroup.com

ALLIED WORLD: Court Dismisses Wellington Suit With Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, WELLINGTON ATHLETIC CLUB, LLC, Plaintiff v. ALLIED
WORLD SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Civil Action No.
2:21-cv-00256-BJR (W.D. Wash.), Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington,
Seattle, grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.

Background

Plaintiff Wellington Athletic Club filed the lawsuit against
Defendant Allied World in March 2021, alleging claims for breach of
contract and a declaratory judgment. The Plaintiff "owns and
operates an exercise gym in Seattle that offers a variety of
standard and specialty gym equipment and machines." Beginning in
March 2020, Governor Jay Inslee issued proclamations that
effectively ordered businesses like Plaintiff's to cease
operations. According to the Plaintiff, these proclamations were
extended through the winter of 2020, and Plaintiff's gym remained
closed during that time. It is not clear from the complaint if or
when the Plaintiff was able to resume operations.

The Defendant is an insurance company that issued the Plaintiff an
"all-risk" insurance policy covering its business property. In
March 2020, the Plaintiff filed a claim for "losses covered by the
Policy." The Defendant denied the claim in May 2020.

The Plaintiff brings the lawsuit claiming that the Defendant
erroneously determined that the Policy did not cover its
COVID-19-related losses and wrongfully denied its insurance claim.

Discussion

The Policy states that the Defendant will pay for the actual loss
of Business Income due to the necessary 'suspension' of the
Plaintiff's 'operations' if the 'suspension' is caused by direct
physical loss of or damage to the covered property." The Policy
also contains a section for "Additional Coverage" that includes a
"Civil Authority" provision. Coverage under that provision is
triggered if "a Covered Cause of Loss causes damage to property
other than property at the insured premises and access to the area
immediately surrounding the damaged property is prohibited by civil
authority as a result of the damage."

Under both provisions, the Plaintiff's claims for coverage hinge on
whether the suspension of its business operations due to the
COVID-19 virus amounts to "direct physical loss or damage to
property."

As the parties are aware, the Court has already decided numerous
cases involving identical policy language in the consolidated
action Nguyen v. Travelers Casualty Ins. Co. of Am, 2021 WL 2184878
(W. D. Wash. May 28, 2021). Like the Policy in the case, the
insurance agreements in the consolidated action contained both a
general coverage provision for "direct physical loss of or damage"
to the insured properties and a "Civil Authority" provision
covering situations where damage to a nearby property prevents
access to the insured property.

Interpreting these provisions, the Court concluded "that COVID-19
does not cause direct physical damage to property as the term is
used in the insurance policies." It likewise rejected the
plaintiffs' interpretation of the term "physical loss" to include
the loss of the ability to use the property for business
operations.  Because all of the plaintiffs' theories of liability
depended on there having been direct physical loss or damage to
their properties, and because the Court found that closure due to
COVID-19 does not constitute physical loss or damage, the Court
dismissed all of their claims. In doing so, the Court agreed with
the vast majority of federal district courts that had considered
the same contract language in the context of COVID-19.

The Plaintiff argues that it suffered the physical loss of its
property when it "was unable to enter or use its physical
premises." It does not dispute that Nguyen considered policy
language identical to that of the Policy and does not seriously
attempt to distinguish the facts of the case; in fact, the
Plaintiff explicitly incorporates by reference the arguments that
the Court rejected in Nguyen. The Plaintiff further claims that the
Policy's language is ambiguous, that the Policy should be construed
in the Plaintiff's favor, and that dismissal is inappropriate, but
the Court has already rejected that argument as well.

In summary, Judge Rothstein holds that the Plaintiff's arguments in
support of its interpretation of the Policy do not materially
differ from those made by the plaintiffs in Nguyen, and the Judge
declines to revisit its findings in that case. As all of the
Plaintiff's theories of liability depend on there having been
direct physical loss or damage to its properties, and the Court
having found that closure due to COVID-19 does not constitute
physical loss or damage, all of its claims must be dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Rothstein grants the Defendant's
motion to dismiss, and the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/umywmx4f from Leagle.com.


ALTRIA GROUP: Class Certification Hearing Schedule Set for Dec. 15
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as GABBY KLEIN, et al., v.
ALTRIA GROUP, INC. et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-00075-DJN (E.D. Va.),
the Hon. Judge David J. Novak entered an order scheduling a hearing
on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification to occur on December
15, 2021, at 10:30 a.m., in Courtroom 6300 of the Richmond
Courthouse.

Altria Group is an American corporation and one of the world's
largest producers and marketers of tobacco, cigarettes and related
products. It operates worldwide and is headquartered in
unincorporated Henrico County, Virginia, just outside the city of
Richmond.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3mp4u3r at no extra charge.[CC]



AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Thomas Class Suit Dismissed Without Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SAVON THOMAS, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-01696 (N.D. Ohio), Judge J. Philip
Calabrese of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, Eastern Division, vacates the proceedings in the case to date
and dismisses the action without prejudice.

Background

Plaintiffs Savon Thomas and Colleen McLaughlin, employees at an
Amazon fulfillment center in Summit County, Ohio, filed a class
action lawsuit against Defendants Amazon.com Services, Inc. and
Amazon.com, Inc., alleging that Amazon violated Ohio's Minimum Fair
Wage Standards Act by failing to pay employees for time spent
undergoing security screenings before lunch breaks at their
respective jobsites. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Ms.
McLaughlin's claim without prejudice.

The Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the Defendants,
asserting a single claim under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards
Act and invoking the Court's diversity jurisdiction. As originally
pleaded, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants failed to pay
workers for time spent going through a mandatory security screening
process twice per shift: At the end of the shift and before lunch
breaks. According to the complaint, the "Defendants' mandatory
post-shift and pre-lunch screening process routinely takes up to
between 10 and 20 minutes." The Plaintiff alleges that workers
regularly work more than 40 hours per workweek and that the
Defendants did not pay them for overtime and underpaid overtime
compensation.

After answering, the Defendants moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Before reassignment of the case, the Court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part. As a result of that ruling,
the Plaintiff's claim was limited to the underpayment of overtime
compensation for the time spent in "the pre-lunch security
screenings that were mandatory."

After ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
before reassignment of the case, the Court consolidated the case
with Gorie v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-1387. In
Gorie, Plaintiff -- represented by different counsel -- challenges
the same compensation practices at Amazon fulfillment centers in
Ohio under the Fair Labor Standards Practices Act. In both cases,
the parties moved to amend the case management order to sequence
the resolution of the claims in the two consolidated cases.

In the Court's view, this procedure is inconsistent with Rule 23,
which directs determination of class certification "at an early
practicable time," which generally comes before summary judgment.
Nonetheless, at a status conference on Oct. 1, 2020 before
reassignment of the case, the Court granted the motion to amend the
case management order as the parties proposed in both cases.

Accordingly, the Court ordered the parties' proposed sequencing of
the cases: Plaintiff Gorie may move for conditional class
certification whenever she chooses, provided that in the event the
court grants notice, the parties agree to defer the issuance of
notice, and the Court orders that the issuance of notice be
deferred, until after a final determination on the merits of the
Thomas named plaintiffs' claims.

The Court ordered the parties to submit a proposed scheduling order
within 14 days of a ruling on the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment in the Thomas case.

Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed several opt-in forms in Gorie.
Both cases were reassigned on Dec. 9, 2021.

The Defendants move for summary judgment.

Discussion

Because of the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, the
Court has an independent obligation to examine its own jurisdiction
to ensure that it has the authority to proceed. In the complaint,
the Plaintiff invokes the Court's jurisdiction "pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1332." Although the complaint does not identify the
specific subsection of Section 1332 that confers jurisdiction, the
Plaintiff goes on to allege that "the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs," making clear that the
complaint invokes conventional diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(a).

Judge Calabrese opines that under the law of the Circuit, the
plaintiffs in a class action may not aggregate the value of their
respective claims to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement
under Section 1332(a) to establish federal jurisdiction. In other
words, for the Court to have diversity jurisdiction, each plaintiff
must demonstrate that his or her claims meet the minimum
amount-in-controversy requirement. Aggregation is only permitted
where the plaintiffs "unite to enforce a single title or right in
which they have a common and undivided interest." Such is not the
case because each prospective plaintiff has separate claims to the
amounts the Defendants allegedly owe to them for overtime hours
worked.

The parties advance two alternative bases for the Court's
jurisdiction.

I. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Plaintiff and the Defendants maintain that the Court may
exercise supplemental or ancillary jurisdiction. This argument,
according to Judge Calabrese, depends on the consolidation between
the Thomas and Gorie matters. Because the Court has federal
question jurisdiction over the claim in Gorie under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the parties suggest that the Court may exercise
supplemental or ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas.

Without question, the allegations in the two suits involve the same
operative facts. But the argument that the Court may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in Thomas gets the jurisdictional basis
precisely backward. "Ancillary jurisdiction may extend to claims
having a factual and logical dependence on 'the primary lawsuit.'"
However, the primary lawsuit must have an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction.

In the case, Judge Calabrese opines that the parties and the Court
treated Thomas as the primary lawsuit, perhaps because it was filed
first. Whatever the reason, the Court's case management order gave
priority to Thomas over Gorie. Indeed, supplemental jurisdiction
operates on a second or subsequent lawsuit, not the primary lawsuit
which must have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction
because jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing. Even if
Gorie were the primary lawsuit, the Court would still need an
independent basis for the action, which was filed some eleven
months earlier and not consolidated with Gorie until Aug.31, 2020,
by which time the case had been pending in federal court for over
thirteen months. Therefore, relying on supplemental or ancillary
jurisdiction begs the question of the jurisdictional basis that
would permit the matter to proceed in federal court in the first
place.

II. Jurisdiction Under the Class Action Fairness Act

Although the Plaintiff did not invoke jurisdiction under the Class
Action Fairness Act, the Defendants maintain that the Act confers
federal jurisdiction. In seeking to establish federal jurisdiction
on grounds the Plaintiff does not allege, the Defendants assume
this burden.

Judge Calabrese holds party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing the jurisdictional prerequisites. Because
the complaint may or may not place the Class Action Fairness Act's
jurisdictional amount in controversy, the Judge cannot say that the
Court has jurisdiction. In fact, in his view, the complaint as
pleaded likely places less than $5 million in controversy, even
accounting for attorneys' fees and costs. Additionally, the Judge
questions whether the Defendants' position regarding the amount in
controversy and their potential exposure would be the same had this
issue arisen at the outset of the litigation, as it should have.
That is an additional reason, beyond the requirements of Rule 23,
that the procedure the parties proposed makes little procedural
sense. The Defendants have not carried the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Calabrese determines that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Where a
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its proceedings are void.
Accordingly, Judge Calabrese vacates the proceedings in the case to
date and dismisses the action without prejudice.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2rnyv8bj from Leagle.com.


AMERICAN EXPRESS: New York Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Zevon Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, MARCY ZEVON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-4938-GHW (S.D.N.Y.), Judge Gregory H.
Woods of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss.

Background

Plaintiff Zevon is an American Express cardholder. Zevon brings
this putative class action against Defendant American Express
("Amex"), alleging that Amex failed to include a disclosure
required by the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") on her monthly
billing statements.

Ms. Zevon holds an Amex credit card account. Amex's card agreement
provides that for a consumer to preserve her eligibility to have a
disputed charge reduced or removed -- her "billing rights" -- she
must dispute the charge in writing. A consumer who disputes a
charge by telephone does not preserve her billing rights. Each
month from June to September 2019, Zevon received a monthly billing
statement for her Amex card. Each statement contained a notice
under the heading "Billing Inquiries" with both an address and a
phone number. The notice in each statement did not explain that
consumers who only disputed charges by calling the phone number
provided, and not also in writing to the address provided, would
not preserve their right to have charges reduced or removed.

Ms. Zevon does not claim to have submitted a billing-error inquiry
but states that in reviewing her "billing statements and Billing
Inquiries disclosures," she "could not determine that the
preservation of her billing rights in the event of a dispute
depended on which method she used to contact Amex to provide notice
she was disputing a charge."

Ms. Zevon alleges that Amex failed to comply with a provision of
the TILA, as implemented through Regulation Z and its commentary,
which, she contends, requires a clear and conspicuous disclosure on
monthly statements that include both a phone number and address for
billing inquiries. She alleges that the terms of the credit card
agreement that instructed consumers on how to preserve their
billing rights were subject to change without notice and, as a
result, the repeated disclosures on monthly statements are
necessary to keep consumers apprised of their obligation to dispute
charges in the proper form. Zevon claims that, as a result of this
missing disclosure on her monthly statements, she could have lost
the opportunity to properly dispute charges that appeared on her
billing statements.

On June 26, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated seeking statutory
damages, actual damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. On Dec. 7,
2020, the Plaintiff amended her complaint. On Jan. 15, 2021, Amex
moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), asserting a facial
challenge to standing, and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for
failure to state a claim. The Plaintiff opposed on Feb. 12, 2021.
The Defendant replied on March 12, 2021. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, both parties
provided the Court with supplemental briefing.

Discussion

Ms. Zevon lacks Article III standing because she fails to establish
that she suffered an injury in fact. To demonstrate injury in fact,
a plaintiff must show the 'invasion of a legally protected
interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'

Ms. Zevon claims that she suffered an injury in fact resulting from
Amex's alleged violations of the TILA. However, Congress' role in
identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a
plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports
to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Only those
plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant's
statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that
violation in federal court." Accordingly, Zevon's allegations that
Amex violated the TILA are insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy
Article III's injury-in-fact requirement. Zevon must establish that
the alleged statutory violations caused her concrete harm.

Thus, the standing inquiry in the case is whether Zevon was
concretely harmed by Amex's alleged violations of the TILA. To be
"concrete," an injury must be "real, and not abstract." Zevon
alleges that Amex's violations of the TILA caused two distinct
harms: (1) an informational harm because she was denied "the full
account information that Congress required she receive with her
Billing Statement," and (2) "a material risk of harm in that she
could have lost the opportunity to have charges that appeared on
her account reduced or removed."

Ms. Zevon fails to demonstrate a concrete injury on either ground,
Judge Woods opines. First, he says, Zevon has not established a
concrete informational injury. The plaintiffs had not suffered a
concrete informational injury. Zevon's allegations similarly fail
to establish a concrete informational injury. Zevon only alleges
that she received the information in the wrong format because it
was not included in clear and conspicuous language on her billing
statements. Finally, Zevon does not allege any downstream
consequences from failing to receive the required information on
her billing statements. She alleges that she could have lost her
billing rights if she submitted a dispute over the telephone.
Because Zevon never submitted or even attempted to submit a
billing-error inquiry, she has not established a concrete
informational injury.

Second, Judge Woods opines that the class members did not establish
a concrete injury based on their asserted risk of future harm.
Similarly, Zevon does not allege that the risk of harm generated by
the TILA violations ever materialized. She alleges only that,
because of the missing disclosures on her monthly statements, she
could have lost the opportunity to properly dispute charges that
appeared on her billing statements.She does not allege that she
actually lost any such opportunity. Nor does Zevon allege that the
risk of losing her billing rights caused any separate concrete
harm. Thus, Zevon's asserted risk of future harm does not support
Article III standing for her damages claim.

Judge Woods grants the Plaintiff leave to replead her claims. While
leave may be denied "for good reason, including futility, bad
faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party,"
those circumstances do not apply in the case. Any amended complaint
must be filed no later than 14 days from the date of the Order.

Conclusion

For the reasons he stated, Judge Woods concludes that the Plaintiff
has not established standing. Accordingly, he granted the
Defendant's motion to dismiss and the Plaintiff's request for leave
to amend her complaint.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the motion pending at
Dkt. No. 21.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/4u8dthyf from
Leagle.com.


AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL: Cadwalader Attorney Discusses Court Ruling
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jason M. Halper, Esq., and Adam Magid, Esq., of Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft LLP, in an article for Mondaq, report that the
Eighth Circuit recently enforced an arbitration clause despite
evidence that the plaintiff never saw the clause or signed the
arbitration agreement.

On June 3, 2021, in Donelson v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc.
[PDF], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ordered
class action allegations in a putative securities fraud class
action stricken on the pleadings under Rule 12(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and, incorporating by reference an
arbitration clause in a separate agreement, directed the matter to
arbitration. The decision is significant not only for its broad
application of an arbitration clause to federal securities fraud
claims but also as a rare appellate-level endorsement of striking
class allegations under Rule 12(f) -- which permits a court to
strike from a pleading "an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" -- prior to class
discovery and a motion for class certification.

Background
The plaintiff in this case is Mark Donelson, a high school graduate
and Sam's Club employee who had no formal training in securities
trading. In 2010, Donelson's investment advisor, Mark Sachse, told
Donelson he was joining Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., and
asked Donelson to open an investment account with his new firm.
Donelson and Sachse met at a restaurant, where Donelson signed an
Ameriprise account application. The application included an
acknowledgement in small print that the applicant had "received and
read" a separate "Ameriprise Brokerage Client Agreement for
Non-Qualified Brokerage Accounts" and "consent[ed] to all these
terms and conditions with full knowledge and understanding of the
information contained in" that agreement, including a "predispute
arbitration clause." The arbitration clause, which Donelson
allegedly never saw, read, or signed, provided for arbitration of
"all controversies that may arise between us," except for a
"putative or certified class action." Thereafter, Sachse allegedly
engaged in improprieties in handling Donelson's investment
account.

Donelson filed a putative class action against Sachse, Ameriprise,
and Ameriprise officers in the Western District of Missouri,
asserting claims for violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The
defendants moved to strike the complaint's class action allegations
under Rule 12(f) and to compel arbitration, and the district court
denied the motions. Applying Missouri law, the district court
concluded that there was no meeting of the minds concerning
arbitration, given that Donelson did not receive or sign the client
agreement with the arbitration clause, and the agreement was
"illusory" because Ameriprise retained a unilateral right to amend
its terms at any time. In denying the motion to strike, the
district court further noted that courts generally view Rule 12(f)
motions with disfavor and that class treatment is more
appropriately addressed on a motion for class certification. The
defendants appealed to the Eighth Circuit.

The Eighth Circuit's Decision
A panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed. The court held that the
arbitration clause in the client agreement was valid and
enforceable against Donelson, even if he never saw the provision or
signed the agreement. It was sufficient for Donelson to sign a
separate agreement -- his account application -- that "expressly
incorporated the arbitration clause" by reference. Further, the
agreement was not "illusory" because Ameriprise provided Donelson
an investment account and could not amend the terms unless it gave
30 days' notice and Donelson then used the account, indicating his
consent.

The court also held that the district court erred by declining to
strike Donelson's class action allegations. Noting a split among
federal district courts, the court explained that it is appropriate
to strike class action allegations if it is "apparent from the
pleadings that the class cannot be certified" because
"unsupportable class allegations bring 'impertinent' material into
the pleading." Considering the allegations of the complaint, the
court concluded that the putative class was not sufficiently
"cohesive" to qualify for class action status under Federal Rule
23(b)(2) because individualized determinations would have to be
made with respect to multiple elements of the securities fraud
claims pled by the plaintiff. Having disposed of the class action
aspect of the case, the court ruled that the arbitration clause --
which exempted putative or certified class actions -- covered the
dispute and ordered the matter to arbitration.

Implications
Donelson is notable in that it enforced an arbitration clause with
respect to federal securities fraud claims, despite evidence that
the plaintiff never saw the clause or signed the agreement. The
decision vividly illustrates the power of the doctrine of
incorporation by reference to bind contracting parties to
arbitration, even as to federal statutory claims, no matter their
level of sophistication. It also stands as a rare federal
appellate-level endorsement of striking securities class action
allegations on the pleadings under Rule 12(f) prior to class
discovery and a motion for class certification.

A viable Rule 12(f) defense could substantially alter the
settlement dynamics in federal securities cases where flaws in a
putative class action are evident on the pleadings. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "extensive discovery and the potential for
uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak
claims to extort settlements from innocent companies." Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008). Class
discovery -- which frequently overlaps with merits discovery,
including depositions and expert witnesses -- is often a primary
source of such settlement pressure. The ability to strike class
action allegations would enable courts to dispose of inadequate
class claims at an early stage of the case, conserving judicial
resources and protecting litigants from unnecessary
discovery-related costs associated with class certification. It
also would reduce distortions in the class action settlements
created by such cost and burden considerations. [GN]

ANNOVIS BIO: Kahn Swick Reminds of October 18 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------
Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC ("KSF") and KSF partner, former Attorney
General of Louisiana, Charles C. Foti, Jr., remind investors of
pending deadlines in the following securities class action
lawsuits:

Annovis Bio, Inc. (ANVS)
Class Period: 5/21/2021 - 7/28/2021
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: October 18, 2021
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nyse-anvs/

Sesen Bio, Inc. (SESN)
Class Period: 12/21/2020 - 8/17/2021
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: October 18, 2021
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgm-sesn/

PayPal Holdings, Inc. (PYPL)
Class Period: 2/9/2017 - 7/28/2021
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: October 19, 2021
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqgs-pypl/  

Cassava Sciences, Inc. (SAVA)
Class Period: 9/14/2020 - 8/27/2021
Lead Plaintiff Motion Deadline: October 26, 2021
SECURITIES FRAUD
To learn more, visit
https://www.ksfcounsel.com/cases/nasdaqcm-sava/

If you purchased shares of the above companies and would like to
discuss your legal rights and your right to recover for your
economic loss, you may, without obligation or cost to you, contact
KSF Managing Partner, Lewis Kahn, toll-free at 1-877-515-1850, via
email (Lewis.Kahn@KSFcounsel.com), or via the case links above.

If you wish to serve as a Lead Plaintiff in the class action, you
must petition the Court on or before the Lead Plaintiff Motion
deadline.

About
KSF, whose partners include former Louisiana Attorney General
Charles C. Foti, Jr., is one of the nation's premier boutique
securities litigation law firms. KSF serves a variety of clients --
including public institutional investors, hedge funds, money
managers and retail investors – in seeking to recover investment
losses due to corporate fraud and malfeasance by publicly traded
companies. KSF has offices in New York, California and Louisiana.

To learn more about KSF, you may visit www.ksfcounsel.com.

Contact:

Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC
Lewis Kahn, Managing Partner
lewis.kahn@ksfcounsel.com
1-877-515-1850
1100 Poydras St., Suite 3200
New Orleans, LA 70163 [GN]

APPHARVEST INC: Faces Ragan Class Suit Over 29% Share Price Drop
----------------------------------------------------------------
GARY H. RAGAN, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. APPHARVEST, INC., JONATHAN WEBB, and LOREN EGGLETON,
Case No. Case 1:21-cv-07985 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2021) is a class
action on behalf of persons and entities that purchased or
otherwise acquired AppHarvest securities between May 17, 2021 and
August 10, 2021, inclusive, pursuing claims against the Defendants
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On August 11, 2021, before the market opened, AppHarvest announced
its second quarter financial results, reporting a $32.0 million net
loss. The Company also lowered its full year sales guidance to a
range of $7 million to $9 million, from a prior range of $20
million to $25 million. AppHarvest attributed the lower than
expected results to "operational headwinds with the full ramp up to
full production at the company's first CEA facility, including
labor and productivity challenges related to the training and
development of the new workforce and historically low market prices
for tomatoes."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $3.46, or
approximately 29%, to close at $8.51 per share on August 11, 2021,
on unusually heavy trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors that AppHarvest lacked sufficient training for its
recently expanded labor force, says the suit.

As a result of the Defendants' alleged wrongful acts and omissions,
and the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, the Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

Mr. Ragan purchased AppHarvest securities during the Class Period,
and suffered damages as a result of the alleged federal securities
law violations and false and/or misleading statements and/or
material omissions.

AppHarvest is a sustainable food company that operates applied
technology greenhouses to produce fresh, chemical-free, non-GMO
fruits, vegetables, and related products. AppHarvest became a
public company following a business combination with Novus Capital
Corporation that closed on or about January 29, 2021. The
Individual Defendants are officers of the company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Gregory B. Linkh, Esq.
          GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP
          230 Park Ave., Suite 358
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 682-5340
          Facsimile: (212) 884-0988
          E-mail: glinkh@glancylaw.com

               - and -

          Robert V. Prongay, Esq.
          Charles H. Linehan, Esq.
          Pavithra Rajesh, Esq.
          1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100
          Los Angeles, CA 90067
          Telephone: (310) 201-9150
          Facsimile: (310) 201-9160

BALLAD HEALTH: Fails to Properly Pay Security Guards, Martin Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DAVID MARTIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. BALLAD HEALTH, Case No. 1:21-cv-00041-JPJ-PMS (W.D.
Va., Sept. 29, 2021) is an action to redress Defendant's violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act by knowingly suffering or
permitting Plaintiff and other similarly situated Security Guards
to work in excess of 40 hours per week without properly
compensating them for those additional hours, and by knowingly
suffering or permitting Plaintiffs to work during their purported
breaks without pay.

The Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees worked for
Defendant as hourly paid Security Guards.

The Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by failing to pay
Plaintiff for wages earned. The Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees were victims of auto-deducted breaks. This
constitutes a wage violation and an overtime violation, says the
suit.

On behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees who
may choose to opt-in to this action, Plaintiff seeks restitution
for all wages due plus interest, an additional amount as liquidated
damages, reasonable attorney fees and costs, and any other damages
to which they may be entitled at law or equity.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jack Jarrett, Esq.
          ALAN LESCHT & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          1825 K St., NW, Ste. 750
          Washington, DC 20006
          Telephone: (202) 315-1741
          E-mail: jack.jarrett@leschtlaw.com

BALTIMORE BUILDERS: Miller Sues Over Unpaid Overtime Compensation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Devon R. Miller, Individually and On Behalf of All Individuals
Similarly Situated v. Baltimore Builders Supply & Millwork, Inc.,
Hometown Hardwares, Inc., Ashville Ace Hardware, Baltimore Ace
Hardware, Groveport Ace Hardware, Heath Ace Hardware, Richard E.
Foreman, and Robin L. Hayes, Case No. 2:21-cv-04867-EAS-EPD (S.D.
Ohio, Sept. 30, 2021), is brought to challenge the policies and
practices of the Defendants that violate the Fair Labor Standards
Act.

The Plaintiff regularly worked more than 40 hours each workweek.
For example, during the one week pay period September 2, 2019 to
September 8, 2019, Plaintiff worked 51 hours; during the one week
pay period November 4, 2019 to November 10, 2019, Plaintiff worked
47.75 hours; during the one week pay period December 21, 2020 to
December 27, 2020, Plaintiff worked 49.5 hours; during the one week
pay period March 1, 2021 to March 7, 2021, Plaintiff worked 49
hours; and during the one week pay period May 3, 2021 to May 9,
2021, Plaintiff worked 47 hours. However, instead of compensating
the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective at one and one-half times
their regular hourly rates for hours more than 40 hours per
workweek, the Defendants paid Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective
their regular, straight time hourly rates for all hours worked. The
Defendants' failure to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA
Collective for hours worked more than 40 hours per week at "one and
one-half times" the employees' "regular rates" of pay violates the
FLSA, and corresponding Ohio law, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants from May 7, 2018 to
July 2021 as a clerk/cashier.

The Defendants operate four Ace Hardware store franchises located
in Fairfield, Franklin, Licking, and Pickaway counties, Ohio.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Caxton Building
          812 E. Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Phone: (216) 912-2221
          Fax: (216) 350-6313
          Email: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                 rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                 kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com


BANK OF NEW YORK: Averts One Coin Fraud Class Action
----------------------------------------------------
Alison Frankel, writing for Reuters, reports that a onetime Locke
Lord partner who was convicted in Manhattan federal court in 2019
for laundering about $400 million in an alleged $4 billion
cryptocurrency Ponzi scheme must have seemed like a big fat target
to the plaintiffs lawyers litigating a fraud class action on behalf
of investors in the scheme.

Prosecutors, after all, had portrayed the lawyer, Mark Scott, as an
integral part of the so-called OneCoin fraud, alleging that he
spent the $50 million he reaped from the scheme on seaside real
estate, fancy cars and a million-dollar yacht.

So it's not exactly surprising that when investors filed a 69-page
amended complaint last September in their class action in Manhattan
federal court, plaintiffs lawyers from the firms Levi & Korsinsky,
Zelle, and Silver Miller highlighted the role that Scott and two
lawyer colleagues allegedly played in the pyramid scheme.

The complaint laid out the alleged international hoax, in which a
Bulgarian woman known as the "Cryptoqueen" teamed up with a
marketing whiz to sell investors materials that would purportedly
allow them to mine for what turned out to be a non-existent
cryptocurrency called OneCoin.

Scott and the other lawyers -- one of whom is also facing federal
criminal charges in Manhattan -- didn't come up with the alleged
scheme. But the complaint contends that the lawyers were
responsible for perpetuating the OneCoin fraud by routing
investors' money through offshore funds. Investors lost hundreds of
millions, if not billions, of dollars, the complaint alleged,
because of the lawyers' participation.

Investors have now lost any chance to prove those allegations. On
Sept. 20, Scott won the dismissal of all of the OneCoin investors'
claims. So did the two other lawyers who allegedly helped him
launder OneCoin's ill-gotten billions, David Pike and Nicole
Huesmann.

U.S. District Judge Valerie Caproni of Manhattan concluded that
despite all of the details about international intrigue in the
investors' complaint - including allegations from a cooperating
witness in the OneCoin criminal investigation -- the class action
faltered at the very first step: Plaintiffs lawyers, she said, had
utterly failed to establish New York's jurisdiction over Scott and
the other lawyers.

The judge, who was clearly exasperated with lawyers for the class,
denied their request for discovery to bolster their jurisdictional
arguments. "This case has been ongoing for over two years,
plaintiffs have had the assistance of a cooperator who played a
central role in the OneCoin scheme, and they are on their third
iteration of the complaint," Caproni wrote. "Plaintiffs'
jurisdictional allegations are doomed by multiple failures of law,
and, therefore, additional discovery would not cure the
jurisdictional defects."

Plaintiffs lawyers Donald Enright and Adam Apton of Levi &
Korsinsky and John Carriel of Zelle didn't respond to my email
query on Caproni's ruling, which also dismissed class claims
against Bank of New York Mellon Corp for allegedly aiding the
laundering of OneCoin money. (Caproni said the class action failed
to state a claim against BNY Mellon, which argued that it was a
victim of the fraud, not a participant.) The ruling seems to leave
plaintiffs without a case, since, according to the judge, all of
the other defendants who are named in the investor complaint have
defaulted.

Scott's counsel, Kevin Brown of Mintz & Gold, said in an email that
his client feels "vindicated" by Caproni's decision, in part
because investors' claims were based on disputed testimony from the
cooperating witness. "The class action claims lacked merit and
should never have been brought in New York," said Brown, who is
appealing Scott's conviction. "We believe this is just the first
step for Mr. Scott," Brown said, adding that he is looking forward
to "proving his innocence in his criminal proceedings."

I did not hear back from Pike's counsel from Raskin & Raskin or
Huesmann's lawyer at Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel.

Investors, according to the judge, committed all sorts of blunders
in their arguments for New York's personal jurisdiction over Scott,
Pike and Huesmann, all of whom live and work in Florida. Broadly
speaking, investors alleged both that the lawyers used banks in New
York to accomplish their wrongdoing and that the alleged
money-laundering scheme affected New Yorkers who lost money when
they invested in OneCoin.

In their brief opposing defendants' dismissal motions, plaintiffs
lawyers argued that Scott and the other lawyers "doubtlessly
availed themselves of the Southern District of New York" when they
moved OneCoin money from bank to bank. Under New York's long-arm
statute, they argued, that's enough to establish personal
jurisdiction.

Not according to Caproni. The judge began by castigating investors'
counsel for lumping the three lawyers together in allegations about
"the Scott group." Group accusations, she said, are "plainly
impermissible" when it comes to establishing jurisdiction over
individual defendants -- and aside from the improper group
allegations, she said, investors didn't offer a single fact to tie
Huesmann to any activity in New York.

To establish New York jurisdiction over Pike, plaintiffs pointed to
the Manhattan federal-court criminal case against him. Caproni was
not persuaded. "The court," she wrote, "is unaware of any authority
supporting the proposition that personal jurisdiction may be
exercised over a party in a particular jurisdiction because venue
was proper for criminal charges against that party."

What about the allegations that Scott's money laundering plot
relied on New York banks to transfer money? Caproni was entirely
unimpressed. The complaint described only one specific transaction
in which money flowed through BNY Mellon, she said. (Investors
irked the judge by citing conflicting dates on that wire transfer.)
New York law, Caproni said, is clear that mere knowledge that money
will be transferred into or out of a New York bank is not
sufficient to establish New York's jurisdiction. New York can only
claim jurisdiction, she said, when a defendant has deliberately
directed the involvement of an in-state bank.

If Scott and the others committed wrongdoing, Caproni said, it
originated in Florida. And if the name plaintiffs were injured, the
harm took place in Montana or Tennessee. "None of those event," the
judge wrote, "occurred in New York."

After the Sept. 20 ruling, neither will the class action. [GN]

BAYER HEALTHCARE: Settles Sunscreen Class Action for $2.25 Million
------------------------------------------------------------------
How to Shop for Free reports that get at least $10 in Coppertone
Class Action Settlement!

Have you purchased Coppertone mineral-based sunscreen anytime
before September 17, 2021? If so, then you are eligible to claim up
to $10 without proof or purchase, or even more with proof, thanks
to a $2.25 million class action settlement.

Products include:

Coppertone Water Babies Pure & Simple
Coppertone Kids Tear Free
Coppertone Sport Face

The lawsuit states that the products were misleadingly labeled as
"mineral-based" when they actually contained chemical active
ingredients in addition to the mineral active ingredients.

If you purchased and are not able to provide proof of purchase, you
will be entitled to $2.50 for each qualified product purchased, up
to four products, for a total of $10 per household.

If you are able to provide proof of purchase, you may receive $2.50
for each qualified product purchased, with no limit on the number
of products. [GN]

BENIHANA INC: Youngsuk Kim Seeks to Certify Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as YOUNGSUK KIM, an
individual, and on behalf of other members of the general public
similarly situated, v. BENIHANA, INC.; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,
Case No. 5:19-cv-02196-JWH-KK (C.D. Cal.), the Plaintiff asks the
Court to enter an order:

   1. determining that a class action is proper as to all causes
      of action in the operative complaint on the grounds that:
      (1) the class is ascertainable and sufficiently numerous,
      (2) common questions of law and fact predominate over
      individual issues, (3) the class representative's claims
      are typical of the class, (4) the class representative
      will adequately represent the interests of the class, and
      (5) class treatment is superior;

   2. certifying a class of:

      "all persons who purchased the Food Products that
      Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for personal or
      household use, and not for resale or distribution
      purposes, from Benihana in California between September
      26, 2015 and November 4, 2019;" and

   3. certifying the following subclasses:

      Subclass A: All persons who purchased the Shrimp Lovers
      Roll that menu labeled to contain "crab," for personal or
      household, and not for resale or distribution purposes,
      from Benihana in between September 26, 2015 and November
      4, 2019.

      Subclass B: All persons who purchased the Shrimp Crunchy
      Roll that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household use, and not for resale or
      distribution purposes, from Benihana in California between
      September 26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

      Subclass C: All persons who purchased the Alaskan Roll
      that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household use, and not for resale or
      distribution purposes, from Benihana in California between
      September 26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

      Subclass D: All persons who purchased the Dragon Roll that
      Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for personal or
      household, and not for resale or distribution purposes,
      from Benihana in between September 26, 2015 and November
      4, 2019.

      Subclass E: All persons who purchased the Chili Shrimp
      Roll that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household, and not for resale or distribution
      purposes, from Benihana in California between September
      26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

      Subclass F: All persons who purchased the Rainbow Roll
      that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household, and not for resale or distribution
      purposes, from Benihana in California between September
      26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

      Subclass G: All persons who purchased the Spider Roll that
      Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for personal or
      household, and not for resale or distribution purposes,
      from Benihana in between September 26, 2015 and
      November 4, 2019.

      Subclass H: All persons who purchased the Sumo Roll Baked
      that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household use, and not for resale or
      distribution purposes, from Benihana in between September
      26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

      Subclass I: All persons who purchased the Lobster Roll
      that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household use, and not for resale or
      distribution purposes, from Benihana in between September
      26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

      Subclass J: All persons who purchased the California Roll
      that Benihana's menu labeled to contain "crab," for
      personal or household use, and not for resale or
      distribution purposes, from Benihana in California between
      September 26, 2015 and November 4, 2019.

Benihana is an American restaurant company based in Aventura,
Florida. It owns or franchises 116 Japanese cuisine restaurants
around the world, including its flagship Benihana Teppanyaki brand,
as well as the Haru and RA Sushi restaurants.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Sept. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2WGDQu1
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Preston H. Lim, Esq.
          LIM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          3435 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2350
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 900-3000
          Facsimile: (213) 204-3000
          E-mail: phl@limlawgroup.com

               - and -

          Jong Yun Kim, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF JONG YUN KIM
          jongkimlaw@hotmail.com
          3600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2226
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 351-9400
          Facsimile: (213) 736-6514

               - and -

          Kenneth H. Yoon, Esq.
          Stephanie E. Yasuda, Esq.
          YOON LAW, APC
          One Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2200
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (213) 612-0988
          Facsimile: (213) 947-1211
          E-mail: kyoon@yoonlaw.com
                  syasuda@yoonlaw.com

BLUEMERCURY INC: Bethel Files Bid for Conditional Certification
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LESLIE BETHEL, on her
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, v.
BLUEMERCURY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Case No.
1:21-cv-02743-KPF (S.D.N.Y.), the Plaintiff asks the Court to enter
an order granting her motion for conditional certification and
court-authorized notice Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b).

Bluemercury is a chain of American beauty stores founded in 1999 by
Marla Malcolm Beck and Barry Beck in Georgetown, Washington, D.C.
The stores sell cosmetics, as well as in-store facials and spa
treatments.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Sept. 29,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3FkYL7y
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Camar R. Jones, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          951 Yamato Road, Suite 285
          Boca Raton, FL 33431
          Telephone: (561) 447-8888
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: cjones@shavitzlaw.com

               - and -

          Michael J. Palitz, Esq.
          SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.
          830 3rd Avenue, 5th Floor
          New York, NY 10022
          Telephone: (800) 616-4000
          Facsimile: (561) 447-8831
          E-mail: mpalitz@shavitzlaw.com

BOOKSPAN LLC: Unlawfully Discloses Customers Info, Shye Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JILL SHYE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. BOOKSPAN LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-12285-TLL-PTM  (E.D.
Mich., Sept. 28, 2021) is a class action complaint against Bookspan
for its intentional and unlawful disclosure of its customers'
Private Reading Information in violation of the Michigan's
Preservation of Personal Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, Bookspan rented, exchanged, and/or
otherwise disclosed detailed information about Plaintiff's
Doubleday Book Club and Literary Guild Book Club subscriptions to
data aggregators, data appenders, data cooperatives, and list
brokers, among others, which in turn disclosed her information to
aggressive advertisers, political organizations, and non-profit
companies.

As a result, the Plaintiff has received a barrage of unwanted junk
mail. By renting, exchanging, and/or otherwise disclosing
Plaintiff's Private Reading Information during the relevant
pre-July 30, 2016 time period, Bookspan violated the PPPA, says the
suit.

While Bookspan profits handsomely from the unauthorized rental,
exchange, and/or disclosure of its customers' Private Reading
Information and other individualized information, it does so at the
expense of its customers' statutory privacy rights (afforded by the
PPPA) because Bookspan does not obtain its customers' written
consent prior to disclosing their Private Reading Information, the
suit added.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Philip L. Fraietta, Esq.
          BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
          888 Seventh Avenue
          New York, NY 10019
          Telephone: (646) 837-7150
          Facsimile: (212) 989-9163
          E-mail: pfraietta@bursor.com

BOSTON BEER: Frank R. Cruz Law Reminds of November 15 Deadline
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz on Sept. 22 disclosed that a class
action lawsuit has been filed on behalf of persons and entities
that purchased or otherwise acquired The Boston Beer Company, Inc.
("Boston Beer" or the "Company") (NYSE: SAM) securities between
April 22, 2021 and September 8, 2021, inclusive (the "Class
Period"). Boston Beer investors have until November 15, 2021 to
file a lead plaintiff motion.

On July 22, 2021, after the market closed, Boston Beer reduced its
full year 2021 guidance, expecting earnings per share between $18
and $22, down from a prior range of $22 and $26. The Company cited
softer-than-expected sales in the hard seltzer category and overall
beer industry and also stated that it had "overestimated the growth
of the hard seltzer category in the second quarter."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $246.54, or 26%, to
close at $701.00 per share on July 23, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

On September 8, 2021, after the market closed, Boston Beer withdrew
its 2021 financial guidance, citing decelerating sales of hard
seltzer products. The Company also stated that it "expects to incur
hard seltzer-related inventory write-offs, shortfall fees payable
to 3rd party brewers, and other costs" for the remainder of fiscal
2021.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $21.09, or 3.7%, to
close at $538.31 per share on September 9, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false
and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose
material adverse facts about the Company's business, operations,
and prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that Boston Beer's hard seltzer sales were
decelerating; (2) that, as a result, Boston Beer was reasonably
likely to incur inventory write-offs; (3) that the Company was
reasonably likely to incur shortfall fees payable to third party
brewers; (4) that, as a result of the foregoing, Boston Beer's
financial results would be adversely impacted; and (5) that, as a
result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements about the
Company's business, operations, and prospects were materially
misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

If you purchased Boston Beer securities during the Class Period,
you may move the Court no later than November 15, 2021 to ask the
Court to appoint you as lead plaintiff. To be a member of the Class
you need not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel
of your choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the
Class. If you purchased Boston Beer securities, have information or
would like to learn more about these claims, or have any questions
concerning this announcement or your rights or interests with
respect to these matters, please contact Frank R. Cruz, of The Law
Offices of Frank R. Cruz, 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1100, Los
Angeles, California 90067 at 310-914-5007, by email to
info@frankcruzlaw.com, or visit our website at
www.frankcruzlaw.com. If you inquire by email please include your
mailing address, telephone number, and number of shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]

BP CORP: Seeks Dismissal of Pension Conversion Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jacklyn Wille, writing for Bloomberg Law, reports that a class
action slated for trial against BP Corp. NA should instead be
dismissed for lack of standing, because the retirees alleging
pension mismanagement can't connect the company's conduct to any
alleged harm, BP told a Texas federal judge.

The retirees have an "insurmountable causation problem," because
even if BP had made the communications and disclosures they claim
should have been made about their pension plan, their benefits
"would be the same and so would any pension benefit differential,"
the company said in a motion filed on Sept. 21 in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. [GN]


BROWARD COUNTY, FL: Federal Court Okays Class Action Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ankita Joshi, writing for The Davis Vanguard, reports that Broward
County Jail has been under fire for placing incarcerated people in
dangerous situations that expose them to the rapid spread of
COVID-19 -- hundreds of COVID-19 infections among those detained
and hundreds of jail staff have been confirmed, despite limited
virus testing.

The ACLU, the ACLU of Florida, and Disability Rights Florida have
sued the Broward County Sherriff's Office on behalf of those
incarcerated, and have demanded that the Sherriff's Office must
"immediately take action to protect people in their custody from
contracting the virus."

In May 2021, a federal court approved the class action settlement
against Broward County's Sheriff's Office.

Broward's County Jail and its medical care contractor, WellPath,
have failed to provide basic health and safety protections, which
have been outlined in the lawsuit.

Some of these COVID-19 prevention and containment procedures
include "providing appropriate and adequate cleaning supplies,
soap, and sanitizer; housing people in a manner that permits social
distancing and protects those who are medically vulnerable;
medically isolating and treating symptomatic and COVID-19 positive
individuals; properly screening and quarantining newly admitted or
transferred detained individuals; waiving fees for sick calls; and
providing accurate and reliable tests for COVID-19."

Additionally it was noted that regardless of the large number of
vaccines available in Broward County, people in jails in Broward
County have been some of the most impacted by the pandemic, and
have had very little access to vaccines.

After the settlement had been approved in May 2021, the Sheriff
undertook a vaccine initiative to offer the Johnson & Johnson
(single dose) vaccine. But as of June 2021, only 1,532 people
detained at the county jail have been vaccinated, even though the
jail housed 3,500 individuals during that time.

There has been little information given about the J&J vaccine by
the Sheriff, but he has agreed to distribute more written
information from trusted public health experts.

The spread of COVID-19 in jail populations is especially
concerning, as they are transient and often operate close to full
capacity.

Concern has been raised over the last few months, according to the
lawsuit, as several new variants of COVID-19 have become pervasive
-- noted the pleading, "Florida has consistently been among the
states with the highest B.1.1.7. variant COVID-19 case count . . .
[and] Broward County has the highest percentage of the B.1.1.7
variant of COVID-19 in the entire state of Florida." [GN]

BURTON CLAIM: Ferguson Seeks to Certify Claims Adjuster Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as LATOYA FERGUSON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
BURTON CLAIM SERVICE, INC., and SEIBELS CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC.,
Case No. 3:21-cv-00580-SAL (D.S.C.), the Plaintiff asks the Court
to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying this action as an Fair Labor
      Standards Act, or FLSA, collective action and authorizing
      notice of this action and the right to opt-into it to the
      following persons:

      "All person who worked for Burton Claim Service, Inc. and
      Seibels Claims Solutions, Inc. in South Carolina as
      insurance claims adjusters and who were classified as
      independent contractors and not paid overtime wages for
      hours worked more than 40 in a week at any time between
      February 26, 2018 and the date of final judgment in this
      matter;"

   2. authorizing him to disseminate the proposed Notice and
      reminder Notice via mail, text message, and email;

   3. allowing class members 60 days to return their consent to
      sue forms; and

   4. directing Defendants to:

      (a) Provide Plaintiffs' Counsel the following information
          with respect to each individual within the above-
          defined collective: name, address, email address,
          phone number, and unique employee identification
          number. This information should be provided in an
          electronic spreadsheet format such as Excel, and each
          item of information should be set forth in a separate
          column; and

      (b) Produce the last four digits of the social security
          number for all collective action members whose notices
          are returned as undeliverable and for all collective
          action members who have the same names.

Founded in 1988, Burton Claim Service is a leading provider of
multi-line insurance adjusting, appraisal, inspection and
catastrophe services.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Sept. 28,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3a4JHfO
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Blaney A. Coskrey, III, Esq.
          COSKREY LAW OFFICE
          1201 Main Street, Suite 1980
          Columbia, SC 29201
          Telephone: (803) 748-1202
          Facsimile: (803) 748-1302
          E-mail: coskrey@coskreylaw.com

               - and -

          Matt Dunn, Esq.
          Rebecca King, Esq.
          GETMAN, SWEENEY& DUNN, PLLC
          260 Fair Street
          Kingston, New York 12401
          Telephone: (845) 255-9370
          Facsimile: (845) 255-8649
          E-mail: mdunn@getmansweeney.com

CANADIAN PACIFIC: Class Action May Last Up to Seven Months
----------------------------------------------------------
Ian Wood and Selena Ross, writing for CTV News, reports that Jean
Clusiault is having to re-live the horrific train disaster at Lac
Megantic, but he says it's necessary -- he's part of a new
class-action lawsuit looking to hold Canadian Pacific railway
accountable.

The class action got underway and could last up to seven months,
with the judge expected to hear from more than 100 witnesses,
bringing a new set of answers into what happened in the 2013
catastrophe.

Clusiault's daughter, Kathy Clusiault, was among the 47 people
killed. She had just moved to the area.

Her father is still looking for answers, he says, and the next
seven months should deliver some of them.

"It makes now eight years that tragedy happens, but for me, I still
have my daughter in my mind," he said.

The class action is based on the allegation that CP was ultimately
responsible, since it contracted out to a smaller and less reliable
railway.

In 2013, a runaway train carrying highly flammable crude oil
levelled the town. The class action alleges that CP's decision to
run the fuel through Lac Megantic wasn't necessary and was
motivated by profit.

The allegations in the class action have not been tested or proven
in court.

To carry crude from Montreal, the company had other options, said
the lawyer representing Clusiault and others in the proposed class
action.

"CP carried the crude oil from North Dakota to Montreal," said
lawyer Daniel Larochelle.

It was then responsible for the next decision, too, about how to
get it to New Brunswick, picking the Montreal Main Atlantic
railway.

"They decide to choose [an] old company with old railway with old
engine -- MMA, Montreal Main and Atlantic -- and we think that's
big fault for CP," Larochelle said.

Lawyers are representing not just families but insurers and the
province in the lawsuit.

The train's engineer, Tom Harding, was the first witness called. He
recounted the night of the disaster.

While acquitted of criminal negligence in a previous trial, he
testified once again about how he did not apply sufficient
handbrakes when he parked the train.

Clusiault says he's accepted how this part happened.

"I don't blame him," he said. "It was a poor company -- that's the
reason why."

The federal Transportation Safety Board identified 18 causes for
the accident, including poor maintenance and lack of oversight.

The class action should help, but it also won't fully put
Clusiault's mind at ease, he said.

"We will have new elements in this trial to have more answers to
our questions, but I [am] still thinking and asking for a public
commission and inquiry, that's it," he said.

CTV News reached out to the federal transport minister to see if an
inquiry is under consideration but did not receive a response.
[GN]


CAPELLA UNIVERSITY: Magistrate Judge's Order in Wright Suit Upheld
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Carolyn Wright, et al., Plaintiffs v. Capella
University, Inc., and Capella Education Company, Defendants, Case
No. 18-cv-1062 (WMW/ECW) (D. Minn.), Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota affirms the
April 2, 2021 Order of Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright.

The Order granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff Maurice Jose
Ornelas' motion for leave to file a second amended class action
complaint.

Background

The Defendants are Capella Education Co. and Capella University,
Inc. (collectively "Capella"), both of which are Minnesota
corporations that operate a for-profit university. The Plaintiffs
are current and former doctoral students of Capella.

The Plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit on April 20, 2018, alleging
claims against the Defendants for a fraudulent scheme in which the
Defendants misrepresented to prospective students the time and cost
to complete Capella's educational programs. They subsequently filed
a First Amended Complaint (FAC). On May 6, 2019, the Court granted
in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
FAC. The Court dismissed all of the named Plaintiffs except
Ornelas, leaving him as the sole remaining putative class
representative.

On Oct. 5, 2020, Ornelas moved to amend the FAC. The proposed
Second Amended Complaint (SAC) seeks to remove allegations
pertaining to the former plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed,
add six new plaintiffs and add claims against the Defendants
pertaining to the new plaintiffs.

On April 2, 2021, the magistrate judge granted in part and denied
in part Ornelas' motion. The magistrate judge found that Ornelas
had not unduly delayed filing his motion and that the proposed
amendments are not unduly prejudicial to the Defendants. Relevant
to this Order, the magistrate judge found that Ornelas'
graduation-rate-misrepresentation claims are not futile. And the
magistrate judge found that the claims of proposed Plaintiffs April
Powers and Jennifer Proffitt are not futile.

The Defendants appeal the April 2, 2021 Order, arguing that the
magistrate judge erred by finding that the proposed
graduation-rate-misrepresentation claims are not futile. They also
appeal the magistrate judge's decision to allow Powers to plead a
claim based on the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA), Idaho Code
Section 48-608, and Proffitt to plead a claim based on the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), 1976 Mich. Pub. Acts 331. Ornelas
argues that the Court should affirm the magistrate judge's April 2,
2021 Order.

Discussion

I. Graduation-Rate-Misrepresentation Claims

The magistrate judge determined that Ornelas'
graduation-rate-misrepresentation claims are not futile based on
the allegations in the proposed SAC. The Defendants contend that
the graduation-rate-misrepresentation claims are futile and do not
plausibly allege fraud.

Judge Wright affirms the magistrate judge's April 2, 2021 Order to
the extent that it granted Ornelas' motion to amend the complaint
to add graduation-rate-misrepresentation claims. She finds that the
SAC alleges that Capella represented that it takes 3 years to 5.5
years to complete a doctoral program. Assuming an even distribution
of students across class years, if there are 12,000 doctoral
students enrolled each year, and it takes between 3 years and 5.5
years to complete the doctoral program, then a 100% graduation rate
would result in between 2,182 and 4,000 doctoral students
graduating each year. If, as the SAC alleges, only 1,109 doctoral
students graduated in a given year, then Capella's actual
graduation rate would be between 27.7% and 50.8%.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, Judge
Wright finds that, if Capella's graduation rate is as low as 27.7%,
this fact plausibly supports the Plaintiffs' claim that Capella's
representations as to "average" or "typical" doctoral students are
false. The Plaintiffs' graduation-rate-misrepresentation
allegations, therefore, are not frivolous. The magistrate judge
correctly granted Ornelas' motion to amend the complaint as to the
graduation-rate-misrepresentation allegations because those
allegations are not "clearly frivolous.

II. ICPA and MCPA Claims

The magistrate judge also concluded that proposed Plaintiffs Powers
and Proffitt may allege claims under the ICPA and MCPA,
respectively. The Defendants argue that both of the proposed
Plaintiffs' claims are futile because those claims fail as a matter
of law. Ornelas contends that, because the Defendants did not
properly raise these issues before the magistrate judge, these
issues are not properly before the Court on appeal.

Judge Wright holds that any arguments that were not presented
before the magistrate judge are waived, and the district court may
properly refuse to consider new arguments. The magistrate judge
expressly observed in the April 2, 2021 Order that the Defendants'
arguments as to the ICPA and MCPA were not fully briefed, and she
concluded that the "Defendants may raise those arguments in a
motion to dismiss, should they choose to bring one, or a motion for
summary judgment." Because the Defendants' arguments were not fully
presented to the magistrate judge, Judge Wright declines to address
them in an appeal of the magistrate judge's order. Accordingly, the
magistrate judge's ruling permitting proposed Plaintiffs Powers and
Proffitt to allege claims under the ICPA and MCPA, respectively, is
affirmed.

Order

Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and
proceedings therein, Judge Wright affirmed the April 2, 2021
Order.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2a5sr7h5 from Leagle.com.


CASSAVA SCIENCES: Statement Lacks Business Info, Rein Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KATLYN K. REIN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly
Situated v. CASSAVA SCIENCES, INC., REMI BARBIER, ERIC J. SCHOEN,
JAMES W. KUPIEC, NADAV FRIEDMANN, and MICHAEL MARSMAN, Case No.
1:21-cv-00856 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 24, 2021) is a class action on
behalf of persons and entities that purchased or otherwise acquired
Cassava securities between September 14, 2020 and August 27, 2021,
inclusive pursuing claims against the Defendants under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

On February 2, 2021, Cassava announced results from its interim
analysis of an open-label study of simufilam, which purportedly
demonstrated that patients' cognition and behavior scores both
improved following six months of simufilam treatment, with no
safety issues. According to the Company, "in a clinical study
funded by the National Institutes of Health and conducted by
Cassava Sciences, six months of simufilam treatment improved
cognition scores by 1.6 points on ADAS-Cog11, a 10% mean
improvement from baseline to month 6," and "in these same patients,
simufilam also improved dementiarelated behavior, such as anxiety,
delusions and agitation, by 1.3 points on the Neuropsychiatric
Inventory, a 29% mean improvement from baseline to month 6."

As the market digested this news, the market price of Cassava
common stock spiraled up, nearly quadrupling from its close of
$22.99 per share on February 1, 2021 to trade as high as $90 per
share in intraday trading by February 3, 2021. The stock spiked on
extremely high trading volume of more than 76 million shares
trading on February 2, 2021 alone, more than 19 times the average
daily volume over the preceding ten trading days. Cassava
immediately cashed in on the stock price inflation, issuing and
selling more than four million shares of its common stock at $49
per share on February 12, 2021 through an underwritten follow-on
public stock offering and reaping more than $200 million in gross
proceeds (the "Offering").

Throughout the Class Period, the Defendants allegedly made
materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to
disclose material adverse facts about the Company's business,
operations, and prospects. Specifically, the Defendants failed to
disclose to investors that the quality and integrity of the
scientific data supporting Cassava's claims for simufilam's
efficacy had been overstated.

On July 29, 2021, Cassava issued a press release entitled "Cassava
Sciences Announces Positive Cognition Data With Simufilam in
Alzheimer's Disease." Although the press release touted supposedly
positive cognition data, analysts and industry observers noted that
the data had not demonstrated that simufilam was more effective at
improving cognition than Biogen Inc.'s ("Biogen") drug Aduhelm.

On this news, Cassava's share price fell $65.77, or 48.61%, over
two trading days, to close at $69.53 per share on July 30, 2021.

On August 24, 2021, after the market closed, reports emerged about
a citizen petition submitted to the FDA concerning the accuracy and
integrity of clinical data for simufilam. The petition requested
that the FDA halt Cassava's clinical trials pending a thorough
audit of the publications and data relied upon by the Company.

On August 25, 2021, before the market opened, Cassava issued a
response to the petition, claiming that the allegations regarding
scientific integrity are false and misleading.

On this news, the Company's share price fell $36.97, or 31.38%, to
close at $80.86 per share on August 25, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

On August 27, 2021, before the market opened, Quanterix issued a
statement denying the Company's claims, stating that it "did not
interpret the test results or prepare the data" touted by Cassava.
The same day, Cassava responded to Quanterix's statement, stating
that "Quanterix's sole responsibility with regard to this clinical
study was to perform sample testing, specifically, to measure
levels of p-tau in plasma samples collected from study subjects."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $12.51, or 17.66%, to
close at $58.34 per share on August 27, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

As a result of Defendants' alleged wrongful acts and omissions, and
the precipitous decline in the market value of the Company's
securities, Plaintiff and other Class members have suffered
significant losses and damages.

The Plaintiff purchased Cassava securities during the Class Period,
and suffered damages as a result of the alleged federal securities
law violations and false and/or misleading statements and/or
material omissions.

Cassava is an Austin-based clinical stage biotechnology company
engaged in the development of drugs for neurodegenerative diseases.
Its lead therapeutic product candidate is called simufilam
(formerly PTI-125) developed as a treatment for Alzheimer's disease
("AD"), and its lead investigational diagnostic product candidate
was SavaDx, a blood-based biomarker/diagnostic to detect AD. The
Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the company

Simufilam purportedly targets an altered form of a protein called
filamin A ("FLNA") in the Alzheimer's brain and reverts it to its
native, healthy conformation, thereby countering the downstream
toxic effects of altered FLNA. The Company's financial viability is
largely dependent upon the clinical success of simufilam as the
Company currently has no sources of revenues.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Willie C. Briscoe, Esq.
          THE BRISCOE LAW FIRM, PLLC
          12700 Park Central Drive, Suite 520
          Dallas, TX 75251
          Telephone: (972) 521-6868
          Facsimile: (346) 214-7463
          E-mail: wbriscoe@thebriscoelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Jeremy A. Lieberman, Esq.
          J. Alexander Hood II
          POMERANTZ LLP
          600 Third Avenue, 20th Floor
          New York, NY 10016
          Telephone: (212) 661-1100
          Facsimile: (212) 661-8665
          E-mail: jalieberman@pomlaw.com
                  ahood@pomlaw.com

CDCP COLONIAL: Seeks Dismissal of Cybersecurity Litigation
----------------------------------------------------------
Kristin L. Bryan, Esq., of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, in an
article for The National Law Review, reports that early in the
summer, owners of the Colonial Pipeline were hit with a putative
class action that was filed in federal court in Georgia. Dickerson
v. CDCP Colonial Partners, L.P., Case No. 1:21-cv-02098 (N.D. Ga.).
As a short recap, a ransomware attack carried out by cybercriminals
crippled the Colonial Pipeline's functionality. The Pipeline was
taken offline as a remedial measure, causing significant gasoline
shortages across the Eastern United States.

Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the owners of the Colonial
Pipeline failed "to properly secure the Colonial Pipeline's
critical infrastructure - leaving it subjected to potential
ransomware attacks like the one that took place on May 7, 2021."
This included the assertion that Defendants "failed to implement
and maintain reasonable security measures, procedures, and
practices appropriate to the nature and scope of [Defendants'
business operations]". (emphasis supplied).

The Complaint alleges a breach of Defendants' duty of care,
including the following acts and omissions: "(1) failing to adopt,
implement, and maintain necessary and adequate security measures in
order to protect its systems (and, thus, the pipeline); (2) failing
to adequately monitor the security of their networks and systems;
(3) failure to ensure that their systems had necessary safeguards
to be protected from malicious ransomware; and, perhaps most
importantly, (4) failure to ensure that they could maintain their
critical fuel transmission operations even in the event of computer
system failure." The Complaint asserts claims for negligence and
for declaratory judgment. An Amended Complaint subsequently
asserted claims for negligence, Unjust Enrichment, Public Nuisance,
and other statutory violations.

On Sept. 21, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
and to strike Plaintiff's class allegations. Insofar as the Motion
to Dismiss was concerned, Defendants' brief was a grab-bag of
various arguments. For instance, the Defendants argued that federal
preemption and the filed rate doctrine preclude all of Plaintiff's
claims. This was in part, Defendants argued, because Plaintiff's
seek to involve the court in pipeline regulation which is the
purview of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. [Note: this
may be the first time in which CPW has seen Defendants rely on the
nonjusticiability doctrine in a data event/cybersecurity
litigation]. Defendants also argued, among other things, that the
economic loss rule bars Plaintiff's negligence claims and in any
event, Defendants owed to duty to end-user, retail consumers not to
shut down its pipeline. Additionally, Defendants argued the
pleadings incorporate impermissible "fail-safe" classes where
membership can only be determined after the merits of the case have
been litigated.

How the court comes out on these issues remains to be seen. And in
any event, a second litigation involving the same cyberattack
remains pending. Not to worry, CPW will be there to keep you in the
loop. Stay tuned. [GN]

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS: Loses Bid to Dismiss Hogans Class Suit
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TIFFANIE HOGANS,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., d/b/a SPECTRUM, Case No.
5:20-CV-566-D (E.D.N.C.), the Hon. Judge James C. Dever III entered
an order:

   1. denying the Charter's motion to strike Hogans' class
      allegations;

   2. denying the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b
      )(l) and Rule 12(b)(6); and

   3. denying the defendant's motion to strike.

On October 27, 2020, Ms. Hogans filed a complaint against Charter
Communications alleging violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991. Hogans also seeks class
certification.

Hogans is a resident of Fayetteville, North Carolina.

Charter is a telecommunications and mass media corporation
headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut.

In January 2020, Hogans obtained a new cell phone number. About the
same time, Hogans began receiving unsolicited calls and voice mail
messages from Charter, though she is not a Charter customer.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 24, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3AaqEvc at no extra charge.[CC]


CHICK-FIL-A INC: Faces Pittman Suit Over Hidden Delivery Charges
----------------------------------------------------------------
ANEISHA PITTMAN and SUSAN UKPERE v. CHICK-FIL-A, INC., Case No.
7:21-cv-08041 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2021) is a class action seeking
monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive and declaratory
relief from Chick-fil-A, arising from its deceptive and untruthful
promises to provide a flat, low-price delivery fee on food
deliveries ordered through is app and website.

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chick-fil-A has moved
aggressively into the food delivery business, exploiting an
opportunity presented by Americans' reduced willingness to leave
their homes. To appeal to consumers in a crowded food delivery
marketplace, Chick-fil-A has promised its customers low-price
delivery in its mobile application and on its website, usually in
the amount of $2.99 or $3.99, the complaint says.

The Plaintiffs contend that these representations, however, are
false, because that is not the true cost of having food delivered
by Chick-fil-A. In fact, Chick-fil-A imposes hidden delivery
charges on its customers in addition to the low "Delivery Fee"
represented in its app and on its website.

On delivery orders only, Chick-fil-A secretly marks up food prices
for delivery orders by a hefty 25-30%. In other words, the
identical order of a 30-count chicken nuggets costs approximately
$5-6 more when ordered for delivery than when ordered via the same
mobile app for pickup, or when ordered in-store.

This alleged hidden delivery upcharge makes Chick-fil-A's promise
of low-cost delivery patently false. The true delivery costs are
obscured, and far exceed its express representation that its
"Delivery Fee" is a flat fee of only $2.99 or $3.99.

By falsely marketing a quantified, low-cost delivery charge,
Chick-fil-A deceives consumers into making online food purchases
they otherwise would not make, the suit alleges.

Chick-fil-A misrepresents the nature of the delivery charges
assessed on the Chick-fil-A mobile application and the website, by
issuing in-app and online marketing materials that fail to correct
reasonable understandings of its low-cost delivery promises, and
that misrepresent the actual costs of the delivery service.

Consumers like the Plaintiffs reasonably understand Chick-fil-A's
express "Delivery Fee" representation to disclose the total
additional cost they will pay as a result of having their food
delivered, as opposed to ordering online and picking up food in
person, or ordering and picking up food in person, added the
suit.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Andrew Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Avenue, Suite 705
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          E-mail: ashamis@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Jeffrey D. Kaliel, Esq.
          KALIELGOLD PLLC
          1100 15th St NW, 4th Floor
          Washington DC, 20005
          E-mail: jkaliel@kalielpllc.com

CONSERVICE LLC: Clay Sues Over Unpaid Compensations
---------------------------------------------------
Ryan Clay, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. CONSERVICE, LLC; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Case
No. 21CV387223 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty., Sept. 30, 2021),
is brought to seek monetary relief against Defendants on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated in California to recover,
among other things, unpaid wages and benefits, interest, attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses.

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have engaged in a systematic
pattern of wage and hour violations unfair the California Labor
Code and Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Orders, all of
which contribute to Defendants' deliberate unfair competition. The
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that The
Defendants have increased their profits by violating state wages
and hour laws by, among other things: failing to pay overtime wages
at proper rates; failing to pay all wages (including minimum wages
and overtime wages); failing to provide lawful mean periods or
compensation in lieu thereof; failing to authorize or permit lawful
rest breaks or provide compensation in lieu thereof; failing to
provides accurate itemized wage statements; failing to provide all
wages due upon separation of employments; and dialing o reimburse
all business expenses incurred by the employees in direct
consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, says the
complaint.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in California during the Class
Period.

The Defendants are in the business of providing utility
management.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kashif Haque, Esq.
          Samuela Wong, Esq.
          Jessica L. Campbell, Esq.
          AEGIS LAWFIRM, PC
          9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 379-6250
          Facsimile: (949) 379-6251
          Email: icampbell@aegislawfirm.com


CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTS: Fails to Pay Minimum and OT Wages, Rode Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Hunter Rode v. Creative Environments Design & Landscape, Inc., an
Arizona Corporation and Daniel Waters, an individual, Case No.
2:21-cv-01656-ESW (D. Ariz., Sept. 24, 2021) is brought on behalf
of the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated alleging that
the Defendants failed to fully compensate them their regular wages
and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and the Collective
Members were compensated on an hourly basis and were not paid
one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for all time
worked in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek as well as not
paid for regular wages of travel time.

The Plaintiff and the Collective Members bring this action against
Defendants for their unlawful failure to pay wages and overtime
wages.

The Plaintiff and the Collective Members are current and former
workers employed by the Defendants.

Creative Environments is a landscape design company in Phoenix,
Arizona providing custom swimming pools, patios, and outdoor
kitchens.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kimberly A. Eckert, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF KIMBERLY A. ECKERT
          5235 South Kyrene Road Suite 206
          Tempe, AZ 85283
          Telephone: (480) 456-4497
          Facsimile: (866) 583-6073
          E-mail: keckert@arizlaw.biz

CRISP MARKETING: Faces Smith TCPA Over Telemarketing Calls
----------------------------------------------------------
SANDRA SMITH, individually and on behalf of all those similarly
situated v. CRISP MARKETING, LLC, Case No. CACE-21-017951 (Fla.
Cir., Broward Cty., Sept. 27, 2021) is a class action under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a federal statute enacted in
response to widespread public outrage about the proliferation of
intrusive, nuisance telemarketing practices.

According to the complaint, Crisp Marketing uses pre-recorded
messages to make outbound telemarketing calls to hundreds if not
thousands of consumers across U.S., soliciting consumers for
insurance services. By doing so, Crisp Marketing has violated the
TCPA when it called consumers without consent, the Plaintiff
contends.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt Defendant's unlawful
telemarketing calls. She additionally seeks damages as authorized
by the TCPA on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members, and any
other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the
actions of the Defendant.

Crisp Marketing is a Florida based marketing company that sells
leads in the insurance space.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Avi R. Kaufman, Esq.
          KAUFMAN P.A.
          400 Northwest 26th Street
          Miami, FL 33127
          Telephone: (305) 469-5881
          E-mail: kaufman@kaufmanpa.com

CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OH: Class Status Partly Granted in Beck Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SHAVANDA BECK, ET AL., v.
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA, Case No. 1:19-cv-00818-CAB (N.D. Ohio), the
Hon. Judge Christopher A. Boyko, Sr. entered an order granting in
part and denying in part Plaintiffs' motion for collective and
class certification.

The Court said, "The Plaintiffs have not met the modest-plus
evidentiary burden to show other employees outside the Detention
Officer position suffered the same FLSA violations. Therefore, the
Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Conditionally Certify its
proposed collective action on behalf of all hourly non-exempt
Juvenile Court employees. Because the proposed Notice is targeted
at this broader definition of employees, the Court declines to
approve the Notice as proposed.

The Court adds that because Plaintiffs' evidence could not support
certification of a collective action under the more lenient
standard under the FLSA, it must necessarily fail under the more
stringent Rule 23 standard because they cannot show commonality or
typicality amongst the different job classifications. Therefore,
the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification of the
class defined as:

   "All current or former hourly, non-exempt employees of the
   County who performed work for its Juvenile Court Division at
   any time during the last three years, whose record of hours
   worked were not made, kept or preserved by the County and who
   were not compensated at a rate of one and one half times
   their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty in
   a workweek (the "Ohio Class").

However, the Court does find the evidence presented supports
conditional certification of a collective action for Detention
Officers. Consequently, Plaintiffs shall submit a modified FLSA
collective definition with appropriately modified collective notice
to the Court no later than September 30, 2021.

Should Plaintiffs intend on refiling a Rule 23 Motion for
Certification on the Detention Officer class, that Motion shall be
filed no later than October 7, 2021. The parties shall then confer
and submit to the Court no later than October 14, 2021, agreed upon
dates for a hearing on the refiled Motion for Class Certification.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 24, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2Yk1NYJ at no extra charge.[CC]

DANIEL FLEISCHMAN: Bid to Certify Class in Beckendorf Suit Nixed
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as FRANK WILLIAM BECKENDORF,
III, v. DANIEL FLEISCHMAN, ET AL., Case No. e 2:21-cv-01357-GGG-MBN
(E.D. La.), the Hon. Judge Michael B. North entered an order:

   1. denying Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel; and

   2. denying Plaintiff's Motion to certify a class and add
      additional Plaintiffs

The Court said, "Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is
denied  after considering the factors set forth in Ulmer v.
Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5 th Cir. 1982). As a non-attorney
pro se Plaintiff, Beckendorf fails to satisfy the adequacy
requirement of Rule 23(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Bowen v. Bureau of
Prisons of United States, Case No. 20-CV-0062, 2020 WL 8678786 3
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2020) (and cases cited therein), adopted, 2021
WL 796039 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2021). Plaintiff’s request to add as
Plaintiffs the finite number of individuals identified in his
motion is denied without prejudice as said individuals have not
submitted separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis."

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 27, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3l6KKlM at no extra charge.[CC]

DEKALB COUNTY, GA: Summary Judgment Granted in IDEA Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
On September 16, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in T.H.
v. DeKalb County School District. The Court held that a trial is
not necessary for the Plaintiff class to prevail on its claim that
the DeKalb County Sherriff has violated the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). This is the first decision in
the 11th Circuit to hold that the IDEA entitles students with
disabilities to special education within adult jails.

The case was filed in 2019 and is being litigated by Children's
Rights, the Barton Juvenile Defender Clinic at Emory University
School of Law, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, and Hecht Walker,
P.C., on behalf of incarcerated youth aged 17 through 21 with a
qualifying disability who have a right to special education
services and accommodations under the IDEA and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)/Section 504. It was filed against the DeKalb
County School District, the Georgia Department of Education, and
the DeKalb County Sheriff.

The DeKalb County School District and Georgia Department of
Education have agreed to settle the claims against them. The
Court's ruling removes the last impediment to obtaining the relief
that the class seeks: special education and related services in the
DeKalb County Jail.

For more than a decade, hundreds of disabled students locked up in
the DeKalb County jail, one of the largest in the country, have not
been getting the special education services they're entitled to
under federal law. Detained youth are disproportionately Black and
frequently caught in the "school to prison pipeline." In Georgia,
32% of residents are Black, while Black people represent 51% of the
jail population and 60% of the prison population.

"The court's decision sends a message to students in the jail I
have been fighting to defend for over a decade: you are worthy of
educating; we are not giving up on you," said Randee Waldman,
Clinical Professor of Law, and the Director of the Barton Juvenile
Defender Clinic at Emory University School of Law. "An education is
a transformative experience that you deserve - and being in jail is
no justification for denying you the chance for a successful
life."

"As a product of the DeKalb County School system myself, I am proud
of this victory for our clients who are eager to learn while in the
jail. Education for incarcerated people with disabilities is
legally required, and studies have shown that participation in
these programs helps decrease recidivism and poverty upon release,"
said Christina Remlin, Lead Counsel, at Children's Rights.

"This decision enables us to ensure that students with disabilities
are identified, evaluated and provided with the education services
to which they are entitled under federal law while in the DeKalb
County Jail. It will require the DeKalb County Jail to follow many
other jurisdictions across the country that have successfully
incorporated this programming into their jails, with positive
outcomes for students," said David Brackett, Partner, Bondurant
Mixson & Elmore, LLP.

Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP: Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP is
a powerhouse litigation firm in Atlanta, GA, which routinely has
been involved in cases of national significance for over 40 years.
The firm can be found online at www.bmelaw.com.

Hecht Walker Jordan, P.C.: The attorneys at Hecht Walker Jordan,
P.C. have over a century of cumulative experience in a broad
variety of specialized practices including corporate, real estate,
civil rights and family law serving all 28 counties in the metro
Atlanta area and other counties throughout the state of Georgia.
The firm provides representation to individuals, small businesses,
large corporations, and government bodies.
https://hechtwalker.com/

Barton Juvenile Defender Clinic at Emory University School of Law:
A clinical offering of the Barton Child Law & Policy Center that
serves as an in-house legal clinic dedicated to providing holistic
legal representation for children in the juvenile and criminal
justice systems. For more information, please visit
http://law.emory.edu/academics/clinics/barton-juvenile-defender-clinic.html.

Children's Rights: Every day, children are harmed in America's
broken child welfare, juvenile justice, education, and healthcare
systems. Through relentless strategic advocacy and legal action, we
hold governments accountable for keeping kids safe and healthy.
Children's Rights, a national non-profit organization, has made a
lasting impact for hundreds of thousands of vulnerable children.
For more information, please visit www.childrensrights.org. [GN]

DYNCORP INT'L: Del Fierro Bid to Certify Class Nixed w/o Prejudice
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as RAMON DEL FIERRO v.
DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL LLC, Case No. 2:19-cv-07091-DDP-JC (C.D.
Cal.), the Hon. Judge Dean D. Pregerson entered an order denying
without prejudice the Plaintiff's motion to certify class:

   "all current and former California non-exempt employees of
   Defendant DynCorp International, LLC who were paid any shift
   premium wages (including certification premiums) at any time
   from August 14, 2018, through the date that the class is
   certified."

The Court said, "To the extent that base-specific, as opposed to
class member-specific, inquiries qualify as "individual" questions,
the court cannot determine on the current briefing whether such
questions are sufficiently complex to predominate over the common
questions in this case. It may be, for example, that there is a
relatively straightforward answer to the question whether some or
all of the bases at issues here are federal enclaves, and/or
whether Section 226(a)(9) applies to those enclaves. However, the
Plaintiff has made no attempt to make such a showing."

The Plaintiff worked for Dyncorp at the Point Mugu Naval Air
Station from December 2016 to July 2019. The Plaintiff alleges, on
behalf of a putative class, that Dyncorp violated California Labor
Code section 226 by failing to provide wage statements that
accurately identified the applicable rate of pay and hours worked
for certain "shift premiums."

DynCorp was an American private military contractor. Started as an
aviation company, the company also provided flight operations
support, training and mentoring.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 24, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uDvuA1 at no extra charge.[CC]

ENCOMPASS HEALTH: Cashon to Supplement Briefing on Class Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, VALERIE CASHON, Plaintiff v. ENCOMPASS HEALTH
REHABILITATION HOSPITAL OF MODESTO, LLC, et al., Defendants, Case
No. 1:19-cv-00671-NONE-SKO (E.D. Cal.), Judge Dale A. Drozd of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California orders
the Plaintiff to file supplemental briefing concerning the motion
for preliminary approval of a class action settlement sufficient
for to permit the Court to adequately review the parties' proposed
settlement.

Plaintiff Cashon initiated the action in Stanislaus County Superior
Court on Jan. 31, 2019. Defendants Encompass Health Rehabilitation
Hospital of Modesto, LLC and Encompass Health Corporation removed
the action to the federal court on May 15, 2019 on the basis of the
court's diversity jurisdiction. The case currently proceeds on the
Plaintiff's first amended complaint against the Defendants on 11
causes of action brought under California state law.

On Aug. 3, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary
approval of a class action settlement and a declaration in support
thereof. The motion also seeks leave to file a second amended
complaint. The proposed second amended complaint brings, for the
first time, claims on behalf of a proposed class.

Judge Drozd finds the matter insufficiently briefed. He holds that
the Court lacks sufficient information to perform the required
analysis. For instance, he says, the Court is without sufficient
information to evaluate the following:

     a. Whether the amount offered in the settlement is adequate.
Among other things, the record does not reflect what the maximum
possible amount of the claims is.

     b. Whether this lawsuit has progressed far enough to merit a
class-action settlement. For instance, it is not clear to the court
whether any discovery has been taken with respect to the class
claims.

     c. Whether the proposed settlement administrator has agreed to
undertake the role.

     d. What other agreements have been made in connection with the
proposed settlement, such as the settlement agreement reached
between plaintiff and defendant with respect to plaintiff's
individual claims.

     e. Whether the requirement to file a copy of the proposed
settlement agreement with the Labor and Workforce Development
Agency has been satisfied.

In addition, Judge Drozd has concerns about the merits of the
underlying motion.

The parties may also wish to address the following areas in their
briefing:

     a. Whether it is appropriate for the employer portion of any
payroll taxes to be paid from the settlement fund -- Settlement
Agreement 1.p; 18.f; 20.h.); see Perez v. All Ag, Inc., No.
1:18-cv-00927-DAD-EPG, 2020 WL 1904825, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17,
2020). In the instant case, however, it appears that the employer
payroll taxes will be paid from the fund set aside for unpaid
wages, depriving employees of the unpaid wages that they are due.
The court cannot approve this provision as interpreted).

     b. Whether the scope of the release is overly broad.

     c. Whether the notice is comprehensible to laypersons,
especially with respect to the scope of the release.

Accordingly, Judge Drozd orders that the Plaintiff will, within 30
days, file supplemental briefing concerning the proposed
class-action settlement agreement.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/44b4yn9p from Leagle.com.


ENERFIN RESOURCES: Deitrich Trust A Suit Seeks to Certify Class
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as Joanne Harris Deitrich
Trust A, trustee Marian D. Browne, on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated, v. Enerfin Resources I Limited
Partnership, et al., Case No. 6:20-cv-00084-KEW (E.D. Okla.), the
Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an order certifying the following
class under Rule 23 for the claim that Enerfin breached its
statutory obligation to pay interest under the Production Revenue
Standards Act (PRSA):

   "All non-excluded persons or entities who: (1) received
   Untimely Payments from Defendants (or Defendants' designees)
   for oil-and-gas proceeds from Oklahoma wells on or after
   March 19, 2015, and (2) who have not already been paid
   statutory interest on the Untimely Payments. An "Untimely
   Payment" for purposes of this class definition means payment
   of proceeds from the sale of oil-and-gas production from an
   oil-and-gas well after the statutory periods identified in
   Okla. Stat. tit 52, section 570.10(B)(1) (i.e., commencing
   not later than six months after the date of first sale, and
   thereafter not later than the last day of the second
   succeeding month after the end of the month within which such
   production is sold). Untimely payments do not include: (a)
   payments of proceeds to an owner under Okla. Stat. tit 52, §
   570.10(B)(3) (minimum pay) if paid annually for the twelve
   months accumulation of proceeds totaling at least $10; (b)
   prior period adjustments; or (c) pass-through payments.

   Exclusions: The persons or entities excluded from the Class
   are: (1) agencies, departments, or instrumentalities of the
   United States of America or the State of Oklahoma; (2)
   publicly traded oil and gas companies and their affiliates;
   (3) persons or entities that Plaintiff's counsel may be
   prohibited from representing under Rule 1.7 of the Oklahoma
   Rules of Professional Conduct; (4) persons or entities who
   have already filed and still have pending or settled lawsuits
   for Untimely Payments against Defendants; (5) Plaintiff's
   counsel, their experts, and officers of the Court; and (6)
   Defendants and their affiliates.

The Plaintiff also requests that the Court appoint Plaintiff as
class representative and that the Court appoint Plaintiff's counsel
as class counsel.

According to the complaint, Enerfin refuses to follow the PRSA -- a
statute with an unmistakable purpose: "the Legislature has
expressed its intent that it shall be the public policy in Oklahoma
for royalty owners to receive prompt payment from the sale of oil
and gas products." "The Oklahoma Legislature adopted the prompt
payment rule because of abusive practices by the oil industry,
which frequently withheld payments from owners for a long time." To
deter this abuse, the PRSA demands that owners receive interest on
proceeds paid outside the statutory deadlines.

Enerfin is a privately held natural gas and crude oil midstream
business.

A copy of the Plaintiff's motion to certify class dated Sept. 29,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ixUowb
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Reagan E. Bradford, Esq.
          Ryan K. Wilson, Esq.
          BRADFORD & WILSON PLLC
          431 W. Main Street, Suite D
          Oklahoma City, OK 73102
          Telephone: (405) 698-2770
          Facsimile: (405) 234-5506
          E-mail: reagan@bradwil.com
                  ryan@bradwil.com

               - and -

          James U. White, Jr., Esq.
          WHITE, COFFEY AND FITE, P.C.
          P.O. Box 54783
          Oklahoma City, OK 73154
          Telephone: (405) 842-7545
          E-mail: jwhite@wcgflaw.com

ERICO INTERNATIONAL: Faces McKnight Class Suit Over FLSA Violations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
PARRIS MCKNIGHT, DAWN ADAMS, MATTHEW BAILEY, RYAN EVANS, COREY
GREEN, DERESSE JACKSON, LATONYA JORDAN, JOSHUA LIVINGSTON, MICHAEL
METZ, ROBERT METZ, FREDERICK MIDGLEY, RANDI ROBINSON, TIA ROBINSON,
AND TYRONN TAYLOR, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated v. ERICO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Case No.
1:21-cv-01826-JPC (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 27, 2021) challenges the
policies and practices of the Defendant that violate the Fair Labor
Standards Act as well as the statutes of the State of Ohio.

The Plaintiffs bring this case as an FLSA "collective action"
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. section 216(b), which provides that "an
action to recover the liability" prescribed by the FLSA "may be
maintained against any employer by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of themselves and other employees similarly
situated."

The Plaintiffs also bring this case as a class action under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and other members of a class of
persons who assert factually-related claims under the wage-and-hour
statutes of the State of Ohio.

The Defendant's website, https://www.erico.com/products.asp, states
that "nVent ERICO" is a manufacturer of "[g]rounding, bonding,
lightning protection and electrical rail connection solutions for
commercial, industrial, utility, rail, alternative energy and
telecom end user groups." The Defendant also manufactures
components for electrical and fastening solutions.

The Defendant utilizes hourly non-exempt employees and other
workers with similar job titles and/or positions of Defendant in
furtherance of its business purpose.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Ryan A. Winters, Esq.
          Joseph F. Scott, Esq.
          Kevin M. McDermott II, Esq.
          SCOTT & WINTERS LAW FIRM, LLC
          The Caxton Building
          812 Huron Rd. E., Suite 490
          Cleveland, OH 44115
          Telephone: (216) 912-2221
          Facsimile: (216) 350-6313
          E-mail: jscott@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  rwinters@ohiowagelawyers.com
                  kmcdermott@ohiowagelawyers.com

FLEETCOR TECH: Morrison Seeks Unpaid Wages for Call Center Agents
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MANDY MORRISON, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. FLEETCOR TECHNOLOGIES OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-03950-TWT (N.D. Ga., Sept. 24, 2021) is an action,
individually and as a collective action on behalf of all other call
center agents who elect to opt-in to this action to recover unpaid
overtime wages, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs as a result of the Defendant's willful violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.

Additionally, Plaintiff brings this action, individually and as a
Rule 23 class action on behalf of all CCAs to recover unpaid
overtime wages, liquidated damages, pre-judgment interest, and
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as a result of Defendant's
violation of the Kentucky's Wages and Hours Act, and Kentucky's
Wages and Hours Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendant failed to pay call center
agents for their pre-shift time spent starting up their computers,
logging into required systems and applications, and reviewing
work-related e-mails and other information, including time worked
in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

Additionally, Plaintiff and other call center agents were victims
of the Defendant's common policy of failing to incorporate their
non-base compensation (such as Incentive Bonuses) into their
regular rates of pay, for purposes of calculating their hourly
overtime rates. As a result, there were many weeks throughout the
statutory period in which Plaintiff and other call center agents
received an hourly rate of overtime hours of less than "one and
one-half times their regular rate," in violation of the FLSA, added
the suit.

The Plaintiff and the members of the putative collective and class
were employed by Defendant as call center agents and were
responsible for handling telephone calls from Defendant's clients
and customers.

The Defendant provides customer service outsourcing services to
global clients in industries including travel and hospitality,
financial services, and telecommunications.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roger W. Orlando, Esq.
          THE ORLANDO FIRM, P.C.
          315 West Ponce De Leon Ave., Suite 400
          Decatur, GA 30030
          Telephone: (973) 898-0404
          E-mail: roger@orlandofirm.com

               - and -

          Jason T. Brown, Esq.
          Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
          Edmund C. Celiesius, Esq.
          BROWN, LLC
          111 Town Square Place, Suite 400
          Jersey City, NJ 07310
          Telephone: (201) 630-0000
          E-mail: jtb@jtblawgroup.com
                  nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com
                  ed.celiesius@jtblawgroup.com

FUJI HANA: Lin Class Suit Seeks Unpaid Overtime Wages Under NYLL
----------------------------------------------------------------
YI DI LIN and CHUN LIN, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated v. FUJI HANA RESTAURANT CORP. d/b/a Fuji Hana
Kosher Japanese Restaurant d/b/a Fuji Hana, LORRAINE GINDI, ESTATE
OF ISADORE GINDI, by executor RAMOND BETESH, ISADORE NATKIN, and
JACK COHEN, Case No. 524702/2021 (N.Y. Sup., Kings Cty., Sept. 29,
2021) seeks to recover for unpaid or underpaid overtime
compensation, liquidated damages, statutory damages, prejudgment
interest, post-judgment interest, attorney fees, costs, expenses,
injunctive relief, and such other and further relief made available
by law pursuant to the New York Labor Law, the Minimum Wage Act and
the Wage Theft Prevention Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have willfully and
intentionally commit widespread violations of the NYLL by engaging
in pattern and practice of failing to pay its employees, including
Plaintiffs, minimum wage for each hour worked and overtime
compensation for all hours worked over 40 each workweek.

Fuji Hana is a domestic business corporation organized under the
laws of the State of New York with a principal address at 512
Avenue U, Brooklyn, New York. The Individual Defendants are
officers, directors, managers and/or majority shareholders or
owners of the Corporate Defendant.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John Troy, Esq.
          Aaron Schweitzer, Esq.
          Tiffany Troy, Esq.
          TROY LAW, PLLC
          Park Regent Condominium
          41-25 Kissena Blvd No. 103
          Flushing, NY 11355
          Telephone: (718) 762-1324

GREAT WESTERN: Faces Pool Class Action Complaint for Unpaid Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JONATHAN POOL, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. GREAT WESTERN BANK, Case No.
1:21-cv-02626-MEH (D. Colo., Sept. 28, 2021) alleges that the
Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiff and others similarly situated
all required minimum and overtime wages for hours worked under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay
Standards Order, the Colorado Minimum Wage Act, and the Colorado
Wage Claim Act.

The Defendant employed Plaintiff Jonathan Pool to work as a bank
teller. The Plaintiff worked in Defendant bank's branches located
at 3650 E 1 st Ave. Denver, Colorado.

This action concerns work performed between September 28, 2015 and
the present.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew H. Turner, Esq.
          MILSTEIN TURNER, PLLC
          2400 Broadway - Suite B
          Boulder, CO. 80304
          Telephone: (303) 305-8230
          E-mail: andrew@milsteinturner.com

HARVEST MIDSTREAM: Suit Seeks Unpaid OT Wages for Day-Rate Workers
------------------------------------------------------------------
DOUGLAS E. YOUNG, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated v. HARVEST MIDSTREAM COMPANY, Case No.
2:21-cv-00226 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 29, 2021) seeks to recover unpaid
overtime wages and other damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
against Harvest Midstream.

Mr. Young and the other workers like him ("Putative Class Members")
regularly worked for Harvest in excess of 40 hours each week.

These workers never received overtime for hours worked in excess of
40 hours in a single workweek. Instead, these workers were paid a
day rate, the lawsuit says.

Harvest is a private oil and gas company headquartered in Houston
that is the "go-to provider for midstream services in the United
States." Harvest has an interest in over 6,000 miles of pipeline
across seven states -- Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Harvest's operations "include the
transport and processing of natural gas, crude oil and natural gas
liquids". To continue operating, Harvest relies on day-rate
workers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Andrew W. Dunlap, Esq.
          Michael A. Josephson, Esq.
          Rochelle D. Prins, Esq.
          JOSEPHSON DUNLAP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3050
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 352-1100
          Facsimile: (713) 352-3300
          E-mail: mjosephson@mybackwages.com
                  adunlap@mybackwages.com

               - and -

          Richard J. (Rex) Burch, Esq.
          BRUCKNER BURCH PLLC
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 3025
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 877-8788
          Facsimile: (713) 877-8065
          E-mail: rburch@brucknerburch.com

HAYNES INVESTMENTS: Sheppard Mullin Attorneys Discuss Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
Anna S. McLean, Esq., and Michael A. Lundholm, Esq., of Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, in an article for The National Law
Review, report that in Brice v. Haynes Investments LLC, No.
19-15707 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2021), the Ninth Circuit considered an
appeal by shareholders in Native American tribe-linked online
lenders of a district court order denying the shareholders' motion
to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit reversed the order
because, under the terms of the parties' agreement, the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement was a question for the
arbitrator, not the judge, to decide.

A class of consumers filed suit against investors in the
now-defunct online lender Think Finance, alleging that investors
violated federal racketeering law, charged consumers interest rates
that were usurious under California law, and that tribal sovereign
immunity did not apply. The borrowers' loan documents contained an
arbitration agreement with a provision delegating to the arbitrator
questions concerning its enforceability. The district court denied
the defendant shareholders' motion to compel arbitration, holding
that a choice of law provision in the parties' agreement requiring
the arbitrator to apply tribal law effectively constituted a
"prospective waiver" of the plaintiffs' substantive rights to
pursue federal statutory claims.

On appeal, the shareholders argued that the lower court erred
because it failed to address the threshold question of whether the
provision delegating questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator
was unenforceable. If the delegation provision was enforceable,
then any questions concerning the enforceability of the broader
agreement to arbitrate were for the arbitrator to decide.

In an opinion authored by the Hon. Danielle J. Forrest, the Ninth
Circuit panel majority agreed with the defendant shareholders.
"Where a delegation provision exists, courts first must focus on
the enforceability of that specific provision, not the
enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole." Under the
governing Supreme Court precedents of Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013) "the delegation provision is
enforceable because it d[id] not eliminate Borrowers' right to
pursue in arbitration their prospective-waiver challenge to the
arbitration agreement as a whole, even though that challenge arises
under federal law."

The dissent, authored by the Hon. William A. Fletcher, disagreed
and argued that that the majority "misunderst[ood] the effect of
the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements," which in his view
precluded the arbitrator from applying anything other than tribal
law and a small, irrelevant subset of federal law. For the dissent,
the choice of law provision effectively invalidated both the
delegation provision and the arbitration clause.

The Brice decision creates a circuit split with the Second, Third
and Fourth Circuits, which have affirmed decisions refusing to
compel arbitration in similar cases involving the application of
tribal law to consumer loan agreements. The panel majority
addressed these decisions, noting that the out-of-circuit cases
conflated "the question of who decides arbitrability with the
separate question of who prevails on arbitrability." Where "there
is a clear delegation provision" the question of enforceability is
"not for us -- or anyone else wearing a black robe -- to decide.
Instead, it is for the arbitrator to decide so long as the
delegation provision itself does not eliminate parties' rights to
purse their federal remedies[.]" While this question may ultimately
need to be decided by the Supreme Court, in the meantime businesses
should review their consumer arbitration clauses and carefully
consider whether they intend the arbitrator or the court to
determine enforceability in the first instance. [GN]

HOME DEPOT: Seeks Extension to Reply on Appiah Class Cert. Bid
--------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as BRENDA APPIAH AND KWADWO
APPIAH v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A, INC. and HOME DEPOT PRODUCT AUTHORITY,
LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-00489-VLB (D. Conn.), the Defendants ask the
Court to enter an order granting 14 day extension of time, up to
and including, October 21, 2021 within which to respond and/or
object to Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Defendants say that additional time is necessary in order for
them to fully and adequately evaluate and analyze Plaintiffs'
motion for class certification and prepare responses and/or
objections. This is the Defendants' first request for an extension
of time with respect to the Motion for class certification. Counsel
for the Defendants has conferred with Plaintiffs' counsel and
Plaintiffs' counsel consents to this request. Defendants' counsel
further represents that no party will be prejudiced and this brief
extension will not cause undue delay or impact the orderly
progression of this case.

Home Depot is a home improvement retailer in the United States,
supplying tools, construction products, and services. The company
is headquartered in incorporated Cobb County, Georgia, with an
Atlanta mailing address.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Sept. 29,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3Ac885H
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Defendants are represented by:

          Cullen W. Guilmartin, Esq .
          Andrew Bullard, Esq .
          GORDON & REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP
          95 Glastonbury Boulevard, Suite 206
          Glastonbury, CT 06033
          Telephone: (860) 494-7513
          Facsimile: (860) 560-0185
          E-mail: cguilmartin@grsm.com
                  abullard@grsm.com

HYRECAR INC: Glancy Prongay Reminds of October 26 Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------
Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP ("GPM") reminds investors of the
upcoming October 26, 2021 deadline to file a lead plaintiff motion
in the class action filed on behalf of investors who purchased or
otherwise acquired HyreCar Inc. ("HyreCar" or the "Company")
(NASDAQ: HYRE) securities between May 14, 2021 and August 10, 2021,
inclusive (the "Class Period").

If you suffered a loss on your HyreCar investments or would like to
inquire about potentially pursuing claims to recover your loss
under the federal securities laws, you can submit your contact
information at https://www.glancylaw.com/cases/hyrecar-inc/. You
can also contact Charles H. Linehan, of GPM at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, or via email at
shareholders@glancylaw.com to learn more about your rights.

On August 10, 2021, after the market closed, HyreCar announced
financial results for second quarter 2021, reporting net losses of
$9.3 million compared to losses of $3.8 million in the prior year
period. The Company also disclosed that it had incurred higher
costs of revenue "primarily [due to] additional insurance claims of
$2.8 million . . . and incidental payments incurred prior to March
31, 2021 in excess of the reserves and accruals."

On this news, the Company's share price fell 50% to close at $9.85
per share on August 11, 2021, thereby injuring investors.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to investors
that: (1) HyreCar had materially understated its insurance
reserves; (2) HyreCar had systematically failed to pay valid
insurance claims incurred prior to the Class Period; (3) HyreCar
had incurred significant expenses transitioning to its new
third-party insurance claims administrator and processing claims
incurred from prior periods; (4) HyreCar had failed to
appropriately price risk in its insurance products and was
experiencing elevated claims incidence as a result; (5) HyreCar had
been forced to dramatically reform its claims underwriting,
policies, and procedures in response to unacceptably high claims
severity and customer complaints; and as a result, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis at all relevant times.

If you purchased or otherwise acquired HyreCar securities during
the Class Period, you may move the Court no later than October 26,
2021 to request appointment as lead plaintiff in this putative
class action lawsuit. To be a member of the class action you need
not take any action at this time; you may retain counsel of your
choice or take no action and remain an absent member of the class
action. If you wish to learn more about this class action, or if
you have any questions concerning this announcement or your rights
or interests with respect to the pending class action lawsuit,
please contact Charles Linehan, Esquire, of GPM, 1925 Century Park
East, Suite 2100, Los Angeles, California 90067 at 310-201-9150,
Toll-Free at 888-773-9224, by email to shareholders@glancylaw.com,
or visit our website at www.glancylaw.com. If you inquire by email
please include your mailing address, telephone number and number of
shares purchased.

This press release may be considered Attorney Advertising in some
jurisdictions under the applicable law and ethical rules. [GN]

HYUNDAI MOTOR: Judge Certifies Panoramic Sunroof Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anna Bradley-Smith, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that a
class action lawsuit alleging that Hyundai fails to warn drivers
about a defect that causes sunroofs in some of its vehicles to
spontaneously shatter has been certified by an Alberta judge.

Associate Chief Justice J.D. Rooke certified the class action
lawsuit that was filed by Hyundai owner Robert Engen, who alleges
that the company has broken state and federal consumer protection
laws in regards to the alleged defect in the panoramic sunroofs.

Engen says in the claim that when designing and promoting the
panoramic sunroofs, Hyundai failed to meet engineering and
manufacturing challenges, resulting in sunroofs being installed
that are susceptible to spontaneous shattering.

Hyundai Knew of Panoramic Sunroof Defect
Hyundai knew that the sunroofs were shattering as early as
mid-2012, he alleges, but failed to disclose that the sunroofs
endanger drivers. He adds that the company either intentionally or
negligently made false representations about the sunroofs and
provided certain warranties when selling the vehicles - then went
on to breach those warranties5.

He alleges that Hyundai breached the Sale of Goods Act and the
Consumer Protection Act.

Hyundai argued that it could not have breached either act in
relation to the drivers because there is no privity of contract
between the company and drivers, the only privity of contract is
between the drivers and individual Hyundai authorized dealers.
However, Rooke rejected that argument and said the company did act
as the seller of the goods to the drivers.

According to the class action lawsuit, there are hundreds of
reported instances of the panoramic sunroofs shattering, and there
are scientific reasons for the modes of failure.

"This is not an isolated issue which affected Engen, there are
hundreds of other reported instances in evidence."

Rooke also ruled there appeared to be evidence of a common defect
across the Class.

This is not the first class action Hyundai has faced over the
panoramic sunroofs. In 2019 the company reached a settlement with
drivers, whereby Class Members could trade their vehicle in for a
Hyundai without a sunroof, and claim an additional $1,000. Those
who decided to sell their Hyundai and replace it with a non-Hyundai
vehicle, could claim up to $600.

Have you ever driven a Hyundai with a panoramic sunroof? Tell us
your experience in the comments section below!

The plaintiff is represented by Gavin Price, Kajal Ervin and
Charlotte Stokes.

The Hyundai Panoramic Sunroofs Class Action Lawsuit is Eagan v.
Hyundai Auto Canada Corp., Case No. 1601 17138 in the Court of
Queen's Bench of Alberta. [GN]

ICON CLINICAL: Nesbeth Suit Seeks to Certify Class Action
---------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as CARLOS O. NESBETH, AMIT
GODAMBE, JENNY GALLERY, MISTY HOWELL and MICAH WEBB, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v. ICON CLINICAL
RESEARCH, LLC, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ICON CLINICAL RESEARCH,
LLC, THE 401(K) PLAN COMMITTEE OF ICON CLINICAL RESEARCH, LLC and
JOHN DOES 1-30, Case No. 2:21-cv-01444-PD (E.D. Pa.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying this action as a class action;

   2. appointing them as representatives of the proposed class
      defined as

      "All persons, except the Defendants and their immediate
      family members, who were participants in or beneficiaries
      of the Plan, at any time between March 26, 2015 through
      the date of judgment; and

   3. appointing their counsel as counsel for the Class.

Icon Clinical provides clinical research services.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Sept. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3lczc0t
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
          Gabrielle Kelerchian, Esq.
          Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
          CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
          312 Old Lancaster Road
          Merion Station, PA 19066
          Telephone: (610) 890-0200
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: markg@capozziadler.com
                  gabriellek@capozziadler.com
                  @capozziadler.com

J. CAIAZZO PLUMBING: Hall Seeks Overtime Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
---------------------------------------------------------------
DYLAN HALL, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated v.
J. CAIAZZO PLUMBING & HEATING CORP. and MICHAEL CAIAZZO, in his
individual and professional capacities, Case No. 1:21-cv-05416
(E.D.N.Y., Sept. 29, 2021) alleges that Defendants engage in a
common, willful, and deliberate policy and practice of failing to
pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated Employees overtime wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

Specifically, Defendants require Employees to drive Company-issued
trucks to each of their assignments and return the trucks to
Defendants' shop located in Brooklyn, New York (the "Shop") after
they complete their shifts and clock out. However, Defendants fail
to pay Employees any wages for this compensable, off-the-clock
work, the Plaintiff contends.

Employees typically spend 30 to 90 minutes driving back to the Shop
to return the Company's trucks and tools at the end of their shifts
without compensation.

Given that Employees are typically scheduled to work 40 to 48 hours
per week, the additional off-the-clock work results in the unlawful
denial of approximately 2.5 to 9 hours of overtime wages which
should have been paid to Employees at a rate of one and one-half
time their regular rates of pay.

Additionally, the Defendants improperly deduct parking and traffic
tickets from Employees' wages. The Defendants have also
consistently failed to furnish their Employees with Notices of Pay
Rate and accurate wage statements, as required by law.

The Defendants own and operate JCPH, a plumbing and heating company
in Brooklyn, New York that specializes in the installation,
service, and repair of plumbing and heating units in residential
and commercial properties throughout the five boroughs of New York
City and Long Island.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Innessa Melamed Huot, Esq.
          Alex J. Hartzband, Esq.
          Camilo M. Burr, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: ihuot@faruqilaw.com
                  ahartzband@faruqilaw.com
                  cburr@faruqilaw.com

J. M. SMUCKER: Crisco Brand Contains No Butter, Strow Suit Claims
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Strow, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. The J. M. Smucker Company, Case No. 1:21-cv-05104 (N.D.
Ill., Sept. 27, 2021) alleges that J. M. Smucker manufactures,
labels, markets, and sells "Butter -- No-Stick Spray" without any
butter under its Crisco brand.

According to the complaint, the largest word is "Butter," with a
sizzling pat of butter atop pancakes in a skillet, causing
consumers to expect the Product contains butter. However, the
Product contains no butter.

The Product is marketed as an alternative to butter in the form of
a no-stick spray. Consumers are misled because the front label
fails to disclose -- as required by law -- that the purported
butter spray is an imitation because "it is a substitute for and
resembles another food [butter] but is nutritionally inferior to
that food."

Had Plaintiff and proposed class members known the truth, they
would not have bought the Product or would have paid less for it,
says the suit.

The Product is sold for a price premium compared to other similar
products, no less than approximately $3.49 per 6 oz, a higher price
than it would otherwise be sold for, absent the misleading
representations and omissions.

Mr. Strow is a citizen of Addison, DuPage County, Illinois.

The Defendant is an American manufacturer of jam, peanut butter,
jelly, fruit syrups, beverages, shortening, ice cream toppings, and
other food products.

The Product is sold in thousands stores of all kinds - convenience
stores, drug stores, grocery stores, big box stores, wholesale
clubs and online.

The Crisco brand has been established for a hundred years and has
always sought to emulate butter. Crisco was originally made with
cottonseed oil and has, since its inception, sought to replace
butter in American kitchens.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Spencer Sheehan, Esq.
          SHEEHAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 Cuttermill Rd Ste 409
          Great Neck NY 11021
          Telephone: (516) 268-7080
          E-mail: spencer@spencersheehan.com

JOEY EAU CLAIRE: Faces Class Action Over COVID-19 Outbreak
----------------------------------------------------------
Anna Bradley-Smith, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that
negligence on the part of the owner of Calgary restaurant Joey Eau
Claire led to a COVID-19 outbreak that infected 58 people, 39 of
whom were infected with a variant strain of the virus, a new class
action lawsuit alleges.

The lawsuit was filed by a diner who says he and his pregnant wife
went to Joey's for dinner on March 13, and a week later both tested
positive for the COVID-19. He says in the claim that staff at the
restaurant were not following COVID-19 safety protocols, and that
the restaurant did not appropriately notify diners of the outbreak,
Global News reports. He is seeking $17 million in damages.

The class action lawsuit, filed by firm Guardian Law Group LLP,
says that six of the couple's close contacts, including both sets
of their parents, then contracted the virus and the plaintiff's
wife and mother both had to be hospitalized. The wife now has to be
monitored throughout her pregnancy, the lawsuit states.

The diner says Joey Eau Claire's parent company Joey Tomato's
failed on a number of counts, including to implement adequate
safety protocols; to warn the class members of COVID-19 exposures
or infections at Joey; to monitor adequate separation between
customers and customers and staff; to conduct regular testing; to
adhere to mandated protocols; to adequately clean; and more.

Joey Eau Claire was issued two notices of violations under the
Public Health Act in March, once on March 6 and again on March 12.

Class counsel Mathew Farrell told Global News that more than a
dozen people had contacted him wanting to be involved in the class
action lawsuit.

"The allegation is that the restaurant didn't do things that were
within its control, things that were reasonable, in order to
minimize the transmission of COVID-19," Farrell said.

When reached for comment by Global News, Joey Tomato's said in a
statement that the company had only just learned about this
class-action lawsuit.

"We take the safety of our employees and patrons very seriously,"
the statement read.

"We have consistently followed the public health guidelines and
recommendations of Alberta Health Services and have cooperated
fully with AHS in respect of this matter." [GN]

KONINKELIJKE PHILIPS: Faces Tobin Suit Over CPAP, BiPAP Machines
----------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL TOBIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED v. KONINKELIJKE PHILIPS, N.V.; PHILIPS NORTH AMERICA, LLC
and PHILIPS RS NORTH AMERICA, Case No. 5:21-cv-00921 (W.D. Tex.,
Sept. 27, 2021) alleges that the Defendants failed to exercise
ordinary care in the designing, researching, manufacturing,
marketing, supplying, promoting, packaging, sale, testing, quality
assurance quality control, and/or distribution of its recalled
products into interstate commerce in that Defendants knew or should
have known that using its products could proximately cause
Plaintiff's injuries.

The Defendants allegedly failed to meet their duty to use
reasonable care in the testing, creating, designing, manufacturing,
labeling, packaging, marketing, selling, and warning of Defendants'
products.

In general, each of the recalled devices express air into patients'
airways. Continuous Positive Airway Pressure ("CPAP") and Bilevel
Positive Airway Pressure ("BiPAP") machines are intended for daily
use, and ventilators are used continuously while needed. Without
these devices, some patients may experience severe symptoms,
including heart attack, stroke, and death by asphyxiation.

The Defendants manufacture and sell a variety of products that are
intended to help people breathe, including CPAP and BiPAP machines,
which are commonly used to treat sleep apnea, and ventilators that
treat respiratory failure.

Mr. Tobin is an individual and resident of Texas. He was diagnosed
with sleep apnea and purchased a Philips Respironics DreamStation
CPAP device around July 2019. This device was subsequently included
in a recall by Philips on June 14, 2021. He would not have
purchased this product if he had known it was defective, contained
a carcinogenic byproduct and respiratory irritants, and would be
subject to a recall for containing defective materials.

Mr. Tobin contends that after using the machine, he began to suffer
irritation and inflammation to his nasal passages and airways, skin
and eyes, headaches, and asthma-like symptoms, including difficulty
breathing. Because of the recall, he has been forced to cease the
use of the device, and he does not have a replacement machine
readily available. He demands a refund, replacement with a
non-effective device, costs for ongoing medical monitoring, and all
other appropriate damages for all the injuries he has suffered as a
result of his defective device.

Koninklijke is a Dutch multinational company established under the
laws of the Netherlands -- headquartered in Amsterdam, Netherlands
-- and is the parent company of Philips North America LLC and
Philips RS North America LLC.

Defendant Philips North America LLC is a Delaware company with its
principal place of business in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Defendant Philips RS North America formerly operated under the
business name "Respironics," is a Delaware company headquartered in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and manufacturers products for sleep and
home respiratory care.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Robert C. Hilliard, Esq.
          Marion Reilly, Esq.
          Whitney J. Butcher, Esq.
          HILLIARD MARTINEZ GONZALES LLP
          719 S. Shoreline Boulevard
          Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
          Telephone: (361) 882-1612
          Facsimile: (361) 882-3015
          E-mail: bobh@hmglawfirm.com
                  marion@hmglawfirm.com
                  wbutcher@hmglawfirm.com
                  HMGService@hmglawfirm.com

               - and -

          Steve W. Berman, Esq.
          Marin D. Mclean, Esq.
          Jacob P. Berman, Esq.
          1301 Second Avenue, Ste. 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone (206) 623-7292
          Facsimile (206) 623-0594
          E-mail: Steve@hbsslaw.com
                  martym@hbsslaw.com
                  jakeb@hbsslaw.com

LAUREATE GROUP: Initial OK of Settlement Deal in McDaniel Sought
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as SYMONE MCDANIEL, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly situated, v. THE LAUREATE
GROUP, INC., et. al., Case No. 2:20-cv-01870-BHL (E.D. Wisc.), the
Parties ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement;

   2. certifying, for settlement purposes only, the proposed
      Rule 23 Class and Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA)
      Collective;

   3. appointing Walcheske & Luzi, LLC as Class Counsel;

   4. appointing Plaintiff, Symone McDaniel, as representative
      of the Settlement Class;

   5. approving the mailing of the Notice Packet to class
      members;

   6. setting deadlines for members of the Settlement Class to
      opt out of the case or object to the Settlement Agreement;

   7. setting deadlines for members of the Settlement Class to
      opt in to the FLSA Collective;

   8. finding that such Notice process satisfies due process;

   9. directing that any member of Rule 23 Class who has not
      properly requested exclusion and FLSA Collective members
      who have chosen to participate to the FLSA Collective
      shall be bound by the Settlement Agreement in the event
      the Court issues a Final Order Approving Settlement;

  10. directing that any member of the Rule 23 Class or FLSA
      Collective who wishes to object to the Settlement
      Agreement in any way must do so per the instructions set
      forth in the Notice Packet; and

  11. scheduling a hearing for final approval of the Settlement
      Agreement.

The Laureate Group Inc was founded in 1969. The company's line of
business includes the operation of apartment buildings.

A copy of the Parties' motion dated Sept. 27, 2021 is available
from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/2YfC9Ej at no extra
charge.[CC]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James A. Walcheske, Esq.
          Scott S. Luzi, Esq.
          David M. Potteiger, Esq.
          WALCHESKE & LUZI, LLC
          235 N. Executive Drive, Suite 240
          Brookfield, WI 53005
          Telephone: (262) 780-1953
          E-mail: jwalcheske@walcheskeluzi.com
                  sluzi@walcheskeluzi.com
                  dpotteiger@walcheskeluzi.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Keith E. Kopplin, Esq.
          Suzanne M. Watson, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
          SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.
          1243 North 10th Street, Suite 200
          Milwaukee, WI 53205
          Telephone: (414) 239-6400
          E-mail: keith.kopplin@ogletree.com
                  Suzanne.watson@ogletree.com

LLOYD'S LONDON: Sun Cuisine's Amended Class Complaint Dismissed
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, SUN CUISINE, LLC d/b/a ZEST RESTAURANT AND MARKET,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON Subscribing to
Contract Number B0429BA1900350 Under Collective Certificate
Endorsement 350OR100802, Defendants, Case No.
1:20-cv-21827-GAYLES/OTAZO-REYES (S.D. Fla.), Judge Darrin P.
Gayles of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted Defendants Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London
Subscribing to Policy No. 350TA100802's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Class Action Complaint.

Background

Plaintiff Sun Cuisine owns, operates, manages, and controls
restaurants and related food and beverage operations at a location
in Miami, Florida. On Feb. 23, 2020, the Defendants issued a
standard form ISO all-risk commercial property insurance policy to
the Plaintiff under which it agreed to make premium payments in
exchange for the Defendants' promise to indemnify it for losses.
Those losses include, but are not limited to, business income
losses at the insured properties. The Policy provides coverage for
the period between Feb. 23, 2020, and Feb. 23, 2021.

Under the Policy, the general coverage provision states: "We will
pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property at
the premises described in the Declarations caused by or resulting
from any Covered Cause of Loss." The Policy includes a standard
policy form titled "Business Income (and Extra Expense) Coverage
Form," which provides for business income losses.

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the
COVID-19 outbreak a worldwide pandemic. On March 16, 2020,
President Donald J. Trump, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC"), and members of the White House Coronavirus Task
Force issued guidance to the American public to limit the spread of
COVID-19. The guidance advised individuals to adopt far-reaching
social distancing measures such as limiting gatherings of more than
ten people and staying away from bars, restaurants, and food
courts.

Following this guidance, former Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos
Gimenez issued Emergency Order 03-20 on March 17, 2020, closing all
restaurants in Miami-Dade County other than for delivery to slow
the spread of COVID-19 through person-to-person and
surface-to-person contact. On March 30, 2020, Governor Ron DeSantis
issued Executive Order 20-69 restricting public access to
businesses and facilities deemed non-essential, including
restaurants in South Florida. As a result, the Plaintiff was unable
to welcome patrons into its restaurant and was required to
drastically alter its property to reduce its operations to take-out
and delivery.

On May 1, 2020, the Plaintiff filed the action seeking insurance
coverage under the Policy for business interruption related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. On Aug. 10, 2020, the Defendants filed a Motion
to Dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiff failed to allege any
physical loss or damage to the property. On Dec. 28, 2020, the
Court granted the Motion to Dismiss in part.

The Plaintiff filed its Amended Class Action Complaint on Jan. 28,
2021, asserting two counts: (1) Declaratory Judgment (Count I) and
(2) Anticipatory Breach of Contract (Count II). It alleges that it
suffered physical loss and damage to its property because COVID-19
altered the property to an unsatisfactory and highly dangerous
state, unusable, inhabitable, and unfit for its intended purpose;
this loss caused significant business income loss and extra
expenses. On Feb. 17, 2021, the Defendants filed the instant Motion
seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims.

Discussion

The Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice of the Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint for two main reasons. First, the Defendants argue
that Plaintiff's allegations do not trigger coverage under the
Policy. Specifically, they argue that the Amended Complaint fails
to allege either "direct physical loss of or damage to" the insured
property or a nearby property as to trigger coverage under the
Policy's Business Income and Civil Authority provisions. Second,
they argue that coverage is barred by the Policy's microorganism
and pollution exclusions.

As a threshold matter, Judge Gayles holds that "the mere presence
of the virus on the physical structure of the premises" does not
amount to "direct physical loss." Secondly, the fact that Plaintiff
had to reconfigure furniture and make physical alterations to the
layout of the property to avoid contamination of COVID-19 does not
qualify as physical loss or damage.

Further, the Plaintiff alleges that "the government orders that
shutdown or curtailed its business operations were the direct
result of the same direct physical loss or damage to property near
its property caused by the physical presence of the coronavirus."
This allegation is insufficient for the reasons stated, Judge
Gayles holds -- no physical loss or damage was caused by the
presence of COVID-19. Thus, the Judge finds that the Plaintiff's
allegations, even if taken as true, do not plausibly show direct
physical loss or damage to the insured property or nearby property
to trigger coverage under the Policy.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Gayles granted the Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint. The Plaintiff's
Amended Class Action Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. All
pending motions are denied as moot. The case is closed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Aug. 31, 2021 Order is available at
https://tinyurl.com/387vf8h4 from Leagle.com.


LOGISTIX LLC: Phelps Seeks Overtime Pay for Managers Under FLSA
---------------------------------------------------------------
ZACHARY PHELPS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. LOGISTIX, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-04279 (E.D. Pa., Sept.
29, 2021) contends that the Defendant unlawfully failed to pay the
Plaintiff and other similarly-situated individuals employed in the
positions of Project Manager, Team Lead/Senior Project Manager, or
in positions with similar job duties ("Class Plaintiffs") overtime
compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant who was employed in
the positions of Project Manager and Team Lead/Senior Project
Manager. During the course of their employment, the Plaintiff and
Class Plaintiffs regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but
were not properly compensated for their work in that Plaintiff and
Class Plaintiffs were not paid an overtime premium at 1.5 times
their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 in a
workweek, says the suit.

Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that he and Class Plaintiffs
were paid on a day rate basis, without receiving an overtime
premium for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek, and that
Defendant failed to accurately track and pay him and Class
Plaintiffs for hours worked, including, but not limited to, certain
compensable travel time.

Logistix LLC is a global logistics provider and freight
forwarder.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael Murphy, Esq.
          Michael Groh, Esq.
          MURPHY LAW GROUP, LLC
          Eight Penn Center, Suite 2000
          1628 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (267) 273-1054
          E-mail: murphy@phillyemploymentlawyer.com
                  mgroh@phillyemploymentlawyer.com

LOS ANDES 231: Olivas Suit Seeks Overtime Wage Under FLSA, NYLL
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARTIN OLIVAS and ERICKA GUEVARA, Individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. LOS ANDES 231 RESTAURANT CORP.
d/b/a LOS ANDES RESTAURANT, LOS ANDES 112 RESTAURANT CORP. d/b/a
LOS ANDES RESTAURANT, and VILMA GUIA, Individually, Case No.
2:21-cv-05373 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2021) alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiffs, and all others similarly
situated, overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a
workweek pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the
New York Labor Law.

Plaintiff Olivas was employed as a waiter at Defendants from June
27, 2016, through up to and including May 14, 2019. Plaintiff
Guevara was employed as a waitress at Defendants from in November
2018 to December 2020.

Los Andes Restaurant serves up flavorful Peruvian and Bolivian
dishes.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kyle T. Pulis, Esq.
          SCOTT MICHAEL MISHKIN, P.C.
          One Suffolk Square, Suite 240
          Islandia, NY 11749
          Telephone: (631) 234-1154
          Facsimile: (631) 234-5048

LOUIS PERL CONTRACTING: Fails to Pay Premium OT Wages, Perez Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
JOSE PEREZ, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly
situated, v. LOUIS PERL CONTRACTING, LTD. and LOUIS PERL, Case No.
1:21-cv-05348 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2021) alleges that the
Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff's premium overtime wages for
hours worked in excess of forty 40 per week in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law.

Throughout his employment, the Plaintiff regularly worked six days
per week, Sunday through Friday. On Mondays through Thursdays,
Plaintiff typically worked, from 7:40 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., and on
Fridays and Sundays, Plaintiff typically worked from 7:40 a.m.
until 4:00 p.m. Each day Plaintiff worked he was afforded a
one-hour lunch break during his shifts. Accordingly, throughout his
employment, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, Plaintiff did
regularly work, in excess of forty hours per workweek, says the
suit.

The Plaintiff contends that throughout his employment, the
Defendants did not pay him overtime compensation at the rate of one
and one-half times his regular rate of pay for hours worked after
40 hours per workweek. Instead, Defendants paid him at his daily
rate of pay regardless of the number of hours he worked each day,
or indeed, each week.

Additionally, the Defendants also failed to provide accurate wage
statements for each pay period under NYLL, failed to furnish a
proper wage notice at his time of hire under NYLL section 195(1),
says the Plaintiff.

The Defendants are engaged in the construction/remodeling
business.

The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants as a manual laborer
and painter from April 2014 until April 2, 2021. Upon his hire, the
Plaintiff's regular rate was $100.00 per day, until April 2015,
when Plaintiff began earning $120.00 per day. Finally in January
2017, the Plaintiff began earning $170.00 per day, which he
continued to earn until the termination of his employment.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Matthew J. Farnworth, Esq.
          Peter A. Romero, Esq.
          LAW OFFICE OF PETER A. ROMERO PLLC
          490 Wheeler Road, Suite 250
          Hauppauge, NY 11788
          Telephone: (631) 257-5588

LUCILE SALTER: Masuda Suit Remanded to Santa Clara Superior Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, EMILY MASUDA, Plaintiff v. LUCILE SALTER PACKARD
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL AT STANFORD, et al., Defendants, Case No.
20-cv-09389-BLF (N.D. Cal.), Judge Bet Labson Freeman of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and remands the
case to the Superior Court of the State of California for Santa
Clara County.

Background

Plaintiff Masuda brings the putative class action against
Defendants Lucile Salter Packard Children's Hospital at Stanford,
Stanford Health Care, and Stanford Health Care Advantage, alleging
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). The Plaintiff
alleges that when she applied for employment with the Defendants,
the Defendants provided her with a disclosure and authorization
form to perform a background check on her. She alleges that the
Defendants did not provide legally compliant disclosure or
authorization forms because the forms contained "extraneous and
superfluous language" in violation of the "clear and conspicuous"
and "clear and accurate" requirements of section 1681(b)(2)(A) and
1681d(a) of the FCRA.

The Plaintiff further alleges that the disclosure and authorization
forms did not accurately provide a summary of rights and the law
and were not standalone documents, both as required by the FCRA.
She alleges that the Defendants routinely acquire credit and
background reports, like those they sought to obtain on her, in
connection with their hiring process.

The Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all of the Defendants'
current, former, and prospective applicants for employment in the
United States who applied for a job and had a background check
performed on them, from five years prior to the filing of this case
through final judgment. She seeks "statutory damages and/or actual
damages, punitive damages, injunctive and equitable relief, and
attorneys' fees and costs."

The Plaintiff filed the Complaint in Santa Clara County Superior
Court on Nov. 13, 2020. The Defendants removed the case to the
Court on Dec. 29, 2020. The Plaintiff filed the Motion to Remand on
March 29, 2021. Judge Freeman finds the Motion suitable for
disposition without oral argument and vacates the Sept. 30, 2021
hearing.

Discussion

A. Article III Standing

The Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded to Santa
Clara County Superior Court because she lacks Article III standing
to assert her FCRA claim in federal court. She argues that she
asserts a bare procedural violation of the FCRA, which the Supreme
Court of the United States found does not constitute a concrete
injury required under Article III. The Defendants argue that the
Plaintiff does have Article III standing because the Court can
infer that the Plaintiff was confused by the disclosure and
authorization forms, which is sufficient to establish concrete
injury.

Judge Freeman agrees with the Plaintiff that she has not alleged
facts showing that she possesses Article III standing to assert her
FCRA claim in federal court. It is true that alleged procedural
violation of a statute "can by itself manifest a concrete injury
where Congress conferred the procedural right to protect a
plaintiff's concrete interests." But the weight of authority under
the FCRA post-Spokeo holds that mere procedural violations of the
FCRA's requirements for consumer reports cannot establish concrete
injury and confer Article III standing.

In opposition, among others, the Defendants argue that the
Plaintiff is seeking actual damages and thus has alleged Article
III injury-in-fact. It is true that the Complaint uses the words
"actual damages" in those sections. Paragraphs 47 and 60 make clear
that Plaintiff is seeking "statutory damages and/or actual damages"
under the FCRA, but the relief sought in the Prayer does include
"actual damages" by itself. In any case, Judge Freeman also
declines to infer concrete harm from these isolated phrases. What
controls are the Plaintiff's allegations about the forms and the
effect they had on her, and those allegations do not resemble the
kind which the Ninth Circuit has found confers Article III
standing.

B. Request for Limited Discovery

In the alternative, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff should
not be allowed to "evade federal jurisdiction" by "clever
pleading," and so if the Court is inclined to find no Article III
standing, the Court should first order limited discovery on the
standing issue to prevent the Plaintiff from later asserting
confusion or some other injury that would confer standing. The
Defendants propose requiring the Plaintiff to submit a sworn
declaration or sit for a limited deposition.

Judge Freeman finds additional discovery unwarranted. She is not
persuaded that the Plaintiff has omitted facts necessary to federal
jurisdiction. The Complaint is clearly brought under federal law:
The FCRA. And the FCRA provides for statutory damages of $100 to
$1,000 even if no actual damages are sustained. As such, the Judge
holds that the Plaintiff is free to plead (truthfully, of course)
that she did or did not sustain actual harm. The Defendants'
speculative arguments regarding what the Plaintiff may or may not
do at later stages of the litigation are simply irrelevant and are
not grounds for discovery. If the Plaintiff does change course at a
later stage of the litigation and make representations inconsistent
with those in her Complaint regarding her injury, the Defendants
are free to seek appropriate relief from the state court at that
time.

C. Remedy

The Defendants' final argument is that if the Court finds that
there is no Article III standing, the proper remedy is dismissal of
the case rather than remand to the state court. The Defendants say
dismissal is warranted because "if the Court were to determine this
is a no-injury FCRA case, as the Plaintiff contends, then it should
not be allowed to proceed regardless of where it is brought,"
making remand futile.

But this is not so, Judge Freeman holds. She says, "a lack of
Article III standing does not necessarily preclude a plaintiff from
vindicating a federal right in state court." Other courts have
noted this "quirk of the United States federalist system" that a
state court may possess "jurisdiction to adjudicate a federal claim
when a federal court does not." Remand is the proper remedy in the
case, and the parties can litigate whether the Plaintiff possesses
standing under California law in front of the state court.

Order

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Freeman granted the Plaintiff's
Motion to Remand. The Clerk will remand the case to the Superior
Court of the State of California for Santa Clara County.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/4dxntvfz from Leagle.com.


MCCLATCHY CO: Borello Test Should Be Used in Carriers' Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
An appeal arose from a class action brought by and on behalf of
newspaper home delivery carriers for The Fresno Bee newspaper.  In
the trial court, the matter proceeded to a bifurcated bench trial
on the issue of whether the owner of The Fresno Bee and its holding
company, respectively, The McClatchy Company and McClatchy
Newspapers, Inc., violated the unfair competition law by failing to
pay the carriers' mileage expenses as required by Labor Code
section 2802.  The primary issue at trial was whether the carriers
were employees or independent contractors.  The trial court
determined the carriers were independent contractors and, as a
result, entered judgment in favor of The Bee.

On appeal, the carriers contend (1) the trial court misallocated
the burden of proof; (2) the trial court erred in relying on a
regulation promulgated by the Employment Development Department
(EDD), which the carriers contend is irrelevant; (3) the trial
court erred in its application of the relevant test, as set out in
S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, (4) under Borello, the carriers are
employees; (5) the trial court erred in relying on equitable
considerations to determine The Bee's liability; and (6) the trial
court improperly relied on testimony from unrepresentative class
members.  In supplemental briefing, the carriers additionally argue
the test for employment set out in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 applies, and the carriers are
employees under that test.

The Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District, agreed that the
question of whether the carriers are employees or independent
contractors must be determined under the Borello test.  As such,
the trial court erred in deferring to the EDD regulations, which
the appeals court concluded are inapplicable.

The appeals court also held that, ultimately, the trial court also
failed to properly analyze the factors required by Borello, and
therefore the lower court's decision must be reversed.  The appeals
court, however, declined to resolve whether the carriers are
employees or independent contractors, and instead remanded for the
trial court to address this question.

The appeals case is VERONICA BECERRA et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. THE McCLATCHY COMPANY et al., Defendants and
Respondents, No. F074680 (Cal. App.).

A full-text copy of the Opinion dated Sept. 30, 2021, is available
at https://is.gd/tBUdiP from Leagle.com.

Callahan & Blaine, Daniel J. Callahan, Esq. --
dcallahan@callahan-law.com -- Michael J. Sachs, Esq. --
msachs@callahan-law.com -- and Scott D. Nelson, Esq. --
snelson@callahan-law.com -- for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Allison Arabian and John S.
Poulos, Esq. -- John.Poulos@lewisbrisbois.com -- Law Offices of
William C. Hahesy and William C. Hahesy; Perkins Coie, Eric D.
Miller and Jill L. Ripke, Esq. -- JRipke@perkinscoie.com --
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman and Derek M. Mayor for Defendants
and Respondents.

The McClatchy Co. -- https://www.mcclatchy.com/ -- is an American
publishing company.

MDL 2836: Direct Purchasers Seek Class Status in Ezetimibe Case
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit RE ZETIA (EZETIMIBE) ANTITRUST
LITIGATION, Case No. 2:18-md-02836-RBS-DEM (E.D. Va.), the Direct
purchaser Class plaintiffs FWK Holdings, LLC, Rochester Drug
Cooperative, Inc., and Cesar Castillo, Inc., ask the Court to enter
an order:

   1. certifying the following class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3):

      "All persons or entities in the United States or its
      territories that purchased Zetia in any form directly from
      Merck, or any agents, predecessors, or successors thereof
      from November 15, 2014 until June 11, 2017;"

      Excluded from the proposed Class are defendants Merck,
      Glenmark and Par, and their officers, directors,
      management, employees, parents, subsidiaries, or
      affiliates, and the government of the United States and
      all agencies thereof, and all state or local governments
      and all agencies thereof;

   2. appointing FWK Holdings, LLC, Rochester Drug Cooperative,
      Inc., and Cesar Castillo, Inc. as representatives of the
      Class; and

   3. confirming Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP as Lead Counsel
      for the Class.

A copy of the the direct purchaser class plaintiffs' motion dated
Sept. 24, 2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/3ixuOr1 at no extra charge.[CC]

The Local Counsel for Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs FWK Holdings,
LLC, Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc., Cesar Castillo, Inc. and the
Proposed Direct Purchaser Class, are:

          William H. Monroe, Jr., Esq.
          Marc C. Greco, Esq.
          Kip A. Harbison, Esq.
          Michael A. Glasser, Esq.
          GLASSER AND GLASSER , P.L.C.
          Crown Center, Suite 600
          580 East Main Street
          Norfolk, VA 23510
          Telephone: (757) 625-6787
          Facsimile: (757) 625-5959
          E-mail: bill@glasserlaw.com
                  marcg@glasserlaw.com
                  kip@glasserlaw.com
                  michael@glasserlaw.com

The Lead Counsel for the Proposed Direct Purchaser Class, are:

          Thomas M. Sobol, Esq.
          Kristen A. Johnson, Esq.
          Erin C. Burns, Esq.
          Hannah Schwarzschild, Esq.
          Bradley Vettraino, Esq.
          HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
          55 Cambridge Parkway, Suite 301
          Cambridge, MA 02142
          Telephone: (617) 482-3700
          Facsimile: (617) 482-3003
          E-mail: tom@hbsslaw.com
                  kristenj@hbsslaw.com
                  erinb@hbsslaw.com
                  hannahs@hbsslaw.com
                  bradleyv@hbsslaw.com

The Counsel for Plaintiff FWK Holdings, LLC and the Proposed Direct
Purchaser Class, are:

          John D. Radice, Esq.
          RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
          475 Wall Street
          Princeton, NJ 08540
          Telephone: (646) 245-8502
          Facsimile: (609) 385-0745
          E-mail: jradice@radicelawfirm.com

               - and -

          Paul E. Slater, Esq.
          Joseph M. Vanek, Esq.
          David P. Germaine, Esq.
          Alberto Rodriguez, Esq.
          SPERLING & SLATER, P.C.
          55 W. Monroe, Suite 3200
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Telephone: (312) 641-3200
          Facsimile: (312)641-6492
          E-mail: pes@sperling-law.com
                  jvanek@sperling-law.com
                  dgermaine@sperling-law.com
                  arodriguez@sperling-law.com
          
               - and -

          Sharon K Robertson, Esq.
          Donna M. Evans, Esq.
          COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
          88 Pine Street, 14th Floor
          New York, NY 10005
          Telephone: (212) 838-7797
          Facsimile: (212) 838-7745
          E-mail: srobertson@cohenmilstein.com
                  devans@cohenmilstein.com

               - and -

          Steve D. Shadowen, Esq.
          Matthew C. Weiner, Esq.
          HILLIARD & SHADOWEN LLP
          1135 W. 6th Street, Suite 125
          Austin, TX 78703
          Telephone: (855) 344-3298
          E-mail: steve@hilliardshadowenlaw.com
                  matt@hilliardshadowenlaw.com

               - and -

          Joseph H. Meltzer, Esq.
          Terence S. Ziegler, Esq.
          KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER & CHECK LLP
          280 King of Prussia Road
          Radnor, PA 19087
          Telephone: (610) 667-7706
          Facsimile: (610) 667-7056
          E-mail: jmeltzer@ktmc.com
                  tziegler@ktmc.com

               - and -

          Michael L. Roberts, Esq.
          Karen Sharp Halbert, Esq.
          Stephanie Smith, Esq.
          Sarah E. DeLoach, Esq.
          ROBERTS LAW FIRM, P.A.
          20 Rahling Circle
          Little Rock, AR 72223
          Telephone: (501) 821-5575
          Facsimile: (501) 821-4474
          E-mail: mikeroberts@robertslawfirm.us
                  karenhalbert@robertslawfirm.us
                  stephaniesmith@robertslawfirm.us
                  sarahdeloach@robertslawfirm.us

The Counsel for Plaintiff Cesar Castillo, Inc. and the Proposed
Direct Purchaser Class, are:

          Linda P. Nussbaum, Esq.
          NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C.
          1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036-8718
          Telephone: (917) 438-9189
          E-mail: lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com

               - and -

          Jayne A. Goldstein, Esq.
          MILLER SHAH, LLP
          1625 North Commerce Parkway, Ste. 320
          Fort Lauderdale, FL 33326
          Telephone: (954) 515-0123
          Facsimile: (866) 300-7367
          E-mail: jgoldstein@sfmslaw.com

The Counsel for Rochester Drug Cooperative, Inc. and the Proposed
Direct Purchaser Class, are:

          David F. Sorensen, Esq.
          Ellen T. Noteware, Esq.
          Nicholas Urban, Esq.
          BERGER MONTAGUE PC
          1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
          Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 875-3000
          Facsimile: (215) 875-4604
          E-mail: dsorensen@bm.net
                  enoteware@bm.net
                  nurban@bm.net

               - and -

          Peter R. Kohn, Esq.
          Joseph T. Lukens, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          1617 John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1550
          Jenkintown, PA 19103
          Telephone: (215) 277-5770
          Facsimile: (215) 277-5771
          E-mail: pkohn@faruqilaw.com
                  jlukens@faruqilaw.com

               - and -

          Barry Taus, Esq.
          Archana Tamoshunas, Esq.
          Kevin Landau, Esq.
          TAUS, CEBULASH & LANDAU, LLP
          80 Maiden Lane, Suite 1204
          New York, NY10038
          Telephone: (646) 873-7654
          E-mail: btaus@tcllaw.com
                  atamoshunas@tcllaw.com
                  klandau@tcllaw.com

               - and -

          Bradley J. Demuth, Esq.
          FARUQI & FARUQI LLP
          685 Third Avenue, 26th Floor
          New York, NY 10017
          Telephone: (212) 983-9330
          Facsimile: (212) 983-9331
          E-mail: bdemuth@faruqilaw.com

MEDALLIA INC: Andrews & Springer Announces Securities Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------------
Andrews & Springer LLC, a boutique securities class action law firm
focused on representing shareholders nationwide, announces that a
class action lawsuit has been filed by another law firm on behalf
of shareholders of Medallia, Inc. (NYSE: MDLA) ("Medallia" or the
"Company") for possible corporate misconduct and breach of
fiduciary duty.

A copy of the complaint is available from the Court or from Andrews
& Springer LLC. If you currently own shares of Medallia and want to
receive additional information and protect your investments free of
charge, please visit us at
http://www.andrewsspringer.com/cases-investigations/medallia-merger-class-action-investigation/
or contact Craig J. Springer, Esq. at
cspringer@andrewsspringer.com, or call toll free at 1-800-423-6013.


NO CLASS HAS YET BEEN CERTIFIED IN THE ABOVE ACTION. UNTIL A CLASS
IS CERTIFIED, YOU ARE NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL UNLESS YOU RETAIN
ONE. YOU MAY ALSO REMAIN AN ABSENT CLASS MEMBER AND DO NOTHING AT
THIS POINT. YOU MAY RETAIN COUNSEL OF YOUR CHOICE.

On July 26, 2021, Medallia and private equity firm Thoma Bravo LLC
("Thoma Bravo") announced the signing of a definitive merger
agreement pursuant to which Thomas Bravo will acquire Medallia in a
merger worth $6.4 billion (the "Merger"). As a result of the
Merger, Medallia shareholders are only anticipated to receive
$34.00 per share in cash in exchange for each share of Medallia.

A Medallia shareholder represented by another law firm has filed a
class action complaint against Medallia for federal securities
violations. The complaint was filed in the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:21-cv-7475.

According to the lawsuit, which was filed on September 7, 2021,
defendants filed a proxy statement (the "Proxy") with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in connection
with the Merger.

The Proxy omits material information with respect to the Merger,
which renders the Proxy false and misleading. Accordingly,
plaintiff seeks that the Merger should be enjoined until defendants
disclose more information to stockholders.

Andrews & Springer is a boutique securities class action law firm
representing shareholders nationwide who are victims of securities
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty or corporate misconduct. Having
formerly defended some of the largest financial institutions in the
world, our founding members use their valuable knowledge,
experience, and superior skill for the sole purpose of achieving
positive results for investors. These traits are the hallmarks of
our innovative approach to each case our Firm decides to prosecute.
For more information please visit our website at
www.andrewsspringer.com. This notice may constitute Attorney
Advertising.   

Contact: Craig J. Springer, Esq.
   cspringer@andrewsspringer.com
         Toll Free: 1-800-423-6013 [GN]

MEDALLIA INC: RM LAW Announces Shareholder Class Action
-------------------------------------------------------
RM LAW, P.C. on Sept. 22 disclosed that a class action lawsuit has
been filed on behalf of shareholders of Medallia, Inc. ("Medallia"
or the "Company") (NYSE: MDLA).

If you purchased shares of Medallia and would like to learn more
about these claims or if you wish to discuss these matters and have
any questions concerning this announcement or your rights, contact
Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or to sign
up online, click here.

On July 26, 2021, Medallia and private equity firm Thoma Bravo LLC
("Thoma Bravo") announced the signing of a definitive merger
agreement pursuant to which Thomas Bravo will acquire Medallia in a
merger worth $6.4 billion (the "Merger"). As a result of the
Merger, Medallia shareholders are only anticipated to receive
$34.00 per share in cash in exchange for each share of Medallia.

If you are a member of the class, (no class has yet been
certified), you may, request that the Court appoint you as lead
plaintiff of the class. A lead plaintiff is a representative party
that acts on behalf of other class members in directing the
litigation. In order to be appointed lead plaintiff, the Court must
determine that the class member's claim is typical of the claims of
other class members, and that the class member will adequately
represent the class. Under certain circumstances, one or more class
members may together serve as "lead plaintiff." Your ability to
share in any recovery is not, however, affected by the decision
whether or not to serve as a lead plaintiff. You may retain RM LAW,
P.C. or other counsel of your choice, to serve as your counsel in
this action.

For more information regarding this, please contact RM LAW, P.C.
(Richard A. Maniskas, Esquire) toll-free at (844) 291-9299 or by
email at rm@maniskas.com.  

RM LAW, P.C. is a national shareholder litigation firm. RM LAW,
P.C. is devoted to protecting the interests of individual and
institutional investors in shareholder actions in state and federal
courts nationwide. [GN]

MILK AND HONEY: White Suit Seeks to Certify Collective Action
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as ALEXIS WHITE, AMIR
BENJAMIN, KENETRA WHITE, DYAMOND WAKLEY, on their own behalf and on
behalf of those similarly situated, v. MILK AND HONEY At WESLEY
CHAPEL, LLC, MICHAEL EPPS, individually, DEON LAMAR HARRISON,
individually, RASHEED DEVON L. GREEN, and ROBERT PAUL MCCADNEY JR.
Individually, Case No. 1:21-cv-03231-SDG (N.D. Ga.), the Plaintiffs
ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. conditionally certifying the class of all current and
      former Cooks, Runners, Servers, and Cashiers who worked at
      the Wesley Chapel and/or Cascade location of Defendants:

   2. directing the Defendants to produce to undersigned counsel
      within 14 days of the Order granting this Motion a list
      containing the names, the last known addresses, phone
      numbers, social security numbers, and e-mail addresses of
      putative class members who worked for Defendant from three
      years prior to the Order granting this Motion to the
      present;

   3. authorizing undersigned counsel to send a notice and
      consent, to all individuals whose names appear on the list
      produced by the Defendant's counsel by first-class mail
      and e-mail and also requiring Defendant to post a hard
      copy of the notice in common areas located within all of
      Defendant's locations;

   4. authorizing undersigned counsel to send a reminder notice,
      to all putative class members who have not responded to
      the initial notice 30 days after the initial notices are
      mailed; and

   5. providing all individuals whose names appear on the list
      produced by the Defendants counsel with 60 days from the
      date the notices are initially mailed to file a Consent to
      Become Opt-In Plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly- situated alleging that they and other employees
in the positions as Cooks, Cashiers, and Runners, were deprived of
proper overtime wages by virtue of Defendant's unlawful
unwillingness to pay appropriate overtime. Meanwhile, Defendants
required Plaintiffs and others similarly-situated to regularly work
more than 40 hours per week without additional overtime pay.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Sept. 27,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3uCUbMY
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Jeremy Stephens, Esq.
          MORGAN & MORGAN, P.A.
          191 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 4200
          Post Office Box 57007
          Atlanta, GA 30343-1007
          Telephone: (404) 965-1682
          E-mail: jstephens@forthepeople.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Jamala S. McFadden, Esq.
          THE EMPLOYMENT LAW SOLUTION
          MCFADDEN DAVIS, LLC
          E-mail: jmcfadden@theemploymentlawsolution.com

MITRE CORPORATION: Breaches Fiduciary Duties, Brown ERISA Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
AARON BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. THE MITRE CORPORATION, THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
MITRE CORPORATION, THE INVESTMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE MITRE
CORPORATION and JOHN DOES 1-30, Case No. 1:21-cv-11605 (D. Mass.,
Sept. 29, 2021) is a class action brought pursuant the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, against the Plans'
fiduciaries, which include the MITRE Corporation and the Board of
Trustees of MITRE Corporation and its members during the Class
Period and the Investment Advisory Committee of the MITRE
Corporation and its members during the Class Period for breaches of
their fiduciary duties.

The Plaintiff alleges that during the putative Class Period
Defendants, as "fiduciaries" of the Plans, as that term is defined
under ERISA section 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. section 1002(21)(A),
breached the duties they owed to the Plans, to Plaintiff, and to
the other participants of the Plans by failing to control the
Plans' administrative and recordkeeping costs.

The Defendants' mismanagement of the Plans, to the detriment of
participants and beneficiaries, allegedly constitutes a breach of
the fiduciary duty of prudence, in violation of 29 U.S.C. section
1104. Their actions were contrary to actions of a reasonable
fiduciary and cost the Plans and its participants millions of
dollars, the suit says.

Based on this conduct, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants
for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence and failure to monitor
fiduciaries.

The Plans, collectively referred to as the "MITRE Retirement
Program" in the SPD, are "defined contribution" plans within the
meaning of ERISA Section 3(34), 29 U.S.C. §1002(34). The TSA is
intended to qualify under Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code, and the QRP is intended to qualify under Section 401(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. The Plans became effective on August 1,
1981 and are maintained by MITRE. Employees of MITRE (excluding
co-op, seasonal, temporary, on-call, leased, and MITRE global
employees) are eligible to participate in the Plans.

At all times during the Class Period, the QRP Plan had at least
$1.6 billion dollars in assets under management. At the end of 2020
and 2019, the QRP Plan had over $2.4 billion dollars and $2.2
billion dollars, respectively, in assets under management that
were/are entrusted to the care of the Plan's fiduciaries.

To safeguard Plan participants and beneficiaries, ERISA imposes
strict fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence upon employers and
other plan fiduciaries. Fiduciaries must act "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," 29 U.S.C. section
1104(a)(1)(A), with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that
would be expected in managing a plan of similar scope. These twin
fiduciary duties are "the highest known to the law." Moitoso v. FMR
LLC, 451 F.Supp.3d 189, 204 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2020) (quoting
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir.
2009).

Mr. Brown resides in Colorado Springs, Colorado. During his
employment, he participated in the Plan investing in the options
offered by the Plan and paying the recordkeeping and administrative
costs associated with his Plan account. Mr. Brown invested in the
QRP Plan, but both Plans are managed in an identical fashion, have
identical managers and have identical Trustees. In fact, MITRE
itself portrays both Plans as being a single plan in reality. The
Summary Plan Description, which is applicable to both Plans, has an
all-encompassing term for both Plans, namely, "the MITRE
Corporation Retirement Program." The MITRE Corporation Retirement
Program, Summary Plan Description, Effective January 1, 2020
("SPD"). The SPD goes on to confirm that the Plans had identical
managers, recordkeepers, trustees and sponsors.

MITRE is the sponsor of the Plans and a named fiduciary of both the
QRP Plan and the TSA Plan with a principal place of business being
202 Burlington Road, Bedford, Massachusetts.

MITRE, acting through its Board of Trustees, appointed the
Investment Advisory Committee of the MITRE Corporation ("Committee"
to ensure that the investments available to both Plans'
participants are appropriate, had no more expense than reasonable
and performed well as compared to their peers.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Jeffrey Hellman, Esq.
          THE LAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY HELLMAN, LLC
          195 Church Street, 10th Floor
          New Haven, CT 06510
          Telephone: (203) 691-8762
          Facsimile: (203) 823-4401
          E-mail: jeff@jeffhellmanlaw.com

               - and -

          Donald R. Reavey, Esq.
          Mark K. Gyandoh, Esq.
          Gabrielle Kelerchian, Esq.
          CAPOZZI ADLER, P.C.
          2933 North Front Street
          Harrisburg, PA 17110
          Telephone: (717) 233-4101
          Facsimile: (717) 233-4103
          E-mail: donr@capozziadler.com
                  markg@capozziadler.com
                  gabriellek@capozziadler.com

MON CHER: Class Suit Seeks to Recover Unpaid Wages Under FLSA, NYLL
-------------------------------------------------------------------
EFRAIN PONCE PLIEGO, Miguel Angel Leon and OSCAR BLANCAS GARCIA,
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. MON CHER
MARKET INC. (D/B/A MON CHER MARKET) and Jae Soo Lee, Case No.
1:21-cv-08037 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2021) seeks to recover unpaid
minimum and overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 and the New York Labor Law.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiffs worked for the
Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week, without appropriate
minimum wage, overtime, and spread of hours compensation for the
hours that they worked. The Defendants failed to maintain accurate
recordkeeping of the hours worked and failed to pay Plaintiffs
appropriately for any hours worked, either at the straight rate of
pay or for any additional overtime premium. Further, the Defendants
failed to pay Plaintiffs the required "spread of hours" pay for any
day in which they had to work over 10 hours a day, says the suit.

The Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendants Mon Cher Market
Inc. and Jae Soo Lee.

The Defendants own, operate, or control an American/Asian
restaurant, located at 339 Broadway, New York under the name "Mon
Cher Market." The Plaintiffs were employed as sandwich and salad
maker, pasta maker and cook at the restaurant.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Michael Faillace, Esq.
          MICHAEL FAILLACE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4510
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 317-1200
          Facsimile: (212) 317-1620

MUSCO OLIVE: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind Users, Lucero Alleges
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CHRISTOPHER LUCERO, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. MUSCO OLIVE PRODUCTS, INC., d/b/a RIGHTS ACT
MUSCO FAMILY OLIVE CO., a California corporation; and DOES 1 to 10,
inclusive, Case No. 2:21-cv-01787-MCE-JDP (E.D. Cal., Sept. 29,
2021) alleges that the Defendant failed to design, construct,
maintain, and operate its website to be fully and equally
accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and other blind
or visually impaired people.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby and
in conjunction with its physical location, is a violation of
Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. Some blind people who meet
this definition have limited vision. Others have no vision.

Because Defendant's website, https://www.olives.com/ is not fully
or equally accessible to blind and visually impaired consumers in
violation of the ADA, the Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to
cause a change in Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and
procedures so that Defendant's website will become and remain
accessible to blind and visually impaired consumers.

The Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind individual
who requires screen-reading software to read website content using
his computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they have a
visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200.

The Defendant offers the https://www.olives.com/ website to the
public. The website 12 offers features which should allow all
consumers to access the goods and services which 13 Defendant
offers in connection with its physical location.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Thiago M. Coelho, Esq.
          Jasmine Behroozan, Esq.
          Binyamin I. Manoucheri, Esq.
          WILSHIRE LAW FIRM
          3055 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90010
          Telephone: (213) 381-9988
          Facsimile: (213) 381-9989
          E-mail: thiago@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  jasmine@wilshirelawfirm.com
                  binyamin@wilshirelawfirm.com

NEW YORK: Navarro Sues Over Civil Rights Violation
---------------------------------------------------
Victoria C. Navarro, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, the New York State
Office of children and Family Services, et al., Case No.
1:21-cv-01075-BKS-ML (N.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2021), alleges fraud,
civil conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to commit kidnapping,
abuse of process, selective and malicious prosecution, and
racketeering all rising from a scheme between City and State
Defendants that are designed and implemented to defraud the
Department of Health and Human Services, the United States Treasury
Department, the Social Security Administration New York State,
violating the Plaintiff's rights under color of law and violating
the Plaintiff's civil rights under the United Stated Constitution,
federal law, and New York state Constitution, state law and
regulations.

By its charter, the Administration for Children's services ("ACS")
(Municipal Enterprises) has monopoly on children's safety and
welfare authorized under its Commissioner. However, the Municipal
Enterprise operated independent of the duties and powers under its
Commissioner. It has an organized structure by Charter. But it also
consists of a nexus that operated by association. On the one hand,
t is as tiered network of employees and agents. On the other hand,
it has members within New York State agencies, administration,
departments, and offices that carry out its operations by
incidental or causal connection(s).

Far too often, physical and psychological abuse -- suffered by the
Plaintiff at the hands of a corrupt system designed to destroy
families is unacceptable. That the responsible state and city
official have known about these problems and done nothing to fix
them is inexcusable and criminal. The Plaintiff brings this lawsuit
on behalf of all parents whose child(ren) was, is, or will be a
victim of the corrupt organization that executes kidnapping schemes
to steal defenceless children by targeting vulnerable parents. The
corrupt organization engages in racketeering, including but not
limited to, kidnapping, pay-to-play, extortion, money laundering,
and trafficking through fronts set up in family court.

Its employees and agents engaged in extortion schemes to frustrate,
delay, obscure, and impede requisite best interest of the child
determinations. These tactics are meant to cause protracted and
lengthy proceeding to coerce and force parents into compliance o go
bankrupt fighting the corrupt organization. To finance the fronts,
employees and agents create and use counterfeit business records,
fabricate court records, and false instruments of filing. The
Plaintiff seeks a ruling from this Court that the systemic failures
and long-standing corrupt organization, acting by and through the
Municipal Enterprise, violate the New York State Family Court Act,
says the complaint.

The Plaintiff is the biological mother of R.R.(3) and L.N.(6), the
former was kidnapped by the Municipal Enterprise and the latter is
held for ransom to ensure the Plaintiff's forced participation in a
money laundering front.

State of New York is a governmental entity.[BN]


NEWLINK GENETICS: Court Enters Final Judgment in Nguyen Class Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Alison J. Nathan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York entered Final Judgment in the case, MICHAEL
NGUYEN and KELLY NGUYEN, Individually And On Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs v. NEWLINK GENETICS CORPORATION,
CHARLES J. LINK, JR., and NICHOLAS N. VAHANIAN, Defendants, Case
No. 1:16-CV-3545-AJN-OTW (S.D.N.Y.).

The matter came before the Court pursuant to the Order
Preliminarily Approving Settlement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(1) and Permitting Notice to the Class ("Order") dated April
2, 2021, on the application of the Lead Plaintiff for approval of
the Settlement set forth in the Amended Stipulation of Settlement
dated as of March 24, 2021. Due and adequate notice have been given
to the Class as required in the Order.

Judge Nathan, having considered all papers filed and proceedings
had therein and otherwise being fully informed in the premises and
good cause appearing therefore, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, affirms the Court's determinations in the
Order and finally certifies for purposes of settlement only a Class
defined as all Persons that purchased or otherwise acquired shares
of NewLink common stock during the period from Sept. 17, 2013
through May 9, 2016, inclusive, in the United States or on a United
States-based stock exchange and who were damaged thereby.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
for purposes of settlement only, Judge Nathan affirms the
determinations in the Order and finally appoints Lead Plaintiffs
Michael Nguyen and Kelly Nguyen as the Class Representatives for
the Class and Kahn Swick & Foti, LLC as the Class Counsel for the
Class.

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge
Nathan affirms the determinations in the Order, fully and finally
approves the Settlement set forth in the Amended Stipulation in all
respects. Accordingly, she authorizes and directs implementation
and performance of all the terms and provisions of the Amended
Stipulation, as well as the terms and provisions thereof. She
dismisses the Litigation and all Released Claims of the Class with
prejudice. The Settling Parties are to bear their own costs, except
as and to the extent provided in the Amended Stipulation and
therein.

The Releases set forth in Section 4 of the Amended Stipulation,
together with the definitions contained in the Amended Stipulation
relating thereto, are expressly incorporated in the Final Judgment
by reference.

Accordingly, Judge Nathan orders that upon the Effective Date, and
as provided in the Amended Stipulation, Lead Plaintiffs shall, and
each of the Class Members will be deemed to have, and by operation
of the Judgment will have, fully, finally, and forever released,
relinquished, and discharged any and all Released Claims (including
Unknown Plaintiffs' Claims) against the Released Persons, whether
or not such Class Member executed and delivered the Proof of Claim
and Release form or shares in the Settlement Fund. Claims to
enforce the terms of the Amended Stipulation are not released.

In the event that the Settlement does not become effective in
accordance with the terms of the Amended Stipulation, or the
Effective Date does not occur, then the Judgment will be rendered
null and void to the extent provided by and in accordance with the
Amended Stipulation and will be vacated and, in such event, all
orders entered and releases delivered in connection herewith will
be null and void to the extent provided by and in accordance with
the Amended Stipulation and the Settlement Fund will be returned in
accordance with the Amended Stipulation.

Without further order of the Court, the Settling Parties may agree
to reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of the provisions
of the Amended Stipulation.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Final Judgment is
available at https://tinyurl.com/3uf8zp58 from Leagle.com.


OSHKOSH CORP: Wisconsin Court Tosses 401(k) Fee Class Action
------------------------------------------------------------
Charles Seemann III, Esq. and Blaine Veldhuis, Esq., of Jackson
Lewis P.C., in an article for JDSupra, report that recently, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
granted a Motion to Dismiss, dismissing ERISA breach of fiduciary
duty claims, failure to monitor claims, and prohibited transaction
claims in a putative class action involving Oshkosh Corporation's
401(k) Plan. The plaintiff supported those claims with allegations
of excessive recordkeeping fees, excessive share class fees,
imprudent high-cost fund options, failure to fully disclose plan
fees, and excessive provider fees. The district court relied
heavily on Seventh Circuit precedent to dismiss the complaint, with
prejudice, holding that it was not possible to plausibly infer
violations of ERISA's duties, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).

Plaintiff alleged that, between 2014 and 2018, the Plan on average
paid $87 per participant in recordkeeping fees which reflected a
lack of prudence and poor management of the Plan. Throughout
Plaintiff's complaint, he compared the Plan's average annual
recordkeeping fee and other investment and service fees to plans
for which Plaintiff alleged were of similar size and with similar
amounts of money under management. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged
Defendants should have paid around $40 per participant in
recordkeeping fees. The Court dismissed the recordkeeping fee claim
because "Plaintiff fail[ed] to state why the fee is unreasonable."
Moreover, the Court stated, "[t]he mere existence of purportedly
lower fees paid by other plans says nothing about the
reasonableness of the Plan's fee, and it does not make it plausible
that another recordkeeper would have offered to provide the Plan
with services at a lower cost."

Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary
duties when they did not retain the share class for each fund that
gives plan participants access to portfolio managers at the "lowest
net fee." Although the court acknowledged that the "net investment
expense" theory is a "novel concept," the court reasoned that
Plaintiff's claims were tantamount to an argument that Defendants
were imprudent simply because they did not retain the least costly
share class, a claim which the Seventh Circuit had previously
rejected in another case.

Next, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary
duties by retaining higher-cost actively managed investments over
the less-expensive passively managed investments. Again relying on
Seventh Circuit precedent, the court dismissed the claim when
Plaintiff conceded he had no knowledge of Defendants' investment
selection and monitoring process and thus the court was not
required to accept "unsupported conclusory factual allegations,"
especially in light of the precedent that "plans may generally
offer a wide range of investment options and fees without breaching
any fiduciary duty."

The Court quickly shot down Plaintiff's claims that Defendants
failed to fully disclose fees charged or credited to the Plan
investments because Seventh Circuit precedent does not require a
plan fiduciary to disclose information about revenue-sharing
arrangements.

In addition, Plaintiff claimed that the fees paid by the Plan to
its service provider were excessive and unreasonable in relation to
the services provided and that Defendants did not solicit
competitive bids from other service providers. The court dismissed
the claim, holding that the existence of a lower-cost alternative
service provider "says nothing" about Defendants' prudence and does
not make it plausible that another service provider would offer the
same service at a lower cost.

The failure to monitor claims were summarily dismissed as
derivative and dependent upon Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty
claims, which had already been dismissed. The court also dismissed
Plaintiff's prohibited transaction claims as "circular" and cited
other district courts that dismissed similar claims.

The case is Albert v. Oshkosh Corporation, No. 1:20-cv-00901-WCG
(E.D. Wis. Sep. 2, 2021). [GN]

PHOENIX-VETERANS PRINT: Garnica Sues Over Biometrics Data Retention
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MARIA GARNICA, individually and on behalf of other persons
similarly situated v. PHOENIX-VETERANS PRINT CORPORATION, Case No.
2021L001010 (18th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ill., Sept. 23, 2021) is a class
action seeking to obtain statutory damages and other equitable
relief under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

According to the complaint, the Plaintiff and other similarly
situated employees were required to provide Defendant with their
personalized biometric indicators and the biometric information
derived therefrom. Specifically, Defendant collects and stores its
employees' fingerprints and requires all the employees to clock-in
and clock-out by scanning their fingerprints. The Plaintiff and
class members have not been notified where their fingerprints are
being stored, for how long Defendant will keep the fingerprints,
and what might happen to this valuable information, says the suit.

Phoenix-Veterans Print Corporation is a privately-held company that
operates in the commercial printing industry.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roberto Luis Costales, Esq.
          William H. Beaumont, Esq.
          BEAUMONT COSTALES LLC
          107 W. Van Buren, Suite 209
          Chicago, IL 60605
          Telephone: (773) 831-8000
          E-mail: rlc@beaumontcostales.com
                  whb@beaumontcostales.com

PILGRIM'S PRIDE: Dec. 31, 2022 Claims Filing Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
Kelly Tyko, writing for USA TODAY, reports that if you purchased
chicken in the last decade, you could be entitled to some money
back.

A $181 million settlement is pending in the Broiler Chicken
Antitrust Litigation, a class-action lawsuit that alleges
price-fixing within the poultry industry.

The lawsuit claims the defendants and "their co-conspirators
conspired to restrict the supply of, and fix, raise, and stabilize
the price of chicken, as of January 1, 2009, in violation of
federal and state consumer and antitrust laws."

To be eligible to receive money, you need to have purchased fresh
or frozen raw chicken between January 2009 and Dec. 31, 2020, and
submit a claim form at Overchargedforchicken.com. You also need to
be a resident of one of 24 states or Washington D.C. (See list of
states below.)

Chicken that is marketed as halal, kosher, free-range or organic is
excluded, the settlement states.

Pilgrim's Pride Corporation and Tyson Foods, Inc. are among the
chicken producers who have reached a settlement in the case. Other
defendants in the suit include Perdue Foods, Sanderson Farms, Wayne
Farms and Koch Foods.

Poultry prices fixed?
The U.S. poultry industry has been operating under a cloud in
recent years. Restaurant chains, food producers and grocers,
including Walmart, Kroger and Chick-fil-A, sued Sanderson Farms,
Wayne Farms and other poultry producers in 2016 alleging that the
companies conspired to fix poultry prices over an eight-year
period.

The U.S. Department of Justice intervened in the case and has
charged at least 10 people with antitrust violations, including
current and former employees at Pilgrim's Pride, Claxton Poultry
Farms, Perdue Farms and Koch Foods. Sanderson Farms and Wayne Farms
have not been charged. Sanderson received a subpoena in the case in
2019 and has said it is cooperating.

According to a news release, the settling defendants "have not
admitted any liability concerning, and continue to deny the legal
claims alleged in" the lawsuit and agreed to settle "to avoid the
further expense, inconvenience, disruption, and burden of this
litigation . . . and thereby to put to rest this controversy."

Chicken class action suit: File a claim
You can file out the claim form online at Overchargedforchicken.com
or print a PDF to mail in.

The claim form asks whether you were a resident of the following 24
states or Washington D.C.: California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, or Wisconsin.

The purchasing dates for the chicken are January 2009 through Dec.
31, 2020, but dates differ in Rhode Island and Wisconsin.

The form also asks for your best estimate of how many packages of
chicken you purchased on a monthly basis and the estimated cost.

The deadline to submit a claim is Dec. 31, 2022. To exclude
yourself from the suit you need to submit an exclusion request by
Nov. 10, 2021, the settlement website says. [GN]

PLAIN GREEN: Trump 9th Cir. Judge Reversed Class Action Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------------
Elliot Mincberg, writing for People for the American Way, reports
that Trump Ninth Circuit judge Danielle Forrest, joined by Trump
judge Lawrence VanDyke, reversed a district court and ruled that
consumers harmed by short-term, high-interest "payday" loans could
not pursue a class action for fraud and related violations, but
must instead at least initially submit their individual claims for
arbitration as requested by defendants. The September 2021 decision
was in Brice v Plain Green LLC.

As documented by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
and others, "payday" loans are high-cost loans made to
lower-income, low-credit borrowers who often encounter questionable
practices and later financial problems as a result. Although many
states regulate payday loans by such methods as prohibiting
exorbitant or "usurious" interest and other measures, the limited
liability corporations and others who make such loans have sought
to evade regulation, through such methods as using the internet and
a technique referred to as "rent-a-tribe," in which "tribal shell
corporations, acting as fronts for non-Indian payday lenders,
charge borrowers exorbitant interest" and claim they are subject
only to tribal law, not state or federal law. Loan agreements
usually provide that any disputes must be arbitrated individually
by an "independent third party" based largely on tribal law. A
number of California consumers were victimized by these practices
and filed a class action lawsuit against Think Finance LLC and its
owners and investors, contending that the defendants had used such
tribal shell corporations to make improper payday loans with
interest rates of more than 400% per year.

As in many such cases, several defendants tried to stop the class
action and force individual arbitration of each victim's claims
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the loan agreements. Following
the lead of most other courts to have considered such lawsuits, the
district court rejected the motions to compel arbitration. The
defendants appealed.

In a 2-1 decision, Trump judges Forrest and VanDyke reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs were required to submit each of their
individual claims to arbitration, and that they could proceed with
a broader lawsuit only if the arbitrators themselves decide that it
was improper for the arbitration agreement to delegate to them the
question of whether the disputes are subject to arbitration. Based
on their interpretation of Supreme Court decisions on arbitration
of cases involving consumers suing corporations, the Trump judges
ruled that the provision in the agreement "delegating to an
arbitrator" the issue of whether the agreement to arbitrate was
valid, and that the district court must "compel the parties to
proceed with arbitration." Only if the arbitrator concludes that
"the arbitration agreement is unenforceable," Forrest continued,
can the consumers "return to court" and seek broader relief.

Judge William Fletcher firmly dissented. He noted that the majority
decision contradicts "all of our sister circuits that have
addressed" the issue, including the Second, Third, and Fourth
Circuits, in holding that the delegation provision was valid. Based
on a careful analysis of these decisions, the Supreme Court
rulings, and the language of the loan agreements, Fletcher
determined that both the delegation provision and the arbitration
agreement were invalid, particularly since they operate as a
"prospective waiver" of the borrowers' right to seek remedies for
violations of state and federal statutes protecting consumers'
rights. Fletcher concluded that the effect of the Forrest-VanDyke
ruling was to "improperly force vulnerable borrowers into
arbitration," despite the fact that other circuits had
"consistently condemned" such arbitration agreements, "including
those used by the very same lenders as in this case."

As a result of the holding by Trump judges Forrest and VanDyke,
therefore, California borrowers will not be able to pursue
effective relief against the improper payday loan practices in the
case, and a troubling precedent has been set that goes even further
than past cases in forcing consumers to resort to ineffective
individual arbitration in disputes with corporations. The case
further shows the need, as part of our fight for our courts, to
promptly confirm Biden nominees to the Ninth Circuit and all our
federal courts to counterbalance the views of such Trump judges and
show proper respect for the rights of consumers. In fact, as
explained elsewhere in this blog, President Biden has recently
submitted the nominations of three "highly qualified judicial
nominees" to the Ninth Circuit as part of the effort to "restore
our federal courts." [GN]

POINT BLANK: Court Urged to Revive Bulletproof Vest Class Action
----------------------------------------------------------------
Nathan Hale, writing for Law360, reports that a group of police
associations and officers urged the Eleventh Circuit on Sept. 22 to
revive their suit alleging a design defect in bulletproof vests
made by Florida-based Point Blank Enterprises., arguing the trial
court made numerous legal errors in denying them class
certification. [GN]




PROVIDENCE TITLE: Fails to Pay Proper Wages, Peden Suit Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Danya Peden, individually, and Falon Carpenter, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Providence Title Company
and Daniel A. Foster, Case No. 3:21-cv-02286-E (N.D. Tex., Sept.
24, 2021) is a civil action brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and the Portal-to-Portal Act seeking damages for Defendants'
failure to pay Peden and Carpenter time and one-half the regular
rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 during each seven-day
workweek while working for the Defendants for the period of time
beginning three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit and
forward.

Mr. Carpenter files this lawsuit individually and as an FLSA
collective action on behalf of all similarly situated current and
former employees who worked for Defendants on a mixed salary and
commissions basis who were not paid time and one-half their
respective rates of pay for all hours worked over 40 in each
seven-day workweek for the time period of three years preceding the
date this lawsuit was filed and forward.

Plaintiffs Peden and Carpenter and the Collective Action Members
seek all damages available under the FLSA, including back wages,
liquidated damages, legal fees, costs, and post-judgment interest.

The Defendants employed Peden from May 2015 through February 2021
as a CE instructor, and Escrow Officer and Business Development
Team Leader. Peden was paid a salary and commissions. Peden
typically worked up to 50 hours per week; however, Defendants did
not pay her any overtime premium wages because the Defendants
misclassified her as an exempt employee, says the suit.

The Defendants also employ escrow officers like Plaintiff Falon, as
well as escrow assistants, who coordinate documents and money
related to real estate transactions and act as neutral third
parties who process files, cure title issues, prepare settlement
statements, and conduct closings.

Providence is is an insurance company that warrants the sales of
homes against claims others might make against a property.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Daryl J. Sinkule, Esq.
          KILGORE & KILGORE, PLLC
          Kilgore Law Center
          3109 Carlisle Street
          Dallas, Texas 75204-1194
          Telephone: (214) 969-9099
          Facsimile: (214) 379-0843
          E-mail: djs@kilgorelaw.com

               - and -

          Melinda Arbuckle, Esq.
          SHELLIST LAZARZ SLOBIN, LLP
          11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1515
          Houston, TX 77046
          Telephone: (713) 621-2277
          Facsimile: (713) 621-0993
          E-mail: marbuckle@eeoc.net

RANGE RESOURCES: Underpays Royalties Under Class Leases, Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
JAMES A. RUPERT, WILLIAM E. AND KARAN A. TRAVIS AND BRYAN E.
MARTIN, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated,
v. RANGE RESOURCES -- APPALACHIA, LLC, and RANGE RESOURCES CORP.,
Case No. 2:21-cv-01281 (W.D. Pa., Sept. 24, 2021) alleges that
Range has consistently and systematically underpaid the royalties
owed to Plaintiffs and the Class members by:

   (1) failing to pay royalties based on the sales price received
       on Range's sales of the natural gas which was produced from

       the wells drilled subject to the Class Leases at the point
       of sale;

   (2) failing to pay royalties based on the sales prices received

       at the point of Range's sale of the NGLs, which have been
       produced from the wells drilled subject to the Class Leases;

       and

   (3) improperly deducting from the sales prices received on the
       sale of the residue gas and the NGL products various Post-
       Production Costs in excess of the $0.80 per MMBTU as
       provided for in the Addendum to the Class Leases.

According to the complaint, by underpaying the royalties owed to
the Plaintiffs and the Class, Range has breached is contractual
obligations to Plaintiffs and the Class under the Class Leases.

As a result of Range's alleged breaches of its royalty obligations
under the Class Leases, the Plaintiffs and the Class members have
sustained substantial damages.

The Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated persons and entities, consisting of:

   "Persons and entities, including their respective successors
and
   assigns, to whom Range since, September 1, 2017, has paid
   royalties, or has an obligation to pay royalties, under oil and

   gas leases which became to be owned by Range on or after October

   13, 2010 and precludes Range from deducting Post Production
   Costs from its Royalty Calculation on Natural Gas, NGLs, and
   related constituents in excess of $0.80 per MMBTU;"

   Excluded from the Class are: (1) Range, its current officers and

   employees; and (2) any person whose royalty underpayment claim
   against Range is subject to a binding arbitration provision.

Range Resources is a petroleum and natural gas exploration and
production company organized in Delaware and headquartered in Fort
Worth, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          William H. Knestrick, Esq.
          NEIGHBORHOOD ATTORNEYS, LLC
          8 East Pine Ave.
          Washington, PA 15301
          Telephone: (724) 705-7082
          E-mail: william@neighborhoodattys.com

               - and -

          George A. Barton, Esq.
          Stacy A. Burrows, Esq.
          BARTON AND BURROWS, LLC
          5201 Johnson Drive, Ste. 110
          Mission, KS 66052
          Telephone: (913) 563-6253
          E-mail: george@bartonburrows.com
                  stacy@bartonburrows.com

REXALL SUNDOWN: Multivitamin Product Falsely Advertised, Suit Says
------------------------------------------------------------------
HOLLY WEINSTEIN, PEGGY RODRIGUEZ, ANDREA DIMARIO, and CRYSTAL
YOUNGER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated v. REXALL SUNDOWN, INC., NATURESMART, LLC, and THE
BOUNTIFUL COMPANY f/k/a THE NATURE'S BOUNTY CO., Case No.
2:21-cv-05378 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2021) is a consumer protection
and false advertising class action alleging that unbeknownst to
consumers, the Products labeled as "Complete" and containing the "B
Vitamins" do not contain Vitamin B1 (thiamine), Vitamin B2
(riboflavin), and Vitamin B3 (niacin) (collectively Missing B
Vitamins).

The Defendants market, advertise, and distribute various
multivitamins under the "Sundown Kids" brand name, which it
prominently advertises as "Complete Multivitamin Gummies"
containing "B Vitamins."

The multivitamin products at issue include the following labels:

   a. Disney and Pixar Incredibles 2 Multivitamin Gummies;

   b. Disney and Pixar Toy Story 4 Complete Multivitamin Gummies;

   c. Disney Frozen 2 Complete Multivitamin Gummies;

   d. Disney Princess Complete Multivitamin Gummies;

   e. Marvel's Avengers Complete Multivitamin Gummies;

   f. Marvel's Spider-Man Complete Multivitamin Gummies; and

   g. Star Wars Complete.

The multivitamin products may also include other multivitamin
gummies that depict other film and comic book characters, but that
have the same label representations and the same product
formulation.

According to the complaint, the Defendants have formulated,
manufactured, labeled, marketed, and sold the Products as "Complete
Multivitamin Gummies," containing the "B Vitamins" (without any
qualifying or restrictive language), and as containing "13
Essential Nutrients."

The representations "Complete Multivitamin Gummies," "B Vitamins,"
and "13 Essential Nutrients" appear on the labels of the Products.

The twin representations of "Complete" along with the unqualified
"B Vitamins" lead reasonable consumers to believe that the Products
contain all B vitamins uniformly recognized by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") and the National Institute of Health
("NIH").

As such, the Products allegedly fail to conform with a statement of
quality made in Defendants' labeling as the Products are not
"Complete Multivitamin Gummies" containing the "B Vitamins," as
represented by Defendants.

Moreover, the labels of the Products are deceptive and misleading.
Indeed, Defendants modified and changed the misleading labels of
the Products in (upon information and belief) calendar year 2020,
adding a diamond-shaped symbol next to the word "Complete" on the
front label of the Products, says the suit.

However, while Defendants now sell some of the Products with the
modified labels containing the qualified "select B Vitamins"
representation, Defendants also continue to market and sell the
Products with the misleading and deceptive labels. As of April
2021, depictions of the Products with the deceptive and misleading
labels still appear on the Sundown Nutrition website, as well as on
major online retailers such as Amazon.

The Plaintiffs and other consumers purchased the Products,
reasonably relying on Defendants' deceptive representation about
the Products, believing that the Products were Complete
Multivitamin Gummies, believing that the Products contained all the
B vitamins, and believing that the Products contained the 13
vitamins recognized by entities such as the FDA and NIH. Had the
Plaintiffs and other consumers known that the Products did not
contain the Missing B Vitamins they would not have purchased the
Products or would have paid significantly less for the Products,
added the suit.

Therefore, Plaintiffs and consumers have suffered injury in fact as
a result of the Defendants' alleged deceptive practices. The
Plaintiffs seek to represent a nationwide class of consumers, a
Rhode Island consumer Subclass, an Indiana consumer Subclass, a
Massachusetts consumer Subclass, a Maryland consumer Subclass, and
a Consumer Protection Multi-State Subclass.

The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other consumers, seek
damages, restitution, declaratory and injunctive relief, and all
other remedies the court deems appropriate.

Defendant Bountiful operates in New York, and directly and/or
through its agents, formulates, manufactures, labels, markets,
distributes, and sells the Products nationwide, including in New
York. Defendant Bountiful has maintained substantial distribution
and sales in this District.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Joseph P. Guglielmo, Esq.
          Sean T. Masson, Esq.
          SCOTT+SCOTT ATTORNEYS
          AT LAW LLP
          The Helmsley Building
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-4478
          Facsimile: (212) 223-6334
          E-mail: jguglielmo@scott-scott.com
                  smasson@scott-scott.com

               - and -

          Gary E. Mason, Esq.
          David K. Lietz, Esq.
          Gary M. Klinger, Esq.
          MASON LIETZ & KLINGER LLP
          5101 Wisconsin Ave. NW Ste. 305
          Washington DC 20016
          Telephone: (202) 640-1160
          Facsimile: (202) 429-2294
          E-mail: gmason@masonllp.com
                  dlietz@masonllp.com
                  gklinger@masonllp.com

S & K SECURITY: Henderson Suit Seeks OT Wages for Security Guards
-----------------------------------------------------------------
KATRINA HENDERSON, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. S & K SECURITY CONSULTANTS, INC., JERRY D.
SWANSON, and DEBRA SWANSON, Case No. 8:21-cv-02484-GLS (D. Md.,
Sept. 29, 2021) contends that the Defendants have unlawfully failed
to pay individuals employed in the positions of Officer, Sergeant,
Lieutenant, Commander, and/or Captain ("Security Guards") overtime
compensation pursuant to the the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Maryland Wage and Hour Law, the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Law, the D.C. Minimum Wage Act Revision Act of 1992, and
the D.C. Wage Payment and Wage Collection Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants unlawfully failed to pay
Security Guards an overtime premium at 1.5 times their regular rate
of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek, in violation
of the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL.

Additionally, Security Guards performed uncompensated off-the-clock
work as required by the Defendants, including arriving and
beginning their shifts early to relieve Security Guards scheduled
on the previous shift, and traveling from one work location to
another during a workday.

The Plaintiff was employed by Defendants in the position of
Sergeant from October 2017 to June 6, 2021. Specifically, the
Plaintiff worked for the Defendants' following client: (a) AFT
Credit Union (D.C.); (b) Counsel House (MD); (c) Riverside
Apartments (MD); (d) Washington Overlook (D.C.); (e) The Wharf
(D.C.); (f) Delta Towers (D.C.); and (g) Capital Crossing (D.C.).

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was compensated on an
hourly basis.

Defendant S & K Security Consulting, Inc. is a business duly
organized and existing under the laws of Maryland, with an address
registered with the Maryland Secretary of State at 7917 Esther
Drive, Oxon Hill, Maryland.

Defendant JS is the co-owner and President of Defendant S & K
Security Consulting, Inc.

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          James Edward Rubin, Esq.
          THE RUBIN EMPLOYMENT LAW FIRM, PC
          600 Jefferson Plaza, Suite 204
          Rockville, MD 20852
          Telephone: (301) 760-7914
          E-mail: jrubin@rubinemploymentlaw.com

               - and -

          Nicholas Conlon, Esq.
          Edmund Celiesius, Esq.
          111 Town Square Pl, Suite 400
          Jersey City, NJ 07310
          Telephone: (877) 561-0000
          Facsimile: (855) 582-5279
          E-mail: nicholasconlon@jtblawgroup.com
                  ed.celiesius@jtblawgroup.com

SELECTQUOTE INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds of October 15 Deadline
------------------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Ardelyx, Inc. (NASDAQ:
ARDX), SelectQuote, Inc. (NYSE: SLQT), Katapult Holdings, Inc.
(NASDAQ: KPLT), and Waterdrop Inc. (NYSE: WDH). Stockholders have
until the deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead
plaintiff. Additional information about each case can be found at
the link provided.

Ardelyx, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARDX)

Class Period: August 6, 2020 to July 19, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: September 28, 2021

Ardelyx is a specialized biopharmaceutical company focused on
developing medicine to improve treatment for people with
cardiorenal disease, including patients with chronic kidney disease
("CKD") on dialysis suffering from elevated serum phosphorus, or
hyperphosphatemia.

In June 2020, Ardelyx submitted a New Drug Application (NDA) to the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") for its lead product
candidate, tenapanor, a supposedly first-in-class medicine for the
control of serum phosphorus in adult patients with CKD on dialysis.
Ardelyx's NDA was purportedly supported by successful Phase 3
studies, which, according to the complaint, showed "improvements"
over current treatments and supported tenapanor's "clinical safety
and efficacy," reinforcing its "potential" to be a "transformative"
treatment.

After the market closed on July 19, 2021, however, Ardelyx revealed
that it had received a letter from the FDA stating that it had
detected issues with both the size and clinical relevance of the
drug's treatment effect.

On this news, the Company's share price declined, falling $9.71 per
share, or nearly 74%, to close at $2.01 per share on July 20,
2021.

For more information on the Ardelyx class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/ARDX

SelectQuote, Inc. (NYSE: SLQT)

Class Period: February 8, 2021 to May 11, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 15, 2021

On May 11, 2021, SelectQuote held a conference call in connection
with its third quarter 2021 financial results during which it
disclosed that its fourth quarter results would be impacted by a
"negative cohort and tail adjustment" due to "lower second-term
persistency for the 2019 cohort."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $5.50, or 20%, to
close at $21.90 per share on May 12, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants made material
misrepresentations concerning the following: (1) that SelectQuote's
2019 cohort was underperforming; (2) that, as a result, the
Company's financial results would be adversely impacted; and (3)
that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants' positive statements
about the Company's business, operations, and prospects were
materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis.

For more information on the SelectQuote class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/SLQT

Katapult Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: KPLT)

Class Period: December 18, 2021 to August 10, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 26, 2021

On June 9, 2021, Katapult became a public company via business
combination with FinServ, a blank check company formed for the
purpose of effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset
acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or similar business
combination with one or more businesses.

On August 10, 2021, Katapult issued a press release announcing
disappointing financial results for the second quarter of 2021
including a net loss of $8.1 million, compared to $5.1 million in
net income for the second quarter of 2020. The Company further
disclosed that it "observed meaningful [negative] changes in both
e-commerce retail sales forecasts and consumer spending behavior"
and retracted its full year 2021 guidance, claiming it could not
"accurately predict our consumer's buying behaviors for the
remainder of the year."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $5.47, or more than
56%, to close at $4.26 per share on August 10, 2021, on unusually
heavy trading volume.

The complaint filed in this class action alleges that throughout
the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and/or
misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
adverse facts about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects. Specifically, Defendants failed to disclose to
investors: (1) that Katapult was experiencing declining e-commerce
retail sales and consumer spending, (2) that despite Katapult's
assertions that it was clear and compelling value proposition to
both consumers and merchants, transforming the way nonprime
consumers shop for essential goods and enabling merchant access to
this underserved segment, Katapult lacked visibility into its
consumers' future buying behavior; and (3) as a result, Defendants'
statements about its business, operations, and prospects were
materially false and misleading and/or lacked reasonable basis at
all relevant times.

For more information on the Katapult class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/KPLT

Waterdrop Inc. (NYSE: WDH)

Class Period: May 2021 IPO

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 15, 2021

On June 17, 2021, Waterdrop issued a press release announcing
Waterdrop's financial results for the quarter conducted before the
IPO. In doing so, Waterdrop reported that its operating costs and
expenses had ballooned over 75%, or RMB579.1 million, to RMB1,343.9
million (US$205.1 million). As a result, Waterdrop suffered an
operating loss for the quarter of RMB460.6 million (US$70.3
million), compared with operating loss of RMB111.1 million for the
same period of 2020 – a more than four-fold increase. This rapid
increase in operating expenses was due largely to the cessation of
Waterdrop's mutual aid business and growing customer acquisition
costs.

Then, on August 11, 2021, multiple news sources reported that
China's banking and insurance watchdog, the China Banking and
Insurance Regulatory Commission, had issued an order directing
insurance companies to cease improper marketing and pricing
practices rampant in the industry and enhance their user privacy
protections. Failure to comply would reportedly result in the
offenders being "severely punished" by Chinese authorities. As
Bloomberg reported, "[r]egulators have since moved to shutter some
operations including mutual aid healthcare platforms operated by
Waterdrop." The article continued: "he latest move will stymie
growth in an industry that had been expected to grow to 2.5
trillion yuan ($385 billion) in a decade."

Finally, on September 8, 2021, Waterdrop revealed that its
operating losses for the quarter ended June 30, 2021 had continued
to accelerate, totaling RMB815.4 million (US$126.3 million),
compared with an operating profit of RMB7.2 million for the same
period of 2020. This was once again due to a sharp increase in
Waterdrop's operating costs and expenses, as Waterdrop's operating
costs and expenses during the quarter increased by RMB1,081.1
million, or 160.5% year over year, to RMB1,754.7 million (US$271.8
million) from RMB673.6 million for the same period of 2020.

On September 13, 2021, Waterdrop ADSs dropped to a low of just $3
per ADS –75% below the price at which Waterdrop ADSs were sold to
the investing public just four months previously.

The Complaint alleges that the IPO's Registration Statement failed
to disclose that Waterdrop was the subject of an intense regulatory
investigation and pending crackdown by Chinese authorities because
of a variety of market abuses perpetrated by Waterdrop used to
artificially inflate Waterdrop's short-term financial results in
the lead up to the IPO, including, among other things: (i)
operating insurance platforms without proper governmental
authorizations; (ii) mispricing risks for consumers; and (iii)
illicitly using client information. The Waterdrop class action
lawsuit further alleges that, unbeknownst to investors, the reason
that Waterdrop had discontinued its mutual aid segment was because
it had been ordered to do so by Chinese regulators. Furthermore,
Waterdrop had suffered rapidly accelerating operating losses in the
first quarter of 2021 which was completed weeks before the IPO.

For more information on the Waterdrop class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/WDH

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in commercial,
securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and
federal courts across the country. For more information about the
firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information:
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.
Brandon Walker, Esq.
Melissa Fortunato, Esq.
Marion Passmore, Esq.
(212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.com
www.bespc.com [GN]

SNAP FINANCIAL: TCPA Class Action Over Robocalls Certified
----------------------------------------------------------
Eric J. Troutman, Esq., of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, in an
article for The National Law Review, reports that so back in late
2019 and early 2020 Snap Financial was allegedly busily sending
prerecorded robocalls to some lady's cell phone, apparently in an
effort to collect a debt owed by a customer.

But - stop me if you've heard this one before - the cell phone SF
was calling did not belong to its customer, but to some random
lady. Apparently, SF acknowledged it was calling the wrong person,
but went ahead and called the number at least one more time just
for good measure. And then it sent a text message because
thoughtful.

So the lady - now the Plaintiff - goes ahead and sues Snap
Financial in a TCPA class action. The case runs its course with
defendant, apparently, producing a bunch of data - never a good
idea folks - and we get to the big moment where the Plaintiff moves
for certification.

Here's the proposed class:

All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Snap Finance
LLC placed, or caused to be placed, a call, (2) directed to a
number assigned to a cellular telephone service, but not assigned
to a current or former Snap Finance LLC accountholder, (3) in
connection with which Snap Finance LLC used an artificial or
prerecorded voice, (4) from February 27, 2016 through the date of
class certification.

Wesley estimates this class could consist of up to 82,780 members.

82,780!

That means if each class member received only one call - and I'm
sure that isn't the case - minimum damages here are over $41MM. (In
the end the Court limited the class to later timeframes and only
about 30k people ended up in the class so this is only about a
$15MM (minimum) problem at the moment.)

Now notice this class should never be certifiable because the mere
fact that a cell phone number is not assigned - whatever that means
- to a current or former Snap Finance customer is not pertinent on
the issue of consent. A regular user of a cell phone - even though
not a subscriber - may consent and that consent is binding. So the
class lacks commonality (nothing can be proven on the merits across
the class by the membership criteria identified). So the case is
uncertifiable.

But it looks like SF missed this argument - at least as the Court
framed the issue. (Let me note that I have not gone back and looked
at the opposition and courts will often time ignore or understate
arguments so keep in mind I am looking only at what the Court
considered, not necessarily what SF presented.)

Instead, SF argued: i) its own data on who is a wrong number is
inaccurate; and ii) whether calls played is an individualized
issue. Rather than address this in the framework of Rule 23(a),
however, SF apparently raised commonality issues solely through the
lens of predominance (Rule 23(b)(3).) If true, that's…. an odd
decision. And it allowed the court to leap what should have been an
impossible hurdle in finding common issues to begin with.

On typicality, SF apparently argued that Plaintiff had not
identified any other class members. But since a Plaintiff does not
need to identify class members at the pleadings stage - which, BTW,
is why class data should never be produced pre-certification - the
court properly rejected that argument.

SF also argued that Plaintiff's history in the collection space
created an special defense around her standing to sue - since she
knew how to make calls stop and didn't, the argument goes, she
lacks standing to sue. The Court rejected that argument as a matter
of law - and substantively - and then proceeded to rule that
Plaintiff was adequate to represent the class.

So on to predominance. As mentioned SF made two big arguments. And
they were both rejected. First on the "did the message play?"
front, Plaintiff's counsel - the tirelessly successful Greenwald
and Radbil - used SF's data against it, again. First, they
identified disposition codes that indicated a voicemail was
identified. Then they looked at talk time - using 55 seconds and
the magic mark - to determine that a voicemail was actually left
for the consumer.

And while there is plainly a difference between SF playing a
message to a VM in a vacant room, on the one hand, and a consumer
actually receiving the VM - which is required to state a claim -,
on the other, the Court bought it: "Wesley has sufficiently
demonstrated that the issue of whether Snap called the putative
class members, including whether a prerecorded voice message
"actually played," can be resolved with common evidence."

That just leaves consent. Again, this issue should absolutely torch
certification - no commonality to begin with - since lack of
subscribership is not dispositive of the issue and regular users
can also consent. I.e. the class as defined is not limited to wrong
number calls.

Instead of focusing on the definitional issues, however, SF
apparently posed only data arguments. And specifically, it argued
that its own data was unreliable (always a risky gambit.) But, as
the Court correctly pointed out, data issues are irrelevant -
because the class is not defined based upon data, but upon certain
facts unrelated to data. (Which, again, explains why class data
need not and should not be produced prior to certification.) So
arguments about data accuracy have nothing to do with merits of
certification.

With SF's best shot brushed aside the Court quickly determined the
class actions is the superior vehicle to resolve the dispute and
that the class is ascertainable using various reverse look-up
methods.

So, yeah. Disaster.

I've said it a thousand times. TCPA class litigation is not for the
green of horn or the faint of heart.

Here are some takeaways:

Do not produce class data pre-certification;

Remember that there is no reason to produce class data
pre-certification;

Focus on class definitional issues and defeating commonality at the
certification stage, not class data;

Don't call wrong numbers;

Do not take a wrong number class action from Greenwald or Radbil
lightly;

Remember that prerecorded calls are very troublesome;

Don't send more calls and texts to a number after you know about
wrong number report;

Do not produce class data pre-certification.

I know I can't require it, but if you are a TCPA defendant facing a
certification motion you should really think about having your
counsel call me to discuss your response. I am always happy to
help. [GN]

SOCLEAN INC: Sanitizing Devices Generate Toxic Ozone Gas, Suit Says
-------------------------------------------------------------------
MICHAEL L. STAHL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated v. SOCLEAN, INC., Case No. 2:21-cv-02424-HLT-GEB (D. Kan.,
Sept. 27, 2021) alleges that SoClean has used false and misleading
representations about its devices to market the SoClean 2 clean
continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) Sanitizing Machine, the
SoClean 2 Go CPAP Sanitizing machine, and their predecessor
devices.

SoClean manufactures and markets devices used to clean CPAP
machines, which treat sleep apnea since approximately 2012.

According to the complaint, SoClean devices work by generating
ozone to sterilize and deodorize CPAP machines. Ozone is an
unstable toxic gas with a pungent characteristic odor -- sometimes
described as "clean" smelling -- that can kill bacteria and
viruses. To be effective as a germicide, ozone must be present in a
concentration far greater than can be safely tolerated by people or
animals.

The Plaintiff contends that SoClean's marketing materials fail to
disclose that its devices emit ozone, which is a longstanding
requirement of federal law. Instead, SoClean falsely represents
that its devices use "activated oxygen" to clean CPAP machines.
SoClean markets the devices as "safe" and "healthy," which is false
given that they generate toxic ozone gas at levels that
substantially exceed federal regulations.

The Plaintiff adds that SoClean falsely represents that its devices
use "no water or chemicals" or "no harsh chemicals" to clean CPAP
machines, despite using ozone gas - a harsh chemical that causes
respiratory problems in humans. SoClean represents that its devices
use the same sanitizing process found in "hospital sanitizing,"
however, hospitals cannot and do not use ozone sanitizers in spaces
occupied by patients. SoClean also claims that separately sold
filters convert "activated oxygen" into "regular oxygen," which is
false because SoClean's filters have no measurable effect on the
device's ozone output. Finally, SoClean falsely claims that its
devices are "sealed" such that "activated oxygen" (i.e., ozone)
does not escape the devices.

The Plaintiff is the owner of a SoClean CPAP cleaning device and
has used that device on a regular basis since he purchased the
device.

Continuous Positive Airway Pressure ("CPAP") therapy is a common
nonsurgical treatment primarily used to treat sleep apnea. CPAP
therapy typically involves the use of a hose and a nasal or
facemask device that delivers constant and steady air pressure to
an individual's throat to help individuals breathe.

Sleep apnea is a common sleep disorder characterized by repeated
interruptions in breathing throughout an individual's sleep cycle.
These interruptions, called "apneas," are caused when the soft
tissue in an individual's airway collapses.

Bi-Level Positive Airway Pressure ("BiPAP") therapy is a common
alternative to CPAP therapy for treating sleep apnea. Similar to
CPAP therapy, BiPAP therapy is nonsurgical and involves the use of
a nasal or face mask device to maintain air pressure in an
individual's airway.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael J. Fleming, Esq.
          KAPKE & WILLERTH, LLC
          3304 NE Ralph Powell Road
          Lee's Summit, Missouri 64064
          Telephone: (816) 461-3800
          Facsimile: (816) 254-8014
          E-mail: mike@kapkewillerth.com

               - and -

          John M. Deakle, Esq.
          Russell L. Johnson, Esq.
          Ronald V. Johnson, Esq.
          DEAKLE-JOHNSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
          802 N. Main Street
          P.O. Box 2072
          Hattiesburg, MS 39403
          Telephone: (601) 544-0631
          Facsimile: (601) 544-0699
          E-mail: jmd@deaklelawfirm.com
                  rljohnson@djlawms.com
                  rvjohnson@djlawms.com

               - and -

          Patrick W. Pendley, Esq.
          Andrea Barient, Esq.
          PENDLEY, BAUDIN & COFFIN
          24110 Eden Street
          P.O. Drawer 71
          Plaquemine, LA 70765
          Telephone: (888) 725-2477
          Facsimile: (225) 687-6398
          E-mail: pwpendley@pbclawfirm.com
                  abarient@pbclawfirm.com

SOUTHWEST PATROL: Fails to Pay Wages, Sterling Class Suit Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
MONET STERLING, on behalf of herself of the general public, and all
others similarly situated, and on behalf of the general public v.
SOUTHWEST PATROL, INC., a California 13 Corporation and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive, Case No. 21STCV35359 (Cal. Super., Los
Angeles Cty., Sept. 24, 2021) is a representation action, pursuant
to the California Labor Code, on behalf of Plaintiff and certain
individuals who are employed by, or were formerly employed by
Southwest Patrol and any subsidiaries or affiliated companies
within California.

The lawsuit suit says, that the Defendants have had a consistent
policy of failing to pay all final wages due at termination or
within 72 hours after separation to all employees in California,
and failing to provide employees with accurately itemized wage
statements.

The Defendants further failed to pay premium wages to Plaintiff and
all other aggrieved employees who were denied meal and rest breaks.
The Plaintiff and Defendant's California employees were routinely
unable, and not authorized to take their 10 minute rest periods and
were also unable to take an uninterrupted 30 minute meal break for
every shift they worked, the suit added.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Los Angeles, California. He was
employed as a non-exempt, hourly employee by the Defendants in
Sonoma County, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Roman Otkupman, Esq.
          OTKUPMAN LAW FIRM, A LAW CORPORATION
          5743 Corsa Ave., Suite 123
          Westlake Village, CA 91362
          Telephone: (818) 293-5623
          Facsimile: (888) 850-1310
          E-mail: Roman@OLFLA.com

TRIKAM NY LLC: Tianio Sues Over "Time Shaving" Violations
---------------------------------------------------------
Manuel Tianio, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated
in the proposed FLSA Collective Action v. Trikam NY, L.L.C., Trikam
NY 1190-6, L.L.C., Deep Foods Inc., Vlorim Odza, Archit Amin, and
Deepak Amin, Case No. 1:21-cv-08043 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 28, 2021)
seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime wages, liquidated
and statutory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the New York State Labor Law, and the Wage Theft Prevention Act.

According to the complaint, the Defendants had a policy and
practice commonly known as "time shaving". Allegedly, the
Defendants would not permit Plaintiff, or other similarly situated
employees, to clock-in at the beginning of their workday.

Plaintiff Tianio was employed as a crew member at Defendants'
fast-casual Indian restaurant chain, known as "Indikitch" a/k/a
"Deep Indian Kitchen", located at Rockefeller Center, 1190 6th
Avenue, New York. He was employed as a non-managerial employee from
August 27, 2018 through December 17, 2019.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joshua Levin-Epstein, Esq.
          Jason Mizrahi, Esq
          LEVIN-EPSTEIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
          60 East 42nd Street, Suite 4700
          New York, NY 10165
          Telephone: (212) 792-0046
          E-mail: Joshua@levinepstein.com

UNITED AIRLINES: Six Employees Class Action Over Vaccine Mandate
----------------------------------------------------------------
Daniel Wiessner, writing for Reuters, reports that United Airlines
Inc (UAL.O) is facing claims that it unlawfully denied religious
and medical exemptions from a requirement that employees receive
COVID-19 vaccines after allegedly making it difficult for workers
to apply for them.

Six United employees filed a class action in Texas federal court on
Sept. 21 claiming that workers who sought exemptions from the
vaccine mandate were subjected to intrusive inquiries about their
medical conditions or religious beliefs, including a requirement
that they obtain letters from pastors.

Chicago-based United in a statement said the lawsuit was without
merit, and that it has seen an overwhelmingly positive response
from employees since announcing its vaccine requirement in August.
More than 97% of United's U.S.-based employees are vaccinated, the
airline said.

The lawsuit highlights the thorny legal issues faced by employers
in mandating vaccines, and comes as President Joe Biden is seeking
to require companies with 100 or more employees to ensure their
workforces are fully vaccinated or tested for COVID-19 weekly.

The plaintiffs on Sept. 22 asked the court to temporarily bar
enforcement of United's mandate for employees who request
exemptions. United has required workers to receive at least the
first dose of a vaccine by Sept. 27 or face termination, according
to the lawsuit.

The airline has already faced a separate legal challenge to its
vaccine mandate, which was dismissed by a U.S. judge in Florida.
The judge said that lawsuit was not filed properly.

The plaintiffs in the Sept. 21 lawsuit say United gave employees
only until Aug. 31 to request religious or medical exemptions from
the vaccine requirement, and that it has automatically denied
requests filed after that deadline.

They accused United of violating federal laws prohibiting
discrimination based on religion and disability.

The workers are seeking to represent a nationwide class that they
said would likely include more than 2,000 United employees. [GN]

UNITED STATES: 6th Circuit Casts Doubt on Associational Standing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Drew Gann, Esq., Cory Church, Esq., Diane Flannery, Esq., and Trent
Taylor, Esq., of McGuireWoods, report that in Association of
American Physicians & Surgeons v. United States Food and Drug
Administration ("AAPS"), __ F.4th __, 2021 WL 4097325 (6th Cir.
Sept. 9, 2021), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently cast
doubt on the continued viability of the associational standing
doctrine.

AAPS, which arose during the COVID-19 pandemic, involved
hydroxychloroquine, a controversial drug that some believe may be
used to treat COVID-19. In 2020, the FDA issued an emergency
Authorization that granted access to the federal government's
national stockpile of the drug "only in limited circumstances."

The plaintiff, an association of physicians, believed the
"Authorization did not offer broad enough access to the federal
stockpile." It sued the FDA, seeking "declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Authorization's restrictions." Attempting to
satisfy Article III's standing requirement, the plaintiff "invoked
associational standing on behalf of its physician members."
Associational standing "permits an entity to sue over injuries by
its members even when…the entity itself alleges no personal
injury."

To satisfy the test for associational standing, an association must
show "that: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right; (2) the interests that the suit seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit."

In AAPS, the plaintiff claimed that its members "could not
prescribe hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19 because of the
restrictions." The district court held that the plaintiff could not
rely on this alleged "injury" to confer associational standing and
dismissed the case under FRCP 12(b)(1).

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiff could not
rely on associational standing. The plaintiff, the court reasoned,
could not satisfy the doctrine's first element—"that its members
have Article III standing in their own right." The court noted the
plaintiff did not allege any "direct harm" to its members because
the FDA Authorization "did not regulate doctor prescribing habits
at all." Similarly, the plaintiff did not allege any "indirect
harm" to its members because there was no "credible threat of
prosecution" for violation of the Authorization. Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff's suit.

In reaching its holding, the Sixth Circuit also cast doubt on the
continued viability of the associational standing doctrine
generally. Noting the Supreme Court developed the doctrine in the
1960s and 70s, the Sixth Circuit claimed associational standing is
"not obviously reconcilable" with the Supreme Court's "more recent
guidance" for three reasons.

First, it recognized that the "‘irreducible constitutional
minimum' of standing requires a plaintiff to allege a
particularized injury." Recent Supreme Court case law, the Sixth
Circuit reasoned, suggests that the "nonparty injury" inherent in
associational standing "does not suffice." The court claimed that,
before authorizing types of "representative" litigation, the
Supreme Court has always "ensured that historical practice
supported it." In the view of the Sixth Circuit, no such historical
support exists for associational standing.

The Sixth Circuit also compared associational standing to class
actions, posing the following question: "[i]f class actions require
the named plaintiffs to identify their own injury, how can
associational standing throw this requirement overboard?"

Second, the Sixth Circuit found issue with the doctrine in the
context of standing's redressability requirement. Specifically, the
Sixth Circuit opined that associational standing "is in tension
with [] Article III redressability rules because it creates an
inherent mismatch between the plaintiff and the remedy." Because
its members, rather than the association itself, have suffered an
injury, an "injunction that bars a defendant from enforcing a law
or regulation against the ‘specific' party before the court—the
associational plaintiff—will not satisfy Article III because it
will not redress an injury."

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit suggested that the relief sought in
associational standing cases "raises other procedural questions."
After noting, for example, that FRCP 23(b)(2) governs the rules for
injunctions in class actions, the Sixth Circuit claimed it was
unclear whether an association must "follow Rule 23 before
obtaining relief for its members."

Third and finally, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) "might also necessitate
reexamination of the Court's associational-standing test." In
Lexmark, SCOTUS raised doubts about the notion of "prudential
standing" rules when it examined the "zone of interests"
requirement, which it characterized as "a statutory question"
rather than "a standing question." Lexmark's "skepticism of
prudential standing," the Sixth Circuit claimed, "suggests that the
Court should reexamine all of the doctrines that have grown out of
it," including associational standing.

Judge Eugene E. Siler Jr. concurred with the court's opinion but
declined to join the discussion regarding the viability of
associational standing, finding it "unnecessary to the resolution
of the case."

Now that the Sixth Circuit has expressed doubts about the viability
of associational standing, it will be interesting to see whether
other Circuits weigh in on the issue. If others do and the Sixth
Circuit is correct that recent caselaw has "undercut" the doctrine,
the Supreme Court could be confronted with a constitutional
challenge to associational standing. A decision on associational
standing from the nation's highest court could have ramifications
for other types of "representative" litigation, including class
actions. [GN]

VEONEER INC: Sabatini Balks at Merger Deal With Magna International
-------------------------------------------------------------------
ERIC SABATINI v. VEONEER, INC., ROBERT W. ALSPAUGH, JAN CARLSON,
JAMES M. RINGLER, MARK DURCAN, JONAS SYNNERGREN, MARY LOUISE
CUMMINGS, KAZUHIKO SAKAMOTO, and WOLFGANG ZIEBART, Case No.
2:21-cv-07676 (C.D. Cal.,Sept. 27, 2021) is brought on behalf of
the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated alleging that the
Veonee and the members of Veoneer's Board of Directors violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and seeking to enjoin the vote on
a proposed transaction, pursuant to which Veoneer will be acquired
by Magna International Inc., through Magna's subsidiary 2486345
Delaware Corporation ("Acquisition Sub").

On July 23, 2021, Veoneer and Magna issued a joint press release
announcing that they had entered into an Agreement and Plan of
Merger dated July 22, 2021 (the "Merger Agreement") to sell Veoneer
to Magna. Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, Veoneer
stockholders will receive $31.25 in cash for each share of Veoneer
common stock they own. The Proposed Transaction is valued at
approximately $3.8 billion.

On September 9, 2021, Veoneer filed a Schedule 14A Definitive Proxy
Statement (the "Proxy Statement") with the SEC. The Proxy
Statement, which recommends that Veoneer stockholders vote in favor
of the Proposed Transaction, allegedly omits or misrepresents
material information concerning the financial projections for
Veoneer.

The Defendants authorized the issuance of the false and misleading
Proxy Statement in violation of Sections 14(a) and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act.

In short, unless remedied, Veoneer's public stockholders will be
irreparably harmed because the Proxy Statement's material
misrepresentations and omissions prevent them from making a
sufficiently informed voting or appraisal decision on the Proposed
Transaction. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the stockholder vote on the
Proposed Transaction unless and until such Exchange Act violations
are cured.

The Plaintiff is, and has been at all times relevant hereto, a
continuous stockholder of Veoneer.

Defendant Veoneer is a Delaware corporation, with its principal
executive offices located at Klarabergsviadukten 70, Section C6,
Box 13089, SE-103 02, Stockholm, Sweden and manufacturing
facilities located in Goleta, California. The Company is a
worldwide leader in automotive technology. Veoneer's common stock
trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol
"VNE." The Individual Defendants are officers and directors of the
Company.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Joel E. Elkins, Esq.
          WEISSLAW LLP
          611 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 808
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Telephone: (310) 208-2800
          Facsimile: (310) 209-2348
          E-mail: jelkins@weisslawllp.com

VIEW INC: Bragar Eagel Reminds of October 18 Deadline
-----------------------------------------------------
Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C., a nationally recognized shareholder
rights law firm, reminds investors that class actions have been
commenced on behalf of stockholders of Iterum Therapeutics plc
(NASDAQ: ITRM), View, Inc. (NASDAQ: VIEW), and Spectrum
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: SPPI). Stockholders have until the
deadlines below to petition the court to serve as lead plaintiff.
Additional information about each case can be found at the link
provided.

Iterum Therapeutics plc (NASDAQ: ITRM)

Class Period: November 30, 2020 to July 23, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 4, 2021

On July 1, 2021, Iterum issued a press release "announc[ing] that
the Company received a letter from the [U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA")] stating that, as part of their ongoing
review of the [sulopenem New Drug Application "NDA"], the agency
has identified deficiencies that preclude the continuation of the
discussion of labeling and post marketing requirements/commitments
at this time."

On this news, Iterum's ordinary share price fell $0.87 per share,
or 37.99%, to close at $1.42 per share on July 2, 2021.

Then, on July 26, 2021, Iterum issued a press release announcing
that it had received a Complete Response Letter from the FDA for
the sulopenem NDA, "provid[ing] that the FDA has completed its
review of the NDA and has determined that it cannot approve the NDA
in its present form."

On this news, Iterum's ordinary share price fell $0.499 per share,
or 44.16%, to close at $0.631 per share on July 26, 2021.

The complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, defendants
made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose
that: (i) the sulopenem ("NDA") lacked sufficient data to support
approval for the treatment of adult women with uncomplicated
urinary tract infections ("uUTIs") caused by designated susceptible
microorganisms proven or strongly suspected to be non-susceptible
to a quinolone; (ii) accordingly, it was unlikely that the FDA
would approve the sulopenem NDA in its current form; (iii)
defendants downplayed the severity of issued and deficiencies
associated with the sulopenem NDA; and (iv) as a result, the
Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at
all relevant times.

For more information on the Iterum class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/ITRM

View, Inc. (NASDAQ: VIEW)

Class Period: November 30, 2020 to August 16, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: October 18, 2021

On March 8, 2021, CF II and View combined via a Business
Combination with View as the surviving, public entity.

On August 16, 2021, after the market closed, View announced that it
"began an independent investigation concerning the adequacy of the
company's previously disclosed warranty accrual."

On this news, the Company's share price fell $1.26, or over 24%, to
close at $3.92 per share on August 17, 2021, on unusually heavy
trading volume.

The complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and/or misleading statements, as well as
failed to disclose material adverse facts about the Company's
business, operations, and prospects. Specifically, Defendants
failed to disclose to investors: (1) that View had not properly
accrued warranty costs related to its product; (2) that there was a
material weakness in View's internal controls over accounting and
financial reporting related to warranty accrual; (3) that, as a
result, the Company's financial results for prior periods were
misstated; and (4) that, as a result of the foregoing, Defendants'
positive statements about the Company's business, operations, and
prospects were materially misleading and/or lacked a reasonable
basis.

For more information on the View class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/VIEW

Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Nasdaq: SPPI)

Class Period: December 27, 2018 to August 5, 2021

Lead Plaintiff Deadline: November 1, 2021

On August 6, 2021, Spectrum announced receipt of a Complete
Response Letter ("CRL") from the FDA regarding the ROLONTIS BLA.
The CRL cited deficiencies related to manufacturing and indicated
that a reinspection of the Company's manufacturing facility will be
necessary.

On this news, Spectrum's stock price fell $0.70 per share, or
21.54%, to close at $2.55 per share on August 6, 2021. The
complaint alleges that, throughout the Class Period, Defendants
made materially false and misleading statements regarding the
Company's business, operations, and compliance policies.
Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements
and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the ROLONTIS manufacturing
facility maintained deficient controls and/or procedures; (ii) the
foregoing deficiencies decreased the likelihood that the FDA would
approve the ROLONTIS BLA in its current form; (iii) Spectrum had
therefore materially overstated the ROLONTIS BLA's approval
prospects; and (iv) as a result, the Company's public statements
were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

For more information on the Spectrum class action go to:
https://bespc.com/cases/SPPI

               About Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C.

Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. is a nationally recognized law firm
with offices in New York, California, and South Carolina. The firm
represents individual and institutional investors in commercial,
securities, derivative, and other complex litigation in state and
federal courts across the country. For more information about the
firm, please visit www.bespc.com. Attorney advertising. Prior
results do not guarantee similar outcomes.

Contact Information: Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. Brandon Walker,
Esq. Melissa Fortunato, Esq. Marion Passmore, Esq. (212) 355-4648
investigations@bespc.comwww.bespc.com [GN]

VOLTAGE PICTURES: Can Proceed With Movie Pirates Class Action Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Abraham Jewett, writing for Top Class Actions, reports that the
Federal Court of Appeals ruled Voltage Pictures can proceed with a
reverse class action lawsuit the company lodged against alleged
movie pirates.

Voltage initially filed the reverse class action lawsuit back in
2016, but it was ultimately dismissed by the Federal Court in 2019,
reports TorrentFreak.  

The Federal Court concluded at the time that a reverse class action
lawsuit would not be the most appropriate scenario since the
circumstances surrounding each case of movie pirating would
differ.

In his reversal, Justice Donald J. Rennie wrote that Voltage should
get an opportunity to explain its arguments in court while pointing
out that there is a low standard for adjoining two or more
defendants in a class action lawsuit, according to TorrentFreak.  

Voltage has filed multiple complaints against movie pirates over
the years, and, in its current reverse class action lawsuit, is
attempting to obtain the personal details of a large number of
copyright violators.

The reverse class action lawsuit revolves around a lead defendant,
Robert Salna, who Voltage says provides WiFi service to tenants.
Through him, Voltage is hoping to gain information about a large
number of alleged copyright infringers, reports TorrentFreak.  

Despite ruling Voltage's reverse class action lawsuit could
proceed, Justice Rennie, citing lack of evidence, sent back to the
lower court the question of whether a class action lawsuit is the
preferable procedure and whether there are grounds to have Salna be
a representative defendant, reports TorrentFreak.

Voltage argues that a reverse class action lawsuit is more
financially reasonable than going after each alleged movie pirate
individually, reports TorrentFreak.

The Federal Court must still review the proceedings once more
before Voltage gets the official okay to go after what could end up
being thousands of movie pirates.

Eastlink customers who downloaded the movie Hellboy through
BitTorrent last year received a letter from HB Productions
informing them they could face a heavy fine if they were found
guilty of copyright infringement. [GN]

WALGREENS CO: Fourth Cir. Hears Arguments in Privacy Class Action
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Erika Williams, writing for Courthouse News Service, reported that
the Fourth Circuit heard arguments on Sept. 22 over whether
Walgreens violated customers' privacy by sharing prescription
information through a third-party vendor.

"Residents of the State of South Carolina who patronize Walgreens'
pharmacies do so without explicitly or impliedly agreeing to
sacrifice their well-established common law privacy rights "at the
corner of happy and healthy," began the underlying class-action
lawsuit against the company in February 2019.

A three-judge panel on Sept. 22 heard arguments from both sides.

In a 72-page brief for the consumers, attorney Michael Moore said
the case arises from "covert corporate access and use of pharmacy
patients' personally-identifiable medical and financial information
to profit via unrelated third-party contracts."

The plaintiffs in the case, including more than 100 proposed class
members, bought prescription drugs from a South Carolina pharmacy
owned by Walgreen Co.

They say the company acquired their sensitive prescription
information from the pharmacy through a corporate-sharing software
program.

Moore, who works with the law firm Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick,
Morrison, & Norwood P.C., argued for the plaintiffs in the case on
Sept. 22.

"Very simply, this is a privacy case. This is about the sanctity of
health care records, and who should have access to it and who
should not have access to it," he told the judges, Sept. 22.

When it comes to Walgreens, he said, the pharmacy is a separate
entity that is governed by state law.

Urging the panel to overturn a decision made by the federal court
in Charleston, Moore said that the lower court had failed to
recognize this distinction between entities.

Moore said it occurred to him as he reviewed briefs in preparation
for the Sept. 22 arguments that, if the federal court was right,
"if you have your prescriptions filled at a big-box retailer, that
happens to also have a pharmacy, anybody within that big-box
retailer would be authorized to have access to your personal health
information and prescription information."

U.S. Circuit Judge G. Steven Agee interrupted to ask Moore to state
his claims with respect to privacy.

"What is the specific injury that you say your clients have
suffered?" the George W. Bush nominee pressed.

"We claim and know and have alleged that, in fact, their personal
information was taken from them without consent and disseminated to
unauthorized people," the attorney responded.

At least 160 people who are completely unrelated to the pharmacy
and to prescription services have been provided access to
customers' personal records, Moore said.

"These are simply people that work in a separate, profit-generated
department that Walgreens has set up to try to get drugs at a
cheaper cost," he said, adding "Walgreens does not even tell its
pharmacists that work for them that they are doing this."

Agee again interjected to ask "Isn't that the purpose of the 340B
program, is to get to the people that are qualified, to get them
these low-cost drugs?"

The 340B drug pricing program, Moore responded, was set up "to help
these poor hospitals be able to find drugs at a cheaper price to
set off some costs."

But, he argued, if Walgreens simultaneously controls a 340B plan
and a pharmacy, it may be able to pick-and-choose plans for
customers based on what is more profitable.

South Carolina affords greater privacy protections and rights than
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, one of
many claims under which the customers brought the legal action.

Robert Hochman of Sidley Austin LLP argued that billing and
payments are pharmacy operations, as he represented Walgreens
during the Sept. 22 oral arguments.

He contended that Walgreens never considers profit when determining
what plan to use.

"Plaintiffs seem to be saying they've alleged injury by alleging
that we benefit from using their personal information in connection
with the 340B program," he said later adding, "The agreement makes
clear that the payment calculation Walgreens carries out pends on
whether the patient is insured or not."

The whole point of the 340B program is to make sure there is a
greater amount of resources available to covered entities that are
serving hard-to-reach populations, he said.

He argued that Walgreens must always choose the option that leaves
the customer paying less.

"So when plaintiffs complain about this secondary financial
analysis at least with respect to uninsured patients, they're
literally saying ‘they should have paid more'. That's what I mean
by the opposite of injury," he added.  

The Walgreens attorney came after Moore for not providing the full
scope of who had access to the pharmacy information.

"And, I know Mr. Moore said that there are other people, but he was
asked point blank whether he knows of anybody else and he said no,"
Hochman said, adding, "So, the injury actually in the complaint is
all 340B and so, therefore, we know from the materials properly
before the court that the 340B program just describes how their
information was used to determine how to pay for medications."

Moore had previously acknowledged that a refusal of certain
discovery materials left his side without further information
related to who else may have accessed the information.

In rebuttal, Moore accused Hochman's side of pretending to "ride a
white horse" by keeping costs cut.

"The fact is, they've acknowledged they make money. It's a
profit-driven thing," Moore said, adding, "They make money on the
filling of prescriptions and certainly on the vendor contract.
That's why appropriations says we have a right, the plaintiffs have
a right, to control their private information and what it's used
for."

U.S. Circuit Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, a Bill Clinton nominee and
Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan, a Barack Obama
nominee, joined the panel on Sept. 22.

"If the district court's ruling stands, South Carolina citizens
immediately lose any previously-held expectation of privacy over
their prescription-PII that the state legislature and judiciary has
exerted great effort to provide," Moore wrote in the brief.

The panel did not indicate when or how it would rule. [GN]

WASHINGTON, DC: Black Female Police Officers File Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------------
Gigi Barnett, writing for WTOP News, reports that a group of
current and former female Black D.C. police officers say they
suffered years of racial and sexual discrimination while working on
the force.

They filed a class-action lawsuit against the department on Sept.
22, laying out a culture of fear.

"We reported these things to management and to EEO [the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] and we were ignored," said
retired officer Tabatha Knight. "The worst of it is we were labeled
as trouble makers, angry Black women."

The lawsuit seeks $100 million in compensation and an overhaul of
the department's EEO.

In a written statement to WTOP, D.C. police said it can't discuss
the lawsuit.

"The Metropolitan Police Department is committed to treating all
members fairly and equitably throughout our organization," wrote
Alaina Gertz, the department's public affairs specialist. "We take
these allegations seriously and we will be reviewing them
thoroughly and responding accordingly."

At a news conference on Sept. 22, the women detailed stories of
harassment and a culture of intimidation collected in their
200-page lawsuit, filed by civil rights attorneys Donald Temple and
Pam Keith.

The group recounted its stories detailed in the lawsuit. The women
recalled years of racial and sexual discrimination.

"No one should have to accept a male manager walking by and
grabbing her buttocks and as he walks by just smiled," said Knight.
"There has been no accountability with us and we were ignored."

The women also say the department grapples with a culture of fear
and a hostile workplace.

"This whole case made me realize that I have some unhealed trauma
of the things that's happened to me over the course of my career,"
said Assistant Police Chief Chanel Dickerson, who is still on the
force.

The lawsuit originally started as a routine EEO complaint brought
by two officers. It morphed to include the 10 plaintiffs as more
officers came forward. Attorneys said they believe more female
officers could come forward.

The women's attorneys are calling on the mayor, the city council
and the attorney general to take a closer look into the department,
Keith said.

"Sometimes you just get overwhelming proof that something in your
institution is sideways," Keith said. "This case brings a fantastic
opportunity for people we hope to be transformative leaders." [GN]

WASHINGTON: Court OKs Class Definition and Schedule in D.S. Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, D.S. by and through her next friend TARA URS; et al.,
Plaintiffs v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
FAMILIES, et al., Defendants, Case No. 2:21-cv-00113-BJR (W.D.
Wash.), Judge Barbara J. Rothstein of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, Seattle, issued an order
regarding the definition of class action and amendment to
scheduling order.

The parties, by and through their respective attorneys of record,
stipulate to the following:

      1. The parties agree that the matter is appropriate to
proceed as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2).
The parties stipulate to certification of a class defined as:

      "Individuals who are or in the future will:

      a. Be under the age of 18; AND

      b. Be in DCYF's placement during a dependency proceeding
under Wash. Rev. Code 13.34 until the proceeding is dismissed; AND

      c. ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

            i. Have experienced five (5) or more placements,
excluding trial return home, in-home dependencies, and temporary
placements. Temporary placements under this stipulation and order
will mean any of the following: overnight stay with a parent,
hospital, respite care, youth camps, on runaway status, or
detention. Temporary placements do not include a hotel stay, an
office stay, or a night-to-night foster care placement. But an
individual will not be counted to have five (5) or more placements
under this section if they have been in the same placement for the
last twelve or more months, except if that placement was in a
Qualified Residential Treatment Program (QRTP); OR

            ii. Have been referred for or are in out-of-state group
care placement; OR

            iii. Have experienced a hotel or office stay in the
past six (6) months; OR

            iv. Are awaiting a Children's Long-Term Inpatient
Program (CLIP) bed."

The parties stipulate that the individuals who meet the definition
are too numerous for joinder to be practicable and share common
questions of law and fact. The Named Plaintiffs' claims are typical
of the class, and none of them have interests in material conflict
with the class. The Named Plaintiffs and their Counsel will
adequately protect the interests of the class. The parties further
agree any injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief would be
appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.

The parties reserve the right to amend the order under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23, including the ability to seek decertification of the class.

They agree that the current pretrial schedule should be amended as
follows:

      a. Discovery is stayed until Oct. 26, 2021;

      b. Reports from expert witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2) are to be served on or by Jan. 7, 2022;

      c. Initial deadline for completed discovery (from Dkt. # 22)
is Feb. 7, 2022;

      d. All dispositive motions are to be filed on or by March 8,
2022;

      e. Opposition for dispositive motions (per Dkt. # 16 briefing
schedule) is to be filed on or by March 29, 2022; and

      f. Replies for dispositive motions (per Dkt. # 16 briefing
schedule) are to be filed on or by April 12, 2022.

The parties agree that the Court should enter an order that
approves and adopts their stipulation.

Judge Rothstein approved and adopted the stipulation of the parties
as follows:

      1. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2), the Court
certifies a class defined as: "Individuals who are or in the future
will:

      a. Be under the age of 18; AND

      b. Be in DCYF's placement during a dependency proceeding
under Wash. Rev. Code 13.34 until the proceeding is dismissed; AND

      c. ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

            i. Have experienced five (5) or more placements,
excluding trial return home, in-home dependencies, and temporary
placements. Temporary placements under this stipulation and order
will mean any of the following: overnight stay with a parent,
hospital, respite care, youth camps, on runaway status, or
detention. Temporary placements do not include a hotel stay, an
office stay, or a night-to-night foster care placement. But an
individual will not be counted to have five (5) or more placements
under this section if they have been in the same placement for the
last twelve or more months, except if that placement was in a
Qualified Residential Treatment Program (QRTP); OR

            ii. Have been referred for or are in out-of-state group
care placement; OR

            iii. Have experienced a hotel or office stay in the
past six (6) months; OR

            iv. Are awaiting a Children's Long-Term Inpatient
Program (CLIP) bed."

Based on the foregoing parties' stipulation, Judge Rothstein
appoints D.Y., by and through his Next Friend Julie Kellogg
Mortensen, H.A., by and through his Next Friend Kristen Bishopp,
and D.S., by and through her Next Friend Tara Urs, as the Class
Representatives. Disability Rights Washington, National Center for
Youth Law, Carney Gillespie PLLP, and Munger, Tolles and Olson LLP
are appointed the Class Counsel.

The parties reserve the right to amend the Order under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23, including the ability to seek decertification of the class.

Judge Rothstein ordered that the pretrial schedule should be
amended as follows:

      a. Discovery is stayed until Oct. 26, 2021;

      b. Reports from expert witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2) will be served on or by Jan. 7, 2022;

      c. Initial deadline for completed discovery (from Dkt. # 22)
is Feb. 7, 2022;

      d. All dispositive motions will be filed on or by March 8,
2022;

      e. Opposition for dispositive motions (per Dkt. # 16 briefing
schedule) will be filed on or by March 29, 2022; and

      f. Replies for dispositive motions (per Dkt. #16 briefing
schedule) will be filed on or by April 12, 2022.

The Clerk is directed to forward copies of this Order to the
parties in the matter.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/48usd3mn from Leagle.com.


WEALTHSPIRE ADVISORS: Web Site Not Accessible to Blind, Suit Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DENISE CRUMWELL, for himself and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated v. WEALTHSPIRE ADVISORS LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-07991-VSB (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 24, 2021) alleges that Defendant
failed to design, construct, maintain, and operate its website to
be fully accessible to and independently usable by Plaintiff and
other blind or visually-impaired people.

Based on a 2010 U.S. Census Bureau report, approximately 8.1
million people in the United States are visually-impaired,
including 2.0 million who are blind, and according to the American
Foundation for the Blind's 2015 report, approximately 400,000
visually-impaired persons live in the State of New York.

Because Defendant's website,
https://www.wealthspire.com/contact/new-york-ny/ is not equally
accessible to blind and visually-impaired consumers, it allegedly
violates the ADA.

The Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to cause a change in
Defendant's corporate policies, practices, and procedures so that
Defendant's website will become and remain accessible to blind and
visually-impaired consumers.

By failing to make its Website available in a manner compatible
with computer screen reader programs, Defendant deprives blind and
visually-impaired individuals the benefits of its online goods,
content, and services -- all benefits it affords nondisabled
individuals -- thereby increasing the sense of isolation and stigma
among those persons that Title III was meant to redress, added the
suit.

The Defendant's denial of full and equal access to its website, and
therefore denial of its products and services offered thereby, is a
violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), says the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person who
requires screen-reading software to read website content using his
computer. The Plaintiff uses the terms "blind" or
"visually-impaired" to refer to all people with visual impairments
who meet the legal definition of blindness in that they have a
visual acuity with correction of less than or equal to 20 x 200.
Some blind people who meet their definition have limited vision.
Others have no vision.

The Defendant offers the commercial website,
https://www.wealthspire.com/contact/new-york-ny/, to the public.
The website offers features which should allow all consumers to
access the services offered by the Defendant and which Defendant
ensures delivery of such services throughout the United States
including New York State. The services offered by Defendant
include, but are not limited to, the following, which allow
consumers to: purchase financial and investment advice and other
services available online for purchase, and to ascertain
information relating to pricing, investments, tax advice, financial
planning and privacy policies.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          Jeffrey M. Gottlieb, Esq.
          Dana L. Gottlieb, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 East 18th Street, Suite PHR
          New York, N.Y. 10003-2461
          Telephone: (212) 228-9795
          Facsimile: (212) 982-6284
          E-mail: nyjg@aol.com
                  danalgottlieb@aol.com
                  Michael@gottlieb.legal

XTO ENERGY: Court Grants in Part Bid to Dismiss Bone's Class Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CORY BONE AND LUIS CARRILLO, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. XTO ENERGY,
INC., Defendant, Case No. 2:20-CV-00697 WJ/GJF (D.N.M.), Judge
William P. Johnson of the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Mexico granted in part and deferred in part the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the Overbroad and Jurisdictionally Defective
Class/Collective Claims in the First Amended Complaint, filed Oct.
9, 2020.

Background

Plaintiffs Cory Bone and Luis Carrillo, as well as the Putative
Class Members in the First Amended Collective/Class Action
Complaint, allege that they worked for Defendant as Safety
Consultants within the period of July 14, 2017 to the present.  The
Defendant is an oil and gas producer that operates throughout the
United States and internationally. The Plaintiffs assert that the
Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.
Sections 201, et seq., and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act
("NMMWA"), N.M.S.A. Sections 50-4-19 et seq., by failing to pay
overtime for work performed beyond 40 hours per week.

The Plaintiffs seek to bring a collective action under FLSA Section
16(b), defining the FLSA Collective as "all Safety Consultants who
worked for XTO Energy, Inc., anywhere in the United States, at any
time from July 14, 2017 through the final disposition of the
matter."

Separately, the Plaintiffs bring a class action for their NMMWA
claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and limit the class to "all
Safety Consultants who worked for XTO Energy, Inc., in the state of
New Mexico, at any time from July 14, 2017 through the final
disposition of this matter."

The Defendant seeks Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction against all claims by non-New Mexico members of the
FLSA Collective. It also seeks Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the
grounds that the FLSA Collective class definition is "defective and
insufficient to place XTO on notice of the putative class members."
In the interests of clarity and judicial restraint, the Court
defers any decision on the Rule 12(b)(6) matter until the
jurisdictional wrinkles are ironed out.

Discussion

When a court receives a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction alongside other issues, such as a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, "the court must first determine the
jurisdictional issue." Judge Johnson therefore looks first to the
Defendant's 12(b)(2) motion.

I. General Jurisdiction

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs "fail to allege facts that
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over XTO." In their
First Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert that Defendant is a
Delaware corporation, but that general jurisdiction in New Mexico
is nonetheless proper "because XTO's significant contacts with, and
business operations in, New Mexico are systematic and continuous
such that it is essentially at home in New Mexico." They cite to
the Defendant's website, which identifies no fewer than 14 states
in which the Defendant operates, including New Mexico.

The Plaintiffs do not explain whether the Defendant's connection to
New Mexico is particularly strong or whether they believe Defendant
is "at home" in over a quarter of this country. Either way, by
making only a conclusory statement regarding Defendant's contacts
with New Mexico, Judge Johnson holds that the Plaintiffs fail to
carry the burden of demonstrating that the Defendant's in-forum
contacts are "so continuous and systematic as to render [it]
essentially at home."

II. Specific Jurisdiction

Specific jurisdiction in light of Bristol-Myers takes center stage
in the jurisdictional dispute in the case. Bristol-Myers dealt with
a mass action claim under state law; the Defendant seeks to apply
its logic and holding to a collective action claim under the FLSA.

A. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, Bristol-Myers is not per se
inapplicable to FLSA claims simply because the FLSA is a federal
law.

The Plaintiffs attempt to dispose neatly of the jurisdictional
questions that Bristol-Myers poses by limiting its impact to state
court jurisdiction. Certainly, Bristol-Myers addressed state court
jurisdiction under the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment becomes critical to federal
personal jurisdiction via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1),
Judge Johnson holds. New Mexico's long-arm statute stretches as far
as the Fourteenth Amendment allows. Therefore, despite beginning
with a federal statute, this legal journey leads right back to the
Fourteenth Amendment issue at the heart of Bristol-Myers.

B. The similarities between FLSA collective actions and the mass
action in Bristol-Myers favor a similar application of law.

Bristol-Myers dealt with out-of-state claims in a mass action in
state court, but some courts have distinguished nationwide class
actions in federal court. Because mass actions are a combination of
many lawsuits in which many plaintiffs serve as parties to the
case, some courts have held that they differ meaningfully from
class actions, in which one or a few named plaintiffs represent a
class of unnamed individuals whose residency will not make or break
jurisdiction.

Judge Johnson holds that mass and collective actions treat all
members as parties who must each meet jurisdictional requirements,
but class actions differ because they are representative in nature.
The soundest approach is a consistent one: Mass and collective
actions bear enough similarities that the holding in Bristol-Myers
applies to both.

C. Congressional intent regarding nationwide FLSA collective
actions does not place such actions beyond Bristol-Myers' reach.

Courts that hold FLSA collective actions to be outside the scope of
Bristol-Myers tend to hold the view that Congress did not intend
the FLSA to cover only in-state plaintiffs when it allowed for
collective actions, and that to constrain the FLSA's collective
action provision by conforming it with Bristol-Myers would
"splinter most nationwide collective actions, trespass on the
expressed intent of Congress, and greatly diminish the efficacy of
FLSA collective actions as a means to vindicate employees' rights."
These concerns are not to be taken lightly. Indeed, a fellow
district court in the Tenth Circuit ruled that Bristol-Myers does
not apply to FLSA collective actions and "declined to substitute
its judgment for that of Congress by expanding the reach of
Bristol-Myers" to the matter before it.

Judge Johnson recognizes the troubling conflict between Congress's
likely intent in creating the FLSA collective action and Congress'
failure to include a nationwide service of process provision within
the FLSA, which would have prevented this entire dispute. However,
he says, Bristol-Myers' harsh effects do not soften the Court's
obligation to apply the U.S. Supreme Court case as binding
precedent. Congress may protect FLSA collective actions from
Bristol-Myers' sting by amendment if it chooses. Otherwise, the
Plaintiffs may pursue a nationwide FLSA collective action in the
Defendant's home state.

III. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Judge Johnson defers ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion until the
jurisdictional matters are resolved.

Conclusion

Because personal jurisdiction over the claims by non-New Mexico
plaintiffs is not proper in the Court, the Plaintiffs have two
choices. They may accept the loss of the non-New Mexico plaintiffs
and proceed as a collective composed solely of New Mexico
plaintiffs, or they may request that this Court transfer the entire
case to Delaware, where the Defendant is incorporated and therefore
may be subject to general jurisdiction on all claims from the
nationwide collective. Judge Johnson orders briefing from both
parties within two weeks of the entry of his Order addressing the
law on this subject to determine next steps for the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Memoradum Order &
Opinion is available at https://tinyurl.com/rzrvaxp4 from
Leagle.com.


ZOOMINFO TECHNOLOGIES: Bid to Dismiss Siegel IRPA Suit Denied
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JESSICA LEVING SIEGEL, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. ZOOMINFO TECHNOLOGIES,
LLC, Defendant, Case No. 21 C 2032 (N.D. Ill.), Judge Charles P.
Kocoras of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Jessica Leving Siegel's Class Action Complaint.

Background

ZoomInfo operates a website that sells access to a database
containing proprietary information about people to anyone willing
to pay ZoomInfo for access to it. It compiles its phone and email
database, in part, from corporate websites and social media
accounts, and the database includes over 63 million direct dials
and over 100 million direct emails. Access to the database must be
purchased from ZoomInfo's website.

ZoomInfo creates landing pages for each individual found within its
database that features the individual's full name, alongside
certain uniquely identifying information such as the individual's
location and a preview of the individual's email addresses and
phone numbers, work information, job title, and a list of
colleagues ("Marketing Page"). As part of its marketing strategy,
ZoomInfo encourages prospective customers to perform a free search
for an individual by typing the individual's first and last name
into the search bar. It then displays a "preview page" featuring
some of the information from the Marketing Page, such as partial
phone numbers and email addresses.

Once a user clicks either "Get Full Access To Searched Individual's
Info," "Get Email Address," "Get Phone Number," or any other
attribute of the searched individual's profile, ZoomInfo presents
an offer to start a free trial to access its database. ZoomInfo
then sells paid access to its database after the free trial period
expires.

The Plaintiff alleges this advertising is intended to sell access
to ZoomInfo's services and, in this way, ZoomInfo misappropriated
people's identities for its own commercial benefit (that is, to
market and promote paid access to any and all information in its
database). ZoomInfo never obtained written consent from the
Plaintiff or the other Class members to use their names or other
identifying information for any reason, and never notified them
their names and other identifying information would appear on its
Marketing Page in conjunction with an offer to purchase access to
ZoomInfo's database. The Plaintiff and the Class Members have no
relationship with ZoomInfo whatsoever.

The Plaintiff brings the action against ZoomInfo for its purported
ongoing violations of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act ("IRPA"),
765 ILCS 1075/1, et seq. ZoomInfo moves to dismiss the Plaintiff's
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ZoomInfo
argues the Plaintiff fails to allege, and cannot allege, that her
identity is used for "commercial purposes," or that her identify
was publicly used or held out. It further asserts that applying
IRPA in the manner Plaintiff attempts would violate the First
Amendment.

Discussion

A. Commercial Purpose

Section 30(a) of IRPA provides: "A person may not use an
individual's identity for commercial purposes without having
obtained previous written consent." "Commercial purpose" is defined
as "the public use or holding out of an individual's identity (i)
on or in connection with the offering for sale or sale of a
product, merchandise, goods, or services; (ii) for purposes of
advertising or promoting products, merchandise, goods, or services;
or (iii) for the purpose of fundraising."

ZoomInfo first argues the Plaintiff's Complaint does not establish
that her information was used to sell a product; rather, the
Complaint establishes the Plaintiff's information is the product.
ZoomInfo claims its free previews "do not attempt to steer users to
purchase a subscription" because when a consumer clicks certain
hyperlinks ZoomInfo presents an offer to start free trial access to
its database, and only after the free trial expires does ZoomInfo
sell paid access. ZoomInfo argues the Plaintiff's differentiation
between the free previews and the subscription services
conclusively undermines her attempt to place herself within the
reasoning of Lukis. ZoomInfo also argues Plaintiff cannot satisfy
IRPA's public use or holding out requirement.

In any event, Judge Kocoras holds that at this stage of the
litigation, the Plaintiff and the Court are without the benefit of
discovery. It may very well turn out that the Plaintiff is unable
to prove the "holding out" aspect of "commercial purpose," but, for
now, the Judge finds the Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim
for relief based on alleged violations of IRPA. The Plaintiff
alleges ZoomInfo used her identity in the free previews to
advertise, promote, and offer for sale its monthly subscription for
its database. This is enough, and ZoomInfo's Motion to Dismiss is
denied.

B. First Amendment

ZoomInfo next argues the Plaintiff cannot state a claim because her
proposed application of IRPA violates the First Amendment. It
asserts its free previews are fully protected, noncommercial speech
which have the same protection traditionally accorded to
directories like the yellow pages. ZoomInfo alternatively argues
the free previews are protected as commercial speech.

ZoomInfo's First Amendment argument more appropriately represents
an affirmative defense. The Seventh Circuit has concluded that
"because affirmative defenses frequently turn on facts not before
the court at the pleading stage, dismissal is appropriate only when
the factual allegations in the complaint unambiguously establish
all the elements of the defense." At this juncture, consideration
of this defense requires an analysis of evidence and issues that is
not possible or appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. Judge
Kocoras therefore denies ZoomInfo's motion to dismiss on this
basis.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Judge Kocoras denied ZoomInfo's Motion
to Dismiss. Status is set for Oct. 26, 2021, at 10:40 a.m.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 22, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/44tmn6s5 from Leagle.com.


[*] 9th Cir. Reinstates Part of California's Anti-Arbitration Law
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Greg Mersol, Esq., and Joseph S. Persoff, Esq., of BakerHostetler,
disclosed that for many years, state and federal courts in
California have opposed arbitration and have manufactured
frameworks under which they become unenforceable despite the clear
directives of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and countless
Supreme Court cases. While a string of Supreme Court cases over the
past decade gave employers some respite, the Ninth Circuit has now
issued a split decision in which it has devised yet another means
of trying to evade the FAA's mandate.

Just two years ago, California enacted AB 51 to discourage the use
of mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment setting,
establishing both civil and even criminal penalties for doing so.
These provisions were in obvious violation of the FAA, and a
California district court swiftly enjoined them for that reason. We
previously wrote about the district court's lengthy and solid
opinion and its grant of the injunction here.

On Sept. 15, 2021, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in the
case, but the 2:1 majority opinion is, to put it charitably, a
mess. You can access the Court's ruling here. The opinion was
authored by a visiting Tenth Circuit judge, and the scathing
dissent reflects both that the majority is wrong and that the
analytical framework it creates is simply untenable.

The district court enjoined the entire law on the ground that it
was preempted by the FAA. As the Supreme Court has held, the FAA
will preempt a state law regulating arbitration agreements if (1)
the state law creates a defense to enforcement of the arbitration
agreement that is not generally applicable to any other,
non-arbitration contract or (2) the state law creates an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the FAA.

The Ninth Circuit majority sidestepped the analysis and fabricated
a distinction found nowhere in the FAA or in controlling Supreme
Court authority. Instead of looking to whether the California law
treats arbitration agreements differently from other contracts or
created obstacles to the accomplishment of the FAA's purposes, it
found that the FAA did not apply to contract formation. More
specifically, it found that AB 51 did not create a defense to
enforcement of arbitration agreements that was not generally
applicable to any other, non-arbitration contracts. Instead, it
said, even though AB 51 imposes civil and criminal liability for
requiring an employee to enter into an arbitration agreement as a
condition of employment, it was still lawful because it did not
provide the employee a ground to avoid enforcement of the
arbitration agreement. This is, of course, a fool's trap, as any
such agreement would likely be voided for illegality, but the
majority sees no need to address this point.

As to the second ground for preemption, the majority concluded that
AB 51 did not create an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the FAA, because AB 51 governs "pre-agreement
behavior." By extension, it concluded that FAA preemption somehow
only applies to pre-agreement behavior to the extent that such
behavior provides a basis for invalidating already executed
contracts. As AB 51 does not implicate the enforcement of
arbitration agreements, the majority reasoned, the FAA did not
preempt it.

The dissent did not mince words. Referencing California's past
illegal efforts to limit arbitration in violation of the FAA, its
opinion began:

"Like a classic clown bop bag, no matter how many times California
is smacked down for violating the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
the state bounces back with even more creative methods to sidestep
the FAA."

After going through the history of the California legislature's
prior unsuccessful attempts to regulate arbitration agreements, the
dissent explained the obvious -- that AB 51 does burden the
formation of arbitration agreements, as it "is intentionally
designed to burden and penalize an employer's formation, or
attempted formation, of an arbitration agreement with employees."
Indeed, it was just another misguided attempt by California to
disregard the FAA's strong policy and straightforward
requirements:

"The history of AB 51 reveals it was the culmination of a many-year
effort by the California legislature to prevent employers from
requiring an arbitration provision as a condition of employment.
California has long known that the FAA preempted laws that made
arbitration agreements unenforceable, because the Supreme Court has
so often struck down its anti-arbitration legislation or judge-made
rules."

It pointed out that in addition to being out of step with Supreme
Court precedent, the majority opinion creates a split with the
First and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal. It aptly noted that the
attempt was "too clever by half" and preempted.

There was no dispute among the three judges that the FAA prohibits
the enforcement of civil and criminal penalties, but the dissent
noted that the FAA would only apply to prevent these penalties if
the arbitration agreement were executed. If, on the other hand, the
employee did not sign the arbitration agreement, then the FAA would
not apply to preempt the civil and criminal penalties. So, the
dissent noted, the majority's conclusion created the seemingly
nonsensical result "that if the employer successfully ‘forced'
employees into arbitration against their will, . . . the employer
is safe, but if the employer's efforts fail, the employer is a
criminal."

Implications

The majority's ruling created an uncertain environment for
employers, but there are some procedural steps that must pass
before the ruling takes effect. The dissent called out for this
ruling to be reviewed by others, and there are two options as to
how. The first is by an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit,
consisting of the chief judge and 10 additional judges. The Ninth
Circuit may take a few weeks to a few months to determine whether
to rehear a case en banc. The second option is review by the
Supreme Court. While it is always a long shot to obtain rehearing
en banc or review by the Supreme Court, this case may have a higher
chance than others given the precedent it would set under the FAA
and its general disregard for decades of Supreme Court precedent.

Bottom line: The Ninth Circuit decision is awkward and wrong, but
it leaves employers once again in a bind about whether and how to
exercise their rights under the FAA to require arbitration. Stay
tuned for future opinions in the case. [GN]

[*] Bill Threatens Viability of Class, Collective Action Waivers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth L. Sherwood, Esq., and Christopher M. Pardo, Esq., of
Hunton Andrews Kurth, disclosed that on September 8, 2021, the
House Education and Labor Committee issued proposed legislation in
connection with the House's new spending bill. Among other
pro-union proposals issued in connection with the Protecting the
Right to Organize (PRO) Act, the proposed legislation seeks to
amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by banning class and
collective action waivers.

The proposed legislation, which can be found here, says that no
employer shall "enter into or attempt to enforce" any express or
implied agreement not to "pursue, bring, join, litigate, or support
any joint, class, or collective claim" arising from the employment
relationship. This is unwelcome news to employers who rely on class
and collective action waivers in their arbitration agreements.

Supreme Court Precedent

Given the coercive nature of class and collective action lawsuits
(regardless of their merits), waivers in arbitration agreements are
valuable risk mitigation tools. Waivers are particularly useful in
defending against claims arising under the Federal Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and other federal laws, as some state laws are insulated
against waiver.

On both state and federal levels, class and collective action
waivers are also popular targets for legal challenges. Prior to May
2018, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and many federal
courts -- including the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits -- issued conflicting opinions regarding whether
class and collective action waivers ran afoul of the NLRA. In order
to resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
and consolidated three cases: Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d
1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the NLRA rendered class
and collective action waivers unenforceable in employment
arbitration agreements); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d
975, 983 (9th Cir 2016) (same); and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
808 F.3d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding class and collective
action waivers in employment agreements under the NLRA).

We previously blogged about the consolidated case, Epic Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis, 138 S Ct 1612 (2018)("Epic Systems"), in which the
Supreme Court sided 5-4 with the Fifth Circuit and GC Memorandum
10-06 (written by Ronald Meisburg, Special Counsel at Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP, when he was serving as General Counsel to the
NLRB). In so ruling, the Supreme Court secured the viability of
class and collective action waivers under the as-written text of
the NLRA.

Challenges Following Epic Systems

Following Epic Systems, pro-union advocates wasted little time in
forming renewed challenges to class and collective action waivers.
This time, the focus was on amending the NLRA. Several of our prior
blog posts cover these challenges in depth.

Most notably for purposes of the current spending bill, House
Democrats sought as early as October 2018 to nullify Epic Systems
by making it an unfair labor practice to require employees to sign
mandatory arbitration agreements, whether individual or collective
in nature, through the Restoring Justice for Workers Act.

As we predicted at the time, the 2018 Restoring Justice for Workers
Act did not go into effect, instead dying in session before getting
to the Senate floor. However, with the Senate and the presidency
currently under Democratic control, the proposed NLRA amendments in
the spending bill may stand a better chance at enactment. The same
is true for a new version of the Restoring Justice for Worker's
Act, reintroduced in July.

If the proposed language remains in the spending bill, the budget
reconciliation passes the Senate, and President Biden signs it into
law, it could go into effect as early as January 1, 2022. We will
post relevant updates to this forum as they become available. [GN]

[*] U.K. Allows Consumers to Participate in Class Action Lawsuits
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Epiq, in an article for JDSupra, reports that historically, class
action lawsuits were primarily tied to the U.S. With the exceptions
of Canada, Australia, and a few others, most countries around the
globe did not embrace this legal recovery mechanism as freely and
frequently. Class actions are still most prevalent in the U.S. and
can address a variety of disputes surrounding antitrust violations,
data breaches, products liability, and more. However, globalization
of class action litigation is developing as more countries continue
to authorize these proceedings. The U.K. has recently seen movement
in this area, which could allow for many more consumers to
participate in various class action recoveries.

Before the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) was enacted in October 2015,
the U.K. did not really have an established mechanism for
individuals to file a class action lawsuit (referred to in the U.K.
as "collective" actions). While group litigations allowed for
opt-in mass claims, opt-out claims were not allowed. The adoption
of the CRA now provides a means for opt-out class actions relating
to private enforcement of competition claims. There are a few key
differences between competition class action in the U.S and U.K.,
namely requiring proposed U.K. class representatives to prepare a
plan outlining methods for notifying represented persons of the
progress of the proceedings, and addressing notification before a
claim is fully litigated or settled.

Over the past six years, quite a few competition opt-out collective
actions were filed in the U.K., but no substantial case moved past
the very early procedural stages until this August, when the
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) finally certified Walter Hugh
Merricks CBE v. MasterCard Incorporated and Others [2017] CAT 16.
This has set the stage for more certification proceeding orders to
be issued.

Movement on the MasterCard Case
In 2016, Merricks filed an application with the CAT to obtain a
collective proceedings order for a case against MasterCard. The
collective action would be based on MasterCard previously imposing
multi-lateral interchange fees on card purchases, which the
European Commission already determined was a violation of U.K.
competition law. Approximately 46 million consumers would make up
the class of plaintiffs. The CAT initially refused to grant an
order allowing the collective action to ensue, concluding that
payment of damages would be difficult to calculate and fail to make
plaintiffs whole.

The Supreme Court eventually reversed the dismissal of this action
in December 2020, finding that certification should be allowed when
such claims are better suited as a collective proceeding as opposed
to individual filings, and that the CAT should not review claim
merits at this early stage. Additionally, the Supreme Court held
that damages being difficult to determine is not a valid reason to
deny certification where a proposed class will be able to establish
harm, which is especially true here since the European Commission
already recognized a violation. This decision put the case back in
circulation and established a more concrete test for certifying
collective actions.

On August 18, 2021, the CAT finally accepted the proposed lead
plaintiff and ruled that the collective action valued at £14
billion could proceed. What happens with this case is extremely
significant in the development of U.K. collective action law.
Following the Supreme Court's 2020 ruling, five other collective
proceedings order applications were already heard and awaiting
decisions. Now, the CAT is also expected to commence hearings on
these and other applications that have been in limbo.

Expected Implications
The U.K. has long resisted embracing the class action mechanism
that the U.S. has had for over 50 years - often citing the fear of
creating an overly litigious society. Regardless of the past,
collective proceedings are now authorized for competition claims
and Merricks v. MasterCard has set the stage for certification of
other actions with similar merit. Following this, it is likely that
more large opt-out proceedings will be approved in the coming
years. The significance of the Merricks decision is not only for
courts and legal professionals, but also for consumers and small
businesses who may now have a mechanism to receive compensation.

Practitioners in this space would be wise to monitor new
developments in this area. We have already seen a wave of new
filings and expect more to come once more collective proceedings
orders are issued. While this may be initially overwhelming to the
Tribunal and create a backlog, once things settle and there are
more decisions that are seminal, the process should become more
routine. Since this is a developing area of law in the U.K., it
will take time and guidance to create new standards and provide a
better sense of predictability. As such, it is important to keep
close tabs on how CAT applies the Supreme Court's certification
guidance to future applications as it will give more insight into
what applications are worth filing. Also, watch if any other unique
questions surrounding certification, merit tests, damages, or
notification procedures make it up to higher courts in the future.
While it may take a while to establish new tests and standards
unique to collective actions, the initial hearing process will
likely be expedited now that the first case has made it through the
threshold.

Consumers now have a way to band together when a serious
competition violation is alleged to have occurred -- and consumers
can now potentially be compensated for harm as these cases are
resolved through settlement or trial. Conversely, this also means
that businesses now have more potential liability on the line and
need to make sure their policies and practices are structured to
limit future exposure. Organizations need to proactively anticipate
a competition collective action trend to avoid heavy penalties and
damaged reputation -- all of which will affect overall operations.
Strategic steps to take include monitoring legal updates in this
space, consulting with legal counsel to confirm policies and
practices are lawful, making necessary changes after completing
internal reviews, and creating training programs to promote
compliance with U.K. competition laws. While these safeguards
should already be implemented, now is the time to audit processes
since the threat of large collective actions is more of a reality.
[GN]


                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***