/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/CAR_Public/211014.mbx               C L A S S   A C T I O N   R E P O R T E R

              Thursday, October 14, 2021, Vol. 23, No. 200

                            Headlines

852 EIGHTH: Santos Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
ACCOLADE INC: Robbins Suit Against PlushCare Underway
ALABAMA: Judgment on Pleadings & Dismissal Bids in Culley Suit OK'd
ALLIED HEALTH: Sombert Sues Over Failure to Pay All Hours Worked
AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Escobar Suit Removed to C.D. California

AMPLIFY ENERGY: Newport Surfrider Files Suit in C.D. California
ANCESTRY.COM: Zhang Suit Removed to N.D. California
BIMBA LLC: Holmes Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
CARMAX AUTO: Bendure Suit Removed to C.D. California
CEQUEL COMMUNICATIONS: E.D. California Refuses to Remand Lopez Suit

CON-FAB CALIFORNIA: Ochoa Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
CONAGRA BRANDS: Appellate Court Rejects Settlement in Briseno Suit
CONAGRA BRANDS: Dismissal of Firefighters Pension Suit Appealed
CONAGRA BRANDS: Negrete Settlement Gets Initial Nod
CONTEMPORARY RTW: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York

CORINTHIAN INT'L: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Turner Suit Affirmed
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Agreement Reached in Martinez Class Suit
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Bid to Dismiss Soulek Putative Class Suit Pending
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Bid to Junk Kristy Class Action Pending
COSTCO WHOLESALE: Consolidated Opioid-Related Litigation Underway

COSTCO WHOLESALE: Continues to Defend Rough Class Action
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, NJ: Court OKs Pro Bono Counsel in Barnes v. Jail
DEL-ONE FEDERAL: Miller Files Suit in D. Delaware
DULUTH, MN: Jorgensen Appeals Civil Rights Suit Dismissal
FIRST-CITIZENS BANK: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Pinehurst Suit

GABRIEL BROS: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
GEICO ADVANTAGE: Parker Files Suit in W.D. Washington
GEICO INDEMNITY: Ewing, et al. Seek to Certify Insureds Class
GENERAL MOTORS: Hurry Files Suit in M.D. Alabama
GENERAL MOTORS: Nalley Files Suit in N.D. Georgia

I.D. JEWELRY: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Serota Suit Transferred to S.D. Florida
KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Murray Files Suit in D. Massachusetts
LINKEDIN CORP: Bid to File Second Amended ERISA Complaint Denied
LOYOLA MARYMOUNT: McCarthy Class Suit Dismissed With Prejudice

MCKESSON CORP: Show Cause Order Issued in True Health TCPA Suit
MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Manning Appeals Ruling in Putative Class Suit
OREGON MUTUAL: Hillbro Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
PRESSED JUICERY: New Class Deal in Brooks Suit Has Initial Okay
RITE AID: Settles Store Associates Purported Class Suit for $12MM

RUMPKE TRANSPORTATION: Class of Welders Certified in Gambrell Suit
STATE FARM: Bid to Exclude Zakowicz Report in Shields Suit Denied
SURGALIGN HOLDINGS: Lowrv Settlement Granted Preliminary Approval
TEACHERS INSURANCE: Haley ERISA Suit Loses Summary Judgment Bid
TILRAY INC: Consolidated Braun Suit Ongoing in Delaware

TILRAY INC: Court Dismisses Kasilingam Putative Class Suit
VIEWRAY INC: Plymouth Cty. Retirement Assoc. Appeals Suit Dismissal
VISION SOLAR: Smith Telemarketing Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
WILLIAM SCOVILLE: Ohio App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Uren Suit

                            *********

852 EIGHTH: Santos Sues Over Unpaid Minimum, Overtime Wages
-----------------------------------------------------------
Miguel Maria Santos, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated v. 852 EIGHTH GOTHAM PIZZA, INC. d/b/a GOTHAM PIZZA, 1443
YORK GOTHAM PIZZA, INC. d/b/a GOTHAM PIZZA, MICHAEL SHAMAILOV, LANA
SHAMAILOV, JOSE BALBUENA, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Case No.
1:21-cv-08304 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2021), is brought pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, alleging that
he is entitled to recover from the Defendants: unpaid minimum
wages, unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid "spread of hours"
premium for each day he worked a span of greater than 10 hours,
liquidated and statutory damages, prejudgment and post-judgment
interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

The Plaintiff worked over 40 hours per week. The Plaintiff was not
paid proper minimum wages or overtime compensation. The Defendant
failed to provide the Plaintiff with wage weekly wage statements
setting forth, among other things, the Plaintiff's gross wages,
deductions, and net wages. The Defendants knowingly and willfully
operate their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA
or the New York State minimum wages and overtime rate (of time and
one-half), in direct violation of the FLSA and the New York Labor
Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of
Labor Regulations, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff was hired by the Defendants to work as non-exempt
food preparer/kitchen helper and food delivery worker.

The Defendants owned and operated a pizzeria restaurant, doing
business as Gotham Pizza, located in New York City.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Justin Cilenti, Esq.
          Peter H. Cooper, Esq.
          CILENTI & COOPER, PLLC
          200 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10166
          Phone: (212) 209-3933
          Fax: (212) 209-7102
          Email: info@jcpclaw.com


ACCOLADE INC: Robbins Suit Against PlushCare Underway
-----------------------------------------------------
Accolade, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended August 31, 2021, that the company's
subsidiary PlushCare, Inc., continues to defend a purported class
action suit entitled, Robbins v. PlushCare, Inc. et al.

On May 8, 2021, a purported class action complaint (Robbins v.
PlushCare, Inc. et al.) was filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California against the Company's
wholly owned subsidiary, PlushCare, Inc.

The complaint alleges that certain of PlushCare's subscription
payment practices violate the California Automatic Renewal Law and
the Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, among other claims,
arising from allegations that PlushCare failed to provide adequate
disclosures to members.

The lawsuit seeks restitution of subscription fees, statutory
damages for each violation, subject to trebling, reasonable
attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief.

Under the terms of the agreement to purchase PlushCare, the selling
shareholders will indemnify Accolade for losses related to this
matter, subject to a cap.

Accolade said, "As a loss is probable and can be reasonably
estimated, the Company has recorded a contingent liability and
corresponding indemnification asset at August 31, 2021."

Accolade, Inc. provide personalized, technology-enabled solutions
that help people better understand, navigate, and utilize the
healthcare system and their workplace benefits. The company is
based in Seattle, Washington.


ALABAMA: Judgment on Pleadings & Dismissal Bids in Culley Suit OK'd
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, HALIMA TARIFFA CULLEY, Plaintiff v. STEVE MARSHALL, in
his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Alabama,
et al., Defendants, Civ. Act. No. 1:19-cv-701-TFM-MU (S.D. Ala.),
Judge Terry F. Moorer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama, Southern Division, grants:

    (i) State Defendants Attorney General Steve Marshall and
        District Attorney Ashley Rich's Motion for Judgment on
        the Pleadings; and

   (ii) the City's Motion to Dismiss.

Background

Plaintiff Culley filed a purported class action complaint against
three Defendants: (1) Steve Marshall, in his official capacity as
the Attorney General of the State of Alabama ("AG Marshall") (2)
Defendant Ashley Rich, in her official capacity as the District
Attorney for the 13th Judicial Circuit of Alabama - Mobile County
("DA Rich"), and (3) and the City of Satsuma, Alabama.

The Plaintiff asserts a proposed class of "All persons who have had
their property seized by the City of Satsuma, Alabama, have not
been charged with a crime, and have had a civil forfeiture action
filed against them from four years prior to the filing of this
action, to present."

She asserts in Count 1 a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 against the State Defendants for violations of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The gist of the argument is that the State has a
policy and practice of seizing property indefinitely and having the
City hold it while the civil forfeiture action proceeds. As a
result, there is no meaningful opportunity to contest the retention
of the property at a meaningful time before the hearing on the
merits of the forfeiture.

In Count 2, the Plaintiff asserts a claim brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. Section 1983 against the State Defendants for violations of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines.

In Count 3, she asserts against the City a conspiracy claim brought
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and seeks damages. She states there
was an agreement between the City and the State Defendants to
violate the Plaintiff's constitutional rights by seizing the
Vehicle and instituting civil forfeiture proceedings.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (federal question) and
Section 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction) as the Plaintiff brings
claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The parties do not contest
personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations
to support both.

Now pending before the Court are the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings of Attorney General Steve Marshall and District Attorney
Ashley Rich and the Motion to Dismiss. The Plaintiff timely filed
its responses in opposition. The Defendants timely replied.

Discussion

The City filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), while the State filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

A. Younger Abstention doctrine

The State and the City both assert that the Court should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims pursuant
to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669
(1971), and its progeny. The Younger doctrine is "an extraordinary
and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate
a controversy properly before it." While Younger involved state
criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court subsequently determined
that the abstention is "fully applicable to noncriminal judicial
proceedings when important state interests are involved."

When abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under Younger,
"federal courts promote the value of comity between the states and
the federal government and avoid unnecessary determinations of
federal constitutional questions." Further, as noted by the
Eleventh Circuit, the state court proceeding is considered
"ongoing" if it was pending at the time the plaintiff filed the
federal complaint.

Based on this framework, Judge Moorer turns to whether the Younger
doctrine applies to the case at hand by applying the three factors.
Based on the filing date of the case, he finds that the state civil
forfeiture action was in progress, thus there was an ongoing state
court proceeding for the purposes of this analysis. The fact that
the case has resolved does not change that particular detail.

However, Judge Moorer holds that the binding precedent clearly
notes that the ongoing nature of a state proceeding is not enough
to merit abstaining if the federal case will not interfere with the
proceeding. In this case, there is no possibility of interference
because the underlying state civil forfeiture proceeding has ended
with judgment in the Plaintiff's favor. Thus, even if Culley were
to prevail and the Court were to issue her requested declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages, it would have
zero effect on the original state action. For these reasons, Judge
Moorer declines to abstain under Younger and both motions are
denied on that basis.

B. Preclusion

The State Defendants assert two separate arguments on preclusion.
To start, between the original motion and the supplemental motion,
the State asserts both claim and issue preclusion. The State
Defendants assert the issue of collateral estoppel through the
Sutton I federal case and also preclusion through the now-final
judgment in the underlying civil forfeiture proceeding. Thus, the
Court is looking at preclusion through both a federal case and a
state case. The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is
determined by federal common law." When determining the preclusive
effective of an Alabama state court judgment, the Court must apply
Alabama law. Therefore, when determining the preclusive effect of
Sutton v. Marshall, 4:19-cv-660-KOB (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2019)
("Sutton I"), the Court looks to federal law and for the underlying
civil forfeiture judgment the Court looks to state law.

First, Judge Moorer opines that the State does nothing to address
the prevailing Defendant discussion in its supplemental briefing
and therefore failed to carry its burden of establishing it is
entitled to the affirmative defense of claim preclusion under
Alabama law. Next, the Judge holds that the State makes a passing
reference to the "first filed rule" in its original motion,
however, the only context is in the discussion of collateral
estoppel.

C. Class Claims

In the supplemental briefing, the State also asserts that because
the Plaintiff's claims are moot, there can be no surviving class
claims. The Plaintiff argues that the class claims would still
proceed because they are inherently transitory. The State argues
that the claims are not inherently transitory and instead are
moot.

Judge Moorer declines to extend any further discussion given the
Court's rejection of the collateral estoppel argument. He opines
that the Defendants have essentially waived the right to bind
putative class members. Therefore, it is prudent to resolve the
motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss prior to
addressing any class matters.

D. Violation of Right to a Post Deprivation Hearing (Count I
against the State)

Count I is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and asserts
three separate constitutional violations under the Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. Culley states repeatedly throughout her
complaint and briefs that the case is not about the initial seizure
or even the ultimate decision at trial in civil forfeiture
proceedings. Rather that the State in conjunction with the City
seizes vehicles and other property and retains custody of it during
the civil forfeiture action. Specifically, there is not a prompt
post-seizure hearing on the Vehicle. Culley seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief against the State.

Judge Moorer opines that an arbitrary 'double value' bond amount
gives no due process as to the proper amount of the bond." Beyond
those statements, the Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the
statute by arguing that the payment of a bond is unconstitutional.
Rather, she focuses on the lack of a prompt post-seizure probable
cause hearing and does a limited argument stating, "the posting of
a bond for double the amount of the value of the vehicle is, by
definition excessive."

1) Fourth Amendment

Turning to Culley's Fourth Amendment claim in Count I, she alleges
a "policy and practice" of failing to provide a prompt post-seizure
probable cause hearing.

Judge Moorer holds finds that the Plaintiff does not contest the
initial seizure incident to arrest. Rather, she only challenges the
retention of the vehicle during the pendency of the forfeiture
proceedings. This falls outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
"A complaint of continued retention of legally seized property
raises an issue of procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Therefore, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is
due to be granted as to the Fourth Amendment Claim.

2) Fifth Amendment

To start, the Plaintiff essentially concedes in a footnote that the
Fifth Amendment claims cannot stand. Judge Moorer agrees that
because the claims are against the State and not the federal
government, the Fifth Amendment does not apply. However, he also
agrees that the due process clauses of both are generally reviewed
in a similar/same manner. Therefore, to the extent the Plaintiff
originally asserted Fifth Amendment claims, they necessarily fail,
but instead are reviewed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3) Fourteenth Amendment

Culley asserts that the lack of a prompt post-seizure probable
cause hearing violates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause.

While Judge Moorer agrees that a vehicle owner has a significant
interest in regaining the vehicle, in the case at hand, he finds
that is insufficient to maintain the claim. The Judge opines that
due process is flexible and calls only for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands. Further, the
Supreme Court recognized that "implicit" in its "discussion of
timeliness in $8,850 was the view that the forfeiture proceeding,
without more, provides the postseizure hearing required by due
process to protect claimant's property interest in the car."
Moreover, the Court has not found a Supreme Court case or an
Eleventh Circuit case that requires an additional post-seizure,
pre-forfeiture judicial hearing. Even when analyzing the Alabama
process under the Plaintiff's own requested analysis, the claims
still fail and merit dismissal.

E. Excessive Fine under Eighth Amendment (Count II against the
State)

Count II is also brought pursuant to Section 1983 and asserts
violation of the Eighth Amendment saying that Culley, who was not
charged with a crime, had her Vehicle retained without due process,
has been fined by the State because the property was seized, and
even if she gets it back through the civil forfeiture process was
deprived of the property in the meantime. The Plaintiff claims this
forfeiture, even if brief, is excessive under the Eighth Amendment
and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

Judge Moorer must decide whether the retention of the Vehicle
during the pendency of the civil forfeiture proceedings constitutes
an "excessive fine" under the Eighth Amendment. He concludes that
when the Plaintiff filed her complaint, the Eighth Amendment claim
was not ripe. Furthermore, the claim is now also moot since the
forfeiture action results were in her favor and never resulted in
the imposition of a forfeiture. Therefore, he says, Culley's Eighth
Amendment excessive fines claim fails and the motion for judgment
on the pleadings is granted on this basis.

F. Conspiracy (Count III against the City)

In Count III, Culley asserts a claim for conspiracy under Section
1983 against the City alleging that there is an agreement between
the City and the State to violate her constitutional rights. Culley
specifically states there is an agreement that the City seizes a
vehicle incident to arrest, contacts the State Defendants who, in
turn, institute a civil forfeiture action. As a result, the City
keeps the seized vehicle and refuses to return it while the civil
forfeiture action proceeds.

As he has already determined there was no constitutional violation
established by the Plaintiff's claims, Judge Moorer holds that her
conspiracy claims also fails and must be dismissed.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
and the Motion to Dismiss are ultimately granted. As such, the
Plaintiff's individual claims are dismissed with prejudice and the
class claims are dismissed with prejudice as to refiling by the
Plaintiff, but dismissed without prejudice as to any other
potential Plaintiffs.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/tzdy28bp from
Leagle.com.


ALLIED HEALTH: Sombert Sues Over Failure to Pay All Hours Worked
----------------------------------------------------------------
Yuribel Sombert, for herself and others similarly situated v.
ALLIED HEALTH ORGANIZATION INC, Case No. 1:21-cv-23562-XXXX (S.D.
Fla., Oct. 8, 2021), is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
against the Defendant for failure to pay the Plaintiff for all of
the hours he worked.

The complaint alleges that the Defendant failed and refused to pay
the Plaintiff for the hours that she worked from August 23, 2021 to
September 19, 2021. The federal minimum wage was set at $7.25 per
hour at all times material to this action. The Defendant's failure
to pay Plaintiff for all of the hours he worked from August 23,
2021 to September 19, 2021 violated the FLSA by failing to ensure
that Plaintiff received at least a minimum wage for the work she
performed during those days, says the complaint.

The Plaintiff worked for Defendant from August 7, 2021 to September
20, 2021.

Allied Health Organization Inc., is a Florida for-profit limited
liability corporation that has at all times material conducted its
health care and COVID-19 testing business in Florida.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brian H. Pollock, Esq.
          FAIRLAW FIRM
          135 San Lorenzo Avenue, Suite 770
          Coral Gables, FL 33146
          Phone: 305.230.4884
          Email: brian@fairlawattorney.com


AMAZON.COM SERVICES: Escobar Suit Removed to C.D. California
------------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Dallan Escobar, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated v. Amazon.com Services LLC (erroneously sued as
Amazon.com, LLC), Amazon Logistics, Inc., Case No. CIVSB2123066 was
removed from the California Superior Court, San Bernardino County
to the United States District Court for the Central District of
California on Oct. 8, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 2:21-cv-08026 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Jobs Civil Rights for Other
Contract.

Amazon Services LLC -- https://www.amazon.com/ -- offers many of
the Web service platforms that are Amazon offer.[BN]

The Plaintiff appears pro se.


AMPLIFY ENERGY: Newport Surfrider Files Suit in C.D. California
---------------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Amplify Energy
Corporation, et al. The case is styled as Newport Surfrider, LLC,
on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated v. Amplify
Energy Corporation, a Delaware corporation; Beta Operating Company
LLC dba Beta Offshore, a Delaware LLC; San Pedro Bay Pipeline
Company, a California corporation; Case No. 8:21-cv-01686 (C.D.
Cal., Oct. 11, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Torts to Land.

Amplify Energy Corp --
https://www.amplifyenergy.com/home/default.aspx -- is an oil
company based in Houston, Texas.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Francis A. Bottini, Esq.
          BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.
          7817 Ivanhoe Avenue, Suite 102
          La Jolla, CA 92037
          Phone: (858) 914-2001
          Fax: (858) 914-2002
          Email: fbottini@bottinilaw.com


ANCESTRY.COM: Zhang Suit Removed to N.D. California
---------------------------------------------------
Alice Zhang and Wayne Tseng, individually and on behalf of a class
of similarly situated persons v. ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS INC., a
Virginia Corporation, Case No. HG21108450 was removed from the
Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California on
Sept. 29, 2021, and assigned Case No. 4:21-cv-07652-JST.

Ancestry operates the largest subscription collection of genealogy
databases, which encompass more than 27 billion historical records,
including school yearbooks. Although much of that data is freely
available, even more of it can be accessed by susbcribing members.
The Plaintiffs take issue with Ancestry providing free previews and
paid access to publicly-available school yearbook information and
filed a class action complaint against Ancestry that asserts five
causes of action: violations of California's Right of Publicity
statute, common law misappropriation of likeness, common law
intrusion upon seclusion, unjust enrichment law, and Unfair
Competition Law. The Plaintiffs seek to certify a statewide class
of non-Ancestry.com users “whose names, photographs, and/or
likenesses” appear on Ancestry’s website.  On behalf of
themselves and the purported class, the Plaintiffs seek:
declaratory and injunctive relief; nominal, statutory,
compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages; restitution and
disgorgement; and attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest.[BN]

The Defendant is represented by:

          Shon Morgan, Esq.
          John W. Baumann, Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
          865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
          Los Angeles, CA 90017
          Phone: (213) 443-3000
          Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
          Email: shonmorgan@quinnemanuel.com
                 jackbaumann@quinnemanuel.com

               - and -

          Cristina Henriquez, Esq.
          QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
          555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor
          Redwood Shores, CA 94065
          Phone: (650) 801-5000
          Facsimile: (650) 801-5000
          Email: cristinahenriquez@quinnemanuel.com


BIMBA LLC: Holmes Suit Removed to N.D. Illinois
-----------------------------------------------
The case styled as Sylvia Holmes, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated v. Bimba, LLC, Case No. 2021L 000638 was
removed from the Circuit Court of Will County, to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Sept. 29,
2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 1:21-cv-05154 to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract for Contract
Dispute.

Bimba -- https://www.bimba.com/ -- manufactures flow control
equipment. The Company offers pneumatic, hydraulic, and electric
actuators, as well as provides air preparation and motion control
products.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Brandon Michael Wise
          Paul A. Lesko
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC
          818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2
          St. Louis, MO 63104
          Phone: (314) 833-4825
          Email: bwise@pwcklegal.com
                 plesko@peifferwolf.com

               - and -

          Adam John Florek
          PEIFFER WOLF CARR KANE & CONWAY, APLC
          73 West Monroe Street, 5th Floor
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: (973) 476-5650
          Email: aflorek@peifferwolf.com

The Defendant is represented by:

          Amy Yongmee Cho
          Yara Khaled Rashad
          SHOOK, HARDY & BACON LLP
          111 S. Wacker Dr.
          Chicago, IL 60606
          Phone: (312) 704-7700
          Email: docket@shb.com
                 yrashad@shb.com


CARMAX AUTO: Bendure Suit Removed to C.D. California
----------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Daniel Bendure, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated v. CarMax Auto Superstores California, a
Virginia corporation, CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, Does 1-10,
inclusive, Case No. CIVSB2120078 was removed from the County of San
Bernardino Superior Court to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California on Oct. 7, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 5:21-cv-01707-JGB-SHK to
the proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Other Labor.

CarMax -- https://www.carmax.com/stores/ca -- offers low, no-haggle
prices and a great selection of vehicles.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Erica T. Khaine, Esq.
          James R. Hawkins, Esq.
          Samantha A Smith, Esq.
          JAMES HAWKINS APLC
          9880 Research Drive Suite 200
          Irvine, CA 92618
          Phone: (949) 387-7200
          Fax: (949) 387-6676
          Email: erica@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 james@jameshawkinsaplc.com
                 samantha@jameshawkinsaplc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Gina M. Tetorakis, Esq.
          Jack S. Sholkoff, Esq.
          Jennifer Lindsay Katz, Esq.
          OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART PC
          400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200
          Los Angeles, CA 90071
          Phone: (213) 239-9800
          Fax: (213) 239-9045
          Email: jack.sholkoff@ogletree.com
                 gina.tetorakis@ogletree.com
                 jennifer.katz@ogletree.com


CEQUEL COMMUNICATIONS: E.D. California Refuses to Remand Lopez Suit
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMIE LOPEZ, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. CEQUEL COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, d/b/a
SUDDENLINK COMMUNICATIONS; and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants,
Case No. 2:20-cv-02242-TLN-JDP (E.D. Cal.), Judge Tory L. Nunley of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

The Defendant is an internet service provider for consumers, such
as the Plaintiff, in Placer, El Dorado, and Nevada Counties in
California. The Plaintiff alleges that although the Defendant
"promises reliable broadband internet services with download speeds
up to 100 to 940 megabits per second, customers experience frequent
and prolonged internet service outages and near constant sluggish
internet speeds," which prevent customers from using the internet.
The Plaintiff further alleges the Defendant "continues to charge
customers regardless of whether there are prolonged unreasonably
slow download speeds and outages."

The Plaintiff filed the putative class action in Nevada County
Superior Court on Sept. 28, 2020, alleging claims for violation of
California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), violation of
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), and breach of
contract. The Plaintiff seeks various remedies, including damages,
restitution, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.

On Nov. 9, 2020, the Defendant removed the action to the Court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). The Plaintiff
filed the instant motion to remand on Dec. 9, 2020.

The Plaintiff argues the Court lacks jurisdiction over his UCL and
CLRA claims (which only seek equitable relief) and should remand
the entire case -- or at least those two claims -- because he has
not pleaded an inadequate remedy at law. The Plaintiff relies on
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.,
971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020).

In Sonner, the plaintiff brought claims for "injunctive relief
under the UCL and CLRA, restitution under the UCL and CLRA, and
damages under an Illinois consumer protection statute." The
plaintiff later dropped her sole damages claim and sought the same
amount as restitution claims, presumably to pursue a bench trial
and avoid having to persuade a jury to award the amount in damages.
The district court subsequently dismissed the restitution claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), stating that
California law required the plaintiff "to establish that she lacked
an adequate legal remedy for the same past harm for which she
sought equitable restitution" and she failed to do so. The
plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her restitution claims.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued California abrogated the
inadequate-remedy-at-law requirement for claims seeking equitable
restitution. The defendant in opposition argued the court should
apply federal common law, not California law. Put simply, the
Sonner court faced a choice of law question: whether to apply
federal equitable principles that would preclude the plaintiff's
equitable restitution claims or California law that would allow the
plaintiff's equitable restitution claims.

The Sonner court ultimately held that "the traditional principles
governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the
requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests
restitution under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action."
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded "the district court did
not err in dismissing the plaintiff's claims for equitable
restitution under the UCL and CLRA."

Judge Nunley holds that although the Sonner court vaguely framed
its discussion as involving a "threshold jurisdictional question,"
it never explicitly held that failure to allege an inadequate legal
remedy deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims
for equitable relief. He finds at least one district court
expressly decided Sonner does not preclude courts from exercising
jurisdiction over such claims -- Naseri v. Greenfield World Trade,
Inc., No. SACV2101084CJCKESX, 2021 WL 3511040, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2021) (denying a motion to remand brought pursuant to
Sonner). He agrees with the well-reasoned decision in Naseri.

At its core, Sonner's holding addresses choice of law, not
jurisdiction. Moreover, since Sonner, district courts in the Ninth
Circuit have repeatedly dismissed claims for equitable relief under
Rule 12(b)(6), not based on a lack of jurisdiction. In fact, the
Sonner court dismissed plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

Because the Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that Sonner
requires remand of his claims, Judge Nunley denies the Plaintiff's
motion to remand.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/urcbmx75 from Leagle.com.


CON-FAB CALIFORNIA: Ochoa Files Suit in Cal. Super. Ct.
-------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Con-Fab California,
LLC, et al. The case is styled as Paul Ochoa, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated v. Con-Fab California, LLC,
a limited liability company, Con-Fab California Corporation, a
California corporation, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2021-0009389 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Joaquin Cty., Oct. 7, 2021).

The case type is stated as "Unlimited Civil Other Employment."

Con-Fab California, LLC -- https://confabca.com/ -- is a
manufacturer of structural precast, prestressed concrete located in
Lathrop, California.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kane Moon, Esq.
          MOON & YANG, APC
          1055 W 7th St Ste 1880
          Los Angeles, CA 90017-2529
          Phone: (213) 232-3128
          Fax: (213) 232-3125
          Email: kane.moon@moonyanglaw.com


CONAGRA BRANDS: Appellate Court Rejects Settlement in Briseno Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended August 29, 2021, that the appellate court
rejected the settlement in Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The company is a party to a number of putative class action
lawsuits challenging various product claims made in the Company's
product labeling.

These matters include Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. in which it is
alleged that the labeling for Wesson(R) oils as 100% natural is
false and misleading because the oils contain genetically modified
plants and organisms.

In February 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California granted class certification to permit plaintiffs to
pursue state law claims. The Company appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed class
certification in January 2017.

The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the
decision and the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. On April 4, 2019, the trial court granted preliminary
approval of a settlement in this matter.

In the second quarter of fiscal 2020, a single objecting class
member appealed the court's decision approving the settlement to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

On June 1, 2021, the appellate court rejected the settlement and
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Conagra said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the results
of this or any other legal proceeding challenging our product
claims, we do not expect these matters to have a material adverse
effect on our financial condition, results of operations, or
business."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra
Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: Dismissal of Firefighters Pension Suit Appealed
---------------------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended August 29, 2021, that the appeal in West
Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Conagra Brands, Inc., et
al., is pending.

The Company, its directors, and several of its executive officers
are defendants in several class actions alleging violations of
federal securities laws.

The lawsuits assert that the Company's officers made material
misstatements and omissions that caused the market to have an
unrealistically positive assessment of the Company's financial
prospects in light of the acquisition of Pinnacle, thus causing the
Company's securities to be overvalued prior to the release of the
Company's consolidated financial results on December 20, 2018 for
the second quarter of fiscal year 2019.

The first of these lawsuits, captioned West Palm Beach
Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Conagra Brands, Inc., et al., with
which subsequent lawsuits alleging similar facts have been
consolidated, was filed on February 22, 2019 in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

That consolidated lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice on December
23, 2020 for failure to state a claim.

On January 22, 2021, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the
trial court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.

In addition, on May 9, 2019, a stockholder filed a derivative
action on behalf of the Company against the Company's directors
captioned Klein v. Arora, et al. in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois asserting harm to the Company due to
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and mismanagement in connection
with the Pinnacle acquisition.

On July 9, 2019, September 20, 2019, and March 10, 2020, the
Company received three separate demands from stockholders under
Delaware law to inspect the Company's books and records related to
the Board of Directors' review of the Pinnacle business,
acquisition, and the Company's public statements related to them.

On July 22, 2019 and August 6, 2019, respectively, two additional
stockholder derivative lawsuits captioned Opperman v. Connolly, et
al. and Dahl v. Connolly, et al. were filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois asserting similar facts
and claims as the Klein v. Arora, et al. matter.

On October 21, 2019, the Company received an additional demand from
a stockholder under Delaware law to appoint a special committee to
investigate the conduct of certain officers and directors in
connection with the Pinnacle acquisition and the Company's public
statements.

All remaining stockholder lawsuits and demands are currently stayed
by agreement pending the final outcome of the West Palm Beach
Firefighters' Pension Fund matter.

The Company's insurance carriers are on notice of each of these
securities and stockholder matters.

Conagra said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the results
of these or any other legal proceedings, we do not expect these
matters to have a material adverse effect on our financial
condition, results of operations, or business."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra
Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.


CONAGRA BRANDS: Negrete Settlement Gets Initial Nod
---------------------------------------------------
Conagra Brands, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended August 29, 2021, that the court granted
preliminary approval of the settlement in Negrete v. ConAgra Foods,
Inc.

The company is a party to matters challenging the Company's wage
and hour practices.

These matters include a number of class actions consolidated under
the caption Negrete v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., et al., pending in the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, in
which the plaintiffs allege a pattern of violations of California
and/or federal law at several current and former Company
manufacturing facilities across the State of California.

On June 21, 2021, the trial court granted preliminary approval of a
settlement in this matter.

If final approval is obtained, the settlement will require a
payment by the Company of $9.0 million, which we have accrued
within other accrued liabilities.

Conagra said, "While we cannot predict with certainty the results
of this or any other legal proceeding, we do not expect this matter
to have a material adverse effect on our financial condition,
results of operations, or business."

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Conagra Brands, Inc., together with its subsidiaries, operates as a
food company in North America. The company operates through Grocery
& Snacks, Refrigerated & Frozen, International, and Foodservice
segments. The company was formerly known as ConAgra Foods, Inc. and
changed its name to Conagra Brands, Inc. in November 2016. Conagra
Brands, Inc. was founded in 1919 and is headquartered in Chicago,
Illinois.


CONTEMPORARY RTW: Crumwell Files ADA Suit in S.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Contemporary RTW Co.,
LLC. The case is styled as Denise Crumwell, on behalf of herself
and all other persons similarly situated v. Contemporary RTW Co.,
LLC, Case No. 1:21-cv-08306 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Contemporary Rtw Co., which also operates under the name Khaite --
https://khaite.com/ -- is a New York-based contemporary womenswear
brand.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Michael A. LaBollita, Esq.
          GOTTLIEB & ASSOCIATES
          150 E. 18 St., Suite PHR
          New York, NY 10003
          Phone: (212) 228-9795
          Email: michael@gottlieb.legal


CORINTHIAN INT'L: Denial of Arbitration Bid in Turner Suit Affirmed
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL WAGE AND HOUR CASES ADRIAN
TURNER, Plaintiff and Respondent v. CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL
PARKING SERVICES INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants, Case No.
G060405 (Cal. App.), the Court of Appeals of California for the
Fourth District, Division Three, affirms the trial court's denial
of the Defendant's motion to compel arbitration of coordinated
wage-and-hour claims brought by its employees.

Background

Plaintiff Turner is a former employee of the Defendant. The
Plaintiff sued the Defendant as the named plaintiff in a putative
class action alleging various Labor Code violations in 2015. In
2016, the Defendant offered its employees, on a voluntary basis, an
arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver. Some of its
employees evidently signed the agreement, while some did not. After
2016, the Defendant required all new employees to sign an
arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver.

In 2019, after extensive litigation, including removal to federal
court, remand back to state court, and various discovery motions,
the Plaintiff moved for class certification. In opposing the
motion, the Defendant asserted the existence of arbitration
agreements with class action waivers. However, it offered no
evidence of the arbitration agreements, and the trial court
certified the class.

Shortly after the certification order was issued, the Defendant
moved to compel arbitration and enforce the class action waivers.
The Defendant included with its motion the declaration of its
owner, authenticating unsigned examples of the arbitration
agreements. The declaration also stated that "many" of the
Defendant's employees had signed the agreements. The Defendant's
motion did not identify either any class member who had signed an
arbitration agreement, or the number of employees who had signed.
It did not propose the terms on which a subclass of employees
subject to the agreement could be defined.

The arbitration agreement offered to the Defendant's then-current
employees in 2016 required submission of "any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to the employee's employment
relationship with the Defendant or the termination of that
relationship," to arbitration. The agreement also contained a class
action waiver. It required of the Defendant's new hires was
substantively identical.

The trial court denied the Defendant's motion. It concluded the
motion was defective because it was directed at only part of the
class and not at any identifiable subclass or class member: "The
Court cannot grant a motion to compel arbitration where not all
class members are parties to a purported arbitration agreement. As
there is no subclass of employees who signed the Agreements to
which the motion can be directed, the motion cannot be granted as
filed." The trial court also found the agreement unconscionable
because it was a contract of adhesion, and was unilateral—only
requiring arbitration of the employees' claims against the
Defendant. The Defendant timely appealed.

Discussion

The Defendant argues the arbitration agreements are not
unconscionable because they have only a low degree of procedural
unconscionability, and because the trial court's finding of
substantive unconscionability was predicated on a misinterpretation
of the agreements. The Defendant also contends the trial court
could and should have granted its motion to compel arbitration and
amended the definition of the Plaintiff class to exclude employees
who had signed the agreements, remedying the problem created by the
fact that the motion only targeted an unidentified group of class
members.

The Plaintiff, as he did in the trial court, asserts the agreements
are unconscionable and that Defendant failed to show an agreement
to arbitrate with any class member. He also contends the Court of
Appeals should find in the first instance that the Defendant waived
its right to arbitrate and failed to comply with a condition
precedent for arbitration.

1. Unconscionability

The Court of Appeals opines that the United States Supreme Court
precedent applying the Federal Arbitration Act requires it to
resolve ambiguities in an arbitration agreement in favor of
arbitrability, citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 626). This rule,it
says, controls over the rule of interpretation against the drafter,
and regardless of potentially conflicting California law. As
applied to the agreements in the case, resolving the ambiguity in
favor of arbitrability means treating the list of covered claims as
non-exclusive examples and relying instead on the broad initial
definition of covered claims, which would include the Defendant's
claims against employees. That interpretation makes the agreements
bilateral and not unconscionable.

2. Application to the Entire Class

The trial court denied the Defendant's motion in part because the
motion failed to address all class members or an identifiable
subclass. The Plaintiff also argues the Court of Appeals should
affirm because the Defendant failed to prove the existence of an
arbitration agreement between the Defendant and any particular
class member.

The Court of Appeals opines that the Defendant's motion failed to
identify the person or persons with whom it claimed to have agreed
to arbitrate, and thus failed to prove the existence of any
particular agreement to arbitrate. Without knowing who or what it
was compelling to arbitration, the trial court had little choice
but to deny the motion. Further, the Defendant's motion is not
specific to the class action context. The Court of Appeals also
finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to modify
the class. Finally, the Defendant had the ability to identify the
class members who had signed the arbitration agreements, and
provide evidence of their assent, but failed to do so.

3. Waiver

In addition to the issues discussed, the Plaintiff suggests the
Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's ruling by finding,
in the first instance on appeal, that the Defendant waived its
right to arbitrate by proceeding in court for years without
asserting its right to arbitration in its answer.

The Court of Appeals finds that the trial court made no finding as
to waiver, having not reached the issue based on its other
findings. When the trial court expressly declines to find waiver,
the Court of Appeals may not infer a finding of waiver on appeal,
citing Wagner Construction Co. v. Pacific Mechanical Corp. (2007)
41 Cal.4th 19, 31. Instead, it leaves it to the trial court to make
the initial factual determination on this question, should the
Defendant file a renewed motion to compel arbitration.

Disposition

The Court of Appeals concludes the trial court erred in finding the
agreements unconscionable. However, it affirms because the
Defendant failed to establish the existence of an arbitration
agreement as to any particular class member or identifiable group
of class members. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirms the
order. The Plaintiff will recover costs on appeal.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/3j5wew6f from Leagle.com.

Berliner Cohen, Susan E. Bishop -- thomas.murphy@berliner.com --
and Thomas P. Murphy -- thomas.murphy@berliner.com -- for the
Defendant and Appellant.

Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky, Carolyn H. Cottrell --
ccottrell@schneiderwallace.com -- David C. Leimbach --
dleimbach@schneiderwallace.com -- Sean L. Litteral --
slitteral@bursor.com; Lawyers for Justice and Edwin Aiwazian for
the Plaintiff and Respondent.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Agreement Reached in Martinez Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 6,
2021, for the fiscal year ended August 29, 2021, that the parties
in Martinez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., reached an agreement
settling for an immaterial amount the remaining claim.

In June 2019, an employee filed a class action against the Company
alleging claims under California law for failure to pay overtime,
to provide meal and rest periods, itemized wage statements, to
timely pay wages due to terminating employees, to pay minimum
wages, and for unfair business practices.

Martinez v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No. 3:19-cv-05624-EMC;
N.D. Cal.).

The Company filed an answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint.

In June 2021, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss his claims for
failure to provide meal and rest breaks and to pay minimum wages.

In July 2021, the parties reached an agreement settling for an
immaterial amount the remaining claim and related derivative
claims.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Bid to Dismiss Soulek Putative Class Suit Pending
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 6,
2021, for the fiscal year ended August 29, 2021, that  the motion
to dismiss the putative class action suit entitled, Dustin S.
Soulek v. Costco Wholesale, et al., Case No. 20-cv-937, is
pending.

On June 23, 2020, a putative class action was filed against the
Company, the "Board of Directors," the "Costco Benefits Committee"
and others under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.

Dustin S. Soulek v. Costco Wholesale, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-937.


The class is alleged to be beneficiaries of the Costco 401(k) plan
from June 23, 2014, and the claims are that the defendants breached
their fiduciary duties in the operation and oversight of the plan.

The complaint seeks injunctive relief, damages, interest, costs,
and attorneys' fees.

On September 11, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, and on September 21 the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint, which the defendants have also moved to dismiss.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Bid to Junk Kristy Class Action Pending
---------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 6,
2021, for the fiscal year ended August 29, 2021, that the request
for dismissal filed in Kristy v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No.
5:20-cv-04119; N.D. Cal.)., is pending.

In April 2020, an employee, alleging underpayment of sick pay,
filed a class and representative action against the Company,
alleging claims under California law for failure to pay all wages
at termination and for Labor Code penalties under PAGA.

Kristy v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No. 5:20-cv-04119; N.D.
Cal.).

The case was stayed due to the plaintiff's bankruptcy, and his
individual claim was settled for an immaterial amount.

A request for dismissal of the class and representative action is
pending.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Consolidated Opioid-Related Litigation Underway
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 6,
2021, for the fiscal year ended August 29, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a consolidated class action suit entitled, In
re National Prescription Opiate Litigation (MDL No. 2804) (N.D.
Ohio).

Beginning in December 2017, the United States Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has consolidated numerous cases concerning
the impacts of opioid abuses filed against various defendants by
counties, cities, hospitals, Native American tribes, third-party
payors, and others.

In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation (MDL No. 2804) (N.D.
Ohio).

Included are cases that name the Company, including actions filed
by counties and cities in Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia
and South Carolina, a third-party payor in Ohio, and a hospital in
Texas, class actions filed on behalf of infants born with
opioid-related medical conditions in 40 states, and class actions
and individual actions filed on behalf of individuals seeking to
recover alleged increased insurance costs associated with opioid
abuse in 43 states and American Samoa.

Claims against the Company in state courts in New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Arizona have been dismissed.

The Company is defending all of the pending matters.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


COSTCO WHOLESALE: Continues to Defend Rough Class Action
--------------------------------------------------------
Costco Wholesale Corporation said in its Form 10-K report filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 6,
2021, for the fiscal year ended August 29, 2021, that the company
continues to defend a class action suit entitled, Rough v. Costco
Wholesale Corp.

In May 2019, an employee filed a class action against the Company
alleging claims under California law for failure to pay overtime,
to provide itemized wage statements, to timely pay wages due to
terminating employees, to pay minimum wages, and for unfair
business practices.

Rough v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No. 2:19-cv-01340; E.D.
Cal.).

Relief is sought under the California Labor Code, including civil
penalties and attorneys' fees.

The Company has moved for partial summary judgement, and the
parties have filed competing motions regarding class certification.


In August 2019, the plaintiff filed a companion case in state court
seeking penalties under the  Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).


Rough v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (Case No. FCS053454; Sonoma County
Superior Court).

Relief is sought under the California Labor Code, including civil
penalties and attorneys' fees.

The state court action has been stayed pending resolution of the
federal action.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Costco Wholesale Corporation, together with its subsidiaries,
operates membership warehouses. It offers branded and private-label
products in a range of merchandise categories. The company was
formerly known as Costco Companies, Inc. Costco Wholesale
Corporation was founded in 1976 and is based in Issaquah,
Washington.


CUMBERLAND COUNTY, NJ: Court OKs Pro Bono Counsel in Barnes v. Jail
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES BARNES, Plaintiff v. CHARLES WARREN, et al.,
Defendants, No. 1:21-cv-12942 (NLH) (AMD) (D.N.J.), Judge Noel L.
Hillman of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
issues an Opinion and Order appointing counsel under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1915.

Plaintiff Barnes filed the complaint under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
on June 24, 2021. The Court granted the Plaintiff's in forma
pauperis application and permitted the complaint to proceed.
Summonses have been issued and the docket indicates the Defendants'
answers are due Oct. 6, 2021. The Defendants have not yet entered
an appearance.

In the time since the Court permitted the complaint to proceed, the
Court has received approximately 17 letters from the Plaintiff
raising concerns about the Cumberland County Jail's general
sanitary conditions, denial of medical care, and testing procedures
for COVID-19. The Court takes judicial notice that the claims
raised in the complaint itself and in the Plaintiff's subsequent
letters are related to the claims presently proceeding before the
Court in class action Brown v. Warden, 20-7907, wherein the class
is represented by counsel.

The parties entered into a consent decree and the Court appointed a
special master in the class action to issue a report "containing
findings and recommendation regarding the adequacy of COVID-19
protections and procedures at the Cumberland County Jail." The
Court has made certain findings since the entering of the consent
decree concerning the responsiveness, or lack thereof, of the
Cumberland County Jail administration to the issues raised by the
class and the Court's orders.

The in forma pauperis statute permits a court to sua sponte
"request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel. Judge Hillman considers the factors set forth in Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993) in making this determination. He
concludes that the Tabron factors weigh in favor of appointing
counsel to represent the Plaintiff in the action due to the
complexity of the case, discovery challenges, probable need for
expert testimony, and the Plaintiff's inability to afford counsel
on his own.

Judge Hillman orders the Clerk will select an attorney from the
civil pro bono panel. The selected appointed attorney from the
civil pro bono panel will enter a notice of appearance within 14
days of the date of his or her appointment. The Order will have no
effect on the time for the Defendants to answer the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. The Clerk will send a copy of
the Order to the Plaintiff by regular mail.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/95drsywk from
Leagle.com.

James Barnes, Cumberland County Jail, Bridgeton, NJ, Plaintiff pro
se.


DEL-ONE FEDERAL: Miller Files Suit in D. Delaware
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Del-One Federal
Credit Union, et al. The case is styled as Joanne Miller,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v.
Del-One Federal Credit Union, Does 1 through 10, Case No.
1:21-cv-01433-UNA (D. Del., Oct. 7, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Del-One Federal Credit Union -- https://www.del-one.org/ -- is a
federally chartered credit union headquartered in Dover, Delaware
and regulated under the authority of the National Credit Union
Administration.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          David W. deBruin, Esq.
          GAWTHROP GREENWOOD, PC
          3711 Kennett Pike, Suite 100
          Wilmington, DE 19807
          Phone: (302) 777-5353
          Fax: (302) 777-5299
          Email: ddebruin@gawthrop.com



DULUTH, MN: Jorgensen Appeals Civil Rights Suit Dismissal
----------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiffs Dwight Jorgensen and Paxton Anderson has filed another
appeal from a court ruling entered in their lawsuit entitled Dwight
Jorgensen and Paxton Anderson, individually, and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, Petitioners v. B. Birkholz, Warden of
Federal Prison Camp Duluth, and Michael Carvajal, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, in their official capacities,
Respondents, Case No. 0:20-cv-02349-NEB, in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Minnesota.

Petitioners Dwight Jorgensen and Paxton Anderson are inmates at
Federal Prison Camp-Duluth. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
they petitioned for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section
2241, inviting the Court to obtrude in "the difficult and delicate
problems of prison management." The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied
Petitioners' request for transfer to home confinement. The
Peititoners then requested that the Court impose its judgment over
the BOP's discretionary decision and order the BOP to do so. To
support their request, Petitioners allege the COVID-19 pandemic has
engendered such unconstitutional conditions in violation of the
Eighth Amendment that the Court should award sweeping injunctive
relief at FPC-Duluth, namely ordering the mass transfer of older or
medically vulnerable inmates to home confinement. Specifically,
they allege that prison officials' failure to implement adequate
safeguards against COVID-19 constitutes an Eighth Amendment
violation because their age and underlying medical conditions
increase their risk of contracting SARS-CoV-2 and their morbidity
or mortality rate if contracted.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter, in a July 13, 2021 Report
and Recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz
recommended dismissing the Petition, denying the motion for
injunctive relief, and staying the entry of judgment for 60 days to
permit Petitioners to refile their claims as a civil rights
lawsuit. The Petitioners appealed the order entered by Judge
Schultz.

On September 28, 2021, the Court ordered that the appeal be
dismissed because appellants' notice of appeal was filed from a
non-final order.

Consequently, Paxton Anderson and Dwight Jorgensen filed another
appeal captioned Dwight Jorgensen, et al. v. B. Birkholz, et al.,
Case No. 21-3168, in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, on September 28, 2021.[BN]

Petitioners-Appellants Dwight Jorgensen and Paxton Anderson, who
are currently incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp Duluth, in
Duluth, Minnesota, appear pro se.

Respondents-Appellees B. Birkholz, Warden of Federal Prison Camp
Duluth, in their official capacities; and Michael D. Carvajal,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in their official
capacities, are represented by:

          Ann M. Bildtsen, Esq.
          Erin Secord, Esq.
          Ana H. Voss, Esq.  
          U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
          600 U.S. Courthouse
          300 S. Fourth Street
          Minneapolis, MN 55415-0000
          Telephone: (612) 664-5600

FIRST-CITIZENS BANK: Court Grants Bid to Dismiss Pinehurst Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, PINEHURST NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, PLLC, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff v.
FIRST-CITIZENS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Defendant, Case No. 1:20CV636
(M.D.N.C.), Judge Loretta C. Biggs of the U.S. District Court
Middle District of North Carolina:

    (i) granted First-Citizens' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
        Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
        and

   (ii) denied as moot First-Citizens' Motion to Compel
        Arbitration.

Background

Plaintiff Pinehurst initiated the class action in Moore County
Superior Court on June 1, 2020, against Defendant First-Citizens.
Pinehurst's Complaint alleges that on March 27, 2020, the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security ("CARES") Act was
signed into law, which provided "$376 billion in economic
assistance to small businesses" and created the Paycheck Protection
Program ("PPP"). Pinehurst claims that the PPP provided for the
allocation of "$349 billion in taxpayer funds to the United States
Small Business Association ("SBA") to make low interest
'forgivable' loans to qualifying small businesses, non-profits, and
independent contractors." Pinehurst's Complaint further alleges
that under the CARES Act, the SBA was required "to issue rules
implementing the provisions concerning the PPP," and in accordance
with this obligation, the SBA issued its Interim Final Rule to
implement the PPP.

Pinehurst also claims that the CARES Act intended for the SBA to
"provide relief to America's small businesses expeditiously," and
to obtain this relief, the PPP allowed small businesses that have
been harmed by COVID-19 between Feb. 15, 2020, and June 30, 2020,
to apply for a loan -- guaranteed by the federal government --
through a bank. Pinehurst alleges that to achieve the CARES Act's
objective of providing "relief to small businesses 'expeditiously,'
PPP lenders like First-Citizens were required to process
applications on a 'first-come, first-served' basis."

According to Pinehurst's Complaint, First-Citizens submitted a
CARES Act Section 1102 Lender Agreement to be eligible as a PPP
lender. Pinehurst alleges that in "the CARES Lender Agreement, any
lender, including First-Citizens, who wished to be approved as a
PPP lender was required to adhere to all PPP loan requirements,
including the 'first-come, first-served' rule." In addition,
Pinehurst alleges that PPP lenders "earned varying percentages of
origination fees, based on the loan amount," and the greater the
loan amount, the greater the percentage fee the PPP lender would
receive. It argues that this financially incentivized PPP lenders
"to move larger loan applications to the front of the queue and
approve larger loans ahead of smaller ones," and that this
influenced-lenders such as First-Citizens to not process loans on a
"first-come, first-served" basis.

On April 5, 2020, the Plaintiff received, completed, and submitted
the application package for a PPP loan from First-Citizens. The
next day, First-Citizens allegedly informed Pinehurst that its
application "is in line." On April 9, 2020, Pinehurst alleges that
it requested an update regarding its application and was asked by
First-Citizens to re-submit a modified application correcting
errors, which it did. On April 13, 2020, Pinehurst alleges that it
was again requested to "modify its application and re-submit
certain application material," and it submitted the necessary
information to process its loan application.

On April 17, 2020, Pinehurst's loan application was submitted to an
internal officer at First-Citizens. The next day, its "loan
application was approved internally by" First-Citizens. Following
internal approval, First-Citizens "electronically submitted an
application to the SBA to guarantee Pinehurst's loan." On April 28,
2020, the SBA denied Pinehurst's loan application because a
business may only obtain a single PPP loan. First-Citizens then
contacted Pinehurst to inform it of the SBA's decision. On May 6,
2020, Pinehurst responded confirming "that it had in fact already
received a PPP loan from another lender."

Pinehurst alleges that First-Citizens' "repeated requests for
modifications to its application was a manifestation of its
prioritizations of larger loans and favored customers over those
requesting smaller loans and less-favored customers." It claims
that by submitting a PPP loan application with First-Citizens, "it
was denied timely access to funds that would have helped it
mitigate the issues resulting from its business reduction and the
economic crisis, and was delayed from seeking assistance from a
different lender." Pinehurst also alleges that this delay caused it
financial harm, because it "was unable to retain employees which
resulted in a loss of business and collections."

First-Citizens removed the action to the Court on July 10, 2020,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1442(a)(1). Following
removal, Pinehurst filed an Amended Complaint on Oct. 7, 2020.
Before the Court are First-Citizens' Motion to Compel Arbitration
and its' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Discussion

In support of its motion to dismiss, First-Citizens argues, among
other things, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the action because Pinehurst "suffered no injury in fact and
therefore lacks standing." In response, Pinehurst argues that it
was injured because it "was delayed in receiving its money under
the PPP loan program and suffered significant harm as a result."

Judge Biggs finds that Pinehurst argues that it has established
standing because it suffered an injury through the delay in
receiving a PPP loan from First-Citizens. Pinehurst has failed,
however, to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that it actually
suffered any delay. Moreover, even if such delay did occur,
Pinehurst fails to establish that it has a legally protected
interest in receiving any loan from First-Citizens, irrespective of
a delay.

More importantly, Judge Biggs opines that Pinehurst has failed to
plausibly allege facts to demonstrate that it, in fact, was
entitled to such loan and therefore cannot show that any delay was
an "invasion of a protected interest," causing injury. Pinehurst
cites a number of cases from other circuits to argue that a delay
in receipt of owed money is a concrete and particularized injury.
In each of these cases, however, the courts found that plaintiff
was entitled to receive the owed money sooner.

Judge Biggs concludes that because Pinehurst has failed to allege
that it was delayed in receiving funds to which it was entitled, it
has not demonstrated that it plausibly suffered an invasion of a
legally protected interest. Accordingly, in construing the
allegations in Pinehurst's Complaint in the light most favorable to
it and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Pinehurst
has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a finding that
Pinehurst has standing. Thus, First-Citizens' Motion to Dismiss for
lack of standing will be granted, and the action will be
dismissed.

Order

For the reasons she stated Judge Biggs granted First-Citizens'
Motion to Dismiss and denied as moot its Motion to Compel
Arbitration. The action is dismissed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Memorandum Opinion &
Order is available at https://tinyurl.com/7c7dtnyc from
Leagle.com.


GABRIEL BROS: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Gabriel Bros, Inc.
The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated v. Gabriel Bros, Inc., Case No.
1:21-cv-05598 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

Gabriel Brothers, Inc. -- https://www.gabesstores.com/ -- operates
a chain of off-price casual family fashion stores.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawfirm.net


GEICO ADVANTAGE: Parker Files Suit in W.D. Washington
-----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Geico Advantage
Insurance Company. The case is styled as Justin Parker,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
Geico Advantage Insurance Company, Case No. 2:21-cv-01325-RSM (D.
Mass., Sept. 28, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Other Contract.

GEICO Advantage Insurance Company -- http://www.geico.com/--
operates as an insurance firm.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Kira M. Rubel, Esq.
          THE HARBOR LAW GROUP
          3615 HARBORVIEW DR STE C
          GIG HARBOR, WA 98329-8644
          Phone: (949) 795-8170
          Email: kira@theharborlawgroup.com


GEICO INDEMNITY: Ewing, et al. Seek to Certify Insureds Class
-------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as TAMARA EWING, KOSMOE
MALCOM, KWANZA GARDNER, AQUEELAH COLEMAN, and TONDRA WASHINGTON,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY,
and GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Maryland corporations, Case
No. 5:20-cv-00165-MTT (M.D. Ga.), the Plaintiffs ask the Court to
enter an order:

   1. certifying a class defined as:

      "all insureds under a Georgia policy issued by GEICO
      covering a private passenger auto for physical damage who
      submitted a physical damage claim determined by GEICO to
      be a covered total-loss claim, and where the total-loss
      payment did not include full TAVT and/or license plate
      transfer fees, during the time period six years before the
      filing of this lawsuit through the date of a class
      certification order;"

   2. appointing them as class representatives;

   3. appointing their counsel as class counsel; and

   4. directing the Parties to submit a proposed Notice Plan
      under Rule 23(c), or, alternatively, for Plaintiffs to
      submit an opposed Notice Plan.

Each Plaintiff suffered a total loss, had a covered claim, and was
not paid full ACV on their total loss claims, the lawsui says.

Geico operates as an insurance company.

A copy of the Plaintiffs' motion to certify class dated Oct. 1,
2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3iPOcjc
at no extra charge.[CC]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Gordon Van Remmen, Esq.
          Christopher B. Hall, Esq.
          HALL & LAMPROS, LLP
          400 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1150
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Telephone: (404) 876-8100
          E-mail: chall@hallandlampros.com
                  gordon@hallandlampros.com

               - and -

          W. Thomas Lacy, Esq.
          LINDSEY & LACY, PC
          200 Westpark Drive, Suite 280
          Peachtree City, GA 30269
          Telephone: (770) 486-8445
          E-mail: tlacy@llptc.com

               - and -

          Bradley W. Pratt, Esq.
          PRATT CLAY LLC
          4401 Northside Parkway, Suite 520
          Atlanta, GA 30327
          Telephone: (404) 949-8118
          E-mail: bradley@prattclay.com

               - and -

          Scott Edelsberg, Esq.
          EDELSBERG LAW, PA
          20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417
          Aventura, FL 33180
          Telephone: (305) 975-3320
          E-mail: scott@edelsberglaw.com

               - and -

          Andrew J. Shamis, Esq.
          SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.
          14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 1205
          Miami, FL 33132
          Telephone: (305) 479-2299
          Facsimile (786) 623-0915
          E-mail: efilings@shamisgentile.com

               - and -

          Rachel Dapeer, Esq.
          DAPEER LAW, P.A.
          300 S. Biscayne Blvd, #2704
          Miami, FL 33131
          Telephone: 305-610-5223
          E-mail: rachel@dapeer.com

               - and -

          Edmund A. Normand, Esq.
          Jacob L. Phillips, Esq.
          NORMAND PLLC
          Post Office Box 1400036
          Orlando, FL 32814-0036
          Telephone: (407) 603-6031
          E-mail: ed@ednormand.com
                  jacob.phillips@normandpllc.com

The Defendants are represented by:

          Kymberly Kochis, Esq.
          Valerie Strong Sanders, Esq.
          EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (US) LLP
          1114 Avenue of the Americas
          The Grace Building, 40th Floor
          New York, NY 10036
          E-mail: kymkochis@eversheds-sutherland.com
                  valeriesanders@eversheds-sutherland.com

GENERAL MOTORS: Hurry Files Suit in M.D. Alabama
------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against General Motors LLC.
The case is styled as Dominguez Hurry, Scott Goodwin, Terry Wasdin,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v.
General Motors LLC, Case No. 3:21-cv-00673-ECM-JTA (M.D. Ala., Oct.
8, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability for
Breach of Contract.

General Motors -- https://www.gm.com/ -- is an American
multinational corporation headquartered in Detroit that designs,
manufactures, markets, and distributes vehicles and vehicle parts,
and sells financial services, with global headquarters in Detroit's
Renaissance Center.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 214-7900
          Email: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                 dferri@gelaw.com

               - and –

          Henry Clay Barnett, III, Esq.
          Wilson Daniel Miles, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES
          P O Box 4160
          Montgomery, AL 36103
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Fax: (334) 954-7555
          Email: Clay.Barnett@BeasleyAllen.com
                 dee.miles@beasleyallen.com

               - and –

          James Mitchell Williams, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES
          218 Commerce St.
          Montgomery, AL 36104
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Fax: (334) 954-7555
          Email: Mitch.Williams@Beasleyallen.com

               - and –

          John E. Tangren, Esq.
          GRANT & ESEINHOFER PA
          30 North LaSalle Street; Suite 2350
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 214-0000

               - and –

          Tyner David Helms, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN LAW FIRM
          218 Commerce St
          P O Box 4160
          Montgomery, AL 36103
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Email: tyner.helms@beasleyallen.com


GENERAL MOTORS: Nalley Files Suit in N.D. Georgia
-------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against General Motors LLC.
The case is styled as Anthony Nalley, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated v. General Motors LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-04174-WMR (N.D. Ga., Oct. 8, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Contract Product Liability for
Breach of Contract.

General Motors -- https://www.gm.com/ -- is an American
multinational corporation headquartered in Detroit that designs,
manufactures, markets, and distributes vehicles and vehicle parts,
and sells financial services, with global headquarters in Detroit's
Renaissance Center.[BN]

The Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Benjamin Randall Keen, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN ET AL
          2839 Paces Ferry Road SE, Suite 400
          Atlanta, GA 30339
          Phone: (404) 751-1162
          Email: ben.keen@beasleyallen.com

               - and –

          Adam J. Levitt, Esq.
          Daniel R. Ferri, Esq.
          DICELLO LEVITT & CASEY
          Ten North Dearborn Street, Eleventh Floor
          Chicago, IL 60602
          Phone: (312) 214-7900
          Email: alevitt@dicellolevitt.com
                 dferri@gelaw.com

               - and –

          H. Clay Barnett, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROW METHVIN PORTIS & MILES
          P O Box 4160
          218 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, AL 36103-4160
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Email: Clay.Barnett@BeasleyAllen.com

               - and –

          John E. Tangren, Esq.
          GRANT & ESEINHOFER PA
          55 West Monroe Street, Suite 1111
          Chicago, IL 60603
          Phone: (312) 984-0000
          Fax: (312) 984-0001

               - and –

          Tyner David Helms, Esq.
          W. Daniel Miles, III, Esq.
          BEASLEY ALLEN CROWS METHVIN PORTIS & MILES-AL
          P.O. Box 4160
          218 Commerce Street
          Montgomery, AL 36103-4160
          Phone: (334) 269-2343
          Email: Dee.Miles@BeasleyAllen.com


I.D. JEWELRY: Duncan Files ADA Suit in E.D. New York
----------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against I.D. Jewelry, LLC.
The case is styled as Eugene Duncan, and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated v. I.D. Jewelry, LLC, Case No.
1:21-cv-05599 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 7, 2021).

The lawsuit is brought over alleged violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act.

I.D. Jewelry -- https://idjewelry.com/ -- is a top jewelry store in
NYC's Diamond District offering a collection of high end diamond
eternity bands, engagement rings, stud earrings and more.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          Bradly Gurion Marks, Esq.
          THE MARKS LAW FIRM PC
          175 Varick Street 3rd Floor
          New York, NY 10014
          Phone: (646) 770-3775
          Fax: (646) 867-2639
          Email: brad@markslawfirm.net


JOHNSON & JOHNSON: Serota Suit Transferred to S.D. Florida
----------------------------------------------------------
The case styled as Meredith Serota, Jacob Somers, Fredric Salter,
Kyra Harrell, Judith Barich, Lauren Harper, Kelly Granda, Heather
Rudy, Dina Casaliggi, Individually and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated, Consol Plaintiffs v. Johnson & Johnson
Consumer, Inc., was transferred to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on Oct. 8, 2021.

The District Court Clerk assigned Case No. 0:21-md-03015-AHS to the
proceeding.

The nature of suit is stated as Personal Injury: Health
Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability.

Johnson & Johnson (J&J) -- https://www.jnj.com/ -- is an American
multinational corporation founded in 1886 that develops medical
devices, pharmaceuticals, and consumer packaged goods.[BN]

The Consol Plaintiffs are represented by:

          Robert Jason Richards, Esq.
          AYLSTOCK WITKIN KREIS & OVERHOLTZ PLLC
          803 N Palafox Street
          Pensacola, FL 32501
          Phone: (850) 202-1010
          Fax: (850) 916-7449
          Email: JRichards@awkolaw.com

The Consol Defendant is represented by:

          Bruce Judson Berman, Esq.
          CARLTON FIELDS, P.A.
          100 SE 2nd Street, Suite 4200
          Miami, FL 33131-2114
          Phone: (305) 530-0050
          Fax: (305) 530-0055
          Email: bberman@carltonfields.com


KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS: Murray Files Suit in D. Massachusetts
----------------------------------------------------------
A class action lawsuit has been filed against Koninklijke Philips
N.V., et al. The case is styled as Edwin Murray, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Koninklijke Philips
N.V., Philips North America LLC, Philips RS North America LLC, Case
No. 1:21-cv-11598-DJC (D. Mass., Sept. 28, 2021).

The nature of suit is stated as Tort Product Liability for Product
Liability.

Koninklijke Philips N.V. -- https://www.philips.com/global -- is a
Dutch multinational conglomerate corporation that was founded in
Eindhoven.[BN]

The Plaintiff is represented by:

          John F. Dew, Esq.
          SHARP LAW, LLP
          28 North Street, 3rd Floor
          Pittsfield, MA 01201
          Phone: (413) 443-9399
          Email: jdew@cohenkinne.com


LINKEDIN CORP: Bid to File Second Amended ERISA Complaint Denied
----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, IN RE LINKEDIN ERISA LITIGATION, Case No.
5:20-cv-05704-EJD (N.D. Cal.), Judge Edward J. Davila of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose
Division, denied the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint.

Background

Plaintiffs Douglas Bailey, Jason Hayes, and Marianne Robinson filed
the putative class action against Defendants LinkedIn, LinkedIn's
Board of Directors, LinkedIn Corporation's 401(k) Committee, and
Does 1-20 who are members of the Board or Committee or are
otherwise fiduciaries of the LinkedIn Corporation 401(k) Profit
Sharing Plan and Trust, alleging violation of fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").

The Plaintiffs are former LinkedIn employees and current and former
participants in the Plan. They assert the following claims under
ERISA: (1) breach of fiduciary duties; (2) failure to monitor
fiduciaries and co-fiduciary breaches; and (3) knowing breach of
trust.

Primarily, they allege that the Defendants violated their fiduciary
duties by, among other things, offering participants the option of
investing in certain actively managed target-date funds (i.e.,
Fidelity Freedom Funds) that were high-risk, performed poorly, and
required greater management fees than other options. They also
allege that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by
offering imprudent investment options, including the American Funds
AMCAP Fund Class R6, which the Plaintiffs say underperformed.

The Plaintiffs filed the original complaint on Aug. 14, 2020. On
Nov. 2, 2020, the parties stipulated to filing the currently
operative Amended Complaint. On Nov. 17, 2020, the Court issued a
Case Management Order setting a deadline to amend the pleadings by
Jan. 16, 2021.

On Jan. 4, 2021, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint, followed by a motion to stay discovery pending
resolution of that motion to dismiss on Jan. 21, 2021. Those
motions remain pending.

On Sept. 22, 2021, the Plaintiffs filed the motion for leave to
file a Second Amended Complaint now before the Court. They request
leave to amend the complaint as follows: (1) drop all claims
against the Doe defendants; (2) add additional allegations
concerning the Committee; (3) add new factual allegations
supporting a theory of liability concerning excessive recordkeeping
fees under ERISA; (4) add additional factual allegations concerning
the Fidelity Freedom Funds; and (5) add additionally factual
allegations concerning the AMCAP Fund. See Proposed Second Amended
Complaint ("PSAC").

Discussion

The Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs' proposed amendments on
multiple grounds. First, Judge Davila holds, as the Defendants
correctly note, that the deadline to amend pleadings has passed,
therefore Rule 16 applies to the Plaintiffs' motion. The Plaintiffs
do not address Rule 16 in their motion; they argue only that leave
to amend is warranted under Rule 15. Judge Davila proceeds to
consider the Plaintiffs' motion under the Rule 16 standard.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated
neither diligence nor good cause for their proposed amendments.
With respect to the recordkeeping theory, the Defendants point out
that the Plaintiffs' original complaint contained a recordkeeping
theory, which the Plaintiffs dropped in the subsequent Amended
Complaint.

Judge Davila sees nothing nefarious in this history. A review of
the original complaint shows that the Plaintiffs expressly
acknowledged that they lacked specific facts about certain things,
including Plan costs, and they alleged that they unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain such information from the Plan Administrator.
Now, however, the Plaintiffs have obtained some initial discovery
from the Defendants which have provided them with the ability to
plead facts to support their recordkeeping theory

Nevertheless, Judge Davila agrees with the Defendants that the
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated diligence in seeking leave to
amend. The Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why they did not
move for leave to amend until nine months after the deadline to do
so had passed. The parties agree that the Defendants did not
produce the documents underpinning the Plaintiffs' proposed
amendments until June 14, 2021, but their moving papers do not
detail the factual circumstances surrounding that production, such
as when the Plaintiffs first made their request for documents.

Judge Davila states that assuming that the Plaintiffs knew at the
time the parties stipulated to filing the Amended Complaint that
they required some initial discovery to obtain facts necessary to
satisfactorily plead a recordkeeping theory, there is no evidence
before the Court showing that the Plaintiffs sought to obtain that
information between the filing of the Amended Complaint on Nov. 4,
2020 and the deadline to amend pleadings on Jan. 16, 2021.
Likewise, there is no evidence before the Court that would explain
why the Plaintiffs further delayed three months between receiving
Defendants' production in June 2021 and moving for leave to amend.

Furthermore, the Defendants' pending motion to stay discovery
cannot serve as a reason for the Plaintiffs' delay, as the
Defendants did not file that motion until after the deadline to
amend pleadings had already expired. And although that motion has
remained pending for some time now, any resulting uncertainty on
the outcome would more likely counsel haste in seeking discovery
and leave to amend before the Court issued a ruling. No haste is
evident in the case, Judge Davila finds. Because the Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated diligence in seeking leave to amend, Judge
Davila's inquiry ends there.

Disposition

The Plaintiffs' motion is denied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/s8zns9ae from Leagle.com.


LOYOLA MARYMOUNT: McCarthy Class Suit Dismissed With Prejudice
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California, Western Division, dismissed the
case, BRIDGET McCARTHY, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY,
Defendant, Case No. 2:20-CV-04668-SB (JEMx) (C.D. Cal.), with
prejudice.

Judge Blumenfeld has considered the parties' Stipulation for
Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In the event there is a future settlement or
judgment of class action or global resolution of claims against LMU
as pled in the First Amended Complaint in the action, then the
Plaintiff will not be prohibited from obtaining the benefit of such
settlement or judgment as a member of the class or global
resolution group.

All dates and deadlines are vacated. The Clerk of the Court will
close the case.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/5cv5yh5m from Leagle.com.


MCKESSON CORP: Show Cause Order Issued in True Health TCPA Suit
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC INC., et al., Plaintiffs v.
MCKESSON CORPORATION, et al., Defendants, Case No. 13-cv-02219-HSG
(N.D. Cal.), Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California orders the Plaintiffs
to show cause why the class should not be decertified.

Background

Plaintiff True Health filed the putative class action on May 15,
2013, alleging that Defendant McKesson sent "unsolicited
advertisements" by facsimile in violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act ("TCPA"). The Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint on June 20, 2013, and a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC")
on July 18, 2014, which added McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates,
Inc. as a Plaintiff and McKesson Technologies, Inc. as a
Defendant.

The operative complaint similarly alleges that Defendants violated
the TCPA by sending "unsolicited advertisements" by fax. The
Plaintiffs contend that they neither invited nor gave permission to
Defendants to send the faxes, but that even assuming the faxes were
sent with a recipient's express permission or based on an
"established business relationship, the required "opt-out notice"
was absent.

The Plaintiffs moved to certify a single class of all putative
class members. After the Court denied certification on the basis
that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance
requirement as to consent, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.

On remand, the Plaintiffs again moved for class certification, and
the Court certified the following class: "All persons or entities
who received faxes from McKesson from September 2, 2009, to May 11,
2010, offering Medisoft, Lytec, Practice Partner, or Revenue
Management Advanced software or BillFlash Patient Statement
Service, where the faxes do not inform the recipient of the right
to opt out of future faxes, and whose fax numbers are listed in
Exhibit A to McKesson's Supplemental Response to Interrogatory
Regarding Prior Express Invitation or Permission, but not in
Exhibit B or Exhibit C to McKesson's Response to Interrogatory
Regarding Prior Express Invitation or Permission."

The Court certified the class on Aug. 13, 2019. On Dec. 9, 2019,
the Consumer and Government Affairs Bureau of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") issued a declaratory ruling that
an online fax service is not a "telephone facsimile machine" under
the TCPA. In the Matter of Amerifactors Fin. Grp., LLC Petition for
Expedited Declaratory Ruling Rules & Regulations Implementing the
Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991 Junk Fax Prot. Act of 2005, CG Dkt.
Nos. 02-278, 05-338, 2019 WL 6712128, Paragraph 3 (Dec. 9, 2019).
According to the FCC, there is no TCPA liability for sending a fax
to an online fax service. The FCC's decision in Amerifactors is
binding on the Court.

Following Amerifactors, the Defendants moved to decertify the
class, arguing that it would require a fact-intensive inquiry on an
individual basis to determine which members of the class received a
fax on a telephone facsimile machine as opposed to via an online
fax service. In response, the Plaintiffs proposed a subpoena
process that they represented would differentiate, on a class-wide
basis, which class members received a fax on a stand-alone fax
machine as opposed to via an online fax service. Because the
Plaintiffs represented that a similar subpoena process had worked
in another TCPA case, the Court determined that it was premature to
decertify the class.

The Court did, however, modify the class definition to identify two
subclasses:

       a. Stand-Alone Fax Machine Class: "All persons or entities
who received faxes from McKesson via a stand-alone fax machine from
September 2, 2009, to May 11, 2010, offering Medisoft, Lytec,
Practice Partner, or Revenue Management Advanced software or
BillFlash Patient Statement Service, where the faxes do not inform
the recipient of the right to opt out of future faxes, and whose
fax numbers are listed in Exhibit A to McKesson's Supplemental
Response to Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or
Permission, but not in Exhibit B or Exhibit C to McKesson's
Response to Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or
Permission."

       b. Online Fax Services Class: "All persons or entities who
received faxes from McKesson via an online fax service from
September 2, 2009, to May 11, 2010, offering Medisoft, Lytec,
Practice Partner, or Revenue Management Advanced software or
BillFlash Patient Statement Service, where the faxes do not inform
the recipient of the right to opt out of future faxes, and whose
fax numbers are listed in Exhibit A to McKesson's Supplemental
Response to Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or
Permission, but not in Exhibit B or Exhibit C to McKesson's
Response to Interrogatory Regarding Prior Express Invitation or
Permission."

The Court then entered summary judgment against the Online Fax
Services Class after the members of that class received notice.

In their continued representation of the Stand-Alone Fax Machine
Class, the Plaintiffs served 246 subpoenas on the class members'
telecommunications services providers to determine whether class
members had received the faxes on a stand-alone fax machine. On
Sept. 10, 2021, the Plaintiffs submitted an Offer of Proof to the
Court, summarizing the results of their subpoena process to date.
The Court also ordered the Plaintiffs to file any declarations or
equivalent materials received from the telephone carriers. The
Plaintiffs submitted the requested declarations and have been
filing newly received declarations on a rolling basis. The
Defendants, in turn, filed (1) a response to the Plaintiffs' Offer
of Proof and (2) two additional telephone carrier declarations.

Discussion

Judge Gilliam finds that multiple declarations submitted by the
telephone carriers, including declarations from telephone carriers
that provided service to a significant percentage of the class
members, state that it is impossible for the telephone carrier to
know whether their customer received faxes on a stand-alone fax
machine or via an online fax service. He says, many of the
Telephone Carrier Declarations on which the Plaintiffs rely in
their Offer of Proof state that the telephone carrier did not
provide an "online fax service." The Plaintiffs make the assumption
that if a telephone carrier did not provide an "online fax
service," then the class member did not receive the fax via an
online fax service. But the declarations submitted by the telephone
carriers, as illustrated above, cast significant doubt on the
reasonableness of this assumption.

At this point, Judge Gilliam has serious concerns about whether the
Plaintiffs can offer class-wide proof to show that the class
members received the faxes at issue on a stand-alone fax machine,
as opposed to via an online fax service. If the Plaintiff cannot
offer such class-wide proof, then individualized inquiries would be
required to determine how each class member received the faxes
before liability could be determined. Amerifactors has made the
manner in which the faxes were received a critical element of TCPA
liability, and, in the absence of class-wide proof, every class
member would need to present evidence as to how they received the
faxes. At this stage, Judge Gilliam holds that this is the
predominant issue. Without generalized, class-wide proof as to
whether the class members used a stand-alone fax machine, he now
believes that questions of law or fact common to the class members
do not predominate and the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are not
met.

Conclusion

Judge Gilliam orders the Plaintiffs to show cause why the class
should not be decertified. He orders that the Plaintiffs should
cite any relevant appellate or district court authority supporting
their claim that the results of their three-step subpoena process
qualify as class-wide proof that satisfies the predominance
requirement. The Defendants may submit any response. In any such
response, the Defendants, too, should cite any relevant legal
authority as to whether the predominance requirement is satisfied.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/pfc3x44f from Leagle.com.


MICRON TECHNOLOGY: Manning Appeals Ruling in Putative Class Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Micron Technology, Inc. said in its Form 10-K report filed with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on October 8, 2021, for the
fiscal year ended September 2, 2021, that the appeal in the
putative class action suit initiated by Chris Manning, remains
pending.

On June 13, 2019, current Micron employee, Chris Manning, filed a
putative class action lawsuit on behalf of Micron employees subject
to the Idaho Wage Claim Act who earned a performance-based bonus
after the conclusion of 2018 whose performance rating was
calculated based upon a mandatory percentage distribution range of
performance ratings.

On July 12, 2019, Manning and three other Company employees filed
an amended complaint as putative class action representatives.

On behalf of themselves and the putative class, Manning and the
three other plaintiffs assert claims for violation of the Idaho
Wage Claim Act, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and fraud.

On June 24, 2020, the court entered judgment in favor of Micron
based on the statute of limitations, and the plaintiffs filed a
notice of appeal on July 23, 2020.

No further updates were provided in the Company's SEC report.

Micron Technology, Inc., through its subsidiaries, manufactures and
markets dynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs), static random
access memory chips (SRAMs), flash memory, semiconductor
components, and memory modules. The company is based in Boise,
Idaho.


OREGON MUTUAL: Hillbro Appeals Insurance Suit Dismissal to 9th Cir.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff Hillbro LLC filed an appeal from a court ruling entered
in the lawsuit entitled HILLBRO LLC, dba HILLS RESTAURANT,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs v. OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Oregon
corporation, Defendant, Case No. 3:21-cv-00382-HZ, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Oregon, Portland.

The Plaintiff operates a restaurant and bar in Shoreline,
Washington. It insured its business with a business insurance
policy from the Defendant. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
business closure orders issued by the state of Washington, the
"Plaintiff had to close, suspend, and/or curtail its business"
leading to financial losses. Although the closure orders allowed
restaurants to serve take-out food for off-premises consumption,
the Plaintiff's business revenues have significantly reduced
because it has been unable to use its dining room and full service
bar for on-premises food and beverage consumption. The Plaintiff
admits that COVID-19 has not been detected in its restaurant.

The Plaintiff filed an insurance claim seeking coverage for its
financial losses stemming from its reduced business operations.
Defendant denied coverage. It alleges that the "Business Income,"
"Extended Business Income," "Extra Expense," "Civil Authority," and
"Ingress or Egress" coverages in its business insurance policy
cover its financial losses.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sept. 23, 2021, Judge
Marco A. Hernandez granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss and
dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of that order entered by Judge
Hernandez.

The appellate case is captioned as Hillbro LLC v. Oregon Mutual
Insurance Company, Case No. 21-35810, in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed on Sept. 28, 2021.

The briefing schedule in the Appellate Case states that:

   -- Appellant Hillbro LLC Mediation Questionnaire was due on
October 5, 2021;

   -- Appellant Hillbro LLC opening brief is due on November 29,
2021;

   -- Appellee Oregon Mutual Insurance Company answering brief is
due on December 27, 2021; and

   -- Appellant's optional reply brief is due 21 days after service
of the answering brief.[BN]

PlaintiffAppellant HILLBRO LLC, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, DBA Hills Restaurant, is represented
by:

          Ian S. Birk, Esq.
          Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Esq.
          Irene M. Hecht, Esq.
          Lynn Lincoln Sarko, Esq.
          Amy Williams-Derry, Esq.
          Benjamin Gould, Esq.  
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3200
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 623-1900
          E-mail: awilliams-derry@kellerrohrback.com   

               - and -

          Alison Elizabeth Chase, Esq.
          KELLER ROHRBACK LLP
          1129 State Street, Suite 8
          Santa Barbara, CA 93101
          Telephone: (805) 456-1496

Defendant-Appellee OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY is represented
by:

          Lind Stapley, Esq.
          SOHA & LANG, PS
          1325 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2000
          Seattle, WA 98101
          Telephone: (206) 624-1800
          E-mail: stapley@sohalang.com

PRESSED JUICERY: New Class Deal in Brooks Suit Has Initial Okay
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Valerie Brooks, et al., Plaintiffs v. Pressed Juicery,
Inc., et al., Defendants, No. 2:19-CV-01687-KJM-CKD (E.D. Cal.),
Judge Kimberly J. Mueller of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California granted the motion for preliminary
approval of new class action settlement.

The Court previously preliminarily approved the parties' proposed
class action settlement and approved conditional certification of
the settlement classes as described in detail in its previous
order.

Following the order granting preliminary approval, the parties came
to a new settlement with all the same terms as the Court previously
approved but with an additional $112,500 settlement fund. Of the
$112,500, up to $35,000 will be awarded to the class counsel for
attorneys' fees and costs. Additionally, this amount will fund the
$2,500 to the named Plaintiff and the class representative the
parties previously agreed to. The remaining $75,000 will be
distributed to the class members who make timely claims
demonstrating attempts to use the defendant's website or mobile
application.

Each class member will be entitled to a share proportional to the
number of valid claimants, but California class members may receive
up to three times their pro-rata share not to exceed $1,000. The
proposed amended settlement does not change the amount provided to
the attorneys in fees and costs, nor to the named Plaintiff.

As this additional settlement fund does not increase the attorneys'
fees nor the named Plaintiff's award the Court preliminarily
approved in its prior order, Judge Mueller finds this additional
term does not change the Court's prior holding that the proposed
settlement is sufficiently fair and equitable. At the final
hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel should be prepared to discuss why
they did not seek the settlement fund earlier in the parties'
discussions.

In light of the foregoing, Judge Mueller granted the motion for
preliminary approval. Her Order resolves ECF Nos. 26 & ECF No. 30.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Order is available
at https://tinyurl.com/npwynvxr from Leagle.com.


RITE AID: Settles Store Associates Purported Class Suit for $12MM
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rite Aid Corporation said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on October 5, 2021, for the
quarterly period ended August 28, 2021, that the Company agreed to
settle for $12 million allegations made by a purported class of
California store associates that it required such associates to
purchase uniforms

The Company is currently a defendant in several lawsuits filed in
courts in California that contain allegations regarding violations
of the California Business and Professions Code, various California
employment laws and regulations, industry wage orders,
wage-and-hour laws, rules and regulations pertaining primarily to
failure to pay overtime, failure to pay premiums for missed meals
and rest periods, failure to provide accurate wage statements, and
failure to reimburse business expenses (the "California Cases").
Some of the California Cases purport or may be determined to be
class actions or representative actions under the California
Private Attorneys General Act and seek substantial damages and
penalties.

These single-plaintiff and multi-plaintiff California Cases in the
aggregate, seek substantial damages.

In June 2021, the Company agreed to settle two of the California
Cases in which the plaintiffs brought class-based claims alleging
that they and all other similarly-situated associates were not paid
for time waiting for their bags to be checked.

One set of cases involving store associates was settled for $9
million, while the other involving distribution center associates
was settled for $1.75 million.

On October 1, 2021, the Company agreed to settle for $12 million
allegations made by a purported class of California store
associates that it required such associates to purchase uniforms.
These settlements remain subject to court approval.

In August 2021, the Company paid approximately $8 million in
connection with a single-plaintiff matter after exhausting appeals.


The Company believes that it has meritorious defenses in the
California Cases.

Rite Aid said, "The Company has aggressively defended itself and
challenged the merits of the lawsuits and, where applicable,
allegations that the lawsuits should be certified as class or
representative actions."

Rite Aid Corporation, through its subsidiaries, operates a chain of
retail drugstores in the United States. The company operates
through two segments, Retail Pharmacy and Pharmacy Services. Rite
Aid was founded in 1927 and is headquartered in Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania.


RUMPKE TRANSPORTATION: Class of Welders Certified in Gambrell Suit
------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, Robert Gambrell, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Rumpke Transportation Company LLC,
Defendant, Case No. 1:20-cv-00801 (S.D. Ohio), Judge Michael R.
Barrett of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, granted the Plaintiff's motion for
conditional class certification.

The matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Pre-Discovery
Motion for Conditional Class Certification and Court-Supervised
Notice to Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section
216(B).

Background

In his First Amended Collective and Class Action Complaint, the
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and Ohio Law based on the failure to pay overtime wages.
The FLSA claim is brought as a collective action pursuant to 29
U.S.C. Section 216(b).

The Plaintiff seeks to conditionally certify the class of: "All
current and former hourly, non-exempt welders of Defendant who were
scheduled to work forty (40) or more hours in any workweek during
the three (3) years preceding the filing of this Motion and
continuing through the final disposition of this case."

The Plaintiff alleges that under the Defendant's company-wide
policy, he and other welders were required to clock out of work for
a meal break for 30 minutes each day, but "while clocked out of
work, welders routinely and regularly were unable to take a full,
uninterrupted 30-minute meal break due to having to engage in job
duties," such as repairing containers which were regularly arriving
at the facility during meal breaks. Because of these interruptions,
the Plaintiff alleges that welders "were routinely unable to take a
full, 30-minute uninterrupted meal break," but the welders "were
not paid for this time worked." He also alleges that if a welder
did not clock out for a meal break because he or she was working,
the Defendant still manually modified the welder's time to take out
a 30-minute meal break.

Analysis

The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff has not carried his
burden of showing that he is "similarly situated" to the other
members of the proposed collective. It first argues that the
Plaintiff concedes that the members of the collective are not
similarly situated because he attempts to certify a collective
based on multiple theories of an alleged violation. The Defendant
maintains that if some collective members are subjected to certain
alleged violations but others are not, this shows that the
collective members are not similarly situated. Next, it argues that
there is no company-wide policy with respect to meal breaks. Third,
the Defendant argues that the working hours, conditions, and
policies at the nine locations are vastly different from one
another so that welders at one location are not similarly situated
to the welders at another location.

Judge Barrett notes that proceeding on multiple theories of an
alleged violation does not necessarily bar conditional
certification. He opines that plaintiffs are similarly situated
when they suffer from a single FLSA-violating policy, and when
proof of that policy or of conduct in conformity with that policy
proves a violation as to all the plaintiffs." Judge Barrett finds
that the claims by the Plaintiff and the putative class members are
"unified by common theories of the Defendants' statutory
violations, even if the proofs of these theories are inevitably
individualized and distinct."

The Defendant argues that not all welders at its nine different
locations are treated the same with respect to their lunch breaks.
However, at the conditional certification stage, Judge Barrett
holds that the Plaintiff must show only that 'his position is
similar, not identical, to the positions held by the putative class
members.' He concludes that at this stage of the proceedings, the
Plaintiff's submissions suggest that Defendant had a common policy
and operation at all of its locations. Therefore, he finds that the
Plaintiff is similarly situated to the other members of the
proposed collective for purposes of conditional certification.

The Defendant argues that even if conditional certification is
proper, the Plaintiff's request for a 90-day notice period should
be reduced to 45 days. The Plaintiff responds that he is willing to
limit the notice period to 60 days, but that a 45-day period with
the current state of the U.S. mail system will not provide enough
time for welders to receive the Notice and Consent forms, read
through the Notice, sign the Consent form, and return the signed
form to Named Plaintiff's counsel's office so that it can be filed
with the Court.

Judge Barrett finds that the Court has approved a 45-day period
where the plaintiffs did not expect significant difficulties in
locating potential class members. However, it acknowledges that
during the COVID pandemic, the increased volume of mail has caused
slower mail service. Therefore, in this instance, Judge Barrett
finds that a 60-day notice period is appropriate.

The Defendant also argues that the Court should deny the
Plaintiff's request for personal email addresses of the putative
collective members. However, courts within the Sixth Circuit have
routinely approved dual notification through regular mail and
email."

Finally, the Defendant objects to the introductory language in the
notice proposed by the Plaintiff because it includes additional
commentary which goes beyond the definition of the collective. It
explains that the first paragraph of the notice should read: "If
you work or worked as an hourly, non-exempt welder at Rumpke
Transportation Company, LLC and were scheduled to work forty (40)
or more hours in any workweek, during the last three years to the
present, then you may be eligible to join this collective action
lawsuit under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")." The
Plaintiff has no objection and is amenable to using the language
provided by Defendant. Therefore, with the foregoing modification,
Judge Barrett approves the Notice and Consent to Join forms.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Judge Barrett granted the Plaintiff's
Pre-Discovery Motion. He conditionally certifies the case as an
FLSA collective action under Section 216(b) against the Defendant,
on behalf of Named Plaintiff and others similarly situated.

The Court-approved Notice of FLSA claims is to be sent by regular
mail and email to: All current and former hourly, non-exempt
welders of Defendant who were scheduled to work 40 or more hours in
any workweek during the three years preceding the filing of the
Motion and continuing through the final disposition of this case
(Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs or Putative Class Members).

The proposed Notice and Consent to Join forms are approved with the
modification stated in the Order.

The Defendant is to provide, within 14 days of entry of the Order,
a roster of all persons who fit the definition (the Potential
Opt-In Plaintiffs) which includes their full names, dates of
employment, job titles, locations worked, last known home
addresses, and personal email addresses.

The Court-approved Notice and Consent to Join forms are to be sent
to such present and former employees within 14 days of receipt of
the roster using the Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs' mailing and email
addresses.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Opinion & Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/2c5wnjva from Leagle.com.


STATE FARM: Bid to Exclude Zakowicz Report in Shields Suit Denied
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, DARREN MICHAEL SHIELDS, ET AL. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., Case No. 6:19-CV-01359 (W.D. La.),
Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Hanna of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division, denied State
Farm's Motion to Exclude the Report and Testimony of Nicole N.
Zakowicz.

Background

The lawsuit challenges a valuation system used by car insurers to
determine cash value of vehicles on total loss claims. Plaintiffs
Darren Shields and Connie Bourque are two Louisiana residents who
had insurance policies through State Farm. Under the terms of these
policies, State Farm agreed to pay the owner the actual cash value
("ACV") of the insured vehicles upon the occurrence of a total
loss. To determine the ACV, State Farm used a valuation product
known as the Autosource Market-Driven Valuation ("Autosource"),
which was developed by a company known as Audatex and allegedly
marketed exclusively to insurance companies.

Plaintiff Shields filed a claim under his collision coverage, after
his 2008 Isuzu i-370 LS truck was involved in an accident that
occurred on April 27, 2019. Plaintiff Bourque also filed a claim
under her collision coverage, based on damage sustained to her 2016
Toyota Rav4 XLE in an accident occurring on March 7, 2018.

Both Plaintiffs challenge the adjusted value of their vehicles, as
determined by the Autosource valuation report, and allege that it
resulted in their claims being undervalued. They filed suit in this
court on Oct. 16, 2019, invoking the Court's jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. Section 1332 and alleging that State Farm's use of
Autosource resulted in a breach of the insurance contract as well
as violations of Louisiana law. They seek certification on behalf
of State Farm policyholders who have been similarly
undercompensated based on the use of Autosource.

On a prior motion for summary judgment, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff Shields's claims on the grounds of judicial estoppel as a
result of his failure to disclose the suit in his bankruptcy
proceedings. The parties are now before the Court on motions
pending prior to their class certification hearing. State Farm
moves to exclude the report and testimony of the Plaintiffs'
expert, Nicole N. Zakowicz, who has offered an opinion on the
methodology for calculating damages class-wide. Doc. Plaintiff
Bourque opposes the motion. The matter came before the Court for
hearing on Sept. 28, 2021.

Application


Ms. Zakowicz opines that damages in the matter can be calculated in
the same manner proposed in Slade v. Progressive Security Insurance
Company, 856 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2017), a putative class action
challenging Progressive's use of a vehicle loss valuation product
called the Mitchell Work Center Total Loss system. The Fifth
Circuit noted that plaintiffs arguing a class-wide theory of
liability must also "put forward a damages methodology that maps
onto their liability theory." It then affirmed the district court's
finding that this methodology did not serve as a bar to
certification. Ms. Zakowicz includes the same excerpt in her report
and opines "that damages can be calculated in the same way as in
Slade since the same data are present in the case.

State Farm disputes this opinion on the basis that the Autosource
valuation system differs from the one used in Slade. It argues that
(1) Ms. Zakowicz has employed no independently verifiable
methodology, and (2) she based her opinion on faulty assumptions of
the Plaintiff's counsel regarding the similarities between the
cases and the commonality of injuries across the proposed class. In
particular, the defense emphasizes its own expert's conclusion that
over fifty percent of potential plaintiffs would have received a
lower ACV determination if a NADA value had been used rather than
Autosource. Accordingly, it maintains, her opinion fails to conform
to Daubert's standards and her report and testimony must be
excluded.

Judge Hanna states that Judge Doughty noted in Prudhomme v. Geico
Insurance Company, Case No. 6:15-cv-0098, doc. 275 (W.D. La. Dec.
22, 2020) (filed under seal), another challenge to an insurer's use
of a vehicle valuation program, that differences in the programs
and their applications can result in an "apples versus oranges"
comparison when experts attempt to apply the same damages models.
However, he rejected Geico's Daubert challenge to the plaintiff's
expert who offered this comparison. Specifically, he concluded
after a hearing that Geico did not challenge the expert's
qualifications and that she had adequately explained the
methodology she used for valuating losses.

Judge Hanna has reviewed Ms. Zakowicz's report and testimony, and
is satisfied that her adoption of the framework from Slade
satisfies Daubert. She says, Ms. Zakowicz's ability to defend any
assumptions made in the process or to adapt the framework to
different parameters goes to the weight her testimony should be
afforded. Accordingly, there is no basis for excluding her report
or testimony.

Order

For the reasons he stated, Judge Hanna denied the Motion.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Memorandum Order is
available at https://tinyurl.com/5twe7k4d from Leagle.com.


SURGALIGN HOLDINGS: Lowrv Settlement Granted Preliminary Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Surgalign Holdings, Inc. said in its Form 8-K filing with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission filed on Sept. 30, 2021, that
the Court granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement
of the securities class action captioned Lowrv v. RTI Surgical
Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-1939-MFK.

On September 22, 2021, the Court also granted preliminary approval
of the proposed settlement of the securities class action captioned
Lowrv v. RTI Surgical Holdings, Inc., et al., Case No.
1:20-cv-1939-MFK.

Information concerning this separate proposed settlement of the
Consolidated Securities Class Action is being sent directly to
potential class members by the claims administrator and published
in a national business interest newswire.

Information contained in the publication or accessible through the
publication does not constitute part of, and is not incorporated
into, this Current Report on Form 8-K.

The proposed settlement of the Consolidated Securities Class Action
is subject to final approval by the Court.

Surgalign Holdings, Inc. is a global medical technology company
advancing the science of spine care, focused on delivering
innovative solutions that drive superior clinical and economic
outcomes. The company is based in Deerfield, Illinois.


TEACHERS INSURANCE: Haley ERISA Suit Loses Summary Judgment Bid
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as MELISSA HALEY,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, v.
TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Case No.
1:17-cv-00855-JPO-RWL (S.D.N.Y.), the Hon. Judge J. Paul Oetken
entered an order that:

   -- Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied;

   -- Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Employee
      Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
      section 406(a)(1)(B) claim is denied;

   -- Defendants motion for summary judgment on the ERISA
      section 406(a)(1)(C) claim is granted;

   -- Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ERISA
      section 406(a)(1)(D) claim is denied; and

   -- Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's expert is denied
      as moot for purposes of the summary judgment motion.

The Plaintiff and class representative Melissa Haley filed a motion
for partial summary judgment in this ERISA class action on November
24, 2020.

The Defendant TIAA cross-moved for full summary judgment on January
8, 2021. TIAA also moved to strike or preclude the opinions of
Haley's expert.

A copy of the Court's order dated Sept. 30, 2021 is available from
PacerMonitor.com at https://bit.ly/3ArYagq at no extra charge.[CC]

TILRAY INC: Consolidated Braun Suit Ongoing in Delaware
-------------------------------------------------------
Tilray, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2021, for the quarterly
period ended August 31, 2021, that the company continues to defend
itself against the class action and derivative suit styled, Braun
v. Kennedy, C.A.  No. 2020-0137-KSJM.

On February 27, 2020, Tilray stockholders Deborah Braun and Nader
Noorian filed a class action and derivative complaint in the
Delaware Court of Chancery styled Braun v. Kennedy, C.A. No.
2020-0137-KSJM. On March 2, 2020, Tilray stockholders Catherine
Bouvier, James Hawkins, and Stephanie Hawkins filed a class action
and derivative complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery styled
Bouvier v. Kennedy, C.A. No. 2020-0154-KSJM.

On March 4, 2020, the Delaware Court of Chancery entered an order
consolidating the two cases and designating the complaint in the
Braun/Noorian action as the operative complaint.

The operative complaint asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty
against Brendan Kennedy, Christian Groh, Michael Blue, and
Privateer Evolution, LLC (the "Privateer Defendants") for alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty in their alleged capacities as Tilray's
controlling stockholders and against Kennedy, Maryscott Greenwood,
and Michael Auerbach for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in
their capacities as directors and/or officers of Tilray in
connection with the prior merger of Privateer Holdings, Inc. with
and into a wholly-owned subsidiary (the "Downstream Merger").

The complaint alleges that the Privateer Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by causing Tilray to enter into the Downstream
Merger and Tilray's Board to approve that Downstream Merger, and
that Defendants Kennedy, Greenwood, and Auerbach breached their
fiduciary duties as directors by approving the Downstream Merger.

Plaintiffs allege that the Downstream Merger gave the Privateer
Defendants hundreds of millions of dollars of tax savings without
providing a corresponding benefit to Tilray and its minority
stockholders and that the Downstream Merger unfairly transferred
and extended Kennedy, Blue, and Groh's control over Tilray.

On July 17, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
asserting substantially similar claims. On August 14, 2020, Tilray
and the Privateer Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint.

At the February 5, 2021 hearing on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss,
the Plaintiffs agreed that their perpetuation of control claims are
moot and stated that they intend to move for a fee award in
connection with those claims.

On June 1, 2021, the Court denied Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint.

In August 2021, the Company's Board of Directors established a
Special Litigation Committee (the “SLC”) of independent
directors to re-assert director control and investigate the
derivative claims in this litigation matter.

The SLC has appointed the law firm Wilson Sonsini to assist the SLC
with an investigation of the underlying claim and determine whether
continued prosecution of such claims is in the best interests of
the Company.  

The SLC has also moved to have the Plaintiffs stay discovery during
their investigation.

Tilray, Inc. engages in the research, cultivation, production, and
distribution of medical cannabis and cannabinoids. The Company is
focused on medical cannabis research, cultivation, processing and
distribution of cannabis products worldwide. The company is based
in Nanaimo, British Columbia.


TILRAY INC: Court Dismisses Kasilingam Putative Class Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tilray, Inc. said in its Form 10-Q Report filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on October 7, 2021, for the quarterly
period ended August 31, 2021, that  the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York entered an Opinion & Order granting
the Defendants' motion to dismiss the putative class action suit
initiated by Ganesh Kasilingam.

On May 4, 2020, Ganesh Kasilingam filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, against
Tilray, Inc., Brendan Kennedy and Mark Castaneda, on behalf of
himself and a putative class, seeking to recover damages for
alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.

The complaint alleged that Tilray and the individual defendants
overstated the anticipated advantages of the Company's revenue
sharing agreement with Authentic Brands Group ("ABG"), announced on
January 15, 2019, and that the plaintiff suffered losses when
Tilray's stock price dropped after Tilray recognized an impairment
with respect to the ABG deal on March 2, 2020.

On September 27, 2021, the U.S. District Court entered an Opinion &
Order granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in
the Kasilingam litigation.

Tilray, Inc. engages in the research, cultivation, production, and
distribution of medical cannabis and cannabinoids. The Company is
focused on medical cannabis research, cultivation, processing and
distribution of cannabis products worldwide. The company is based
in Nanaimo, British Columbia.


VIEWRAY INC: Plymouth Cty. Retirement Assoc. Appeals Suit Dismissal
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Plaintiff PLYMOUTH COUNTY RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION filed an appeal
from a court ruling entered in the lawsuit entitled PLYMOUTH COUNTY
RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs v. VIEWRAY, INC., et
al., Defendants, Case No. 1:19-cv-2115, in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

Defendant ViewRay is a small medical device company that
manufactures MRI-guided radiation systems used to locate, target,
and treat cancer. This product represents an upgrade over an
earlier first-generation product and uses a more advanced linear
accelerator, which irradiates cancer cells with less collateral
damage. Various overseas regulatory authorities approved the
MRIdian device between 2016 and 2018, and the Food and Drug
Administration approved it for use in the United States in February
2017. Nearly all of ViewRay's revenue relates to the sale of
MRIdian systems.

In July 2015, ViewRay went public through a reverse merger and
private placement and trades on the NASDAQ under the symbol "VRAY."
Since going public, ViewRay sought to raise capital on several
different occasions through various private, semi private, and
public offerings of common stock. In July, November, and December
2019, Plymouth purchased ViewRay common stock on the open market at
prices ranging from $9.46 per share (on July 19, 2019) to $3.13 (on
Dec. 4, 2019).

Plaintiff Plymouth County Retirement Association purchased ViewRay
common stock on the NASDAQ stock exchange.  On Jan. 13, 2020,
ViewRay released 4Q19 and FY19 results, disclosing that it had
generated less than $17 million in revenue and received only four
new orders. ViewRay's stock declined roughly 23%, closing at $2.85
per share.

After ViewRay's stock price dropped in late 2019, the Plaintiff
sued ViewRay and various current and former executives for
securities fraud. Plymouth allegedly suffered losses as the share
price fell throughout 2019. It alleges that ViewRay (and its
officers and directors named as Defendants) committed securities
fraud by telling investors one thing about its backlog -- the key
metric underpinning the company's valuation in the absence of
revenues and profits -- while internally having knowledge or taking
actions regarding backlogged orders inconsistent with those public
statements. It bases its claims on alleged material
misrepresentations or omissions in several statements in various
10-Qs, 10-Ks, 8-Ks, press releases, presentations, and on earnings
calls.

As the Lead Plaintiff, Plymouth alleges the Defendants violated
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act (Count 1) and that
the officers and directors, as controlling persons of the company,
each violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Count 2). It seeks
compensatory damages.

The Plaintiff brings the case under Rule 23, on behalf of a
putative class of "all persons and entities that purchased, or
otherwise acquired, ViewRay securities." It defines the class
period as running from May 10, 2018 to Jan. 13, 2020.

A second amended complaint filed in the case names the following
ViewRay officers and directors as Defendants: (a) since June 24,
2018, Scott Drake who served as ViewRay's President and CEO and
holds a seat on its board of directors; (b) from June 8, 2016,
until his departure from the company on Sept. 30, 2019, Ajay Bansal
who was ViewRay's CFO; (c) James Dempsey who founded ViewRay and
serves as the company's Chief Scientific Officer; he also sits on
its board; (d) since June 24, 2018, Shahriar Matin who has been
ViewRay's COO; and (e) From Feb. 4, 2013, until July 22, 2018,
Chris Raanes who served as ViewRay's President and CEO and as a
member of the board.

As reported in the Class Action Reporter on Sep. 8, 2021, Judge J.
Philip Calabrese granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint and dismissed it with prejudice.

The Plaintiff now seeks a review of the order entered by Judge
Calabrese.

The appellate case is captioned as Plymouth County Retirement
Association v. ViewRay, Inc., et al., Case No. 21-3863, in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, filed on Sep.
27, 2021.[BN]

Plaintiff-Appellant PLYMOUTH COUNTY RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION,
Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, is
represented by:

          Thomas Livezey Laughlin, IV, Esq.
          SCOTT & SCOTT
          230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
          New York, NY 10169
          Telephone: (212) 223-6444

Defendants-Appellees VIEWRAY, INC., SCOTT DRAKE, AJAY BANSAL, JAMES
F. DEMPSEY, CHRIS A. RAANES, and SHAHRIAR MATIN are represented
by:

          Monica K. Loseman, Esq.
          GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
          1801 California Street, Suite 4200
          Denver, CO 80202
          Telephone: (303) 298-5700

VISION SOLAR: Smith Telemarketing Suit Seeks to Certify Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
In the class action lawsuit captioned as STEWART SMITH; FRED
HEIDARPOUR, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, v. VISION SOLAR, LLC, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
and each of them, Case No. 2:20-cv-02185-MMB (E.D. Pa.), the
Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter an order:

   1. certifying the Solar Exchange Class under Fed. R. Civ. P.
      23(b)(2) and (3) defined as:

      "All persons within the United States who received a
      solicitation/telemarketing telephone call from Solar
      Exchange LLC to solicit Defendant’s services to said
      person’s cellular telephone with an "outbound" designation

      in the outbound dial list from November 18, 2019 to
      November 15, 2020;"

   2. certifying the Prerecord Injunction Class under Fed. R.
      Civ. P. 23(b)(2) defined as:

      "All persons within the United States who received any
      solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from
      Defendant's vendors to said person’s telephone made
      through the use of any artificial or prerecorded voice
      within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint;"

   3. apointing them as Class Representatives; and

   4. appointing their counsel as Class Counsel.

Vision Solar offers solar panel installation for homeowners across
Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.

dated Oct. 1, 2021 is available from PacerMonitor.com at
https://bit.ly/2YDy2lP at no extra charge.[CC]

The Attorneys for the Plaintiffs Stewart Smith, Fred Heidarpour,
and the putative Classes, are:

          Todd M. Friedman, Esq.
          LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
          21031 Venture Blvd, Ste. 340
          Woodland Hills, CA 91364
          E-mail: tfriedman@toddflaw.com

WILLIAM SCOVILLE: Ohio App. Affirms Summary Judgment in Uren Suit
-----------------------------------------------------------------
In the case, JAMES T. UREN, and JOSEPHINE KHOO-SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellees v. WILLIAM SCOVILLE, Individually and on
behalf of his IRA, et al., Defendants, and DAVID DAHOUD,
Defendant-Appellant, Appeal No. C-170438 (Ohio App.), the Court of
Appeals of Ohio for the First District, Hamilton County, affirms
the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas' grant of summary
judgment for the class on the cross-motions for summary judgment.

Background

The class-action lawsuit was filed in November 2014. According to
the amended complaint, nondefendants Glen Galemmo and his
affiliated entities perpetuated a criminal fraud by operating a
Ponzi scheme. Some persons and entities who invested money in that
scheme from January 1, 2002, to July 26, 2013, suffered a "net
loss," meaning "the funds invested exceeded the total of all funds
received in the form of purported income or return of principal."

The class of "net losers" sought to claw back money from several
named defendants, including Dahoud, on the theory that certain
transfers they received from Galemmo, a "debtor" under Ohio's
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, R.C. Chapter 1336, were in
violation of R.C. 1336.04(A)(1) and (2), resulting in "unjust
enrichment."

Among other things, the class alleged that Dahoud received
transfers of "cash or cash equivalents" from Galemmo during a time
period when Galemmo was "insolvent" that exceeded the sum of funds
Dahoud had deposited with Galemmo, without Galemmo receiving "any
reasonably equivalent value" in exchange. Further, the class
alleged the transfers to Dahoud were made "with the actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud the Class as creditors of Galemmo" and
that Dahoud had a "business relationship" with Galemmo "at the
time" of the subject transfers. Finally, the class alleged that
Galemmo had paid Dahoud "approximately 2% to 3% of $10 million of
investor's funds" for referring others to invest in Galemmo's
scheme.

In his answer, Dahoud denied all substantive allegations. The class
moved for summary judgment against Dahoud in October 2016. In
support, the class relied upon the affidavit of Brian P. O'Connor,
one of their attorneys, and certain exhibits attached to that
affidavit. The class contended these exhibits, coupled with the
stipulation concerning the business records of the banks, contained
the detailed facts establishing the class claims under the caselaw
related to Ponzi schemes and fraudulent transfers.

The counsel for the class explained the import of the business
record stipulation with respect to establishing the claims in the
context of a Ponzi scheme: "If you deposit this money, you get
credit for this. You withdrew this money, you get debited for this
amount."

Dahoud also moved for summary judgment. In support, Dahoud filed
his own affidavit with attached exhibits, and the affidavit of
expert Joseph B. Mansour with attached exhibits. Dahoud primarily
relied upon a legal argument, abandoned on appeal, that he could
not be subject to the claw-back claims because he believed he was,
by contract, only a "limited partner" in a specific Galemmo fund,
the Queen City Investment Fund II, LLC. Dahoud additionally took
the conclusory position that he had invested more with Galemmo than
he had withdrawn over the years.

Both parties opposed the other party's motion for summary judgment,
and also moved to strike the affidavits submitted by the opposition
in support of summary judgment. Dahoud then filed a reply in
support of summary judgment and a supplemental affidavit with
additional exhibits.

On Nov. 21, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motions. In
an entry dated Nov. 28, 2016, the trial court granted the class'
motion for summary judgment against Dahoud, entered a judgment
against Dahoud for $195,473 plus interests and costs, and denied
Dahoud's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court also ruled on
the pending motions to strike affidavits. In doing so, the court
denied Dahoud's motion to strike O'Connor's affidavit and granted
the class's motion to strike Dahoud's and Mansour's affidavits, but
noted that the later evidence was ineffective for summary-judgment
purposes even if considered.

Eventually, the claims against the other Defendants in the case
were resolved by way of settlement, dispositive motion, or trial.
The trial court then entered a final judgment disposing of all
claims. That July 11, 2017 judgment incorporated by reference the
prior orders appealed in this case. Dahoud filed a timely appeal
that this court consolidated with appeals filed by several other
defendants. The consolidated appeals were delayed by a bankruptcy
stay. That stay has been lifted and the appeals by the other
defendants have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
proceeds only on Dahoud's appeal.

Discussion

Generally, Dahoud's three assignments of error challenge the
court's resolution of the cross-motions for summary judgment and
the evidentiary rulings leading to that determination.

A. Class Carried Summary-Judgment Burden

Mr. Dahoud's first and second assignments of error are related. In
part, he contends the trial court erred when granting summary
judgment for the class because O'Connor's affidavit was not
sufficient to authenticate the attached exhibits. Dahoud maintains
that O'Connor lacked the personal knowledge to authenticate the
attached documents. The authenticity challenge is directed to
whether the affiant, O'Connor, sufficiently demonstrated the
attachments were true and accurate copies of what O'Connor
purported them to be; O'Connor was not swearing to the truth of the
underlying facts.

The Court of Appeals concludes that the trial court did not err by
considering the exhibits attached to O'Connor's affidavit as "true
and correct" copies that could be considered for summary-judgment
purposes. Thus, Dahoud has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court erred by granting summary judgment for the class because this
evidence was not authenticated.

B. Dahoud's Supplemental Affidavit and Attached Exhibits were
Insufficient

Mr. Dahoud additionally argues that the court erred by entering
summary judgment against him. To that end, he contends that his
supplemental affidavit tendered with his reply memorandum
introduced evidence of other transactions that should have been
taken into account when calculating his losses. This evidence, he
asserts, demonstrates that he would be a net loser, not a net
winner, even if the class could prove the class allegations that
Galemmo transferred funds to him during a Ponzi scheme.

Based on its review, the Court of Appeals concludes that none of
the evidence Dahoud submitted with his supplemental affidavit
demonstrates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as
to the class claims. Further, it concludes that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to
Dahoud, even when the evidence and stipulation is construed most
strongly in his favor. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirms the trial
court's entry of summary judgment for the class on the
cross-motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, it overrules the
first and second assignments of error.

C. No Error with Respect to Initial Dahoud and Mansour Affidavits

In his third and final assignment of error, Dahoud contends the
trial court erred in striking his initial affidavit in support of
summary judgment and that of his expert, Mansour. With respect to
this evidence, the trial court explained that even if it considered
the evidence, that evidence would not affect the court's analysis.
In other words, the evidence did not weigh on the existence or
absence of a material fact.

The Court of Appeals opines that a harmless evidentiary ruling is
not a ground for reversal. Dahoud has not demonstrated any
prejudice -- how the evidence, if considered, affected the trial
court's resolution of the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals overrules this assignment of
error.

Conclusion

In summary, the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the class on the cross-motions for summary
judgment. Judgment affirmed.

A full-text copy of the Court's Sept. 29, 2021 Opinion is available
at https://tinyurl.com/2ws4dzmp from Leagle.com.

Santen & Hughes, Brian P. O'Connor -- bpo@santenhughes.com -- and
Charles E. Reynolds -- cer@santenhughes.com -- for the
Plaintiffs-Appellees.

James R. Hartke -- info@hartkelaw.com -- for the
Defendant-Appellant.



                            *********

S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Class Action Reporter is a daily newsletter, co-published by
Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania,
USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.  Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L.
Toledo, Christopher G. Patalinghug, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2021. All rights reserved. ISSN 1525-2272.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The CAR subscription rate is $775 for six months delivered via
e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same
firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof
are $25 each. For subscription information, contact
Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.

                   *** End of Transmission ***